Human Trafficking in the Era of Global Migration: Unraveling the Impact of Neoliberal Economic Policy 9781529214659

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HU MA N T R A FF IC KIN G I N THE E R A OF GLOB A L MIG RATION U N R AV E L I NG THE IM PACT O F N EO LIBER A L ECONOM IC POLIC Y S ARAH HUPP W ILLI AM SO N

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION Unraveling the Impact of Neoliberal Economic Policy Sarah Hupp Williamson

First published in Great Britain in 2022 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 954 5940 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2022 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-5292-1463-5 hardcover ISBN 978-1-5292-1465-9 ePdf ISBN 978-1-5292-1464-2 ePub The right of Sarah Hupp Williamson to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: Hannah Gaskamp Front cover image: Unsplash/Jehyun Sung Bristol University Press use environmentally responsible print partners. Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

I dedicate this book to the helpers. To the family who helped nourish my love of reading. To the professors who helped me learn and grow as a scholar. To my friends and husband who helped encourage me when I needed it. And yes, even to the cats who helped me by forcing me to take breaks from writing. Without them this book would not be possible. It is also dedicated to those helping in the field of anti-​trafficking work. To those who help by conducting outreach and education working with vulnerable populations. To the attorneys who help in the fight for victims’ rights and protections under the law. To the volunteers helping at shelters and hotlines. To all of those helping push the field of anti-​ trafficking forward in some way. Though this book is focused on understanding how the past has shaped the present in regard to human trafficking, it is these helpers who will shape the future.

Contents List of Figures and Tables Notes on the Author

vi viii

1 Introduction 2 Linking the Local and the Global: Understanding Human Trafficking Flows 3 The Pathways of Human Trafficking Flows 4 Neoliberal Colonialism and the Case of Cambodia 5 Neoliberal Accommodation and the Case of Bolivia 6 Neoliberal (In)stability and the Case of The Gambia 7 Conclusion

1 15 29 45 65 83 100

Appendix References Index

110 125 153

v

List of Figures and Tables Figures 2.1 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7

An analytical model of macro-​level conditions leading to the formation of human trafficking flows Data indicators for the analytical framework Cambodia’s scores on globalization and economic dominance Cambodia and Southeast Asia maternal mortality ratio, 1990–​2015 Public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 1995–​2014 Inequality-​Adjusted Income Index, 2010–​2015 Cambodia labor force participation rate by gender, 1990–​2015 (% age 15+​) Gender Inequality Index, 1995–​2015 Cambodia net migration rate, 1990–​2015 Cambodia scores on the 3P Anti-​Trafficking Index, 2000–​2015 Bolivia’s scores on globalization and economic dominance Maternal mortality ratio, 1990–​2015 Inequality-​Adjusted Income Index, 2010–​2015 Bolivia percentage of labor force unemployed by gender, 1991–​2017 Bolivia and South America Corruption Perceptions Index scores, 1996–​2017 Remittance inflows as percentage of GDP Bolivia scores on the 3P Anti-​Trafficking Index, 2002–​2015 Gambia net official development assistance and official aid received (in millions of US dollars) Gambia’s globalization scores, 1970–​2015 Indicators of state fragility in Gambia, 2006–​2018 Human development scores, 1990–​2017 Maternal mortality ratio, 1990–​2015 Gender Inequality Index, 1995–​2015 Gambia scores on the 3P Anti-​Trafficking Index, 2002–​2015

vi

25 35 49 51 52 53 54 55 56 62 69 70 71 72 74 78 80 87 88 90 91 91 93 97

List of Figures and Tables

Tables 3.1 3.2 3.3 5.1 6.1 A.1 A.2 A.3 A.4 A.5 A.6

Countries included in final analysis by region Configurations for high human trafficking flows, 2015 Configurations for high out-​migration, 2015 Net migration rate in South American countries per 1,000 Net migration rate per 1,000 Indicator summaries and calibrations Test of necessary conditions Abbreviated condition names Alternative calibrations for outcome of high number of identified victims Configurations for high number of identified victims, 2015 Countries by UN geoscheme region classification

vii

37 39 41 77 94 116 117 118 121 122 124

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Notes on the Author Sarah Hupp Williamson is Assistant Professor in the Criminology program at the University of West Georgia in the United States. Her several lines of research examine the intersections of globalization, inequality, and crime. She is particularly interested in the macro-​level factors that contribute to human trafficking in various regions around the world as well as the application of comparative and historical analysis to studies of human trafficking. Her published work has appeared in the book Broadening the Scope of Human Trafficking Research (2019), and the journals Critical Criminology (2018), Sociological Inquiry (2020), Journal of International Women’s Studies (2017), and The Prison Journal (2017).

viii

1

Introduction Faith was approached by a woman who promised her a job at a Nigerian restaurant in Italy. Faith thought this was her chance to begin a new life, especially as she saw some fellow Nigerians return from Europe better off than when they left. When Faith arrived in Italy, however, she was informed she had to pay back more than $50,000 in debt before she could leave. Her traffickers forced her into prostitution, telling Faith they would kill her if she did not comply. Faith felt like she was always in danger and was even stabbed several times. She managed to escape and now works to help other women trapped in sex trafficking in Italy. (Trafficking in Persons Report, 2018: 8) Ashik was struggling to support his family in Bangladesh when he saw an ad for chefs in London. The recruiter said he needed to pay up front for visas, so Ashik borrowed more than 20,000 USD from moneylenders. When he arrived in London, he was put on a bus to Scotland where he was forced to work in a remote hotel. The recruiter confiscated Ashik’s passport and threatened to report him as an illegal worker if he complained. Ashik was the only employee responsible for dozens of hotel rooms and tour groups. He slept either on the floor of empty rooms or in an old caravan behind the hotel. Ashik was eventually able to leave but he was never paid for his work. He is still afraid to return home because of the money he owes recruiters. (Trafficking in Persons Report, 2018: 37) I start with these stories from the Trafficking in Persons Report. They are merely two accounts from a global estimate of millions of victims. The total number of human trafficking victims worldwide range from 24.9 million (Trafficking in Persons Report, 2019) to 40.3 million (International Labour Organization and Walk Free Foundation, 2017). The transnational and

1

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

hidden nature of human trafficking makes accurate figures difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, human trafficking is considered by some to be the largest systematic abuse of human rights in the world today, and it continues to grow. For the purposes of this book, human trafficking is defined as: [T]‌he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. (United Nations, 2000: 2) This definition comes from the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and is the most internationally recognized definition of human trafficking (Cho, 2015a). These victims and their stories demonstrate that trafficking in humans knows no geographic boundaries, gender, or singular type of exploitation. Yet they also share a similarity. Their experiences did not merely happen, but have much deeper, underlying causes that precipitated their trafficking. Such is the case for any sociological phenomenon. Whether we are talking of human trafficking, migration, family roles, or food consumption, such phenomena cannot be removed from their larger social context. In a globalized world, the context of human trafficking is intricately complex, involving economic, social, political, local, and global factors. Frequently, traffickers promise a better life in the form of job or educational opportunities. Migrants seeking to leave situations of poverty or gender discrimination may then find themselves exploited and trafficked. Yet these seemingly individualistic experiences are linked to larger forces, such as economic policy, immigration reform, and more. To truly understand human trafficking, we must understand the forces that give rise to it. For instance, the study of modern human trafficking has identified different relationships with when human trafficking flows increased greatly in specific geographic regions. Malarek (2011) identifies four waves of human trafficking based on the origin country. These waves of trafficking, each of which is comprised primarily of women and girls, include trafficking from: (1) Southeast Asia in the 1970s; (2) Africa in the early 1980s; (3) Latin America in the late 1980s; and (4) formerly Soviet countries in the 1990s. Outshoorn (2015) similarly notes that the first reports of trafficked women emerged from Southeast Asia before reports shifted to Latin America, the Caribbean, and West Africa in the 1980s and finally Eastern and Central Europe in the 1990s. Farr (2004) and Truong (2003) chronicle a similar timeline of sex trafficking beginning with South and Southeast Asia and finally shifting to former Soviet and Soviet dependent states. 2

Introduction

In regard to trafficking from former Soviet states, research has focused on the economic and social changes following the dissolution of the USSR. In particular, the transition from a centrally planned economy to a capitalist free market impacted women in a multitude of ways, including deepening economic and gender inequality, growing corruption and a shift toward traditional gender roles. Such factors were ultimately connected to their victimization through trafficking (Corrin, 2005; Kligman and Limoncelli, 2005; Surtees, 2008; Limoncelli, 2009a; Hupp Williamson, 2019). As for Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Sub-​Saharan Africa the role of globalization cannot be overlooked. Globalization emerged alongside the neoliberal era in the 1970s and largely spread throughout the world under the hand of global economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (Ritzer, 2010). Global neoliberal economic policies have brought demonstrably more wealth to countries considered to be part of the global North, while the global South has suffered from exploitation and marginalization (Bosworth et al, 2008). To understand why human trafficking increased in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Sub-​Saharan Africa at this time necessitates understanding the processes of globalization and their resulting social, cultural, and economic impacts. One way to achieve this is through cross-​national and historical research. Through such sociological and criminological work, gaps in the field of human trafficking can be filled. In particular, this type of research is useful to the study of human trafficking because it: Incorporates an analysis of political, economic, and cultural factors within and across borders and the way that they are related to trafficking; an understanding of trafficking globally as well as in specific geographic locales; and a sociology that views trafficking as a multifaceted social phenomenon, rather than a singular issue of migration, crime, or gender. (Limoncelli, 2009a: 84) This book aims to accomplish this by creating and applying a unifying theoretical framework to answer the question of how global financial programs and policies have contributed to conditions within countries that have created human trafficking flows and how these pathways vary by geographic region. Before this, however, a history of human trafficking and current knowledge on human trafficking is reviewed.

Framing human trafficking The historical roots of human trafficking can be linked to slavery, meaning it is not a new social condition (Farrell and Fahy, 2009). However human trafficking as a social problem can be traced back to the late 19th century, 3

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

meaning that this is when it began to be publicly recognized and problematized as a social issue. At this time in Europe and North America, societal shifts and the growth of industry and urban living had caused an increase in migration, and with that, worries about the movement of White women (Outshoorn, 2015). Concern revolved largely around trafficking women for the purposes of prostitution and culminated in the 1904 international treaty titled the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Trade (Boris and Berg, 2014; Outshoorn, 2015). In 1949, similar concerns led the United Nations to pass the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others. These early anti-​trafficking efforts demonstrated racist and sexist concerns, focusing on the prostitution of White women regardless of consent (Outshoorn, 2005; Boris and Berg, 2014; Outshoorn, 2015). With no pressure on nations to implement the protocols of the convention, the issue of human trafficking declined in political and public spheres. A resurgence in awareness of the issue of human trafficking began in the mid-​1990s when media and women’s rights organizations began to draw attention to human trafficking, though they tended to focus exclusively on female victims of sex trafficking (Farrell and Fahy, 2009; Hua, 2011). The human rights frame of human trafficking, focusing primarily on victims, was the primary way human trafficking was discussed and understood leading up to the first piece of federal legislation in the United States dealing with human trafficking in 2000 (Farrell and Fahy, 2009). The passing of both the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in the United States and the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (also known as the Palermo Protocol) in 2000 enhanced public awareness of human trafficking as a criminal offense, prompting the media to take interest in this new crime. As such, the narrative around human trafficking began to focus more on the progression of the act from beginning to end, including the recruitment, harboring, and transportation of individuals, rather than the socio-​economic and socio-​political conditions which give rise to human trafficking (Lee, 2011). This shift in media framing of human trafficking redirected focus from framing human trafficking as a human rights issue to framing it as a crime and criminal justice problem. This change importantly tapped into public attitudes about anti-​immigration and transnational crime (Chuang, 2006a; Farrell and Fahy, 2009; Lee, 2011). Although this shift in the framing of human trafficking as a problem of crime and justice helped draw more awareness, support, and funding for anti-​trafficking efforts, it has also meant that legislation has evolved within a criminal legal framework (Farrell and Fahy, 2009; Hua, 2011). This criminal justice framing means that anti-​trafficking efforts have focused largely on prosecuting offenders, while protecting victims has received less attention 4

Introduction

(Chuang, 2006a; Farrell and Fahy, 2009). Furthermore, the prevention of human trafficking has not received as much attention at the government level. Outside the United States, a similar shift happened globally as international laws were developed around human trafficking (Gallagher, 2010; Shelley, 2010). The United Nations shifted from framing human trafficking as a human rights issue to a criminal problem with the Trafficking Protocol, part of a larger protocol to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime enforced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Gallagher, 2010). Studies have shown how many countries have largely conceptualized their response to human trafficking as an issue of crime and justice, including Ghana (Lawrance, 2010), India and Thailand (Sobel, 2014), and the United Kingdom (Broad and Turnbull, 2018). With this shift, governments have focused instead on treating human trafficking as a law-​and-​order problem. By failing to view human trafficking as a structural problem in a wider perspective, underlying connections to migration, inequality, and violence are overlooked. As a result, anti-​trafficking strategies have not focused on corresponding measures of prevention (Chuang, 2006a). Instead, prevention efforts have largely been short-​sighted, focusing on awareness campaigns. By failing to address the root causes of human trafficking, including global economic policies, social inequalities, and conflicts, anti-​trafficking efforts will continue to fall short (Chuang, 2006a; Farrell and Fahy, 2009).

Explaining human trafficking Existing knowledge about human trafficking is vast, spanning across disciplines as diverse as criminology, migration, social work, and economics. Research findings across disciplines concerning the factors that inform human trafficking are quite consistent and they generally find that the root of human trafficking does not start with the traffickers, but instead the forces that lead people to migrate and leave them vulnerable to exploitation (Chuang, 2006a). Seven primary issues are connected to these underlying conditions, including causes stemming from globalization, economic inequality, gendered inequality, racial/​ethnic discrimination, corruption, conflict, and human trafficking’s connection with migration. Each of these factors and their relationship to human trafficking are briefly discussed.

Globalization Globalization can be defined as a set of processes that hinder or facilitate the international flows of individuals, items, and information (Ritzer, 2010). One of these flows has been the growth of a neoliberal ideology. Neoliberalism is defined as political economic practices which emphasize that individual 5

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

well-​being is advanced through the state’s role in protecting an institutional framework of individual freedom such as private property rights and freedoms associated with markets and trade (Harvey, 2005). Global neoliberalism emphasizes individualism, competitiveness, and open marketization while ignoring the ways that structural inequalities associated with exploitation and poverty are often made worse by such an ideology (Mishra, 2015). This globalization of neoliberalism influences human trafficking through several main ways. Human trafficking is linked to globalization through the strains, inequalities, and migration associated with it (Lee, 2011). Under globalization, the industries of local economies are transformed as migration and trading across borders increases. Globalization has created a wide gap of global inequalities between countries, and even within countries there is a widening gap between poor and rich communities (Chuang, 2006a; Zhang, 2007). These inequalities are exacerbated by neoliberal global economic policies found in structural adjustment programs, economic restructuring, and other policies from international economic institutions (Truong, 2003; Farr, 2004; Stone, 2005; Cameron and Newman, 2008; Kara, 2010; Shelley, 2010; Lee, 2011; Mishra, 2015). These international financial institutions impose debt and restructuring through the lens of development and growth, though these actions and decisions skew toward the interests of transnational companies based in ‘the most empowered countries’ (Rothe and Friedrichs, 2015: 43). This gap then creates a growing population of individuals who use migration as a means to attain economic gain (Chuang, 2006a; Surtees, 2008). Through globalization it is important to consider the ways in which migration is linked with human trafficking, including demand for labor and increased hopes (Chuang, 2006a; Shelley, 2010). Considering trafficking within global migratory movement shifts the focus to the pull of unmet labor demands within cities and across borders. That is, restrictive immigration policies may lead individuals to alternative routes, placing them at risk of trafficking victimization (Chuang, 2006a; Shelley, 2010; Lee, 2011). In addition to structural changes, globalization has led to cultural shifts as the spread of global media and the internet allows for communities to receive an influx of messages that promise better chances and opportunities elsewhere (Chuang, 2006a). Growing structural inequalities meet with cultural ideals of attainment to foster an environment which encourages and enhances the decision to migrate (Chuang, 2006a; Cameron and Newman, 2008; Mishra, 2015). Falsely promised opportunities are promoted alongside the processes of globalization and urbanization. In this way, globalization creates a structural environment which limits the opportunities of some, and a cultural environment which contributes to fostering hopes and expectations. Together these may inform individuals’ willingness to migrate, increasing their risk of trafficking (Chuang, 2006a; Cameron and Newman, 2008). 6

Introduction

Economic inequality Economic inequalities have been exacerbated by globalization and accompanying international financial policies that harm local economies and shift job opportunities (Limoncelli, 2009a; Kara, 2010). Frequently these neoliberal economic policies in the global South have worsened inequality and created vulnerable populations (Truong, 2003; Farr, 2004; Stone, 2005; Limoncelli, 2009a; Shelley, 2010). The policies are often packaged in the form of structural adjustment programs. Structural adjustment and other economic restructuring programs aimed to integrate countries into the global economy through stimulating a country’s economic growth by ‘restoring balance between (1) government revenues and spending, (2) savings and investments, (3) export and import of goods and services, (4) the flow of foreign capital’ (Truong, 2006: 34). Such programs often came from international economic institutions like the World Bank and IMF. Associated measures put in place could include export processing zones, which allow multinational corporations to exploit local labor, and austerity programs, which reduce or remove government social services. However, research shows that this form of governance and growth is regularly associated with increased poverty and inequality (Henderson, 2005). The types of neoliberal ‘market-​determined economic outcomes’ pushed by international institutions deepen gender inequalities by increasing demand for women’s labor in informal, underpaying, and often exploitative sectors (Pyle, 2005). Economic restructuring has had a similar effect in Central and Eastern Europe by removing social safety nets and creating economically marginalized groups (Corrin, 2005; Kligman and Limoncelli, 2005; Surtees, 2008; Limoncelli, 2009a; Hupp Williamson, 2019). Risky migration decisions and economic based disparities such as poverty and blocked job or educational opportunities are consistently linked to human trafficking (Truong, 2003; Farr, 2004; Bales, 2007a; Zhang, 2007; Cameron and Newman, 2008; Jac-K ​ ucharski, 2012; Mishra, 2015; Outshoorn, 2015). These forms of deprivation and insecurity can exacerbate vulnerability and make migration for work or other economic opportunities appear as a viable option (Chuang, 2006a; Surtees, 2008). Traffickers then ultimately exploit vulnerable populations by deceiving individuals with promises of jobs or education (Hughes, 2000; Cameron and Newman, 2008).

Gender inequality Gender-​based inequality, including discrimination and violence, has also been identified as a causal factor in increasing human trafficking (Farr, 2004; Corrin, 2005; Chuang, 2006a; Limoncelli, 2009a; Kara, 2010; Lee, 2011). Research has shown that a lack of economic and social rights and 7

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

opportunities—​including property rights, educational access, and political participation—​are important factors in the trafficking of women and girls (Shelley, 2010). Gender-​based inequalities are often connected to the ‘feminization of poverty,’ where existing social structures do not provide equal opportunities to all genders (Chuang, 2006a). This feminization of poverty, where women and children are disproportionately impoverished in a population, has been worsened by globalization and its associated macro-​ level trends (Chuang, 2006a). These trends include international economic practices, such as structural adjustment programs and economic restructuring, which have disproportionately impacted women’s opportunities and their access to social safety nets (Hughes, 2000; Corrin, 2005; Lee, 2011; Hupp Williamson, 2019). Such programs have been found to add additional strains and barriers for women’s double burden—​their labor both in and outside of the home—​leading to migration (Farr, 2004). For example, Nigeria has been studied as a country whose structural adjustment loans and bailouts resulted in significant reductions in social programs and welfare. The result caused an increase in women facing high unemployment, and in seeking work abroad they were victimized by traffickers (Shelley, 2010). Similar patterns have been observed in countries such as Argentina, Thailand, Zambia, and former Soviet states (Geisler and Hansen, 1994; Farr, 2004; Cameron and Newman, 2008). Ultimately, economic policies associated with these programs and bailouts disproportionately burdened women, often leading to problems of unemployment, an intensification of both paid and unpaid labor, and disputes over rights such as land rights (Truong, 2006; Cameron and Newman, 2008). Migration to seek work then results in human trafficking (Farr, 2004; Shelley, 2010). Under such circumstances, the concept of ‘feminization of survival’ is used to refer to family and community reliance on women to migrate for economic sustenance (Sassen, 2002). Also referred to as ‘survival migrants’, it is the need for work that combines with a contradictory demand for workers and tightening migration restrictions in destination countries that leave these migrants at risk of trafficking victimization. For women, these circumstances are only magnified by gender-​based employment discrimination that pushes them to informal economic sectors, which lack legal migration routes (Chuang, 2006a). Both the feminization of poverty and the feminization of survival demonstrate that globalization is gendered, often leading to the ‘feminization of irregular migration’ (Lee, 2011). In short, poverty and discrimination are often compounded for women, leading them to seek ways to migrate for more prosperous opportunities (Outshoorn, 2015). Such migration leaves women vulnerable to trafficking not only during their movement, but also once they have reached their destination. 8

Introduction

Racial and ethnic inequality Given that transnational victims of labor and sex trafficking are likely to be non-​White individuals from nations in the global South and East, it becomes important to also consider the role of racial and ethnic discrimination and inequality. Race-​based discrimination, stereotypes, and cultural oppression can contribute to an individual’s vulnerability to human trafficking. Such things can inhibit equal access to income, education, housing, and legal protections, leading to marginalization (Bryant-​Davis and Tummala-​ Narra, 2017). For example, in Latin America, indigenous populations are at risk for labor trafficking (Cameron and Newman, 2008), while ethnic minorities in Thailand and Moldova experience high rates of sex trafficking (Shelley, 2010). Racism also intersects with, and intensifies, class and gender-​based inequalities, making it important to look at issues of poverty, gender, and race together. Too often, women of color face marginalized access to education and employment. This vulnerability is capitalized on by the sex industry, as sexist stereotypes based on race and ethnicities create a demand for women from nations of emerging economies (Kempadoo, 2001; Limoncelli, 2009b; Chong, 2014; Bryant-​Davis and Tummala-​Narra, 2017). Women of color may be forced or coerced into sexual labor, contributing to their overrepresentation ‘at the bottom, most dangerous levels’ (Limoncelli, 2009b: 266). Ultimately, much of the research on minority victimization in human trafficking notes that it is a compounding of vulnerabilities through discrimination and marginalization in multiple areas which places them at a high risk of trafficking (Corrin, 2005; Chuang, 2006a; Limoncelli, 2009a; Todres, 2009; Kara, 2010; Chong, 2014; Butler, 2015).

Corruption Corruption’s link to human trafficking is often described as a facilitating one, in that it both enables and exacerbates trafficking. A country’s level of corruption has been shown to play a role in allowing the offenders of trafficking to continue their crimes, which can erode perceptions of the legitimacy of law enforcement and the law among victims, ultimately undermining anti-​trafficking policy and law enforcement within a country (Farr, 2004; Surtees, 2008; Malarek, 2011; Jac-​Kucharski, 2012). Globalization has created favorable contexts for crime by facilitating corruption, including organized crime groups involvement in transnational human trafficking (Shelley, 2010; Lee, 2011), and through a lack of oversight from international structural adjustment and economic financing that allows top political leaders to siphon funds, while international banking systems prevent easy recovery of lost funds (Shelley, 2010). 9

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

Both large-​and small-​scale corruption also enables organized crime groups to operate (Farr, 2004; Bales, 2007a; Zhang, 2007; Shelley, 2010). In regard to human trafficking and organized crime groups, demand is high and the supply is available with high profits to be made at relatively low risks. One way that the risks are made low is through creating a political–​criminal nexus or a ‘symbiosis of crime and politics that is mutually advantageous’ (Williams, 2008: 146). The action or inaction of law enforcement and public officials allows the traffickers to continue to exploit individuals (Malarek, 2011). Consider the role corruption played in the story of M, a female minor trafficked from Moldova to the Balkans: First, actual blank passports had been allegedly corruptly obtained by her traffickers from a neighbouring Balkan country and used to transfer her into the location where she was sexually exploited. Second, even though the passports were filled out incorrectly and obviously improper, with the wrong official stamps and other glaring mistakes, and even though M. did not speak any of the local languages of where she was exploited, she was passed through several border crossings without question, allegedly through corrupt facilitation. Third, the brothel where M. was exploited was across the street from the local police station. No action to investigate was taken; some police officers were allegedly obtaining sexual services from M. and other victims of trafficking. (Skrivankova et al, 2011: 11) In addition to corruption being influential in traffickers’ ability to evade prosecution for their crimes, the legal framework often works in their favor as well. To date the UN Anti-​Trafficking Protocol has been ratified by 178 countries; however, the protocol lacks formal oversight and enforcement mechanisms. Studies have shown that levels of compliance with anti-​trafficking laws vary by country and are impacted by factors such as corruption and the rights of women (Avdeyeva, 2012; Cho et al, 2014a). Research also shows that countries may be selective in their enforcement, focusing on aspects that reflect economic interests such as border control, rather than the protection of human rights or prosecution of offenders (Cho and Vadlamannati, 2012; Hacker, 2015).

Conflict Human trafficking has been documented as the direct or indirect result of armed conflict in countries such as Afghanistan, Libya, the Philippines, and Somalia (Kangaspunta et al, 2018). More specifically, conflict in the form of civil conflict, war, violent militarization, and social unrest has been implicated in initiating both migration and human trafficking flows (Bales, 2007a; 10

Introduction

Cameron and Newman, 2008; Shelley, 2010; Lee, 2011; Mishra, 2015). Such conflicts create social disorganization and weaken social institutions, leading to deterioration in the rule of law, community and family, and social and economic protections (Kangaspunta et al, 2018). Along with militarization and displacement, such conditions are associated with an increase in both the supply and demand of human trafficking (Limoncelli, 2009a). That is to say, these conditions often act to drive individuals to seek migration out of the area, placing them at risk of victimization by trafficking. As conflicts erode economic and social institutions, displaced individuals and refugees are populations vulnerable to trafficking through migration and exploitation (Akee et al, 2010). Further, studies show that measures of conflict and a high presence of displaced persons and refugees in a country are predictive of that country’s likelihood of experiencing human trafficking, meaning the link between conflict and trafficking cannot be ignored (Akee et al, 2010).

Migration Human trafficking research identifies a strong relationship between migration and human trafficking victimization, as areas with high migration also reflect high human trafficking flows (Skeldon, 2002; Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2010). What often begins as voluntary migration may shift into human trafficking (Chuang, 2006a; Cho, 2015b; Mo, 2018). In fact, Chuang (2006a: 138) emphasizes that ‘more often than not, trafficking is labour migration gone horribly wrong in our globalised economy.’ This includes the introduction of unexpected risks and exploitation during and after the migration process (Petrunov, 2014). Consequently, studies show that migration between two countries often generates corresponding human trafficking flows (Akee et al, 2010, 2014). Explaining this relationship, the factors that have shown to be important links to human trafficking have demonstrated importance for promoting migration as well (Aronowitz, 2001). This involves many of the factors discussed previously including economic motivations such as income inequality and job opportunities (Jac-​Kucharski, 2012; Mo, 2018), women’s vulnerable positions (Kligman and Limoncelli, 2005; Lee, 2011; Outshoorn, 2015), and conflicts (Akee et al, 2010; Mandic, 2017; Yousaf, 2018). Factors like corruption compound these socio-​economic and socio-​political conditions to make migrants more vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking (Richards, 2004; Surtees, 2008; Petrunov, 2014). Essentially, there is strong evidence that the drivers of both migration and human trafficking are related. A quantitative analysis of 70 variables associated with countries of origin and 63 variables associated with countries of destination found that human trafficking is largely driven by economic motivation with poorer countries acting as the ‘senders’ for human trafficking 11

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

victims (Cho, 2015b). Specifically, things like income levels in both origin and destination countries, institutional quality in origin countries, information flows between countries, and demand for labor in destination countries have important impacts on human trafficking flows (Cho, 2015b). Another study of 76 variables shows that poverty, governmental corruption, and social conflict are important factors in predicting human trafficking out of a country, while economic well-​being and demographic factors associated with a demand for labor predict trafficking into a country (Bales, 2007b). It is important to note, however, that because many contributing factors are shared between the two phenomena, the line between migration and human trafficking is not always distinct and is often blurred (Skeldon, 2002; Ford et al, 2012; Rao and Presenti, 2012). Take the case of migrant Filipina women working as hostesses in Japan (Parreñas, 2011) or domestic workers in Italy and the United States (Parreñas, 2015) whose experiences more accurately reflect those of labor migrants making choices under structural constraints. Their precarious position as ‘partial citizens’ means that single employer-​tied visas and a lack of labor protections leave them vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking (Parreñas, 2015). It is in this blurred boundary between migration and trafficking that many anti-​trafficking responses actually work as a carceral practice of migration control. Human trafficking policy often reinforces migration policies such as tighter border controls and greater policing of immigrants (Kempadoo, 2007). Such practices can extend beyond policing borders domestically, influencing extraterritorial responses as well. Frequently, if nations seen as source or transit countries wish to benefit from financial development aid, they are required to adopt a neoliberal economic model that involves policing their borders to prevent migrants from ‘leaving their shores and troubling’ the destination country (FitzGerald, 2016: 194). This is reflected in the United States’ annual tier ranking of countries in the Trafficking in Persons Reports, where the threat of economic sanctioning for countries who fail to pass has resulted in the passage of stiff anti-​prostitution laws, border tightening, and restrictions on migrant travel (Chuang, 2010; Bernstein, 2012). The consequence of these policies, however, has meant increased criminalization of marginalized populations and a focus on eliminating prostitution, rather than on properly identifying and protecting trafficking victims (Chapkis, 2005; Chuang, 2006b; Bernstein, 2010). Ultimately, what we know about human trafficking demonstrates a complex relationship between factors such as inequality, globalization, corruption, conflict, and migration. This makes it important to address the root socio-​economic and socio-​political factors at play to be effective in the fight against human trafficking. This includes taking action through things such as reducing governmental corruption, poverty, and related inequalities (Bales, 2007a). Efforts at combating human trafficking will have 12

Introduction

only short-​term effects if the reasons individuals and groups are exploited, such as their economic and social status, are not fully considered in reform.

Goals of the book To date, research on human trafficking has not sufficiently explored how these economic, social, and political contexts come together to influence human trafficking within different world regions. Although much is known about the individual factors previously described that drive human trafficking, such as inequality and conflict, there is a lack of research on how these factors may combine in unique and important ways in various geographic locales (Limoncelli, 2009a). Prior studies have importantly explored issues such as documenting trafficking routes; estimating the scope of the problem; classifying countries as source, transit, or destination; and understanding legal responses to and policies regarding human trafficking. However, studies have yet to fully grapple with the larger social, cultural, and economic contexts in which migration, and relatedly human trafficking, takes place (Karakus and McGarrell, 2011). Further, research on human trafficking lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework within which research is conducted (Gożdziak, 2015; Kakar, 2017). That is to say, theoretical application specific to the phenomenon of human trafficking remains underdeveloped and fragmented across disciplines (Limoncelli, 2009a). As a result, the aims of this book are twofold. First, disciplinary explanations of human trafficking are brought together to create a unifying theoretical framework in Chapter 2. This involves integrating theory from criminology, migration, and feminist literatures. This framework will take into consideration how larger neoliberal global economic shifts shape nations’ economic and social contexts. This includes critically examining the ways that migration and connected human trafficking victimization are connected to blocked opportunities placed within in a larger socio-​historical context. Specifically, institutional anomie theory, migration systems perspectives, and critical global feminism are used to create a unifying framework that answers the question of how global financial programs and policies have contributed to conditions within countries that have created human trafficking flows and how these pathways vary by geographic region. To understand how these conditions vary by geographic region, this book uses set-​theoretic multi-​method research (MMR) to specify configurations of conditions that shape human trafficking across three geographic locales, including Southeast Asia, Sub-​Saharan Africa, and Latin America. Set-​ theoretic MMR combines fuzzy-​set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) at the comparative level with process tracing at the within-​case level. The fsQCA identifies both the causal factors and combinations of those factors important to human trafficking. Chapter 3 outlines the pathways 13

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to human trafficking identified by this analysis. Process tracing is then used to historically examine one country from each combination or pathway. Chapter 4 examines Southeast Asia with the case of Cambodia; Chapter 5, South America with Bolivia; and Chapter 6, Sub-​Saharan Africa through The Gambia. Chapter 7 concludes by synthesizing the findings of each country alongside a discussion of the policy implications they have for human trafficking. As this book examines macro-​level institutional trends, such as global economic policy, an important note should be made about how human trafficking is defined. The focus of this book does not permit fine-​grained differentiations between sex and labor trafficking, male and female victims, or trafficking within versus across borders. Instead, the focus is on understanding how structural forces related to socio-​economic and socio-​political changes give rise to an environment conducive to victimization. Ultimately, this book aims to uncover how policies put in place in Southeast Asia, Sub-​Saharan Africa, and South America by international financial institutions contributed to conditions that increased migration, and concurrently, gave rise to the formation of human trafficking flows.

