Human Dignity in the Latin Reception of Origen 9783161627736, 3161627733

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Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum Studies and Texts in Antiquity and Christianity Herausgeber/Editors Liv Ingeborg Lied (Oslo)· Christoph Markschies (Berlin) Martin Wallraff (München) · Christian Wildberg (Pittsburgh) Beirat/Advisory Board Peter Brown (Princeton) · Susanna Elm (Berkeley) Johannes Hahn (Münster) · Emanuela Prinzivalli (Rom) Jörg Rüpke (Erfurt)

135

Sara Contini

Human Dignity in the Latin Reception of Origen

Mohr Siebeck

Sara Contini, born 1993; 2022 PhD in Classics at the University of Bristol; Fritz Thyssen Foundation postdoctoral fellow at Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen. orcid.org/0000-0003-1588-3662

ISBN 978-3-16-162773-6 / eISBN 978-3-16-162774-3 DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-162774-3 ISSN 1436-3003 / eISSN 2568-7433 (Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum) The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available at http://dnb.de. © 2023 Mohr Siebeck Tübingen. www.mohrsiebeck.com This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher’s written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations, microfilms and storage and processing in electronic s­ ystems. The book was printed on non-aging paper by Gulde-Druck in Tübingen and bound by Buchbinderei Nädele in Nehren. Printed in Germany.

Acknowledgements This book is a revised version of my doctoral dissertation in Classics, which I defended at the University of Bristol in July 2022. I had a wonderful PhD experience, and I wish to express here my gratitude to all those who made the past few years so formative and fulfilling. I am immensely grateful to my supervisor, Professor Karla Pollmann, for guiding me to find my voice as a researcher. What she has taught me regarding how to read ancient texts and how to communicate my findings has become the guiding principle of my research. Moreover, her attention, openness, and continuous support both during and after my PhD make me believe in myself and feel that my work is valued and important. I am thankful for the help and guidance that I received at the University of Bristol, in particular from my wonderful second supervisor, Dr Ellen O’Gorman, from Professor Esther Eidinow, from Dr Edwin Shaw, and from the stellar library services available at UoB. I also wish to thank my examiners, Professors Gillian Clark and Ulrich Volp, for their precise and helpful advice on my dissertation and for all their suggestions on future research projects (which have proven very valuable!): thanks to their positive and warm attitude, my viva voce was a very pleasant experience which I remember fondly. I am truly thankful to the University of Bristol for awarding me the prize for outstanding excellence in a doctoral dissertation for the Faculty of Arts in 2022/23, and to my examiners for recommending me for the prize. I wish to convey my sincere gratitude to the institutions that provided funding for my research, namely the European Union’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie program, the University of Bristol, the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), the OeAD (Austria’s Agency for Education and Internationalisation), “Sapienza” Università di Roma, and the Fritz Thyssen foundation. In the past six years, I had the opportunity to work in different universities, including Reading, Tübingen, Münster, Santiago de Chile, and Vienna. In all these places, I was warmly welcomed by thoughtful and caring supervisors and by their respective teams of exceptional early career researchers, whose contribution to my research has been and continues to be invaluable. In particular, I have received guidance and support from Professors Volker Drecoll, Alfons Fürst, Samuel Fernández, Uta Heil, Patricia Ciner, Peter Martens, and Fernando Soler. Working with them is a privilege that I am deeply thankful for.

VI I would like to thank all members of the research and innovation program ITN History of Human Freedom and Dignity in Western Civilization, especially Professor Anders-Christian Jacobsen, who has always encouraged me since the very beginning of my doctorate. I would like to thank Elena Müller, Dr Katharina Gutekunst, and Markus Kirchner: I have learned a lot from my work with Mohr Siebeck in the past few years, and I really enjoyed it too! I would also like to thank all the editors of STAC, Professors Liv Ingeborg Lied, Christoph Markschies, Martin Wallraff, and Christian Wildberg. I wish to thank all the Professors in Rome who first introduced me to the study of Early Christianity, especially Gaetano Lettieri and Alberto Camplani. I am always grateful to Professor Emanuela Prinzivalli, who is truly a role model for me. By far, the best part of my PhD and now post-doc experience are my wonderful colleagues, such as the researchers from Italy and from all over the world that I got to meet during my studies and then at seminars and conferences such as the Origeniana XIII (Münster 2022): I wish to thank them for their friendship and for their genuine desire to work together to create something new. In particular, I would like to thank Drs Martina Delucchi, Valeria Dessy, Lorenzo Livorsi, Ilaria Scarponi, and Giovanni Tortoriello. I have known these bright, fun, passionate researchers for years, and yet every day I find new reasons to cherish and admire them. Finally, I want to thank my friends and family in Rome for their love and support. Tübingen, June 2023

Table of Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................. V Introduction ............................................................................................... 1 Part I: Linguistic Issues .......................................................................... 9 Chapter 1: Comparison with Greek Terms .......................................11 1.1 Greek Terms That Rufinus and Jerome Translate as Dignus or Digne ...................................................................11 1.1.1 Ἄξιος, ἀξίως, κατ’ἀξίαν etc.: “Worthy” ......................................... 11 1.1.2 ‘Ικανός: “Sufficient” ...................................................................... 13 1.1.3 Πρέπον: “Appropriate” .................................................................. 13 1.2 Greek Terms That Rufinus and Jerome Translate as Dignitas ............14 1.2.1 ’Αξίωμα and ἀξία: “Worth” ........................................................... 14 1.2.2 Other Terms Indicating Worldly Status and Political Power ......... 16 1.3 Conclusions ........................................................................................19

Chapter 2: Terms Associated with Dignity in Rufinus’ Translations of Origen .....................................................21 2.1 Honour ...............................................................................................22 2.2 Power .................................................................................................24 2.3 Glory ..................................................................................................26 2.4 Status .................................................................................................28 2.5 Nobility ..............................................................................................32 2.6 Beauty ................................................................................................33 2.7 Conclusions ........................................................................................36

Part II: Dignity in Origen ......................................................................37

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Chapter 3: Dignitas of Creatures in the Latin Translations of Origen ...................................................................................................39 3.1 Dignity as Rank and Social Status ......................................................39 3.2 Dignity in the Church .........................................................................42 3.3 Dignity of the Worthy Souls before Apocatastasis .............................45 3.3.1 “Dignity of the Likeness”: Progress in Three Stages (De Principiis 3.6)................................................................................... 45 3.3.2 Dignity of the “Co-heirs with Christ”: An Imbalance in Dignity in the End Times? ................................................................................... 50 3.4 Dignity of the Heavenly Powers .........................................................59 3.5 Conclusions ........................................................................................63

Chapter 4: The Dignity of God and the Communication between God and Humans ....................................................................65 4.1 Understanding God through His Dignity ............................................65 4.1.1 Layered and Inclusive Communication .......................................... 71 4.2 Origen and Celsus: Discovering and Communicating God as Is Worthy of Him .................................................................................76 4.2.1 Who Is Worthy of God? ................................................................. 78 4.2.2 Origen and Celsus on the Incarnation ............................................ 82 4.3 Overcoming Rank: The Dignity of God in the Homilies on Psalms ....86 4.4 Conclusions ........................................................................................92

Part III: A Turning Point in the Usage of Dignitas: Universal Human Dignity .....................................................................95 Chapter 5: An Exceptional Passage in Origen through Rufinus’ Latin Translation: “Dignity of the Image” in De Principiis 3.6.1 .................................97 5.1 What Is the “Dignity of the Image”? Purpose, Themes, and Structure of Princ. 3.6.1 ....................................................................97 5.2 Human Dignity and Instability .........................................................103 5.3 Conclusions ......................................................................................106

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Chapter 6: A Possible Parallel in Cicero? The Dignity and Excellence of Human Nature in De Officiis 1.106 ...............109 6.1 Dignitas across Cicero’s Life ...........................................................110 6.2 De Officiis and Its Reception in the 4th Century ................................114 6.3 The Structure of the First Book of De Officiis: Honestum ................115 6.4 The Context of Off. 1.106: Decorum ................................................117 6.5 Human Dignitas in Off. 1.106–107 and in the Latin Version of Princ. 3.6.1 ........................................................................................121 6.5.1 The Shared Philosophical Background and Terminology ............ 122 6.5.2 Dignity as Universal Potential...................................................... 124 6.6 Conclusions ......................................................................................126

Part IV: The Usage of the Term Dignitas and the Reception of Origen’s Views on Humanity in the Cultural Environment of Rufinus and Jerome....................129 Chapter 7: Universal Human Dignity in Latin Christian Texts from the 4th Century ..................................................................131 7.1 Dignity of Human Souls Established at Creation ..............................131 7.1.1 Arnobius of Sicca: The Absurdity of Human Dignity.................. 131 7.1.2 Hilary of Poitiers: The Unique Dignity of the Creation of the Human Being .............................................................................. 134 7.1.3 Ambrose of Milan: Spiritual Dignity Lost and Found ................. 136 7.1.4 Augustine of Hippo: The Dignity of the Soul .............................. 139 7.2 Dignity Available to All Those Who Become Christian ...................140 7.2.1 Gregory of Elvira: The Dignity of the Church as the Body of Christ............................................................................. 140 7.2.2 Zeno of Verona: Dignity and Community ................................... 141 7.2.3 Ambrosiaster: Transformative Dignity ........................................ 144 7.3 Conclusions ......................................................................................147

Chapter 8: Human Dignity in the Latin Translations of the Cappadocians .............................................................................149 8.1 Gregory of Nazianzus: “Dignity of the Image” .................................150 8.2 Basil of Caesarea: Dignity as Superiority .........................................152

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8.3 Gregory of Nyssa: Dignity and Royalty............................................153 8.4 Conclusions ......................................................................................155

Chapter 9: Filastrius of Brescia: The Progress from Image to Likeness .................................................................................157 9.1 Filastrius’ Views on the Human Soul in Comparison with Origen ....158 9.1.1 Souls and Intellects ...................................................................... 160 9.2 Human Dignity in Filastrius .............................................................162 9.3 The Difference between Image and Likeness in the 3rd and 4th Centuries......................................................................166 9.4 Conclusions ......................................................................................172

Chapter 10: Human Dignity in Jerome ............................................173 10.1 Dignity as Office ............................................................................174 10.2 Dignity in Jerome’s Polemic against Origen’s Views on the Creatures .....................................................................................178 10.2.1 Angelic Dignity .......................................................................... 178 10.2.2 Dignity and Apocatastasis .......................................................... 181 10.3 Dignity of the Human Soul .............................................................188 10.3.1 Dignity as Immortality ............................................................... 188 10.3.2 Dignity as the Prerogative of True Humanity ............................ 190 10.3.3 Dignity and Assimilation to God: Jerome vs Origen?................ 193 10.4 Conclusions ....................................................................................194

Conclusions ............................................................................................197 Bibliography...........................................................................................205 Index of References ..............................................................................231 Index of Modern Authors....................................................................243 Index of Subjects...................................................................................245

Introduction It is difficult to describe what “human dignity” is, and what it entails. However, there are some elements that are consistently associated with human dignity in modern discourses, at least since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Although the UDHR does not provide a definition of dignity, it coveys that dignity is inherent to each and every member of the human species.1 As noted by Oliver Sensen (2011) and Miriam Griffin (2017), the idea of a universal, inalienable, inviolable, and unmerited human dignity emerging from modern texts such as the UDHR is in stark contrast with the views expressed in ancient texts featuring dignitas, i.e. the Latin noun from which, as per the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “dignity” is derived (by way of the French “dignité”).2 In fact, in most of the extant Latin texts written before the 5th century AD, dignitas is mainly attributed to individuals (rather than to all human beings), and it refers to one’s contribution to public life, in the context of hierarchical institutions such as the Roman State and the Church. Thus, this study examines a particular stage in the history of the idea of dignity, in order to shed light on the development of the meaning of this term which led it to also include a universal sense that it did not express before. The role played in this shift in the meaning of dignity by Early Christian thought on humanity as created in the image of God (Genesis 1:26–27) will be assessed.

1 UDHR Preamble: “Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. [...] The peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women [...].”. Article 1: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. Art. 22: “Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization [...] of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality”. Art. 23 c. 3: “Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection”. Available at https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights (last accessed on 13/05/2023). 2 Other studies, such as Hennette-Vauchez (2011), focus instead on the existing links between rank-based dignitas and modern views on human dignity in jurisprudence.

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Introduction

To achieve this, the meanings attributed to the term dignitas in the Latin translations of Origen of Alexandria made by Rufinus and Jerome will be investigated, as well as other Latin Christian texts of the 4th century which, to different degrees, show the reception of Origen’s exegesis of Gen 1:26–27. Particular focus is placed on instances where “dignity” refers to humanity as a whole, as is the case with Rufinus’ translation of Origen, On First Principles (De Principiis) 3.6.1. The aim of this study is to shed light on the way in which Origen’s thoughts on the relationship between God and human beings, as mediated by the Latin translators, problematised Classical views on dignitas and contributed to a shift towards a universalising understanding of the term. The 21st century has seen a rise in the number of publications investigating the idea of human dignity, both scholarly and meant for a wider public.3 The concept of dignity has undergone heavy scrutiny, and coming to a sufficiently convincing definition of what “dignity” actually means has proven to be elusive. While some scholars declare it to be the “linchpin of the modern selfunderstanding of the human person”,4 others have concluded that “dignity” cannot be more than “an empty and flawed signifier”.5 The definitions and qualifications of dignity in contemporary scholarship are countless: [Dignity] has been described as powerful (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001), yet useless and vague (Macklin 2003); arbitrary (Van Steendam et al. 2006), yet addictive (Wetz 2004); elusive (Ullrich 2003), yet widely used (Van Steendam et al. 2006); groundless (Rachels 1990), yet revolutionary (Wood 2008); of supreme importance, yet without reference points.6

Many of the scholarly works dedicated to human dignity have attempted to shed light on this complex notion by studying its development throughout history: notable examples are the collected volumes edited by Remy Debes (2017) and by John Loughlin (2021). Christopher McCrudden (2013) remarks on the difficulty of selecting an appropriate methodology to investigate the historical development of an abstract notion that is not nearly univocally understood.7 This is especially true for the study of dignity in ancient texts such as those by Origen; in the introduction of his book on human dignity in Early Christian literature, Ulrich Volp (2006) identifies three possible methodological approaches.8 The first is to focus on the occurrences of terms such as dignitas and 3

One example is the debate “In Pursuit of Dignity”, aired on BBC Radio 4 on 18 Aug. 2012. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/b01lv26v (last accessed on 07/01/2022). The discussion showcased different perspectives on what “human dignity” is, what it is based on, and how it affects various aspects of the life of each member of contemporary society. 4 Ammicht-Quinn, Junker-Kenny, and Tamez (2003): 2. 5 Douzinas (2007): 8. 6 Schroeder and Bani-Sadr (2017): 3. 7 McCrudden (2013): 5–6. 8 Volp (2006): 10–13.

Introduction

3

investigate how their meaning changes throughout history. The second is to focus on anthropological notions expressed by a specific ancient philosophical school – for example, the Stoic concept of self-determination – and assess their presence in Early Christian authors. The third approach, which Volp prefers, is to identify not a term or a specific philosophical school but rather a fundamental research question. In the case of his study, the question is: To what extent is the idea of a common human nature endowed with a special dignity, which distinguishes humans from animals and from animate and inanimate matter, found in the writings of the ancient Christian thinkers, and how is this nature conceived and justified?9

Thus, in the introduction of his study Volp provides a working definition of human dignity (Würde) as a distinctive attribute of the collective human nature in comparison to the rest of created nature: this concept of dignity is traced back by Volp to Early Christian texts. When it comes to Origen, Volp concludes, based on Princ. 3.6.1 and especially on passages in Origen’s treatise Against Celsus (preserved in Greek), that Origen contributed to the development of this concept of human dignity by maintaining that, unlike animals, human souls, endowed with reason, are created with the capacity to attain the likeness with God through their virtue and their humility.10 My approach is complementary to Volp’s. I primarily follow the first of the three methodologies he identifies, meaning that I use the presence of the Latin noun dignitas in texts as the main criterion to select and organise the ancient evidence. In my study, the contribution offered by the Latin translators of Origen to the history of dignity is evaluated by assessing how these ancient authors use the term dignitas in different contexts, and what it means for them to attribute dignitas to individuals, to God, or to humanity as a whole. In the case of the Latin texts that I will examine, having dignitas as the starting point of the research presents three advantages: first, it helps to define the object of the research and the selection criterion as univocally as possible. Second, approaching the subject of human dignity from the point of view of the occurrences of dignitas does not require to postulate a definition of dignity in advance; instead, an evolving definition of dignity between Origen and his Latin readership will emerge at the end from the range of contexts and usages of this term. Thirdly, and most importantly: because dignitas is such a distinctive and highly codified term of Roman political culture, investigating each of the occurrences of dignitas in the translations of Origen allows for a comparison with 9 Volp (2006): 13, “Inwieweit findet sich in den Schriften der antiken christlichen Denker die Vorstellung einer mit einer besonderen Würde ausgestatteten gemein-menschlichen Natur, die die Menschen von Tieren und von belebter und unbelebter Materie unterscheidet, und wie wird diese Natur gefasst und begründet?” (my translation). 10 Volp (2006): 143–153. The view that for Origen human dignity resides in the capacity for moral progress established with the creation “according to the image” of God (Gen 1:27) is also expressed by Hengstermann (2010): 47–53.

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Introduction

the traditional understanding of Roman dignitas that Rufinus, Jerome, and their audience were familiar with. The Classical understanding of dignitas has a relatively clearer meaning when compared with modern notions of “human dignity”, as it generally denotes the elevated social standing – often connected to a public office – awarded to an individual or to specific groups (such as families or social classes), in comparison with others.11 This traditional usage of individual dignitas, emerging from the majority of the Early Christian texts taken into consideration, will be compared in this study with the few occurrences of dignitas referring to the entirety of humankind. As will be shown in parts III and IV of this study, during the 4th and early 5th centuries these exceptional occurrences are mainly found in texts involving the creation of human beings “according to the image of God” (as told in Gen 1:26–27), such as Hilary of Poitiers, Tract.118Ps. 10.3–8; Jerome, Comm.Isa. 14.11, and especially Rufinus’ translations of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1 and of Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 16.8,15. Scholars such as Bonnie Kent (2017) or Emmanuel Rehfeld (2021) have demonstrated that the relationship between Early Christian discourses on the creation of humanity in the image of God and modern views on inalienable human dignity should be understood as complex and to a certain extent even contradictory. The significance of Late Antique and Medieval discourses on humanity created in the image of God for the development of a notion of dignity as the inherent worth of the collective human nature, endowed with the faculty of reason and with freedom of choice, was evaluated in studies such as Gaetano Lettieri (2010) or Ruedi Imbach (2014).12 The role played in this process by Origen and his Latin reception is not widely acknowledged in the scholarly works on dignity and its historical developments. For example, Andreas Großmann13 notes the difference between the traditional understanding of dignity as part of a social hierarchy, associated with status, reputation, and prestige, and the more recent idea of an inviolable and indestructible human dignity (Menschenwürde). Großmann quotes Ambrose of Milan, Leo the Great, and Gregory the Great as Late Antique and Early Medieval authors who contributed to a shift in the understanding of dignitas, based on the Christian notion of the human soul as “image” of God, without mentioning Origen. Similarly, many studies on human dignity in Late Antiquity focus mainly on Greek texts by the Cappadocians, sometimes in connection with Latin authors such as Augustine.14 11 For definitions of Roman dignitas, cf. Sensen (2011): 75–76; Griffin (2017): 50, and Sangiovanni (2017): 16. 12 For previous studies cf. the literature review in Volp (2006): 5–10. 13 S.v. “Würde”, in Ueding (2009): 1459–1466. 14 Cf. Harper (2016); Mikhaylov (2019). Guerrero van der Meijden (2019): 267–281; Müller (2020): 30–36; Pfordten (20232): 22–23.

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Origen and his Latin tradition are rarely taken into consideration.15 However, Origen’s interpretation of Gen 1:26–27 impacted significantly on Christian anthropology both in the Greek and the Latin Church, as will be discussed in part IV of this study. Theo Kobusch (2008), Alfons Fürst (2012), and Pasquale Terracciano (2018) showed that the reception of Origen’s anthropology can be seen not just in Late Antiquity, but also in later authors whose works are considered turning points in the history of human dignity, like the Italian philosopher Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and other Renaissance thinkers. There are many studies on Origen’s anthropology and its reception, and some of them use the expression “human dignity” in reference to his views on humans as rational beings originally created “according to the image” of God (Gen 1:27). Namely, John Solheid (2023) examines Origen’s arguments (particularly as expressed in Princ. 3.1 and in the Homilies on Psalms) on freedom of choice and on the kinship between God and human beings, and concludes that Origen’s views on human persons as spiritual beings provide a valuable theological framework to appreciate the intrinsic dignity of every human being.16 However, a textual analysis clarifying what dignitas means in the Latin reception of Origen in the 4th century and assessing its significance in the shift from traditional Roman to Christian dignity has yet to be done. Thus, I will address a gap in scholarship on the history of dignity by assessing the way in which the aristocratic understanding of dignitas prevailing at the time was challenged not just by Origen’s thought on humanity, but also by the mediation of his thought through its Latin reception. In this sense, I study dignitas in the Latin translations of Origen as a moment of intercultural dialogue, by investigating how a Greek Christian discourse on humanity as God’s creation is transmitted to a Latin audience by employing a familiar term of Roman political culture. Even if the objective of this study cannot be to provide a conclusive definition of “human dignity” in Early Christian literature, clarifying the extent of continuity and innovation in the use of dignitas as displayed in the Latin reception of Origen will shed light on the history of dignity as both a social/divisive and as a universal/uniting notion. This study is divided into four parts, following this introduction. Part I, titled “Linguistic Issues”, deals with the matter of translation, investigating which Greek terms and expressions were perceived by the Latin translators of Origen as equivalents of dignitas (chapter 1). A related linguistic issue that will be

15 An overview on human dignity in Early Christian writings is provided in Soulen and Woodhead (2006): 3–8: Origen is mentioned in passing, with a reference to Princ. 3.6.1. 16 Cf. Klöckener (2021): 80; Rizzi (2010): 32, “Origen seems to belong at full title to the classical philosophical tradition, according to which human beings’ dignity consists in the presence and activity of the logos – i.e. rational capability – within them”. For Origen’s views on freedom of choice, cf. Sfameni Gasparro (1998): 151–176; Caruso (2012): 11–175; Fürst (2019); see section 3.4 in this study.

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Introduction

examined in chapter 2 is the specificity of the term dignitas in Rufinus’ translations of Origen, i.e. the question of whether Rufinus perceived dignitas as a unique and irreplaceable term (and, if so, in which ontext), or if he regarded as at least partly interchangeable with similar Latin terms such as honor or status. Part II, titled “Dignity in Origen”, examines all occurrences of dignitas referring to specific individuals or classes in the Latin translations of Origen. The texts examined in chapter 3 refer to dignitas as attributed to human beings and other rational creatures, and I analyse the connection between rank and merit: section 3.1 deals with dignitas as social status; section 3.2 with dignitas denoting a position of authority within the Christian Church; section 3.3 concerns the high dignitas awarded to worthy individuals in their afterlife, and section 3.4 focuses on a particular usage of dignitas which is connected to Origen’s thought on the progress of rational creatures based on their freedom of choice.17 A central theological concept that emerges from the texts analysed in chapter 3 is the participation of rational creatures in Christ: the theme of participation is significant in Origen’s thought and so there is ample literature on the matter.18 To summarise: when “Christ” is mentioned in this study, unless a distinction is explicitly made between “the soul of Jesus” and “the Logos”, I refer to the incarnate Son, the union of both the second hypostasis of the Trinity (which Origen calls Logos, Wisdom, or Image of God) and the created human soul (and body) of Jesus Christ.19 The expression “participation in Christ” refers to Origen’s view that, because human souls as rational creatures share a natural affinity with the Logos,20 when they choose to respond positively to the pedagogical activity of Christ (supported by the angels, the apostles, and the saints)21 human beings set themselves on a path that ultimately will lead them to achieve the same unity with the divine Logos that was attained by the soul of Jesus.22 This progress is achieved through prayer, through the practice of the virtues which have their ontological foundation in the Logos (such as wisdom, justice, etc.),23 and especially through the study of Scripture as the medium through which the Trinity communicates with humanity. The Greek term 17

For the theme of the progress of rational beings in Origen and its reception, cf. Lettieri, Fallica, and Jacobsen (2023), especially the contributions by Lettieri (pp. 17–53) and by Jacobsen (pp. 55–64). 18 For the human soul and its relationship with the Logos in Origen, cf. Crouzel (1989): 92–98; Simonetti (2004): 29–50, and Prinzivalli (2005); furthermore, cf. Evers (2019): 40– 46, for the intermediary role played by the Logos in the creation, fall, and restoration of rational creatures in De Principiis; Maspero (2016) for the participation of the human logoi in the divine Logos in Origen’s Commentary on John. 19 Origen’s views on the incarnation are discussed in section 4.2.2. 20 See sections 5.1; 6.5. 21 Cf. Rizzi (2010): 36–41. 22 Fernández (2019). 23 Cf. Orig. Comm.Jo. 32.11.127; Hom.Isa. 3.3; Hom.36Ps. 2.1.

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employed by Origen to refer to the “participation” of human souls in the Logos is normally μετοχή: this is the case for example with Cels. 7.17, examined in section 4.2.2. In Hom.36Ps. 2.4, which is extant both in the original Greek and in Rufinus’ translation, μετοχή is rendered as participatio. Alternatively, Origen speaks of κοινωνία (cf. Cels. 3.28).24 In Rufinus’ translations, this concept is expressed mainly as participatio (cf. Princ. 1.3.6–8) or as consortium (cf. Hom.Num. 20.2). The concept of participation is introduced in sections 3.3–4 and plays an important role especially later in part III of this study. Chapter 4 deals with the dignity of God, and how it relates to the dignity of the creatures examined in the previous chapter. Section 4.1 examines passages in the Latin translations of Origen where dignitas and correlated adjectives such as dignus are used as technical terms of Origen’s exegesis, in reference to the hermeneutical principle of θεοπρέπεια, i.e. the notion that everything that Scripture says about God must be interpreted by the spiritual exegete in a way that fits the dignity of the incorporeal God.25 The same exegetical notion of dignitas of God that we find in the Latin translations is also expressed in Greek texts by Origen, using the noun ἀξίωμα and other derivatives of ἄξιος, identified in chapter 1 as the closest Greek equivalents to dignitas. These Greek passages (mainly from Against Celsus and the Homilies on Psalms) are analysed in sections 4.2–3 so as to complete the assessment of Origen’s views on the dignity of God as a hermeneutical criterion for spiritual exegesis. The purpose of chapters 3 and 4 is to establish a “baseline” of what “dignity” normally means in Origen’s writings, in order to demonstrate why the expression “dignity of the image” (imaginis dignitas), found twice in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, constitutes an exception. Part III of this study, titled “A Turning Point in the Usage of Dignitas: Universal Human Dignity”, aims at clarifying the meaning of “dignity of the image” in the context of Origen’s interpretation of Gen 1:26–27, and to investigate possible parallels for this exceptional occurrence of dignitas in Latin literature prior to Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis, made in 398.26 Chapter 5 is dedicated to Princ. 3.6.1, whereas chapter 6 deals with Cicero, On Duties (De Officiis) 1.106. Reading these two texts in comparison with one another is aimed at identifying in which way the “dignity of the image” in Princ. 3.6.1 is truly an innovation compared to non-Christian understandings of dignity. Princ. 3.6.1 and Off. 1.106 have in common the usage of dignitas as referring not to an individual (as it was in the texts analysed in the previous chapters) but rather to the whole human species, by virtue of its rational nature. However, as will be clarified in chapter 6, the single occurrence of dignitas referring to human nature in Cicero, 24

For Origen’s terminology for participation, cf. Biriukov (2017). This principle of Early Christian exegesis has been examined by Sheridan (2000). 26 Grappone (2007): 18–21. In general, for the dating and the transmission of Origen’s texts, cf. the Clavis Origenis (forthcoming). 25

8

Introduction

Off. 1.106 does not truly represent a shift in the meaning of the term in relation to humanity in the way that later Christian discourses do. The investigation of possible parallels for the occurrence of universal dignitas in Princ. 3.6.1, initiated with Off. 1.106 in chapter 6, continues in part IV, titled “The Usage of the Term Dignitas and the Reception of Origen’s Views on Humanity in the Cultural Environment of Rufinus and Jerome”. The Latin texts examined in part IV are examples of usages of dignitas which do not correspond to the traditional understanding as the social, political, or ecclesiastical rank of an individual. Chapters 7, 8, and 9 give an overview on dignitas in texts written before 398. Chapter 7 deals with Latin Christian authors: the texts are divided among those where dignitas refers to a rank awarded to all human souls since their creation according to the image of God (section 7.1), and those who instead use dignitas to denote a spiritual rank available to all beings made according to the image of God once they decide to become true Christians (section 7.2). Chapter 8 deals with the Cappadocians and with their Latin translations. The following chapters focus on the occurrences of dignitas in two Latin authors as case studies: chapter 9 deals with Filastrius of Brescia and his views on the progress from image to likeness (which was also present in Origen, Princ. 3.6.1), while chapter 10 examines Jerome’s writings, assessing the different ways in which he uses dignitas in reference to human beings and other rational creatures. The main findings of this study will be summarised in the conclusions, evaluating the contribution offered by Origen’s thought on the relationship between human beings and God through Christ, as mediated by 4th century authors and translators, to the spread of a novel, counter-cultural understanding of dignitas not just as individual rank in a social hierarchy but also as universal potential of all humans as rational beings created in the image of God.

Part I

Linguistic Issues The aim of this part of the study is to assess what semantic areas are covered in the Latin translations of Origen by the adjective dignus, “worthy” (or the adverb digne, “worthily”), and by the noun dignitas, “dignity”, and also to clarify whether these areas are exclusively covered by these terms. Chapter 1 will assess which Greek terms were presumed by Rufinus and Jerome as equivalents to dignus and dignitas, by comparing the Latin translation with the extant Greek texts. Chapter 2 will investigate the matter of whether dignitas was perceived by the Latin translators of Origen as a distinctive and irreplaceable term (and, if so, in which contexts), or if the role of dignitas could also be played in the translations of Origen by other closely related Latin terms.

Chapter 1

Comparison with Greek Terms 1.1 Greek Terms That Rufinus and Jerome Translate as Dignus or Digne 1.1.1 Ἄξιος, ἀξίως, κατ’ἀξίαν etc.: “Worthy” In the revision of the Latin translation of the four Gospels completed by Jerome in 384, the adjective ἄξιος (“worthy”) is translated as dignus in Matt 3:8 (= Luke 3:8);1 10:10–11 (= Luke 10:7); 10:37–38;2 22:8; Luke 7:4; 12:48;3 15:19.21; 23:15; 23:41; John 1:27. Jerome translated the verbs ἀξιοῦν and καταξιοῦσθαι as dignum arbitrari in Luke 7:7 and as dignum habere or haberi (“to consider” or “to be considered worthy”) in Luke 20:35; 21:36. The correlation between the Latin adjective dignus (normally with ablative) and the Greek ἄξιος (with genitive) to indicate “worthy of” is confirmed by those works by Origen that were translated by Rufinus4 or Jerome and are also extant in Greek. These include twelve Homilies on Jeremiah, delivered by Origen in Caesarea (Palestine) possibly between 245 and 249,5 and translated by Jerome for the priest Vincentius around 380;6 four Homilies on Psalm 36, translated by Rufinus for the Roman nobleman Apronianus around 400,7 and passages by Origen (namely, Princ. 3.1, 4.1–3; Hom.Lev. 5.1, and Hom.Jes.Nav. 20.1–2) that are found in Latin translations by Rufinus and also in the Philocalia, an anthology of writings by Origen traditionally attributed to Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus.8 The comparison between the Greek text and the Latin translation reveals that Jerome normally uses dignus or digne to translate ἄξιος, ἀξίως or 1

Rufinus also uses dignus to translate Matt 3:8 in Orig. Comm.Rom. praef. 5. Cf. Rufinus’ translation of Orig. Comm.Rom. 6.13.4. 3 Cf. Rufinus’ translation of Orig. Comm.Rom. 2.7.1, Comm.Cant. 2.5.34. 4 For the context, purposes, methodology, date, and audience of Rufinus’ translations, cf. Lo Cicero (2008): 17–125. For an assessment of Rufinus’ methodology and reliability as a translator of Origen’s homilies, based on the comparison with the available Greek fragments, cf. Grappone (2007). For Rufinus’ translation of Gregory of Nazianzus, cf. Memoli (1969). 5 Grappone (2001b): all homilies by Origen can be dated to the reign of Philip the Arab. 6 For the identification of Vincentius cf. Williams (2006): 213–216. 7 Cf. Prinzivalli (2019): 131–186. 8 This attribution is however disputed; cf. Junod (2015). 2

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derivatives.9 As for Rufinus, out of eight total occurrences of dignus or digne in the Homilies on Psalms 36, three do not exactly correspond to the Greek text (Hom.36Ps. 1.6; 2.4, 3.10), while three correspond to ἄξιος or ἀξίως (Hom.36Ps. 2.1; 3.9; 4.3). In the Philocalia, dignus corresponds to ἄξιος in Princ. 3.1.16,21 and 4.2.9. As for Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s Commentary on the Song of Songs, dignus in the quote from Wis 6:16 in praef. 2.1 and Comm.Cant. 3.4.19 corresponds to ἄξιος in the Septuagint. In Rufinus’ version of Wis 6:16, ἄξιος is translated as dignus accompanied by the adjectives capax, “able”, and aptus, “fit”. Rufinus also translated other Christian authors whose Greek texts are extant. Around 399, Rufinus translated for Apronianus seven homilies by Basil of Caesarea and his Epistle 46; furthermore, it is debated whether he is also the translator of two Homilies on Fasting by Basil. In Rufinus’ translations of Basil, dignus corresponds to ἄξιος, ἀξίως or derivatives in Hom. Attende tibi 2; Hom. On Envy 1,4; Hom. On Proverbs 2,5,8; Hom. On Faith 1, and in the quote from Prov 3:15 in Hom. On Proverbs 4.10 The correlation between the adjective dignus (and derivatives) and ἄξιος (and derivatives) is confirmed by Rufinus’ translation of Eusebius of Caesarea’s History of the Church, made for the influential bishop Chromatius of Aquileia in 402–403,11 as well as by his translation of nine speeches by Gregory of Nazianzus, made around 399 for Apronianus.12 Otherwise, Rufinus translates the adverb καλῶς, “beautifully”, as digne, often accompanied by another adverb: digne here means that something is “correctly” understood or judged, as for example in Rufinus’ version of Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 2.50; 16.19: digne et conpetenter, “correctly and properly”; Orat. 38.10: bene et digne, “rightly and correctly”; or of Origen, Princ. 3.1.19: digne meritoque, “correctly and deservedly”. Dignus also translates ἀναγκαῖος, to signal that a reference or a fact is deemed by the author “necessary” or “worthy” to be included in the book.13

9

Cf. the translation of Orig. Hom.Jer. 1.1,10,14; 11.3,6; 12.1,2,8; 13.2,3; 14.16; 16.5,7. For an overview on the Latin translations of Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus in the 4th to 6th century, cf. Fedwick (1981): 455–470; Voicu (2018): 298–301. 11 On Chromatius and the Church of Aquileia, cf. Beatrice and Peršič (2011). 12 Dignus or digne translate ἄξιος or derivatives in Rufinus’ version of Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 2.3,8,14,53,88,95,96,117; 6.18; 16.12; 17.8; 26.5,10,16; 39.4,19, and of Eusebius, Hist. 1.13.3; 2.1.12; 2.9.2; 2.10.2; 2.18.8; 3.7.1; 3.9.3; 3.10.4; 3.11.1; 3.39.5; 4.5.2; 3.14.5; 3.16.3; 3.18.8; 5.1.13; 5.1.31; 5.2.1; 5.3.1; 5.7.6; 6.2.2; 6.8.4 (where the subject is none other than Origen himself!); 6.11.5; 6.29.4; 7.18.1; 7.32.25; 8 praef.; 8.1.5; 9.11.6. We also have Rufinus’ translation, made for Apronianus and his wife Avita in 399, of the Sentences of Sextus, a 2nd century author known to Origen (cf. Cels. 8.30): dignus corresponds to ἄξιος in Sent. 3, 4, 58, 122, 132, 248, 250, 329, and 376a. Finally, in Rufinus’ version of Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 76 the phrase ut dignum est (“as is worthy”) translates the Greek πρός ἀξίαν. 13 Eus.Caes. Hist. 4.14.2; 5.20.2; 6.44.1; 7.32.13. 10

Chapter 1: Comparison with Greek Terms

13

1.1.2 ‘Ικανός: “Sufficient” In most cases, the adjective ἱκανός in the NT indicates a number of people or things or a period of time and is translated with adjectives indicating quantity, such as “sufficient”, “enough”, or even “a lot”, “abundant”. Jerome however translates ἱκανός with dignus in Matt 3:11 (= Mark 1:7; Luke 3:16);14 8:8 (= Luke 7:6),15 where the adjective is part of the speaker’s negative statement about himself, affirming his own insufficiency and unworthiness: John the Baptist declares that he is not worthy to wash Jesus’ feet, the centurion says that he is not worthy of Jesus entering his house. 1.1.3 Πρέπον: “Appropriate” Rufinus translates terms connected to τὸ πρέπον, “what is appropriate” or “convenient”, with derivatives of dignus in his version of Eusebius, Hist. 4.17.12; 7.28.1; Gregory, Orat. 6.7; 41.11); Origen, Hom.36Ps. 2.1, and in passages from Basil’s homilies, namely Hom. Attende tibi 8; Hom. Destruam horrea mea 6; Hom. On Proverbs 16. An expression with a similar meaning is ὡς εἰς οἰκεῖον, “as appropriate to”, “proper of”, that Rufinus translates as dignum in Origen, Hom.36Ps. 2.5. The adjective θεοπρεπῆς, “appropriate to God”, is translated by Rufinus as deo dignus, “worthy of God”, in Eusebius, Hist. 3.24.3–4, 4.15.14; Sextus, Sent. 131; Basil, Hom. On Faith 2. In the Emperor Justinian’s Epistle to Mena, Patriarch of Constantinople, written in 543, there is a passage, namely 210.21, that is considered by contemporary editors of De Principiis to be a witness for Princ. 1.2.10.16 Justinian has τι τῶν πρεπόντων αὐτῷ, “some of the things that are appropriate to [God]”, where Rufinus has aliquid ex his … quae eum habere dignum erat, “some of the things fitting for [God] to have”. There are also many occurrences in 4th century Greek Christian literature of θεοπρεπὲς ἀξίωμα, “dignity appropriate to God”.17 This corroborates the connection between derivatives of πρέπον and derivatives of ἄξιος: in Fr.Lam. 19 ad 1:6, Origen speaks of the εὐπρέπεια καὶ ἀξίωμα, “majesty and dignity”, of the daughter of Sion, using the two nouns basically as synonyms.

14

Dignus also in the quotation of this passage in Rufinus’ version of Orig. Princ. 4.4.3. Dignus also in the quotation in Rufinus’ version of Greg.Naz. Orat. 39.9. 16 Fernández (2015): 196–197; Behr (2017): 58. 17 Greg.Nyss. Or.Cat. 24.5; 27.6; Eus.Caes. Eccl.theol. 1.20.1; Orig. Fr.Luc. 55 ad 3:16. 15

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Part I: Linguistic Issues

1.2 Greek Terms That Rufinus and Jerome Translate as Dignitas 1.2.1 ’Αξίωμα and ἀξία: “Worth” Together with other substantives such as ἀξίωσις,18 ἀξίωμα is presented as a possible equivalent to dignitas by 5th–6th century Latin authors such as Priscianus (Inst. 18.1.4) and Fulgentius (Mythol. 2.14).19 Modern lexicons and encyclopaedias also suggest ἀξίωμα or ἀξία as the closest Greek equivalents to dignitas, followed by δόξα (“glory”) and τιμή (“honour”).20 In Jerome, only one occurrence of dignitas can be traced back with certainty to ἀξία: it is found in Hom.Jer. 1.7.21 On the other hand, in Rufinus the correlation between dignitas and ἀξία or ἀξίωμα appears in a variety of contexts, where the term refers to different divine or human subjects. For example, in Basil, Hom. On Faith 2, dignitas refers to the dignity (ἀξία) of divine nature, that is not diminished by the fact that Christ lowered himself to humanity for the purposes of salvation,22 while in Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 16.8,15, dignitas refers to the prelapsarian dignity (ἀξίωμα) of humanity.23 Otherwise, in Gregory, Orat. 2.14, it is said that those who hold a position of power should take care to excel for their virtue as much as they excel for their political rank or ἀξίωμα, a term that Rufinus specifies in his translation as humana dignitas, “worldly dignity”.24 In Gregory, Orat. 39.14, people are invited to subject themselves to the ministers of faith, especially those who outrank them in some way (ἀξίᾳ τινί, dignitate aliqua … vel sapientia). In Basil, Ep. 46.3, it is said that the life of the unmarried maid, or “the dignity (ἀξίωμα/dignitas) of virginity”, has deserved high praise from the Apostle Paul himself. In Gregory, Orat. 2.106, dignitas translates another derivative of ἄξιος: “the credibility of prophecy” (τῆς προφητείας τὸ ἀξιόπιστον) is translated by Rufinus as “prophetic dignity” (dignitati propheticae). Finally, in Gregory, Orat. 6.10, a sentence indicating that there should have never been a separation among the priests, and they should have never lost their “old dignity (ἀξίωμα) and ornament

18

The noun ἀξίωσις in Origen does not mean “dignity”, but rather “prayer” or “request”, mostly addressed by human beings to God, cf. Cels. 8.13; Orat. 5.2; 14.2; 15.1; 18.3. 19 Cf. Ambr.Med. Exp.118Ps. 22.14: sed quia Graecus habet: ‘εἰσέλθοι τὸ ἀξίωμά μου’ (Ps 118:170a), hoc est ‘dignitas mea’. 20 See TLL ad loc.; Dürig, s.v. “Dignitas”, in Klauser (1957): 1031–1032; Großmann, s.v. “Würde”, in Ueding (2009): 1459. For Rankine (2017): 22–24, “Abstract forms of ἄξιος” are the closest parallel to dignitas, followed by “a complex of words having to do with appearances”, especially derivatives of the stem doc/dec-, such as δόξα, “glory”, and decorum, “seemliness”. For dignitas and decorum see also section 6.4. 21 This text will be discussed in section 4.1. 22 For the theme of the dignity of God in Origen see chapter 4. 23 For this text see section 8.1. 24 For the negative view of humana dignitas see section 3.1.

Chapter 1: Comparison with Greek Terms

15

(καλλώπισμα)”, is rendered by Rufinus as: “the grace of our concord should never have been tainted by the indignity (indignitate) of separation”. However, ἀξίωμα is not consistently translated with dignitas by Rufinus: there are plenty of occurrences of ἀξίωμα (and ἀξία as well) that are translated with other terms, despite indicating a status of distinction and power, just as in the passages where the word is translated with dignitas. For example, the same juxtaposition ὕψος καὶ ἀξίωμα, “sublimity and dignity”, of a ruler or specifically of God, is translated by Rufinus in three different ways in the same speech by Gregory, and only in one of those instances ἀξίωμα is translated as dignitas. Namely, in Orat. 2.10 we find spes et gloria, “hope and glory”; in Orat. 2.109: magnificentia et dignitas, “magnificence and dignity”; finally in Orat. 2.76: “the greatness, the sublimity, the dignity, and the pure natures” (ἡ μεγαλειότης, καὶ τὸ ὕψος, καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα, καὶ αἱ καθαραὶ φύσεις) is translated as “the sublimity of the celestial creatures and the purity of those above” (altitudo caelestium et puritas supernorum). Thus, it is not possible to identify specific contexts or meanings attributed to the words ἀξίωμα in the Greek text that lead Rufinus consistently to recognise the word as an equivalent to dignitas: often he uses dignitas to translate ἀξίωμα, but sometimes he does not. Instead, in the Latin translations of extant Greek texts by the Cappadocians which will be discussed in chapter 8, dignitas is almost exclusively a translation of ἀξίωμα or ἀξία. A contemporary of Rufinus, namely Eustathius, translated for a deaconess called Syncletica25 the Homilies on the Hexameron, delivered by Basil of Caesarea around 378. Augustine made use of this translation in his De Genesi ad litteram (cf. 1.18.36), and Eustathius remained well-known through the Middle Ages: his translation was praised by Cassiodorus (Inst. 1.1.1) around 560, and was mentioned by the English monk Bede in the preface to his On Genesis, written around 720. When referring to rational creatures, dignitas is used by Eustathius to indicate the social prestige of pagan philosophers (Hom.Hex. 3.8, translating ἀξίωμα), or the ranks of angels (Hom.Hex. 9.6, translating ἀξίωμα; Hom.Hex. 2.5, translating ἀξία). Later, in an anonymous collection of translated texts by Gregory of Nazianzus and Basil of Caesarea, made in the mid-6th-century possibly in northern Italy and preserved in cod. Laurentianus Marcianus 584, dignitas corresponds most of the times to ἀξία26 or to ἀξίωμα,27 and then once to ἀρχαί, the “authorities” or “magistrates” (Basil, Ep. 214.2), once to τιμή, “honour” (Gregory, Orat. 45.2), and once to τὸ ὁμότιμον, the “equal honour” of the Father and the Son (Basil, Ep. 52.2). Another example is Dionysius Exiguus. In the first half of the 6th century, 25

For the identification of Eustathius, cf. Altaner (1940), who believes that the addressee could be the same Syncletica praised by the poet Sedulius in his Epistle to Macedonius. For Basil’s exegetical methodology in the Homilies on the Hexaemeron, cf. Drecoll (2017). 26 Basil.Caes. Ep. 236.1,3,4,7; Greg.Naz. Orat. 19.8,9,15; 45.1,2. 27 Basil.Caes. Ep. 236.3; Greg.Naz. Orat. 19.5,11,13.

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Part I: Linguistic Issues

Dionysius translated for Eugippius, the abbot of Lucullanum (near Naples), the treatise On the Creation of Humankind (De opificio hominis)28 which Gregory of Nyssa wrote in 379 with the objective of completing and supplementing Basil’s Homilies on the Hexameron. In Dionysius’ translation, most occurrences of dignitas correspond to ἀξία οr ἀξίωμα.29 1.2.2 Other Terms Indicating Worldly Status and Political Power In many texts translated by Rufinus or Jerome, dignitas denotes either a highly regarded public office or the elevated social status of its holder.30 This was the most frequent understanding of dignitas at the time of Rufinus and Jerome, not only in the theological and exegetical writings examined in this book but also in the legal language of the 4th and 5th centuries. This is demonstrated for instance by the Notitia dignitatum31 or by the sixth book of the Theodosian code,32 where the term dignitates refers to military and civil ranks. In this sense, the basic understanding of dignitas as part of a social hierarchy – with particular reference to the Roman ruling class of senatorial rank – remained relatively stable from the time of Cicero33 to the time of Rufinus and Jerome. The rules of the competition to achieve dignitas were different in Late Antiquity from what was presented by Cicero, because the access to dignitas was not anymore based primarily on the social and political credit accrued by the individual and their family within the aristocracy itself, but was now also largely regulated by the Emperor.34 Nevertheless, the pursuit of dignitas was still as much the cornerstone of the identity of the Roman aristocracy (both pagan and Christian) in the late 4th century AD as it was in the 1st century BC.35 The texts translated by Jerome and especially Rufinus often convey very critical views on this value system centred on dignitas. For instance. in Hom.Jer. 12.8 Origen argues that most people are puffed up with pride based on vain categories, such as their privileged social status or their political power 28 For this translation, cf. Levine (1958). For an overview on Dionysius Exiguus’ activity as a translator, cf. Gallagher (2002): 1–9. For De opificio hominis, cf. Behr (1999); Ramelli (2013b). For the reception of Alexandrine exegesis (namely Origen and Philo) in Gregory, cf. Scognamiglio (2002). For the way Gregory envisions the relationship between his work and Basil’s Homilies on the Hexaemeron, as well as the legacy of Origen, cf. Ross (2021). 29 These will be presented in section 8.3. 30 Garnsey (1970): 224, “It is often impossible to separate the various shades of meaning possessed by the word: the office itself, the prestige that is acquired through office, the rank in society that an office holder attains to, the quality of his life”. 31 For the composition and dating of this document, cf. Clemente (2010). 32 For instance in Cod.theod. 6.2.13; 6.3.12, and 6.6.1; see section 3.4 in this study. 33 See section 6.1. 34 Cf. Choda, de Leeuw, and Schulz (2020), especially the essay by Rollinger (pp. 36– 72). For the centrality of the Emperor in the Notitia dignitatum, cf. Neira Faleiro (2003). 35 As demonstrated by studies like Salzman (2002), Dillon (2015), and Rebenich (2019).

Chapter 1: Comparison with Greek Terms

17

(ἐξουσία, translated by Jerome as potestas), or “because they have acquired what is called by themselves success (τὴν παρ’ἀυτοῖς καλουμένην προκοπήν) to the point that they can cut people’s heads off”. Jerome translates this latter sentence as: “because, as they themselves believe, they have such splendid dignity (dignitas) that they can behead whomever they want”. The term προκοπή means “progress”, and Jerome normally translates it as profectus, as in Hom.Jer. 14.10, but it may be connected with dignity when it refers to an advancement in one’s political or ecclesiastical career, as in Hom.Jer. 1.10: ὅσον προκόπτομεν, “to the extent that we progress” in our earthly lives, in Jerome, “if we were endowed (praediti) with some dignity (aliqua … dignitate)”. In Hom.Jer. 12.8, προκοπή indicates a deceptive and violent kind of societal progress, leading to the accumulation of clout and political power, which Jerome chooses to render with dignitas. Other equally vain reasons to feel valued and dignified listed in Hom.Jer. 12.8 include the “worldly dignities” (κοσμικὰ ἀξιώματα) of the ancestors – translated by Jerome as “to be born of noble families” – as well as “wealth, not the true one but the one below”, but also Christian values such as wisdom, chastity or martyrdom. The idea that even dignitas as ecclesiastical rank is pointless without merit is also expressed in Hom.Jer. 11.3, where Origen stigmatises the priests who do not “‘profit’ from their ‘offices’ (κλῆροι, Jer 12:13), nor honour them”. Kλῆρος means “allotment”, “inheritance”, “province, area of competence”, but can also indicate the Christian “clergy”. In Jerome’s translation, those unworthy priests do not gain fruit from their holy order (ex ordine), nor do they honour “their dignity” (suae dignitati). Very similar arguments on the dignity of priesthood are in Jerome’s own Comm.Jer. 3 ad 12:13a and in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Hom.Lev. 6.6:36 both texts include dignitas. This reemphasises the in Origen’s view uncompromising point that pride is always degrading regardless of its cause: as will be shown in section 3.1, dignity as social status is part of a system of external recognition that only appears to attribute worth to human beings, but in fact it is empty and meaningless. As for Rufinus, he employs the language of Roman statesmanship, including dignitas, to convey the dismissal of worldly values he finds in the original Greek text. In Hom. Attende tibi 5, Basil’s Greek list of vain hopes and futile dreams includes “the splendours of life (περιφανείας βίου), illustrious marriages, prosperous offspring, long life, honours (τιμάς) from everybody”. Rufinus clarifies that “the splendours of life” mentioned by Basil are in fact a shining political career, indicated by dignitas: “excellent dignities (excelsas dignitates), illustrious marriage, prosperous offspring, long life, homage (obsequia) from subjects, service from clients”. Basil reminds the audience of those who spent their lives “in splendours” (ἐν ταῖς ... περιφανείαις), which Rufinus translates as “those who shone with rank and power”, lit. “with 36

See section 3.2.

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Part I: Linguistic Issues

dignities of power” (potentiae dignitatibus). Basil asks what became of those who held political power (οἱ τὰς πολιτικὰς δυναστείας); Rufinus’ translation expands and contextualises Basil’s reference to a brilliant political career with symbols of status and public office that were familiar to Rufinus’ readership of noble Roman Christians, such as the fasces or the clientele: “Where are their fasces now? Where are the magistrates? Where are the badges of various dignities (diversarum infulae dignitatum)?”.37 Rufinus’ translation of the homily indicates a breach with the Roman ideal: all the signs of power and accomplishment that were valued in Roman society, such as dignitas, are in fact unable to stand the test of time. Dignitas may also just be a descriptor of someone’s social standing, without an immediately negative connotation. This is the case for example with the anonymous translation of Origen, Comm.ser.Matt. 61,38 concerning the leaders of the Church who are tasked with administrating the goods and properties of the Church according to the needs of their communities. These leaders are invited to take into consideration the dignitas of each member of the community when distributing resources to those in need (unicuique secundum dignitatem uniuscuiusque subministremus). In this case, dignitas is presented in the text as the way in which each person has been brought up by their families (uniuscuiusque dignitatem quomodo educatus est): for Origen, Church leaders need to take into account the fact that a person who was brought up in a wellto-do family and then lost their wealth has different needs compared with someone who grew up in poverty. The neutral sense of dignitas as “social class” is also the meaning of ἀξίωμα as temporal status in some passages by Origen such as Comm.Jo. 13.58.396 or Comm.Matt. 15.35, where the term describes the higher social position, compared with the other characters in the pericope, of the royal official in John 4:46–54 or of the landowner in Matt 20, respectively, without any explicit negative connotation. In Rufinus’ translations, this neutral use of dignitas is found for example in Clem.Recogn. 1.46.4, where the term denotes the ranks of a king, prophet, or priest, or Basil.Reg. 79.5, where eminentia dignitatis, “excellence of dignity”, indicates the superiority in rank of a king in relation to one of his soldiers. A further example is Rufinus’ translation of Hist. 8.5, where Eusebius tells of a Christian martyr in Nicomedia. In order to point out the impact of his highprofile testimony, Eusebius says that the martyr is “one of those who are by no means obscure, but are the most highly honoured (ἄγαν … ἐνδοξοτάτων) for what this world deems to be excellencies (κατὰ τὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ νενομισμένας ὑπεροχάς)”. Rufinus translates this sentence as “one of the nobles, illustrious for the honour and the dignity of this world (honore et dignitate saeculi)”. Here, Rufinus employs a language specific to Roman politics (honor, dignitas, 37 38

Cf. Moreschini (2004): 463; Lo Cicero (2008): 177–209. For this translation in the context of 5th century Arianism, cf. Tondini (2023): 81–125.

Chapter 1: Comparison with Greek Terms

19

nobilis) to qualify the societal status of this martyr, and uses the juxtaposition honore et dignitate to translate ὑπεροχάς, meaning “superiorities, pre-eminences”. The term ὑπεροχή was associated by Origen with ἀξίωμα as social status in Comm.Jo. 28.23.209; 32.12.133.

1.3 Conclusions Evidence suggests that when we encounter dignus or digne in Origen’s Latin output, it is quite safe to assume that in the vast majority of cases (but not all!) these terms translate ἄξιος, ἀξίως, κατ’ἀξίαν or similar expressions meaning “worthy”. In general, these terms indicate some sort of correspondence, for example between punishment (or reward) and fault (or merit). The direct correlation between the adjective dignus (and derivatives) and ἄξιος (and derivatives) is much clearer than with possible equivalents of dignitas, if only because in Rufinus and Jerome there are many more occurrences of dignus than of dignitas. Moreover, unlike dignus which had a more generic meaning in the Latin language, dignitas was at the time of Rufinus and Jerome highly codified as a political value specific to the Roman world, which has no precise parallels in Greek.39 This does not mean that the Greek-speaking world had no familiarity with this notion whatsoever: after all, areas like Greece, the Near East, or Egypt had been part of the Roman Empire for centuries and, as discussed in section 1.2.2, dignitas was often found for example in imperial laws. The impact of dignitas in the Greek-speaking part of the empire and the way this Roman notion may have been communicated for example in the legal language could be the object of future studies; as far as the translations of Greek Christian authors made by Rufinus and Jerome are concerned, it is not possible to identify a specific Greek term equivalent to dignitas. Given that the adjective ἄξιος appears to be by far the best candidate to serve as an equivalent to dignus, it would seem likely that derivatives of ἄξιος such as the neutral noun ἀξίωμα and the feminine ἀξία (meaning “worth” or “dignity”) correspond to the feminine noun dignitas. In fact, the correlation between dignitas and ἀξίωμα in Jerome’s and Rufinus’ translations is not exact, as sometimes dignitas is used to translate terms other than ἀξίωμα. The seventeen total occurrences of dignitas in Jerome’s or Rufinus’ translations of extant Greek texts correspond to various Greek words. In the case of the translations made by Jerome, dignitas corresponds once to ἀξία (Origen, Hom.Jer. 1.7),

39 Griffin (2017): 48. In this sense, dignitas is similar to another key term of the Roman value system and statesmanship, which was later attributed a new role in Latin Christian literature, namely auctoritas, cf. Pollmann (2014): auctoritas, like dignitas, does not have a specific Greek counterpart but is sometimes used by Latin authors to translate ἀξίωμα.

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once to τιμή, “honour” (Hom.Jer. 14.16),40 once to προκοπή, “progress” (Hom.Jer. 12.8, cf. Hom.Jer. 1.10), and once to κλῆρος, “allotment” or “office” (Hom.Jer. 11.3). In the case of the occurrences of dignitas in the translations made by Rufinus: – Five can be traced back to ἀξίωμα (Basil of Caesarea, Ep. 46.3; Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 2.14,109; 16.8,15), two to ἀξία (Basil, Hom. On Faith 2; Gregory, Orat. 39.14, where ἀξία is translated as dignitas vel sapientia), one to τὸ ἀξιόπιστον (Gregory, Orat. 2.106). – One to ὁμο-τιμία, “same honour” (Basil, Hom. Attende tibi 6, as dignitas culmenque).41 – One to ὑπεροχή, “pre-eminence” (Eusebius of Caesarea, Hist. 8.5, as honor et dignitas). – In Rufinus’ translation of Basil, Hom. Attende tibi 5, excelsae dignitates and potentiae dignitates correspond to περιφανείαι, meaning “social distinctions”. When it is possible to single out in Rufinus’ translations (as examined in this chapter) a specific word that was translated with dignitas, the Greek word is in fact in the majority of the cases (eight out of twelve) a derivative of ἄξιος such as ἀξίωμα or ἀξία. Hence, at least in Late Antique Latin translations of Greek Christian authors, ἀξίωμα or ἀξία appear as the most frequent correlation for dignitas.

40 The connection between “honour” and “dignity” in the translations of Origen will be examined in section 2.1. 41 For this passage see section 2.1.

Chapter 2

Terms Associated with Dignity in Rufinus’ Translations of Origen Section 1.2 has shown that the Greek passages regarding a high status both in the Church and in society often feature, together with the term that Jerome or Rufinus translate with dignitas, also other expressions indicating glory (derivatives of δόξα such as ἔνδοξος in Eusebius, Hist. 8.5), authority (ἐξουσία in Origen, Hom.Jer. 12.8), and political power (derivatives of δύναμις such as δυναστεία in Basil’s Hom. Attende tibi 5). Sections 3.1–2 concern the occurrences of dignitas in passages concerning status, external recognition, and public office in Rufinus’ and Jerome’s translations of Origen. Some of these passages present a similar cluster of terms, pairing dignitas with nouns denoting “power” or “leadership”, such as potestas or principatus, “leadership”. These nouns are not necessarily synonyms of dignitas, but they are paired with dignitas to convey similar meanings. For example, in Rufinus’ translation of Hom.Judic. 3.1, the sentence condemning those who “rush towards the powers and the dignities of this world (ad potestates atque ad dignitates saeculi)” refers to the pursuit of public offices as a way to attain power and prestige: the notion of political and social rank is expressed in this sentence by both dignitates and potestates. Dignitas and potestas also serve a similar purpose in Jerome’s translations of Hom.Ezech. 9.5 – “Nothing exalts one to arrogance like [...] high rank and power (dignitas quoque et potestas)” – and Hom.Isa. 6.1, where the ecclesiastical offices are indicated collectively as dignitates et principatus et ministeria ecclesiae. When dignitas retains its traditional meaning of public office or elevated social and political status in this world, thus, it may be partly interchangeable with these other terms in the Latin translations of Origen. The objective of this chapter is to assess whether this is also the case when dignitas is used to translate Origen’s discourse on the progress of the rational creatures as triggered by their freedom of choice (which will be the main focus of sections 3.3–4), or if, when employed in this context, dignitas assumes a distinctive and irreplaceable meaning and function. For this purpose, this chapter will take into consideration Latin nouns that are close in meaning to dignitas as social rank, such as honor, potestas, or status, and assess what each of these terms means in each different context where it occurs.

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2.1 Honour Honor and dignitas were often connected in Roman political language, as they both could indicate a public office or social distinction. The connection between honour and dignity is also present in Greek authors, where terms such as τιμή or τίμιον, which may be considered the closest equivalents to the Latin term honor, often appear in Greek texts together with derivatives of ἄξιος such as ἀξία to denote markers of external recognition such as honour and respect.1 In most cases, τιμή is translated by Jerome as honor, as for example in Matt 13:57 and John 5:23. However, there are some instances where τιμή or derivatives are translated as dignitas. In his version of Origen, Hom.Jer. 14.16, Jerome translates τιμὴ ἐκκλησιαστική, “ecclesiastical rank” (the text mentions for instance the rank of presbyter or bishop), as ecclesiae dignitas, “dignity of the church”. Another example of this type of wording is Rufinus’ translation of Pamphilus, Apol.Orig. 16: presbyterii dignitate in Ecclesia honoratus est; Origen “was honoured in the Church with the dignity of presbyter”. Dignus or dignitas rarely translate derivatives of τιμή in Rufinus: one of the few examples is Rufinus’ version of Basil, Hom. Attende tibi 6, a text stating that human beings, made according to the image of God, may reach by good behaviour the “same honour” as angels.2 Here, Rufinus translates ὁμοτιμία, a derivative of τιμή meaning “same honour”, as dignitas culmenque, “dignity and height”. In this context, derivatives of ἄξιος and of τιμή are perceived by Basil as close in meaning: sometimes Basil expresses the notion that human beings may progress until they achieve the dignity of angels, which in Hom. Attende tibi 6 he had described as ὁμοτιμία, by using instead ἀξία, as in Hom.Hex. 9.6: “the perfect human is elevated to the dignity (ἀξία) of angels”. There are instances where Rufinus translates ἀξίωμα as honor. For example, the Greek text of Hom.36Ps. 1.23 mentions those who “went about all puffed up” (περιεπάτουν πεφυσιωμένοι) because they achieved a high rank in society (ἐν ἀξιώμασι γεγένηνται), which Rufinus translates as honoribus tumidi, “swollen with honours”. The close connection between honor and dignitas that these examples show does not mean, however, that the two Latin terms are interchangeable for Rufinus, as is revealed by the analysis of the occurrences of honor in his translation of Origen’s De Principiis. As will be shown in sections 3.3–4, among the works by Origen which have been translated into Latin, the theme of the progress of rational creatures is mainly explored in the texts 1 Cf. Philo, Opif. 37; Sacr. 16, also with εὔκλεια, “glory”; Plutarch, Is.Os. 354B, or Gregory of Nyssa, Mos. 48.309; Adv.Eun. 1.43.317, 1.44.335. 2 The term ὁμοτιμία can also be used by Basil in reference to human nature itself, for instance in Ep. 262.1: “I know that, in regards to their nature, in each human being there is equality in honour with the rest of them”, despite the differences in social status. 3 For this passage see section 10.1.

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translated by Rufinus, especially in De Principiis and to a lesser extent in the Commentary on Romans. So, this preliminary terminological investigation of honor, potestas, and gloria mainly focuses on these two works. Most occurrences of honor in De Principiis translate εἰς τιμήν in 2Tim 2:20– 21 as in honorem, “for honour”, as opposed to εἰς ἀτιμίαν or in contumeliam, “for reproach” (Princ. 2.9; 3.1).4 There is only a handful of occurrences of honor that are not from a biblical quote. Namely, honor indicates the blessedness shared among the angels (Princ. 1.5.4), or the splendid signs of gratitude and appreciation that Mordecai received from king Artaxerxes (Princ. 3.2.4). Finally, both in Rufinus’ and in Jerome’s version of Princ. praef. 4, there is a reference to the “dignity (dignitas) and honour (honor)” of the Holy Spirit: here, the two terms are used as synonyms, to denote the rank of the Spirit compared to the other hypostases of the Trinity. Thus, in his translation of De Principiis, Rufinus does not attribute to honor a specific and recurring meaning as related to the rational creatures in a theological context.5 In Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s Commentary on Romans, when honor refers to human beings and it is not part of a biblical quotation,6 it may denote a prestigious public office (Comm.Rom. 6.9.5; 10.12.2), specifically within the Church (Comm.Rom. 2.2.1), or the respect and admiration given by the community to those who perform the office (Comm.Rom. 10.17). Expressions such as saecularis honor or honores saeculi are often used in the pejorative sense of social status and prestigious offices in this world.7 In this context, dignitas and honor are very close in meaning: for instance Comm.Rom. 7.6.6 presents both honor and dignitas negatively as worldly pursuit. When used in a positive sense, however, honor may convey theological meanings relating to the creatures, most notably in Comm.Rom. 2.5.6, where Origen, commenting on the mention in Rom 2:7,10 of “those who seek glory and honour”, draws a parallel with the reference in Ps 48:13 to a past time where human beings were “in honour”. For Origen, Ps 48:13 (“Human beings, when they were in honour, did not understand; they were compared to mindless cattle, and have become like them”) indicates that worthy human beings aspire to recover the “honour” of the close relationship with God that creatures enjoyed before original sin (illum 4 Cf. Orig Princ. 1.5.5: ἐν τιμῇ in Isa 14:18(LXX) as in honore; Princ. 3.1.6: δόξα and τιμή in Rom 2:7,10 as gloria and honor respectively. 5 A survey of the few occurrences in the translation of De Principiis of other nouns related to dignitas as elevated social status (such as excellentia, eminentia, or magnitudo) yields similar results: none of these terms is consistently used by Rufinus to express a unique and recognisable aspect of Origen’s thought. 6 In Rufinus’ translation of the Commentary on Romans, honor translates τιμή in quotes from Rom 2:7,10; 9:21; 12:10, and 13:7; Col 2:23, Ps 48:13, and Isa 11:10; cf. Comm.Rom. 2.5 (especially Comm.Rom. 2.5.6); 7.17; 9.7; 9.42.8, and 10.8.4. Honor translates δόξα in Rom 15:7 and in Mal 1:6; cf. Comm.Rom. 7.2; 10.7. 7 Cf. Orig. Comm.Rom. 9.15.1; 10.12.2; see sections 1.2.2; 3.1.

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quem habebat in paradiso antequam peccaret honorem quo Dei vocem merebatur audire). Although Origen often quotes Ps 48:13, the notion of the prelapsarian blessedness of the creatures is more frequently expressed in Rufinus’ translations of Origen as status.8

2.2 Power The term potentia never refers to the creatures in Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis, but always to the power of God: one example is Princ. 4.1.7, where potentia translates δύναμις in 2Cor 4:7 (“The superior power belongs to God”). Instead, the related term potestas may either translate ἐξουσία in scriptural quotes9 or be used independently to denote the power or authority that someone has over someone or something else. For example, potestas refers to the power that sin – alternatively called “death” and identified with the “last enemy” defeated by Christ (1Cor 15:26), i.e. the devil – holds over those who choose to yield to it.10 Alternatively, potestas indicates the power that Christ holds over sin/death, as in Comm.Rom. 5.10.6. Potestas also has a distinct meaning referring to the creatures, denoting the faculty of freedom of choice. In Princ. 3.1, we find (liberi) arbitrii potestas or arbitrii libertas in Rufinus and τὸ αὐτεξούσιον in the Philocalia. So, potestas, unlike honor or gloria,11 is frequently used by Rufinus in reference to a specific anthropological notion by Origen.12 Freedom of choice is never referred to in Rufinus’ translations as dignitas, and in general the two terms are not normally used in the translations of Origen as synonyms, as dignity is regarded by Rufinus as related to but different from power: Comm.Rom. 7.3.3: There is, besides, that dignity of co-heirs of Christ (illa dignitas coheredum Christi), that certainly the Father ‘gave all judgment to the Son’ (John 5:22). But also to his co-heirs the Son says, ‘And you will sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel’ (Matt 19:28). And in this way Christ leads his co-heirs not only into a share of the inheritance, but also into a participation in his power (in consortium potestatis).

