Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific: Engaging the Debate in Policy and Practice (SpringerBriefs in Political Science) 9813348739, 9789813348738

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SPRINGER BRIEFS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Alistair D. B. Cook Lina Gong   Editors

Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific Engaging the Debate in Policy and Practice

SpringerBriefs in Political Science

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8871

Alistair D. B. Cook · Lina Gong Editors

Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific Engaging the Debate in Policy and Practice

Editors Alistair D. B. Cook Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programme Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore, Singapore

Lina Gong Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programme Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University Singapore, Singapore

ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Political Science ISBN 978-981-33-4873-8 ISBN 978-981-33-4874-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

The Evolving Humanitarian Landscape: Rise of the Asia–Pacific Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alistair D. B. Cook and Lina Gong

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China and Humanitarian Affairs: Thinking, Policy and Prospects . . . . . . . 13 Lina Gong The PLA’s HADR Operations at Home and Abroad: Embedding War Preparation in Humanitarian Endeavors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 You Ji Sino-Nepal Cooperation in Disasters: Dynamics and Challenges . . . . . . . . 25 Lin Peng Chinese Humanitarian Leadership in the UN and Multilateral System . . . 29 Tiewa Liu and Hongsheng Sheng India’s Response to Humanitarianism: A Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Paula Banerjee Japan’s New Security Perspective on Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . 37 Masataka Nakauchi Australia and the South Pacific Islands in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Derek McDougall Regional Humanitarian Platforms—The Case of ASEAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Alistair D. B. Cook Reinforcing Universal Values for Humanitarian Cooperative Arrangements in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Sigit Riyanto Military Humanitarianism in the Asia–Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Christopher Chen v

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Indonesia’s Humanitarian Engagements: Perspectives, Limitations and Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Tiola and Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki The Humanitarian Face of US-Philippines Security Alliance: Humanitarian Partners, Friends and Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Julius Cesar I. Trajano The Role of Civil Society in Disaster Response—The Philippine Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Maria Ela L. Atienza and Dennis Quilala Private Sector: Under-Appreciated Actors in Disaster Response and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Ranit Chatterjee Future Research Directions for Humanitarian Affairs in the Asia– Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Alistair D. B. Cook and Lina Gong

The Evolving Humanitarian Landscape: Rise of the Asia–Pacific Region Alistair D. B. Cook and Lina Gong

Abstract This collection offers insights of the international humanitarian system from within the Asia–Pacific. It adds to the conversation on reforming the global humanitarian system by providing the space to share perspectives of what constitutes humanitarian action from our place in the world. This collection considers what constitutes humanitarianism in the Asia–Pacific, and how it shapes policy and practice in the region and globally. The authors in this collection answer these questions by focusing on a range of issues from national to sectoral perspectives to relations between ‘traditional’ and ‘emerging’ players. The authors conclude that the dynamics of the humanitarian system from the perspectives of the Asia–Pacific are rooted in their localized experiences and built outwards. The first significant trend is that understandings of humanitarianism the Asia–Pacific are primarily shaped by the experience of disasters at home. Second, national governments play a dominant role in humanitarian affairs in the region. Finally, the humanitarian landscape in the Asia–Pacific constitutes a diverse yet under-appreciated set of actors. Keywords Asia–Pacific · Humanitarianism · Natural hazards · Community of practice · Humanitarian affairs · Private sector · Civil society · Civil-military relations · China · India · Philippines · Australia · Pacific islands · ASEAN · Indonesia · Nepal · USA

1 Trends and Issues in the Humanitarian Sector Talk of humanitarian reform at the United Nations has a long history since the establishment of the UN humanitarian system on 19 December 1991 with the adoption A. D. B. Cook (B) · L. Gong Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] L. Gong e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_1

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of UN General Assembly resolution 46/182. However, since its formal establishment in the United Nations system the first series of changes came through the Humanitarian Reforms of 2005 to provide more flexible financing, a stronger coordinator role and the UN Cluster System. When the most recent reform process culminated in the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, there was great promise with the diversity of participants from across the globe representing different countries and sectors feeding into the summit processes to provide direction to root-and-branch reform. This reflected the evolving humanitarian landscape that is featured by multistakeholder partnerships. At the same time, it became well-known that the United Nations was dominating these summit processes articulating New York and Genevacentric guidance. There was a relatively low presence of high-level politicians at the summit and Medecins Sans Frontieres withdrew before it took place. MSF withdrew because it lacked faith in the process to hold states to account and appreciate the necessary differences between humanitarian and development action. Such developments led observers to question the summit’s potential impact in terms of political commitments and the utility and representativeness of the project. Concurrently, the dominance of conflict settings over disasters raised further questions over its impact in and representation of the Asia–Pacific, the region with greatest exposure to natural hazards. The growing humanitarian needs are a compelling reason for humanitarian reform. A study by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre shows that the world saw a record high of 33.4 million new displacements in 2019, with 8.5 million caused by violence and conflict and 24.9 million by natural hazards (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2020: 1). While the global humanitarian discourse tends to prioritize conflict-settings due to the protracted nature of many conflicts, natural hazards actually displace far more people as the statistics show. This trend is likely to continue or even worsen as climate change is predicted to induce more natural hazards. However, the ability of the humanitarian community to alleviate human suffering is constrained by issues such a lack of humanitarian funding and geopolitical rivalry. Despite the record high of humanitarian needs, donations have been declining, with over two thirds of the appeal in 2019 unfunded by July 2019 (Beaumont 2019). In particular, the United States has demonstrated declining interest in international affairs and multilateralism in general, with the decision in early August 2019 to freeze foreign aid for the rest of the year as its latest manifestation (Wong 2019). This tendency of a major aid donor adds to the challenge facing the humanitarian community. Increasing commitments from emerging donors to some extent fill the gaps left by the shrinking of donations from traditional donors. Yet most recently in 2019 and 2020 both emerging and major donors have reduced their funding for humanitarian assistance, while the number of people in need continues to grow. In contrast to the US retreat, China has significantly increased its commitment to humanitarian affairs. This is evident in the increases in China’s humanitarian funding, institutional restructuring to support China’s humanitarian role and strengthened cooperation with UN agencies. This support often falls outside the main catchment of humanitarian contributions. The Chinese government committed a total of USD 3 billion to the

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South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund and USD 200 million to the UN Peace Development Trust Fund. In part, this collection provides a platform for countries in the Asia–Pacific to articulate their understanding of humanitarian work and, as such, offer new ways to evaluate who and where actors are involved in such work. In China, new government bodies were established in 2018 to strengthen China’s involvement in international cooperation in humanitarian affairs, namely the Ministry of Emergency Management and the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA). The Chinese government signed agreements with various UN agencies in 2019 on cooperation in disaster risk reduction, emergency response, humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities and health assistance (CIDCA 2020). Similar developments were also seen in other emerging donors that used to be recipients of humanitarian assistance. India established the Development Partnership Administration under the Ministry of External Affairs in 2012 to improve coordination and monitoring of its aid programmes. The scale of India’s development assistance in 2015 was $1.8 billion which included humanitarian aid (OECD 2020a, b). Likewise, Indonesia launched the Indonesian Agency for International Development in October 2019, with an endowment fund of $212 million so far (Pinandita 2019). Although emerging donors are yet to level or surpass historic major donors in terms of financial commitments, their status as developing countries and previous experience in dealing with humanitarian situations induced by various causes can inform their aid activities in other countries (Richmond and Tellidis 2014: 573). In particular, the prospect of China’s greater role in humanitarian affairs has given rise to questions, such as whether and how the international humanitarian community will be able to socialise China, what changes China’s expanding role will bring to humanitarian work, and how China’s growing power resources can best benefit humanitarian action. Such discussion feeds into the broad debate on the implications of China’s rise for the international system. Positions on these issues shape how China carries out humanitarian action and engages humanitarian actors, which can have an impact on the international humanitarian community at normative, policy and operational levels given China’s growing influence on global agendas. Therefore, an examination of China’s perspective constitutes a key component of this book’s contribution to the global understanding of humanitarianism and humanitarian action. Humanitarian affairs have always been a site of negotiation in international politics with international and local actors seeking to provide assistance to populations affected by disaster or conflict. Dynamics in the bilateral relations between donors have impacts on humanitarian action and global humanitarian reform. The US-China rivalry gives rise to concerns over the implications for humanitarian affairs, for which leadership and cooperation is essential. Traditional and emerging donors differ in their positions on key issues of humanitarian affairs, such as the relations between humanitarian, development and political agendas (Richmond and Tellidis 2014: 568). The heightening of tension between US and China risks more intense competition rather than complementarity between the two approaches. The same concern also applies to the relations between China and India. Both countries have been categorized into the group of emerging powers that challenge the existing liberal order and cooperated in instances related to issues like the responsibility to protect and

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intervention (Dunne and Teitt 2015). However, geopolitical considerations prompt competition between the two countries in their aid activities as in the relief efforts after the Nepal earthquake in 2015 (Chand 2017). Hence, the changing geopolitical dynamics at global and regional levels are a major factor that impact humanitarian reform. Apart from geopolitics, humanitarian reform is influenced by new trends in the humanitarian sector, which will impact the future humanitarian eco-system. First, actors such as the military, the private sector, spontaneous volunteers and diasporas, which traditionally do not have a humanitarian mandate, are increasingly being recognised for their role in, and increasingly involved in, humanitarian response (Carbonnier 2015: 56). While the proliferation of humanitarian actors broadens the pool of aid and support, the challenge is to optimise the allocation and utilisation of aid from diverse sources. This explains the increasing emphasis on multi-stakeholder partnerships in humanitarian action. Second, calls for localising humanitarian response has gained more traction in the global discourse since the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. Localisation in the humanitarian sector essentially refers to “a process of recognising, respecting and strengthening the leadership by local authorities and the capacity of local civil society in humanitarian action” (Fabre 2017: 1). In this context, local means geographic, physical, social and national proximity to the communities affected by disasters (Maxwell 2018: 2). Such proximity often comes with knowledge of local context, relationships, culture, religion and language, which have impacts on the success of humanitarian response. Contextual knowledge better informs decisions on allocation of aid. Religion shapes how local communities perceive and respond to disasters and aid and influences their trust in humanitarian workers (Sun et al. 2018). Hence, local actors often have better access to acceptance by the affected communities even than the national actors (Robillard et al. 2020: 16). In addition, due to the rise in nationalism and improvement in the capability to deal with disasters, some national governments have become less willing to grant access or offer conditional access to international humanitarian actors. Such a tendency also highlights the need to support the growth of local actors and partner them in humanitarian action. Moreover, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has further highlighted the importance of local actors as the outbreak presented a scenario that international humanitarian workers are prevented from travelling to the affected communities. Such dynamics in the humanitarian sector point to the immediate need to proactively reform the humanitarian system. It presently appears that the humanitarian system will be reformed by external events such as COVID-19 and those actors operating outside the formal UN-centred humanitarian system than those from within it. This reality provides impetus for this collection to bring together scholars from the Asia–Pacific to reflect on the understandings of humanitarianism from countries and positions that often only gain peripheral attention in the global humanitarian discourse.

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2 Relevance of the Asia–Pacific Region Against this background, this book contributes to the debate on humanitarian reform by presenting how major Asia–Pacific countries conceptualise and practice humanitarianism. This examination is important because how countries understand humanitarianism shape their approaches to humanitarian action both as donors and recipients. Humanitarianism essentially refers to “the impartial, independent, and neutral provision of relief to those in immediate danger of harm” (Barnett 2005: 724). However, there are variances among countries within the region. What has shaped Asia–Pacific countries’ perspectives of humanitarianism? What are the positions of prominent countries and sectors in the Asia–Pacific on the key issues? How do they or do they not differ from one another? What role do governments play vis-à-vis other humanitarian actors broadly defined in the region? The discussion suggests that understandings of humanitarianism in the Asia–Pacific are shaped by the dominance of natural hazards and national culture and tradition and that the translation of humanitarianism to humanitarian practices is influenced by geopolitics and regional norms. Humanitarian action in the region is featured by the dominant position of national governments and the growing roles of non-governmental actors and the private sector as important partners, which has long be under-appreciated in the humanitarian landscape. The fourteen chapters presented in this collection look at different perspectives and practices of humanitarian action in the Asia–Pacific by exploring the significance of these actors. The Asia–Pacific has, over the past few decades been a site for global power competition and cooperation. Non-traditional security issues have been considered the ‘low-hanging fruits’ of cooperation, of which humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is identified as where the most intense and widest cooperative activity occurs relative to other non-traditional security issues. This is as a result of the exposure of the Asia–Pacific to natural hazards, the relatively low institutional capacity or political will of many states to prioritize sustainable development, and the reliance on traditional donor countries to bankroll emergency preparedness and response activities in the long term. A key humanitarian policy challenge for the Asia–Pacific has been how to engage China, maintain more traditional donors like the United States, Japan and Australia, and increase recognition of the diversity and importance of non-state actors in an international system with overlapping institutional arrangements arguably centered around ASEAN—the oft-referenced ‘ASEAN Centrality’ in Asia–Pacific international relations. The emergence of Indonesia and India as significant powers reflected in the shift from ‘Asia–Pacific’ to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as the emerging dominant regional nomenclature further diversifies the humanitarian landscape as both India and Indonesia seek to provide regional leadership and develop partnerships. According to the Financial Tracking Service of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the outgoing humanitarian funding from the national governments and official aid agencies of—Australia, China, Indonesia, India, Japan and the United States in 2019 amounted to over $9 billion, and the total global tracked

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Tracked humanitarian funding, 2019

Asia-Pacific

Global

Fig. 1 Tracked humanitarian funding from the six Asia–Pacific countries in 2019. Source UN OCHA FTS. *The combined amount of the five countries was derived from putting the key words—Government of China, Government of Australia, Government of Japan, Government of India, Government of Indonesia, Government of USA, USAID, JICA, and Australia Aid International. Last accessed on 14 July 2020, https://fts.unocha.org/data-search/results/outgoing? usageYears=2019&organizations=2976%2C4391%2C4537%2C476%2C12%2C4846%2C463% 2C4356%2C2053%2C6911%2C2060%2C8492%2C2933%2C5822#search-results, *The global number was from the Appeals/Plan Overview Data 2019, https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/overview/ 2019, last accessed on 14 July 2020

funding was $18.76 billion (Fig. 1). Hence, the Asia–Pacific as the center of cooperation on disaster response should elicit much interest from within and outside the region. It is this interest that provides further reason to understand the perspectives and practices of humanitarian action from those dominant actors in the Asia–Pacific. A second major challenge is the prominence of disasters over conflict in the Asia– Pacific compared to the global primacy of conflicts over disasters in humanitarian affairs. This trend is principally shaped by the region’s high vulnerability to natural hazards. Asia in 2018 accounted for 45% of disaster events, 80% of the death toll and 76% of the total population globally (CRED 2019). As a consequence, the region suffers more economic losses from natural hazards than other parts of the world. In the past three decades, the economic losses as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the Asia Pacific was above 0.3% while the world’s average has been 0.1% (2019: 8). Hence, individual ASEAN Member States, and collectively as the regional organization of Southeast Asia, have been proactive in facilitating technical and institutional developments on disaster management and emergency response. With the universal buy-in of all its member states and dialogue partners like Australia, China, India, Japan and the US, the success of and trust in this framework has led to it being adapted to conflict situations in response to the Marawi Siege in the Southern Philippines and the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar, both in 2017. This has caused concern in the international humanitarian community over the different ingredients needed for effective humanitarian assistance in disaster and conflict settings.

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Besides the demand for cooperation in non-traditional security, the humanitarian landscape in the Asia–Pacific offers both challenges and opportunities. The exposure to natural hazards has placed countries in the Asia–Pacific at the ‘coalface’ of disaster response, which provides them with experience in this arena that few else in the global community have access to on this scale. This provides the region with the opportunity to become a global leader in disaster governance drawing on their local knowledge. Such experience in dealing with natural hazards informs the region’s views on issues that are central to humanitarian reform. For instance, disaster response in the Asia– Pacific has long seen the active role of local actors like faith-based organisations (Gianisa and Loic 2017). Hence, localised disaster response already exists in the Asia–Pacific and the focus of the localisation agenda here should be placed on giving local actors greater agency, contributing to capacity development and knowledge transfer. Moreover, the region’s experience points to the need to differentiate local and national actors and strengthen coordination across layers of response (Cook and Chen 2019). The experience of natural hazards also places national governments in charge of most disaster responses. This has led to national governments self-identifying as humanitarian actors, which causes challenges within the global humanitarian system. The reason for this is two-fold. On the one hand, the humanitarian principles which underpin International Humanitarian Law are clear on the need for a commitment to uphold humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Governments by their very nature are partial and political. On the other hand, there is no such consolidated body of law to cover disasters. The Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance (IDRL Guidelines) were designed by the IFRC and supported by states in 2007. Since then the formal development of a consolidated body of international law on disaster relief continues to be a work-in-progress. This therefore poses a difficulty for humanitarian actors over what parts of what bodies of international law they fall under in disaster contexts. As a result, we are faced with a region frequently exposed to natural hazards and a global system ill-prepared to govern it. It is within this framework that each of the following chapters focuses on specific actors or relationships in understanding the humanitarian landscape in the Asia– Pacific to unravel these opportunities and challenges. The first four chapters on China respectively examine the country’s understanding of humanitarianism, the involvement of its military forces in domestic and overseas humanitarian operations, and its use of disaster diplomacy in bilateral and multilateral settings reflecting its emergence as a prominent humanitarian player. Lina Gong examines how China defines and uses the concept of humanitarianism and argues that while the state-centric and development-oriented approach has enabled China to materialize its comparative advantage in capacity and resources, it faces challenges to prove its approach as a robust alternative to the existing ones. You Ji discusses how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), one of China’s most important actors in disaster response, conceptualizes and practices humanitarian action at home and abroad. Lin Peng analyzes China’s disaster diplomacy in the context of China-Nepal relations as part of its policy toolkit and the limitations it will face as an established humanitarian player.

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Tiewa Liu and Hongsheng Sheng review China’s engagement with the humanitarian components of the UN system since the 1970s and how it has become a global leader in the United Nations system. India has also emerged as a humanitarian actor in the Asia–Pacific as part of its “Act East” Policy under Prime Minister Modi since 2014. Paula Banerjee traces the historical factors that have shaped India’s understanding of humanitarianism and provides insight into India’s responses to major humanitarian emergencies in the world in the past five decades. She argues that domestic public opinion needs to be considered in the discussion on India’s expanding role in humanitarian affairs. Traditional donors and active humanitarian players in the international system like Japan and Australia have been key sources of funding and resources for humanitarian action in the region. Masataka Nakauchi traces the development of Japan’s approach to foreign aid since the 1990s. However, he observes the initial rise and now the fall of the concept of human security in Japan’s foreign policy. He identifies a tendency of the Abe Administration to adjust its approach to foreign assistance from one centered on human security towards a more traditional security approach. He discusses the possibility of the Japan Self-Defense Force assuming a greater role in Japan’s foreign assistance through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) activities. Derek McDougall examines Australia’s leading role in disaster response in the South Pacific. He argues that Australia’s multisectoral approach to humanitarian engagement has been implemented through bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Australia’s historical dominance in the South Pacific will likely continue to shape the humanitarian system in the region even as it becomes crowded with more actors in the field. Likewise, Southeast Asia is home to a multisectoral humanitarian approach with diverse partnerships between civilian agencies, militaries and non-state actors. As the regional organization, ASEAN provides an increasingly important forum for humanitarian partnerships, evidenced by the interactions in the ASEAN Regional Forum in disaster response that involves not only ASEAN member states but also its major partners like Australia, China, India, Japan and the United States. Alistair D. B. Cook discusses how ASEAN’s regional humanitarian architecture has evolved and argues that Southeast Asian governments maintain a primary role in humanitarian affairs and the regional organization provides the pre-eminent forum for humanitarian affairs in the region. At the operational level, the military is often the first responder in the face of disaster given their unique capabilities. Christopher Chen examines the place of the military in the changing humanitarian landscape in the Asia–Pacific and discusses the opportunities and challenges that the military bring to the humanitarian world. Despite the contention and controversy associated with the involvement of the military in humanitarian action, he argues that it is necessary to reconsider the meaning of humanitarianism in line with the evolving nature of the humanitarian landscape. The private sector is another key stakeholder in post-disaster response and recovery, whose importance however has been under-appreciated. Ranit Chatterjee divides the engagement of the private sector divides into short-term and long-term.

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The short-term activities that include relief distribution and early recovery and rehabilitation alleviate immediate humanitarian needs and the long-term engagement focuses on reconstruction and resilience-building. He argues that a sufficient understanding of the role and potential of the private sector contributes to better mobilisation of capacity and resources to meet the growing demands for humanitarian aid. Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia is the most vulnerable to natural hazards, accounting for 1012 out of 1604 disasters between 2012 and 2018 in the region, according to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) (Pang and Dimailing 2019: 8). Following the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, Indonesia established a national disaster management system guided by Law No. 24/2007 on Disaster Management adopted in 2007 and coordinated by the Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management (BNPB) set up in 2008. After the Palu earthquake and tsunami in 2018, the Indonesian government doubled its funding for disaster relief to 15 trillion rupiah ($1.06 billion) in 2019, and the proposed budget for 2020 was four to five trillion rupiah ($342 million) (Reuters 2019; Antara 2019). Nevertheless, funding at this scale is unable to meet the need to finance disaster management (Pratiwi and Swasono 2020). This makes international and cross-sectoral cooperation important. Moreover, as aforementioned, Indonesia is increasing commitments to providing foreign aid. The dual role of Indonesia as aid recipient and new donor provides a reason to understand how Indonesia thinks and practices humanitarianism. Tiola and Keoni Mazuki argue that Indonesia’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts are primarily rooted in the spirit of the country’s 1945 Constitution and the founding ideology of Pancasila (or Five Principles), both of which recognise the values of humanity and solidarity among nations. Indonesia’s domestic humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts are a part of the government’s function as maintained by the constitution, but its international engagements are influenced by domestic politics and public opinion. The chapter analyses how an Islamic identity influences Indonesia’s humanitarian aid to other countries as well as the growing role of Indonesian Islamic organisations in disaster response. The Philippines is the most exposed country to all types of natural hazard in Southeast Asia, ranking higher than Indonesia in terms of hazard exposure. It was affected by 165 natural hazards between 2012 and 2019, second only to Indonesia in Southeast Asia (Pang and Dimailing 2019: 8). In view of the country’s high vulnerability to natural hazard, the Philippine government established the cross-sectoral National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) under the Department of Defense in 2010 to oversee the country’s response to disasters. The Philippine government appropriated P20 billion ($404 million) for disaster management in 2019 and eventually released about P6.2 billion ($125 million) (Government of the Philippines 2020). Disasters cause about 5% of the country’s GDP annually, and this means about P17 billion in 2019 (ESCAP 2019: 3). Hence, the Philippines faces budgetary constraints as Indonesia as well as many other disaster-prone developing countries.

