How Think Tanks Shape Social Development Policies 9780812209624

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How Think Tanks Shape Social Development Policies

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How Think Tanks Shape Social Development Policies

Edited by

James G. McGann, Anna Viden, and Jillian Rafferty

U N I V E R S I T Y O F P E N N S Y LVA N I A P R E S S PHIL A DELPHI A

Copyright  2014 University of Pennsylvania Press All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher. Published by University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112 www.upenn.edu/pennpress Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data How think tanks shape social development policies / edited by James G. McGann, Anna Viden, and Jillian Rafferty.—1st ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8122-4601-8 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Research institutes—Case studies. 2. Social planning—Research—Developing countries—Case studies. 3. Social policy—Research—Developing countries—Case studies. 4. Policy sciences—Research—Case studies. I. McGann, James G. II. Viden, Anna. III. Rafferty, Jillian. H97.H687

2014

303.44—dc23 2013047827

Contents

Preface ix Introduction: Social Development, Think Tanks, and Policy Advice 1 Part I. Education 63 1. Brookings Institution: The Case for Global Education 65 Rebecca Winthrop 2. CIPPEC: The Monitoring Project for the Law on Educational Funding 76 Florencia Mazzadra, Vanesa Weyrauch, and Marı´a Bele´n Sa´nchez Part II. Infrastructure 95 3. Centre for Public Policy (CPP): Indian Institute of Management Bangalore 97 Rajeev Gowda, Ashwin Mahesh, and Sridhar Pabbisetty 4. Centre for Policy Research (CPR): Reforming the Urban Transit System in Delhi 109 Partha Mukhopadhyay Part III. Environment and Sustainable Development 127 5. The Ecologic Institute and Its Influence on Policies in Germany and the EU 129 R. Andreas Kraemer

vi Contents

6. MISTRA: Configuring Research Teams to Realize Policy Influence 148 Mcebisi Ndletyana 7. Gulf Research Center (GRC): Promoting Social Development in the Arab Gulf Region 162 Christian Koch

Part IV. Economic Reform, Debt Crisis Management, and Economic Coordination 173 8. Bruegel: Creating Your Own Luck 175 Matt Dann 9. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): Shaping Development Policy in a Globalized World 185 Maria Monica Wihardja 10. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS): Reshaping China’s Development Strategy 200 He Fan 11. Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE): Think Tanks in the Era of Globalization 213 Marek Dabrowski 12. Korea Development Institute (KDI): Korean Service Sector Advancement 231 Oh-Seok Hyun

Part V. Agriculture and Land Development 247 13. Fundar and Subsidios al Campo: Farm Subsidy Policy in Mexico 249 Miguel Pulido and Francisco Cravioto 14. Ethiopian Economics Association: Stories of Social and Economic Policy Influence 262 Assefa Admassie

Contents vii

15. CRESS: The Grassroots Perspective and Policymaking 271 Wang Xiaoyi

Part VI. Poverty Alleviation 287 16. African Economic Research Consortium (AERC): Shaping the Policymaking Process and Its Outcomes 289 William Lyakurwa 17. Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA): Think Tanks and Social Development Policy in Tanzania 299 Samuel Wangwe

Part VII. Social Policy 307 18. Center for American Progress: Importing Social Impact Bonds 309 Jitinder Kohli and Kristina Costa 19. Carnegie Moscow Center: Russia’s Social Development— A Continuing Story 322 Dmitri Trenin 20. Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas and PRONASCI: A Study of Brazilian Think Tanks 333 Celso Castro, Elena Lazarou, and Marco Aurelio Ruediger Conclusion: Recommendations for Think Tanks and Policymakers 343 Contributors 351 Index 353 Acknowledgments 371

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Preface

This book is an outgrowth of the research conducted by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) at the International Relations Program, University of Pennsylvania, on the role policy institutes play in governments and civil societies around the world. The program maintains a database and network of over 6,600 think tanks in 152 countries. Often referred to as the ‘‘think tanks’ think tank,’’ TTCSP examines the evolving role and character of public policy research organizations. Over the last twenty-five years, the program has developed and led a series of global initiatives that have helped bridge the gap between knowledge and policy in critical areas such as international peace and security, globalization and governance, international economics, environmental issues, information and society, poverty alleviation, and health care and global health. These international collaborative efforts are designed to establish regional and international networks of policy institutes and communities that improve policymaking while strengthening democratic institutions and civil societies around the world. The program works with leading scholars and practitioners from think tanks and universities in a variety of collaborative efforts. TTCSP produces the annual Global Go To Think Tank Index, which ranks the world’s leading think tanks in a variety of categories. This is achieved with the help of a panel of over 1,900 peer institutions and experts from the print and electronic media, academia, public and private donor institutions, and governments around the world. TTCSP has strong relationships with leading think tanks around the world, and its annual Think Tank Index is used by academics, journalists, donors, and the public to locate and connect with the leading centers of public policy research around the world. The program’s goal is to increase the profile and performance of think tanks and raise public awareness of the important role think tanks play in governments and civil societies around the globe.

x Preface

Since its inception in 1989, TTCSP has focused on collecting data and conducting research on think tank trends and the role think tanks play as civil society actors in the policymaking process. In 2007, TTCSP developed and launched the global index of think tanks, which identifies and recognizes centers of excellence in all the major areas of public policy research and in every region of the world. To date, TTSCP has provided technical assistance and capacity building programs in eighty-one countries. The program is now working to create regional and global networks of think tanks in an effort to facilitate collaboration and the production of a modest yet achievable set of global public goods. Our goal is to create lasting institutional and state-level partnerships by engaging and mobilizing think tanks that have demonstrated their ability to produce high-quality policy research and shape popular and elite opinion and actions for public good. The Think Tanks and Social Development Case Studies Project is an outgrowth of a conference of think tanks in the G20 countries1 cosponsored by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program. The publication project is underwritten by a generous grant from the New Ventures Fund, which is supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. At its outset, the main objective for this G20 Think Tanks and Social Development Project was to engage think tanks, policymakers, and other stakeholders in a peer-to-peer dialogue, knowledge exchange, and capacity building endeavor focused on global development policies. Throughout its evolution, the project has embraced and sought to advance the objectives of global development by improving the awareness and capacity of think tanks in the G20 countries on issues related to agricultural development, water sanitation and hygiene, financial inclusion, and global access to technology. Our broader objective is to build partnerships across regions and sectors for the promotion of global development, especially among the countries in the Southern Hemisphere. The culmination of the project was the production of a number of case studies that explore the role think tanks have played in shaping social development policies at the national, regional, and global levels. The focus on social development—rather than development more generally—was an intentional limitation, imposed in an effort to zero in on a set of policy priorities and research that typically are overshadowed by discussions of economic and sustainable development. The case studies, each produced by a leading scholar at a G20 think tank, fall in one of four broad thematic

Preface xi

areas and demonstrate the think tank’s impact on a policy associated with social development. The cases are crafted such that they might illustrate how the strategy and structure of the think tank contributed to its ability to affect a specific policy issue—thereby simultaneously bringing both the nature of successful think tanks and progress and social development policy to the forefront. In the long run we hope the activities associated with this project will contribute to: (1) an improvement in the quality and quantity of resources for national and global development; (2) the promotion and support of the use of high-quality domestic policy research to create budgets and inform policies in developing countries; (3) the strengthening of the network of the policy, advocacy, and media communities working on resources for development; (4) the betterment of the quality and impact of global and domestic campaigns that can bring more and better resources to development; and (5) the building up of the policy and advocacy communities in areas related to agricultural development and water, sanitation and hygiene, financial inclusion, and global libraries.

Note 1. The Group of 20, or G20, is an association of the twenty largest economies in the world: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

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Introduction: Social Development, Think Tanks, and Policy Advice

Governments, developmental organizations, and individuals are closer than ever before to a consensus about the appropriate strategy to development. This is attributable to the recent and ongoing crises that have exposed the depth of human insecurity and the inadequacy of reforms put in place over the past three decades to create sustainable and equitable growth, or to move poor countries and populations on to a stable development trajectory.1 The path leading to today’s consensus began in the years after World War II with a development strategy focused purely on economic growth. Increased output and growth maximization were thought to be the key components to a nation’s security and stability. Those who dissented, who argued that economic growth did not eliminate or minimize human suffering, because it failed to provide the most basic human rights and needs, lost out to the governments and organizations that supported the focus on economic growth. Those who sided with a social development trajectory, which focused on empowering and mobilizing the poor and closing the equality gap, were overruled by the stronger consensus of their time. Thus, the move to a social development strategy in recent decades, which now has governmental, organizational, and financial support, was not a smooth one. There was no clean evolution, with support for economic growth decreasing steadily over time in favor of a social focus. A number of scholars have examined this shift in thinking about development policy that has culminated in an increased emphasis on social development. John Friedman, in his book Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development, writes that, along with the social movements of the 1960s, there was an intellectual movement limited mainly to scholars

2 Introduction

and development professionals who fought for an alternative approach to the development of poor countries; the achievements of this movement were not won in the streets, but at international conferences held throughout the 1970s.2 These conferences included the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, which established the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) to help counteract environmental degradation. Two years later, in 1974, the Cocoyoc Seminar, convened in Mexico by UNEP and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, brought together professionals from all over the world who came to the conclusion that international development efforts were ineffective. In the seminar’s final report, the participants noted that ‘‘thirty years have passed since the signing of the United Nations Charter launched the effort to establish a new international order. Today, that order has reached a critical turning point. . . . It has proved impossible to meet the inner limits of satisfying fundamental human needs. On the contrary, more people are hungry, sick, shelterless and illiterate today than when the United Nations was first set up.’’3 The seminar helped important individuals in the world of development recognize the need for an alternative development strategy. Friedman shows how this tide continued to advance into 1975, when the Swedish Dag Hammarskjo¨ld Foundation published a pamphlet titled ‘‘What Now? Another Development,’’ which again challenged the focus on economic development. The push for an alternative social development in the 1970s concluded with the establishment in 1976 of the International Foundation for Development Alternatives in Switzerland, whose principal purpose was to launch the Third System Project.4 This project recognized that people can act as autonomous power centers that are distinct from the powers of the state and the market. The third system included those groups that serve the needs and interests of the people. Despite this strong tide of support, the dying social movements of the 1960s, along with modernization and economic growth and a focus on market liberalization, negated the movement’s efforts. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development argues that a package of market-led liberalization reforms, initiated in the 1970s and applied to developing countries through the structural adjustment and stabilization programs of the 1980s, imposed heavy costs on the poorest countries and peoples, leading much of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa to a ‘‘lost decade’’ of development.5 The neoliberalism initiated in the 1970s opened the financial credit market, with funds flowing from the

Introduction 3

United States and Europe to developing countries throughout the decade. These loans, invested in the receiving nations’ economies, were thought to spur economic growth by developing export economies. However, funds were now flowing from poor to rich countries as lender nations collected money from the steep interest rates that were imposed. When credit institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) requested repayments on the loans, the burden of repayment proved too steep for poor countries, and an international debt crisis ensued. To ensure that receiving nations allowed for market liberalization, the IMF required countries to carry out structural adjustment programs geared toward the requirements of a recently rediscovered neoliberal economic doctrine in order to qualify for loans.6 Such requirements included deregulation, privatization, and promotion of export production. In the end, the developed countries’ enforcement of economic liberalism on the developing world for the purpose of development led only to debt, unemployment, and civil unrest. Compounding this was a shift, beginning in the 1980s, that saw governments limit the scope of social provision in the developing world. In Thandika Mkandawire’s terminology, the shift was from universalism—a country’s entire population is the beneficiary of social benefits as a basic right—to targeting, which used a form of means testing to determine the ‘‘truly deserving.’’7 This shift was concurrent with the neoconservative ideology that grew ascendant in the 1980s, finding strong support in the Western world, including that of U.S. president Ronald Reagan and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher. The principles that became the new orthodoxy, including individual responsibility and a limited role of the state, coupled with the fiscal caution and limited spending of the decade, countered the movement for social development and empowerment of the poor. Despite the fact the world seemed to be moving in a different direction, the movement for social development remained alive. In addition to more landmark conferences and publications in the 1980s, including the United Nations’ appointment of the World Commission on Environment and Development and the publication of the Brundtland Report, which stimulated renewed discussion of alternative modes to development, Friedman shows that proponents of social development began pushing for social development outside established institutions.8 There are various explanatory frameworks for development. The main theme that can be derived from the literature that critiques these frameworks is that in many cases

4 Introduction

increasing economic productivity can improve social welfare, but it ‘‘cannot be achieved without significant investments in health, education, and training of people.’’9 In 1984, social development proponents began to meet annually for what they called ‘‘The Other Economic Summit,’’ at which they debated topics such as ‘‘the international economic disorder,’’ ‘‘putting people first,’’ ‘‘in search of self-reliance,’’ ‘‘working like women,’’ and ‘‘local economic regeneration.’’10 Over the next few years, these efforts began to shake mainstream institutions, gaining the support of governments and developmental organizations alike. As the world transitioned to the twenty-first century, the establishment of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, the recent economic crisis, and the widespread recognition of the need for sustainable social growth to remedy the lack of basic human needs in many regions of the world have led to the strongest consensus yet in support of social development.

Social Development: Main Theoretical Concepts Social development is an especially broad topic, and the definition presented here will be equally broad in order to properly convey the full breadth of social development practice. The major sectors of social development are dissimilar—agriculture, criminal justice, defense, environment, health, human rights, and social services.11 We will not examine the individual sectors in detail here, though they may be addressed in the regional discussions in which they are prominent issues. Most broadly, ‘‘social development’’ refers to the processes that lead to ‘‘improvements in human well-being’’ and progress toward desirable social goals.12 It is a ‘‘movement, a practice, and a perspective’’ concerned with helping people to ‘‘realize the fullness of the social, political, and economic potentials that already exist within them.’’13 Unlike economic development, the primary focus of social development is the human element.14 Social development aims to help people by pursuing three overarching goals. First, practitioners work to create inclusive institutions: those that allow the people to participate and to have equal access to opportunities. They also endeavor to generate cohesive societies in which all population groups work together to solve problems. Finally, social development works to ensure

Introduction 5

that institutions are accountable; that is, they respond to the public interest in an efficient and effective manner.15 Social development is a multidisciplinary field that reaches ‘‘across all geopolitical borders and . . . all levels of social, political, and economic organization.’’16 Richard Estes outlines the eight specific levels in which social development can function: ‘‘individual empowerment; group empowerment; conflict resolution; institution-building; community-building; nation-building; region-building; and world-building.’’17 Social development operates on a set of assumptions that, together, give special importance to its practice. Estes identifies the most important of these assumptions. Practitioners commonly believe that the events occurring in other regions of the world have direct consequences on quality of life in all other regions of the world, thereby classifying social development not solely as a regional issue but also a global one. They also believe that human degradation has underlying causes in social, political, and economic factors that are international in nature. Moreover, peaceful coexistence is necessary for any meaningful advancement in social development, and given the current circumstances, the need to restructure the national and international social order is urgent.18 In sum, social development is the practice that aims to empower people in every region, and it does so largely through the means of transforming institutions, particularly those that define relationships between actors.

The General Goals and Values of Social Development As solutions to leading social policy issues continue to evade the minds of policymakers, the goal of social development is to provide a platform for world leaders, policymakers, and think tanks to enhance the living conditions of the millions of impoverished persons worldwide. The focus on the social dimension of development is to aid members of societies plagued by gender inequality, extreme poverty, or human rights violations. The global economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 caused poorer countries especially to spiral into deeper political, economic, and social turmoil. As a result policymakers advanced socioeconomic issues to the forefront of policy. In the 1990s, in comparison to the present, the areas social development focused on—to a greater extent—included ethnic conflicts and rebuilding war-torn

6 Introduction

societies. Hence, social policy will shift priorities to address problems that harm the most vulnerable. The paramount goal of social development is to ensure social sustainability by creating, improving, and preserving social cohesion.19 At the core of social development is the belief that the international community, in collaboration with world governments, can improve the conditions in which many are forced to live, by creating innovative policies that promote security, democracy, human rights, and gender equality. Additionally, policymakers use social development as a means of aiding the United Nations millennium goals, via measures aimed at reducing the ramifications of social problems. Another goal of social development is to rectify urgent issues like the vast amount of money governments provide financial institutions in comparison to the amounts allocated to combat poverty. Social development’s goal of promoting social equity requires world leaders, policymakers, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to develop multidisciplinary research for contemporary problems. Effective social development policies are contingent on an understanding of both the social and political circumstances of contemporary times whereby such knowledge can be used to construct methodologies for normative social policies.20 In order to create effective social development policies, these key players must set policy priorities, as well as commit to focusing on development, eliminating poverty, and responding to the needs of the most vulnerable. Thus, social development’s goals require the support, advocacy, and partnership of all key players in the international community. While the definition of social development can be elusive, the Development Working Group of the G20 is meant to provide some cohesion on the issue of development. At the 2012 G20 Summit held in Los Cabos, Mexico, the Development Working Group asserted: We recognize the impact that the modest global recovery might have on developing countries, particularly Low Income Countries . . . , in addressing the most pressing challenges of development and poverty reduction, including the fulfillment of the UN Millennium Development Goals. Promoting sustainable development and eradicating poverty by ensuring sustainable economic growth and decent job creation, therefore, remain key challenges for the G20. In order to meet these challenges, we need to adopt the right economic policies

Introduction 7

and appropriate coherent and large-scale actions that boost growth in a manner that is inclusive, sustained and environmentally sustainable, in order to benefit present and future generations. The G20 considers social dimensions separate factors of development rather than necessary preliminary initiatives for all other development. These leaders still maintain a focus on economic development as a means to achieving development on a larger scale. In the UN Millennium Goals, issues of social development are mentioned as steps to be taken after economic development has occurred.

Defining Think Tanks and Their Role in Social Development As social development emerges, however, it is coming to be seen not just as a supplement, a necessary partner to economic development, but as a project in itself. As a result, more resources are being dedicated to social development by major international organizations, the G20 governments, and the think tanks in G20 countries and it is at the forefront of discussion on development. Yet even as the G20 countries and think tanks in that bloc treat social development as a goal in itself, no official channel of cooperation has been established to exchange information and to bridge the gap between the approach and perceptions of the G20 and the major think tanks. It is important to concede that no government alone and no single institution can individually manage a tremendous amount of data, influence domestic as well as international policy, and take action on its own. The lack of resources, the ubiquitous presence of misunderstanding, and the variety of economic and political interests demand more comprehensive cooperation and integration of G20 as an entity and think tanks into the development momentum. Just as the definition of social development can be elusive, so too can the meaning of ‘‘think tank.’’ Indeed, the most agreed upon characteristic of ‘‘think tank’’ seems to be the elusiveness of its etymology. To Thomas Medvetz, it is a ‘‘murky object’’ that is difficult to nail down precisely.21 Simon James, too, posits that the ‘‘discussion of think tanks . . . often degenerates into futile semantics.’’22 Indeed, the majority of scholars in the literature, from the initial inquiries of Harold Orlans and Paul Dickson to

8 Introduction

the present-day coverage of the think tank domain, attempt to tackle this difficulty, in varying degrees of detail.23 These attempts can be categorized.24 Some offer a broad definition, an approach that often avoids engagement with the significant points of contention and is subsequently reductive and averts any attempt to provide a cohesive definition. Medvetz comments that these scholars ‘‘gesture towards both sides of the dilemma . . . then step backwards to acknowledge the concept’s slippery, mutable, fuzzy nature.’’25 An futile pursuit in most cases, such a treatment essentially amounts to a retreat to the ‘‘murky political folk notion’’ that was started with.26 We can call this the minimalist school approach, a school in which the majority of the literature falls. To Diane Stone, such definitions allow researchers considerable flexibility in application, but can be too broad and encompassing.27 However, some continue their pursuit of a more precise definition and attempt to provide a narrower one. At this point, a definition emerges that is too narrow and ignores the diversity of think tanks, excluding a number of institutions commonly accorded the classification of ‘‘think tank.’’28 This narrower definition characterizes the parochialist school of thinking about think tanks. The third school of defining think tanks can be called the typologist approach, which accepts the difficulty of defining the term (indeed, just as those above do too), but proceeds to wrestle with the points of contention until it apprehends a notion of ‘‘think tank’’ that is as universal and portable as possible. These scholars consider an absolute definition elusive because of these points of disagreement and obscurity. During the fifty years that the body of literature grappling with the etymology of ‘‘think tank’’ has existed, there has been a gradual development of a broad definition that identifies a number of core institutional characteristics on which there is a consensus. Even on a broad level, however, attempts to define or categorize think tanks immediately start a debate over the meaning of basic terms such as ‘‘public policy research,’’ ‘‘think tank,’’ and ‘‘advocacy.’’ There is no wonder, then, that a struggle exists among think tanks concerning their role in the policymaking process; are they academics, advisors, or advocates? This debate reflects the inherent tension between the world of ideas and world of politics or the clash of academic and policy cultures. While there is a general consensus at the broadest level of scholarly attempts to define the term ‘‘think tank’’ (irrespective of the aforementioned debate), when scholars seek to refine the definition to a more specific level, a number of points of contention

Introduction 9

emerge, and these are the core loci of divergence in the literature. One is the notion of financial autonomy, and associated with this debate is one concerning whether think tanks practice the academic freedom and conduct the nonpartisan, objective research that they were associated with before World War II. Another is the now rather antiquated notion of ideological autonomy—are think tanks nonpartisan and institutions sans institutional policies? The debate over this notion is also inextricably related to the question of academic freedom. Such debates have a distinctly Anglo-American character and attempts to transfer past and present definitions of the term to other sociopolitical contexts have proved unworkable. The notion of independence as applicable to ‘‘think tank’’ is both contested in the AngloAmerican domain and in the global domain, albeit for different reasons. Questions of ideological affiliation or financial obligation are at the forefront of the Anglo-American debate, whereas the question of governmental affiliation is at the center of the global critique. A further difficulty surrounding the definition of the term arises because it carries ‘‘social consequence.’’29 If an institution is accorded the classification ‘‘think tank,’’ an aura of credibility and academic objectivity and a ‘‘cache of intellectual authority’’ are bestowed on it, accurately or otherwise, each of these perceptions contributing to a comparative advantage in the marketplace of ideas.30

The Historical Role of Think Tanks To understand the current status of the debate over the meaning of the term, one must follow the trajectory that the definition of ‘‘think tank’’ has taken over the past century. Doing so offers substantial insight into the confusion that seems to permeate the literature on the topic thus far.

The First Era (1830–1946) Like any concept, ‘‘think tank’’ has meant different things to different people at different times since its inauguration in 1830.31 During the first era—between 1830 and 1946—’’think tanks’’ were characterized as objective research organizations. According to Donald Abelson, few disagree that ‘‘think tank’’ once described nonpartisan, truly independent public policy

10 Introduction

research organizations. Dickson notes that think tanks advised the U.S. government in this way as early as the 1830s,32 with such institutions growing out of the intellectual and social movements of the nineteenth century.33 Although these institutions, like many modern ones, could survive only with the generosity of outside donors, their primary goal was not to actively ‘‘interfere’’ in the decision-making process but to provide a more passive source of nonpartisan, policy-primed advice.34 Such a nonideological stance was the by-product of an ‘‘avowedly apolitical mandate.’’35 The rise of think tanks during this period follows a trajectory similar to the emergence of the United States as a global leader, and various institutions of this character— the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1910), Kiel Institute for Economics (1914), Brookings Institution (1916), and Royal Institute for International Affairs (1920)—were established during the early twentieth century. Another less formal example existed during the winter of 1917– 1918 in the form of an assembly of prominent scholars, known as ‘‘The Inquiry,’’ which was organized around an exploration of U.S. options for postwar peace. The brainchild of Colonel Edward House, an advisor to President Woodrow Wilson, this group was a primary source of advice for the U.S. contingent at the Paris Peace Conference that ended World War I, and eventually joined with New York bankers, lawyers, and academics to establish the Council on Foreign Relations in 1921.36 This first generation institutionalized the link between the academics frequenting the various disciplines of the social sciences and policymakers in both Washington, a connection thus far only a tacit one, and the global domain, with this connection fostering international engagement. This rise created both a tool to be used to professionalize the government during the progressive era and a set of institutions that could satisfy the growing information imperative, the latter a force that continues to be the primary energy behind the proliferation of public policy research organizations today.37 The Second Era (1946–1970) The second era—beginning in 1946 and ending in 1970—was heavily influenced by the rise of Cold War tensions. While independent public policy research organizations had existed in the United States before the outbreak of World War I, the term ‘‘think tank’’ was initially employed in the United States during World War II to refer to a physically secure room or environment where expert defense industry, the various branches of the

Introduction 11

military, and civilian strategists discussed military plans.38 Though the term had been associated with human intelligence prior to this military-specific usage (it was coined in 1900 as a flippant colloquialism for the brain) the immediate post–World War II period saw its association with institutionalized intelligence engaging in research activity and producing policy or strategy-primed advice. This second generation of think tanks could be classified as ‘‘contract-researchers,’’39 since they received generous and direct legal, financial, and administrative support from the U.S. government. This compelled them to allocate resources to scientists and researchers, which was symptomatic of their involvement in the Cold War. The Rand Corporation (1948) is a paradigmatic example of the nature of think tanks during this period and an institution that played a core role in the formulation of defense policy.40 Institutions were also established during this era separate from military preoccupations. They include the ‘‘generalpurpose’’ American Enterprise Institute (1943) and the Institute for Policy Studies (1963), operating from a perspective that it called ‘‘existential pragmatism.’’41 On this note, David Ricci contends that the emergence of partisanship in the think tank domain began during the 1960s as a result of the flourish of liberalism, manifest in the Institute for Policy Studies, and the conservative response in the 1970s.42 Indeed, the notion of think tanks as truly independent, public policy research organizations appears naı¨ve in the presence of this dynamic. The Third Era (1970–1994) Finally, the third historical era of think tank development, occurring between 1971 and 1994, was characterized by an influx of both freedom and partisanship. Scholarly inquiry into the meaning of ‘‘think tank’’ is a distinctly post–World War II pursuit: these institutions were accorded negligible scholarly attention before then. During the latter part of this era, academia began to acknowledge the emergence of a knowledge-value society from a previously industrial one. Value came to be treated as a consequence of information and analysis generated by humankind, and, in turn, these inputs of human intelligence were recognized as the cornerstone of modern society. Hence, think tanks, seen as factories producing this intellectual value, began to harness the interest of not only their two main consumers, policymakers and the media, but also scholars. Thus, the third generation of think tanks emerged during a period when scholarly attention

12 Introduction

to the phenomenon first materialized. That being said, the only consistency that emerged was the susceptibility of the scholars to minimalism or parochialism, this disposition shrouding the term with an alarming obscurity. In the 1960s Bill Baroody, Sr., president of the American Enterprise Institute, issued the now famous statement ‘‘the competition of ideas is fundamental to a free society.’’43 During the 1960s and the rise of the New Right, an alternative doctrine of ideas emerged to challenge the liberal orthodoxy that had prevailed over Washington for the first half of the century.44 Accordingly, it is fair to assert that the politicization of think tanks only became a problem during the ideological revolution of the 1970s, when conservative thinkers and think tanks entered the marketplace of ideas.45 Apt examples are the Heritage Foundation (1973) and the reinvigoration of the American Enterprise Institute. Corporate financing initiatives also became part of the think tank domain during this era and this influx of capital contributed to a veritable proliferation of public policy research organizations. Two-thirds of all the think tanks that exist today were established after 1970, and over half were established since 1980. This exacerbated the crowding of a marketplace of ideas already divided along partisan lines. Further, such crowding became increasingly unequal—by 1982, the Republican national committees took in $191 million compared to $32 million for the Democratic national committees.46 Consequently, competition became rife and the priorities of think tanks further shifted from ‘‘utility’’ to ‘‘visibility.’’47 Given that scholars of this period were exploring untraversed terrain, the literature from the 1970s focused not so much on grappling with this notion of partisanship and the associated question of academic freedom as ascertaining a broad definition of the term. Indeed, the impulse to begin thinking about these institutions was induced by an increasing interest in matters other than the politicization of the think tank domain. Scholars became interested in (1) the competition between independent research institutions and the new ‘‘research’’ universities, (2) the methodology and uses of applied social research, (3) the methodology, uses, and limits of professionalized public policy research, and (4) the emergence of interdisciplinary pursuits in a world of disciplinary research.48 The first comprehensive scholarly attempt to categorize and define ‘‘think tank’’ came with The Non-Profit Research Institute: Its Origins, Operations, Problems and Prospects (1972) by Harold Orlans. His point of departure is the second generation of think tanks, the defense-related research

Introduction 13

and development centers established after World War II. With his inclusion of all public policy research institutes, as well as research and development centers, Orlans’s definition, albeit broad, provided an ample platform for forthcoming scholars to build on. Orlans concludes that think tanks were ‘‘independent, often separately incorporated, non-degree-granting organizations that devote most of their annual expenditures to the development of new technology and to research in the natural and social sciences, engineering, humanities and professions.’’49 Though Orlans does not expand on this definition, we can assume that he is referring to all research and development centers that are independent of higher education institutions. Such a notion of ‘‘independence,’’ one that disassociated think tanks from institutions of higher education as well as from government, was pathbreaking, and Orlans is to be credited for introducing the whole notion of independent nonprofit research institutes into the literature.50 Indeed, the presence of this characteristic, or lack thereof, has proved to be the cornerstone of debate regarding the definition of ‘‘think tank.’’ Other works from the 1970s, such as Paul Dickson’s Think Tanks (1972) and David Boorstin’s article Directions of Policy Research (1975), conduct their inquiries in a similar vein. According to Dickson, the term acquired a new meaning in the 1960s when it became associated with institutions based on military research and strategy. Since the mid-1970s, it has been used to describe a diverse set of research organizations localized around Washington, DC.51 Despite the breadth of the definition, or rather the absence of clarity, Dickson contributed substantially to the field in his distinction between research and development centers and think tanks.52 To Dickson, think tanks conduct ‘‘policy research or research that provides ideas, analysis, and alternatives relevant to people who make policy’’ whereas research and development centers are committed to traditional science and solely produce ‘‘scientific knowledge for scientists and researchers.’’53 Put simply, think tanks act as a ‘‘bridge between knowledge and power’’ and are ‘‘closer to being agents of new knowledge and discovery than creators of new knowledge.’’54 Dickson also associates a number of characteristics with think tanks, such as ‘‘scientificity’’ and ‘‘interdisciplinariness of approach’’ to research, substantial freedom in defining and exploring problems, a role of making formulations and recommendations, privileged access to and interaction with policymakers, and permanent organizational status, that have become almost timeless in the definition of the term.55 Boorstin also attempts to define what he terms a ‘‘think tank’’

14 Introduction

though, like Dickson, he lacks some precision in his definition. To Boorstin, think tanks are ‘‘a special class of R and D institutions [designed] to act as synthesizers bringing together scholarship and scientific and technological tools for the use of policymakers combining the ‘know-how’ and the ‘know-who.’ ’’56 Despite Dickson’s attempts to provide a typology of public policy research organizations, both Dickson’s and Boorstin’s definitions are all inclusive and lack clarity. The authors agree that the term ‘‘think tank’’ is ‘‘broad and subjective’’ (Boorstin)57 and ‘‘ill-defined, subjective, and debated’’ (Dickson).58 Hence, while both scholars are to be credited for their inauguration of the inquiry into the term ‘‘think tank,’’ they are equally accountable for setting in motion a trend that would inhibit the majority of scholars from seeking a definition that is at once narrow and universal for decades to come. A number of scholars have written articles on a narrower field of institutions to which they accord the term ‘‘think tank.’’ In contrast to Dickson and Boorstin, these scholars begin from a point too narrow and each uses markedly different frameworks for analysis, thus making synthesis difficult. Roger Levien (1969) asserts that there are six characteristics that an institution must possess within its organizational structure to qualify as an independent public policy research institution: ‘‘a policy orientation, influence, breadth of charter, interdisciplinary character, an eye to the future and a concern with systems.’’59 Levien was the first author to associate independence with public policy analysis organizations and to separate them from university-based think tanks and for-profit research and development centers. However, Levien’s definition of ‘‘think tank’’ appears markedly similar to the agenda and organizational dynamic of the Rand Corporation (Levien was a researcher at Rand) and this significantly undermines the universality of his interpretation. Very few, if any, of the institutions operating today practice interdisciplinary research and systems theory to the extent demonstrated by Rand.60 Nelson Polsby, in his article ‘‘Tanks but No Tanks,’’ introduces the notion of public policy research institutes by distinguishing them from what he terms ‘‘true think tanks.’’61 He contends that public policy research institutes, or those engaged in the social sciences, are the policy-oriented progeny of these true, ‘‘ivory towerish’’ think tanks, and that these institutions represent a paradigm shift from the notion of think tanks abstaining from actively participating in public matters to one of tanks engaging in such participation.62 George Fauriol elaborates on this notion by extending

Introduction 15

Dickson’s ‘‘bridge’’ metaphor, heralding a disposition to poeticism that has permeated scholars’ approach to defining the term ever since. To Fauriol, ‘‘the foreign policy think tank acts as a conveyor belt of thought . . . a midpoint between the ivory towers of academia and the hustled atmosphere of the policy making world of government.’’63 He asserts that think tanks may be distinguished from political educational organizations and helps us to further clarify the differences between university-based research centers and those that are freestanding. Building on Levien and Fauriol, Yehezkel Dror defines a think tank as ‘‘a bridge between power and knowledge.’’64 For Dror, a public policy research institute has six independent features: ‘‘(1) mission; (2) critical mass; (3) methods; (4) research freedom; (5) clientele-dependency; and (6) outputs and impacts.’’65 In addition, he adopts the views of Boorstin and Levien, proposing that a public policy think tank’s mission should be focused on ‘‘interdisciplinary science-based contributions to policy-making’’ and that its research staff should enjoy a considerable level of freedom in defining and exploring the problem.66 Dror contributes in a number of ways to the literature. First, he distinguishes think tanks from ad hoc research or think groups, introducing into his definition the requirement of a full-time staff. Second, his concept of ‘‘outputs and impacts’’ focuses on the unique product that these institutions produce and its character as policy oriented and timely.67 Finally and perhaps most significantly, in his approach Dror provides the first detailed definition and typology that centers solely on public policy research institutes yet is universal enough to encompass a whole range of these organizations.68 To some degree, Dror’s represents the first scholarly attempt to surpass the minimalism and parochialism of definitions before him, reconciling uniqueness of think tanks in relation to other institutional forms, with their diversity within their own form. Winard Gellner, along with Howard J. Wiarda, refine Dror’s notion of ‘‘outputs and impacts.’’ Gellner identifies four functions or outputs: ‘‘generation of ideas and ideologies; convocation [networking]; publication [diffusion]; transformation [of elites].’’69 He asserts that it is these functions that separate think tanks from ‘‘non-political ‘scientific institutions’ on the one side and non-scientific ‘interest groups’ on the other.’’70 In these scholars’ attempts to define ‘‘think tank,’’ the simultaneous pursuit of clarity yet universal applicability to all institutions of this form is notable, and Dror’s, Gellner’s, and Wiarda’s approach will constitute a vital influence in the definition developed later in this chapter.

16 Introduction

Perhaps the most influential example of this approach is Kent Weaver’s pathbreaking treatment of the term in his article ‘‘The Changing World of Think Tanks.’’ Weaver’s reflections on the changing world of think tanks, or even just his acknowledgment of the fluidity of the domain, introduce into the literature a number of useful concepts and areas of focus that allow us to capture the diversity of the think tank domain in the most distilled manner possible. This approach amounts to organizing such institutions under organizational structure, product lines, and marketing strategies.71 Weaver’s work focuses on those institutions with organizational independence and asserts that institutions (‘‘think tanks’’) in this group follow one of three organizational models: universities without students, the contract researcher, and advocacy tanks.72 Building on Orlans’s notion of think tanks as ‘‘non-degree granting’’73 institutions, Weaver describes universities without students as relying heavily on academics as researchers and on private sector funding and primarily producing book-length studies, academic monographs, and journal articles. This type of think tank is typically funded by foundations, corporations, and individuals, with their agendas set internally as part of a bottom-up process in which the researchers themselves play an important role. According to Weaver, this type of ‘‘think tank’’ maintains a long-term focus and seeks to change elite opinion.74 Traditional examples of this type of think tank are the Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, with a new breed represented in the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Contract researcher think tanks, like universities without students, practice objective analysis with a ‘‘heavy reliance on academics as researchers,’’ emphasizing rigorous social science methods.75 With a reputation for objective research, these institutions provide a useful external voice to supplement their clients’ own work. Where contract researchers and universities without students differ, however, is in their sources of funding, research agendas, and output. Contract researchers mainly produce reports for specific agencies and hence their research agenda is determined accordingly. In the late 1980s, this assertion was novel and one that broke with Levien’s and Dror’s belief that one of the defining characteristics of think tanks was their research freedom. Indeed, many of the studies produced by these think tanks are not even available to the general public unless the specific agencies consent to their release. Unsurprisingly, contract researchers are funded in large part by contracts with

Introduction 17

these agencies. Institutions that best exemplify this type of think tank are the Rand Corporation and the Urban Institute. Weaver’s final category, advocacy think tanks, is different in a number of ways and, at the time of the publication of his article, was a relatively new phenomenon. Weaver contends that while universities without students and contract researchers were the predominant models operative in the think tank domain in the 1970s to 1980s, they were supplanted by the proliferation of advocacy tanks in the 1980s.76 This new breed of think tank was unabashedly partisan and ideological, and prioritized putting a ‘‘spin on existing research’’ over the production of original research.77 In the words of Weaver, they ‘‘combine a strong policy, partisan or ideological bent with aggressive salesmanship and an effort to influence policy debates,’’ decreasing their academic character in favor of increasing their accessibility to policymakers.78 Advocacy tanks frequently draw their resources disproportionately from sources linked to specific interests (e.g., corporations for conservative think tanks, labor unions for liberal think tanks). Their staffs, in comparison, are typically drawn more heavily from government, political parties, and interest groups than from university faculties, and may be less credentialed in terms of social science expertise. Normally in the form of policy briefs or white papers, their product tends to advocate a particular policy rather than the more monograph-like tomes that are associated with the more academic think tanks. This medium of communication tends to be more condensed and concise and to clearly illustrate policy implications and options. Examples of this type of think tank can be found on the right in the Heritage Foundation and on the left in the Center for American Progress. Weaver’s broader treatment of ‘‘think tank’’ aligns fairly concordantly with his predecessors. To Weaver, think tanks play a number of defining roles: they are a source of policy-primed ideas, evaluation of policy proposals and government programs, personnel (they are ‘‘hospitals for governmental casualties’’), and punditry. That said, Weaver also acknowledges a number of inherent tensions within the concept that he perceives will be the subject of future debate. He acknowledges the politicization of the think tank domain as a future point of contention, identifying the contradiction between the image of academic objectivity that public policy research institutions seek to present and the organizational form that advocacy think tanks represent as well as their survival impulse to satisfy budgetary necessity. Weaver also identifies the distinctly Anglo-American character and lack

18 Introduction

of portability of current definitions as a forbidding etymological difficulty.79 Finally, while he admits the irreconcilability of each of his aforementioned models with each other, he asserts that newly established think tanks are beginning to hybridize to some degree.80 Weaver is to be credited primarily for his change of the conventional approach to defining ‘‘think tank.’’ Indeed, he acknowledges the diversity of think tanks and the subsequent need for a typology that accounts for both their intercategorical uniqueness and intracategorical diversity. In their 1989 work, ‘‘Studying Washington Think Tanks: In Search of Definitions and Data,’’ Samantha L. Durst and James A. Thurber attempt to define public policy think tanks by using many of the same characteristics as their predecessors.81 Where these two authors differ from other scholars, however, is in their attempt to define public policy think tanks by ‘‘sources of funding’’ and ‘‘types of expenditures.’’ Durst and Thurber contend that the source of funds (grants, endowment, and contracts) and nature of the funding (restricted or unrestricted, public or private) ‘‘has an influence on the objectivity, direction, and influence of a think tank.’’82 Four years later, in Nonprofit Public Policy Research Organizations, Robert Hollings identifies the same phenomenon, labeling think tanks’ dependence on clients for ‘‘financing, information, access and feedback’’ as an ‘‘inherent limitation’’ on their pursuit of academic freedom.83 This once novel notion of the relationship between financial independence and ideological and intellectual autonomy has become a major point of contention in the current literature. A further point of contention for today’s scholars was introduced into the literature by a group of scholars in the late 1980s. These scholars focus on the politicization of think tanks during the mid-1970s and 1980s and expound an underlying premise that think tanks, once the spring of objective policy-oriented discourse in a desert of rising partisanship, are now mirages, absorbed into the politics of Capitol Hill and transformed into ideologues, actively fighting in the ‘‘war of ideas.’’84 Robert Landers believes that the influence of politics on the think tank domain has caused the ‘‘more overtly ideological’’ 85 to rise to prominence at the expense of the more centrist institutions that have thus far served to mediate public discussion and attain compromise and consensus. Gregg Easterbrook reaches a similar conclusion: ‘‘while the political ascent of conservatism has taken place in full public view, the intellectual transformation has for the most part occurred behind the scenes, in a network of think tanks.’’86 To Easterbrook, it appears that think tanks are a major player in making the

Introduction 19

American political landscape increasingly partisan. James A. Smith is a leading proponent of this notion, asserting in The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite that think tanks have split along ‘‘philosophical fault lines that traditionally split the American policy elite into ‘idealist’ and ‘pragmatist.’ ’’87 Smith goes so far as to say that the ‘‘war of ideas’’ has battered the loyalties of the think tank domain to academia and objectivity to such an extent that rational discourse has been ousted by a ‘‘factious and sectarian disputatiousness.’’88 Such a change is attributed to the counterestablishment influx of conservative policy research institutions amid the wave of neoconservatism in the 1970s that set in motion a paradigmatic change in the think tank domain and the politicization of new and existing institutions. This, according to Smith, was symptomatic of the devaluation of the technocratic role that think tank scholars used to play. Not all scholars exhibit such skepticism, however. Paul Sabatier, for example, views this difficulty through a slightly less critical eye.89 Deriving his notion from Hugh Heclo’s concept of ‘‘issue networks,’’ Sabatier identifies the presence of ‘‘advocacy coalitions within these networks.’’90 However, he also asserts that ‘‘the distinction between an advocate and a broker is . . . a continuum.’’ For Sabatier, an idea broker is not the same thing as an advocate; ‘‘some brokers will have some policy bent’’ but advocates must ‘‘show some serious concern with system maintenance.’’91 While he acknowledges the possibility of partisanship within idea brokers, Sabatier suggests that very few of these organizations can be authoritatively classified as simply overly partisan advocacy operations, a phrase that scholars subscribing to Smith’s line of thought perhaps would accord to the new breed of public policy research organizations. With the emergence of institutions such as the Heritage Foundation and the Institute for Policy Studies, there is no doubt that, since the 1970s, the think tank domain has borne the brunt of the partisan divide in Capitol Hill. Many scholars acknowledge that the value of academic freedom is disappearing at all levels of the organizational structure of think tanks.92 It remains to be seen if such politicization has created overly partisan organizations and denatured the traditional institutional form of a think tank so much that its academic integrity is compromised. While there have been some promising anomalies in the form of the work of scholars such as Dror and Weaver, attempts at defining the concept of a think tank during this era have resorted to minimalism or parochialism in the face of the ‘‘ill-defined, subjective and debated term, ‘think tank.’ ’’93

20 Introduction

Defining Think Tanks in the Twenty-First Century Today, many components of most modern definitions of think tanks are not novel. Rather, they have their roots in the inaugural attempts at defining the term made by scholars such as Orlans, Dickson, and Boorstin, using many of the same characteristics as these and other predecessors. Some twenty-first-century accounts of ‘‘think tank’’ have propagated the growing tendency in the literature to borrow heavily from the definitions of previous scholars.94 As evident, for example, in the definition of Montoya and Swanger, characteristics such as ‘‘non-governmental,’’ ‘‘nonprofit,’’ and ‘‘evidence-based advice’’ are common terms for some twentyfirst-century scholars (a more precise definition ‘‘remains elusive,’’ they add).95 In a few cases, this borrowing amounts to rather arcane accounts of the term. Hartwig Pautz, for example, aligns his broad definition of ‘‘think tank’’ in almost perfect concordance with Weaver’s definition in his seminal article ‘‘The Changing World of Think Tank,’’ which was published sixteen years earlier. Some, however, introduce into the literature novel notions. Montoya and Swanger assert that the common output of think tanks is rapidly changing. Once articulated in the form of books, journal articles, congressional testimony, op-ed essays and conference papers, the policyoriented product of public policy research organizations, these two scholars contend, is increasingly being distributed by way of electronic media, such as blogs, websites, and databases.96 In his work Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-maker’s Perspective, Richard N. Haass offers substantial insight into the twenty-firstcentury meaning of the concept ‘‘think tank’’ through his unique approach to the term, one that could only be taken by a policymaker, not a detached scholar (Haass is the president of the Council on Foreign Relations). Haass conducts an empirical assessment of the observable influence of think tanks as opposed to a normative one that would focus primarily on their agendas. To Haass, think tanks affect foreign policymakers in five different ways: ‘‘by generating original ideas and options for policy, by supplying a ready pool of experts for employment in government, by offering venues for high-level discussion, by educating U.S. citizens about the world, and by supplementing official efforts to mediate and resolve conflict.’’97 Haass is to be credited for introducing a number of new ideas into the literature. First is his association of the ‘‘revolving door’’ with the think tank domain. For Haass, think tanks offer both a consistent source of talented administrators and congressional staffs, and a haven for personnel leaving government office either

Introduction 21

for an ‘‘intellectual breather’’98 or because of a failure of their presidential administration to be reelected.99 With regard to the former, think tanks function as ‘‘political training grounds,’’100 helping presidents and cabinet secretaries respond to the regeneration of the staffing landscape that occurs with each governmental transition. To the latter, these institutions also offer a ‘‘short- or long-term landing place’’101 in which personnel who have left office can remain involved in the policy debates in a way that has a tangible practical impact. Further, it allows those whose political party is out of power to think and exercise ‘‘long-range vision’’102 in a manner unaccommodated by the pressures of government leadership.103 Lee M. Katz cites the recent example of the new liberal think tank the Center for American Progress to illustrate this concept. According to Katz, the center played a crucial role in President Barack Obama’s transition and is now a source of personnel for his administration.104 The Bush administration, too, appointed a number of think-tank recruits. Abelson is another proponent of this idea, noting that think tanks ‘‘often serve as ‘holding tanks’ where policy experts congregate in hopes of being recruited into senior government positions.’’105 As Haass acknowledges, this notion is one unique to the American political system; in other developed democracies such as England, France, and Japan, a new government finds continuity of available personnel in the professional civil service.106 Indeed, in the words of P. J. Crowley, a Center for American Progress fellow, think tanks are the closest thing that the United States has to a shadow government; in the English political system, for example, there exists a formalized government in waiting for a political party that is out of power.107 Second, Haass introduces the idea that think tanks intermittently function as venues or passive entities that facilitate informed policymaker discourse. He cites the Council on Foreign Relations as an example of think tanks playing a convening role, hosting hundreds of meetings annually in major cities across America.108 This concept of think tanks as conveners is a novel one, and a number of scholars have adopted it since he introduced it.109 In Think Tanks in Scotland, Pautz agrees that think tanks are instruments for consensus building amid the corporate, military, and administrative policy communities, noting that they ‘‘contribute to the creation of discourse coalitions.’’110 Wiarda concurs with this notion, labeling think tanks sites of ‘‘cross fertilization’’ among think tank scholars, journalists, and government officials who attend the conferences, lectures, and forums hosted by think tanks.111 Think tanks are constantly meeting, formally or

22 Introduction

informally, with policymakers themselves. Haass asserts that this function extends to the public domain, contending that think tanks enhance America’s civic culture by informing citizens about the dynamics of the world that surrounds them.112 Stone offers an updated categorization of the think tank domain that builds on Weaver’s seminal typology of the late 1980s. Constructing a demand-side explanation of the think tank domain, she asserts that there are three types of services independent public policy research institutions offer that meet the diversity of demand in the marketplace of ideas.113 The first service is ‘‘knowledge and expertise.’’ This service is more widely practiced by think tanks in developing countries (discussed in more detail in the section concerning the portability of the term ‘‘think tank’’ below), and, in these countries, it is one born out of excess demand for research.114 In advanced democracies, Stone notes, this service does not ameliorate a deficit; rather, it introduces a competitor into the market of policy advice, one that, despite its lack of formal power, provides ‘‘superior forms of policy advice by mustering the best thinkers and practitioners.’’115 The second service is ‘‘advocacy and argumentation.’’ In this function, think tanks serve as a repository of credibility for corporations and foundations that seek to articulate their interests in the most legitimate manner possible.116 (As we shall see later, this service is the locus of the contentious question of the academic freedom that think tanks practice.) The third and final type of service that think tanks provide is ‘‘organizational and technical services.’’ This service amounts to think tanks facilitating dialogue and consensus building between the policymakers, as well as providing civic education.117 Stone is to be credited with organizing the features discussed in previous sections into a typology that is, for the most part, consistent with the changing paradigms operating in the think tank domain. Medvetz approaches the term from perhaps the most unusual angle evident in the literature to date. In his initial inquiry into the term, Hybrid Intellectuals: Toward a Theory of Think Tanks and Public Policy Experts in the United States, Medvetz develops his argument from a somber recognition that there exists a ‘‘constitutive blurriness’’ in the term itself, describing think tanks as structurally ambiguous organizations that exist in an intermediate zone between two clearly defined organizational domains.118 In fact, Medvetz treats think tanks not ‘‘as a distinctive kind of organization per se, but rather as an organizational device for gathering and assembling forms of authority conferred by institutions of academics, politics, business

Introduction 23

and journalism.’’119 Medvetz proposes what he calls a ‘‘relational notion’’ of think tanks as ‘‘structurally hybrid offspring’’—composed of elements from both their own developing ‘‘institutional niche’’ and that of these more established institutions—that exist in a ‘‘hybrid interstitial field’’120 between the spaces of these institutions. For Medvetz, think tanks’ status as the progeny of these institutions has both a ‘‘material’’ and a ‘‘symbolic’’ dimension; ‘‘material’’ in the sense that such institutions are the sole supply of personnel and patronage and ‘‘symbolic’’ in the sense that at the level of both think tanks and the policy experts themselves, there is a clear adoption of the operational models at work in these parent institutions.121 Given that think tanks have ‘‘multiple orientations’’ to a number of ‘‘social universes’’ represented by politics, academia, and so on, Medvetz believes that there exists an inherent tension within the think tank domain, with its institutions engaged in a ‘‘cycle of detachment [from] and association [with]’’ each universe that they seek to amalgamate with, borrowing some components of each operational model but not others.122 This dynamic, according to Medvetz, ‘‘exacts a particular cost on the think tank,’’ one that contributes to the blurriness of the term.123 As Medvetz himself acknowledges, one could argue that his account is ‘‘too seamless,’’ ‘‘too mechanical,’’ and reductive of the think tank domain.124 Indeed, Wiarda asserts that think tanks are definite ‘‘integrating agencies,’’ not intermediate spaces where integration occurs.125 Regardless, such conceptualizations refute both constructivist and stucturalist accounts of think tanks (two categories that the majority of the definitions cited in this chapter fall under) and, in his application of elite theory to the think tank domain, Medvetz’s contribution to the literature represents a substantial departure from traditional accounts of the think tank and offers an alternative lens through which to view this institutional sphere. However, the politicization of the think tank domain poses a significant obstacle to any attempt at defining the term.126 The fact that the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics now classifies some think tanks as ‘‘organizations of an explicitly partisan interest that seek to offer policy advice to chosen recipients’’ only adds further weight to this notion.127According to Andrew Rich, three major transformations in the think tank domain have occurred in recent decades: first, their numbers have grown considerably, second, new think tanks have adopted an ideological persuasion, and, third, think tanks have become quite forceful advocates of their research and analysis.128 In 1996, centrist or nonideological think tanks enjoyed a sizable

24 Introduction

proportion, comprising 141 of 306 think tanks, or 45 percent.129 Such a figure is expected, given the long-standing U.S. tradition of producing balanced and nonpartisan research. That being said, think tanks displaying an ideological character, either conservative or liberal, represented 54 percent of think tanks.130 This proportion represents an increase from 14 percent in 1970.131 Indeed, in the 1990s, partisanship became invariably common among emerging think tanks with conservative think tanks both outnumbering identifiably liberal organizations and outperforming them in the coverage of their research agendas and in the size of their budgets at both state and national levels. With the continued advent of public policy research organizations that have an ideological partiality into the 1990s and 2000s, it seems that this paradigm shift that emerged in the 1980s has now secured permanent tenancy in the once nonpartisan marketplace of ideas. As in the third era, in the present one, scholars fall across a broad spectrum of interpretation. Some are skeptics, believing the politicization of the domain to be contributing to the rise of overly partisan institutions and the decline of objective research. Others are more balanced in their approach, acknowledging the influence of partisan politics on think tanks and the ‘‘risk of distortion,’’ but also holding that their academic freedom has not been compromised to the extent that one could classify the present era of institutions as representing the ‘‘demise of think tanks.’’132 Some go one step further, and suggest that the politicization of the domain has in fact had a formative influence on new and existing think tanks in a way that reestablishes, not denatures, their integrity as independent public policy research institutions. In Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process, Stone attempts to define ‘‘think tank’’ first by considering what independent public policy research institutions are not. The most significant distinction that she makes is that between think tanks and interest or advocacy groups. Stone notes that a common trend among new think tanks is the emphasis on marketing and promotion in response to increased competition for funding, media exposure, and political influence; ‘‘their advocacy in policy debates combines a strong ideological, policy or partisan position with aggressive salesmanship.’’133 For Stone, however, think tanks and interest groups are different in their aspirations: ‘‘while the line between analysis and advocacy becomes blurred, policy institutes aspire to be rigorous and balanced’’ and seek to uphold the diversity of their agenda, addressing

Introduction 25

multiple issues whereas interest groups tend to focus only on one.134 Even though this ‘‘scientific status’’ and subsequent ‘‘intellectual authority’’ is increasingly under threat, Stone maintains that interest groups are primarily concerned with advocacy and think tanks with research, irrespective of any other overlap.135 In her collaborative effort with Andrew Denham, Think Tanks Across Nations, Stone builds on her distinction between think tank output and interest group advocacy. There she asserts that think tanks are primarily concerned with engagement, not advocacy, and thus she looks upon the categorization of think tanks as intellectual glorifications of interest groups with an unsatisfied glance. Indeed, ‘‘think tanks need to have some kind of engagement with government if they are to succeed in influencing policy.’’136 In reality, think tanks require a relationship with their primary target, the policymakers, and this materializes in the form of engagement, not advocacy.137 Stone, once more, notes that while think tanks’ innate desire to preserve absolute academic freedom conflicts with the growing necessity of sacrificing financial autonomy, relative academic freedom and nominal independence is still achievable.138 Stone builds on her previous musings on the think tank domain in Think Tank Transnationalization and Non-profit Analysis, Advice and Advocacy, arguing that relative, as opposed to absolute, independence and autonomy is a necessary prerequisite for think tanks to fulfill their function. In her broad definition of the term, Stone concurrently asserts that think tanks have one thing in common: the individuals in them seek to make ‘‘academic theories and scientific paradigms policy relevant’’; and she acknowledges that there is considerable diversity among think tanks, especially where ‘‘ideological disposition’’ is concerned.139 Stone further addresses the question of autonomy, developing from the notion that think tanks practice variable levels of it.140 Ultimately, she recognizes, ‘‘complete autonomy and independence for think tanks is illusory.’’141 However, Stone also contends that absolute independence and autonomy is less favorable if a think tank is to fulfill its primary objective of policy influence.142 Indeed, while contributing to the credibility and intellectual authority of an institution, academic freedom, scientific methodology, freely defined research agendas, and financial autonomy in an absolute sense can preclude optimal policy influence and pertinence. Thus, in reality, this compromise is a necessary component for any nonprofit, policy-research organization to be considered a think tank.

26 Introduction

In her later coauthored article ‘‘Bridging Research and Policy,’’ Stone contends that the product of even the most avowedly objective and nonpartisan think tanks is, to some degree, subjective. Stone identifies three obstacles to a think tank’s ability to practice absolute academic freedom: the funding of the research, the values of the researcher, and the intended application of the research.143 This normative dimension to production in the marketplace of ideas is something that, according to Stone, cannot be ‘‘ignored.’’ Indeed, the term ‘‘knowledge’’ or ‘‘research,’’ the basis of policy-research organizations, ‘‘does not signify a single body of thinking, data or literature that is commonly recognized and accepted.’’ Instead, according to Stone, the terms indicate an inherent multiplicity, and a tension within such multiplicity, materializing into a ‘‘struggle between different ‘knowledges,’ ’’ ‘‘researches,’’ ‘‘discourses,’’ ‘‘worldviews,’’ and ‘‘regimes of truth.’’144 What is otherwise treated as an objective and monodimensional term in the academic domain becomes an innately malleable one in the policymaking domain. Consequently, there exists a ‘‘mobilization of bias,’’ symptomatic of either the researcher’s compulsion to heed the demands and ideology of those commissioning the research, the researcher’s institutional obligation to prime the product in a manner most likely to influence the target, or the researcher’s own subconscious ideological, cultural, and historical partialities that color even the strongest attempt to commit to objectivity and scientificity.145 Stone concludes that this normative dimension to the product of think tanks is an unavoidable obstacle blocking the path of the bridge between policy and research. Yet the defining facet of Stone’s account is that she accepts this bias as an inevitable part of any research organization that seeks policy influence, contending that, albeit it is nonabsolute, think tanks still practice some degree of academic freedom. For Stone, resource dependency is not coterminous with ideological indoctrination. Evert Lindquist agrees with Stone, but approaches the issue from a slightly different perspective. With particular reference to the Canadian sphere of think tanks, Lindquist labels funding a ‘‘critical issue.’’146 Lindquist argues that those think tanks that rely on governmental support face fierce competition from institutions such as universities. He writes that, with the current shortage in capital, this competition is becoming increasingly problematic and that the more academic think tanks face a moral quandary; do they sacrifice some of their academic freedom for financial support or do they maintain absolute intellectual independence and suffer

Introduction 27

the budgetary consequences? Lindquist is to be credited for his introduction of the notion that reduced capital available to the tenants of the marketplace of ideas has led to increased competition and a tension between ‘‘dancing with the devil’’ and safeguarding credibility and independence. Katz concurs with Lindquist, classifying today’s top think tanks as major financial operations that constitute a community wherein increasing financial muscle is not limited to any point on the ideological spectrum.147 He agrees with most scholars that associated with this flow of capital is a potentially crippling impact on the ideology of these institutions. For ‘‘in the interests of continued existence and financial viability, institutes need to accommodate some of the expectations of funders.’’148 However, he qualifies this statement with an assertion that, in the United States at least, think tanks are at once competitive and cooperative, and still provide a modicum of bipartisanship where partisanship would otherwise dominate.149 Some scholars view the politicization of the think tank domain with a more skeptical eye. Abelson is a major proponent of this perspective, believing in the pervasiveness of institutional policy and an appetite for lobbying.150 For Abelson, although new think tanks establish legitimate research programs, their ‘‘primary goal [is] not to pursue social science research, but advance their ideological agenda in the political arena.’’151 Indeed, it is becoming increasingly apparent that think tanks are not committed to ‘‘insulating’’ themselves from the vagaries that the politics of policymaking poses to the ‘‘ivory towers’’ of academia.152 Instead, some institutions are making a ‘‘concerted effort’’ to become a part of the political landscape, irrespective of Internal Revenue Service restrictions. While most think tanks nominally seek to limit contract research to 5 to 15 percent of their budgets, since the government is where a majority of the funding lies, most institutions also ignore these rules. In academics, it is common practice to conduct research first, and draw conclusions second. To Jonathan Rowe, a lawyer and libertarian writer from the United States, this process is often reversed in the think tank domain, and he comments that ‘‘think tank’’ is a misnomer: ‘‘they don’t think; they justify.’’153 Wiarda even contends that think tanks exacerbate the partisan politics that underscores policymaking in the American political system.154 Hence, as a result of the prioritization of engagement with and influence on decision makers over objective, nonideological scholarly research, think tanks have, according to Abelson, transformed over the past thirty years from scientific, nonpartisan institutions to active participants and advocates in the political process.

28 Introduction

John Chuckman offers us further insight into this perspective. He believes that think tanks are no more than ‘‘public relations fronts’’ that serve the primary function of fulfilling the ‘‘advocacy goals of their sponsors.’’155 His subsequent assertion, that think tanks are ‘‘phony institutes where ideologue-propagandists pose as academics . . . [into which] money gushes like blood from opened arteries to support meaningless advertising’s suffocation of genuine debate,’’ is particularly graphic.156 For scholars who admire the commitment of the traditional think tank domain to ‘‘safeguard[ing] institutions from the vicissitudes of American politics,’’ this ‘‘demise’’ is ‘‘somewhat disturbing.’’157 Charles William Maynes shares such nostalgia. Today, Maynes laments, ‘‘ideas are no longer tools made available to everybody. Rather, they are weapons crafted primarily for one’s political allies’’ with the aim of achieving victory for an ideologically similar administration.158 Extending his application of ‘‘elite theory’’ to the think tank domain, Medvetz asserts that the space of a think tank represents a world divided against itself, where the traditional desire for credibility is at odds with the modern necessity of visibility. For Medvetz, each attempt to operate in a scientific manner will ‘‘run up against a set of powerful limitations,’’ the most notable being the ‘‘need to maximize political access’’ and publicity, accrue ‘‘policy relevance,’’ and observe budgetary necessity.159 Ultimately, this continuous conflict inflicts a ‘‘cost’’ on think tanks’ ‘‘intellectual production,’’ immobilizing these institutions’ ability to, quite simply, think. Abelson’s comments on the issue in A Capitol Idea perhaps best summarize the skeptics’ perspective. Like Stone, he distinguishes think tanks from interest groups. However, unlike the former, he does not make such a distinction with the hope that the practice of academic freedom will pertain in the think tank domain; instead, the distinction comes laden with disappointment. He contends that whereas interest groups are in the ‘‘business of giving money to attract support for their cause or causes . . . think tanks are in the business of raising money to advance their institutional mandates.’’160 Others scholars are slightly more optimistic, with some even positing that politicization is beneficial for the think tank domain. Francesco Grillo, for example, believes that the necessity of outside funding for think tanks may turn out to be a ‘‘positive factor’’—if the institution ‘‘sharpens’’ its output.161 While Grillo himself acknowledges that this perspective is perhaps a little optimistic, he concludes that this refinement of output ‘‘helps

Introduction 29

to ensure’’ an institution’s survival in the increasingly competitive marketplace of ideas.162 Peter Singer’s ‘‘Washington’s Think Tanks: Factories to Call Our Own’’ is one of the most recent accounts of the term ‘‘think tank.’’ Singer asserts that the proximity of think tanks to power and the media has induced confusion in these institutions between visibility and utility and prioritizing advocacy over objective intellectual production.163 In support of these remarks, he notes that over the past decade, new think tanks have been smaller and more specialized164 and that a trend of increasing donor responsiveness and decreasing independence and accountability in response to the ‘‘shrinking money environment’’ has emerged.165 To Singer, new think tanks establish themselves in such a way as to attract specific donors and thus allow them to compete with the more established think tanks. It appears, then, that the sources of capital for think tanks are enjoying increasingly privileged positions and, for the motivated donor in particular, wielding more power to influence the ideological color of emerging institutions. A mist of bias permanently shrouds the path that the bridge of objective, distilled knowledge intended by policy-research institutions takes en route to the policymakers. Indeed much of the knowledge arrives in the hands of policymakers drenched in partiality and bias.

The ‘‘Anglo-American Domain’’ The U.S. think tank community is commonly joined with think tanks in Britain under the label ‘‘Anglo-American domain.’’ This phrase, however, seems slightly reductive and, in British Think Tanks and the Climate of Opinion, Denham and Mark Garnett seek to explain the differences that the term fails to acknowledge.166 The authors argue that all think tanks are ‘‘adapted to their diverse national contexts’’ and that the notion that think tanks are a unique element of American politics is false.167 In support of this thesis, they identify a number of polarities between the political environment of the American and the Anglo think tank domain. The authors note that the division of powers between president and Congress contrasts with the more ambiguous separation in the British Parliament, that American political parties are markedly less ideological than British ones, and that the administrative elites of the American government are more permeable

30 Introduction

than those of the British government.168 In Britain, permanent civil services are the primary source of policy advice to government, which considerably reduces need for external suppliers of policy advice. Moreover, the authors suggest that the British government and British political parties in particular play a much larger and more explicit role in the establishment, financing, ideology, and research agenda of think tanks than in the rest of Europe. Despite these differences in environment, Denham and Garnett’s commentary is not a caution against the usage of the term ‘‘Anglo-American domain.’’ Indeed, it can be seen that these differences, the ‘‘closed’’ nature of British politics in particular, are often exaggerated. While for the majority of the twentieth century, the term ‘‘think tank’’ in Britain was synonymous with the country’s single, governmental policy planning and research institution, the Central Policy Review Staff, toward the end of the century, the phrase was given a different meaning, ‘‘closer to American usage.’’169 To Denham and Garnett, the term ‘‘was increasingly applied to ideologically charged, free-market bodies which were outside government, which support [British prime minister] Margaret Thatcher in her efforts to shift British policy away from the post-war ‘consensus.’ ’’170 In addition, think tanks in Britain over the past thirty years accommodate classification into the four types of think tanks identified by Weaver.171 Reflecting a similar movement in the American think tank domain, Denham and Garnett find ‘‘a gradual historical shift in the character of British think-tanks towards the more partisan advocacy tanks.’’172 While in the American domain, think tanks claim to be nonpartisan, it is commonplace in Britain for these institutions to be explicit in disclosing their party affiliation.

Toward a Working Definition of ‘‘Think Tanks’’ Current debates over what constitutes a think tank and the lack of an established definition have led to a classification of think tanks that is either narrowed to an American-centric view or expanded into an overinclusive term that encompasses an increasingly diverse set of organizations. Since think tanks vary in size, structure, financial resources, areas of expertise, research agendas, and the quality of produced publications, ‘‘think tank’’ has become an umbrella term used to describe all the roles and functions of these organizations. Indeed, public policy research organizations encompass an institutional range so diverse that one could suggest they not be

Introduction 31

attributed the same term. Think tanks now engage in public policy research, analysis, advocacy, education, and formulation. Nevertheless, amid this striking diversity of focus, size, and function, there does exist a discernible group of organizations, all of which share the common goal of analyzing and influencing public policy in a specific context. Think tanks are one type of civil society organization. As objective, independent policy analysts and producers representing neither the public nor the private sector, think tanks constitute an important part of a strong civil society. In seeking to bridge the gap between knowledge and power, think tanks overcome a limitation inherent in all modern political systems—time. Policymakers do not have the time to research comprehensively the topics for which they must formulate and evaluate policies. Equally, academics do not have the time to study the complete landscape of issues that policymakers traverse. Both possess a comparative advantage in their respective field and thus, in alignment with the law of specialization, the two trades are split. Indeed, without such a liaison, policymakers would formulate policy uninformed, and academics would conduct research unheeded. Hence, think tanks fill the space between knowledge and power in a manner that, given the right conditions, does much to promote good governance and democracy. Think tanks also satisfy a demand that has persisted ever since the concept first emerged in the early nineteenth century: the demand for information. Policymakers need basic information about the world and the societies they govern, how current policies are working, possible alternatives, and their likely costs and consequence. If we were to suggest that such a statement accurately captures the full extent of the demand that think tanks satisfy, we would be reductive. Not only do policymakers need information, they also need information that is primed for them. The problem is that this information can be unsystematic, unreliable, or tainted by the interests of those who are disseminating it. Some information may be so technical that generalist policymakers cannot understand it or use it. Or information may be politically, financially, or administratively impractical, or contrary to the interests of the policymakers who must make decisions based on information that they often think is less than adequate. Other information may not be useful because it differs too radically from the worldview or ideology of those receiving it. Hence, think tanks have filled policymakers’ insatiable need for information and systematic analysis that is policy relevant.173

32 Introduction

Structured as permanent bodies, in contrast with ad hoc commissions or research panels, think tanks devote a substantial portion of their financial and human resources to commissioning and publishing research and policy analysis in the social sciences: political science, economics, public administration, and international affairs. The major outputs of these organizations are books, monographs, reports, policy briefs, conferences, seminars, briefings, and informal discussions with policymakers, government officials, and other key stakeholders. While purely academic research is focused on creating new knowledge, think tanks are focused on producing research, analysis, and advice that is accessible and understandable for policymakers and the public. Functionally, think tanks carry out research and analysis on policy problems; provide advice on immediate policy concerns; evaluate government programs; interpret policies for electronic and print media, thus facilitating public understanding of and support for policy initiatives; facilitate the construction of issue networks that involve a diverse set of policy actors that come together on an ad hoc basis around a particular policy issue or problem; and provide a supply of key personnel to government.174 Think tanks are unique public policy research organizations in a number of ways. They are more effectively future oriented than government research functionaries, who work in an environment in which efforts at creativity are rarely rewarded. They are also more likely to generate reconfigured policy agendas, while bureaucracies thrive on a security-maximizing environment of standard operating procedures. Think tanks are better able to facilitate collaboration among separate groups of researchers for a common purpose because they have no permanent vested interest in any one domain. Finally, think tanks can aid intellectual synthesis that results from breaking down bureaucratic barriers because they are better able to disseminate information to targets; better suited to deal with the interdisciplinary nature of global policy issues; better able to function as conveners; better able to telescope the policy process, from data collection to knowledge and policy creation; and better able to conceive the means of implementing a policy than government bureaucracies, which may be internally segmented by department and area of specialization.175 In light of this discussion, think tanks, in the broadest sense of the term, are independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan organizations that generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice on domestic and international issues that enable policymakers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy by offering such

Introduction 33

advice in the form of intellectual argument, platforms for convocation and debate, and resources; these organizations also have significant autonomy from government and societal interests such as business firms, interest groups, and political parties. While this remains a comprehensive and authoritative description of the class of institutions under analysis, there are important qualifications to be made, most of which center around the degree of autonomy think tanks wield. While this section of the definition remains broad, it allows us to focus on a number of finer characteristics and place further boundaries on these organizations and their definition. As we saw earlier in this chapter, problems arise when one removes the ideal environment presupposed in the description above and attempts to refine ‘‘think tank’’ further. In reality, the role and effectiveness of think tanks is limited and determined according to the nature of the legal, political, social, and economic contexts in which they exist. Independent, nonpartisan or nongovernmental think tanks are those that are not affiliated with political parties, governments, interest groups, or corporations. The intellectual, financial, and legal independence from governments, political parties, and for-profit organizations is a defining characteristic of truly independent think tanks. The freedom to develop and promulgate positions free from influence and interference of government is what makes these nongovernmental organizations critical civil society actors and affords them greater credibility with the public. Today, however, such institutions, in the absolute sense, exist only in an ideal environment. As we have seen, from the mid-1990s to the present, the marketplace of ideas has degenerated into an uncivil war of ideas between conservative and liberal ideologues with the casualties none other than think tanks and scholars. Think tanks, long regarded as factories with an objective output of independent analysis, are presently at risk of polarization and the subsequent loss of their intellectual independence and credibility. There are a number of environmental forces at work: partisan politics, the growth of liberal and conservative advocacy groups, the restrictive funding policies of donors, the growth of specialized think tanks, the narrow and short-term orientation of Congress and the White House, the tyranny of myopic academic disciplines, and, finally, the 24/7 cable news networks. All these factors prove inhibitory to the capacity of think tanks for independent analysis and advice. Of these, the two most pressing factors are the interrelated forces of funding and partisan politics.

34 Introduction

The think tank landscape is no longer populated with passive purveyors of policy ideas but has become a noisy policy bazaar, filled with scholars, policy activists, and entrepreneurs. The notion of an ‘‘independent’’ think tank is an ideal that is compromised by the demand for funding and the influence of various external and domestic interests within the country concerned. Some have argued that the very notion that a think tank must be independent to be objective is a Western idea, which is not necessarily shared by governments and think tanks in the developing and transitional countries. The reality is that such independence is rarely achieved, even in the West. Although many think tanks are nominally ‘‘independent’’ (an important characteristic for an organization that hopes to produce objective policy analysis), a large number are government or university affiliated. Others have strong links to the private sector or are, in fact, established to promote business interests. Finally, there exists a group of these institutions that are directly affiliated with a political party, interest group, or prominent political personality. As expected, think tanks associated with government or corporate groups lose some independence, as they are subjected to some degree of influence over the direction and focus of their research. For this reason, the classification of many think tanks as ‘‘independent’’ is a distinction that, in practice, is blurred by the varying degrees and types of affiliations that these institutions maintain. Moreover, the growing influence of funding institutions such as governments, foundations, international lending organizations, and others leads to questions as to whether think tanks can produce independent policy analysis that does not, in some way, reflect the perspectives and interests of their donors. The nonprofit and nongovernmental character of think tanks constitutes an ideal situation in which these institutions are free to conduct independent analysis. However, the reality is that nongovernmental means of support are usually limited or nonexistent. This compels many think tanks to engage in contract work for government or the private sector. A high proportion of the funding provided to think tanks has been donor-defined, project-specific grants and as a result, think tanks have been obliged to narrow their research agendas and schedules in accordance with the directives of the donors. Sometimes, project-specific grants and targeted funding are merely fac¸ades for a deliberate attempt to influence the research agenda and findings. It is also apparent that some donors flood the marketplace of ideas with money that funds their issues or worldview. These distortions in the free market of ideas are markedly inhibiting the ability of think tanks

Introduction 35

to produce innovative ideas and independent research. Think tanks have moved away from a tradition of articulating an understanding of policy problems to one of prescription, a transformation compelled by pressure to demonstrate efficacy to their donors. While many donors operate in the public interest, there are those partisans on the right and the left who serve as the paymasters in the war of ideas. Some, therefore, straddle the line between nonprofit and for-profit organizations. Clearly, the funding dilemma obstructs the think tank ideal of objective policy advice. Preying on budgetary necessity, partisan politics exudes an overriding pressure on think tanks to align. Increasingly, balanced analysis is no longer considered by both sides as nonpartisan; rather, it is considered a product of the enemy. This unfortunate situation has the potential to eventually erode the credibility of think tanks. In order to remain effective, think tanks must actively seek to uphold their intellectual independence and objectivity and avoid being sucked into the ideological warfare presently occurring within the American political landscape. Nevertheless, while the fact that public policy think tanks are influenced by politics is self-evident and the observation that some think tanks have become overtly partisan is empirically valid, the contention that all think tanks have become overly partisan and therefore dysfunctional is somewhat questionable. That is not to say that think tanks exercise absolute academic freedom, but rather to assert that a defining characteristic of public policy think tanks is their relative intellectual independence even during this modern paradigm of politicization operating with full force on the think tank domain. Through greater synergy, collaboration, and consolidation, think tanks can respond to the changes in Washington’s political environment in the most positive manner possible.

