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Copyright © 2012. University of Wisconsin Press. All rights reserved. LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:45:04.
Copyright © 2012. University of Wisconsin Press. All rights reserved.
Hooligans in Khrushchev’s Russia
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:45:04.
Copyright © 2012. University of Wisconsin Press. All rights reserved.
Publication of this volume has been made possible, in part, through support from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:45:04.
HOOLIGANS IN KHRUSHCHEV’S RUSSIA
Copyright © 2012. University of Wisconsin Press. All rights reserved.
Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance during the Thaw
Brian LaPierre
T h e
U n i v e r s i t y
o f
W i s c o n s i n
P r e s s
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:45:04.
The University of Wisconsin Press 1930 Monroe Street, 3rd Floor Madison, Wisconsin 53711-2059 uwpress.wisc.edu 3 Henrietta Street London WCE 8LU, England eurospanbookstore.com Copyright © 2012 The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any format or by any means, digital, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, or conveyed via the Internet or a website without written permission of the University of Wisconsin Press, except in the case of brief quotations embedded in critical articles and reviews.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev’s Russia : defining, policing, and producing deviance during the thaw / Brian LaPierre. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-299-28744-3 (pbk.: alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-299-28743-6 (e-book) 1. Criminal justice, Administration of—Soviet Union. 2. Hoodlums—Government policy—Soviet Union. 3. Deviant behavior—Government policy—Soviet Union. 4. Sov iet Union—Hist ory—1953–1985. 5. Sov iet Union—Soc ial cond it ions— 1945–1991. I. Title. HV9960.S65L36 2012 364.30947’09045—dc23 2011045234 An earlier version of chapter 2 was published as “Private Matters or Public Crimes: The Emergence of Domestic Hooliganism in the Soviet Union, 1939–1966” in Borders of Social ism: Private Spheres of the Soviet Union, ed. Lewis H. Siegelbaum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 191–210. Portions of chapter 3 were published earlier as “Making Hooliganism on a Mass Scale: The Campaign against Petty Hooliganism in the Soviet Union, 1956–1964,” Cahiers du monde russe, 47 (2006): 349–376. Likewise, segments of chapter 5 were first published in a festschrift for Richard Hellie as “Dealing with Social Disorders That Should Not Exist: The Khrushchev-Era Soft Line on Petty Crime,” Russian History/Histoire russe, 36 (2009): 183–200. I would like to thank Brill, Palgrave Macmillan, and the editorial board of the Cahiers du monde russe for their generous permission to reuse sections of these articles in the current work.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:45:04.
To
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Lena
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:45:04.
The law is like the shaft of a wagon; it goes wherever you turn it.
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—Russian proverb
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:45:04.
Contents
List of Tables Acknowledgments
Introduction
1
A Portrait of Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
17
Private Matters or Public Crimes? The Emergence of Domestic Hooliganism in Soviet Russia
59
Making Hooliganism on a Mass Scale: The Campaign against Petty Hooliganism
96
Empowering Public Activism: The Khrushchev-Era Campaign to Mobilize Obshchestvennost’ in the Fight against Hooliganism
132
5
The Rise and Fall of the Soft Line on Petty Crime
168
Conclusion: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose: Hooliganism after Khrushchev
199
Notes Bibliography Index
209 265 275
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2 3 4
ix xi
3
vii
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:34:26.
Copyright © 2012. University of Wisconsin Press. All rights reserved. LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:34:26.
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List of Tables Table 1. Number of Courtroom Convictions for Malicious and Simple Hooliganism in the USSR and the Russian Republic (RSFSR), 1945–1965
18
Table 2. Social Composition of Hooligan Convicts in the USSR, 1947–1965
43
Table 3. Age Range of Convicted Hooligans in the USSR, 1945–1957
47
Table 4. Age Range of Convicted Hooligans in the USSR, 1962–1965
47
Table 5. Recidivism Rate among Convicted Hooligans in the USSR, 1947–1957
51
Table 6. Distribution of Hooliganism (Simple and Malicious) by Republic, Measured in Number of Convicts per 100,000 People, 1961–1963
52
Table 7. Rates of Party and Komsomol Membership among Convicted Hooligans, 1947–1957
55
Table 8. Urban/Rural Distribution of Hooliganism in the USSR, 1947–1957
56
Table 9. Number of People Given Measures of Administrative Punishment for Petty Hooliganism (Arrests and Fines) in the USSR, 1957–1964 ix
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:34:37.
104
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Acknowledgments This book would not have been possible without the help and support of many individuals and agencies. My research was generously sup ported by a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship (with funds provided by the United States Department of Education), a grant from the International Research and Exchange Board’s Regional Scholar Exchange Program (with funds provided by the United States Department of State’s Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs), an Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Dissertation Year Fellowship, and by a Summer Faculty Research Grant from the Univer sity of Southern Mississippi. For helping me to realize my dream of researching in the Russian archives, I am very grateful to these four institutions. This book had its beginnings as a PhD dissertation, and I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee at the University of Chicago, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ron Suny, and the late Richard Hellie, for their counsel and guidance. In particular, Sheila Fitzpatrick has guided me through each step of the research and writing process and offered advice, encouragement, and support during the good times and the bad. For having the opportunity to learn from these wonderful scholars and mentors, I have been most fortunate. During the writing of this book, I was greatly saddened to learn the news of Richard Hellie’s death. He was a central figure in our Chicago kruzhok and will be sorely missed. Throughout the course of my work on this book, I have benefited greatly from the aid and encouragement of my fellow historians and xi
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:34:52.
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xii
Acknowledgments
f riends. I would like to thank, in particular, Alan Barenberg, Ed Cohn, Mark Edele, Marc Elie, Klaus Gestwa, Mie Nakachi, Chris Raffensperger, and Ben Zajicek for their help and good humor over the years. My journey from the first draft to the final manuscript would have been more difficult and lonelier without them. I also owe a special debt to all of those who have read and commented on earlier drafts of this work. In particular, I would like to recognize (in addition to all those previously listed) Stephen Bittner, Susan Costanzo, Yoram Gorlizki, Phyllis Jestice, Michael Khodarkovsky, Joan Neuberger, David Shearer, and Lewis Siegelbaum for their insightful and helpful comments on earlier versions of various chapters. Special thanks are due to Peter Solomon and the other anonymous reviewer for the Uni versity of Wisconsin Press for reading through the entire manuscript and offering important suggestions for its improvement. I would also like to thank the many universities, workshops, and conferences that have given me the opportunity to present my research over the last decade. Their participants have given me many interesting ideas and much helpful criticism. In particular, I would like to thank the Russian Studies workshops of the University of Tübingen, Humboldt Univer sity, the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung/Helmut Schmidt University, and the University of Chicago for particularly stimulating sessions. All of these individuals and audiences have saved me from many errors and are responsible for none that remain. My colleagues in the history department of the University of Southern Mississippi merit special thanks for their good humor and assistance over the years. Specifically, my hat goes off to Phyllis Jestice for her editorial skills and to Doug Chambers for giving me the courage to let this manuscript go. Of all the fine people at the University of Wisconsin Press, I would like to recognize Gwen Walker. She has stayed with this project throughout its long life and has been a model of professionalism throughout it all. On a personal note, I would like to thank my parents, Douglas and Anne LaPierre, for always supporting my dreams. Now that I am a parent, I only hope that I can do for my daughter everything that they have done so skillfully and selflessly for me. To my wife, Manuela, I owe a special note of thanks. She has been my companion through all my academic adventures and has lived with me through all the highs and lows of a historian’s life. She left her career and country and she put her dreams on hold so that I could fulfill my own.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:34:52.
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Acknowledgments
xiii
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Shortly after I began working on the research for this book, my daughter was born. Her beauty, kindness, and endless energy have enlivened the long and lonely hours of work and given me great joy. As a proud papa, I dedicate this book to my happy khuliganka, Lena. If it is anywhere near as good as she is, I will be as fortunate a scholar as I am a father.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:34:52.
Copyright © 2012. University of Wisconsin Press. All rights reserved. LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:34:52.
Copyright © 2012. University of Wisconsin Press. All rights reserved.
Hooligans in Khrushchev’s Russia
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:34:52.
Copyright © 2012. University of Wisconsin Press. All rights reserved. LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:34:52.
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Introduction In 1957, Soviet police arrested an intoxicated man for attacking and stabbing a bystander twice with a knife.1 In 1959, another man was arrested for having sex with his wife in a “perverted manner.”2 Five years later, authorities detained yet another Soviet man for cutting off a cat’s tail.3 Despite the diversity of their actions, these three men were tried and convicted under the same criminal article. Instead of being convicted for sexual assault, spousal abuse, cruelty to animals, or at tempted murder, Soviet courts convicted them for “rudely violating public order and expressing clear disrespect for society.” The crimes these men committed did not make them rapists, wife batterers, or murderers in the eyes of the Soviet court. They made them hooligans. These three cases, and the millions of hooligan cases like them that occurred during the Khrushchev era, are the subject of this study. In modern English, “hooligan” is a term for a “young street tough or member of a street gang.”4 Perhaps a contraction of “Hooley’s gang” or a reference to an infamous or fictional Irish criminal family (the Hooli hans or Houlihans), the word “hooligan” burst into the London press in the summer of 1898 and reflected widespread fears about the crimi nality of the wild Irish immigrant.5 Although it once circulated widely in the world of mass journalism and popular entertainment, the word “hooliganism,” is seldom used in contemporary American English. It is a quaint and slightly archaic term of admonition that has found renewed currency with the rise of soccer hooliganism, a violent form of sports fandom first popularized and practiced in the United Kingdom. 3
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
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4
Introduction
In the Soviet Union, hooliganism (khuliganstvo) was more than a mild term of admonition and more than a viol ent soccer-based subculture. It was a crime: the serious crime of showing disrespect to the values of Soviet society. During the Khrushchev period, authorities imprisoned millions of Soviet citizens under the criminal category of hooliganism for anywhere from three days to five years for everything from swearing at a stranger to stabbing him. In contrast to his contemporary European counterpart, the Soviet hooligan was not confined to the soccer stadium or the sports underworld.6 As the most common offender on the docket after the petty thief (melkii khishchenik), the hooligan was a more frequent character in the criminal justice system than in the world of spectator sports.7 In short, hooliganism was a mass crime. The fact that one out of every twenty-five Soviet men between the ages of 18 to 40 was either convicted in a court or arrested administratively for hooliganism during the course of a single average year (1963) shows the ubiquity of this form of everyday criminality in the Khrushchev era.8 It also demon strates that the Soviet Union suffered from more than just a problem with political crime; it also suffered from an equal, if not more serious, problem with ordinary forms of deviance. While the Soviet Union was justly famous (or infamous) for manu facturing pig iron and repressing politic al dissent, this study will show that it was just as good at producing and punishing the little-known hooligans who clogged its criminal justice system. These hooligans formed one of the largest inmate populations in the penal colonies and labor camps of Khrushchev’s Gulag archipelago, rivaling and often ex ceeding in terms of sheer size many categories of the political prisoners more popul arly associated with these sites.9 In early 1956, for example, the percentage of Gulag inmates detained for hooliganism (15.9 per cent) was greater than those held under the politic ally charged rubric of counterrevolutionary crimes (11.3 percent).10 Such figures show that the Gulag in the Khrushchev era was as much a home for hooligans as it was a space for disciplining Ivan Denisoviches. But the courts and labor colonies were not the hooligan’s only habitat in Soviet society. He lurked along every citizen’s street, hid in his shadowy courtyard, and lived in the noisy neighbor’s apartment. He worked in collectives and resided in communities across the world’s first socialist state. As a focus of anger, anxiety, and even amusement, the hooligan was an ever-present part of Soviet society: one that Soviet
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
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Introduction
5
citizens experienced every day on their streets, in their homes, and in each other. In this study, I examine how citizens, courts, and social control agencies during the Khrushchev period (1953–1964) understood and applied the amorphous and commonplace criminal category of hooli ganism. By exploring practices of peer-group reform, punishment reduc tion, category creation, and public activism, I examine how the actions of local actors and the reformist policies of central bureaucrats changed the way hooliganism was policed and punished in the post-Stalin era. Last, I explore how the shift from limited liberal reform to conservative reaction in the final years of the Khrushchev regime led to the adoption of a new policy of viol ent confrontation between social control agencies and the hooligan criminal. Of course, hooliganism was neither a new social phenomenon nor a new concern of the Soviet state during the Khrushchev period. Instead, hooliganism had been a perennial source of public panic for Russian society and the object of intensive anti-crime campaigns since the late 1890s. Far from being the creation of communism, the hooligan strad dled regime types and revolutionary divides, finding fertile breeding grounds both in the autocratic empire and in the new socialist state that followed it.11 Khrushchev’s campaign against hooliganism was therefore part of an anti-hooligan effort whose history preceded Soviet power. It fit into a cyclical campaign of Russian and Soviet anti-hooligan efforts and into a larger Khrushchev-era program of prosecuting stigmatized social groups, such as parasites and gypsies, whose values clashed with the cultured and productivist ideology of the Soviet civilizing project. Yet, although Khrushchev’s anti-hooligan efforts complemented some of his regime’s programs, they also complicated and contradicted others, such as the push to promote socialist legality through processes of professionalization, procedural codification, and institutional over sight. By boosting the supervisory powers of the Procuracy, reining in police power, and reducing punishments, Khrushchev’s de-Stalinizing state took a variety of measures during the 1950s to contain the aggres sive and uncontrolled police power it associated with the discredited terror tactics of the Stalin era.12 In the interests of accelerating and improving its anti-hooligan efforts, the Khrushchev regime, however, often acted outside of and in opposi tion to the socialist legality program that was its domin ant policy of
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
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6
Introduction
de-Stalinization. To fight hooliganism, it opted for using public volun teers rather than professionals, for simplifying legal procedures rather than strengthening them, for overriding rather than instituting mecha nisms of oversight and appeal, and for strengthening social control at the expense of extending socialist legality.13 The policies and practices of Khrushchev’s anti-hooligan campaign remind us that the Thaw period was more than a time of limited liberal reform and decreased regime repression. It was also, as this study will show, a time of repres sive social discipline in which the state sought to expand its policing power to the most mundane aspects and areas of everyday life. By re vealing the limits of liberalization and socialist legality, the Khrushchevera campaign against hooliganism shows us that a de-Stalinizing state coexisted in an uneasy equilibrium during the 1950s with the develop ment of a society of overreaching and increasingly intimate intrusion, in tolerance, and the mass incarceration of stigmatized social undesirables.
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Historiography Most historians view Russian hooliganism through the interpretative framework of social disorganization theory.14 Developed by the Chicago School of sociologists in the first half of the twentieth century, the social disorganization paradigm argues that the rapid social change asso ciated with industrial modernization, urbanization, and mass migra tion produced deviancy by destroying the traditional control mecha nisms embedded in the face-to-face social structure of the village. Instead of inhabiting the village’s stable social world of set ritual, authority, and routine, the early twentieth century’s new urbanites found themselves set loose in an unfamiliar world of disorienting anon ymity, freedom, and estrangement. As traditional mechanisms of social con trol lost their traction, urban immigrants were freed to experiment with accepted rules, flout authority figures, and indulge in unconventional roles and behavioral repertoires that attracted the scorn of urban elites.15 As modernization fell out of fashion for its ethnocentrism and its teleological assumptions about social evolution, competing interpre tive paradigms, such as moral panic, developed to explain the origins of deviant behavior. Moral panic theory seeks to augment the structural bias of the social disorganization school by underlining the independent role discourse has in creating and steering anti-deviancy campaigns. Popularized by the work of sociologist Stanley Cohen, the model of moral panic looks at deviance as an outcome not of social structural
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
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Introduction
7
c hange, but of the way mass media coverage constructs crises and stimulates citizens and social control agencies to act against targeted social groups and carefully selected scapegoats.16 By suggesting that deviance does not become a social problem until the mass media makes it into one, moral panic theory underlines the key role of the media in shaping the public’s reaction to the deviant communities it helps create. As a result, moral panic studies pay close attention to media representa tions and assign them a key causal role in fomenting anti-hooligan hysteria. Rather than simply being a byproduct of industrial moderniza tion, studies on moral panic interpret the public’s anti-deviancy paranoia as a symptom of misplaced and misdirected anxiety over l arger issues of social malaise, economic stagnation, perceived moral decay, and imperial decline.17 Combining both interpretive worlds, most studies of Russian/Soviet hooliganism merge social disorganization with moral panic and explain hooliganism as the product of rapid social structural change, cultural clash, mass media-induced anxiety, and elite angst. They argue that hooliganism was the result of social changes that brought new actors and ideas to the modernizing metropolis and created cultural clash and com petition between estranged workers, political elites, and the urban intelligentsia. In addition, most also treat hooliganism as a mediadriven discourse of moral panic that symbolized society’s anxiety over larger issues of status reversal, eroding social values, and ideological contamination.18 Moreover, many scholars of Russian deviance treat hooliganism as a form of resistance. In her study of late Imperial hooliganism, Joan Neu berger argues that St. Petersburg’s hooligans created a new type of “street theater” or “Rabelaisian carnival” that upended the established social order and scoffed at the values of the cultured urban elite.19 Like the futurist artists of the early twentieth century, hooligans, Neuberger explains, were street performers who used publicity (both on the boule vards and in the penny press) and “in your face” tactics to shock their audiences into rethinking accepted canons of civilized taste and con duct.20 According to V. A. Kozlov’s analysis of mass urban disorders in the post-Stalin period, hooligans were not only agents of resistance but also active fomenters of anti-Soviet rebellion. Hooligans, Kozlov con tends, were provocateurs pushing the urban crowd into overt and aggressive opposition against the state and its local agents. By manipu lating grievances against shortages and police brutality, Kozlov contends that hooligans turned peaceful mass demonstrations against official
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
8
Introduction
misconduct and malfeasance into violent riots that served their own a nti-statist and anti-authoritarian agenda.21
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Hooliganism as a Label In this study, I have endeavored to move away from (but not to ignore completely) the explanation of hooliganism as a product of social dis organization, moral panic, and mass media scapegoating. Rather than being the outcome of extraordinary social change, this study argues that the Soviet hooligan was a depressingly ordinary and commonplace social character. Instead of being a creature of disorder, stress, and dis location, he was a child of Soviet normality: the offspring of the ugly underside of everyday life in the supposed workers’ utopia. As a fix ture of social life, the hooligan was a kind of Soviet everyman. He was a familiar problem figure that citizens saw on the streets and, increasingly during the Khrushchev period, lived with in their homes. By locating it in the commonplace and the quotidian, this study treats hooliganism as a representative artifact of the difficult, repressive, and mundane envi ronment of the Soviet everyday. For Soviet citizens, the experience of hooliganism was not an abstract one mediated by shifts in social structure and media-driven discourse. Instead, it was an immediate one of being harassed on the street, battered by an abusive partner, or disturbed in the dead of the night. In short, hooliganism was a daily reminder of the constant difficulty of living life in an intolerant society where there was too much alcohol, too much boredom, and where aggressive policing, ambiguous laws, and narrow conduct norms were likely to label the smallest misdeed as a serious violation of vague concepts like social order or socialist morality. Rather than viewing social change or shifting mass media discourse as the primary drivers of deviance, I argue that it was countless indi vidual policemen, judges, prosecutors, and ordinary citizens who made Soviet hooliganism. Far from being the powerless tools of a totalitarian state, these actors were empowered by broadly defined laws that allowed them to see hooliganism in virtually any unsavory action or eccentric behavior and by an anti-deviance campaign that enabled them to expand the domain of deviance to new actors and areas. As we shall see throughout this study, the state’s anti-hooligan campaign, instead of constraining agency, delegated it downward and gave local law enforcement personnel and Soviet citizens the power to redefine the elusive hooligan category in new and sometimes startling ways.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
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Introduction
9
Seen from this perspective, hooliganism was a cumulative product of the way Soviet citizens (both official and ordinary) interacted with, evaluated, and applied interpretive labels to the small-scale social niches around them. Instead of being imposed by the center or identified solely in the pages of the mass press, hooliganism was endlessly created and recreated in countless local interpersonal settings where actions met interpretations and where citizens were outfitted with appropriate stigmata. In these diverse niches, individuals, based on their own in complete understandings and personal interests, applied a flexible and ambiguous criminal and cultural category (hooliganism) onto the con crete, intimate, and ordinary world of their lives and relationships. Through their varied acts of everyday attribution, these ordinary agents sometimes confirmed, sometimes contradicted, and sometimes chal lenged conventional ideas and expectations of what it meant to be hooligan.22 For these reasons, this study will primarily focus on the policing, petitioning, and prosecution practices through which central bureau crats, local law enforcement, and Soviet citizens applied and instantiated their understanding of the hooligan label. This approach reflects my belief that it was not just disorder or media discourse that created Soviet hooliganism. Instead, it was individuals and their concrete inter pretations, interests, and attributions that continually defined and re defined Russian deviance. This study treats hooliganism as a fluid and flexible label: an ascribed identity that individual interpreters applied across a wide and chang ing array of actors and actions.23 As a historically constructed, socially conditioned, and individually interpreted artifact, hooliganism was not a unitary category that remained constant over time. Instead, it had multiple meanings that evolved and changed across interpreters and in different popular and professional discursive domains. Far from being standardized, the ambiguous and evocative quality of the hooligan label made its understanding and application highly indi vidual and local. Never a stable or a singular concept, hooliganism reflected the varying concerns and crises of individuals at all levels and locations in the Soviet social structure. By looking at difference and change in this flexible catchall category, this study examines the multiple meanings, policies, and practices that coalesced around this key word of Soviet culture and how these understandings and appli cations changed over time to cover and criminalize new people and practices.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
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10
Introduction
In terms of its interpretation, this study takes many of its basic insights from the school of sociologic al analysis known as labeling theory. According to labeling theorists, deviance does not refer to a timeless and universal set of dysfunctional or immoral actions and behaviors. Instead, they argue that deviance is best understood as a label that encompasses different actions at different times and changes to match historical, social, and individual contingencies. Labeling theorists, therefore, explore the ways definitions of deviance change and examine how these shifting definitions determine who gets located within the flexible boundaries of illegal behavior.24 Following from these ideas, this study concentrates on how changing legal discourse helped to determine the conviction rates and campaign dynamics that marked Khrushchev’s anti-hooliganism. In particular, it pays close attention to the changing language of the criminal code’s definition of hooliganism and how these modifications altered the understanding, expansiveness, and overall applicability of this elastic deviant label. Alongside “enemy of the people,” “kulak,” and “Trotskyite,” the hooligan label joins Soviet Russia’s infamous list of indistinct social categories, categories that were often vulnerable to overinterpretation, outright invention, and arbitrary abuse.25 Like these similarly unstable terms, hooligan was an ascribed identity whose symbolic power and prominence rose with the regime’s determination to purge its popula tion of the people and behaviors unworthy of its bright communist future. During an era of ideological change, Cold War competition, and increasing foreign influence, this study will show how the hooligan label became a convenient weapon with which the Khrushchev regime could civilize the Soviet working class, enforce appropriate codes of everyday conduct, and socially engineer the new post-Stalinist Soviet man. Hooliganism’s labeling, hence, did not take place within a vacuum. It occurred within an exciting and uneasy social and cultural context that contributed to and constrained its universe of possible meanings: a context defined by the anxieties of the confrontation with American capitalism, the uncertainties of the era of de-Stalinization, and the promises of a Soviet-style civilizing mission that sought to call forth and fortify the builders of communism. Khrushchev’s campaign against hooliganism fit within this context of cultural clash, foreign pollution, and ideological reset well. In an era of transatlantic unease over rebels without a cause and during a time when taboo Western fashions and subcultures were creeping into the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
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Introduction
11
nce-cloistered world of postwar communism, prosecuting deviance o served as a means for resurrecting the post-Stalinist Soviet Union’s frayed sense of social solidarity, ideological certainty, and moral supe riority. As the functionalist disciples of Emile Durkheim have argued for over a century, the policing of deviant behavior allows complex societies to come together in the public affirmation and defense of their basic values.26 Instead of being a destabilizing product of social dis order, these scholars have shown how deviancy often stabilizes societies by allowing them to engage in public rituals of persecution that define their shared moral boundaries.27 In an era of foreign cultural penetra tion, de-Stalinization, and declining faith in the old orthodoxies, fight ing hooliganism served a similar function for Soviet elites anxious to reaffirm and recommit to their core ideals about human nature, right conduct, and socialist civilization. Through public combat against its uncultured other, the Soviet Union sought to save itself, regain its wholeness, and realize its vision of a model society populated by polite, productive, and politically literate subjects. Ideology motivated Khrushchev’s anti-hooligan campaign; ambi guity and campaign-style enforcement shaped it and extended its reach deep into Soviet society. Rather than treating hooliganism as a resist ance project centered on overt anti-regime opposition, I argue that many of the hooligans produced in the Khrushchev period were accidental deviants.28 Instead of being self-conscious rebels who raged openly against the system, they stumbled unwittingly into hooliganism as their formerly innocuo us or unpunished everyday behaviors (such as cursing or drinking) were absorbed into the expanding boundaries of an increasingly broad deviant label, invested with criminal content, and transformed into imprisoning offenses. As the Soviet legal system expanded the domain of deviance into the trivial acts of everyday life during the 1950s and 1960s, millions of Soviet citizens drifted into an ever more inclusive definition of deviance, were remade into hooligans, and reborn as outcasts of the Soviet system. Fueled by alcohol and animus, their deeds had little overt dissident or anti-state content and spoke more of their personal foibles and petty hatreds than of their political passions. Instead of being centered on the opposition between subjects and their state, hooliganism revolved around a series of un stable relationships: relationships between citizens and social control agencies; drunks and do-gooders; commonplace bad behaviors and slippery criminal categories; and empty lives and overabundant alcohol.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
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12
Introduction
The fact that over 90 percent of hooligans were intoxicated when they engaged in deviance shows that hooliganism was caused not so much by dissent, but by the drinking to which workers turned to escape the boredom, blur, and bleakness of life in the Soviet factory town.29 Just as hooliganism cannot be defined solely in terms of resistance, neit her can it be def ined prim ari ly in c lear-cut gene ra t ional or age-related terms. Rather than being a youth category or a synonym for juvenile delinquency, hooliganism occurred at all ages. Though juve niles certainly committed hooliganism and often monopolized the attention of the authorities and mass media on this issue, the majority of convicted hooligans were not children under the age of 18 (see chapter 1). They were adults in their late twenties and thirties.30 What unified hooligans was their gender rather than their age. The fact that over 97 percent of convicted hooligans were men meant that hooliganism was not a youth problem but a male problem.31 As a pro foundly gendered category, hooliganism was inextricably linked to notions of masculinity and machismo. In his performances and postur ing, the hooligan acted out a vision of manhood that conflicted with the state’s vision of cultured subjectivity and drew its repressive wrath. As a category of rough masculinity, hooliganism tells us something about what it meant to be a “real” man in the Soviet Union and about how certain (non-Soviet) notions of manliness were perceived and embodied in the leisureless and underserviced factory towns of the post-Stalin period. It also tells us how steep and slippery the slope was from being a man to becoming a hooligan in a society whose official culture left little room for the traditional rites and rowdy rituals of male, working-class sociability. By drinking, cursing, and carousing, workers made them selves into men in the eyes of their cohorts and hooligans in the eyes of the state and its agents of social control. Hooliganism made collective farmers and workers into tough guys and targets and, in this sense, served less as a space for enacting resistance than as a site around which a rough masculine identity was performed and publicized in opposi tion to the state’s nongendered, class-based social categories.32 In addition to being men, the majority of convicted hooligans were members of the working class. Rather than being marginalized misfits who existed at the fringes of Soviet society, the average hooligan worked as a factory laborer and was a vital part of the state’s industrial economy. Despite what the regime’s rhetoric about the survivals of capi talism suggested about his alien origins, the hooligan’s class status and occupational profile put him at the ostensible center of a Soviet project
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
Introduction
13
whose raison d’être was (in rhetoric, if not exactly in reality) workingclass empowerment. As the symbolic heart of the society he was allegedly sinning against, the hooligan occupied a paradoxic al position as both class insider and cultural outsider to the Soviet project, as both the regime’s poster boy and its problem child. Instead of being an outsider, the hooligan was made an outsider by the system of which he was so in extricably a part. The story of hooliganism is a story of how the Soviet state criminalized part of its core constituency and turned those who should have been system-supporters into offenders who acted outside of the state’s narrow vision of civilized and cultured society. Through the fight against hooliganism, the Soviet state found itself, ironically, at war with the existing lifeways of a working class that it claimed to champion, but that it could neither understand nor esteem.
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Chapter Outline This study is divided into roughly three sections. In the first section (chapter 1), I explore how Soviet authorities and citiz ens defined and understood hooliganism. In the second section (chapters 2 and 3), I examine the creation of new categories of hooliganism during the Khrushchev period. The final section (chapters 4 and 5) of the study is devoted to the changing ways authorities policed and punished hooli ganism in the Khrushchev era. In chapter 1, I explore the dramatic increase in conviction rates for hooliganism that took place in the Soviet Union during the mid-1950s. As statistics spiked, hooliganism became a growing cause of concern for authorities and ordinary citizens alike. I begin the first section of this chapter by examining the causes behind the increase in 1950s-era conviction rates. Instead of focusing on social disorder, I explore how shifts in definition and policing practices drove the deviancy produc tion process to new levels. Chapter 1 also explores hooliganism’s multiple meanings and faces by looking at how the law, the popular imaginary, and state statistics constructed hooliganism and the hooligan. By treating hooliganism as a crime, as a style, as a performance practice, or as a category of social analy sis, each of these sites created its own vision of who the hooligan was and what he did. When viewed together, they show the hooligan not only as an object of criminal prosecution but also as a performer whose actions and attire outraged and attracted and as a person with particular class, occupational, educational, and generational characteristics. By
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
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14
Introduction
looking at hooliganism across professional and popular discourses, I examine in this chapter the various ways Soviet society imagined and understood its deviant other. Most studies of hooliganism treat the public street as the main site of deviant behavior. The street was the space where the hooligan enacted his anti-elitist carnival or led the urban crowd in its showdown with the Soviet state.33 In chapter 2, I explore the development, during the Khrushchev period, of a new type of deviancy: domestic hooliganism (bytovoe khuliganstvo). The growing prevalence of domestic hooligan ism throughout the Khrushchev period meant that the home, in many areas, began to displace the street as the most common habitat of the post-Stalin hooligan. The shift in the locus classicus of hooliganism from the street corner to the kitchen table transformed the identity of both hooligan and victim and changed the way people applied and under stood this label. Remaking hooliganism from a crime of anonym ous violence that happened on the street to a crime of intimate violence that took place in the home opened new aven ues for criminalizing common sources of domestic dysfunction, such as spousal battery and child abuse. However, the insertion of the public category of hooliganism into areas and actions many thought of as private and non-prosecutable also touched off a debate over how to disentangle the borders between public and private and where to draw the boundaries of communal responsibility. Beginning in the 1950s, hooliganism shifted from being a public crime committed in a public place and became a crime that problema tized public space, pushing its fluid parameters outward and expanding the state’s punitive reach deeper down into the everyday world of hearth and home. By appealing to an outsized and expanded interpretation of hooliganism, local police, prosecutors, and judges not only relocated the deviant to the domestic realm, they also contributed to the creation of a system of overreaching and intimately intrusive social control and made hooliganism into a flexible instrument for regulating the most personal and private areas of Soviet citizens’ lives. In chapter 2, I trace how hooliganism was domesticated during the Khrushchev period and examine the debate that swirled around this new and controversial form of domestic deviance. In chapter 3, I explore how the regime decided, starting in 1956, to get tough on hooliganism by paradoxically getting more lenient. By giving more people lighter punishments, the state sought to curb more serious forms of criminality through combating minor forms of misbehavior
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
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Introduction
15
and creating a new post-Stalinist style of social control. To accomplish this, a new watered-down categ ory of hooliganism, “petty hooligan ism,” was created that gave lenient punishments for light offenses. In anticipation of high case volumes, the government also instituted a new pared-down punishment process to fast-track petty hooligan cases and prevent the system from swamping over. Chapter 3 examines the implementation of a petty hooligan program that changed hooliganism into a mass crime involving the administra tive arrest of over a million Soviet citizens annually. With the creation of petty hooliganism, the Soviet state pushed the limits of an ambiguous criminal category deeper down the behavioral spectrum into common practices such as drinking and cursing. By creating types of hooliganism to fit every occasion, the state not only ensured that every act, from the trivial borderline behavior to the terrible crime, would fall under one of the categories of the hooligan catchall, it also made it possible for a growing number of people to be labeled as deviants, fitted with out sider identities, and stigmatized. By charting how it made millions of ordinary citizens into hooligans, exposed them to arbitrary and unregu lated police and judicial power, and dragged them through a degrading detention process, I interpret the petty hooligan decree not as a symbol of Thaw era liberalization. Instead, I see it as part of a larger package of prosecution, coercive refashioning, and aggressive state intolerance that the Khrushchev regime brought to bear on an expanding array of social outcasts during the 1950s, a collection of social undesirables ranging from vagrant gypsies and labor-shirking parasites to the innocu ous offenders of Soviet byt (or everyday life). In chapter 4, I explore how the Khrushchev regime began experi menting with new ways of policing and punishing hooligans during the mid- to late 1950s. Instead of relying solely on the police and the criminal courts for its anti-hooligan efforts, the regime appealed to public activism (obshchestvennost’) to assist and augment the anti-crime campaign. It sought to stimulate public participation and create through out the country an extensive grassroots network of volunteer police and prosec utory agencies. In the druzhina and comrades’ courts, a com munity of self-policing social activists functioning outside, although under the ultimate oversight, of the formal systems of law enforcement and criminal justice would apprehend hooligans and bring them to account. Chapter 4 explores the attempt to outsource the fight against hooli ganism to obshchestvennost’ and looks at the costs and constraints that
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
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16
Introduction
hampered the campaign to create a grassroots network of volunteers ex nihilo. Comrades’ courts and druzhina units were left to themselves not only to improvise their own type of justice but also to confront the violent underworld of the Soviet city. The loosening of restrictive self-defense laws and the campaign’s violent rhetoric of confrontation suggests that the obshchestvennost’ experiment was about more than constructing communism and relieving an overcrowded crimin al jus tice system. It was also a way to mobilize violent vigilantism against wrongdoers and take the offensive in the fight against Soviet society’s stubbornly persistent crime problem. In chapter 5, I examine the new soft-line approach toward petty criminals that the Soviet state unveiled in 1959. Instead of mandatory prison sentences, the soft line urged judges to give petty criminals non custodial forms of punishment, transfer them out of the formal criminal justice system, and remand them to the care of their collectives for reform and reeducation. By working and being worked on by the collec tive, offenders would be saved for the Soviet system and returned as remade men to their families and factories. Through the soft line, the state divested itself from the job of disciplining petty deviants and con served its police and judicial resources for the fight against dangerous criminals. Chapter 5 traces the story of the soft line and its demise. By examining how the soft line operated in the collectives and on the criminals who were remanded to them, the chapter illustrates how most collectives left soft-line criminals ignored and uncorrected rather than reformed and remade. As officials misused soft-line measures to coddle hardened criminals and hide crimes from key statistical records, opposition to the soft line grew, especially among Soviet citizens. The dysfunction of most collectives and the widespread misuse of suspended sentences eventually discredited the soft line and led to the unveiling, toward the end of the Khrushchev period, of hard-line polic ies that favored the use of physical force in the fight against hooliganism.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:21.
1
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A Portrait of Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period Hooliganism had risen to high levels several times in the Stalin era. However in the mid-1950s, conviction rates for this crime rose to un precedented post-WWII heights, making it a critic al problem for the young socialist state as it sought to win the Cold War and construct communism. In tandem with soaring statistical indicators, Soviet citizens’ anxiety over the increasing problem of deviance swelled. Although it had always been an ugly part of everyday life in the workers’ state, hooliganism, by 1958, presented an unique problem that had, as a man from Riazan’ wrote to Pravda, “surpassed all previous bounds.”1 Compared with the past, “there has never been such a problem with hooliganism as there is now,” concerned citiz ens pointed out.2 Wherever Soviet citizens looked, they saw, as a resident of the Sverdlovsk region noted, “hooliganism . . . flourishing everywhere.”3 They were, a man from Gor’kii commented, “the everyday eyewitnesses of hooligan acts.”4 Supposedly the favored sons of the socialist state, workers “were laboring for the good of the Motherland, but [they] lived in fear,” as a letter writer from the Ivanovo region complained.5 When the sun went down in some cities, women and children stayed indoors and workers on the night shift slept on the shop floor rather than braving dark and deserted streets.6 17
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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18
Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
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Table 1. Number of Courtroom Convictions for Malicious and Simple Hooliganism in the USSR and the Russian Republic (RSFSR), 1945–1965 Year
Number of Hooligan Convictions in USSR
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
40,092 69,789 40,133 45,024 70,425 71,907 85,741 103,897 116,592 126,832 126,772 196,558 185,035 207,587 152,612 82,430 181,318 173,659 115,678 100,682 110,654
Number of Hooligan Convictions in RSFSR 30,683 51,906 27,908 30,628 51,515 51,086 62,687 74,353 86,213 91,219 92,324 143,924 128,672 145,180 108,255 55,168 123,911 123,113 81,244 71,347 —
Sources: GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 44. Data on USSR convictions before 1945 and after 1957 are taken from GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 95, l. 1; and GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 228, l. 147. For data on RSFSR convictions until 1957, see GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5681, l. 65. For data on RSFSR convictions after 1957, see GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 474, l. 2.
These concerned citizens wanted to live what they saw as the Soviet good life: to work, to rest, and to raise their famil ies. But the ever-present and persistent problem of hooliganism haunted their neighborhoods and spoiled their daily routines. “Hooliganism has grown to such an extent,” a railroad worker complained, “that if you want to relax, then you better stay at home because the hooligans in the park and in the movie theaters always spoil your mood.”7 “I can’t even remember the last time I went to the park with my daughter since there is so much hool ig ani sm there,” a man reg retf ully told his coll eagues at an anti-crime assembly.8
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
19
Like the letters of concerned Soviet citizens, statistics showed that the mid-1950s were a boom time for hooliganism in the post-WWII period. Collectively, they painted a bleak picture of an ever-expanding hooliganism that seemed to be spiraling out of control. Courtroom con victions for hooliganism in the USSR rose 417 percent from a postwar low of 40,133 in 1947 to a high of 207,587 in 1958. During the postwar period, the Russian Republic (RSFSR) experienced similar strong growth with hooligan convictions rates climbing 420 percent from 1947 to 1958 (see table 1). As the statistics make clear, the Khrushchev period may have been an era of de-Stalinization and cultural thaw, but it was also the beginning of the golden age of Soviet hooliganism.
