Humility and Human Flourishing : A Study in Analytic Moral Theology 019883022X, 9780198830221

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OXFORD STUDIES IN ANALYTIC THEOLOGY Series Editors Michael C. Rea Oliver D. Crisp

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O X F O R D S T U DI E S I N AN A L YT I C T H E OL OGY Analytic Theology utilizes the tools and methods of contemporary analytic philosophy for the purposes of constructive Christian theology, paying attention to the Christian tradition and development of doctrine. This innovative series of studies showcases high-quality, cutting-edge research in this area, in monographs and symposia. PUBLISHED TITLES INCLUDE:

Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God William Hasker The Theological Project of Modernism Faith and the Conditions of Mineness Kevin W. Hector The End of the Timeless God R. T. Mullins Ritualized Faith Essays on the Philosophy of Liturgy Terence Cuneo In Defense of Conciliar Christology A Philosophical Essay Timothy Pawl Atonement Eleonore Stump Humility, Pride, and Christian Virtue Theory Kent Dunnington

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Humility and Human Flourishing A Study in Analytic Moral Theology

MICHAEL W. AUSTIN

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Michael W. Austin 2018 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published in 2018 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2018941694 ISBN 978–0–19–883022–1 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

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This book is dedicated to Lewis Winkler, Dave Dishman, Terry McKinney, and Dave Leedy, good friends and mentors.

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Acknowledgments I have greatly benefitted from the help of many people, who offered their expertise and assistance to me as I worked on this volume. Thanks to Ian Church, Taya Cohen, Terence Cuneo, Trent Dougherty, Doug Geivett, Angela Knobel, Cristian Mihut, Christian Miller, Nancy Snow, James Spiegel, Rebecca Stangl, and two anonymous referees for Oxford University Press. Thanks as well to the staff at Oxford University Press, including Tom Perridge, Karen Raith, and the others who helped create the final product. Finally, many thanks go to my wife Dawn, and my daughters Haley, Emma, and Sophie, for the years of listening to me talk about the book, and for their encouragement and love. I am also grateful for the permission of the following publishers, allowing me to make use of my work contained in the following materials: “Is Humility a Virtue in the Context of Sport?” Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (2014): 203–14. Permission granted by WileyBlackwell. “Defending Humility: A Philosophical Sketch with Replies to Tara Smith and David Hume,” Philosophia Christi 14 (2012): 461–70. Permission granted by the journal. More information about the journal can be found at www.epsociety.org. “Christian Humility as a Social Virtue,” in Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology, Christian Miller, Angela Knobel, R. Michael Furr, and William Fleeson, eds (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 333–50. Permission granted by Oxford University Press. This volume was made possible through support of a grant from the Character Project at Wake Forest University and the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Character Project, Wake Forest University, or the John Templeton Foundation. I am grateful for the support.

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Contents 1. Philosophy, Theology, and Christian Virtue

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2. A Christian Account of Humility

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3. Theological and Philosophical Objections

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4. Humility and Human Flourishing

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5. Contemporary Applications

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6. Conclusion: Summary and a Brief Reflection on John 13

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Appendix: The Modules of Christian Humility Bibliography Scripture Index Index

225 227 240 242

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1 Philosophy, Theology, and Christian Virtue Humility is a complex, controversial, and misunderstood virtue. People conceive of the nature and value of this trait in a variety of ways. There are distinct and sometimes mutually inconsistent philosophical and theological accounts of this virtue. There are also different folk understandings of what humility is and what it requires. One common view of Christian humility is that it involves having a low view of oneself. On this view, the humble person has low self-esteem, and perhaps a very low regard for her interests. The humble person should not be assertive, but rather passive and submissive. I will argue that this view is mistaken, and contrasts in significant ways with a proper Christian conception of the virtue of humility. This diversity of opinion with respect to humility is perhaps reinforced by the fact that philosophers past and present have expressed skepticism concerning its status as a virtue. For example, humility does not have a place in Aristotle’s catalogue of the virtues. David Hume expresses deep skepticism about humility’s status as a virtue, and asserts that it is a moral vice. Contemporary philosopher Tara Smith argues that pride, and not humility, is a virtue.1 Within the Christian tradition, however, many take humility to play a central role in the moral and spiritual life. The virtue of humility is also emphasized in different parts of the Bible, sometimes quite strongly. In Numbers 12:3, the author states that “the man Moses was very humble, more so than anyone else on the face of the earth,” and subsequently records Yahweh’s confrontation of Aaron and Miriam for speaking against Moses. Humility is also a trait that God is said 1

I discuss the views of Hume and Smith in chapter 3.

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to reward (see Proverbs 22:4). In Micah 6:8, the author states “He has told you, O mortal, what is good; and what does the LORD require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?” Humility also appears in the gospels and many New Testament epistles. It is described as a trait that Jesus possesses and that his followers should exemplify.2 With respect to the meaning of humility, Stephen Pardue observes that while it is clear that this trait is commended in both the Hebrew Bible and Judaism more broadly, the definition of it is less clear.3 He notes that some take the Hebrew Bible to associate humility with humiliation, while others dispute this and contend instead that humility involves recognizing one’s dependence on God, submitting to God, and service to others. In the Jewish tradition, humility is taken to be an important trait for relating to God and others, including a recognition of one’s own intellectual limitations and being humble in one’s actions.4 Pardue also notes that those who espouse a Christian understanding of humility in the New Testament and the early Christian tradition “renovate humility in light of Jesus’ life and death, transposing the rich Jewish tradition regarding the virtue and its social, political, and theological implications into a Christocentric key.”5 This renovated notion of humility plays a significant role in the Christian narrative, culminating in the person and work of Christ. It is developed in the New Testament as a central virtue for piety and for hope in the eschaton.6 For example, humility is seen as important for one’s relationship to God, insofar as “God opposes the proud, but gives grace to the humble” (James 4:6). Humility also appears in some of the New Testament virtue lists (Colossians 3:11–13; Ephesians 4:1–3). It is seen as a product of wisdom (James 3:13). The humility of Christ is evident in the gospels. Jesus is reported as ascribing humility to himself in Matthew 11:28–30, where he describes himself as “humble in heart.” He exemplifies humility when he washes the feet of his disciples (John 13:1–20). The apostle Paul urges the Philippian church to imitate the humility of Christ in their relationships with one another, following the pattern displayed by Jesus in his incarnation 2 For example, see Matthew 11:29, Colossians 3:12, Ephesians 4:2, 1 Peter 5:5–6, Philippians 2:1–11, and James 4:10. 3 Stephen T. Pardue, The Mind of Christ: Humility and the Intellect in Early Christian Theology (New York, NY: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2013), pp. 31–5. 4 5 See Sirach 3:17–31. Pardue, The Mind of Christ, p. 35. 6 ibid. p. 38.

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and crucifixion (Philippians 2:1–11). I engage with much of this biblical material in more detail later in the book. At present, my point is merely that humility appears in many places in both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament. As the Christian tradition continued, many Christian thinkers devoted attention to the virtue of humility. Augustine, for example, holds that love is perfected in humility.7 In humility, we realize our weakness, we come to see who and what we are, and in dependence on God we also see that by grace we are nevertheless loved and capable of virtue. Humility, then, is not only concerned with our limitations, but also with God empowering us to transcend many of them in particular ways, by grace.8 For Aquinas, humility is primarily concerned with subjecting oneself to God, which is clearly vital for the human realization of the beatific vision (partially now, fully in the hereafter).9 He maintains that humility also involves subjecting ourselves to other human persons as appropriate, and that it includes knowledge of one’s deficiencies. Christian monastics such as Bernard of Clairvaux, Benedict, Bonaventure, and John Cassian also take humility to be a virtue of central importance, and focus on its formation within monastic communities.10 Benedict contends that the humble person should be convinced that he is (in some sense) worse than everyone else.11 Saint Gregory the Great holds that “humility is the guardian of virtue.”12 7 Augustine, The Trinity Book IV, chs 1–2. See also Book VIII, ch. 7 and Book IV, ch. 4; and City of God, Book XIV, ch. 13. 8 Some of our creaturely limitations are to be transcended, but others not. For example, God empowers us to transcend our selfishness, but not our finitude. For more on the empowering aspects of humility for Augustine, see Pardue, The Mind of Christ, pp. 145–58. 9 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIaIIae.161. 10 Saint Benedict, The Rule of Benedict (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2008); Bernard of Clairvaux, The Steps of Humility and Pride (Trappist, KY: Cistercian Publications, 1973); Bonaventure, Bonaventure: The Soul’s Journey into God, The Tree of Life, The Life of St. Francis (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1978); John Cassian, Conferences of John Cassian, Conference 14, ch. 10. 11 Benedict, The Rule of Benedict, p. 25. 12 Saint Gregory the Great, “On the Gospel (Homily 7),” http://www.lectionarycentral. com/advent4/GregoryGreat.html. Gregory is considered a saint in both the Roman and Eastern Orthodox traditions. Eastern Orthodox theologian Saint John Climacus extols humility as follows: “The sun lights up everything visible. Likewise, humility is the source of everything done according to reason. Where there is no light, all is in darkness. Where there is no humility, all is rotten.” See Saint John Climacus, “On Humility (Step 25),” Ladder of Divine Ascent http://www.fatheralexander.org/booklets/english/vainglory_ ladder_climacus.htm#_Toc530064365.

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Teresa of Avila writes “so long as we are on this earth, nothing matters more to us than humility.”13 In seventeenth-century England, several Protestant theologians conceive of humility as the “chief attribute of their religion.”14 In the late nineteenth century, South African Dutch Reformed pastor Andrew Murray extols humility as “the only root from which the graces can grow, the one indispensable condition of true fellowship with Jesus.”15 Twentieth-century Roman Catholic philosopher and theologian Dietrich von Hildebrand maintains that humility is the “fountainhead of all specifically human virtues.”16 Contemporary philosopher Paul Copan claims that Jesus exemplified humility in his incarnation and crucifixion, and that it is a crucial virtue with respect to our worship of God. Copan argues that humility involves a realistic assessment of oneself, including one’s weaknesses and one’s strengths.17 Pardue offers a definition of humility as “a long term tendency to recognize and embrace creaturely limits in such a way that, by the working of divine grace, those limits are surpassed and expanded over time.”18 Others could be alluded to, and there is more to say about these accounts of humility, but my point at present is that humility is both studied and taken to be a vital Christian virtue by a variety of Christian thinkers across denominations, times, and cultures. While humility holds a significant place in both Scripture and Christian thought, and its value is proclaimed in both, it is clear that there is some disagreement on the nature of this virtue.19 An examination of a key biblical term translated as “humility” can be 13 St. Teresa of Avila, Interior Castle, trans. E. Allison Peers (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008), p. 24. 14 Kari Konkola, “Have We Lost Humility?” Humanitas (2005): 183. Numerous examples from this time period are illustrative of the prominence of humility in the works of its theologians (many of them bestsellers at the time). For example, in The Whole Duty of Man (1658), Richard Allestree takes humility to be the most important Christian virtue and discusses it at length. 15 Andrew Murray, Humility (Bloomington, MN: Bethany House Publishers, 2001), p. 12. 16 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Humility: Wellspring of Virtue (Manchester, NH: Sophia Institute Press, 1997), p. 5. 17 Paul Copan, “Divine Narcissism? A Further Defense of God’s Humility,” Philosophia Christi 8 (2006): 313–25. Humility does not necessarily include a recognition of weakness or limitation, according to Copan, but merely an accurate self-assessment. This is why God can be humble, on his view. 18 Pardue, The Mind of Christ, p. 158. 19 Josef Pieper agrees, and notes that “the notion of humility has become blurred even in the Christian consciousness.” See his The Four Cardinal Virtues (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 189.

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helpful, but is not in and of itself sufficient for the clarity we need to understand this trait. Tapeinophrosune is translated as “humility,” but it can also be translated as “lowliness of mind.”20 This term, and most of its cognates in both the Hebrew Bible and New Testament, can be interpreted as describing something that is needed for a proper relationship with God and other human beings.21 In spite of its significance and prevalence in the history of Christian thought, many contemporary Christian reference works are either silent or quite limited concerning humility.22 However, humility is receiving renewed attention from some popular religious authors.23 In addition, in the wake of the revival of virtue ethics in philosophy, some contemporary analytic philosophers have turned to an analysis of individual virtues, including courage, compassion, and forgiveness.24 There is also a renewed interest among some of these philosophers regarding the nature and value of humility. Some of these contemporary treatments of the virtue of humility are explicitly theological, but in general this is not the case. Some offer a naturalized version of this virtue that has long been associated in the minds of many with Christian theism, rather than atheism or philosophical naturalism.25 Erik Wielenberg, for instance, argues that there is a naturalistic version of humility that corresponds to Christian humility.26 Others conflate humility with modesty.27 The primary aims of this book, then, include an explanation, defense, and application of a Christian account of the moral virtue of humility. I do not engage in an exhaustive linguistic study of “humility” and its cognate terms in the Scriptures, nor do I attempt 20 Verlyn Verbrugge, New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, abridged edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), p. 555. 21 ibid. I examine this term in more detail in chapter 2. 22 See Konkola, “Have We Lost Humility?” for a survey of such works which supports this claim. 23 See C. J. Mahaney, Humility: True Greatness (Colorado Springs, CO: Multnomah Books, 2005); and John Dickson, Humilitas: A Lost Key to Life, Love, and Leadership (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011). 24 See Clifford Williams, ed., Personal Virtues (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 25 For example, see G. Alex Sinha, “Modernizing the Virtue of Humility,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2012): 259–74. 26 Erik J. Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 102–16. 27 On this see Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Faith and Humility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), chapter 8.

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a fully comprehensive biblical or historical treatment. All of these elements are present in the following study of humility, however, in which I apply the methods of analytic philosophy to the field of moral theology in order to analyze a Christian conception of this virtue. This book, then, is best characterized as a work of analytic moral theology.28 In the next section, I describe what this means.

ANALYTIC MORAL THEOLOGY In order to understand the nature of analytic moral theology, consider Michael Rea’s description of analytic theology as “the activity of approaching theological topics with the ambitions of an analytic philosopher and in a style that conforms to the prescriptions that are distinctive of analytic philosophical discourse.”29 The ambitions of the analytic philosopher include identifying the scope and limit of our epistemic powers as well as constructing a true explanatory theory in some area of philosophical inquiry. The analytic theologian has the same ambitions in an area of theological inquiry. As Rea characterizes them, the prescriptions of analytic philosophy include a style of writing in which philosophical argumentation is made up of formalized and logically manipulable sentences; the prioritization of precision, clarity, and logical coherence; the avoidance of the nondecorative use of metaphor; the employment of primitive concepts or concepts that can be analyzed in such terms, when possible; and the belief that conceptual analysis can serve as a source of evidence.30 Along these lines, Oliver Crisp states that: analytic theology, like contemporary analytic philosophy, involves the use of certain tools like logic to make sense of theological issues, where metaphysical concerns are central. And like analytic philosophy, analytic theology will prize intellectual virtues like clarity, parsimony of expression, 28 It could also be called “Christian moral philosophy” or “philosophical moral theology” while still capturing what I take to be distinctive about this approach. I have chosen “analytic moral theology” given recent developments in what is called “analytic theology.” I discuss this in the section, “Some Objections to Analytic Moral Theology.” 29 Michael Rea, “Introduction,” Analytic Theology, Oliver Crisp and Michael Rea, eds (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 7. 30 ibid. pp. 5–6.

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and argumentative rigour. It will also, where appropriate, seek to deal with complex doctrinal concerns by dividing them into more manageable units, or focusing on providing a clear expression of theological terms that inform particular doctrines in important respects . . . analytic theology is about redeploying tools already in the service of philosophy to a theological end.31

Analytic moral theology, then, involves approaching theological topics where moral concerns are central with the ambitions of an analytic philosopher, prizing particular intellectual virtues, and using the analytic style of discourse. Applying analytic methodology to topics of theological significance is nothing new. For instance, a significant body of work in philosophical theology has emerged in recent years dealing with central Christian doctrines such as the Incarnation and the Trinity using the methods of analytic philosophy. However, in recent years comparatively little has been done in the field of moral theology using those methods. Many scholars are engaged in some form of moral theology, but comparatively few of them make use of the methods and tools of analytic philosophy in their work.32 Analytic methodology is certainly not the only methodology we should employ, but much progress has been made in advancing a Christian understanding of God by this methodology via its application to doctrines such as the Incarnation and the Trinity. Similarly, I believe that there is great potential for progress in our understanding and application of concepts in Christian moral theology if we approach the field with analytic ambitions and style. This is not to belittle or question the significance of the moral reflection that has been done and is being done by biblical scholars, theologians, or others using non-analytic methodologies. Rather, the aim is to bring some underutilized tools to bear on Christian moral theology. More specifically, my aim in this book is in part to achieve greater clarity and depth with respect to our understanding of the Christian virtue of humility. Such moral knowledge is both theoretically significant and practically useful, as will become clear in the pages that follow. 31 Oliver Crisp, “On Analytic Theology,” in Analytic Theology, Crisp and Rea, eds, pp. 38–9. 32 For examples of such work, see Cristian Mihut, “Change of Heart: Forgiveness, Resentment, and Empathy,” Philosophia Christi 14 (2012): 109–24; Robert C. Roberts, Spiritual Emotions: A Psychology of Christian Virtues (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007); and a special issue of the journal Faith and Philosophy dealing with virtues and virtue theories from a Christian perspective; see Faith and Philosophy 15:4 (1998).

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Humility and Human Flourishing SOME OBJECTIONS TO ANALYTIC MORAL THEOLOGY

Given the nature and contemporary practice of analytic philosophy, one might be concerned about applying its methods to theological and existentially important issues concerning Christian morality and human fulfillment. There are several concerns here. Perhaps it is unrealistic for analytically trained philosophers to do theology, given what is required to do it well. In addition, the tendency of analytic philosophy to focus on theory rather than practice poses a problem for doing moral theology with analytic philosophical methods, given that theology for many has an essentially practical element. Others may object that the practice of analytic moral theology is not conducive to moral and spiritual growth. It is to these types of worries that I now turn. William Abraham describes a potential objection to the practice of analytic theology that can be raised from within the field of theology, namely, that it is unrealistic for analytically trained philosophers to engage in it well, given the variety of fields that are involved in doing theology well: ancient and modern languages, the historical study of the Scriptures, church history, and familiarity with other disciplines such as sociology and psychology.33 This is perhaps especially troubling for someone engaging in an analytic study of the virtue of humility, because the charge of hubris seems appropriate to the one who assumes that she has the requisite mastery of the relevant fields. In reply to this concern, Marc Cortez agrees that it is unrealistic to expect a philosopher to master all of the relevant disciplines that theologians draw upon in their work.34 However, he also points out that there is a question of fairness here. Theologians do not meet these (unrealistic) standards; they do not master all of the relevant disciplines and methods of study. Rather, they specialize and depend on others to help them fill in the gaps. So while it is important to be sufficiently equipped for the task of theological study, those who take an analytic approach are in the same boat, i.e., they bring a variety of disciplines to

33 William J. Abraham, “Turning Philosophical Water into Theological Wine,” Journal of Analytic Theology 1 (2013): 2–16. Abraham describes but does not offer a reply to this objection. 34 Marc Cortez, “As Much As Possible: Essentially Contested Concepts and Analytic Theology: A Response to William J. Abraham,” Journal of Analytic Theology 1 (2013): 17–24.

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bear on the issues that are of special concern to them, and ideally collaborate with others to help them when they venture outside their areas of specialization. Such collaboration will take different forms, but it is needed in an era of academic specialization. Philosophers who engage in analytic theology can derive an important lesson here, apart from accepting the need for collaboration. They should come to see that theology, like philosophy, has a deep and rich history that must not be ignored by the philosopher who seeks to engage in theological study with the tools of analytic philosophy. As Abraham puts it, “Imagine a theologian showing up and offering to do philosophy without serious immersion in the whole history of philosophy (ancient, medieval, and modern), and without first-order work in epistemology, normative ethics, metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of language.”35 This goes the other way, too. Philosophers must familiarize themselves with the relevant issues and historical developments concerning the particular theological concepts they are interested in analyzing. It is realistic to expect that philosophers who take part in the analytic theological enterprise will immerse themselves in the historical and contemporary theological literature to a significant degree. They should show serious concern for and attention to the historical development of the relevant doctrines as well as the most significant discussions of the biblical texts related to the theological issues they are examining. Another reason that some may have for being skeptical about the enterprise of analytic moral theology has to do with the emphasis on metatheoretical rather than substantive issues present in contemporary analytic philosophy. Metatheoretical questions are important, but if the analytic moral theologian neglects substantive theological issues, then this is problematic. In his book, Reason in Faith: On the Relevance of Christian Spirituality for Philosophy,36 Adriaan Peperzak observes that contemporary philosophy can be “overly-reflective” insofar as the substantive questions philosophers ask end up being an afterthought. Prior to addressing these questions, philosophers “are tempted to devote ample time to defining the problem, determining the methodological requirements for a possible answer, and critically evaluating previous approaches. Such metatheoretical Abraham, “Turning Philosophical Water into Theological Wine,” p. 4. Adriaan Peperzak, Reason in Faith: On the Relevance of Christian Spirituality for Philosophy (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1999). 35 36

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considerations can captivate us for so long that we have no time or energy left for the questions themselves.”37 Related to these preoccupations is “the stagnant formalism of our anthropological, ethical, and metaphysical considerations, particularly in philosophy.”38 One worry here is that the practice of analytic theology will lead to a focus on metatheoretical concerns, and a neglect of substantive issues. While metatheoretical considerations are part of the motivation for doing analytic moral theology, a focus on them is not an end in itself. Rather, when such a focus occurs it is a means to the end of not only moral knowledge, but also the formation of moral character. I will return to this later in the book. At present, the point is that analytic moral theology, as I conceive of it, should ultimately include a significant focus on the questions themselves: What is the aim of the moral life, for the Christian? What is humility? What is compassion, and how can it be cultivated? How is virtue relevant to medicine? Should Christians endorse pacifism? In what sense is Jesus Christ a moral exemplar? These and many other questions that concern practical moral concerns are proper topics for study using the methods and concerns of analytic moral theology. Peperzak also observes that “many philosophers seem to have cut the ties between their life and their reflection,” even though “their pre-reflective engagements play an important role in the unfolding of their thoughts.”39 If this separation of the practical from the theoretical is a necessary part of the practice of analytic methods, then we should be wary of this, given the potential for hypocrisy as well as pride yielded by theoretical accomplishments when the fruit of such accomplishments is rarely (if ever) applied to everyday life. The proper response to this problem is to intentionally make and preserve connections between one’s life and one’s scholarly reflections. I see nothing within analytic methodology that entails a bifurcation between one’s everyday life and one’s scholarship. There is potential for both hypocrisy and pride, but the proper response is to safeguard one’s integrity and seek the integration of theory and practice, not to abandon theoretical reflection. The analytic moral theologian ought to make connections between her reflection and her own daily life when this is feasible, not only to avoid hypocrisy and pride, but also to produce scholarship that will be useful for dealing

37

ibid. p. 26.

38

ibid. p. 28.

39

ibid. p. viii.

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with issues concerning morality and character in everyday life. This is one reason, among many, for engaging in analytic moral theology. A final objection to be considered here is closely connected with the foregoing one. It might be objected that analytic moral theology is not conducive to moral and spiritual formation (perhaps because of its formalism or its focus on theoretical concerns). William Wood considers this sort of objection to analytic theology, noting that genuine theology is essentially practical. It fosters, or at least seeks to foster, greater love for God and others, and is connected with the various Christian sacraments and spiritual disciplines.40 The objection is that analytic theology (for our purposes this includes analytic moral theology) does not exhibit these traits. It is impractical, “spiritually sterile,”41 and therefore does not count as genuine theology. Wood goes on to consider Michael Rea’s reply to this sort of worry. Rea contends that the aim of both philosophy and theology should be “clarifying, systematizing, and model-building.”42 They should not attempt to produce a “self-contained body of wisdom”43 aimed at spiritual or moral growth, as this would act as a rival to Scripture. For wisdom and moral improvement, Rea advises turning to the Scriptures rather than the work of philosophers or theologians. Wood thinks that Rea gives too much away here. He contends that analytic theology can be approached as a spiritual practice aimed at cultivating virtue, including the virtue of love for God. I agree. While Rea is correct that Scripture is central for the task of spiritual growth, it is also true that one can make use of the fruit of analytic moral theology (and other sources of knowledge) as a supplement to the Bible. Just as some think of philosophy as the handmaiden of theology, I think that some of the fruits of analytic moral theology may be employed in this context as a handmaiden of the Scriptures, rather than a rival to them and certainly not as a self-contained body of wisdom. Analytic moral theology can be spiritually and morally fruitful. It can be approached as a spiritual practice, if we possess the appropriate attitude and employ it in pursuit of appropriate ends.44 Wood points out that analytic theologizing can be done for the sake of union 40 William Wood, “Analytic Theology as a Way of Life,” Journal of Analytic Theology 2 (2014): 43–60. 41 42 43 ibid. p. 45. Rea, “Introduction,” p. 19. ibid. 44 For more on this, see Wood, “Analytic Theology as a Way of Life.” Wood discusses the ways in which philosophical theology can function as a spiritual practice that nourishes the soul.

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with God. One can produce or study analytic theology as a way of drawing closer to God via a deeper knowledge of the character of God. It can also lead to the acquisition of moral knowledge which is essential for moral formation. Such knowledge is important for the Christian with respect to humility because it is helpful for her to know what she is aiming at as she seeks to cultivate and grow in this virtue. Is humility a self-regarding virtue? Is it also other-regarding? Does humility require that she always downplay her accomplishments? Does humility involve self-denigration, or does it merely require giving credit where credit is due? How is humility related to other virtues, such as faith, hope, or love? The answers to such questions are important, because they will guide one’s pursuit of this Christian virtue, and this will have an impact on one’s character. A Christian understanding of moral improvement will not ultimately rest on the insights offered by Christian philosophers and theologians. Rather, it will ultimately rest on the love, grace, and activity of God in the life of the believer, as well as her understanding of and response to Scripture. But there are other sources of moral and religious knowledge that are applicable to moral and spiritual growth. As Wood points out, who is to say what can be indirectly valuable to one’s spiritual life? Given God’s freedom to offer his grace as he chooses, it is wrong (and perhaps incoherent) to maintain that analytic theology cannot be spiritually nourishing.45 In light of this, the model of humility I offer here, insofar as it clarifies and systematizes our understanding of Christian humility and considers the many ways in which it is relevant to everyday life, can be used as a supplement to the Scriptures to aid the believer in her pursuit of humility, wisdom, and a flourishing Christian life. As I analyze the Christian virtue of humility, the foregoing considerations both motivate and inform my approach.

THE APPROACH In this introductory chapter, it will be useful to discuss briefly some of the other relevant features of my approach to articulating and defending a Christian account of the virtue of humility. I take philosophical

45

ibid. pp. 46–7.

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reasoning and argumentation in the analytic style to be a useful method for acquiring knowledge, as was described above in my discussion of analytic moral theology. I employ an analytic approach as I interact with a variety of sources—biblical, theological, philosophical, and empirical—in order to develop, defend, and apply a Christian account of humility. First, it is important to note that my focus throughout the book is, unless otherwise explicitly stated (or when I am summarizing the views of others concerning humility), a Christian form of the moral virtue of humility. Given this, the explanation and defense of a Christian account of humility I offer here assumes the truth of Christian theism. That is, I am interested in how we ought to conceive of humility, on Christian theism. But of course one need not accept Christian theism to find my study of humility useful. Just as I have found naturalistic studies of humility to be of interest,46 my hope is that those who do not affirm Christian theism will find the arguments of this book of interest. As will become evident, there is some overlap between my account of humility and some non-theological accounts. Second, I make use of the Bible as a text for philosophical analysis, given that I am articulating and defending a Christian account of humility.47 Consistent with the aims and scope of the project, I take the Bible to be a potential source of knowledge, though I do not argue for this view. I also assume the Bible’s normativity for Christian theory and practice, without addressing other important issues related to it. For instance, there are many ways of understanding the nature of divine inspiration as it relates to Scripture, and many issues concerning authorship, dates of writing, and the reliability of the texts.48 Here, I will not defend a particular position with respect to these issues. Rather, I merely seek to engage the content of some of the most relevant portions of Scripture for articulating a Christian account of humility. However, in my appropriation of the biblical texts, I take a broadly ecumenical approach, drawing from classic and contemporary sources, Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and a variety of Protestant traditions. 46 For example, see Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe, pp. 102–12. 47 I will be using the Protestant canon. 48 For a discussion of many of these issues by contemporary philosophical theologians, see Michael Rea, ed., Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, Volume II: Providence, Scripture, and Resurrection (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), chapters 6–14.

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The conception of humility I offer is Christological, insofar as it is grounded in the gospel accounts of the life of Christ and other portions of the New Testament that are relevant to understanding this virtue as exemplified by Jesus. It is also dependent upon particular theological interpretations of these texts and doctrines. This approach is a product of the conviction that the foundations of Christian ethics must be Christological foundations; or, to put it more simply, Christian ethics must arise from the person of Jesus Christ. Otherwise it could not be Christian ethics in the most important sense of the term.49 Given this, an analysis of Christian humility must centrally include an analysis of the humility of Christ as it is described in both the Christian scriptures and Christian theology. I will interact with many of the theological and philosophical treatments of humility that are on offer from prominent historical figures. However, my primary aim is not historical, insofar as I am not delving into accounts of Augustine, Aquinas, or others in order to give a comprehensive historical analysis of how humility has been understood. I will interact with select historical accounts in order to construct and clarify my account, but my primary intent is not to offer a historical treatment of this virtue. As I develop and defend my account of humility, I will also draw from relevant empirical data. Such data can be useful for particular questions in both moral philosophy and moral theology. For instance, the plausibility of philosophical and theological accounts of character traits and their connections to human flourishing can be enhanced or undermined by empirical data, because the subject matter is not merely conceptual. The application of such accounts to the everyday lives of human beings will have empirical elements, and empirical data may increase or decrease the level of justification that exists for claims included in these accounts. I therefore make use of empirical data regarding humility in my argument that it is an important virtue for human flourishing, understood within the framework of Christian theism. As we will see, humility plays a prominent role in one contemporary psychological model of personality structure, the HEXACO model.50 In addition, I make use of empirical studies 49 This is a modification of a quotation from Oliver Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994): “The foundations of Christian ethics must be evangelical foundations; or, to put it more simply, Christian ethics must arise from the gospel of Jesus Christ. Otherwise it could not be Christian ethics” (p. 11). 50 Michael Ashton and Kibeom Lee, “Empirical, Theoretical, and Practical Advantages of the HEXACO Model of Personality Structure,” Personality and Social

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concerning the virtue of humility as it relates to religiosity, leadership, prosocial behaviors, emotional well-being, and its connections with other virtues like honesty and generosity. Another important element of the approach I employ in this study is my placement of this trait within a Christian form of virtue ethics. Christian theism offers a way of life in which morality plays an essential role. Christianity is not merely about ethics, but it does essentially include ethics. Many of the contemporary social debates and discussions of ethics in the context of religion tend to focus on social issues, rather than on the more general notion of a morally excellent character. And yet it is arguably the case that character is the fundamental ethical concern from a Christian perspective. Moral principles, actions, and the consequences of our actions are important. However, Christianity is centrally focused on the redemption of persons, which entails the redemption of their moral and intellectual character. More specifically, the Christian is to exemplify, in some analogous sense, the character traits that Jesus exemplified. Virtues such as patience, hope, love, compassion, forgiveness, and humility are essential for a flourishing Christian life, i.e., the abundant life that Christ came to give (John 10:10). Moreover, 2 Peter 1 encourages followers of Christ to become “participants of the divine nature,” which is said to involve faith, moral excellence, knowledge, selfcontrol, perseverance, godliness, brotherly kindness, and love. With this in mind, the study of humility I engage in here is situated within the normative ethical theory of virtue ethics. More specifically, the moral framework within which my development and defense of humility is set is a Christian virtue ethics. It will be helpful, then, to summarize briefly a few of the main components of this normative framework. On virtue ethics, character is fundamental, rather than some moral law or the consequences of actions. This is not to say that moral rules and consequences are unimportant. But they are not foundational in the way that character is on a virtue ethical approach. In his argument for the claim that a virtue-based approach to the moral life is promising as a Christian approach, Joseph Kotva draws from Psychology Review 11 (2007): 150–66. See also http://hexaco.org/ for an overview of the HEXACO model (so called because it includes the claim that there are six major dimensions of human personality). This is not a Christian form of humility, though there is significant overlap between the HEXACO conception and the one I defend.

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both Christian thought and neo-Aristotelian virtue theory in order to construct a Christian case for virtue ethics.51 As Kotva describes it, a virtue ethic (based on Aristotle and Aquinas) is teleological, insofar as it includes the claims that there is a human nature and a proper end or telos for human persons. A teleological virtue ethic will include certain prescriptions concerning the exercise of the virtues, as well as the belief that the virtues themselves are a part of the human telos. It is also crucial that on such a view, the human good is not merely individual; it is also social. It involves relationships with others. On a Christian view, it is not only relationships with other humans that matter, but with the divine as well. On the version of Christian virtue ethics that I employ (but do not argue for) in this book, the human telos includes a communal union with and likeness to God. Virtues such as patience, faith, hope, love, compassion, and humility help us to achieve this telos and are partially constitutive of it. A virtue is an excellence of character that is aimed at some good end involving dispositions, beliefs, desires, emotions, will, and action.52 Virtues are both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable. A virtuous person is a good person, worthy of admiration and emulation.53 So the more of these virtues that one possesses and practices, the more deeply one will experience shalom—well-being, inner harmony, wholeness, and a flourishing relationship with God, others, and the rest of creation.54 In addition, Jesus is the primary Christian moral exemplar, the perfect embodiment of the human telos. The virtues are excellences of character that are perfectly exemplified by Jesus Christ. Christians will not fully achieve conformity to

51 Much of what follows is drawn from Joseph Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1996). For a fuller account of a Christian virtue ethics, see especially chapters 4–5 of Kotva’s book. 52 I will not address the debate surrounding the situationist challenge to virtue ethics, though I think there are several possible replies that are consistent with a Christian understanding of virtue and human nature. See Diana Fleming, “The Character of Virtue: Answering the Situationist Challenge to Virtue Ethics,” Ratio 19 (2006): 24–42; Nancy Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010); and Christian Miller, Character and Moral Psychology (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014). 53 See Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 10–15; and Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 59–84. 54 On shalom, see David H. Stern, Jewish New Testament Commentary (Clarksville, MD: Jewish New Testament Publications, 1992), pp. 39, 107, and 200–1.

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Christ in this life, but believe that by God’s grace they can make significant progress. It is important to emphasize that a virtue ethical approach to morality is not reducible to mere rules, because treating virtues as moral rules can lead to confusion. This is not to deny that rules can be useful. However, on virtue ethics moral rules are often rules of thumb based on previous experiences and decisions that exemplified wisdom. As Kotva puts it, rules “provide a reference point of previous good judgments.”55 These rules can be overridden if the circumstances require it. Because of this, the definition of humility I give in this book cannot be reduced to a rule or moral principle that one must always follow. A proper appreciation of this fact will prevent much potential misunderstanding that is a product of what Kotva calls “the enlightenment’s legacy,” which “is a vision of ethics that seeks formal elegance and an almost geometric clarity [involving] impartiality, universality, systematization, and a deductive calculus.”56 This legacy contrasts with ethics as they are found in the Christian scriptures and Christian theology. For Kotva, Scripture and theology exemplify a “messy complexity”57 and are subjective insofar as they are prudential relative to one’s particular circumstances. Nevertheless, we can still profit from an analysis of individual virtues, such as humility. The salient point is that the definition and analysis of humility offered in the pages that follow is not a virtue ethical analog to the categorical imperative or principle of utility. Even though I employ an analytic approach, which has some features in common with the Enlightenment’s legacy criticized by Kotva, there will still be concerns related to individual circumstances that inform the ways in which humility is (or is not) relevant and its possible applications. An analytic approach to the nature, value, and application of the virtue of humility will be fruitful, but not in the way that an understanding and application of the principle of utility is fruitful.58 However, the approach I employ does include the belief that there is a degree of impartiality, systematization, and universality that may be achieved via the application of some of the methods of analytic philosophy to the study of moral theology, including the study of the virtue of humility.

55 57

56 Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, p. 35. ibid. p. 157. 58 ibid. These issues are discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.

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Finally, I take it that whatever else it includes, being a follower of Christ includes the imitation of Christ motivated by both the love of God and one’s love for God. Following Christ essentially includes seeking to imitate Christ as one means of conformity to Christ and experiencing a deeper union with him. The follower of Christ seeks to (analogically) think, feel, and act as she imagines Jesus would were he in her particular circumstances, consistent with his teachings and example.59 The moral virtue of humility is central to the character of Christ, as we will see. Given this, it is of central importance for union with and likeness to Christ.

OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK In this study, I articulate, defend, and consider several applications of a Christian account of the virtue of humility. In Chapter 2 I explain and offer an initial defense of a Christian conception of humility that is biblically grounded, theologically informed, and philosophically sound. I interact with the views of several philosophers and theologians who have offered a variety of accounts of the virtue of humility. While I do not engage in a comprehensive overview of every account of humility that is on offer, I reference and discuss other views, both classic and contemporary, as I explain and defend the account I favor. In Chapter 3, I consider several objections to my account, both to offer a defense against such objections and to develop my view further in dialogue with alternative perspectives concerning the nature and value of humility. I first consider three theological objections that could be raised against my account of humility. Next, I answer several philosophical objections to my account of humility. I conclude that none of these objections are successful. In Chapter 4 I explore several ways in which humility is conducive to human flourishing. I claim that humility is rational, benefits its possessor, and contributes to its possessor being good qua human.

59 I discuss this more fully in chapter 3. For a defense of the claim that Christians ought to seek to imitate Christ, see Klaus Issler, “Jesus’ Example: Prototype of the Dependent, Spirit-Filled Life,” in Jesus in Trinitarian Perspective: An Introductory Christology, ed. Fred Sanders and Klaus Issler (Nashville, TN: B & H Academic, 2007), pp. 189–225.

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I also show how humility plays a variety of positive roles with respect to the other virtues, undermines the vice of pride, and plays a key role in the process of theosis (a particular view of Christian moral and spiritual growth). In Chapter 5, I consider how the Christian virtue of humility is applicable to issues in personal and social ethics. This chapter demonstrates several ways in which humility can be robustly action-guiding. This constitutes a strong piece of evidence against the persistent objection to virtue ethics that it fails to provide such guidance. First, I examine some of the ways in which humility is relevant to several of the classic spiritual disciplines, such as prayer, fasting, solitude, silence, and service. Next, I consider humility’s relevance to issues related to religious pluralism and tolerance. I then discuss a variety of ways in which humility is essential for a flourishing family life. I conclude the chapter by arguing that humility is a virtue in the context of sport. Finally, I conclude the book with a summary of its main points and a brief meditation on the portion of John’s gospel in which Jesus washes the feet of his disciples. I have also included an appendix listing the modules of humility I describe in chapter 2, which is intended to be a helpful reference tool for reading subsequent chapters of the book. It is to an initial explanation of Christian humility and an analysis of these modules that we now turn.

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2 A Christian Account of Humility In this chapter, I offer an analysis of a Christian conception of the moral virtue of humility, applying the methods of analytic philosophy to the field of moral theology for the sake of developing and defending a thick understanding of this important virtue. With this aim in mind, in what follows I make use of biblical texts, theology, philosophy, and some relevant empirical data. Perhaps most importantly, the account I develop is Christological, insofar as it is grounded in the gospel accounts of the life of Christ and other portions of the New Testament that are relevant to understanding humility as it is exemplified by Jesus in these texts. As I stated in chapter 1, Christian ethics must arise from the person of Jesus Christ. Given this, a Christian understanding of the moral virtue of humility must arise from an analysis of the humility of Jesus. First, consider a common understanding of the virtue of humility, which includes the claim that it involves having a low view of one’s self. What does it mean to have such a view? Some contend that the humble person thinks that neither she nor her accomplishments are worth very much.1 The humble person will be hesitant to take risks, eschew ambition, and have relatively low aspirations because of her low self-esteem or self-regard. The humble individual will deflect and perhaps reject any praise of her character, accomplishments, and talents. Humility, so understood—if it involves certain unreasonable forms of devaluing one’s self, of underestimating one’s own abilities and worth—is problematic, for reasons that will be made clear in what follows. 1 For example, see Tara Smith’s criticism of humility in “The Practice of Pride,” in Personal Virtues, ed. Clifford Williams (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 90–116.

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Many within the Christian tradition espouse views of humility that include having a low view of one’s self, in some sense. Whether or not these views are problematic depends on whether or not they include a devaluing or underestimation of one’s self. It is one thing to have a low view of one’s self because one is sinful, but it is quite another to see one’s self as lacking the value one has as an image-bearer of God or to underestimate one’s positive qualities. With respect to these issues, consider Dietrich von Hildebrand’s claim that the humble man “considers himself the least among his fellow men, more sinful and unworthy than everyone else.”2 This view is acceptable and is consistent with the account of humility I give in this chapter, if it is interpreted in the following manner: u = “For all I know, I am more sinful than anyone else.” I might view myself as more sinful than everyone else, in the sense denoted by u. Making such comparative judgments is difficult, especially given the Christian belief that all human beings are sinful and unworthy of God, apart from his intervention in our lives. Humility counsels caution about comparative judgments concerning the extent of our sinfulness, and so it seems appropriate to believe u. But I might object to this, noting that I am not guilty of genocide, and so surely I am less sinful than Hitler, Karadzic, Pol Pot, and those responsible for the Trail of Tears, to name just a few. While it is true that I have not committed such acts, the concept of sin applies not only to acts, but also to character. It therefore applies to dispositions and the correlative actions that could obtain in counterfactual situations. Unfortunately, for all I know, if I were born and raised in the particular circumstances of any of these individuals, I would have done what they did. I do not believe this to be the case, but for all I know I am mistaken about this belief. So in the particular sense signified by u I might properly consider myself more sinful than everyone else. Consider another conception of humility as a low view of one’s self from The Rule of Benedict, a book of practical instructions related to the monastic life compiled in the sixth century. This text includes twelve steps that monks are advised to take in order to cultivate the virtue of humility. In the seventh step, Saint Benedict enjoins the 2 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Humility: Wellspring of Virtue (Manchester, NH: Sophia Institute Press, 1990 [1948]), p. 69. See also St. John of the Cross, The Dark Night of the Soul, Book I, chapter 2.

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monk “not only to claim that he is beneath everyone else and worse than them, but also to be convinced of this deep in his heart.”3 At first glance, Benedict’s view seems stronger than u, because the monk is to be convinced deep in his heart that he is worse than everyone else. But again, we might read this as consistent with u, as being fully convinced that, for all I know, I am worse (i.e., more sinful) than everyone else. If so, then this is not problematic. Problems do arise, on a stronger interpretation, however, such as this: w = “I am the worst of all sinners.” If we interpret w in a literal and straightforward manner, that is, if we take it to be the claim that I am literally the worst human being that has ever existed, in terms of my character and actions, then there is a problem. The problem is that on such an interpretation, w is almost surely false. There can only be one person who satisfies this description. It is unreasonable, then, for most people to believe w. But if this is true, then a difficulty arises related to the New Testament. Paul states in 1 Timothy 1:15, “The saying is sure and worthy of full acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners— of whom I am the foremost.” At first glance, it seems that Paul has expressed w.4 Given that I have no desire to contradict the apostle Paul on this issue, what can be said here? The most important clues to what Paul has in mind can be found in the immediate context: I am grateful to Christ Jesus our Lord, who has strengthened me, because he judged me faithful and appointed me to his service, even though I was formerly a blasphemer, a persecutor, and a man of violence. But I received mercy because I had acted ignorantly in unbelief, and the grace of our Lord overflowed for me with the faith and love that are in Christ Jesus. The saying is sure and worthy of full acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners—of whom I am the foremost. But for that very reason I received mercy, so that in me, as the foremost, Jesus Christ might display the utmost patience, making me an example to those who would come to believe in him for eternal life. (1 Timothy 1:12–16)

3 Benedict, The Rule of Benedict, trans. by Carolinne White (New York, NY: Penguin Classics, 2008), p. 25. 4 The NIV makes the problem even plainer by its translation of this verse: “Here is a trustworthy saying that deserves full acceptance: Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners—of whom I am the worst.”

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A case can be made that Paul’s claim to be the foremost of sinners is not equivalent to w. The immediate context leads to a different plausible interpretation of what he means. Paul believes that he has committed acts that are tokens of the worst sins one can commit: blasphemy and the violent persecution of people because they were followers of Jesus Christ (as recorded in the book of Acts). In this sense, he can rightly and reasonably take himself to be the foremost of sinners. If it is correct that Paul holds the view that there is no deeper offense against God than these acts that he has committed, then this is a plausible interpretation of his claim in verse 15 that is not strictly equivalent to w. Finally, Bernard of Clairvaux describes humility as “a virtue by which a man has a low opinion of himself because he knows himself well.”5 With this in mind, consider a different way of thinking about humility that includes a low view of one’s self: v = “I have a low view of myself that correlates with my knowledge of my moral frailty and sinfulness.” It is reasonable to believe v, no matter how much moral progress one has made, in part because many have testified that their moral and spiritual progress has resulted in a clearer view of the depths of their own vice or sin. For example, the Desert Father Mathois says that “The nearer a man comes to God, the more he sees himself to be a sinner. Isaiah the prophet saw the Lord and knew himself to be wretched and unclean (Is. 6:5).”6 In a similar vein, and in an effort to teach Christians how to overcome sin, undermine pride, and foster humility, John Owen exhorts them to “be much in thoughtfulness of the excellency of the majesty of God and thine infinite, inconceivable distance from him. Many thoughts of it cannot but fill thee with a sense of thine own vileness, which strikes deep at the root of any indwelling sin.”7 In support of this, Owen makes reference to Job 42:5–6, where Job says to God “I had heard of you by the hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees you; therefore I despise myself, and repent

5 Bernard of Clairvaux, The Steps of Humility and Pride (Trappist, KY: Cistercian Publications, 1973), p. 30. 6 Benedicta Ward, ed., The Desert Fathers: Sayings of the Early Christian Monks, revised edition (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003), p. 157. 7 John Owen, Of the Mortification of Sin in Believers, Ch. XII; http://www.ccel.org/ ccel/owen/mort.i.xv.html.

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in dust and ashes.” Furthermore, Jonathan Edwards claims that an experience of God’s grace creates a tenderness of conscience, such that one is more attuned to his own sin and its heinous nature, but also “more convinced of his own sinfulness and wickedness of his heart.”8 The same line of thought can also be found among contemporary Christian thinkers. For instance, in a discussion of the cognitive renewal that occurs in regeneration by the Holy Spirit, Alvin Plantinga claims that as the Spirit of God gives us a clearer view of God— including his glory, beauty, and love for us—the Spirit also gives us more accurate knowledge of ourselves.9 As Plantinga puts it, the Spirit “gives me a much clearer view of the heinousness of sin, and of the degree and extent to which I am myself enmeshed in it.”10 This form of self-knowledge that is correlated with a deeper knowledge of God is connected to humility, in part because it gives us good reason to have a low view of ourselves in the sense that v describes. The more I understand the ways in which God in Christ exemplifies compassion, humility, love, patience, and the other virtues, the clearer it becomes that even as I make progress, I remain callous, proud, hateful, angry, and so on. I take v to be part of what it means to be humble according to many within the Christian tradition, and include it in my own account of this virtue, as will become evident later. It is important to point out that one can believe v without also underestimating one’s value as an image-bearer and child of God, or unreasonably ignoring whatever moral and spiritual virtues one in fact possesses. Along these lines, Josef Pieper observes that “the notion of humility has become blurred even in the Christian consciousness. In the whole tractate of St. Thomas concerning humility and pride, there is not a single sentence to suggest an attitude, on principle, of constant self-accusation, of disparagement of one’s being and doing, of cringing inferiority feelings, as belonging to humility or any other Christian

8 Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections, p. 221 (http://www.ccel.org/ccel/ edwards/affections.vi.viii.html). 9 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 280–1. One need not accept the whole of Plantinga’s epistemology to accept these claims. For another contemporary example, see D. A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge, Letters along the Way: A Novel of the Christian Life (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1993), pp. 15–25. 10 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 281.

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virtue.”11 Rather, humility is grounded in self-knowledge—“man’s estimation of himself according to truth”12—which on a Christian anthropology recognizes the moral progress and potential of human beings, but takes into account their moral frailties as well. We can exemplify such knowledge without the self-accusation and selfdisparagement that Pieper mentions. The upshot here is that, given the importance of cultivating and relying on true beliefs in order to cultivate sound moral character, in what follows I assume that humility does not include w; both u and v, however, can be seen as consistent with and even partially constitutive of this virtue.13 In the remainder of this chapter I both explain and offer some initial arguments for a particular Christian conception of humility. More specifically, I want to defend a particular sort of person, the humble person.14 In order to do this, I first discuss a few passages from the canonical gospels that are relevant to the virtue of humility. An examination of some of the relevant portions of the life and character of Christ as portrayed in the gospels will be a useful starting point. I then examine in more detail a crucial passage for developing a Christological account of humility. Philippians 2:1–11 serves as a primary (though not solitary) source for the account I develop here. I also briefly discuss the notion of humility present in 1 Peter 5:5–6. I then offer an intuitive definition of Christian humility. Next, I discuss the modularity of virtue and analyze Christian humility in terms of its cognitive, emotional, and active modules. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of a few strengths that this particular conception of humility possesses.

THE HUMILITY OF JESUS CHRIST IN THE GOSPELS The conception of humility and of the humble person that I will articulate is Christological. Jesus is the primary Christian moral exemplar who is traditionally thought to flawlessly embody and act 11 Josef Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 189. 12 ibid. 13 They both are included in module (C1), described later in this chapter. 14 This focus will give a richer account of the virtue itself, its connections with other virtues and human flourishing (chapter 4), and will underscore its relevance to human concerns in daily life (chapter 5).

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from intellectual and moral virtue, where a virtue is understood as an excellence of character aimed at some good end or ends. I take it that the ends of Jesus as he is portrayed in the canonical gospels include exemplifying and encouraging both love for and knowledge of God, as well as loving one’s neighbor as oneself. When human beings know and love God, and love their neighbors as themselves, they are disposed to obey God, to exhibit moral and intellectual virtue, and to enjoy deep communion with each other and God. This state is also captured by the Hebrew term shalom, in which humans experience well-being, inner harmony, health, and wholeness; they also possess a deep integrity as individuals in flourishing relationships with God, one another, and the rest of creation.15 All of these goods are present in a New Testament picture of redemption and more generally the notion of the kingdom of God. Given this, an examination of some of the relevant portions of Jesus’ life and aspects of his character, as well as his stated views in the gospels on the subject, is essential for developing a Christian understanding of the virtue of humility. In this section and the next, “Humility in Philippians 2 and 1 Peter 5,” I explore the character and teachings of Jesus as portrayed in the canonical gospels and Paul’s teachings contained in the letter to the Philippians which exemplifies one approach to appropriating Christian views of the character of Jesus Christ for the practice of analytic moral theology. I discuss the ways in which humility is exemplified in the incarnation and crucifixion of Christ. Another scriptural source for the account of humility I develop is 1 Peter 5, which includes an emphasis on humility in relation to both God and others. This biblical and theological picture of humility will then be employed in developing and supporting a robust Christian account of this virtue. Luke’s gospel begins with a description of the humble birth and beginnings of Jesus. After he is born, Jesus is laid in a feeding trough because there is no better place available. Unlike Matthew, who describes the court of King Herod, the wise men, and other powerful people, Richard Burridge points out that “Luke begins his portrait of Jesus among the pious poor and women, the meek and the lowly.”16

15 This understanding of shalom is drawn from David H. Stern, Jewish New Testament Commentary (Clarksville, MD: Jewish New Testament Publications, 1992), pp. 39, 107, and 200–1. 16 Richard A. Burridge, Imitating Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), p. 232.

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In Luke, we are given the story of a barren older woman, Elizabeth, bearing a son who will announce the coming of the Messiah and his kingdom. In addition, Luke presents the reader with an unwed teenage mother who carries the incarnate Son of God, and who extols humility in her Magnificat (see Luke 1:46–56). Burridge notes that with this approach, “Luke sets up his basic theme that, coming out of Israel’s history, Jesus is the universal bearer of burdens, concerned especially for women, the poor and outcasts, of all nations and races.”17 The canonical gospels consistently portray Jesus interacting with people who in the culture of the Ancient Near East would be considered outsiders or outcasts. For instance, in the Ancient Near East women and children were considered to be property. Those with chronic physical conditions were outcasts who according to many deserved to suffer in this way because of their (or their ancestors’) sins. Jesus, however, intentionally interacts with such people, often to the surprise and even dismay of his followers and others. For example, in John 4 Jesus engages a divorced Samaritan woman in a conversation about her life and his identity as the Messiah. In Mark 10 Jesus is indignant when his disciples try to keep children away from him, and instead takes the time to lay his hands on them and bless them. Later in the same chapter of Mark, followers of Jesus rebuke a blind beggar because he cried out to Jesus for mercy. Yet Jesus, who is on his way to Jerusalem to be arrested and executed in order to fulfill his Messianic mission, stops in order to heal this blind man. While the significance of the foregoing emphases and episodes may be lost due to the distance in cultural context, it is fair to conclude that associating with and seeking to help outsiders and outcasts are indicative of the humility of Jesus. These passages indicate that at least one important aspect of humility involves a willingness to lower oneself, in particular ways, in relation to others, without a devaluing of one’s self. In these instances, Jesus associates with and is concerned with the welfare of those at or near the bottom of society. The proud person, however, does not associate with those whom he considers to be beneath himself, in part because he takes himself to be superior to and more valuable than them. The humble person considers no one to be beneath her, as she believes all human beings have equal worth

17

ibid.