The Role of Think Tanks Outside the United States It is important to recognize that the conditions that enable think tanks to operate as an effective counterweight to the state and the for-profit sector are not necessarily present in every civil society; considerable variation exists in the character of public policy research organizations in differing national contexts. Indeed, certain conditions are required if think tanks are to be afforded the independence and, consequently, permitted the objectivity they require. In the advanced industrialized democracies of Europe and

36 Introduction

North America there exist legal, political, and financial frameworks that reserve a space in the political arena for the independent policy analysis think tanks provide. In contrast, the restricted nature or absence of such frameworks in much of the developing world acts to severely limit the intellectual freedom of think tanks in these regions. Yet the assumption that think tanks are unique to the American political system continues to lead to the imposition of an American-centric definition to classify its global counterparts. Such an imposition could not be more inaccurate. Think tanks now operate in a variety of political and economic systems—in mature democratic nations as well as emerging democracies, in postindustrial economies as well as developing market systems—and while the United States has vastly more think tanks than any other country, the number of think tanks operating in the rest of the globe now exceeds the number found in the United States. It must be recognized that the character of these organizations emerging outside the Anglo-American sphere represents a changing dynamic in the think tank domain. The majority of the think tanks throughout the rest of the world are explicitly affiliated with political parties, governments, or corporations. It is not surprising, then, that as think tanks have crossed borders and political systems, the meaning and the international usage of the term has become fuzzy. While a tension between think tanks with affiliations and those without can be found in the United States,, the debate outside America is a little different. The question of independence in the Anglo-American domain arises from the politicization of the domain and the subsequent emerging trend of reduced financial autonomy in both newly established and existing policy research institutions. For the most part, outside the Anglo-American domain, the questions of financial, legal, and administrative independence do not exist. If anything, a lack of any such independence is a prerequisite for recognized existence outside this domain. The classification of independent think tanks as an ideal model, according to some, reflects the Anglo-American-centric dimension of this definition. To this end, Stone, Denham, and Garnett assert that ‘‘the notion that a think tank requires independence or autonomy from the state and private interests in order to be ‘free-thinking’ is a peculiarly Anglo-American predilection that does not travel well in other countries.’’176 Indeed, the conditions that give rise to this model (namely, the democratic freedom of civil association) have most often eluded the nations of the developing world, which, for varying reasons, have been unable to accommodate the full range

Introduction 37

of independent research and analysis. Hence, truly independent, nonaffiliated think tanks are, in many places, an implausible model currently; it will take many years for developing and transitional countries to adopt that model and incorporate it into their political and social frameworks. There is a specific set of conditions that must be met in order for these institutions to be permitted the space in which to operate as independent actors in the political arena. For think tanks outside the Anglo-American domain, substantial independence from government and the private sphere is highly uncommon and, in certain instances, prohibited. Corruption and the constant struggle by governments to maintain power mean that even minor affiliations with government can compromise the intellectual liberty of an affected think tank. In addition, often the same individuals espouse government and business interests, in cases where corrupt political officials effectively control the private sector. It is no surprise that, given their proximity to government and the nature of policy advice, think tanks are often targets for government intervention in countries where there are authoritarian, corrupt, nontransparent governments. Hence, the United States prototype is in some respects unrepresentative in certain countries. One must be careful not to generalize these differences between the American and British think tank domain into broad assumptions about the way in which the European domain can be distinguished from the American domain. Indeed, the European domain is far from homogeneous. That said, it appears that there is more agreement than disagreement on the key features of a think tank. The French view suggests a European belief that think tanks are only independent if they are funded by the government and that if they are not, and instead are funded by private funds, then they are somehow corrupted, no matter how diversified the funding is. In this regard, Fieschi asserts that ‘‘there is no sound definitional French equivalent to the English term ‘think tank.’ ’’177 There is in fact a fundamental dissonance between AngloAmerican and French political thought. In Britain and America, society is founded on a liberal philosophy that has as its core the role of the free market (this is where the notion of a ‘‘marketplace of ideas’’ came from). In France, however, civil society ‘‘virtually excludes the private sector’’ and hinges ‘‘on a direct relationship between the state and the individual.’’178 Corporate financing of public policy research organizations is seen as existing in direct tension with the values of the republic. Furthermore, think tanks in France maintain a ‘‘conflictual’’ relationship with political parties

38 Introduction

and project themselves instead as alternatives.179 While France embraces a different view of the relationship between state and civil society, its think tank domain agrees with the Anglo-American domain on a number of basic features, namely ‘‘ideological coherence,’’ ‘‘expertise,’’ and a goal of ‘‘impact.’’180 An analysis of Germany yields similar conclusions. To Martin Thunert, Germany has ‘‘hardly a vigorous legacy of independent policy analysis and research.’’181 Thus, he asserts, it is necessary to use a broad and encompassing definition of a think tank. Moreover, compared to the Anglo-American domain, the percentage of publicly financed think tanks is high (at least 75 percent). The commitment of the state to its think tank domain as financier and sponsor reflects Germany’s federal structure. On a broader level, this also embodies the aforementioned belief that think tanks are only independent if the government funds them. Hartwig Pautz also assesses the transferability of the term to the German political context. He contends that while in the English-speaking world the term connotes scientificity and intellectual freedom, in Germany the term is ‘‘popular with more recent advocacy-oriented policy research institutes but sometimes still frowned upon by organizations thriving on their ostensibly scholarly disposition.’’182 This notion attests to Stone’s statement that the understanding of what constitutes a think tank is indeed highly ‘‘reflective of the socio-political context in which think-tanks were first constituted.’’183 Nevertheless, the basic characteristics of think tanks in the Anglo-American domain persist in like institutions in the German domain. For while the distribution of think tanks in Germany across Weaver’s categorization is different from that in the American think tank community, the basic purposes of these institutions remain the same.184 The Italian think tank domain is further evidence of the fundamental similarities between think tanks in the Anglo-American domain and those in Europe. To Sonia Lucarelli, although there may be very few think tanks of the ‘‘U.S./UK-type,’’ most of Italy’s private independent policy research institutions share some features of the traditional think tank model to some extent.185 For example, think tanks in Italy have some degree of control over their research agenda and have robust dissemination programs in place. Between the states of eastern Europe there was formerly a common way in which ideas, policymaking, and power were associated within the think tank domain and that of the government. The institutional, intellectual,

Introduction 39

and ideological landscape of the Soviet Union placed boundaries on this association. Centralized authority restricted free expression of original ideas, especially in subjects that carried particular political or ideological weight. Hence, relative to the Anglo-American domain, intellectual autonomy could seldom be exercised. Despite this climate of reduced intellectual autonomy, think tanks still occupied an important position on the Soviet– east European political landscape. Kevin Quigley documents the rise of think tanks in eastern Europe, providing insight into the dynamics of that think tank domain as well as those in the Anglo-American domain.186 During communist rule, policy analysis and development were solely carried out by the government, at government-controlled academies and research institutes. Moreover, those institutions that did create high-quality research produced work that was primarily theoretical, and thus inapplicable to the policymaking domain. Since 1989 and the end of communist rule, there has been a rapid increase in the number of think tanks in eastern Europe that conduct more policyoriented research. That being said, because of historical obstacles such as the lack of public participation in policymaking, emerging think tanks in eastern Europe face formidable obstacles to success. Indeed, while think tanks foster civic engagement, they are doing so in a political environment that suppresses that very democratic liberty; disagreement is often interpreted, and punished, as political hostility. Quigley’s study argues that think tanks in the region generally originated in one of two ways: through the establishment of a completely new institute (focusing primarily on economic issues) or the transformation of an existing institute, often within the country’s academy of sciences. The transformed think tanks tend to focus on political issues (such as foreign policy or security). Quigley stresses that it is unrealistic to think these transformed institutions can provide policy alternatives that will be heeded, let alone implemented to some degree. For the most part, these institutions are still under the financial and administrative control of their countries’ foreign and defense ministries. For Quigley, think tanks operate with a different agenda outside the Anglo-American domain—most institutions rely on the leadership of a single individual and do not have many qualified leaders. The newly created think tanks also often try to do too many things—they are a far cry from the project-specific public policy research institutions emerging in the United States. At the same time, the marketing

40 Introduction

skills of these institutions are deficient, their constituency is narrow, and, even if their advocacy operations were relatively competent, the government exercises its power to curtail any such pursuits. Hence, while Quigley does not offer a definition that reconciles these differences with the AngloAmerican domain, he provides considerable insight to the inapplicability of the Anglo-American notion of a think tank to political contexts outside that sphere. The lack of analytical proficiency of the communist government in the Soviet Union led to the use of the expertise the domain offered, and hence Soviet think tanks, though not intellectually autonomous, were politically active. Once more, though the Soviet think tank domain presents perhaps a few more peculiarities than most European regions, the basic informed policy-advice-producing function of think tanks persists. No clear boundaries have been placed on this universe of institutions; it has been almost impossible to arrive at a shared definition for institutions that conduct public policy research. Most of the attempts at definitions are either too broad or too narrow and, when approaching the term from a narrower perspective, many of the authors have failed to build on existing literature on the subject, resulting in duplication and confusion.

Broadening the Discussion to the Developing World When we think about think tanks universally, a modified version of Paul Dickson’s 1972 definition is more representative: from a global perspective, a think tank can be for profit or nonprofit; supported by the government, part of the government, completely free of the government, or supported by a number of institutions, such as a company or university;187 and, finally, must practice relative academic freedom. The market for new ideas reflects the conditions into which these ideas are to be introduced. There are thirteen determinants of the number and character of think tanks in a particular nation-state or region.188 These include political freedom, political system, number of years as a democracy, number and strength of political parties, nature of civil society, freedom of the press, economic freedom, gross domestic product per capita, public sector demand for independent policy advice, population, philanthropic culture, number and independence of universities, and the level of global integration of and number and type of think tanks. Though a theoretical explanation of the correlation

Introduction 41

between these indicators and the think tank environment of a given nationstate or region is beyond the purpose of this chapter, a more practical insight into these relationships is provided by the regional analyses below. Central and South America The countries of Central and South America face policy issues—health care, social security, welfare, and foreign policy—that are concerns for any nation-state. Regardless of such similarities, there exists considerable polarity in political systems and political culture, and thus in the fundamental way in which these issues are approached. Indeed, even though a large proportion of countries in Central and South America have embraced market-based economies and democratic principles of governance, the continent remains a far cry from the fully developed democracies found in the United States and Western Europe. The countries in the region are instead fragile democracies still plagued by a legacy of colonialism, military rule, command economics, and the geopolitics of the Cold War. These inhibitions on political and economic development are also the result of the current legacy of these countries, wherein the social and political maladies of drug trafficking and corruption serve to undermine the rule of law and democratic institutions. Hence, the policy environment of these countries is distinguished from that of the Anglo-American domain not only by the presence of partially democratic states but also in that problems such as crime and lawlessness, poverty, unemployment, rapid urbanization, and population growth are present in both a different form and magnitude. For example, Venezuela is rated by Freedom House as only ‘‘partly free’’ because of its limited democracy and limited capacity to stimulate independent public policy analysis (and it has just three think tanks). Because of the difference in capacity for independent public policy analysis, the think tanks in the countries of Central and South America are markedly different from analogous institutions in the Anglo-American domain. A common problem in Central and South America is not partisanship and heterogeneity in policymaking but instead the opposite. The media sphere imposes a stifling homogeneity on independent public policy analysts as a result of a strict tradition of self-censorship. Because the media are the primary outlet for the expression of policy ideas in Central and South America, this tradition substantially limits the agenda and efficacy of public policy research organizations in this region. Furthermore, many of

42 Introduction

the region’s think tanks lack the capital and subsequently the resources to achieve significant policy influence because of the absence of the kind of philanthropy found in the United States. Limited economic freedom has translated into a relatively weak philanthropic culture in Latin America. In the absence of private support, Latin American think tanks are incentivized to rely on government contracts, foreign donors, and private sector consulting. This has obvious consequences for the intellectual independence of public policy research institutions in the region. There are, however, some similarities between the Central and South American think tank sphere and think tanks in Anglo-America. Although the response has been slower in comparison to the United States, Central and South American think tanks are proliferating in response to an increasingly common interest in reform. Furthermore, think tanks in Latin America have increased public awareness and engagement in policy issues, and will likely continue to benefit from this more competitive policy environment through increased demand for their services in countries across the region. Europe In Europe, the divide that separated the continent into East and West has come to an end but significant ethnic, economic, and political cleavages remain. These are manifest in policy problems such as immigration, terrorism, organized crime, corruption, and the challenges posed by dynamic yet volatile democracies and market economies in the east and the stagnant economies in the west. Nevertheless, Europe provides a stable environment for think tanks and independent analysis and advice. Important determinants of European think tanks include political freedoms, political structure, the strength of the economy and civil society, and the university systems. In central and eastern Europe, the complementary processes of democratization and market reform have created an emerging environment for strong and sustainable think tanks. Hungary is a good example of this. Its political system, relatively well-developed civil society, free press, dynamic economy, and assistance from substantial and continuous foreign investment are conditions amenable to the development of think tanks that more closely resemble those found in the Anglo-American domain. However, considerations of the strength of the European think tank domain

Introduction 43

aside, there are a number of important differences between the American and European notion of a think tank. First, think tanks—in the European Union countries especially—have different horizons than those in the United States and seek influence at different levels of the system of governance. Policy research institutions in Germany, for example, not only have a national and local focus, providing policy analysis and advice within the nation’s borders, but also work increasingly at the European level. This represents a shift in approach to policy issues from a consideration of national interests only to one of national versus regional interests. Second, it is more common in Europe for political parties to have think tanks that function as party foundations. In Germany, for example, think tanks are party affiliated. Though these party affiliations allow for the sustainability of think tanks in their respective regions, this raises serious questions about partisanship and independence that, though present, are perhaps more implicit in the Anglo-American domain. Third, some countries have systems of government in which the centralization of power leaves little room for the influence of nongovernmental actors. In limiting these actors’ distribution channels, such systems of government reshape the fundamental role of these institutions. In Russia, for example, its federal semipresidential republic system of government only accepts the operation of these organizations as long as they are providing ‘‘useful’’ services and not engaging in explicit advocacy. Civil opposition is not welcome. In addition, the reduced freedom of the press in Russia has meant that media outlets are less inclined to disseminate the research of independent public policy analysts. As a consequence, the American precedent of a policy discourse between think tanks, the public, and government is absent from civil society in Russia. Indeed, think tanks operating under these circumstances are less able to generate the original ideas, informed discussion, and educative role that are characteristic of think tanks in the Anglo-American domain. Fourth, the philanthropic culture that so fuels the development of think tanks in America is absent in some European countries. Russia once more provides a good example. Russia has a low gross domestic product and a relatively weak economy, and this economic instability suppresses the philanthropic spirit. This lack of philanthropy and investment in Russia represents a major obstruction to the growth and advance of policy advice

44 Introduction

in the country. That said, the emergence of a hyperwealthy class of businessmen might induce some future dynamism in Russia’s philanthropic culture. By contrast, a strong economy and philanthropic culture in Germany has fueled the expansion of its think tank environment. Finally, university systems are of much greater importance to the European think tank domain than in the United States. After the fall of communism in countries such as Hungary and Russia, the communist emphasis on academic excellence translated into the foundations for newly independent think tanks, or at least partly autonomous government or university research institutes. In Germany, too, university systems are primary engines for policy analysis and advice. Asia Asia provides an array of policy problems and political systems markedly different from those in the United States. For this reason, the policymaking environment is to a large degree inhospitable to the brand of think tanks that frequent the Anglo-American domain. Asia is home to three of the four remaining communist states in the world, many of the economies and democracies are fragile, and several authoritarian regimes are firmly in control of power. Other issues, such as extreme environmental degradation, overpopulation, and a rapidly expanding HIV-AIDS epidemic, shroud the region. For example, as a result of the marked absence of economic freedom, freedom of the press, civil liberties, and religion, all five think tanks in Vietnam are controlled by the government. In many countries across the region, these factors contribute to an extremely closed society that inhibits the ability of think tanks to engage with policymakers and offer sound, independent policy advice. China is another example. China represses the freedom to publicly oppose government policy and, despite the fact that China’s economy has undergone considerable liberalization and decentralization, the Chinese Communist Party severely limits the people’s political freedom and civil liberties. Indeed, on a broader level, the concentration of decision making creates an environment in which open, inclusive political debate cannot take place and limits the ability of think tanks to carry out the role played by analogous institutions in the Anglo-American domain. The absence of this freedom can be accredited to the leader and party’s desire to hold onto power through control and repression of critical voices. Additionally, the

Introduction 45

absence of freedom of the press and freedom of private academic institutions to pursue independent research exacerbates the inhospitableness of Asia to Western think tank models. Conversely, in stable multiparty systems, there is a much higher tolerance for critical opinion and debate that provides considerable room for the establishment of more think tanks. In this way, countries such as Japan offer a policymaking environment similar to the Anglo-American sphere. Hence, with the presence of open, inclusive policy debate, transparency, and party competition, the demand for the deeper analysis of current issues offered by independent public policy research organizations is high.

Africa The sociopolitical context of Africa is also markedly different from that of the United States. Though the policy challenges are numerous and complex—including a rapidly growing population, high incidence of infant mortality and HIV-AIDS infection, continuing national and subnational conflict, environmental degradation, endemic corruption, and lack of respect for the rule of law—the region has notable potential and the opportunity for continued political reform and social and economic development. Indeed, most of the constituent states that are currently authoritarian and unstable are following a trajectory toward stable, representative democracies and thus an environment more conducive to independent public policy analysis and advice. That being said, Africa is a region of extremes. The politically repressive and economically ruinous situation in Angola stands in stark contrast with the more stable, yet faltering Ivorian context and with the exceptional conditions present in the South African case. In Angola, the scarcity of philanthropic support and lack of demand for policy advice distinguishes the notion of a think tank in Africa from that of its counterparts in the United States. Yet in the Ivory Coast and South Africa, there is a substantial demand for economic policy advice and the philanthropic culture is strong. In general, however, capital to fund and develop think tanks is scarce on the continent. The vast extremes that define Africa make it difficult to construct a definition of Africa’s think tank domain. South Africa’s thriving think tank community appears to fit more in the European or North American context, whereas Ivory Coast and Angola represent a departure. The forms of

46 Introduction

government and the character of civil society in these three examples help illustrate why this is the case. In Africa especially, there appears to be a chasm between the legal definition of a given political system and the reality of everyday power and politics. For example, on paper, South Africa, Angola, and Ivory Coast are supposed to be operating as presidential-parliamentary electoral democracies. However, in practice, each of these governments operates very differently, and it thus seems that the reality, not the formal structure of a political system, is the most important determinant of the environment in which think tanks operate. Thus we have Angola being run as a single-party authoritarian state and political competition and the demand for policy advice is the opposite of what would be expected of a presidentialparliamentary electoral democracy. The character of think tanks in Africa is also dependent on the nature of civil society. The higher the tolerance for civil society, the greater the number and intellectual independence of think tanks found in the country in question. Given the diversity of the African think tank domain, exemplified in the polarity between South Africa and Angola, one cannot identify a continent-wide trend from for this metric. As is evident in other regions, the availability and allocation of capital to support think tanks is definitive of the institutions occupying a given think tank environment. Once more, though, given the diversity of political reality in the African domain—civilsociety-targeted funding and, as noted earlier, a philanthropic culture characterize the South African environment but not the Angolan environment—it is equally problematic to identify a trend using this alternative metric. If the paradox of think tanks’ situation is that they must operate within the very environment they seek to change, then in Africa, by virtue of the different environments that clusters of the constituent nation-states offer, think tank operations and character display great variance.

The Middle East The Middle East does not have a thriving civil society; each country, with the exception of Israel, has yet to develop the democratic values and atmosphere that is conducive to independent civil society organizations and think tanks. Indeed, governments in the Middle East restrict the free and

Introduction 47

effective operation of the third sector in their countries. Censorship is commonplace, and antigovernment opinions are prevented from publication, while authors of such materials may face fines and imprisonment. In addition to these hindrances, countries of the Middle East are torn between the forces of globalization, religious fundamentalism, and traditional patriarchal society. Furthermore, governments face issues of war and peace, economic stagnation, lack of participatory government, competition for water resources, and high population rates. Evident in the Middle East think tank domain is the potential for ongoing conflict and political tension to markedly distort the environment in which think tanks operate. Such conflict attracts investors, both domestic and global, who are seeking to articulate their goals of peace in the region. For example, Egypt receives substantial foreign assistance, partly to ensure the government supports the peaceful resolution of the conflict, but also to invest in policy decisions that align with those funders’ partiality on certain issues. As in the Anglo-American domain, this dependency on interestbased capital provision compromises, to some extent, the intellectual autonomy of the institutions in the Middle East. In other countries, such as Iran, the government does not allow domestic or international funds to support think tanks. Hence, the two think tanks in the country are government run. Think tanks in Egypt, too, possess formal affiliations with external institutions; many think tanks in the country are strongly affiliated with universities. Thus, intellectual independence, as a function of nominal financial and organizational autonomy, is something of an elusive ideal in the Middle East and cannot be justifiably included in a universal definition of its constituent think tanks. In the Middle East, however, as in the case of Africa, there is variation in the freedom of civil society and media. In Israel the nonprofit sector is thriving, with collaboration and deliberation over policy issues rampant, whereas in Egypt, this parallel vibrancy is closely monitored by the government and checked when the government feels threatened. This variation further renders a universal definition of the think tank domain in the region problematic. Open democratic societies provide the best conditions for independent policy analysis and advice. Therefore, a multiparty democracy seems to be the system that is most hospitable to think tanks of the character of the Anglo-American domain. One must note, however, that the system implicit in the political reality of a country is much more formative of

48 Introduction

that country’s think tank domain than the system that it is formally associated with. Philanthropy makes a significant difference in the character of the think tanks that occupy a given country’s third sector. Wealth and disposable income are not enough. Countries can be wealthy but if they do not believe in spending their money on public goods like independent policy analysis or do not value this good specifically, think tanks will not benefit. For example, in many countries there are more pressing domestic issues, such as health epidemics in Africa, that demand funds that might otherwise be dedicated to public policy research. It seems, therefore, that the character of think tanks is to some degree a function of the priorities of the government and a private funding environment, constituted by domestic or international donors who can be particularly sensitive to issues of government concern. Indeed, in countries where there is little hope of finding the wealth necessary to support a philanthropic community, charitable causes such as feeding the hungry or housing the homeless absorb the bulk of private domestic and international aid. Media freedom is another factor that determines the strength of the correlation between think tanks outside the Anglo-American domain and those inside it. The level of freedom that the media can exercise is the primary determinant of the extent of the dissemination operations that a think tank can pursue. Individual local factors may also greatly influence the number and specialized nature of think tanks within a country. For example, the character of the think tank domain of countries such as South Africa that once experienced severe racial tensions tends to display a disproportionate focus on topics that directly and indirectly address this issue. Despite the efforts of some scholars and policymakers to question the potential transferability of U.S.-style independent think tanks to other regions and countries of the world, many policymakers and civil society groups from around the globe have sought to create truly independent, freestanding think tanks to help their governments. So while the transferability of the Brookings Institution, Rand Corporation, or Heritage Foundation model to other countries and political cultures may be debated, the need and desire to replicate the independence and influence these institutions enjoy is unchallenged. In an effort to bridge the conceptual problems encountered consistently throughout this chapter and to create a typology that takes into consideration the comparative differences in political systems and civil societies, we

Introduction 49

Table 1. Think Tank Typologies Category

Definition

Autonomous and independent

Significant independence from any one interest group or donor and autonomous in its operation and funding from government

Quasi-independent

Autonomous from government but controlled by an interest group, donor, or contracting agency that provides a majority of the funding and has significant influence over operations of the think tank

University affiliated

A policy research center at a university

Political party affiliated

Formally affiliated with a political party

Government affiliated

A part of the structure of government

Quasi-governmental

Funded exclusively by government grants and contracts but not a part of the formal structure of government

have developed a number of categories for think tanks. While think tanks may perform many roles in their host societies, not all think tanks do the same things to the same extent. Over the last eighty-five years, several distinctive organizational forms of think tanks have come into being that differ substantially in their operating styles, their patterns of recruitment, and their aspirations to academic standards of objectivity and completeness in research. It should be noted that other analysts have offered alternate typologies of think tanks. We argue here that, in the global context, most think tanks tend to fall into the broad categories outlined in the table of typologies (see Table 1).

Achieving the Objectives: Structure and Form Each case study in the chapters in this book falls into one of the following thematic areas: (1) challenges and opportunities for social and economic development arising from processes of globalization (relation of market and governance), (2) social and political conditions of development strategies (industrialization, agricultural development, water sanitation and

50 Introduction

hygiene, financial inclusion, global access to technology, and urbanization), (3) similarities and differences of development models among the G20 countries (comparison of development models), and (4) development and environmentally sustainable resource utilization (environment and resource crisis). In designing the project, we aimed to keep the chapters concise— primarily to maximize their accessibility and impact. Institutional background is important—and we encouraged the authors to incorporate it. Still, the primary objective of each case is to demonstrate a think tank’s impact on social development policies—or, more specifically, to show the reader how the knowledge, evidence, and research produced by think tanks has successfully translated into social development policies all around the world. With all this in mind, the case studies that follow all communicate a number of common elements. Each chapter first details the distinctive features of a given think tank’s strategy and structure, to the extent that they are relevant to the successful impact of the institution’s social development policy research. Following this more structural explanation, each chapter contextualizes the think tank’s efforts in relation to the political, economic, and social factors that shape both the institution and the policy environment in which it operates. The chapter then discusses the specific policy impacts of the institution’s research, explaining both the stage or stages in the policy process in which the think tank was most impactful and how the organization overcame any conceptual, political, financial, or institutional limitations to achieve and maximize its impact on policy. Finally, each chapter discusses the lessons learned from the think tank’s particular iteration of policy research and influence that might provide a jumping-off point for future peer-to-peer exchanges. In broadest terms, the objective in compiling this collection of institutional case studies was to develop a detailed set of success stories of think tanks and their influence on policy, in the hopes that the product might prove instructive for and transferable to think tanks in other countries— and especially those that operate in developing countries. The case studies generated are rigorous in their content, supported both by the academic literature and by independently verifiable evidence of the institutions involved and their impact on the policymaking process. The cases aggregated here together provide a coherent set of examples of effective and innovative think tank strategies and organizational structures, represent

Introduction 51

institutions based around the world and in a wide range of political and economic systems, and suggest novel means of measuring both policy impact and think tank performance. And most importantly, the aggregated cases illustrate the importance of practitioner input in improving development policy and provide an accessible resource for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners alike.

Selecting and Developing the Case Studies Our methods for reviewing and processing information involved inviting over thirty think tanks to participate in the project by submitting prospectuses that conformed to the specifications outlined above. We developed the universe of institutions using the 2011 Global Go To Think Tank Index, the annually compiled list of the world’s leading think tanks, consciously including a range of political and economic systems, social development policies, and think tank strategies and structures. A group of scholars and research assistants at the University of Pennsylvania reviewed the prospectuses and selected twenty institutions to develop case studies. The authors submitted drafts of the case studies, which the editorial team reviewed, and the team sent suggested revisions to each of the authors. In June 2012, we convened a meeting of the authors in Philadelphia to review the draft manuscripts and discuss the goals of the project. Additionally, we circulated the full set of cases for comment and editing in advance of publication. The authors of the case studies in these chapters are scholars at institutions based around the world. They include those in highly industrialized European countries such as Germany and major world powers such as Russia and United States, and also institutions in emerging countries such as China, India, and Brazil and maturing emerging countries such as the Republic of Korea. The choice to include institutions from non-G20 member countries—including Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania— reflects our and our sponsor’s desire to transfer the accumulated knowledge of think tanks in the developed and emerging countries to those in developing countries. We also hope that this collection of cases will contribute to an expansion of the traditional G20 agenda of economic growth and stability to incorporate the concerns of developing nations—concerns often themselves intrinsically linked to social development.

52 Introduction

What Follows This discussion of the extant literature on think tanks and the work they do to research and influence development policy sought to provide a review of the literature on ideas and their power in shaping both the policy environment specifically and the world we live in more broadly, contextualizing the work think tanks do in regard to the power of the work they produce to affect tangible (social) change. By means of the review of the literature, we hoped to highlight the various ways in which think tanks might seek to influence policy and policymakers, providing a framework along which our readers might make relevant comparisons throughout the following chapters. Immediately following this literature review, the book looks first at education policy through a discussion of the successful efforts of the Brookings Institution and CIPPEC to affect education policy in the United States and Argentina, respectively. We then turn to a pair of cases that detail the influence of two think tanks based in India, the Centre for Public Policy (CPP) and the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), on the state’s policy on and provision of public transportation. Third, the book turns to think tanks’ efforts to affect environmental and sustainable development policies. The chapters in this part grow out of the work of the Ecologic Institute, based in Germany; Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA), based in South Africa; and the Gulf Research Center (GRC), based in Saudi Arabia. The fourth part details think tanks’ impact on policies related to economic reform, debt crisis management, and economic coordination, through a set of five very geographically diverse cases—Belgium’s Bruegel, Indonesia’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Poland’s Center for Economic and Social Research (CASE), and the Korea Development Institute (KDI). The fifth part delves into agriculture and land development policies, featuring case studies from Fundar, based in Mexico; the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA); and China’s Center for Rural Environment Social Studies. Sixth, we turn to think tanks that have engaged with poverty alleviation policy, including studies from Kenya’s African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) and Tanzania’s Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA). The seventh and final part looks specifically at social policy, featuring cases from the Center for American Progress, Russia’s Carnegie Moscow Center, and Brazil’s PRONASCI.

Introduction 53

In its final pages, the book concludes with a three-pronged discussion. First, we provide an overview of the chapters, with a particular focus on the key lessons of each think tank’s successful efforts to influence social development policy. Largely an outgrowth of this first section, the second then introduces a set of recommendations for think tanks and policymakers to maximize the instructiveness and applicability of the cases as presented. Finally, the conclusion turns to a broader discussion based in the literature on the importance of ideas—both in today’s world more broadly, and in the value of think tanks and the work they do more specifically. Ultimately, we conclude with a simple statement: ideas matter. It is, at the end of the day, for this reason that think tanks and the work they do can and do have so profound an impact on bettering the world we all live in.

Notes 1. UNRISD, ‘‘Social Development in an Uncertain World: UNRISD Research Agenda 2010–2014,’’ United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (Geneva, 2011). 2. John Friedmann, Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992). 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. UNRISD, ‘‘Social Development in an Uncertain World.’’ 6. Ibid. 7. Thandike Mkandawire, ‘‘Targeting and Universalism in Poverty Reduction,’’ United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (2005). 8. Friedmann, Empowerment. 9. Gary Gereffi and Stephanie Fonda, ‘‘Regional Paths of Development,’’ Annual Review of Sociology 18, 1992, 419–448. 10. Friedmann, Empowerment. 11. Estes, ‘‘Developmental Social Work: A New Paradigm for a New Century,’’ Inter-University Consortium for International Social Development (Cairo, 1998). 12. UNRISD, ‘‘Social Development in an Uncertain World.’’ 13. Estes, ‘‘Developmental Social Work.’’ 14. Estes, ‘‘Developmental Social Work’’; Friedmann, Empowerment; UNRISD, ‘‘Social Development in an Uncertain World’’; World Bank, ‘‘World Bank Social Development Strategy,’’ 2005; Amal Kanti Ray, ‘‘Measurement of Social Development: An International Comparison,’’ Social Indicators Research 86, no. 1 (March 2008) 1–46. 15. World Bank, ‘‘World Bank Social Development Strategy.’’

54 Introduction 16. Estes, ‘‘Developmental Social Work.’’ 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Rob Bijl, ‘‘Never Waste a Good Crisis: Towards Social Sustainable Development,’’ Social Indicators Research 102 (2011) 157–168. 20. Ibid. 21. Thomas Medvetz, ‘‘Think Tanks as an Emergent Field,’’ Social Science Research Council (2008): 1. 22. Simon James, ‘‘Review of Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process by Diane Stone,’’ Public Administration 76, no. 2 (1998): 409–410. 23. This is reflected in the following works: Donald E. Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 8–9; James A. Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite (New York: Free Press, 1991), xiii–xvi; James G. McGann and Erik C. Johnson, Comparative Think Tanks, Politics and Public Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005), 11–12; James G. McGann and R. Kent Weaver, Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 2002), 4–5; R. Kent Weaver, ‘‘Changing World of Think Tanks,‘‘ Political Science and Politics 22 (1989): 563–564; Medvetz, ‘‘Think Tanks as an Emergent Field,’’ 9–10; Thomas Medvetz, ‘‘Hybrid Intellectuals: Toward a Theory of Think Tanks and Public Policy Experts in the United States,‘‘ Cornell University 1 (2007): 1–3; Diane Stone, Andrew Denham, and Mark Garnett, Think Tanks Across Nations: A Comparative Approach (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 2–6; Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 11–12; DeMuth, ‘‘Thinking About Think Tanks,’’ in Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg, part one of two, October 13, 2005, 2; Hartwig Pautz, ‘‘Think Tanks in Scotland,’’ paper presented at the 55th Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Leeds, April 4–7, 2005, 2–5; Diane Stone, ‘‘Think Tank Transnationalization and Non-Profit Analysis, Advice, and Advocacy,’’ Global Society 14, no. 2 (2000): 28; Andrew Denham and Diane Stone, eds., Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 1–4. 24. Diane Stone offers her own categorization of the literature in Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 10. To Stone, there are two types of literature seeking to define think tanks: Type (1) studies the manner of all organizations engaged in policy and scientific research, either independently of or for government and business. (Example: Paul Dickson and Harold Orlans identify a broad organizational phenomenon, but do not address in detail the precise manifestations of the independent public policy research institute.) Type (2) attempts to define more precisely the independent public policy research institute. Stone notes, however, that these narrower definitions, while ‘‘individually useful,’’ are ‘‘collectively’’ confusing. Further, the use of different terms, criteria, and methodologies creates contradictions and obscurity. (Example: Nelson Polsby’s definition of a

Introduction 55 ‘‘true think tank’’ [one that is removed from policy influence] conflicts with many definitions. Nelson W. Polsby, ‘‘Tanks but No Tanks,’’ Public Opinion 6 [1983]: 14–16, 58–59.) 25. Medvetz, ‘‘Think Tanks,’’ 3. 26. Ibid. 27. Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, 10. 28. Ibid. 29. Medvetz, ‘‘Think Tanks,’’ 2. 30. Ibid., 3. 31. Paul Dickson, Think Tanks (New York: Atheneum, 1971). 32. Ibid. 33. James G. McGann, The Competition for Dollars, Scholars, and Influence in the Public Policy Research Industry (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995), 19. 34. Donald E. Abelson, A Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 54. 35. Richard N. Haass, ‘‘Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker’s Perspective,’’ Foreign Policy Agenda 7, no. 3 (2002): 5. 36. Ibid. 37. James G. McGann, ‘‘Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy,’’ U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda 7, no. 3 (2002): 14. 38. Dickson, Think Tanks, 26. 39. Weaver, ‘‘The Changing World of Think Tanks,’’ 566. This dynamic is also identified in Abelson, A Capitol Idea, 74–77. 40. Weaver, ‘‘The Changing World of Think Tanks,’’ 566. 41. Marcus G. Raskin, Being and Doing (New York: Random House, 1971), xii, xxv. 42. David M. Ricci, The Transformation of American Politics: The New Washington and the Rise of Think Tanks (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993), 149. 43. James G. McGann, ‘‘The Casualties in the War of Ideas,’’ Viewpoints (2005): 1. http://www.fpa.org/newsletter_info2489/newsletter_info_sub_list.htm?sectionThe %20Casualties%20in%20the%20War%20of%20Ideas. 44. Ibid., 1. 45. Michael L. Katz, ‘‘American Think Tanks: Their Influence Is on the Rise,’’ Carnegie Reporter 5, no. 2 (2009): 7. http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/ Reporter/PDF/carnegiereporter_v5n2.pdf. 46. Ricci, The Transformation of American Politics, 176. 47. Peter W. Singer, ‘‘Washington’s Think Tanks: Factories to Call Our Own,’’ Brookings Institution (2010), http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2010/0813_think_ tanks_singer.aspx. 48. McGann, The Competition, 29. 49. Harold Orlans, The Nonprofit Research Institute: Its Operation, Origins, Problems and Prospects (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), 3.

56 Introduction 50. McGann, The Competition, 28. 51. Dickson, Think Tanks, 26. 52. McGann, The Competition, 31. 53. Dickson, Think Tanks, 28. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid., 29. 56. David Boorstin, ‘‘Directions of Policy Research,’’ Congressional Quarterly 2 (1975): 725–744. 57. Ibid., 728. 58. Dickson, Think Tanks, 27. 59. Roger E. Levien, ‘‘Independent Public Policy Analysis Organization—A Major Social Invention,’’ Rand Papers Series (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1969), 4231. 60. McGann, The Competition, 35. 61. Polsby, ‘‘Tanks But No Tanks.’’ 62. Ibid. 63. George A. Fauriol, ‘‘Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy,’’ paper presented at the Fourth Tamkang American Strides Conference, Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan, November 25–28, 1984, 1, 9. 64. Yehezkel Dror, ‘‘Think Tanks: A New Invention in Government,’’ in Making Bureaucracies Work, ed. Carol H. Weiss and Allen H. Barton (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), 139–152. 65. Ibid., 141–145. 66. Ibid., 145. 67. Ibid., 144. 68. McGann, The Competition, 42. 69. Winard Gellner, ‘‘Political Think Tanks: Functions and Perspectives of a Strategic Elite,’’ paper presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 5. See also Howard J. Wiarda, Foreign Policy Without Illusion: How Foreign Policy-making Works and Fails to Work in the United States (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown Higher Education, 1990). 70. Ibid., 4. 71. McGann, The Transformation, 49. 72. Weaver, ‘‘The Changing World,’’ 563. 73. Orlans, The Nonprofit Research Institute, 3. 74. Weaver, ‘‘The Changing World,’’ 564. 75. Ibid., 568. 76. Ibid., 564. 77. Ibid., 567. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid., 577. 80. Ibid., 576–577. 81. McGann, The Competition, 45.

Introduction 57 82. Samantha Durst and James Thurber, ‘‘Studying Washington Think Tanks: In Search of Definitions and Data,’’ paper presented at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1989. 14. 83. Robert L. Hollings, Nonprofit Public Policy Research Organizations: A Sourcebook on Think Tanks in Government (New York: Garland, 1993), xv–xviii. 84. Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). The notion of a marketplace of ideas and the competition of ideas has its roots in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty published in 1859 in which he stresses the importance of liberty of thought and discussion. 85. Robert K. Landers, ‘‘Think Tanks: The New Partisans,’’ Editorial Research Reports 1, no. 23 (1986): 455. 86. Gregg Easterbrook, ‘‘Ideas Move Nations,’’ Atlantic Monthly (January 1986): 66. 87. Smith, The Idea Brokers, 236. 88. Ibid., xx. 89. Paul A. Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), 27. 90. Ibid. 91. Ibid. 92. Weaver, ‘‘The Changing World,’’ 574–575. 93. Hollings, Nonprofit Public Policy Research Organizations, acknowledges the imprecision of the term and concludes with only a ‘‘basic idea’’ of what think tanks are (‘‘research oriented . . . staffed to conduct its research agenda . . . needed by a clientele . . . produce research outputs’’; think tanks as a bridge between power and knowledge; ‘‘not-for-profit private organizations devoted to examining and analyzing public policy issues’’ and providing ‘‘inter-disciplinary science based contributions to policy-making’’; ‘‘brains, papers, and computers . . . are the equipment of think tanks’’ and they do not engage directly in field work; they must have ‘‘research freedom’’ or the ability to produce research free from the corruption and ideological persuasion of their institutional targets and that tackles questions cross-examined and reformulated independently). He also argues that think tanks ‘‘should be research oriented, staffed to conduct [their] research agenda, needed by a clientele, and produce research outputs.’’ In doing so, he succumbs to something very similar to the impulse that he condemns in his opening words. Ricci, The Transformation of American Politics, believes the universal unifying element of a think tank is the ‘‘intent to discuss policy relevant ideas with elected officials, bureaucrats, reporters, financial patrons, interest groups, and various sectors of the public at large.’’ Carol H. Weiss, Organizations for Policy Analysis: Helping Government Think (Newbury Park: Sage, 1992), asserts that think tanks are ‘‘policy oriented and their primary purpose is to improve the process and content of public policies’’ (ix). She sees output as ‘‘paper (Prince, 1983)’’ and emphasizes communication to ‘‘those engaged in making policy’’—and thus the necessity of the notion of engagement, with efforts focusing on dissemination.

58 Introduction 94. Matthews, qtd. in Katz, ‘‘American Think Tanks,’’ provides a modification of Stone’s definition, ‘‘bridge between government, academia, business and, depending on the issue, science.’’ Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, refers to think tanks’ ‘‘organizational independence and permanency; self-determination of research agendas; policy focus; public purpose; expertise and professionalism; organizational yield.’’ Denham and Stone, Think Tank Traditions, describe think tanks as institutions that (1) attempt to affect policy through academic argument as opposed to advocacy, (2) are engaged in both formulating policy itself and enunciating the principles that underpin policy, and (3) produce an output commonly in the form of information products intended for an audience composed of one or more of the following: political organizations, bureaucratic groups, the media, interest groups, business organizations, international civil society, and the general public. 95. Silvia Montoya and Rachel M. Swanger, ‘‘Ideas for Policymakers: Enhancing the Impact of Think Tanks,‘‘ Pardee RAND Graduate School: Policy Insight 1, no. 2 (2007): 1–2. 96. Ibid., 2. 97. Haass, ‘‘Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy,’’ 5. Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, concurs on a number of these points (civic education, broad output, conveners of discussions, marketing, and advocacy pursuits). 98. Katz, ‘‘American Think Tanks,’’ 13. 99. Haass, ‘‘Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy,’’ 7. 100. Diane Stone, Simon Maxwell, and Michael Keating, ‘‘Bridging Research and Policy,’’ paper presented at the International Workshop, Bridging Research and Policy, Warwick University, July 16–17, 2001, 29. 101. Strobe Talbott, qtd. in Katz, ‘‘American Think Tanks,’’ 13. 102. Howard J. Wiarda, Think Tanks and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Research Institute and Presidential Politics (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2010), 31. 103. Katz, ‘‘American Think Tanks,’’ 13. 104. Ibid., 2. 105. Abelson, A Capitol Idea, 14–15. 106. Haass, ‘‘Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy,’’ 7. 107. Crowley, qtd. in Katz, ‘‘American Think Tanks,’’ 3. 108. Haass, ‘‘Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy,’’ 8. 109. Katz, ‘‘American Think Tanks,’’ for example, shares this notion, as does Representative Jane Harman, qtd. in Katz, ‘‘American Think Tanks.’’ So do Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter?; Evert A. Lindquist, ‘‘Three Decades of Canadian Think Tanks: Evolving Institutions, Conditions and Strategies,‘‘ in Denham and Stone, Think Tank Traditions, 264–280; and Stone, ‘‘Think Tank Transnationalization.’’ 110. Pautz, ‘‘Think Tanks in Scotland,’’ 5. 111. Wiarda, Think Tanks and Foreign Policy, 29. 112. Haass, Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy, 8. 113. Stone, ‘‘Think Tank Transnationalization,’’ 16.

Introduction 59 114. Ibid. 115. Ibid. 116. Ibid., 18. 117. Ibid., 19. 118. Medvetz, ‘‘Hybrid Intellectuals,’’ 35. 119. Medvetz, ‘‘Think Tanks,’’ 9–10. 120. Ibid., 9–10. 121. Medvetz, ‘‘Hybrid Intellectuals,’’ 35–36. 122. Medvetz, ‘‘Think Tanks,’’ 6. 123. Ibid., 10. 124. Ibid., 8. 125. Wiarda, Think Tanks and Foreign Policy, 31. 126. In their article ‘‘Ideas for Policymakers,’’ Silvia Montoya and Rachel M. Swanger argue that think tanks have to strike a difficult balance between ‘‘building a close relationship with stakeholders for the purpose of enhancing the relevance and timeliness of research, and maintaining adequate independence to preserve the integrity (real and perceived) of the research’’ 4. 127. Iain Maclean and Alistair MacMillan, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 128. Andrew Rich, ‘‘U.S. Think Tanks and the Intersection of Ideology, Advocacy and Influence,’’ NIRA Review 8, no. 1(2001): 54. 129. Ibid., 55. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid. 132. Donald E. Abelson, American Think Tanks and Their Role in U.S. Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 125. 133. Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, 23. 134. Ibid., 13. 135. Ibid. 136. Stone, Denham, and Garnett, Think Tanks Across Nations, 5. 137. In Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise, Rich concurs with this notion. 138. Stone, Denham, and Garnett, Think Tanks Across Nations, 5. 139. Stone, ‘‘Think Tank Transnationalization,’’ 3. 140. Ibid., 5. 141. Ibid. 142. Ibid. 143. Stone, Maxwell, and Keating, ‘‘Bridging Research,’’ 27–28. 144. Ibid., 30. 145. Ibid. 146. Lindquist, ‘‘Three Decades of Canadian Think Tanks.’’ 147. James G. McGann, qtd. in Katz, ‘‘American Think Tanks,’’ 2.

60 Introduction 148. Stone, ‘‘Think Tank Transnationalization,’’ 15. 149. Katz, ‘‘American Think Tanks,’’ 17. 150. Abelson, American Think Tanks, 125. 151. Ibid., 49. 152. Ibid., 3. 153. Jonathan Rowe, http://jonrowe.blogspot.com. 154. Wiarda, Think Tanks and Foreign Policy, 31. 155. John Chuckman, ‘‘The Real Clash of Civilizations: Liberals Versus The Crypto-Nazis,’’ June 24, 2003, Aftermath-11-September-2001 Yahoo group, http:// www.yellowtimes.org/article.php?sid1442&modethread&order0. 156. Ibid. 157. Abelson, American Think Tanks, 125. 158. Charles William Maynes, farewell address in Foreign Policy (1997) cited in Raymond J. Struyk, Reconstructive Critics: Think Tanks in Post-Soviet Bloc Democracies (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1999), 36. 159. Medvetz, ‘‘Think Tanks,’’ 4. 160. Abelson, A Capitol Idea, 13–14. 161. Francesco Grillo, ‘‘Think Tanks in the Global Marketplace of Ideas,’’ Open Democracy (September 2001): 1–3. http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-think tank/articlee_390.jsp. 162. Ibid., 2. 163. Singer echoes Abelson, American Think Tanks, in this notion. 164. Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, also notes this trend fifteen years earlier. 165. Singer, ‘‘Washington’s Think Tanks,’’ 5. 166. Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, British Think Tanks and the Climate of Opinion (London: Routledge, 1998). 167. Ibid., 4. 168. Ibid., 5. 169. Ibid., 9. 170. Ibid. 171. Ibid., 9–10. 172. Ibid., 14. 173. McGann, ‘‘Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy,’’ 13–14. 174. Ibid. 175. Ibid, 16–17. 176. Stone, Denham, and Garnett, Think Tanks Across Nations, 2. The connection between the freedom of civil association and democracy was first identified in Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. 177. Fieschi, qtd. in Denham and Stone, Think Tank Traditions, 105. 178. Ibid., 107.

Introduction 61 179. Ibid., 120. 180. Ibid., 109. 181. Thunert, qtd. in ibid., 71. 182. Hartwig Pautz, ‘‘Think Tanks in the United Kingdom and Germany: Actors in the Modernisation of Social Democracy,’’ British Journal of Politics and International Relations 12, no. 2 (2010): 276. 183. Diane Stone, ‘‘Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three Myths Regarding Policy Analysis Institutes,’’ Public Administration 85, no. 2 (2007): 260. 184. Denham and Stone, Think Tank Traditions, 72. 185. Lucarelli, qtd. in ibid., 88. 186. Kevin Quigley, ‘‘Think Tanks in Newly Democratic Eastern Europe,’’ Think Tanks in a Democratic Society: An Alternative Voice (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1996). 187. Dickson, Think Tanks, 28. 188. McGann and Johnson, Comparative Think Tanks, 1–2.

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PART I

Education

Education is perhaps the issue most closely knit to social development more broadly. Time and again, scholars have argued that without a strong educational base, a society cannot develop and progress. This argument is not without foundation. Certainly, a government’s dedication to and investment in the establishment of a sound education system has extraordinary potential to increase human capital and lift a society out of poverty. As with many such issues, however, often policy agendas fail to give education the attention it merits, given the benefit sound policy can bring to a society. The two case studies that follow illustrate the importance of education as a means to social development, and delve into think tanks’ potential in furthering a policy agenda that prioritizes education—and thereby prioritizes social development.

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Chapter 1

Brookings Institution: The Case for Global Education Rebecca Winthrop

We had to leave behind all of our possessions. The only thing we could bring with us is what we have in our heads, what we have been taught—our education. Education is the only thing that cannot be taken from us. Woman who fled from Darfur to Chad, 2004 (Women’s Refugee Commission)

The case for education, as expressed in the quotation above from a Sudanese refugee, is simple. First and foremost, education is a fundamental human right and the birthright of every child. It is also the springboard for human development, creating the conditions for progress in health and gender equity; it plays a key role in helping to tackle some of the world’s pressing challenges such as climate change, food security, and peace building. Economic growth and poverty reduction depend on an educated and skilled workforce. In developing countries, one additional year of education adds about 10 percent to a person’s earnings. For a female farmer in Ethiopia, education can mean being able to provide adequate nutrition, health care, and education for her children. There are more young people on the planet than ever before, with 1.3 billion of the world’s twelve- to twentyfour-year-olds living in developing countries. Investing in their knowledge, skills, and competencies has been called the ‘‘education growth premium,’’

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and to date no developing country has been able to sustain high rates of growth without investing heavily in educating its young people. Improving even the most basic educational outcomes can make a definitive difference. For example, if all children in low-income countries left school knowing how to read, a reality not reflected by current literacy levels, then 171 million people could move out of poverty. There is broad agreement—and significant evidence—that education enhances people’s ability to lead happier, healthier, and more productive lives. However, 64 million primary school-aged children and 72 million lower-secondary-school-aged children remain out of school in low-income countries, and many who do enroll drop out before completing primary school. And though some countries and regions have made significant improvements, this progress has been highly uneven, particularly educationally marginalizing girls from poor, rural households and children and youth living in conflict-ridden areas. Those children who are in school too often leave both primary and secondary levels without acquiring the basic knowledge, skills, and competencies—such as reading, writing, mathematics, problem solving, and critical thinking—that would allow them to continue to learn as adults and lead safe and productive lives. Every day, families make enormous sacrifices to send their children even to substandard schools. By some estimates, approximately 200 million children who are in primary school struggle with literacy. This is a serious problem given that recent international evidence shows that the quality of education matters more than the total years in school for individual wages, health outcomes, and national economic growth. Today the global community is not prepared to address these education challenges. High-level political leadership is missing, with education featuring minimally in the agendas of the Group of Eight, the Group of Twenty, and the United Nations (UN) secretary-general. There is no set of internationally agreed on metrics for tracking the learning progress of young people, an important indication of the quality of education. Very few developing countries have the policymaking tools needed to assess the effectiveness of their education systems in promoting learning opportunities for those out of school and improving learning outcomes for those in school. National education accounts, which would provide policymakers with invaluable information for improving school systems, are used in only five countries, compared to the over 190 that make use of similar accounts for tracking health financial resources.

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The Brookings Institution Center for Universal Education: Taking Action on Education in Developing Countries The motto of the Brookings Institution—independence, quality, and impact—is more than just a tagline on an annual report; rather, it reflects the culture of the institution. Independence is fiercely guarded by senior leadership, and policies protecting academic freedom and rigor rule the day. Brookings itself has no official position on any particular topic, instead preferring to let diversity of opinion flourish within. Brookings scholars are free to opine however they may choose, provided that they rigorously present evidence to back up their claims. It is not uncommon to have Brookings scholars actively debating each other and proposing different solutions to essential policy questions of the day. This academic culture of independent and high-quality scholars producing policy-oriented research naturally results in a veritable sea of ideas, the impacts of which are often difficult to measure and to collectively assess. Instead of trying to shape how its scholars influence policy, Brookings’s senior leadership has recently focused on trying to characterize what form of impact their work takes. Largely describing its work in three domains, the institution sees that work as helping to set agendas, shape debates, or design policies. Agenda setting consists of helping to insert an idea or issue that has been previously missing into public discourse; policy shaping, in contrast, involves scholars’ offering a fresh perspective or new evidence on an existing issue being debated. Policy design is when Brookings scholars, satisfied that the public debate is focused on the right policy option(s), are invited to help assist in crafting the details of a particular policy (e.g., drafting legislation, developing guidelines for global institutions). How a Brookings scholar helps to set agendas, shape debates, or design policies is largely left up to the individual. Traditional models of think tank engagement are frequently used, including the ‘‘shelter-producedisseminate’’ strategy of scholars’ developing ideas on their own, producing research, and disseminating the outputs of that research in whatever form is most useful (e.g., book, working paper, or policy brief). The ‘‘advise senior policymaker’’ strategy of providing, upon request, evidence-based policy options to senior public leaders is also frequently employed, as are a number of related combinations and permutations. Less frequently deployed is a model where stakeholders of Brookings research actively participate in the design, development, and dissemination of the research itself.

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The Center for Universal Education, the Brookings team focused on improving education in the developing world, recently used this ‘‘stakeholder participation’’ model for a project titled ‘‘A Global Compact on Learning’’ (GCL). While the project has not been under way for long, it has been influential in the global education policy arena; much of its success to date can be attributed to the active participation of the center’s stakeholders throughout the project. Examining this case in detail illuminates some of the ways that collaboration can extend the policy influence of think tanks. Below is a description of the project, the impacts of the project to date, and an analysis of the different factors that contributed to the project’s success.

A Global Compact on Learning Project The GCL project was developed in response to a number of phenomena in the global policy arena. First is the perception by a number of senior leaders outside the education community that global education is a ‘‘finished agenda.’’ Often citing the relative progress of the Millennium Development Goals, a set of eight international development objectives established following the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000, many point out that the education-related goal is nearly met, with 95 percent of all children enrolled in primary school. Second, policymakers outside the education community often are unclear what, if any, effective solutions exist to solve the range of education problems with which countries continue to grapple. Frequently leaders cite other sectors, such as health care, that have united around a core set of interventions which, they argue, have proved successful and could be generalized to education. This type of common messaging is needed particularly because educationalists appear, more readily than others, to devolve into technical debates that result in little clear agreement on directives for action. Indeed, a high-level panel of political leaders and UN agency heads discussing education on the margins of the UN General Assembly meetings in 2010 concluded that they were very concerned that education was falling down the list of global priorities, and that it would be important to find better ways of communicating the key messages of the sector to those outside it.1 In this context, the project aimed to do two main things: (1) set out a compelling case as to why education is, contrary to popular opinion, an unfinished agenda and (2) set forth a clear set of priorities for what to do

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about it. To accomplish these goals, the project moved through three main stages. First, from September to December 2010, the center’s team did exploratory research, mapping new or ongoing initiatives of interest and identifying gaps and opportunities for action. Second, from January to June 2011, the team led the development of a major review of education policies that culminated in a report titled A Global Compact on Learning: Taking Action on Education in Developing Countries. Third, from July 2011 onward the focus has been on disseminating the findings of the report and facilitating the adoption of the report’s various recommendations. The report argues that by simply viewing education in relation to the narrow criterion of primary school enrollment (as did the Millennium Development Goals), researchers and policymakers mask a global learning crisis that is hurting hundreds of millions of young people who are both in and out of school. This crisis has three dimensions. First, over 60 million children, particularly marginalized young people such as poor girls and young people affected by armed conflict, have no access to learning opportunities. Second, approximately 200 million children are in school but not mastering foundational skills, such as literacy and numeracy. Third, for those who progress on past primary school, few are acquiring the skills they need for their lives and livelihoods. To address this crisis, the report argues, the global community must move from focusing on ‘‘access to school’’ to ‘‘access to plus learning in school,’’ and it must invest in proven strategies at the early childhood, early primary grade, and postprimary levels. Success of the GCL project ultimately would mean that the children and youth in low- and middle-income countries would have access to a high-quality education that develops relevant skills for their lives and livelihoods. However, this certainly is not directly under Brookings’s control, and as a think tank it defines the success of this project as its efficacy in influencing the policies, debates, and agendas of agencies and political actors. Evidence of this influence can be seen in a range of ways, including new initiatives and policies reflecting the content of the report as well as adoption of report recommendations by external actors. Within a year after the June 2011 launch of the report, there was already a wide range of evidence on its impact. Several foundations and corporations have used the report to shape their education investment strategies, with one significant private philanthropy adopting in full the policy agenda articulated in the report as the institution’s framework for its education grant making. Several high-level leaders have used (and cited the influence

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of) the report to shape their agendas on education, including Kofi Annan in his work on development in Africa, Gordon Brown in his various education initiatives, and the UN special rapporteur on the right to education, who has devoted his entire 2012 report to the UN General Assembly to the themes in the GCL. Several coalitions have formed around the policy agenda articulated in the report, such as a donor working group of private foundation, government, and corporate investors which the center has been asked to advise. Perhaps more importantly, several of the recommendations made in the report have gained traction with diverse actors, including a new global Task Force on Learning Metrics that is being set up particularly with UN leadership, a new Global Business Coalition for Education that is being formed with heads of major corporations, and a major education initiative of the UN secretary general. For all three of these, the center has been appointed to a formal role as the expert advisor.

The Stakeholder Participation Model The influence of the GCL report to date can be attributed not only to the Center for Universal Education team but also equally to the numerous stakeholders of Brookings research who have been highly involved in the project. In many ways, this participatory approach has led to external actors’ not only buying into the policy recommendations set forth in the report but also becoming full collaborators in the dissemination of report findings, outreach to stakeholders afterward, and adoption of the findings. Several conditions and strategies have been important in making this stakeholder participation model successful. Strategic Clarity with Tactical Flexibility The center’s operating strategy is an important condition that underlies the project’s success to date. All the center’s work is guided by a five-year strategy that outlines several high-level policy outcomes it hopes to help bring to fruition. One is the shift in focus in the global education agendas from access to, instead, access plus learning. Having a clear outcome that guides its work was useful in keeping the team focused on selecting the best strategies and opportunities for achieving that goal. As the level of participation grew over time, it became more and more possible to engage

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in opportunities or issues that were interesting but not central to achieving the policy outcomes the center was striving to reach. Knowing when to pass up opportunities or not engage in particular issues allowed the small team working on the project to stay focused and maximize its effectiveness. Having a clear policy outcome in mind, before drafting and disseminating the report, also helped the center’s team to be strategic in crafting the research so that the findings would be easily communicated to the desired audiences. Indeed, the center sought the advice of a professional marketing firm early in the process, which helped it be very thoughtful about choosing a title for the report and developing a look and feel for the report design. For example, the Brookings logo was specifically not used on the cover of the report and accompanying materials in order to make it easier for stakeholders of the research to disseminate the report themselves and feel some degree of ownership over the product. Equally important as having a clear overarching strategy guide its work was the tactical flexibility the center enjoys in pursuit of its goals. While its strategy is clear in its goal of influencing the global education agenda, it is not prescriptive on how to do this. For example, during the first phase of the project that mapped the field, it became clear that a participatory model of working would be possible and desirable. This had not been predicted before the team did the exploratory research. However, it was able to quickly react to this idea and capitalize on the opportunity. This ability to adjust tactics is largely made possible both by the center’s major funders and by Brookings senior leadership. The core funders of the project provide flexibility on tactic, as long as the major objectives of the project are met, as does the internal operating environment within Brookings, which cedes considerable autonomy to individual scholars. This has been an essential condition for enabling the development of this approach to stakeholder participation in the project. Brookings as Neutral Convener Another equally important condition that has supported the project’s success is the reputation of the center and Brookings as a whole as a neutral convener for discussion and debate. This is a role that Brookings as an institution attempts to fill given its focus on evidence-based policy recommendations regardless of partisan affiliation. Brookings’s reputation as a well-regarded think tank that has a long (almost hundred-year) track

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record of high-quality and independent policy advice was integral to the center’s ability to be seen as a neutral convener. This ability to bring people together and facilitate an open and frank discussion was an important condition for building trust among stakeholders. It was very important at the outset of the project to ensure that stakeholders believed that if they committed to participating in the project, their voices would be heard regardless of the perspective they brought to the table. Establishing transparent ways of operating, including facilitating discussions and making decisions, was something the center’s team did early, and ultimately it proved important for quickly garnering trust and participation in the project.

Multiple Pathways for Participation The project had several ways of engaging stakeholders in the center’s research and this diversity proved particularly useful not only for reaching a wide variety of actors but also for identifying the right actors. First, an informal working group formed to serve a ‘‘kitchen cabinet’’ function. The actors that participated in this informal working group were policymakers from governments as well as representatives from foundations and corporations, senior specialists in their organizations, many of whom were not education experts themselves but instead oversaw education policy in their institutions. The group played an important role in the project from the earliest stages. In many ways the center’s team and this informal working group co-created the project design. The group was not closed, and members joined throughout the process. However, new members were first vetted by the group, and then prior to joining received a thorough briefing from the center’s team so they could enter the discussions without slowing down the collective process. Having the insight of policymakers at the outset was incredibly helpful. For example, the format the center’s team originally proposed for the GCL report was changed to include a much more action-oriented policy agenda based on feedback that this format would be more usable to policymakers. Second, it became clear that there was a need to involve educationalists in the process and this was done two ways. For the drafting of the report in the second phase, a high-level panel of education experts provided guidance on its content. The panel comprised outstanding individuals, not institutions, who together had a diverse set of technical expertise (e.g., early

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childhood vs. secondary education) as well as diverse geographic perspectives (representatives from all regions of the world). And then it was essential that the panel members serve as well as individuals rather than representing institutions. This allowed them to speak freely and provide rapid feedback that did not need to be vetted by their institutions. Early on it became clear that there were many diverging views on the panel, and coming to consensus would take a substantial amount of time—time the center believed it did not have, as its goal was to draft and finalize the report in six months. This timing was linked to external opportunities to influence the global education agendas. Therefore, the center’s team made it clear—to each person individually—that if there were disagreements among panel members they would be mediated and decided by the center’s team. Third, through the process of developing the report with the high-level panel, it became clear that there were several education specialists not on the panel whose input would be very valuable. Rather than asking for inputs in an ad-hoc manner, the center decided to engage in a broad consultation process on the second and third drafts of the report. It disseminated the call for consultation widely and in the end received substantive inputs from many experts. In total (including the high-level panel and the informal working group) over 150 people were involved in editing the GCL report. Opening up this process of consultation not only strengthened the report but developed a broad network of actors interested and invested in the findings of the report as well. ‘‘Nerve Center,’’ Not Owner Another successful strategy was the center’s functioning as a ‘‘nerve center’’ for discussions and fostering collaboration on the development of the report and particularly in the dissemination and adoption of report findings. Being a nerve center means walking a fine line between exercising too much ownership over the report and its call to action so that it limits stakeholder engagement, on one hand, and failing to assume enough ownership over the process and to facilitate a dialogue, on the other. This was perhaps the most difficult aspect to negotiate of the entire stakeholder participation model. The center’s team grappled with several important issues involved in striking this balance. First, it debated how to simultaneously maintain its

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independence (a cornerstone of the Brookings approach) while at the same time engaging stakeholders deeply and meaningfully. In drafting the report, the center’s team accomplished these goals by clearly stating that decisions would not be consensus based; instead, the center’s team would be the final decision makers on the content and structure. After the report was finished, there was much discussion on how to best launch the report. Many partners suggested launching it jointly with commitments to action that policymakers could announce. While this seemed appealing, the center’s team believed it was important to separate the research from whatever actions stakeholders of the research take. It chose to launch the report in June 2011 at Brookings, at a think tank event where the main findings of the report were discussed. This allowed the center to clearly articulate its policy recommendations in a way that both acknowledged the input of all the stakeholders and also made clear that the views in the report (and any faults or shortcomings in the research) belonged to the center. This provided a level of two-way protection between the center and its stakeholders. Stakeholders involved in the process would not be blamed or criticized for any of the shortcomings of the research, and the center would not be blamed or criticized for any of the possible shortcomings on how stakeholders respond to recommendations in the report. Second, after launching the report, the center team grappled with how involved it should be in the dissemination and outreach phases. At the outset, the team planned to scale back its involvement with the stakeholders, preferring instead to permit the stakeholders themselves to respond to the recommendations however they saw fit. Indeed, given the heavy involvement with the design and development of the report, a number of actors quickly moved to help disseminate the report, emphasizing the importance of the findings. Within a few months of the launch, a number of actors linked the report to their websites, presenting the report at meetings; an independent website for the report’s call to action was set up; and several high-level meetings were organized in the margins of the UN General Assembly in September. However, throughout this process, it became clear that the center had a role to play as a continued facilitator of conversations. The stakeholders requested numerous times that the center stay engaged and help facilitate discussions among themselves. This was often described as the need for the nerve center, the place where stakeholders— old and new—could learn about how GCL’s recommendations were received. Having the ability, financial and human, to maintain one key focal

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point for the GCL report postlaunch that would serve this function proved crucial in sustaining momentum and ultimately helping to facilitate adoption of policy recommendations. As one stakeholder described it, ‘‘the Center was the glue that brought everyone together on a common platform in order to address a crucial policy issue in the education agenda.’’

Note 1. Education for All High-Level Panel, UN General Assembly, 2010, New York.

Chapter 2

CIPPEC: The Monitoring Project for the Law on Educational Funding Florencia Mazzadra, Vanesa Weyrauch, and Marı´a Bele´n Sa´nchez

After almost a decade of authoritarian rule, Argentina’s return to democracy in 1983 coincided with a new discourse on the protection of human rights and economic development based on the importance of education as a means of economic progress. During the 1980s, the Radical Party organized a National Congress of Education in order to democratically plan the educational policy. However, the congress failed to translate the discourse into concrete actions. In 1993, under a Peronist government, deep educational reform was finally implemented through the Federal Law of Education. Among other provisions, the law established that the investment in education should reach 6 percent of Argentina’s gross domestic product (GDP), but it did not specify the mechanisms through which this objective would be achieved. In 2005, under a new Peronist government with Ne´stor Kirchner as president, Argentina adopted the Law on Educational Funding No. 26.706, which again set the goal at 6 percent of GDP. However, this time it included specifications on how to achieve this goal.

The Law on Educational Funding and Its Implementation The Law on Educational Funding sought to increase investment in education, science, and technology to 6 percent of GDP by 2010. In 2001, the deep economic crisis that plagued the country had sparked a decrease in educational investment from 5.1 percent of GDP in 2001 to 4 percent in

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2004. Thus, increasing educational spending to 6 percent of GDP in a fiveyear period posed a significant challenge. The law established three main budgetary commitments and a series of specific educational goals. The first of these has been undertaken by the federal government, which committed to increase 40 percent of its spending on educational investment over those five years. It is interesting to note that in 2005 the government’s participation in this domain was only 22 percent. The provincial governments have undertaken the second commitment, pledging to take on the remaining 60 percent of the increase in educational investment through resources addressed specifically for this purpose within the Federal Tax Coparticipation program.1 Finally, the third commitment for the national government and the provinces required them to keep the amount of investment per student and the proportion of educational expenditure above the 2005 values of total expenditures in all jurisdictions.

Box 2.1. The Unsolved Problem of Inequality in Funding at the Provincial Level The presence of strong inequalities between jurisdictions is a structural problem affecting education finance in Argentina. The possibilities of investment by each jurisdiction are related to their fiscal capacities, which are unequal because of the different levels of regional development and the unfair resource distribution of the Federal Tax Coparticipation program. The Coparticipation program does not have objective parameters in the definition of its distribution; instead, it is tied to historical political arrangements that benefit some jurisdictions to the detriment of others. As a result, a deep inequality in the investment capacity of provinces exists. Another result of inequality in resource availability is that those provinces that are disadvantaged by the Coparticipation program need to make a greater effort to sustain or increase investment in education. The larger percentage of provincial public funds for education compensates, to some extent, for the original inequalities, but stem from this unsolved structural problem of inequality in possibilities of investment. The solution to this problem is not simple, as Argentina’s federalist system strongly restricts efforts to modify the availability of resources. The Coparticipation law needs a special majority in Congress to be modified, and the overrepresentation of small provinces (most of which have benefited by the Coparticipation program) makes it difficult to realize that change. It is at this point that the role of the national government becomes crucial to mitigate these inequalities.

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These decisions have had far-reaching implications, since they established the priority for greater proportions of social investment in the education system. The foundation for these ambitious actions by the state is the concept of education as a long-term strategy toward social, economic, and democratic development, given that education investment positively affects all of these dimensions. Finally, one of the key elements in the law’s implementation has been making sure that information regarding both the effort’s goals and the resources invested in the jurisdictions would be easily accessible to the general public. CIPPEC, a policy-oriented research and implementation think tank, has pushed the government to see transparency and access to information by the general public to be of utmost importance. When the law’s

Box 2.2. The Argentine Education System and Its Funding The Argentine education system, made up of 50,050 schools (2010), 825,250 teachers (2004), and 11,432,618 students (2010),2 is decentralized. Since 1993, schools have not been the responsibility of the national government but of the twenty-three provinces and the City of Buenos Aires. This decentralized responsibility extends to schools’ financing as well: provinces are responsible for 70 percent of the total educational expenditure. Wide differences exist between provincial education systems, in both size (the province of Buenos Aires holds around 40 percent of the students) and access to schools and learning results (the percentage of students in the last year of secondary education demonstrating a high-level performance in the 2010 National Assessment Operatives in mathematics, for example, was 30.7 percent in the City of Buenos Aires and only 3 percent in Catamarca). Furthermore, great inequalities exist in the funding of education among provinces. While, for instance, Tierra del Fuego spent $12,714 per student in 2009, the province of Buenos Aires just spent $4,666 per student in the same year. The differences in educational expenditure per student stem from two main causes: the inequitable distribution of national fiscal resources, arranged through the Federal Coparticipation program (see Box 2.1), and the different levels of budgetary allocation toward education in each jurisdiction. As noted earlier, the Law on Educational Funding set up commitments both for the national and provincial governments, and the monitoring of its implementation has occurred in both types of jurisdiction.

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project was discussed in Congress, CIPPEC proposed what would become Article 16, which establishes that the provinces and the City of Buenos Aires should list the amount of resources spent on education separately from funding for all other sectors. By emphasizing the importance of transparency of information, CIPPEC seeks to exert pressure on the provincial governments to meet their commitments. The experience in Formosa provides an example of the indirect effects of this goal. Even though it is a poor province as measured by the socioeconomic status of its population, Formosa has traditionally been relatively rich in terms of fiscal resources (through the Coparticipation program). Prior to the law’s implementation, the province had among the lowest budgetary commitments to education. Its behavior in this respect changed dramatically after the law was passed, and in 2010 it had among the highest budgetary commitments to education. Publicizing this information played a key role in creating pressure to increase the provincial investment in education and in public recognition of this policy. The implementation of the educational funding law was successful in terms of investment (Figure 2.1). Between 2006 and 2010, the investment in the sector grew from 5 to 6.2 percent of GDP. However, the marked growth in educational investment hides some problems in its composition. First, some jurisdictions have not managed to comply with the objectives of the Law on Educational Funding in one or more years.3 This means that global compliance has been reached only through extraordinary efforts by other jurisdictions. A second problem, related to the first, has to do with the persistence of deep investment inequalities in the context of Argentina’s federal structure. The growth in the amount of available and dedicated resources has not led to a change in the unequal levels of educational investment among provinces, which each year become clearer through an analysis of investment levels per student. These inequalities have a direct impact on other relevant dimensions of education, including infrastructure, didactic resources, teachers, and educational results. The third problem involves implementation of the educational goals. The inclusion of this second group of objectives in the law is remarkable, since it established a set of priorities for the increase in investment: coverage and enrollment, equity in quality of learning, eradication of illiteracy, inclusion of information and communication technologies into classrooms,

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Figure 2.1. Evolution in Consolidated Investment in Education, Science, and Technology as a Percentage of GDP, 2001–2010. Source: Elaborated by CIPPEC on the basis of information provided by General Coordination on the Study of Costs of the Education System (CGECSE, for its acronym in Spanish), Ministry of Education; and Educational Funding Law.

teachers’ labor and wage conditions, quality of teacher education, technical education, extension of the school day, education for young people and adults, the university system, and scientific research.4 Most of the educational goals were stated in a general way, without specifying measurable indicators to evaluate them. Nevertheless, CIPPEC analyzed their implementation through a series of proxy indicators. At the national level, the changes can be summed up in the following way. First, the coverage dimension registers one of the greatest improvements. The increase in enrollment has been significant especially at the primary level, where the attendance rate increased from 64.5 percent in 2005 to 72.9 percent in 2009. Moreover, although the enrolment rate in secondary education remained quite stable, it showed an important increase among the students belonging to the most vulnerable sectors of society (those in the

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lowest income quintile): it rose from 67.4 percent to 78.4 percent between 2005 and 2010. Second, the average teacher salary increased 20 percent between 2005 and 2010. Finally, great advancements can be identified in the inclusion of information and communication technologies. The number of students per computer decreased from ninety-three to sixty-three between 2005 and 2009 through the distribution of equipment for computing rooms. The introduction of the national program Conectar Igualdad in 2011, through which one laptop is distributed to each student and teacher in public secondary schools, should boost these figures; by January 2011, a total of 358,227 laptops had been distributed among the twenty-four jurisdictions. At the same time, some key issues remain unresolved. Among the most pressing of these are: the extension of the school day, the quality of learning, and the strengthening of teacher education. Regarding the extension of the school day, the law established as a goal that 30 percent of enrolled students in basic education should be covered by extended- or full-day schools. However, between 2005 and 2009 the percentage of extended of full-day schools has only risen from 5.5 percent to 5.9 percent. As to teacher education, even though the length of teacher education has been extended from three to four years by the National Law of Education, the pace of the implementation of this measure has been slow, and no significant improvements in the qualitative aspects of teacher education have been registered. Finally, the quality of education remains the greatest failure of the law to date. Despite the fact that the country’s performance in the Program of International Student Assessment for 2009 shows slight improvements in comparison with its performance in 2006, the structural diagnosis still places Argentina far below the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and even below other Latin American countries whose social, economic, and cultural contexts are similar to Argentina’s, like Uruguay and Chile, both in average results and in equalities. At the federal level, some provinces stand out for having been able to achieve exemplary results in achieving some of the educational goals of the Law. For example, Rı´o Negro implemented an important policy regarding the extension of the school day, focused on the most vulnerable sectors of the society. School failure rates dropped significantly in these schools. Santa Fe, for another example, implemented a series of policies with the purpose of improving teachers’ working conditions.

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Indeed, the comparison between the cases of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Rı´o Negro—provinces whose educational policies CIPPEC has studied recently and in depth—shows that even though the increase in educational financing has enabled them to advance toward the achievement of some of the established educational goals, not all of them can be achieved simultaneously. These cases demonstrate, for example, that ambitious and expensive policies such as the extension of the school day can only be achieved by neglecting other key policies such as the improvement of teachers’ labor conditions and education. Either resources must be used more efficiently and effectively, or the country will need to make an even greater budgetary effort in order to achieve these goals.

CIPPEC’s Project: Purposes, Strategies, and Policy Impact CIPPEC strives to create a more just, democratic, and efficient state and improve the quality of life for all Argentines. Since its foundation in 2000, CIPPEC has developed over 120 projects focusing on policy-oriented research, advocacy, assistance, training, pilot project implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. These projects are implemented at the national level, in Argentina’s twenty-four provinces, and in more than one hundred municipal counties. Specifically, the purpose of the monitoring project relative to the Law on Educational Funding was to underpin the political initiative to increase education spending with transparent, efficient, and effective allocation of sizable public funds through the generation and dissemination of relevant and timely evidence. In order to reach this objective, CIPPEC through the project focused on building capacity in key institutions responsible for the distribution of resources on education, promoting public participation in monitoring the use of the resources, and encouraging successful fulfillment of commitments made by national and provincial governments. Strategies The publication and distribution of synthetic and analytical information regarding compliance with the educational funding law has been one of the key elements of the project. CIPPEC put forward a comprehensive communication strategy, which went beyond the simple publication of the

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biannual monitoring reports, to promote such compliance. For that purpose, the main monitoring actions included creation of a website for ongoing diffusion of the information disaggregated by provinces, development of a guide for the effective and efficient administration of educational investment, opening of dialogue with political actors responsible for compliance with the goals, and public diffusion of the annual results of compliance with the goals.

Policy Impact The monitoring project became one of the main tools available to guarantee the fulfillment of the educational funding law and has gained a notable reputation among all actors involved. National and provincial authorities, teachers’ unions, experts in the field, and the media value CIPPEC as a key resource regarding information on the compliance with and implications of the law. For instance, the minister of education and the secretary-general of the Confederation of Education Workers in Argentina (CTERA) participated as speakers during the presentation of the annual report in 2007 and 2008. Furthermore, the project was able to create a network of social organizations, known as the Commitment to Educational Funding, which has taken the lead as an alternative source of opinions in discussions of education policy, and which has further become a mediator between the government and teachers’ unions (which had previously monopolized the dialogue regarding educational financing). In addition, CIPPEC has trained the member organizations and promoted the participation of other regional organizations in the monitoring process, facilitating this network’s development into a national one dedicated to monitoring educational financing activities. The monitoring program has become a central tool in guaranteeing that the requisites of the educational funding law be satisfied, achieving widely recognized legitimacy with the main parties involved. One unplanned related outcome was that the national Ministry of Education entrusted CIPPEC exclusively to publicize the data on the implementation of the law in all jurisdictions. Additionally, the project produced several relevant outcomes that further depict what type of policy influence was achieved.

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Increase in the Demand of Information About Educational Funding As a civil society organization dedicated to public policies, CIPPEC receives many inquiries and requests for information. On average, the institution receives twenty weekly inquiries from the press and 265 daily visits to its website (www.cippec.org/mlfe). The monitoring project’s website was launched during the fourth quarter (January–March 2007) and has been updated periodically. The website contained all of the project’s reports, relevant data about the fulfillment of the goals, related legislation, publications, and mass media news and articles on educational funding. With regard to the monitoring program itself, CIPPEC has been invited to present the research to national and local educational authorities, to national legislators, to teachers’ unions, and at academic meetings.5

Increased Information Available to Monitor Educational Funding The project has created a transparency index of educational funding information in order to monitor the provinces’ fulfillment of the law’s requirements. The index (which ranges from 1 to 10) had an average value of 2 in July 2006, which increased to 5 by April 2007 and finally to 6 by October 2008. Applied to the national government, the index increased from 6 in July 2006 to 10 in April 2007 and October 2008.

Larger Quantity and Increased Capacity of Civil Society Organizations Involved in Monitoring Educational Funding As mentioned above, a network of eight civil society organizations called Commitment to Educational Funding was established to monitor the implementation of the law.6 CIPPEC participates as an active part of this network and has provided internal training on topics related to educational funding. The federal character of the Argentine education system implies that a high percentage of the total resources for basic education comes from provincial budgets. For that reason, the existence in each province of a strong civil society able to monitor compliance with educational laws (both national and provincial) is of utmost importance. In order to facilitate such

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compliance in 2008, this network promoted through a call for proposals the participation of provincial civil society organizations in monitoring the law. Eight organizations submitted proposals (from the provinces of Co´rdoba, La Pampa, Rı´o Negro, Tucuma´n, and Santa Fe), and the network selected two of them, those from La Pampa and Co´rdoba, to receive financial and technical support. As a consequence of this support, the selected organizations in these provinces each also established a local group of organizations that currently monitor educational funding. The network trained almost forty national organizations in several sessions, as well as ten journalists from the national media. On the provincial level, it trained almost thirty civil-society organizations. The training sessions included the following elements: (1) education financing analysis, (2) components and commitments of the education funding law agreed on and undertaken by the government, (3) available sources of information, both at national and provincial levels, (4) analysis of the problems related to the available information, and (5) policy influence strategies. Support for Decision-Makers to Deepen Their Analytical Skills When Dealing with Educational Financing One of the main objectives of the project was to strengthen the financial analysis skills of national and provincial government officials. In these cases, the intention is that officials know and understand the main sources of injustice in the distribution of educational resources (both at the national and the provincial levels) and that they familiarize themselves with the indicators necessary to analyze the budgetary efforts made by provinces, analyze the teachers’ wage situation, and gain access to objective information to negotiate with unions. In this way, CIPPEC strove to influence the decisions related to the distribution of budgeted funds allocated to education. CIPPEC organized training sessions for public officials in the provinces. During the project, eighteen meetings with local educational authorities and public officials have been held as well as with officials of the national Ministry of Education, who implement the educational funding law.7 Impact of General Discourse on Educational Funding The great inequality between the provinces in educational funding has been a long-term problem in Argentina. Nevertheless, it was not a central

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issue in educational policy or public discourse. It was in this context that CIPPEC decided to carry out a campaign to influence the general discourse on educational funding regarding the distribution of resources both among the provinces and between schools within the provinces. Additionally CIPPEC published several reports to raise awareness of this problem and worked continuously with the media to increase its visibility even before the sanction of the Law on Educational Funding. The monitoring of the law gave the campaign a renewed strength and the institutional context to further discuss possible solutions. Nowadays, inequality between provinces is central in the public agenda, and it is present not only in the discourse of specialists, the media, and teacher unions but also among policy leaders. A clear indicator of this influence was the annual speech of the president during the first Congress session in 2012. The president, Cristina Ferna´ndez de Kirchner, officially announced the opening of the legislative sessions on March 1, 2012. Each year on this occasion, the president summarizes the country’s current situation, making reference to the main policies implemented during the previous year, and presents the main changes she considers necessary to be addressed in the coming year. During her speech, she talked at length about education and the issue of teacher wages, and more specifically about the unequal distribution of the national contributions to these. Ferna´ndez de Kirchner said that ‘‘the National Teacher Incentive Fund [FONID] was thought, when created, to last until an educational funding law was passed, and should have been suppressed when that law effectively entered in force.’’ She added that ‘‘the distribution of FONID is absolutely regressive: teachers who earn $2,300 and those who earn $8,000 both receive $255.’’ She also mentioned that FONID constitutes ‘‘the most relevant number included in the annual budget, and is equally distributed to unequal people, which is to say that it is being unequally distributed.’’ Finally, she pointed out that this topic needs to be discussed by the Federal Council of Education and all governors. The main argument of her statements corresponds to the recommendations made by CIPPEC about the distribution of wage funds. The successive meetings that CIPPEC held with the minister of education, as well as CIPPEC’s reports about this issue, have had an influential impact on national policy.

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Modification of Central Aspects of the Implementation of the Law to Improve Equity in the Distribution of the Public Budget CIPPEC’s highlighting of the distribution of resources between provinces had an effect not only on the discourse but also on concrete policy decisions, specifically regarding the Program of Wage Compensation. The program was created to sustain a minimal wage for all teachers of the country and thus to reduce the differences in wages between jurisdictions. The national government administers the program , which applies to provincial jurisdictions whose teachers each year do not reach the minimum wage established at the national level. The province of Buenos Aires, which includes 40 percent of all the students in the country, had been excluded from the group of provinces that benefited from this fund, in spite of the fact that the data showed it should be included (since it is a province with few fiscal resources per inhabitant, and was the province with the greatest proportion of its total expenditure addressed to the education sector and, despite this, paid its teachers a wage lower than the national average). Thanks to conversations with the national minister of education, this became an issue of concern and the national government decided to address a specific fund aimed to strengthen its teachers’ wages. These funds, however, are not included in the framework of the Program of Wage Compensation.