8

See section 2.4. Rom 9:21: Princ. 3.1.7,21,24; Comm.Rom. 7.17. John 10:18: Princ. 4.4.4; Comm.Rom. 5.1.19; 5.10.6. Luke 10:19: Comm.Rom. 5.8.9; 10.37.4. 1Cor 7:4: Comm.Rom. 1.1.2. Cf. Princ. 3.2.1,4 (πνεῦμα τοῦ ἐξουσιάζοντος in Eccl 10:4 as spiritus potestatem habentis). 10 Orig. Comm.Rom. 5.1.32; 5.3.7; 5.7.8; 6.9.4. For the “last enemy” cf. Princ. 3.6.5–6 (see my section 3.3.1); Orat. 25.1. 11 Examined in sections 2.1 and 2.3, respectively. 12 For potestas (liberi) arbitrii (“freedom of choice”) see Orig. Princ. 3.1.6–7; 3.2.4; Comm.Rom. 8.11.4,7; 9.3.3 (cf. Princ. 2.3.4; Comm.Rom. 6.3.3). For in nostra potestate, in sua potestate, in potestate habere (“what is in our/their own power”), cf. Princ. praef. 5; Princ. 1.8.3; 3.1.1,3,5–6,8,15; 3.2.3; Comm.Rom. 6.1.4; 6.4.2; 7.8.2–6; 7.16.4; 8.8.6; 9.3.8. 9

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The acquisition of potestas is framed in this text, which will be discussed in section 3.3.2, as a consequence of the acquisition of dignitas, meaning that as the saints deserve the “dignity” or “rank” of co-heirs of Christ, they also acquire a share in his “power” or “faculty” to judge souls.13 Although this passage certainly refers to a positive dignitas, the use of this term in Comm.Rom. 7.3.3 presents many aspects in common with the passages on worldly dignitas,14 meaning that dignitas is here presented as a status above others, entailing the faculty to exert power (potestas) over others in order to perform an office, in this case the office of judge. Even if the context is entirely different, the dignitas of the judges of souls is not that distant from political dignitas as presented, for instance, in Jerome’s translation of Origen, Hom.Jer. 12.8, where people who possess dignitas have the faculty (potestas) to have someone else killed, if they wish.15 In Rufinus’ translation of Comm.Rom. 7.3.3, the dignitas of coheirs of Christ is presented in markedly political terms: only those who are officially invested by the supreme authority (i.e. Christ) with dignitas are allowed to rightfully exercise the potestas of judging other people on his behalf, whereas, as stated in Comm.Rom. 9.36.5, human beings are not normally allowed the faculty to judge a fellow human being (potestas fratri iudicandi). In turn, the plural form potestates is mainly used in biblical quotations, translating ἐξουσίαι. Potestates refers to human rulers in the context of the interpretation of Rom 13:1–3, especially in Comm.Rom. 9.25–28.16 In most other cases, potestates denotes a specific category of heavenly beings, in reference to the various orders of angelic powers enumerated in Col 1:16 (“In him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or powers”).17 In the translation of Princ. 1.5.3 (ad potestatem istam dignitatemque and potestates istas ac dignitates et glorias), dignitas in the sense of the high rank awarded to some creatures (such as the heavenly powers or the saints) as a consequence of their merit is associated with potestas, as well as gloria.18 Although in Princ. 1.5.3 dignitas/dignitates and potestas/potestates are not clearly differentiated in the context of the hierarchies of heavenly beings, in texts such as Princ. 1.8.4 it is clarified that their meaning is in fact not the same. Rather, the rank of potestates is presented as a specific kind of dignitas: Col 1:16 is interpreted as indicating that depending on the degree of their merit, some heavenly beings are awarded the rank or dignitas of “powers” (potestates or ἐξουσίαι), others the rank of “rulers” 13

Cf. Orig. Comm.Rom. 4.1.4: “The saints and the righteous … receive potestas from God for passing judgment upon visible human works”. 14 See sections 1.2.2; 3.1; 6.1. 15 For this text see section 1.2.2. 16 Cf. Orig. Comm.Rom. 3.5.3: de humanis potestatibus; Comm.Rom. 6.7.11: Romanorum potestas as “the Roman government”. 17 Orig. Princ. 1.5.1–3; 1.6.2; 1.7.1; 1.8.2–4; 2.6.1; 2.9.4–5; 4.3.14; 4.4.3. 18 For this passage see section 3.4.

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(principatus or ἀρχαὶ), others the rank of “dominions” (dominationes or κυριότητες). Potestas or potestates may also be used to refer to another kind of immortal beings, i.e. “the enemy powers”, the demons, in reference to the evil ἐξουσίαι mentioned in several NT passages such as 1Cor 15:24, Eph 2:2, Eph 6:12, and Col 2:15.19 In a similar fashion, the nouns princeps and principatus are mainly used in Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis to refer to the rulers (ἀρχαὶ) mentioned in Colossians (denoting a specific rank of heavenly beings) and Ephesians (meaning the devil and his angels; cf. the “prince of Tyrus”, Ezek 28:12), whereas the noun dominatio is only used in reference to creatures in De Principiis when interpreting Col 1:16.

2.3 Glory Apart from the aforementioned passage Princ. 1.5.3, where gloriae is associated with potestates and dignitates in reference to the ranks of the angels, in Rufinus’ version of De Principiis there are no occurrences of the plural gloriae. Instead, the singular gloria is primarily used by Rufinus to translate the noun δόξα in biblical verses in a variety of contexts and meanings.20 Most of these verses refer to the glory of Christ;21 other occurrences of gloria, mainly in the eschatological chapter Princ. 3.6, refer to the resurrected body, following the terminology in 1Cor 15:43 (“[The body] is raised in glory”).22 One of these occurrences of gloria of the resurrected body is associated with dignitas: in Princ. 2.10.3, Origen argues that at the resurrection each soul will be given an immortal body, but the kind of body that one receives depends on individual merit, meaning that those who are judged worthy of joining the kingdom of heaven will be given a suitable spiritual body, whereas those who need to go through punishment will receive a body that is lower in rank and can withstand the fire of punishment.23 In this regard, Origen observes that there is a correspondence between the dignity that each soul achieved in their life and the rank and glory of the body that the soul receives at the resurrection (pro uniuscuiusque vitae atque animae dignitate etiam gloria corporis et dignitas dabitur). So, in the context of the depiction of the resurrected body in Princ. 2.10.3 Rufinus 19

Princ. 1.8.4; 2.8.1,3; 2.11.6; 3.1.23; 3.2.1,4–6; 3.4.1; 4.3.12; Comm.Rom. 1.18.6; 2.5.3; 3.5.3; 5.1.33; 5.10.11; 6.7.13; 7.12.2,5,11; 7.13.9; 10.15.3–4. 20 Rom 8:21: Princ. 1.7.5; 3.5.1. 1Cor 15:41: Princ. 2.9.3,5; 2.10.2. Col 3:4: Princ. 4.4.4. Matt 4:8: Princ. 4.3.1. Ps 44:14: Princ. 4.3.14. 21 1Cor 2:7–8: Princ. 3.3.1–2; 4.2.4,6. 2Cor 3:18: Princ. 1.1.2. Heb 1:3: Princ. 1.2.5,7– 8. Matt 16:27: Princ. 2.6.3. John 17:5: Princ. 3.5.6; 4.3.13. Isa 6:3: Princ. 4.3.14. Wis 7:25: Princ. 1.2.5,9–10. For the gloria of Christ (outside of a biblical quote) cf. Princ. 2.6.1. 22 Quoted in Orig. Princ. praef. 5; Princ. 2.10.1–3, and 3.6.6. 23 See section 3.3.1 for Origen’s views on the educational purpose of punishment and on the impermanence of the hierarchy established at the resurrection.

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does not establish a clear difference between gloria and dignitas. It may even be speculated that the two Latin terms dignitas and gloria in the expression gloria corporis et dignitas translate just one Greek term, possibly δόξα.24 The analysis of the occurrences of gloria in Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis shows that, although the term is used twice in close association with dignitas (in Princ. 1.5.3 and 2.10.3),25 gloria is not generally used in reference to the creatures, outside of the commentary on 1Cor 15:43. Origen, in Rufinus’ translation, reflects on how creatures may receive true gloria mainly in eschatological contexts, such as Comm.Rom. 4.8 or 7.4. There is no passage in Rufinus’ translations of De Principiis and of the Commentary on Romans where gloria is attributed directly to the nature of the rational creatures as established in their first creation (Gen 1:26–27), as is dignitas in Princ. 3.6.1, examined in chapter 5. Nor is gloria used to describe a present condition of the rational creation, such as the ranking of the various orders of the creatures based on merit, as is dignitas in the texts examined in section 3.4. Hence, a distinctive notion of the glory of the rational creature or the glory of humankind, which could be compared to dignity, does not emerge from Rufinus’ translations of Origen: of the more than 200 occurrences of gloria in Rufinus’ translation of the Commentary on Romans, the majority comes from a scriptural quote from passages on the glory of God or Christ such as Rom 1:23. However, when commenting on Rom 2:7 (“To those who by perseverance in good works seek for glory and honour and incorruption, eternal life”), Origen draws a connection between the glory of the Father and the glory that is available to all creatures through the participation in the Son: Comm.Rom. 2.5.5–6: The source of glory is the Father himself, from whom the ‘splendour of that glory’ (Heb 1:3), the Son, is generated, by participation in whom all creatures are said to have glory (cuius participatione omnes creaturae gloriam habere dicuntur), just as it is written about those who are of the resurrection, ‘there is one glory of the sun, another glory of the moon, another glory of the stars, and star differs from star in glory’ (1Cor 15:41). Therefore those who seek for the glory of the resurrection and for honour and incorruption, shall assuredly attain what is written, ‘The body is sown in dishonour, it will rise in glory. It is sown in corruption, it will rise in incorruption’ (1Cor 15:42–43). And so the one who searches for this glory and honour and incorruption through perseverance in good works will attain to eternal life. [...] That person honours the Father and the Son, then, who shows the proper honour and devotion to wisdom, justice, and truth, and to all things which Christ is said to be. Therefore, it is in this manner that those who are hastening to eternal life seek glory and honour and incorruption.

24

This is a common practice of Rufinus, cf. Prinzivalli (2015): 39–40. Another passage in the Latin translations of Origen where dignitas and gloria are not clearly differentiated is the anonymous translation of Comm.ser.Matt. 62, “[Christ] shares this kind of dignity and glory with his faithful and wise stewards, that they too might be over every creature and power”. Comm.ser.Matt. 62 will be further examined in section 3.3.2. 25

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The ideas emerging from the argument on gloria in Comm.Rom. 2.5 are key points also of Origen’s discourse on dignity. These key ideas are that perfection is made potentially available to all creatures, and that this potential may be activated by practicing all the virtues that are founded in the Son and thus attaining participation in him. The Son is the only one that can reflect the total glory of the Father; the rest of the rational creation derives from the Son a partial reflection of that glory (Comm.Jo. 32.28.353). So, gloria is not a synonym of dignitas in Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s discourse on the progress of rational creatures; however, since passages on gloria such as Comm.Rom. 2.5 convey views on the perfection available to the creatures which are also expressed in Origen’s passages on dignity, gloria may be considered part of the same “Wertetextur”,26 or value texture surrounding dignitas in Origen’s discourse on human progress.

2.4 Status Like dignitas – but unlike other terms such as potestas, gloria, or honor – status (meaning “condition”, “state”, or “position”) is not a term that Rufinus uses to translate Scripture. Moreover, like dignitas, status could be used by Rufinus to translate ἀξία,27 as is the case with the translation of Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 41.12, where the term denotes the different “rank” of human and divine nature as humble and glorious respectively. Like dignitas, status had a fairly well-established meaning in Roman political language: although status could be used to refer to social rank,28 it generally indicated a person’s legal status.29 So, while terms such as dignitas or nobilitas normally denoted positive and desirable things, status was a more neutral term, as, for example, it could be used both in reference to the condition of freeborn (status ingenuitatis, cf. Cod.theod. 2.7.3) and to the condition of slave (servilis status, cf. Cod.theod. 9.45.5). Conversely, there are no occurrences in Classical or Late Antique Latin texts of dignitas referring to an undesirable rank such as that of slave. Status generally has a neutral meaning also in Rufinus’ translations of Origen. For instance, in Hom.Jes.Nav. 13.2 the toponym “Libnah” (Jos 10:29) is interpreted as meaning “whiteness”; Origen reflects that whiteness can either be considered as a positive attribute (in connection to light) or it can have 26 Volp (2006): 55–61, employs this term to describe the connection of Roman values such as gloria, honor, dignitas, etc. to each other. 27 See section 1.2.1. Other Greek nouns that Rufinus translates as status are σύστασις, “constitution” in Greg.Naz. Orat. 2.36; ἕξις, “state” in Basil.Caes. Hom. Attende tibi 3, and ἡγεμονία in the sense of “government” in Eus.Caes. Hist 4.13.6. 28 Often in connection with dignitas (as in Cicero, Att. 10.4.1). 29 For the connections between legal status and social status or dignitas, cf. Taylor (2016).

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negative connotations (in connection to leprosy). Rufinus uses status to refer to Libnah’s whiteness as either a good or a bad condition, claiming that “it is possible to indicate with the interpretation of the name itself the differences between the two conditions (utriusque status differentias)”. Origen explains that whiteness can be interpreted in its negative sense in reference to Libnah’s status before it was ruled by Israel, and in the positive sense afterwards. When referring to human beings and other rational creatures, status can be used by Rufinus to refer to a specific spiritual condition of creatures in a given time, i.e. to one of the various stages that rational creatures go through from their first creation, to the present world, and finally to eschatology.30 One example is Hom.Num. 9.9, where a significant theme of Origen’s thought on the relationship between Christ and human beings is discussed, namely the principle of adaptation or condescension. Based on 1Cor 9:22 (“To the weak I became weak, that I might gain the weak. I have become all things to all, that by all means I might save some”), Origen claims that in order for the interaction to be beneficial for the creature, Christ adapts the way he presents himself to each creature and relates to them based on their current spiritual condition: “Although Christ is one in substance, he becomes diverse to each one, in accord with the need of each one in whom he works (singulis tamen diversus efficitur, prout indiget is, in quo operatur)”.31 Christ adapting himself to the creatures does not apply only to human souls in their different spiritual conditions, but to all rational creatures: “The Savior, therefore, in a way much more divine than Paul, has become ‘all things to all’, that he might either ‘gain’ or perfect ‘all things’ (1Cor 9:22). He has clearly become a human to humans, and an angel to angels” (Comm.Jo. 1.31.217). Based on this principle, Origen, Hom.Num. 9.9 argues that the “children”, “fathers”, and “young men” in 1John 2:12–14 do not refer to physical ages, but rather to differences in the progress of the soul (animae profectuum differentias).32 The “rod” and the “blossoming” in Isa 11:1 are also interpreted in a similar fashion: Christ becomes a “rod” to discipline those who are negligent in their pursuit of virtue and justice; however, for those who are more advanced he “blossoms”.33 Regarding those who need the rod, Origen comments: “It is necessary for those who are inactive and weak to ‘come forth’ (Isa 11:1) from the status in which they are wrongly staying, and they must pass to another status, as if compelled by a rod”. So, the term has neutral connotations: this passage describes a spiritual progress from a lesser status, i.e. the condition of the weak, to another, more advanced status. 30

See sections 3.3–4 for the progress of rational creatures in the translations of Origen. Cf. Orig. Comm.ser.Matt. 35: “Perhaps the Word of God appears in differing glories in accordance with the power of each soul that sees it and in keeping with what each soul has shown itself capable”; see section 4.3 for this theme in the Homilies on Psalms. 32 For the stages of progress in Origen’s Homilies on Numbers, cf. Hom.Num. 12.3. 33 For this interpretation of Isa 11:1 cf. Orig. Hom.Isa. 3.1. 31

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In Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s discourse on the rational soul, status and dignitas are associated and treated as very close in meaning, as they both refer to the spiritual condition of the rational creature, especially when Origen reflects on the condition that the creatures enjoyed before they fell due to their sin and distanced themselves from the love of God: Princ. 2.8.3–4: As God therefore is ‘fire’ (cf. Deut 4:24), [...] so, on the contrary, those who have fallen away from the love of God are undoubtedly said to have cooled in their love for him and to have become cold. [...] If the love of sinners is said to grow cold, it must be asked whether perhaps even the word ‘soul’, which in Greek is ψυχή, is so called from a cooling down from a more divine and better condition (de statu diviniore ac meliore), and has been transplanted, that is, it is seen to have cooled down from that natural and divine warmth, and therefore to have been placed in its present position (in hoc quo nunc est … statu) with its present designation. [...] It must be considered, therefore, if perhaps, as we have said is shown by the name itself, it was called ψυχή, that is, ‘soul’, from the fact that it has cooled down from the fervour of the righteous and from the participation in the divine fire, and yet has not lost the power of restoring itself to that condition of fervour (in illum statum fervoris) in which it was at the beginning. Whence the prophet also appears to point out some such idea, when he says: ‘Return, o my soul, unto your rest’ (Ps 114:7a). From all these things, this appears to be shown, that the intellect, falling away from its status and dignity (de statu ac dignitate sua declinans), was made or named soul; and if restored and corrected, it returns to being an intellect. Now, if it is thus, it seems to me that this departure and falling away of the intellect is not to be thought of as equal in all, but as a greater or lesser change into soul, and that some intellects even retain something of their former vigour, and others, on the other hand, retain either nothing or a very small amount.

This text will be examined in sections 5.2 and 9.1.1; from a terminological standpoint what is relevant here is that in the sentence “falling away from its status and dignity”, dignitas and status are used more or less as synonyms. Here, dignitas is associated with another term in the context of an argument dealing not with social status but rather with the human soul and its relationship with God. The difference between dignitas and status is not further elaborated on, and, as they are so close in meaning, perhaps Rufinus made the stylistic choice to use these two Latin terms to translate only one Greek word. In the discourse in De Principiis on the progress of rational creatures, status is often used in a positive sense, i.e. to describe the condition of blessedness that the creatures, to different degrees, lost as a consequence of their negligence (Princ. 2.8.3).34 This prelapsarian state of beatitude can always be reacquired by the creatures with trials and tribulations, through which the creatures move forward both by their individual merit and by God’s grace, expressed through 34 For status as the blessedness of the beginning cf. Orig. Princ. 1.3.8; 2.1.1; 2.3.3; 3.6.3,6; Hom.Gen. 5.1; as the blessedness that all should strive to acquire in the future cf. Hom.Num. 16.5; Princ. 2.3.7. There are not many significant occurrences of status in Jerome’s translations, but cf. Hom.Ezech. 10.1: sinners who accept their just punishment and convert may be restored to their previous status or honor; see section 10.2 for Jerome’s rejection of this belief held by Origen.

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Christ. There are also other terms that Rufinus uses in this context: for instance, in Princ. 2.1.2, the notion of the dignity or status of blessedness that human beings recover after progress is expressed in military terms as post victoriam reparati gradus statio, “place of rank recovered after the victory” over the enemy powers. However, status is used more often in Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis than related terms such as statio. The argument by Origen on negligence and merit (and the role played by dignitas in the Latin translations of this argument) will be further explored in section 3.4; for now, two things must be noted regarding the use of status in De Principiis. First: although there are similarities, this status of blessedness that the creatures enjoyed at their beginning should not be confused with the “dignity of the image” received at creation (Princ. 3.6.1). As will be argued in chapter 5, “dignity of the image” refers to the universal capacity to progress in the participation in Christ, a capacity that all rational creatures derive from their natural affinity with the divine Logos. This “dignity of the image” (i.e. the ability to progress as rational beings) is fundamentally inalienable: although in most people this capacity is dormant or not fully activated, no creature can truly lose it because it is part of their nature established by God at creation. Instead, status is not described as a latent potential, and it is not attributed to the creatures’ nature: status describes a state of perfect joy and beatitude in the union with God that was once shared by all creatures but was since lost at least by human beings (Princ. 1.2.4; 1.6.2–3), being for most only a desired goal. In fact, there is no occurrence in Rufinus’ translations of Origen of status or of any other related Latin term mentioned so far in this chapter playing a key role in the discourse on Gen 1:26–27, in the way dignitas does in Princ. 3.6.1. This is also the case with other texts translated by Rufinus: for example, in his translation of Gregory of Nazianzus’ speeches there are occurrences of status in reference to the original condition of blessedness that preceded sin (for instance Orat. 2.25 and 38.16), but not in reference to the rank awarded to humanity with the creation according to the image of God, which in Rufinus’ translation of Orat. 16.8,15 is referred to as dignitas (translating ἀξίωμα).35 Even in Latin authors who wrote before Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis and used dignitas more than once to refer to the universal rank of rational human souls created according to the image of God (such as Hilary of Poitiers, or Filastrius of Brescia),36 there is no occurrence of status in this sense. Second: as a fundamentally neutral term, status can be used by Rufinus to describe either a positive or a negative condition. In Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis, status describes this positive original condition as well as the less desirable conditions that the creatures fell into because of their sin of negligence, not only the status of human beings in their mortal bodies (Princ. 1.7.4; 35 36

This passage will be examined in section 8.1. See section 7.1.2 for Hilary, chapter 9 for Filastrius.

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3.5.5), but also the condition of demons (Princ. 1.5.5) and even of senseless animals (Princ. 3.4.3).37 Even in Princ. 2.8.3 status does not refer only to the original “more divine or better condition” of the intellects, which is associated in this passage with dignitas, but also to the present condition that the souls occupy due to their sin. As summarised in Princ. 3.6.5: the creatures “will undergo change and variation, so as to occupy a better or worse status in accordance with their merits”.38 Also dignitas is presented by Rufinus in the passages examined in section 3.4 as awarded to the individual “in accordance with their merit” and therefore as subject to change. However, unlike status, dignitas is never used in Rufinus’ translations of Origen’s discourse on the progress of the souls to refer to a worse or undesirable condition; instead, it always assumes positive connotations as for example the rank awarded to angels or saints.

2.5 Nobility When not referring in a literal sense to someone’s family status, most occurrences of nobilitas in Rufinus’ translations of Origen regard Istrahelitica nobilitas, the “nobility of Israel”: in this context, the term nobilitas denotes the high rank that souls derive from God being their Father, their creator, and their Lord.39 This nobility is in principle shared by all souls, but is in practice only active in the righteous, because others lose it, at least temporarily, when they subject themselves to other lords, meaning when they are swayed by sin. For instance, in Hom.Judic. 6.3 it is claimed that the true insignia nobilitatis (“marks of nobility”) or titulus nobilitatis (“noble title”) in each person are shown when they follow the leadership of Christ and subject the body to the rule of the spirit, thus gaining true power over themselves. In Hom.Jes.Nav. 10.3 Origen likens sin with slavery40 and incites his audience to reclaim their former freedom and the paternal nobility by proving themselves worthy of receiving the “spirit of adoption” (Rom 8:15).41 A similar argument on freedom and slavery is found in Hom.Gen. 16.2, claiming that human souls as the people of God possess a “natural freedom” (quibus naturalis inerat libertas) but they 37 Cf. Orig. Princ. 3.4.3: neque in bono statu … neque … in malo. For status as indicating an undesirable state for the soul, or at least a less advanced degree of spiritual progress, cf. Comm.Cant. 2.4.19; Comm.Rom. 1.18.10. This neutrality of status applies not only to the condition of individual creatures but also of the created world in general, cf. Princ. 2.3.4. 38 Cf. Orig. Comm.Rom. 5.10.13: “For freedom of choice shall always remain in rational natures. […] In whatever status a soul is and in whatever degree of perfection of the virtues, it can still experience a fall, owing to the fact that virtue is changeable”. 39 Orig. Hom.Gen. 16.2,4; Hom.Jes.Nav. 22.6; Comm.Rom. 8.7.5 (“nobility of the Israelite soul”); cf. Princ. 3.1.23. 40 See section 3.1. 41 See section 3.3.2.

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are deprived of it when they sin. In this text, where the notions of nobility and dignity are linked, Origen discusses the issue of how to interpret the “sons of Israel” and the “Egyptians” in Exod 1:12. Based on John 8:31–34 (“If you abide in my word, you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free. […] Everyone who practices sin is a slave to sin”), he argues that the Israelites are “those who care for the freedom of the soul and ennoble the dignity of the mind (dignitatem mentis … nobilitat) with thought pertaining to heaven”. He adds that although they may be oppressed for some time, meaning they may fall prey to sin, these spiritual Israelites do not lose their freedom permanently. So, nobilitas is used by Rufinus to translate Origen’s exegetical argument that what Scripture says about God, the Israelites, and the enemies who enslave the Israelites must be understood as referring to the relation between human souls and God and to the dangers of sin. There are some aspects in common between nobilitas and dignitas, for instance the idea that the nobility of human souls is a standard that each person must uphold in oneself. Furthermore, in his translation of Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 6.14 and 26.10, Rufinus uses nobilitas (translating τὸ εὐγενές) to denote a concept similar to the understanding of “dignity of the image” emerging from his translation of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, i.e. the high rank of creatures made according to the image of God. There are however not many occurrences of nobilitas in Rufinus’ translations of Origen, compared to dignitas or status, and only one is found in De Principiis. So, despite some similarities, the occurrences of nobilitas in Rufinus’ translations of Origen do not support the idea that nobilitas, like dignitas, is consistently used by Rufinus to translate a specific point of Origen’s thought on the progress of rational creatures.

2.6 Beauty A different issue arises for the Latin terms signifying “beauty”, such as pulchritudo. These terms were probably not perceived by Rufinus as so closely related to dignitas as were other terms discussed so far such as honor, status, or potestas: unlike those terms, pulchritudo does not have particular relevance in the language of Roman politics and legislation. Hence, while we do find in Rufinus’ translations of Origen and other Greek Christian authors expressions such as “dignity and honour” (Hist. 8.5, Princ. praef. 4), “status and dignity” (Princ. 2.8.3), “authority and dignity” (Princ. 1.3.2), “power and dignity” (Princ. 1.5.3), “glory and dignity” (Princ. 2.10.3; Hom.Judic. 2.3), “dignity and magnificence” (Greg.Naz. Orat. 2.107), etc., there is no occurrence of “dignity and beauty”, “dignity of beauty”, “beauty of dignity”, or any similar expression that may suggest a close terminological relationship between dignitas and words such as pulchritudo.

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However, there is a conceptual connection in the texts translated by Rufinus between terms signifying beauty and the notion of “dignity of the image” (Princ. 3.6.1). This connection hinges on Origen’s interpretation of the beauty attributed in Cant 1:5,8 to the Bride, whom he identifies with the human soul (as well as with the Church).42 Rufinus speaks of the natural pulchritudo, species, and decorum (in this case, these three terms all mean “beauty”) that the soul received at its creation according to the image of God.43 This original beauty of the image must be protected because it is constantly at risk of being obscured by sin.44 The exegetical connection between the beauty of the Bride in Cant 1:8 (“If you do not know yourself, oh beautiful among women…”) and the creation of the human soul according to the image of God is found in Origen’s Commentary on the Song of Songs translated by Rufinus and also in a Greek fragment from the commentary, i.e. Fr.Cant. 10. On the other hand, in Jerome’s translation of Hom.Cant. 1.9, another text where Origen interprets the commandment to the beautiful Bride to “know herself” (Cant 1:8), there is no mention of Gen 1:26–27. In Hom.Cant. 1.9, it is stated that the beauty and dignity of the Bride derives from her relationship with the Groom; if she fails to recognise that it is the Groom who made her beautiful, the Bride does not “know herself” nor her dignity (tuam nescieris dignitatem). In Jerome’s version of Hom.Cant. 1.9, thus, a connection is drawn between dignitas and the beauty bestowed on the soul by the Son: the Bride, or the soul, is in fact endowed with beauty and dignity, but these inherent qualities are not actualised outside of her monogamous relationship with the Groom, or the Son. The notion that the original beauty of the soul must be cultivated and shielded from the other suitors of the Bride, meaning protected from the corrupting influence of heresy and sin,45 is expressed in several text by Origen, not only in the exegesis of the Song of Songs, but also for example in Jerome’s translation of Origen’s Homilies on Ezekiel. Here, the beauty given to the soul at its creation according to the image of God is interpreted as the rational capabilities of the soul, which should always be used only for the pursuit of the correct knowledge of God: Hom.Ezech. 7.6–7: The human soul is very good-looking and has a marvellous beauty (Anima humana multum speciosa est et mirabilem habet pulchritudinem). Indeed, its craftsman, when he first created it, said, ‘Let us make a human being in our image and likeness’ (Gen 42 For Origen’s views on the union between the Logos (i.e. the Groom) and the soul (i.e. the Bride) as they emerge from his exegesis of the Song of Songs, cf. Lettieri (2001). For the use of allegory in Origen’s exegesis of the Song of Songs, cf. Pollmann (2017): 95–99. 43 Section 7.2.1 will discuss a different interpretation of the beauty of the Bride, provided by Gregory of Elvira, who in other respects follows Origen’s exegesis of the Song of Songs, especially the identification of the Bride as both the soul and the Church. 44 Orig. Comm.Cant. 2.1.4; 2.5.2,15; Hom.Lev. 4.3; 12.7; Hom.Jes.Nav. 14.1. For the connections between decorum and dignitas see section 6.4. 45 See section 5.2.

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1:26). What is more beautiful than this beauty and likeness?46 [...] Even if a person is not stuck in the greatest sins, still, because the soul’s beauty is extraordinary, it is sullied by association with smaller ones as well. Consider the faculties of the soul, and if they have been implanted there by God (Respice virtutes animae, quae si insitae sint a Deo), look at [the soul’s] beauty, its capacity of invention, arrangement, expression, memory, delivery; […] consider what keen impulses it has, what thought processes relating to God. When it possesses these faculties, it has great beauty; but it is corrupted by heretical doctrines and a foreign religious system.

This interpretation of the beauty of the soul created according to the image of God is also supported by extant Greek texts by Origen, emphasising the importance of a correct application of the natural capacity of rational thinking: Hom.77Ps. 8.9: The human soul has great beauty, and if you want to see its beauty, see the beginning, how it was created: ‘Let us make a human being according to our image’ (Gen 1:26). You see the beauty: the human soul is spoken of as ‘according to the image’ and ‘according to the likeness’ of God, for it hopes to regain the likeness (Ὁρᾷς τὸ κάλλος· κατ’εἰκόνα λεγομένη ψυχὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ καθ’ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ, ἐλπίζει γὰρ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἀπολαβεῖν).47 Many have become lovers of this beauty even as many have become lovers of the beauty of a woman. [...] In the same way every soul of a human being for the sake of its own logos and the formation just mentioned is a beautiful creation, although not every soul employs that beauty in the same way, but it is possible for some soul to be employing it badly (πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ τῷ ἑαυτῆς λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προηγουμένῃ δημιουργίᾳ καλόν ἐστι κτίσμα, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ὁμοίως χρῆται τῷ κάλλει ἀλλ’ ἔστι τις χρωμένη κακῶς). [...] In a woman thinking badly the beauty of the soul is bad, for the very soul surrenders itself in quest of her lovers, and she walks in quest of them. Who are the lovers? The spiritual adversaries are recorded as lovers also in Ezekiel. And the rulers are lovers, the authorities, the cosmic powers of this darkness; the spiritual things of wickedness are lovers.

In these two passages, Origen reflects on the instability the beauty of the soul in a way that is very reminiscent of the discourse on the instability of dignity in Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis48 – both beauty and dignity are established at creation as part of the very nature of the rational soul, but are at risk of being corrupted or obfuscated if the soul is not constantly vigilant against sin. Despite these similarities, pulchritudo and related Latin terms signifying “beauty” are not closely related to dignitas, neither for Rufinus nor in the Latin language in general, as they do not express notions such as ranking, status, and office. As will be argued especially in chapters 3 and 5, these hierarchical notions are integral both to the meaning of the term dignitas and to the discourse on the progress of rational creatures that emerges from Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis. So, although the Latin translations of Origen refer both to the 46 The reference to the image of God found in Jerome’s translation of this passage is not present in Greek fragments that possibly correspond to this part of the homily; cf. Pearse and Hooker (2014): 610. 47 This is one of the passages where Origen presents the attainment of the “likeness” (Gen 1:26) as a future hope, as he does in Princ. 3.6.1 (see section 3.3.1). 48 See section 5.2.

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dignity and to the beauty of the human soul, also in this case dignitas maintains a distinct meaning. An in-depth inquiry into terms such as pulchritudo is not directly relevant to a study that deals with the interrelation between: 1. the traditional Roman understanding of dignitas as individual rank; 2. Origen’s universalising views on progress and on the relationship between God and humans through the Logos, and 3. the mediation of Rufinus and other 4th century Latin readers of Origen towards a more widespread understanding of dignity as referring to all human beings. However, passages by Origen on the beauty of the soul created according to the image of God will be taken into consideration in chapter 5, dealing with the “dignity of the image” in Princ. 3.6.1, insofar as they can help to shed further light on Origen’s interpretation of Gen 1:26–27.

2.7 Conclusions Rufinus’ and Jerome’s usage of terms such as potestas or honor in connection with dignitas reveals that, when dignitas retains its traditional meaning of public office or elevated social status, it may be partly interchangeable with these other nouns. However, this is not the case with Rufinus’ translations of Origen’s discourse on the progress of rational creatures, where terms such as potestas, honor, or gloria do not play a role comparable to dignitas. Of all the Latin nouns examined in this chapter, the term that is closest in meaning to dignitas in the context of the progress of the creatures is status, which is however not identical to dignitas insofar as it has a more neutral connotation (whereas dignitas is always positive when used in this context) and it does not play a significant role in Origen’s interpretation of the creation according to the image of God (Gen 1:26–27), like dignitas does in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1. Conversely, nobilitas or especially terms denoting “beauty”, such as pulchritudo or decorum, may be used in reference to natural qualities of the human soul in a way that is comparable to the “dignity of the image” in Princ. 3.6.1, but they are not regarded by Rufinus as synonyms of dignitas as they do not express notions of office and rank. Thus, in Rufinus’ translations of Origen there is no Latin term (not even among those which are perceived by Rufinus himself as closely related to dignitas) that can easily replace dignitas in the sense of the elevated rank that is awarded to the rational creature by God – either to the individual in proportion to their merit, as is the case with the texts which will be examined in sections 3.3–4, or to all creatures equally, as is the “dignity of the image” analysed in chapter 5.

Part II

Dignity in Origen The meanings normally attributed to the term “dignity” (dignitas or ἀξίωμα) in Origen’s works will now be investigated. This will provide the basis for the study in chapter 5 of the phrase “dignity of the image” in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1 as an exceptional occurrence of dignitas in the context of Origen’s writings and their Latin translation.

Chapter 3

Dignitas of Creatures in the Latin Translations of Origen This chapter analyses the meanings attributed to dignitas in the Latin translations of Origen, focusing on the occurrences of the term which refer to human beings and other creatures, and which denote the status or rank attributed to specific individual beings or groups. This includes the status of human beings in this world (sections 3.1–2) and in the afterlife (3.3), as well as the rank of rational creatures (including human beings, angels, and demons) as based on their individual merit (3.4).

3.1 Dignity as Rank and Social Status Rufinus’ translation of Basil, Hom. Attende tibi1 shows that the use by Rufinus of a highly codified term in Roman politics such as dignitas to denote the elevated social rank attributed to those who for example hold a prestigious public office or come from a noble family must be understood in the perspective of a break with classical Roman values. With his translation, Rufinus indicates that all the signs of prestige and power which were appreciated and sought after by Roman society, as encapsulated in the social value of dignitas, are not truly able to stand the test of time, whereas the relationship with God is the only eternal gain. This negative view of transient social status is also observable in Rufinus’ translations of Origen, as for example in the translation of Origen’s argument on the eschatological promises in Scripture, most notably the resurrection of the bodies (1Cor 15:44), against those who interpret them according to the literalism of Jewish exegesis, rather than allegorically:2 Princ. 2.11.2: They reckon that after the fashion of the form of things in this life, and according to the circumstances of dignities or ranks or the excellences of the powers in this world (secundum mundi huius dispositiones dignitatum vel ordinum vel eminentias potestatum), they will be kings and princes, like those earthly ones are.

1

See section 1.2.2. For the anti-heretical purposes of this passage by Origen and a comparison with Irenaeus, cf. D'Anna (2014): 78–81. 2

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Origen’s opponents believe that according to Scripture the end times will be very similar to this world. In fact, the powers and ranks will not last in eternity: this view is dismissed by Origen as foolish, myopic, and worse, inconsiderate of the true spiritual dignity of Scripture.3 Origen does not necessarily imply that political authority or the social system as such should be actively fought against by Christians, but rather maintains that these worldly hierarchies are not grounded in divine truth and have no lasting power whatsoever beyond their external earthly appearance.4 Origen, Princ. 2.11.1 says the same of other achievements that formed part of the functioning of human society at his time and were valued as markers of success: marriage, the procreation of children, the foundation of cities, the ownership of slaves. Every pursuit that is not immediately related to becoming progressively closer to God,5 be it the accumulation of wealth and prestige, giving public advice (in commune consulere), or study, is only a part of “this life” and not necessarily of the eternal one. Moreover, there are passages in the translations of Origen’s works where dignity as social standing is not only presented as empty and transient, but as downright evil, especially in texts where Origen interprets biblical texts that reference idolatry and slavery. This is the case with Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s Homilies on the Book of Judges. Origen, Hom.Judic. 2.3 warns against the risk that the love for worldly goods such as the “ambition for human dignity” (humanae dignitatis cupiditas) is greater than the love for God. This is the only occurrence in the Latin translations of Origen of the expression “human dignity”, and here the adjective humana is used in a pejorative sense, i.e. as indicating a worldly and transitory pursuit, as opposed to the heavenly and long-lasting benefits deriving from the love for God.6 Origen lists wealth, the desires of the flesh, beauty, glory, the love for one’s spouse and children, and “transitory and temporal dignity” (caduca ac temporalis dignitas) among the goods that distract humanity from the love of God (Hom.Judic. 2.3). Origen, Hom.Judic. 3.1 condemns the impiety and idolatry of those who do not abstain from acting against the faith in order to “rush toward the powers and dignities of this world” (ad potestates atque ad dignitates saeculi prosilit). As indicated in Hom.Judic. 2.3, idolatry means being moved by passions other than the love of God and prioritising other objectives over the pursuit of a closer relationship 3

For the theme of the dignitas of God and of Scripture in Origen’s argument against literalism see section 4.1. 4 Cf. Stewart (2015): 130, “Christians, explains Origen, are not attempting to escape public duty; rather, their citizenship is of another political realm: the Church”. In passages such as Cels. 3.30 and 8.75, “Origen clearly portrays the church as a visible, active ‘nation’ or polis, existing alongside of and distinct from the secular Graeco-Roman empire”. 5 See sections 3.3–4; 5.1 for the increasing closeness to God through the mediation of Christ as the worthiest pursuit for human beings. 6 See section 1.2.1 for the same understanding of humana dignitas as worldly status in Rufinus’ translation of Greg.Naz. Orat. 2.14.

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with God. Idolatry is for human beings a form of degradation: earthly idols cannot yield any lasting and truly satisfying result, hence human beings who believe that by climbing the social ladder they will attain success are in fact condemning themselves to a life of frustration and continuing humiliation.7 Origen, Hom.Judic. 3.2 clarifies that this does not apply solely to those who have attained a position of power, but rather to all those who are trying to achieve external recognition and predominance over other people, regardless of whether they were successful in their pursuit or not. Nobody can consider themselves immune from the vice of pride, not even those who are not in a position of power and therefore “make use of no dignity of this world” (etiamsi nulla usus sit in saeculo dignitate). Hence, every member of Origen’s audience, or of Rufinus’ readership, regardless of their social status, is constantly exposed to the risk of being carried away from God by the love of “idols” such as the pursuit of dignitas. This is why Origen declares: “It often happens that these present gains and secular dignity (praesentia haec lucra et dignitas saecularis) yield a loss for the soul and its eternal8 reproach” (Comm.Rom. 7.6.6). The frequent remarks in Origen’s homilies regarding the pursuit of wealth and status have been interpreted as indicating that most of his audience in Caesarea was formed by people who were high or middle class and had access to public offices, such as merchants and artisans;9 furthermore, high-ranking Church members were likely in attendance, at least in some occasions.10 Even more so, a moralistic discourse on dignity would have been relevant to the experience of Rufinus’ readership, which was largely made of Roman aristocrats interested in learning about ascetic ideals, like Apronianus, or of powerful Church leaders like Chromatius who aimed at the moral edification of his community.11 In these texts by Origen as translated by Rufinus, the term “dignity” is integral part of an ideal of social empowerment that attributes worth to individuals based on false and transitory markers of success. Hence, dignitas is associated in Rufinus’ translations (for example in Hom.Judic. 3.1) with terms such as potestas, which indicate power over others, and with references to 7

For idolatry and humiliation in Origen’s Homilies on Judges, cf. Contini (2021a). Cf. Tzamalikos (2007): 223–233: when Origen says that the punishment of the souls in the afterlife are “eternal”, he may be meaning “otherworldly” (as opposed to terms such as “of this world”, in saeculo) or “long-lasting”, but not “everlasting”; on Origen’s idea that punishment is not everlasting see section 3.3. 9 Monaci Castagno (1987): 87–88. The context in which Origen delivered his homilies and the possible composition of his audience are assessed in Monaci Castagno (2014); Grappone (2001a); for the rich and diverse background of Caesarea and its cultural, political, and religious history, cf. Rinaldi (2013). 10 Heine (2010): 179–183. The attendance of bishops is confirmed in Origen’s Hom.1Reg. 1 (mentioning Alexander of Jerusalem) and Hom.67Ps. 1.1 (addressing an unnamed bishop), cf. Perrone (2020–2021): 1.343–344n2. 11 For the addressees of Rufinus’ translations, cf. Grappone (2007): 33–45. 8

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glory, excellence, ambition, political offices, admiration accorded by one’s community, availability of means and people, prestige derived from the display of erudition, but also with frequent remarks on the fact that these goods are passing and worldly. Such is the system of values that includes dignity.

3.2 Dignity in the Church In Jerome’s translation of Hom.Isa. 6.1 Origen explains that “it is a good thing not to rush eagerly towards those things that are from God: offices, positions of high rank and of leadership and ministries in the Church (dignitates et principatus et ministeria ecclesiae)”.12 This concept is similar to the one expressed in the texts analysed in the previous section, i.e. that people should not pursue dignitas as a hierarchical position of eminence in this world. However, in this case the hierarchy in question is not connected to pagan society and its empty values, but rather to the ecclesiastical offices which “are from God”. Accordingly, Origen, Hom.Isa. 6.1 explains that unlike the desire for political power, the pursuit of an ecclesiastical career is not a form of idolatry, provided that those who are “called to the office of bishop are not called to rulership, but to service of the whole Church”. The leaders of the Church should understand their high dignitas as a position requiring humility (humilitas) and servitude (servitus), rather than predominance (principatus).13 Such a humble behaviour will allow those who in this life are invested with leadership roles in the Church, not to gain power in this world, but rather to achieve in their afterlife the “heavenly throne”. This means, for Origen, that worthy Church leaders will take part in the final judgement in the role of judges, together with Christ, the supreme judge (Matt 19:28): as in this life they have imitated Christ in his humility, in the afterlife they will participate in his glory.14 Dignitas as high rank in the Church does not guarantee a successful and meritorious Christian life, meaning that for Origen possessing ecclesiastical dignitas does not necessarily indicate that the person has more merit than others, or any merit at all. Origen claims that it is not necessary to hold an ecclesiastical title (dignitas) in order to lead a worthy life (Hom.Jer. 14.16; Hom.Ezech. 5.5) and warns that, although we should always respect the authority of those whom God appointed as our superiors because their title commands obedience, bishops or presbyters should not be too proud for being “higher in 12 For Origen’s views on priesthood, cf. Stewart (2015): 111–144, highlighting that Origen maintained that the main duty of the Christian minister was to teach the spiritual reading of Scripture (see section 4.1). 13 Origen’s views on the humility of Church leaders (cf. Comm.Matt. 16.8) are also found in several Christian texts, such as Ambrose’s De Officiis, cf. Smith (2020): 173–191. 14 See section 3.3.2.

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status” (dignitate sublimior). In fact, there may be among those who are subjected to them some who are “better” (melior) than them, meaning superior in merit (Hom.Luc. 20.5).15 For Origen, the office or dignitas by itself is not only not enough to save the person holding it from God’s punishment in their afterlife, but it is also cause for a more severe judgement by God, if the office is not accompanied by worthy behaviour (Hom.Jer. 11.3).16 God’s punishment is commensurate with the person’s authority or dignitas in the Church. Their sin is particularly hateful, argues Origen, because of the respect that other people in the Church are required to show to their superiors by virtue of their title: this honour is only appropriate for the righteous, so ecclesiastical authorities whose acts are not as worthy as is their title (dignitati meae opera condigna) usurp a reverence that they do not actually deserve (Hom.Ezech. 5.4). Thus, for Origen the ecclesiastical title by itself commands respect from others, but the people possessing that dignitas are not always worthy of this respect. This is because people possessing dignitas in the Church are particularly susceptible to the worst sin of all, namely pride, the sin of the devil. Origen, Hom.Ezech. 9.2 argues that wealth, worldly dignity, and secular glory are the main causes of pride (materia superbiae divitiae, dignitas, gloria saecularis), a view on social dignitas found also in the passages translated by Rufinus discussed in the previous section (3.1). However, Origen adds that, paradoxically, those more prone to pride are often those who hold an ecclesiastical office (ecclesiasticam dignitatem). This fact is surprising for Origen, because holding an ecclesiastical title should instead be a reason to become humbler, rather than prouder, as Scripture – Origen refers to Eccli 3:18 (“The greater you are, the more you must humble yourself”) – teaches that “they ought to have pursued humility more, because they had acquired dignity” (Quin potius humilitatem sequi debuerant, quia dignitatem fuerant consecuti). Thus, Origen reasons that, although material and worldly things such as wealth, dignity, and power (divitiae … dignitas quoque et potestas) generate arrogance, developing pride because of one’s knowledge of Scripture and other spiritual gifts is even more insidious and detrimental to the soul’s destiny in the afterlife (Hom.Ezech. 9.5). Even though pride is presented in these homilies by Origen as the worst sin that high-ranking Church officials can commit, there are also other sins that are especially reproachable in them precisely due to their elevated position. For instance, as concrete examples of people who are unworthy of holding ecclesiastical titles (ecclesiasticis dignitatibus), in Hom.Luc. 17.10 Origen mentions 15

Lienhard (1996): 86n14: “Origen may have had his own relationship to the bishop of Alexandria in mind when he speaks about a lesser man put in charge of a greater”; for Origen’s complex understanding of the religious authority of bishops and his relationship with Demetrius of Alexandria, cf. Trigg (1981). 16 For Jerome’s translation of this passage see section 1.2.2.

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those who fornicate and those who contract a second marriage after divorce from, or death of, their first wife.17 The passages discussed so far in this section are translated by Jerome but views on ecclesiastical dignitas can also be found in Rufinus’ translations, especially in the Homilies on Leviticus. For instance, in Hom.Lev. 6.6, similarly to Hom.Jer. 11.3, Origen distinguishes among the bishops18 who limit themselves to formally holding their office (in sacerdotibus officio fungi; solemni ministerio fungi ad populum), and those who actually have sound morals, an in-depth knowledge of Scripture, and effective communication skills. Origen concludes: “One then is the name of ‘priest’, but there is not one dignity either based by the merit of their lives or by the virtues of their soul” (Unum igitur est sacerdotii nomen, sed non una vel pro vitae merito vel pro animi virtutibus dignitas).19 Church ministers should constantly monitor and examine themselves20 in order to assess the degrees of their merit (veluti in speculo inspicere se debet unusquisque sacerdotum et gradus meriti sui inde colligere). If they actually find themselves virtuous and well versed in Scripture, they are truly bishops not only in name but also by merit (non solum nomine, sed et meritis); otherwise, they must consider themselves as placed at a lower degree than other people, despite having received the name of the highest ministry (inferiorem sibi gradum positum noverit, etiamsi primi nomen acceperit).21 Ecclesiastical dignitas emerges from the Latin translations of Origen’s homilies not as something meaningless or evil, but rather as something that requires from its holder higher standards of behaviour than from other people. The complex interaction between dignity and merit is at the heart of Origen’s views on ecclesiastical dignitas: in the passages analysed in the previous section (3.1) dignitas understood as a social value by the pagan world was never discussed in connection with merit, and was rather consistently associated with the notion of futility, through the use of terms meaning “worldly” and “temporary” (such as saecularis, caduca, humana, etc.), as opposed to “heavenly” and “eternal”. Instead, in his passages on dignity in the Church Origen insists on the notion of worthiness, as all the texts analysed in this section deal with the matter of 17 Cf. Orig. Cels. 3.48: Paul wants bishops to be both virtuous (i.e., among other things, monogamous) and capable of holding their own in theological debates (Titus 1:9). 18 Di Berardino (1998) argues that in the 4th and early 5th centuries the term sacerdos normally indicates specifically the bishop: since in Rufinus’ translation of Hom.Lev. 6.6 Origen speaks of the sacerdos as having received the highest title in the Church, it is likely that the passage does in fact refers to bishops. 19 For further occurrences of dignitas as a position of authority in the Church in Rufinus’ translations of Origen, cf. the “dignity of the high priest” (dignitas pontificis) in Hom.Lev. 9.2; 12.4, and the “apostolic dignity” (apostolica dignitas) of Paul and the other apostles in Comm.Rom. 6.9.2; 7.5.5. 20 For dignitas as the product of constant monitoring of oneself see section 6.1. 21 For the connection between dignitas and the different degrees of merit see section 3.4.

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what it means for an individual to be worthy (or unworthy) of an ecclesiastical title or dignitas. Origen argues that being invested with an ecclesiastical title is not by itself an indication of someone’s worthiness; on the contrary, those who have the title need to prove themselves as exceptionally worthy (digni).

3.3 Dignity of the Worthy Souls before Apocatastasis The occurrences of dignitas examined the first two sections of this chapter correspond to the more widespread usage of this term to denote social status or office, and the contents of the texts examined so far are not unique to Origen: for example, the association between worldly dignitas and idolatry is also found in passages by Tertullian such as Idol. 17–18 or Spect. 12. Instead, the occurrences of dignitas analysed in sections 3.3–4 involve distinctive themes of Origen’s thought on the progress of rational creatures. 3.3.1 “Dignity of the Likeness”: Progress in Three Stages (De Principiis 3.6) In the eschatological section of his treatise De Principiis (i.e. Princ. 3.5–6), Origen describes the progress of human souls towards the likeness with God: Princ. 3.6.1: The human being indeed obtained the dignity of the image in their first creation (in prima conditione), but the perfection of the likeness was reserved for them at the end (similitudinis vero ei perfectio in consummatione servata est). [...] While the possibility of perfection was given to human beings in the beginning (in initiis) through the dignity of the image, they should in the end, through the accomplishment of works, complete for themselves the perfected likeness (in fine demum per operum expletionem perfectam sibi ipse similitudinem consummaret). Now the Apostle John more openly (apertius) and clearly (evidentius) determines this to be the case, when speaking thus: ‘Little children, we do not yet know what we shall be; but when he is revealed to us (speaking, no doubt, of the Saviour) we shall be like him’ (1John 3:2). By this he points out with utmost certainty (certissime) both the end of all things, which he says was still unknown to him, and also the hoped-for likeness to God, which will be conferred in proportion to the perfection of merits (similitudinem dei sperandam, quae pro meritorum perfectione praestabitur). The Lord himself also in the Gospel points out that these same things will not only come to pass, but will come about by his own intercession (non solum futura, verum etiam sui intercessione futura), when he deigns to make this request of the Father for his disciples (hoc a patre discipulis suis impetrare dignatur): ‘Father, I want that where I am, there also they might be with me’ (John 17:24), and ‘As I and you are one, so also may they be one in us’ (John 17:21). In this the likeness itself already seems, if we may say so, to advance, and from being similar to become one, for the reason, no doubt, that in the consummation or end ‘God is all and in all’ (1Cor 15:28) (In quo iam videtur ipsa similitudo, si dici potest, proficere et ex simili unum iam fieri, pro eo sine dubio quod in consummatione vel fine omnia et in omnibus deus est). In this context, the question is asked by some whether the condition of bodily nature, however much cleansed to purity and rendered completely spiritual, does not appear to obstruct the dignity of the likeness and the property of unity (vel ad similitudinis dignitatem vel ad unitatis proprietatem)…

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The “dignity of the image” and Origen’s argument on the creation of human souls will be further discussed in chapter 5 of this study, but what is relevant now is the “dignity of the likeness” (similitudinis dignitas).22 Origen claims that the possibility to “become like God” is given to all human beings since their creation; the likeness is achieved by the worthy souls who have reached the end of their progress in virtue, through the intercession of Christ as well as through their own merit.23 In Princ. 3.6.1, Origen presents the progress of human dignity from potential (given to all) to act (fulfilled by each one): there is for Origen one and the same human “dignity”, as God gives to all human souls collectively at creation a “dignity of the image”; this dignity is explained in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1 as the possibility to progress until souls, as individuals, achieve perfection, which is also referred to in the text as the “dignity of the likeness”. When individuals are so progressed in the imitation of Christ that they achieve the “likeness”, they effectively become what God gave them the possibility to be since the beginning. For Origen, in the present times not many people have achieved such an advanced stage of progress: as he claims in Hom.Ezech. 13.2, only a few exceptionally blessed individuals, such as the apostles, have received the likeness with God promised in Gen 1:26 (Pauci admodum, qui receperint similitudinem, ut Apostoli). When Origen discusses the difference between image (potential) and likeness (fulfilment of that potential that each person hopes to attain), as for example in Hom.77Ps. 8.924 or in Cels. 4.30, he does not clarify whether worthy individuals who have achieved the likeness with God had done so already during their earthly lives, or if they were awarded the “dignity of the likeness” only in their afterlife. In any case, from Hom.Ezech. 13.2 it emerges that the apostles have already achieved the likeness, which means that they at least received it before the end times. Princ. 3.6.1 also indicates that the achievement of the likeness is not in fact the end, since Origen claims that the likeness achieved by worthy human beings will ultimately progress to become unity of all rational creatures with God.25 So, it must be clarified why, in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1, Origen states that the likeness is attained “in the end”, as opposed to the “dignity of the image” which is given “at the first creation” or “at the beginning”.

22 For the exegetical theme of the difference between image and likeness in Gen 1:26 in Origen and other Greek and Latin authors see section 9.3. 23 For Origen’s notion of the journey of rational souls, focusing on the different degrees of their participation in Christ, as well as on the complex interplay of the universal participation of the rational creatures in Christ as Logos on the one hand, and the participation of the worthy in Christ’s sanctification in the afterlife, on the other, cf. Greggs (2009): 54–84. 24 See section 2.6. 25 For the progress of the human soul from image to likeness and finally to unity as envisioned in Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, cf. Zambon (2007): 14–18.

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Given that in Princ. 3.6.1 the idea that human beings may attain the likeness with God is grounded in the authoritative philosophical tradition on assimilation and more importantly in Scripture,26 we find in Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s claims regarding the likeness reiterated expressions of certainty (apertius et evidentius, sine dubio, certissime). When Origen then pushes the argument further, entailing not just that human beings may resemble God, but that they may become one with him, the text transmitted by Rufinus shows more caution (si dici potest) and admits that there may be doubts and objections, which are addressed in the rest of chapter Princ. 3.6. For Origen the key to understanding how this progress is possible is the role played by Christ, who “deigns” to intercede with the Father on behalf of humanity.27 The mediation of Christ fulfils the human attempt to attain “the dignity of the likeness”, thus enacting the possibility offered by the “dignity of the image”, and ultimately allowing human beings to share the “property of unity”. The fulfilment of the potential offered by the “dignity of the image”, i.e. the achievement of the likeness, is thus envisioned as an intermediary step in the existence of rational creatures, which is presented in Princ. 3.6.1 as a threestep process. The first step is the creation according to the image of God, when all creatures received the “dignity of the image” (Gen 1:27). The second step is the progress of each creature towards perfection and the achievement of the “dignity of the likeness”. The third step is in the eschaton with apocatastasis, when all creatures will be subjected to Christ and, through him, to God, who will at that point be “all in all” (1Cor 15:28).28 If Origen’s views on the beginning of the rational creation are based on his interpretation of Gen 1:26–27,29 his argument on the third and final stage is based on 1Cor 15:24–28: Then comes the end, when Christ hands over the kingdom to God the Father, when he has defeated30 every rule and every authority and every power, for he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet. The last enemy to be defeated is death, for ‘he subjected all things under his feet’ (Ps 8:7). [...] When all things are subjected to the Son, then the Son himself will be subjected to the one (i.e. the Father) who subjected all things to him, so that God may be all in all.

At the end times, for Origen, all creatures will share the “property of unity” (unitatis proprietas; Princ. 3.6.1), based on the universalistic interpretation of 1Cor 15:28 expressed in Rufinus’ translation of eschatological sections of De 26

See section 5.1. Cf. Orig. Princ. 4.4.4. 28 For Sytsma (2021): 123–128, Origen envisioned the progress of creation towards the final perfection as happening in two stages, the first of which is the individual achievement of worthiness through the imitation of Christ, and the second is apocatastasis, i.e. the collective restoration of all souls to the unity with God after the conversion of all sinful will. 29 See chapter 5. 30 Lit. voided, rendered ineffective. 27

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Principiis such as Princ. 1.6 or Princ. 3.5–6. For Origen, 1Cor 15:28 refers to all creatures, including those who received blessedness in their afterlife but also those who converted after receiving punishment. As clarified by Emanuela Prinzivalli, the judgment of God, which rewards virtue and punishes sin, is a preparation for apocatastasis and it is not the end itself.31 Universalising statements referring to the end times as described in 1Cor 15:24–28 are found in Origen’s Greek works contemporary to De Principiis: Comm.Jo. 1.32.235: The ‘taking away’ (John 1:29) affects each one in the world (ἐπὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ), until sin be removed from all the world and the Savior deliver to the Father a prepared kingdom in which there is no sin at all, a kingdom which permits the Father's rule and again admits all things of God in its whole and total self (πάλιν ἐπιδεχομένην τὰ πάντα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν ὅλῃ ἑαυτῇ καὶ πάσῃ), when the saying is fulfilled: ‘That God may be all in all’ (1Cor 15:28).

This is emphasised in Rufinus’ translation by several universalising statements in the chapters surrounding Princ. 3.6.1: Princ. 3.5.4: The whole creation (universa creatura) indeed entertains the hope of freedom, of being ‘set free from the bondage of corruption’ when ‘the children of God’ (Rom 8:21), who either fell away or were scattered abroad, shall be gathered together into one (in unum fuerint congregati) [...] 7. Just as when the Son is said to be subjected to the Father (1Cor 15:28), the perfect restoration of the whole creation (perfecta universae creaturae restitutio) is announced, so also when the enemies are said to be subjected to the Son of God (1Cor 15:24–26), the salvation of the subjected and the restoration of the lost (reparatio perditorum) is understood in that. [...] 6.3. I reckon that this expression, where God is said to be ‘all in all’ (1Cor 15:28), also means that he is all in each individual person (in singulis). God himself becomes all, [...] not in a few things or in many, but in all [...]. 4. As far, then, as our understanding can grasp it, we consider the quality of a ‘spiritual body’ (1Cor 15:44) to be such as befits being inhabited not only by all holy and perfect souls, but also by that whole ‘creation’ which ‘will be set free from the slavery of corruption’ (Rom 8:21). [...] When things have begun to hasten towards that end, that they all may be one as the Father is one with the Son (cf. John 17:21–22), it may rationally be understood that where all are one, there will no longer be any diversity (ubi omnes unum sunt, iam diversitas non erit). [...] 5. It is on this account, moreover, that ‘the last enemy’, who is called ‘death’, is said to be ‘destroyed’ (1Cor 15:26), that there may no longer be [...] diversity when there is no enemy (neque diversum sit, ubi non est inimicus). The destruction of the last enemy, indeed, is to be understood in this way, not that its substance, which was made by God, shall perish, but that the hostile purpose and will which proceeded not from God but from itself shall disappear. It is destroyed, therefore, not in the sense that it shall not be, but that it shall not be an enemy and death. [...] 6. Into this condition (statum,32 viz. of ‘spiritual body’), then, it must be supposed that this entire bodily substance of ours will be brought when all things will be restored, when they shall be one (cum omnia restituentur, ut unum sint), and when God shall be ‘all in all’. It must be understood, however, that this shall happen not suddenly, but gradually and by degree, during the passing of infinite and immeasurable ages, with the improvement and correction being accomplished slowly and by degrees, some hastening in advance 31 32

S.v. “Giudizio”, in Monaci Castagno (2000): 208–209. For status in Rufinus’ translations of Origen see section 2.4.

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and tending towards perfection by a quicker route, and others following behind at a close distance, with others far behind:33 and so, through the many and innumerable orders of those making progress and being reconciled, from enmity, to God, until ‘the last enemy’ [...]. When, therefore, all rational souls (omnes rationabiles animae) have been restored to a condition like this, then also the nature of this body of ours will be brought into the glory of a spiritual body.

The development of the argument on the end times in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6 shows that the “dignity of the likeness” in Princ. 3.6.1 should be understood as the desired “end” goal or the destination of the progress of the individual, propelled both by their merit and by the intercession of Christ. But this dignity attained by the worthy is not the eschatological “end” of all created nature, as it precedes apocatastasis. In sentences such as “the perfection of the likeness was reserved for them at the consummation” or “they should in the end [...] complete for themselves the perfected likeness” (Princ. 3.6.1), the terms “end” and “consummation” refer not to apocatastasis but rather to an intermediate stage, when, one by one, the creatures will attain the likeness. This is why in Princ. 3.6.1 Origen says that the likeness is achieved at the end, but then he also says that only when the likeness will finally progress towards unity will the events proclaimed in 1Cor 15:24–28 take place. In a similar fashion, in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 1.6.1 it is stated that “the end and consummation of the world” refers to a time when everyone gets their due, when God’s rewards and punishments take place in consideration of individual progress (Finis ergo mundi et consummatio dabitur, cum unusquisque pro merito peccatorum etiam poenis subicietur; quod tempus deus solus agnoscit, quando unusquisque quod meretur expendet). However, Origen, in Rufinus’ translation, also adds that the goodness of God will at last bring the whole creation to one and the same end, after even the enemies are subjected to Christ (In unum sane finem putamus quod bonitas Dei per Christum suum universam revocet creaturam, subactis ac subditis etiam inimicis). This will presumably happen after the punishments have served their educational purpose, otherwise the end would not be in fact the same for everyone. This point is fundamental to the anti-Gnostic argument in De Principiis. In Princ. 1.6.1– 2, Origen clarifies that “subjection” to Christ in 1Cor 15:28 means “salvation”, and states that from this one end of all things one may comprehend the one beginning: thus, Origen’s discussion of equality and unity in the end times in Princ. 1.6.1–2 is meant as an introduction to his argument against the Gnostic belief that there were different “beginnings”.34 So, “end” (finis) and “consummation” (consummatio) in Rufinus’ translation of the eschatological sections of De Principiis may refer not only to the end times but also to a previous stage, i.e. the “end” or culmination of the 33 34

Cf. Orig. Princ. 3.5.8. See section 3.4.

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progress of creatures as triggered by their freedom of choice. Alternatively, these two terms may refer to the “end” of the present age (mundus, saeculum), based on Origen’s views on the succession of different “worlds”.35 This would mean that for Origen the likeness will be achieved by the worthy only at the end of the present world, whereas the unity will take place at the end of all creation, i.e. at apocatastasis. However, in Hom.Ezech. 13.2 Origen (in Jerome’s translation) indicates that exceptionally worthy human beings such as the apostles have already achieved the likeness in this world. In other passages where Origen speaks of the progress towards the likeness, he claims that the likeness is achieved for instance when a human being gains true faith (Comm.Rom. 4.5.11),36 or loves even one’s enemies (Comm.Jo. 20.17.148), or distances oneself from earthly desires (Comm.Jo. 20.22.183), but it is never said that the likeness will only be attained at the end of this world. In any case, Princ. 3.6 implies that the acquisition of the likeness precedes the events described in 1Cor 15:26–28, which, according to Origen, will take place after the process of conversion of every single rational creature is completed over the course of several “ages”. After they have all freely chosen to associate themselves to Christ and have thus deserved to attain the “dignity of the likeness”, the creatures will also achieve what is referred to in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1 as the “property of unity” with God.37 Thus, “dignity of the likeness” in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1 refers to a high status that individuals attain when they reach the end of their progress in merit. 3.3.2 Dignity of the “Co-heirs with Christ”: An Imbalance in Dignity in the End Times? The “dignity of the likeness” in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1 is not the only occurrence in the Latin translations of Origen where dignitas denotes the elevated rank achieved by deserving human beings through Christ: Comm.Rom. 7.3.3 as well as Comm.ser.Matt. 62 also feature dignitas in this sense. Both passages convey Origen’s interpretation of Rom 8:15–17: For you did not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received the Spirit of adoption […] The Spirit himself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God, and if children, then heirs – heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ.

Comm.ser.Matt. 62 focuses on the “faithful and wise administrator” (Matt 24:45), whom Origen identifies with the leaders of the Church who aptly serve their community (Comm.ser.Matt. 61). According to the Latin translation of Comm.ser.Matt. 62, Origen describes the heavenly reward promised to these 35

Orig. Princ. 2.1.3; 2.3.5; 3.5.3; Comm.Matt. 15.31. Cf. Scherer (1957): 210. 37 For the analysis of the biblical verses that Origen references most often in the context of apocatastasis, namely 1Cor 15:23–28 and Ps 109:1, cf. Heil (1993). 36

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worthy Church leaders: they will be made “‘heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ’ (Rom 8:17) and co-rulers with Christ”.38 Christ, the Son of God, receives from the Father dominion over everything and “shares (participat) such dignity (dignitatem) and glory with his faithful and wise administrators, so that they too are above all creatures and powers, and are with Christ”. The argument in Comm.ser.Matt. 62 is similar to the one expressed in Hom.Isa. 6.1:39 the leaders of the Church who in this life serve the community in a way worthy of their rank or dignitas will be rewarded in their afterlife with a share in the dignitas of Christ as universal ruler and judge. Furthermore, the idea that a person may gain the highest elevation in Christ not through power or glory but only through humility and servitude (identified in Hom.Isa. 6.1 as well as in Comm.ser.Matt. 61 as the main qualities of a good leader of the Church)40 resonates with the discourse on dignitas in the Homilies on Judges.41 Comm.ser.Matt. 62 concerns Church leaders; however, in other Greek and Latin texts where Origen discusses Rom 8:15–17, the possibility of being made “heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ” is presented as available not only to one specific category of people (such as Church leaders), but also to everyone else. In particular, in Rufinus’ version of Origen, Comm.Rom. 7.3.3, dignitas is used in the exegesis of Rom 8:17 as the high rank awarded to the “co-heirs with Christ”. Following the distinction established in Rom 8:15, Origen presents a progress from the “spirit of slavery” to the “Spirit of adoption”. Rom 8:15–17 refers for Origen to “each one of us”, as Paul calls upon the believers and invites them all to advance from the first basic stage of spiritual progress to the stage where they deserve the “Spirit of adoption”. The Spirit affirms the bond between human beings and the divine Son:

38 Both Rufinus’ translation of the Commentary on Romans and the anonymous translation of the Commentary on Matthew are abridged versions of the original Greek text, cf. Tondini (2023): 81–87 (Tondini argues that also the Greek text of the Commentary on Matthew that we can read now is in fact an epitome of Origen’s commentary). There is however no reason to suspect that the exegesis of Rom 8:15–17 which emerges from the texts examined in this section (i.e. that worthy human beings are allowed to share some prerogatives of Christ, for example being children of God, or judges of souls) is severely interpolated, considering that it is not very different from the interpretation of these verses found in Greek texts such as Hom.67Ps. 1.2, see section 4.3. De Cock (In Press) argues that Origen’s interpretation of Rom 8:15 remains consistent in his extant homilies and commentaries: Rom 8:15 refers to the progress of all human beings, who, with their own merit and with the help of the angels and especially of the incarnate Son, may advance from the “spirit of slavery” (i.e. when their faith is still hindered by earthly sins) until, purified by the Spirit, they are given the “spirit of adoption”, indicating the highest degree of participation in the Logos. 39 See section 3.2. 40 Cattaneo (2011). 41 See section 3.1.