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Among the diverse partnerships between the Philippines with state and non-state international donors, the US-Philippine alliance has been crucial for the country’s disaster relief. Julius Trajano reviews the existing military and civilian agreements between the Philippines and the US and explains how these frameworks contribute to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Philippines through two cases, namely Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 and the Marawi Conflict in 2017. The benefits of the bilateral partnership include providing platforms for fast delivery of humanitarian aid, institutionalising a multinational military coordination mechanism, sharing of resources and advancing resilience and disaster risk reduction at the local level. He further argues that the bilateral partnership is compatible and complementary with regional multilateral frameworks. Beyond these traditional international humanitarian interactions between states, Ela Atienza and Dennis Quilala focus on the particularly enabling environment in the Philippines for NGOs to play a role in disaster response and describe the contributions of NGOs in the time of disasters. They highlight the diversity of non-state actors within the humanitarian landscape illustrating the complexities of the system today. With such a collection of chapters, this book captures the dominant dimensions of humanitarian affairs in the Asia–Pacific from the perspectives of traditional and emerging national players and the underappreciated roles of civilian, military and non-state actors that will influence the global humanitarian system in the years ahead. Rather than capturing a monolithic humanitarianism, these conversations provide further evidence of the presence of a number of humanitarianisms in the Asia–Pacific (Yeophantong 2014). Japan and Australia represent the traditional donors whose commitments and preferred mode of assistance can be influenced by domestic politics and geopolitical calculation. China and India are emerging actors in the global humanitarian system. While their developmental orientation in foreign assistance coincides with the increasing emphasis on the humanitarian-development nexus, they have reservations over certain aspects of the existing paradigm of foreign assistance that includes humanitarian aid. Indonesia and the Philippines are on the receiving end of HADR efforts and ASEAN has emerged as the pre-eminent platform for cooperation and coordination in Southeast Asian humanitarian affairs. Their experiences and lessons accumulated through operations can be of value for and inform strategy in the global humanitarian system. Further, the crucial role played by governments, local non-state actors and the private sector in the Asia–Pacific calls for deeper reflection on the role and engagement of a diverse landscape of actors with the UN-centred humanitarian system. As such, this book wishes to contribute to the study of humanitarian affairs, international norms and global governance more broadly.

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Beaumont P (2019) Alarming’ shortfall in foreign aid for world’s biggest crises. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jul/16/alarming-shortfall-for eign-aid-worlds-biggest-crises Carbonnier G (2015) Humanitarian economics: war, disaster and the global aid market. C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London Chand B (2017) Disaster relief as a political tool: analysing Indian and Chinese responses after the Nepal earthquakes. Strateg Anal 41(6):535–545 Cook ADB, Chen C (2019) Humanitarian action: southeast Asia’s local turn. RSIS Commentaries No.19246. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore (2019). https://www.rsis. edu.sg/rsis-publication/nts/humanitarian-action-southeast-asias-local-turn/#.Xw6gG20zbIV Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) (2019) Natural disasters 2018. https://www.cred.be/natural-disasters-2018 CIDCA (2020) China signs south–south cooperation assistance fund projects with international organizations. News Release. https://en.cidca.gov.cn/2020-01/09/c_447246.htm Dunne T, Teitt S (2015) Contested intervention: China, India, and the responsibility to protect. Global Gov 21:371–391 Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (2019) The disaster riskscape across Asia-Pacific: Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2019. United Nations, Bangkok. https:// www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/publications/Asia-Pacific%20Disaster%20Report%202 019_full%20version.pdf Fabre C (2017) Localising the response. The commitments into action series. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris Gianisa A, Loic LD (2017) The role of religious beliefs and practices in disaster: The case study of 2009 earthquake in Padang city, Indonesia. Disaster Prev Manag 27(1):74–86 Government of the Philippines (2019) Status of national disaster risk reduction and management fund. Accessed 13 July 2020, https://www.dbm.gov.ph/index.php/programs-projects/status-ofnational-disaster-risk-reduction-and-management-fund#2019 Government designates Rp5 trillion for disaster mitigation in 2020. Antara. https://en.antaranews. com/news/133598/government-designates-rp5-trillion-for-disaster-mitigation-in-2020 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2020) Global report on internal displacement 2020. Geneva. https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2020IDMC-GRID.pdf Indonesia to double disaster relief budget in 2019 after year of tragedies. Reuters 8 January 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-disaster-budget/indonesia-to-double-disaster-rel ief-budget-in-2019-after-year-of-tragedies-idUSKCN1P20H0#:~:text=JAKARTA%20(Reuter s)%20%2D%20Indonesia%20will,the%20vast%20archipelago%20last%20year Maxwell D (2018) Local humanitarian action: background, key challenges, and ways forward. Keynote address to the meeting advancing local humanitarian leadership. Seattle, Washington. Accessed 13 February 2018. https://disasterplaybook.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/LocalHumanitarian-Action_Keynote_Daniel-Maxwell.pdf Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2020a) India’s Development Co-operation. Website information. Accessed 9 July 2020. https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-globalrelations/indias-development-co-operation.htm OECD India’s Development Cooperation (2020b) Website information. Accessed 13 July 2020. https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/indias-development-co-operation.htm Pang Q, Dimailing LA (2019) Trillion Dollor multi-hazard risk landscape in southeast Asia. In: ASEAN risk monitor and disaster management review, 1st edn. AHA Centre, Jakarta Pratiwi A, Swasono DA (2020) Strengthening disaster financing policies. The Jakarta Post. https:// www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/02/06/strengthening-disaster-financing-policies.html Pinandita A Indonesia launches international assistance agency. The Jakarta Post. https://www.the jakartapost.com/news/2019/10/18/indonesia-launches-international-assistance-agency.html Richmond OP, Tellidis I (2014) Emerging actors in international peacebuilding and statebuilding: status quo or critical states? Global Gov 20:563–584

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Robillard S, Howe K, Rosenstock K, Munive J (2020) We must be the pioneers. Perspectives on localization in the response to the 2018 Sulawesi earthquake in Indonesia. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University & Save the Children Denmark, Boston Sun L, Deng Y, Qi W (2018) Two impact pathways from religious belief to public disaster response: findings from a literature review. Int J Disaster Risk Reduct 27:588–595 Wong E (2019) US orders freeze of foreign aid, bypassing congress. New York Times. https://www. nytimes.com/2019/08/07/us/politics/foreign-aid-freeze-congress.html Yeophantong P (2014) Understanding humanitarian action in East and Southeast Asia—a historical perspective. HPG Working Paper, pp 1–29

Alistair D. B. Cook is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is the President of the Asia–Pacific Region of the International Studies Association (2018–2021). His research interests are in non-traditional security and human security in the Asia–Pacific including peace and conflict studies, humanitarian affairs, foreign policy and regional cooperation, and domestic politics in Myanmar. Lina Gong is Research Fellow at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU). Lina holds a BA in English Language and Literature and an MA in Interpreting and Translation from Sichuan University, China. She received her Ph.D. from RSIS, NTU. Her Ph.D. thesis is on China’s engagement with the UN peacekeeping. Her research interests include non-traditional security studies in East Asia, humanitarian studies, China’s foreign policy, and global governance. She has published several journal articles and book chapters on non-traditional security issues in Asia as well as China’s engagement with UN peace effort. She has also contributed to a dozen of RSIS publications.

China and Humanitarian Affairs: Thinking, Policy and Prospects Lina Gong

Abstract China has substantially increased its contributions to a range of areas of global governance in recent years, like humanitarian affairs. While greater commitments from China to humanitarian work can help narrow the widening gap between the surging humanitarian needs and donations, this development has also led to the debates on its implications for the humanitarian world as China’s approach seemingly differs from the dominant paradigm underpinning the international humanitarian system. it is timely and necessary to examine how China defines and uses the concept of humanitarianism and identify the factors that facilitate and limit China’s influence in this field. This article argues that while the state-centric and development-oriented approach has enabled China to materialize its comparative advantage in capacity and resources, it faces challenges to prove its approach as a robust alternative to the existing ones. Keywords China · Humanitarianism · Culture · Humanitarian assistance

1 Introduction China has substantially increased its contributions to a range of areas of global governance in recent years, like humanitarian work. Chinese rescue teams and volunteer groups, both governmental and non-governmental, have been seen responding to disasters in the Philippines, Nepal, Laos and Indonesia in the past few years. Beijing has also strengthened contributions to issues that it used to maintain limited involvement in, like the refugee issues. It offered at least 12.5 million USD to the UN Refugee Agency in 2017, up from 2.8 million USD in 2016.

L. Gong (B) Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programme, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_2

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Greater commitments from China to humanitarian work can help narrow the widening gap between the provision of international humanitarian aid and assistance and surging demands (Tan 2017). Therefore, its thinking and behaviour will influence how the norms and practices of humanitarian assistance will evolve at the international and regional levels. However, this has also led to the debates on the implications of this development for the humanitarian world as China’s approach seemingly differs from the existing paradigm that is heavily influenced by liberal values. Against this background, it is timely and necessary to examine how China defines and uses the concept of humanitarianism and identify the factors that facilitate and limit China’s influence in this field. This article argues that while the state-centric and development-oriented approach has enabled China to materialize its comparative advantage in capacity and resources, it faces challenges to prove its approach as a robust alternative to the existing ones.

2 Cultural Roots of Humanitarianism Humanitarianism in Chinese literally consists of three parts—“ren” (human), “dao” (the way of things), and “Zhuyi” (a set of thoughts or values). Humanitarianism per se has been taken as a foreign term introduced to China together with the concepts like freedom, equality and human rights between the late 19th and early 20th centuries when China lagged far behind the West and the Chinese intellectuals sought to find a way to rejuvenate the country by learning from the then great powers (Luo 2005). However, scholars point out that elements of humanitarianism per se and in a broad sense such as benevolence, compassion, dedication and sacrifice can be found in the classics of Confucianism and Taoism. For instance, it is written in Dao De Jing that the ways of harmony are creating without possessing, acting without expecting, and guiding without interfering (Lao 2006, 130). Confucianism advocates that the ruler should put people first, but the purpose of doing so is primarily to consolidate ruling. It also aspires for an ideal world that is well-ordered and truly shared by all and where one takes care of not just oneself and one’s families but others as well (Hirono 2013). This coincides with certain aspects of cosmopolitanism. Regarding the agent and actor of humanitarianism, the state has been assumed to be the primary provider of humanitarian aid and assistance. In China’s ancient dynasties, as the emperor was believed to be the Son of Heaven (Tianzi), he was supposed to take care of its population (Zimin) in times of disaster. This way of thinking has influence how disaster is managed today in China, which remains highly state-centric.1 While factors like national interests, geopolitics and geo-economics also shape China’s current policy on humanitarian issues, the Chinese classics and traditional values has informed its understanding of the concept and provision of humanitarian assistance to other countries. 1 There are studies showing that social forces in China are playing a growing role in domestic disaster

relief and began to engage in disaster response in foreign countries. See, for example, Peng and Wu (2018). Nevertheless, the government remain the dominating actor in this issue in China.

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3 Humanitarianism in the Context of Chinese Foreign Policy However, as afore-mentioned, humanitarianism was spread to China together with notions such as democracy and human rights, and such association led to the cautious usage of the term in the Chinese official language, due to the concern that it can be an excuse for external interference. Humanitarianism and humanitarian are usually used in a restricted context, such as emergency humanitarian aid as in China’s white paper on foreign aid in 2011. The situations when China provides emergency humanitarian aid to other countries are referred to “natural and humanitarian disasters”. It is interesting to note China’s preference to use humanitarian in the context of public health, referring to the efforts of medical personnel to rescue the dying and take care of the injured. For instance, the phase of ‘the spirit of international humanitarianism’ is often used to praise the Chinese medical teams that are dispatched to disaster/conflict-affected areas. Provision of emergency medical aid and technical support to countries affected by epidemics like bird flu and Ebola were cited as examples of China’s humanitarian aid to other countries in the white paper on foreign aid. In addition, food aid has been another major form of humanitarian assistance preferred by China. This is evident in the distribution of China’s donations through various UN agencies. According to the OCHA Financial Tracking Service, the World Food Programme has been the largest recipient of Chinese aid in the last two decades, followed by the World Health Organization (Fig. 1), which means China’s involvement in humanitarian action focusing on food and health issues. China emphasizes the casual linkage between the lack of development and various humanitarian crisis and argues that economic development constitutes a key component of the long-term solutions to humanitarian situations. Speaking on the Rohingya issue, Wu Haitao, China’s Deputy Representative to the UN, stated that the international community should make greater efforts in poverty eradication and sustainable development so as to achieve stability and harmony in the affected areas (United Fig. 1 Distribution of China’s donations: 2000–2020. Source UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service, last accessed on 13 July 2020

Distribution of China's Donations to UN: 2000 2020

WFP

WHO

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Nations 2018). Shaped by such thinking, China’s humanitarian aid is usually delivered as part of broader development assistance. For instance, at the Belt and Road Forum in 2017, President Xi pledged one billion USD for addressing refugee issues in Asia and Africa through the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund (Government of China 2017).

4 Opportunities and Challenges The international community has seen China’s growing interest and capability in contributing to humanitarian work. Institutional and financing developments reflect China’s interest in strengthening its aid programmes. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, between 2015 and 2017, the Chinese government committed over $3 billion to set up South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund and the UN Peace Development Trust Fund, which finance humanitarian projects ranging from post-disaster recovery to refugee issues. In addition to official aid, donations from Chinese companies and private foundations are also increasing. For instance, Jack Ma Foundation and Alibaba Foundation were actively providing medical supplies across the globe during the outbreak of the Coronavirus Disease 2019. The growing material and financial resources support China’s expanding engagement with the humanitarian system which is severely constrained by a lack of resources and funding. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that China’s proportion in the global humanitarian funding remains small despite the substantial increases. China’s donations through the UN agencies between 2013 and 2020 amounted to $369 million while those from the Japanese government and the Japan International Cooperation Agency in the same period were over $7 billion. While there have been funding and donations from China not recorded in the FST, China’s humanitarian funding at the current level is modest if compared with major donors (Fig. 2). Humanitarian donations: China and Japan, 2008-2020 1,20,00,00,000 1,00,00,00,000 80,00,00,000 60,00,00,000 40,00,00,000 20,00,00,000 0 2008

2009

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Fig. 2 Humanitarian donations: China and Japan, 2008–2020. Source UN OCHA FST

2020

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While the emphasis on the development agenda in humanitarian action is accepted by many developing countries, China as an emerging donor needs more stories of success to show the feasibility and robustness of its approach to humanitarian affairs. China remains very state-centric in terms of providing humanitarian assistance, while the international humanitarian community has seen the operation of diverse actors ranging from international agencies to non-governmental organizations and the private sector. China’s partnership with related international bodies has expanded as Beijing began to increase its commitment to humanitarian issues. For instance, the aforementioned pledge one billion USD in 2017 has been delivered through UN agencies like UNHCR. How to further engage with the variety of actors and develop multi-layered coordination and cooperation presents a challenge to China if it aims for a greater role in the humanitarian world.

References Government of China (2017) China and UNHCR sign the assistance agreement to meet refugee challenges. Ministry of Commerce: News. http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/sig nificantnews/201710/20171002654087.shtml. Accessed 30 Sept 2017 Hirono M (2013) Three legacies of humanitarianism in China. Disasters 37(S2):202–220 Lao Z (2006) Dao De Jin (trans Ma T-W). The Liberal Arts Press, Taipei Luo W (2005) Humanism in China: historical course and its practical significance. In: Conference Paper. International symposium on globalization and human development, June 2005, Beijing, pp 499–507 Peng L, Fengshi W (2018) Building up alliances and breaking down the state monopoly: the rise of non-governmental disaster relief in China. China Q 234:463–485 Tan V (2017) China can play key role in solving refugee crises—UNHCR Chief. UNHCR News. https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/6/593946b64/china-play-key-role-sol ving-refugee-crises-unhcr-chief.html United Nations (2018) The situation in Myanmar. Meeting Records S/PV.8333. https://undocs.org/ en/S/PV.8333

Lina Gong is Research Fellow on the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programme at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU). Lina holds a BA in English Language and Literature and an MA in Interpreting and Translation from Sichuan University, China. She received her Ph.D. from RSIS, NTU. Her Ph.D. thesis is on China’s engagement with the UN peacekeeping. Her research interests include non-traditional security studies in East Asia, humanitarian studies, China’s foreign policy, and global governance. She has published several journal articles and book chapters on non-traditional security issues in Asia as well as China’s engagement with UN peace effort. She has also contributed to a dozen of RSIS publications.

The PLA’s HADR Operations at Home and Abroad: Embedding War Preparation in Humanitarian Endeavors You Ji

Abstract China has steadily enhanced its humanitarian relief activities inside the country and beyond. Politically any effective emergency relief at home would help add the government’s credibility in managing grave national events, reduce peoples’ sufferings and thus enhance the ruling party’s legitimacy claim to rule the country. Internationally China’s active participation reflects its new thinking of overseas humanitarian intervention: as a major power it needs to contribute more to global governance. The PLA is a principal actor in mounting humanitarian operations to lessen natural or war-induced disasters. It shoulders the bulk of HR missions that China has committed itself abroad. This pertains to one basic function of many militaries in the world. As the most organized and resourced force, the military is in a unique position to deal with the catastrophes in terms of fast response and quick containment of the consequences. This chapter explores China’s case and the PLA’s participation in humanitarian activities and its unique features: (1) linkage between humanitarianism and regime security; (2) strong civil-military dimension in humanitarian affairs; (3) civil-military dynamic eases relations between the state, the military and the society; and (4) public opinion. Keywords China · Humanitarianism · PLA · Legitimacy · Civil-military relations · Regime security The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is crucial in China’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) endeavours. This pertains to a basic military function in the world (Rossier 2011). As the most organized and resourced force, the military is in a unique position to deal with sudden catastrophes from a distance and in terms of fast response and capability to contain the consequences. This essay conceptualizes the PLA’s role in mounting China’s HADR operations at home and in relieving war-induced sufferings abroad.

J. You (B) Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Macau, Zhuhai, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_3

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The PLA’s participation has been institutionalized in China’s civil-military HADR structure to handle emergencies that pose serious challenges to state governance and people’s wellbeing. For instance, in March 2019 alone the PLA heavily involved in putting down the Xiangshui chemical blast in Jiangsu and two simultaneous bush fire in Beijing and Shanxi. Organizationally the PLA parallels the Cabinet’s new National Emergency Management Ministry in executing disaster relief operations of a major scale, where its units are promptly mobilized and fast deployed to tackle the disaster professionally.1 Abroad the PLA carries out the bulk of HADR missions China has committed, mostly in the forms of peace keeping and maritime anti-terrorist patrols. By 2018 China provided a number of peacekeepers second only to India. In total the PLA has allocated 8,000 soldiers for peacekeeping in the world. Combat units are now organized at the brigade levels.2 2019 is the 15th year of the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) anti-piracy operations in the Bay of Eden. 32 sub-fleets and over 20,000 sailors have been dispatched to the troubled spot.

1 Conceptualizing the PLA’s Functions to China’s Overall HADR Endeavors 1.1 The Symbiosis Between the PLA HADR and Regime Security The PLA’s HADR contributions address Beijing’s concerns over regime stability, which was traditionally undermined by poor handling of disaster relief. Xi Jinping raised this issue of non-traditional security (NTS) to the level of political security affecting the CCP’s legitimacy. This explains why the Party leadership would call the PLA in each time there is a scaled emergency or a major national event that impacts China’s international standing. For instance, the PLA deployed 46,000 solders for the safety of the Beijing Olympic Games. The symbiosis between the PLA HADR and regime security is reflected by its crisis-prevention roles ranging from anti-terrorism and HADR to street control during a mass riot.3 Internationally China’s active HADR participation is indicative of its new thinking of humanitarian intervention: a major power’s global status is evaluated by R2P and public goods provided to foreign countries in need. For instance, Beijing’s new financial inputs in global peacekeeping were meant to offset the effect of the unpaid dues of $ 2 billion with the U.S. taking one-third (about $700 million) of this amount.4 1 The

PLA Daily, 30 March 2019. CCTV-4, 29 September 2017. 3 Colonel Hu Fan’s speech to the Australian Defense College, 25 March 2010. 4 The UN’s new membership ratios: the U.S. 22%; China, 12.1%; Japan 8.56%; CCTV-4, News Today, 23 December 2018. 2 The

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1.2 The Symbiosis Between HADR Challenges and PLA MOOTW In practice the PLA regards HADR as a component of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), absorbing the U.S. concept to guide its own operations, which embrace five categories of actions: emergency rescue and disaster relief; border closure against riots; anti-terrorism; suppressing domestic turmoil; world peacemaking; safeguarding China’s maritime interests, e.g., SLOCs safety.5 The PLA has set 11 MOOTW missions to meet the NTS challenges with HADR ones ranked highly, given the latter’s frequent occurrence. On the other hand, although NTS threats have been routinized in China, it is the traditional security threats that preoccupy the minds of Xi and PLA leaders. The PLA’s MOOTW is thus integrated into its transformation through war preparation (Yu 2008: 62). For instance, when the PLA uplifts its combat readiness through intensified joint warfare training and realistic simulation of the future battles, HADR operations have become part of this simulation exercise based on the pre-set scenarios and plans (Ren 2015: 13).

1.3 The Symbiosis Between PLA HADR Missions and Military Operations of War According to Major General Xu Guangyu, the mission hierarchy for the PLAN’s Somalia HA operations is ranked (1) providing a war simulation venue for the PLAN to train in near combat situations; and (2) raising China’s international visibility as one of the top powers. Interestingly the HA requirements are not in his strategic sequencing.6 To most commanders the PLA’s international HADR operations are valued as a test of battlefield efficiency. Therefore, the top and hidden agenda for these missions, e.g., either for peacekeeping or for HADR, is to compensate for a force that has not experienced any real war engagement for more than three decades. If one reviews the PLAN’s 32 dispatches in the Somalia Patrols, it covers a wide range of surface combatants. Clearly there is a rotation of warships for it to allow all first line units to gain near combat experiences in the high seas. Similarly, the PLA’s peace-keeping troops follow the same pattern in selection. Although not an ideal way to train soldiers, it is much better than none.