Why Was CIPPEC Able to Have This Impact on Educational Policy? A successful combination of internal and external factors allowed CIPPEC to effectively influence education policy. These factors can be classified as either endogenous or exogenous. Endogenous factors, or those under the control of the think tank, include, in this case, CIPPEC’s experience and characteristics as an organization, the main policy influence strategies used, and the fact that the project’s funding has been uninterrupted. The exogenous factors, or those beyond the control of the think tank (especially those related to the political and economic context), explain in part the compliance with the law and the project’s success. Looking Inside CIPPEC’s Program on Education CIPPEC’s institutional background had a key influence on the results of the project. A great majority of CIPPEC’s projects include training

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programs, informational meetings, capacity-building seminars, networking and network development, and conferences attended by policymakers and other stakeholders. Furthermore, in addition to generating knowledge and data useful to decision makers in articulating policy decisions, almost all of CIPPEC’s projects are traditionally accompanied by comprehensive dissemination and advocacy strategies. As a result, CIPPEC has not only earned a notable reputation as one of Argentina’s most respected policy research and implementation think tanks, it has gained an unparalleled ability for outreach to the policy community. In consequence, CIPPEC’s staff enjoys highly positive response rates when requesting information (e.g., databases), meetings, hearings, or attendance at events. It also receives positive feedback from policymakers regarding its publications and is very often referenced by government officials, legislators, and other policymakers as evidenced by news releases, declared support, or testimony provided at hearings and policy forums. More specifically, CIPPEC’s Program on Education carried out several research projects on educational funding. These were published and widely disseminated with the purpose of positively influencing the sector’s decision-making processes. In particular, it actively participated in the technical advice process involved in the elaboration of the Law on Educational Funding together with the national Ministry of Education, as well as in the generation of debates and in support of the legislative process involved in the approval of the law. Selected Policy Influence Strategy: Continuous Engagement with Key Stakeholders A second endogenous factor that contributed to the success of the project was the chosen strategy: building alliances with the national government, as well as with the main national teachers’ union and other civil society organizations interested in the issue. On one hand, the national Ministry of Education showed its support and interest, demonstrated by the importance given to the analytical tools offered by the project and the decision by the state to support the initiative in both its birth and evolution. This decision originated from a meeting held at the inception of the project with Daniel Filmus, minister of education at the time. Since then, the ministry’s collaboration has been continuous. CIPPEC has not only worked as a source of data related to the law’s

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implementation but has also participated on its behalf in several private meetings where the distribution of resources and the teachers’ wage conditions were analyzed. On the other hand, CIPPEC received the support at the national level of the main teachers’ union, the Argentine Educational Workers Confederation. Several regular meetings held with its secretary-general allowed discussion of issues considered vital for the funding of Argentine education, such as the inequalities among provinces in teacher wages. These meetings also enabled CIPPEC to publish information that became a key input for the negotiations between the union and the national government. Moreover, CIPPEC created a network of civil society organizations for diffusion purposes, which expanded the results of its work through the provincial level and complemented the information produced in other aspects of the project. Finally, the alliance built with the media has been of key importance. Several meetings with journalists preceded presentation of the annual reports, and CIPPEC signed an agreement with one of the main newspapers in the country to publish the results. Additionally, the institute organized specific meetings with specialized media at the beginning of each school year, since there is usually a higher demand for information during this period. Since the project was launched, 116 articles have been published in national newspapers and magazines. Furthermore, 138 articles were published in provincial newspapers and on provincial websites, and 66 interviews were given on radio and television programs.

Reinforcement and Continuity in the Funding of the Project Educational funding has become a central topic in regard to educational policy. National and provincial authorities, teachers’ unions, experts in the field, and the media constantly highlight the importance of educational expenditure. CIPPEC has decided to maintain the monitoring project as one of its main activities, with the objective of underpinning the complete implementation of the educational funding law. This means that CIPPEC will carry out basic analysis of the educational budget and will search for specific funding to carry out further research and activities in order to continue to influence policy. For example, thanks to funds provided by the Global

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Development Network, CIPPEC carried out a policy simulation in 2011 that explored the distribution of federal educational resources among provinces. A report on this simulation is under way. In accordance with the findings, CIPPEC plans innovative diffusion strategies, such as the production of a video to be disseminated through the social networks, to spread the main lessons learned. Furthermore, the network Commitment to Educational Investment is still active and continues to work on educational topics. The group has published the document How Much Does Quality Education Cost in Argentina? The aim is to estimate the amount of resources necessary for the achievement of a set of eight educational goals in the period 2011–2016. Looking Outside During the project’s implementation, two external factors have been fundamental: first, the effective compliance with the Law on Educational Funding, which made it possible both to maintain the alliances set in the strategies and to monitor that compliance. This alliance has been of key importance given the importance of the information provided by the national Ministry of Education, which constituted an essential input for monitoring the Law on Educational Funding and for production of the successive reports. At the same time, the implementation of the Law on Educational Funding, particularly in its financial dimension, has been influenced by the positive economic context. Key economic variables, such as GDP, the evolution of public finance, and inflation have direct effects on educational expenditure. Given the positive evolution of the GDP during implementation of the Law on Educational Funding, the increase of investment in education, science, and technology had two main sources: the percentage of increase in relation to GDP set for each year and the resources needed to maintain the percentage of initial investment in light of the increases in GDP. This investment in educational funding was possible, first of all, because of the increase in public expenditure, both by the national government and the provincial ones. Total public expenditure in relation to GDP has grown during recent years (it has increased from 32 percent in 2005 to more than 43 percent in 2009), which has been possible thanks to the increase in the tax burden of the national and provincial jurisdictions and to the budgetary effort of the provinces, whose percentage of investment in education

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Table 2.1. Endogenous and Exogenous Factors That Contributed to the Educational Policy Impact Endogenous Factors CIPPEC and its Program on Education Strategies: Key alliances with government, unions, civil society organizations Sustainability of the project Exogenous Factors Compliance with the law, to which the following factors contributed: (1) increase in the total public expenditure, (2) increase in tax burden, (3) increase in the budgetary effort in education by the provinces Demand for and interest in information about educational funding demonstrated by the governments, the unions, and the media

increased from 26 percent in 2005 to 31.2 percent in 2009. The national government has only increased the proportion of education in its total expenditure at a marginal level: it increased from 7.4 percent in 2005 to 8.3 percent in 2009. The second external factor that contributed to the project’s success was the many conflicts in the educational sector. During the implementation of the law, there were several teachers’ strikes mainly due to the inflationary economic context. The negotiations between the government and teachers’ unions increased public interest in education, and particularly in educational funding. Thus, during the negotiation periods, usually at the beginning of the year, the project gained visibility and requests for information increased.

The Future: Challenges and Opportunities The stipulated period for implementation of the law has already ended, which emphasizes the importance of assessing the compliance with its objectives in order to analyze the steps forward and backward in each aspect and, thus, redefine midterm objectives. This not only implies a review of the main elements of the law but also establishing priorities, deadlines, and intermediate objectives.

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The definition of new objectives for education requires, at the same time, analyzing their likely financial impact, since these dimensions (financial and educational) are interrelated. Educational aims require funds, and the potential for funding thus plays a part in the definition of objectives. There are some instruments created and improved during recent years, like bilateral agreements between the national government and the provinces, that establish objectives and general funding priorities; there is also a general objective, set by the national education law, of reaching a level of educational investment equivalent to 6 percent of GDP.8 But there are no framework devices able to establish either the responsibilities of each level of government or the annual investment goals. Defining the rules of this game is of utmost importance so as not to retreat from advances made in investment and representation of the views of all the actors in the education system. The implementation period of the Law on Educational Funding has been very positive. It has demonstrated that political will and clarity of objectives make it possible to prioritize education. The present challenge is to sustain this pledge with new objectives and with a better balance of efforts between the national and provincial levels—more in tune with their fiscal possibilities—which would make it possible to improve the education system through more just distribution of resources. With this public policy horizon in mind, CIPPEC, together with the network Commitment to Educational Funding, keeps striving for fair and sufficient educational funding. For that purpose, it set as a goal in 2012 diffusing the results of the report How Much Does Quality Education Cost in Argentina? Furthermore, CIPPEC continues to pursue policy influence strategies that seek to promote adoption of a legal framework making it possible to sustain the Law on Educational Funding and to define a plan for educational investment by the nation and the provinces.

Notes 1. In Argentina, the national government is responsible for collecting a great proportion of taxes and then transfers part of them to provinces mainly through the Federal Tax Coparticipation program. The Law on Educational Funding established that a portion of the resources transferred by the national government should be allocated to the education system, and that it should be set to a specific amount.

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2. Data on the number of students and schools are collected every year, but the most updated data regarding the number of teachers is 2004, when the last teacher census took place. 3. Provinces that have not complied can be divided into two groups. On the one hand, we find those that while making a significant financial effort (greater than the provincial average) do not dispose of sufficient fiscal resources to comply with the commitments set by the law. An example is Corrientes, which did not reach the goal despite investing 36 percent of its budget in education. On the other hand, there are provinces that, even though they dispose of a comparatively high amount of fiscal resources, have not managed to reach the proposed objectives. This is the case of San Luis, the province that made the smallest financial effort for education (20 percent). 4. It is worth mentioning that in 2006 a new National Law of Education was adopted, which reinforced many of the educational goals of the Law of Educational Funding. 5. Members of CIPPEC were invited to present the results of the monitoring program at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Buenos Aires); the annual conference of IDEA; the international seminar ‘‘The Right to Education: Struggles, Challenges and Perspectives,’’ organized by the Argentine Campaign for the Right to Education, CTERA, and the International Campaign for Education (Campan˜a Mundial por la Educacio´n); the seminar ‘‘Education on Debate’’ (‘‘Educacio´n en debate’’) organized by the Argentine Bank Association; and the conference ‘‘Education and the Argentine Future’’ (‘‘La educacio´n y el futuro de los argentinos’’), promoted by La Nacio´n and Cları´n newspaper; and to the Educational Commission of the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress; the undersecretary of educational planning; the Ministry of Education of the province of Buenos Aires; the Senate of the province of Buenos Aires; and CTERA. Besides the organized events and meetings mentioned here, there were several other meetings during the project with national and local educational authorities. 6. The member organizations are Ca´ritas Nacional, Cippec, Conciencia, Foro del Sector Social, Fundacio´n Arcor, Fundacio´n Lu´minis y Fundacio´n Solidaridad, Educacio´n y Sustentabilidad, and Fundacio´n Ethos. 7. The list of provincial training sessions can be consulted at http://cippec.org/ nexos/acciones_nexos.php. 8. The Law on Educational Funding included science and technology in its 6 percent.

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PART II

Infrastructure

Successful social development depends on the establishment and maintenance of public infrastructure. Transportation is an integral part of such a system. Just as social programs and development rely on the education of the populace, so, too, are they dependent on a well-functioning society to run smoothly. Public transportation is certainly pivotal to this endeavor. The two cases that follow provide close examinations of the role of think thanks and their research in promoting public transportation in India. Together, they paint a detailed picture of the influence that think tank research has exerted on policymakers in helping to shape both the transportation-focused policy agenda and the infrastructural plans ultimately put in place.

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Chapter 3

Centre for Public Policy (CPP): Indian Institute of Management Bangalore Rajeev Gowda, Ashwin Mahesh, and Sridhar Pabbisetty

This chapter examines the impact of the Centre for Public Policy (CPP) on public policy in India through a specific case study. CPP is part of the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, one of India’s leading business schools. CPP is a think tank engaged in research, consultancy, teaching, training, and outreach. CPP was established in 2000 to address the gap between research and public policymaking in India through a collaborative effort between the Department of Personnel and Training, the government of India, the United Nations Development Programme, and the institute. The CPP also received an endowment grant from the government of Karnataka. In addition, this chapter examines the context of public policy formulation in India, various activities undertaken by CPP, membership of CPP faculty in influential committees, and direct and indirect policy impact of research projects at CPP, and finally it takes a close look at a direct policy change triggered by the intervention of a CPP faculty member in the domain of urban public transportation in Bangalore. This type of intervention could easily be replicated across India.

The Centre for Public Policy India liberalized its economy in 1991, which provoked a dramatic transformation in the challenges faced by the government of India. Many goods

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and services that were earlier being delivered by public sector were now being entrusted to private companies. In sectors like health, waste management, electricity distribution, and telecommunications, the public sector was competing with private companies. This transition from the state to the market demanded that civil servants and the large number of managers in public sector organizations reorient themselves to the changing socioeconomic dynamics. A negative outcome of liberalization was the increase in societal inequalities, worsening the divide between the rich and the poor. Liberalization presented a variety of opportunities for CPP, particularly in the new kinds of knowledge needed by policymakers and practitioners. Thus CPP’s initial mandate was to train the highest levels of civil servants in India to attune them to the policy challenges they faced in the postliberalization environment. CPP therefore launched a master’s degree equivalent Post Graduate Programme in Public Policy and Management in 2001. The program aims to strengthen the policy and managerial skills of senior civil servants, and now professionals from social, infrastructural, and private sectors. This two year program helps professionals tackle new challenges in the context of liberalization, globalization, and rapid technology change along with India’s traditional challenges such as the continuing burden of poverty and social exclusion. Apart from the postgraduate program, CPP conducts midcareer civil service training. Examples include the Phase IV Program for Indian Administrative Service bureaucrats with fourteen to sixteen years of experience and the Phase V program for senior Indian Forest Service officers with twenty-six to twenty-eight years of service. In addition CPP has conducted over one hundred short duration programs of one to two weeks’ duration for Indian Administrative Service officers. CPP has moved beyond the bureaucracy to also focus on elected representatives, who play a central role in policymaking in India. CPP has created an orientation program for first-time state legislators and policy workshops for legislators from across India. It has recently launched a course for aspiring women political leaders in anticipation of Parliament’s passing a law mandating that a third of its seats and of those in legislatures be set aside for women (already, there is a 50 percent reservation of seats for women at the level of local government). Through these training programs, CPP is able to engage with policymakers and implementers and thus have an indirect influence on how government discharges its responsibilities.

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The Context of Public Policy Formulation in India In the context in which policies are formulated in India, it is important to take into account that the Constitution of India outlines the roles of legislature, executive, and judiciary. While the legislature responds to the popular and political aspirations of the people of India and leads policy formulation, the executive plays a collaborative role in ensuring that the policy is implementable, translating it into effective programs and ensuring its delivery. The judiciary interprets and clarifies the law and has the power of judicial review. To quote the report written by Chapal Mehra on Think Tanks and the Policy Landscape in India: the legislature ‘‘reacts to a perceived demand and in order to fulfil this demand it initiates the process of creating policy. The policy is in turn prepared, scrutinized, debated, adopted (or not) and published; . . . the executive bodies conceptualize programs under policy and supervise its delivery’’ and the ‘‘judiciary engages in policy making through judgments and directives to both government and administrative machinery on the policy or the nature of its implementation. It may change the law through judgements on critical aspects of policy.’’ The report observes that ‘‘while we see the perceptible opening up of policy discussions in the government, it has been restricted to a few individuals and institutions. The initiative to engage in plural and diverse sets of perspectives has not been done through institutional mechanisms that can naturally facilitate this process.’’ In order to have an impact on government policy, given the centralized and top-down nature of the government, CPP focuses on being part of the government process. This is possible through membership on influential committees and boards that help in policy formulation. In addition CPP does create direct policy proposals and often its research output has indirect policy impact. CPP does not typically engage in policy advocacy outside formal engagement with government.

CPP Faculty Membership on Policymaking and Other High-level Committees CPP faculty members serve on various committees and on the boards of national level organizations. These appointments reflect the government’s

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recognition of their expertise and the value of their inputs for public policy. The following are examples of such appointments of CPP faculty members. Professor G. Ramesh: Government’s Performance Evaluation Committee Professor Gita Sen: Mission Steering Group, National Rural Health Mission, and High Level Expert Group on Universal Health Coverage, Planning Commission of India Professor Rajeev Gowda: Director, Reserve Bank of India Professor Nayana Tara: Karnataka Knowledge Commission Dr. A. Ravindra: ABIDe Task Force, and advisor on urban policy to the chief minister of Karnataka Dr. Ashwin Mahesh: ABIDe Task Force, and advisor on urban policy to the chief minister of Karnataka Professor M. S. Sriram: Director, National Bank for Rural DevelopmentFinancial Services Limited

Concrete and Indirect Policy Inputs From time to time CPP faculty members develop concrete policy proposals through the studies they engage in, particularly through projects that they undertake on behalf of government. Professor Rajeev Gowda initiated and was part of a Karnataka government committee that looked at the redevelopment of the two-hundred-year-old but now defunct Kolar Gold Fields. The committee proposed that the land owned by the mining company could be redeveloped into a center for automotive production, an education city, a site for governmental offices, and other facilities, and elaborated on how the existing town and its population could be provided new economic opportunity. Professor Gopal Naik and his team have been involved in action research in using innovative technology to develop a sustainable model of delivering services for the rural economy through an e-governance initiative delivered through computer kiosks located in rural settings. Some of the research at CPP has had indirect policy implications and also has served as an early warning bell indicating the need for policy intervention. Professor Rajalaxmi Kamath and Professor Arnab Mukherji conducted innovative research with poor households using financial diaries.

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They showed that the poor were subject to loans from competing microfinance organizations, and this served to alert policymakers to a problem in the microfinance sector. This study was reported in August 2009 in the Wall Street Journal and subsequently became the subject of policy interventions by the governments of Andhra Pradesh and India. While delivering the nineteenth convocation address of North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, the vice president of India, Shri M. Hamid Ansari, while advocating gender equality, quoted at length the findings of Professor Hema Swaminathan and her team’s work on ‘‘Measuring the Gender Asset Gap in Ecuador, Ghana and India.’’ Case Study of CPP Policy Impact: Direction-Based Bus Services in Bangalore—Big 10 Bangalore is the capital of the state of Karnataka and is the fifth largest urban agglomeration in India. According to the 2011 census, Bangalore urban district has a population of 9.6 million, of which 85 percent fall under the jurisdiction of the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike. The public transport system in Bangalore has been based on buses. Only in October 2011 was the Bangalore Metro launched, which caters only to a small number of travelers in Bangalore. With the continued boom in the information technology, biotechnology, and education sectors, the affluence of Bangalore has been rising, resulting in an extraordinary increase in private transportation. Streets are thus congested, and managing traffic load is a huge challenge. The radial routes are also facing congestion because of urban sprawl. According to statistics from the Bangalore Traffic Police, ‘‘The number of motor vehicles registered in Bangalore increased from 236,000 in 1983 to 684,497 by 1992 and 2.1 million by December 2004, phenomenal rates of increase by 289% and 278% respectively. Out of these vehicles, 1.5 million are 2 wheelers and .33 million are cars, i.e., 88.17% of the total vehicles are personal vehicles. This does not include the floating vehicle population.’’ Thus getting people out of private transportation options and into buses (and eventually the Metro, once more routes are in place) is a key policy challenge, along with the intermediate challenge of improving the efficiency of bus transportation. In order to improve public services across domains in Bangalore, the chief minister established the Agenda for Bengaluru Infrastructure Development (ABIDe) Task Force. It was an independent body with the mandate

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to provide a clear strategy for improving the infrastructure in the city. Its remit is thus wide ranging, including roads and public transportation as well as water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure; urban governance; and security. The task force is made up of politicians, prominent business leaders, and technical experts from academia and industry. ABIDe consulted with transport planning experts were by to deliver the public transport recommendations found in its main planning document, the Plan Bengaluru 2020. Dr. Ashwin Mahesh of CPP was a key member of the ABiDe Task Force, which examined Bangalore’s bus transportation challenge. He observed that the traditional design of the bus transport network in Bangalore has been point-to-point bus routes, also known as destination-oriented services. With over 2,300 operational routes, the government-owned Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTC) had the problem of managing the ever-increasing routes that were a combination of origin-destination. This problem presented various challenges for the users of public transport. Because buses for specific destinations were not frequent on particular routes, waiting times at bus stops were high. Thus, trying to figure out an optimum travel route for commuting within the city was difficult.

The Solution Mahesh proposed the design and implementation of a direction-based bus service initiative. Named Big 10 (because the service was introduced on the ten major arterial roads that connect the center of the city with the outlying areas), this service simplified the user experience and helped to decongest the three main bus interchanges. In this system, users simply have to identify the route that heads in the direction of their final destination. Highfrequency services mean that they can quickly catch a bus going in the general direction of their travel, and then transfer to another service that takes them closer to their final destination. The introduction of direction-based bus services required very little in the way of infrastructural investment, with no extensive new road or terminal infrastructure necessary. The primary cost for the project was the acquisition of buses for the variety of services. These costs were minimal, since the buses used were appropriated either from the existing BMTC fleet or

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Figure 3.1. The ‘‘Big 10’’ Logo

from existing orders for fleet expansion. Mahesh also introduced the idea of ‘‘fully branding’’ the vehicles used for the Big 10 operation, so as to distinguish them easily. The logo of the brand reads ‘‘Big 10’’ in English as well as in Kannada, the local language in Bangalore, and was widely hailed by the design community in the city. In Bangalore, historically there has been a conflict between groups that insisted that bus signage should only be in the local language and others arguing that multiple language signs were critical to improving patronage. The novel logo solved this problem (Figure 3.1). The cost of branding the buses for the new services was also negligible. In the case of new buses, these were painted in the new design at the point of production. When older buses were appropriated for the new services, they were repainted when they came in for recertification of their operational effectiveness—buses are painted anyway during the recertification process and therefore this did not lead to any additional costs.

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Bus Route Network There are currently several types of direction-based services, and feeders to those: Big 10 routes that travel along the major arterial roads leading into and out of Bangalore, connecting major suburbs and residential areas with the central business district (Figure 3.2). Although initially planned for ten major arterial roads, services are now available on twelve roads. This service is still popularly referred to as ‘‘Big 10.’’ They are also known as ‘‘green routes’’ because of the color design of the buses serving these routes. In addition, ‘‘blue routes’’ will connect two Big 10 routes, running through the city center. They thus will provide mobility through the central business district and facilitate suburb-to-suburb travel. Currently there is only one operational blue route, although more are planned for the near future. These buses sport a blue paint design. Despite the difference in colors, these blue buses are also branded as ‘‘Big10’’ services. Big Circle bus routes run on the Outer Ring Road of the city, providing circulatory services. There are currently twenty-four routes in operation, twelve each in the clockwise and counterclockwise directions (numbered C1–12 and D1–12 respectively). In each direction, the route number refers to the road on which the corresponding Big 10 route number runs. For example, the D-4 Big Circle route is a counterclockwise service beginning at Bannerghatta Road, along which the G-4 Big 10 service operates. Each Big Circle route makes a half ring from its starting point to the terminus point on the opposite side of the city. These buses have a multicolored design on a white background. K bus routes run in an inner circle within a four-to-six-kilometer radius of the city center, starting from three major terminus points. Each route covers one-third of the circle from its starting point and overlaps with its next route. Routes are numbered counterclockwise, but buses run in both direction. These routes are the present incarnation of the Kendra Saarige circulatory service, which was revamped as K Routes after low usage in the initial months. Their design is similar to that of the Big Circle buses. Finally, Big Connect routes are feeder services that connect different neighborhoods to the nearest Big 10 route. These have been introduced in the peripheral areas of the city, and are also different from typical services provided earlier in these areas. Whereas BMTC had been running buses very infrequently from these neighborhoods to different major destinations like the city market and the railway station, the Big Connect service instead simply connects the neighborhood to the arterial Big 10 service instead, and does so more

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Figure 3.2. Direction-Based Service: Route Diagram. Source www.btis.in/dbs.

frequently. This trade-off between direct service and frequency is one that passengers appear to like—it means that users have to change buses to complete their journeys, but they benefit by being able to travel at a time convenient to them, rather than when the bus is available.

Implementation and Success As in any large publicly owned bus system worldwide, the main hurdles in implementing the project were issues of general institutional inertia and resistance to change. Furthermore, there is also usually pressure in such cases to cancel any new services if there are no signs of immediate success. Advocates of direction-based services were able to overcome these roadblocks. Providing the direction-based services with their own unique branding and the buses with their own color designs introduced a degree of

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irreversibility to the process—scrapping the program and reintegrating the fleet with regular BMTC services would not be costless. In the first few weeks after the introduction of the direction-based services, use of them was low. This led to pressure to abandon the services, as the prospects for breaking even or making profits were thought to be slim. ABIDe remained committed to the initiative, however, and insisted that the services remain in place as long as ridership and revenue figures showed month-to-month improvements. This persistence was rewarded as these figures continued to rise. Mahesh also discovered a flaw in the method that BMTC was using to determine the profitability of each route. This not only helped BMTC understand Big 10 revenue better, but also helped it understand its data from other services. The direction-based services were ultimately hailed as a successful innovation in Bangalore’s public bus system. These and other innovations of the BMTC received praise in not only the local press but also at the national level, receiving an award for excellence in urban transport from the Ministry of Urban Development in December 2010. The success of direction orientation in BMTC has subsequently led to an even more important development—the focus of other departments is now aligning with that of the transport system. For instance, the traffic police are considering a proposal to prioritize their enforcement efforts, ensuring they keep the Big 10 roads and the ring roads of the city moving while giving less attention to congestion elsewhere. This change will help push traffic onto these larger roads that have the capacity to handle them, whereas a lot of traffic now uses smaller roads, cutting even into residential neighborhoods, because the major ones are often clogged. Similarly, the municipality and the land-use planning authority are considering a transit-oriented approach to zoning land use, by which higher densities of utilization would be promoted along the arterial Big 10 corridors.

Conclusion CPP has been able to use a mix of approaches in order to exert influence on the policymaking process in India. As highlighted in the case study of direction-based services, CPP faculty have been able to engage successfully in the process of analyzing the policy problem, coming up with a solution,

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bringing in smart and quick implementation methods, and developing a road map to solve the problem. While many interventions in the form of concrete policy inputs may be provided, some eventually become implemented in actual policies while some do not. In instances of indirect policy inputs, by continuing to align research with emerging social problems, CPP will be able to build its credibility as a policy problem spotter before situations become full-blown crises. Overall, CPP has managed to work within the constraints of India’s complex policymaking system to influence the content and direction of public policy.

References ABIDe: Home. Accessed April 30, 2012, http://abidebengaluru.in/. Agenda for Bangalore Infrastructure and Development Task Force. Roads, Traffic Management and Transportation. Accessed March 21, 2011, http://abidebengaluru.in/ report/show/7. ‘‘A Global Surge in Tiny Loans Spurs Credit Bubble in a Slum.’’ Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2009. Accessed April 30, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1250 12112518027581.html. ‘‘BMTC Bags Excellence Award.’’ Deccan Herald, December 6, 2010. Accessed March 21, 2011, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/118700/bmtc-bags-excellence -award.html. ‘‘Buses Add to Growth of Public Transport.’’ Deccan Herald, December 29, 2009. Accessed March 21, 2009, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/43971/buses -add-growth-public-transport.html. ‘‘Direction Based Bus Services in Bangalore.’’ Bangalore Transport Information System. Accessed April 30, 2012, http://btis.in/dbs. ‘‘Directors.’’ NABARD Financial Services Limited. Accessed April 30, 2012, http:// www.nabfins.org/Director. ‘‘High Level Expert Group on Universal Health Coverage.’’ Planning Commission of India. Accessed April 30, 2012, http://uhc-india.org/about_hleg_members.php. ‘‘IIMB Paper Awarded ICEGOV Certificate of Merit.’’ Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. Accessed April 30, 2012, http://www.iimb.ernet.in/node/2281. ‘‘Karnataka Knowledge Commission.’’ Karnataka Jnana Aayoga. Accessed April 30, 2012, http://jnanaayoga.in. Mahesh, Ashwin. ‘‘Big 10: Good Idea, Better Execution.’’ Times of India, Viewpoint column, March 23, 2009. Accessed April 30, 2012, http://www.epaper.timesof india.com/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?FromArchive&SourcePage& SkinTOINEW&BaseHrefTOIBG/2009/05/23&PageLabel2&EntityIdAr 00200&ViewModeHTML&GZT.

108 Infrastructure ‘‘Mission Steering Group.’’ National Rural Health Mission. Accessed April 30, 2012, http://www.mohfw.nic.in/NRHM/msg.htm. ‘‘Namma Metro.’’ Wikipedia. Accessed April 30, 2012, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Namma_Metro. ‘‘Organisation and Functions.’’ Reserve Bank of India. Accessed April 30, 2012, http:// www.rbi.org.in/commonman/English/scripts/organisation.aspx. Policy Landscape and Think Tanks in India: Paradigms, Processes and Future Directions. New Delhi: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2009.

Chapter 4

Centre for Policy Research (CPR): Reforming the Urban Transit System in Delhi Partha Mukhopadhyay

Researchers cannot understand why there is resistance to policy change despite clear and convincing evidence. Policy-makers bemoan the inability of many researchers to make their findings accessible and digestible in time for policy decisions. Practitioners often just get on with things. —John Young

This chapter looks at the reform of the urban transit system in Delhi, the capital of India, specifically the manner in which bus services are provided. Buses, in 2006, when this intervention occurred, accounted for 60 percent of all vehicular trips in Delhi. The chapter emphasizes the role of civil society, working through the media and the courts in highlighting the issue. It also details the various political balances that had to be struck in crafting a solution. The chapter begins with a short reiteration of the importance of urban transport within a broader agenda of sustainable growth. The impact of India’s urbanization on the evolution of its energy consumption and consequently, its effect on global carbon emissions, will depend significantly on the extent to which Indian urban residents continue to use public transport. The chapter then describes the urban transport system in Delhi before the reform, followed by the events that led to its reform and the

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Figure 4.1. India’s Share of World Growth of Liquid Fuel. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration International Energy Outlook 2011, p. 162.

manner in which the think tank was able to influence the process. It concludes with the current status of implementation of these reforms.

Importance of Urban Transit One of the major transformations of this century is the ongoing urbanization of China and India. By 2025, according to projections from the census of India, around 40 percent of the Indian population will be urban, well over half a billion people. A critical question in this context is the model it will follow. Traveling down the American or even the European path is not an option, for the level of energy consumption would be unsustainable, especially once China’s emissions are taken into account. The relationship between transport and urbanization in India thus has to be different from that seen so far. A Global Environment Facility report (GEF 2010) projects that without a ‘‘major shift away from current patterns of energy use, the transport energy use in 2030 will be about 80 per cent higher than in 2002 . . . [and] a large part of the growth will be in developing countries.’’ India’s outcomes in this area will have large global effects. As Figure 4.1 shows, from now until 2030, India is expected to have a growing and large share of global energy consumption. In fact almost a quarter of the increase in consumption of liquid fuel is projected to come

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Figure 4.2. India’s Share of Transport in Liquid Fuel. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration International Energy Outlook 2011, p. 220.

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Figure 4.3. Rise in Private Vehicle Use in India. Source: National Sample Survey, various reports.

from India. Figure 4.2. shows that more than half of the demand for liquid fuel is projected to come from the transport sector. This, however, is less than the United States, where this share is around 70 percent. In part, this is due to the comparatively low transport demand in India. Changing or even holding on to these projections would require working on the form that India’s urbanization transformation will take. Figure 4.3 shows that the share of households who use private vehicles in India (including two-wheelers and cars)1 is rising rapidly, especially in

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Figure 4.4. Vehicle Ownership Rises Sharply with Income. Source: National Sample Survey on Consumption 2009–10.

urban areas, where a third of households now use personal transport. As is to be expected, this varies widely with the economic situation of the household. Figure 4.4 shows the extent of car and two-wheeler ownership in Indian urban areas and specifically in the city of Delhi, which is among the richer Indian megacities, with an area of around fifteen hundred square kilometers and a population of around seventeen million. As can be seen, for the topmost 10 percent, more than half the households own cars while this is true for two-wheelers for the top 30 percent. In this context, it is imperative for public transit in cities to be efficient, comfortable, and inexpensive if the future urban resident in India is to use it. The predominance of two-wheelers as a mode of transport in the middle-income classes, as seen in Figure 4.4, means that the system has to be able to replicate the point-to-point feature of personal transport at a price point that is roughly around two cents per kilometer. As Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show, the share of public bus transport as a share of motorized travel (nonmotorized travel rose from 9 percent to 15 percent of trips) was falling rapidly as a consequence, and the new metro system was able to compensate only for a part of this decline. This was the policy challenge faced in reforming the Delhi bus system.

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The Problem: The State of Delhi’s Bus Service in 2007 In 2007, bus operations in Delhi were provided by three main types of operators: (1) private stage carriages, mostly under what is known as the Blueline program; (2) Delhi Transport Corporation, an undertaking of the government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi to a limited extent; (3) Delhi Metrorail Corporation (DMRC), the metropolitan rail service provider that ran connector services to the Metro stations.

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The Blueline buses were privately owned buses that plied on designated public bus routes in Delhi for which they were licensed by the State Transport Authority of the Delhi government. These buses were individually owned (76.3 percent of the buses were owned by a licensee who had only a single vehicle and another 14.4 percent of buses were owned by licensees with two vehicles) for the most part and were often subcontracted to the driver and conductor for a fixed fee on a bill-and-keep system. Thus, each driver had strong incentives to pick up as many passengers as possible. Since there were multiple buses licensed for a given route and the enforcement of timetables was lax, it gave a strong incentive for on-road competition. In part because of this on-road competition, coupled with other features of the Delhi transport system, these Blueline buses were responsible for about eight to ten fatalities per month (Delhi has approximately two thousand road fatalities a year). In 2007, following a series of particularly egregious incidents, print and television media attention started focusing on deaths caused by Blueline buses. The data do not show any particular rise in the deaths caused by these buses, though the rate of fatalities caused by their on-road behavior indisputably was already high. In response, the chief minister of Delhi announced on July 3, 2007, that that the government would phase out the Blueline buses, but without a definite plan or time frame.

The Intervention In July 2007, the Honorable High Court of Delhi suo moto took notice of the developments and asked the Delhi capital government what action it was planning to take to control the menace.2 In response, the Delhi government asked the Delhi Integrated Multi-Modal Transit System (DIMTS)3 to prepare a plan. As part of the public discourse on the issue, I published an op-ed piece on July 17, 2007, in a major national newspaper, pointing out structural features of the contract with Blueline buses that made them more prone to dangerous driving behavior and pointing out that the age and nature of management were peripheral reasons for this behavior.4 Shortly thereafter, the chief executive of DIMTS, a civil servant, got in touch and asked whether my organization, the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), could help the agency think through the issues and work on analyzing what kind of bus contracting would address the problems.5

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The Delhi government was under a lot of pressure from the Honorable High Court to submit a plan quickly, and judges were monitoring progress frequently.6 There were intensive discussions with the team at DIMTS, the transport officials of the Delhi government, lawyers retained by DIMTS to prepare contractual documents, and the team from CPR, with data on accidents analyzed and various international mechanisms for involving private participation in the delivery of urban bus services explored, along with technologies and methods for monitoring compliance and measuring performance. Those involved tried through multilateral institutions to involve international experts, but the time was too short. Finally, CPR submitted a report on October 30, 2007. 7 DIMTS then forwarded it to the Transport Department of the Delhi government, which sent it to the Council of Ministers of the Delhi government; the council considered it on November 13, 2007, and accepted it with certain modifications.8 A status report was filed with the Honorable High Court on November 15, 2007.

The Proposed Scheme The plan regrouped the 657 routes of Delhi (a number of which were not being served) into seventeen clusters using digital models. Each cluster consists of a consolidated set of routes, such that there is minimal overlap of routes across clusters. Each such cluster will be serviced by a private entity and Delhi Transport, both of whom will be required to provide a scheduled bus service based on a unified timetable. The private entity will be awarded the cluster through a competitive bidding process for ten years. A performance incentive regime is to reward or penalize the operator on the basis of the quality of service delivered.9 Each vehicle is to be equipped with an automatic vehicle location system. The Operation Control Centre will monitor the movement of each vehicle for adherence to the unified timetable set by DIMTS. An algorithmic software system will calculate penalties and rewards for reliability10 and frequency. In case of foreseeable defaults the operator will notify DIMTS of the inability to deliver a service, allowing for suitable substitution. Additional features like a passenger information system were included to help make waiting easier for passengers. DIMTS also planned a biometric identification system to register and certify drivers as well as conductors.

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The bus operators will not bear revenue risk and instead will be paid a performance-related fee, a concession structure known as the gross cost model. Fares are to be collected by the public sector through a networkwide mechanism. This feature was designed to eliminate on-road competition. Further, viability of the service will be assessed not be on the basis of routes but on a network basis. This was also designed to address a situation where a combination of high-cost operation by Delhi Transport and private buses that only ran on profitable routes meant that almost half of Delhi’s 657 registered bus routes were not operated at all, depriving citizens of access and forcing them onto more expensive transport modes. In summary, the plan was designed to have the following key characteristics:11 (1) safety in all its aspects, (2) universality, that is, availability of service on all scheduled routes, (3) cost effectiveness, so as to minimize the user tariff and provide economically self-sufficient operations to the extent possible along with continuous improvement of the service, and (4) integrated character, punctuality, and passenger comfort to attract existing private transport users to use public transport. After approval of the plan in November 2007, the Delhi government issued a request for qualification in March 2008 and later in the year a request for proposals; the government then called for bids and finally awarded the contract for the first cluster in May 2009. Subsequently, it invited bids for clusters 2, 3, 4, and 5 and subsequently, in January 2011, bids for four other clusters. Of these, cluster 6 is to have 423 buses, cluster 7 will have 358 buses, cluster 8 will have 513, and cluster 9 is designed to have 418 running on specified routes.12 In all, these four clusters are to eventually put 1,712 buses on the road. In the same month, agreements were signed for cluster 2, which went to a consortium of former Blueline operators,13 and clusters 3, 4, and 5 to a single firm (each firm is limited to three clusters).14 However, the plan faced continuing legal challenges in court. On March 3, 2011, the Honorable High Court dismissed challenges to the plan. In its judgment, the court observed that [the] Court had stepped in the present matter in larger public interest. Directions were given to the Government of NCT of Delhi to evolve a scheme. Unlike those situations where sometimes there is difference in the perspective of the judiciary on the one hand and the executive on the other hand, leading to friction at times, happily, in the present case, the Government of NCT of Delhi also rose to

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occasion accepting the fact that the blue line buses had failed this city and time had come to find the alternate [sic]. Such reality or commonality of the thought process of the judiciary and the executive in the present case has to be commended. Working in tandem and at the same time discharging its own executive function as it is the executive which is well equipped with necessary paraphernalia to study the nitty-gritty and nuances of the problem and take remedial steps, the Govt. of NCT of Delhi has introduced the Cluster system. Therefore, unless it is found that this scheme infringes some statutory or constitutional rights of the blue line bus operators, it is not the function of this court to sit over the judgment of the executive and substitute the same with some other scheme.15 On May 5, 2011, the first buses on the first awarded cluster finally came on road.16 Delhi moved from provision of public bus services by licensed individual owners of private buses to a bus concession policy based on gross cost, with buses are equipped with GPS devices enabling their movement and geographic location to be tracked by an automatic vehicle location system on a real-time basis. Electronic ticketing machines are being used on these buses in place of preprinted tickets. The Operations Control Centre is already functional, which receives real-time data feeds from the location system and the fare collection system. An advanced automatic fare collection system, which will include multimodal smart cards, is in an advanced stage of procurement.

Outcome Since May 2011, the induction of cluster buses has been slower than expected. A primary bottleneck has been the provision of bus depots to the cluster bus concessionaires. Currently, about three hundred cluster buses are currently in operation in clusters 1 to 5 and bids for clusters 6 to 9 have been held and the successful bidders selected.17 The cluster bus services have been quite efficient in putting buses on the road while a significant share of the public operator’s buses are regularly off the road because of maintenance problems. The number of accidents caused by these buses is also much lower than the erstwhile Blueline buses. Finally, the revenue per

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bus-day, which accrues to the government, is higher than that of the public operator on similar routes. Thus, it would appear from the limited experience that the cluster bus system is meeting at least three of the four goals: safety, universality (to the extent of the clusters in operationa), and cost effectiveness. Whether the system will be able to attract users back to public transport once the entire program is implemented is a major question.

What Makes for Successful Policy Change? Clarity About the Objective The first element in successful policy is clarity about the objective. In Delhi, it was the higher judiciary that pushed the executive to make up its mind. Once what needed to be accomplished was clear, the professionals were allowed to determine how it should be achieved. In this context, Agarwal and Somanathan (2005) point to a number of instances of executive policy unreliability in the sense of Evans and Manning (2003), where policies in India have either been reversed or put on hold, not just because of ‘‘political interference’’ but because of intrinsic substantive and procedural weaknesses in the policy. The Delhi bus reform seems to have overcome India’s difficulty with ‘‘formulating the ‘right’ policy and then sticking to it’’ (5). It responded to an immediate need, a clear public demand for better road safety, strengthened by heightened media visibility. This immediacy of need sustained the political demand for a solution. It is here that the role of civil society becomes very important. The ability of a well-grounded social movement to mount constant pressure on the political decision makers is critical to obtaining clarity about the objective.18 Of course, in the absence of countervailing pressures, the objective may be skewed to favor one section of civil society over another. Here, however, while the appreciation of the nature, motives, and objectives of such social movements is important for think tanks, it is not clear whether a closeness of association may affect one of their raisons d’eˆtre, viz. that of providing a neutral space. Conversely, especially for think tanks focused on social policy, association may not only bring access but also add to credibility, in terms of independence from government. Indeed, for some think tanks in the social policy space, the distinction between movement participant and think tank could become blurred.

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Role of the Judiciary The second element in policy success is the higher judiciary’s role in policymaking in India. In this case, its role was to force the government to formulate a policy, but a number of parameters were implicitly set, such as the need to remove the Blueline buses. In many other instances, for example, the conversion of Delhi’s public transport (both passenger and freight) to compressed natural gas, the judiciary has been much more prescriptive. Ayyar (2009) provides a recent discussion on the judiciary and the making of public policy in India. A feature of such judicial intervention is the creation of monitoring mechanisms, in the form of court-appointed committees or amicus curiae to oversee the compliance with court orders, providing a further impetus to implementation. Role of Finance The third element for success is the need to complement policy with finance. In Delhi, during the Honorable High Court’s deliberations, the government increased bus fares for the first time in almost seven years. Justifying the hike, the chief minister said: ‘‘We are offering a clean and modern transport system to the citizens. We are increasing the fleet of low floor buses to 5,000. So, to make up a portion of the cost we have decided to increase the bus fare.’’19 There has, however, been significant resistance to the idea that the private sector should not bear usage risk, which, while it has been accepted in the case of buses in Delhi, has not yet been tested (in situations where the government would have to make contributions to meet costs, if required). In such instances, it is therefore beneficial to have people who understand financial implications well as part of the policymaking process, in order to ensure smoother implementation. Mutual Credibility The fourth element in success is the mutual credibility between the various organs of the state and the policy analyst and researcher. In this case, the credibility derived from past interactions of the policy expert with the executive. The movement of Indian civil servants between bureaucracy and research institutions thus provides opportunities, as well as constraints. It exemplifies the value attributed by Court and Maxwell (2005) to ‘‘people moving between the research and policy communities, carrying embedded

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knowledge and ways of working with them’’ (719). Such credibility is usually based on professional expertise, which is a matter of both education and exposure to the mechanics of government. It helped that while the policy advisors were trained at very well regarded institutions, they also had prior experience engaging with the government. Since the bureaucrats were similarly trained, they were able to appreciate and engage with the advice of the policy advisors. This addressed both the ‘‘problems of [research] supply’’ as well as issues related to ‘‘lack of policymaker demand and lack of government capacity’’ (Court and Maxwell 2005: 716). In federal countries, this feature can vary across levels of government.20

Role of the Centre for Policy Research The RAPID framework enunciated by Court and Maxwell (2005) focuses on three elements: the political context, the links between policymakers and other stakeholders, and the evidence. Among these three elements, Young (2005) sees policy analysis as the overlap of the political context and evidence, academic discourse as the intersection between evidence and links, and lobbying and advocacy as the area between links and political context. This chapter provides a vivid example of the intersection of the three elements, ‘‘the area in the middle—the bulls-eye—where convincing evidence providing a practical solution to a current policy problem . . . is supported by and brought to the attention of policymakers by actors in all three areas . . . [which] is likely to be the most immediate link between evidence and policy’’ (Young 2005: 729). In this case, the political context was provided by the intense media and judicial focus on the issue, there was substantial international experience that could be applied to the issue, and the ties between the policy experts and executive decision makers were strong. This last element was based on two characteristics, the prior interaction between the individual policy experts and the civil servants tasked with crafting a solution and the nature of the Centre for Policy Research as an institution. Established in 1973 by a group of academics and former civil servants, CPR has over the years built up a reputation for nonpartisan and reasoned policy advice. Building on its initial network of relationships, it has retained relatively strong access to the government, especially the executive branch, while remaining independent.

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Conclusion Currently in India, broad-based think tanks are limited. Their size is much smaller than American think tanks. Most are contract research organizations. Their ability to disseminate information differs (the Internet is helping but websites are weak, though improving rapidly). Advocacy in India is linked more with social movements than think tanks. Recently, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada’s development research funding agency, surveyed think tanks in India, as part of a proposed large-scale capacity-building initiative (which has since been launched). The survey found that almost all (twenty-three of twenty-four) think tanks say government sees a role for research centers in supporting policymaking. Of course, self-justification may have inflated these numbers. Further, funding is mostly project specific and endowments are limited, with 75 percent of funding from grants or contracts. This affects capacity. Limited long-term support makes it difficult to attract good researchers. Most think tanks (nineteen of twenty-four) say that while doing so is not impossible, they have to work hard to find and retain such researchers. In the midst of these challenges, there are a number of positive elements. First, the openness of the Indian system means that there are many parallel channels to influence policy. An activist judiciary is based on the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution (also a liberal interpretation of the fundamental ‘‘right to life’’). The mechanism of public interest litigation gives access to the judiciary.21 Social movements have an independent role and increasing state resources, driven by economic growth, have made many of their demands more fiscally possible. A vibrant and competitive media increases their visibility. However, in examining the links between research and policy in India, Saxena (2005), himself a former bureaucrat, finds that bureaucracy in India often poses a challenge to policy innovation. Thus, in Saxena’s account, civil society is crucial and change requires constant lobbying, advocacy, and pressure. He argues that policy change happens most easily when researchers, government, and civil society work together. Looking at the same issue, Mathur and Mathur (2007) too conclude that though policy research has gradually become more interdisciplinary, it remains largely an economics-technology discourse. Second, there remains a culture of debate and allowing space for dissenting views, which is a crucial element in the making of policy. Further,

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the enactment of the Right to Information Act in 2005 makes it less likely that policy-relevant research will stay out of the public domain, making it difficult for the public to engage with it. Research commissioned by the government, as well as most committee reports, are now often, if not invariably, made public. Third, the element of transparency has also helped to improve access to data, and thereby subject available sources to various tests of quality, consistency, and relevance. The growth of data-based research should help, subject to ‘‘distortion’’ of incentives by disciplinary priorities. Fourth, the federal nature of the polity allows opportunity for variety and innovation. The state of Andhra Pradesh was a test bed for various forms of e-governance, Rajasthan was a petri dish for the right to information, and the electricity regulatory agency in Maharashtra has been in the vanguard of involving civil society in the regulatory process. Each of these has been applied in different degrees by other states and occasionally the federal government.22 Fifth, policy enterprises, in the spirit of McGann (2005), may be emerging. The Arghyam Foundation may be one such example and CPR itself may be responsible for two other candidates, PRS Legislative Research and the Accountability Initiative. These initiatives have the ability to engage with media and improve the quality of public debate. Naturally, however, when there is the extent of churn in the policy landscape as is the case in India, there are a number of unresolved issues. One of these is the role that activist and academic research will play, especially as social movements become more salient in the policy process. The other question, a` la Mead (2005), is about the nature of evidence. This is related to the major unresolved question as to who is thinking about the questions to ask, the framing of the problem, as it were. In such areas, the purpose of research, even at think tanks, may well be to stimulate debate rather than bring closure with specific recommendations.

Notes Epigraph: John Young, ‘‘Research, Policy and Practice: Why Developing Countries Are Different,’’ Journal of International Development 17 no. 6 (2005): 727–734. 1. This is the share of households who report spending on gas and diesel for transportation.

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2. ‘‘HC Issues Notice to Delhi Govt on Menace of Blueline Buses,’’ Times of India, July 10, 2007, accessed April 10, 2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ 2007–07–10/india/27981824_1_blueline-buses-killer-buses-hc-issues-notice. 3. DIMTS is a joint venture company set up with equal equity of the GNCTD and IDFC Foundation. Its professed aim is to develop and deliver world-class urban infrastructure to the citizens of Delhi, primarily in urban transport (see ‘‘Delhi Integrated Multi-Modal Transit System Ltd.,’’ accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.dimts .in/). 4. Partha Mukhopadhyay, ‘‘A Bus Colored Blue,’’ Indian Express, Tuesday, July 17, 2007, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/a-bus-colou red-blue/205207/0. 5. The chief executive of DIMTS and I were both earlier associated with the prime minister’s Task Force on Infrastructure. 6. A full list of orders related to this case can be accessed on the website of the Honorable High Court (see ‘‘High Court of Delhi,’’ accessed April 10, 2013, http:// delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhc_case_status_oj_list.asp?pno369511) . 7. Subsequently, as part of the process of detailing the concession agreement, international consultants were retained. These consultants, from the same firm that advised the reorganization of Transport for London, made almost no changes to the basic conceptual structure of the scheme. 8. ‘‘Dwarka-Airport Metro Link Okayed,’’ The Hindu: New Delhi News, November 14, 2007, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.hindu.com/2007/11/14/stories/ 2007111456940400.htm. 9. Following public consultation and research, the parameters chosen for operator evaluation by DIMTS included service reliability and frequency, bus crowding, journey time, bus accessibility, staff attitude and behavior, personal safety and security during the journey, and vehicle cleanliness and repair. 10. Thus, high maintenance standards generate financial rewards for running a reliable system and poorly maintained buses that break down more often incur a penalty. 11. Court of Its Own Motion vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors., W.P.(CRL) 878/ 2007 (March 3, 2011) at 23, accessed April 10, 2013, http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/AKS/judge ment/05–03–2011/AKS03032011CRLW8782007.pdf. 12. ‘‘DCT Invites Proposals for Four New Bus Clusters,’’ Indian Express, January 11, 2011, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/dtc-invites -proposals-for-four-new-bus-clust/735880/. 13. Ananya Bhardwaj, ‘‘Can’t Fight Them, so Blueline Owners Join Govt’s Cluster Scheme,’’ Indian Express, Tuesday, January 18, 2011, accessed April 10, 2013, http:// www.indianexpress.com/news/cant-fight-them-so-blueline-own ers-join-go/738837/. 14. ‘‘Agreements Signed for Three Bus Cluster Routes,’’ The Hindu: New Delhi News, Wednesday, January 12, 2011, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.hindu.com/ 2011/01/12/stories/2011011262220300.htm.

124 Infrastructure 15. Court of Its Own Motion vs. State of NCT of Delhi, at 41–42, accessed April 10, 2013, http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/AKS/judgement/05–03–2011/AKS03032011CRLW 8782007.pdf. 16. ‘‘First Lot of Cluster Buses Hit the Road,’’ Indian Express, December 9, 2012, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/first-lot-of-cluster -buses-hit-the-road-in-s/786531/. 17. ‘‘Cluster Scheme Depot Space Cluster Buses,’’ Times of India, December 12, 2009, accessed April 10, 2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012–12 –09/delhi/35704846_1_cluster-scheme-depot-space-cluster-buses. 18. See Halpin (2011) for an analysis of policy bandwagons and their relationship to campaigns. 19. See ‘‘DCT Hikes Bus Fares,’’ Times of India, October 26, 2009, accessed April 10, 2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009–10–26/delhi/28113184_1 _new-fares-minimum-fare-concessional. Low-floor buses are more than twice as expensive as traditional buses in the public transport system. 20. The capacity of different levels of government is an understudied area. Howlett and Newman (2010) examine the background and training of provincial and territorial policy analysts in Canada. 21. For a brief review of public interest litigation, see Desai and Muralidhar (2000). 22. This feature of provinces undertaking different policies is much like China’s, but it is possible that the selection of successful innovations and their process of diffusion may be less centrally determined and controlled in India.

References Agarwal, O. P., and T. V. Somanathan. ‘‘Public Policy Making in India: Issues and Remedies.’’ Gender Resource Centre. February 2005. Accessed April 20, 2013, http://grcgujarat.org/PDF/Public Policy/Public Policy Making in India 14–2–05 TV SOMANATHAN.pdf. Ayyar, R. V. Vaidyanatha. Public Policy Making in India. New Delhi: Pearson Publishing Delhi, 2009. Court, Julius, and Simon Maxwell. 2005 ‘‘Policy Entrepreneurship for Poverty Reduction: Bridging Research and Policy in International Development.’’ Journal of International Development 17, no. 6. (2005): 713–725 Desai, Ashok H., and S. Muralidhar. ‘‘Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems.’’ In Supreme but Not Infallible—Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of India, edited by B. N. Kirpal et al., 159–192. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000.

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Evans, Gord, and Nick Manning. ‘‘Helping Governments Keep Their Promises: Making Ministers and Governments More Reliable Through Improved Policy Management.’’ South Asia Region Internal Discussion Paper, World Bank, Report No. IDP-187. 2003. Global Environment Fund (GEF). ‘‘Investing in Sustainable Urban Transport: The GEF Experience.’’ 2010. Accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/ thegef.org/files/publication/Investing-Urban-Transportation_0.pdf. Halpin, Darien. ‘‘Organized Interests and Cascades of Attention: Unpacking Policy Bandwagon Dynamics.’’ Governance 24, no. 2 (2011): 205–230. Accessed April 30, 2012, https://researchers.anu.edu.au/publications/75867. Howlett, Mike P., and Joshua Newman. ‘‘Policy Analysis and Policy Work in Federal Systems: Policy Advice and Its Contribution to Evidence-Based Policy Making in Multi-Level Governance Systems.’’ Policy and Society 29, no. 2 (May 2010). Mathur, Navdeep, and Kuldeep Mathur. ‘‘Policy Analysis in India: Research Bases and Discursive Practices.’’ In Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, edited by Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney, 603–615. Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press and Taylor and Francis, 2007. McGann, James. ‘‘Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US.’’ Foreign Policy Research Institute. Philadelphia. August 2005. Mead, Lawrence M. 2005 ‘‘Policy Research: The Field Dimension.’’ Policy Studies Journal 33, no. 4 (2005): 535. Saxena, Naresh C. ‘‘Bridging Research and Policy in India.’’ Journal of International Development 17, no. 6 (2005): 737–746. Young, John. ‘‘Research, Policy and Practice: Why Developing Countries Are Different.’’ Journal of International Development 17, no. 6 (2005): 727–734.

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PART III

Environment and Sustainable Development

Today there is a growing consensus at the global, regional, and local levels of the linkages between environmental issues and social development. This realization is not new. It is part and parcel of the third generation of human rights as expressed in the Rio declaration of 1992. Despite opposition by certain actors favoring arguments for growth, there is an increasing understanding that we depend on a sound ecological environment to sustain our living now and in the future. The three chapters that follow demonstrate both the relevance and the role of think tanks in informing and promoting environmental policy agendas. At the very least, more traditional aspects of social development cannot and will not be addressed until environmental concerns are taken into account as well. National, regional, and international perspectives on the changing environment and on states’ and the international community’s responsibility in mitigating the challenges these changes pose have varied greatly. As a result, the issue has become increasingly prevalent in policy debates worldwide: a prevalence that the topic surely would not have enjoyed without the work done at and the influence of think tanks. What follows are three cases demonstrating the contribution to environmental policy by think tanks today.

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Chapter 5

The Ecologic Institute and Its Influence on Policies in Germany and the EU R. Andreas Kraemer

The Ecologic Institute, founded in 1995, is an internationally minded, private-initiative, nongovernmental, and nonprofit organization. Based in Berlin, Germany, and with a policy office in Brussels, Ecologic is very active at the European Union (EU) level. In 2008, the institute was also formally established in the United States as an IRC 501c3 public charity, with its main office in Washington, D.C., and a project office in San Mateo, California. The Ecologic Institute covers the full range of policy challenges on environment and the movement toward sustainability, in developed and developing countries alike. It provides policy responses to the environmental and resource crises, and regards effective protection and rational management of natural resources as a precondition for sustainable social development policies. In this respect, it contributes to capacity building and social development, while further striving to protect the integrity, resilience, and productivity of natural and managed ecosystems It does so particularly with regard to the transboundary and global nature of environmental and developmental challenges emanating from industrialization, urbanization and resource exploitation, and the restrictions on national-level policies resulting from economic globalization. In addition, the Ecologic Institute is a pioneer in exploring and promoting the integration of environmental, resource, and sustainable development concerns into other policies, notably engaging in domestic and

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broader European energy, agriculture, and transport policies as well as internationally in transatlantic relations, foreign policy and public diplomacy, Arctic affairs, and aspects of human security policy. In Germany and the EU, the Ecologic Institute is the ‘‘greenest’’ among think tanks working on international relations, foreign affairs, and global policy coordination. At the same time, it is the most international among think tanks in the fields of environment, resources, energy and climate, and sustainable development. Examples of key achievements to date include: (1) framework contracts with the European Parliament to submit short, evidence-based and policyoriented reports to prepare debates among legislators along the lines of a parliamentary research service; (2) 60 percent or higher success rate of policy-relevant proposals in the EU’s Framework Programmes for Research (at least five times better than the statistical average); (3) relationships with EU and national policymakers on the environment, development, diplomacy, and international affairs; and (4) impact notably on ‘‘Greening the EU Treaties,’’ EU and member state water policy, the EU and German carbon trading systems, and the expansion of renewable energy.

A Profile of the Ecologic Institute and Its Institutional Background The Ecologic Institute is one of the preeminent environmental and development think tanks in Germany and the EU, and with 140 staff and an annual revenue of 7 million euros in the EU and seven staff and $350,000 in the United States,1 one of the largest nongovernmental research and policy organizations working on development, the environment, and sustainable resource utilization. In Germany, it is one of several similar small- and medium-sized private, nonprofit, and independent social-ecological research organizations and think tanks combining critical science research outside governmental or core-funded institutes or universities with mission-driven, public-interest policy advocacy and advisory work. At the EU level, the Ecologic Institute is also typical of a small number of academic or private and independent nonprofit think tanks contributing to the evolution of European policies on the environment and resources, climate and energy, and the relevant aspects of EU external policies, including most notably international development.

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The Context for Environmental Think Tanks: Low Politics and Sound Science There are a number of specifics in regard to the environment and sustainable development that provide context and restrict strategy choices for think tanks. First to note is the sheer breadth of environment policy, ranging from policies affecting ‘‘media’’ such as air, soil, waste, water, and biodiversity to those addressing living and renewable ‘‘resources’’ such as water (and its scarcity), timber, fish, wildlife and game meat, animal husbandry, agriculture, and forestry and—more controversially –those dealing with nonrenewable resources, such as minerals, ores, coal, and oil and gas. Environmental policy also responds to ‘‘threats,’’ such as floods, droughts, fires, pests, predators, and chemical pollution; aims to maintain animal, plant, and individual human health and general public health; and contributes to the ‘‘livelihood security’’ of humans. Climate protection and adaptation to climate change were long considered part of environmental policy, but are now a separate policy field related to energy, transport, urban development, technology, and other policy areas. In the EU at least, integrating environmental (and resource) protection requirements into other policies and thus redirecting economic and social development policies on a path toward sustainability is an important objective of environmental policy. This breadth is difficult for any but the largest organizations to cover, and in consequence most think tanks limit themselves to specific aspects of environmental policy or maintain a geographic focus. There are very few ‘‘full service’’ environmental think tanks able to address the challenges in their full complexity on a global scale. The Ecologic Institute still faces limitations on its way to being a global think tank able to cover the full range of issues and challenges in environmental policy and other relevant policies, but it has expanded its thematic and geographical range through partnerships with like-minded organizations, notably through EU-funded research projects. Environmental and resource concerns are ‘‘urgent’’ (in that failure to implement solutions within a few years will endanger current human civilization) but also largely ‘‘low politics’’ and, with the notable exception of the climate challenge, rarely get the attention of top-level decision makers or make headline news. Partly as a consequence, think tanks working in the field have to rely on attention-creating incidents (including natural and man-made catastrophes) and seek to (help) stimulate ‘‘policy rhythms’’ by

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instituting formal policy cycles and creating regular events around which public awareness can be raised and media and advocacy work be organized. The Ecologic Institute—among others—has consistently and often successfully argued for formal policy review mechanisms to be established not only in EU law but also in policy-learning and coordination processes at all levels, with successes notably in the areas of water resource protection and management (in the EU), the expansion of renewable energy (in Germany), and the evaluation of national climate policy initiatives in Germany at federal and state levels. Environmental protection and the rational management of resources are in the public interest, even if on occasion small groups can be the main beneficiaries. This condition often limits the appeal to corporate sponsors or clients, and makes it necessary to seek funding elsewhere. In the German and European context and in the absence of core funding or institutional support, governmental ‘‘soft’’ research funding on a project-by-project basis has proven to be the most useful if not dependable source. A disadvantage of this type of funding is that as a rule it cannot be used for dissemination, the raising of awareness, or even education and training as ways to bring new scientific knowledge and insights to the public, policymakers, or practitioners in the field. Another disadvantage is the bias in favor of young researchers, who receive lower levels of pay according to German (and European) public sector pay scales that are binding also for recipients of government grants and contracts. This bias makes it difficult to retain more experienced staff, in effect causing a ‘‘brain drain.’’ At the same time, high levels of scientific competence are needed to understand environmental challenges, the cause-effect webs, the technologies involved in earth observation and monitoring, and pollution control, as well as clean production, economic and social response mechanisms, and the role of scientific knowledge in policymaking. Any think tank working in the field must perforce balance public-interest advocacy and policy relevance with scientific excellence and standing in science communities. In practice, ‘‘scientific excellence’’ and ‘‘policy relevance’’ are partly contradictory, and the Ecologic Institute—like all similar organizations at least in Germany—must make trade-offs between the two characteristics in its public profile. One way to make the necessary trade-off is to forgo science or policy impact, which both limits the effectiveness of the institution in addressing the underlying challenges and has a negative impact on the profiles and

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(academic) career prospects of the individuals involved. Another, more positive approach is through partnerships with other organizations— including sponsors and clients—that may focus their efforts on policy impact. Partnering with university-based researchers can help maintain science impact even if think tank staff cannot then always maintain ‘‘ownership’’ of the results of their work, and get full credit for their contribution. The dynamic nature of environmental and resource challenges creates a need for policy learning and the continuous improvement of approaches through adaptive (and cyclical) policy evaluation. Such monitoring can strengthen policymaking, and this in part explains the success of EU environmental policies, which have often incorporated formal review cycles. However, this feature also draws environmental think tanks into policy implementation, administration, and policy evaluation, which is only possible using staff from a wide range of disciplines cooperating in teams, from the natural, technical, and social sciences to political sciences and humanities, including at least lawyers and geographers. The Ecologic Institute has reached the ‘‘critical mass’’ or minimum (but not optimum) scale to accommodate the range of scientific and professional disciplines needed. It has established appropriate recruitment and staffing policies, and developed into a unique and highly adapted ‘‘fluid matrix organization’’ (to be described later). Environmental change is slow compared to economic, technological, or societal change, and environmental concerns play out in the long run. As a consequence, environmental think tanks must provide forward-looking impact assessments, and use forecasts, scenarios, back-casting, and other prediction methodologies. All these are based at least in part and to varying degrees on assumptions, conjecture, extrapolation, and speculation, and can thus be attacked as ‘‘unscientific.’’ Here again is a trade-off between being credible and forward-looking for environmental think tanks and effectively elucidating future environmental consequences of policy choices, on the one hand, and being credible because of a reliance on standard, evidence-based, and therefore necessarily backward-looking scientific methodologies, on the other. In fact, the leading German think tanks in the field have developed and established a specific form or ‘‘mode’’ of transdisciplinary, social-ecological research that is increasingly recognized as good (or best) practice. Together with its peers in Germany, the Ecologic Institute has founded the Ecological Research Network (Ecornet) in Germany to establish professional standards and promote this new mode of scientific

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inquiry seeking practical results for addressing societal challenges. (More detail is provided below.) Furthermore, the environmental sciences, technology, economics, and regulation are dynamic, which creates a range of uncertainties and the need to use a precautionary approach in risk assessment and management. This invariably draws environmental think tanks into controversies, where datadriven and rational arguments (preferred by the scientifically trained staff typically found in environmental think tanks) can easily lose out to emotional appeals to short-term particular or economic interests. As a consequence, the Ecologic Institute—like other such organizations—has been the object of (politically motivated) attacks in the media. In the consensusoriented policymaking environment in Germany, and with generally cautious public servants as sponsors, clients, or addressees of its work, such attacks generally harm policy influence and fund-raising as well as staff morale and—ultimately—staff retention. While it would be possible to build a reputation providing more resilience in the face of such attacks, the cost of doing so through effective communication and media relations is currently too high for the institute to bear. Context in Germany: Consensus-Driven Federalism on the Move In addition to the general characteristics of environmental and resource policies described above, there are a number of specificities that pertain to Germany, where the Ecologic Institute is based and obtains around half its project revenue. Five are most prominent: First, Germany is a federation with overlapping responsibilities among ‘‘levels’’ or geographic scales of government, from municipalities to the federal government, embedded in European and international policy and law. In order to be relevant and effective, a think tank must be competent at all levels of government policymaking and legislation and be able to facilitate communication or ‘‘translate’’ among the levels. Second, politics in Germany is not strongly polarized, but characterized by broad cross-party support for environmental protection and rational resource use.2 This general consensus and coordination among levels of government has produced continuity and stability, and this shapes expectations for recommendations from think tanks: they must fit broadly into the

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preexisting order or dominant (political) paradigms to be acceptable. (A rule of thumb: any report must contain 80 percent consideration of the structure and merits of existing policy and law and 20 percent novel ideas.) As a result, the adoption of new ideas may be delayed, perhaps avoiding mistakes, but once adopted, new ideas become embedded in stable new policy paradigms. Third, German municipalities and states (La¨nder) have found and often still find it difficult to engage in policymaking at the EU level, even if they are directly affected. The Ecologic Institute has a reputation as an ‘‘honest broker’’ in policy dialogues designed to make local experience with policy implementation available in policy formulation at the EU level, or to explain the objectives and rationale of EU policy choices to state and local officials in Germany. Fourth, in the 1970s, federal environmental policy was institutionally weak, with no ministry or representation in the cabinet. After its establishment in 1986, the Federal Ministry of Environment had only three relatively small ‘‘implementing’’ federal agencies (providing knowledge for policymaking) but no dedicated scientific support organizations. Instead, the ministry to this day relies on public and private research and policy organizations, including think tanks, to broaden the scientific knowledge base and advice it receives. Today, over one hundred organizations provide policydirected research and consultancy, about fifty of them on a regular basis. This is the largest number of ‘‘content providers’’ working for any federal ministry. They constitute a culture of competition and contestation of ideas, and help avoid group think that can mar policymaking in other fields, especially since the Federal Environment Agency in 1995 switched to competitive awarding of grantsfor policy research. The move of (large parts of) the federal government from Bonn to Berlin also opened long-established issue networks to new ideas and approaches. Fifth, with philanthropic support for policy work traditionally low in Germany, there are multiple governmental sources—notably the Federal Ministry of Environment, the Federal Environment Agency, and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research—of grant funding for policy-relevant scientific research, science-based policy research, contract research, and advisory or consultancy projects on a fee-for-service basis. Common to all is that, in order to be effective, policy recommendations must be communicated in writing and in person to the responsible officials in government or

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the legislature in a way that creates ownership of the recommendation. Good ideas then travel through the policymaking process and find their way into policy strategies and legislation. Think tanks (as institutions) and experts (as persons) must be willing to ‘‘donate’’ ideas and recommendations without claiming credit so that the likelihood of a think tank shaping policy is enhanced while visibility is reduced.

Context in the EU: Multicentric Polity with a Culture of Its Own The structure of the EU differs from that of each of the member states and other national, international, or intergovernmental systems. The EU is a polycentric system, where policy initiatives rarely come from the center but normally from one of the ‘‘active’’ member states.3 Effective intervention in EU policy processes by a think tank requires both a presence in Brussels and presence or strong relations with partners in the capitals of the most important member states. Such a strong network exists within the Institutes for European Environmental Policy, to which the Ecologic Institute belongs.4 The EU is multilingual and partly supranational, partly intergovernmental, but without a European polity, a people with a shared or common understanding of its history and destiny that participates in political discourse in a common language. Instead, it has multiple, mainly languagebased polities and a new polyglot EU elite mediating between them. This trait allows more room for think tanks than exists in most member states, and requires a mode of policy intervention that is specific to the EU. In Europe, a successful think tank must be ‘‘European’’ and not have a strong national identity or profile. Its work should reflect various national or language-based perspectives and the sometimes divergent interests of various regions. Policymakers in Brussels differentiate between those who ‘‘think European’’ and those whose work is rooted in and restricted to a narrow, national understanding, and they will more readily listen to arguments that consider the needs and priorities of Europe as a whole. The Ecologic Institute has developed a reputation as a European think tank that happens to have its origins (and EU headquarters) in Berlin without being ‘‘German.’’

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Strategy: Applied Transdisciplinarity from Research to Policy Typically, think tanks can employ one of two strategies to exert policy impact. The first is to generate ideas, play them up through media work to get the attention of policymakers, and thus hope to change the composition of issue networks so that policy recommendations are then accepted. This approach works well for think tanks tat either are governmental, ‘‘core’’ funded, successfully ‘‘crowd source’’ their revenue, or specialize in advocacy work with the support of their (fee-paying) members. The second strategy is to develop ideas, policy options, and recommendations, then submit them to executive officials at the technical, not political level, so that they influence the assessment of policy effectiveness and impact and lead to changes first in policy and then, over time, in the structure of the policy community and the (dominant) policy discourse. The Ecologic Institute operates almost exclusively through this second approach. As a science organization, it is very successful in attracting EU research funding and is embedded in EU-wide scientific communities, and it cultivates partnerships with U.S. universities (and increasingly also those in China). The scientific work provides part of the knowledge base for the think tanks’ transdisciplinary work, namely the orientation toward solving policy and management problems (rather than proving theories) and working with practitioners and prospective beneficiaries of research (rather than in academic isolation).5 The same staff provides input into policy processes at the national and EU levels. Several committees of the European Parliament regularly obtain Ecologic Institute expertise in the form of evidencebased research briefings for committee members and their staffs. Similar arrangements exist with other EU organizations, notably the various services of the European Commission including EuropeAid, the Committee of the Regions, and the European Environment Agency.

Strategy: Working Around the Policy Cycle The Ecologic Institute intervenes—in various ways and with differing frequencies and intensity—all around the policy cycle, from problem definition and agenda setting via policy formulation and (administrative) implementation to evaluation and (transnational) policy learning. In fact,

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one of the strong points of the Ecologic Institute working at all levels in the multi-layered governance system is its ability to ‘‘translate’’ EU policy into guidelines for local (administrative) action, to ensure best practice in policy implementation, and to bring the experience to the attention of the (usually) Brussels-based communities or networks for policy evaluation and the regular reviews of EU directives. The institute enables ‘‘horizontal’’ and ‘‘vertical’’ policy learning, even if such types of learning occur in conjunction. ‘‘Horizontal’’ learning refers to the identification of best practice (and occasional instructive examples of failure) for the benefit of practitioners and administrative officials. The necessary formats and processes are usually transnational in Europe, because they involve participants from several countries or nations.6 ‘‘Vertical’’ learning refers to the systematic collection of experience with policy implementation, and making it available in the reformulation phase of the policy cycle. Example: The ‘‘Clearing Point’’ for Grid Connections of Renewable Power Sources One example is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that the Ecologic Institute established and maintains in Germany for independent renewable power producers and grid operators. Part of the challenge in expanding the role of renewable energy in the German grid is that the renewable sector is highly dynamic in the innovation and technologies involved, economics and market dynamics, and the need to adapt the regulatory framework more frequently than was initially thought and more often than would be acceptable to legislators. The risk was that conflicts between independent generators of renewable power (that are eager to expand) and grid operators (that are less keen to expand variable supply sources in their power mix) would go to the regional courts for adjudication, where judges usually have limited understanding of the (complex) relevant law, and must decide on the basis of the presentations of the parties only. There was concern that this would lead to a slow and disruptive development of the sector. In order to avoid this, the German federal Renewable Energy Act provided for a (nongovernmental) ‘‘Clearing Point’’ (see www .clearingstelle-eeg.de/english) where legal expertise would be concentrated, flanked by economic and technical expertise, and where the ‘‘bench’’ in its deliberations would be able to invite amicus briefs and conduct its own

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research, and look into the implications for decisions on the sector as a whole rather than focusing narrowly on the (specific) merits of each case. The decisions of the Clearing Point have been well received by parties and nonparties from all sides, and have found their way into subsequent court decisions as well as revisions of the law. Through the work of (currently) eighteen staff members, the Clearing Point has decided or rendered obsolete several hundred cases that otherwise would have gone to a law court over the past five years. Strategy: Cooperation in Networks Within Germany, the Ecologic Institute cooperates with peer organizations in the Ecologic Research Network7 and within the EU in the network of Institutes for European Environmental Policy and other like-minded think tanks.8 Cooperation can be project specific in the form of temporary, focused consortia dividing work among partners, or it can be strategic, for instance in providing training for staff from several institutes. Sharing access to research or policy networks is an important source of synergy in partnerships. Operating in networks with partners that are always also current or potential competitors is an effective strategy for addressing the challenges of intervening in policy systems with multiple centers, or dealing with very complex or ‘‘wicked’’ problems that can only be solved by integrating different kinds of knowledge through combinations of scientific methods and policy-management methods.

Structure: Diversification and Fluid Matrix Organization Operating in the absence of significant philanthropic funding or institutional support of any kind, the Ecologic Institute raises most of its revenue as ‘‘soft money’’ in competitive situations. In order to survive in this environment, the institute has diversified in relation to a number of criteria, and it has developed into a highly flexible fluid matrix organization, enabling it to respond rapidly to emerging policy challenges and demands or opportunities for policy impact. Structure: Diversification for Resilience (and Growth) The Ecologic Institute must balance (usually short-term) project-based revenue with (perforce more long-term) obligations under the laws of

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employment. As a response, it has always sought to diversify in a number of directions. One direction addresses themes, issues, or challenges so as to reduce vulnerability to swings in (political) priorities; another addresses funding, from grants to cost-recovery agreements and contract research (usually with public authorities), to sponsorship and donations, to fee-forservice consultancy and advisory services, so as to have a number of mutually independent revenue streams governed by different laws and policy dynamics; another direction focuses on types of projects and duration, from multiyear (research) grants, annually recurring (advisory) engagements, and framework contracts to short-term commitments in applied research and consultancy, events, field trips, and so on so as to balance long-term partial funding with short-term full funding and projects promising (small) surpluses; and the final direction evaluated key staff acting as main contact persons within the institute so as to reduce vulnerability in case of staff fluctuation and reduce the pressure on top management (management other than for projects is very light). This diversification has evolved over time, and the institute is now able to plan and change the composition of projects in anticipation of potentially disruptive events, such as elections at the European and German federal levels. Structure: Fluid Matrix Organization As the Ecologic Institute focuses on satisfying project needs or meeting project or program objectives, it must have mechanisms for rapidly assembling and deploying project teams with personnel having the right mix of skills and experience to implement projects successfully and within budget. Teams are formed, mostly spontaneously by leading staff members interested in an opportunity for policy impact or responding to a call for proposals or tenders. The process is open: anyone can express interest and volunteer. If a project is selected for funding, the initial team is (re)assembled for its implementation, but the team may change over time as personal priorities and project needs change. Most teams dissolve upon completion of their project, unless there is a direct follow-up. Almost all staff members and associates are part of several teams at any one time. The institute does not have a rule that only principals can own or lead a project; anyone with the necessary skills can become a project leader, and junior staff members are encouraged to take on responsibilities of appropriate complexity, scale, and political salience. The assigned project leader

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has overall responsibility for the success of the project. This assignment is typically made based on which office or experienced staff member is most heavily involved in the project development and application, or whose contribution is most critical for the project to succeed. In larger projects a project manager supports the project leader, by planning and managing day-to-day activities of the project. As the impact of the institute’s work on policymaking results from public briefings of decision makers as well as from participating in transnational networks of policy practitioners and administrators, key staff must also have the right people skills and be able to communicate results effectively to lay audiences, practitioners, or policymakers. Having those skills, and being part of both the scientific and the policy communities, is a requirement for any project leader at the institute. Other, similar organizations in Germany and the EU have dedicated staff for each and separate the scientific, managerial, and communication roles. They can do so because of core funding or institutional support. The Ecologic Institute compensates for the handicap of having no core funding (for general expenses) in part through a growing network of alumni—former staff members and participants in any of the various programs. These now form a community around the institute that deepens its endurance and outreach, and can increase its policy impact.