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Comm.Rom. 7.2: You see how Paul here [...] could designate the ‘spirits of slavery’ that are given ‘in fear’ (Rom 8:15) as children’s tutors and guardians (cf. Gal 4:1–3), which keep each one of us (unumquemque nostrum), while a child according to the inner human, in fear until we come to the age when we merit receiving ‘the spirit of adoption as sons’ (Rom 8:15) and become now a son and lord of everything. [...] After we have died together with Christ (cf. Rom 6:8) and his spirit has come into us, we do not receive once again a spirit of slavery unto fear. That is to say, we have not become children and beginners again, but as those who are perfect (quasi perfecti) we know receive the spirit of adoption once and for all.42

Consequently, in Comm.Rom. 7.3.3,43 Origen maintains that by becoming children of God in a way similar to how Christ is Son of God,44 exceptionally progressed individuals acquire “the dignity of co-heirs of Christ” (illa dignitas coheredum Christi), meaning that they share some of the prerogatives of Christ. Namely, Origen argues that the “dignity of co-heirs of Christ” includes a share in his power as judge of the souls. In Comm.ser.Matt. 62, Origen speaks of the heavenly reward set aside for a specific type of soul (the good servant, Matt 24:45) and of the punishment that awaits others (the bad servant, Matt 24:48). At the final judgement, the saints are rewarded with a placement on the right side of Christ (cf. Matt 25:33) “according to the dignity of their own right acts” (secundum dignitatem actuum suorum dextrorum); the sinners instead are tormented (Comm.ser.Matt. 70). The claim that the good servants will share with Christ a dignitas that sets them above everyone else points to an imbalance in dignity in the afterlife. This is also the case with Comm.Rom. 7.3.2–3, which clearly indicates that only some human beings deserve to be made “co-heirs” of Christ: while others may still be saved, they are not so progressed that they receive the “Spirit of adoption” and the dignitas that comes with it. The fact that all believers receive spiritual gifts and will not be damned in their afterlife, but the “Spirit of adoption” is bestowed only on the exceptionally progressed, is confirmed for Origen by the example of Abraham, who left his inheritance only to Sarah’s son Isaac, whereas the sons of slaves and concubines received just “gifts” (Gen 25:5–6): Comm.Rom. 7.3.2: Doubtless, what was being foreshadowed in this is that those who go on serving God out of fear will not be entirely rejected (nec illi quidem penitus spernentur), but there are gifts for them and there are presents; it is, however, to those who merit to receive the Spirit of adoption that the inheritance belongs.

42 For Origen’s thought on the role played by the Spirit in facilitating the progress of rational creatures towards higher degrees of participation in the Son, cf. Hermanin de Reichenfeld (2021): 113–153, focusing on the Commentary on John. The idea that the Spirit allows worthy human beings who have pursued the participation in Christ to achieve it is further explored in my section 4.2.1 43 For this text, see section 2.2. 44 See section 10.3.3.

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This view on dignitas in the afterlife expressed in Rufinus’ translation of Comm.Rom. 7.3.2–3 appears different from what was conveyed in Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis: a disparity in rank even among those who are saved would go against the statement that in the end times there will be “no difference” among the creatures (Princ. 3.6.4). There is therefore a discrepancy between the way progress is envisioned in Comm.Rom. 7.3.3 compared with Princ. 3.6. The latter, originally written by Origen around 230,45 has a stronger universal focus: although Princ. 3.6.1 explicitly connects the likeness with individual merit, it also presents the “dignity of the likeness” as a step towards the final “property of unity” or “perfect restoration of the whole creation”, claiming that in the end times everyone will eventually be reunited with God through Christ. While Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6 regards therefore the whole creation, the passages in the commentaries, produced by Origen between 243 and 249, are mainly concerned with the reward specifically set aside for the righteous in the afterlife, without stating that in the end times this imbalance in rank between worthy and less worthy individuals will be overcome. Provided that we take the Latin translations as an overall faithful witness of Origen’s thought on the dignity of the creatures if not of his exact words or arguments, this discrepancy between the views on universal equality in the end times expressed in De Principiis and the claims in the later commentaries that some people will deserve a higher dignitas in their afterlife could be interpreted in two ways. The first explanation is that the different translations reflect an evolution in Origen’s thought on the end times, as suggested by Ronald Heine (2010): later in his life Origen still believed in the educational purpose of the punishments in the afterlife, and, thus, that all human beings may eventually be saved, but did not think anymore that in the end times all creatures will be perfectly equal in rank. The ambivalence and uncertainness in our understanding of Origen’s thought on the end times depend in part on later controversies, but also on the fact that Origen himself addressed apocatastasis as an open issue rather than as a dogma.46 Origen discussed universal salvation throughout his life in different contexts for different purposes in consideration of different audiences,47 rather than offering one consistent explanation of the issue. For other scholars, such as Prinzivalli,48 the fact that Origen expressed his views on a difficult matter such as apocatastasis in his usual investigative style and in consideration of the different needs of his audience should not lead us to 45

The dating of De Principiis varies from 215 to 230, with 231 being the terminus ante quem; cf. Sfameni Gasparro (1998): 237–295. Most scholars favour a late dating around 229 or 230, cf. Behr (2017): xvii; Simonetti, s.v. “Principi”, in Monaci Castagno (2000): 373. 46 Bendinelli (2004): 55–59; Evers (2019): 53–54. 47 Scott (2010). 48 S.v. “Apocatastasi”, in Monaci Castagno (2000): 24–29; cf. Simonetti (2011): 19–22, arguing that at the time when Origen wrote the Commentary on Matthew Origen’s views on apocatastasis were the same as when he wrote De Principiis.

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think that Origen himself ever doubted universal salvation. Although his opinion is thus not universally accepted, Heine successfully argues that Origen’s stance on the end times and on universalism should not be seen as simple and monolithic, although opponents like Jerome presents it as such.49 So, it is possible that in the commentaries Origen was in the process of rethinking his views on universal salvation as expressed in De Principiis,50 and actually envisioned the end times as characterised by an imbalance in dignity. The belief in the existence of various degrees of dignitas in the end times is expressed by Latin authors of the late 4th century who were likely aware of Origen’s thought, such as Hilary of Poitiers and Jerome.51 Their writings confirm that, at the time when Rufinus translated De Principiis and the Commentary on Romans, the use of dignitas to denote a special status in the afterlife attained by the worthy, although less frequent than the use of dignitas as social rank, was well attested. Moreover, the idea that Origen believed in universal salvation but not in universal equality could explain why in the same commentaries we find mentions of the high rank set aside for the righteous but also references to universal salvation. There are several passages in the commentaries implying that all creatures (or at least all human beings) will in the end be saved through Christ. One example is Comm.ser.Matt. 8, indicating that “subjection of all things” to Christ in 1Cor 15:27–28 means “salvation of all things”. More examples are found in the Commentary on Romans, such as in Origen’s interpretation of Rom 5:19 (“For as by the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, so by the one man’s obedience the many will be made righteous”): Comm.Rom. 5.1.38: Just as death exercised dominion in this age through one man, Adam, and the whole human race became mortal, so also in the future age life shall reign through Christ and the whole human race (omne hominum genus) will be bestowed with immortality.

The fact that this passage refers to universal salvation is further reinforced by the comparison with the following chapter Comm.Rom. 5.2. In Comm.Rom. 5.2.6–8, Origen reflects on the reasons why Paul said in Rom 5:19 that “many” (and not “all”) will be made righteous. Origen explains that God’s punishment is ultimately good for sinners, as it is intended to prompt their repentance and subsequent rehabilitation, but it is terrible to endure, so we should not abuse God’s patience and resist repentance. This is why Paul does not say explicitly that all human beings will in the end be saved by Christ, not because it is not true, but rather so that people do not become lazy and persist in their sin relying on the certainty of universal salvation, instead of fearing God’s punishment.

49 See section 10.2.2: for Jerome, Origen believed that in the end there would be no distinction whatsoever between sinners and saints as regards their dignity. 50 Heine (2010): 238–256. 51 See section 10.2.2.

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As Origen states in Cels. 1.9, the believers who find themselves in the less advanced stage of spiritual progress benefit at least from their simple faith that sin will be punished.52 So, at the time when he wrote his Commentary on Romans Origen most likely still believed that at least all human beings would be saved, but passages on the afterlife of holy individuals such as Comm.ser.Matt. 62 and Comm.Rom. 7.3.3 could be interpreted as indicating that he did not believe that all would share the same dignity. A second explanation could be that Comm.ser.Matt. 62 and Comm.Rom. 7.3.3 do not refer to the end times –in fact, they do not reference 1Cor 15:24– 28, i.e. the text that Origen most often quotes when he discusses the end times, as for example in Princ. 3.5–6. Rather, similarly to the “dignity of the likeness” in Princ. 3.6.1, Comm.ser.Matt. 62 and Comm.Rom. 7.3.3 could describe an intermediate stage after this life, when God’s rewards and punishments take place and establish a hierarchy among all creatures based on merit, but before the final apocatastasis, when every creature will have learned from their punishment and will finally have achieved the fullness of virtue, as indicated by Origen’s exegesis of the victory of Christ over his last enemy (1Cor 15:24–26; Ps 109:1, “The Lord said to my lord, ‘Sit on my right until I make your enemies a footstool for your feet’”). For now, there are different levels of progress; instead, in the end times, when every single individual will not only have attained enough merit to be saved, but will also have reached the perfection of the virtues, then the events described in 1Cor 15:28 will take place: Comm.Rom. 6.5.6: There is an order in the levels of advancement and there are degrees within the virtues (Est tamen ordo profectuum et sunt in virtutibus gradus). Hence, it is said that Christ certainly reigns as he is justice, until the fullness of the virtues is accomplished in each individual (donec in unoquoque compleatur plenitudo virtutum); but when the measure of perfection has been fulfilled (ubi vero mensura fuerit perfectionis expleta), at that time (tunc) it is said that ‘he hands over the kingdom to God the Father’ (1Cor 15:24), so that now ‘God might be all in all’ (1Cor 15:28).

This second interpretation of Origen’s views on the end times as reflected in Rufinus’ translations has consequences for our understanding of Origen’s views on the resurrection of the bodies as described in 1Cor 15:22–23, which mentions different ranks: “all shall be made alive, but each in their own rank (τάγματι)”. If we believe that passages by Origen on ranking such as the ones examined in this section pertain to the second stage, so does the resurrection of the bodies. The resurrection is thus not the end, which happens only afterwards, as indicated by the words εἶτα τὸ τέλος (1Cor 15:24) that introduce the eschatological section 1Cor 15:24–28, in which there is no further mention of ranks 52 For Origen’s views on Paul’s educational “deception”, cf. Edwards (2020): 305–307. For the theme of educational punishment in Origen, see Comm.Rom. 2.2–3; cf. Fernández (1999). For the presentation of this topic specifically in the Commentariorum series, cf. Bendinelli, Scognamiglio, and Danieli (2004): 36–38.

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or distinctions based on merit. If instead for Origen the ranking at the resurrection coincided with the restoration, this would mean that 1Cor 15:28 refers for Origen to universal salvation, but not to universal equality, as the element of individual difference connected to merit remains in the ranks of resurrected bodies.53 However, the view that a difference in rank among the creatures will for Origen be preserved also in the end times seems in contrast with the universalising description of the end times in passages such as Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.4–9, claiming that all creation will achieve the glory of the one spiritual body. The idea that the ranking based on merit happening at the resurrection could be permanent is also in contrast with passages in Rufinus’ translations of Origen’s homilies, which, like the commentaries, were originally composed in the 240s. Origen often describes this ranking at the resurrection (1Cor 15:22–23),54 but he also alludes to the fact that he does not see this as the end, which is instead for him the universal unity in the subjection to God (1Cor 15:24–28). For instance, in Hom.Jes.Nav. 8.4, Origen, in Rufinus’ translation, interprets 1Cor 15:22 as indicating that in the future resurrection at first people will be divided and ranked according to merit, but then, as the “last enemy” is vanquished (1Cor 15:26), all people will “unite into one for Jesus” (Nam et tunc dividetur populus in duas partes, erunt et tunc quidam primi et alii postremi, qui cum ad Iesum in unum conspiraverint, iam tunc ultra omnino non erit diabolus, quia iam non erit mors).55 For the debated issues of whether for Origen the rational creatures possessed a body even before the fall, and whether they will preserve it in the end, I follow the view of Samuel Fernández (2020): only the Trinity is truly incorporeal, whereas bodies are a part of the nature of rational creatures from beginning to end, and undergo a change in quality with the fall and subsequent progress of the individual but never disappear. At the very least, this is how Rufinus interprets Origen’s thought, judging from his translation of some passages in the eschatological sections of De Principiis, for example: Princ. 1.6.4: If anyone thinks that in that end (i.e. when ‘God will be all in all’, 1Cor 15:28) material, i.e. bodily, nature will perish utterly, he cannot in any respect meet my argument, how all such beings are able to live and exist without bodies, since it is thought to be a property of God alone, that is, of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, to exist without any material substance and apart from any association of a bodily addition. Another, 53 An example of this interpretation of Origen’s views on the resurrection is Therrien (2022): 104–114. 54 For example Orig. Hom.Num. 1.3; 28.4; Hom.Jes.Nav. 10.1; 25.4; cf. Pålsson (2021): 166–168. For the view that the ranking happening at the resurrection as described in 1Cor 15:22–23 is not for Origen the end, see section 10.2.2 and Prinzivalli, s.v. “Resurrezione”, in Monaci Castagno (2000): 401–405. 55 The view that the ranking at the resurrection (1Cor 15:22–23) precedes the defeat of the devil and the end (1Cor 15:26–28), and is not the end itself, is also implied by Origen in Greek passages such as Comm.Jo. 32.3.28–31.

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perhaps, might say that in the end every bodily substance will be so pure and refined that it must be thought of as the aether, in a way, and of a heavenly purity and clearness. Just how it will be, however, God alone knows with certainty…

Hence, this is the perspective which will be adopted in this study, which focuses primarily on Rufinus’ translations of Origen. However, the fact that the creatures will still have some form of a body at the end does not cause distinctions based on merit: Origen, in Rufinus’ translation, argues that the restoration takes place only after all creatures have achieved equal merit, i.e. they all attained the “dignity of the likeness” (Princ. 3.6.1) and are therefore equally rewarded with the transformation from the earthly, corruptible, animal body to the heavenly, incorruptible, spiritual body that was promised in 1Cor 15:35– 54. This means that creatures are in the end all equal with each other as they are one with God in their shared love – they are not however equal with God (only “like” him) because they are still bodily creatures, albeit rewarded for their merit with a purified spiritual body. The hierarchical difference between the worthy and the less worthy, both in this life and at the resurrection, is thus understood by Origen not as a permanent difference in the creatures’ eschatological rank, but rather as a difference in the time when they convert and are re-united with Christ. Those who are worthy will reach that goal and reap the benefits faster than others, but in the end, after the resurrection, everyone, including “the last enemy”, will eventually attain that same goal (Princ. 3.6.6). An example of this argument is Comm.Rom. 3.8.13, where Origen, commenting on 1John 2:2, where Jesus is called the atonement (ἱλασμός) of our sins, explains: “For although the entire creation is awaiting the grace of the redeemer, nevertheless each one shall come to salvation in its own order”. In sum, the Latin translations of Princ. 3.6.1 (“dignity of the likeness”), Comm.Rom. 7.3.3 (“dignity of the co-heirs of Christ”), and Comm.ser.Matt. 62 (dignity that Christ shares with his co-heirs) all feature dignitas in a similar sense, i.e. as the high status achieved by those who are exceptionally progressed in their participation in Christ, in preparation for the end times. At this intermediary stage, the souls of these holy individuals share the dignitas and dominion of Christ in the sense that they, like the soul of Christ, act as leaders and judges for other human beings, guiding them to share their blessedness.56 Hence, those who possess the dignitas of apostles, such as Paul, assist other, less advanced human beings in their progress towards the “spirit of adoption” (Comm.Rom. 7.5.5–6). In this sense, apostles and saints are endowed with dignitas as they continue in the afterlife to perform their office as teachers and leaders of the Church.57 This view on the elevated dignity of the worthy in the afterlife has strong universalistic implications for Origen. The blessedness of the saints – and even that of Christ himself! – will be complete only when 56 57

Orig. Comm.Rom. 5.3.5; Princ. 2.11.3,6–7. See section 3.2.

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everyone else will also share it, which, according to Origen, will happen when the events described in 1Cor 15:26–28 will take place. Origen, translated by Rufinus, indicates that the work of Christ is not complete until all creation has not only been saved, but brought to perfection: Hom.Lev. 7.2: For now [Christ’s] work is still imperfect (cf. John 17:4) as long as I remain imperfect. And as long as I am not subjected to the Father, neither is he said to be subjected to the Father (cf. 1Cor 15:28). Not that he himself is in need of subjection before the Father but for me, in whom he has not yet completed his work, he is said not to be subjected, for, as we read, ‘we are the body of Christ and members in part’ (1Cor 12:27). [...] See that, although we are all said to be his body and members, he is said not to be subjected as long as there are some among us who have not yet been subjected by the perfect subjection. But when he shall have completed his work and brought his whole creation to the height of perfection (Cum vero consummaverit opus suum et universam creaturam suam ad summam perfectionis adduxerit), then he is said to be subjected in these whom he subjected to the Father, [...] ‘so that God may be all in all’ (1Cor 15:28).58

Consequently, the prophets, the apostles, and the saints do not fully attain the highest reward for their progress in merit (i.e. the union with God) until everyone else has also attained perfection: Hom.Lev. 7.2: For indeed even the apostles have not yet received their joy, but they also await that I may be a partaker of their joy (Nondum enim receperunt laetitiam suam ne apostoli quidem, sed et ipsi exspectant, ut et ego laetitiae eorum particeps fiam). For the saints, when they leave this place do not immediately obtain the whole rewards of their merits. They also wait for us though we delay, even though we remain. [...] You see, therefore, that Abraham is still waiting to obtain the perfect things. Isaac waits, and Jacob and all the prophets wait for us, that they may lay hold of the perfect blessedness with us.

A coherent picture on the dignity of the creatures emerges from Rufinus’ translations of Origen: if the differences in dignity depend on the differences in merit as determined by freedom of choice, and if in the end every single creature will freely choose to associate with Christ, then there is no reason to have differences in dignity in the end times. This belief is in line with the anti-Gnostic concern that animates Origen’s entire output: for Origen “the end is like the beginning” (Princ. 1.6.2; 3.6.3), and it is heretic to maintain that at the beginning there was already a distinction between worthy and less worthy creatures (as stated in Princ. 1.8.2, but also in the later commentaries, as in Comm.Rom. 8.11.2). So, just like the beginning described in Gen 1:26–27 was characterised by equality among the creatures (both in their nature and in their rank, before the fall), also the end must be.

58 Orig. Hom.36Ps. 2.1: “When all things have been subordinated to Christ, [...] then he is to be subordinated. […] Look at his great philanthropy and mercifulness (τὴν πολλὴν φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ χρηστότητα; see section 4.3): he does not reckon himself subordinated, as long as there is anything not subordinated to the Father”.

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3.4 Dignity of the Heavenly Powers Especially in Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s De Principiis, dignitas also has a meaning that is very specific to Origen’s vision of the present stage in the progress of rational creatures as determined by their freedom of choice. The relevant passages are those where Origen explains his views regarding immortal beings such as the angels,59 and examines how they got their powers. Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 1.6.2–3 and 3.5.4–5 conveys that creatures were originally created by God simultaneously and all equal, without distinction between human beings, angels, and demons. The issue of Rufinus’ supposed interpolations in his translation of Princ. 1.6.2, such as those concerning Origen’s views on the succession of different worlds after the present one, was examined by Nicola Pace (1992): the matter of the original equality in nature of all creatures is considered authentically Origenian. As explained by Georgios Lekkas (2001), Origen’s claim in De Principiis that all rational creatures (natura rationabilis universa, cf. Princ. 3.6.1) were created equal, before individual differences were introduced with their use of freedom of choice, should be understood as referring to their common rational nature, due to their equal participation in the God Logos (cf. Princ. 3.5.4). However, already at their creation rational beings, although they all shared the same nature, were not for Origen one and the same, but were rather distinct individuals: the differentiation was established at creation as a potential, later enacted when the creatures started exercising their freedom of choice. The distinction between the orders (human, angelic, and demonic) happened only after creation, when the creatures, with the sole exception of the soul of Jesus Christ,60 neglected their relationship with God to different degrees. Now, each creature must go through the process of their self-actualisation, triggered by freedom of choice, a progress which Origen represents as the fulfilment of the “likeness” with God.61 As a result of the sin of negligence,62 now each individual occupies a different position in the hierarchy of the orders based on the intensity with which 59

For the various orders of heavenly beings see section 2.2. Orig. Hom.15Ps. 2.3: “As it was not the nature of God Logos to sin, the ‘firstborn of all creation’ (Col 1:15) could not sin. But the commendation of Jesus for not sinning (1Pet 2:22) refers to the human being. And if it said, ‘the one who did not sin was made sin for our sake’ (2Cor 5:21), do not hear this about the firstborn of all creation, but about the one who did not know sin, Jesus’s soul”. 61 See section 3.3.1. In this sense, Lekkas (2001): 27–37, describes the creatures’ individuality in Aristotelian terms as “first entelechy”, referring to this dynamic between potential and actualization beginning at creation. This theme will be further explored in my chapter 5, focusing on the “dignity of the image” in Princ. 3.6.1. 62 For Origen’s notion of sin as the creature’s “negligence” in the pursuit of the participation in good, i.e. in God, cf. Princ. 1.4.1; 2.8.3–4 (see section 2.4), and 3.1.14 (ἀμέλεια in the Philocalia; neglegentia in Rufinus’ translation); Arruzza (2011): 138–143. 60

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one desires the union with God and pursues the participation in Christ. The creatures who stayed closer to God obtained for themselves the elevated ranks of the various heavenly powers, each rank entailing a specific set of offices and tasks. Those who have distanced themselves the most from God’s love now find themselves in the abject condition of demons. Finally, the creatures whose love for God cooled off, but may be re-ignited, are the human beings.63 The condition of the creatures is continuously changing, as they always have the possibility of progressing in their relationship with God through Christ, if they desire it enough: dignity, understood as the status or condition attributed to the creature depending on the degree of closeness to God, grows with the increase of merit, understood as the creature’s love towards God and willingness to progress in the imitation of God and participation in him: Princ. 1.6.3: All those beings are regulated on the basis of order, and according to the measure, the kind, and the dignities of their merits (pro ordine, pro ratione, pro modo et meritorum dignitatibus dispensantur). [...] Every nature endowed with Logos is able, passing from one order to another, to go from each order to all and from all to each, while it continues, through its faculty of freedom of choice, susceptible of promotions and demotions according to its own actions and efforts.64

So, for Origen, according to Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis, all rational beings are created by God as equal in nature or substance (meaning that, for example, angels are not created by God as angels and as distinct from human beings); subsequently, based on the way they have used their freedom of choice in a state of their existence that precedes their current one, each creature receives from God a rank (for example, that of angels) which is appropriate to their merit. If creatures use their freedom of choice in a worthy way, i.e. to pursue a closer relationship with God, they can in principle attain a higher dignitas: there is no natural reason why a human being cannot deserve the dignitas of angels (with all the qualities and tasks that the office of angels entails) in a future stage of their existence.65 When used in this context, dignitas may denote the degree of merit displayed in a previous stage of the creature’s existence resulting in a specific rank in the present stage. This is the case with Princ. 1.6.3 (pro modo et meritorum dignitatibus),66 or with Princ. 2.9.7, claiming that the variety of celestial creatures and their tasks does not begin at creation

63

Cf. Martens (2012): 230–233; Grappone in Grappone and Bucchi (2016): 12–13. See section 10.2.1 for Princ. 1.6 in Jerome, Ep. 124.3,8. 65 Cf. Orig. Cels. 4.29: “Angels are so are so far superior to human beings that human beings who are made perfect become equal to angels (cf. Luke 20:36). […] Though we humans fall far short of these beings, we have hopes that by living a good life and doing everything according to reason we may ascend to the likeness of all these”. 66 For status used in a similar sense, i.e. as the degree of merit necessary to attain a specific condition, cf. Rufinus’ version of Princ. 3.1.17: “The past status of the merits is always the cause of the future status” of the soul. 64

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but is “proportionate to the dignity of the merit” (pro meriti dignitate) of each individual creature. Alternatively, dignitas may refer to the rank itself, as in Princ. 1.8.4: “It is not from any random or chance occurrence that the [...] orders are assigned their respective offices, but they have obtained the degree of their dignity (gradum dignitatis) in proportion to their merits”, or in Princ. 1.5.3, where Origen maintains that angels received their exceptional “power” (potestas), “dignity” (dignitas), and “glory” (gloria) as a reward for their extraordinary merit, and not because God gave them the qualities that relate to their office as angels when he created them.67 In this context, dignitas may denote the orders themselves. The angelic and the human “order” are referred to as dignitas in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Comm.Rom. 5.1.29, indicating that the judgement of God applies to every creature regardless of their dignitas, meaning regardless of whether they are human beings or angels. The reason why Origen is so adamant that the differences in dignity between the creatures depend not on their nature (as they were all created equal) but rather on the unstable and accidental element of merit, is found in the antiheretic purposes of Origen’s work, as declared in Princ. 1.8.2. Origen claims to be writing against those who believe that creatures were different by nature since their creation: in passages such as Princ. 2.9.5, Origen explicitly identifies these opponents with the followers of Valentinus and other thinkers whom he deems “heretics” (Princ. 2.9.6). Origen reports that Valentinus and his followers believed that some creatures were naturally destined to salvation from the beginning, whereas others would be inevitably lost (Comm.Rom. 8.11.2). For Origen, this vision is unacceptable, because it undermines the importance of the individual merit of the creatures and depicts the creator as arbitrary and unjust. The accuracy of Origen’s portrayal of his opponents is difficult to assess. In Princ. 2.9.5 this view on the difference of the natures is attributed by Origen also to Marcion, who, according to scholars like Enrico Norelli (1992), did not express it. In passages from the Commentary on John such as Comm.Jo. 20.8.54, Origen attributes this view to Heracleon, whom he presents as a Valentinian, but Carl Johan Berglund (2020) argues that Heracleon’s views might have been misrepresented by Origen. Conversely, other scholars, such as Manlio Simonetti (2003), defend Origen’s presentation of Heracleon as a representative of Valentinianism, in line with the description of Valentinian doctrines in Irenaeus of Lyon, Haer. 1.1–8, including the belief in the different natures established at creation. The deterministic portrayal of Valentinian thought on the different natures of human beings, as it emerges from opponents such as Irenaeus, Clement, or Origen, has been challenged by scholars such as Ismo Dunderberg (2013), Jean-Daniel Dubois (2020), and Alexander Kocar (2020), who highlight the complexity of the various Gnostic beliefs, not all of which completely disregarded the impact of freedom of choice and individual 67

For the usage of dignitas, potestas, and gloria in Princ. 1.5.3 see section 2.3.

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responsibility in favour of predestination. Regardless of whether Origen’s portrayal of his opponents is historically accurate or not, what matters to my argument here is that Origen’s insistence that the differences in rank depend on freedom of choice rather than on nature is often framed in his works – for example in Princ. 1.8.2 – as a response against what he presents as heretical beliefs on creation, which, in his view, infringe on God’s goodness and justice. The notion of the progress of the creatures is mostly developed by Origen in De Principiis. However, the view that the offices of the angels and of the various heavenly powers depend on the merit displayed by these creatures is also expressed using dignitas in other works by Origen which have been translated into Latin. For example, Rufinus’ translation of Comm.Rom. 9.30.2 confirms that the dignitas and the tasks of each angel are connected to their merit: “All heavenly powers administer the life of human beings, but each of them according to their own dignity and merit (pro dignitate et merito sui)”. Or, in Rufinus’ translation of Hom.Jes.Nav. 23.3 it is claimed that the judgement of God assigns each human being to the care of a specific angel based on the dignity of that angel (illorum dignitatem) and on the quality of the human soul (nostrae animae … qualitatem). A similar observation is expressed by Origen in Comm.Matt. 17.2, concerning the different kinds of heavenly and demonic beings: Origen claims that God assigns to each of the heavenly powers a dominion proportionate to their dignity, which is known only to him: “Each of these powers, established by God based on some ineffable dignity (κατά τινα ἀπόρρητον ἀξίαν), exercises dominion over those who are worthy to be dominated by that specific power, according to the difference among them”. The Latin translation of this passage does speak of an ineffable dignitas of the creatures, but refers it to those who are controlled by the powers, whereas the Greek text spoke of the ἀξία of the powers themselves: “There is not only one power for all, but rather perhaps one power for some and another one for others, according to the dignity of their faith (secundum dignitatem fidei eorum), which is known only to God”. Although this notion of angelic dignity is quite different from social status in this world, the term still indicates a rank connected to an office, hence a condition attained only by some individuals. The rank awarded to these individuals determines their relationship with those who are beneath them in the hierarchy: angels receive their superior dignitas because of their merit and this dignitas entitles them to preside over humanity. The fact that angelic dignity is not entirely different from the one encountered in the previous sections is also indicated by the fact that in the texts analysed in this section dignitas is likewise associated with terms such as “power” and “glory” in Princ. 1.5.3. Furthermore, the presentation of dignitas as the rank bestowed by the supreme ruler (i.e. God) on his subjects in proportion to the merit that they displayed by their loyalty to him is reminiscent of the views on the imperial faculty to distribute dignitas expressed in texts such as the Theodosian code. For

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instance, Cod.theod. 6.5.2 declares that the divine imperial decree “prescribed a fixed position and merit for each single dignitas”, and that those who attempt to usurp a position different from the one they were assigned are essentially committing sacrilege. Origen’s views on individual dignity are less rigid. In the Latin texts examined in this section, he clarifies that individual dignity as ranking is not directly a product of God’s creative action;68 moreover, Origen emphasises the mobility within the hierarchy of the creatures, due to freedom of choice. The dignity of the creatures is strictly connected to God, since dignity is determined by merit, meaning by the intensity of the creature’s relationship with God, and only God can know the true extent of a creature’s merit and therefore correctly assign them their proper dignitas – and the duties that their station entails – based on the current stage of their spiritual progress, as Origen claims for instance in Comm.Matt. 17.2. In this sense, while human beings can often be deceived by false dignity, and believe that someone has dignity only because of their success in this world, as Origen argues in Hom.36Ps. 1.1 (with ἀξίωμα),69 God is instead the ultimate judge of true dignity. However, the hierarchical order of the creatures and the differences in status or dignitas are caused by the freedom of choice of each individual creature and are not based on the nature established at creation by God. In Origen’s discourse on rational creatures, therefore, “dignity” is employed in relation to the key concepts of equality and instability.70 This points to equality being the inherent and inalienable natural quality of all creatures for Origen, both at their beginning and at the end with apocatastasis,71 whereas dignity, as it is based on each creature’s own will and not on unalterable essence, is always subject to change.

3.5 Conclusions “Dignity” is consistently understood in the Latin translations of Origen with a clear notion of proportionality, relating to the precise correspondence between the individual’s merit (or fault), their position in a hierarchy, and the characteristics and tasks that belong to that specific position. The dignitas attributed to a creature, be it social status, ecclesiastical rank, the high status of the saints in heaven, or the positioning in the various orders of the creatures, has always a distributive, hierarchical and relational quality. The dignity of the individual is traditionally understood as superior or inferior to that of another, it describes their relation to society, and is determined 68

Instead, the universal “dignity of the image”, equal for all rational creatures, is directly created by God, see chapter 5. 69 For Rufinus’ translation of this passage, see section 1.2.1. 70 For Origen’s views on the instability of creatures, cf. Princ. 2.9.2–3; 2.11.1; 3.1.23. 71 See section 3.3.

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by merit or by the public role performed in that specific moment. Dignity is therefore constantly affected by change, as it grows or decreases when the level of merit or the role changes.

Chapter 4

The Dignity of God and the Communication between God and Humans This chapter focuses on Origen’s view that Scripture must always be interpreted in a way befitting the dignity of God. This exegetical argument is connected by Origen to the theological notion that God’s fatherly love for humanity is expressed through his condescension, i.e. his way of communicating the knowledge of himself to human beings by adapting to the human language and experience.1

4.1 Understanding God through His Dignity Frequently throughout De Principiis and other works Origen highlights the importance of a correct understanding of Scripture, using digne or comparable Greek terms to denote a way of interpreting the biblical text that is always suitable to its divine author and subject.2 Origen makes two different, but interconnected, arguments on the topic of divine dignity. Both arguments are part of Origen’s discourse on the correct methodology for the interpretation of Scripture as a divinely inspired text: his first point is that Scripture must be interpreted in a way that is appropriate to the dignity of the Spirit or of the Son, who both speak in and through Scripture; his second point is that Scripture must be interpreted in a way that is appropriate to the dignity of the Father, about whom Scripture speaks. Both arguments are used by Origen to defend his non-literal methodology of exegesis: in this section, I will analyse passages where Origen is mainly concerned with opposing those who interpret Scripture only according to the letter; thus, I will speak in broad terms of “non-literal” exegesis of Scripture, aimed at producing a spiritual understanding of the Bible. However, as clarified by scholars such as Elizabeth Dively Lauro (2005), Origen often identifies more than one kind of non-literal meaning of Scripture

1

In his study of the early Christian discourse on biblical anthropomorphisms, Sheridan (2015): 30–31, points out that the term συγκατάβασις, “condescension”, often indicates in Origen and in other authors such as John Chrysostom the way God speaks to humanity through Scripture. 2 Cf. Orig. Princ. 2.10.2; 3.5.4; 4.3.5,9; Comm.Rom. 8.8.2; Hom.Lev. 5.1; Hom.Exod. 9.1.

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(at least two, which Dively Lauro refers to as the “psychic” and “pneumatic” senses of Scripture, each requiring its specific exegesis). Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Hom.Num. 26.3 is an example of the argument that the correct interpretation of the biblical text is the one that respects the dignity of the divine hypostasis who speaks in Scripture. Origen claims that since the Holy Spirit speaks through Scripture, Scripture must be interpreted in a way that corresponds to the dignitas (and maiestas) of the Holy Spirit.3 This means, for Origen, that the interpreter should “‘remove the veil’ (cf. 2Cor 3:14–15) of literalism”4 and research the hidden or spiritual meaning of the text (quae in secreto sunt; spiritalis intellegentia).5 A second example is Hom.Isa. 2.2, translated by Jerome. Origen discusses the issue of how the exegete should interpret biblical passages where food is mentioned,6 such as Prov 24:13 (“My child, eat honey, for it is good”). Origen claims that the honey that the Spirit, as author of the passage in Proverbs, invites us to consume must be understood as the prophecies in Scripture. Origen argues that only this interpretation of honey as a “spiritual” nourishment (mel spiritale) corresponds to the dignity of the Holy Spirit (pro dignitate sancti Spiritus), whereas the bodily interpretation of honey as actual food does not. Hence, the non-literal interpretation is justified by Origen as required by the dignity of the Spirit, who speaks in Scripture.

3 In other instances where Origen, in Rufinus’ translation, speaks of the dignitas of the Holy Spirit (namely, Princ. praef. 4; Princ. 1.3.2,7, but cf. Hier. Ep. 124.2), he refers to the rank of the Spirit as compared to the other hypostases of the Trinity. An assessment of Origen’s Trinitarian thought, or of the way it may have been interpolated by the Latin translators after the Arian controversy, is beyond the scope of the present study on dignity, but there are several studies on the topic, cf. Waers (2022), Ip (2022a), and Lee (2023). At least in the aforementioned passages in Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis, Origen implies that in the perfect union between the three persons of the Trinity there may be differences in individual substance but there is no difference in dignity or in the shared divine nature. If this really was Origen’s thought, this perfect union would be mirrored in the union of rational creatures in apocatastasis – as suggested in sections 3.3 and 10.2.2, Origen possibly envisioned the end times as the product of each creature’s individual choice to adhere to the Logos, so each creature joins the union as a distinct individual, but as all creatures have made the same meritorious choice and share the same rational created nature there are no hierarchies in dignity anymore. 4 For the exegetical and mystical principle of “unveiling” in Origen cf. Lomiento (2017). 5 Sometimes, Origen expresses this exegetical notion by referring not to the dignity of a divine person but rather of Scripture itself, which requires a spiritual understanding of difficult passages. Cf. Jerome’s version of Hom.Cant. 2.11: “Which of us, do you think, is competent to explain the full meaning of this passage and this mystery according to their dignity?”, and the anonymous translation of Comm.ser.Matt. 35: “Ascend now to the moral and spiritual understanding and see if you can, in some way, discover some meaning worthy of the grandeur of the knowledge of Christ and of the precision of the evangelists, so you do not debase the dignity of the wisdom found in the Gospel”. 6 For Origen’s interpretation of the biblical references to food, cf. Soler (2021).

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In other texts, Origen uses similar arguments regarding the dignity of the Son, rather than the Spirit, as the divine hypostasis who speaks in specific passages in Scripture. For example, in Hom.77Ps. 1.2 Origen examines the identity of the person who speaks in the Psalm, or rather the various persons. Origen’s exegetical argument starts from the observation that, while at least one of the speakers in the Psalm can be identified as Christ (based on Matt 13:35), the fact that the speaker of Ps 77:2–3 says that they have heard and learned something from their ancestors seems inadequate to the dignity (οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἀξίωμα) of the Saviour, whose only teacher is the Father. It is precisely the fact that this particular verse cannot be interpreted in a way that is worthy of Christ, hence, that leads Origen to closely analyse the entire Psalm and compare it to other Psalms. In this way, he ascertains that, while some verses must indeed be attributed to Christ, there are also other persons speaking in Psalm 77, namely the Church and the prophet Asaph. Another example of this type of reasoning involving the dignity of Christ as the divine speaker is found in Hom.Jer. 1.7, where Origen reasons that what Jeremiah says in Jer 1:6 (“I do not know how to speak; I am too young”), must not only concern the prophet himself, but it must be valid also for Christ, despite the fact that such a declaration of inadequacy seems inappropriate for the Saviour.7 Origen declares: “We try to bring these words up to the saviour” – he is here using the verb ἀναγαγεῖν, which is a technical term in Origen’s exegesis denoting his non-literal interpretation8 – “according to the dignity of the Logos (κατὰ τῆν ἀξίαν τοῦ λόγου) and according to the truth”. Jerome translates this statement of purpose as: “We try to explain the words that are spoken according to the dignity of the person (iuxta personae … dignitatem)” who speaks them. Following this principle, Origen proceeds to show that other biblical passages such as Isa 7:14–16 and Luke 2:52 support the idea that the words of Jer 1:6 can be applied to Christ anagogically, as they refer to the fact that Christ willingly “emptied himself” (Phil 2:7) in order to dwell among human beings and progress with them, just like humans who grow from young children to adults. So, Origen presents his exegetical methodology of seeking the spiritual meaning of biblical verses by comparing them to other passages in Scripture9 as required by the necessity that the meaning of the verses corresponds to the dignity of the divine hypostasis who utters them.

7

For this passage cf. Simonetti (2001): 13–18. For the terms, such as ἀναγωγή, that Origen uses to describe his exegetical method, see Simonetti (2004): 24–25; O’Keefe, s.v. “Anagogical Interpretation”, in McGuckin (2004): 50–51. Cf. Orig. Philoc. 1.22; the non-literal interpretation (ἀναγωγή μυστική) of the prophecies in Scripture is needed to preserve “the elevation and dignity” (ἀνάστημα καὶ ἀξίωμα) of God’s promises. 9 Simonetti (2004): 143–146. 8

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The second argument concerns how human beings should understand God based on Scripture. No one is truly able to speak “worthily” of the Father, because no rational being can fully comprehend God (Princ. 1.3.1).10 Nevertheless, it is possible to gain some level of knowledge of God, when the human mind, which has a natural affinity with God, applies itself to the observation of the visible creation and especially to the investigation of Scripture (Nam de deo quidem patre quamvis digne proloqui nemo valeat, tamen possibile est intellectum aliquem capi ex occasione visibilium creaturarum et ex his, quae humana mens naturaliter sentit; insuper etiam de scripturis sanctis confirmari possibile est). The exegetical principle is enunciated in Princ. 2.4.4: we must aim at a spiritual, rather than literal, understanding of Scripture, so as to think according to a worthy understanding of matters relating to God (non secundum litteram quae dicuntur advertimus, sed spiritalem intellectum requirimus in talibus, ut ita sentiamus, sicut intellegere de deo dignum est).11 For Origen, the “worthy of God” as an exegetical criterion has mostly polemical implications, as he employs it against notions of God that are based on an interpretation of the passages in Scripture referring to God that Origen deems incorrect. For example, Origen explicitly accuses “Marcion, Valentine and Basilides and other heretics” of “not wanting to understand [Scripture] in a way that is worthy (dignum) of the Holy Spirit” (Hom.Jes.Nav. 12.3). In Comm.Rom. 2.14.11, Origen maintains that heretics who distinguish the God of the OT from the God of the NT err in their interpretation of Scripture precisely because “they discern nothing spiritual and nothing worthy of God in these writings” (nihil in his sentiunt spiritale, nihil Deo dignum). This topic is further discussed in Princ. 2.5, presented by Origen as his response to those he calls “heretics”, who say that justice is different from goodness, and distinguish the good Father of Christ from the just God of the OT (Princ. 2.5.1). This distinction was typical of Marcionism12 and was based, according to Origen, Princ. 2.5.2, on the misinterpretation of biblical passages such as Matt 10:18, which was read by these heretics only “according to the letter” (secundum litteram) without researching the inner meaning (quid introrsus significet). In Princ. 2.5.3, Origen states that the idea that God could have been attributed with “goodness”, but not “justice”, or “justice”, but not “goodness”, is unacceptable because it does not convey the “dignity of divine nature” (dignitas 10

Cf. Orig. Princ. 1.1.5; 4.3.14. The importance of this device for Origen’s exegesis has been acknowledged by scholars such as Fernández (2015): 867n87, on Princ. 4.2.9, and Ramelli (2013a): 195, who notes its significance especially for Origen’s eschatology. Prinzivalli (2002): 96–97, analyses the significance of the θεοπρέπεια in Origen’s commentary on Ps 1:5, and remarks on the importance of this principle especially in the Christian exegesis practiced in Alexandria already by Clement (cf. Strom. 7.1.3.6). For the philosophical background of this exegetical principle, cf. Tornau (2017): 181–182. 12 Norelli, s.v. “Marcione”, in Monaci Castagno (2000): 258–263. 11

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divinae naturae). On the one hand, the heretics misinterpret Scripture because, in Origen’s view, they limit themselves to the letter of the text, and by doing so produce an unworthy understanding of the divine. On the other hand, those who interpret Scripture in a spiritual way conclude that God is both good and just, which befits the true dignity of divine nature. God’s dignity becomes in this sense an exegetical criterion for the spiritual reading of Scripture, a distinguishing factor between a correct and a misguided interpretation of Scripture, between a Jewish and a Christian approach to the Bible,13 even between legitimate faith and heresy. The correct understanding of what is said of God in Scripture is pursued, in practice, when each statement, action, image, or faculty attributed to one of the divine hypostases is measured against the assumption that they must always be worthy of God.14 In case the literal meaning of the text does not appear to say anything that corresponds to God’s dignity, then another interpretation must be produced. The problem of the interpretation of the texts in Scripture that appear to associate to God something that could be perceived as inappropriate to him was addressed already by Jewish allegorical exegetes active in Alexandria, such as Philo and Aristobulus.15 Origen deals with this hermeneutical issue by applying the exegetical principle of defectus litterae, described in Princ. 4.3. It is the observation that if for one reason or another the literal text is not acceptable as it stands, the passage requires an allegorical interpretation. This principle was often criticised by the detractors of Origen’s exegetical method, who accused him of ignoring the literal text of Scripture, when in fact for Origen only some specific passages in the Bible were characterised by defectus litterae.16 Dively Lauro interprets Origen’s references to the “flesh” or “body” of Scripture or to the “somatic” meaning not as a synonym for all literal readings of Scripture, but rather as indicating only those instances where the literal meaning of the text conveys a useful message. For Origen, as stated for example in Princ. 4.3.4, there is plenty of valuable moral teaching, historical information, and even significant theological notions in the letter of Scripture, which is only unacceptable in the limited amount of cases when the literal sense is unworthy of God (for example, when it speaks of his physical body), or when it says something manifestly impossible, irrelevant, or contrary to reason, such as when the devil is said to show to Jesus’ human eyes all the kingdoms of the 13 Cf. Orig. Hom.Num. 13.4: “This is why, again and again, we need to implore the grace of God, so that we may be able to explain these things, not by means of fables and ‘Judaic stories’ (Titus 1:14) but by reasonable interpretations that are worthy of the divine law”. 14 For the use of dignus in the same context in a text by Origen translated by Jerome, cf. his version of Hom.Jer. 12.1: “What God orders the prophet to say, must be worthy of God’s command (dignum … imperio Dei/ἄξιον ... τοῦ θεοῦ). However, it will not appear worthy (dignum/ἄξιον), if we stick to the literal meaning, and do not search for anything higher”. 15 Kraus Reggiani (1986). 16 Simonetti (1985): 102–103; Dively Lauro (2005): 51–58.

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world (Matt 4:8). So, whether the literal sense of Scripture is valid or not depends on its subject: the criterion “worthy of God” should be applied on a caseby-case basis to assess the correct meaning of each passage based on its subject. A telling example of this type of reasoning is when Origen addresses those who think that Isa 66:1 (“Heaven is my throne; the earth is my footstool”) indicates the actual size of the physical body of God. Origen returns often to the correct interpretation of this passage as proof of the incorporeality of God, for example in Orat. 23.3 or Fr.Eph. 1.19 ad 1:20, where Origen comments that if we were to interpret the heavenly “throne” of Isa 66:1 as a physical seat, we would not speak “worthily” of the divine nature (οὐκ ἂν τῆς θείας φύσεως ἀξίως ταῦτα λέγοιμεν). According to Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Hom.Gen. 1.13 those who understand from Isa 66:1 that God is corporeal “do not have such ears that are able to listen worthily to the words of God about God which are reported through Scripture” (non habent illas aures, quae digne possint audire verba Dei de Deo, quae per Scripturam referuntur). Origen then proceeds to show in which way one may truly obtain a worthy understanding of God (ita digne de Deo intellegitur) from Isa 66:1: in order to do so, one must interpret the text “figuratively” (figuraliter). Such figurative or allegorical interpretation will reveal that the text refers not to God’s body but rather to his relationship with creatures: “God rests and resides in those whose citizenship is in heaven (Phil 3:20). But in those who are still involved in earthly details, the most remote part of his providence is found”, which is indicated by the “footstool” in Isa 66:1. By contrast, when it comes to human beings, it “seems appropriate (dignum) to investigate” what Scripture says about them “according to the letter” (secundum litteram), and “to consider it also through allegory” (per allegoriam), as Origen demonstrates in Hom.Gen. 1.14–15. The distinction in Hom.Gen. 1.13–15 between one worthy way of understanding passages relating to God, such as Isa 66:1, and two worthy ways of understanding passages relating to human beings, such as Gen 1:27, indicates that the nature of the subject of a scriptural passage determines which kind of reading is appropriate for that passage. As a being of pure intellect (Princ. 1.1.6), God requires an entirely allegorical interpretation of the passages relating to him. As for the passages which refer to human beings, creatures who participate both of the bodily and of the intellectual (Princ. 1.1.9). the literal and the spiritual interpretations are both valid.17 In the passages analysed in this section, such as those from De Principiis and from the Homilies on Genesis, Origen employs the dignity of God mainly as a polemical device, rather than a theological notion: his purpose is to defend his spiritual exegesis and to refute the bodily interpretation offered by his opponents, based on the consideration that it is not “worthy of God”. Here, Origen 17

Cf. Martens (2012): 94–97. For Origen’s exegetical methodology as it emerges from the First Homily on Genesis, cf. Ludlow (2014): 48–53.

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treats the incorporeality of God as an underlying assumption rather than as a theory that must be proven using exegetical criteria such as “worthy of God”: the non-literal interpretation of Scripture is recognised as preferable and more “worthy of God” because it is appropriate for God’s incorporeal nature. Thus, in order to ascertain that the non-literal interpretation is more “worthy of God” the exegete should already know that God is incorporeal. This does not mean that Origen did not explain his belief that God is incorporeal: in fact, the demonstration of God’s incorporeality is discussed by Origen at length in texts such as Princ. 1.1.18 For Origen, any interpretation of Scripture must be in line with what he had preliminarily established as doctrinal tradition (regula fidei) in Princ. praef. 4–8 (i.e. monotheism, the goodness of God, the self-determination of the creatures, and the divine inspiration of Scripture), and it must adhere to principles of good reasoning such as non-contradiction: if a text appears to contradict either the ecclesiastical tradition that Origen subscribes to or reason, it will necessarily require allegorical interpretation.19 In the passages analysed in this chapter, the incorporeal nature of God appears as one of these a-priori principles, even though in Princ. praef. 9 Origen had included the issue of whether God should be understood as bodily or of a different nature than bodies not among the regula fidei, but rather among those dubious matters which should be investigated as they were not explicitly clarified by the apostles (and this is why he proceeds to demonstrate it in Princ. 1.1). The different treatment of the incorporeality of God in Princ. praef. 9 versus the passages on the dignity of God analysed in this chapter is probably motivated by the fact that the latter focus more on the different ways in which God communicates himself to human beings at different stages of their intellectual progress through both the literal and the spiritual sense of Scripture, and on the salvific purposes of this layered communication, rather than on a theological investigation of the nature of God. 4.1.1 Layered and Inclusive Communication In Rufinus’ translation of Comm.Cant. 3.9.4, Origen analyses the two stages in which human beings, while still in this life, receive knowledge about the divine from Scripture. Origen intends to clarify why Scripture contains statements about God that appear unworthy of him and therefore must be interpreted in a deeper way in order to reveal a hidden meaning worthy of God. In other words, Origen addresses the issue of why God does not just speak to us in Scripture plainly as is worthy of him, instead of speaking in figurative terms. Comm.Cant. 3.9.4 concerns the correct interpretation of Cant 2:6, where the Groom, who was identified with the Word of God already in the prologue of 18 19

Cf. Markschies (2019): 54–61; Lee (2023): 36–42. Fernández (2005).

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Origen’s commentary,20 is described as “embracing” the Bride. Origen observes that what Scripture says about the divine Logos is expressed “through the customs of human speech, so that we hear it (audire: phase 1) through words that we know and are familiar with”. In this first stage, the communication happens on human terms, with words pertaining to our experience in this world as bodily creatures. At a later stage, says Origen, the meaning (sensus) must be interpreted (sentire: phase 2) according to what is “worthy (dignum) of divine and incorporeal things”: this will produce a correct understanding of what Scripture says about a divine subject. The two stages are necessary, argues Origen, because there are some less advanced human beings “who are unable to listen unless commonly used words are employed”: if Scripture spoke immediately as is worthy of God, i.e. in spiritual terms, there are some people who would be completely excluded from even the first stage of communication with God through Scripture, i.e. listening (audire). In Cels. 7.37, Origen explains that human beings in this life should progress in their knowledge of God starting from a literal understanding towards the spiritual. Thus, the reason why Scripture must be received in at least two stages is God’s love for human beings and his wish that everyone is able to access Scripture at least on its basic level, i.e. the literal meaning (Princ. 4.2.4–6). The duty of exegetes is to go through both phases of this communication with Scripture, especially when it comes to passages that describe God: they do not just “hear” the familiar expressions in their literal sense, relating to the present bodily dimension of the human experience (such as the act of “embracing the Bride”). The exegetes must also interpret their meaning in a way that is worthy of the divine nature to whom these familiar expressions refer to, and relate this higher meaning in understandable terms to other people who may not be able to directly access it themselves. In this way, exegetes are invested with an important soteriological function: as observed by Peter Martens (2012), scriptural scholarship plays a significant role in the restoration of the original unity between human beings and God.21 Only by investigating in which way the familiar may say something worthy of the unfamiliar,22 one can gain some insight into the unfamiliar. In this case, the unfamiliar theme is the communication of knowledge between the Logos and the Church, which is how Origen interprets the embrace in Comm.Cant. 3.9.9–10. Origen makes a similar argument regarding the dignity of God and the communication between God and human beings through Scripture in Hom.Jer. 20

For Origen’s exegesis of the Bride and Groom see section 2.6. See section 3.3. 22 This association between familiar and unfamiliar is the basis for metaphoric reasoning. For Lakoff and Johnson (1980), our knowledge of the world is based on the way we create concepts to categorise reality; these concepts are organised as metaphors, as we tend to understand unfamiliar concepts by associating them to familiar ones. 21

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18.6: Origen explains that the way God communicates with human beings is comparable to an adult who wants to be understood by a child. If those who are superior in power and abilities to another, such as adults compared with children, want to communicate with others, it is necessary that the adults condescend (συγχαταβαίνοντας) to the children’s mode of speech. Otherwise, if adults were to “maintain the dignity (τηροῦντας ... τὸ ἀξίωμα) of grown-ups”, which would forbid them to “speak inarticulately” like a child does, then the child would not understand and communication would be impossible.23 The “worthy of God” as exegetical criterion is therefore a necessity produced by the fact that God lowers himself and speaks to human beings as his children: humans initially require the simpler language that references what is familiar to them, but as they grow in faith they should become able to seek an understanding that is worthy of the greatness of God and progress to the spiritual interpretation. This is God’s condescension, or as Richard Hanson (1959) calls it, the “principle of accommodation” of the Logos in his communication with human beings, which is made accessible and useful to all at least in its first basic stage.24 For Origen, the fact that the literal meaning of Scripture appears sometimes as not befitting God’s dignity is motivated by God’s parental love for all human beings, including those who do not (yet) possess the intellectual, moral, and exegetical skills25 necessary to understand the spiritual meaning of Scripture without the mediation of language referring to the more familiar experience of bodily creatures. Furthermore, the divergence between the literal sense of the text and the true spiritual meaning is also helpful for the more advanced reader, as it prompts them to hone their exegetical skills and therefore to progress further in their understanding of Scripture (Princ. praef. 3). Regarding the possibility that these less advanced Christians can also reach a higher level of understanding of Scripture, in the next section (4.2) it will be shown that Origen, when arguing against Celsus, maintains that a formal Greek education is not a necessary requirement for accessing the communication with the Logos; in fact, for Origen the power of the Christian message, compared with Greek philosophy, resides in the fact that the Logos makes himself 23 Cf. Orig. Cels. 2.76: “If my prophets and Jesus himself, with a view to the conversion of their hearers, utter the word Woe (cf. Isa 5:8–24) and others that you regard as abuse, is there in the use of such words no accommodation (οὐδὲν οἰκονομεῖται) to the capacity of the hearers, and does he not apply such a warning to them as a healing medicine? Perhaps, however, you want God, or him who shares in the divine nature, in addressing humankind to consider only his own nature and what is worthy of himself (τὰ κατ’ἀξίαν ἑαυτοῦ), and no more to consider what is suitable for proclamation to human beings who are under the care and guidance of God’s Logos, and what may be appropriately addressed to each individual according to their fundamental character (ἑκάστῳ γε κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἦθος)”. 24 Hanson (1959): 210–231. As a preacher, Origen was similarly mindful of the needs of his audience, cf. Markschies (1997). 25 Cf. Monaci Castagno (1981).

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potentially available to all regardless of their means and status. According to Karen Jo Torjesen (1986), Origen envisioned the advancement of the exegete from the literal sense to a higher spiritual understanding of Scripture as a progress towards the knowledge of God that eventually every soul will complete with the guidance of the incarnate Logos. This is true for the global history of creation from beginning to end, but not necessarily for the lifespan of every individual person in this world: Origen believes that in the end times every soul will attain the union with God, and he views all creatures as endowed with the same natural capabilities.26 Thus, Origen emphasises that everyone should seek to progress in their understanding of Scripture as much as is possible for them, because no one is naturally incapable of receiving the Logos.27 In her study on divine condescension, Corine Milad (2018) argues that Origen envisioned progress not only as an advancement in reason, but also as an ethical and a religious process attained through a dynamic and personal relationship with the incarnate Logos. Thus, Origen did not believe that people who were less intellectually advanced were incapable of pursuing spiritual progress, especially when guided by a teacher who, in descending to their level, imitates the humility of Christ, expressed in his kenosis (Phil 2:7). However, Origen does not indicate in his extant writings that each and every Christian, regardless of their personal inclinations, skillset, and virtue, is equally capable of achieving a fully spiritual understanding of Scripture in this life: conversely, in texts such as Hom.Gen. 1.7 or especially Hom.Num. 27.1 he stresses that the multiple layers of meaning in Scripture are meant to target the individual needs of Christians at different stages of spiritual maturity. For this reason, God takes care to include in his teaching also those who at this stage of their existence are not able immediately to grasp the spiritual meaning of Scripture, and yet, with the proper guidance, can receive something of value from Scripture, that will help them to better themselves. The spiritual exegete and preacher must imitate God’s care: for Origen, the main requirements for Church leaders,28 apart from virtuous conduct, are the theological and philological skills necessary to produce a correct spiritual interpretation of Scripture, as well as the communication skills necessary to relate this interpretation to their communities in the ways that are most appropriate for every level of their audience. So, in the writings of Origen, Latin terms such as dignus, digne or dignitas, as well as the Greek noun ἀξίωμα, are used in relation to the divine in a discourse about the importance for human beings to gain an understanding of God 26 For Origen’s views on the nature of rational creatures, see section 3.4; for the end times, see sections 3.3; 10.2.2. See also section 6.5.2: Origen’s belief that no human being is by nature less capable than others to reach perfection is contrasted with the views on humanity emerging from Cicero’s De Officiis. 27 Dively Lauro (2005): 78–85. 28 See section 3.2.

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that is appropriate to his incorporeal nature, which clearly marks the distinction between God and bodily creatures. The dignity of God forbids us to think of him through our physical realities, thus highlighting the distance between divine and human. For example, dignus is used in Princ. 1.2.4, dealing with the topic of the begetting of the Son, to highlight the radical difference between divine and human activity: the relationship between the Son and the Father should never be understood in terms of human familial relationships, but rather as something “exceptional and worthy of God”, that has no parallel in the world of his creation. This sharp distinction between the sublime, incorporeal nature of the Trinity who expresses itself through Scripture and the noble, but still corporeal nature of the rational creatures to whom Scripture is addressed is very significant to Origen’s argument on the dignity of God. As will be further discussed in sections 4.2–3, in order fully to appreciate the greatness of God’s love for his creation one must be aware of how wide the disparity between creature and creator is in both dignity and nature, and therefore how extraordinary it is that, in his interactions with creatures, God condescends to their lower dignity. Thus, Origen remarks that, because of this natural distinction, the knowledge of God shared by the hypostases of the Trinity is very different from the knowledge that is attainable by creatures (including humans as well as angels and other rational beings). This is highlighted in Origen’s interpretation, as provided in texts such as Princ. 4.3.14, of the Seraphim that surround and hide God in the vision of Isaiah (Isa 6:2–3), which Origen identifies with the Son and the Holy Spirit. In Hom.Isa. 4.1, Origen, in Jerome’s translation, maintains that no creature can truly understand the sanctity of God according to its very dignity (iuxta dignitatem rei): the kind of understanding that is truly worthy of God is accessible only to the Trinity.29 For this reason, when Origen speaks of the understanding or knowledge of God available to human beings through the study of Scripture and the guidance of Christ, he refers to an incomplete and imperfect knowledge. This knowledge is presented by Origen as the worthiest pursuit for any human being; and yet it is necessarily always “in progress” (Princ. 4.3.14). Emmanuel Albano (2014) argues that for Origen the limitations in the knowledge available to human beings through the study of Scripture are due not only to the limited capacity of understanding God possessed by human beings as embodied creatures before the end times, but also to the nature of Scripture itself, a divinely inspired text, and yet a text transmitted by human beings (albeit exceptionally progressed ones) in the human language. Thus, according to Albano, Origen regarded the knowledge derived from the study of Scripture as a necessary “introduction” (εἰσαγωγή) to the divine mysteries. Because each human being should put their efforts into perfecting an exegetical methodology aimed at drawing from Scripture as much knowledge 29

Dively Lauro (2021).

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about God as it is possible for them, the dignity of God facilitates the relationship between the creature and the creator, because spiritual exegetes may use hermeneutical instruments such as the “worthy of God” as criteria to discern between a correct and a misguided understanding of God based on Scripture, and thus to progress in their knowledge of God. If correctly employed (i.e. used in the context of a spiritual interpretation of Scripture), the exegetical criterion “worthy of God” allows human beings to ascertain some facts about the Father, for example that he is both good and just, immutable, and that he does not generate in a bodily way.

4.2 Origen and Celsus: Discovering and Communicating God as Is Worthy of Him In Cels. 7.42, Origen reports that his opponent Celsus, possibly a Middle Platonist active around 180,30 referenced Plato as the highest authority in matters of theology. According to Origen, Celsus based his argument on Timaeus 28c: “It is hard work to discover the maker and father of all that is here, and, having discovered him, it is impossible to tell all” (τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν).31 For Celsus, this text indicates that for most human beings it is impossible to “discover the path of the truth”. Some philosophers were in fact able to travel this path and gain some notion of the divine, but according to Celsus this knowledge could not be communicated to all, especially to people like the Christians, who are stuck with unreasonable notions of God.32 As highlighted by Cinzia Arruzza (2012), Origen’s response to Celsus’ use of Tim. 28c against the Christians reveals a “democratisation” of the knowledge of God. Origen was not the first Christian author to reflect on Plato’s statement in Timaeus about the difficulty of discovering God and communicating him to others. For instance, Clement of Alexandria praised this statement by Plato and emphasised that the only way for human beings to gain some knowledge of God was by receiving in their soul the divine Logos (Strom. 5.12.78).33 However, the

30

Villani (2018). For Origen’s use of this sentence by Plato in Against Celsus, cf. van Kooten (2014): 319–322; Limone (2018): 215–216. For an overview of the way in which Origen and other Christian writers (mainly Justin and Eusebius) deal with the agreements and the disagreements between Platonism and Christianity, cf. Morlet (2019). For the use of both Plato’s writings and Scripture in Origen, Cels. 7.42–44, cf. Di Pasquale Barbanti (2003): 118–122. 32 For the critique of the Christian notion of God expressed by philosophers like Celsus, cf. Zambon (2019): 255–272; for the logical tools and strategies employed by Origen to respond to Celsus’ arguments, cf. Somos (2015): 165–189. 33 Cf. van den Hoek (2009). 31

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fact that in Origen the commentary on Tim. 28c is framed as a direct response to an attack on Christianity allows us fully to appreciate the difference between the beliefs regarding the knowledge of God held by philosophers such as Celsus (at least according to Origen’s report) and the new Christian ideas as represented by Origen, as well as the social impact of their respective views on what is truly “worthy of God”. Origen praises Plato’s statement in Tim. 28c as noble and impressive, but he argues that Scripture offers a perspective on the possibility of human knowledge of the divine that is more in line with the greatness of God. Origen reasons that Holy Scripture as God’s word describes the God Logos as having more love for humans (φιλανθρωπότερον) than as described by Plato. In Cels. 7.42, Origen employs the term “philanthropy” to denote the love of God for his creatures and his willingness to reach out to them through the incarnate Logos.34 In Cels. 7.42, Origen explains that, according to Plato, the very best of human nature could either get to know God “to a worthy degree” (κατ’ἀξίαν), or, if this is not possible, at least reach a higher level of knowledge of God in comparison to the knowledge possessed by the multitude. However, Origen, with a reversal of Plato’s argument, states that human nature is actually not at all sufficient in itself (αὐτάρκης) to discover God.35 Instead, it is the divine Logos himself that, moved by philanthropy, makes himself available to all with the incarnation. So, for Plato God is knowable by a few people and ultimately not communicable to all. For Origen, God is knowable by none and communicates himself potentially to everybody through the incarnate Logos, in the measure that is convenient to each embodied soul. The incarnate God Logos can potentially be discovered by all; in fact, he is “found” only “by those who, after doing what they can, recognise that they need him” (εὑρισκομένου τοῖς ὁμολογοῦσι μετὰ τὸ παρ’αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν ὅτι δέονται αὐτοῦ, Cels. 7.42). In Princ. 3.6.1,36 Origen claims that in principle all human beings are given the possibility of joining the Logos and becoming like God, but not all of them actually reach this goal at the same time. In Cels. 7.42, Origen clarifies that human beings have the possibility of discovering God not because their nature is able to attain that knowledge, but because the Logos “became flesh”.37 Human beings fulfil that possibility only by accepting the 34

For this understanding of philanthropy cf. Orig. Hom.67Ps. 1.2–3, see section 4.3. For a summary of the evolution of the understanding of “philanthropy” from pre-Christian Greece to the Byzantine Church, and the key role played by Clement of Alexandria’s and Origen’s views, cf. McGuckin (2010): 50–60. For an analysis of the terminology employed by Origen in Against Celsus and other Greek works to refer to God and to Christ as benefactors cf. Messer (2022), esp. 218–220 for “philanthropy”. 35 Cf. Orig. Princ. 1.1.8. 36 See section 3.3.1. 37 For the theme of the incarnation of the Logos in Origen’s polemic against Celsus’ views on the knowledge of God available to human beings, cf. Uhrig (2004): 381–394.

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shortcomings of human nature and consequently by acknowledging how necessary it was for them that the Logos “became flesh”. If God is “found by those … who recognise that they need him”, then “discovering God” means contemplating the greatness of his love for humans, expressed through the incarnation of the Logos. Knowing the true God as is worthy of him means knowing his love for humanity, and this is why Celsus and Plato, who thought that it was not impossible for human nature to know God, did not “recognise”, according to Origen’s Cels. 7.42, how indispensable it was for human beings that God himself made this knowledge available to them through the incarnation of the Logos. Because he did not recognise that he needed the Logos, Plato did not “find” the Logos and did not know God “to a worthy degree” (κατ’ἀξίαν). Origen emphasises that human beings cannot attain the knowledge of God by themselves also in Cels. 6.17, where he maintains that a worthy knowledge of God is obscure and unattainable (ἀφανῆ καὶ ἄγνωστά ἐστι τὰ κατ’ἀξίαν νοηθέντα ἂν περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ) for all human beings. It is possible to receive some knowledge of God in this world, but only through the mediation of the Logos: Cels. 6.17: In the first place only the Logos knows and comprehends God as is worthy (κατ’ἀξίαν), and secondly those whose minds are illuminated by the Logos of God (cf. Matt 11:27). Neither can anyone worthily (κατ’ἀξίαν) know the [...] ‘firstborn’ (Col 1:15) of all created nature in the way that the Father who begat him knows him; nor can anyone know the Father in the same way as the living Logos who is God's wisdom and truth. By participation (μετοχῇ) in him who took away from the Father what is called ‘darkness’ (Ps 17:12) [...] thus revealing the Father, anyone who has the capacity to know him (ὅστις ποτ’ἂν χωρῇ γινώσκειν αὐτὸν) does so.

Passages such as Cels. 6.17 and Cels. 7.42 show that Origen’s view of a worthy understanding of God, in opposition to Plato’s views as represented by Celsus, is based on the notion that human beings may “participate” in the divine Logos, who reveals the Father and allows humans to take part in the Son’s worthy knowledge of the Father, as much as this is possible for each soul. Celsus does not understand how human beings may attain some knowledge of God because his idea of divine transcendence does not contemplate the possibility of communion between human and divine.38 4.2.1 Who Is Worthy of God? Because they did not understand how the knowledge of God is attained, for Origen philosophers such as Plato and Celsus had no way of communicating God “to all” (Tim. 28c). In Cels. 6.1–2, Origen remarks on the difference between Plato’s philosophy, which, noble and impressive as it was, remained confined to a small circle of Greek intellectuals, and the Christian message, which attracts and converts all kinds of people. In Against Celsus, this view of 38

Cf. Villani (2018): 119–125.

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the universal appeal of the Christian preaching is consistently expressed by Origen with the recurrent use of the terms “philanthropy” and “condescension”, which may refer both to God or Christ and to the human prophets and Christian preachers, as in Cels. 6.1: “Through their philanthropy (διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν), those who preach the truth should, as much as it is possible, lead towards the truth not only the Greek and the highly educated but also the ignorant and the barbarian”.39 By doing so, the preachers imitate Jesus Christ: Cels. 7.41: [Christ] enlightened humankind and proclaimed a way to worship God, and, as far as was up to him, left no one without some experience of his mysteries. On the contrary, because of his exceeding philanthropy he was able to give the educated a conception of God which could raise their soul from earthly things, and nevertheless he also came down to the level (συγκαταβαίνοντα) of the inferior conditions of ordinary men and simple women and slaves, and, in general, of people who have been helped by none but by Jesus alone to live a better life, so far as they can, and to accept doctrines about God such as they had the capacity to receive.