14

2

Linking the Local and the Global: Understanding Human Trafficking Flows Introduction As mentioned previously, research on human trafficking lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework developed specifically for understanding and studying human trafficking (Gożdziak, 2015; Kakar, 2017). In fact, one review of the human trafficking literature from 2000 to 2014 found that among over 1,000 scholarly articles on the topic, less than 5 percent were based in theory (Russell, 2018). Fundamentally, theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of human trafficking remains underdeveloped and fragmented across disciplines (Limoncelli, 2009a; Russell, 2018). This chapter explores how theory from the fields of criminology, migration studies, and feminism can be brought together for a unified explanation of human trafficking. This chapter will demonstrate the important role that theory integration can play, as it draws from multiple theories across disciplines. These theories must link the local and the global, as it is important to understand the role of processes of globalization, including socio-​economic and socio-​political factors, all while remaining sensitive to issues of agency, gender, and culture. Specifically, the theories of institutional anomie, migration systems perspectives, and critical global feminism are brought together here to explain how international financial institutions and the policies of economic globalization they imposed onto nations contributed to the creation of conditions that increased migration, and concurrently, human trafficking. While it is the macro-​level, or institutional, processes that are the focus of this book, the theoretical framework can be applied to micro-​level, individual issues and other areas of human trafficking as well. In this chapter, I first review each of the theories and offer an assessment of relevant empirical tests. Next, I outline the relationships between each of the theories in order to demonstrate how they create a unified framework. 15

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Here, I also evaluate the applicability of the theoretical frameworks for understanding human trafficking. Finally, I conclude by specifying how the theoretical framework will guide the analysis. This includes identifying the mechanisms involved in a causal chain leading to the outcome of human trafficking. Together these theories create a unifying framework that can answer the question of how global financial programs and policies have contributed to conditions within countries that have created human trafficking flows and how these pathways vary by geographic region.

Theory from criminology From the field of criminology, institutional anomie theory, which has its roots in strain theory, is the first theory used for this framework. Strain theory draws attention to how blocked opportunity structures play an important role in generating anomie. Anomie refers to a sense of normlessness, where a breakdown in societal norms and values creates instability. In its origins, Merton’s (1938, 1968) strain theory emphasized that an imbalance is created when there is a discrepancy between a society’s culturally defined goals and the legitimate means to achieve these goals. There is an over-​emphasis on cultural goals, notably the goal of economic success. At the same time there is an under-​emphasis on structurally shaped means, or opportunities. Merton (1938) notes that these goals act as common success symbols which transcend class lines, despite the structural organization of society that creates class differentials in the ability to access and achieve these goals. When there is a lack of integration between culturally defined goals and institutionalized means of achieving these goals, anomie can occur. Blocked structural opportunities can then lead individuals to a number of adaptations (Merton, 1938). Drawing from Merton’s work, Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2013) institutional anomie theory emphasizes how social structure and culture come together in American society to create an environment favorable to crime and deviance. In American society, the culturally defined goals center on achieving monetary success by any means necessary. That is, Americans value economic success to a much greater degree than the use of legitimate means to reach these goals. Messner and Rosenfeld (2013) note that this cultural goal emphasizes the values of individualism, achievement, universalism, and the fetishization of money. A cultural emphasis on economic success coupled with structural dominance of the economy then creates an imbalance between culture and structure, producing anomie within society and generating a breeding ground for deviance and crime. Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2013) approach to anomie to highlights these institutional imbalances between the economic and non-​economic. They emphasize that institutional anomie leads to the breakdown of social 16

Understanding Human Trafficking Flows

controls, socialization, and regulations. Their theory focuses explicitly on the dominance of the economic institution over other institutions that fulfill core functions of control and socialization, including the family, polity, and education. In staking the claim of institutional imbalance, Messner and Rosenfeld (2013) identify three interrelated ways that the dominance of the economic institution manifests itself. First, non-​economic institutions and roles, such as the social functions of education, family, and the government, are devalued. Second, non-​economic institutions become increasingly required to accommodate the economic institution’s requirements. Finally, the norms of the economic institution, such as individualism and profit, permeate non-​economic institutions. Ultimately, institutional anomie theory argues that an increase in economic dominance can actually increase the pressure to achieve monetary success by any means necessary, resulting in an increase of anomie in the society when other non-​economic institutions are weakened (Chamlin and Cochran, 2007). In discussing where this economic dominance emerges from, Messner et al (2008) point to the decreasing ability of both the state and other non-​ economic institutions to regulate the economy and its associated processes. They note that the manifestations of economic dominance, including accommodation, devaluation, and permeation, are subsumed under the idea of globalization and have many negative outcomes. These include increasing poverty and inequality that often emerge alongside a move toward more neoliberal social welfare policies (Messner et al, 2008). The resulting economic changes and deepening inequalities associated with globalization are potentially criminogenic to their societies. Similarly, Passas (2000: 18) argues that neoliberalism and globalization contribute to processes that lead to global anomie by activating criminogenic asymmetries, which are defined as ‘structural discrepancies and inequalities in the realm of the economy, law, politics, and culture.’ By recognizing that the strains, tensions, and contradictions of a culture are tied to social organization, institutional anomie theory considers the cultural and structural environment when explaining crime (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2013). Bernburg (2002) argues that, based on Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997) statements of the theory, the anomic cultural ethos is the result of the dominance of the capitalist market economy, rather than a unique aspect of America. Though this theory focuses on the United States in its original application (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2013), it can be argued that it may be applied to any country with a capitalist economic structure, as the ethos of the ‘American Dream’ will still be present to some degree. Aspects of the American Dream are inherent in modern capitalist societies, as ‘the encouragement of high levels of aspiration and ambition corresponds to specific socioeconomic demands and is part of process making for social integration or for discrepancies and contradictions’ (Passas, 1997: 69). The 17

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influences of secularization, globalization, affluence, and even mass media have contributed to the promotion of rising expectations in societies around the world. In discussing the globalization of capitalism, Robinson (2011: 733) notes that ‘the culture and ideology of global capitalism –​consumerism, individualism and competition’ are not so much uniquely Western as they are a product of transnational global capitalism. Likewise, several studies have not found evidence to support the idea that Americans are unique in their emphasis on the pursuit of material success goals compared to other nations (Bernburg, 2002; Chamlin and Cochran, 2007; Hughes et al, 2015). From these studies we see support for the argument that institutional anomie theory may be applicable cross-​nationally, and particularly in the age of globalization, as many nations shift toward a neoliberal capitalist economic structure. This involves a cultural ethos that places high importance on economic success. According to institutional anomie theory, as economic institutions are strengthened, non-​economic institutions and their social policies and programs are often correspondingly weakened, creating environments conducive to crime and deviance. Research testing institutional anomie theory has generally found support for the idea that economic dominance and weakened non-​economic institutions create criminogenic conditions. The size of economic inequality and the strength of the welfare state act as robust predictors of crimes such as homicide (Savolainen, 2000; Maume and Lee, 2003; Hughes et al, 2015). Further, research shows that where economic institutions dominate over non-​economic institutions at the macro-​level, there is a higher the prevalence of a marketized mentality, where the individual embrace of marketization is connected to prejudice against vulnerable groups seen as economically burdensome, at the micro-​ level (Hövermann et al, 2015, 2016). One of the criminogenic conditions created through economic dominance is an environment conducive to human trafficking victimization. Institutional anomie is well situated to explain how the neoliberal policies pushed by international financial institutions create economic dominance and weaken non-​economic institutions. Such changes are often followed by deepening inequality in economic and social spheres and even political corruption. As discussed in the first chapter, these factors play a large role in explaining human trafficking.

Theory from migration Theories of migration range in focus, with early theoretical developments stemming from neoclassical functionalist approaches or structural Marxist approaches. Neoclassical functionalism includes classical push–​p ull approaches to migration. These focus on factors that influence migration from poorer to wealthier nations (Castles et al, 2014). Push–​pull theories 18

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emphasize the ways structural variables such as economic opportunity or demand for labor play a role in migration. However, these theories do not specify interactions between factors nor do they account for the fact that advanced and wealthier nations also experience emigration and internal movement (Castles et al, 2014). Structural Marxist approaches include historical-​structural theories that focus on the role of capitalist development in deepening economic inequalities between nations. These theories focus on the connections between migration patterns, relationships of domination, and labor markets (Castles et al, 2014). Both neoclassical functionalist and structural Marxist approaches problematize human agency. Push–​pull approaches over-​emphasize rational actors by viewing migratory decisions as being based on full information and reacted to in a uniform manner, while historical-​structural theories have an overreliance on portraying individuals as victims of structural forces (Castles et al, 2014). To address these shortcomings, migration theories were developed to emphasize the ties, networks, and identities involved in migration that have developed alongside globalization processes (Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992; Castles et al, 2014). These various perspectives all share the common thread of considering how a migrant’s agency interacts with the socio-​economic and socio-​cultural structures to impact migratory processes (Castles et al, 2014). One of these perspectives was migration systems theory. Migration systems theory accounts for a migrant’s agency, while also placing migration itself within the broader framework of development and social change (Castles et al, 2014). The theory synthesizes portions of world systems theory, network theory, institutional theory, and cumulative causation theory to suggest that migration patterns build an international structure over space and time (Massey et al, 1993). Massey et al (1993) identify several propositions that derive from a migration systems theory framework. These propositions include an emphasis on nations’ political and economic relationships (rather than geographic proximity), the presence of multiple or overlapping migration systems across nations, and an understanding of how socio-​economic and socio-​political shifts impact migration systems both within and across countries. Ultimately, migration systems theory provides a way to understand the processes involved in both internal and international migration as they are placed within broader processes of social change and economic development (King and Skeldon, 2010). A migration systems perspective links the macro to the micro by seeking to understand how macro-​level conditions and policies shape individual, micro-​level migration decisions. The processes linking the macro and micro ‘include networks of both institutions and individuals that assist with the mobilisation and recruitment of migrants and with the actual organisation of migration’ (Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992: 6). Understanding these networks includes acknowledging the legal and extra-​legal institutions working at the 19

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macro-​level as well as the networks of individuals operating at the micro-​ level. That is, global social and economic forces cannot be separated from more geographically local socio-​economic and socio-​political contexts. To not do so would be to misconstrue how migration decisions are impacted by both ‘remote and proximate variables’ (Salt, 1989: 440). For example, at the macro-​level, historical ties between countries as well as shared economic or political memberships matter for migration flows between countries (DeWaard et al, 2012). But at the micro-​level, such political and economic decisions can impact funding for social services, economic opportunities, and even experiences of discrimination which are connected to individual decisions to migrate (Cooke and Bélanger, 2006). Research shows that migration decisions are impacted by factors at multiple levels, including things like individual and household characteristics, community resources, and economic variables (Yang and Guo, 1999; Brown, 2002; Chi and Voss, 2005; Swain and Garasky, 2007). Multilevel approaches to understanding migration can thus maintain the agency of the individual while acknowledging that such agency is often structurally constrained (Brown, 2002). Ultimately, migration systems theories seek to place international migration within a historical framework in order to understand how social, political, economic, cultural, and demographic contexts pattern migration (Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992). Relevant to the focus of this book, the historical-​ structural focus of this migration perspective points to the important role that larger processes of development and social change play in human trafficking. This includes specifying the role that international economic policies and programs have played in increasing the economic, social, and political globalization of nations and how such shifts filter down to impact individual migration decisions and migration rates.

Theory from feminism Feminist scholarship, which transcends disciplinary borders, has many names, including multicultural, transnational, and global feminism. Feminist perspectives have been critiqued for their tendencies toward ahistoricism and Eurocentrism (Shohat, 2001). Addressing these critiques, a critical feminist theoretical framework focuses analysis on the ways in which social differences and inequalities are constructed and function within social structures (Kim, 2005). Situated within the global, critical global feminism takes an intersectional approach, locating practices within their geographic, historical, and cultural context. An intersectional approach involves understanding how class, gender, race, nationality, and other social positions intersect, at times creating conflicts and contradictions (Shohat, 2001). A critical global feminist approach views various feminist perspectives as being interconnected through global capitalism and the ideologies that support it (Kim, 2005). 20

Understanding Human Trafficking Flows

Criminology has also faced criticisms regarding ahistoricism and a Eurocentric focus, as well as additional critiques of androcentrism and an urban emphasis (Miller and Mullins, 2006; Carrington, 2015). In criminology, feminist inquiry has played a large role in developing a more intersectional framework (Daly, 1997; Burgess-​Proctor, 2006; Carrington, 2015). Miller and Mullins (2006) describe central features of a feminist criminology, including viewing gender as a social, cultural, and historical product that patterns institutions and interactions in a manner which leads to the socio-​economic and socio-​political dominance of men. In order to globalize feminist criminology, Carrington (2015) specifies a framework of transnational feminist intersectionality. This framework examines global inequalities alongside gendered and raced experiences, including those of crime, violence, and victimization. Reflexivity in regard to cultural analysis is also emphasized (Carrington, 2015). That is, research that is reflexive proceeds from the viewpoint that situational experiences must be understood through historical and cultural contexts, including processes of power (Burawoy, 1998). A global feminist framework can be strengthened by joining with the literature on critical globalization studies. Within the social sciences, the critical tradition is an approach that is analytical of the status quo and its coexisting power structures, ultimately seeking to replace power structures with ‘just and equitable social arrangements’ (Robinson, 2005: 12). Against the backdrop of globalization, such analysis can only be juxtaposed within an understanding of global society and the rise of global capitalism. As globalization processes erode the foundations of nations’ autonomy and ways of life, it becomes increasingly ‘impossible to address local issues removed from global context’ (Robinson, 2006: 24). Comparing a critical globalization framework to other perspectives on globalization it is: Unlike economism, [for] it does not underestimate agency, gender, mental frameworks, culture, and the environment. Unlike realism, it is not silent about the social forces and the normative aspects of world order. Unlike neoliberal approaches … it does not focus on cross-​ border flows, interdependence, or technological advances as managerial problems and without linking them to hierarchic power relations and the structure of global hegemony. (Mittleman, 2005: 27) Thus, one can see the advantage a critical globalization framework offers by covering a broad range of knowledge within the field of globalization and providing a focus on the role of historical social arrangements. Pertinent to the issue of human trafficking, this theoretical framework can be used to investigate the gendered effects of globalization, including the role of structural adjustment policies and powerful transnational economic 21

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institutions. For example, Pyle (2005: 251) showed how international institutions push ‘market-​determined economic outcomes’ which deepen gender inequalities and lead to an increase in women’s participation in low-​ income informal work sectors like sex work, domestic work, and export-​ oriented production work. Further illustrating the connection between macro-​level economic policies and individual outcomes, Parreñas’ (2005: 245) work demonstrates how demand for domestic labor in industrialized labor is ‘embedded in a gendered system of transnational capitalism’, which causes women to migrate for employment in order to support their families in their country of origin. Such research ultimately demonstrates how economic globalization is often gendered in its effects and the ways such effects drive migration, placing individuals at risk of human trafficking. In conclusion, a critical global feminism draws attention to understanding how globalization has deepened inequalities through the prioritization of economic growth over social programs and policies. Ultimately, a critical global feminist framework embeds differential access to resources and blocked opportunities within their larger socio-​historical context. This includes specifying the important role that economic and gender-​based inequalities have in regard to human trafficking.

An integrated theoretical framework The previous sections have discussed the core ideas of the theories of institutional anomie, migration systems perspective, and critical global feminism. I now turn to describing the areas of overlap between the three theories and how they work together to create a unified framework that can be applied to understand how human trafficking flows form in the first place. The integration of these theories allows for a greater understanding of how macro, or structural, changes are linked to human trafficking. Institutional anomie posits that economic dominance increases anomie at the macro-​ level as non-​economic institutions and their associated social safety nets are weakened. Yet studies have also demonstrated how economic globalization also increases strains at the micro-​level due to blocked opportunities (Passas, 1997, 2000; Carrington, 2015). The influences of secularization, globalization, affluence, and even mass media have contributed to the promotion of rising expectations in societies around the world, while inequalities have only deepened. As economic development increases aspirations, migration may also increase. Migration studies have shown how economic development leads to increased migration (Massey et al, 1998). Furthermore, both theories emphasize the role of institutions. As Jennissen (2007) notes, the international migration systems approach can be seen as an institutional approach. He states that ‘the concept of institutions may be used to mirror the structure of the entire social environment in which 22

Understanding Human Trafficking Flows

individuals have to make choices’ (Jennissen, 2007: 432). Such a perspective includes the political, legal, and economic constraints as well as opportunities that are embedded in migration. Institutional anomie and migration systems theory can thus emphasize macro-​level forces and institutions and the consequences they can have for human trafficking. On a smaller level, migration flows can often be traced back to these larger government or institutional actions (Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992). For example, increases in crime and changes in migration flows have been previously connected to the transition to a privatized capitalist society (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997; Hupp Williamson, 2019) and the imposition of strategic adjustment programs from international financial institutions (Geisler and Hansen, 1994; Truong, 2006; Iyanda and Nwogwugwu, 2016). Research also connects these shifts in migration to victimization through human trafficking (Skeldon, 2002; Chuang, 2006a; Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2010). Additionally, recent research demonstrates the role of weakened institutions in contributing to individuals’ vulnerability to sex trafficking victimization, particularly when combined with weak social safety nets (Heil and Nichols, 2015; Nichols, 2016). Weakened institutions include ‘poor education systems, failure to provide a minimum wage as a living wage … lack of affordable daycare resources, limited access to mental health or substance abuse rehabilitation, services for those leaving prostitution, misguided criminal justice policy, and conflict-​ridden families’ (Heil and Nichols, 2015: 87). Institutional anomie helps explain how social institutions have been weakened with increases in economic dominance, and migration perspectives show how resulting migration flows in response to such economic changes may be related to trafficking victimization. Bringing in critical global feminism to both institutional anomie and migration theory brings further nuance to the complexities involved in human trafficking. In regard to institutional anomie, critical global feminism highlights how factors such as gender and race are embedded in the structure of societal institutions. This includes the ways in which the gendering occurs within institutions. Non-​economic institutions such as the family are culturally devalued in favor of economic dominance (Rosenfeld and Messner, 2013). One result is the feminization of migration where migration for economic opportunity is seen as a way for women to meet the familial financial responsibilities that fall increasingly on women (Sassen, 2002; Parreñas, 2005; Mishra, 2015). Because of this, a critical global feminist lens also joins well with the migration perspective. Pickering (2011: 12) notes the importance of the need to ‘locate gender at the centre of understandings of new incarnations of the global economic system and the drivers of migratory processes.’ This includes attention to the gendered economics of migration as well as the role 23

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of gendered violence. A feminist perspective remains inclusive of the role of agency while also attending to forces ranging from the role of the state to marginalized identities (Nichols, 2016). Ultimately, a critical global feminist approach can incorporate the political economic approach that is prevalent in migration literature but also bring in a more critical sociological perspective. More than just highlighting the role of gender inequality, a critical global feminism also reveals how ‘global capitalism has eroded the sustainability of many local communities, confiscated traditional lands, accelerated the forced migration of women and the feminization of poverty and created a plethora of anomic spaces where violence reigns’ (Carrington, 2015: 179). This includes drawing attention to how gender intersects with other identities, such as race, to compound vulnerability. Racism and discrimination in areas like education, employment, land rights, and more may place individuals at a higher risk of trafficking victimization (Limoncelli, 2009a; Todres, 2009; Chong, 2014; Butler, 2015). Critical global feminism alongside institutional anomie theory and migration systems theory thus underscores the ways in which anomic spaces are created globally, and often contribute to the vulnerability or victimization of individuals through migration and human trafficking. Applying this framework to human trafficking, attention is drawn toward the ways in which the processes of globalization are gendered. This includes studies which have noted the feminization of poverty (Farr, 2004; Chuang, 2006a; Limoncelli, 2009a; Shelley, 2010; Applin and Messner, 2015) and the feminization of migration (Sassen, 2002; Lee, 2011; Mishra, 2015; Outshoorn, 2015). A criminological approach to human trafficking would do better to view the phenomenon as a manifestation of structural social problems, including those related to labor, exploitation, global power, and internal and cross-​national migration (Lee, 2011). Merging critical feminist approaches with migration and the study of human trafficking brings attention to the dynamics linking globalization, vulnerability, migration, and victimization. In regard to policy, Lee (2011: 153) notes that such an approach leads to ‘a different set of non-​enforcement led responses to trafficking that involve debates about resources, priorities, and so on.’ This thus serves to move the criminological literature on human trafficking forward and beyond limited views of trafficking as a law-​and-​order problem (Farrell and Fahy, 2009; Lee, 2011). Ultimately, migration systems theory draws attention to the ways in which international economic policies and programs impact macro-​level conditions of countries, influencing migration and human trafficking. Institutional anomie theory and critical global feminism work to further specify these conditions, including increasing economic dominance, corruption, and inequality. Drawing from this integrated theoretical framework, I hypothesize that international economic policies and programs from organizations like 24

Understanding Human Trafficking Flows

Figure 2.1: An analytical model of macro-​level conditions leading to the formation of human trafficking flows The global level IMF and World Bank economic policies and programs

The national level Economic dominance

Globalization

The local level Growing inequality

Shrinking social expenditures

Corruption

State instability

Movement Migration flows

Human trafficking flows

the World Bank and IMF influenced conditions such as the economy, globalization, inequality, corruption, social safety nets, and even the stability of the state. I argue that these conditions, spurred on by the imposition of globalized economic policies and programs, created an anomic state where movement increased leading to both migration flows and human trafficking flows. An analytical model of this process is conceptualized in Figure 2.1. At the global level are the international economic policies and programs. This book focuses on those stemming from organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, which focus heavily on neoliberalism. These policies and programs shape the national level, through a process that pushes globalization and the idea of economic dominance from institutional anomie theory. Through policies that push economic liberalization, privatization, and tax reform, anomic conditions are generated. These conditions also occur at the national level, though I argue that they are what impact individual lives, or the local level. These conditions include growing economic inequality, which may be experienced differently by gender or race/​ethnicity. Shrinking social expenditures also occur as non-​economic institutions are not prioritized. Corruption may flourish in the public sphere, particularly when political leaders face little oversight in regard to international financing. Further, with international financial institutions or even other nations maintaining heavy influence over economic and national policy, state instability can occur. These are the conditions that, at the local level, influence movement. Individuals may seek migration for economic opportunity, to leave a 25

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situation of discrimination, or to provide for their families. These conditions spur migration, and may leave individuals vulnerable to risk and potential exploitation. So, alongside these migration flows may emerge human trafficking flows.

Applications to the field of human trafficking The unification of the proposed theories—​institutional anomie theory, migration systems perspective, and critical global feminism—​allows for a more complex approach to the study of human trafficking. This approach incorporates processes of globalization, socio-​economic and socio-​political factors, all while remaining sensitive to issues of agency, identity, and culture. Moreover, this theoretical framework allows for the incorporation of a wide range of literature, ranging from criminology to migration. In this book the theoretical framework will be used to understand how global economic policies imposed by the IMF and World Bank are ultimately connected to increasing conditions of inequality and instability that have increased migration, and concurrently, human trafficking. While this book will focus on cross-​national comparisons of these historical trends, this integrated theoretical framework holds potential for broader application to the field of human trafficking in a variety of ways. This includes linking macro-​level institutions to micro-​level vulnerabilities, cross-​national comparisons, applications across a variety of forms of trafficking, and more. The unification of these theories allows for application at both the macro, or institutional, level as well as the micro, or individual, level. For example, though this book will focus on macro-​level processes, the theoretical framework can certainly be extended to explore issues of agency and decision at the micro-​level. As Merry (2016: 140) noted, ‘ethnographic studies show that trafficked people do make choices, but within the constraints of economic, political, and social structures that persuade or drive them to move, even into exploitative labour conditions.’ Such conditions include violence and conflict, inequality and poverty, and state policies and laws that prohibit movement and protection. The relationship between these larger structural conditions and the decisions and vulnerabilities faced by individuals can be understood through the theoretical framework. This book focuses on human trafficking broadly conceptualized, but the framework can be applied to understanding unique aspects among specific forms of human trafficking. Similar macro-​level conditions as those discussed in Chapter 1 have been cited in regard to organ trafficking (Nichols, 2017). These push and pull factors associated with globalization, inequality, and corruption have also been studied in regard to trafficking of child soldiers (Haer, 2017) and sex trafficking in conflict zones (Houston, 2017). Further, due to the inclusion of critical global feminist theory, the framework can be 26

Understanding Human Trafficking Flows

used to examine differences and/​or similarities across vulnerable populations. This includes examining the intersection of racial and gender identities such as Black or American Indian women (Gonzalez, 2017; Heil, 2017) or the unique vulnerabilities faced by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) immigrants (Egyes, 2017). A cross-​disciplinary explanation such as this one also allows us to examine the relations between trafficking and the processes that facilitate or hinder it. This represents a step forward for a previously fragmented and undertheorized body of literature within the human trafficking field. This theoretical framework is able to move beyond focusing on human trafficking as a singular issue of crime, migration, or gender inequality. Instead, the issue of human trafficking can now be contextualized within larger geospatial issues. This includes being able to examine how the conditions that drive trafficking are functions of larger socio-​economic and socio-​political forces that extend from the local to the global. For example, human trafficking scholars have noted the ‘need to foreground the connections between different forms of exploitation within the broader context of migratory conditions and labour relations’ (Lee, 2011: 151). Critical global feminist theory and institutional anomie ground the framework by identifying the conditions of exploitation, including inequality, corruption, conflict, and a lack of social safety nets. At the same time, institutional anomie and migration systems theory are able to position these conditions in relation to larger shifts connected to development, globalization, and economic dominance. This includes an understanding of the importance of the linkages between human trafficking, migration, and the ‘tensions, discontents and violence of globalization’ (Lee, 2011: 151). Importantly, a theoretically grounded examination of human trafficking holds potential for assessing areas of unique contributing factors in order to guide potential solutions, whether policy-​based or programmatic in nature. This framework demonstrates the need for focusing on the root drivers of human trafficking. A shift from viewing the issue as purely an issue of criminal justice to a contextualized social issue is necessary (Lee, 2011). This includes addressing the systemic issues, including socio-​economic inequality, corruption, and conflict. A focus on local issues also becomes important, including the reality of global migration flows (Samarasinghe, 2008). Ultimately, there is no singular solution to human trafficking that can be easily applied across all regions (Shelley, 2010). Instead, it becomes important to address the social, cultural, and economic causes that underlie human trafficking.

Conclusion At the start of the book, the lack of theoretical application to the field of human trafficking was noted. Theory that was being developed was often 27

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fragmented and scattered across different disciplines. This chapter then set out to bring together theory from across the fields of criminology, migration studies, and feminism. The resulting integrated theoretical framework links the local and the global, enabling researchers to better understand the role that processes of globalization, including socio-​economic and socio-​political factors, play in creating and exacerbating individual vulnerability. Specifically, the theories of institutional anomie, migration systems perspectives, and critical global feminism were brought together in this chapter and will be used to explain how international financial institutions and the policies of economic globalization they imposed onto nations contributed to the creation of conditions that increased migration and, concurrently, human trafficking. The framework will also be used to understand how these shifts and changes have varied across countries. Finally, it is important to note that while it is the macro-​level, or institutional, processes that are the focus of this book, the theoretical framework can be applied to micro-​level, individual issues as well as other areas of human trafficking.

Acknowledgments Portions of this chapter are adapted with permission from the following work: Hupp Williamson, Sarah. (2019) ‘Toward a Theory of Human Trafficking: An Integrated Framework from Criminology, Migration, and Feminist Literatures’, in E.C. Heil and A.J. Nichols (eds), Broadening the Scope of Human Trafficking Research: A Reader (2nd edn), Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, pp 7–​26.

28

3

The Pathways of Human Trafficking Flows Introduction The goal of this chapter is to understand which combinations of explanatory conditions account for the qualitative differences between various pathways of human trafficking. The chapter is organized into three parts. First, set-​theoretic MMR is described and justified as an appropriate analytical strategy. Set-​theoretic MMR is a relatively new methodological approach that combines qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) at the comparative level and process tracing at the within-​case level (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013a). Second, the data and analytical steps of the fsQCA are briefly detailed to prepare the reader to understand the results of the human trafficking pathways. A more in-​depth explanation of the fsQCA analysis, including calibration and tests of necessity, can be found in the Appendix. Finally, the third part presents and discusses the results of the fsQCA pathways before concluding with the process tracing that will be explored through the country-​specific case studies in the proceeding chapters.

Set-​theoretic multi-​method research Set-​theoretic MMR combines QCA at the comparative level and process tracing at the within-​case level (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013a). The two methods of process tracing and QCA are compatible when used together for several reasons. First, QCA is well matched with cross-​national research as it blends the methods of comparative sociology and case-​oriented research. Due to this QCA is complemented by comparative historical methodology like process tracing which has often focused on cross-​case comparisons (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Rihoux, 2006; Skaaning, 2011). Second, both comparative historical analysis and QCA require high case knowledge and emphasize that the researcher move between theory and data when selecting 29

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

cases and specifying variables (Ragin, 2000; Schneider and Wagemann, 2010; Lange, 2012; Lee, 2013). Finally, process tracing and QCA both allow for assessing causal complexity and causal conjunction, especially in cases of equifinality (Tomini, 2018). Conjunctural causation refers to understanding the ways multiple causal mechanisms link together to explain the outcome while equifinality recognizes that there may be multiple pathways to the same outcome. In the next section, process tracing as a method is detailed briefly before discussing fsQCA.

Process tracing Comparative historical methods have a long tradition in sociology and have been used to study processes like capitalist development, secularization, and globalization (Lange, 2012). Scholars have identified the unique features of comparative historical analysis, including that there is a temporal focus on historical processes, a comparative aspect of cases that may be similar or different, and that together these elements bring to the forefront the identification of causal processes which lead to a given outcome (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Lange, 2012). For example, a researcher using comparative historical research to study why genocide occurred in one country but not a similar one would ask questions comparing what was happening in the country prior—​what economic, demographic, social, or political factors were changing and how can such changes be linked with the occurrence or non-​occurrence of genocide. Along with these unique characteristics, comparative historical research ‘has successfully developed valid generalizations about many phenomena of great importance without ignoring contextual particularities’ (Skocpol, 2003: 414). Comparative historical analysis means researchers must gather and assess large amounts of data over time (Mahoney, 2004) while also attending to the ways in which the macro-​level unit of study has been shaped by socio-​historical processes (Ebbinghaus, 2005). Comparative historical analysis most frequently makes use of small-​N analyses over large-​N or statistical analyses, meaning fewer cases are studied in more depth (Lange, 2012). Process tracing is one type of small-​N comparative historical method which involves tracing a sequence of events over time in order to evaluate hypotheses about the causal mechanisms leading to an outcome in the case under study (Hall, 2003; George and Bennett, 2005; Mahoney, 2012; Beach and Pedersen, 2013). Process tracing differs from other small-​N methods such as narrative analysis through its focus on causal inference (Trampusch and Palier, 2016). Rather than simply narrate the sequence of events, process tracing case studies, and particularly those focused on theory testing, should ‘be presented as a stepwise test of each part of a causal mechanism’ (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 5). The method of process 30

The Pathways of Human Trafficking Flows

tracing thus provides a way to incorporate temporality when examining causal chains (Rihoux, 2006; Williams and Gemperle, 2017). In essence, process tracing ‘allows for an in-​depth and context sensitive analysis in situations where the theory foresees a complex causal process over a lengthy period’ (Ulriksen and Dadalauri, 2016: 229). The use of process tracing has grown in recent years, as researchers are able to use it to provide depth to their cases while also testing theory-​derived causal hypotheses (George and Bennett, 2005; Hall, 2008; Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Trampusch, 2014; Trampusch and Palier, 2016; Ulriksen and Dadalauri, 2016). Small-​N analyses like process tracing employ an understanding of causation that frequently uses Boolean logic (Ragin, 1987; Mahoney, 2000; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Mahoney, 2004). This means that important cases and causal conjunctions point the way toward more detail-​oriented case studies (Ragin, 1987). Boolean comparisons focus on configurations of variables to explore necessity and sufficiency in relation to the outcome. Boolean analysis may be combined with other within-​case analysis in order to expand and clarify the comparative findings. As the next section will show, Boolean logic also underlies the methods of fsQCA that may be complemented and strengthened by the within-​case comparative analysis of process tracing.