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Questioning the Causes of the Crime Boom How could hooliganism exist, and even increase, in this, the best of all possible worlds? That was the question that troubled Soviet leaders, law enforcement officials, and criminologists not only in the 1950s, but ever since the advent of Soviet power. Crime, all of these parties agreed, was a capitalist phenomen on fueled by the structural inequalities, class conflict, police repression, and abject poverty that marked working-class life in that exploitative and immoral economic system. But if capitalism caused crime, how could it possibly exist in the setting of Soviet-style socialism, which, according to Communist Party ideologues and per sistent propaganda, knew neither exploitation nor class warfare? Crim inologists and law enforcement officials could not deny that crime was a troubling part of Soviet social life (although some did claim that citizens were exaggerating the extent of crime in their local communities).9 But they also could not craft an orthodox social structural explanation with out either drawing an unacceptable analogy between the USSR and its capitalist competitor-states or shedding unwelcome attention on the problems that continued to plague life in the workers’ parad ise. In short, leaders, officials, and academics alike were stretched to their con siderable sophistical limits pondering how to explain the inexplicable persistence of criminals, such as hooligans, under the enlightened con ditions of Soviet rule. Because they could not blame their native social and ideological system, Soviet legal theorists and criminologists blamed the nearest available scapegoat. They pinned the crime problem on the late Impe rial period’s experiment in state-sponsored capitalism and on the adverse social and cultural effects it had on some members of Soviet society.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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20
Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
Instead of being a product of contemporary socialism, hooliganism was a “survival of the past”—a rotten product of capitalism and the Roma nov old regime that continued to haunt a Soviet system that in and of itself lacked all the necessary social conditions that Marxist-Leninists believed produced crime.10 Capitalist contamination and harmful ideo logical holdovers from the late tsarist era that polluted the conscious ness of a small number of unenlightened and estranged citizens were the causal agents that lay behind crimin al behaviors such as hooligan ism.11 As Soviet power became entrenched among the public and as intensive political education and propaganda made the new Soviet man, crime would gradually begin to decrease and, eventually, disappear. Almost four decades after the October Revolution, however, the explanation of hooliganism as a slowly diminishing “survival of the past” was losing its credibility among the public and criminal justice professionals. Instead of getting better gradually, crime was growing along with the Soviet system. Instead of being committed by a preRevolutionary generation polluted by tsarism, hooligans were (as we shall see later) now people born and bred in the USSR—products of a social and ideological environment that was supposed to be free of crime-causing factors. While the “survivals of the past” explanation for crimes such as hooliganism never left the established orthodoxy, concerned individuals and law enforcement professionals began to seek more satisfying explanations for the continuance of crime under Soviet-style socialism. Some continued to insist that crime was a foreign phenomenon that hostile forces must have imported into the perfect world of the Soviet Union. Feeding on Cold War fears and foes, they blamed American spies for sowing the seeds of crime and deviance in an attempt to sabo tage their society from within through the creation of a crimin al “fifth column.”12 Others, however, sought internal explanations for the acceler ation of criminal activity that would pin the origins of Soviet crime on indigenous social problems. The high rate of binge drinking and drunkenness in Soviet life, espe cially among the male, industrial working class, was an internal prob lem that some argued was the root of crime and deviant conduct. The high number of hooligans who committed their crime under the influ ence of alcohol reinforced the belief that drinking was the main cause of deviance. Hooliganism, a prosecutor remarked confidently to his col leagues, “is the result of drunkenness.”13 The equation of alcohol and egregious misconduct made many think that, as a local Komsomol
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
21
leader noted: “Where there is drinking, hooliganism is the inevit able outcome.”14 Given the high correlation between alcohol and hooliganism, perhaps the rapid rise of hooliganism in the mid-1950s was due to a parallel rise in drinking and drunkenness? As we shall see, alcohol was a key lubri cant of Soviet social life that remained well-entrenched within the male, industrial working class and its rowdy leisure life during this period. Concerned citizens inundated the authorities with letters complaining about the local abuse of alcohol, especially at key moments of the holiday calendar and pay cycle, and decrying the ease with which it could be obtained in their local communities, often despite official attempts to limit sales and cap consumption in retail stores and restaurants. More over, statistical studies have also shown a relatively steady increase in alcohol production in the post-Stalinist period, in the output of both vodka and lighter alcoholic beverages, though it is unclear whether these production increases translated into increased consumption, abuse, and inebriation.15 This combination of acute public concern, increased alcohol supply, and abusive drinking practices meant that the local police only awaited appropriately expansive categories of criminal deviance and the empowerment of an anti-hooligan campaign to turn the Soviet Union’s steady stream of drunken misbehavers into hooligans—and, starting in the second half of the 1950s, they would get both. In addition to the chronic abuse of alcohol, observers at all levels spotlighted the poor moral education and upbringing of young Soviets as an indigenous and independent cause of deviant behavior. Official reports, sensationalist mass media, and citizen complaints alike all denounced the young generation for their rudeness, their materialism, and their overall lack of good manners.16 Instead of merely blaming the bad kids, however, authorities, journalists, and angry citizens focused their criticism on parents, pedagogues, and factory directors. These absentee authority figures, they argued, failed to instill the proper values in their impressionable charges and did not exercise the necessary supervision and stewardship over their daily lives.17 Instead of being introduced to the cultured leisure practices and acts of self-improvement that would make them into appropriately enlightened Soviet subjects, Soviet children were often left to their own devices and to the ugly temp tations of the uncivilized street and its twin vices of drink and deviance. Were out-of-control kids the cause of the mid-1950s increase in hooli ganism? Certainly, media coverage and citizen anger over delinquents
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
fed into an atmosphere of moral panic and generational anxiety about the character and commitment of the post-war period’s overly pampered “golden youth”—concern that was magnified by apprehension over the number of single mothers and their often unsupervised offspring.18 This moral panic over a youth gone wild, in turn, helped push the authorities to take active measures to address social order. However, the association b etween youth and hooliganism was often overdrawn. As we shall see, the main demographic driving the increase in hooligan ism in the Khrushchev period was not among the juvenile age cohort; instead, the adult was the post-Stalinist decade’s new face of deviance. Survivals of capitalism, American spies, increased drunkenness, deviant juveniles, and improper moral upbringing—these were some of the many explanations that Soviet authorities and concerned citiz ens advanced for the existence of hooliganism and crime in their country. Few, however, looked at their own disordered society and its rapid development as a reason for the increase in deviance. The social land scape of the Soviet Union in the post-Stalinist period was changing rapidly as the USSR accelerated its shift from an agrarian empire to a modern, urban, industrial superpower. These changes created prime conditions for increased public concern over deviant behavior. Cities grew swiftly as mass in-migration expanded their populations and brought new urbanites out of the regulated, face-to-face world of the village and into the anonymous and destabilizing setting of the modernizing industrial metropol is.19 Perhaps even more unsettling, the move to the separate apartment and the mass construction of standard ized, prefabricated housing projects transformed the Soviet cityscape and added to the sense of movement and monumental change that marked urban life in the Khrushchev era.20 Of course, state and society celebrated this development as a sign of material progress and as a solu tion to the housing shortage and the communal apartment. But, the move to the standardized single-family apartment also created a design land scape in the expanding Soviet city that American sociologists have long associated with increased criminality and fear of victimization.21 Writing in 1958, the New York Times reporter Harrison Salisbury was firmly convinced that hooliganism was linked to the new housing projects—and he was in a good position to know, having written his own exposé linking American deviance and urban housing reform.22 Lumping these new residential developments in with the public housing projects of the American inner city as centers of anti-social criminality, Sal isb ury noted that hool ig ans “sprung up a round the great new
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
23
Cheremushki housing projects just as they have around the slum clear ance buildings in Brooklyn and lower Manhattan. . . . The Soviet young sters have been uprooted and sent footloose into a new and shifting environment just as were their American cousins.”23 Established life style patterns and social networks were disrupted as people relocated into the atom ized world of the separate apartment and re-situated next to strangers.24 In short, this was a time of mobility and intense change for both new and old urban residents that produced both positive and negative results. While often improving the living standards and con ditions of countless Soviet citizens, these abrupt social changes also created conditions in which alienation and fear could inadvertently find fertile new soil. The death of the great dictator in 1953 and the uncertainties of de-Stalinization added an element of moral anxiety and cultural confu sion to the unstable social atmosphere as Soviet citizens tried to figure out what to believe, who to obey, and how to act now that all the old authorities, orthodoxies, and values of the Stalinist era were seemingly open to reassessment.25 Worsening the sense of moral crisis and chal lenge, Khrushchev’s soft power strategy of waging the Cold War by opening the Soviet Union up to the outside world flooded the country with ideologically alien foreign influences that spawned enthusiastic copycat subcultures and outraged critics in equal measure. Moral panic and generational anxiety developed as leaders, citizens, and mass media decried the degeneration and corruption that lurked in the cosmopolitan underworld of the Soviet city.26 In this environment of cultural strain and confrontation, anti-hooligan campaigning became a useful tool that the authorities could use to police the outer boundaries of acceptable behavioral experimentation, dispel the moral uncertainties of the deStalinizing era, and define the new ethical contours of the civilized post-Stalinist subject.27 Anti-hooligan campaigning was not just an outcome of the social and cultural strains facing society during the Khrushchev era, however. It also reflected the improved material conditions of the post-Stalinist period and the popular expectations that this created for using state power to sculpt a more civilized and refined citizenry. Besides intense urban change and ideological upheaval, the 1950s were a period of eco nomic advance and improved living conditions as Khrushchev raised workers’ wages, pursued a more consumer-oriented economic policy, and wrung new peaks of productivity out of the centrally planned com mand economy.28 With the rise in living standards, citizens demanded
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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24
Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
that the authorities fulfill basic public goods, not only by giving them more consumer staples such as butter, but also by providing safer streets filled with better-behaving and more cultured subjects—citizens who were, in other words, just like themselves. Arguably, all of these causes and conditions played roles in producing the spike in hooliganism during the mid-1950s. Yet, these were all suffi cient rather than necessary causes for the explosion of deviance in the Khrushchev era. The biggest factors in the increase in hooliganism at this time had less to do with social structural change, offensive sub cultures, and urban disorder than with shifting definitions of deviance. It was the creation of such newly expansive understandings and cate gories of hooliganism that allowed Soviet citizens and officials to take their inchoate anxieties and fears over social change and turn them into concrete, prosecutable crimes. Before we deal with such necessary causes as definitional shifts and anti-crime campaigns, however, we must look at one more explanation for the escalation of hooliganism in the post-Stalinist period, the mass amnesty of Gulag prisoners. Like their Soviet counterparts, contemporary scholars have struggled with explaining the origins of the mid-decade’s increase in criminal deviance. The dominant answer in the historiography is that boom in hooliganism in the 1950s was the result of the mass amnesty of March 1953: an event that released over 1.2 million prisoners from the Gulag and sent them, with little socialization, back into a Soviet society that could not or would not absorb them. During the “cold summer” of that year, this returning horde terrified local popul ations, produced signifi cant panic, and increased crime levels in some localities.29 However, the conviction figures that the Soviet state compiled on hooliganism show that the steep increase in hooliganism came in 1956 rather than in 1953, the year advocates of the Beria boom hypothesis identify as the moment when hooliganism took off in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union. After the great Gulag amnesty, hooligan conviction rates rose only 12 percent unionwide in comparison with 1952 levels. In the RSFSR during the same year, the increase was slightly larger at 16 percent. By contrast, the unionwide hooligan conviction rate rose 55 percent from 1955 to 1956. In the RSFSR, convictions increased 56 percent over the same period. Rather than spiking after the amnesty, hooligan conviction rates rose only slightly in 1953 and held relatively steady until 1956, after which they increased rapidly. The state’s conviction figures do not support the Beria boom hypothesis that hooliganism increased sharply in the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
25
spring and summer of 1953. Instead, they suggest an alternative take-off point in 1956. The reported recidivism rate for the hooligan convict cohort during this period does not support the Beria boom hypothesis either. If the 1953 amnesty c aused a large increase in hooligan convictions, then we should expect to see an increase in the number of ex-prisoners in the convict sample. However, the percentage of recidivists in the convict sample did not increase following the 1953 amnesty. Instead, it dropped in 1953 and decreased again in 1954, falling from 20 percent in 1952 to 13 percent in 1953 and finally to 11 percent in 1954.30 The conviction figures for hooliganism present us with a riddle. Undoubtedly, the mass amnesty of 1953 produced, as both Miriam Dobson and V. A. Kozlov have shown, at least localized increases in crime and a great deal of public panic.31 However, the conviction statis tics do not show a sharp increase in hooliganism until 1956, three years after the 1953 amnesty. Moreover, information on rates of recidivism among convicted hooligans shows that Gulag returnees were not the engine driving the dramatic increase in mid-1950s deviance. Low recidi vism rates suggest, instead, that the increase was caused not by the re arrest of old criminals, but by the creation of new ones.32 Maybe the amnesty-related crime increases were too localized to show up or affect the movement of broad unionwide or republic-wide statistics. Or maybe the conviction statistics compiled by the Soviet state were too biased to be fully representative.33 Or, I would suggest, former criminals did not cause the increase in hooligan conviction statistics. Instead, it was the cops who were supposed to fight them who did. The March 1953 amnesty did not cause the explosive growth in hooli gan convictions in the 1950s. Instead, it was caused by a concerted cam paign in 1955 and 1956 to get tough on crime in general by cracking down on hooliganism in particular. During this period, the Presidium had formed a top-level, interministerial group to discuss and draft anti-hooligan and anti-crime measures.34 During this period, decrees were passed to professionalize the police and boost their performance.35 During this period, additional patrols, many manned by volunteers and Komsomol members, were placed on city streets to clear them of hooligans and other criminal elements.36 During this period, a new anti-hooligan decree was passed that punished even the most minor misbehaviors and created almost a million and a half new hooligans annually during the first few years of its operation.37
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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26
Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
These measures may in part have originated in the panic and dis order unleashed by the mass amnesties. However, they did not target solely, or even primarily, Gulag returnees; the new criminals they created were not ex-prisoners, but “ordinary” people. In the mid-1950s, the state took the panic caused by rising crime and produced a system of social control that would make hooligans out of a new generation of first-time offenders.38 During the mid-1950s anti-hooligan campaign, law enforcement and judicial agents pushed the borders of this abstract and unbounded criminal category outward to an ever-widening circle of people and practices. By creating crimes and by incriminating those previously treated as non-prosecutable, the campaign increased the conviction rate and caused the mid-1950s boom in deviance by making borderline behaviors into hooliganism. Speaking during the height of the convic tion increase in 1957, the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court noted that the 1956 anti-hooligan campaign had led “to the discovery of a great number of crimin al acts that would earlier have remained unpunished.”39 The criminologist N. F. Kuznetsova, also noting the “discovery” and “creation” of criminality inherent in anti-hooligan campaigning, remarked that: “Every strengthening of the struggle against hooliganism is frequently accompanied by enthusiasm for bringing to criminal responsibility those whose actions would earlier have been considered as misdemeanors.”40 Through creating new meanings for hooliganism, workers in the criminal justice system created new classes of hooligans and, rather than ending deviance, extended its application, ratcheted up its conviction rate, and created the 1956 statistical spike. If hooliganism was an epidemic in Khrushchev’s Soviet Union, it was largely self-inflicted. Through its own anti-hooligan campaign, the state ramped up arrest and conviction figures by empowering local police, prosecutors, and judges to expand the application of hooligan ism. Furthermore, as it loosened its definition of hooliganism, the Soviet state began to see the infectious agents of deviance developing and spreading all around it. In the mid-1950s, the state looked at the every day disorder and deviance on the Soviet street and made millions of new cases of hooliganism out of it. The Khrushchev era, therefore, was a time of skyrocketing hooligan ism because it stood at the crossroads of two independent, but ulti mately interrelated, developments: the development of a convenient and campaign-ready criminal category of maximum applicability and
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
27
extension and the growing wave of anxiety and excitement unleashed by the dramas of de-Stalinization, post-WWII social change, and the limited opening of the country to the outside world. In addition, the 1950s was also a time of peak hooligan production because the inter pretive and definitional confusion surrounding hooliganism was par ticularly intense during this time. As we shall see, hooliganism, during this d ecade, bec ame inc reasi ngly den uded of its spec ific cont ent through definition change and excision. The Stalin-era legal consensus that defined hooliganism and specified the spaces and relationships where it could and could not occur was abandoned. The result was fun damental ambiguity, contestation, and inconsistent judicial practice. Basic questions—such as how to apply hooliganism, where to apply it, to whom to apply it, and how to differentiate it from other crimes— became harder to answer. Basic components of its definition, such as what type of crime it was and who were its victims, became and remained contested subjects of reconceptualization and categ ory shifting. The growing ambiguity of hooliganism made possible its appli cation to new actions as local actors played increasingly loose with an amorphous law. The Ukrainian Supreme Court, noting with worry how ambiguity and interpretive freedom combined to push out the parameters of hooliganism and increase conviction levels, remarked that: “Some investigators and courts are interpreting the meaning of hooliganism broadly. Therefore, the investigative organs charge, and the courts convict under the hooliganism article, any type of behavior associated with physical violence ( poboi) or indecent expression even though these actions lack the element of [hooliganism]. . . . This leads to an artificial increase in the number of persons convicted [of this type of crime].”41 The latitude that law enforcement had in determining the ambiguous criminal category of hooliganism reminds us that the answer to the question of what hooliganism was was not stable across the statistical time series. Instead, it changed as the notion of “deviance” was reimag ined and rethought. The interpretative instability surrounding hooligan ism caused, as Kuznetsova noted, “the sphere of criminal responsibility for hooliganism [to] expand and contract.”42 Therefore, the way hooli ganism was understood, both in the legal and the popular imagination, had (like campaign policies) strong effects on conviction rates. By re locating the borders of accountability either toward or away from new people and places, such shifts in meaning and interpretation deter mined who could and could not be considered hooligan and, hence,
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
28
Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
who would and would not be convicted of this crime. As these ex amples show, it was not amnesties and ex-inmates that created the boom in hooligan convictions during the mid-1950s, but the unlikely ways campaign empowerment, ambiguity, and the creation of new hooligan categories combined to expand the domain of deviance in a Soviet society unsettled by rapid social change, cultural penetration, and de-Stalinization.
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The Multiple Faces of Hooliganism: The Legal Portrait of the Hooligan Hooliganism was (and is) notorious for being one of the most opaque and ill-understood crimes in Russia. Full of undefined general phrases and separated into three indistinct categories, it was, as a USSR Supreme Court justice complained to his colleagues, “perhaps the most imprecise and ambiguous of all the imprecise and ambiguous crimes that we have in our criminal code.”43 This ambiguity made the criminal category of hooliganism both extremely difficult to define and temptingly easy to ex ploit and abuse. Fuzzy and imprecise, it served as a conveniently expan sive catchall into which seemingly any offender could be fitted with ease. As its meanings multiplied and evolved during the first half century of the Soviet period, however, hooliganism’s notorious ambiguity was intensified as this crime was gradually stripped of concrete qualifiers and increasingly invested with abstract and ill-defined content. In response to changing trends and concerns, new types of hooliganism were continually created before older types were delimited and defined. Crucial parts of the definition of hooliganism were deleted from the criminal code with little explanation or instruction. These additions and excisions made it harder for police, prosecutors, and judges to under stand what hooliganism was and led to a great amount of category con fusion over how to differentiate an increasingly denuded conception of hooliganism from closely related crimes, such as intentional infliction of light bodily injuries (article 112 of the RSFSR Criminal Code) or insult (article 131). But ambiguity also (as we shall see in chapters 2 and 3) opened up new opportunities for local police, prosecutors, and judges to apply and instantiate hooliganism across a wide array of new actors and actions and, in the process, to increase hooliganism’s possible range of meanings. Initially, hooliganism was defined in concrete terms as a crime directed against the person. When it entered the Russian lexic on at the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
29
turn of the century via late-1890s London, Russia’s penny press used hooliganism to label a new type of insubordinate and confrontational street conduct.44 In one of the first attempts to define this unfamiliar English loanword, the third edition of V. I. Dal’’s famous dictionary identified hooligans as “petty criminals (zhuliki ) who attack people in gangs.”45 This simple definition made a clear statement concerning the identity of both hooligan and victim. Reflecting the fears of the urban intelligentsia and elites, the hooligan of Dal’’s dictionary was an un couth, unskilled worker caught up in the criminality of the urbanizing metropolis and a product of rural in-migration into the industrializing cities of European Russia. In addition, Dal’’s dictionary defined hooli- ganism’s victims in individual, rather than abstract, terms. According to this understanding, hooliganism was a violent crime inflicted on and against concrete people. The Ministry of Justice’s 1912 draft definition of hooliganism echoed Dal’’s formulation of hooliganism as a crime that victimized concrete individuals. Hooliganism, according to the draft, was defined as “par ticular maliciousness or licentiousness on the part of the guilty party or . . . the intent on the part of the guilty party to violate in a crude manner the personal rights of the victim.”46 In addition to understanding hooliganism as a crime against the person, the 1912 Ministry of Justice draft added an affective component into the understanding of hooli ganism that marked the hooligan as outside the common morality of cultured society (“maliciousness or licentiousness”): an understanding that was underlined by folk etymologies that identified the hooligan with the uncivilized immigrant or the ferocious and untamed Indian tribes of the American West, like the Apaches.47 The Soviet understanding of hooliganism retained many aspects of prerevolutionary law and usage. Echoing the Dal’ dictionary’s concep tion of hooliganism as a crime against concrete individuals, the 1924 RSFSR Criminal Code categorized hooliganism as a “crime against the person” ( prestuplenie protiv lichnosti). Punishable by a term of corrective labor not exceeding one month or by a fine of fifty rubles, hooliganism was defined as “the commission of mischievous acts that are accom panied by clear disrespect for society (obshchestvo).”48 The 1924 defini tion, like its 1912 tsarist predecessor, attributed a mischievous psycho logical component (ozorstvo) to hooligan actions that marked the deviant as an outsider to accepted codes of appropriate social conduct. Later in the 1920s, the legal configuration of hooliganism shifted, causing a reconceptualization of who hooliganism’s victims were. This
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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30
Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
shift, by recategorizing hooliganism under the section “crimes against administrative order” ( prestupleniia protiv poriadka upravleniia) took victimhood away from the individuals who suffered at the hands of hooligans.49 While they were often the target of hooligan assaults and insults, individuals were no longer considered as hooliganism’s vic tims, according to the new legal definition. Hooliganism’s victim was envisioned as an indistinct, supra-individual entity denoted by the multivalent word “upravlenie” (defined as “authority, administration, management”). While hooliganism was still defined as “mischievousness accom panied by explicit disrespect for society,” its victim was transposed from particular individuals to abstract notions of authority, organiza tion, and collective morality. In c ontrast to imagining them as discrete individuals, D. N. Ushakov, in his 1940 dictionary, defined hooliganism’s victims in general and abstract terms as “society (obshchestvo) and human dignity (dostoinstvo cheloveka).” 50 By deleting references to personhood, Ushakov and the RSFSR Criminal Code excised any sense of individual victimization from the meaning of hooliganism and turned hooliganism into a crime against abstract notions of authority and civilized culture. The reform of the Criminal Code in 1960 established a new categoriza tion of hooliganism as a crime against society. The 1960 RSFSR Criminal Code redefined hooliganism by dropping its equation with “mischie vousness” and, instead, defining it as “intentional actions that violate public order in a coarse manner and express clear disrespect for soci ety.”51 Rather than envisioning social disrespect and disruption as “accompanying” or resulting from the criminal activity of the hooligan, social disrespect and disruption became the crime itself. Rather than being categorized as an offense against governmental authority, hooli ganism became a crime directed against the calm and communal life of the social collective. The canonization of hooliganism as a crime against the Soviet social order took victimhood away from the abused, insulted, and accosted individual and applied it to society at large. In this manner, it erased individua ls from the receiving end of the criminal confronta tion. By striking a citizen on the street, the hooligan did not commit assault against the affected individual. He showed disrespect to Soviet society as a whole. At the same time as they were reconceptualizing hooliganism, legal authorities were multiplying its meanings by creating new categories of this criminal catchall. The first new addition to the expanding
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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31
anti-hooligan arsenal was malicious hooliganism (zlostnoe khuliganstvo). reated in 1935 as a response to the rise of violent street crime during C this period, the new law defined malicious hooliganism as hooliganism committed under one of the following aggravating circumstances: exhibition of “rowdiness” (buistvo) or “excess” (beschinstvo); “continuing to commit hooliganism despite warnings from the police to stop;” and for actions that were “distinguished by exceptional cynicism or audacity (derzost’).” Malicious hooliganism was also distinguished by the severity of its sentence: deprivation of freedom from three to five years.52 In addition to custodial measures, supplemental punishments could also be applied to convicted malicious hooligans. They could be stripped of a variety of rights, such as voting rights, parental rights, the right to hold elected offices in public organizations, or the right to bear honorary titles. The residence of repeat malicious hooligan offenders could also be restricted or controlled. They could be exiled for a period of up to five years or denied the right to live in cities subject to the special passport regime, a restriction that sometimes severed hooligans from birthplaces, social networks, and the opportunity to live in coveted showcase cities like Moscow or Leningrad.53 The creation of the legal category of malicious hooliganism led to a spate of questions from local actors on the meaning of malicious hooliganism’s opaque qualifying terms (such as “audacity” and “cyni cism”) and about how to define the border between “cynicism” and “exceptional cynicism.”54 However, the meaning of non-aggravated or simple hooliganism ( prostoe khuliganstvo) was even more problematic for practical workers in the criminal justice system. A 1940 decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet mandated a punishment for simple hooliganism (deprivation of freedom from three months to one year, corrective labor for the same period, or a fine of thirty rubles). It did not, however, give a definition for this category of crime, stating only that “hooligan acts that are committed in enterprises (predpriiatiiakh), in institutions (uchrezhdeniiakh) and in public places are punished by a prison term not to exceed one year in length.” Many jurists were quick to point out that the 1940 decree “did not give any legal description of the elements (priznaki) of simple hooliganism.”55 Making it even more difficult for local authorities to define simple hooliganism, the republics created, in 1956, a third type of hooliganism, petty hooliganism (melkoe khuliganstvo). Instead of being precisely defined and delimited, petty hooliganism’s open-ended construction
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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32
Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
often overlapped with the undefined domain of simple hooliganism. Punishable by a three- to fifteen-day period of incarceration and forced labor, petty hooliganism was defined as “violation of public order and peace, insolent (oskorbitel’noe) disrespect to citizens, the use of foul language (skvernoslovie), and other indecent acts.”56 As a telling example of the purging of the particular, petty hooliganism’s tag phrase (“and other indecent acts”) showed the authorities’ penchant for attaching ambiguous qualifiers to its new hooliganisms that were undefined, open-ended, and expandable. The legal history of hooliganism was one of multiplying its meanings, stripping it of the concrete and the qualifying, and investing it with abstraction and ambiguity. As its legal interpretation evolved, hooli ganism was purged of particulars and saddled to abstract notions of authority, morality, and social order. This purging process was particu larly acute during the Khrushchev period, a period in which many accepted orthodoxies and authorities were subject to rethinking and re modeling. During this period (as we shall see in chapter 2), key qualifiers that regulated the spaces and relationships in which hooliganism could occur were dropped from the hooligan definition. These moves created confusion, contradictory local practices, and opportunities for local actors to apply anti-hooligan laws to new actors and areas such as the home and the family. At the same time, legal and state authorities extended hooliganism’s inherent ambiguity and flexibility by multiplying its meanings and con tinually creating new hooligan categories. By differentiating deviancy into multiple categories that varied in terms of severity and sentence, legal authorities tried to respond to changing social concerns and crime trends.57 To do this, they created a type of hooliganism for every occa sion, from the terrible to the trivial, each of which (supposedly) had its own definition and domain of deviancy. However, continually differen tiating deviancy led to growing category confusion as local police, prosecutors, and judges struggled to untangle in their daily practice the indistinct boundaries between hooliganism’s multiple meanings, a con fusion that was especially strong with such closely related categ ories as petty and simple hooliganism. Lower courts and local law enforcers bombarded the USSR Supreme Court with requests to define and delineate hooliganism’s expanding spectrum of meanings more clearly.58 Some even suggested getting rid of seemingly superfluous categories of this crime, such as simple
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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hooliganism, to reduce the confusion and complexity that surrounded the issue of understanding and applying the hooligan label.59 However, the USSR Supreme Court largely stayed silent on these issues, waiting for the new republican criminal codes (then being drafted) to be com pleted.60 As the process of completing the criminal codes dragged on for the rest of the decade, the Supreme Court left local law enforcers adrift and, as a consequence, forced them to figure out for themselves the differences between hooliganism’s multiple forms of deviance. Aside from creating confusion, multiplying hooliganism’s meanings also created the context in which the mid-1950s boom in deviancy could develop. Armed with an expansive menu of open-ended hooligan cate gories that covered everything from major acts to minor eccentricities and empowered to interpret these categories in their own way, local authorities could encompass within the boundaries of deviance a domain of situations and sites that was larger than ever before. When the cam paign a gainst hooliganism kicked in, they used this catchall category to pursue offenders across the entire range of wrongdoing and, as a result, pushed convictions up to unpreced ented levels. In addition to creating confusion and expanded labeling opportu nities, criminal law created a particular portrait of who the hooligan was and what he did. Unlike Dal’’s dictionary, which saw this crime as gang related, Soviet law painted a portrait of the hooligan as a loner and outsider whose motivation was his distaste for Soviet society and its collectivist morality. The canonization of hooliganism as a crime against social order created a tension between the individual offender (lichnost’) and the social collective (obshchestvennost’) as well as between the public and the private. This tension and opposition can be seen in the discussion of the main trope of hooliganism, “clear disrespect for society.” A commentary of the 1960 RSFSR Criminal Code defined “clear disrespect for society” as “a scornful attitude to Soviet laws, norms of socialist morality, rules of socialist communal living and the striving to place the person in opposition to the collective.”61 Underlining the construction of hooliganism as an opposition between the private and the public, another commentary explained “explicit disrespect” as “actions that oppose the personal (lichnyi) interest of the hooligan to the public (obshchestvennyi) interest.”62 Hooliganism was seen as an opposi tion between the individual and the private world of his interests and appetites and the “rules of communal living” and “socialist morality” of the collective.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
Criminal categorization did not exhaust the complex question of hooliganism, however. As a concept that had a rich life in the common world of Soviet culture, hooliganism had multiple sources of meaning that resided outside of the courtrooms and criminal codes and inside a larger social world of speech, stereotype, and style. For most Soviet citizens, the ordinary phenomenon of hooliganism was defined not by the legal profession, but by popular culture. Instead of representing the alien and the exotic, hooliganism was a familiar concept that they understood and applied intuitively and nonproblematic ally. As a com mon word of everyday Soviet speech, the word “hooliganism” was, as an American exchange student declared in the 1960s, “an indispensable word” that Soviet citizens used ubiquitously to refer to the social world around them.63 A Western tourist, noting its “wide application” in the everyday arena to all types of improper conduct, wrote: “Small boys who drop their ice cream p apers may be hool ig ans; so are noisy, shouting fourteen year olds, and so were the adolescent gangs who used to knife people in order to steal their clothing.”64 In other words, hooliganism was an object of cultural revulsion, fascination, and appropriation that lived outside the legal sphere in the everyday speech acts and vivid imagination of Soviet citizens. In the dynamic world of street-level language, new dimensions were con tinually added onto hooliganism as people applied this elusive cate gory to the varied contexts of their everyday lives and, in the process, transformed its limited range of legal meanings. By using the term hooli ganism to scold a schoolboy or to condemn serious and shocking crimes, citizens were doing more than making their emotions and anger concrete. They were also making hooliganism’s ever-evolving meaning into a composite cultural product that was shaped by countless indi vidual understandings and attributions as much as by the arcane com plexities of legal discourse. The public deployed the term “hooliganism” even though they may not have understood, or even been aware of, the shifts in its legal meaning. They did not need to know the law because they were accus tomed to identifying hooliganism (rightly or wrongly) by reading devi ance in the faces, fashion, and actions of the social actors around them. As we have seen, the legal community had great difficulty defining the meaning of hooliganism in legal terms. The public did not: they knew hooliganism by sight. And, much to the chagrin of Soviet authorities, some of them even liked what they saw.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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The Multiple Faces of Hooliganism: Hooliganism as a Style of Self-Presentation and Category of Performance The hooligan was a common character in the visual milieu of Soviet space. The hooligan was, in fact, so familiar a sight that a 1956 Izvestiia article had to admit that: “Bitter as it may be, the hooligan’s loathsome appearance is familiar to many.”65 As the frequent subjects of Soviet media, hooligans appeared in magazines, newspapers, and novels. They were broadcast via movies, radio, and television. Street signs and factory wallpapers displayed the photos of accused hooligans.66 These representations of hooliganism defined deviance visually in the popular imagination. And, they did so by associating it with a rich set of iconic referents, practices, and props. Through linking hooligan ism to certain clothing styles, mannerisms, weapons, and forms of body art associated with the criminal underworld, the mass media, amateur artists, and individual citizens did more than just stigmatize the deviants of Soviet society. They also created a portrait of hooliganism as a commonplace cultural persona with an identifiable dress and demeanor. In the process, they gave face to an abstract criminal categ ory and re inforced in the public mind a particular vision of the hooligan that linked this outsider identity to particular modes of uncultured being and behaving. Besides being a crime, hooliganism was a category of cultural per formance or a way of looking and acting that was reflected, reenacted, and reinforced in popular representations and practices. In addition to being a legal category, it was a cultural stereotype with an immediately recognizable iconography that one could learn to read on faces, in dress styles, and into ways of acting. A satirical poem published in a 1956 edition of Iunost’ demonstrates the popular identification of hooligan ism with particul ar modes of stylistic display and self-presentation. His cap ( furazhka) is flat like a pancake (although he bought it just the other day). The shirt is unbuttoned at the collar (he is not one for this button business). There have not been any hooks on his jacket for quite some time (he thinks this is especially chic). And his pants (there is no secret in this), he simply is not in the habit of ironing. And that sad symbol of the petty-bourgeois, the neck-tie,
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
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he has abolished forever from his neck. As for his shoes, he does not clean them, as they say, on principle. When he walks down the street, . . . [he has in his pocket] a pack of Belomar cigarettes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . You will say that he is a hooligan.67
From the cartoons of Krokodil to the character of Volk in Viac heslav otenochkin’s carton series Nu pogodi (1969–1986), the visual representa K tion of the hooligan remained remarkably stable across the post-Stalinist decades and defined hooliganism for the public in terms of concrete visual and performative characteristics. In particular, the iconography of deviance through which hooliganism was popularly understood and embodied revolved around a cluster of props, such as the cigarette, the tattoo, the cap (kepka), the dangling forelock (chelka), and the striped sailor’s shirt (tel’niashka). It also centered on a style of self-presentation that involved grooming practices, naming conventions, songs, and speech patterns. Krokodil, for example, portrayed the “standard hooli gan” as a person “in a striped sailor’s shirt, with clenched fists and a stubbly face.”68 When the hooligan antagon ist of a Komsomolskaia pravda feuilleton was introduced, he was depicted as a person “who wore his cap (kepka) dashingly (likho) at an angle with a forelock of hair (chelka) sticking out from it.”69 In a satirical sketch about a meeting between the “heroes of the early 1960s” and an editorial board from the future, the article’s archetypal hooligan was described as “a red-nosed subject with a loutish forelock (khamskoi chelochkoi ) gracing his forehead.”70 Soviet citizens would have identified the hooligan in the accompanying illus tration easily: he was the one wearing the small cap with the aforemen tioned lock of disobedient hair, with a cigarette dangling from his frowning mouth and dressed in a striped sailor’s shirt. In contrast to the men surrounding him, the hooligan was also the only one without a tie.71 The small cap, the red nose, the stubbly face and the striped sailor’s shirt were not innocent fashion accessories and physical attributes. In combination and context, they formed a display that helped communi cate and reinforce certain notions about hooliganism to the reading and viewing public. A 1956 Pravda article demonstrated the role style played in marking deviant identities by describing how an inspector attributed hooligan status to a boy brought before her based only on seeing his fashion choices and slovenly manner of self-presentation. The inspector
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
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met the delinquent and saw that “an out and out hooligan (otpetyi sor vanets) was standing before her. His outward appearance, small cap (kepochka), a forelock of hair (chelka) protruding from under the cap’s visor, raised collar and sloppy boots (sapogi garmoshkoi), confirmed it.”72 A 1956 Izvestiia article on hooliganism likewise introduced its hooligan hero by describing what he wore and how he acted: “Pants stylishly stuffed into his boots (sapogi garmoshkoi ), a sports cap pulled forward on his head, a forelock of hair (chelka), shifty eyes. . . . He is the one who organizes a gang near some dark doorway; he is the first one to hurl obscenities after a passer-by, to shove a woman, to insult a child. . . . He is a hooligan.”73 The objects displayed in the icon ography of deviance underlined the low cultural status and subhumanity of the hooligan. They visually marked him for the reading public as a reject of the Soviet civilizing process and its program of cultured living. The lack of culture was marked on the hooligan’s body through the artists’ representation of facial grooming and fashion. In an era when the beard was disapproved of with a vigor worthy of Peter the Great and associated with the ortho dox peasant past or the dissident avant-garde, the hooligan often sported an untidy five o’clock shadow.74 While the white-collar ideal was shirt and tie, the hooligan never wore a tie. Instead, he unbuttoned his shirt to show a striped sailor’s shirt or a bare chest, or he stalked the streets in a sleeveless undershirt.75 The hooligan’s incessant chain smoking, cussing, and drinking underlined his status as the archenemy of cultured conduct. The cigarette, the subject’s smoking style, and the bottle of alcohol played key roles in the iconography of deviance as symbolic attributes of the typical hypermasculine hooligan. A cigarette (more than likely a self-rolled papirosa) was invariably depicted dangling loosely from the corner of the deviant’s mouth.76 A bottle was often shown either carried in the hand, discarded on the ground, or on a nearby table. To show that the hooligan was drunk, he was often portrayed in contorted bodily pos tures, in a drunken rage, or with telltale physical symptoms of inebria tion, such as the red nose.77 In these representations, the hooligan’s behavior communicated his distance from accepted modes of correct conduct. To underline his disrespect for the little monuments of cultured life and his slovenly style of self-presentation, the representation accompanying the Iunost’ poem showed the hooligan trampling on carefully tended flower beds as spittle flies from his mouth.78 Other images depicted hooligans
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
performing such ignominious feats as pulling a girl’s pigtails or yelling at a woman pushing a perambulator.79 In addition, the names given to hooligan characters advertised their otherness from accepted conven tion. As Vecherniaia Moskva noted: “They [hooligans] do not call each other by their proper names but by their nicknames, such as “Blin” and “Arkan.”80 Hooliganism was more than a cultural stereotype whose contours were defined by artists and authors and deployed in the countless everyday acts of Soviet individuals. It was also an identity that those labeled as hooligans sometimes inscribed on themselves through acts of self-attribution, such as tattooing. Particular tattoos became vehicles for self-representation through which these hooligans visually adver tised and affirmed their deviant identity. Such tattoos formed a key part of the iconography of deviance that artists deployed in the popular press. Given the strong correlation between tattooing and criminality, the tattoo acted as a strong visual marker of outsider identity through which artists could stigmatize the deviant and underline the status of the hooligan as a reject of the Soviet civilizing project.81 The mass media conspicuously flaunted such tattoos to hooliganize its subjects. Cartoonists often depicted hooligans with forearm tattoos, such as a heart with an arrow through it. Often the tattoos that artists depicted underlined the deviant’s status as outsider and other. The prominent display of lower-class and peasant-sounding female diminu tives in the tattooed hearts, such as the name Mania, underlined the connection of hooliganism with the uneducated underclass. It also linked the hooligan to the recently arrived rural inhabit ant whom work recruitment policies had thrust into the center of urban life but had not acclimated to the rarified culture of the civilized socialist city.82 The media also used the textual content of tattoos to link hooliganism to l arger social problems. A Trud article reinforced the connection between alcohol and deviance by spotlighting a photograph of a hooligan’s tattoo and its text, “why isn’t there any vodka on the moon?”83 Prisoners marked themselves with particular signs that identified and advertised their hooligan status. Common finger and body tattoos with which hooligan prisoners marked themselves underlined their violent and menacing nature, such as the skull and crossbones or the black spade. A common tattoo for an unrepentant hooligan convict spotlighted one of the malicious hooligan’s iconic attributes, the knife.84 By marking themselves with such tattoos, deviants inscribed them selves into particular communities of crime and claimed for themselves
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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39
an identity as a hooligan. Their bodies became texts on which the history of their hooliganism was carved in the distinctive sign language of Soviet Russia’s crimin al underworld. The representation of hooliganism revolved not only around exhibit ing body art or appropriate props, such as the cigarette, the tattoo, or the bottle, it also centered on the showing of the face. Hooligan faces were well known because they were often shown as part of the hooli gan punishment process. Visuality and public display were central to the 1950s soft-line campaign against hooliganism and its shame-based punitive process, a shaming process that was accomplished, in part, through the mass manuf acture and exhibition of caricaturized hooligan portraits. The faces of hooligans appeared on street signs and on factory wallpapers. Newspapers printed photos of hooligans to accompany articles on the anti-deviancy campaign and ordered readers to “look at the photo” (vzglianite na snimok) and study the face of hooliganism.85 The public faces of deviance were meant to embarrass, amuse, and underline the atavistic status of the offender. The faces of hooligans drawn in the popular press bear distorted features suggesting the sub human and bestial nature of the deviant. The hooligan portraits that accompany the 1961 Krokodil article “100 Interviews with Hooligans” have grotesquely exaggerated jaws, ears, and noses that mimic animal forms or the facial traits of the developmentally disabled.86 The link between hooligans and developmental degenerates and animals was made more explicit in cartoons that depicted hooligans directly as preda tory beasts with anthropomorphic attributes and by a popular slang term for hooligan, baklan, which literally referred to a notoriously ravenous seabird.87 A Krokodil cartoon, for example, depicted hooligans as a pack of predatory, guitar-playing, binge-drinking, and girl-hungry wolves.88 Display, style, and visuality were key parts of hooliganism. Linked in popular culture to particular props, practices, and modes of selfpresentation, hooliganism was a category of cultural performance that any citizen through his dress and demeanor could (intentionally or accidentally) appropriate and embody for his fellow public. As a com monplace cultural persona, Soviet citizens imagined the familiar features of the hooligan in terms of a stereotypical set of iconic traits that sup posedly typified the archetypical deviant offender. It was through the reenactment and display of such iconic practices and props that some deviants asserted their identity in a larger community of criminality and advertised their outsider status. And, it was also through the dis play of such stylistic stereotypes that the mass media hooliganized the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
deviant subjects in their representations and, in that way, reflected and reinforced the public’s peculiar vision of hooliganism. In addition, the association of nonstandard styles and modes of self-presentation with deviant categories was also used to identify and incriminate other out siders during this period besides hooligans, such as the stiliagi (whose stigmatized identity could similarly be attributed on the basis of seem ingly trivial fashion markers, such as narrow pants and brightly colored shirts). For the public, the iconography of deviance provided, in a way the law could not and did not, an accessible and comprehensible vocabu lary for describing ambiguous identity categories and for fleshing out the abstractions of Soviet legalese.89 Certainly, the cultural representation of hooliganism that the mass media and the public imagination conjured up did not always match the realities of who the average hooligan was and what he did. Many men convicted of hooliganism were not the tattooed and stripedsailor-shirt-wearing thugs depicted in the mass media’s iconography of deviance. Far from being a criminal other, the average hooligan was, as we shall see, a kind of Soviet everyman in terms of his occupational, educational, and class identity. By applying generic markers of crimi nality (such as tattoos) or signs of hypermasculinity to hooligans, the iconography of deviance helped to criminalize a group of offenders who often fell into trouble for the ordinary (and sometimes seemingly trivial) everyday offenses and rough masculine pastimes that plagued the urban working class, such as binge-drinking, cursing, or brawling. The often interc hangea ble way that the mass media disc ourse treated the distinction between hooligans and other crimin als, how ever, mirrored popular sensibilities that often used hooliganism as a shorthand way to complain about urban crime and social disorder in general. In their letters to authority, for instance, many citizens used the terms “hooligan” and “hooliganism” loosely to label and complain about a diverse range of criminal and anti-social activity. In the slippery visual symbolism of the social imaginary and in the public’s homoge nizing rhetoric, the hooligan often played the generic role of the arche typal criminal offender who represented in individual form all the various dangers threatening the moral and physical health of postStalinist society. However, the hooligan inspired fascination as well as fear and became an object of emulation rather than alarm in certain artistic circles and social niches. This cultural appropriation of hooliganism paralleled, and fed on, a growing popularization of the Soviet Union’s
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
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criminal subculture among parts of the population, especially the youth.90 Cultural items associated with the criminal underworld, such as songs and slang, found currency in popular culture and resulted in the partial romanticization of the hooligan/crimin al. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the underground songs of the semiofficial bard movement that sprang up in the 1960s. Echoing Sergei Esenin and the bohemian poets of the New Economic Policy (NEP) era, bards such as Vladimir Vysotsky wrote works that were sometimes self-consciously criminal and hooligan in terms of their tone, vocabul ary, and point of view.91 Criminal songs were also popular sing-along items for groups of loitering youth in the context of the urban courtyard (dvor). “Groups of adol escents often gather in the courtyards and entry ways during the evenings,” a Moscow Komsomol official complained to his colleagues. “Guitars are strummed, songs like ‘I live close to the Sea of Okhotsk’ are sung, and the sound of half-liter bottles rings out.”92 As a subject of state condemnation, symbol of machismo and nonconformity, and as an object of popular cultural interest and appropriation, the hooligan was both pariah and hero. For many, he was a character to be reviled. Yet for some, he was a figure to be emulated and reenacted in sanit ized form via particular ways of dressing, acting, singing, and speaking.
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The Multiple Faces of Hooliganism: The Statistically Average Soviet Hooligan Quantitative data on convicted hooligans, and the statistics derived from them, were an alternative instrument for envisioning the “average” hooligan. State agencies produced statistics that created, like media representations, a simplified portrait of hooliganism that the authorities used to understand the location, class origin, and educational achieve ment of the typical deviant. As with any statistical sample, the state’s data had formidable sampling biases and methodol ogical problems that compromised its representativeness. State conviction statistics left several streams of deviants out of the samples they quantified by under reporting juveniles offenders, overlooking those punished informally or administratively outside the criminal justice system, and focusing (sometimes exclusively) on more serious cases of malicious hooliganism. Despite these defects, however, Soviet jurists and criminologists made extensive use of these data sets to understand who the average hooligan was and where he came from. For a state obsessed with understanding social reality through supposedly objective quantitative
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
indicators (and one that was well aware that such numerical informa tion was often distorted as it traveled up the administrative hierarchy), conviction statistics—whatever their obvious and not-so-obvious errors—were the best means to create a composite picture of the statis tically average Soviet hooligan.