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and dignity, regardless of their place in the social hierarchy. She will be disposed to intentionally associate with and assist those whom society considers to be among the lowly. There are numerous other instances in which both the humility of Christ and his views on the subject are on display in the gospels. His baptism by John the Baptist (Matthew 3:13–17), his washing of the disciples’ feet (John 13:1–20), his dependence upon and partnership with the Father (John 5), and his stated belief that the glory he possesses was given to him by the Father (John 17:24) reveal his humility as portrayed in the gospels. Jesus is also reported as ascribing humility to himself in Matthew 11:28–30, where he describes himself as “humble in heart.”18 Some of his teachings on the subject include how to understand and practice leadership as a servant of others in the kingdom of God (Mark 10:42–5; Matthew 23:8–12), his claim that greatness in the kingdom of heaven is dependent upon one’s humility (Matthew 18:1–6), and his teaching in John 15:5 that we can “do nothing” apart from Christ, which helps to reveal why humility is appropriate for us as human beings given this dependence upon God. In the next section, “Humility in Philippians 2 and 1 Peter 5,” I will focus on two important New Testament passages concerning the virtue of humility.

HUMILITY IN PHILIPPIANS 2 AND 1 PETER 5 The Greek term tapeinophrosune is translated as “humility” in two New Testament passages that are important for understanding this virtue, namely, Philippians 2:1–11 and 1 Peter 5:5–6. Tapeinophrosune can also be translated as “lowliness of mind.”19 Without examining the particular context in which this term appears, its meaning remains somewhat vague. It is clear that in some contexts the meaning includes 18 While we are right to be wary of self-ascriptions of humility, on the definition developed here, such a claim is coherent and in principle can be true. For Christians, Christ is the moral exemplar, and so his self-ascription is true on Christian theology. We should of course be more cautious about engaging in such self-ascriptions. For more on this, see James Kellenberger, “Humility,” American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2010): 321–36. 19 Verlyn Verbrugge, New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, abridged edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), p. 555.

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a self-regarding aspect, insofar as tapeinophrosune is concerned with particular types of self-knowledge, including knowledge of one’s moral flaws, especially in relation to the character of God in Christ.20 However, it is also clear that this trait possesses other-regarding elements. When the term appears in Ephesians 4:2 and Colossians 3:12, the context points to humility as being in part a social virtue, as it is mentioned in a discussion of relationships and other virtues appropriate for them within the community, such as compassion, kindness, forgiveness, and patience.21 Tapeinophrosune and most of its cognates can be interpreted as describing something that is needed for a proper relationship with God and other human beings.22 Tapeinophrosune also occurs in Philippians 2:1–11, a passage which contains important theological and ethical information related to the humility of Christ and its ramifications for Christian thought and practice. The passage is also a primary source for much of my account of the virtue of humility. In his letter to the Philippians, Paul expresses gratitude for their partnership with him and exhorts them to work out their salvation in unity by seeking to live in a manner worthy of the gospel of Christ. Philippians 2:1–11 is of special importance for my purposes. Many New Testament scholars take vv. 5–11 to be an early Christian hymn that Paul is appropriating. Nevertheless, as we interpret the passage, we must see the hymn in its literary context in the epistle, and interpret it accordingly. That is, it is important that we interpret Philippians 2:5–11 in a way that gives priority to its role in Paul’s argument in the epistle, rather than isolating the hymn from this rhetorical context.23 In order to understand this passage and its relevance for the virtue of humility, I will first consider some recent discussion of the structure and aims of this epistle, and then examine the passage itself in more detail. In order to understand the purpose and structure of Paul’s letter to the Philippians, it is helpful to consider it in light of concepts from

20 See http://biblehub.com/str/greek/5012.htm. This is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 21 In both passages, Paul is discussing the quality of the relationships among the members of these two early churches, and offers instructions for how they are to relate to each other. On this, see Ephesians 4:2–6, 16, 25–6, 29–32; and Colossians 3. 22 Verbrugge, New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, p. 555. 23 Robert Strimple, “Philippians 2:5–11 in Recent Studies: Some Exegetical Conclusions,” Westminster Theological Journal 41 (1979): 247–68.

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ancient rhetorical theory.24 Paul’s letter to the church at Philippi can be divided into four segments, corresponding with the four elements of an ancient deliberative speech. Philippians 1:1–11, then, is the exordium, which functions to introduce the topic of the speech and prepare the audience for the message that is to come. The second segment, 1:12–26, is the narratio. This describes recent events, interprets them, and also affords the speaker the chance to expound upon his own character. The propositio, 1:27–30, is the part of an ancient deliberative speech that contains the main thesis of the argument, as well as an outline of what is to come.25 The probatio, 2:1–4:1, is the body of the speech’s argument. Finally, 4:2–23 constitute the peroratio, the function of which is to recapitulate the argument. In Philippians 1:27–30 Paul introduces his main thesis. The propositio is crucial for interpreting the other parts of this epistle: Only, live your life in a manner worthy of the gospel of Christ, so that, whether I come and see you or am absent and hear about you, I will know that you are standing firm in one spirit, striving side by side with one mind for the faith of the gospel, and are in no way intimidated by your opponents. For them this is evidence of their destruction, but of your salvation. And this is God’s doing. For he has graciously granted you the privilege not only of believing in Christ, but of suffering for him as well—since you are having the same struggle that you saw I had and now hear that I still have.

Paul urges the Philippian Christians to live their lives in a manner that is worthy of the gospel of Christ: with unity, faith, courage, and a willingness to suffer for Christ. In this way, they will live out their citizenship in the kingdom of heaven, which is significantly different from the way of life associated with being a citizen of Rome in the colony of Philippi. The verb Paul employs in the imperative, “live 24

James W. Thompson and Bruce W. Longnecker, Philippians and Philemon, Paideia Commentaries on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2016), pp. 14–17. 25 In his Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), pp. 2–10, Gordon Fee argues that Philippians is a friendship letter. For the argument against this and in favor of a socio-rhetorical analysis, see Thompson and Longnecker, Philippians and Philemon, pp. 14–16; and Ben Witherington, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians: A SocioRhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), pp. 13–29. Notably, Fee also claims that 1:27–30 is likely the primary imperative in the letter. So whatever one makes of the debates about how to best classify Philippians as a whole, there are good reasons for taking this passage as central for understanding the rest of the epistle.

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your life in a manner worthy of the gospel of Christ,” is politeuesthai, which literally means “live out your citizenship.”26 The Philippians are now part of an alternative commonwealth, where Christ rather than Caesar is Lord. Because of this, at least some of their way of life will conflict with the way of life that citizens of Rome were expected to embrace.27 One difference of interest here is the Christian belief that humility is a virtue rather than a trait to be avoided, as most of the Philippian citizens of Rome would have been likely to believe. As the main thesis of Philippians, this passage is both the foundation for and receives support from the arguments that are to come. It also foreshadows the remaining contents of the letter, in which Paul shows the Philippian church how to stand firm in the face of suffering and adversity.28 The image conveyed by “standing firm” (1:27) is one of a military unit holding a line in the face of an enemy. The Philippians are to strive together, in unity and mutual support for the sake of the gospel. As they do this, they are to reject any intimidation that their opponents may seek to create.29 It is clear that the relationships they have with one another are crucial; Paul expounds upon this in the subsequent passage, where humility takes center stage. With the foregoing in mind, then, Philippians 2:1–11 elaborates upon and its interpretation should be informed by 1:27 and its imperative to stand firm in unity and work together for the sake of the gospel. 2:1–11 is part of the probatio, in which Paul’s “primary interest [is] the formation of the community . . . the exhortation to maintain harmony in the face of adversity is the central component of the letter.”30 The passage reads as follows: If then there is any encouragement in Christ, any consolation from love, any sharing in the Spirit, any compassion and sympathy, make my joy complete: be of the same mind, having the same love, being in full accord and of one mind. Do nothing from selfish ambition or conceit, but in humility regard others as better than yourselves. Let each of you look not to your own interests, but to the interests of others. Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as something to be 26

ibid. p. 50. In addition to Thompson and Longnecker, see also Witherington, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, pp. 96–109. 28 Witherington, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, pp. 96–107. 29 Thompson and Longnecker, Philippians and Philemon, pp. 51–2. 30 ibid. p. 16. 27

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exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form, he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross. Therefore God also highly exalted him and gave him the name that is above every name, so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bend, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.

As will become evident later in this chapter, this passage contains “both an argument from example and a narrative description of the reversal of values that is required to maintain unity.”31 Paul exhorts the Philippians to be united for the sake of the gospel (vv. 1–4), which requires humbly valuing the interests of others rather than one’s own honor and selfcentered interests. This is a reversal of values in the sense that it constitutes a different way of seeing reality that employs an alternative set of values in comparison to those cherished by the Greco-Roman culture in Philippi. Rather than seeking to climb up the social ladder, Paul exhorts members of the Philippian church to step down that ladder in service to others.32 He also encourages them to imitate the humility exemplified by Christ in his incarnation and crucifixion (vv. 5–11). Paul assumes in v. 1 that encouragement, consolation, love, sharing in the Spirit, compassion, and sympathy are present realities in the Philippian church.33 He is describing the collective experience of the Philippians, not merely the experiences of individuals within the community. There is unity already present in this church, and Paul’s concern is that it be strengthened so that they can make further progress in fulfilling the imperative in the propositio. In v. 2, when Paul urges them to “be of the same mind,” he is referring to mental and attitudinal dispositions he believes they should possess. He wants them to be inclined to think in a particular way, in order to foster loving unity and living in a manner worthy of the gospel. Paul goes on to more fully describe the mindset and the corresponding actions that he is concerned with in this passage. In vv. 3–4, there are several imperatives that reveal something about the nature of humility as it is conceived of here. In these verses, Paul exhorts the Philippians as follows: “Do nothing from selfish ambition or conceit, but in humility regard others as better than yourselves. Let each of you look not to your own interests, but to the interests of others.” The content of these verses and their context point 31 33

32 ibid. Witherington, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, pp. 31–2. ibid. pp. 120–1.

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to something vital for our understanding of Christian humility, namely, that it is in part a social virtue. The content of these verses supports the claim that humility has to do with how we view others in relation to ourselves, and it emphasizes how one should prioritize and act upon others’ interests in relation to his own. The immediate context supports the view that humility is a social virtue, as prior to this Paul exhorts the Philippians to be united in love and to be “of one mind,” which he expounds upon here and in the remainder of the passage. In v. 3, “humility” (tapeinophrosune) is contrasted with “selfish ambition” and “conceit.”34 The former is a threat to the common love and life described in vv. 1–2, and in the context of Paul’s appeal to unity refers to a kind of divisiveness that a devotion to one’s own selfinterest tends to manifest. The latter is a translation of the Greek word kenodoxia, which literally means “empty glory” and can be translated as “empty self-glorification.” In the Greco-Roman world of Philippi, an agonistic honor and shame culture, this term refers to a person who is a self-promoter, who overestimates his own achievements, and describes them to others for the sake of gaining honor. Such a person believes that he possesses glory, but this belief is baseless.35 He is mistaken because he is “conceited without reason, deluded.”36 He fails to possess self-knowledge with respect to the honor that is due him and the glory he possesses. In contrast to this, the person described as humble in this culture would be someone of low birth or occupation, someone who is base, or even someone who is a flattering groveler.37 Tapeinophrosune was a pejorative term, but Paul is exhorting the Philippians to be humble in a different sense, to take on a radically different mindset than the culture they inhabited. The Christian of higher status was to be concerned with the well-being of those who had a lower status, as described in v. 4.38 Some commentators believe that Paul is offering a definition of humility in v. 4, where he states that each person should look out for the interests of others above (or rather than) their own.39 Gordon Fee argues that Paul has an Old Testament understanding of humility in 34

The following is drawn from ibid. pp. 122, 128. Fee, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, p. 187. 36 Gerald Hawthorne and Ralph Martin, Philippians, revised edition, Word Biblical Commentary vol. 43 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2004), p. 87. 37 See Thompson and Longnecker, Philippians and Philemon, p. 62. 38 Witherington, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, p. 129. 39 For example, see ibid. and Thompson and Longnecker, Philippians and Philemon, pp. 68–76. 35

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mind here, where the “lowliness” alluded to by tapeinophrosune refers to our status as creatures.40 Given this, Fee observes that “Humility . . . has to do with a proper estimation of oneself, the stance of the creature before the Creator, utterly dependent and trusting.”41 He goes on to analyze the structure of vv. 3–4 in order to interpret what humility is in this passage, and claims that the humble person avoids making too much or too little of her weaknesses or her glory as an image-bearer of God, but is instead focused on others and their concerns. Fee takes Paul’s command in v. 3 to “regard others as better than yourselves” to be clarified by v. 4. Together then, these verses teach that “we are to so consider others, not in our estimation of them—which would only lead to the very vices Paul has just spoken against—but in our caring for them, in our putting them and their needs ahead of our own. After all, this is precisely how Christ’s humility expressed itself, as Paul narrates in v. 8.”42 A linguistic analysis also supports this reading, according to Fee. The term translated as “better” in v. 3 appears in two other places in the letter, and in both cases it denotes “surpassing,” i.e., going far beyond. Given this, and the content of v. 4, Fee argues that this also seems to be the sense of the term in v. 3. He contends that the set of clauses in v. 4 modify the term “consider” in v. 3, so that v. 4 “is not another in a series of exhortations; rather, it clarifies the preceding clause.”43 If this is correct, then members of the Christian community at Philippi are being instructed to regard others as surpassing themselves by looking out for their interests ahead of their own. Finally, an additional feature of the structure of this passage supports reading vv. 3–4 as showing that Paul’s conception of humility, of “regarding others as better than yourselves,” means looking out for their interests. While vv. 1–4 form one sentence in the Greek, the sentence is made up of three strophes. The final strophe (vv. 3–4) follows an ABAB pattern: A B A’ B’ 40

not with selfish ambition or conceit, but with humility considering one another better than yourselves, not looking to your own interests, but to the interests of others.44

41 Fee, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, pp. 188–90. ibid. p. 188. ibid. p. 189. Fee is working with the NIV, which uses the word “consider” rather than “regard,” as in the NRSV. 43 ibid. p. 190. 44 Thompson and Longnecker, Philippians and Philemon, pp. 68–70. 42

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Together, B and B’ point to an understanding of humility that includes looking to the interests of others. The ABAB pattern shows that what Paul means by considering others to be better than oneself is to look out for their interests over one’s own, which the parallel structure of B and B’ arguably reveals. In sum, the foregoing points concerning vv. 3–4 are important, because they support the view that humility (i) involves looking out for the interests of others over one’s own; and (ii) does not require that I believe that others are literally “better than” or more valuable than I. Or, returning to the discussion at the beginning of this chapter, this understanding of the meaning of humility is consistent with u and v, but not w. Both (i) and (ii) are essential components of the conception of humility I offer later in this chapter. The imperatives of the first four verses are illuminated in vv. 5–11, where Paul presents Christ as the exemplar that the Philippians are to imitate. In order to live their lives in a manner that is worthy of the gospel, Paul reminds them of that gospel in the narrative that is present in vv. 6–11. A life that is truly worthy of that gospel will conform to that narrative. Christ exemplified humility in the incarnation and crucifixion, which gives the Philippians reason to do the same in their community as followers of Christ.45 Since Christ became a servant and died the death of a slave for their salvation, then it is only proper that his followers imitate him by putting the interests of others ahead of their own, including (and perhaps especially) the interests of those below them on the social ladder. The language Paul uses here “is deliberately extreme to shock the audience into following Christ’s example . . . as a cure for party spirit, rivalry, or tensions in the community . . . attitudes or thoughts of status seeking or climbing the honor ladders of society are squelched here with great force.”46 The Philippians are to use whatever honor and status they possess to benefit others in their community, following the pattern of Christ as it is described here.47 If the example of Christ fails to motivate the Philippians to pursue loving unity via humble and mutual selfsacrifice, then it is hard to see what will.48

45

ibid. pp. 54, 63, 72. Witherington, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, p. 149. 47 Joseph Hellerman, Reconstructing Honor in Roman Philippi (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 154. 48 Witherington, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, p. 111. 46

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Much has been written about the kenosis (i.e., self-emptying), of Christ in Philippians 2.49 Though I agree with those who take vv. 6–11 to be primarily ethical, it will still be helpful, before articulating a Christian account of humility, to briefly discuss the model of the kenosis assumed in the account. Rather than entering deeply into the debates about this theological concept, I will merely state the view of the incarnation (including the kenosis) that I hold, without defending it. I ascribe to what Garrett DeWeese refers to as a contemporary model of the incarnation.50 A key distinction for this model has to do with the differences between persons and natures. A person, according to DeWeese, “is an individual with an appropriately complex and structured set of mental properties, faculties (a natural grouping of capacities) and higher order capacities, unified by internal relations.”51 A nature is distinct from a person, and should be understood as “a complex property that includes all properties essential to an individual’s being a member of a kind; the set of properties which are necessarily coinstantiated in any individual of that kind.”52 On this view, my family’s dogs Bell and Loofa are not persons but they exemplify canine nature. My wife Dawn and our daughters Haley, Emma, and Sophie are persons who exemplify human nature. DeWeese points out that any existing person also exemplifies a nature, such that on Christian theism there are divine persons, angelic persons, and human persons. With the above distinctions in mind, on this contemporary model Jesus is the eternal Logos, a person who essentially instantiates the divine nature while contingently at the incarnation instantiating the essential properties of human nature. During his time on earth, Jesus engaged in a voluntary restriction of aspects of his divine nature as the eternal Logos, but he did not lose any essential attributes of divinity. 49 For example, see Stephen T. Davis, Christian Philosophical Theology (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 172–93; Larry W. Hurtado, How on Earth Did Jesus Become a God? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005); C. Stephen Evans, Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006); N. T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant (New York, NY: T & T Clark, 1991), pp. 56–98. 50 Garrett DeWeese, “One Person, Two Natures: Two Metaphysical Models of the Incarnation,” in Jesus in Trinitarian Perspective, Fred Sanders and Klaus Issler, eds. (Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman Academic, 2007), pp. 114–53. Other views of the kenosis may have all or many of the same implications. 51 ibid. p. 138. Examples of such properties and capacities include consciousness, self-consciousness, and relationality. 52 ibid. p. 141.

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Jesus voluntarily limits himself at the incarnation to exercise his personhood through his human nature. While important questions remain concerning the content and implications of this model, a mere statement of these main ideas is sufficient for my present purposes.53 Though much theological reflection on this passage centers on interpretations of the controversial concept of Christ’s kenosis, the passage itself is primarily ethical in nature. Philippians 2:5–11 is “not merely an exercise in theology but an ethical pattern of behavior to follow.”54 A central focus of the passage is the humility of Jesus, described in vv. 6–8.55 In his discussion of these verses, Larry Hurtado claims that the “self-humbling and obedience in v. 8 are probably to be taken as referring to the readiness of the human Jesus to take the path of service (and this must be taken as obedience to God), even at the cost of his life through the violence of crucifixion.”56 The passage claims that Jesus, who was divine and could have chosen a different path, opted instead to become incarnate and suffer the pain and humiliation associated with crucifixion. The concepts of service and obedience will be central to the account of humility developed below, as will Paul’s stated desire that the Philippians imitate the humility of Christ in their particular circumstances and relationships. This connects back to the propositio, insofar as to live a life worthy of the gospel in part means to live in a way that is reflective of the character of Christ, the paragon of Christian virtue. So while the theological issues are important, they do not constitute the main point of the passage. Christ’s humility as it is exemplified in the Christian doctrines of the incarnation and crucifixion provides a theological foundation for the ethical exhortation present in the passage, which Karl Barth describes as a “humility in which we all look to the interests of others and not just our own.”57 The main point of the passage has to do with humility and its connections to unity within this early Christian community.

53 For a slightly different and more detailed view, which he calls “kryptic Christology,” see Oliver D. Crisp, Divinity and Humanity (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 118–53. See also Oliver D. Crisp, The Word Enfleshed (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2016). 54 Witherington, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, p. 102. 55 Hurtado, How on Earth Did Jesus Become a God? pp. 83–107. 56 ibid. p. 103. 57 Karl Barth, Ethics (New York, NY: The Seabury Press, 1981), p. 330.

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In sum, we can draw several conclusions about the nature of humility based on the foregoing discussion of this virtue in Philippians 2:1–11. First, the self-regarding aspect of humility has to do with proper selfestimation, including our knowledge of our status as creatures, our moral limitations, and our dependence upon God for our salvation. Second, humility is not merely a self-regarding virtue, but an otherregarding one as well. Or, to put the point differently, humility is in part a social virtue that is important for how we relate to other humans and to God. Third, a central aspect of Paul’s understanding of humility as it functions in the human realm is putting the interests of others ahead of one’s own in both thought and action. Important elements of Christian humility are underscored in another part of the New Testament, 1 Peter 5:5–6. I will briefly consider this passage in order to demonstrate that the notion that humility is a social virtue is not merely part of a Pauline perspective on this trait,58 but is present in other parts of the New Testament as well. 1 Peter was intended by its author to be circulated among several early Jewish Christian communities.59 It is concerned with God and what it means to orient one’s life fully around him, including “refusing the conventions of honor and status that constitute Roman politics in favor of the valuations and judgment of the merciful God who has chosen and honored what the systems of this world have dismissed.”60 These themes are similar to those found in Philippians, and so it is not surprising that humility is also discussed here. In 1 Peter, humility is seen as a virtue that is appropriate for human relationships, as well as for one’s relationship to God. In addition, 1 Peter arguably has a rhetorical structure similar to that of Philippians.61 The propositio of 1 Peter is 1:13–16, which includes imperatives about being self-controlled, setting one’s hope on the grace of Jesus Christ, and being holy because God is holy.62 For a discussion of humility, elements of 1 Peter 5:1–11 are 58

See Ephesians 4:2 and Colossians 3:12. See 1 Peter 1:1–2; and Ben Witherington, Letters and Homilies for Hellenized Christians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1–2 Peter (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2008), pp. 21–39. 60 Joel Green, 1 Peter, The Two Horizons New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), p. 3. 61 Witherington, Letters and Homilies for Hellenized Christians pp. 45–51, and 92–9. 62 It reads as follows: “Therefore prepare your minds for action; discipline yourselves; set all your hope on the grace that Jesus Christ will bring you when he is revealed. Like obedient children, do not be conformed to the desires that you formerly 59

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relevant, especially vv. 5–6. These two verses form the end of one section, and the beginning of another. 1 Peter 5:1–5 is the fifth argument in the book concerning the propositio; it explains how leaders and those under their care can reflect the self-control, hope, and holiness in the propositio as they relate to each other. The elders are to lead their flock by example, following the paradigm of humility as exemplified by Jesus the Chief Shepherd (2:21–5).63 In v. 5, the author exhorts the elders and those under their leadership as follows: “In the same way, you who are younger must accept the authority of the elders. And all of you must clothe yourselves with humility in your dealings with one another, for ‘God opposes the proud, but gives grace to the humble.’”64 Everyone—young and old, elders and those under their leadership—should clothe themselves with humility in their interactions with each other. The imagery of clothing oneself is significant here. In this culture, clothing communicated social position. The fact that everyone, leaders and followers, are instructed “to wear the same garment, irrespective of its color or quality or texture, is itself already a startling negation of the social distinctions that among people in Roman antiquity would have been worn like uniforms in a parade.”65 Here, as in Philippians, the countercultural rejection of honor-seeking behavior and concern for status is present. Leaders and followers are to relate to one another with mutual respect and service. Humility involves actions done in service to others, including those who have less social status. Apart from the ways in which humility fosters flourishing in the community, those who exemplify it also receive divine grace so that they can continue to serve one another.66 1 Peter 5:6 is the initial statement in the peroratio, the part of the epistle which recapitulates the foregoing arguments concerning the propositio. It reads: “Humble yourselves therefore under the mighty hand of God, so that he may exalt you in due time.” The verb here “to humble” is in the passive voice. The point is that Christians are to accept had in ignorance. Instead, as he who called you is holy, be holy yourselves in all your conduct; for it is written, ‘You shall be holy, for I am holy.’ ” 63 Green, 1 Peter, p. 164. 64 The term translated as “humility” in this verse is tapeinophrosune, as in the Philippians 2 passage. The words translated “humble” and “humbled” in vv. 5–6 are cognates of this term. 65 Green, 1 Peter, p. 170. 66 Witherington, Letters and Homilies for Hellenized Christians, pp. 232–3.

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the low status given them by God, which is a consequence of patterning their lives after Christ (see 1 Peter 2:21–5).67 They are to be humble before God, which in part means that they are to be aware of their status as creatures and the fact that they are to live under God’s authority.68 In sum, then, there are several conclusions that can be drawn about humility from 1 Peter 5:5–6, some of which overlap with those drawn from Philippians 2:1–11. First, humility is a virtue that followers of Christ are to exemplify in their relationship with God, as creatures under his authority. Humility is also a virtue they are to exemplify in their relationships with each other, expressed in service to one another. Lastly, humility is a virtue that Christians can put on, as they might put on a piece of clothing; humility can be intentionally pursued and exemplified. In light of this, the examination of humility in Philippians 2, my discussion of the previously mentioned passages in the gospels, and both classical and contemporary thought regarding this trait, in the next section, “A Christian Account of Humility,” I offer an analysis of the Christian virtue of humility as exemplified by an ideally humble human person.

A CHRISTIAN ACCOUNT OF HUMILITY In this section, I discuss the following general and intuitive definition of Christian humility: proper self-assessment and a self-lowering othercenteredness. This is derived from the foregoing biblical passages as well as various Christian understandings of this virtue. I then engage in a deeper conceptual analysis of what I take to be the most important components of this character trait. My purpose in the rest of this chapter is primarily explanatory, though I do consider a few objections. In chapter 3, I consider in more depth several objections to the account of Christian humility I offer here. In order to more fully understand the Christian virtue of humility, it will be helpful to distinguish aspects of the trait that are primarily concerned with self-assessment and those that are primarily social. Both the self-regarding and other-regarding facets of humility are

67 68

Green, 1 Peter, p. 172. Witherington, Letters and Homilies for Hellenized Christians, pp. 236–7.

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necessary for the exemplification of this virtue in its perfected form in an ideal moral exemplar. We should be dubious—as seems appropriate given Christian views of human nature—about whether any merely human person has exemplified humility in its perfect form. Even so, such an understanding is valuable in itself and as a goal to pursue, even if it is never fully realized. For Jesus and Paul, in terms of their teaching about and exemplification of this virtue as recorded in the New Testament, humility is primarily social. Humility has intrinsically other-regarding elements that are relevant to how humans relate to one another and to God.69 Given this, the emphasis in the remainder of this book will follow suit. However, there are particular aspects of the Christian conception of humility I offer below that are self-referential and concerned with proper self-assessment. I employ the term “proper” here in a particular sense, inclusive of both the accuracy of one’s self-assessment and the level of concern with such assessment that the humble person will possess. The humble person tends not to inflate his own importance, abilities, or character, or to expend much time or effort thinking about them. The self-regarding and other-regarding aspects of humility are of course connected in deep ways, as components of the same virtue. For example, knowing that one is an image-bearer of God will help one to avoid the error of undervaluing her own interests in interactions with others, thereby avoiding the vice of self-denigration. It will also help her properly value the interests of others, seeing them

69 An anonymous reviewer asks whether humility is by nature a social virtue, or whether it is instead a virtue that has a variety of social implications? It seems to me that the virtue itself is social, that is, it seems that some aspects of Christian humility are other-regarding. The biblical texts lend themselves to this view. For example, the reading of Philippians 2 discussed above shows that Paul is discussing humility itself as including a higher regard for the interests of others compared to ones’ own, and not just the claim that one implication of the virtue of humility is that one should have such regard. As I stated in my discussion of this passage, Paul understands humility as a trait that includes putting the interests of others ahead of one’s own. See also the discussion of modules (C3), (E1), (E2), (A1), and (A2) below, as each of these has to do with how humans relate to God or one another. Finally, for more related to this, see John Dickson and Brian Rosner, “Humility as a Social Virtue in the Hebrew Bible?” Vetus Testamentum 54 (2004): 459–79. On p. 479, Dickson and Rosner observe that the common definition of humility in early Christianity—“lowering oneself before an equal or lesser”—is social. This common early definition of humility is arguably conceptually connected with Philippians 2:1–11, and is an additional piece of evidence in favor of the claim that Christian humility is a social virtue.

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as image-bearers of the God who loves and cares for them.70 This helps her to avoid the vice of pride. And the disposition not to inflate one’s own importance is conducive to putting the interests of others ahead of one’s own, which I will argue below is an essential component of humility. Humility, then, includes self-knowledge. But the humble person tends to focus on others, and other things, rather than herself or her own humility. Humility turns its possessor away from herself and towards the needs, interests, and intrinsic value of others. As C. S. Lewis (perhaps a bit too strongly) puts it, “a really humble man . . . will not be thinking about humility: he will not be thinking about himself at all.”71 So while Christian humility, as I conceive of it, does include self-knowledge, this will be of secondary importance compared to its social aspects concerning one’s relationships with other people and God. The social or other-regarding aspect of Christian humility can be intuitively defined as a self-lowering other-centeredness. This definition is derived from the conception of humility that is present in Philippians 2, as in this passage humility stands in contrast with selfcenteredness and certain forms of pride. Humility is understood by Paul to involve unselfishness. As we saw earlier, Paul contrasts humility with selfish ambition and conceit, and enjoins each Philippian Christian to value others’ interests more than his own. This is also reflected in 1 Peter 5, insofar as the welfare of others and of the local community of followers of Christ is to be valued over one’s own narrow self-interest. Humility stands in opposition to the vice of pride, which overvalues the individual’s interests via a self-centered arrogance. The ideally humble person possesses a set of cognitive, emotional, and action-oriented dispositions, many of which will be examined in more detail later in this chapter.72

70 See Craig A. Boyd, “Pride and Humility,” Virtues and their Vices, Kevin Timpe and Craig A. Boyd, eds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 245–66. Boyd also discusses humility as including “appropriate self-assessment.” 71 C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1952), p. 99. 72 See Lisa Fullam, The Virtue of Humility: A Thomistic Apologetic (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2009), for a theological account of humility based on Aquinas that is in some ways similar to the account I offer here. However, Fullam defines humility as accurate self-understanding that is sensitive to context, which is acquired by the practice of other-centeredness. In contrast to this, I argue that other-centeredness is partially constitutive of the virtue itself.

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While the humble person is disposed towards a self-lowering other-centeredness, she is not disposed to self-abasement or an irrational disregard for her own interests in the context of interpersonal relationships. When the false humility of self-abasement or selfdenigration obtains, it may lead its possessor to seek to exclude herself from relating to God, because of her self-perceived moral and spiritual wretchedness (and misguided belief that her own interests are entirely insignificant).73 It may also cause her to exclude herself from deeper relationships with others. Both forms of self-exclusion are not included within authentic Christian humility, as I understand it. Humility does not require one to completely disregard his own needs and interests in any and all circumstances, as this could constitute a failure in accounting for the value and dignity of oneself as an image-bearer of God. Nevertheless, in some circumstances humility may dispose one to give her life for some good or set of goods, as it did in the case of Christ. The first other-regarding aspect of humility (as a social virtue) is selflowering. As I will discuss in more detail later, self-lowering involves particular kinds of preferential judgments, desires, and actions concerning others and one’s relationship to them. For instance, the humble person will be disposed to place the interests of others ahead of her own, as is appropriate given the circumstances. The humble person need not always place the interests of others ahead of her own, but she is disposed to do so as is appropriate, given the circumstances and dictates of prudence. The essence of self-lowering, then, with respect to the social form of humility is how one is disposed to weigh the interests and needs of others relative to one’s own. This manner of lowering oneself in relation to others leads us to the second aspect of social humility. The second primary other-regarding aspect of humility is othercenteredness. Others are at the center of the humble person’s concerns. The other on this Christian definition of humility refers most importantly to God, but also other persons. Along these lines, Basil Hume observes that for Benedict, the humble man is not “limp and negative,” but rather according to him “humility is a virtue for the strong monk, because it enables him to put God and other people at the centre of his life and not himself . . . [and] release the powers and energies with which God has endowed him.”74 I am using “other” in a 73

Von Hildebrand, Humility, p. 51. Basil Hume, In Praise of Benedict (Petersham, MA: Saint Bede’s Publications, 1981), p. 18. It is not clear whether this means humility enables one to be 74

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sense that is broad enough to also include non-human animals as well as certain moral, aesthetic, and alethic values.75 For example, one may highly regard the moral value of justice, the beauty of the natural world, and a truth about human nature, and then humbly order her life around these values. A fully humble individual will engage in selfsacrificial actions for the sake of the welfare of others, when required to do so by justice in her particular circumstances (e.g., by giving of her time or money to help those in her community who are in need). One can be devoted to a value such as justice while maintaining selfrespect, grounded in the theological belief that humans are imagebearers of God and so worthy of such respect. Just as the humble person avoids arrogance and pride, she will avoid self-denigration. However, one can maintain self-respect and give one’s life for some good or set of goods. The Christian will hold that Jesus was able to do this, and as her moral exemplar and ultimate standard she will follow suit insofar as she maintains self-respect but is also disposed to whatever self-sacrifice is appropriate in her own context. “Other,” then, on this general intuitive definition of humility can refer to other persons, non-human animals, and other instantiations of value, though God is its most important referent. “Centeredness” signifies a valuing of God and others that is present in the humble person, and includes a form of rational and voluntary subjection to the relevant needs, interests, or values in a given context. This stands in sharp contrast to the self-centeredness present in the vice of pride, while including the self-respect and self-care that are absent in the vice of self-denigration. In this way, the individual honors God, others, and herself, as appropriate. I have offered a general intuitive definition of Christian humility that I take, when properly understood, to capture the essential elements of this moral virtue and to be applicable across a range of contexts (as will become evident later). In its ideal form, Christian humility essentially includes both proper self-assessment and a selflowering other-centeredness, and is teleological in the way discussed earlier. This intuitive definition is admittedly still somewhat vague. In light of this and the complexity of Christian humility, much more other-centered via its connection with other virtues, or if this is the act of humility itself. Regardless, on the view I explain and defend, the latter is the case. 75 For a similar view, see von Hildebrand, Humility, pp. 17–19, who contends that a fundamental aspect of humility is the proper response to objective value.

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needs to be said about the nature of this virtue. A more complete analysis of humility should include the relevant cognitive, emotional, and active elements of this trait as instantiated by the ideally humble person. This will help to clarify the virtue itself as it may exist within persons while avoiding the artificiality of analyzing it in isolation from both context and other aspects of an individual’s life and character. As will become clear in the discussion that follows of the cognitive, emotional, and active aspects of Christian humility, my account has some features in common with recent non-theistic conceptions of this virtue, but is also distinct from them in significant ways.

The Modularity of Virtue In my account of humility, I assume the modularity of virtue, as described by Robert Adams.76 According to Adams, modules of the virtues are behavioral dispositions that are independent and domainspecific. As he puts it, “a person will often acquire and exercise a disposition to act in a certain way in one domain without being disposed to act similarly in somewhat different domains.”77 These modules can be combined to form a more complete disposition, which can be thought of as a virtue. A person might be disposed to be courageous in one domain (sports), but not so disposed in another domain (speaking up for his moral convictions in the face of opposition). Modules of a particular virtue can be added together to form a more complete disposition, a more wide-ranging virtue. On this view, the more courageous one is, the more domains there will be in which one is disposed to behave in a courageous manner. These modules, then, can be thought of as parts of a virtue, and are morally valuable in their own right. While Adams focuses on modules as independent and domainspecific components of a virtue, two points must be added in order to clarify how I conceive of such modules. First, a particular module of a virtue might obtain in a variety of domains. That is, a single discrete component of a virtue can surface in a variety of contexts. For example, one might have the physical module of courage across more than one domain. A police officer may show physical courage

76 Robert Adams, A Theory of Virtue (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 25–7. 77 ibid. p. 125.

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in that context when pursuing a suspect, and also in the context of sports. Second, we can conceive of modules of virtue not just in terms of the domains across which a behavioral disposition may exist, but also in terms of the relevant cognitive, emotional, and active aspects of a particular virtue. An individual may possess certain cognitive modules of a virtue, but perhaps not the relevant active or emotional modules. For instance, one might come to believe that the suffering of others matters, and in this way exemplify a cognitive module of compassion. But this person may not have yet progressed, for whatever reason, to the point at which she in some sense emotionally suffers with those who suffer. She does not yet possess this emotional module of the virtue of compassion.78 The cognitive, emotional, and active elements described later in this chapter can be thought of as modules of the complete form of humility expressed in a variety of contexts. In some contexts they will work in concert with other virtues. Humility may foster or reinforce the theological virtue of faith, or vice versa. Humility and hope may yield particular attitudes or actions together. And humility will always be guided by prudence. I follow Aquinas here, who maintains that prudence is the “right reason of things to be done.”79 The connections between prudence and all of the virtues, including humility, are emphasized within the Thomist tradition. Prudence shapes the other virtues, and they all participate in it. Humility, then, operates according to prudence. Humility operates in accord with “what is appropriate to us as created, rational, and dependent beings.”80 As rational animals, we are able to see the relationships that exist between us and other persons. We can understand what our obligations are in any particular circumstance, in part because we are able to understand the obligations we possess in light of the relationships in which we stand with others. The relationships inform the obligations. Right reason helps us to see that we owe God worship, for example, or gratitude to our mothers. Prudence, then, enables us to think and act in a rational manner in light of our nature and our telos, which ultimately is a life in union with and participation in God. For this,

78 The order may be reversed. That is, she may feel the emotions related to compassion which then leads her to have the relevant beliefs. 79 Aquinas, ST I.II.57.4. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FS_Q57_A4.html. 80 Boyd, “Pride and Humility,” p. 261. See chapter 4 for more on the connections between humility and prudence.

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we need the help of others as well as the grace of God.81 All of this underscores both the self-regarding and other-regarding aspects of humility. The humble person is able to recognize her need for divine grace and then receive it. She is also able to love others as she loves herself, because she recognizes the value of all human beings as bearers of the imago Dei. In what follows, I take the cognitive modules of humility to include both belief and knowledge. For my purposes, the emotive modules include not just emotions, but also desires and preferences. Finally, the active modules concern particular dispositions to act that the humble person will possess. It is important to note that the boundaries between these categories of modules are not necessarily sharply defined. For instance, emotions may also be cognitive, in certain respects.82 Some of the modules that I categorize under the emotive category possess cognitive elements, which will become apparent in the discussion that follows. Finally, recall that the emotive and active modules are dispositional. That is, it is possible in principle that someone might possess a particular module of humility, but never have the occasion to exemplify it because circumstances do not obtain which call upon that particular module. It is also important to clarify that one need not possess all of the modules of humility in order for humility to be properly attributed to her. The modules discussed below are not jointly necessary for attributing humility to a person. However, they are jointly necessary for humility in its ideal or perfect form.83 This is an important point. We can properly attribute humility to an individual, even if she does not possess all of the modules. That is, we can attribute humility to her while also recognizing that she does not possess humility in its perfect or ideal form. In addition, we can properly attribute humility to one who only possesses a single module of humility. One may exemplify only a single module of this virtue, and that to an imperfect degree, but still be properly seen as exemplifying humility to that degree. A person who possesses only one module of humility, and that imperfectly, can be regarded as humble in that particular respect.

81

ibid. pp. 260–3. Emotions arguably involve judgments. See Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 83 For Christians, Christ would of course be the exemplar of this ideal form of humility. 82

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Possession of one module is sufficient for ascribing humility to a person, in this very limited manner. While it is of course better that she possess more than one module of humility, and possess all of the modules of this virtue to a greater degree, neither of these conditions are required for us to attribute humility to her in the above sense. With the foregoing in mind, I will discuss several modules of humility as exemplified by the ideally humble human person. Or, to put it differently, I will analyze and seek to understand the central elements of the Christian moral virtue of humility in its ideal form.84

Cognitive Modules of Humility There are several cognitive modules of humility that the ideally humble person will possess. The first two modules are concerned with proper self-assessment, while the remaining cognitive modules, as well as all of the emotive and active modules, are primarily social. That is, they are concerned with interpersonal relationships. This reflects what I take to be the emphasis of the biblical authors as they understand this virtue. The above discussion of Philippians 2 and 1 Peter 5 reveals a focus on humility’s role in interpersonal relationships rather than how we view our accomplishments and ourselves. This latter emphasis is found more often in contemporary discussions of non-religious conceptions of humility, but my claim is that a Christian account of this trait should focus primarily—though not exclusively—on its other-regarding or social aspects. First, then, I will consider two self-regarding cognitive modules of humility.

84 The account is not intended to be comprehensive. For example, I do not discuss intellectual humility at length in what follows, though a full account must include an analysis of this form of humility. For more on intellectual humility, see Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 236–56. Several of the concepts within the modules I discuss are present in both ordinary language and discussed, often briefly, in the literature dealing with this virtue. For example, see John Cottingham, “What Difference Does it Make? The Nature and Significance of Theistic Belief ?” Ratio 19 (2006), pp. 407–8. For a brief overview of many of these accounts, see James Kellenberger, “Humility,” American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2010): 321–36.

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(C1) The humble person possesses self-knowledge with respect to his virtues, vices, and limitations, both personal and qua human person Many accounts of humility (both religious and non-religious) include an emphasis on different aspects of self-knowledge as partially (if not wholly) constitutive of this virtue. (C1) is a module that Christian and non-Christian notions of humility may share, though the former will include particularly Christian understandings of such knowledge and the relevant limitations.85 (C1) is a result of the exegesis of Philippians 2 that I offered above, but it can also be partially drawn from Matthew 18:1–5: At that time the disciples came to Jesus and asked, “Who is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven?” He called a child, whom he put among them, and said, “Truly I tell you, unless you change and become like children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven. Whoever becomes humble like this child is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. Whoever welcomes one such child in my name welcomes me.”

What features of children are the disciples being called to embrace here? As Craig Keener points out, the disciples, reflecting the common concern with status in Mediterranean Judaism, want to know their future status in Christ’s coming kingdom.86 In reply to their question, Jesus states that greatness in God’s kingdom belongs to those who become like children, who possessed low status in the Ancient Near East. As Keener notes, early Judaism emphasized humility, but Matthew challenges his readers with a view of Jesus in which he calls for a radical form of this virtue. This was countercultural, as it reveals that “status in the kingdom is often inversely proportional to status in the world.”87 Rather than offering a hero or statesman as an exemplar, Jesus tells his disciples to emulate a child. Children were powerless, had no status, and were wholly dependent upon their parents. Jesus here commands his followers to be like children by embracing lowness of status and recognizing 85 On humility and self-knowledge, see St. Teresa of Avila, Interior Castle, trans. E. Allison Peers (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008), pp. 24–5, 121–2; and St. John of the Cross, The Dark Night of the Soul, Book I, chapters 12 and 14. 86 Craig S. Keener, The Gospel of Matthew: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), pp. 447–9. 87 ibid. p. 447.

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their dependence. Children seek help from others in part because they know they are limited, and so are dependent upon others to meet their various needs. Followers of Christ, then, should similarly humble themselves by accepting their limitations and realizing their dependence upon others and God to meet their needs.88 The humble person, like a child, realizes that he is not a self-sufficient being. Humility includes knowledge of one’s limitations, exemplified in certain respects by children. However, children are most likely unaware of their virtues and vices, and so we must look elsewhere for support for this aspect of the self-knowledge included in (C1). The foregoing discussion of u and v supports the claim that humility includes knowledge of one’s moral shortcomings. The term tapeinophrosune is relevant to this as well. As we saw, this term includes knowledge of one’s moral flaws. Philippians 2:1–11 is also relevant to (C1)’s claim concerning knowledge of one’s vices and virtues, insofar as one implication of the passage is that proper self-estimation is part of what it means to be humble. While the focus of this is our status as creatures—dependent and flawed, especially in relation to God’s power and perfection—it is arguably the case that one’s self-estimation can properly include knowledge of one’s virtues. In the Philippians passage, such knowledge is latently present. Paul states that encouragement, consolation, love, sharing in the Spirit, compassion, and sympathy are present in the Philippian church.89 The presence of these traits in this early Christian community requires the presence of the corresponding virtues in its individual members. For instance, a significant number of people in the Philippian church must have the virtue of compassion to a significant degree if the community can accurately be described as compassionate. And knowledge of the presence of virtue, both in oneself and others, forms part of the motivation for regarding others as more important than oneself (see Philippians 2:1–4). The humble person will have this form of self-knowledge with respect to her virtues, but she will not be focused on or overly 88 Dependence is often included in accounts of Christian humility. Augustine’s account, for example, focuses on acknowledging one’s dependency on God. See Jennifer Herdt, “Frailty, Fragmentation, and Social Dependency in the Cultivation of Christian Virtue,” in Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology, and Philosophy, ed. Nancy Snow (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 227–49; and Augustine, City of God, Book V, chapter 19. 89 Witherington, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, pp. 120–1.

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concerned with these positive aspects of her character. In addition, knowledge of one’s virtues underscores the fact that we are dependent on God, as whatever moral virtues Christians possess are present because of God’s redemptive work. The humble person recognizes this fact, too. And all of this reflects what Thomistic philosopher Josef Pieper says, namely, that humility includes a form of self-knowledge, understood as a “man’s estimation of himself according to truth.”90 So when a person possesses virtue, humility includes this form of selfknowledge. Self-knowledge with respect to one’s virtues and vices is also present in some non-religious conceptions of this trait. In his nonreligious account of humility—which overlaps in some ways with (C1)—Norvin Richards argues that it “involves having an accurate sense of oneself, sufficiently firm to resist pressures toward incorrect revisions . . . the pressures are to think too much of oneself, rather than too little,” and also includes “an inclination to keep one’s accomplishments, traits, and so on in unexaggerated perspective, even if stimulated to exaggerate.”91 For Richards, the humble person neither overestimates nor underestimates herself because of the depth and accuracy of her self-appraisal. Humility is valuable in a variety of ways, according to Richards. For instance, the humble person, the person who has an unexaggerated self-perspective, will be able to accurately judge the accomplishments of others in part because humility involves accurately judging one’s own accomplishments. For Richards, this skill of accurate judgment is transferable in this manner. The humble person will feel less pressure to undervalue the accomplishments of others, because she does not need to protect her self-image by doing so. Other reasons offered by Richards for the claim that humility is a virtue are that it yields an inclination to forgive others, fosters having reasonable expectations of oneself, and is conducive to intimacy with others. It also precludes self-absorption, improper pride, envy, and jealousy. These claims made by Richards about humility generally are also true of (C1). For Richards, humility is an accurate estimation of oneself that includes both beliefs and dispositions. In contrast to this, A. T. Nuyen 90

Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, p. 189. Norvin Richards, Humility (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992), pp. 5, 8. 91

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takes humility to involve “an underestimation of one’s achievements, or worth . . . to a suitably low level.”92 This is a purely cognitive account of humility that centers on the underestimation of one’s achievements and worth. J. L. A. Garcia rejects Nuyen’s account in part because it limits humility to a mere cognitive state. Garcia rightly points out that a moral virtue ought to include dispositional desires, feelings, preferences, and choices.93 This is part of the reason I am discussing cognitive, emotive, and active modules of humility. Virtues include cognitive elements, but go beyond them as well. In his discussion of humility, Garcia offers two additional criticisms of the nonoverestimation aspect of the account proffered by Richards. A person may not be as good at some activity or skill as she believes herself to be and yet still be humble. For example, she may believe that she is the best goalkeeper in the world while in actuality she is not, and yet remain humble about her overestimated abilities as a goalkeeper. For Garcia, this shows that nonoverestimation is not necessary for humility. Alternatively, “someone might accurately see her achievements but still make too much of them, strutting about, for example, or being disposed to do so.”94 Nonoverestimation, then, is not sufficient for humility. Before moving on to a different limitation present in Richards’ view, I would like to point out that Garcia’s line of reasoning reveals a problem in the quest for a definition of humility which I think is sometimes present in philosophical analyses of this virtue. Garcia employs analytic methodology as he seeks the necessary and sufficient conditions of humility both in his evaluation of other accounts and the construction of his own. While I to an extent agree with such an approach—the approach in this book is one of analytic moral theology, after all—there is a potential problem with it given the modularity of humility (and other virtues). One might argue that a particular module is not necessary for humility, if one defines humility in terms of one or more other modules of this trait. The result of 92 A. T. Nuyen, “Just Modesty,” American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1998): 101–9. Quotation is from p. 101. On p. 108 Nuyen describes humility as involving a low self-estimation, rather than underestimation of oneself. 93 J. L. A. Garcia, “Being Unimpressed with Ourselves: Reconceiving Humility,” Philosophia 34 (2006): 417–35. For a different and distinctly Christian criticism of Richards’ account of humility, see also Mark McLeod-Harrison, Repairing Eden (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), pp. 70–85. 94 Garcia, “Being Unimpressed with Ourselves,” p. 423.

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such an approach would be a truncated definition of the virtue. For example, one might argue that x is necessary for humility, while his opponent counters that this is not the case in light of her conviction that y is necessary and sufficient for humility and concludes that x is a mistaken analysis of the trait. Yet if Christian humility is modular in the way that I argue, then such an approach should take this into account.95 The best way to do this, I think, is to consider the virtue of humility in its perfect or ideal form, as I am seeking to do in this chapter. In this form, humility includes all of the modules discussed in this chapter. This approach allows for the complexity and modularity of virtue, and seeks a full understanding of humility as a Christian ideal.96 And this is in part why I maintain that (C1) is a module of humility but not the whole of the virtue. Humility includes accurate self-assessment, but it is much more than this. In the goalkeeper case, this means that the goalkeeper who wrongly believes that she is the best goalkeeper in the world does not possess (C1) with respect to this belief: she fails to possess self-knowledge in this domain. However, she might possess other modules of humility with respect to her false belief that she is the best in the world. For example, she may believe that God deserves the credit for her (overestimated) talents, that these talents do not make her more important or valuable than anyone else, and that regardless of her belief that she is the world’s best, she nevertheless should place the interests of others ahead of her own.97 This is consistent with the intuitions about humility Garcia discusses. This analysis is also consistent with the claim that (C1) is necessary but not sufficient for humility,

95 For a different criticism of this sort of approach, see T. Ryan Byerly, “The Values and Varieties of Humility,” Philosophia 42 (2014): 889–910. For a reply to Byerly, see J. L. A. Garcia, “Methods and Findings in the Study of Virtues: Humility,” Philosophia 43 (2015): 325–35. Garcia criticizes Byerly’s conception of humility as an altruistic disposition to subordinate one’s own good to the good of others, when the relevant good of the other is equal to, greater than, or incommensurate with one’s own good. Garcia’s criticism does not undercut my conception of humility, because I do not hold that it is solely an interpersonal virtue. 96 In “Humility,” Kellenberger makes a related point when he argues that humility is a polythetic concept. That is, its instantiations are not fully captured by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead, they “are marked by characteristics shared by many but not all instances” (p. 324). I am not endorsing this suggestion. 97 These represent (C2), (C4), and (C3), respectively, which are discussed in what follows.

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then, in its ideal form, because other modules of the virtue are needed for one to be the ideal exemplar of this trait. While there are similarities between Richards’ account of humility and a more complete analysis of this virtue in its ideal Christian form, there is a problem with his account (and others that are similar to it) related to the transcendent. Vance Morgan points out that such accounts share a problematic assumption, namely, that humility is primarily a self-referential virtue. Morgan goes on to argue that this is due to their being grounded in a naturalistic metaphysic that eschews any role for the transcendent.98 I agree, and on a Christian view the complete form of humility will essentially include other-regarding and transcendent elements. In fact, as I have noted, it will emphasize these over its self-referential aspects. While it is less important than the other-regarding aspects of humility, the self-referential is still important. A significant selfreferential aspect of (C1) is knowledge of one’s own character. This type of self-knowledge can be explored through a brief consideration of what Aristotle has to say about the pursuit of moral excellence.99 Achieving such excellence is difficult, given the requirements of complete virtue concerning knowing what is right, desiring what is right, and doing what is right in a manner that is sensitive to context. In our pursuit of virtue, Aristotle calls for us to examine ourselves, and consider our own particular tendencies related to a virtue or a vice. Not all of our tendencies will be vicious, fortunately, but knowing which virtues and vices come more easily to us can be beneficial as we seek to acquire and practice the virtues, as well as shed and avoid the vices. The humble person will be able to face both the strengths and weaknesses of her character, and will do so for the sake of further moral progress, in the spirit of Aristotle. Related to knowledge of one’s character, (C1) also acts as a corrective with respect to the human tendency towards self-serving bias.100 Vance Morgan, “Humility and the Transcendent,” Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001): 307–22. Though I will bracket these points for my purposes, Morgan also claims that the nonoverestimation account requires a principle of fundamental equal worth of all human beings as well as a justification for the assumption that the collective value of human beings is comparatively low. In his view, some sort of transcendent, non-naturalistic metaphysic is needed. 99 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109a10–b15. 100 David G. Myers, “Humility: Psychology Meets Theology,” Reformed Review 48 (1995): 195–206. 98

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This is another reason for thinking that it is a module of a virtue. We tend to have inflated views of ourselves, to see ourselves as better than average in numerous ways. There is substantial empirical evidence which shows that people generally see themselves as more ethical than others, better workers than others, more intelligent than the average person, and both better and safer than the average driver (this last selfascription is made even by most of those who have been hospitalized due to an automobile accident). In contrast to this, the humble person is aware of her limitations, both those that are particularly hers and those that are true of her qua human. (C1) helps to undermine the tendency to self-serving bias. (C1) is an important module of humility, but humility is much more than this. On a Christian account, there is an important reason underlying the claim that we should keep our accomplishments in an unexaggerated perspective, which I will discuss below in the context of (C2). First, though, it is important to note that (C1) does not include any type of irrational self-denigration. With the discussion at the beginning of this chapter in mind, (C1) does not include w (“I am the worst of all sinners”) but it is consistent with both u (“For all I know, I am more sinful than anyone else”) and v (“I have a low view of myself by virtue of my knowledge of my moral frailty and sinfulness”). In fact, (C1) includes Bernard of Clairvaux’s view that humility is “a virtue by which a man has a low opinion of himself because he knows himself well,”101 i.e., it includes v. A Christian anthropology includes a recognition of the moral frailty of human beings. On such an understanding of human nature, the humble person will have selfknowledge with respect to his past sins and moral shortcomings. He will have this same knowledge regarding his present moral state. Even those who might accurately be described as Christian moral exemplars will possess these forms of self-knowledge. Such a person may rightly believe that at present it would not be possible for him to commit a particular immoral act, but this is no reason to reject v. And if this is the case for the Christian moral exemplar, it will also be the case for others who are at earlier stages of moral and spiritual development. With this in mind, the person who knows herself well in a manner that is informed by such Christian anthropology will have an appropriately low opinion of herself. This is not to

101

Bernard of Clairvaux, The Steps of Humility and Pride, p. 30.