Fuzzy-​set qualitative comparative analysis The techniques of QCA were set forth by Charles Ragin (1987). QCA aims to bridge the gap between quantitative and qualitative methods by combining the causal complexity of qualitative work with the generalizability aims of quantitative work. This is accomplished through QCA’s focus on conceptualizing cases as having configurations of conditions which lead to the outcome. As a key component of QCA, configurational thinking is when ‘a combinatorial causal argument provides explicit guidance regarding what to observe in an empirical case’ (Ragin, 2008: 112). Configurational thinking contributes to an understanding of the causal mechanisms linking the explanatory variables together to the outcome. More specifically, QCA uses Boolean algebra as opposed to linear algebra found in statistical methods. The Boolean method begins with maximum complexity as it allows every possible configuration of causes to be initially considered before being narrowed methodologically (Ragin, 1987). The specific method of fsQCA extends these principles further by allowing for a case to have degrees of membership in a condition (Ragin, 2008; Lee, 2013). In the social sciences, it is not uncommon for phenomena to vary by both kind and degree. For example, a country’s economic orientation may be either capitalist or socialist; however, within capitalist countries there may be variation by the extent to which capitalist policies freely govern the 31

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

market. Thus, fsQCA is valuable because it allows the researcher to assess both of these qualities by allowing for a qualitative assessment of partial memberships (Ragin, 2000, 2008). Fuzzy sets thus involve quantitative assessment of scores ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 which indicate the qualitative states of full non-​membership and full membership respectively. In order to analyze a fuzzy set, the data must first be calibrated accordingly. This involves the designation of a target set which ‘not only structure the calibration of the set but it also provides a direct connection between theoretical discourse and empirical analysis’ (Ragin, 2008: 83). Once the data is calibrated on the 0 to 1 scale, the use of truth tables in fsQCA allows for examination of causal complexity. A truth table includes all possible paths leading to the outcome, or 2k configurations of conditions. Truth tables aim to ‘identify explicit connections between combinations of causal conditions and outcomes … [and] assess the sufficiency of all logically possible combinations of presence/​absence conditions that can be constructed from a given set of k causal conditions’ (Ragin, 2008: 125). With all variables calibrated, the truth table reports the number of cases with membership in each condition greater than 0.5. The table also gives the consistency and coverage score of each configuration. Consistency assesses ‘the degree to which solution terms and the solution as a whole are subsets of the outcome,’ and coverage assesses ‘how much of the outcome is covered (or explained by) each solution term and by the solution as a whole’ (Ragin, 2008: 85). Analysis of the truth table thus shows the consistency of evidence for the causal combinations believed to have a connection to the outcome, as well as the necessity and sufficiency of the causal conditions (Ragin, 2000, 2008; Lee, 2013). The logic of QCA means that variables are not thought of in isolation, net of other effects, but instead in combination (Tomini, 2018). Analysis can identify multiple pathways, or combinations of conditions, that can lead to the outcome. With the analytic framework of set-​theoretic MMR I am able to comparatively identify the causal mechanisms and combinations of mechanisms important to human trafficking through fsQCA, while testing their necessity and sufficiency within cases through process tracing. This method will allow me to understand both how conditions that are important to human trafficking are complex, combining in multiple ways, and how these combinations may vary from country to country.

Setting the stage for analysis Data sources The data for this book is gathered from a large variety of sources, including secondary national-​level data from various international organizations to be used in the fsQCA. These include the United Nations, Transparency 32

The Pathways of Human Trafficking Flows

International, the Fund for Peace, and the Heritage Foundation. The selection of indicators for inclusion in the analysis was based on literature and the integrated theoretical framework. These include human trafficking and migration as outcomes, with conditions of economic dominance, globalization, economic inequality, gender inequality, safety nets, corruption, and state conflict. As with many studies on human trafficking, there are several limitations regarding data. As a severely underreported crime, most cases of human trafficking remain undiscovered. Existing databases are scarce, lack data, and may even be inaccessible to outside researchers (Gożdziak, 2015). Despite a growing literature on human trafficking, available statistics and data are lacking in the documentation of human trafficking and thus few studies are empirically based (Laczko and Gramegna, 2003; Gożdziak, 2015). It is not uncommon for country level data on trafficking to be mere estimates, often including data related to smuggling and irregular migration (Laczko and Gramegna, 2003). Moreover, combating the crime of human trafficking is often a low priority so many countries do not strive to collect data on it. Laczko and Gramegna (2003) state that this low prioritization may be tied to inadequate legislation, which hurts the ability of courts to prosecute traffickers, as well as the fact that witnesses and/​or victims are often required to testify for the successful conviction of a trafficker, both of which present many roadblocks. Even with new data sources emerging from agencies across the world, often there is the issue that ‘no single agency acts as a focal point for the collection, collation, or harmonization of statistics on trafficking either at the national or regional levels’ (Laczko and Gramegna, 2003: 184). Data on human trafficking is obtained from the 3P Anti-​Trafficking Policy Index (Cho et al, 2014a). This database evaluates countries based on the requirements prescribed by the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (2000). Though this database largely examines countries’ legislation surrounding human trafficking, it does examine numbers of traffickers prosecuted and numbers of victims identified (Cho et al, 2014a). As the index takes into account government efforts toward enforcing anti-​trafficking policies, it demonstrates how ‘weak enforcement is a fundamental problem with the increased prevalence of human trafficking’ (Cho, 2015a: 97). In congruence with this, I argue that strong and effective anti-​trafficking efforts will result in low human trafficking flows, while weak and ineffective or non-​existent anti-​trafficking efforts will result in high human trafficking flows. A chi-​square test, detailed in the Appendix, makes use of the 3P scores and a country’s total number of detected victims from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The test shows that 3P scores increase alongside total numbers of detected victims. This indicates that a country with zero identified victims is unlikely to have no human trafficking 33

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

problem, but more that they lack successful anti-​trafficking efforts. Ultimately this correlation demonstrates the strong relationship between enforced and effective policy and successful identification of trafficking victims. Human trafficking literature has pointed to the relationship trafficking shares with migration given that the same conditions driving migration are often connected to trafficking as well. Due to this, migration is selected as a second outcome to be examined in order to compare similarities and differences in the pathways leading to trafficking versus out-​migration. Migration is measured using the Net Migration Rate. This indicator is taken from the United Nations Human Development Data Portal. This variable expresses the ratio of the difference between the number of in-​migrants and out-​migrants from a country to the average population, and is per 1,000 people. The theoretical framework identified the role of economic dominance, or the concept that the prioritization of neoliberal economic practices weakens non-​economic institutions and safety nets. An institutional imbalance of power, or economic dominance, is measured through the Index of Economic Freedom, which refers to any ‘state action or government control that interferes with individual autonomy’ (Miller and Kim, 2018: 10). However, such an index is a good way to measure economic dominance because it emphasizes free market principles and a limited role for government in the areas of rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency, and market openness. Conversely, to estimate the weakening of non-​economic institutions, public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP is taken from the United Nations Human Development Data Portal. Globalization is noted as being one way that the neoliberal economic practices associated with economic dominance have spread throughout the world, increasing inequality both between and within countries. The KOF Index of Globalization assesses a country’s overall level of globalization by considering globalization in the three spheres of economic, social, and political globalization. Inequality in various forms plays an important role in human trafficking. To evaluate economic-​based inequality, the United Nations’ Inequality-​ Adjusted Income Index is used. This score accounts for inequality in income distribution within a country. Gender-​based inequality is measured using the Gender Inequality Index from the United Nations. A country’s Gender Inequality Index score is based on gender disparities in three dimensions: health, empowerment in education and politics, and the labor market. Due to the cross-​national nature of the study, there is no quantitative data included as a measure of racial and ethnic inequality for the fsQCA analysis. This is because both racial and ethnic group definitions and issues can vary widely from country to country. However, discussion of the role of race/​ethnicity in human trafficking is qualitatively explored in more depth within the country case studies. 34

The Pathways of Human Trafficking Flows

Corruption is an important facilitator of human trafficking and is measured using the Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International, which gauges corruption in the public sphere. Finally, as previous studies have pointed to the importance of civil conflict, war, violent militarization, and social unrest in initiating both migration and human trafficking flows, a measure of nation stability is included. The Fragile States Index from the Fund for Peace assesses a country’s vulnerability to conflict or collapse by looking at social, economic, and political variables. In addition to this macro-​level data for use in the fsQCA, I gather historical information from a variety of secondary sources, such as the country reports from the World Bank and IMF, for within-​case process analysis. The theoretical framework, as conceptualized in Figure 2.1, is recreated in Figure 3.1 with the indicators that will be used for each concept and their source. All data is again measured at the national level. The local level refers in the diagram to where these impacts are felt the most in the day-​to-​day lives of individuals, influencing their decisions to move.

Figure 3.1: Data indicators for the analytical framework

The global level International financial institutions’ economic policies and programs (IMF, World Bank, and UN reports)

The national level Economic dominance (Economic Freedom Index from the Heritage Foundation)

Globalization (KOF Index of Globalization from Axel Dreher, ETH Zurich)

The local level Growing inequality (Inequality-Adjusted Income Index and Gender Inequality Index from the UN)

Shrinking social expenditures (public health expenditures as % GDP from the UN)

Corruption (Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International)

State instability (Fragile States Index from the Fund for Peace)

Movement Migration flows (net migration rate from the UN)

Human trafficking flows (3P Anti-Trafficking Index from the EU Project)

35

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

Case selection For this study, the three regions of South America, Southeast Asia, and Sub-​Saharan Africa are selected based on their importance within human trafficking scholarship, particularly as source countries (Truong, 2003; Farr, 2004; Malarek, 2011; Outshoorn, 2015). As the integrated theoretical framework is focused on the origin of human trafficking flows, it is important to focus on the regions largely classified as source countries within the human trafficking literature. It is also important because prior research has not examined how conditions identified as important to human trafficking combine in unique ways across these geographic regions (Limoncelli, 2009a). To select countries from these three regions, the geoscheme designations from the United Nations are used (see Table A.6). This classification scheme groups countries into geographic regions before further dividing them into sub-​regions and intermediary regions. The use of sub-​regions and intermediary regions allows for ‘greater homogeneity in sizes of population, demographic circumstances and accuracy of demographic statistics’ (United Nations Statistics Division, n.d.). These include the sub-​region of Sub-​Saharan Africa and the intermediary regions of South America and Southeast Asia. All countries listed by the UN in these regions are included in Table B.6. After gathering data for each of the conditions and outcomes used for this study, I eliminated any country that was missing data on one or more indicator. This was done because fsQCA will drop all data cases that have a missing value for any of the conditions or outcomes. This reduced my final sample size from 74 potential countries to 42 countries, listed in Table 3.1. By region the sample consists of nine countries from South America, six from Southeast Asia, and 27 from Sub-​Saharan Africa. Despite the reduction in sample size due to missing data, these countries still show variation in terms of their ranks on the macro-​level data used, which is important for calibration of the conditions and outcomes. Additionally, there is variation by country in population size, support from international financial institutions, and GDP.

Understanding the pathway solutions To aid in interpretation of the results, I present additional background on fsQCA and the final solutions that will be presented. A key component of QCA is configurational thinking, which contributes to an understanding of the causal mechanisms linking conditions together to the outcome. Configurational thinking allows for examination of causal complexity, or equifinality. This means that there may be several different combinations of causal conditions that all lead to the outcome under study (Ragin, 2008). When a standard analysis of a truth table is performed, it produces three 36

The Pathways of Human Trafficking Flows

Table 3.1: Countries included in final analysis by region South America Southeast Asia

Sub-​Saharan Africa

Bolivia

Cambodia

Benin

Mali

Chile

Indonesia

Cameroon

Mauritania

Colombia

Laos

Democratic Republic of Congo

Mauritius

Ecuador

Philippines

Cote d’Ivoire

Niger

Paraguay

Thailand

Eswatini

Rwanda

Peru

Vietnam

Ethiopia

Senegal

Suriname

Gabon

Sierra Leone

Uruguay

Gambia

South Africa

Venezuela

Ghana

Tanzania

Guinea

Togo

Kenya

Uganda

Lesotho

Zambia

Liberia

Zimbabwe

Malawi

configurational solutions, each of which uses Boolean operators. These solutions include the complex, parsimonious, and intermediate solutions. The complex solutions allow for maximum complexity, while the parsimonious solutions allow for ‘the incorporation of any counterfactual combination that contributes to the derivation of a logically simpler solution’ (Ragin, 2008: 201). Conditions identified by the parsimonious solutions are considered to be the ‘core’ causal conditions leading to the selected outcome. Finally, the intermediate solution may be used, which ‘is obtained by first deriving the most complex solution … and then using only “easy” counterfactuals to produce an intermediate solution … [which] is a subset of the most parsimonious solution and a superset of the most complex solution’ (Ragin, 2008: 203). In other words, the intermediate solutions take the core causal conditions identified from the parsimonious solutions and include important contributing causal conditions. In this chapter, the intermediate solutions are the focus of the discussion; however, the parsimonious and complex solutions are included in the Appendix. In addition to presenting the intermediate solutions, I also indicate the coverage and consistency scores of both the solution term and the solution as a whole. Consistency assesses ‘the degree to which solution terms and the solution as a whole are subsets of the outcome,’ and coverage assesses ‘how much of the outcome is covered (or explained by) each solution term and by the solution as a whole’ (Ragin, 2008: 85). Consistency holds parallels 37

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

to significance, in that high consistency indicates that the researcher’s theory is supported. Coverage, on the other hand, may be thought of as a measure indicating the strength of the pathway in explaining the outcome. Unlike consistency, the fact that a configuration’s coverage is low does not imply less relevance. In cases where a result occurs through multiple causal configurations a single configuration can have low coverage but nevertheless be useful to explain a set which causes a particular outcome. Finally, it is important to note that the test of necessity showed that no single condition meets the threshold to lead to the outcome on its own. This test is detailed in the Appendix, but this means that the conditions just described are not enough on their own to generate the outcome. Corruption alone, or gender inequality by itself, does not generate a pathway to human trafficking. Instead, sufficiency becomes more important in the analysis, or looking at how conditions lead to the outcome when they are found in combination.

The pathways of high human trafficking flows The first fsQCA model uses the human trafficking outcome. This outcome is calibrated to measure countries’ membership in weak and ineffective anti-​ trafficking efforts under the assumption that such scores are also connected to un-​and under-​identified human trafficking flows. Table 3.2 vertically displays the four intermediate solutions given by this analysis. Overall, one can see themes emerging around the core causal conditions identified by the solutions. Economic dominance, globalization, gender inequality, corruption, and low social expenditures consistently appear in the solutions of countries in the membership of high human trafficking flows. An important contributing factor includes having high income inequality and being a fragile state. There are 27 countries in this analysis that fall into the calibrated outcome of having weak and ineffective anti-​trafficking efforts. The solutions cover 20 countries, listed in Table 3.2. Regionally, this includes three countries from South America, two from Southeast Asia, and 15 from Sub-​Saharan Africa. These results are fairly proportional given the number of countries from each region in the total sample. When interpreting fsQCA results, the conditions within the solutions are treated as combinations. Unlike statistical techniques, fsQCA treats each case, or country, as a combination of attributes leading to the outcome. Countries defined by solution 1 have membership in high gender inequality, high corruption, and low social expenditures, but are not members of fragile states. Countries in solution 2 do not have membership in economic dominance, but have membership in high globalization, income inequality, gender inequality, and corruption. Solution 3 represents countries that have membership in high economic dominance and globalization, high 38

The Pathways of Human Trafficking Flows

Table 3.2: Configurations for high human trafficking flows, 2015 Intermediate Solutions 1 High economic dominance High globalization High income inequality High gender inequality High corruption Low social expenditure

• • •

2

3

○

•

4

•

•

○

• •

•

• •

■

■

•

• ■

High fragile state

○

■

Countries

Gabon, Indonesia, Suriname, Venezuela

Bolivia, Liberia, Mauritania, Togo

Benin, Cambodia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, Zambia

Eswatini, Gambia, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Tanzania, Uganda

Consistency

0.95

0.85

0.88

0.97

Raw coverage

0.20

0.16

0.23

0.26

Unique coverage

0.11

0.07

0.10

0.14

Solution coverage

0.58

Solution consistency

0.91

•

Note: =​core causal condition present; ○ =​core causal condition absent; ■ =​contributing causal condition present; □ =​contributing causal condition absent

income and gender inequality, and low social expenditures. Finally, solution 4 contains countries with membership in economic dominance but not globalization, in membership of income and gender inequality, and in membership of corruption state fragility. All of these solutions contain high gender inequality as a core condition, indicating that it plays an important role in generating pathways conducive to human trafficking flows. Appearing in three solutions each, high corruption is another consistent core condition, while income inequality is an important contributing condition. That economic dominance, globalization, and low social expenditures appear in two of the four conditions demonstrates that they are important in shaping human trafficking in distinct ways, though are not always present. Furthermore, with the exception of solution 1, all solutions have at least high economic dominance or high globalization as a core condition of their combinations. 39

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

Overall, the solutions are largely consistent with the integrated theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2, with fsQCA allowing for the illumination of interesting combinations of conditions. Having both gender and income inequality alongside corruption appears important when countries have either economic dominance (solution 4) or globalization (solution 2). When both economic dominance and globalization are present together, income and gender inequality remain important, though corruption is replaced by low social expenditures (solution 3). Solution 1 represents a unique combination, as neither economic dominance nor globalization is present. Instead, the solution indicates the combination of gender inequality, corruption, low social expenditures, and interestingly, the absence of state fragility. It should be noted that this is the only solution that does not contain a country from Sub-​Saharan Africa, perhaps contributing to the lack of state fragility. Solution 4, which is the only solution to contain countries exclusively from Sub-​Saharan Africa, does point to the importance of state fragility.

The pathways of high emigration The next fsQCA model uses the outcome net migration, which has been calibrated according to country membership in high out-​migration, or emigration. Table 3.3 indicates the seven intermediate solutions given by this analysis. While some conditions appear in some solutions when present, and in others when absent, patterns emerge around the core causal conditions. Economic dominance, globalization, income and gender inequality, corruption, and low social expenditures consistently appear in the solutions of countries in the membership of high out-​migration. Being a fragile state is an important contributing factor. There are 26 countries in the analysis that fall into the outcome of high out-​migration. The solutions presented cover 18 countries. Regionally, this includes four countries from South America, two from Southeast Asia, and 12 from Sub-​Saharan Africa. I do not review all solutions for the outcome of high emigration in-​depth, as the book is focused specifically on human trafficking. However, it is critical to note that human trafficking research identifies a strong relationship between migration and human trafficking victimization, as areas with high migration also reflect high human trafficking flows (Skeldon, 2002; Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2010). Explaining this relationship, the factors that have shown to be important to human trafficking have demonstrated importance for promoting migration as well (Aronowitz, 2001). This makes it important to examine the conditions leading to high migration, and identify any areas of overlap. The analyses show a great deal of overlap between the four solutions contributing to high human trafficking flows, and several of the solutions contributing to high out-​migration. I will focus on the solutions that lead to high out-​migration. 40

The Pathways of Human Trafficking Flows

Table 3.3: Configurations for high out-​migration, 2015 Intermediate solutions 1 High economic dominance High globalization High income inequality High gender inequality

2

3

4

6

7

○

•

5

○

•

○

•

•

○

•

•

•

•

•

○

•

•

•

•

○

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

○

High corruption Low social ○ expenditure

•

•

•

High fragile ○ state

■

Countries

Mali, Peru, Paraguay Eswatini, Niger, Philippines Gambia, Rwanda, Malawi, Tanzania, Mali, Uganda Niger, Tanzania, Uganda

Bolivia, Laos, Bolivia, Lesotho Suriname, Liberia, Venezuela Mauritania, Togo

○

■

Consistency 0.97

0.90

0.83

0.79

0.89

0.90

0.83

Raw coverage

0.12

0.14

0.17

0.20

0.12

0.07

0.23

Unique coverage

0.02

0.07

0.06

0.03

0.06

0.01

0.05

Solution coverage

0.55

Solution consistency

0.84

•

Note: =​core causal condition present; ○ =​core causal condition absent; ■ =​contributing causal condition present; □ =​contributing causal condition absent

Solution 2 suggests that the absence of economic dominance and income inequality, when combined with the presence of gender inequality, corruption, and low social expenditures leads to high out-​migration. This 41

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

solution has some overlap with solution 1 for human trafficking, which also had core conditions of the presence of gender inequality, corruption, and low social expenditures. Both Suriname and Venezuela are found in each of these solutions, meaning that this combination of conditions is causally connected to both human trafficking flows and high out-​migration in both countries. Solution 3 leading to high out-​migration does not have membership in economic dominance, but does have membership in high globalization, income inequality, gender inequality, and corruption. This solution is identical to solution 2 for human trafficking, with the exception that income inequality is a contributing rather than a core condition. The same four countries are found in each solution: Bolivia, Liberia, Mauritania, and Togo. Finally, solution 7 contains countries with membership in economic dominance but not globalization, in membership of income and gender inequality, and in membership of corruption state fragility. Again, with the exception that income inequality is a core rather than contributing condition, this solution is identical to solution 4 for human trafficking. The same six countries have membership in this solution: Eswatini, Gambia, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Tanzania, and Uganda. This human trafficking solution also shares some overlap with solution 4 leading to high out-​migration. Here the solution contains countries again with membership in economic dominance but not globalization, and in membership of income inequality and state fragility. Unique to this solution 4, however, is membership in low social expenditures. The pathways to high emigration identified by this analysis indicate that there are a variety of ways causal conditions may combine to lead to the outcome. However, of interest to this book are the pathways that are consistent with the same, or similar, pathways to high human trafficking flows. As predicted by the theory, conditions of inequality combine with others such as corruption, low health expenditures, and state fragility. Such conditions often appear alongside either high economic dominance or high globalization.

Conclusion This chapter introduced the reader to the method of set-​theoretic MMR and discussed the results of the fsQCA. In summary, the fsQCA analyses run on each outcome confirm the role of the theoretical framework in illuminating the conditions that explain the origin of human trafficking flows. That several solutions leading to high human trafficking flows are identical or very similar to solutions leading to high emigration suggests the importance of examining the conditions that may be shared between these two outcomes. Conditions of inequality when combined with corruption are consistently shown to be important. Interestingly, while gender inequality 42

The Pathways of Human Trafficking Flows

appears as a core condition for human trafficking and emigration, income inequality appears as a core condition only for emigration. Instead, income inequality acts as a contributing condition for human trafficking, suggesting its importance may be different for migration patterns. The presence of state fragility appears as an important contributing condition for both human trafficking and emigration. The aforementioned conditions often, though not always, appear alongside either high economic dominance or high globalization. In very few solutions do both high economic dominance and high globalization appear together, suggesting that simply one or the other may be important in the causal configuration. For comparison with the outcome used to assess human trafficking, a fsQCA model was also ran using the outcome of Total Detected Victims of Trafficking in Persons. This data comes from the UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons. More about the analysis of this outcome can be found in the Appendix. Overall, however, it is important to note that the solutions are largely the opposite of the pathways identified by the previous models. While high income and gender inequality appeared in solutions leading to high human trafficking flows, here low income and low gender inequality form a pathway to identifying high numbers of human trafficking victims. These conditions are important when combined with low corruption, low economic dominance, low state fragility, and high social expenditures. Ultimately, the solution set for pathways to high numbers of identified victims has the lowest consistency and coverage scores of all three outcomes. This perhaps indicates that the theoretical framework is better suited to explaining the conditions that give rise to human trafficking rather than the conditions that work to successfully combat it. That is, conditions such as economic dominance, globalization, inequality, corruption, low social expenditures, and state fragility are better mechanisms for explaining weak and ineffective anti-​trafficking efforts connected to high human trafficking flows, as well as some solutions of high emigration. To complete the set-​theoretic MMR, the next step is to proceed with process tracing of selected cases. Case selection for process tracing after a fsQCA proceeds with intention after examining case’s fuzzy-​set membership in both the solution and the outcome (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2016). Comparative case process tracing after a fsQCA of sufficiency can proceed in several manners. Here, I take the approach of similar-​outcome comparisons, or selecting typical cases within a solution in order to build or test the hypothesis in regard to the causal mechanisms under study (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013b). A ‘typical case’ represents a country that has high fuzzy-​ set membership scores in both the solution term and the outcome. I choose three solution terms to select one case from each region for my process tracing. The first solution term comes from the third intermediate solution listed in Table 4.5. The solution states that high economic 43

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

dominance, high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, and low social expenditures represent one causal pathway to high human trafficking flows. From this solution term I select the typical case of Cambodia for process tracing. This solution term is unique to the solutions leading to high human trafficking flows, and shares no overlap with solutions leading to high emigration. Conversely, both of my next selected solution terms share a great deal of overlap with the intermediate solutions leading to high emigration. The two cases come from the second and fourth intermediate solutions listed in Table 4.5. The second solution term states that not high economic dominance, high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, and high corruption represent a combination of conditions leading to high human trafficking flows. From this solution term I select the typical case of Bolivia for process tracing. Finally, the fourth solution term states that the combination of high economic dominance, not high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, high corruption, and high state fragility combine in important ways to create a unique pathway for high human trafficking flows. From this solution term I select the typical case of The Gambia for process tracing. Over the next three chapters, the pathways identified here will be unraveled. Historical analysis of economic, political, and social shifts can help us understand how the conditions of inequality emerged, how they combined, and how they ultimately lead to human trafficking flows. Chapter 4 will begin with the case of Cambodia, Chapter 5 will cover Bolivia, and Chapter 6 The Gambia. Finally, Chapter 7 will summarize these findings in relation to the integrated theoretical framework while also drawing comparisons between these solution terms as they represent three very different pathways to the origin of human trafficking flows.

44

4

Neoliberal Colonialism and the Case of Cambodia Introduction This chapter uses process tracing to analyze one of the pathways identified in the previous chapter. Specifically, this chapter presents the results of Cambodia, whose fsQCA solution indicates that it is the combination of high economic dominance, high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, and low social expenditures important in creating a pathway for human trafficking. The chapter begins by setting the stage with a brief review of Cambodia’s history. Following that, the historical processes are teased out to reveal how high economic dominance and globalization emerged due to Cambodia’s restructuring and dependence on foreign aid. This has resulting in increasing inequality and corruption and a weakening of the state’s role. The relationship such forces have with cross-​national labor migration and resulting human trafficking are explored before concluding the chapter.

Cambodia A brief history Located in Southeast Asia between Thailand and Vietnam, the Kingdom of Cambodia gained independence from France in November of 1953 (Chandler, 2008). The country was later subjected to heavy aerial bombardments from 1969 to 1973 during the US–​Vietnam War (Chandler, 2008; Kiernan and Owen, 2015). At the same time, a military coup in 1970 overthrew the monarchy, ending Prince Sihanouk’s 15-​year rule (Corfield, 2009; Dayley and Neher, 2013). By 1975, the new Communist government known as Khmer Rouge gained control and changed the official name of the country to the Democratic Kampuchea. The primary leader Pol Pot enforced strict rules and isolated the country from the outside world. 45

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

Between 1975 and 1979, an estimated 1.7 million people were executed or worked to death (Corfield, 2009; Dayley and Neher, 2013). The overthrow of the Khmer Rouge government by Vietnamese troops in 1978 began a ten-​year occupation by the Vietnamese, under which the country was renamed the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in 1989 coincided with the start of a peace agreement and the renaming of the country to the State of Cambodia (Chandler, 2008; Corfield, 2009; Dayley and Neher, 2013). The UN-​brokered Paris peace agreements were signed in 1991, beginning a short-​lived period of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) governing from 1992 to the first free election in 1993. The country eventually returned to its former name, the Kingdom of Cambodia, in 1993 with the restoration of the constitutional monarchy (Chandler, 2008; Dayley and Neher, 2013). During the latter period Cambodia entered the global economic market through heavy dependence on foreign aid. In the first decade of the 21st century, Cambodia became one of the fastest growing economies (Unteroberdoerster, 2014). At the same time, Cambodia relied heavily on external funding and assistance to accomplish these changes, maintaining a foreign aid flow of about 12 percent of its GDP in the first ten years following the restoration of the government in 1993 (Nakamura, 2006). While Cambodia shared similarities with other Southeast Asian countries, it was also unique. As two scholars noted: ‘The Kingdom of Cambodia, in its most recent incarnation, was born from international assistance. Few countries have had such an intimate history with the broad constellation of the global community’s official and private foreign aid organizations’ (Dayley and Neher, 2013: 155–​6). To understand migration and human trafficking patterns in Cambodia necessitates understanding the political and economic legacy of Cambodia’s history and its transition into globalization.

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and economic dominance Global financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank prove instrumental in shaping economic policy in transitioning and emerging economies (Cooke, 2004; Stewart and Wang, 2006). Lending from global institutions is often tied to the implementation of certain economic reforms and priorities that reflect a neoliberal economic model (Marshall et al, 2001). In the past, lending was packaged in Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) aimed at integrating countries into the global economy by stimulating a country’s economic growth through ‘restoring balance between (1) government revenues and spending, (2) savings and investments, (3) export and import of goods and services, (4) the flow of foreign capital’ (Truong, 2006: 34). However, research shows that the financial programs often exacerbated economic and gender-​based inequalities, while lack of 46

Cambodia

oversight generated corruption among government officials (Truong, 2003; Farr, 2004; Stone, 2005; Cameron and Newman, 2008; Kara, 2010; Shelley, 2010; Lee, 2011; Mishra, 2015). Designed to replace SAPs, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) began in 1999. PRSPs are a joint World Bank–​IMF initiative with the aim of reducing poverty through economic growth (Marshall et al, 2001; Malaluan and Guttal, 2002; Cooke, 2004). To be eligible for loans from the IMF, a country must have in place a PRSP with endorsement by the World Bank and the IMF. The IMF and World Bank encourage additional donors to fund aid through the PRSP plan rather than coordinate it independently (Marshall et al, 2001). PRSPs hoped to avoid the same criticisms and issues faced by SAPs by turning over more ownership of the design and implementation of programs and policies to the countries where they would be carried out (Cooke, 2004; Stewart and Wang, 2006). However, the extent of participation and ownership within emerging economies has been questioned as ‘countries are reluctant to consider approaches other than those advocated by the Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) because they know the limits to the kinds of policies that the international financial institutions are prepared to accept’ (Kabeer, 2003: 210). Because the IMF has the final say in the formation and approval of a country’s PRSP, government officials rely largely on external advisors or even advisors from the Bank itself (Kabeer, 2003; Cooke, 2004; Stewart and Wang, 2006). One IMF report on Cambodia notes that foreign aid flows played a large role in shaping both the new economy and government policy in the period following Cambodia regaining independence. The report states: ‘While Cambodians returning from abroad have partially filled the hole in human capital left by the Khmer Rouge rule, a large number of foreign experts were needed to fill in the remaining gap’ (Nakamura, 2006: 53). In Cambodia, foreign experts and donor countries played a large role in shaping the future of the country. PRSPs focus on several tenets that encompass neoliberalism. Primary tenets include an emphasis on trade liberalization, extensive privatization, and tax and other fiscal reforms that work to create open and free markets (Marshall et al, 2001; Malaluan and Guttal, 2002; Stewart and Wang, 2006). Thus, PRSPs ultimately focus on crafting and implementing the same sorts of policies found in SAPs. Further, PRSPs are largely homogeneous across nations, not attending to the need for policies unique to different countries’ cultural and historical contexts, nor providing the ownership and participation claimed to set them apart from SAPs (Malaluan and Guttal, 2002; Kabeer, 2003; Cooke, 2004). In Cambodia, the process of opening the country up to globalization and economic dominance involved international groups and donors from the beginning. The Royal Government of Cambodia, with assistance from the 47

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 11 other groups, created a national Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia. These plans were presented and revised at meetings of the International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia, the first of which was in 1994 (Curtis, 1998). Around the same time, the government committed to a three-​year SAP from 1994 to 1996. The focus was on economic growth through the expansion of the private sector and corresponding limitation of the role of the public sector (Curtis, 1998). To further extend development goals, the government worked with the Asian Development Bank to create a five-​year plan called the Socio-​ Economic Development Plan (1996–​2000). These plans, guided by external technical assistance, intentionally attracted international donors, though vague language meant that donors could supply aid in the forms that benefited them the most, without input from Cambodian officials (Curtis, 1998). This meant that countries like Japan and France funded development projects in focused areas, often using their language and models to implement them. Key markers of this period were the lack of input and choice from the Cambodian government as well as a lack of prioritization in the targets of development aid (Curtis, 1998). Cambodia began its interim PRSP in 2000, which was criticized for lacking concrete solutions and adequate resource allocations (Marshall et al, 2001). Full implementation of the final PRSP began in March of 2003 (Battaile et al, 2005). Again, there was an absence of country ownership and organizational participation. Negotiations were conducted between government and World Bank officials in private. Tellingly, the final version of the PRSP was not made available in Cambodia’s Khmer language until after it was finalized, effectively excluding local input (Malaluan and Guttal, 2002; Cooke, 2004). As with many countries, the PRSP prioritized growth through exports and tourism, managing public expenditures, and developing infrastructure (Battaile et al, 2005). The broad generalities of the PRSP meant that the local context and culture of Cambodia was ignored. This meant that the PRSP ‘did not provide a longer-​term vision to guide short-​and medium-​term programs in some of the key crosscutting strategic issues facing Cambodia’ (Battaile et al, 2005: 20). Ultimately, the role of international financial institutions in Cambodia’s transition, including the UNDP, IMF, and World Bank, set the country on a trajectory for high globalization and high economic dominance. Figure 4.1 demonstrates these changes. The solid line shows Cambodia’s steady increase on the KOF Index of Globalization, and the dotted line shows its scores on the Index of Economic Freedom. The latter is used to measure economic dominance as it contains indicators for measures such as government spending, business freedom, and open marketness. The two 48

Cambodia

Figure 4.1: Cambodia’s scores on globalization and economic dominance 70 60 50 40

Globalization

30

Economic dominance

20 10 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

vertical lines indicate important historical points, including when the first SAP was implemented in 1994 and the first PRSP in 2003. Following both there is a sharp increase in globalization. As the next several sections show, corruption, weakened social services, deepened inequality, and an increase in migration were all associated with this path. That is, these conditions coalesced to create an environment conducive to human trafficking.