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Class Breakdown The clear majori ty of hool ig ans who were conv icted duri ng the Khrushchev era were, according to state statistics, workers in terms of their occupational and class identity (see table 2). In 1947, by contrast, the statistically average Soviet hooligan was not a worker. Instead, a combination of diverse identity categories, from collective farmers and white-collar administrators to students, soldiers, and the unemployed, accounted collectively for the absolute majority of convicted hooligans. By 1957, however, the percentage of proletarians in the conviction figures for hooliganism had exploded upward, with workers in that year taking a greater than two-thirds majority in the convict sample. Hooliganism’s upward proletarian trend continued unabated for most of the 1950s and early 1960s, with 74 percent of the USSR’s convicted hooligans reported as workers in 1962.93 As Soviet statistics make clear, the average convicted hooligan was an industrial laborer, and the blue-collar working class was, by far, the biggest growth engine fueling the rapid rise of hooligan convictions in the High Stalinist and Khrushchev eras. Hooliganism committed by collective farmers and hooliganism committed by white-collar adminis trators decreased by two t hirds and one half respectively from 1947 to 1964. During the same period, however, worker hooliganism sky rocketed upward nearly 50 percent, transforming the Soviet Union’s key class constituency into its primary producer of criminal deviancy. In comparison with Union-wide figures, the Russian Republic’s (RSFSR’s) hooligan conviction statistics show an even stronger positive correla tion between the blue-collar working class and high rates of hooligan convictions, with 84.5 percent of its convicted hooligans being reported as workers in its 1961 statistics.94 At the beginning of the Khrushchev era, members of the blue-collar working class were overachievers at getting caught and convicted for hooliganism. During this period, the proportion of workers among hooligan convicts exceeded the general percentage of workers in the overall Soviet population, suggesting that workers were outperforming
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
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Table 2. Social Composition of Hooligan Convicts in the USSR, 1947–1965 Year Workers (%) 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958–61** 1962 1963 1964 1965
49.3 53.5 63.1 65.4 69.6 70.5 72.9 73.8 72.1 71.8 71.3 — 74.0 72.7 72.0 72.3
White-Collar Administrators (%)
Collective Farmers (%)
Other* (%)
10.5 12.1 11.0 9.0 7.9 7.7 6.2 5.8 5.2 4.5 4.1 — 3.5 3.5 3.2 2.8
20.4 18.8 16.1 16.9 15.2 14.8 12.5 13.5 13.6 15.9 16.8 — 9.5 9.4 8.6 7.9
19.8 15.6 9.8 8.7 7.3 7.0 8.4 6.9 9.1 7.8 7.8 — 13.0 14.4 16.2 17.0
Source: GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 46. Data after 1962 from GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 228, l. 150. *The other category, presumably, contained noncollectivized farmers, handicraft workers, students, soldiers, and the unemployed.
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**Aside from scattered anecdotal information, I have been unable to find systematic data on the social composition of convicted hooligans in the USSR for the years 1958 to 1961. Therefore, I have left these cells blank in the table.
their class peers in the output of deviants. In 1956, for example, bluecollar workers and white-collar administrators comprised 58 percent of the Soviet workforce, but blue-collar workers alone accounted for more than 72 percent of the convictions for hooligan crimes.95 Moreover, few other criminal categories showed such a strong working-class character as hooliganism during the early Khrushchev era. In 1954, slightly over half of the people whom the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) brought to criminal responsibility were workers, while in the same year almost two thirds of the convicted hooligans were members of the working class.96 By the end of the Khrushchev period, the statistically average hooli gan was a Soviet everyman in terms of his class and occupational iden tity. In fact, by the close of the Khrushchev period, the percentage of
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
workers convicted of hooliganism almost perfectly mirrored the percentage of workers in the overall labor force. In 1963, 74 percent of the Soviet labor force was composed of workers and white-collar administrators and, in the same year, workers accounted for 73 percent of the hooligan convictions (only 4 percent of convicts were white-collar administrators).97 Far from being a social marginal, the statistically average hooligan was, as an industrial laborer, at the center of an ideological and eco nomic enterprise predicated (at least in rhetoric if not in reality) on advancing and bettering the lives of blue-collar workers. As a represen tative of the expanding industrial working class, the average hooligan typified the dynamic economic development of the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, which pulled millions of rural migrants and laborers out of their homes and placed them in a mobile, anonymous, and under serviced urban environment that was ripe for hooliganism. The fact that the majority of hooligans were workers tells us that the overwhelming majority had jobs. They were not, save for a small minority, unemployed outcasts who shunned socially useful labor. They were key parts of the modernizing Soviet Union’s industrial economy and of its skilled and unskilled labor force. This complicated the task of anti-hooligan cam paigning, especially in mass actions, such as the one against petty hooli ganism. Taking a million workers off the shop floor (even for relatively short prison stays) disrupted the labor process and, especially in the case of skilled workers, threatened production rhythms and output levels.98 In addition, the roots of hooliganism in the working class and in key industrial institutions, such as the workers’ dormitory, shaped some of the government’s key anti-hooligan policies, such as its stress on trying to build up the worksite’s infrastructure of cultured leisure and its attempt to hold factory directors responsible for the after-hours lives of their labor force.99
Gender Distribution Even more than membership in the blue-collar working class, maleness defined hooliganism’s convict cohort. As conviction statistics and crimi nological studies made clear, Soviet hooliganism was a gender-specific crime that was committed overwhelmingly by men. That men should dominate the conviction data on hooliganism is not, perhaps, surprising. But, it did fly in the face of the Soviet Union’s skewed sex ratio that, as
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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a result of massive male wartime mortality, made women the most numerous members of Soviet society—especially in the age cohorts most associated with courtroom convictions for hooliganism. Although men accounted for only 45 percent of the Soviet population during this period (and 43 percent in the crucial 25–50 age cohort most closely corre lated with this crime), they regularly accounted for approximately 98 percent of the hooligan convictions.100 Of course, women did commit and were convicted of hooliganism, and a female variant of the word hooligan existed in the Soviet lexicon (khuliganka).101 However, women were convicted of hooliganism in far less numbers than their male counterparts. As Soviet statistical data made clear, hooliganism was something that men did; and, it was often something that men did to women.102 As we shall see in chapter 2, women tended overwhelmingly to be hooliganism’s victims rather than its agents. In the rare occasions when they did commit hooliganism, there was a remarkable consistency between what female hooligans did and where they did it. The female hooligan was a domestic creature who committed her acts in the home in relation to her family or neighbors.103 She argued with her husband or neighbors or, notoriously, contami nated their food in the communal kitchen.104 The male hooligan also, increasingly, brought hooliganism into the home during the late 1950s and 1960s. But he maintained a strong public presence at the same time. The female hooligan did not. She was neither a street fighter, nor an obnoxious sexual harasser, nor a streetcorner drunk. She limited her actions, audience, and stage to the home. The stereotypical hooligan was a fighter and a drinker: a man with a ready fist, a rowdy shout, and a wicked tongue (the association of the hooligan with fighting was underlined by the use of the word “boxer,” bokser, as a slang term for hooligan).105 Undoubtedly, women fought and drank, but they were, as a whole, much less likely to engage in the high-risk rough masculine behaviors of public brawling and bingedrinking that often ended in hooligan convictions for their male counter parts. In his actions, demeanor, and presentation, the hooligan was coded male—and the Soviet state’s statistics and representations reflected the correlation between hooliganism, urban industrial labor, and the commonplace (often alcohol-soaked) rituals of rough masculinity. In short, hooliganism was a masculine crime that grew out of the machismo of male behavior, sociability, and interaction in the Soviet
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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industrial city. In the rough masculine culture of these urban spaces, common male leisure behaviors, such as binge-drinking, often led to ugly consequences that could easily be read through the lenses of an expanding and increasingly ambiguous conception of hooliganism as cases of criminal deviancy. Yet despite the overwhelming correlation between maleness and hooliganism, the state’s class-based ideology made it blind to the gender-biased aspects of Soviet deviancy. For a state that often tried to minimize or deny gender differences in the name of women’s emancipation and equality, the male essence of Soviet hooliganism remained an irrelevant and understudied curiosity.
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Age Distribution Hooliganism in the West is typically associated with juvenile delin quency. Surprisingly, however, the statistically average convicted Soviet hooligan was between the ages of 25 and 50, with the latter part of the age range gaining in prominence throughout the post-Stalinist period. Demonstrating the decidedly adult character of hooligan offenders was the fact that the two largest growth demographics for hooliganism during the 1945 to 1957 period were the 25 to 39 and the 40 and older age groups (see Tables 3 and 4). These age ranges were the growth engines for hooliganism in the 1950s and 1960s, and their increasing weight in the data demonstrates a graying of the statistically average Soviet hooligan. In 1951, the majority of hooligans (53 percent) were 25 years of age or younger. However, the majority of hooligans, for every year from 1952 to 1957 and 1962 to 1965, were over the age of 25. Moreover, the aging of the hooligan cohort accelerated throughout the period, with the percentage of hooligans aged 25 and over steadily increasing each year (with the only exceptions being minor drops in 1957 and 1964), from 52 percent in 1952 to 56 percent in 1954 and from 62 percent in 1956 to 65 percent in 1963. The statistically average Soviet hooligan was, therefore, getting older throughout the 1950s, moving out of the early 20s age group and into the cohort of late twenty-somethings and t hirty-somethings. This aging trend continued into the 1960s, with the average hooligan moving from the 25 to 29 age bracket to the 30 to 49 age bracket.106 For the years 1962, 1963, and 1964, this latter age range was the single largest age group in the hooligan conviction data, suggesting an increasingly high median age for the statistically average post-Stalinist hooligan. These age trends held true in the RSFSR as well, whose statistically average hooligan
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
Table 3. Age Range of Convicted Hooligans in the USSR, 1945–1957 Years 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
17 and Younger (%) 18–19 (%) 20–24 (%) 25–39 (%) 17.0 10.0 7.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 3.7 4.0 4.7 4.8 5.2 4.9 4.6
— — — — — — 14.3 11.4 11.8 12.8 14.4 14.2 14.9
— — — — — — 35.3 32.8 29.8 26.3 21.1 19.3 22.5
40 and Older (%)
— — — — — — 38.9 43.4 45.7 47.8 50.2 51.5 49.1
3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 — — 7.8 8.4 8.0 8.3 9.1 10.1 8.9
Source: GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 58.
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Table 4. Age Range of Convicted Hooligans in the USSR, 1962–1965 Years 1962 1963 1964 1965
14–17 (%) 3.9 5.8 8.4 10.4
18–24 (%) 32.0 29.6 29.5 30.2
25–29 (%) 20.4 21.5 22.4 22.6
30–49 (%)
Over 50 (%)
40.2 39.5 36.4 33.9
Source: GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 228, l. 152.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
3.5 3.6 3.3 2.9
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
in the 1950s was also located in the 25 and older age demographic, with the 30 to 39 age range emerging as the predominant grouping during the 1960s.107 The increasing weight of the over-25 age group in the conviction data is surprising not only because it goes against popular stereotypes, but also because it goes against the prevailing age structure of Soviet males in the post-WWII period. Given the extremely high mortality among adult men during the war, the majority of Soviet males in the Khrushchev era were under 25 years of age, with those over 25 years of age representing only 46 percent of the male population in the late 1950s.108 During this same period, however, this more mature male minority comprised over 60 percent of the country’s convicted hooli gans. The increasing prevalence of the 30 to 50 age group is especially striking given the essential youthfulness of Soviet male society and given how deeply the mass killing of WWII impacted men in the middle range of the age distribution. As the statistical data set makes clear, the majority of convicted hooli gans were not juveniles below the age of 18. In fact, the percentage of convicted hooligans age 17 and younger tied the 20 to 24 age group for the biggest decline in the 1950s-era convict data, dropping from a post war high of 17 percent in 1946 to 5 percent in 1957. Throughout the 1950s, men in their 40s were convicted of hooliganism at almost twice the frequency of their under-18 counterparts. By the end of the Khrushchev era, however, the juvenile age range began to reemerge in the convic tion statistics as a growing hooligan demographic. However, the abso lute majority of convicted hooligans still remained above age 25, even during this time of juvenile resurgence. Of course, such age-related comparisons are complicated by the underrepresentation of juvenile offenders in the data on age distribu tion. Juveniles were underreported because their deviancy was often disciplined outside of the courts and did not appear in statistical data drawn from courtroom convictions. However, the juvenile data were not the only ones distorted downward. Because alternative and “off the books” punishment practices were applied across the entire age range of hooligan offenders (see chapter 5), they deflated courtroom convic tions across all age groups. Of course, there is good reason for believing that the juvenile group was deflated more than any other cohort. How ever, the differential between juveniles and the 30 to 39 age group was so great that even relatively large upward revisions in the juvenile rate would not close the gap between these two cohorts. Therefore, there is
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
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good reason to assume that these age comparisons are valid, but readers should keep in mind the difficulties that cloud the data’s interpretability on the issue of the average hooligan’s age.
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Educational Attainment Unfortunately, information on the average hooligan’s educational level is spotty and impressionistic. Based on the nonsystematic data avail able on the convicted hooligan cohort’s degree of educational attainment, the statistically average Soviet hooligan was a poorly educated primary or secondary school dropout. A 1957 study of a local sample of 745 people convicted of hooliganism found, for example, that almost half of them (50 perc ent) only had an elem ent ary edu c at ion below the fourth-year (klass) level. Most of the rest (35 percent) had left school between the fifth and seventh year. In comparison to the over 85 per cent of the sample who were primary or secondary school dropouts, the percentage of secondary school graduates among these convicts amounted to 13 percent. Only eighteen people, or 2 percent of the hooli gans in the sample, had some level of higher education.109 Available data suggests that such low educational levels and high primary and secondary school dropout rates were typic al of hooligan convicts in the 1960s as well. The absolute majority (58 percent) of those convicted of hooliganism in the RSFSR in 1961 were reported to have only a primary school educ ation (nachal’noe obrazovanie) or were listed as barely literate (malogramotnye).110 Likewise, hooligan convicts in 1962 throughout the USSR displayed a similar (though slightly improved) level of educ ational attainment, with 46 percent reported as having either an elementary educ ation or being illiterate or being barely liter ate.111 Although overall educational attainments were still low, the average convicted hooligan appears to have been getting better edu cated as the Khrushchev period neared its end. In addition, the reported degree of educational attainment among the convict cohort began to display a generational divide between young and old offenders during this same period, with the latter tending to have less schooling than their younger counterparts.112 In comparis on to the overall Soviet population, the average hooli gan convict was less educated, had higher dropout rates, and suffered from more significant amounts of illiteracy. In other words, he was less schooled than your average Ivan and Masha—but often not by much. In fact, the educational level of convicted hooligans was often
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
uncomfortably close to that of the general adult population. As we have seen, the 1957 sample showed that 85 percent of hooligans had dropped out of school at or by the seventh class level. The corresponding figure for RSFSR citizens was 72 percent and for USSR citizens as a whole it was 79 percent.113 Surprisingly when educ ational levels are disaggregated according to gender, the average hooligan had an approximately equal, if not slightly better, education than the average male citizen, even in comparatively more advanced republics, such as the RSFSR. For instance, 87 percent of men (excluding pensioners and domestic servants) in the RSFSR had dropped out of school at or before the seventh class, compared to 85 percent in the 1957 hooligan sample.114 Not only was the average hooli gan marginally better educated than the average Soviet adult male, he was also better educated than the ordinary policemen who were trying to catch him. In 1956, the Central Committee noted that 93 percent of police patrolmen had an incomplete secondary-level education, a 10 percent higher dropout rate than the 1957 hooligan sample.115 There fore, instead of being an anomaly or exception, the average hooligan’s relat ively low degree of educational attainment marked him yet again as a Soviet everyman—reflecting the nature of a society that, while it was progressing rapidly, still had much to achieve in improving the educational profile of its population.
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Recidivism The statistically average Soviet hooligan was a first-time offender who had no prior criminal convictions on his record before his arrest for hooliganism (see table 5). This, of course, does not mean that the average hooligan had never engaged in previous criminal wrongdoing. It only means that he was never caught and convicted in a court for his past misdeeds. As with the underreporting of juvenile offenders, the wide spread punishment of first-time, nonserious offenders “off the books” through administrative punishments, verbal warnings, or spot fines (see chapter 5) probably distorted recidivism rates downward and understated the prevalence of repeat offenders in the convict sample. Yet despite the skewed nature of the data set, the high number of first-time offenders in the convict group was significant. In the early years of the Khrushchev period, the number of first-time offenders in the convict pool remained at or above 80 percent, peaking at a high of 89 percent in 1954 and hitting a low of 80 percent in 1957. Yet although
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
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Table 5. Recidivism Rate among Convicted Hooligans in the USSR, 1947–1957 Years
Convicted Previously for Hooliganism (%)
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
3.3 3.6 4.1 5.2 6.3 7.0 5.0 3.7 6.3 7.7 9.6
Convicted Previously for Other Crimes (%)
Total: Repeat Offenders (%)
8.2 10.1 12.6 15.0 14.6 12.6 8.1 7.3 9.9 9.8 10.2
11.5 13.7 16.7 20.2 20.9 19.6 13.1 11.0 16.2 17.5 19.8
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Source: GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 58.
the overw helmi ng majori ty of hool ig ans duri ng the 1950s were rst-time offenders, the period between 1947 and 1957 did see steady fi growth in the percentage of repeat offenders, especially those who had an earlier conviction for hooliganism. While the percentage of those previously convicted of other crimes held steady or even decreased, the percentage of convicts who had previous hooligan convictions more than tripled between 1947 and 1957—suggesting that as the antihooligan campaign started in the mid-1950s and peaked between 1955 and 1957, many prior offenders were recaptured and recycled through the criminal justice system. The steady trend toward increased recidivism evid ent in the 1950s increased quickly and suddenly in the early 1960s with the percentage of recidivist offenders jumping from 20 percent of the convict cohort in 1957 to 37 percent in 1962, 34 percent in 1964, and 40 percent in 1966.116 When prior administrative punishments for minor offenses such as petty hooliganism were added to the estimates, studies suggested that recidivism rates among hooligans convicted in the second half of the 1960s were as high as 50 percent.117 The growth in the recidivism rate throughout the 1950s and 1960s showed that the state’s attempt to rehabilitate and reintegrate hooli gans had produced an increasing stream of career crimin als rather than
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
converts to the Soviet cause. Having been stigmatized with a prison r ecord, possible residency restrictions, and an outsider identity that often hindered their ability to find employment or reintegrate success fully into ordinary society, a third to a half of hooligan ex-convicts in the 1960s fell back into old self-destructive habits and found their way back into the court and camp system following their release.
Republican Distribution
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In terms of his republican habitat, the statistically average convicted Soviet hooligan resided in the RSFSR, the territorial core of the old Romanov Empire. In relation to its sister republics, the RSFSR was an economic and cultural powerhouse. It was also a consistent over producer of the country’s criminal deviants. While it contained approxi mately 55 percent of the USSR’s total population during the Khrushchev period, the RSFSR convicted approximately 70 percent of its hooligans over the same time span (1953: 74 percent, 1955: 73 percent, 1957: 70 percent, 1959: 70 percent, 1961: 68 percent, 1963: 70 percent).118 Con trolling for size differences between the more populous RSFSR and its smaller peer republics, the RSFSR continued consistently to outpace the others in the production of hooligan convictions (see table 6). Although so many hooligan convictions were in the RSFSR, the authorities neither restricted their anti-hooligan efforts to this area nor conceived of hooliganism as a uniquely Russian crime. In fact, the
Table 6. Distribution of Hooliganism (Simple and Malicious) by Republic, Measured in Number of Convicts per 100,000 People, 1961–1963 Republics RSFSR Kazakh SSR Georgian SSR Ukrainian SSR Belorussian SSR Uzbek SSR
1961
1962
1963
145.2 118.4 100.8 93.8 56.9 46.9
142.5 106.8 91.7 72.5 51.6 55.6
92.7 73.5 77.1 44.7 41.1 41.4
Source: GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 95, l. 5.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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authorities made no attempt to identify a national dimension in Soviet hooliganism or to pin the blame on Russians for their multiethnic society’s lingering problem with deviancy. Despite the ample data that was collected on Soviet hooligans, the statistics are silent on the national or ethnic identity of convicted offenders. Studies of pre-Revolutionary hooliganism in the late Imperial period have made causal connections between crimin al deviancy and Russian national identity or Slavic 119 ethnicity. Because of the lack of available information on both national ity and ethnicity in the data, we cannot make similar generalizations here.
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Alcohol and Hooliganism The statistically average Soviet hooligan was virtually always drunk when he committed his crime—underlining the close connection that existed in the USSR between chronic inebriation, male misbehavior, and hooliganism. To put it slightly differently, hooliganism was not just something men did—it was something that drunken men did. Typically, reports found that between 80 to 90 percent of convicted hooligans were under the influence of alcohol when they committed their acts of criminal deviancy.120 By comparison, criminals convicted of robbery, premeditated murder, and rape were drunk only 54 percent, 61 percent, and 63 percent of the time when they committed their crime.121 As we have seen, this uniquely close link between bingedrinking and criminal deviance was well known to the authorities, who often treated alcohol abuse as a key cause of hooliganism and shaped their anti-deviance efforts accordingly. Given the often close correspondence between drunkenness and deviancy, it is tempting to conclude as well that the majority of hooli gans were alcoholics. However, there is no reliable statistical data on this issue. Certainly, some convicted hooligans were problem drinkers who were prone to the c hronic, long-standing abuse of hard liquor. Others, however, appear to have been occasional binge-drinkers who overconsumed alcohol periodically, especially on weekends, paydays, and public holidays. Rather than outright addiction, drinking style or the prevailing culture of Soviet alcohol consumption (which encour aged the overdrinking of strong alcoholic beverages in a single sitting) appears to be the key variable that turned seemingly ordinary episodes of drinking into criminal cases of hooliganism.
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Party/Komsomol Membership In this chapter, many things have been stated about who the average hooligan was. Now, we can make a generalization about who he was not. The statistically average convicted Soviet hooligan was neither a member of the Communist Party nor of the Komsomol. From a 1947 high of 5 percent of convicted hooligans, the percentage of Communist Party members in the convict population decreased steadily to around 1 percent in the 1950s and 1960s (see table 7)—meaning that over 98 percent of convicted hooligan offenders were outside the select clique of Communist Party members. Of course, one cannot conclude from this that Party members were all parag ons of good conduct who abhorred the commonplace bad behaviors, such as binge-drinking, that drove other Soviet citizens into deviancy. As with rates of juvenile hooliganism, the disciplining of Party members “off the books” probably understated the amount of deviancy within this community and kept their conviction rates for hooliganism down relative to the rest of the population. In particular, the presence of alternative, internal venues for disciplining Party mem bers through Party Control Commissions may have been manipulated to keep Party-affiliated misbehavers out of regular courts and off of criminal records. In addition, Party bodies and patrons may have inter vened in the criminal justice system to shield fellow members from punishment. In the Azerbaijani SSR, for example, the police did not press petty hooligan charges against Party members without the approval of the local district Party committee, giving local bosses veto power over the punishment of Party-affiliated offenders.122 In other cases, local judges threw out hooligan cases, in part because of the defendant’s Party status.123 As the number of Party members in the convict sample decreased during the 1950s, the percentage of Komsomol members, moving in inverse correlation, increased. In the period between 1947 to 1957, the size of the Komsomol’s share in the population of hooligan convicts increased from 5 percent to 8 percent. Komsomol hooliganism continued to grow into the 1960s with the RSFSR reporting that 9 percent of its 1961 hooligan convicts were members of the youth league.124 In fact, hooliganism was one of the most popular crimes for young Leninists to commit, with every third Komsomol member convicted of a crime being convicted of hooliganism.125 The increasing correlation between
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Table 7. Rates of Party and Komsomol Membership among Convicted Hooligans, 1947–1957 Years
Percentage of Party Members
Percentage of Komsomol Members
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1963
5.3 3.7 2.7 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.7
5.2 5.2 5.4 6.6 7.6 8.1 7.3 8.2 8.0 7.4 7.8 —
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Source: GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 58. For the 1963 information, see GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 228, l. 157.
Komsomol membership and criminal deviancy was satirized by a Krokodil cartoon in which an investigator asks a well-dressed man whether he knows the tattooed, bruised, and bloodied hooligan youth sitting before him: “Of course, I do,” the man replies. “I collect his Komsomol dues every month.”126 Despite these isolated examples of moral panic and mass media sensationalism, Party and Komsomol members remained a relatively insignificant part of the cohort of hooligan convicts, rarely amounting to more than 10 percent of prosecutions under this criminal category. Just as in his class identity and level of educational attainment, the statistically average hooligan was a Soviet everyman in the sense that he did not belong to the well-connected and privileged elite that comprised the Communist Party and its feeder organization in the Komsomol. Like other ordinary Soviet workers, the average convicted hooligan was a small cog in the complex, stratified machine of Soviet socialism—a machine that the Komsomol and Party elite dominated supposedly on his behalf and for his benefit.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
Urban/Rural Split The statistically average Soviet hooligan committed his crime in a city. Hooliganism was an urban crime, with more than 60 percent of its inci dents occurring in cities and urban workers’ settlements (see table 8). It was closely correlated with the rapidly changing urban environment of the 1950s and 1960s. This era saw the built environment of the city transformed with the mass construction of prefabricated apartment blocks. At the same time, the urban population exploded as in-migrants flooded in from the shrinking villages. In short, during the Khrushchev era, the Soviet Union shifted definitively from being a rural society to embodying one vision of modern, urban, industrial civilization. Despite the majority of urban hooliganism in the convict population, rural hooliganism retained and even regained a significant share in the convict sample in the 1950s as the incidence of urban hooliganism dropped from a postwar high of 67 percent in 1947 to a low of 59 percent in 1957. However, the city’s predominance in the production of deviance was quickly regained in the 1960s. In 1961, the RSFSR Supreme Court reported that the urban/rural spread had widened to 67 percent and 33 percent.127 By 1963, the percentage of urban hooliganism in the RSFSR had increased to 70 percent, turning the city back into the premier site of Soviet hooliganism.128
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Table 8. Urban/Rural Distribution of Hooliganism in the USSR, 1947–1957 Years
Urban Area (%)
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
63.3 60.6 66.9 63.0 63.0 63.4 64.7 60.6 60.9 60.4 58.6
Rural Area (%) 36.7 39.4 33.1 37.0 37.0 36.6 35.3 39.4 39.1 39.6 41.4
Source: GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 58.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
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Des pite the rapid adv ance of urban ind ust ria li sm duri ng the Khrushchev period, hooliganism was consistently more urban than the country in which it occurred. In 1953, for example, the urban population amounted to only 43 percent of the Soviet population, but more than 60 percent of the convicted hooliganism in this year was committed in a city. Likewise, the urban population accounted for 52 percent of the Soviet citizenry in 1964, yet was the stage for nearly 70 percent of its convicted hooligan crimes. Hooliganism was, therefore, urbanizing at a rate that was even more explosive than postwar Soviet society as a whole—reflecting the close correlation between the environment of the fast-growing industrial city and hooliganism and placing the hooligan at the avant-garde of Soviet urban change. In terms of social context, the average convicted hooligan was, by the end of Khrushchev era, an urbanite who lived, worked, and committed his crime in the brave new world of the standardized Soviet factory town.
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Conclusion: The Statistically Average Soviet Hooligan The statistically average Soviet hooligan was a male between 25 and 50 years of age. He lived in a city in the RSFSR. He was an industrial worker and, as we shall see in the next chapter, often a married family man. He had an incomplete primary or secondary level education and no prior history of criminal conviction. And, he was a substance abuser whose drug of choice was alcohol. In many ways, the statistically average hooligan was the mirror of a rapidly modernizing Soviet society that was becoming, like him, more urban, industrial, and educated over the course of the post-Stalinist decade. Rather than being a monstrous anomaly, deviant other, or external import, he was, in many respects, a Soviet everyman—only more male, more drunk, and more Russian (in terms of republic of resi dence if not in nationality). In this way, the hooligan both was and was not a social marginal. He isolated himself in his afterwork hours from the collective organizations and activities of cultured leisure that the Soviet civilizing project pushed. Rather than being an activist or an organization man, he marginalized himself from the official programs and institutions of Soviet power. However, in terms of his social class and occupational profile, he was the ideological center of the Soviet society he was allegedly disrespecting with his crime. As the heart of the working class, he was not an outsider. He was born in the USSR and was a product of it—no matter what the regime’s “survivals of
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
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Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period
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capitalism” rhetoric seemed to suggest about his alien origins. He was, seemingly, the core constituent of a Soviet project predicated on working-class empowerment and advancement. The hooligan was a worker, but not the model worker that the Soviet state wanted to pro duce. In the hooligan, the Soviet state saw the dark side of the working class in whose name it ruled—and declared war on it.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:32:51.
2 Private Matters or Public Crimes?
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The Emergence of Domestic Hooliganism in Soviet Russia
An illustration in a 1956 issue of the Soviet satirical magazine Krokodil depicted young men loitering on the city streets and harassing female pedestrians.1 This was the stereotype of hooliganism that many Soviet citizens encountered in films and read about in novels and newspapers. This stereotypical portrait reflected common ideas about who hooligans were and what they did. It also reflected contemporary concerns over urban crime, youth culture, alcoholism, and public safety. It reflected many things. But, like most stereotypes, it did not reflect reality fully. By the mid-1960s, the typical Soviet hooligan was not an adolescent loitering on a city street and assaulting pedestrians. He was a married man who stayed at home with his family and victimized his wife and children. Reports on hooliganism in the early 1950s noted that “streets and courtyards (dvory)” were the most common sites of hooliganism.2 How ever, the apartment began to displace the street and the courtyard as the center for hooligan activity in the late 1950s and early 1960s, especially in the Soviet Union’s expanding urban centers. This Khrushchev-era relocation of hooliganism to the apartment transformed the identity of both hooligan and victim. Surprisingly, husbands and wives were 59
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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Private Matters or Public Crimes?
much more l ikely to be part ies to hool ig ani sm duri ng the p ostStalin period than the stereotypical strangers in the night depicted in Krokodil. Domestic hooliganism made abusive husbands and loud neighbors into a new class of deviants. It also made the public and the private into objects of debate. In cases of domestic hooliganism, police, judges, and prosecutors were forced to define the borders of the public place. They also had to decide when events that went on behind closed doors, such as spousal abuse and family arguments, stopped being private matters and became public crimes. In this manner, the emergence of domestic hooliganism is more than just a story of the relocation of hooliganism to the home. It is also a case study in the negotiation and transformation of public/private boundaries in the post-Stalinist period.