The principles of philanthropy and condescension are at the heart of Origen’s argument against Celsus on what is “worthy of God”. Celsus mocks the Christians and their Scripture for addressing the lower classes:40 in the quotation of the True Discourse reported in Cels. 3.44, Celsus claims that the Christians target their communication at those who have no proper education or any intelligence. This is why in Celsus’ opinion the Christians are only able to persuade slaves, women, youngsters, and people of low birth.41 To the claim by Celsus that the Christians reject people who are well-educated, Origen responds in Cels. 3.45–49 that Scripture attests that God appreciates those who dedicate themselves to their studies and supports them in their pursuit of knowledge; however, what Celsus considers wisdom is not in fact true wisdom. If Celsus argued that the Christian preachers only addressed the ignorant because they saw them as the only ones who were “worthy” of their God (ἀξίους ... τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ, Cels. 3.44), Origen responds in Cels. 3.48 that the Logos approaches everyone, regardless of their background or their means, and he makes anyone who comes to him “worthy of God” (ἀξίους … τοῦ θεοῦ). Hence, the difference between Platonists and Christians is not, as Celsus believes, that the Christians exclude from their communication those who possess worldly wisdom (i.e. Greek education); the difference is that the Christians,

39

Cf. Duncan (2013). Cf. Simonetti (2004): 93–95, for the connection in Celsus’ polemic between the claim that the Christians are not able to understand God in a “worthy” way, and the claim that with their Scripture they only communicate with lower social groups in a rather unpolished way, cf. Orig. Cels. 3.39. 41 For an assessment of the historical accuracy of Celsus’ claim, emphasising the involvement of women and children in the expansion of Christianity in the 2nd century, cf. MacDonald (2003). 40

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unlike the Platonists, do not exclude anyone, and only regard as true wisdom the knowledge that is communicated by the Logos (Cels. 3.45).42 The idea that Christ makes human beings “worthy” of receiving true wisdom (Cels. 3.45–48) is connected in Origen’s thought to the idea, described in section 4.1, of the progress of the spiritual exegete towards an understanding of Scripture that is worthy of God. This connection emerges from passages where Origen describes the exegetical effort of perfecting one’s understanding of Scripture as an act of love towards Christ as Wisdom. In Princ. praef. 3, Origen reflects on the reasons why the apostles left some parts or aspects of the Christian message unexplained.43 Origen claims that those who prove themselves “worthy (digni) and capable (capaces) to receive wisdom” are those who have been more diligent (studiosiores) in their effort (exercitium) to investigate those unclarified aspects of Scripture. Their exegetical efforts are motivated by the fact that they are “lovers of Wisdom” (qui amatores essent sapientiae): Origen identifies Wisdom mainly with Christ. Christ is the “Wisdom itself” (αὐτοσοφία)44 that enlightens the human mind (Princ. 2.9.4), and every person who is truly wise derives their wisdom from their participation in Christ as Wisdom (Comm.Jo. 1.34.244–246). Christ alone is Wisdom by nature and immutably, whereas the participation of other rational beings in Wisdom is accidental (accidentem), as it depends on their merit and on the love or diligence (studium) with which they pursued this participation (Princ. 1.8.3). The love for Christ as Wisdom demonstrated by zealous exegetes is rewarded by the Holy Spirit with the “excellent gifts” of wisdom and knowledge (Princ. praef. 3). Namely, the gift of the Holy Spirit is to allow human beings who have desired and pursued the participation in Christ as Wisdom to achieve it, thus becoming “worthy” of their creator (Princ. 1.3.8).45 The view that human beings are made worthy of receiving insight into divine matters by their love for Christ is also expressed in Comm.Rom. 5.10.7: because Paul has progressed more than anyone else in the love for Christ, he has reached a level of wisdom where he does not claim anything anymore about Christ that is not “worthy” of Christ. In other words, it is the love for Christ that made Paul the perfect exegete, according to the criterion of a worthy understanding of God analysed in section 4.1. For Origen, the intensity of the love that a 42

According to Secord (2020): 120–146, the critique of traditional Greek knowledge that we find in Christian intellectuals such as Origen must be understood in the light of a broader cultural conflict taking place in the Roman Empire in the 3rd century, when the long-standing Hellenocentrism was challenged as more attention than ever was given to other cultural traditions. For Origen’s views on the process of education as an interplay between human beings and the incarnate Christ in comparison with the views expressed by other Early Christian authors (such as Clement, Basil, and Augustine), cf. Gemeinhardt (2020). 43 For Origen’s views on these difficult passages in Scripture see section 4.1. 44 Cf. Orig. Cels. 7.17 (see section 4.2.2); Princ. 1.2.2–3. 45 For the role of the Spirit see section 3.3.2.

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person feels for Christ motivates them to study Scripture with diligence, thus making them worthy of receiving true wisdom, understood as the knowledge of the Father that is revealed (to the degree that is appropriate for the creatures) by the Son (Princ. 1.2.6; Cels. 6.17) and by the Spirit through Scripture (Princ. 1.3.1). Origen connects a hermeneutical argument on the love for the Son/Wisdom of God, leading the exegete to pursue a worthy knowledge of God through the study of Scripture, with an argument on the philanthropy of God, expressed through the Son, that has strong social implications. As already observed regarding Origen’s argumentative strategy in Cels. 7.42, in Cels. 3.45–48 Origen counteracts Celsus’ elitist perspective by proclaiming the universal power of the Logos, who communicates true knowledge and wisdom to all who open themselves to him. For Origen, only the understanding of God that is centred on his philanthropy is truly worthy of him: to think that being uneducated, non-Greek, or of low origin, would prevent someone from receiving the knowledge of God – and vice versa, that being the best of the Greek philosophers would allow some to get some understanding of God, albeit with great difficulty – means to impose limitations based on worldly status as a form of human dignity46 on the power of God and his philanthropy. This point is driven home by Origen in the polemic against Celsus by stressing the universal reach of the divine initiative: because God is not knowable by human reason alone (as no human being possesses wisdom by nature), but through the incarnate Logos, the ignorant and the disadvantaged have at least in principle the same natural capability of understanding God as the brightest and most learned philosophers. In practice, as observed in the section 4.1.1, those who are less intellectually prepared may not yet be able to unlock the full spiritual meaning of Scripture in this life, but even at the very first stages of their progress they are not completely excluded from the communication with God as, with the help of a preacher, they can still access at least the useful teachings conveyed by the “body” of Scripture. Although often in passages such as Hom.Gen. 1.13 Origen uses polemical tools such as the “worthy of God” to ridicule the beliefs held by those he considered less advanced in their understanding of Scripture, his emphasis on the fact that the different levels of meaning in Scripture are targeted to different audiences is generally meant to be inclusive, rather than elitist. The worthy Christian preacher needs to provide appropriate guidance to each member of his audience, by steering them away from the most outlandish or naïve readings of Scripture (especially concerning the corporeality of God), but also by communicating the universal love of God and by making sure not to perpetuate the exclusionism of traditional social and cultural hierarchies. In sum, Against Celsus presents a remarkable reversal of Plato’s ideas (as presented by Celsus) on how the divine is understood and communicated, 46

See sections 1.2.2; 3.1.

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something which Origen achieves through suffusing philosophical thought with biblical exegesis. In Origen’s view, Plato does not know God “to a worthy degree” because Plato thinks that only the best humans, i.e. the philosophers, are able to know God (Cels. 7.42). As a consequence of this view, Plato cares to communicate only with the highly educated among the Greeks: for all his merits, Plato does not aim at a universal audience, something which should be the objective of those who preach the truth (Cels. 6.1). On the other hand, for Origen no human nature is able to know God, and it is God himself who, through his Son, makes himself available potentially to all humans (Cels. 7.42). The notion of being “worthy of God” plays a very important role in this discourse: Origen argues that no one can be made “worthy” of discovering God by earthly conditions that differentiate them from other people; only the universal love of the Logos can make humans “worthy of God” (Cels. 3.48). It follows that all human beings indistinctively are potentially “worthy of God”. Origen stresses the universality of God’s reach, but also the importance of the human action in achieving for oneself the knowledge of God. Origen establishes a dynamic between what is in theory possible for all humans and what is in practice fulfilled by deserving individuals: the knowledge of God results from the individual choice to love Christ (Comm.Rom. 5.10.7), to “come” to him (Cels. 3.48), to recognise that we need the incarnate Logos (Cels. 7.42). Theologically speaking, the implications of the concepts of the two thinkers are: Celsus believes in an elitist, anthropocentric knowledge of the divine enabled through human agency and capability for a happy few, whereas Origen purports a universal theocentric communication of the divine enabled by God’s initiative potentially to all human beings. 4.2.2 Origen and Celsus on the Incarnation Hermeneutically speaking, the opposing views on how God should be understood and communicated are conveyed by Origen and Celsus through the nuanced use of the criterion of the dignity of God. Throughout the treatise Against Celsus, Origen employs the terminology “worthy of God” (ἄξιον τοῦ θεοῦ) to refute Celsus’ misguided representation of two specific tenets of the Christian faith, namely the resurrection of the bodies (Cels. 5.18; Cels. 7.32), and the Christological interpretation of the prophecies on the death and suffering of God (Cels. 7.17). This second argument is the most relevant here, as nowhere is the distinction between Origen’s understanding of God and the tradition represented by Celsus more acutely evident than in texts concerning the incarnation of the Logos and the passion and death of Christ. In the text quoted by Origen in Cels. 7.14, Celsus attacks the Christians who believe that Christ was truly God because in the OT it was prophesied that God was going to suffer and die, as Christ did. Celsus claims that, in order to establish whether a claim regarding God is believable or not, one should not consider

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whether the fact was prophesied or not, but rather whether “the fact is worthy of God” (εἰ τὸ ἔργον ἄξιόν ἐστι θεοῦ). Hence, according to Celsus, even if the prophets did truly announce the suffering and death of God in Christ, this impious and shameful claim would still be unacceptable, as suffering and death are not appropriate for God. Celsus weaponizes the criterion of the dignity of God, not unlike what Origen himself does elsewhere (see section 4.1). In order to refute Celsus’ attack on Christianity, Origen refers first (Cels. 7.15) to the logical devices provided by Greek philosophy (namely Stoicism), and then (Cels. 7.16) to the testimony of Scripture. Origen demonstrates that his opponent’s argument is based on a faulty logic: Origen uses what he calls the “syllogism of the two conditionals”47 to show that the whole assumption on which Celsus’ argument is based, i.e. the fact that the true prophets of God have predicted the suffering and death of God, cannot be true. Then, Origen provides evidence, coming from both the OT and the NT, that the OT prophecies48 referred in fact to the Passion and death of a human being, not of the supreme God or of his Son; Jesus himself confirmed in the NT that this was the case. Origen deals with the topics of the impassibility of God and of his philanthropy in a complex and multifaceted way. Fernández (2006) shows that while in polemical contexts such as Cels. 7.16–17 Origen tended to emphasise that divine beings such as the Son of God cannot suffer, in passages such as Hom.Ezech. 6.6 he attributes suffering not only to the pre-existent Logos (i.e. the Son of God before the incarnation in the soul of Jesus) but also to the Father himself. In many of Origen’s homilies, this is explained in the light of God’s willingness to adapt himself to human beings in order that he might benefit them.49 A different strategy is at play in Against Celsus. Origen reports that for Celsus the prophesied death of God is “impossible and inappropriate for God” (ἀδύνατα ... καὶ ἀπρεπῆ θεῷ; Cels. 7.15). Origen agrees with him: Origen specifies in Cels. 7.17 that the only point that Celsus gets right about the prophecies is precisely that prophesising the suffering and death of God is impiety. In this case, Celsus’ mistake, in Origen’s view, is not that he did not understand what is worthy of God, but rather that he did not understand the prophecies and their fulfilment in Christ, because he thought that the prophecies regarding slavery and death referred to God himself, while for Origen they clearly indicate the suffering and death of Christ as a human being (Cels. 7.16). Origen claims in Cels. 7.17 that what was actually prophesied is in fact truly worthy of God (ἄξιον δὲ θεοῦ), namely that the divine Logos would have united himself with the soul of Jesus and with his human body. Jesus’ soul, explains Origen, was 47

Somos (2015): 186–188. Hall (2021) emphasises the importance to Origen’s polemic against Marcionism of his belief that the higher or “pneumatic” meaning of the OT prophecies refers to the divine Logos and Son of God and to his incarnation in the soul of Christ. 49 This is a prominent theme in Origen’s Homilies on Psalms see section 4.3. 48

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different from all other human souls in merit, because this particular soul achieved a degree of participation (μετοχή) in the divine Logos that no other creature has reached yet.50 On the other hand, in nature the soul of Jesus and his body were created just like any other human soul and body, so it was not in any way absurd or inappropriate that, insofar as he was human, Christ experienced suffering and death. Origen clarifies in Cels. 7.17 that the purpose of the incarnation was that the Logos could remain untouched by suffering and death but still be able to dwell among humans and communicate to them the teaching (λόγον) that leads whoever receives it and cultivates it in their soul to the familiarisation with God (οἰκειοῦντα τῷ ... θεῷ). Origen often employs the terminology of οἰκείωσις to describe the objective of the progress of human beings, i.e. the “familiarisation” with God the Father.51 Origen presents the goal of οἰκείωσις as made possible by the will of God and through the mediation of the soul of Christ, and as something that human beings should pursue through their ascetical and exegetical efforts. Origen, Cels. 7.17 explains in which way the incarnation of the Logos in a human soul which in nature is just like any other soul facilitates this process of familiarisation: the incarnation shows that the presence of the divine Logos in a human soul is not an exclusive prerogative of the soul of Jesus. Every soul which opens itself to the Logos and strives to attain a higher level of μετοχή can in principle achieve the same union with the Logos that the soul of Jesus already possesses and communicates to others.52 The Logos, i.e. the Groom in the Song of Songs, “does not join only one soul, but rather many different souls” (Fr.Cant. 54).53 The difference is that for the souls other than 50 Orig. Princ. 2.6.3–7; Comm.Matt. 14.7; Cels. 3.41, 5.39, 6.79; Comm.Rom. 3.8.4, 7.7.7; cf. Stang (2020). Although Origen’s views on the soul of Christ are rarely explicitly discussed in the homilies (with some exceptions, such as Hom.15Ps. 2. 3–4), there are several homiletic passages where he may be implicitly alluding to his notion of the descent of the divine Son into a human soul as intended to facilitate the progress of human souls towards the union with God, such as Hom.Num. 27.3: “Those who ascend, ascend with him who descended from there to us, so that they can reach the place from which he descended, not because he had to, but because he deigned to do so, so that what was spoken might be true, that: ‘He who descended is the one who also ascended’ (Eph 4:10)”. 51 Orig. Cels. 3.56, 4.26, 6.45; Comm.Jo. 6.11.68, 20.17.135. For the appropriation by Christian authors of the Stoic terminology of οἰκείωσις (“familiarisation”) to describe the objective of Christian life to come closer to God, in connection with the originally Platonic notion of ἐξομοίωσις (“assimilation” to God), cf. Maslov (2012). Maslov focuses on Gregory of Nazianzus and his language of divinization, but the philosophical notions and terminology of οἰκείωσις and ἐξομοίωσις (see my chapter 5 and section 6.5.1) play a significant role also in Origen’s discourse on the relationship between humanity and God. 52 For the incarnation in Origen’s works cf. Martens (2022); Fernández (2019). Jacobsen (2015): 240–257, demonstrates that the incarnation of the divine Logos and Son in the human soul and body of Jesus is the core of Origen’s argument against Celsus. 53 For Origen’s interpretation of the Bride as the soul see section 2.6.

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the soul of Christ the union with the Logos described in the Song of Songs is not perfect or permanent (at least not in this life) but can rather be temporarily lost and then regained (Hom.Cant. 1.7). Thus, humankind needs guidance in this process, which for Origen, Cels. 7.17 is provided by the incarnate Son, not only thanks to the exemplary virtue and wisdom displayed by Jesus during his earthly life and especially in his death, but also as he leads humanity towards the union with the divine Logos, and, through him, ultimately with God. Passages such as Cels. 7.14–17 demonstrate the versatility of the hermeneutical criterion of the dignity of God: Celsus and Origen agree that any claim about God must be evaluated against the assumption that it is must be worthy of him, and they also agree, at least in this passage, that suffering and death is not worthy of God. However, for Origen Celsus is unable to use this criterion to read Scripture correctly and learn something about God: the reason is that Celsus does not have a grasp of the concept of μετοχή, the possibility that every human soul participates in the divine Logos, just like the soul of Christ does, without the Logos losing his fully divine nature or substance. Because he does not understand the communion of the human and the divine in Christ, Celsus thinks that the prophecies refer to the death of God himself. Origen produces a very similar argument in Cels. 4.14–16. Celsus maintains that the descent of God onto the human level is inadmissible because change (μεταβολή), and especially a change from the very best, i.e. the blessed divine condition, to the worst, i.e. the lowly human condition, is in conflict with the immutability of God. Origen agrees with Celsus that divine nature is immutable, but he argues that Celsus did not understand what is actually indicated by the biblical texts regarding the lowering of the God Logos. Passages such as the transfiguration of Jesus Christ (Matt 17:2) do not signify, according to Origen, a change in the “essence” (οὐσία) of the divine Logos, but rather that there are different “forms” (μορφαί) of the Logos, according to how the Logos appears to each creature based on what the creatures need at each stage of their progress. When the Logos descends to the human level (Phil 2:6–7), so that he might be received by human beings, he does so because of his love for them (διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν), as passages such as indicate. However, the incarnation of the Logos does not imply that God is affected by sin (1Pet 2:22; 2Cor 5:21). The Logos does not change from best to worst, for how can benevolence and philanthropy (τὸ χρηστὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον) be considered the worst? In Cels. 7.14–17, Origen agrees with Celsus both on the hermeneutical notion that what is not worthy of God could not be true of him, and on the theological conclusion that suffering and death were not worthy of God. In the case of Cels. 7.14–17, Origen argues that Celsus did not understand that the prophecies did not in fact refer to the death of God. In Cels. 4.14–16, Origen and Celsus agree that change (μεταβολή) is not appropriate for divine nature, and therefore it cannot be said of God that he changes. Once again Celsus is presented by Origen as unable to put his notion of the appropriateness to God to

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good use and to employ it to understand something about God based on Scripture. Origen maintains in Cels. 4.15–16 that Celsus failed to see that Scripture indicates that while the Logos “condescends” (συγκαταβαίνων) and assumes a human body and soul, he “remains Logos in essence, without suffering what the body and the soul suffer”, and that God remains immutable in his essence (τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἄτρεπτος) but condescends (συγκαταβαίνει) in his care for humans (τῇ προνοίᾳ καὶ τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις πράγμασιν). In sum, the reason why Celsus cannot discover God as is worthy of him, according to Origen, is that he lacks the notion of divine condescension: Celsus’ Platonic notion of God is less “philanthropic” than the nature of the Christian God. Thus, Celsus cannot conceive a God that, without losing his divinity, by means of the incarnation willingly lowers himself to include humans into the participation in his divinity. For Origen, because of this blind spot in his view of God, Celsus may possess the theory of the criterion “worthy of God”, but he is unable to apply it to Scripture in a correct way.

4.3 Overcoming Rank: The Dignity of God in the Homilies on Psalms For Origen, the biblical passages that seemingly attribute a bodily size or corporeal actions to God must be understood in a way that is “worthy” of the incorporeal nature of God, thus requiring a non-literal interpretation (as discussed in section 4.1). The hermeneutical notion of a worthy understanding of God was connected by Origen in Against Celsus to a worthy communication of God, and to the idea that God communicates himself to human beings through the Logos (as shown in section 4.2). This element of communication is put front and centre in the discourse on the dignity of God and exegesis that Origen makes in his Homilies on Psalms. The argument that Origen develops in these homilies concerning divine ἀξίωμα54 begins with the observation that a specific passage in Scripture appears surprising and therefore requires special attention from the exegete. Namely, Origen discusses in Hom.67Ps. 1.2 the use of the imperative in prayers addressed to the Father, such as Ps 67:2a – “Let God arise (ἀναστήτω)”, rather than the optative “I wish that God would arise (ἀνασταίη)”. This use requires a closer examination, according to Origen, because it seems surprising that God is addressed in Scripture in a mood that expresses a command from human beings, rather than a wish. Origen declares that he will demonstrate how it is in fact not so absurd (ἄτοπον) that “one who is subject (προστασσόμενον) to God and receives his commands” addresses God “with a certain freedom of

54

For ἀξίωμα as “dignity” see section 1.2.1.

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speech (παρρησία)”.55 According to Origen, biblical verses such as Ps 67:2a must be taken as proof that those who have respected (τετηρηκέναι) God’s commands may in turn “somehow command” (οἱονεὶ ἀντιπροστάξαι) God in prayer. In order to substantiate his argument on the freedom of speech of humanity towards God, Origen observes that this sort of communication between human beings and God happens frequently in Scripture, not just in a few obscure passages. Not only are human beings often shown in Scripture as not afraid to make demands of God, but “it is recorded in Scripture (for example in Deut 10:12), as something directly evident and rather normal (αὐτόθεν καὶ κοινότερον), that even God himself does not respect the dignity of God (οὐ τηρῶν τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ) but asks something of us”. This first argument leads Origen to conclude that the biblical passages where human beings ask something of God and he asks something of human beings must indicate that God has granted us “the freedom of speech to command him, provided we respect his commands” (παρρησίαν τοῦ προστάσσειν αὐτῷ, ἐὰν τηρῶμεν αὐτοῦ τὰ προστάγματα). Origen says in Hom.67Ps. 1.2 that human beings are subject to God and must respect his commands, but God himself does not respect his own rank (οὐ τηρῶν τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ). The noun ἀξίωμα is often in Origen the object of the verb τηρέω, to “keep”, “protect”, “guard”, “respect” or “maintain”: when the grammatical subjects of the sentence are in a subordinate position, like human beings compared with God, they are said to respect God’s demands and his divine dignity.56 One example is Philoc. 27.2: interpreters must respect the dignity of God (τὸ ἀξίωμα … τερῶν) by putting their efforts into finding the “goodness of God” also in the most obscure biblical passages, where this is most difficult, for example with the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart in Exod 7:3. However, when the grammatical subject is God, the sentence is often constructed in a negative form, as in Hom.67Ps. 1.2: God “does not maintain the dignity of God” (οὐ τηρῶν τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ). Origen acknowledges the boldness of his claim that God himself does not hold on to the divine dignity when he gives us freedom of speech, and, to further support this view, goes on to make an even bolder statement. Origen’s second argument in support of freedom of speech in Hom.67Ps. 1.2 is that we find in Scripture, and not just in the OT but especially in the NT, things that are much more surprising and scandalous than God allowing us to have some 55 Cf. 1John 3:21; Acts 4:13. For the “freedom of speech” towards God in Origen, cf. Princ. 3.1.22, commenting on Rom 9:20. On freedom of speech in Princ. 3.1 and the impact of the Pauline notion of παρρησία on Origen’s zetetic method, cf. Perrone (1992): 31–65. On Origen’s argument regarding παρρησία in the First Homily on Psalm 67, and its connection with the themes of the philanthropy of God, the incarnation of Christ, and the deification of human beings, cf. Cacciari (2020): 75–86; James (2021): 227–243. 56 Cf. Orig. Fr.Gen. D11: “The one who respects the commandment of the Saviour (τηρῶν τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ σοτῆρος): […] ‘becomes perfect as the Father … is perfect’ (Matt 5:48), becomes ‘image’ (Gen 1:26–27) according to all of God”.

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freedom of speech, and yet these surprising things are the core of the Christian faith. Origen points out that God is said in the NT to have made us “his heirs”, and “co-heirs of Christ”, by giving us “the spirit of adoption” (Rom 8:15–17),57 so that “we are not slaves anymore, but children” (Gal 4:7). This was made through the mediation of Christ, who, despite being the Son of God, was not above washing the disciples’ feet (John 13:4–5) in order to purify them and admit them into the participation of his own filiality.58 This argument leads Origen to conclude that through the adoption, God is our father and Christ is our brother, and so “what is surprising about the fact that a child, who has the right to speak freely to the parent, without dishonoring the ‘spirit of adoption’, when given commands by the father, commands in turn the father?”. Origen’s strategy in his exegesis in Hom.67Ps. 1.2 of the prayers in Scripture where human beings address God with the imperative mood is to interpret them in the light of the participation of human beings in Christ.59 If one reads the prayers in Scripture with the knowledge, derived from the NT, that human beings were gifted by God with the possibility of sharing the filiality of Christ, then – according to Origen – one should not be surprised by the tone of the conversation between human beings and God. Instead, one should recognise that these passages are in line with how the relationship between human beings and God is depicted throughout the entirety of Scripture. The relationship between human beings and God is expressed in Origen’s Homilies on Psalms as the relationship between a respectful child and their parent. Children who keep the commands of the parent are allowed to speak freely to them: Hom.37Ps. 2.3: But how will God listen to us, if we do not listen to him? How will he do what we want, if we ourselves do not listen to his demands? God wants us to be such that we could speak with God as if we were gods as well (quasi dii cum Deo loquamur). He wants us to be children of God, so that we can be made companions and co-heirs (consortes et cohaeredes; cf. Rom 8:17) of the Son of God.

Human beings and God, in this perspective, are not equal in rank, since being “subject to God and receiving his commands” (Hom.67Ps. 1.2) is the condition to deserve freedom of speech. Yet, freedom of speech indicates that there is a certain level of reciprocity in the communication between human beings and God. This reciprocity is made possible, according to Origen, “not because we are worthy (ἄξιοι) of commanding, but because the philanthropy of God and his mercifulness (χρηστότης) is great” (Hom.67Ps. 1.2). The discourse on God’s philanthropy in Hom.67Ps. 1.2 is similar to the one in Cels. 7.42, where 57

See section 3.3.2. Origen interprets the washing of the feet in this sense also in Comm.Jo. 32.4.49 and Hom.Jer. 16.4, cf. Simonetti (2006a); Cocchini (2006). 59 Perrone (2020–2021): 1.64–68, highlights the relevance in Origen’s Homilies on Psalms of the theme of the philanthropy of God, expressed through the incarnation of his Son, allowing human beings to participate in the divine filiality of Christ. 58

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Origen claimed that human nature cannot know God as is worthy of him, but God communicates himself potentially to all through the Logos.60 In Hom.67Ps. 1.2, human nature per se is not worthy of commanding God, but God renounces his incommensurably superior rank (i.e. he “does not maintain the divine dignity”) in order to allow human beings to communicate with him in a relatively free way. So, the use of the imperative mood in Ps 67:2a must be interpreted as indicating that through the “Spirit of adoption” (Rom 8:15) God grants human beings the extraordinary privilege of a relationship with him based on free speech, beyond the restrictions of what they would strictly speaking be “worthy” or deserving of. This usage of ἀξίωμα of God in Origen allows for a comparison with later usages of the terminology of dignity in reference to the divine. Texts produced in the second half of the 4th century, after the development of the Arian crisis, such as Basil of Caesarea, Hom. On Faith 2,61 Hilary of Poitiers, Trin. 2.27, or Ambrose of Milan, Fid. 1.4.32, use ἀξία/ἀξίωμα or dignitas in reference to the divine dignity of the Son, defensively arguing that this dignity is not in any way diminished by the incarnation. Origen’s argument on the dignity of God examined in this chapter is partly different: as discussed in section 4.2.2, he did not believe that the incarnation diminished the divinity of the Logos; however, in passages involving the theme of divine condescension such as Hom.Jer. 18.6 or Hom.67Ps. 1.2, Origen emphasises that God voluntarily renounces part of his dignity, at least from the point of view of the creatures. Although Origen’s discourse on the dignity of the Father has theological implications, dignity is primarily an exegetical argument for Origen, who maintains that the language of Scripture – which he understood as the “permanent incarnation of the Logos”62 – is where the fact that God “lets go” of his dignity for the sake of philanthropy is most evident. So, for Origen, the point is not really to argue that the incarnation does not diminish the dignity of divine nature, but rather to argue that the love of God is so great that he willingly loses dignity in order to communicate with humans, both in the sense of the communication between the divine Logos and a human soul and body in Christ, and in the sense of communication via Scripture, which sometimes makes use of forms or expression which do not appear “worthy of God”. The idea that seemingly unworthy passages in Scripture indicate that God lets go of his dignity because of his philanthropy or love for humanity is further highlighted in Hom.77Ps. 9.1. The text deals with Ps 77:65 (“The Lord awoke as from sleep, as a warrior wakes from the stupor of wine”). Because the text compares God to someone who has the bodily necessity to sleep (whereas in Ps 120:3–4 it is said that God does not sleep), as well as to a state perceived as 60

For this text and the argument on philanthropy see section 4.2. For this passage see section 1.2.1. 62 Simonetti (1994): 41. 61

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shameful such as drunkenness, this verse may appear unfit for God.63 Origen clarifies that God does in fact “keep himself in the dignity of his greatness”, but only for those creatures for whom it is worthy and fitting that he is awake (τηρῶν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ ἀξιώματι τῆς μεγαλότητος αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις); conversely, for others he “sleeps”. Origen explains the apparent absurdity64 of the biblical passage, where God is said to be doing something beneath his rank,65 such as sleeping, through the example of Paul: Hom.77Ps. 9.1: It is for love (ἀπὸ ἀγάπης) that Paul, who ‘can do all things’ (Phil 4:13), becomes ‘weak for the weak’ (1Cor 9:22), because for the weak his weakness was more beneficial (χρησιμωτέρα) than strength, which, had it been kept (εἰ τετηρήκει), would have preserved his dignity (τὸ ἀξίωμα πεφυλάκει), but the weak would not have profited from it.

The reason why we can learn about the Father through the example of Paul is that “Paul does everything by way of imitating Christ (κατὰ μίμησιν Χριστοῦ), Christ by way of imitating the Father” (Hom.77Ps. 9.1). If Paul imitates Christ, and Christ imitates the Father, then the archetype of the one who becomes “weak for the weak”, lowering himself to adapt to those he wants to reach, must be the Father himself.66 For Origen, the example of Paul reveals that, in order to benefit human beings, as well as all other beings endowed with a rational substance (καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων λογικῶν ζῴων ὑπόστασις), God “becomes for each one whatever each one makes oneself ready for, insofar as depends on their own choice” (ὁ θεὸς ἑκάστῳ γίνεται ὁποῖον αὑτὸν ἕκαστος, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ προαιρέσει, κατασκευάζει). Προαίρεσις is a technical term in Origen’s discourse on the freedom of choice of the creatures.67 Thus, in Hom.77Ps. 9.1 the exegetical issue of biblical anthropomorphisms is explained in the light of the soteriological and mystical notion that God enters a dynamic relation with the objectives of his action as determined by freedom of choice. Although God 63

For Origen’s presentation of the person of Paul, cf. Cocchini (1992): 29–66. For the salvific power of these seeming absurdities of Scripture, cf. Hom.67Ps. 2.5; Perrone (2021): 153–156. For the connection between the interpretation of these absurdities and the exegetical criterion of the “usefulness” (ὠφέλεια) of Scripture, cf. De Cock (2020). For examples of the exegetical methodology displayed by Origen in particular in the Homilies on Psalm 77, cf. Solheid (2019) and Perrone (2021): 199–219, who both analyse the homilies in the light of their audience, in order to assess how Origen targeted his exegesis specifically to them, with the objective of providing them with the exegetical tools to progress in their knowledge of God pursued through the study of Scripture. 65 Cf. Kim (2019): attributing to God something beneath his rank contravenes a specific principle of Late Antique rhetoric, namely what Latin authors of the 4th century such as Diomedes the Grammarian and Donatus call tapinosis. 66 Cf. Perrone (2021): 217, “By reconsidering in the 9th Homily the perspective of the ‘condescension’ (συγκατάβασις) in a movement backwards, from Paul through Christ to the Father, [Origen] regards it as a process fundamentally dictated by the compassion of God”. 67 Cf. Orig. Princ. 3.1.10; for the philosophical background of this term and its use in Origen, cf. Gibbons (2017); for its use in previous Christian authors, cf. Karamanolis (2020). 64

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remains perfect and immutable in his nature, in his communication with human beings he adapts himself to the current state of each human being in that given moment and responds to the creatures’ choices in the way that is most beneficial to them.68 Thus, the example of Paul becoming “weak for the weak” demonstrates that the sleep of God in Ps 77:65 is not to be taken literally. Instead, this kind of language in Scripture is meant to communicate that, while for deserving individuals God “is vigilant”, meaning that he supports them in their fight against evil, for the sinners God is “asleep”, meaning that he withdraws from them and temporarily abandons them to their sin so that they may eventually become aware of their condition and repent.69 The dignity (ἀξίωμα) of God in the Homilies on Psalms can be compared with the various notions of dignitas of the creatures expressed in De Principiis, namely the “dignity of the image” (see chapter 5) and the dignity of the creatures in connection to their merit (section 3.4). This can shed light on the relation between the dignity of the creatures and the dignity of God in Origen’s thought, even though we do not have a text where Origen explicitly connects the dignitas or ἀξίωμα of God with the dignitas or ἀξίωμα of human beings. In Princ. 3.6.1, human beings are said to possess the “dignity of the image”, meaning a status that entails the possibility of participation in Christ. This participation is made possible by a certain kinship of the spiritual element within the human being, created according to the image of God, with the pure spirit of the divine.70 In the Homilies on Psalms, Origen explains the fulfilment of that natural affinity as a familial bond, as the joyful participation in the loving relationship between the Father and Son.71 Human beings are allowed to share this relation as they receive “the spirit of adoption” (Rom 8:15).72 Hom.67Ps. 1.2 and Hom.77Ps. 9.1 show that the beneficial contact between the human and the divine is made possible by the love of God, who, despite his incommensurable greatness, accepts to adapt himself to the dignity of each creature73 instead of protecting his own perfect and immutable rank. Similarly, in Hom.Isa. 1.1, Origen (in Jerome’s translation) claims that God appears as more elevated or lowered according to the current rank or state of the object of his action 68 For God’s philanthropy as the reason why he adapts himself to the needs of his creatures cf. Orig. Hom.15Ps. 2.8; Hom.67Ps. 1.3: “The God of all is per se unchangeable (ἄτρεπτος καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος καὶ ἀμετάβλητoς), but because of you, human, he is said to undergo a sort of mutation, becoming for each one what it is worthy (ἄξιον) that he becomes for each one. Now Paul, as a human being, because of philanthropy and love becomes for each one the benefactor that they need.”; cf. Perrone (2020–2021): 2.433–435n4. For this theme in the Homilies on Numbers, see my section 2.4. 69 Cf. Orig. Princ. 3.1.12–14. 70 See section 5.1. 71 Cf. Ip (2022b). 72 For Origen’s exegesis of Rom 8:15, see section 3.3.2. 73 Perrone (2021): 157.

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(iuxta dignitatem negotiorum). By condescending to the inferior dignity of the creatures whom he wants to reach, God establishes a familial relation between creatures and creator. There is still a hierarchy, as children are subjected to the Father, but the differences in dignity do not prevent human beings and God from communicating with each other: the relationship with God is based on mutual love, rather than on the subjection entailed by the rigid difference in nature (and consequently in rank or dignity) between the omnipotent, incorporeal, immutable creator and the unstable bodily creatures. The references in Hom.77Ps. 9.1 and in Hom.67Ps. 1.3 to the fact that God adapts himself to the choice (προαίρεσις) of the creature indicate that the dignity of individual creatures as described in De Principiis,74 i.e. as the stage in the creature’s progress as determined by freedom of choice, still plays a role in salvation, as it determines the kind of interaction that will take place between human beings in their current state and God. In passages such as Princ. 1.6.2, the creatures’ progress was described as motivated by merit and merit was understood as the advancement in the love of the creature for God, leading to an increasing level of participation in Christ and thus to the achievement of a higher dignitas (for example, the angelic dignity). In this sense, in De Principiis the creatures’ willingness to pursue the relationship with God determined their dignity; in the Homilies on Psalms, the creatures have the possibility of a relationship with God precisely because of God’s willingness to let go of his own dignity. With this shift of focus from human merit to divine initiative, in the Homilies on Psalms Origen celebrates humanity as the object of God’s love, allowing human beings to share the filiality of Christ and even his divinity.75

4.4 Conclusions The dignity of God is at the heart of Origen’s notion of Scripture as the way God communicates himself to human beings: respecting the criterion “worthy of God” is how humans can learn something about God from Scripture (section 4.1). The fact that God does not respect his dignity is the necessary condition for the communication to take place (section 4.3). The dignity of God is part of Origen’s argument about God being at the same time very distant and very close to humans: on the one hand, for Origen the dignity of God forbids to think of him as corporeal (section 4.1), which signals a discontinuity with human beings whom Origen defines in Cels. 7.42 as “embodied souls” (section 4.2). Origen often uses the dignity of God to remark on this discontinuity between what is appropriate for human beings and what is appropriate for God in texts where he addresses bodily interpretations of 74 75

See section 3.4. As described in Origen’s Homily on Psalm 81, cf. Contini (2021b).

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Scripture, for example in Hom.Gen. 1.13, presented in section 4.1. In this sense, the dignity of God marks his overwhelming superiority in comparison to bodily creatures, and also the superiority of Origen’s spiritual exegesis of Scripture in comparison to a bodily interpretation: human beings may not be able to understand God as he is truly worthy, but they must still strive to produce an interpretation of Scripture that is as worthy as humanly possible. On the other hand, Origen also uses the dignity of God in his argument about the closeness between humans and God, which in his opinion is a consequence of God’s philanthropy. Especially (but not exclusively) where he challenges philosophical views of the divine, which did not consider a unique issue such as the incarnation (section 4.2.2), Origen is interested in explaining in which ways there can be a proximity between humanity and the divine that is not limited to humans becoming like God,76 but also vice versa. While the texts analysed in this chapter differ in genre and purposes, they all share one common view on the communication between God and humanity, i.e. that God wants to reach out to all human beings, and that this is done through the mediation of the incarnate Son. In this discourse on God’s condescension and his relationship with humanity, the notion of God’s dignity and what is “worthy” of him plays a significant role: passages such as Cels. 7.42 indicate that nothing is more worthy of God than his philanthropy; in the Homilies on Psalms Origen shows how God’s philanthropy is enacted through the voluntary loss of his dignity.

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Part III

A Turning Point in the Usage of Dignitas: Universal Human Dignity The occurrence of dignitas which will be investigated in chapter 5, namely the “dignity of the image” in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, stands out in comparison to the meaning normally attributed to dignitas in the Latin translations of Origen. In chapter 3, it was established that, in the Latin translations of Origen and in particular in De Principiis, when referring to rational creatures dignitas denotes a status attained through individual merit. In Princ. 3.6.1 (a passage that is only extant in Rufinus’ Latin translation), however, the “dignitas of the image” denotes a positive quality that is not acquired by the creature through merit but is rather given to all human beings upon their first creation and can never be truly lost. A possible parallel for this unexpected use of human dignitas is found in Cicero: the “excellence and dignity” of human nature in Cicero, Off. 1.106 also stands out in comparison to how Cicero normally employs the term, because, like in Princ. 3.6.1, dignity is here attributed to humanity as a whole, rather than to worthy individuals or groups in a hierarchical context. The meaning and significance of these universalising expressions will be analysed in the context of the two treatises, i.e. De Principiis (in chapter 5) and De Officiis (in chapter 6). The purpose of this investigation is to shed light on the reasons why Rufinus and Cicero used the term dignitas in a way that was so unusual for them, and on the role played by dignitas in their respective arguments on human nature and the goal that we should strive for as rational beings.

Chapter 5

An Exceptional Passage in Origen through Rufinus’ Latin Translation: “Dignity of the Image” in De Principiis 3.6.1 In section 3.3.1, the “dignity of the likeness” in Princ. 3.6.1 and its eventual progress into the universal “property of unity” were examined: the likeness and the unity were identified as the second and third step respectively of the progress of the rational creation according to Origen. This chapter concerns the first step of the progress, namely the “dignity of the image”, and investigates the reasons behind the striking exception of an undeserved, universal dignity, based on the gratuity of divine creation and not on the individual’s actions.

5.1 What Is the “Dignity of the Image”? Purpose, Themes, and Structure of Princ. 3.6.1 Chapters 3.5–6 in De Principiis deal with the topics of the beginning and end of the created world. The reflection on the creation according to the image of God is prompted in Princ. 3.6.1 by the question of what is the “highest good”, i.e. the destination of the progress of all rational creatures (summum bonum, ad quod natura rationabilis universa festinat, qui etiam finis omnium dicitur). Origen tackles this issue by presenting the answers provided by Greek philosophy and then by the Bible. First, Origen quotes Theaet. 176b, where Plato says that the objective towards which human beings must strive and their motivation for pursuing virtue should be the attempt to achieve as much as possible a likeness with the divine.1 In Princ. 3.6.1, Origen states that this knowledge regarding the likeness with God, like many other statements of wisdom by ancient philosophers, derives in fact from the Bible. By saying that Plato’s knowledge about the assimilation to 1 Plato, Theaet. 176ab: διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. For the theme of the assimilation to God in Plato’s writings, cf. Lavecchia (2006). For the use of this sentence by Plato in Origen, cf. Limone (2018): 167–169. For the influence of Platonic philosophy on Origen’s views on the human soul, cf. Di Pasquale Barbanti (2003): 147–201. For the way Origen deals with Plato’s legacy in Against Celsus, see section 4.2.

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God actually derives from Scripture, Origen is here engaging the apologetic strategy of the “theft of the Greeks”, employed frequently by Christian apologists of the 2nd and 3rd centuries, such as Justin Martyr (1Apol. 59–60), Tatian (Or.Graec. 31–41), Theophilus of Antioch (Autol. 1.14.2), and Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 5.14; 6.2–4). Origen proceeds to identify which biblical passage could be the source for Plato’s assessment of “becoming like God” as the highest good for human beings. He finds that the most significant text mentioning the likeness with God is the Genesis account of the first creation of the human being (primam conditionem hominis).2 This passage presents an exegetical challenge: in Gen 1:26LXX, God announces: “Let us make the human being according to our image and according to likeness” (ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ’εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ’ὁμοίωσιν), but then the following verse just states that “God made the human being and he made them according to the image of God” (καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ’εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν), without mentioning the likeness. Origen proposes to solve this predicament as follows: Princ. 3.6.1: The fact that [Moses] said, ‘in the image of God he made him’ (Gen 1:27) and was silent about the ‘likeness’ (cf. Gen 1:26), indicates nothing else except that the human being indeed obtained the dignity of the image in their first creation (imaginis quidem dignitatem in prima conditione percepit), but the perfection of the likeness was reserved for them at the end.3 This means that they might acquire the likeness for themselves by the exercises of their own diligence in the imitation of God (ut ipse sibi eam propriae industriae studiis ex dei imitatione conscisceret), so that while the possibility of perfection was given to them in the beginning through the dignity of the image (quo possibilitatem sibi perfectionis in initiis datam per imaginis dignitatem), they should in the end, through the accomplishment of works, complete for themselves the perfected likeness.

Origen posits the “dignity of the image” as a present condition, a potential gifted to all human beings upon their creation, and the “perfection of the likeness”, i.e. the “highest good”, as a future condition, the fulfilment of the potential offered by the image.4 This is why Scripture does not say that the human being is immediately created both in God’s image and in the likeness but rather only in his image. Through his argument on image and likeness, not only does Origen offer his solution to the ostensible aporia of the biblical text, but he also shows that it is precisely the discrepancy between Gen 1:26 and Gen 1:27, indicating a progress from image to likeness, that makes the creation narrative of Genesis the basis for the philosophical assessment of becoming (fieri) “like God” as the highest good. 2 I discuss Origen’s views on the double creation of humankind (as told in Gen 1:27 and in Gen 2:7 respectively) in an article which is currently under review for publication, titled: “Origen, Hilary, and the Hands of God: Human Dignity as the Exegetical Key to Ps 118(LXX):73a”, where I also discuss the plural “let us make the human being” in Gen 1:26. 3 See section 3.3.1. 4 For other Christian texts which differentiate the image from the likeness see section 9.3.

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In Princ. 3.6.1, Origen does not clarify whose creation is described in Gen 1:26–27, and therefore who possesses the “dignity of the image”. Although initially Origen states that “all rational beings” pursue the likeness with God as “the highest good”, Princ. 3.6.1 deals mainly with the creation of human beings: Rufinus uses the term homo, corresponding to the term ἄνθρωπος found in Gen 1:26–27. This clearly refers to all human beings: in Princ. 3.6.1, Origen declares that the possibility of attaining perfection as the likeness with God is given to all human beings equally when they are all created according to the image of God, and are thus endowed with the “dignity of the image”. Origen reiterates this claim also in Greek texts such as Hom.Jer. 2.1: “The soul, not only of the first human but of all humans, arose according to the image; for the statement, ‘Let us make the human being according to our image and according to our likeness’ (Gen 1:26), applies to all human beings”, or Comm.Jo. 13.28.167: “The words ‘Let us make the human being according to our image and according to our likeness’ apply to each and every human being”.5 However, in other passages Origen interpreted Gen 1:26–27 as referring to the creation of all rational creatures and not just human beings.6 The view that all rational creatures (including all human souls) were created simultaneously and equal in nature is a significant point of Origen’s polemic against Gnosticism:7 thus, the universality of the “dignity of the image” has relevance in Origen’s anti-heretical discourse. If one follows this latter interpretation of Gen 1:26–27 as referring to all rational creatures, one could argue that Princ. 3.6.1, despite the use of homo, would not describe a kind of dignity that is specifically human. Instead, the biblical account of the creation of humanity would be a way for Origen to speak of the entirety of the rational creation. Nevertheless, in most of the extant passages dedicated to the creation narrative in Genesis, Origen’s interest is mostly directed towards human beings. Origen, like Philo (Conf. 147), Clement (Protr. 98.4), and Irenaeus (Epid. 22), identified “the image of God” with the divine Logos.8 Hence, even though not just human beings were created in God’s image, Origen’s objective in dealing with Gen 1:26–27 is primarily to investigate the nature of humanity in relation to the image of God, i.e. to the Logos. For this reason, while for Origen the “dignity of the image” is not the exclusive prerogative of humanity alone, it does play a 5

Cf. Orig. Comm.Jo. 13.50.331. For the sociological implications of Origen’s views on the universality of the image of God in all human beings, see section 7.2.2. 6 Orig. Comm.Jo. 2.23.144–148; 10.45.316–317; Hom.15Ps. 1.3. 7 See section 3.4. 8 Cf. Orig. Princ. 1.2.6; Cels. 6.63–69; Comm.Jo. 1.17.104–105; Hom.Gen. 1.13; Hom.38Ps. 2.1; Hom.77Ps. 6.1. For the “image” in the OT, Plato, Stoicism, Philo, and Paul, cf. Niles (2023). For the passages in Origen’s Commentary on John (especially 1.32.231 and 13.36.233–234) about Christ as image of God, in relation to Christ’s incarnation and sacrifice, cf. Batut (2008). For the hermeneutical implications of Origen’s views on the Logos as image of God, particularly as expressed in Cels. 6.68–69, cf. Kwak (2022): 78–83.

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primary role in defining what humanity is and what each human being should strive to become. Another issue connected to who exactly possesses the “dignity of the image” is the question as to which part of the human being was created according to the image of God. In many Greek and Latin passages by Origen it is stated that the human soul (ψυχή/anima) was created according to the image of God, without further specifications, as for example in Comm.Matt. 17.27: “the soul is by nature according to the image of God” (ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει κατ’εἰκόνα ἐστὶ θεοῦ).9 However, in Princ. 2.10.7 Origen suggests that there may be a distinction between different “parts” of the human soul, only one of which was in fact created according to the image of God. Origen discusses the possibility that only the “better part of the soul was made according to the image and likeness of God”, whereas the “other part” of the soul, which is closer to the material body, was assumed by the human being after the fall caused by freedom of choice. This view of the partition of the soul is also implied in Jerome’s translation of Origen, Hom.Ezech. 13.2, which speaks of a specific “region of the soul (animae regionem) where the thinking faculty, the intellective faculty, resides”. In this text, Origen claims that the beauty of the image of God within human beings is found in this part of the soul. Origen however does not further develop this view in his exegesis of Gen 1:26–27. In most of the extant passages discussing the creation narrative in Genesis, such as Hom.Gen. 1.13, Cels. 6.63, or Comm.Rom.1.19.8, Origen is not really concerned with clarifying which part of the human soul possesses the dignity of the image. Rather, his main interest is to argue against a corporeal understanding of God (which in Fr.Gen. D11 Origen attributes to Melito of Sardis),10 by maintaining that the image of God is not visible in the physical mortal body but rather refers to the “inner human”. This Pauline expression, found in Rom 7:22, 2Cor 4:16, and Eph 3:16, indicates for Origen the part of the creature which is invisible, immortal, endowed with reason and freedom of choice, and individual to each being: in Rufinus’ translation of Comm.Rom. 7.4.9, Origen defines this “inner human” as one’s “soul or mind” (anima vel mens).11 So, Origen believes that the “dignity of the image” was originally bestowed at creation on the human soul taken as a whole – or, more precisely, on all νοές (“intellects” or “minds”), which is how rational 9

For the idea that the soul is made in the image of God, see also the passages from Origen’s exegesis on the Song of Songs mentioned in section 2.6, as well as Mart. 12; Dial. 23; Comm.Rom. 1.19.8; Hom.Gen. 1.13; Hom.Lev. 12.7; Hom.Num. 23.7, 24.2; Hom.77Ps. 8.9; Hom.Jer. 2.1; Hom.Ezech. 7.6; Hom.Luc. 8.2. 10 For Origen’s argument against the corporeality of God, see section 4.1. For an assessment of Melito and his views on the corporeality of God as they emerge from the writings of Origen and others, cf. Markschies (2019): 183–193. 11 For Origen’s views on the “inner human”, see Dial. 12, and passages translated by Rufinus such as Comm.Rom. 2.13.34, 7.4.8; Comm.Cant. praef. 2.4–5, and Hom.Gen. 1.13. Conversely, the “outer human” is the body, the creation of which is described in Gen 2:7.

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souls were called before the fall caused by freedom of choice (Princ. 2.8.3).12 Subsequent distinctions between a superior or spiritual soul and an inferior or bodily soul are not permanent, natural differences. Rather, these distinctions reflect the inclination of that specific soul in that specific time, depending on the way each individual soul applies their own freedom of choice at each stage of their progress: souls who at the moment are less resistant to sin lean more towards the bodily dimension, whereas more progressed souls are more oriented towards the spiritual dimension.13 The dignity of the image, established by God at creation, precedes these distinctions: Origen’s understanding of the “dignity of the image” may be summarised as a natural propensity or capacity of all human souls, based on their creation in the Logos or “image” of God, to act according to reason and to pursue a higher degree of participation in Christ. In the rest of Princ. 3.6.1, Origen completes the argument on likeness by adding a further element to the tradition that he presented so far, based on evidence from the NT. He does so with the purpose of explaining how the likeness is made possible through a complex interplay of factors, all necessary but not equally important, that contribute to progress. In the first part of Princ. 3.6.1, Origen claims that the “dignity of the image” determines the possibility of attaining the highest good, i.e. the likeness with God. This possibility was given to all human beings because they were created by God in his image, and each individual is required to do their part in fulfilling that possibility with their efforts to imitate God and thus attain the “likeness”. Then, Origen clarifies that ultimately the outcome of their progress depends on the intercession of the Son: Princ. 3.6.1: The Lord himself also in the Gospel points out that these same things will not only come to pass, but will come about by his own intercession (non solum futura, verum etiam sui intercessione futura), when he deigns to make this request of the Father for his disciples (hoc a patre discipulis suis impetrare dignatur): ‘Father, I want that where I am, there also they might be with me’ (John 17:24), and ‘As I and you are one, so also may they be one in us’ (John 17:21). In this the likeness itself already seems, if we may say so, to advance, and from being similar to become one, for the reason, no doubt, that in the consummation or end ‘God is all and in all’ (1Cor 15:28).

Origen is progressively expanding the scope of his argument: first he has shown that Plato’s tradition is part of the truth of Genesis; now he is adding the NT to this same truth encompassing various stages of the history of human knowledge of the divine in Classical and Judeo-Christian culture. Origen’s argumentation regarding the highest good in Princ. 3.6.1 is articulated in three stages: first, he demonstrates that the philosophical knowledge about becoming like God as the highest good depends on the creation narrative in Genesis; 12 See sections 2.4; 5.2; 9.1.1. As clarified by Fernández (2020): 24–25, while “strictly speaking, the term ‘soul’ refers to the rational creature itself after its primordial fall, […] Origen himself often used ‘soul’ and ‘rational creature’ interchangeably”. 13 Cf. Sfameni Gasparro, s.v. “Anima”, in Monaci Castagno (2000): 16–21.

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second, he interprets the image and likeness in Genesis as the distinction between potential and fulfilment; third, he uses the NT to prove that the progress from image to likeness is made possible by the mediation of Christ. The Son is thus omnipresent in this process of creation, progress, and perfection.14 The Logos is the image of God in which humanity is created. The incarnate Christ is the model that humans must strive to imitate in their progress: as Origen claims also in Comm.Rom. 7.7.7, the soul of Jesus is the model of the human soul created in the image of God that has attained the perfect likeness with the divine Logos.15 Finally, humanity will be reintegrated in Christ as his mystical “body” in order to become one with God. This consideration at the end of Princ. 3.6.1 leads to the presentation in the rest of chapter Princ. 3.6 of the theme of the eschatological subjection of creation to Christ.16 In sum, Origen’s anthropological views as expressed in Princ. 3.6.1 derive from exegesis: his argument on rational nature and its progress in Christ follows from the interpretation of Gen 1:26–27 (creation and promise of the likeness, reprised in 1John 3:2 and John 17:21–24) and 1Cor 15:24–28 (eschatological union). “Dignity of the image” refers to the fact that all human beings are capable by nature to pursue the participation in Christ (i.e. in practice, to act in accordance with reason and in pursuit of the virtues), because they were given at creation a familiarity with the Logos.17 The theological framework of this notion is explained in Princ. 1.3.8. Here, Origen describes what the creatures receive from each hypostasis of the Trinity – i.e. primarily being (ut sint) from the Father, being capable of reason (ut rationabilia sint) from the Son,18 and being holy (ut sancta sint) from the Spirit. Origen elaborates in Princ. 1.3.8 that the participation (participatio) in Christ as Logos (verbum vel ratio) makes all creatures rational (rationabilia) and thus endowed with freedom of choice and 14

Simonetti (2004): 33, identifies the role of guidance that the Logos Christ assumes for every single soul, in their progress towards the likeness to God, as one of the most significant ways in which Origen innovates the platonic and Christian thought on the relationship between the human souls and the divine. Cf. Lettieri (2010): Christ, as the perfect union between a human soul and the divine Logos, reveals and fulfils the original gift of the creation in the image of God, which was meant as the communion between all the individual rational creatures or logoi and the one divine Logos. 15 See section 4.2.2. 16 See section 3.3. 17 For the natural affinity or kinship between human beings and the divine Logos as motivating the desire of the soul to be re-united with God and thus fuelling the soul’s progress, cf. Zocchi (2021): 144–154. 18 Cf. Orig. Comm.Jo. 1.37.267–275. Cf. Simonetti (2010): n.4 ad Princ. praef. 1: Rufinus usually translates λόγος, meaning “thought”, “speech”, or “word”, with verbum, but when λόγος is used by Origen in the sense of “reason”, he translates it with ratio or verbum vel ratio. Λόγος as reason or word is not used all the time by Origen in the sense of “Divine Word”, the second hypostasis of the Trinity, but is never completely independent from that either; cf. Somos (2015): 5.

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responsible for their actions. Subsequently, each creature must progress “in the participation in Christ” (per participationem Christi) as Wisdom and Justice, until, purified by the Spirit,19 they become what God gave them the possibility to be, i.e. virtuous and thus worthy of the creator. As the Logos is the image of God in which humanity was created, the universal “dignity of the image” in Princ. 3.6.1 corresponds to what is referred to in Princ. 1.3.8 as the first level of participation in the Logos, from which all souls derive that they are rational, immortal,20 and endowed with freedom of choice, and thus capable of progress, understood as the pursuit of the participation in Christ not only as reason but also as all the virtues such as wisdom. The comparison with Princ. 1.3.8 sheds light on the “dignity of the image” from Princ. 3.6.1 as the prerequisite of future progress towards a closer relationship with God. Had humans not been given this original “dignity” of rational and free beings, they could not have pursued the communion with God in Christ, which is therefore first and foremost the product of God’s love for his creation.

5.2 Human Dignity and Instability “Dignity of the image” indicates the universal potential of human nature, deriving from the relationship established at creation between the divine Logos and the creature endowed with reason or logos. So, for Origen, the “dignity of the image” is not a natural condition permanently realised in all humans; instead, it is up to the individual to fulfil this universal possibility in oneself. In Princ. 3.6.1, Origen remarks that it is crucial that human beings really put their own efforts towards cultivating and advancing the dignity that they were given at creation, and in many other passages he discusses the constant struggle of preserving or recovering the original beauty of the human soul created in the image of God.21 Thus, the “dignity of the image” is not immutable: on the one hand, it is supposed to progress and come to its full realisation as “dignity of the likeness”; on the other hand, the image of God within humans is also always at risk of being tarnished or obfuscated by sin. Since their creation in the image or Logos of God, human souls share an affinity with the Logos, which means that they are not only capable of acting in accordance with their rational nature, but also responsible for doing so. Living in accordance with reason means fulfilling the very identity of the human being: as Origen claims in Hom.Lev. 2.2, “I think that ‘human being’ should be understood as indicating the one who, created according to the image and 19

See section 4.2.1. For the view that what is created “according to the image of God” (Gen 1:27) must necessarily be immortal, cf. Orig. Hom.Jer. 16.6; Hom.Num. 23.7; Fr.Gen. E5. 21 See section 2.6. 20

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likeness of God (Gen 1:26), lives according to reason”.22 In Princ. 3.6.1, Origen, in Rufinus’ translation, refers to this natural affinity between rational human souls and the divine Logos as “dignity of the image”, and he presents this dignity as the possibility for rational creatures endowed with freedom of choice to pursue an even higher level of participation in Christ and through him ultimately to become like God. But what happens to people who do not always imitate Christ, do not live according to reason,23 do not cultivate their relationship with God through Christ as their ultimate objective,24 and in sum do not act according to their “dignity of the image”? Evidently, for as long as they persevere in sin, they do not attain the “dignity of the likeness”, but do their souls also lose the “dignity of the image”, i.e. their possibility to progress as rational creatures due to their connection with the divine Logos? And since the enactment of the natural propensity towards reason is so tied for Origen to the identity of the human being created according to the image of God, did he think that people who do not act according to reason cease to be human beings? From Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis, the answer seems to be that human souls cannot lose their inherent dignity inherent as creatures of reason: even if human souls are constantly subject to progress or degradation, it is impossible that they “come to such a degree of abasement that, forgetting their rational nature and dignity (naturae rationabilis et dignitatis oblitae), they descend even into the order of non-rational beings” (Princ. 1.8.4). Even if one gives in to sin and neglects the pursuit of the union with God, humans as rational beings can never lose the possibility of recovering the connection with God, established at their first creation as told in Gen 1:26 (Princ. 4.4.9). Jerome, Ep. 124.4.4–5 implies that on the contrary Origen claimed that human souls may be so negligent and sinful as to descend to the status of animals. However, Rufinus’ version of Princ. 1.8.4 is supported by texts by Origen preserved in Greek, such as Cels. 4.83, indicating that, since human souls were created according to the image of God, they can never turn into non-rational animals. Origen often expresses the view that, while all human beings were created in the image of God, based on their merit or fault individuals could assume either a worthy or a degrading “image”. This distinction is established by Paul in Rom 1:23 (“They exchanged the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of the image of a corruptible human and of birds and four-footed animals and reptiles”) and 1Cor 15:49 (“Just as we have borne the image of the earthly,

22 For the idea that only those who live according to reason can be called truly human in the full sense of the term, see sections 6.4; 10.3.2. 23 In chapter 6, Cicero’s notion of dignity will be discussed: Cicero emphasises the idea of acting in accordance with reason in order to preserve dignity, as well as the view of dignity as the product of constant monitoring of oneself. These notions are part of Roman political culture, but also of Stoic principles, which Origen too was familiar with (see section 6.5.1). 24 See section 3.1 for examples of wrong objectives.

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we shall also bear the image of the heavenly”). Thus, Origen’s definition of sinners as animals has to do with his view on the possibility for human souls to cover or obfuscate the image of God with the “image of the earthly” (1Cor 15:49),25 rather than implying that they can truly cease to be biologically human. From texts such as Princ. 1.8.4, it emerges that the universal dignity established at creation is not a status that can be acquired and lost, as were the types of individual dignitas in the Latin translations of Origen discussed in chapter 3.26 Rather, the “dignity of the image” (Princ. 3.6.1), or the “rational nature and dignity” (Princ. 1.8.4), is an inalienable part of the nature of human beings as creatures made “according to the image” or Logos of God. In this sense, dignity is something that all humans possess forever. At the same time, however, dignity is also something that most humans do not possess yet, as the “dignity of the image” is described in Princ. 3.6.1 as a potential, and it is said that the actualisation of that potential, i.e. the attainment of the likeness, can only be achieved with great effort. As Origen indicates in Princ. 2.8.3,27 the current state of human souls is the result of at least a partial or temporary loss of the higher dignitas given at creation. Origen explains that, because of sin, the human intellect has fallen away from the warmth of the love of the Father, where the intellects created in the Son were united with the Spirit. Because of their incorrect use of freedom of choice, they have cooled down into the state of souls, thus “falling away from 25

Orig. Hom.Luc. 8.3: “We create other images in ourselves instead of the Saviour’s image. Instead of being the image of the Word, or of wisdom, justice, and the rest of the virtues, we assume the form of the devil. Then we can be called ‘serpents’ and ‘a generation of vipers’. When we are venomous, cruel, or wily, we have taken on the character of the lion, the snake, or the fox. When we are prone to pleasure, we are like the goat. […] One has the likeness of birds, another of reptiles and serpents. Still another makes oneself the image of God”; cf. Hom.Gen. 1.13; 13.3–4; Hom.Jer. 2.1; Hom.Luc. 39.5–6; Fr.Ps. ad 4:3 (see section 10.3.2). Commenting on Hom.38Ps. 2.1–2, Prinzivalli (1991): 466, notes the similarities between Origen’s notion of the two “images” and the Aristotelian notion of habitus. This Pauline notion is shared by Jerome, who references 1Cor 15:49 in Comm.Ezech. 11 ad 38:20 (see section 10.3.2) as an example of Scripture signifying “diversity of character” by “various designations”, such as “heavenly” and “earthly”. 26 On the contrary, Origen seems to be saying that the image may be “brought to nothing” in the Greek Fr.Eph. 1.2 ad 1:1b: “If one, after having obtained participation in God as Being, forgets about this participation and wrongfully attributes to oneself the cause of being, instead of giving all credit to God, who brought him from not being to being in his image and likeness (Gen 1:26), then ‘the things that are, are brought to nothing’ (1Cor 1:28)”. However, in this case Origen refers specifically to the “saints who are” of Eph 1:1b. His goal, rather than to assert that human beings can fully revert into nothingness, is probably more to clarify that Paul felt the need to add “who are” as a warning against pride and as an invitation never to think oneself above the risk of straying away from God and always to cultivate the relationship with God, no matter how advanced one is in one’s progress. 27 For critiques brought against this belief held by Origen in the late 4th century see section 9.1.1. For dignity in Princ. 2.8.3 see section 2.4.

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their status and dignity”. However, souls “have not lost the faculty of restoring themselves to that status of warmth, in which they were at the beginning”: if the soul “is corrected”, it will recover its original status of “intellect”. Hence, the opposition between passing and eternal, which was drastic in Origen’s texts on worldly dignity,28 is more nuanced in texts on the dignity of humans as rational creatures, such as Princ. 3.6.1.

5.3 Conclusions The interpretation of Gen 1:26–27 provided in Princ. 3.6.1 results in a distinctive notion of the progress of humans as rational beings. This idea is an integral part of Origen’s thought and of De Principiis in particular, as discussed in sections 3.3–4. The reflection on image and likeness in Princ. 3.6.1 and in several other texts demonstrates that Origen thought of human nature as possessing a fundamentally inalienable spiritual or intellectual capacity, allowing all human souls to relate to God through Christ. However, it is unclear to what extent Origen conceptualised this intellectual potential of human nature as “dignity”. The two occurrences of “dignity of the image” in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1 alone are not enough evidence that Origen developed a specific terminology of “human dignity” in the context of the exegesis of Gen 1:26–27 and consistently used it to refer to a fullyfledged anthropological notion, i.e. as the inherent, undeserved, and inalienable worth of any rational being created according to the image of God. Neither dignitas nor derivatives of ἄξιος play a distinctive role in Origen’s extant output referring to humanity in the image of God, as they do in later works examined in part IV of this study, such as Gregory of Nyssa’s De opificio hominis and Hilary of Poitiers’ Commentary on Psalm 118. These terms do not appear in the many Greek or Latin texts where Origen reflects on the image of God or shows the difference between image and likeness.29 Princ. 3.6.1 frames the “dignity of the image”, a universal potential given to humanity at creation, in a discourse about the progress towards the perfect likeness. Rufinus’ translation also employs the expression “dignity of the likeness” to refer to a status which must be pursued through human merit and the intercession of the Son, pointing to a more traditional understanding of dignitas as awarded to the worthy individual. In Princ. 3.6.1, Origen states that the likeness “will be conferred in proportion to the perfection of merits”, a formula that corresponds almost exactly to the way that – in texts such as Princ. 1.5.3 – other types of “dignities” or ranks (like the “angelic dignity”) were conferred 28

See section 3.1. See section 3.3.1. Only one fragment on Ps 4:3 attributed to Origen attributes ἀξίωμα to human nature created according to the image of God; see section 10.3.2. 29

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by God as respective reward for each creature’s merit.30 Thus, when it refers to the rational creatures, dignitas always indicates in De Principiis a specific stage or rank in their progress: Origen (or Rufinus)31 employs the term “dignity” in Princ. 3.6.1 as a handy emblem to reemphasise and summarily highlight a relatively familiar point on the progress of rational creatures that has been developed elsewhere. “Dignity” is used to add profile to the thought that all human beings have the possibility of progressing towards the likeness with God because their starting point is the elevated “rank” or “status” of being made in the image of God, i.e. in Christ. The “dignity of the image” is thus a spiritual “rank” that allows deserving human beings to pursue a more advanced rank, the “dignity of the likeness”. So, on the one hand the “dignity of the image” clearly stands out when compared with other occurrences of dignitas in the translations of Origen, as the potential for perfection given to rational creatures with their creation in the image or Logos of God is originally attributed indistinctly to all human beings, and, while individuals may neglect the pursuit of a life in accordance with reason and virtue, they cannot permanently lose their status of rational creatures made in the image of God. On the other hand, the use of dignitas in Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis, including in Princ. 3.6.1, is inextricably connected to Origen’s views on the instability of the creatures as based on their freedom of choice, and thus to the traditional understanding of dignitas as individual rank affected by change. For this reason, trying to separate what comes from God and what comes from the creatures, and claiming that Origen and his translators conceptualised the distinction between a traditional dignity attained by worthy individuals, on the one hand, and a novel understanding of unalienable universal dignity bestowed on all beings created in the image of God, on the other hand, may be partly misleading. Human progress is presented by Origen in De Principiis (especially in Princ. 3.6.1) as a continuous interaction between creature and creator. This uninterrupted dialogue takes place in Christ as a mediator, and, as discussed in section 4.3, is for Origen made possible by the fact that even God’s own dignity is in a way both permanent and unstable, at least from our perspective. God himself is perfect and immutable (unlike the creatures), but he is willing to adapt his dignity to our own in order to assist us in our progress towards him: in this sense, impermanence or instability is always present in Origen’s understanding of dignity. So, Princ. 3.6.1 may be read as part of Origen’s quest to investigate the spiritual significance of the visible reality, not cancelling the literal sense of the notions he deals with but rather transfiguring them: the very same idea of “rank” which made dignity part of a pagan system of attributing social worth to people, which Origen viewed as an 30

See section 3.4. See section 8.1: there is evidence to suggest that here Rufinus may be translating ἀξίωμα, as is also argued by Volp (2006): 150. 31

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unworthy pursuit because it is impermanent,32 is now framed in a new discourse on the affinity between God and his children.

32

See section 3.1.