Impact: Some Achievements Since its foundation in 1995, the Ecologic Institute has been very successful in influencing policy in a number of cases. None of these have been subject to third party evaluation, partly because few outsiders are interested, partly because the specific contribution of any one think tank is difficult to ascertain, and partly because the mode of intervention—namely to openly share policy recommendations with officials, legislators, and ‘‘political entrepreneurs’’—makes formal evaluations of policy impact difficult and potentially disruptive to the institute and threatening to its standing in the policy communities it serves. In many instances, most prominently in the case of work for various committees of the European Parliament, the institute does not seek to have a specific impact in the sense of influencing the direction of policy. In much of its work, it restricts itself to providing evidence-based information and

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assessments in submissions that are as unbiased as possible to provide a neutral platform for better-informed policy debate and decision making. Any impact would be through the improvement of the quality of discourse and decision making, rather than on the substance or direction of policy choices. There were a large variety of social development impacts. One such impact was drawing attention to the ‘‘gendercide’’ mainly in some Asian communities that results in millions fewer women living than biology would predict.9 Another was helping the European Commission to think through the links between the social and environmental pillars of sustainable development.10 Yet another social impact was helping German communities and federal policymakers understand the links between demographic change—immigration and the integration of migrants, and aging and the stability of social security systems—and environmental services, such as water, sewerage, waste, and public health.11 The work also influenced by animating reflection and discussion on the fate and treatment of climate-change-induced migrants—or ‘‘climate refugees’’– and implications for foreign policy.12 Moreover, the institute influenced society by highlighting the risks of bioenergy policy in the United States and the EU for food security in developing countries, and the medium-term implications for water resources and soil fertility.13 Another impact was explaining the interlinkages between climate change, population changes, and types of economic development with water security, the potential for conflict over resources, and the livelihood of Mediterranean communities.14 Furthermore, the institute was able to move the EU to think ‘‘Beyond GDP’’ through the integration of mainstream economic indicators with sustainable development objectives.15 Finally, its work placed a new focus on understanding the nature and organization of environmental crime and developing recommendations for improved crime fighting at national, European, and international levels.16 In the following sections, two examples illustrate achievements and the pathways of policy impact.17 Alignment of Regulatory Approaches Across EU Member States (Water Policy) Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, EU policy on water resource protection and management was in stalemate, with different regulatory philosophies in key member states blocking adoption of an effective European

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regulatory framework that would overcome the patchwork of water-related directives adopted. The most extreme positions in the controversy were held by Germany and the United Kingdom. In partnership with the Water Research Centre in the United Kingdom, the Ecologic Institute iniated a series of joint technical seminars, allowing practitioners from both countries to share experience of their best practices, build trust, and build a sufficiently deep understanding of one another’s approaches. The experience showed that, while top-level politicians were often caught in symbolic or ritualized exchanges based on the reiteration of stereotypes that were unhelpful for consensus building, lower-level officials and practitioners were more interested in understand and solving problems, and were keen to look into the situation of the other side with an open mind. The seminars were open to representatives from other member states and European institutions. Together they developed solutions that would work in different settings, and as a result of the seminars, a combined approach to water pollution control was formulated. This approach was acceptable to both Germany and the United Kingdom, and all other member states with positions in between, and the consensus was sufficiently strong to overcome old antagonisms further up the hierarchy. The combined approach was the capstone in the development of the EU’s Water Framework Directive adopted in 2000. In addition, the seminars provided opportunities for regular meetings of some of the water directors, the heads of departments in member state ministries of environment responsible for water resources. Their dialogue and coordination was formalized in parallel with the adoption of the directive to provide coordination in its implementation, especially in shared, transboundary river basins. This achievement in the early years provided the basis of the Ecologic Institute’s reputation as a think tank that understands Europe, seeks solutions that work for all member states, and can manage its relationship with the German government so that it remains a neutral facilitator or mediator even if funding is provided by the German government (as was the case for many of the seminars). On this basis, the institute now helps with transnational policy exchanges and the harmonization of policies and regulation in the EU. Nuclear Phase-out and the Green Power Shift in Germany and the EU Historically, think tanks in Germany tended to be established and financed by government. This is true for the best-known foreign and security policy think tanks (SWP, DGAP), and those established in parallel to

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the political parties represented in the federal or state parliaments. The first noteworthy exception to this rule came in the early 1970s, when a societal conflict over a nuclear power plant in southwest Germany resulted in research into the consequences of nuclear radiation on human health and other impacts. This research faced obstacles in government laboratories and universities. A number of scientists steeped in the tradition of critical sci¨ ko-Institut, the first noteworthy nongovernence in 1977 founded the O mental, civil-society think tank. It initially specialized in nuclear and chemical research, providing the policy debate in Germany with a center of competence not controlled by government or the energy industry. A number of other similar think tanks were established that today form Ecornet, including the Ecologic Institute. Together, these institutions not only conducted research into the effects of nuclear radiation and the risks of nuclear technology but also worked on formulating technical, economic, and political alternatives. They laid the foundation for the development of the renewable energy industry. This developed dynamically after the adoption of the first ‘‘feed-in tariff’’ for electricity from renewable sources in 1990, and was further stimulated by the phase-out of nuclear power negotiated in 2000 between the then federal government and the energy industry. The agreement was for the last nuclear power plant to go off the grid in 2021–2023. The Ecologic Institute contributed to this development most notably by providing expertise and advice on the development of the legal framework for the energy sector, and especially the evolution (through various amendments) of the Renewable Energy Act. The role of the institute was noted with delight by promoters of the German shift toward renewable energy and with dismay by detractors in the German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and (parts of) the large German energy companies that operate nuclear power plants.

Conclusion This chapter explains the specifics of a think tank working in a very broad policy field where there is a need to have an exceptional grounding not only in social and political sciences but also in the natural and technical sciences, and also to engage with a great variety of policy communities. The objective to provide arguments and solutions for integrating environmental protection requirements into other policies especially forces the Ecologic Institute into a comparatively broad range of issues, networks, work methods, and

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formats of engagement, including with practitioners with their ‘‘feet on the ground.’’ This applies not only to environmental management challenges in the narrow sense but more importantly to a wider range of social and economic development challenges in industrialized as well as developing countries. While the underlying contextual factors are not exclusive to environment, resource, and sustainable development policy, this example highlights a specific contextual feature of this policy area. It also addresses the peculiarities of a think tank working in the lowphilanthropy environment of Germany, which leads to a significant share of revenue coming from governmental sources, and in the EU as a young and yet unsettled institutional setting rather than Europe as a geography. Other think tanks working in western Europe, and increasingly in the young democracies of central and eastern Europe, are facing the same circumstances and challenges of working in a hybrid context that is neither domestic nor international. Cooperation in networks appears an effective solution to the challenge of working in a multicentric political system. This insight has relevance beyond the EU and may be instructive for think tanks addressing global challenges. The approaches to working at the intersections of levels of government and fields of policy are particularly useful in promoting coherence and consistency of international policies, such as capacity building or development cooperation, which need to be formulated with due regard to ecosystems and the services they can provide to communities and nations, while at the same time respecting local environmental constraints as well as planetary boundaries. The internal organization of the Ecologic Institute with its high degree of fluidity and openness appears to be well suited to the changing challenges of policy-relevant research and science-based policy work covering the environment and social development.

Notes 1. These figures are from 2011. 2. Parties on the extreme right and left play no noticeable role in the formulation of environmental policy in Germany. The impact of the emerging Pirate Party cannot yet be assessed. Most likely, its influence will be more on the communication between government, political parties and citizens, and thus more on the government and the culture of policymaking than on the substance of policies on environment and development.

146 Environment and Sustainable Development 3. For environmental policy, those active member states are most often the founding members Germany, France, the Netherlands and later members the United Kingdom, Austria, and Sweden. Other member states may be prominent only on specific issues of interest to them. 4. Today, this network is established mainly in London and Brussels, with a (small) office in Spain and a network of partner institutions (but not network members) and correspondents in many EU member states. See www.ieep.eu. 5. For a recent survey, see Thomas Jahn, Matthias Bergmann, and Florian Keil, ‘‘Transdisciplinarity: Between Mainstreaming and Marginalization,’’ Ecological Economics 79 (2012): 1–10, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.sciencedirect.com/ science/article/pii/S092180091200168 1. 6. A similar process of state-to-state policy learning in the United States would not be called transnational but would face the same challenges and provide the same opportunities, with the exception of the multilingual nature of any such process in Europe. 7. Members of Ecornet in addition to the Ecologic Institute (www.ecologic.eu) are the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (www.ifeu.de), the Institute for Ecological Economy Research (www.ioew.de), the Institute for Social-Ecological ¨ ko-Institut (the Institute for Applied Ecology, www Research (www.isoe.de), O .oeko.de), the Independent Institute for Environmental Issues (www.ufu.de) emanating from the citizens’ movement in the former East Germany, and (as the only one with significant governmental core funding) the Wuppertal Institute (www.wupper inst.org). Other similar organizations are the Institute for Future Studies and Technology Assessment (www.izt.de), the university-affiliated Environmental Policy Research Center (www.fu-berlin.de/ffu) at Freie Universita¨t Berlin, and the less research focused Global Public Policy Institute (www.gppi.net). 8. The most relevant are the Institutes for European Environmental Policy (www.ieup.eu), the Stockholm Environment Institute (http://www.sei-international .org), the half-governmental Regional Environment Center (www.rec.org), the Institut du De´veloppement Durable et des Relations Internationales (www.iddri.org), the Sustainable Europe Research Institute (www.seri.at), the Institute for Environmental Studies of the Free University Amsterdam (www.ivm.vu.nl), and with a more international and European focus the International Institute for Environment and Development (www.iied.org), and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (www.iisd.org). 9. ‘‘Gendercide: The Missing Women,’’ Ecologic Institute, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.ecologic.eu/4760. 10. ‘‘Links Between the Social and Environmental Pillars of Sustainable Development,’’ Ecologic Institute, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.ecologic.eu/2047. 11. ‘‘Unterm Strich: Erbschaften und Erblasten fu¨r das Deutschland von morgen: Eine Generationenbilanz,’’ Ecologic Institute, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.eco logic.eu/1746.

Ecologic Institute 147 12. Sina, Stephan. ‘‘When their home is submerged – Who will take the climate refugees in?’’ March 11, 2010. Ecologic Institute, accessed April 10, 2013, http:// www.ecologic.eu/3273. 13. ‘‘Shifting Renewable Energy in Transport into the Next Gear,’’ Ecologic Institute, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.ecologic.eu/bioenergy; ‘‘Impacet of EU Bioenergy Policy on Developing Countries,’’ Ecologic Institute, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.ecologic.eu/4644. 14. ‘‘Climate Change, Hydro-Conflicts and Human Security (CLICO),’’ Ecologic Institute, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.ecologic.eu/3295. 15. ‘‘The Integration of Mainstream Economic Indicators with Sustainable Development Objectives,’’ In-Stream, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www.in-stream.eu. 16. ‘‘EFFACE—a Research Project on Environmental Crime,’’ EFFACE: European Union Action to Fight Environmental Crime, accessed April 10, 2013, http://www .efface.eu. 17. A longer list would include but not be limited to: aligning of EU member states on a number of issues, such as water resource management, soil protection, the content of the Seventh EU Environmental Action Programme, the integration of environmental protection requirements into other policies (the ‘‘Cardiff Process’’), or their position in UN environmental governance and the reform of the UN Environment Programme; establishing of EU-wide procedures, processes, or institutions for policy learning and coordination, such as for the water directors’ and soil directors’ groups, the European Sustainable Development Network, or the development and adoption of the EU’s strategy on adaptation to climate change; establishing of the National Allocation Plan of emission credits in Germany under the EU Emission Trading System, or the German part of the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register, equivalent to the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory; establishing (in 2011) a climate and energy development plan for the German state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg to guide its energy transformation for 2020–2050, where the Ecologic Institute iniated and moderated stakeholder dialogues and managed the process of policy-relevant research to feed into the policy formulation, which culminated with the formal adoption of the plan by the state cabinet; initial scoping of the Transatlantic Climate Bridge as a mutual policy-learning platform involving subnational units in Europe and North America (United States and Canada); aligning formal positions and language in official documents through public diplomacy, such as on the Arctic policies of the United States, Canada, and the European Union (European Commission and European Parliament) in 2009–2011 (see www.arctic-transform.org) or on ocean policy (see www .calamar-dialogue.org); assisting negotiators of multilateral environmental agreements in finding consensus or formulating compromise, for instance in the international climate negotiations (e.g., on finance) or the development of the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing on biodiversity.

Chapter 6

MISTRA: Configuring Research Teams to Realize Policy Influence Mcebisi Ndletyana

The extent to which think tanks are able to exert policy influence is a function of their access, credibility, and timing. Each variable is critical in its own right, but may be insufficient alone. A think tank may have access to policymakers, for instance, but lack credibility because of an apparent ideological bias on the part of the institution (or on account of the poor quality of the products). In such instances, policymakers may doubt the relevance or sincerity of the policy advice or simply ignore it. The timing may also render what might in fact be sound and credible policy advice entirely irrelevant. Because political parties retain or ascend to political office on the basis of either a demonstrable ability or a promise to respond to the immediate needs of the electorates, public policy tends to be fluid, and politicians demand instant results. Policy advice that was sought at one point may quickly be rendered obsolete by a sudden development that carries political implications for the ruling party, therefore necessitating urgent attention and action. A confluence of timing, credibility, and access, albeit not a necessary condition, increases the prospects of exerting policy influence. This confluence can be realized through a particular configuration of research teams and the process. Using the experience at the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA), this chapter presents a case study on how think tanks can direct their research teams and conduct research in a manner that optimizes their ability to shape public policy. The effectiveness of both the structure

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of the teams and the conduct of the research process is such that, as the case study further demonstrates, the research process, itself not yet concluded, has already begun to bear fruit. MISTRA researchers are making decisive policy interventions, especially in the departments whose members either are part of the research teams or attend workshops organized by the institute. The chapter also demonstrates that MISTRA’s modus operandi is a function of a particular history and political context. A country that has just emerged from a long history of conflict, South Africa is still plagued with ideological fissures. Distrust exists among the various social actors, who pursue divergent social interests. Policymaking processes have not escaped the influence of the mistrust that pervades South African society. It is not uncommon for a research output to meet with policymakers’ indifference because of the ideological bias, real or perceived, of the think tank that produced it. This has meant that the content of policy research has not been as rich as it could be, were vibrant exchange and interactions among the various think tanks and policymakers possible. Because of their previous experience in public institutions, MISTRA’s founders thus attempted to shield the institution from such pitfalls. The chapter is structured into three sections. The first explains how MISTRA has constituted its research teams and conducts its research. The second provides an account of the origin of MISTRA. This raison d’eˆtre is critical in understanding the institute’s modus operandi. To provide further clarity on MISTRA’s raison d’eˆtre, and drawing from interviews, this section provides a brief survey of the views of prominent policymakers on the stalemate between the civil service and the research community. The third section of the chapter provides instances in which MISTRA exerts policy influence, thereby validating the appropriateness of the modus operandi.

‘‘An Idea Whose Time Has Come’’: Fusion of Abstraction and Experience into an Intellectual Movement Initiated in 2010, publicly launched in March 2011, and currently with a total staff complement of eighteen, MISTRA sees itself as an agent for intellectual movement. The eleven researchers at the institute perform research; the institute also involves academics, other researchers, and policy practitioners, both active and retired, dubbed members of the Mapungubwe

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Society of Researchers. Inherent in this idea is that knowledge is acquired not only through academic application but also through experience (MISTRA 2010a). In other words, MISTRA’s operations are based on the premise that knowledge derives from a combination of practical experience and theory. Without any connection to how the phenomenon it purports to explain actually functions in real life, theory runs the risk of being inaccurate, inapplicable, and outdated. Practical experiences help to revise old theories and develop new ones, while theory gives meaning and structure to what, on surface, seem like unrelated, haphazard policy actions. Thus MISTRA’s research program was an offshoot of a collective intellectual engagement. The institute’s launch was preceded by two workshops with targeted individuals from the academy, civil service, and think tanks. The initial workshop, held in August 2010, sought input on the research topics the institute would tackle. The purpose was to refine the topics even further and gauge their relevance and soundness. The only requirement imposed on the participants was that they maintain a multidisciplinary orientation in research topics, in keeping with the multisectoral nature of society; further, they were asked to adopt a long-term view for the organization (MISTRA 2011a). This implied that the research was not to be pursued in a quest to satisfy immediate needs or to appease the specific interests of donors. Rather, topics were to be probed because of their strategic importance to the long-term future of South Africa, as well as to fill the gaps in our understanding of the policy choices that South Africa has adopted in the past eighteen years of nonracial democracy.1 Equally significant, the initial workshop served as a recruitment exercise for the institute. The recruitment process was open and based on merit. Based on their availability, interested individuals were encouraged to apply for a contract position on the research team to undertake the actual research, as members of the core project team, or as noncontracted members of the broader research team that served as a reference group. Of course, recruitment continued even beyond the initial workshop. MISTRA’s website has a standing invitation to any interested individual to apply to join its reference group. Another round of open, intellectual critique followed once the research teams had written drafts of their proposals for each of the eight research topics. This happened over a two-day period immediately preceding

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MISTRA’s public launch in March 2011. Project teams presented their proposals to a gathering of academics, researchers, and policy practitioners for critique. Only after this process was complete did MISTRA officially adopt the research projects for study. The collective conception of MISTRA’s research program affords the institute a number of advantages: credibility, relevance, and acceptance. In a suspicion-laden society in which each public initiative can be easily misconstrued or ascribed to some mysterious, hidden agenda, MISTRA’s public engagement has somewhat dampened suspicion. Its bona fides were laid bare from the outset, and thus imbued the newly formed institute with credibility. If suspicion does exist, it has not discouraged various public and private institutions from soliciting MISTRA’s intervention. The presence of academics, owing to the academic conventions of scientific rigor and autonomy, promised an institute that would function independently of political influence. This is in addition to the explicit assertion of independence of the research work in the institute’s Memorandum of Incorporation. The involvement of policy practitioners ensured that the research issues were relevant to the needs of the time. Because they were included from the outset, the intention was that policy practitioners develop a sense of ownership over the research findings and become advocates of any policy advice that arises therefrom.

The Origin and Traction of the ‘‘Idea’’ MISTRA is unique among South African think tanks. Unlike many of its counterparts, the institute enjoys credibility in a wide cross-section of society. Relations between most think tanks and government have been near absent and frosty at best, in the last few years. MISTRA has bridged the gap between the policy and academic worlds, bringing them together into one intellectual movement. This is possible not only because MISTRA fulfills an existing need from either side but also because its founders straddle both the intellectual and policy worlds, giving them credibility in both. Located in Johannesburg, South Africa, MISTRA was established by a mixed group of academics, former policy practitioners, and retired politicians. The idea itself was a brainchild of both Sibusiso Vil-Nkomo, an academic based at the University of Pretoria and a former commissioner of

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the Public Service Commission, and Joel Netshitenzhe, former head of the Policy Unit in the Presidency and a member of the National Executive Committee of South Africa’s ruling party, the African National Congress. A number of individuals, with similarly diverse backgrounds, were subsequently drawn in to lend advice regarding the inception of the institute. They included Mosibudi Mangena, former minister of science and technology and ex-president of the Azanian People’s Organisation; Jakes Gerwel, former rector at the University of Western Cape, director-general in the President’s Office (during Nelson Mandela’s tenure), and current chairperson of the Nelson Mandela Trust; and Joe Mathews, former deputy minister of safety and security and a veteran intellectual of South Africa’s liberation movement (MISTRA 2010a). MISTRA is one of two think tanks that emerged in the aftermath of South Africa’s 1994 democratic breakthrough.2 Its formation followed a change of the political leadership in the South African government. A number of MISTRA’s founders were prominent in the Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki administrations. Following a stint as head of communication during Mandela’s inaugural presidency, MISTRA’s cofounder and current executive eirector, Joel Netshitenzhe, for example, was a policy head throughout most of Mbeki’s tenure, for almost ten years. Because he was head of policy in the Presidency, Netshitenzhe’s name became synonymous with postapartheid policies. A testimony to Netshitenzhe’s significance in the post-1994 policy world was a flattering presidential tribute upon his resignation in October 2009. Under Netshitenzhe’s stewardship, President Jacob Zuma noted, the Policy Unit’s assessments of government performance were ‘‘as honest and transparent about our achievements and our failures as any reports by any democratic government in the world.’’ That objective appraisal, Zuma added, stemmed from Netshitenzhe’s deep belief in the rationality of people: that if we identify the issues correctly and analyze them well, we can make progress. It stems also from his deep democratic commitment: that if correct information is made available to our citizens, they will make sure that we solve the problems and move forward (see www .thepresidency.gov.za). MISTRA’s formation was thus characteristic of the general pattern of the evolution of think tanks, especially in the United States. While enabled by the change of government leadership, on the one hand, MISTRA’s formation was a response to the need for a common forum that brings

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together experts, intellectuals, and researchers of different backgrounds into an intellectual engagement on the challenges that confronts contemporary South Africa, on the other. Both Netshitenzhe and the MISTRA head of operations, Barry Gilder (who was director-general in various departments and and served for fifteen years of uninterrupted employment in successive postapartheid governments), are experienced civil servants. This enabled them to develop a commanding grasp of the workings of government— especially the policy regime that had been introduced since 1994’s democratic breakthrough—as well as a unique insight into why some policies failed while others succeeded. Among the policy problems identified in MISTRA’s founding documents, for instance, was ‘‘short-termism.’’ Policy ideas were driven primarily by political objectives, and the life span of policy was thus determined by the electoral cycle. Besides, new ministers could easily substitute one policy for another, not because the old one had failed, but rather because they sought to distinguish themselves from their predecessors. The intention for MISTRA, therefore, was to undertake relevant research, insulated from day-to-day demands and based on scientific rigor. To this end, MISTRA has managed somewhat to secure donors committed to multiyear grants. Their donations are not project specific, but are committed toward the general research work of the institute. However, ultimately MISTRA sought to translate the results of its research into policy making. This meant that MISTRA had to grapple with the problem of (official) indifference toward research (MISTRA 2010b), a problem policy researchers in South Africa are well attuned to. This was revealed in a study I undertook in 2008, commissioned by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.3 Interviewed for the study, Shadrack Gutto, law professor at the University of South Africa and former director of the Institute of African Renaissance, believes that government regards research more as a hindrance to the usual government business than as an enabler to achieve even better results.4 Civil servants, Gutto emphasized, view their role as implementers of policy, not intellectuals seeking to engage in discussions about the appropriateness of policy. However, according to Prince Mashele, the relationship between government and the research world did not allow for closer cooperation either.5 Rather, this relationship has historically been fraught with mistrust. Researchers lack easy access to policymakers, which would enable them to present their research findings. Policymakers, on their part, do not have

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sufficient confidence in outside researchers to allow them to assist with developing the research agenda for their departments. In fact, government officials appear to believe that researchers are out to embarrass them, hoping to expose government inefficiency. ‘‘We get a lot of defensiveness—this is what is wrong with your research, this is missing,’’ commented Lisa Vetten.6 ‘‘They get stuck in the methodology,’’ Vetten said, ‘‘just to prove what’s wrong with the research, to invalidate the study and never really engage with the content.’’ The mistrust is a function of the misconceptions each has about the other’s intentions, which, in turn, is fueled by the detachment from one another. In the course of the interviews in 2008 for the study, officials at the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development confirmed the absence of interaction between themselves and policy researchers. They rarely attended seminars, nor did they invite policy researchers for roundtable discussions in the department. Aware of such problems, the founders of MISTRA thus shaped the institute into a combined epistemic and policy community. It is not exclusively composed of professional experts, which is typical of an epistemic community, nor is it driven purely by policy advocacy, as is characteristic of a policy community. It is instead an amalgam of the two (Haas 1992, Stone 2001). In other words, MISTRA modeled itself along the traditional think tank mold—that is, the ‘‘university without students’’ type that prioritized scholarship. Such think tanks, which emerged largely in the first half of the twentieth century, preferred recruiting staff with doctoral degrees and insisted on scientific rigor in their research pursuits. This set them apart from the subsequent generations of think tanks, especially those that have sprung up since the 1970s, which are often characterized by political bias (if not outright political activism) and a preference for public relations over scholarship. The institutions founded in the 2000s are, above all, ‘‘marketing think tanks.’’ The idea is to win politically charged public debates rather than suggest different ways of tackling public problems. This predisposes them toward employing public relations experts over scholars to make frequent television appearances rather than doing original research (Troy 2012, McGann 2005). Similar to the ‘‘university without students’’ model, MISTRA is structured into three faculties: Humanity, Political Economy, and Knowledge Economy and Scientific Advancement, and has signed agreements of cooperation with almost all of South Africa’s universities. A doctorate is a prerequisite for the position of head of faculty; for senior researchers, a

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master’s degree is required. Each staff member is required to publish a minimum of one journal article or book chapter per year. The research teams that have been assembled to undertake the various projects, as noted above, are both led by and comprise a number of distinguished academics. In the project teams for the current eight projects MISTRA is undertaking, there are eight to fifteen members per team, with the majority employed full-time outside MISTRA. MISTRA’s choice of research issues, therefore, is relevant, as it is based on an intimate insight into the challenges that confront government and society at large. Its research findings are therefore likely to find resonance with policymakers, especially because civil servants and a few private sector managers are part of the research teams. They will likely become advocates for MISTRA’s research findings within the public and private sectors. This accounts for the credibility that MISTRA enjoys not only with the public service and the private sector but also within the academy. The transparency of its formation and openness to academics, coupled with a strong emphasis on scholarship, undercuts any suspicion of political bias. MISTRA’s modus operandi has already been vindicated. Even though the institute has not completed its ensemble of initial research projects, members of the research teams have been invited by civil servants to make research input that has yielded discernible policy ideas. The activities of the Platinum Group Metal (PGM) Research Project under the Knowledge Economy Faculty provide a prime example of this policy influence.

Emerging Policy Influences in Science and Technology: The PGM Research Project The PGM Research Project examines the use of PGMs as a source of lowcarbon, renewable energy, given that South Africa has about 85 percent of the world’s identified reserves of these minerals. Presently, South Africa derives more than 90 percent of its energy from coal. The abundance of coal, combined with its relatively low price, has historically discouraged any serious investment in exploring low-carbon sources of energy. Through that process, South Africa became one of the largest polluters in the world. The country is thirteenth on the list of global polluters, yet has a relatively tiny population of forty-eight million, with a midsized economy ranked at twenty-eighth globally (Joburg City 2011).

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Movement toward low-carbon energy sources is thus necessary to head off further environmental damage. South Africa’s recent hosting of the United Nations’ Climate Conference reinforced the country’s commitment to clean energy. This undertaking dates back to 2007, when the South African government committed the country, through the Integrated Resource Plan 2, to reducing the reliance on coal to 48 percent of its 2007 levels by 2030, while increasing the use of renewable sources, including nuclear power, to 14 percent (nearly tripling the 2007 levels of 5 percent). With regard to the hydrogen economy, the government has committed to capturing 25 percent of the global fuel cell technology market by 2025. Through the research initiative on PGMs, MISTRA seeks to aid the ongoing public efforts toward discovering and promoting the use of lowcarbon sources of energy. Specifically, as the proposal notes, this research initiative seeks to:

Assess the case for South Africa to establish a downstream fuel cell capacity, including the necessary investment in developing key elements of the requisite technologies and strategies, and to use its relative PGM producer power to realize the forward linkages; Explore incubation models to foster local manufacturing capabilities in high-value products based on PGMs, as well as in the infrastructure and the technical skills to build a system on innovation to support the South African economy in this regard; and Identify some of the strategies the state should adopt in effecting a migration from fossil fuels to hydrogen, and the partnerships it should foster with the private sector to realize this. (MISTRA 2011a)

A researcher on the project and on MISTRA staff, Wilson Manganyi, explains that a fuel cell is a battery-like device with an electrolyte and two electrodes (anode and cathode), which combines hydrogen molecules and oxygen molecules to produce water, electricity, and heat. To effect the splitting of the hydrogen atom into protons and electrons and enable the subsequent chemical reaction, the process uses a platinum-based catalyst. Only in high-temperature fuel cells is the platinum-based catalyst not required for the process (Manganyi 2011).

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Fuel cells are thus an enabling technology in the migration to a lowcarbon economy. They emit relatively few greenhouse gases, and in instances where pure hydrogen is applied, the fuel cells produce only energy and water. The benefits of this technology extend beyond the environment to the high quality of the power itself as well as its convenient use. For instance, fuel cells can be deployed in areas that require silence, take relatively less time to recharge than other batteries, and allow compact power generation. This makes them ideal for use in hospitals and government buildings, among others, as back-up energy sources. The transport system, one of the major polluters, could also benefit immensely from the use of fuel cells. They can be adapted, for instance, for use in buses, cars, motorcycles, and trains. The research project began at the beginning of 2011, and was scheduled to conclude in June 2012, upon which conclusive recommendations were to be made to policymakers. Still, researchers have not awaited the conclusion of the research in order to influence policy thinking within government both at the provincial and national levels. For starters, in keeping with MISTRA’s modus operandi, included among the team members, in addition to academics and researchers, are policymakers drawn from state departments and state-owned enterprises.7 Through these public officials, the relevant departments in the civil service have remained informed about the research project. MISTRA has consequently been invited to provide input into policy initiatives on these issues by the Johannesburg metropolitan government and the Department of Trade and Industry. Joburg’s Development Growth Strategy Following the May 2011 inauguration of a new mayor, Parks Tau, the Johannesburg metropolitan government released a draft of its strategy document, titled Growth and Development Strategy, in August 2011. A member of the PGM research project, Wilson Manganyi, was among the specialists invited by the metro government to provide expert input on the strategy, focusing specifically on energy, at a workshop held on December 11, 2011. MISTRA’s input was catalytic, spurring the metro government to lead the initiative toward the introduction of renewable sources of energy (Joburg City 2012). The initial draft made no specific mention of the metro government’s getting directly involved in the innovation, but looked to the national government, through its Integrated Resource Plan 2, as noted

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above, to lead the effort ( Joburg City 2011). Not only did the metro government commit to direct involvement following Manganyi’s recommendations but it also prioritized hydrogen as one potential renewable source to explore. Another discernible policy influence was on the envisaged modes of transportation. Johannesburg is home to almost 40 percent of the roughly ten million cars registered in South Africa (see http://www.carsinsur ance.arrivealive.co.za). This not only causes congestion on Johannesburg’s roads, it is also another major source of carbon emissions. Accordingly, a strategy geared toward reducing carbon emissions must consider cars. To this end, the draft strategy proposed a nonmotorized transportation means, characterized by ‘‘walking, cycling, rickshaws, wheelchairs, animal drawncarts.’’ The traditional modes of transport are intended for the amusement of tourists, who are looking for a typical ‘‘African experience.’’ Following MISTRA’s input, the final draft, in addition to these means of transportation included, ‘‘light electric vehicles from renewable energy sources’’ (Joburg City 2012: 95). Fuel cells, as noted earlier, can also be adapted to power vehicles and motorcycles. Department of Trade and Industry: Productivity South Africa Productivity South Africa is a body set up within the Department of Trade and Industry to promote the competitiveness of the South African economy. It does so through a variety of means, including initiating research and providing expert advice and auditing services. As part of its responsibility, Productivity South Africa envisaged setting up a Competitiveness Council. MISTRA was part of the process that conceptualized this council. Its purpose is to generate specific recommendations to improve productivity in each industry, including providing financial support and expertise for innovations. MISTRA earned the invitation to join the envisaged council on account of its research work on PGMs. Departmental staff learned of the research into PGMs at a MISTRA workshop. They were impressed by MISTRA’s interest in the potential of PGMs to expand the country’s manufacturing. As part of the initiative to launch the Competitiveness Council, MISTRA partnered with the department to host a workshop, June 6–7, 2012, where this idea was canvassed with a broader base of stakeholders.

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A critical point to underscore here is that the relevance of MISTRA’s research issues has made the institute attractive to policymakers. That MISTRA invites civil servants into its research teams and research processes has endeared the institute to the policy world even more. The connection to the policy world has also made the institute appealing to private institutions that wish to engage with the public sector through an independent, credible medium. Two instances stand out in this regard. First, toward the end of 2011 at the request of AgloGold Ashanti, the largest producer of uranium in South Africa, MISTRA organized a strategic retreat, of the Aspen Institute type, to examine the partnership that could be forged between uranium miners and the state in meeting the government’s objective to build a suite of nuclear power stations in the coming twenty years. Among the participants were senior managers of AgloGold Ashanti and deputy director-generals (the second layer of management) from state departments such as energy, science and technology, minerals, higher education, and trade and industry, as well as the state energy company Eskom and the country’s nuclear energy corporation. The participants agreed that MISTRA should facilitate a broader consultation between the public and private sectors to further develop the results of the retreat forward. Second, in April 2012 MISTRA facilitated the first-ever roundtable discussion since the inauguration of the postapartheid state on the longstanding public debate over the accuracy of employment statistics in South Africa. The fierce exchange has primarily involved Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), a state body, and Adcorp Holding, an investment company. Loane Sharpe of Adcorp disputes Stats SA’s assertion that South Africa’s unemployment level stands at 25 percent. The inaccuracy, Sharpe contends, stems from the narrowness of the sources from which Stats SA derives its data. Other data sources, such as the number of taxpayers and of workers contributing to an unemployment fund, according to Sharpe, show that Stats SA undercounts the number of employed people. Consequently, and contrary to Stats SA, Adcorp puts South Africa’s unemployment rate at around 10 percent. Stats SA has in turn defended the integrity of its figures, citing use of internationally respected and scientifically proven datagathering methodologies. It is possible that Adcorp and Stats SA will not reach any consensus on a common methodology. What is noteworthy, however, is that MISTRA has managed to do what no institution or individual has ever managed to

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do: bring the protagonists in the debate, experts from academia, privatesector analysts, and representatives of other state institutions to a roundtable to debate these methodologies. Whereas the two actors would not have met previously, there has, as a result of MISTRA’s efforts, been a follow-up meeting between Adcorp and Stats SA to further discuss their various methodologies (Netshitenzhe 2011). The MISTRA roundtable broke the stalemate. This is testimony to the credibility of the institute owing to the composition of its research teams and the manner in which it carries out research. This gives confidence that, once the various research projects issue their findings, MISTRA’s impact on policy content will be felt even more. In summary, MISTRA tells us that political connectedness need not necessarily compromise intellectual rigor or objectivity. Plurality of views and inclusion of academics in the research teams and processes secures MISTRA a degree of academic integrity, while the political background of some of its managers opens up access to officialdom. Most importantly, MISTRA illustrates that, to exert some level of policy influence, an institution does not have to await research findings, and thereafter lobby policymakers. Exerting policy influence starts at the moment of research inception. Gauging the relevance of policy issues for research among policymakers and involving them in the actual research process optimizes the possibility of influencing policy. Policymakers do get influenced in the course of research and develop trust with the institution, which also means they develop a sense of ownership over the research and thus are likely to incorporate the research findings into their policymaking process.

Notes 1. The inaugural suite of research projects examines a range of topics such as why South Africans have a poor culture of saving, how the country can harness its unique natural endowment in platinum group metals to promote further industrialization and diversify its energy sources, the impact of the interplay between poverty and inequality on the conduct of politics, whether South Africans are cultivating a common national identity, how the postapartheid state has been constructed and what explains the choices that were made in that process, the impact of sports on society, understanding the rise and fall of civilizations, and how transdisciplinarity can be applied in the study of socioeconomic phenomena.

MISTRA 161 2. The other think tank is the Institute for Global Dialogue, which was founded in 1995 by Nelson Mandela, with the expressed purpose of providing the newly inaugurated democratic government, led by the African National Congress, with expert advice on international relations. 3. The purpose of the study was to develop a framework that would guide civil servants on how to use research in policymaking. It was commissioned by the Office of the Director-General in the department and took a year-long period, during which I spent two days a week at the department observing and participating in its activities. The study also involved a number of interviews not only with the public servants in the department and policymakers but also with members of Parliament who serve in the portfolio committee on justice. 4. Interview with Shadrack Gutto, April 29, 2008. 5. Interview with Prince Mashele, April 24, 2008. Mashele was then policy analyst at the Institute for Policy Studies, Pretoria. 6. Interview with Lisa Vetten, April 30, 2008. She was then a researcher and policy advocate based at Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre, Johannesburg. 7. These include Cordellia Sita, from the Department of Science and Technology; Lufuno Marwala, from Eskom, the state energy company; and Mpho Ndaba, from Mintek.

References Johannesburg City. 2011. Growth and Development Strategy. Draft. Johannesburg: Johannesburg Metropolitan Government. ———. 2012. Growth and Development Strategy. Johannesburg: Johannesburg Metropolitan Government. Haas, P. M. 1992. ‘‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Co-Ordination.’’ International Organisation 46, no. 1: 1–35. Manganyi, Wilson. ‘‘Is South Africa Ready to Embrace the Hydrogen Economy?’’ Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection. November 6, 2011. McGann, James. 2005. ‘‘Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the U.S.,’’ Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia. MISTRA. 2010a. Business Plan. Johannesburg: MISTRA. ———. 2010b. Founding Proposal. Johannesburg: MISTRA. ———. 2011a. Annual Report. Johannesburg: MISTRA. ———. 2011b. Staff Publication Policy. Johannesburg: MISTRA. Netshitenzhe, Joel. 2012. ‘‘Stop Quibbling, Fix Unemployment.’’ Business Report. Stone, Diane, et al. 2001. ‘‘Bridging Research and Policy.’’ Presented at seminar, Radcliffe House, Warwick University, July 16–17, 2001. Troy, Tevi. ‘‘Devaluing the Think Tank.’’ National Affairs 10 (Winter 2012).

Chapter 7

Gulf Research Center (GRC): Promoting Social Development in the Arab Gulf Region Christian Koch

The emergence and role of think tanks and research institutes located in the Arab Gulf states (this refers to the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, states and includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) is relatively new and as such is underdeveloped. A closely related point is that the overall status of civil society in these countries is weak as virtually all aspects of political decision making reside within the ruling monarchies and a handful of other political and economic elites. Civil society organizations do exist but their function is limited to mostly social causes without any corresponding political role to influence the decision making or provide support for policy formulation.1 The institution-building process as part of wider political development in these states has also only been undertaken to a limited degree and thus remains unfinished. For the most part, the ruling bargain embodied in the concept of the rentier state whereby the population abdicates any political involvement in exchange for widespread economic opportunities continues to define the public policy process in the GCC countries.2 Symptomatic of the difficulty of establishing think tanks in the Gulf region is the fact that local legislation does not provide for the establishment and registration of nongovernmental organizations. The possibility of obtaining such a status simply does not exist. Some countries have suggested making corresponding changes to their legislation, but as the example of the United Arab Emirates shows, draft legislation has been on the

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books for nearly a decade without any concerted effort by the government to actually proceed and implement such law. As a result, institutions that work in fields that would typically classify them as an NGO are forced to obtain commercial licenses that restrict the activities that they can legally conduct. All in all, the environment in the GCC states is heavily restricted as far as think activity is concerned. The spread of information and communications technologies, a rising educated national population, and the overall impact of globalization have at the same time begun to change some of the underlying dynamics both as far as existing ruling arrangements are concerned and as regards civil society development. On the one hand, as these states have entered the next phase of their political development following independence, the rulers have as part of the overall process accepted the need for more structured decision support in the form of research institutes. This, in turn, created a first wave of such organizations being established in the 1990s, for example, the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research in the United Arab Emirates in 1994. These institutions were, however, sponsored by the government and remained firmly under their control. On the other hand, with the beginning of the twenty-first century and the growing international awareness of the strategic significance of the Gulf region, a second phase was inaugurated including the emergence of more semiautonomous and even independent institutes. This also included branch offices of foreign think tanks and research centers opening in the GCC states. The Gulf Research Center (GRC) established in 2000 in Dubai is the most prominent example of an indigenous Gulf-based institution. Meanwhile, Qatar has become the destination of choice for foreign organizations to locate in the region, as is evident in the opening of the RandQatar Policy Institute in 2003, the Brookings Doha office in 2007, and the Center for International and Regional Studies associated with Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in 2008.3 The overall development has, however, remained extremely limited. In fact as of May 2012, the Gulf Research Center remains the only real independent institution focusing on the political, economic, security, and social development of the GCC states, thus functioning as a think tank to develop policy alternatives and offering policy prescriptions. The environment has witnessed a further negative development with the refusal of the United Arab Emirates government to renew the GRC’s commercial license in 2010. As a result, the GRC shifted its operation to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where it

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obtained a commercial license, as well as to Geneva, Switzerland, where the GRC Foundation had already been established in 2007 as the formal NGO legal framework of the GRC. In 2012, the United Arab Emirates further restricted the work of such institutions with the closing of the offices of the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute.4 As part of its work, the GRC has developed numerous research programs that contribute to the analysis and study of the region. These programs are supported by a variety of activities such as conferences and workshops, training, and cooperation with other research organizations in joint project work. Research results are distributed through the traditional mechanisms of conference events, publications, a website, and the media. One particular aspect has been the attempt to involve governmental representatives in the various stages of the center’s work as part of a concerted effort to inject ideas and analysis into the policy process. Given the propensity of the governments in the GCC states to view much of this work with a certain degree of skepticism, even at times questioning its motivations, the success of the GRC in this regard has varied a great deal. Nevertheless, a sufficient number of initiatives have been undertaken that allow for an evaluation about the role of the GRC in influencing and even shaping social development policies at the national and regional level. In the two sections to follow, this chapter focuses on two key notions of social development in the GCC countries—one with a national focus on Saudi Arabia and one with a more regional focus on the Arab Gulf states as a whole. Both case studies provide a good overview of and insight into the role of a think tank in promoting issues of social development within the Gulf region. They also highlight the limitations that continue to exist and which hamper the effective role being played by such organizations in the region.

Promoting Sustainable Development in Rural Areas of Saudi Arabia The Saudi Arabian case study centers on a feasibility study conducted by the Gulf Research Center to encourage and further sustainable economic development in three regions, Rabigh, al Qunfudah, and al Leith in the Makkah Province of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The major focus of the

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study was on agricultural development and cluster-based economic and industrial growth with specific attention to infrastructural requirements as a framework for sustainable development of backward regions, given the overall specific emphasis on rural areas. A look at this case thus has value since the issue itself ranks high among the country’s priorities. The project was essentially designed to find ways to better integrate the three relatively underdeveloped regions of Rabigh, al-Leith, and al-Qunfuda into existing economic structures and to provide prescriptions for how to develop their economies. The project was supported by the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry with the clear objective of seeking specific, actionable items that businessmen might be able to invest in. As part of this undertaking, the GRC took the approach of identifying macro-level issues affecting the economies of the three regions and as a result placed particular emphasis on the issues of education and labor. At the same time, the GRC examined ways in which industry, agriculture, and tourism might be developed in these places. To gain the proper overview, the GRC brought in various experts and conducted meetings with a number of local actors in order to collect information about prevailing conditions and what might be changed. In addition to meeting with various groups throughout the project, the GRC held stakeholder meetings to discuss the project’s aims and later on to get feedback on preliminary results. This step was also necessary in order to obtain approval from different groups for the work to be carried out. Introductory letters from the Jeddah chamber proved essential as a way to open doors, collect necessary and often otherwise unavailable information, and allow the overall work to proceed. Without such supporting documents, the project would have faced severe limitations given that people would have been hesitant in providing relevant information. This highlighted the prevailing skepticism that continues to exist in the region in connection with such research, and it emphasized the key role played by informal mechanisms of local connections that would certainly not be available for outside institutions coming in to conduct such work. At the same time, with the parameters in place, there were not any real limitations on what one could or could not do. Following the conclusion of the project, senior officials including the governor of the province to which these three districts belong, Prince Khalid al-Faisal, were briefed on the report. While it is difficult to assess what direct impact the report had on policy decisions, certain recommendations appear to have at least been forwarded and considered. This is

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reflected, for example, by various news reports about plans to build an airport in al-Qunfuda, a recommendation that was made in the report. Other similar news reports have emerged, thus indicating that the project deliberations were indeed passed on and had received the attention of governmental officials. Given that the overall decision-making process in a place like Saudi Arabia, however, remains opaque, with little information on the environment in which certain decisions are made or how their implementation is followed up, questions remain on whether the overall context of the issues that are discussed in the project findings had indeed been properly understood. There is further the uncertainty whether even if initial enthusiasm helped propel ideas forward such momentum was in fact maintained. The sustained attention required to handle an issue such as rural development over a longer period of time is a critical element and to what degree this stipulation was properly understood remains unknown. Such accurate assessments are beyond the scope and the capacity of the original project. In the above context, the impact of the study can be narrowed down to the actual identification and pinpointing of the existing problems in addition to the process of conceptualizing solutions as far as a particular case of rural development is concerned. The goal of the project was to equip policymakers with various policy options and to help them see how problems were interconnected. This equipping was certainly provided. Overall, the project can be classified more as a consulting project for which the GRC was hired to produce a proprietary study on a specific project than a pure research project that caught the attention of policy officials. The project did highlight the limits of think tanks in the Gulf region, as they often take on more of a consulting role than one producing knowledge that attempts to influence policy but which is freely accessible. From this perspective, there is much work to be done even in the field of social development.

The GCC-EU Higher Education Project The second example presented here is of a more regional nature and looks at development in the higher education sector with a specific emphasis on instituting cooperative programs between institutions of higher learning of the GCC states and the European Union. Within the framework of a

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broader project on EU-GCC relations, initiated through a call for proposals and partially financed by the European Commission, the Gulf Research Center undertook an effort at promoting linkages between universities in the Gulf and Europe in order to strengthen the educational development of Gulf-based universities. One aspect focused on promoting the establishment of European study programs within the curriculum of Gulf universities while another sought to highlight ways in which those same Gulf universities could learn from European experiences and build their institutional capacities. This issue and the objective of the project are relevant for such a case study given the importance that GCC governments have in the past decade extended to their education sector, including massively expanding their annual education budgets, undertaking widespread reform efforts within the higher education sector, and inviting foreign institutions to come into their countries and through their presence help improve the quality of the overall higher education field. The project is further of interest for this study, as the ideas of improving cooperative relations had been tried previously at the official EU-GCC level in the 1990s but had failed to materialize because of various bureaucratic obstacles and the failure to create the sufficient degree of consensus among the key proponents in the effort. For these reasons, the project never materialized to the point where implementation could be considered. Thus, the GRC project was a renewed effort but from an independent institutional rather than a governmental perspective. As part of the overall strategy of the GRC, projects such as this are structured to bring together representatives from government, academia, the business community, and the media as a way to bring the main stakeholders into the process. While academia provides the necessary specialization, government is essential for linkages into the policy process, the business sector is often a key financial element to support programs, and the media creates the necessary awareness across society as a further element of support. In addition, various mechanisms are applied to bring the issue to the attention of people within those sectors. In this case of higher education cooperation, the GRC first produced a background paper to document all official statements from the EU on education cooperation with the GCC states and list all actual initiatives already being implemented between higher education institutions of the two sides. This paper then circulated among relevant officials in GCC ministries, among university presidents

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representing the main universities, and within the GCC universities themselves among specialized departments or key people working on this type of issue. A key partner on the Gulf side was the Euro-Gulf research unit of Kuwait University. The next step was to hold a workshop that would bring together various stakeholders in order to discuss the status of cooperative ventures in the education field, highlight projects in place and discuss their success or obstacles being faced, bring to the attention of EU officials the developments taking place in GCC education, provide an overview of the kind of initiatives being offered by the EU for both Gulf educational institutions and Gulf students, and engage in a discussion about the next steps in this field. To supplement the workshop discussion, an open student forum took place with students from various Gulf universities to receive their input as well as enhance their knowledge about possible programs with European universities. In order to gain the right of attendance and ensure that the outcome of the discussion would be filtered back into the university and ministerial administration, the GRC sent invitations to the university presidents and the GCC ministers of higher education with the specific request to provide nominations of persons to attend. Given the centralized nature of decision making in the Gulf, making the effort to have direct communication with the top officials is essential. Following the conclusion of the workshop, participants prepared a policy brief that summarized the discussion of the meeting and outlined numerous policy recommendations. The GRC then translated this brief into Arabic and distributed it widely in the Gulf region, again emphasizing reaching the key stakeholders involved in the process from its beginning. An additional important component to ensure that the workshop outcome would receive adequate attention was intensive contact with the GCC ambassadors in Brussels, the GCC Secretariat in Riyadh, and the relevant EU officials responsible for the Gulf region in the External Affairs Directorate of the European Commission, which later became the European External Action Service. Given this widespread effort, the initial results were encouraging. Many of the recommendations made were directly reflected in the Joint Action Program that the EU and the GCC agreed on in their annual joint ministerial meeting in June 2010. While the communique´ of the ministerial meeting welcomed the ‘‘launching of the specific GCC window under Erasmus Mundus in order to foster mobility of university students, professors and

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academic staff,’’5 the program provides a more detailed step-by-step outline for encouraging cooperation between the EU and the GCC in fourteen concrete fields. Among these fields, higher education and scientific research is in fact one of the best defined, with a subcategory of ‘‘Cooperation in Higher Education.’’ Among the steps outlined here is the establishment of a joint GCC-EU expert group to follow up and coordinate on a regular basis, increasing the exchanges of students and faculty staff, sharing best practices, and enhancing GCC participation in EU funded mobility programs.6 The same recommendations are in the policy brief produced from the GRC project. Furthermore, the initiated discussions were also reflected in a major report prepared by the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament on European Union Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council in which the issue of education featured prominently. The report itself called on authorities to address shortcomings and further support exchange programs for students, academics, and professionals, and it specifically welcomed the GRC-led Al-Jisr project as having proved immensely beneficial.7 The activity of the workshop and its accompanying publications also provoked a response within the GCC countries, with several ministries writing comments to the GRC directly and seeking additional guidance and advice. The Ministry of Higher Education of the Sultanate of Oman provided its own ideas for promoting EU-GCC ties in higher cooperation based on ‘‘enriched and expanded utilization of existing frameworks for cooperation’’ and listed new initiatives.8 A particular aspect that distinguished this project from previous initiatives pursued by the GRC was that the institution took a different approach in trying to improve cooperation between the national universities of the GCC states and counterparts in Europe. The GRC established, for example, twinning programs at the academic and administrative levels instead of focusing exclusively on the role being played by European institutions in the GCC states. The idea of fostering more cooperative efforts not only at the bilateral but more importantly at the multilateral level was another aspect that had not been considered previously. Given that cooperation at the regional level within the GCC is still not very strong and what cooperation exists mostly exists at the horizontal rather than the vertical level, the idea here was to allow for a sharing of experiences across the board and to encourage officials to consider such an approach. The idea was therefore not only to improve communications between EU and GCC institutions

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but also among GCC institutions themselves. Significantly, efforts among higher education institutions and relevant ministries to increase their cooperation intensified as a result. Overall, the effort was most useful in identifying potential areas of cooperation, in highlighting to GCC officials where EU experiences could prove most useful, and in suggesting new ways to overcome and solve existing policy impasses. Many of the ideas proposed in 2009 and 2010 have remained on the table and were followed up in a further project on EUGCC diplomacy that the GRC undertook in 2012 and 2013. Trying to create a level of consensus within the policy community so that recommendations such as those developed in this work enter the official discourse remains the key limitation. Without a gradual process of breaking down the centralized decision-making structures in the GCC states, this is likely to remain the key obstacle faced by institutions such as the Gulf Research Center in their effort to see policy initiatives implemented at the governmental level. While there is generally no interference in the conceptual development of ideas, the restrictions on institutional and personal access are still severe and can only be somewhat overcome through a persistent effort of personal communication in addition to working through numerous institutional channels. But it should be stated here that the primary objective was never to see the developed policy prescriptions enacted fully. Rather, the project as described here was just as much an effort to bring together officials and experts and thereby provide them with an opportunity to exchange views and experiences from which they could learn. The effort itself was thus conceptualized as part of a broader process whereby officials are simply being brought into the discussion to gain their own first experiences in such a discourse.

Evaluation and Lessons Learned The fact that think tanks at this stage play only a very minor role in the development of policies in the GCC states means that there exists a learning process both at the governmental and think tank levels in order to understand the work and limitations of the former and the potential value of the latter. As GCC governments undertake a wider political development effort to strengthen their institutional capacity, a space is opening for research institutes and think tanks to carve out a role for themselves. The work of

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think tanks can be incredibly useful in shaping policy in a context where governments and policymakers lack in-house expertise or are seeking alternative, distilled voices on an issue. Within this framework, constant and sustained communication about respective goals is essential. In a place such as Saudi Arabia, but also in the other GCC states, where decisions are almost exclusively made at the highest levels, plodding along at lower levels of a bureaucracy or organization can be much less effective than if one starts out knowing specifically what those key decision makers are seeking. This is also the way to create the necessary consensus that will ensure that lower levels of the bureaucracy remain supportive as instructions are passed down. Too often, vague policy proposals are offered while it remains clear that political obstacles can prevent implementation. Given that those political problems are very difficult to overcome, excellent policies tend to go unrealized. The GCC states are still at the very early stages in their civil society development, which also affects the role think tanks play. These case studies illustrate that concrete results or even effective measuring standards to evaluate influence are not available and that governments so far are not ready to engage think tanks in a substantive manner to enhance their decisionsupport mechanisms. But a first step has been taken and the prerogative therefore has to be to build on this first effort.

Notes 1. It should be mentioned here that Kuwait represents somewhat of an exception as civil society here is more developed and so-called political groupings have been active in Kuwait for several decades. 2. For the concept of the rentier state, the literature is vast. For an introduction, see Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, eds., The Rentier State, vol. 2, Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World (London: Croom Helm, 1987). 3. For a partial overview of these developments, see Ezzat Ibrahim, ‘‘Arab and American Think Tanks: New Possibilities for Cooperation? New Engines for Reform?’’ Working Paper, October 2004, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; and James McGann, ‘‘Forging a Partnership Between GCC and U.S. Think Tanks,’’ Emirates Lecture Series no. 79, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi, 2009. 4. ‘‘German, U.S. Institutes in UAE Closed,’’ Gulf News, April 5, 2012; ‘‘Dubai Kicks Out U.S. Democracy NGO, Too,’’ Christian Science Monitor, April 2, 2012.

172 Environment and Sustainable Development 5. For the ‘‘Joint Communique of the 20th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting Held on June 14, 2010,’’ see www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009 _2014/documents/darp/dv/darp20100713_01_/darp20100713_01_en.pdf. 6. The Joint Action Program can be accessed at www.eeas.europa.eu/gulf_co operation/docs/joint_action_programme_en.pdf . 7. European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on European Union Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council, No. A7–0042/2011, Rapporteur: Dominique Baudis, released March 10, 2011, and available at www.europarl.europa .eu/sides/getDoc.do?typeREPORT&reference A7–2011–0042& languageEN. 8. The document is available from the author.

PART IV

Economic Reform, Debt Crisis Management, and Economic Coordination

As the world struggles to recover from the financial crisis that struck the global economy in 2008, issues of economic coordination and debt crisis management remain salient in the minds of policymakers. It is in this context of imposed austerity measures, on the one hand, and social unrest, on the other, that the linkages between social and economic development become increasingly clear. Emerging and established states alike stand to benefit from economic reforms, but such reforms can only come about if they are supported by a substantial body of policy research. Such research is, without a doubt, integral to the furthering of social development policies: social programs and efforts to promote them can and will only be successful when accompanied by economic stability. For this reason, it should come as no great surprise that this volume contains five think tank case studies that focus primarily on the economic dimensions of social development. The authors discuss a wide range of topics, spanning from a socially informed response to the continuing eurozone debt crises to the need for new and continuing coordination among long-suffering economies and the potential for economic reform in the postcrisis global economy.

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Chapter 8

Bruegel: Creating Your Own Luck Matt Dann

‘‘It’s the economy, stupid.’’ This phrase, which was repeated like a mantra during the presidential elections in 1992, helped Bill Clinton defeat his Republican rival, George H. W. Bush.1 The message still holds true in the context of the European financial crisis, which has ravaged Europe since 2009. Economics and politics are intrinsically linked in the sense that the electorate has expectations for the future including public services and welfare. Such services are often taken for granted in Western democracies. However, in the European Union (EU), politics is standing in the way of viable economic solutions. This is detrimental to social and economic development in the EU. Civil unrest, falling governments, and high unemployment, as well as the difficulties involved in implementing austerity programs, point to the connections between economics and social development—or arrested development, perhaps, in the case of a number of European states. It is in this contentious and morose climate that resounding ideas, promoted among other actors by think tanks, have the potential to stir debate and ultimately influence policy. Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank focusing on economic issues, has made a significant impact on the debate provoked by Europe’s sovereign debt crisis through the blue bond proposal. The impact beyond Europe’s borders is explained by the repercussions at the global level of any major regional economic crisis. That ideas emanating from think tanks can carry weight is demonstrated by the numerous references to the blue bond proposal made by policymakers, economic experts,

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and the news media.2 And as the purpose of this book is also to highlight innovative strategies and structures of organizations like think tanks that allow them to influence public policy, Bruegel certainly has relevant research to convey. Bruegel shares many characteristics with think tanks from around the world, but it also has a number of unique elements to its structure and some innovative strategies that both make it distinctive and have helped it to have an impact greater than the sum of its parts. After seven years of operations, Bruegel enjoys a reputation that defies its youth.

The Blue Bond Proposal The idea of pooling the sovereign debt of countries in the eurozone did not originate with Bruegel. In fact the Giovannini Report in November 2000 first presented the idea of a eurobond3 and in 2008 an EU Commission report4 suggested that the integration of the euro area government bond market could be enhanced. However, the Bruegel proposal, written by Jakob von Weizsa¨cker and Jacques Delpla and published in May 2010,5 was novel in that it suggested a two-way approach (a mix of traditional national bonds, or red bonds, and jointly issued eurobonds, or blue bonds) to tackling the sovereign debt crisis in the EU while at the same time promoting internal fiscal discipline in participating states. The ‘‘debt trap’’ created by high debt levels and the ensuing rise in premiums for those countries with high levels of debt has had a significant effect on social development as demonstrated by the social unrest in Greece but also in Spain, Italy, and Portugal. But finding a solution proved difficult. Pooling all the debt issued by states participating in the euro, for example, would do nothing to encourage those who borrow too much to reign in their spending, borrow less, and carry out essential reforms to make their economies more sustainable; economists call this problem ‘‘moral hazard or the ‘free-rider’ problem.’’6 The proposal by von Weizsa¨cker and Delpla sought to circumvent this problem by restricting the proportion of pooled debt available to euro area states to 60 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)—equal to the Maastricht criteria concerning debt levels for participating in the currency union. While the cost of the pooled debt would be reduced for participating states, the cost of borrowing for the proportion of debt above 60 percent of GDP would increase, providing an incentive for individual states to do what they

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could to reduce the price of this part of their debt, by, for example, carrying out reforms that would convince the markets that their borrowing was sustainable.7 There would be other beneficial side effects as well: creating a market of pooled, greater liquidity of debt in Europe would help prepare the ground for the euro becoming an ‘‘important reserve currency,’’ which might further reduce the costs for all participating countries. The distinction between the pooled debt and the ‘‘red debt’’ issued by individual states above the 60 percent threshold would also help in making defaults more orderly as new regulation would require banks to prepare for losses on red debt. The allocation of blue bonds would be administered by an Independent Stability Council, which would be established by the participating countries and would have the expertise to grant an appropriate allocation to each participant state. It would also control the credibility of the system by having the power to eventually exclude members who could not meet certain basic guarantees.8 The proposal as described in Bruegel’s policy brief on it was further developed almost a year later when Bruegel published the policy contribution ‘‘Eurobonds: The Blue Bond Concept and Its Implications’’ in March 2011, prepared for the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.9 It outlined the original proposal and went on to respond to a number of observations that had followed the initial publication. ‘‘Eurobonds’’ developed the idea that red debt should be kept out of the banking system as far as possible; this, according to the argument, would aid a more orderly default, if necessary. The document also addressed questions about the costs of blue bonds and red debt, how the orderly default of red debt might be made credible, and how these arrangements would interact with the European Stability Mechanism.10

Outreach Strategies The proposal was, and continues to be, supported by events organized at Bruegel to continue the advocacy as well as to refine the idea. Two years after first publication, both authors presented the idea to key policymakers and thought leaders through an event at Bruegel in 2012. The proposal was also accompanied by a media campaign, both at an international and a national level; for the blue bond policy to be adopted (as is the case with

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many policies in Europe), support would have to be generated at a number of levels and in a number of institutions—national, European, and international. As of April 2012, the blue bond proposal has been mentioned more than two hundred times in the media, with 65 percent of the coverage in European outlets and 19 percent in ‘‘international’’ outlets.11 Of the mentions in Europe, the largest share, at 32 percent, was in Germany, where the idea of pooling euro area debt has been met with skepticism.12 In order to promote its ideas, Bruegel targets media at the local, regional, and global levels. A crucial part of any think tank’s strategy is to disseminate ideas. That Bruegel has been successful in this endeavor is demonstrated by the institution’s nomination as global think tank of the year by the British journal Prospect in 2012. In the nomination Bruegel is described as a ‘‘constant source of excellent and prescient analysis of the Eurozone crisis’’ and the ‘‘go-to organization on one of the events shaping policy across the world.’’13 Bruegel, if it wants to be effective, must reach out to policymakers and policy-influential individuals, while also engaging in the debates taking place in national and international media—a task that requires in-depth monitoring of all these debates as well as the ability to intervene in these debates despite limited resources. The international nature of Bruegel’s work poses a further challenge: the institution needs to engage in debates in a number of languages, necessitating Bruegel’s management to consider the overall nationality balance at Bruegel as well as the team’s abilities in research. In practice, this has also necessitated the construction of a communications team with an international flavor, which perhaps appears oversized in comparison to other areas of Bruegel’s operations. Bruegel further faces a challenge common to all European think tanks: that of speaking to a broader European audience even as the research must convincingly benefit individual EU member states. Increasingly, Bruegel and its counterparts are developing into part of a ‘‘nascent public sphere . . . shaping expectations and perceptions about European policies’’ and taking advantage of their increased ‘‘access to local and international media.’’14 To that end, Bruegel has worked toward ‘‘producing new thinking with old thinkers,’’ as senior fellow Nicolas Ve´ron succinctly put it, mastering the art of identifying the ‘‘narrow space for innovation’’—a challenge that few meet.15

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Advocating on behalf of policy ideas generated at Bruegel often requires scholars who have not authored a particular paper to be involved in its promotion, despite Bruegel’s rule demanding that the organization itself take no institutional standpoint. This in particular is a difficult message to convey to the media (and in turn to the public): policy proposals from Bruegel’s scholars are not endorsed as official positions by the organization, and it is authors who must stand by their own proposals, with Bruegel ensuring the quality of the work and providing the necessary support for its fellows. Of course ensuring quality involves peer review and plenty of input from colleagues, though none of this requires that Bruegel itself support a particular position. Still, there is a role for the whole Bruegel team to keep the debate alive, especially when one considers national as well as European debates.

No Institutional Standpoint Taking no institutional standpoint is an important aspect of maintaining Bruegel’s nonpartisan nature. Being a nonpartisan think tank does not mean that Bruegel refuses to work with political parties: political parties form governments, and think tanks have to interact with governments in order to effectively improve public policy, and by extension, the welfare of citizens. By taking no institutional standpoint, it is harder to label Bruegel as an organization occupying any particular space on the political spectrum. This in turn helps engender the respect of political parties and policymakers across that spectrum, with whom Bruegel’s scholars interact, helping to prevent typecasting it as a think tank of the political left, right, or center. Bruegel also has to be careful not to show a nationality bias—an issue that may seem peculiar to the European Union but is in fact relevant to think tanks in any federated state, or in similar economic or political unions. Maintaining a reputation for public service in geographic areas where policy can be made at a number of institutional levels requires also considering the national or regional dimension. A nonnational perspective can be maintained by establishing it as editorial policy, as well as ensuring that there is as wide a selection of nationalities among researchers and staff as possible. Unlike in many European institutions, there is no nationality

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requirement to work at Bruegel; employing researchers and staff from outside the European Union can help in identifying national bias in the policy recommendations Bruegel scholars provide.

Public-Private Partnership Bruegel was developed with the financial support of both governments and private corporations, and has since developed support from some international institutions. Because of its position as a premier think tank on economic issues, Bruegel has privileged access to some of the institutions it targets for the dissemination of ideas. This is an important feature since it enables Bruegel to bypass some of the first obstacles many think tanks face in their dissemination strategies. Furthermore Bruegel seeks to promote a close relationship with its corporate members, whose numbers are restricted by the exclusive nature of membership subscriptions. Of course, this is a balancing act for Bruegel, which accepts funding from EU member states but not from any of the broader EU institutions for day-to-day operations; advocacy directed at the European institutions is clearly at arm’s length and from an entirely independent standpoint, but advocacy directed at national governments that may be members of Bruegel may appear less so. However, the arm’s-length relationship is also maintained for supporting state members. The sheer number of states involved (nineteen at the moment) and the amount of each single financial contribution help to guard against the dominance of any one state. States contribute according to the size of their population and GDP, but inside broad bands, meaning that the five largest states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom) contribute the same amount, preventing the biggest from dominating the others. Neither Bruegel’s members nor its board has any influence on the final policy recommendations produced. While members may be consulted during the writing of a paper (as many other sources that are not part of the Bruegel community would also be consulted), they do not have an opportunity to edit or approve publications before they are released. Bruegel’s members’ primary input to Bruegel (apart from financial) is to decide research priorities. Bruegel’s members do have an input into the process that produces the annual research program, but they have neither

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the opportunity to request individual papers nor the possibility of using Bruegel as a consultancy. Member states of Bruegel do not always welcome the policy recommendations that Bruegel fellows produce. And they are certainly not guaranteed audiences for Bruegel’s output. Indeed the blue bond proposal is a perfect example, in that Bruegel has had to work very hard to promote the idea in Germany, one of Bruegel’s founding members. Funding from private interests and corporations is nothing revolutionary in the think tank world. But Bruegel’s approach is different in that it prices corporate membership high enough that only those organizations that share Bruegel’s values will get involved, especially given its purpose for public good and its refusal to serve as a consultant. A high price also restricts the number of corporations supporting Bruegel, meaning Bruegel cannot become a corporate interest representative group by the back door. It also means Bruegel’s team has more time to understand and interact with its limited number of corporate members. Bruegel has found the support of both public and private organizations to be invaluable when designing its research.

Collaboration A key part of Bruegel’s strategy in generating successful policy ideas is its approach to collaboration. Not only does Bruegel seek to collaborate with other organizations at many levels (international, European, national, and regional), it also allows its fellows to collaborate with whomever they prefer, giving scholars the freedom to seek the best match when coauthoring research. Bruegel’s management also has a role to play in successful collaboration; indeed, it was Bruegel that brought together the two coauthors of The Blue Bond Proposal, one of whom was a resident fellow of Bruegel, while the other was not previously involved. It is also Bruegel’s responsibility to provide the right environment and incentives to make sure that collaborative projects work. Many times Bruegel scholars will collaborate with each other (a far easier process to manage), but just as often, as noted above, they will write with researchers previously unconnected to Bruegel; it is up to Bruegel’s management to set in place appropriate means to accommodate the usually ad hoc arrangements. It is an important academic freedom designed to generate the most

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interesting and innovative ideas to policy problems that often cannot be satisfactorily answered by more conventional means. Bruegel advocates bringing together the brightest minds to solve policy problems, no matter their background, nationality, or political beliefs.

Transparency and Accountability From the perspective of Bruegel and its members and supporters, transparency and accountability are essential in giving a think tank ‘‘authority’’ to be able to claim to be a public good. So, as many think tanks do, Bruegel publishes its income and spending each year in its annual report. Being based in Belgium means there is no fiscal advantage to financial transparency; while nonprofit organizations do not pay corporate taxes in Belgium, they are subject to all other taxes. For Bruegel, maintaining transparency and accountability to the public and to members is a matter of reputation and responsibility. After all, a substantial amount of Bruegel’s funding comes from taxpayers. And there is a role for transparency in persuading the policymaking world that Bruegel does have the interests of the public, and the quality of policymaking, at its heart. It is also not unusual for think tanks to require their scholars to uphold the highest academic standards, but Bruegel’s ‘‘Statement on Research Integrity,’’ which all scholars must sign, also requires Bruegel’s fellows and senior staff to make an annual declaration of outside interests, to allow Bruegel’s management to manage potential conflicts of interest. Academic, media, political, national, commercial, financial, and other similar interests are declared, helping to assure those who follow Bruegel’s policy work that no other interests are being represented that may have their origin in a scholar’s personal business. All these strategies and aspects of Bruegel’s structure give it a high level of visibility and credibility so that when a policy recommendation such as The Blue Bond Proposal is made, it is not easily discredited or ignored.

Creating Your Own Luck When asked to comment on what he thought were the most important aspects of Bruegel’s structure and strategies in promoting The Blue Bond

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Proposal, one of its authors remembered something that is not so easy to strategize or incorporate into a particular structure: the ability to create luck. Policy recommendations made by think tanks rely enormously not only on the content, pragmatism, and originality of the proposal but also on being in the right place at the right time with the right approach to a problem that is capturing the moment—for the public, for policymakers, and for the media. Bruegel’s structure and strategies help its fellows to ‘‘get lucky’’ in the production and promotion of their policy recommendations that should, if adopted, benefit us all. Of course the case of the blue bonds is not complete: the discussion in Europe on pooling the sovereign debt of the euro area continues, and Bruegel continues to be part of that debate. In effect this means the potential social impact of the recommended policy is still just that: potential. But despite not being a social development policy think tank, Bruegel is doing its part to solve the sovereign debt crisis in Europe with pragmatic ideas that will allow Europe to regain some stability and reinvest in the social development it is known for throughout the world.

Notes 1. The quote ‘‘It’s the economy, stupid,’’ is a variation of the quote ‘‘The economy, stupid,’’ which has been attributed to Bill Clinton’s campaign strategist James Carville during the 1992 presidential election. See Michael Kelly, ‘‘The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats—Clinton and Bush Compete to Be Champion of Change; Democrats Fight Perceptions of Bush Gain,’’ New York Times, October 31, 1992, accessed April 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/31/us/1992-campaign-dem ocrats-clinton-bush-compete-be-champion-change-democrat-fights.html. 2. See, for example, Ewing Jack, ‘‘Preventing Future Debt Crises in Europe,’’ New York Times, May 13, 2010; EU Public Debt Management and Eurobonds, Directorate General for Internal Policies, September 20, 2010, accessed April 17, 2013, http:// didattica.unibocconi.it/mypage/upload/48917_20100920_031632_DOWNLOAD.PDF; Jean-Claude Juncker and Giulio Tremonti, ‘‘E-bonds Would End the Crisis,’’ Financial Times, December 5, 2010, accessed April 17, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 540d41c2–009f-11e0-aa29–00144feab49a.htmlaxzz2QljaBwSF; David Veredas, ‘‘Mutualising Eurozone Sovereign Bonds? First of All, Tame the Tails,’’ Vox, June 24, 2012, accessed April 17, 2013, http://www.voxeu.org/article/mutualising-eurozone-sover eign-bonds-fi. 3. Coordinated Public Debt Issuance in the Euro Area, report by the Giovannini Group, November 8, 2000, cited in Eurobonds: ‘‘Fluch oder Segen,’’ Grand Duchy of

184 Economic Reform and Economic Coordination Luxemburg, November 12, 2012, accessed April 17, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/eco nomy_finance/publications/publication6372_en.pdf. 4. EMU@10: Successes and Challenges After Ten Years of Monetary Union., Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2008, accessed April 17, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication12682_ en.pdf. 5. Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weiza¨cker, The Blue Bond Proposal (Brussels: Bruegel, 2010). Von Weizsa¨cker is a nonresident fellow at Bruegel. He heads the Department for Economic Policy and Tourism at the Thuringian Economics Ministry in Erfurt, Germany. Delpla is an economist at the Conseil d’Analyse E´conomique in Paris and a senior advisor at BNP-PARIBAS. He was formerly a visiting fellow at Bruegel. 6. See, for example, Ansgar Belke, ‘‘Should the Euro Zone’s Debt Be Mutualized?’’ Opposition’s Opening Remarks, Economist Debates, July 11, 2012, accessed April 17, 2013, http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/856. 7. Further details of the original proposal are available in Bruegel’s policy brief on it in 2010, http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/403 -the-blue-bond-proposal/. 8. Ibid. 9. Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsa¨cker, ‘‘Eurobonds: The Blue Bond Concept and Its Implications,’’ Bruegel, March 21, 2011, accessed April 10, 2013, http:// www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/509-eurobonds-the-blue -bond-concept-and-its-implications. 10. Ibid. 11. Bruegel’s list of ‘‘international’’ media includes Financial Times, International Herald Tribune and New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Economist, and Time. 12. See, for example, ‘‘German Resistance to Pooling Debt May Be Shrinking,’’ Spiegel Online, November 24, 2011, accessed April 17, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/ international/business/euro-bonds-debate-german-resistance-to-pooling-debt-may -be-shrinking-a-799692.html; Albrecht Ritschl, ‘‘Germany, Greece and the Marshall Plan,’’ Economist, June 15, 2012, accessed April 17, 2013, http://www.economist.com/ blogs/freeexchange/2012/06/economic-history. 13. ‘‘Think Tank of the Year Awards 2012,’’ Prospect, July 11, 2012, accessed April 17, 2013, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/think-tank-of-the-year -awards-2012/. 14. Andrea Mocada, ‘‘Think Tanks and the European Financial Crisis,’’ June 26, 2012. 15. Ibid.

Chapter 9

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): Shaping Development Policy in a Globalized World Maria Monica Wihardja

Indonesia’s Social and Political Context Indonesia’s economy has been growing at a relatively rapid rate—in December 2011, amid the economic turbulence in the United States and Europe, Indonesia grew at 6.5 percent. In 2012, it was projected to grow at a rate between 6. 2 and 6.8 percent. Strong investment growth and domestic consumption offset weak export demand. This sound growth rate is needed for a developing country such as Indonesia. Sound economic growth and other macroeconomic indicators, including robust growth of credit, a low fiscal deficit, and the debt-to-GDP ratio, and sound banking indicators are not ends in themselves but also, and most importantly, are instrumental to improving people’s welfare, especially in a country like Indonesia that still has a lot of room to improve the living standard of its people. Growth matters only as long as it is used to improve human development. Thus Indonesia’s main challenge is to maintain strong, stable, and resilient growth and to use this strong growth and other stable and resilient macroeconomic indicators to open up more social opportunities and eventually to improve human development. The challenges that Indonesia faces in its development efforts arise from the country’s political complexity, poor regulatory processes, and loose, or insufficient, institutional structure. In education and employment, for

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example, the OECD reports that Indonesia’s workforce consists of 19 percent upper secondary school graduates, 5 percent of tertiary school graduates, and the rest lower secondary school and primary school graduates. By comparison, the OECD average’s workforce consists of 44 percent upper secondary school graduates and 30 percent tertiary school graduates.1 These figures are 33 percent and 26 percent for the G20 average. About 62 percent of Indonesia’s employment is informal in 2011, which means that these workers face short-term uncertainties in retaining their jobs and they work without any social benefit outside their low wages. When combined with the absence of government social protection, this condition leaves a majority of Indonesia’s population living in very unstable social conditions, easily falling below the poverty line should an adverse shock befall their families, such as illness or draught. This situation is reflected in poverty measurements. Although only about 11–12 percent of Indonesians were categorized as poor in 2012 (from 14.15 percent in 2009), the number of Indonesians living below an income level of $2 a day reached almost 50.65 percent in 2009. Inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) is also rising and reached its historically highest peak in early 2012 of 0.41. It is not surprising that inequality is rising since poorly skilled workers are left behind the global production network, unable to enjoy the benefits of globalization. The problem is not how to spend more on social expenditures but how to best capitalize on these investments. About one-fourth of the 2013 national budget was spent on poorly targeted energy subsidies, whereas only about 12 percent was spent on infrastructure and 5 percent on social expenditure.2 Furthermore, Indonesia’s infrastructure is severely underdeveloped. Despite its 81,000 kilometers of coastline, Indonesia has only one port per 1,157 kilometers of coastline; Japan, for example, has one seaport for every 11 kilometers of coastline and Thailand one for every 50 kilometers.3 Education is another important area where Indonesia is lacking. According to a World Bank study, although Indonesia allocates 20 percent of the national budget to education, more than half of the additional resources went to teacher salaries and teacher certification.4 However, not only does increasing the number of teachers not lead to better learning outcomes but also the teacher certification program (which absorbs 9 percent of the education budget) has not shown any significant impact on learning outcomes.

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Policies promoting social development therefore should be one of Indonesia’s major research interests. However, political barriers impede the implementation of such reforms. A case in point is the political complexity of education reform. Other examples are political complexities involved in reforms pertaining to natural resources, labor, and agriculture. In light of these difficulties, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as an independent think tank has always been actively involved in the process of social development through the drafting of independent studies and policy recommendations that directly and indirectly relate to it.

About CSIS CSIS continues to be one of the most influential think tanks in the region, while being recognized and respected globally. As one of the world’s twenty-five highest-rated think tanks for security and international affairs, CSIS is also ranked among the top five think tanks in Asia.5 This chapter demonstrates how CSIS plays a role in shaping social and economic development policies within Indonesia. CSIS was founded on the philosophy of ‘‘Nalar Ajar Terusan Budi,’’ which essentially means ‘‘to educate with reasoning and to reflect good deeds.’’ CSIS researchers are always encouraged to be independent, creative, and passionate about their work. The more senior researchers also nurture the younger researchers so that they can succeed as academics and researchers beyond the CSIS context. Most of CSIS’s young researchers continue their studies during their employment at the center. CSIS goals include enhancing core competency, strategic thinking, influence, networking, public education and social capital, and human resources. The center receives most of its funding from the CSIS Foundation, for about 80 to 90 percent of its operating costs (another 10 percent comes from revenue from CSIS contract projects). It is run by the CSIS Board of Directors, which is monitored by the CSIS Council of Advisors. Two case studies exemplify CSIS’s role in shaping social and economic development policies. The first is a set of examples of social development research based on individual contracts, examples that are therefore more ad hoc in their undertaking. These include fuel and energy subsidies (and

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the need for fiscal reform), decentralization issues related to fiscal transfers to regions, trade policies and their impact on food security, the knowledge sector, and the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008 on the Indonesian economy. These were usually one- to three-month projects, tailored to quickly respond to (expected) policy changes. The second case study is a set of initiatives on regional and global architectures, especially on structural reforms. Such reforms are crucial for longterm social and economic development both in Indonesia and globally. Indonesia’s international profile has been lifted since it became a member of the G20. It is now not only the natural leader of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the regional organization that has proliferated into ASEAN3, but also a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the G20. Furthermore, CSIS has been active in the ‘‘tracktwo’’ processes of these regional and global forums, including the development of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, which is the track-two level of APEC. Finally, CSIS has participated in track-two processes of the G20 such as Think 20 and the G20 Global Online Forum. The two case studies have similarities but also differences in how they influence policymaking. Moreover, with the growing diversity of audience since the democratization and decentralization of Indonesia in 1998, CSIS strategies to influence policymaking have changed. During the Suharto era, it focused on providing policy advice and ideas directly to the government, but during the Reformasi (post-Suharto) era, it has focused on influencing not only one centralized government, but NGOs, civil society groups, and media, as well as the fragmented executive-legislative bodies, regional governments, and subdistrict administrations prevalent in Indonesia.

Strategies and Structure There are ten main strategies that CSIS adopts in order to influence policymakers and reach out to the public, relating to these areas: 1. Core competency: Our core competency still is primarily in international issues; however, we are strengthening our core competency in domestic economics, politics, and regional autonomy. 2. Strategic thinking: Researchers are encouraged to think strategically, forward, and ‘‘out of the box.’’

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3. Influence: To influence policymakers, we make efforts to disseminate our findings and influence the central and local governments’ policies. 4. Networking: CSIS has a wide network domestically, regionally, and globally with links to businesses, the Parliament, local governments, government ministries, and others. We also engage in public debates with like-minded institutions. 5. Public education and ‘‘social capital’’: In order to promote democracy and pluralism, we are responsible for educating the public and sharing what we think and learn. Since the post-Suharto era, there has been more freedom of speech and more transparency. Hence, we are able to freely publish our findings in the media. 6. Competent think tank: Researchers are always encouraged to be creative, objective, and independent. We are expected to be ‘‘thinkers,’’ not only ‘‘doers.’’ Informal internal discussions often take place in everyday life at CSIS, whether at the office or online, through social media, mobile message groups, and so on. 7. Human resources: Researchers exhibit strong reasoning skills and are encouraged to be ‘‘opinion makers.’’ In addition to the the council of advisors and board of directors mentioned earlier, the CSIS Foundation consists of the board of trustees and board of supervisors. The board of directors consists of the executive director, executive secretary, director of infrastructure and operations, director of administration and personnel, head of the Department of Economics, and head of the Department of Politics and International Relations. The council of advisors consists of ten members from different fields, including the government, academia, and the media.