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endorse self-denigration, but rather to recognize our moral and spiritual frailty alongside the intrinsic worth we possess as imagebearers of God. But why should someone who is a moral exemplar retain a low opinion of herself, in the sense described by v? First, the teleological nature of Christian humility is relevant. The telos of this virtue includes likeness to and union with God. It also includes communion with other human persons. In short, humility is constitutive of and conducive to shalom. For the Christian, Jesus Christ is the perfect exemplar of humility in particular, and more generally the human telos. Given this, our merely human exemplar will retain a low opinion of herself, given the expansive gulf that exists between her character and the character of Jesus Christ, whom she seeks to imitate. As Teresa of Avila puts it, “by looking at His purity, we shall see our foulness; by meditating on His humility, we shall see how far we are from being humble.”102 This gulf is impassible, given the perfection of the character of Christ. However, the impossibility of perfectly imitating and exemplifying the character of Christ does not entail that undertaking the project is hopeless or futile. The follower of Christ can grow in the virtues, and much progress can be made as she comes to possess more modules of the virtues across many different domains, even if strictly speaking absolute moral perfection is unattainable. Such an exemplar will also come to see her own fallenness and vice more clearly, as I discussed earlier with reference to Mathois, John Owen, Jonathan Edwards, and Alvin Plantinga. Many Christian thinkers have maintained that as one makes moral and spiritual progress, one becomes more aware of one’s own sin and vice. Our Christian exemplar, then, should see these facets of her character with more clarity than those who have made less progress. This gives her good reason to believe v.103 102

St. Teresa of Avila, Interior Castle, p. 25. It is also worth noting that something similar exists for those who do not possess Christian belief but nevertheless seek moral progress. In his discussion of a general non-religious form of humility, Joseph Kupfer notes that “the person with humility is humbled before the very standards and ideals which govern his life and toward which he aspires” (p. 256.); see his “The Moral Perspective of Humility,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003): 249–69. So the moral realist, regardless of her religious belief or lack thereof, may still have reason to be humble and have a certain sort of low opinion of herself, if she recognizes the moral demands of values such as justice and compassion, alongside her own imperfect but still valuable aspiration to live in a way that reflects such values. 103

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Another reason the exemplar has for maintaining a low opinion of herself has to do with her past failures. On a Christian understanding, the claim that all human beings are in some sense fallen creatures refers not only to human actions, but also to human dispositions and desires. The moral exemplar will be aware of her past moral shortcomings, not from a pathological sense of guilt or shame but rather from a clear and deep understanding of the standards she holds and her own failure to meet those standards, especially those that concern the beliefs, desires, dispositions, and resulting actions related to the human tendency to self-centeredness. The exemplar will see this tendency in herself, in both its past and present manifestations. In fact, it is likely that this clear thinking and moral sensitivity will have played significant roles in her becoming an exemplar. A third reason that the exemplar has for endorsing v is that she realizes that her current moral state, however praiseworthy, could only be obtained and can only be sustained via the grace and assistance of God. It is, in many ways, a gift rather than an accomplishment. I will return to this later in my discussion of (C2), a distinct cognitive module of humility that focuses on issues related to the divine and human roles in moral and spiritual transformation. A fourth reason that the exemplar is right to believe v has to do with moral luck.104 This was briefly discussed above when considering u. For all the moral exemplar knows, if she was born and reared in different circumstances, she may have become a very different and much less moral person. In fact, she may have been quite vicious. Given her dependence on family, friends, mentors, and a variety of circumstances that contributed to her becoming an exemplar, for all she knows significant changes in one or more of these could have had deeply detrimental effects on her character. This provides further reason for her to be humble, and to believe that v is true of her. A fifth reason for the exemplar to maintain a low opinion of herself is that even if she is unable to commit some particular class of immoral act today, she realizes that moral regress is possible for her if she begins to make choices that undermine her character. For example, if our exemplar lives in an economically developed part of the world, and has cultivated the trait of generosity, this virtue could 104 Some theists will reject the notion of moral “luck.” Moral “good fortune” may be substituted here. I employ “luck” given that this is the standard way such issues are discussed in the philosophical literature.

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slowly be undermined in a culture where consumerism is rampant and the supply of luxury goods is plentiful. Over time, she may become less generous and instead engage in conspicuous consumption. The specifics of the case are less important, but the pattern illustrated by it is a familiar one. The exemplar has reason to maintain a low opinion of herself, then, based upon certain facts of human nature related to moral progress, regress, and frailty. For the Christian, having a low view of oneself is not based on an irrational belief that w is true, but rather on a theologically and existentially grounded awareness of one’s moral dependence and frailty.105 In this way, even the moral exemplar identifies with the tax collector of Luke 18 who strikes his own chest and asks for mercy from God as a sinner, rather than the Pharisee who praises his own fulfillment of his religious duties and thanks God that he is not like other men. Finally, consider two further points related to this module of humility. First, the self-knowledge referred to in (C1) may include knowledge of one’s own humility. I noted above that the author of Matthew’s gospel reports Jesus ascribing humility to himself, saying that he is “humble in heart.” Given this, it seems that on a Christian account of humility, there is no principled reason for thinking that a humble person cannot know that he is humble or even claim that he is humble. Nevertheless, there may be other reasons for avoiding such claims, given the moral gap between followers of Christ and Christ himself, their moral exemplar. One reason for skepticism about such self-ascriptions of humility, and about virtue in general, is that pride may be lurking in the heart of even a very humble human being. Bernard Mandeville makes this claim, stating that “the humblest man alive must confess, that the reward of a virtuous action, which is the satisfaction that ensues upon it, consists in a certain pleasure he procures to himself by contemplating his own worth: which pleasure, together with the occasion of it, are as certain signs of pride, as looking pale and trembling at any imminent danger, are the symptoms of fear.”106 For Mandeville, the pleasure experienced when an agent

105 For von Hildebrand, our frailty is one reason that the humble person should not contemplate his or her own virtues. See his Humility, pp. 71–6. 106 Bernard Mandeville, “An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue,” British Moralists 1650–1800, Volume I, ed. D. D. Raphael (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1991), p. 236.

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contemplates her worth is indicative of pride. In addition, for the humble person to be aware of her humility may seem wrong because it appears immodest or prideful for an individual to possess this awareness. That is, it appears to be somehow paradoxical to believe or claim “I am humble,” because having such a belief or making such a claim itself arguably evinces pride. First, in reply to Mandeville, it is not clear why taking pleasure in one’s own worth is a certain sign of pride. It might rather be a cause of gratitude to God for being an image-bearer of God. There is a key distinction to be made between one’s moral excellence (which given the role of divine agency is surely a reason for gratitude) and one’s worth. The humble person may experience pleasure or satisfaction connected to her own moral progress, but will also be dissatisfied because she will be acutely aware of her own shortcomings as well. When she is aware of her own virtue, gratitude to God will be the primary feature of her psychology. While I do not argue that gratitude is a module of humility, the humble person should also be a grateful person. Given the role of God and of other people in bringing good about in the life of the humble person, there are sound reasons for thinking that gratitude to God and others will be present in her character related not only to her own intrinsic value and moral progress, but for much else as well. Humility fosters gratitude, in part because the humble person is “aware of [her] own lack of selfsufficiency in achieving the good.”107 The humble person will be grateful to God and others for the ways in which they have helped her achieve and experience the good. Finally, there is empirical evidence that links humility with the trait of gratitude.108 The humble person may know that he possesses several modules of this virtue, but he will not tend to focus on this fact, or more generally on himself. Even if he is at times aware of his own virtue, it will rarely occupy his attention for long. Ideally, he will appreciate excellence, moral and non-moral, wherever it is found, regardless of whether it is found in himself or others. As Lewis puts it in his discussion of humility, God “wants to bring the man to a state of mind in which he could design the best cathedral in the world, and know it to be the best, and rejoice in the fact, without being any more (or less) or otherwise Boyd, “Pride and Humility,” p. 259. Julie Exline and Peter Hill, “Humility: A Consistent and Robust Predictor of Generosity,” The Journal of Positive Psychology 7 (2012): 209. 107 108

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glad at having done it than he would be if it had been done by another. [God] wants him, in the end, to be so free from any bias in his own favour that he can rejoice in his own talents as frankly and gratefully as in his neighbour’s talents—or in a sunrise, an elephant, or a waterfall.”109 Second, and finally, an important claim that is implicit in much of the above but should be made explicit here, that helps to justify (C1), is the Christian view of human beings as creatures. We are limited in part because we are creatures. We are never fully independent beings because we depend on our creator for our very existence. As Josef Pieper puts it, as creatures humans “continually receive being and essence from the divine Source and Creator.”110 As creatures, it is not just that we owe our initial coming into existence to God, but also our continuing in existence. As our creator, God not only brings us into being, but also sustains us in our being. Having an awareness of our limits as creatures can help yield an appropriate self-understanding. A consideration of our creatureliness also leads us to the second cognitive module of Christian humility.

(C2) The humble person knows that God deserves the credit for her salvation, talents, abilities, accomplishments, and virtues The proud person takes too much credit for her accomplishments and positive qualities, neglecting or underappreciating God’s direct role, as well as the role he plays through other people and providential circumstances. The self-denigrating person takes too little credit, in the sense that he fails to realize his own important albeit limited role. The humble person avoids both of these extremes.111 First, she knows

109 C. S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters, revised paperback edition (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1982), p. 64. 110 Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2012), p. 62. 111 This aspect of humility would help ground the attitude discussed by J. L. A. Garcia as constitutive of humility as such in his “Being Unimpressed with Ourselves: Reconceiving Humility.” According to Garcia, a person is “humble about (with respect to) her being F (e.g., one or more of her talents, skills, and virtues, her achievements, her possessions, ancestors, and so on with possible grounds of pride) if, only if, and to the extent that, she has a stable, deep-seated, and restrained disposition to play down in her own thinking, self-concept, and feelings—and therein to decenter, to (place in the) background, (not to stress, focus on, make much of, relish, or delight in)—the significance of her being F and, because of that, similarly not to stress in her self-concept her liberties, options, entitlements, and privileges” (p. 418). (C2) provides a significant reason to play down the significance of being F.

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that apart from divine grace and forgiveness, she would not be able to experience salvation via authentic faith. It is a gift. She knows that God deserves credit for the goods listed in (C2) in two senses. First, God deserves ultimate credit insofar as he is the creator and sustainer of all. He has granted human beings the capacities we need to receive, pursue, and exemplify a variety of goods, enabling us to flourish. The goods referred to in (C2) originate in God. Second, on Christian theism God deserves such credit insofar as his role is vital with respect to her moral, intellectual, and spiritual development. Not only is God the originator of these goods, but he is their sustainer as well. In order to cultivate these capacities and experience these goods more fully, she must actively depend on God (I discuss this aspect of dependence on God in more detail below).112 All of this, including the fact that she is able to see her need for God’s assistance and grace for her growth in virtue, is a reflection of the grace of God.113 With this in mind, (C2) helps to reveal the fact that humility is an example of what Alasdair MacIntyre refers to as the “virtues of acknowledged dependence.”114 MacIntyre distinguishes these from virtues of independence. The latter are virtues that help us become independent practical reasoners, and include such traits as courage, truthfulness, and temperance. The virtues of acknowledged dependence, however, “also enable us to participate in relationships of giving and receiving through which our ends as practical reasoners are to be achieved.”115 As dependent rational animals, we need to cultivate our own capacities in order to flourish, and we need the help of others.116 This is consistent with the notion that many Christians have traditionally held, namely, that while we ultimately owe our well-being to God, it is also the case that God employs others in our community to help secure our well-being. The virtues of acknowledged dependence help us to live in community with others in ways that are conducive to

112 There are different manifestations of such active dependence, but spiritual practices such as fasting, prayer, community, and meditation are ways in which one may express it. For more on this, see chapter 5. 113 See John Cassian, Institutes, Book XII, chapter XXXIII. 114 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1999), pp. 119–28. 115 ibid. p. 120. 116 Boyd, “Pride and Humility,” pp. 256–60. Boyd’s analysis of MacIntyre focuses on our need for other humans. Here, I appropriate this but include our dependence on God in my discussion of these issues.

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human flourishing, both theirs and ours. The recognition that we are not self-sufficient, that we need others for a variety of goods, reveals our need for humility as well as the truth of the claim that it is a virtue. Humility helps us to see ourselves as needing others, both human and divine, in a variety of ways. In The Screwtape Letters, C. S. Lewis, through the demon Screwtape, makes the following observation which is relevant to this discussion and to (C2) more generally: [God] will also try to render real in the patient’s mind a doctrine which they all profess but find it difficult to bring home to their feelings—the doctrine that they did not create themselves, that their talents were given them, and that they might as well be proud of the colour of their hair.117

While Lewis is not attempting to give a full analysis of humility, his point is nonetheless worth considering as a means of gaining a fuller understanding of this virtue. There is a sense in which what Lewis states with respect to humility is correct. From a Christian perspective, talents are gifts from God, and we have no more control over which talents we possess than we do the (original) color of our hair.118 However, there is a difference worth noting regarding not just our talents but also at least some of our character traits, both intellectual and moral. Many of our talents and virtues must be cultivated. Given this, we have a role to play in developing (as well as expressing) them. An excellent writer must cultivate and practice the relevant skills. An excellent human being must do the same. Generally speaking, God will neither cultivate our talents for us nor form our character against our will; on a Christian understanding of such things we possess responsibility insofar as we have a cooperative role to play in these forms of self-improvement. There is a vast and diverse literature concerning the potential roles of human beings and God with respect to moral and spiritual development. Here I will merely describe rather than argue for the view I favor concerning the relationship between divine agency, human agency, and moral development. I then discuss its relevance to (C2). I hold a view that is partially described by Jennifer Herdt, when she says that “grace can work through ordinary processes of habituation, 117 118

C. S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters, p. 65. See also McLeod-Harrison, Repairing Eden, p. 81.

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allowing a gradual transcendence of prideful self-love, a growing recognition of our true final end, a developing sense of our moral agency.”119 When humans embody and reflect some aspect of the divine nature, this is the result of divine grace and divine agency acting in concert with our own. Human agency and divine agency are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for progress in virtue, on this view. There are elements of thought from both Augustine and Aquinas present in such a view, but it is in the work of Erasmus that Herdt finds a substantive conception of the acquisition and exemplification of Christian virtue as something that involves both divine and human activity. For Erasmus, “the exercise of human agency involved in the imitation of Christ is at the same time an indwelling of Christ in us and thus a human participation in divine agency.”120 Herdt expressly relates the imitation of Christ to humility: Christians are indeed called upon to imitate Christ, but this act of imitation is not a willful grasping after divine perfection. Rather, to imitate Christ is fundamentally to imitate Christ’s humility and thus be willing to be dependent, receptive, open to transformation from without. Erasmus thus exhorts Christians to be on guard against two forms of the semblance of virtue: one that relies on mere performance rather than transformation of the heart, and one (that of the Stoic sage and Neoplatonic aspirant to divinity) that relies on self rather than God, fundamentally misunderstanding the nature of Christ’s example and its transformative power.121

The imitation of Christ includes union with Christ. Moreover, elements of both (C1) and (C2) are present in the foregoing points offered by Herdt with respect to humility. This view of character development recognizes that humans play a limited yet active role, but it also includes the claim that the power for deep transformation of character— “transformation of the heart”—is divine. Given this, the humble person is rightly characterized as knowing that God deserves the lion’s share of the credit for her talents, abilities, accomplishments, and virtues. This view of Christian moral formation is distinct from the mere habituation model, most often associated with Aristotle, who advises those who seek to cultivate virtue to perform virtuous acts. As he 119 Jennifer Herdt, Putting on Virtue (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 3. 120 121 ibid. p. 119. ibid. p. 115.

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puts it, “we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, and brave by doing brave actions.”122 The foregoing view of Christian moral formation has an advantage over views that exclusively focus on habituation.123 On the mere habituation model, we consider what the virtuous person would do, and attempt to do the same. Over time, this will lead to the formation of virtue. Yet we can perform virtuous actions from non-virtuous motives, or for non-virtuous reasons. For example, one may perform generous actions, but do so in order to gain public notoriety. While a defender of Aristotle might argue that the virtuous character will include the experience of appropriate pleasure that is a product of performing a virtuous act in the proper manner, this raises a problem. If a virtuous action only produces virtuous character when one enjoys performing such an action, then the desired virtue must already be present in the agent in order for her to enjoy the act and become virtuous. It is difficult to see how the process gets off the ground. While there will be cases of habituation and proper character formation grounded in one’s upbringing, the issue under consideration here is the development of a virtue that one does not yet possess. A theory of moral formation should inform us about how to cultivate the exemplar’s psychological states that yield virtuous actions. As Steve Porter puts it, “we don’t practice the virtuous acts of the moral exemplar in order to get the exemplar’s character. Rather, we practice the lifestyle that made the exemplar the kind of person he or she is, in order to develop the same kind of virtuous character.”124 The account of moral development discussed above, based on the thought of Erasmus, has room for Porter’s insight concerning the cultivation of virtue. Many Christian traditions include a commitment to a variety of spiritual practices, including meditation, prayer, fasting, study, and solitude, among others.125 Such practices are

122

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103b. Steve L. Porter, “Contentment,” in Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday Life, Michael W. Austin and R. Douglas Geivett, eds (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), pp. 126–44. 124 ibid. pp. 138–9. 125 For more on this see ibid. pp. 126–44; Henri Nouwen, The Way of the Heart (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1981); Dallas Willard, The Spirit of the Disciplines (San Francisco, CA: Harper, 1989); and Richard Foster, Celebration of Discipline (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1998). For a discussion of such practices that includes other religious traditions, see James Gould, “Becoming Good: The Role of Spiritual 123

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present in portions of the New Testament, and the canonical gospels portray Jesus as practicing and endorsing them. Contemporary advocates of these spiritual practices note that they are ways for the religious believer to open up her life to the power and activity of God. This complements the points made above by Herdt in her discussion of Erasmus concerning human receptivity and openness to transformation. These practices are thought by many to provide an avenue for divine power to work in the character of the religious believer. In addition, they provide a further way in which to conceptualize in practical terms one manner in which human agency and divine agency may cooperate in the formation of virtue. The human agent chooses to engage in such practices, God acts through them, and then the psychological states which serve as the basis for virtuous action and in part constitute virtuous character are the result. The upshot is that we humans do not give ourselves the capacities, talents, or virtues we possess, even though we play a role in developing and expressing them in partnership with and dependence upon God and others.126 Divine agency and human agency are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the cultivation of an excellent Christian character and a flourishing Christian life.127 With this in mind, then, (C2) is an important module of the virtue of humility.

(C3) The humble person believes that he ought to have a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over the satisfaction of his own interests (C3) involves intentionally taking a certain perspective about one’s obligations to others relative to oneself. This shift in our thinking is necessary, given our propensity for self-centeredness. This is rational because the Christian can entrust his welfare to God, rather than seeking to manage it himself. This yields a particular freedom to focus Practice,” Philosophical Practice 1 (2005): 135–47. I discuss the connections between humility and these spiritual disciplines in more detail in chapter 5. 126 For a helpful discussion of infused and acquired virtue, see Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke, Aquinas’s Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009); and Andrew Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012). 127 One may be subject to bad moral luck, but from a Christian perspective such luck will one day run out, when the effective reign of God’s kingdom is allencompassing.

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more heavily on the welfare of others. Moreover, in a community that functions in a way that is consistent with Paul’s instructions in the letter to the Philippians, the Christian also entrusts his welfare to other members of his community as a means by which God cares for him. Recall Paul’s moral exhortation to the Philippians that they intentionally take a particular perspective regarding others in their community, “in humility” they are to “regard others as better than” themselves. They are to see others as having a particular property, that of being “better than” than themselves. If no further clarification of this point were given, it would be both morally and theologically problematic. Morally, it seems wrong to take some human beings as having greater worth or significance than others. There are strong biblical and theological reasons in support of the view that all human beings are equal with respect to their intrinsic worth and basic dignity. Theologically, if Christ is taken to be the exemplar of humility, then problems arise for the claim that he saw others as being better than himself. Christians at least ought to see themselves as being less than Christ, both morally and metaphysically. Moreover, if Christ genuinely saw a mere human to be more important or better than himself, then that would seem to be a case of self-deception, which would be an unsatisfactory result for the one who is thought to be the perfect moral and intellectual exemplar for Christians. Another theological problem looming here concerns ascribing humility to God the Father, which is desirable, but taking humility to require that one sees others as better than oneself has the undesirable result that God the Father sees his creatures as better than himself.128 These problems can be avoided. In Philippians 2:1–11, which is the primary basis for (C3), Paul clarifies what is meant by taking others to be better than oneself. This instruction from Paul to the Philippians should be interpreted in a precise way, which is clarified when Paul exhorts each of the Philippians to “look not to your own interests, but to the interests of others.” It is plausible to think that the best way of understanding what it means to regard others as better than oneself in light of the context of the passage and the nature of humility concerns how we weigh the interests of others relative to our own. More specifically, we are to prefer the satisfaction of their interests to the

128

I discuss this objection in more detail in the next chapter.

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satisfaction of our own interests. I discussed this earlier in my exegesis of Philippians 2:1–11. The interpretation given there was that members of the Christian community at Philippi are to regard others as better than themselves in the sense that others are to be taken as surpassing themselves by looking out for their interests over against their own. (C3), then, does not include the belief that the interests of others are objectively more important or valuable than my own, or that others are more valuable than I. Instead, it means that I believe that I ought to prefer that their interests be satisfied over against my own. These interests include that which is conducive to their flourishing, physically, emotionally, psychologically, and spiritually. The nature and content of this preference will be discussed in more detail below, but at present the point is that the humble person believes that she ought to have such a preference, as a follower and imitator of Christ. Christ exemplifies such a preference for the interests of others, and this serves to justify (in part) the belief denoted by (C3) for those who seek to imitate Christ’s example in an analogous manner. There is a type of duality in the foregoing analysis of (C3). We inhabit a particular perspective in the role of follower of Christ in which we believe that we ought to prefer that the interests of others be satisfied relative to our own, while also recognizing that from God’s perspective we are just as important as they (and our interests are just as important as theirs). This dual nature of humility is to be expected, given the Christological approach of the account. As Mark Noll points out in his call for scholarship grounded in Christology, the fact that “some important results of scholarship will have a dual or doubled character would seem to flow naturally from the realities summarized by the Chalcedonian Definition.”129 According to this definition, Christ is a single person with both a human and a divine nature. With this in mind, Noll points out that if everything exists from, in, and for Christ, then given his dual nature we should expect that some form of duality would surface as we explore other aspects of reality. And insofar as my current analysis of humility is based upon the humility of Christ, and is therefore deeply Christological, we should expect such a result in this context. The upshot with respect to humility is that we are not to believe that others’ interests matter more than ours to God, who is impartial, but rather we are to believe 129 Mark A. Noll, Jesus Christ and the Life of the Mind (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), p. 45.

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that the interests of others are to matter more to us than our own as we make choices and act, all else being equal. In order to better understand the dual nature of (C3), it will be useful to consider the concept of role obligations in more depth. Those familiar with this concept will perhaps wonder whether the above is consistent with the generally accepted account of such obligations as special obligations, i.e., as obligations that we do not have to all but rather to particular others by virtue of some relevant role or relationship. Parents have special obligations to their children which they do not have to all children, a husband has special obligations to his wife that he has to no one else, and employers have obligations to their employees that they do not have to others. Such role obligations are special, rather than general, obligations. The problem, then, is that Paul seems to be indicating that followers of Christ have the obligation to believe (C3) and put it into practice, but it is an obligation to all other persons. As such, it would be a general rather than special obligation. And since role obligations are usually conceived of as special obligations, a problem arises. In response to this, consider two possibilities. First, in the context of Philippians Paul is addressing members of a particular religious community and the nature of their relationships with one another. One interpretation of the scope of (C3), then, might be that it is to be believed and applied within a particular community which one has voluntarily entered. Given the Christian practice of referring to one’s fellow believers as “brothers” and “sisters,” the foregoing is consistent with the accepted account of the nature of special role-based obligations. Second, we might interpret (C3) as a role-based obligation that is general insofar as it is owed in some sense to everyone, but one that we come to have upon assuming a particular or special role. In this case, the particular role is that of “follower of Christ.” And one is a follower of Christ in part to the extent that one imitates him. With this in mind, given Jesus’ example as well as his teaching in the gospels that we are to love our neighbors as ourselves, the scope of (C3) could plausibly be widened in this manner and understood to be a role-based obligation for those who seek to be followers of Christ and participate in the divine nature (see 2 Peter 1:1–8). This generality of scope is also a feature of other role-based obligations. A physician arguably has an obligation to help others who are sick or injured as circumstances arise in which she has the opportunity to do so. For instance, she may be on an international trip and witness a

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car accident. Given her ability and moral obligations as a physician, she has a stronger obligation to assist the injured compared to a philosopher or theologian who might also be present, given her profession and the obligations it includes. And she would be wrong to deny the provision of such help on the grounds that the accident victims are not her patients. The point is that in this sense one can have special obligations to everyone, which may only come into play as circumstances place one in the position to fulfill such obligations. (C3) involves a cognitive element, then, in which we have a particular belief grounded in our role-based obligations. The preference referred to in (C3) is a prima facie preference, as circumstances and context will dictate when one may prefer the satisfaction of her own interests. I will offer a fuller analysis of this preference, including the prima facie condition, in the section below dealing with the emotive modules of humility. The central point at present is that the humble person will accept as true the claim that she ought to have the preference alluded to by (C3).130

(C4) The humble person will not conceive of human beings in a hierarchical manner in light of their equal inherent dignity and worth as image-bearers of God The humble person does not ascribe more value to some over others— the rich over the poor, the successful over the struggling, the healthy over the sick, or the powerful over the weak, to cite a few general examples—because he is convinced that such ways of classifying people are inconsistent with how God views human beings. This is a recurring trait of Jesus as he is portrayed in the canonical gospels and is a consistent biblical theme emphasized in the prophetic language of the Hebrew Bible and the instructions regarding community to the churches of the New Testament.131 The humble person possesses a freedom from concern about her place and the place of others within any human hierarchy. As 130 I say much more about the emotions and actions that correspond to this preference below, in my discussion of (E1) and (A2). My discussion of (C3) is relatively brief in light of this fact and of the reliance of (C3) on the exegesis of Philippians 2 earlier in the chapter. 131 Contemporary readers of the gospels who live, move, and have their being in a context where concern for (or at least rhetoric in support of ) egalitarian values often miss the countercultural status of (C4) in the Ancient Near East.

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Robert Roberts puts it, humility is “a matter of viewing everybody as ultimately or basically equal.”132 This does not entail the denial of the differences that exist between people, but rather that with respect to humility, “its conception of human equality would turn on a feature of the self that transcends such differences.”133 That feature turns out to be the fact that we are all God’s children, or potentially so, and are all objects of the love of God in equal measure. This also grounds one’s self-confidence, and prevents one from slipping into the vice of self-denigration. This is the case because, as Roberts puts it, “God loves me for myself . . . in the way that a good mother loves the fruit of her womb.”134 The humble person can admit both his inferiority with respect to some trait and his superiority with respect to a different trait, without this undermining his self-comfort or the quality of his relationships with others. (C4), then, is important both for how we regard ourselves, and how we regard and relate to others, but its primary emphasis is social rather than self-referential. Given the relatively uncontroversial status of (C4) within Christian thought, I now move on from this module to the final cognitive module of humility that I will discuss.

(C5) The humble person is properly concerned with how others perceive her Humility involves a proper and very limited concern for what others think, as the humble person does not believe that the views of others about her matter, in a certain sense.135 Christ is portrayed in Philippians and other portions of the New Testament as undergoing a humiliating death on a cross. In so doing he provides an example of this 132

Robert C. Roberts, Spiritual Emotions (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), p. 83. ibid. p. 83. 134 ibid. p. 88. On this same page, Roberts states that “Humility is an emotiondisposition . . . a disposition not to feel the emotions associated with caring a lot about one’s status.” I agree, but here want to emphasize that what underlies this emotional independence is the cognitive foundation included in (C4). 135 Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood make a similar point, stating that humility includes a lack of concern for how others regard one and for one’s status. See their “Humility and Epistemic Goods,” Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski, eds (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 261. See also Interior Castle, p. 121, where St. Teresa urges her readers that “we must not desire to be reputed better than we are.” This is a temptation related to a concern for her reputation to which the ideally humble person will not succumb. 133

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module of humility insofar as he, the divine Son of God, allowed himself to be executed in the manner used for criminals and traitors, so that he could fulfill his divine mission. In addition, throughout the gospel narratives Jesus is willing to be rejected by the religious leaders and others who “matter” as he argues with them, rebukes them, and associates with those whom they regard as social and religious outcasts. His commitment to God trumps any worries about how others may perceive him. Similarly, the humble follower of Christ will not allow the perceptions (or misperceptions) of others to move her away from what she takes loving God and others as well as imitatio Christi to require. One example of “proper concern” is found in the context of interpersonal relationships. Someone might be properly concerned that a good friend misunderstands his motives for some action in the relationship, and seek to correct such a misunderstanding for the sake of the relationship. This is an example of a good worth being concerned about, whereas for the humble person mere reputation as such is not. Concern for what others think can become vicious, if it is excessive or insensitive. For instance, think of the abrasive faculty member at a committee meeting who disregards what others think of him and manipulates the conversation for long periods of time, seemingly without good reason. The humble person will avoid such excesses related to (C5). The proud person, however, is often overly concerned with what others think of him, and this motivates him to seek to create and maintain a good personal and professional reputation.136 The proud individual overvalues his reputation, whereas the humble person is properly concerned about his reputation. This proper concern is situated within his commitment of faithfulness to God and the central values that such faithfulness endorses. The humble individual will do what he thinks he ought to

136 (C5) captures what some think of as the virtue of modesty. Julia Driver, in her Uneasy Virtue (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 114–15, uses the terms “humility” and “modesty” interchangeably. My view, though I do not argue for it here, is that (C5) is a module of humility that many refer to using the term “modesty.” But I contend that (C5) is in fact part of the virtue of humility, at least on a Christian taxonomy. The use of the term “modesty” in this sense, then, is superfluous. There are other senses and contexts in which modesty may be an appropriate term, however. For a different view, see Jonathan Kvanvig, Faith and Humility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 150–4. Kvanvig distinguishes humility and modesty, and takes modesty to include something similar to (C5).

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do even if others will criticize or misunderstand his motives, mock or reject him, or in other ways express disapproval or disappointment. In this way, humility can foster courage, as it leads to facing up to these forms of adversity. The foregoing describes what I take to be the central and most significant cognitive modules of humility. While these cognitive modules are very important, there are also crucial modules of humility related to both emotion and action. It is to these modules that we now turn.

Emotive Modules of Humility There are many emotions, desires, and preferences connected with (C1)—(C5), but here I will limit my focus to those emotive aspects of humility that I take to be important for moving the humble person to act for the sake of others. As I noted above, the boundaries between the cognitive modules of humility and the emotive modules are not sharp. This is particularly the case with (E1), which has cognitive and conative aspects. Given that it goes beyond mere belief in important ways, I have chosen to categorize it as an emotive module of the virtue of humility. There is a vast philosophical literature dealing with the nature of belief, emotion, desire, and preference, a discussion of which would take us too far afield. In what follows, I will make use of portions of the literature, without seeking to comprehensively discuss the state of the debate. With this in mind, I now turn to two emotive modules of humility.

(E1) The humble person has a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over his own In the voluntary restriction of his divine capacities involved in the incarnation and crucifixion, motivated by a desire to bring about the kingdom of God and the redemption of human beings as well as the rest of creation, it is clear that the authors of the New Testament take Christ to have preferred the satisfaction of the interests of others over the satisfaction of his own interests. Both one’s own interests and those of others are important, but the individual follower of Christ is to prefer others insofar as she places greater subjective weight, prima facie, on their interests compared to hers.

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In order to understand the particular preference described by (E1), consider first the nature of a preference.137 A preference is not a mere taste, such as the taste for amber ale or the color red. Tastes are immune from deliberation, whereas preferences are not. Preferences are distinct from mere desires, insofar as a preference includes a ranking of at least two alternatives. I do not merely prefer x, but rather I prefer x over y. Mere desires do not possess this comparative aspect. In addition, a preference may be concerned with the selfinterest of its possessor, or it may not. One may prefer an alternative that is worse with respect to one’s own welfare. In the case of (E1), imagine an agent has a choice between S (satisfying his own interests) and O (satisfying the interests of another). Imagine as well that the interests are equal with respect to their potential contribution to the welfare of both parties; they are equally significant for each individual. In such a case, the agent will believe that O has a desirable property that S lacks, namely, that it fulfills the obligation alluded to by (C3), which is partially grounded in the belief held by the humble agent that she ought to imitate Christ as her exemplar of humility. This preference will not always hold nor inevitably lead to a correlative action, however, given the prima facie condition included in (E1), which I will address in due course. At present, it is important to note that the agent prefers satisfying the interests of others, prima facie, over her own, because of her belief that she ought to imitate Christ—including the specific belief in (C3) discussed above—and her desire to engage in this form of imitation of Christ. Her desire to imitate Christ in this way will ideally be motivated by her love for God and others (see Mark 12:28–34 and John 13:34–5). Recall as well that the context of the command to look to the interests of others is that there is a community in which love is present (see Philippians 2:1–2). Her imitation of Christ, motivated by love, also connects to her goal of having character that is increasingly similar to that of Christ. The preference in question will be appropriate, given her beliefs concerning the interests of others that are in play, how they relate to their well-being, the importance for her of the goal of the imitation of Christ, and her love for God and others. The preference is appropriate for her, given these and perhaps many other beliefs, preferences, 137 This discussion draws from Philip Pettit, “Preference, Deliberation and Satisfaction,” Preferences and Well-Being, Serena Olsaretti, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 131–53.

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goals, and desires that she holds. Finally, there may not be a particular phenomenal feel associated with and perhaps supporting the preference for O over S. However, it is better if such a qualitative experience is present alongside the preference, as in the ideally humble person the virtue of humility will be present all the way down. An important point related to (E1) has to do with a correlative belief (or judgment) concerning the interests of others. Another person may believe that some putative interest would be conducive to her own flourishing, and be mistaken about this. The humble person is not bound by the beliefs and judgments of others concerning their interests. Rather, she depends on her own beliefs and judgments, which may be informed by the views of others. She will attempt to determine whether or not a putative interest is a genuine interest, i.e., something that is conducive to the well-being of the other, and this will inform her preference and the decision that she makes in any particular case. Cognitively, if she determines that the putative interest is a genuine interest, then the preference will be rational insofar as she reasonably believes that preferring the interests of the other in this case is best for that other.138 In this way, she satisfies her obligation in these circumstances to imitate the humility of Christ and exemplify love for the other. It will be useful to analyze (E1) further, and consider how an agent might go about intentionally forming such a preference. Doing so will provide further evidence that (E1) is a rational preference, insofar as one can form it without needing to rely on false beliefs about oneself or others. In addition, the following discussion of the formation of (E1) shows that while this module of humility is demanding, it is not overly demanding and can be intentionally formed. It therefore does not violate the ought-implies-can principle. (E1) involves a way of seeing others that is in some ways analogous to what epistemologists call seeing as in the realm of perception.139 When I see something that I take to be a bird, I will often see it as having further properties. I might see a bird as being large, swift, or black. A useful illustration for my present purposes is the duck–rabbit line drawing. Depending on the perspective one intentionally adopts, Christian Piller, “Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences,” in Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59 (2006): 177. 139 Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), p. 26. 138

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one can see it as either a duck or a rabbit. The humble person, then, intentionally sees the satisfaction of the interests of others as preferable to the satisfaction of her own interests. (E1) can be construed as including a willful appearance state. As one may choose to see the duck–rabbit line drawing as either a duck or a rabbit, in an analogous manner one may choose to see the satisfaction of the interests of others as preferable in the way described above. We can willfully or intentionally take the satisfaction of the interests of others to be prima facie preferable to the satisfaction of our own interests. We can arrive at such a perspective in part by focusing more on the interests of others and the desirability of their satisfaction. We can attend to the interests of others, and not our own. This is in part how we may place ourselves in the relevant willful appearance state. The interests of others are in the foreground, and our interests fade into the background of our attention. Christians may meditate upon Philippians 2:1–11 as an aid to creating such a state. Then, in part because of this willful appearance state, we will more easily find ourselves with the preference described in (E1). The primary reason one does this is to fulfill particular role obligations one possesses as a follower of Christ grounded in love for God and others. When we take on this role, the interests of others do become prima facie more important to us than our own, and can appear as such. In chapter 3 I will consider the notion of role obligations and their relevance to humility in greater detail when considering objections to my account of this virtue. Finally, the significance of the interests in play is one important factor in determining whether or not an all-things-considered preference for the satisfaction of the interests of the other is appropriate in any particular situation. However, this is not the sole determining factor. That is, the claim in (E1) is not merely that the humble person should have a prima facie preference concerning the interests of others only when their interests are equally or more significant compared to her own, in an objective sense. Rather, there may be cases in which the humble person sacrifices some of her own interests for the sake of the interests of others, even when the former are, objectively speaking, more significant than the latter.140 The overriding factor in such cases In his “The Values and Varieties of Humility,” Byerly suggests that the humble person is someone who prefers the promotion of the good of others rather than one’s own good, when the good in question is equal to one’s own good or incommensurate with it and the good of others and one’s own cannot be promoted. My view is distinct, 140

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is not the weight of the particular interests in play, but rather the love the humble person has for God and others, which grounds the obligations she has as a follower of Christ. However, the preference is prima facie, not only because something may not truly be in the interest of the other, but also because the humble person may have an interest in play that overrides that of the other.141 (E1) allows for this, and does not require that the humble person always put all of the interests of others ahead of her own.

(E2) The humble person is motivated to act by her love for God and for the sake of his kingdom While (E2) is not unique to the virtue of humility, it is essential to it in terms of our understanding of the emotive modules of this trait in the ideally humble person. In their discussion of humility, Robert Roberts and Jay Wood observe that this virtue “presupposes an overriding interest in something.”142 While their focus is intellectual humility (which they argue presupposes an interest in epistemic goods), they note as well that Christ’s humility as described in Philippians 2 presupposes his charity towards humanity. It is his charity that motivates him to “undertake the task in which he exhibits his humility.”143 I agree, and would add that for Christ as well as those who seek to follow him, charity towards others partially constitutes love for God. The humble person seeks to be good and do the morally right action because of the love of God that she has received and out of her own responsive love for God. Theists and their critics often overlook this form of Christian moral motivation.144 Many believe that an account of religious moral motivation is exhausted by fear of divine punishment and desire for divine reward. But at least for those within the Christian tradition who take salvation to be a gift which then

insofar as I also hold that the humble person may even prefer to sacrifice her more weighty interests for the good of others, as dictated by the virtue of prudence and motive of love, in some circumstances. 141 The virtue of prudence is important here; see chapter 4 for more on this. 142 143 Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, p. 77. ibid. p. 78. 144 For a discussion of this and other issues related to theistic and secular moral motivation, see Is Goodness without God Good Enough?, edited by Robert Garcia and Nathan King (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009). See also Erik Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 68–97.

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motivates the believer to engage in loving actions (see Galatians 5:6), fear of punishment in hell and seeking to earn a place in heaven as a reward for good deeds should not enter into the motivational set of the religious believer. Rather, a love for God and a desire for the advancement of his kingdom—the realm in which God’s will is in fact done— ought to occupy a centrally important place in her motivational set and be reflected by the corresponding actions. In the next section, I will consider some of the active modules of the virtue of humility.

Active Modules of Humility The humble person will be disposed to engage in certain types of actions and refrain from engaging in other types of actions. I employ the language of dispositions because whether or not a particular disposition is expressed via an action of some type will be dependent on the particular circumstances one is in. That is, an individual may have a certain disposition to perform act A in circumstance C, but C never obtains in her life. Because of this, she does not have the opportunity to perform A even though she possesses the disposition to do so. As noted earlier, some conceive of humility as a merely (or primarily) self-regarding virtue, having to do with self-evaluation and possessing little or no direct connection to action. For example, Joseph Kupfer states that while there are particular acts that are courageous or forgiving, “no actions are especially humble.”145 In addition, Kupfer does not believe that humility facilities action, unlike “virtues such as courage, patience, and determination [which] enable us to execute our plans and achieve worthwhile goals.”146 The account of humility on offer here is different. Humility as exemplified by Jesus can facilitate action. In fact, it is not just that the humility of Christ led to the loving and merciful actions connected with the incarnation and crucifixion. Rather, these actions are themselves humble, because they essentially involve a self-lowering other-centeredness that cannot be fully captured without the language of humility. Kupfer, “The Moral Perspective of Humility,” p. 251. ibid. p. 266. Kupfer does think that humble people “are motivated to work to promote worthwhile things in the world” (p. 257), but the acts themselves are not humble, for him. Rather, humility merely motivates courageous or forgiving acts, for example. 145 146

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(A1) The humble person will be disposed to obey God Philippians 2 assumes a clear connection between the humility of Christ and the obedience of Christ. The humility of Christ was such that “he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross.” His obedience to the will of the Father was an expression of his humility; it was an act in part fostered by this virtue and is exemplary of it. As we have seen, the love of Christ for human beings and for God was also in play. What matters here is that humility is connected to Christ’s ultimate act of obedience, and as followers of Christ seek to imitate him, their obedience to God will often be, in part, a result of their humility. The humility of Jesus is also underscored in the biblical account of his prayer in the Garden of Gethsemane prior to his arrest and crucifixion: “Father, if you are willing, remove this cup from me; yet, not my will but yours be done” (Luke 22:42). Such obedience connects humble attitudes and actions with the will of God. The humble Christian’s will becomes more “alloyed” and therefore more “allied” with God’s will.147 Christ’s incarnation and crucifixion exemplify just this sort of obedience to the will of the Father. While other virtues will also contribute to the disposition described by (A1), as it is to be expected that perhaps all Christian virtues should, humility does play a significant and unique role. Having the disposition alluded to in (A1) does not entail that engaging in such actions will always be free of internal difficulty—as we see in the Garden of Gethsemane—but rather that the overriding disposition which yields action will be that of humble obedience to God. I take such obedience to include acting for the sake of what is good, which leads to the second active module of humility that is essential to a Christian account of this virtue.

(A2) The humble person will be disposed to engage in self-sacrificial actions for the good of others While (A2) is closely connected to (A1) as well as (C3) and (E1), it merits attention in its own right given both its importance as a module of humility and its practical difficulty. This disposition to act unselfishly

147

See McLeod-Harrison, Repairing Eden, p. 96.

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for the good of others is an essential aspect of a Christological account of humility. Philippians 2:1–11 describes in concise yet clear terms the presence and practice of (A2) in its understanding of the life and death of Jesus aimed at the redemption of all human beings. The depth and significance of the sacrifice of Christ, including but not limited to the crucifixion, is difficult to comprehend. On my interpretation of the passage, Jesus willingly set aside his divine prerogatives by becoming human in order to make shalom available to humanity and the rest of creation. For this reason, he experienced life as a human infant, child, and adult with its trials and triumphs. He sacrificially subjected himself to ridicule, persecution, violent abuse, and execution by those whom he came to redeem, out of love for them and for God. It is difficult to imagine a clearer case of a set of actions characterized by a self-lowering other-centeredness. And while we cannot replicate such actions, strictly speaking, those who seek to imitate Christ may perform actions that are analogously similar in the manner described by (A2).

(A3) The humble person will not be disposed to seek either honor or social status This module of humility is crucially connected with (C3), (C4), and (C5), insofar as it is a natural implication of the other-centeredness included in these modules that one not seek to surpass others in some way for the sake of receiving greater honor or achieving greater social status. (A3) does not entail that the humble person must refrain from engaging in activities which may earn him honor and social status. His pursuit of excellence may garner both. The crucial point is that receiving honor and status are not the ends for which he pursues excellence. Nor are they relevant for how he perceives and values himself. This is one way in which the humble person is clearly distinct from Aristotle’s magnanimous man.148 For Aristotle, magnanimity is primarily concerned with honor. For Aristotle, the magnanimous man believes that he is worthy of great things, and rightly so. He desires honor that is in accord with his great worth. He will be pleased when he receives honor from excellent people, but he will have no regard for honor given him by lesser people, because he sees them as his 148 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed., translated by Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1999), 1123b–1125a35.

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inferiors. He will also disdain dishonor; it is undeserved given his greatness. In contrast to this, on the Christian account described here, the humble person is not concerned with honor. She may receive it when given, but she does not seek it out, nor does her evaluation of her own self-worth depend upon it. Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung’s discussion of Aquinas’s transformative analysis of Aristotelian magnanimity is relevant here.149 On a Christian understanding, magnanimity is best understood as “a wholehearted readiness to attempt the great acts of virtue to which we are called, however impossible or daunting the task may seem and however much the attempt may ‘stretch’ us.”150 For Aquinas, this depends on the grace of God, and as such for him magnanimity, like humility, is a virtue of acknowledged dependence. As Aquinas describes magnanimity, it “makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God.”151 Konyndyk DeYoung observes that magnanimity for the Christian not only depends on the grace of God, it is also a response of obedience to God in which one employs God’s gifts in one’s vocation. Humility comes into play insofar as it works alongside magnanimity to free us from the tyranny of evaluating our worth on the basis of comparison to and feedback from others. Our worth is measured by and grounded in God, not others. Humility reminds us of the moral and metaphysical gap between God and humanity. Humility, like magnanimity, reminds us of our dependence upon him. In light of this, we have good reasons for taking (A3) to be a module of humility. Given the social and cultural context of the world of the New Testament, the disposition described in (A3) would have been strongly countercultural. The Ancient Near East was an honorshame culture. In such a cultural setting, “lowering oneself before an equal was not regarded as morally advisable or sound.”152 Human beings generally tend to desire and seek honor and social status, but 149 Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, “Aquinas’s Virtues of Acknowledged Dependence: A New Measure of Greatness,” Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004): 214–27. 150 ibid. p. 219. 151 Thomas Aquinas, ST II.II.129.3.ad4. My analysis is distinct from Aquinas’s, insofar as he takes humility to be primarily a human attitude concerning our relationship to God and not other human beings. I take it to involve both in very important ways. On this, see Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, p. 102. 152 Dickson and Rosner, “Humility as a Social Virtue in the Hebrew Bible?” p. 459.

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(A3) in combination with (C3) and (E1) leads to actions which practically speaking can be described as self-lowering. If a person prefers the satisfaction of the interests of others to his own, and refrains from seeking honor and social status for their own sake, then in a society where these are taken as goods that ought to be competitively pursued, the implication is that such a person will end up lowering himself before others who are his social equals. Moreover, and even more counterculturally, for the person seeking to imitate the example of Christ in his humility, such self-lowering will be engaged in not only with those who are perceived as social equals but also with those who occupy lower positions of honor on the social ladder. This form of humility would be scandalous in such a culture (and remains so in many contemporary ones), but this is the ideal embodied in the descriptions of Jesus in the canonical gospels and Philippians 2. It is also the ideal that the audiences these texts were aimed at were exhorted to imitate.

(A4) The humble person will be disposed to engage in particular forms of risk-taking The disposition described by (A4) is deeply connected with (C5). Given the proper lack of concern about how others view her, potential barriers to engaging in proper forms of risk-taking are removed. Pride, by contrast, can erect barriers to taking risks that one ought to take. The arrogant and self-centered person may suffer from a form of insecurity that prevents him from risking failure in the eyes of others, whereas the humble person would be less prone to such insecurity, given (C5). In turn, this helps to yield (A4). The virtue of magnanimity is again relevant. Recall what Aquinas said, that magnanimity “makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God.”153 Humility removes the barriers that egoistic and insecure pride may erect, while magnanimity supports this willingness to take risks when doing so is appropriate, because we deem ourselves to be worthy of great things. For the Christian, this may include taking risks for the sake of excellence in her vocation. I will have much more to say in chapter 3 about (A4), as it is relevant to objections that have been

153

Aquinas, ST II.II.129.3.ad4.

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lodged against the claim that humility is a virtue. For now, we turn to a consideration of an episode in the gospels in which it and many other modules of humility appear.

Humility Exemplified in a Gospel Episode I now briefly discuss one episode in the life of Jesus present in the canonical gospels that is illustrative of many of the foregoing modules of humility. Each of the gospels includes an account in which Jesus confronts the moneychangers and others conducting business in the temple. Scholars have different views with respect to the meaning and significance of this episode, but nevertheless it is useful as an illustration of humility as exemplified by Christ in the gospels.154 The story is described as follows in Mark 11:15–19: Then they came to Jerusalem. And he entered the temple and began to drive out those who were selling and those who were buying in the temple, and he overturned the tables of the money changers and the seats of those who sold doves; and he would not allow anyone to carry anything through the temple. He was teaching and saying, “Is it not written, ‘My house shall be called a house of prayer for all the nations’? But you have made it a den of robbers.” And when the chief priests and the scribes heard it, they kept looking for a way to kill him; for they were afraid of him, because the whole crowd was spellbound by his teaching. And when evening came, Jesus and his disciples went out of the city.

This episode might seem like an odd selection for illustrating the virtue of humility. At first glance the actions of Jesus as reported in this story appear to be at odds with the virtue of humility and the claim that Jesus is “humble in heart.” However, this is not the case. When seeking to construct a Christian conception of humility that takes into account the life of Jesus as it is described in the gospel narratives, it is important to consider this episode insofar as it appears to be in tension with humility. This episode is in tension with and perhaps contradicts any view of humility which equates the trait with non-assertiveness, excessive meekness, or self-abasement. However,

154

For an overview of the main interpretive categories, see W. R. Herzog II, “Temple Cleansing,” Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, Joel Green, Scot McKnight, and I. Howard Marshall, eds (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992), pp. 817–21.

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the accounts of the actions of Jesus at the temple are consistent with and even illustrative of my conception of humility. Jesus exemplifies a self-lowering other-centeredness by sacrificing his reputation among the religious establishment and its leaders via publicly opposing the social, economic, and political system surrounding the temple. His actions were a threat to religious, political, and economic power structures, and therefore placed him at personal risk.155 With this in mind, Jesus exemplifies (C3), (C5), (A2), (A3), and (A4) in the temple cleansing. Humility is also manifested by the temple episode in a way that illustrates the concern of Jesus for those considered to be outsiders by the religious leaders, on some readings of this episode. If (at least) part of the motivation of the temple cleansing was that by his actions Jesus “declares God’s will in making the Temple a source of access to Yahweh for all peoples and denounces the perversion of that purpose,” and was concerned about the “exploitative and oppressive domination of the people through taxation and tribute . . . masked as piety and religious obligation,”156 then (C4), (E1), and (A1) are present because Jesus is rejecting the traditional divisions among people in this context and affirming the universal concern and love of God for all human beings. In addition, (E2) is present insofar as it appears that at least part of the motivation is concern for proper reverence towards God the Father and the temple, which at this time was taken to be the unique location where God’s presence was manifested (this is underscored by the account in John’s gospel, where in relation to Jesus’ actions here the disciples are said to recall Psalm 69:9, “Zeal for your house will consume me”).157 This brief discussion illustrates how many of the modules of humility can be present and operate in a particular set of circumstances. In addition, given that Jesus is understood as the exemplar of the Christian virtue of humility, it is useful to see how this trait is present in the influential descriptions of his life present in the canonical gospels, especially in the foregoing episode which at first glance 155 This is the case irrespective of whether one opts for a religious, messianic, prophetic, or political interpretation of the incident. On these interpretations, see ibid. pp. 817–21. 156 ibid. pp. 818, 820. 157 The only modules not present, then, are (C3) and (C4). Yet a full reading of the gospels would reveal their presence. For example, see John 5:25–30 and Matthew 22:34–41. See also the section in this chapter, “The Humility of Jesus Christ in the Gospels.”

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seems not to exemplify humility, but which upon further examination includes most of the modules of this virtue discussed in this chapter. And it is worth pointing out that while I have depended upon the New Testament as the primary scriptural source for the conception of humility described above, it is also the case that it is consistent with an analysis of this trait as it appears in the Hebrew Bible.158

STRENGTHS OF THE ACCOUNT With a fairly fine-grained description of humility now in hand, in what follows I will consider some of the strengths of the account. Further strengths will surface in later chapters, where objections to the account are considered and connections between humility and human flourishing are explored. Here, I consider three strengths of the foregoing account of humility: (i) it recognizes the goodness of God in humanity; (ii) it is not dependent upon an epistemic defect; and (iii) it is pluralistic.

It Recognizes the Goodness of God in Humanity The account of humility described in the foregoing pages of this chapter does not include self-denigration. One important theological reason for this is the Christian belief that human beings are made in the image of God. On Christian theism, all human beings are image-bearers of God, and as such possess inherent dignity and worth. Some views of humility are too denigrative of human persons, and so fail to incorporate this important aspect of Christian anthropology. A strength of the present account is that it incorporates this aspect of Christian theological anthropology by including a recognition of the goodness of God that is present in humanity.

158 See Stephen Dawes, “Humility: Whence This Strange Notion?” The Expository Times 103 (1991): 72–5. Dawes concludes that the Old Testament takes humility to include “a recognition of one’s dependence upon God and a willingness to submit oneself to him, a realistic assessment of one’s own character and ability with a curbing of undue ambition, and a regard for others with a willingness to give oneself in service to them” (pp. 73–4).

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While a full discussion of this doctrine would take us too far afield, it is also unnecessary. A brief overview is sufficient. In his discussion of the image of God in humanity, nineteenth-century German theologian Gustav Oehler describes what it means that human beings are image-bearers of the divine. He states that “the divine image lies inalienably in man’s being,” and goes on to explain that “The divine likeness is rather to be referred to the whole dignity of man . . . in virtue of which human nature is sharply distinguished from that of the beasts; man as a free being is set over nature, and designed to hold communion with God, and to be his representative on earth.”159 Humans represent God insofar as we reflect his likeness, to a limited degree. And humans are God’s representatives insofar as we are to exercise our power over the created order for good. While these claims raise many questions, and humans fall short of fulfilling these roles in many ways, it is important to note that if God’s image is an inalienable aspect of our being, then even the most morally depraved among us retains a basic dignity. This makes a self-denigrative conception of humility inappropriate. On this brief account of what it means that human beings are created in God’s image, pride is also misguided. We misuse our freedom, abuse nature, exploit others, often reject communion with God, and therefore fail to fulfill the obligations connected to being God’s representatives on earth. Humility, as described in this chapter, is consistent with and in some ways depends upon the claim that human beings are created in the image of God.160 That it does so is a strength of the account.