Chapter 6

A Possible Parallel in Cicero? The Dignity and Excellence of Human Nature in De Officiis 1.106 Chapter 6 begins the investigation of occurrences of dignitas of the entire humanity in Latin works which to different degrees show the reception of a Greek predecessor: this investigation will proceed in part IV of this study. In the case of the text examined in this chapter, namely the first book of Cicero’s treatise De Officiis, the Greek predecessor, as Cicero himself declares (cf. Off. 3.7) is the lost treatise On Appropriate Action (Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος) in three books, written by the Stoic Panaetius of Rhodes sometime between 140 and 129 BC.1 The objective of this study is better to understand the exceptional usage of dignitas in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1 with the help of previous instances of universal dignitas in the transmission to a Roman audience of Greek philosophical thought on humanity. Just as the “dignity of the image” appears to be an exception when compared with other occurrences of dignitas in the Latin translations of Origen, there is also a surprising occurrence of dignitas referring to human nature in Cicero, Off. 1.106. Among all Latin authors before Rufinus, Cicero is the one who uses the term dignitas most often – more than 800 occurrences are found in his output. Cicero’s interest in defining the meaning of dignitas in many different contexts (such as politics or rhetoric) surpasses all other Classical Latin authors, even those who, like Cicero in De Officiis, were inspired by Stoic ethics, such as Seneca or Persius. Hence, Cicero can be considered as one of the most influential authors in shaping the notion of dignitas that Rufinus and his readership of Roman notables possessed, given that Cicero’s works were still wellknown in the 4th century.

1

Vimercati (2002): 35–37, 241–245, 260.

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6.1 Dignitas across Cicero’s Life There is extensive literature on Cicero’s notion of dignitas,2 so the aim here is just to analyse a few passages in his output to get a broad understanding of Cicero’s views, in order to clarify why the occurrence of dignitas found in De Officiis appears so exceptional. Cicero provides a definition of dignitas already in his first extant work, the treatise On Finding Arguments (De Inventione), composed around 85 BC. Cicero is concerned with the objectives of deliberative rhetoric: he distinguishes between the objectives that should be pursued only because of their dignitas or intrinsic worth (these objectives are the honesta), the objectives that are pursued because of the utilitas, i.e. the advantage or profit they yield (these are the utilia), and finally the goods which are pursued both for their dignitas and for the utilitas they produce (these are also among the honesta). Cicero argues that the dignitas of a person, as well as their glory (gloria), influence (amplitudo), and relationships (amicitia), is part of this third set of values, which are both intrinsically good and advantageous for the individual. In Inv. 2.166, Cicero defines dignitas as “honourable authority, worthy of respect, honour, and reverence” (honesta et cultu et honore et verecundia digna auctoritas). As for how one is to achieve dignitas, Cicero explains in Mur. 24 (63 BC) that the utmost dignitas belongs to those who bring the utmost utilitas to the State, with their power to make decisions in politics and in the military, as well as with their expertise as public speakers and influencers. This is how Cicero’s dignitas combines the honourable (honestum) with the advantageous (utile): the dignitas of each good person and good orator in Rome, as well as their libertas (political independence) and the salus (well-being and safety) of themselves and their possessions, is not separable from the dignitas, libertas, and salus of the Roman people as a whole, which for Cicero hinge on the authority and independence of the Senate. This notion of dignitas is found in passages from political orations3 and from epistles such as Fam. 1.8.3; the use of the term is comparatively less frequent in the treatises (a fact that makes it even more difficult to assess the importance of the dignitas of human beings in De Officiis from a philosophical standpoint), but there are some instances in the treatises addressed to young Romans such as De or. 1.34. The fact that dignitas is connected to the public office, but is not limited to it, is evident from passages such as Fam. 10.6.2 (43 BC). Plancus is invited by Cicero to behave in a way that matches his office: Plancus may be consul, but only in name if he does not actively take part in political warfare by clearly picking a side. In her analysis of Fam. 10.3.3, written to Plancus by Cicero about three months prior to Fam. 10.6, Hannah Mitchell (2019) has shown that 2 3

Cf. the definitions provided by Kaster (2006): 429, and Maso (2009): 79–83. Such as Cic. Phil. 1.14; 3.19,33,36; 11.21; 12.4; 14.8; Verr. 2.5.143–144; Dom. 1, etc.

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the main critique Cicero made to his friend Plancus was that if during the dictatorship Plancus was wise not openly to challenge Caesar, now Plancus’ hesitation to confront Antony infringes on his dignitas.4 Cicero states that all the gradus dignitatis (“levels of dignity”, i.e. different public offices and titles) Plancus has amassed for himself as an ally of Caesar must be considered only honorum vocabula (i.e. mere names denoting the various offices held by Plancus) and not dignitatis insignia (i.e. actual signs of Plancus’ personal dignity) if now, after the death of the dictator, the power and military resources connected to these offices are not employed in service of the libertas of the Roman people and the auctoritas of the Senate. Unless this happens, Plancus will have “the greatest of titles”, the consulship, but he will never be “a great consul”: he will have no dignity, only the greatest shame (deformitas). In her article comparing Roman dignitas as it emerges mostly from Cicero’s writings with a Christian view of dignitas as displayed in the early 6th century by Boethius, Milena Minkova (2005) claims that the main difference between the two understandings of dignitas is that, while Cicero sees it as an inherently positive value, the term assumes a neutral or technical meaning in Boethius, i.e. as indicating a public office or social status which is not positive per se unless it belongs to a virtuous person.5 This Christian view on dignitas is also reflected in the Latin translations of Origen: even an office or dignitas in the Christian Church is not by itself a worthy objective but must be supported by virtue.6 It is true that, compared with these Christian authors, Cicero generally presents a more positive view of dignitas as referring to a public office. However, texts such as Fam. 10.6.2 show that also Cicero sees the connection between dignity and individual merit: with his discourse on true dignitas and the common good, Cicero conveys that the gradus dignitatis as public offices or titles by themselves, if they are not carried out with good works, can be meaningless or even downright shameful, as will also later be argued by Christians such as Jerome. Hence, the primary difference between Cicero and the Christians is not necessarily that Cicero portrayed the pursuit of dignitas as inherently positive while the Christians held more ambiguous views; instead, the innovation brought by the Christians concerns the ways in which people can achieve true and meaningful dignity. As indicated by the inclusion of dignitas among the honesta in Inv. 2.166, Cicero believes that people should always aim to increase their status in the eyes of their peers, especially through a highprofile public life; furthermore, in texts such as Mur. 24 or Fam. 10.6.2 he presents the achievement of meaningful dignitas as connected to one’s 4

Cf. Cic. Fam. 2.9.3: defending a friend’s dignitas means actively to take his side (friends protecting each other’s dignitas in this sense is a recurrent theme in the Familiares, cf. the solemn proclamation in 3.10.1). 5 For parallels between Cicero and Boethius concerning dignitas, cf. Vincenti (2009): 16. 6 Section 3.2; for the argument on social dignitas in Jerome see section 10.1.

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contribution to the res publica. Conversely, Christian texts such as those by Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, or Jerome7 indicate that true dignity is determined not by the individual’s relationship with society (as it was in Cicero), but rather by the relationship with God, our creator. Cicero specifies that a political career does not bring any real dignitas to anyone unless it is devoted not only to the advancement of one’s own influence and prosperity but also to the influence and prosperity of the res publica. Cicero, Fam. 10.6.2 describes the dignitas of the public office as a potential: the title itself – in the case of Plancus, the title of consul – holds value (dignitas) insofar as it entails the concrete possibility for the magistrate to act for the libertas of Rome, but this dignitas is truly possessed by the actual holders of the title only when they enact this potential. This is precisely the view that Cicero adopts in Off. 1.106 with the dignitas of reasonable human nature: human nature itself holds value (dignitas) because it entails the possibility for human beings to act according to reason, but dignitas is truly possessed by actual individuals only when they enact this potential to the best of their own personal abilities and apply it to how they present themselves in society.8 The passages from Cicero’s letters and speeches analysed in this section are not intended by Cicero merely to describe what dignitas is; instead, dignitas plays a specific role in each of these texts depending on the persuasive strategy that Cicero resorts to and the political objectives that he wants to accomplish in that particular occasion. For example, the emphasis placed by Cicero in Fam. 10.6.2 on the idea that a magistrate cannot have true dignitas without openly taking up arms against the enemies of the republic can be understood in the light of the political uncertainty of March 43.9 Cicero indicates that he wrote the epistle because Plancus, who as proconsul was in charge of five legions in Gaul, was ambivalent in his support of Cicero against Antony, and the response Plancus gave in his official despatch to the Senate differed from the message he transmitted through his legate. In the case of Mur. 24, the focus on military and rhetorical dignitas is instrumental in accomplishing the main objective of the entire section Mur. 21–30, i.e. undermining the authority and dignity of the prosecutor Sulpicius and of his judicial expertise, which is elsewhere praised by Cicero (Brut. 151–153) but is here unfavourably compared with Murena’s military achievements and, implicitly, to Cicero’s own political career. Cicero’s writings from the last decade of his life10 often deal with the loss of the past dignity, pristina or vetera dignitas (at the same time his own, the Senate’s, and Rome’s), and the search for a new kind of dignity. The instability of dignity, i.e. the idea that the dignity that one possessed in the beginning can 7

See chapters 3, 4, and 5, for Origen; section 8.3 for Gregory; chapter 10 for Jerome. Cf. Becchi (2013): 7–9. 9 Cf. Watkins (2019): 85–109. 10 Cf. Cic. Fam. 2.5.2. 8

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be lost or at least obscured, and later restored or renewed, continues to be part of the understanding of the term even when it is used in a completely different context, such as the creation of human beings according to the image of God.11 In the last days of the republic, Cicero, Fam. 4.14.412 indicated that people like him could retain their dignitas even when they were not able actively to take part in the political life of Rome, if the impossibility of an independent political activity was owed to factors outside their control. Even though the presentation of dignitas depends on the context and purpose of each text, we can gather from the passages examined in this section a general idea of what Roman dignitas means for Cicero at different stages of his life. Cicero’s idea of dignitas can be summarised as the status of excellence that is awarded to those who are worthy, i.e. those who possess the will and the skills to contribute to the political life in a way that would generate an advantage (utilitas) for the State and consequently the esteem of one’s peers. This public status, as for example senatorial dignitas, is marked by proper insignia that immediately signal to others the person’s public role. However, as demonstrated by texts such as Fam. 10.6.2, the public office and its insignia do not constitute true dignitas unless they are accompanied by worthy behaviour. In private life, dignitas still has to do with power and reputation, as it is mainly displayed by the control that the head of the family exercises over his household, as well as by his self-control and integrity. Dignitas is for Cicero a comparative and relational notion, based on external recognition and on the possibility of exercising power and influence over others. Dignitas has to do with one’s familial and political connections; hence, it may be associated with terms such as nobilitas or amicitia. Furthermore, dignitas is for Cicero inextricably linked to the libertas and auctoritas of the ruling class represented in the Senate. Dignitas and also another key concept of this chapter, i.e. decorum, “what is appropriate”,13 are perceived by Cicero as the result of continuous activity and monitoring of this activity:14 not only are Roman politicians tasked with attaining these qualities, but they are also required to constantly work on maintaining dignitas for themselves, their friends and associates, and their families. This activity involves all areas connected to one’s reputation and to the way Roman notables presented themselves to others in a rich array of social interactions: dignitas and decorum were displayed in the military field, in politics, in all public appearances (especially speeches), but also in education, in the way people conducted their household, in one’s choice of entertainment, 11

See sections 5.2; 8.1; 10.3.2. Hall (2009) analyses this passage in the light of Cicero’s attempts to develop a new form of political speech in the years after Caesar seized the dictatorship in 46. 13 For decorum in Cicero and its connection to other concepts mentioned in this section, such as dignitas and libertas, cf. Connolly (2007): 158–197. 14 Gunderson (2000): 207. 12

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external appearance,15 etc. The degradation of one’s dignitas because of behaviours considered deviant or inappropriate could have dramatic consequences, even in some cases severely infringing on one’s civil rights: thus, accusing an opponent of lacking dignitas carried a significant weight at the time of Cicero – and also at the time of Rufinus and Jerome.16 Dignitas is therefore not an inalienable possession of the whole of humanity; it is something that a very specific type of person in a very specific context, i.e. the Roman politician of the late republic, must always strive to develop in their relation with society, broadly defined as including both political and private aspects.

6.2 De Officiis and Its Reception in the 4th Century Cicero began writing the three books of De Officiis in late 44 BC, and the treatise was published posthumously. De Officiis is dedicated to Cicero’s 21-yearold son Marcus, although Cicero notes that the treatise is also intended for all young future Roman statesmen like Marcus (Off. 2.45).17 In the preface (Off. 1.1–4), Cicero declares that he wants his son to benefit not only from the Greek education that he was at the time receiving in Athens, but also from a Roman perspective on philosophy, especially concerning the theme that, for Cicero, was most relevant to one’s life, i.e. a dutiful moral conduct. Panaetius18 and his pupil Posidonius of Apamea were concerned with the topic of καθῆκον, translated by Cicero as officium (“appropriate action”).19 Even though, as Cicero remarks (Off. 1.7), Panaetius had never provided a definition of καθῆκον, Stoic texts (SVF 3.491–499) inform us that καθῆκον refers to the course of action that is recognised by one’s reason as coherent with one’s nature and thus preferable to other possible actions. To live in accordance or in coherence with nature (ὁμολογουμένως or ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, secundum naturam vivere) was the objective of Stoic ethics, especially for Chrysippus (SVF 3.4–6,12). Based on the same Stoic principle of the coherence with nature, Origen, who envisioned the moral life of human beings as a progress in accordance with their nature of rational beings created in the image of God,20 describes Christ as leading humanity “to live according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν) practising self-control and the other virtues” (Cels. 2.29). 15 Cf. Cic. Off. 1.107, 130: dignitas as stately appearance is the attribute of masculine beauty, as opposed to venustas, “grace”, which is the attribute of feminine beauty. The evolution of the usage of the term dignitas to also include feminine attributes is the subject of my current research project. 16 For the legal repercussions of not possessing dignitas, cf. Lo Nero (2001); Bond (2014). 17 For the intended audience of the treatise cf. Kries (2003). 18 On ethics and the καθῆκον in Panaetius cf. Vimercati (2002): 34–44; Veillard (2014). 19 For Cicero’s translation of καθῆκον, cf. Dyck (1996): 3–8; Davidson (2002): 1.8 20 See chapter 5.

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Cicero’s texts on dignitas were very well-known in the 4th century.21 Lactantius quoted De Officiis many times in his The Divine Institutes (Divinae Institutiones), written between 304 and 313, and called it “a work of great seriousness” (Inst. 3.29).22 Later, Augustine quoted and discussed the text of Cicero, Inv. 2.159–167 in his Div.Quaest.LXXXIII 31.23 Around 390, just a few years before Rufinus translated Origen’s De Principiis in 398,24 Ambrose of Milan modelled his On the Duties of the Clergy (De Officiis Ministrorum) after Cicero’s treatise.25 In Off.Min. 1.7.24, Ambrose named Cicero – and the writings “on duties” by Panaetius and Posidonius, which Ambrose probably knew through Cicero26 – as the most significant predecessors for his own De Officiis. It is likely that, like Lactantius or Ambrose, Rufinus also read Cicero’s De Officiis, possibly at school.27

6.3 The Structure of the First Book of De Officiis: Honestum In Inv. 2.166 Cicero included dignitas among the honesta, “the things that are honourable”.28 Although Cicero never produces a definition of honestum in De Officiis, it is possible to deduce what the term means for him from passages such as Off. 1.11–15 and especially from another philosophical work, heavily 21 According to McCormack (2013): 262–263, among all of Cicero’s rhetorical writings, De Inventione was the one that was read most often in school in the 4th century. 22 Cf. Hier. Ep. 58.10; Kendeffy (2015). 23 Many scholars have noted the importance of Cicero in authors who were in contact with Rufinus, such as Jerome, Ambrose, Paulinus of Nola, and Augustine, cf. Gasti (2016). Cf. La Bua (2019): 168–172, 332, for the use in Jerome, Ruf. 1.16 of 4th century commentaries on Cicero’s works probably used in schools. 24 It is not clear whether Rufinus knew of Ambrose’s De Officiis when he translated Origen’s De Principiis in 398, but Ambrose’s De Officiis was likely known around that time to other authors with whom Rufinus was in contact. Davidson (2002): 1.97–98, finds references to Ambrose’s work possibly in Jerome (Ep. 52, from 393) and Paulinus (Ep. 124, from c.400), and certainly in Augustine (in Ep. 82, from c.404). 25 Cf. Davidson (2002): 1.6–19, for the analysis of the reprisal in Ambrose of the structure of Cicero’s De Officiis. For Ambrose’s treatment of the theme of καθῆκον/officium in its evolution from the Greek Stoics to Cicero (and, according to Mazzoli, to Seneca’s De Beneficiis), cf. Mazzoli (2015) and Atkins (2011). 26 It is unlikely that Rufinus knew much more about Panaetius. Panaetius is named in 212 by Tertullian, who claims in An. 14 that Panaetius divided the human soul in five or six parts; cf. Inwood (2014): 77–78, for the possible connection between this information reported by Tertullian and the account of Panaetius’ views on the soul in Nemesius of Emesa, Nat.hom. 15. A century later, Arnobius of Sicca includes Panaetius among the Stoics who preach that the world will be destroyed by fire (Adv.nat. 2.9). Ambrose and Lactantius (Inst. 6.4) only mention Panaetius as the predecessor of Cicero’s De Officiis. 27 For Lo Cicero (2008): 249, Cicero’s De Officiis directly influenced Rufinus. 28 See section 6.1.

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relying on Stoicism, that Cicero had completed little more than a year before De Officiis, i.e. On the Ends of Good and Evil (De finibus bonorum et malorum). For Cicero, honestum indicates the coherence of humans with their nature that was identified by the Stoics as the only true virtue (Fin. 3.20, 5.20). For Panaetius, virtue is never truly in contrast with true utilitas (Off. 3.35).29 As declared in the preface (Off. 1.4), the majority of Book 1 of De Officiis is dedicated to the analysis of the parts of the honestum, with the objective to establish the criteria that should guide the civic life of the individual. So, the main concern of De Officiis, including the passage on dignitas, has more to do with the definition of a seemly and dignified behaviour in Roman society, thus again linked to the outward perception which was one of the most significant aspects of the traditional meaning of dignitas, rather than with a philosophical assessment of the nature of humanity.30 In Off. 1.11–15 Cicero argues that human beings share some basic natural drives with animals, such as self-preservation, but, because human beings participate in reason (rationis est particeps), they are also characterised by other natural impulses that are specific to rational beings. Each of these impulses determines a number of duties, or appropriate actions. To pursue the honestum means to live in accordance with the impulses of rational beings, and to recognise the duties that proceed from each impulse as the preferable course of action. One of these impulses of rational beings is seemliness (decorum), examined by Cicero in Off. 1.93–151.

29

Scholars such as Long (1995) and Kries (2003) have pointed out that the solution of the apparent conflict between honestum and utile is a distinctive feature of Cicero’s De Officiis and of its ambiguous relationship with its Greek predecessor: while the idea of the concordance of honestum and utile is ostensibly drawn from Panaetius, scholars have noted the way Cicero adapts it to his own political purpose, i.e. “to set Roman values, especially glory and wealth, within an ethical framework which will show that they are proper objectives if and only if they are combined with justice”, thus positioning himself as representing the true values of the mos maiorum against their perversion by greedy individualists such as Caesar and Antony, cf. Long (1995): 215. 30 Cf. Griffin and Atkins (1991): xxiii–xxiv, “Though at the outset Cicero says that precepts about duty apply to the whole of life, what interests him is the behaviour of men in society, which is presented as the natural and best condition for human life”. Cicero is not interested in “all the social obligations of all men” (emphasis theirs); his focus is rather on “the relationship of mutual obligation” among peers, and specifically on “those who take part, or reasonably aspire to take part, in public life”. Cf. Long (1995): 214, “The ethical problems that Cicero treats in [De Officiis] are not those of persons in general”, but rather of “actual and potential statesmen, the Roman ruling elite”. For the analysis of the terms honestum, decorum, and dignitas, cf. Griffin and Atkins (1991): xliv–xlvii.

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6.4 The Context of Off. 1.106: Decorum In Off. 1.14–15, Cicero explains decorum as the perception that there is an order (ordo) and a measure (modus) in which things should be done, and as the drive to behave, accordingly, with restraint and self-control (modestia, temperantia). Decorum is so embedded in the honestum that the two are not clearly distinguishable, as both are based on the idea of what is appropriate for one’s nature (Off. 1.93–94). The Latin noun decorum and the corresponding verb deceo indicate the appearance of appropriateness and share the same root as dignitas; in Off. 1.93, Cicero clarifies that decorum is a translation of the Greek τὸ πρέπον, “what is appropriate”. Tὸ πρέπον as the category denoting that the action and speech must be appropriate to one’s role31 is a notion that was first developed for poetry, but was applicable also to real life, as Cicero remarks in Off. 1.97–98 (and, a couple years before, in Orator 70–71). Poets and playwrights are required to consider “what is suitable and seemly (quid conveniat et quid deceat) for a huge variety of roles (personae)”, if they want the public to applaud: the applause shows that the words that the poet attributed to the role were recognised as “worthy of the role” (est enim digna persona oratio).32 In a similar way, human beings must play the role they were assigned by nature, so that the harmony between their actions and their respective roles elicits the approval (approbatio) of their peers. First and foremost, nature assigned to human beings as rational beings “a role (persona) of great excellence, and superior to all other beings” (Off. 1.97): the appropriate action (officium) deriving from the drive towards seemliness is always to act in accordance with the excellence of human nature (Off. 1.100). What this role entails, in practice, is that one has to prefer self-moderation to unregulated pleasure which Cicero perceives as beastly: as rational beings, humans must subject every impulse and desire to reason (Off. 1.101–104). Bodily pleasure is “not worthy (digna) enough of the superiority (praestantia) of human beings”, and should be scorned altogether or at least enjoyed in moderation. If only we take into consideration the excellence and dignity of our human nature (quae sit in natura excellentia et dignitas), we immediately realise how dishonourable (turpe, the opposite of honestum) it is to abandon ourselves to pleasure and luxury and how honourable (honestum) it is instead to live in sobriety and self-restraint (Off. 1.106). 31 See section 4.1 for this criterion of appropriateness in Origen’s exegesis. For background on πρέπον and Cicero’s choice to translate it with decorum, cf. Dyck (1996): 242, 254–256. Dyck suggests that Panaetius was chiefly responsible for attributing a key role in Stoic ethics to πρέπον. For the political value that Cicero attributes to decorum in De Officiis at a time of great turmoil for Rome, cf. Marchese (2013). 32 For the discourse on theatre and actors in the section on decorum of De Officiis, and for the role it might have played in Panaetius’ thought, cf. Alesse (1994): 63–74.

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This is the only occurrence in Cicero of dignitas of human nature itself; there is no other text by a Latin Stoic where dignitas so clearly denotes the universal status of humanity. The exceptionality of this use of dignitas in Off. 1.106 has been noted by most of the scholars who have written on the history and evolution of the idea of human dignity. Many of these scholars examine Off. 1.106 as the first extant reference to the dignity of human nature, assessing the significance of Off. 1.106 in the shift from an aristocratic notion of dignity to later humanistic developments. The Stoic idea of the high status of humanity as rational beings,33 transmitted by texts such as Off. 1.106, is often identified as a major inspiration for discourses on human dignity in the Renaissance and in the Enlightenment.34 However, the dignity of Off. 1.106 is interpreted as a “fragmented”35 notion that oscillates between universality and exclusivity, rather than as the affirmation of an inalienable quality shared equally by all human beings.36 Sensen (2011) considers Off. 1.106 as Cicero’s universalising move, meant to attribute to the entire humanity the traditional notion of dignitas as an elevated rank, which in his other works he only attributed to specific individuals or groups in comparison with the rest of society. This innate dignitas of humanity in Off. 1.106 appears to be a status of excellence that is part of the nature of all human beings, regardless of their individual merit or achievement. Cicero does not speak of this sort of universal dignity again in the treatise or in the rest of his output, and he appears more concerned here with prescribing proper behaviour than with describing the nature of humanity, so the philosophical significance of the statement in Off. 1.106 that human nature possesses dignity and excellence should not be overemphasised. Rather than using dignitas here with a clear awareness of the exceptional significance of a universal dignity, Cicero could have used the term here more or less as a synonym for excellentia, a less politically charged term signifying a high standard that needs maintaining. Still, it is undeniable that the meaning attributed to dignitas in Off. 1.106 is different from the normal understanding of the term in Cicero, insofar as dignitas is here attributed to the entirety of humanity. For Cicero, human nature participates in reason (Off. 1.11,107): in On the Laws (De Legibus) 1.29–30, Cicero further confirms that reason which separates human beings from beasts is common to all human beings (cunctis hominibus certe est communis).37 The superior rank of human nature, compared to animals, is thus awarded because of a certain capacity that 33

For the philosophical background of the understanding of human dignitas emerging from Cicero, Off. 1.106, cf. Volp (2006): 49–54; Lössl (2019). 34 Cancik (2002); Rosen (2012): 11–14; Steenbakkers (2014): 86–88. 35 Lebech (2009): 53. 36 Cutler Shershow (2014): 53–62; Sangiovanni (2017): 17–19; Griffin (2017): 54–55. 37 Cf. Kapust (2011): because for Cicero all human beings, and not only the Stoic sage, participate in “common sense”, the external perception even by non-expert observers is a good guidance to preserve decorum, both in a rhetorical and in a moral sense.

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all human beings possess (in this case, reason), which determines the duty to behave in a way that fits their high position. In Off. 1.105–107, Cicero indicates that all human beings have the duty to uphold in their behaviour the standards of excellence that rational nature demands; while the best thing for all human beings would be to live in accordance with this universal dignity of humans as rational beings, in practice not all human beings actually show superiority in their behaviour, and in any case not all display it at the same level. This is because human nature is one thing, and individuals are another. Cicero, Off. 1.107 clarifies why individuals are so different from each other based on the theory, attributed to Panaetius,38 that human beings are in fact assigned two roles (personae) by nature: the first is what was discussed so far, i.e. the role of dignity and excellence that is determined by the rational nature of humanity. Cicero states that this first persona is common (communis) to all people, because all human beings partake of the reason that makes them superior to beasts (quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis) and should act as such. From this role or persona of excellence depend all considerations on what is honestum (i.e. coherent with the superiority of rational beings) and consequently on what is the appropriate duty. Then, there is a second persona, which is attributed specifically to each individual (proprie singulis tributa): this second role explains the great differences that can be observed among individuals. In Off. 1.107–109, Cicero argues that there are distinctive and dissimilar individual traits in the body (in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines), including for example strength, grace, or stately appearance (in formis … dignitatem), and even greater varieties in character traits (in animis … maiores etiam varietates), i.e. in personality and demeanour, such as wit or earnest, shrewdness or straightforwardness, gracious or ordinary manners, etc. These individual traits, both in the body and in the soul, tell us how to act in accordance with our nature, and be appreciated for it, or blamed when we fail to attain this coherence. Cicero concludes in Off. 1.110–111 that the best way to preserve decorum is first and foremost to make sure that we never act against the first role or persona, as determined by the universal nature of human beings as rational beings (contra universam naturam), and subsequently that we also act in accordance with the second role or persona, assigned to us by our own personal nature (propriam nostram sequamur). From Cicero’s distinction between the first and the second persona, it follows that acting in accordance with reason as a human faculty, and thus fulfilling the potential for dignity, is something that comes easier to some people 38 For an outline of Panaetius’ thought, focusing on the theory of the four personae (“roles” ), cf. Vimercati (2004); for a contextualisation of this theory (and specifically of the theme of the hierarchy between the first and second persona) in the history of Stoicism, cf. Machek (2016). For the way Cicero employs this theory in De Officiis, cf. Roller (2019).

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than to others. Every human being is potentially able to pursue at least some level of decorum because human nature possesses the dignitas of reason. However, because in reality not all human beings are equally capable of reasonable behaviour, not everyone is able to attain the same degree of decorum and consequently of honestum. The faculty of reason is for Cicero part of human nature, whereas “dignity” is a potential offered to all human beings by virtue of that faculty. Not everyone fulfils this potential (or at least not everyone enacts it to the same degree), because not everyone applies reason to a degree that fits the “dignity and excellence” of human nature. The individual persona of some people may be less predisposed to reasonable behaviour than that of others, but, because the standards of behaviour required by the first persona must always be upheld, these people must make an effort to act as reasonably as they can. In De Officiis, Cicero does not clarify whether individuals who fail to maintain the standard of excellence prescribed by the first persona by not acting reasonably cease to possess the dignity of rational beings. In Off. 1.105, he speaks of those who are more inclined than others towards pleasure. This is a case where personal temperament (the second persona, according to Off. 1.107) clashes with the universal excellence of humanity as rational beings (the first persona). Cicero indicates how decorum may be preserved in these cases: these people may still be dominated by pleasure (voluptate capiatur), but as they are moved by a rightful sense of shame (verecundia) to at least hide their desires from others (occultat et dissimulat appetitum voluptatis), they show that they still stand even a little bit above (paulo erectior)39 beasts, instead of being just like animals (ex pecudum genere). Cicero remarks that there are however some who are human beings only in their name, but not in their actions (homines non re, sed nomine).40 We should probably not make too much of this brief statement: it is unlikely that in this text Cicero contemplated philosophically the possibility that an individual could cease to participate in reason. He does not indicate in this passage that human beings may entirely lose their humanity because of unreasonable behaviour, nor does he deny that all human beings possess the dignity of humanity, at least as a latent potential.41 In his analysis of the personae theory in Cicero’s De Officiis, Lazar Maric (2014) argues that the strategy of dehumanisation, which implies accusing someone of failing to assume the characteristic of the first persona of humanity (i.e. living according to reason), is used by Cicero against opponents such as Antony and Catiline not only as a rhetorical tool for character assassination, but also to advocate that because his enemies 39

See section 8.2 for the superiority of human beings compared to animals based on their posture or standing. 40 See section 10.3.2 for the idea that some members of the human species are not actually fully human as expressed by Origen and Jerome. 41 As does Donnelly (2015): 3.

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are less than human, violence against them should not be regarded as immoral or illegal. So, in Cicero’s writings dehumanisation serves a political purpose against specific targets, rather than being developed as a philosophical concept concerning the nature of humanity as whole and its inalienability. In Off. 1.105, Cicero is speaking about concealing one’s disorderly conduct from others for fear of social judgement, and the sentence sunt enim quidam homines non re, sed nomine is syntactically presented to us as an aside, an offhand sarcastic remark directed at those whose behaviour Cicero deems improper. This is in line with the overall aim of this text, which is to explain, based on the Stoic ethical principle of coherence with nature, why the lack of self-control is “dishonourable” (turpe) for a human being, whereas controlled behaviour in society is recognised and approved by one’s peers as “honourable” (honestum).

6.5 Human Dignitas in Off. 1.106–107 and in the Latin Version of Princ. 3.6.1 When in Off. 1.106 Cicero speaks of the dignity of human nature, he is using the term dignitas in an unexpected way, if compared with the very traditional understanding of dignitas as the individual quality of “stately appearance” that is featured for example in Off. 1.107. The argument in Off. 1.106–107 is not exceptional or novel in the context of the treatise, and the views on humanity expressed by Cicero in this passage are also found elsewhere in his output. The idea that each human being has at least two personae, one common to all humanity and one specific to themselves, was an integral part of Panaetius’ thought as described by Cicero.42 The view that collective human nature is defined by reasonableness and superiority over animals (as encountered in Off. 1.106) is also expressed by Cicero in other works, most notably in Leg. 1.30.43 Moreover, even if dignitas refers in Off. 1.106 to a universal and innate quality, the section on decorum in the first book of De Officiis concerns elements that were part of the traditional understanding of dignitas as described in section 6.1, such as proper behaviour, comparison with others, and external perception. There is a similar ambiguity in Princ. 3.6.1: we have no other occurrence of “dignity of the image” in Origen, but concepts such as the possibility of advancement from one dignity to another,44 or the notion that the creation of human beings in the image of God, i.e. in the divine Logos, allows them to 42 On individual and universal nature in Stoicism and specifically in Panaetius, cf. Vimercati (2002): 269–271, 283–285. 43 Cf. Hawley (2020) for a comparison between Cicero, Leg. 1.29–33 and Off. 1.106–107 focusing on the concept of natura and the conflict between universal equality of humankind and hierarchy among individuals. 44 See section 3.4.

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progress towards the union with God, are found often in Origen and especially in De Principiis. So, on the one hand the use of universal dignitas in Off. 1.106 and Princ. 3.6.1 is a unique occurrence in the entire output of these two authors, but on the other hand the argument and context of the passages where the term is found are perfectly in line with the authors’ overall thought and with the purposes of the respective treatises. 6.5.1 The Shared Philosophical Background and Terminology Both Off. 1.106 and Princ. 3.6.1 present human dignitas as a universal status of excellence determined by the possibility for all humans to fulfil themselves as beings endowed with reason. For both Origen and Cicero, rationality, which is part of human nature, offers a potential for a high and excellent dignity, which must be enacted by the individual by living in accordance with reason. Additionally, both Cicero, Off. 1.105–107 and Origen (for instance in Cels. 4.74–99) follow the view, which they present as Stoic, that the participation of humanity in divine reason or the divine Logos determines the superiority of the human species in comparison to animals.45 The participation in reason is presented by both Origen and Cicero as the affinity between the human mind and the divine, understood as universal reason: in On the Nature of the Gods (De Natura Deorum), written only about a year or less prior to De Officiis, Cicero attributes this notion to the Stoic Chrysippus (Nat.D. 1.39; cf. SVF 2.113), an author whom Origen knows and quotes often, for instance in Cels. 1.64. Possibly due to this common Stoic background, the concept of the natural affinity between the human and the divine is expressed in similar terms by Cicero and by the Latin translators of Origen: for instance, in Cicero, Leg. 1.25 it is said that, because the reason within human beings is the same as divine reason, human nature possesses a “likeness” (similitudo) and “kinship” (cognatio) with the divine being who generated the human soul. The human being is described in Leg. 1.23 as well as in Off. 1.11 as the only being on earth who participates in reason (particeps rationis). A similar language concerning likeness, kinship, and participation in divine reason is employed in Origen’s De Principiis referring to the relationship between the human and the divine through the Logos, for instance in Princ. 4.4.9–10. Rufinus tends to use consanguinitas rather than cognatio to indicate the natural affinity between the human and the divine, but in his translation of Origen, Comm.Rom. 10.39.2 he indicates that he regards the two terms as synonyms. Thus, it would not seem surprising to encounter a similar use of “dignity” describing the connection between humanity and universal reason both in Cicero, Off. 1.106, and in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, just as “participation”, “kinship”, and “likeness” are used in a similar way in Cicero, Leg. 45

See section 7.1.1 for the rejection of this view in Arnobius of Sicca.

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1.23–25, and in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Princ. 4.4.9–10. However, the terminology of “kinship”, “participation”, or “likeness” is part of the shared philosophical vocabulary describing the relationship between human nature and divine reason: for example, the terminology of “kinship” (συγγένεια) and “participation” (μετοχή) is attested in later accounts of Chrysippus’ thought, cf. SVF 2.532 (from Philo of Alexandria) and SVF 2.1076 (from Philodemus of Gadara); the language of “participation” (expressed for example with the substantivised infinitive τὸ μετέχειν) is also found in Plato, Parm. 129a–132c. The concept of the “assimilation” or ἐξομοίωσις (i.e. the attainment of the “likeness”) of human beings to God was mainly expressed by Plato in texts such as Theaet. 176b (a passage which Origen explicitly quotes in support of the views on the likeness he expresses in Princ. 3.6.1) and Leg. 4.716bc. Later, we find it in Stoic philosophers such as emperor Marcus Aurelius (cf. Med. 10.8.4: “The gods … want … that all rational beings are similar to them”) and Epictetus, as shown in Disc. 1.3,6,12 and especially 1.9, focusing on the “kinship” between the divine and all human souls (cf. Disc. 1.14). Instead, there are no philosophical precedents for a terminology of human dignitas or ἀξία/ἀξίωμα: this highlights the exceptionality of Off. 1.106 and Princ. 3.6.1. In addition to the shared beliefs on the superiority of human beings due to their participation in reason, the question may be asked of whether Origen’s argument regarding universal and individual dignity in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1 (i.e. the passage from “dignity of the image” to “dignity of the likeness”) is also influenced by the theory of the (at least) two natures of humanity that Cicero attributes to the Stoic Panaetius. Unlike Cicero, who openly discusses the notion of the two personae in Off. 1.107, Origen does not explicitly reference this view on humanity in Princ. 3.6.1 or in any other extant text dealing with the creation of humankind according to the image of God. Possible reconstructions of the books available to Eusebius in the library of Caesarea, some of which must have been deposited by Origen, include Stoics such as Chrysippus, Zeno, or Chaeremon, but not Panaetius or Posidonius.46 Panaetius had some form of circulation among Greek Christian authors: at least his name and some elements of his thought were known in Alexandria to Philo (Aet. 76), an author Origen certainly knew,47 and to Clement (Strom. 2.21.129.4). Unlike them, Origen does not name Panaetius,48 as he does other Stoics such as Zeno, Chrysippus, or Epictetus.49 It could be argued that, even if he did not know Panaetius, Origen may also have found this view in other 46 Carriker (2003): 77–130; Grafton and Williams (2006): 64–67. For an overview on the history of the library of Caesarea, cf. Helton (2022): 29–31. 47 Runia (1993): 157–183. 48 However, for Alesse (1994): 25n9, the use of the term ἀφορμαί in Origen, Princ. 3.1.3 is likely inspired by Panaetius. 49 For Origen’s knowledge of these Stoic authors, cf. Limone (2018): 188–193.

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Stoic thinkers that he certainly knew, such as Chrysippus. However, the notion of the two natures of humanity is not clearly expressed in extant Stoic texts other than in Cicero’s account of Panaetius. In his study on the theme of individuality versus universality in Stoic ethics, Christopher Gill (2010) compares the four personae theory attributed to Panaetius in the section on decorum in De Officiis to previous Stoic theories (namely, Chrysippus’ therapeutic strategy as it emerges from Origen, Cels. 7.51). Gill argues that the ethical relevance of the categories of the universal and the individual is more explicit in Panaetius than in Chrysippus, and suggests that this may be because Panaetius was especially interested in connecting the fundamental Stoic tenet that the entire humanity possessed reason as the capacity for virtue (which is represented in Panaetius’ first persona) with more Platonising and Aristotelian ideas about the importance of the individual nature, upbringing, and education in the development of virtue (the second persona). Thus, the emphasis on universal and individual nature seems to be specific to Panaetius, at least according to how Cicero presented him, rather than generally Stoic. However, as noted by David Machek (2016), Epictetus – who was active after Panaetius and Cicero and was certainly known and appreciated by Origen (Cels. 6.2) – conveys in his “How to maintain one’s proper character in every occasion” (Disc. 1.2) that, while human beings in general are bound to pursue what is rational and reject what is irrational, each individual should also consider their own personal προσῶπον (persona) in order to determine which course of action is consistent with reason. Even if this text does not directly depend on Panaetius, it attests an understanding of the importance of individual character (προσῶπον) in assessing the most reasonable course of action.50 Thus, it is possible that through later philosophers such as Epictetus Origen was aware of the Stoic discourse on the importance of both the universal and the individual for the progress towards the attainment of goodness, i.e. the coherence with rational nature. 6.5.2 Dignity as Universal Potential For both Origen and Cicero, the dignity of human nature as determined by reason entails the duty for all human beings to act according to reason: life in accordance with universal dignitas is presented by both authors as a worthy pursuit for every individual. Since human beings possess the dignity of rational beings, they can and must practice self-restraint by subjecting all impulses to the control of reason (in Cicero), or pursue “the highest good” defined as the participation in God through reason or Logos (in Origen).

50 For De Lacy (1977): 177, Epictetus here is not following Panaetius. Instead, for Alesse (1994): 267–278, Panaetius’ views on universal and individual nature, as they emerge from the section on decorum in Cicero’s De Officiis, are at the core of Epictetus’ ethics.

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There are however differences in the ways Cicero and Origen present human dignitas as universal potential. For Cicero, human nature has excellentia et dignitas because the human species collectively possesses the faculty of reason, which, if correctly applied, allows human beings to fulfil their role of superiority and conduct themselves better than animals; thus, human beings have the possibility of self-control (Off. 1.106). The individual human being possesses dignity as a potential or guideline, as it were, to preserve decorum: each human being must try to “play the part (persona)” of the human being and adhere to this standard of superiority and excellence, so as to ultimately attain honestum as concordance with both collective and individual nature (Off. 1.110). For Cicero, it is not by any means certain that every single person will be able perfectly to achieve honestum. There are in fact people who, because of their individual nature and inclinations, find it harder than others to comply with the standards of behaviour that are appropriate for the dignity of human nature (Off. 1.105). This does not mean however that these standards do not apply to them: each person has the obligation, deriving from the role of excellence and dignity that nature assigned to the human species, at least to try to display as much decorum as possible in public, otherwise they will deserve to be shunned and reprimanded. So, for Cicero, human dignitas is a universal potential in the sense that no one is exempt from the duty to preserve decorum in their interactions with society to the best of their own personal abilities and in the particular way that is best suited to their own personal nature.51 For Origen, the human soul has dignitas because all human beings were created according to the image of God, which Origen identifies with the divine Logos.52 Individuals possess dignity as the possibility to attain perfection (possibilitatem sibi perfectionis in initiis datam per imaginis dignitatem): each human being must preserve the “image” of God in themselves and pursue the “likeness”, so as ultimately to attain universal “unity” in God (Princ. 3.6.1). Even though in this life not everyone displays the same capacity for reasonable and virtuous behaviour, by the end times every human being will eventually become like God and will be re-united with him via the Logos. Each individual will have to get there in their own time, through the various stages of their existence. The hierarchies that can be observed in this life among individuals (and among the various orders of the creatures, for example among angels and human beings) are never ascribed by Origen to the personal nature of those

51 Cf. Hawley (2020): 99, “The equal human capacity for rationality and sociality is the ground for considering certain human types superior on the basis of their more developed reason and greater contributions to human society. But, since the particular natures of most individuals are not suited to the highest pursuits of which our species is capable, they ought to develop their own particular talents and interests” as long as they “do not violate those foundational norms of justice”. 52 See section 5.1.

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individuals, as Cicero does in Off. 1.107–114, because this would undermine Origen’s argument against Gnosticism.53 For Cicero, although the impulses deriving from individual nature (the second persona) should in theory be subjected to the duties determined by the first persona, the second persona is just as much a part of the person’s fundamental nature as the first common persona. Instead, for Origen the differences among individuals depend on the stage of their progress that they currently find themselves in, which does not have a permanent impact on their nature or substance. So, for Origen, human dignitas is truly a universal potential in the sense that, although in this life some individuals may have progressed further than others because of their own virtue, no one is naturally incapable – or less naturally inclined than others – of ever achieving perfect virtue through participation in Christ.54 Both Origen and Cicero refer to universal dignity to indicate that the duty to live according to reason is part of the nature of all human beings, but only in Princ. 3.6.1 “dignity” is part of a discourse about universal and natural equality, established at creation and restored in the end times through the Son of God. Conversely, while the single occurrence of dignitas of rational beings in Cicero, Off. 1.106 is noteworthy (as it is to our knowledge the first time that the term refers to human nature), it should not be considered a breach with the traditional notion of dignitas and the start of a new egalitarian understanding.

6.6 Conclusions The example of Cicero further proves the nuanced significance that dignitas possessed throughout the whole history of Latin literature: as is the case with Rufinus and Jerome, the fact that the term is predominantly used in its aristocratic sense does not prevent the author from exploring its meaning in relation to the whole of humanity, at least once. Whether this indicates that Rufinus felt justified in using dignitas in an unexpected way in Princ. 3.6.1, as denoting both the undeserved, God-given condition for human progress (the “dignity of the image”) and the product of individual merit (the “dignity of the likeness”), precisely because he recalled the authoritative precedent in Cicero, is difficult to say, given how sporadically dignitas is used to refer to human nature in the four and a half centuries that separate De Officiis from the translation of De Principiis. Even if the use of dignitas in Princ. 3.6.1 does not directly depend on Off. 1.106, the parallel between the two passages is still helpful for our understanding of Princ. 3.6.1, as it encourages us to read the dignity of the image as connected to a Stoic tradition that preached the superiority of human beings 53 54

See section 3.4. Cf. Orig. Cels. 3.65–69; Princ. 2.7.2.

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because of their natural affinity to reason. Moreover, Cicero’s text sets a significant precedent for the use of dignitas as potential, understood as the capacity for all human beings to adhere to universal reason, which every human being should attempt to fulfil in themselves: this offers us a key to the interpretation of the relationship between “dignity of the image” and “dignity of the likeness” in Princ. 3.6.1 as based on the Stoic dialectic between universal and individual.

Part IV

The Usage of the Term Dignitas and the Reception of Origen’s Views on Humanity in the Cultural Environment of Rufinus and Jerome Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1, examined in chapter 5, is a unique case in the translations of Origen, because dignitas here denotes a status shared by all human souls since their creation according to the image of God, rather than the social standing or office of an individual or of a specific category of people. In the following chapters, other examples of this unconventional understanding of human dignitas will be examined. The Latin Christian texts on dignitas discussed in the next chapters convey anthropological views which will be compared to the beliefs expressed by Origen in texts such as Princ. 3.6.1. A study of these exceptional occurrences of dignitas will shed light on the development of the notion of human dignity and the corresponding terminology in the 4th century, and on the role played by the transmission of Origen’s thought on humanity to a Roman audience in this process.

Chapter 7

Universal Human Dignity in Latin Christian Texts from the 4th Century This chapter focuses on dignitas in Latin works prior to Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s De Principiis: section 7.1 deals with texts where dignitas is used in reference to the nature of human souls, whereas section 7.2 focuses on texts where dignitas is presented as available to all humans once they become true Christians. This investigation aims at contextualising the exceptional occurrence of universal dignitas in Princ. 3.6.1 in the Latin reception of Origen, as well as in the discourses on human dignity taking place at the time.

7.1 Dignity of Human Souls Established at Creation In Latin Christian authors from the 4th century, most occurrences of dignitas still retain their traditional meaning as individual rank. However, some instances of universal dignitas attributed to all human souls since their creation can be detected. 7.1.1 Arnobius of Sicca: The Absurdity of Human Dignity While Tertullian had spoken of the dignitas of the human flesh, against those who opposed the Christian doctrines of the incarnation of Christ and the resurrection of the bodies,1 the first occurrences of the dignitas of human souls in a Latin Christian author are found in Arnobius, Against the Pagans (Adversus Nationes). Arnobius was active in the early 4th century2 in Sicca, Proconsular Africa (today’s El Kef, north-western Tunisia). The second book of his apologetic treatise deals with Greek philosophy, and is directed against those (unnamed) Christian or pagan thinkers who believe that the human soul is immortal, pre-exists the body, and is superior to animals by virtue of reason.3 Arnobius does not believe that human beings were created by God and ridicules the view that human souls are close in dignity to him: 1

Tert. Res. 5.3; 10.5; 44.1; cf. Volp (2006): 200–205. Edwards (2016). 3 Tommasi (2017): 35–39. For Arnobius’ polemic against his contemporary philosophers and scientists, and his view that the only truth is in Christ, cf. Amata (2007). 2

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Adv.nat. 2.15: There is no reason that we should be deceived by what promises us vain hopes, something said by certain upstarts carried away by an extravagant opinion of themselves, namely that souls are immortal, very near in degree of rank to the Lord and Ruler of Creation (domino rerum ac principi gradu proximas dignitatis), brought forth by that Begetter and Father; divine, wise, learned, and not touchable by any contact with the body. Because this is true and certain and we have been brought forth by the Perfect One in a perfection that is capable of no correction, we are [...] good, just, and upright […]. No passion subdues us, no lust dishonors us. [...] Because the souls of all of us have flowed out from a single source, therefore we feel alike and are in agreement. We differ in neither morality not beliefs. We all know God and there are not as many opinions in the world as there are people…

Arnobius finds the idea that all human souls were originally created by God with one and the same elevated dignitas ludicrous: he sarcastically observes that those who believe that all human beings come from one and the same source, and that this source is God, blatantly disregard the most evident characteristic of humanity, i.e. that we are all different, and most of us are sinners. Arnobius does not clarify who in fact created human souls or when – in Adv.nat. 2.47–48, he says that it is not up to him to investigate these matters; his job is simply to disprove the view, inspired by Platonism, that souls were created by God and were only later united with bodies, and also to demonstrate the importance of conversion, given that, when bodies die, the souls of the faithful need to be personally rescued by Christ, otherwise they are destroyed.4 For Arnobius, in order to gain true faith in Christ, and thus salvation, it is necessary to recognise that human beings are not immortal by nature: hence, in Adv.nat. 2.16–17 Arnobius challenges the view that humans, as rational and intelligent beings, possess something so excellent (eminentia tanta) that human beings cannot in any way be considered like any other mortal animal. His opponents would have valid motives to claim this superiority for humanity only if all members of the human species acted according to reason, but this is clearly not the case: the idea of a collective human dignity is unconceivable to Arnobius, who sees it as contrasting with the lived experience of individuals. Thus, human beings have no grounds to believe that their dignity and their substance are superior to everything else that is in this world (hunc totum ... mundum et dignitate et substantia praeterire), just because of the arts, the sciences, the artifacts, and the knowledge developed by human reason (Adv.nat. 2.19). The objections that the Christian Arnobius raises against a philosophical understanding of human souls in Adv.nat. 2.15–19 are very similar to the ones made against the Christians by the pagan Celsus, who was possibly known to Arnobius.5 According to Origen, Cels. 4.74–99, Celsus attacked the Christians who believed, like Origen, that humans, as rational beings, shared a natural affinity with the divine and that the visible world, including animals, was created to be subjected to humanity. In fact, Volp argues that one of the most 4 5

Cf. Arnob. Adv.nat. 1.65; 2.14,32,53,62–65. Morlet (2021).

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significant contribution made by Origen to the development of a Christian notion of human dignity was precisely his view that, because human souls are given the potential to become like God through their inalienable “dignity of the image”, they are inherently superior to animals, contrary to the beliefs held by philosophers such as Celsus.6 This is the view criticised by Arnobius, whose argument on the dignity of human souls is closer to Celsus than to Origen.7 Arnobius also speaks against the notion of the fall of the souls, arguing that it is impious to maintain that God gave human souls a special dignity at their beginning, only to then allow for this dignity, beauty, and integrity to be forgotten because of sin. For Arnobius, views such as those held by Origen,8 i.e. that human souls at least temporarily lost the original dignity that they were given at creation due to the careless usage of their freedom of choice, are highly problematic in terms of theodicy: Adv.nat. 2.44: ‘But’, you say, ‘they came by their will, not sent by the King’. And where was the Almighty Father, [...] that he did not prevent their departure and not allow them to fall into ruinous pleasures? For if he knew that by changing places they would degenerate – as the Founder of all causes he should have known – or that something would influence them and would cause them to forget their dignity and beauty (oblivisci suae dignitatis et decoris), then – I would ask him a thousand pardons – there is no other cause of all these errors than himself; yes, indeed, as he had granted the free will to stray to those whom he foresaw would not preserve their innocence (siquidem perpessus est evagandi eas habere ius liberum quas retenturas non esse integritatis suae habitum providebat). And so the result is that it makes no difference whether they came of their own will or whether they obeyed his command, since by not forbidding what should have been forbidden, by his negligence he made the fault his own.

So, to our knowledge the first Latin Christian discourse on the natural dignitas of rational souls, understood as the high status and vicinity to God that makes human beings superior to animals, is found in an author that denies its existence. While for the “Platonising” thinkers Arnobius attacks all human souls were immortal and possessed a special dignity since their creation (which could be obscured, but never cancelled), for Arnobius it is necessary that individual souls are made immortal by Christ (Adv.nat. 2.64–65). Arnobius believes that the free choice to reach out to Christ and be saved is available to all human beings indistinctly, hence the need for Christians such as Arnobius to address the pagans and encourage them to convert. However, Arnobius never refers to this open channel of communication between humanity and Christ as human dignity; instead, he uses dignitas in reference to human souls only in a negative context, i.e. to describe the arrogant and dangerous beliefs of his opponents. The view on human souls that Arnobius attacks is very similar to the one 6

Volp (2006): 146–153. For the philosophical predecessors of Celsus’ and Origen’s respective arguments, cf. Spittler (2008): 39–43. For the superiority of humans as rational beings see section 6.5. 8 For the instability of the dignity of the creatures in Origen see sections 2.4; 3.4; 5.2. 7

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expressed by Alexandrine thinkers such as Clement, Origen, and later Didymus:9 it has been argued that Arnobius read at least Clement.10 The correspondence between the beliefs on the dignity of rational souls held by Arnobius’ unnamed opponents and those held by Origen show that, even if Arnobius was not referring specifically to Origen, Adv.nat. 2.15–19 is the first Latin text where views on humanity comparable to those held by Origen are described using the term dignitas.11 7.1.2 Hilary of Poitiers: The Unique Dignity of the Creation of the Human Being With the second half of the 4th century, in concomitance with the spread of Origen’s thought in the West,12 we begin to find in Latin Christian literature occurrences of spiritual dignitas, the dignitas of human souls, especially in authors who translated Origen or were heavily inspired by his work, such as Jerome or Hilary, bishop of Poitiers (west-central France). In particular, in his Commentary on Psalm 118, written between 364 and 367 and considered both by modern scholarship and by ancient witnesses such as Jerome as indebted to Origen, Hilary presents his views on human dignitas in the interpretation of Ps 118:73a (“Your hands made me and fashioned me”).13 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalms was probably known to Rufinus: Jerome, Ep. 5.2 claims to have made a copy of Hilary’s commentary for Rufinus, and in Apol.Hier. 2.35, written in 400–401, Rufinus rejects Jerome’s opinion that Hilary translated the commentary from Greek, meaning from Origen. Hilary shows a completely opposite view of humanity to that of Arnobius, and appears closer to the “philosophical” notion of the soul which was ridiculed by Arnobius.14 In Hilary, Tract.118Ps. 10.3–8 we do not only find multiple references to the dignitas bestowed on the human soul upon its creation according to the image of God – the term occurs in this sense four times in five pages of the critical edition, a much higher frequency than any other previous Latin Christian text – but this dignity is also thoroughly explained as the 9

See section 9.3. Tommasi (2017): 12. 11 The few other occurrences of dignitas attributed to human beings in Arnobius mean social status (cf. Adv.nat. 3.27) – aside from that, most occurrences of dignitas in the treatise refer to divine beings. 12 Simonetti (2006b). 13 My article on the understanding of dignitas emerging from Hilary’s interpretation of Ps 118:73a and of Gen 1:26 in comparison with Origen and other previous exegetes such as Irenaeus, Tertullian, Theophilus, Didymus, Epiphanius, and Ambrose is currently under review for publication. This article focuses on Hilary’s statement that the creation of humankind as described in Gen 1:26 and Ps 118:73 required a preliminary deliberation, and also on the Origenian tradition on the double creation of the human being. 14 See section 7.1.1. 10

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exceptional status of the rational soul, which comes from the unique circumstances of its creation. Furthermore, outside of one occurrence of ἀξίωμα in Theophilus of Antioch (Autol. 2.18.1), no Greek or Latin author prior to Hilary used dignitas or related Greek terms to reflect on the uniqueness of the creation of human beings made by the hands of God. Thus, the emphasis placed on dignity in the exegesis of Ps 118:73a appears as an innovation by Hilary. Hilary interprets “Your hands made me” (Ps 118:73) as referring to the first creation of the human being as told in Gen 1:26. Like Origen,15 Hilary argues that the creation according to the image of God shows the dignity of the inner human, i.e. the rational human soul. At first, Hilary argues that the dignitas of human beings is shown in Scripture by the fact that the creation of humanity, and humanity alone, did not simply come to be when God commanded “Let there be the human being”, but required a more complex process: Tract.118Ps. 10.3–4: In fact, the prophet (viz. David, author of Psalm 118), understanding the honour of his own condition (honorem condicionis suae), wanted to indicate the special dignity of his lineage (specialem originis suae … dignitatem) by saying at first: ‘Your hands made me’ (Ps 118:73a). Because it is said: ‘Let there be light’ (Gen 1:3), ‘Let there be a firmament’ (Gen 1:6), ‘Let the dry land appear’ (Gen 1:9), etc., we gather that in the creation of the world everything was made by the word. Everything from which or in which the body of the entire world was created originated from God’s command and came to be as it is from God’s word. But regarding the human being, God says this: ‘Let us make the human being according to our image and likeness’ (Gen 1:26). The nature and origin of the human being differ from the arrangement of the whole rest of creation in this aspect: specifically for the creation of the human being, there was a preliminary discussion and deliberation, whereas the rest of creation came from God’s command and not from any discussion and resolution. The origin of the human being, thus, has this first dignity, i.e. that it was distinctive of this creation to be discussed in advance (Habet ergo primam hanc origo hominis dignitatem, quod ei proprium fuit de se ante tractari).

Only the creation of the human being required the two hands of God (Ps 118:73), whereas for other noble things, such as the sky (Isa 45:12), just one hand was sufficient: “There is this outstanding and prestigious thing about the human being, i.e. that they are distinguished from the rest by the dignity of the way they were created (dignitate operationis)” (Tract.118Ps. 10.5). Hilary describes the creation of the human soul in Gen 1:26: Tract.118Ps. 10.7–8: Something divine and incorporeal must have been established in the one who was made according to the image and likeness of God, meaning that a certain specimen of the image and likeness of God was created in us. Thus, the first thing about the rational and incorporeal substance of our soul is that it was made according to the image of God. [...] Being made according to the image of God pertains to the dignity of the soul (Quod ergo fit secundum imaginem Dei, ad animi pertinet dignitatem).

15

See section 5.1.

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Despite the many similarities in their respective exegesis of Gen 1:26, especially as regards the double creation of the inner and outer human, Hilary presents dignity in a different way compared with what Origen does in texts such as Princ. 3.6.1. Origen reflects on the difference between image and likeness and explains the dignity established at creation as the possibility for each rational creature to progress in their participation in the Logos. On the other hand, Hilary argues that Scripture proves the unique dignity of humankind by showing that the creation of the human soul required a special care by God, who paused to make the deliberate decision to make the human being with the cooperation of the Son, and took the time to create the human being in three stages – in Tract.118Ps. 10.6–8, Hilary explains that the first stage is the making of the human soul (Gen 1:26–27), the second stage is the fashioning of the body from the dust of the ground (Gen 2:7), and the third stage is the in-breathing of the Spirit, which unites the two (Gen 2:7). So, on the one hand Hilary’s views on the dignity of the creation of the human being are not merely a replica of Origen. On the other hand, it is remarkable that the first text in Latin literature where dignitas is consistently used in reference to the human soul created according to the image of God is a work which shows the reception of Alexandrine exegesis and especially of Origen. 7.1.3 Ambrose of Milan: Spiritual Dignity Lost and Found A further occurrence of spiritual dignitas is found in Ambrose of Milan’s Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, possibly completed around 390.16 In his interpretation of the parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11–32), Ambrose speaks of a spiritual dignitas that is wasted by those who abandon the Church because of the allure of worldly sins, and is then restored by the Father: Exp.Luc. 7.211–212: We are ‘sheep’ (Luke 15:4–6), let us beg him to give us pastures green. We are ‘drachmas’ (Luke 15:8–9), let us keep our value. We are ‘sons’ (Luke 15:11–32), let us run to the Father. Nor let us be afraid because we have wasted our inheritance of spiritual dignity (acceptum spiritalis patrimonium dignitatis) in chasing after earthly pleasures, for the father has restored to the son the treasure that he had [...]. Maybe you dreaded some affront, instead he restores your dignity (ille restituit dignitatem)…

Unlike Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, Hilary, Tract.118Ps. 10.1–8, or Jerome, Tract.81Ps. 6,17 Ambrose does not explicitly say that humanity in general possesses dignitas. In Cain. 1.2.7, Ambrose does speak of the common “dignity of the human condition” (humanae dignitatem condicionis) but he is not referring to the high status of humanity established at its creation in the image of God. Instead, his argument is that, because of his exceptional purity, Moses deserved the honour of being called “god” (cf. Exod 7:1), a title which for Ambrose is 16 17

Visonà (2004): 95. These three passages are examined in sections 5.1, 7.1.2, and 10.3.3, respectively.

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normally far beyond the status or dignity of humanity. Other occurrences of dignitas attributed to human beings in Ambrose’s exegetical writings generally refer to social and political rank (which is mostly presented in negative terms).18 There are however clues in Ambrose’s interpretation of the parable of the prodigal son which may shed light on the issue of who for Ambrose possesses the spiritual dignitas mentioned in Exp.Luc. 7.211–212. Ambrose states that the protagonists of the parables of mercifulness in Luke, i.e. the sheep, the drachma, and the prodigal son, all represent “us”,19 i.e. the Christian community to whom Ambrose addresses his explanations on the Gospel.20 A telling clue that the prodigal son may also refer for Ambrose to humanity in general comes from the association of “spiritual dignity” with the “inheritance” that the father restores to the younger son. Ambrose implies that this inheritance is in fact the “image” and “likeness” of God: Exp.Luc. 7.214: But that young man, living a life of debauchery, wasted all the lovely qualities of his nature (ornamenta naturae). Hence, you who have received the image of God, you who have his likeness (cf. Gen 1:26), take care not to squander it with insane foulness.

Thus, Ambrose implicitly identifies spiritalis dignitas, i.e. the inheritance, with the nature of the human soul created “in the image and likeness” of God.21 The idea that Ambrose attributes dignitas to human nature created according to the image of God is also supported by his interpretation of Ps 9:21b (“Let the nations learn that they are human”), provided in Exp.118Ps. 13.20.22 Ambrose maintains that “they are human” conveys the weakness (infirmitatem) of the nations, because humans as mortal beings share the same limitations as animals (per commune quoddam atque carnale consortium bestiarum) and cannot escape sin without God’s support. However, the same statement “they are human” also expresses the grace of God: when one considers that human beings were made according to the image and likeness of God, one recognises that calling the nations “human beings” is actually not a sign of their lowliness but rather of their dignity (Dignitas coepit esse quae ignobilitas videbatur). Again, 18 Ambr.Med. Exp.Luc. 1.14, 3.3, 4.28,31, 6.69, 8.81; Hex. 5.15.52; Exp.1Ps. 13,23; Exp.37Ps. 51; Exp.43Ps. 70; Exp.61Ps. 24; Exp.118Ps. 14.34, 15.32. 19 Cf. Smith (2007): 215–216. 20 Corsato (1993): 279. 21 For Ambrose’s view that Gen 1:26–27 refers specifically to the creation of the human soul, or inner human, see Exp.118Ps. 10.15; Exp.Luc. 8.95; Ep. 69.19; Hex. 6.8.44–46. 22 Ambrose quotes Ps 9:21b in the context of his interpretation of Ps 118:102 (“I have not turned aside from your rules, for you have given me the law”); this connection between Ps 9:21b and Ps 118:102 is also observed in a fragment preserved in the so-called “Palestinian catena” and attributed to Origen. It is believed that Ambrose made use of Origen’s Commentary on Psalm 118, cf. Maschio (2009): 160–165. However, in this case the argument on human dignity in Ambrose, Exp.118Ps. 13.20 cannot be compared to the fragment by Origen in the Palestinian catena, where the reference to Ps 9:21b is used in the context of an argument about the Christian gospel as the spiritual fulfilment of Mosaic law.

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a connection between dignitas and the creation of the human being according to the image and likeness of God is drawn here. Both Ambrose’s Commentary on the Gospel of Luke and his Commentary on Psalm 118 were likely indebted to Origen’s exegesis. Celestino Corsato (1993) concludes that Ambrose mainly used Origen’s Commentary on Luke in five books, which is lost to us for the most part, as well as Hilary, Hippolytus, Didymus, Basil, and Eusebius.23 This influence of Origen is also recognised by Ambrose’s contemporaries, as indicated by Jerome’s preface to his translation of Origen’s Homilies on Luke or by Rufinus, Apol.Hier. 2.22–25.24 Origen’s commentaries on Luke, Psalm 9, or Psalm 118 are not extant, and none of the 39 Homilies on Luke by Origen translated by Jerome deals with the parable of the prodigal son in its entirety;25 we just have a Greek fragment, namely Fr.Luc. 85, where Origen interprets only the verse Luke 15:16.26 Nevertheless, we find in another Greek fragment attributed to Origen, namely Fr.Jer. 14 ad 22:24–26, an exegetical solution regarding the pericope of the prodigal son that is comparable to the one offered by Ambrose in Exp.Luc. 7.212–214. Origen interprets the fact that the father gives the younger son his ring as revealing that “Every person who through repentance regains what is according to the image becomes a seal, a ring on the right hand of God. [...] The father gave this kind of seal to the profligate son who returned”. We have no proof that Ambrose knew of this specific passage attributed to Origen, but this fragment may be taken as evidence that Origen, like Ambrose, interpreted the “inheritance” restored to the prodigal son as the quality given to humanity at creation according to the image of God, obfuscated by sin, and then restored after repentance.27 Perhaps, this interpretation was expressed by Origen in his lost Commentary on Luke, and was reprised by Ambrose, who presents this exegetical solution in his own commentary with a special emphasis on the theme of God’s love for the sinner. This association between Gen 1:26–27 and Luke 15:12–22 is not present in other Christian exegetes of Luke that Ambrose may have known.28 However, the use of terms signifying “dignity” is not attested in any text by Origen referencing the parable of the prodigal son. So, the fact that Ambrose refers to this exegetical notion using “dignity” may be an innovation by 23

Cf. Maschio (2009); Griffith (2016); Markschies (2007): 195–222. For these charges of plagiarism against Ambrose, cf. Layton (2002). 25 Origen references the parable in Comm.Rom. 2.8.4; Hom.Lev. 8.11; Hom.Jer. 18.9, and Hom.Num. 18.4, on the repentance of the prodigal son; Hom.Gen. 4.2 and Hom.Lev. 2.4, on the fattened calf in Luke 15:23 as a symbol of the sacrifice of Christ. 26 For the theme of freedom of choice in Orig. Fr.Luc. 85 and its reception in Jerome, cf. Scardia (2017). For the themes of divine mercifulness and pre-existence of souls in Origen’s exegesis of the prodigal son, cf. Di Paolo and Limone (2015). 27 See section 5.2. 28 Corsato (1993): 183–185. 24

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Ambrose, rather than coming from Origen. Of course this is all speculation since we do not have the Greek texts of Origen’s commentaries on Luke or on Psalm 118, but if this was the case, and terms signifying “dignity” were not present in Origen’s interpretation of Luke 15:11–32 or Ps 118:73a, then both Ambrose, Exp.Luc. 7.212–214 and Hilary, Tract.118Ps. 10.1–8, while relying heavily on Origen’s exegesis and especially on his views regarding the creation of human souls, would also contain an innovative element by expressing these views with terms signifying “dignity”. 7.1.4 Augustine of Hippo: The Dignity of the Soul Finally, the Christian author who most often used dignitas to refer to the human soul is Augustine. Even taking into consideration solely the passages by Augustine published before Rufinus translated Origen’s De Principiis in 398, we find many more occurrences of dignitas of the soul than in all other previous authors combined. Augustine referenced the dignitas of the soul mainly in the third book of On Freedom of Choice (De libero arbitrio) and in the sixth book of On Music (De musica),29 where he speaks of dignitas as a status of excellence and superiority, compared with physical bodies or even heavenly bodies, shared by all human souls since creation.30 A direct link between these passages by Augustine featuring dignitas of the soul and a specific writing by Origen cannot be established: it is unlikely that Augustine had access to Origen’s Greek works by 398, but it is possible (albeit not certain) that he had read Jerome’s translation of Origen’s homilies.31 Thus, there is not enough evidence to include Augustine’s works among the examples of 4th-century Latin translations or re-interpretations of Origen’s, like other texts which featured dignitas in its universal sense and were likely known to Rufinus at the time when he translated De Principiis, namely those by Hilary, Ambrose, and Jerome.32 However, compared to other 4th century Latin authors, this view of human dignitas expressed by the early Augustine has more in common with the idea of the natural dignity of the human souls created in the image of God as expressed by Origen, Hilary, Ambrose, or Jerome, rather than with the transformative view of Christian dignitas attested by Gregory of Elvira, Zeno, or Ambrosiaster (see the next section).