Corruption and privatization As countries transition to a privatized capitalist economy, corruption is often facilitated through a lack of oversight from international structural adjustment and economic financing that allows top political leaders to siphon funds, while international banking systems prevent easy recovery of lost funds (Marshall et al, 2001; Shelley, 2010). In the period following UNTAC occupation and throughout the transition, corruption remained a large issue in Cambodia. Rent-​seeking behaviors were common, which included ‘various official and unofficial forms of capturing benefits from external (and other) public sources for non-​productive purposes’ (Curtis, 1998). This included government officials taking a cut of development contracts in exchange for selling resources at a low price (Curtis, 1998). In the time since, Cambodia continued to struggle with corruption throughout its government (Dayley and Neher, 2013; Keo et al, 2014). In the period from 2005 to 2020, Cambodia’s scores on the Corruption Perceptions Index have hovered between a low of 1.8 and a high of 2.3 with a mean of 2.1 where scores range from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2020). Though the IMF’s reform agenda focuses on economic growth, studies report that such reforms open up a 49

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

country’s exposure to and extent of non-​economic issues such as corruption (Thirkell-​White, 2005). Governmental corruption is tied to international assistance and the global opening of the country’s natural resources (Dayley and Neher, 2013). Moreover, the highly centralized administrative structure of the government means that corruption, as well as nepotism and cronyism, is deeply entrenched (Keo et al, 2014). As studies have shown with other transitional countries, the process of privatization often opens both the public and private sectors up to high levels of corruption (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997; Marshall et al, 2001; Hupp Williamson, 2019).

Weakened non-​economic institutions The transition to a neoliberal capitalist economy for Cambodia meant that non-​economic institutions and their social services were often weakened in response (Sanders, 2012). The social policies found within PRSPs were often based around the idea of cost recovery. That is, social services were privatized and individuals paid for services as they were used (Marshall et al, 2001; Cooke, 2004). This reflects the same ideology found within SAPs, with PRSPs being noted as extending the privatization of public sector services even further (Cooke, 2004). Through extensive privatization, PRSPs diminished or removed the role of the government in delivering social and economic protections and services. Privatization and its reliance on charges reduced access to social safety nets among citizens (Marshall et al, 2001). The shift is summarized by one study: ‘The poor and vulnerable will be taken care of by safety nets—​if there is money for them—​and if some people fall through the cracks, well, the Bank and the Fund never denied that structural adjustment would be painful’ (Malaluan and Guttal, 2002: 16). This created a state in which social protections were noted as being the bare minimum, with a lack of safety nets and social insurance (Sandy, 2007; Dowling and Yap, 2009). As programs and policies tied to international loans and aid were put into place, the institutional weakness of the state receiving them was often noted. A World Bank and IMF assessment of Cambodia identified weak state institutions as a hindrance to their transition to market capitalism (Malaluan and Guttal, 2002). However, as Cambodia shifted toward ‘market-​based economies after years of centrally planned political-​economic models, it is not surprising that the required structures, institutions and governance processes to facilitate market capitalism are weak’ (Malaluan and Guttal, 2002: 8). This view, however, caused international donors and agencies involved in Cambodia’s transition to view previously established institutions and structures as ‘illegitimate or invalid’ (Curtis, 1998: 72). This view worked not to establish strong institutions, economic or otherwise, but conversely to further weaken Cambodian institutions as all governmental reforms made 50

Cambodia

before UNTAC were disregarded (Curtis, 1998). Such reforms created economic dominance at the expense of other social institutions, including negative impacts on health, education, human rights, and the environment (Chossudovsky, 1997). Since shifting to a globalized capitalist economy, Cambodia faced rising healthcare costs despite a lack of access to basic health services (Sandy, 2007). The situation was often compounded for individuals living in rural areas (Samarasinghe, 2008). Despite a large amount of international aid which contributed to modest GDP growth throughout the 2000s, a ‘decade of Cambodian development has proven that technical solutions often fail in the face of political reality’ (Ear, 2013: 33). Instead, human development indicators such as infant and child mortality rates rose after 1990. Compared to other Southeast Asian countries, Cambodia ranks among the worst for maternal mortality (Samarasinghe, 2008). Figure 4.2 demonstrates this difference, with the maternal mortality ratio measured as the deaths per 100,000 live births (Human Development Data, 2018). Though the gap has been closing, Cambodia’s maternal mortality ratio remains higher than surrounding counterparts. Public expenditures on health services remained low. Cambodia has not improved its GDP expenditures on health, particularly when compared to the world average, as well as the average for Southeast Asia as a whole. Figure 4.3 demonstrates this using public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Cambodia remains around 1.5 percent or lower, while Southeast Asia has been increasing to above 2 percent. The world average has remained above 4 percent since 2010. Following the implementation of Cambodia’s first PRSP in 2003, the country faced a steady decline in health expenditures through 2010. Though there was a slight increase from 1.3 percent to Figure 4.2: Cambodia and Southeast Asia maternal mortality ratio, 1990–​2015 1200 1000 800 Cambodia

600

Southeast Asia

400 200 0

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

51

2015

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

Figure 4.3: Public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 1995–​2014 4.5 4 3.5 3 Cambodia Southeast Asia

2.5

2 1.5

World

1 0.5 0

1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

1.5 percent in 2012, it has since decreased again. Overall, the data indicates that social services have not received better funding since the implementation of international financial policies and programs, but have instead weakened as economic institutions came to dominate.

Deepening inequality Alongside the structural and economic changes that come with transition, economic and gender-​based inequalities often deepen (Hughes, 2003; Sanders, 2012; Zheng, 2016). What macroeconomic growth Cambodia achieved was not distributed evenly across the population. Much of the population remained below the poverty line, with a high percentage dependent on agricultural work (Dowling and Yap, 2009; Dayley and Neher, 2013). In 2000, 73.7 percent of employment was in agriculture work, and this figure remained high at 54.1 percent in 2010 (Human Development Data, 2018). Even though the overall poverty rate did decrease over time in Cambodia, these gains were stated to be highly fragile. In a 2014 report, a poverty analyst for the World Bank in Cambodia stated that ‘the loss of just 1,200 riel (about 0.30 USD) per day in income would throw an estimated three million Cambodians back into poverty, doubling the poverty rate to 40 per cent’ (World Bank Group, 2014). As development continues to grow, so too does inequality, and particularly income inequality (Chossudovsky, 1997; Rigg, 2016). It has been noted that ‘compared to the region’s other poor countries, Cambodia suffers the highest degree of income inequality, suggesting that recent economic gains benefit primarily those who already have wealth’ (Dayley and Neher, 2013: 160). The Inequality-​Adjusted Income Index adjusts a country’s score lower 52

Cambodia

Figure 4.4: Inequality-​Adjusted Income Index, 2010–​2015 0.6 0.5 0.4

Cambodia Southeast Asia

0.3

World

0.2 0.1 0 2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

on the Human Development Index to account for inequality in income distribution (Human Development Data, 2018). Ranging from 0 to 1, the lower the score the greater the income inequality. Figure 4.4 shows that Cambodia lags behind regional comparisons as well as the world mean on income inequality. Women’s roles changed in important ways during Cambodia’s transition, and there was often a push toward more traditional gender roles. This frequently resulted in gendered inequalities as women struggled to be full political and economic actors in the new economy. Studies of post-​Soviet countries’ transitions from centralized to capitalist economies often note that a return to traditional gender roles and patriarchal relations accompanied transitions (Buckley, 1997; True, 2003; Vullnetari and King, 2011). Similarly, a cultural emphasis on the essential femininity of women emerged during Cambodia’s transition (Derks, 2008; Brickell, 2010). This included the construction of ‘srei krup leakkhana (virtuous woman)’ which stressed the familial role of women (Jacobsen, 2008). The Chbap Srey, or moral code for women, also gained ‘renewed relevance in the effort to restate a social order that is thought to be either lost due to years of war and destruction or at stake in the face of foreign influences. In such a context … gender ideals become emphasised and used as cultural symbols that embody “Khmerness” ’ (Derks, 2008: 47). The consequences of this tension between a transition heavily guided by foreign influence and a return to traditional gender relations meant that Cambodian women were often hindered from participating fully in new developments while also experiencing worsened social and economic situations with development (Derks, 2008). Figure 4.5 indicates a large gap 53

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

Figure 4.5: Cambodia labor force participation rate by gender, 1990–​2015 (% age 15+​) 90 85 80 Female Male

75 70 65 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

between male and female labor force participation. This rate represents the percentage of the working-​age population currently in the labor market (Human Development Data, 2018). For the most part, the difference between male and female labor force participation has remained at around a 10 percent difference. The Gender Inequality Index is another indicator of gender equity. This index measures gender inequality based on reproductive health, empowerment, and labor market participation. The higher the score, the worse the inequity gap (Human Development Data, 2018). While Southeast Asia as a whole tracks alongside the mean world score, Cambodia scores much worse. Figure 4.6 shows that though gender inequality significantly declined between 1995 and 2010, it has since stagnated. Educational opportunities for women have not benefited from the implementation of SAPs and PRSPs (Brickell, 2010). Although the gender gap in primary education in Cambodia is small, many girls drop out and fail to attend upper secondary schools (Dowling and Yap, 2009). Research on Cambodia demonstrates a sharp gender disparity in literacy levels and educational attainment (Samarasinghe, 2008). The associated policies and programs Cambodia entered into as part of its transition contributed to exacerbating inequality. Southeast Asian countries have faced increased inequalities corresponding with increased globalization and market integration (Rigg, 2016). Neoliberal economic policies mean that public social services and enterprises are privatized and subsidized, generating both economic and gender-​based inequality (Sanders, 2012). PRSPs afforded little attention to the role of gender in economic shifts, and even less to issues of gender-​based violence, gender and education, and 54

Cambodia

Figure 4.6: Gender Inequality Index, 1995–​2015 0.7 0.6 0.5 Cambodia 0.4

Southeast Asia

0.3

World

0.2 0.1 0

1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

gender in the realm of political representation (Kabeer, 2003). Women have been disproportionately impacted by the IMF/​World Bank implementation of cost recovery (that is, privatization) for social services like health and education (van Staveren, 2002). Women were also negatively affected by such changes due to their overall lower income and familial responsibilities (van Staveren, 2002).

The role of regional migration With the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge government by Vietnamese troops in 1978, the start of a ten-​year occupation led hundreds of thousands of Cambodians to flee the country (Chandler, 2008; Dayley and Neher, 2013). Many fled to refugee camps on the border of Thailand (Owen, 2005; Chandler, 2008). Over one million Cambodians resettled in third countries while almost a quarter of a million resettled in the United States (Dayley and Neher, 2013). The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in 1989 and subsequent signing of the Paris peace agreement in 1991 resulted in UNTAC occupation until 1993. During this period UNTAC was tasked with overseeing the repatriation of over 350,000 refugees, many from Thailand (Owen, 2005; Chandler, 2008; Dayley and Neher, 2013). At the same time, Cambodia’s sex sector began to grow with the presence of the United Nations peacekeepers (Munro, 2012). Following the election of 2003, Cambodia began to see a vast influx of money from tourism and the return of Cambodians who had resettled overseas (Corfield, 2009). After the era of repatriation of refugees to Cambodia, however, the country has experienced high out-​migration (Castles et al, 2014). Figure 4.7 pictures the net migration rate for Cambodia between 1990 and 2015 expressed as 55

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

Figure 4.7: Cambodia net migration rate, 1990–​2015 10 8 6 4

2 0 -2 -4 -6 1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

the ‘ratio of the difference between the number of in-​migrants and out-​ migrants from a country to the average population, expressed per 1,000 people’ (Human Development Data, 2018). As Figure 4.7 shows, starting in 1990 and through the UNTAC occupation in 1993, migration into Cambodia was on the rise. Following this period, net migration began to decrease, dropping steadily in the period prior and following the global financial crisis in 2007. Reasons for migration often include poverty, lack of opportunities, and gender inequality (Piper, 2003; Maltoni, 2007; Vutha et al, 2011). Irregular labor migration is common, particularly from Cambodia to Thailand (Sophal and Sovannarith, 1999; Maltoni, 2007; Vutha et al, 2011; Castles et al, 2014). Between 2000 and 2010, the number of Cambodian migrants in Thailand increased from 18,718 to 281,321 (ILMS Database in ASEAN, 2015). Migration from Cambodia to Thailand occurred for several reasons related to both demographics and economics (United Nations Inter-​Agency Project on Human Trafficking, 2010; Chalamwong et al, 2012). Maltoni (2007: 7) notes: ‘While Thailand has decreasing birth rates and a strong economy Cambodia continues to have one of the fastest growing populations in the GMS [Greater Mekong Subregion] and few employment opportunities for a growing workforce.’ Furthermore, the global financial crisis deeply impacted the Cambodian economy, which saw GDP growth decrease from 10.2 percent to -​2.0 percent between 2007 and 2009 (United Nations Inter-​ Agency Project on Human Trafficking, 2010). With Thailand maintaining a much higher gross national income comparatively, it is an appealing destination for migrants seeking opportunity. 56

Cambodia

Despite Thailand having signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on labor migration with Cambodia in 2003, there are several factors which lead to a large number of irregular migrants between the two countries. Issues include the high cost of recruitment fees, restrictive labor migration regulations, and premature returns associated with misinformation about the working conditions (Chalamwong et al, 2012; Verité, 2019a). For example, provisions in the Thailand–​Cambodia MOU require that 15 percent of the migrant’s salary go to a savings fund managed by Thailand, taxes are required by both Thailand and Cambodia, and there is a mandatory three-​ year wait before a labor migrant who has returned to Cambodia can return to Thailand for work again (Verité, 2019a). Such barriers to legal status migration to Thailand lead to a reliance on third parties for migration, including smugglers and traffickers (Piper, 2004; Doneys, 2011; Dickson and Koenig, 2016). It is common practice to use Mehkchoul, or brokers that act as intermediaries between jobs across the border and the labor pool. Fieldwork on women trafficked from Cambodia found they were often deceived into human trafficking by these brokers at some point in their migration process (Shimazaki, 2021). A 2016 International Organization for Migration (IOM) assessment of returned Cambodian workers found that nearly 20 percent reported experiencing abuse and/​or exploitation during their time in Thailand. Among this share of workers, 83 percent were working in Thailand without documentation, exposing them to exploitative working conditions (Dickson and Koenig, 2016). Ultimately, migrant workers who are also irregular migrant workers are more vulnerable to human trafficking, exploitation, and physical abuse (Chalamwong et al, 2012; Dickson and Koenig, 2016). In addition to labor migration to Thailand, Cambodian workers also frequently migrate to Malaysia for domestic work and to South Korea for manufacturing, construction, and agricultural work (Holliday, 2012). Migration from Cambodia to Malaysia grew quickly in 2009 after a ban on migration from Indonesia to Malaysia. Reports of abuse increased as recruitment was not effectively tracked by the Cambodian government. Specifically, underage recruitment, debt bondage, and other forms of abuse were cited as growing problems (Holliday, 2012). Women migrants in domestic work who reported their abuse to the Cambodian Embassy were often returned to the recruitment agency only to be reassigned a new employer. In the case of Cambodia, structural adjustment policies and programs did impact the country’s entrance into globalization, with their scores on the KOF Index of Globalization increasing. However, the economic dominance associated with these changes resulted in a host of negative social and economic factors. Poverty, gender inequality, and lack of educational opportunities act as driving forces for migration for work and opportunity 57

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(Naro, 2009; Chalamwong et al, 2012). Facing barriers to legal migration, many Cambodians choose alternative routes, placing them at particular risk for exploitation (Piper, 2004; Chalamwong et al, 2012; Dickson and Koenig, 2016). It is this relationship between migration and human trafficking that must be further explored.

Impact on human trafficking Human trafficking from Cambodia is intricately connected to the foregoing shifts in migration and inequality. Labor and sex trafficking patterns often overlap with irregular migration movements (Schwartz, 2004; Takamatsu, 2004; Brown, 2007; Davy, 2014). A 2010 study found that among the 89,096 individuals deported from Thailand to Cambodia in 2009, 23 percent were trafficked. Of that 23 percent, 40 percent were classified as the worst cases, with deception into the worst labor conditions with no freedom of movement and no pay. Additionally, both migration and trafficking flows overlapped along the major highways that link Cambodia to Thailand (United Nations Inter-​Agency Project on Human Trafficking, 2010). Trafficking flows linked with migration have also been identified from Cambodia to Malaysia and Vietnam (Derks et al, 2006; Naro, 2009). Distinguishing irregular migration and trafficking across borders is often blurry in Southeast Asian countries (Asis, 2008). However, acknowledging their relationship is important as it represents ‘a continuum from voluntary individual movement to use of middlemen to trafficking and bonded labour’ (Castles et al, 2014: 155). With globalization and the associated economic policies and programs implemented in Cambodia inequality deepened (Schwartz, 2004; Davy, 2014). This ‘unrestrained’ form of capitalism weakened non-​economic institutions and the social safety nets the institutions previously provided (Schwartz, 2004). These conditions of inequality and weakened social services then act as key drivers for migration in order to seek opportunity (Schwartz, 2004; Samarasinghe, 2008; Bradley and Szablewska, 2016). In addition to poverty driving migration for job seeking opportunities, drought and flooding impacted the agricultural livelihood upon which many depended, creating an environment–​migration relationship (Naro, 2009; Kranrattanasuit, 2014; Bylander, 2016). These drought-​affected migrants are vulnerable and may accept dangerous offers from smugglers in their aim to get to Thailand (Caballero-​Anthony, 2018). Once again, many Cambodian migrants to Thailand experienced trafficking (Shelley, 2010; Kranrattanasuit, 2014). Research consistently shows that migrants who were trafficked in industries such as domestic work, factory, plantation, and fishing experienced ‘deception, coercion, debt bondage, non-​payment of salary, arbitrary salary deductions, forced work and forced overtime, and physical, verbal and 58

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mental abuse’ (Rigg, 2016: 115). Labor trafficking of Cambodian men in Thailand is common, particularly in the fishing industries. A researcher describes the experiences of the Cambodian men he encountered in the Thailand fishing sector: They all migrated with recruiters who promised work in various sectors, including construction, manufacturing, and seafood … They were all brought straight to the docks, where they were either sent on fishing boats or put to dock work. In either case, they worked around the clock, seven days a week … They described being paid wages that ranged from $2 to $5 dollars a day, even though Thailand set a minimum wage in 2013 of THB 300 [~9.25 USD] per day. The working conditions were unsafe, unhygienic, and oppressive. (Kara, 2017: 227) Cross-​border trafficking occurs throughout Southeast Asian countries, and Cambodia is no different. Organized crime groups take advantage of vulnerable populations seeking a way out of poverty (Blackburn et al, 2013). Corruption is also an issue, working to weaken the effectiveness of state institutions in providing protection. Casino owners in the border areas where sex industries can also be found have influence over Cambodian military and civilian police. This relationship allows for the establishment of trafficking flows across the border (Munro, 2012). Even in the single country of Cambodia, human trafficking is far from a homogenous phenomenon. Still, many of the same factors that drive cross-​ border migration and trafficking victimization are also connected to internal movements in the country as well. Internal trafficking usually draws upon movement of individuals from rural to urban centers. Economic downturn from drought and flooding, uneven economic development, lack of job and education opportunities, and gender discrimination also work as push factors for internal trafficking (Sari, 2010). Early on in Cambodia’s structural adjustment, non-​g overnmental organizations (NGOs) noted their skepticism about whether the recommendations and reforms found in Cambodia’s PRSP would actually be implemented. A 2001 NGO Forum on Cambodia reported that although their interim PRSP recognized the problem of violence against women and human trafficking, it lacked any concrete solutions including laws and policies (Marshall et al, 2001). Passed in 1996, Cambodia’s Law on Suppression of the Kidnapping, Trafficking, and Exportation of Humans was their first law dealing directly with the issue of human trafficking. However, it received wide criticism for focuses on punishing sex workers and undocumented migrants (Human Rights Now, 2009; Keo et al, 2014). An ambiguous definition of trafficking led the law to focus on women engaged in commercial prostitution, regardless of their consensual involvement. 59

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Internationally, Cambodia signed the UN Palermo Protocol on human trafficking in 2001, though it was not ratified until 2007. To meet international standards, new national legislation on human trafficking was passed in 2008 with the Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation (LSHTSE). Though this law expanded human trafficking to recognize men, women, and children victimized by both sex and labor trafficking, it still had several shortcomings. Cambodia’s law offers no direct protection for victims from prosecution. Protecting victims by maintaining confidentiality through legal proceedings is also not adequately addressed by the law (Cambodian Center for Human Rights, 2010; Kranrattanasuit, 2014). The issue of victim detention has also received attention in Cambodia. Many shelters, funded by NGOs rather than the government, have come under criticism for being ‘closed’ shelters which essentially detain victims under the justification that it is for their protection (Gallagher and Pearson, 2010; Surtees, 2013). Interviews with survivors about their experiences in these Cambodian shelters have also revealed abusive behaviors and stigmatization by staff, feelings of imprisonment, and mixed experiences with counseling (Tsai et al, 2020b, 2021). Boys in such shelters also report a lack of freedom and feeling trapped by rules, the presence of violence in the shelter, and lack of staff response to the boys’ experiences (Tsai et al, 2020a). Though on paper Cambodia’s new anti-​trafficking law is more inclusive, in practice it falls into many anti-​trafficking stereotypes. Focus remains on women and children who are victims of sex trafficking, with conflation occurring between prostitution and sex trafficking (Sandy, 2012). True sex trafficking victims are rarely distinguished from consensual sex workers (Bradley and Szablewska, 2016). The LSHTSE also criminalized third party involvement in prostitution, including assistance programs for sex workers (Bradley and Szablewska, 2016). Local authorities themselves are involved in violence and harassment against sex workers, including illegal detainment (Bradley and Szablewska, 2016). The conflation of prostitution and sex trafficking is seen following the passage of the 2008 law. Immediately after, brothel raids in known red-​light districts led to the detainment of sex workers for questioning. They were told if they returned to the red-​light district, they would be arrested, and were instead returned to their home villages or NGO shelters (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Another study of sex workers found that police crackdowns on brothels did not protect them, but instead increased their exposure to violence and police harassment while decreasing their ability to access safe sex and healthcare services (Maher et al, 2015). Ultimately, the result has meant that sex workers of all kinds have been pushed further underground, making them more vulnerable to exploitation and cutting off vital support services. With a focus on prostitution, little attention is given to prosecuting labor trafficking cases, particularly those involving men exploited in Thailand 60

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(Kranrattanasuit, 2014). A 2010 study found a lack of trafficking victim screening by immigration and police officers working with migrant laborers. Specifically, ‘nearly 20 per cent of Cambodian deportees who are actually labor trafficking victims report their case, but action by authorities was not taken in any of these cases’ (United Nations Inter-​Agency Project on Human Trafficking, 2010: 118). The majority of men however, did not report their exploitation, citing majority fears of their broker, employer, or police; not having a full understanding of their rights; and/​or the inability to speak Thai (United Nations Inter-​Agency Project on Human Trafficking, 2010). Deportees instead face being treated as illegal migrants, rather than trafficking victims. These issues are exacerbated by the fact that interviews with anti-​trafficking stakeholders in Cambodia have found that legal personnel lack understanding about how to apply the law to labor trafficking cases and noted inconsistencies in how the cases were handled by the courts (Williams and Gehring, 2016). The law and punishment approach to combating trafficking focused primarily on anti-​migration measures as a tool to prevent human trafficking. For example, Cambodia placed limitations on travel rights to curb trafficking of migrant laborers to Malaysia (Kranrattanasuit, 2014). Specifically, the government passed a comprehensive ban on Cambodian women traveling to Malaysia for work in domestic service (Trafficking in Persons Report, 2012). Such restrictions, however, often backfired and increased risks for trafficking as migrant workers sought out risky routes or the services of smugglers (Kranrattanasuit, 2014). Figure 4.8 shows Cambodia’s scores on the 3P Anti-​Trafficking Index from 2000 to 2015. Countries are rated on a scale from 1 to 5 on three dimensions for a total possible score of 15. Cambodia consistently scores the lowest on the protection dimension, averaging a score of 2.7. This indicates there is significant room for improvement in regard to laws, policies, and funding toward the protection of human trafficking victims. In addition to the issues of victim immunity from prosecution and illegal detention discussed previously, victim provisions are lacking in the areas of legal counseling, medical assistance, educational and vocation programs, and housing (Kranrattanasuit, 2014). The mean scores for prevention and prosecution are 3.2 and 3.4 respectively. Police and court officials receive little training around human trafficking (Keo et al, 2014; Kranrattanasuit, 2014). Anti-​trafficking officers interviewed about their one-​day training said that ‘instead of spending time investigating potential trafficking they were told to cooperate with NGOs in raising public awareness of illegal migration, prostitution, and human trafficking’ (Keo et al, 2014: 217). Overall, Cambodia’s sum score ranges from a low of 7 to a high of 11. Its mean overall score, however, is 9.4. In reality, Cambodia’s commitments to international and domestic human trafficking laws did not translate into sufficient action (Schwartz, 61

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Figure 4.8: Cambodia scores on the 3P Anti-​Trafficking Index, 2000–​2015 12 10 8 Prevention

6

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2015

2014

2013

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2011

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2004; Kranrattanasuit, 2014). Furthermore, international organizations and donors have heavily influenced the response. Cambodia’s anti-​trafficking framework cannot be separated out from this Western influence which has become embedded with ethnic stereotypes, misinformation about migrant workers, and misogyny around ideas about who is or isn’t a victim (Chow, 2020). Conditions attached to international funding allows international organizations or even countries to attach ‘their own values and ideology to specific aid agendas, sometimes with little thought to the local context’ (Bradley and Szablewska, 2016: 462). For example, historically anti-​ trafficking funding has gone primarily to religious based NGOs in Cambodia (Davy, 2014). In addition, funds are not funneled to programs that could help vulnerable groups, but instead focus on increasing economic infrastructure projects (Takamatsu, 2004). The United States, in particular, has also been influential over anti-​trafficking efforts, as one of Cambodia’s largest donors. The US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons reports emphasize the criminalization of prostitution as a way to combat trafficking, with countries’ rankings influencing non-​humanitarian and non-​trade-​related assistance (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Another major obstacle for effective anti-​trafficking efforts was corruption within the Cambodian government (Schwartz, 2004; Davy, 2014; Keo et al, 2014). Corruption within the criminal justice system has included the prosecution of individuals in the judiciary, police, and military (Schwartz, 2004). In 2006, the former Deputy Director of the Police Anti-​Human Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Department and two officials under his supervision were convicted for involvement in trafficking (Trafficking in Persons Report, 2007). Police have also been found to provide labor 62

Cambodia

recruitment agencies with advance notice of inspections, giving them the ability to hide evidence of labor trafficking (Kranrattanasuit, 2014). In sum, the response to human trafficking in Cambodia has not focused on addressing the identified root causes. Fieldwork and interviews with human trafficking victims in Cambodia highlight these root causes as economic instability, including poverty that extends to being unable to afford healthcare and education, and prior gender victimization, including domestic and sexual violence (Shimazaki, 2021). Instead of tackling these issues, anti-​trafficking efforts have ‘had the effect of shuffling the problem around’ while also further exacerbating inequalities (Bradley and Szablewska, 2016: 462). The government has focused on sex workers without distinguishing between genuine victims of trafficking and individuals engaging in consensual sex work. As such, Cambodia’s law on human trafficking was restricted by an almost exclusive focus on sex work. Along with exacerbating the stigma associated with sex work, the government’s focus made all sex workers more vulnerable and ignored labor trafficking and its association with migration. Ultimately, anti-​trafficking efforts must focus on reducing vulnerability for at-​r isk populations, including addressing economic and gender inequality. Rather than focus on law-​and-​order responses, more legitimate opportunities are necessary for individuals (Keo et al, 2014). Addressing corruption is also necessary with an emphasis on legal reforms and large structural changes to the criminal justice system (Keo et al, 2014).

Conclusion In Cambodia’s transition, high economic dominance and high globalization quickly occurred due to the multiplicity of policies and programs put in place by the IMF and World Bank. Consistent with the literature, these neoliberal economic policies were associated with anomie and criminogenic possibilities (Passas, 2000; Messner et al, 2008; Sanders, 2012). A study of trafficking in Cambodia notes: A form of unrestrained capitalism has emerged … which not only makes few allowances for the vulnerable in terms of job security or governmental welfare programs but also, in some cases, exacerbates their poverty. Rapacious industrial development and resource extraction have denied existing communities means of survival, forcing mass urban migration and, in the worst cases, trafficking of family members. (Schwartz, 2004: 388) The role of international financial institutions and foreign governments represent a new form of neoliberal colonialism, or ‘market colonialism’, through which the broader consequences of economic reform are overlooked 63

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through the lens of neutral market forces. As Cambodia emerged from a politically turbulent history, social and economic inequalities remained unaddressed. Instead, an ‘anomic period in Cambodia was embedded in a larger transformation brought about by globalization, itself a generator of anomic conditions’ (Keo et al, 2014: 221). This situation was directly impacted by Cambodia’s dependence on aid donors. In 2008, China surpassed Japan as the largest foreign government aid donor to Cambodia (Ear, 2013). This relationship has meant that Cambodia receives financial support from China, but in turn, the ‘evidence suggests Cambodia finds itself serving nearly every Chinese whim—​from enormous land concessions to dam building and other infrastructure projects—​and suffering labour abuses, geopolitical backlash, social unrest, ecological degradations, and a deep and lasting threat to the country’s democratic norms’ (Burgos and Ear, 2010; Ear, 2013: 30). Foreign NGOs and aid donors such as the United States have also had a lasting impact on the development of anti-​trafficking responses in Cambodia, ultimately leading to laws that confound human trafficking with illegal migration and prostitution (Keo et al, 2014). High growth was emphasized for development, but this growth comes at social costs, including leaving inequities unaddressed (Marshall et al, 2001). Individuals working in various aid sectors in Cambodia agree about the limitedness of aid effectiveness. A survey found that while aid was perceived to be working positively in improving political stability, and to a smaller extent accountability, things like government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption were perceived to not be impacted by donor aid (Ear, 2013). In the case of Cambodia, it was ultimately a combination of social, historical, political, and economic factors that coalesced to influence trafficking. This included the emergence of economic dominance and rapid globalization, the disintegration of social safety nets, and deepening income and gender inequality. Such forces impacted migration and, alongside it, vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking. Taken together, these conditions represented an environment in which one pathway to human trafficking can emerge.

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5

Neoliberal Accommodation and the Case of Bolivia Introduction This chapter will explore the pathway to human trafficking identified in Chapter 2 using the case of Bolivia. This pathway indicated the importance of high globalization, high income and gender inequality, high corruption, and a lack of high economic dominance. That is, when these conditions combine, a unique pathway for human trafficking is created. The chapter begins by giving some background on the social and economic history of Bolivia, before exploring how high globalization emerged. The consequences of this in terms of inequality and corruption are investigated. The lack of economic dominance is teased out through the idea of neoliberal accommodation and the unique pushbacks against such economic policies that have occurred in Bolivia. The chapter concludes by summarizing how these conditions have come together to create an environment for human trafficking.