Focus Program The center has three main areas of focus: 1. Indonesia and the world: • ASEAN: economic and political security • East Asian architecture

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• Indonesia in global forums and governance: G20, World Trade Organization (WTO), UN, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) • Emerging and new crucial issues: food and energy security, nontraditional threats, maritime security, peacekeeping, disaster relief 2. Indonesia and strategic issues: • Sound macroeconomic policy: fiscal policy, energy subsidies, better-targeted subsidies, credible monetary policy • Food and energy security • Regional integration • Emerging economic power: specialized knowledge regarding development (vis-a`-vis China, India, and Turkey). • Global architecture: finance, trade, investment, climate change, and so on • Domestic competitiveness: dynamic view (manufacturing and services, supply chain positioning, demographic dividend, natural resources) • Job-generating growth • Regional autonomy and decentralization 3. Politics and international relations: • Political institutions: draft law on politics, constitutional amendment, political party reforms • Regional autonomy and decentralization: local leadership and good governance • Bureaucratic reforms • Nationhood and pluralism • Defense reforms • Global governance—human rights, peacekeeping • ASEAN • Indonesia and the world. CSIS has identified several topics that have high urgency and relate to high competency among its researchers: fiscal vulnerability (subsidies); Indonesia’s position in ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, and the G20; job-creation and labor-related issues; nation and character building; food and energy

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security; infrastructure (land, power, gas, etc.); regulatory reforms; and regional autonomy.

Mechanism and Dissemination CSIS focuses on five main channels to disseminate its thinking and studies to the public and policymakers: by introducing forward-thinking, influential policies, having a capacity to respond, taking part in public debate, disseminating ideas, and engaging in public relations. In order to provide checks and balances for the performance of each researcher in contributing to study and public outreach, CSIS utilizes a performance index. Essentially, each researcher is evaluated based on the following achievements: 1. Research: the number of research projects conducted, the number of research administrative works a researcher is cooperating on, the number of research proposals written, the number of articles written for CSIS journals, the number of articles written for international journals, the number of books or book chapters written or edited. 2. Public outreach: the number of op-ed articles written for newspapers, magazines, online media, and similar forums; the number of domestic (external and internal) and international seminars and workshops a researcher participates in as a speaker, discussant or panelist, and observer; and the number of appearances on television, radio, and other public venues As an independent think tank, CSIS disseminates research outcomes, stimulates public debates, and conducts public outreach campaigns. However, CSIS lacks the capacity to personally lobby influential and high-level policymakers despite the fact that there are high-level officials who have been close to CSIS (for example, one of CSIS’s senior researchers was appointed minister of trade and is the current minister of tourism and creative economy). Beyond these individuals, however, CSIS does not have any agenda to lobby highly placed policymakers to influence policymaking other than inviting them to its seminars and to benefit from its programs.

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Case Study: Challenges and Opportunities for Social and Economic Development Arising from Processes of Globalization Case Study 1: Noninstitutionalized Social Research—Energy Subsidies, Fiscal Transfers to Local Governments, Food Security, Knowledge Sector, Global Financial Crisis CSIS researchers are also very active in supplying research and public outreach that are individually initiated, more reactive, and ad hoc in nature. Some of this research does not have any formal contract, but rather is merely the outcome of the accumulation of knowledge, at times publicized through op-ed essays, public seminars, or media interviews. Examples of recent studies conducted include: 1. Research on energy subsidies, especially oil subsidies and electricity tariffs. The accumulation of knowledge on this topic began in the 1980s. Recently, CSIS conducted two public seminars on oil subsidies and their impact on the national budget, which received wide media coverage. These studies are important since in Indonesia, as is the case in many other parts of the world, energy subsidies crowd out other development expenditures, including on infrastructure. With the increase in oil prices due to geopolitical issues (including sanctions on the importation of Iranian oil), energy subsidies threaten national fiscal stability. Moreover, because Indonesia is a net oil importer with a growing middle class that consumes a lot of energy, large oil imports also threaten macroeconomic stability. More importantly, the government often favors populist policies of not raising the price of oil, even though such a policy course is not always the most efficient. Hence, CSIS can deliver ‘‘buy-ins’’ when leaders are not implementing the best policies despite their awareness of what would best serve the economy. CSIS can also help educate the largely uninformed public. One CSIS researcher even used cartoons to illustrate the danger of energy subsidies to Indonesia’s fiscal stability since many of the general public are unfamiliar with economic jargon. 2. A short research project on fiscal transfers to local governments. This was a one-month study requested by the Presidential Working Unit on Monitoring and Controlling Development. The study was a

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response to a complaint by the Ministry of Backward Regions that the current formulation of specific purpose grants (earmarked fiscal transfers from the central to local governments) had not supported the less developed regions. Political implications, nontransparency, and a tendency to generally ‘‘share the pie’’ in lieu of specificity in designating activities and recipient regions jointly resulted in this phenomenon. The specific purpose grants are fiscal transfers used for specific activities that are under the authority of local governments but in line with national priorities. There are currently nineteen designated national priorities. These grants are also used to improve standard minimal services in local regions in three sectors: health, education, and infrastructure. Hence, this study has a big social development impact. 3. Research on food security: CSIS is currently conducting research on how increasing protectionist measures in Indonesia threaten food security. This topic emerged on the CSIS agenda in 2011. In 2012, a CSIS researcher, along with a CSIS intern, conducted research on food security in Indonesia and its link to ASEAN trade in food commodities, the report of which has been published in a CSIS journal and in newspapers. Food self-sufficiency6 is often misunderstood as food security.7 Since policies encouraging food self-sufficiency may not only threaten food security (by refusing to import food that is necessary to meet domestic food demand) but also increase food prices, which will affect poor farmers, who are mostly net consumers of food (e.g., rice). Another CSIS researcher also spoke on food security and commodity price volatility during the Think 20 meeting (February 27–29, 2012), held jointly by the Mexican G20 presidency and the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations. The researcher then moderated a G20 online forum held by the Mexican G20 presidency on the same issue. The inputs from this meeting and the online forum contributed to the Los Cabos G20 Summit in June 2012. Food security is a domestic, regional, and global issue. It is also both a long-term issue (as it includes such topics as agricultural productivity) and a short-term issue (as it pertains to, for example, the financialization of food commodity and food price volatility). 4. A research project on the knowledge sector. This is a project of the Australian Agency for International Development undertaken by a CSIS researcher individually. The contract for the individual’s paper

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lasted four months, while the whole project itself is long-term (perhaps spanning as many as twenty-five years). The initial paper focuses on the incentives for and constraints to good quality research in Indonesia aimed at policymakers. It explores the demand side of the knowledge sector (namely the government) and the supply side (namely the government, universities, NGOs, think tanks, and private institutions). With the country’s very poor record of education and a limited supply of high-quality assessments of policy options from national sources, this research becomes increasingly important in the emerging Indonesia. 5. A public seminar on the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008: CSIA conducted a public seminar on the global financial crisis and its impact on Indonesia and the region recently. It was intended to stimulate public debate on how Indonesia may continue to be affected by the crisis. It does not have any direct implication for social development issues, but because the impact of a crisis can be very detrimental, especially to the poorest people, any economic crisis is also a social crisis. This public seminar and the accumulation of knowledge on this issue are important because in a globalized world, the contagion effect can be neither avoided nor ignored.

Case Study 2: CSIS Regional and Global Roles in Structural Reforms and Strategic Issues Involvement in the APEC New Strategy for Structural Reforms The following issue is a recent example of the role of CSIS in promoting a structural reform agenda within government institutions and helping to internalize regional and global commitments into domestic policies. Structural adjustments are needed to solve long-term social issues in Indonesia. Among these are fiscal reforms to increase social and infrastructure expenditure and regulatory reforms. Since the crisis of 2008, structural reforms have priority to help equilibrate the global imbalance (including external trade imbalances between surplus and deficit countries and internal fiscal imbalances of debt-stricken countries). Within ASEAN, countries have carried out this process by increasing consumption and moving from a tradedriven economy to a domestic and regional demand-led economy; in troubled European countries and the United States, the process has involved

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saving and fiscal consolidation The importance of structural reform cannot be emphasized enough. This has become a global agenda since every G20 country has committed to such reform. However, structural reforms need time to bear fruit, and more often than not, they are politically unpalatable and therefore difficult to implement (such as phasing out fossil fuel subsidies). Structural reforms may include regulatory reforms, bureaucratic reforms, competition policy, corporate governance, changes in legal and economic infrastructure, and improvements to the ease of doing business, as well as sectoral issues involving labor, financial inclusion, and the social safety net. CSIS has been active in holding closed roundtables and policy dialogues with policymakers on structural reforms in the context of Indonesia’s commitment at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the G20. CSIS experts on this issue have also participated in interministerial meetings as key consultants and have attended related workshops on structural reforms. One of the positive outcomes from working with the government on this issue is that Indonesia developed a plan to conduct the second APEC structural reform ministerial meeting since 2008 during its APEC chairmanship in 2013. As mentioned above, structural reform is an issue that often does not get enough political support. Hence, through the influence of CSIS’s engagement, the issue gains more political consideration and support. CSIS also strives to cement Indonesia its regional and global commitment to engage in domestic reforms, when domestic political constraints are impeding such undertakings. Regular op-ed articles on issues at APEC and G20 also help to educate the public about Indonesia’s engagement in regional and international forums. The issue of structural reform itself is domestic, though with Indonesia’s involvement in the G20 and APEC, the policies adopted are often hybrids of national criteria and international best practices. In preparation for the APEC 2013, CSIS was engaged as expert in the APEC New Strategy for Structural Reforms program. The Indonesian Government’s head representative for the program, a member of the APEC Economic Committee, sent an expert from CSIS to attend a residential training workshop on structural reform held by the Australian government in July 2012 in Bali. She had previously attended an APEC residential training workshop on structural reforms in Singapore in August 2011, as well as the APEC Senior Official Meeting 3 workshop on structural reform in San Francisco in September 2011.

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Involvement in the East Asia Bureau of Economic Research at the Australian National University A CSIS researcher has been appointed as the associate editor for the East Asia Forum, which ‘‘provides a platform for East Asian analysis, research and policy comment on the Asia Pacific Region and world affairs.’’ She will be in charge of coordinating a short article per week on Indonesia from different writers and is a regular contributor to the East Asia Forum herself. She spoke about Indonesia’s outlook at the East Asia Bureau of Economic Research—South Asia Bureau of Economic Research Roundtable on ‘‘Thinking About Asian Century’’ on April 17, 2012, at the Crawford School of Economics and Government in the Australian National University. The inputs from the roundtable and public forum went to the advisory committee to the Australian government on the white paper on Australia in the Asian Century. Among the issues discussed were social ones, including the intolerable level of malnutrition, poor record on education, and pervasive poverty based on the World Bank’s US$2 per day indicator—all of which are the main factors that could trap Indonesia as a middle-income country like South Africa and Brazil. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Study on ‘‘Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century,’’ Brazil and South Korea are among the countries that are stagnating and not growing to advanced country levels. However, Indonesia’s main concern should not only be with being trapped as a middle-income country but also with being trapped in low human development, such as poor health and education. Hence, CSIS’s influence in the region is also contributing to how other regional countries frame their strategies.

Involvement in the G20 In preparation for the G20 Seoul Summit in 2010, CSIS senior fellows, representing the Indonesian National Committee on Pacific Economic Cooperation in collaboration with the Korea National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation and the East Asia Bureau of Economic Research at the Australian National University, organized a series of informal meetings and roundtables at a track 1.5 level among the regional economies to produce a policy framework paper; it was delivered to the Asian G20 sherpas (Australia, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, and China), the finance ministers, and the central bank governors for their consideration.

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Following the Seoul Summit, CSIS has been actively engaged in the follow-up to it, especially in prompting Indonesia to pursue necessary structural adjustments in the context of its G20 commitment. By conducting a series of closed roundtables on structural reforms and Indonesia’s commitment at the regional and international tables, CSIS is helping relevant ministries and the G20 sherpas organize discussions and brainstorming sessions, and stimulate debates on how Indonesia could translate its commitment into domestic policies. CSIS has also regularly been invited both by the G20 sherpa committee and other international research institutes and governments to speak on issues related to the G20. Currently, CSIS is engaged in a project with the East Asia Bureau of Economic Research and the South Asia Bureau of Economic Research at the Australian National University entitled ‘‘Asian Economic Integration: Managing Its Global and Regional Institutional and Strategic Consequences,’’ funded by the Australian government under the Public Sector Linkages Program, which is administered by the Australian Agency for International Development. The project is organized around the following research themes: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Asia and the global system: making the G20 effective Regional architecture: adequacy and its future Economic integration in the Asian region The role of foreign investment in regional development Economic development and political voice Energy, resource security, and the climate

Conclusion The indirect and direct roles of CSIS in shaping social and economic development policies have been tremendous since its establishment in 1971, although factors such as transitional gaps between generations of researchers have at times increased (or, for that matter, decreased) the organization’s influence. CSIS bridges the gap between social science and policy, the general public and policymakers, objective studies and acceptable policy options. Furthermore, it builds networks, provides continuity, and delivers acceptable ways for the government to implement the right policies. It also serves as the window on the world to provide insight into the economic,

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political, and social dynamics of Indonesia. The case studies outlined above are some recent examples of the role that CSIS plays (directly or indirectly) in shaping social and economic development policies in the era of globalization, and how this work strengthens Indonesia’s links to, position in, and contributions to the world. There are of course financial, political, and institutional limitations. One example is public outreach, an area where CSIS still needs to coordinate its efforts more effectively internally and externally. Public outreach remains uninstitutionalized and still very much ad hoc. Moreover, the changing political economic structure in the post-Suharto era necessitates that CSIS change its strategy. For example, CSIS previously only needed to approach one person close to Suharto, but it must now approach many different people and agencies to influence policymaking in the legislative and executive bodies, as well as civil society. CSIS is also in transition. The organization’s success in the 1980s and the late 1990s was largely due to a handful of big names—mostly its founders. Most of them have either passed away or retired, and the younger generation still has to build its reputation in order to emulate the past success of CSIS. Moreover, because of the Asian financial crisis in 1997– 1998, CSIS lost a huge portion of its endowment. Although its financial state has improved somewhat, there are still financial constraints. Projects undertaken by CSIS cannot be cost-shared and have to be fully funded by donors. There are also constraints to attracting young researcher with PhDs and other qualified academics because, as in other Indonesian domestic research institutes, researchers’ salaries are much less than those offered by international organizations. The shortage of researchers has pushed those in the institution to conduct research on many issues at the same time, making the depth of the research necessarily somewhat less deep. Also, because researchers are responsible for reaching out to the public and to policymakers, sometimes there is not enough time to write the full-fledged academic papers necessary to form the basis of political recommendations. Despite these challenges, other institutions have much to learn from CSIS. Foremost is the organization’s independence. Not many similar institutions are completely independent in being able to freely express the opinions or views they promote. CSIS researchers are never dictated to or restricted as to what they study, view, and write or express. This allows continuous, innovative thinking. Second is the senior-junior mentorship program. Some of the organization’s younger researchers come to CSIS

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inspired by its more senior researchers who are (or were) Indonesia’s foremost economists, political scientists, and international affairs scholars. Younger researchers benefit from their seniors—not only from their mentorship and professionalism but also from the networking and almost parental relationships they foster. Third is the mixture between economic, political, and international affairs studies. CSIS’s core competency in the three fields encourages the researchers to specialize in one field while maintaining a wide body of knowledge about the other fields as well. This is truly a comparative advantage of CSIS among other local research institutions.

Notes 1. OECD, Education at a Glance 2012: OECD Indicators (OECD Publishing, 2012), 34, accessed April 17, 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2012-en. 2. Adam Latif, ‘‘The 2013 Indonesian State Budget Draft,’’ East Asia Forum, September 15, 2012. 3. Adam Latif, ‘‘The Roles and Problems of Infrastructure in Indonesia,’’ Economics and Finance in Indonesia, 60 (2012): 116. 4. World Bank, ‘‘Spending More or Spending Better: Improving Education Financing in Indonesia,’’ East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank, June 4, 2012. 5. James G. McGann, 2011 Global Go to Think Tanks Report and Policy Advice (Philadelphia: Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania, 2011). 6. ‘‘Food self-sufficiency’’ means being able to supply domestic food demand without relying on international market as a supplier. 7. According to the World Food Summit of 1996, food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to enough safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for active and healthy lifestyles.

Chapter 10

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS): Reshaping China’s Development Strategy He Fan

The past two decades witnessed the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy. But China’s economic development is unbalanced and unsustainable in the long run. Rebalancing the Chinese economy has gradually become one of the priorities on the agenda of Chinese policymakers. Many think tanks in China have been involved in this policy change. The Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP) within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) plays a unique and important role in this process. This chapter documents IWEP’s involvement in three stages to reshape China’s development strategy. In the stage of policy discussion, IWEP led the academic research, predicted the unsustainability of the pro-export policy favoring foreign direct investment and proposed a package of policy suggestions. In the stage of policymaking, IWEP provided a background report and technical papers on specific topics, and worked closely with major government agencies such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, and the People’s Bank of China (the central bank). At the same time, IWEP researchers also played a very active role in disseminating the ideas to the general public. In the stage of policy negotiation, when renminbi (RMB) appreciation became the headline story and global imbalance became the mostly debated issue among G20 members, IWEP further cooperated with the Chinese government, and became more and more active in the international arena.

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How can a foreign policy think tank like IWEP play such an important role in domestic policy? The case of IWEP shows that, for think tanks, especially those in developing countries, a close relationship with the international community, a broad knowledge of the historical experience of other economies, and an ability to understand local realities, to translate local knowledge in a way that can be understandable to international society, are the most important elements if they want to increase their influence on domestic issues. The chapter describes the current situation of think tanks in China and their roles in China’s economic reform, then focuses on the IWEP and examines its role in policy change in China. The last section generalizes IWEP’s case study and outlines lessons learned and limitations to overcome.

Think Tanks in China and Their Roles in China’s Economic Reform In the last three decades, think tanks have mushroomed in China and played a more and more important role in economic reform. Generally speaking, two different categories of think tanks can be distinguished in China. There are official and semiofficial think tanks, and there are nonofficial think tanks. Many government departments have their own research institute: for example, the State Council has the Development Research Center, the National Development and Reform Committee (formerly the State Planning Committee) has the Academy of Macroeconomic Research, the Ministry of Finance has the Institute of Public Finance, and the Ministry of Commerce has the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation. CASS is a semiofficial think tank. It is affiliated with the State Council but can also accept funding from the private sector. Official and semiofficial think tanks mainly focus on policy-oriented research and work closely with the government. The most famous nonofficial think tanks mainly come from leading universities, for example, the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University. There are also some influential nonofficial think tanks in the field of economic research, such as the National Economic Research Institute, whose director is a former CASS economist, and the Unirule Institute of Economics, whose founders and core members also are CASS scholars. Private think tanks are generally

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more focused on academic research, and some of them are more engaged in grassroots research and local issues. Foreigners are often puzzled by Chinese think tanks because they are quite a different animal from their Western counterparts. It can be very difficult to identify a purely ‘‘independent’’ and ‘‘nonprofit’’ think tank in China. Most of the Chinese think tanks have a government background. Some official think tanks are under the direct control of government departments. But like their peers in the Western world, Chinese think tanks enjoy the autonomy of choosing their own research agenda and can undertake independent research on most economic issues. The concept of ‘‘nonprofit’’ is also not appropriate in the Chinese context, since it is very difficult to register as a nonprofit organization in China. Some nonofficial think tanks have to be registered as consulting companies. This is in sharp contrast to the Western world, where most of the think tanks are registered as nonprofit organizations, although many ‘‘nonprofit’’ think tanks have a strong government connection. Since the early 1980s, when China launched its reform and opening-up policy, the Chinese government has gradually realized the important role of think tanks. In late 1970s, when CASS was established, its main purpose was to support Deng Xiaoping in winning the propaganda battle with his rivals. Later, CASS started to play the role of economic advisor for political leaders. Other research institutions began to emerge in the 1980s, when the State Council, for example, established its Economic Research Center, Technical Research Center, Price Research Center, and Rural Development Research Center. In 1985 the first three of those research centers mentioned merged as the Development Research Center. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping made a famous tour of south China, and urged that China should continue its market-oriented reform and further open up to the outside world. This tour marked the beginning of a new phase in China’s development, and a new phase for China’s think tanks also began. In the 1990s, nonofficial think tanks flourished. The Unirule Institute of Economics was most active in the late 1990s. Many nonofficial think tanks were also involved in policymaking. The founders of these nonofficial think tanks were usually experts in the semiofficial think tanks or scholars returned from overseas, with a good reputation already established. In this period both the official and nonofficial think tanks made great contributions to policy making. The government also established a tradition of inviting experts to discuss major

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policy changes. Additionally, the top political leaders invited famous scholars to give lectures for high-ranking government officials on a wide range of issues.

Factors Affecting Think Tank Roles on Policymaking in China Political Factors Since China launched the reform and opening-up policy, the decisionmaking process of the Chinese government has become more decentralized. This decentralization has led to a wider use of think tanks, as experts are called upon for consultation in the process of policymaking. Semiofficial think tanks like CASS play a unique role in policy consulting. Unlike government department research institutes, they do not represent any sectoral interest and can provide unbiased judgments. Unlike nonofficial think tanks, they maintain a close relationship with major government departments and better understand how the demands of government affect research. As a result, these think tanks can provide tailor-made recommendations to suit the needs of the government. Economic Factors Chinese think tanks used to be entirely government funded, but now different kinds of think tanks have various sources of funding. Some wellknown think tanks within CASS receive funding in various ways, including from the government, private companies, and overseas programs. If think tanks have enough diversified sources of funding, they do not need to cater to the interests of their funders, which better assures their independence. A by-product of stronger ties with a wide range of funders is that the research of these think tanks becomes more specific and technical, and during this process scholars in the ivory tower have more opportunities to learn from the real world. Social Factors Rapid economic growth brings rising aspiration. People want more opportunities to air their opinions and express their feelings in the policy

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discussion. The spread of the Internet and social media is creating a new platform for people to exert influence on important issues. Chinese authority encourages freewheeling speech both in the traditional media and the new social media, as long as it does not go against the leadership of the Communist Party and the government. The filtration policy for the Internet is more open than is widely thought. Think tanks should help to bridge the gap between the elite and the masses by becoming more active in mass media. They may do so on occasion as interpreters to explain the background and intention of new government policies, and on other occasions to express their own opinions candidly, arguing for better policies than the current ones. Think tanks can also help introduce the perspectives of the weaker social classes to the decision makers on issues such as medical care, social security, and taxation by sending reports to the government and publishing their research. Generally speaking, most scholars have done very solid work in this regard, because they want to build their own reputation among the people as impartial observers.

IWEP and Policy Change in China: A Case Study Challenges for the Chinese Economy The Chinese economy is currently one of the fastest growing in the world, and has been so for three decades. However, it suffers from numerous imbalances and uncertainties. It is characterized by high investment but low consumption, a very competitive manufacturing sector and a highly protected service sector, an increasing trade surplus, excessive foreign exchange reserves, and a widening income gap. China also suffers from high levels of pollution, rampant corruption, and other problems. The Chinese government gradually realized the importance of adjusting its economic development strategy in the last decade, and rebalancing the Chinese economy has become one of its priorities. Think tanks like IWEP played an important role in shaping this great policy shift. History of IWEP As noted, the IWEP is a research institute belonging to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It was created in 1964, as part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and originally called the Institute of World Economy.

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In 1977 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was formally established, formed from what had been the Division of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. IWEP became one of its subordinate institutes. In December 1980, part of the Institute of World Politics and the Institute of World Economy were combined to establish the Institute of World Economics and Politics. IWEP’s main task was to provide background reports and policy suggestions for the government. It has more than ten research sections that cover the global macroeconomy, international trade, international finance, international investment, multinational companies and industrial policy, developmental economics, international political economy, international politics, and diplomatic policy, among other fields. It boasts more than 120 staff members, among them more than 80 researchers. It also publishes four academic and policy journals, including Journal of World Economy (a monthly academic journal of economics, in Chinese), International Economic Review (a bimonthly policy journal, in Chinese), World Economy and Politics (a monthly academic journal of international politics, in Chinese), and China and World Economy (a bimonthly journal, in English). IWEP also includes two national academic societies, the China Society of World Economy and the China Society of Emerging Economics. IWEP conducts various kinds of exchanges with foreign institutions, including organizing visits by researchers to foreign countries, receiving visiting foreign scholars, and organizing international academic symposia. The next portion of this section divides the process of policymaking into three stages: the policy discussion stage, the policy formation stage, and the policy negotiation stage, and discusses IWEP’s involvement in these three stages. The Policy Discussion Stage: How Far Can Theory Go Ahead of Policy? Even before Chinese policymakers became aware of the unsustainable nature of the current Chinese economic model and global imbalance became a hotly debated topic among international economists, IWEP scholars had predicted such an evolution. The earliest evidence is a conference document from the early 1980s. In this document, one IWEP scholar argued that China would have a ‘‘twin surplus’’ (current account surplus and capital account surplus) and also predicted that it would not be sustainable.

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In the 1990s, Prof. Yu Yongding, former director of IWEP, was already arguing that China’s foreign exchange reserves would continue to increase, diminishing public welfare. At that time, China’s foreign exchange reserve was a little more than US$100 billion; now the size is more than US$3 trillion. In 2002, IWEP scholars predicted that the RMB would appreciate and thus conducted intensive research in this area. Before the establishment of China Investment Corporation (CIC), the sovereign wealth fund of China, IWEP scholars had already introduced the experience of State Information Center of China (SIC), and argued that China should take a more aggressive approach in managing its bulging foreign exchange reserve. In 2005, before an announcement of RMB exchange rate policy, IWEP scholars participated in a meeting hosted by Premier Wen Jiabao and submitted the IWEP’s proposal on dealing with the problem. In 2005, IWEP researchers joined a dozen international economists, including Oliver Blanchard, Dani Rodrik, Michael Spence, and Barry Eichengreen, and thoroughly analyzed the problems with China’s traditional development policy and proposed a package of reforms. The government accepted many of these recommendations, especially after the American financial crisis of 2008. The executive summary of this research project proposed that China should use an expansionary fiscal policy, a sound monetary policy, and a more flexible exchange rate policy to maintain macroeconomic stability, while at the same time facilitating structural reform. The Policymaking Stage: Connecting the Dots At the policymaking stage, IWEP scholars were to some extent less vocal in the public media, because of their close working relationship with major government agencies involved in reform programs. Compared to the first stage, the research topics now were more detailed, to the point of seeming mundane. However, through this close cooperation, and through tailormade proposals, IWEP scholars helped to connect the dots into lines and draw the blueprints for the evolving Chinese economy. IWEP scholars assisted the government with monetary policy, exchange rate policy, capital account liberalization, RMB internationalization, monitoring of short-term capital flows, and many other issues. Yu Yongding was a member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the People’s Bank of China. Prof. Zhang Yuyan, current director of IWEP, was one of the earliest

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members of the Diplomatic Policy Committee for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Then serving as the assistant director of IWEP, I was also a consultant to the People’s Bank of China, and helped with issues like exchange rate policy, development of the foreign exchange market, and monitoring short-term capital flows. At present my team is also engaged in the issue of RMB internationalization. The team not only worked with the central government but also helped the local government in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, to launch a pilot project on RMB internationalization. IWEP scholars currently provide assistance to the Ministry of Commerce on trade policy. They are involved in tax rebate policy reform, the monitoring system for China’s export sector, import policy, official development assistance, free-trade agreement negotiations, and many other issues. IWEP scholars also assist the Ministry of Finance on issues like fiscal policy and tax reform. Furthermore, IWEP seeks to gain influence both among policymakers and the public. IWEP scholars, as noted, often attend government work meetings and they lecture top political leaders. But they are also active in public debates and conduct intensive field studies, interviewing people at export companies in coastal areas and coal mines in western areas, talking with farmers and vegetable peddlers, and visiting black market banks and urban slums and other places.

The Policy Negotiation Stage: A Two-Level Game One unique role IWEP plays in China’s policymaking process is through its participation in international negotiations. It acts as a bridge between foreign governments, think tanks, the international community, and their counterparts in China. International negotiations are a two-level game, being played both at the international and domestic levels. Significantly, IWEP can also bridge the gap between different departments of the Chinese government. IWEP scholars work closely with major government departments on international negotiations, providing support to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank, and other Chinese government agencies when their representatives attend important meetings, such as the G20 meetings, the (BRICS) meetings, the ASEAN3 meetings, and Sino-U.S. economic and strategic dialogues. Additionally, IWEP scholars provide advice on policymaking, participate in coordination meetings

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between different government departments, participate in phone conferences with foreign partners, and attend academic meetings on relevant issues. IWEP also assists the People’s Bank and the Ministry of Finance in their dealings concerning international and regional financial systems, and gives support to the Ministry of Commerce when it conducts negotiations on foreign trade agreements. A recent example is IWEP’s involvement in the BRICS summit meetings. In February 2011, IWEP set up a research team for BRICS countries. During the recent BRICS summit in India, the team provided a background report to the Ministry of Commerce. IWEP scholars also coordinate the BRICS economics research group within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The feasibility research on the BRICS Bank proposed by India has been carried out by a team in IWEP. Throughout these processes, IWEP has built a strong international network, through contact and cooperation with the U.S. government, think tanks, and organizations in civil society, as well as with the EU, EU member states, the European Central Bank, and think tanks in Europe. IWEP also has strong relationships closer to home, with Asian countries and think tanks in Asia, as well as with emerging economies, international organizations, and institutions in global civil society. Summary The IWEP has carved out an important role for itself in the policymaking process in China. During the policy-discussion phase, IWEP formulates theories that attempt to predict future problems and suggest possible policies. During the policymaking stage, IWEP works with government agencies, especially the People’s Bank and the Ministries of Commerce, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, to formulate specific policy reform plans. At the policynegotiation stage, IWEP assists major government departments with international negotiations. It has also built strong ties with international networks.

Lessons to Be Learned A Conceptual Framework: The Role of Think Tanks in China’s Policymaking Policymaking is a cyclical process (Figure 10.1). It starts when a certain issue is defined as a problem on which action needs to be taken, usually

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POLICY FORMULATION

PROBLEM DEFINITION

POLICY ADOPTION

POLICY EVALUATION

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Figure 10.1. Think Tanks and Policymaking in China

because of public pressure (problem definition). The issue is then taken up by policymakers, who create strategies to address the problem (policy formulation). Policymakers then formally adopt a policy solution, usually in the form of legislation (policy adoption). The policy is then given its final structure during the implementation process, which involves subordinate political and administrative figures (policy implementation). The results of the policy then give rise to either positive or negative political reactions, which may lead to a continuation, modification, or termination of the policy (policy evaluation). The official definition of the Chinese decision-making system is ‘‘democratic centralism,’’ a principle implemented in the decision-making process. Its main characteristic is that when the final decision has to be made, the

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minority submits to the majority, and the lower level submits to the upper level. The focus is on quick and decisive implementation. But as many close observers of Chinese politics have pointed out, China’s policymaking process has become more and more decentralized and is relying more and more on consensus building. During this paradigm change, think tanks have had more chances to be involved in all the stages of decision making. In the first phase of decision making, policymakers receive professional support from the think tanks and sometimes invite their experts to participate in closed-door meetings. In this way, think tanks become more familiar with decision makers and have more influence on their decisions. Once the policies are made, think tanks publish their reports and air their views to the media, giving the decision makers a chance to reflect on the policies they made.

A Puzzle Until now China has been an inward-looking country, which implies that domestic issues always dominate international issues. In the early stages of China’s economic reform, the most influential research teams were those that worked on rural reform and in the agricultural sector. The state-owned-enterprises reform attracted many talented economists in China. A foreign policy think tank like IWEP could have easily been marginalized; instead, it became the only research institute in CASS ranked in the top thirty by the yearly Global Go To Think Tank Index released by the University of Pennsylvania. It is important to note that IWEP is listed both among foreign policy think tanks and domestic policy think tanks. How has a think tank focused on foreign policy been able to garner such influence on domestic issues? The first explanation is that international exposure helps IWEP to be unbiased. Usually think tanks play a more important role in sectoral issues. Health-care experts propose health-care reform, and food security experts believe that is the most important issue. This is understandable, but the problem is that the more think tanks are involved, the more likely their opinions will be biased. For example, experts on real estate or capital markets often strongly support the industries they are studying. However, if think tanks concentrate on international policies and issues, this may prevent them from being co-opted by vested interest groups mainly concerned

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with domestic issues. It will also reduce the likelihood of their receiving funding from these same groups. The second explanation is that international expertise helps IWEP to be more convincing. Focusing on the experiences of other economies can help a great deal in persuading policymakers: just as a picture is worth a thousand words, a good story can be worth a thousand theories. For example, Japan’s experience in the 1980s (currency appreciation) and 1990s (collapse of the property bubble) made a deep impression on Chinese policymakers. The third explanation is that international economic policies can be used to facilitate domestic reforms. China’s entry into the WTO is a famous case of ‘‘forcing reform by opening up.’’ By the same token, RMB appreciation, though not effective in reducing China’s trade surplus, can help facilitate the reform of the service sector. Last but not least, think tanks that focus on international issues, like IWEP, are more likely to engage in joint research both within and outside China. Joint research is often more convincing than individual research. A certain research topic may require different fields of expertise, so that researchers focusing on different fields have to work together on overlapping issues. Even when the topic of research covers only one field of expertise, it is still useful for researchers to bring different perspectives so as to make the conclusion more pertinent. IWEP has successfully provided platforms to bridge the knowledge gap between local scholars and foreign experts. Limitations That Need to Be Overcome Compared with the developed world’s consultancy industry, the Chinese one is still in its infancy. It does have advisory agencies to the government, like the Council of Economic Advisers in the United States. When there is a need to make a decision on a particular issue, the government may call for consultation. But after the meeting, scholars are dismissed. They cannot participate in the policymaking full-time. The central government and the State Council emphasize policy consultation work and hold nationwide policy consultation meetings every year, and always insist that significant decisions should go through a technical and democratic process. They are trying their best, but to many scholars, their best is still not good enough. Another limitation of the Chinese system is that when think tanks provide their reports, there is often a lack of feedback from the government

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agency in question. This means that the think tanks do not know why their policy suggestions are accepted or rejected, and find it harder to improve their research. China is changing; so will think tanks in China. On the one hand, they have to be more active on the international stage, airing Chinese scholars’ views, and learning more from the international experience. On the other hand, with China’s further opening up, more international think tanks will come to China. There will be more cooperation between Chinese and foreign think tanks, but they are also competing with each other. This competition can help those well-prepared Chinese think tanks become more effective and influential.

Chapter 11

Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE): Think Tanks in the Era of Globalization Marek Dabrowski

This chapter analyzes new challenges and opportunities faced by think tanks in the face of globalization, particularly in the economic and social policy spheres. Globalization has made the entire world more integrated, with an increasing number of economic, social, and political issues becoming of international importance. As result, economic and social research, analyses, policy advice, and policy advocacy increasingly must address supranational challenges. This supposes that a transformation has to take place among think tanks, which traditionally have focused on national policymaking agendas and competition in the national markets of ideas. This transformation affects various aspects of think tank business: the setting of their agendas, fund-raising, competition, external alliances, internal organization and management, communication, dissemination and outreach, and others. The subsequent two sections present the economic and social consequences of the globalization process itself and its impact on economic and social sciences. An analysis follows in the next two sections of the new opportunities and challenges for economic and social policy think tanks stemming from globalization processes and of their various strategies for adjustment to the new market environment. The final section contains a case study of the Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE) in

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Poland, which over the twenty years of its existence has evolved from a national to a global think tank. An analytical narrative is the main approach in this chapter.

Globalization and Its Consequences for Setting a Supranational Economic and Social Policy Agenda In the last thirty years the world economy has become increasingly integrated and interdependent. This process has been driven by worldwide liberalization of the trade of goods and services, liberalization of capital movement and the financial sector, expansion of transnational corporations, and to a lesser extent growing cross-border labor mobility (even if formal restrictions to labor movement are reinforced, from time to time, in high-income countries). In addition, the rapid development of global transportation networks, the expansion of the English language as the new lingua franca, and even more importantly the information revolution involving advances in information and communication technologies have helped to sharply decrease various kinds of transaction costs and to provide convenient technical platforms for integrated global markets. As result, the world has become ‘‘smaller’’ and more interdependent, much more than it has previously been in human history. This growing interdependency has been particularly strongly felt during the recent global financial crisis, which rapidly spread from the U.S. subprime credit market to the entire world economy within just one year. Even without such a serious crisis as that observed in 2007–2009, the number of global policy challenges that require well-coordinated actions on a supranational level is growing rapidly. These challenges include, among many others, trade and regulatory regimes, financial market regulations, macroeconomic policies, migration, the environment, energy, climate change, global security, fighting terrorism and international crime, preventing spread of pandemic diseases, and building an international justice system. As result, economic, social, and other policies, largely national in import two or three decades ago (although with attention to external constraints), have become increasingly the subject of international coordination and global policymaking processes. Some regions, particularly in Europe, have been transferring several important policy competences from

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the national to the supranational level as they move toward increasingly advanced projects of economic and political integration. The globalization and regionalization of policymaking creates the demand for global and regional expertise. The latter is not just the sum of country-specific analyses or recommendations. To understand the global or regional processes and challenges that are experienced, and to propose global or regional solutions, or both depending on the situation, requires an array of global and regional knowledge and experience; respective theoretical, forecasting, and simulation models; analytical frameworks; databases; and an ability to address global and regional issues in an impartial way (sometimes against the interest of the country of origin of a given researcher or institution). The process of creating such a global pool of expertise is well under way, but far from being completed.

The Globalization of Economic and Social Sciences As noted in the previous section, the process of globalization in the social and economic sciences is already under way following the globalization and the regionalization of economic and social policymaking in many spheres. This process has several dimensions, including the globalization of research agendas and the globalization of research and analytical perspectives. In regard to the globalization of research agendas, the thematic focus of research is moving from national to global and regional problems, which is justified by the increasing degree of interdependence in various areas of economic, political, and social life. Research and analytical perspectives have also become globalized, as there are an increasing number of regional and global challenges, as well as public goods that require both analysis and recommendations from a perspective broader than that of a single country. Consequently, the public debate on various issues is moving from presenting the stories and arguments of an individual country to addressing global and regional problems in a more geographically balanced way. In the same way, cross-country comparative analyses have an obvious advantage over single-country cases studies, even if the purpose of the latter is to provide advice to national governments. There has been increased globalization of the labor market for researchers, with high-quality specialists being able to choose the most attractive

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workplace and move across borders regardless of their nationality and original residency. Furthermore, the information revolution allows multinational teams to form without changing the residencies of their members, an increasingly attractive option for scholars and professionals. In addition to the globalization of the labor market, there is an increased globalization of the research market these experts are involved in. Factors such as the information revolution, the expanded use of the English language, and the growing network of global consultancies and think tanks create more room for transborder competition in policy research and policy advertising. The globalization of funding means more international funding is available to think tanks and researchers. On the other hand, this also means more competition for local funding. These processes have been even more pronounced in Europe because of the substantial role of long-term EU research programs that prefer building geographically balanced transnational teams and consortia. In addition, the single European market has facilitated unrestricted movement of high-quality researchers and specialists between countries. Despite these developments, there is still a long way to go in order to catch up with the new realities of the global economy, especially in the economic sciences. Most theoretical models are based on a single national economy framework. Consequently, there is insufficient understanding of global interdependence, especially in the macroeconomic and financial spheres.

New Opportunities and Challenges for Economic and Social Policy Think Tanks Globalization processes themselves and the globalization of economic and social sciences bring both new opportunities and new challenges to think tanks. With new opportunities, they may benefit from new thematic agendas (increasing demand for global, regional, and comparative crosscountry policy analyses) and new funding sources outside their home countries or provided by international institutions. They can more easily identify potential project partners around the globe and build international consortia, alliances, and partnerships. Internally, they can form multiethnic teams without having to move individual experts to their headquarters, experts

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can continue working at their home locations and cooperate or communicate with each other using modern means of electronic communication such as e-mail, social networks, and intranet websites. Researchers now have much easier (online) access to various sources of information, including open-access journals and other publication series, international databases, and electronic libraries. Going further, the information revolution also provides a convenient way of organizing various international academic events at low costs, without the necessity for travel. Think tanks, even those representing less attractive or remote geographical locations, can now organize their work on a network basis, communicate across borders, and disseminate their output internationally through various global communication channels. All these new opportunities, if used wisely and rationally, may help individual think tanks upgrade their academic and professional status, especially if they are located in countries considered peripheral from the point of view of the global research market. An open international recruitment of the best experts (based on professional criteria rather than on their nationality, residence, or just personal connections) provides an opportunity to compete for more sophisticated and value-added project opportunities and to enhance the professional credibility of a given think tank. This also gives local experts a chance to learn from more experienced foreign ones and become familiar with working in a multiethnic and multicultural environment. Furthermore, by ‘‘globalizing’’ their thematic agendas and diversifying funding sources, many think tanks, especially in less developed or ‘‘peripheral’’ countries, can strengthen their financial fundamentals and make themselves more independent from domestic funding sources, which are often both limited in terms of their available size and, sometimes, create various types of political or business dependencies. This is particularly important for the nongovernmental think tanks that finance themselves exclusively on a project basis. They can also move from the model of permanent resident staff employment to a more flexible one of project-based network engagement, which additionally increases their financial security. On the other hand, globalization means more competition both on the demand side (competition for funds, clients, and audience) and the supply side (competition for competent experts and original ideas). Even if think tanks want to continue to concentrate their focus on national and local problems, they must have elementary competence on international issues

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and global and regional interdependence and state-of-the-art competence on the international research market to avoid the risk of being seen as producing irrelevant expertise or just reinventing the wheel. This is particularly important in small open economies or in countries belonging to the strong regional integration blocks like the EU where many important prerogatives in economic and social policy have been already delegated to supranational organs. This globalization of the labor market for researchers and the crossborder expansion of global and regional consultancies and think tanks (which open branches and subsidiaries outside their home location to compete in local markets) has put additional strain on many small local think tanks that are too weak to offer experts attractive remuneration packages and ambitious professional career paths. More generally, the academic and consultancy markets at the global level are increasingly shaped by the so-called agglomeration effect as elaborated by the new economic geography school. In practice, much of the potential funding and best workforce moves from the ‘‘periphery’’ to the core. This process puts additional pressure on think tanks in locations considered peripheral, according to prevailing market stereotypes, even if they operate at a strong professional level and are competitive in terms of operational costs. As result, many of them must either change their agendas, or way of operation, or disappear from the market.

Adjustment Strategies of Think Tanks: How to Compete in a Global Market? In the new market environment, most think tanks (apart from those that concentrate on purely local agendas) will have to follow a similar path of adjustment to that already experienced in both manufacturing and service sectors worldwide. In other words, they must become able to operate and compete across borders. There is no one adjustment model and very much depends on a particular think tank’s mission, goals and ambitions, geographical location, funding sources, type of activity, institutional capacity, and so on. The first and most ambitious strategy is to set up a global or regional network of subsidiaries or branch offices that enable a given organization

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to penetrate various regional and national markets. However, such a strategy is costly, at least in its initial stage (before additional streams of revenue compensate for substantial upfront costs). In practice, it is available either to global consultancies (which cannot be considered as typical think tanks even if they effectively compete with them) or to well-funded foundations and think tanks in developed countries. In the second category the examples include, among others, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the German Marshall Fund, and foundations affiliated with major political parties in Germany. The second less costly but less ambitious approach involves building a permanent network or alliance of cooperating organizations, working closely together in several areas of their common interest, applying for joint projects, organizing joint conferences and seminars, and publishing joint publication series. This is more than an ad hoc project consortium but definitely less daunting than building a single global or regional structure of any organization. There are many such networks and alliances in Europe, including the ones initiated and led by the Center for European Policy Research in Brussels. The third approach represents an intermediate variant between the previous two: building a regional network of associated think tanks that, although legally and financially independent, remain in a permanent institutional and program relationship with the network founder and leader, often using the same logo and following a joint business strategy. Two examples include the institutional networks funded by the Stockholm Institute for Transition Economies and CASE—the Center for Social and Economic Research, both operating in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Finally, the fourth and most frequently observed approach involves the globalization of research agendas and expert teams in the already existing think tanks, even if they retain simple organizational structures and do not expand institutionally outside their home locations. This goal has been accomplished, to a large, extent, through the internationalization of their expert teams either employed in-house, that is, on a permanent basis, or belonging to a looser network of nonresident associates employed on a project-related basis. The first model is affordable for either large and wellfunded publicly owned institutes in some western European countries or equally well-funded private foundations and university outfits (mostly in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom). The second model

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can be used also by smaller and medium-size institutions funded mostly on a project basis. An increasing number of these institutions have moved from relying on permanently employed staff to a looser network of nonresident fellows, experts, associates, and others engaged to carry out concrete projects. The London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research was one of the first to promote this type of think-tank business model in the 1990s. The issues addressed in this section seem to be of crucial importance for the future of think tanks and require further analysis.

From a National to a Global Think Tank: The Case Study of CASE, the Center for Social and Economic Research The new developments and challenges for think tanks are evident in the example of CASE, which in over twenty years of its existence has evolved from a mostly national and regional think tank to a truly global institution. Mission, Agenda, Values, and Finances CASE is an international, nonprofit, policy-research and policy-advising institute working on a broad spectrum of issues related to the global economy, economic and social development, European integration, and the transition process in the postcommunist world. Legally, it is a private foundation under Polish law. CASE’s mission is to provide objective economic analysis and promote constructive solutions to the challenges of transition, reform, integration, and development, in order to improve the socioeconomic well-being of societies. CASE conducts policy research and analysis; advises governments, international organizations, and NGOs; informs and encourages public debate; disseminates economic knowledge and research results; and supports the development of the think tank sector in transitioning and developing countries. CASE is independent and nonpartisan in all its public activities. It does not represent any explicit ideological profile, although many of its outputs intellectually support the ideas of a market economy and globalization. In practical terms it works as follows: the CASE network does not institutionally participate in policy advocacy. In their research, writing, and speaking, individual CASE experts or small teams of experts often advocate particular

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policies as the result of specific projects. When doing so, experts solely represent themselves as individuals. However, this model does not apply to policy issues affecting the institutional interests of CASE and its network in countries in which they operate, nor does it apply to policy issues affecting nongovernmental organizations generally in these countries. CASE and its network do not institutionally endorse political candidates and political parties, nor do they participate in political campaigns. CASE experts who wish to participate in politics or endorse political candidates may do so only during their personal time and supported by their personal resources. As a general rule, CASE experts who wish to devote considerable personal time and effort to participating in political activities and campaigns must refrain from simultaneously participating in CASE projects. CASE’s publications series provide several forums in which scholars and experts can post their research and advance their points of view. Materials published from within CASE publications reflect the views of the author or authors, and not the views of CASE as an institution. CASE and organizations in its network and its affiliated scholars and experts do not engage in lobbying or other political activities on behalf of project sponsors and institutional supporters. CASE activity has been always funded exclusively on a project basis. During the twenty years of its existence, CASE has managed and successfully completed over three hundred international projects varying in size, topic, nature, and geographical coverage. This record illustrates the scale of the fund-raising effort and flexible approach needed to acquire new research and development assistance projects (usually only some 20 percent of project proposals submitted in open tenders or competitions are successful). In turn, this requires an intensive analysis and ex ante forecast of potential market opportunities, as well as close monitoring of changes in market demand and funding sources. In the last decade CASE’s annual revenue varied in the range between US$1.5 and 3 million, with the apogee in the precrisis years 2006–2007 (without revenues of organizations in its network, which are separate legal entities, as described below). Most of this revenue in the last seven to eight years has come from projects financed by the European Commission and global organizations such as the World Bank or various UN agencies and, to a much lesser degree, from national governments and the business sector. Earlier, in the 1990s and early 2000s, other sources of financing played

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the dominant role, particularly private U.S. foundations (especially the Open Society Institute and Ford Foundation) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), though the World Bank and UN agencies did contribute. Since 2004, CASE has been building its endowment, with one-time support from the Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe, and then by cumulating part of annual financial surpluses. Nevertheless, the current value of the CASE Endowment does not exceed the equivalent of US$1 million, meaning that it plays the role of reserve fund rather than real endowment. By international comparison, CASE continues to belong to the category of small or medium-size institutions, even if it is considered one of the biggest and strongest in central and eastern Europe, and rated among the thirty top non-U.S. think tanks in the world according to the annual global think-tank rankings published by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program of the University of Pennsylvania in cooperation with the UN. Why CASE Went International This is the key question to be answered if one wants to understand CASE’s model and its gradual evolution. The two short answers to this question are by choice, as the consequence of working on postcommunist transition in the 1990s and early 2000s and then on European and global integration, and by necessity because of the scarcity of available funding in Poland and, more generally, in central and eastern Europe, a constraint that has deepened over the last twenty years, instead of easing up as might have been expected. CASE was founded in 1991 by a group of policymakers and experts involved in the first stage of Poland’s economic transformation of 1989– 1991. At that time Poland’s experience was considered a model example of radical (and successful) market reforms and it raised great interest not only among researchers but also policymakers in other postcommunist countries. This was the background to CASE’s involvement in policy advising in the very first stage of its existence, until the mid-1990s. In the second half of the 1990s, with fading international interest in the Polish experience (the reforms in Poland were slowing down and ultimately stalled completely), bygaining policy-advising experience in other transition economies and building its international network of experts, CASE could offer policymakers the best international experience and best practices in various policy

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areas. Finally, in the decade of the 2000s, after the market transition of former communist economies was largely accomplished, CASE evolved toward a global policy-research and policy-advising institute working in various geographic areas (central and eastern Europe, including the western Balkans, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and Africa, and Asia) and for various clients (the European Commission, the World Bank, UN agencies, governments, and the private sector). It has also become increasingly involved in various types of pan-European research projects related to the entire EU, as well as its various subregions. Many of these projects have had an explicitly applied character (i.e., they have been related to concrete policy issues) with the European Commission or European Parliament as recipients of the center’s expertise. In addition, the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 increased the workload related to global problems and challenges and their impact on particular regions.

Modus Operandi: Building a Triple Network International expansion has had an obvious impact on CASE’s business model and its internal organization. Since the very beginning of its existence, CASE has relied mostly on project-specific employment of experts, whose areas of research were determined by both the broad thematic spectrum of projects (requiring various specialists) and project-based funding. Over the years CASE’s network of researchers and experts has hugely expanded and has become truly global in its character. In 2009 it became formally structured by introducing the position of a (nonresident) CASE fellow responsible for initiating, carrying out, and supervising projects in various thematic areas. Currently CASE has twenty-eight fellows, while over a hundred other experts are involved on a project-by-project basis. CASE experts are based across the world, particularly in Europe, North America, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and North Africa. CASE experts are drawn from the academic community, the nonprofit sector, private business, the former staff of the IFI, and the public sector. This broad selection, combined with the wide-ranging geographic bases of CASE experts, ensures a diverse and multitalented network of individuals who bring a wide range of expertise, experience, and contacts to their CASE activities— whether these be in research, advising, evaluation, or a combination of these.

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The CASE expert network is supported by a permanent project management and support staff of around ten people based at its Warsaw headquarters. The support staff is responsible for accounting, financial management, public relations, and project development and management, as well as the organization of conferences, seminars, and study tours and the supervision of CASE publication activities. English is the working language of CASE and its entire network. It is the language of most of its projects, publications, events, and internal and external communications. Other languages such as Russian, Polish, Ukrainian, and French play a secondary role. Since 1998, CASE has been building a network of associated organizations in other transitional countries. This network now includes these institutions, most of which focus on specific local markets but also participate in international projects together with CASE: • • • • • • •

CASE-Belarus (Warsaw, Poland) CASE-Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan) CASE Moldova (Chisinau, Moldova) CASE Georgia (Tbilisi, Georgia) CASE Ukraine (Kyiv, Ukraine) IPM-CASE Research Centre (Minsk, Belarus) Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy (Moscow, Russia), previously the Institute for the Economy in Transition • CASE Advisors Ltd. (Warsaw, Poland) The third element of networking involves external alliances with other think tanks as well as European and global consultancies. CASE belongs to the European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes, European Forecasting Research Association for the Macro-Economy, the EuroMediterranean Forum of Economic Science Institutes, and the Policy Association for an Open Society, among others. It is also an observer at the Association of Russian Economic Think Tanks. Global Communication and Outreach CASE tries to make most of its intellectual output accessible to the broader public, a policy that is the best way for academic and intellectual marketing of CASE’s activity. Some exceptions (fortunately not numerous) relate to situations when client or project donors impose restrictions.

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In the over twenty years of CASE’s existence, its dissemination activities have undergone radical changes following the evolution of CASE’s thematic agenda, its organizational and geographic expansion, and the information revolution. At the beginning of the 1990s dissemination consisted of printed publications and contacts with the media in Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and other countries where CASE’s projects were conducted. There was no website, no teleconference facilities, and no social networks, and e-mail systems had only begun. Twenty years later CASE relies mostly on its own electronic communication channels and the use of global communication networks. Three international CASE publication series (CASE Network Studies and Analyses [the oldest one], CASE Network Reports, and CASE Network E-Briefs) are produced exclusively in electronic form and are available either directly from the CASE website (www.case-research.eu) or through various global dissemination networks (such as the Social Science Research Network, Research Papers in Economics, and Europe’s World). CASE has accounts on Facebook and LinkedIn. The CASE network group on LinkedIn (with over five hundred participants from all over the world) serves as a highly professional discussion forum on CASE’s publications and other key economic policy issues. The photo gallery on Flickr presents pictures from various CASE events, while the CASE video channel on Vimeo contains presentations from CASE conferences and seminars. CASE also organizes CASE policy research seminars, which are available online in real time. Every two years CASE organizes its large international conferences (the last one was held on November 18–19, 2011, and its topic was ‘‘Strategy 2020: Exploring the Future of European Integration’’). The Policy Impact of CASE Activities The two main avenues of CASE activities, policy research and policy advising, differ in the way that they affect practical policies. The first and dominant activity, research, offers the possibility of only an indirect impact, through the dissemination of outputs (publications, seminars, conferences, contacts with media, etc.), by attempting to influence the broad professional debate. In practice, policymakers draw practical conclusions from such debates selectively and after some delay. The second avenue, advising, gives the opportunity of a more direct impact, but its form and scale are determined by the agenda and modus

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operandi of concrete policy advising or a technical assistance project. Furthermore, as most governments in developing and transitional countries do not have their own resources to pay for expertise, it is necessary to obtain a separate funder. Project donors usually have their own preferences in respect to a project’s thematic agenda, achievements, and forms of dissemination, which may complicate relations between assistance providers and project beneficiaries. In most instances CASE is not the sole player but works in partnership with other organizations and institutions, sometimes as a part of a larger consortium. This is a consequence of project size and donor preferences, especially in the case of large EU-funded research and technical assistance projects. It is also, however, a consequence of CASE’s reflection and acknowledgment of its own limited resources and capacities. Generally, most CASE projects have focused on influencing the policymaking process in the medium-to-long term (i.e., in its initial, conceptual stage) and contributing to capacity building in the public administration and nongovernmental sectors rather than promoting any single policy decision, action, or piece of legislation in the short term. Such a practice has been consistent with the nonpartisan character of CASE and its nonengagement in policy advocacy or lobbying. The thematic agenda of CASE projects and their audience have undergone radical changes over the last two decades following changes in policy needs (including the consequences of globalization and European integration processes), new sources of financing, geographic expansion of CASE activities, and the building of its new expert capacities. Until the mid-2000s, CASE projects concentrated on strategies of postcommunist transitions in central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. CASE experts coauthored general blueprints of economic reforms in countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia and actively assisted in their implementation. Smaller-scale operations have been usually limited to one or two thematic topics, very often focusing on capacity building and analytical support rather than on grand strategy. The center conducted these smaller-scale operations in Belarus, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and several other countries. Although measuring the concrete policy impact of such activities is almost impossible, especially in the short term, one can say that CASE’s expertise and policy support eventually contributed to more coherent and

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efficient market-oriented reforms in several postcommunist countries. In particular, CASE activities helped to overcome widespread ignorance in respect to macroeconomic stabilization policies in the early 1990s, policies that produced populist decisions and resulted in high inflation or hyperinflation in many transitional economies. The center also facilitated public debate on fiscal policy challenges and reforms of the social safety net, which extended to pension systems, privatization strategies, and corporate governance. CASE experts consequently advocated liberalization of domestic markets (especially price liberalization) and external openness. CASE projects contributed to training market-oriented economists in both the governmental and nongovernmental sectors. CASE researchers also participated in the international debate on the effectiveness of various transition strategies (including the well-known controversy on shock therapy vs. gradualism) and conducted several cross-country comparative analyses related to this and other issues. Assistance in transitional processes and policy reforms in individual countries continued in the second half of the 2000s and early 2010s, with, however, greater focus on specific fields (macroeconomic analyses and forecasts; public finance management; aid programming; trade and competition policies; social assistance; the financial sector; public administration reform in countries such as Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine; capacity building; and training) rather than designing ‘‘grand’’ strategies. This reflected the maturing of the postcommunist transition, changing policy needs, changing priorities, and the changing modus operandi of international technical assistance. Since the beginning of the new millennium, CASE activities expanded toward new geographic and thematic frontiers, which has brought new opportunities to influence economic and social policies. In the early 2000s CASE became involved in several research, aid programming, and aid evaluation projects and high-level policy consultations, which helped international organizations (mostly the UN Development Program, the World Bank, and the IMF) assess their assistance strategies to transitional countries and elaborate new regional and country-specific programs. In the same period CASE expanded its activity to the Middle East and North Africa region. Technical assistance projects have focused on strategic policy advice, regional integration, capacity building, aid programming, and evaluation in countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Morocco, Iraq, Syria,

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and Djibouti. More recently, CASE conducted a series of regional policy studies requested by the European Commission, which related to EuroMediterranean trade relations and, more generally, the southern dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy, as well as macroeconomic policies of Mediterranean countries. These studies provided an analytical basis for upgrading the EU’s economic relations with southern Mediterranean countries. Since 2010 CASE has been part of a pan-European consortium that conducts the EU Framework Program-7 research project on ‘‘Prospective Analysis for the Mediterranean Region MEDPRO’’ (completed in 2013) with responsibility for economic policy, trade and investment, migration, and part of energy policy analyses. This project, implemented during the revolutionary changes in the Arab world, has a great potential to affect both national policies in individual countries and EU policy toward this region. CASE has also significantly contributed to developing the eastern dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy, including an economic agenda of the EU Eastern Partnership initiative (launched in 2009) and a new generation of association agreements and free-trade agreements between the EU and countries of the former Soviet Union (now being negotiated). It started from the EU Framework Program-6 research project on the ‘‘EU Eastern Neighborhood: Economic Potential and Future Development’’ carried out in 2006–2009 and was followed by a number of moreapplied policy studies commissioned by the European Commission and other donors (like UNICEF). These studies analyzed EU trade and economic relations with Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia; the energy sectors in countries of the former Soviet Union; public finance management; social policies; and other topics. Since the second half of the 2000s CASE has been increasingly involved in conducting other kinds of applied policy analyses commissioned by the European Commission and the European Parliament, for example on the evaluation of EU macrofinancial assistance to transitional and developing countries, tax policy, regional and cohesion policy, support to small and medium-size enterprises, education, and EU external trade relations (beyond the countries in the European Neighborhood Policy). Very recently CASE researchers have become engaged in the debate on the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis, as documented by numerous CASE publications, seminars, and conferences on this topic.

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What Others Can Learn from CASE’s Experience Each think tank has its own business model and operates in its own unique environment, which is determined by its mission, legal status, history and accumulated experience, geographic location, human capital, leaders’ ambitions, funding opportunities, and so on. Thus, drawing lessons from others’ experience is always risky and requires a very careful approach. Nevertheless some lessons from CASE’s experience can be useful for other think tanks. The most important one concerns flexibility and mobility. We live in a rapidly changing world and even highly successful business models are not sustainable in the long term. In the two decades of its existence, CASE had to change its thematic agenda, organizational structure, and business model several times following changes in market conditions. Early diagnosis of forthcoming changes and the ability to draw accurate conclusions is the key to timely and successful adjustment. For a think tank that relies exclusively on project financing (like CASE), this is a matter of survival. Organizations that enjoy stable institutional funding operate in a more comfortable environment, but this can make them inert and less flexible in response to forthcoming changes. Another lesson relates to the challenges and the opportunities of the globalization process. In this respect CASE has managed to seize the opportunities provided by the global research market (new funding sources, global pool of experts) and the information revolution (working across borders with experts residing on all continents, global dissemination and outreach) while minimizing risks such as increasing competition and the danger of becoming marginalized in a peripheral location. However, this required genuine internationalization of thematic agenda, staff and institutional culture, and communication and dissemination channels, in addition to overcoming the limited intellectual perspective of a single country or region. The search for quality, building a strong professional reputation, and an independent status are another key to success and indeed a condition of survival. This point may seem obvious, but these characteristics can be difficult to achieve in practice, especially when a think tank faces a shortage of funding. Some clear internal rules and procedures can help in achieving a strong reputation and independent status. It starts from careful selection of project opportunities and donors and rejection of those that involve

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reputational risk. More generally, multiplicity of funding sources contributes to financial sustainability and an organization’s independence. The recruiting of staff and experts should be based on purely professional criteria and follow open and transparent procedures. Internal quality control is a must. Each think tank must be aware of its strong and weak points. Attempts to provide expertise on each policy topic and comment publicly on all events will not be considered credible. ‘‘Cozy’’ relations with politics, business, organized groups of special interests, and popular media may also be damaging for a think tank’s reputation.

Chapter 12

Korea Development Institute (KDI): Korean Service Sector Advancement Oh-Seok Hyun

In March 1971, the Korea Development Institute (KDI) was established as a government-funded research center under a strong commitment by then President Park Chung Hee. Its aim was to develop and propose plans for Korea’s economic and social progress, hence contributing to the prosperity of the national economy. As the first Korean research institute in the social sciences, KID actively used experts in each area, thus contributing to the development of the nation’s Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development. KDI then took part directly and indirectly in the development of economic policies. By proposing leading alternatives to existing national agendas, the institute actively responded to economic changes at home and abroad, explored new growth engines for Korea’s sustainable future, and worked toward establishing a long-term vision for the nation. KDI is home to a large number of the most prominent research fellows from various fields, including those dealing with the macroeconomy, finance, public finance, social security, labor, industry, trade, development, law and economy, the North Korean economy, and a vision for the future. KDI’s core objective is to propose policy alternatives based on reasonable discussions through in-depth and unbiased studies. As a result, KDI is recognized as a world-class research institute, and even a role model for developing nations that are trying to establish a similar institute.

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In its early period, KDI focused on research directly related to economic development that could also serve as a basis for the development of economic policy, such as analysis of the current status of social security programs or policy suggestions. In particular, by conducting leading research on social security ideas such as health insurance, industrial accident insurance, and employment insurance, KDI significantly contributed to preparing a road map for Korea’s social growth. Between the late 1970s and early 1980s, KDI research made invaluable contributions to the shift of the nation’s economic focus from growth to stability. In the 1980s, KDI’s research played a significant role in the adoption of import liberalization policies, competition policies, and social welfare policies such as the national pension program and the real-name financial transaction system. During this time, KDI also launched studies on the true status of the North Korean economy, including the outlook for interKorean economic cooperation, which contributed to developing policies for high-ranking official meetings between the two Koreas after the interKorean economic talks, and hence laid the cornerstone for the beginning of inter-Korean economic cooperation. In the 1990s, while navigating through increasing globalization, KDI explored agendas for financial reform that included openness and liberalization. It sought solutions to the problems of the financial industry and alternatives for its progress and published a comprehensive report on financial reform. In addition, after the foreign exchange crisis in 1997 and based on its abundant experience studying pending economic issues and developing a long-term economic development plan, KDI released the Plan for Overcoming the Crisis and Restructuring the Economy, which proposed the basic framework for reforming four main sectors, key agendas for restructuring and action plans. Since the 2000s, KDI has explored subjects concerning sustainable growth and balanced development, while also deepening its studies of economic system reform and market structure improvement, which are essential for the Korean society to consolidate its status as a global leader. In the twenty-first century, an era of globalization and information technology, KDI has proposed medium- and long-term policy measures for sustainable growth, conducted studies on economic system reform and market structure improvement for economic advancement, and sought measures to enhance the productivity of public finance. With all these efforts to pursue a balance between growth and distribution, KDI has been strengthened by

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joint studies with international organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, and OECD as well as domestic research institutes in order to improve the effectiveness of policies on pending issues including education, housing, and free-trade agreements. In particular, by sharing Korea’s development experience with partner nations, KDI has played a significant role in upgrading Korea’s status as a leading member of the global economic system.

The Advancement of Korea’s Service Industry and KDI KDI has played a significant role in continued policy efforts for the advancement of Korea’s service sector since the 2000s through in-depth analysis, policy recommendations, and sometimes participation in external conferences. The general understanding of the service industry as ancillary to the manufacturing industry changed considerably with the emergence of information technology as an independent industry in the 1980s, which coincided with a rapid growth period. The advent of information technology, which itself is an indispensable part of the service sector, also led to its function as an infrastructure for other industries, and turned out to have tremendous impact on industrial sectors afterward. After the mid-1990s, when the economic growth rate showed a clear sign of slowdown and the manufacturing sector reached its limits in job creation, the service sector increasingly became important as a new growth engine and source of employment. The foreign exchange crisis between 1997 and 1998 and resulting structural changes in the Korean economy raised awareness of the importance of the service sector. However, even right after the foreign exchange crisis when the service sector was considered a new growth engine and source for employment generation, its advancement did not attract much attention. Rather, areas such as finance were met with great interest. The main policy focus at the time was on enhancing the capacity for innovation and productivity of the manufacturing industry and creating a pro-cyclical structure, which in turn served to facilitate the progress of the service sector. This naturally led to growing awareness of the need for fostering knowledge-based services as a main catalyst to building the pro-cyclical structure. To put it another way, in the early period, there were no established comprehensive policies or

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measures covering the entire service sector. This eventually changed and the service sector began to attract major policy attention. Such policy attention can be seen as positive in the sense that it reflected a view of the knowledge-based service sector as a growth industry. However, only a few aggressive policies were implemented in small-sized and vulnerable business sectors, such as wholesale, retail, trade, food, and the hotel and restaurant industry, which played a main role in absorbing laidoff workers from manufacturing. The general lack of such measures further aggravated the structural weakness of Korea’s service sector. Meanwhile, after the 2000s ‘‘creative services’’ such as the culture industry, including films, music, and games, emerged as a major player in the service sector and thereby attracted systematic policy attention. This attention led to fullfledged discussions on the progress of the service sector itself and its convergence with manufacturing by the growing demand for information technology and its application, along with a new tendency to regard the service sector as a new growth engine. Furthermore, as the openness of service sector became a pending issue, the demand for stronger competitiveness of service sector rose rapidly.

A Brief History and the Appropriateness of Advancement of Korea’s Service Industry Beginning in the 2000s, the service sector was increasingly recognized as an industry and began drawing increased attention in terms of its policy importance. Previous studies carried out on the Korean service sector sporadically in the 2000s were lacking in methodology and focus. KDI started to carry out studies on the service sector in the 2000s and had conducted approximately 50 projects in various forms by 2011. With this recognition of the service sector’s potential to further the economic growth of Korea, the government pushed ahead a goal to turn Korea into Asia’s financial and logistic hub, an effort to enhance its growth potential and to stress employment as a way to solve income polarization and increase the middle class. To this end, KDI conducted intensive studies on the three pillars of service industry policies: (1) the knowledge service sector including finance, health care, law, and consulting, which promotes growth and is directly

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related to the increase in the productivity of manufacturing, (2) the distribution service sector, which employs many, especially lower- and middleclass people, and (3) the cultural, tourism, and leisure services sector, which could help accomplish significant agendas, two of which were to use the service sector to narrow the economic polarization prevalent in Korea and to foster economic growth through objective analysis. The Korean government made efforts to strengthen the competitiveness of the service sector and maximize its generation of employment with theoretical and analytic support from government-funded research institutes, including KDI. Korea’s service industry had various chronic problems. In particular, resolving polarization through providing high-quality jobs was the most significant reason to stimulate the service industry, but there was a dilemma, as sectors with high potential for providing high-quality jobs had severe entry barriers due to mandatory requirements such as a license, while sectors with many job possibilities were mostly composed of small businesses and self-employed individuals, which only served to absorb laid-off workers from manufacturing. In order to stimulate the growth engine, the economy needed an effective policy to strengthen the competitiveness of small sectors. However, such policies ran the risk of being counterproductive because more resources had to be allocated to unproductive sectors, which would eventually trigger unemployment. Indeed, there was a risk of creating a vicious cycle of service sector expansion with low productivity. This in turn could lead to the erosion of the overall mid-term and longterm growth of the Korean economy, thus weakening the basis for the creation of an advanced workforce (Korea Development Institute 2005). To enhance the competitiveness of the service sector, it was crucial to ease frictions among policymakers and organized stakeholders. However, conflicts continued, particularly in the sector for key knowledge-based service areas, such as education and medical and professional businesses. There were great concerns that measures gathered respectively by each competent authority without sufficient review of their effect on competitiveness or medium- and long-term growth in each sector could eventually end up repeating each other and disregarded. Relevant laws and regulations targeting different sectors and business types were complex and intertwined, and competent authorities handled each area independently according to the respective laws, without coordinating with other ministries. This meant a lack of fundamental legal infrastructures required to foster and support service sectors systematically.

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Such a problem could not be resolved overnight, but solving this issue was nevertheless important in order to enhance policy effectiveness. KDI studies pointed out this problem and continuously suggested improvement measures. One noteworthy characteristic around the time when studies on the service industry first appeared was that direct and indirect study exchanges existed with the OECD. The organization had already recognized the importance of the service sector by the 1990s and suggested measures that could increase productivity in it. As a part of this emphasis, the organization attempted to enhance competition by eliminating regulations and systems discriminating against service businesses in favor of manufacturing ones and by encouraging capital, labor, and goods to move much more freely. Such efforts were in large part consistent with the philosophy of KDI fellows of the time, who tried to fix pending problems fundamentally by correcting market distortion. Although fellows at the OECD did not directly participate in KDI studies as authors, they took part in KDI’s international conferences and provided support for its efforts in regard to regulation and reform of the service industry aimed at increasing productivity. What KDI fellows emphasized was that improving the productivity of the service sector was essential to its progress. Through in-depth analysis, KDI studies emphasized that the low productivity of Korea’s service sector was partly attributable to the lack of timely responses to the industrial restructuring process during the 1990s and also explained that such a lack resulted in Korea’s economic slowdown. This was later acknowledged as the most perceptive explanation of the low productivity of the service sector. In particular, as labor-intensive sectors suffered the loss of competitiveness in the early 1990s and their laid-off workers moved to the service sector, employment in service sector increased sharply. However, despite such a rapid rise, the policy direction at that time was limited to only enhancing technical skills and increasing the exports of the manufacturing sector, with much less attention paid to the policy direction of increasing the productivity of the service sector, according to KDI. By stressing this element, KDI’s study gained the government’s attention and led it to focus more on increasing the productivity of the service sector. KDI considered the low productivity of the service sector attributable to structural factors. The proportion of services with high productivity was small, for example, whereas that of the distribution services with low productivity was high. It was impossible for the workforce laid off from

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labor-intensive manufacturing to be directly hired by service businesses without extra training or policy development. Most of these workers were headed into relatively labor-intensive service sectors such as distribution, wholesale and retail trade, and the hotel and restaurant industry. These conditions foreseen in KDI’s analyses; the institute pointed out that transferring the workforce laid off from labor-intensive manufacturing to laborintensive service industries would cause serious problems. Despite the fact that the proportion of value-added services was on the rise, it was still lower than that of advanced countries. Also, the growth rate of the value added by services slowed down after the foreign exchange crisis. So KDI projected that without further aggressive efforts and policy responses, Korea would end up going through grave difficulties in resolving structural low-productivity problems. KDI also emphasized that the social service sector needed to adopt the market principles of the general private sector. Employment in social services was on the rise, but regulations severely constrained medical and social welfare services, and social services themselves faced weak competition since they were driven by the public sector, hence the decline in this sector’s productivity. It is an unwritten law that maximizing efficiency must be sought even when intervention by the public sector is inevitable. To that end, the best way is to introduce a system that is the closest to market principles. There was reluctance to introduce market principles to certain sectors, but KDI boldly noted the necessity of doing so, which was not only consistent with the fundamental philosophy of KDI studies but also served as a catalyst to encourage subsequent studies that attempted to promote efforts to adopt market principles in other areas, such as medical and educational services.

Advancement of the Service Industry and KDI’s Role Limitations of the Advancement of the Existing Service Industry Beginning in 2008, the new administration, which had pursued increases in growth potential through stimulating market functions and increasing the business-friendly environment, recognized that the service sector, despite constituting a large proportion of the entire economy, had very low productivity compared to advanced economies, and therefore

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attempted to develop and implement more active and forward-looking policies in the service sector. Influenced by the government’s strong commitment to promoting the service sector, KDI carried out intensive studies and analysis on related policies. During this period, in particular, KDI maintained a close cooperative relationship with the government in the process of developing and establishing policies. This resulted in KDI playing a leading role in the service industry by hosting conferences and conducting studies. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the policies implemented by the government in the service industry also started being questioned in 2008. The policies failed to not only properly reflect the needs of and voices from the industry but also had negative socioeconomic impacts. To enhance effectiveness, it was necessary to identify difficulties in the fields accurately, conduct an analysis of the cost-effectiveness policy implementation, and develop advancement policy that considers all possible measures for implementation. In other words, there was a need for full-scale cooperation among the private sector, research institutes, and the government in order to improve the industrial environment. The Task Force on Service Sector Advancement The new administration initiated its commitment to pursuing the advancement of the service industry in collaboration with KDI’s research capacity in a systematic and organized manner. One example of this collaboration was the operation of the Task Force on Service Sector Advancement from 2008 to 2009. Starting in 2008, the government initiated more aggressive and forward-looking efforts to drive the service industry, and accordingly KDI conducted more intensive policy-related studies and analysis. The public hearings and international conferences KDI hosted demonstrated the institute’s research capacity and the network it had accumulated for the previous four to five years, and as a result, relevant studies and activities were fully utilized. The Task Force on Service Sector Advancement, comprising members from the government led by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, scholars from academia and research institutes, and field experts, has consistently studied and discussed ten main areas and developed a policy to overcome the difficulties caused by the lack of intergovernmental cooperation. In fact the lack of intergovernmental cooperation has been one of the main

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barriers to the implementation of advancement policies for the service sector despite the clear need for a better, stronger policy that can overcome systematic resistance from the privileged and actively reflect voices from the disciplines. The vice minister of strategy and finance and the KDI president jointly chaired the steering committee, which was a public-private joint committee on service sector advancement, with Dr. MoonJoong Tcha, senior fellow at KDI, and General Director Bonjin Koo of the General Policy Coordination Division of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance as joint project managers in charge of the studies and the actual policies produced. KDI fellows mostly from the Department of Industrial and Corporate Affairs and Department of Public Economics and Social Development (Drs. Gyeongjoon Yoo, Heesuk Yun, Suil Lee, Yangsoo Jin, Jaehoon Kim, Siwook Lee, Duol Kim, Ki-Wan Kim, and Kyoung-Soo Yoon), along with directors of relevant government divisions, served as project submanagers for ten working groups.1 Forming this task force was actually not the first effort made by the new administration to advance the service sector. The government since its early stages had the policy goal of expanding the growth engine through advancing the service sector and continuously released policies to accomplish this goal. With the release of two policy series in 2008 and one in early 2009, the participation by private sector and research institutes had increased considerably. Each working group held one meeting a week for ten weeks on average and discussed various suggestions for the advancement of the service industry. The public-private joint committee received five report briefings from the working groups, then reviewed them and suggested directions for future works. The task force went through rocky phases involving conflicting opinions among the representatives of government, research institutes, and the private sector and even between those from different ministries. Often, there was a sharp conflict of opinions between the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. Recommendations suggested by the committee often encountered passive, noncommittal responses from ministries due to internal objections. Sometimes, as well, a ministry objected to general opinions produced by a working group, refusing to participate in the working group or adopt policy recommendations. Facing such hardships, KDI promoted understanding among the different parties by initiating and leading relevant studies, and coordinating different opinions from the government and experts from the private sectors to drive consensus toward drafting the policies.

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In the end, with the exclusion of the working group on advertisement, which failed to adopt improvement measures, the nine remaining specific working groups and one general working group presented policy improvement measures based on shared consensus among representatives from the private sector, research institutes, and the government. These were published in a research document under the title Policy Direction Reports on Service Progress, and simultaneously announced as the ‘‘Fourth Policy Agenda for Service Sector Advancement.’ ’’ Compared to the preceding three policy series by the new administration, the fourth measure carries comprehensive measures on more extensive areas with considerable efforts to deal with pending issues such as by establishing committees on service sector advancement in collaboration with the private sector and thereby gathering opinions from various interests from each social group. New policy measures mostly focused on strengthening the competitiveness of the service sector by rationalizing regulations in nine promising service areas such as education and health care, thus encouraging competition and reducing discriminative treatment. Unlike other policy measures on service sector advancement, the new measures were close to a coordinated policy package covering broad areas and various policies and also strongly focusing on institutional improvement. Regarding the knowledgeintensive areas such as information technology, design, and consulting, the committee conducted intensive discussions on how to foster skilled human resources. Achievements of the Task Force on Service Sector Advancement It is difficult to describe all extensive study outcomes here, but some noteworthy recommendations can be summarized. Most of these recommendations were implemented as real policies. Above all, the discrimination between service and manufacturing sectors was corrected.2 Such discriminative treatments of small and medium-sized service businesses, compared to corresponding manufacturing businesses, have repeatedly been pointed out in the past, and these have been improved through several succeeding government policies. The fourth agenda significantly reduced the criteria for qualifying as small and medium-sized enterprises in the service sector so that 805 service businesses were newly incorporated into that category, subject to tax benefits and financial support. The former

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include special tax exemptions, tax credits for investment, and tax exemption for start-ups, and the latter includes supporting research and development businesses. Additionally, the government made efforts to reduce difficulties in fund-raising by expanding the range of guarantees in the service sector. In the past, for example, only films could be covered by cultural-product export insurance, but the coverage was expanded to overall cultural products such as television dramas, online games, and theater performances. Loans for companies exporting knowledge services and cultural contents were expanded as well. The new policies strengthened institutional enforcement measures as well as institutional reforms further, one significant example being copyrights. Korean laws on copyright protection are not weak, but they have lacked effective enforcement measures. So in accordance with the fourth agenda, a task force was launched in collaboration with the ministry, government prosecutors, and the police to handle issues related to the protection of content copyright. The task force discussed targets and measures to investigate suppliers of illegal copyrights and also strengthened the policy on copyright infringement. It then opened the online website (www.copy112.or.kr) where the public can report copyright violations. The fourth agenda includes fostering human resources in information technology by supporting the launch of the customized degree. This degree, contracted under an industry-academy partnership, guarantees students a job upon completion of their course. To that end, a total of 145 students from seven universities as of July 2009 were selected and given support. In order to create a fair environment for content creation and distribution, a standard supply contract for five major digital content areas was publicly released in December 2009, which stipulated the content provider as the holder of rights. The new policies also led to development of regulations prohibiting unfair contracts by service providers. The reforms appropriately developed standard supply contracts by category for music, visual work, e-learning, and mobile phones based on the variety of digital content. As for the information technology service sector, the government adopted a system that splits purchasing of software products in order to enhance the profit of small and medium-sized software companies and improve the quality of software businesses (Article 84 of the Enforcement Decree on the State Contract Act, October 2007).3 Activating the system required revising of relevant regulations to make multiple software

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purchases mandatory, which provides competent small and medium-sized software companies with more opportunities to win a contract, unlike in the past when large system-integration companies could choose how to select software products, including from a single source. The design sector attracted considerable policy attention. This is because it is closely related to manufacturing and has been recognized as an area that could significantly improve the value added to goods. For this sector too, the most significant policy agenda for its industrial development was to foster the quality of human resources. A contract agreement on degrees between the industry (mostly small and medium-sized enterprises) and the universities running a curriculum on design has received support since 2007, and new policy measures were added to enhance the selection of competent next-generation design leaders and support for their participation in overseas exhibitions and workshops so that they could become world-class designers. Fostering human resources was a significant policy agenda in consulting services as well. After universities in the capital area such as Sogang and Hansung opened graduate programs intended to educate consulting professionals, three more universities in provinces followed suit and established graduate programs. In addition, the government prepared measures to turn the Knowledge Sharing Program into an export product by using human resources such as retired experts. This project was designed to share with recipient countries Korea’s know-how earned from its economic development experience involving public services. This has not only laid the foundation for the project to be exported to foreign markets but also was expected to strengthen cooperative relationships with developing countries. As for distribution services, the government conducted third-party logistics consulting and provided the world’s first logistics cost calculation program for free to eight hundred companies in the private sector, which helped significantly reduce logistics costs, enhance the competitiveness of the logistics sector, and improve the price competitiveness of goods.