29

Aug. Lib. 3.5.15–16; 3.20.56; 3.22.65; Mus. 6.4.7; 6.14.46. Cf. Aug. Fund. 37.43: the nature of the rational human soul receives dignity from God as the greatest being after God himself. 31 Heidl (2009). On Augustine’s possible knowledge of Origen through Jerome in the 390s, cf. Sfameni Gasparro (1998): 123–150; Grossi (2006): 56; Ramelli (2013c): 292–304. 32 See sections 7.1.2–3; 10.3. Jerome referred to the dignitas of immortal human souls already in 389 (Comm.Eccl. ad 3:18–21). 30

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7.2 Dignity Available to All Those Who Become Christian There are other works from the 4th century mentioning a spiritual dignitas which is markedly different from socio-political dignitas, but the perspective on how human beings can access this dignity is different from the one espoused by the Latin Christian authors examined so far in this chapter. 7.2.1 Gregory of Elvira: The Dignity of the Church as the Body of Christ The Commentary on the Song of Songs by Gregory, bishop of Elvira (today’s Granada, Spain), shows significant connections with Origen’s exegesis.33 For Karl Shuve (2016), who dates Gregory’s commentary to the late 340s or early 350s, Origen’s exegetical solutions reached Gregory via earlier Latin exegetes such as Victorinus of Poetovio, whose commentary on the Song of Songs is lost.34 In his interpretation of Cant 1:5 (“I am dark and beautiful”), Gregory presents spiritual dignitas as the product of a transformation occurring in humans when they enter with baptism a new life and discard the old one: Tract.Cant. 1.30: This is thus the Church, body of Christ, through which all of us who believe in Christ, as members of his body, purified from the crime of our previous way of life, receive the ornament of seemliness (ornamentum decoris) and the beauty of dignity (speciem dignitatis) through Jesus Christ.

The Bride is here identified mainly with the Church, but in general Gregory often presents the double interpretation of the Bride as both the Church and the human soul, as he states already in the first lines of Tract.Cant. 1.1. In Eph 5:25–32, the Church is presented both as the wife of Christ and as his body. Based on this association between “Bride of Christ” and “body of Christ”, Gregory explains why the Bride, i.e. the Church, claims in Cant 1:5 that she is beautiful: by assuming a human body Christ has made it possible for humans even as carnal beings to be purified with baptism and re-integrated as the body of Christ, thus receiving decorum and dignitas. Gregory’s interpretation of the dignity and beauty of the Bride is different from Origen’s. Origen regarded the references to the beauty of the Bride in Cant 1:5,8 as closely connected to the rational capacity that the human soul received upon its creation according to the image of God.35 In Jerome’s translation of Origen, Hom.Cant. 1.9, the Bride has dignitas because of the way the Groom made her. For Gregory of Elvira, the dignity that the Bride receives through the Groom is notably distinct from dignity in traditional society, as it marks a break with the past and it relates to the soul (since it is bestowed on 33

Gianotti (1984). Cf. Elliott (2000): 15–50, for an overview on all known Latin and Greek exegetes of the Song of Songs (3rd to 5th centuries) and their theological backgrounds. 35 See section 2.6. 34

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the Bride and Gregory interpreted the Bride also as the soul). However, Gregory does not present this new dignity as universal or undeserved or inherent to the nature of the Bride. On the one hand, in Tract.Cant. 2.31 Gregory claims that the saints who are united and made equal in the Church as one body share the exact same glory of dignity and honour (in uno corpore coniuncti et posteriores prioribus adaequati unius honoris et dignitatis gloriae haberentur). The purpose of this text is to show the concordance of OT and NT as interpreted by the Christian Church: Gregory sees the patriarchs and the apostles as the two “cheeks” of the Bride mentioned in Cant 1:10, laying below the two eyes, meaning below the light of the two Testaments. So, in this passage Gregory conveys that becoming part of the same body means acquiring the same dignity. On the other hand, in the interpretation of Cant 1:8 that he provides in Tract.Cant. 1.30, Gregory makes it very clear that the dignity of the Bride and body of Christ is limited to those who are baptised in the right faith, excluding heretics and Jews.36 So, in Gregory’s interpretation of the statements in Cant 1:8–10 describing the beauty of the Bride, dignitas is presented as shared equally only among the baptised. By contrast, Origen’s interpretation of the beauty of the Bride did not focus on the transformation taking place in individuals who are baptised, but rather on God’s creation of all souls. 7.2.2 Zeno of Verona: Dignity and Community It is not known whether Zeno, bishop of Verona (north-eastern Italy) approximately from 362 to 380, could have had direct access to Origen’s Greek works; however, Zeno was possibly aware at least of Hilary’s Commentary on Psalms, which was largely based on Origen’s exegesis.37 Vittore Boccardi (1983) and Gianni Sgreva (1989) demonstrated that many of Zeno’s exegetical solutions ultimately come from Origen, and reached Zeno mainly via Hilary of Poitiers. Indeed, Zeno’s exegesis of Gen 1:26 has many aspects in common with Origen and Hilary.38 Zeno regards rational human souls as images of the Son of God (Tract. 2.4.3); the image and likeness of God in human beings is invisible, intelligible and spiritual, rather than corporeal (Tract. 1.27; 2.30). In his brief speech On Easter (Tract. 2.29), Zeno celebrates baptism as the death of the “old human” (cf. Col 3:9) and as the birth of the new human transformed by Christ. This new stage of human life, beginning with baptism, is in line with the notion that human beings can choose between the “life of the flesh” and the “life of the soul” (Tract. 2.4). Human beings access the life of 36

Cf. Greg.Ill. Tract.Cant. 2.15–21. For Gregory and the Jews, cf. Molina Gómez (2021). See section 7.1.2. Cf. Fedalto in Banterle and Ravazzolo (2008): 19–20, 283. 38 Cf. Sgreva (1989): 256–280, 416–419. Cf. pp. 293–297 for Zeno’s view that, before the original sin, human beings were not different from angels, and the connections with Origen’s notion that all creatures were created as equal in nature (see sections 3.4; 10.2.1). 37

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the soul with baptism39 and maintain it by resisting the allure of worldly and transient goods. In Tract. 2.29.2, Zeno claims that before baptism there were differences among humans based on kin, gender, age, conditions of life; conversely, with baptism, God, who loves all Christians equally, “bestows on all the baptised one and the same birth, one milk, one reward, one dignity of the Holy Spirit” (unam nativitatem, unum lac, unum stipendium, unam spiritus sancti praestat omnibus dignitatem). Zeno does not clarify if this new dignitas is received specifically by the human soul, only that with baptism human beings leave the “life of the flesh” and enter the “life of the soul” (Tract. 2.4). Zeno does not argue, like Hilary, Tract.118Ps. 10.3–5 or Origen in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1, that all human souls share a special dignitas since the creation of humanity as a species. Rather, Zeno, Tract. 2.29.2, like Gregory of Elvira,40 maintains that from the moment that people are re-born as Christians with baptism they all receive a spiritual dignitas that marks a break with their previous life. An element that is instead present in Zeno’s discourse on the new dignity of the Christians but is not found in Gregory of Elvira is the social interpretation of this dignity. Zeno claims that in this world there are social differences depending on how one is born in the flesh (as male or female, rich or poor, etc.); however, after baptism, i.e. after the new birth to the true life of the soul, these differences are cancelled. Since their second birth to the life of the soul, all human beings are endowed by God with one and the same dignity, not a dignity or status of this world but the “dignity of the Holy Spirit”, shared by all Christians. So, while for example Tertullian, Apol. 1.2 claimed that the true spiritual dignitas of Christians was in the afterlife, Zeno speaks of a new dignitas that human beings acquire already in this life when they receive the Spirit at baptism and enter the community of the Christians.41 When the distinctions that regulate worldly society lose importance, all members of the new community formed by the Spirit receive the same dignity, changing their status before God but also before each other. Zeno, Tract. 2.29.3 claims that the result of everyone receiving the same dignity at baptism is that people start to look at each other with new eyes, and discover something to admire and even to emulate in those they had previously detested and despised. For Zeno, this newfound fraternity and unity among the baptised fulfils the potential for equality offered by the creation of humanity in the image of God.42 39 For the Easter baptismal ceremony in Zeno, cf. Ferguson (2009): 648–651; Jeanes (1989). For an overview of the context, style, and prominent themes of Zeno’s speeches, cf. McEachnie (2018): 454–460. 40 See section 7.2.1. 41 On the unity of the newly baptised in Zeno, cf. Jeanes (1995): 252–255. 42 Sgreva (1989): 270; 344, remarks that Zeno, like Hilary and Ambrose, inherited from Alexandrine exegesis the view that with baptism the “image of the heavenly” (1Cor 15:49) is restored in human beings, who first received it at their creation according to the image of God, and then lost it (at least temporarily; see sections 5.2; 10.3.2) with original sin.

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Zeno claims that when individuals recognise and honour the image of God in another as well as in themselves, they discover the true nobility of humanity: Tract. 1.36.7: Whoever retains an awareness of their own nobility (quisque … nobilitatis suae conscientiam retinet), loves their sibling [...] and they love themselves so much through the sibling, that they would hate themselves without the sibling. [...] For this reason God made the human being in his own image and likeness (cf. Gen 1:26), [...] so that, if we do something good or bad to anyone else, we appear to have done that to God.

The idea that we all have a connection with fellow humans because we are all equally made in the image of God despite our social differences was expressed roughly in the same years as Zeno by Gregory of Nazianzus using ἀξίωμα.43 One of the earliest examples of this “social” interpretation of the creation of the human being in the image of God is found in Origen. In Hom.15Ps. 1.3, Origen interprets the requests that Christ makes for his own body in Scripture – for example, in Ps 15:1 (“Protect me, Lord”) or in Matt 25:35 (“When I was hungry, you gave me food”) – as referring in fact to the Church as the body of Christ. Origen then argues that those who “protect” or “feed” a member of the Church are doing good to Christ himself, and, vice versa, those who harm or offend a Christian are committing a sin against Christ. Then, unlike Zeno, who in Tract. 2.29.3 speaks specifically of a community among the baptised,44 Origen expands the scope of his argument on solidarity to explicitly include also non-Christians: because all human beings and in fact all rational creatures are created “according to the image and likeness” of God (Gen 1:26), it follows that even when we sin against non-Christians we are offending the very “image of the creator” (Col 3:10). This inclusive interpretation of Gen 1:26 is found often in Origen’s writings. For example, the view that hurting someone else is an act against Christ, as he is the image in which all humans are created, is also expressed in Hom.73Ps. 3.6; in Comm.Jo. 13.28.167 Origen states that the creation of each and every human being according to the image and likeness and God entails that we should not despise those who are inferior to us in social status. Before Origen, universalising views on the creation in the image of God as creating a community among all human beings (including non-Christians) were also expressed by Clement of Alexandria:

43

See section 8.1. As argued by Volp (2006): 162–166, the social implications of Gen 1:26–27 were especially developed by Basil of Caesarea; however, unlike Gregory of Nazianzus Basil does not describe this notion with derivatives of ἄξιος. 44 The purposes and methodologies of Zeno’s polemic against non-Christians, especially pagans, are investigated by Dümler (2013), who concludes that Zeno’s attack is not directed against specific pagans active in Verona; instead, paganism is employed as a sort of secular foil to the Christian morality that Zeno aims at conveying in his speeches. Thus, his arguments against paganism are primarily intended to highlight the counter-cultural significance of Christianity: Tract. 2.29.3 can also be read in this light, as it claims that the new spiritual dignitas cancels the established social distinctions.

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Strom. 7.14.86.1–2: For we know not yet whether even the one who is at present hostile may not hereafter believe. From which we clearly gather, if not that all are siblings, yet that to us they should seem such. And further, that all humans are the work of one God, invested with one image upon one substance (though in some the image may be more confused than in others), – the recognition of this is reserved for the Gnostic, who through the creatures adores the divine energy, and through that adores the divine will.

Similar views on human beings as created according to the image of God and therefore deserving of love and respect were expressed by a Latin author that Zeno probably knew45 much better than Origen, namely Lactantius, who claimed that what is done to someone who is created in the image of God is also in some way done to God himself (Inst. 6.10). Hence, there is no need to postulate a direct connection between Zeno and the Greek passages by Clement and Origen conveying this view (which do not feature ἀξία, ἀξίωμα, or other Greek terms signifying “dignity”). However, the thematic connections between Origen’s and Zeno’s views on humankind as created in the image of God show that universalising ideas which we find expressed for the first time in Alexandria in the early 3rd century re-appear in late 4th century authors, such as Zeno or Gregory of Nazianzus, who integrate them in their own theology and adapt them to their own purposes. Unlike their 3rd century predecessors, these 4th century authors use dignitas or ἀξίωμα to indicate a spiritual status shared by all humans since their creation (in Gregory) or at least accessible to all humans when they receive baptism (in Zeno),46 entailing already in this life a duty to treat each other as equals despite the differences in worldly status. Thus, although it is possible that Zeno’s sermons, in their extant form, may not report the exact words used by Zeno,47 the occurrence of dignitas in Tract. 2.29.2 is in line with the new tendency, emerging in the late 4th century, to employ the term dignitas in a way that does not correspond to its traditional meaning as individual status, when expressing universalising Christian views on humanity. 7.2.3 Ambrosiaster: Transformative Dignity A similar view to the one expressed by Zeno in Tract. 2.29, namely that all those who join the Christian Church receive a new spiritual dignitas that is much more meaningful than worldly status, is expressed by the anonymous author known as “Ambrosiaster”, active possibly in Rome in the 380s,48 in his 45

McEachnie (2018): 455. The view that the transformation humans go through when they convert to Christ was accessible to every human is also present in Arnobius, cf. Adv.nat. 2.64; see section 7.1.1. 47 McEachnie (2018): 456–457; the opposite view is held by Jeanes (1995): 20–53, who affirms “the integrity and authenticity of the sermons as those preached by Zeno” (51). 48 Capone (2020); for the dating and contextualization of Ambrosiaster’s works, cf. also Lunn-Rockliffe (2007): 11–32. For further examples of common aspects between Ambrosiaster and Zeno, cf. d'Alès (1929). 46

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Question 81 on the New Testament, concerning the statement in Gal 2:15 “We ourselves are Jews by birth”. We cannot compare Ambrosiaster’s interpretation of this verse with Origen, because not much is known of Origen’s exegesis of Gal 2:15. It is debated whether Ambrosiaster had access to Origen’s Greek works at all;49 scholars have mostly highlighted the influence on Ambrosiaster’s Quaestiones of other 3rd century Christian authors, such as Tertullian. David Hunter (1992) highlights the role played by Tertullian in the polemic found in Ambrosiaster’s exegesis of Gen 1:26–27 against ascetical views deriving from Greek authors like Origen, who influenced opponents of Ambrosiaster such as Jerome. In general, compared with other contemporary authors (such as Zeno or Filastrius) whose relationship with Origen was perhaps indirect but who still hold comparable views on the human being created according to the image of God, Ambrosiaster’s interpretation of Gen 1:26–27 does not have as many aspects in common with Origen. For instance, Ambrosiaster did not believe that all humans – let alone all rational creatures – were created according to the image of God: Ambrosiaster makes it very clear that women were not in fact made in the image of God.50 Furthermore, Ambrosiaster does not distinguish between image and likeness, nor does he ever claim that Gen 1:26–27 refers specifically to the human soul, or the inner human. So, his perspective on Christian dignity in opposition to traditional dignity is based on a view of humanity which is different from the one examined so far. Ambrosiaster speaks of the contrast between the vain and external dignitas passed down to the members of families of senatorial rank, and the true dignitas of Christians, which each individual must attain for themselves when they mature in their faith. Christians are not born as such by substance, like Jews who are born from Jewish parents, but rather by faith: unlike Zeno, Ambrosiaster does not explicitly identify the moment when one becomes a true Christian specifically with baptism, but rather with the time when one gains faith through “spiritual reason”. Ambrosiaster identifies true dignitas with the gift of immortality that God bestows on the substance of the believers:51 Quaest. 81.2: For the Christian is not born through substance, but through faith, that touches those who are already born: ignorance is born with the flesh, whereas faith comes later with spiritual reason. Objection: ‘In any case, if the parents have already become [Christians], their child should be as they are, so that the dignity that they have received is passed on to the child (ut accepta dignitas traducem faceret), just as senators give birth to senators’. But the dignity of the senators is not considered a merit by God: nature itself (i.e. substance) does not benefit from it, but their dignity is only in fame and words (senatorum dignitas non habet apud deum meritum, neque ipsa natura, hoc est substantia, consequitur beneficium, sed in sola fama et sermone dignitas vertitur). [...] [Words] do not offer anything but the 49 Matteoli (2011): 21–22, believes he did; de Bruyn, Cooper, and Hunter (2017): lxvii– lxviii, hold the opposite opinion. 50 Ambrosiast. Quaest. 21, 45.3, 106.17. 51 A similar understanding of spiritual dignitas is found in Jerome, see section 10.3.1.

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perception of dignity (opinionem dignitatis): those who are consuls or are honoured by statues rejoice in vain. Instead, as soon as one becomes a Christian, dignity gets to their nature, so that the very essence of the human receives the eternal benefit of incorruptibility, and this by God is in execution not only in perception, but in reality (Christiani autem cum fiunt, ipsi naturae accedit dignitas, ut essentia ipsa hominis aeternum habeat incorruptibilitatis beneficium, ut non opinione sola, sed et re sit in effectum apud deum). [...] This indeed is the true glory, when the dignity that one strives for (quaesita dignitas) is so advanced in them, that they do not need anything else, as long as this is offered to their nature, that it may live by itself, and it may live well without requiring any other support; this means that they have become truly rich and glorious.

Hence, Ambrosiaster maintains that the dignity of the Christian is not just a perception or external recognition, like the one that Roman senators pass down to their children; instead, becoming a true Christian is a transformation that affects the very nature or essence of the human being, who acquire immortality. While Zeno, Tract. 2.29,52 focuses on the change that spiritual dignitas brings in this life to the Christian community, for Ambrosiaster true dignitas as immortality has mostly to do with the fate of the individual after death. In fact, Ambrosiaster often claims that the Christian will attain true dignitas only in the afterlife.53 However, Ambrosiaster indicates in Quaest. 81.2 that the transformation that determines the new spiritual dignitas begins to produce positive results already in this life, stating that the objective individuals should pursue in their life is to progress in dignity until they do not require any wealth or glory other than their own spiritual enrichment. In Ambrosiaster, Quaest. 81, true dignitas is associated with familiar themes found also in Origen, such as progress and detachment from the false values promoted by “pagan” society, including traditional dignity.54 However, the idea of Christian dignity emerging from Quaest. 81.2 does not involve the creation of humankind according to the image of God or the exegesis of Gen 1:26– 27. Texts such as Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, Hilary, Tract.118Ps. 10.3–5, Ambrose, Exp.Luc. 7.212, Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 16.8,15, Filastrius, Div.Her. 98.5, or Jerome, Comm.Isa. 14.1155 refer to a dignity that, although it may be obscured in this life, has been part of human nature since its beginning. Conversely, the spiritual dignitas in Ambrosiaster, Gregory of Elvira, and Zeno emphasises the transformation occurring in individuals when they gain true faith and join the Christian community. Ambrosiaster argues that while most people who possess senatorial dignitas achieved it by being born in a family of senatorial rank, the attainment of Christian dignitas is open to all those who 52

See section 7.2.2. Ambrosiast. Ad Gal. 4.14; Quaest. 101.2; 115.50. For Ambrosiaster’s beliefs regarding the afterlife, cf. Comm.1Cor. 15. 54 For dignity and the progress of the creatures in Origen, see section 3.4; for true dignity as opposed to pagan society, see section 3.1. 55 These six texts are examined in sections 5.1, 7.1.2–3, 8.1, 9.2, and 10.3.1, respectively. 53

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gain true faith. The class or ethnicity into which someone is born does not prevent them from achieving dignity, as true faith is something that each one must achieve for oneself over the course of one’s life and not something that only some individuals possess from birth.56 Authors such as Ambrosiaster and Zeno do not speak of universal and undeserved dignitas in the sense that all souls are given dignity at creation. Instead, they speak of universal dignitas in the sense that people from all social classes can choose to become true Christians and thus deserve to receive dignity.

7.3 Conclusions The earliest Latin reception of Origen by Hilary of Poitiers coincides with the earliest example of a Latin text explaining in detail when and how the entire humankind received dignitas. The texts analysed in section 7.1 prove that at the time when Rufinus translated Origen’s De Principiis in 398 there were occurrences of spiritual dignitas in authoritative Latin bishops who expressed universalising views on humanity which were to different degrees connected to Origen’s interpretation of Gen 1:26–27. In particular, occurrences of dignity of the human soul created according to the image of God are found in Hilary and Ambrose, who presumably had direct knowledge of at least some exegetical writings by Origen. Instead, the occurrences of transformative, rather than natural, dignitas in authors whose connection with Origen is indirect or uncertain, namely Gregory of Elvira, Zeno, and Ambrosiaster (section 7.2), tell us that in the late 4th century, when Latin Christian authors were just beginning to speak of a spiritual dignitas of all humans, the understanding of this term was already very complex and nuanced. Thus, it is possible that, when faced with the difficult question of how to translate a Greek term denoting “dignity” (possibly ἀξίωμα) in the original text of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, Rufinus might have felt that the use of dignitas in relation to all human souls, although it did not correspond to the most widespread understanding of the term, was not entirely without precedent in the context of the late 4th century reception of Origen.

56 Di Santo (2008): 377–381, highlights the connection with Tertullian’s principle, expressed in passages such as Apol. 18.4, that nobody is “born” Christian, but each soul must decide for itself to convert to Christianity. This view is explicitly rejected by Filastrius, Div.Her. 111 (see chapter 9), maintaining that Christianity is in fact the natural status of humanity as established at creation, while paganism and Judaism are later perversions; cf. Gassman (2021).

Chapter 8

Human Dignity in the Latin Translations of the Cappadocians This chapter deals with occurrences of dignitas attributed to humankind in the Latin translations of Greek Christian authors of the late 4th century from Cappadocia (today’s central Turkey), whose views on humanity in the image of God are comparable to those of Origen and who were well-known to Rufinus at the time when he translated De Principiis in 398. Compared with the Latin translations of Origen, many more occurrences of universal human dignitas are found in the Latin translations of the Cappadocians. As discussed in the previous chapter, Latin authors of the 4th century had access to Origen’s biblical interpretation through three main channels. First there are those who, like Hilary or Ambrose (sections 7.1.2–3), read Origen’s writings in their original Greek. The second channel are the Latin translations produced by Rufinus and Jerome: for example, as discussed in section 7.1.4, it is debated in scholarship whether Augustine read Origen’s homilies already in the 390s, using the translation by Jerome. The third channel is the indirect reception of many exegetical solutions by Origen, through the mediation of influential Latin authors such as Hilary, Ambrose, or Jerome (and possibly other exegetes whose writings are for the most part lost to us, such as Victorinus of Poetovio): this is likely the case with authors examined in section 7.2 such as Zeno of Verona. The present chapter addresses a second way of indirect reception, i.e. through the Latin translations of less controversial Greek Christian authors such as the Cappadocians, who, as will be discussed in this chapter, reelaborate in their writings elements of the Alexandrine interpretation of Gen 1:26–27 provided by authors such as Philo and especially Origen. Thus, this chapter will assess the role played by the Latin translations of the Cappadocians in cementing the significance of dignitas in the transmission of these universalising views on humanity to a Roman audience.

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8.1 Gregory of Nazianzus: “Dignity of the Image” When attributed to humans, dignitas generally retains in the translations preserved in cod. Laurentianus Marcianus 584 its traditional meanings1 indicating mainly the dignity of kings or other public authorities. However, the translation of Gregory’s speech To Julian the tax collector (Orat. 19), delivered in Nazianzus between 374 and 375, contains a different understanding of dignitas. Gregory establishes an opposition between the uniting power of the image of God, giving all human beings the same dignity, and the social divisions. Gregory uses this argument to invite those who, like the tax collector, are in a position of power to follow the example of Christ’s philanthropy and be merciful towards those who are in a lesser position. This will be beneficial not only for the subjects, but also for the soul of the one who shows mercifulness: Orat. 19.13: This is the way the Savior brought salvation even though as the God who created the entire universe at a word he could have done so also by the mere expression of his will. What he did give us was greater and more compelling: he embraced human feelings and the human condition. Where then does duty lie for us, the disciples of Christ, mild and philanthropic, who did so much for us? Shall we not emulate the Lord’s compassion? Shall we not be kind to our fellow servants so that the Lord may in equal spirit repay us to the measure of our own kindness? Shall we not gain our own lives through gentleness? It is enough that free people find themselves in bondage and that the difference (τὸ διάφορον) among us creatures of the same clay is so great that some are rulers and other subjects; and that some impose taxes while others are put on the rolls to pay them; and that some can be criminals and commit injustice while others struggle and plead not to suffer it; and that these things all concern the one image, and the one dignity (περὶ τὴν μίαν εἰκόνα, καὶ τὸ ἓν ἀξίωμα; in the Latin translation: circa unam imaginem unius dignitatis), the heirs of the same life, for all of whom equally (ὁμοίως/similiter) Christ has died. [...] Do not make the yoke heavier.

In the Latin text, all human beings are said to be one and the same image of one and the same dignity, i.e. that of Christ. The Latin translator refers to the dignitas of Christ, of which human beings are the image. Gregory’s Greek speeches, on the other hand, explicitly attribute one and the same dignity directly to all human beings, who possess dignity through the sacrifice of Christ.2 As observed by Brian Matz (2004), for Gregory the humility displayed by the self-emptying of Christ (Phil 2:7) serves as an exemplary model for directing 1 See sections 1.2.2; 3.1–2; 6.1; 10.1. For background on the translations examined in this chapter see section 1.2.1. 2 Cf. Greg.Naz. Orat. 1.4: “Yesterday I was crucified with Christ; today I am glorified with him; yesterday I died with him; today I come alive with him; yesterday I was buried with him; today I rise with him. Now, let us bring offers to him who suffered and rose again for us […]. Let us offer ourselves, the possession most precious to God, and most fitting; let us give back to the image what is made after the image. Let us recognize our dignity (τὸ ἀξίωμα); let us honour our archetype; let us know the power of the mystery, and for what Christ died”. Transl. adapted from NPNF 7.

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the choices that humans make in their earthly life. Gregory emphasises the equality in the real and present dignity of all human beings, anchored in the sacrifice of Christ and in the creation in the image of God, as opposed to less meaningful social distinctions.3 The contraposition between the differences among the living conditions of humans on the one hand and the unity of the dignity of human nature on the other is expressed by Gregory also elsewhere in his speeches, most notably in Orat. 14.4 The anonymous translation of Orat. 19.13 reinforces the connection between dignitas and ἀξίωμα in discourses about the “image” that can be observed also in Rufinus’ translation of Gregory’s speech On the father’s silence (Orat. 16). This speech, originally delivered in 373, focuses on how human beings should understand and react to God’s punishment.5 Gregory of Nazianzus was for Rufinus a much more recent author compared with Origen, and one that was not considered so controversial in the Latin Church. This is proven by the quotation of Rufinus’ translation of Gregory, Orat. 16.15 in Augustine, C.Jul. 1.5.15. Augustine argues that even one of the most well-respected Greek bishops, such as Gregory of Nazianzus, believed in original sin,6 which distanced the entire humanity from the “dignity of the image” and could be washed away only through the sacrament of baptism. Gregory’s speech deals with the dignity that human beings were given at their creation in a similar way as Origen does in Princ. 3.6.1,7 but it focuses more on the theme of sin and God’s punishment, rather than on the creation of humanity. Gregory states that “the dignity of the image” may be “overshadowed and confused by our evil”, and that God will hold us accountable for this (τὸ τῆς εἰκόνος ἀπαιτῶν ἀξίωμα, τῇ κακίᾳ συνθολωθείσης καὶ συγχυθείσης). Rufinus clarifies in his translation that what is obscured by sin is “the dignity of the pure image” (cum a nobis requirens purae imaginis dignitatem oblitteratam eam invenerit et obfuscatam). Furthermore, Gregory observes that the human soul created in the image of God is torn between its natural upward tension to heaven and its creator, and the weight of sin bringing it down to abjection. However, the human soul is able, with the help of the Logos, to fulfil its natural heavenly quality and elevate not only itself, but also the purified body. As Gabrielle Thomas (2019) points out, for Gregory of Nazianzus the “image of God” in which humans are created is both the divine Logos and the incarnate Christ (whereas Origen tended to identify the “image of God” mostly

3 For the origins of this social reading of the creation in the image of God, see section 7.2.2. On Gregory of Nazianzus’ notion of justice and law as inspired by divine philanthropy, cf. Nigro (2013): 244–247. 4 Cf. Greg.Naz. Orat. 33.12; McGuckin (2016). 5 Cf. Moreschini (2008): 121–122. 6 Cf. Caruso (2016): 111. 7 See chapter 5.

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with the Logos); hence, the human being made “in the image of God” includes both the rational soul and the body, when the latter is purified by the first. Gregory argues that it would have been better not to have needed this process of punishment, conversion and purification of the body: Orat. 16.15 (Gregory): Indeed, even if the earth drags along some evil, and the earthly body oppresses the intellect that tries to elevate itself, that was created to elevate itself, let however the image clean the mud, and elevate also the flesh, its companion under the yoke, lifting it up on the wings of the Logos. It would have been better not to have needed such purification, not to have been purified, retaining in us the first dignity (τοῦ πρώτου μένοντος ἡμῖν ἀξιώματος), to which we also aim with the discipline of this life. It would have been better not to have fallen away from the tree of life for the bitter taste of sin. But it is still better, rather than to not be corrected when we fall, to be converted from sin. The Lord corrects those he loves, and he punishes as a Father: every soul that will not be warned, is incurable. Orat. 16.15 (Rufinus): Indeed, even if this earth carries with itself a great deal of evil and this earthly body oppresses the sense that thinks of great things and looks up, that was even created for this purpose, to strive for things that are high above, let however the image of God clean the mud flooded from the body, and lift up the flesh, united with the image, on the wings of the Word of God. And even though it would have been better not to even need such purification, and instead to have remained in that first dignity (in illa prima dignitate permansisse), to which we also aim after the present amendment, and it would have been better not to fall away from the tree of life for the bitter taste of sin, still the second most profitable thing is to be amended and corrected after the fall, rather than to remain in sin. The Lord reproaches those he loves; he does punish every child that he has. And he adds: the soul which is not reproached, is incurable.

In Rufinus’ translation, the dignity which was lost with sin and that we now aim to restore is clarified as “that first dignity”, i.e. the dignity of the unblemished image mentioned in Orat. 16.8.8 Rufinus’ translation of Orat. 16 provides a telling parallel to his translation of Origen’s Princ. 3.6.1. Both translations by Rufinus feature imaginis dignitas, denoting the dignity that all humans were given at their beginning by being created in the image of God, and, in the case of Orat. 16.8, this is certainly a translation of ἀξίωμα. So, it is possible that also Origen’s Princ. 3.6.1 expressed the “dignity of the image” as ἀξίωμα.

8.2 Basil of Caesarea: Dignity as Superiority In Hom.Hex. 9.2, Basil observes that: “Cattle are terrestrial, and bent towards the earth, but the human … is different as much for the figure of the bodily conformation as for the dignity of the soul (ὅσον τῷ σχήματι τῆς σωματικῆς διαπλάσεως, τοσοῦτον καὶ τῷ ἀξιώματι τῆς ψυχῆς)”. In the translation of this 8 For the conservation or restoration of the image of God in human beings cf. Greg.Naz. Orat. 24.15: “There is only one distinction of ancestry, and that is to preserve the divine image and to become as much like the archetype as is possible for prisoners of the flesh”.

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passage, Eustathius uses dignitas to refer to humanity as a species: “the human is different from cattle as much for the bearing of the figure, as for the dignity (qui quantum habitu figurae, tantum dignitate)”. This interpretation of the posture of humans and of their use of the hands as a sign of distinction of the rational being was a notion of Greek philosophy already developed at the time of Anaxagoras, as reported by Aristotle (Part.an. 4.10.686a–687b) and Plutarch (De frat.amor. 478de),9 and is also found in Christian authors such as Lactantius (Ir. 14; Opif. 8).10 The notion of the superiority of humans as rational beings over animals is also found elsewhere in the homilies by Basil which were translated into Latin by Rufinus and Eustathius, for instance in Hom.Hex. 6.1 or in Hom. Attende tibi 8. However, unlike Gregory of Nyssa in De opificio hominis, Basil does not consistently express this idea of superiority with derivatives of ἄξιος. Consequently, Eustathius’ translation of Hom.Hex. 9.2 is the only occurrence of human dignitas in the translations of Basil.

8.3 Gregory of Nyssa: Dignity and Royalty So, universal human dignitas remains an exception in Eustathius, as it is in Rufinus. A more frequent use of this expression in a Latin translation of a Greek Christian author is found in Dionysius Exiguus’ translation of Gregory of Nyssa, De opificio hominis. Dionysius’ translation of Gregory of Nyssa is different from the Latin translations of Origen, Basil, or Gregory of Nazianzus, because in this case the universal usage of dignitas is the rule and not the exception. All occurrences of dignitas in the treatise indicate the royal rank of the human race created in the image of God, and its ruling power over the rest of creation. In De opificio hominis, dignity is part of a thorough investigation of human nature based on the creation in the image of God, explaining the stages of human progress from the beginning to the end of times. De opificio hominis does not just mention human dignity: the objective of the entire text is precisely to assess what this dignity is, where it comes from, how it is manifested in human beings and in their relation with other creatures, and the changes that affect it over the course of human existence.11 Human beings were designed by the Logos even before the creation of the world: in this sense, humans had a dignity that preceded their own creation (πρεσβυτέραν ... τὴν ἀξίαν/antiquiorem ... dignitatem), as it was decided by the Logos before human beings actually came into existence that they would rule over other beings, as 9

Cf. Longo (2000). Cf. Ambr.Med. Exp.118Ps. 5.32; 10.7. 11 For Gregory’s interpretation of the creation of the universal nature of humanity in the image of God in comparison with Origen’s, cf. Zachhuber (2014): 154–160; Maspero, s.v. “Image”, in Mateo-Seco and Maspero (2010): 411–415. 10

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declared in Gen 1:28 (De hom. op. 3.1).12 This superior rank is part of humanity from the beginning to the end, but not without any change. In De hom. op. 17.2 and 22.4, Gregory explains that human beings in the beginning possessed the same honour as the angels (ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγγέλους ὁµοτιµία/angelica dignitas),13 and possibly even higher, because the dignity of human beings is based on their resemblance of the divine archetype (De hom. op. 4.1). As Gregory explains in Or.Cat. 6.5, humanity is created as “a being having a likeness to the transcendent dignity” (τις οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπερέχουσαν ἀξίαν ὡμοιωμένη).14 For this reason, the devil grew jealous of human beings and plotted for their fall. Due to their sin, humans temporarily lost their exceptional dignity (De hom. op. 12.10; 20.4). However, in the end times “the grace of the image” (τῆς εἰκόνος ἡ χάρις/imaginis gratia), and “the dignity of command” (ἡ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀξία/dignitas principatus), which were lost with original sin, will be restored to human beings (De hom. op. 21.4). The superiority of humanity is a recurring theme in De opificio hominis, and is often expressed by ἀξία, indicating the dignity of human nature as made in the image of God. Sometimes Dionysius chooses to translate it with terms other than dignitas, such as honor: De hom.op. 4.1: In the ordinary use of humans, those who make images of rulers [...] represent the royal rank (τὴν βασιλικὴν ἀξίαν/regiam dignitatem) by the purple robe, and the images themselves are commonly referred to as ‘kings’. In the same way, also human nature, since it was created with dominion over others, thanks to the likeness to the king of all, was made a living image, as it were, which shares with the archetype both the dignity (κοινωνοῦσα … τῆς ἀξίας/honore participans) and the name. It is not vested in purple, nor does it signal its rank (τὴν ἀξίαν/gloriam suae dignitatis) by sceptre or diadem, for the archetype itself is certainly not arrayed with these. Instead of the purple robe, human nature is vested in virtue, which is the most royal of all garments [...], so that in all aspects of the dignity of royalty (ἐν τῷ τῆς βασιλείας ἀξιώματι/ad dignitatem regiam) human nature is shown to be precisely like the beauty of the archetype.

Dionysius’ friend Cassiodorus consistently used dignitas in his treatise On the soul to indicate the high status bestowed on all humans since their creation as rational beings.15 Instead, in Dionysius’ text, though dignitas in its universal 12

Cf. Orig. Hom.Gen. 2.1: “The abode for human beings was located at the highest point [of the ark], since it is they who excel all in both honour and reason, so that just as human beings, by means of their reason and wisdom, are said to have dominion over all things which are on the earth, so also they might be higher in place and above all the animals which were gathered in the ark”. 13 For the same translation of ὁµοτιµία in Rufinus’ version of Basil, see section 2.1. 14 For the theme of the original dignity of humankind resembling their creator in Gregory, cf. the description of the prelapsarian condition of humanity in Or.Cat. 6.10: “Human beings were exalted in dignity (ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὑψηλὸς μὲν ἦν τῷ ἀξιώματι), empowered through the divine blessing – they were appointed to reign over the earth and all things on it, and their form was beautiful, for they had come into being as a representation of the archetypal beauty, and they had an impassible nature, for they were a copy of the impassible one”. 15 Cass. De an. 4, 5, 9, 10; Comm.Ps. ad 48:13.

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sense is found more often than in Rufinus’ or Jerome’s translations of Origen, it appears still partly interchangeable with terms such as honor, gloria, or potestas. For example, in De hom. op. 8.1 Gregory argues that the fact that only human beings among all creatures walk upright proves their “royal rank” (τὴν βασιλικὴν ἀξίαν/regiam potestatem). Human posture “clearly points to the difference in dignity (τὴν τῆς ἀξίας διαφοράν/differentia honoris) [...] and in superior authority (τῆς ὑπερανεστώσης … ἐξουσίας/supereminentis … dignitatis)” over the creatures who bow down. The upright position leaves the human hands free for purposes such as the act of writing, which, as says Gregory, De hom. op. 8.2, is connected “with the grace of reason”, lit. “rational grace” (λογικῆς χάριτος); in the Latin version, writing is connected “to the dignity of reason”, lit. “rational dignity” (rationalis dignitatis).

8.4 Conclusions The evidence analysed in this and in the previous chapter has shown that the connection between terms signifying “dignity” (mainly dignitas and ἀξία/ἀξίωμα) and views on humankind expressed in Origen’s exegesis of Genesis 1:26–27 was established in the second half of the 4th century. This new use of dignity was developed by both Greek and Latin authors, many of whom reinterpreted Origen’s views on humanity in the light of their own specific backgrounds and their theological and exegetical purposes, thus creating a rich and complex web of different but interconnected meanings of dignity. The Latin authors were examined in the previous chapter; as for the Greeks, the connection between the terminology of dignity and Gen 1:26–27 was created mainly by Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, who consistently used derivatives of ἄξιος to denote the special (yet unstable) status that humanity received with its creation in the image of God. The translations analysed in this chapter present a dignitas shared by all human beings, and in most of these texts dignitas translates ἀξίωμα or ἀξία. Given how seldom the term is used in this sense in Latin literature, it is notable that almost all extant occurrences of dignitas relating to the human species in Latin translations of Greek Christian authors correspond to ἀξίωμα or ἀξία. Therefore, although it is not by any means certain that the lost Greek text of Origen’s Princ. 3.6.1 featured ἀξίωμα in the expression that Rufinus translated as “dignitas of the image”, it is at least more likely than with other equivalents of dignitas identified in chapter 1. Further evidence that the original Greek text of Princ. 3.6.1 may have featured τὸ τῆς εἰκόνος ἀξίωμα is provided by the fact that this is the expression that Rufinus translates as imaginis dignitas in his version of Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 16.8. In any case, as argued in section 5.3, the “dignity of the image” in the Latin text of Princ. 3.6.1 by itself is not a sufficient indicator that Origen

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conceptualised a term akin to “dignity”, such as ἀξία or ἀξίωμα, as a technical term consistently referring to the worth of humanity created in the image of God. Instead, the Cappadocians, particularly Gregory of Nyssa, often used ἀξία or ἀξίωμα in the context of their own anthropology, which presents concepts that are comparable to those previously elaborated by Origen. The connections between the texts analysed in this chapter and Origen do not mean that Gregory of Nazianzus or Gregory of Nyssa interpreted Gen 1:26 in the exact same way as Origen did in texts such as Princ. 3.6.1. In particular, the texts examined in this chapter do not present the argument on progress based on the discrepancy between Gen 1:26 and Gen 1:27, and on the distinction between image and likeness. For example, in Gregory of Nazianzus’ Orat. 16, which in other respects is comparable to the texts by Origen on the instability of the image of God in human beings, the objective that humans should strive for is identified with the recovery of the dignity of the image, and not, as in Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, with the attainment of the dignity of the likeness. On the other hand, the views on humanity which are present both in Origen and in the Cappadocians (especially Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa) are mainly: first, since the creation in the image of God human beings are collectively endowed with a very high status or dignity, which makes them superior to animals. Second, the image of God in human beings is not immune from a certain degree of change, due to the instability of them as creatures; third, the objective of human progress in this life is to live according to the original dignity given at creation and to preserve as much as possible the image of God in oneself.16 Such concepts, as they are also employed by the Cappadocians, are at the core of Origen’s thought on humanity, and are found often in his work, both in its Greek and in its Latin versions, but not often in connection with terms signifying dignity. The consistent association of these originally Alexandrine notions on the high status of humanity created in the image of God with Greek terms referring to dignity should be therefore attributed to the Cappadocians, rather than to Origen himself. Consequently, Latin authors from the late 4th century onwards may have familiarised themselves with the association between some anthropological concepts developed by Origen and the terminology of “dignity” thanks to the mediation of the Cappadocians and their Latin translations.

16

For a survey of passages by the Cappadocians on Gen 1:26, and their connections with Origen, cf. Girardi (2001).

Chapter 9

Filastrius of Brescia: The Progress from Image to Likeness Filastrius, bishop of Brescia (northern Italy), wrote his catalogue of 156 heresies in the 380s.1 Of all the Latin texts examined in this study which were written prior to Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis, only Filastrius uses dignitas in a discourse on the progress of the human soul from the “image”, which everyone received at creation, to the “likeness”, achieved by the worthy, as is also found in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1. Thus, this chapter aims at situating Filastrius’ statements on the dignitas of the soul (presented in section 9.2) within the context of the views on humanity emerging from the treatise (which in section 9.1 are compared to Origen’s) and also in the framework of 3rd and 4th century discourses on the theme of the progress from image to likeness (section 9.3). We do not know whether Rufinus read Filastrius: Filastrius’ immediate successor Gaudentius, who celebrated Filastrius’ work, for instance in Serm. 21, was a close friend of Rufinus and was possibly acquainted with Origen’s exegesis.2 Filastrius’ work is known at least to Augustine, who used it as a source for his own catalogue of heresies, written in 428, as stated in Haer. 80 and Ep. 222.2 (claiming that Filastrius was in contact with Ambrose). As for Filastrius’ sources: while Filastrius may have read at least Irenaeus and Epiphanius,3 we do not know to which degree he was aware of other Greek Christian authors, such as the Alexandrines. Filastrius may have had access to Origen’s theology for example through the section in Epiphanius’ Panarion dealing with Origen’s “heresy” (Pan. 64), written approximately between 375 and 378; however, Origen is not mentioned in Filastrius’ own catalogue of heresies. 1

Banterle (1991): 11; cf. Archetti (2010): 218–223. For a comparison between Filastrius and other 4th–5th century heresiologists, such as Epiphanius, Theodoret, and Augustine, cf. Szram (2017a); Flower (2020). 2 McEachnie (2018): 462. 3 Banterle (1991): 12, cf. Simonetti, s.v. “Filastrio”, in Di Berardino (2007): 1942–1943. Humphries (1999): 133–136, emphasises that Filastrius’ work was not merely a reproduction of Greek predecessors such as Epiphanius, but has a distinct focus on the theological context of Northern Italy. Setién García (2018): 196–197, argues that the similarities between Epiphanius and Filastrius are primarily due to the fact that both authors use the Greek Syntagma of Hyppolitus, an early 3rd century work which is lost to us, as a source.

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9.1 Filastrius’ Views on the Human Soul in Comparison with Origen Like Origen, Filastrius conceives the human soul as created ex nihilo (Div.Her. 126.1),4 immortal (Div.Her. 7.2), and endowed since creation with reason (Div.Her. 105.1) and freedom of choice (Div.Her. 26.3). Filastrius argues that the fact that God created the human being in his image does not indicate that God has a physical body like ours:5 in fact, Gen 1:26–27 refers only to the creation of the human soul, whereas Gen 2:7 refers to the creation of the body as an instrument for the soul. In Div.Her. 97.7, Filastrius interprets the verbs “made” and “fashioned” in Ps 118:73a (“Your hands made me and fashioned me”) as referring to the creation of the soul as told in Gen 1:26 (“Let us make the human being”) and of the body as told in Gen 2:7 (“God fashioned the human being from the dust of the ground”): this interpretation of Psalm 118 was most likely developed by Origen and is later reprised by several 4th century exegetes such as Hilary of Poitiers.6 Furthermore, in Div.Her. 100 and 139.1– 2 Filastrius explains the difference between human beings and animals with arguments found also in Origen, Cels. 4.74–99: based on Gen 1:26–28, Filastrius argues that human souls created according to the image of God received the intellect, a faculty which entails the capacity to know God and to dominate over animals, with which human beings share only the bodily life. In Div.Her. 124, Filastrius claims that, although sinners are likened to animals in Scripture (for instance in Matt 3:7) based on their lowly behaviour, the idea that the souls of the sinners will turn into animals or demons after their death is heretic: like Origen, Filastrius states that the nature of the human soul cannot change into another nature of a lower degree.7 Conversely, human souls can for Filastrius ascend to a higher nature, i.e. to that of the angels: Div.Her. 126.2–3: The soul created by God is called image of God, evidently after the creation of angels, for the human being is inferior to the nature of angels.8 But if human beings observe the precepts of the Law, then they will be like angels.

Filastrius, who specifies that human beings were created after angels, does not subscribe to the belief, found in Origen,9 that all rational creatures, including 4

For an assessment of the theme of the creation ex nihilo in Greek philosophy, in Philo of Alexandria, and in Christian authors prior to Filastrius (focusing on Origen and Basil of Caesarea), see Rasmussen (2019): 81–114. 5 See section 5.1 for this argument in Origen. 6 I discuss this interpretation as an Origenian tradition in my article on Ps 118:73a which is currently under review for publication. 7 Cf. Orig. Cels. 4.83: Human souls cannot turn into animals; see section 5.2. 8 Ps 8:6 (“You diminished him a little in comparison with angels”). Cf. Filast. Div.Her. 99.1; 126.2. 9 See section 3.4.

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human souls and angels, were created simultaneously and equal in nature. However, in his texts regarding the achievement of angelic dignity Filastrius does not appear as concerned with distinguishing worthy human beings in the afterlife from angels as are Latin authors openly opposing Origen such as Jerome.10 Filastrius often expresses that our main goal in life should be to acquire so much merit in the sight of God that after our death Christ will grant us the participation in the immortal angelic dignity, a much worthier pursuit than the transitory honour or dignity in worldly society. Filastrius, Div.Her. 141.4, claims that “human beings shall attain the perfection of the virtues, meaning [...] the immortal prize in the faith of the resurrection of the Lord and the token of angelic dignity (pignusque dignitatis … angelicae)”. This prize is awarded to “those who hope to obtain from Christ [...] the participation in heavenly glory (caelestis gloriae participationem)”. Those who were able to offer this heavenly tribute, meaning their faith in the resurrection, “were endowed with the highest perfection and, leaving this world, were confident that they could obtain there the glory of the resurrection and that they would be united in the participation in heavenly dignity (caelestisque dignitatis consortio copulari)”, as promised in Matt 22:30 (“In the resurrection they … are like angels in heaven”). As Filastrius clarifies in Div.Her. 134.6: “The honour and dignity of this world will end and will be destroyed, therefore we must desire that heavenly and angelic dignity” (honor et dignitas mundi istius cessabunt et destruentur, illa quippe erit desideranda caelestis et angelica dignitas).11 Filastrius conveys that human merit and the intercession of Christ are both necessary to attain such a high heavenly or angelic dignity. In Div.Her. 128.1– 5, Filastrius presents an allegorical interpretation of the passages in Scripture referring to the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart, such as Exod 4:21 or Rom 9:15– 18: Pharaoh represents people who are blinded by sin and deceived by worldly pursuits and therefore need to be reminded of God so that they may eventually be saved. This reminder may take the form of harsh punishments, but the intent behind these punishments is educational, as Filastrius claims in his exegesis of Rom 9:16 (“It is not of the one who wills or who strives, but of God who is merciful”). For Origen, Rom 9:16 meant that, although people cannot reach perfection if they do not correctly apply their freedom of choice, believing that avoiding sin and pursuing virtue is sufficient to attain perfection is in fact a sinful act of pride, because it means attributing salvation to human worthiness rather than to God’s love (Comm.Rom. 7.16.5; Princ. 3.1.19).12 Likewise, Filastrius, Div.Her. 128.6–10 claims that human beings should strive for virtue, 10

See section 10.2.1. Angelica dignitas: Filast. Div.Her. 153.8; futura angelorum gloria: Div.Her. 134.4. 12 See sections 4.2 (the knowledge of God is for Origen only attainable when human beings recognise that they need the Logos); 5.1 (although we cannot attain the dignity of the likeness without merit, the Son is the main driving force of the progress of rational creatures). 11

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but they must also be aware that their salvation ultimately depends on God, who enacts it with means such as educational punishment: good works are important, but so is being aware that we must pray that Christ grants us the high dignity of the blessed (supplicantis ut tantam consequi mereatur dignitatem). Thus, Filastrius, like Origen, interprets salvation as the result of the interplay between divine philanthropy and human will. Filastrius argues in Div.Her. 112.8 that the impiety and sin that can be observed across human history are not a product of a defect or weakness in the nature of human souls created by God, but rather of their own will. The way Filastrius emphasises that the cause for the shortcomings of humanity must be identified with the human will and not with their nature is comparable to Origen’s argument on freedom of choice, directed against Gnostic views on the different human natures.13 However, the anti-deterministic discourse on freedom of choice in Div.Her. 26 and 112 is not directed against the Gnostics, but rather against pagan oracles14 and against the notion that Christianity is more recent than paganism and Judaism, respectively. Furthermore, in his passages discussing Gnosticism, such as Div.Her. 88, Filastrius does not address the notion of different human natures. Thus, Filastrius’ views on freedom of choice are not as clearly motivated by antiGnostic concerns as are Origen’s. 9.1.1 Souls and Intellects Despite sharing many similarities with Origen’s beliefs on human souls, Filastrius also condemns as heretic some views found in Origen. Most notably, Filastrius attacks the unnamed “philosophers” who believe that “intellect” was the original name of the soul: Div.Her. 99.1: There is a heresy which claims that the human soul was not called ‘soul’ (animam) when it was created by God. They argue that it was originally called ‘intellect’ (intellectus), and it was in heaven; however afterwards, since the intellect desired earthly things, they think it came down from heaven and was henceforth named ‘soul’. They do not know that the soul, made by God and created after angels, was named by God in the beginning, and received from God this proper name, so that it shall be called ‘soul’, not ‘intellect’.

The notion of the human soul as a fallen “mind” (mens) was expressed, albeit tentatively,15 by Origen: that Origen held this belief is confirmed not only by Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 2.8.3–4, but also by Jerome, who clarifies in Ep. 124.6 that the Greek term for “mind” employed by Origen is νοῦς.16 Filastrius, 13

Cf. Orig. Princ. 3.1.8; see my section 3.4. Cf. Orig. Philoc. 23. 15 Orig. Princ. 2.8.4: “Our statement, however, that the intellect is changed into a soul, or anything else that seems to look towards this, the readers must carefully consider and explore for themselves; the points advanced by us must not be thought of as dogmas, but discussed in the manner of exploration and discussion”; see sections 2.4; 5.2. 16 Cf. also Iustin. Ep.Men. fr. 18 (ACO 3.212.3–8). 14

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Div.Her. 99.3 claims that this belief is in contrast with Scripture, and it is just one of the “pointless opinions of philosophers” (filosoforum inanes sententiae). In fact, the intellect is for Filastrius as “a faculty (potentia) of the immortal soul infused in it by the Holy Spirit” (Div.Her. 100.4). The relationship between the “mind” or “intellect” (νοῦς) and the “soul” (ψυχή) is a major theme in Platonism and especially Neoplatonism, as demonstrated by Plotinus:17 hence, Filastrius is correct in recognising the association between “intellect” and “soul” as a philosophical notion. It is not possible to identify exactly the “philosophers” Filastrius attacks, and to determine whether Div.Her. 99 is directed against Christian or pagan thinkers or both. As pointed out by Mariusz Szram (2017b), Filastrius employs the term “heresy” with a very broad understanding, so it is difficult to narrow down whom exactly he is referring to. It is possible that Div.Her. 99 describes a heresy developed after the advent of Christ in the flesh (as only the first 28 heresies in the catalogue are presented as preceding that event): this would exclude pagan philosophers such as Plato, but it would fit for instance Plotinus. Among the Christian writings prior to Filastrius, Princ. 2.8.3 is one of the texts where the notion that the soul was originally created as an intellect is most explicit. However, if Filastrius had in mind this specific passage by Origen, he did not challenge the controversial interpretation, expressed in Princ. 2.8.3, of the name “soul” (ψυχή) as etymologically connected to “cooling” (ψύξις). This interpretation was based on Greek philosophy, namely on Stoic thinkers such as Chrysippus (SVF 2.806); the underlying idea in Stoicism was that πνεῦμα, the “spirit”, became ψυχή at birth, as it came in contact with the cooling air.18 This etymology of “soul” is instead discussed in the critique of Origen’s views on the fall of the souls which Epiphanius conveys in a passage from a letter addressed to John of Jerusalem in 394, translated by Jerome (Ep. 51.4), and in Pan. 64.4.5–7. There are some aspects that Filastrius has in common with Epiphanius: for example, both authors quote Ps 114:7a (“Return to your rest, my soul”), in support for their views (in the case of Filastrius, this is among the biblical verses which in his opinion demonstrate that the soul has always been a soul since its creation). This verse was also used in Origen, Princ. 2.8.3 to demonstrate that the soul still retains the possibility to return to its original state as intellect, after a process of purification. It is possible that Filastrius’ attack against those who believe that the souls were originally intellects may derive from Epiphanius’ critique of Origen.19 However, Epiphanius’ 17 Cf. Plot. Enn. 5.1.6; 5.2.1. Cf. Blosser (2012) for Origen’s reception of Platonic and Middle Platonic views on the relationship between the “higher” soul (the νοῦς) and the “lower” soul; for Princ. 2.8.3, cf. pp. 115, 120–124. 18 Cf. Phil.Al. Somn. 1.31; Berno (2016). 19 Hunter (2007): 158n113. Cf. Anathemas 2–6a of the Second Council of Constantinople in 553, where Origen was condemned (ACO 4.1, 248).

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polemic against Origen focuses on the belief that the souls are fallen angels,20 and the idea that souls were originally intellects is not discussed. Furthermore, as already mentioned, Filastrius does not deal with the etymology of soul, which was present in Epiphanius. A few years after Filastrius, Theophilus of Alexandria, as translated by Jerome (Ep. 98.15, from 402), tackles instead both aspects of Origen’s views on the fall of the soul as they emerge from Princ. 2.8.3 (i.e. 1. the fact that the soul was originally called an intellect, and 2. the etymological connection with “cooling”).21 Perhaps, rather than addressing specifically Princ. 2.8.3, Filastrius, Div.Her. 99 could be directed against a view held by some Christians partly inspired by Origen, which Filastrius saw as too dependent on a pagan notion of the fall of the soul from its intellectual state. For example, among the contemporaries of Filastrius, the concept of the soul as a fallen intellect was expressed by Evagrius Ponticus, KG 3.28.22 It is unlikely that Filastrius had in mind this specific passage by Evagrius; however, this occurrence in Evagrius suggests that the belief that souls were originally intellects, which we find in Origen, was still expressed in the late 4th century by some Christian authors.

9.2 Human Dignity in Filastrius Filastrius’ understanding of human dignitas is connected to his views on the Holy Spirit and its role in the creation of humankind and in the progress of the soul towards the likeness of God. In Div.Her. 67, directed against the Macedonians (a 4th century Christian heresy that denied the divinity of the Spirit), Filastrius argues that the Spirit, like the Son, is not a creature; instead, all creatures are made through the “breath” of God, i.e. the Spirit. Like Hilary,23 Filastrius, Div.Her. 97 presents the creation of the human being as happening in three stages. For Filastrius, the first stage happened on the sixth day, when God created the rational and immortal human soul (both male and female) in his own image (Gen 1:27). The second stage happened on the seventh day, when God made the “outer human”: at first God fashioned the male body (Gen 2:7), subsequently adding the female body (Gen 2:21–23). At last, also on the seventh day, through his “breath” (Gen 2:7) God provided the human soul with “spiritual grace” (spiritalis … gratia), which made the human being capable of knowing God and of observing his Law.24 20

See section 10.2.1. For Theophilus cf. Markschies (2019): 235–273. 22 Cf. Caruso (2013); Ramelli (2015): xxxvi. 23 However, Hilary (see section 7.1.2) believed that the Spirit cemented the union between body and soul, thus giving life to the new creature: this view is not present in Filastrius. 24 Cf. Filast. Div.Her. 148.4: “human nature in everyone is capable of divine knowledge”. 21

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For Filastrius, the “spiritual grace” produced by God’s breath is thus “an advancement in dignity” (provectio dignitatis; Div.Her. 98.1) which is added to the human soul, but, contrarily to what the unnamed “heretics” believe, the breath (πνοή, inspiratio) is not the soul (ψυχή, anima) itself: as indicated in Gen 2:7, Adam receives the Spirit or breath only after his soul is created in Gen 1:26–27. According to Filastrius, further proof that the breath or Spirit is different from the soul is found in the NT: in John 20:22 God is said to breathe the Spirit into the apostles, who already possessed a soul. Filastrius concludes that the breath given in Gen 2:7 is the universal and undeserved grace of dignity, which each one should then cultivate and increase in order to receive the higher grace brought by the Spirit: Div.Her. 98.5–6: The breath is thus not the soul, but the grace of dignity (gratia dignitatis), which comes to all from god Christ through the Holy Spirit. Those who have it and preserve it, such as the apostles, the prophets, and all the righteous, receive a further addition in grace (adiectionem accipiunt gratiarum). However, sinners who neglect it and disregard it lose such a great merit of dignity (tantum meritum dignitatis).

Losing this “great merit of dignity” means for Filastrius missing the opportunity to progress from the grace of the breath to the grace of the Spirit, as claimed in Wis 1:4 (“The spirit of wisdom will not enter a malicious soul”). In Div.Her. 152.1, Filastrius clarifies what he means by this further spiritual grace received by the righteous: he explains that human beings receive the Spirit to different degrees over the course of their lives. Filastrius argues that the breath that Adam received at creation is a sort of lesser grace common to all (Commune est enim omnium spiramen), given to human nature so that human beings are able to observe God’s law (spiramentum est modicae virtutis aliqua gratia in audienda lege dei multorum primum). This lesser grace given by the breath is what in Div.Her. 98 Filastrius calls the provectio dignitatis or gratia dignitatis received by all human souls. Then, human beings may receive more and more grace as they progress in their faith, their study of Scripture, and their good works. Finally, the Spirit received by a few of the faithful, such as the apostles (John 20:22), is the fullness of perfection (spiritus autem perfectionis est plenitudo, Div.Her. 152.1). This higher grace given by the Spirit is what Filastrius calls adiectio gratiarum or meritum dignitatis (Div.Her. 98). In the second half of the 4th century, the identification of the human soul with the breath of God (Gen 2:7) was also condemned by Diodore of Tarsus, Comm.Gen. ad 2:7, but many other Christian exegetes, such as Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 5.14.94.3), Tertullian (An. 3–4), and Ambrose (Noe 25.92), believe that the soul is introduced in the human body via the breath, or that the breath is the soul itself. Although Filastrius’ distinction between the breath and the soul is therefore not common in Christian exegesis, his distinction between a grace that is common to all (i.e. the “breath” of Gen 2:7) and a higher grace attained by the worthy (i.e. the “Spirit” of John 20:22) is reminiscent of

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Irenaeus. Irenaeus, Haer. 5.12.2 distinguishes the “breath” that gives life to all (Gen 2:7) from the “Spirit” that gives eternal life to the worthy (cf. 1Cor 15:45). This issue also emerges from Origen’s writings, and especially from his treatise on the Holy Spirit and its activity (Princ. 1.3), where Origen assesses the significance of the “breath” in Gen 2:7 and its relation to the Holy Spirit. Origen reasons that there are two possible interpretations of Gen 2:7: the “breath” may be interpreted generically as the breath of life given to all human beings at creation, or specifically as the participation in the Holy Spirit attained solely by the worthy (Princ. 1.3.6).25 Origen clarifies that at least in the case of the creation of Adam one option does not exclude the other, since Adam was both endowed with the breath of life (as he was a living human being), and with prophetic abilities (given by the Holy Spirit). So, there are precedents for Filastrius’ observations on the passages in Scripture regarding the “breath” and the “Spirit” of God, making a distinction between what is natural, universal, and undeserved, and what is instead a reward for individual merit.26 Filastrius connects the theme of the contraposition between the universal “grace of dignity” and the higher “merit of dignity” attained by the worthy (Div.Her. 98.5–6) to the theme of the progress from the image to the likeness, in a way that is comparable to Origen’s discourse on human dignity in Princ. 3.6.1. Filastrius addresses the unnamed heretics who argue that human nature possesses since its creation both the image and the likeness of God: Div.Her. 137.1–2: There are some heretics, who descend into proper madness, when they read in Scripture that God says: ‘Let us make the human being in the image and in our likeness’ (Gen 1:26): they ignore first what is the image, and second what is the likeness of God, and since they do not know what is the image of God in its proper nature, and what is the role of grace, they claim for themselves a not inconsiderable haughtiness of dignity (non parvam sibi praesumunt superbiam dignitatis). For the image of God is this soul of all human beings, created from nothing; however, the image of God cannot be called ‘alike’ unless its life in the faith has been recognised by God as likeness (Imago enim dei id est anima omnis hominis, facta ex nihilo: similitudo autem in fide vita nisi cognita fuerit a deo, appellari non potest dei imago similis). When someone believes that they are more than this, they commit the sin of presumption, rather than acquiring for themselves the merit of dignity (potius quam meritum dignitatis sibi adquirit).27

This text is based on the opposition between superbia dignitatis and meritum dignitatis: believing that human beings are both image and likeness by nature prevents people from striving to acquire the likeness through merit. Filastrius maintains that only Christ, the eternally-begotten Word and Son of God, is the divine image of the Father by nature and immutably, as he possesses also the eternal likeness (sempiterna similitudo, Div.Her. 66.5): 25

Cf. Orig. Comm.Jo. 13.23.140–144. For the distinction between the “breath” of Gen 2:7 and the Spirit received by the apostles see also Eus.Caes. Eccl.theol. 3.5. 27 Cf. Szram (2021): 112. 26

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Div.Her. 137.3–4: How can this soul be the natural image of God, when it is discovered in sin and is recognised as subject to judgment, when it is known to serve several sins? In fact, there can be no natural, divine image of God, the Father’s own – no angel, no human being – other than Christ, the Son of God, who is by his own undivided nature the eternal image of the Father’s substance, properly begotten, not created from nothing in a position of servitude, like human beings and angels.28

Instead, in regards to human beings, Filastrius combines an inclusive perspective, by which all human souls, including Jews and heretics, are equal by nature and are the “image”, with an exclusive, merit-based perspective, by which only the Christians and the saints achieve also the “likeness”: Div.Her. 137.5–7: Scripture showed that it is possible to call ‘image’ the human soul (of pagans, Jews, heretics, and of everyone else) according to the common generation, and announced that the substance [of all souls] is of one and the same quality of nature; however, Scripture showed that the likeness is not of everyone, but only of the saints and the Christians. It is promised to those who remain strong in faith, in conduct, and in good works that they will obtain the heavenly merits of angels in the future, like the patriarchs, the prophets, priests, judges, apostles, evangelists, and martyrs, who believe in the Trinity and maintain an illustrious life: to them the Lord announces that they will be coupled with the glory of angels. For true likeness is recognised from the teaching of the law, from faith, conduct, from one’s passion and from their actions, so that [the soul], following the divine law of the God who created it, having observed the established precepts, may hope to be able to obtain from God the participation (consortium) in the heavenly realm.

It is not clear what happens to the image of God in those who fail to attain the likeness, such as non-Christians. Clearly, they will face some sort of punishment: for Filastrius, non-Christians encounter a similar fate as the devil, as they are given the chance to convert but do not accept it. Both Adam and the devil (i.e. the snake) were expelled from Eden with the purpose of teaching them a lesson that would lead them to repent their sins and be saved; however, only Adam benefited from this correctional punishment, whereas the devil persevered in his sin and will therefore be justly condemned (Div.Her. 115.6–9). Since Filastrius believed that the knowledge of the true Christian faith was given to humankind at creation and that other religions were established later due to human sin (Div.Her. 109–112; 129), this punishment also applies to nonChristians who lived before the advent of Christ in the flesh (Div.Her. 125). Those who only worship the desires of the flesh with no interest for the divine Law must also be considered idolaters as well as the Jews and the pagans (Div.Her. 135.5). Does their sin and the consequent punishment also entail the loss of the original dignity of the image? Filastrius does not claim, like Origen, that the image of God within human beings can be obscured by sin but never 28 For the eternal generation (sempiterna generatio) of the Son cf. Filast. Div.Her. 64.1; 127; for the anti-Arian argument that the Son is generated from the substance of the Father and not ex nihilo like human beings and angels, cf. Div.Her. 66. For the eternal generation of the Son in Origen, cf. Princ. 1.2.2.

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be completely cancelled.29 Certainly, sinners who do not pursue the potential received through the breath of God by observing his Law do not attain the higher dignity, i.e. the further grace of the Spirit (Div.Her. 98.6), but it is not clear if they also lose the lesser dignity, the one that is undeserved and received at creation by all souls. In his texts on dignity, Filastrius is mainly concerned with the reward set aside for the saints, as he claims that worthy individuals who attain the likeness in this life can aspire to achieve in the afterlife the participation in the angelic dignity: Div.Her. 137.9: The likeness takes place as a result of faith in the Holy Trinity, worthy conduct and corresponding actions, so that leaving this world they may receive the promised participation in angelic dignity (ut exeuntes percipiant promissum consortium angelicae dignitatis), like John says: ‘then we will be like him’ (1John 3:2).