It Is Not Dependent upon an Epistemic Defect Unlike some accounts of humility, the account offered above does not require that one be ignorant or hold a false belief of some sort in order to be humble. Such a conception of humility, defined as underestimation of oneself, can be found in Julia Driver’s work on modesty.161 Though Driver is focused on modesty, her account is useful when

159 Gustav Oehler, Theology of the Old Testament, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1884), pp. 145, 146. 160 Recall that humility can do this in part due to its complementary relationship with the virtue of magnanimity. 161 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, pp. 16–28.

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considering humility, and whether or not it is a virtue, as she states that her use of “modesty” is the same as others’ use of “humility.”162 According to Driver, the humble person consistently underestimates her self-worth, and is ignorant of it. For her, then, this virtue is dependent upon an epistemic defect. Driver distinguishes her account from self-deprecation and low self-estimation, because the humble person believes her character and deeds have some worth and “could still have a rather high opinion of herself, just not as high as she is entitled to have.”163 For Driver, a positive feature of her account is that it explains why self-ascriptions of humility seem odd. It does seem intuitively odd or somehow misguided to claim “I am humble.” When one asserts some proposition, one is claiming to know or at least believe that proposition. So, when a person states “I am humble,” this is odd because the person making the statement is claiming to know that she is humble, but the virtue requires ignorance of one’s self-worth or excellence. If humility requires ignorance in the sense Driver claims, then it would certainly be odd, even self-defeating, to claim that one knows or believes that she has this trait. There are few supporters of this account, and three main criticisms of it have emerged.164 First, the underestimation account takes selfdeception and ignorance to be required for this virtue, but these are generally taken to be defects or even vices of some sort. Hence, this account is highly counterintuitive. It seems clear that we are right to take such a form of self-deception to be a character flaw. Making a virtue dependent upon it, then, is a serious mistake. The issue of ignorance as it relates to virtue is not as clear. Driver notes that perhaps her account is counterintuitive for some because they believe that ignorance is intrinsically bad. In response to this worry, she argues that ignorance is not intrinsically bad if this means that it is always bad, and offers counterexamples to the claim that it is. For instance, being ignorant of the names and addresses of the persons passing by her office window or of the number of coins currently in her pocket seems unproblematic to her. I agree with Driver that not all forms of ignorance are bad, as her examples of trivial ignorance show. I also believe that some forms of ignorance are even desirable. For instance, it is good to be ignorant of

162 164

163 ibid. pp. 114–15. ibid. 19. See Morgan, “Humility and the Transcendent.”

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what it is like to torture (or be tortured by) another human being. But some forms of ignorance are bad and undesirable. It is bad in some sense to be ignorant of the fact that other persons feel physical and psychological pain, even if one is not blameworthy for such ignorance. What is important with respect to humility and ignorance is whether or not the particular form of ignorance that humility requires for Driver is of the good or bad sort. And it seems to me that it is of the bad sort. Her account is highly counterintuitive not because it involves ignorance per se, but because it involves ignorance concerning self-knowledge, which is a morally and existentially important form of knowledge.165 With this in mind, consider two different scenarios concerning an individual who is at the top of her field. In scenario one, this individual has Driver-humility, because she knows neither the merit nor the worth of her deeds and therefore underestimates them. In scenario two, she has Christian humility as I have described it. She knows the level of excellence that she has attained in some realm, but this selfknowledge does not cause her to view herself as more important than others. She realizes that she has the same intrinsic worth qua human being as others do, and that her individual excellence does not elevate her above them in this way. From a Christian perspective, all human beings have equal intrinsic value as creatures made in the image of God, and whatever talents or successes we possess are ultimately gifts from God. This makes humility an appropriate trait to have, especially when we are aware of our own excellence. Finally, note a distinction that these scenarios uncover which Driver does not adequately address, namely, the distinction between one’s accomplishments and one’s worth. One reason that scenario two is appropriate is that the individual has knowledge of her personal excellence, but does not take this excellence to justify elevating herself over others. This seems more admirable than merely being ignorant of one’s excellence. Another problem with the underestimation account is that it prohibits the deliberate exercise and intentional development of

See Garcia, “Being Unimpressed with Ourselves: Reconceiving Humility”; and Owen Flanagan, “Virtue and Ignorance,” The Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 420–8. Teresa is again instructive here, when she states that “to be humble is to walk in truth,” which for her includes the truth about ourselves (Interior Castle, pp. 121–2). 165

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humility, because of the difficulty or perhaps impossibility of the voluntary, conscious formation of false beliefs about oneself. Driver replies that such concerns about voluntarily acquiring humility are misguided, and asks us to imagine a case in which a mad scientist creates a machine that transforms one’s vices into virtues. A thief is made honest, and the cruel parent is made kind. As long as those who are transformed by such a machine are no longer disposed to steal or be cruel and are now disposed to be honest and kind, then according to Driver they now possess these virtues, even though they did not deliberately cultivate them. Even if this is correct, it does not fully get at the objection at issue. In order to be humble, on Driver’s account, it is not just that one could become humble without intentionally becoming so. Rather, the problem is that one must be ignorant in the relevant ways. This entails that it is impossible to develop this trait intentionally or deliberately act in humble ways. And this is a serious problem for her view. A third criticism that has emerged is that this particular virtue of ignorance would, on Driver’s analysis, result in undesirable states of affairs. It is perhaps likely that having Driver-humility would dispose some persons to servility, feelings of inferiority, and ignorance of the worth they possess simply by virtue of being human. If this is right, then Driver-humility would not be conducive to human flourishing, which gives us a further reason for rejecting the claim that it is a virtue. The foregoing criticisms are sufficient for rejecting the account of humility offered by Driver. The Christian account I propose contrasts sharply with her account, and avoids these criticisms which have been raised against it. The account I offer includes self-knowledge, allows for the intentional development and practice of humility, and includes self-lowering as well as a prima facie preference for the welfare of others without servility or unjustified feelings of inferiority. Another positive feature of my account is that it is pluralistic, and it is to this that I now turn.

It Is Pluralistic The analysis of humility in this chapter rightly accounts for the fact that those who practice a religion other than Christianity or no religion at all may be said, in some sense, to possess this virtue.

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That is, the conception of humility articulated in this chapter is partially pluralistic, in an important sense. Other comprehensive views of reality (e.g., Islam, Hinduism, philosophical naturalism) have the conceptual space and apparatus for at least some of the modules of humility described in this chapter.166 In addition, individual adherents to other comprehensive views of reality may exemplify many modules of this virtue. More precisely, a person with different religious commitments, or no such commitments, may possess many of the modules of humility. For example, humility is an important virtue in Islam, and is discussed at several points in the Koran. In order to know Allah, one must seek Allah in humility and abandon pride and self-sufficiency. The Muslim practice of prostrating oneself in prayer is an act of humility before God. Humility is also an important virtue for Hindus, as it includes the realization that one is no more important, as a part of the whole, than any other part. Buddhists arguably value humility insofar as they are to avoid self-gratification and self-promotion, and are encouraged to recognize their own weaknesses and limitations.167 A Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist can exhibit many modules of humility (such as (C5) The humble person is properly concerned with how others perceive her; or (A2) The humble person will be disposed to engage in self-sacrificial actions for the good of others) in the context of her religious practices and life. Does humility require belief in God or the supernatural? Clearly some modules include such a requirement, such as (C2), (E2), and (A1), but belief in God or some other divine entity and having a proper attitude toward that entity is not a necessary condition for all of the modules of humility. Even if Christian theism is true, it is clear that someone who is not a Christian can possess one or more modules of humility.168 For instance, a secular person can exemplify (A2).

166 For a discussion of the importance of humility in several world religions, including Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism, see Elissa Woodruff, Daryl R. Van Tongeren, Stacey McElroy, Don E. Davis, and Joshua N. Hook, “Humility and Religion: Benefits, Difficulties, and a Model of Religious Tolerance,” in Religion and Spirituality Across Cultures, edited by Chu Kim-Prieto (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), pp. 271–85. 167 ibid. p. 273. 168 I return to this issue in chapter 5, where I discuss how being image-bearers of God relates to the potential all human persons have to exemplify modules of this virtue.

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In this way, the non-theist can be seen as being allied with God in important ways. Her actions, motives, and desires may be thought of as involving “attention to goods that . . . are images of God,”169 as she engages in self-sacrificial actions for the good of other people. While she may not see herself as humble in an explicitly theological or Christian sense of the term, it is nevertheless true on my account that she is humble in an implicitly Christian sense. The pluralism of the foregoing conception of Christian humility is a strength because it allows for the fact that individuals who are not adherents of some form of the Christian religion nevertheless may be quite humble, oftentimes more so than many who selfidentify as Christians and conceive of their humility in an explicitly theological manner. In this way, the account maps onto reality as we find it.

CONCLUSION In this chapter, I have offered an initial, general, and intuitive definition of humility as a virtue that includes both proper self-assessment and a self-lowering other-centeredness that is distinct from selfdenigration, self-abasement, and egoistic pride. I have also explored in more depth and detail several of the cognitive, emotive, and active modules of this virtue in order to gain a fuller understanding of its nature and a picture of its value for human beings. The account is grounded in biblical, theological (especially Christological), and philosophical reflection. Along the way, I have briefly considered some potential objections to the account, and have discussed a few of its strengths. In chapter 3, I will engage in a more thorough evaluation of the foregoing account of humility by describing and responding to a variety of important theological and philosophical objections that might be raised against it. In chapter 3, as well as in chapter 4, I also consider in more detail many of the ways in which humility is related to other virtues, in order to more fully explain the

169 Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 198.

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interconnections between the virtues as well as humility’s roles related to human flourishing. Then, in chapter 5, I consider several contemporary applications of the account by examining some of the ways in which humility is relevant to religious thought and practice, the family, and sports.

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3 Theological and Philosophical Objections In chapter 2, I offered a general definition of humility in terms of its self-regarding and other-regarding aspects. With respect to the former, I claimed that humility involves proper self-assessment, and with respect to the latter that it includes a self-lowering other-centeredness. I then analyzed this virtue in more detail, discussing several of its most important modules in the cognitive, emotive, and active realms. In this chapter I will consider several objections that might be raised against the account. Some of these objections I characterize as theological, while others are more philosophical in nature. While not every objection fits perfectly into the theological or philosophical category, the objections are distinct enough so that it will be useful to categorize them in this manner. In the first major section of this chapter I consider several theological objections to the account of humility I have offered, and in the next I reply to philosophical objections.

THEOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS In this section, I consider three objections to my account of humility. The first objection is theological insofar as it concerns the nature of the Christian God and how such a being can be humble. I categorize the other two objections as theological because they are centrally concerned with Christian theory and practice related to specific biblical content. One of these objections focuses on whether or not imitatio Christi is a Christian norm with sufficient theological and biblical support, while the other has to do with whether or not humility as I conceive of it is consistent with the command of Jesus

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to love our neighbors as ourselves. The latter objection is clearly relevant, but given the role played in my account of humility by Jesus as an exemplar and the resulting implications for those who claim to follow him, the former is important as well.

A Humble God? Theologians and philosophers in the Anselmian tradition have taken the Christian God to be the greatest conceivable being. Such a being is maximally perfect in power, knowledge, and goodness. How can such a being be humble? If God can be humble, is humility even appropriate for such a being? Some have argued that such a being cannot be humble, while others contend that humility would be an inappropriate trait for God to possess. In this section, I will address these concerns and argue that God so conceived can be and is humble. Charles Taliaferro discusses a potential problem for theistic belief that is related to the issue of divine humility, the problem of divine vanity.1 When we consider creation, worship, and redemption, it initially appears as if the Christian God displays traits that are opposed to humility. The Christian God creates beings made in his own image, and desires that they worship and praise him. He also takes center stage with respect to the redemption of his creatures, rather than allowing them to obtain it on their own, independent from him. Whether or not God can be humble is important for my analysis of Christian humility. Given that followers of Christ are to imitate him and in the process become in some sense more like him, it is important not only that God can be humble, but is in fact humble in order for the account I have offered to make sense within a Christian framework. In his criticism of Taliaferro’s argument, Daniel Campana claims that it is logically impossible for the Christian God to be humble.2 He constructs the following argument derived from Taliaferro’s discussion: (1) God, according to Christian tradition, has all virtues. (2) Humility is a virtue. Therefore, (C) God has the virtue of humility.3 1 2 3

Charles Taliaferro, “The Vanity of God,” Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989): 140–54. Daniel Campana, “On ‘The Vanity of God,’ ” Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992): 105–8. ibid. p. 105.

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According to Campana, this argument is unsound. Given Taliaferro’s understanding of God’s nature and the virtue of humility, Campana argues that it is impossible for God to be humble. On Taliaferro’s characterization, humility includes the disposition to more easily believe the best of others compared to oneself. The humble person is aware of the limited nature of her positive qualities. Yet if God is a maximally perfect being, then he would have no limits and it follows that he cannot be humble. In sum, while Campana allows that humility may be ascribed to the incarnate Jesus, he claims that “humility can hardly describe the God whose redemptive plan, culminating in Christ, was designed to bring about his own unlimited glory.”4 Given this, (1) is false because God does not have at least one of the virtues, namely, humility, and so (C) is obviously false as well. One reply that may be suggested on behalf of Taliaferro is that some modules of humility may be appropriate for human beings, but not for God. We should expect this, given the relationship between the nature of a being and what virtues are appropriate to it, given that nature. So a humble and merely human being may be disposed to believe the best about others compared to herself, and be aware of her own moral limitations. In addition, there are divine analogs to these aspects of humility as Taliaferro understands them. Jesus arguably knows about his own moral limitations, namely, that there are none (apart from those which are logically impossible). Jesus has no need to be disposed to believe the best about others compared to himself because he is not susceptible to self-serving bias as are mere humans. Even if these suggestions are wide of the mark, the point remains that some aspects of humility (and other virtues) will apply to humans or be realized by humans in ways that are distinct from the manner in which God exemplifies them.5 I merely offer this as a suggestion, and in what follows I will set Taliaferro’s account of humility aside in order to consider Campana’s claims in light of my definition of this trait in order to determine whether or not God can be humble.

4

ibid. p. 107. As an anonymous reviewer rightly points out, if we take language about God here to be analogous, then we should expect such continuity and discontinuity between the human and divine when ascribing virtue to God. 5

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First, consider one interpretation of what it might mean for God’s redemptive plan to, in Campana’s words, “bring about his own unlimited glory.” It is plausible to think that a significant dimension of the manifestation of God’s glory is contingently related to humanity. In his Against Heresies, the early Church Father Irenaeus states that “the glory of God is a living man.”6 This is often translated as “The glory of God is man fully alive,” which is understood by many as an endorsement of mere self-fulfillment. Patrick Henry Reardon rejects this interpretation, and rightly so.7 He holds that the “living man” referred to by Irenaeus is Christ. While I also reject the self-fulfillment interpretation of Irenaeus, there is another possible interpretation distinct from the one offered by Reardon (though it is one that he hints at later in his essay). Given the context of the quote, there is an important connection for Irenaeus between human life and God’s glory which also has relevance for Campana’s claims concerning God’s humility. The context of Irenaeus’ claim that “the glory of God is a living man” is a discussion of the ways in which God may be seen and known. Irenaeus describes Christ as one of the modes of God’s self-revelation, which lends credence to Reardon’s interpretation. But for Irenaeus, “those who see God are in God, and receive of His splendour. But [His] splendour vivifies them; those, therefore, who see God, do receive life.” It is through Christ the Word that human beings are given life as we (partially) see God. Irenaeus later states that humanity will ultimately be received “into that glory which shall afterwards be revealed in those who love God.” God’s glory, then, will be revealed in those who love him, and so it is at least plausible to interpret Irenaeus as holding the view that there is a sense in which God is glorified in a human being who is fully alive in Christ. That glory will be revealed in such persons fully after death, but it may also be partially revealed in many human beings now, who now partially receive and reflect his splendor. It is as one participates in the life of Christ now, exemplifying and reflecting the character of Christ in

6 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf01.ix.vi.xxi.html; all quotations are from Book IV, chapter 20 of this work. 7 Patrick Henry Reardon, “The Man Alive,” Touchstone: A Journal of Mere Christianity (Sept/Oct 2012); http://www.touchstonemag.com/archives/article.php?id=2505-003-e.

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significant ways, that one is fully alive qua human being. By loving and imitating Christ we experience true fulfillment and glorify God. The upshot of this for the humility of God, then, is that divine humility is present insofar as God shares his glory, in the sense just discussed. This manifestation of divine glory in and through the lives of human beings depends in part on our moral progress, which reveals God’s humility in at least two ways. First, by both sharing and making some aspects of the manifestation of his glory dependent upon fallen human beings, God displays humility, insofar as it includes a willful acknowledged dependence on humanity with respect to this manifestation of his glory. Second, the moral progress we make with God’s help which manifests God’s glory is in our best interests because it is through being virtuous and participating in the divine nature that we flourish as human beings. This evinces divine other-centeredness. By relating to human beings, when such a large ontological and moral gap exists between God and us, a divine self-lowering is also evident. A form of humility, as we have seen, is also present in the incarnation. In Philippians 2, Jesus is implicitly presented as knowing that he is divine (“who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality as something to be exploited”) and explicitly as manifesting a self-lowering other-centeredness (“taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form, he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross”). As Taliaferro puts it, the incarnation does “suggest a startling image of self-limiting love.”8 I would say that the incarnation displays a startling image of humble love.9 In sum, a God who is willing to share the glory that rightly belongs to him by allowing and enabling human creatures to participate in the divine nature evinces humility as I understand this trait.10 Divine self-knowledge is preserved and maintained in this process, so that it Taliaferro, “The Vanity of God,” p. 151. In his Enchiridion, Augustine mentions God’s humility in this context, when he says that “Once sin had widely separated the human race from God, it was necessary for a mediator, who alone was born, lived, and was put to death without sin, to reconcile us to God, and provide even for our bodies a resurrection to life eternal— and all this in order that man’s pride might be exposed and healed through God’s humility” (chapter 28, section 108); http://www.ccel.org/ccel/augustine/enchiridion. chapter28.html. 10 See 2 Peter 1:2–11. See also Michael J. Christenson and Jeffery A. Wittung, eds, Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008). 8 9

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is true of God that he engages in a proper self-assessment. God also exemplifies self-lowering by entering into a relationship with mere human beings. Finally, other-centeredness is also exemplified insofar as God allows humans to share in and manifest aspects of his glory for our good.

Philippians 2:1–11 Does Not Call for Imitating Christ One claim present in chapter 2 as well as the foregoing discussion of the humility of God is that Christ perfectly exemplifies the virtue of humility, as he is described in the canonical gospels and Philippians 2. A second claim that is relevant here is that not only do the biblical writers provide us with an understanding of the humility of Christ, but that they also expect that their readers will seek to imitate Christ in this and many other ways. In fact, they explicitly exhort them to do so. I think this is arguably the case for Paul and the letter to the Philippians in general, and specifically with respect to the virtue of humility. However, some interpreters argue that Philippians 2 does not contain an exhortation for followers of Christ to imitate him in his attitude (and acts) of humility as described in the passage. For example, Bernd Wannenwetsch argues that Paul’s aim in the passage is to summon the Philippian believers to be what they already are, i.e., one with Christ. He then claims that: as the actual content of the Christ hymn that follows this summons reveals, the imperative toward mimesis is ironically broken. That hymn, which elaborates on Christ’s “attitude,” does not point to Jesus’ good works on earth, but rather to Christ’s exclusive soteriological “work,” that is, his mission of incarnation, cross, and resurrection. Ironically, Paul seems to be asking the believers to emulate that which cannot be emulated—apart from being made one with Christ himself, which cannot be achieved by emulation at all.11

For Wannenwetsch, since it is impossible for followers of Christ to perform the soteriological works of Christ as described in Philippians 2, it is not the case that they are to seek to imitate Christ. They are Bernd Wannenwetsch, “The Whole Christ and the Whole Human Being: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Inspiration for the ‘Christology and Ethics’ Discourse,” Christology and Ethics, F. LeRon Shults and Brent Waters, eds (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), p. 88. 11

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simply to receive union with Christ by grace, and then the attitudes described in the passage will begin to appear within them as their hearts are renewed. Wannenwetsch is right to stress the priority of union with Christ and the work of God within the human heart, but there are good reasons for thinking that imitatio Christi is also at the heart of this passage. I discussed some reasons for taking Philippians 2:1–11 to be primarily ethical in my exegesis of this passage in chapter 2. But there are additional problems for Wannenwetsch’s view. First, he makes the mistaken assumption that the imitation of Christ must include acts of the same token, rather than merely acts of the same type. The advocate of imitatio Christi in connection with this passage need not hold that this entails that followers of Christ are somehow to perform the same soteriological works as Christ. As Wannenwetsch rightly observes, this is impossible. Yet acts of the same type can be performed, insofar as they exemplify humility and other traits of the soteriological acts of Christ that humans may exemplify in other contexts. As Frank Matera puts the point in his discussion of these issues: To be sure, there can be no perfect comparison between the situation of Christ and that of the Philippians. Unlike Christ, the Philippians cannot claim a divine status. Moreover, no act of obedience on their part can ever be redemptive as was Christ’s obedience. Finally, the Philippians must not expect that their obedience can or will earn a divine recompense. Nonetheless, Paul draws an important analogy between the behavior of Christ and that of the Philippians. Just as Christ did not consider his divine status as consisting in snatching, so the Philippians must not look to their own interests but to the interests of others (2:4). For Paul, Christians are to imitate the self-emptying of Christ.12

Along the same lines, in his discussion of Philippians 2:5–11 Stephen Fowl argues that Paul’s aim is “to encourage the Philippians to let the picture of Christ presented in 2:6–11 guide their common life by means of drawing analogies between this story of Christ and the sorts of situations the Philippians face.”13 Moreover, in the next chapter of

12 Frank J. Matera, New Testament Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), p. 179. See also Richard Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament (New York, NY: HarperOne, 1996), pp. 16–46. 13 Stephen Fowl, “Christology and Ethics in Philippians 2:5–11,” in Where Christology Began: Essays on Philippians 2, Ralph P. Martin and Brian J. Dodd, eds (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), p. 147.

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the letter to the Philippians Paul does this very thing, as he discusses analogies between his life and the life of Christ related to selfdenial, renunciation of status, and sacrifice.14 Paul then exhorts the Philippians to imitate him in this way of life, in his seeking to imitate and know Christ. The fact that Paul alludes to the soteriological works of Christ rather than his other good works on the earth does not somehow rule out the interpretation that Christians should have the same attitude and perform analogous acts of humility in their own circumstances, following the pattern exemplified by Christ in the incarnation and crucifixion. In addition to the above, consider also that the soteriological works of Christ are treated as symbols which can be imitated in the context of the daily life of the Christian elsewhere in the Scriptures. For instance, in the gospels Christ exhorts those who would come after him to deny themselves, take up their cross, and follow him (Matthew 16:24; Luke 9:23). The authors are not claiming that Christians are literally to take up a cross and follow Jesus to Golgotha, but rather that they are to imitate the attitude exemplified in these soteriological actions as they engage in distinct but still analogous acts of love, humility, and self-denial for the sake of the good of others. Salvific imagery can be applied to everyday life in a variety of ways. This does not entail that Christ is merely an exemplar of moral virtue—for the Christian he is much more than this—but he nevertheless is an exemplar of such virtue. It seems clear that for Paul those who identify themselves as followers of Christ, then, are to actively imitate him in their everyday lives by their submission to the will of God, which is crucially expressed by intentionally putting the interests of others ahead of their own.

This Account of Humility Conflicts with the Neighbor-Love Commandment of Jesus In the synoptic gospels, Jesus is reported as saying that the two primary commandments are (i) to love God and (ii) to love others 14

William C. Spohn, Go and Do Likewise (New York, NY: Continuum, 2007), pp. 147–9. See also Brian J. Dodd, “The Story of Christ and the Imitation of Paul in Philippians 2–3,” in Martin and Dodd, Where Christology Began: Essays on Philippians 2, pp. 154–61.

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as we love ourselves (Matthew 22:34–40; Mark 12:28–34; and Luke 10:25–37). More precisely, the greatest commandment is to love God with all of your heart, soul, mind, and strength, and the second greatest commandment is this: (LC) Love your neighbor as yourself. This might pose a problem for my account of the social aspect of humility, because (LC) appears to be inconsistent with a self-lowering other-centeredness. (LC) seems to require some form of proportional or equal love with respect to self and others, whereas my account of humility requires a lowering of the self before others. To put the objection differently, (LC) is inconsistent not only with the general definition of social humility as a self-lowering other-centeredness, but also with the following modules of humility: (C3) The humble person believes that he ought to have a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over the satisfaction of his own interests. (E1) The humble person has a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over his own. (A2) The humble person will be disposed to engage in selfsacrificial actions for the good of others. The objection is that my account of humility requires that Christians adopt a belief and a preference, (C3) and (E1), that are inconsistent with (LC), and even be disposed to act in ways, as described by (A2), which may contradict applications of (LC). If such inconsistencies exist, then this constitutes a serious problem for my account. A desideratum of any Christian account of humility, or of any other Christian virtue for that matter, is that it be consistent with (LC), given (LC)’s centrality and significance for the Christian moral and spiritual life. What might be said in response to this objection? Consider what it might mean to love one’s neighbor as oneself. Does this mean I am to love my neighbor with an equal amount of love?15 This seems unlikely, given the difficulty of quantifying love and of achieving such equilibrium in interpersonal relationships. Does this 15 On this and the other five main understandings of Christian “neighbor-love,” see Garth L. Hallett, Christian Neighbor-Love: An Assessment of Six Rival Versions (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1989).

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include some other equality of love, such as weighing my interests equally with those of my neighbor? This is more plausible, but if correct it would only serve to underscore the objection at issue. However, this interpretation of (LC) is misguided. I suggest that loving my neighbor as I love myself in part means to love in the same manner as I love myself. To love another essentially includes being disposed to seek the good of another as I am (or should be) inclined to do for myself. Just as I am disposed to seek the satisfaction of my genuine needs and interests if I truly love myself, I should be disposed to do the same for others. This is consistent with something Augustine says in The City of God, that God “inculcates two precepts,—the love of God and the love of our neighbor,—and as in these precepts a man finds three things he has to love,—God, himself, and his neighbor,—and that he who loves God loves himself thereby.”16 Nicholas Wolterstorff observes that for Augustine, self-love is not merely permissible, it is implicitly commanded.17 Wolterstorff goes on to argue that self-love, but not self-indulgence, is partially justified by one’s recognition of one’s own intrinsic worth.18 He points out that both Moses (in Leviticus 19) and Jesus would have stated that we should love our neighbors instead of ourselves if there was something morally illegitimate about self-love. But both presuppose that such love is legitimate; they tell us to love our neighbors as ourselves, i.e., we are to recognize the intrinsic worth our neighbors possess and treat them accordingly. We are to do the same for ourselves. Next, I will consider how such love, both for one’s neighbor and oneself, is consistent with humility. The conception of love in (LC) is agape love. This type of love is often understood as a self-giving, sacrificial love. It seeks the good of the other. God’s love, and the love those who seek to emulate God are to exemplify towards their neighbor, is agape love. In a conclusion of his discussion of the many forms of love, Timothy Jackson argues that the sacrifices for the good of others, made for their sake, enjoined

16 Augustine, City of God, Book 19, chapter 14. https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/ npnf102.iv.XIX.14.html. 17 See Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice in Love (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), p. 97, n. 3. 18 ibid. pp. 94–9. Wolterstorff also makes the case that a failure of self-love can also be a failure to love others. If he is right, then this would be another way that one might violate (LC).

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by agape may “outstrip the demands of strict justice and natural preference.”19 With this in mind, I want to suggest that such love is best characterized as humble love.20 Such love is also present in Philippians 2:1–11. Paul exhorts the Philippians to imitate the pattern of Christ, who in his incarnation and crucifixion lowered himself and placed the welfare of fallen humanity above his own. When love of neighbor is understood in this manner, the consistency of (LC) with humility as a self-lowering other-centeredness is evident. A qualification concerning prudence is important here. As Jackson points out, while it is the case that Christian love may lead to suffering and even martyrdom, there is no obligation to embrace every opportunity for sacrifice or self-denial.21 For example, Jesus flees from those who are seeking to kill him, praises Mary for anointing him with expensive perfume, and withdraws from the crowds at several points in the gospels to commune with God. The upshot is that humility is consistent with a prudent sacrificial love of others, whereas the limited notion of self-love upon which the objection rests is distinct from the Christian notion of agape love. Scripture and Christian tradition propose that one’s individual flourishing is in part conditional upon one’s practice of self-denial. For example, we find the following teaching of Christ in Mark 8:34–6: He called the crowd with his disciples, and said to them, “If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me. For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake, and for the sake of the gospel, will save it. For what will it profit them to gain the whole world and forfeit their life?”

According to Scripture, for Jesus and Paul certain forms of self-denial are conducive to ultimate fulfillment (see Matthew 6:16–18; Romans 12:1–2; 1 Timothy 4:7–8). When we live in this manner and exemplify this form of life, numerous virtues are cultivated and reinforced, such as compassion, humility, and patience. These virtues are constitutive of shalom, or human flourishing. So humility as I conceive of it is not only consistent with (LC), it is also in part how one obeys 19 Timothy P. Jackson, Love Disconsoled (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 90. 20 I discuss how to individuate humility and love later in this chapter. 21 Timothy P. Jackson, The Priority of Love (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 23–4.

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this commandment. I can properly love myself when I am humble, when I believe (C3), have the preference described by (E1), and am disposed to act in the manner described by (A2). Finally, there is another feature of Philippians 2 that is relevant to how an appropriate form of self-love remains present in the midst of great sacrifice. Bruce Fisk points out that the story Paul is telling in Philippians 2:6–11 “begins and ends in splendour, and that in between [it] traces a journey of abject humiliation followed by exaltation.”22 Fisk explains that the story is “V-shaped”: verses 6–8 move downward through the incarnation to the crucifixion, and then in verses 9–11 there is a distinct change and a move upward towards the point at which there is universal recognition of Jesus’ divine status. This V-shape, reflected in Christ’s paradigmatic humility and subsequent exaltation, applies in an analogous way to followers of Christ. Humility is taken by many of the biblical authors to be a necessary condition of blessing from God.23 Such blessing is a central component of human flourishing from a Christian perspective. The upshot is that when one imitates Christ by following him downward in his humility, she will ultimately experience the upward trajectory as well, both in the present life as she experiences shalom and then in the next life as she experiences shalom more fully in communion with God, others, and the redeemed creation. And while it is not a popular thought in many contemporary religious circles, at least Paul and many others hold the belief that our union with God, which is our good, can be deepened by an analogous sharing in the sufferings of Christ.24 Given this, it follows that one form of self-love includes humble self-denial lovingly engaged in for the sake of others in imitation of Christ. With 22 Bruce Fisk, “The Odyssey of Christ: A Novel Context for Philippians 2:6–11,” Exploring Kenotic Christology, C. Stephen Evans, ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 48. 23 For instance, see James 4:10; 1 Peter 5:6; and Proverbs 29:23. 24 See Philippians 3:7–11. See also Pope John Paul II, Salvifici Doloris (On the Christian Meaning of Human Suffering), (1984), p. 26: “Down through the centuries and generations it has been seen that in suffering there is concealed a particular power that draws a person interiorly close to Christ, a special grace . . . This interior maturity and spiritual greatness in suffering are certainly the result of a particular conversion and cooperation with the grace of the Crucified Redeemer. It is he himself who acts at the heart of human sufferings through his Spirit of truth, through the consoling Spirit. It is he who transforms, in a certain sense, the very substance of the spiritual life, indicating for the person who suffers a place close to himself.” http://www.vatican.va/ holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_Fjp-ii_apl_11021984_salvificidoloris_en.html. Accessed July 19, 2012.

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the above in mind, it is clear that humility is consistent with (LC). This theological objection fails. In the next section of this chapter, I consider several philosophical objections to my account.

PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTIONS In the remainder of the chapter, I consider several philosophical objections that can be raised against my account of Christian humility. While some of these objections and all of my replies have theological content, I have categorized them as philosophical for a variety of reasons. Some of the objections are based on the arguments of figures from the history of philosophy or of contemporary philosophers. Other objections necessitate discussions of significant philosophical concepts (e.g., role obligations). In what follows, then, I consider the truth-status of some of the modules of humility, the demanding nature of the account, and whether the account sufficiently individuates humility from other virtues. Another problem for the claim that humility is a virtue has to do with the oppressed and marginalized, and whether it is a virtue for such people given their past and present circumstances. Finally, I consider skepticism concerning humility’s status as a virtue that is present in the thought of David Hume and Tara Smith, and offer responses to each.

(C3) and (E1) Are False (C3) is the claim that the humble person believes that he ought to have a particular preference, namely, that referred to by (E1), which states that such a person has a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over his own interests. In reply to these claims, the critic may argue that the interests of others are not in fact more important than one’s own, and so we should neither believe (C3) nor prefer their satisfaction over the satisfaction of our own interests as indicated by (E1). From an impartial perspective, the value of the interests of all humans is the same. The objection is that there is no property from a God’s-eye view that one person possesses which makes her or her interests more important than anyone else or their interests. From the impartial perspective of the

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Christian God, all human beings have equal inherent dignity and worth. The problem, then, is that (C3) and (E1) are false because they endorse an objectionable form of partiality. If this is right, then they should not be included as modules of the virtue of humility, because a virtue should not require one to hold a false and perhaps even immoral belief, or to possess a misguided preference. What can be said in response to this? First, James Spiegel, in his analysis of the Christian virtue of humility, makes a point that is relevant to this objection. He states that “the humble person’s ‘low self-regard’ may be taken in a performative sense, such that one plays the role of the unworthy or assumes the position of the lowly through her behavior, words, or self-conception.”25 Similarly, perhaps the humble person’s preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others could be thought of in this performative sense, rather than in a cognitive one. However, Spiegel argues, and I agree, that humility includes both cognitive and performative elements. Given this, we will need to look elsewhere for a full solution to the current objection, a solution that makes use of the active elements of humility while retaining the cognitive ones as well. The objection at issue can be refuted by employing the concept of role obligations. The humble person knows that he has the responsibility to further the interests of others and work for their good, and that this should take precedence over his own interests. There is a sense in which (C3) is true and (E1) is appropriate, relative to each individual person. I can know that my interests and those of my closest friend have equal weight from God’s point of view, and yet consistently adopt a perspective in which I take his interests to be more important than my own, in which I believe (C3) and appropriately possess (E1). This is due to the fact that we possess some obligations by virtue of the particular roles we inhabit in our personal and social lives. For example, spouses have obligations to one another qua spouses which they voluntarily assumed when they recited their wedding vows. A parent has particular obligations qua parent, a nurse qua nurse, a minister qua minister, and so on. A person possesses such role obligations only when she occupies the relevant role. As a university professor, I do not have the obligations that are

25 James Spiegel, “Humility as Moral Irony,” Logos 6 (2003): 133. Italics are Spiegel’s.

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peculiar to someone who is a minister, for example. I am obligated to prepare for my classes, but not to prepare for a weekly sermon. Given the scope of Paul’s exhortation to humility in his letter to the Philippians, we can take believing (C3) and possessing (E1) to be partially constitutive of the role played by an individual as a member of a Christian community, and as one primary aspect of the more general role obligations Christians have as followers of Christ. If (C3) and (E1) are connected with role obligations, then this would help to undermine the claim that these modules are false, given the nature of such obligations. For example, in a marriage relationship, part of what it means to stand in that relationship is that I take the interests of others to have less prima facie weight than those of my spouse in my deliberations and actions. This type of partiality does not entail that her interests always trump those of others. As an obvious example, I might sacrifice one of her less important interests in order to save the life of a stranger. The point is that my role as a husband entails that I regard the interests of my wife to be more important than mine and others, all else being equal. Or consider the case of parents and children. While it is true that the interests of all children carry equal weight, the person who is a parent of a particular child in a sense takes that child’s interests to be more important than those of all other children, insofar as he devotes his time, energy, and resources to that particular child. He is taking the interests of that child to be more important for him than the interests of other children because he is that child’s parent.26 In an analogous manner, regarding the role responsibilities one possesses as a follower of Christ, one is to view others as more important than oneself in the sense of prioritizing their interests. When one takes on this role, others are more important in this sense from the perspective of the role. This is true, even though from God’s perspective, all humans are of equal importance. From the chosen perspective of each individual in her role as a follower of Christ the interests of others are to count more than her own. She rightfully believes (C3) and has the preference alluded to in (E1). But perhaps these responsibilities are too

26

It is important to point out that this does not mean that all partiality is justified. In addition, there is much controversy about whether such partiality is morally permissible. For example, see Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991).

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demanding, i.e., these modules require too much. In the next section, I consider this objection to my account.

(C3), (E1), and (A2) Are Too Demanding Recall the following modules of humility: (C3) The humble person believes that he ought to have a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over the satisfaction of his own interests. (E1) The humble person has a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over his own. (A2) The humble person will be disposed to engage in selfsacrificial actions for the good of others. One might object that these modules of humility are too demanding as stated because they range over all people, and not just those with whom we have special relationships. It is difficult enough for human beings to exemplify humility in a consistent manner within special relationships, such as marriage, the parent–child relationship, and friendship. But the modules of humility are not restricted to these relationships; they extend to others as well. This underscores the demanding nature of this virtue and the objection at issue. Is the humble person to sacrifice all of her goods until the level of well-being of others is raised to an acceptable minimum, or hers is lowered to the point at which she has no more to give to satisfy the interests of others? Adopting a perspective with such universal scope is at best very difficult, and at worst nearly impossible. In reply, it should first be pointed out that humility does not function in isolation from other virtues. In this context, as in many others, phronesis, or prudence, will be relevant. These modules of humility—(C3), (E1), and (A2)—do not function in a vacuum. It is the case that (C3) describes a cognitive perspective that the humble person possesses and (E1) a preference that she will have, both of which will often yield actions as described by (A2). Nevertheless, there will be times when the humble person may place her interests ahead of the interests of others, as prescribed by phronesis and made clear by the prima facie condition. Humility’s modules are not virtue ethical analogs to Kant’s Categorical Imperative or Mill’s Principle of Utility, insofar as it will not be the case that the humble person

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must always put the interests of others before her own. Rather, she will rely on other virtues, including phronesis, to guide her in a manner that is sensitive to circumstances. For Aristotle, phronesis is “a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being.”27 Spiegel notes that this “practical moral insight is essential in all moral conduct and decisionmaking.”28 In her account of phronesis, Linda Zagzebski helpfully characterizes it as a mediating virtue with respect to the intellectual and moral virtues. Such a virtue is needed because more than one virtue may be relevant to a particular set of circumstances. For example, both courage and humility may be relevant in a particular situation. Some features of the circumstances faced by the agent may relate to courage, while other features relate to humility. In such cases, virtues may appear to conflict with one another: Suppose there are salient features of the situation that pertain both to courage and to humility. It might be that in this case humility is more important than courage. That is to say, it may be more important to act in a humble manner than to do what courage would have dictated in the absence of considerations of humility. Or it might be that humility is not so important in this case, although this is not to say that humility is usually less important than courage. The person who knows how to act (and feel) in these cases does not simply act from a combination of humility and courage and the knowledge of the proper function of these virtues. If we are to avoid an excessive and unworkable fragmentation of value, there needs to be some virtue that permits a person to sift through all the salient features of the situation—that is, all those features that are pertinent to any of the virtues—and to make a judgment that is not simply the judgment of a person qua courageous . . . or qua humble but is the judgment of a virtuous person. Therefore, the ability to mediate between and among the individual moral virtues must itself be a virtue. Phronesis is defined in part as the virtue that has this function.29

27 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed., translated by Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1999), 1140b5. 28 James Spiegel, “Wisdom,” Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday Life, Michael W. Austin and R. Douglas Geivett, eds (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), p. 56. 29 Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 222.

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The foregoing is worth quoting at length for many reasons, one of which is to disavow us of the notion that humility as generally defined, or as I have more particularly analyzed it in terms of the various modules, is to be applied as a principle or set of principles which can guide a fixed decision-making procedure yielding the correct course of action. Consider the application of these modules to a particular case. The humble person will believe (C3) and possess (E1) with respect to all of the world’s poor, but this does not entail that she must ignore her own interests as she seeks to come to their aid. Humility is consistent with a concern for one’s own interests, with a particular form of self-love, while it also leads its possessor to be concerned for the interests of others. The humble person may sacrifice a portion of her resources to come to the aid of some who suffer from grinding poverty, but she need not take the entire world on her shoulders. In a Christian context, it is important that she do her part while accepting that others have their roles to play as well. The Christian quest for social justice (and other goods) is a communal and not merely individual quest.30 It is also important to point out that we can accept the morally demanding nature of these modules of humility while recognizing that in a Christian context the individual has many resources from which to draw upon as she seeks to adopt and exemplify them. As a human made in the image of God, one can grow in virtue with the gracious and powerful assistance of God. In different ways, others can help us in this as well. This point is present within the context of the passage in Philippians 2. Prior to Philippians 2:3, which contains the admonition to “regard others as better than yourselves,” there are several background assumptions made by Paul which help ground the expectation that adopting such a perspective is in fact possible. The beginning of the passage assumes certain antecedent conditions prior to the transition to the moral exhortations it contains, including the experience of encouragement in Christ, consolation of love, 30 As a side note, because of the communal nature of Christian faith and practice, the humble person will also allow others to make sacrifices on her behalf and for her good, as dictated by prudence. An individual can be humble, believe (C3) and possess (E1), and yet allow others to put her interests ahead of their own. This is not only consistent with, but is arguably required by, the general definition of humility as a selflowering other-centeredness. This is the case because it is often pride that prevents one from accepting help or assistance from others, not humility, and all three of the modules under discussion, rightly understood, are consistent with this fact.

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fellowship in the Spirit, sympathy, and compassion. Paul is assuming that there is an ongoing moral and spiritual transformation within individuals that is in part a result of the work of God’s Spirit in their lives, and is also a result that is partially dependent upon the existence of a certain form of community marked by affection, compassion, and unity. When these conditions obtain, (C3), (E1), and (A2) are less demanding than they would otherwise be, because we are not left on our own to cultivate and exemplify these modules of humility. Finally, a qualification is needed. When the humble person’s interests conflict with the interests of another, for him the burden of proof will be on the side of putting his interests ahead of the other person’s as phronesis guides such a choice. I am aware of no better rule of thumb here than the following, suggested by C. S. Lewis: I do not believe one can settle how much we ought to give. I am afraid the only safe rule is to give more than we can spare. In other words, if our expenditure on comforts, luxuries, amusements, etc., is up to the standard common among those with the same income as our own, we are probably giving away too little. If our charities do not at all pinch or hamper us, I should say they are too small. There ought to be things we should like to do and cannot do because our charities expenditure excludes them.31

The implications of Christian humility for generosity are demanding. Phronesis will guide the humble individual with respect to what it means in his context to give until it hurts. In fact, the humble person may be called upon to sacrifice his very life, if the goods at stake merit such a sacrifice. In this way, the humble follower of Christ may be called upon to imitate his exemplar by making this sacrifice. However, given the love of Christ, the good of union with Christ, and the good of the exemplification of Christ’s character, if such a sacrifice is required it will not be seen as too demanding by those who seek to love and imitate him.

The Account Does Not Sufficiently Individuate Humility from Other Virtues There are numerous ways to explain and formulate this objection, but one way is as follows. The objector might claim that some of the

31

C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York, NY: HarperOne, 2001), p. 86.

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modules of humility are not really modules of humility, but of other virtues. Consider the following modules: (E2) The humble person is motivated to act by her love for God and for the sake of his kingdom. (A2) The humble person will be disposed to engage in selfsacrificial actions for the good of others. (A4) The humble person will be disposed to engage in particular forms of risk-taking. The objection, then, is that these modules belong to other virtues, and not humility. (E2) could be a module of the virtue of love, (A2) of justice, and (A4) of courage or faith. In reply, I think that particular modules can be modules of more than one virtue. And within the character of the individual, some virtues can be deeply connected to one another, such as love and humility. A compassionate act could also be a generous act—if I give a substantial (for me) sum of money to one who is in need and suffering, it might be described properly by both of these terms. The point is that a single act, or in this case a single active module, namely “a disposition to help others who are in need,” can be characterized by multiple virtue descriptions. When we analyze a particular virtue and offer a thick description of that trait, we may cross over into the realm of neighboring virtues. For this reason an analysis of Christian humility overlaps with an analysis of Christian love and obedience. This view of the modules and the virtues might be unwelcome on an analytic approach prizing sharp classifications and a strict individuation of the virtues, but nevertheless if accuracy is sacrificed for the sake of such categorization, then clearly accuracy should be favored. This reply may be frustrating for an analytic philosopher or theologian, but it is arguably correct. Next, consider (A2) as it relates to humility and justice. If we think of justice roughly as giving to others what is owed to them, then perhaps we do not need the language of humility to capture the disposition described by (A2). So if one possesses the virtue of justice, this would lead them to help satisfy the basic needs of others, and at times more than this as is merited by circumstances. In addition, justice may require us to sacrifice the fulfillment of some of our own interests for the basic needs of others. Perhaps it requires one to forego some luxury items in order to provide food, water, shelter, or basic medical

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care to others who are in such need. However, humility goes further than this. The disposition described in (A2) endorses engaging in selfsacrificial actions for the good of others beyond the requirements of justice, at times even at great cost to oneself. For example, in humility a husband may delay or forego altogether his pursuit of further education so that his wife may do so. In such a case, the weight of the interests in play is roughly equivalent, and justice would seem to leave such a conflict at a standoff. Humility, however, endorses such a sacrifice. In fact, it will in some circumstances endorse the sacrifice of one’s weightier interests for the satisfaction of lesser interests of another. Perhaps the most difficult issue with respect to the individuation of virtues in this context is distinguishing humility as I have described it from the Christian virtue of love. At least some forms of love, such as the agape form of love discussed earlier, include an unselfish concern for the good of others. In reply to this worry, I will first describe the connective role that the virtue of love plays in relationship to other virtues. I will then discuss ways in which love and humility are distinct. In the letter to the Colossians, Paul makes a claim about love and other virtues that is relevant here. In Colossians 3:12–14, he writes, “As God’s chosen ones, holy and beloved, clothe yourselves with compassion, kindness, humility, meekness, and patience. Bear with one another and, if anyone has a complaint against another, forgive each other; just as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also must forgive. Above all, clothe yourselves with love, which binds everything together in perfect harmony.” C. F. D. Moule reads the Greek in this passage as stating that love holds these other virtues together, and that in some sense it completes them. In addition, he claims that Paul may be suggesting that love, which Christ embodies, is a principle that brings coherence to the entire moral realm.32 Many commentators interpret the role of love along similar lines, and conclude that love plays some type of unitive role with respect to these other virtues. For example, in a homily discussing Colossians 3, Chrysostom discusses the role that love plays here as “the bond of perfectness.”33 He states that love is like the ligaments that hold the

32 C. F. D. Moule, The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon, The Cambridge Greek New Testament Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), pp. 123–4. 33 Chrysostom, “Homily VIII. Colossians iii. 5–7.” http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/ npnf113.iv.iv.viii.html.

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bones in a body together, and like the ropes that hold a ship’s rigging together. He concludes his discussion of v. 14 with the observation that Paul does not refer to love as “the summit,” but rather as the bond that holds these traits fast together. It produces them; love is “the root.”34 Calvin makes a similar point when he observes that the preceding list of qualities—compassion, kindness, humility, etc.—all “flow from love.”35 Calvin states that love is to be the rule of life for the Christian. All of one’s choices, actions, and character should flow from it, be regulated by it, and be directed towards it. In his sociorhetorical analysis of Colossians, Ben Witherington agrees. He maintains that love binds these other virtues together; it is “the bond of perfection.”36 He suggests that one way of interpreting this is that love is the virtue that binds the others together; he holds that it may also refer to the function of love in producing unity in the body of Christ. All of this points to the centrality of the virtue of love in Christian moral thought and practice, and to the ways in which it unites the virtues. An important implication of this is that, given love’s unitive functions, we should expect love and humility to exhibit a connection to one another. This is the case on my definition of humility, given the ways in which it and the virtue of love share a concern for the welfare of others. Something similar can be said with respect to love and other virtues. For example, love and justice both share a concern for giving another person what she is due. As Edward Collins Vacek notes, “Love is like justice in rendering to the beloved what is its due since it corresponds to the beloved as it is and can be.”37 Consider also 1 Corinthians 13, one of the most famous descriptions of love in the New Testament. In verses 4–7, we are told that “Love is patient; love is kind; love is not envious or boastful or arrogant or rude. It does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice in wrongdoing, but rejoices in the truth. It bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.” Here, love is itself described with other virtue terms. It is said to be patient and kind. While this and the Colossians passage pose a potential problem for 34

ibid. John Calvin, Commentary on Colossians. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/cal com42.v.iv.iv.html. 36 Ben Witherington III, The Letters to Philemon, the Colossians, and the Ephesians (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), p. 180. 37 Edward Collins Vacek, Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1994), p. 46. 35

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the individuation of love from other virtues, it also reflects one Christian way of thinking about the unity of the virtues. Paul is not writing as a moral philosopher or theologian, and obviously the letters to the Corinthians and the Colossians are not works in analytic moral theology. Nevertheless, we must do the best we can with the teachings of Scripture as they are given, working with the content to tease out potential theoretical possibilities. For my present purposes, one salient point is that just as some forms of love are patient, so some forms of it are humble. As Garth Hallett observes, humility, piety, forgiveness, and friendliness are not mere dispositions, but also characterizations of action: “There are forgiving, mild, humble, friendly, devout ways of doing things we do and of leading our lives in pursuit of varied values.”38 A full description of some actions and virtue modules will need both the language of love and humility. In particular, my suggestion is that we should, at least in some instances, understand agape love as humble love, a love that includes some modules of humility. In addition, we should expect overlapping descriptions of particular modules of individual virtues, if it is true that in some sense there is a unity of the virtues. I do not want to endorse a strong claim that all virtues are one, such that if an agent possesses one virtue then she possesses them all. However, it does seem to me that when we engage in longer and more fine-grained discussions of any particular virtue, we end up discussing other virtues as well, and this is evidence of some weaker form of the unity of the virtues. Even so, there will be ways to distinguish the virtues and their neighboring (and even overlapping) modules. How, then, are love and humility distinct from one another? Both are oriented towards others and their good (as many of the virtues are), but there are differences. Consider one neo-Thomistic account of love, which states that it is “a disposition towards relationally appropriate acts of the will consisting of disinterested desires for the good of the beloved and unity with the beloved held as final ends.”39 Pieper also describes love as involving unity, and that to love another includes highly valuing unity with the beloved. He also emphasizes the role of 38

Garth L. Hallett, Christian Moral Reasoning (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 128. 39 Eric J. Silverman, The Prudence of Love (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), p. 59, italics in original.

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the will in love, and that love expressed as an act of the will affirms the goodness of the beloved, acting for the welfare of the beloved.40 Love, then, includes a desire for union with the beloved. This is not only the case in romantic love, but friendship, parental love, love of one’s neighbor, and love of God. All these forms of love include a relational union of some sort. Vacek offers a broader account of love that is also relevant here, and describes love as “an actively receptive movement of the heart that creatively enhances the value of both the lover and the beloved through a union that affirms their respective dynamisms.”41 When the relevant portions of this notion of Christian love are unpacked, certain features which distinguish it from humility are revealed. Vacek describes love as a receptive movement of the heart, which includes the notion that love in its complete form includes emotion insofar as the lover is affectively moved by the beloved in part because love includes union with one’s beloved. This union with the beloved changes the one who loves. This reveals a distinction between love and humility, namely, that love includes a desire for union with the other whereas humility does not. Love also, in its complete form, necessarily includes affect for the other, whereas humility does not. Humility may lead to such union and affect, setting the stage for love, but it does not include these. In addition, love does not necessarily include sacrifice. I may engage in a shared activity with someone I love which does not require sacrifice and satisfies the above definitions of love. For example, I may spend time with my daughter playing soccer, as an act of parental love because of the goods that she will receive from the activity, such as developing skill, learning about the connections between sport and character development, and the pleasure of playing the sport. Such an action requires no sacrifice, given that I enjoy playing the game, as well as all that I find good and enjoyable about spending time with my daughter. Yet it nevertheless is an act of the virtue of love. When love does include the sacrifice of one’s interests on behalf of the beloved, it should be characterized as humble love in order to capture fully the relevant virtues involved.

40 Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2012), pp. 154, 163–232. 41 Vacek, Love, Human and Divine, p. 66; see also pp. 41–66.

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Another manner in which humility is distinct from love can be seen when considering the following module of social humility: (E1) The humble person has a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over his own. In his discussion of love and preferences, Vacek states that “We can prefer taking out the garbage to studying, though we love neither.”42 Similarly, one can prefer that the interests of another person be satisfied over his own, without loving that other person. In humility, I may possess and then act upon (E1) in relationship to another person, but fail to exemplify a desire for union in relationship as love requires for a variety of reasons. Preferring that the interests of another be satisfied over my own is not identical to love. This is a further way in which love and humility are distinct virtues. But some might still question humility’s status as a virtue, at least for those who have been or are subjects of oppression. In the next section, I consider this form of skepticism about humility.