Implications of Tasks for Advancement of the Service Industry KDI’s precise and scientific arguments did not always gain support or work out. In particular, the attempt to increase service sector productivity and

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high-quality jobs did not inevitably lead to regulatory reform, openness, and competition enhancement. For this reason, as these efforts were reinforced further, it became increasingly likely that the service sector advancement would not be achieved because of strong resistance from those enjoying rent-seeking positions under conditions of noncompetition and inefficiency. For instance, consumer-oriented policies such as the sale of nonprescription drugs at general retail stores have still not been implemented amid pressure from lobbies and because of political dynamics, and many of the relevant measures have not been actualized so far. KDI intends to continue to strongly pursue the reform endeavors and help improve the service sector. It should be noted that the fourth agenda developed by KDI was made possible thanks to the participation of members from relevant ministries, private sector entrepreneurs, and other researchers. It is also true that based on these study results, various policy actions were implemented so as to strengthen the competitiveness of the service sector. However, as mentioned earlier, there were some difficulties and failures due to conflicting opinions within the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, for example, and competent authorities presenting conflicting opinions on health care and education, and even researchers at private institutes could not agree on a balance between commercial viability and public goods. This suggests that there is an inherent weakness in the current institutionalized foundation for service sector advancement. It also demonstrates that a framework to effectively coordinate conflicting opinions among ministries is lacking. This also confirms that the consensus on public goods and commercial viability was not firm enough at that time so that it was difficult to resolve conflicts between the privileged protected by regulations and others pursuing reforms. On the other hand, the irony is that such rocky processes had made many participating researchers with high expectations for advancement clearly realize that effectively implementing intergovernmental and reform measures, such as this one, requires a strong guiding force or legal foundation. Witnessing stiff resistance to reforms from various ministries, organizations, and the private sector, participants started in-depth discussions on the function of a leading authority that could take charge of legal systemization such as the Framework Act on Service Industry and then pushed ahead initiatives for advancing this systematization. Subsequently, there has been official agreement on the need to establish a center for service research that

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could continuously study the competitiveness and productivity of the service sector and explore ways for its advancement.

Epilogue Even after the termination of the Task Force on Service Sector Advancement, KDI has continued its efforts. Fortunately for Korea’s service industry, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance had a policy stance consistent with the belief of KDI, which was to enhance productivity based on competition by introducing market principles to the service industry and also to transform the service market away from being provider oriented to being consumer oriented. After the task force jointly led by KDI and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance was terminated in 2009 and the policy paper was published, KDI conducted a study on professional license systems, soon followed by two additional studies upon the request of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, ‘‘Exploring New Macroeconomic Policy Direction in Response to the Shift to Service Economy’’ and ‘‘Agenda for Medium-and Long-term Advancement of the Service Industry.’’ In 2010, fourteen experts from KDI and from the outside conducted another large-scale research project, ‘‘Restructuring the Korean Economy in the Postcrisis Era: Modernization of Service Industry.’’ This study is based on the recognition that in the global economic recovery, it was important to conduct preemptive studies on each economic sector in order for Korea to take another leap forward or sustain its pace of growth. As a part of such efforts, in 2011, KDI launched another study, ‘‘Overseas Expansion of the Service Industry and Increase in Overseas Employment Opportunities.’’ The results of KDI’s studies of the service sector were not intended for onetime or temporary public attention, but rather as a series of preparations to develop a new paradigm for the robust and sustainable growth of the Korean economy. Each study was designed to serve as an initiation of subsequent studies. Above all, KDI studies, throughout their entire series, have sustained consistency in their focus: productivity improvement based on competition under properly adopted market principles and high-quality job generation through improved productivity. These KDI studies, through the institute’s rigorous review procedures such as peer review and the

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referee system, were refined to have more precise and scientific contents; they have been able to play a practical role and make more policy contributions through collaborative efforts with authorities in the field. Furthermore, as a government-funded research institute with a mission to substantially contribute to establishing and managing Korea’s economic policies, KDI has continued to study the service industry in broad collaboration with other research institutes, universities, and international organization, where appropriate. Studies presented in this chapter do not, of course, cover all KDI studies on the service sector. There are many other valuable and meaningful studies other than those discussed here. KDI has hosted ten international conferences since 2008 to exchange opinions and insights with prominent scholars and experts from advanced economies, and to discuss policy implications. By hosting a number of domestic and international conferences in a consistent manner, KDI seeks to jump-start the commitment to reform and consolidate improvements whenever interest in advancement of the service industry wanes and the process for reform turns rocky. Taking this into account, the relevant ministries have greatly supported KDI in hosting such conferences. The Korean economy continues to evolve and there is no end to the advancement of the service sector. This suggests that KDI’s studies on service sector advancement should be continued consistently and systematically. Above all, considering that reforming the system faces organized resistance from the privileged and that the possibility remains that many measures could end up as failures, further studies should be planned and conducted in more precise, thorough, and tenacious ways. To that end, it is, of course, necessary for experts in this area to continuously further their research capacity and to build a broad and intensive network at home and abroad.

Notes 1. The ten working groups are on education, health care, distribution, broadcasting and communications, contents, advertisement, design, consulting, information technology service, and employment support. In addition there is one general working group. 2. Examples of such discrimination include the government defining small and medium-sized enterprises differently for the manufacturing and service sectors,

246 Economic Reform and Economic Coordination providing more benefits to the former, and differentiating the approximate valueadded ratio to enable the manufacturing sector to pay less value-added tax than the service sector. 3. Software products subject to this decree are any worth more than US$50 million in a project with a total project cost of more than US$1 billion.

PART V

Agriculture and Land Development

In the era of globalization and information technology, agriculture and sustainable land development remain essential for our survival and overall socioeconomic development. The countries represented in the chapters in this part, Ethiopia, China, and Mexico, diverge greatly in their level of development, history, socioeconomic fabric, and issues they face. At the same time they share some of the problems faced by many developing countries, such as an overreliance on agriculture, unequal land distribution, and inadequate land use that may lead to degradation and in some cases even to desertification. These problems are often compounded by wars and conflicts that may cause a resource crisis or by structural obstacles often embedded in the political culture. Furthermore, while striving to achieve economic growth, developing countries often fail to adhere to sustainable principles because of a lack of knowledge, technological resources, or political will. All of these issues are illustrated in the following chapters.

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Chapter 13

Fundar and Subsidios al Campo: Farm Subsidy Policy in Mexico Miguel Pulido and Francisco Cravioto

Fundar’s Subsidios al Campo project makes extensive use of the Federal Transparency and Access to Government Public Information Law to provide evidence about how federal monies allotted to farm subsidies are distributed among rural producers. This chapter draws most of its information from the report published by Fundar’s main researcher involved in the Subsidios al Campo project, Ana Joaquina Ruiz Guerra, as well as Guillermo M. Cejudo’s account of this experience. Among the project’s findings, the concentration of these subsidies among the country’s biggest rural producers stands out prominently. This finding raises important concerns, since poverty affects a large percentage of Mexico’s rural population. These conclusions were widely disseminated by the national press, generating a public scandal for the Ministry of Agriculture. The government answered criticism by claiming that poverty reduction is not a goal of the farm subsidy programs. Nevertheless, public pressure has forced the federal government to revise its beneficiary lists and program regulations. The Farm Subsidies project’s impact on public policy, however, remains limited. Because of the absence of effective legal and institutional accountability mechanisms in Mexico, the resistance of powerful interest groups, and government inertia, the government has not undertaken any serious measures to redistribute these monies more equally. The Subsidios al Campo coalition’s success, from a public policy perspective, should be measured in regard to redefinition of a public policy problem.1 The coalition continues

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to pressure the current administration (as it will subsequent ones) to advocate for the formulation of a progressive farm subsidy policy.

Farm Subsidies in Mexico Farm subsidies policies were profoundly revised and modified as a result of Mexico’s trade liberalization process in the early 1990s. In 1994 the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect. The liberalization of trade in rural goods was set to be accomplished in stages (with partial trade liberalization by January 1, 2003, and full liberalization by January 1, 2008), to allow producers of basic agricultural goods to become competitive within this interval. Before this treaty went into effect the Mexican government decided to do without policies such as broad access to credit for productive inputs, guaranteed prices, expenditures in surplus produce, rural infrastructure, and trade protectionism on foodstuffs, among other existing policies meant to support farmers. However, to avoid leaving Mexican farmers unprotected from their northern competitors, the government established a set of direct cash transfer programs. The programs’ purpose was to compensate local farmers to compete with the agricultural subsidies dispensed by the governments of Mexico’s trade partners in NAFTA. Trade liberalization reforms were meant to be an engine of growth and a source of prosperity for the country as a whole, and rural inhabitants in particular. However, after eighteen years of implementing this set of policies, government data shows that, in terms of poverty reduction, Mexico finds itself back at square one. AntonioYu´n˜ez and Omar Stabridis demonstrate how, after a dramatic increase in poverty due to the Peso crisis of 1994–1995, it has taken the Mexican economy more than fifteen years to stabilize to levels of poverty below what they were before NAFTA.2 Nevertheless, after the 2008 financial crisis, poverty rose back to 1992 levels. Poverty among the rural population is consistently higher than that displayed by urban inhabitants. In 2008, one in three rural inhabitants was incapable of fulfilling his or her family’s food needs with available income. Almost 40 percent of rural inhabitants displayed capacity poverty and 60 percent were immersed in asset poverty. Taking this background into consideration, it is important to assess the role of farm subsidies in Mexico’s rural economy. According to Kristina

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Pirker (2010), between 2004 and 2007 the budget assigned to rural subsidies grew continually, from 120 billion pesos to 176 billion pesos (US$9,448 million to US$13,915 million at mean 2010 prices). Pirker questions how, in spite of increasing resources spent on farm subsidies, rural inequality could increase for the same period. According to the United Nations Center for Information, rural inequality in Mexico increased from a 0.46 score on the Gini Index in 1994 to 0.48 in 2010 (UNIC 2012).This finding raised doubts that constituted one of the main hypotheses formulated by the Subsidios al Campo project. Cejudo compiled a list of authors such as Scott (2010), Fox and Haight (2010), and Robles (2010) and institutions such as the World Bank (2009: ix; cited in Yu´n˜ez 2010) that reach similar conclusions about farm subsidy policy in Mexico and question the procedure by which these resources are allotted.

Fundar and the Subsidios al Campo Project Fundar is a Mexico City–based think tank of a plural, independent, horizontal, and politically nonaffiliated nature. It seeks to push for substantive democracy in Mexico through public policy monitoring and an advocacy strategy. In the pursuit of these objectives, the organization specializes in applied research, a critical and propositional approach to problems, experimentation, and the development of close links with civil society stakeholders and government officials. Its main objectives are (1) the promotion and strengthening of citizen participation in the public sphere, (2) transparency and accountability, (3) consolidation of the rule of law, (4) promotion of substantive equality, and (5) fulfillment of human rights.3 Fundar’s interest in monitoring the monies allotted by the federal budget to farm subsidies was born after an encounter with the Asociacio´n Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productores del Campo (ANEC).4 The ANEC is an organization formed by several small basic grain producing organizations. Its main objective is to promote the survival, development, strengthening, and revalorization of the peasantry through a strategy that seeks to increase this class’s bargaining power in the market and with political institutions. Other organizational objectives include the promotion of food suzerainty for the country, development of small and medium rural producers, sustainable agriculture, and free, fair, and socially responsible trade. The members of this rural producer organization suspected that the

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resources allotted by the federal government to farm subsidies were benefiting only a small and privileged group of rural producers. They asserted that the only beneficiaries from the Procampo agricultural subsidy program and fuel subsidies were the largest producers in the country, those with the highest margins of income who, theoretically, could compete in international markets and do without these federally allotted resources. On the other hand, this policy left most medium, small, and subsistence farmers to their own devices. The encounter between Fundar and ANEC in 2007 was arranged by Libby Haight, who at the time was working as a researcher for the University of California, Santa Cruz. She was familiar with both organizations’ work and found synergies between ANEC’s concern for unequal resource allocation of farm subsidies and Fundar’s expertise in the use of freedom of information legislation to procure data and produce solid evidence-based analysis with the potential to generate change in public policy. Haight and Jonathan Fox (another academic from her university) brought with them a third party, the Environmental Working Group (EWG).5 This organization had notorious success in creating an open data set on farm subsidies in the United States, and Fundar and ANEC drew much useful knowledge from its experience as well as the technical know-how to make enormous data sets of government data readily available via a website. After this coalition of organizations was established, it worked to collect all relevant information from the Secretarı´a de Agricultura Ganaderı´a, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentacio´n (Sagarpa; Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fishing and Food). Although this government department held most farm subsidies’ beneficiary lists, these were not readily available at its website. According to the researchers involved in this project, the website seemed to be designed to fulfill subsidy applicants’ needs more than transparency purposes. The information collection process required thirty information requests to the Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Informacio´n y Proteccio´n de Datos (Federal Access to Information and Data Protection Institute) and sixteen additional appeals when such requests were denied or answered with incomplete information. It is important to state that, despite resistance displayed by several government departments in complying with basic transparency standards, Mexico has boasted legislation mandating advanced access to information since 2002. This legal framework allowed the Subsidios al Campo project to obtain data that would have otherwise remained outside civil society’s reach. After a year’s

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hard work of collection, study, and systematization of the information presented, the parties involved launched the Subsidios al Campo website (www.subsidiosalcampo.org.mx) in October 2008. Initially, the Subsidios al Campo website presented detailed information on two subsidies programs, Procampo6 and Ingreso Objetivo,7 including the amounts received by each individual beneficiary and aggregate data displayed by municipalities and states. By 2010 the website incorporated four additional subsidies programs: Diesel Agropecuario, Diesel Marino, Gasolina Riberen˜a,8 and Fomento Productivo al Cafe´.9 The website’s interface facilitated comparisons that were impossible to make when information about the amounts delivered to specific beneficiaries appeared in aggregate form in Sagarpa’s database. ANEC’s suspicions about concentration of these resources among the most affluent producers were confirmed. Three features made the Subsidios al Campo website a successful endeavor: (1) the extent of the available information, (2) the ability to carry out searches by name of the beneficiary or by locality, and (3) its interface’s facilitation of geographical and temporal comparisons. After the website was launched, the Subsidios al Campo coalition was aware of the necessity of promoting the use of this tool among journalists and researchers. Without dissemination in the media of the coalition’s findings in Sagarpa’s database, changes initiated by evidence-based advocacy would never take place. To fulfill this purpose, Fundar engaged in training workshops for journalists and farmers in the use of the Subsidios al Campo website. The website has become a valuable source of information for the media, academia, civil society organizations, and, surprisingly, government officials and congressmen. Although many stakeholders have disputed the conclusions from research making use of the database, no one has disputed the veracity of the data contained therein.

Project Findings The main conclusion of the parties involved in developing the Subsidios al Campo website was the confirmation of ANEC’s suspicions. That is, the allocation of resources displayed an unusual concentration among the top income rural producers (the top 10 percent of beneficiaries received 57 percent of available resources; the top 20 percent received 73 percent of available resources) (Cejudo 2011). Additionally, other problems found

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involved delays in the delivery of monetary transfers, geographical concentration on northern states (particularly Sinaloa and Tamaulipas, which received 10.7 percent and 9 percent of available resources, respectively; Ruiz Guerra, 2011: 9), regressiveness, and lack of concrete results in poverty reduction. This first outcome of the Subsidios al Campo project allowed ANEC to back its claims with hard evidence. Jonathan Fox took the initiative to convene a group of academics and other experts in rural policy. With the support of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, this group was charged with the task of developing research using the Subsidios al Campo platform. Among the research projects published by this initiative, the analysis of the Procampo program by Mauricio Merino, professor at the Centro de Investigacio´n y Docencia Econo´mica (CIDE; Center for Economic Research and Teaching), stands out. Merino established that the main problem with Procampo lies in its simultaneous pursuit of possibly contradictory objectives: reducing rural poverty and fostering competitiveness for rural producers. In its implementation, this farm subsidy has forgone the former in pursuit of the latter. Eventually, powerful interests among rural producers captured the program, interests that received most of the monies allotted for farm subsidies (Merino 2010).

Stakeholders’ Reaction to the Publication of Subsidios al Campo’s Findings and Their Impact on Public Policy Dissemination of Research Findings The national media promptly made use of the results of the Subsidios al Campo project and the Woodrow Wilson research initiative. Mexico City’s daily El Universal led with a series of reports that made headlines for a couple of weeks in midsummer 2009. Other periodicals reproduced El Universal’s findings and became engaged with the Subsidios al Campo website to produce research of their own. What the Subsidios al Campo coalition did not expect was that the media would identify particular beneficiaries within the list in order to raise a public scandal. In the weeks following the platforms’ initial launch, headlines about government officials or suspected drug lords on the beneficiaries’ list proliferated. The case of

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Jorge Kondo Lo´pez was particularly appalling. The media found eightynine entries in the beneficiary list under Kondo Lopez’s name, at a time when he was serving as minister of agriculture for the state of Sinaloa. The message the Subsidios al Campo coalition was trying to convey about a regressive distribution of these resources was lost in the cacophony of public scandals involving individual beneficiaries. Only the Mexico City– based daily La Jornada published an article addressing this issue from a distributive perspective.10 The media’s preference to emphasize scandalous malpractices over a comprehensive analysis of the issue made it difficult to create a policy problem, in the sense that most public opinion remained uninformed about the general tendency of these policies toward regressive distribution of available monies. According to coalition members, the media’s approach tended to raise the question, among public opinion, of the validity of farm subsidy policy as a whole. The whole message about the necessity of adjusting existing policy to reduce rural inequality gained little momentum. Consequently, lack of public pressure limited efforts for change in farm subsidy policy via evidence-based advocacy.

The Government’s Reaction The federal government reacted promptly to the media’s pressure by defending the program while recognizing problems with the beneficiary lists. Secretary Alberto Cardenas of Sagarpa announced that he would lead an effort to revise the beneficiary lists and review the program’s operating rules to improve its progressivity. It’s important to note that the presentation of Subsidios al Campo findings was concurrent with negotiations on behalf of the federal government for a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank. Pressure from this international organization led to Sagarpa’s efforts to implement changes in the operating rules of farm subsidy policy and to start a depuration of the beneficiary lists. A floor of 1,300 pesos (US$93.46) was established as the minimum amount any beneficiary could receive. A ceiling to farm subsidies was also established for individual beneficiaries (independent of how many properties a single owner may hold), set at 100,000 pesos (US$7,188.80). The agency also established a single registry system collecting more data on recipients as well as establishing geo-referenced data on plots of land. This system was meant to prevent

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single recipients from receiving multiple subsidies from the federal government. After Secretary Ca´rdenas’s resignation on September 7, 2009 (in large part as a consequence of the farm subsidies scandal), Francisco Mayorga took charge of Sagarpa. The media promptly found in the Subsidios al Campo website that Mayorga was listed as a farm subsidy recipient. Nevertheless, he publicly refused to give up the subsidy allotted to his property, despite the fact that Article 6 of the new Procampo regulations explicitly forbade this sort of conflicting malpractice. The Secretarı´a de la Funcio´n Pu´blica conducted an investigation on Mayorga. To date, this investigation has led to no significant decision regarding Mayorga’s conflicting status as a public official and a subsidy recipient. This scandal led the secretary to be summoned to testify before several Senate committees. Despite this information, to date, Mayorga has suffered no significant consequences for his actions, aside from public derision. Overall, the Subsdios al Campo project did lead to changes in the way Sagarpa published information about its subsidy beneficiaries on its website. All relevant data was uploaded, including identification numbers of recipients, amounts allotted, and localization by state and county. However, all names were omitted. The Sagarpa asserted that, because of an increase in drug-related violence throughout the country, it was dangerous to publish recipients’ names since they could be subjected to extortion. Fundar responded that the failure to protect citizens spoke volumes about other federal authorities’ inability to accomplish the tasks they are legally mandated to comply with—particularly guarding citizens’ security. The organization pointed out that the deletion of recipients’ names reflected a failure to fulfill transparency obligations on the ministry’s part. Alleged security concerns were just an elaborate excuse to avoid complying with transparency standards set by the law. Congress’ Role in This Process Fundar engaged in efforts to convince congressmen to become involved in farm subsidy policy. Although the coalition found many allies favoring progressive reform of such policy, they met remarkable opposition from congressmen with direct ties to powerful interests in the big agricultural business sector. According to Merino, the biggest rural producers are probably one of the better-represented lobbies in the federal Congress. The agribusiness lobby rallied to defend the status quo, issuing veiled threats to

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raise food prices if the existing policy was reformed.11 For 2011, the federal government’s budget proposal included significant reductions to farm subsidies. Although the Chamber of Deputies12 regularly rubber-stamps most executive budget proposals, in this case many legislators mobilized to bring significant changes to the proposed farm subsidy chapter for fiscal year 2011. The same amount of resources (adjusted for inflation) was programmed for disbursement as for the previous fiscal year. Other Public Accountability Institutions’ Involvement in This Process Fundar’s theory of change establishes that once information is generated and made accessible about a particular policy problem, stakeholders and civil society organizations will use this information to demand changes. As pressure builds, the government will react to those demands and improve its policies in regard to this particular issue. However, this assumption relies heavily on the existence and effectiveness of a legal and institutional accountability framework. Therefore, it does not hold true for the contemporary Mexican political landscape. For the past fifteen years, since Mexico transitioned from a hegemonic party political system to a pluralistic democracy, several steps have been taken to consolidate advanced reforms on transparency and access to public information through legal and institutional frameworks. However, reforms that guarantee accountability of government officials have been modest at best. In 2000 an external audit institution, the Auditoria Superior de la Federacio´n (Federation Superior Audit), was established within Congress. Although this institution has gained a strong reputation for its annual reviews of the public accounts, it lacks the necessary legal and institutional mechanisms to enact sanctions for government officials who incur irregularities in expenditures. In 2011, the federation produced an audit for the 2009 farm subsidy exercise, which found 18,023 producers held more than a single identification number in the recipient list. It also found 323,026 recipients older than seventy-five years (a highly improbable number, which raised suspicions of resource misappropriation). Some recipients got more than 100,000 pesos, despite the promulgation of new regulations for farm subsidy programs. Lastly, 557 public officials shamelessly remained on the recipients list, in spite of the evident conflict of interest. Despite these findings, few steps have been taken to modify existing policy to avoid such malpractices.

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Another mechanism was created in 2006 to produce external evaluations of public social development policy, managed by the Consejo Nacional de Evaluacio´n de la Polı´tica de Desarrollo Social (National Council for Public Development Policy Evaluations). This mechanism has allowed government agencies to make internal adjustments in policy and provides data from which informed budgetary decisions can be made. Nevertheless, despite the council’s oversight of farm subsidies programs, no serious measures were enacted to make subsidy allotment more efficient.

Conclusion The Subsidios al Campo coalition’s efforts contributed to the reformulation of public policy to solve a problem: the unequal distribution of farm subsidies in Mexico. However, several structural obstacles impeded the coalition’s push for change in farm subsidy policy through evidence-based advocacy. The Subsidios al Campo coalition benefitted from each member’s expertise and inputs. ANEC’s experience as a network of small and medium producers provided the experiental knowledge that laid the foundation for research on the unequal distribution of farm subsidies in Mexico. Fundar contributed with organizational experience in the use of access to informational tools and evidence-based advocacy work in Mexico. The Environmental Working Group provided a valuable example in the publication of information regarding farm subsidies, as well as technical know-how on online publication of huge sets of public data. The Woodrow Wilson Center and CIDE pursued research using the tools created by the other members of the coalition, which supported ANEC’s hypothesis with hard evidence. Finally, all these efforts were made possible thanks to Haight and Fox’s initiative in gathering and coordinating the coalition. After developing the Subsidios al Campo website, Fundar showed academics and journalists how to conduct research on official farm subsidy data using this innovative tool. Journalists disseminated evidence of government malpractice in the use of these resources. Their headlines on government officials and suspected drug lords appearing in the program’s recipient lists generated a national scandal. However, this interpretation of the Subsidios al Campo’s findings obscured the message that the coalition was trying to convey about unequal and regressive disbursement of resources. According

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to Jonathan Fox, the programs ‘‘suffer from a problem of design: If [the programs do] not function as planned, you get scandals such as illegal crops, subsidized urban lands, and politicians as recipients. If [the programs] work as planned, you get inequality.’’ Besides the media’s diverging discourse regarding the problems presented by current farm subsidy policy, the coalition’s efforts for evidence-based advocacy met with resistance from powerful interest groups, such as the agribusiness lobby, in control of enough congressmen to thwart any effort to reform current policy. In addition, government inertia (and blatant cynicism from Secretary Mayorga) undercut substantive change for a progressive reformulation of farm subsidy policy. Public pressure and evidence-based advocacy managed to force limited change (such as a partial revision of the beneficiary lists, the promulgation of new program rules, and the production of a new official website disclosing the recipient lists) only when conjoined by pressure from international financial institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank. Despite the fact that the coalition benefited from fairly advanced access to public information legislation, other structural factors such as the absence of effective legal and institutional accountability mechanisms contributed to government immobility. Despite the fact that change in the formulation of farm subsidy policy via evidence-based advocacy still faces an upward slope, the coalition succeeded in reformulating an existing policy problem. The Subsidios al Campo data was never questioned by any of the stakeholders involved in this process. All actors recognized the Subsidios al Campo website as a valuable and reliable source of information. The media and academics use the Subsidios al Campo website constantly to dig out new information relevant to their research. The website has received more than six million visits to date. Members of Congress have pressed the federal government to revise its lists and Sagarpa has acquiesced. The farm subsidy scandal arising from the publication of information about unequal disbursement of public monies forced the former secretary of agriculture to resign. The most important lessons extracted from this experience relate to the use of federal access to information laws to gather all relevant information on a particular issue. An important contribution to civil society organizations could be the analysis, systematization, and presentation of this information that would otherwise remain obscure, out of the reach of ordinary citizens. Such research can provide a source of hard evidence from which other organizations, movements, the media, and academia can advocate for

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change in public policy. It is important, however, to take into consideration each country’s legal framework and informal power structure to design effective strategies to advocate for change.

Notes 1. For a theoretical framework on how public policy problems are created, see Tierney (1982). 2. The data presented by this study was elaborated using National Council for Evaluations on Social Development Policy (Consejo Nacional de Evaluacio´n de la Polı´tica de Desarrollo Social) data. 3. Fundar, ¿Quie´nes somos?, accessed May 22, 2012, http://fundar.org.mx/mexico/ ?page_id235. 4. National Association of Rural Producers’ Marketing Companies, Quienes somos, accessed May 22, 2012, http://www.anec.org.mx/anec-1/quienes-somos/decalogo -anec/folder_listing. 5. The Environmental Working Group is a nonprofit organization that seeks to use the power of public information to protect public health and the environment. One of its organizational goals is to replace federal policies, including government subsidies that damage the environment and natural resources, with policies that invest in conservation and sustainable development. The organization publishes information on interactive websites (such as its farm subsidies website, http://farm.ewg.org) to shame and shake up polluters and lobbyists and rattle politicians to push for change. Environmental Working Group, About the Environmental Working Group, accessed May 22, 2012, http://www.ewg.org/about. 6. The Rural Support Program (Procampo) was created in 1994 as a program of direct transfers of cash resources to Mexican farmers, as part of the compensation for the agricultural subsidies in other NAFTA countries mentioned earlier. This is the largest farm subsidies program in Mexico to date. From 1994 to 2010, the federal government spent a total amount of 159,376 million pesos (US$12,601 million at mean 2010 prices). Ruiz Guerra 2011: 5. 7. The Target Income program (Ingreso Objetivo) was created to compensate rural producers in case of fluctuations in the international price of particular agricultural goods. The main beneficiaries from this program were livestock feed producers (and, for a brief time, cotton producers). This subsidy was created in 2000 and later canceled in 2007. During this interval, the federal government allotted 21,503 million pesos (US$1,700 million at mean 2010 prices). Ruiz Guerra 2011: 5. 8. Diesel Agropecuario, Diesel Marino, and Gasolina Riberen˜a are discount programs for producers’ fuel expenditures. 9. Fomento Productivo al Cafe´’s purpose is to support coffee growers through direct transfers of cash.

Fundar 261 10. La Jornada, ‘‘Por 15 an˜os, el 80% de los beneficiaries de Procampo obtuvieron menos de mil pesos,’’ October 14, 2008. 11. Merino 2010. 12. Mexico has a bicameral legislature, with a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber of Deputies is the only legislative chamber constitutionally empowered to modify and approve the annual federal budget.

References Cejudo, Guillermo M. The Experience of Subsidios al Campo in Mexico. Mexico City: CIDE, 2011. Fox, Jonathan, and Libby Haight, eds. Subsidios para la desigualdad: Las polı´ticas pu´blicas de maı´z en Me´xico a partir del libre comercio. Mexico City: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, CIDE, and University of California, Santa Cruz, 2010. Merino, Mauricio. ‘‘Los programas de subsidios al campo: Las razones y sinrazones de una polı´tica mal disen˜ada.’’ In Fox and Haight, Subsidios para la desigualdad. Pirker, Kristina. ‘‘Subsidios al campo en Me´xico: Contralorı´a social, nuevas tecnologı´as e incidencia en polı´ticas pu´blicas.’’ UNAM, Mexico City, September 1, 2010. Robles, He´ctor. ‘‘Ejercicio del presupuesto de SAGARPA 2007–2010 por entidad Federativa.’’ Unpublished working paper, 2010. Ruiz Guerra, Ana Joaquina, Transparencia en Accio´n: La experiencia de subsidios al campo. Mexico City: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Fundar, and Centro de Ana´lisis e Investigacio´n, 2011. Scott, John. ‘‘Campo en Me´xico siembra opacidad en subsidios.’’ El Semanario, October 14, 2010. Tierney, Kathleen J. ‘‘The Battered Women Movement and the Creation of the Wife Beating Problem.’’ Social Problems 29, no. 3 (1982): 207–220. UNIC (United Nations Center for Information). ‘‘Informe latinoamericano sobre pobreza y desigualdad 2011: Zonas rurales concentran el 60% de la pobreza extrema en Me´xico.’’ Release no. 43/12, May 23, 2012, http://www.cinu.mx/ comunicados/2012/04/informe-latinoamericano-sobre-/. World Bank. Me´xico: Ana´lisis del Gasto Pu´blico en el Desarrollo Agrı´cola y Rural. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2009. Yu´n˜ez Naude, Antonio. ‘‘Las polı´ticas dirigidas al sector rural: El cara´cter de las reformas para el cambio estructural.’’ In Los grandes problemas de Me´xico: Economı´a Rural, edited by Alejandro Castan˜eda, Nora Lustig, and Antonio Yu´n˜ez Naude. Vol. 11. Mexico City: El Colegio de Me´xico, 2010. Yu´n˜ez Naude, Antonio, and Omar Stabridis Arana. Diagno´stico sobre pobreza rural en Me´xico. Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Econo´micos and PRECESAM, El Colegio de Me´xico, 2011.

Chapter 14

Ethiopian Economics Association: Stories of Social and Economic Policy Influence Assefa Admassie

Economic and Political Situation of Ethiopia Ethiopia is relatively rich in natural resources, with reasonably diverse agroclimatic regimes, good resource potential for development including agricultural resources, huge biodiversity, abundant water resources, minerals, and others. However, in spite of this potential, Ethiopia is a very poor country. Nearly one-third of the population lives in severe poverty. Constraints ranging from internal wars and conflicts, inappropriate policies, and structural conditions to external factors have contributed to the dismal performance of the Ethiopian economy during the various regimes. The wars and conflicts that took place in Ethiopia have consumed significant resources and have destroyed the economic base of the country. Similarly, the policies adopted by different regimes have undermined the growth prospects of the Ethiopian economy. In addition, like most developing countries, Ethiopia is vulnerable to external shocks. Furthermore, the instability of primary commodity prices and the excessive reliance on a few agricultural commodities like coffee, pulses, and oil crops have brought serious shocks to the Ethiopian economy. In the absence of proactive and well-conceived policies, it is impossible to attain accelerated development or to improve the condition of Ethiopia’s people. This predicament can only be addressed if the country is able to

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formulate and put in place an economic policy that will accelerate economic growth, distribute the growth broadly to the people, and build a system that can progressively grow in strength within the framework of the international division of labor. This requires the capacity to generate the right information and policy choices since the need for an objective, policyrelevant stock of knowledge to support selection of appropriate policy packages is critical. At the same time there is an increased quest for more information to enrich policy debates and monitor progress. These circumstances imply greater demand for capacity building within the private and public sectors, policy analysis and research, and policy advice. In addition, there must be a reliable mechanism to enable society to participate in the formulation or design of policies and strategies and follow up with evaluation of the implementation of these policies, to fulfill the public need to proactively engage in both processes. Several policy issues remain controversial and unpopular. Consensus is still lacking on policy issues such as rural-urban and agriculture-industry linkages, labor and capital mobility, quality and relevance of education and health services, democracy and good governance, property rights, and security. However, in order to validate the various economic and social policies formulated by the government, an objective and independent evaluation is essential. Within this context, the role of independent think tanks able to provide rigorous policy research and analysis is crucial to the transformational process in the country.

The Ethiopian Economics Association The Ethiopian Economics Association (EEA) was established in 1991 as a nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nondenominational association that would contribute to formulation of policy and broadly to the economic advancement of Ethiopia through promoting economic research and public dialogue and disseminating the results of its research. It also aspires to assist the teaching of economics at higher learning institutions in the country and to promote professional contact between Ethiopian and international economists. EEA has been implementing various research and other capacitybuilding activities over the last two decades. The association established

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the Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute (EEPRI) as its research, publication, and training arm in July 2000. EEPRI is the first independent economic policy research think tank in Ethiopia. The major objectives of the institute include (1) to strengthen research capacity and establish independent policy analysis centers to provide continuous information and analysis on economic policy matters, (2) to collect and compile macroeconomic and sectoral data in a way that allows rigorous empirical research on the Ethiopian economy, (3) to improve the policy environment through informed public debate and contribute to enhancing public participation in policy issues, (4) to increase options available to the government in making economic policy decisions, and (5) to contribute to the development of the Ethiopian economy by providing policy-relevant research and disseminating such research to all stakeholders in the Ethiopian economy. The research and training activities of the association are organized under four major thematic areas: macroeconomics, agricultural and natural resource management, trade and industry, and poverty and social sector issues. Since the establishment of EEPRI, the association has been able to undertake several research projects related to the macroeconomy, trade, agriculture and food security, poverty, health, finance, education, and other areas that have significant impact on the policymaking process of the country. The institute has also had considerable experience in carrying out extensive urban and rural surveys of various qualities involving sample sizes as large as eight thousand households and covering all regions of the country. The works of the institute have provided useful sources of independent information for researchers, donors, the general public, and policymakers. They have contributed directly to policy debates as well as to the formulation and implementation of economic policies in the country, improving the quality of policy debate and helping to sharpen public policy intervention; they have also been considered in the policy framework, although attribution is always an issue. In general the institute has been successful in two broad areas: informing policy dialogue and policy formulation and developing professional skills. EEPRI’s research outputs have often been quoted in discussion of policy-related issues, and have been important references for students of economics in the country and elsewhere; many agree that EEA and EEPRI research outputs have increased the effectiveness of public policy. EEPRI researchers are often called on to contribute to policy dialogue forums,

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technical committees, and other forums. Participation in various discussion forums organized by the EEPRI has been steadily rising. EEPRI has significantly developed professional skills through various capacity-building activities, such as organizing short-term training and providing academic advisory services to graduate students in economics. By directly imparting skills to young Ethiopians, EEPRI staff members have thus contributed to expanding the pool of in-country economic political analysis. By providing these academic advisory services, EEPRI researchers were also motivated to keep abreast of advances in economic theory and methods, which helped to enrich their own technical expertise. Policymakers and other stakeholders are increasingly recognizing the critical role the Ethiopian Economic Association and the EEPRI play in advancing the country’s economic development. In the future, EEA can continue to serve as an independent nonpartisan entity to evaluate policies and their implementation and propose policy options. In view of its increased recognition, EEA believes that its involvement in economic policy matters will further increase in the future. The EEA and EEPRI are now receiving a number of demand-driven research projects from federal and regional governments, international organizations, the private sector, civil society organizations, and other sources, continuing toinfluence and shape social and economic policies in the country. Two examples illustrate how its research has started to shape national and regional policies.

Land Tenure and Agricultural Development in Ethiopia The performance of the agricultural sector has not been satisfactory, as it has not been able to meet growing demand. Despite many efforts at increasing productivity thorough the introduction of improved inputs, the average output per hectare of farm land has not shown much improvement. The number of food-insecure households has been high, which has forced the country to depend on food imports to sustain the livelihood of its population. The land-tenure system has been cited by many as the major impediment to the adoption of sustainable and long-term land improvement and management practices. As a result, the land-tenure issue has attracted widespread attention among policymakers, governmental and nongovernmental actors, the private sector, donors, researchers, and the public at large.

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In view of this, the EEPRI decided to undertake comprehensive research on the land-tenure system and its implications for the performance of the Ethiopian agricultural sector. EEPRI undertook this research project to encourage and contribute to a healthy and informed debate on policy issues important for the economic development of the country in general and the agricultural sector in particular. The research has tried to address several important questions such as: What is the rationale behind the current landholding system? Does it hinder high levels of output and productivity? Could it fight rural poverty? Does it create a favorable environment for sustainable natural resource conversion and land use? What is the option of the primary stakeholders (the farmers) regarding the current land policy and its alternatives? And finally, is a freehold a better alternative to resolve the problems? The research involved three approaches: first, literature surveys of the economics of land policy in general and the history of land tenure in the country; second, a survey of 8,500 farm households in all regions of the country (except Gambella) to gather a wide variety of information from farmers; and third, an opinion survey of about 700 professionals, experts, development agents, extension agents, and politicians, as well as other stakeholders from private sector groups. This study, which has brought different, positive developments to the policy debate in Ethiopia and helped resolve a number of controversies, was well received by the government. The results of the study have been extensively debated within various public dialogue forums, including election campaigns. The study has initiated discussion among the various stakeholders, encouraged the government to recognize that tenure security is important for agricultural development, and forced the government to start a land-certification program in which title deeds were issued to farmers. While attribution may still be a problem, the redistribution of land that caused the fragmentation of farmland, one factor behind the poor performance of the agricultural sector, was stopped after this study. The government also implemented a major initiative called Land Certification and Registration Programs to assure land security for smallholder farmers. This initiative has significantly reduced the problem of land insecurity. This project also marked the beginning of a new relationship between EEA and government officials, enabling EEA to achieve credibility among the consumers of its products and services. The association has also tried to align its research and training activities with the government’s development

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agenda and priorities as defined in national development strategies so as to continue to enhance its credibility and relevance. The research report was published as a book and disseminated to various stakeholders including policymakers, governmental agencies and legislators, and nongovernmental organizations, academia, researchers, and the media. The summary of the research report and a news release were also disseminated to key stakeholders. The association presented the result of the research at different workshops and conferences organized by it and other stakeholders.

Estimation of the Revenue Potential and Gap Analysis for the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Regional State in Ethiopia The EEPRI undertook a research project on estimating revenue potential in response to a request by the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Regional State, one of nine national regional states constituting the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has embarked on a new development trajectory, guided by a five-year development plan known as the Growth and Transformation Plan being implemented between 2010–2011 and 2014–2015. The plan is intended to improve the lives of the Ethiopian people and reduce inequalities in all dimensions of well-being. One of its critical challenges is mobilizing the necessary financial resources to implement the proposed development projects. The regional state has taken an important step to improve and enhance its domestic revenue mobilization capacity, which is required for the development of the region. One of the means through which the region can improve its revenue-generating capacity is to know the revenue potential of the region based on sound and credible research in order to guide the government’s revenue collection efforts. As measured by the ratio of tax collection to the gross domestic product (GDP) and its ratio to the regional budget, the region’s performance is very low and declining over time. The ratio of average regional tax revenue to regional GDP is estimated as only 1.7 for the five fiscal years from 2005 to 2010. This is far less than the national and sub-Saharan countries’ tax-to-GDP ratio, 10 percent and 18 percent, respectively. Moreover, the regional tax to budget ratio declined

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from 13.4 percent in 2005 to 12.9 percent in 2010. The evidence also indicates that about 84 percent of the region’s budget is from the federal government’s subsidy. The remaining 3 percent comes from nontax revenues. The very low tax mobilization effort as measured by the tax-to-GDP ratio on the one hand and the increasing demand for state-run development endeavors with high dependency on the federal government subsidy on the other called for critical attention. Accordingly, the Bureau requested the association to undertake this study primarily because of its high credibility and competence. The specific objectives of the study are to assess and determine the revenue potential of the region at different administrative levels such as zones, woredas (districts), and major towns; to identify the tax gap in the region under the existing national and regional tax laws; and to assess the efficacy of the tax administration system of the region. Following this research, the study then recommended possible mechanisms to narrow the tax gap and increase tax revenues from potential sources and improve the legal and tax administration system. In its approach, the study used both primary and secondary data collected from 134 woredas and 22 administrative towns and from other relevant regional and zonal administrative (sectoral) offices. The researchers also reviewed federal laws as well as the experiences of other countries. The study made use of a combination of literature and policy document reviews as well as interviews with relevant policymakers and economic actors in the region. It used both descriptive and analytical approaches to analyze the collected quantitative and qualitative data. Several field-workers have been mobilized with close supervision to collect information based on structured and unstructured questionnaire from each woreda and municipal town.

Major Results of the Study The study generated useful results, which demonstrated that there was huge untapped revenue potential in the region. It also aroused interest among other regions in undertaking similar studies. More specifically, the result shows that the region could mobilize 2.3 billion Ethiopian Birr (ETB) (more than US$130 million) in the 2009–2010 Ethiopian fiscal year alone, and predicted an increase to ETB 2.9 billion (more than US$165 million) by the end of the 2011–2012 fiscal year under the existing tax laws and

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regulations (the base case scenario). The study estimated the ensuing tax gap to be ETB 1.1 billion (about US$63 million) and ETB 1.4 billion (more than US$80 million) in 2009–2010 and 2011–2012, respectively. The study also attempted to assess the gap within existing tax law and found room for improvement. In particular, the study found that the existing tax rate levied on the agricultural sector, the major economic activity in the region, is not optimal. The study then showed that the total revenue potential of the region could reach ETB 3.4 billion (nearly US$200 million) and 4 billion (nearly US$230 million) in the 2009–2010 and 2011–2012 fiscal years, respectively, if the region revised its existing tax laws. The ratio of potential tax revenue to GDP, which is 5.9 percent for the base case scenario, would be raised to 9.3 percent in the proposed tax law revision. The study also underscored that improving the recording, systematization, and accuracy of data warrants serious consideration. Lack of reliable and up-to-date data was a serious constraint during this study. To determine fully the tax potential of the region, more accurate and reliable data will be essential. Based on these findings, the study recommended two major actions: 1. As the lack of reliable data is a serious limitation in designing appropriate polices, the region might take appropriate initiatives to create a system in which all sectors collect reliable data. 2. Given the huge gap between what the region is now able to collect and the potential revenue, it would be useful to institutionalize a progressive tax system, particularly in the agricultural sector, with due consideration for the poorest segment of the population.

Impact on Policy The study was completed in May 2011, and the EEA has started observing policy and administrative measures being taken based on its recommendations. The Bureau of Revenue has been adopting measures based on the report, such as setting annual revenue targets for each woreda and administrative town based on revenue-generating potential identified by the research and using the results of the study in monitoring and evaluation. This biannual process shows the amount of revenue collected during each period against both annual agreed targets and estimated revenue potential.

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The Bureau of Finance and Economic Development has also used the revenue potential estimates to set the regional annual revenue target for the annual regional government budget, and has started using the results of the study for its taxpayers awareness creation activities, as well as undertaking administrative measures aimed at reorganizing its human resources, as recommended by the study. The impact of the study is also being observed beyond the regional state. As per the request of the Federal Revenue and Custom Authority, the study was presented at a national workshop in which all the regional bureaus of revenue participated. The workshop also attracted officials from the national Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and heads of regional bureaus of finance and economic development, among others. Several media reports quoted the results of the study. In addition, it has aroused additional interest from other national regional governments (even from the federal government) to undertake their own revenue potential assessments. So far, EEPRI has received interest from the Amhara National Regional State and the Afar Regional State. The Federal Revenue and Custom Authority has also shown interest in signing a memorandum of understanding that will set the framework for collaboration in research, training, and advisory services.

Chapter 15

CRESS: The Grassroots Perspective and Policymaking Wang Xiaoyi

As the ecosystem that occupies the largest land area of China, grassland accounts for 40 percent of the territory. It is found mainly in two ecologically sensitive areas—the Tibetan Plateau and the arid-semiarid area of northern China, both of which have a significant impact on China’s ecosystem. Since the 1990s, the majority of China’s grasslands has significantly degraded. Research carried out at the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences Planning Institute shows that the degradation rate of grassland in northern China was 51 percent in the early 1990s, and had reached 62 percent by the late 1990s.1 According to statistics from the Ministry of Environmental Protection, in 2005, 90 percent of all usable natural grassland in China had undergone degradation to varying degrees, the main reasons being overgrazing, excessive reclamation, industrialization, and wood chopping. Grassland degradation also exacerbates the threat of desertification in China, as degraded grasslands and their dry lakes become a source of sandstorms. Statistics from the State Forestry Administration show that up to 2004, the total area of desertified land in the nation was 2.6362 million square kilometers or 27.46 percent of total land area, while the total area of sandy desertified land reached 1.7397 million square kilometers or 18.12 percent of total land area. Of the newly desertified lands, most were caused by grassland degradation and sandy desertification, according to a report by the State Forestry Administration in 2005. Although the state had heavily invested in the prevention and treatment of desertification, by 2009 there

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had been less than 0.5 percent decrease in desertified and sandy desertified lands. Grassland degradation and the resulting desertification have posed a severe threat to the ecosystem of northern China. The degradation has threatened grassland animal husbandry—the means of livelihood for the local population—and widely affected agriculture and industries in the north, leading to huge economic losses. To prevent grassland degradation and to mitigate desertification, the Chinese government had formulated a series of grassland environmental protection policies and implemented a series of major ecological projects. However, these environmental protection policies and projects have not delivered the expected results. To this end, Center for Rural Environmental Social Studies (CRESS), established in 2007 as a center in the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has conducted systematic research to explore the reason for such failure and to experiment with ways for improvement.

Grassland Protection Policies and Projects In order to improve the grassland environment, starting in the late 1990s, the Chinese government introduced a number of policies, increased financial investment, and implemented a series of environmental protection projects. However, these policies and projects have not achieved their desired outcome. The first policy was a grazing tenure system, which was rapidly popularized in the arid ranges of northern China. Before the late 1990s, grasslands had been collectively owned by villages, where herdsmen grazed their own livestock on collective grasslands. The traditional way of grazing is nomadism, and most villages were categorized by grassland type and by geographical and climate conditions into winter, summer, and spring-fall grasslands. Livestock were grazed in different grasslands by season. Yet this mode of grassland utilization was problematic in two ways: First, there was uneven use of grasslands. Households varied greatly in the number of animals they owned. Further, livestock ownership overall has increased dramatically; this increase is the most significant reason for grassland degradation, as it results in grassland overuse. At the same time, the loss of grassland resources caused by degradation creates even more anxiety among herdsmen, driving up competition over the resources. Policymakers speculated that the only

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solution to the two problems above would be the allocation of grassland to herdsmen. To this end, the government adopted the policy of householdbased grazing tenure. To implement this policy, the government ordered the construction of chain-link fences in the grazing districts. The fence divided the grassland of each village into small patches to be separately used by different households. The government then turned its attention to reducing the amount of livestock. As overgrazing was the main reason for grassland degradation, the government employed both remote sensing technology and field monitoring to obtain data on the grass yields of different areas. Based on the data, it developed a forage-livestock balance quota, the maximum number of grazing animals a household could keep given the grass yield and the area of the grassland it owned. New policy prohibited any herdsmen from keeping livestock in excess of these quotas. The policy did not work, however, because wealthy farmers held a great advantage over their poorer counterparts. The policy was also impractical because of the start-up and maintenance costs of such detailed quota monitoring, especially given the self-monitoring in which herdsmen engage by default. Along with the forage-livestock balance policy, the government also introduced rotational grazing and no-grazing policies. During rotational grazing cycles, livestock at times must be fed manually, which means that herdsmen must have sufficient forage reserves and manpower to do so. Nograzing policies, on the other hand, ensure that herdsmen cannot graze in the area but can only keep their livestock through captive breeding. Although the state attempted to provide subsidies for herdsmen to increase the feasibility of implementing rotational grazing and no-grazing policies, these subsidies were far outweighed by the losses herdsmen incurred because of these policies. Furthermore, rotational grazing and no grazing were contrary to traditional methods, and in many areas, the two policies were never truly implemented. In order to protect grassland more effectively through such measures as maintaining forage-livestock balance, rotational grazing, no grazing, and captive breeding, the state increased its investment in the grassland areas and implemented a series of major projects. The first, the Beijing-Tianjin Sandstorm Source Control Project, started in 2000. Of the project’s various components, no grazing (including no-grazing areas and migration), rotational grazing, and forage-livestock balance were still the most closely related to the livelihood of local herdsmen. The second grassland-related

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project was the ‘‘Grazing for Grass’’ Project from 2003 to 2010, through which the central government invested billions of yuan to convert millions of hectares of grasslands to sustainable management methods, according to the Ministry of Agriculture. In ‘‘Grazing for Grass’’ project areas, the state provided funding for the enclosure of herdsmen’s grasslands, by subsidizing the herdsmen’s rotational grazing and not grazing. Since 2011, the state has stepped up its grassland subsidy. The central government provided 1.34 million yuan of funding each year to compensate for rotational grazing, no grazing, and forage-livestock balance measures. Such a subsidy from the central government enabled local authorities to develop various grassland ecological recovery plans, which mainly consisted of no grazing and livestock reduction. According to official statements, for some herdsmen, such subsidies were actually more than their income from stockbreeding before no grazing started. Data from grassland management authorities shows that the aforementioned policies and projects have seen improvement in grassland quality, but survey results from the pastures dispute this conclusion. When seen over a longer time, grassland degradation is still significant, and despite almost ten years of large-scale management, grassland has not been effectively restored. Even conclusions of the Ministry of Agriculture affirm that the grassland ecology has been ‘‘good in individual places but degrading overall, regionally improved but generally deteriorated.’’ On the other hand, herdsmen contend that grassland conditions depend largely on rainfall, and have nothing to do with grassland protection policies and projects.

Policy Failure In order to assess the effectiveness of grassland environment protection policies, CRESS conducted continuous research in Inner Mongolian pastures for seven years. The Inner Mongolian grassland is located between the arid and semiarid regions of northern China, with decreasing rainfall from the east to the west—450 millimeters of precipitation in the east and merely 50 millimeters in the west. The distribution of grassland types is also diverse, ranging from the lush, water-rich meadow steppe to the typical steppe in the central region to the desert in the west. As the result of sustained interaction with the Han agricultural civilization, there has been a

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farming-ranching ecotone formed in southern Inner Mongolia. In the ecotone, the villagers are simultaneously engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry, whereas in the northern region, only pure pastures are found with almost no sign of farming. The institute selected six research sites in different regions of Inner Mongolia to study the effectiveness of grassland environment protection policies and the impact of such policies on the livelihood of herdsmen, while providing a comprehensive discussion on the socioeconomic transformation of the grassland pastures. In the course of this study, CRESS published approximately twenty papers in Chinese and in English, which examined, from various angles, the environmental crises faced by the arid and semiarid grassland pastures in northern China, and the subsequent policy failure. The grassland tenure system was one of the reasons for grassland degradation. First, grassland contraction contributed to grassland degradation by fragmenting grassland in a way not conducive to its conservation. Because of the uneven amount of rainfall and diverse geographical conditions, grasslands come in many varieties, to which herdsmen adapted by using mobile grazing. For instance, they prefer the warm, sunny hillside in winter but move to the riverside or lakeside in summer. Not only does this method of mobile grazing maximize the efficient use of grassland, but it is also conducive to its recuperation. Prior to the tenure system, all herdsmen followed the traditional mobile grazing. Within a village, there were usually a winter pasture, a summer pasture, and a spring-autumn pasture. However, the grassland tenure system disrupted this traditional form by cutting the grassland available for mobile grazing into small patches separated by enclosures. Livestock were divided into small herds within the small, enclosed pasture, which caused trampling of the grassland. Livestock grazed in the same pasture all year round, giving no time for the grass to recover. To the policymaker, it appeared that as long as the grassland was contracted to each household, each family would automatically assume the responsibility to protect it. Yet reality was much more complex than was assumed. First, poor families were not able to protect even their own grasslands. With few grazing animals and limited income, they could not afford to have their grassland enclosed with fence. Government-sponsored enclosure projects hardly reached these poor households. As a result, poor herdsmen’s pastures often became public pastures and underwent severe degradation. Even though some poor herdsmen were able to enclose their pasture with subsidies from the state-sponsored projects, they often chose

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to lease out the pasture to increase income. Since the lease was usually only for one year, the incoming herdsmen would often graze a very large amount over a very short time, which resulted in overgrazing. Such overgrazing resulting from an increased number of animals would not be ameliorated by grassland contraction. As prices of animal products went up, the number of grazing animals kept by each rich herdsman also dramatically increased. In the Pifang villager group of Yongsheng Village that was surveyed, for example, there were only three hundred to four hundred goats in the 1980s. With the tenure system, however, the number of animals had increased rapidly. Around 2005, the international cashmere price shot up, which created incentives for the villagers to raise goats; grazing animals at one point numbered around three thousand, and in a very short time they caused grassland degradation.2 Such a phenomenon is prevalent in many parts of the northern pastoral areas. The principal measures in the government projects were aimed at reducing the amount of livestock through the grassland contracting policy and the prohibition of grazing during certain times of year. However, these measures did not achieve the expected result. The most critical step in grassland ecological protection is the reduction of livestock. As grassland degrades, it further exacerbates the problem of livestock overload. To solve this, the government established the foragelivestock balance system, using grass yield for each region from its monitoring data to set a maximum livestock carrying capacity per unit area for each region. The maximum number of grazing animals that each household is allowed to keep would be the livestock carrying capacity per unit grassland area multiplied by the area of the grassland. Fines were imposed by the grassland regulating authorities for any violation of this limit. In order to monitor the livestock population of the herdsmen, the government conducted a census in June and December each year. However, the survey results show that the forage-livestock balance policy was very difficult to implement. Whenever financially possible, most herdsmen preferred to increase their livestock regardless of the grassland area. For those with smaller pastures, the number of animals allowed for the area would not be enough to make a living. Those with larger pastures were mostly richer, who were usually able to maintain a larger herd in the first place. In order to maintain a larger herd size, herdsmen often tried to skip the biannual livestock census. As grasslands were usually vast in area, herdsmen

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were able to evade the census in a variety of ways, far beyond the authorities’ ability to control, and it was virtually impossible for the foragelivestock balance policy to take effect. Historically, herd size has always naturally adjusted itself. Natural disasters force the herdsmen to reduce their herd size actively, by selling animals, or passively, as cattle die in the disaster. Household spending is also an important factor for the change in herd size, as cattle are practically the only source of income for herdsmen. An increase in family expenditure causes the herdsmen to increase the slaughter of livestock, thus reducing the herd size. The state hoped to replace natural and family needs with administrative measures in determining the herd size, yet this approach did not work. Statistical data from the national Ministry of Agriculture in 2011 show that total livestock decreased after the implementation of the foragelivestock balance policy. However, surveys at the microscopic level show that the reason for the adjustment in herd size was not the policy but the herdsmen’s prediction of natural disasters.3 The government realized that it was almost impossible to regulate the herd size. It then attempted to relocate the formerly spread out herdsmen into migrant villages through migration so as to facilitate regulation. The state provided housing and living subsidies, in an effort to make the herdsmen abandon grassland animal husbandry and, instead, practice captive breeding, agriculture, or nonagricultural work. Our survey results show, however, that after losing their grassland, these migrant herdsmen were barely able to sustain themselves. Having abandoned grassland animal husbandry, whether they engaged in agriculture or nonagricultural work, most of them did not have a stable income. In order to make a living, many herdsmen continued to keep livestock in various ways even after relocation, and dispersed them to their relatives’ households to feed. Therefore, whether from the perspective of improving living standards or from that of protecting the grassland, ecological migration did not achieve its desired effect. Just as the government’s intervention policies aimed at livestock reduction failed to work, rotational grazing and no-grazing policies also did not meet expectations. After the grassland had been contracted and enclosed, the tradition of mobile grazing in most regions stopped. Continuous grazing concentrated within a small area was considered detrimental to forage growth, and for this reason the government promoted rotational grazing and no-grazing

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policies. The so-called rotational grazing was the prohibition of grazing for forty-five to sixty days every spring when forage was beginning to grow. During this period, all cattle must be captive bred, in order to allow sufficient time for the forage to grow. In areas where degradation was more severe, all-year prohibition of grazing was introduced, which means that no cattle were allowed to graze, but only captive bred. Policymakers thought that with rotational grazing and no-grazing policies, the grassland would be able to recover. However, this policy was resisted by the herdsmen. Captive breeding meant a large amount of forage had to be prepared, yet this heavily indebted the herdsmen as their income was not enough to cover the expenditure. Even though the state had provided forage subsidies for those in ‘‘Grazing for Grass’’ districts, these subsidies were far less than were enough to cover the forage expenses incurred by rotational grazing and no grazing. In addition, captive breeding also required a large labor input. Yet contraction had already created a labor shortage for many households. Therefore, herdsmen generally resisted rotational grazing and no grazing. To the herdsmen, the quality of grass mainly depends on rainfall, especially in the arid and semiarid regions. The growth cycle of forage mainly depends on the timing of precipitation. From their perspective, although grazing prohibition in spring would help forage grow, it came at a cost to the growth of cattle because spring grass is the most nutritious and beneficial. Rotational grazing would not only mean increased spending on forage for the herdsmen, but also reduced cattle quality. Therefore, the government hoped to ensure the implementation of rotational grazing and nograzing policies through strict regulation, and assembled grassland ecological monitoring units. These units were mainly responsible for monitoring the implementation of rotational grazing and no-grazing policies. Whenever they found illegal grazing, they would confiscate the cattle and impose a fine. The herdsmen came up with various strategies to avoid such inspection. For instance, they would often graze in remote pastures that were rarely inspected, or close to their stalls so that they could easily herd the cattle back in. A more common tactic was to graze during the night when there was no one inspecting, because the monitoring units usually did not work at night. Apart from this, almost all herdsmen had had the experience of being caught and fined, and they usually responded by increasing their herd size to make up for the loss. For this reason, herdsmen dubbed the grassland ecological protection policy as an ecological destruction policy.

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Theoretical Explanation and Policy Recommendation There are mainly two reasons for the failure of grassland conservation policies: The first is that new theoretical thinking was missing in the process of policy formulation, and the second is that the decision makers did not have a good knowledge of social reality at the grassroots level. Policymakers in this case were still much influenced by Garrett Hardin’s theory of the ‘‘Tragedy of the Commons,’’ where they were convinced that grassland could not be effectively conserved without completely exclusive property rights achieved through the explicit contraction of households’ holdings and the enclosure of the pastures. Yet when it comes to the new paradigms of natural resource management, such as Elinor Ostrom’s theories of ‘‘Governing the Commons,’’ and of community-based comanagement, the policymakers were poorly informed. They did not believe that resource users could achieve effective resource management through consultation. Policymakers were even more intent on solving the problems of resource management through state invention. Yet the available measures are simplistic, whereas society is complex. As much as the state managed to cover various parts of the country with its grassland conservation policies and projects, they usually employed the same measures. In reality, such an overly simplistic policy often fails to adapt to the diversity of society. Grassland is highly diverse and unpredictable. In the arid and semiarid areas, since the precipitation rate varies greatly, the grassland is subsequently affected and therefore becomes highly unpredictable. Herdsmen living in the grassland also have different cultural backgrounds and means of livelihood, and react differently to policies. Because the state did not trust herdsman to develop their own grassland conservation practices, the state took on the responsibility of grassland protection. This resulted in policy formulation and implementation in a topdown fashion, in which the herdsmen were not able to participate and thus resisted the environmental policies. This top-down policymaking process was the primary reason for the policy failure. The lack of a feedback mechanism was another cause of failure. Problems encountered in the policy formulation and implementation stages were not reflected to the decision makers in a timely fashion in order for them to make adjustments. The government tried to achieve grassland conservation through stringent regulation but was met with resistance from the grassroots community. Violation was prevalent, which further intensified the conflict between the

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government and herdsmen. These phenomena were never reported to the decision makers, and ineffective policies ended up still being practiced. Based on its understanding of the policy failure, CRESS began its work on four aspects of the issue: reflection on and understanding of the true reaction in the grassroots community, theoretical explanations, policy recommendations, and experimenting with new management methods. First was a systematic survey to reflect the real policy implications. The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region contains different grassland types, with decreasing rainfall from the east to the west, and the corresponding gradual transition from meadow steppe to typical steppe, desert steppe, and desert. The southeast and central south have been long developed and are more densely populated, which results in a farming-grazing ecotone. Different geographical conditions and socioeconomic situations produce different reactions to the grassland environment policies. For example, in the farming-grazing ecotone where population is dense and people simultaneously engage in both grassland animal husbandry and agriculture, human activities have a greater impact on the grassland. In the desert region where the population is sparse, the effect of precipitation on the grassland becomes prominent. CRESS selected eight survey sites in regions of different grassland types, and conducted a systematic study of the socioeconomic changes in the pastures in the past thirty years. It uncovered a series of issues such as grassland degradation, herdsman poverty, and overconsumption of groundwater resource, as well as the social background of these issues. These surveys were published as research reports and academic essays in journals and had far-reaching impact, playing an important role in uncovering the real issues with grassland pastures. For a research group, the discovery and communication of the true social condition is the first step in influencing policymaking. The real impact of the implementation of grassland environment protection policies was often unknown to the decision makers. For instance, they thought that rotational grazing and no grazing had rendered good results, when the reality was that illegal grazing was prevalent. Therefore to inform the decision makers of the social reality would be the first task for CRESS. Yet it is not enough to convey the social reality. To explain such reality, it is more important for the decision makers to replace their old thinking with the new. Thus the second task for CRESS was to propose a new theoretical explanation based on the reality of grassland regulation.

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James Scott’s theory of state intervention is highly instructive for the understanding of the practical problems faced by the People’s Republic of China. In Seeing Like a State, Scott criticizes the state’s direct control of the grassroots. On the one hand, the state attempts social planning through simplistic methods that disrupt existing social traditions against the public interest. On the other hand, such social planning is met with stubborn resistance from society, which leads to a planning failure.4 CRESS introduced this theory to China and used it to analyze the grassland environment protection policies, so that both decision makers and society would become aware of the true reason for the failure. After grassland regulation failed because of such simplistic policies, what would be the alternative policy? Beyond the existing policies, what were the other policy options? The new grassland ecology that has emerged from the African experience demonstrates that in the arid steppe region, because of the high variability in the precipitation rate, conditions in the grassland are highly uncertain. To adapt to such uncertainty, herdsmen have developed the tradition of mobile grazing as a way to respond to the variation in forage growth through movement. Such mobility is key to understanding the social organization of the nomadic tribes in Africa.5 In its research on the grassland regulation policies in China, CRESS identified many similarities between the arid and semiarid regions in northern China and the arid grasslands in Africa. Simply contracting the grassland of households and assigning uniform times for rotational grazing and no grazing in no way adjust to the unpredictable conditions of the arid grassland of the north. Instead, increasing mobility rather than keeping livestock in small patches is the correct approach to grassland conservation. Yet increasing herd mobility runs against the state’s theory on property rights. Ostrom provided a theoretical tool for managing shared resources in her ‘‘Governing the Commons.’’6 Ostrom’s theory is that certain resources including grassland resources cannot be privatized because of their unique properties. To remain shared resources is the only way they can be efficiently utilized. In addition, shared resources can be well managed. Based on this theory, CRESS discussed the importance of keeping the grassland as shared property in order to maintain herd mobility in arid and semiarid regions, particularly in the farming-grazing ecotones where grass was scarce. Traditional theory holds that because of the scarcity in the ecotones, grassland resource-related conflicts tend to be intense, which makes it even

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more necessary for the grassland to be privatized as a means to resolve the conflict. In CRESS’s research, however, it discovered that as herds needed to be mobile, and grassland resources could not be contracted for households, community-based grassland resource management had to be strengthened, especially in these resource-scarce and conflict-prone regions. After the market-oriented reforms, the state had kept up its intervention into the daily management of communities, which weakened the selfmanagement mechanism of the society. Accordingly, knowledge imported from external society drives social operations in these communities. It is therefore crucial to reexamine the value of the original community rules, and to reconsider the traditional indigenous knowledge. In order to achieve community-based natural resource management, it is essential to integrate the traditional knowledge of pastoral grasslands and modern grassland management and to integrate tradition into modern policymaking. Just as the decision makers were beginning to see traditions as backward and to abandon them, CRESS discovered through its field investigation that tradition played an irreplaceable role in solving many of the current problems. This is because human knowledge comes not only from scientific experiments but also from experience over the time spent by many generations in the region.7 In the face of China’s grassland environment policy failure, CRESS introduced the theories of uncertainty, shared resources, and indigenous knowledge. It hoped that these theories would help form a new way of thinking for decision makers. To form new policy guidance in this case is to establish a mechanism that would motivate the herdsmen and solve the issue of grassland degradation through their collective action.

Policy Advocacy and Action CRESS hopes to transfer its research into operable policies, and thus advocates a solution to the impending grassland ecological crisis through the establishment of a grassroots environmental protection mechanism that drives collective action from the community. To this end, CRESS strives to recommend this perspective to decision makers through seminars, policy recommendations, and publications. To establish a new policy atmosphere, it is not only necessary to influence the decision makers but also society as a whole. Through its forums,

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publications, and policy laboratory, CRESS was also able to reach NGOs, students, and grassroots herdsmen beyond the decision makers. NGOs dedicated to grassland conservation, young students, and many herdsmen have already gradually begun to question the state grassland conservation policies and to discuss the problems these policies engendered. To persuade decision makers to accept the new way of management, it is imperative for them not only to recognize the failure of the old way of management and to understand the new way but also to see the results of the new policies implemented. To that end, CRESS conducted a policy experiment in Pifang Village of Otindag Sandy Land8 to make decision makers see the outcomes of different policies through the experiment’s results. The village of Pifang had experienced severe grassland degradation and frequent conflicts over grassland use and management among the villagers and between the villagers and the government. CRESS supported a grassland management experiment aimed at grassland recovery and conflict resolution, which includes the following elements: first, the establishment of a community grassland management mechanism based on village rules and pacts. The government opened the space for this without directly intervening in village grassland management, but developed village regulatory systems through discussion among the villagers. These included control of total herd size, the appropriate use of grassland, and grassland restoration. Through an internal self-regulatory system in the village, two problems associated with the simplistic and uniform state policies, namely poor adaptation to local reality and resistance from the community, were avoided. Second, the reestablishment of the mobile grazing system: as a result of the villagers’ settlement and the implementation of ecological protection policies, grassland use in Pifang Village was severely uneven. Grasslands in many remote parts were not used at all, whereas those closer to the village underwent severe degradation due to overgrazing. The village therefore redeveloped a grazing plan and adhered to mobile grazing, so that grassland use was made more even. Third, the establishment of a grassland management system that corresponded to the state policies: in the process of drafting village rules and pacts, participation from the grassland regulatory authorities and from the science and research sector was highly encouraged. This helped make the new grassland management system more likely to be accepted by decision makers. This experiment has been conducted for six years, and has produced good results in grassland recovery. Professional surveys conducted by the

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grassland regulatory authorities show that Pifang Village experienced visibly better grassland recovery than the surrounding villages. To the villagers, grassland management based on community collective action has achieved three effects: first, the grassland was able to recover. After five years of conscious livestock reduction and long-distance mobile grazing, the cover, height, and grass yield of the grassland vegetation were significantly greater than those of the surrounding villages, and the villagers were proud of this fact. Second, the villagers were able to maintain a stable livelihood. In recent years, drought and overgrazing had caused severe forage shortages in many places. In the event of drought in spring and summer or snowstorm in winter, herdsmen had to purchase large amounts of forage in order to ensure the survival of the livestock. The huge demand for forage and the limited supply kept the forage price high and reduced the herdsmen’s income, resulting in their impoverishment.9 In Pifang Village, however, the situation was different. As grassland was allowed to recover, good grass growth ensured large forage reserves for the villagers. Despite a reduction in total herd size, since they no longer needed to buy forage, thus saving on the production cost, the herdsmen had maintained a relatively stable source of income. The experiment of Pifang Village shows that it is possible to form grassland comanagement through the collective action of villagers, which provides an effective tool to solve the problem of grassland conservation in the current context. CRESS has conducted research on grassland environment and pastoral livelihood for many years, and has always considered field survey, theoretical analysis, policy advice, and policy experiment as a whole, in order to push for policy change and to ultimately benefit the herdsmen.

Notes 1. Li Cong, ‘‘Analysis and Solution on the Degradation and Productivity in North Grassland,’’ China Livestock Newspaper, 30 Nov. 2003 (Chinese). 2. Wang Xiaoyi, ‘‘From Contracting to Recentralizing in Rangeland Management,’’ Rural Survey 3 (2009) (Chinese). 3. Wang Xiaoyi, ‘‘Shrinking in Herding Space,’’ Rural China Review 3 (2008) (Chinese); Wang Xiaoyi and Zhang Qian, ‘‘Climate Variability, Change of Land Use and Vulnerability in Pastoral Society: A Case from Inner Mongolia,’’ Nomadic Peoples 16, no., 1 (212): 68–87.

CRESS 285 4. James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 5. Ian Scoones, Living with Uncertainty: New Directions in Pastoral Development in Africa (London: ITDG Publishing, 1994). 6. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 7. Xun Lili, ‘‘Co-Exist with Uncertainty: Indigenous Knowledge in Herders,’’ Xeuhai 3 (2011) (Chinese). 8. Wang Xiaoyi et al., ‘‘Adaptation and Innovation Under Re-Centralized Policies: Grassland Management Through Democratic Consultation in an Agro-Pastoral Village,’’ in M. E. Ferna´ndez-Gime´nez, X. Wang, B. Baival, J. Klein, and R. Reid, eds., Restoring Community Connections to the Land (Wallingford, UK: CABI, 2011). 9. Wang Xiaoyi and Zhang Qian, ‘‘Poverty Under Drought: An Agro-Pastoral Village in North China,’’ Journal of Asian Public Policy 3, no. 3 (2011).

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PART VI

Poverty Alleviation

Perhaps the most obvious means of promoting social development is through targeted efforts to alleviate poverty. Efforts to bring communities and entire societies out of poverty have long dominated the national and international political consciousness, but even with this focus, nearly onethird of the world lives below the poverty line (according to CIA World Factbook statistics). Poverty alleviation efforts must be made more widespread and effective in order for their goals to be achieved. The two chapters that follow detail the work think tanks have done in researching, promoting, and helping to implement poverty alleviation efforts globally. Surely, it is only with such informed and dedicated research that poverty reduction policies will prove effective.

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Chapter 16

African Economic Research Consortium (AERC): Shaping the Policy Making Process and Its Outcomes William Lyakurwa

The African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) model is not a result of a preconceived design; rather, its structure has evolved over the past quarter century in light of operational experience. The AERC was established in 1988 with the aim of strengthening African capacity to conduct rigorous, independent research bearing on economic policy. Its mission is to strengthen local capacity for conducting such inquiries into problems facing the management of economies and to facilitate evidence-based policymaking in sub-Saharan Africa. It also promotes the maintenance of such capacity and encourages its application in the policy context. AERC was established under the Delaware General Corporation Law as a corporation with exclusively charitable, scientific, literary, and educational objects and purposes with the U.S. tax status 501(c)(3). The AERC secretariat is located in Nairobi, Kenya, and enjoys the status of an international, not-for-profit organization. AERC’s success is remarkable when compared with most projects that were established in the 1980s with similar aims. Three important elements contribute to its long-term sustainability: its governance structure, performance monitoring, and succession planning.

The AERC Strategy and Structure The organization initially operated with three-year, project-type phases, and one mark of AERC’s maturity was the implicit recognition of the consortium’s evolution into an institution in its strategic plan for 2005–2010.

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Since then, the pace of activities has been fine-tuned to meet the growing demand for AERC programs in a region that remains in dire need of welltrained, locally based professional economists to facilitate sound economic management. The consortium is meeting this challenge with a wellstructured implementation strategy for 2010–2015 backed by a supporjytive board of directors and a continent-wide network of experienced economists. Responsibility for developing, funding, and carrying out AERC’s mission is shared by the consortium’s three governance bodies, as is the responsibility for maintaining its independence. The three-pillar structure has allowed flexibility within which ideas are presented for consideration, critique, and subsequent adoption or, in some cases, rejection. AERC’s governance structure consists, first, of a board of directors, who are appointed or elected by members of the consortium, plus independent members appointed by the board for their varied expertise (directors at large). The board is responsible for setting broad policy, providing support for a multiyear program of activities, and approving annual work programs and budgets. AERC is presently supported by a group of sixteen funders (institutional directors of the board) who support a commonly agreed on program of research, its dissemination, and the training of future researchers. This provides the essential foundation for a set of coordinated activities with shared overheads. At present, in a show of increasing confidence in AERC’s expanding activities over the years, a number of African governments, including those of Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, and institutions, such as the central banks of Nigeria, Zambia, and Tanzania, have joined into the ranks of donors through onetime contributions. The program committee, composed of leading researchers and policymakers from the region plus international resource persons, contributes to multiyear strategic plans, sets the research agenda, oversees the research and training programs, advises on scientific matters, and reviews and approves proposals for grants for research and training. The secretariat of forty staff members is headed by an executive director, manages the program, and provides technical support to researchers, students, and participating institutions.

AERC’s Vision, Mission, and Objectives The AERC’s purposes include the promotion of economic and social development in sub-Saharan African countries, particularly by encouraging and

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supporting economic research pertinent to policymaking; enabling individuals to conduct competent research on problems of managing the region’s economies; assisting research institutions and other associations; and promoting collaboration among economists through training, conferences, and other means. Institutionally, AERC aims to enhance the long-term capacity of locally based researchers to conduct policy-relevant and applicable economic inquiry. AERC is inspired by a long-term vision of a future in which all populations live in a state of dignity and well-being. In sub-Saharan Africa, AERC anticipates that struggling economies will steadily progress toward breaking the bonds of poverty and low growth assisted by the adoption of diverse, sound economic policies, grounded in pioneering research results. In response to this vision, the consortium’s mission is to strengthen local ability to conduct effective inquiry into the problems of economic management in sub-Saharan Africa. This mission is derived from the premise that development is more likely to occur where there is sustained sound management of the economy; and that such management is more likely to happen where there is an active, well-informed cadre of locally based professional economists to conduct policy-relevant research. AERC is building that cadre through a program that has two primary components: research and training and a supporting, comprehensive outreach program to inject the results of research into the policymaking process.

The Political, Economic, and Social Environment The consortium was established at a time when several African economies, still in their relative infancy, were struggling to find their place in the global economy while at the same time grappling with the bonds of poverty and low economic growth. The early 1980s were a difficult time for African economies and for African economists. International financial institutions were putting pressure on African governments to adopt structural adjustment policies. In addition, funding was on the decline to universities, and many African economists had left the continent to work overseas.1 In 1984, academics from universities in East Africa in concert with members of the economics department at the University of Toronto created the Macroeconomic Analysis Network Project for Eastern and Southern Africa with funding from the International Development Research Centre in Canada to support economic research on structural adjustment by developing African

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economic expertise. At the time, both AERC’s senior management and the researchers participating in its programs reflected its origins in East Africa. Active participation by Nigerian researchers soon brought West Africans into the network. As the consortium’s reputation grew and increasing numbers of researchers desired to join the thematic research program, the board became concerned about the continued concentration of certain countries in AERC’s activities, the absence of others, bridging the linguistic divide, and improving gender balance; in 1992, for example, the board first discussed the issue of underrepresented countries.2 These three issues inevitably resulted in trade-offs by the consortium, but the AERC has taken up the challenge and has committed resources to meet it despite the additional workload.

Specific Policy Impacts AERC’s successful track record as a capacity builder was not achieved without overcoming a number of challenges along the way. Among the major puzzles is how to retain the built capacity in Africa and in African institutions for its effective involvement in both policy analysis and advice, as well as for its cascade effect, whereby those researchers AERC develops proceed to build other capacities and thus attain a critical mass of individual researchers and institutions. If the built capacity is retained in African institutions, the next challenge is to identify the channels through which that capacity communicates to policymakers in what we refer to as the researchpolicy nexus—introducing the results of research and training into policymaking. The advent of greater political pluralism has led to a growing sense of responsibility on the part of local professionals to inform discussions on economic issues conducted by other groups within civil society, including parliamentarians, women’s groups, trade unions, chambers of commerce, and professional associations. As a result of various research projects on global trading systems, AERC network members were well placed to contribute to the September 2001 conference of African trade ministers in Abuja, which deliberated on a set of common African positions for the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) held in Doha the same year. Similar workshops in Mauritius (held in October 2001 and November 2001), in Oslo (held in June 2002), and in Geneva

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(held in September 2002) provided the opportunity to present and discuss some of the project results with African trade negotiators and policymakers. Further, a set of five background papers was prepared to assist African countries in their preparations for the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003. They proved crucial in galvanizing the African countries’ position on multilateral trade negotiations. Similarly, without the AERC’s Collaborative Research Project on Poverty, Income Distribution, and Labor Markets (the so-called Poverty Project), African countries would not have been in a position to prepare the poverty reduction strategy papers increasingly required by donors, at least without significant external help. The project built an indigenous capacity to prepare these plans, as it aimed to build general analytical capacity in poverty analysis in Africa. Other collaborative research projects that address evolving policy are Managing the Transition to Less Aid Dependence in Sub-Saharan Africa, Africa and the World Trading System, African Imperatives in the New World Trade Order, and Explaining African Economic Growth Performance. During the last ten years, policymakers were directly targeted for capacity building through three short-term courses conducted in partnership with the World Bank Institute: Strategic Poverty Analysis, Basic Poverty Measurement and Diagnostics; Living Standards Measurement Studies; and Advanced Poverty Analysis for Trainers. Participants came from more than thirty countries and included policy analysts and government officers involved in the development of poverty reduction strategy papers in their respective countries. A particular feature of the programs, rooted in a series of evaluations of AERC activities, has been enhanced outreach to policymakers and underrepresented groups. The aim is to sharpen the tools AERC uses for outreach and policy relevance in order to make the programs more valuable to policymakers and more accessible to the wider society. Among these tools are AERC senior policy seminars, which provide a forum for discussing policyoriented syntheses of AERC research and obtaining feedback from policymakers on the AERC research agenda.3 To date, there have been fourteen similar seminars on diverse topics ranging from exchange rates and fiscal and financial policy (Nairobi, Kenya, 1995) to poverty reduction and macroeconomic management in Africa (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 2002). More avant-garde themes have featured natural resource management and climate change (Addis Ababa, 2008).