So, Filastrius identifies three levels of dignity: the first is the common “grace of dignity” (Div.Her. 98.5) which the breath of God infuses in all rational souls created according to the image of God; the second is the “merit of dignity” (Div.Her. 98.6, 137.2) which souls attain when they become worthy of receiving the Spirit of God and can be called not just the image of God but also his likeness; the third is “angelic dignity” (Div.Her. 137.9, 141.4–5), i.e. the reward set aside in the afterlife for those who have merited the likeness.30

9.3 The Difference between Image and Likeness in the 3rd and 4th Centuries Filastrius’ argument on dignity may be compared with other Christian authors who distinguished the image from the likeness.31 This was a prominent theme in Alexandrine exegesis. Clement claimed that Plato got the idea of becoming like God as the highest good (Theaet. 176b) from the Bible, as Gen 1:26–27 demonstrates that: “A human being has obtained ‘according to the image’ immediately at birth (εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν εἰληφέναι), but will obtain ‘according to the likeness’ later, as they attain perfection (ὕστερον κατὰ τὴν τελείωσιν μέλλειν ἀπολαμβάνειν)” (Strom. 2.22.131.5). As discussed in chapter 5, also in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1 the discrepancy between Gen 1:26 and Gen 1:27 is explained by interpreting the image as a present condition and the likeness as a future objective. 29

See section 5.2. See section 9.1. The view that since their creation in the image of God human beings are endowed with the possibility to attain through good behaviour the “same honour” (ὁμοτιμία) as the angels is found in Basil.Caes. Hom. Attende tibi 6; see section 2.1 for this passage and its Latin translation by Rufinus. 31 For the exegetical and philosophical theme of assimilation in Early Christianity, cf. Burghardt (1957): 1–11; Munkholt Christensen (2019): 277–284; Latinovic (2019): 58–69. 30

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Later, in his Commentary on Genesis, written possibly in the 360s, Didymus the Blind, like fellow Alexandrines Clement and Origen, interprets Gen 1:26– 27 as describing the “progress” (προκοπή) of humans as rational beings from the “image” to the perfection of the “likeness”. Didymus explains that all human souls (which may also be called “inner human”, or intellects), since their creation “in the image” of God are endowed with reason, and are thus suited to the participation (μετουσία) in God’s image, which for Didymus is the Son. When deserving individuals acquire this participation in Christ with their progress in virtue, they enact the natural ἐπιτηδειότης (“propensity”, “disposition”, or “potency”) of humanity towards reason or Logos, and attain the “likeness” to God. Didymus explains that humanity made in the image of God is like an infant, who has the natural capacity of reason but does not yet fully possess reason; in this analogy, people attain the likeness when they reach adulthood by perfecting their use of reason. Didymus claims that “what is according to the image, as long as it is not suffocated, shows the dignity of the first creation” (τὸ κατ’εἰκόνα, ἕως μὲν οὐκ ἐπιχώννυται, φέρει τῆς πρώτης δημιουργίας τὴν ἀξίαν). Thus, Didymus, much like Origen in Rufinus’ version of Princ. 3.6.1, identifies the “dignity” of the creation of the human being as told in Gen 1:26–27 with the capacity to progress in one’s participation in the Son. Like other Greek Christian authors such as Origen or Gregory of Nazianzus,32 Didymus argues that the image of God in human beings, i.e. the “disposition” towards the Logos Christ, can be obscured by sin, which is unreasonable behaviour. Then, a process of repentance (μετάνοια) is required in order to bring back the image of God in human beings. Finally, the idea of the progress from image to likeness is also present in Evagrius Ponticus,33 who, in texts such as the Epistle to Melania, written possibly in 397–398, presents being made according to the image of God as a natural property of human beings, who have the capacity to progress in their knowledge of God until they become like God.34 Unlike Didymus and Origen (at least judging from Rufinus’ translation), as far as we know Evagrius did not express the notion of the natural propensity of human beings towards God using the terminology of dignity examined in chapter 1. Because Filastrius identifies the image of God with the rational soul,35 his argument appears more similar to this Alexandrine exegesis, rather than to the views conveyed by Irenaeus, who interprets the body formed by God in Gen 2:7 as the image of God (Haer. 5.6.1).36 This aspect also distances Filastrius’ 32

See sections 5.2 and 8.1, respectively. Evagrius knew Rufinus and possibly also Didymus personally: for his biography see Dysinger (2005): 7–27; Baán (2011): 18–34. 34 Cf. Baán (2011): 223–224. 35 Filast. Div.Her. 97.5; 100.2,4; 126.2; 137.2,5. 36 Cf. Markschies (2019): 193–198. 33

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exegesis of Gen 1:26–27 from Epiphanius. In Pan. 76.35.8, Epiphanius does claim that the human being received at creation the “dignity of the image” (τὸ τῆς εἰκόνος ἀξίωμα). However, his views on humanity created in the image of God are significantly different from those held by Origen and Filastrius,37 as he claims that it is impious to try to identify where the image of God is located (in the body, in the soul, or elsewhere); furthermore, Epiphanius does not distinguish between image and likeness.38 Moving on from Greek to Latin authors, Filastrius’ view also appears closer to Origen than to Tertullian, who maintains that people receive the eternal grace of the likeness to God after they are purified of sin with baptism. Baptism restores in humans the Spirit of God which they received at creation (Gen 2:7) and subsequently lost because of sin: Ita restituitur homo deo ad similitudinem eius, qui retro ad imaginem dei fuerat (imago in effigie, similitudo in aeternitate censentur), recipit enim illum dei spiritum quem tunc de adflatu eius acceperat sed post amiserat per delictum (Bapt. 5.7). This is similar to the view later expressed by Jerome in Comm.Ezech. 9 ad 28:12, i.e. that the image is established at creation (Gen 1:27) and the likeness is perfected with baptism (imago tunc facta sit tantum, similitudo in Christi baptismate compleatur);39 Jerome however does not further develop his thought on the distinction between image and likeness.40 Instead, Filastrius clearly states in Div.Her. 137.6– 7 that human beings achieve the likeness through their effort in faith and good works (without mentioning baptism), and in Div.Her. 152 he distinguishes the breath received at creation from the Spirit received at baptism. However, Tertullian also identifies the attainment of the likeness with worthy conduct, as God “wants us, his own image, also to become the likeness, so that we are saints, just like he is saint” (Exh.cast. 1.3). Tertullian specifies this sanctificatio as the practice of chastity; the idea that the attainment of the likeness corresponds to the practice of chastity, following the example of the incarnate Christ, is also found in Methodius of Olympus, Symp. 1.4–5. Another Latin text where the image is distinguished from the likeness is Marius Victorinus, adv.Ar. 1.20, written in 358. To contrast Arianism, Victorinus argues that the fact that God says to Christ “let us make the human being according to our image” (Gen 1:26) means that the Father and the Son are consubstantial. In this context, Victorinus claims that the rational human soul is created “according to the image of God”, i.e. according to the Logos and Son of God. It follows that the human soul is an “image of the image” (imago imaginis): Victorinus is the only Latin author of the 4th century who uses this 37

Volp (2006): 161. Epiph. Anc. 55–57; Pan. 70.2–5 (cf. Hier. Ep. 51.7). 39 For the view that human beings lost because of sin the spiritual grace they received at creation through the “breath”, cf. Basil.Caes. Spir. 16.39. 40 Cf. Volp (2006): 228. 38

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expression in the way Origen did, i.e. to describe the relationship between human souls and the Logos.41 For Victorinus, in the present life the soul possesses as its substance the “according to the image”, i.e. the fact that it is rational due to its relationship with divine reason.42 Instead, the criterion “according to the likeness” is not a substance, but rather a quality: Hoc autem est rationale, iuxta imaginem τοῦ λόγου rationalem esse. Aliud igitur est iuxta imaginem esse, quod quidem substantia est, aliud autem iuxta similitudinem esse, quod non est substantia, sed in substantia nomen qualitatis declarativum. While the image is what rational beings are now and always have been, the likeness is the perfection that human souls possessed before original sin and that they hope to recover in the future through their faith: In quo igitur rationalis est, ad rationem iuxta imaginem est; in quo futura perfecta est, secundum similitudinem. There are similarities between the arguments made by Origen and Victorinus, especially as they both associate the image with the natural and fundamentally unalienable participation of the rational soul to the Logos. However, Victorinus does not use the terminology of dignity in the context of the creation of humankind according to the image of God as distinguished from the likeness: so, prior to Filastrius this distinctive element was only present in Didymus and possibly in the original Greek text of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1.43 Finally, among the Latin texts on image and likeness we have the example of Paulinus of Nola’s Epistle 24 to Severus, written in 400,44 concerning the continuous struggle of virtuous and chaste souls against sin and the support that they receive from God through Christ. Based on the discrepancy between Gen 1:26 and Gen 1:27, Paulinus claims in Ep. 24.9 that God made all human beings and wants them to be saved, but, following Adam’s sin of pride, humanity lost the likeness with God, which may only be recovered by worthy individuals who imitate the incarnate Christ.45 In Ep. 24.21, Paulinus refers to the likeness with God, which human beings lost with original sin but may regain through the correct use of their freedom of choice, as primordialis dignitas, the original dignity of humankind. So, although Paulinus, like Origen, interprets Gen 1:26 and Gen 1:27 as referring to the progress of human beings towards the likeness with God via the imitation of Christ, Paulinus’ discourse on dignitas is partly different from Origen’s. Origen and Didymus attributed dignity to the very nature of human souls created according to the image of God, due to 41 Boersma (2016): 51–86, emphasises the importance of participation in Victorinus’ views on human beings as images of the Logos, the consubstantial image of God. For the possible connection between Origen and Victorinus, cf. Belcastro (2013): 175–178, 183. 42 For the historical, theological, and philosophical background of Victorinus’ correspondence with Candidus (including adv.Ar. 1A), cf. Lössl (2022); for the views on the human soul expressed in adv.Ar. 1.20 cf. Zacher (2023): 463–465. 43 See section 8.1. 44 Trout (1999): 199. 45 Cf. Conybeare (2000): 158–160.

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their innate capacity to progress towards higher degrees of participation in Christ, and ultimately to the likeness of God. Similarly, Filastrius distinguishes basic dignity, which all human beings possess as creatures made according to the image of God who have received his breath and are thus capable of observing his Law, from the higher spiritual dignity of those who attain the likeness of God and receive a status comparable to that of angels. The attainment of the likeness as a higher degree of dignity is therefore an individual achievement for Origen and Filastrius, but basic dignity refers to a capacity that all human beings have, although many do not apply it. Instead, Paulinus argues that human beings were originally given dignity, identified with the likeness (not the image!) at their creation but they lost it and must now strive to recover it: in this sense, Paulinus’ argument on prelapsarian dignity shows similarities with the “first dignity” in Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 16.15.46 In sum, Filastrius’ arguments on the distinction between image and likeness (Div.Her. 137) and on the increase in spiritual grace (Div.Her. 97–98; 152) have more in common with the Alexandrine interpretation of Gen 1:26–27 and especially with Origen than with other exegetical traditions such as those represented by Irenaeus or Tertullian. The arguments in Origen (in Rufinus’ translation) and Filastrius are very similar in the use of a universal and a more advanced individual dignitas. For Origen, Princ. 3.6.1 at creation all human souls receive the “dignity of the image”, as told in Gen 1:27. This initial dignity makes human beings capable of progressing in their participation in Christ, but this potential must be activated by the individual. The worthy individuals who actually do so attain the “dignity of the likeness”, as promised in 1John 3:2. For Filastrius, at their creation each human soul is established as an image of God, as told in Gen 1:27 and receives the “grace of dignity” via the breath of God, as told in Gen 2:7. This initial dignity makes human beings capable of progressing in their observation of God’s law, meaning capable of being virtuous,47 but the potential must be activated by the individual. The worthiest individuals who actually do so attain the likeness, as promised in 1John 3:2, and because of this “merit of dignity” they are rewarded in the afterlife with eternal spiritual grace, i.e. the participation in the “dignity of angels”.48 However, there are also differences between Filastrius and Origen. Filastrius often emphasises the clemency of Christ and the possibility for all to repent and achieve salvation and eternal life: especially in passages directed against the supporters of the 3rd century theologian Novatian, who argued that some sins (mainly apostasy), were unforgivable (Div.Her. 82; 89), Filastrius maintains that through Christ there is the possibility of repentance for all human 46

See section 8.1. Cf. Filast. Div.Her. 148.7: Melchizedek is “capable of observing the heavenly Law of God through his own effort as image of God”. 48 See section 9.2. 47

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beings, even those who sinned after their baptism.49 However, Filastrius does not claim, like Origen in Princ. 3.6.3, that the progress of all rational beings will culminate in universal equality of all creatures in the eschatological union with God.50 On the contrary, Filastrius argues that all human beings should pray and work as hard as possible in order to deserve to achieve the perfect likeness and consequently the reward of heavenly or angelic dignity; however, not everyone will attain it, even among the saved. For Filastrius, not only not all human beings will go to heaven after their death (for instance, pagans and Jews who do not convert face eternal punishment)51 but also among those who will go to heaven only a few will occupy the same position as the angels for their exceptional merit. Hence, even among the saved there will be individuals with more dignitas and individuals with less dignitas (Div.Her. 150.6–10).52 Furthermore, there is a ranking also among the damned, as the harshness of each one’s punishment corresponds to the extent of their sin (Div.Her. 125.7). In other words, for Origen, Princ. 3.6.1 the progress of humankind begins with the potential offered by the “dignity of the image” received by all at creation; this potential is fulfilled with the “dignity of the likeness” attained by the worthy; finally, the “property of unity” will be shared by all in the end times. Instead, Filastrius does not include this third step in his discourse on human progress; for him, at the time of the final judgement the exceptionally righteous who have attained the likeness will be rewarded with the participation in the dignity of angels.53 For Origen, as for Didymus, all human beings may in principle become like God as a direct consequence of the natural affinity or kinship between the human and the divine established at creation through the Logos of God. Conversely, this theme is not prominent in Filastrius, who conceptualises the likeness more as a special honour obtained by the exceptionally worthy, who are rewarded in the afterlife with a proximity to God similar to the one already possessed by the angels. For Filastrius, the first, lesser dignity (i.e. the “grace of dignity” described in Div.Her. 98) that souls receive when they are created according to the image of God and receive the breath of life is undeserved and shared by all human beings. However, we cannot conceive the ultimate and eternal dignity granted by the likeness as dependent on our collective human nature rather than on exceptional individual merit, otherwise we would incur the sin of pride like the heretics condemned in Div.Her. 137.1.

49

Cf. Filast. Div.Her. 107.12–14. See sections 3.3; 10.2.2. 51 Filast. Div.Her. 110.10; 124.3; 134.7. 52 Cf. Filast. Div.Her. 82.9; 89.5, see section 10.2.2. 53 Filast. Div.Her. 137.8: in die iudicii eos sicut angelos demonstrabat futuros. 50

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9.4 Conclusions There are aspects of Filastrius’ views on the creation of human souls that could suggest some knowledge of Origen’s theology and exegesis. Possible indications of Filastrius’ knowledge of at least some aspects of Origen’s thought on humanity are the polemical reference to the belief that human souls were originally created as intellects, or the interpretation of Ps 118:73a as referring to the double creation of the human being. However, there is not enough evidence to conclude with certainty that the similarities between Filastrius and Origen, such as their respective arguments on the progress from image to likeness and the emphasis placed on dignity, demonstrate Filastrius’ acquaintance, either direct or indirect, with Origen’s thought on humanity and its creation. Nevertheless, Filastrius is standing in the Origenian tradition as regards his views on the dignity of humanity created in the image of God, and he could have had access (possibly through Ambrose?) to some relevant ideas of Origenism that were circulating in Northern Italy in the 380s, as evidenced also by the Origenian aspects in Zeno’s views on humanity as made in the image of God.54 Even in the absence of a tangible link with Origen, Filastrius’ work remains a significant predecessor for Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, as it is to our knowledge the only prior example of dignitas in a Latin Christian discourse about the progress of the human soul (rational, immortal, and endowed with freedom of choice) from the image of God received by all at creation towards the likeness attained by the worthy.

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Chapter 10

Human Dignity in Jerome The occurrences of dignitas referring to human beings in the translations of Origen produced by Jerome in the late 370s and early 380s generally have to do with rank in pagan society or in the Church.1 In Jerome’s own writings too, when dignitas refers to human beings, it mostly retains its traditional meaning as individual “rank” or “office” (sections 10.1–2); however there are some exceptions, where dignitas refers to all human souls, in texts by Jerome which present traces of Origen’s legacy (section 10.3). The works by Jerome analysed in this chapter are not directly a translation of Origen, however they are to a large extent influenced by Origen’s theology and exegetical solutions. There is concrete evidence for this: in some of the works mentioned in this chapter, such as To Pammachius, against John of Jerusalem, the Epistle 124, or the Apology against Rufinus, Jerome uses dignitas in passages where he discusses and challenges beliefs that he presents as held by Origen or his supporters. In the case of Jerome’s commentaries on Scripture examined in this chapter, Jerome himself explicitly references Origen’s exegetical works. This is true also for the commentaries written after 393, when Jerome became involved in the Origenist controversy as an opponent of Origen’s theology.2 For example, Jerome programmatically references Origen’s exegetical works (which are for the most part lost to us) in his prefaces to the commentaries on Ephesians, Galatians, Matthew, Zechariah, Malachi, Hosea, Micah (book two), and Isaiah – and as Rufinus reminds him in Apol.Hier. 2.25, Jerome was even accused of downright plagiarising Origen’s commentaries.3 This does not mean that in his commentaries Jerome uncritically appropriated Origen’s exegetical solutions: Jerome laments that Origen’s exegetical methodology did not pay enough attention to the historical meaning of the OT.

1 Viz. Jerome’s translations of Origen’s Hom.Jer. 1.10; 12.8 (section 1.2.2); Hom.Luc. 17.10; 20.5; Hom.Ezech. 5.4,5; 9.2,5; Hom.Isa. 6.1; Hom.Jer. 11.3; 14.16 (section 3.2). 2 For an assessment of Jerome’s involvement in the controversy and his conflict with Rufinus, cf. Clark (1992): 121–151; Prinzivalli (2006). For an overview of relevant episodes, dates, and documents of the various stages of the controversy and how they involved Jerome, cf. Cola (1997): 38–46; Rebenich (2002): 41–51. 3 For Jerome’s and Rufinus’ opposite ways of dealing with charges of plagiarism, see Layton (2002). For the purposes and literary background of Jerome’s programmatic prefaces and the way he presents his approach to exegetical predecessors, see Lagioia (2017).

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For example, in the preface to his Commentary on Zechariah, Jerome reports that Origen, Hippolytus, and Didymus all wrote commentaries on Zechariah, the latter at Jerome’s own request, but “their entire exegesis was allegorical, and they touched hardly a few things concerning the history”. Furthermore, according to Jerome, Origen’s exegesis could be misled by his own heretical views, most notably in matters concerning the resurrection of the physical bodies, the salvation of the devil, and especially the relationship between the hypostases of the Trinity (Ep. 61.2). In the preface to his Commentary on Malachi, written in 406, Jerome reports that: “Origen wrote three volumes on this book, but he did not touch the history at all, and as is his custom he got completely involved in the allegorical interpretation”. Jerome claims that Origen’s allegorical interpretation of Malachi was informed by his notion of the “fall of souls from heaven”, which Jerome deems unacceptable.4 Jerome does not refuse altogether the allegorical methodology of exegesis as practiced in Alexandria;5 he refuses only the exegetical solutions by Origen which he felt were connected to heretical beliefs. Texts like the preface to the Commentary on Malachi prove that Jerome was certainly acquainted with Origen’s exegesis and in many cases made use of it, so his commentaries may still be considered as part of the transmission of Origen’s thought to a Roman audience.6

10.1 Dignity as Office Dignitas denotes in Jerome the elevated status of public figures, social classes, or offices in Roman society, the royal rank of biblical kings, or a position of authority in the Christian Church.7 Dignitas is often associated with traditional

4 Jerome’s stance on the pre-existence of souls is complex and ambivalent, cf. Clark (1987); Squires (2013). For the relationship between Jerome’s Commentary on Malachi and Origen’s lost work, cf. Duval (1999). 5 For an example of Jerome presenting both a literal and an allegorical reading of Scripture in Comm.Eccl. ad 3:18–21, see section 10.3.2. 6 Rebenich (1993) highlights this role of Jerome as mediator; cf. Cain (2019). 7 Dignity of biblical rulers: Hier. Jov. 2.4; Comm.Eccl. ad 1:1; Comm.Os. 1 ad 5:3–4; Comm.Jer. 3 ad 13:18–19; 4 ad 22:13–17; Comm.Ezech. 9 ad 29:2. Senatorial dignity: Vigil. 6; Comm.Isa. 18.30. Apostolica dignitas: Ep. 74.3; 118.4; Jov. 2.19; Ruf. 1.17; Tract.92Ps.ser.alt. 3; Comm.Isa. 8.33; 11.4; 17.7; Comm.Matt. 1 ad 10:31; Comm.Eph. 2 ad 3:8; Comm.Tit. ad 1:1a; ad 1:5a. Pontificatus dignitas: Ep. 60.14. Sacerdotii/sacerdotalis dignitas: Lucif. 9; Comm.Os. 1 ad 4:4; Comm.Zach. 1 ad 3:5–7; Comm.Mal. ad 3:3; Comm.Isa. 5.125; 7.4; Comm.Jer. 4 ad 20:1–2; Comm.Ezech. 13 ad 42:13; 14 ad 45:17, ad 46:16–18. Dignity of the presbyter or the bishop: Ep. 69.3; 146.2; Comm.Isa. 2.8. Dignity

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concepts8 such as distinguished appearance, wealth, hierarchy, political power and its insignia, reputation, competition with others.9 Jerome, like Cicero,10 observes that dignity, understood as the title or office, should correspond to worthy conduct. When the holder is unworthy, people lose respect towards the office (Ep. 66.7), even though they are still bound to abide by its laws (Comm.Matt. 4 ad 23:1). As with Cicero’s De Officiis,11 being worthy of the high rank or dignitas may be specified also by Jerome as practicing restraint and self-control: for example, kings and other dignitaries should abstain from unregulated pleasure and violent outbursts of emotion (Comm.Dan. ad 6:20; ad 11:37). Otherwise, being unworthy of the title is presented by Jerome as a consequence of greed (Comm.Matt. 3 ad 21:13) or deceit (Ep. 40.2): this is the case for example with ministers in the Church who measure their dignity in terms of their wealth and not their merit (Comm.Ezech. 14 ad 48:13). Ministers of the Christian faith are deemed by Jerome unworthy of their dignity when they disrespect a venerable bishop (Jo.Hier. 12), become too involved in the business of this world (Comm.Soph. ad 1:4), are not diligent in their study of Scripture (Comm.Mal. ad 2:7),12 and especially when they embrace and promote heretical beliefs (Comm.Jer. 4 ad 23:11–12). Church ministers who do not act virtuously, according to Jerome, contaminate and devalue their office,13 and corrupt the entire community (Comm.Ezech. 5 ad 16:52a). The high rank or dignity that sinful bishops possess in this world will not save them from divine judgement (Comm.Ezech. 11 ad 34:17): on the contrary, their punishment will be particularly harsh as they betrayed the office that God gave them. The high dignity of the bishops puts them at a higher risk of being severely judged by God: this is a recurring theme both in Jerome’s own Commentary on Ezekiel and in his translation of Origen’s Homilies on Ezekiel.14

of monks and nuns as servants of God: Tract.115Ps. 16; Tract.133Ps. 1; Tract.89Ps.ser.alt. 1. Other occurrences of dignitas as social or ecclesiastical status: Ep. 3.4; 12.1; 60.13,14,16; 66.7; 69.3; 77.3,8; 79.8; 105.5; 108.30; 125.19; 130.7; Jov. 1.41; Jo.Hier. 37; Tract.108Ps. 1; Comm.Os. 1 ad 5:1–2; Comm.Soph. ad 1:9; Comm.Zach. 2 ad 10:4; 3 ad 12:12–14; Comm.Isa. 1.32,58; 2.4,10; 4.2; 7.37; 8.10; 13.24; Comm.Ezech. 7 ad 23:22–27; 13 ad 44:9– 16; Comm.Dan. ad 2:11, ad 10:1; ad 5:18; Comm.Matt. 3 ad 18:6; Comm.Tit. ad 1:5b; ad 2:3–5. 8 See sections 1.2.2; 3.1–2; 6.1. 9 Cf. Hier. Ep. 12.1; Pelag. 2.16, and Comm.Matt. 3 ad 18:6, for the apostles competing among themselves for dignity, contrary to Christ’s teaching of humility. 10 See section 6.1, regarding Cic. Fam. 10.6.2. 11 See section 6.4. 12 Cf. Hier. Comm.Am. 3 ad 6:6: because heretics lack knowledge of Scripture and of the apostolic tradition of the Church, they cannot claim the dignity of priesthood. 13 Hier. Comm.Jer. 1 ad 2:8; Comm.Ezech. 11 ad 34:4. 14 Hier. Comm.Ezech. 5 ad 16:53; 13 ad 44:30: “Great is the dignity of bishops, but great is their downfall if they sin”; for Origen’s Homilies on Ezekiel see section 3.2.

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According to Jerome, the title does not bring any real worth to the person holding it without good works.15 As Jerome explains in Comm.Isa. 15.12,16 written between 408 and 410, the philosophical basis for this view of dignity is the Stoic notion of “indifferent” goods (indifferentia; cf. SVF 3.117–123), which was referenced also by Origen.17 Jerome, Comm.Isa. 15.12 includes wealth, good health, and a political career (saeculi dignitates) among those things that are either good or bad depending on how one uses them.18 Hence, the office without the good works is not something that should be regarded as good; however, this does not mean that a political or ecclesiastical career is bad per se. Jerome indicates that dignity should not be regarded as the objective to pursue in an individualistic effort of self-affirmation, but rather as a standard to uphold, meaning that an outstanding position in society should correspond to outstanding behaviour. Jerome also conveys traditional Christian motives concerning social dignitas, in discourses aimed at marking the distance between the Christian truth and the emptiness of the pagan value system and worldview. These motives are: first, that social status and wealth are not something that a Christian should pursue (Comm.Dan. ad 2:11); second, that they pale in comparison with true, spiritual goods (Ep. 22.16; 23.3),19 and third, that while in this world we must respect and obey the secular authority, social differences are transitory and they will not matter at the time when the souls will be judged by God.20 In Comm.Eccl. ad 10:5, and especially in Comm.Habac. 2 ad 3:6–7, the admiration for physical beauty, wealth, nobility, and titles (dignitates) is described as the product of demonic deception, leading human beings to pursue in any way possible worldly things that will in the end be destroyed.21 An example of a text by Jerome featuring worldly dignitas that includes themes that may be compared to a text by Origen is Comm.Gal. 2 ad 4:17–18, 15 Hier. Ep. 14.9; 69.8–9; 79.2; Jov. 1.35; Comm.Eccl. ad 10:4; Tract.14Ps. 4; Tract.98Ps. 6; Tract.100Ps 4; Comm.Soph. ad 1:4; ad 3:3–4; Comm.Jer. 3 ad 12:13a. 16 For Simonetti (1984): 468, this passage by Jerome might be influenced by Didymus. For Jerome’s use of Stoic materials in the Commentary on Isaiah, cf. Capone (2018). 17 Cf. Orig. Princ. 2.5.3; 3.1.18; Comm.Rom. 4.9, 6.6.5, Cels. 4.45; 6.73. Dignity as social status is not mentioned in these passages by Origen. 18 The same view of dignitas is expressed by Marius Victorinus, Expl.Cic.Rhet. 1.6. Seneca, Ep. 82.14 also lists public offices (honores) among the indifferent goods. 19 Cf. Hier. Comm.Zach. 2 ad 10:12: the only real dignity is neither strength nor wealth; it is instead the great dignity of calling oneself Christian; for the theme of the dignitas of the true Christian, see section 7.2. For the maximum grade of dignity (primo fastigio dignitatis) achievable in this life with a virtuous conduct imitating the apostles, cf. Ep. 120.1. 20 Hier. Comm.Os. 1 ad 5:6–7; Comm.Mich. 2 ad 7:5; Comm.Soph. ad 1:11b; ad 3:11; Comm.Zach. 3 ad 12:11; Comm.Isa. 6.23; Comm.Jer. 2 ad 8:12b; Comm.Ezech. 8 ad 27:27b. 21 See section 3.1 for dignitas and idolatry in Origen’s Homilies on Judges. Cf. Fernández Lago (1993): 60–62 for the interpretation of mountains as evil in Origen’s homilies and its reception in passages by Jerome such as Comm.Habac. 2 ad 3:6.

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written in 386, regarding the concept of emulation or zeal. The verb used in Gal 4:17–18 is ζηλόω, expressing the idea that when people perceive that someone else is in some way superior to them or possesses something desirable, they conceive a sort of envy or rivalry and put in the maximum effort to attain the same for themselves through emulation. As Jerome explains, Paul’s invitation to “be zealous for a good cause” (Gal 4:18) indicates that there is a good zeal and a bad zeal (aemulantur bene vs aemulantur non bene), depending on whether one correctly discerns what is worthy of good emulation (quae bona aemulatione digna sunt). Jerome presents the person who imitates (imitatur) those who possess “wealth, power, and dignity” (divitias potentiam dignitatem) as an example of bad emulation, aimed not at what should be pursued but at what should be shunned; on the contrary, good emulation is aimed at spiritual things rather than fleshly. Jerome’s Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians is certainly indebted to Origen’s exegesis of the epistle, as Jerome himself declares in the preface to Book 1.22 Origen’s exegetical work on Galatians is now lost to us for the most part, but we find a discourse on emulation that is very similar to the one provided by Jerome in Origen, Hom.36Ps. 1.1–2, both in the original Greek and in Rufinus’ translation. This passage deals with Ps 36:1b (“Do not emulate [μηδὲ ζήλου] those who do injustice”), a verse that also Jerome quotes in his Comm.Gal. 2 ad 4:17–18. Origen explains that Ps 36:1b indicates that we should not be fooled by wealth, worldly glory, a marriage of high nobility, or social status – ἀξίωμα in the Greek text of the homily, specified by Rufinus as immerita honorum culmina, important public offices obtained without merit – and think that we should emulate those who display these things. If we emulate those who possess worldly dignity, we “emulate those who do injustice” and therefore we, like them, will also “soon wither” (Ps 36:2a). So, both Jerome and Origen include worldly dignity (dignitas in Jerome; ἀξίωμα in Origen) among the false goods that should not be pursued. We do not know whether Jerome draws directly from Origen’s First Homily on Psalm 36 for his interpretation of the concept of emulation in Gal 4:17–18. We cannot compare the interpretation of Ps 36:1b that Jerome provides in Comm.Gal. 2 ad 4:17–18 to previous Latin authors, as we do not possess any Latin text focusing on Psalm 36 written before 386: Ambrose’s Exposition on Psalm 36 was only delivered in March 395;23 Augustine’s in September 403.24

22 The reception of Origen’s exegesis has been observed by all the contemporary editors and translators of Jerome’s commentary, written several years before Jerome became involved in the controversy surrounding Origen’s legacy after 393, cf. Cain (2010): 25–30; Raspanti (2010). On the Greek and Latin sources of Jerome’s Commentary on Galatians, cf. Cain (2009); Raspanti (2004). 23 Türel (2019): 89. 24 Hombert (2000): 12–16.

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Jerome’s exegesis of Gal 4:17–18 may however be compared with Latin exegetes of Galatians from the second half of the 4th century, namely Ambrosiaster and Marius Victorinus; Jerome read at least Victorinus’ commentary.25 Unlike Jerome, Ambrosiaster probably did not have access to Origen’s Greek works on Galatians or Psalm 36, and maybe neither did Victorinus.26 Ambrosiaster and Victorinus do not interpret Gal 4:17–18 as referring to the pursuit of false goods, do not quote Ps 36:1b, and do not employ the terminology of dignity. As for the Greek exegetes other than Origen that Jerome mentions as his sources in the preface to the first book of his Commentary on Galatians, we only have a catenary fragment of Eusebius of Emesa’s commentary ad Gal 4:1827 and it does not feature these three distinctive elements either. Thus, as far as we know, if Jerome derived the association between Gal 4:17–18 and Ps 36:1b and the relevance of dignity as social status from a previous exegete, he may have found these elements directly in Origen.

10.2 Dignity in Jerome’s Polemic against Origen’s Views on the Creatures This section deals with passages where Jerome attacks the belief that all rational creatures were made equal in nature at their beginning and will in the end times also be equal in rank, according to the three-step progress described by Origen in passages such as Princ. 3.6.1.28 10.2.1 Angelic Dignity In Jerome, angelic dignitas denotes a status much above the rank of human beings (Comm.Zach. 1 ad 2:8) and normally out of reach for most human beings, so that not even the prophets Ezekiel, Daniel, and Zechariah can claim it for themselves (Comm.Dan. ad 8:17). Jerome awards the “angelic dignity” to exceptionally worthy human beings, namely the apostles and saints of the Christian Church (Comm.Zach. 1 ad 3:6–7). However, from Comm.Zach. 3 ad 12:8 it emerges that the saints will acquire this dignity only in the end times (Jerome’s interpretation of Zach 12 has eschatological connotations), when they will be honoured with a title almost like that of the angels (quasi nuntius domini et angelicae dignitatis) without actually becoming angels in nature.29 25

And likely also Ambrosiaster’s, cf. Raspanti (2003). Cf. Cooper (2005): 93n21 (Victorinus); de Bruyn, Cooper, and Hunter (2017): lxvii– lxviii n28 (Ambrosiaster). For the reciprocal relationship between the Latin exegetes of Galatians between 360 and 410, cf. Plumer (2003): 5–59. 27 Staab (1933): 48. 28 See section 3.3.1. 29 Cf. Hier. Ep. 75.2. 26

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For Jerome, human beings are fundamentally different from angels, and this difference is maintained from creation to the end times. In passages explicitly directed against those whom Jerome depicts as supporters of Origen, namely Jo.Hier. 15–22 and Ruf. 1.23, both written around 400, Jerome fights the view that the difference between human beings and angels is only a matter of merit and not of nature, a belief that Origen expresses in texts such as Princ. 1.5 and 1.8.30 In Jerome’s opinion, this view entails that angels may fall from their dignity and become human beings, or, vice versa, that deserving human beings who acquire angelic dignity effectively become angels. In this regard, Jerome clarifies in Comm.Matt. 2 ad 11:9, written in 398, that John the Baptist is really the angel announced in Mal 3:1 not because John, in fact a human being, participates in the very nature of angels, but because he shares with angels the dignity of his office as messenger.31 Jerome needs to make the distinction between sharing the nature of angels and sharing their office or dignity very clear, because of the Origenist implications of the idea that human beings are rewarded for their merit with “angelic dignity”. The idea of the instability of the orders, based on the assumption that there is no natural distinction between the various heavenly powers and human beings, was one of the charges brought against Origen already around 310 by Methodius of Olympus,32 according to the quotations from his treatise On Resurrection in Epiphanius, Pan. 64.41–43. This aspect of Origen’s thought on dignity was still considered highly controversial at the time of Jerome: the idea that the heavenly powers acquired their dignitas because of their merits, instead of being endowed with it since their creation, is among the charges brought against Origen by Theophilus of Alexandria, according to Jerome’s translation of the letter he addressed in 402 to all bishops in Egypt (Jerome, Ep. 98.12). Thus, when Jerome attributes to worthy human beings a very high dignitas in the end times, he makes explicit that this happens not because of their nature, but rather because of the grace of God expressed through the incarnate Christ. For example, in Tract.93Ps.ser.alt. 20, Jerome claims that the righteous souls, together with their resurrected bodies, will deserve the dignity to rule with Christ (dignitatem regni).33 Jerome rebuts the view (which in Tract.78Ps. 11 he attributes to Origen) that human souls are really angels fallen from heaven and trapped in mortal bodies as a consequence of a sin they committed before the creation of the material world.34 The belief that human souls were originally 30

See section 3.4. Cf. Scardia (2019). 32 Cf. Dechow (2017), with bibliography. 33 For the exceptional dignitas that awaits worthy human beings in the afterlife (without turning them into angels), cf. also Hier. Jov. 2.28 (the virtuous are rewarded for their good works with the great dignity of a heavenly mansion in the kingdom of God, as indicated in John 14:2–3). For heavenly dignitas in Origen, see section 3.3. 34 Cf. Hier. Tract.88Ps.ser.alt. 6; Tract.89Ps. 2. 31

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angels cast down from heaven and trapped in mortal bodies was also attributed to Origen by Epiphanius, as evidenced by Pan. 64.4.5,35 as well as by his letter to John of Jerusalem. In Jerome’s version of this letter (Ep. 51.4), dignitas refers to the excellent condition of angels before their supposed fall into the state of souls (e sublimi fastigio dignitatis facit ad inferiora descendere). Conversely, Greek terms akin to dignitas36 are not used in Pan. 64 (neither in the sections where Epiphanius is speaking for himself, nor when he is quoting from Methodius). In sum, Jerome’s rejection of the view that human beings and angels originally shared the same nature is tied to the polemic against what was presented during the controversy as Origen’s thought. Consequently, most occurrences of angelic dignitas in Jerome’s output are part of an argument against Origen and his supporters. The reason why Jerome is very preoccupied with stating that he does not believe, like Origen, that human souls and angels share the same nature is the eschatological consequence of this belief. As discussed in sections 3.3–4, the view that all creatures were made equal in nature and that their differences depend on freedom of choice is central to Origen’s argument against Gnosticism in defence of the goodness and justice of God. For Origen, 1Cor 15:24–28 demonstrates that the end is the same for every creature; since the end is like the beginning, it follows that also the beginning must be the same for every creature. The connection between Origen’s idea of the angelic dignity as a product of merit and apocatastasis, or the final unity of all creatures, is not lost on Jerome, whose main polemical targets are not anymore the Gnostics and their doctrine on the natures, but rather the Origenists, who are accused of professing the salvation of the devil. In Ep. 124.3,8, written in 410, Jerome addresses the belief, that he attributes to Origen, that each rational creature may progress or regress from one order to another depending on their freedom of choice. Jerome comments that this shows that for Origen human beings may become either angels or demons, and that demons in turn, if they start acting with virtue, can achieve angelic dignity themselves (pervenire ad angelicam dignitatem).37 That demons may one day become angels is manifestly unacceptable for Jerome, who, without naming Origen, in Comm.Dan. ad 4:23, written in 407, speaks against those who believe that the devil will repent and will be restored to his former dignity (pristina dignitas) that he possessed before he fell (in Ep. 124.3, Jerome explains that for Origen the devil was originally an archangel). The idea that the devil, after a process of purification and repentance, would be restored to his former dignitas is condemned as one of Origen’s most outrageous heretical 35

See section 9.1.1. See section 1.2. 37 Cf. Fernández (2015): 286. For this theme in Rufinus’, Jerome’s, and the Philocalia’s respective version of passages in De Principiis such as Princ. 1.5.5, 1.6.3, and 3.1.23, cf. Pace (1990): 176–183; Fernández (2014): 34–35. 36

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views in a letter addressed in 400 to Theophilus of Alexandria from the bishops gathered in Jerusalem (transl. Jerome, Ep. 93), as well as in Epiphanius’ letter to John of Jerusalem (transl. Jerome, Ep. 51.5).38 To counteract this view, Jerome claims in Comm.Os. 1 ad 3:1 (written in 406) that demons “have fallen from their own dignity (lapsi de propria dignitate) and do not possess anything of the former grace”. Because of their sin, the devil and his demons irreparably lost their previous dignitas as angels (Tract.81Ps. 7). In sum: for Origen (at least according to how Jerome presents Origen’s theology, e.g. in Ep. 124), all creatures are created equal and all of them are in theory capable of achieving “angelic dignity”; in the end, even the demons who had lost it will reacquire it. Instead, for Jerome “angelic dignity” is something that God gives only to the nature of some creatures (the angels) at their creation; this dignity can be lost as a consequence of sin, as it happened to the devil and the demons, but they can never reacquire it, nor can the creatures who were not endowed by God with “angelic dignity” at creation, such as human beings, attain this dignity in their very nature. 10.2.2 Dignity and Apocatastasis Jerome found it hard to accept the idea of underserved dignity, as indicated by the passages analysed in section 10.1, such as Comm.Ezech. 5 ad 16:52 and Tract.14Ps. 4. This is true on a political level, and even truer on a cosmic one. The next section (10.3) considers the issue of whether or not Jerome agreed with Origen39 that all human beings as a species shared one and the same dignity since their creation in the image of God. Instead, this section considers Jerome’s opinions on universal dignity in the end times. Elizabeth Clark (1987) argues that already in one of Jerome’s first works, the Commentary on Ephesians, which came under fire during the controversy with Rufinus (as the latter took it as an example of Jerome’s former Origenism), Jerome starts to distance himself from the idea of apocatastasis.40 Clark highlights the complexity of Jerome’s stance against this notion: on the one hand, he believes in the power of repentance, and that all sins were ultimately forgivable; on the other hand, he cannot accept that there will be complete equality without any ranking at the end times, even among the saved. Jerome’s 38

Cf. Hier. Ep. 96.8. For this notion in Origen see chapter 5, on the “dignity of the image” (Princ. 3.6.1). 40 Daley (1991): 103–104, observes that Jerome shows ambivalence in his stance on eternal punishment throughout his entire life, from the Commentary on Ephesians to the late Commentary on Isaiah. Conversely, Ramelli (2013a): 627–641, maintains that in his first works, including the commentaries on Ephesians, Psalms, and Ecclesiastes, Jerome completely embraced Origen’s views, including apocatastasis, and that even after he turned against Origen, his opposition was more of a political nature, rather than a complete reversal of his previous theological views in favour of Origen. 39

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aversion towards the idea of equality in the end times comes across particularly in works such as the commentaries on Daniel, Amos, and Jonah. In these texts, Jerome challenges Origen’s eschatological beliefs, but it is unclear to which degree Jerome’s portrayal of apocatastasis is accurate. In Comm.Jon. ad 3:6–9, written in 396, Jerome speaks out against the “very many” who interpret the king of Nineveh in Jonah 3, as well as king Nebuchadnezzar in Daniel 4, as referring to the devil at the end of the world: Jerome does not name the “very many”, but from the contents and language of the passage (for example, the use of the term restituere)41 it may be deduced that he refers to the idea of apocatastasis as developed by Origen. Jerome, Comm.Jon. ad 3:6–9 claims that “they” believe that the devil will not be destroyed (as, according to Jerome’s opponents, no rational creature can be destroyed); instead, like the biblical kings who committed the sin of pride and subsequently repented and were restored to their throne, the devil will convert and shall be restored to his former place (super diabolo interpretari qui in fine mundi, quia nulla rationabilis et quae a deo facta sit, pereat creatura, descendens de sua superbia, acturus sit paenitentiam, et in locum pristinum restituendus). For Jerome, this interpretation is not only not supported by Scripture, but is also very dangerous, because it may lead the faithful to think that, if even the devil himself will eventually be saved, they can sin as much as they want without fear of any real and lasting retribution. From Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.5,42 Jerome seems accurate in his portrayal of Origen’s belief that no rational creature can be destroyed, and that the devil will in the end repent and thus be saved. However, Jerome also claims that for Origen all creatures, including the devil, will at the end be rewarded with one and the same rank: Comm.Jon. ad 3:6–9: If all rational creatures are equal (aequales), and of their own accord either are raised on high by their virtues or are plunged into the depths by their vices, and there shall be a restitution of all things and a single ranking for all soldiers (omnium rerum restitutio fiet, et una dignitas militantium) after a long cycle and infinite ages, what difference (distantia) shall there be between virgin and prostitute? [...] Imagine what you like, double the years and time, and heap up infinite ages for the torments. If the end for everyone is the same (similis), the entire past counts for nothing, since we seek not what we were at one time but what we shall be forevermore. Nor am I unaware of what they ordinarily say in opposition to this, and to prepare hope for themselves and salvation with the devil.

Jerome did not approve of Origen’s view that all rational creatures, including humans as well as immortal beings, were equal at their first creation, not only in their rational nature but also in their original status and rank, as they shared the prelapsarian condition of blessedness43 and were all endowed with the 41 Cf. Duval (1985): 396–401, for Jerome’s critique of apocatastasis and for restituere as a technical term referring to Origen’s eschatological views. 42 See section 3.3.1. 43 See sections 2.4–5.

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“dignity of the image” (Princ. 3.6.1).44 Jerome, Comm.Jon. ad 3:6–9 confirms that his opponents believe that “all rational creatures are equal”, and argues that this leads them to hold impious and unjust views on equality in the end times. For Jerome, those who believe in apocatastasis, i.e. the “restoration of all things” as they were in the beginning, maintain that “the end is similar for everyone”.45 As discussed in section 3.3, this seems to be how Origen envisioned the third and final stage of the progress of creation, but the issue is very nuanced, and Origen did stress the differences in rewards and punishments in passages referring to the second stage. Jerome acknowledges that for Origen the reunification will only take place after each creature has gone through a long process of purification. Nevertheless, this belief is unacceptable for Jerome because it does not neatly establish enough “distance” between sinners and saints in the end times: if the end for every creature (including the devil!) is the same or similar, Jerome argues, and if there will be “a single ranking (dignitas) for the soldiers”, even though their merits were widely different, then each one’s past, their mistakes and their achievements, the choices they made, their entire identity and history as individuals endowed with freedom of choice, will not have any importance in the afterlife. God is merciful, claims Jerome, Comm.Jon. ad 3:6–9, but he is also just: for Jerome, there is no justice in preparing the same end for sinners and saints alike. According to most scholars, this eschatological argument is connected to Jerome’s polemic against Jovinian and against the notion that one and the same heavenly reward is set aside for those who chose celibacy in their life as well as for those who did not.46 However, Jerome does not normally employ the noun dignitas (nor the related term status) in this eschatological context in his writings against Jovinian, namely the epistles 48–49–50 and the treatise Against Jovinian, in the way he does instead in the writings examined in this chapter, where the primary target of Jerome’s polemic is Origen. In Comm.Am. 2 ad 5:1–2, written around 406, Jerome maintains that repentance is good and will grant the sinner salvation and eternal life, but the sinners who have repented are like the biblical Israel, that willingly abandoned the worship of God. According to Jerome, Amos 5:1–2 refers to the fact that the ten tribes of Israel, after being enslaved, never returned to their kingdom. Thus, as explained by Jerome, Amos indicates that Israel “will never recover its former dignity” (nequaquam pristinam recipiet dignitatem). For Jerome, the

44

See chapter 5. Jerome explicitly attributes to Origen the idea that in the end times there will be “one and the same restoration of all things” (unam omnium restitutionem) in Ep. 84.7, written in 399. In this passage, Origen’s view is criticised because it entails that the end will be the same for the saints (including the angels) and for the sinners, including the devil. 46 Cf. Clark (1992): 129–132; Caruso (2012): 445–449; Pieri (2021). For the reception of Origen’s asceticism in Jerome’s polemic against Jovinian, cf. Pålsson (2021): 88–116. 45

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prophecy can also be taken as a warning against people in this world who are not careful about abstaining from sin because they think they can repent in the future and thus recover the purity that they lost with their sin. Jerome states that, unlike the followers of Novatian, he does not discount the importance of repentance, but the sinner who has repented is not, and will not be, the same as the saint. Hence, there will be no equality in rank in the end times, but even among the saved there will be a hierarchy based on individual merit (Qui autem post peccatum egerint paenitentiam, pro diversitate meritorum stellis aliis aequabuntur). Similar formulations are found in Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis, in passages where Origen describes how each creature is rewarded with a different status or dignitas depending on their merit, as for example in Princ. 1.8.4: pro meritis suis gradum dignitatis huius adepti sunt.47 These echoes of Origen’s language can be read in the light of the observations by Katarina Pålsson (2021), who argues that in his writings against what he presents as Origen’s notion of apocatastasis, i.e. the equality in the end times of all rational creatures including the devil, Jerome is in fact indebted to Origen’s own views on the hierarchies in the afterlife as based on individual merit.48 In other words, Pålsson implies that, in his portrayal of Origen’s “heresy”, Jerome attacked the third stage of the progress of creation according to Origen (i.e. the final equality) while at the same time employing exegetical and theological solutions developed by Origen to describe the second stage (i.e. the imbalance in dignity in the afterlife). Indeed, passages in Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis such as Princ. 1.8.4 aim at explaining the hierarchy that can be observed now among the creatures and their various orders, not to maintain that such a hierarchy would be preserved in the end times. The differences in dignity are not mentioned in the eschatological sections of the treatise, i.e. Princ. 1.6 and especially Princ. 3.6. On the contrary, “when all are one, there will be no more difference (diversitas)” (Princ. 3.6.4).49 In Comm.Am. 2 ad 5:1–2, Jerome quotes John 14:2 (“In my father’s house are many rooms”) and 1Cor 15:41 (“There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for star differs from star in glory”), to support his view that even among the saved there will be differences in rank as based on merit. John 14:2 and 1Cor 15:41 are also taken by Origen as referring to the journey of the souls in the afterlife; however, while Jerome regards the differences implied in these two passages as the permanent result of God’s judgement, Origen sees them as mutable. In particular, the “rooms” (mansiones) that are with the Father (John 14:2) are interpreted by Origen as the different heavenly stages reserved for each of the saints in accordance with 47

See section 3.4. Expressed in passages such as those examined in section 3.3.2. 49 See section 3.3.1. 48

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the level of their individual progress: because the progress of saints continues after their bodily death, even in the afterlife they advance from one “mansion” to the next, as their proximity to God and their understanding of his mysteries increases.50 As argued in section 3.3, Origen did envision a form of hierarchy based on merit happening in the afterlife and then at the resurrection, with a leadership role reserved for the saints, but he thought that at the end, after God’s punishments and rewards have fulfilled their educational purpose, everyone will have achieved the perfection of merit, therefore there will be no need for a ranking among the creatures anymore. So, does this mean that Jerome’s portrayal of Origen’s views on the end times as characterised by the annulment of individual differences is completely accurate? Origen often stressed the equity of God’s judgement, that will reward merit and punish fault (Princ. 2.9.8). This punishment is necessary to prompt the conversion of the soul: Origen often describes apocatastasis as the product of each individual creature’s free choice to respond positively to the love of the Father, expressed through the Son. Fernández (2017) argues that the unity that will take place in the end, according to Origen, will be similar to the beginning, but not identical, as the beginning, depicted in Gen 1:26, is the product of the will of God, whereas the end, described in 1Cor 15:28, completes the progress of the creatures who cooperate with their own will at the restauration of the unity. This is why in texts such as Comm.Rom. 5.10.15 Origen argues that at the end there will not be another fall caused by the creatures’ incorrect use of freedom of choice, as it happened after the beginning. Rational nature will never cease to possess freedom of choice, but, once the soul has attained perfection, understood as the maximum degree of love for God and for each other, then the power of the love which unites God and the creatures will be so great that no creature will ever want to distance itself from God again, as revealed in 1Cor 13:8 (“Love never fails”).51 The “property of unity” achieved in the end times (Princ. 3.6.1) is thus immutable not because creatures are not free to sin anymore – according to Origen’s interpretation of Gen 1:27, freedom of choice is established by God as a permanent characteristic of the nature of the “inner human”52 – but rather because they will not wish to do so. This is why, in Cels. 8.72, Origen states that the healing power of the Logos can cure any evil in the soul, until “at some time the Logos will have overcome the entire rational 50 Cf. Orig. Princ. 2.11.6 and 4.3.10 (a passage that is transmitted in Rufinus’ translation, in the Philocalia, and in Jerome, Ep. 124.11); Hom.Num. 27.5. 51 The view that fallen souls may return to the warmth of the love of God, i.e. their state as it was at their beginning, is expressed in Princ. 2.8.3 (see my sections 2.6; 5.2; 9.1.1); for the idea that the Logos will win the creatures not by force but with teaching and persuasion cf. Princ. 3.5.8. For Origen’s eschatology as a union of love freely chosen by the creatures, see Daniélou (1955): 285–289; Blosser (2012): 253–263; for an overview of the scholarly debate on Origen’s views on apocatastasis, cf. Sytsma (2021): 106–114. 52 See chapter 5.

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nature, and will have remodelled every soul to his own perfection, when each individual simply by the exercise of their freedom will choose what the Logos wills”. So, the claim in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.4 that “there will be no more difference” should be interpreted as describing a unity of will and love among the creatures and the creator achieved at the end of the progress of each creature, rather than as indicating that for Origen the creature’s merit will bear no meaning in the end times as individuality will be annihilated, as Jerome implies in Comm.Jon. ad 3:6–9. Still, it is true that at least in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6 Origen described the final stage of the progress of humanity as marked by the unity in Christ rather than by individual differences. The idea that “there will be no more difference” in ranking based on merit is unacceptable to Jerome: in other words, we do not find, in Jerome, the concept that through God’s love the rigid differences in dignity among rational beings may be loosened, observed in Origen and especially in his Homilies on Psalms.53 The context in Jerome’s commentaries does not regard Roman politics, as the comments in Comm.Jon. ad 3:9–6 and in Comm.Am. 2 ad 5:2 are rather a critique of a specific Greek Christian view of eschatology, which may be read in the light of previous critiques of Origen’s views on the orders of the creatures, as expressed by Greek authors such as Methodius or Epiphanius.54 However, Jerome’s passages on apocatastasis may also be read in the light of a traditional idea of justice and of individual dignity. Jerome uses dignitas in his discourse on the end times against Origen in a way that is reminiscent of a principle enunciated by authors such as Cicero: “Justice is a disposition of mind attributing to each one their proper dignity, while preserving the common interest” (Iustitia est habitus animi communi utilitate conservata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem; Inv. 2.160).55 Compared to traditional ideas on dignity held by Romans like Cicero, Jerome does not think anymore that one’s dignitas should be awarded based on their contribution to the utilitas of the State, but he still firmly believes that the “foundation of justice” (Cic. Off. 1.42) is that to a difference in merit should correspond a difference in rank or dignitas. This notion of dignity and justice permeates the way Latin Christian authors understand the afterlife. The view on the various degrees of dignitas in the end times held by Jerome is in line with the belief that while eternal life and the possibility of salvation is open to everyone, not everyone will attain the same dignitas in the end times. Namely, the interpretation of John 14:2 and 1Cor

53

See section 4.3. See section 10.2.1. 55 For an earlier expression of this notion cf. Rhet.Her. 3.2.3: Iustitia est aequitas ius uni cuique re tribuens pro dignitate cuiusque. On this principle in connection with Cicero’s view of social hierarchies and dignity, cf. Wood (1991): 149–150; on its complex relation to notions in Greek philosophy of a justice κατ’ἀξίαν, i.e. as the reward for merit and the punishment for crimes, cf. Falcone (2008). 54

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15:41 as conveying that the differences in merit in this life determine differences in dignitas in the afterlife is expressed by Hilary of Poitiers: Tract.64Ps. 5: Many rooms are prepared for the various degrees of dignity of the inhabitants (diversae dignitati), but although the dignity is different (licet diversa sit dignitas) – for ‘star differs from star in glory’ – still anyone who is deemed worthy of the rooms, albeit different, will be allotted the fruit of faith and the honour of heavenly glory (cf. Tract.132Ps. 2).

Later, this view on dignitas in the afterlife is found in Ambrosiaster: Comm.1Cor. ad 15:39: Just as the flesh of living creatures is diverse, even though it is made from the same basic material, human beings will differ in dignity at the resurrection, although they are all of the same flesh. Everyone will appear in the manner befitting their merit.

And in Filastrius: Div.her. 89.5: In his teachings, [Christ] does not exclude repentance; rather, he shows that there is a different degree of dignity (diversum gradum dignitatis) between those who preserved themselves intact and those who sinned. The dignity of those who sin is damaged, but their salvation is not lost (cf. Div.her. 82.9; 150.8).

As well as in Augustine, Serm. 343.4: “Everyone attains eternal life, but in the afterlife not everyone attains the same honour, the same dignity, the same merit” (cf. Tract.Ev.Io. 67.2). Such an ingrained notion of dignitas as connected to individual merit made it difficult to accept views on the final equality in the status of all beings. As shown in section 3.3.2, Origen did believe that the saints attain a special degree of dignity in their afterlife, so that they may act as guidance for other souls, but he envisioned this imbalance in dignity as pertaining to an intermediate stage before the final apocatastasis, and not as the end itself. So, passages like Hom.Num. 28.3, where Origen, in Rufinus’ translation, discusses the differences in the afterlife as based on merit, describe the second stage in the progress of the creatures, not the end.56 Instead, Jerome and other Latin Christian authors cannot conceive justice in the end times without hierarchy; for Jerome, as for Cicero, justice is the opposite of universal equality. Jerome follows the Christian perspective that one should not pursue dignity in this world; however, he remains very Ciceronianus (Ep. 22.30) in his ideas on how we are to achieve (or not achieve) dignity in the afterlife.57

56

For Daley (1991): 50–51, Hom.Num. 28.3 does not describe a permanent condition of the souls, as Origen’s discourse on the end times normally tends to emphasise equality and unity, as in Princ. 3.6. 57 Cf. Williams (2006): 45–49, for the way in which Jerome presents in his early works Origen and Cicero as two opposing models.

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10.3 Dignity of the Human Soul As shown in the previous section (10.2), Jerome opposes the idea, that he attributes to Origen, that all human souls will share the same rank in the end. Now it must be investigated whether Jerome accepted Origen’s view that all human souls shared the same undeserved dignity at their creation, which for Origen, Princ. 3.6.1 was the “dignity of the image”.58 10.3.1 Dignity as Immortality In Comm.Isa. 14.11, Jerome interprets Isa 51:12–13 (“I am, I am the one who comforts you. Know who you have been, and you were afraid of a mortal man […]. And you have forgotten God your maker…”). Here, Jerome identifies the dignitas of all human souls created according to the image of God with immortality. Jerome argues that people who fear those who can only do harm to their mortal bodies, instead of recognising that souls are in fact immortal, ignore the dignitas of their souls.59 A parallel for this interpretation of Isa 51:12–13 is Eusebius, Comm.Isa. 2.39: Eusebius also refers Isa 51:12–13 to the creation of the rational soul according to the image of God, and maintains that people who fear the persecutors “forget their own ἀξία”. Aside from the statement in Comm.Isa. 2.39 that human beings have the privilege of finding comfort and support in God and have thus nothing to fear from their mortal enemies, in his writings Eusebius does not further develop his views on human dignity by using derivatives of ἄξιος:60 the only occurrence in Eusebius of “dignity of the soul” (τῆς ψυχικῆς ἀξίας) outside of the Commentary on Isaiah is found in a quote from Porphyry (Praep.ev. 15.11). Judging from Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, Origen’s understanding of dignity does not exactly correspond to either Eusebius or Jerome. Undoubtedly, Origen believed that the human soul created in the image of God was immortal (Hom.Gen. 1.13)61 and that human beings could find strength in God (Princ. 3.2.5). However, in Princ. 3.6.1 Origen identifies the dignity of human beings specifically with the possibility to progress in their participation in Christ.62 Instead, in Jerome and Eusebius the dignity of humanity created in the image of God is not connected to the theme of human progress. 58

See chapter 5. I examine this passage by Jerome and the exegetical connection with Eusebius in an article which is currently under review for publication, titled: “Jerome on Human Dignity: A Comparison with Eusebius and Didymus”. 60 For instance, in Eus.Caes. Praep.ev. 7.18 the superiority of the human being created in the image of God compared to the rest of creation is expressed as ὑπεροχή, “excellence”, one of the terms analysed in section 1.2. 61 For Origen’s views on the immortality of the soul, cf. Blosser (2012): 237–243. 62 See section 5.1. 59

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Jerome, Eusebius, and Origen attribute “dignity” (dignitas in Jerome, Comm.Isa. 14.11 and in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1; ἀξία in Eusebius, Comm.Isa. 2.39) to the human soul created in the image of God. In Tract.89Ps.ser.alt. 3, written possibly after 415,63 Jerome further confirms that the part of the human being possessing dignitas is the soul. In this text, Moses addresses God in prayer, and says: “The human beings you have created in your image, do not let them perish. [...] Do not consider the worthlessness of the body (corporis vilitatem),64 but the dignity of the soul (animae dignitatem)”. In this passage, Jerome expresses the three key points of his views on the dignitas of human souls: first, the connection, recognised also by Origen and Eusebius, with the creation in the image of God (Gen 1:26–27); second, the association with immortality (“do not let them perish”), and third, the fact that immortality (and thus also dignity) is given by God. The dignity of immortality is for Jerome a constitutive part of human nature as established at creation according to the image of God: Jerome states in Comm.Eccl. ad 3:18–21 that human beings are different from animals “as regards the dignity of the soul” (secundum animae dignitatem), because, while the life force of animals dies with their bodies, the human soul survives the death of the mortal body.65 The immortality of the soul was established at the beginning, but it was only activated and made available for humans after the resurrection of Christ, who opened the doors of heaven. Jerome sees dignity as a gift from God through Christ that impacts the afterlife: for Jerome, only the Trinity possesses immortality in nature, whereas all rational creatures may only access it as a gift (largitio or gratia) from God.66 The association between spiritual dignity and the “gift” of immortality (incorruptibilitatis beneficium) is also found in Ambrosiaster, Quaest. 81.67 However, Ambrosiaster did not present dignitas, like Jerome, Comm.Isa. 14.11, as something that the human soul has possessed since its creation in the image of God, but rather as the result of a transformation taking place in human “nature” or “essence” (natura, essentia) once the individual acquires true faith.68

63

Malavasi (2019). This passage referring to the abasement of the body does not mean that the body will not be granted immortality: Pålsson (2019) argues that both Jerome and Origen believe that the condition of the body in the afterlife is dependent on the condition of the soul, hence the body too can access immortality once the soul is worthy. 65 I examine this passage by Jerome and the exegetical connection with Didymus in an article which is currently under review for publication, titled: “Jerome on Human Dignity: A Comparison with Eusebius and Didymus”. 66 Cf. Hier. Pelag. 2.7; Comm.Tit. ad 1:2. 67 See section 7.2.3. At least some of Ambrosiaster’s Quaestiones were certainly known to Jerome, cf. Perrone (1996): 33–35. 68 Cf. Lact. Inst. 7.5. 64

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In the passages examined in this section, namely Comm.Isa. 14.11, Comm.Eccl. ad 3:18–21, and Tract.89Ps.ser.alt. 3, Jerome does not explicitly connect dignity to rationality. This does not mean that Jerome did not believe that human souls were by nature rational: for example, in Comm.Habac. 1 ad 2:5–8 Jerome defines the human being as a rational animal (hominis, id est animalis rationabilis). However, Jerome did not identify the dignity of the human species with its rational nature, as maintained by previous thinkers known to Jerome, both Christian (for example Origen, Didymus, or Hilary of Poitiers) and pagan (Cicero),69 but rather with immortality. 10.3.2 Dignity as the Prerogative of True Humanity The literal interpretation of Eccl 3:21 provided by Jerome in Comm.Eccl. ad 3:18–21 indicates that human beings have a dignity that distinguishes them from animals, because human souls do not die together with their bodies. The spiritual sense, on the other hand, which entails that “the spirit of the children of man” in Eccl 3:21 refers to the righteous, whereas “the spirit of cattle” to sinners, shows that not all human beings, but only the saint is “worthy of the title ‘human’” (sanctus, qui hominis appellatione dignus est). This text by Jerome presents a dilemma similar to the one observed in Cicero’s De Officiis:70 can individuals lose the dignitas of human nature (Off. 1.106) if they do not adhere to the standards of behaviour characteristic of rational beings? Despite making a sarcastic remark in Off. 1.105 about those who are human only in name, Cicero does not further develop in his treatise the issue of whether a person could still be considered human if they gave in to unregulated pleasure and acted like beasts. The same discussion can be made for Jerome’s view of the dignitas of the human soul: can individuals, for Jerome, cease to possess the dignity that human souls are endowed with, if they do not act in a way that is befitting human beings? This understanding of the name “human” as not merely denoting members of the human species but also as a honorific title signifying individual worthiness is explored in one of Jerome’s later exegetical work, namely the Commentary on Ezekiel, completed around 414. Jerome comments on Ezek 38:19–20, a prophecy announcing a great earthquake, when the fish in the sea, the birds in the sky, wild beasts, all reptiles and all human beings will tremble. Jerome, Comm.Ezech. 11 ad 38:20 reasons that these different names (i.e. fish, birds, beasts, reptiles, and human beings in Ezek 38:20) denote allegorically the differences among the various members of the Christian Church (morum diversitas variis signetur nominibus). Based on each one’s behaviour, some believers 69 Orig. Princ. 3.6.1, see my section 5.1. Did. Comm.Eccl. ad 3:18–21; Comm.Zach. 3.122–124; Comm.Gen. ad 1:26–27, see section 9.3. Hil.P. Tract.118Ps. 10.1-8, see section 7.1.2. Cic. Off. 1.106, see chapter 6. 70 See section 6.4.

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are called “fish”, others “birds” or “reptiles”, while only a part of them have “preserved their original name” (nomen pristinum servaverunt), i.e. they preserved the name of “human” that they received at their creation, and retained the dignity of being called “human” (retinentes hominis dignitatem). Consequently, as conveyed in 1Cor 15:38–42, at the resurrection people will be given different kinds of bodies corresponding to their individual dignity: as the human body is different from the bodies of fish or reptiles, so will the heavenly body awarded to the worthy be different from the earthly body reserved for those who will go through punishments in their afterlives. In Comm.Ezech. 11 ad 38:20, Jerome does not explain any further which kind of merit or fault warrants the titles “reptile”, “fish”, or “human”. However, a parallel in Origen may shed some light on what it takes to deserve the dignity of the human being. In several texts such as Jerome’s translation of Hom.Ezech. 3.871 or Rufinus’ translation of Comm.Rom. 5.1.22,28, Origen states that only those who preserve in themselves the image of God are worthy of being called truly human. In particular, a Greek fragment attributed to Origen claims that only Daniel and Ezekiel deserve to be addressed in Scripture with the formula “sons of men” (Ps 4:3). In the case of Daniel, this is because, while most people around him were sinners and therefore more similar to animals than to human beings, he maintained the original dignity of humanity: Fr.Ps. ad 4:3: Only Daniel preserved the dignity of human nature, made according to the image and to the likeness [...]. For the name ‘human’ was given for the first time to the one who was created by God in his image and likeness (Gen 1:26), so that this one would be ‘human’ in the proper sense (κυρίως).72

The phrasing in this fragment referring to Daniel, i.e. σώσαντα τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου … φύσεως, “having preserved the dignity of human nature”, is very close to the one in Jerome, Comm.Ezech. 11 ad 38:20 referring to worthy individuals, i.e. retinentes hominis dignitatem, “retaining the dignity of the human being”. As far as we know, there are no other occurrences of expressions such as “preserving the dignitas/ἀξίωμα of the human being” in Christian literature prior to Jerome. There is no proof that Jerome knew of Origen’s commentary on Ps 4:3 exactly in the form preserved in the catenary fragment: in his Epistle 28, written in 384, Jerome discusses Origen’s interpretation of the term διάψαλμα in Ps 4:3, but the catenary fragment by Origen interpreting the expression “sons of men” does not include the discussion of διάψαλμα quoted by Jerome. The positive interpretation of υἱοὶ ἀνθρώπων found in the Greek fragment by Origen, i.e. as indicating a special dignity of those people who preserved the image of God within themselves, is not found in Jerome. Instead,

71 I am currently working on article on Origen’s interpretation of the biblical expression “human human” (Ezek 14:4), developed in Hom.Ezech. 3.8, and on its reception in Jerome. 72 PG 12: 1140AB. For Villani Hanus (2014): 75, this text is authentically Origenian.

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in Comm.Dan. ad 8:17, Jerome claims that Ezekiel, Daniel, and Zechariah are addressed as “sons of men” so as to remind them that despite their greatness they are still human, and have not attained either the nature or the dignity of angels.73 Nevertheless, Origen’s fragment on Ps 4:3 and Jerome, Comm.Ezech. 11 ad 38:20, provide evidence that they share the idea that there is a dignity attributed specifically to human beings at their beginning, but only worthy individuals can truly claim it for themselves. So, for Jerome, the name “human being” in its basic, biological sense, conveys dignity as elevated rank, because it identifies a species that received from God an immortal soul and is thus superior to animals. All human beings equally share this inalienable dignity; however, not all possess the higher dignity of those who do not only belong to the human species, but also choose as individuals to act in a way that corresponds to its high dignity. Thus, the statement in Jerome, Comm.Ezech. 11 ad 38:20 that only some human beings “retain the dignity of the human being” does not indicate that the souls of sinners lost the natural dignity of immortality. Instead, while the universal dimension of dignity impacts on the nature of humanity as a species, the individual dimension, determined by merit, affects each soul’s destiny in the afterlife. Unworthy human beings do not receive at the resurrection a body capable of enjoying heaven but rather a less desirable body that will accompany them during their punishment (Comm.Ezech. 11 ad 38:20). Thus, they lose the individual dimension of the dignity of humanity (i.e. a title of merit signifying perfection). They do not however lose the natural and undeserved dignity (i.e. being born a human being with an immortal soul): claiming that human souls could truly perish with their mortal body as do the spirits of animals would be unacceptable for Jerome, as revealed for instance by his interpretation of Eccl 3:18–21. In other words, all human beings maintain their immortality (universal human dignity) but depending on their merit or demerit (individual dignity) they encounter different fates in the afterlife. In sum: in his discourse on the dignitas of human beings Jerome distinguishes between universal dignitas – all human souls are created immortal (Comm.Isa. 14.11; Tract.89Ps.ser.alt. 3) – and individual dignitas – only the righteous display the worthiness that is implied by the very title “human” (Comm.Ezech. 11 ad 38:20; cf. Comm.Eccl. ad 3:18–21). This distinction is also found in passages by Origen such as Fr.Ps. ad 4:3, expressing that only a few worthy individuals in this life deserve to claim the true dignity of humanity for themselves; in other words, only few people have protected and cultivated the “dignity of the image” in themselves and acted on its potential in order to achieve the “dignity of the likeness” (Princ. 3.6.1).74 Jerome also agrees with Origen that in the present times there are imbalances in dignity, as only a few 73 74

See section 10.2.1. See sections 3.3.1; 5.2.