Bolivia A brief history Located in the middle of South America, Bolivia is landlocked and shares borders with Peru, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. Known as Upper Peru while under Spanish colonial rule, the state of Bolivia declared independence in 1825 following a 15-​year war (Morales, 2010). Following several successful initial presidencies, Bolivia was characterized by a succession of caudillos, or ‘corrupt military strongmen’ who ruled the country (Morales, 2010). The War of the Pacific, which lasted from 1879 to 1884 over disputed coastal territory in Bolivia, established a civilian ruling class made up of tin-​ mining and land elites. In 1935, the loss of disputed territory to Paraguay following the Chaco War sparked radicalism and reform among Bolivians (Morales, 2010). 65

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From the end of the Chaco War in 1935 until the Bolivian National Revolution in 1952, competing ideologies and new parties emerged. Many reformers focused on decreasing the control private economic interests had over the state (Morales, 2010). Under new rule, a new constitution introduced a central economy that was state-​managed in 1938 (Morales, 2010). Soon after this, conservative parties regained control, but they now had to contend with parties such as the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) and Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB) (Morales, 2010; Klein, 2011). These parties would go on to become key players leading to the Bolivian National Revolution. Specifically, the success of the MNR party led to the installation of a government in which there were sweeping changes, including extensive land reform, the introduction of voting rights, and the nationalization of mines (Morales, 2010). However, a 1964 military backed coup resulted in a long and violent struggle between the ruling military and citizens, lasting until a democratic election in 1982 (Klein, 2011). In the two decades that followed 1982, Bolivia cycled through a variety of governments that struggled to restore democracy and prosperity. Over this time, short-​term loans through the military had resulted in a 5 billion USD debt to foreign banks and organizations. Economic shifts during this period included austerity measures put in place in response to IMF lending, and a capitalization program that privatized infrastructure and industry throughout the nation (Morales, 2010, 2012). Social protests against privatization were common, as demonstrated in the Water War of 2000 and Gas War of 2003. The former dealt with the proposed privatization of local water while the latter criticized the exportation of natural gas (Morales, 2010; Klein, 2011). The 2005 election of Evo Morales marked the first indigenous presidency in the history of Bolivia and was largely connected to discontent with the socio-​ economic effects of the previous decades’ neoliberal policies (Siekmeier, 2011). Similar to the outcomes following the National Revolution, the Morales administration focused on nationalizing gas, oil, and telecommunication industries; land reforms; shifts away from foreign policy involvement; and a focus on environmental protection. Furthermore, the introduction of a new constitution in 2009 expanded the state conception of plurinationality and decentralization (Morales, 2010). The constitution even renamed the country from the Republic of Bolivia to the Plurinational State of Bolivia, a change meant to emphasize that the country is made up of many different ethnicities (Crabtree and Chaplin, 2013). Despite making progress with some of these changes, critics of the administration lament a lack of substantial change and struggles in the administration to meet all of its promises (Kohl and Farthing, 2009; Morales, 2012; Postero, 2017). Ultimately, the history of Bolivia demonstrates a consistent tension between neoliberal economic reforms and social protest and pushback against such reforms. 66

Bolivia

Globalization As in the case of Cambodia in the previous chapter, Bolivia implemented both SAPs and poverty reduction strategies. IMF and World Bank involvement in Bolivia grew in the mid-​1980s due to the Bolivian debt crisis (Buxton, 2008). A New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched in 1985 in conjunction with the IMF, making Bolivia one of the first Latin American countries to implement a SAP (Mucha, 2017). This SAP focused on the adoption of free market reforms aimed at curtailing the role of the state through extensive privatization (Gill, 2000). More specifically, the NEP included a stance against wage increases, public sector employment cuts, the attraction of international creditors, limitation of state intervention to anti-​labor actions, and support for the adjusted exchange rate (Pastor, 1992; Jimenez, 2006; Haarstad and Andersson, 2009). Ultimately, the NEP revolved around globalizing Bolivia by opening it up to world economic markets (Jimenez, 2006). Around the same time as these early economic shifts, US involvement in Bolivia also increased. Stipulations around development and aid from the United States were filtered through the concern of drug policy (Menzel, 1997). At a fragile time for Bolivia’s economy, aid from the US to Bolivia was dependent on eradication of coca crops, with no attention to the pressing social and economic issues of the country (Leichtman, 2000). US involvement would continue through the new decade, with harmful repercussions for Bolivian democracy: US-​B olivian counternarcotics policies, especially in the Bush administration, encouraged Bolivian leaders to behave unconstitutionally. Whenever US/​Bolivian operations could skirt potential obstacles, such as the need for Bolivian congressional approval or other aspects of democratic rule that might countermand US initiatives, US and Bolivian planners did so. This ability to bypass congressional approval placed much of the decision making and power in the hands of a few bureaucrats, discarding elected officials and the public … It thus undermined Bolivian democracy. (Leichtman, 2000: 82) Bolivia was also a Latin American leader when it worked on its interim PRSP in 1999 (Dijkstra, 2010). The PRSP was approved in 2000 and full implementation began in 2001. IMF and World Bank staff, along with donors, were heavily influential in crafting the agenda of Bolivia’s PRSP (Dijkstra, 2010). The PRSP ultimately was ‘written by a government think-​ tank, by people who did not participate in the Dialogue’ (Morrison and Singer, 2007: 727). Although PRSPs were intended to alleviate some issues associated with SAPs by providing more country ownership, Bolivia failed 67

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to achieve this. In 2000, a network of seven Bolivian NGOs sent a letter to the IMF and World Bank demanding the rejection of the PRSP, voicing criticism about marginalization of parliament, political parties, and those opposed (Spanger and Wolff, 2003). Some core issues included a lack of prioritization, attention to feasibility, country ownership, and a controlled dialogue that excluded marginalized groups (Uriona et al, 2002; Dijkstra, 2010). Critical discussion about larger structural and economic issues was not included (Buxton, 2008). While increasing spending on health, education, and infrastructure was a focus of the PRSP, many civil society organizations held that important issues around land reform, natural resource control, and trade agreements were ignored (Morrison and Singer, 2007; Buxton, 2008). These organizations also noted a lack of transparency throughout the process, as citizen participation was limited and many initial documents were only presented in English (Ranis et al, 2006). During the period from 1986 and 2001, Bolivia received 350 million USD in loans from the IMF in exchange for adopting its specific economic policies (Schultz, 2008). To ensure the adoption of their policies and programs, the World Bank and IMF demonstrated a history of applying pressure to Bolivian governments (Kohl and Farthing, 2009). There historically has been resistance to privatizing the many state-​owned enterprises in Bolivia, including water, gas, mining, and telecommunications industries (Buxton, 2008; Kohl and Farthing, 2009). Following the implementation of the NEP, however, the World Bank and IMF pushed for privatization and were later backed in their efforts by the United States and Inter-​American Development Bank (Kohl and Farthing, 2009). This culminated in the passing of the 1992 Law of Privatization, which led to the privatization of many state firms, although not the largest (Kohl and Farthing, 2009). A new privatization plan, known as ‘capitalization’, eventually led the Bolivian government to surrender control of oil and gas to foreign and transnational corporations (Schultz, 2008; Simarro and Antolín, 2012). However, ‘by complying with IMF’s demands for privatisation, Bolivia ended up reducing its public revenue and started acquiring higher public deficits’ (Schultz, 2008: 97). External aid, conditioned on privatization, dramatically increased the national debt to 7.5 billion USD by 2005 (Artaraz, 2012). The Bolivian economy also continued to remain divided between a peasant, rural economy and an insecure, informal economy in the cities (Artaraz, 2012). The impact of these privatizations was felt widely by those most vulnerable in Bolivian society, which is discussed in more detail later. The Bolivian government was willing to use ‘measures such as the state of siege to enforce its policies’ (Jenkins, 1997: 112). This was demonstrated in February of 2003, with deadly consequences. Demands from the IMF that the Bolivian government reduce their deficit culminated in a proposed income tax (Kohl, 2006; Schultz, 2008; Kohl and Farthing, 2009). The 68

Bolivia

Figure 5.1: Bolivia’s scores on globalization and economic dominance 80 70 60 50

Globalization

40

Economic dominance

30 20 10 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

resulting social protests led to clashes between military and police, ending after two days and leaving dozens dead (Kohl, 2006; Schultz, 2008; Kohl and Farthing, 2009). Fundamentally, the Bolivian case demonstrates that the tension between the push for neoliberal globalization and resistance against privatization creates a context of high globalization but not high economic dominance. Figure 5.1 demonstrates this tension over time. While Bolivia’s scores on globalization have increased, particularly since the 1985 SAP, the same cannot be said for its scores on economic dominance. Instead, there is actually a steady decrease in economic dominance, especially following 2004. This period is largely seen as representative of a pushback against neoliberalism that culminated in the election of Evo Morales (Dangl, 2007; Siekmeier, 2011; Vanden and Prevost, 2012). Despite the lack of economic dominance, neoliberal economic policies and programs deepened economic and gender inequality and created space for corruption to flourish, ultimately producing another pathway for human trafficking.

Unequal impacts The neoliberal economic policies first introduced in 1985 were intended to stabilize the Bolivian state. While inflation was reduced, providing some economic stabilization, there was a lack of corresponding economic growth (Emmerij, 1998). The neoliberal economic restructuring also served to deepen economic inequality, most often by diminishing the state’s role in social welfare provision and privatizing state enterprises (Gill, 2000; Postero, 2017). As an example, social expenditures as a percentage of GDP decreased from 8 percent in 1981 to just 1.8 percent in 1986 (Silva et al, 2011). Extensive privatization of various public industries throughout the 1990s 69

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worked to divert the bulk of Bolivia’s wealth into the control of foreign corporations (Dangl, 2007). Health and education are two areas that experienced considerable cuts in social spending and shifts toward privatization (Chossudovsky, 1997; Silva et al, 2011). Social indicators of development such as life expectancy, health, and education remained low (Van Dijck, 1998). Following World Bank recommendations, Bolivia’s privatization of public health services resulted in ‘the segmentation and fragmentation of the health system [being] exacerbated, [and] accessibility and quality of care suffered and health status barely improved’ (Silva et al, 2011: 22–​3). These changes followed the 1985 SAP and culminated in a healthcare sector with high costs and poor services that caused the formal healthcare system to be viewed as a ‘last resort’ (Gómez, 2006; Heckert, 2018). Today, Bolivia compares poorly to other Latin American countries on a variety of health indicators, including infant mortality (Thiele, 2003; Heaton et al, 2014; Tejerina et al, 2014). Bolivia’s maternal mortality rate also lags far behind other South American countries (see Figure 5.2). Income inequality also greatly increased throughout the 1980s across Bolivia, and especially in urban areas (Psacharopoulos et al, 1995). When adjusted for inequality, the human development income index shows countries inequalities in income distribution across households. Figure 5.3 shows that although the gap in income inequality has decreased more recently in Bolivia, inequality continues to remain higher in Bolivia as compared to South America and the world. The trend of concentrated income despite economic reforms has remained, even after the PRSP adjustments (Jimenez, 2006). Bolivia’s income distribution continued to be among the most unequal among Latin American countries (Arias, 2006).

Figure 5.2: Maternal mortality ratio, 1990–​2015 450 400 350 300 250

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Figure 5.3: Inequality-​Adjusted Income Index, 2010–​2015 0.6 0.5 0.4

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2014

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The 1985 economic reforms also led to large declines in both employment and earnings (Chossudovsky, 1997). The national estimate for unemployment in 1980 was 6.1 percent of the total labor force. This figure jumped to 19.76 percent by 1986 (World Development Indicators, 2018). Following the implementation of the interim PRSP in 1999, unemployment continued to skyrocket. Bolivia experienced a lower average income per capita when compared to other Latin American countries (Van Dijck, 1998). In particular, there are now larger gaps between male and female unemployment as Figure 5.4 demonstrates. Figure 5.4 shows that the economic impacts of adjustment were often unevenly felt by men and women. Women in Bolivia have lower employment and education rates than men (Inchauste, 2000; Llanos, 2006). Challenges for women in obtaining formal employment and education, on top of domestic care responsibilities and violence, mean that women often end up with precarious jobs in the informal and low-​productivity sector (Bohoslavsky, 2020). Within the PRSP of Bolivia, a lack of attention to the ways that macroeconomic policies are gendered has meant that explicit acknowledgment of gender inequality and how to tackle it has been missing from the dialogue (Whitehead, 2003; van Staveren, 2008). Compared to other South American countries, Bolivia lags behind in terms of equality between men and women in regard to both health and education (Gianotten et al, 1994). The Bolivian PRSP did not consider gender disaggregated data and while it did mention income inequality in passing, the report did not provide any analysis of how this connects with work opportunities or poverty more broadly (Whitehead, 2003; van Staveren, 2008). Consequentially, gender inequality in regard to poverty, access to land, credit, and the labor market has been overlooked (van Staveren, 2008). 71

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Figure 5.4: Bolivia percentage of labor force unemployed by gender, 1991–​2017 8 7 6 5 4

Male Female

3 2 1 2017

2015

2013

2011

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In addition to deepening inequality between socio-​economic groups and between men and women, economic shifts often informed racial dynamics as well. There was a racial element present throughout adjustment, and many scholars noted that the traditional White–​mestizo political class was responsible for instituting racialized changes (Postero, 2017). Stemming from colonialization, a racial distinction has been made between ‘indios and mestizos/​Europeans, with mestizos and Europeans taking on a racial categorisation of “white” ’ (Heckert, 2018: 38). Centuries of exclusion and discrimination have created ethnic stereotypes and hierarchal assumptions that characterize the practices and discourses found in social relationships (Tuchschneider et al, 2006). Indigenous populations were impacted negatively by neoliberal economic reforms, which privileged Whites and mestizos (Postero, 2017). Bolivia’s indigenous groups have borne the negative impacts of the reforms and are more likely to be among the poorest (Psacharopoulos et al, 1995). This included issues of rural poverty, educational inequality, and health inequality (Vos et al, 1995). Still today, indigenous groups are more likely to come from poor households, less likely to complete primary and secondary education, less likely to be employed, and paid less when employed (World Bank Group, 2015). This gap is also greater for indigenous women, with Bolivian indigenous women earning about 60 percent less than comparable non-​indigenous women (World Bank Group, 2015). Although indigenous groups make up the majority of the population in Bolivia, at over 60 percent, politically they represent less than one fourth of all seats (The Global Americans, 2017). It was the White-​mestizo political class leading the changes during the neoliberal era of the 1980s and 1990s. The 1994 Law of Popular Participation demonstrates the lack of indigenous representation in Bolivia. Under this law, ‘neoliberal 72

Bolivia

multiculturalism’ was encouraged as indigenous groups and social movements were told to participate at the municipal level in the changing economic decisions (Postero, 2017). Yet racism throughout the country, and the control of political parties by the White-​mestizo elite prevented any true meaningful indigenous participation in political decisions (Rice, 2012; Postero, 2017). As one scholar notes: ‘Just as debt relief has had little impact on structural poverty, it has also done little to reduce Bolivia’s financial dependence on foreign lenders’ (Buxton, 2008: 131). By the early 2000s, Bolivia’s official development assistance had reached 10 percent of its GDP and 50 percent of its public investment (Spanger and Wolff, 2003). Globalization has intensified structural inequity and disenfranchisement in a multitude of ways. This includes the unequal impact that adjustment and austerity measures have on indigenous communities, increasing labor market segmentation, and continued exploitation of indigenous land and resources by transnational corporations (Robinson, 2008). The neoliberal economic reforms that stemmed from both the 1985 SAP and 1999 PRSP thus deeply impacted socio-​economic inequality along not just class, but also gender and racial lines as well.

The facilitation of corruption The role of corruption in Bolivia has also been significant. Compared to other Latin American countries, Bolivia has consistently ranked near the bottom on various measures of corruption (Murphy, 2004; Gingerich, 2010). Figure 5.5 illustrates this by comparing Bolivia’s scores on the Corruption Perceptions Index to the mean scores for the region of South America. The scale for this index ranges from 0–​10, with higher scores indicating lower levels of perceived corruption in areas of the public sphere. Bolivia’s scores have consistently been below the average for South America, ranging from 2 to 3.5 with a mean score of 2.8. Corruption within the political sphere has predominated, and has eroded public confidence in the government and reduced administrative efficiency (Schwarz-B ​ lum, 2006; Gingerich, 2010). One 2012 study of South American countries found Bolivia to be in the top three where police are believed to collude with crime, with 60 percent of Bolivian respondents stating so (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). This corruption has taken the form of patronage, or siphoning money for personal profit, and bribes (Gingerich, 2010; Postero, 2017; Hummel, 2018). One study found that intermediaries are commonly used to pay bribes to government officials: ‘Street vendors now pay larger bribes in lump sums to a small cadre of bureaucrats … street vendor representatives capitalized on the reorganisation of licenses to collude with bureaucrats and form bribery cartels’ (Hummel, 73

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Figure 5.5: Bolivia and South America Corruption Perceptions Index scores, 1996–​2017 5

4

3 Bolivia South America

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1

0 1996

1999

2002

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2018: 219). Corruption related to asset and money laundering tied to cocaine is also common (Thoumi and Anzola, 2010). Anti-​corruption measures focused on the public sector have been limited in their progress (Mosquiera and del Villar, 2006). While legal reforms have been introduced, they often focus on monitoring and sanctioning individual acts rather than ‘systematic forms of corruption linked to party funding’ (Gingerich, 2010: 77). The legal framework also fails to protect witnesses and whistle-​blowers in reporting on corruption (Bohoslavsky, 2020). Moreover, the succeeding government did not follow through on anti-​corruption initiatives (Gingerich, 2010). By focusing on abuses of power by individual offenders, political corruption within administrations and state-​owned organizations has gone unchecked (Guglielmone, 2008).

Globalization and its discontents Bolivia represents an interesting point of departure compared to many other cases due to the level of pushback against neoliberal economic policies and privatization. The fostering of this resistance reflects a long history of people’s protests (Gill, 2000; Young, 2017; Heckert, 2018). Neoliberalism and its associated economic reforms had promised increases in prosperity and quality of life. When these promises failed to materialize and many individuals found themselves worse off, popular social movements emerged: ‘By 2000, the majority of Bolivians were not only disillusioned by privatisation and globalisation but in open rebellion against the many negative consequences’ (Morales, 2010: xxiii). In the 1990s and 2000s, social movements emerged as powerful political forces at both the local and national level in Bolivia. 74

Bolivia

They emerged as a result of several factors, including growing processes of urbanization and education, the failure of the liberalizing economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, and the breakdown of a political system run by elite domination that had failed large portions of the population (Crabtree and Chaplin, 2013). Although the government pushed through many policies with violent means, social movements continued, ‘leading neoliberalism to dig its own grave’ (Dangl, 2007: 15). The neoliberal policies did not radically alter impoverishment, and indigenous groups continued to pay a heavy price. Anti-​neoliberal protests represented the failure of state policies to adequately represent the people’s interests (Rice, 2012). It is this pushback against neoliberalism and privatization which helps to account for the high globalization without corresponding economic dominance found in Bolivia’s pathway. Historically, resource nationalism, or ‘the idea that resource wealth should be used for the benefit of the nation,’ has brought together various social groups at important revolutionary moments (Young, 2017: 1). Many times, these movements have also been fueled by perceived corruption, with the government being seen as unrepresentative and self-​serving (Domingo, 2005; Dangl, 2007). Two prominent examples of this mobilization more recently included the Water War of 2000 and Gas War of 2003. The precipitating events for these protests both involved privatization of natural resources (Domingo, 2005). Framed within the context of globalization, these protests responded to what was negatively viewed as wealth extraction that would continue to deepen inequality and subject the nation to heavy outside influence (Dangl, 2007; Buxton, 2008; Vanden and Prevost, 2012). As Kaup (2012: 4) framed it: These are conflicts over how Bolivia’s rich natural resource base is integrated into the global economy and who benefits from it. They are conflicts over neoliberal forms of global integration –​and potential alternatives –​that are embedded in long histories of struggle among transnational corporations, geopolitical allies and foes, local classes and local class factions. Globalization thus created discontents by deepening inequality, while a history of political struggle allowed pushback against such forces to flourish. The Water and Gas Wars culminated in the election of Evo Morales, a president largely seen as opposing economic neoliberalism and foreign influence (Kaup, 2012; Young, 2017). While the historic importance of an indigenous president in Bolivia cannot be overlooked, Morales’ goals of building a ‘plurinational state’ would ‘prove harder in practice than on paper’ (Crabtree and Chaplin, 2013: 176). Under the Morales administration, 75

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the Bolivian economy grew as robust industry taxes were put in place and indicators such as education dropout rates, maternal mortality, and poverty decreased for the better. Despite these advances, Bolivia remained one of the poorest countries in the region, with social indicators lacking in comparison to its regional counterparts (Bohoslavsky, 2020). Analyses of change under Morales have been critical of the administration for bending, molding, or accommodating neoliberalism (Panizza, 2005; Kohl and Farthing, 2009). Natural resource extraction and dependency on global markets has continued, with transnational corporations acting as the controlling force while the state simply takes a small profit (Webber, 2011; Kaup, 2012; Postero, 2017). For example, the administration has continued to invite transnational corporations to extract and export Bolivia’s minerals and hydrocarbons (Kaup, 2012). Investments in this industry remain dependent on transnational corporations and the global strategies they choose to pursue (Paz and Ramírez-​Cendrero, 2018). Under the Morales government, the state found itself at the head of a dilemma between attracting foreign investment and technology to develop extractive industries and boost exports and protecting the rights of indigenous people and the natural environment. As two researchers summed up the state: ‘On balance, when push came to shove, the needs of the former seemed to prevail’ (Crabtree and Chaplin, 2013: 178). In addition, government social spending has remained low and income inequality has remained high, indicating a lack of substantial change (Webber, 2011). While some reforms have been successful, including healthcare and agrarian reforms focused on poor and indigenous populations, they have been met by serious challenges (Filho et al, 2010; Heaton et al, 2014). The primary economic model of development centered on globalized extractive capitalism has not been fundamentally altered (Filho et al, 2010; Webber, 2011; Simarro and Antolín, 2012). Transnational corporations remain at the top in regard to producing goods and taking profits, though the state does take a small percentage (Postero, 2017). Exploitation of natural resources by these transnational corporations, who are in close partnership with the state, does not match with the radical changes demanded by indigenous groups (Artaraz, 2012). Instead, these policy shifts represented an accommodation of neoliberalism in the sense that changes are made only ‘at the margins’ (Kohl and Farthing, 2009). Regarding the Morales administration, Webber (2011: 228) stated: ‘Whatever the pretenses of transnational “partners,” as opposed to “bosses,” the capitalist state’s principal role of facilitating the conditions for the ongoing accumulation of capital has not been interrupted by the Morales government’s new development program.’ In these ways, a reconstitution of neoliberalism allows processes of globalization to continue, while social mobilization and protest has hindered the development of economic dominance. As Figure 5.1 showed, while Bolivia’s scores on globalization 76

Bolivia

have steadily increased over time, its score on economic dominance has actually been decreasing since 2001.

A pathway for migration and human trafficking Bolivia’s pathway to human trafficking also appears in the analysis for high out-​migration. This pathway that leads to both high human trafficking and high out-​migration is the combination of not high economic dominance, high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, and high corruption. As discussed in Chapter 3, these solutions are identical, with the exception that in the solution leading to human trafficking, high income inequality is a contributing factor, while in the solution leading to high out-​migration it is a core factor. This shared overlap in the conditions leading to these outcomes underscores the importance of understanding the relationship that migration shares with human trafficking in Bolivia. Globalization has increased migration in Latin American countries (Castles et al, 2014). Bolivia, in particular, has been characterized by high out-​ migration. Compared to its neighboring countries, Bolivia has sustained a high rate of out-​migration over the past several decades. Table 5.1 demonstrates that Bolivia’s net rate of migration has remained negative since 1990, indicating out-​migration. Stemming from the neoliberal economic reforms and related industry privatizations of 1985, many Bolivians migrated to major cities within Bolivia, neighboring countries such as Argentina and Chile, or destinations such as Spain and the United States (Whitesell, 2008). Migration to Brazil doubled from 1984 to 1985, the same time period in which economic restructuring began in Bolivia (Buechler, 2004). This migration, both international and internal, was often connected back to employment opportunities (Klein, 2011; Punch, 2014). Men often traveled to cities after losing their jobs from the privatization of mines; women migrated abroad seeking domestic labor opportunities (Whitesell, 2008). Bolivian women’s migration to Argentina Table 5.1: Net migration rate in South American countries per 1,000 1990

1995

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1

0.2

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0.9

1

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1.7

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-​1.7

-​3.9

-​2.7

Peru

-​1.8

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-​4.3

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-​3.4

-​1.6

Argentina

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Figure 5.6: Remittance inflows as percentage of GDP 6 5 4 3

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in particular increased dramatically through the 1990s to nearly equal the migration of Bolivian men (Pizarro, 2015). Young Bolivians saw migration to Argentina as a path to job opportunities that were not available at home (Punch, 2014). Remittances sent back home from migrants acted as a way to help alleviate poverty. A high percentage of Bolivia’s GDP comes from these remittances, particularly when compared to other South American countries, as Figure 5.6 shows (Whitesell, 2008). As discussed in Chapter 1, the drivers of migration are often connected to human trafficking. Places with high flows of migration are likely to see corresponding flows of human trafficking (Skeldon, 2002; Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2010). This remains true for the case of Bolivia. Case studies of teenage migration from Bolivia to Argentina revealed patterns of child trafficking as well (Bastia, 2005). Bolivian migrants who work in the textile industry in Argentina have also experienced trafficking and exploitation (Buxton, 2008; Castles et al, 2014; Betrisey, 2017). Regarding the drivers of this relationship between migration and trafficking, Bastia (2005: 62–​3) noted: The causes … are closely related to those that sustain international migration—​the prolonged political and economic crisis, collapse of traditional industries such as mining, inadequate land distribution for sustaining the rural population engaged in subsistence agriculture, structural adjustments implemented since the 1980s, gender-​based discrimination, and income differences as compared to the countries of destination. In addition to these socio-​economic and gender-​based inequalities that place individuals at risk of trafficking, research on Bolivia has also noted a higher risk for trafficking among indigenous populations (Cameron and 78

Bolivia

Newman, 2008; Seelke, 2013; Pizarro, 2015). When considering these vulnerabilities together, indigenous women migrants from Bolivia face increased discrimination at their destination (Pizarro, 2015). Exploitation of Bolivian migrant workers has been an ongoing issue that is specifically linked back to global economic restructuring. Bolivian garment workers in Brazil have reported having their papers taken and working long hours for little pay in subpar lodgings (Buechler, 2004). For those without documents, labor conditions may also be precarious and exploitative (Farah and Sánchez, 2002). As has been documented in Bolivia, where migration is seen as the cultural norm to achieve better opportunities, individuals may be more likely to take risks and ignore warnings, making them vulnerable to trafficking (David et al, 2019). Internal labor abuses, including the use of child labor, are also an issue in Bolivia, particularly in the sugarcane and Brazil nut industries (Sharma, 2006; Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 2018). Inadequate enforcement of existing labor laws contributes to the issue of exploitation (Moyer, 2016). As with many countries, Bolivia’s approach to combating trafficking has focused on addressing the issue as a problem of crime, law, and order. Anti-​ trafficking initiatives have focused on law enforcement and stricter border controls (Bastia, 2005). Regulating and restricting migrants’ movements often has had the indirect effect of making them vulnerable to human trafficking and undermining the protections available to them in their destination country (Bastia, 2006; Pizarro, 2008). These restrictions make migrants vulnerable to trafficking through reliance on ‘clandestine channels’ such as the use of coyotes (Buxton, 2008; Pizarro, 2008). In response to restrictions in countries that demand migrant labor, Bolivian traffickers may operate out of firms, travel agencies, or individual networks. They offer traditional recruitments, including offering advances to aspiring migrants, in response to demand for labor in apparel plants in Argentina and Brazil and in agriculture in Spain, Chile, and Argentina (Farah and Sánchez, 2002). Institutionalized corruption among border and other law enforcement agents has further facilitated such movements and exploitation (Bastia, 2005; Pizarro, 2008). Figure 5.7 shows Bolivia’s scores on the 3P Anti-​Trafficking Index from 2002 to 2015. Countries are rated on a scale from 1 to 5 on three dimensions for a total possible score of 15. Bolivia consistently scores the lowest on the protection dimension, averaging a score of 2.3. This indicates that there is significant room for improvement in regard to laws, policies, and funding toward the protection of human trafficking victims. The mean score of 2.9 for prevention indicates that there are only limited efforts made in the prevention of human trafficking, including awareness campaigns, training for appropriate authorities, national plans to combat human trafficking, and cooperation with various organizations and governments against trafficking in persons. The mean score for prosecution is the highest at 3.6. Overall, 79

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Figure 5.7: Bolivia scores on the 3P Anti-​Trafficking Index, 2002–​2015 12 10 8 Prevention

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Bolivia’s sum score ranges from a low of 6 to a high of 11. Its mean overall score, however, is 8.8. A lack of adequate trafficking legislation can serve to criminalize rather than protect victims, while also facilitating the impunity of the offenders (Pizarro, 2008). In 2006, Bolivia did ratify the UN Anti-​Trafficking Protocol and pass Act No.3325 on Trafficking in Persons and Related Offences which added trafficking in persons to the penal code. Bolivia is also one of the only countries to eliminate the statute of limitations for the crime of human trafficking (Barraco, 2021). However, this legislation failed to effectively deal with internal human trafficking. This is particularly important given that the 2016 UNODC Global Report on Human Trafficking identified 589 victims of domestic trafficking victims in Bolivia (UNODC, 2016). Further, while a variety of forms of trafficking were covered by the law, the specifics of how monitoring mechanisms, programs, and preventative actions would be implemented were brought into question (CEACR, 2007). Almost a decade after the law was passed, a report from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees noted that child and sex trafficking had persisted, with Bolivia still lacking systematic data on trafficking causes and extent with an absence of adequate anti-​trafficking measures (UNHCR, 2014). In 2012 Law No. 263, the Comprehensive Law against Trafficking and Smuggling of Persons, was passed. The law criminalized sex, labor, child, and organ trafficking, requiring the standard demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion. In practice, the 2012 Bolivian law on trafficking and smuggling often conflated the two, impacting data collection efforts and prosecutorial responses (Trafficking in Persons Report, 2018). Although the law set out victim rights and protections, a 2020 report found that many states still lacked adequate infrastructure for victim care and reintegration (Defensoria del Pueblo Estada Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2020). Among the 733 victims 80

Bolivia

included in data provided by the Office of the Attorney General of the State, only 207, or 28 percent, were reported to have received protection and care by their local governments (Defensoria del Pueblo Estada Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2020). Furthermore, the Bolivian National Police announced at the end of 2017 that it would begin to ‘publish a list of “false victims” of trafficking crimes as an effort to prevent false allegations to police’ (Trafficking in Persons Report, 2018). While no update on this list has since been provided, this action would serve to further marginalize trafficking victims, discouraging victims to report or endangering victim participation in investigations.

Conclusion Bolivia makes a unique case given its history of social protest against economic measures associated with the IMF and World Bank. Neoliberalism began in Bolivia with the country’s return to democracy in the 1980s. In exchange for external aid, the privatization of industry was imposed, starting with the mines in 1985 and continuing on to other industries such as gas, oil, and telecommunications (Artaraz, 2012). Yet these changes often came at the expense of the most vulnerable in society. For example, soybean cultivation rapidly increased in the 1980s, becoming a major agricultural export, following a World Bank project. But much of the crops are controlled by Brazilian entrepreneurs and transnational agribusinesses, at the expense of the indigenous communities that make up the majority of the population in the area (Robinson, 2008). As Rice (2012: 85) states: ‘The racially exclusive and impoverishing policy of neoliberalism provided fertile terrain for the rise of pro-​poor indigenous movements. Mass antineoliberal protests were an open expression of the failure of the democratic institutions of the state to adequately represent the people’s interests.’ This history of counter movements and protests has contributed to the lack of economic dominance and relatively high social expenditures seen today. Closer historical examination, however, shows that the quality of social expenditures on services such as health, education, and employment have not worked to alleviate inequality. Rather, as this chapter explored, Bolivia continues to have high rates of poverty and poor health outcomes, low education levels, and high income and gender inequality. Despite social protests and pushback against neoliberal measures, as globalization and an economy that remained centered on neoliberal accommodation persisted, so too have economic and gender inequalities. Although the Morales government argued that the period of neoliberalism ended when it took office in 2005, critics have disagreed. Instead, the Morales state has continued to privilege the role of transnational corporations in extractivist development, often over the preferences of indigenous 81

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communities (Postero, 2017). Today, Bolivia still has high dependence on foreign capital and global commodity markets (Postero, 2017; Jepson, 2020). Additionally, various Bolivian governments over time have not been successful in addressing corruption. Taken altogether, this situation has spurred migration and, relatedly, human trafficking. It is only when looking in combination at historical, political, and economic factors that the emergence of human trafficking in Bolivia can be fully understood. The combination included the emergence of globalization, a corresponding deepening of income and gender inequality, and the presence of high corruption, all without high economic dominance. Together these conditions represent yet another environment in which one pathway to human trafficking can emerge.

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6

Neoliberal (In)stability and the Case of The Gambia Introduction This chapter continues the use of the comparative historical method of process tracing to analyze a third and final solution from Chapter 3. More specifically, this chapter presents the results of The Gambia, whose fsQCA solution leading to human trafficking included a combination of high economic dominance, not high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, high corruption, and high state fragility. Together these conditions combine in important ways to create a unique pathway for human trafficking. The chapter begins by briefly outlining The Gambia’s history. Following that, the conditions identified in the pathway are unraveled historically to reveal how high economic dominance emerged due to IMF and World Bank restructuring. Yet a lack of economic and political stabilization meant that social inequalities were not improved and corruption continued to weaken the state. The relationship such forces have with cross-​national migration, rural–​urban migration, and human trafficking are explored before concluding the chapter.