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These seminars typically feature sixty to seventy senior African policymakers at the ministerial and presidential levels, who engage with researchers in frank exchanges on the latest research findings, their application to individual country contexts, and country-specific experiences. Internationally, the network increasingly serves as a sounding board for major policy considerations by the multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund—and more recently the United Kingdom’s Commission for Africa. Furthermore, AERC researchers have to date been invited four times to testify to the U.S. Congress on matters pertaining to African development and the related operations of international financial institutions.

Contributing to the Evolving Policy Environment Building capacity is only part of the equation; AERC’s mandate insists that once built, that capacity must be maintained so that it may contribute to the sound economic management of the continent. The impact of AERC’s programs is evident in the career progression of network members who continue to work in economics and policymaking in sub-Saharan Africa. At the Central Bank of Nigeria, all twenty of the newly recruited staff in its restructured Research Department are AERC alumni. The central banks of Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda are replete with active AERC researchers, while in Mali, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Chad, AERC researchers have been leaders in the development of their respective countries’ poverty reduction strategy papers. The AERC network stretches beyond the continent to reach members of the African diaspora, including prominent economists who continue to be associated with the AERC Research Program as resource persons. Among these are Lemma Senbet of the University of Maryland, Mwangi Kimenyi of the Brookings Institution, and John Mbaku of Weber State University. AERC has thus contributed to the creation of a professional esprit de corps in sub-Saharan Africa. The biannual research workshops, graduate training programs, senior policy seminars, national policy workshops, and other AERC activities bring economists together from across the continent to exchange views and explore common problems. In all these ways, association with AERC means that participants are able to apply their expertise as economists, thereby contributing to professional pride and independence.

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Lessons Learned: AERC Twenty-Five Years Later AERC was initially conceived as a single project with an inherently limited life span. However, over time and as a result of its success, it transformed from a project into an institution. Although AERC’s operating base is Nairobi, Kenya, it is registered in the state of Delaware, thus giving the institution flexibility to temporarily or permanently move its activities from that base of operation to another location in the event of political instability. Further, by being an organization registered in the United States, AERC uses as its operating currency the U.S. dollar, primarily using Citibank New York for its banking. Although AERC has been affected by the global financial crisis in reduced financial support, the institution has been much less affected by domestic financial instability. AERC operates as a network; hence, any impacts are felt more in the network members’ countries. Success does not come easily, nor is it absolute. Any successful organization continues to face challenges for as long as it remains dynamic. Because AERC is a grant-dependent organization, the need for financial sustainability remains paramount, particularly given the global financial peaks and troughs of recent years. AERC has relied on a fairly static set of donors for the last fifteen years. The benefit of attracting new donors has come up at every board meeting. While funders have joined the consortium, potentially important donor countries such as Japan4 and Germany have been approached without success. The executive directors have been tireless in fund-raising, but the board, largely because of its composition, has been less active in looking for new donors. Institutional directors can be counted on to give AERC a fair hearing within their own agencies, but they do not consider garnering support for it from other agencies as their role. Directors-at-large are seldom in a position to make personal contributions, unlike their peers at other institutions, although they can provide valuable support to the executive director in fund-raising. The AERC bylaws are ambiguous about board directors’ responsibilities for fund-raising in saying that the board should ‘‘take appropriate measures to ensure the Consortium’s long term viability.’’ Other governance challenges relate to the composition of the board of directors, the reliance on outstanding individuals, and the need to maintain the comparative advantage that makes the organization unique. Every organization depends on its people. This is particularly true for AERC because of the small size of the secretariat in light of the scope of its

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activities, the complexity of its governance structure, and its challenging mission. Experience shows that bringing network outsiders into leadership positions can be difficult, yet limiting recruitment to insiders would risk losing the dynamism and creativity that have characterized all three governance bodies. Orientation or ‘‘grooming’’ for new senior staff, PC members, and directors is necessary, thus, good succession planning becomes crucial. There are several aspects of this challenge, including staff retention, given both the secretariat’s heavy workload and its good reputation, as employees trained by AERC are in high demand, and AERC’s programming success, which has created heavy demands for its assistance. The institution must ask itself how far it can expand without losing its distinctive characteristics.5 While donors may not want to commit new core funds, they often ask AERC to manage a workshop or lead a task force, and international organizations and even governments may follow. This could interfere with programming.6 Finally, the challenge of identifying and maintaining a comparative advantage remains on the organization’s agenda. Several management capacity reviews and external evaluations have asked where AERC sees itself in ten years; will its clientele change, what is its ‘‘steady state,’’ and so on.7 These are not easy questions to answer in the rapidly evolving African continent and globalized economy. But they require answers, especially now that AERC faces much more competition for both funds and talent than it did at its inception. These questions concern programming rather than governance and management, but the answers to them will have important implications for both. The AERC may have faced some of its most daunting challenges during 2005–2010. As in the past, it overcame them with the help of foresight and astute leadership, on one hand, and the guidance of a strong governance structure, on the other. Among several, relatively minor operational challenges encountered in the course of the strategic plan period, two challenges prominently affected the consortium. A tenuous political climate prevailing during the early part of the calendar year 2008 in Kenya, its host country, threatened the feasibility of implementing some program activities. This called for swift decisions and follow-up actions to relocate key activities such as the graduate programs’ Joint Facility for Electives and the June biannual research workshop, as the daunting travel advisories threatened the participation of other African and international researchers, resource persons, lecturers, and students.

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Thus with the express approval of the AERC Board of Directors, management successfully planned and relocated the 2008–2009 JFE to Arusha, Tanzania, and the June 2008 biannual research workshop to Entebbe, Uganda. As these crucial decisions were made with adequate lead time, the secretariat was logistically geared up to meet the challenges of relocation. A review of costs incurred revealed that despite the additional planning, the relocations did not entail significant cost differences—ultimately, the costs were lower than they would have been in Nairobi. A key positive outcome of this experience is proof that with sufficient lead time, AERC can convene its program activities at any location. Further, this cost savings experience has opened more possibilities for locating program activities. The challenge of a fluid political climate remains, with elections in 2013 continuing the tension, mainly as a result of the 2008 experience.

Conclusion Several independent external and internal evaluations have verified the utility and tenacity of the AERC approach, comprising its program focus and unique governance arrangements. This approach is today being replicated by other social science networks (e.g. the Partnership for African Social and Governance Research), while other capacity-building ventures such as the Collaborative Masters of Agricultural and Applied Economics (CMAAE) have been incorporated into the AERC training programs. A long-range view of the AERC foresees a need to define, beyond the five-year span, an institutional niche that will combine greater flexibility and responsiveness to the rapidly changing global environment. Given the five years from 2007 to 2012, this may suggest a more in-depth review of the organization’s strengths and limitations with a view to, in some instances, incorporating radical changes to the consortium’s approach to business for optimal philanthropic impact.

Notes 1. Pestieau 2008. 2. While most African countries have at least one person who has participated in AERC programs, participation is still quite concentrated within West and Central African countries. See Hoffman 1994; Pegatienen and Wangwe 1999; and Njinkeu 2000.

298 Poverty Alleviation 3. Hassan and Rempel 2004; Lipumba and Rowland 2008; Gwin and Loxley 2009. 4. A representative from Japan attended the first board meeting in 1989 as an observer. 5. Pestieau 2008. 6. See Fine 1992. 7. See, for example, Trowbridge 1998; Horton 1999; Hassan and Rempel 2004; Mestor Associates 2005.

References Fine, J. C. 1992. ‘‘Could Success Destroy the AERC?’’ African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi. Gwin, Catherine, and John Loxley. 2009. ‘‘Review of the African Economic Research Consortium Strategic Plan 2005–2010.’’ African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi. Hassan, Rashid, and Henry Rempel. 2004. ‘‘Building an Economics Profession in Africa: An Evaluation of Phase V of the African Economic Research Consortium.’’ African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi. Hoffman, Joseph. 1994. ‘‘Linking Economics and Policy-making in Francophone African Countries: A Three-Country Study for the AERC.’’ African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi. Horton, Susan. 1999. ‘‘The African Economic Research Consortium: Evaluation of Phase IV.’’ African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi. Lipumba, Ibrahim, and Dane Rowlands. 2008. ‘‘Final Report of the Midterm Review of the African Economic Research Consortium’s Strategic Plan 2005–2010.’’ African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi. Njinkeu, Dominique. 2000. Enhancing AERC’s Efforts in Francophone Countries. African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi. OECD and DAC. 2003. ‘‘Rome Declaration.’’ In Harmonizing Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery. Good Practice Paper. Paris: Development Assistance Committee, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Pegatienen, Jacques, and Sam Wangwe. 1999. ‘‘Francophones and Underrepresented Countries.’’ African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi. Pestieau, C. 2008. ‘‘AERC Governance, Management and Structure—a Model That Works.’’ In The African Economic Research Consortium: Twenty Years of Capacity Building in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nairobi: African Economic Research Consortium. Trowbridge, James. 1998. ‘‘Management Capacity Review in Preparation to Evaluate Past and Present Management Performance and Its Capacity to Ensure Sustainability.’’ African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi. Whyte, Anne. Mestor Associates. 2005. ‘‘Assessment of the Performance of the Board of the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), June 2005.’’ African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi.

Chapter 17

Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA): Think Tanks and Social Development Policy in Tanzania Samuel Wangwe

The Distinctive Features of REPOA’s Strategy and Structure Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) is a nongovernmental organization in Tanzania, which was formed in 1994 and commenced operations in 1995. REPOA seeks to deepen the understanding of and inform future policy on the causes, extent, and nature of poverty, and to establish strategies to combat its spread throughout the country. Tanzania being one of the poorest countries in the world, REPOA considers research to be central to understanding the poverty challenge as a development challenge. In addition, research is a vehicle for developing broad-based knowledge that can be used to make decisions and design realistic and effective evidence-based interventions. REPOA facilitates and undertakes economic and social research and trains stakeholders to understand the importance of using a research-based approach to influence policy dialogue and development. Research is central to economic growth and the reduction of poverty, as it establishes a foundation for making insightful decisions and designing interventions. REPOA believes in determining local solutions for national issues, drawing on national and international research to garner knowledge to support these solutions. Hence, REPOA’s three main research themes are growth and development, social protection, and governance and service delivery.

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The organization’s reach stretches beyond research alone. It also fosters the advancement of local intellectual capacity and encourages better knowledge that can be used effectively. REPOA serves the government of Tanzania, development partners, academics, members of civil society, the media, and the private sector; it is well recognized as a key contributor to knowledge on development issues in Tanzania. In 2011, the organization evaluated its structure and revised it to provide more research capacity on strategic issues and to organize program support for the generation of technical knowledge. It also sought to enhance the synergy between the information and the communication functions of library, information technology, and communication and to emphasize outcomes and resultsbased management, monitoring, and evaluation and learning.

Political, Economic, and Social Factors Affecting REPOA Operations REPOA came into being after the first generation of structural adjustment programs in Tanzania, which revealed that the policymaking process was more complex than the earlier approach of macroeconomic stabilization based on ‘‘getting prices right’’ would suggest. In addition, the process of democratization and political liberalization marked by the adoption of multiparty politics in 1992 also meant greater willingness to allow various groups in society to express their interests and to have such interests accommodated in the policy process. The redefinition of the role of government in relation to other actors in society involved public sector reform, which created space for think tanks in the policy process. Interaction between civil society and policy think tanks became more acceptable. With the changing political and social conditions, the government was inclined to be more accountable to the public when various groups were freer than before to ask questions and seek explanations concerning the policy steps being undertaken. In an aid-dependent economy like Tanzania, demand for policy work has also been coming from donors, who have also been more willing to fund such research. The Tanzania Household Budget Surveys of 1991–1992, 2000–2001, and 2007 show that the levels of poverty continue to persist with very modest reduction, even with an increased level of economic growth.1 REPOA has engaged strategically with policymaking institutions and their processes

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since the second half of the 1990s. The key objective of these relationships was to ensure that the findings and recommendations from relevant policy research are actually taken into account during policy development. REPOA began this strategic engagement by participating in the development of Tanzania Development Vision 2025 in 1996–1998 and production of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2000. Inherently donor driven, the PRSP detailed a three-year poverty reduction plan, identifying six priority sectors where resources saved as debt relief should be directed. The plan stemmed from the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiatives. The government of Tanzania facilitated the participation of a variety of stakeholders in drafting the PRSP, including members of civil society and the private sector, although the time frame for qualifying for the initiative was rather short. Recognizing this limitation, the review of the PRSP was given adequate time to allow production of the second edition in 2004. During this phase, REPOA consulted much more widely with civil society organizations, the private sector, researchers and academia, local government authorities, and grassroots organizations. This ensured a much more homegrown strategy than the first-generation strategy for poverty reduction.

Specific Policy Impacts of REPOA The implementation of the PRSP process proved to be challenging in its coordination and its implications for the way the government organized planning and economic development management. Those involved realized that the focus on poverty in thinking on development required good, relevant data on the status of poverty and progress in reducing poverty. The master plan formonitoring poverty, completed in June 2001, was introduced in this context and constituted an important tool to foster a coherent approach to monitoring poverty in Tanzania. This involved four main tasks: conducting surveys and censuses to fill data gaps and to reorient data analysis toward poverty monitoring, developing administrative data within ministries and on local government and community levels, strengthening poverty-related research and analysis, and disseminating results and sensitizing policymakers and others to them. Operationalization of the third task (research and analysis) led to the formation of the Research and Analysis Working Group (RAWG), and REPOA was appointed its secretariat. A

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major task of RAWG was coordination of participatory poverty assessments that identified research priorities, including testing underlying assumptions in the PRSP, impact studies, and research to deepen knowledge and understanding of poverty reduction challenges. RAWG’s most notable contribution was to emphasize that a reduction in poverty cannot be realized without achieving economic growth. This new emphasis on economic growth was informed by a combination of various studies, dialogues, and exchanges with different stakeholders. REPOA took the lead in the production of a biennial report, the Poverty and Human Development Report (PHDR). REPOA’s influence—in various RAWG meetings, in PHDRs, and through review of the first-generation poverty reduction strategy in 2004— helped raise awareness that poverty reduction could best be achieved through growth. In response, the second-generation poverty reduction strategy (known as the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA in Kiswahili) identified economic growth as its focus in its first strategy cluster. REPOA’s influence continued throughout the implementation and monitoring of MKUKUTA. The organization helped develop a more focused growth strategy by including a chapter on rural growth in PHDR 2005, a chapter on growth priorities in PHDR 2007, and a chapter on the state’s role in promoting growth in PHDR 2009. Each of these has influenced the direction of policy development toward more growth. In this regard, the recent Five Year Development Plan (2011–2012 through 2015–2016) and MKUKUTA II (2010–2015) have a more growthfocused orientation. The Views of the People program managed by REPOA reflected the need to conduct poverty mapping that allows for small-area estimation of poverty and awareness of people’s perception of the implementation of MKUKUTA, including the views of the elderly and children. To contribute more effectively to changing the orientation of policy toward growth, REPOA adopted the strategy of enhanced collaboration with different actors. The positive results resulted in further collaboration in the organization’s other activities. It developed specific training and capacitybuilding initiatives for civil society organizations and councilors, including instruction in budget analysis and expenditure tracking. Research themes were redesigned under the open competitive system to incorporate issues that emerged from policy dialogue. Following the formulation of the Decentralization Policy in 1998, the government of Tanzania started implementing this policy by embarking on local government reform, carried out through the Local Government

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Reform Program, which was guided by the vision of improving service delivery to poor people in Tanzania. REPOA initiated research on processes leading to changes in service delivery at the local level. It is in this context that , the organization has implemented periodic formative monitoring and evaluation of local government reforms in Tanzania since 2002 through the Formative Process Research Program. Its research themes are service delivery, governance both at central and local levels, and local government finances and financial management. Through this research program, REPOA has been documenting processes of change and impacts of the local reform program with the underlying aim of promoting informed dialogue among stakeholders to ensure that policymaking continues to be a consultative process. This has in turn provided managers and key stakeholders with operationally relevant data and analyses of lessons learned during implementation as well as strengthened the link between operational arms of the executive branch, legislature, citizens, researchers, and academia. The initiative of formative process research complemented REPOA’s earlier studies on tax compliance, which had pinpointed inefficiencies caused by the so-called nuisance taxes, specifically the Development Levy. The studies indicated that the coercive powers used in the collection of local taxes contributed to a deteriorating relationship between citizens and local authorities. These studies became an important input into the Tax Reforms of 2003–2004, which finally led to the removal of the nuisance taxes. Research outputs from the formative research program informed various reviews that eventually led to the second phase of the Local Government Reform Program. In addition, REPOA carried out a study on outsourcing of local revenues to private tax collectors. One such tax collector was operating at the Ubungo Bus Terminal. The study focusing on this site identified a number of loopholes and weaknesses in the contractual processes, which led to the abrogation of the contract with the private tax collector. A number of newspapers published the output of this study, which eventually led to intervention by the prime minister to resolve the matter.

Areas of Influence and How REPOA Overcame Limitations REPOA, as the secretariat to RAWG, reaches decision makers in different ways, primarily through the National Policy Dialogue (previously the Poverty Policy Week). This forum includes policymakers, development partners, academics, and members of the public and involves presentation and

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discussion of different research outputs, as well as identification of next steps. Since 1995, REPOA’s Annual Research Workshop has been another avenue for reaching policymakers, along with a series of open seminars. Becuase other studies outside REPOA are relevant to the development processes, REPOA invites these outside researchers and policymakers to the workshop to discuss emerging issues. In some instances, civil organizations and citizens are better positioned to pressure the government. However, most of the reports published by RAWG and REPOA are overly technical and difficult for citizens and these organizations to understand, so in such cases REPOA popularizes the reports with cooperation by relevant civil organizations. RAWG worked to influence policymakers in sector ministries and the parliament by providing an analysis of the implementation of strategy and by defining areas that needed more attention and funding. As a research institution, REPOA has the freedom to set its research agenda and implement it. It determines the agenda before the strategic plan starts. Different stakeholders provide their contributions through organized meetings held toward the end of the implementation of a strategic plan. For the current strategic plan of 2010–2014, the three key areas of growth and development, social protection, and governance and social delivery are being implemented. By allowing other stakeholders to be influence the research agenda, the organization ensures consideration of the most relevant and topical issues. The research work undertaken by REPOA can be categorized in three groups: strategic research, collaborative research, and commissioned studies. Strategic research allows the organization to research problems it deems essential for enhancing the understanding of underlying issues and influencing the policymaking process. Collaborative research puts REPOA in close touch with researchers from other institutions and particularly enables REPOA researchers to collaborate with competent researchers from other parts of the world. Commissioned studies offer REPOA the opportunity to influence policy in the short term by addressing pressing policy challenges. To become a competent research institution, REPOA has been working to find a balance between strategic research and commissioned studies but with greater space for strategic research. It will increase in importance and will become the focal point of the organization’s knowledge-creation activities and capacity-building efforts. Researchers within REPOA are now organized in thematic research groups corresponding to the strategic research themes to focus on areas of competence and deepen their capacities in those areas.

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Additionally, REPOA has been working to increase the effectiveness of the research-capacity-building program for junior and somewhat experienced researchers by offering competitive research grants, which will be more closely linked to the organization’s strategic research agenda; grantees will be affiliated with thematic research groups for more structured mentoring. In addition, the strategy for training researchers has shifted toward enhancing acquired skills. Training for research users is now organized on a demand basis. REPOA has also enhanced mechanisms for sharing knowledge and making research more accessible through organized events (research workshops, seminars, dialogues, and policy roundtables), use of media, publications, and redesign of its website to make it more interactive. Its management has shifted from emphasizing output and activity to emphasizing outcomes and results. REPOA management continues to go through capacity-building sessions to this end and has instituted mechanisms for monitoring progress toward intended outcomes.

Lessons Learned for Future Peer-to-Peer Exchanges Many lessons can be drawn from the experience of REPOA. First, as the government’s policymaking process becomes more inclusive, the demand for input by local policy think tanks is likely to increase. The choice of a think tank to work with policymakers is influenced by its previous work and reputation. REPOA’s appointment as secretariat of the Research and Analysis Working Group and the Formative Process Research Program provided a unique setup in which REPOA played a pivotal role as a provider of credible information not only to the government but also to donors, academics, and other stakeholders. The independence of REPOA in conducting strategic research was made possible by donors who supported the implementation of the strategic plan REPOA formulated and did not interfere with its day-to-day implementation. It is important to strike an appropriate balance between working with government and retaining independence in analytic work and to ensure that information provided is analyzed according to research ethics while avoiding bias favoring any specific social group. Research results are more likely to be utilized for policy development when policy analysts from government are involved in the research process, especially in determining the research agenda. This makes the research responsive to policy needs.

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Finally, the chances of adoption of research results are enhanced when the think tank is credible and has a good reputation in policymaking circles.

Note 1. Between 2001 and 2010, agriculture grew annually at 4.2 percent on average, significantly less than the annual GDP growth of 7.1 percent. Poverty rates have shown modest decreases, from around 38 percent in 1991 to 33 percent in 2007.

PART VII

Social Policy

In addition to the many specific subfields of social development already detailed, such policies can also include ones targeted at generating positive societal good more broadly. Whether through social impact bonds—a financing instrument through which governments pay for measurable, positive social outcomes only after they have been achieved—or efforts to improve the freedom of speech and expression through increasing cooperative efforts between governments and their civil society, social policy is fundamentally reshaping the world we live in. The chapters that follow delve into examples of that fundamental change, highlighting how think tanks have worked hand-in-hand with governments to generate tangible positive outcomes throughout society.

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Chapter 18

Center for American Progress: Importing Social Impact Bonds Jitinder Kohli and Kristina Costa

The Center for American Progress (CAP) was founded in 2003 to be a different kind of think tank—one dedicated to developing and promoting a progressive policy agenda across a wide range of issues. Like that of all think tanks, the primary goal of CAP is to produce original research on pressing policy issues. Half of the center’s resources are dedicated to providing leadership in analysis of progressive ideas, with the other half devoted to ensuring that those ideas gain traction in the public sphere. Beyond producing written materials, hosting public and private events, and providing expert speakers at conferences and panel discussion, the Center for American Progress also aims to drive public debate, influence the influencers, and build collaborative coalitions. The center attempts to spark public debate by using television, radio, and print appearances, general media outreach, and communication with researchers at other think tanks to get people talking about ideas the center is trying to promote. To influence the influencers, CAP undertakes concerted outreach to members of Congress and the presidential administration, as well as influential people outside government. Think tanks propose and refine policy, but they cannot make it happen on their own. Such outreach is crucial, as is building collaborative coalitions. The center is a progressive organization, but it is also a nonpartisan one, meaning

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that when the center drafts ideas that have appeal to both major political parties, it makes an effort to build bipartisan consensus—or at least bipartisan knowledge—of those ideas inside and outside government. The center has played a leading role in policy debates around health care reform, clean energy and green jobs, tax and budget policy, education, economic competitiveness, and government reform. Although the center is American-focused, its experience can be useful to institutions worldwide; no country has a monopoly on innovative solutions to public policy challenges. But it can sometimes be difficult to identify and translate these approaches across borders. Think tanks have a powerful role to play in identifying promising public policy approaches in other countries and ‘‘importing’’ them to their own. That is what happened at the Center for American Progress when its experts learned about ‘‘social impact bonds,’’ an innovative new financing instrument for social programs in which government only pays for measurable, positive social outcomes after they have been achieved. Social impact bonds originated in the United Kingdom and fit well alongside our ongoing work on government reform.1 Since CAP began promoting social impact bonds in 2010, they have been embraced by the Obama administration, and several state and city governments are exploring the possibility of applying the concept in areas like recidivism and homelessness. ‘‘Great ideas come from many places,’’ said Sonal Shah, former director of the White House Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation. ‘‘The best organizations know how to capture those ideas, adapt them and make them relevant for local circumstances. The Center for American Progress’s work on social impact bonds has been able to capitalize on the innovative work of the British government and private sector and adapt it to the United States.’’2 The Center for American Progress is an independent, nonpartisan think tank dedicated to improving the lives of Americans through progressive ideas and action. This chapter uses our experience with social impact bonds to explore the essential elements of a think tank’s strategy in importing an idea from another country. The chapter provides a general overview of social impact bonds—how they work, the problems they are meant to help address, and some caveats about the model. It also discusses how the Center for American Progress has gone about translating social impact bonds to the American context, and how CAP’s actions reflect its overall organizational mission and strategy.

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How Think Tanks Can ‘‘Import’’ Ideas from One Country to Another No two countries’ governments are so similar that new ideas can be imported wholesale. Every public-sector innovation must be adapted to work within each country’s code of laws and political culture. Think tanks have a valuable role to play in that process. In CAP’s experience, there are at least four key things a think tank should do when trying to adapt an idea from one country to another: identify any changes necessary to make the idea fit the local political and legal circumstances, find the best way to frame the idea to fit with the local political climate, identify the other players interested in the idea and coordinate their efforts, and craft a strong, targeted communications strategy. There are also three major challenges a think tank may face when importing an idea. A think tank must sufficiently differentiate the new idea from the ideas already in existence, protect the idea from being weakened by friends and foes, and be clear and honest about the idea’s weaknesses and avoid pretending that it is a panacea. Before examining each of these steps in more detail, we briefly explain how social impact bonds work.

Introducing Social Impact Bonds As we noted, social impact bonds are an innovative approach to financing social services. Instead of government departments funding activities they hope will result in improved social outcomes in areas like chronic homelessness, a social impact bond allows government to define the outcome it wants achieved, and then partner with an external organization that promises to achieve the outcome. The government agency relinquishes considerable control over how the outcome is achieved and frees the external organization to use approaches it thinks will succeed. If the external organization succeeds, the government pays it an agreed-on sum of money. If the external organization fails, the government pays nothing. Since the government does not pay any money up front, the external organization will likely need to raise funds for the interventions it thinks will achieve the outcome. So the external organization may turn to investors who put up the necessary working capital. If the outcome is achieved, the external organization would repay its investors with an appropriate return.

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It is easiest to understand social impact bonds with an example—the very first being at Peterborough Prison near London. In the United Kingdom, up to 60 percent of prisoners who serve sentences of less than twelve months reoffend within a year of being released.3 These prisoners typically receive little in the way of services like drug therapy or employment assistance to prevent them from reoffending. ‘‘The problems that people had before they went to prison are the same problems they encounter after they leave prison,’’ said Dame Anne Owers, former chief inspector of prisons, in 2008. ‘‘If you don’t deal with the before and the after, then all you create is a circle.’’4 To address this problem, the British Ministry of Justice is piloting the first social impact bond. The agreement has bipartisan support, having been initially developed under a Labour government in 2009 and implemented in 2010 by the current coalition Conservative–Liberal Democrat government. The government has partnered with an organization called Social Finance that has pledged to reduce the reoffending rate of prisoners leaving Peterborough Prison. If Social Finance reduces reoffending among those prisoners by at least 7.5 percent, it will receive payment from the government, with higher payments for higher reductions in reoffending, up to about $12 million.5 The payment levels were calculated by estimating the projected savings in prison costs and court fees should reoffending rates decline.6 Although it is too early for results to be available from Peterborough Prison, the British government is so confident in the model that it is in the process of negotiating new rounds of social impact bonds in juvenile justice and foster care. The Center for American Progress first came across the concept of social impact bonds in late 2009 as part of its Doing What Works project, which focuses on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the federal government. The center collaborated on a report with the Young Foundation, a British think tank instrumental in developing the social impact bond concept. That report, Scaling New Heights, first recommended that governments in the United States should also embrace social impact bonds. The center then decided it wanted to continue to push the idea and made a concerted effort to do so over the next two years.

Adapting the Idea to a New Context Every country has its own code of laws and its own political culture, and successfully importing an idea from one country to another requires

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adapting the idea to local circumstances. With social impact bonds, particular areas of concern include the tax code, the budget process, and how legislatures and government departments make decisions. One major difference between the United Kingdom and the United States is the structure and role of the national government. In the United Kingdom, the national government plays a fairly direct role in providing social services. Every prison in England, for instance, is under the supervision of the national government. But in the United States, both the federal government and the fifty state governments have significant decisionmaking power. This added complexity meant that when CAP began adapting social impact bonds to the American context, it had to determine the proper roles for three different levels of U.S. government: federal, state, and local. Because the U.S. federal government does not directly oversee many social programs, CAP determined that its ideal role would be to advocate for and publicize social impact bonds, and to help fund outcome payments in instances where savings from a successful intervention accrue to the federal government. CAP believes the vast majority of early social impact bonds will be initiated by state and local governments. The center emphasized the difference in roles for the three levels of U.S. government in its written work and in meetings with all interested groups. It also led an introductory session on social impact bonds at a White House meeting in October 2011 for state and local government officials, foundations, and service providers.7 It led other sessions at the National Association of State Budget Officers and the American Public Human Services Association, which bring together budget and social services staff from state agencies. One of the issues raised in these meetings was the challenge presented by annual budgeting in the United States. Unlike in the United Kingdom, there is no tradition—and no established mechanism—for making multiyear commitments to providers of social services. So in the United States, social impact bonds will require special provisions to give the external organization confidence that government will be in a position to make outcome payments at the appropriate time.8 Sometimes the mechanics of how an idea works need to be tweaked to match local circumstances, as in the examples above. But even where this is not the case, a think tank will always find itself in the role of translator— changing the way an idea is described to fit the political ‘‘language’’ of the new country. CAP began the task of translating social impact bonds to the ‘‘American’’ language from the ‘‘British’’ with its first major report on the subject in February 2011. The center commissioned Harvard University

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professor Jeffrey Liebman, who had recently left a senior position in the White House, to write the report, which was the first think tank publication on social impact bonds. Rather than writing abstractly about the concept, Liebman pegged the idea to existing social service programs like Head Start and the federal home visiting program for low-income mothers, placing social impact bonds firmly within the American context.9

Framing the Idea in the Political Narrative It is also important to present an imported idea in a context that policymakers and the public care about. The Center for American Progress framed social impact bonds in two ways: as a way to fund social programs during a period of fiscal tightness and as one solution to a long-standing problem around measurement and effectiveness in government programs. The postrecession political climate in the United States and Europe placed significant pressure on budgets at every level of government. Proponents of social service programs, particularly preventive programs, are apprehensive about the future availability of funding for the services they care about. Moreover, governments in many industrialized nations face a similar set of problems around the provision of social services. Funding streams for social programs can be overly prescriptive and tend to focus on inputs—the number of people served, for instance—rather than on measuring the outcomes of the intervention. It can be unclear which programs are more effective than others because rigorous measurement is rare. And funds rarely flow to innovative new interventions and programs that deliver results over legacy programs that may not work as well. When money does not flow to what works, it gets wasted. That’s why the center has emphasized the potential of social impact bonds to address both of these issues. In fiscally tight times, governments may find themselves reluctant to fund social programs if they are uncertain about the likely impact. But if the funds are only released when an outcome is realized, it is easier for governments to direct funds toward social programs. Additionally, federal, state, and local government have recently made efforts to focus on outcomes in government programs.10 One challenge faced was that while social impact bonds should appeal to both conservative and progressive policymakers, the concept risked being greeted with suspicion by conservatives merely because it had been

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embraced by a progressive organization and by a Democratic administration. That’s why much of CAP’s work aimed to demonstrate that social impact bonds should have bipartisan appeal. The center coauthored several published pieces with University of Maryland professor Douglas Besharov, a respected conservative thinker, and met with conservative and liberal policymakers and researchers to demonstrate that the idea should appeal to both sides of the aisle.11

Building a Coalition of Groups Interested in an Idea Because think tanks often need to work with other organizations in order to successfully import an idea from one country to another, it is essential to ensure that this coalition of organizations acts in a complimentary and coordinated, rather than competitive, manner. A number of U.S. organizations have embraced the social impact bond concept. Foremost among these is the Rockefeller Foundation, a major philanthropic organization that, along with some other foundations, believes social impact bonds could significantly increase the flow of capital available for solving major social problems. Rockefeller, which funds the center’s work in promoting social impact bonds, is an investor in the Peterborough Prison social impact bond and plays a role in other organizations’ work.12 Other important players include Social Finance US, sister to the external organization in the Peterborough Prison experiment. Third Sector Capital Partners, with staff in Boston and New York City, is another new organization working with governments to help set up social impact bonds. The New York–based Nonprofit Finance Fund provides education and resources on social impact bonds and works with groups seeking to advance the concept in their communities.13 And McKinsey & Company, a major consulting firm, recently published a report on the concept.14 In addition, pioneering state and city governments aim to be among the first to apply the idea in the United States, including the state of Massachusetts and New York City. To avoid redundancy with other groups, CAP focuses its social impact bonds work on policymakers and others who influence government. This role fits closely with the center’s organizational mission and the skills of its team. It is also important that organizations work together. CAP maintains regular communication with the other organizations working on the Social

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Impact Bond concept, and seeks their input in its work. The center understands the importance of coordinating the efforts of each organization in order to maximize the chances of achieving this common goal: to bring social impact bonds to the United States.

Crafting a Communications Strategy Outreach and communications are essential for building on the excitement of a new idea. There are a number of ways for a think tank to publicize its work, including publishing materials through the think tank itself, placing materials in outside publications, meetings and outreach, and public and private events. CAP works hard to make sure that everything it publishes is accessible and useful to a range of audiences. Often, it makes sense to publish a short summary piece alongside a longer piece of work. For example, in April 2012 it published a long, detailed piece providing a template for a social impact bond agreement written in the style of a legal contract, with commentary to help the reader interpret the contract language. The piece was published in two formats—a printable PDF and an online interactive site where the commentary appeared when the reader clicked on highlighted sections. Numerous people involved in bringing social impact bonds to the United States commented on the piece’s usefulness. But it was far too detailed for those less familiar with the concept. So CAP published a shorter piece of around a thousand words alongside the detailed sample agreement. CAP succeeded in pitching stories to the New York Times, where Washington bureau chief David Leonhardt published a column pegged to Liebman’s 2011 report, and in placing articles by CAP staff in the Baltimore Sun and on targeted social-service blogs.15 CAP experts have spoken at dozens of events about social impact bonds. Whenever possible, CAP works to get audiences to think about how the concept could be applied in their own context. With government audiences, CAP experts ask them to think about the specific policy areas where social impact bonds could be useful in their departments. All of these techniques are central to the way the Center for American Progress works. It is committed to ensuring that communications are tailored for different audiences, even if that means being repetitive at times. The center works with media outlets to ensure that its ideas receive maximum exposure. And it

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ensures that those with influence are able to explore how they can apply those ideas in their roles.

Obstacles to Success As we mentioned earlier, think tanks need to meet at least three major challenges when importing a new idea: differentiating the new idea, defending it against being weakened, and being clear and honest about the idea’s limitations. This is how CAP attempted to address these challenges during the social impact bond project. Differentiating the Idea Think tanks are well placed to distill a new idea to its essence and to continually communicate what is innovative and exciting about it. Social impact bonds are most commonly conflated with performance contracts, which have been used in government for a long time. A typical performance contract includes significant payment for activities with a performance bonus if outcomes are achieved. This is a very different arrangement than a social impact bond, in which governments pay no money up front and all payments are contingent on achieving the outcome. Equally challenging to explain to those who are accustomed to traditional government contracting is the amount of latitude given to the external organization in a social impact bond to determine its own methods of achieving the outcome. The center envisions only loose restrictions being placed on the external organization’s activities—for instance, CAP thinks it is important that the external organization be prohibited from causing harm, but does not believe government should determine the external organization’s strategy. CAP addresses these problems by defining social impact bonds quite orthodoxly and by consistently emphasizing the differences between these new tools and more traditional forms of government financing in written materials, meetings, and presentations. Defend the Idea Against Being Weakened One of a think tank’s most important roles in importing an idea from abroad is to articulate the intellectually pure version of the concept. Setting

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out a clear vision of a new idea is crucial for preserving its integrity. Those who are enthusiastic about an idea may try to redefine it more loosely to make it happen faster, while those who work on more traditional approaches may feel threatened and try and falsely present their methods as the new concept. A think tank must be aware of both of these possibilities and try to prepare plans to respond appropriately.

Be Clear and Honest About the Idea’s Limitations Every policymaker yearns for silver bullets to solve pressing social problems. But magical solutions do not exist in the complex world of public policy, and while social impact bonds are a powerful idea, they are certainly not a panacea to all social ills. It is important to be open about the situations in which an idea is likely to be valuable and the areas in which it will not be. A think tank should not engage in complicated intellectual gymnastics to hide the shortcomings of a new idea, lest either the idea or the organization be discredited. In everything the Center for American Progress publishes on social impact bonds, it tries to mention some of the limitations of the idea and emphasize the nascent character of the concept. For example, CAP believes social impact bonds are most likely to be useful in providing noncore services in areas where there is at least some evidence that interventions have been successful at delivering real, measurable outcomes in a reasonably short time. CAP also believes that in the near term, payment levels will often be determined by calculating the projected savings to government from achieving the outcome. So while social impact bonds have great potential in areas like early childhood education and reducing homelessness, they should not be used to provide general schooling or public safety services more broadly. Additionally, the idea is still in its infancy, and it is important for think tanks not to oversell what has been achieved. After all, there is only one existing social impact bond agreement—although others are being developed—and no matter how deeply and how well we analyze and interpret the idea, new problems and challenges will crop up as more of these agreements are negotiated and executed. For many people in CAP’s audience, the organization’s honesty about the concept’s limitations and early stages is essential to winning their confidence.

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Conclusion To be sure, it is still early days for the social impact bond concept, particularly in the United States. Some governments have made significant steps toward implementing the first American social impact bond agreements, and the Obama administration has been vocal in its support of the idea. In August 2012, the Bloomberg administration in New York City announced the first fully negotiated social impact bond agreement to reduce recidivism among adolescent men imprisoned at Rikers Island. Goldman Sachs put up $9.6 million in working capital to run the interventions in the New York City deal. But a great deal of work remains to educate politicians, government officials, and the general public about social impact bonds. The first social impact bond is still under way in Peterborough, and results are not yet available. But there is great excitement on both sides of the Atlantic about the potential for social impact bonds to be used in a range of social areas, including early childhood education, helping the unemployed reenter the workforce, preventive health care, and even energy efficiency or international development projects. The Center for American Progress is uniquely well suited to bring new ideas to the debate in the United States, whether it formulates the ideas itself through original research or imports and adapts exciting approaches from elsewhere. From health care reform to promoting green jobs, CAP has a reputation for injecting passionate, informed, innovative ideas into policy debate in the United States. CAP also prioritizes working with those who can implement ideas as much as it prioritizes developing them. The center allocates a significant amount of its resources to teams that work to communicate its message, either to Congress, government agencies, or the media. And everyone who works at the center understands that turning a good idea into reality requires considerable outreach to decision makers. Social impact bonds are no different from any other concept in these regards. CAP took on the difficult task of adapting an unusual new financing mechanism to the American context as part of its effort to introduce innovative ideas. And it took its work one step further by reaching out to conservative and progressive policymakers, politicians, and thinkers. It will take a lot of work to implement social impact bonds well. But against conventional wisdom, interest in social impact bonds is growing in Washington, and in a city where it is notoriously difficult to get a new idea under way, the Center for American Progress is proud of what has been achieved in just a few years.

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Notes We thank Ken Gude and Gadi Dechter for their thoughtful comments and guidance on this chapter. 1. The Center for American Progress launched an ambitious government reform project in 2010 called Doing What Works. The project aims to increase public trust in government by advocating for and helping institute reforms across a wide range of areas, including eliminating wasteful spending programs and tax expenditures, improving management and streamlining operations in areas like procurement, and building a foundation for smarter decision making by improving assessment and transparency. See John Podesta and Reece Rushing, Doing What Works (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2010), and http://www.americanprogress.org/ projects/doing-what-works/view/. 2. Interview with Sonal Shah, May 24, 2012. 3. National Audit Office, Managing Offenders on Short Custodial Sentences (London: Stationery Office, 2010), 4. 4. Emily Bolton, Social Impact Bonds (London: Social Finance, 2010), 9. 5. Jitinder Kohli, Douglas J. Besharov, and Kristina Costa, What Are Social Impact Bonds? (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2012), 3. 6. Ibid. 7. Cecilia Munoz and Robert Gordon, ‘‘Pay for Success: A New Results-Oriented Federal Commitment for Underserved Americans,’’ White House Blog, January 24, 2012. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/01/24/pay-success-new-results-orientedfederal-commitment-underserved-americans; and Nonprofit Finance Fund, Pay for Success: Investing in What Works Video Recap, accessed May 25, 2012, http://payforsuc cess.org/resources/pay-success-investing-what-works-video-recap. 8. Jeffrey B. Liebman, Social Impact Bonds (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2011), 4–5. 9. Ibid., 7–8. 10. Kristina Costa, Washington State Shows What Works (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2012). 11. Douglas J. Besharov is a professor at the Maryland School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, was formerly a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and was the first director of the U.S. National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect. 12. Among other efforts, Rockefeller Foundation president Judith Rodin provided the introduction to Social Finance US’s overview report on social impact bonds and former Rockefeller Foundation managing director Antony Bugg-Levine has discussed social impact bonds for The Wall Street Journal and Institutional Investor. In addition to investing in the Peterborough Prison social impact bond, the Rockefeller Foundation supported Social Finance UK in developing the concept. In the United States, the foundation has been a collaborator and supporter of, among other activities, the

Center for American Progress 321 Nonprofit Finance Fund’s Pay for Success Learning Hub, Liebman’s efforts to provide technical assistance to state and city governments, and the October 2011 White House meeting. See Social Finance, A New Tool for Scaling Impact (Boston: Social Finance, 2012), 2; Shelly Banjo, ‘‘Rockefeller Foundation Sees Social-Change Dividend,’’ Wall Street Journal, February 15, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274 8703584804576144661629994864.html; and Katie Gilbert, ‘‘The Appeal of the Social Impact Bond,’’ Institutional Investor, June 13, 2011, Accessed http://www.institutional investor.com/Article/2847158/The-Appeal-of-the-Social-Impact-Bond.html. 13. Nonprofit Finance Fund operates a comprehensive online knowledge platform on social impact bonds called the Pay for Success Learning Hub, which can be found at www.payforsuccess.org. 14. McKinsey & Company, From Potential to Action: Bringing Social Impact Bonds to the US (New York: McKinsey, 2012). 15. David Leonhardt, ‘‘For Federal Programs, a Taste of Market Discipline,’’ New York Times, February 9, 2011, accessed http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/business/ economy/09leonhardt.html; David Leonhardt, ‘‘What Are Social-Impact Bonds?’’ New York Times Economix Blog, February 8, 2011, accessed http://economix.blogs.nytimes .com/2011/02/08/what-are-social-impact-bonds/; Gadi Dechter, ‘‘Obama’s Social Impact Bonds: Private Money, Public Benefit,’’ Baltimore Sun, February 14, 2011, accessed http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011–02–14/news/bs-ed-social-bonds20110214_1_social-services-social-impact-social-finance; Kristina Costa, ‘‘New Financing Tool for Social Programs Opens Doors for Juvenile Justice,’’ Reclaiming Futures Blog, April 2, 2012, accessed http://www.reclaimingfutures.org/blog/new-financingtool-social-programs-opens-doors-juvenile-justice; and Jitinder Kohli, Douglas J. Besharov, and Kristina Costa, ‘‘Social Impact Bonds: What’s the Buzz About?,’’ Independent Sector Blog, May 10, 2012, accessed http://www.independentsector.org/blog/ post.cfm/social-impact-bonds-what-s-the-buzz-about.

Chapter 19

Carnegie Moscow Center: Russia’s Social Development—A Continuing Story Dmitri Trenin

Work at the Carnegie Moscow Center (CMC) has been and remains an adventure. The organization’s story is one of a notable contribution to Russian social development in a key area of policy research and intellectual debate. The CMC was founded under a decree signed by President Boris Yeltsin in 1992. To prepare ground for the CMC founding, the field office began its work in Moscow in 1993, and the first scholars were recruited in 1994, when the center became operational. Since the early to mid- 1990s, the CMC has witnessed an uneven evolution of Russian politics, from Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin to Dmitri Medvedev, and back to Putin again. It has also weathered many storms in Russian-Western relations, including the crises over Kosovo in 1999, Iraq in 2003, and Georgia in 2008, to name but a few. Its scholars, however, have never had to compromise their beliefs and distort their views to ensure the institution’s survival.

The Phenomenon of an International Think Tank in Russia’s Capital In Moscow, the CMC is one of a kind. It was founded at the time when Russia was a hot topic, and a number of Western think tanks—Rand among them—considered opening an office in Moscow. The Carnegie Endowment, then led by Morton Abramowitz as president, was the only one to

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carry through with this project. To this day, the CMC is the only fully functioning think tank in Russia that is part of a foreign-based institution. But the CMC is much more than a U.S. intellectual implant inside Russia: had it been only that, it is not certain it would have survived for long. At the beginning, the operating formula for the CMC was that of a field station for U.S. scholars interested in Russia. Each individual U.S. scholar participating in the project had a partner in Moscow, who was an expert in the field, knew the relevant local audience, and organized seminars and other events for his senior partner in Washington. Such a model, however, did not last too long. Naturally, even organically, without any special policy decisions taken anywhere, the relationship began to change, inexorably, toward a more equal arrangement. By the turn of the millennium, Moscowbased scholars no longer felt inferior to their Washington counterparts as far as running the programs was concerned. This led to a new phenomenon: a think tank that was neither fully American, because the Russian scholars not only dominated the Moscow center but also drove its program agenda, nor fully Russian, because the CMC remained embedded within the Carnegie Endowment as an integral part. Even as the rules of engagement changed, the operation ran fairly smoothly. Russian scholars were fast becoming well known not only in their own land but also internationally. Washington-based scholars, for their part, could use the Moscow center as a unique platform for their research and contacts in Russia and, to some extent, in other parts of the former Soviet Union. By the early 2000s, given the success of the CMC, the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, led by its president, Jessica Mathews, contributed to the idea of Carnegie as a truly international think tank. Rather than handing off the Moscow center to the Russians—which was more or less the original idea, in the early 1990s—it was decided that the CMC would become a model for other regional centers around the world. This revolutionary decision was appropriately called the Global Vision, which inspires the Carnegie Endowment to this day. By now, alongside Washington and Moscow, Carnegie has offices in Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels, and is about to open another in New Delhi. Thus, having started as an American operation in Russia, the CMC soon became a genuinely Russo-American enterprise and eventually evolved into an element of the world’s first global think tank. This significant transformation has had a major impact on its mission.

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Accomplishing the Mission When Carnegie came into Russia in the early 1990s, it sought, through its Moscow center, to offer the Russians a model of a modern think tank. The notion was novel to the former Soviet Union, accustomed as it was to the system of academic institutions under the Academy of Sciences, which itself functioned as a sort of a Ministry of Science. In the field of international relations and foreign policy, the academy had built an impressive network of specialized institutes, each of which advised the Communist Party leadership and the government ministries on developments in the United States and Canada, western Europe, eastern Europe, the Far East, the Middle East and South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Apart from that, there were institutes with a global reach: IMEMO, which dealt with the world economy and international relations; the Institute of the International Workers’ Movement; and others. In addition, various agencies of the government had their own institutes, such as the Diplomatic Academy and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. A number of universities also had their own institutes or departments engaged in international affairs research. Policy research as such was not new in Russia. It had been practiced in those parts of the Soviet academic establishment that were tasked with watching the West, such as the celebrated Institute of the USA and Canada. What was new, however, was the concept of a think tank that was independent of the government; it was this concept that the CMC was spreading through its very existence and its modus operandi. While the CMC was doing so, however, it was important for the institution not to be seen as an arm of a foreign intelligence-gathering agency, as some Russian skeptics claimed it to be. Furthermore, it was crucial to prove to the Russian audience that the CMC was neither doing research on Russia ‘‘from within’’ for the benefit of the U.S. government nor trying to indoctrinate Russians with ideas serving U.S. interests. The CMC managed to do this by holding nothing back, making everything—its proceedings, publications, financial arrangements—accessible. The message was clear: there is no hidden agenda—what you see is what you get. The center also stressed another part of its mission: to be a place for genuine debate among Russians. Prior to the collapse of the communist system, debate on foreign policy issues in the Soviet Union was strictly limited. It was only from 1987 that foreign and defense policies were first addressed in the public square. By the early 1990s, however, that debate

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had become so politicized that proponents of different views viewed each other as antagonists, and seldom found themselves under the same roof. Westernizing liberals gathered in one corner, patriots who claimed allegiance to Russia’s unique Eurasian heritage, in another; of the surviving communists, on the defensive, many also kept to themselves. Carnegie changed that. It invited anyone who had something serious to say, and was prepared to respect one’s intellectual and political opponents, to come to its gatherings and freely discuss the burning issues of the day. The CMC soon turned into Moscow’s true hotspot. People as disparate as the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the liberal torch bearer Yegor Gaidar, and the nationalist firebrand Vladimir Zhirinovsky, not to mention the communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, showed up at its packed meetings. In the early days, routine CMC seminars—actually, they were anything but routine in those days—easily assembled a half dozen members of the Duma, Russia’s foremost public opinion leaders, and even generals, including the very conservative Igor Rodionov, once Gorbachev’s nemesis, who briefly served as defense minister, and the maverick Lev Rokhlin, one of the top commanders during the first Chechen campaign. Everyone was given the floor; no one was allowed to abuse anyone; all opinions were treated with respect. Carnegie was moderating—in the literal sense of the word. By engaging a broad and diverse audience, Carnegie also moved to demolish the traditional compartmentalized Soviet system that had not allowed for government officials to intermingle much with independent experts, and certainly not journalists. These walls fell, of course, with the collapse of communism, but before the CMC arrived there had been few venues for cross sectoral, nonhierarchical discussion. Carnegie made such discussion routine. A typical meeting at the CMC included people from very different occupations, professions, and statuses, provided they shared an interest in the subject and were able and ready to contribute to debate. This did not mean, however, that Carnegie simply held it doors wide open, advertised in the street, and was generally nondiscriminating. CMC events were by invitation only, to exclude people not qualified for serious debate. CMC scholars built a database that became the equivalent of Moscow’s Who’s Who in various professional fields, thereby helping to form a community of Russian foreign policy experts and practitioners. Indeed, one of Russia’s first directories of scholars and research institutions was published by IREX with the CMC’s cooperation.

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In Soviet days, contacts with foreign scholars were closely circumscribed. Leading institutions, such as the famous ISCAN (the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies) and IMEMO were expected to maintain contacts with Western and other foreign experts, but in most other cases Soviet experts were only able to read the works of their foreign colleagues. The end of the communist era abolished those restrictions and allowed researchers to travel abroad and communicate with foreign colleagues as they saw fit, but, again, there were no institutions immediately at hand to foster the contacts that were no longer banned or tightly regulated. There was also the issue of penury, as the budgets of several institutions shrank dramatically. Carnegie jumped in to fill this gap. It introduced Russian experts to their Western counterparts on a regular and sustained basis. The Carnegie Endowment’s senior associate at the time, Michael McFaul, spent an entire year in 1995–1996 doing research from the CMC office. During that time he held dozens of seminars and countless other meetings with Russian politicians, scholars, officials, and journalists. This has had a lasting effect. When McFaul came to Moscow as U.S. ambassador in 2012, he could say that he personally, and sometimes intimately, knew the entire Russian policy establishment. Other leading scholars who spent a significant amount of time at CMC included Martha Olcott, the leading expert on Central Asia, who in 2011 founded a research center for regional studies at Almaty’s Al Farabi University, modeled to some degree on Carnegie Moscow. The CMC did not confine the contacts it sponsored to either its own Washington-based faculty or Americans. Europeans and Canadians, Chinese and Japanese, coming from a number of the world’s leading think tanks, were all welcomed at the institution. In addition to senior scholars who were invited to take residence in Moscow for a few months to work out of the CMC, many younger researchers from around the world became interns at the CMC. They were able to mix closely with their Russian peers at Carnegie Moscow, who functioned as program coordinators. This has had an impact. In the last decade and a half, a modern think tank community has taken root in Moscow and throughout Russia. Policy research has become an activity for independent think tanks not tied to a particular branch of the government. Like their Western analogues, these think tanks have to secure their own funding, and are held accountable by their sponsors. It is true that the think tanks that focus on foreign policy and have found a way to cooperate with the government, such as

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PIR-Center, are having an easier time than the think tanks that focus on domestic politics, not to speak of those that are close to the Russian political opposition. Yet the fact that Russia, twenty years after the end of the Soviet Union, has a think tank community is heartening. The CMC did not do it on its own, of course, but it certainly contributed to it by means of its own example. The culture of Russian intellectual debate has also undergone major shifts. Again, the CMC led by example. Its scholars had their values and political preferences, but they firmly committed themselves to professionalism, objectivity, and impartiality. There was—and still is—an appreciable diversity of views among CMC scholars, which does not prevent their close interaction. Carnegie does not speak with one voice, but rather from the same basic platform of values. This in turn bred respect, even among those who did not agree with the CMC scholars’ views or values, or were critical—sometimes very critical—of U.S. foreign policy. A CMC study on the Kosovo issue, which appeared in 1999 at the time of the conflict in the Balkans, received two letters of praise: one from the German ambassador to Russia, and the other one from the chief of the Russian General Staff.

Generating Usable Policy Ideas Carnegie Moscow’s mission, of course, has not been only about setting a good example and promoting national and international exchanges. It has had a very rich research program, which was aimed at generating usable ideas for public policy. These programs, to some extent, informed Russian policymaking. Not only did senior government officials come and take part in CMC seminars or followed them by means of podcasts, several CMC scholars moved on to become decision makers in various fields. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Mikhail Dmitriev, who led the CMC’s Economics Program, worked on a blueprint for Russia’s pension reform. Dmitriev came to Carnegie after serving as a deputy economics minister in the Russian government. He left the CMC to become a first deputy minister, working closely with Herman Gref, the leading reformer of the early 2000s. Dmitriev was the first to demonstrate that a revolving door cycle for scholars to swap places with officials could work in Russia as it does in the United States. He now heads the Center for Strategic Research, which, despite its links to the Russian government, has been free to engage in

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research openly critical of the government’s policies. Dmitriev is now a prominent member of the liberal wing within the Russian government, which is close to former finance minister Alexei Kudrin. The pension reform, however, is still on the agenda, and the government has few options other than turning to professionals like Dmitriev when they eventually pluck up enough political courage. Another CMC scholar, Sergei Vasiliev, an economist like Dmitriev, made a similar career. He left the center to become a senator from Leningrad region, and then a vice chairman of the board of Russia’s Development Bank, VEB. As of today, Dmitriev and Vasiliev are exceptions as scholars turned government officials turned scholars again. In the future, however, if the process of modernization goes forward, such a pattern could become more common in Russia, providing a closer link between think tank activities and policymaking. At about the same time, another CMC scholar, Tatiana Maleva, was engaged in pioneering research on a subject that has only become popular recently: the emergence of the Russian middle class. From the start, Maleva clearly saw that she had to devise her own methodology and a set of techniques to identify and measure the Russian middle class, as simple importations from Western theories made little if any sense in a post-Soviet Russian environment. Maleva did not join the government, like Dmitriev, or become a banker, like Vasiliev. Instead, she was able, thanks to a generous grant from the Ford Foundation, to upgrade her program to an Independent Institute of Social Policy. Carnegie’s loss, however, was Russia’s gain. Tatiana Maleva advised the government extensively, and became a leading public figure on social issues. More recently, she has been advising the city government of Moscow, a twelve-million-strong metropolis and the hub of Russia’s middle class. Maleva’s other areas of interest addressed issues no less vital to Russia’s present and future: the country’s birth and death rate. As a sociologist rather than a demographer, she sought to examine those issues to the extent they were connected with people’s well-being and social status. Her books became bestsellers, though, of course, CMC has never actually sold its books. Demography was also the field where another CMC scholar, Galina Vitkovskaya, did her research. She focused on domestic and cross-border migration. Internal and external migration was a highly topical subject in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, with millions of people on the move within what used to be, just a few years previously, a single state.

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One area on which Vitkovskaya focused was the issue of Chinese immigration into Russia. In the late 1990s, there were numerous wild reports, often supported by government officials, of ‘‘millions’’ of Chinese immigrants engaged in a ‘‘demographic aggression’’ against Russia, particularly in the sparsely populated Far Eastern and Siberian provinces. Vitkovskaya went on research trips, literally counting Chinese migrants at various localities in eastern Russia, to dispel those rumors while arguing that a certain amount of Chinese immigration into Russia was inevitable and actually beneficial to the Russian economy. She pleaded for a policy of integration of foreigners into Russia’s multiethnic society. When the Russian State Duma, in the mid-2000s, was debating immigration bills, Vitkovskaya was among those who insisted on liberalizing legislation on immigration, which was eventually done, thanks in part to the efforts of public intellectuals such as herself. In the mid-2000s, administrative reform was high on the Russian government’s agenda. A former head of Russia’s Securities and Exchange Commission, Dmitri Vasiliev, joined the CMC to pursue a project that saw administrative reform in the spirit of good governance as an instrument to reduce government corruption. Intellectually, the project was a success. In real terms, however, its findings were never heeded by Russian officialdom. Vasiliev soon moved on to become head of a Moscow energy company, and regrettably has disappeared from the research field. Clearly, think tank activities alone are woefully insufficient to take on such issues as corruption. Think tanks are capable of exposing the nature of corruption in societies like that of present-day Russia and of devising ways of limiting corruption in the state bureaucracy. Public anticorruption activities in Russia are being led by such advocacy groups as the Russian chapter of Transparency International, headed by Elena Panfilova (a CMC Research Council member) and the National Anti-Corruption Committee led by Kirill Kabanov, as well as by popular bloggers and activists like Alexei Navalny. Russia is formally known as a federation, though in reality it is still more of a unitary state. After a period of extreme weakness of the central authority in the 1990s when Russia was dangerously close to disintegration, the state was recentralized again by Vladimir Putin. Yet new centralization has also had a stifling effect. The country’s social and economic development makes it increasingly difficult to manage Russia’s diversity from any one center. The CMC scholar Nikolay Petrov has been closely monitoring Russian regional development. The CMC has not been able, mainly for budgetary regions, to fan out from Moscow to Russia’s eleven time zones—

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even though former president Dmitri Medvedev made the task easier by merging several of them, so that the total is now only nine. However, the CMC’s Petrov is staying in touch with policy expert communities in Russia’s key regions, who contribute to CMC publications. Carnegie Moscow’s bimonthly journal, Pro et Contra, which the center has published with the generous support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation since 1996, is widely used in universities around the country as one of the main sources of analyses of topical issues. The CMC has both followed Russia’s spiritual evolution and sought to contribute to it. The Religion and Society program led by Alexei Malashenko has focused on two vastly different areas experiencing revival: Islam and Orthodox Christianity. Through this program, the CMC has become a forum for dialogue among traditional and more radical supporters of Islam, committed Islamists, secular experts, government officials, and journalists. This role was particularly crucial during the war in Chechnya, with its Islamist overtones, but with the process of Islamization well under way in the north Caucasus and even in the more moderate environment of Muslim communities elsewhere in the Russian Federation, the center functions as a rare venue for candid discussion on Islam in Moscow. The key to that role is the trust that all parties in the debate have developed in Carnegie’s program chair, Malashenko. The reinvigoration of the Russian Orthodox Church and its role as Russia’s spiritual guide have become particularly pronounced with the 2009 election of the current patriarch of Moscow and All Russias, Kirill. Carnegie has offered itself as a platform for dialogue on church-state issues, with prominent theologians engaging in debate with liberal journalists, ably moderated again by the CMC host, Alexei Malashenko. A series of books he edits, Religion in Eurasia, has become very popular with the readership across the country and takes center stage at Carnegie’s presentations at the annual Nonfiction Book Fair in Moscow.

Critique of Official Policies and Suggestions for Alternative Solutions Over the years, the CMC has assumed the role of a close monitor and critic of the policies of the Russian government along a rather broad front. During the Chechen War, Dmitri Trenin and Alexei Malashenko wrote books, papers, and articles sharply critical of the methods of war fighting in the

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north Caucasus. Senior Associate Lilia Shevtsova leaves no stone unturned in her indomitable efforts to expose the nature and dangers of the system of personal power that still dominates Russia’s political regime. Alexei Arbatov, who before joining Carnegie had spent several years on the Duma floor as deputy chair of the Defense Committee, and Major General (retired) Vladimir Dvorkin, formerly Russia’s top nuclear strategist, put forth ideas on military reform to wean the national defense establishment off the mind-set that arose during the Cold War and has yet to be entirely laid to rest. Several CMC scholars have taken inspiration from their counterparts in Washington to produce an ‘‘Agenda for the New Presidency,’’ to discuss the issues facing the country and ways of dealing with those issues. Rather than providing advice to the new incumbent, Vladimir Putin, this 2012 collection contributes to the public debate on policies. The ‘‘Agenda’’ was published in the form of a special edition of Pro et Contra. The journal, led by Maria Lipman, who took over from its founder, Marina PavlovaSilvanskaya, is the CMC’s flagship publication. As its very name suggests, Pro et Contra brings together authors who debate the pros and cons of various policies and measures, thus further entrenching the culture of modern policy debate in Russia. As a think tank with the words ‘‘international peace’’ as part of its name, the Carnegie Endowment has traditionally prioritized foreign and security policy issues. While this chapter does not deal with those areas, I should point out that CMC programs and projects during the past two decades have contributed to the formation of a modern foreign and security policy community in Russia. Thus, Nuclear Nonproliferation, one of the CMC’s longest-running programs, helped bring together various parts of Russia’s nuclear policy community and sustain it, particularly during the 1990s. It also helped mobilize the resources of that community in the late 2000s to revive arms control in the run-up to the negotiations for a New Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty. In 2006–2008, the CMC turned itself into a platform for detailed dialogue on nuclear and strategic issues, led by center director Rose Gottemoeller, who in 2009 as U.S. assistant secretary of state headed the American delegation that negotiated the treaty, and by Alexei Arbatov, Russia’s defense policy expert. CMC was also instrumental in assembling a group of eminent personalities who in 2009–2011 formed a Carnegie Commission on the EuroAtlantic Security Initiative. In terms of its impact in Russia, the commission was a pioneering exercise in getting views by an independent international

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body seriously studied and considered by the Russian government. It helped bring together senior Russians, Americans, and Europeans—many of whom were still steeped in the mentality of mutual adversity—in a joint exercise toward a common goal and produced a palpable community spirit.

Entering the Third Decade: New Challenges Ahead As the CMC turns twenty, Russia’s domestic evolution is at a new juncture. Following the protests after the Duma elections, Russian society has awakened and will not slump back into its prior slumber. Russia’s future political evolution is uncertain. What is clear, however, is that society is on the move, that the present political setup is unsustainable in the medium term, and that things will not remain as they were until late 2011. Russia will be one of the places to watch in the next few years, and the CMC scholars’ ability to understand what is happening, why, and in what direction the situation is evolving will be crucial. This puts CMC scholars before a new set of challenges in terms of the center’s own ‘‘software’’ and ‘‘hardware.’’ With its original mission largely accomplished as a result of Russia’s civil society development, what is CMC’s new mission? With its core set of programs stable since the early 2000s, what are the new questions that need to be asked? With the advent of new technologies in digital communication, what are the new ways of and tools for doing business? With the Carnegie Endowment now present at five (soon to be six) locations globally, what is the role of the Carnegie Moscow Center in that constellation? In regard to Russia’s socioeconomic development some questions must be asked, such as who are the target audiences of the CMC and what can be the real-world impact of the center’s activities on these audiences? How can the institution maximize and measure that impact? What are the optimal formats of events, publications, and outreach? What are the ways of rejuvenating both the faculty and the audiences? These are all difficult questions, without obvious answers. Taken together, they emphasize the need to redesign the think tank that already has a history, established practices and preferences, and inertia. Whether the Carnegie Moscow Center is up to the task will only be proven by the center itself. The adventure continues.

Chapter 20

Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas and PRONASCI: A Study of Brazilian Think Tanks Celso Castro, Elena Lazarou, and Marco Aurelio Ruediger

This chapter demonstrates how the Fundac¸a˜o Getulio Vargas (FGV) has influenced an important policy issue fundamental to the social development of contemporary Brazil—the national Public Security with Citizenship (PRONASCI) program launched in 2008 by the Ministry of Justice. It also explains how FGV’s strategy, structure, and resources contributed to its ability to successfully address this issue. FGV is a private, independent, and nonprofit institution created in 1944 to foster Brazilian development. To accomplish this goal the institution trains qualified personnel for the administration of Brazil’s public and private sectors and produces and advances scientific and technological knowledge for public and private organizations. Since the outset, FGV has carried out research and development in four areas: management, economics, social sciences, and law. With main headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, Sa˜o Paulo, and Brası´lia, it also, through cooperation agreements with other institutions, operates in all other Brazilian states,1 as well as in 196 of the principal Brazilian municipalities and ten foreign cities in Latin America and Africa. It has over 1,650 professors and researchers and has published over 250 books and 22 periodicals. FGV’s organizational structure combines units that are primarily academic (schools whose main objective is to produce knowledge) with units that are dedicated to consulting, extension, and applied research programs. The production and application of knowledge follow two complementary

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lines: academic development feeds into extension courses and training (primarily continuing education), as well as into consulting projects for both the public and the private sector. The institution’s extension and research programs bring in the majority of the funding necessary for its activities, and also stimulate academic creativity through meeting specific needs. In this way, the development of research within FGV’s schools produces advancements in knowledge that are translated into high-quality teaching and, more importantly, into empirical applications for the design and implementation of diverse projects in both the public and private sectors. The three vectors that jointly guide FGV and make it uniquely positioned within Brazil’s political and institutional context are a solid and extensive academic base, a wide range of tools to manage information accumulated and refined over nearly seventy years of operation, and tradition combined with firsthand experience of national issues and events over time. The stages of the knowledge-into-policy chain begin with a theoretical conception phase by academics; second is research undertaken to help implement the knowledge gained; third, this knowledge serves as the theoretical and methodological framework for the implementation of broad and specific policies; and last, the institution contributes to society through effective action with direct benefits for the public and by promoting transparency. FGV produces critical reflections on strategic national issues, and it helps apply the knowledge produced. As a result, it must constantly adapt its structure, while assisting in the production and implementation of policies to address the interconnectedness of these national issues through empirical analyses. There is a constant challenge to translate knowledge into applied policy. Critical to FGV’s success is the wide network of leaders and experts it has developed over the years. Out of a sample of one thousand major Brazilian companies, 25 per cent of directors are FGV alumni. For every ten executives of major public and private companies, seven are FGV alumni. The organization is a resource for the production and maintenance of government public policy, as well as for the publication of statistical models, the indexing of public and private contracts, and the domestic inflation index. FGV is also a source for the international media on subjects concerning Brazil. Another telling indicator of FGV’s success is that over the past few years, the Ministry of Education has consistently ranked FGV as administering three out of five of the best undergraduate courses in the country.

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Because of FGV’s cumulative record of achievement, the quality of its schools, and its wide network, FGV is a nationally recognized and respected institution, enjoying high credibility. We now present one specific case study in detail.

The National Public Security with Citizenship Program—PRONASCI Over the past fifteen years, Brazil has made important political, economic, and social advances. The country enjoys a consolidated political democracy, a growing economy with low inflation, and a gradual reduction of poverty. At the same time, the country has increased its presence on the international stage, and is widely considered an important emerging power. Despite these advances, there still exist major challenges to be faced by a country that encompasses nearly 200 million inhabitants and a land area of more than 8.5 million square kilometers. Among these problems is public security, in particular, the high rate of homicides. In response to this issue, the Ministry of Justice launched the Public Security with Citizenship program, whose projected goal was to reduce the rate of homicides in Brazil from twenty-nine to twelve per 100 million inhabitants in four years.2 This program was established on the basis of ninety-four specific policies, involving police qualification, technological modernization, social inclusion, and police occupation of violent areas with high crime rates. The key concept is that the complexity of urban violence requires a systemic response by the federal government, in cooperation with the individual states and municipalities, to integrate a series of policies in police-occupied communities. The Public Security with Citizenship program is a pioneering initiative that combines the prevention and control of violence with initiatives focused on the sociocultural roots of crime. PRONASCI combines public security programs with social policies already developed by the federal government, without forgoing traditional strategies of control and qualified repression of crime. The initiatives developed by PRONASCI follow the guidelines developed by the Public Security System, whose central focus is the synergy between federal, state, and municipalities to combat crime. PRONASCI grew out of the premise that public security is a political issue. However, treating it only as a matter of imposing security and control would not lead to a successful security policy. This premise explains the

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‘‘with’’ in the name of the program, fundamental to its understanding: Public Security with Citizenship, security initiatives with social initiatives. In order to achieve this goal, PRONASCI had to develop a strategy that allowed it to create an unprecedented synergy within the Brazilian federative structure. The federal government had never before, in this field, coordinated its policies together with state governments, while systematically monitoring the results. Constitutionally, public security falls under the responsibility of the states of the federation, which are directly linked to the police corps. As a result, the federal government has—until recently— avoided intervening directly in issues of public security except in a few exceptional cases. Municipalities are, in turn, responsible for policing individual communities. This task is carried out by ‘‘municipal guards’’ without lethal weapons.3 Under PRONASCI, synergy between the different levels of government was achieved through a combination of citizen action and police enforcement. Specific programs under PRONASCI include scholarships for police officers who participated in refresher courses offered by local universities; a housing plan for members of the police forces; a ‘‘Women of Peace’’ program, which offers scholarships to women leaders who were responsible for identifying at-risk youth and families within poor communities, among others. Several of these programs were integrated into a broader initiative known as ‘‘Territories of Peace.’’ Inspired by similar programs in Colombia and Chicago, these community-building programs inherently created new roles for the police. Through these types of programs, PRONASCI aims to break down historical mistrust between the public and police, while at the same time combating police discrimination against lower-class citizens, in effect extending public security rights to all social classes. PRONASCI aims not only to reduce urban violence but also to introduce new methods of inclusion that generate opportunities and social mobility for all citizens. Thus, PRONASCI marked the beginning of a paradigm shift in the nation’s public security environment through a federative approach that was not merely federal. It modified all existing logic through which public security was delegated to state and municipal governments, and in which the police were inextricably linked to the idea and rhetoric of repression. It is important to emphasize the scope of the program, its capillarity, which included 150 municipalities and more than one thousand agreements signed by the Ministry of Justice. In addition, the program invested a total of US$4.2 billion in the first four years of operation (2007–2011).

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FGV’s Role in PRONASCI and Its Impact on Public Policies FGV was invited by the Ministry of Justice to prepare and implement a monitoring system, as well as evaluate and coordinate the institutional development of PRONASCI. FGV participated in the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of PRONASCI over eighteen months in 2007– 2009.4 Because there was no dynamic integration before PRONASCI, the demands of the states and municipalities were attended to ad hoc, without any efficient system of control over the utilization of resources. At the Ministry of Justice’s request, FGV created a control system (System of Monitoring and Evaluating PRONASCI) that required the prefectures and states wanting to receive PRONASCI resources to create a structure in which to receive them. They were required to reform themselves according to the guidelines defined by the ministry, and be subject to defined responsibilities and controls. If they failed to meet these conditions, they would not receive the resources. There are various points of control in this process. The monitoring system concurrently provided a methodology for the evaluation of public policy, supported by information-management tools, and consolidated relevant information from various sources, hired personnel, implemented projects, and created budget guidelines. It also helped to diagnose challenges in the public safety system through monitoring the implementation of projects and assessing their impact on society. A number of seminars provided the conceptual framework for PRONASCI from its origin. In addition, PRONASCI developers looked to similar programs in other countries, as noted, such as Colombia and the United States, particularly their systematic approaches and use of police occupation in volatile high-crime territories. In both these cases there was a clear readjustment of police behavior. Building on this knowledge, PRONASCI invested heavily at a national level in police training and orientation. In the initial phase of PRONASCI, there were almost one hundred meetings in various parts of the country. It was, therefore, a process that involved learning about the subject and not just adopting a ready-made model. The methodology involved the creation of focus groups and interviews with police and target populations in order to analyze the investment in public security. The institution conducted surveys with more than eighty-six thousand people, including police and target populations, to evaluate the beneficiaries’ perception of the final implementation of the program. The design and operation of PRONASCI’s management model was also largely based on the experience accumulated by FGV in overseeing

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implementation of a wide range of projects over the years, as well as evaluating their impact and societal accountability. To maximize its capacities, FGV consolidated its expertise in both the Brazilian federal system (a topic dear to the social sciences) and the public administration structure, as well as in the justice system. FGV also has practical experience in national initiatives through its close relationship with the three levels of government—federal, state, and municipal—in project development consulting, as well as in the formation of qualified public managers and qualified personnel. FGV’s objective, therefore, was to develop a monitoring methodology intended to provide the ministry with the capacity to constantly calibrate its policies, assess the final implementation, and promote greater efficiency and transparency. The process therefore involved different dimensions: institution building, the construction of a new security model with a federative base, and the institutionalization of management tools for decision making in public security. This ensured that the adjustment of public policy would occur within a process of continual policy feedback. Regarding the actual impact of PRONASCI on crime rate reduction in Brazil, not much data is yet available. Some early indicators, however, suggest that it has been successful, at least in the major urban centers. For example, between 2000 and 2010 the key cities of Rio de Janeiro, Sa˜o Paulo, and Belo Horizonte saw a drop in the number of homicides from 56.6 per 1,000 inhabitants to 24.3 (a drop of 53.7 percent) in Rio, from 64.8 to 13.0 in Sa˜o Paulo, and from 34.8 to 24.9 in Belo Horizonte, as recent research has shown.5

The ‘‘Four I’s’’ at FGV: How They Work Together This brief overview of the structure and the functioning of FGV, as well as its role in the PRONASCI program, makes clear a certain ‘‘elective affinity’’ between the program’s characteristics—its national dimension, the reach of its operations (including its network), and the necessary synergy between the different levels of the federation, and so on—that is very similar to FGV’s own history and structure. These same characteristics have enabled FGV, over time, to deal with problems on this scale. In a sense, FGV’s mission, experience with national initiatives, and expertise in dealing with

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different levels of the Brazilian government make PRONASCI a good example of its work. Beyond this elective affinity, however, it is important also to highlight some of FGV’s principles in its operation as a think tank, which help create effective actions. These values can be synthesized as the ‘‘Four I’s,’’ comprising the four key goals of the institution’s current agenda: interdisciplinarity, integration, innovation, and internationalization. Interdisciplinarity refers to FGV’s structure—the multiplicity of schools and research centers with different disciplinary backgrounds—which creates a valuable pool of researchers who are able to approach the same issues and policy challenges from different perspectives. As the only think tank of its kind in Brazil, FGV thus holds the ability to approach issues in a holistic and interdisciplinary way, considering the social, economic, political, managerial, legal, and quantitative aspects of policy proposals at the same time. This is particularly relevant in today’s increasingly interdependent and complex environment.6 The benefits of interdisciplinarity are maximized by FGV’s high level of internal integration. FGV management consistently works to improve coordination and familiarization among its various units. This occurs, for example, through weekly brainstorming meetings at the directorial level, the presentation of potential major projects of various units to all other FGV research units, the introduction of new colleagues and researchers and their areas of expertise across FGV, and other such activities. New colleagues are encouraged to propose ways in which their research and ideas could work in conjunction with colleagues from other FGV areas. Integration is also pursued externally. FGV is strongly poised as an actor with close links to Brazilian policymakers, the media, entrepreneurs, and the public. It is thus ‘‘integrated’’ in Brazilian society, a unique position that increases the legitimacy and outreach of its proposals, as well as provides FGV researchers and directors with a sense of the demands of Brazilian society and policymakers. FGV strives to further cultivate these relationships in order to maintain relevance and maximize the potential of its research to make a valuable contribution to the country. Together, interdisciplinarity and integration allow FGV to make policy proposals and introduce ideas that are innovative, or ‘‘out of the box.’’ 7 As for internationalization, in today’s globalized and interdependent world, and given Brazil’s rising significance, FGV aims to be a bridge between Brazil and the outside world, informing Brazilian foreign policy on developments abroad and promoting Brazilian domestic issues in international forums. In recent

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years, FGV has established a number of international partnerships, and continues to do so, to increase its participation in the global community. FGV’s intent is to engage in cooperation and mutual exchange with similar institutions around the world as a way to improve its knowledge, best practices, and international relations. With this in mind, in 2008 FGV inaugurated the Center of International Relations, a key tool in this process of internationalization. Having made networking and peer-to-peer exchanges one of the key aspects of its international activity, FGV aims to serve as a model for how an integrative structure, interdisciplinarity, innovation, and internationalization can apply to think tanks in Latin America and emerging countries in other areas. At the same time, as stated above, FGV intends to draw on the examples of other institutions facing the challenge of formulating policies in areas similar to those in which Brazilian policymakers are looking for better and more efficient answers. Social security and the case study in question offer such an example. As mentioned above, FGV partially drew on the experience of Chicago and Colombia for the formulation of the PRONASCI. Nevertheless, these policies had to be adapted to the reality of the Brazilian urban environment. The U.S. policies had been designed for cities smaller in size, more advanced in infrastructure, and characterized by substantially lower levels of inequality and corruption. The Colombian projects were aimed at confronting urban violence linked to different political realities. PRONASCI adapted examples drawn from these cases to the Brazilian context: that of an emerging economy, with a fast growing GDP and a rapidly transforming social environment. As a consequence, FGV’s work can be of use to other think tanks operating in similar environments and facing the same challenges, such as South Africa and India.

Final Considerations Some scholars have argued that think tanks become more important in critical situations.8 FGV recognizes its role in supporting changes in Brazil as the country prepares itself to become a global power. Through its credibility, as attested by studies with different audiences, and its network of executives in companies and officials at different levels of the government,

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FGV focuses on its mission to contribute to the economic and social development of Brazil. This is possible due to three elements: credibility, network, and focus on its mission. Today’s world presents us with numerous threats and problems that are global in scale and unpredictable in their nature. These are what James McGann and Richard Sabatini refer to as policy tsunamis: critical issues we need to identify, preempt as problems, and design policies around.9 At the same time, we are undoubtedly facing a time of ‘‘critical junctures’’— moments when change is continuously being triggered by endogenous and exogenous factors, change that will last long. We are facing a new global order. It is in these times that the knowledge produced by think tanks can have a maximum impact on policymaking. Brazil is facing a critical juncture of development, global projection, and the rise of prosperity. Given FGV’s mission to promote Brazil’s economic and social development, and its credibility, network, and efficiency, this is an opportune moment for it and other think tanks and for the country itself to maximize their impact and influence in the country and the world. Consistent learning, refinement of methods and practices, and inspiration drawn from similar institutions across the world are the way to optimize policy proposals and better governance.