Is Humility a Virtue of the Oppressed? One source of skepticism about the claim that humility is a virtue has to do with the apparent harm done by this trait to its possessor, if she is a member of an oppressed or marginalized community. Historically, the notions of virtue in general and humility in particular have been used to support oppression. For example, virtue was wrongly used to bolster the institution of slavery in the Antebellum Southern United States.43 It was argued that a slave needed several “virtues,” including obedience, gratitude, loyalty, industry, and humility. These traits of “the good slave” helped support the unjust social structures and interpersonal relationships which existed in this historical context. The oppressors enlisted the Christian religion to reinforce the importance of many such traits, including humility. Frederick Douglass reports that he had met “many good religious colored people at the south, who were

42

Vacek, Love, Human and Divine, p. 38. Nancy Snow, “Virtue and the Oppression of African Americans,” Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (2004): 57–74. 43

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under the delusion that God required them to submit to slavery and to wear their chains with meekness and humility.”44 Similar points can be raised with respect to the oppression of women.45 In many times and places, women have been socialized to believe that virtue for them includes subservience. They are to put their husbands and children ahead of themselves, tending to their needs while subsuming or even ignoring their own interests. To the extent that humility encourages or requires the agent to place the interests of others ahead of her own in such ways, it seems that this trait is not a virtue, at least for the oppressed and marginalized. One potential reply to this objection is that for the oppressed, there are situations in which they find themselves where some of the modules of humility are not appropriate. In cases of oppression, the humble who are suffering from oppression do not need to and in fact should not lower themselves before their oppressors, who have already wrongly lowered them via their oppressive actions and the structures of injustice. In such a situation, the virtuous agent still possesses the relevant humble dispositions related to the cognitive, emotive, and active modules of humility, but the circumstances are such that these modules and dispositions should not be activated. Nancy Snow makes a similar point with respect to meekness that is applicable here, when she claims that “meekness in certain contexts could be a virtue, being pervasively meek or submissive in all situations is not. Cultivating emotional wholeness ensures that one will develop a healthy sense of self-esteem, and so will react to oppression with proper spirit and appropriate anger.”46 The same could be said of humility. It is also important to point out that both the Jews and the early Christians in the New Testament era were an oppressed minority within the Roman Empire. The context in which Paul wrote the letter to the Philippians, then, was an oppressive one in which he still thought that humility was relevant as a virtue. What is required, then, is prudence, so that Christians are able to appropriately exercise (or not) the virtue of humility in their own circumstances.

44 Frederick Douglass, The Complete Autobiographies of Frederick Douglass (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008), p. 318. 45 Nancy Snow, “Virtue and the Oppression of Women,” in Feminist Moral Philosophy, Samantha Brennan, ed. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2003), pp. 33–61. 46 ibid. p. 54.

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The Aristotelian assumption that virtue is necessary but not sufficient for flourishing is also relevant to the objection that humility is not a virtue for the oppressed. As Rosalind Hursthouse observes, the claim that the virtues benefit their possessor by enabling her to flourish is not intended to serve as a sufficient condition for flourishing. There is no guarantee, but rather the neo-Aristotelian claim is that the virtues “are the only reliable bet—even though, it is agreed, I might be unlucky and, precisely because of my virtue, wind up dying early or with my life marred or ruined.”47 Perhaps in such cases, humility is a virtue but its connection to flourishing is broken by bad moral luck. In addition, in order for flourishing to be realized, one must have the requisite external goods (e.g., sufficient money, leisure time, physical and psychological health), and bad luck can prevent this from occurring as well.48 Oppression would certainly qualify as bad luck, in this context. Humility, then, is necessary but not sufficient for human flourishing. In cases of oppression the problem is that the relevant necessary external goods are not present. Yet humility can still be considered a virtue in such situations, on a particular counterfactual analysis: In oppressive conditions, humility may not connect with human flourishing, but if those conditions were improved, then humility would connect with the flourishing of its possessor.49 The problem is that the requisite external goods are not present. If they were, humility would be conducive to human flourishing. Next, recall that part of the intuitive definition of humility given in chapter 2 was a self-lowering other-centeredness. With respect to situations of oppression, it is important to note that “other” does not merely refer to God and other human persons, but also to moral, aesthetic, and alethic values. Given this, the humble person suffering from oppression may resist it in a variety of ways, and may be moved to do so in part because of the virtue of humility. She may resist her own oppression because she is moved by other values, such as self-respect, justice, or personal autonomy, each of which arguably count as an “essential

47 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 172. 48 Lisa Tessman, Burdened Virtues (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 159–64. Tessman’s focus is distinct from my own in important ways, and I do not claim that she would agree with my application of her ideas in this context. 49 I employ “may not” here because in what soon follows I argue that humility as I understand it can function as a virtue in oppressive circumstances.

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antidote to oppressive uses of virtue.”50 Relative to other moral values, then, humility can motivate the oppressed to resist, and in this way it is consistent with what to many seems the intuitively right thing to do in such situations. Humility does not require that one accept enslavement, discrimination, or oppression. One who values justice, ordering her life around it and other important moral values, will thereby have a deep concern for others who are suffering from oppression. Because of this, she will be disposed to fight injustice and oppression on their behalf. There is another manner in which humility is apt for situations of oppression. It could be the case that the humble person will rise up against oppression in part for the benefit of the oppressor. Why might this be? First, it is not in the interest of the oppressor, from a Christian perspective, to engage in acts of oppression. Frederick Douglass makes a point that is relevant here when he says, “I had now penetrated to the secret of all slavery and all oppression, and had ascertained their true foundation to be in all the pride, the power, and the avarice of man.”51 Oppressors do not flourish because of the presence of such vices. The humble person may be moved to resist oppression for the sake of his oppressors, even to the point of sacrificing his own life. For instance, Martin Luther King, Jr. once said that “if physical death is the price that some must pay to free their children and their white brothers from an eternal psychological death, then nothing can be more redemptive.”52 King expressed a willingness to die not only for the sake of those suffering from racial injustice and oppression, but also for the sake of those who were perpetrating it. This is a clear case of humility, of a prima facie disposition to put the interests of others ahead of one’s own. And it reveals another way in which humility can function as a virtue in oppressive situations. Next, I consider a deeper skepticism about the virtue of humility, from one of its most prominent philosophical critics.

Hume’s Critique In the history of philosophy, one of the most prominent critics of the claim that humility is a virtue is the Scottish philosopher David Hume. Snow, “Virtue and the Oppression of Women,” p. 53. Douglass, The Complete Autobiographies of Frederick Douglass, p. 318. 52 Speech at the Great March on Detroit, June 23, 1963. From http://mlk-kpp01. stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/documentsentry/doc_speech_at_the_great_ march_on_detroit; accessed March 2, 2014. 50 51

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In order to clarify and defend the Christian account of humility developed in this book against Hume’s objections, it will be helpful to understand Hume’s general moral framework. Hume’s approach in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is empirical. He maintains that a sound ethical system will be like a sound natural science insofar as it will be based on experience, fact, and observation. For Hume, morality is based on sentiment; the feeling of sympathy is central to his view of what it is to be good.53 We experience this feeling when we observe suffering, and we praise sympathy when we observe others experience it and subsequently help those in distress. For Hume, morality is a matter of feeling, rather than reason. As he puts it, his hypothesis is that “morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.”54 On Hume’s account, then, we feel a particular kind of attraction with respect to the virtues, which leads us to approve of them. We feel an aversion to the vices, which leads us to disapprove of them. Regarding the nature of virtue, he offers the following definition: It is the nature, and, indeed, the definition of virtue, that it is a quality of the mind agreeable to or approved by everyone, who considers or contemplates it. But some qualities produce pleasure, because they are useful to society, or useful or agreeable to the person himself.55

The categories present in this definition are employed by Hume as potential justifications with respect to claims about virtue. For Hume, a person who is a model of perfect virtue will possess traits that are (i) useful to others; (ii) useful to the person; (iii) agreeable to others; and (iv) agreeable to the person. In order to understand a Humean picture of a fulfilled human being, at least two things are required.56 First, it is necessary to construct a framework of a person’s character with the sociable and good-natured virtues that are, according to Hume, universally praised. Second, we must place this person in a society where all the

53 For a brief overview of Hume’s ethics, see Kelly James Clark and Anne Poortenga, The Story of Ethics (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), pp. 61–6. 54 David Hume, An Enquiry into the Principles of Morals (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), p. 85. 55 56 ibid. p. 68, n. 50. Clark and Poortenga, The Story of Ethics, p. 65.

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members seek to promote the happiness of the species through benevolence and the other qualities which are both useful and agreeable to human individuals and societies. In this way, Hume’s definition of utility is distinct from the utilitarian principle of someone like Jeremy Bentham, insofar as Hume is not concerned with a calculation concerning the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. For Hume, rather, utility has to do with the survival of society, with a tendency to promote the end of social preservation.57 Fostering happiness and limiting human misery are important aspects of Hume’s morality, but in a way that is distinct from utility as the maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain. Hume engages in the first task—describing a model of a person with a praiseworthy character—in the conclusion of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. He offers a short description of Cleanthes as someone who a philosopher might see as having exemplary character, and asks the reader to imagine the happiness of a man whose daughter will marry him. Cleanthes has many admirable and useful traits. First, he is a man of honor and humanity, and all those who interact with him can be confident that they will receive fair and kind treatment from him. Such traits are useful to others. Second, Cleanthes will likely advance both socially and professionally, given his diligent study of the law and knowledge of both men and business. These qualities are useful to Cleanthes himself. Third, Cleanthes is, in a certain sense, the life of the party. He has wit, good manners, gallantry without pretention, and knowledge which he communicates in a refined manner. These qualities are agreeable to others; people enjoy and find pleasure in his company. Finally, Cleanthes is said to have a cheerfulness which runs throughout all of his life, a serene countenance, and a tranquil soul. By his greatness of mind he has been able to meet and overcome trials, misfortunes, and dangers. These qualities, then, are immediately agreeable to Cleanthes himself. As Hume puts it in several passages, the “personal merit” of an individual is constituted by his possession and practice of qualities that are useful to himself and others, and also agreeable to himself and others. The virtuous man, then, can be described as an efficient and industrious businessman who has a good reputation and is praised by society. He is cheerful, charming, prudent, welcome at 57 Richard Hiskes, “Has Hume a Theory of Social Justice?” Hume Studies 3 (1977): 72–93.

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dinner parties because he is pleasant company, and is at peace with himself. He is benevolent and promotes the public good.58 I have offered this brief overview of Hume’s views with respect to morality because doing so will be helpful as I next consider and reject his belief that humility has no place either in the character of the virtuous person or among the members of a good society. For Hume, humility is not a moral virtue, but rather it (along with several other traits) is a moral vice: Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man’s fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. We justly, therefore, transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices.59

For Hume, anyone who would argue that one’s personal merit is constituted by the possession and practice of the monkish virtues is deluded. These “virtues” are rejected by reasonable men because they fail to (i) make a person more valuable qua member of society; (ii) advance one’s fortune in the world; (iii) enable one to bring pleasure and enjoyment to others as one relates to them; and (iv) produce any enjoyment in oneself (i.e., yield pleasant mental states in their possessor). The monkish virtues “cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper.” They do not satisfy Hume’s definition of a virtue as being agreeable or useful to oneself and others. These traits, then, are not virtues but vices. Hume’s final charge is that a “gloomy, hairbrained enthusiast, after his death, may have a place in the calendar; but will scarcely ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society, except by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself.”60

58 Elizabeth Dimm, “Hume and the Monkish Virtues,” Philosophical Investigations 10 (1987): 212–25. 59 David Hume, An Enquiry into the Principles of Morals (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), pp. 73–4. 60 ibid. p. 74.

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Regarding humility, Hume believes that we have a sufficiently accurate idea of the nature of this trait. He says that “by pride I understand an agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy’d with ourselves: And that by humility I mean the opposite impression.”61 This form of humility, then, is a monkish virtue that we should reject. Some of those who exemplify the monkish virtues may receive the honor of a day devoted to their memory, but these individuals are vicious for Hume. Some form of superstitious and false religion has taken them in. It is important to note that the concept of humility Hume has in mind is somewhat different from the one I have offered.62 For this reason, it is perhaps the case that Hume would agree that humility as I have defined it is a virtue. He might endorse at least some form of what can be called humility.63 For example, Hume praises Socrates for his tranquility, serenity, and contentment, in the midst of poverty and domestic difficulties. It could be argued that Socrates was humble insofar as he accepted his relative poverty, experienced and accepted the ridicule of social elites, and in the end gave his life for his ideals.64 It is at least the case that in these ways Socrates could be said to manifest some of the modules of humility. And to the extent that Hume thinks this is praiseworthy, he may also take humility as I have described it to be a praiseworthy trait. One area of disagreement between Hume’s conception of humility and my own is that Hume takes humility to be a solely self-regarding trait. For him, humility’s object is the self, and if the “self enters not into consideration, there is no room for . . . humility.”65 Given this, and given Hume’s classification of humility as a monkish virtue, he appears to have in mind the sort of self-referential humility which in his time would be ascribed to the Christian ascetic. The relevant point

61

ibid. p. 297. Perhaps Hume’s version of humility is something along the lines of servility, which is distinct from my conception of this trait. 63 Hume, An Enquiry into the Principles of Morals, p. 65. See also Dimm, “Hume and the Monkish Virtues,” and William Davie, “Hume on Monkish Virtues,” Hume Studies 25 (1999): 139–53. 64 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 277–97. Given what I argue below, Hume should endorse my conception of humility. 65 ibid. p. 277. 62

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which I will now defend is that Hume’s rejection of humility as a virtue fails when applied to humility as I conceive of it. As an initial way to evaluate Hume’s rejection of the monkish virtues in general, and humility in particular, we should consider his proposed method in the Enquiry for discovering whether some particular trait is a virtue or a vice. This method involves the philosopher examining the trait in question and determining whether it motivates others to esteem or have contempt for its possessor. One should consider whether or not the ascription of some particular trait “implies either praise or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or satire”66 of one’s character. The philosopher can be assured “that he can never be considerably mistaken . . . He needs only enter into his own breast for a moment, and consider whether or not he should desire to have this or that quality ascribed to him, and whether such or such an imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy.”67 Hume proffers three ways of reliably determining whether some trait t is a vice or a virtue.68 First, the philosopher can consider whether one’s possession of t merits praise or blame from others. Second, he can consider whether a friend or an enemy would ascribe t to him. And third, he can look within himself in order to determine whether or not he should desire to have t. Using this method, what result do we get regarding humility? As we have just seen, Hume takes humility (and the other monkish virtues) to be vicious, so clearly for him, when applying the above procedure, the conclusion is that humility is no virtue. But why should this methodology be sufficient for determining the status of humility? Hume and those with his views of morality may not desire this trait, but others have and do. The near universality assumed by Hume here does not obtain. When I as a philosopher consider the virtue of humility as I have described it, I desire to possess this trait. I think an ascription of it to me would come from a friend rather than an enemy. And I think such a trait should receive praise rather than blame. What should we make of this disparity of results regarding whether or not humility is a virtue? Hume would likely respond that I am unqualified to make reliable judgments here because as a Christian 66

67 Hume, An Enquiry into the Principles of Morals, p. 16. ibid. See Davie, “Hume on the Monkish Virtues.” Davie briefly employs these three standards, and finds that some of the monkish virtues are in fact virtues, though he fails to consider humility as I do here. 68

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theist, my reason is prejudiced by my religious beliefs and commitments. This leads us to an important criticism of Hume: his conception of humility is highly localized.69 Alasdair MacIntyre argues that for Hume the utility of morality has to do with the ends which the passions endorse as worthy of pursuing.70 The problem, of course, is that different people have different passions endorsing distinct ends. This can be seen when one compares a Humean view of life with a Christian one, as well as a Humean view of virtue with a Christian one. Hume conceives of life as a race. In his praise of the trait of industry, he observes that it is advantageous for acquiring power and material wealth. He notes that the “tortoise, according to the fable, by his perseverance, gained the race of the hare, though possessed of much superior swiftness.”71 Success in life is substantially constituted by victory in the race for power and wealth, according to Hume. As Elizabeth Dimm points out, for Hume this race is common to all human beings, and serves as the context in which our needs and desires arise. This leads to a problem for Hume. As Dimm puts it, “This concept is one which Hume applies to the observations he makes, thus the descriptions we receive are necessarily descriptions whose essential component is the clarification of the success or failure of the object in question to conform to Hume’s preconceived framework; we receive slanted descriptions.”72 For Dimm, Hume has misunderstood the monk’s commitment and his account of the ascetic individual is prejudicial. I believe that Dimm is correct. According to Hume, wealth and power are among the ends of human life for which the virtues have utility. On Christian theism, life is also a race, but of a very different sort. The New Testament employs athletic imagery and contains conceptions of life as a race. In 2 Timothy 4:7, Paul writes that “I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith.” Similar imagery appears in 1 Corinthians 9:24–7, “Do you not know that in a race the runners all compete, but only one receives the prize? Run in such a way that you may win it. Athletes exercise self-control in all things; they do it to receive a perishable garland, but

See Dimm, “Hume and the Monkish Virtues.” Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 48–9. 71 Hume, An Enquiry into the Principles of Morals, p. 53. 72 Dimm, “Hume and the Monkish Virtues,” p. 222. 69 70

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we an imperishable one. So I do not run aimlessly, nor do I box as though beating the air; but I punish my body and enslave it, so that after proclaiming to others I myself should not be disqualified.” The telos of the Christian race is different, and so the nature and role of the virtues are different as well. The ends of the Christian race are love for and union with God and others, i.e., shalom, rather than wealth, power, pleasure, or popularity. The normal and rational individual is simply assumed by Hume to be the person who takes life to be a race in pursuit of power and material wealth that is both personally and socially enjoyable and also has social utility. The passions and corresponding ends of religious enthusiasts and ascetics are absurd and deviant, according to Hume. This makes sense, given the foregoing picture of his view of the good life. This is a problem for him, however. While Hume may hold that because Christianity is false we are justified in condemning the monkish virtues, his ultimate justification for this view is an appeal to the passions of those who share his worldview. Rather than supplying a universal, rationally grounded morality, it is arguably the case that Hume has merely given us an account of a morality that is local to parts of Northern Europe in the eighteenth century.73 If this is correct, then Hume’s rejection of humility by the method employed in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals does not pose a serious problem for my account of humility. But we need not leave things at this sort of standoff. Humility as I understand it does not have the failings Hume ascribes to his understanding of the trait. Christian humility, contra Hume, can make a person more valuable qua member of society, advance one’s fortune in the world, enable one to bring pleasure and enjoyment to others as one relates to them, and produce enjoyment in its possessor. In support of these claims, I employ both philosophical and empirical argumentation. The latter form of argument is relevant for at least two reasons. First, Hume’s philosophical account of virtue and rejection of humility both include empirically testable claims. Hence, empirical data may be used when evaluating Hume’s views. Second, the plausibility of a philosophical account of character and its connections to human flourishing can be enhanced or undermined by empirical data, because the subject matter is not merely conceptual. The implications

73

ibid. pp. 231–2.

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of such accounts in the everyday lives of human beings will have empirical elements. For instance, if a certain character trait has a positive influence on one’s relationships by fostering psychological intimacy, trust, and honesty, then that is relevant to the plausibility of the claim that such a trait is a virtue. Or if a particular trait is empirically linked with the performance of morally praiseworthy actions, then all else being equal this is a prima facie reason for thinking that the trait in question is a moral virtue. With this in mind, I next consider particular ways in which humility as I conceive of it may be seen as a Humean virtue of sorts, given how it can function in the individual and social realms of life. First, humility may make a person more valuable qua member of society. Conceptually speaking, it is clear that a person who is disposed to place the interests of others ahead of his own will also likely have a positive impact in his various spheres of influence by engaging in actions which are (or at least are intended to be) beneficial to others. In this sense, humility will increase his value in society. Imagine a wealthy individual who is humble. It is clear that such a person will likely employ a significant portion of her wealth for the sake of the common good, in a variety of possible ways. Wealth is not a necessity for contributing to the common good, of course, as a humble individual with fewer financial resources may devote time to volunteering for a local charity, mentoring, or actively participating in political processes on behalf of others. All of this may make one a more valuable member of society. Moreover, there are empirical data that support the claim that humility can make one a more valuable member of society. The conception of humility operating in much of contemporary psychology overlaps in many ways with humility as I conceive of it. This is true with respect to three studies performed by Julie Exline and Peter Hill.74 Exline and Hill first observe that those who offer a definition of humility in the field of psychology “have focused on elements such as an orientation toward others . . . an accurate sense of one’s abilities; the ability to acknowledge mistakes, imperfections, gaps in knowledge, and limitations . . . keeping one’s accomplishments in perspective;

74 Julie Exline and Peter Hill, “Humility: A Consistent and Robust Predictor of Generosity,” The Journal of Positive Psychology 7 (2012): 208–18.

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low self-focus or an ability to ‘forget’ the self; and an appreciation for the value of all things.”75 Employing this definition, then, Exline and Hill conclude that humility is robustly linked with generosity concerning time and money. One of their studies revealed that participants who scored high with respect to humility were more likely to make a small donation to charity (generosity with money) and return a take-home survey to the researchers (generosity with time) than those who did not score highly on this trait.76 Such forms of generosity enhance the well-being of others in society. Given this empirical evidence linking humility with generosity, there is additional reason to believe that humility makes a person more valuable as a member of society. Second, and perhaps surprisingly, humility can advance one’s fortune in the world. The humble person will not engage in activities with the accumulation of wealth as her ultimate end, but her disposition to engage in particular forms of risk-taking—as described by module (A4)—can help advance her fortune. For instance, she might risk a very public failure by starting a small business in her community. This sort of risk may prevent some from engaging in such a venture, but the humble person will be unconcerned about how this might impact her reputation. This appropriate lack of concern for what others think—as described by module (C5)—is conducive to starting what could become a very successful business enterprise, thereby advancing her fortune.77 It is clear that there is nothing inherent in humility as conceived of here which will prevent its possessor from obtaining wealth. In fact, humility so conceived can foster this sort of success by removing one prominent barrier to it, namely, a concern for one’s reputation. There is also empirical evidence which counts against Hume’s claim that humility will not advance one’s fortune in the world. In a study of the leadership of a particular kind of successful company, humility was found to play a significant role. In this study, 11 of the 1,435 companies that made the Fortune 500 between 1965 and 1995 were identified as being “good to great.”78 To qualify as “good to 75

ibid. p. 208. Similar results obtained in the other studies done by Exline and Hill. 77 Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood make a similar point in their Intellectual Virtues (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 255–6. 78 Jim Collins, “Level 5 Leadership: The Triumph of Humility and Fierce Resolve,” Harvard Business Review 79 (2001): 66–76. See also J. A. Morris, C. M. Brotheridge, 76

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great,” a company had to follow a particular pattern: (i) generate cumulative stock returns at or below those of the general market for fifteen years; then (ii) undergo the occurrence of a transition point; followed by (iii) generating returns of at least triple the market rate over the next fifteen years. If an entire industry followed this pattern, the company would be dropped from the study to rule out industrywide success as a factor in a particular company’s move from good to great. Humility was identified as an important characteristic of the CEOs of each of these successful eleven companies. This is one piece of empirical evidence which supports the claim that humility can help advance one’s fortune in the world. Third, humility enables one to bring pleasure and enjoyment to others as one relates to them. As Nancy Snow points out, humility makes one’s life better in part because it makes one a more pleasant person to be around; it makes our interactions with others go more smoothly. Proud, arrogant, and conceited people are often difficult and unpleasant to be around.79 Why is this so? One reason is that a self-lowering other-centered person will tend to be a good listener. The humble individual will refrain from talking over others in conversation and will seek to understand their views, including those with which he disagrees. This will very likely bring pleasure and enjoyment to others. Imagine a parent, for instance, who genuinely listens to his child express her thoughts and feelings, and the likely consequences of this for the child’s enjoyment of the parent–child relationship. The same positive result is likely in other types of social relationships. And again, empirical findings support the claim that the humble person can bring pleasure and enjoyment to others via their relationships. Humility is linked not only with a better quality of social relationships and being seen by others as well-adjusted and kind, but also with many prosocial behaviors and traits including gratitude, forgiveness, and cooperation.80 Finally, humility can increase one’s powers of self-enjoyment. That is, humility can yield pleasant mental states in the one who

and J. C. Urbanski, “Bringing Humility to Leadership: Antecedents and Consequences of Leader Humility,” Human Relations 58 (2005): 1323–50. 79 Nancy Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), p. 97. 80 Exline and Hill, “Humility: A Consistent and Robust Predictor of Generosity,” p. 209.

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possess this virtue.81 Christian humility, understood as both proper self-assessment and a self-lowering other-centeredness, is conducive to experiencing and enjoying goodness, truth, and beauty as divine gifts, wherever they are found. The proud and arrogant person often cannot see past himself to enjoy these gifts. As G. K. Chesterton helpfully puts it, “How much happier you would be, how much more of you there would be, if the hammer of a higher God could smash your small cosmos, scattering the stars like spangles, and leave you in the open, free like other men to look up as well as down!”82 Not only will the proud struggle to enjoy many available goods, but so will the self-denigrating individual. Both are often too self-focused to enter into and appreciate many experiences of goodness, truth, and beauty. This is not the case for the humble person. There is also empirical evidence that supports the claim that humility has the potential to “increase one’s powers of self-enjoyment,” as it may foster emotional well-being and self-regulation.83 Regarding emotional well-being, those who think more highly of themselves than the evidence allows might base their self-evaluations on fragile grounds.84 This fragility of self-evaluation, along with risky behavior and bad decisions, can undermine one’s powers of self-enjoyment. With respect to self-regulation, or self-control, humility may prevent its possessor from taking foolish risks and making bad decisions. Moreover, the humble person is relatively free from self-preoccupation, whereas the person who seeks to portray a particular image of himself may thereby experience a psychological burden and might even seek relief through substance abuse, masochism, eating disorders, or suicide.85 Once again Hume’s criticisms of humility, applied to the trait as I understand it, fall short.86 Finally, then, perhaps Hume would (or at 81 Hume has in mind such states as tranquility and serenity. See Hume, An Enquiry into the Principles of Morals, p. 73. 82 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1990), p. 21. 83 Roy Baumeister, “Humility and Modesty,” in Character Strengths and Virtues, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman, eds (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 461–75. 84 ibid. pp. 469–70. 85 See ibid. p. 470; and Roy Baumeister, Escaping the Self (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1991). 86 In his “The Moral Perspective of Humility,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003): 249–69, Joseph Kupfer argues that humility fails to do two things when it is compared to other virtues: it neither motivates socially useful behavior by providing concrete and particular goals to be pursued by the agent nor does it facilitate action.

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least should) agree that on my conception of humility it is a virtue, given the above account of the ways in which it can function in individual and social human life. Next, we turn to a contemporary critique of the claim that humility is a virtue.

Tara Smith’s Critique Contemporary philosopher Tara Smith criticizes the view that humility is a virtue, and argues that pride is a virtue in light of its practical value with respect to individual flourishing.87 Smith notes that historically pride has had its detractors (e.g., Augustine) and supporters (e.g., Aristotle). She also states that “religious doctrine . . . has offered a stream of hostility towards pride.”88 For example, she points out that the book of Proverbs in the Hebrew Bible tells us “pride goes before destruction,” while the New Testament includes the claim that “whoever exalts himself will be humbled, but he who humbles himself will be exalted.”89 Pride, however, like humility, has been conceived of in a variety of ways. In chapter 2 I characterized pride as a self-centered arrogance that includes an overvaluing of one’s own interests because they are one’s own. Pride as defended by Smith is distinct from this, however. She states that “pride, as a virtue, is the disposition to practice proper and demanding moral standards. Pride is the commitment to achieve one’s moral excellence.”90 Smith’s conception of pride—hereafter Other virtues—such as courage, patience, and perseverance—help us to achieve our goals by facilitating action. For example, the courageous person faces adversity rather than letting it prevent her from acting in ways that she desires to act. Kupfer claims that “virtues such as courage, patience, and determination enable us to execute our plans and achieve worthwhile goals. In short, the satisfactions afforded by other virtues are not available through humility” (p. 266). For Kupfer, the role of humility is to help one accept her successes and failures with equanimity. His claim is not that humility is necessarily defective because it fails to motivate certain forms of behavior nor facilitates action, but rather that these are just not the sorts of things humility accomplishes in and through human persons. Kupfer is mistaken about this. He is right that humility helps one accept her successes and failures with equanimity, but it can do much more than this. Contrary to Kupfer’s claims, humility can provide concrete and particular goals that are socially beneficial, and it can facilitate action. We have seen this to be the case in reply to Hume’s worries about humility. 87 Tara Smith, “The Practice of Pride,” in Personal Virtues, ed. Clifford Williams (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 90–116. 88 89 ibid. p. 90. See Proverbs 16:18 and Matthew 23:12. 90 Smith, “The Practice of Pride,” p. 95.

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pride*—is clearly a virtuous character trait. The problem is that those whom Smith cites as condemning pride—Augustine, the author of the relevant portion of the book of Proverbs, and the New Testament authors—are not condemning pride* or anything close to it. The author of Proverbs 16:18 is clearly not claiming that “The disposition to practice proper moral standards and commitment to achieve moral excellence goes before destruction.” A primary aim of the book of Proverbs is to instruct and encourage the reader in wisdom, justice, and righteousness, i.e., in a particular vision of moral excellence (see Proverbs 1:1–33). Clearly pride* is not the intended target. In addition, the short statement Smith lifts from the New Testament is found in Matthew 23:12, but the context there also encourages moral excellence rather than condemning it. When Jesus is portrayed by the author of Matthew as saying “whoever exalts himself will be humbled, but he who humbles himself will be exalted,” the target of this claim is the person who seeks the place of leadership and honor, but fails to serve others for their good. Such a person is criticized later in the passage for ignoring the morally significant matters of justice, mercy, and faithfulness. The self-exaltation and self-importance that partially constitute pride are rejected, not the commitment to moral excellence indicated by pride*. I think it would clarify the argument if rather than using the term “pride,” Smith employed the term “magnanimity.” Some have translated Aristotle’s magnanimity as pride, but the former is clearer than the latter given the ways in which pride can be a slippery term, sometimes denoting mere self-respect and a commitment to moral excellence, while at other times referring to egoistic selfishness and arrogance.91 As I discussed in chapter 2, from a Christian perspective, magnanimity and humility can work in concert with each other.92 The magnanimous person will not back away from attempting virtuous acts, even very formidable ones that appear to be beyond mere human capabilities.93 Humility can work alongside magnanimity to prevent pride and remind us of our need for and dependence on God.

91 For another discussion of magnanimity and an understanding of this trait that is consistent with Christian humility, see David Horner, “What it Takes to Be Great: Aristotle and Aquinas on Magnanimity,” Faith and Philosophy 15 (1998): 415–44. 92 Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, “Aquinas’s Virtues of Acknowledged Dependence: A New Measure of Greatness,” Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004): 214–27. 93 ibid. p. 219.

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The upshot is that the rejection of pride entailed by my account of humility is unscathed by Smith’s defense of pride*. Given my purposes, in the remainder of this section I will consider some of the elements of Smith’s rejection of the claim that humility is a virtue. Smith defines humility in a way that is distinct from the definition I have articulated and defended in this book, however. For her, humility “primarily concerns two things: a person’s aspirations and a person’s presentation of herself to others. Typically, the humble person does not want very much. She is content with a minimal standard of living, or job, or romance, and satisfies herself with relatively low-level needs and aims. Humility also refers to the way that a person projects her abilities and accomplishments. The humble person does not seek to spotlight her success or try to publicize her achievements.”94 She goes on to say that if such a person “believes the belittling self-image that she projects, she will not view herself as worthy of much, so it will seem appropriate to trim her aspirations and make do with the minimum.”95 The situation with respect to humility is similar to that concerning pride and pride*. Smith rejects humility, but her conception of humility is very different than the one I defend. She holds that humility partially involves the ways in which a person presents herself to others. In addition, Smith argues that the humble individual will be encouraged to take a rather unambitious path in life, because as a humble person she will recognize and even celebrate her limits. She will also minimize her own merits and desires. One effect of this is that she will fail to pursue ambitious goals, because humility counsels her “to rein in your dreams, lower your sights, and be satisfied with less.”96 It will be useful to apply her criticisms to my conception of humility, however, because doing so will bring some important truths about my conception of humility to light. Smith’s criticisms apply to some conceptions of humility, yet nothing about humility as I conceive of it entails that one must minimize her merits and desires in this manner. Moreover, humility can in fact motivate and strengthen proper ambition and risk-taking. Consider the fact that many people fail to embark upon an ambitious path in their professional lives because they fear failure. Often, part of this fear is grounded in a concern with what others will think. For 94 96

Smith, “The Practice of Pride,” pp. 97–8. ibid. p. 109.

95

ibid. p. 98.

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example, someone might strongly want to be a philosophy professor, but fear that she does not have what it takes to succeed in graduate coursework, successfully write and defend a dissertation, and then compete for and obtain a job in an ever-tightening market in which sexism continues to be an issue. One reason that such a person might not embark on this path is that she fears what others will think of her if she fails at some point along the way. Humility, however, frees her from this concern, because she truly does not care that others might consider her a failure if she is unsuccessful in reaching her goals. Humility is conducive to risk-taking and proper ambition because it removes a prominent barrier to both, namely, being overly concerned about what other people think. This type of concern can prevent people from taking risks and pursuing ambitious goals in the personal and professional realms of life. In addition, the other-centeredness of humility is relevant if this aspiring philosopher is motivated by certain ideals such as love for God, a concern for truth, the pursuit of wisdom, or the related desire to encourage her students to pursue such values. The virtue of humility can foster ambition and enable one to take risks that one might not otherwise be willing to embrace. Finally, people often do not know what their limits are until they embark on a path that tests those limits. Humility enables us to do so, because we are less concerned with failure. Given this, humility can foster both perseverance and courage. This can in turn yield greater self-knowledge, as we come to have a more accurate picture of our strengths and weaknesses by seeing where our limits in fact lie. But what about Smith’s point that humility encourages people to celebrate their limits? This would seem to be a hindrance to ambition and risk-taking, and perhaps courage as well. However, humility does not encourage individuals to celebrate their limits, but rather merely to be aware of them. The ideally humble person neither celebrates her limits nor exaggerates her successes. She is aware of her limits, at least to the extent that she can be aware of such things (see (C1)), and she also is aware of and accepts the fact that the credit for her successes does not belong entirely to her (see (C2)). She is therefore able to be realistic about herself and the future paths that she may reasonably pursue. She rightly gives credit for her successes to others in addition to herself, in recognition of her dependence on other persons for those successes. Smith claims that honesty is all that is required to obtain the foregoing benefits of an accurate self-appraisal, and that individuals

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can obtain these benefits without humility. However, humility as I conceive of it is both conducive to and enhances the trait of honesty. In many cases, it is even a necessary condition for honesty. For example, a teacher may not know the answer to a question posed by a student, and out of pride (not pride*) he might either make up an answer, or simply move the class along to the next topic. The point is that such a person needs humility in order to be honest and admit that he does not know the answer. In this way, honesty about oneself, especially as it relates to one’s limits and flaws, requires humility. A certain sort of pride may also cause one to be less than honest with oneself, by overestimating one’s abilities. Someone may want to be a world-class marathoner and deceive himself into thinking that he has the potential to do this, when this is not the case. Humility enables him to accept the truth about himself in such a situation, which enables him to then be honest with himself about his own particular limits. To know his limits, a person must often test them in a way that opens him up to the risk of failure. This involves risk-taking, ambition, and courage. And the virtue of humility can move and enable us to risk such failure, whether public or private. In addition, one contemporary psychological model of personality structure—the HEXACO model—includes the claim that there is a deep connection between the traits of honesty and humility.97 On the HEXACO model, there are six major dimensions of personality, one of which is Honesty-Humility. The inclusion of the category of HonestyHumility as one of the major dimensions of personality structure is justified by several empirical findings concerning the link between these two traits.98 For example, the HEXACO model outperforms a competing model of personality structure—the Big Five, or Five Factor Model—by virtue of its inclusion of the Honesty-Humility dimension of personality. The inclusion of Honesty-Humility has also been shown to make the HEXACO model more accurate with respect to predicting certain behaviors. The upshot is that there is evidence that 97 Michael Ashton and Kibeom Lee, “Empirical, Theoretical, and Practical Advantages of the HEXACO Model of Personality Structure,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 11 (2007): 150–66. See also http://hexaco.org/ for an overview of this model, so named because it includes the claim that there are six major dimensions of personality. 98 ibid. p. 161. Ashton and Lee also report that there is strong empirical evidence supporting a link in personality structure between honesty and humility across individuals from a variety of cultures, based in part on lexical studies.

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humility and honesty are two traits that are deeply linked to one another in human personality structure. The relevance of this for my response to Smith is that this is a strong piece of prima facie evidence that the link between the virtues of honesty and humility cannot be easily dismissed and may be quite strong. That is, both honesty and humility are required for an accurate self-appraisal and the ensuing benefits to the agent. Finally, Smith rejects caricatures of the proud person as someone who is haughty or condescending in part because they “frame nonessential personality variables rather than the core of the character trait.”99 The upshot here is that something similar is true of her criticisms of humility. Her characterization (or caricature) of humility does not frame the core of this character trait, especially as I have described it. Given this, and given the foregoing responses I have offered, the claim that humility as I understand it is a virtue survives Smith’s critique.

CONCLUSION We briefly considered in the above section the claim that humility is connected to honesty in significant ways. In chapter 4, I explore humility’s connection to several other important character traits, including the cardinal virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice as well as the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. I also explore ways in which humility acts as a partial remedy for the vices commonly referred to as the seven deadly sins: envy, vainglory, sloth, avarice, anger, gluttony, and lust. Humility is significant in part because of its positive connections to these important virtues and its remediation of these potent vices. This in turn reveals the importance of humility for human flourishing, which is the primary focus of chapter 4.

99

Smith, “The Practice of Pride,” p. 112.

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4 Humility and Human Flourishing Augustine underscores the centrality of humility when he states that if he is asked about “the instructions of the Christian religion, I would be disposed to answer always and only, ‘Humility.’”1 St. Teresa of Avila tells us that “so long as we are on this earth, nothing matters more to us than humility.”2 In a similar vein, Bonaventure contends that humility is “the root and guardian of all virtues.”3 While this is perhaps too strong, I maintain that humility plays a variety of very important positive roles with respect to the other virtues. Cassian agrees and contends that humility plays a foundational role concerning character. He claims that “no structure (so to speak) of virtue can possibly be raised in our soul unless first the foundations of true humility are laid in our heart, which being securely laid may be able to bear the weight of perfection and love upon them.”4 A central aim of this chapter, then, is to provide evidence for the truth of the claim that humility plays an important role with respect to other virtues by exploring connections between it and several other individual virtues. In order to do this, I will first explore several ways in which humility is conducive to human flourishing. I claim that humility is rational, that it benefits its possessor, and that it contributes to its possessor being good qua human. I then examine humility’s connections with

1

Augustine, Letter CXVIII. https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf101.vii.1. CXVIII.html. 2 St. Teresa of Avila, Interior Castle, translated by E. Allison Peers (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008), p. 24. 3 Bonaventure, Bonaventure: The Soul’s Journey into God, The Tree of Life, The Life of St. Francis (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1978), p. 129. I will return to this claim later in the chapter. 4 John Cassian, Institutes, Book XII, chapter XXXII; http://www.newadvent.org/ fathers/350712.htm.

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flourishing in more detail by exploring how it relates to other virtues. I consider the relationship between humility and the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, as well as how it relates to the cardinal virtues of prudence, fortitude, justice, and temperance. In addition, one way to think of how humility might act as a guardian of the virtues is that it prevents (or at least hinders) vice. Another aim of this chapter, then, is to consider how humility hinders or prevents vice in human beings related to the seven capital vices of envy, vainglory, sloth, avarice, anger, gluttony, and lust, insofar as they are all grounded in the primary capital vice, pride. It is to these issues concerning humility and human flourishing that we now turn.

THE VALUE OF HUMILITY FOR HUMAN BEINGS In the context of an extended discussion of the rationality of morality as it relates to virtue ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse discusses three interrelated theses: 1. The virtues benefit their possessor, i.e., they enable her to flourish. 2. The virtues make their possessor a good human being, i.e., they are required for her to flourish as a human being and live a characteristically good life. 3. (1) and (2) are interrelated.5 In what follows, I will focus on (1) and (2), but set (3) aside. The first claim is focused on what is good for the agent, while the second focuses on what makes the agent good. In the case of humility, (1) leads to the question “What is good for me about being humble?” (2) leads us to ask “Why does humility make me a good human being?” This chapter can be construed in part as an answer to these questions. The positive connections humility has with the theological and cardinal virtues will show that it is good for its possessor and makes its possessor good. There are some fairly straightforward and intuitively sound ways in which humility satisfies (1) and (2). First, it is in many ways better for us to be humble than either arrogant or self-denigrating. Arrogant 5 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 167–77.

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and conceited people are difficult to be around, and generally others will not like such people even if they are able to put up with them. Arrogance leads you to think more of yourself than you should, and can lead you to make foolish decisions in many realms of life. If you overestimate your importance or abilities, or expect honor from others beyond what you really deserve, you will often end up feeling unhappy and dissatisfied. You will often be left wondering why others fail to properly appreciate you and your abilities. Humility, then, is important and can be beneficial in personal and professional relationships. In addition to this, consider the fact that those who are self-denigrating both in how they see themselves and how they relate to others fail to evince appropriate self-respect grounded in the basic dignity possessed by all human beings. Those who fall prey to this mistake need to learn to stand up for themselves and their ideas as is appropriate, and not always defer to others. They may deny it, to varying degrees, but often such individuals become unhappy and bitter because of the ways in which they disregard their own interests and needs. There is a variety of ways in which humility makes one a better human being. Humility can foster good relationships with other people, contribute to one being a better friend, spouse, or parent who tends to put the welfare of others first, and it helps one to take truth and other important values to be more important than one’s own narrow self-interest. How else might humility benefit its possessor and contribute to her being a good human being? In chapter 3, several points were raised in response to objections from David Hume and Tara Smith that also reveal how humility can satisfy requirements (1) and (2). For example, it was shown that humility is empirically linked with prosocial traits and behaviors including gratitude, forgiveness, and cooperation.6 It is good to be humble because it is good to be in deep interpersonal relationships, in part because the traits and abilities required for such relationships help to make one a good human being. Humility is conducive to this end and some of the traits needed to pursue and achieve it. The same point applies to humility’s connections with emotional well-being and self-regulation.7 Moreover, the humble person is relatively free from

6 Julie Exline and Peter Hill, “Humility: A Consistent and Robust Predictor of Generosity,” The Journal of Positive Psychology 7 (2012): 209. 7 Roy Baumeister, “Humility and Modesty,” in Character Strengths and Virtues, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman, eds (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 461–75.

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self-preoccupation, whereas the person who seeks to portray a particular image of himself may thereby experience a psychological burden and seek relief in unwise or harmful ways.8 To the extent that humility thwarts this pattern of psychological burden and the associated pursuit of relief in misguided ways, it is good for its possessor and is conducive to making its possessor a good human being. Before moving to a more detailed discussion of humility’s connection with other virtues, it is important to point out that in her discussion of (2), Hursthouse is working from a naturalistic framework. However, in an approach such as the one I am employing that includes supernatural components, humility makes one a good human being because to be a good human being requires possessing and exemplifying to some degree the character of Jesus. This does not mean one has to be a Christian theist, as clearly naturalists, other theists, and those who adhere to other religions can exemplify such traits. But it does mean that when thinking about what it is to be a good and even excellent human being, for the Christian theist resemblance to the character of Jesus is an essential and primary component. And given the teachings from the New Testament discussed in chapter 2, it is clear that Jesus is represented there as an exemplar of humility. While there is obviously a deep difference between Hursthouse’s naturalistic framework and my supernaturalistic one, it is still the case that much of what she says about (2) can be included within my approach. This is because a supernaturalistic conception of virtue and human flourishing can encompass much of what is included in a naturalistic approach. There can be significant overlap in terms of the connections between human nature, human virtues, and human fulfillment. Honesty, for instance, is a good trait to have given the social nature and interdependence of human beings, regardless of whether one is a naturalist or theist. With this in mind, I will consider the four ends of virtue present in Hursthouse’s framework and see how humility fares with respect to achieving these ends. Subsequent to that discussion, I will also briefly consider the possibility of a fifth end that relates to us as not only social animals, but also as rational ones.9

8 See ibid. p. 470; and Roy Baumeister, Escaping the Self (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1991). 9 I am interacting with her views as stated in Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 192–216, and follow her procedure of considering how a trait fares with respect to achieving the fulfillment of these ends.

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On Hursthouse’s ethical naturalism, a good human being is one whose aspects, including its parts, operations, actions, desires, and emotions, function well. To determine whether or not these aspects are functioning well, we must determine whether or not they work to satisfy the four ends appropriate for human beings, given that we are social animals. These four ends are individual survival, continuance of the human species, freedom from pain and enjoyment that are characteristic of members of the species, and the good functioning of the social group (i.e., the group fosters the development of the capacities of its individual members). With this in mind, a virtuous human being is one who is functioning well with respect to these aspects as they relate to the four ends. The important question for our study is whether or not humility qualifies as a virtue, so understood. Initially, to explore this question, I will bracket the theistic aspects of the virtue in order to evaluate it under Hursthouse’s ethical naturalism. Then I will discuss these aspects in light of her own brief allusions to ethical supernaturalism. A preliminary point worth noting is that, as Hursthouse points out, the criteria for attributing goodness to a human being include what a human being is and does, as a human being. She also alludes to the disagreements that exist concerning the question of what human beings are, and states that “It might be said, for example, that what human beings are are possessors of an immortal soul through which they can come to know and love God for eternity. But ‘ethical naturalism’ is usually thought of as not only basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature, but also as taking human beings to be part of the natural, biological order of living things. Its standard first premise is that what human beings are is a species of rational, social animals and thereby a species of living things.”10 How does humility fare with respect to serving the four ends that are appropriate for social animals in general, including human beings?11 As we consider this question, we must keep in mind that humility may not have the positive effects relative to these ends in every single case. I am only claiming that it will tend to have such effects, but circumstances may obtain which prevent such effects from coming to be. This is an implication of the Aristotelian observation that virtue is 10

ibid. p. 206. Hursthouse examines courage as it relates to these ends (pp. 208–9). I use her methodology to consider how humility fares on the same grounds. 11

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not sufficient for eudaimonia. However, it is conducive to it, and as I consider the connections between humility and the ends appropriate for social animals, I am merely claiming that it will tend to fulfill these ends in the ways discussed, not that the presence of this virtue will guarantee that these ends are fulfilled. The self-regarding aspects of humility are conducive to the first end, namely, individual survival. Recall from chapter 2 that in terms of its self-regarding aspects, the virtue of humility is best understood as a proper self-assessment. A specific module related to this is (C1). The humble person tends not to inflate his own importance, abilities, or character. He will be aware of his limits. This point is relevant here because such an awareness can have life-preserving consequences in a variety of circumstances. It may seem that the other-regarding aspects of humility (i.e., social humility) are not conducive to the end of individual survival. After all, the humility of the Christian exemplar, Jesus Christ, led to his death. However, social humility can also be conducive to individual survival. To see how this is the case, consider that social humility can serve the second end, the continuance of the human species. In a community where this virtue is present and active via modules (C3), (E1), (A1), (A2), and (A3), the common good will be served in a variety of ways as individuals make use of their capacities to serve others where a need exists. And they will receive similar assistance from their compatriots. In general, individuals who make up such communities will survive longer and flourish more deeply because of how social humility functions. In this way, social humility also contributes to the end of individual survival. Social humility serves the third end of characteristic freedom from pain and enjoyment in a variety of ways. A humble person’s tendency to put the interests of others ahead of her own will help to enable others in her community to experience many characteristic enjoyments. The presence and practice of humility will hinder the presence of many of the characteristic pains that come in relationships (especially close friendships, romantic relationships, and filial friendships). When humility is present and working, the pain of rejection, betrayal, dishonesty, and other sorts of emotional hurts that can obtain when one is subjected to the selfishness of another, will be hindered. The other-centeredness of humility will hinder the selfishness that tends to cause such pains. The fourth end, a social group’s functioning, will be qualitatively enhanced and improved by humility. In addition to the relevant points

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mentioned in the foregoing two paragraphs, humility will enhance cooperation in the social groups in which it operates. When members of a social group possess and exemplify (C4) and (A3), for example, cooperation will be more likely to occur because both hierarchical thinking and the pursuit of status for its own sake often prevent cooperation. Humility removes these barriers. In addition, as Hursthouse notes, a social group that functions well helps its members develop their capacities. Given that it is in the interest of individuals to do so, and given that humble persons will tend to put the interests of others ahead of their own, it follows that when humility is present and operating in groups, capacity-development will be much more likely to obtain. Lastly, keeping in mind that “other” in the other-centeredness that partially constitutes humility includes moral, alethic, and aesthetic values, this virtue can promote much that enriches our common human life: knowledge, beauty, and goodness as they are present in a wide variety of cultural forms including music, art, literature, religion, philosophy, sport, and the social and physical sciences. But as Hursthouse states, we are not just social animals, we are also rational, and it might be argued that this brings a fifth end that is unique to rational beings into the picture.12 One traditional notion is that preparing one’s soul for an afterlife constitutes this fifth end. Another is the contemplative life of the philosopher advocated by Aristotle. The first is not suitable for Hursthouse’s naturalistic project, and she notes that even most philosophers have rejected the second. She does not reject the claim that there is no fifth end, but because she can find no plausible candidate she is also unwilling to suggest one. Given that my approach to human nature and human flourishing falls under the category of ethical supernaturalism, there are potential candidates available to me that are unavailable to Hursthouse. On Christian ethical supernaturalism, a potential fifth end is communion with the triune God and others who have freely entered into this divine–human community. This fifth end includes the beatific vision (i.e., a vision of God) which constitutes the “final and perfect happiness” of human beings, according to Aquinas.13 But this fifth end as I conceive of it emphasizes the communal nature of the beatific vision. It is something that we who have freely chosen to enter enjoy together. True human fulfillment, or shalom, is realized as we enjoy

12

Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 218.

13

Aquinas, ST IaIIae.3.8.

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this fifth end that is appropriate to us as rational creatures created by God in his image. This end can be partially satisfied in the present life, and so does not depend entirely on the afterlife for its fulfillment. But it is only in the afterlife that this end is fulfilled in a complete sense. I will not give a defense of the claim that this fifth end is suitable for all human beings, but here simply note that much of the Christian tradition holds that it (or something very like it) constitutes our ultimate good. As will become evident and important below, I take participation in and enjoyment of this end to include a type of character transformation for which humility is deeply relevant. How does humility fare with respect to satisfying this fifth end? One line of argument for the claim that humility serves this fifth end is scriptural. There is a consistent stream of thought in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament which holds that humility is conducive to and even necessary for being blessed by God.14 In addition, calling to mind the general definition of humility as both proper self-assessment and a self-lowering other-centeredness, the suitability of this trait for satisfying this fifth end becomes apparent. In Christian thought, one condition for entrance into the divine–human community is repentance. The humble person will satisfy this condition, because she will realize her need for God’s grace and forgiveness, in part as a result of the presence and activity of (C1). A self-lowering other-centeredness is appropriate for this community, because the triune God is at the center of it as a subject of worship, love, and trust. The human members of the community realize the greatness of God relative to their own moral and ontological status and thereby lower themselves before God in worship, as prescribed by humility. To be a part of this divine–human community is a gift. One element of this gift is the transformation of character. This transformation is referred to in a variety of ways in the Christian tradition by terms such as sanctification, godliness, holiness, and theosis. This last term has primarily been employed by the Eastern Orthodox Church, but is beginning to receive more attention within other Christian traditions, where it has long been present but unfortunately neglected.15 14 For example, see Proverbs 3:34, 15:33, 18:12, 22:4; Matthew 23:12; James 4:6–10; and 1 Peter 5:5–7. 15 See Michael J. Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009); J. Todd Billings, “United to God through Christ: Calvin on the Question of Deification,” Harvard Theological Review 98 (2005): 315–34; Robert Rakestraw, “Becoming Like God: An Evangelical Doctrine of Theosis,” Journal of

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The concept is relevant here because it captures something that is important not only for the fifth end of human beings as rational animals, but also for linking humility with human flourishing. Theosis is a transliteration of a Greek term; the best English term for this idea is “deification.”16 According to Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov there are many conceptually equivalent terms for deification, including “union, participation, partaking with the divine, similitude with God, transformation, elevation, transmutation, commingling, assimilations, intermingling, rebirth, regeneration, transfiguration.”17 They describe it more fully as follows: In Christian theology, theōsis refers to the transformation of believers into the likeness of God. Of course, Christian monotheism goes against any literal “god making” of believers. Rather, the NT speaks of a transformation of mind, a metamorphosis of character, a redefinition of selfhood, and an imitation of God . . . Theologians now use theōsis to designate all instances where any idea of taking on God’s character or being “divinized” (made divine) occurs.18

When an individual experiences and exemplifies deification, this includes not only union with God but also the exemplification of (to some degree) the virtues of Christ. Deification was seen by many Patristics as crucially important, “as the telos (goal) of human existence and of salvation.”19 This constitutes human flourishing, on a Christian view. The relevant point in the present context is that I intend the divine–human community offered above as a possible fifth end of human beings to mean something along these lines. The concept of theosis, or deification, includes both union with God and transformation of character.20 How is humility relevant to this? Deification includes not only a willingness to be changed, but also a deep desire that such change occur. (C2) is especially pertinent to the reality of theosis in the life of the Evangelical Theological Society 40 (1997): 257–69; Carl Mosser, “The Greatest Possible Blessing: Calvin and Deification,” Scottish Journal of Theology 55 (2002): 36–57. 16 Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov, “Introduction,” Theōsis: Deification in Christian Theology, Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov, eds (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2006), pp. 1–15. 17 18 19 ibid. p. 6. ibid. p. 1. ibid. p. 5. 20 Others may prefer to use the concepts of Christlikeness or sanctification for this transformative union with Christ, and I have no objection to this. For a more detailed discussion of these ideas, see my “The Doctrine of Theosis: A Transformational Union with Christ,” Journal of Spiritual Formation and Soul Care 8 (2015): 172–86.