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The Public Paradigm of Hooliganism The People’s Commissariat of Municipal Services of the Russian Repub lic (Narkomkhoz RSFSR) and the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the Russian Republic (Narkomiust RSFSR) launched the debate over domestic hooliganism and the multiple meanings of “the public” by criminalizing misbehavior in communal apartments in a July 1935 circular. Designed to change a common site of interpersonal conflict into a zone of cultured living, the circular announced that the pathologies that commonly afflicted communal life, such as noisy drinking bouts and violent arguments, would now be considered as hooliganism.3 Inadvertently, the Narkomkhoz/Narkomiust RSFSR circular touched off a controversy about what hooliganism was and where it could occur that would transform hooligan prosecution patterns and challenge the unstable boundaries that separated public from private and individual from collective. The 1935 circular “On the Fight against Hooliganism in Apartments” brought hooliganism indoors and, by deciding to treat private deviants in the same manner as their public counterparts, created a new type of domestic hooliganism (bytovoe khuliganstvo). However, the new circular ran into determined opposition from high-ranking members in the Soviet judiciary. The USSR Supreme Court, in particular, housed a number of vocal critics. In an April 1939 Plenum, the court warned that the circular had, through expanding the application of hooliganism to new spaces, created a new type of hooli ganism that was not defined in republican criminal codes.4 By enabling
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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legal workers to read hooliganism into everyday domestic dramas, the court worried that the circular had made hooliganism into a catchall category and obscured the meaning of a crime already notorious for its opacity, elasticity, and ambiguity. This prompted criticism from justices who complained: “[although] hooliganism is an action that expresses disrespect for society we apply this article when a quarrel happens between a husband and a wife in their homes.”5 They noted that the Narkomiust/Narkomkhoz RSFSR circular, by transforming the common place into the criminal, threatened to create a spike in hooligan cases that would overwhelm an overstretched judicial infrastructure with the everyday “squabbles” that plagued life in overcrowded urban housing.6 The USSR Supreme Court’s response was to promulgate a public paradigm of hooliganism. In a decree issued at the same plenum where they attacked the Narkomiust/Narkomkhhoz circular, the USSR Su preme Court announced the explicitly public parameters of hooligan ism by defining it as an “activity that is connected with violence, damage or destruction of property . . . that is committed in a club, in a theater, or in other public places (obshchestvennye mesta).”7 The USSR Supreme Soviet reinforced the emerging public paradigm with its August 1940 decree on petty theft and hooliganism. Like the USSR Supreme Court’s earlier interpretation, this decree explicitly linked hooliganism to a set of specific sites in which it could be committed, namely “enterprises ( predpriatiia), institutions (uchrezhdeniia) and public places.”8 That this decree should have had the unintended effect of cementing the Supreme Court’s correlation of hooliganism with a defined set of public sites was ironic given that its primary purpose was to reduce labor mobility rather than exclude the application of hooliganism to hearth and home. As several scholars have noted, the August 1940 decree was intended to reduce job turnover, promote labor discipline, and improve economic productivity in the face of the looming war against fascism.9 The language on “public places” had been tacked on to the end of the decree as a sweetener targeted to win the support of those concerned about reports of rising urban disorder and youth crime.10 Although written for different purposes and motivated by different intentions, the 1939 USSR Supreme Court and the 1940 USSR Supreme Soviet decrees both contributed to the creation of a public paradigm of hooliganism. Each in its own way, they linked the legitimate application of hooliganism to explicitly public locations and, in the process, made
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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the interpretation of space central to the understanding and application of hooliganism. Whether to beat back an overreaching definition of deviant behavior, combat rising urban disorder, or reduce labor turn over, both the USSR Supreme Court and the USSR Supreme Soviet tied the criminal category of hooliganism to the concept of the public place. Yet by doing so, they inadvertently made every case of hooliganism into a potential opportunity for legal workers, criminologists, and ordinary citizens to argue over and reimagine what the “public” meant, espe cially in a socialist society where the bourgeois distinction between public and private spheres had long been derided as ideologically il legitimate and illusory.11 In an environment where the borders between public and private were often entangled, ill-formed, and fluid, the attempt to link the ambiguous and contested criminal category of hooli ganism to the equally open-ended and opaque concept of the public place added another seemingly insoluble dimension to the already vexing question of identifying and applying this elusive crime. Spatializing hooliganism and tying it to a specifically defined set of public places was, however, only one means by which the USSR Supreme Court sought to create a public paradigm that would prevent the transformation of “petty apartment squabbles” into hooliganism. To separate hooliganism from the arguments and in-fighting that often marred the overcrowded Soviet home, the USSR Supreme Court stressed the fact that hooliganism could only be motivated by disrespect for the Soviet social collective and its values rather than by dysfunctional personal relationships. In the same April 1939 resolution in which it defined hooliganism’s public spatial parameters, the Court asserted that crimes, such as “beatings” and “insults” [oskorbleniia], could be prosecuted as hooliganism only if their “goal” was to “display explicit disrespect for society and not when their motives [were] connected with the personal relationship between the guilty party and the victim.”12 With this decree, the USSR Supreme Court reimagined hooliganism as an anonymous crime that occurred between strangers. Motivated by contempt and disrespect for the Soviet project, hooliganism’s true victim was society and its collectivist morality rather than the accosted individual. Like acts in nonpublic places, the USSR Supreme Court denied private relationships consideration as possible spaces for hooli ganism. Hooliganism was a crime expressing the deviant’s outrage against the moral order and active contempt for Soviet social values and, therefore, could not be motivated by the depressingly ordinary
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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arguments and animosities that plagued the everyday interactions of individual family members, friends, neighbors, lovers, acquaintances, and spouses. Like the inclusion of the public place into the understanding and application of hooliganism, such a strict public construction of the motives and victims of hooliganism was designed to delegitimize the idea of domestic hooliganism. In addition, such rulings were supposed to differentiate this elastic catchall category of deviance from closely related crimes and limit its overuse and expansive misinterpretation. However, the public construction of hooliganism’s motives and victims also, again like the linkage of public space and hooligan act, created an inadvertent opportunity for legal workers and citizens to argue over the elusive and intertwined boundaries between the individual citizen and the social collective. By making the application of hooliganism con tingent on amorphous concepts such as the public place or the elusive boundary between individual and collective, the Supreme Court and the state (however inadvertently) provided legal workers, criminolo gists, and citizens with a difficult and daily opportunity to define these concepts in reference to the messy and malleable realities of Soviet life. And, in the process, the state ceded to actors outside its immediate con trol the opportunity to imagine and reimagine some of the key terms of Soviet culture in ways that sometimes reinforced and sometimes chal lenged the center’s preexisting ideas and practices. More than just an expression of moral panic or all-purpose criminal category, hooliganism acted as an entryway through which countless local citizens and legal workers entered into an ongoing debate in postStalinist society over locating the unstable and entangled boundaries between the elusive private world of the individual and the expansive public world of the social collective. By applying hooliganism to some cases and not to others, as well as interpreting hooliganism in narrow or expansive ways, citizens and social control agents were not only deciding which criminal labels to affix to which offenses, they were also, at the same time and in their quiet and uncoordinated ways, arguing for and calling into being new notions of public boundaries and respon sibilities. Simply put, they were shaping the Soviet public sphere to match their local understandings, inclinations, and interests and, in the process, cumulatively and gradually changing the ways that other Soviet citizens, criminologists, courts, and legal workers imagined the most intimate interactions and areas of their domestic worlds.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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Peeling Back the Public Paradigm After 1940, the public paradigm served as the main model for under standing, applying, and limiting the evasive criminal categ ory of hooli ganism. However, during the 1950s, new understandings of hooligan ism gradually challenged and put pressure on the public paradigm, understandings that freed legal workers to apply hooliganism to onceforbidden resid ential and relational spaces. The rollback of the public paradigm of hooliganism and the resurgence of domestic hooliganism is, however, not a simple story of the latter concept completely overtaking and trumping the former. Instead, it is a messy story of the collision of different conceptions of how to understand and apply hooliganism that generated a great deal of local confusion and contradictory practice. In this environment of uncertainty with its lack of clear central signals and directives, local actors were left to themselves to create their own policies and preced ents about how to apply hooliganism. Often responding to victims’ complaints and to their own under standings of what was and was not hooligan, more and more local policemen, prosecutors, and judges ignored the strict spatial and rela tional demands of the public paradigm, convicted hooligans for mis behavior in their homes targeted toward their family, friends, and neighbors, and drove the resurgence of domestic hooliganism. More and more criminologists also read the ambiguities of the public para digm in creative and expansive ways that allowed for the prosecution of domestic acts between intimates under an expanded understanding of the hooligan category. The disparate and uncoordinated actions of these three groups (outraged victims, crusading local legal workers, and creative criminologists) led to the de facto domestication of hooli ganism in the Khrushchev period and brought into being a new under standing of hooliganism that saw this once explicitly public category morph into a new means to police disordered domestic spaces and enforce proper personal relationships in all areas of Soviet society. As we have seen, the public paradigm made determining the motive of the criminal a central part of identifying and applying hooliganism. According to the restrictive terms of the public paradigm, hooliganism could only be committed intentionally and could only stem from the desire to show disrespect and disdain for Soviet society and its collec tivist values. Hooliganism could not originate from within personal relationships and could not be committed against a person whom the hooligan knew, such as an acquaintance, friend, wife, or relative.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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Taking advantage of the importance of ascertaining motive in the public paradigm’s understanding and application of hooliganism, many defendants successfully argued in court or through the appeals process that their actions were not hooliganism because they were involved in a personal relationship with the victim. By demonstrating a personal history, the defendant could show that his actions were moti vated by animus toward a specific individual rather than by the dis respect toward the social order that was the sine qua non of Soviet hooli ganism. The defendant, by pursuing this strategy, could argue that his case, rather than being a public concern (obshchestvennoe delo) deserving criminal prosecution, was a private matter (lichnoe delo) or, as a lawyer argued in an appeal, “a typical domestic quarrel devoid of any element of hooliganism.”13 The case of Ivan provides a good example of this acquittal strategy. While in his neighbor’s apartment, Ivan physically attacked the man, knocked over a kerosene stove, vomited in the neighbor’s room, and used foul language in the presence of his children. In August 1953, Ivan was convicted of malicious hooliganism by a Moscow regional court and sentenced to two years imprisonment. Following his conviction for hooliganism, Ivan appealed his sentence to the USSR Supreme Court. In his appeals letter, Ivan did not deny what he had done or argue that he did not commit a crime. He only argued that he had a motive for his action and, therefore, could not and should not have been prosecuted for hooliganism. By arguing that his actions stemmed from hatred for his neighbor rather than from hatred for Soviet society, he wriggled his way out of being labeled a hooligan. This verdict contradicts the meaning of malicious hooliganism that is in the Criminal Code, which specifies that hooligan actions must be committed without any motive or reason. . . . But in my actions, as you can see, there wasn’t motive-less hooliganism. In fact, it was quite to the contrary and I had a motive. A long time before this case, I was, on three occasions, in bad personal relations with my neighbor. . . . For the motives given in the court’s verdict, the court could have evicted me from the apartment. But it should not have tried my case in the criminal sphere and charged me with hooliganism.14
In their appeals, hooligans, like Ivan, did not deny that they had done something wrong. They denied that they did something to society. “How is it possible to agree with this verdict?” a hooligan who had been convicted of malicious hooliganism for pushing and cursing at his
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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other-in-law wrote in his appeals letter. “My actions were connected m with purely family relationships and sprang from an internal family argument with my wife [and could not, therefore, be hooliganism].”15 By contextualizing their actions, embedding them in relationships, and portraying them as motivated and directed toward particular people, such convicts used the public paradigm’s loopholes to escape heavy hooligan sentences and argue their way into acquittals or lighter sentences. Instead of being legal illiterates, hooligans such as Ivan were well schooled in the subtleties of the law and its relational restrictions. They knew that the type of relationship that existed between criminal and victim was, for Soviet jurists, vital to determining if a criminal act was hooliganism, and they manipulated it to their advantage. “An experi enced hooligan, especially one who has spent time in a place of deten tion and has received suitable instructions or one who has consulted with a dishonest lawyer,” a judge noted in a letter to the journal Sotsia listicheskaia zakonnost’, “always tries to discover and show in court some kind of motive for his actions. Thus, they always talk about jealousy, revenge, and about personal matters and to support their story they bring witnesses, who are mostly relatives or friends.”16 The appeals strategy these hooligans implemented took advantage of the uncertain and ambiguous boundary that separated such closely related criminal categories as crimes against the individual from crimes against the social order. As we have discussed, the public paradigm made a clear distinction between crimes motivated by and directed against individuals and crimes motivated by and directed against society and its code of values. In the messy realities of practical casework, however, it was extremely difficult to draw such clean-cut distinctions, especially in a socialist society where the boundaries between citizen and social collective were often entangled or deliberately dismissed as artificial bourgeois constructs. In a polity where the personal was the political and where the social collective often subsumed the individual, the public paradigm’s insistence that crimes could be neatly compart mentalized as either against the individual or against the social collec tive overlooked the fact that many hooligan offenses had an impact on both. Crimes against individuals often had larger spillover conse quences that affected social order. Crimes against society, likewise, often affected the separate individuals within it. Looked at in all their messy multidimensionality, the hooligan crimes that legal authorities and local citizens confronted often l acked
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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c lear-cut either/or categ orization. Instead, most hooligan acts con tained interlocking social and individual dimensions that straddled both w orlds and, therefore, blurred the borders b etween them. Forced by the either/or logic of the public paradigm to distinguish and separate what was often multidimensional, murky, and capable of being inter preted in various ways, legal authorities were put in the difficult posi tion of deciding (using their own discretion) when offenses against individuals ceased being personal matters and started becoming hooli gan crimes against society as a whole. Not surprisingly, ambiguity arose over where to situate the uncertain and ill-formed line between the ordinary bad relationship and the oversized offense of hooliganism—an ambiguity that empowered concerned local citizens and law enforcers to understand and apply hooliganism in their own ways and that savvy hooligans could try to exploit to escape conviction. In this confusing and ambiguous situation, local policemen, prosecu tors, and judges could and did interpret similar (and, in some instances, the same) cases in different ways depending on their interests and understandings. Take the case of a man who cursed at a woman who refused to dance with him on a public park’s dance floor and slashed her face with a razorblade. Was this crime best characterized as a case of assault inflicted against the individual woman? Or, was it a case of hooliganism that violated social order and expressed brazen contempt for Soviet values? Who was the victim of the crime, the woman or Soviet society? The Ivanovo police who arrested the man interpreted his crime as an offense against Soviet social order and, accordingly, charged the man with malicious hooliganism. The Ivanovo city court, however, looked at the same case, interpreted it as a crime against the individual, threw out the hooligan charge, and convicted the man of simple assault. Following the dictates of the public paradigm that hooliganism could not stem from personal motives, the court reasoned “that the actions of the accused did not have as their goal the expression of clear disrespect for society but were directed against the girl as a result of a quarrel with her arising from their per sonal relations.” The Ivanovo regional court, hearing the case on appeal, interpreted the same crime yet again as an offense against the Soviet social order. Despite the impeccable public paradigm logic of the lower court’s sentence, the regional court threw out their ruling and convicted the man of malicious hooliganism.17 The varied, flip-flopping interpretations these local Ivanovo law en forcers gave to the same crime were anything but rare and demonstrated
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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the state of confusion and contradictory practice that surrounded hooli ganism at the dawn of the Khrushchev era. However, this case also hints at how the combination of uncertainty and inconsistent practice created an open and opportunistic environment that local law enforce ment could use to apply their own novel understandings of hooligan ism to local cases often independent of the center’s dictates and control. The regional court’s ruling also provided glimpses of a new under standing of hooliganism that was beginning to chip away at the rela tional restrictions of the public paradigm—an understanding that was offering local actors a way to see (despite the directives of the 1939 USSR Supreme Court decree) crimes against individuals simultaneously as hooligan assaults on the social order. In the months before Stalin’s death, criminologists and local prose cutors began criticizing the public parad igm in the pages of the leading Soviet legal journals.18 Blaming the inconsistency and confusion that surrounded the question of how to apply hooliganism on the “unclear,” “outmoded,” and “insufficiently comprehensive” character of the 1939 USSR Supreme Court decree, these pion eering prosec utors and crimi nologists attacked what they saw as the overly narrow and illegitimate either/or logic of the public paradigm. Rather than insisting that crimes could only be either against the individual or against society, these critics argued that, under certain circumstances, crimes could be against both the individual and against the social order at the same time. With this both/and logic, these local prosecutors and criminologists implied that the individual citizen and the social collective were inter twined entities that could easily slide or shade into each other. More crucially for our story, they also implied that the crimes against these entangled entities were equally slippery and expansive constructs that were also capable of shifting easily and imperceptibly from one to another. In particular, these critics argued that if a crime against a person was committed “in a public place, in the presence of other citizens and in violation of the elementary rules of socialist communalism,” then that crime (regardless of whether it was motivated by personal argu ments or animosities) also simultaneously violated public order.19 In this sense, it shifted from being a direct crime against the individual into an indirectly motivated assault against the values of the Soviet social collective that could legitimately be tried as hooliganism.20 Through this model of indirect and incidental hooliganism, these criminologists and local law enforcers found a way to hooliganize heinous, public crimes against individuals that arose out of the personal relationships
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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etween offenders and victims. It could now be argued that when a b man, motivated by personal animus, committed assault with the primary intention of inflicting violence on the individual, he was simultaneously (albeit indirectly and unintentionally) committing an act of symbolic violence against the Soviet moral order that transformed his crime into hooliganism. The indirectly motivated model of hooliganism demonstrated, in a striking way, how interwoven and permeable the boundaries were becoming between bad interpersonal relationships and hooligan offenses and how easily the former could be translated and folded into an expan sive understanding of the latter. By making virtually any public offense against a Soviet person into an incidental and indirect form of hooli ganism, this new model served as a convenient intellectual device for reading a whole new set of intimate acts and interpersonal relationships into the restricted domain of hooligan deviance. Of course, local courts had tried offenses against family, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances as hooliganism before. Now, however, such applications received a new intellectual justification and theoretical respectability that helped set the stage for the post-Stalinist spike in home-based hooliganism. In addition to advancing a new understanding of hooliganism that enlarged the domain of deviance to include dysfunctional and abusive relationships, the articles also put pressure on the USSR Supreme Court to issue a new ruling on hooliganism to replace the 1939 decree. In particular, they lobbied for “a special decree of the Supreme Court Plenum” to “decide this question [of defining judicial practice toward hooliganism],” arguing that a “correct and politically sharp ruling would correct the courts’ frequent mistakes on this issue.”21 These critics did not have to wait long for the Supreme Court to make itself heard on the hooligan question. Less than a year later, a plenary session of the USSR Supreme Court decreed changes to the April 1939 directives on hooliganism that appeared to legitimize the model of indirectly motivated hooliganism and to reverse the court’s earlier insistence that hooliganism could not be motivated by individual rela tionships.22 As we have seen, the April 1939 USSR Supreme Court decree instructed courts that crimes such as “beatings” [naneseniia poboev] and “insults” [oskorbleniia] could be prosecuted as hooliganism only if their “goal” was to “display explicit disrespect for society and not when their motives [were] connected with the personal relationship between the offender and the victim.”23 The March 1953 decree deleted the entire second half of the statement dealing with the issue of personal relationships and
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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the origin of hooliganism. Now, after the deletion mandated by the March 1953 revision, the law read only that “crimes can be prosecuted [as hooliganism] if their motive is to display explicit disrespect for society.”24 With the March 1953 USSR Supreme Court revision, one of the key planks of the late 1930s public paradigm of hooliganism was removed and suddenly called into question. Instead of personal relationships and intimate interactions between family, friends, and neighbors being treated as inadmissible grounds for the commission of hooliganism, the 1953 revision made the rich everyday world of interpersonal disagree ments and dysfunction into a potential fertile new frontier for the expan sion of an increasingly denuded and open-ended definition of hooli ganism. The “family squabbles” that the court had tried to shield from hooliganism in the late 1930s could now be seen, à la the arguments of the indirectly motivated model, not as individual cases of assault or insult but as indirect and incidental acts of hooliganism against the Soviet moral community as a whole. Purposefully or inadvertently, the 1953 decree appeared to legitimize the resurrection and resurgence of the contested concept of domestic hooliganism. “Appeared” is the key word because, although the March 1953 decree removed the obstacles to treating interpersonal disorder as a cause of hooliganism, it did not explicitly endorse this view or instruct courts to use anti-hooligan laws to police domestic disorder or regulate the inti mate world of interpersonal relationships. Instead, the USSR Supreme Court simply deleted a key part of the earlier consensus on how to understand and apply hooliganism and remained silent about its larger implications. Waiting for the new federal and, later, republican crimi nal law codes (then being slowly drafted and debated), the USSR Supreme Court sat on its hands and, in the meantime, issued vague sudebnye praktiki (guides to judicial practice) that merely repeated out dated prior understandings.25 Through both its actions and its inactions, the USSR Supreme Court devolved decision making downward to local actors and increased the already significant interpretational freedom that they could exercise in applying, understanding, and identifying hooliganism within the context of their own communities. The result was a hodgepodge of in consistent and sometimes contradictory local practices. Some local actors persisted in following the familiar planks of the embattled public paradigm by continuing to insist that hooliganism could not originate
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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in interpersonal relationships. In articles, they attacked the model of indirectly motivated hooliganism, arguing that this concept threatened to increase the number of hooligan convicts unjustifiably and to dilute this form of deviance it into an even more meaningless catchall category. One regional prosecutor, writing in a leading legal journal, worried that: “Such a practice would lead to the unlimited expansion of the meaning of hooliganism and, in the end, to the groundless conviction of those who should not be included in the number of hooligans.”26 Likewise, concerned local law enforcers argued that the indirect model threatened to efface the distinction between vario us criminal categories and to transform every public offense into a variety of hooliganism. Such critics feared that the fuzzy borders between hooliganism and other crimes and the growing expansion of hooliganism into the dis tinct domains of other crimin al categories “will lead to unbelievable confusion in the operation of the courts.”27 Other local members of the legal system, however, used the ambi guity and confusion that the March 1953 decree created as an opportu nity to expand their application of anti-hooligan laws to new areas and actions involving disordered domesticity and dysfunctional intimate relationships. Taking advantage of the center’s silence to implement their own understandings of hooliganism, these local actors increasingly applied the hooligan label to conflicts between family, friends, and neighbors and, in the process, gradually domesticated the post-Stalinist understanding of deviance.28 One commentator, for example, observed that local judicial practice in his area had come to a “firm conclusion” that cases of interpersonal conflict between intimates should be tried as hooliganism “indepen dent of the motives of such actions” as long as they were committed in a public place and exhibited disrespect for society.29 Not only were courts shifting their practices in relation to hooliganism, crimin ologists and legal textbooks were also changing their presentation of hooligan ism to match emerging local practices and ideas.30 After commenting that “court practice is rich in cases of hooliganism that arise on the grounds of the personal relationship between the hooligan and his victim,” a textbook author opened his section on hooliganism by vir tually copying the indirectly motivated model’s argument that “when a person starts a quarrel in a public place and during this shows clear dis respect for society then, independent of the motives of these acts, this person must be charged with hooliganism. His acts have crossed the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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boundaries and exhibited disrespect not towards the person but toward society and the collective.”31 As these examples of conflicting local practices and opinions make clear, the March 1953 decree did not replace one single, uniform way of understanding and applying hooliganism (the public paradigm) with another. Instead, the decree created a hole in the predominant defini tion of hooliganism that local actors filled with a plethora of local prac tices, applications, and understandings. Rather than creating a uniform conception of hooliganism to oppose to the public paradigm, the March 1953 decree’s silences opened a space for legal actors to follow their own individual and idiosyncratic visions of a hooliganism that conformed to the increasingly minimal and malleable directives of the center as well as to their own local understandings, interests, and agendas. It also gave an opportunity for local actors to advocate and advance new models of indirect motivation that gave intellectual ammunition to local actors who wanted to expand the domain of deviance by relabeling interpersonal conflicts as hooligan crimes against society at large. In this atmosphere of ambiguity, inconsistency, new ideas, and local initia tive, domestic hooliganism began to take off as some local actors across the country began (in an uncoordinated and unplanned way) to apply anti-hooligan laws to home-based offenses in increasing numbers and, in this way, transformed hooliganism’s ever-evolving meaning. During the 1950s, the first plank of the public parad igm, that hooli ganism could not occur between parties involved in a personal relation ship, had been removed. Slowly, hooliganism shifted from being a crime of anonymous viol ence between strangers that was motivated by hatred of Soviet values to becoming a crime of intimate violence inflicted against loved ones and arising out of the toxic relationships between estranged neighbors, family members, and friends that typified the urban everyday. In the Khrushchev era, cases of intimate dysfunction in the domestic realm, such as a husband beating his wife or a father cursing at his children, transformed from untouchable private matters (lichnye dela) to public matters (obshchestvennye dela) that demanded the extension of hooliganism to the Soviet home. However, before the con cept of hooliganism could be fully imported from the street corner to the kitchen table and used as a way to police dysfunction in disordered domestic spheres, the second plank of the public paradigm (the 1940 USSR Supreme Soviet’s linkage of hooliganism to public places) had to be reexamined, rethought, and expansively redefined.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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Hooliganism and the Boundaries of Public Space As we have seen, the 1940 USSR Supreme Soviet decree had specified that hooliganism could occur only in specifically “public” sites, such as “enterprises, institutions, and public places.” By demanding that hooli ganism be interpreted as a public crime committed in a public place, the Supreme Soviet, however, also simultaneously ensured that hooli ganism became a crime that problematized the very concept of “the public.” By confronting legal authorities with the need to think about the spatial distinction between public and private, hooliganism f orced each of them (whether they wanted or not) to decide for themselves, in their daily casework, what a public place was and continua lly to con front the dilemma of disentangling the public from the private in spaces where these two supposedly separable concepts were often inextricably interwoven. Because the public paradigm demanded that hooliganism could only happen in public places, how judges, prosecutors, and policemen read the status of spaces often determined the outcome of cases. The USSR Supreme Court, for example, overturned a hooligan conviction in the case of a man who had assaulted a traveler because its chairman con sidered that the deserted rural road on which the incident happened was not a public place and therefore not a valid site of hooliganism.32 In the city of Stalingrad, the police refused to charge a man with hooligan ism because they determined that the dormitory courtyard in which he committed his crime was not a public place and, therefore, was off-limits to hooliganism according to the restrictive spatial rules of the public paradigm.33 However, reading the status of Soviet spaces was often anything but easy or unproblematic, especially in a society whose socialist ideology and Stalinist herit age remained suspicious of the public/private dis tinction. In practice, the public paradigm’s simplistic model of the public/private distinction was ill-matched to the messy and compli cated realities of the Soviet spatial world. As we have seen, the Supreme Soviet and Supreme Court’s public parad igm suggested that the public and the private existed in Soviet space as cleanly demarcated and easily separable territories with a fixed border defining them. Far from being easily discernable and differentiated, however, the public and the pri vate often occupied and overlapped the same site in Soviet space. In other words, public and private were innately entangled categ ories that
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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often coexisted in a superimposed rather than a neatly separable state. As hybrid sites within which the public and private coinhabited in various vague and fluid configurations, the complex nature of Soviet space often belied local actors’ attempts to parcel it off into pure public and private parts. Rather than being stable or singular, Soviet spaces could be read in multiple (even conflicting) ways simultaneously according to the shifting interests, agendas, and perspectives of the interpreter and according to which part of the public/private mix the individual interpreter chose to stress. Was the Soviet home a private site? As we shall see, the answer could be (and often was) both yes and no at the same time. In such an entangled spatial environment, the public paradigm’s insistence that law enforcers make clear distinctions between public and private sites (and apply anti-hooligan laws only to the former) opened up both problems and possibilities. The domestic site whose spatial status proved most troublesome to read using the simplistic either/or logic of the public paradigm was the communal apartment. With its complex multifamily composition, its crowding, its areas of common use, and its nosy neighbors, the commu nal apartment was the quintessential hybrid space of “public privacy.”34 The simultaneous existence of overlapping public and private dimen sions in the superimposed space of the communal apartment made it possible for interpreters to generate conflicting interpretations of its elusive public/private nature that led to divergent local practices in the application of the hooligan label to communal apartment conflicts. For advocates of the public paradigm, however, the spatial status of the communal apartment was unproblematic. It was not a public place. “Why was their unworthy and anti-social conduct not brought before the court?” a 1955 Literaturnaia gazeta article remarked about a pair of apartment hooligans. “Certainly no one can dispute that their conduct is antisocial. But, you see, it takes place in a [communal] apartment and, in the minds of some jurists, the [communal] apartment is not a public place and therefore it is impossible to prosecute them for hooligan ism.”35 Describing another communal apartment tenants’ fight against a pair of “apartment troublemakers,” a 1955 article in Krokodil also lamented the failure of local prosecutors to try such cases as hooli ganism: “The reason is always the same: the hooligan activity has not occurred in a public place, but in an apartment and behind closed doors.”36 In opposition to this restricted reading, critics of the public paradigm pointed to the common areas of the communal apartment, such as the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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itchen, corridors, and bathrooms, and argued that they constituted a k public place that overlapped and coexisted with the private areas in the complex space of the communal apartment. By identifying the public niches that dotted the communal apartments’ domestic contours and confirming their status as spatially entangled sites, they argued for the extension of hooliganism to home-based misbehaviors.37 However, other commentators simply reversed the public paradigm’s reading of the spatial nature of the communal apartment and labeled it unproblematically as a public place. Taking advantage of the elastic and ambiguous nature of Soviet space and the power to define the public domain that the public paradigm gave them, more and more local law enforcement personnel were coming to the same confident conclusion as an official at the RSFSR Ministry of Justice who, noting and approving the local rise of domestic hooligan convictions in a 1957 report, remarked unambiguously that “the communal apartment in which a great number of citizens live is a public place (obshchestvennoe mesto) and the afore mentioned actions have been ruled correctly as matters of public rather than private (chastnyi) interest.”38 The separate apartment, which was gradually replacing the commu nal apartment as the main residence of urban Soviet citizens beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, also emerged as a contested object of spatial analysis.39 As standardized units within larger multifamily structures and with notoriously thin walls, the separate apartment was a public/ private hybrid whose ambiguous spatial status could, like the commu nal apartment, be read in multiple ways.40 In addition to those inter preters who viewed the apartment as outside the realm of the public, there were increasing numbers who, taking advantage of the elasticity of the center’s terminology and the fuzzy meaning of the “public” in an entangled spatial environment, unilaterally labeled the domestic as a vital part of public space open to anti-hooligan policing. These local actors would have agreed with the chief justice of the Moscow City Court who, before a skeptical USSR Supreme Court, asserted: “I think that we need to apply the same punishments to domestic hooliganism as we do to hooliganism in a public place, because the apartment is also a public place.”41 What allowed for the expanded application of the hooligan label to domestic deviance and for the confident classification of the communal and separate apartment space as a public site was a new and expanded interpretation of the meaning of “public place.” In the mid-1950s criminologists’ writings on hooliganism began to develop a semantically
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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expansive understanding of the public space that encompassed areas of residence, rest, and relaxation. For example, legal scholars I. G. Filanovskii and I. I. Solodkin, in their 1957 monograph on hooliganism, defined “public place” so broadly that it covered the domestic as well as the “clubs, theaters, enterprises, and institutions” originally outlined in the decrees of the USSR Supreme Court and USSR Supreme Soviet. By identifying as public “those places where people work, spend their leisure time and interact with one another, for example enterprises, institutions, theaters, movie houses, clubs, streets, backyards (dvory), stairwells, markets, trains, streetcars, parks, apartments, and places of study,” Filanovskii and Solodkin legitimized domestic hooliganism by pushing the elastic boundaries of the undefined concept of the “public place” outward to encompass domestic areas once regarded as off-limits to hooligan prosec ution.42 A textbook, likewise, argued expansively for a novel conception of the “public place” as a moral rather than a spatial site or as any place where it was necessary to “observe the rules of socialist communalism.” This open-ended definition pried open the spatial straitjacket of the public paradigm and allowed “apartments and collective farm fields” to be considered public places that were open to the application of anti-hooligan laws.43 Similarly, criminologist N. F. Kuznetsova in her 1963 monograph on hooliganism declared that hooliganism must take place in public, but defined the public in an expansive way that effaced the public/private divide and made meaningless the limiting either/or logic of the public paradigm. She argued that: “The definition of pub lic encompasses multiple spheres of a Soviet citizen’s life and activity and a hooligan can disturb it wherever he is located, for example in a communal or a separate apartment, in a park, in a hospital, at work, in a stadium, or even in the forest.”44 Instead of being a private realm, a growing body of legal theory argued that the home was a public place that, in relation to hooliganism, was no different from a street, work site, park, or theater. By expansively redefining the notion of “public place,” these criminologists were able to argue for the existence of a public within the intimate domesticity of the apartment where the hooli gan could be found and to legitimize the application of hooliganism to the home. The ambiguous and entangled nature of the public place and its increasingly expansive redefinition in the spatial imagination of Soviet legal literature were key drivers of the domestication of hooliganism. The relocation of hooliganism to the home, however, was also fueled by
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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from-below petitioning and denunciation as well as mass media lobbying. Rather than being objects of the domestication drive, angry citizens and crusading journalists were active agents involved in the renegotiation of public places and police responsibilities. With their letters, they lobbied local police to criminalize domestic dysfunction under the elastic hooligan label and, in the process, helped move the hooligan’s habitat from the street corner to the kitchen table. Concerned citizens, beginning in the mid-1950s, began attacking the notion that contested concepts like “public” and “place” were essential prerequisites for prosecuting hooliganism. Arguing that anti-hooligan laws should be applied across spatial sites, a worker from the Khaba rovsk region asked the USSR Procuracy at a 1955 public meeting to “expand the circle of activities that can be considered as hooliganism so that any action that expresses clear disrespect for society can be defined as hooliganism wherever it occurs.”45 A railway worker, likewise, remarked to representatives of the USSR Procuracy that “it is impossible to tolerate such people as hooligans in our society and it shouldn’t matter whether they commit hooliganism at home or in any other place.”46 By demanding that hooliganism be decoupled from restrictive public parameters, concerned citizens opened up its application and expanded the domain of deviant behavior to cover domestic spaces and dysfunc tional families. Like their legal counterparts, local citizens called on the state to criminalize disorderly and disrespectful behavior in both public places and private realms. A man from Rostov, noting that the threat of apart ment hooliganism was not addressed by current laws, chided the state on its hypocritical differentiation between prosecutable public and non-prosecutable private forms of hooligan behavior. “If a person com mitted an undignified, hooligan, slanderous act in a public place, a policeman would immediately lead him off to the local precinct. The hooligan would then receive for his actions a punishment based on the law. But why is there no law or no article in the criminal code for apart ment hooliganism? Why do these hooligans remain outside the law and without punishment? Why? Who gave them the right to commit hooliganism?”47 The coupling of hooliganism to public places and strangers, according to many citizens, had transformed the apartment into a space in which troublemakers could act with impunity. “Apparently,” Krokodil com plained wryly in an article about apartment hooliganism “at home you can fight as much as you want.”48 The separation of the public place
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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from the apartment, these critics maintained, had created a double standard on how the law treated interior and exterior behavior. A woman, for example, wrote to the USSR Supreme Soviet: “You write about establishing criminal responsibility for appearing drunk on the street and in public places. But what about in the home? Is it permissible to act like a hooligan at home? A drunk thinks that when he is at home he is the master of everything. He can break the dishes. He can bust the furniture. He can fight with his family and with the neighbors.49 To lobby police and prosecutors to take action against what they saw as hooliganism in the home, letter writers shared their stories of victim ization at the hands of deviant apartment dwellers. A Muscovite, for example, told the USSR Supreme Soviet of his 62-year-old sister whose neighbor assaulted her. The neighbor, a Party member, broke the rules of the apartment by washing his dog in the common bathroom and allowing the dog to relieve itself in the communal apartment’s toilet. The elderly sister “could not agree with such disorder” and complained to the police. After the police intervened and removed the dog from the apartment, the Party member, “taking advantage of the fact that the apartment had only two rooms and there were no witnesses,” barged into the elderly sister’s room during the holiday of November 7, grabbed her by the throat, and struck her “with great force.” The man ended his letter by attacking the law’s insistence on the public and the presence of strangers in hooligan cases, trying to shame the authorities through an unfavorable comparison to the (imagined) state of affairs under the tsars. This is how a communist wished a non-Party member a happy holiday during the anniversary of the Great October Revolution. Now she, an old and sickly person, is forced to wander around all day long because she can’t even be in her own apartment because she fears she will be beaten again. Such a case is not solitary but is widespread. This is proved by the articles in the newspapers. Even in old, rotten Tsarist Russia it was considered a great shame to strike a woman and now it doesn’t mean a thing. You can do it as long as it’s done indoors and there are no witnesses around.50
Letter writers often appealed to the state’s interests in an attempt to attract intervention. Speaking to the state’s productivist ideology, a Moscow man claimed that an apartment hooligan deprived him of sleep, adversely affected his labor output, and ultimately undermined the targets of the planned economy. He also accused the hooligan of disrupting his children’s studies and wasting the resources that the state had invested in youth education.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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Why are these apartment hooligans harmful and dangerous? This is very clear. After I return home from work, I don’t have the right to rest and relax as I want in my own apartment. In the morning, I have to go to work tired, irritated, and with an aching head. And on the job, my work suffers. My children cannot prepare their lessons. My boy is in his fourth year at the institute but he cannot study well. He needs to be able to rest and to be able to work in order to become a useful and knowledgeable specialist for the Motherland. His training is costing the state more than forty thousand rubles. That apartment hooligan is hampering and sabot aging his progress. He is decreasing the knowledge of our children. This is happening to us right in the heart of the motherland and the state is indifferent. When a neighbor is walking and fiddling with his record player or watching TV at full volume, he is paral yzing all of family life. Isn’t this person a dangerous and harmful hooligan? Such apartment hooligans are hampering the Seven Year Plan.51
Many letters stressed the negative impact apartment hooligans had on their quality of life in an effort to impel state agents into action. A Moscow woman wrote to the USSR Supreme Court in 1956 complain ing that bad neighbors, whom she wanted prosecuted as hooligans, were “systematic ally poisoning the lives of their fellow residents with their dirty and petty tricks.”52 “How am I supposed to live under the same roof,” a woman remarked rhetorically to the authorities, “with a person who denies me the possibility of living and working normally?”53 Another woman wrote to the Supreme Soviet: “Comrades, you cannot imagine what happens in apartments. There are people who are com pletely cut off from the good life and held in their communal apart ments like hostages.”54 The concern over the safety and sanctity of the family and the home witnessed in many letters echoed the themes of the family melodrama that was becoming a dominant genre in the film and literature of the Khrushchev period.55 The style and narrative structure of many lobbyists’ letters share with family melodrama its Manichaean characters, its focus on domestic interiors, its aesthetic of suffering, its intermixing of the public and private, and its depiction of women and children as helpless objects of victimization awaiting outside male protection or rescue.56 Letter writers often used the melodramatic theme of the family in danger to appeal for public intervention into private affairs. A letter from a 7-year-old boy addressed to Khrushchev and read in the Lenin grad City Party Committee ( gorkom) attracted the special attention of paternalistic Party members with its grim aesthetic of family suffering. Following the melodramatic narrative of the imperiled family, the young boy played on Party obsessions, such as hygiene, sobriety, and
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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educ ational advancement, in a particul arly effective way: “Comrade Khrushchev! My father comes home drunk and uses bad words. He is dirty. Our home is a mess. It is not cleaned. We live in filth. We sleep with bedbugs. There is nothing to eat. He threatens that he will tear out mother’s eyes and kill her. I am afraid that mama will die. I cannot study because of him.”57 The Party committee immediately resolved to intervene in the family’s affair. Responding to the melodramatic tone and the boy’s narrative skill, the secretary of the Party committee remarked “what material this would make for a writer.” The boy’s skill at making his real-life situa tion read like fiction and the Party committee secretary’s ability to read literary elements into it point to the power of low-brow melodrama as a ready-made means through which victims and authorities sought to express and understand the social pathology of domestic violence. In the 1950s, the meaning of the public changed from the public paradigm’s limited list of “public” sites and spilled outward to envelope areas once seen as off-limits to anti-hooligan laws. Local law enforce ment, criminologists, concerned citizens, and crusading journalists (acting as the agents of this change) took advantage of the undefined ambiguity of the public. They used the opportunity that the public paradigm of hooliganism afforded them to enact their own interpreta tion of the status of spaces and deployed a sophisticated conception of public and private as innately entangled categories. And, through these related means, they gradua lly reimagined the status of the Soviet home in inclusive terms that recognized the existence of public dimensions even within this seemingly most intimate and private of areas. If advo cates of the public paradigm demanded an artificial and unworkable distinction between public and private spaces for the purposes of prose cuting hooliganism, then these local actors were increasingly denying the boundaries that supposedly separated these overlapping spatial categories and demanding that hooliganism be used to police correct conduct equally throughout the interwoven public/private matrix that marked the Soviet spatial world. As in the controversy over whether violence within personal rela tionships could be labeled as hooliganism, the USSR Supreme Court responded to the cacophony of local interpretations largely by staying silent over the dilemma of defining a public place—despite insistent pleas from lower courts for guidance on this issue.58 During the mid1950s, an interagency committee engaged in formulating anti-crime policies circulated a draft decree that proposed expanding the definition
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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of the public place in cases of hooliganism to include such communal spaces as multifamily apartments and dormitories. However, this draft decree was not enacted and the public paradigm remained intact.59 The Supreme Court seems to have been waiting for the release of the new republican criminal codes, hoping that the drafting committees would decide the issue for them.60 As the drafting committees’ delibera tions dragged on until the release of the RSFSR’s new code in 1960, local legal authorities were effectively left to decide for themselves how to instantiate the abstract and open-ended terms of the center’s legal stat utes on hooliganism. However, when the legal code was released, it did not end the controversy that swirled around the divergent local inter pretations of the ill-defined laws on hooliganism. Instead, it intensified the ambiguity and, hence, the interpretational freedom that the law’s elusiveness and elasticity gave to local actors to define hooliganism for themselves. Rather than defining a public place, the new RSFSR criminal code deleted all references to it and removed the key public paradigm require ment that hooliganism had to occur in a public place. Commentators on the new RSFSR criminal code were quick to regard this deletion as a signal that “any activity that is rudely disruptive of social order and expresses explicit disrespect for society regardless of the place of its commission” could now be prosecuted as hooliganism.61 By implying that what made hooliganism a crime was the offender’s motive rather than the place of occurrence, the decree appeared to signal a victory for local lobbyists and to legitimize the application of anti-hooligan laws to an unbounded domain of sites that included “homes, commu nal apartments, private apartments, and rooms.”62 This definitional shift reinforced the movement of hooliganism from outdoor areas to apartments. Commentaries on the new 1960 RSFSR criminal code were explicit that, as one put it, “the law is not limited by the places where hooligan ism is committed.”63 An article on the new RSFSR criminal code and its treatment of hooliganism noted: “In contrast with the [earlier] RSFSR Criminal Code . . . article 206 of the new code [hooliganism] does not contain an indication of the places where this act can be committed. By this means, it brings to an end the long quarrel about whether a rude disruption of social order accompanied by clear disrespect for society that takes place in homes, in communal apartments and in similar places is hooliganism. According to the new code, such acts . . . fall under hooliganism.”64
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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Yet despite the unequivocal conclusions of these legal commen taries, some local policemen, prosec utors, and judges continued to be wary of applying hooliganism to domestic spaces. Sharp-eyed observers would have noticed that neither the new criminal code nor subsequent Supreme Court rulings explicitly endorsed the once-forbidden concept of domestic hooliganism. They would also have noticed that sudebnye praktiki issued after 1960 took pains to limit the application of hooligan ism to the home only in situations where the crime happened in the presence of unrelated people or when it viol ated the peace and quiet of other residents.65 In the wake of the 1960 release of the RSFSR criminal code, local law enforcement did not collectively abandon one set of practices for another. As before, the mixed signals and silence of the center gave local judges, policemen, prosecutors, and citizens the ability to follow their own understandings of deviance. Some continued to stick to a public paradigm that had seemingly disappeared, while many others began (or continued) to apply an increasingly denuded and expansive under standing of hooliganism to an enlarged list of entangled public/private sites. As late as 1966, such an advocate of domesticating deviance as the head of the USSR Procuracy, R. A. Rudenko, was arguing that “viola tions of public order in apartments should be treated as hooliganism” and urging the USSR Supreme Court to do something about the domes tic hooliganism “that is worrying our citizens so much.” However, his pleas were countered by critics, such as Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court A. F. Gorkin, who countered that legitimizing domestic hooli ganism would “dilute the meaning of hooliganism” and flood the courts with trivial cases.66 As before, central action (by deleting the obstacles to deploying antihooligan laws to deal with domestic problems) and central inaction (by failing to endorse the contested concept of domestic hooliganism explicitly) created new questions and conflicts of opinion at the same time as it opened up new opportunities and avenues for local actors and authorities to understand and deploy hooliganism in their own way. As in 1953, a hole had been opened in the heart of the public paradigm and local law enforcers began to fill in the center’s silence with local understandings and applications built out of local interests, agendas, and pressures and out of new ideas concerning the expansive and en tangled essence of the Soviet public space. The stage was set for the 1960s surge in domestic hooliganism convictions as the last legal obstacles of the public paradigm were removed and as enduring ambiguity, new
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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ideas, and local pressures empowered willing local actors to apply hooli ganism to cases of domestic disorder throughout the various hybrid sites of the Soviet spatial world—despite the objections that some continued to hold about this controversial issue. The growing prevalence of domestic deviance in conviction statistics for hooliganism testifies to the fact that more local law enforcers agreed with Rudenko and his position that something had to be done about domestic deviance than with Gorkin’s concern for preserving hooligan- ism’s definitional purity. Starting from a low level in the mid-1950s, hooliganism in apartments began to be prosecuted in increasingly large numbers throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s.67 A USSR Supreme Court study found that 17 percent of hooliganism in 1957 was committed in apartments and dormitories, compared to 35 percent in streets, parks, and outdoor dancing pavilions (tantsploshchadki).68 However, disaggre gated figures show that apartment hooliganism occurred with greater regularity in several urban localities. In 1957, the Procuracy reported that 25 percent of the hooliganism committed in Moscow’s Krasnog vardiia and Bauman districts happened in apartments. Whereas in the city of Gor’kii and in the Iaroslavl’ region, the percentage of apartment hooliganism was 21 percent and 19 percent respectively.69 However, the amount of domestic hooliganism convictions grew rapidly throughout the second half of the 1950s. As a judge from the Moscow region city of Lublino noted in 1956: “Cases of domestic hooli ganism that used to be relatively rare are now growing quickly.”70 In some regions, such as the Bashkir ASSR, local authorities, even in the late 1950s, reported to the RSFSR Minister of Justice that “hooliganism is committed more in apartments than in public places.”71 In the 1960s, the number of domestic hooligan convictions rose yet more rapidly as the final planks of the public paradigm were removed. The city of Ivanovo, for instance, reported that in 1961, hooliganism had increased 100 percent and that “the majority of these acts occurred in the home during drinking sprees.”72 A 1963 report of the Saratov College of Lawyers similarly noted that more cases of hooliganism happened in apartments (404 cases) than on s treets (327 cases), dorms (152 cases), or enterprises (139 cases).73 Even in the showcase cities, domestic hooliganism was on the rise. In 1964, the USSR Supreme Court revealed that half of all Moscow’s cases of hooliganism were committed in apartments.74 The Tatar ASSR reported, in the same year, that “the majority of hooligan acts were committed in apartments.”75 The concept of domestic hooliganism had become so accepted and
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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mainstream by the beginning of the 1960s that the journal Agitator in an article on hooligans listed as one of their typical crimes that “they start scandalous arguments in communal apartments.”76 By 1966, a report from the Kalinin region found that 50 percent of petty hooliganism took place in apartments or places of resid ence.77 The RSFSR Supreme Court likewise reported in 1966 that the apartment was the main site of repeat petty hooligan offenses.78 Analyzing figures from the second half of 1966, noted criminologist A. A. Gertsenzon reported that 41 percent of hooliganism occurred in “living quarters,” almost double the amount that occurred in “streets and courtyards.” He also noted that every third act of malicious hooliganism took place in a communal apartment.79 Showing a similar trend toward defining domestic deviance as hooliganism, the Mordovian ASSR reported that over 60 percent of the hooliganism that took place in the republic in 1967 occurred in apartments.80 The increasing movement of hooligan ism from common spaces, such as the communal apartment kitchen, to private rooms and single-family apartments prompted a noticeably worried Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court to announce anxiously in a 1964 report that: “There occurs not only so-called domestic and apartment hooliganism but now room hooliganism (komnatoe khuliganstvo) has begun to appear. . . . It has reached the point that any infringement against a person committed in a separate and private room is tried as hooliganism.”81 Through highlighting the essentially interwoven nature of the public and the private in the Soviet imagination, the growth in prosecutions for domestic hooliganism not only challenged the idea that domestic spaces were cleanly separable from public places, it also collapsed the distinction between private affairs and public concerns. As the domes tication of hooliganism injected the public into realms and relationships some considered private, it opened a space for some local legal workers and lobbyists to reconceptualize private matters, such as domestic violence, and turn them into public concerns prosecutable under an expansive interpretation of hooliganism. Through their local prosecutory practices, these local police, prosecutors, judges, and activist citizens made abusive husbands and nasty neighbors into hooligans and trans formed deviance by giving it a legitimate domestic face. What, in 1955, had been a private matter that stayed “behind closed doors” was, by 1964, a public concern that was being tried openly as a crime against the social order of the Soviet Union.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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Private Matters or Public Crimes? Despite the demand of many victims that they use anti-hooligan laws to control domestic disorder, many police and court organs in the early 1950s were reluctant to handle personal and, especially, family relation ships under the category of criminal deviance. Rather than using criminal law to intervene in the world of intimate affairs, authorities down played domestic abuse and recommended informal methods of conflict resolution in cases of family misbehavior. A soldier, writing to the USSR Supreme Soviet, remarked about law enforcement’s unwillingness to wade into domestic disturbances: “Experience shows that in such cases the police or courts refuse in general to investigate these cases on the grounds that these are family matters and that families can work them out themselves.”82 Labeling domestic violence and abuse as “family matters,” local policemen often refused to arrest domestic deviants and belittled their victims. Concerned about a neighbor who was unemployed, drank too much, and hung around with suspicious people, a railroad worker told Procuracy representatives at a public meeting about the difficulty of getting the police involved in domestic disturbances. “I informed the police about my neighbor’s activities. But, they only laughed at me and said that if I wanted something done I had to bring them the hooligan myself.”83 The indifferent, incompetent, and insensitive policeman, un concerned about the domestic abuse and crime around him, was not only the subject of citizen anger; he was also the subject of social satire, as shown by a 1956 Krokodil cartoon in which a woman complains to a policeman that her neighbor is on a “hooligan rampage” and is threat ening to beat her. “When he kills you,” the policeman responds, “then come and see me.” The cartoon’s title (“It Often Happens that Way”) highlighted the fact that such a response was anything but rare.84 According to critics, local law enforcers’ refusal to arrest and try family deviants as hooligans created an atmosphere of impunity around the issue of family violence. Confident that they were immune from criminal prosecution, domestic hooligans were emboldened by this hands-off attitude and continued or escalated their abusive behavior. “I am not afraid of anybody,” an apartment hooligan told the neighbor who threatened to turn him in to the police. “Nobody will dare do anything to me.”85 Sometimes, this could lead to tragic consequences, as in the case of Sergei—a man who reportedly “drank systematically,
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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insulted his family, threatened to kill his wife, and deprived his neigh bors of peace and quiet.” At first, the neighbors turned to the police for help. When no help was forthcoming, the neighbors turned to Sergei’s factory director for help. The director passed the case on to the comrades’ court and failed to follow up on it. After the comrades’ court did nothing, Sergei brutally murdered his wife on New Year’s Day 1959 by cutting off her head.86 Often when the police did intervene in cases of spousal abuse, they preferred, much to the dislike of the victim, not to use custodial punish ments and crimin al categories to address the problem. In some in stances, the police extracted abusive husbands from the apartment, took them to the station to sober up, and then released them with a warning and a pledge to improve their behavior. A battered wife from Moscow wrote of how the police responded to the “scandal” her alco holic husband created one night in their communal apartment: “They [the police] took away my husband. At the station they had him promise that this would not happen again. They asked me to write a statement to the local director of the police. I thought that now they would finally help me. Instead, I saw that in the morning they released my husband scot-free. I went to the police station to make an inquiry and they laughed at me quite merrily. I was sobbing and they laughed.87 Another frustrated woman complained to the USSR Supreme Soviet about the methods, or lack thereof, that the police used in her case of domestic battery. She described her usual nighttime routine when her husband drank: “Often at midnight or at 2 AM or 3 AM I have to go and summon the police or leave the house for the entire night. The police arrive. They take him away. But at 6 AM they free him and the case is closed. It doesn’t matter what I do. The police won’t do anything.”88 When not passed off as family matters, police and prosec utors often argued that minor cases of assault, defam ation (kleveta), and insults between apartment residents and family members were cases of private complaint (dela chastnogo obvineniia) rather than criminal cases of hooli ganism. Such cases were initiated only after the victim filed a complaint and could be terminated by reconciliation between the parties.89 As the tendency to treat family violence as cases of personal complaint makes clear, the proponents of domesticating deviance had to struggle against larger social attitudes that refused to see spousal abuse and domestic violence as ordinary crimes. Many Russian citizens (both now and then) would have agreed with the Kuibyshev region man who, while on trial
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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for malicious hooliganism for the “systematic” abuse of his wife “in the presence of other people’s children,” declared: “I do not need a lawyer. I don’t need to defend myself. What kind of crime is it to beat a wife? She is my wife after all and we are one family.”90 Therefore, in addition to butting heads with indifferent policemen, activists for the domestication of deviance also had to convince skeptics that domestic deviance was indeed a crime in the first place. After witnessing the case in which an abusive husband received a light non custodial punishment for beating his wife, a man felt compelled to write and remind the USSR Supreme Soviet that “we really do think it is a crime to beat one’s wife.”91 By citing cases of egregious domestic violence and arguing for their inclusion under an expansive understanding of criminal deviance, such advocates sought to collapse the distinction between social disorder and domestic disorder by labeling both as equally valid instances of hooliganism. Telling the story of a drunk who sadistically “mocked his sick wife” by “putting vomit and rubbish in her food and by forcing her to wash his feet and then drink the filthy water,” a local judge pressured his colleagues to rethink their restricted vision of hooliganism by asking rhetorically in the pages of a leading Soviet legal journal: “Isn’t this hooliganism?”92 Prop on ents of dom est ic ati ng dev ia nce a rgued that “apartm ent hooligans are no less dangerous than the hooligan on the street.”93 Hooliganism in the home, they maintained, often had significant spill over effects that transformed private interpersonal scandals into legiti mate issues of public concern and police intervention. Moreover, critics of the “hands off” approach to the pathologies of the private world argued that such a stance rested on a discredited bourgeois ideology of privacy and a sharp separation of domestic and public spheres that were at odds with both socialist collectivism and the entangled nature of the Soviet public and private. “The behavior of a person in society cannot contradict his behavior in everyday life (byt), at home, and in his relationship with individual persons,” a local judge argued in Sovetskaia iustitsiia. “In Soviet society there is not and must not be any bourgeois separation of morality into public and private.”94 Such advocates of applying anti-hooligan laws to the domestic would have agreed whole heartedly with the opinion of a man who wrote to the USSR Supreme Soviet criticizing “those who defend the rotten, vulgar, and pettybourgeois (meshanskaia) belief that a family should not air its dirty linen in public (sor iz izby ne vynosit’). . . . It is precisely these acts which must
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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be brought out of the house and the scoundrels and vulgarians dragged to the court. . . . We will never succeed in improving public order if we don’t devote the necessary attention to this.”95 Central to the argument of those who sought to criminalize private matters was the idea that the family was an integral part of Soviet society, rather than a separate space of domestic autonomy. Like the spatial sites of public and private, family and society existed in the imagination of these advocates as entangled and interwoven entities that could not be separated and distinguished. Therefore, the laws that governed social interaction should also regulate relations within the space of the family. Arguing that the family was an integral and constitu tive part of the Soviet social world, the Kuibyshev regional court sent a letter to the deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Court demanding that anti-hooligan laws be freed to operate in family settings and accusing the court of following a double standard in relation to streetbased and home-based hooliganism.