Notes 1. Brazil is a federal republic composed of twenty-six states and one federal district. 2. The sources used in this section were PRONASCI’s report from FGV and the book edited by Marieta Ferreira de Moraes and Aˆngela Britto, Seguranc¸a e cidadania: Memo´rias do Pronasci (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2010). 3. On the federal level the Brazilian police force is supervised by the Ministry of Justice. The Federal Police agency is responsible for specific types of crimes (drug trafficking, for example) and for safeguarding maritime, aerial, and land borders. 4. The coordinator of the project at FGV was Prof. Marco Aure´lio Ruediger. 5. Mapa da Violeˆncia (Instituto Sangari, 2012), based on official data from the Ministries of Justice and Public Health, as well as the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. The same research gives evidence that the rate of homicides is growing in the interior of the country and in smaller cities, especially in the northeast region. 6. For example, few economic decisions today do not carry an important social and international aspect. The economic reshuffling of GDP per capita in Brazil, for instance, has had such implications, and sociologists and international relations scholars at FGV work closely on these aspects together with its leading economists.

342 Social Policy 7. Two examples: bringing together mathematics and sociology, FGV has created a Center for Applied Mathematics with benefits for sociological research. Its Center for Technology and Society has been a key actor in promoting the role of the Internet as a tool of public participation and consultation in the introduction of legislation. 8. Diane Stone, Andrew Denham, and Mark Garnett, Think Tanks Across Nations: A Comparative Approach (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). 9. James McGann and Richard Sabatini, Global Think Tanks: Policy Networks and Governance (Global Institutions) (London: Routledge, 2011).

Conclusion: Recommendations for Think Tanks and Policymakers

What can we learn from these chapters? Along what lines can we draw meaningful comparisons among the various case studies, and to what end? Most fundamentally, what structural and contextual conditions make a think tank effective—both generally and in social policy more specifically? How do think tanks respond to the challenges posed by the processes of globalization? First and foremost, the case studies in this volume provide a meaningful demonstration of the incredible potential of think tanks to inform and influence policymakers and policy outcomes. In each instance, the hard work of the institution’s dedicated scholars, in combination with the structure of the think tank and political environment it operates in, proved translatable into tangible social development policies. That, even at the most basic or far-removed level, is of immeasurable value. Beyond the platitude that these think tanks have proved their own relevance to the policymaking process, the examples explored in this volume allow us to draw a number of reasonable conclusions by means of juxtaposing the experiences of the researchers and institutions across different political environments, civil society contexts, and organizational structures.

Think Tanks in Their Political Contexts The case of the Korea Development Institute is perhaps one of the more clear-cut examples of a think tank’s ability to adapt to a changing political environment. Itself an independent think tank, KDI has evolved as the Korean government has transitioned from an authoritarian to a democratic

344 Conclusion

regime. And as that regime changed, so, too, did the extent to which KDI allowed its policy recommendations to fall outside traditional Korean policy, increasingly innovating as the space for that innovation grew. Like KDI’s, the success of the Tanzania think tank REPOA has in many ways been reliant on and based on the institution’s ability to constantly adapt to the ever-changing Tanzanian political environment. Though earlier REPOA had operated within a decidedly undemocratic national context, it was able to gain traction in the context of the country’s democratization and political liberalization. More specifically, the redefinition of the role of government in relationship to other actors in politics and society has provided more space for policy think tanks (like REPOA) in the policymaking process. Further, with the changing political landscape has come the increasing accountability of the government—and thus the government’s increasing reliance on research and policy advice. In the interest of generating successful policy outcomes, the Tanzanian government has sought assistance, and REPOA has capitalized on its own organizational capacity to rigorously advise and guide the increasingly democratic government. Ultimately, it has been REPOA’s ability to adapt to the political system that has allowed for its success in influencing policy. The role that could potentially be played by think tanks as ‘‘guardians’’ against corruption and ‘‘defenders’’ of democratic values in newly democratized countries, where the democratic system is characterized by malfunctions related to issues of governance and postcolonial legacies, is illustrated by the impact the Argentine think tank CIPPEC had on the implementation of the Law on Educational Funding. The law, which was adopted by the Kirchner government in 2005, called for increased investment in education, science, and technology by an amount equal to 6 percent of GDP by 2010. Achieving that goal would be difficult, however: the economic crisis that enveloped the country in the mid-2000s actually had led to a decrease in educational investment. Facing these fiscal realities, CIPPEC worked with the Argentine Congress to create a monitoring project to ensure the implementation of the law at the provincial level throughout the country. In this case, it was essentially a matter of influencing the hegemonic discourses on educational funding and ensuring compliance through transparency with established laws. CIPPEC seems to have achieved just that through smart communications strategies and capacity building with policymakers at different levels

Conclusion 345

of government. Finally, the propagation by the media of a new type of hegemonic discourse in which qualitative education is perceived as crucial to social development contributes to CIPPEC’s success. The shift from an authoritarian regime to a democratic forms of government also means that think tanks in the country that has undergone that transformation need to modify their strategy in order to influence policymaking. This is demonstrated by Indonesia’s CSIS, which emphasizes that think tanks not only are expected to provide direct policy advice and ideas to government but also focus on NGOs, civil society groups, and media. This places significant pressure on a think tank such as CSIS, which navigates in an Indonesian policy context characterized by fragmented executive and legislative government bodies both at the central and regional level. Government development policy is another area in which think tanks have played a political role, especially in China. Semiofficial think tanks such as the Institute of World Economics and Politics within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences have been able to gain traction in the context of the opening up and reform policy launched by the Chinese government. The need for informed policy advice has only increased as the rebalancing of the Chinese economy has become one of the main priorities of Chinese policymakers. IWEP and CASS have played and continue to play an essential role the reshaping of China’s development strategy. IWEP has been involved at the three stages of policymaking: policy discussion, policymaking, and dissemination of ideas. Furthermore, when RMB appreciation and global imbalance became a debated issue among G20 members, IWEP was involved in the policy negotiation process with the Chinese government, while at the same being increasingly active at the global level. At the same time IWEP and think tanks operating in the Chinese policy environment must adapt to the particular context, which (although this context is evolving) remains significantly more closed than the climate for think tanks in Europe or the United States. IWEP scholars have been influential because of their close working relationship with major government agencies involved in reform programs, which supposes at the same time that they cannot be as vocal in the media, for example. More specifically IWEP scholars have assisted the government with monetary policy, exchange rate policy, capital account liberalization, RMB internationalization, monitoring of short-term capital flows, and many other issues.

346 Conclusion

The Nature of Civil Society and Think Tank Operations The Warsaw-based Center for Social and Economic Research provides an illustrative example of the power of think tanks to adapt to and take advantage of changes in the structure and robustness of the broader civil society in which they operate. While headquartered in Poland, CASE proved able to ‘‘go international’’ in the context of the nation’s and region’s postcommunist transition and the European integration that followed. The institution’s involvement in the early stages of Poland’s economic transformation put it at the forefront of policy advising both within Poland and throughout eastern Europe amid the otherwise sluggish pace of post–Cold War reforms. As civil society grew more robust, CASE emerged as an unequivocal leader, capitalizing on its prior success to maximize its own potential to provide meaningful and impactful advice to the region’s policymakers. The Gulf Research Center provides an instructive counterpoint to that of CASE. Whereas CASE rose to prominence in a country and region whose civil society was expanding and deepening at a brisk and steady pace, the GRC faces a unique set of challenges given its base in what is generally viewed as a more closed, legally constrained civil society. While nearby countries such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have acknowledged the value of and need for policy advice from research institutions, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia think tanks remain a largely unknown phenomenon. The very existence of the GRC, which focuses on the political, economic, and security development of the Gulf states, fundamentally challenges this condition. Integrating its organizational structure with the specifics of Saudi culture—by means of, for example, a stakeholder model based on the personal contacts that underwrite Saudi social culture—the GRC has maximized its impact even in the context of a political environment and civil society that by their very nature largely minimize the potential impact of such institutions. India provides another example in which think tanks must compete with civil society, although the Indian case is more positive for the future role of think tanks in Indian policymaking. Indeed, public policy think tanks, such as the Centre for Public Policy (CPP) and Centre for Policy Research (CPR) have been able to play important roles as policy advisers in the area of infrastructure development. In Bangalore, the CPP proposed the design and implementation of the direction-based bus service initiative. Its deep understanding of Bangalore’s transportation needs and its knowledge of government policy—along with the ability to exert influence on

Conclusion 347

government policy—made this possible. CPR also had a deep understanding not only of the policy process but also the financial side of infrastructure investment in playing a role in the designing the cluster bus system in New Delhi. There are quite a few overlapping features in the two transportation cases: they both cover the Indian socioeconomic context and the crucial need to reform the transportation system to ameliorate socioeconomic problems in a country undergoing transformational changes related to both internal demographic issues and processes of globalization. They both emphasize the top-down, centralized nature of the Indian policy context where think tanks have traditionally exerted limited influence in favor of civil society organizations. This may have changed, as evidenced by the CPP case but especially the CPR case; both point to the growing space for think tanks in countries such as India, which are undergoing dramatic changes and therefore are in dire need for smart and practical policy solutions. We have also seen that cooperation between international scholars and national and local civil society organizations in conjunction with the use of existing laws can lead to a redefinition of public policy problems. This is especially true in a context where change is hindered by structural impediments related to economic interests that are embedded in the political culture. This is demonstrated by Mexico’s Fundar and its Subsidios al Campo project, where global research synergy and cooperation with local and national civil society organizations facilitated by extensive use of the Federal Transparency and Access to Government Public Information Law helped to uncover evidence about how federal monies allotted to farm subsidies are distributed to Mexico’s biggest rural producers. Despite the fact that no serious measures have yet been taken to redistribute these monies because of the resistance of interest groups and government inertia, the cooperation between scholars and civil society organizations should be considered a success from a policy perspective. The success lies in the raised salience of the issue at the public level. The hope and objective is that the increased salience of the issue eventually will lead to the formulation by the Mexican government of a progressive farm subsidy policy.

Organizational Structure: Different Roads to Success The Brookings Institution in the United States provides an example of the successful use of a stakeholder participation model in the development and

348 Conclusion

promotion of its policy research. In this particular example, Brookings adopted the participatory model in the generation and dissemination of research on education policy, culminating in the publishing of the Global Compact on Learning Report. Among the GCL’s goals were the maintenance of an open education agenda and the establishment of clear priorities for the future of education reform. The stakeholder model allowed actors external to Brookings not only to buy into the policy recommendations set forth in the GCL but also to act as full collaborators in the dissemination, outreach, and adoption of the report’s findings. This stakeholder model was then complemented by the flexibility and dynamism of the institution, both of which are inherent to its very nature and structure. The African Economic Research Consortium operates under a substantially different organizational structure. Based in Nairobi, Kenya, the institution is formally incorporated as a 501(3)(c) not-for-profit group with exclusively charitable, scientific, literary, and educational purposes. Though the group’s board of directors and program committee set institutional policy and coordinate the research agenda, many of the AERC’s efforts focus on alleviating problems that have plagued the region’s research organizations more generally. Most broadly, the consortium has focused much of its activity on enhancing the capacity of locally based researchers to conduct policy-relevant inquiry, promoting the maintenance of that capacity, and encouraging its application in the policy context. In doing so, the AERC maximizes its own effectiveness—both in enhancing the policy research environment in the region writ large and in furthering the research the consortium itself produces.

Synthesis and Recommendations The lessons to be learned from the set of cases presented are at least twofold. First, and most important, the cases together demonstrate more clearly than they possibly could separately the importance and relevance of ideas in today’s world. Never before have ideas been so powerful, so transformative, as in the ever more globalized, integrated world of the twenty-first century. And as the points of origin, the incubators, and the governesses of ideas, the institutions responsible for their very success, think tanks have never been more relevant—nor have their success and impact ever been more important in facing the challenges of the day.

Conclusion 349

Beyond that lesson, though, there lies a second regarding how think tanks might do just that—rise to the challenges of the twenty-first century. More than anything else, the cases in this volume all so clearly demonstrate the value of adaptability. Only by constantly changing and reinventing themselves can think tanks meet the challenges posed by a world in a constant state of flux and development. The think tanks that enjoy the most profound success are those that are unfettered by changes in the systems in which they operate, instead diving headfirst into the new relationships, power dynamics, and civil societies that unendingly evolve around—and, because of their own efforts, with—them.

Final Thoughts: The Importance of Ideas in an Increasingly Global World John Maynard Keynes, one of the most storied economists and philosophers of the recent past, argued, ‘‘The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else.’’ Though we have attempted to weave this thread throughout the text, it is here more than anywhere else that we hope to convey the motivating thought behind this project and the work we do as a whole: ideas matter. Scholars at Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas developed the PRONASCI program in an effort to cut Brazil’s homicide rate in half. Their counterparts at the Center for Policy Priorities did the lion’s share of the legwork in the development of a viable means of improving Bangalore’s public transportation. The efforts of the researchers at the African Economic Research Consortium have resituated sub-Saharan Africa’s poverty alleviation policy in the context of the region itself. Germany’s Ecologic Institute has tirelessly promoted environmental protection policy, both increasing awareness and successfully affecting such policies’ incorporation into EU standards and treaties. Researchers at the Gulf Research Center have, despite the institution’s semidependence on the Saudi government, begun to carve out a small but meaningful and growing space for civil society organizations in a political environment previously inaccessible to them. In South Africa, MISTRA’s scholars have generated research that has proven pivotal in bridging the seemingly untraversable gaps among the country’s primary stakeholders.

350 Conclusion

The Korea Development Institute has pushed the traditional envelope of Korean economic policy, providing research that proposed novel policy solutions outside the entrenched national agenda. Each of these projects—and both the immediate and ripple effects thereof—started with a single idea. And those ideas, in the hands of the brightest scholars in some of the world’s foremost research institutions, then developed into the effective reports and programs attributable to the think tanks that nurtured their growth and expansion. While a more cynical perspective might fear the power of ideas in a world vulnerable to their influence, that fear—as well as the rationale behind it—provides still greater justification for the study of those people and institutions that get it right, effecting positive change around the world. As they develop and expand, think tanks are increasingly determined to maximize their own efficacy in informing and shaping public policy. And as governments become increasingly responsive to the work and advice of civil society institutions, the universe of think tanks has grown—both in number and in the depth and rigor of the work each produces. ‘‘What they all have in common,’’ as Daniel Start and Ingie Hovland so succinctly put it, ‘‘is a wish to capture the political imagination; they aim to use their insight to have political impact.’’ Ideas matter. And so, too, do the individuals and institutions that prioritize them—their generation, their development, their implementation— fundamentally affecting and changing the world we live in. So having opened with the words of one of the foremost scholars of the twentieth century, we will close with the enduring words of American actor Robin Williams: ‘‘No matter what people tell you, words and ideas can change the world.’’

Contributors

Assefa Admassie, EEA Marı´a Bele´n Sa´nchez, Centro de Implementacio´n de Polı´ticas Pu´blicas para la Equidad y el Crecimiento (CIPPEC) Celso Castro, Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas (FGV) Kristina Costa, Center for American Progress (CAP) Francisco Cravioto, FUNDAR Marek Dabrowski, Center for Economic and Social Research (CASE) Matt Dann, Bruegel Rajeev Gowda, Centre for Public Policy (CPP) at the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore (IIMB) He Fan, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Oh-Seok Hyun, former president of Korea Development Institute (KDI); currently Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Strategy and Finance of the Republic of Korea. Christian Koch, Gulf Research Center (GRC) Jitinder Kohli, Center for American Progress (CAP) R. Andreas Kraemer, Ecologic Institute Elena Lazarou, Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas (FGV) William Lyakurwa, African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) Ashwin Mahesh, Center for Public Policy (CPP) at the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore (IIMB) Florencia Mazzadra, Centro de Implementacio´n de Polı´ticas Pu´blicas para la Equidad y el Crecimiento (CIPPEC) Partha Mukhopadhyay, Centre for Policy Research (CPR) Mcebisi Ndletyana, Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA) Sridhar Pabbisetty, Centre for Public Policy (CPP) at the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore (IIMB)

352 Contributors

Miguel Pulido, FUNDAR Marco Aurelio Ruediger, Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas (FGV) Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center (CMC) Wang Xiaoyi, Center for Rural Environment Social Studies (CRESS) at CASS Samuel Wangwe, Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) Maria Monica Wihardja, CSIS Indonesia Vanesa Weyrauch, Centro de Implementacio´n de Polı´ticas Pu´blicas para la Equidad y el Crecimiento (CIPPEC) Rebecca Winthrop, Center for Universal Education; Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution

Index

Abelson, Donald: on politicization of think tanks, 27, 28; on term ‘‘think tank,’’ 9; on think tanks as ‘‘holding tanks’’ for government positions, 21 ABIDe (Agenda for Bengaluru Infrastructure Development) Task Force, 101–2, 106 Abramowitz, Morton, 322 academic freedom, 9; disappearing value of, 19; and financial autonomy, 25; and funding, 26–27; Hollings on, 18; obstacles to, 26 Academy of Macroeconomic Research, 201 Academy of Sciences (Russia), 324 accountability; at Bruegel, 182; and Mexico’s farm subsidies, 257–58; of Tanzanian government, 300 Accountability Initiative, 122 adaptability, for rising to challenges, 349 adapting ideas from other countries, 310–14, 317–18 Adcorp Holding, 159–60 ad hoc research groups, think tanks vs., 15 Advanced Poverty Analysis for Trainers (AERC/World Bank Institute), 293 advocacy; by Bruegel, 179; evidence-based, 259; in India, 121; prioritization of, 29 ‘‘advocacy and argumentation’’ (as think tank service), 22 advocacy think tanks, 17; in Britain, 30; output of, 25; and partisanship, 19 advocates, idea brokers vs., 19 AERC. See African Economic Research Consortium Africa, 45–46; AERC’s policy impacts in, 292–94; capacity building in, 293; grassland ecology in, 281; political, economic, and social environment in, 291–92; retaining built capacity in, 292. See also individual countries

Africa and the World Trading System (AERC), 293 African Development Bank, 294 African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), 289–97, 348; and Africa’s political, economic, and social environment, 291–92; and evolving policy environment, 294; lessons learned from, 295–97; policy impacts of, 292–94; strategy and structure of, 289–90; vision, mission, and objectives of, 290–91 African Imperatives in the New World Trade Order (AERC), 293 Agarwal, O. P., 118 Agenda for Bengaluru Infrastructure Development (ABIDe) Task Force, 101–2, 106 ‘‘Agenda for Medium- and Long-term Advancement of the Service Industry’’ (KDI), 244 ‘‘Agenda for the New Presidency’’ (CMC), 331 agglomeration effect, 218 AgloGold Ashanti, 159 agriculture and land development, 247; Center for Rural Environmental Social Studies, 271–84; Ethiopian Economics Association, 262–70; food self-sufficiency, 193; Fundar Subsidios al Campo project, 249–60; rural sustainable development in Saudi Arabia, 164–66 Albania, CASE studies for, 227 al-Faisal, Prince Khalid, 165 Al-Jisr, 169 al-Leith, Saudi Arabia, 164–65 alliances; of CASE, 224; in Europe, 219; of media and CIPPEC, 89 al-Qunfuda, Saudi Arabia, 164–65 American Enterprise Institute, 11, 12, 16 American Public Human Services Association, 313

354 Index ANEC (Asociacio´n Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productores del Campo), 251–54, 258 Anglo-American domain; Denham and Garnett on, 29–30; qualities of think tanks in, 9; think tanks outside of, 36–37; Weaver on, 17–18 Angola, 45–46 Annan, Kofi, 70 Ansar, Shri M. Hamid, 100–101 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), 188, 194–95 Arab Gulf states, 162–63; countries of, 162; education initiatives in, 167; think tanks in, 162–63, 166, 170–71. See also Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Arbatov, Alexei, 331 Argentina; education system of, 78; Federal Tax Coparticipation program in, 77; Law on Educational Funding in, 76–92, 344–45 Argentine Educational Workers Confederation, 89 Arghyam Foundation, 122 Armenia; CASE studies for, 226, 227; EU trade and economic relations with, 228 arm’s-length relationship, 180 ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN  3, 188 Asia, 44; financial crisis of 1997–1998 in, 198; policymaking environment in, 44–45. See also individual countries ‘‘Asian Economic Integration’’ project, 197 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 188, 194–95 Asociacio´n Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productores del Campo (ANEC), 251–54, 258 Association of Russian Economic Think Tanks, 224 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 188; structural reform in, 194; trade in food commodities, 193 Auditoria Superior de la Federacio´n (Mexico), 257 Australia; ‘‘Asian Economic Integration’’ project, 197; Australia in the Asian Century, 196; Seoul Summit, 196–97 Australia in the Asian Century, 196 Australian Agency for International Development, 193–94 autonomous and independent think tanks, 49. See also independent think tanks

autonomy (of think tanks), 9, 18, 23–26. See also independence (of think tanks); in China, 202; degree of, 33; financial, 9, 25; ideological, 9, 18, 27, 28; intellectual, 18, 39 Ayyar, R. V. Vaidyanatha, 119 Azerbaijan, CASE studies for, 227 Bahrain, 162 balanced development, in Korea, 232 Bangalore direction-based bus services, 101–7, 346–47 Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (BMTC), 102, 106 Baroody, Bill, Sr., 12 Beijing-Tianjin Sandstorm Source Control Project, 273 Belarus, CASE studies for, 226 Belgium, financial transparency and, 182 Belo Horizonte, Brazil, 338 Besharov, Douglas, 315 bias, 26, 29; avoiding, 210–11; nationality, 179–80; political, 154; toward younger, lower-paid researchers, 26 Big 10 bus services (Bangalore), 101–7 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, x bioenergy policy, 142 Blanchard, Oliver, 206 blue bond proposal, 176–79, 181–83 Blueline buses (Delhi), 113, 114, 117 BMTC (Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation), 102, 106 Bonjin Koo, 239 Boorstin, David, 13–14 Bosnia and Herzegovina, CASE studies for, 226, 227 brain drain, 132 Brazil; critical juncture for, 341; Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas in, 333–35; Public Security with Citizenship program, 333, 335–40; stagnation in, 196 BRICS Bank, 208 BRICS summit meetings, IWEP involvement in, 208 ‘‘Bridging Research and Policy’’ (Stone, Maxwell, and Keating), 26 British Ministry of Justice, 312 British Think Tanks and the Climate of Opinion (Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett), 29–30 Brookings Institution, 65–75; culture of, 67; Doha office, 163; establishment of, 10; ‘‘A Global Compact on Learning,’’ 68–75; stakeholder participation model of, 70–75, 347–48; as university without students, 16

Index 355 Brown, Gordon, 70 Bruegel, 175–83; and blue bond proposal, 176–79, 181–83; collaboration by, 181–82; impact of, 175; nonpartisanship of, 179–80; public-private partnership of, 180–81; strategy of, 178; transparency and accountability of, 182 Brundtland Report, 3 Buenos Aires, Argentina, 78 Buenos Aires province (Argentina), 82, 87 Bulgaria, economic reforms in, 226 Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (Ethiopia), 270 Bush administration, think-tank recruits in, 21 business, think tank’s reputation and relations with, 230 business models, of think tanks, 229 bus services; in Bangalore, 101–7; in Delhi, 109–10, 113–22 Cameroon, poverty reduction strategy in, 294 CAP. See Center for American Progress capacity building, by REPOA, 305 A Capital Idea (Donald Abelson), 28 captive breeding (cattle), 278 Capturing the Political Imagination (Diane Stone), 24–25 Cardenas, Alberto, 255, 256 Carnegie Commission on the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, 331–32 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10, 219, 322–23 Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, 16 Carnegie Moscow Center (CMC), 322–32; generation of usable policy ideas by, 327–30; mission of, 324–27; official policy critiques and alternative suggestions from, 330–32; and Russia’s domestic evolution, 332; uniqueness of, 322–23 CASE. See Center for Social and Economic Research case studies, 343; lessons to be learned from, 348–49; objective of, 50–51; selection and development of, 51; structure and form of, 49–50 CASS. See Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Cejudo, Guillermo M., 249, 251 Center for American Progress (CAP), 309–19; adapting ideas from other countries, 310–14; as advocacy think tank, 17; challenges for, 317–18; coalition building by, 315–16; communications strategy of, 316–17; Doing What Works project, 312, 320 n.1; and framing of political narrative,

314–15; objective of, 309, 310; reputation of, 319; as ‘‘revolving door,’’ 21; social impact bond project, 310–12 Center for European Policy Research, 219 Center for International and Regional Studies, 163 Center for Rural Environmental Social Studies (CRESS), 271–84; and China’s grassland protection policies and projects, 272–74; establishment of, 272; grassland conservation policy explanations and recommendations from, 279–82; Inner Mongolian pastures research, 274–78; policy advocacy and action by, 282–84 Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE), 219–30; and changes in civil society, 346; evolution of, 222–23; global communication and outreach by, 224–25; learning from, 229–30; mission of, 220; modus operandi for, 223–24; policy impact of, 225–28; structure of, 223 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 185–99, 345; in APEC New Strategy for Structural Reform, 194–95; dissemination channels of, 191; and East Asia Bureau of Economic Research, 196; focus areas of, 189–91; founding philosophy of, 187; in G20, 196–97; noninstitutionalized social research by, 192–94; strategies of, 188–89; structure of, 189; as university without students, 16 Center for Strategic Research (Russia), 327–28 Center for Universal Education (Brookings team), 68–70, 73–75 Center of International Relations (FGV), 340 Central America, 41–42 Central Bank of Kenya, 294 Central Bank of Nigeria, 290, 294 Central Bank of Tanzania, 290, 294 Central Bank of Uganda, 294 Central Bank of Zambia, 290 central Europe; postcommunist transitions in, 226; scarcity of funding in, 222; think tank environment in, 42 Central Policy Review Staff, 30 Centre for Economic Policy Research, 220 Centre for Policy Research (CPR), 109–22, 346–47; Delhi urban transit system, 109–10, 114–22; reputation of, 120 Centre for Public Policy (CPP), 97–107, 346; Bangalore direction-based bus services case, 101–7; concrete and indirect policy inputs by, 100–101; initial mandate for, 98; as part

356 Index Centre for Public Policy (CPP) (continued ) of government process, 99; service of faculty members from, 99–100 centrist think tanks, 23–24 Centro de Investigacio´n y Docencia Econo´mica (CIDE), 258 Chad, poverty reduction strategy in, 294 Chamber of Deputies (Mexico), 257 ‘‘The Changing World of Think Tanks’’ (Kent Weaver), 16–18, 20 China; absence of freedom in, 44–45; CASS, 200–212; CRESS, 271–84; democratic centralism in, 209–10; economic challenges for, 204; economic reform in, 210; government development policy in, 345; grassland degradation in, 271–72; grassland protection policies and projects in, 272–74; influence of IWEP in, 210–11; problems faced by, 247; reform and opening-up policy in, 202; Seoul Summit, 196–97; think tanks in, 200–204, 208–12; urbanization of, 110 China Center for Economic Research, Peking University, 201 China Investment Corporation (CIC), 206 China Society of Emerging Economics, 205 China Society of World Economy, 205 Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences Planning Institute, 271 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), x, 200–212, 345; CRESS in, 272; establishment of, 201, 202, 205; funding for think tanks within, 203; Institute of World Economics and Politics, 200, 204–8, 210–11 Chuckman, John, 28 CIC (China Investment Corporation), 206 CIDE (Centro de Investigacio´n y Docencia Econo´mica), 258 CIPPEC, 76–92, 344–45; education-related programs of, 87–88; goal of, 82; and Law on Educational Funding, 80, 82–92; projects of, 82; public officials’ training organized by, 85; reasons for impact of, 87–91; and transparency/access to information, 78–79 Citibank New York, 295 Clearing Point (Germany), 138–39 climate change, 142; adaptation to, 131; and ‘‘climate refugees,’’ 142 climate protection, 131 ‘‘climate refugees,’’ 142 Clinton, Bill, 175 CMAAE (Collaborative Masters of Agricultural and Applied Economics), 297 CMC. See Carnegie Moscow Center

coalitions; for social impact bond concept, 309–10, 315–16; for Subsidios al Campo project, 252, 258 Cocoyoc Seminar (1974), 2 Cold War, 10, 11 collaboration; in AERC projects, 293; Bruegel’s approach to, 181–82; by REPOA, 302 collaborative coalitions, 309–10, 315–16 Collaborative Masters of Agricultural and Applied Economics (CMAAE), 297 Collaborative Research Project on Poverty, Income Distribution, and Labor Markets (AERC), 293 Commission for Africa (United Kingdom), 294 Commitment to Educational Funding, 83, 84, 92 Commitment to Educational Investment, 90 Committee of Foreign Affairs (European Parliament), 169 Committee of the Regions (EU), 137 communication; of CAP’s social impact bond project, 316–17; by CASE, 224–25; electronic, 216–17, 225 communications team, at Bruegel, 178 community-building programs, in Brazil, 336 competition; and globalization, 217–18; of ideas, 12; in Korea, 232, 235–36, 240 Competitiveness Council (South Africa), 158–60 Conectar Igualdad (Argentina), 81 Consejo Nacional de Evaluacio´n de la Polı´tica de Desarrollo Social (Mexico), 258 conservatism, and partisanship of think tanks, 11, 19 contagion effect, 194 ‘‘contract-researchers,’’ 11 contract researcher think tanks, 16 contract work, as funding source, 34 copyright protection (Korea), 241 Co´rdoba (Argentina), 85 Corrientes province (Argentina), 93 n.3 corruption, 37; in Central and South America, 41; in China, 204 Council on Foreign Relations, 10, 20, 21 Court, Julius, 119–20 CPP. See Centre for Public Policy CPR. See Centre for Policy Research creative services, in Korea, 234 credibility; and adoption of research results, 306; in current environment, 230; of FGV, 335, 340, 341; and impact of policy advice, 148; of MISTRA, 151, 155, 160; new opportunities for enhancing, 217; between state and analysts/researchers, 119

Index 357 CRESS. See Center for Rural Environmental Social Studies crime; Brazil’s PRONASCI program, 335–40; environmental, 142; Peterborough Prison project, 312, 315, 319 cross-border expansion, 218 cross-country comparative analyses, 215 Crowley, P. J., 21 CSIS. See Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS Foundation, 187, 189 cultural, tourism, and leisure services sector, in Korea, 235 culture industry, in Korea, 234 Dag Hammarskjo¨ld Foundation, 2 debt crisis; in Europe, 175–79, 181–83, 228; international, 3 decentralization; in China, 203; in Indonesia, 188 Decentralization Policy (Tanzania), 302–3 defense-related research and development centers, 12–13 Delaware General Corporation Law, 289 Delhi Integrated Multi-Modal Transit System (DIMTS), 114, 115 Delhi Metrorail Corporation (DMRC), 113 Delhi Transport Corporation, 113, 115, 116 Delhi urban transit system, 109–10, 113–22, 347 Delpla, Jacques, 176 democratic centralism, in China, 209–10 democratization; in Indonesia, 188; in Tanzania, 300; think tanks’ role in, 344, 345 demographic change, environmental services and, 142 Deng Xiaoping, 202 Denham, Andrew, 25, 58 n.94; on AngloAmerican view of think tanks, 36; on British think tanks, 29–30 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (South Africa), 153 Department of Personnel and Training (India), 97 desertification, in China, 271–72 design sector (Korea), 242 developing countries; ‘‘knowledge and experience’’ services in, 22; problems faced by, 247; scope of social provision in, 3; think tanks in, 201; U.S. and European loans to, 3. See also individual countries Development Research Center, 201, 202 development strategy, social vs. economic growth focus in, 1–2

Development Working Group (G20), 6–7 DGAP (German think tank), 143 Dickson, Paul, 10, 13, 14 DIMTS (Delhi Integrated Multi-Modal Transit System), 114, 115 Directions of Policy Research (David Boorstin), 13–14 discourse coalitions, 21–22 distribution service sector, in Korea, 235, 242 diversification; by Ecologic Institute, 139–40; of funding, 217 Djibouti, CASE activity in, 228 Dmitriev, Mikhail, 327, 328 DMRC (Delhi Metrorail Corporation), 113 Doing What Works project (CAP), 312, 320 n.1 Dror, Yehezkel, 14 Duol Kim, 239 Durst, Samantha L., 18 Dvodkin, Vladimir, 331 East Africa, 291–92 East Asia Bureau of Economic Research, Australian National University, 196, 197 East Asia Forum, 196 Easterbrook, Gregg, 18–19 eastern Europe; postcommunist transitions in, 226; scarcity of funding in, 222; think tank domain in, 38–40; think tank environment in, 42 Eastern Partnership initiative (EU), 228 Ecological Research Network (Econet), 133–34, 139, 144, 146 n.7 Ecologic Institute, 129–45, 349; diversification in, 139–40; as fluid matrix organization, 140–41; impact of, 141–44; peer networks of, 136, 139; profile and institutional background of, 130; reputation of, 136; and sound science vs. policy relevance, 132–34; strategies of, 137–39 Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (EU), 177 economic development; in Central and South America, 41; in China, 200, 204; in Ethiopia, 265; integrating environmental/resource protection and, 131; in Korea, 232; in subSaharan Africa, 291 economic dimensions of social development, 173; Bruegel, 175–83; Center for Social and Economic Research, 219–30; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 185–99; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 200–212; Korea Development Institute, 231–45

358 Index economic growth; in China, 203–4; development strategy focused on, 1–2; for Ethiopia, 262–63; in Indonesia, 185; and Law of Educational Funding implementation, 90; for poverty alleviation, 302; research central to, 299; in rural Saudi Arabia, 164–66 economic reforms; CASE projects studying, 226; in China, 210; in Korea, 232 Economic Research Center, 202 economic sciences, globalization of, 215–16 Econet. See Ecological Research Network education, 63, 65–66; Brookings Institution, 65–75; CIPPEC Law on Educational Funding monitoring, 76–92; crisis in, 69; GCC-EU higher education project, 166–70; in Indonesia, 186; in low-income countries, 66; of workforces, 185–86 EEA. See Ethiopian Economics Association EEPRI. See Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute Egypt, 47, 227 Eichengreen, Barry, 206 elite theory, 28 El Universal (Mexico City), 254–55 emerging countries, model for think tanks in, 340 Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 163 employment statistics (South Africa), 159–60 Empowerment (John Friedman), 1–2 energy subsidies, CSIS research on, 192 environmental crime, 142 Environmental Policy Research Center, 146 n.7 environmental protection policies and projects (China), 271–84 environmental think tanks; forward-looking assessments by, 133; funding for, 132; in policy implementation/administration/evaluation, 43; political and scientific context for, 131–36; risk assessment/management approach of, 134. See also individual organizations Environmental Working Group (EWG), 252, 258, 260 n.5 environment and sustainable development, 127; Ecologic Institute, 129–45; GRC promotion of social development, 162–71; Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection, 148–60; political and scientific context for, 131–36 Eskom, 159 Estes, Richard, 5

Ethiopia; economic and political situation of, 262–63; estimation of revenue potential and gap analysis in, 267–70; land tenure and agricultural development in, 265–67; natural resources of, 262; poverty reduction strategy in, 294; problems faced by, 247 Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute (EEPRI), 264–65; estimation of revenue potential and gap analysis study, 267–70; land tenure and agricultural development study, 265–67 Ethiopian Economics Association (EEA), 262–70; activities of, 263–64; Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, 264–65; objective of, 263; relationship with government officials, 266–67; research projects of, 265 EU. See European Union eurobonds, 176–79, 181–83 Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic Science Institutes, 224 Euro-Mediterranean trade relations, 228 Europe, 42–44; competition for researchers/ funding in, 216; financial crisis in, 175; funding for environmental issues in, 132; loans to developing countries in 1970s, 3; networks and alliances in, 219; postrecession political climate in, 314; structural reforms since crisis of 2008, 194–95; supranational policies in, 214–15; think tanks in, 37–40, 178. See also individual regions and countries EuropeAid, 137 European Commission; CASE projects for, 221, 223, 228; and euro area government bonds, 176; External Affairs Directorate, 168; services of, 137; sustainable development policy in, 142 European debt crisis, 175–79, 181–83, 228 European Environment Agency, 137 European Forecasting Research Association for the Macro-Economy, 224 European Neighborhood Policy, 228 European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes, 224 European Parliament; CASE projects for, 223, 228; committees of, 137, 141, 160, 177 European Stability Mechanism, 177 European Union (EU), 43; bioenergy policy in, 142; blue bond proposal for, 176–79, 181–83; Bruegel’s funding from, 180; Ecologic Institute in, 129–30, 137; environmental policies of, 133; Framework Program-7 research project, 228; GCC-EU

Index 359 higher education project, 166–70; German engagement in policymaking of, 135; integration of environmental/resource protection into other policies of, 131; and nationality bias, 179–80; policy review mechanisms in, 132; politics vs. economic solutions in, 175; think tanks in, 136; translating policy into local guidelines for, 138; water policy in, 142–43 European Union Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council, 169 Evans, Gord, 118 evidence-based advocacy, 259 evidence-based interventions, REPOA’s research supporting, 299 evidence-based policymaking, AERC’s facilitation of, 289 EWG. See Environmental Working Group existential pragmatism, 11 experts, recruiting, 230 expert teams; for CASE, 223–24; globalization of, 219–20 Explaining African Economic Growth Performance (AERC), 293 ‘‘Exploring New Macroeconomic Policy Direction in Response to the Shift to Service Economy’’ (KDI), 244 External Affairs Directorate (European Commission), 168 Facebook, CASE account on, 225 farm subsidies; data sets on, 252; in Mexico, 249–60 Fauriol, George, 14–15 Federal Environment Agency (Germany), 135 Federal Law of Education (Argentina), 76 Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs (Germany), 144 Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Germany), 135 Federal Ministry of Environment (Germany), 135 Federal Revenue and Custom Authority (Ethiopia), 270 Federal Tax Coparticipation program (Argentina), 77 Federal Transparency and Access to Government Public Information Law (Mexico), 249, 347 Ferna´ndez de Kirchner, Cristina, 86 FGV (Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas), 333–41, 349 Filmus, Daniel, 88 finance, complementing policy with, 119

financial autonomy (of think tanks), 9, 25. See also funding financial crisis (1997–1998, Asia), 198 financial crisis (2007–2009), 173, 175, 214. See also global economic crisis (2008–2009); and AERC financial support, 295; causes and consequences of, 228; CSIS seminar on impact of, 194 financial reform, in Korea, 232 fiscal policy, CASE work on, 227 fiscal transfer to local governments (Indonesia), 192–93 Five-Year Development Plan (Tanzania), 302 Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (Korea), 231 flexibility; of AERC, 294; of CASE, 229 Flickr, CASE account on, 225 fluid matrix organization, Ecologic Institute as, 140–41 FONID (National Teacher Incentive Fund), 86 food security, 142, 193 food self-sufficiency, food security vs., 193 forage-livestock balance policy (China), 272–73, 276–77 Ford Foundation, 222, 328 foreign exchange crisis (1997–1998), Korean economy and, 232, 233 foreign exchange reserve (China), 206 foreign policy, ‘‘climate refugees’’ and, 142 foreign policy think tanks; Fauriol on, 15; Institute of World Economics and Politics, 200, 204–8, 210–11 Formative Process Research Program (Tanzania), 303, 305 former Soviet Union; energy sectors in, 228; migration in, 328; postcommunist transitions in, 226 Formosa, 79 ‘‘Four I’s’’ (FGV), 339–40 Fox, Jonathan, 252, 254, 258, 259 Framework Act on Service Industry (Korea), 243 Framework Programmes for Research (EU), 130 Framework Program-6 research project (EU), 228 Framework Program-7 research project (EU), 228 France; Bruegel’s funding from, 180; think tank domain in, 37–38 free-rider problem, 176 Friedman, John, 1–3 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, x fuel cells, 156–57

360 Index Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas (FGV), 333–41, 349 Fundar, 249–60, 347; objectives of, 251; organizational experience of, 258; Subsidios al Campo project, 249–60 funding; and academic freedom, 26–27; for advocacy think tanks, 18; for AERC, 295–96; agglomeration effect for, 218; and arm’s-length relationship, 180; for Bruegel, 180, 182; for CASE, 221–22, 226; for CASS, 201; for Chinese think tanks, 203; for contract researchers vs. universities without students, 16–17; for CSIS, 187, 198; diversification of, 217; Durst and Thurber on, 18; for environmental think tanks, 132; in Europe, 132, 141, 216, 222; in Germany, 132, 135, 141; globalization of, 216; independence inhibited by, 34–35; for MISTRA, 153; multiplicity of sources of, 230; and politicization of think tanks, 29; positive perspective on, 28–29; for REPOA, 305; and social impact bonds, 311–15; in Tanzania, 300 G20. See Group of 20 Garnett, Mark, 29–30, 36 GCC. See Gulf Cooperation Council GCL (‘‘A Global Compact on Learning’’), 68–75, 348 GEF (Global Environment Facility), 110 Gellner, Winard, 15 ‘‘gendercide,’’ in Asian communities, 142 Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 163 Georgia; CASE studies for, 227; economic reforms in, 226; EU trade and economic relations with, 228 German Marshall Fund, 219 Germany; and blue bond proposal, 178, 181; Bruegel’s funding from, 180; demographic change and environmental services in, 142; Ecological Research Network in, 133–34; Ecologic Institute influence in, 129–45; funding for environmental issues in, 132; nuclear phase-out in, 144; policymaking environment in, 134–36; renewable power sector in, 138–39, 144; think tanks in, 38, 43, 130, 134–36, 143–44; university systems in, 44; water policy in, 143; well-funded foundations/think tanks in, 219 Gerwel, Jakes, 152 Gilder, Barry, 153 Gini coefficient, 186 Global Business Coalition for Education, 70

‘‘A Global Compact on Learning’’ (GCL), 68–75, 348 Global Development Network, 89–90 global domain; education challenges in, 66; policy tsunamis in, 341; qualities of think tanks in, 9 global economic crisis (2008–2009). See also financial crisis (2007–2009); and advancement of socioeconomic issues, 5–6; and APEC New Strategy for Structural Reform, 194–95; issues in recovering from, 173 Global Environment Facility (GEF), 110 Global Go To Think Tank Index, x, xi, 51, 210 globalization, 213; adjusting think tank strategies for, 218–20; and contagion effect, 194; of economic and social sciences, 215–16; and importance of ideas, 349–50; and inequality in Indonesia, 186; and new think tank opportunities and challenges, 216–18; and supranational economic/social policy agenda, 214–15 Global Public Policy Institute, 146 n.7 Global Vision, 323 Goldman Sachs, 319 Gottemoeller, Rose, 331 ‘‘Governing the Commons,’’ 279, 281 government affiliated think tanks, 49 government personnel, from and to think tanks, 20–21 Gowda, Rajeev, 100 grassland protection (China), 271–84 ‘‘Grazing for Grass’’ Project (China), 274, 278 GRC. See Gulf Research Center GRC Foundation, 164 Greece, social unrest in, 176 Gref, Herman, 327 Grillo, Francesco, 28–29 Group of 20 (G20), xi n.1; CSIS and Seoul Summit, 196–97; Development Working Group of, 6–7; education in agenda of, 66; Indonesia in, 188; and structural reform, 195; think tanks in, 7; workforce education in, 186 Group of Eight, 66 Growth and Transformation Plan (Ethiopia), 267 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 162–63; GCC-EU higher education project, 166–70; sustainable development in rural Saudi Arabia, 164–66; and work of think tanks, 162–63, 170–71 Gulf Research Center (GRC), 162–71, 349; GCC-EU higher education project, 166–70;

Index 361 and nature of civil society, 346; sustainable development in rural Saudi Arabia, 164–66 Gutto, Shadrack, 153 Gyeongjoon Yoo, 239 Haass, Richard N., 20–22 Haight, Libby, 252, 258 Hardin, Garrett, 279 Heclo, Hugh, 19 Heesuk Yun, 239 He Fan, 207 Heritage Foundation, 12, 17 Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiatives, 301 history of think tanks, 9–19; 1830–1946, 9–10; 1946–1970, 10–11; 1970–1994, 11–19; in twenty-first century, 20–28 Hollings, Robert, 18, 57 n.93 horizontal policy learning, 138 House, Edward, 10 Hovland, Ingie, 350 How Much Does Quality Education Cost in Argentina? (Commitment to Educational Investment), 90, 92 human resources, fostering, 241, 242 Hungary, think tank environment in, 42 Hybrid Intellectuals (Thomas Medvetz), 22–23 idea brokers, advocates vs., 19 The Idea Brokers (James A. Smith), 19 ideas; competition of, 12; importance and relevance of, 349–50; ‘‘uncivil war’’ of, 33 ideological autonomy (of think tanks), 9; Abelson on, 27; Chuckman on, 28; and financial independence, 18; and funding, 27; Maynes on, 28; recent changes in, 23–24 ideological think tanks, 24 IDRC (International Development Research Centre), 121, 291–92 IMEMO, 324, 326 IMF. See International Monetary Fund impact(s) (of think tanks), 15; AERC, 292–94; balance of sound science and, 132–34; Brookings Institution, 69–70; Bruegel, 175; CASE, 225–28; CIPPEC, 83–87; CMC, 331–32; Ecologic Institute, 141–44; EEA and EEPRI, 264–65, 269–70; FGV, 337–38; Haass on, 20–21; MISTRA, 155–60; optimizing, 148–49; REPOA, 301–3; strategies for, 137; variables affecting, 148 ‘‘importing’’ ideas from other countries, 310–14, 317–18 income inequality; in Indonesia, 186; in rural Mexico, 251

independence (of think tanks), 9, 13, 25; in Anglo-American domain, 36; in Arab Gulf states, 164; Carnegie Moscow Center, 324; in China, 202; CSIS, 198; factors inhibiting, 33–35; in industrialized democracies, 35–36; outside of Anglo-American domain, 36–40; REPOA, 305; for survival, 229–30 Independent Institute for Environmental Issues, 146 n.7 independent think tanks, 33; CAP, 309; CASE, 220–21; characteristics of, 24; in China, 202; classification of, 36; CSIS, 191; Dror’s features of, 15; EEPRI, 264; FGV, 333; Fundar, 251; Levien’s requirements for, 14; MISTRA, 151; policy research by, 326–27; and politicization of domain, 24; types of services offered by, 22 India; BRIC summit in, 208; Centre for Policy Research, 109–22; Centre for Public Policy, 97–107; context of public policy formulation in, 99; economic liberalization in, 97–98; energy consumption in, 110–11; policy landscape in, 122; think tanks in, 121, 346; transportation systems in, 101–7, 109–10, 113–22, 346–47; urbanization of, 110; vehicle ownership in, 111–13 Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, 97. See also Centre for Public Policy (CPP) Indonesia; CSIS, 185–99, 345; democratization and decentralization of, 188; economic growth in, 185; energy subsidies in, 192; fiscal transfer to local governments in, 192–93; food security in, 193; and global financial crisis, 194; international profile of, 188; outlook for, 196; Seoul Summit, 196–97; social and political context of, 185–87 Indonesian National Committee on Pacific Economic Cooperation, 196 inequality; in Argentina’s education funding, 77, 79; in Indonesia, 186; in rural Mexico, 251, 253 influencing the influencers, 309 information; demand for, 31; inquiries and requests for, 84, 252–53; online access to, 217 information revolution, 216, 217 information technology sector, 233, 241–42 informed discourse facilitation, 21–22 infrastructure, 95; in Indonesia, 186; for public transportation (See public transportation infrastructure); in rural Saudi Arabia, 165–66

362 Index Ingreso Objetivo program (Mexico), 253, 260 n.7 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, 280 Inner Mongolian pastures research (CRESS), 274–78 ‘‘The Inquiry,’’ 10 Institut du De´veloppement Durable et des Relations Internationales, 146 n.8 Institute for Ecological Economy Research, 146 n.7 Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, 146 n.7 Institute for Environmental Studies of the Free University of Amsterdam, 146 n.8 Institute for Future Studies and Technology Assessment, 146 n.7 Institute for Global Dialogue, 161 n.2 Institute for Policy Studies, 11 Institute for Social-Ecological Research, 146 n.7 Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies (ISCAN), 326 Institute of Public Finance, 201 Institute of the International Workers’ Movement, 324 Institute of the USA and Canada (Russia), 324 Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), 200, 210–11, 345; history of, 204–5; in policy discussion, 205–6; in policymaking, 206–7; in policy negotiation, 207–8; structure of, 205 Institute of World Economy, 204, 205 Institute of World Politics, 205 Institutes for European Environmental Policy, 136, 139, 146 n.8 institution-building process, in Arab Gulf states, 162 integrating agencies, think tanks as, 23 integration (in FGV’s Four I’s), 339 integrity (in FGV’s Four I’s), 339 intellectual autonomy; in eastern European think tanks, 39; and financial independence, 18 intellectual movement, MISTRA’s creation of, 149–51 Inter-American Development Bank, 255 interdependence, global, 216 interdisciplinarity (in FGV’s Four I’s), 339 interest groups; think tank’s reputation and relations with, 230; think tanks vs., 24–25, 28 intergovernmental cooperation, and Korea’s service sector policies, 238–39, 243

International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 121, 291–92 International Foundation for Development Alternatives, 2 International Institute for Environment and Development, 146 n.8 International Institute for Sustainable Development, 146 n.8 internationalization; by CASE, 229; in FGV’s Four I’s, 339–40 International Monetary Fund (IMF); and AERC network, 294; CASE study for, 227; KDI joint studies with, 233; and repayment of loans to poor countries, 3 international negotiations, IWEP in, 207–8 international think tank, Carnegie Moscow Center as, 323 Internet, in China, 204 Iraq, CASE activity in, 227 ISCAN (Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies), 326 Islam, in Russia, 330 Israel, 47 ‘‘issue networks,’’ 19 Italy; Bruegel’s funding from, 180; social unrest in, 176; think tank domain in, 38 Ivory Coast, 45–46 IWEP. See Institute of World Economics and Politics Jaehoon Kim, 239 James, Simon, 7 Japan, 45; as lesson for Chinese policymakers, 211; seaports of, 186; Seoul Summit, 196–97 Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and industry, 165 Johannesburg, South Africa, 157–58 John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 330 Joint Facility for Electives (AERC), 296, 297 Kabanov, Kirill, 329 Kamath, Rajalaxmi, 100–101 Katz, Lee M., 21, 27 Kazakhstan, economic reforms in, 226 KDI. See Korea Development Institute Kenya; as AERC donor, 290; political climate in, 296; poverty reduction strategy in, 294 Keynes, John Maynard, 349 Kiel Institute for Economics, 10 Kimenyi, Mwangi, 294 Kirchner, Ne´stor, 76 Ki-Wan Kim, 239

Index 363 knowledge; bridging gap between power and, 31; from combination of practical experience and theory, 150; for evidence-based interventions, 299 ‘‘knowledge and experience’’ (as think tank service), 22 knowledge-based service sector, in Korea, 233–35 knowledge-into-policy chain (FGV), 334 knowledge sector, CSIS research on, 193–94 Kolar Gold Fields, 100 Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 164 Korea; advancement of service industry in, 233–45; political environment of, 343–44 Korea Development Institute (KDI), 231–45, 350; adaptation to political environment by, 343–44; and advancement of Korea’s service industry, 233–45; early research of, 232; establishment of, 231; recent studies of, 232–33 Korea National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation, 196 Kosovo study (CMC), 327 Kudrin, Alexei, 328 Kuwait, 162, 171 n.1 Kuwait University Euro-Gulf research unit, 168 Kyoung-Soo Yoon, 239 Kyrgyzstan; CASE studies for, 227; economic reforms in, 226 La Jornada (Mexico City), 255 Land Certification and Registration Programs (Ethiopia), 266 land development. See agriculture and land development Landers, Robert, 18 land-tenure system; in Ethiopia, 265–67; grassland tenure in Inner Mongolia, 275–76 La Pampa (Argentina), 85 Latin America, 41–42; and liberalization reforms of the 1970s, 2–3; model for think tanks in, 340 Law on Educational Funding (Argentina), 76–92, 344–45; challenges and opportunities resulting from, 91–92; and CIPPEC’s impact on educational policy, 87–91; CIPPEC’s monitoring of, 82–87; goal of, 76–77; implementation of, 79–81; and persisting educational problems, 79–82; provisions of, 77–79 Leonhardt, David, 316 Levien, Roger, 14 liberalism, partisanship of think tanks and, 11

liberalization reforms; CASE advocacy for, 227; in Korea, 232; under NAFTA, 250; for Russian immigration, 329; of the 1970s, 2–3; in Tanzania, 300 Liebman, Jeffrey, 314 Lindquist, Evert, 26–27 LinkedIn, CASE account on, 225 Lipman, Maria, 331 Living Standards Measurement Studies (AERC/World Bank Institute), 293 Local Government Reform Program (Tanzania), 302–3 Lo´pez, Jorge Kondo, 255 Lucarelli, Sonia, 38 luck, creating, 183 Macedonia, economic reforms in, 226 Macroeconomic Analysis Network Project for Eastern and Southern Africa, 291–92 macroeconomic stabilization policies, 227 Mahesh, Ashwin, 100, 102, 106 Malashenko, Alexei, 330–31 Malev, Tatiana, 328 Mali, poverty reduction strategy in, 294 Managing the Transition to Less Aid Dependence in Sub-Saharan Africa (AERC), 293 Mandela, Nelson, 152, 161 n.2 Manganyi, Wilson, 156–58 Mangena, Mosibudi, 152 Manning, Nick, 118 Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA), 148–60, 349; credibility of, 151, 155, 160; influence of, 155–60; origin and modus operandi of, 149, 151–55; Platinum Group Metal Research Project of, 155–58; research and research teams at, 149–51, 155; structure of, 154–55 Mapungubwe Society of Researchers, 149–50 marketing strategies (of think tanks): for Brookings Institution CGL project, 71; Stone on, 24; Weaver on, 16 marketing think tanks, 154 market structure, in Korea, 232 Marshall Fund, 219 Mashele, Prince, 153 Massachusetts, social impact bonds in, 315 Mathews, Jessica, 323 Mathews, Joe, 152 Mathur, Kuldeep, 121 Mathur, Navdeep, 121 Maxwell, 119–20 Maynes, Charles William, 28 Mayorga, Francisco, 256, 259 Mbaku, John, 294

364 Index Mbeki, Thabo, 152 McFaul, Michael, 326 McGann, James, 122, 341 McKinsey & Company, 315 Mead, Lawrence M., 122 media; and blue bond proposal, 177–78; in Central and South America, 41; in China, 204; CIPPEC’s alliance with, 89; in the Middle East, 47, 48; in policy impact strategies, 137; and Subsidios al Campo findings, 254–55; think tank’s reputation and relations with, 230 Medvedev, Dmitri, 330 Medvetz, Thomas, 7, 8, 22–23, 28 Mehra, Chapal, 99 mentorship program (CSIS), 198–99 Merino, Mauricio, 254, 256 Mexico; farm subsidy policy in, 249–51; Fundar farm subsidies project in, 251–60, 347; and NAFTA, 250; political system of, 257; problems faced by, 247; rural inequality in, 251; rural poverty in, 249 middle class, in Russia, 328 Middle East, 46–48; Arab Gulf states, 162–63; CASE activity in, 227–28. See also individual countries Millennium Development Goals (UN), 4, 6, 7, 68 Ministry of Agriculture (China), 274 Ministry of Agriculture (Mexico), 249 Ministry of Backward Regions (Indonesia), 193 Ministry of Commerce (China), 200, 201, 207, 208 Ministry of Education (Argentina), 83, 88–90 Ministry of Education (Brazil), 334–35 Ministry of Finance (China), 200, 201, 207, 208 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (Ethiopia), 270 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China), 208 Ministry of Higher Education of the Sultanate of Oman, 169 Ministry of Justice (Brazil), 333 Ministry of Strategy and Finance (Korea), 238, 239, 243, 244 mission, of public policy think tanks, 15 MISTRA. See Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection mistrust, in South Africa, 140, 154 Mkandawire, Thandika, 3 MKUKUTA (Tanzania), 302 MKUKUTA II (Tanzania), 302 mobility, of CASE, 229

Moldova; CASE studies for, 227; economic reforms in, 226; EU trade and economic relations with, 228 Mongolia, CASE studies for, 226 Montenegro, CASE studies for, 226 Montoya, Silvia, 20, 59 n.126 MoonJoong Tcha, 239 moral hazard problem, 176 Morocco, CASE activity in, 227 Mukherji, Arnab, 100–101 multiethnic teams, 216–17 multinational teams, 216 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), 250 Naik, Gopal, 100 National Anti-Corruption Committee (Russia), 329 National Association of State Budget Officers, 313 National Congress of Education (Argentina), 76 National Democratic Institute, 164 National Development and Reform Committee (China), 201 National Economic Research Institute, 201 nationality bias, 179–80 National Law of Education (Argentina), 93 n.4 National Policy Dialogue (Tanzania), 303–4 National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (Tanzania), 302 National Teacher Incentive Fund (FONID), 86 Navalny, Alexei, 329 neoconservatism, 3, 19 neoliberalism, 2–3 ‘‘nerve center,’’ in stakeholder participation model, 73–75 Netshitenzhe, Joel, 152, 153 networks, 216; of AERC, 294, 295; of CASE, 223–24; of CSIS, 189; in European Union, 136, 139; of FGV, 333, 334, 340, 341; in Germany, 133–34, 139, 144; global/regional, 218–19; regional, 219 New Right, 12 New Ventures Fund, x New York City, social impact bonds in, 315, 319 Nigeria, as AERC donor, 290 no-grazing policies (China), 273, 277–78, 281 ‘‘non-degree-granting’’ institutions, 16 nondenominational association, EEA as, 263 nongovernmental think tanks, 33; GRC Foun¨ kodation, 164; new flexibility for, 217; O Institut, 144; REPOA, 299

Index 365 nonideological think tanks, 23–24 noninstitutionalized social research, by CSIS, 192–94 nonofficial think tanks, in China, 201, 202 nonpartisanship, of CASE, 220–21, 226 nonpartisan think tanks, 33; Bruegel, 179–80; CAP, 309–10; EEA, 263; Fundar, 251 Nonprofit Finance Fund, 315 Nonprofit Public Policy Research Organizations (Robert Hollings), 18 The Non-Profit Research Institute (Harold Orlans), 12–13 nonprofit think tanks; in China, 202; EEA, 263; FGV, 333 North Africa, CASE activity in, 227–28 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 250 North Korea, economy of, 232 Nuclear Nonproliferation program (CMC), 331 nuclear power, in Germany, 144 Obama, Barack, 21 Obama administration, social impact bonds and, 310, 319 observable influence (of think tanks), 20–21 OECD; KDI joint studies with, 233; study exchanges with, 236; workforce education in, 186 official think tanks, in China, 201 ¨ ko-Institut, 144, 146 n.7 O Olcott, Martha, 326 Oman, 162, 169 Open Society Institute, 222 ‘‘organizational and technical services’’ (of think tanks), 22 organizational structure (of think tanks), 247–48; CASE, 229; Weaver on, 16 Orlans, Harold, 12–13 Ostrom, Elinor, 279, 281 ‘‘The Other Economic Summit,’’ 4 outputs (of think tanks), 15, 32. See also products (of think tanks); for contract researchers vs. universities without students, 16; interest group advocacy vs., 25; recent changes in, 20 ‘‘Overseas Expansion of the Service Industry and Increase in Overseas Employment Opportunities’’ (KDI), 244 Owers, Anne, 312 ownership, and inclusion of policy practitioners, 151

Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, 188 pan-European research projects (CASE), 223, 228 Panfilova, Elena, 329 Paris Peace Conference, 10 Park Chung Hee, 231 participation pathways, in stakeholder participation model, 72–73 partisanship, 18–19; emergence of, 11–12; independence inhibited by, 35; recent changes in, 23–24 Partnership for African Social and Governance Research, 297 partnerships; of AERC, 293; of Bruegel, 180–81; of CASE, 226; of Fundar-ANECEWG, 252; global, 216 Pau, Parks, 157 Pautz, Hartwig, 20, 21, 38 Pavlova-Silvanskaya, Marina, 331 peer networks; at CMC, 323–27; of FGV, 340 pension reform (Russia), 327, 328 People’s Bank of China, 200, 208 people skills, of Ecologic Institute staff, 141 performance contracts, 317 performance index (for CSIS researchers), 191 Peterborough Prison (United Kingdom), 312, 315, 319 Petrov, Nikolay, 329 PGM (Platinum Group Metal) Research Project (MISTRA), 155–58 PHDR (Poverty and Human Development Report), 302 philanthropic culture; in Germany, 44, 135; in Latin America, 42; in the Middle East, 48; in Russia, 43–44 Pifang Village (China), 283–84 Pirate Party (Germany), 145 n.2 Pirker, Kristina, 250–51 Plan Bengaluru 2020, 102 Plan for Overcoming the Crisis and Restructuring the Economy (KDI), 232 Platinum Group Metal (PGM) Research Project (MISTRA), 155–58 Poland; CASE studies for, 219–30, 227, 346; economic reforms in, 226; economic transformation in, 222–23, 346; scarcity of funding in, 222 polarization, in Korea’s service industry, 235 policy, complementing finance with, 119 Policy Association for an Open Society, 224 policy design, by Brookings Institution, 67 Policy Direction Reports on Service Progress (Korea), 240 policy discussion, in China, 200, 205–6

366 Index policy environment; in Africa, 294; in Asia, 44–45; in Central and South America, 41; in China, 282–83; in European Union, 136; in Germany, 134–36 policy learning; in European Union, 138; in United States, 146 n.6 policymakers: in China, 279; information needed by, 31; and research-policy nexus, 292; in South Africa, 153–54 policymaking: CASE projects focused on, 226; in China, 200, 202–3, 206–12; globalization and regionalization of, 214–15; modifying strategy to influence, 345; stages of, 205 policy negotiation, in China, 200, 207–8 policy shaping; by Brookings Institution, 67; by Ecologic Institute, 137–39 policy tsunamis, 341 political climate, postrecession, 314 political contexts, think tanks in, 343–45 political development, in Central and South America, 41 political narrative, framing of, 314–15 political parties; and fluidity of public policy, 148; and nonpartisanship, 179; in Tanzania, 300 political party affiliated think tanks, 49 political party affiliations: in Germany, 43, 145 n.2; in Great Britain, 30; and independence of think tank, 34, 36–37; of think tanks outside of United States, 36 politicization of think tanks, 12, 23–29; during mid-1970s and 1980s, 18–19; Weaver on, 17 politics; for environmental think tanks, 131–36; in Germany, 134–35; and social development in Indonesia, 187; think tank’s reputation and relations with, 230 pollution, in China, 204 Polsby, Nelson, 14 Portugal, social unrest in, 176 postcommunist transition studies (CASE), 226–27 poverty; in Ethiopia, 262; in Indonesia, 186; in Mexico following NAFTA, 250; in rural Mexico, 249, 250; in Tanzania, 299 poverty alleviation, 287; African Economic Research Consortium, 287, 289–97; in Mexico, 250; Research on Poverty Alleviation, 299–306 Poverty and Human Development Report (PHDR), 302 Poverty Project (AERC), 293 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP, REPOA), 301

power; bridging gap between knowledge and, 31; of ideas, 350 Price Research Center, 202 private think tanks; in China, 201–2; FGV, 333 Procampo program (Mexico), 253, 254, 256, 260 n.6 productivity, in Korea’s service sector, 236–37 Productivity South Africa, 158 products (of think tanks), 15. See also outputs (of think tanks); advocacy think tanks, 17; and obstacles to academic freedom, 26; Weaver on, 16 Pro et Contra, 330, 331 Program of International Student Assessment, 81 Program of Wage Compensation (Argentina), 87 Program on Education (CIPPEC), 88 project management, at CASE, 224 project (research) teams; of Ecologic Institute, 140–41; at MISTRA, 151, 155 PRS Legislative Research, 122 PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, REPOA), 301 public debate; in Russia, 324–25; in Soviet Union, 324; sparking, 309, 310 public finance; enhancing productivity of, 232; management of, 228 public-private partnership; of Bruegel, 180–81; in KDI Korean services sector project, 239 Public Sector Linkages Program (Australia), 197 Public Security with Citizenship (PRONASCI) program (Brazil), 333, 335–40, 349 public services, 175 public transportation infrastructure, 95; Centre for Policy Research, 109–22; Centre for Public Policy, 97–107 Putin, Vladimir, 329, 331 Qatar, 162, 163 quality; internal quality control, 230; for survival, 229 quasi-governmental think tanks, 49 quasi-independent think tanks, 49 Quigley, Kevin, 39–40 Rabigh, Saudi Arabia, 164–65 Ramesh, G., 100 Rand Corporation, 11, 14, 17, 322 Rand-Qatar Policy Institute, 163 RAPID framework, 120 Ravindra, A., 100

Index 367 RAWG. See Research and Analysis Working Group (Tanzania) Reagan, Ronald, 3 Regional Environment Center, 146 n.8 regionalization of policymaking, 214–15 regional networks, 219 Religion and Society program (CMC), 330 renewable energy; in Germany, 138–39, 144; for Johannesburg, 157–58; Platinum Group Metal Research Project, 155–58 Renewable Energy Act (Germany), 138–39, 144 REPOA. See Research on Poverty Alleviation reputation; and adoption of research results, 306; of Bruegel, 176; of CAP, 319; and CIPPEC’s impact, 88; of CPR, 120; of Ecologic Institute, 136; in stakeholder participation model, 71–72; for survival, 229–30 research agendas: of Brookings Institution, 67; of CASE, 226, 229; for contract researchers vs. universities without students, 16; of CSIS, 189–91; of FGV, 333; globalization of, 215, 219; of REPOA, 299, 304; Research and Analysis Working Group (RAWG, Tanzania), 301–2, 304, 305 research and analytical perspectives, globalization of, 215 research and development centers; defenserelated, 12–13; think tanks, 13–14 researchers, labor market for, 215–16, 218 Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), 299–306; adaptation to political environment by, 344; areas of influence of, 303–95; factors affecting operations of, 300–301; lessons learned from, 305–6; policy impacts of, 301–3; strategy and structure of, 299–300 research-policy nexus, 292 research teams. See project (research) teams resource protection, 131. See also environment and sustainable development; EU water policy, 142–43; grassland protection in China, 271–84; green power in Germany, 143–44; renewable power in Germany, 138–39 ‘‘Restructuring the Korean Economy in the Postcrisis Era’’ (KDI), 244 ‘‘revolving door’’ concept (Haass), 20–21 Ricci, David, 11, 57 n.93 Rich, Andrew, 23 Right to Information Act of 2005 (India), 122 Rikers Island, 319 Rio declaration of 1992, 127

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 338 Rı´o Negro (Argentina), 81, 82 risk assessment and management, for environmental issues, 134 Rockefeller Foundation, 315 Rodionov, Igor, 325 Rodrik, Dani, 206 Rokhlin, Lev, 325 Romania, economic reforms in, 226 rotational grazing (China), 273, 277–78, 281 Rowe, Jonathan, 27 Royal Institute for International Affairs, 10 Ruiz Guerra, Ana Joaquina, 249 Rural Development Research Center, 202 rural sustainable development, in Saudi Arabia, 164–66 Russia, 43–44; administrative reform in, 329; Carnegie Moscow Center, 322–32; CASE studies for, 227; Chinese immigration into, 329; domestic evolution of, 332; economic reforms in, 226; EU trade and economic relations with, 228; Moscow-based scholars in, 323; nuclear policy of, 331; recentralization in, 329–30; socioeconomic development in, 332; spiritual evolution in, 330; think tanks in, 324 Russian Orthodox Church, 330 Russian State Duma, 329 Sabatier, Paul, 19 Sabatini, Richard, 341 Santa Fe (Argentina), 81, 82 Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil, 338 Saudi Arabia, 162; decision making in, 171; Gulf Research Center in, 163–64; sustainable development in rural areas, 164–66; think tanks in, 346 Saxena, Naresh C., 121 Scaling New Heights (CAP), 312 science, and context for environmental think tanks, 131–36 Scott, James, 281 Secretarı´a de Agricultura Ganaderı´a, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentacio´n (Sagarpa), 252, 253, 255 Secretarı´a de la Funcio´n Pu´blica (Mexico), 256 Seeing Like a State (James Scott), 281 seminars; AERC, 293–94; FGV, 337 semiofficial think tanks, in China, 201, 345 Sen, Gita, 100 Senbet, Lemma, 294 senior-junior mentorship program (CSIS), 198–99 Serbia, CASE studies for, 226, 227

368 Index service industry (in Korea), 233–45; history of, 234–37; implications of tasks for advancing, 242–44; KDI’s role in advancing, 237–42 services (of think tanks), 22 Shah, Sonal, 310 Sharpe, Loane, 159 Shevtsova, Lilia, 331 SIC (State Information Center of China), 206 Singer, Peter, 29 Siwook Lee, 239 Smith, James A., 19 social cohesion, 6 social development; assumptions in, 5; defined, 4–5; focus on economic growth vs., 1–2; general goals and values of, 5–7; integrating environmental/resource protection and, 131; levels of functioning in, 5; movement for, 1–4; overarching goals of, 4–5; sectors of, 4; subfields of, 307; think tanks’ role in, 7–9 social development policies, 6 social equity, 6 social factors, and think tanks in China, 203–4 Social Finance, 312 Social Finance US, 315 social impact bonds, 310–19; adapting idea for, 312–14; communications strategy for, 316–17; as financing instrument, 310; framing idea of, 314–15; obstacles to success of project, 317–18; Peterborough Prison project, 312 social media, in China, 204 social movements, 1, 2, 121 social policy, 307; Carnegie Moscow Center, 322–32; Center for American Progress, 309–19; Fundac¸a˜o Getu´lio Vargas and PRONASCI program, 333–41; supranational, 214–15 social safety net, CASE work on, 227 social sciences, globalization of, 215–16 social security issues, in Korea, 232 social sustainability, 6 social welfare policies, in Korea, 232 Somanathan, T. V., 118 South Africa, 45–46; as AERC donor, 290; clean energy initiative for, 155–58; employment statistics in, 159–60; MISTRA’s policy influence in, 148–60; mistrust in, 140; official indifference toward research in, 153–54; Productivity South Africa, 158; think tanks in, 151, 152 South America, 41–42. See also individual countries

South Asia Bureau of Economic Research, Australian National University, 197 Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Regional State (Ethiopia), 267–70 South Korea; Seoul Summit, 196–97; stagnation in, 196 sovereign debt crisis (Europe), 175, 228; blue bond proposal, 176–79, 181–83; and social unrest, 176 Soviet Union, 39, 40. See also former Soviet Union; contacts with foreign scholars in, 326; public debate in, 324 Spain; Bruegel’s funding from, 180; social unrest in, 176 Spence, Michael, 206 Sriram, M. S., 100 Stabridis, Omar, 250 staff; for AERC, 295–96; recruiting of, 230 stakeholder engagement and involvement; by CIPPEC, 88–89; in Gulf Research Center projects, 165, 167–68 stakeholder participation model, 70–75, 347–48; ‘‘nerve center’’ vs. ownership in, 73–75; participation pathways in, 72–73; reputation in, 71–72 Start, Daniel, 350 State Council (China), 201, 202 State Information Center of China (SIC), 206 state intervention; in China’s resource management, 279, 282; Scott’s theory of, 281 ‘‘Statement on Research Integrity’’ (Bruegel), 182 Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), 159–60 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment (1972), 2 Stockholm Environment Institute, 146 n.8 Stockholm Institute for Transition Economies, 219 Stone, Diane, 8; on Anglo-American view of think tanks, 36; on categorization of think tanks, 22; on defining think tanks, 24–25, 54–55 n.24, 58 n.94 strategic clarity, 70–71 Strategic Poverty Analysis, Basic Poverty Measurement and Diagnostics (AERC/ World Bank Institute), 293 structural reform; in China, 206; Indonesia’s engagement in, 195–96; since crisis of 2008, 194–95 ‘‘Studying Washington Think Tanks’’ (Samantha L. Durst and James A. Thurber), 18

Index 369 sub-Saharan Africa; AERC in, 289–97; evolving policy environment in, 294; and liberalization reforms of the 1970s, 2–3; political, economic, and social environment in, 291–92 Subsidios al Campo (Mexico), 249–60, 347; findings of, 253–54; information collection for, 252–53; organizations involved in, 251–52; stakeholders’ reactions to findings, 254–58; subsidies programs of, 253 Suil Lee, 239 supranational economic and social policy agenda, 214–15 sustainability, social, 6 sustainable development. See also environment and sustainable development; in developing countries, 247; and farm subsidy policy in Mexico, 249–60; in rural Saudi Arabia, 164–66 Sustainable Europe Research Institute, 146 n.8 sustainable growth, in Korea, 232 Swaminathan, Hema, 100–101 Swanger, Rachel M., 20, 59 n.126 SWP (German think tank), 143 Syria, CASE activity in, 227 tactical flexibility, 71, 149–51 Tajikistan; CASE studies for, 227; economic reforms in, 226 ‘‘Tanks but No Tanks’’ (Nelson Polsby), 14 Tanzania; agriculture in, 306 n.1; political environment of, 344; poverty in, 299; poverty reduction strategy in, 294; Research on Poverty Alleviation, 299–306; think tanks in, 305 Tanzania Development Vision 2025, 301 Tanzania Household Budget Surveys, 300 Tara, Nayana, 100 targeting, in social provision, 3 Task Force on Learning Metrics, 70 Task Force on Service Sector Advancement (Korea), 238–42, 244 tax gap (Ethiopia), 267–70 Tax Reforms (Tanzania), 303 teacher education, in Argentina, 81 Technical Research Center, 202 ‘‘Territories of Peace’’ initiative (Brazil), 336 Thailand, seaports of, 186 Thatcher, Margaret, 3, 30 Theunert, Martin, 38 think groups, think tanks vs., 15 think tanks. See also specific topics; in ‘‘AngloAmerican domain,’’ 29–30; in critical situations, 340; defining, 7–9, 20–28, 54–55 n.24,

57 n.93, 58 n.94; and the developing world, 40–49; historical role of, 9–19; and nature of civil society, 346–47; in newly democratized countries, 344; organizational structures of, 347–48; outside of United States, 35–40; overselling by, 318; in political contexts, 343–45; research and development centers vs., 13–14; and social development, 7–9; in the twenty-first century, 20–28; typology for, 18, 48–49; value of, 32–33; working definition of, 30–35 Think Tanks (Paul Dickson), 13 Think Tanks Across Nations (Stone, Denham, and Garnett), 25 Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP), ix–x, 222 Think Tanks and Social Development Case Studies Project, x Think Tanks and the Policy Landscape in India (Chapal Mehra), 99 Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy (Richard N. Haass), 20–21 Think Tanks in Scotland (Hartwig Pautz), 21 Think Tank Transnationalization and Nonprofit Analysis, Advice and Advocacy (Diane Stone), 25 Third Sector Capital Partners, 315 Third System Project, 2 Thurber, James A., 18 Tierra del Fuego, Argentina, 78 timing; and impact of policy advice, 148; luck created by, 183 ‘‘Tragedy of the Commons,’’ 279 transdisciplinary work, at Ecologic Institute, 137 transparency; at Bruegel, 182; at Carnegie Moscow Center, 324; in India, 122; in Mexico, 252–53 transparency index of educational funding information (CIPPEC), 84 Transparency International, 329 transportation; Bangalore direction-based bus services, 101–7; Delhi urban transit system, 109–10, 113–22; infrastructure for (See public transportation infrastructure); in Johannesburg, 158 Trenin, Dmitri, 330–31 Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe, 222 TTCSP (Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program), ix–x, 222 Ukraine; CASE studies for, 227; economic reforms in, 226; EU trade and economic relations with, 228

370 Index UN. See United Nations UNEP (United Nations Environmental Program), 2 Unirule Institute of Economics, 201, 202 United Arab Emirates, 162–64 United Kingdom; Bruegel’s funding from, 180; Commission for Africa, 294; national government structure/role in, 313; Peterborough Prison project in, 312, 315, 319; political environment of United States vs., 29–30; water policy in, 143 United Nations (UN); CASE projects financed by, 221; on education, 68 United Nations Center for Information, 251 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2 United Nations Development Programme, 97, 227 United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), 2 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2–3 United States; bioenergy policy in, 142; and Carnegie Moscow Center, 322–23; competition and cooperation among think tanks in, 27; Ecologic Institute activity in, 129; loans to developing countries in 1970s, 3; national government structure/role in, 313; political environment of Britain vs., 29–30; postrecession political climate in, 314; structural reforms since crisis of 2008, 194–95 universalism, 3 universities without students, 16, 154 university affiliated think tanks, 49 University of Toronto, 291 university systems, 44 Urban Institute, 17 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 222 Uzbekistan, CASE studies for, 226 Vasiliev, Dmitri, 329 Vasiliev, Sergei, 328 Venezuela, 41 Ve´ron, Nicolas, 178 vertical policy learning, 138 Vetten, Lisa, 154

Vietnam, think tanks in, 44 Views of the People program (Tanzania), 302 Vil-Nkomo, Sibusiso, 151–52 Vimeo, CASE account on, 225 Vitkovskaya, Galina, 328, 329 von Weizsa¨cker, Jakob, 176 ‘‘Washington’s Think Tanks’’ (Peter Singer), 29 Water Framework Directive (EU), 143 water policy, in European Union, 142–43 Water Research Centre (United Kingdom), 143 Weaver, Kent, 16–18, 20 Wen Jiabao, 206 West Africa, 292 Wiarda, Howard J., 15; on discourse coalitions, 21–22; on politicization of think tanks, 27; on think tanks as integrating agencies, 23 Williams, Robin, 350 ‘‘Women of Peace’’ initiative (Brazil), 336 Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, 254, 258 workforce(s); agglomeration effect for, 218; education of, 185–86 World Bank; and AERC network, 294; CASE projects for, 221, 227; KDI joint studies with, 233 World Bank Institute, 293 World Commission on Environment and Development, 3 World Trade Organization (WTO); China in, 211; Ministerial Conferences of, 292–93 World War II, 10–11 Wuppertal Institute, 146 n.7 Yangsoo Jin, 239 Yeltsin, Boris, 322 Yemen, CASE activity in, 227 Yongsheng Village, 276 Young, John, 109, 120 Young Foundation, 312 Yu´n˜ez, Antonio, 250 Yu Yongding, 206 Zhang Yuyan, 206–7 Zuma, Jacob, 152

Acknowledgments

We would like to extend our deepest gratitude first of all to the New Venture Fund, whose generous grant has made it possible to realize the Social Development Policy Case Studies Project. Second, we would like to thank Oliver Babson of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Linda Frey of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for their advice as we developed and implemented this project. Third, we would like to thank all the participating institutions and authors whose accumulated knowledge we believe will contribute to good practices not only among think tanks in developing countries but among those in developed and emerging countries as well. Finally, we would like to express our appreciation to the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung for their October 2011 cosponsoring the event entitled ‘‘The Role of Think Tanks in Social Development’’ in Beijing, which served as a catalyst for this edited volume. It is our hope and belief that these case studies and their exemplary features will contribute to an increased interest in and commitment to social development, as well as to economic growth and stability among the G20 nations and the developing world. The cases featured in this book consider sustainable agriculture, a clean environment (e.g., access to clean water and sanitation), transportation, education, and global access to technology, and also touch on social repercussions related to the international financial crisis and the heightened interdependence caused by globalization. Finally we would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to all the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program interns who have been involved in this project in many different capacities.