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the believer. Recall Herdt’s discussion of the work of Erasmus from chapter 2, where she finds a substantive conception of the acquisition and exemplification of Christian virtue requiring both divine and human agency. Herdt claims that to imitate Christ “is fundamentally to imitate Christ’s humility and thus be willing to be dependent, receptive, open to transformation from without.”21 On her reading of Erasmus, he warns Christians to avoid relying on their own efforts and the performance of merely external actions for growth in virtue, rather than pursuing an inner transformation accomplished in partnership with God. Two points are especially relevant here with respect to humility and theosis. First, we human beings are not responsible for the capacities, talents, and virtues that we possess. Humility, as a virtue of acknowledged dependence, recognizes our fundamental and inescapable dependence upon others for our flourishing.22 In humility we realize that our talents and capacities (including the capacity for virtue) are given to us, rather than acquired by us. Second, however, we do play a role in developing and expressing them in partnership with God, in dependence upon God, and in union with God.23 Divine agency and humble human agency are both necessary for theosis. In humility, the follower of Christ must recognize her own moral and spiritual lack with respect to the characterological and unitive aspects of theosis. She is unable to reach her full moral potential as a Christian apart from attempting to do so in union with God. And she is unable to experience union with God apart from God’s activity in the divine–human relationship. On Christian theism, God is not at our disposal, but rather is a being whose agency the believer must respect and take account of as she seeks a deeper relationship with him. Humility fosters this, because the humble person recognizes that she is limited not only as (C2) states, but she is also aware of her personal limitations and her limitations as a human person, as (C1) claims. Included in these limitations is the inability to control or manipulate God. There are things she can do to 21 Jennifer Herdt, Putting on Virtue (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 115. 22 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1999), pp. 119–28. 23 For a helpful discussion of infused and acquired virtue, see Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke, Aquinas’s Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009); and Andrew Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012).

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foster a deeper union with God, some of which will be discussed in chapter 5. But according to most in the Christian mystical, monastic, and other relevant traditions, such a union only comes to fruition as God chooses to respond in the manner and time that he deems appropriate. Humility helps to enable the believer to accept all of this, and act accordingly. According to the above, this can lead not only to a deeper exemplification of crucial Christian virtues, but also a deeper union with God. Finally, there is something beautiful about the picture provided by the kenosis and humility of Christ and the resulting possibility of theosis, including humility, within the life of the follower of Christ. In general terms, then, humility is conducive to and is an element of theosis. In more specific terms, an exploration of the connections between humility and other virtues will reveal some of the more particular ways in which it is connected with human flourishing, so understood. It is to this task that I now turn.

HUMILITY AND THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES In the Christian tradition, the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love are thought to play an essential and central role in human flourishing. Throughout the New Testament, faith, hope, and love often appear together.24 According to Aquinas, faith, hope, and love are theological virtues because they direct their possessor towards God, are infused by God, and are known by us through divine revelation via the Scriptures.25 The theological virtues direct us to our supernatural end of union with God. Aquinas also holds that humility has an important role to play with respect to these virtues as it removes the vice of pride and creates receptivity to God’s gracious activity and infusion of virtue.26 In what follows, we will explore some of the ways in which humility is connected to faith, hope, and love. It will become apparent that humility can play a significant role in relation to these three central virtues of the Christian life.

24 25

For example, see 1 Corinthians 13, 1 Thessalonians 1, and Colossians 1. 26 Thomas Aquinas, ST IaIIae.62.1. ibid. IIaIIae.165.ad2.

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Faith While there are many ways of understanding the nature of religious faith, as a starting point I first note that the New Testament Greek term pistis, translated as faith, means trust.27 In his discussion of the virtue of faith, Richard Swinburne observes that this notion is more than mere belief; it also includes trust in God.28 That is, faith is not just belief that God exists, or belief that the Christian religion is true. Rather, it is faith in a person, which includes belief in God as a particular type of person (or persons) who has certain properties, performed significant actions on our behalf, and finally has made significant promises to us. Faith includes such belief that and belief in; it disposes one to love and obey God (e.g., by worshiping God, serving the poor). The virtue of faith works in concert with God’s love for us as well as our love for God and others. The person with the virtue of faith is committed to God and trusts God. As Swinburne puts it, “saving faith . . . involves the whole person.”29 In a similar vein, Paul Moser analyzes faith in God as “entrusting oneself to God.”30 This entrusting of oneself is not merely intellectual. It also involves obeying God. The entrustment of oneself to God and God’s promises, exemplified in the Hebrew Bible by Abram in Genesis 15, is a way of appropriating divine grace. But such self-entrustment is manifested in obedience to God. In this way, it involves the everyday life of the religious believer. Such faith is thought to involve one in a relationship with God as a person. F. Gerrit Immink also makes these points, but emphasizes that in practice such faith assumes that we are in a communal relationship with Christ, a relationship that we conceive of as involving concrete interactions between two subjects.31 As Immink understands it, faith also opens the believer up to a new reality, the 27 For a helpful overview of the many ways of understanding faith, see John Bishop, “Faith,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta ed., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/faith/. 28 Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 137–58. In this chapter Swinburne discusses several conceptions of faith—Thomistic, Lutheran, pragmatic, and notions found in early Christian thought—but for my purposes it is sufficient to discuss the idea that faith as a virtue includes propositional belief but goes beyond it as well. 29 ibid. p. 141. 30 Paul K. Moser, The Evidence for God (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 91. 31 F. Gerrit Immink, Faith: A Practical Theological Reconstruction, translated by Reinder Bruinsma (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), p. 2. See also pp. 17–42.

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reality of the kingdom of God.32 Faith is more than this, however. For Immink, it is important to see that faith also plays important cultural and social roles. It is not only important for the human–divine relationship, but human–human relationships as well. While there is much more that could be said about the nature of faith, and numerous philosophical and religious controversies surround the concept, the foregoing is sufficient for considering how the virtue of humility relates to faith. Humility is conducive to faith in God, to the self-entrustment to God and commitment to God’s ways that constitutes such faith. First, consider the social aspect of the intuitive definition of humility involving a self-lowering other-centeredness, and how it relates to this. Many of the attitudes which, according to Christian theology, can act as barriers to faith and growth in faith are connected to what Immanuel Kant calls “the dear self ”: I am willing to admit out of love for humanity that most of our actions are in accordance with duty; but if we look more closely at our planning and striving, we everywhere come upon the dear self, which is always turning up, and upon which the intent of our actions is based rather than upon the strict command of duty (which would often require self-denial).33

While Kant is considering how our preference for ourselves relates to moral duty, we can expand the application of the notion of the dear self to the virtue of faith. Some individuals reject faith in God because of their devotion to the dear self, which may be simple selfishness or may reflect a desire to maintain ultimate autonomy over one’s life (of course, many religious believers also exemplify forms of such devotion to self ). This can serve as a barrier to faith because the individual is taking her perceived self-interest to be of greater value than the life of fulfilling self-denial that the gospels present as normative for the Christian life. Humility, then, can remove such barriers to faith as it draws the attention of an individual away from herself, moving her to value others (and other things of value) in a deeper manner. In this way, humility can work in concert with and even foster faith in God, as well as the communal sharing of that faith (and an acting out of its implications) with others in the human realm. 32

ibid. p. 246. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 3rd ed., translated by J. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1993), p. 20. 33

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A significant aspect of entrusting oneself to God is the realization of and admission to God that one is, to use a biblical term, sinful. A person who embraces such faith comes to see that her thoughts, beliefs, emotions, dispositions, and actions are not always what they should be, and in part because of this, as well as the love she comes to believe God has and has shown for her, she entrusts herself to God. She realizes her limits and fallibilities—which is part of what it is to be humble—and in light of them she sees her need for faith in God. In these ways, humility, like all the virtues, exemplifies the proper use of reason.34 Recall (C1) in order to see how it is related to this: the humble person possesses self-knowledge with respect to her virtues, vices, and limitations, both personal and qua human person. Perhaps humility is a necessary condition of faith, not only because (C1) appears to be implicated by what initially entrusting oneself to God involves, but also by what happens subsequently as the individual seeks to live out her faith in the various facets of her existence.35 Humility, especially as it is described by (A1) and (A2), disposes one to obey God in general, and in particular it disposes one to act unselfishly on behalf of others. But whether or not humility is a necessary condition of salvific faith—given that faith produces obedience to God as one entrusts oneself to God—it is evident that humility is at least an important ally of the virtue of faith as one seeks to integrate faith into her character and life. Entrusting oneself to another, whether the other is human or divine, involves both an initial decision as well as an ongoing commitment. In a limited sense, this is what occurs when two individuals marry. They entrust themselves to their spouse in a variety of ways (e.g., emotionally, physically), and must continue to do so for the relationship to flourish. In the case of a human person entrusting herself to God, there is some sort of initial decision or set of decisions, but then this self-entrusting is an ongoing process as she becomes aware of areas of her life that are not yet characterized by such faith, and struggles to maintain such faith in areas that she has been entrusting to God. 34 See W. Jay Wood, “Prudence,” in Virtues and their Vices, Kevin Timpe and Craig Boyd, eds (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 37–58. 35 An anonymous reviewer notes that at least some Protestants may reject the claim that humility is a necessary condition of faith, given the belief that one is justified by faith alone. The reviewer goes on to suggest the quite plausible possibility that the divine grace which precedes salvific faith not only prepares the person to respond in faith, but also generates a form of humility.

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Finally, the virtue of humility is consistent with and perhaps even demands a faith that is rational. In his discussion of faith, Swinburne claims that it is “to act on the assumption that He will do for us what He knows that we want or need, when the evidence gives some reason for supposing that He may not and where there will be bad consequences if the assumption is false.”36 Faith depends in part on evidence not only for God’s existence, but also for God’s care and provision for us. Given that humility is in part constituted by an other-centeredness which includes a concern for and valuing of truth, it follows that such humility will be inconsistent with at least some aspects of fideistic conceptions of religious faith, and evince a natural fit with evidentialist ways of understanding this virtue.

Hope In his discussion of hope as a theological virtue, grounded in the thought of Aquinas, Josef Pieper takes it to consist in a persistent and intentional lived focus upon the fulfillment of our human nature, with grace functioning as its source and happiness in union with God serving as its end.37 Such hope is confident and patient, and includes a longing for its as yet unattained end, the future good of fulfillment in union with God. Hope is not a mere wish, or an emotional longing for something that is very unlikely to happen. Rather, it includes a confident assurance that fulfillment in union with God will obtain. As Pieper defines it, then, hope is “the confidently patient expectation of eternal beatitude in a contemplative and comprehensive sharing of the triune life of God; hope expects from God’s hand the eternal life that is God himself.”38 Given this conception of hope, I will next consider ways in which humility is connected to this virtue, so understood. Pieper claims that humility is important in this context because a lack of it can lead to a loss of hope. Pieper’s conception of humility is narrower than my own. For him, it is primarily an attitude of human beings before and towards God, rather than towards one another. As he puts it, humility is “the knowledge and acceptance of the inexpressible distance between Creator and creature.”39 The humble person has 36

Swinburne, Faith and Reason, p. 144. Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2012), pp. 99–112. 38 39 ibid. p. 103. ibid. p. 102. 37

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knowledge of her own value before God and compared to God, and of her limits. It is not entirely clear from Pieper’s analysis how a lack of humility leads to the loss of the theological virtue of hope. However, some helpful points can be drawn from his discussion. First, Pieper considers the nature of presumption. One form of presumption, which Pieper refers to as “a heresy propagated by the Reformation,” is the belief that God’s redemptive action is sufficient for salvation, and that in view of this and belief in “the absolute certainty of salvation solely by virtue of the merits of Christ,”40 the Christian is no longer a pilgrim because he has now achieved the goal of his own salvation. For Pieper, this type of presumption is a false self-esteem and evinces a lack of humility because it involves a denial of one’s status as a creature and includes a claim that one is like God. But hope presupposes humility, and so the lack of humility evinced by this Reformation-linked error is a barrier to hope. I do not want to engage in a lengthy discussion of the merits of the Reformation, or lack thereof, but merely point out that on many Protestant understandings, salvation by grace through faith can be seen as quite consistent with humility. In addition, I believe but will not defend the claim that there is a common conception of faith that Protestants and Roman Catholics can share, while differences concerning faith nevertheless remain.41 This reveals that humility can be linked with hope not only for Roman Catholic followers of Christ, but others as well. In many traditions of Christian theology, salvation is both an event and a process. On such an understanding, it is possible for the Christian believer to be assured that she is saved, insofar as she will enter into the beatific vision after her death. However, another aspect of her salvation, that of the transformation of her character into a likeness of the character of Christ, is a lifelong process that perhaps often occurs in fits and starts. Hope is relevant here because while she may know that she will enter into the beatific vision after death because of God’s mercy, love, and grace, she will nevertheless realize that the transformative aspect of salvation is not guaranteed. This is because, as I argued in chapter 2, she has a role to play in this process. One criterion of an authentic faith, then, is that a process of moral and spiritual 40

ibid. p. 126. For a brief but helpful discussion of faith and the Reformation, see Swinburne, Faith and Reason, pp. 137–47. He concludes as follows: “It is beginning to look as if the Reformation controversy about whether faith alone would secure salvation would seem no real controversy about matters of substance, only a dispute resulting from a confusion about the meaning of words” (p. 146). 41

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transformation is occurring. Humility includes an awareness of the need for the grace and power of God to enable such a transformation. And there is hope that it can occur, because grace and power are available to humans. On such an understanding, there is not necessarily a form of presumption that is present. While one aspect of salvation is a gift given to those who receive the merits of the work of Christ, the other aspect—character transformation—is part gift and partly a result of the will and actions of the individual follower of Christ. Hope, then, can come into play in many ways. For instance, regarding the transformative aspect of faith, one may be tempted to despair when faced with a recurring immoral behavior, temptation, or disposition, yet hope holds that change is still possible. Humility is relevant here not only because it leads to an awareness of one’s limitations, moral and otherwise, but also of one’s need for God’s assistance in this process.42 The person lacking humility may not see her need for character transformation, because she has an overblown self-concept in this realm. Or she may indeed be presumptuous and believe that since God has secured her salvation, there is nothing left for her to do. Because of this, she does not hope for a change that she believes she has no need of undergoing. Yet this is incorrect, given the above, and given Paul’s reply to this claim in his letter to the Romans, where he urges them to remember that they have not only been forgiven from the consequences of sin via God’s grace, but also ought to live a new life of righteousness (see Romans 6; see also James 2:14–26). Humility, then, includes the recognition that I am unable to achieve the beatific vision in union with God and others as well as transformation into Christlikeness by my independent efforts. Rather, I must humbly hope in God and his assistance in receiving and realizing these goods. In sum, Pieper is correct that hope presupposes humility. In humility, one sees that she is limited, and in part from this awareness she comes to hope that nevertheless God will secure her ultimate fulfillment in union with him. She stands in need of and hopes in God’s grace and help to achieve and receive fulfillment. Hope, then, presupposes an admission of one’s own limits with respect to such fulfillment. We are unable to achieve it by our own efforts. We are dependent upon God (and others) for this. Humility, then, is supportive

42

See modules (C1) and (C2), respectively.

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of the virtue of hope, and at least some modules of humility—(C1) and (C2)—are necessary for hope to obtain because they include knowledge of one’s own limits and of God’s necessary role in achieving human excellence and human fulfillment.

Love In his rule of the spiritual life written for members of a monastic community, Saint Benedict describes twelve steps monks can take as they seek to cultivate the virtue of love. When all of these steps have been climbed, Benedict claims that the monk will reach a perfect form of love. Rather than a fear of hell, his motive for doing good will be the love of Christ. Love and humility are connected for Benedict in the sense that a truly humble individual will be motivated to do good to others, to love them, by his love for Christ.43 This is one way in which love is supported by humility. In this section, I will consider other ways in which these virtues are related. In chapter 3 I engaged in a discussion distinguishing my conception of humility from the Christian virtue of love. Recall that the definition of love I employed was that love is “a disposition towards relationally appropriate acts of the will consisting of disinterested desires for the good of the beloved and unity with the beloved held as final ends.”44 Love includes a desire for union with the beloved, which is one aspect of this virtue that distinguishes it from humility. Both love of others and humility are connected to self-denial, and it is in part because of this that they are mutually reinforcing character traits. Recall from chapter 3 the discussion of agape love, which is a self-giving and sacrificial form of love. I suggested there that this type of love is aptly characterized as a humble form of love. I also claimed in chapter 3 that proper self-love in its fullest form depends upon humility, because the self-denial of social humility partially constitutes what it means to flourish as a Christian. Proper self-love requires humility because it requires the belief described by (C3), the preference of (E1), and the disposition to act in the way described by (A2).

43

Benedict, The Rule of Benedict (New York, NY: Penguin, 2008), pp. 22–6. Eric J. Silverman, The Prudence of Love (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), p. 59, italics in original. 44

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There are other ways in which the virtues of humility and love are interconnected. Humility and love are allied in several ways. The other-centeredness of humility can awaken its possessor to objects and subjects that are worthy of being loved. Humility turns the focus of its possessor outward, and this may create opportunities for various kinds of love to come into being. For example, a person may turn outwards toward her surroundings at work or in her community, and find an opportunity for deep friendship. If she pursues this opportunity, the love characterizing such friendships can come into being. Egoistic pride can prevent one from becoming aware of such a potential relationship, but the humble person is more likely to see, in this sense, and this can create opportunities for the virtue of love to be manifested in new ways. This is but one of many potential examples, as the way in which humility turns its possessor away from herself can open up other opportunities for the virtue of love to be cultivated and exemplified in interpersonal relationships. Humility is allied with love insofar as both are connected to Christian obedience. In chapter 2 we examined the presence of humility, love, and obedience to the Father exemplified by Jesus in the incarnation and crucifixion. The imitation of Christ will include humility, love, and obedience as well. In John 14:15–24, Jesus states that if we love him, then we will obey his commandments. Obedience is one aspect of an authentic love of God. Humility can play a role with respect to such obedience, as we have seen in the example of Christ and as (A1) states. It is important to re-emphasize that the obedience of Christ as described by Paul in Philippians 2 was an expression of the humility of Christ, motivated by his love for both God and humanity. In analogous ways, imitators of Christ may exemplify humble obedience motivated by love in their particular circumstances. Humility and love are allies in the sense that both of them are conducive to obeying God and so can be mutually reinforcing in particular ways. Humility is also supportive of a particular form of the virtue of love which Christians are called to exemplify, namely, love of one’s enemies. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus tells his followers “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be children of your Father in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the righteous and on the unrighteous” (Matthew 5:43–5). Actions characterized by such enemy love do not come easily to human beings.

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Moreover, as a virtue, this radical form of love is even more difficult and is likely more rare. Robert C. Roberts discusses how several different virtues can support the virtue of loving one’s enemies, including the virtue of humility.45 For Roberts, the humble person is not disposed to feeling self-righteous nor to focusing on her own moral superiority in relation to others, even if she is in fact morally superior to them. The morally mature follower of Christ will characteristically love other persons in her life, including those who are her enemies. She will seek to do good to them. Humility is relevant because it serves to undermine a barrier to enemy love. One trait that is too common among human beings is taking pleasure in having contempt for our enemies. One form of such contempt obtains when we take pleasure in our own moral superiority in relation to them. This is in fact a form of hatred, according to Roberts, because hatred involves seeing others as evil and wishing that harm or even destruction would come upon them. When we see ourselves as good, and our enemy as evil, we evince a form of hatred towards them. Humility, however, can forestall such hatred and supports love of one’s enemies because it includes a disposition not to feel self-righteous. Since such a feeling is an obstacle to the virtue of love, and humility disposes its possessor against having such a feeling, humility can support love of one’s enemies by removing this obstacle, or preventing it from coming into being in the first place. One of the modules of humility contained within my account is relevant to this discussion. Recall module (C4), which states that the humble person will not conceive of human beings in a hierarchical manner in light of their equal inherent dignity and worth as imagebearers of God. The scope of (C4) includes all human beings, which obviously includes one’s enemies. The humble and morally mature person will be disposed against conceiving of others as worse than her. That is, (C4) will dispose the agent against thinking of herself as morally superior to others, including her enemies, and because of this it may remove the obstacle to enemy love discussed by Roberts. (C4), then, supports love of others, including one’s enemies. Humility and love are allies in another way. In his discussion of love, Pieper states that both “our being somebody and our 45 Robert C. Roberts, “Unconditional Love and Spiritual Virtues,” The Wisdom of the Christian Faith, Paul K. Moser and Michael T. McFall, eds (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 156–72.

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needfulness, come most plainly of all to light when we love.”46 Loving another helps us to realize the error of self-denigration, then, as we see our significance as creatures who by love affirm that it is also good that our beloved exists. In addition, none of us is a self-sufficient creature, but rather each of us is a human being that “is by nature a totally needful being.”47 Blaise Pascal underscores this point in his discussion of our search for happiness and need for God: What else does this craving, and this helplessness, proclaim but that there once was in man a true happiness, of which all that now remains is the empty print and trace? This he tries in vain to fill with everything around him, seeking in things that are not there the help he cannot find in those that are, though none can help, since this infinite abyss can be filled only with an infinite and immutable object; in other words by God himself (148/428).48

A fulfilling life, then, is one in which we are united to God. And love is an essential aspect of this union. We need both to love and be loved.49 It is arguably the case that we love God neither with a completely disinterested love nor with an unmotivated love, but rather we love God in part out of our need for God. (C1) is clearly relevant here. The humble person is aware of these aspects of his creaturely status, and this can move him to love God. The opening prayer and meditation of Augustine’s Confession is relevant, as it connects our creaturely status, fallen nature, and need for God: Great are you, O Lord, and exceedingly worthy of praise; your power is immense, and your wisdom beyond reckoning. And so we humans, who are a due part of your creation, long to praise you—we who carry our mortality about with us, carry the evidence of our sin and with it the proof that you thwart the proud. Yet these humans, due part of your creation as they are, still do long to praise you. You stir us up so that praising you may bring us joy, because you have made us and drawn us to yourself, and our heart is unquiet until it rests in you.50

For Augustine, the human heart is restless until it rests in God. The creature longs for and needs the creator. In light of this, we can 46

47 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, p. 218. ibid. Blaise Pascal, Pensées, rev. ed., translated by A. J. Krailsheimer (New York, NY: Penguin, 1995), p. 45. 49 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, pp. 219–22. 50 Augustine, The Confessions, 2nd ed., translated by Maria Boulding (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2012), p. 39. 48

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only achieve and experience an incomplete fulfillment separate from God. But when in humility we become aware of this, and humbly open ourselves to receiving God’s love and respond by loving him and others, we experience a deeper fulfillment than is otherwise possible. (E2), then, is relevant because it connects humility and love. (E2) is the claim that the humble person is motivated to act by her love for God and for the sake of his kingdom. In the discussion of this module in chapter 2, I noted that for Roberts and Wood humility “presupposes an overriding interest in something.”51 They claim that Christ’s humility presupposes his love towards humanity and that his love motivates him to “undertake the task in which he exhibits his humility.”52 The humble person is moved by a love for God and others to be and to do good. She exemplifies humility in part because of God’s love for her, and it is in part because of her humility that she is a willing recipient and sharer of God’s love. Humility helps us to receive and extend God’s love. In sum, humility is conducive to receiving love from God and others.53 Human beings may resist love, especially love that is a gift rather than a result of our efforts or self-perceived merit. We have an aversion to receiving love for nothing. We prefer to be loved for our talents, contributions, and other features of ours that we feel make us worthy of love. It seems apparent to me that such resistance and aversion is grounded in a form of pride. We will return to the vice of pride below, but for now it is enough to point out that the humble person is able to receive the love of God and others, even though they know him, his limits, and his flaws. Rather than persisting in shame related to the feeling that such love is undeserved, or the arrogance that such love must be deserved, the humble person is able to receive love from others, both divine and human. Humility helps its possessor to be able to be fully known, loved, and valued. It is not independently sufficient for this, but nevertheless it plays a crucial role in receiving such love and affirmation rather than rejecting it out of pride or selfdenigration.

51 Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 77. 52 53 ibid. p. 78. Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, pp. 179–86.

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HUMILITY AND THE CARDINAL VIRTUES Like faith, hope, and love, the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance play a central role in the history of Christian thought. However, unlike the theological virtues, there are significant treatments of the cardinal virtues which temporally precede the arrival of Christianity. For example, in the Republic Plato describes the cardinal virtues and their connection to the different parts of the properly functioning human soul.54 In what follows, I will again make use of Josef Pieper’s treatment of these individual virtues, given the shared Christian context of his writings and this work.55

Prudence The virtue of prudence is the most important of the cardinal virtues, insofar as it is necessary for individual moral excellence. Prudence is a necessary condition for possessing the other cardinal virtues; one must be prudent in order to be just, courageous, and temperate. Every virtue is also prudent, and necessarily so. What is prudence? Pieper describes it as “the perfected ability to make right decisions.”56 Prudence is a form of knowledge, but it is not merely knowledge. Rather, prudence includes the application of knowledge to action via a decision of the agent. As a form of knowledge, prudence is consistent with objective reality. It is not a subjective preference. Moreover, there is no conflict between the prudent and the moral. Rather, the morally excellent is necessarily prudent. This is important because in some everyday uses of the term, that which is “prudent” is taken to be distinct from that which is moral. For example, cutting corners in ways that contradict ethical business practices in order to maximize profit is seen by many as the “prudent” course of action. Prudence, however, as Pieper and I use the term, does not conflict with what is right and good. Prudence and the virtue of humility are connected in a variety of ways. The humble person is disposed to place the interests of others ahead of her own. The humble person need not always do this, but she is disposed to do so as is appropriate, given the circumstances 54

Plato, Republic, Book IV. Josef Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966). 56 ibid. p. 6. 55

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and the dictates of prudence. Several points raised by Pieper in his discussion of prudence are instructive here.57 The proper ends of a person do not change, insofar as we are obligated to be just, brave, and temperate at every time and in every circumstance in pursuit of the good. The obligation to exemplify these cardinal virtues is fixed, but the manner in which the obligation is fulfilled is not. That is, the manner in which the virtues are manifested can vary according to the individual and the individual’s circumstances. Prudence dictates to the person in the situation what the ethically correct decision is in that situation. He must make the decision because only he has access to all of the relevant concrete and specific information. These points concerning prudence and the cardinal virtues can be extended to prudence and humility. Prudence enables its possessor to know if and how humility is relevant to his particular circumstances. For instance, consider (A2), which is the claim that the humble person will be disposed to engage in self-sacrificial actions for the good of others. Prudence will dictate to the individual agent whether such a disposition should be put into action in the particular situation she inhabits. There will be times when (A2) should be manifested in action, and times when it should not. The disposition itself is virtuous, but the appropriate times and means by which it can be expressed will be determined by the virtue of prudence as it functions within the individual person and her context. Humility and prudence are related in other ways. Humility is necessary for prudence, as the latter presupposes aspects of the former. The humble person realizes her own limits, including cognitive ones. An awareness of these limits is important for making prudential judgments. Given that prudence is concerned with objective reality, the other-centeredness of humility with respect to truth and other important values also underscores the supportive role humility can play with respect to this cardinal virtue. One way in which we can be objectionably subjective is to perceive some state of affairs in a biased manner and then choose a path which we see as being in our own self-interest at the expense of others, even when this is not consistent with objective reality. Prudence, however, “holds within itself the humility of silent, that is to say, of unbiased perception.”58 Prudence and humility are important in part because there 57 58

ibid. pp. 25–8. See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II.II.47.15. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, p. 22.

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are many ways in which human beings exemplify self-serving bias.59 For example, we overestimate the accuracy of our personal beliefs and judgments. This is not prudent, of course, but given that we appear to do this for self-serving and self-centered reasons, humility as a proper self-assessment and self-lowering other-centeredness can serve as an antidote to such biases. In this way, humility can clear the way for prudence to operate in a manner that is less hindered by selfserving bias. Humility supports prudence by removing other obstacles to this cardinal virtue. For example, Pieper claims that prudence and covetousness are particularly opposed to one another. Covetousness is not merely an inordinate desire for property or money, but rather it is an “immoderate straining for all the possessions which man thinks are needed to secure his own importance and status.”60 The virtue of prudence is often sacrificed at the altar of such forms of personal security. Many human beings sacrifice the good, including aspects of their character, out of a felt need for securing their status before others. Pieper claims that this reveals another reason for thinking that prudence is dependent on humility, because it is “dependent upon the constant readiness to ignore the self, the limberness of real humility and objectivity.”61 Humility will act as a check on such immoderate straining, and in the ideally humble person such straining will not be present. (C4), (C5), and (A3) are particularly relevant for this discussion. (C4) is important because one significant cognitive basis underlying the drive to secure one’s own importance and status is the disposition to conceive of human beings in a hierarchical way, based on social status, power, wealth, beauty, or some combination of these traits. When an individual sees human beings and judges them to be more or less significant in light of such categories, he is then more likely to engage in the immoderate straining described by Pieper in pursuit of securing his own status. But humility is not consistent with such a perspective, and so undermines the misguided pursuit of such status. (C5) will also undermine the motivation for the pursuit of status, as the humble person will resist the pressures to foster a particular image of herself before others based on some social hierarchy. Finally, (A3) 59 David G. Myers, “Humility: Theology Meets Psychology,” Reformed Review 48 (1995): 195–206. 60 61 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, p. 21. ibid.

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is a disposition that stands in direct opposition to covetousness as it is described by Pieper. The humble person who possesses this module will not pursue the acquisition of material possessions for the sake of obtaining social status.

Justice There are many varieties, conceptions, and interpretations of justice. For Pieper, justice can be reduced to this: giving each person that which is their due.62 As a virtue, justice is the habit of doing this. Many conceptual and practical difficulties exist relative to this notion of justice, but for my purposes this succinct definition will be sufficient. An initial and fairly straightforward way in which humility supports the virtue of justice is that it removes a barrier to it, namely, the desire for and disposition to attempt to secure more than is my due. To want and seek to have more than I can rightfully say is owed to me is characteristic of self-centered pride. The self-lowering other-centeredness of humility, however, turns the focus of its possessor away from herself and towards the needs and interests of others, including those needs and interests that are owed them on the grounds of justice. The humble person will not knowingly withhold what is genuinely due to another. Humility, then, is directly opposed to injustice. Next, consider a particular aspect of justice that has to do with wrongdoing and restitution: The just man recognizes when wrong has been done, admits his own injustice, and endeavors to eradicate it. Who would deny that we touch here the sore spot in all reciprocal relationships, and that the basic way to realize commutative [i.e., compensatory] justice does in fact have the character of restitution?63

The just person, when he has wronged another, admits it and seeks to provide restitution for the person he has wronged. This form of justice is relevant to close personal relationships as well as more distant social ones. Restitution is not merely the return of property or seeking to provide recompense for some illegal harm one has perpetrated. Here, the term is employed with more breadth, and can be extended to close personal relationships. In one sense, it may be a matter of justice for 62

Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, p. 44.

63

ibid. p. 80.

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one to admit an act of dishonesty or selfishness to a close friend. This is not merely a matter of justice, as it also has to do with loyalty, respect, and care. Nevertheless, justice is also involved. It seems apt to say that when I wrong my friend, I owe it to him to admit my wrongdoing as a form of restitution that can then restore trust in the relationship. Humility fosters the admission of such wrongdoing, not only because the humble person is aware of his moral limits, but because he is more concerned with the values of trust, loyalty, and friendship than he is with the possibility that his friend will think less of him. The integrity of the relationship is more important to him than his own status or reputation. Justice can also foster and even support the virtue of humility in the person who has this cardinal virtue. One way in which it can do this is by putting our own limits into stark relief when we consider what it is that we owe other persons, both human and divine. Pieper observes that some obligations to others can never be completely fulfilled, even if the individual is completely willing to do so.64 A person can owe another but not be able to repay what is owed, as justice requires. For Pieper, this shows that there are relationships that exist beyond the scope of justice, beyond the ability of the individual to give what the other is due. But the relationships that are characterized in this way are ones that are central to human existence, such as the relationship between a parent and child. The deeply just person will “experience that incontrovertible disparity with special acuteness.”65 Not only the parent–child relationship, but marital relationships or deep friendships might also qualify as being the sort of relationships Pieper has in mind here. The primary relationship which the foregoing points to, however, is the relationship of a human being with God. Human beings can never be even with God, in part because they are creatures whose very existence is a gift that cannot be repaid. These considerations concerning the scope and limits of justice will point the reflective person to the need for and appropriateness of humility in relation to God and other humans. The humble person will be aware of his own limitations, and these considerations related to justice will reveal some of these limits that are grounded in our creatureliness and the dependent nature of our existence. Our inability to truly satisfy the demands of justice in relation to God and others with whom we

64

ibid. pp. 104–7.

65

ibid. p. 104.

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have significant relationships can serve to reveal the truth of (C1). The limits we face in satisfying justice are included within the scope of (C1), and this shows how the deeply just and reflective person may see her need for humility as a consequence of her possession of the virtue of justice. Pieper’s conception of justice includes not only giving others what I owe them, but also that which is their due. That is, justice includes a concern for the well-being of others and what they deserve regardless of whether or not one has a personal debt to them. Justice as a personal virtue, then, arguably includes a commitment to social justice.66 Those who want social justice can be characterized as wanting “a world in which it is possible for everyone to have the best life that it is possible for human beings to have; where the life of everyone matters and everyone matters equally.”67 Such a world will be devoid of prejudice, unjust discrimination, and it will include a shared commitment to the common good. People’s basic needs will be met, and because of this they will also be free to pursue good, fulfilling, and meaningful lives. This is not the world we currently live in, with its widespread inequality, suffering, and injustice. To see how humility can support a commitment to social justice, we will consider the values of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The ways in which humility can connect to and support social justice are not only important to see because this shows how humility relates to these aspects of individual and social flourishing. A discussion of its potential relationships to the different aspects of social justice is also important because it serves as a reply to the claim that humility is an oppressive virtue, which we discussed in chapter 3. If humility can foster these aspects of social justice, then that is evidence that it is a virtue suitable for resisting and overcoming, rather than passively submitting to, political and social oppression. Liberty, as an aspect of social justice, includes important legal rights such as the right to vote, freedom of speech, and freedom of worship, among others, but underlying these freedoms is the more basic freedom of individual autonomy, or self-determination. A lack of basic healthcare, lack of education, poverty, discrimination, and other social barriers may prevent one from exercising autonomy in order to cultivate one’s individual capacities and seek to realize one’s 66 Richard White, Radical Virtues (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 89–104. 67 ibid. p. 96.

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individual potential in a variety of realms of life. In a socially just society, these fundamental interests are satisfied so that people are free to exercise self-determination over their lives without such hindrances. How does humility relate to such a conception of liberty? Some of the other-regarding aspects of humility are especially relevant. In particular, (C1), (E1), and (A2) support the requirements of liberty as an aspect of social justice. These interrelated modules of humility will dispose the agent to not only care about the basic needs and fundamental interests of others, but to be willing and disposed to make personal sacrifices for the sake of others’ well-being. Arguably one central aspect of well-being for human beings is the possession and exercise of individual autonomy. In addition to this, there are several other fundamental interests that human beings possess.68 A fundamental interest is something that is vitally important for human beings, who have fundamental needs that make certain goods and freedoms important to our continued existence and well-being. Such goods and freedoms constitute our fundamental interests. Fundamental interests are necessary conditions for and in some cases constitutive of human flourishing. These interests are significant because their satisfaction makes human life possible and worth living. Included among these interests are physical health, psychological well-being, and the prima facie freedom to pursue that which gives meaning and satisfaction in life. The humble person, given the presence and operation of modules (C3), (E1), and (A2), will be concerned about the satisfaction of such fundamental interests in the lives of others. She will be willing to sacrifice some of her own desires and interests to contribute to a more socially just society. The concern for others and their ability to exercise their liberty in a variety of ways that is present in a socially just society can be strongly supported by the virtue of humility. A second aspect of social justice is equality, which in this context is the idea that all human beings have equal moral worth and should be treated accordingly. Humans should not treat others as a means to their own ends, but rather with respect, as Kant famously argued. 68 For discussions of the nature of such interests and how they ground human rights, see James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987); Susan Moller Okin, “Liberty and Welfare: Some Issues in Human Rights Theory,” in Human Rights: Nomos XXIII, Roland Pennock and John Chapman, eds (New York NY: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 230–56; and J. Raz, “On the Nature of Rights,” Mind 93 (1984): 194–214.

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Moreover, equality also includes the notion that the interests and needs of all people have equal weight. The interests of all matter, and equal consideration should be given to the fundamental interests discussed above. This is a necessary component of a society in which true equality obtains. In a socially just society, there may be inequalities that exist, but they will not be unjustifiable inequalities. (C4) is particularly relevant here. Hierarchical views of human beings based on claims about ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, wealth, power, status, and so on often serve as the basis for a putative justification of social inequality. The past and the present contain numerous examples of this. Such views and reasoning based upon them have been used to justify genocide, slavery, exploitation, and massive inequality of wealth. But (C4) will tend to dispose its possessor against such judgments and their results in political and social life, because the ultimate grounding for the claim that all human beings have equal moral worth is something that all human beings share, namely, being bearers of the image of God. Before God, all human beings are on a level plane, and this supports the claim that a good human society is one in which equality is present. Fraternity is the final aspect of social justice that we will consider. Fraternity denotes the value of community, where people see themselves not merely as individuals, but as parts of a society that provides them with the opportunity to pursue that which creates meaning and satisfaction in life. In a society where such authentic community exists, our lives are enhanced because we have a sense that we belong to something greater than ourselves. This requires that we develop our human capacities and put them to work not just for our own individual advancement, but also for the common good. One clear way in which humility can foster fraternity surfaces when we consider (A2). Consider the social inequality that is manifested in the disparity of economic wealth in many societies. Some who have the lion’s share of wealth in such societies are unwilling to sacrifice a portion of that wealth for those who arguably deserve it. For example, the owner of a large corporation (and others who profit from it in large measure) may be unwilling to provide quality healthcare or a living wage to his employees. In some of these cases not only is inequality present that is arguably unjustifiable, but the fundamental interests of some of the employees are at risk. However, if the owner is humble and possesses (A2), then he will be disposed to sacrifice some of his wealth for the

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sake of his employees and their well-being. This is a relatively small sacrifice, but it qualifies as one nevertheless and is an action that the humble person will be disposed to perform.

Fortitude In his discussion of fortitude, Pieper states that “because man is by nature vulnerable, he can be brave,” and defines fortitude as “readiness to fall, to die, in battle.”69 It is interesting that both humility and fortitude are grounded in part upon the vulnerability, or certain limitations, of human beings. Fortitude depends on our vulnerability, at least in part, and this vulnerability is also part of what makes humility a virtue for human beings. Humility can support and work in concert with fortitude when the welfare of others is under threat. Often, fortitude is required in order to defend the welfare and interests of other people. Humility’s concern with the interests of others over one’s own—as described by (C3), (E1), and (A2)—will support fortitude in such circumstances, including drastic ones, such as readiness for death in battle or as a martyr. Pieper believes that for the Christian readiness for martyrdom is essential. With this in mind, fortitude is not merely a virtue for the soldier, but rather it is a virtue that is central for maintaining one’s faith in the midst of persecution, even to the point of death. The person with fortitude does not suffer harm for the sake of suffering harm, but rather is willing to do so for the sake of some greater good or value that she is committed to upholding. Humility supports fortitude because the term “other” in the othercenteredness of humility refers not only to other persons, but also to truth, goodness, and beauty. A humble person is concerned with such values, and is willing to sacrifice some of her interests for their sake. This may support fortitude, including the fortitude shown by the martyr, because the humble follower of Christ will be willing to sacrifice her life not only for values related to her faith, but also for the person of Christ himself if she feels called by him to do so. Love is relevant as well, and can work in concert with humility as it fosters a valuing not only of values, but persons, including God. This can help ground fortitude and its exemplification in relation to these values and persons.

69

Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, p. 117.

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According to Pieper, endurance is the most basic act of fortitude, rather than attacking one’s enemies.70 There are times when enduring suffering is the only way to manifest resistance to evil. For Pieper, following Aquinas, such circumstances reveal the essence of fortitude: “the true ‘position’ of fortitude is that extremely perilous situation . . . in which to suffer and endure is objectively the only remaining possibility of resistance.”71 For Pieper, endurance reveals the deepest strength that humans are capable of possessing. Humility is important here, because it includes an awareness of our own limits (as stated in module (C1)) within the particular circumstances in which those limits are made manifest. So humility, in concert with prudence, may reveal to the agent that at a given point in time all that is left for her to do is resist by enduring. Humility will help to enable the agent to know and accept this, and to then exemplify endurance as a form of fortitude. Such endurance is not a passive activity, but rather it is “a vigorous grasping of and clinging to the good; and only from this stout-hearted activity can the strength to support the physical and spiritual suffering of injury and death be nourished.”72 Endurance, like humility, is not a passive virtue for the weak, but a necessary virtue for those who seek to manifest strength under trial. Humility can support fortitude in another way. Recall (A4), which states that the humble person will be disposed to engage in particular forms of risk-taking. The willingness to “lose face” before others requires a form of fortitude. Given the disposition of the humble person described by (A4) and the appropriate lack of concern for what others think as described by (C5), it is clear that there can be circumstances in which humility and fortitude will be tightly interconnected and mutually supportive.

Temperance There are many ways to conceive of temperance.73 Some take this virtue to be fairly broad in scope. Pieper, for example, takes temperance at a 70

71 72 ibid. pp. 126–33. ibid. p. 128. ibid. For a concise summary of different conceptions of this virtue, see Alasdair MacIntyre, “Sophrosune: How a Virtue Can Become Socially Disruptive,” in Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XIII, Peter French, Theodore Uehling, and Howard Wettstein, eds (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 1–11. 73

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general level to be “selfless self-preservation,” and intemperance to be “self-destruction through the selfish degradation of the powers which aim at self-preservation.”74 This understanding of temperance includes more than mere self-control or moderation with regard to eating, drinking, and sex. Rather, a temperate person arguably exemplifies harmony in body and soul. In his discussion of temperance, William Mattison defines it as “the virtue that inclines us to desire and enjoy pleasures well. It enables us to regulate our actions, and even our desires, concerning pleasurable activities so that they are reasonable, or in accord with the way things really are.”75 In the following discussion of some of the connections between humility and temperance, I will focus on temperance as it concerns the pleasures of the senses. Aquinas, following Aristotle, holds that temperance is primarily concerned with the human desires and pleasures that are related to the sense of touch.76 It is also worth noting here that for Aquinas, humility is a virtue which falls under the cardinal virtue of temperance.77 More specifically, humility is a mode or form of temperance.78 Following Aquinas, Pieper also discusses the virtue of humility as a form of temperance.79 For him, humility is grounded in “man’s estimation of himself according to truth.”80 This is the essence of the virtue, not the self-disparagement or feelings of inferiority so often associated with it. But in reference to what truth are we to estimate ourselves? Humility affirms that we are creatures, and as such we ought to subject ourselves to God. As previously stated, I (unlike Aquinas) have avoided this level of systematization of the virtues, and will remain neutral about whether or not humility is in fact a mode of temperance (or any other virtue). My concern here is to explore some of the possible connections between humility and temperance, as distinct traits. There are several ways in which humility can support or foster temperance. For example, as Pieper describes it, the problem with one form of intemperance—unchastity—is that it is a form of selfcenteredness. The problem is not that the unchaste person values the sensual world and the sexual aspects of that world, but rather

74

Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, p. 148. William C. Mattison III, Introducing Moral Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2008), p. 76. 76 77 ST 2a2ae.141.4. ST 2a2ae.161. 78 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, pp. 145–52; 189–92. 79 80 ibid. pp. 189–92. ibid. p. 189. 75

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that he is selfish in these realms. Instead of dedicating himself, the unchaste person merely offers himself in the quest to satisfy an illicit lust.81 While both Aquinas and Pieper have more to say about such things, the foregoing is sufficient for pointing out that humility can hinder selfish forms of desire-satisfaction in the sexual realm of life (and more generally in the sensual realm). The humble person, the person who evinces a self-lowering other-centeredness in his relationships with others, is dedicated to the other in the sexual realm of life. He will not use others as mere means to his own satisfaction in this or any other manner. Humility undermines the self-centeredness of unchastity, and so removes a potential and significant barrier to temperance in this realm. Another example of how humility may connect with temperance has to do with how humans relate to the rest of the natural world. Consider a possible relationship between temperance and the consumer demand for inexpensive meat. Economic factors are a primary driving force behind the development and growth of factory farming methods. Combine this with the demand for meat in the United States, for example, and the result is widespread inhumane treatment of animals. For example, animals are often prevented from acting on instinct in factory farming situations. Chickens are debeaked without anesthesia, prevented from dust bathing, and experience many other harsh conditions due to their confinement in battery cages. Pigs and cows are confined to very small indoor areas, at times with only enough room to stand or lie down, but not turn around. Factory farm animals are caused to grow at unnaturally fast rates, causing them many physical problems. Many are slaughtered without effective pain management, or without any attempt at such management. Even when employees of factory farms act in humane ways, the very structure of the industry and its methods for raising and slaughtering animals is inhumane. The cases in which employees treat the animals inhumanely through physical abuse, for example, only exacerbate the issue. How is this relevant to temperance and humility? With respect to temperance, and its concern for physical pleasures—taste, in this instance—it could be argued that at least in some cases many of us willingly ignore or fail to be adequately concerned about the evils of factory farming, because of the pleasure derived from eating meat

81

ibid. p. 161.

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produced in this way and our desire to purchase it for a relatively cheap price. This is a case in which one’s desire for a particular type of food is satisfied via the inhumane and immoral treatment of animals, and as such it seems that temperance would counsel one to forego such pleasures. Humility can support temperance in this case. The humble person is not only other-centered with respect to God and other humans, but also non-human animals. Given this, she will have a moral concern for their welfare. When this concern is combined with the self-lowering aspect of humility, temperate behavior is more likely to occur. She may refrain from consuming such meat, motivated in significant part by humility and temperance. She is willing to sacrifice certain culinary pleasures for the welfare of animals (or pay more if need be for humanely raised and slaughtered ones). My point is not that humility and temperance require veganism or vegetarianism, but rather that this is a particular type of case in which humility can support temperance. Humility has many other connections to the theological and cardinal virtues. The above is sufficient for demonstrating some of the ways in which it is positively related to them. In the next section, I consider how humility counteracts the vice of pride.

HUMILITY AND PRIDE Numerous figures in the Christian tradition have discussed the vice of pride. While there are different ways of understanding the term, it is fair to say that most Christian understandings of “pride” include the belief that it involves egotism, self-centeredness, and arrogance. Aquinas, for example, describes pride as “the inordinate desire for pre-eminence,”82 which “extinguishes all the virtues and weakens all the powers of the soul by the diffusion of its governance.”83 He contends, then, that pride is present in all sins, and is their “root and queen.”84 The idea that pride is the root of human rebellion against God is present throughout much of the history of Christian thought. As we will discuss later, many have claimed that pride is the 82 Aquinas, On Evil, translated by R. Regan (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 336. 83 84 ibid. p. 330. ibid. p. 329.

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fundamental human sin, or the capital vice from which all others somehow flow. If this is right, it underscores the significance of humility as a crucial Christian virtue. Before discussing the relevance of pride as the fundamental human vice and how this reveals something about the significance of humility for human flourishing (Christianly understood), I will describe Reinhold Niebuhr’s analysis of pride.85 Subsequently, I will discuss ways in which humility undermines this vice.86 At a general level, consider Niebuhr’s claim that pride involves seeking to raise one’s “contingent existence to unconditioned significance.”87 Pride, then, is a vice that includes an overestimation of one’s own significance relative to one’s nature as a contingent being. One component (or possible result) of this is to see one’s own interests as more important than the interests of others. Niebuhr’s general description of pride is consistent with thinking of pride as an egoistic selfishness. Niebuhr goes on to discuss four distinct types of pride, including pride of power, pride of intellect, pride of virtue, and pride of the spiritual life. For Niebuhr, the person who displays the form of pride that is related to power believes that she is self-sufficient, master of herself, and secure in the face of the changing circumstances of human existence. Such a person fails to recognize and appreciate the contingency and dependency of her existence. She takes herself to be the ultimate judge of her values as well as the master of her destiny. This form of pride fails to recognize the limitations and weaknesses we possess as human beings, as well as the proper role of God with respect to one’s values and calling in life. Humility as I have defined it will counteract pride of power. One of the facts recognized by the person who possesses (C1) is that she is not self-sufficient, but rather is dependent on God and other human beings for her welfare, and even her very existence. She recognizes the contingency of her existence as a human being, and acknowledges her need for God and others. Rather than taking herself to be her own master and the ultimate determiner of her values, the humble person, consistent with module (A1), seeks to obey God, which includes

85 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), pp. 186–203. 86 For a different discussion of pride and humility, see Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics, pp. 77–83. 87 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, p. 186.

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allowing him to determine her values and destiny. She of course has a role to play, but for her God has the ultimate say. According to Niebuhr, a second type of pride—intellectual pride— is related to human finitude as well as our susceptibility to ideological bias. As he describes it, such pride is “derived on the one hand from ignorance of the finiteness of the human mind and on the other hand from an attempt to obscure the known conditioned character of human knowledge and the taint of self-interest in human truth.”88 For Niebuhr, our knowledge claims are perspectival and ideologically tainted, but we pretend that they constitute the final and ultimate knowledge of the truth. One aspect of intellectual pride that has particular significance for Niebuhr is constituted by “the inability of the agent to recognize the same or similar limitations of perspective in himself which he has detected in others.”89 In intellectual pride, we also try to obscure the taint of self-interest, which we know (or partly know) is present and operating. However, while we fail to recognize these cognitive limitations in our own case, we believe that we see them clearly in others. Humility will undermine intellectual pride. (C1) is again relevant, insofar as the humble individual will be aware of and act in light of the intellectual limitations that are inherent to human beings as such. The other-centeredness of humility will also undermine intellectual pride, insofar as the humble person’s concern for others as described by modules (C3), (E1), and (A2) can have corrective functions with respect to the element of prideful self-interest present in intellectual pride. The humble person’s orientation towards and concern for the welfare of others, as well as her disposition to self-lowering with respect to her own interests, will help protect her from the taint of self-interest in her pursuit of the truth which Niebuhr takes to be a component of intellectual pride. The third type of pride discussed by Niebuhr is pride of virtue (or moral pride). This occurs when the agent condemns others for failing to live by his own arbitrary standards of morality (though he acts as if these standards are God’s standards). For Niebuhr, the reason that such standards are arbitrary has to do with (i) the finiteness of human beings; and (ii) the stubborn pretension that the morally proud possess. The relevance of (i) is clear, insofar as human limitations

88

ibid. pp. 194–5.

89

ibid. p. 196.

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ought to be recognized in the moral realm. The relevance of (ii) has to do with the belief of the morally proud that their moral beliefs and practices are identical to the moral beliefs and practices endorsed by God. Such pride can be classified as a sin of self-righteousness, a sin which the gospels portray Jesus as consistently and strongly condemning. (C1) is relevant, as it will lead the humble person to recognize (i). The pretension discussed by Niebuhr is also something that the humble person will not possess. One reason for this is that the individual who is humble avoids the pretension and self-exaltation engaged in by the morally proud. Moreover, the humble person will recognize that whatever moral progress she has made essentially depends on God and others. As (C2) states, she knows that it is God who deserves ultimate credit for her character, even though she also played an important role. Humility, then, also undermines the pretension and self-righteousness present in moral pride. Moral pride may produce a fourth type of pride, pride of spirit or spiritual pride. This form of pride is present when one claims divine sanction for one’s standards and even one’s very self. For Niebuhr, spiritual pride is the ultimate sin because it involves an explicit self-deification. For such an individual, God is her “exclusive ally.”90 When a Christian assumes that she is superior to others because she takes herself to possess the revelation of God, there is a sense in which pride is now controlling her religion. It is important to note that for Niebuhr it is not the mere belief that one possesses the revelation of God that is sufficient for pride. Rather, it is the belief that one is better than, superior to, or more significant than others in light of possessing such divine revelation. To see how humility can counteract spiritual pride, let us begin with Niebuhr’s own observation that Christianity, as a revelatory religion, “is grounded in the faith that God speaks to man from beyond the highest pinnacle of the human spirit; and that this voice of God will discover man’s highest not only to be short of the highest but involved in the dishonesty of claiming that it is the highest.”91 It is clear that many people employ the Christian religion as a way to secure power over others, feed pride, and engage in self-exaltation. This is incredible, given the content of the Christian revelation in

90

ibid. p. 201.

91

ibid. p. 203.

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which humility is praised and pride is condemned, including pride based on one’s own religious views and practices. For these and other reasons, the humble person will not employ her religion in such ways. For example, (C1) will prevent her from self-deification as described by Niebuhr, because she recognizes her limits qua human being. In light of (C4), the humble person will not evince Niebuhrian spiritual pride. The humble person’s rejection of hierarchical perspectives of human beings will undermine such pride, which necessarily includes such perspectives. Not only will the humble person reject the use of religion as a basis for some claim to superiority over others, but she will reject any perspective which includes such a hierarchical structure. She will see God as her ally, but not her exclusive ally. And given her concern for the welfare of others, she will want them to come to believe that God is (or at least desires to be) their ally as well. (A3) also stands in direct opposition to spiritual pride. The spiritually proud person seeks honor and status relative to others by means of his religion; the humble person in possession of this module does not. We will return to issues connected to humility and religious faith in the next chapter, and how this virtue relates to different views concerning religious pluralism. The foregoing discussion of how humility counteracts pride is far from comprehensive, but it is sufficient to show that this virtue has great potential to counteract, weaken, and even eradicate this vice. From a Christian perspective, the efficacy of humility in undermining and removing pride is especially significant, given the relationship of pride to other vices. As was noted above, many in the Christian tradition take pride to be the fundamental vice. Aquinas defends the claim that pride is the beginning of all sin.92 Augustine also takes pride to be fundamental with respect to other vices. In his discussion of the Fall and the rebellion of our “first parents,” he claims that pride was “the root of their bad will.”93 On such an understanding of pride, not only is humility significant insofar as it undermines this vice, but also because it undermines the other vices that are connected to it. In his Moralia on Job, Gregory the Great

92

ST 1a.2ae.84.2. Augustine, The City of God in The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), Book IV, ch. 13, p. 380. 93

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claims that pride is the root of all evil, including the seven principal vices: For the tempting vices, which fight against us in invisible contest in behalf of the pride which reigns over them, some of them go first, like captains, others follow, after the manner of an army . . . For when pride, the queen of sins, has fully possessed a conquered heart, she surrenders it immediately to seven principal sins, as if to some of her generals, to lay it waste . . . For pride is the root of all evil . . . But seven principal vices, as its first progeny, spring doubtless from this poisonous root, namely, vain glory, envy, anger, melancholy, avarice, gluttony, lust . . . [and] these several sins have each their army against us.94

Given this, humility not only counteracts pride, but also many other vices which are the fruits of pride. On a Christian view, the seven principal vices prevent human flourishing, and so it is significant that, consistent with what Aquinas, Augustine, and Gregory have to say, humility cuts these vices off at their root. Moreover, as Gregory describes it, each of these vices gives rise to a multitude of other vices. Each vice has its own army of derivative vices. For example, avarice can produce “treachery, fraud, deceit, perjury, restlessness, violence, and hardnesses of heart against compassion.”95 On this picture, humility is clearly a virtue that is central for human flourishing. We need not merely depend upon Christian theological and philosophical thought to see the significance of humility for human flourishing by virtue of its opposition to pride. There is also evidence from contemporary social psychology in support of this. In a paper summarizing research in social psychology related to self-serving bias, pride, and humility, David Myers claims that such research “reaffirms the ancient wisdom about the deadly sin of pride and the benefits of humility.”96 The research supports the claim that we possess a persistent and potent self-serving bias, in many forms and in many realms of life. We tend to attribute our successes to our own abilities and effort, whereas we attribute our failures to bad luck or some other external factor. Spouses believe that they do more work than their partners believe to be the case. Students who do well on an exam 94 Gregory the Great, Moralia on Job 31.45.87–8. For more on the seven capital vices, see Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Glittering Vices: A New Look at the Seven Deadly Sins and their Remedies (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2009). 95 Gregory the Great, Moralia on Job 31.45.88. 96 Myers, “Humility: Theology Meets Psychology,” p. 195.