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When we consider legislation regarding marriage and the family, we cor rectly proceed from the position that the family is the fundamental building block of our society, in which the interests of individual citiz ens and the state are closely connected. But when we consider cases of improper conduct that take place within the family, in particular cases of hooliganism, then suddenly this family is no longer considered the building block of our society. Rude violations of family peace and intentional acts that insult or humiliate family members, relatives, or friends should be considered as article 206 (hooliganism). And this should not depend on whether the neighbors were disturbed or whether any strangers were present.96
The debate over domestic hooliganism gained particul ar strength and momentum from the mid-1950s because it paralleled other social discourses that sought to redefine the borderline between the personal and the public. In particular, it echoed a larger moral discourse that sought to configure private domestic matters in public terms and to look for public help to deal with personal problems—the discourse on communist morality. This Khrushchev-era morality discourse sought to involve the collective in regulating the individual’s life in both public areas and private spheres. The communist morality discourse spoke through press articles that condemned not only adulterers and child abusers but also their coworkers and neighbors who failed to intervene in the behavior of their neighbors and coworkers based on the false belief that it was “none of their business.” By eroding the boundaries
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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that separated private matters from public concerns, new ideas on communist morality helped transform domestic hooliganism from a personal problem to a public crime. Communist morality changed family matters from nobody’s business to all of society’s business and, in the process, helped make domestic deviance into a valid object of public intervention and criminal prosec ution.97 The combination of legal change, grassroots lobbying, and the regime’s moral campaigning opened a window for local actors to shift the way hooliganism was understood and applied in relation to the intimate and the interpersonal. It worked. In 1962, it was reported that 43 percent of the people who were convicted of hooliganism in the city of Irkutsk committed their crime against a family member. In many other regions, the percentage of convicted hooligan acts that were directed against family members ranged from 33 to 40 percent.98 The RSFSR Supreme Court reported in 1966 that over 40 percent of those convicted of petty hooliganism had been detained for acts against their famil ies.99 In 1967, the Mordovian ASSR reported that family members were the typic al victims of local hooligans.100 The expansion of the definition of hooliganism to encompass intimate as well as anonymous relationships changed hooliganism’s typical victim and perpetrator. Rather than a young street tough, the typical hooligan was a family man. The hooligan’s primary victim was not a stranger, but his wife, his child, his neighbor, his friend, or his relative. Gertsenzon’s figures show, for example, that 66 percent of hooligans knew their victims, and that they victimized their wives more than any other category grouping.101 The dissident Andrei Amalrik also esti mated that half of the people convicted for hooliganism were sentenced, not for disruptive behavior in public sites, but for spousal abuse.102 Likewise, the writer Iurii Dombrovskii noted that among the petty hooligans with whom he was imprisoned: “Almost all the crimes . . . are identical: a quarrel (ssora) with the neighbor, a quarrel with the wife, apartm ent squabb les (skolki ).” 103 Ins tead of being an anony m ous stranger on the street, hooligans were the people who their victims lived, interacted, and slept with on a daily basis. The growth of domestic hooliganism convictions in the mid-1960s grew out of a combination of local prosecution practices, from-below pressure, definitional change, and the regime’s discourse on socialist morality. But, it also stemmed from the post-Stalinist elite’s willingness in the late 1950s and 1960s to project state power into disordered domestic sites. The question of how people behaved in their homes
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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became increasingly important for state officials as the rise of the single-family apartment revolutionized the ordinary Soviet citizen’s sense of privacy.104 Instead of being a space of relaxation and cultured leisure, officials noted that the separate apartment was, in some instances, a prominent space of unregulated vice and victimization. Having (in their minds) experienced some success in ridding Soviet streets of crime, these officials argued that the public (obshchestvennost’) and the police should turn their attention to the final frontier of crime and human corruption: the disordered home. After noting that the domestic sphere was the place where “hooliganism and other survivals of the past flourish most freely,” L. F. Il’ichev, the Secretary of the Central Committee’s Department of Ideology, argued at a June 1963 Central Committee Plenum: “it is time to expand the wide front for the struggle to strengthen and develop communist norms in domestic life and to run a fresh breeze into its back alleys.”105 The First Secretary of the Kuibyshev Regional Party Committee, A. M. Tokarev, was even more explicit in insisting that the domestic should be open to public policing, declaring at the same Plenum: “Such vices as drunkenness, hooliganism, and religious obscurantism occur most of all in the family. Therefore, it is necessary to attack these vices there in the home.”106 As Soviet home life relocated to the separate apart ment, these state officials wanted to end the double standard that con demned bad behavior in public spaces but condoned it in private. By disciplining citizens in the home as well as in the workplace, they wanted to perfect Soviet byt and get rid of the vices that threatened to spoil life and labor in the workers’ paradise. As the state became increasingly interested in projecting its power into the privatized domain of single-family life, the top-down interests of officials and the from-below demands of local victims coincided and resulted in the takeoff of domestic hooliganism in the 1960s. Empowered by state anti-crime policy, battered wives, police, prosecutors, and judges used the criminal label of hooliganism to draw public agencies into private quarrels. In the process, they shifted hooliganism from a crime that during the Stalin period had served primarily as a means to enforce correct public conduct into a way to criminalize domestic spaces and abusive family relations once considered as off-limits. By arguing that spousal battery was everyone’s business rather than nobody’s business, abused wives and ambitious officials challenged prevailing orthodoxies on the public/private divide and underlined the increas ingly problematic nature of the distinction that separated public matters from private affairs.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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The relocation of hooliganism to the home not only created a new meaning for hooliganism in the post-Stalin world, it also created a new vision of public responsibility that was more intrusive and expansive than the Stalinist one it replaced. Instead of trying to keep the state out of their private lives, many citizens invited it in and asked it to police the disorder it found there. In this way, domestic hooliganism followed a Khrushchev-era tendency for extending public account ability to private acts and opening the intimacies of the private world to the scrutiny of the public gaze.107 One family, for example, requested that the Supreme Soviet create a special group of public inspectors who would “systematically visit residents’ apartments . . . in order to observe the norms of behavior of apartment residents and, in case of necessity, to spend the night in order to see and evaluate the behavior of people.” 108 Many of these letter writers wanted to expand the Khrushchev-era policy of using public (obshchestvennyi ) agencies (such as the comrades’ courts and the druzhina) to police the private relation ships of the everyday.109 A worker in Moscow’s Polytechnical Museum, for instance, called for local comrades’ courts to make a periodic tour of all the apartments to see “how people live.”110 Such letter writers, by crafting a more intrusive function for state and public agencies in the policing and surveillance of the domestic everyday, helped to undermine the status quo separat ion of private matters from public concerns. At heart, these citizens denied that private life was a purely personal matter. As a man from the Udmurt ASSR wrote to the USSR Supreme Soviet: “Soviet domestic life (byt), the Soviet family, these are not the private matters of individual citizens or families. These are the direct duty of public organizations.”111 In this way, the category of the domestic hooligan blurred the lines between the personal and the public. As one letter writer advised the USSR Supreme Soviet: “It is time to remember the famous position of Lenin that in our Soviet socialist society there is nothing private (chastnyi ) and therefore it is necessary to use state means in the fight against all types of crime, including crimes in apart ments: crimes which we workers think are neither petty nor private.”112 Just as it had forced jurists and citizens to rethink the public and private as spatial categories by calling into question where the public sphere ended and private space began, domestic hooliganism challenged pre vailing conceptions concerning personal privacy and public account ability. By transforming the subject of how one treated family and friends in the home from nobody’s business to all of society’s business, it pushed the application of hooliganism outward and expanded the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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state’s punitive reach deeper down into the everyday world of home and hearth.
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Disciplining the Domestic Hooligan Although the label of hooliganism was now being applied to acts of both intimate and anonymous violence, significant asymmetries existed between the judicial treatment of domestic and public hooligans. Sen tences were harsher for the latter rather than the former. People’s Judge K. Bel’skii, for instance, bemoaned the fact that apartment hooligans received lighter sentences than hooligans committing crimes in other places, served their sentences in less-severe “general regime” colonies, and were usually paroled after serving only half of their sentence.113 Just as they had argued for collapsing the distinction between public and private misbehavior, concerned citizens also argued for erasing sentencing differentials by increasing the punishments of domestic hooligans. The chairman of a comrades’ court in Moscow suggested to the Supreme Soviet that apartment hooligans be sentenced to hard physical labor or to fines of two to three hundred rubles.114 Other activ ists and outraged citizens argued for the physical extraction and separa tion of the hooligan from Soviet society. An oil worker in the Tatar ASSR wrote that hooligans who commit their actions in s treets, public places, and in apartments should be sentenced to “twenty-five years penal servitude (katorga) with confiscation of all property.”115 In order that “honest people will have a normal life,” an anonymous letter sug gested that after two or three convictions, apartment hooligans should be exiled to the Far North “without possibility of return.”116 Another irate citizen recommended that, in addition, the relatives of convicted apartment hooligans “should be subject to exile in the far-off places of the USSR” as well.117 A man from Moscow, writing to the Supreme Soviet in 1955, argued that apartment hooligans should receive the ultimate punishment for the harm that they inflict on their neighbors. Deploying pseudomedic al terminology to give his “modest proposal” scientific legitimacy, the man stated: Apartment hooliganism damages the health greatly. The nervous system is impaired and shaken. The organism is overcome by vario us illnesses and, in the end, systematic tyranny leads to invalidity. They don’t allow a person to rest in his own bed. They won’t let you close your eyes and go to sleep. This
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
Private Matters or Public Crimes?
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rings the sick person closer to death. . . . An apartment hooligan is an evil b person and a murderer. Here in the Soviet Union there is a law that for inten tional murder the death penalty is given. I thank the government for this law. I ask you, couldn’t we apply this law to apartment hooligans, who, by their actions, intentionally and systematically murder people within the walls of their home and shorten the lives of people who are not guilty of anything?118
The punishment of domestic hooliganism was often complicated in cases of spousal abuse. Wives often wanted their husbands to be punished. But few wanted to have their husbands incarcerated and thereby to lose the financial support of the family’s main wage earner. For example, a prosecutor from the Astrakhan region wrote to the jour nal Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost’ that abused wives rarely seek legal redress against their abusive husbands “not only to preserve the family, but because the court’s verdict would punish them again, materially, by depriving the family of a breadwinner.”119 Many women were, therefore, reluctant to press for the prosecution of their abusive spouses. A letter writer told the Supreme Soviet of the double bind battered wives faced in using the courts against their abusers: “Wives usually endure this abuse for a long time but when they lose patience then they come and request: ‘Put him in jail for twenty four hours.’ Then you explain that such a measure of punishment does not exist and that their husband can only be sent to prison for an extended period. Some wives agree to this and off he goes to prison. The majority, however, ask that you call instead and give him a warning or they come back after a few days and ask you to drop the case.”120 The Vologda College of Lawyers similarly complained that battered wives “put the guilt solely or partially on themselves, shower their torturer-husbands with pity for some reason and ask the court to l ighten the punishment or not to deprive the hus band of his freedom, expressing their full faith in his reformability.”121 As such cases illustrated, many battered wives failed to report cases of abuse or, to maintain family finances, convinced law enforcement officials not to jail their abusive husbands. This makes the rise in the number of abuse cases prosecuted as hooliganism during this period even more remarkable given the incentives many wives faced not to report cases of abuse. Nonetheless, despite the physical and economic risks associated with informing on their abuser, these victims still lobbied the state to get involved in their intimate domestic lives and, by doing so, undermined any attempt to keep private acts from being tried and policed as public concerns.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
94
Private Matters or Public Crimes?
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Home Is Where the Hooligan Is The prevalent image of the street hooligan in journals such as Krokodil obscured the domestic origins of a great deal of hooligan activity and misrepresented hooliganism’s perpetrators and victims. It taught Soviet citizens to fear hooliganism from strange men on the streets, rather than from the husbands and male relatives who shared their homes. In the late 1950s and 1960s, hooliganism shifted from the street corner to the kitchen table, and the typical hooligan transformed from the stranger in the street to the family member sitting at one’s side. The relocation of hooliganism to the home gave policemen, judges, and local prosecutors the opportunity to debate the problematic public/ private dichotomy and its relevance or irrelevance to the entangled spatial and relational environment of Soviet socialism. Because of hooliganism’s link to the ambiguous concept of the “public place,” hooli gan cases provided ideal grounds for rethinking what the public meant in Soviet society and for arguing about where its borders ought to lie. Likewise, cases of domestic hooliganism opened a space to debate prevailing distinctions between private matters and public concerns. By applying the contested categ ory of hooliganism to new contexts and concerns, local lobbyists, police, prosecutors, and judges created new meanings for it that were expansive and intrusive. Taking advantage of the ambiguity of the public place, local authorities extended the law’s meaning to include communal and private apartments. Through labeling domestic deviants like abusive husbands as hooligans, the proponents of criminalizing domestic dysfunction legitimized the public policing of the home and obscured the problematic distinction between private matters and public concerns. In a more gene ral way, the dom est ic at ion of hool ig ani sm gave criminologists a new way of thinking about the orig ins of crime. It iden tified the family home as the site where violence and victimization were practiced and taught to the next generation. Previously, criminologists argued that because class exploitation did not exist in the Soviet Union, there was no internal reason for crime except “survivals of capitalism.” Far from being only a safe haven from social instability, the Soviet family could also serve as a source of disorder, dysfunction, and crime—as the increasing rate of domestic hooligan convictions in the 1950s and 1960s demonstrated.122 The creation and growing conviction of domestic deviants saw the movement of hooliganism out of traditional spatial frameworks and
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
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95
into new sites. This process of displacing deviance onto new contexts and concerns can also be seen in regard to the new Khrushchev-era phenomenon of radio hooliganism. Amateur unofficial radio broad casts, some with ranges of thousands of miles, beamed modern music, off-color jokes, and, occasionally, anti-Soviet propaganda to a wide range of Soviet citizens in the 1950s and 1960s. As the state seized radio frequencies for its own use and decided to clamp down on this inde pendent medium of communication, amateur radio broadcasters found themselves increasingly criminalized and crowded out of the ether. In their efforts to find an appropriate criminal category for this offense, the state fell back on the convenient hooligan catchall. In July 1963, the USSR Supreme Court decreed that unauthorized radio broadcasting would be punished as hooliganism.123 Like the creation of domestic deviance during the same period, the creation of radio hooliganism shows the emancipation of deviance during the Khrushchev period from its Stalin-era spatial straitjacket and its novel application to an un likely cast of actors and areas. Lastly, the domestication of hooliganism during the Khrushchev period tells us something about change in the Soviet Union. Instead of coming from big-shot bureaucrats, the understanding and application of hooliganism was transformed by the practices of policemen, prosecu tors, and judges scattered across the Soviet Union. Empowered by the anti-hooligan campaign and freed by the center’s inability to take a clear and consistent position on major policy questions, these legal workers, pressured by petitioning citizens and victims, mapped hooli ganism onto the home. Hooliganism’s new meaning and mission did not come suddenly from above in the form of a central decree or direc tive; it was created gradua lly through the local and unorthodox map ping practices of these actors, through their daily routine of applying ambiguous criminal categories to the realities of concrete cases, and through their sometimes enthusiastic and sometimes reluctant responses to persistent citizen complaints.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:33:09.
3 Making Hooliganism on a Mass Scale
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The Campaign against Petty Hooliganism Khrushchev’s Thaw is often presented as a period of increased experi mentation and official toleration. In many ways, this interpretation is undeniably true, especially in the cultural sphere. Khrushchev may have aimed his attack on the Stalinist cult of personality to discredit his remaining rivals and accelerate his rise to political power. But, his critique also generated significant collateral damage by challenging and inadvertently discrediting entrenched Stalin-era orthodoxies and authority figures in a variety of fields outside of elite politics.1 In the atmosphere of excitement, anxiety, and ideological uncertainty that emerged, spaces opened for ambitious actors to challenge their shellshocked elders and to experiment with and argue about alternatives to established modes of Stalinist being, believing, and behaving. Taking ad vantage of the mixed messages and frustrating silences of Khrushchev’s stop-and-go de-Stalinization, artists rediscovered and revived the formerly repressed movements of the avant-garde from the New Eco nomic Policy era, from constructivism and suprematism to Meyerhold’s biomechanics. Using the new openness of the era of peaceful coexistence, they began to advocate and experiment with the forbidden fruits of Western modernism, from atonality and nonrepresentational abstrac tion to the theater of the absurd. Unofficial subcultures and performance sites, featuring jazz musicians and beat poets, proliferated and spread 96
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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97
t hrough a rapidly urbanizing post-Stalinist society hungry for the escapism, entertainment, and commodities of Western consumerism and pop culture.2 A new cultural environment of hesitant pluralism and highly limited autonomy arose as Soviet citizens argued out the meanings of a Thaw whose limits official statements often left undefined and amorphous.3 However, the Thaw was more than a time of increased official toler ance and relative cultural experimentation. It was also a time of increas ing official intolerance and intensified social discipline during which a utopian state accelerated its efforts to civilize Soviet society (riddled in the eyes of state actors by continued capitalist survivals and alien ideals) around a uniform code of communist morality.4 In addition to cautious liberal policies that promised limited cultural pluralism and socialist legality, the de-Stalinizing state was also actively engaged in parallel illiberal projects during the mid- to late 1950s that entailed identifying the moral “others” who existed outside its civilizing mission and subjecting these stigmatized social groups to forms of increased police persecution and reformative reeducation that often violated the regime’s new legitimizing rhetoric of socialist legality. For young artists, students, and intellectuals chafing under the stale orthodoxies and authorities left over from the Stalin era, the second half of the 1950s was (in retrospect if not in reality) a golden age of relative artistic freedom and intellectual rebirth. For those individuals who were unlucky enough to be labeled “paras ites,” “gypsies,” or “petty hooligans,” the same period was an era marked by an emphasis on increased repres sion, arbitrary state power, and unrestrained policing that, seemingly, had little to do with socialist legality or permissive pluralism. Coexisting with liberal Thaw-era policies, therefore, was an illiberal exercise in repressing moral deviants and state-defined undesirables. And at the heart of this illiberal project was a campaign against petty hooliganism that seemed to contradict many of the policies associated with the de-Stalinizing society of the Khrushchev reforms. If deStalinization promised to roll back the discredited policies of the dead dictator, the petty hooligan campaign signaled a partial revival of Stalin ist policing tactics and their extension to previously unpunished minor offenses. If de-Stalinization promised a society that respected Leninist norms of socialist legality, the petty hooligan campaign instead threw legal oversight and protections overboard in the name of expanding and accelerating a punishment process from which no deviant, no matter how seemingly insignificant, was supposed to escape.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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Making Hooliganism on a Mass Scale
By empowering them to go after minor forms of misbehavior, the petty hooligan decree gave policemen a powerful and flexible new weapon in the Soviet state’s ongoing battle to enforce and instill good behavior in its human subjects. For besides being a crime-fighting tool, the petty hooligan campaign also served as a tool for sculpting a more civilized social body out of the rough manners and mores of a working class that the Party-state loved more in theory than reality. Helping to socially engineer the new Soviet man, the petty hooligan categ ory acted as a flexible catchall for disciplining the everyday indecencies of post-Stalinist society. It also promised to bring order to urban spaces destabilized by decades of rapid industrialization, rural in-migration, and the noxious mix of mobile men, simple peasants, and social dis order that these processes unleashed on the showcase world of the socialist city. In addition, such social cleansing would begin in the crucial months before the 1957 World Youth Festival, when the eyes of the world would be focused on a Moscow temporarily scrubbed (hope fully) of its physical and human imperfections and turned into a suit able platform for triumphant propaganda.5 Through this ambitious campaign, the post-Stalinist state would, its officials believed, bring into being a society populated by polite, productive, and politically literate citizens and purged of the quality of life crimes that threatened to spoil the rising living standards of the 1950s. Through the petty hooligan campaign, the Party-state would show that constructing communism and winning the Cold War were about more than maximizing pig iron production and acquiring more weapons systems. It was also about overtaking the dissolute and de generate world of Western capitalism in the production of cultured citizens—citizens whose true mark of civilizational superiority would reside in their strict and unswerving embodiment of communist moral ity. By means of the petty hooligan decree, the Khrushchev regime would get its citizens to stop cursing, insulting, and pestering each other and, in the process, build the impeccably well-behaved and sober socialist society of their dreams.
A More Humane Anti-Hooligan Campaign? The decree on petty hooliganism was one of the many measures that bodies from the Supreme Soviet to the Presidium had drafted in the mid-1950s to deal with the perceived problem of rising post-Stalinist social disorder and the moral panic that it generated among both state
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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99
a gents and ordinary citizens.6 To fight a seemingly out-of-control epidemic of urban deviancy, the decree decided to target the most minor and mainstream of indecent and uncultured behaviors, such as spitting, swearing, shouting, or pestering other people. These common everyday acts of indecency would be labeled under a new category of hooligan behavior and subject to new forms of custodial correction. By categ orizing mass forms of minor misbehavior as petty hooligan ism, the decree on petty hooliganism effectively decriminalized the least serious forms of hooliganism by making them into a new and expansive type of administrative offense. The decree also reduced the sentence imposed on the most minor deviants through offering an alternative to the harsh one-year prison sentence found in the criminal codes for the slightest types of simple hooliganism. Replacing longer term incarceration with short prison stays, the decree created a new three- to fifteen-day period of administrative detention for petty hooli gans, which was to be spent apart from the ordinary crimin al popula tion and in the daily performance of mandatory physical labor.7 Un burdened with a criminal record and with his job held for him during his detention, the petty hooligan would emerge from his short prison stay as a chastened, reformed, and redeemed member of the social collec tive who had, hopefully, learned the lesson of his minor misconduct. Through the petty hooligan decree, the Soviet regime decided to crack down on the hooligan problem not by giving a small number of people heavy prison sentences, but by giving a large number of people light ones. By decreasing punishments rather than increasing them, the architects of the petty hooligan campaign took a counterintuitive ap proach to rising crime rates and reversed their former approach to antihooligan campaigning. In the mid-1930s, the state had created a more serious form of deviance (malicious hooliganism) and heavier prison terms (three to five years) to combat dangerous forms of hooliganism involving physical assaults and knife fighting.8 With the passage of the petty hooligan decree, they did the opposite. They created a less serious form of hooliganism and a less serious form of hooligan punishment to combat this multivalent criminal category’s most minor and mundane manifestations. In the months following the RSFSR’s December 19, 1956, decree, all the union republics passed similar petty hooligan legislation.9 Before the creation of the petty hooligan category, minor a nti-social offenses were often allowed to slide through the criminal justice system unpunished because local police, prosecutors, and judges lacked lenient
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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100
Making Hooliganism on a Mass Scale
sentencing options under the current hooligan category or were unwill ing to devote scarce investigative and judicial resources to nonserious offenses.10 Prior to petty hooliganism, local police officers, operating under a July 1940 Sovnarkom decree, could impose twenty-five ruble spot fines for “hooligan acts” that were not punishable under the existing criminal categ ory. Arguing that they “did not exercise the necessary in fluence on offenders,” officials in the Khrushchev-era law enforcement bureaucracy questioned the effic acy of such small fines in ending minor forms of everyday deviancy. Concerned over the rising tide of hooligan convictions, they created the petty hooligan program as a suitable solu tion to the Soviet Union’s persistent problem with bad behavior.11 Ending the atmosphere of impunity around minor misbehavior was important because unpunished misdemeanors were, in the minds of many jurists, one of the root causes of major crime.12 “It is well known,” the criminologist N. F. Kuznetsova noted, “that the vast majority of crimes begin with simple indiscipline, with seemingly harmless and in offensive immoral behaviors.”13 Unpunished minor offenders, they argued, were emboldened to try more serious offenses, slid farther down the slippery slope of deviancy, and developed into tomorrow’s hardened criminals. As what some commentators called the common “source” of more serious offenses, hooliganism was imagined as a gate way crime that, in the words of A. A. Kruglov, the General Prosecutor of the Russian Republic, “frequently leads to the most serious and dangerous criminal acts.”14 By allowing police and judges to go after the little indecencies of daily life, the petty hooligan decree allowed them to intervene early in the deviant career of offenders and stop the seemingly small misdeeds from which serious disturbances and crimi nality later arose.15 Minor misbehavior not only developed into future criminality, it also spoiled the daily lives of Soviet citizens who wanted to work and relax in an environment of civilized urbanity. In the 1950s, the Soviet command economy and Khrushchev’s more consumer-friendly regime were lifting living standards for the average Ivan and raising popular expectations for increased material and cultural improvements.16 In an environment of increased expectations and Cold War competition, the everyday deviance that petty hooliganism symbolized threatened to frustrate popular hopes for progress and draw unwelcome attention to the ugly underside that stubbornly and inexplicably persisted in socialist society. Decades before inner-city America embraced “broken windows”
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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policing tactics, the Soviet Union (through the petty hooligan program) embarked on a similar policing experiment that sought to lift living standards and reduce serious crime by concentrating on and correcting the seemingly minor quality-of-life offenses that helped cause it.17 The decree on petty hooliganism’s focus on decriminalization, sentence reduction, and on breaking the slippery slope that linked hooli ganism to hard crime seemed to herald the introduction of a kinder and gentler system of upholding social order indebted to the new soft-line tactics of Khrushchev’s Thaw. Emphasizing the key soft-line word the reformist regime used to differentiate itself from the Stalinist past and the capitalist West, the architects of the petty hooligan decree stressed its “humane” ( gumannyi ) nature.18 Scholars of Soviet law have, like wise, interpreted the petty hooligan decree as a liberalizing reform of the Thaw period: one in a series of mid-1950s liberalization measures in the legal sphere that included reducing punishments for petty theft of state and public property (1955) and decriminalizing notorious Stalin-era laws against abortion (1955) and leaving one’s work without permission (1956).19 However, this reading obscures the fact that the petty hooligan degree was a partial revival rather than a complete rejection of previous Stalin ist anti-hooligan policies and policing tactics. Rather than marking a clean break with the Stalinist past, the petty hooligan campaign con tinued many of the methods of the last major anti-hooligan effort in 1940 and expanded their application. The police in the 1940 anti-hooligan campaign used streamlined procedures designed to fast-track the hooli gan punishment process. Judges tried arrested hooligans under an accelerated process and tight timeline, using special quarters outside the normal court chamber for the immediate hearing and sentencing of hooligan cases.20 As we shall see, the petty hooligan campaign used similar streamlined and fast-track processes to bypass conventional and time-consuming regular police and judicial routines. The petty hooligan campaign also heard petty hooligan cases outside of the court room and without access to prosecutorial oversight or legal safeguards. As moral panic accelerated in the mid-1950s, some local law en forcers demanded that the state respond to perceived increases in social disorder by resurrecting the institutions and procedures of the 1940 anti-hooligan campaign.21 Therefore, the petty hooligan campaign was not so much a reform or repudiation of discredited Stalinist antideviancy tactics; instead, it was a return to fast-tracked, unregulated,
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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Making Hooliganism on a Mass Scale
and streamlined 1940 Stalinist methods writ large and applied to the more expansive and more densely populated plane of ordinary, every day deviancy. For its framers, the petty hooligan program was about much more than simple sentence reduction. It was also about erecting a society of all-compassing intolerance in which every appearance of anti-social behavior would be identified and addressed quickly using streamlined punishment processes and conveniently expansive categories of devi ance that encompassed the entire possible range of wrong-doing. By giving law enforcement the means to go after all forms of misbehavior, including the most seemingly insignificant, the petty hooligan decree was supposed, as a senior consultant for the RSFSR Ministry of Justice wrote in a popular journal, “to organize the struggle against hooligan ism in such a way that not one hooligan act remains hidden and not one hooligan is able to evade punishment.”22 Through creating such a society of all-encompassing intolerance toward every imaginable type of deviancy, the petty hooligan decree was intended to replace a system of slow, selective, and severe punish ment. In its place, it would erect a system of inevitable and inescapable punishment in which all offenders could easily be fitted into a flexible grid of finely differentiated deviant categories and punished in propor tion to the seriousness of their offense. Seen from this perspective, the petty hooligan decree was about closing off legal loopholes and uni versalizing punishment. It was about building a better citizenry by expanding the hooligan label to both the trivial and the terrible. With the decree on petty hooliganism, the state declared war on the entire spectrum of anti-social behavior—from serious hooligan crimes to the embarrassingly all-too-common incivilities that the authorities believed bred further crime, spoiled Soviet byt, and generated negative publicity in the Cold War-era clash of civilizations.23 In the process, it also inaugu rated a new era of post-Stalinist social discipline and control focused on fighting crime and disorder by rigidly enforcing correct conduct at the level of the mundane, the ordinary, and the everyday. In the 1956 RSFSR Supreme Soviet decree, petty hooliganism was defined as a “violation of public order and peace, insolent (oskorbitel’noe) disrespect to other citizens, the use of foul language (skvernoslovie), and other indecent acts.”24 In ambiguous language, the decree announced the state’s desire to punish anything it interpreted as incorrect conduct. The open-ended tag phrase (“and other indecent acts”) hinted at the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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rogram’s potential for unchecked expansion and abuse. It set the stage p for petty hooliganism to grow from an ambitious anti-deviancy program into a mass persecutory process that would e nvelop millions of Soviet citizens annually.25
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Creating an Avalanche of New Offenders Triumphant articles and images in the mass media accompanied the unveiling of the petty hooligan decree, warning potential offenders about the new weapon in the state’s anti-deviancy arsenal and testifying to the power of the decree in stopping social disorder.26 Journals, such as Krokodil and Iunost’, printed cartoons showing the deviant being carted off for incarceration and cautious hooligans hiding in their homes or voluntarily gagging themselves in order to escape the long arm of the new law.27 By nipping even the most trivial misbehavior in the bud, the decree seemed to promise an end to hooliganism, a senti ment echoed by a Krokodil cartoon showing Soviet zoo patrons in the not-too-distant future lining up to buy tickets for an exhibit entitled “The Last Hooligan.”28 In the short term, however, the state’s desire to wage a full-spectrum war on minor misbehavior inflated hooligan-related arrests to un precedented proportions. In the mid-1950s, hooligan conviction rates in the USSR had increased rapidly, but they had risen above the level of 200,000 convictions per year only once, in 1958. By contrast, the petty hooligan program resulted in the detention of over 1.4 million people annually in the USSR during the first few years of its enforcement and the numbers of yearly arrests thereafter only fell below the million mark once in the USSR, in 1960. Before the petty hooligan decree, hooligan ism was a common crime. After it, it became a mass crime involving the administrative arrest of millions. Those millions arrested for petty hooliganism were, like their criminal counterparts, generally drunk, urban, male workers over the age of 25 with an incomplete secondary-level education, no prior crimin al record, and a residence in the RSFSR.29 Instead of being marginals existing at the outskirts of civilized society, petty hooligans, in terms of their demo graphic and occupational profile, were fairly typical representatives of the dynamic industrializing and urbanizing society of the Khrushchev period. It was not their identity that set them apart from civilized Soviet society. It was the commonplace, everyday indecencies that were a part
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
one line short
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
1,092,637 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1,449,303
RSFSR Ukrainian SSR Kazakh SSR Belorussian SSR Uzbek SSR Lithuanian SSR Latvian SSR Azerbaijani SSR Moldavian SSR Georgian SSR Kirghiz SSR Estonian SSR Armenian SSR Turkmen SSR Tadzhik SSR USSR Total
1,015,678 180,098 54,614 34,127 27,672 18,256 17,620 11,746 10,763 10,597 10,003 8,422 7,354 4,794 4,111 1,415,855
1958 841,315 132,623 49,175 36,113 21,265 18,251 14,764 8,340 9,797 9,360 7,230 7,968 5,323 4,733 2,572 1,168,829
1959 559,350 98,697 22,342 31,349 11,469 10,080 10,173 5,375 5,606 5,632 3,013 3,992 4,112 2,326 1,494 775,010
1960 937,531 153,858 50,394 37,530 22,471 14,710 17,493 9,092 7,867 8,456 5,564 6,899 5,379 4,510 2,514 1,284,268
1961 1,135,395 156,881 58,924 41,166 25,644 14,946 19,620 11,263 8,720 9,498 5,600 8,086 6,255 4,666 3,128 1,509,792
1962 957,366 129,752 56,517 38,444 22,134 9,425 16,341 7,557 6,419 9,017 5,830 7,088 4,023 3,783 3,775 1,277,471
1963
850,238 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
1964
Source: GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 95, l. 20. The 1957 USSR total is taken from GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5659, l. 28. Unfortunately, numbers of arrests and other petty hooligan punishments vary. The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR Supreme Court gave different numbers for total arrests. An alternative 1957 USSR total, including arrests carried out by the transport police, was given by the Ministry of Internal Affairs as 1,524,855. For this number, see GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 505, l. 398. The USSR Supreme Court gave a third estimate of unionwide 1957 petty hooligan arrests as 1,537,689. For this number, see GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 58. The RSFSR total for 1957 and 1964 is taken from GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 474, l. 2. A different 1957 and 1958 total for the RSFSR is given respectively as 1,005,804 and 972,546 in GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 505, ll. 398–399.