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individuals have acted on the potential for worthiness given by that initial dignity. However, Jerome rejects the notion, that he attributes to Origen and his supporters, that in the end all human beings will ultimately be equal in dignity in the afterlife (Comm.Jon. ad 3:6–9). Thus, Jerome does not believe that the gap between the individual and the universal dignity of human beings will be completely bridged in the end times. 10.3.3 Dignity and Assimilation to God: Jerome vs Origen? Jerome did accept the notion of a specific dignity of immortal human souls created in the image of God.75 However, Jerome’s view of human dignity does not coincide with Origen’s. For Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, the “dignity of the image” in human beings was the possibility for each human being to progress towards the likeness with God;76 Jerome holds different views on the way the dignity of the human soul determines the soul’s relation with God. The use of dignitas in Jerome’s Homily on Psalm 81 confirms that for Jerome humanity has a high dignitas, because God created all human beings with the possibility of deserving the grace of becoming ‘gods’ and ‘children’ of God (Ps 81:6). In Tract.81Ps. 1, Jerome comments: “Behold the dignity of the human being (vide hominis dignitatem). […] God gifts to us the name (of gods, Ps 81:1), so that he may gift also the reward”; and in Tract.81Ps. 6 he reiterates: “Behold how great is the dignity (videte quanta sit dignitas): we are called ‘gods’ and ‘children’ (Ps 81:6)”. However, Jerome feels compelled to find a way to speak of this great dignity of humanity without falling into what he presented in Ep. 124.14 as Origen’s error, i.e. merging into one and the same substance God, Christ, the immortal angels, and human beings based on the dignity of their soul.77 For Jerome, the clarification that human souls cannot be one with God in substance or nature, whereas Christ is, is intended to counteract the views of Arianism, which did not attribute to Christ the same substance as God and thus associated him with the creatures. In Comm.Isa. 14.11, Comm.Eccl. ad 3:18–21, and Tract.89Ps.ser.alt. 3,78 Jerome had avoided this risk by not presenting the universal dignitas of human souls as connected to the human progress towards the union with God. This connection is found in Origen, Princ. 3.6.1 where the “dignity of the image” (imaginis dignitas) was the first step towards the “dignity of the likeness” (similitudinis dignitas) and finally the “property of unity” (unitatis proprietas) between human beings and God.79 For Jerome, the danger in this argument on human dignity made by Origen is not in the claim that all human beings are 75

See section 10.3.1. See chapter 5. 77 Contini (2021b): 226–228, 235. 78 See section 10.3.1. 79 See section 5.1. 76

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attributed equal dignity at their creation, a fact which Jerome confirms in his own works such as the Homily on Psalm 81, but rather in the fact that the progress initiated with the “dignity of the image” leads for Origen to the assimilation of all creatures to God through Christ. Contrarily to what he did in the passages analysed in section 10.3.1, in his Homily on Psalm 81 Jerome cannot avoid the connection between dignity and progress, as in Tract.81Ps. 6 he claims that the great dignitas of humanity is shown by the fact that God wants all human beings to become gods (ut de hominibus dii fiant) and to progress until they become worthy of being children of God (ut postquam dii fueritis, digni efficiamini esse filii Dei). As in Princ. 3.6.1, dignity is given to human beings at their creation as the potential to develop a closer relationship with God, which each one must then work to fulfil. Hence, Jerome needs to present his views on human progress towards the achievement of the title “gods” and of the adoption as children of God while making it abundantly clear that he does not follow Origen’s views as they are found in Origen’s own Homily on Psalm 81, where there is no explicit distinction in nature between the divinity possessed by Christ and the one available to human beings. Jerome accomplishes this by explicitly stating in Tract.81Ps. 6 that, although they may deserve the name ‘gods’, no human being is or will be so worthy as to truly become ‘god’ and ‘child of God’ in the same way as Christ is, i.e. in substance.80

10.4 Conclusions In the vast majority of cases, dignitas indicates for Jerome that a person stands out from other less worthy persons. This individual worthiness could be either perceived – meaning that, for instance, sometimes those who are honoured with a high rank in society may not actually be worthy, as shown in section 10.1 – or truly deserved, as is the case with the dignity of the human being as a proper title of merit, discussed in section 10.3.2. Conversely, universal spiritual dignity in Jerome, discussed in sections 10.3.1 and 10.3.3, is markedly different from individual dignity, as the dignity of the human species is not determined for Jerome by the worthiness of the human individual but rather by what God is willing to do for all human beings.81 For example, we see the spiritual dignity of the human soul in the titles of “gods” and “children” that God bestows on humanity (Tract.81Ps. 1). We are reminded of our dignity by the immortality that God grants us through Christ (Comm.Isa. 14.11; Comm.Eccl. ad 3:18–21). The “great dignity of souls” (magna dignitas animarum) is shown by the fact that God assigns each 80 81

Contini (2021b): 235. Cf. Volp (2006): 229.

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and every (unaquaeque) soul to a guardian angel from birth (Comm.Matt. 3 ad 18:10). The dignity of the soul is presented as the best part of the human being, and as deserving a special consideration by God (Tract.89Ps.ser.alt. 3). In sum, universal human dignitas is understood by Jerome as a special sign of the favour God freely bestows on humanity. Jerome’s use of dignitas in reference to humanity reveals on the one hand the impact that Origen’s exegesis (sometimes through the mediation of more recent authors such as Eusebius and Didymus) had in shaping Jerome’s view that humanity as a species possesses a high dignity as determined by its relationship to God. On the other hand, Jerome filters the exegetical and anthropological arguments that he reads in his Greek predecessors through the lens of a Roman view of dignitas which is always configured in a hierarchical and agonistic context. Jerome can accept Origen’s view that God gave all human beings the potential to achieve worthiness (universal dignity), but not Origen’s idea that all human beings would ultimately be able to fulfil this potential until all differences in their individual dignity would be overcome. So, although the reception of Origen is significant in the texts by Jerome concerning the dignity of all human souls, Jerome appears closer to the views on human dignity expressed for example in Cicero, Off. 1.106–107,82 namely that humanity as a species was given universal dignity by nature, but only some people possess dignity also in their individual nature. This is because Jerome’s views on human dignitas are shaped by his antiheretical concerns (against Arius, against Jovinian, against Novatian, but especially against Origen), similarly to how Origen’s insistence on the universal dignity of souls made in the image of God is informed by his fight against Gnosticism, or against bodily interpretations of Scripture. Jerome is wary of the possible heretical implications of attributing such a high dignity to humanity; he is concerned with defending the full divinity of the Son, as well as with counteracting Origen’s views – or at least the views that Jerome presents as held by Origen in texts like Ep. 124 – on the simultaneous creation of all rational beings as equal in nature, and on the restoration of that same equality of all rational beings in God at the end of times. Jerome feels the need to clarify that the high dignity that all human souls are endowed with at their creation does not entail that all souls will be equally worthy in the end times, nor that any human is (now), or can be (in the future), anything more than a human being. This means that no human truly becomes an angel, or becomes like or even one with God in the way that Christ is, not even the worthiest, i.e. those who have deserved to be adopted into the filiality of Christ (Tract.81Ps. 6). “Human being” is a title that conveys a precise dignitas, i.e. the elevated rank of the immortal soul created according to the image of God, and this dignitas must be recognised for exactly what it is: being associated with anything lower 82

See chapter 6.

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than this dignitas is shameful for humans (as discussed in section 10.3.2), but being associated with something higher is heresy.

Conclusions The aim of this study, as defined in the introduction, was to shed light on the extent of continuity and innovation between the meanings attributed to dignitas in the Latin reception of Origen and the traditional understanding of dignity in Roman society, i.e. as a status awarded to the individual in the context of a social hierarchy. For this purpose, this study focused on the occurrences of dignitas in the Latin translations of Origen, as well as in other works by Latin authors from the 4th century which, to different degrees, show the reception of Origen's exegesis of Gen 1:26–27. In part I, the Latin translations of Greek Christian texts produced by Rufinus and Jerome were compared to their extant Greek originals, with the purpose of assessing which Greek nouns or expressions were perceived by Rufinus and Jerome as words which could be translated with dignitas in different contexts. This comparison has shown that while the Latin adjective dignus normally translates the Greek adjective ἄξιος, “worthy” (and occasionally derivatives of the verb πρέπω, such as τὸ πρέπον, “what is appropriate” or “fitting”), there is no Greek word that corresponds to the Latin noun dignitas exactly. However, at least in the case of Rufinus, two-thirds of the relevant occurrences of dignitas correspond to a derivative of ἄξιος, mainly ἀξίωμα or, less frequently, ἀξία; this correspondence between dignitas and ἀξία/ἀξίωμα is even more consistent in the Latin translations of the Cappadocians made in the 5th and 6th centuries. In many of the texts examined in part I, dignitas is used to denote a highly regarded public office, or the elevated social status awarded to those who hold such an office. This was the most frequent understanding of dignitas at the time of Rufinus and Jerome, as demonstrated for instance by their contemporary legal language. Rufinus and Jerome employ the familiar language of Roman statesmanship, including dignitas, to convey the dismissal of worldly values, such as the pursuit of a political career, expressed in Greek Christian texts. The passages analysed in chapter 2 have demonstrated that, on the one hand, in the Latin translations of Origen dignitas in its traditional meaning as social status connected to a public office is frequently associated with terms such as potestas or honor, which convey very similar notions and so are at least partly interchangeable with dignitas. On the other hand, when dignitas is used by Rufinus in the context of Origen’s discourse on the progress of the rational creatures, dignitas retains a specific and distinctive meaning as the elevated

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rank awarded by God to the creature, which cannot be replaced even by closely related terms such as status. In part II, all occurrences of dignitas in the translations of Origen were taken into consideration and organised in different sections based on what they refer to, i.e. to human beings in this world (sections 3.1–2) or in the afterlife (section 3.3), to rational creatures in general (section 3.4), and finally to God (chapter 4). The texts examined in section 3.1 show that when dignitas is used in the translations of Origen to denote a position of political power, it often assumes a pejorative meaning as something meaningless and transitory, thus indicating a rejection of the traditional Roman value of dignitas as a worthy objective in life. In opposition to this value system based on the individual pursuit of dignitas, texts such as Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s Homilies on Judges present the imitation of the humility of Christ as a way to attain the only true and lasting good, i.e. the union with God through Christ. Even when dignitas describes a position of authority within the Church, primarily that of the bishop (as is the case with the passages examined in section 3.2), the main point of the text is that the ecclesiastical title is not a value in itself, but needs to be substantiated by merit as borne out by appropriate behaviour of the respective office holders. All Church leaders should constantly monitor and examine themselves in order to ensure that the degree of their merit corresponds to the degree of their dignity. So, while dignitas in social hierarchies is presented in the Latin translations of Origen as connected to the idea of futility, dignitas in ecclesiastical hierarchies is associated with the notion of individual worthiness. The texts examined in section 3.3 explain how individual worthiness affects dignity in the afterlife. People such as the saints and the apostles, who during their lives have reached with their merit (i.e. their efforts to imitate Christ) a very advanced stage of their individual progress, attain a very high degree of participation in Christ, to the point that they may share his prerogatives as teacher and judge of human souls. In this capacity, the saints lead other souls to attain their same blessedness. Only those who deserve it are awarded with this superior heavenly dignitas. This is, according to Origen, the second of three stages in the progress of the rational creation. These three stages are described in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, arguing that the creatures acquire first the “dignity of the image”, then the “dignity of the likeness”, and finally the “property of unity”. While the “dignity of the image” is examined in chapter 5 of this study, section 3.3 investigates Origen’s views on the progress that leads individuals to achieve for themselves the “dignity of the likeness”, as well as his understanding of the universal “property of unity”. The first stage is the creation of all intellects “according to the image” or Logos of God (Gen 1:26–27). At this point, all creatures are perfectly equal not only regarding their nature as rational beings endowed with freedom of choice and with the capacity to progress towards God, but also in rank, as Origen indicates by claiming that God bestows on all the “dignity of the image” (Princ.

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3.6.1). Subsequently, the second stage follows the progress of the souls as determined by their freedom of choice, starting from the first fall of the intellects into the state of souls, caused by their choice not to reciprocate with sufficient intensity the love of God. This second phase encompasses the various stages of the souls’ existence in the earthly life and in the afterlife. At this stage, the creatures are still equal in their rational nature but due to the differences in their individual merit they are not anymore equal in dignity, as they acquire different ranks depending on their worthiness. Even though the universal “dignity of the image” can never be truly lost by any human being, there are differences in individual dignity in the sense of worthiness, because only individuals who are exceptionally worthy, such as the saints, attain a high rank in their afterlife and ultimately achieve the “dignity of the likeness”. Furthermore, in this intermediate stage there are also differences in dignity between human beings and other rational creatures: in the texts examined in section 3.4, dignitas refers to the rank awarded to each creature in the hierarchies of heavenly powers, human beings, and demonic powers, depending on their personal merit. In order to counteract Gnostic views which attributed the differences in rank among rational beings to their differences in nature, Origen emphasises the mobility within the hierarchy of the creatures as determined by freedom of choice. This second phase is characterised by various stages of repentance and purification that each person goes through in their own time and at their own pace both in this life and in the afterlife. The progress of each creature reaches its final stage when eventually the creature freely chooses to return the love of God, just like the saints and the angels did. With this correct and perfected use of freedom of choice, the soul displays the necessary merit and worthiness ultimately to access perfection. Perfection is understood by Origen as the highest degree of participation of a created soul in the divine Logos, which was first attained by the human soul of Jesus Christ. In sum: while equality in nature is a permanent feature of the rational creation from its beginning to the end, individual dignity is initially unstable, as it is determined by freedom of choice, and will only reach stability in its third stage. The third stage, i.e. apocatastasis, takes place after even the last of the sinners has gone through all the stages of purification, has converted, and has chosen to join the other creatures in their communion with the Logos. Origen envisions this final stage as characterised by the union of all creation with God, based on his interpretation of 1Cor 15:28, with its statement that in the end times “God will be all in all”. At this last stage, dignity as a hierarchical notion of rank disappears from Origen’s argument: in passages such as Princ. 3.6.4 Origen stresses that “there will be no more difference” among the creatures, meaning that no one will be more or less worthy than the others. Thus, in the Latin translations of Origen the differences in dignitas among individuals, in this life or in the next, determine the role that they perform towards other

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human beings, but will not be maintained in the end times, when every single creature will have attained perfection. The texts discussed in chapter 4 demonstrate that terms such as dignitas or ἀξίωμα imply a certain degree of instability even when they refer to God himself, at least from the point of view of the creatures. Origen argues that, although God is immutable and impassible in essence, God does not maintain his own incommensurably superior rank when he communicates himself to humankind (through Scripture and through the incarnate Son). Instead, God adapts himself to the individual needs of each creature, based on their current stage of spiritual progress. The occurrences of dignitas examined in parts I and II are in line with the traditional understanding of dignity as attributed to an individual in a hierarchical context. Part III focuses instead on a novel understanding of dignitas. The “dignity of the image” in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, Princ. 3.6.1, analysed in chapter 5, stands out in comparison with the other occurrences of dignitas of the creatures in the Latin translations of Origen, because in this one instance dignitas does not denote the rank pursued by individuals and awarded to them in consequence of their merit or their social standing. Instead, it refers to the possibility for all humans to progress in their participation in Christ, based on the natural affinity between the rational soul and the divine Reason or Logos, established directly by God when he created every soul in his own image (Gen 1:27), i.e. in the Logos. The “dignity of the image” is a universal potential of rational nature, based on the gratuity of God’s creation and not based on individual action. However, even this universal natural dignity is not immune from a certain degree of change: since it is given by God at the beginning of creation as a potential, it must be activated by the individual, who is supposed to advance from “dignity of the image” (potential) to “dignity of the likeness” (act). Furthermore, the image of God within humans can be tarnished or obscured by sin, even though no soul can permanently lose its dignity of rational creature made in the image of God and endowed with freedom of choice; instead, all souls are always capable of converting from sin and pursuing the participation in Christ. So, on the one hand, the universal “dignity of the image” is markedly different from traditional dignitas, because the potential for perfection is given equally to all souls and it is fundamentally inalienable. On the other hand, because the “dignity of the image” is a potential, it still has many aspects in common with the notion of dignity as the unstable product of individual merit which is prone to change, because Origen indicates that if a person does not constantly monitor oneself and strive to keep oneself worthy, the potential remains inactive or is not exploited fully. Nevertheless, the idea of a dignity that, at least as a potential, is attributed permanently to the collective human nature since its creation, rather than being earned by the individual, is groundbreaking and almost unprecedented in Latin literature. One of the few other occurrences of the universal dignitas of rational

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human nature is found in Cicero, Off. 1.106, examined in chapter 6. Like Origen in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1, Cicero attributes dignitas to human nature based on the affinity between the intellectual capacity of human beings and universal divine reason. Like Origen, Cicero envisions dignitas as a universal potential, determining the duty for all individuals to live in accordance with the rational nature of humanity, as much as is it possible for each individual nature. However, Cicero does not indicate, like Origen, that every human being is equally capable of sooner or later activating the potential offered by the dignity of human nature; thus, Cicero’s views on dignitas never really move past its aristocratic roots of fundamental inequality between different human beings towards a more universalising understanding. In the conclusions of chapter 5, it is stated that, even though the two occurrences of universal “dignity of the image” in Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 3.6.1 are noticeably different and novel compared to the traditional understanding of dignitas as individual worthiness, they are not by themselves a sufficient indication that Origen or his translators developed a terminology of human dignity in reference to his views on the intellectual potential of human nature created in the image of God, especially considering that no other Greek or Latin passage by Origen on Gen 1:26–27 features dignitas or terms such as ἀξία or ἀξίωμα. Instead, my research was able to establish a more consistent association between the terminology of dignitas (or ἀξία/ἀξίωμα) and universalising views on humanity in the image of God by Latin and Greek authors in the second half of the 4th century, examined in part IV. Notable examples of texts where dignitas is used to express views on humanity in the image of God that can be traced back to Alexandrine exegesis and especially to Origen include Hilary of Poitiers’ Commentary on Psalm 118 (section 7.1.2) and Dionysius Exiguus’ Latin translation of Gregory of Nyssa’s De opificio hominis (section 8.3), but also authors whose relationship with Origen is likely indirect, such as Filastrius of Brescia (chapter 9) or Zeno of Verona (section 7.2.2). The texts analysed in part IV demonstrate not only the pervasiveness and lasting power of four fundamental tenets of the Alexandrine exegesis of Gen 1:26–27 – namely, 1. the identification of the “image” of God with the Logos and Son of God; 2. the double creation of humankind (i.e. the idea that Gen 1:26–27 refers to the creation of the immortal rational soul, and Gen 2:7 to the creation of the body); 3. the view that the creation in the image of God gives all human beings the possibility of pursuing perfection understood as the union with God, and 4. the notion that the original dignity which humanity received with its creation in the image of God is obfuscated because of sin but can be restored – but also the originality of these later authors. This is especially evident in the case of Jerome, whose understanding of dignitas is assessed in chapter 10: on the one hand, the argument on the natural dignitas of the immortal human soul created in the image of God that Jerome makes in his commentaries on the OT are comparable to Origen’s thought and

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exegesis. On the other hand, Jerome rejects Origen’s idea that in the end times there will be no difference in rank among creatures based on their individual worthiness. In this sense, Jerome is an example of how Roman views on dignity and justice affect the way the Latin Church receives Origen’s ideas on humanity. Even if Jerome may accept that God as the supreme and benevolent ruler concedes equal dignity to all his creatures at their beginning, he regards the belief that in the end times everyone will ultimately be entirely equal in rank and perfected worthiness as profoundly unjust, based on the principle, expressed for example by Cicero, that there can be no justice without a hierarchy of different dignities, corresponding to different merits. In other words, Latin writers like Hilary, Jerome, or Filastrius show the reception of Origen’s views on the dignity of human nature as a universal potential, but reject the idea that the gap between what is in principle accessible to all and what is in practice attained only by some can eventually be bridged. For Origen, God gives all creatures the possibility to progress by bestowing on them the gift of “dignity of the image”; furthermore, God supports the progress of each creature by condescending to their spiritual condition, in order to allow all creatures to participate in the filiality of Christ. Thus, for Origen, the progress of humanity from its creation according to the image or Logos of God, to the acquisition of individual worthiness, and finally to unity with God is enabled by the love of God for all his children, expressed through the incarnate Son. It is not that human merit is not important for Origen: on the contrary, only with the free choice to respond positively to the love of God the creature can deserve to attain a higher level of participation in Christ and thus to advance in its spiritual progress towards perfection. However, with his focus on the universality of God’s philanthropic initiative, Origen argues that the differences in rank as determined by individual worthiness, although they may be relevant in the present life, are only temporary, as in the end there will be no more difference or hierarchy among the creatures. The beliefs held by Origen on the impermanence of hierarchies determine an ambiguous portrayal of dignitas in the Latin translations of his writings. On the one hand, in the translations of Origen the most widespread understanding of dignitas as the status one derives from one’s contribution to public life – a value which had a central role in shaping the identity of the Roman ruling class, as much in Late Antiquity as at the time of Cicero – is completely disavowed and rejected as a valid objective to pursue. On the other hand, even when dignitas has positive connotations in 4th century Christian Latin texts, as for example when it refers to the office of the heavenly powers, or even in the case of the “dignity of the image”, it still refers to something unstable, requiring constant self-monitoring, rather than indicating an inalienable attribute which all human beings in this world possess to the same degree regardless of their individual worthiness, as human dignity is generally understood today.

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This ambiguity of human dignity as a potential, attributed to all human beings but not equally realised by every individual, emerges not only from the translations of Origen, but in general from all occurrences of dignitas in 4thcentury Latin Christian literature receptive to Origen’s thought and exegesis. Influential authors such as Ambrose or Jerome, although they still predominantly use dignitas as social or ecclesiastical status, also begin to apply it to humanity more frequently than ever before in the history of the Latin language. Beforehand, dignitas denoted the rank awarded to individuals. With the wider circulation of Origen’s thought and exegesis in the Latin West starting in the late 4th century, a new understanding of dignity emerges, in reference to humanity and its relationship to God. As stated in the introduction, modern views on dignity as the inherent worth of each human being and as the foundation for human rights were only elaborated several centuries after Origen. However, it was with the late 4th century reception of Origen that terms denoting dignity were first attributed to all humans as rational and free beings. In a society so thoroughly obsessed with the competition for dignitas, the fact that Latin Christian authors use the term dignitas to refer to humanity as a whole carries significant counter-cultural implications and indicates a dramatic breach with the traditional Roman values. At the same time, the Latin authors act as mediators, because they convey a new Christian message on humanity and its relationship with God by using a familiar and highly codified term such as dignitas. This new usage of dignitas retains some fundamental and recognisable aspects of its traditional understanding, such as the element of instability or the idea of dignity as something that should be protected and increased. However, dignitas is also given new meaning and significance in relation to the fulfilment of human beings as creatures made according to the image of God. The contribution offered by 4th-century Latin Christian authors to the history of dignity was, based on Origen’s notion of the universal reach of God’s love encompassing all his creation (deriving from the interpretation of Scriptural passages such as Gen 1:26–27 and 1Cor 15:28), to problematise the elitism and individualism associated with Classical views on dignitas and thus to re-frame the traditional individual and hierarchical understanding of dignitas as rank in a new universalising and egalitarian perspective. For this reason, the Latin reception of Origen, which presents the dignity of humanity as the universal potential of the rational soul, constitutes a benchmark, and indeed watershed, in the history of the meaning, understanding, and conceptualisation of dignity.

Bibliography 1. Editions and English Translations of the Main Works Cited All abbreviations of the titles of ancient works and Scripture in this book are from the Society of Biblical Literature’s Handbook of Style (20142): 141–216. Ancient sources are quoted following the English translations available, with some modifications; I have provided my own translation when I could not find an existing one. The abbreviations of modern book series in this list are from Schwertner, Siegfried M. 20143. Internationales Abkürzungsverzeichnis für Theologie und Grenzgebiete (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter). SCRIPTURE OT: Works published in the series Septuaginta. Vetus Testamentum Graecum. Auctoritate Academiae Scientiarum Gottingensis editum (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht). English translations adapted from NETS, available at: https://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/ nets/edition/ (last accessed on 13/05/2023). NT: Nestle, Eberhard, Erwin Nestle, Barbara Aland, et al. 201428. Novum Testamentum Graece et Latine (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft). English translations adapted from ESV. AMBROSE OF MILAN Commentary on the Gospel of Luke Latin text: Adriaen, Marcus. 1957. Ambrosius Mediolanensis. Expositio evangelii secundum Lucam. CCSL 14 (Turnhout: Brepols). English translation available in: Ní Riain, Íde M. 2001. Commentary of Saint Ambrose on the Gospel according to Saint Luke (Dublin: Halcyon Press/Elo Publications). Commentary on Psalm 118 Latin: Petschenig, Michael, and Michaela Zelzer. 1999. Ambrosius, Expositio psalmi CXVIII. CSEL 62 (Vienna: VÖAW). English: Ní Riain, Íde M. 1998. Homilies of Saint Ambrose on Psalm 118 (119) (Dublin: Halcyon Press). AMBROSIASTER Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti Latin: Souter, Alexander. 1908. Pseudo-Augustini. Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti CXXVII. CSEL 50 (Leipzig/Vienna: G. Freytag/F. Tempsky). Commentary on First Corinthians Latin: Vogels, Heinrich Joseph. 1968. Ambrosiastri qui dicitur Commentarius in epistulas Paulinas. Pars II: In epistulas ad Corinthios. CSEL 81/2 (Vienna: Hölder-PichlerTempsky). English: Bray, Gerald L. 2009. Ambrosiaster. Commentaries on Romans and 1–2 Corinthians. Ancient Christian Texts (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic).

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ARNOBIUS OF SICCA Against the Pagans (Book II) Latin: Armisen-Marchetti, Mireille. 2018. Arnobe. Contre les Gentils (Contre les Païens). Livre II. CUFr Budé Série Latine 419 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres). English: McCracken, George E. 1949. Arnobius of Sicca. The Case against the Pagans. ACW 7, 8 (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press). BASIL OF CAESAREA Homilies Greek: PG 31, 164–617. Latin translation by Rufinus: Lo Cicero, Carla. 2008. Rufini Aquileiensis Homiliarum Basilii Magni interpretatio latina. CCSL 20A (Turnhout: Brepols). Greek text of Homily on “Attende tibi” and Latin translation by Rufinus: Marti, Heinrich. 2012. Nosce te ipsum ... animam tuam ... Deum. Predigt 3 des Basilius Caesariensis in der Übersetzung des Rufinus. TU 168 (Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter). Homilies on the Hexameron Greek: de Mendieta, Emmanuel Amand, and Stig Y. Rudberg. 1997. Basilius Caesariensis. Homilien zum Hexaemeron. GCS NF 2 (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter). Latin translation by Eustathius: de Mendieta, Emmanuel Amand, and Stig Y. Rudberg. 1958. Eustathius. Ancienne version latine des neuf homélies sur l'Hexaémeron de Basile de Césarée. TU 66 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag). English: Way, Agnes Clare. 1963. Saint Basil. Exegetic Homilies. FaCh 46 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). CICERO De Inventione Latin: Achard, Guy. 1994. Cicéron. De l’invention. CUFr Bude Série Latine 320 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres). English: Hubbell, Harry M. 1949. Cicero. De Inventione. De Optimo Genere Oratorum. Topica. LCL 386 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). De Legibus Latin: Powell, Jonathan G.F. 2006. M. Tulli Ciceronis De Re Publica, De Legibus, et al.. OCT (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press). English: Rudd, Niall. 1998. Cicero. The Republic and the Laws. Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press). De Officiis Latin: Winterbottom, Michael. 1994. M. Tulli Ciceronis De Officiis. OCT (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press). English: Griffin, Miriam T., and E. Margaret Atkins. 1991. Cicero. On Duties. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Familiares Latin: Shackleton Bailey, David R. 1988. M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia. Fasc 30: Epistulae ad Familiares. Libri I–XVI. BSGRT (Stuttgart: Teubner). English: Shackleton Bailey, David R. 2001. Cicero. Letters to Friends. LCL 205, 216, 230 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Pro Murena Latin: Clark, Albert Curtis. 1905. M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes Vol. I. OCT (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press).

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English: Berry, Dominic H. 2000. Cicero. Defence Speeches. Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press). CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA Stromata Greek: Stählin, Otto, and Ludwig Früchtel. 1985, 1970. Clemens Alexandrinus II–III. Stromata. GCS 52, 17 (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter). English: Ferguson, John. 1991. Clement of Alexandria. Stromateis, Book 1–3. FaCh 85 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Wilson, William. 1869. The Writings of Clement of Alexandria II: The Miscellanies. Book II–VIII. ANCL 12 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark). Hort, Fenton John Anthony, and Joseph Bickersteth Mayor. 1902. Clement of Alexandria. Miscellanies Book VII (London: Macmillan and co.). DIDYMUS THE BLIND Commentary on Genesis Greek: Nautin, Pierre, and Louis Doutreleau. 1976, 1978. Didyme l'Aveugle. Sur la Genèse. SC 233, 244 (Paris: Les éditions du Cerf). English: Hill, Robert C. 2016. Didymus The Blind. Commentary on Genesis. FaCh 132 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). EPIPHANIUS OF SALAMIS Panarion Greek: Holl, Karl, Marc Bergermann, and Christian-Friedrich Collatz. 2013. Epiphanius I/1. Ancoratus und Panarion haer. 1–33. GCS NF 10/1 (Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter). Holl, Karl, and Jürgen Dummer. 1980. Epiphanius II. Panarion haer. 34–64. GCS 31. Eid. 1985. Epiphanius III. Panarion haer. 65–80. De fide. GCS 37 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag). English: Williams, Frank. 2009, 2013. The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis. De fide. NHMS 63, 79 (Leiden/Boston: Brill). FILASTRIUS OF BRESCIA Diversarum Hereseon Liber Latin: Heylen, Firmin. 1957. Filastri Episcopi Brixiensis Diversarum hereseon liber. CCSL 9 (Turnhout: Brepols). GREGORY OF ELVIRA Commentary on the Song of Songs Latin: Pascual Torró, Joaquín. 2000. Gregorio de Elvira. Comentario al Cantar de los Cantares y otros tratados exegéticos. Fuentes Patrísticas 13 (Madrid: Ciudad Nueva). GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS Oration 16 Greek: PG 35, 933–964. Latin translation by Rufinus: Engelbrecht, Augustus. 1910. Tyrannii Rufini Orationum Gregorii Nazianzeni Novem Interpretatio. CSEL 46 (Vienna/Leipzig: F. Tempsky). Oration 19 Greek: PG 35, 1043–1064. Anonymous Latin translation: Moreschini, Claudio. 1997. Filosofia e letteratura in Gregorio di Nazianzo. CPFP 12 (Milan: Vita e Pensiero), 285–292. English: Vinson, Martha P. 2004. St. Gregory of Nazianzus: Select Orations. FaCh 107 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press).

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Bibliography

GREGORY OF NYSSA De Opificio Hominis Greek: PG 44, 123–256. Latin translation by Dionysius Exiguus: PL 67, 347–408. HILARY OF POITIERS Commentary on Psalm 118 Latin: Milhau, Marc. 1988. Hilaire de Poitiers. Commentaire sur le Psaume 118. SC 344, 347 (Paris: Les éditions du Cerf). JEROME Homilies on Psalms Latin: Morin, Germanus. 19582. Sancti Hieronymi presbiteri Tractatus sive Homiliae in Psalmos. CCSL 78 (Turnhout: Brepols). English: Ewald, Marie Liguori. 1964. The Homilies of Saint Jerome, Volume 1 (1–59 on the Psalms). FaCh 48 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Commentary on Ecclesiastes Latin: Birnbaum, Elisabeth. 2014. Der Koheletkommentar des Hieronymus. CSEL Extra Seriem (Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter). English: Goodrich, Richard J., and David J.D. Miller. 2012. St. Jerome: Commentary on Ecclesiastes. ACW 66 (New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press). Commentary on Isaiah Latin: Gryson, Roger. 1993–1999. Commentaires de Jerome sur le Prophete Isaie. AGLB 23, 27, 30, 35, 36 (Freiburg: Herder). English: Scheck, Thomas P. 2015. St. Jerome: Commentary on Isaiah. Origen: Homilies 1– 9 on Isaiah. ACW 68 (New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press). Commentary on Ezekiel Latin: Glorie, Franciscus. 1965. Hieronymus. Commentariorum in Hiezechielem libri XIV. CCSL 75 (Turnhout: Brepols). English: Scheck, Thomas P. 2017. St. Jerome: Commentary on Ezekiel. ACW 71 (New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press). Commentaries on the Twelve Prophets Latin: Mantelli, Sincero. 2018. Hieronymus. Commentarius in Abacuc. CCSL 76–76A bis 1. Gryson, Roger. 2022. Hieronymus. Commentarii in Aggaeum, Abdiam, Malachiam. CCSL 76–76A bis 2. Other prophets: Adriaen, Marcus. 1964, 1969. Hieronymus. Commentarii in prophetas minores. CCSL 76A, 76 (Turnhout: Brepols). English: Scheck, Thomas P. 2016. Jerome. Commentaries on the Twelve Prophets. Ancient Christian Texts (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Academic). Commentary on Matthew Latin: Hurst, David, and Marcus Adriaen. 1969. Hieronymus. Commentariorum in Matheum libri IV. CCSL 77 (Turnhout: Brepols). English: Scheck, Thomas P. 2008. St. Jerome: Commentary on Matthew. FaCh 117 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Commentary on Galatians Latin: Raspanti, Giacomo. 2006. Hieronymus. Commentarii in epistulam Pauli apostoli ad Galatas. CCSL 77a (Turnhout: Brepols). English: Cain, Andrew. 2010. St. Jerome: Commentary on Galatians. FaCh 121 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press).

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Letters Latin: Hilberg, Isidor. 1910, 1912, 1918. Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi Epistulae. CSEL 54, 55, 56 (Leipzig/Vienna: G. Freytag/F. Tempsky). English: Wright, F.A. 1933. Jerome. Select letters. LCL 262 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). MARIUS VICTORINUS Against Arius Latin: Henry, Paul, and Pierre Hadot. 1960. Marius Victorinus. Traités théologiques sur la Trinité I. SC 68 (Paris: Les éditions du Cerf). English: Clark, Mary T. 1981. Marius Victorinus. Theological Treatises on the Trinity. FaCh 69 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). ORIGEN Fragments on Genesis: Metzler, Karin. 2010. Origenes: Die Kommentierung des Buches Genesis. Orig.WD 1/1 (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter/Herder). Homilies on Genesis Latin translation by Rufinus and Greek fragments: Habermehl, Peter. 2012. Origenes Werke VI. Homilien zum Hexateuch in Rufins Übersetzung. Erster Teil: Die Homilien zu Genesis. GCS NF 17 (Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter). Other Homilies on the Hexateuch Latin translation by Rufinus and Greek fragments: Baehrens, Wilhelm Adolf. 1920, 1921. Origenes Werke VI–VII. Homilien zum Hexateuch in Rufins Übersetzung. GCS 29, 30 (Leipzig: Hinrich'sche Buchhandlung). English: Heine, Ronald E. 1982. Origen. Homilies on Genesis and Exodus. FaCh 71 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Barkley, Gary W. 1990. Origen: Homilies on Leviticus. FaCh 83 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Scheck, Thomas P., and Christopher A. Hall. 2009. Origen: Homilies on Numbers. Ancient Christian Texts (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic). Bruce, Barbara J., and Cynthia White. 2002. Origen: Homilies on Joshua. FaCh 105 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Dively Lauro, Elizabeth A. 2010. Origen. Homilies on Judges. FaCh 119 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Homilies on Psalms Greek: Perrone, Lorenzo, Marina Molin Pradel, Emanuela Prinzivalli, and Antonio Cacciari. 2015. Origenes Werke XIII. Die neuen Psalmenhomilien. Eine kritische Edition des Codex Monacensis Graecus. GCS NF 19 (Berlin/Munich/Boston: de Gruyter). English: Trigg, Joseph W. 2020. Origen. Homilies on the Psalms: Codex Monacensis Graecus 314. FaCh 141 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Latin translation by Rufinus: Prinzivalli, Emanuela. 1991. Origene. Omelie sui Salmi. BPat 18 (Florence: Nardini). English: Heintz, Michael. 2023. Origen. Homilies on Psalms 36–38. FaCh 146 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Commentary and homilies on the Song of Songs Latin translations by Rufinus and Jerome: Baehrens, Wilhelm Adolf. 1925. Origenes Werke VIII. Homilien zu Samuel I, zum Hohelied und zu den Propheten; Kommentar zum Hohelied. GCS 33 (Leipzig: Hinrich'sche Buchhandlung).

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Greek fragments: Barbàra, Maria Antonietta. 2005. Origene. Commentario al Cantico dei cantici: testi in lingua greca. BPat 42 (Bologna: EDB). English: Lawson, R.P. 1957. Origen. The Song of Songs: Commentary and Homilies. ACW 26 (Westminster, MD/London: The Newman Press/Longmans, Green and co). Homilies on Isaiah Latin translation by Jerome: GCS 33, 242–289. English: Dively Lauro, Elizabeth A. 2021. Origen. Homilies on Isaiah. FaCh 142 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Homilies on Jeremiah; Fragments on Jeremiah and on Lamentations Greek: Klostermann, Erich, and Pierre Nautin. 1983. Origenes Werke III. Jeremiahomilien, Klageliederkommentar, Erklärung der Samuel- und Königsbücher. GCS 6 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag). Latin translation of the homilies by Jerome: PL 25, 584–692. For the two homilies which are only extant in Jerome’s translation: Nautin, Pierre, and Pierre Husson. 1977. Origène. Homélies sur Jérémie. Tome II: Homélies XII–XX et Homélies latines. SC 238 (Paris: Les éditions du Cerf), 300–367. English: Smith, John C. 1998. Origen. Homilies on Jeremiah; Homily on 1 Kings 28. FaCh 97 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Homilies on Ezekiel Latin translation by Jerome; Greek fragments on Ezekiel: GCS 33, 319–454. English: Pearse, Roger, and Mischa Hooker. 2014. Origen of Alexandria. Exegetical works on Ezekiel. Ancient Texts in Translation 2 (Ipswich: Chieftain Publishing). Commentary on Matthew Greek, books XII–XIII: Tondini, Raffaele. 2023. Origenes brevior. Studi sulla tradizione del Commento a Matteo. TU 193 (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter). Other books (Greek text and Latin translation): Klostermann, Erich. 1935. Origenes Werke X. Matthäuserklärung I. GCS 40. Klostermann, Erich, and Ursula Treu. 1976. Origenes Werke XI. Matthäuserklärung II. GCS 38 (Leipzig: Hinrich'sche Buchhandlung). English: Heine, Ronald E. 2018. The Commentary of Origen on the Gospel of St Matthew. OECT (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Homilies on Luke Latin translation by Jerome; Fragments on Luke: Crouzel, Henri, François Fournier, and Pierre Périchon. 1962. Origène. Homélies sur S. Luc. SC 87 (Paris: Les éditions du Cerf). English: Lienhard, Joseph T. 1996. Origen: Homilies on Luke, Fragments on Luke. FaCh 94 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Commentary on John Greek: Preuschen, Erwin. 1903. Origenes Werke IV. Der Johanneskommentar. GCS 10 (Leipzig: Hinrich'sche Buchhandlung). English: Heine, Ronald E. 1989, 1993. Origen. Commentary on the Gospel According to John. FaCh 80, 89 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). Commentary on Romans Latin translation by Rufinus: Hammond Bammel, Caroline P. 1990, 1997, 1998. Der Römerbriefkommentar des Origenes. AGLB 16, 33, 34 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder). Greek fragments: Scherer, Jean. 1957. Le commentaire d'Origène sur Rom. III. 5–7. 7: d'après les extraits du papyrus no 88748 du Musée du Caire et les fragments de la Philocalie et du Vaticanus Gr. 762. Bibliothèque générale 27 (Cairo: Imprimérie de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale).

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English: Scheck, Thomas P. 2001–2002. Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. FaCh 103, 104 (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press). I also follow Scheck’s numbering of the passages. Against Celsus Greek: Marcovich, Miroslav. 2001. Origenes. Contra Celsum libri VIII. SVigChr 54 (Leiden/Boston/Cologne: Brill). English: Chadwick, Henry. 1953. Origen: Contra Celsum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). De Principiis Latin translation by Rufinus and other Latin and Greek witnesses: Fernández, Samuel. 2015. Orígenes. Sobre los Principios. Fuentes Patrísticas 27 (Madrid: Ciudad Nueva). English: Behr, John. 2017. Origen. On First Principles. OECT (Oxford: Oxford University Press). PAULINUS OF NOLA Letters Latin: Hartel, Wilhelm. 1894. Sancti Pontii Meropii Paulini Nolani Epistulae. CSEL 29 (Leipzig/Vienna/Prague: G. Freytag/F. Tempsky). English: Walsh, Patrick G. 1966, 1967. Letters of St. Paulinus of Nola. ACW 35, 36 (New York/Ramsey, NJ: Paulist). ZENO OF VERONA Treatises Latin: Pascual Torró, Joaquín. 2016. Zenón de Verona. Tratados. Fuentes Patrísticas 30 (Madrid: Ciudad Nueva).

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Index of References Old Testament Genesis 1:3–9 1:26–27

1:28 2:7

2:21–23 25:5–6

135 1–7, 27, 31, 34–36, 46, 47, 58, 70, 98– 106, 135–138, 141, 143, 145–147, 155, 156, 158, 162–170, 185, 188, 189, 191, 197–203 154 100n11, 136, 158, 162–164, 167, 170, 201 162 52

Exodus 1:12 4:21 7:1 7:3

33 159 136 87

Deuteronomy 4:24 10:12

30 87

Joshua 10:29

28

Psalms 4:3 8:6 8:7 9:21 15:1 17:12

191 162n8 47 137 143 78

36:1–2 44:14 48:13 67:2 77:2–3 77:65 81:1,6 109:1 114:7 118:73 118:102 118:170 120:3–4

177, 178 26n20 23, 24 86, 87, 89 67 89, 91 193 50n37, 55 30, 161 134, 135, 139, 158, 172 137n22 14n19 89

Proverbs 3:15 24:13

12 66

Ecclesiastes 3:21 10:4

190, 192 24n9

Song of Songs 1:5,8 1:10 2:6

34, 140, 141 141 71, 72

Wisdom 1:4 6:16 7:25

163 12 26n21

Ecclesiasticus 3:18

43

232

Index of References 11:1 11:10 14:18 45:12 51:12–13 66:1

29 23n6 23n4 135 188 70

23n6 179

Jeremiah 1:6 12:13

67 17

73n23 26n21, 75 67

Ezekiel 14:4 28:12 38:19–20

191n71 26 190

Amos 5:1–2

183

Jonah 3:6–9

182

Malachi 1:6 3:1 Isaiah 5:8–24 6:2–3 7:14–16

New Testament Matthew 3:7 3:8, 22:8, 10:10–11,37–38 3:11, 8:8 4:8 5:48 10:18 11:27 13:35 13:57 16:27 17:2 19:28 20 22:30 24:45 24:48, 25:33 25:35 Mark 1:7 Luke 2:52 3:8, 7:4,7, 10:7, 12:48, 20:35, 21:36, 23:15,41 3:16, 7:6

158

10:19 15:4–32 20:36

24n9 11, 136–139 60n65

11 13 26n20, 70 87n56 68 78 67 22 26n21 85 24, 42 18 159 50, 52 52 143

John 1:27 1:29 4:46–54 5:22 5:23 8:31–34 10:18 13:4–5 14:2 17:4 17:5 17:21–24 20:22

11 48 18 24 22 33 24n9 88 179n33, 184, 186 58 26n21 45, 48, 101, 102 163

Acts 4:13

87n55

Romans 1:23 2:7,10 5:19 6:8 7:22

27, 104 23, 27 54 52 100

13

67

11 13

233

Index of References 8:15–17 8:21 9:15–18 9:20 9:21 12:10, 13:7, 15:7 13:1–3 1 Corinthians 1:28 2:7–8 7:4 9:22 12:27 13:8 15:22–23 15:24–28

15:38–40 15:41 15:42–44 15:45 15:49 2 Corinthians 3:14–15 3:18 4:7 4:16 5:21 Galatians 2:15 4:1–3 4:7 4:17–18

32, 50–52, 88–91 26n20, 48 159 87n55 23n6, 24n9 23n6 25

105n26 26n21 24n9 29, 90 58 185 55 24, 26, 45–50, 54– 58, 101, 102, 180, 185, 199, 203 191 26n20, 27, 184, 187 26, 27, 39, 48, 57 164 104, 105, 142n42

66 26n21 24 100 59n60, 85

145 52 88 177, 178

Ephesians 1:1 2:2, 6:12 3:16 4:10 5:25–32

105n26 26 100 84n50 140

Philippians 2:6–7 3:20 4:13

67, 74, 85, 149 70 90

Colossians 1:15 1:16 2:15 2:23 3:4 3:9 3:10

59n60, 78 25, 26 26 23n6 26n20 141 143

2 Timothy 2:20–21

23

Titus 1:9 1:14

44n17 69n13

Hebrews 1:3

26n21, 27

1 Peter 2:22

59n60, 85

1 John 2:2 2:12–14 3:2 3:21

57 29 45, 102, 166, 170 87n55

Ancient Authors Ambrose of Milan

7.211–214

136–139, 146

Commentary on Luke 1.14, 3.3, 4.28,31, 6.69, 8.81,95 137

Commentary on Psalm 118 5 153n10 10 137n21, 153n10

234

Index of References

13–15 22

137 14n19

Contra Iulianum 1.5.15

De Cain et Abel 1.2

136

De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII 31 115

De Fide 1.4.32

89

De Genesi ad litteram 1.18.36 15

De Noe et Arca 25.92

163

De Haeresibus 80

150

157

De Officiis Ministrorum 1.7.24 115

De Libero Arbitrio Book 3 139

Hexaemeron 5.15.52, 6.8.44–46 137

De Musica Book 6

139

Other Commentaries on Psalms 1, 37, 43, 61 137n18

Homilies on John 67

187

Letters 82 222

115n24 157

Sermons 343

187

Ambrosiaster Commentary on the Pauline Epistles 1Cor 146n53, 187 Gal 146n53 Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti 21, 45, 106 145n50 81 145, 146, 189 101, 115 146n54

Basil of Caesarea Homilies Attende tibi

Aristotle De Partibus Animalium 4.10.686–687 152 Arnobius of Sicca Against the Pagans 1.65 2.9 2.15–19, 47–48 2.44 2.64–65 3.27

132n4 115n26 132 133 132n4, 133, 144n46 134n11

Augustine of Hippo Contra Epistolam Manichaei quam vocant Fundamenti 37.43 139n30

Destruam horrea On Envy On Faith On Proverbs

12, 13, 17, 20–22, 28n27, 39, 153, 166n30 13 12 12–14, 20, 89 12, 13

Homilies on the Hexaemeron 2, 3 15 6 152 9 15, 22, 152, 153 Letters 46 52, 214, 236 262

14 15 22n2

On the Holy Spirit 16.39 168n39

235

Index of References Cassiodorus Commentary on Psalms ad 48:13 154n15 De Anima 4, 5, 9, 10 Institutiones 1.1

154 15

Cicero

Orator 70–71

117

Pro Murena 24 110–112 Clement of Alexandria Stromata 2.21 2.22 5.12 5.14 6.2–4 7.1 7.14

123 166 76 98, 163 98 68n11 144

Brutus 151–153

112

De Finibus 3.20, 5.20

116

De Inventione 2.160 2.166

Protrepticus 98

99

186 110, 111, 115

Codex Theodosianus

16, 28, 62, 63

De Legibus 1.23–25 1.29–30

122 118, 121

Didymus the Blind

De Natura Deorum 1.39 122 De Officiis 1.1–7 1.11–15 1.42 1.93–104 1.105–107

Commentary on Genesis ad 1:26 167, 169 Diodore of Tarsus

1.108–114 1.130, 2.45 3.7 3.35

114, 116 116–118 186 117 7, 8, 95, 109, 112, 114n15, 117–126, 190, 195, 197, 201 119, 126 114 109 116

De Oratore 1.34

110

Familiares 1.8, 10.3 2.5 2.9, 3.10 4.14 10.6

110 112n10 111n4 113 110–113

Commentary on Genesis ad 2:7 163 Epictetus Discourses 1.2,3,6,9,12,14

123, 124

Epiphanius Ancoratus 55–57

168n38

Panarion 64 70, 76

157, 161, 179, 180 168

Eusebius of Caesarea Commentary on Isaiah 2.39 188

236

Index of References

Ecclesiastical Theology 1.20 13n17 3.5 164n26 History of the Church 8.5 18–21, 33 Praeparatio Evangelica 7.18, 15.11 188 Eusebius of Emesa

162n24, 170n47 171, 187 163, 168, 170, 174 159n11

Fulgentius Mythologies 2.14

14

Gregory of Elvira

Commentary on Galatians ad 4:18 178 Evagrius Ponticus Kephalaia Gnostika 3.28 162 Letter to Melania

148 150 152 153

167

Filastrius of Brescia Diversarum Hereseon Liber 7, 105, 139 158 26 158, 160 64, 127 165n28 66 164, 165n28 67 162 82, 89 170, 171n52, 187 88 160 97 158, 162, 167n35, 170 98 146, 163, 164, 166, 170, 171 99 158n8, 160–162 100 158, 161, 167n35 107 171n49 109 165, 167 110 165, 171n51 111 147n56, 165 112 160, 165 115, 129, 135 165 124 158, 171n51 125 165, 171 126 158, 167n35 128 159, 160 134 159, 171n51 137 164–171 141 159, 166

Commentary on the Song of Songs 1.1 140 1.30 140, 141 2.15–21,31 141 Gregory of Nazianzus Orations 1 2 6 14 16

17 19 24 26 33 38 39 41 45

150n2 12, 14, 15, 20, 28n27, 31, 33, 40n6 12n12, 13, 14, 33 151 4, 12, 14, 20, 31, 146, 151, 152, 155, 156, 170 12n12 15nn26;27, 150, 151 152n8 12n12, 33 151n4 12, 31 12n12, 13n15, 14, 20 13, 28 15

Gregory of Nyssa Catechetical Oration De Opificio Hominis

13n17, 154 16, 106, 153–155, 201

237

Index of References Hilary of Poitiers Commentaries on Psalms 64, 132 187 118 4, 106, 134–136, 139, 142, 146 De Trinitate 2.27

89

Irenaeus of Lyon Against Heresies 1.1–8 5.6 5.12

61 167 164

Jerome Commentaries on Pauline Epistles Gal 173, 177 Eph 173, 174n7 Titus 174n7, 189n66 Commentaries on the Twelve Prophets Hos 173, 174n7, 176n20, 181 Amos 175n12, 183, 184, 186 Jonah 182, 183, 186, 192 Mic 173, 176n20 Hab 176, 190 Zeph 175, 176nn15;20 Zech 173, 174, 176nn19;20, 178 Mal 173–175 Commentary on Daniel ad 2:11 174n7, 176 ad 5:18, 10:1 174n7 ad 4:23 180 ad 6:20, 11:37 175 ad 8:17 178, 192 Commentary on Ecclesiastes ad 1:1 174n7 ad 3:18–21 139n32, 189, 190, 192–194 ad 10:4–5 176 Commentary on Ezekiel Book 5 175, 181

Books 7, 13 Book 8 Book 9 Book 11

174n7 176n20 168, 174n7 105n25, 175, 190– 192 Book 14 175 Commentary on Isaiah praef. 173 Books 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 17, 18 174n7 Books 6, 15 176 Book 14 4, 146, 188–194 Commentary on Jeremiah Book 1 175n13 Book 2 176n20 Book 3 17, 174n7, 176n15 Book 4 174n7, 175 Commentary on Matthew praef. 173 Book 1 174n7 Book 2 179 Book 3 175, 195 Book 4 175 Homilies on Psalms 14 176n15, 181 78, 93ser.alt. 179 81 136, 181, 193, 194 88ser.alt., 89 179n34, 180 89ser.alt. 174n7, 189–194 92ser.alt., 108, 115, 133 174n7 98, 100 176n15 Letters 3, 60, 74, 77, 105 108, 125, 130 5 12 14, 23, 120 22 28 40, 66 48–50 51 52 58 61

174n7 134 174n7, 175n9 176 176, 187 191 175 183 161, 168n38, 180, 181 115n24 115n22 174

238 69, 79 75 84 93, 96 98 124

Polemical Works Jo.Hier. Jov. Lucif., Vigil. Pelag. Ruf. 1

Index of References 174n7, 176n15 178n29 183n45 181 162, 179 66n3, 104, 160, 180, 181, 185n50, 193, 195 175, 179 174n7, 176n15, 179n33, 183 174n7 175n9, 189n66 115n23, 174n7, 179

Justin Martyr First Apology 59–60

98

Lactantius De Ira Dei 14

153

De Opificio Dei 8

153

Divinae Institutiones 3.29, 6.4 115 6.10 144 7.5 189n68 Marcus Aurelius Meditations 10.8

123

Marius Victorinus Against Arius 1.20

168, 169

Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam 16 176n18 Methodius of Olympus Symposium 1.4

168

Origen Against Celsus 1.9 1.64 2.29 2.76 3.28 3.30, 8.75 3.39 3.41, 5.39, 6.79 3.44–49 3.56, 4.26, 6.45 3.65–69 4.14–16 4.29 4.30 4.45, 6.73 4.74–99 5.18, 7.32 6.1–2 6.17 6.63–69 7.14–17 7.37 7.41 7.42 7.51 8.13 8.30 8.72

55 122 114 73n23 7 40n4 79n40 84n50 44n17, 79–82 84n51 126n54 85, 86 60n65 46 176n17 104, 122, 132, 158 82 78, 79, 82, 124 78, 81 99n8, 100 7, 82–85 72 79 76–78, 82, 88, 92, 93 124 14n18 12n12 185

Commentary on John 1.17.104–105 99n8 1.31.217 29 1.32.231 99n8 1.32.235 48 1.34.244–246 80 1.37.267–275 102n18 2.23.144–148 99n6 6.11.68 84n51 10.45.316–317 99n6 13.23.140–144 164n25 13.28.167 99, 143 13.36.233–234 99n8 13.50.331 99n5 13.58.396 18 20.8.54 61 20.17.135 84n51

239

Index of References 20.17.148,22.183 28.23.209 32.3.28–31 32.4.49 32.11.127 32.12.133 32.28.353

50 19 56n55 88n58 6n23 19 28

Commentary on Matthew 14.7 84n50 15.31 50n35 15.35 18 16.8 42n13 17.2 62, 63 17.27 100 Commentary on Matthew (series) 8 54 35 29n31, 66n5 61 18, 50, 51 62 27n25, 50–57 70 52 Commentary on Romans praef. 11n1 1.1, 10.37 24n9 1.18 26n19, 32n37 1.19, 2.13 100 2.2 23, 55n52 2.5 23, 27, 28 2.7 11n3 2.8 138n25 2.14 68 3.5 25, 26n19 3.8 59, 84n50 4.1 25 4.5 50 4.8 27 4.9 176n17 5.1 24nn9;10, 26n19, 54, 61, 191 5.2 54 5.3 24n10, 57n56 5.7 24n10 5.8 24n9 5.10 24, 26n19, 32n38, 80, 82, 185 6.1,3,4, 7.8 24n12 6.5 55 6.6 176n17

6.7 6.9 6.13 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.12–13, 10.15 7.16 7.17 8.7 8.8 8.11 9.3 9.7,42, 10.7–8 9.15 9.25–28 9.30 9.36 10.12,17 10.39

25n16, 26n19 23, 24n10, 44n19 11n2 23n6, 52 24, 25, 50–57 27, 100 44n19, 57 23, 41 84n50, 102 26n19 24n12, 159 23n6, 24n9 32n39 24n12, 65n2 24n12, 58, 61, 63 24n12 23n6 23n7 25 62 25 23 122

Commentary on the Song of Songs praef. 12, 100n11 2.1.4; 2.5.2,15 34 2.4.19 32n37 2.5.34 11n3 3.4.19 12 3.9.4–10 71, 72 Fr.Cant. 34, 84 De Oratione 5, 14, 15, 18 23 25 De Principiis praef. 1.1 1.2

1.3 1.4

14n18 70 24n10 23, 24n12, 26n22, 33, 66n3, 71, 73, 80 26n21, 68n10, 70, 71, 77n35 13, 26n21, 31, 75, 80n44, 81, 99n8, 165n28 7, 30n34, 33, 66n3, 68, 80, 81, 103, 164 59n62

240 1.5

1.6

1.7 1.8

2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8

2.9

2.10 2.11

3.1

3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

3.6

Index of References 23, 25–27, 32, 33, 61, 62, 106, 179, 180n37 25n17, 31, 32, 49, 56, 58–60, 92, 180n37, 184 25n17, 26n20, 31 24n12, 25, 26n19, 58, 61, 62, 80, 104, 105, 179, 184 31, 30n34, 31, 50n35 24n12, 30n34, 32n37, 50n35 68 68, 176n17 25n17, 26n21, 84n50 126n54 26n19, 30–33, 59n62, 101, 105, 160–162, 185n51 23, 25n17, 26n20, 60, 61, 63n70, 80, 185 26, 27, 33, 65n2, 100 26n19, 39, 40, 57n56, 63n70, 185n50 5, 11, 12, 23, 24, 26n19, 32n39, 59n62, 60n66, 63n70, 87n55, 90n67, 91n69, 123n48, 159, 160n13, 176n17, 180n37 23, 24nn9;12, 26n19, 188 26n21 26n19, 32 26nn20;21, 32, 48, 49n33, 50n35, 55, 59, 65n2, 185n51 2–4, 5n15, 7, 8, 24n10, 26, 27, 30n34, 31–34, 36, 37, 45–50, 53, 55–

4.1 4.2 4.3

4.4

59, 77, 91, 95–109, 121–129, 136, 142, 146, 147, 151, 152, 155, 156, 164, 166– 172, 178, 182–194, 198–201 11, 24 11, 12, 26n21, 72 11, 25n17, 26nn19;20;21, 65n2, 68n10, 69, 75, 185n50 13n14, 24n9, 25n17, 26n20, 47n27, 104, 122, 123

Dialogue with Heraclides 12, 23 100 Exhortation to Martyrdom 12 100n9 Homilies on Exodus 9 65n2 Homilies on Ezekiel 3 191 5 42, 43 6 83 7 34, 35, 100n9 9 21, 43 10 30n34 13 46, 50, 100 Homilies on Genesis 1 70, 74, 81, 93, 99n8, 100, 105n25, 188 2 154n12 4 138n25 5 30n34 13 105n25 16 32, 33 Fr.Gen. 87n56, 100, 103n20 Homilies on Isaiah 1 2 3 4

91 66 6n23, 29n33 75

241

Index of References 6

21, 42, 51

Homilies on Jeremiah 1 12n9, 14, 17, 19, 20, 67 2 99, 100n9, 105n25 11 12n9, 17, 20, 43, 44 12 12n9, 16, 17, 20, 21, 25, 69n14 13 12n9 14 12n9, 17, 20, 22, 42 16 12n9, 88n58, 103n20 18 73, 89, 138n25 Fr.Jer. 138 Fr.Lam. 13 Homilies on Joshua 8, 25 56 10 32, 56n54 12 68 13 28 14 34n44 20 11 22 32n39 23 62 Homilies on Judges 2 33, 40 3 21, 40, 41 6 32 Homilies on Leviticus 2 103, 138n25 4 34n44 5 11, 65n2 6 17, 44 7 58 8 138n25 9 44n19 12 34n44, 44n19, 100n9 Homilies on Luke 8 17, 20 39 Fr.Luc.

100n9, 105n25 43 105n25 13n17, 138

Homilies on Numbers 1 56n54

9, 12 13 16 18 20 23 24 26 27 28

29 69n13 30n34 138n25 7 100n9, 103n20 100n9 66 74, 84n50, 185n50 56n54, 187

Homilies on Psalms Hom.15Ps. 1 99n6, 143 Hom.15Ps. 2 59n60, 84n50, 91n68 Hom.36Ps. 1 12, 22, 63, 177 Hom.36Ps. 2 6n23, 7, 12, 13, 58n58 Hom.36Ps. 3, 4 12 Hom.37Ps. 2 88 Hom.38Ps. 2 99n8, 105n25 Hom.67Ps. 1 41n10, 51n38, 86– 92 Hom.67Ps. 2 90n64 Hom.73Ps. 3 143 Hom.77Ps. 1 67 Hom.77Ps. 6 99n8 Hom.77Ps. 8 35, 46, 100n9 Hom.77Ps. 9 89–92 Fr.Ps. 105n25, 106n29, 191, 192 Homilies on the Song of Songs 1 34, 85, 140 2 66n5 Philocalia 1 23 27

67n8 160n14 87

Nemesius of Emesa De Natura Hominis 15 115n26 Paulinus of Nola Letters 24 124

169, 170 115n24

242

Index of References

Philo of Alexandria De Aeternitate Mundi 76 123 De Confusione Linguarum 147 99 De Somniis 1.31

Pamphili Apologia pro Origene 16 22 Seneca Letter 82 to Lucilius

176n18

Tatian 161n18

Oratio ad Graecos 31–41 98

Plato Tertullian

Laws 4.716bc

123

Parmenides 129a–132c

123

Theaetetus 176b

97, 123, 166

Timaeus 28c

76–78

Plotinus Enneads 5.1–2

161n17

Plutarch De Fraterno Amore 478de 153 Priscianus Institutiones Grammaticae 18.1 14 Rufinus Apology Against Jerome 2.22–25 138, 173 2.35 134 Basilii Regula 79

18

Clementis Romanis Recognitiones 1.46 18

Apologeticum 1 18

142 147n56

De Anima 3–4 14

163 115n26

De Baptismo 5

168

De Idololatria 17–18

45

De Resurrectione 5, 10, 44

131n1

De Spectaculis 12

45

Exhortation to Chastity 1 168 Theophilus of Antioch To Autolycus 1.14 2.18

98 135

Zeno of Verona Treatises 1.27, 2.30 1.36 2.4 2.29

141 143 141, 142 141–144, 146

Index of Modern Authors Albano, Emmanuel 75 Alesse, Francesca 117n32, 123n48, 124n50 Arruzza, Cinzia 59n62, 76

Lekkas, Georgios 59 Lettieri, Gaetano 4, 6n17, 34n42, 102n14 Lo Cicero, Carla 11n4, 18n37, 115n27

Berglund, Carl Johan 61 Blosser, Benjamin 161n17, 185n51, 188n61

Machek, David 119n38, 124 Maric, Lazar 120 Markschies, Christoph 71n18, 73n24, 100n10, 138n23, 162n21, 167n36 Martens, Peter 60n63, 70n17, 72, 84n52 Matz, Brian 150 McCrudden, Christopher 2 McEachnie, Robert 142n39, 144nn45;47, 157n2 Milad, Corine 74 Minkova, Milena 111 Mitchell, Hannah 110, 111

Caruso, Giuseppe 5n16, 151n6, 162n22, 183n46 Clark, Elizabeth 173n2, 174n4, 181, 183n46 Corsato, Celestino 137n20, 138 Daley, Brian 181n40, 187n56 De Cock, Miriam 51n38, 90n64 Dively Lauro, Elizabeth 65, 66, 69, 74n27, 75n29 Fernández, Samuel 6n22, 13n16, 55n52, 56, 68n11, 71n19, 83, 84n52, 101n12, 180n37, 185 Fürst, Alfons 5 Gill, Christopher 124 Grappone, Antonio 7n26, 11nn4;5, 41nn9;11, 60n63 Griffin, Miriam 1, 4n11, 19n39, 116n30, 118n36 Großmann, Andreas 4, 14n20 Hanson, Richard 73 Heine, Ronald 41n10, 53, 54 Hunter, David 145, 161n19, 178n26 Jacobsen, Anders-Christian 6n17, 84n52

Norelli, Enrico 61, 68n12 Pace, Nicola 59, 180n37 Pålsson, Katarina 56n54, 183n46, 184, 189n64 Perrone, Lorenzo 41n10, 87n55, 88n59, 90nn64;66, 91nn68;73, 189n67 Pollmann, Karla 19n39, 34n42 Prinzivalli, Emanuela 6n18, 11n7, 27n24, 48, 53, 56n54, 68n11, 105n25, 173n2 Ramelli, Ilaria 16n28, 68n11, 139n31, 162n22, 181n40 Sensen, Oliver 1, 4n11, 118 Sgreva, Gianni 141, 142n42 Sheridan, Mark 7n25, 65n1 Shuve, Karl 140

244

Index of Modern Authors

Simonetti, Manlio 6n18, 53nn45;48, 61, 67nn7–9, 69n16, 79n40, 88n58, 89n62, 102nn14;18, 134n12, 157n3, 176n16 Solheid, John 5, 90n64 Somos, Róbert 76n32, 83n47, 102n18 Sytsma, Lee 47n28, 185n51 Szram, Mariusz 157n1, 161, 164n27

Thomas, Gabrielle 151 Torjesen, Karen 74 Volp, Ulrich 2, 3, 4n12, 28n26, 107n31, 118n33, 131n1, 132, 133, 143n43, 168nn37;40, 194n81

Index of Subjects Animals 3, 32, 104, 105, 116–122, 125, 131–133, 137, 152–155, 158, 189– 192 Apocatastasis 47–56, 63, 66n3, 102, 171, 180–187, 199 Arianism 18n38, 66n3, 89, 168, 193 Audience 4, 41, 53, 74, 78–82, 90n64 Baptism 140–145, 151, 168 Bride 34, 72, 84, 140, 141 Condescension 29, 65, 73–93, 107 Demons/Devil 24, 26, 32, 59, 60, 154, 165, 174, 180–184 Dignity – as office in the Church 14, 22, 42– 45, 51, 57, 174–176, 198 – as ranking in the afterlife 52–58, 171, 181–187, 199, 202 – as socio-political rank 1, 4, 16–19, 21, 22, 25, 28, 39–44, 81, 106, 110– 116, 142, 145, 146, 159, 175–177, 186, 195, 197, 198, 202, 203 – in modern times 1, 203 – in the Renaissance 5, 118 – of angels 15, 22, 25, 26, 32, 59–62, 92, 106, 154, 158, 159, 165, 166, 170, 171, 178–181, 192, 199 – of God 7, 65, 68–93, 109, 200 – of the image 7, 31–37, 45–47, 91, 95–109, 124–131, 133, 151–155, 165, 168–171, 183, 188, 189, 192– 194, 198–202 – of the Son 14, 65, 67, 89 – of the Spirit 23, 65, 66 – unstable 32–35, 61, 63, 64, 92, 103– 108, 112, 113, 120, 136–138, 156,

165–167, 170, 179, 185, 190, 191, 199–203 Fall of the Souls 30, 31, 56, 59, 60, 100, 101, 105, 133, 151, 160–162, 169, 174, 179, 180, 185, 199 Freedom of Choice 4–6, 24, 32, 50, 58, 59–63, 90, 92, 101–107, 133, 160, 180, 185, 186, 198–203 Freedom of Speech 86–89 Gnosticism 49, 58, 61, 62, 99, 126, 160, 180, 199 Imitation 42, 46, 60, 74, 79, 90, 102, 104, 168, 169, 177, 198 Immortality 103, 131–133, 145, 146, 162, 188–192, 201 Incarnation 6, 59, 74, 77, 78, 82–86, 89, 131, 150, 200 Inclusivity 73, 74, 78–82, 99, 126, 143, 144, 150, 151, 165, 202, 203 Inner Human 52, 100, 135, 137n21, 145, 167, 185 Jovinianism 183 Kinship between Rational Creatures and God 5, 6, 31, 68, 91, 102–104, 122, 123, 127, 132, 171, 200, 201 Literalism vs Spiritual Exegesis 39, 40, 65–76, 89–91, 93, 173, 174, 190 Marcionism 61, 68, 83n48 Mediation of Christ 46, 47, 78, 84, 88, 93, 101, 102, 159

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Index of Subjects

Novatianism 170, 184 Participation 6, 7, 27, 28, 42, 46n23, 57, 59, 60, 70, 78, 80, 84–86, 88, 91, 92, 101–105, 122, 123, 136, 167–170, 188, 198–202 Philanthropy 58n58, 77–93, 150, 160, 202, 203 Platonism 76–80, 97, 98, 123, 132, 161, 166

Progress from image to likeness 46, 47, 50, 98–107, 126, 127, 156, 164–171, 193, 194, 199 Resurrection 26, 27, 39, 55–57, 82, 131, 159, 174, 189, 191, 192 Succession of Worlds/Ages 50, 59, 182 Stoicism 3, 83, 84, 109, 114–118, 121– 124, 161, 176