5 Yet the PLA researchers argue that although the U.S. military dropped the terminology of MOOTW,

it does not means it is not engaged in MOOTW activities. On the contrary, it even raised MOOTW to the level of normal military operations. Tu Binlin, Outline on political work in MOOTW, Beijing: The Blue Sky Press, 2009, p. 7. 6 His comments to the Special Report on the PLAN’s 70-Year anniversary, the Phoenix TV, 28 April, 2019.

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2 The PLA’s Capability Enhancement for HADR Operations HADR’s political importance to Beijing requires the PLA to possess sufficient hardware and software capabilities to cope with the disastrous effects of the emergencies. Among other things, the listed items below are considered essential: (1) The designation of the PLA crack troops for HADR operations both at home and abroad. The earmarked force is of a large size so as not to be overwhelmed by the scale of the disasters; and it is professionally trained as part of its routine combat drills as a regular military force. In 2010 the Central Military Commission approved “The PLA Program for MOOTW Capability Construction”, which set eight HADR special forces with a manpower of 50,000 soldiers.7 (2) HADR operations serve as a driver for battlefield construction beyond the national borders. Situational awareness of the future battlefield is crucial for the PLA’s war winning. This is especially true to a designated combat venue in a faraway place, e.g., along the BRI routes. Normally acquisition of this kind of knowledge for the military use can be sensitive. If it is collected amid the HADR operations, the level of sensitivity would be reduced. (3) Converging both HADR and combat capabilities. Any effective HADR operations would require suitable equipment that can be dual use for military purposes as well. In fact, the latter is foundational for any effective HADR efforts by the civilians and soldiers as well. These basic HR instruments include the following: the strategic lift, especially in forms of large fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft, the four-dimensional real-time intelligence, reconnascence and surveillance equipment, especially space-based, and unmanned vehicles, aircraft and vessels. Finally, when the PLA contributes to the state’s HADR management, it has to strike a proper balance that HADR missions would not damage its own occupational pursuits as a professional force. Both the civilians and commanders need to reconcile the discrepancy inherent between frequent participation in HADR activities and the military’s own profession as an organization of war. As far as China is concerned, natural hazards happen unexpectedly and require immediate HADR measures to save lives and property, dictating the PLA to be capable of fast mobilization and deployment, which resemble wartime ones. The situational pressure in the disaster zones often match that of a battlefield, e.g., large numbers of dead bodies in the Wenchuan Earthquake. This helps the PLA to embed its HADR missions in the preparation of war. Each HADR mission is an opportunity to train the soldiers to handle complicated sub-combat circumstances as if these are real combat. As a result, the PLA has generally managed the discrepancy well.

7 Major

General Tian Yixiang revealed this in the MoD news conference on Yushu HA/DR Operations in Beijing on 20 April 2010.

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References Rossier MK (2011) Linking humanitarian action and peacebuilding. Centre on conflict, development and peacekeeping working paper 7. Geneva Institute, June 2011 Yu H (2008) On the objective and tasks of capability building for MOOTW. Military Econ Stud 8:62 Ren T (2015) The way to the strengthening of the PLA through reforms. The PLA National University Press, Beijing

You Ji You Ji is professor of international relations and head of Department of Government, University of Macau. He has authored four books, including China’s Military Transformation— Politics and War Preparation (2016); and numerous articles. The most recent among them are “Indian Ocean: A Grand Sino-Indian Game of Go”, In David Brewster (ed.), India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean, Oxford University Press, 2018; “The Political and Military Nexus of Beijing-Washington-Taipei: Military Interactions in the Taiwan Strait”, The China Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2018; “Sino-US “Cat-and-Mouse” Game Concerning Freedom of Navigation and Overflight”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 5–6, 2016; “China’s National Security Council: Evolution, Rationality and Operations”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 25, No. 96, 2016; “Xi Jinping and PLA Centrality in Managing the South China Sea Disputes”, China: International Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2017, “Managing conflicts on Korean Peninsula: a Challenge to China’s national security”, The Bulletin on Korea Studies, Vol. 30, 2017. You Ji is on the editorial board of eight academic journals including The China Journal, Issue and Studies, and Journal of Contemporary China.

Sino-Nepal Cooperation in Disasters: Dynamics and Challenges Lin Peng

Abstract Engaging in disaster relief and, more recently, post-disaster reconstruction has become an increasingly regular and institutionalized component of China’s evolving humanitarian diplomacy over the past decade. Drawn upon novel evidence from China’s growing disaster-related humanitarian aid to Nepal and unprecedented engagement in Nepal’s long-term post-earthquake rebuild since 2015, this paper explores the dynamics behind China’s transforming humanitarian diplomacy. The findings of this paper suggest that (1) Geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, represented by the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), serve as a critical driver for the development of bilateral partnership in the disaster sector; (2) Non-state actors, represented private foundations and civil NGOs, have played active roles in the statedominance cooperation in disaster management. This paper also suggests that intensified geopolitical confrontations, such as military clashes between India and China, would bring uncertainties to the Sino-Nepali partnership and be counter-conducive to humanitarian goals. Keywords Disasters · Humanitarian assistance · Humanitarian diplomacy · Sino-Nepal relationship

1 Elevated Sino-Nepal Cooperation in Disaster Relief over the Past Decade China’s active and extensive participation in international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is a rather new phenomenon. Nepal, as China’s neighbor as well as the most disaster-prone country in the world, is one of the important targets of China’s out-bounded HADR efforts. Nepal and China’s bilateral cooperation in disaster relief also mirrors some new features of China’s international aid strategies,

L. Peng (B) Institute of Politics and Laws, Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences, Guangzhou, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_4

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evolving humanitarian diplomacy, and engagement with the international humanitarian regime. Rather than simply providing relief materials for the affected people, China is beginning to expand cooperation with Nepal in other more long-term and complex dimensions of disaster management over the past few years. The key turning point for the elevated Sino-Nepal cooperation in disaster management was the end of the prolonged Nepali civil war in 2006 and a move towards closer ties with China made by the new Marxist-led Nepali government. The deepened bilateral relationship paved the way for increased assistance from Beijing to Kathmandu and proliferated in the specific field of disaster management. The 2015 Nepal earthquakes marked another milestone for Sino-Nepal cooperation in disaster management. The devastating earthquake triggered the largest disaster relief operation organized by the Chinese government on foreign soil. More importantly, rather than simply providing relief materials, Chinese government participated extensively and unprecedentedly in post-disaster reconstruction. From 2016 to 2018, the Chinese government donated a total of 483 million U.S. Dollars to the Nepali government for post-earthquake reconstruction and more long-term capacity building related to disaster prevention, coping and response. After the 2017 flood, the Chinese government provided another US$4 million aid to Nepal for post-disaster recovery in the most affected areas and continued to strengthen its cooperation with Nepal in capacity enhancement in recovery and community-based risk reduction.

2 Driving Forces and UN The rapid development of Sino-Nepal collaboration in disaster management in the past few years has been driven by two key factors: Changes in diplomatic interests and the third-party intervention represented by active involvement of the UN. The first important driving force is the sharp improvement of diplomatic relationship between Nepal and China. The Marxist-led Nepali government after the civil war has been trying to pursue a more balanced diplomatic relationship with India and China. After a five-month blockade imposed by India in 2015 in response to the promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal, the Nepali government made a more decisive move to end total economic dependence on India and signed the Trade and Transit Agreement with Beijing in early 2016. China is also increasing its engagement in Nepal with new areas of operations after the end of the Nepali civil war. From 2009, the two countries have signed a series of agreements to expand trade, infrastructure, technical collaboration, and even military and security cooperation. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Belt-and-Road Initiative in 2017, the flagship diplomatic strategy of President Xi Jinping, marked another watershed moment for the deepened ties between Nepal and China. Although the strengthened partnership between Nepal and China prioritizes economic diplomacy, technical issues such as disaster management can still gain additional momentum from the bilateral relationship. First, disaster relief and technical cooperation in disaster risk reduction and disaster response are considered by the

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Chinese government to be an effective strategy facilitating people-to-people connectivity proposed by the BRI and supplementary to economic diplomacy. Second, the ambitious infrastructure projects under various bilateral agreements and the framework of the BRI have increased the need for effective disaster early warning and risk reduction, and more extensive exchange of knowledge and skills related to disaster prevention and response between China and Nepal. Compared to political motivations of the national governments, the United Nations, especially the UNDP, has provided more direct momentum for the elevated Sino-Nepal cooperation in the disaster sector as a multilateral third-party. In 2010, the Chinese government signed a MOU with UNDP under the framework of SouthSouth Cooperation (SSC) and the two parties jointly implement a variety of developmental projects in developing countries. As one of the least developed and most disaster-prone countries, Nepal is an important participant in the SSC projects and major beneficiary of technical and financial assistance jointly provided by UNDP and China, particularly in the field of disaster risk reduction and disaster response. Since 2013, coordinated by UNDP, the Chinese government has periodically organized workshops to share its experiences in community-based disaster risk reduction and post-disaster recovery with Nepal and other disaster-prone countries. Also under the framework of SSC, the Chinese government provided Nepal with funding for post-disaster rehabilitation and recovery and sent experts to train first responders and enhance capacity of local network of Emergence Operation Centers in Nepal.

3 Looking Forward: Opportunities and Challenges Generally speaking, the partnership between China and Nepal in the field of disaster management is built upon friendly diplomatic relations and concrete mutual benefits. Some new trends in diplomacy and domestic politics of both sides might generate sustained momentum for more extensive bilateral cooperation in the disaster sector. First, deepened Sino-Nepal cooperation under the BRI framework will facilitate bilateral cooperation in varying areas, including disaster management which combines both infrastructures and people-to-people engagement. Second, China’s restructuring of its disaster management system and domestic push for reforms in the international humanitarian system, represented by the establishment of the Ministry Emergency Management (MEM) and China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in the early 2018, is likely to provide more integrated and efficient mechanisms for bilateral cooperation in HADR issues. Third, the newly emerged Chinese relief NGO community and its active participation in international disaster response, started from the relief work following the 2015 Nepal earthquakes, is generating new impetus for state-driven collaboration in disaster sector. Due to their expertise in urban search and rescue (USAR) and Internet-enabled disaster information management and effective mobilization of social networks in the affected areas, these societal actors are increasingly recognized by the Chinese government as effective

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tools to promote people-to-people connectivity under the BRI and likely to play bigger roles in Sino-Nepali collaboration in disaster response. However, despite the generally friendly atmosphere, there are some factors that might create uncertainties for more extensive and effective Sino-Nepali collaboration in but not limited to the field of disaster management. Domestically, Nepal’s internal political squabbles and problematic local government building since the approval of the constitution in 2015 have already hindered the post-earthquake reconstruction of the affected communities and might have negative impacts on long-term bilateral collaboration in disaster risk reduction between Beijing and Kathmandu. Another important X factor is India. Traditionally considered Nepal its sphere of influence, India has been unhappy about China’s increased economic and even political presence in Nepal under the framework of BRI and silence towards the China-India-Nepal trilateral partnership proposed by Beijing. In the specific area of disaster management, India has also tried to compete with China in providing aid for Kathmandu in disaster relief and post-disaster reconstruction. How Beijing interacts with New Delhi especially during the second phase of the BRI, marked by the second BRI Summit held in Beijing in the late April 2019, and against the background of intensified military confrontation between the two regional powers, would have far-reaching effects on the bilateral collaboration between China and Nepal in a wide range of economic and developmental issues, including disaster management.

Lin Peng obtained his Ph.D. in China Politics from the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2012 and served as postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Government and Public Administration at CUHK in 2013. His doctoral thesis and postdoctoral research focused on the intergovernmental relationship and state-society relationships in China’s disaster relief. Before joining the Institute of Politics and Law at Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences (GZASS) in 2015, he taught Political Participation, Contentious Politics, and Environmental Politics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and University of Hong Kong. Currently serving as research fellow at GZASS, Dr. Peng mainly conducts policy-oriented studies on participatory urban development and government-civil society relationships and provides consultations for both governmental agencies and NGOs. His recent scholarly work mainly focused on the policy and political impacts of the NGO-driven disaster management in China. At this workshop organized by RSIS, Dr. Peng will share his on-going research on the Sino-Nepal cooperation in disaster management and its far-reaching implications for regional and even global HADR governance.

Chinese Humanitarian Leadership in the UN and Multilateral System Tiewa Liu and Hongsheng Sheng

Abstract Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, prominent challenges of humanitarian concern have emerged rapidly throughout the world. International community as a whole has undertaken a variety of measures to tackle the problems arising from natural disasters, armed conflict or other emergent situations. In recent years, China is quite proactive in multi-lateral humanitarian operations within the United Nations framework; however, new obstacles came out to impose constraints and possibilities for China’s leadership in the United Nations system in humanitarian affairs. In the first place, lack of legal foundation for operations to be undertaken abroad will result in difficulty in organization, thus low efficiency. Secondly, regional or bilateral agreements need to be concluded before taking operations of humanitarian nature, to ensure legal guarantee and possible dispute settlement. Last but not the least, apart from ICRC regime, more permanent international humanitarian mechanism should be stabled for further coordination and cooperations amongst states, in which China will play a leading role. Keywords China · Humanitarian affairs · United Nations · Multilateral system

1 Introduction With the closure of the half a century long Cold War by the end of 1989, so called non-traditional security issues came to central stage in international affairs while traditional security problems remained important. Great challenges of humanitarian concern have emerged rapidly throughout the world since the beginning of the twenty-first century. The international community as a whole has undertaken a variety of measures to tackle the problems caused by natural hazards, armed conflicts T. Liu (B) Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing, China e-mail: [email protected] H. Sheng Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai, China © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_5

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or other humanitarian situations. It is submitted that after the Humanitarian Emergency Disaster Relief and Rapid Assistance Mechanism was established in 2004, with support from and led by the Chinese Government, increasingly more and more Chinese charity organizations, enterprises and individuals have engaged in international humanitarian affairs. In this profound scenario, it is submitted that China has played a proactive and positive role in the UN humanitarian system as part of multilateralism and humanitarian action in Asia and beyond. In accordance with statistics by an authoritative source, China had participated in over 200 assistance missions of a humanitarian nature in just a five-year period of 2010–2015, and has been a significant assistance source state for Asia, Latin America and Africa in particular.1

2 China in the UN Humanitarian System In terms of multilateral humanitarian affairs at the United Nations, China joined the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Program (WFP) in 1979, resumed its activities in the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and made many donations to the UNHCR. The Red Cross Society of China (RCSC), China Charity Federation (CCF), China Welfare Institute (CWI), China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) and private charities, along with legal persons of certain enterprises and societies in China, have all engaged in international humanitarian relief, demonstrating to the international community China’s sincere desire to be involved in international humanitarian relief and to protect human rights through tangible actions. Moreover, China’s humanitarian assistance always goes beyond state interest, that is to say, that under so many emergent circumstances, even though there are no Chinese nationals involved and it is not under a legal obligation to act, China is always willing to offer humanitarian aid to those who are in need indeed, so as to attain humanitarians values.

3 China and Multilateral Humanitarian Affairs As a historic milestone in international humanitarian affairs, it is considered that the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul held in 2016 has drawn sincere attention of all states to review the threat against peace and stability caused by all sort of elements which need a comprehensive solution by humankind as a whole. It could be argued, however, that transboundary humanitarian challenges appeal for international solutions, and in this field, multilateralism shall prevail. For a long period of 1A

Heat Topic on the Agenda by Experts: China Serves as an Important Strength in International Humanitarian Rescue, People’s Daily Network, https://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/1028/c100127750301.html, visited on 23 February 2019.

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time, China has insisted that international cooperation and coordination are needed in achieving development and progress of humanity. In Asia as well as at the international level, China has shown a good example in dealing with security, disaster relief, evacuation of overseas nationals under various circumstances, like evacuating both 35,860 Chinese nationals and numerous aliens from Libya in 2011, and 571 Chinese nationals and 225 aliens (including nationals of Pakistan, Ethiopia, Singapore, Italy, Germany, Poland, Ireland, UK and Canada) from Yemen in 2015. China also offered its assistance for victims of Iran, and the states affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004.2 Since 2004 and up until now, China has undertaken over 300 humanitarian assistance missions, which enjoyed an average annual increase of 29.4%.3 In March 2014, when Ebola broke out in many West African countries, China provided four rounds of humanitarian relief, with a total value of RMB 750 million, and deployed more than 1,000 experts and medical workers. At present, among the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, China is the largest contributor of military and police forces and the second-largest financial contributor to UN peace missions, according to UN data. In the nearly 30 years since China joined UN Peacekeeping Operations, more than 40,000 Chinese peacekeepers from the military and police have participated in 25 UN missions throughout the world. Chinese peacekeepers have made tremendous efforts, including building and maintaining 13,000 roads and over 300 bridges, clearing more than 9,400 landmines and unexploded objects, receiving 160,000 patients and transporting 1.2 million tons of materials and equipment. Apart from participating in peacekeeping missions, China has also contributed a lot to training UN peacekeepers. Chinese troops have adhered to the UN Outlines for Peacekeeping Operations Training and have established training systems at the high, intermediate and primary levels. China also offers training curricula for foreign officers and police. By shifting from trainees to trainers, China plays an important role in UN training systems.4 In 2016, the Chinese navy sent a fleet to join the Rim of the Pacific 2016 (RIMPAC 2016) multinational naval exercise which is led by the US. By taking part in joint manoeuvres with US troops and other militaries, China’s military can benefit from understanding their strategy, tactics and how they accomplish their missions.

4 A Brief Prospect In recent years, China is quite active in multilateral humanitarian operations within the United Nations framework; however, new obstacles emerged to impose limits 2 News,

Democracy and Rule of Law Times, November 26, 2017. https://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/ 2017-11-26/doc-ifypathz6007582.shtml, visited on 22 February 2019. 3 China’s White Book “Progress and Development in Human Right in China for 40 Years of Reform and Opening to Outside World”, China Government Network, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/201812/12/content_5347961.html, visited on 13 January 2019. 4 Global Time News “PLA expands overseas missions”, Global Times, July 25, 2017, https://www. globaltimes.cn/content/1057869.shtml, visited April 26, 2019.

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and possibilities for China’s leadership in the United Nations system in humanitarian affairs. In the first place, lack of legal foundation for operations to be undertaken abroad will lead to difficulty in organization and low efficiency. Secondly, regional or bilateral agreements need to be concluded before conducting operations to ensure legal guarantees and dispute settlement. Last but not the least, apart from the international humanitarian legal regime, more permanent international humanitarian mechanisms should be established for further coordination and cooperation amongst states. It should be stressed that alongside the old ones, the whole world is confronted by a series of new challenges, namely climate change, urbanization, increase in population, degradation of environment, and high risk in nature and technology. Global challenges call for global solutions and China will be a constructive and conducive role in this area as well as impose positive impacts in the longer term upon the global humanitarian system. In the near future, the legislation for the Assistance Act for both economic aid and emergent assistance of humanitarian nature will be put on the agenda for enactment. Moreover, regular academic exchanges between Chinese scholars and international academia will help offer practical policy recommendations for Chinese Government and Governments of related states as well. China will continue to act in the international humanitarian system and shape its norms.

Liu Tiewa, Ph.D. of Waseda University, Japan and Beijing University, is researching mainly on the United Nations, International Organizations and North-East Asian Studies. She is Deputy Dean of Beiwai College, Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU) and the Deputy Director of Research Centre of the United Nations and International Organizations at BFSU. She also serves as the Council Member of UNA-China. In recent years, she has mainly worked on R2P, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding operations, Women, Peace and Security and her recent publication includes “WPS as Diplomatic Vocation: The Case of China” in S. E. Davies and J. True (Eds). Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace and Security (New York: Oxford University Press), 2018, “The Comparative Studies of US and China’s Engagement in UN Peacekeeping Operations”, The Journal of International Studies, 2017. Hongsheng Sheng is Professor of Public International Law at Shanghai University of Political Sciences and Law, China. From April 2004 to April 2005, he was United Nations Expert on Mission for the MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, serving as Team Leader of Military Observers, and Senior Liaison Officer. He was also appointed by the Chief of the Mission Chair of Independent Board of Enquiry to review international criminal cases. In April 2005, he was granted United Nations Medal (In the Service of Peace). Up till now, he has published 6 titles including Challenges and Responses in International Criminal Law (2017), Constraints on the Use of Force—Legal Aspects of Armed Conflict in Early 21st Century (co-author, 2014), NGO’s in Contemporary International Relation (2004), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Legal Aspects (2006), Developments in British Politics and Its Foreign Policy (2008), State Responsibility under International Law in Anti-Terrorism Campaign (2008), and over eighty articles in leading academic journals at home and abroad. His academic interests focus on international law, international relations, international organisation, international humanitarian law and international criminal justice as well.