The Gambia A brief history Following the River Gambia, the small West African country of The Gambia (henceforth Gambia) is completely bounded by Senegal with the exception of its small Atlantic coastline. Though it is the smallest country on mainland Africa, Gambia has a population of just over two million. The country gained independence from Great Britain in 1965 and became known for retaining political stability in its early years (Perfect, 2016). Although there was a multi-​party democracy within the country, the first president, Dawda Jawara, governed from 1965 to 1994. 83

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An attempted coup in 1981 splintered political parties, resulted in an estimated 500 deaths, and effectively shattered standing beliefs about the stable nature of Gambia (Saine, 2012). The fallout that resulted is summarized by Kandeh (1996: 391): The period between the failed coup of 1981 and the successful coup of 1994 was marked by growing leadership corruption, endemic poverty and public discontent. Jawara was viewed in the West as a champion of democracy and human rights and Gambia seemed the quintessence of social tranquility and political stability in Africa. This stability, however, masked a corrupt political system mired in patronage, nepotism and cronyism. Rather than view the failed coup of 1981 as a wake-​up call to reform the political system and restore probity to public institutions, Jawara continued to surround himself with sycophants and opportunists whose abuses damaged the credibility of his government. It was against this background of a complacent and discredited leadership that the AFPRC coup took place. The successful coup in 1994 was led by junior military officers, who ended the Jawara era without bloodshed. Yahya Jammeh subsequently established and led the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) (Perfect, 2016). The AFPRC planned to return Gambia to civilian rule after four years, but mounting economic sanctions and pressures from the international community reduced the timetable to two years (Kandeh, 1996). A presidential election to return the country to civilian rule was held in 1996, although in the months leading up to the election, Jammeh and the AFPRC introduced bans on the formation of new electoral parties and leaders (Saine, 2003). These introduced constraints ultimately led to the election of Jammeh under conditions that the international community condemned as unfree (Saine, 2003, 2009). Jammeh continued to win elections over the next two decades, under increasingly authoritarian rule. Indeed, Jammeh’s rule was marked by violations of political, civil, and social rights of Gambia’s citizens (Saine, 2009). Laws intended to repress freedom of expression and the media were introduced in 2013, and anti-​gay legislation in 2014 (Thompson, 2015). Those targeted included journalists, government critics, human rights defenders, religious leaders, and LGBTQ individuals. Human rights violations among these groups included arbitrary arrests, detention, harassment, threats, and the use of torture (Thompson, 2015). In the 2016 election, however, Jammeh was defeated by candidate Adama Barrow who was backed by opposition coalitions. While Jammeh initially accepted defeat, within the week he reneged and demanded a new election (Perfect, 2017). This sparked a political crisis that culminated in military intervention from the Economic Community of West African States 84

the Gambia

(ECOWAS), during which an estimated 46,000 Gambians fled the country due to threat of possible violence (Perfect, 2017). In January of 2017, Barrow was sworn in as president at the Gambian embassy in neighboring Senegal. Jammeh fled to Equatorial Guinea due to a deal brokered by the African and European Union along with ECOWAS, likely due to the country’s non-​recognition of the International Criminal Court (Perfect, 2017). This transition of power once again marked another important shift in the history of Gambia.

Some strings attached Following independence in 1965, Gambia quickly joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1967 and the African Development Bank in 1973 (World Bank Group, 1980). Its first five-​year development plan began in 1975 and was largely dependent on borrowing funds from donors (Jabara, 1994). This included the International Development Association, the German-​owned KfW development bank, and the African Development Bank (World Bank Group, 1975). Examining the early economic policy of Gambia, a World Bank report positively detailed the limited government interference in private enterprise, lack of restriction on international financial transactions, and open climate for foreign investments (World Bank Group, 1980). Despite this, the report noted that slow economic growth had actually resulted in a reduced average standard of living (World Bank Group, 1980). To combat deteriorating social and economic conditions, Gambia adopted an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1985 (Sriram, 2009; Cham, 2012). Crafted in consultation with the World Bank, IMF, USAID, and others, the ERP was continually renewed through 1990 (Jabara, 1994). The ERP focused on increasing import pricing, increasing returns on exports, and decreasing government expenditures. Nonetheless, Gambia remained heavily dependent on foreign aid and donors for the majority of its financing (Jabara, 1994). The Program for Sustained Development was started in 1990 with similar intended goals focused on tightening expenditures, lifting price controls, and divesting public enterprises (Saine, 2009). With such policies in place, Gambia was able to receive additional loans from the IMF and World Bank (Saine, 2009; Kea, 2010). Gambia during this period was often cited by the IMF and World Bank as a successful example of adjustment (Parfitt, 1995; Edie, 2000). However, despite some improvement in stabilizing macroeconomic indicators, Gambian’s quality of life saw little improvement. The perspective of success by the international financial institutions was not reflected by ordinary Gambians (Sallah, 1990). Instead, ‘conversations with Gambians over the 1990–​1993 period indicated that there was growing dissatisfaction among many sectors in the urban areas over the fact that economic hardships had 85

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not been erased, while government ministers’ salaries and perks had been increased’ (Edie, 2000: 178). Despite dissatisfaction with the neoliberal policies, there was no widespread social pushback as was seen in the case of Bolivia. One reason for this is likely due to the one-​party dominant system, which faced little opposition. In the absence of independent media and interest groups, debate about the policies was missing and dissent was suppressed (Edie, 2000). The coup in 1994, however, would disrupt the development projects, leading to economic sanctions and the cutting off of foreign aid (Cham, 2012; Saine, 2012). After the presidential election in 1996, international aid, loans, and reforms were reintroduced to Gambia (Cham, 2012). The Gambian government entered into a three-​year loan in 1998 through the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility with the IMF, though this was soon renamed as the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (Cham, 2012). Tighter financial regulations and the introduction of a new privatization framework aimed to create a stronger and more competitive economy (Saine, 2009). Gambia entered an interim PRSP in 2000, the first of which was fully implemented in 2003, and the second in 2007 (Cham, 2012). Satisfactory completion of these economic programs and policies led Gambia to reach Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) completion, a point ‘at which countries receive the balance of the debt relief that the international community committed to at the decision point’ (World Bank Group, 2018). The IMF and World Bank program was critiqued for compelling African countries to join, whereby member countries were able to gain access to funds only through PRSP compliance (Ninsin, 2012). As Ninsin (2012: 13) noted, ‘the HIPC initiative carried the same tough conditionalities as were imposed under previous policy reforms –​sweeping privatisation and radical tax reforms designed to raise state revenue –​before a country would qualify for debt relief.’ The Gambian economy has been heavily reliant on foreign and international aid and assistance since its independence (Heintz et al, 2008; Kea, 2010). Figure 6.1 shows the increase in net official development assistance and aid over time, including a dip in aid during the period immediately following the coup. Gambia’s dependence on foreign aid has limited the pathways of the government and the country. The stipulations attached to the HIPC and other IMF/​World Bank programs effectively constrained development strategies to those previously deemed appropriate (Heintz et al, 2008).

A peripheral position in a globalized world? Within Sub-​Saharan Africa (henceforth SSA) there have been over two decades of various SAPs aimed at stimulating economic shifts within countries in order to enable global integration. Despite the stated intentions, 86

the Gambia

Figure 6.1: Gambia net official development assistance and official aid received (in millions of US dollars) 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 2016

2012

2008

2004

2000

1996

1992

1988

1984

1980

1976

1972

1968

1964

1960

0

however, SSA continued to experience high rates of poverty and a minimal trade and exchange relationship with the global economy (Truong, 2006). Instead, SAPs perpetuated policies focused on extractive economies, ignored social needs while constraining the role of the state, and lacked the breadth needed to attend to complex internal dynamics of each country (Mengisteab, 1996). The policies and programs of international financial institutions led governments to implement changes that have not necessarily resulted in increased growth or productivity, but instead have entered the global economy in a ‘mode of dependence’ (Kea, 2010; Ninsin, 2012). In West Africa, member countries of ECOWAS remain at the bottom of human development indicators (Sawadogo, 2012). In Gambia specifically, the small economy remains undiversified with high unemployment and poverty (Saine, 2012). The country depends heavily on imports to meet needs and relies on external financial assistance to make up the vast majority of the government’s budget (Saine, 2012). Ultimately, Gambia’s increasing globalization has not resulted in the diversified and strong economy promised by the multitude of SAPs. Figure 6.2 demonstrates that Gambia’s scores on globalization remained low, only recently scoring above 50 on an index of globalization ranging from 0 to 100. Globalization created a wide gap of global inequalities between countries, and even within countries there is a widening gap between poor and rich communities (Chuang, 2006a). Inequalities in power structured how African countries entered the global economic market and the flows that occurred between countries (Harrison, 2010). That is, African countries tended to retain a peripheral position in regard to their influence in a globalized world, while conversely, they were often impacted substantially by shifts at the international level (Harrison, 2010). 87

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Figure 6.2: Gambia’s globalization scores, 1970–​2015 70 60 50 40 Gambia

30

World

20 10

2015

2012

2009

2006

2003

2000

1997

1994

1991

1988

1985

1982

1979

1976

1973

1970

0

Corruptible stability SSA faces high and endemic levels of corruption, where government leaders often used their positions of power to enrich themselves at the expense of their citizens (Shelley, 2010). Globalization and the associated power inequities enabled criminal networks operating through corruption that ultimately undermines the state (Sawadogo, 2012). In Gambia this included government officials implicated in drug and arms dealing associated with an increased presence of South American cartels in the region (Saine, 2012). Furthermore, studies have shown that foreign aid and development assistance often came with a perilous price. A study of 53 African countries, Gambia included, from 1996 to 2010 showed that such funds negatively impacted institutional quality, including rule of law, government regulations and effectiveness, democracy and political stability, and corruption and accountability (Asongu, 2013). In Gambia, the 1994 coup led by Jammeh was predicated on military intervention being necessary to clean up corruption within the current government (Saine, 2003). Indeed, Jawara’s time as president involved corrupt practices, including a political system full of patronage, nepotism, and cronyism (Kandeh, 1996; Saine, 2009; Kea, 2010). Ironically, Jammeh and the AFPRC did not transform these practices, but again used positions of power for self-​enrichment (Kea, 2010; Saine, 2012). This broadly included steps that corrupted democratic processes such as voting, disregarding the rule of law, and steadily eroding human rights (Wright, 2015). Freedom of the media and press in particular declined under Jammeh. Journalists, critics, and activists disappeared, were killed, or were imprisoned (Johnson, 2017). Toward the end of his time as president of Gambia, Jammeh was noted to 88

the Gambia

be among the richest people in the country and one of the richest heads of state in West Africa (Saine, 2009). Gambia’s scores on the Corruption Perceptions Index, where 0 indicates high corruption and 10 indicates low, ranged between a low of 1.9 and a high of 3.5 with a mean of 2.8 between 2003 and 2017 (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2018). Corruption, particularly corruption concentrated within the government, impacted political stability. When corruption and economic reforms deepen inequality and power differences, the legitimacy of the government is eroded (Saine, 2012). The political reforms associated with SAPs are often lacking. In Gambia, this deepened political factionalism and wore down government legitimacy (Saine, 2012). From the attempted coup of 1981 to the authoritarian rule of Jammeh, and most recently Jammeh’s refusal to step down as president, Gambia has experienced political and economic instability stemming from the reforms associated with globalization. Saine (2009: 57–​8) concluded: Ultimately, The Gambia’s security and human rights deficits together with a poor governance framework plunged the economy into a crisis of unprecedented proportions. The deepening economic crisis in The Gambia intensified by policies of structural adjustment, the impacts of globalization and poor leadership, have rendered the state apparatus less able to fulfill its ‘security’ obligations. The immediate effect has been a sharp descent into social and economic ‘insecurity’ as well as the violation of civil and political rights of citizens. This is demonstrated by Gambia’s scores on the Fragile States Index which has increased 18 percent from 2006 to 2018, from a score of 74.0 to 87.1. The Fragile States Index scores countries from 1–​10 on 12 indicators for a total possible score of 120. Lower scores indicate improved relative stability over time (Fragile States Index, 2018). When Gambia’s scores on the 12 indicators are broken down, four specific indicators increased substantially, as shown in Figure 6.3. These four indicators all increased by over 30 percent in the time period between 2006 and 2018. The four indicators include: factionalized elite, which measures political power struggles and the credibility or perceived legitimacy of electoral processes; human flight, which considers the impacts of voluntary emigration and forced displacement; human rights, which indicates abuse of legal, political, and social rights; and demographic pressures, which includes both population and environmental pressures on the state (Fragile States Index, 2018). In Gambia, turbulent electoral processes and eroding human rights act in conjunction with demographic pressures to push human flight, as will later be discussed in this chapter’s section on migration and human trafficking. 89

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

Figure 6.3: Indicators of state fragility in Gambia, 2006–​2018 10 9

Factionalized elite Human flight

8

Human rights

7

Demographic pressures

6 5

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Together these conditions work to increase the vulnerability of the state to conflict or collapse.

Impacts on economic and social conditions The primary goal of economic reforms in SSA was to integrate countries into the global economy by stimulating economic growth through government spending, investments, balancing imports and exports, and generating a flow of foreign capital (Truong, 2006). However, some questioned how successful reforms have been and whether or not they differentially harm the poor and vulnerable, with outcomes pointing to increasing income inequality (Mengisteab, 1996). Under the economic reforms of the Jawara era, Gambia continued to remain among the poorest countries with low scores on human development indicators (Jabara, 1994; Saine, 2003). Gambia’s scores on the Human Development Index lag behind those of SSA as demonstrated by Figure 6.4. This index is a composite of indicators for life expectancy, education, and income (Human Development Data, 2018). More recent reforms have shown modest improvements in economic growth, though this has not translated into employment opportunities, and poverty has increased (Sallah and Williams, 2011). Beyond not reducing poverty, reductions have also not been made in regard to ‘hunger, malnutrition, maternal mortality, incidence of malaria and tuberculosis, and access to safe drinking water … [implying] that the so-​called trickledown effects of growth have been delayed, and there is slow and uneven development in the Gambia’ (Cham, 2012: 492). As Figure 6.5 indicates, Gambia’s scores on maternal mortality are significantly worse than both the larger region and the world average. Efforts to improve the morbidity 90

the Gambia

Figure 6.4: Human development scores, 1990–​2017 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 Gambia

0.4

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.3

World

0.2 0.1 0 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017

Figure 6.5: Maternal mortality ratio, 1990–​2015 1200 1000 800 Gambia

600

Sub-Saharan Africa World

400 200 0

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

and mortality rates of the country have been curtailed by factors such as inadequate financial and logistic support for the health sector, a shortage of trained staff, and a high staff attrition rate (Lahire et al, 2011). What growth Gambia has seen has largely benefited the urban elite (Sallah and Williams, 2011). This is further indicated by income inequality, which has not improved substantially, and has remained stagnant for the past several years at a score of 0.3 out of the ideal score of 1 (Human Development Data, 2018). As part of the SAP in Gambia, price reforms were introduced which increased prices on food, communications, water, and electric (Jabara, 1994; Wright, 2015). Healthcare service fees increased by 25–​400 percent and 91

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cost recovery methods for health services were introduced (Jabara, 1994). Earnings overall declined, public sector wages froze, and the government workforce was reduced by 24 percent (Jabara, 1994). Public expenditures were sharply reduced, with social services, agriculture, and public works facing the steepest cuts (Jabara, 1994). Overall, the quality of life declined under these economic reforms, and as Wright (2015: 195) noted: ‘It was not a situation that bred stability.’ While expenditures on healthcare and education may have increased, these figures mask a reality faced by many Gambians (Wright, 2015). Gambia lacked enough clinics to meet the needs of patients, while prenatal care remained minimal and was reflected in a high infant mortality rate (Wright, 2015). Additionally, the shift to a cost recovery system combined with high poverty has meant many people simply do not seek care (Wright, 2015). Regarding education, Gambia retained a high dropout rate along with significant gendered inequalities in regard to literacy and educational attainment (Chant and Jones, 2005; Jones and Chant, 2009). The primary school dropout rate was at 25 percent for Gambia in 2015, with the males averaging 4.2 years of schooling compared to 2.6 years for females (Human Development Data, 2018). Examinations of SAPs indicate that they combine with existing structures of power and neoliberal policies to negatively harm women and children (Truong, 2006). Specifically, economic reforms disproportionately harm women, who often rely on social services, by cutting spending and resources put toward needed social services (Turshen, 1994; Truong, 2006; Iyanda and Nwogwugwu, 2016). Women were hindered in their power to labor outside the home, obtain their own businesses, and move away from the reproductive tasks of the private sphere (Geisler and Hansen, 1994; Iyanda and Nwogwugwu, 2016). Gendered inequalities are exacerbated by SAPs that impacted access in the public sphere and burdens in the private sphere (Geisler and Hansen, 1994; Lensink, 1996). The gender inequality in Gambia, nonetheless, decreased somewhat, though it remained high when compared to the world and even the region of SSA (see Figure 6.6). An example of profound gender inequality is found among female agricultural farmers, who often make up a considerable portion of the agricultural sector in the region. Due to gender-​based inequalities, however, female agricultural farmers are often unable to ‘build up sustainable enterprises’ because they lack necessary resources (Truong, 2006; McFerson, 2010). In Gambia, patriarchal familial structures undercut efforts for women to access land because male heads of households were able to declare authority over plots (Gordon, 1996). Communal rice plots also took the place of what were centrally women-​owned crops once irrigation pumps were introduced (Blackden and Bhanu, 1999). More recently, a gender gap in earnings persists in addition to the aforementioned educational gap, while women 92

the Gambia

Figure 6.6: Gender Inequality Index, 1995–​2015 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 Gambia

0.4

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.3

World

0.2 0.1 0 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

also tend to be concentrated in more precarious employment positions (Heintz et al, 2008). Between 1991 and 2017, the female to male ratio of unemployment remained virtually unchanged at 1.88 and 1.84 respectively (Human Development Data, 2018). A feminization of responsibility accompanied the feminization of poverty in Gambia. This entailed growing gender disparities around household labor and the ability to negotiate household obligations (Chant, 2010). Research demonstrates an increase in Gambian women’s financial responsibilities, including providing children’s clothes, food, and household furnishings (Kea, 2010). The removal of price controls and subsidies under economic restructuring increased the costs of basic items such as rice, negatively impacting women trying to feed their families (Bräutigam, 1994). One researcher sums up the economic changes of the 1980s in Gambia: The structural adjustment programmes imposed by the International Monetary Fund, which entailed opening the local markets to the global economy, resulted in the impoverishment of the majority and a growing class divide, with foreign goods available but unaffordable for most, mass youth unemployment as well as a spiralling insecurity and marginalisation in the world market. (Brzezińska, 2020: 267) Ultimately, since Gambia’s entrance into neoliberal economic reforms, the population has not seen an increasing standard of living, as poverty, unemployment, lack of quality health and educational access, and gender inequality remain prominent. 93

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Migrating ‘the back way’ and human trafficking Early on, Gambia received high rates of migrants due to conflict in neighboring states (Kebbeh, 2013). Since 1995, however, the country has been characterized by high out-​migration rates, as shown in Table 6.1. Gambia maintains one of the highest emigration rates in West Africa, and migration to Europe is seen as a route to a better life and increased employment opportunities (van Nieuwenhuyze, 2009; Nyanzi, 2010; Drammeh, 2018; Altrogge and Zanker, 2019). Summing up the situation, Gaibazzi (2012: 123) states: ‘Over the last three decades, employment and subsistence opportunities in The Gambia have shrunk as a consequence of declining agriculture, rising inflation, neoliberal restructuring and, at least for some, the deterioration of political liberties, all of which have contributed to making international migration a dominant model of success.’ A Gambian Labour Force Survey in 2018 found unemployment among youth ages 15–​35 to be at a staggering 41.5 percent (GBOS, 2018). Facing such prospects, many Gambian youth see migration to Europe as a way to attain a better life. The reasons for this migration are primarily economic, though the political history of the country, its postcolonial condition and the cultural impact of globalization, alongside a degree of idealization of the West also factor in (Brzezińska, 2020: 265). Economic and ecological deterioration in the rural areas of Gambia also drive increased migration to the West (Brzezińska, 2020). This migration is primarily male, changing dynamics in rural areas as there is an increased burden on those left behind (primarily women) to continue farming (Curtis, 2018). Many Gambian young men express frustration at the mismatch between their aspirations and the restrictive emigration policies which narrow their opportunities to go to Europe (Gaibazzi, 2010). These migration restrictions are compounded by the ‘documents problem’ or ‘visa problem’ as some Gambians refer to it. Obtaining the documents necessary for legal migration to Europe, Canada, or the United States is a long, costly, and difficult process that is likely to end in rejection. The rejection rates for visa applicants from West Africa are among the highest in the world and have only been increasing (Brzezińska, 2020). These barriers create enforced immobility, and alternative strategies are pursued. Table 6.1: Net migration rate per 1,000 1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Gambia

11.7

-​3

-​4.6

-​2.1

-​1.8

-​1.5

Sub-Saharan Africa

-​1.4

-​3.9

0.2

-​0.3

-​0.6

-​0.8

World

-​1.6

-​2.6

-​1.1

0.2

1.3

0.2

94

the Gambia

In response, irregular migration movements toward Europe from Gambia have increased, particularly among young people (Adepoju, 2002; Nyanzi, 2010; Drammeh, 2018). A survey completed by the Gambia Bureau of Statistics found around 40,000 Gambians who migrated by irregular means between 2013 and 2017 (GBOS, 2018). Many of these migrants head in large numbers to Italy and Spain (de Haas, 2008; Curtis, 2018). Between the period from 2006 and 2008, nearly 300 Gambian migrants were apprehended at sea near the Spanish border, while over 12,000 arrived by sea in Italy in the years 2014–​2015 (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012; Drammeh, 2018). Gambia also ranks the highest among SSA countries for unaccompanied minors who migrate (Drammeh, 2018). In addition to high rates of youth migration, Gambia experienced an increase in female migration and the emigration of highly skilled individuals (Adepoju, 2003; Spadavecchia, 2013; Verité, 2019b). Gambia ranks in the top ten SSA countries in emigration of highly skilled populations, with a emigration rate of 63 percent (Kebbeh, 2013; Spadavecchia, 2013). Much of this ‘brain circulation’ takes place between the countries of Gambia, Ghana, and Nigeria (Adepoju, 2003). As with migration of youth, independent female migration is often used as a survival response to deepening poverty and inequality (Adepoju, 2003). Overall, it is estimated that 4 percent of all Gambians now live outside the country (Kebbeh, 2013; Perfect, 2017). Remittances from migrants are an important component of the Gambian economy (Saine, 2009; Verité, 2019b). Incoming remittances accounted for just over 10 percent of the country’s GDP in 2010 (Kebbeh, 2013). Migration remittances as a percentage of GDP in Gambia have increased from 9.5 percent in 2000 to 21.23 percent in 2013, showing a substantial increase and reaching some of the highest levels in the world (Human Development Data, 2018). Remittances are used to supplement the incomes of families (Adepoju, 2000; Saine, 2012). More specially, remittances to Gambia were used by families to pay for basic necessities such as food, utilities, and school fees (Saine, 2009). Tightening border controls meant that migration shifted to more dangerous routes (Adepoju, 2002; Drammeh, 2018). The alternative routes to Europe were commonly referred to as ‘the back way’ (Drammeh, 2018; Brzezińska, 2020). The back way involves migrating toward Europe through Senegal, Mali, and Niger into Algeria or Libya, then frequently accessing Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Italy (di Cortemiglia et al, 2018; Altrogge and Zanker, 2019). Gambian migrants may make use of the Niger route, which often involves trafficking (Drammeh, 2018). Senior officials at Interpol and within Gambia, including the Gambian National Agency Against Trafficking in Persons (NAATIP), have cited awareness of how ‘agency men’ involved in these migration routes are also connected to trafficking (di Cortemiglia et al, 2018). Studies of youth migration from Gambia show that the process of taking the back way involved: 95

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Risking their lives in illegal trafficking scams, attempting long trips by sea either in pirogues or on the cargo decks of ships, being smuggled in the back of long-​distance trucks, travelling by land for many months through various Sahelian countries, sex tourism with the promise of emigration, and cross-​generational sex with much older tourists in exchange for visa and air ticket. (Nyanzi, 2010: 210) Migrating the back way thus involves taking a multitude of risky and entangled routes that can involve trafficking (Adepoju, 2002). A recent survey by the IOM of migrants to Italy asked about trafficking and exploitation, and 73 percent of respondents reported experiencing at least one of the trafficking practices (International Organization for Migration, 2016). Migrants from Gambia reported some of the highest rates, with over 90 percent reporting at least one trafficking practice, taking place primarily en route in countries such as Libya, Algeria, and Sudan (International Organization for Migration, 2016). Gambia acts primarily as a source country for human trafficking. Deteriorating socio-​economic and socio-​political conditions for Gambian citizens have intensified irregular migration. In response, many young people have been victimized through scams promising migration run by labor traffickers through fake agencies (Adepoju, 2002). While much irregular migration may simply be a case of smuggling, cases of Gambian women trafficked to Europe through similar routes have been reported (de Man and Bah, 2013). Demand for female labor migrants in the domestic sector of the Arab Gulf states have also been connected to reports of human trafficking (Altrogge and Zanker, 2019). In addition to trafficking that occurs through migratory patterns toward Europe, trafficking to wealthier SSA countries such as Nigeria and South Africa is also common (Shelley, 2010). Cases of children trafficked from Gambia to Senegal for domestic labor and forced begging have also been documented (Devillard et al, 2015). Within Gambia, trafficking for sexual exploitation also occurs, with child sex tourism becoming an increasingly visible issue (Fitzgibbon, 2003; Monzini, 2005; de Man and Bah, 2013). There is some evidence that trafficking networks have been connected to Gambian and European tourism agencies in regard to child sexual exploitation in tourism (ECPAT International, 2015). Figure 6.7 shows Gambia’s scores on the 3P Anti-​Trafficking Index from 2002 to 2015. Countries are rated on a scale from 1 to 5 on three dimensions for a total possible score of 15. Gambia consistently scores the lowest on the protection dimension, averaging a score of 2.1. This indicates that there is significant room for improvement in regard to laws, policies, and funding toward the protection of human trafficking victims. Gambia’s law on trafficking does include provisions on providing medical, 96

the Gambia

Figure 6.7: Gambia scores on the 3P Anti-​Trafficking Index, 2002–​2015 10 9 8 7 6 Prevention

5 4

Protection

3

Prosecution

2 1 2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

0

psychological, and legal services in addition to maintaining the safety and integrity of victims (Devillard et al, 2015). However, several UN committees have recommended Gambia increase access to and availability of free supports and services. Further, there are scant examples of foreign victims being granted temporary residence visas (CPA The Gambia and ECPAT International, 2019). The mean score of 2.5 for prosecution in the case of Gambia indicates that the country has legislation but does not enforce it adequately ‘in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishment of such offenders’ (Cho et al, 2014b: 2). As of 2015, no prosecutions had been carried out under Gambia’s trafficking law, and there is a lack of a comprehensive data collection and reporting system (CPA The Gambia and ECPAT International, 2019). The mean score for prevention is the highest at 2.9, although this still indicates that there are only limited efforts being made. Prevention efforts have included various awareness-​raising campaigns at borders and on television as well as training for criminal justice officials (Devillard et al, 2015; di Cortemiglia et al, 2018). Gambia’s mean overall score is 7.4 out of 15. The response to human trafficking in Gambia has lacked the money and resources needed to enforce new legislation (Lawrance and Roberts, 2012). Gambia passed the Trafficking in Persons Act in 2007 that does cover all forms of trafficking and exploitation. An amendment to the Act in 2010 increased the penalties for trafficking (Devillard et al, 2015; CPA The Gambia and ECPAT International, 2019). One significant gap in the law concerns the detainment, imprisonment, and prosecution of trafficking victims. The act states that this is allowed in cases ‘where circumstances justify’ but does not provide further guidance or clarification. This shortcoming leaves victims 97

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vulnerable, and imprisonment has been used in cases related to children and women involved in prostitution (ECPAT International, 2015). A National Agency Against Trafficking in Persons (NAATIP) was also created to enforce the legislation (Trafficking in Persons Report, 2018). Several problems have plagued the NAATIP, however, preventing it from functioning effectively. The NAATIP is mandated for a wide variety of responsibilities, including investigating trafficking, assisting with prosecutions, cooperating with various organizations and governments, and leading victim recovery and protection efforts. Despite this, there is only one NAATIP office located in the capital city of Banjul, with a small staff of no more than ten (ECPAT, 2015; di Cortemiglia et al, 2018). The NAATIP has not been adequately funded, and few investigations and prosecutions have been undertaken (de Man and Bah, 2013; Trafficking in Persons Report, 2018). The few investigations that have occurred have failed to identify victims and follow through with prosecution (Devillard et al, 2015). The Trafficking in Persons Act also established a fund for victims, though to date NAATIP funding has only been used for operation and program costs (CPA The Gambia and ECPAT International, 2019). Moreover, corruption undermines what little state action is taken on the issue (Shelley, 2010). Despite reports of government officials’ involvement in human trafficking, no action has been taken (Trafficking in Persons Report, 2018).

Conclusion The introduction of various neoliberal economic reforms were intended to stabilize Gambia’s economy for entrance into the global market. From the 1980s through the 2000s, Gambia entered into a variety of economic strategies and programs with international financial institutions. Each intended to create stabilization in a country with a shaky political history, pushing the country toward globalization. Though they differed, each plan centered around neoliberal economic strategies such as cutting public expenditures to reduce budget deficits and debt (Edie, 2000). Instead, Gambia never achieved high globalization and experienced increasing political, social, and economic instability. Political instability around the election process, extensive corruption in government and business, high poverty levels, and discrimination continued to be large issues in Gambia into the 2010s (Verité, 2019b). The presence of economic dominance stemming from reliance on external creditors and worsening inequality acted as push factors for migration. For many Gambians, migrating the back way to Europe became a coping strategy in response to these economic hardships, political restrictions, and social inequalities (Kebbeh, 2013). These worsening social conditions and employment prospects have

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intensified emigration along with trafficking in migrants, responding to the draw of enhanced opportunities in countries in the North (Adepoju, 2000). Altogether, this situation has placed many Gambians, and young individuals in particular, at risk of human trafficking. Historical analysis of the country demonstrate that it is this combination of factors that coalesce in Gambia to influence trafficking. As identified by the fsQCA, these factors included the emergence of economic dominance, deepening income and gender inequality, and corruption. Alongside political shifts, such factors created a nation with high fragility. Together, these conditions formed an environment in Gambia from which a pathway for human trafficking flows emerged from.