1957
Union Republics
Table 9. Number of People Given Measures of Administrative Punishment for Petty Hooliganism (Arrests and Fines) in the USSR, 1957–1964
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of their ordinary behavioral repertoire and the way others interpreted and applied deviant labels to them that made these people into petty hooligans. As a catchall weapon for building better behavior and intervening early in the deviant career of potential offenders, the petty hooligan decree was applied to a wide and seemingly bewildering array of the ordinary indecencies that plagued the Soviet everyday. Responding with enthusiasm and imagination to this latest campaign, policemen and judges were empowered to discipline their subjects according to their own varying, expansive, and inconsistent local visions of the behavioral decorum and appropriate conduct required of Soviet citizens. The eccentricities and minor misbehaviors of urban life provided them with almost limitless supply of actions and actors out of which they could manufacture petty hooliganism on a mass scale. Police and judges tried to protect their subjects’ quality of life by enforcing correct standards of polite speech and trying to get Soviet citizens to stop using name-calling and foul language as normal parts of their speech repertoire. The fact that the use of obscene language on the streets and in other public places was the ordinary indecency that got most drunk males labeled as petty hooligan reflects the importance of policing improper speech in the petty hooligan campaign.30 Always seen as a marker of low culture, the use of foul language now became a symbol and early warning sign of deviance that demanded interven tion and correction through the petty hooligan campaign. The case of a man from the Molot ov region who was arrested for using foul language in a bus station and, thereby, bothering the citizens around him was a common one throughout the petty hooligan program.31 Given the entangled borders of the public and private in the Soviet spatial imagina tion, obscene speech in the home could also result in a petty hooligan prosec ution, as seen by the case of a 42-year-old bookkeeper from Moscow who was imprisoned for five days for cursing at home “in the presence of his wife and children.”32 The petty hooligan campaign was not only designed to get Soviet citizens to stop swearing, it was supposed to end the insults and verbal abuse that citizens, stressed by life in cities marred by overcrowding, scarcity, and poor services, commonly hurled at one another. Such insults ran the gamut from the standard ugly epithets of arguing husbands and wives to trivial everyday exchanges in which a man called his neighbor a “witch” (koldun’ia) and an office worker (arguing over the correct compensation for his business trip) called his boss a
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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“bureaucrat.”33 Through the power the petty hooligan campaign gave them to define and enforce polite discourse, police and judges remade the ill-spoken and the loose-lipped into the deviant and tried to impose their understandings of appropriate conduct onto the rough urbanizing society of the Khrushchev era.34 “Pestering” ( pristavanie) was another common form of ugly, every day urban behavior that police and judges now pursued through the petty hooligan program. Pestering could take many forms, including propositioning women, exposing oneself in a public place, pushing pedestrians, urinating in public, and harassing bystanders.35 It could also take more obscure forms, as in the case of a 51-year-old unemployed man who received fifteen days in prison for pestering customers at a store to drink vodka with him and a 16-year-old boy who received the same sentence for throwing snowballs “with mischievous intent” (na pochve ozorstva).36 Other everyday markers of dysfunction in overcrowded urban resi dences, such as making too much noise, drew the attention of zealous police and transformed careless speakers into deviants. Regardless of its content, noisemaking in general could be read as petty hooliganism, especially during nighttime hours. Two men, for example, were arrested simply for making noise after midnight.37 In Voronezh, two restaurant goers were sentenced to five days for slamming their plates on the table.38 A tenth-grade Moscow student and Komsomol member was arrested for three days for shouting while he was walking down Dzer zhinksii Street with his friends. To inflate the social danger of his actions, the police chief noted in the case material forwarded to the judge that the student was a person “without definite occupation.”39 Petty hooliganism was, likewise, discovered in the behavior of a man who conversed in a loud voice at his friend’s home (the case materials underlined the deviant’s obvious lack of culture by noting that he put his dirty boots on the couch).40 Empowered by the ambiguity and fast-track punishment process of the petty hooligan decree, the police transformed the innocuous rule breakers of the everyday into hooligan offenders against society. By enforcing the partition of parks and streets into restricted areas and no-go zones with the decree, they were able to make a schoolchild who ran in a flower garden and a Novosibirsk man who crossed the street at an unmarked place into petty hooligans.41 The commonplace uncivil occurrences of life in an urban economy of shortage were reread under the expansive petty hooliganism decree as new forms of deviancy. A
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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man, for instance, who jumped the line at a furniture store found him self labeled as a hooligan and sentenced to five days in prison.42 Minor forms of property theft and defacement were turned into anti-social offenses warranting administrative arrest and incarceration. For instance, two Alma-Ata residents were given ten-day sentences for picking flowers for their girlfriends from the roadside. Even the destruction of one’s own property could land one among the petty hooligans. In Odessa, a man who accidentally locked himself out of his home was sentenced to ten days for breaking the lock of his own door to gain reentry.43 Petty hooliganism acted as a convenient vehicle for policing social space and maintaining orderliness. However, it also made the public hostage to the police’s tacit and personal vision of petty hooliganism, a vision that often made unheeded steps into administra tive offenses and placed the unmindful and the eccentric onto the path of imprisonment. The same process of using the relaxed standards and processing machinery of the petty hooligan program to make the everyday into the imprisonable can be seen in relation to drunkenness. In a massive expansion of an already outsized administrative punishment program, an April 1961 RSFSR Supreme Soviet decree made drunkenness (“in the streets or in other public places”) into a type of petty hooliganism.44 As a result, many people found themselves labeled as deviants for doing something they did on a regular basis in the entertainment-free world of the Soviet factory town.45 For example, a Moscow man was held for ten days for “hooligan acts expressed in appearing drunk on the street.” In Novosibirsk, a judge gave a woman five days for “drinking vodka in the entryway of her home.”46 A local judge even sentenced a drunken man who asked the police to take him to a sobering-up station to three days incarcerat ion.47 Designed to cut down on alcohol-related crime and social disorder, the decree made a common everyday phe nomenon of the Soviet street deviant. In this way, it enlarged the scope of the hooligan label to encompass common misbehaviors that were previously non-prosecutable under this elastic criminal category and, thereby, expanded its application outward to vast new cohorts of poten tial offenders. Like its criminal cousin, a great deal of petty hooligan behavior took place in apartments and was directed against the offenders’ wife, rela tives, or neighbors. Proponents of domesticating deviance, such as USSR General Prosecutor R. A. Rudenko, explicitly defended the appli cation of the petty hooligan decree to domestic disorder. Arguing that
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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spousal abuse in a private home (chastnyi dom) was a public concern, he urged his subordinates that “even here [in private homes] the decree [on petty hooliganism] must be active.”48 Using the campaign to police improper conduct in the home, the police arrested a Chuvash man and gave him fifteen days for beating his parents, chasing them onto the street, breaking all the dishes and windows, and trying to set fire to their house.49 Less spectacularly, those who insulted their wives or argued loudly with their spouses or children both at home and in public often received petty hooligan punishments. Cases of verbal and physical assault against neighbors were also a common source of petty hooligan prosecutions, as exem plified by the case of a man who invited his neighbor to drink with him in the communal kitchen, got into an argument with her, ripped off her dress, and grabbed her breast.50 As with criminal hooliganism, residen tial conflicts and family feuds were some of the most prevalent forms of petty hooliganism, and the kitchen rivaled the street corner as a common site of deviant disturbance. The movement of petty hooliganism to the home bred familiar debates over untangling the interwoven boundaries between private matters and public affairs in the Soviet spatial imagin ary.51 But it also led to anger and astonishment that daily forms of urban incivility that were once considered insignificant were now being treated as imprison ing offenses under the vague and expansive clauses of the petty hooligan categ ory. Iurii Dombrovskii, the famous author of The Faculty of Useless Knowledge, was arrested for petty hooliganism in the mid-1960s and, on his release, wrote a complaint to the Secretariat of the Union of Soviet Writers about the injustice and humiliation of his detention. While in prison, he asked his cellmates why they had been arrested for petty hooliganism. In the account he left of his experience, he wrote of his amazement over their answers: Almost all the crimes here are identical: a quarrel (ssora) with the neighbor, a quarrel with the wife, apartment squabbles (skolki). Not a single one of these cases falls under the meaning of hooliganism. Instead, they all fall under the category that used to be called “cases of private suit (dela chastnogo iska).” One resident quarreled with another. A wife swore at a husband. Something happened in the kitchen above the gas stove. You could engage in these little fights as much as you wanted until now. But now, one of the more informed troublemakers or neighbors understands that a campaign is going on and that the police are interested in entering as many cases of petty hooliganism into their books as possible (before they were interested in doing the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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reverse). So he calls the police. The policeman arrives. He walks off with one of the people and tells the other person what he needs to write in the case report. . . . And the next thing you know, you are sitting in prison for fifteen days.52
The petty hooligans about whom Dombrovskii writes were victims of an expansive vision of deviancy run amok. Instead of being rebels raging against the system, they were accidental deviants. They stumbled unwittingly into hooliganism as their everyday incivilities (such as arguing, cursing, and carousing) and their ways of socializing (such as binge-drinking) were absorbed into the expanding boundaries of a broadened category of deviance. By walking unknowingly into some body else’s broad definition of deviancy, the argumentative, uncultured, uncouth, and eccentric became hooligans and were reborn as outcasts of the Soviet system. They were not lashing out at the Soviet state but only doing what, unfortunately, they always had done: drink, curse, and fight. The campaign against petty hooliganism did not reduce hooligan ism except in the Potemkin world of Soviet official statements. Nor, in the short term, was it supposed to. Instead, it increased hooliganism by making the police and the courts into manufacturers of deviancy on a mass scale.53 On the up side, it allowed police officers, prosecutors, and judges to speed up turnover times in petty cases and conserve resources for serious crimes. On the down side, the petty hooligan campaign made millions of Soviet citizens who had no prior arrest records into deviants, stigmatized them with an outsider identity, inadvertently introduced some of them to the criminal subculture of the Soviet penal system, and launched them into a new career in crime. This was especially true of the repeat petty hooligan offenders who made up a troubling minority of the new anti-deviancy program’s detainees.54 From the start of the petty hooligan campaign, reports began emerging of people who were being arrested five to ten times per year or even every month under the petty hooligan program and who were spending an appreciable portion of each year under administrative incarceration.55 One such report told the story of a 42-year-old man who, during the course of a single year, was arrested thirteen times for petty hooliganism and incarcerated for 151 days.56 To some repeat offenders, the disciplinary world of the petty hooligan program became so familiar that, as the journal Krokodil joked of an eight-time petty hooli gan who had spent over a quarter of the year under administrative
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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arrest, “when [they] enter the prison, the police greet [them] like old acquaintances and friends.”57 For such people arrested multiple times, the petty hooligan program disrupted the world of work and family and turned life into a rotating round of short-term incarcerations. These repeat offenders were at particular risk for falling into petty thievery and more serious types of hooliganism upon release. Instead of being reformed into better workers, they were remade into bigger and better offenders. The fact that 30 to 50 percent of the hooligans convicted in criminal courts in the mid1960s were alumni of the petty hooligan program showed the success of the new system in creating the very type of crime that, in the long term, it was designed to suppress.58
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Making the Innocuous into the Imprisoning and Vice Versa With the promulgation of petty hooliganism, the state created a new form of hooliganism that coupled nonserious offenses to light punish ments. By recognizing the entire spectrum of anti-social acts through the creation of the petty hooligan category, the state inserted degrees of deviancy into hooliganism and made it into a flexible catchall category that could be ratcheted up or watered down to fit any occasion no matter how small or insignificant.59 By differentiating deviancy in this manner, legal workers were given the ability to recognize the full diversity of disorderly practices that had previously coexisted uneasily under the older homogen izing labels of simple and malicious hooliganism. In introducing the concept of petty hooliganism, the state expanded the domain of deviance at the expense of clarifying and standardizing its meaning. They responded to emerging crime problems by making new hooliganisms without first solving the interpretive problems asso ciated with the existing labels (simple and malicious). However, con tinually differentiating and expanding hooliganism’s definitions did not make it easier to apply or to understand. Instead, it multiplied the opportunities for mislabeling and elicited growing category confusion as local legal workers struggled to define, in practice, the ill-defined borders between hooliganism’s multiple meanings. Right from the beginning, people at both ends of the power hierarchy noted petty hooliganism’s vague and elusive formulation—and the potential this offered for the unchecked abuse and uncontrollable expansion of the petty hooligan program.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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A citizen from Leningrad wrote to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to complain about the decree’s vagueness and lack of clarity, especially in such “empty” phrases as “appearances of insulting disrespect.”60 Even an official as illustrious as Lazar Kaganovich posed the frank question to his Presidium colleagues, during their debate over the new decree: “What exactly is petty hooliganism?”61 This last question in particular bedeviled lower courts, who frequently peppered the RSFSR and USSR Supreme Courts with questions about how to define and distinguish petty hooliganism, especially from the closely related and inadequately defined criminal categ ory of simple hooliganism.62 So acute was the confusion between petty and simple hooliganism that many policemen and judges stopped using the latter category entirely (convictions for simple hooliganism correspondingly dropped nearly one third in the year after the unveiling of the petty hooligan campaign) and even suggested that the state scrap this now seemingly superfluous crimin al 63 label. With the creation of petty hooliganism, the state may have differ entiated deviancy and purposefully given police and judges the power to go after the petty. In the process, however, they also inserted an addi tional layer of ambiguity into what was an already inscrutable crimin al category and made it even more diffic ult to define and deploy. This ambiguity not only perplexed the local interpreters of the petty hooligan campaign; it also enabled local police officers and judges to abuse and manipulate the petty hooligan campaign to their own ends and advantages. In their everyday practice of applying crimes to new cases and contexts, these local a gents invested petty hooliganism with new meanings and opened up the domain of deviancy to new acts and actors. Armed with their own visions of deviance that matched local understandings, needs, and agendas, local police officers and judges hijacked the state’s petty hooligan campaign and aggravated the ava lanche of incarceration by pushing the elastic boundaries of petty hooli ganism outward. Empowered by the petty hooligan decree and the campaign fashioned around it, they pursued their own meaning of petty hooliganism and, in the process, used (and, at times, abused) a fast-track system of administrative punishment to make both innocuous actors and serious criminals into a new class of lightweight lawbreakers. The legal journals and bureaucratic watchdogs decried obvious misuses of petty hooligan sanctions, such as in the case of a man charged with petty hooliganism for attempting suicide.64 Government reports contained lists of inappropriate petty hooligan convictions. They told
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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the story of a man arrested for petty hooliganism for cursing in a store and demanding that he be given the book of complaints. After learning that the man’s tirade was caused by the saleswoman’s refusal to sell him thirty grams of candy (she claimed that the scale could not accu rately measure anything less than fifty grams), the judge threw out his case.65 They also told the story of a 45-year-old housewife and mother of two who was sleeping in a hut in her yard when she saw some boys trespassing in her garden. The housewife, while still in her nightgown, immediately ran to the police to inform them of the offense. Instead of taking action against the trespassing youths, the police fined her fifteen rubles for petty hooliganism on the grounds of indecent exposure.66 The petty hooligan decree was not only used (sometimes illegiti mately in the eyes of watchdogs) to make the debatable and borderline misbehaviors of the everyday deviant; it could also be used to transform major crimes into minor offenses. A prominent legal journal reported that “a significant number” of police and investigative workers, when confronted with a case of criminal hooliganism, preferred to process it as petty hooliganism and purposefully formulated materials to “soften events and present them as an administrative offense.”67 The large-scale misapplication of petty hooliganism to major, violent crimes was proven by the fact that fighting and various forms of physical assault were, after public obscenity, the second most common form of petty hooliganism reported in some localities.68 Although watchdogs frowned on the practice, police often applied petty hooliganism to violent assaults, such as in the case of a man who beat a woman for refusing to dance with him and in the case of an intoxicated Leningrader who inflicted two knife wounds on a bystander.69 Noting how the elastic and open-ended petty hooligan category was misused to make major crimes disappear as administrative offenses, a prison guard wrote to the USSR Supreme Soviet: “Many crimes are covered up by this decree. When you read the sentence you are amazed. For all that this person did, they needed to give him three or four years in jail rather than fifteen days.”70 Commenting on the case of a man who was arrested for petty hooliganism after he (and three accom plices) broke into a house, stabbed a woman in the arm, assaulted a man, and broke all the glass in the windows and doors, a legal journal cautioned that such improper use of the petty hooligan category “per verts the meaning of the [petty hooligan] decree by virtually amnestying hooligan-criminals. It does not strengthen, but weakens the fight against hooliganism.”71
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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Despite the widespread public and professional disapproval of such “liberal” approaches to violent offenders, the petty hooligan program gave local officials incentives to transfer violent crime onto the fast-track system of administrative punishment. Defining stabbings and assaults as petty hooliganism coddled violent offenders and allowed them to slip through the criminal justice system. But it also allowed local police officers, prosecutors, and judges to accelerate their case turnover and conserve scarce investigative and judicial resources.72 By taking cases out of the criminal courts and putting them in administrative venues, these officials deflated conviction rates, lowered local crime statistics, and created a virtual victory over crime that they could use to impress their superiors.73 Yet, police officers were far from the only agents involved in re inventing petty hooliganism and using this ambiguous category to pursue their own agendas and understandings. Citizens, in the denun ciations they wrote to the police on the alleged petty hooliganism of their neighbors and relatives, were also actively rethinking the concerns and contexts to which the petty hooligan decree could be applied. Battered wives, for example, sometimes sent denunciations to the police asking that their abusive or drunken husbands be arrested for petty hooligan ism.74 Using the decree as a way to draft public agencies into their affairs, they attempted, with increasing success, to expand the application of petty hooliganism to the entangled spaces of the Soviet domestic sphere. In the process, battered wives projected their own meanings of deviance onto petty hooliganism and expanded its application to new areas and ends. Rather than being simply objects of the application process, Soviet citizens adopted the petty hooligan decree for their own purposes and, in the process, shaped its evolving implementation. A teacher, for instance, used the decree to discipline classroom troublemakers by sending a denunciation to the local police about a student who did not prepare his lessons, was rude to his teachers, and cursed in school. The student was sentenced to five days.75 By using the petty hooligan decree as a way to enforce discipline within their disordered workplaces and private lives, activist citizens reinvented its meaning, opened new spaces for its application, and fueled the avalanche of incarceration it inspired. Campaign pressures, idiosyncratic local applications, and ambiguity allowed petty hooliganism to spill over from legitimate targets onto illegitimate ones. Noting the drift of petty hooliganism into misapplica tion, watchdogs constantly complained that the decree “was being
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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applied in the localities in an excessively broad manner.”76 A 1957 report on the implementation of the petty hooligan decree declared: “The police send a great number of petty hooligan cases to the courts groundlessly that lack any sign of this violation.”77 Particularly worrisome was the misapplication of the petty hooligan label to groups such as the mentally ill, children under the age of 16, car thieves, and others whose actions called for different forms of civil and criminal response.78 Fast-track arrests, limited investigations, and the lack of appeals made such cases of illegitimate application and illegal detention a frequent occurrence in the petty hooligan campaign.79 In stead of safeguarding procedural norms and ending arbitrary arrests, the petty hooligan program, in an effort to expedite the punishment process and end the persistent hooligan problem, was dismantling the former and extending the latter. In this way, the petty hooligan decree seemed to contradict the socialist legality language that the regime used as its principal discourse of de-Stalinization. The deputy chair of the USSR Supreme Court openly expressed his worry at a 1964 plenum that the program increased, rather than curtailed, the operation of puni tive police power and made citizens more, not less, liable to arbitrary incarceration. Before the promulgation of the decree on petty hooliganism, the reasons for the detention of citizens and their delivery to the police were very narrow. According to the Criminal Procedural Code, there had to be serious grounds for doing so. But now the reasons for detaining a citizen are in essence limit less. Any kind of trivial misbehavior (nepravil’noe povedenie) by a citizen in a public place or in an apartment can be interpreted as petty hooliganism and lead to that person being delivered to the police, brought before the court, and detained. . . . We talk a lot about . . . safeguarding citizens from ground less arrest and, therefore, the courts and the Procuracy should all give the question [of how to apply the petty hooligan decree] more attention.80
Despite press statements that hyped it as “occupying an important place in the safeguarding of socialist legality,” the petty hooligan cam paign created a system of streamlined punishment and arbitrary incar ceration that clashed with the legal protections associated with this key phrase of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization.81 Original drafts of the petty hooligan decree had envisioned prosecutorial oversight and regulation of the program. However, concerns that such regulation would bog the system down in unending appeals and arguments that administrative
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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offenses did not warrant the same protections and procedures that governed criminal cases won the day—despite the Procuracy’s repeated attempts to assert their right to regulate and oversee the petty hooligan program.82 Rather than safeguarding socialist legality, the petty hooligan pro gram sacrificed it by producing a large amount of groundless prosecu tions and illegal arrests and by propagating a punishment process that operated outside of prosecutorial oversight and protection. The com bination of empowerment and elasticity that the petty hooligan decree brought to local anti-deviance efforts was one contributing factor to the expansion of arbitrary punitive power. However, the large caseloads the petty hooligan campaign generated created another cause for the prevalence of illegal incarceration. Bogged down in petty hooligan cases, local police and judges used short-cut strategies to speed up turn overs, strategies that increased the likelihood that unwarranted cases would sail through the fast-track system unchecked and uncorrected.
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Coping with an Avalanche of Offenders Originally, police officers, prosecutors, and judges welcomed the petty hooligan decree as a way to cut red tape, reduce workloads, and speed the turnover of time-consuming cases of nonserious hooliganism.83 Instead of relying on prolonged investigations and trials that often took weeks or months and ate up excessive resources and man-hours, the decree set up a fast-track system for trying trivial hooligan cases. Upon arresting a suspected petty hooligan, the police officer drew up a short case report. Superiors at precinct headquarters would review this report and then make the decision on whether or not to send the case to court. The suspect and the case report would then, if warranted, be for warded to a judge for an immediate hearing. The decree’s truncated method of treating petty cases promised to boost the power of the police and streamline the hooligan punishment process. However, the campaign against petty hooliganism did little to reduce workloads and case volumes. Instead, it created a flood of new deviants that tied down personnel in paperwork and processing demands. The decree required that petty hooligan cases be brought to a judge for sentencing within twenty-four hours of the initial arrest. This require ment put the police under immense pressure to process petty hooligan cases as quickly as possible, a pressure that many were unable to handle.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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The adaptive strategies that the police developed to speed case pro cessing created the conditions for a flood of junk cases to sail through the system unregulated and uncorrected. The first victim of tight processing deadlines was the twenty-four hour target itself. The inability of police and judges to process petty hooligan cases within the required twenty-four hour period was sympto matic of a system swamped by sheer numbers. Across the Soviet Union, twenty-four hour turnovers were rare as incoming cases overstretched the system.84 More troublingly, tight time limits had a delet erious affect on the quality of case materials. Beat cops, under pressure to increase turnover, often produced case reports “on the fly” by cutting out particu lars and omitting the information necessary for proper processing. Many case materials lacked names, contact information, and did not state what actions the accused was supposed to have committed. Reports often complained that case filers described the alleged petty hooligan actions committed in an “imprecise and superficial” language that overused general phrases, such as “he committed hooligan acts,” or “the accused caused a ruckus (skandal) and etc.”85 The use of such generalizations and vague formulas cut down on filing time, but it also complicated sentencing and oversight by concealing case specifics in a homogen izing language. The lack of detailed information on action and situational context hampered the court in making fair judgments and often meant they were passing sentences blindly on ambiguous case materials.86 The police also cut down on petty hooligan work and aggravated the avalanche of incarceration by letting others find the petty hooligans for them. The police were the only agents empowered to draw up reports on suspected petty hooligan activity. However, apartment residents, directors, wives, and other private citizens bypassed this restriction by informing on petty hooligans and sending case reports directly to the authorities.87 Although a legal journal warned that some citizens were abusing the petty hooligan decree “as a way to settle personal scores,” the police periodically accepted these denunciations with little factchecking and frequently forwarded them to judges for sentencing.88 By subcontracting out the composition of petty hooligan case reports to third parties, the police allowed citizens to co-opt the state’s antideviancy program, made it dependent on the questionable testimony of self-interested parties, and increased the number of false case reports filtering through the system. For example, a man was arrested for petty hooliganism on the basis of a case report written up by the man’s live-in
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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f ather-in-law and mother-in-law claiming that he used foul language in the apartment. No neighbors corroborated the charge, and it was dis covered that the in-laws had fabricated it to evict their son-in-law from the apartment and augment their tight living space.89 In other cases, people were sentenced on the basis of anonymous, third-party denun ciations that were impossible to verify.90 The flood of cases left over burdened police organs more concerned with avoiding oversight and, as the Tadzhik SSR General Prosecutor noted, using short cuts to “lighten their workload” than with following the procedural formalities that kept the petty hooligan decree from becoming an instrument of illegal prosec ution.91 To expedite the turnover of petty hooligan cases, free up their work schedules, and, at the same time, process petty hooligan cases in the required time, judges also adopted short-cut strategies. Judges fre quently rushed through low-priority petty hooligan cases. Some reports noted that judges crammed in as many as twenty-two petty hooligan cases in a single hour.92 Dombrovskii described the speed of petty hooli gan hearings among his sentencing cohort as a quasi-military operation that combined speed with superficiality: “One-two, one-two! The door [of the judge’s chamber] opened and closed. Next, next, next! A man flew out with ten to fifteen days every three minutes.”93 The behavior of Dombrovskii’s judge, who was on the telephone holding a personal conversation during most of his hearing, showed how hard-up judges saved time in petty hooligan cases by cutting corners in examinations, rubber-stamping police materials, and passing sentences with little analysis. Kochetova [the judge in Dombrovskii’s case] turned to the first page of the case file and looked at the last lines. . . . With a habitual movement, she took out a blank sheet of paper [on which to write the verdict] and grabbed her pen. “So you committed hooliganism and used uncensored language?” she asked. I answered . . . that I neither fought with anyone nor committed hooliganism, but was simply trying to protect a woman who was beaten. She again read to me the last words of the police report. My words had no impact on her whatsoever. She was not interested. . . . She listened and she did not listen. She looked at me and she did not look at me . . . She grabbed a blank sheet of paper. “Well that’s it. Ten days. Try to draw the right lessons from this.”94
The high caseloads, low priority, and tight deadlining of petty hooli gan work prompted judges to adopt questionable examination methods
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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that ignored time-consuming formalities, such as calling witnesses, examining case materials for evidentiary gaps, allowing the accused hooligans to defend themselves, keeping protocols of the examinations, and writing out formal sentences.95 One judge in Briansk was so hasty in his sentencing that he did not verify the identity of the accused and wrote the wrong man’s name down on the arrest decree, resulting in the delivery of an innocent man to prison.96 In another case, police arrested a man for petty hooliganism on the basis of a case report, com posed by his former wife and her friend, accusing him of having called his ex-wife a “speculator.” Even though the man professed his inno cence, the judge refused to call witnesses in the case, dismissed the man’s complaint that the police report was drafted by self-interested parties and sentenced the man to ten days.97 Such tactics saved schedules from swamping, but they also violated the regime’s socialist legality rhetoric by exposing citizens to arbitrary power with little hope of appeal or oversight and by causing unwarranted detention.
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Putting Up the Petty Hooligan The heavy case volume generated by the campaign against petty hooli ganism complicated the task of finding holding spaces for petty hooligan detainees. Prisons were often reluctant to house low-priority, short-term administrative detainees and at times refused to open their doors to the stream of petty hooligan arrestees.98 Because the decree mandated imprisonment, local governments were forced to find and improvise storage spaces for petty hooligans outside the prison system. Many localities used the police stations’ pretrial detention cells (kamery predvaritel’nykh zakliuchenii, KPZ) as petty hooligan storage centers. However, most KPZs were not designed to handle the high traffic of the petty hooligan system. When coupled with the sheer number of petty hooligans, spatial limits meant that overcrowding was a common part of the detention process. In the Moscow-region town of Khimki, nineteen petty hooligan detainees were held in a twenty square meter room.99 The single fifteen square meter room in which the petty hooligan detainees of Moscow’s Lenin district were held was so crowded that there was no place for them to sleep or lie down during the night.100 In Moscow’s Butyrka prison, petty hooligans were forced to sleep two to a bunk to maximize occupancy.101 In his recollection of his detention experience, Dombrovskii, who had spent several years in the Stalin-era Gulag, described the tiny and overcrowded room where he spent his
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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sentence: “I had never seen such a prison chamber (kamera) before. It was completely full. There wasn’t even an empty space to spit in. In 1939 and 1949, they used to take us to such rooms for maybe two or three hours or, at the most, a couple of days. But I would be here for half a month. . . . You couldn’t walk around. There wasn’t any place to stretch your legs. The tiny expanse [of the chamber] . . . held so many impossibilities: it was impossible to move, to breathe . . . or to get some fresh air.”102 Sanitation and a lack of basic hygiene made contagion a frequent problem of the overcrowded KPZ. Overcrowding, the holding of healthy and sick prisoners in the same cell, and a lack of bathing facilities raised fears of infectious disease outbreaks among the petty hooligan popula tion. In the Gor’kii region, watchdogs reported that healthy detainees and detainees suffering from contagious forms of tuberculosis were being held in common holding cells.103 Shortages of kitchen utensils and crockery also increased the risk of disease outbreaks. In the Gor’kii region, only two bowls and three spoons were handed out at meals, forcing detainees to share dirty utensils with one another.104 Local officials had to develop creative policies to counteract KPZ overcrowding, policies that eroded the punitive power of the petty hooligan decree. Practices such as early release and house arrest were reluctantly used to free up detention space. In the Ivanovo region, female detainees were allowed to go home at night because of a lack of space at the KPZ.105 In Leningrad, “a significant number” of petty hooli gans were released home because of lack of space in the KPZ. When space became available, they were rearrested to serve out their sen tence.106 In some KPZs of the same city, female detainees were allowed to wander around the police quarters because of lack of available space in the holding cells and at night they slept on whatever tables and chairs they were able to find unoccupied.107 Overcrowding, in some instances, contributed to the inadvertent criminalization of the petty hooligan population. The RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) required that male, female, adult, and juvenile petty hooligan detainees be held in separate cells and that petty hooli gans be segregated from more serious criminals.108 By taking minor offenders out of the ordinary prison population, the MVD hoped to peel petty hooligans away from the corrupting influence of the hardened crimin als with whom they were often lumped together under the pre vious one-size-fits-all system. In reality, spatial limitations constrained the MVD’s policy of segregated detention and, at times, forced petty
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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hooligan detainees and general offenders to be held in common rooms regardless of differences in gender, age, and criminal background.109 In these mixed detention spaces, petty hooligan detainees often fell under the spell of criminal elements who used the detainees’ relative freedom of movement (during the time they traveled to and from their work assignments) and their ability to receive outside packages to smuggle information, instructions, and contraband into and out of holding cells and prisons.110 Because of infrastructure constraints, the punishment process turned from a time of correction into a time of corruption in which some petty hooligan detainees were exposed and absorbed into criminal subcultures.111
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Punishing the Petty Hooligan The Khrushchev regime, through the campaign against petty hooli ganism, decided to get tough with hooligans by, in part, getting more lenient. The petty hooligan decree reduced prison sentences for the lowest level of hooliganism from one year to short three- to fifteen-day microstays.112 In opposition to Stalinist anti-hooligan strateg ies, lengthy incarceration was no longer the center of the strategy for dealing with nonserious hooliganism. Instead, the central corrective for petty hoo liganism revolved around the mandatory physical labor that the de tainee had to perform during each day of his incarceration. Echoing the reforging philosophy of the 1930s, the architects of the petty hooligan policy believed in the power of physical labor to remake broken men.113 Physical labor was a reformative instrument through which detainees could mold themselves into useful Soviet subjects and refind their place in the Soviet system. Moreover, manual labor would reinforce a work ethic in a deviant subculture popularly associated with shirking and sloth.114 The compulsory labor requirement also seconded as a public system of shaming, status reversal, and exposure designed to make hooligans lose face before their collectives and communities. Ideally (though rarely in reality), officials tried to set labor projects in high-traffic areas to display petty hooligan detainees and maximize their exposure to the public gaze. Overseers sometimes ratcheted up the humiliation by shaving the forced laborers’ heads and assigning detainees to “feminine” work duties that crossed gendered notions of sex-appropriate labor.115 Exposing detainees to demeaning tasks associated with a feminized domestic sphere, such as cleaning toilets or sweeping floors, challenged
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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the self-image of a group infamous for its association with ritua ls of rough masculinity, such as drinking and fighting.116 To maximize the misery, petty hooligans, as the prosecutor of the Kaluga region advo cated, were to be given “the most filthy” jobs, such as emptying garbage cans, working as stable boys, gathering hay, collecting firewood, sorting veget ables, and cleaning wells.117 In this manner, mandatory public labor acted as a spectacle designed to embarrass the hooligan and inform (if not entertain) his collective. The logic of such shaming spectacles was vividly described in a 1958 Izvestiia article: “Now the [detainees] are carrying brooms and shovels. The “heroes” of yesterday are marching along sadly, hiding their faces beneath their coat collars. As they sweep the street, they try to keep their backs to the sidewalk. And from that corner one hears sarcastic jokes and laughter. . . . No matter how the heroes hide their eyes, the shame of fifteen days of public scorn will be remembered all their lives.”118 Public clean-up projects, such as street sweeping or snow removal, provided an ideal vehicle for exposing petty hooligans to visible and audible public scorn.119 Through public works projects, the hooligans’ stereotypical habitat would be reclaimed and turned into the stage on which they were displayed before the public eye. The shame of being paraded before their neighbors and colleagues would, officials hoped, stay with the petty hooligan forever and speed his reintegration into the collective. In addition, local economic imperatives and interests shaped the petty hooligan labor system and dictated where detainees were sent to work. Petty hooligan detainees were frequently farmed out to local enterprises for temporary work assignments. In this way, the petty hooligan detainees, through their labor, were not only serving out their sentences, but (it was hoped) rededicating themselves to the task of constructing communism. They were also adding value to the local economy by filling gaps in the local labor market, especially in such low-status or labor-intensive sectors as sanitation or construction.120 From its inception, however, the compulsory labor system ran into multiple administrative and supervisory difficulties that limited the extent of the make-work system and often inadvertently freed detainees from their labor responsibilities. In particular, administrative negligence on the local level subverted the petty hooligan work program. Police in Stalingrad, for example, sent lists of detainees to the local executive committee, but local officials made no effort to create make-work
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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assignments for them.121 Similarly, detainees in Moscow’s Krasnog vardiia district were not put to work because the district had failed to organize any work projects.122 The negligence of local Soviets in creating make-work assignments for petty hooligan detainees was reflected in the large percentage of detainees who did little or no labor at all during their incarceration. The USSR Procuracy estimated that only 20 to 30 percent of detainees were being put to work in required labor projects.123 In one district in the Gor’kii region, only one out of seventy-four detainees was sent to work on each day of his sentence as required by the decree. Most of the other detainees worked only 10 to 25 percent of their sentence days.124 Detainee inactivity undermined the utopian program of reformation through labor and turned detention into what many critics mocked as a period of “idle rest.”125 Vacation, relaxation, and leisure rather than status reversal, shaming, and manual labor became the unintentional leitmotifs of a forced labor system on the skids. The inability to match detainees with labor projects prompted complaints that petty hooligan detainees “eat free bread and do not suffer.”126 Without compulsory labor, prison lost its bite and its transformative power to remold de tainees into model Soviet workers. “Ten or fifteen days is not a reform measure,” a Leningrad woman wrote in dismay, “it is a time of amuse ment.”127 Prison for idle petty hooligans had, according to critics, become a “holiday hotel” ( pansionat) in which they spent “vacation.”128 Illustrating the suspicion that petty hooligans enjoyed their periods of administrative incarceration too much, a Komsomolskaia pravda article reported a petty hooligan describing his detention as “an all-expenses paid pass to the local branch of heavenly paradise.”129 Inadequate work transformed the idle and unrepentant petty hooli gan into the popular punch line of such mass media vehicles as Leonid Gaidai’s film Operatsiia “y” i drugie prikliucheniia Shurika (1965) or the satirical journal Krokodil. Parodying the laborless detention, a cartoon in Krokodil, entitled “A New Place of Rest (novoe mesto otdykha),” depicted two petty hooligans leaving a police station at the end of their detention period and comparing how much weight they had gained during their incarceration. The petty hooligan who gained the least (seven pounds as opposed to ten) explains the reason for the differential by complaining: “Well that’s because they gave you fifteen days and I only got ten.”130 With their ability to supplement their conditions of incarceration with liberal access to outside packages and given their ability to evade assigned labor tasks, some in the MVD feared that petty hooligans “feel
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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no worse in the KPZ than at home.”131 Other critics noted that the KPZ experience was often better for petty hooligans because: “At home, the wife nags him. At work, the comrades keep an eye on him. But in the KPZ, the petty hooligan feels completely free from any restraint.”132 Instead of acting as a deterrent, the cozy conditions of incarceration made some petty hooligans desire rather than fear arrest. “To the drunk, it is even better to have fifteen days,” one angry citizen wrote to the authorities. “He sits around and gets that much closer to his pension.”133 Believing that “the hooligans laugh at this decree,” such critics called for petty hooligans to be treated more “severely,” arguing that “they should be held to such a ration and in such a regime that they would think twice before committing hooliganism again.”134 However, the petty hooligan program’s primary saboteurs were not the bureaucrats who ignored the system from above. They were the petty hooligan prisoners who wrecked it from within. Not surprisingly, they had their own thoughts about being pawns in the state’s labor game and proved reluctant to play by its rules. Getting local authorities to run a small-scale empire of unfree labor against their wishes was a constant challenge to the petty hooligan project. Making poorly super vised and completely unmotivated unfree laborers work, stay on site, and not misbehave—that was the real challenge for the Soviet state. Work was at the top of the state’s petty hooligan agenda. But for those petty hooligans who found themselves at the center of the com pulsory labor system, it was often the farthest thing from their minds. Through various tactics of work avoidance, petty hooligan detainees sidestepped the labor system. By refusing to work, running away, and dragging their feet, petty hooligans did their best to avoid the labor the Soviet state sought to impose on them. To evade compulsory labor, petty hooligans often used the excuse that they did not have appropriate work clothes to participate in dirty work details. Others complained that they lacked the tools necessary to take part in labor schemes. Still others claimed that they were sick or suffered from physical disabilities that precluded their use in makework projects.135 When excuses failed, flight was another popular tactic that petty hooligan detainees used to avoid work assignments. The unwillingness or inability of police departments to waste personnel or resources on escort duties meant that petty hooligan detainees were often sent to worksites without police escort or in underguarded convoys. Detainees escaped the compulsory labor system by simply running away while
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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en route to work projects and returning to their homes or neighbor hood haunts. In one instance, a prison sent detainees to work without any guard or escort on the condition that they return to the prison “around 6–7 PM.” A spot check found that only 33 percent of detainees reported to their assigned worksites.136 To plug the steady loss of petty hooligan labor from unguarded work gangs, some enterprises in the Gor’kii region hired off-duty policemen and prison guards to escort and supervise detainees at the cost of forty rubles per guard per day. By moonlighting as convoy escorts, police men generated side earnings to supplement their state salaries. How ever, they placed an additional financial burden on a loss-making labor system whose costs often ate up any potential benefits that workplaces derived from petty hooligan labor. Frequently, the cost of funding escort services exceeded the value of the labor that enterprises were able to extract from the system.137 When (or if) they arrived at their worksite, detainees needed constant onsite supervision to prevent shirking, work stoppages, disciplinary infractions, and escape attempts. This added another layer of costs onto a system that demanded expensive oversight at every phase of its opera tion. Police guards often read newspapers and failed to ensure that detainees worked properly.138 Frequently, the police passed supervisory functions off onto enterprise managers who also often took little or no interest in diverting manpower to the task of detainee babysitting. Rele gating the task of guarding detainees onto the institutions making use of their labor meant that, as one report declared, “there was really no guard duty provided at all.”139 Many detainees were unsupervised during work hours and did whatever they pleased.140 As a result, many detainees did no work and left the worksite to wander or engage in disorderly behavior. One petty hooligan detainee in the Tiumen region left his worksite, which was supposedly under police guard, went downtown, got drunk, and committed another act of petty hooliganism for which he was sentenced to an additional fifteen days. In the same region, six detainees held a drinking party at their un supervised worksite and one ran away.141 Some detainees left the worksites and returned to their homes.142 One detainee in Moscow, for example, left his worksite, went home to celebrate New Y ear’s Eve, and then returned to the KPZ following the holid ay celebration.143 One Leningrad petty hooligan left his work site and returned to the police station only two months later.144
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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Some detainees took advantage of their freedom of movement and lack of supervision to acquire contraband and smuggle it back into detention centers. In the Gor’kii region, four detainees returned to the KPZ from their worksite drunk and one tried to bring a bottle of vodka back to his cell (the police mounted a contraband search and found several more empty bottles in his cell).145 To help them attain prohibited materials or supplement their package allowances, relatives and friends would sometimes illicitly meet petty hooligans at their work sites and give them additional food or other forbidden items.146 The unsupervised detainees who did stay onsite at work assignments exerted their own control over the work process through a repertoire of shirking and foot dragging. Work tempos were attenuated and work days contracted to limit exertion.147 Stoppages disrupted production routines. Without oversight, no incentive existed for petty hooligans to work. The Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee described the working patterns of petty hooligans: “Those who want to work, they do a little bit of work. Those who don’t want to work, they play dominos.”148 “After working for an hour or so, they start to talk about what they’re going to eat for lunch,” a policeman remarked about his detainees’ work routine at a local collective farm.149 “All the time they either sit around or smoke,” A prison worker from Uzhno-Sakhalinsk com plained about the petty hooligans he guarded. “When you remark [that they should be working], they only smile and still they don’t work.”150 Hooligans, local employers discovered, were bad workers who added little value to the production process.151 Medically and physi cally, many petty hooligan detainees were ill-suited for physical labor. Some detainees were alcoholics who suffered from the side effects of alcohol withdrawal during their incarceration and were physically unable to work.152 Unskilled detainee labor presented a hazard in dangerous worksites, especially in the construction sector, that multi plied the costs and concerns of using petty hooligan labor. Untrained detainee laborers often ignored or violated safety regulations, exposing workplaces to increased risks and liabilities.153 Facing an unenviable calculus of high supervisory costs and low benefits, many enterprises refused to take petty hooligan labor. Local enterprises in Kaluga informed regional officials that they did not want detainee workers because they “just sit around all day, drink, and run off to their homes.”154 In the Sverdlovsk region, local officials refused to create work assignments for the detainees because they argued that
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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detainees “worked badly and did nothing.”155 Trying to pawn his petty hooligan detainees off on local enterprises, one local police chief remembered the directors pleading with him: “For God’s sake, don’t send them to us!”156 The difficult hunt for a willing worksite meant that some detainees found themselves “led around town in busses like tourists on an excursion in search of a workplace that would agree to use their services.”157 The law inadvertently encouraged shirking by failing to give over seers disciplinary powers over underperforming detainees.158 Localities experimented with various strategies to compel detainees to work and regain control over the labor process. In the Leningrad region, the police informed the detainees’ workplaces about work refusals so that they could punish the detainee for viol ating labor discipline or for absentee ism.159 Officials in the Kaluga region tried to punish detainees who refused to work by adding a day onto their sentence for each day they refused to attend their work assignment.160 In some hard-line localities such as Tula and Ivanovo, labor-shirking detainees were placed in punishment cells (kartser).161 Other localities tried to encourage detainees to work through positive incentives, such as early release and monet ary rewards. However, such incentive packages directly violated the petty hooligan decree and took the sting out of the compulsory labor system. In Novosibirsk, regional officials experimented with giving police chiefs and prison wardens the right to release detainees early who were “conscientious in the fulfill ment of the work assigned to them.”162 In the Gor’kii region, petty hooli gan prisoners were released early for “good work.”163 Although the decree forbade such compensatory arrangements, detainees were some times paid for their labor, giving them a monetary incentive not to engage in shirking and work stoppages.164 These moves blunted the punitive power of forced labor and reinforced public concern over the incarceration regime’s insufficient severity.
Paying for the Petty Hooligan Program By March 1959, the USSR MVD was already complaining to the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers about the excessive number of petty hooligan detainees (almost three million in the first two years of the program) and especially about “the significant amount of state resources spent to keep them under guard.”165 Commenting on the escalating expenses of the program, local reports began complaining of
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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the petty hooligan campaign as a “burden” that was “hanging on the neck of the state.” Early concerns, in particular, centered on the persistent imbalance between the large inputs required to run the compulsory labor system and the limited and low-quality output it generated.166 Much to the shock and chagrin of officials, basic program expenses, such as feeding costs, often outstripped the value that detainee labor added to the local economy.167 Commenting on the labor system’s input/output imbalance, the Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee noted at a February 1960 plenum that: “120,000 rubles are wasted on workers whose labor is worth only 70,000 rubles.”168 The mass arrest and imprisonment of industrial workers also imposed losses on the state in addition to the direct costs associated with incarceration. Pulling workers off the factory floor, even for short periods of punishment, threatened to disrupt production rhythms and lower output levels in enterprises across the Soviet system.169 To cut expenses and reduce the budgetary burden of the program, some localities forced detainees to cover their own incarceration costs.170 Others sought to trim costs by requiring detainees to supply their own food and bedding during detention.171 Aside from levying side charges on detainees, state bodies attempted to recoup costs and address input/ output imbalances by charging workplaces for the petty hooligan labor that they used. Yet they often overpriced petty hooligan labor and rendered it too expensive relative to its poor quality. For example, an order of the Azerbaijani MVD required workplaces to pay twenty-five rubles into the republican budget for every day a petty hooligan detainee worked at their enterprise. Such a measure allowed the republic to recoup part of the costs of administering the program. It also cut down on the risk of local off ic ials misa pp rop ria ti ng the money r aised through the sale of hooligan labor by depositing it directly into central coffers.172 Yet, as a result of this measure, a Procuracy report observed that enterprises in Baku refused to accept detainee labor that they now saw as o verly expensive and unprofitable.173 Inadvertently, the state’s cost-sharing program, which was instituted unionwide by an August 1957 joint order of the USSR MVD and the USSR Ministry of Finance, lowered workplace demand for petty hooligan labor and jeopardized the make-work system that was at the heart of the decree’s reformative program.174 In an effort to curb program expenses further, the state tried other cost-cutting strategies, such as passing program costs entirely onto local
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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governments: a move that was accomplished by a December 8, 1958, USSR Council of Ministers decree that shifted the costs of incarceration for both petty hooliganism and petty speculation onto local budgets starting from January 1, 1959.175 Others floated the idea of alternative punishment practices as a possible cost cutter. To reduce prison time, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Nikolai Dudorov recommended in June 1959 that judges be given additional noncustodial punishment options, such as fines of 300 rubles or corrective labor sentences of thirty days. He also suggested that the costs of incarceration be deducted from the detainees’ wages, that parents be forced to pay the imprisonment expenses of their children, and that unemployed petty hooligans be subjected to compulsory property seizures.176 Picking up on Dudorov’s ideas, the RSFSR legalized alternative non custodial punishment options in 1961, giving judges the opportunity to discipline petty hooligans through wage garnishments, fines, or by transferring cases to comrades’ courts.177 An April 19, 1961, decree of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet introduced a ten- to thirty-ruble fine for petty hooliganism that could be given in lieu of the original three- to fifteen-day imprisonment standard. The new decree sought to cut down on caseloads and reduce pressure on the judiciary by making certain cases (“taking into account the personality of the violator and the nature of the act committed”) available to be transferred to comrades’ courts. Additionally, the decree aimed to curb incarceration costs and boost the productivity of detainee labor by making petty hooligans who refused to work pay for the costs of their meals out of their own pocket at the cost of one ruble per day.178 However, even when comrades’ courts were available for offloading, many judges ignored the state’s policy push and continued to handle these cases in-house rather than transfer this offense to an erratic and underregulated system of volunteer courts. Instead of seizing on the comrades’ courts as a way to purge their schedules of petty crime, local judges continued to process the vast majority of petty hooligan cases personally, often sending less than 5 percent of their cases to comrades’ courts.179 Even after the promulgation of a 1963 RSFSR Supreme Soviet decree urging judges to send petty hooligan cases to the comrades’ courts, most judges still refused to send petty hooligan cases to these alternative venues, arguing that such offenders often slipped through the wide cracks of the volunteer court system and fell into increased risk of recidivism.180 The fact that the Tatar autonomous republic sent only 265 out of 3,727 petty hooligan cases to the comrades courts right
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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after the decree was published shows both the unwillingness to make use of this alternative disciplinary system and the limits of a system of local comrades’ courts that was often dysfunctional or existed only in the world of bureaucratic paper (see chapter 4).181 In contrast to the comrades’ courts, the new noncustodial punish ments, such as fines and wage garnishments, were much more successful in diverting a sizable minority of offenders from the expensive incarcera tion and compulsory labor system. After 1961, between 30 to 40 percent of petty hooligan cases were given noncustodial punishments, easing cost concerns and opening a revenue stream that could be used to subsidize compulsory labor. Of the two available alternative punishments, fines were used more widely and were often applied to first-time offenders who had good work evaluations (kharakteristiki ).182 However, many judges had mis givings about levying fines on petty hooligans, arguing that it lacked the reformative impact of arrest and compulsory labor. Some petty hooligans l acked a permanent address or occupation and could not be fined.183 Others (often up to 20 percent of those fined) simply refused to pay, ignored their obligations and, thereby, sidestepped the punishment process completely.184 Although the majority of petty hooligans were still imprisoned, such reforms subverted the petty hooligan program’s utopian vision by ending its universal punishment regime centered on reform through forced labor. By allowing some hooligans to slip through the system easily, it returned to the ineffective and deviance-promoting days of mixed punishment for minor misbehavior. With the 1961 decree, petty hooligan punishments traveled full circle away from an expensive forced labor regime and back toward the low-impact and low-cost repertoire of fines and corrective labor that the program was, in part, designed to replace.