India’s Response to Humanitarianism: A Synopsis Paula Banerjee

Abstract India’s tryst with colonialism has had deep impact not just on Indian psyche but also on Indian policy-making. The colonial experiences have made Indian policy makers sensitive to the fact that humanitarianism can come with a price tag. After independence therefore Indian policy makers became strong supporters of nonintervention and state sovereignty. In the post-colonial phase and even before India could complete the process of decolonisation the world had become bipolar. Tied to that was a deep unease about great power configurations that made Indian leadership desirous of striking an alternate note in foreign policy making, thereby creating an independent space for itself and other decolonised nations. Even though critical of international humanitarian regime and especially about international humanitarian interventions Indian past history bears testimony to the fact that India is not above such interventions when it is considered in its national interest. In the post economic liberalisation period Indian attitude to humanitarianism has seen some major shifts. Progressively India is giving humanitarian assistance to countries to reinforce India’s major power status. But there is a concern that Indian humanitarianism is bypassing its own people. This essay will address India’s humanitarian responses internationally and internally, towards its own people. Keyword Non intervention · Humanitarian intervention · Post-colonial citizenship · Non-alliance · International humanitarian regime · Decolonisation United States’ humanitarian interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have once again brought to the forefront debates on the future of humanitarian aid/interventions in India. Attacks on the legitimacy of the international humanitarian regime have come from multiple corners, both state and non-state. Targeted killings of humanitarian workers have evoked another type of concern over the issue of humanitarian aid. At present in India questions are being raised over the future of the international

P. Banerjee (B) The University of Calcutta, Kolkata, West Bengal, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_6

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humanitarian regime and the maxim of “Responsibility to Protect.” From the beginning the Indian response to humanitarianism has been ambivalent. Indian leaders have often reiterated the famous Sanskrit rhetoric of “atithi deva bhava” or guest is God and “Vasudaiva Kutumbakam” or the world is a family. In his first speech to the United Nations the present Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, pursued this theme when he said that, “India’s ancient wisdom sees the world as one family.” He then linked it to India’s humanitarianism when he went on to say that “India is part of the developing world, but we are prepared to share our modest resources with those countries that need this assistance …” There is no doubt that Indian leaders and policy makers look at delivering humanitarian assistance as a moral duty of states and yet there is a deep-rooted suspicion of this assistance. If one wants to find out reasons for this ambivalence one has to delve into India’s history. India’s tryst with colonialism has had deep impact not just on Indian psyche but also on Indian take on policy making. The colonial experiences have made Indian policy makers sensitive to the fact that humanitarianism can come with a price tag. After independence therefore Indian policy makers became strong supporters of nonintervention and state sovereignty. In the post-colonial phase and even before India could complete the process of decolonisation the world had become bipolar. Indian experience in combating one of the biggest colonising nations in history created within the Indian leadership a profound sense of their own place in history. Tied to that was a deep unease about great power configurations that made Indian leadership desirous of striking an alternate note in foreign policy making, thereby creating an independent space for itself and other decolonised nations. The Bandung (1955) and Belgrade (1961) and the NAM is a testimony to such a mindset. Related to this is India’s deep rooted suspicion of humanitarian interventions by powerful countries which to most Indian leaders is a form of neo colonialism. Even though critical of the international humanitarian regime and especially about international humanitarian interventions Indian past history bears testimony to the fact that India is not above such interventions when it is considered in its national interest. In 1971 when 10 million refugees from East Pakistan came to India, the Indian Prime Minister intervened on behalf of East Pakistan and sent the Indian army to combat the West Pakistan army. This resulted in the second partition of South Asia resulting in the birth of Bangladesh. India is extremely conscious of its leadership role in South and Southeast Asia and not above intervening in internal matters of South Asian states. The Indian peace keeping force in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990 is another case in point. However, in recent times with increasing Indian economic acumen India seems more reluctant to physically intervene in matters of other South Asian states. Now humanitarian interventions are largely through humanitarian aid. Until the early 1990s India was considered an aid receiving country but in the new millennium India progressively began to be recognised as an aid offering country. This aspect was dramatically revealed when India became one of the top 5 donors in Afghanistan after 2001. India’s post-Tsunami restructuring plan in Sri Lanka is considered a best practice. India even offered aid to United States after Katrina. Broadly under humanitarian aid there are two kinds of aid that India offers to other countries. The first is development aid which is largely offered through Line of

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Credit (LoC). In 2017–18 under the LoC scheme India offered Bangladesh US $ 4.5 billion and a total of US $ 8 billion as development aid. Other than that India offers humanitarian aid as well. India helped in reconstruction of 500,000 houses in Nepal after the earthquake. In the same period Indian aid to Sri Lanka was US $ 2.63 billion. Most of Indian humanitarian and development aid is to South Asian countries. However, India is known to respond to requests from other countries as well. In response to a request made by the Yemeni Government, India gave the Republic of Yemen medical assistance worth US $ one million. India is known to give humanitarian assistance bilaterally and largely in response to requests from foreign governments. When governments so desire India channels humanitarian aid through UN agencies. Another recent shift in Indian priorities regarding humanitarian aid is that India has increased its quantum of aid to African countries. In 2016 India gave Rs. 855 crores to 17 African countries as Development and Disaster Relief Aid. Indian aid to countries is usually without political conditions although sometimes it results in the betterment of trade relations.1 In another aspect India’s humanitarian response has been exemplary. Although not a signatory of the 1951 Conventions India has been a host to large refugee populations. In 1960–61 India hosted over 100,000 refugees giving each family one acre of land. In 1971 India hosted huge numbers of East Pakistani refugees who later went back to Bangladesh. After 1983 India hosted a large number of Tamil refugees. India is home to refugees from Myanmar, Somalia, Afghanistan, Bosnia and many other countries. For most of its history India followed article 32 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and practiced non-refoulement but only recently there seems to be a shift in that policy and a few Rohingyas are being sent back. This is extremely unfortunate since till date India had a fairly unblemished record of hosting forced migrant populations. In the post economic liberalisation period Indian attitude to humanitarianism has seen some major shifts. India has always been against humanitarian interventions unless the country in question is considered as vital to Indian national interests. Progressively India is giving humanitarian assistance to countries to reinforce India’s major power status. But there is another development running alongside and that is India’s increasing suspicion of people trying to cross the border illegally. They are progressively seen as a threat to India’s national security. Also there are criticisms about India’s attitude towards its own citizens. There is a growing concern about one section of the population that Indian humanitarianism is bypassing its own people who are living in conflict areas. The NRC in Assam has created great disquiet among one section of the population. This has brought the contention that India is failing short of the standard that it expects from other countries. This aspect needs to be explored in detail particularly when considering Indian response to humanitarianism. If this is considered as a question of human rights and not of humanitarianism then the larger question is can there be a humanitarian response that is devoid of human rights?

1 All

data presented in this section is taken from MEA reports.

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Professor Paula Banerjee, best known for her work on women in borderlands and women and forced migration, is the former President of the International Association for Studies in Forced Migration. She is a faculty member of the Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Calcutta, one of the largest and oldest Universities in South Asia. She is also the Director of the avant guard South Asian think tank called Calcutta Research Group. Winner of many awards and accolades, in 2013 she was awarded the Distinguished Fulbright SIR Award and a Visiting Professorship to SUNY, Oswego. Her recent publications include Statelessness in South Asia (2016), Unstable Populations, Anxious States (edited 2013), Women in Indian Borderlands (edited, 2012) and Borders, Histories, Existences: Gender and Beyond (2010) which has been acclaimed as a best seller. She is the editor of Refugee Watch and the editorial board member of a number of international journals such as Oxford Journal of Refugees. She has written and edited over 15 books and monographs and has published widely in international journals such as Journal of Borderland Studies, Canadian Journal of Women’s Studies, Forced Migration Review and Journal of International Studies. Acknowledged as a radical and prolific speaker she has delivered lectures in all five continents. She has been a visiting professor in a number of universities including Helsinki University (Finland), Yunnan University (China) University of Paris 7 (France) and New School, New York (USA) and others.

Japan’s New Security Perspective on Humanitarian Assistance Masataka Nakauchi

Abstract Japan’s new Development Cooperation Charter in 2015 clearly shows Japan’s sustained development-centered approach in its external commitments. Is such a position of Japan changing? The answer is Yes and No. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administrations after its coming back to power in 2012 emphasize strategic usage of foreign aids aiming ‘peace, stability and prosperity of the world including Japan.’ The security environment in North East Asia is the main reason for emphasizing the strategic aspects. Also, Many LDP politicians, headed by former Prime Minister Abe, have long-cherished aspiration to modify the constitution and bring Japan back to the ‘normal country’ changing the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) into a constitutional and legal military. Contributions to the UN Peacekeeping operations and the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) activities are two policy areas to which LDP administrations may increase the commitments of the JSDF as that might be a way to increase its legitimacy. This paper concludes that LDP administrations are streamlining its foreign commitments under a more strategic principle, but that change is in a low-key manner as they see the possibility of negative reactions from domestic public. Keywords Japan’s external commitments · Japan’s constitution · Official development assistance (ODA) · Human security (HS) · Japan self defense forces (JSDF) · Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) In approving the new Development Cooperation Charter in 2015, the Government of Japan (GoJ) declared that ‘development’ in this Charter is used in a broader sense rather than in the narrow sense; it also encompasses such activities as peacebuilding and governance, promotion of basic human rights and humanitarian assistance’ (Cabinet decision on the Development Cooperation Charter, provisionally translated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This is clearly showing GoJ’s developmentcentered approach in implementing foreign assistance. This paper claims, however, M. Nakauchi (B) Faculty of Global Studies, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_7

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that this long-standing tendency is changing not in words but in fact especially under the initiative of then Abe administration (2006-2007, 2012-2020). Japan started its foreign assistance with the reparation for damages in Southeast Asian countries it had caused in the WW2. Since then, the GoJ, partially due to its constitutional constraints prohibiting possession of military, has long seen the Official Development Assistance (ODA) as the biggest diplomatic tool. Japan joined the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development as early as 1964 and kept increasing the budget for foreign aid up until 1997. However, Japan’s ODA has been criticized for a long time. Domestically, its inefficiency and lack of accountability for taxpayers have been among the reasons for criticism, and internationally, its high ratio of tying and its posture prioritizing bilateral diplomatic relations rather than pursuing good governance in recipient countries led the international donor community to see Japan as not conforming to international norms. Apart from the ODA, a critical blow to Japan’s ‘checkbook diplomacy’ came when its contribution to the multinational force in 1991 Gulf War was not appropriately evaluated by the USA and Kuwait. In the same first half of the 1990s, Japan, facing the first North Korea Nuclear Crisis, started seeking a new way for its security. An Advisory Group on Defense Issues commissioned by then prime minister emphasized the necessity for multifaceted security policies and claimed Japan should utilize its Self Defense Force (JSDF) in the framework of the United Nations in its report in 1994 (‘The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century’) to Prime Minister Murayama. However, the US government was critical to the report and the following administration re-focused its security efforts in strengthening its ties with the USA. Proposal of the idea of the Human Security (HS) by the UNDP (1994) was good news for Japan as it gave Japan rooms to put additional positive meaning to its foreign aid, so, settling the idea as the guiding principle of foreign aid can be understood as a strategic move for the GoJ. In the same context, the GoJ has been emphasizing the aspect of ‘Freedom from Want’ of the HS while attempting to prevent HS from involving any acts of enforcement, especially military interventions. This posture reflects Japan’s preference of incremental improvements by cooperative than compelling means in diplomacy. But, at the same time, it was a well calculated move for the GoJ wanting to make the HS as a ‘Japan brand.’ This initiative led Japan to become the champion of ‘Freedom from Want’ aspects of the HS separating it from the idea of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ advocated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001. Is such a position of Japan about the external commitment changing? The answer is Yes and No. The current conservative administration under Prime Minister Abe, in replacing the former ‘ODA Charter’ with the above-mentioned ‘Development Cooperation Charter,’ emphasized strategic usage of foreign aid aiming ‘peace, stability and prosperity of the world including Japan.’ What the administration has kept emphasizing was that the security environment in North East Asia had drastically changed and Japan had to react to such a new reality with realistic views. Even in such a context, however, HS remained as one of the main pillars in the new charter and activities advocated under the HS concept were basically limited within the

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framework of the ODA, meaning its understanding about the HS was not exceeding from the traditional one. In recent discourse by cabinet ministers and government officials, they emphasize the HS in its relation with the Sustainable Development Goals. On the other hand, Prime Minister Abe, famously, was attempting to modify the constitution for the first time in the history and bring Japan back to ‘normal country’ equipped with constitutional and legal military. Also, then Foreign Minister (20172020) Kono used to criticize Japan’s ODA as wasting taxpayer’s money and claimed that the budget for ODA should be cut down by half. After his entry into the cabinet, he agreed to slightly increase ODA budget but maintains that Japan had to find a way to improve its diplomacy apart from ODA. Another observation in thinking about that question is the JSDF started availing the ‘Grant Assistance for Grassroots and Human Security Projects’ ODA when they dispatched a unit for the UN Peacekeeping Operation in South Sudan (UNMISS). Since those activities were limited for building roads and other infrastructures, this is not immediately meaning that Japan is stepping into military sphere of HS. But, at the same time, the security legislations in 2015 admitted bigger roles for the JSDF in peace operations, Accordingly, it is possible, at least in theory, for the JSDF to take part in fighting activities in the future if required by the UN. However, the JSDF unit was withdrawn from the UNMISS as the result of deteriorating security situation in South Sudan and administrative problems within the GoJ resulting from that. Still, the fact that the JSDF unit to the UNMISS was, for the first time in its history, mandated to defend civilian and military personnel (including those coming from abroad) on requests requests from the UN is worth for memorizing. Having requests from the UN is one of the least controversial ways to proactively utilize JSDF and to expand its limits of military activities if taking Japan’s domestic political scenery into the consideration. As far as the GoJ keeps its ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ policy and continues its discussion about the roles of the JSDF in its attempt to modify the constitution, committing to peace activities within the framework of the UN will remain as one of the main issues. Another possibility for the GoJ to drastically change its policies of external commitment is in the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief area. The GoJ, facing many natural hazards in its history, surely has the experiences and know-hows in the activities, though this area is just loosely separated from the development assistances. Especially about the roles for the JSDF units in HADR activities, much discussions have been accumulated since its controversial commitment in the relief activities after the huge earthquake in 1995. Accordingly, dispatching the JSDF unit overseas for HADR activities can be an attractive option for the government in the aim to give more legitimacy to the JSDF. Still, dispatching the JSDF in the conflict situation is not a realistic idea for the GoJ as having even a single casualty in the JSDF unit overseas might become a fatal blow to the attempt to modify the constitution, the long-cherished desire for many LDP politicians. In conclusion, in this paper I claim that the GoJ has been streamlining its foreign commitments under the more strategic principle utilizing the traditional ODA and

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probably more commitments to HADR activities. Within that, more active involvements of the JSDF would be an option. However, in the run-up to the attempt to modify the constitution, it is expected that the current low-key involvement will continue in the foreseeable future.

Masataka Nakauchi is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Global Studies, Sophia University, Japan. He was previously an Associate Professor at Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University. He teaches International Relations, Human Security, and Democratization courses. His area of specialization includes Human Security, Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding focusing on the role of International Organizations. He is paying special attention on the relationship between international norms and domestic politics in countries that are under pressure to accept such norms. He earned his Ph.D. (International Public Policy) from Osaka University in 2008 by his thesis about the impacts of the international integration in Europe on policy and politics of war-torn countries in the former Yugoslav region. Since then, he is still observing developments in the region where many challenges for building stable and lasting peace remain. He served for the Embassy of Japan in Vienna (2002–2005) as a special advisor, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in Belgrade (2005–2006) as a long-term expert for aid coordination, and a private think tank the Research Institute for Peace and Security (2008–2012) as a researcher. In Osaka University, he was also working for an internal think-tank Social Solution Initiative (SSI) which is a brand-new challenge for a Japanese state university to connect with the society outside of academia and take a role to make it better place.

Australia and the South Pacific Islands in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Derek McDougall

Abstract The role of Australian governments in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) in the South Pacific islands relates primarily to the perception that Australia should play a leading role in this region. While Australian involvement is consistent with the humanitarian objectives represented by the United Nations’ Humanitarian Reform process and the Agenda for Humanity, Australia would be active in South Pacific HADR anyway. At a region-wide level Australia’s focus for HADR is the Pacific Islands Forum. Australia also has partnership agreements with the various Pacific island countries, with HADR as one element. Preparing for climate change is a major aspect of Australia’s engagement with HADR in the region. When a natural disaster strikes, as with recent cyclones, Australia assists the emergency response in the affected country or countries as well as providing aid for reconstruction. Keywords Australia · South Pacific · Pacific island countries · Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) · Climate change · Natural disasters Australia approaches the issue of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) in the South Pacific islands not just from the perspective of a compassionate neighbor but through its role as the leading local power in the region. By “Australia” I mean Australian governments primarily, but within the context of support from Australian society more generally (particularly through civil society organizations). While there is a global context for HADR, enunciated most clearly through the United Nations, in understanding Australian involvement in this matter we need in the first place to have a broad view of Australia’s place within regional geopolitics. From here we can see how Australia contributes to HADR, covering both general objectives and practical measures. Objectives and practical measures can include both preventative aspects (disaster risk reduction and improving preparedness) and emergency response and reconstruction efforts. D. McDougall (B) School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_8

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1 Regional Geopolitics Australia is the leading local power in the South Pacific, with New Zealand playing a secondary role. Externally based Western powers that are significant, mainly because they have a regional territorial presence, are the United States (US) and France. China has also assumed an increasingly important role, partly because of its competition with Taiwan (Republic of China), but also because of its aspirations both as a regional Pacific power and as a global power. The Anglo powers (US and United Kingdom in particular) look to Australia to play a leading role in the South Pacific. As far as the Pacific island countries (PICs) are concerned, they generally welcome Australian development assistance and Australian support in relation to trade and investment and guest worker schemes. At the same time the PICs have been increasingly resistant to the notion that Australia should dominate the affairs of the region, with climate change an important point of differentiation (the PICs favoring more far reaching action than Australia has). Fiji has led resistance to Australian domination, a stance that became stronger during the period of military rule in Fiji (2006– 2014) when Australia and New Zealand took the lead in imposing sanctions against the Bainimarama regime. Fiji developed a “Look North” strategy, seeing China as an alternative focus to Australia. Whereas Australia and New Zealand played the leading role in the Pacific Islands Forum, both countries were excluded from the Fiji-led Pacific Islands Development Forum.1 Applying these general points about regional geopolitics to the specific issue of Australian involvement in HADR in the region, the expectation from Australia, the other Anglo powers, and the PICs is that Australia would play a leading role in responding to natural hazards, as well as in assisting the PICs to be more prepared for whatever disasters might occur. HADR are one aspect of Australia’s involvement in the region more generally. The question then becomes how does Australia carry out its role in that respect?

2 The Australian Contribution: Objectives and Practice Australia contributes to HADR in the South Pacific islands through various regional and bilateral arrangements. The broad background for this aspect of international relations is the framework provided by the United Nations. Particularly important in this respect is the Humanitarian Reform process as initiated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (Under Secretary-General, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)) through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee in 2005, leading most recently to the World Humanitarian Summit (Istanbul, May 2016) and the adoption of the Agenda for Humanity. Regionally Australia contributes through arrangements instigated by the Pacific Islands Forum. Bilaterally there are partnership agreements between Australia and most Pacific island countries (PICs). These 1 For

an overview of Australian strategy in the Pacific islands, see Wallis (2017).

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agreements cover all aspects of overseas development assistance, but usually there is some reference to climate change and disaster relief. The importance of the latter point can vary depending on the degree to which the PIC feels threatened by rising sea levels. The agreements are also more important where the PIC has a high level of dependence on Australian aid. At a regional level an important initiative was the adoption by the Pacific Islands Forum in 2016 of the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management, 2017– 2030 (FRDP). Governments and non-government organizations could participate in the FRDP on a voluntary basis to become part of the Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP). Australia as a leading member of the Forum (and its most important financial contributor)—in turn reflecting regional geopolitics—has instituted an Australia Pacific Climate Partnership (APCP), with funding of A$75 m (about US$50 m), 2018–2024, including support for a Climate and Oceans Support Program in the Pacific (Phase 2) and a Climate Change Risk Governance program. The former assists meteorological services in the PICs; the latter aims to mainstream climate change issues in PIC governance. These programs are primarily preventative. Pacific partnership agreements date from 2008, the aim being to develop a more systematic approach to Australian aid in the Pacific islands region, covering objectives, implementation, and evaluation. It is noticeable that over time there has been more emphasis on climate change and disaster resilience. This can be seen by reviewing the eleven Pacific partnerships that have been concluded since 2016. All eleven agreements make some reference to integrating climate change and disaster resilience into development projects. The partnership agreement where the issue is highlighted most is that for Tuvalu, one of the countries most threatened by rising sea levels. The Australia-Tuvalu Aid Partnership 2017–2021 has climate change adaptation and environmental resilience as one of two main priorities, with Australia committing to support Tuvalu’s work in this area, “particularly to achieve water security, coastal protection and food security … also [ensuring] that Tuvalu has a plan in place to prepare and respond to disasters” (Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019a). Tuvalu is highly dependent on overseas development assistance, with 24.8% of that aid coming from Australia in 2017 (Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019d). Kiribati is another low-lying PIC where climate change is a major issue; like Tuvalu, Kiribati is highly dependent on overseas development assistance, with Australia providing 29.4% of that assistance in 2017 (Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019c). Nevertheless, Kiribati’s partnership agreement with Australia (2016– 2019) does not prioritize climate change and environmental resilience as much as the Australia-Tuvalu agreement does. While clearly climate change and environmental resilience are important issues for the PICs, the focus on these issues can vary; Tuvalu is a leader on climate change issues, as is the Republic of Marshall Islands in Micronesia (but Australia’s engagement is relatively minor in the latter case). The other aspect of Australian involvement (emergency response and reconstruction) receives more attention when a natural hazard occurs. For example, Australia

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played an active role in responding to floods in Solomon Islands in April 2014 and then to Tropical Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu in March 2015, and Tropical Cyclone Winston in Fiji in February 2016. This role can include deploying elements of the Australian military as well as civilian support through the Australian Civilian Corps (ACC) and non-government organizations such as the Australian Red Cross. The Australian government has highlighted its A$35 million (US$24 m) contribution to recovery in Vanuatu through the construction of 71 health facility buildings, 95 classrooms, 51 public buildings, 80 water systems, and 27 tourism bungalows (Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019e). An interesting dimension of Australian involvement in HADR is the bilateral relationship with Fiji. Given the past history of this relationship (especially 2006– 2014) and contemporary differences, the two countries have not concluded a formal partnership agreement. However, the signing of the Fiji-Australia Vuvale [Family] Partnership in September 2019 indicated that Australia’s objectives in its aid relationship with Fiji are broadly similar to its objectives with other PICs, including the emphasis on climate change and disaster resilience. Australia contributed A$6 million to Fiji to support Fiji’s presidency of the 23rd Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (held in Bonn, November 2017). The Australian government has given particular attention to working with Australian NGOs in response to natural hazards in Fiji, through the Australian Humanitarian Partnership and the Australia Assists program. In the aftermath of Tropical Cyclone Winston in February 2016 Australia provided A$35 million in reconstruction funds, enabling 29 schools to be rebuilt by early 2019, with a further five schools to be finished by June 2019 (Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019b). Australian involvement in HADR in the South Pacific reflects regional geopolitics, where Australia assumes a leading role. As with other aspects of its role in the region, Australia has involved itself in various aspects of disaster relief to give substance to the role it believes it should be playing. This involvement includes both multilateral regional and bilateral aspects. A key dimension is climate change, with some differences of emphasis between Australia and the PICs, and indeed among the PICs themselves.

References Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2019a) Australia-Tuvalu Aid Partnership 2017–2021. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Doc uments/australia-tuvalu-aid-partnership-2017-2021.pdf Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2019b) Tuvalu: Development cooperation fact sheet. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Doc uments/development-cooperation-fact-sheet-tuvalu.pdf Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2019c) Kiribati: Development cooperation fact sheet. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Doc uments/development-cooperation-fact-sheet-kiribati.pdf

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Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2019e) Vanuatu: Development cooperation fact sheet, April 2019. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/public ations/Documents/development-cooperation-fact-sheet-vanuatu.pdf Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2019e) Fiji: Development cooperation fact sheet, April 2019. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/ Documents/development-cooperation-fact-sheet-fiji.pdf Wallis J (2017) Pacific power? Australia’s strategy in the Pacific Islands. Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic

Derek McDougall is a Professorial Fellow in the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne. His main field of interest is Asia-Pacific international politics, with particular reference to Australian engagement in the region. His most recent book in this field is Asia Pacific in World Politics, 2nd edition (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016). In relation to humanitarian assistance, Professor McDougall has written mainly on humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and the security-development nexus, with particular reference to Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands. He is also an active member of the International Advisory Board for Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, contributing many articles to this journal. In recent years Professor McDougall has been a visiting academic at both the University of Fiji and the University of Greenland. He has also been a visiting fellow at Wolfson College, University of Cambridge, and a visiting lecturer at Australian Catholic University (Melbourne).

Regional Humanitarian Platforms—The Case of ASEAN Alistair D. B. Cook

Abstract Since the devastating Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami in 2004 there are three significant broad trends that have shaped the regional humanitarian landscape in Southeast Asia, namely ASEAN centrality, sectoral approaches and a diversifying multi-stakeholder environment. The challenge for the region remains how these communities of actors engage with one another for more effective action. Over the next five years as the region moves towards realizing the ASEAN Vision 2025 on disaster management, it will face multiple challenges. States and societies in Southeast Asia have demonstrated a commitment to build up their disaster response capacity which is often termed “nationally-led, regionally-supported and international as necessary” so that they can respond themselves to natural hazards. The next steps will be to reflect on the strengths of the different actors in the regional humanitarian community and focus on community leadership; determine how transferable the skills developed by humanitarian responders in the region are and adapt them to new scenarios; strengthen relationships across the diverse humanitarian community; and be better prepared for complex humanitarian emergencies in all their forms. Keywords ASEAN · Humanitarianism · Natural hazards · Disaster management · Southeast Asia · Regionalism Progress on regional cooperation in Southeast Asia is often punctuated by decades rather than years. While this characterization remains broadly true, it does not for the regional humanitarian system or ‘architecture’. The exposure of the wider Asia– Pacific to natural hazards renders it the world’s most disaster prone region (OCHA 2019, 15) and an issue of high importance to states and societies. Since the devastating Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami in 2004 there are three significant

A. D. B. Cook (B) S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_9

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broad trends that have shaped the regional disaster response architecture particularly in Southeast Asia, namely ASEAN centrality, sectoral approaches and a diversifying multi-stakeholder environment. The challenge for the region remains how these communities of actors engage with one another for more effective action. It is also important that these communities continue to develop their skillsets and be able to apply them to the “new normal” in terms of what disasters to expect, and to highlight the need for more systematic horizon scanning i.e. how adaptable are these actors to ‘other’ humanitarian situations. As the world’s first legally-binding disaster management mechanism, the 2008 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response mandated the ASEAN Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) as its operational arm. Over the past decade, Southeast Asia has experienced many disasters, some simultaneous disasters like the July 2018 Dam collapse in Laos PDR and the 6.4 magnitude earthquake that struck Lombok and Bali islands in Indonesia. This were followed by the September Sulawesi Earthquake, Tsunami and Liquefaction, making ‘2018 Indonesia’s mostly deadly year in a decade’ (Heriyanto and Holliyani Cahya 2018). At the end of 2017, ASEAN had also further mandated the AHA Centre with providing humanitarian assistance to Rakhine State in Myanmar after the Rohingya Exodus into Bangladesh. Subsequently, following endorsement at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in Chiang Mai on 17–18 January 2019, a Preliminary Needs Assessment Mission of the AHA Centre was sent to Rakhine State, Myanmar, on 4 March 2019. The main research question therefore is “what is the emerging role of the AHA Centre, with reference to global humanitarian norms and the global humanitarian system?”. Over the next six years as the region moves towards realizing the ASEAN Vision 2025 on disaster management, it faces multiple challenges. States and societies in Southeast Asia have demonstrated a commitment to build up their disaster response capacity which is often termed “nationally-led, regionally-supported and international as necessary” so that they can respond themselves to natural hazards and “bridge regional and global conversations to prepare for current risks and future threats” (ASEAN 2016, 3). The next steps will be to reflect on the strengths of the different actors in the regional humanitarian architecture; determine how transferable the skills developed by humanitarian responders in the region are and adapt them to new scenarios; strengthen relationships across the diverse humanitarian community; and be better prepared for complex humanitarian emergencies in all their forms. This chapter will seek to track the development of a regional humanitarian architecture that on first sight appears to be a combination of national, regional and international cooperation, but increasingly sees the primacy of national government asserting itself in humanitarian affairs in Southeast Asia. As the need for access to affected populations increases in ASEAN for humanitarian providers, this access and cooperation reasserts the centrality of the state. Rather than the emerging regional humanitarian system mirroring the dominant global humanitarian norms, we can see that Southeast Asian states see these efforts as primarily their job that other actors can ‘plug into’ as needed. Pak Said Faisal, the

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then Executive Director of AHA Centre, foresaw these developments in his conceptualisation of ASEAN 1.0, ASEAN 2.0, ASEAN 3.0 and ASEAN X.0 (AHA 2018, 6). Under ASEAN 1.0, in its first phase the AHA Centre experienced teething problems notably in 2012 around its response to Super Typhoon Haiyan and received ‘visibility damage’, because it focused its efforts on working with the Philippines national disaster management office in Manila and was not seen as an active player in the field. In 2015, the AHA Centre entered ASEAN 2.0 which was launched with the ASEAN Community’s ‘One ASEAN, One Response’ and aims to bring together stakeholders within the regional grouping. This sees the training of national staff together in regional exercises and courses like the Emergency Response and Assessment Team induction course and the AHA Centre Executive (ACE) programme to prepare future leaders of disaster management in ASEAN. This builds informal networks across Southeast Asia within the disaster management sector. Working together outside of a disaster builds confidence and comradery envisioned in One ASEAN, One Response and needed for more effective responses. Arguably the AHA Centre entered ASEAN 3.0 in the 2018 Sulawesi earthquake and Tsunami when the AHA Centre was made the main coordination centre for the region and its connections with the wider international community. Even before the Sulawesi earthquake and Tsunami, Pak Said Faisal identified three key elements— political will, operational capacity and emotional bonds—were critical to building and sustaining regional cooperation in disaster response (Said Faisal 2018). In its future iteration of ASEAN X.0, the AHA Centre would respond to disasters outside Southeast Asia. In the 2018 humanitarian response, the Indonesian government mandated the AHA Centre with the function to coordinate all aid offers from the international system, rather than OCHA which is the internationally mandated agency to cover this function. This development was unannounced and took many in the humanitarian community by surprise as this role was not assigned in emergency preparedness activities. Indeed the processes that had been exercised was captured in the ASEANUN Joint Strategic Plan of Action on Disaster Management 2016-2020. Instead the mandate given to the AHA Centre by the Indonesian government realised ASEAN 3.0 as the main coordinating mechanism in humanitarian assistance in Southeast Asia for the 2018 Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami. However, the shift towards ASEAN 3.0 as understood strategically must be tempered with the budget and personnel constraints it faces. There remain underlying questions over how many simultaneous disasters the AHA Centre can coordinate, as was witnessed in 2018. It needs to also be considered that although ASEAN Member States increased their contributions in 2017 from $50,000 per state to $90,000 per state to the AHA Centre budget, it remains small no matter the relative increase in money. In 2018, the AHA Centre received 82% of its funding from ASEAN Dialogue Partners and other partners (AHA Centre 2018, 61). Furthermore, the developments need to be tempered with the realisation that Indonesia is a strong advocate of the AHA Centre, donating further to it in terms of office space with AHA Centre being in the same building as Indonesia’s National

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Disaster Management Agency (BNPB). Would such a mandate be issued in other ASEAN Member States where the AHA Centre is not physically located? Is there the institutional capacity in other ASEAN Member States to work with the AHA Centre for such a mandate? While the Philippines is in a similar position to provide such a mandate, is there the appetite? Despite Indonesia’s support for the AHA Centre and regional solidarity, there was a pre-requisite requirement that support in terms of ASEAN Member State citizens be Bahasa Indonesia speakers. However, was this a constraint on ASEAN Member States contributions to this potential significant shift in response? It therefore seems likely that this occurrence of ASEAN 3.0 may be significant on the surface but once the layers are peeled back then there are significant limitations to this development. There may be significant progress in Indonesia, which is notable in itself as the largest country in Southeast Asia, but the penetration of ASEAN 3.0 in other ASEAN Member States to such a degree as was seen in Sulawesi is not assured. Therefore progress is being made in regional developments on humanitarian affairs, yet so far it seems that once state capacity can itself govern disaster response it takes charge, knocking back the international community and empowering the regional organisation in the case of the Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami in 2018. Whether a state-centric humanitarian system is an emerging characteristic of the regional humanitarian system in Southeast Asia remains to be seen, it appears to be the case in Indonesia in 2018. That said, the state-centric characteristic does not mean isolationist or protectionist, but rather a cooperative state-based regional arrangement in response to natural hazards. If IOs and INGOs are adapting or able to re-insert themselves in another way to remain relevant may illustrate a new dynamic for Southeast Asia as well. However, the mandate given to the AHA Centre in providing humanitarian assistance to those affected in Rakhine State, Myanmar signalled the ad hoc use of the AHA Centre for humanitarian action in a conflict setting. Recent developments at the regional level suggest that this was an exception rather than an emerging rule. In the AADMER Work Plan 2021–2025, there is a restatement of the scope of work of the ASEAN Committee for Disaster Management, the strategic implentation mechanism of the AADMER and oversight body of the AHA Centre, which categorised natural disasters and man-made disasters and notably excluded conflicts and pandemics (ASEAN 2020). There was a notable ‘among others’ added presumably to allow for future exceptional humanitarian emergencies signalling a reliance on ad hoc measures and developments in other sectoral bodies. What the developments in ASEAN humanitarian affairs in response to natural hazards over the last decade have illustrated is that where there is political will, operational capacity and emotional bonds, the regional organisation is able to provide a coordination mechanism to assist those in need. However, the recent revisions to the ACDM work scope show that with political will and operational capacity comes a more defined area of application for AADMER. While this is to be expected, it does not signal a regional humanitarian platform that is ready for complex humanitarian emergencies or future disaster scenarios more broadly defined in ASEAN, which ultimately limits its effectiveness to those in need of humanitarian assistance and protection.

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Reference AHA Centre (2018) Operationalising one ASEAN one response, March. ASEAN (2016) Joint statement of the association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the World Humanitarian Summit: National Leadership & Regional Partnership for Resilient ASEAN, Istanbul, Turkey, 22 May. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ADOPTED-ASEANJoint-Statement-for-the-World-Humanitarian-Summit-22-May-2016.pdf ASEAN (2020) AADMER Work Plan 2021–2025. ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta. https://asean.org/ storage/AADMER-Work-Programme-2021-2025.pdf Heriyanto D, Holliani Cahya G (2018) 2018 sees Indonesia’s deadliest year in decade. The Jakarta Post, 27 December. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/12/27/2018-sees-indone sia-s-deadliest-yeardecade.html OCHA (2019) Global humanitarian overview. United Nations, Geneva Said Faisal (2018) Managing disasters: three key elements in ASEAN cooperation. RSIS Commentary 18–036, March 2018. Available: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co18036-man aging-disasters-three-key-elements-in-asean-cooperation/#.XSwnbvkzaM8

Alistair D. B. Cook is Coordinator of the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programme and Senior Fellow at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is the President of the Asia-Pacific Region of the International Studies Association (2018–2021). His research interests are in non-traditional security and human security in the Asia-Pacific including peace and conflict studies, humanitarian affairs, foreign policy and regional cooperation, and domestic politics in Myanmar. He has recently authored or coauthored “Achieving the ASEAN 2025 Vision for Disaster Management: Lessons from a Worthy Journey” (ASEAN Risk Monitor and Disaster Management Review, 2019), “Towards ‘Shared’ and ‘Complex’ Disaster Governance in Bangladesh: The 2017 Rohingya Exodus” (International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 2019), “Integrating disaster governance in Timor-Leste: Opportunities and challenges” (International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 2019), “Negotiating Access to Populations of Concern in Southeast Asia” (Pacific Review, 2018), “An Assessment of International Emergency Disaster Response to the 2015 Nepal Earthquakes” (International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 2018) and co-edited Irregular Migration and Human Security in East Asia (Routledge, 2017), Civilian Protection in the Twenty-First Century: Governance and Responsibility in a Fragmented World (Oxford University Press, 2016) and NonTraditional Security in Asia: Issues, Challenges and Framework for Action (ISEAS, 2013). Twitter: @beancook

Reinforcing Universal Values for Humanitarian Cooperative Arrangements in Asia Sigit Riyanto

Abstract Asia and especially East and Southeast Asia has been recognized for their remarkably economic development. However, humanitarian issues in the region have been very rarely and openly debated consequently there are questions for effectiveness, genuine commitment, ability and even the reliability of the countries in the region in responding the issue on humanitarian. In such a context, it is plausible to discuss the reinforcement of Universal Values for Humanitarian Cooperative Arrangements in Asia. There are relevant issues deserve to be deliberated critically: the changing landscape of humanitarian problem, evolving definition of sovereignty, spreading of universalism and the need of institutionalized humanitarian cooperation. Dialogues should be continued among different sectors of society to convey the message that humanitarian actions are feasible to be materialized and assumed as a realistic implementation of Asian solidarity in a concrete agenda. Humanitarian principles serve an invaluable purpose by embedding the principles of humanitarianism in any action to solve the real and factual humanitarian problems. Eventually, finding solutions to humanitarian problems requires more than principles; it necessitates innovation, flexibility, and a clear understanding of the essential agenda by governments and other stakeholders, and political willingness.

Asia and especially East and Southeast Asia has been recognized for their remarkably economic development and sparkled a very dynamic discourse between and among the media, politicians, academics, the private sector and civil society. However, humanitarian issues in the region have been very rarely and openly debated by the same parties in international forum, and consequently there are questions for effectiveness, genuine commitment, ability and even the reliability of the countries in the region in responding the issue on humanitarian. This skeptical perception is based on the fact that to date, there is no coherent political and legal arrangement designed and adopted by the Asian countries. In such a context, it is plausible to discuss the S. Riyanto (B) Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_10

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reinforcement of Universal Values for Humanitarian Cooperative Arrangements in Asia. In this regards there are relevant issues deserve to be deliberated critically: the changing landscape of humanitarian problem, evolving definition of sovereignty, spreading of universalism, the need of institutionalized humanitarian cooperation.

1 The Changing Humanitarian Landscape In the twenty-first century, we have witnessed the significant proliferation of actors in global governance, including in the international humanitarian system. Against this background, we have noted that these multiple humanitarian actors work with different objectives, principles and modi operandi at policy and operational levels. The diversity of actors and approaches can help to alleviate complicated humanitarian problems, should they manage to act in an orchestrated and complementary fashion. Conversely, if there lacks coordination and cooperation between the multiple actors, their actions would be ineffective and even complicate the humanitarian problems. Humanitarian norms and values remain valid today, but the implementation of such values and norms is confronted with more complicated relationship and interests of the stakeholders concerned. Against this background, the consensus of all key stakeholders is the best starting point to cope with the existing fragmentation, approving realistic agenda and priority, designing effective programs, and building better future for all.

2 Redefinition of Sovereignty The practice of states in defining sovereignty within the framework of international relations has long been debated and the debate still continue until now. It is clear that in the 21th century, there was a transformation on the concept and nuance of state sovereignty and its implementation. The change of the society, institutional framework, technological advance as well as the intensity of economic activity among states have led to the revival of the meaning of state sovereignty under the current international system. There are two factors that must be considered as catalyst to determine the current situation: (i) the development, spreading and implementation of universal values including fundamental human rights and humanitarianism by international organizations, individuals and non-states actors; and (ii) the process of globalization, globalism, and economic liberalization are intensively across the globe. There are three patterns in which globalization and globalism affected sovereignty. First, the expansion of trade and capital markets internationally have altered the state in controlling its domestic economic matters. Secondly, as a response to globalization

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and globalism, states have transferred and or delegated their powers towards international organizations. Third, there are new norms of international law, more specifically norms relevant to international economic relations which are now recognized as the New Frontier of International Law. These new norms which have been processed and institutionalized by international organizations, reduced the independence of the national authority on rule and policy making. In this way, states should have a consensus and mutual dialogue among them and with the existing international institutions to find out a new meaning of sovereignty. The globalization process reflects a reality that we are living in the era where the sovereignty cannot be exercised as a shield to limit the movement of peoples, assets, information, values and ideas. This situation also reflects the future global governance where globalization process, would eventually erode and eliminate the absolute sovereignty. A new world order is emerging based on a complex web of transnational networks and universally accepted standards. The globalization has transformed the function of international law. It has become a vehicle for states to cooperate with each other in areas like economic development and trade, environment, security, humanitarian issues and human rights. This situation also necessitates states to rethink the previous notion of the inviolable sovereignty. Moreover, states also have choices and outlook to consider response toward globalization. States weighed the costs and benefits of the loss of this valuable sovereignty. The on-going process of balancing between sovereignty and issues like humanitarianism, economic interests, individual freedom, empowerment of non-state entities, should be realized as an indication of the transformation of international law from a state-centric system to a individual or people-centred system. This transformation is a continuance of the codification and institutionalization of human rights norms and values that was started after the World War II by the endorsement of Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

3 Emergence of Universalism The increasing complexity of human problem in Asia and around the world has given rise to discussions over the urgency of universal values. Asian countries has been part of the global discussion on the universally adopted humanitarian values. One of the most relevant issue deserves to be discussed in the context of encouraging debate of humanitarian response in Asia is the spreading of universal norms and values. The notion on humanitarian values would be very relevant and deserve to be taken into consideration and further discussed and elaborated in the context of establishing a cooperative arrangement on Humanitarian Affairs in Asia. The strengthening of universalism can be ascertained due to the following reasons: The first reason is the strengthening of globalism and movement of encountering the “status quo”. Globalisation has given rise to the debate on the “status quo” concepts

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such as absolute state sovereignty. There is no state capable of handling transnational challenges arising from globalisation alone, such as terrorism and transnational organised crimes. Second, there is growing awareness and support for setting the rules on human rights in the international law. In the aftermath of the World War II, individuals possess a legal standing before international court and constitute as one of the subjects of international law. Moreover, the international community through international organizations has set a standard for the protection of human rights in the form of international legal instruments. These developments demonstrate the international support for the legal codification of human rights. Third, the international community has built the institutional structure for protecting individual rights, that include various mechanisms and institutions such as the international criminal court system that consists of both ad hoc courts like the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as well the International Criminal Court which is permanent. Human rights and humanitarian law are applicable and recognized by international community in both interstate and intrastate armed conflicts. Fourth, protection of human rights is increasingly viewed as an obligation erga omnes. Should there is an action categorized as gross violation of human rights, there is an obligation of every state to respond in line with the existing agreed international to protect the victims, prevent further casualties, and restoring public order. This postulate has been supported and strengthened by the legal doctrine as well as judicial decisions (case law) in the contemporary international legal system.

4 Regional Approach for Humanitarian Cooperation in Asia Humanitarian initiatives have been started and implemented in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia. For example, the initiative of ASEAN members by the establishment of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response or AADMER which entry into force on 24 December 2009. AADMER has directly contributed to the building of ASEAN Community, and the enhancement of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation of the peoples and communities in ASEAN. Taking into account the current challenges of humanitarian affairs in Asia, it is plausible that such an arrangement, should be extended beyond the ASEAN members. Contribution and support from non-ASEAN members would likely enhance the humanitarian programs and its accomplishments in Asia or even globally. Thus it is plausible for advocating more comprehensive approach in institutionalize humanitarian cooperation among Asian countries. This humanitarian cooperation should be designed and implemented on the basis of regional approach, without excluding support and participation from external stakeholders at the global level. This tenet would likely encourage burden sharing among the relevant stakeholders

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in the region. In such a framework we could learn from the success story and best practice of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989–1997, generally well known as Comprehensive Plan Of Action (CPA). The CPA concept and its implementation have been appreciated greatly by international community and cited as a model of institutionalizing international solidarity and burden sharing dealing with humanitarian problem in the region.1 A cooperative approach such as CPA above mentioned widely recognized as a successful humanitarian program based on regional approach and also combining humanitarian principles and values as well as international politics pragmatism. A regional approach for humanitarian cooperation should be regarded in Asia regarded as realistic and feasible to be endorsed, considering the fact that the existence of humanitarian problems in the territory of one State and all the accompanying problems, eventually would likely affect the situation in the neighboring States. Thus, it is clear that there is a sense of urgency and common interest of the States in the region to identify the feasible options and establishing collaborative response to the existing humanitarian problems. Based on the above mentioned setting, regional cooperation approach appears to be more effective and compelling. An effective regional approach to humanitarian actions necessitates the support of all stakeholders, including the receiving countries, donor states as well as international organisations like the UN. Moreover, the comprehensive regional approach offers challenges and opportunities to materialize a realistic combination of humanitarian norms and values and political practicality in Asia. Taking into account the populist narratives of nationalism and “sovereignty” among the Asian Countries and suspicious perception concerning the promotion of “Western values,” it is imperative that advocacy and continuous dialogue among the leaders of the Asian Countries, academia, civil society and local as well as international media should be intensified to convey the message that humanitarian program is a realistic implementation of Asian and even global solidarity and focused on the impartial alleviation of those who are suffering and in need of proper assistance. Apart from structural and burden sharing concerns the humanitarian cooperation arrangement in Asia be supposed to adopt a needs-based approach to humanitarian assistance that addresses vulnerable populations in the regions regardless of the host country. The agreed humanitarian cooperation arrangement should be based on a more timely response in order to circumvent the protracted and negative significance of the concerned problems. The implementation of such humanitarian program must be combined with support for national and local actors through greater flexibility in funding mechanisms and increased institutional and programmatic investments in the touched communities.

1 The

CPA was an attempt to avert a humanitarian disaster through cooperation among countries of origin, first asylum, and resettlement. It combined “deterrence measures” (orderly departures from Vietnam and Laos, mass screening of asylum seekers who arrived spontaneously and orderly return of those whose claims were rejected) with “protection measures” (temporary asylum for all arrivals and resettlement of those determined to be refugees). It was a pragmatic but principled response.