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believe their success is best explained by their competence, whereas those who do poorly are more likely to hold that the exam was somehow flawed. Teachers, similarly, take credit for their student’s successes but attribute failure to some shortcoming of the student. Research also shows that we overestimate how well we would act in a particular situation, we misremember our past in ways that are selfenhancing, and if we have performed some action that is undesirable and we cannot undo it or misremember it, then we often find a way to justify it. Moreover, most people see themselves as better than average in the realm of ethics, job performance, driving, intelligence, physical attractiveness, and their ability to get along well with others. Of course, the majority of us cannot be above average, but nevertheless the majority of us believe that we are. For Myers, all of this is relevant to pride and humility, because the fact that so many people possess self-serving bias is not a new fact; it has been recognized as the flaw of hubris in ancient Greek drama and the sin of pride in Christian thought. He goes on to comment that the sin of pride alienates us from God and one another, it gives rise to racism, sexism, and nationalism, and at our darkest it can yield atrocities such as genocide. For Myers, pride and self-serving bias are akin to one another. Given our working understanding of pride as including selfishness, self-centeredness, and arrogance, this is arguably true. The relevant point here is that humility is a virtue that counteracts pride, and if Myers is right that the sin of pride is akin to the self-serving biases uncovered by social psychology, then humility has the potential to undermine the presence and limit the effects of such biases. Humility’s connections to human flourishing are not merely negative, as an antidote to pride and its effects. Humility is also positively connected to moral and spiritual progress, as we have seen. In chapter 5, I will discuss the value and relevance of humility with respect to such progress by focusing on issues related to religious thought and practice, the family, and sport.

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5 Contemporary Applications In the previous chapters I articulated and defended a particular conception of humility as a Christian virtue. I also explored ways in which humility can contribute to human flourishing. In this chapter, I consider several ways in which humility is applicable to issues in personal and social ethics. This chapter, while focusing in a practical manner on how humility relates to issues in applied religious and philosophical ethics, also has theoretical significance. Some have criticized virtue-based ethical theories as being unable to guide action. If humility—which as we have seen is thought by some to be a passive virtue—can be robustly action-guiding in the ways I have described, then that fact constitutes a strong piece of evidence to be marshaled against the persistent objection to virtue ethics (both philosophical and theological versions) that it fails to provide action-guidance.1 A thick understanding of particular moral virtues such as humility can be quite useful for applied ethics. A deeper and more complete analysis of a virtue potentially reveals its relevance to a wide variety of contemporary issues. In this way, both theological and philosophical moral theory can benefit from theological reflection in the analytic style on the virtue of humility. In addition, applying such an analysis of a virtue exemplifies the practicality valued by Aristotle and reflected in his claim that “our present discussion does not aim, as our others do, at study; for the purpose of our examination is not to know what virtue is, but to become good, since otherwise the inquiry

This objection is raised by Robert C. Louden, “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics,” in Virtue Ethics, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 201–16. For a reply to this sort of objection, see Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 25–42. 1

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would be of no benefit to us.”2 I am not interested in defending everything stated or implied by Aristotle here. However, at some point in Christian moral inquiry, it is important to consider how to apply the insights gained via such reflection to practical concerns. There are several contemporary moral issues to which humility is relevant.3 In this chapter, I consider some of the ways in which humility is relevant to religious thought and practice, the family, and sport. These are in many ways disparate realms of life, disconnected from each other with respect to some of their moral features. This is in part why I have selected them, to show that humility is relevant to many realms of life and to a variety of forms of Christian life. Some Christians pursue the religious life as a vocation, eschewing family life and aspects of contemporary culture, such as sport. For others, family is central. Sport is present across human cultures; it can provide challenges and opportunities for all. The martialcommercial model of sport—which is arguably the predominant model in many cultures—creates challenges for those who approach sport as a context in which not only physical but also moral excellence can be cultivated and displayed.4 The martial-commercial model, in practice, can make cultivating and displaying virtues like patience, compassion, and respect in the context of sport much more difficult. And it can undermine the development and exemplification of particularly Christian forms of virtues like humility, faith, hope, and love. However, there are opportunities to cultivate such traits, despite the opposition that exists in some sporting contexts.5 In what follows, then, I will discuss several of the ways that humility is applicable to these realms of life, which will also underscore its significance as a Christian virtue.

2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed., translated by Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1999), 1103b30. 3 For example, see Rebecca Walker and Philip Ivanhoe, eds, Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems (New York, NY: Clarendon Press, 2007); Michael W. Austin, ed., Virtues in Action: New Essays in Applied Virtue Ethics (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and Mike McNamee, Sports, Virtues and Vices (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008). 4 See M. Andrew Holowchak and Heather Reid, Aretism: An Ancient Sports Philosophy for the Modern Sports World (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013). 5 For more on this, see my “Sport for the Sake of the Soul,” Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 12 (2018): 20–9.

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Humility and Human Flourishing HUMILITY AND RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND PRACTICE

For Christians, humility is an important part of cultivating the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. As we saw in Philippians 2, it is closely connected with obedience to the will of God, and so it has great significance for practicing one’s faith in many realms of life. The virtue of humility is also relevant to how we understand and relate to others in a religiously diverse and pluralistic world. It is relevant to interreligious dialogue, as well as dialogue with atheists and agnostics. Humility fosters a posture of listening and seeking understanding as well as articulating and defending one’s own positions on controversial topics, and as such has great value. But foundational to much of the above, for anyone who takes the Bible to be (in some significant sense) authoritative, is seeking a posture of humility as one engages the Scriptures themselves. In what follows, I will explore these claims in more detail. I begin this discussion of humility in religious thought and practice with a focus on humility and its place in the inward life via a consideration of some of the classical spiritual disciplines. I then move outwards, discussing issues related to humility’s role in a pluralistic context. This ordering is intentional, insofar as I assume but do not argue for the view that one’s character must be formed in a particular manner in order to interact properly with others in a pluralistic society.

Humility and Spiritual Disciplines I have argued for the claim that Christian humility, understood in a particular way, is a virtue. As we have seen, it is a virtue prized by monastics, scholars, and others from a variety of Christian traditions, and rightly so, not only because it is conducive to our flourishing, but because it was instrumental in the redemptive mission of Jesus.6 As Augustine puts it, “seeing, then, that man fell through pride, He restored him through humility.”7 The humility of Christ as exemplified in his incarnation and crucifixion is the solution to our pridefulness, on

6

See Anselm of Canterbury, St. Anselm’s Book of Meditations and Prayers, translated by M. R. (London: Burnes and Oates, 1872), Meditation 11, pp. 136–51. 7 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Book I, Chapter xiv. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/ augustine/doctrine.xiv.html.

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a Christian view. In this and other ways, “our vices are cured by the examples of His virtues.”8 One way that this cure can obtain is by recognizing that humility is an important—even essential—virtue for cultivating a rich inner spiritual life. Humility may serve as a telos of many of the spiritual disciplines, but it can also motivate one to engage in them. Before I consider ways in which humility can be both a motive for and an end of many spiritual disciplines, I will first briefly consider skepticism about the intentional formation of this virtue. Is humility a virtue that we can intentionally form in ourselves? Andrew Pinsent is skeptical that this is the case.9 The reason for this is that he regards humility itself as a gift that is received from God, rather than something which we can acquire via our own effort. Pinsent claims that a person could seem humble from the perspective of an external observer, but nevertheless be “insanely proud.”10 This is certainly true on my account of humility. One could appear to be humble, by evincing behavior consistent with (A2). Such a person may act in ways that seem to put the good of others over her own, without actually being humble. In such a case, I would argue that (A2) is not in fact present, because to be a genuine module of this virtue the behavior must in some sense be a product of at least some of the cognitive and emotive modules. The acts in question may not be truly sacrificial, as some form of self-interest or self-deception may be a (or the) motivating factor. What matters at present is that the person who wants to grow in the virtue of humility should be concerned not only with behavior, but also with her beliefs, emotions, and internal dispositions. I agree with Pinsent that the presence of some form of the virtue of humility is a gift from God. We do not create humility within ourselves.11 However, as I argued in chapter 2, divine agency and 8

ibid. Andrew Pinsent, “Humility,” in Being Good, Michael W. Austin and R. Douglas Geivett, eds (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), pp. 242–64. 10 ibid. p. 263. 11 Here, I am neutral with respect to how this virtue, in its initial uncultivated form, comes to exist within a person. One possibility is that a beginning form of the virtue (or a capacity for it) is present as an aspect of the image of God in human beings. Perhaps, as Aquinas puts it, there are “nurseries” or “seeds” of virtue present in human beings “inchoatively” (see ST IaIIae.63.1–4). In this sense, humility is a gift from God, a common grace to all human beings. On Christian theism, growth in humility can be a work of the Holy Spirit in partnership with human beings as they practice the spiritual disciplines and respond to events in their lives (I discuss both of 9

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human agency are both necessary for the cultivation of an excellent Christian character and a flourishing Christian life. This also applies to the cultivation of humility. If we desire growth in this virtue, the idea is that we have a cooperative role to play. Humility is a gift, but in order for it to be cultivated and more fully exemplified in our lives, it is necessary that we do something in partnership with God. We may not be able to directly cause our own personal growth in humility, but we may be able to facilitate it via certain spiritual practices and actions. One primary way to do this, according to many different Christian traditions, is via the classical spiritual disciplines.12 Such disciplines have the potential to foster change in the heart, i.e., in the inner dispositions of the person who practices them.13 The inspiration for many of these practices comes from the life and teachings of Jesus as described in the New Testament. For example, Jesus fasted and taught his disciples to do the same (Matthew 4:1–4 and 6:16–18). He prayed, and taught his disciples how to do so (Luke 11:1–13; Matthew 6:5–15). Jesus also practiced the discipline of solitude (Luke 5:16), taught his disciples about giving (Matthew 6:2–4), and memorized Scripture (Luke 4:1–13). I will not consider all of the disciplines, as that would require at least a book-length treatment in and of itself. However, it will be helpful to consider a select few. Humility and the spiritual discipline of prayer (both alone and with others) are clearly connected to one another. In a brief discussion of hope, humility, and prayer, Josef Pieper defines hope as “the confidently patient expectation of eternal beatitude in a contemplative and comprehensive sharing of the triune life of God; hope expects from God’s hand the eternal life that is God himself.”14 Pieper then claims that hope presupposes humility, and that petitionary prayer expresses hope.15 The former claim seems correct, because hope of this sort accepts these below). On this, see Steven Porter, “Contentment as a Christian Virtue,” in Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday Life, Michael W. Austin and R. Douglas Geivett, eds (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), pp. 126–44. I would add that atheists and others may grow in humility as well in a variety of ways, as their perspectives and characters are shaped by events and their responses to them, among other things. Christians can see this as a further common grace. 12 See Dallas Willard, The Spirit of the Disciplines (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1988); and Romano Guardini, Learning the Virtues: That Lead You to God, 4th ed. (Manchester, NH: Sophia Institute Press, 2013). 13 For more on this, see James Gould, “Becoming Good: The Role of Spiritual Practice,” Philosophical Practice 1 (2005): 135–47. 14 Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1986), p. 103. 15 ibid. p. 127. His reasons for this differ from mine.

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our creaturely limitations as described by (C1). Petitionary prayer expresses hope, if the person who offers such prayer is confident that an answer will come, though she may have to wait for it, and realizes that the answer may be negative in any particular case. The foregoing suggests a straightforward argument concerning hope, prayer, and humility: (1) The virtue of hope presupposes the virtue of humility. (2) Petitionary prayer presupposes and is an expression of hope. Therefore, (3) Petitionary prayer presupposes humility. There are good reasons for thinking that (3) is true, on the conception of humility discussed and defended in this book. Prayer presupposes some of the modules of humility because it presupposes that we are creatures, limited in what we can do independent of God’s grace and activity in our lives. When we hope, it is for something beyond our ability to bring about, and so we may pray that God would bring about that which we hope to see obtain. (C1) includes self-knowledge with respect to one’s limitations, and it is arguably the case that authentic petitionary prayer necessarily includes this. Why ask God to act, unless it is beyond one’s own power to bring about the desired states of affairs? Petitionary prayer engaged in on behalf of others also seems to require other modules, in addition to (C1). Such prayer necessitates the presence of (E1). This is the case because the person praying could be praying for her own needs or wants, but insofar as she sets those aside and intercedes on behalf of others it seems that the preference (E1) describes is likely in operation. Moreover, given that such prayer is a means of obeying God, (A1) is in play here as well. Finally, it is also the case that (A2) is present, since prayer for others involves a sacrifice of one’s own time and energy for their good. Many modules of humility, then, are present as one engages in this type of prayer. The practice of prayer itself expresses humility in the foregoing ways, and the act of prayer can strengthen the virtue in the one who prays. Prayer should be a personally transformational activity. As Henri Nouwen describes it, one “should strive to let his prayer remodel the whole of his person.”16 Can the activity of prayer contribute to such transformation by contributing to the cultivation of the virtue of 16

p. 77.

Henri Nouwen, The Way of the Heart (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1981),

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humility? Just as our beliefs and attitudes impact behavior, our behavior can have an impact upon our beliefs and attitudes.17 Given this, it is plausible that engaging in prayer could foster growth in some of the modules of humility. For example, one might engage in prayer for another person, which in a small way is a self-sacrificial action for the good of that other as described by (A2). This action may reinforce two modules of humility that correlate with (A2), namely, (C3) and (E1); it can strengthen the belief that is described by (C3) and it can deepen the preference of (E1). Along these lines, Jennifer Herdt points out that some of the research on meditation and compassion suggests that those who engage in meditative practices that bring the needs and humanity of others to mind are more likely to develop compassionate and generous dispositions.18 When the practice of prayer (which in some forms is a meditative practice) focuses on similar concerns, these dispositions may be developed. Such prayer can also foster humility, as prayer for others is a clear instance of a self-lowering othercenteredness. As such it can serve to cultivate and strengthen the virtue of humility. One who is engaged in prayer for the needs of others is using time that could be employed for praying for his personal needs. Sometimes praying for the needs of others results in a desire to be involved personally in meeting those needs. So a middle-class citizen of the United States might pray for the poor in his community, or around the world, and in light of this prayer a shift in his attitudes can occur which then leads him to serve the poor, donate to the relevant charities, and engage in other behavior which exemplifies (A2). And this could further reinforce (C3) and (E1). The upshot is that given the mutually reinforcing dynamic of belief and behavior, not only can humility be a source of prayer in the aforementioned ways, it can be a potential fruit of it as well. Humility is also relevant, in significant ways, to the study of Scripture. Cassian argues that one must be humble in order to properly understand the Scriptures: “You must then, if you want to get at the true knowledge of the Scriptures, endeavour first to secure steadfast 17 See Dennis Coon, Psychology: A Journey (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002), pp. 531–5; Angela Sabates, Social Psychology in Christian Perspective (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012), pp. 238–59; and James Spiegel, “Wisdom,” in Being Good, pp. 53–71. 18 Jennifer Herdt, “Frailty, Fragmentation, and Social Dependency in the Cultivation of Christian Virtue,” in Cultivating Virtue, Nancy Snow, ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 227–49.

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humility of heart, to carry you on by the perfection of love not to the knowledge which puffeth up, but to that which enlightens.”19 For Cassian, humility is required for one to know and apply Scripture in a way that is conducive to enlightenment and the formation of love rather than pride. Consider also the following observation from Richard Briggs with respect to humility and biblical hermeneutics: “Few things are as well established in recent hermeneutical discussions as the maxim that hermeneutics should lead the biblical interpreter to an appropriate humility.”20 A key aspect of humility for Briggs is dependence on God, and this is important for how humility is relevant as a virtue one brings to the study and interpretation of Scripture. In his discussion of Numbers 12:3—which claims that “Moses was very humble, more so than anyone else on the face of the earth”—Briggs convincingly argues that given the context, what is meant by humility here is dependence upon God, especially for speaking any divinely authorized word on God’s behalf. The humility of Moses, then, is constituted by his dependence upon God. This is a virtue for interpreting the Scriptures then, which requires engaging the text but depending on God as one does so. More specifically, it requires the interpreter to have a deep spiritual life.21 This means that she pursues God via a wide variety of spiritual disciplines, including the discipline of biblical exegesis. Prayer is also an important activity for the interpreter to engage in alongside her study of Scripture, according to Briggs (as well as Barth and Aquinas, whom he cites in support of this point). What does it mean to approach, read, and interpret the Bible, with the conception of humility I have offered? My conception includes but goes beyond the sort of dependence discussed by Briggs. Using the definition developed in this book, one thing it means to study the Scriptures with humility is that contrary to our contemporary selfcentered ways of reading the Scriptures, the reader does not come to the text with the belief that it is about her. Rather, it is about God, the church, and the world, including of course her role in this larger schema. Humility and fasting are connected as well. In a discussion of fasting, Aquinas approvingly quotes Augustine’s claim that: “Fasting 19 John Cassian, Conference XIV, chapter X. http://www.ccel.org/osis/xml/cassianconferences.xml#i. 20 Richard S. Briggs, The Virtuous Reader (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010), p. 45. 21 ibid. pp. 67–8.

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cleanses the soul [and] renders the heart contrite and humble.”22 Not only can fasting foster humility, as I will describe below, but it is also a practice that is in part constituted by a self-lowering other-centeredness. In the contemporary spiritual classic, Celebration of Discipline, Richard Foster observes that fasting should not be used to try to manipulate God into doing what we want. Instead: Fasting must forever center on God. It must be God-initiated and Godordained . . . Every other purpose must be subservient to God . . . If our fasting is not unto God, we have failed. Physical benefits, success in prayer, the enduing with power, spiritual insights—these must never replace God as the center of our fasting.23

Fasting, if practiced in this manner, is a context in which humility is exemplified. It includes a lowering of oneself, insofar as the natural desire for food is denied for a time for the sake of communion with God. Some of one’s own interests and needs are put on hold for the sake of the divine–human relationship. In this way, it is also an othercentered practice, one in which the person fasting intentionally and humbly focuses on God rather than herself. Fasting is also related to (C1). When we practice the discipline of fasting and abstain from food for a set period of time, we will likely soon become aware of some of our creaturely limitations. In a brief discussion of this practice, Dallas Willard says that fasting “will certainly prove humiliating to us, as it reveals to us how much our peace depends upon the pleasures of eating.”24 It is not clear precisely how Willard is using the term “humiliating” in this passage, but it is plausible that he means something like “strongly humbling.” The realization that we use food for more than physical sustenance, but also psychological and even spiritual comfort is one insight that the practice of fasting may yield. If we discover this about ourselves through this practice, this can foster our growth in humility. It is clear that as we come to see our limitations connected with food, the cultivation of (C1) is a potential result. Not only will we encounter our limits, but the discipline of fasting may also reveal some of our vices and the shallowness of some of our virtues. It may bring one’s lack of self-control into sharp relief, for

22

ST IIaIIae.147.1; https://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.SS_Q147_A1.html. Richard Foster, Celebration of Discipline, revised ed. (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1988), pp. 54–5. 24 Willard, The Spirit of the Disciplines, p. 166. 23

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example. Or it might reveal impatience. If so, this can be conducive to (C1). Consider the following possible scenario. A person believes that he is both patient and self-controlled. His evidence for this belief is grounded in how he behaves in situations that try these virtues. For example, when his children behave in ways that are disappointing or annoying, he does not “lose it,” but patiently engages them, trying to help them act in respectful and self-controlled ways. He also consistently exhibits self-control in his life with respect to food, drink, and exercise. But when he begins to regularly practice the spiritual discipline of fasting, the results are not what he’d hope for when he decided to do this. He finds that his thoughts are nearly consumed by food as he goes about his day, and that after going without food for two meals he is deeply tempted to give up and forget this practice. He also exhibits a lack of patience with his children and other circumstances in this life that normally would not have this effect. Fasting has revealed that his patience is fairly thin. It is susceptible to being undermined when the comfort he derives from food is withdrawn. For the Christian, patience is a virtue grounded in a dependent union with God and consistent practice. But in this scenario, it is at least in part grounded in the consistent experience of comfort received from food. Fasting reveals this, and as such reveals not only our limitations, but also our vices and the precarious state of some of our virtues. Given this, fasting is a practice with the potential to foster humility. Next, consider the relationship between humility and the disciplines of solitude and silence. Solitude can act as “the furnace of transformation.”25 This practice can free us from the false self, as we disengage from all that we use to avoid self-knowledge—friends, books, technology, entertainment, meetings, and so on—we encounter ourselves as we truly are: weak, broken, and sinful. It reveals the vices we possess that are hiding just under the surface of our activity.26 Solitude, then, is conducive to (C1). Another way in which solitude can be conducive to humility is that, like fasting (and all of the disciplines, in fact) a central aim of this practice is to focus upon God, to center one’s attention and one’s very self on God. This is a humble act, an act of self-lowering other-centeredness. There are times in which solitude can be engaged in for the sake of self-reflection and the pursuit of certain kinds of selfknowledge, but one way in which solitude can be practiced is “to be

25

Nouwen, The Way of the Heart, p. 25.

26

ibid. pp. 27–8.

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still, and to know that Jehovah is indeed God (Ps. 46:10), to set the Lord before our minds with sufficient intensity and duration that we stay centered upon him.”27 There are forms of silence that are also connected with humility. According to Willard, silence is not merely something we seek when we withdraw from the noise of the world, but there is also the silence of choosing not to speak.28 This type of silence can be a practice of self-lowering other-centeredness, as we are better able to listen to others rather than focus on what we will say next or on fulfilling our desire to be heard. In addition, it can exemplify or help us cultivate (C5). As Willard describes it, the silence of not speaking is a way to forego our practice of trying to secure the approval of others with our words. We worry about their opinions, that they will not appreciate our virtues or understand our vices and shortcomings, and use words to secure these results. But in silence, we can exemplify and strengthen (C5). In these and likely many other ways, humility is connected with the spiritual disciplines of solitude and silence. Secrecy is also a spiritual discipline with connections to the virtue of humility. Willard describes this lesser known spiritual discipline as follows: “In the discipline of secrecy . . . we abstain from causing our good deeds and qualities to be known. We may even take steps to prevent them from being known, if it doesn’t involve deceit.”29 Secrecy is a way to lessen or undermine the desire we have for others to know about our virtues, morally praiseworthy actions, and other accomplishments. As such, it is a way to cultivate and exemplify (C5) and (A3). In secrecy, we can undermine the improper concern we might have for how others perceive us. We also exemplify the disposition described by (A3) to seek neither honor nor social status. Secrecy is a way to attempt to intentionally avoid the honor and social status within religious communities that are often given to those who perform the actions that a particular community values. Willard himself connects secrecy with humility, claiming that this discipline can enable us to exemplify humility. As he puts it, “It actually becomes possible for us to ‘do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit, but in humility consider others better than yourselves,’ as Philippians 2:3 advises.”30 Secrecy is a countercultural practice, given the widespread presence of social media and its potential to be used to garner attention. Given this, we may have more reason to 27 29

Willard, Spirit of the Disciplines, p. 162. 30 ibid. p. 172. ibid. pp. 173–4.

28

ibid. pp. 164–5.

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practice secrecy as a way to avoid egoistic pride and cultivate humility. As a spiritual discipline, frugality involves abstaining from the use of money and other goods for merely satisfying desires for status or luxury.31 As a virtue, frugality is subversive; when rightly understood it is associated with moderation, thrift, efficiency, and contentment.32 So understood, frugality is subversive because it revolts against some basic values of the Sumptuous Society. For the sake of personal, social, and ecological well-being, frugality rejects the gluttonous indulgence, compulsive acquisitiveness, conforming and competitive consumerism, casual wastefulness, and unconstrained economic growth promoted by peddlers of economic “progress”—and embraced in different degrees by all of us who have known the entitlements of affluence.33

Frugality as both a discipline and a virtue is connected to humility, in part because it will enable us to use more of the resources at our disposal to meet the needs of others. If we avoid frivolous consumerism, we can then give more to meet the basic needs of other people in our community and beyond. This calls to mind several modules of humility, including (C3), (E1), and (A2). Recall that the former two modules involve a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over the satisfaction of one’s own interests. Frugality is related to this preference, because the practice of this discipline involves intentionally putting the welfare of one’s neighbors ahead of one’s own. Frugal actions can also exemplify (A2), as they may be the products of this disposition to engage in self-sacrificial actions for the good of others. Frugality can be closely related to the final discipline that I will discuss, the spiritual discipline of service. Service is perhaps one of the most obvious spiritual disciplines for exemplifying and intentionally cultivating humility. Again, Willard’s description of this discipline is apt for my purposes. He states that when we serve “we engage our goods and strength in the active promotion of the good of others and the causes of God in our world . . . I may . . . serve another to train myself away from arrogance, possessiveness, envy, resentment, or covetousness. In that case, my service is 31

ibid. pp. 168–70. James A. Nash, “Toward the Revival and Reform of the Subversive Virtue: Frugality,” The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics (1995): 137–60. 33 ibid. p. 144. 32

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undertaken as a discipline for the spiritual life.”34 The connection between service and the modules of humility focused on putting the interests of others ahead of one’s own are clear. When we meet the needs of others through acts of service, we may exemplify (C3), (E1), (A1), and (A2). The humble person, as she serves, exemplifies the belief concerning and the prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over her own. She also reveals her disposition to obey to God and the disposition to engage in self-sacrificial actions for the good of others by her acts of service. As Willard notes above, acts of service need not be engaged in as a spiritual discipline, but merely as acts done for the good of others. When this occurs, acts of service may still exemplify many virtues, including the virtue of humility. But when they are performed intentionally as a spiritual discipline, acts of service can be engaged in not only for the sake of helping others, but also for undermining arrogance and pride, as well as cultivating humility.

Humility, Religious Pluralism, and Tolerance Issues related to religious pluralism and tolerance have become more prominent in recent years for a variety of reasons. Philosophers and theologians have been interested in these issues, but the resurgence of religiously motivated and often violent intolerance has created more widespread attention and concern. In this section, I will argue that humility can play an important role in fostering not only religious tolerance, but also beneficence, towards those who practice a different religion than the possessor of this virtue, as well as those who practice no religion at all. In addition, I argue that a person can hold to a form of religious exclusivism in a way that is consistent with the virtue of humility. Religious pluralism is nothing new. Neither is religious intolerance, which James Kraft and David Basinger define as “the practice of keeping others from acting in accord with their religious beliefs.”35 Because of the resurgence of groups who employ violence in an effort to shape their societies in ways that conform to their religious belief and practice, Kraft and Basinger note that there is a corresponding

34

Willard, Spirit of the Disciplines, p. 182. James Kraft and David Basinger, eds, Religious Tolerance through Humility: Thinking with Philip Quinn (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), p. 1. 35

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interest in how to foster religious tolerance, which they understand as “establishing socio-political environments in which individuals with differing religious perspectives can practice their faiths unencumbered.”36 In what follows, I will accept these as working definitions of both religious tolerance and religious intolerance, and consider some of the ways in which humility is relevant to these issues, with one clarification. Religious intolerance is generally seen as immoral, but at times we may be justified in preventing others from acting upon their religious beliefs. A form of religious practice that violates some form of the harm principle, inflicting significant harm on others, would be a case in point. As I have argued, humility can support and even foster the cultivation of both the cardinal and theological virtues. While these virtues are also relevant to religious tolerance, and reveal indirect ways in which humility can support such tolerance, here I focus on particular ways in which the modules of humility described in chapter 2 relate to religious pluralism and religious tolerance. One purported way of fostering religious tolerance is by increasing awareness of other religions, including an awareness of the fact that many of their followers are morally decent and have evidence for their views. Some hold that the epistemic uncertainty that should be produced by such awareness will foster religious tolerance.37 In contrast to this, William Lane Craig contends that epistemic uncertainty is not a solid foundation on which to build religious tolerance.38 What is needed, according to Craig, is a moral foundation for such tolerance that mere epistemic uncertainty does not provide. Even if it is empirically the case that an increase in uncertainty is positively correlated with an increase in religious tolerance, we still need a justification for claiming that people ought to be tolerant in such ways. In addition, some religions include an ethic of tolerance and love, such that when one undermines the epistemic justification of one’s religious beliefs, there may be a concomitant undermining of one’s commitment to religious tolerance. Craig contends that it is hatred for others who are different, rather than epistemic certainty, which is the source of religious intolerance. If this is correct, then in order to reduce intolerance such hatred must be addressed, rather than the level of epistemic certainty possessed by 36

37 ibid. For an extended discussion of these claims, see ibid. William Lane Craig, “Is Uncertainty a Sound Foundation for Religious Tolerance?” in ibid. pp. 13–27. 38

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any particular person. It seems clear that epistemic certainty does not entail intolerance. There are many individuals who have a high degree of justification for their religious beliefs, and even consider themselves to have religious knowledge, who are tolerant of others and their distinct religious traditions. For my purposes, it is not necessary to determine the role of epistemic certainty with respect to religious tolerance. It seems clear to me that a moral foundation for such tolerance is required, and that humility provides at least part of that foundation. The cultivation and instantiation of humility’s relevant cognitive, emotive, and active modules would do much to undermine and even eradicate the hatred connected with religious intolerance, and the violence it can produce. Humility is able to help accomplish this in a way that does not require a decreased level of epistemic certainty or justification for the religious beliefs of its possessor. In order to see one way in which humility can serve to undermine such hatred, recall the following cognitive module: (C4) The humble person will not conceive of human beings in a hierarchical manner in light of their equal inherent dignity and worth as image-bearers of God. On a standard Christian anthropology, human beings are image-bearers of God, whether or not they are Christians, and as such they are worthy of respect. Such respect for persons, and the valuing of others that it includes, is incompatible with the forms of hatred alluded to by Craig which yield religious intolerance. Recall that in chapter 4 I argued that humility and love are related to one another in a variety of ways. For instance, the other-centeredness of humility can awaken its possessor to objects and subjects that are worthy of being loved. Humility turns its possessor outward, away from herself, and when she detects the value that humans possess as creatures made by God in his image, she has reasons to not only forego intolerance, but for engaging in loving acts of service on behalf of those who are not also Christians. They have intrinsic worth and dignity as bearers of God’s image. (C2) is relevant as well. This module will act as a check on the arrogance that is often related to religious intolerance, because not only will the humble person be characterized by (C4), and so avoid hierarchical thinking about others, she will include herself in this insofar as her good-making properties are ultimately gifts of God. She

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believes that she would not possess them, apart from divine grace and love. This will undermine patterns of thought and behavior that could lead her to think of herself as better than or more important than others; it also supports religious tolerance and undermines intolerance. Finally, when we also consider that humility’s active modules include a disposition to engage in self-sacrificial actions for the good of others, grounded in cognitive and emotive modules related to a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over one’s own, the humble person will not be disposed to be intolerant towards others, including those of different religious faiths than her own. This virtue, on its own and in concert with others, has great potential for fostering religious tolerance. But we ought to aim higher than mere tolerance.39 Humility can play important roles here as well, because it prescribes more than tolerance. As I have argued, the first two active modules of humility dispose one to obey God and engage in self-sacrificial actions for the good of others. Obedience to God requires loving God and our neighbors, regardless of their views about religion (see Mark 12:28–34). This would include tolerance, but of course goes well beyond it. The humble person will tolerate her neighbors who do not share her religious faith, but she will also love them as a way of expressing obedience to God and be disposed to perform actions intended to contribute to their overall well-being. Our neighbor may at times also be our enemy, and Jesus instructs those who seek to love and follow him to love their enemies (Matthew 5:43–7). I will expand on these points in the following discussion of religious exclusivism and humility. A final question to consider here is whether or not one can hold to some form of religious exclusivism and exemplify humility. I contend that humility is compatible with at least one form of religious exclusivism. I am not arguing that exclusivism is true, but rather that a form of it is consistent with Christian humility. The form of exclusivism I have in mind is both doctrinal and soteriological.40 A doctrinal exclusivist holds that the doctrines of one religion (most likely her own) are true, and that insofar as the doctrines of other religions are 39 For a different proposal on how to do this in diverse communities, focused on promoting “respectful curiosity,” see Robert McKim, “A Path to (and beyond) Tolerance,” in Kraft and Basinger, Religious Tolerance through Humility, pp. 75–84. 40 This distinction and the explanation that follows is from Nathan L. King, “Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief,” Philosophy Compass 3/4 (2008): 830–53.

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incompatible with it, they are false. There are two further categories into which a doctrinal exclusivist might fall. First, in addition to the foregoing, the closed doctrinal exclusivist also believes that no religious truths exist outside of her religion. So the Christian who holds this view contends that there are no religious truths to be found in Buddhism, Islam, or Hinduism. In contrast to this, the open doctrinal exclusivist believes the claims of her religion to be true and incompatible claims from other religions to be false. But she also holds that it is at least possible that there are religious truths within other religions. A soteriological exclusivist holds that salvation is available via one (most likely her own) religion. Those who adhere to other religions do not have access to salvation, unless they convert to the one true religion, on this view. With the above in mind, I contend that one can be an open doctrinal exclusivist and a soteriological exclusivist (hereafter, ODSE), in a manner that is consistent with the virtue of humility.41 At first glance, ODSE will seem arrogant to many (or at least presumptuous). Not only that, but adhering to ODSE might even seem to provide support for destructive forms of intolerance. In his discussion of such issues, Rousseau makes the following claim: Those who distinguish civil from theological intolerance are, to my mind, mistaken. The two forms are inseparable. It is impossible to live at peace with those we regard as damned; to love them would be to hate God who punishes them: we positively must either reclaim or torment them. Wherever theological intolerance is admitted, it must inevitably have some civil effect.42

Rousseau makes the strong claim that it is impossible to tolerate in civil life those who have theological views which one thinks are sufficient for their damnation. For Rousseau, soteriological exclusivism is “necessarily destructive of respect for persons.”43 Given this, he would hold that ODSE is also necessarily destructive of such respect. Similarly, Peter Byrne argues that whether or not soteriological exclusivism is arrogant, it threatens respect for persons. Can such respect coexist

41 I neither defend nor assume the truth of ODSE. My aim here is merely to show the consistency of humility with this view. 42 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2012), p. 181. 43 Peter Byrne, “Quinn on Tolerance and Diversity,” in Kraft and Basinger, Religious Tolerance through Humility, p. 106.

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“alongside the opinion that the other is God-hated and damned for eternity”?44 Before going further, I would like to offer a few qualifications concerning the type of person who holds to ODSE that I have in mind.45 She will have more than a passing familiarity with and understanding of other religions. She will have reflected upon the fact that there are thoughtful individuals who adhere to faiths other than her own, and that many of them are both religiously devout and exhibit moral decency. This person will also believe that she knows of no argument that necessitates assent from all honest and intelligent inquirers. Finally, she will have also reflected upon how this might pose a challenge to her belief that God has revealed himself in a unique manner through Christ, the Scriptures, and the Christian church. With these qualifications in mind, then, it is clear that ODSE does not require the belief that “the other is hated by God.” In fact, ODSE can be seen to be consistent with humility and as maintaining respect for persons. First, with respect to ODSE’s doctrinal aspects, I see no reason why belief that one’s religion is true entails any form of pride or arrogance, or necessarily prevents one from being humble. If one has sufficient evidence (broadly speaking) to justify such belief and Christianity seems true to him, it is difficult to see how this is incompatible with humility or necessitates pride. Of course, this same point applies to those who adhere to other religions, and also to agnostics and atheists who are similarly situated with respect to their views. Open doctrinal exclusivism related to one’s own religious faith or any other comprehensive view of reality does not entail pride or arrogance. But does the soteriological aspect of ODSE entail some form of arrogance or intolerance, since this type of exclusivist believes that salvation is only available via her religion? For many, such a view seems to at least imply that those who practice a different faith or no faith at all are somehow inferior to the rightly believing and practicing soteriological exclusivist. After all, on one traditional Christian view, those who are not followers of Christ end up eternally separated from God in hell.46 And many religious believers tend to conceive 44

ibid. See Alvin Plantinga in “Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,” in The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, Philip L. Quinn and Kevin Meeker, eds (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 172–92. 46 For more on this, see Stephen T. Davis, “Universalism, Hell, and the Fate of the Ignorant,” Modern Theology 6 (1990): 173–86. 45

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of a non-believer as the other, as less valuable or moral by virtue of his non-belief. In its extreme forms, such views are used to justify violent forms of religious intolerance. This, however, is a grave error, and is one that the Christian who holds ODSE in a way that is consistent with humility will not make. In fact, such a Christian has quite strong reasons that are internal to her religious faith and practice for loving those outside of her faith, which of course includes fully respecting their inherent dignity as persons. This love will motivate her to act in humble ways towards those persons (as (A2) describes) and highly esteem them, given the fact that she believes their very salvation is at stake.47 There is clear guidance from words that are ascribed to Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount about how enemies are to be treated by his followers, and it is a far cry from Rousseau’s description: “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be children of your Father in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the righteous and on the unrighteous” (Matthew 5:43–5). Those who seek to put these words into practice will not have the attitude Rousseau describes, but rather will seek to love their enemies with divine agape love. Moreover, they will seek to love their neighbors as themselves, and if their neighbors are not enemies but simply followers of another religion or no religion at all, they are still to exhibit love for them (see Mark 12:28–34). The Christian has strong reasons, internal to her religion, for adopting attitudes towards those outside of her faith that are in direct contrast with those described by Rousseau and Byrne. Given the claim that God loves all persons, including those who reject him, and given the instructions of Jesus concerning love in the Sermon on the Mount and other parts of the gospels, it follows that Christians should also love those who reject God in this life, and that in so doing they do not “hate God who punishes them.” Rather, they imitate him by having and expressing such love. So, in light of the above, how is ODSE consistent with humility? There is nothing in ODSE that contradicts the modules of humility. In fact, a proper Christian humility will undermine salvific pride, a

47

An anonymous reviewer raised this important point.

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form of arrogance or self-importance related to the belief that one’s religious beliefs and practices reflect the truth and that this somehow makes one superior to others. Nothing in ODSE requires such pride. Christian theological conceptions of grace, mercy, and forgiveness are relevant, because if they are properly understood and accepted, they serve to undermine salvific pride, insofar as they assume that human beings have good reasons to be humble, given our limits and inability to flourish apart from God’s redemptive activity. (C2) counteracts such pride, as it includes the claim that the humble person knows that God deserves the credit for her salvation and other goods. Egoistic pride related to one’s relationship with God is inconsistent with the nature of Christian soteriology and with not only (C2), but also (C1) and (C4). Humility and salvific pride are opposed to one another. In addition, some of the key social modules of humility—(C3), (E1), and (A2)—are also highly relevant to showing how humility is consistent with ODSE. Recall that these modules focus on beliefs, emotions, and actions which dispose the humble person to have a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over her own and to act in ways that satisfy such interests. The passage from Philippians 2, upon which these modules are partially based, is focused on how members of the Philippian church are to relate to one another. With this in mind, it might seem that these modules of humility are not relevant to how believers are to relate to those outside of the faith. However, while the focus in this particular passage is on relationships within this particular community of faith, there is nothing that necessitates excluding others from being the subjects of humble acts. First, the letter to the Philippians includes a concern for those outside of the community of faith.48 Second, there is significant evidence from Paul’s life as described in the New Testament that he sought to exhibit humility in relation to those who were not Christians.49 Third, these modules are also grounded in the life of Jesus as described in the gospels, and it is clear that he was humble towards those who neither believed in nor followed him. Religious faith and practice appear in a variety of forms across different cultures, and humility is important for how we interact with each other in this realm of human life. There are two other cultural phenomena, the family and sport, which are also ubiquitous. In the 48 49

See Philippians 1:3–5; 2:14–15; and 4:5. For example, see 1 Corinthians 9:19–23 and Romans 9:1–5.

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remainder of this chapter, I consider some ways in which humility is relevant to these two realms of life.

HUMILITY AND THE FAMILY There are a variety of ways in which humility is a virtue that is relevant to and important for family life. Humility is especially important for parents to practice, as the potential to exercise and abuse power in the parent–child relationship is great, and parenting can be a context in which egoistic pride appears. Such pride can be destructive to the parent–child relationship, and to the child’s ability to engage in intimate relationships in the short and long term. The other-centeredness of humility is an important corrective to the tendency many have towards parental pride, which is often related to an over-identification of the parent with the child’s successes and failures. While it is true that the engaged and loving parent will rejoice when her child rejoices, and mourn when her child mourns, there is also a temptation to pride, to equating success as a parent with the success of a child on the field, in the classroom, or in the concert hall. The temptation of vicariously living through one’s child may be the product of parental pride, of an egoistic desire for the success of a child to reflect upon the parent. But in parenting, humility, without dismissing the value of excellence, also underscores the importance of experiences of failure for growth in virtue. And as I have argued, the humble person will not be concerned with social status or honor. There are other ways in which humility is an important filial virtue. First, the family can be a place in which both parents and children cultivate the self-knowledge described by (C1) with respect to one’s virtues, vices, and limitations, both personal and qua human person. Parenthood can be self-revelatory in these ways. For example, a parent may not think that he possesses compassion, but upon having a child and being in a parent–child relationship, this virtue is revealed. The parent may still lack it in a variety of realms, but parenthood can reveal to him that he has a module (or modules) of compassion in this realm of human life. This may give him hope and motivation to develop it in other realms as well. With respect to vice, parenthood may reveal impatience that was heretofore unknown. A parent may exemplify patience in some realms of life, and believe

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that she is more patient than she is. But parenting may also reveal some impatient dispositions. Once she becomes aware of this, she may be more attuned to the vice of impatience and then become aware of other realms of life where it exists. Children, as they are developmentally able to do so, may also grow in these kinds of selfknowledge, and parents may help them to become aware of their own particular virtues, vices, gifts, talents, and limitations. This can contribute to the overall flourishing of the child now and into adulthood, as the relevant module of humility, (C1), delivers this kind of knowledge that is useful for a variety of decisions that the child will face. The family, then, can be a significant context in which (C1) is cultivated. Second, humility is also a key virtue related to the religious upbringing of children within the context of the family. I have argued elsewhere that parents have the right to raise their children within a particular religious framework, under certain conditions, and that they can be obligated to do so for reasons of personal integrity.50 Here I will argue that the virtue of humility as I have analyzed it supports the claim that parents are obligated to raise their children within their religion in a particular manner. Humility is a corrective virtue with respect to parental pride and opposes authoritarian models of religious upbringing. I contend that a humble parent will strongly value the present and future autonomy of her child as she raises him within a particular religion. That is, humility as a virtue underscores the need for parental respect of the autonomy of the child, but it also takes into account the beliefs of religious parents concerning the connection between their child’s welfare and religious faith and practice. Humility will also dispose a parent to focus on the child’s well-being and to seek to foster moral and intellectual virtue within the child. Why think that parents can have an obligation to raise their children within their own religious tradition? Presumably, some parents hold their religious commitments for some or all of the following reasons: it is the tradition they were raised within; they believe that their religion is true; they believe that the moral values included in their religion are important and true; and they believe that their religion is conducive to human flourishing. Christian parents, for example, might believe that Christianity is both true and if practiced properly, conducive to human flourishing. But what sort of religious upbringing is permissible, or 50 See Michael W. Austin, Conceptions of Parenthood (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 96–9, 120–3. Some of what follows is based upon this work.

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desirable? Taking into account different modules of the virtue of humility suggests not only that parents can have an obligation to raise their children within their religious faith, but also that they will be disposed to do so in a particular way. In the remainder of this section, then, I offer support for the following claim: (HSN): Considerations related to humility support the claim that parents ought to raise their children in ways that exemplify Socratic nurturing.51

In his discussion of the morality of shaping the convictions of children, Colin Macleod argues that children have a right to Socratic nurturing.52 I will leave this rights-claim aside, and instead focus on the obligations of parents and how the virtue of humility is related to such an upbringing as it relates to religion. What is Socratic nurturing? Given a framework where the wellbeing of the child is a central concern, Macleod describes four main elements of this type of nurturing. First, it emphasizes the development of a wide range of reasoning skills. Second, it encourages children to use these skills for both instrumental goals in pursuit of their ends but also for the sake of critically reflecting upon the value and desirability of the ends themselves. Third, it will afford children access to quality material that is relevant to such issues and represents different perspectives. Fourth, Socratic nurturing includes constraints on what parents may do to secure the allegiance of their children to their own preferred ends and ultimate commitments. Macleod illustrates this with an example that directly relates to my present focus, when he states that “a child raised in a Christian household should be equipped, by the time she reaches maturity, to deliberate not only about how Christian convictions might guide her conduct but also about whether Christian convictions merit adoption.”53 In sum, Socratic nurturing will, over time, allow a child to grapple with competing views of the good life from distinct religious and secular perspectives. She will 51 This claim is contingent upon the particular circumstances that parents are in, and assumes that the basic needs of the family are being met which then enables them to focus on Socratic nurturing. 52 Colin Macleod, “Shaping Children’s Convictions,” Theory and Research in Education 1 (2003): 315–30. I do not claim that Macleod would agree with my application of his view in what follows. See also Michael W. Austin, “Parenthood and Personally Transformative Experiences,” Procreation, Parenthood, and Education Rights: Ethical and Philosophical Issues, Jaime Ahlberg and Michael Cholbi, eds (New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 211–29. 53 Macleod, “Shaping Children’s Convictions,” p. 318.

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ideally develop the capacities needed for leading an examined life, which includes reflecting upon and evaluating the goods and values related to her life commitments. The value of Socratic nurturing seems clear to me, and I will not defend the claim that it has value here. Rather, I will focus on defending (HSN), with a special focus on its connections with the religious upbringing of children. As the focus of this book is the Christian virtue of humility, I will focus on parents and a Christian upbringing of children. Many of the points may be modified and transferred to work within other religious and secular traditions. First, recall (A3), which is the claim that the humble person will be disposed to seek neither honor nor social status. Sometimes, parents seek a certain outcome with respect to religious faith in their children out of a concern for how others in their church or community will view them. They want the praise and admiration that may come from raising “good and faithful Christian kids,” and to avoid their own selfperceived failure if their children reject the faith or live in ways that are inconsistent with it. These motives, and the means that some parents adopt in service to them, are problematic.54 Humility can serve a corrective or preventive role in this context. For example, (A3) supports (HSN) insofar as it will undermine egoistic concerns parents might have with respect to their reputation with others, including the honor and status that are connected to the faith and practice of their children. Given that such concerns may prevent parents from Socratic nurturing and instead lead them to engage in indoctrination, (A3) can undermine the motives of some parents that lead them to indoctrinate their children. Second, (C1) also supports (HSN). A parent realizes that her limitations as a human person, in conjunction with her obligations to love her neighbor as herself (in this case, her child), should prevent her from seeking to control the religious beliefs and practice of her child. She may be able to indoctrinate her child, but the actions required for such religious indoctrination would require her to violate her obligations of love for that child. Humility, then, disposes her to remain within the boundaries set by the neighbor-love command. She may seek to influence and persuade, but in ways that respect the welfare, autonomy, and character of her child. Humility—in

54

Some of these are discussed in what follows.

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particular modules (C3), (E1), and (A2)—disposes her to value and to attempt to satisfy the genuine interests of her child. Humility supports the claim that her child is best served by coming to believe and practice the Christian faith, if she does so, in the context of moral and intellectual virtue formation, rather than indoctrination that is inconsistent with respect for persons and does not exhibit unconditional love for the child. In addition, there are good reasons for respecting the autonomy of a child while raising her within a religious tradition. It is unclear how a particular religious faith is the child’s unless autonomously adopted by the child (or the adult the child becomes). If Christian parents seek to inculcate their religious views within their children via indoctrination, and thereby fail to respect the present and future autonomy of their children, then they have failed to exhibit some of the modules of humility. For example, (C3), (E1), and (A2) are all connected to the interests of others. In the context of the family and the religious upbringing of children, it is difficult to see how the interests of a child are served by parental indoctrination of that child. Failure to respect the child’s present and future autonomy is failure to respect the child as a person. Such a failure falls short of exemplifying humility as described by these three modules. Moreover, if it is right that indoctrination can be self-defeating because it seeks to impose religious faith and practice rather than encourage and cultivate it if it arises, then from within a Christian framework parents have good reasons based on the interests of the child as they conceive of them to refrain from it. In contrast to this, these modules allow for and even encourage parents to seek to influence their children in a loving and autonomy-respecting manner with respect to Christian faith and practice. So far I have primarily considered the limitations that humility imposes upon the forms of religious upbringing that parents may employ. Does Socratic nurturing really serve the interests of children? For (HSN) to be true, it must be the case that it does serve their interests. The modules which form the core of social humility—(C3), (E1), and (A2)—center on a concern for satisfying the interests of others over one’s own. Given this, Socratic nurturing in a Christian context needs to serve the interests of children in order to justify accepting (HSN). With respect to how humility can support a religious upbringing as described by (HSN), consider the interests children have regarding psychological intimacy with their parent(s) as well as developing and

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exercising their autonomy. These interests are arguably crucial to the well-being of children.55 Given this, and given (C3), (E1), and (A2), the humble parent will seek the satisfaction of the interests of his child with respect to the form of religious upbringing he implements by (i) respecting her autonomy; and (ii) teaching her about his faith in a way that fosters intimacy in the parent–child relationship. Indoctrination by definition fails to respect autonomy, and it is difficult to see how it can foster psychological or emotional intimacy within the parent–child relationship. In contrast to this, when a parent engages in Socratic nurturing with respect to religious upbringing, this includes respect for autonomy, and it can also foster intimacy in the parent–child relationship. Discussions with one’s child about religious faith, as appropriate given her cognitive and emotional maturity, can foster such intimacy. Here I have in mind not only teaching the child about the beliefs and practices of the Christian faith, but also a discussion of other religious and non-religious ways of life, as well as some of the main challenges to Christian belief. For example, a parent may discuss the problems posed for such belief by the existence and prevalence of evil and suffering. He may also discuss his own past (and current, if applicable) struggles with doubt, and what has helped to assuage those doubts. This supports (HSN), then, as the humble person will be disposed to satisfy the interests of his child, and this type of religious upbringing arguably helps satisfy important interests related to autonomy and intimacy in the parent–child relationship. In addition to this, there is one further consideration in support of the claim that such an upbringing is good for children and the adults they will become. This type of upbringing can help foster resilience, which is a crucial trait for human flourishing. Resilience can be defined as “a relatively stable personality trait characterized by the ability to overcome, steer through, and bounce back from adversity.”56 Resilience yields many benefits, including maintaining positive emotions when dealing with stress and experiencing positive outcomes when stressful events occur. In fact, there is empirical support for the value of resilience: resilient people tend to have more positive 55

For more on this, see Austin, Conceptions of Parenthood, pp. 76–87. Anthony Ong, C. S. Bergeman, and Toni Bisconti, “Psychological Resilience, Positive Emotions, and Successful Adaptation to Stress in Later Life,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 91 (2006): 730–49; p. 731. 56

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emotions, are better able to regulate negative emotions, and they react better to stress in everyday life.57 In a Socratic upbringing, Christian parents will expose their children to some of the challenges to their deeply held beliefs. The problem of evil is a classic example of such a challenge. For some, the force of this problem will lead them to reject or renounce Christian belief and practice, while others will find one or more theodicies compelling and sufficient for maintaining their religious beliefs. My point at present is that it is reasonable to think that someone who deeply considers the problem of evil, whether or not she maintains her faith, will grow in resilience. Certain aspects of the process of wrestling with the problem of evil will be stressful and constitute a form of adversity for her. As she deals in an honest and rational way with this challenge to her foundational religious commitments, it is plausible to think that resilience will be fostered. This is likely to serve her well in all domains of life when adversity arises in the future. In sum, after thinking through and dealing with such challenges, a child may retain her faith, undergo a change in some of her religious beliefs, or reject her faith altogether. Whichever of these possibilities obtain, it is plausible that greater resilience will be one result. Given the value of resilience as briefly described above for furthering the interests of human beings, we have further reason for accepting (HSN) in general as well as its application to the religious upbringing of children in particular. There is a final consideration that supports (HSN), namely, that parents—like all human beings—are epistemically fallible. (C1) recognizes this human limitation, and in conjunction with the three modules that focus on the interests of others—(C3), (E1), and (A2)—provides good reasons grounded in the virtue of humility for parents to Socratically nurture their children. It is possible that the child may not only end up with different beliefs than her parents, but also that she is correct and they mistaken. Providing a Socratic upbringing allows for this possibility, and parental humility gives further reason for favoring such an upbringing over indoctrination. And the humble parent, as he exemplifies (A1), will love his child regardless of whether or not she shares his religious commitments. Christian humility undergirds Christian love. For parents, this love is 57 ibid. Positive emotions include the following: cheerful, peaceful, happy, excited, proud, strong, and determined. Negative emotions include such things as: anxious, worried, depressed, scared, hostile, and guilty.

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unconditional, and is therefore not dependent upon the child having the same religious views as they. Those who would reject their children because of their rejection of the Christian faith are failing with respect to humility, love, and a host of other virtues. Finally, it is worth noting that participating in certain Christian practices and being part of a church or Christian community itself has the potential to cultivate several virtues, including humility.58 A family’s participation in such practices and cooperative social activities can foster humility in all of its members. Herdt points out that many Christian practices have a characterological component. Practices like meditation, worship, and prayer “are inseparably joined with practices of outreach and ministry in the ‘world’—that is, beyond the formal worship context.”59 As families engage in these practices, and are active within a religious community in which the individual’s needs and goals are conceived of within a broader social context in relationship to God and others, there is great potential for self-lowering other-centeredness to develop. In the next section, I consider another realm of life that perhaps surprisingly also possesses great potential for the cultivation and display of humility.