Putting Petty Hooliganism in Perspective The history of petty hooliganism presents a nonstandard narrative of legal reform during the Thaw period. The plot does not involve reformers replacing an arbitrary Stalinist system of punitive power with a structure of socialist legality that respected legal and procedural norms. Instead, it is a story of how reformers, in order to punish minor misbehavior, created a pared-down punishment process that often ran rough shod over both the former and the latter, a punishment process modeled, in
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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part, on a fast-track system that was first used in the prewar Stalin period. Rather than shoring up socialist legality, the petty hooligan decree sacrificed it in an effort to realize a project of intrusive behavioral engineering based on expanding the authority of the state into the trivia of everyday life. In this way, the story of petty hooliganism complicates our picture of the Thaw by underlining the interplay of liberalization and repression, legality and arbitrary authority, and past programs and present reforms that went on within it. The foundational year of Khrushchev’s Thaw, 1956, began with one of the best-known events of the Khrushchev era, the Secret Speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, and ended with one of the least, the RSFSR decree on petty hooliganism, two acts that provide two very different visions of this pivotal year. Read from the perspective of the Secret Speech, the year 1956 appears as a period of liberalization associated with the challenging of old orthodoxies and authorities.185 Yet seen through the prism of petty hooliganism, it also appears as a time of repressive social discipline in which the state sought to expand its policing power to the most mundane aspects of everyday life. Like the anti-gypsy legislation or the student crackdowns of the same year, the petty hooligan decree shows us that 1956 was more than a year of liberalizing politic al reform.186 It was also a year of increased prosecu tion, coercive refashioning, and aggressive state action against an ex panding array of state-defined undesirables. By showing the limits of liberalization and socialist legality, the petty hooligan campaign reminds us that during the late 1950s a de-Stalinizing society coexisted in an uneasy equilibrium with a society of overreaching and increasingly inti mate intrusion, intolerance, and mass incarceration. However, were these two sides of 1956 (the Secret Speech and the petty hooligan decree) really so incompatible? As many sociologists and anthropolog ists have noted, societies often turn to the figure of the deviant during times of acute social tension or transition to affirm their core cultural values.187 In the same manner, the Soviet state’s antideviance efforts allowed it to advertise its bedrock moral ideals by defining and distinguishing them in opposition to the uncouth and un cultured behavior of the hooligan—a process that was especially useful during the destabilizing period of uncertainty, experimentation, and change inaugurated by de-Stalinization.188 In an era of flux when all existing authorities and ideals appeared open to revision, policing and prosecuting petty hooliganism allowed the state to reassert the continued
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
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relev ance of its civilizational values and to remind society of the conse quences that lay outside the limits of acceptable experimentation. Therefore, rather than merely undermining each other, the Secret Speech and the petty hooligan campaign acted in complementary ways to define the murky mix of possibilities, prohibitions, and penalties that de-Stalinization opened before Soviet society. Far from being the simple bogey man of socialism, the petty hooligan helped to demarcate and defend the hazy borders between acceptable and inappropriate modes of behavior during a liminal period of cautious challenge and change. By doing so, this lowly and lamentable figure became the symbolic foil through which a rapidly changing post-Stalinist Soviet Union could reaffirm for itself and reinstill in its citizens everything that was un shakable and enduring in its vision of man, morality, and socialist society.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:12.
4 Empowering Public Activism
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The Khrushchev-Era Campaign to Mobilize Obshchestvennost’ in the Fight against Hooliganism In 1959, Khrushchev unveiled an ambitious new program for policing and punishing hooliganism in Soviet society. With the expansion of the comrades’ courts and the people’s auxiliary police (druzhina), the state sought to enlarge its community of activists and enlist them in the anticrime cause. By unleashing Soviet obshchestvennost’ and tapping into the power of expanded public activism, Khrushchev undertook a new approach to curbing criminality and halting the spread of hooliganism. Obshchestvennost’ is one of the key words of Russian culture and its use was particularly widespread and important during the Khrushchev era. “It is one of the first Russian words to know,” an American in Khrushchev’s Moscow noted, “but one of the most difficult to render into English.”1 Its various definitions include the “public,” the “opinionmakers,” “society,” or “the community.” For Soviet speakers, obshchestvennost’ signified “the total number of people who take an active interest in social life,” or what D. N. Ushakov termed “social tempera ment or the inclination for social work.”2 Instead of referring to everyone in Soviet society, obshchestvennost’ referred to the self-selected group that chose to involve itself in volunteer social work. During the Stalin period, the domain of obshchestvennost’ was largely limited to elite women who could afford to take part in volunteer projects.3 However, 132
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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the meaning of obshchestvennost’ broadened during the Khrushchev era to indicate a mass movement of social activism that crossed the country’s stratified status and gender hierarchies. Rather than being limited to the elite or to women, the Khrushchev-era campaign was designed to draw in as wide and varied a group of volunteers as possible from all social strata.4 The campaign to enlarge obshchestvennost’ and empower community activism in the fight against crime was given a high publicity send-off. Images and speeches celebrated the power of the community to confront and excise the crimin al. To link the policy to the uncorrupted preStalinist past, continuities with the Lenin-era workers’ police (rabochaia militsiia) were suggested and stressed. Above quotes of Lenin, cartoons depicted the hooligan being plucked from his lair and carried off by the long arm of obshchestvennost’.5 The empowerment of public activism and obshchestvennost’ heralded the end of anti-social disorder and the coming end of traditional law enforcement organs. “Are we really going to take hooligans into the communist future with us and police men in order to stop them?” Khrushchev asked a Komsomol Congress. “You have the power, comrades. If all of you take on this matter, you will correct it.”6 Although the campaign to mobilize obshchestvennost’ unionwide was officially unveiled in 1959, the forces and frustrations that led to its announcement had been brewing for many years prior. One of the biggest of these frustrations was the public’s growing anger over the failure of its police force to fight crime effectively. In the mid-1950s, angry officials and citizens criticized the police for their inability or un willingness to stop serious crimes like hooliganism.7 Ineffective police, these critics charged, left city streets unsafe, unsupervised, and under the control of crimin als. Mass newspapers, such as Izvestiia, criticized the police for “staying away from hooligans” and “closing their eyes” to this persistent urban problem.8 Citizens complained to state authorities that their local police force was “hopeless” or, worse yet, consisted of cowards who “run as far away as possible when they see a hooligan.”9 When a Krokodil cartoon character asked why there were no police on the streets at dark, her companion’s proclamation (“Because it’s dangerous. There are a lot of hooligans around”) played off the common stereotype that the police were too afraid to confront the hooligan.10 The common accusation that the police turned a blind eye to dangerous hooliganism to focus on trivial and harmless offenses inspired another Krokodil cartoon depicting a policeman ignoring the drunk hooligan
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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terrorizing the park to arrest a child improperly picking a flower (the cartoon’s caption read: “He [the Policeman] Chose the Lesser of Two Evils”).11 Such representations reflected and reinforced the public’s deep distrust of the police’s ability and desire to mount a successful anti-hooligan campaign. In addition to the public, Communist Party offic ials were also deeply concerned in the mid-1950s about the state of police professionalism. Central Committee reports found that the police were woefully under educated, with 93 percent of ordinary patrolmen and 65 percent of precinct captains (nachal’niki gorraiotdelenii militsii ) having only an elementary or incomplete secondary level education. They also found that police departments suffered from a serious shortage in basic equip ment, with 90 percent of police posts having no telephone connection and 63 percent having no automobile. Mainly because of poor pay and work conditions, in the first half of the 1950s, over 11 percent of the police force annually was leaving or being fired—a crippling rate of personnel turnover that increased the difficulty of building an accom plished, experienced, and effective force.12 Confirming what the public already knew and was complaining about, the Central Committee reported that the police were “not leading an active struggle against crime.” As a result, crime, according to the Central Committee, was increasing in many localities. To improve their local crime figures, some police were refusing to register crimes and distorting local statistics downward accordingly—a practice that the Central Committee noted had taken on a “mass character” by the mid-1950s.13 To improve police performance, the Party had dismissed the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, S. N. Kruglov—accusing him of deliberately misleading them about the real state of crime in the country and allowing the professionalism of the police to deteriorate under his watch.14 It also passed decrees designed to improve police operations and increase pay and benefit levels to attract better applicants and retain personnel. In addition, the Party undertook a propaganda offensive, commissioning literature that portrayed policemen in positive ways, designing new police uniforms, and starting a new holiday, Policemen’s Day (Den’ militsionerov), designed to improve the public image of the average Soviet policeman.15 In response to the breakdown in public and Party trust in the police, some citizens recommended sending in the military to restore order to unsafe city streets.16 But the most common Party and public response to
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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poor policing was to advocate that the community police itself and stand collectively as one against the hooligan other. Instead of ineffec tive individual opposition, the press declared that the public should intervene en masse against hooliganism. Underlining the necessity of moving from individual intervention to collective opposition, a 1956 Izvestiia article stated: “If a hooligan does meet resistance it is only from a few brave individuals. The hooligan can deal with them easily. Instead, we need to mobilize all the pedestrians, all the passengers in the street car, and all the spectators at the movie theater. Against their united resistance the hooligan is helpless.”17 Collective intervention worked because the hooligan, it was argued, was a coward who would stop his crime and run away at the first sign of resistance. “A hooligan thinks he is a hero when he is not checked,” a judge told Komsomolskaia pravda. “People need only treat him as he deserves and he will stop.”18 Cartoons that showed the hooligan retreating in front of united public resistance reinforced this point and encouraged collective forms of opposition.19 The idea of stimulating social activism and using it to police disorder and deviancy was not new. From the 1920s onward, various volunteer groups performed auxiliary police functions and, during World War II, helped provide public protection against “spies and saboteurs.”20 The state had also long used the comrades’ courts as an instrument for adju dicating minor disputes and enforcing labor discipline, especially during the prewar period.21 What was new about the Khrushchev program was its extent. In the obshchestvennost’ program, the Khrushchev regime sought to create a mass community of activists to whom it could hand off the problem of policing and punishing hooliganism.
Violent Vigilantism and the Obshchestvennost’ Campaign Scholars, such as Harold Berman and G eorge Breslauer, have interpreted the obshchestvennost’ experiment as an outgrowth of Khrushchev’s populist, pro-mobilization leadership style and his ideological agenda of quickening the pace of communist construction.22 By spinning off state functions to social activists and increasing community participation in policing and punishing petty criminals, Khrushchev hoped to wither away the state’s punitive apparatus and train the Soviet citizenry to function in the stateless self-regulating Communist society to come.23 Rather than linking it to ideology and leadership style, Oleg Kharkhor din has interpreted the policy to outsource the anti-hooligan campaign
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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to obshchestvennost’ as an effort to increase social self-policing, achieve a mass system of total surveillance, and expand the regime’s social control capabilities.24 Through expanding the reach of obshchestvennost’ out ward, the Khrushchev regime, Kharkhordin argues, sought to replace the Stalinist system of totalitarianism from above with a more perva sive, omnipresent, and all-intrusive type of totalitarianism from below. Shying away from issues of social control and surveillance, other scholars have looked at the effect of the obshchestvennost’ campaign on the inner workings of the criminal justice system. Yoram Gorlizki has, for example, argued that public institutions, such as the comrades’ courts, served a useful function in lightening the criminal court system’s over crowded dockets. Appealing to obshchestvennost’, he argues, provided much-needed relief to an overburdened court system by providing an alternative venue for processing trivial and time-consuming cases.25 By focusing too narrowly on ideology or institution-building, how ever, historians have erased themes of physical confrontation and violence from the story of how the obshchestvennost’ campaign operated. Or, they have written off violent vigilantism as the unintended outcome of break-neck social mobilization, bad recruitment practices, poor personnel oversight, and lack of training.26 However, violence, instead of being the unintended outcome of bad apples slipping into the volun teer system, was an integral part of the state’s campaign to outsource policing to obshchestvennost’. The state wanted ordinary citizens to enlist in obshchestvennost’ so that they could take back city streets and take the offensive in the fight against persistent crime. If those citizens hurt a few criminals in the process—so be it. Certainly, the druzhina was a training ground for a society of activists and a symbol of the withering away of the state’s punitive power in the run-up to the self-regulating communist community to come. Certainly, it was a practical way for a cash-strapped state to augment a failing police force by outsourcing petty crime policing on the cheap. However, the druzhina also provided a platform for unleashing legiti mate popular violence in the confrontation between community and criminal. In addition to being an institution of social s elf-mobilization, the druzhina was an instrument for creating, controlling, and co-opting vigilante violence in the service of a full-spectrum fight against the enduring problem of crime. Through the druzhina, segments of the state sought to harness the power of popular violence in the anti-crime and anti-hooligan campaign, a power whose legitimacy and necessity were both being newly recognized in the mid-1950s.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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In the mid-1950s, the state rethought accepted precedents that limited the role of community activism in crime control, negotiated new rules of permissible popular violence, and adopted a new proactive fight-back philosophy in the relationship between community and criminal. One signal of the state’s increasing tolerance of popular anti-crime activities and its shift from penalizing to promoting violent vigilantism in the mid-1950s was its redrafting of self-defense legisla tion. Pushed by concerned citizens and Party elites, the USSR Supreme Court expanded the boundaries of permissible popular viol ence out ward and, in the process, created a space for vigilante violence in the anti-crime campaign, a space that gave local communities wide leeway to get tough against hooligans. In the summer and fall of 1956, a series of articles appeared in Litera turnaia gazeta and other mass circulation papers on the question of self-defense. A feuilleton by Semen Narin’iani entitled “Instead of Thanks” appeared in Pravda as a part of this series.27 The feuilleton told the story of several men who, having used violence to defend other people from hooliganism, had found themselves under criminal prosecu tion. In one such case, a worker at a local factory came to the aid of a policeman whom hooligans were beating. During the course of the struggle, the worker hit the hooligans and, subsequently, was himself arrested and, ironically, brought on trial for hooliganism. The investigator . . . explained that, after Saikov [the worker] had struck one of the hooligans, the hooligans ceased being hooligans and became victims while the victim Saikov became a hooligan. “In acting in self-defense, Saikov exceeded permissible limits,” said the judge. “What do you mean exceeded? He received twenty blows and gave only one in return.” “That doesn’t matter [said the judge]. Saikov should not have raised a finger against the hooligans. He should have tried to talk to them.” “These people are not judges, but some kind of non-resisting pacifists,” said Secretary Zubarev of the local Komsomol organization.28
By setting very narrow or nonexistent parameters of permissible violence, the current self-defense statute, the feuilleton complained, took violence out of the repertoire of acceptable social reactions to crime. At the same time as it left individuals unable to defend them selves, it eroded commonsense distinctions between offenders and defenders. Many readers could not understand why fighting back against crime made a man a hooligan rather than a hero. Describing his own experience fighting back against hooligans, a Moscow man wrote
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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to Pravda about how shocked he was to be prosecuted rather than applauded for saving a woman from hooligan harassment: “It turns out that [in the course of the struggle] I maimed the hooligan. ‘Well,’ says the jurist, ‘they are going to convict you.’ I was astonished by this answer and began to explain that I was defending myself against a hooligan and that I did a noble thing by protecting the woman [whom the hooligan was harassing]. Regardless of this fact, the jurist confirmed that they were still going to convict me all the same.”29 The existing self-defense law not only blurred the line between victim and victimizer, it rewarded cowardice instead of courage. Narin’iani’s feuilleton continued, excoriating the RSFSR’s self-defense legislation for penalizing the actions of real men who confronted criminals and condoning the cowardice of the weak ones who cringed before them.
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For us, [Saikov] is a hero. And yet the court thinks that Filimonov, not Saikov, is the real hero. Filimonov had seen the scandal caused by the hooligans. He had heard the victim’s call for help, but had done nothing. “I was shining my shoes,” he claims. Filimonov had seen the hooligans beating up their victim and had not come to his aid. “I had no time. I was shining my shoes.” One of the hooligans had struck Filimonov on the ear and Filimonov had looked at the offender meekly and again bent over his shoes. It revolted Goncharova [the judge] to hear the testimony of this healthy young man, this coward. But Goncharova was forced to go against her convictions and subject to punishment real men like Saikov: bold, honorable men who should have received the public’s thanks. And all of this happened because of outmoded articles of the criminal code.30
The Narin’iani feuilleton not only attacked an insuffic ient self-defense statute, it celebrated a vision of masculinity that equated vigilante violence with “bold and honorable manhood.” By signaling out for shame those who stood aside and failed to fight back, it called on all “healthy young men” to stand up, collectively confront the criminal, and use, if need be, aggressive force to fight back against hooliganism. The response to media pieces such as Narin’iani’s was overwhelming and catapulted the issue of permissible violence to the forefront of the anti-crime debate. Letters poured into state agencies and newspapers on the self-defense issue. Letter writers attacked the self-defense law for teaching Soviet citizens to be passive in the face of crime and for putting the brave people who stood up to crime “on the defendant’s bench next to the hooligans.”31 Writing on how the overly narrow law on self-defense allowed courts to act as “defenders of hooliganism,”32 a
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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man wrote in response to a Pravda article: “Imagine if Griaznov and Baranov had gone to the aid of their comrade and, in the heat of the moment (v azarte), they broke one of the hooligan’s arms. They would be dragged to court [and suffer the consequences]. At the same time, it would immediately be discovered that the hooligan was a sweet and innocent boy.”33 By imposing excessive costs and consequences on good Samaritans, the self-defense statute encouraged inaction and gave Soviet citizens perverse incentives to decrease rather than increase popular participa tion in local anti-crime campaigning. “The Soviet intelligentsia is taught that they should not lay hands on the crimin al (rukoprikladstvom),” a Leningrad teacher wrote, “but should run away.”34 Instead of encour aging an activist “Soviet morality,” a man from Moscow denounced the Soviet judicial system for judging vigilante violence from a “pacifist Christian perspective” and for conditioning Soviet citizens to “turn the other cheek” to viol ent offenders.35 The letter writers believed that they had a right to confront criminals and hooligans with violent force, a right that the current self-defense legislation denied. The self-defense statute, as a student at the Gorky Institute of World Literature put it, “hinder[ed] us from setting upon the scoundrels and grabbing them by the neck” because it took the option of violent confrontation between community and criminal off the table.36 Like their citizens, high Soviet officials showed an interest in pushing out the parameters of self defense and encouraging a violent collective confrontation against criminality. Less than a week after the publica tion of Narin’iani’s piece, the highest political body in the country, the Presidium, discussed the issues raised in the feuilleton and acknowl edged the correctness of the author’s conclusions. In a top-secret decree, the Presidium blasted the USSR Procuracy and the USSR Supreme Court for their “bureaucratic slowness” and instructed both bodies to review the republics’ self-defense legislation immediately and to publish popular explanations in the press on the interpretation of these laws.37 Law enforcement officials were quick to adapt to the new Party line on the issue of self-defense. At a November 1956 meeting of Moscow regional administrative workers, the USSR General Prosecutor R. A. Rudenko, for example, strongly condemned the narrow interpretation of self-defense, claiming: “This is, of course, incorrect, contradicts our socialist morality, and trains (vospityvat’) our citizenry to act like cowards. Our citizens have the right to defend themselves. This is their function, their right.”38
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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To encourage an “active fight against criminals” and following the explicit instructions of the Presidium to review self-defense legislation, the USSR Supreme Court reinterpreted the restrictive self-defense statute to allow a space for popular violence in the anti-hooligan fight. Cautioning lower courts not to take a “mechanical approach” to selfdefense, the USSR Supreme Court, in an October 1956 guiding instruc tion, legitimized popular violence as a valid response to hooligan actions. It allowed Soviet citizens to use force against any attack or threat of attack at any degree thought reasonable so long as the criminal re fused to cease his crime and the force was not motivated by a spirit of “vengeance or retribution.” Following the Presidium’s orders and the Supreme Court’s instruction, newspapers published interviews with Supreme Court members and explanatory essays to acquaint the public with the expanding limits of permissible viol ence.39 The 1956 USSR Supreme Court instruction on self-defense was designed to unleash popular forces in the anti-hooligan campaign. It was designed to proclaim the public’s right to use violence against criminal aggression and to create a wide space for the public to exercise that right. It also signaled to lower courts that they should allow more freedom for the application of force in self-defense cases. The desire to push out the limits of permissible violence in the public fight against hooliganism prompted a justice to note to his colleagues at the October Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court: “If the courts allow some extreme leeway (krainost’) in the application of this instruction it will be justified because the resolution is directed at drawing citizens into an active struggle against hooliganism and crime.”40 The USSR Supreme Court showed its support for violent self-defense by overturning lower court convictions of a man who had beaten a hooligan to death with an iron bar and of a man who had stabbed a hooligan several times. The court advertised these exonerations in a mass circulation paper that was aimed at the youth audience they were hoping to mobilize to the anti-hooligan cause.41 The prehistory of the obshchestvennost’ experiment was one of soften ing self-defense legislation and encouraging collectives to forcefully confront criminality. It was a communal call to arms against the hooli gan other replete with the rhetoric of violent vigilantism, a language of “laying hands” on the hooligans, of “grabbing them by the neck,” of “leading an active struggle,” “of striking first,” or “striking back.” Perhaps not surprisingly, one of the most vocal supporters of un leashing the power of popular violence was Khrushchev. During a 1957
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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visit to the Khabarovsk region, Khrushchev encouraged the community to take c harge of its crime problem and told them in clear terms not to be afraid to hit back against the hooligan: “The hooligan is a coward. He is a hero only so long as nobody stands up to him and grabs him by the back of the neck. So, go ahead and grab the hooligan by the neck and show him his place. Workers should not be afraid to bring the hooli gan to order. Bring the violator to heel (Obuzdaite narushitelia)! We cannot tolerate his kind anymore! Show him that the workers are the boss of this town and not the hooligan.42 Several years later during a speech to Komsomol activists, Khru shchev reminded his audience that violent vigilantism was an acceptable response to aggressive deviants. Recalling his own experience in preRevolutionary Ukraine, Khrushchev told his young listeners about how they handled hooligans in the unruly industrial towns of his youth: “I grew up at the mines in the Donets Basin. The hooligans were running wild there, but the honest people defended themselves. How did they defend themselves? Not by praying for deliverance from the hooligans, but by more effective means!”43 The “stir” that broke out in the hall and the “applause” that followed s howed that his views on unleashing the power of popular violence in the anti-crime campaign had not fallen on deaf ears. Violence accompanied the advent of the obshchestvennost’ campaign and, especially, the anti-crime activities of the druzhina. Empowering obshchestvennost’ led to confrontations that often escalated into the application of brute force. A Cheliabinsk activist wrote that the con frontation between determined druzhinniki and desperate crimin als had “on more than one occasion produced sharp skirmishes” in which physical injuries were inflicted and received.44 Casualties were a part of the popular policing process. The mass press carried several stories of druzhinniki who had been wounded or killed in the line of duty and had received special awards and medals for their service, stories that not only underlined the bravery of public volunteers but also the level of violence unleashed by the outsourcing of public policing to obshchestvennost’.45 Fear was also prevalent as vulnerable, unarmed druzhinniki were sent out onto unsafe city streets and criminal elements resorted to terror tactics to intimid ate the agents of obshchestvennost’. Druzhinniki reported that criminals beat them and warned them not to continue their patrol activities.46 In other instances, criminals used the threat of death to deter druzhina activism, as in the case of a thief caught with a list of druzhina members’ names that the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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local crimin al underworld had sentenced to death for their anti-crime activities.47 Initially, some law enforcement agents dealt with those who assaulted or slandered druzhinniki under the 1956 petty hooligan decree. By making it an administrative offense subject to short-term incarceration or fines, these local law enforcers essentially decriminalized antidruzhina activity and turned a blind eye to aggressive street-corner resistance to the activism of obshchestvennost’.48 However, mounting criticism and concern over the vulnerability of volunteers led the state to reconsider the criminal costs of anti-obshchestvennost’ violence. In 1962, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet acknowledged the dangers of anti-druzhina violence and passed a decree granting stiff custodial sentences (five to fifteen years) or the death penalty to those who used force against or attempted to kill an on-duty druzhinnik, a decree that n icely complemented the other hard-line law enforcement measures introduced in that year (see chapter 5).49 The violent undercurrent of the obshchestvennost’ campaign helps put the actions of over-the-top druzhinniki in perspective. Foreign observers and the Soviet press often made mention of the “rough” behavior of the druzhinniki.50 They decried the druzhina for forcibly cutting the hair and clothing of social undesirables and for roughing up those they identified (sometimes incorrectly) as offenders. Critics who complained about violent druzhinniki in contemporary newspapers and publica tions often described them as the products of improper recruitment or organizational infiltration.51 However, they were also part of the process of unleashing popular aggression, a process that was a central component of the obshchestvennost’ experiment and the campaign to soften rigid self-defense rules that preceded it. Violence was not alien to the obshchestvennost’ campaign. Just as injury and death were part of the human costs of collective confrontation, physical force and rough treatment were also an intrinsic part of the clash between the community of activists and the criminal world. In the confrontation, harsh tactics were not renounced. They were reshaped to strike out against a new assortment of society’s enemies. By promoting permissible violence and opening an area for vigilantism, the obshchestvennost’ experiment was not so much about getting rid of the power to regulate and punish Soviet society arbitrarily, aggressively, and extra-legally. It was about taking this power away from the police and giving it to the people instead.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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Measuring the Extent of Obshchestvennost’ The campaign to mobilize obshchestvennost’ called on every member of Soviet society to become involved in the anti-crime struggle and to stand up against anti-social activity. The press underlined the univer sality of the mobilization call by depicting and describing men and women, both young and old, playing their part to rid Soviet society of hooligans.52 Such media coverage inspired readers regardless of age and gender to join obshchestvennost’ and help the regime achieve mass membership.53 According to official statistics, the size of the volunteer movement during the Khrushchev period was immense, and its rate of growth was extremely rapid. In July 1960, the druzhina, less than a year after the resolution establishing its existence was announced, comprised 80,000 patrol units with a membership around 2.5 million. By July 1965, this number had grown to the incredible figure of 130,000 patrols and 4.5 million members.54 However, these outsized numbers often obscured and inflated the real level of volunteer activity and under stated the difficulties officials faced in drafting activists on the side of obshchestvennost’. The attempt to transfer the policing and prosecution of deviants to obshchestvennost’ faced a big problem in the localities—many people did not want to volu nt eer. Memb ers hip in the org ani zat ions of obshchestvennost’ involved heavy time investments that cut down on after-work leisure and, especially in the case of druzhina membership, exposed volunteers to the physical dangers associated with policing activities. Lacking the right to carry weapons on patrol and often with out the means to call in back-up in cases of attack, the druzhinniki were sometimes outgunned and outnumbered by the criminals they were supposed to detain. They were also the potential targets of revenge attacks, physical harassment, or public ridicule. Sent to confront crimi nality with little protection, many druzhinniki, as a pensioner told the Supreme Soviet, were in constant fear of being assaulted, intimidated, or murdered while on patrol duty. My son is a member of the militia assistance brigade. However, he has stopped working with them. When I became interested in his lack of desire to work in the brigade my son and his friends told me that they lack the right working conditions. They gave examples when hoodlums (zhuliki ) and
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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criminals beat them and warned them that if they catch them again then they will be killed. The parents of many brigade members pressured them to quit such work saying that the life of their children is too dear to them. Without weapons, the members of the brigade cannot do anything. They are scared and do not even approach them [the criminals]. Such a situation is unbearable and intolerable. . . . They are unarmed except for a red armband that does absolutely nothing to scare off hooligans or bandits.55
The potential physical costs of joining druzhina units, as the pensioner’s letter made clear, had an adverse effect on membership rates. The state responded to this negative feedback with a positive publicity campaign and with the creation and awarding of distinguished service medals to druzhinniki.56 Through medals and citations, the state at tempted to create a new and more positive public image of the druzhina, stop the high turnover and organizational exod us, and fill membership gaps with fresh cohorts. Yet despite efforts at inspiring the public to enroll, the druzhina experienced a persistent problem in recruiting and replenishing its personnel. By themselves, voluntary recruitment drives made little headway in creating a mass membership.57 In the rush to expand obshchestvennost’ enrollments and pad unit rosters, workplaces sometimes abandoned the principle of voluntary membership and drafted workers into the druzhina.58 Blanket enrollments, in which entire work collectives were drafted into the volunteer effort, were also used to build mass member ships posthaste in the face of unenthusiastic employees.59 Enterprise directors, struggling to inflate their obshchestvennost’ enrollments, also resorted to stuffing units with nonexistent activists. The rush to follow central policy and build a massive grassroots volunteer system without the necessary material and manpower led to the pro liferation of Potemkin organizations staffed by rosters of virtual volun teers. Many druzhina units were like the ones in the Belgorod region, which a local offic ial admitted “were created only on paper.”60 The pressure to maximize enrollments as quickly as possible also prompted workplaces to bypass the druzhina’s time-consuming vetting procedures. According to druzhina regulations, prospective members over the minimum age of 18 had to send a letter of intent indicating their desire to join up and had to receive the support of the collective where they worked, studied, or resided, a requirement that demanded convening a meeting of the collective and holding a vote.61 Ignoring
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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or waivi ng these req uirem ents ena b led the rapid exp ans ion of o bshchestvennost’, but it also allowed improper applicants and “morally unsuitable persons” to get around screening safeguards and into the druzhina.62 As a result, a Leningrad institute appointed as its druzhina commander a man who had just been released from serving a ten-day detention for petty hooliganism and a factory in Belgorod elected as comrades’ court chairman a convicted thief who had served fifteen years in detention and been caught stealing goods from the same factory whose court he now chaired.63 By empowering rather than eliminating criminals, the RSFSR Supreme Court complained that poor recruitment methods drafted into the anti-crime fight “persons who during their patrols commit crimes themselves.”64 There were reports of druzhinniki shaking down citiz ens, such as in the case of a druzhina commander who stole furs, a pair of felt boots, and a sweater from a man at the local market and of a druzhinnik who stole a drunk’s watch while accompanying him to the sobering-up station.65 In this way, the line between druzhinnik and crimin al was increasingly blurred during the campaign drive. Crimin als were be coming druzhinniki through on-the-fly enrollment and improper vetting. And druzhinniki were becoming criminals who turned the druzhina into an institutional vehicle for personal aggrandizement, harassment, and rent-seeking and took advantage of the unregulated policing power that had been transferred to them in order to prey on the population they were recruited to protect. Many druzhina units were not only short of volunteers, they were starved for supplies as well. Complicating provisioning problems was the fact that many druzhina bodies lacked the organizational clout and bureaucratic pull to command scarce resources from local administra tions. Some local druzhina had diffic ulty finding a space for their head quarters. Others lacked access to the basic office supplies needed to record their organizational activity.66 Like their professional police counterparts, many druzhina headquarters lacked means of transporta tion and communication and, therefore, had difficulty coordinating field patrols and dispatching units to emerging crime scenes quickly.67 The state’s desire to create a mass infrastructure of grassroots volun teer organizations ex nihilo often outpaced the ability of local governments and workplaces to realize them given their material and manpower constraints. The result was a rush to bring on line “flash” institutions that satisfied central policies but often disappeared soon after they were
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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f ormed or persisted only on paper. Forced to shoulder the costs and responsibilities of the obshchestvennost’ campaign despite competing production and personal priorities, some localities, workplaces, and volunteers followed a strategy of building potemkin institutions that created the appearance of compliance to state goals. On paper, the grassroots obshchestvennost’ start-ups numbered in the tens of thousands and were effective in rolling back crime rates. In reality, the druzhina and comrades’ courts were often underfunded, overstretched, and had service records that ranged from irregular to nonexistent. The life cycle of obshchestvennost’ start-ups often followed a campaign rhythm marked by initial bouts of rapid creation followed by the equally rapid onset of organizational inertia.68 The activity level of start-ups tended to fall off precipitously with time. For example, of the twentynine druzhina units created in the Kirov district of Krasnoiarsk, only two continued to do work of any kind when they were checked.69 In Saratov’s Balakov district, watchdogs discovered that only half of the area’s twenty-four comrades’ courts were active and working. The rest had stopped meeting altogether.70 Membership rolls followed a similar campaign dynamic of initial high enrollment followed by rapid orga nizational exod us and understaffing.71 Many obshchestvennost’ startups only operated for a short time, dissolved, or inched along out of inertia and remained active only as a line on a bureaucrat’s ledger.72 After a heroic opening phase, many of the organizations that these local bureaucrats threw together sank into lethargy as the public atten tion, material, and manpower resources originally allocated to them dried up. The druzhinniki of Tatar ASSR’s Factory #159, for example, were criticized for doing nothing else in five months except bringing five drunks to the police—despite the fact that the druzhina supposedly consisted of 466 active members.73 The USSR Procuracy declared that many druzhina units were “in essence inactive” or only able to field a handful of hardcore activists to support their activity.74 Like the druzhina, the comrades’ courts also suffered from similar problems of understaffing and organizational lethargy. For instance, a report discovered that Omsk’s 139 comrades’ courts tried only 383 cases for all of 1963, suggesting an annual per court caseload of around three cases.75 Many comrades’ courts, such as the one created in Moscow’s Bolshevik confectionary factory, did not hold sessions for years at a time or, as in the case of a comrades’ court in Mezhdurechinsk, did not examine any cases at all and disbanded after a short period of virtual existence.76
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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Outside the Limits of Socialist Legality: The Khrushchev Era Comrades’ Courts The comrades’ courts were work or residence-based institutions whose members were elected by their collectives. Their main task, according to the 1961 RSFSR comrades’ court statute, was “to prevent violations of law and misdemeanors detrimental to society, to educate people by persuasion and social influence, and to create an attitude of intolerance toward any antisocial acts.” To accomplish these tasks, comrades’ courts could order the offender to apologize, censure him, fine him up to ten rubles, propose that he be demoted or evicted, or require him to pay damages to the victim in any amount up to fifty rubles.77 Scholars have interpreted the creation of the comrades’ court system, in part, as an attempt by a resource-poor state to extend its criminal justice system on the cheap and relieve the case burden on an over burdened people’s court system by creating alternative disciplinary venues.78 However, they did not always work this way. The punishment of petty hooliganism is a textbook case of the malfunctioning of the volunteer court system. Despite central attempts to transfer more cases to the alternative system of volunteer courts, the criminal courts and police in republics such as the RSFSR sent an insignificant number of petty cases to their comrades’ court peers, ranging from a low of 2.6 percent in 1961 to a high of 10.9 percent in 1964.79 The constricted flow of petty cases to the volunteer courts underlined the disconnect that existed between state goals to minimize pressure on the criminal justice system via transfer ring petty crime to obshchestvennost’ and local punishment practices that emphasized criminal courts over comrades’ courts. Instead of picking up the system’s slack, the comrades’ courts were, more often than not, isolated and ignored by their professional counterparts in the criminal justice system. The operation of the comrades’ courts revealed the tension that existed between central policies and local practices. It also unveiled a central tension within Khrushchev’s legal program itself: the tension between the program of socialist legality and the policy of outsourcing certain case categories to the arbitrary, ill-trained, and unprofessional agents of obshchestvennost’. By subjecting citizens to punitive power that was often capricious and unregulated, the comrades’ courts hindered rather than helped the program of improving socialist legality in the Soviet Union.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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Socialist legality was the keyword of the Khrushchev-era criminal just ice s ystem. To elimi n ate the arb it rary, unc hecked, and ill eg al measures associated with Stalinist terror, the Khrushchev administra tion sought to create a legal culture based on professionalism and respect for codified legal and procedural canons. These measures, it was hoped, would safeguard the population from the arbitrary will of state agents.80 However, as the obshchestvennost’ campaign showed, the regime’s rhetoric of socialist legality had its limits. And outside those limits, where volunteers improvised their own laws beyond the state’s regulatory oversight, stood the comrades’ courts. Initially, comrades’ courts acted and existed beyond the boundaries of legality for one simple reason—because there was initially no law governing their increased responsibilities. The state had published a draft statute on the comrades’ courts on October 24, 1959, lobbied aggres sively to create comrades’ courts in workplaces and residential units throughout the country, and signaled that petty crime cases should be transferred to their jurisdiction. However, it did not pass a final statute on comrades’ courts until July 3, 1961. In their rush to outsource the punishment of petty criminals to volunteer bodies and bring as many units on line as quickly as possible, the state did everything to promote the growth of comrades’ courts but failed to legalize their status as valid sites of discipline. “It is impossible to consider the legal basis of the comrades’ courts as normal,” a comrades’ court deputy chairman admitted to the Supreme Soviet “in reality they are, so to say, only half legal.”81 Lacking a legal foundation on which to operate, comrades’ courts, as a volunteer court in Kiev noted, had “no legal right to apply measures of public influence (vozdeistviia) to the lawbreakers ( pravona rushiteli)” that the state was sending to them.82 In the absence of legal standing and lacking sentencing guidelines, some comrades’ courts used the published draft law as the basis for their sentencing and procedural functions although many, like this Moscow lawyer, worried about the legitimacy of “applying this draft in real life . . . when it is still not a law but only a draft?”83 Still other local comrades’ courts used the window of freedom created by the time lag between draft and law to create their own justice, a process that led, in the view of its critics, to diversity, arbitrariness, and illegality. Forced by the legal limbo to infer and improvise rules and procedures on the spot, comrades’ courts created their own sentencing and procedural standards. The result was a complex polyphony of local practices that sometimes contradicted state law and led to confrontations with local
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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government and judicial bodies.84 As volunteer courts overshot their mandate and wandered into their jurisdictional territory, suspicious local officials often refused, as a Moscow lawyer explained, to rubber stamp the sentences of their comradely counterparts or issue orders for the implementation of their decisions. As a result, some minor offenders were able to slip out of the volunteer system undisciplined.85
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In the work of the comrades’ courts there is one serious shortcoming . . . The local executive committee is overloaded with complaints on the decisions of the comrades’ courts. This happens because the [comrades’] courts are guided by a draft statute and they apply all the sanctions that are included in this draft. But at the same time, it is impossible to apply any of these sanctions in practice because it is only a draft [and not a law]. The [comrades’] courts impose a fine. But nobody in the court has the legal power to levy such a fine. The citizens complain about these illegal fines. The district execut ive committee considers that this is illegal and changes the sentences [of the comrades’ courts]. This creates great hardships in the work of the comrades’ c ourts because they find themselves in two positions: on the one hand it is said to them “go ahead and judge,” while, on the other hand, it turns out that when they do judge then the executive committee changes their sentences.86
The state’s inability to legalize the comrades’ courts during the first crucial years of their operation undercut their popular legitimacy and, by bringing up the question of the comrades’ courts’ legal right to try cases, allowed citizens to contest their decisions. A comrades’ court chair man from Moscow’s Bauman district complained that “in the collective the residents say that the court has no right to examine cases.”87 In their rush to create comrades’ courts on the ground as quickly as possible, the state sacrificed their legal standing and, in so doing, inadvertently sabotaged their ability to function effectively as agents of punishment in a post-Stalinist culture of socialist legality. The comrades’ court and the druzhina operated as nonprofessional sites where the agents of obshchestvennost’ could create and enforce their own vision of justice outside the limits of socialist legality. The Kirov regional court warned the RSFSR Supreme Court that “the comrades’ courts frequently go beyond the boundaries of the rights that have been given to them and make illegal decisions.”88 At a meeting of the Presidium of the Moscow College of Lawyers, a speaker, discussing the legal illiteracy of the comrades’ courts, commented that “there are masses of mistakes and, it is possible to say, arbitrariness ( proizvol) in the decisions of the comrades’ courts.”89 Reports told of comrades’ courts
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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carrying out a large number of “incorrect sentences,” that were not specified in the comrades’ court statute, such as exile from villages, excessive fines, and corrective labor.90 Some rural comrades’ courts took away labor days from collective farmers or forced defendants to perform compulsory community service, such as digging and cleaning irrigation ditches.91 Poor regulation, oversight, and guidance were blamed for volunteer malpractice. According to the law, local labor unions and governments were to oversee the operation of the obshchestvennost’ courts. In reality, overlapping jurisdictions in the regulatory structure, limited resources, and competing policy priorities meant that neither body performed its watchdog tasks effectively. Instead of being walked through the start-up process, many obshchestvennost’ spin-offs complained that the legal establishment ignored them. The chairman of the Vologda region “Memories of Ily’ich” comrades’ court wrote in exasperation to the USSR Supreme Soviet: “Nobody is interested in our affairs. [Nobody gives us any] advice. Nobody wants to acknowledge our existence.”92 Another comrades’ court chairman from Moscow complained that “nobody guides (rukovodit) the local comrades’ courts. . . . And all this brings confusion into our work.”93 The companion of the comrades’ courts in the obshchestvennost’ experi ment, the druzhina, also had trouble staying within the confines of codified law and canonical procedure. Like the comrades’ courts, the druzhina often functioned outside effective rules and regul ation. In its arbitrary applications and loose interpretations of the crimin al categ ory of hooliganism, it acted less like a site of socialist legality and more like an institutional amplifier of deviance.