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5 Conclusion In the 21st century, there is a multi-level governance consolidation as an effort to uphold human rights as international law norm and making the presence of international law to be more humanized system. This concept of humanized international law being supported with a “Multi-level Governance” framed as enforcement of international law and supported by relevant international institutions. A well-defined consensus and commitment from states and other stakeholders on minimum standards of humanity, and solid agreement for people oriented programs would likely assure the continuation of the humanitarian works in the region. Dialogues should be continued among different sectors of society to convey the message that humanitarian actions are feasible to be materialized and assumed as a realistic implementation of Asian solidarity in a concrete agenda. Humanitarian principles serve an invaluable purpose by embedding the principles of humanitarianism in any action to solve the real and factual humanitarian problems. However, finding solution to humanitarian problems requires more than principles; it necessitates innovation, flexibility, a clear understanding of the essential agenda by governments and other stakeholders, and political willingness. The consolidation of such aspects would determine realistic programs for the beneficiaries of which the programs directed. Humanitarian initiatives have been started and implemented in Asia, however, we need to intensify dialog, propose innovative initiatives, set concrete agenda and implement concrete programs in the region.

Sigit Riyanto is the Dean of the Faculty of Law Gadjah Mada University; he was Vice Dean and Director of International Program from 2008 to 2012. He has been appointed as Head of the Center for Security and Peace Studies (2015–2017) and member of the Indonesian National Research Council (2015–2018 and 2019–2022). Professor Sigit Riyanto is member of the Experts Panel in the Judicial Commission for the Selection of Judges of the Indonesian Supreme Court, from 2013 to 2019. Professor Sigit Riyanto studied law at Gadjah Mada University (UGM), the University of Nottingham, UK, and The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. His primary research interests are in; International Law, Law & Conflict Resolutions, International Humanitarian Law, Refugee Law and Legal Theory. He has held visiting academic positions at the Charles Darwin University, Australian National University, Canberra; Hankuk University of South Korea, IIUM Malaysia; and Maastricht University, the Netherlands. He is a member of expert reviewer and advisory boards of some Legal Journals, in Indonesia as well as foreign academic journals. He is frequently invited to lecture around the world, and has participated as speaker in national and international seminars and symposium. In addition to the academic post, he has been working extensively for International Organizations in South East Asia, including as Legal Officer International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC Regional Delegation: 1999–2000), Legal Adviser (WHO: 2000–2002) and Legal Protection Officer of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Regional Representative (Covering Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Brunai Darussalam and Timor Leste: 2002–2006).

Military Humanitarianism in the Asia–Pacific Christopher Chen

Abstract The Asia-Pacific is the most disaster-prone region in the world. As more disasters occur and the needs of affected populations increase, the global community faces the dual challenges of government capacity and the legitimacy of nongovernmental organisations. One way of addressing the humanitarian capacity challenge is to recognise the added value and comparative advantages that those outside the traditional humanitarian sector can provide. This article identifies one such actor—the military—in the Asia-Pacific and discusses some of the opportunities and challenges that it brings. It looks at some of the attempts to integrate the military into the regional humanitarian system. The evolving nature of the humanitarian landscape raises new dilemmas. While traditional humanitarians are committed to upholding the principles of humanitarianism—neutrality, impartiality, independence and a commitment to humanity—other stakeholders are not solely motivated by such a humanitarian logic. By exploring the role of the military as a humanitarian actor, as well as the contentions surrounding its entry into the humanitarian arena, this article aims to inform efforts to navigate the gap between non-traditional and traditional humanitarian actors. Keywords Military · Humanitarianism · Asia-pacific

1 Introduction The Asia-Pacific is the most disaster-prone region in the world. As more disasters occur and the needs of affected populations increase, the global community faces the dual challenges of government capacity and the legitimacy of non-governmental organisations. Carpenter and Kent (2016: 149) argue that one way of addressing the humanitarian capacity challenge is to “recognise the added value and comparative advantages that those outside the traditional humanitarian sector can provide in C. Chen (B) S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_11

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strengthening efforts to manage risk and enhance preparedness, response and recovery”. The global humanitarian community at large faces the challenge of whether and how to integrate new actors into the system to leverage the strengths of different stakeholders. This article identifies one such actor -the military- in the Asia-Pacific and discusses some of the opportunities and challenges that it brings. It looks at some of the attempts to integrate the military into the regional humanitarian system. The evolving nature of the humanitarian landscape raises new dilemmas. While traditional humanitarians are committed to upholding the principles of humanitarianismneutrality, impartiality, independence and a commitment to humanity—other stakeholders are not solely motivated by such a humanitarian logic. By exploring the role of the military as a humanitarian actor, as well as the contentions surrounding its entry into the humanitarian arena, this article aims to inform efforts to navigate the gap between non-traditional and traditional humanitarian actors.

2 Regional Nuances The use of military assets in disaster relief is not a new phenomenon. The military is an important actor as their unique capabilities enable them to provide a whole range of support functions (Heaslip and Barber 2014: 60; O’Hagan and Miwa 2014: 416). Particularly in the case of quick onset disasters, the military is able to provide rapid surge capacity with its niche assets including air and sea-lift, logistics, debris clearing and infrastructure reconstruction including, engineering, communications and emergency medical support (Moroney et al. 2013: 1). The reality is that the military’s strong logistics capacity, ability to identify and prioritise common objectives, rapid response capabilities, and dedication to maintain a force of trained personnel, does not yet exist within the ‘traditional’ humanitarian community (Wiharta et al. 2008: 98). The literature suggests that, in the Asia-Pacific, countries view the role of the military differently as compared to other regions. Countries in the region generally accept the military is a “first provider of humanitarian assistance”, a view that challenges Western assumptions that the military should only be used as a last resort during humanitarian operations (Carpenter and Kent 2016: 151). This might stem from the fact that the “humanitarian experience in the Asia-Pacific is characterised by its exposure to natural hazards over-and-above high-intensity conflict” (Cook and Yogendran 2020: 12). This creates a dynamic where militaries in the region frequently take on the role of relief provider, in addition to their more traditional role as defenders of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Indeed, while most aspects of the disaster management cycle have traditionally fallen under the ambit of humanitarian organisations and civilian agencies such as National Disaster Management Offices, the military is widely considered to be the de facto first responder during the emergency phase of disaster response efforts when surge capacity is needed in the region. This is evident from past disasters, where militaries–both local and foreign- have

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often been the first responders on the ground such as after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Wiharta et al. 2008: 87). The first responder status of the military in the Asia-Pacific is reflected in the crafting of region-specific guidelines that seek to address this. One of the priorities on the Asia-Pacific security agenda is to improve the capacity for principled and effective civil-military cooperation in relief operations (Ahn et al. 2012: 52; Madiwale and Virk 2011: 1105; Hofmann and Hudson 2009: 29). While the Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief , also known as the Oslo Guidelines, indicate that foreign military assets should only be used as a last resort when domestic capacity is insufficient, it is largely tailored mainly for the international community at large (Hofmann and Hudson 2009: 30; Wiharta et al. 2008: xi; UN 2006). However, in the Asia-Pacific, this last resort paradigm is contested, and militaries are unequivocally regarded as first responders in disaster response efforts (RCG Summary Report 2017: 5). As such, humanitarian actors in the region have recognized the pressing need for an Asia–Pacific version of the guidelines. In 2006, Singapore and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN OCHA) co-organised the first Asia–Pacific Conference on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO) (Ng 2015). This led to the formulation of the Asia–Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations, which acknowledges the nuances and differences present in the Asia-Pacific– the most glaring being the fact that military forces are often the first responders to regional disasters (UN OCHA 2014). Adherence to these guidelines can help to minimise the perceived negative connotations of military asset use. An ASEAN-specific version also exists in the form of the Standard Operating Procedures for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP).1 Moreover, traditional humanitarian actors are acknowledging the need to engage meaningfully with the military. For instance, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement have also created their own set of guidelines to direct their interactions with the military (Hofmann and Hudson 2009: 30).2 To this end, regional initiatives that seek to create coordinating mechanisms for military actors similarly suggest a collective acknowledgement of the importance of military-military and civil-military coordination in relief efforts. These initiatives include the Regional Consultative Group (RCG) on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific and the Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (RHCC). 1 See

‘Standard Operating Procedures for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP) document’ https://ahacentre. org/wp-content/uploads/SASOP/2.-SASOP-Revision-V2.0-April2018.pdf. 2 See ‘ICRC Council of Delegates 2005: Resolution 7, Guidance Document on Relations between the Components of the Movement and Military Bodies’ https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/ documents/resolution/council-delegates-resolution-7-2005.htm. and ‘Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Humanitarian Assistance’ https://www.ifrc.org/Global/Documents/Secret ariat/Accountability/Principles%20Rules%20for%20Red%20Cross%20Red%20Crescent%20H umanitarian%20Assistance.pdf.

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Regional Consultative Group (RCG) on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific and the Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (RHCC). Expanding on the outcomes laid out in APC-MADRO, the Regional Consultative Group (RCG) on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific was formed in 2014. It acts as a regional forum to foster a culture of trust and cooperation between humanitarian, civilian and military actors involved in disaster preparedness and response in the region (RCG Summary Report 2017: 2). The recently established Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (RHCC) aims to foster better coordination between foreign and affected state militaries responding to disasters (MINDEF 2014). It aggregates information from early warning systems and coordination centres to distribute to partner militaries through its OPERA Command and Control Information System (CCIS) web-portal (MINDEF 2014). This helps to minimise duplication in relief efforts and enhance interoperability and coordination in HADR operations (Cook 2018: 369; Lim 2016: 43; MINDEF 2014). In the event of a disaster, RHCC staff will provide daily situational awareness briefings using their OPERA system to pinpoint what relief items are needed in particular locations in an effort to minimise relief duplication. With the large number of military and civilian actors involved in response situations, it can be difficult to achieve effective coordination (Wiharta et al. 2008: 87). The various regional initiatives demonstrate a commitment to institutionalise and advance civil-military collaboration. They facilitate the coordination of operational planning and the exchange of ideas between civil and military actors. More importantly, they serve as an avenue for the building of interpersonal relationships between key decision makers and stakeholders. Engagement between the civil and military sectors should be a constant process; trust should be built up during peacetime and before disasters occur (Cook 2018: 371). Increasingly, humanitarian actors realise the legitimacy of regional militaries as a vital cog in relief efforts. For those able to engage the military, it is important they understand how and under what conditions they can engage them to maximise the effectiveness of relief provided to affected populations.

3 Military Humanitarianism? Military intervention in humanitarian aid is still a sensitive issue. Arguably, a collective acknowledgement exists among Asia–Pacific states and humanitarian actors in the region that militaries can help to fill the capacity gap in humanitarian responses. This is evident from the various attempts made in the region to institutionalise military-military and civil-military engagement in HADR. Forums such as the RCG facilitate knowledge sharing among humanitarian, civilian and military actors involved in HADR. This enables them to understand one another’s niche capabilities,

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specific needs, as well as motivations for providing aid, all of which allows for better interoperability and coordination. The military’s participation in disaster relief efforts, especially in the region, is not an overwhelmingly contentious issue per se. There is a general understanding that the military is well-placed to provide aid during disasters. However, military involvement takes on a greater degree of ambiguity when humanitarian emergencies are of a complex nature, that is to say when the situation involves “disaster-affected communities [that] are home to pre-existing tensions such as political violence or internal conflict” (Cook 2018: 538). In situations like these, traditional humanitarians and the Dunantists3 are often reluctant to work with the military because it “threaten(s) the operating principles of civilian agencies and humanitarian organisations” (Hofmann and Hudson 2009: 29; Malesic 2015: 993; Mesina 2017: 398). An association with the military might create a scenario whereby all foreign organisations are automatically grouped under the ambit of foreign military operations and are hence viewed with distrust (Mesina 2017: 399). Hence, the problem lies in the fact that the legitimacy of the military as a humanitarian actor is often questioned. It is perhaps tough for humanitarians to reconcile the military’s humanitarian work with its traditional role as an instrument of war. Moreover, the degree of military involvement is also a point of contention. Most militaries strive to set a definite timeframe of involvement, with the consensus that they should only be involved during the initial relief and response stage (Tay 2010: 26). In line with this objective, militaries are supposed to start preparing their ‘exit strategies’, gradually handing over most of the relief efforts to the local government and NGOs. However, there might be a temptation to rely on military assets and resources for an extended period. This complicates the transfer of authority and responsibility in a disaster setting, especially when the relief and recovery phases are often not readily distinct from one another (Tay 2010: 26). Hence, what we can observe is a delicate balancing act in the region. On one hand, we see general acceptance of the fact that the military is and will always be a first responder in relief efforts. On the other hand, in a region where states still zealously guard their sovereignty, we also observe attempts to ensure that militaries, especially foreign, do not overstep their boundaries. While the relationship between civilian and military actors brings its fair share of challenges, there is certainly potential for more constructive cooperation and collaboration. Early structured engagement between the military and the larger humanitarian community should be a priority (Cook and Yogendran 2020: 47). In the region, this is already happening through the conduct of joint trainings and simulation exercises, and multi-stakeholder participation in civil-military forums such as the RCG. These activities facilitate the building of relations between the various actors, and help to clarify their roles and responsibilities during disaster situations. Particularly 3 Dunantists

are practitioners who operate with a strict adherence to the humanitarian principles. See ‘Hilhorst, Dorothea. “Classical Humanitarianism and Resilience Humanitarianism: Making Sense of Two Brands of Humanitarian Action.” Journal of International Humanitarian Action 3, no. 15(2018): 1–12.’.

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in the region, where trust and interpersonal relationships are key determinants of cooperation, these platforms gain more relevance and salience.

4 Conclusion Humanitarian action is no longer the preserve of traditional humanitarian actors, as has long been the case in the Asia–Pacific. There is a need to start challenging the assumption that “those outside the traditional sector have to fit within a tried and tested humanitarian framework” (Carpenter and Kent 2016: 159). Non-traditional humanitarian actors, such as the military, the private sector, and spontaneous volunteers, are already starting to influence the structure of the global humanitarian system through their own agency, while at the same time creating new operational norms. With this evolving landscape, more strategic forms of engagement between actors need to be formulated and actualised. There is a need to move from peaceful co-existence to meaningful collaboration. Modalities of interaction should be implemented such that the greatest number of humanitarian needs are met as efficiently and timely as possible.

References Ahn D, John B, James N, Harold W (2012) The case for establishing a civil-military disaster-relief hub in northeast Asia. Asia Policy 14:51–78 Carpenter S, Kent R (2016) The military, the private sector and traditional humanitarian actors. In: Sezgin Z, Dijkzeul D (eds) The new humanitarians in international practice: emerging actors and contested principles. New York, Routledge, pp 144–165 Cook ADB (2018) Siloes, synergies and prospects for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in southeast Asia. In: Chong A (ed) International security in the Asia-pacific: transcending ASEAN towards transitional polycentrism. Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 357–375 Cook ADB, Yogendran S (2020) Conceptualising humanitarian civil-military partnerships in the Asia-pacific: (Re-)ordering cooperation. Aust J Int Aff 74:35–53 Heaslip G, Elizabeth B (2014) Using the military in disaster relief: systemising challenges and opportunities. J HumItarian Logist Supply Chain Manag 4(1):60–81 Hofmann C-A, Laura H (2009) Military responses to natural disasters: last resort or inevitable trend? HumItarian Exch Mag 44:29–31 Lim GGN (2016) The future of the Singapore armed forces amidst the transforming strategic, geopolitical and domestic environment. Pointer J Singap Armed Forces 42(3):38–48 Madiwale A, Kudrat V (2011) Civil-military relations in natural disasters: a case-study of the 2010 Pakistan floods. Int Rev Red Cross 93(884):1085–1105 Malesic M (2015) The impact of military engagement in disaster management on civil-military relations. Curr Sociol 63(7):980–998 Mesina AJF (2017) Foreign military involvement in filipino relief operations. Peace Rev 29(3):392– 400 Moroney JDP, Pezard S, Miller LE, Engstrom J, Doll A (2013) Lessons from department of defense disaster relief efforts in the Asia-pacific region. RAND National Security Research Division Report, pp 1–146

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Ng EH (2015) Keynote address by minister for defence, Dr. Ng EH, at the World humanitarian summit global forum on humanitarian civil-military coordination 2015 on 13 Apr 2015. https://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/press_room/official_releases/sp/2015/ 13apr15_speech.html O’Hagan J, Miwa H (2014) Fragmentation of the international humanitarian order? understanding “cultures of humanitarianism’ in East Asia. Ethics Int Aff 28(4):409–424 UN OCHA (2014) Asia-pacific regional guidelines for the use of foreign military assets in natural disaster response operations. Ocha U report. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resour ces/Guidelines_FMA_Final.pdf RCG Summary Report (2017) Regional consultative group on humanitarian civil-military coordination third session summary report. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humani tarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/rcg_summaryreport_final.pdf Tay KL (2010) Should the armed forces be employed to fight the war or win the peace? a look at the military’s involvement in humanitarian assistance disaster relief operations. Pointer, J Singap Armed Forces 36(3–4):20–29 Wiharta S, Ahmad H, Haine JY, Lofgren J, Randall T (2008) The effectiveness of foreign military assets in natural disaster response. SIPRI Report, pp 1–139

Christopher Chen is an Associate Research Fellow on the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Programme at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He obtained a Master of International Relations and a Bachelor of Arts (Media & Communication and Politics & International Studies) from the University of Melbourne, Australia. He currently specialises in the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. His research interests include HADR in the AsiaPacific; institutional memory; human rights in Asia; forced migration; politics and conflicts in the Asia-Pacific.

Indonesia’s Humanitarian Engagements: Perspectives, Limitations and Prospects Tiola and Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki

Abstract In the past two decades, Indonesia has been playing a more active role in humanitarian affairs, despite preoccupation with natural disasters and political hurdles at home. This paper highlights that in performing these roles, the Indonesian government ties its humanitarian actions to its national interest and foreign policy goals. This tendency is demonstrated in the country’s humanitarian foci, which are largely linked to its ambitions to demonstrate leadership in resolving crises in ASEAN; as well in Muslim communities. As such, the Indonesian government’s contributions are more pronounced in cases which promote Indonesia’s leadership regionally and globally, such as in the Rohingya crisis and Palestine issue. On top of this, the paper also discusses Indonesia’s contribution to the United Nations Peacekeeping missions. Although peacekeeping is usually separated from humanitarian actions due to its political nature, in the case of Indonesia, the two are deeply interlinked. Lastly, this paper also explores the perspectives and contributions of various state and non-state institutions involved in the engagements, including the Indonesian Military and non-governmental organizations. Keywords Indonesia · Humanitarian diplomacy · ASEAN · Muslim solidarity

1 Introduction Indonesia is not a stranger to humanitarian crises, particularly in the form of disasters that virtually plagued the archipelago all year round. One of the most striking examples is the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, which devastated coastal areas of Sumatera and killed 167,000 people, as well as displacing more than half a million people (Jayasuriya and McCawley 2010, 69). Over the past decade, Indonesia has grappled with various humanitarian crises, although comparatively smaller in terms of scale with the 2004 earthquake and tsunami such as volcanic eruptions, forest Tiola (B) · K. I. Marzuki S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_12

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fires, droughts and floods, to name a few. Apart from domestic disasters, Indonesia also had the first-hand experience in the 2015 Rohingya refugee crisis in which the country provided temporary shelter for Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar in rickety boats towards Australia (Cochrane 2015). At the broader international stage, Indonesia has been consistently vocal on the issue of Palestine independence and the 2017 Rohingya crisis, as well as participating in several peace-keeping operations in war-torn/conflict areas worldwide since as early as 1957 (Anwar 2014). This paper argues that Indonesia has been involved in humanitarian efforts domestically and abroad in one form or another, i.e. as an active contributor and as a recipient. Indonesia’s domestic HADR efforts could generally be regarded as a part of the government’s function as maintained by the constitution. But nevertheless, both the domestic and international dimension of Indonesia’s humanitarian engagements— expressed primarily through Indonesia’s foreign policy—is primarily rooted to the spirit of the country’s 1945 Constitution and the founding ideology of Pancasila (or Five Principles), both of which recognise the values of humanity and solidarity among nations. There are, however, some limitations to Indonesia’s humanitarian engagements overseas due to preoccupation towards domestic HADR efforts, as well as the ever-changing political winds. As a part of foreign policy, Indonesia’s humanitarian engagements are driven by bottom-up pressures, compared to other areas of the country’s foreign policy, which are a lot more top-down and elite-dependent.

2 Perspectives and Priorities of Indonesia’s Humanitarian Engagement Indonesia’s perspectives on humanitarianism are philosophically embodied in the 1945 Constitution and the state ideology of Pancasila (Gordyn 2018). The preamble explicitly states that freedom is the right of all nations and thus any form of colonialism and oppression by one nation to another must be abolished as they are not humane nor just. Furthermore, the Constitution mandated the government to protect the Indonesian nation, guarantee their welfare and participates in the maintenance of peaceful world order. Pancasila’s second principle of Kemanusiaan yang Adil dan Beradab (just and civilised humanity) further highlighted that all human beings are to be treated with dignity. Based on the philosophical foundation, Indonesia’s humanitarianism can be understood as the promotion of human welfare based on a universal value of humanity and justice, with an emphasis on the liberation from any form of oppression. In practice, this philosophy is expressed through direct government involvement in providing humanitarian relief, hosting refugees, as well as contributing to UN peacekeeping operations, among other initiatives. Indonesia’s humanitarian activities, within the country or abroad, involves a number of actors, both state actors and civil society/non-governmental organisations. Given the mandate of the constitution, state actors generally play a more prominent role in domestic humanitarian efforts. The Indonesian military (TNI), for

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example, has been in the forefront given its assets and over-arching military structure. Depending on the type of humanitarian assistance initiatives, the Ministry for Social Affairs and the National Disaster Management Authority (BNPB), as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, may play a role in terms of coordinating humanitarian activities. Civil society and local NGOs are other key actors in Indonesia’s humanitarian assistance. With their networks and the ability to pool donations from the public often places them as a potent agent in delivering humanitarian assistance, whether domestically or internationally. Moreover, CSOs and NGOs, particularly established ones with overseas networks, can bypass diplomatic constraints. But more recently, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been more directly involved to coordinate CSOs/NGOs humanitarian activities overseas. The Indonesian military and the national police force (POLRI) are also frequently involved in specific types of humanitarian initiative such as peacekeeping operations. Given the wide-ranging actors involved in humanitarian engagements, different standards of humanitarianism naturally emerge. Certain faith-based NGOs, for example, exemplified certain biases in the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance due to their unique philosophical paradigms (Latief 2013, 188). Another example that highlights the different standards of humanitarianism is the Indonesian government insistence that external humanitarian initiatives, as well as domestic initiatives to some degree, are coordinated through government institutions, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the National Disaster Management Authority (BNPB) in order to ensure that humanitarian aid is delivered to the right people and minimise externalities (Masyrafah and McKeon 2008) as Indonesia had experienced in the post-tsunami relief efforts in Aceh.