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7

Conclusion Putting together the puzzle pieces: pathways to human trafficking At the beginning of this book, I highlighted gaps in the human trafficking literature. This included a fragmented and underdeveloped body of theory, a lack of knowledge about how conditions of human trafficking combine and work together in unique ways, and a lack of geographic comparison in how those combinations may vary. In order to tackle these issues and better understand the multi-​faceted and complex context of human trafficking, Chapter 2 outlined an integrated theoretical framework that drew from sociology and criminology in order to examine the social, economic, and political factors that link the local to the global. These factors were identified by the human trafficking literature and included: globalization, economic and gender inequality, corruption, conflict, and migration. The integrated theories included institutional anomie theory, migration systems theory, and critical global feminism. Together these theories draw attention to the ways that historical processes of development and social change at a macro-​level have impacted countries globalization and the dominance of the economy. These shifts have resulted in deepening inequalities and increasing rates of migration that work to make individuals vulnerable to trafficking. This framework was then applied across the geographic regions of Southeast Asia, South America, and Sub-​Saharan Africa through the use of set-​theoretic MMR. The fsQCA results detailed in Chapter 3 showcased four unique pathways to the initiation of human trafficking flows. Overall, the solutions are consistent with the theoretical framework, with fsQCA allowing for the illumination of distinctive combinations of conditions. The combination of gender inequality, corruption, low social expenditures, and absence of state fragility represents a unique combination (solution 1). Having both gender and income inequality alongside corruption appears important when countries have either globalization (solution 2) or economic dominance 100

Conclusion

(solution 4). When both economic dominance and globalization are present together, income and gender inequality remain important, though corruption is replaced by low social expenditures (solution 3). Importantly, these pathways shared substantial overlap with several of the seven pathways to high levels of out-​migration. These results contribute to previous literature that found that trafficking and migration routes tend to overlap (Skeldon, 2002; Akee et al, 2010, Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2010; Akee et al, 2014). The solutions show why this might be—​that the conditions that drive human trafficking origin flows are very similar to those that drive migration flows. Specifically, this book was able to empirically demonstrate that the pathways that lead to high human trafficking and high out-​migration have shared combinations of conditions. Three of the pathways to human trafficking were then examined through process tracing of a case study in order to better understand how these combinations of conditions emerged historically. In-​depth analysis through the case of Cambodia (solution 3) in Chapter 4 demonstrated how high economic dominance and high globalization work together. In this case, a plethora of IMF and World Bank neoliberal economic policies worked to shape the direction of Cambodia’s transition. I argued the neoliberal economic policies took shape in a new form of market colonialism, as dependence on aid and lending shaped policy. Local governments and organizations were denied a role in this transition, and the ensuing policies resulted in a weakening of non-​economic institutions and corresponding deepening of economic and gender inequality. High income inequality and gender inequality in education and labor force participation are just two factors that were exacerbated by policies focused on market privatization and liberalization. These conditions contributed to a high rate of emigration, frequently to neighboring countries such as Thailand or Malaysia for economic opportunities. However, barriers to legal migration have led to irregular labor migrants experiencing abuse and exploitation. Cambodian anti-​trafficking efforts have failed to focus on these issues, instead focusing on the issue of prostitution of women, conducting brothel raids, and implementing the use of closed shelters. Altogether, these conditions represent one environment in which one pathway to human trafficking can emerge. In Chapter 5 the case of Bolivia (solution 2) represented an interesting contrast due to the country’s history of social protest against economic measures associated with the IMF and World Bank. This history contributed to the lack of economic dominance and relatively high social expenditures. Closer historical examination, however, showed that the quality of social expenditures on services such as health, education, and employment have not worked to alleviate inequality. Instead, as globalization and an economy centered on neoliberal accommodation has persisted, so too have economic and social inequalities. Bolivian governments have continued to prioritize 101

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transnational corporations and foreign investment in extractive industries at the cost of protecting the rights of the indigenous population and natural environment. Furthermore, various Bolivian governments over time have not been successful in addressing corruption. Bolivia has maintained a high rate of emigration, with a higher percentage of its GDP coming from remittances. Bolivian workers in other countries have reported labor abuses and exploitative working conditions, particularly among vulnerable populations such as women and indigenous peoples. Conflation between trafficking and smuggling by the Bolivian anti-​trafficking law demonstrates just how unclear this relationship between migration and human trafficking remains. Altogether, the confluence of conditions in Bolivia spurred migration and, relatedly, human trafficking. Finally, in Chapter 6 the case of The Gambia (solution 4) focused heavily on the role of state instability. Neoliberal economic reforms were intended to stabilize Gambia’s economy for entrance into the global market. Instead, Gambia lacked high globalization, and experienced increasing political, social, and economic instability. Gambians faced economic hardships, harsh political restrictions, and growing social inequalities. The presence of economic dominance and worsening inequality acted as push factors for migration. Together with corruption that has undermined many anti-​ trafficking efforts, this has placed many Gambians, and young people who are emigrating in particular, at risk of human trafficking. Altogether these cases have demonstrated the importance of considering how there may be more than one pathway through which human trafficking flows originate. Previous research on human trafficking emphasized the causes of trafficking (Farr, 2004; Chuang, 2006a; Cameron and Newman, 2008; Shelley, 2010). A separate body of research noted the ways in which international financial institutions and the policies of economic globalization they impose onto nations result in harmful repercussions, often on nations’ social safety nets and stability (Chossudovsky, 1997; Ranis et al, 2006; Schultz, 2008; Dijkstra, 2010). This research connects these two literatures by demonstrating how policies put in place by international financial institutions in Southeast Asia, Sub-​Saharan Africa, and Latin America contributed to combinations of conditions that increased migration, and concurrently, human trafficking.

Implications for researchers Based on this book, there are several future directions for researchers in the field of human trafficking to consider. First, it is important that researchers continue pushing for the gathering of and access to country level statistics on the numbers of trafficking victims. Such information is important for pushing the human trafficking literature forward and being able to make 102

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distinctions between various issues among trafficking. The available data used for this research prevented making a distinction between internal versus transnational human trafficking, sex versus labor trafficking, and male versus female victims. This limitation inhibits the ability to uncover if there are unique combinations of conditions relevant to such distinctions. The continued push to expand human trafficking data collection must therefore include distinctions between internal and transnational trafficking, sex and labor trafficking, male versus female victims of trafficking, and other distinctions. Additionally, it is crucial that statistics of trafficking are recorded independent from similar crimes, such as smuggling or irregular migration. The integrated theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2 brought together sociological and criminological literature. This represents a step forward for a previously fragmented and undertheorized body of literature within the human trafficking field. It moves beyond focusing on human trafficking as a singular issue of crime, migration, or gender inequality, for example. Instead, the issue of human trafficking can now be contextualized within larger geospatial issues. This includes being able to examine how the conditions that drive trafficking are functions of larger socio-​economic and socio-​political forces that extend from the local to the global. For example, human trafficking scholars have noted the ‘need to foreground the connections between different forms of exploitation within the broader context of migratory conditions and labour relations’ (Lee, 2011: 151). Critical global feminist theory and institutional anomie help achieve this by grounding the framework in the conditions of exploitation, including inequality, corruption, conflict, and a lack of social safety nets. At the same time, institutional anomie and migration theory are able to position these conditions in relation to larger shifts connected to development, globalization, and economic dominance. This includes an understanding of the importance of the linkages between human trafficking, migration, and the ‘tensions, discontents and violence of globalisation’ (Lee, 2011: 151). This is not only an important addition to the literature, but allows for studies of human trafficking to better identify the root causes of human trafficking, therefore allowing for potentially more effective solutions. A cross-​disciplinary explanation such as the theoretical framework developed here allows researchers to more wholly examine the relationships between trafficking and the processes that facilitate or hinder it. While the focus here was on the impact of international financial policies and programs, future research could make use of the framework to explore the impacts of globalization and economic dominance within a singular country, such as the United States. The framework also allows for multilevel research that can tease out the relationships between macro-​and micro-​level factors. Future research could thus understand how the macro-​level consequences of globalization explored 103

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in this study impact individual level constraints and choices. For example, future research could focus on the links between policy and individual migration decisions, which are influenced by legal and extra-​legal institutions working at the macro-​level as well as networks of individuals operating at the micro-​level. However, the focus of this research and the available data did not allow for multilevel models to fully illuminate the linkages between the micro-​and macro-​levels. The research generated from such a framework can only help to better inform the many human trafficking policies and programs, which are in need of factual driven strategies. Furthermore, previous literature on human trafficking has been noted as lacking comparative analyses by region (Shelley, 2010). This is problematic because it has meant that the literature has largely assumed that the conditions that drive human trafficking are the same across the world. The use of set-​ theoretic MMR in this study however enabled the examination of cross-​ regional differences and similarities. This is useful because it allows for the identification of combinations of conditions, which may be unique to specific geographic locales. Specifically, fsQCA focused on the comparative level, while process tracing gave detail at the within-​case level. The four pathways of human trafficking identified by the fsQCA demonstrated that countries from all three regions could fall into the same pathway. Overall, QCA represents a way to bridge the quantitative–​qualitative divide while also emphasizing complex causal processes. In particular, the focus on set relations and combinations of conditions contrasts with the emphasis on correlations and net effects that dominates conventional quantitative techniques. The ability to identify how combinations relevant to human trafficking combine in complex ways, and how there may be several pathways to the outcome, was something previously missing from the literature. For example, QCA could be used to determine pathways to labor trafficking among migrant farmworkers, urban and rural differences, or vulnerabilities for commercial sexual exploitation. It is important to also note that the logic of QCA states that the conditions that lead to a given outcome are not necessarily the same that lead to not seeing, or an absence of, that outcome. So, for example, not having high income inequality does not necessarily lead to not having high human trafficking. Thus, future research can model for conditions that lead to nations having strong and effective anti-​ trafficking efforts, in order to tease out what factors in what combinations have been important to those developments. Again, these results can be used to help better inform policy by working with agencies to study and inform where and what resources could best be focused on to improve anti-​ trafficking efforts. While QCA was joined with the qualitative technique of process analysis for this study, it may also be used in conjunction with more traditional regression analysis, allowing for large-​N statistical analysis. 104

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Finally, the regional focus of the research for this book was on the geographic regions of Southeast Asia, South America, and Sub-​Saharan Africa due to their importance in the human trafficking literature as source countries (Truong, 2003; Farr, 2004; Malarek, 2011; Outshoorn, 2015). This is primarily because this book was interested in explaining the origin of human trafficking flows in these areas. However, expanding the focus to include Western and industrialized nations often classified as destination countries would be beneficial for future studies.

Implications for policy makers The primary response to human trafficking has proceeded from a law-​ and-​order, crime and justice approach (Chuang, 2006a; Lee, 2011). Anti-​ trafficking efforts are frequently centered around the 3Ps of prosecuting the offender, protecting the victim, and prevention of human trafficking. These 3Ps have been embedded in this law-​and-​order response to human trafficking, which has meant that prosecution has often been the primary focus, and to a lesser extent protection of victims. This approach however, has led to several issues in the response to human trafficking. One such issue is the deportation of victims of human trafficking to their country of origin (Monzini, 2005; Samarasinghe, 2008). Such actions not only further harm victims, but also demonstrates a flawed understanding of the reality of migration flows (Samarasinghe, 2008). To combat the fact that trafficked individual often face prosecution for prostitution or for lacking proper identification papers, the United Nations formed the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children in 2000. The protocol asks states to adopt practices ‘including assistance with identification and travel documents, the granting of special residency status, and protection for victims who are willing to testify against their traffickers’ (Farr, 2004: 224). Though they may have varying stipulations, countries such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States have implemented services that provide things such as temporary residences or special visas (Farr, 2004). While such services are a much-​needed step in the direction of helping to protect victims of trafficking instead of simply deporting them to be re-​victimized, they are still significantly flawed. Research has shown that these unique visas may not be granted due to eligibility restrictions or require things like cooperation with law enforcement which may discourage victims from seeking the visa (Heinrich, 2010; Pollock and Hollier, 2010). Of the 3Ps, however, prevention is rarely the focus of anti-​trafficking efforts. To truly tackle prevention, a shift from viewing the issue as purely an issue of criminal justice to a social issue is necessary (Lee, 2011). It is 105

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crucial to move away from what has historically been a moralized agenda of human trafficking, focused on criminal justice responses such as the elimination of sex work, immigration control measures, and criminalization of marginalized groups (Bernstein, 2010, 2012; Lee, 2011). To do so would include addressing the systemic issues such as the ones identified in this study, including socio-​economic inequality, corruption, and conflict. A focus on local issues also becomes important, including the reality of global migration flows (Samarasinghe, 2008). However, as other scholars have noted, broad and abstract calls to eliminate poverty or gender-​based oppression are not truly solutions to the issue of human trafficking (Parreñas, 2011). As this book showcased, it is not these factors in isolation that explain why human trafficking occurs. An individual experiencing poverty alone is not sufficient, but it is instead an interplay of complex social, economic, political, and cultural factors that make one vulnerable to victimization (Derks et al, 2006). Further, these issues cannot be separated out from other forms of movement. The relationship that human trafficking shares with migration should be given greater primacy in anti-​trafficking work. Because the combinations of conditions that lead to migration share significant overlap with pathways for human trafficking, it becomes difficult to disentangle the two. It becomes beneficial to conceptualize human trafficking as a continuum, ‘with the use of force and coercion at one end and voluntary movement for economic opportunities at the other end’ (Derks et al, 2006: 32). It is in this middle ground that many of the examples explored in the case studies of this book may be placed. Specifically, this book further demonstrates what other scholars have emphasized—​that individual agency and movement must be situated within larger structural constraints (Parreñas, 2011; Hoang, 2015). Migration from Cambodia to Thailand for economic advancement is common, yet barriers to legal migration between the two countries lead to a reliance on third parties which include both smugglers and traffickers. Similarly, Bolivian migration to Argentina or Brazil is regarded as a cultural norm for employment opportunities, with remittances making up a high percentage of the country’s GDP. In Gambia, an unstable state and oppressive government are connected to increased irregular migration movements toward Europe. In both countries, once again, risky decisions must be weighed and made, leaving individuals vulnerable to trafficking. In all cases, vulnerabilities can be compounded, whether examining gender in Cambodia, indigenous status in Bolivia, or age in Gambia. Further, as many individuals seek out irregular migration to cope with structural inequalities, their undocumented status only exposes them to more exploitation. Human trafficking is a global issue, but enforcement is generally a domestic initiative, subject to various local policies and national laws. It 106

Conclusion

is difficult to combat trafficking at the international level due to the fact that countries approach the problem differently and organizational efforts remain uncoordinated across borders (Monzini, 2005). Another issue facing human trafficking responses is the lack of research and resources directed at evaluating and enforcing good practices (Samarasinghe, 2008; Mishra, 2015). Issues cited include a lack of prioritization, training, and cross-​ agency coordination (Mishra, 2015). While many countries have ratified international protocols on human trafficking, at a national level they may lag behind on legislation and strategies to address the issue (Shelley, 2010). Moreover, many anti-​trafficking initiatives have not been properly monitored and evaluated (Samarasinghe, 2008). Without such research, many human trafficking policies have been built on stereotypes, rhetoric, and ideology (Mishra, 2015). To begin, the practice of law enforcement raids in brothels and prostitution areas should be discontinued. International research highlights the ineffectiveness of such raids in identifying human trafficking victims, instead frequently leading to the arrest and deportation of migrants and other abuses (Baer, 2015). As discussed in Chapter 4 on Cambodia, the conflation of trafficking and prostitution in the law led to brothel raids which increased the violence and harassment sex workers experienced. Further, as the cases of Cambodia, Bolivia, and Gambia demonstrated, crackdowns on irregular migration and tightening border controls in the name of protection does not work to effectively prevent trafficking. Instead, such practices end up criminalizing ‘survival strategies’ employed by the most vulnerable in response to a neoliberal state (Bernstein, 2012). At the heart of the issue is the fact that there is not a single universal solution that is easily applied across regions to the issue of human trafficking. As this book has shown, while countries may share an experience of imposed neoliberal economic policies, their unique histories, cultures, and even locations contribute to differences in the way that socio-​economic shifts are experienced and give rise to human trafficking. Therefore, to truly be successful, anti-​trafficking initiatives need to be localized and specific. They should address specific needs of victims, while also working to protect migrants and increase agency. While this book focused on the larger, structural factors that filter down and act as constraints, future researchers should complete extensive and grounded research to fully understand the impacts of such factors on individuals’ lives and experiences. For example, in Cambodia, donor influence over their anti-​trafficking agenda centers a moralized agenda of criminalizing prostitution. These efforts, however, do not successfully tackle deeply rooted issues of poverty and gender inequality. In Bolivia, stricter border controls do little to aid indigenous populations experiencing an eroding safety net. In Gambia, legal loopholes that lead to victim imprisonment, a lack of resources for services, 107

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and corruption throughout undermine the effectiveness of anti-​trafficking work. Such work can serve to craft specific policy solutions in localized areas.

Final thoughts The control that advanced economies and global institutions have exerted in the past has continued today through globalization, albeit in a new and distinct manner. Winant (2004: 134) notes of this change that: Rather than send their troops to dictate policy, break strikes, or enforce the superexploitation of labor, they [post-​imperial powers] use financial instruments: the threat to withhold credit if strikes are not broken, or perhaps if education and public health budgets are not cut. Using intermediaries like the IMF, they control commerce, finance, labor practices and social policy. Today, the imposition of neoliberal capitalism on a global level has meant that in order for countries to receive aid, funding, and development money from these international financial institutions, their economies must be structured in accordance with neoliberal ideology. It has been demonstrated in this book how SAPs, poverty reduction strategies, and more, which are put in place in emerging economies, have the outcome of increasing inequality and corruption, eroding social welfare and democracy, and overlooking the unique needs of a country (Abouharb and Cingranelli, 2010; Babb, 2010; Glassman and Carmondy, 2010). It is through this coercive economic approach, justified by free market neoliberal ideology, that the conditions conducive to flows of both migration and human trafficking emerge. This book has highlighted the need to shift focus to addressing the root issues of human trafficking, which are often quite disconnected from the criminal justice system. Responding to human trafficking only as a criminal justice problem has only exacerbated issues, by often focusing on solutions such as criminalization of prostitution or irregular migration. Yet these solutions do not truly solve the problem, but simply push it around. Rather than conceptualize human trafficking solely in the realm of criminology and criminal justice, it is crucial to recognize the socio-​economic and socio-​ political problems underpinning trafficking. In order to better respond to human trafficking, we must understand, and listen, to the reasons why people move. A balance must be struck between the agency of individuals and the constraints within which they live. This perspective can be summed up as follows: ‘This homogeneous view of “immigrants” as vulnerable corresponds to a superficial and problematic view that reproduces stereotypical discourses, ignores the subjective dimension, and eliminates from the debate any reference to the conditions of capitalist 108

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production that are responsible for the emergence of these social sectors in labor contexts’ (Betrisey, 2017: 67). The links between shifts in global economic policies explored in this book and their impacts on the local lived experiences of inequalities distinctly shape the environment in which options are weighed and made. Decisions to migrate against the backdrop of these structural constraints leaves individuals vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Ultimately, it is only by placing human trafficking within these broader social, economic, political, and cultural spheres that the interwoven causes of trafficking can be illuminated.

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Appendix This methodological appendix will further detail the data used for this book as well as provide more information on the application of fsQCA. It begins with a discussion of the selected outcome. Then each of the data sources for the processes hypothesized to be important to the causal chain are outlined in more detail. The appendix concludes by covering the more particular steps of fsQCA including calibration, testing for necessity, and the parsimonious and complex solutions.

Data Human trafficking For the outcome of human trafficking, two variables were examined. First, data on the effectiveness of government anti-​trafficking efforts is obtained from a research database on the 3P Anti-​Trafficking Policy Index (Cho et al, 2014a). This database evaluates countries based on the requirements prescribed by the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (2000). A country is given a score from 1–​5, with 1 being the worst and 5 the best on three sub-​indices: prosecution of traffickers, prevention of the crime of human trafficking, and protection of trafficking victims. These scores are then summed to an overall index score, with a range from the worst score of 3 to the best score of 15 (Cho et al, 2014a). This dataset has scores which cover the period from 2000 to 2015 and includes 189 countries. Though this database largely examines countries’ legislation surrounding human trafficking, it does examine numbers of traffickers prosecuted and numbers of victims identified. The coding guideline of the 3P Anti-​ Trafficking Policy Index notes that actual enforcement in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and punishment of offenders is examined alongside legislation when forming the basis of the Prosecution score. Likewise, the number of victims identified is examined alongside efforts to protect victims’ rights and provide measures for recovery when forming the basis of the Protection score (Cho et al, 2014a). Furthermore, the focus on evaluating effectiveness is important. To receive a high score 110

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on each dimension, it is not enough that a country simply has legislation in place that is in accordance with the UN Protocol. Effectiveness is also a component of the scoring, considering policing and prosecutorial efforts, efforts to identify and protect victims, and cooperation with NGOs. I argue that strong and effective anti-​trafficking efforts will result in low human trafficking flows, while weak and ineffective or non-​existent anti-​ trafficking efforts will result in high human trafficking flows. As the index takes into account government efforts toward enforcing these policies, it demonstrates how ‘weak enforcement is a fundamental problem with the increased prevalence of human trafficking’ (Cho, 2015a: 97). Evaluating this enforcement, research shows that many NGOs that are engaged with governments in anti-​trafficking work view such policies as being important to being able to achieve their work (Heiss and Kelley, 2017). The majority of NGOs in this same study also reported feeling that both local and national governments were engaged and invested in anti-​trafficking efforts and have seen improvement over time in those efforts (Heiss and Kelley, 2017). To further corroborate this, a second outcome variable is selected. The total number of detected victims of trafficking by country of citizenship is taken from the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (UNODC, 2016). This report examines human trafficking patterns and flows at a country level based on detected cases of trafficking. The report also uses the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol definition of trafficking, which states that trafficking in persons refers to: the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. (UNODC, 2016: 14) To assess the relationship between these outcome measures, a bivariate correlation of the two indicators is run. The variables selected from 3P Anti-​ Trafficking Policy Index and the UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons shows a statistically significant positive relationship at the 0.004 level. As scores increase on a country’s overall 3P score, their total number of detected victims of trafficking increases.

Economic dominance Though past research has operationalized economic dominance through an index of decommodification (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997; Savolainen, 2000; Jensen, 2002), the measures used in this index are often restricted to 111

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a limited number of countries and time period. Thus my research follows recent research extending to a broader sample of cross-​national data and over greater periods of time that has made use of the Index of Economic Freedom (Bjerregaard and Cochran, 2008; Hughes et al, 2015). An institutional imbalance of power, or economic dominance, is measured through the Index of Economic Freedom, which is published annually by conservative American think tank The Heritage Foundation in collaboration with the Wall Street Journal. The index began in 1995 and today uses a variety of indicators to measure 12 freedoms in 186 countries. Economic freedom is used by the index to refer to any ‘state action or government control that interferes with individual autonomy’ (Miller and Kim, 2018: 10). Free market principles and a limited role for government are emphasized, as the index measures indicators broadly grouped into four categories: rule of law (property rights, judicial effectiveness, and government integrity); government size (tax burden, government spending, and fiscal health); regulatory efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, and monetary freedom); and market openness (trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom) (Miller and Kim, 2018). Overall scores may range from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating greater economic freedom, or as I am using the variable, greater economic dominance.

Globalization Information regarding a country’s level of globalization was gathered from the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006). This database evaluates a country’s level of globalization on three main dimensions: economic, social, and political globalization. Economic globalization includes indicators of actual flows and restrictions; social globalization indicators of personal contact, information flows, and cultural proximity; and political globalization indicators on international involvement. Scores range from 0 to 100, with scores closer to 100 indicating higher levels of globalization (Dreher, 2006). A yearly ranking has been produced since 1970.

Inequality Data on gendered inequalities by country was taken from the Gender Inequality Index (GII) which is generated by the United Nations Development Programme (Human Development Data, 2018). The first report that included the GII was published every five years starting in 1995, before becoming an annual publication beginning in 2010. A country’s GII score is based on three dimensions—​health, empowerment in education and politics, and the labor market—​which each contain several indicators. Scores may range from 0 to 1, with scores closer to one indicating that there 112

Appendix

is more inequality. Essentially, ‘the higher the GII value the more disparities between females and males and the more loss to human development’ (Gender Inequality Index, 2018). Data on economic inequalities by country was taken from the Human Development Report, a yearly report produced by the United Nations (Human Development Data, 2018). The variable selected from the Human Development Report to be used for this study is the IAII, or Inequality-​ Adjusted Income Index score. This score adjusts the HDI Income Index by accounting for inequality in income distribution. The scale of scores may range from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating less income inequality. This dataset has values which cover the period between 2010 and 2015 and includes 188 countries (Human Development Data, 2018).

Corruption The perception of corruption within a country was obtained from the country’s score on the Corruption Perceptions Index, produced annually since 1995 by Transparency International (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2018). Through the opinions of experts and analysts, a country’s perceived corruption within areas of the public sphere (that is, education, politics, and businesses) are gauged. Here the scores may range from 0 to 100, with scores closer to 100 indicating lower levels of perceived corruption (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2018). As the scoring system for the Corruption Perceptions Index changed from 0–​10 to 0–​100, scores have been calculated based on the 0–​10 scale for consistency.

Social expenditures To measure the weakening of non-​economic institutions, two measures of social expenditures are used. Public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP and government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP are taken from the United Nations Human Development Data Portal (Human Development Data, 2018). This data is available every five years from 1990 to 2010 and annually from 2010 onward. A second fsQCA was run with education expenditures as a percentage of GDP also included. The solutions indicate the same core conditions. This measure was ultimately excluded because large amounts of missing data would have significantly decreased the overall sample size.

Conflict Data on a nation’s vulnerability to conflict or collapse is taken from the Fragile States Index, produced annually since 2006 by the Fund for Peace (Fragile States 113

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Index, 2018). This variable uses methodological triangulation to score 178 countries on 12 indicators grouped into four broad categories. The categories and their associated indicators include cohesion (security apparatus, factionalized elites, group grievance), economic (economic decline, uneven economic development, human flight, and brain drain), political (state legitimacy, public services, human rights, and rule of law), and social (demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs, external intervention) measures (Fragile States Index, 2018). Scores may range from up to 120, with lower scores indicating improved relative stability over time (Fragile States Index, 2018).

Migration Finally, migration is measured using the Net Migration Rate. This indicator is also taken from the United Nations Human Development Data Portal. This variable expresses the ratio of the difference between the number of in-​migrants and out-​migrants from a country to the average population, and is per 1,000 people. The data is available every five years from 1990 to 2015 for 185 countries (Human Development Data, 2018).

Analysis The steps involved in a set-​theoretic MMR has been extensively outlined by recent scholars (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013a; Schneider and Rohlfing, 2016; Beach, 2018; Rohlfing and Schneider, 2018). The analytic framework of the method was most clearly laid out by Schneider and Rohlfing (2013a: 561). This design presents a ‘QCA-​first design’ which proceeds by first, deriving ‘the truth table from existing, possibly case-​based empirical research and theory rather than from process-​tracing evidence’ (Rohlfing and Schneider, 2018: 44). The process tracing which then follows the analysis of the truth table serves to examine the sufficiency of causal mechanisms, either through a ‘typical’ or ‘deviant’ case (Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013a; Rohlfing and Schneider, 2018). If findings do not corroborate the original theory, the QCA may be modified by adding or removing conditions, recalibration, or considering case selection. The inclusion of fsQCA benefits small-​N case studies by allowing for the identification of set-​relational patterns. Schneider and Rohlfing (2013a: 588) note though that process tracing also benefits QCA by allowing the researcher to ‘discern the causal mechanisms behind a set-​relational pattern and further improve the theory and QCA model.’

Data calibration Fuzzy sets involve quantitative assessment of scores ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 indicating the qualitative states of full non-​membership and full membership 114

Appendix

respectively in your condition or outcome (Ragin, 2008). In order to analyze a fuzzy set, the data must first be calibrated accordingly. Calibration entails arraying all data on the 0 to 1 scale for QCA analysis. All indicators for this study were calibrated using the direct method which blends the researcher’s theoretical and substantive case knowledge with external criteria. With the direct method, the ‘researcher specifies the values of an interval scale that correspond to the three qualitative breakpoints that structure a fuzzy set’ (Ragin, 2008: 85). These three points include full membership (.95), ambiguous membership or the crossover point (.5), and full non-​ membership (.05). Values between the crossover point and full membership represent the state of ‘more in than out,’ while values between the crossover point and full non-​membership represent the state of ‘more out than in.’ Calibration of the conditions and outcomes followed close examination of the variation within the sample data as a whole. QCA requires that data be calibrated onto a scale of 0 to 1 for analysis. To transform indicator values onto a 0–​1 scale, qualitative breakpoints are designated by the researcher, allowing calibration to be performed by the fsQCA program. For example, countries with a fragile state index score of 90 and above are designated as full members of countries with high state fragility (0.95), countries with scores of 80 as ambiguous members (0.5), and countries with scores of 70 and below as full non-​members (0.05). The calibration procedure for each outcome and condition is detailed in Table A.1. It should be noted that for the outcome high number of identified victims, condition indicators are calibrated differently to represent low economic dominance, low globalization, etc. The purpose of this is detailed further in the section about testing another human trafficking outcome. Table A.4 lists these alternative calibrations.

Testing necessity Following calibration, each fsQCA model proceeds with a test for necessity. Testing for necessary conditions is an important first step as it identifies any condition that must be present for the outcome to be present (Rohlfing and Schneider, 2013). Though these conditions may occur without leading to the outcome, where the outcome occurs, the condition must also occur. For example, state breakdown may occur without leading to social revolution. However, social revolutions cannot occur without state breakdown, meaning that in this example state breakdown is a necessary condition for social revolution (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). Any conditions identified as necessary may be excluded from the truth table analysis of sufficiency. The results of the necessity test for each outcome are listed in Table A.2. It is important to use a more restrictive consistency score for necessity tests as it minimizes the chance of a true logical contradiction (Ragin, 2008; Schneider and 115

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Table A.1: Indicator summaries and calibrations Indicator name

Data source

Calibration (fuzzified score)

High human trafficking flows

3P Anti-​Trafficking Policy Index, EU Project

.7=​.05, .65=​.5, .45=​.95

High out-​migration

Net Migration Rate, United Nations

-​.09=​.05, -​.45=​.5, -​1.45=​.95

High number of identified victims

Total Detected Victims of Trafficking in Persons, UNODC

2.5=​.05, 35=​.5, 67=​.95

High economic dominance

Economic Freedom Index, Heritage Foundation

49.99=​.05, 55=​.5, 60=​.95

High globalization

KOF Index of Globalization, Axel Dreher at ETH Zurich

48=​.05, 54=​.5, 60=​.95

High economic inequality

Inequality-​Adjusted Income Index, United Nations

.5=​.05, .45=​.5, .35=​.95

High gender inequality

Gender Inequality Index, United Nations

.39=​.05, .45=​.5, .55=​.95

High corruption

Corruption Perceptions Index, 50=​.05, 44.5=​.5, 29.5=​.95 Transparency International

Low social expenditures

Public health expenditures as % GDP, United Nations

5.5=​.05, 3.4=​.5, 2.05=​.95

High state fragility

Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace

70=​.05, 80=​.5, 90=​.95

Outcome indicators

Condition indicators

Wagemann, 2012). Using the recommended consistency score of 0.9, none of the conditions meet the necessity criteria for any outcome. High gender inequality and high corruption come closest to being necessary conditions with scores of 0.84 and 0.82 respectively under the outcome of high human trafficking flows. As no condition meets the 0.9 consistency threshold, no indicator alone acts as a necessary condition leading to high human trafficking flows, high out-​migration, or a high number of identified human trafficking victims. Tests of sufficiency proceed next, which identify how conditions may combine to create important causal pathways leading to the outcome. Though these conditions are not necessary on their own, the truth table analysis identifies important solutions that are sufficient to lead to the studied outcome. Analysis of a truth table is completed to test for sufficiency. The use of truth tables in fsQCA allows for examination of causal complexity. A truth 116

Appendix

Table A.2: Test of necessary conditions Outcome

Condition

Consistency

Coverage

High economic dominance

0.63

0.64

High globalization

0.54

0.58

High income inequality

0.76

0.69

High gender inequality

0.84

0.73

High corruption

0.82

0.66

Low social expenditure

0.77

0.71

High fragile state

0.71

0.69

High economic dominance

0.61

0.60

High globalization

0.58

0.59

High income inequality

0.69

0.61

High gender inequality

0.73

0.61

High corruption

0.81

0.62

Low social expenditure

0.67

0.60

High fragile state

0.69

0.65

Low economic dominance

0.50

0.50

Low globalization

0.43

0.40

Low income inequality

0.50

0.61

Low gender inequality

0.54

0.67

Low corruption

0.51

0.48

High social expenditure

0.50

0.57

Low fragile state

0.48

0.58

High human trafficking flows

High out-​migration

High number of identified victims

table includes all possible paths leading to the outcome, or 2k configurations of conditions. As this study involves a seven-​condition recipe, there are 128 possible combinations of causal conditions. Truth tables identify different pathways or causal combinations of conditions and outcomes, while also evaluating their sufficiency (Ragin, 2008). This table lays out all the observed configurations of the conditions. With all conditions calibrated, the truth table reports the number of cases with membership in each condition greater than 0.5. The table also gives the consistency score of each configuration. Membership in each outcome is coded according to a more restrictive 117

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

Table A.3: Abbreviated condition names Condition

Abbreviation

High economic dominance

ED

High globalization

GZ

High income inequality

II

High gender inequality

GE

High corruption

CP

Low social expenditure

SE

High fragile state

FS

consistency threshold of consistency scores of 0.8 and above and a frequency threshold of 1.