HUMILITY AND SPORT Why consider humility’s status as a virtue in the context of sport? First, for many it is counterintuitive to think that humility functions as a virtue in sport, given the emphasis placed on victory, the quest for individual glory, and the steady stream of news detailing egoistic behavior by elite athletes. Yet there are good reasons to think that humility is a virtue in sport, as we will see. I argued in chapter 4 that humility is a virtue in part because it benefits its possessor and makes her a good human being. The argument below is that humility is a virtue in the context of sport in part because it benefits its possessor and makes her a good human being in a sporting context. In support of these claims, I will offer an analysis of some of the ways in which humility is instrumentally valuable in sport. Given this, the 58 See Herdt, “Frailty, Fragmentation, and Social Dependency in the Cultivation of Christian Virtue,” pp. 227–49. 59 ibid. pp. 242–3.

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virtue of humility should be emphasized by sport practitioners, especially coaches. In addition, much of what follows could be profitably modified and then applied to many other human endeavors. Humility can function as a virtue not only in sport, but also in other communal and competitive endeavors, such as dance, music, academics, and the everyday work that we perform. Why think that humility, conceived of as proper self-assessment and a self-lowering other-centeredness, is a virtue in the context of sport? Former professional American football player Deon Sanders gives voice to what many believe about this virtue as it relates to sport, when he states, “They don’t pay nobody to be humble!”60 One implication that could be drawn from Sanders’ claim is the notion that humility should not play a role in sport because it undermines athletic excellence (which is often tied to the external good of monetary gain in elite sport). Moreover, the predominant contemporary model of competitive sport—the martial-commercial model (MC model)—has little or no place for humility.61 On this model, competition is conceived of as a battle and the opponent is seen as an enemy. The MC model includes the claim that the goods of sport are external goods, and include fame, wealth, celebrity, and school or national pride. Winning is the sole goal of sport on this model, because it is often the key to acquiring these external goods. The MC Model is also essentially commercialistic, and at times rewards the behavior of many elite athletes as they engage in self-promotion, demeaning opponents, and other types of egoistic behavior, to the detriment of both their characters and the character of their sports.62 Many practitioners and fans of sport accept much or even all of the MC Model. Given its sole emphasis on victory, acceptance of the claim that sport is merely a commercial enterprise, and the attention paid to boastful and brash athletes, there seems to be little room for humility as a virtue in contemporary sport. I argue however that humility is a virtue in the context of sport. If this is the case, it serves not only as a reason to seek to cultivate this trait via sport, but also as a reason to reject the MC Model. 60 M. Andrew Holowchak and Heather L. Reid, Aretism: An Ancient Sports Philosophy for the Modern Sports World (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), p. 109. 61 ibid. 62 Holowchak and Reid do not object to professional sport or commercial sponsorship, but rather they reject the reduction of competitive sport to a business.

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Even if it is the case, as I have argued, that humility is a virtue, and a very important one, it does not simply follow that this trait is a virtue in the context of sport. Traits that are virtues in other contexts are not always virtues in sport. For example, honesty about one’s intentions is not always virtuous in the context of sport, given the role deception plays in the strategies appropriate in many sports.63 Perhaps humility is not a virtue in sport. There are certainly many coaches, athletes, and fans who would argue that it is not. Consider the following view of sport discussed (but not advocated) by Anthony Skillen: Sports are competitive. In sport, we do not set out simply to exercise our capacities and to develop our skills, we set out, by showing more capacities and skills than they do, to beat our opponents. The spirit of competition and conquest, therefore, is inextricable from sport.64

On the conception of humility that I have developed and defended in this volume, humility is not opposed to a competitive display of athletic skill engaged in for (in part) the purpose of victory. It is, however, opposed to a prideful, egoistic display of such skill. This perspective is consistent with the longstanding ideal of sportsmanship, or sportspersonship, which remains operative in many sporting contexts today. Humility is a virtue in sport because it is one important aspect of sportspersonship. But how do humility and sportspersonship overlap? Skillen touches on this issue in the context of his advocacy of what he calls idealistic realism, which is a conception of sport “as potentially a noble and educative field of activity and interest—as a sort of image of the good life.”65 On such a view, it is admitted that in actual practice sport reflects the vainglory and pride present in many realms of life. However, sport is at its best when “the proper spirit of the game gives flesh to the fairness required by its rules—in the tension between the quest for and love of victory and the acceptance of the reality, the objectivity, of vulnerability to defeat that is bound up with the very idea of a sporting encounter,” and, what is crucial for my purposes, “the good 63 For more on this issue see Leslie Howe, “Gamesmanship,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 31 (2004): 212–25; and Kathleen M. Pearson, “Deception, Sportsmanship, and Ethics,” in Sports Ethics, Jan Boxill, ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 81–3. 64 Anthony Skillen, “Sport Is for Losers,” in Ethics and Sport, M. J. McNamee and S. J. Parry, eds (New York, NY: E and FN Spon, 1998), p. 171. 65 ibid. pp. 173, 177–81.

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sport, then, has learned both to ‘go for it,’ and to ‘take it,’ and these intertwined lessons constitute among the deepest we can expect to be taught.”66 The good sport is gracious in defeat and humble in victory, according to Skillen. Skillen is correct. A primary lesson of sport is the acceptance of limits with respect to our opponents as well as nature itself. There is certainly a limit to athletic excellence imposed by the laws of the natural world, and in every case, sooner or later, there will be an opponent who is athletically superior. A good sport is disappointed after losing in a fair competition, but can appreciate her opponent’s performance. The disappointment arises from the newly gained knowledge that her best was not good enough. Alternately, the victorious good sport appreciates her opponent’s play and is a generous winner. In these ways, whether she wins or loses, such an athlete exemplifies the proper self-assessment and self-lowering othercenteredness that constitute humility. With these points in mind, then, we have reason to believe that humility is a virtue in sport, given its overlap with sportspersonship. As Skillen points out, sportspersonship has been and still is embodied in sporting rituals, as can be seen by postgame handshakes, embraces, and congratulatory remarks. My point is that all of this also embodies and expresses humility, and gives us some reason for thinking that there is no inherent conflict between the nature of humility and the nature of sport. If there were, then there would be a conflict between sportspersonship and the nature of sport, which is surely not the case. In fact, humility as I have defined it fits nicely as a virtue within Robert L. Simon’s influential conception of the nature of sport as a cooperative rather than combative activity.67 For Simon, sport is best conceived of as “a mutual quest for excellence through challenge.”68 On this view, sport is not a zero-sum game in which the aim is egoistic self-promotion through victory over one’s opponents. Rather, it is a competitive activity that is also cooperative insofar as it presupposes respect between persons who seek to do their best in part to bring out the best in their opponent. The athlete seeks victory,

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ibid. pp. 177–8. Robert L. Simon, “Good Competition and Drug-Enhanced Performance,” in Sports Ethics, pp. 175–81. For more on this, see Simon’s Fair Play: The Ethics of Sport, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010). 68 Simon, “Good Competition and Drug-Enhanced Performance,” p. 179. 67

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but desires that it obtain as both she and her opponent perform at their best within the rules of the sport. It is clear that humility fits well within this conception of sport. In fact, it would seem that humility as I understand it would play a central role in sport, so conceived. Adopting the paradigm of sport advocated by Simon can and will very likely foster proper self-assessment, in terms of athletic excellence and one’s own moral character, as described by (C1). Moreover, the emphasis on mutuality in Simon’s account requires self-lowering other-centeredness insofar as one is concerned about athletic excellence both in oneself and one’s opponent, rather than “the selfish and egotistical desire to promote oneself by imposing losses on others.”69 This concern for the interests of one’s opponents is a mark not only of sportspersonship, but also of humility. In particular, it can be seen as a manifestation of (C3), (E1), and (A2). As was noted above, some people hold that hubris rather than humility is needed for success in sports. The ego-fueled athlete will give all that he has in pursuit of victory and will rely on his self-confidence and pride to motivate an excellent performance. By contrast, it could be thought that the humble athlete will not take risks, because he knows his limits and when athletic confidence is appropriate. On the contrary, humility can engender risk-taking in the context of sport as (A4) describes, because the barriers of egopreservation and the related fear of public failure are undermined by this virtue. Moreover, given that humility includes self-knowledge, including knowledge of one’s athletic skill, the humble athlete can still possess self-confidence, and she can be more assured that it is well-grounded and not based on the self-deceptive powers of ego and pride. Humility counteracts the self-deception that these vices may engender. Given these points, humility can be conducive to the discovery and display of athletic excellence. And in those cases where an athlete realizes that he may or may not be able to outperform his competition, humility can enable him to accept this ambiguity and to compete to the best of his ability, free from egoistic concerns related to the outcome, as modules (C5) and (A3) undermine such concerns. For the humble athlete who is unsure of her athletic talents, humility can play a part in enabling her to risk discovering that the level of

69

ibid.

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those talents is less than she hoped (though of course she may discover that she possesses great athletic ability). Given the potential of humility to remove the barrier of concern about what others think, this virtue can fuel high aspirations in the context of sport. For example, an athlete might believe that she has the potential to compete in the Olympics in her chosen sport and strongly desire to pursue this goal, but fear the possibility that she does not have what it takes to be successful. One reason that she might not pursue this goal is a fear of what others will think of her if she fails to reach it. Humility, however, removes this barrier and so will help her to test her limits and discover what she is capable of as an athlete. Given the defeasibility of judgments concerning one’s athletic ability and potential as well as the many factors that causally impact sporting performances and outcomes, and given humility’s aforementioned connection to athletic aspiration, it is evident that this virtue can help to enable an athlete to compete in the midst of such ambiguity. In this way, humility can be a crucial ingredient of athletic excellence, even at the elite level. Humility can also motivate an athlete to pursue greater excellence in her sport. The humble athlete properly assesses herself, and this includes her athletic excellences and deficiencies. The humble athlete will acknowledge her deficiencies and their negative impact on others in the team context. In basketball, for example, an excellent and dominating post player might realize that she is deficient in shooting free throws. She then comes to understand that this makes her team vulnerable to the intentional foul strategy late in games and increases their chances of losing. The acknowledgment of this deficiency and subsequent willingness to overcome it can be products of the virtue of humility. Humility can also motivate a stage race cyclist who excels at climbing to work at her skills in time trialing, because she is able to be honest with herself about this deficiency in her skill set. In this way, humility is conducive to achieving greater levels of individual and corporate athletic excellence. Next, consider that to the extent that an athlete is humble, he will also be less likely to seek to strongly humiliate his opponents, or be weakly humiliated by them. Strong humiliation occurs when someone is morally reduced as a person, and it is clear that humility would forestall actions that inflict this form of humiliation in sporting contexts. Weak humiliation occupies the conceptual space

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between strong humiliation and a mere loss of self-esteem. Weak humiliation is connected to what Mike McNamee calls structural pretension.70 This sort of pretension is present in many realms of society, including sport. In boxing, as McNamee points out, there is a clear hierarchy where the champion of a particular class is at the top and the various contenders are ranked beneath that champion. McNamee asks us to imagine a pre-fight news conference in which the challenger displays hubris by disparaging the skills of the current champion and describes in a variety of ways how he will visit a resounding defeat upon him. When such a challenger is easily and resoundingly defeated by the champion, we have an example of weak humiliation. The now defeated challenger claimed a status within the hierarchical structure of boxing beyond that which his skills justified. He sought a status beyond his merit, and the deflation of his status occurred for all to see. This is weak humiliation, as it is more than a mere loss of self-esteem, but less than the moral reduction of the boxer as a person that strong humiliation requires. Here, the salient point is that the humble athlete will not be weakly humiliated by his opponents, nor will he need the potential moral benefits of such humiliation (e.g. the undermining of his pride), because he will neither possess hubris nor display the structural pretension that such humiliation requires. As McNamee points out, weak humiliation can act as a corrective with respect to hubris. This is a moral corrective that our ideally humble athlete will not need. Lastly, the athlete who (or the team that) is weakly humiliated has the opportunity to learn a moral lesson from the experience, and this underscores one way in which sport can serve morally educative and formative functions.71 There are also several ways in which humility may be instantiated as a virtue in the context of team sports. Since the humble person is disposed to place the interests of others ahead of his own, he is inclined to act on behalf of others and to do what he realistically can to foster their well-being. Because of this, all else being equal he

70 McNamee, Sports, Virtues and Vices, pp. 134–44. See also his “Hubris, Humility, and Humiliation: Vice and Virtue in Sporting Communities,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 29 (2002): 38–53. 71 For more on sport and moral development, see Michael W. Austin, “Sport as a Moral Practice: An Aristotelian Approach,” Philosophy and Sport, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 73 (2013): 29–43.

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will be a better teammate. Here, some of what Robert Adams has to say about humility is especially relevant: I think there is a form of humility that is also a form of love of excellence, a form of humility that focuses on the excellence there is or can be much more than on the excellence of one’s own part in it. If one is humble in this way, one will want to participate in excellence that transcends one’s own or extends beyond one’s own. In this context one will relax one’s interest in the thought that one’s own excellence might stand out in some way amidst the general excellence. Such humility may demand of me that I focus more on the excellence of what we are doing than on the excellence of my part in it. If I think that I have participated in a particularly excellent collective performance, for example, I may spoil or cheapen my enjoyment of that excellence if I let my mind go very far in trying to distinguish my own excellence in the matter from that of others.72

These points raised by Adams as applied to sport relate to some of the moral and aesthetic dimensions that help to make it a valuable human endeavor. They also shed light on the value of humility in the context of team sports. The humble athlete who exemplifies a selflowering other-centeredness will put the interests of the team ahead of his individual statistics; he will be willing to sacrifice individual glory when this is required for the success of the team. His humility can foster unity as it “inhibit(s) certain classes of action, such as attention-seeking, boasting, and basking in the limelight.”73 And it is quite plausible to think that the team will be better off because of this in terms of wins and losses. For example, a wide receiver in American football may refuse to acknowledge his deficiencies as a blocker and their negative impact on his team. Humility can counteract this and motivate this player to develop his skills as a blocker. Excelling as a blocker in the wide receiver position may not command the attention of fans or draw the limelight, but it will benefit his team as well as make him a better overall player. For the humble athlete, these are sufficient reasons for developing as a blocker. Or consider a soccer player who makes an unselfish pass to a teammate who is better situated to score a goal. This player’s concern for victory and 72

Robert Adams, A Theory of Virtue (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 169. 73 Joseph Kupfer, “The Moral Perspective of Humility,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003): 251.

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the excellence of the team, if he is humble, overrides or undermines the desire for individual glory that comes from scoring a difficult goal. The concern for collective excellence, minimizing of interest in one’s particular contribution to that excellence as well as recognition for that contribution, and a desire for participation in excellence with others that transcends one’s own excellence will, all else being equal, foster athletic excellence, moral excellence, and victory as well. With the above in mind, it must be pointed out that while humility includes self-knowledge and other-centeredness, it does not entail that its possessor must always defer to others. For example, a humble basketball player who is also the best player on her team can and perhaps should request the role of taking the last shot in a close game, grounded in her knowledge of her excellence relative to her teammates. If she does so, she will also realize that she is dependent on her teammates in various ways. She will know that she needs them to execute the play properly so that she can get the ball in a good scoring position. An important difference between the humble athlete and the ego-driven athlete in such a situation is that the former will not need to take the last shot to fuel her ego. She will be willing to let another do so if a case can be made that it gives her team a better chance at victory. Perhaps the opponent will key on her defensively, freeing up a teammate for a clear shot. Or perhaps she is not in fact the best player on her team in this situation. In such a case, humility enables her to be honest about her excellence relative to the better player, and it helps her to accept this with equanimity. Or consider the veteran athlete who takes a younger athlete who plays the same position under his wing, hastening the development on and off the field of his teammate. Humility will produce this sort of behavior. This can foster athletic excellence in the younger player as he learns from a more experienced player, and it can foster the same in the veteran as he must maintain or raise the level of his play in order to retain his starting position on the team. A unique but relevant example of this occurred several years ago in the US National Football League. The Philadelphia Eagles signed quarterback Michael Vick to a one-year contract in August of 2009, soon after Vick was released from prison for his involvement in animal torture and dogfighting. Pride and ego could have motivated Eagles’ starting quarterback Donovan McNabb to come out against signing Vick, but we see at least some aspects of humility in McNabb’s handling of the situation. First, it was McNabb himself who initially approached

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the Eagles head coach at the time, Andy Reid, about signing Vick.74 When the possibility of Vick taking away some of McNabb’s playing time was raised, McNabb responded that “I wouldn’t have a problem with it if it’s helping us win” and that he would serve as a mentor of sorts for Vick, helping him “to get his life together.”75 These may just be platitudes. We have no way of knowing for sure. However, McNabb’s apparent unselfishness and concern for the athletic and moral welfare of Michael Vick are hallmarks of the self-lowering other-centeredness which partially constitutes the virtue of humility. And given that McNabb has dogs and is a dog-lover, the instantiation of forgiveness and grace in offering Vick a chance at redemption also provides a socially useful example of these character traits. This is also a possible example of the form of humility described earlier by Adams, given a focus on the potential excellence that could come into being, both in Vick’s personal life as well as the athletic forms of excellence that the Eagles might be able to instantiate. Finally, humility in the context of team sports can be a socially beneficial virtue in another way. One manner in which sport can be socially useful and instructive has to do with the display of unity within diversity on a team. While it is true that some teams are characterized by discord, greed, and selfishness, others are characterized by cooperation, sacrifice, and unity. If humility is sufficiently present within and between the members of a team, it can enable them to set aside selfish goals and work together for the good of the team. A team that includes a diverse group of athletes who differ with respect to ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and so on, who are able to work together for the common good of that team both on and off the field of play, demonstrates the value of humility to those who observe it from the outside. Unity is the likely result in a team in which the athletes recognize their dependence upon one another, realistically assess their limits as individuals and as a team, are disposed to put the interests of others ahead of their own, and have a deep appreciation for morality and its demands. Such a display of unity in the midst of diversity is one way in which sport can be a force for positive social change. In this way,

74

http://donovanmcnabb.yardbarker.com/blog/DonovanMcNabb/How_and_Why_ it_Happened/996125 (accessed 18 August 2009). 75 http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/trainingcamp09/news/story?id=4404702 (accessed 18 August 2009).

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humility that is beneficial in the context of sport also has the potential to influence the broader social arena as a force for the common good. Next, consider the following scenario, which is imaginary but also quite realistic. At a press conference, an athlete who genuinely thinks that he is the best in his sport at the current time is asked whether he believes that he is the best in the world. What should he say, if he is also genuinely humble? It is important to note that such determinations are difficult to make. Was Kobe Bryant at his peak a better basketball player than LeBron James? Do either compare to Michael Jordan? Who is the best soccer player in the world—Cristiano Ronaldo, Lionel Messi, or someone else? Who is the best pitcher in baseball? Humility counsels athletes in such situations to realize that the criteria and closeness of such determinations make such claims of superiority epistemically problematic. But what if one athlete is clearly the best in his or her sport? Jamaican sprinter and current world record holder in the men’s 100 meters Usain Bolt comes to mind. He often defeats opponents with apparent ease. At least the margin of victory is often wide. In such a situation, the humble best athlete in the world realizes and gives expression to the reality of his dependence on others, including God as described by (C2). He may also appreciate the vulnerability of such success, as (C1) will lead him to see that injury, illness, and misfortune always lurk as potential destroyers of athletic excellence and success. However, in my view, such an athlete may acknowledge in a manner consistent with humility that at present, he is the best in the world. To fail to do so could amount to dishonesty, or even false humility. The world’s best athlete will not acknowledge his status with chest-pounding proclamations of greatness, but rather with an understated acknowledgment of his excellence and of all of the factors contributing to his status as the best in the world. He will also express gratitude for the opportunity to develop and display his athletic excellence. All of this is the result of humility working in concert with prudence, or right reason. The humble athlete recognizes his dependence on others for his success, and the importance of those relationships with respect to what he has been able to accomplish.76 In addition, he likely will—as Owen Flanagan puts it when discussing 76 For more on this, see Craig A. Boyd, “Pride and Humility,” in Virtues and their Vices, Kevin Timpe and Craig A. Boyd, eds (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 245–66.

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this sort of case—assess “his accomplishments as less significant than others do. He might think that being the world’s fastest human is not so important sub specie aeternitatis.”77 If so, he exemplifies humility (and prudence). There are many other sporting contexts in which morally praiseworthy manifestations of humility are both possible and potentially beneficial having to do with self-respect and respect for opponents, the game, officials, and fans. There are of course, in reality, many sporting contexts where a large dose of humility is needed from the elite level on down. The vicious forms of pride displayed by parents and coaches in youth sport and their negative impact on young athletes immediately come to mind. However, the point of the above is to offer an argument for the claim that humility is a virtue in the context of sport. Its presence would help to solve many of the morally problematic attitudes and practices that are present in sport at all levels. I take the above points to be sufficient for showing that humility is a virtue in the context of sport. And if sport can be both representative and partially constitutive of a flourishing life, then the presence of humility in the context of sport has the potential to encourage its development and display in other realms of human life. Clearly this is an idealistic hope, but for those who love sport and desire humility, it is a hope worth pursuing.

CONCLUSION In this chapter, I have argued that humility is both practically relevant and a valuable character trait. It is germane to practical ethical issues that arise in religious thought and practice, the family, and sports. Given that these are ubiquitous features of life across human cultures, Christians have good reason to both cultivate and display humility in these contexts. Doing so constitutes an important part of their witness to the world of their belief in the transforming power of Christ, not merely in the spiritual realm, but in all realms of human existence.

77 Owen Flanagan, “Virtue and Ignorance,” The Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 425. For another discussion of this type of case, see G. Alex Sinha, “Modernizing the Virtue of Humility,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2012): 259–74.

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6 Conclusion Summary and a Brief Reflection on John 13

The primary aims of this book have been to (i) explain and defend a particular Christian conception of the virtue of humility; (ii) examine some of the ways in which this virtue is conducive to human flourishing, as Christians understand it; and (iii) explore a variety of ways in which this virtue is relevant to personal and social life. Each chapter in this volume reflects the belief that there is knowledge available via Jerusalem and Athens that can wisely be put to use in order to foster individual and social flourishing. That is, I hold that theology and philosophy have value with respect to acquiring knowledge and prudently applying it to individual and social life. Of course many who pursue knowledge through philosophy are dubious about the claim that the Christian scriptures have significant epistemic or ethical value. And others who take the Bible (as well as some of the theological reflection and systematization connected to it) to be a reliable source of knowledge eschew philosophy as an empty pursuit of merely human “wisdom.” While I do not explicitly argue against such views, this book serves as an example of how philosophy, theology, and reflection on the Scriptures can work together in the pursuit of wisdom and knowledge, for the sake of a flourishing Christian life. In chapter 1, I introduced some of the ways in which humility is conceived of in both the Bible and Christian thought. I explained the approach taken in the book—analytic moral theology—and considered several objections that can be offered against it. I argued that the objections are not sufficient for rejecting analytic moral theology. In light of this, I claimed that the process and product of such theological reflection can be conducive to shalom, an important concept within

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Christian virtue ethics (the normative moral theory in which I situated my account of humility). In chapter 2, I articulated a conception of humility and of the humble person that is Christological. I began with a biblical and theological picture of humility based on the canonical gospels, Philippians, and 1 Peter. I argued that humility is intuitively best understood as involving both a proper self-assessment and a self-lowering other-centeredness. I then engaged in a deeper exploration of what I take to be the most important components of this character trait by analyzing several modules of humility in the cognitive, emotional, and active realms. I agreed with others who have analyzed humility in terms of self-knowledge, acknowledged dependence, and acceptance of one’s limits qua human being. However, a relatively unique as well as important feature of my analysis was its emphasis on Christian humility as a social virtue involving a disposition to act on a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over one’s own. In chapter 3, I considered several objections, both theological and philosophical, to this account of humility. The first objection I considered was that if the Christian God is seen as the greatest conceivable being, then it follows that such a being cannot be humble. I addressed this concern and argued that God so conceived can be and is, on Christian theism, humble. This objection is important given the Christological nature of my project, and my claim that humility is not only a human virtue, but a divine one as well. I then considered two other theological objections: (i) some argue that the notion of imitatio Christi, which is important to my account, lacks sufficient theological and biblical support to be a Christian norm; and (ii) it initially appears that my conception of humility is inconsistent with Jesus’ command to love our neighbors as ourselves. I argued that both objections fail. I also defended the truth-status of several modules of humility, replied to an objection concerning the demanding nature of the account, and then argued that my account sufficiently individuates humility from other virtues. Another problem for the claim that humility is a virtue has to do with oppressed and marginalized peoples, namely, whether it is a virtue for them given their past and present circumstances. I showed that this objection does not undermine my account. Finally, I described two varieties of skepticism concerning humility’s status as a virtue offered by David Hume and Tara Smith, and provided answers to their skeptical challenges. In chapter 4 I argued that humility is conducive to human flourishing. In order to demonstrate this, I argued that humility is rational,

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benefits its possessor, and contributes to its possessor being good qua human. Next, I considered the positive relationship between humility and the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, as well as how it relates to the cardinal virtues of prudence, fortitude, justice, and temperance. I also argued that humility prevents and hinders moral vice, especially the vice of pride. I concluded the chapter by examining some of the ways in which humility connects with a particular understanding of Christian moral development, captured by the concept of theosis. Chapter 5 contains a demonstration of several of the ways in which humility is applicable to issues concerning personal and social ethics. This chapter, while focusing in a practical manner on how humility relates to issues in applied religious and philosophical ethics, also has theoretical significance as a reply to the persistent objection to virtue ethics that it fails to be action-guiding. First, I examined some of the ways in which humility is relevant to several of the classical spiritual disciplines, such as prayer, fasting, solitude, silence, and service. I argued that humility is an important and even essential virtue for cultivating a rich inner spiritual life. It can be a result of the practice of the spiritual disciplines, and it can motivate one to engage in them. Next, I considered the relevance of humility for issues related to religious pluralism, exclusivism, and tolerance. I then discussed a variety of ways in which humility is essential for a flourishing family life. Humility is especially important for parents, as the potential for abusing power in the parent–child relationship is great. Parenting can be a context in which egoistic pride appears. Such pride can be destructive to the parent–child relationship and to the child’s present and future ability to engage in intimate relationships. Such relationships play an important role in being a person who both has and acts from virtue, which underscores the importance of humility for family life. Finally, I argued that humility is a virtue in the context of sport, and offered arguments in support of this claim. As a conclusion to this study, we will briefly reflect upon another exemplification of the humility of Jesus, as found in John’s gospel.

A CONCLUDING REFLECTION In John 13:1–17, Jesus does something that both startles his disciples and exemplifies the virtue of humility:

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Now before the festival of the Passover, Jesus knew that his hour had come to depart from this world and go to the Father. Having loved his own who were in the world, he loved them to the end. The devil had already put it into the heart of Judas son of Simon Iscariot to betray him. And during supper Jesus, knowing that the Father had given all things into his hands, and that he had come from God and was going to God, got up from the table, took off his outer robe, and tied a towel around himself. Then he poured water into a basin and began to wash the disciples’ feet and to wipe them with the towel that was tied around him. He came to Simon Peter, who said to him, “Lord, are you going to wash my feet?” Jesus answered, “You do not know now what I am doing, but later you will understand.” Peter said to him, “You will never wash my feet.” Jesus answered, “Unless I wash you, you have no share with me.” Simon Peter said to him, “Lord, not my feet only but also my hands and my head!” Jesus said to him, “One who has bathed does not need to wash, except for the feet, but is entirely clean. And you are clean, though not all of you.” For he knew who was to betray him; for this reason he said, “Not all of you are clean.” After he had washed their feet, had put on his robe, and had returned to the table, he said to them, “Do you know what I have done to you? You call me Teacher and Lord—and you are right, for that is what I am. So if I, your Lord and Teacher, have washed your feet, you also ought to wash one another’s feet. For I have set you an example, that you also should do as I have done to you. Very truly, I tell you, servants are not greater than their master, nor are messengers greater than the one who sent them. If you know these things, you are blessed if you do them.”

Some interpreters of this passage contend that the foot washing is primarily a prophetic action, connected to the coming death of Jesus. Others hold that the primary point of the passage has to do with hospitality. Still others focus on foot washing as a sacramental act. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive interpretations; settling the disagreements is not necessary for my present purposes. In fact, while there are differences in interpretation concerning this passage, there is also consensus that humility is exemplified when Jesus washes the feet of the disciples.1 I think it is sufficiently clear that one of the 1 See Sandra Schneiders, “The Foot Washing (John 13:1–20): An Experiment in Hermeneutics,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 43(1981): 76–92; Mary L. Coloe, “Welcome into the Household of God: The Foot Washing in John 13,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 66 (2004): 400–15; Herold Weiss, “Foot Washing in the Johannine Community,” Novum Testamentum 21 (1979): 298–325; Annang Asuman, “Washing One Another’s Feet as Jesus Did: Revelatory Activities and the Progressive Sanctification

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aims of the passage is to provide an example of humility that the disciples are to follow (“I have set you an example, that you also should do as I have done to you”).2 With this in mind, I offer a few concluding reflections on this passage as it relates to the virtue of humility. First, the very act of washing feet is an expression of humility by Jesus, of lowering himself for the sake of others.3 Jesus physically lowers himself to wash their feet, but there is a social lowering that is exemplified here as well. Roles are reversed, as the teacher takes on the role of a slave and serves his own disciples. In fact, John Thomas points out that by removing his outer garment, Jesus is now dressed as a servant.4 This can be seen as emphasizing the reversal of roles. In addition, Thomas states that the foot basin itself was a sign of servitude, and that to wash another’s feet was an expression of subjugation. However, he goes on to note that someone who was not a servant might, very rarely, perform this as an act of love and honor. Thomas observes that both love and servitude are present in this pericope, and emphasizes the point that “Jesus’ action remains unparalleled in ancient literature, for no other master (superior) condescends to perform this act for a subordinate.”5 Lastly, in this culture disciples would generally do for their teachers whatever a slave would do, except anything having to do with feet. This was considered to be too demeaning for someone who was not a slave. Jesus models humility, including an inversion of rank and power, by this act.6

of Believers,” Conspectus 15 (2013): 1–38; and Craig S. Keener, The Gospel of John: A Commentary, Vol. II (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003), pp. 893–929. 2 This is consistent with many of the different interpretations given, which include the view that the exemplification of humility is one of the points of the passage, though disagreement arises with respect to its other functions. For example, Schneiders, “The Foot Washing (John 13:1–20),” states that the foot washing “is not simply a good example in humility but a prophetic action” (p. 81). She does not think that the meaning of the passage is exhausted by the exemplification of humility, but holds that this meaning is nevertheless present in it. See also Keener, The Gospel of John, pp. 901–2; and John Christopher Thomas, Footwashing in John 13 and the Johannine Community (New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2004), pp. 11–17. 3 See Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John, Tractate LV. 4 Thomas, Footwashing in John 13, pp. 86–7. 5 ibid. p. 88. Thomas goes on to argue that the act of foot washing by Jesus is not merely an example of humble service, but also would have been interpreted by his disciples and John’s audience as teaching that those who follow Jesus should engage in the actual practice of foot washing (see pp. 108–12). 6 Keener, The Gospel of John, pp. 906–11.

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Second, it is particularly striking that Jesus is presented as not only washing the feet of his disciples, but also the feet of the disciple whom he knew to be his betrayer. In a discussion of the humility of Jesus being exemplified in washing the feet of Judas, Augustine states that “the greatness of His humility should be still further enhanced by the fact that He did not esteem it beneath His dignity to wash also the feet of one whose hands He already foresaw to be steeped in wickedness.”7 For Chrysostom, this aspect of the passage is relevant for anyone who would seek to imitate Jesus’ example of humble service; to this end he employs the passage to chastise those who would demand honor or think themselves to be above serving others in a like manner.8 If Jesus knowingly served his betrayer in humility, it is clear that those who seek to follow in his steps should not take themselves to be above such radical acts of humility done in service to others. Third, this passage can serve as a reminder for those seeking to cultivate humility that there are opportunities to do so in small, everyday situations. Christian ethics commends self-denial, and the exemplification of humility in Philippians 2 points to the incarnation and crucifixion of Jesus as a paradigm case of this trait. For the cultivation of humility, this paradigm is important to keep in mind. However, it is also important to keep in mind that there are many small ways we can show humility in daily life with family, friends, co-workers, and others. One feature of the washing of the disciples’ feet is that it is both a radical example of reversing social roles via humble service of others as well as an example of humility in the context of the mundane. For most of us, this is where our character is usually formed and expressed. The person seeking to cultivate Christian humility can draw inspiration from this passage in John’s gospel, and look for small ways to humbly love and serve others in his daily life. Finally, I’d like to offer a word of caution from Blaise Pascal to those of us who are engaged in the study of humility and who value the cultivation of character: Talk about humility gives occasion for pride to the proud and humility to the humble . . . Few speak humbly of humility, chastely of chastity,

7 Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John. Tractate LV. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/ schaff/npnf107.iii.lvi.html. 8 Chrysostom, “Homily LXXI: John 13,” Homilies on the Gospel of St. John.

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dubiously of skepticism. We are nothing but lies, duplicity, contradiction, and we hide and disguise ourselves from ourselves.9

If Pascal is correct, those who study and reflect on this virtue have additional reasons for seeking to cultivate humility, as even the study of humility itself can foster pride. In these pages my aim has been to provide a deeper Christian understanding of this central, valuable, and difficult virtue. Pascal may be right about the manner in which we hide and disguise our true selves, but for the follower of Christ there is one who offers a way out of our duplicity and egoistic pride. Jesus taught and exemplified a way of life where humility is at the core of one’s character and expresses itself in service of others. Those who seek to follow in his steps must take the way of humility, as the pages of the New Testament tell us he did.

9

Blaise Pascal, Pensées, Penguin Classics (London: Penguin Books, 1995), pp. 212–13.

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APPENDIX The Modules of Christian Humility (C1) The humble person possesses self-knowledge with respect to his virtues, vices, and limitations, both personal and qua human person. (C2) The humble person knows that God deserves the credit for her salvation, talents, abilities, accomplishments, and virtues. (C3) The humble person believes that he ought to have a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over the satisfaction of his own interests. (C4) The humble person will not conceive of human beings in a hierarchical manner in light of their equal inherent dignity and worth as image-bearers of God. (C5) The humble person is properly concerned with how others perceive her. (E1) The humble person has a prima facie preference for the satisfaction of the interests of others over his own. (E2) The humble person is motivated to act by her love for God and for the sake of his kingdom. (A1) The humble person will be disposed to obey God. (A2) The humble person will be disposed to engage in self-sacrificial actions for the good of others. (A3) The humble person will not be disposed to seek either honor or social status. (A4) The humble person will be disposed to engage in particular forms of risk-taking.

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Scripture Index Hebrew Bible Genesis 15:1–6 148 Leviticus 19:18 101 Numbers 12:3 1, 185 Job 42:5–6 23 Psalms 46:10 188 69:9 83 Proverbs 1:1–33 132 16:18 132 22:4 2 Isaiah 6:5 23 Micah 6:8 2 New Testament Matthew 3:13–17 28 4:1–4 182 5:43–5 155, 196 5:43–7 193 6:2–4 182 6:5–15 182 6:16–18 102, 182 11:28–30 2, 28, 58 16:24 99 18:1–6 28, 49 22:34–40 100 23:8–12 28 23:12 132 Mark 8:34–6 102 10:13–16 27 10:42–5 28 10:46–52 27 11:15–19 82 12:28–34 73, 100, 193, 196

Luke 1:46–56 27 4:1–13 182 5:16 182 9:23 99 10:25–37 100 11:1–13 182 18:9–14 58 22:42 78 John 4:1–30 27 5:19–30 28 10:10 15 13:1–20 2, 28, 219–23 13:34–5 73 14:15–24 155 15:5 28 17:24 28 Romans 6:1–23 153 12:1–2 102 1 Corinthians 9:24–7 125 13:4–7 113 Galatians 5:6 77 Ephesians 4:1–3 2 4:2 29 Philippians 1:12–26 30 1:27–30 30, 31 2:1–4 32–5, 50, 73, 109, 188 2:1–4:1 30 2:1–11 3, 25, 28–31, 38, 40, 50, 66, 67, 75, 78, 79, 97–9, 102, 197, 222 2:5–11 29, 32, 35–7, 76, 96, 103 4:2–23 30 Colossians 3:11–13 2 3:12 29 3:12–14 112–13 1 Timothy 1:12–16 22–5 4:7–8 102

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Scripture Index 2 Timothy 4:7 125 James 2:14–26 153 3:13 2 4:6 2 1 Peter 1:13–16 38

2:21–5 39, 40 5:1–5 39 5:5–6 25, 28, 38, 40 5:6 39 2 Peter 1:1–8 68 1:4 15

241

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Index Abraham 9, 148 acknowledged dependence 61, 80, 96, 132, 146, 218 action-guiding 19, 178, 219 adversity 31, 72, 131, 203, 204 agape 101, 102, 112, 114, 154, 196 Allah 89 ambition 20, 31–4, 42, 84, 133–5, 188 analytic moral theology 6, 7, 9–11, 13, 26, 52, 114, 217 analytic philosophy 6–9, 17, 20 analytic theology 6–12 anger 117, 136, 138, 176 animals 44, 46, 61, 140–3, 145, 146, 170, 171 Anselm 180 Aquinas, Thomas of 3, 14, 16, 42, 46, 63, 80, 81, 132, 143, 147, 151, 160, 168–71, 175, 176, 181, 185, 186 Aristotle 16, 54, 63, 64, 79, 108, 131, 132, 143, 169, 178, 179 arrogance 42, 44, 131, 132, 139, 158, 171, 177, 189, 190, 192, 195, 197 arrogant 81, 113, 129, 130, 138, 194 Augustine 3, 14, 50, 63, 96, 101, 131, 132, 137, 157, 175, 176, 180, 221, 222 autonomy 118, 149, 164, 165, 199, 201–3 Avila, Teresa of 4, 49, 56, 137 avarice 119, 136, 138, 176 Barth, Karl 37, 185 Basil 43 beatific vision 3, 143, 152, 153 Benedict 3, 21, 22, 43, 154 Bernard 3, 23, 55 bias 54, 55, 60, 94, 161, 173, 176, 177 Bonaventure 3, 137 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich 97 brave 64, 160, 167 Buddhism 89, 194 Calvin, John 113, 144, 145 cardinal virtues 4, 25, 51, 136, 138, 159–62, 167, 169, 171, 219

Cassian 3, 61, 137, 184, 185 character 10–12, 14–16, 18, 20–2, 25, 26, 30, 37, 40, 41, 45, 51, 54, 56, 57, 59, 62–5, 67, 73, 84, 86, 95, 110, 111, 113, 115, 120–2, 124, 126, 127, 130, 132, 136, 137, 139, 140, 142, 144, 145, 150, 152–4, 161, 162, 168, 173, 174, 180, 182, 201, 206, 209, 214, 216, 218, 222, 223 charity 76, 127, 128 Chesterton, G. K. 130 children 27, 38, 49, 50, 68, 70, 106, 117, 119, 155, 187, 196, 198–205 Christological 14, 20, 25, 67, 79, 90, 218 Christology 18, 36, 67, 97–9, 103 Chrysostom 112 communion 26, 56, 85, 103, 143, 186 community 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 39, 42, 44, 50, 61, 66–9, 73, 106, 110, 116, 128, 142–4, 154, 155, 166, 184, 188, 189, 197, 201, 205, 220, 221 compassion 5, 10, 15, 16, 24, 29, 31, 32, 46, 50, 56, 102, 110, 112, 113, 176, 179, 184, 198 compassionate 50, 111, 184 contemplative 143, 151, 182 courage 5, 30, 45, 61, 72, 77, 108, 111, 131, 134, 135, 141 courageous 45, 77, 108, 131, 159 covetousness 161, 162, 189 cross 32, 70, 78, 96, 97, 99, 102, 122 crucifixion 3, 4, 26, 32, 35, 37, 72, 77–9, 99, 102, 103, 155, 180, 222 death 2, 32, 35, 70, 78, 79, 95, 96, 119, 122, 142, 152, 167, 168, 220 deification 96, 144, 145 dependence 2, 3, 28, 38, 50, 57, 58, 61, 65, 80, 84, 96, 132, 134, 146, 185, 214, 215, 218 dependency 50, 172, 184, 205 dignity 28, 43, 66, 69, 84, 85, 105, 139, 156, 192, 196, 222 discrimination 119, 164

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Index

243

disposition 42, 45, 46, 53, 60, 70, 77, 78, 80, 81, 94, 111, 112, 114, 119, 128, 131, 132, 153, 154, 156, 160–2, 168, 173, 188–90, 193, 218 dispositions 16, 21, 32, 42, 45, 47, 51, 57, 77, 114, 117, 150, 181, 182, 184, 199

grace 2–4, 12, 17, 22, 24, 38, 39, 47, 57, 61–3, 80, 98, 103, 144, 148, 150–3, 181–3, 193, 197, 214 gratitude 29, 46, 59, 116, 129, 139, 215 greed 214 Gregory 3, 175, 176 guilt 57

Edwards, Jonathan 24, 56 endurance 168 enemies 155, 156, 168, 193, 196 enemy 31, 124, 155, 156, 193, 196, 206 enjoyment 122, 126, 129, 141, 142, 144, 212 equality 31, 70, 96, 101, 106, 164–6 equanimity 131, 213 Erasmus 63–5, 146 evil 155, 156, 168, 171, 176, 196, 203, 204 excellence 15, 16, 26, 54, 59, 79, 81, 86, 87, 131, 132, 154, 159, 179, 198, 206, 208–10, 212–15 exemplar 10, 16, 25, 28, 35, 41, 44, 47, 49, 54–8, 64, 66, 73, 83, 93, 99, 110, 140, 142

happiness 121, 143, 151, 157 hate 155, 194, 196 heaven 28, 30, 32, 49, 77, 155, 196 Herdt, Jennifer 50, 62, 63, 146, 184 HEXACO 14, 135 Hinduism 89, 194 honesty 15, 127, 134–6, 140, 207 honor 32, 33, 35, 38, 79–81, 121, 123, 132, 139, 175, 188, 198, 201, 221, 222 hope 2, 12, 15, 16, 38, 39, 46, 136, 138, 147, 151–4, 159, 179, 180, 182, 183, 187, 198, 216, 219 hubris 8, 177, 209, 211 Hume, David 1, 104, 119, 120, 122, 123, 139, 218 humiliation 2, 37, 103, 210, 211 humility; active modules 77–82; and 1 Timothy 1:15 21–5; cardinal virtues 159–71; cognitive modules 48–72; emotive modules 72–7; family 198–205; Hume’s critique 119–31; in John 13 217–23; in Philippians 2 and 1 Peter 5 28–40; intuitive definition 40–5; misunderstanding of 20–1; of God 93–7; of Jesus in the Gospels 25–8, 82–4, 217–23; oppression 116–19; religious pluralism 190–8; spiritual disciplines 180–90; sport 205–16; theological virtues 147–58; value for human beings 138–47 Hursthouse, Rosalind 16, 118, 138, 178

faith 9, 12, 15, 16, 22, 30, 46, 61, 109, 111, 125, 136, 138, 147–53, 159, 167, 174, 175, 179, 180, 193, 195–7, 199–205, 219 family 19, 57, 91, 177, 179, 197–200, 202, 216, 219, 222 fasting 19, 61, 64, 122, 185–7, 219 fear 58, 76, 77, 133, 134, 154, 209, 210 flourishing 12, 14–16, 18, 19, 26, 39, 62, 65, 67, 74, 84, 88, 91, 102, 103, 118, 126, 131, 136–8, 140, 143, 145–7, 164, 165, 172, 176–8, 180, 182, 199, 203, 216–19 foot-washing 217–23 fortitude 136, 138, 159, 167, 168, 219 fortune 57, 122, 126, 128, 129 frailty 23, 55, 56, 58 fraternity 164, 166 friendship 30, 107, 115, 155, 163 frugality 189 gender 166 generosity 15, 57, 110, 128 glory 24, 28, 32–4, 94–7, 176, 205, 212, 213 gluttony 136, 138, 176

ignorance 39, 86–8, 173 imitatio christi 71, 92, 98, 218 impatience 187, 198, 199 indoctrination 201–4 injustice 117, 119, 162, 164 integrity 10, 26, 163, 199 intolerance 190–6 Irenaeus 95 Islam 89, 194

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244

Index

Jesus 2–4, 10, 14–18, 20, 22–6, 28–32, 35–8, 40, 42, 43, 47, 50, 56, 58, 63, 66–8, 70–9, 81–3, 93–9, 102, 103, 106, 109, 110, 112, 113, 142, 144–8, 152–6, 167, 180, 195, 216, 223 Judaism 2, 49, 89

moral knowledge 7, 10, 12 moral theology 6–11, 13, 14, 17, 20, 26, 52, 114, 169, 217 moral virtue 5, 13, 18, 20, 26, 44, 48, 52, 58, 99, 122, 127 Moses 1, 101, 185

Kant, Immanuel 149, 165 Keener, Craig 49 kenosis 36, 37, 147 kindness 2, 15, 29, 112, 113 knowledge 3, 7, 10–13, 15, 23–6, 29, 38, 47, 49–51, 54, 55, 58, 87, 93, 108, 121, 127, 143, 151, 152, 154, 159, 173, 184, 185, 192, 199, 208, 209, 213, 217 Konyndyk DeYoung, Rebecca 65, 80, 132, 146, 176 Kotva, Joseph 15–17

neighbor-love 99, 100, 201 Niebuhr, Reinhold 172 Nouwen, Henri 64, 183

leadership 15, 28, 39, 128, 129, 132 liberty 164, 165 limitations 2, 3, 38, 49, 50, 55, 89, 94, 127, 146, 150, 153, 163, 167, 172, 173, 183, 186, 187, 198, 199, 201, 202 Lewis, C. S. 42, 59, 62, 110 love 3, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 22, 24, 26, 31–3, 47, 50, 68, 70, 73–9, 83, 93, 95, 96, 99–103, 109–16, 126, 134, 136–8, 141, 144, 147–50, 152, 154–9, 167, 179, 180, 185, 191–4, 196, 201, 202, 204, 205, 207, 212, 216, 218, 219, 221, 222 lowliness 5, 28, 34 loyalty 116, 163 luck 57, 65, 118, 176 MacIntyre, Alasdair 61, 125, 146, 168 magnanimity 79–81, 132 marginalized 104, 116, 117, 218 Mathois 23, 56 meditation 19, 61, 64, 157, 184, 205 meekness 82, 112, 117 mercy 22, 27, 58, 132, 152, 197 mimesis 97 modesty 5, 71, 85, 86 monastic 3, 21, 147, 154 moral character 10, 25, 209 moral development 62, 64, 211, 219 moral excellence 15, 54, 59, 131, 132, 159, 179, 213 moral exemplar 10, 16, 25, 28, 41, 44, 55–8, 64

obedience 37, 78, 80, 98, 111, 116, 148, 150, 155, 180, 193 oppressed 104, 116–19, 218 oppression 116–19, 164 other-centeredness 40, 42–4, 77, 79, 83, 90, 92, 96, 97, 100, 102, 109, 118, 130, 134, 142–4, 149, 151, 155, 160–2, 167, 170, 173, 184, 187, 188, 192, 198, 205, 206, 208, 209, 212–14, 218 other-regarding 12, 29, 38, 40–3, 47, 48, 54, 92, 142, 165 Owen, John 23, 56 pain 37, 87, 121, 141, 142, 170 parent 88, 105, 106, 129, 139, 163, 198, 199, 201–4 parenthood 198–200, 203 Pascal, Blaise 157, 222, 223 patience 15, 16, 22, 24, 29, 77, 102, 112, 131, 179, 187, 198 Paul 2, 22, 23, 29–35, 41, 42, 50, 66, 68, 97–9, 102, 103, 109, 110, 112–14, 117, 125, 155 peace 122, 186, 194 persecution 23, 79, 167 perseverance 15, 125, 131, 134 phronesis 107, 108, 110 Pieper, Josef 4, 24, 25, 51, 60, 115, 151, 159, 182 piety 2, 83, 114 Pinsent, Andrew 65, 146, 181 Plantinga, Alvin 24, 56 Plato 159 pluralism 19, 90, 175, 190, 191, 219 poor 26, 27, 69, 109, 148, 184 Porter, Steven 64, 182 prayer 19, 61, 64, 78, 82, 89, 157, 182–6, 205, 219 preference 65, 67, 69, 72–6, 88, 100, 102–7, 116, 149, 154, 159, 183, 184, 189, 190, 193, 197, 218

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Index prejudice 164 pride 1, 10, 19, 23, 24, 42, 44, 51, 58, 59, 81, 85, 89, 90, 119, 123, 131–3, 135, 138, 147, 155, 158, 171–7, 180, 185, 189, 190, 195–9, 206, 207, 209, 211, 213, 216, 219, 222, 223 prosocial 15, 129, 139 prudence 43, 46, 76, 102, 107, 109, 117, 136, 138, 159–61, 168, 215, 216, 219 racism 177 rational 18, 44, 46, 61, 65, 74, 126, 137, 140, 141, 143–5, 151, 204, 218 redemption 15, 26, 72, 79, 93, 214 regeneration 24, 145 resilience 203, 204 restitution 162, 163 reverence 83 risk-taking 81, 111, 128, 133–5, 168, 209 Roberts, Robert C. 70, 76, 156, 158 Rousseau 194, 196 sacrifice 76, 79, 99, 102, 103, 106, 107, 109–12, 115, 161, 165–7, 171, 183, 212, 214 salvation 29, 30, 35, 38, 60, 61, 76, 145, 152, 153, 194–7 sanctification 144, 145, 220 secrecy 188, 189 self-abasement 43, 82, 90 self-absorption 51 self-appraisal 51, 134, 136 self-ascription 28, 55 self-assessment 4, 40–2, 44, 48, 53, 90, 92, 97, 130, 142, 144, 161, 206, 208, 209, 218 self-centered 32, 42, 81, 131, 161, 185 self-centeredness 42, 44, 57, 65, 169–71, 177 self-concept 60, 153 self-confidence 70, 209 self-control 15, 39, 125, 130, 169, 186, 187 self-deception 66, 86, 181, 209 self-deification 174, 175 self-esteem 1, 20, 117, 152, 211 self-estimation 38, 50, 52, 86 self-interest 33, 42, 73, 139, 149, 160, 173, 181 selfishness 3, 132, 142, 149, 163, 172, 177, 214

245

self-knowledge 24, 25, 29, 33, 42, 49–51, 53–5, 58, 87, 88, 96, 134, 150, 183, 187, 198, 199, 209, 213, 218 self-love 63, 101–3, 109, 154 self-lowering 40, 42–4, 77, 79, 81, 83, 88, 90, 92, 96, 97, 100, 102, 109, 118, 129, 130, 144, 149, 161, 162, 170, 171, 173, 184, 187, 188, 206, 208, 209, 212, 214, 218 self-regarding 12, 29, 38, 40, 41, 47, 48, 77, 92, 123, 142 self-regulation 130, 139 self-respect 44, 118, 132, 139, 216 self-sacrificial 44, 78, 89, 90, 100, 107, 111, 112, 160, 184, 189, 190, 193 self-serving 54, 55, 94, 161, 176, 177 service 2, 19, 22, 32, 37, 39, 40, 84, 189, 190, 192, 219, 222, 223 servility 88 sexism 134, 177 shalom 16, 26, 56, 79, 102, 103, 126, 143, 217 shame 33, 57, 158 silence 19, 122, 187, 188, 219 sin 21, 23, 24, 56, 153, 157, 172, 174–7 sinfulness 21, 23, 24, 55 slavery 116, 117, 119, 166 sloth 136, 138 Smith, Tara 1, 104, 131–9, 218 Snow, Nancy 117, 129 Socrates 123 soteriological 97–9, 193–5 soul 100, 121, 141, 143, 159, 169, 171, 186 Spiegel, James 105, 108 spiritual disciplines 11, 19, 65, 180–2, 185, 188, 189, 219 spiritual formation 11, 145 spiritual life 1, 12, 100, 103, 154, 172, 181, 185, 190, 219 sport 19, 115, 143, 177, 179, 197, 205–12, 214–16, 219 sportspersonship 207–9 study 12, 17, 64, 178, 184, 185, 222, 223 success 125, 128, 129, 133, 177, 186, 198, 209, 212, 215 suffering 30, 31, 46, 102, 111, 117–20, 164, 167, 168, 203 sympathy 31, 32, 50, 110, 120 Taliaferro, Charles 93–6 tapeinophrosune 5, 28, 29, 33, 34

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246

Index

teleological 16, 44, 56 telos 16, 46, 56, 126, 145, 181 temptation 153, 198 Tessman, Lisa 118 theosis 19, 144–7, 219 tolerance 19, 190–3, 219 trust 127, 144, 148, 163 truth 13, 25, 44, 51, 87, 103, 108, 113, 130, 134, 135, 139, 151, 160, 167, 169, 173 underestimation 21, 52, 85–7 union 11, 16, 18, 46, 56, 63, 98, 103, 110, 115, 116, 126, 145–7, 151, 153, 154, 157, 187 upbringing, religious 199–204 vainglory 136, 138, 207 vanity 93 vice 1, 19, 23, 41, 42, 44, 54, 56, 70, 120, 122, 124, 138, 147, 158, 171, 172, 175, 176, 198, 199, 219

violence 22, 37, 176, 190, 192 virtuous 16, 58, 63–5, 96, 108, 117, 121, 122, 132, 141, 160, 207 vocation 80, 81, 179 vulnerability 167, 207, 215 weaknesses 4, 34, 54, 89, 134, 172 wealth 125–8, 161, 166, 206 well-being 15, 16, 26, 33, 61, 73, 74, 107, 128, 130, 139, 164, 165, 167, 189, 193, 199, 203, 211 wholeness 16, 26, 117 wickedness 24, 222 Willard, Dallas 64, 182 wisdom 2, 11, 12, 17, 132, 134, 157, 176, 217 Witherington, Ben 32–40, 50, 113 worship 4, 46, 93, 144, 164, 205