2.1 Muslim Solidarity Since its independence, Indonesia has been channelling assistance to Muslimmajority countries, including various assistances for Palestine, Bangladesh, the Rohingyas, and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan. Given the long-shared history and, to some extent, ideological affinities among them, this assistance is reflective of the aspiration of many Indonesians to express solidarity among Muslim communities. However, such activism is quite distinct from other areas of foreign policy, where Indonesia’s identity as a Muslim-identity country does not play the main role. Although Indonesia is a part of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), its activism in the organisation is very limited (Sukma 2006, 90). This stands in contrast with Indonesia’s engagement in other platforms, particularly in ASEAN—an organisation in which Indonesia largely defines its identity, as well as economic, political and defence orientations. Within this context, Muslim solidarity, seen as an essential expression by many Indonesians—manifest in a less crucial dimension of its foreign policy, through Indonesia’s humanitarian contribution and soft diplomacy with Islamic countries and communities.

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Additionally, non-governmental Islamic organisations in Indonesia have also been largely active in humanitarian assistance. In addition to their self-organised fund-raising, the government, as well as domestic and foreign donors, have increasingly tapped on these organisations as partners. For instance, since 2004, Australia’s AusAID has worked with Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah—the two largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia—in many projects in Indonesia, including in post-tsunami disaster relief in Aceh (Fauzia 2017, 224).

2.2 Peacekeeping Operations Indonesia’s contribution to the UN Peacekeeping operations is a major part of the country’s humanitarian activities. Indonesia has been active in contributing peacekeeping since 1957. Since then, Indonesia has sent over 40,000 personnel in 28 peacekeeping missions, and by January 2019, the country ranked 5th among the largest contributors. Following the downfall of President Soeharto in 1998 and the abolition of dual function doctrine—a system where the Indonesian military served as both a defence and a socio-political force, Indonesia is increasingly focused on military modernisation, and, by extension, the country’s contribution for peacekeeping surged. This is particularly prevalent under the presidency of Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014), whose foreign policy focused on boosting Indonesia’s participation in international institutions. In the regional context, Indonesia also actively promoted peacekeeping values within ASEAN. In 2003, during discussions related to ASEAN Security Community, Indonesia proposed the establishment of an ASEAN peacekeeping force to maintain regional security (Thayer 2014). However, the proposal was declined by other member states, due to the organisation’s non-interference principle. Indonesia’s focus on peacekeeping continues under the Joko Widodo administration (2014 to present), with the enactment of the “Roadmap Vision 4000 Peacekeepers 2015–2019”, which was largely driven by Indonesia’s ambition to sit as a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council—which had materialised in July 2018 (The Jakarta Post 2018). In addition to its ambitions to be a global player, Indonesia’s peacekeeping contribution is also nuanced with Muslim solidarity. This tendency is apparent in Indonesia’s effort to maintain a larger number of military personnel in UNIFIL compared to other missions, which is party related to Indonesia’s support for Palestine (Sebastian 2006). Overall, the experience of Indonesia in humanitarian affairs reflects its internal composition, exposure to natural hazards in the Asia-Pacific and demonstrates an emerging player both in terms of government and non-government activity within the global humanitarian system.

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References Anwar DF (2014) Indonesia’s peacekeeping operations: history, practice, and future trend. In: Aoi C, Heng YK (eds) Asia-pacific nations in international peace support and stability missions. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp 189–210 Cochrane J (2015) Indonesia and Malaysia agree to care for stranded migrants. New York Times. 20 May 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/world/asia/indonesia-malaysia-rohingyabangladeshi-migrants-agreement.html Fauzia A (2017) Islamic philanthropy in Indonesia: modernization, islamization, and social justice. Austrian J South-East Asian Stud 10(2):223–236 Gordyn C (2018) Pancasila and pragmatism: protection or pencitraan for refugees in Indonesia? J Southeast Asian Hum Rights 2(2):336–357 Jayasuriya S, McCawley P (2010) The Asian tsunami: aid and reconstruction after a disaster. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Latief H (2013) Islam and humanitarian affairs: the middle class and new patterns of social activism. In: Burhanudin J, van Dijk K (eds) Islam in Indonesia: contrasting images and interpretations. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, pp 173–194 Masyrafah H, McKeon J (2008) Post-tsunami aid effectiveness in aceh: proliferation and coordination in reconstruction. Wolfensohn center for development working paper. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC Sebastian LC (2006) Indonesian peacekeepers in lebanon. IDSS commentary. 13 Sept 2006. https:// www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO06098.pdf Sukma R (2006) Islam in Indonesian foreign policy. Routledge, New York Thayer (2014) ASEAN and UN peacekeeping. The Diplomat. 25 April 2014. https://thediplomat. com/2014/04/asean-and-un-peacekeeping/

Tiola is a Senior Analyst at the Indonesia Programme. Her research mainly covers Indonesia’s foreign policy, civil-military relations, and the modernization of the Indonesian Military. Prior to joining the Indonesia Programme in October 2018, she worked in political risk consulting firms in Singapore and Hong Kong. She obtained an M.Sc degree in Strategic Studies in 2016 at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. During her study in RSIS between 2014 and 2016, she concurrently served as a Research Associate at the Indonesia Programme under the Research Analyst Award. Her publications have appeared in various outlets, including The National Interest, The Jakarta Post, and Eurasia Review.Tiola is a Senior Analyst at the Indonesia Programme. Her research mainly covers Indonesia’s foreign policy, civil-military relations, and the modernization of the Indonesian Military. Prior to joining the Indonesia Programme in October 2018, she worked in political risk consulting firms in Singapore and Hong Kong. She obtained an M.Sc. degree in Strategic Studies in 2016 at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. During her study in RSIS between 2014 and 2016, she concurrently served as a Research Associate at the Indonesia Programme under the Research Analyst Award. Her publications have appeared in various outlets, including The National Interest, The Jakarta Post, and Eurasia Review. Keoni Marzuki is an Associate Research Fellow at the Indonesia Programme. He joined the Indonesia Programme in October 2015 after obtaining his M.Sc. degree in Strategic Studies in 2015 at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He was a programme associate at the Indonesia Programme from 2013–2015 while concurrently studying full-time at RSIS under the Research Analyst Award. He provided assistance to Associate Professor Leonard Sebastian, Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki in the publication of Indonesia Beyond Reformasi: Necessity and the “De-Centering” of Democracy, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 3–2014 (218), Carey School of Law, University of Maryland.

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He obtained his bachelor degree on political science (international relation) from Parahyangan Catholic University in 2008. His publication have appeared in The Jakarta Post, East Asia Forum and Eurasia Review. Additionally, he had also published in Indonesian journals such as Jurnal Analisis CSIS, Indonesian Quarterly, and Strategic Review.

The Humanitarian Face of US-Philippines Security Alliance: Humanitarian Partners, Friends and Allies Julius Cesar I. Trajano

Abstract With the rising intensity and frequency of disasters that regularly hit the Philippines, the humanitarian face of the US-Philippines security alliance addresses critical challenges to the Philippines’ humanitarian relief operations. From the Philippines’ perspective, the security partnership helps the country prepare for and respond effectively to disasters and humanitarian emergencies as the US provides the muchneeded logistics and financial aid to humanitarian relief and rehabilitation. Meanwhile, the US’ humanitarian diplomacy allows it to deepen its strategic presence in the Philippines. In recent years, such diplomacy has been largely focused on providing comprehensive assistance encompassing multinational military coordination, deployment of humanitarian relief logistics, and community-based disaster risk reduction projects. By focusing on localised disaster preparedness assistance, the US will not need to deploy huge contingent of its military assets while achieving the same geostrategic objectives and humanitarian diplomacy goals in the Philippines. Keywords US-Philippines security ties · Humanitarian assistance · Bilateral alliance · Disaster relief · Disaster risk reduction · Humanitarian diplomacy The long-standing security and treaty alliance between the United States and the Philippines has undergone evolving strategic goals since the end of World War 2, from the spectre of Cold War conflicts, terrorism, China’s assertiveness, to providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). With the rising intensity and frequency of disasters that regularly hit the Philippines, the humanitarian face of the US-Philippines security alliance addresses critical challenges to the Philippines’ HADR operations. From the Philippine perspective, the security partnership helps the Philippines prepare for and respond effectively to disasters and humanitarian emergencies as the US provides the much needed capacity-building assistance, logistics and financial aid to humanitarian relief and rehabilitation. Meanwhile, as the U.S. J. C. I. Trajano (B) S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_13

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ships deliver food, water and medicine, they are also delivering goodwill that could ease the way for the US to strengthen its often-controversial military presence in one of Southeast Asia’s most strategic countries as well as in the Asia–Pacific.

1 Pre-existing Military and Civilian Agreements The Philippines and the US maintain an enduring and responsive security alliance with the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty as its primary foundation. Anchored into the Treaty is the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement which allows the Balikatan (shoulderto-shoulder) exercises between the American and Filipino soldiers. The joint military exercises have been the most evident manifestation of the bilateral partnership. Over the last decade, disaster response has also become an increasingly vital agenda of joint training exercises between the US and Philippine militaries. In order to make their alliance responsive to the contemporary security challenges and opportunities, the Philippines and the US signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (Department of Foreign Affairs 2014). The agreement states that the US can rotate troops into the Philippines for extended stays and is allowed to build and operate facilities in Philippine military bases. Such facilities may store military assets and personnel for HADR and other security cooperation initiatives (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement 2014). Meanwhile, a key civilian arrangement is the cooperation between US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Philippine government on disaster risk reduction programmes. Since 1990, USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has responded to 50 disasters in the Philippines, through comprehensive disaster risk reduction programs that build the capacity of local communities, government agencies and NGOs (USAID Philippines 2018). From 2013 to early 2018, the US government gave over US$184 million for humanitarian and disaster risk reduction assistance in the Philippines (US Embassy in the Philippines 2018a).

2 Key Contributions to HADR in the Philippines 2.1 Providing Platforms for Fast Delivery of Humanitarian Aid The comprehensive US-Philippines partnership on HADR is very evident in two known cases: the Super Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 and Marawi Conflict in 2017. In the first hours of Typhoon Haiyan, the U.S. military, collaborating with the Philippine military counterparts, was able to respond quickly due to prepositioned military assets based in facilities near the Philippines. In the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, the US launched Operation Damayan (mutual help), providing over US$143 million

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in humanitarian aid to typhoon victims and affected provinces. Given the lack of Philippine military assets for relief operations, including the much needed strategic lift, the close bilateral partnership facilitated the immediate deployment of US military assets (78 US ships and aircraft and around 1,040 US soldiers), particularly in isolated coastal communities and mountainous provinces (Lum and Margesson 2014). In May 2017, conflict broke out between terror groups and the Philippine military in Marawi, displacing nearly 360,000 people. The growing US-Philippines partnership to effectively respond to growing humanitarian challenges from armed conflicts was clearly demonstrated in this crisis. As Marawi City has yet to be rehabilitated, the USAID launched the Marawi Response Project in 2018, which aims to improve economic and social conditions of communities affected by the conflict. Part of the project is to assist vulnerable populations, including youth, enhance their job skills and attain livelihoods. As of 2018, the total funding commitment of the US to Marawi humanitarian response reached nearly US$60 million (US Embassy in the Philippines 2018b).

2.2 Institutionalising a Multinational Military Coordination Mechanism In the aftermath of Haiyan, the interoperability for joint operations between the US and Philippine militaries served as the foundation of the multinational military coordination mechanism, known as the Multinational Coordination Centre (MNCC). Setup by the Philippine military, the MNCC started as a Command Coordination Center (CCC) based on the existing bilateral mechanism on HADR cooperation with the US. It was the US which first provided logistical assistance to the Philippine military during Haiyan. Eventually, there was a need to convert CCC to MNCC to accommodate the growing list of foreign militaries that were providing assistance to the Philippines after Haiyan.1 Through the MNCC, the deployment of foreign militaries with their C130s and other logistical assets became systematic, organised and quick which accelerated the delivery of relief items and evacuation of survivors in the affected areas. It was demonstrated that the optimal use of defence assets should be best coordinated through the MNCC, an important lesson derived from the Haiyan responses. Since Haiyan, the MNCC has become a permanent fixture in the Philippines’ large-scale disaster response that requires assistance from foreign militaries.

1 Interview with a high-ranking official of the AFP, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, 22 July

2016.

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2.3 Sharing of Resources Another key lesson from previous mega-disaster such as Haiyan is the pre-positioning of HADR assets for immediate deployment should the need arise. Under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the US military can setup facilities within Philippine military camps, purportedly for their HADR and maritime security operations. The first of the five planned facilities has been recently inaugurated at a Philippine Air Force base in central Luzon in January 2019. This facility serves as a multi-purpose warehouse, which will be used to store assets for HADR operations by the US military (Mangosing 2019).

2.4 Advancing Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction at the Local Level US-Philippines partnership on HADR is not exclusive to military-military interoperability and response operations. Since 2014, the USAID has also been partnering with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in helping local governments’ disaster management councils promote community-based disaster risk reduction programmes. The USAID-CRS disaster resilience project also trains local authorities to develop comprehensive disaster management plans, as well as strengthens sustainable livelihoods in vulnerable communities so that they can have income diversification and savings strategies to heighten their resilience to disasters (USAID Philippines 2018).

3 Implications on the Humanitarian Landscape in the Philippines and ASEAN The bilateral partnership is indeed compatible with multilateral cooperation on HADR. For instance, the bilateral partnership contributes to increasing collaboration among allied foreign militaries in the region in terms of military exercises involving HADR. In fact, in 2018, the US-Philippines Balikatan exercises were expanded for the first time to include Australian and Japanese defence forces. The Philippines has a visiting forces agreement with Australia while it has a strategic partnership pact with Japan. The exercises tested the capability and preparedness of the four militaries to jointly respond to mega-disasters. They conducted exercises with the MNCC procedure as an inter-operability framework (US Embassy in the Philippines 2018c). The MNCC framework has become a model of inter-state civil-military cooperation on HADR in the region. The bilateral partnership also complements the ASEAN regional framework on HADR as the US provides the needed military assets and logistics for humanitarian aid and even rehabilitation, which the region might not be able to sufficiently

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provide. This can be seen in the aftermath of Haiyan. ASEAN Member States immediately responded with aid assistance to the Philippines and a small contingent of the ASEAN-Emergency Response and Assessment Team. However, the ASEAN’s mechanisms, including the AHA Centre, were not yet designed to address disasters of this magnitude and complexity at that time (ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre 2014). It was the US military that was able to significantly improve the conduct of humanitarian relief during Haiyan and even provided long-term rehabilitation aid.

References ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre (2014) Weathering the perfect storm—lesson learnt on the ASEAN’s response to the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan. ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines (2014) Philippines-United States bilateral relations fact sheet. https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/dfa-releasesupdate/2695-philippine-united-states-bilateral-rel ations-fact-sheet Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the Philippines and the United States, Quezon City, April 2014 Lum T, Margesson R (2014) Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda): U.S. and international response to Philippines disaster. Congressional Research Service, Washington DC Mangosing F (2019) Philippines-US launch first Edca site in Pampanga. Inquirer.net, 29 Jan 2019 USAID Philippines (2018) Partners in the Philippines’ development. USAID Philippines, Manila US Embassy in the Philippines (2018a) U.S., Philippine Governments and WFP celebrate accomplishments of disaster resilience project. News and Events, 26 Apr 2018. https://ph.usembassy. gov/us-philippine-governments-and-wfp-celebrate-accomplishments-of-disaster-resilience-pro ject/ US Embassy in the Philippines (2018b) Ambassador Kim announces Php1.35 billion Marawi response project. News and Events, 16 Oct 2018. https://ph.usembassy.gov/ambassador-kimannounces-php1-35-billion-marawi-response-project/ US Embassy in the Philippines (2018c) Balikatan 34-2018. U.S. Indo-Pacific command news release, 20 Apr 2018. https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/150 0010/balikatan-34-2018/

Julius Cesar I. Trajano is Research Fellow with the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests are in non-traditional security issues in the Asia-Pacific, particularly nuclear security governance, peacebuilding in the southern Philippines, marine environmental protection, and human trafficking. He has recently authored or co-authored “A Policy Analysis of Nuclear Safety Culture and Security Culture in East Asia” (Nuclear Engineering and Technology, 2019); “Peacebuilding from the grassroots: Resolving conflicts in Mindanao” (Asia Dialogue, 2019); and “Enhancing nuclear energy cooperation in ASEAN: Regional norms and challenges.” Chapter 7 in Learning from Fukushima: Nuclear Power in East Asia (Australia National University Press, 2017). He is presently the coordinating chair for the Asia Working Group and Working Group 2 vice chair, both within the International Nuclear Security Education Network, and is a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific-Nuclear Energy Experts Group.

The Role of Civil Society in Disaster Response—The Philippine Experience Maria Ela L. Atienza and Dennis Quilala

Abstract This article focuses on the role of civil society, particularly local nongovernment organizations (NGOs), in disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) in the Philippines. Disaster response is usually viewed as dominated by state actors and international organizations. In the Philippines, the DRRM frameworks and plans put a lot of responsibility on different national and local government agencies but the legal environment also allows for participation of local NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs). This chapter argues that local NGOs can ensure transparency and accountability and provide voice to those who don’t have access to influential institutions. They have the expertise, local knowledge, trust of the local community, and the resources that could complement the government’s responsibility in disaster risk reduction and management. They can perform unique roles like the transport of relief goods in conflict areas or bridging government and local community relations. Thus, the global humanitarian system should not look at local NGOs as competitors in humanitarian work. They should be seen as partners whose resources and skills can improve communities’ disaster resilience. Keywords Civil society · Civil society organizations (CSOs) · Disaster response · Disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) · Non-government organizations (NGOs) · Philippines

1 Legal Environment The national disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) framework of the Philippines is led by governmental actors at the national and local levels. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) is chaired by the M. E. L. Atienza (B) · D. Quilala Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] D. Quilala Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_14

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Secretary of the Department of National Defense. Moreover, the vice-chairs and most of the members of the NDRRMC are also from the government. The NDRRMC is responsible for crafting both the national DRRM framework and the national DRRM plans of the Philippines.1 The NDRRMC’s other roles include monitoring efforts by different agencies in implementing the framework and developing the capacity of local government units (LGUs) in DRRM. In this government-led framework, the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (LDRRMCs) are given the responsibility as the first disaster responders. The nature of humanitarian crises could justify a framework that is dominated by government. A complex event such as a humanitarian crisis requires an organization that could coordinate all efforts and resources to effectively respond. Ideally, the government has the resources and the ability to coordinate such efforts. Moreover, humanitarian crises also require speedy and authoritative decision-making which governments could provide. Given this environment, what are the roles played by civil society organizations (CSOs) in humanitarian crises? Republic Act No. 10121 (RA 10121) or the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 recognizes the roles of CSOs in DRRM. It is state policy to involve CSOs in the DRRM programs of the government particularly when it comes to the mobilization of resources and the delivery of services during humanitarian crisis. In RA 10121, civil society is defined as non-state actors whose aims are neither to generate profits nor to seek governing power. CSOs unite people to advance shared goals and interests. ... CSOs include nongovernment organizations (NGOs), professional associations, foundations, independent research institutes, community-based organizations (CBOs), faith-based organizations, people’s organizations, social movements, and labor unions.

In this framework, the “[p]rivate sector and civil society groups shall work in accordance with the coordination mechanism and policies set by the NDRRMC and concerned LDRRMCs.” In the National Disaster Response Plan for TerrorismRelated Incidents, CSOs are required to coordinate all their activities with the NDRRMC. Likewise, the Local Government Code of the Philippines (RA 7160) recognizes the roles of NGOs in enhancing local autonomy. LGUs can tap NGOs in delivering basic social services. There should also be NGO representation in the local development councils and in some other local special boards. While the legal environment for disaster risk reduction and management in the Philippines is dominated by government actors, it is conducive for NGO participation before, during, and after a humanitarian crisis. There are plenty of potential roles for NGOs during a humanitarian crisis.

1 Republic

Act 10121 or the Act Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System.

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2 Roles of Civil Society While the NDRRMC is led by the secretaries of the different departments of the executive department,2 the Council also has members from civil society. The four CSOs include the Ateneo School of Government, the Center for Disaster Preparedness, World Vision, and DRRNet. Civil society participation in shaping the DRRM framework of the Philippines ensures that the voices of non-state actors that work at the grassroots level reach the officials of the national government agencies. This also ensures transparency within the NDRRMC. Potentially, these NGOs could hold government agencies accountable when it comes to their roles in DRRM.3 Transparency and accountability could also be ensured by NGOs at the local levels as CSOs also need to be represented in the LDRRMCs. More importantly, the voice of constituents at the local level can be heard in these local councils through the NGOs. NGOs have also developed expertise on DRRM which could be used to help government in ensuring that communities are resilient. The Center for Disaster Preparedness has been involved in the promotion of community-based DRRM and has been working on disaster preparedness, disaster risk reduction project implementation, disaster response, networking and advocacy. Its DRRM research could be used by government in policy-making. Its work could complement efforts by government to develop the capacities of LGUs and other organizations in DRRM. It also serves as the lead convener of the DRRNet which is made up of more than 50 CSOs. NGOs can also mobilize resources needed for disaster response. The Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation is a non-profit organization established by the private sector and by other NGOs. It operates the Emergency Operations Center which is a “24/7 self-sufficient operations hub for disaster preparedness training and coordination of relief and recovery efforts” primarily of the private sector. It works with the government and other CSOs to ensure disaster resilient businesses as well. It also helps government transport relief goods to conflict-affected areas. Because there are many cases in the Philippines were communist armed groups attack relief operations that use military vehicles, the Foundation has provided civilian vehicles from its members to the government to ensure that the relief operations will not be prevented from entering conflict areas. It is observed that this process has been more efficient and devoid of bureaucratic processes that could slow down operations. Local NGOs work with vulnerable groups that may not be in the radar of government or the international community. With the knowledge and experience of engaging vulnerable groups, they could be tapped by government as partners to implement programs. In addition, local NGOs that they are trusted by the local communities

2 The

members of the council from government come from 41 government agencies. “Accountability for Disaster Risk Reduction: Lessons from the Philippines” Emily Polack, Emmanual Luna, and Jessica Dator-Bercilla.