Parsimonious and complex solutions Chapter 3 focused on detailing the findings of the intermediate solutions, which take the core causal conditions from the parsimonious solutions and include important contributing causal conditions. However, the parsimonious and complex solutions leading to high human trafficking flows and high out-​migration are provided here. Rather than present the parsimonious and complex solutions in table format, they are presented in Boolean algebra using the abbreviated condition indicator name (provided in Table A.3). When capitalized, the abbreviation indicates that the specified condition has been identified as a core condition (for example, ED). When the abbreviation is presented in lowercase, this means that the specified condition has been identified as a contributing condition in that solution (for example, ii). Where possible, the solutions have been simplified for visual purposes using Boolean operators, including or (+​), and (*), and not (~) which signifies that the condition is part of the solution when it is absent (for example, not having high state fragility is an important part of the pathway). The parsimonious solutions leading to high human trafficking flows indicate which conditions are the core causal conditions. The parsimonious solutions indicate that the core conditions include economic dominance and globalization, when present or absent. Also important are gender inequality, corruption, low social expenditures, and not being a fragile state. ED*~GZ*CP (ED+​GZ+​~FS)*GI*SE ~ED*GZ*GI 118

Appendix

The complex solutions that follow demonstrate that there are a variety of complex causal pathways leading to the outcome of human trafficking flows. Conditions combine in various ways, with conditions appearing in some pathways as present and in others as absent. Fairly consistent across pathways are the presence of high globalization, income inequality, gender inequality, corruption, and low social expenditures. ED*~GZ*ii*GI*CP*fs ED*GZ*ii*GI*~CP*SE*~FS ~ED*GZ*ii*GI*CP*~SE*~FS GZ*ii*GI*CP*SE*fs ~ii*GI*CP*SE*~FS The parsimonious solutions leading to the second outcome of high emigration that follow indicate the importance of all conditions as a core condition in one or multiple manners. Economic dominance when combined with not high globalization and income inequality contributes to high emigration. High globalization or not high income inequality contributes to high emigration when combined with not high economic dominance and gender inequality. Gender inequality is an important core condition alongside not low social expenditures and not high state fragility. Finally, not high gender inequality combines with high corruption and low social expenditures to act as another pathway to high emigration. ED*~GZ*II (GZ+​~II)*~ED*GI GI*~SE*~FS ~GI*CP*SE The complex solutions that follow demonstrate that there are a variety of complex causal pathways leading to high emigration. All conditions appear in at least one pathway as present and at least one as absent. Fairly consistent across pathways are the presence of income inequality, gender inequality, and corruption. High economic dominance, high globalization, low social expenditures, and high state fragility all appear as present in roughly half of the solutions, and as absent in the other half. In only two solutions however, do both economic dominance and globalization appear as absent at the same time, suggesting that having either high economic dominance or high globalization or both is an important part of the causal pathways. (~GZ+​~FS)*~ED*~II*GI*CP*SE ED*~GZ*II*GI*CP*fs ED*~GZ*II*~GI*~cp*SE*fs 119

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

ED*GZ*~II*~GI*CP*SE ED*GZ*~II*GI*CP*~se*~FS ~ED*GZ*II*GI*CP*~se*~FS ~ED*GZ*II*GI*CP*SE*fs ~ED*~GZ*II*GI*~cp*~se*~FS

Testing another human trafficking outcome As mentioned in the discussion of data sources, a second outcome of human trafficking was used for comparison. This was the outcome of the Total Detected Victims of Trafficking in Persons. A chi-​square test showed a significant and positive relationship between this outcome of human trafficking and the 3P Anti-​Trafficking Index outcome. For comparison, a fsQCA model was also ran using the outcome Total Detected Victims of Trafficking in Persons. This is calibrated to represent countries’ membership in high numbers of identified victims. Note that for this analysis, conditions are recalibrated to represent the presence of low economic dominance, low globalization, low income and gender inequality, low corruption, high social expenditures, and low state fragility. This is done for several reasons. First, I hypothesized that strong and effective anti-​trafficking efforts result in low human trafficking flows, while weak and ineffective or non-​existent anti-​trafficking efforts result in high human trafficking flows. A high number of identified victims are likely to be found in countries that are funding and enforcing anti-​trafficking policies and programs. Simply because a country has low numbers of identified victims does not mean the country has low human trafficking. Instead, low numbers of identified victims could be indicative of weak or ineffective anti-​trafficking enforcement. This would lead to very different predictions. For example, low levels of corruption rather than high levels of corruption are important to identifying victims. This leads to the second point, that the conditions cannot simply be examined with truth table analysis to see if they are absent. Under the logic of fsQCA, the absence of high corruption does not equate to low corruption; it only indicates not high corruption. Low corruption is a theoretically and empirically distinct concept and must be calibrated as such. For these reasons, all conditions have been recalibrated and are listed in Table A.4. Table A.5 visually maps the four intermediate solutions given by this analysis. The presence of low income inequality, low gender inequality, low corruption, and low state fragility appear most frequently in the solutions of countries in the membership of high numbers of identified human trafficking victims. Other factors include conditions such as the presence and absence of low economic dominance, the absence of low globalization, and the presence of high social expenditures. There are 17 countries in this analysis that fall into the outcome of having a high number of identified victims. 120

Appendix

Table A.4: Alternative calibrations for outcome of high number of identified victims Indicator name

Data source

Calibration (fuzzified score)

Low economic dominance

Economic Freedom Index, Heritage Foundation

65=​.05, 55=​.5, 45=​.95

Low globalization KOF Index of Globalization, Axel Dreher at ETH Zurich

65=​.05, 54=​.5, 45=​.95

Low economic inequality

Inequality-​Adjusted Income Index, United Nations

.305=​.05, .45=​.5, .55=​.95

Low gender inequality

Gender Inequality Index, United Nations

.6=​.05, .45=​.5, .35=​.95

Low corruption

Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International

25.5=​.05, 34.5=​.5, 50=​.95

High social expenditures

Public health expenditures as % GDP, 1.99=​.05, 3.4=​.5, 4.9=​.95 United Nations

Low state fragility Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace

90=​.05, 80=​.5, 60=​.95

The solutions in Table A.5 cover ten countries. Regionally, this includes four countries from South America, three from Southeast Asia, and three from Sub-​Saharan Africa. Overall, the solutions are largely the opposite of the pathways identified by the previous models. While high income and gender inequality appeared in solutions leading to high human trafficking flows, here low income and gender inequality demonstrates a pathway to identifying human trafficking victims. These conditions are important when combined with low corruption even when there is not low state fragility (solution 2), or with low economic dominance, low state fragility, and high social expenditures (solution 1). Interestingly, the absence of low globalization appears in half of the solutions. When combined with the absence of low economic dominance and the absence of low gender inequality, the presence of low income inequality and low state fragility present one pathway to identifying victims (solution 3). Alternatively, when the absence of low globalization is combined with the absence of low income inequality, it is the presence of low corruption and again low state fragility that appear as important (solution 4). The parsimonious solutions indicate the core conditions sufficient for a country to have membership in high numbers of identified human trafficking victims. The parsimonious solutions that follow indicate that these core conditions include things such as low economic dominance, low income inequality, and low state fragility. Interestingly, not low globalization appears in several solutions. 121

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

Table A.5: Configurations for high number of identified victims, 2015 Intermediate solutions 1 Low economic dominance Low globalization Low income inequality Low gender inequality Low corruption High social expenditure Low fragile state

2

•

3

4

○

•

•

■

■

•

• •

○

•

○

○ ○

•

○

•

•

Countries

Ecuador, Vietnam

Columbia, Philippines

Indonesia, Paraguay

Benin, Bolivia, Ghana, South Africa

Consistency

0.89

0.94

0.86

0.82

Raw coverage

0.14

0.24

0.18

0.27

Unique coverage

0.03

0.07

0.05

0.12

Solution coverage

0.45

Solution consistency

0.83

Note: • =​core causal condition present; ○ =​core causal condition absent; ■ =​contributing causal condition present; □ =​contributing causal condition absent

LII*LCP*~LFS LED*LII*HSE ~LGZ*~LII*LFS ~LED*~LGZ*~LGI*LFS The complex solutions that follow demonstrate a range of causal pathways leading to countries having a high number of identified victims. Across these pathways the absence of low economic dominance and low globalization consistently appear in the configurations. Also consistent are the presence of low income inequality, low gender inequality, low corruption, and low state fragility. Low social expenditures appear as present in roughly half of the solutions.

122

Appendix

~LED*~LGZ*LII*~LGI*~lcp*LFS ~LED*~LGZ*LII*lgi*LCP*~LFS ~LED*~LGZ*~LII*~LGI*LCP*~hse*LFS ~LED*~LGZ*~LII*lgi*LCP*HSE*LFS LED*~LGZ*LII*lgi*~lcp*HSE*LFS Ultimately, this solution set has the lowest consistency and coverage scores of all three outcomes. This perhaps indicates that the theoretical framework is better suited to explaining the conditions that give rise to human trafficking rather than the conditions that work to combat it. That is, conditions such as economic dominance, globalization, inequality, corruption, low social expenditures, and state fragility are better mechanisms for explaining weak and ineffective anti-​trafficking efforts connected to high human trafficking flows, as well as some solutions of high out-​migration. These conditions create environments conducive to pathways enabling migration and human trafficking patterns. Future research could determine the theoretical framework and conditions that better explain what environments are important to combating or addressing human trafficking.

123

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL MIGRATION

Table A.6: Countries by UN geoscheme region classification South America

Southeast Asia

Sub-​Saharan Africa

Argentina

Brunei Darussalam Angola

Liberia

Bolivia

Cambodia

Benin

Madagascar

Bouvet Island

Indonesia

Botswana

Malawi

Brazil

Laos

British Indian Ocean Territory Mali

Chile

Malaysia

Burkina Faso

Mauritania

Colombia

Myanmar

Burundi

Mauritius

Ecuador

Philippines

Cabo Verde

Mayotte

Falkland Islands Singapore

Cameroon

Mozambique

French Guiana Thailand

Central African Republic

Namibia

Guyana

Timor-​Leste

Chad

Niger

Paraguay

Vietnam

Comoros

Nigeria

Peru

Democratic Republic of Congo Réunion

South Georgia

Republic of Congo

Rwanda

Suriname

Côte d’Ivoire

Saint Helena

Uruguay

Djibouti

São Tomé and Príncipe

Venezuela

Equatorial Guinea

Senegal

Eritrea

Seychelles

Eswatini

Sierra Leone

​Ethiopia

Somalia

French Southern Territories

South Africa

Gabon

South Sudan

Gambia

Sudan

Ghana

Tanzania

Guinea

Togo

Guinea-​Bissau

Uganda

Kenya

Zambia

Lesotho

Zimbabwe

124

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Vanden, H.E. and Prevost, G. (2012) Politics of Latin America: The Power Game (4th edn), New York: Oxford University Press. Verité. (2019a) Thailand Bound: An Exploration of Labor Migration Infrastructures in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Lao PDR, Amherst, MA: Verité. Verité. (2019b) Trafficking Risk in Sub-​Saharan African Supply Chains: The Gambia, Amherst, MA: Verité, www.verite.org/​africa/​explore-​by-​country/​ the-​gambia/​ Vos, R., Lee, H., and Mejía-​Guerra, J.A. (1995) Structural Adjustment and Poverty in Bolivia, Indes Working Paper Series I-​3, Program for the ‘Improvement of Surveys and the Measurement of Living Conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean’ (ISLC/​MECOVI), Washington, DC: Co-​sponsored by the IDB, World Bank and CEPAL. Vullnetari, J. and King, R. (2011) Remittances, Gender and Development: Albania’s Society and Economy in Transition, London: I.B. Tauris. Vutha, H., Pide, P., and Dalis, P. (2011) ‘Irregular Migration from Cambodia: Characteristics, Challenges, and Regulatory Approach’, Philippine Journal of Development, 38(1/​2): 1–​25. Webber, J.R. (2011) From Rebellion to Reform in Bolivia: Class Struggle, Indigenous Liberation, and the Politics of Evo Morales, Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books. Whitehead, A. (2003) Failing Women, Sustaining Poverty: Gender in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Report for the UK Gender and Development Network. Whitesell, L. (2008) ‘And Those Who Left: Portraits of a Bolivian Exodus’, in J. Schultz and M.C. Draper (eds) Dignity and Defiance: Stories from Bolivia’s Challenge to Globalization, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp 196–​223. Williams, P. (2008) ‘Trafficking in Women: The Role of Transnational Organized Crime’, in S. Cameron and E. Newman (eds) Trafficking in Humans: Social, Cultural and Political Dimensions, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp 126–​57. Williams, P. and Gehring, B. (2016) Labor Trafficking in Cambodia: A Review of the Public Justice System’s Response, Cambodia Countering Trafficking-​in-​ Persons Program, Washington, DC: International Justice Mission. Williams, T. and Gemperle, S.M. (2017) ‘Sequence Will Tell! Integrating Temporality into Set-​Theoretic Multi-​Method Research Combining Comparative Process Tracing and Qualitative Comparative Analysis’, International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 20(2): 121–​35. Winant, H. (2004) The New Politics of Race: Globalism, Difference, Justice, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. World Bank Group. (1975) The Economy of The Gambia, Washington, DC: World Bank Group. World Bank Group. (1980) The Gambia: Country Economic Memorandum: Main Report, Washington, DC: World Bank Group. 151

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World Bank Group. (2014) ‘Poverty Has Fallen, Yet Many Cambodians are Still at Risk of Slipping Back into Poverty, New Report Finds’, Press Release, www.worldbank.org/​ en/​ n ews/​press-​release/​2 014/​0 2/​2 0/​ poverty-​has-​f allen-​yet-​many-​cambodians-​are-​still-​at-​r isk-​of-​slipping-​ back-​into-​poverty World Bank Group. (2015) Indigenous Latin America in the Twenty-​First Century: The First Decade, Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank Group. (2018) Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative, World Bank Brief. World Development Indicators. (2018) DataBank, Washington, DC: World Bank. Wright, D.R. (2015) The World and a Very Small Place in Africa: A History of Globalization in Niumi, the Gambia (3rd edn), London: Routledge. Yang, X. and Guo, F. (1999) ‘Gender Differences in Determinants of Temporary Labor Migration in China: A Multilevel Analysis’, The International Migration Review, 33(4): 929–​53. Young, K.A. (2017) Blood of the Earth: Resource Nationalism, Revolution, and Empire in Bolivia (1st edn), Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Yousaf, F.N. (2018) ‘Forced Migration, Human Trafficking, and Human Security’, Current Sociology, 66(2): 209–​25. Zhang, S. (2007) Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: All Roads Lead to America, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. Zheng, T. (2016) Cultural Politics of Gender and Sexuality in Contemporary Asia, Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press.

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Index References to figures appear in italic type; those in bold type refer to tables. 3P Anti-​Trafficking Policy Index  33, 61, 62, 79–​80, 96–​7, 110–​11 A Africa  2, 3 see also Sub-​Saharan Africa; West Africa African Development Bank  85 agency  19, 20, 24, 106 agriculture  52, 58, 92 American society  16–​17 anomie  16 see also institutional anomie theory Argentina  8, 78, 79, 106 Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC)  84, 88 Asian Development Bank  48 Australia  105 Austria  105 B Barrow, A.  84, 85 Bastia, T.  78, 79 Belgium  105 Betrisey, D.  108–​9 Bolivia  42, 65–​82, 101–​2 3P Anti-​Trafficking Policy Index  80 anti-​trafficking initiatives  107 corruption  73–​4, 75, 79, 102 globalization  67–​9, 74–​7 history  65–​6 human trafficking  77, 78–​81 inequalities  69–​73 maternal mortality  70 migration  77–​8, 106 remittance inflows  78 unemployment by gender  72 Boolean logic/​algebra  31, 118–​20 boys  60 Brazil  79, 106 Brzezińska, M.  93, 94, 95 Buxton, N.  67, 68, 73, 75, 79

C Cambodia  45–​64, 101, 107 3P Anti-​Trafficking Policy Index  61, 62 corruption  49–​50, 59, 62–​3 dependence on China  64 economic and gender-​based inequality  52–​5 Gender Inequality Index (UN)  55 globalization and economic dominance  49 history  45–​6 human trafficking  58–​63 labor force participation by gender  54 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and economic dominance  46–​9 regional migration  55–​8, 106 weakened non-​economic institutions 50–​2, 58 Cameron, S. and Newman, E.  6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 47, 78–​9 Canada  105 capitalism  18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 50, 58, 63 capitalist societies  17–​18 capitalization  68 Carrington, K.  21, 22, 24 case selection  36, 37, 43 Castles, S.  18–​19, 55, 56, 58, 77 Central Europe  7 Chaco War  66 child labor  79 child mortality  51 child sex tourism  96 child trafficking  78, 80, 96 Chile  79 China  64 chi-​square test  33–​4, 120 Cho, S.Y.  2, 10, 11, 12, 33, 97, 110 Chuang, J.A.  4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 87, 105 comparative case process tracing  43 comparative historical analysis  29, 30 see also process tracing

153

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configurational thinking  31, 36–​7 conflict  10–​11, 35, 113–​14 conjunctural causation  30 consistency  32, 37–​8 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons (UN, 1949)  4 corruption  9–​10 Bolivia  73–​4, 75, 79, 102 Cambodia  49–​50, 59, 62–​3 data sources  113 see also Corruption Perceptions Index Gambia  88–​90, 98 and migration  11 as pathway of emigration  40, 41, 42 as pathway of human trafficking  38, 39, 40 and structural adjustment programs (SAPs)  47 Sub-​Saharan Africa (SSA)  88 Corruption Perceptions Index  35, 49, 73, 74, 89, 113 cost recovery  50 countries by UN geoscheme region classification  37, 124 coverage  32, 37, 38 CPA The Gambia  97, 98 criminology  criticisms  21 theory from  16–​18; see also institutional anomie theory critical global feminism  20–​2, 23–​4, 27, 103 critical globalization framework  21 cross-​national research  3 cultural goals  16 cultural shifts  6 Curtis, G.  48, 49, 50, 51, 94, 95 Czech Republic  105

integrated theoretical framework  22, 23, 34 as pathway of emigration  40, 41, 42, 43 as pathway of human trafficking  38, 39, 40, 43–​4 economic inequality  7, 18, 34, 46, 90, 113 see also income inequality economic institutions (financial institutions)  6, 17, 18, 63–​4 see also International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank economic policies  see neoliberal economic policies Economic Recovery Program (ERP)  85 economic restructuring  7 economic sanctions  12 economic success  16 ECPAT International  96, 97, 98 education  54, 63 education expenditures  70, 92, 113 emigration, pathways of  40–​3, 101 employment  90 see also unemployment ethnic inequality  9 exploitation  27

D data analysis  36–​8, 114–​23 data calibration  114–​15, 116, 121 parsimonious and complex solutions  118–​23 pathways of high emigration  40–​3, 101 pathways of high human trafficking flows  38–​40, 42–​3, 43–​4, 100–​1 test of necessary conditions  115–​18 data sources  32–​5, 110–​14 Dayley, R.A. and Neher, C.D.  45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 55 E Eastern Europe  7 Economic Community of West African States (ECWAS)  84–​5, 87 economic dominance  Bolivia  69 Cambodia  46–​9, 51 data sources  111–​12 Gambia  98 institutional anomie theory  17, 18

F Farr, K.  2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 36, 47, 105 Farrell, A. and Fahy, S.  3, 4, 5, 24 Farthing, I.  66, 68, 69, 76 female migration  77–​8, 95 feminist criminology  21 feminist theories  20–​2, 23–​4 feminization of irregular migration  8 feminization of migration  23, 24 feminization of poverty  8, 24, 93 feminization of responsibility  93 feminization of survival  8 Filipina women  12 financial development aid  12 see also foreign aid (international aid) financial institutions  see economic institutions (financial institutions); International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank foreign aid (international aid)  Bolivia  67, 68 Cambodia  47, 51, 62, 64 Gambia  85, 86, 87, 88 fragile states  data sources  113–​14 Gambia  89, 90, 102 as pathway of emigration  40, 42, 43 as pathway of human trafficking  38, 40, 43 Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace)  35, 89, 90, 113–​14 France  48 Fund for Peace  35 fuzzy-​set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA)  13, 31–​44 Cambodia  45

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case selection  36, 37 data analysis  36–​8 data calibration  114–​15, 116, 121 parsimonious and complex solutions  118–​23 pathways of high emigration  40–​3, 101 pathways of high human trafficking flows  38–​40, 42–​3, 43–​4, 100–​1 test of necessary conditions  115–​18 data sources  32–​5, 110–​14 Gambia  83 implications for researchers  104 G Gambia  42, 83–​99, 102 3P Anti-​Trafficking Policy Index  96–​7 anti-​trafficking initiatives  107–​8 corruption  88–​90, 98 economic and social inequalities  90–​3 Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace)  90 Gender Inequality Index (UN)  93 globalization  86–​7, 88 history  83–​5 human development scores  91 IMF and World Bank restructuring  85–​6 maternal mortality  91 migration and human trafficking  94–​8, 106 net migration rate  94 net official development assistance and official aid  87 remittance inflows  95 Gambia Bureau of Statistics (GBOS)  95 Gambian Labour Force Survey  94 Gas War 2003, Bolivia  75 gender inequalities  7–​8 Bolivia  71 Cambodia  53–​5, 101 critical global feminism  23–​4 data sources  112–​13 Gambia  92–​3 as pathway of emigration  40, 41, 42–​3 as pathway of human trafficking  38, 39, 40, 42–​3, 44 and structural adjustment programs (SAPs)  46 Gender Inequality Index (UN)  34, 54–​5, 93, 112–​13 gendered globalization  22 geoscheme designations  36, 37, 124 girls  2 see also gender inequality Global Americans  72 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (UNODC, 2016)  43, 80, 111 globalization  3, 5–​6, 108–​9 Bolivia  67–​9, 74–​7 Cambodia  47–​9 of capitalism  18 and corruption  9, 88

data sources  112 and economic dominance  17 and feminism  21–​2 and feminization of poverty  8, 24 Gambia  86–​7, 88 KOF Index of Globalization  34, 48, 57, 112 as pathway of emigration  40, 42, 43 as pathway of human trafficking  38, 39, 40, 43, 44 H health expenditure  51–​2, 70, 113 healthcare  63, 76, 91–​2 Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) 86 historical research  3 see also comparative historical analysis human agency  19, 20, 24, 106 Human Development Data (UN)  employment  52 gender inequalities  92, 93, 112 income inequality  53, 91, 113 labor force participation  54 maternal mortality  51 net migration rate  34, 114 regional migration  56 remittances  95 social expenditure  113 Human Development Index  53, 90 human development indicators  87 Human Rights Now  59 Human Rights Watch  60, 62 human trafficking  Bolivia  77, 78–​81 Cambodia  58–​63 case selection  36, 37 data sources  110–​11 definition  2, 111 detected victims  33, 43, 111, 120–​3 estimated numbers of victims  1, 111 framing of  3–​5, 105–​6 future research directions  102–​5 Gambia  95–​8 implications for policy makers  105–​8 theoretical frameworks  15–​28 from criminology  16–​18; see also institutional anomie theory from feminism  20–​2; see also critical global feminism integrated framework  22–​7, 28, 36, 100, 103–​4 from migration  18–​20 underlying factors  5–​13; see also human trafficking flows, pathways of analytical model of  25–​6 waves of  2 wider context  2 see also sex trafficking

155

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human trafficking flows, pathways of  38–​40, 42–​3, 43–​4, 100–​1 Hungary  105 I income inequality  Bolivia  70–​1, 72, 76, 77 Cambodia  52–​3, 101 Gambia  91–​2, 91–​3 as pathway of emigration  40, 41, 42, 43 as pathway of human trafficking  38, 39, 40, 44 see also economic inequality Index of Economic Freedom  34, 48, 112 indigenous populations  9, 72–​3, 78–​9 inequalities  6, 112–​13 see also economic inequality; ethnic inequality; gender inequalities; income inequality; racial inequality; social inequalities Inequality-​Adjusted Income Index (UN)  34, 52–​3, 71 infant mortality  51, 70 institutional anomie theory  16–​18, 22, 23, 24, 27, 103 institutions  22–​3 integrated theoretical framework  22–​7, 28, 36, 100, 103–​4 Inter-​American Development Bank  68 International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Trade 1904  4 international aid  see foreign aid (international aid) international financial institutions  6, 63–​4 see also International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank International Labour Organization  1 International Monetary Fund (IMF)  Bolivia  66, 67–​9 Cambodia  46–​9, 49–​50, 50, 55 Gambia  85, 86, 93 International Organization for Migration (IOM)  57, 96 internet  6 intersectional approach  20 Italy  95, 96, 105 J Jabara, C.  85, 90, 91, 92 Jammeh, Y.  84–​5, 88–​9 Japan  48 Jennissen, R.  22–​3 K Kandeh, J.D.  84, 88 Kara, S.  6, 7, 47, 59 Kaup, B.Z.  75, 76 Kea, P.  85, 87, 88, 93 Keo, C.  49, 50, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64 KOF Index of Globalization  34, 48, 57, 112

Kohl, B.  66, 68, 69, 76 Kranrattanasuit, N.  58, 60, 61, 62, 63 L labor force participation by gender, Cambodia  54 labor trafficking  9, 58, 59, 60–​1, 63 Latin America  2, 3, 9 law enforcement  9–​10, 33, 79, 105, 106–​7, 110–​11, 120 Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation (LSHTSE), Cambodia  60 Lee, M.  4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 24, 27, 47, 103, 105, 106 Limoncelli, S.A.  3, 7, 9, 11, 13, 24, 36 Lithuania  105 M macro-​level conditions  5–​13, 25–​6 see also pathways of high emigration; pathways of human trafficking flows macro-​level data  32–​5 Mahmoud, T.O. and Trebesch, C.  11, 40, 78, 101 Malarek, V.  2, 9, 10, 36, 105 Malawi  42 Malaysia  57, 58, 61 Mali  42 market colonialism  63–​4 Marshall, A.  46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 59, 64 Massey, D.S.  19 maternal mortality  51, 70, 91 Mauritania  42 media  6, 84, 88 media framing  4 men  60–​1 Merry, S.E.  26 Merton, R.K.  16 Messner, S.F.  16–​17, 23, 50, 63, 111 migrant workers  57, 61, 79 migration  6 Bolivia  77–​8, 106 Cambodia  55–​8, 106 and conflict  10–​11 data sources  34, 114 and economic inequality  7 feminization of  23, 24 and feminization of survival  8 Gambia  94–​6, 106 and human trafficking victimization  11–​13, 40, 78, 101, 106 pathways of high emigration  40–​3, 101 see also net migration rate migration systems theory  19–​20, 22, 23, 24, 27 migration theories  18–​20 minority victimization  9 Mishra, V.  6, 11, 23, 47, 107

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Index

Mittleman, J.H.  21 Moldova  9, 10 Morales, E.  66, 75 Morales Administration  75–​6, 81–​2 Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), Bolivia  66 N National Agency Against Trafficking in Persons (NAATIP), Gambia  98 necessary conditions, test of  115–​18 neoclassical functionalism  18–​19 neoliberal colonialism  63–​4 neoliberal economic policies  7, 24–​5, 54, 63, 101, 102, 108–​9 neoliberal economic practices  34 neoliberalism  5–​6, 17, 47, 74–​7, 81 net migration rate  34, 40, 55–​6, 77, 94, 114 Netherlands  105 Nigeria  8, 42 Ninsin, K.A.  86, 87 non-​economic institutions  17, 18, 50–​2, 58 Nyanzi, S.  94, 95, 96 O organ trafficking  80 Outshoorn, J.  4, 8, 36, 105 P Palermo Protocol  see Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (UN, 2000) Parreñas, R.S.  12, 22, 23, 106 Passas, N.  17, 22, 63 pathways of high emigration  40–​3, 101 pathways of high human trafficking flows 38–​40, 42–​3, 43–​4, 100–​1 Perfect, D.  83, 84, 85, 95 policy makers, implications for  105–​8 Postero, N.G.  66, 69, 72, 73, 76, 82 poverty  52, 58, 63, 87, 90 feminization of  8, 24, 93 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)  46–​9, 50, 54, 59, 67–​8, 71, 86 price reforms  91 privatization  49–​50, 55, 68, 69–​70, 74–​7 process tracing  13, 14, 29–​31, 43, 114 Program for Sustained Development  85 prostitution  4, 59, 60, 62, 107 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (UN, 2000)  4, 5, 10, 33, 60, 80, 105, 110 public health expenditure  see health expenditure public institutions  see non-​ economic institutions Punch, S.  77, 78 push-​pull theories  18–​19 Pyle, J.L.  7, 22

Q qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) 29–​30, 31, 104 see also fuzzy-​set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) R racial inequality  9, 72–​3 racism  24 Ragin, C.C.  31, 32, 36, 37, 115, 117 refugees  55 remittances  78, 95, 102, 106 researchers, implications for  102–​5 resource nationalism  75 Rice, R.  73, 75, 81 Rigg, J.  52, 54, 59 Robinson, W.I.  18, 21, 73, 81 Rohlfing, I.  29, 43, 114 Rosenfeld, R.  16–​17, 23, 50, 111, 115 S Saine, A.  84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 95 Samarasinghe, V.  27, 51, 54, 58, 105, 106, 107 Sanders, A.  50, 52, 54, 63 Schneider, C.Q.  29, 43, 114, 115 Schwartz, A.  58, 61, 62, 63 set-​theoretic multi-​method research (MMR)  13, 29–​32, 104, 114 sex industry  55 sex tourism  96 sex trafficking  2, 4 Bolivia  80 Cambodia  58, 60, 63 and corruption  10 and institutions  23 and racism  9 sex workers  60, 63, 107 Shelley, L.I.  5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 27, 47, 49, 58, 88, 96, 98, 104, 107 Skeldon, R.  11, 19, 40, 78, 101 Skivankova, K.  10 social expenditure  Bolivia  69–​70, 76, 81, 101 data sources  113 Gambia  92 as pathway of emigration  40, 41, 42 as pathway of human trafficking  38, 39, 40, 44 social inequalities  90–​3 social movements  74–​7 social protections  50 social services  50, 52 South America  36, 38, 40, 77 South Korea  57 Southeast Asia  2, 3, 36, 38, 40, 51, 54 Soviet states, former  2–​3, 8, 53 Spain  79, 95, 105

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state fragility  data sources  113–​14 Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace)  35 Gambia  89, 90, 102 as pathway of emigration  40, 42, 43 as pathway of human trafficking  38, 40, 43 strain theory  16 structural adjustment programs (SAPs)  7 Bolivia  67 Cambodia  46, 48 and corruption  9 Gambia  91–​2, 93 Nigeria  8 Sub-​Saharan Africa (SSA)  86–​7 structural inequalities  6 structural Marxist approaches to migration  19 Sub-​Saharan Africa (SSA)  3, 36, 38, 40, 86–​7, 88, 90 Suriname  42 Surtees, R.  6, 7, 9, 60 survival migrants  8 Swaziland  42 T Tanzania  42 teenage migration  78 see also youth migration Thailand  8, 9, 55, 56–​7, 58–​9, 60–​1, 106 theoretical frameworks  15–​28 from criminology  16–​18; see also institutional anomie theory from feminism  20–​2; see also critical global feminism integrated framework  22–​7, 28, 36, 100, 103–​4 from migration  18–​20 theory integration  15 Togo  42 Total Detected Victims of Trafficking in Persons  43, 111, 120–​3 Trafficking in Persons Report (United States Department of State, 2007)  62 Trafficking in Persons Report (United States Department of State, 2012)  61 Trafficking in Persons Report (United States Department of State, 2018)  1, 12, 62, 80, 81, 98, 111 Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA, US)  4 transnational feminist intersectionality  21 Truong, T.D.  2, 6, 7, 8, 36, 46, 47, 87, 90, 92, 105 truth tables  32, 116–​18

U Uganda  42 unemployment  71, 72, 87, 93, 94 United Nations  Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons 1949  4 geoscheme designations  36, 37, 124 human trafficking definition  2 see also Gender Inequality Index (UN); Human Development Data (UN); Inequality-​Adjusted Income Index (UN); Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (UN, 2000) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  48, 73 United Nations Inter-​Agency Project on Human Trafficking  56, 58, 61 United Nations peacekeepers  55 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)  46, 55, 56 United States  16–​17, 62, 67, 68, 105 see also Trafficking in Persons Report (United States Department of State, 2018) V Venezuela  42 Verité  57, 95, 98 victim detention  60 Vietnam  58 W Walk Free Foundation  1 War of the Pacific  65 Water War 2000, Bolivia  75 West Africa  87 White women  4 Winant, H.  108 women  2, 4, 8, 22 see also female migration; gender inequalities; labor force participation by gender, Cambodia women of color  9 World Bank  46–​9, 50, 52, 55, 67–​8, 85, 86 World Bank Group  52, 72, 85, 86 World Development Indicators  71 Y youth migration  94–​5, 95–​6 see also teenage migration

158

Erin C. Heil, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

“This book examines the intersection between globalization, inequality, and human trafficking. Through the lens of neoliberalism, the author explores trafficking patterns in countries in three regions across the globe.” Alexis Aronowitz, University College Utrecht

Sarah Hupp Williamson is Assistant Professor at the University of West Georgia.

Factors such as inequality, gender, globalization, corruption, and instability clearly matter in human trafficking. But does corruption work the same way in Cambodia as it does in Bolivia? Does instability need to be present alongside inequality to lead to human trafficking? How do issues of migration connect?

Challenging existing thinking, the book concludes with an anti-trafficking framework which addresses the root causes of human trafficking.

S ARAH HUPP WILLI AMSON

Using migration, feminist, and criminological theory, this book asks how global economic policies contribute to the conditions which both drive migration and allow human trafficking to flourish, with specific focus on Cambodia, Bolivia, and The Gambia.

H U M A N TRA FFI C KI NG I N TH E ERA OF GLOB AL MIGRATION

“This book is a valuable addition to human trafficking research, demonstrating the common pathways to migration and trafficking through a cross-disciplinary theoretical framework and integrated methodology.”

ISBN 978-1-5292-1463-5

9 781529 214635

B R I S TO L

@BrisUniPress BristolUniversityPress bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

@policypress

HUM AN T RAFFI C K I N G I N T HE E RA O F GLO B AL M I GRAT I O N U N RAV E L I N G T HE I MPACT OF N EOL I B E RAL ECON OMI C P OL I C Y S A RA H HU PP W I L L I A M S O N