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could advocate for the interests of local communities in local, national, and international fora. In cases where there is conflict between the government and the communities, local NGOs could serve as intermediaries or facilitators for dialogue. This may be possible with the local NGOs’ access to both the communities and government institutions. Local NGOs could be tapped in programs that intend to improve community resilience because they are more immersed in local communities and thus have local knowledge. Local NGOs can help design programs that fit the needs of the community and are culturally sensitive. Sulong CARHRIHL4 for instance is primarily involved in the promotion of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Philippine government’s armed conflict with the communist New People’s Army. Moreover, with the network it has created, Sulong has become an advocate of the concerns of the individuals and communities affected by armed conflict. While the government could provide immediate responses to individuals affected by the armed conflict, Sulong provides various types of support even in times of fragile peace in these communities. Typhoon Haiyan (local name Yolanda) was one of the worst natural hazards in the history of the Philippines. The government-led response was viewed by many people as a failure and lack of coordination between various actors and agencies. The Pope Francis Village in Tacloban City, which was built after the disaster, represents a model case of an inclusive strategy involving international and local organizations, local communities, and LGUs. A consortium of local and foreign organizations that include Caritas, Urban Poor Associates, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, etc. helped in setting up the village. They were able to build typhoon and earthquake-resilient in-city housing units for survivors of some coastal barangays as well as identify appropriate livelihood projects, e.g. rice enterprise, and develop a savings scheme managed by community clusters.5

3 Broadening Space for Civil Society DRRM could be dominated by state actors and international organizations. In the Philippines, the framework and the plans that would lead to disaster resilience put a lot of responsibility on the different national and local government agencies. But the legal environment also allows for participation from local CSOs in general. Local NGOs can ensure transparency and accountability. They also provide voice to those who don’t have access to influential institutions. Local NGOs have the expertise, local knowledge, trust of the local community, and the resources that could complement the government’s responsibility in disaster risk reduction and 4 CARHRIHL or the Comprehensive Agreement on the Respect for Human Rights and International

Humanitarian Law refers to the agreement signed by the Philippine government and the Communist Party of the Philippines. 5 Atienza et al. (2019).

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management. They can perform unique roles like the transport of relief goods in conflict areas or act as a bridge between government and the local community. Although the space for local NGOs is not as vast as the space for state actors in the area of DRRM, they could still complement state efforts and in some instances contribute uniquely in complex situations. The global humanitarian system should not look at local NGOs as competitors in humanitarian work. They should be seen as partners whose resources and skills can improve communities’ disaster resilience.

Reference Atienza ME, Eadie P, Tan-Mullins M (2019) Urban poverty in the wake of environmental disaster: rehabilitation, resilience and Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda). Routledge, London and New York, p 81

Maria Ela L. Atienza, Ph.D. is Professor and former Chair in the Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman. She is Editor of the Philippine Political Science Journal, the Scopus journal of the Philippine Political Science Association, and CoConvenor of the Program on Social and Political Change of the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies. Professor Atienza’s research interests and publications cover local governance and devolution, human security, health policy and politics, and women and gender issues. She recently finished a project on poverty alleviation in areas affected by super typhoon Haiyan and co-authored the book Urban Poverty in the Wake of Environmental Disaster (Routledge, 2019). Dennis Quilala is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science in the University of the Philippines Diliman. His research interests include human security, conflict resolution, human rights, and international actors and local governments in conflict situations. He is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand.

Private Sector: Under-Appreciated Actors in Disaster Response and Recovery Ranit Chatterjee

Abstract Across economies, the private sector essentially consists of large, medium, small and micro businesses, in varying degrees. These categories are characteristically different but mutually dependent and, hence, their inclusive recovery is essential. Due to limited available data, most disaster policies and recovery frameworks address the private sector as a homogenous entity and propose uniform recovery activities that might have varying implications on the ground. On the other hand, the large and medium businesses engage proactively in response and recovery initiatives while the small and micro businesses are mostly managing their own risks. This chapter studies the past cases of private sector engagement in disaster response and recovery to develop a framework for enhancing the engagement of the micro sand small businesses into disaster risk management. Keywords Disaster recovery · Response · Private sector · Micro and small businesses · Policy · Asia

1 Introduction The Asia Pacific region has a diverse landscape of developed, developing and emerging economies and is projected to be the world’s fastest-growing economic corridor over the next decade. The private sector is a major driver of this growth with 75% or more investment in national economies. On the other hand, this region is one of the most disaster-prone regions of the world. Considering the future predictions of an increase in frequency and severity of disasters in this region, the risk is high for millions of lives and livelihoods at the regional, national and local level. This risk has been well recognised globally and resonated in the Sendai declaration, calling for significant reduction in loss of lives, and livelihoods by 2030 and beyond. Needless to say, the role of the private sector will be central to disaster management in R. Chatterjee (B) Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_15

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the future, with a shift in approach from “Response to Risk Reduction to Resilience Building”. The private sector has a long history of engaging in humanitarian assistance and disaster response. A majority of these engagements are in the form of philanthropic donations and voluntary services to the disaster-affected community. But they were lacking a formal recognition in the global and national disaster policies as a major stakeholder till recently. A major fallout of this was reflected by the limited role of the private sector in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). By the time, the private sector got recognition as a major stakeholder, the focus shifted from response to risk reduction, which leads to sufficient development of risk reduction activities for the private sector. Whilst the role of the private sector in response, relief and aid was less explored (Davies 2011). This warrants for a study on the role of the private in disaster response, relief and aid. The scope of this article is limited to the role of the private sector in post-disaster response, relief and recovery activities. A review of the private sector activities in recent disasters in the Asia–Pacific is conducted to highlight the latent potential in the private sector that can be useful for filling up various grey areas of humanitarian aid. The global policies address the private sector as a homogenous entity while in reality, it is highly heterogeneous in nature. Private businesses can be categorized based on their capital investment (micro, small, medium and large), sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, retail and wholesale, service) and their relation with state actors (formal and informal). Having said that, there is hardly any disaggregated data or study that focus on response and aid mechanism of the various private sector subgroups that would highlight their capacities. To understand this better, the engagement by the private sector in the 2001 Gujarat Earthquake, 2008 Cyclone Nargis, 2013 Typhoon Haiyan, 2015 Nepal Earthquake is studied.

2 Mapping Private Engagement in Disaster Response and Recovery The private sector along with the local community become the first responders for any disasters primarily engaging on the moral and ethical ground but there are other possible drivers such as developing commercial opportunities, improving the market, protecting the consumer base and preventing market interruption, and formal agreements with government (OCHA 2017). The private sector response can be categorized under two broad heads short term (Response, Relief, Rehabilitation essentially within 6 months after a disaster) and long term (post 6 months to 7 years or more).

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2.1 Short-Term Engagement The private sector’s presence in the initial phase of disaster response has been reported in all the disasters refereed for this study. The form of engagement can be categorized as direct and indirect engagement. The direct engagement of the private sector happens either through the distribution of relief materials, voluntary services or due to requisitions made by the government agencies. In the first two cases, it is not legally binding and not coordinated as in the latter case where a formal agreement dictates a systematic coordinated engagement of the private sector. Most likely businesses who are located within the impact zone will engage directly while others would make indirect contributions through NGOs in cash or kind as was seen in the case of the 2001 Gujarat earthquake. 75 corporate entities were involved in the response and relief distribution. Some initiatives by the business community (Tea traders) to extend relief and rehabilitation support to the affected people in their own line of business were observed in Gujarat (Patel and Alagh 2003). In case of the 2015 Nepal earthquake, interviews with informal business owners highlighted their engagement in clearing debris from collapsed buildings in first 3 months to clear the narrow lanes leading to shops and residences (Chatterjee and Okazaki 2018). On the other hand, formal businesses distributed either their products (bottled water, food) or gave cash donations to the national relief fund or local NGOs. The large enterprises set up stand-alone relief camps from their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds. In the aftermath of 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, large corporations made cash donations or in kind from CSR funds (ILO 2015). Significant efforts were made to brief companies on how best to assist the affected communities and partner with businesses in the provision of cash-based assistance (Carden and Clements 2015). A common issue in both Nepal and in the Philippines is the lack of planning and coordination for response work among the private sector, NGOs and government. Another issue was the security of the relief goods and staff, due to the worsening security situation after a disaster. Similar cases were reported in the Zamboanga City of Mindanao Province and Santa Rosa of Laguna Province after Typhoon Haiyan. It was observed in both the Gujarat and Nepal relief efforts that the large enterprises tend to engage in short-term humanitarian aid. It is possible that the efforts of the large corporations are well recorded and reported for using these engagements as a trust-building exercise with both the community and the government. Whilst the private sector engages in disaster relief and response, there have been no efforts made by the humanitarian aid agencies and government agencies to reach out to the private business especially the ones in the formal clusters in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.

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2.2 Long-Term Engagement Public–Private Partnership (PPP) is one of the most practised models for engaging the private sector in long-term reconstruction and recovery. In Gujarat, a total of 17 public sectors, private companies and corporate associations enlisted for the PPP model of earthquake reconstruction in the initial phase. A trend among the corporates was to work within a controlled and planned framework of activities in order to deliver a standard product according to a time schedule. As a result, they preferred relocation to reconstruction. However, strong bureaucracy for recovery was an impediment for the companies, which led to the withdrawal of a few of them in the later phase. In the case of 2013 Typhoon Haiyan, the private sector after the relief phase, engaged in reviving distribution chains for essential items, reduce predatory pricing and restore livelihoods. In addition, they made substantial contributions to recovery and reconstruction in the form of financial donations from companies, corporate foundations and employee giving campaigns, and donations of products and expertise (Brown 2015). Whilst all these efforts reduced the burden on the government, issues with role clarity, coordination and lack of planning were experienced for the private sector engagement in the Philippines (ILO 2015). In the case of Nepal, PPP has been projected as the tool for achieving recovery after the 2015 earthquake. While a few cases have been seen in terms of developing healthcare, education and public infrastructure. There is a need for further studies to document private sector engagement in the recovery process.

3 Conclusion The private sector is a key agent in disaster response and recovery in the Asia–Pacific and more generally. They support response, relief and restoration efforts of markets in the short term and reconstruction in the long term. The large corporate entities mostly prefer independent, direct and short-term engagement, and also partner with government and other agencies for long-term engagement in physical reconstruction. The micro, small and medium enterprises, on the other hand, would essentially engage indirectly in short-term response and relief and are absent in long term recovery efforts. The key to having a well-coordinated response mechanism for the private sector will lie in their preparedness and relations with the government and NGOs. A need is felt at the end of this study to further explore the role of the private sector in addressing wider and long-term impacts of a disaster like the livelihood loss, market failures, and innovation on new disaster products and services. Further studies need to fill the gap in understanding how the private sector engages in long-term disaster recovery.

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References Brown S (2015) The private sector: stepping up. Humanit Exch 6:34–36 Carden D, Clements AJ (2015) Coordinating the response to Typhoon Haiyan. Humanit Exch 63:3–5 Chatterjee R, Okazaki K (2018) Household livelihood recovery after 2015 Nepal Earthquake in informal economy: case study of shop owners in Bungamati, ICBR2017, 27–29 November 2017, Bangkok, Thailand Davies P (2011) The role of the private sector in the context of aid effectiveness, OECD. https:// www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/47088121.pdf. Accessed 3 March 2019 ILO Report (2015) Needs assessment for the private sector in the Philippines: disaster preparedness, response and recovery OCHA Report (2017) The business case: a study of private sector engagement in humanitarian action. United Nations, Geneva Patel B, Alagh R (2003) Response of the corporate sector to the Gujarat Earthquake of 2001, ILO

Ranit Chatterjee has a Ph.D. in Environmental Management from Kyoto University, Japan. He is currently working as a JST Postdoctoral fellow at Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University. Trained as an Architect, Ranit did his masters in Disaster Management from Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai. His current work focuses mainly on disaster management while spanning across the private sector, governance, ecosystem services and heritage risk management. He has worked previously with UN agencies, the private sector, local communities, NGOs and national and local Governments in Asia. Ranit is a recipient of IRDR young scientist fellowship and member of IUCN on business and biodiversity group.

Future Research Directions for Humanitarian Affairs in the Asia–Pacific Alistair D. B. Cook and Lina Gong

Abstract Over the past two years from project inception to research completion, there are several areas that emerged as worthy of further study. In this chapter, we document several of these potential future research directions for scholars and policy practitioners to further consider. Some of these research puzzles have been repeated over a longer period and gained particular attention during the global consultations ahead of the World Humanitarian Summit and in regional policy dialogues in the Asia–Pacific. We also reflect on the challenges that the COVID-19 global pandemic in the year 2020 posed not only for the humanitarian community but for global society as a whole, and its implications on future research. Keywords Future research · Strategy · Humanitarian affairs · Disaster management · Disaster preparedness · Disaster governance · Asia–Pacific · ASEAN · China · Indonesia · India · Pacific islands · Complex disasters · Humanitarian financing

1 Introduction While this collection was shepherded through the publication process, the world experienced the rapid spread and disruption of COVID-19. The global pandemic affected the daily lives of people the world over, saw the closing of international borders and a prolonged humanitarian crisis. The experience of COVID-19 challenged the multilateral system and highlighted once again the deep connections between societies and the environment. It highlighted the limitations to the global humanitarian system as international travel was curtailed and global supply chains were disrupted with international, regional and local actors adapting their responses to available resources. The ensuing response effort underlined the discontinuity A. D. B. Cook (B) · L. Gong S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. D. B. Cook and L. Gong (eds.), Humanitarianism in the Asia-Pacific, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4874-5_16

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between humanitarian and development actors, and the need for an integrated wholeof-society approach to ensure those most in need received the necessary assistance. The struggle for most countries to manage the specific humanitarian challenges caused by the pandemic in the early days of the outbreak included the shortage of vital medicines and medical equipment and pointed to the importance for the global humanitarian community to adapt to local restrictions amidst seasonal hazards.

2 Crafting a Humanitarian Research Agenda Fit for the Future Back in 2016, the outcome document of the World Humanitarian Summit, ‘An Agenda for Humanity’, set out five core responsibilities for the global community to alleviate human suffering, which are ‘Political leadership to prevent and end conflicts’, ‘Uphold the norms that safeguard humanity’, ‘Leave no one behind’, ‘Change people’s lives: From delivering aid to ending need’, and ‘Invest in humanity’. However, as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold it became clear much more work was needed to achieve these goals. Alongside the World Humanitarian Summit saw the launch of the ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management in Southeast Asia which set out a roadmap to develop capacity in the region on disaster management and humanitarian response over the next decade through three mutually-inclusive elements—‘institutionalisation and communications’, ‘financing and resource mobilisation’, and ‘partnerships and innovations’. Once again, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted that although significant progress was made in disaster management in Southeast Asia it was largely limited to natural hazards. The multi-faceted ramifications of the public health crisis underscored the need to consider systemic risks more broadly in the development of regional and global governance mechanisms. While both the global ‘Agenda for Humanity’ and the ‘ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management’ reinforce the commitment of stakeholders in the Asia–Pacific to build a more resilient region, the COVID-19 experience illustrated the inadequacies of our humanitarian system. Within the Asia–Pacific over the past year, there was a re-evaluation of the regional system and its role in humanitarian situations. It was particularly pertinent as countries faced simultaneous disasters like the impact of cyclones during the COVID-19 pandemic. As one significant institutional component of the Asia–Pacific, ASEAN was established in 1967 to facilitate regional cooperation. Over the past fifty years, the regional grouping has demonstrated resilience through the maintenance of the principles of consensus-building and non-interference, and facilitated trust-building not only within the regional organisation but also between regional states and the international community. It provided a necessary bridge between the international community and Myanmar in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, but remains underutilised in providing a mechanism to address the COVID-19 pandemic, the Rohingya exodus and the ongoing conflict in Rakhine State in recent years. While

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unpredictable and reliant on individual leadership, it nonetheless remains an important avenue of engagement. Academic and policy research in furthering the institutional development and leadership in ASEAN in this domain is a necessary avenue to pursue if a resilient region is to be achieved. There is however nascent institutionalisation with the establishment of regional coordinating bodies that highlights a greater commitment to providing predictable humanitarian mechanisms and points to a more networked or systems-based approach to regionalism. The announcement of the establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases Centre in November 2020 represented the region’s latest effort towards institutionalisation. In addition, it is necessary that the region integrates the mechanisms for dealing with different challenges that can lead to humanitarian crises, since the risk of complex and concurrent disasters is real as we have seen during the COVID-19 pandemic. Over the next ten years, it will be important to establish ways in which to minimise this unpredictability through the establishment of a baseline of conditions to activate humanitarian action across the Asia–Pacific in the multiple and interconnected humanitarian challenges we face. Once the mandate for a humanitarian response is established, it needs to be sufficiently supported to be effective. The essays in this collection show that there exists a regional architecture for carrying out humanitarian assistance that consist of bilateral partnerships, multilateral frameworks and regional institutions. Some examples include the US-Philippines security alliance, Australia’s bilateral partnerships with the Pacific island states, Japan’s bilateral and multilateral support for disaster management and humanitarian action in Southeast Asia, ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, and the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre). Efforts to improve humanitarian operations in the region should be based on continuing and reinforcing commitments through the existing arrangements towards a more future-oriented and holistic humanitarian architecture. One such challenge that the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated is the need to rethink funding models that are adaptive and draw from across society. While the mandate and regional role of the AHA Centre is clear, its formal funding from each member state remains at $90,000 per annum. As a result, financing the operational capacity of the AHA Centre needs to be sourced from other stakeholders, and the niches of relevant stakeholders and forums identified. Japan has been a major source of funding for the regional body, primarily through the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund. The European Union signed a financing agreement with ASEAN, worth 10 million Euros, to enhance cooperation on crisis and disaster management in the region. China signed a Memorandum of Understanding with ASEAN on disaster management cooperation signed in 2014, in which China pledged 50 million Chinese yuan of grant assistance to the regional organization to enhance capacity in disaster management. However, there has been delay in disbursement of the Chinese funding, and this reflects the challenge to translate the increasing commitment to tangible outcomes. It is therefore imperative that strategies and mechanisms are developed to ensure greater sustainability of humanitarian funding and to give the AHA Centre greater independence to set a needs-based agenda. This case highlights the need for

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strategies and mechanisms that encourage and facilitate cooperation between the regional bodies like the AHA Centre and new funding sources from both within the regional community of state and non-state actors and those external to Southeast Asia. Apart from state partners, the potential of non-state stakeholders needs to be explored further. There are multiple options outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management, which can also offer opportunities to other geographic areas of the Asia–Pacific. One of the significant opportunities is to develop an agreed strategy to engage the diaspora. Diaspora communities are known to engage more in their own communities than elsewhere while living abroad. This engagement includes volunteering in disaster-affected areas; as developers of new ideas; utilising their personal and business connections; and to transfer knowledge back to their home communities. Alongside the development of a diaspora strategy for the Asia–Pacific is the potential to further develop regional humanitarian financing mechanisms. In the aftermath of a disaster, one of the challenges faced is the availability of cash to fund basic necessities for the affected population. The establishment of the Pacific Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Program builds on an initiative between the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, with financial support from the Government of Japan and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. The experience in the Pacific offers insight into the further development of the Southeast Asia Disaster Risk Insurance Facility (SEADRIF) and can be applicable to other areas of the Asia–Pacific, like South Asia. The discussion in this collection highlights the proliferation of humanitarian actors in the Asia–Pacific and thus the need to strengthen their respective role and to improve coordination among the multiple actors. Although controversies exist over military involvement in humanitarian action, the Asia–Pacific countries generally accept the military as a first responder, particularly for aspects like search and rescue, logistics, medical treatment and engineering work notably in natural hazards. This was again demonstrated in the COVID-19 response as militaries were called upon as government capacity was stretched to its limit. Furthermore, given the benign nature of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, it has also been a platform for militaries to build confidence that is threatened by issues arising from the traditional security domain. A recent example was the first ever China-ASEAN naval drill in October 2018 which included search and rescue mission. Moreover, there have been several iterations of confidence-building measures in Southeast Asia to de-escalate tensions between claimant states in the South China Sea over the course of the regional forum’s history. These measures have evolved and include the development of Table Top Exercises (TTX) and Simulation Exercises (SIMEX) highlighting important modalities for states and societies in the region to build disaster preparedness. Given that militaries played an important role in the pandemic response in many countries and many Asia–Pacific countries face the risk of simultaneous disasters, a scenario of the concurrence of the pandemic and natural hazards can become a component of these joint exercises and for future research. Likewise in the humanitarian arena, the region has witnessed the running of several TTX and SIMEX engaging stakeholders in a variety of bilateral and multilateral

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scenarios. As governments and communities become increasingly aware of conflicts and natural hazards in the region, some governments have also identified niche areas in which to drive humanitarian action in the region forward from the establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Military Medicine in Thailand to the establishment of the Militaries Ready Group under the Malaysian ASEAN Chairmanship in 2016 and the Regional HADR Coordination Centre in Singapore in 2014. Over the next decade it will be important to ensure the sustainability of these TTX, SIMEX and other humanitarian initiatives that deliver tangible benefits towards executing a more effective response whatever the nature of the disaster. It is necessary to review these various measures to assess overlaps and duplication, and to consolidate the necessary TTX, SIMEX and other initiatives into a more cohesive regionally-important catalogue of activities in humanitarian affairs. This will necessarily include academic and policy research in these areas to assess, critique and evaluate these developments and their implications. Finally, Asia–Pacific states have the highest exposure to natural hazards and experience in the humanitarian response to them. They also contribute to humanitarian operations in conflict settings with notable contributions to UN peace operations from Fiji in the Pacific Islands to Indonesia in Southeast Asia to Bangladesh and India in South Asia. However, it remains unclear how successful states in the Asia–Pacific are in utilising their experiences in one context to contribute to the other, particularly the development of institutional memory and transferable skills.

3 Conclusion It is important to identify ways in which to capture this knowledge to build on previous experiences to identify lessons learnt and chart a pathway forward for a more resilient Asia–Pacific region. In the immediate future there are several avenues to advance an Asia–Pacific research strategy to improve humanitarian action as briefly outlined here. It will take a combination of stakeholders and forums, and for different geographic areas to share their experiences to ensure the Asia–Pacific becomes better prepared, capable and more resilient to the risks the region faces.