The Druzhina as an Institutional Amplifier of Deviance Like the comrades’ courts, the druzhina was an elected institution that (ideally) local labor collectives chose. Elected commanders would draw up patrol schedules and routes, and druzhinniki, usually several times a month and in groups of two or more, would walk their assigned beat looking for signs of suspicious or criminal activity. In practice, the dru zhina was charged with maintaining public order, combating petty crime (such as hooliganism, drunkenness, theft, and speculation), and enforc ing traffic regulations. To accomplish these diverse tasks, a druzhinnik’s main weapon was “persuasion and warning.” Offenders who were resistant to moral
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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lecturing were to be escorted to police or druzhina headquarters for processing and punishment. The druzhina was also charged with con tacting the offender’s work unit and place of residence and informing them of the transgression.94 One of the druzhina’s main weapons in the fight against hooliganism was the use of public shaming techniques, such as exposing offenders to the gaze of the assembled collective through satirical cartoons, wall newspapers, and public displays of offenders’ photographs. Being publicly displayed as a hooligan, the deviant was stigmatized in the court of public opinion, exposed to the ridicule of his collective, and started on the long road to rehabilitation. The humiliation that public shaming practices produced was vividly communicated in a 1956 Trud article: “The student was deeply ashamed when he saw his own picture in the regular issue of the Komsomol Patrol, read the satirical verses about his behavior and heard the laughter and indignant words of those standing near. It seemed to him that even as he walked down the street fingers were pointing at him. There he is, the hooligan student.”95 In satirical articles named “heroes not of our time,” “guests of the druzhina,” or “zor’kii” (a well-known camera model), offenders were exhibited to such an effect that they “begged” the paper’s editors to remove their photos and caricatures, explaining that “anything is better than to blush before the gaze of your fellow citizens and to hear their taunts.” In Vyborg, a shamed hooligan admitted that he had lost thirteen pounds after the druzhina exhibited his picture, and in Astrakhan’ a man attacked a local editor for displaying an insulting caricature of him and his girlfriend.96 Druzhina shaming practices also took more imaginative forms. For example, a problem drinker and frequent hooligan was forced to receive his pay from a fair booth shaped like a bottle of Osobaia moskovskaia (a popular brand of vodka), a technique that a certain Comrade Kotov claimed would cause the offender to be “embarrassed and forsake alcohol.”97 In a Gor’kii factory, they placed signs at the workstations of troublesome workers that read “here works a drunk and a truant (progul’shchik).”98 In the Leningrad region, the druzhina wrote a program exposing and satirizing wrongdoers and broadcast it, through loud speakers, at every local house of culture, before every movie screening, and before every sporting event held at the local stadium.99 The fight against hooliganism in public places was a core part of the druzhina’s mandate. However, the mobilization of the druzhina took place in an atmosphere of extreme ambiguity and tension over what
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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constituted hooliganism and what constituted a private space during a time when problematic dichotomies of public and private and indi vidual and collective were being contested. Hooliganism’s broadness and ambiguity as a distinct criminal category had drastic effects on illeducated volunteers’ ability to identify what was hooliganism and who was a hooligan. Empowered by a discourse and campaign of mobiliza tion, driven by an atmosphere of fear over rising rates of hooliganism yet lacking a clear idea of what hooliganism was, druzhinniki fell prey to a process that Stuart Hall has termed “signification spiral.”100 The main signification spiral process, according to Hall, is “conver gence.” During the convergence phase, two distinct activities are linked together based on an assumed shared attribute, and new social prob lems are understood through being placed in the context of familiar ones. Druzhina prosecution practices exhibited such a convergence between hooliganism (norm-breaking behavior that resulted in the criminal disruption of and disrespect for society) and deviations from established conventions (differences in standard dress or behavioral style). In other words, ill-educated druzhinniki frequently understood hooliganism as anything that was culturally out of the ordinary or that subverted conventional moral norms, whether it was socially disruptive or not. Via convergence linking, druzhinniki understood as hooliganism such trivial norm-breaking actions as walking outside the designated path of a park, discarding cigarette butts on the sidewalk, going out in public “clad in pajamas,” cruelty to cats, and sending insulting letters through the mail.101 The most striking example of signification spiral in druzhina prosecution practices was the labeling of visual displays of cultural difference or nonconformity as hooliganism. A 1963 Komso molskaia pravda letter told the story of a woman who was labeled as a hooligan, had her picture displayed on the “wall of shame,” and was kicked out of the Komsomol for dancing the “Charleston.” When the newspaper’s editors called the local Komsomol secretary to ask about why she had been punished as a hooligan, the secretary responded: “She is quite strange, you know. . . . She hasn’t bought a bed for one thing and everyone has white curtains hanging in the windows, but she hangs red ones.”102 Individual displays of difference, deviations from fashion norms, and stylistic pluralism attracted the druzhina’s frequent intervention and sanctioning as public violations of social order. An Izvestiia reader wrote a letter complaining that the druzhina brought his 17-year-old
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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daughter to the police station along with “drunken hooligans” because “she had her scarf tied around her head in a certain way.” The editor responded angrily that volunteer patrols needed more education on what their actual responsibilities in maintaining public order were and declared: “The girl’s manner of dress was hardly more coquettish than that of any other girl.”103 The Sochi druzhina was particularly infamous for sanctioning indi viduals deviating from fashion norms. The conflation of hooliganism and cultural difference in druzhina prosecution patterns was exem plified in the Sochi druzhina’s practice of labeling displays of difference, such as men wearing narrow pants or bright shirts, as examples of hooliganism. Dyed red and black shirts, according to local volunteers, were worn by hooligans “who annoy girls when drunk and start fights on the dance floor.” Based on this spurious correlation, volunteers reasoned meton ymically (identifying a whole by one of its constitut ive parts) that “consequently, when you see a person who is distinguished from others by the color of his shirt, do not expect good of him.”104 The volunteers’ imagining of the ambiguo us legal category of hooli ganism in terms of deviations from standardized cultural conventions in local dress styles was subject to growing press critic ism. Exhibiting a link between the enthusiasm inherent in anti-hooligan campaigning and the illegitimate extension of hooliganism to noncrimin al acts, Kom somolskaia pravda responded critically to a druzhina leader’s confession that “‘perhaps we overdid things a bit. Sometimes the fellows were carried away by their enthusiasm and detained worthy persons because they were dressed somewhat out of the ordinary [the captain said].’ To fight parasites, hooligans, and other harmful elements is a noble and necessary task. But can one confuse such trash with working people whose only sin is that they dressed differently from the stan dard and in a way to which some Sochi Komsomol members were not accustomed.”105 The creation of a sphere of intolerance in which the slightest devia tion (wrong scarf knot, improper shirt pattern, nonstandard curtain color) from convention was labeled as hooliganism did not create an orderly public sphere. It created public resentment. In addition, the diffusion and proliferation of rules of public conduct through pamph lets, posters, and lectures made citiz ens feel self-conscious of the ever-present possibility of being labeled as a lawbreaker. A 1959 Ogonek article, for example, complained: “Indeed, comrades, have not too many ‘rules’ and ‘obligatory regulations’ appeared in our lives? As
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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soon as you leave your apartment you are no longer an ordinary citizen but a potential rule breaker and hooligan. You are admonished by announcements, posters, and appeals as if you are a hooligan and do not know how to behave in decent society.”106 The increasingly broad application of hooliganism to increasing numbers of people based on ambiguous conduct rules prompted Kom somolskaia pravda to observe that “the druzhina see practically everyone as a hooligan. They degrade and insult people for no reason at all”107 The mounting confusion between misdemeanor, stylistic difference, and hooliganism in druzhina sanctioning practices resulted in the exten sion of the types of actions considered as hooliganism as well as in the class of people identified as hooligans. Broad definitions of hooliganism not only affected the convergence strategies that volunteers used to identify hooligans, but also where they looked for hooliganism. Just as private actions in private spaces (apartment hooliganism and wife beating, for example) were being reconfigured as acts with public significance in the legal sphere, volun teers identified public hooligan disruptions in both the private world of the domestic and in individual expressions of style and taste. The druzhina’s persecution of cultural difference as hooliganism was aimed at promoting homogenization by limiting individual behavior and choice to the conventions of local culture. However, the creation of a sphere of intolerance to diversity and its projection onto private areas of individual expression resulted in a backlash against an increasingly intrusive druzhina. Attacking the legitimacy of druzhina persecution, individuals defended displays of difference, in print, by phrasing difference in the rhetoric of privacy and individual choice. To protect small expressions of plurality, they rhetorically configured certain insig nificant but symbolically important parts of their world into small private spaces that were closed off from outside public intervention. A music patrol created by the druzhina “to fight against banality and teach good musical taste” prompted an anonymous letter from students. In their letter, the students defended difference by using the language of individual choice to challenge the legitimacy of public interference in matters of personal taste. “Our anger is beyond all bounds! What are you [the music patrol] trying to tell us? We ourselves can tell which music is good or bad.”108 In another instance, a woman, manipulating the rhetoric of privacy, defended stylistic plurality by appealing to a personal space beyond public intervention and control. Confronted by a druzhina p atrol for wearing pants and informed that her “indecent”
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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attire was disorderly, “Nina S., instead of candidly repenting her action and giving up the pants, became angry. She went so far as to assert that wearing pants was strictly a private matter.”109 Druzhina brigades, empowered with a broad, intrusive definition of hooliganism and understanding the private as open to public interven tion, showed an increasingly intrusive interest in monitoring domestic spaces. Such intrusive intervention in private space was viewed as a legitimate prophylactic aimed at preventing future violations of social order. “By intruding into people’s so-called personal lives,” a sympa thetic legal journal opined, “the druzhina have, in effect, saved them from committing crimes and helped them to embark on an honest life of labor.”110 Other druzhina supporters argued that successful street patrolling had pushed deviance indoors and that it was now necessary to bring the battle for public order to the homebound hooligan. Arguing that domestic intrusion was called for to save Soviet children, a druzhinnik in Cheliabinsk commented to an Oktiabr’ correspondent: “On the streets we have order. But in homes, behind closed doors, all kinds of things still happen. We must find a way to intrude (vtorzhenie) into the lives of families whose personal fights (chastnye skandaly) are ruining the lives of their children and warping and embittering their souls.”111 Originally, the druzhina statute gave the druzhinniki the right to enter only “public places,” such as movie theaters, clubs, and stadiums, to police public order infractions.112 Fueled by their increasingly intru sive interests in monitoring domestic space and taking advantage of the ambiguity between public/private borders, some druzhina units lobbied to expand their entry rights to include private apartments (chastnye kvartiry).113 By giving them the right to force entry into apart ments, the druzhina could police the final frontier of public disorder, the home, and extend public surveillance from the street to the family circle. However, both the press and the public contested the legitimacy of redefining the private sphere as a key site for druzhina intervention. Writing on a notorious Nikolaev brigade, Komsomolskaia pravda, for example, criticized the druzhina’s domestic surveillance practices and hinted that there were some private spaces in which the public gaze was unwelcome. For the Niko l aev druz hina, Koms om olsk aia p ravda complained, “the most important task is to peak into others’ bed rooms and to savor the details of their personal relations.”114 Druzhina surveillance prompted an angry citiz en to send a letter to the Supreme Soviet attacking such seemingly unwarranted intrusions: “If the activities of the druzhina and the comrades’ courts are developed any
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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further . . . then this will only lead to massive spying on the people and to the destruction of all human freedoms. I protest against this and against the slavery [which it will impose].”115 Such actors, facing aggressive druzhina intrusions into spaces of indi vidual choice and privacy, reasserted the separation of private life from public intervention. In a letter to Izvestiia, a 72-year-old pensioner told of a pair of druzhinniki who lived next to her. The druzhinniki, according to the woman, regularly listened at her door and reported on the pri vate activities that took place in her apartment to the local comrades’ court, calling her weekly family gatherings “binges,” and “orgies,” and reporting that her son was her lover. Izvestiia editorialized that the duty of public organizations to control and intervene in the private spaces of individuals, though it may be necessary for sanctioning and preventing hooliganism, was also an invasion of privacy when applied to non deviant actors: “The public [obshchestvennost’] will rightly be interested in how a person behaves, [and] will rebuff hooligans, but this has nothing in common with crude interference in the personal lives of good people or with secretive glancing into keyholes.”116 A press that in the apartment hooligan discourse blurred and con flated notions of public and private and social and individual by advo cating “throwing open” the doors of the private to public control now ad vocated shutting the door linking the public world to the private sphere of the individual. Instead of generating greater social-mindedness, in trusive druzhina practices also generated a concern with protecting and separating the private and domestic realms from unwarranted public intrusion. An unexpected consequence of the obshchestvennost’ campaign was a partial reassertion of the private, the individual, and the domestic in the face of a volunteer movement gone too far.
If at First You Don’t Succeed . . . Soviet authorities were savvy enough to realize that hooliganism was something they could not solve through arrest and incarceration alone. Ending it, they understood, also required more than empowering obshchestvennost’ to confront the criminals within their communities. In addition to all these efforts, defeating deviance required fixing the deep-seated social ills that caused hooliganism in the first place. As we saw in chapter 1, Soviet authorities believed that hooliganism derived from improper moral upbringing (vospitanie), the overconsumption of alcohol, and the uncultured entertainments of the male, urban, working
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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class. In an attempt to mount a full-spectrum fight against hooliganism, Soviet authorities set about tackling this trio of causes. In the process, they came face-to-face with some of their most pervasive and insoluble social problems. Hooliganism was most frequently committed in the evenings, on holidays, and during paydays.117 In other words, hooliganism was a leisure crime that sprang, in part, from how working-class men filled their free time. As an offense that occurred during afterwork hours, hooliganism was closely linked to working-class leisure practices and the entertainment infrastructure of the Soviet industrial city. In these factory towns, a clash of competing leisure cultures raged that pitted what workers actually did in their afterwork hours against what the authorities wanted them to do. The state’s vision of cultured leisure involved practices of self-improvement and education and revolved around canonic sites of enlightenment, such as the library and the theater. By privileging books over booze and high culture over card games, it reflected the state and the intelligentsia’s enduring faith in the redeeming power of the classics of Russian culture to improve behavior, ennoble humanity, and prevent crimes like hooliganism.118 Yet rather than embracing the state’s vision of culturally appropriate entertainment, the hooligan avoided the ideal leisure pursuits of the well-made Soviet man. The Komsomol Central Committee noted regret fully in 1962 that 90 percent of convicted hooligans never read fictional literature (khudozhestvennaia literatura), did not know what volunteer work (obshchestvennaia rabota) was, did not take part in the activities of cultural organizations, and never played sports.119 Moreover, many cities and factory towns lacked (because of competing spending priorities, physical deterioration, wartime damage, or insufficient funds) a cultured leisure and entertainment infrastructure appropriate to the state’s gran diose vision of building better Soviet men through easily available art and enlightenment.120 The lack of available and/or interesting leisure outlets created a vacuum in the afterwork hours of workers that they filled with practices that put them at high risk for hooliganism.121 Drinking, a practice that was highly correlated with deviance, dominated working-class leisure culture and the rituals of male sociability in the Soviet industrial cities. Illustrating the omnipresence of alcohol and its communal consumption in the workers’ world, a 17-year-old Cheliabinsk workman, responding to a Komsomolskaia pravda query about how readers spent their leisure time, wrote: “Today—a drinking party (p’ianka), tomorrow—a drinking
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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party. So it’s been for the last three years.”122 Often, workers had nothing else to do but drink, given the limited leisure opportunities of the normal factory town. “We decide to stop drinking,” another letter writer remarked, “but we have absolutely nothing to do with our time and so we reach for the bottle again.”123 Instead of being created by capit alism or external bourgeois influ ences, hooliganism was bred by the ordinary boredom of the average factory town, the emptiness of Soviet working-class life, and the des perate attempt to have fun in a society that prioritized work over play. Underlining the links between boredom, hooliganism, and nonexis tent entertainment options, observant foreign correspondents, such as Edward Crankshaw, identified post-Stalinist hooliganism as a “revolt against the tedium and emptiness of the Soviet way of life.” He noted of the young generation: “They are bored . . . and desperate.”124 The battle against boredom, therefore, emerged as one of the princi pal fronts in the larger struggle against hooliganism. “Boredom is a bad life companion,” the Komsomol Central Committee remarked in a 1956 letter. “When there is nowhere to spend one’s free time in an interesting way, out come the cards and the bottle of vodka and, after that, the hooliganism [starts].” 125 Yet in a state where the authorities were boosting leisure time (and heralding it as a sign of Soviet socialism’s superiority to exploitative Western capitalism), this leisure time, ironi cally, was often filled with an anti-social mixture of dullness, drink, and deviance.126 To fight the unholy trinity of tedium, heavy drinking, and hooli ganism, the state and its organization of labor unions tried to equip and furnish factory campuses and dormitories with an appropriate infra structure of cultured entertainment. They created libraries stocked with books, newspapers, and periodicals. Every dormitory had designated Red Corners, outfitted with radios and other media. Art and music study circles were encouraged and sponsored. Palaces of culture were built to house a wide variety of cultural programs and activities. The authorities built playgrounds and supported and promoted recrea tional sports. These institutions would, optimists believed, raise and mold the population into appropriate Soviet subjects and cut down on inappropriate activity by giving workers and their children construc tive alternative pursuits with which to occupy their afterwork hours.127 Certainly, these institutions enriched countless Soviet lives and laid the foundation for Soviet excellence in a wide range of sporting and cultural domains, from ballroom dancing to chess.128 Yet despite the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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state attention and substantial resources that were devoted to them, many local outlets and organizations of cultured leisure, especially out side the showcase world of the capital cities, were ill equipped, poorly funded, and sparsely attended.129 Faced with competing priorities and scarce resources, local leaders often prioritized economic development and industrial output over cultured entertainment. Leisure outlets were often planned last, built last, and had the lowest priority for scarce labor and monet ary resources. Due to a lack of repair budgets, many local outlets of cultured leisure suffered from significant deterioration to their physical plant, creating “a bad internal appearance” that deterred workers. Other clubs lacked essential utilities, such as heat and electricity, undermining their opera tions and driving away leisure seekers, especially during the winter. Inadeq uate funding also adversely affected the ability of institutions to acquire necessary leisure supplies, such as musical instruments, art materials, or periodical subscriptions.130 Even more troublingly, the lectures, concerts, and meetings that Party and Komsomol functionaries devised often ended up eliciting the boredom they were designed to forestall. One Moscow Komsomol leader, when asked why youths went to “our lectures, concerts, and conversations without enthusiasm,” responded with the simple declara tion “because they are boring.”131 Much to the chagrin of the author ities, workers proved less than excited about listening to lectures on political ideology, the international situation, or the use of plastics in Soviet manufacturing. “Frequently,” the Komsomol Central Committee concluded, “the youth are bored in our dormitories, clubs, palaces of culture, and parks.”132 Chronic funding problems also drove many clubs and leisure outlets to charge or raise fees as self-financing strategies.133 To maximize attend ance and entrance fees, clubs offered attractions of questionable educa tional, moral, or vospitanie value, such as dances, that often degenerated into deviance and devalued the clubs’ mission of high-end cultural and educational outreach. Instead of being “evenings of relaxation,” a Komsomol official lamented that club events quickly converted into “rowdy dances” (tantsul’ki ).134 At such events, a people’s judge com plained to the Procuracy, attendees “do not occupy themselves with dancing, but with hooliganism.”135 Instead of being a key instrument in the state’s fight against the degraded culture that created hooliganism, many clubs converted into hooligan hangouts or enacted events that propagated the crime-promoting cycle of drink and deviancy.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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Yet even when alternatives were available to alcohol, many workers continued to prefer binge drinking to book reading. The preference for the bottle over the competing objects pushed by the state’s cultured leisure program was reflected in household spending patterns. The average mid-1950s Soviet family spent about twice as much on vodka and wine as it did on the classical artifacts of cultured leisure (thea ter tickets, movie tickets, books, newspapers, magazines, sporting equipment, musical instruments, and camera and radio equipment) combined.136 Working-class males continued to drink because alcohol and its communal consumption were about more than escapism or emptiness. It was also about defining, asserting, and claiming male identity and community. Instead of being an anti-social activity, alcohol consumption was the key ingredient of male interaction and hospitality, cementing social bonds and sealing friendships between men in sites ranging from the shop floor to the separate apartment’s kitchen. In countless troiki, kompanii, and other small-scale social settings, strangers became friends and friends deepened the mutual ties that made their lives meaningful— all accompanied by the drinking culture that the state demonized. The state could not get rid of alcohol because alcohol was an inseparable part of the male, working-class world: it was the lifeblood of a subculture the state claimed to represent but that in reality it increasingly could neither understand nor tolerate.137 The state tried to fight the ever-present enemy, alcohol, not only by creating an infrastructure of cultured leisure in the industrial cities, but by enacting new legislation designed to reduce alcohol consumption and restrict its sale. By tightening control over the flow of alcohol out of stores and into consumers, the state sought to kill the twin demons of heavy drinking and hooliganism with a single blow. “The fight against drunkenness,” as a local prosecutor in Gor’kii stated, “will at the same time be a fight against hooliganism.”138 However, alcohol proved extremely difficult to efface from the Soviet scene. Just as alcohol was ingrained in the culture of the male working class, it was also built into the urban environment of the average Soviet city. The city landscape was dotted with small alcohol outlets that functioned as centers for the unregulated sale and consump tion of alcohol and as spaces of sociability that were often identified as birthplaces of deviant behavior. These deceptively modest establish ments sported signs reading “Snack Bar” (Bufet), but, as one letter writer remarked, should “more truthfully be called taverns (traktir) or
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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bars (korchma/zabelovka).”139 Such urban sites of alcohol consumption were often the scenes of brawls and social disorder. The cursing and commotion that revolved around them caused pedestrians to cross the street to avoid walking past these dens of deviance or to petition local authorities to close them.140 Despite a well-publicized anti-alcohol campaign, such small alcohol outlets formed an ineradicable niche in the urban ecosystem of the Khrushchev period, turning the socialist city into a landscape of desire littered with areas that catered to its inhabitants’ demand for drink. Wherever the Soviet citiz en turned, a letter writer described, he en countered “vodka at every step.”141 It was sold and consumed in cafe terias, restaurants, and snack bars (zakusochnye). The deceptively named tea shop (chainaia) served wine.142 Seemingly any site could become an impromptu arena for the sale and consumption of hard alcohol. “In the majority of cases, grocery stores have been turned into taverns (kabaki),” a collective letter signed by ten women from Mogilev declared: “in which or on the corner outside of which crowds of workers and juveniles drink vodka.”143 In 1958, the Khrushchev regime tried to stop problem drinking by imposing alcohol sales restrictions and consumption caps at stores and restaurants.144 However, restaurant goers quickly adopted practices that allowed them to consume above quota and to counteract sales caps.145 Patrons got around sales restrictions by bringing their own alcohol to restaurants and drinking it on the sly. Bribes got servers, anxious to supplement their salaries through illicit side payments, to overlook sales restrictions and allow over-quota consumption. In addi tion, drinkers asked companions and third parties to order alcohol for them and, in this way, bypassed ordering limits.146 Like their restaurant counterparts, local trade bureaucrats often followed policies that counteracted state restrictions. The state tried to cap consumption by reducing the number of retail outlets selling alcohol or by limiting their sales hours. However, local governments, anxious to maximize their alcohol revenues, pressured local trade organizations to expand, rather than roll back, the number of retail outlets selling alcohol.147 In Belgorod, a district executive committee approved an extensive alcohol expansion plan that tripled the number of trade points for alcohol from 104 to 385 after the promulgation of the December 1958 anti-alcohol decree.148 Anxious to push purchase points as close as possible to key consumer groups, profit-minded planners at times actively disregarded the spatial restrictions on alcohol sales designed
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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to create alcohol-free zones around enterprises, transit terminals, and educational institutions.149 “If before the decree there were 150 trade organizations [in a particular city] that sold vodka,” a worried RSFSR general prosecutor remarked about the out-of-control proliferation of alcohol in local communities, “then now there are 500 such shops.”150 Facing competing and conflicting priorities, stores were also under pressure to overlook state restrictions on the sale of alcohol. By selling alcohol outside of official sales hours or at above-quota amounts, they padded trade turnover, met their targets more easily, and rang up increased sales, especially in the lucrative afterwork period. As a result, alcohol was availa ble, as one off ic ial rep orted, “from early in the morning till late in the evening.”151 Despite seemingly strict state regula tions, many areas were able to support a culture of around-the-clock consumption where, disapproving authorities noted, “you can buy alcohol wherever and whenever you want.”152 In addition, federal and local governments hindered efforts to cut alcohol consumption and allowed consumers to sidestep state restric tions by failing to choke off sources of alternative supply, such as the samogon or homemade alcohol trade. Firmly entrenched local cultures of samogon production and permissive local officials frustrated the state’s campaign to stop the production of homemade alcohol, espe cially in rural areas (where samogon production was a popular cottage industry among some women) and in the Caucasian republics. This latter region, in particular, served as a supply zone and launch pad for the internal Soviet samogon trade, with their officials even at one point petitioning the center for the legalization of samogon production as an essential part of Caucasian traditional culture and as the only viable way for peasants to save their surplus fruit from spoilage. Although these Caucasian overtures never received official approval, they under lined the tolerant soft-line policy toward samogon production in the Caucuses and revealed the double standard that existed between republics on the question of the illicit at-home production of alcohol.153 Homemade Caucasian alcohol, sometimes thousands of liters at a time, moved across internal borders to markets in industrial areas under the guise of collective farm products and was sold in collective farm markets. Many of the illegal merchants possessed documents from local Georgian and Armenian authorities allegedly giving them the right to produce and sell homemade alcohol. When a Georgian man was arrested with 200 liters of illicit alcohol, he tried to avoid punish ment by producing an official certificate (spravka) that testified that the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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“Twenty-Fifth of February” Collective Farm gave him the right to distill grape vodka (chacha). When an unemployed Yerevan resident was arrested with 200 liters of chacha, he also showed the police a certificate (spravka) from his local village council (sel’sovet) that awarded him the right to “sell his own homemade vodka.”154 This trade supplied Ukrainian and Russian industrial centers with the illicit liquor that fueled the drinking culture of urban workers, placed further pressure on the center’s attempt to impose cultured leisure on the working class, and undermined central attempts to dampen consumption through placing restrictions on official retail outlets. The state’s attempt to attack hooliganism by encouraging cultured leisure practices saw only limited success. On the one hand, this policy left an impressive legacy of institutions and individuals dedicated to spreading a wide array of cultured hobbies and art forms. On the other hand, the persistent problem of scarce resources, competing economic priorities, and local maladministration undermined many of these gains. In addition, a significant portion of working-class men rejected the state’s vision of enlightened entertainment and its offic ial high culture, preferring their own repertoire of rough masculine practices and pastimes to what they saw as the inauthentic, boring, and overly politicized world of official public culture. Likewise, the state’s attempt to fight hooliganism by cutting down on alcohol consumption was also systematically undermined. Local administrators openly flouted central regulations. Local citizens proved uncannily able to subvert state restrictions. And, as we have seen, local sites and subcultures of alcohol consumption proved remarkably resistant and resilient to outside state attacks.
Making Better Soviet Men: Vospitanie and Hooliganism The Soviet state believed that people were not born hooligans—that was an anti-Marxist and biologically determinist argument that echoed the discredited ideas of the nineteenth-century crimin olog ist Cesare Lombroso. Instead, they believed that people, or more precisely children, were made into hooligans through improper or inattentive vospitanie. Referring to the moral education and upbringing of children and young people, vospitanie was one of the key words of Soviet culture. It was also one of the key concerns of the state’s anti-crime and anti-hooligan campaigns. Improving vospitanie would not only create more polite, politically literate, and productive citizens, it would also cut down on
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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society’s pool of potential criminal offenders by creating more morally upright Soviet men. For a post-Stalinist state that was intent on civilizing its citizenry and winning the Cold War by demonstrating the superiority of its socialist values to the world, issues of morality and its appropriate inculcation were matters of prime social concern. In comparison to the Stalinist period, the Khrushchev era marked a golden age of Soviet moralism—as evidenced by the heated rhetoric and media hype that surrounded the release of the “Moral Code of the Builders of Communism.”155 During this period, countless pamphlets and articles dealt with the issue of communist morality and good everyday behavior, urging citizens to improve their ethical outlook and social etiquette.156 Many more were devoted to topics such as how to raise children in an enlightened manner or how to intervene into the ethical dilemmas of fellow comrades and members of the collective—teaching others, and oneself in the process, how to be better, more moral citizens of a collectivist society.157 By making vospitanie a vital part of its anti-hooligan efforts, the paternalist Soviet state made itself into the ultimate authority, arbiter, and supporter of proper morality, good parenting and ethical education. It also inserted itself into the everyday mentoring relationships that existed between parents and children, teachers and pupils, and bosses and employees, urging these authority figures to take their respon sibilities seriously as moral educators and exemplars for the new Soviet generation. Yet by emphasizing the importance of vospitanie, the state also took some of the stigma off the hooligans and placed it on the authority figures who supposedly failed to give them the appropriate moral education and ethical example. The main culprits, whose absent authority and inattention left a vacuum of vospitanie in the lives of the maturing Soviet subject, were factory directors, school teachers, and parents. According to angry offi cials and citizens, factory directors made their workers into hooligans by failing to break the cycle of drink and deviance that ruled everyday life in workers’ dormitories. Instead of taking an interest in their moral education and shepherding them on the correct path to proper Soviet subjectivity, many factory directors neglected the ethical improvement of their charges and focused exclusively on fulfilling economic goals. As a result, employees were left to their own devices after working hours, and the dorms became notorious dens of binge-drinking, petty crime, and debauchery.158
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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In report after report on the hooliganism of young workers, factory directors and officials were singled out for blame for ignoring the daily life and ethical education of their workers, often failing even to set foot in their enterprises’ dormitory institutions. The prosecutor of Moscow’s October district, noting the link between managerial neglect and local hooliganism, marveled that “nobody read the newspapers to them [the workers] or held conversations or gave reports of a moral, cultural, or educational character to them. These people were left completely to themselves.”159 Criticism for worker hooliganism was focused not so much on the hooligan, but on factory authority figures, ranging from the director to the dormitory guardian (vospitatel’).160 Through their ignorance and inaction, these absentee authorities failed to create a cultured counterpoint to the standard dormitory cycle of drink and deviance that ruled their workforce’s leisure lives and, thereby, allowed them to descend into hooliganism. Officials and citizens also argued that parents, like factory directors, made their children into present and future hooligans through poor moral education, inattention, and lack of supervision. Imagining hooli ganism as the result of faulty childrearing put parents and parenting at the heart of the anti-hooligan campaign. As with the worksite, the state delegated to the family the responsibility for raising well-built Soviet subjects through proper education and parenting. However, Soviet commentators on hooliganism noted that many dysfunctional famil ies, racked by arguments, abuse, and alcoholism, could not and did not fashion well-ordered workers. Instead, they created disordered deviants. Rather than assisting their offspring on the road to adulthood, singleparent families and parental neglect left unsupervised and undersuper vised children to be schooled by the shadowy agents and harmful vices of the city street.161 The state sought to cut down on the role that faulty families played in making hooligans by policing parenting and by making parents answer for the sins of their children. Legal sanctioning was one proposed method for pressuring problem caregivers into improving their parental performance.162 In official and unofficial sites of discipline, parents were made to answer for their role in making hooligans through the mechanism of the faulty family. Fines, for example, were proposed for problem parents, but rarely implemented.163 The courts also tried (mostly unsuccessfully) to prosecute cases when parental “drinking bouts and cursing in the presence of children [led to the] deformation
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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of the child’s consciousness” and the creation of criminality. However, the lack of specific legal articles with which to police problem parenting (before the creation of the 1956 petty hooligan decree) made winning such cases extremely diffic ult.164 More frequently, collectives disciplined problem parents in the informal sites of shaming associated with the workplace. Along with their hooligan offspring, mothers and fathers were publicly exposed and subjected to scorn for their poor parenting practices. By admitting their guilt in the creation of criminality through faulty childrearing, they were forced to engage in ritualistic self-criticism (samokritika) before the collective and made to serve as an example to others not to dodge the duties of proper parenting.165 Shaming and criminal sanctions were not the only ways to deal with the problem of poor parenting. In an effort to reinforce proper practices, some local governments created institutions of continuing education designed to boost parental performance. The Ivanovo region created a “university for parents” to provide childrearing classes and improve vospitanie. In other areas, public organizations and activists were en couraged to look in on problem families and advise struggling parents on appropriate childrearing techniques.166 Supervision was a key component of the state’s program of proper parenting that, given the gendered role expectations of the patriarchal family and the skewed sex ratio of postwar Soviet society, fell heavily on mothers. In particular, single mothers were often targeted as the paradigmatic problem parents from whose neglect delinquent children sprang, with some critics even arguing that such single mothers should be stripped of their parental rights.167 Despite their demonization, single mothers and their undersupervised children were the social products of the state’s promotion of single-parent families following the demographic disaster of World War II.168 By sanctioning the singleparent family as a vehicle for population replacement but providing only limited financial support to those families, the state forced mothers to leave their out-of-wedlock offspring unsupervised to pursue the unskilled, low-wage labor needed to shore up the household budget. The state then blamed these mothers for failing to supervise their children’s leisure and for failing to shepherd them from corrupting street influences. Afterschool programs were one way for the state to keep kids off the streets and under responsible adult supervision. In support of this agenda, local governments built up and promoted a wide variety of
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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afterschool sites of artistic study and physical culture. In many instances, these institutions provided an enlightened alternative to the unsuper vised street play that fed public fears of juvenile delinquency. In some cases, however, local communities failed to provide adequate funding for these programs or poorly administered them. In other cases, single mothers, trapped in low wage jobs and facing chronic arrears in alimony payments from deadbeat dads, lacked the spare cash to pay for even inexpensive afterschool programs and summer camps.169 In addition to summer camps and afterschool programs, the state promoted boarding schools (internaty) as a way of dealing with under supervised children from single-parent and dysfunctional families. However, there were never enough of such institutions to deal with the mass problem of undersupervised children. Moreover, single mothers reported a bias in admissions policies at such institutions that favored children from privileged parents and left at-risk children to the tempta tions of the unsupervised urban street.170 When drafting anti-crime measures in the mid-1950s, one of the first decrees that the Party considered was an act on improving vospitanie that required all Soviet bodies to play their part in raising morally sound and well-rounded citizens.171 Rather than being an inconsequen tial sideshow, such a measure was an essential part in the state’s fullspectrum strategy for combating social disorder and rising crime rates. It reflected the belief that improper moral mentoring made men into crimin als and that correct guidance and ethical education could cure society of crime. However, improving vospitanie and getting authority figures to accept their duty as moral mentors proved anything but easy. Competing priorities, apathy, and material constraints often teamed up to undo the state’s grand policy for molding the next generation into model Soviet men—men who would be free of the little vices and immoralities that made hooliganism.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 17:13:35.
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The Rise and Fall of the Soft Line on Petty Crime During the late 1950s, reform replaced punishment as the state’s primary response to petty crimes such as simple hooliganism. This new soft-line approach to crime recentered the Soviet system of criminal justice around the principles of humaneness ( gumannost’), reform, and the non-isolation of the petty criminal from the social collective.1 The long mandatory custodial sentences that were an infamous part of the Stalin-era approach to petty criminality were ended. In their place, minor offenders would be given suspended sentences, remanded to the custody of their work collectives, reformed through collective labor and peer guidance, and reconstructed into appropriate Soviet subjects. Khrushchev’s soft line was based on the candid assessment that the Stalinist system of criminal justice, centered on increasing prison time for petty crime, was unsustainable. Instead of helping reduce its deviant dilemma, custodial punishments worsened society’s crime problem, c logged its labor camps, and burdened the state’s budget. By switching to a soft-line position based on reform and reeducation, Khrushchev and his colleagues hoped to save minor offenders from the corrupting influence of camp criminals and remake them into benign Soviet sub jects. Through decriminalizing petty crime, they sought to keep trivial matters from clogging overcrowded court schedules and conserve re sources for the fight against serious crime. By transferring the disciplining of petty deviants from state to public bodies, Khrushchev’s reformers planned to accelerate the withering 168
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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away of the state and h erald the form at ion of the s elf-regulating Communist society of the future. More important, the de-Stalinizing Khrushchev regime, by making the switch to the soft line, hoped to distance and differentiate itself from the terror tactics of its predecessor. With the soft line on petty crime, the Khrushchev regime shifted its style of social control away from the custodial and punitive approach associated with the discredited Stalin and the demonized Beria in favor of a humane system based on the reclamation of redeemable wrongdoers. Soft-line punishments for petty crimes, such as simple hooliganism, were certainly nothing new. Episodes of decriminalization and experi ments with various strategies of collective reform had occurred through out the Soviet period.2 Key instruments of the soft-line reform, like the suspended sentence, were common elements of the Soviet judiciary’s sentencing repertoire that lenient judges had been applying to petty and first-time offenders for years with or without state prompting. Key words of the campaign, such as collective responsibility or krugovaia poruka, gave the soft line a rich pre-Soviet pedigree that linked it to the Russian state’s traditional instruments of rural social control, instru ments that dated back to the Muscovite period and the era of the peasant commune.3 As with the use of the druzhina and the comrades’ courts, the soft line’s institutions and instruments were standard parts of Soviet and pre-Soviet statecraft and criminal justice. Rather than the novelty of its core elements, it was the sheer scale and high-profile visibility of Khrushchev’s soft-line campaign that set it apart from earlier experi ments in decriminalization and peer disciplining. For much of 1959 and 1960, publicity and pronouncements concerning the soft line filled the Soviet mass media and caught the attention of a citizenry told that it was living at a crucial pivot point on the road to communism. Despite the long prehistory of many of its core components, the softline campaign was not publicly unveiled and enacted on a mass scale until Khrushchev signaled his support for reform and reeducation in the spring of 1959. The timing was not accidental. This was also the year when the institutions and agencies of obschestvennost’ were also unleashed against the problems of crime and social disorder. It was a period of searching out, sponsoring, and setting loose explicitly non state solutions to long-standing social pathologies that linked together institutions and practices as diverse as the druzhina, the comrades’ courts, and collective peer reform. It was the epicenter of Khrushchev’s
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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utopianism and the soft-line campaign fit in well with the period’s mast er disc ourse of opt im ism, volu nt ari sm, and imm in ent soc ial transformation. As his platform for promoting the soft line, Khrushchev chose, appropriately, the Third Congress of Soviet Writers (May 1959), the professional meeting of a prominent organization associated since the Stalin era with the reengineering of Soviet souls. In his speech to the Congress, Khrushchev presented a case study of a Soviet citizen gone astray: a professional criminal who had been convicted numerous times for theft. Tired of the cycle of dropping out of jobs and drifting back into crime, this lost Soviet soul wrote Khrushchev requesting a meeting and recommitting himself to a life of legitimate labor.4 Turning to his expert audience on social engineering, Khrushchev told them how to approach redeemable wrongdoers and, in the process, spoke the soft line into existence.
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We could put such a person, who strays from the correct path, in prison. But he would only become a more qualified thief there. We need this person for our purposes. In order to put this person on the correct path, we need another approach. We need to believe in man and in his best qualities. Can this man be an active participant in the construction of communism? He can, comrades [stormy applause]. . . . I am telling you this in order to show you that the upbringing (vospitanie) and reform (perevospitan ie) of such people is a matter of the greatest importance.5
During his speech, Khrushchev paid tribute to a man who was both a former member of the Writers’ Union and a famous pedagogue celebrated for his work on the reform of problematic Soviet subjects: Anton Makarenko.6 By favorably mentioning Makarenko in his speech, Khrushchev signaled his support for the non-isolation of the offender and the use of the peer group in the reform process. The invocation of Makarenko also reinforced Khrushchev and the soft line’s message that repentant criminals were redeemable and could be remade into produc tive members of Soviet society.7 With the ascent of the soft line, humanism or humane treatment (variously phrased in the Russian primary sources as gumannost’ or gumanizm) became the order of the day and the centerpiece of the state’s approach to non-malicious hooliganism. In an era of transatlantic con cern over juvenile delinquency and Cold War propaganda, the soft line’s humaneness showed the enlightenment and superiority of the postStalinist system of criminal justice in comparison with the capitalist
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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West.8 The stress on the word humaneness or humanism also conceptu ally linked the soft-line campaign with the secular rationalism of modern Western civilization and the penal reforms of influential philosophes such as Cesare Beccaria.9 It showed the world that the Soviet Union had shed the barbarism of the Stalin era and the irrationality of its coercive methods. It was now going to deal with its persistent hooligan problem not with blunt instruments like prisons and police units, but with benevolent practices that revolved around suspended sentences and peer guidance.
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The Soft Line and the Virtual Victory over Hooliganism Following Khrushchev’s public statement of support, a series of central decrees directed all local law enforcement to apply, in a systematic fashion, the main premises of the soft line: the use of noncustodial sentences, the transfer of petty cases to public sites of discipline that operated outside the formal criminal justice system, and the embedding and reform of the offender within his peer collective. The promulgation of the soft line had a dramatic downward effect on hooliganism. In the run up to the soft line, hooligan convictions in the USSR had hovered around the 200,000-person level (1956: 196,558; 1957: 185,035; 1958: 207,587). Following the unveiling of the soft line, the conviction rate for hooliganism declined 60 percent in the USSR and 62 percent in the RSFSR between 1959 and 1960. Although they fell across the range of hooligan categories, conviction rates dropped most steeply for cases of simple hooliganism, falling 82 percent in the USSR and 87 percent in the RSFSR during the 1959 to 1960 period. The 58 percent and 60 percent decrease in malicious hooliganism in the USSR and RSFSR during the same period showed that, despite efforts to keep malicious hooligans out of the reform and reeduc ation process, the soft line deflated convic tion rates downward for more serious criminal offenses as well. Even petty hooliganism, which as an administrative offense was ineligible for soft-lining, decreased markedly during the soft-line policy push, drop ping 45 percent in both the USSR and the RSFSR from 1959 to 1960.10 The precipitous decline in the use of the crimin al courts as the venue of choice for processing petty (and not so petty) crime had a dramatic downward effect on sentencing patterns for hooliganism.11 From a low level in the 1940s and 1950s, the use of soft-line measures for hooligan ism picked up rapidly in 1959 and 1960. In 1958, 5 percent of hooligan
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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convicts received a conditional sentence as punishment for their crime. This percentage increased to 12 percent in 1959 and 20 percent in 1960. When corrective labor sentences are factored into the mix, more than one out of three convicted hooligans received a noncustodial punish ment at the height of the soft-line spree in 1960. Many more hooligans had their charges dropped before their trials and were slipped into the soft-line system for reform and reeducation without ever appearing in courts or crime registries. Utopian rhetoric often accompanied the soft-line experiment in the kinder and gentler treatment of petty criminals. Reports or rumors of steep crime reductions swept through society, the mass media, and the criminal justice system and fed expectations that civic activism was laying the foundation of the self-regulating, conflict-free, and harmo nious society of the communist future. The unleashing of obshchestvennost’ and Khrushchev’s soft-line policy had seemingly conquered crime. Breathless commentators announced that the Soviet Union had entered a “new stage in the development of society and social relations.”12 “In the little town of Ves’egonsk,” an article gushed, “they are closing their prison. They have nobody left to put in it.”13 Through the soft-line system of the late 1950s, the Soviet Union appeared to have solved its hooligan problem. However, it soon become apparent that the state had performed this enviable feat not by stopping deviance, but by sending it “offshore” or out of the formal criminal justice system. To make hooliganism disappear, local legal workers dropped charges against petty criminals or gave them sus pended sentences and sent them to labor collectives where they were discretely disciplined “off the books.” Instead of reducing hooliganism, local actors simply transferred it to sites where it was not counted in official crime statistics. Through moving hooligans from courts to col lectives and using peer reform rather than criminal punishment, legal workers kept crime off the books, drove down local conviction rates, and artificially lowered crime statistics. By setting up alternative disci plinary sites outside the formal criminal justice system and by cooking their crime books using fraudulent accounting practices, they followed central soft-line policies and, at the same time, claimed a virtual victory over the persistent problem of hooliganism.14 The crime reductions reported at the local and union level were not due to a decrease in crime but to a change in the way crime, especially petty crimes like non-malicious hooliganism, were being processed through (or more specifically around) the system. A 1961 report on the
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.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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results of the soft line stated: “The reduction of crime in the USSR in 1959 and 1960 was only partly due to a reduction in crime itself. The main reason [was that] criminal cases were sent to the courts less and there was a reduction in the number of people sentenced [because] prosec utors and investigative organs sent a great number of persons who had committed less dangerous crimes to public (obshchestvennye) organizations and workers’ collectives.”15 In a 1960 letter to the USSR Supreme Soviet, a man from the Kuibyshev region also explained that the crime reductions claimed by local officials were due to a rejection of the criminal courts rather than a decrease in crimin ality.
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Now cases are being tried less in the courts. This is a fact. The number of persons who are being sentenced to prison has decreased. But is it possible from this to make any conclusion about the composition of crime? No, it is impossible. Here in our city, the amount of crime has increased in comparison with last year. Yet in reality the number of convictions has become less and those receiving punishments even less. In our country they are closing prisons in some cities because they say there is no need for them because there aren’t any criminals. This is ridiculous.16
Officials quickly became conscious that local crime reports obscured as much as they informed. Answering the question of why, in 1960, crime had decreased in his region by 50 percent in comparis on with 1950, the prosecutor of the Saratov region reported that minor crimes ( pravonarusheniia) were being tried by public organizations (obshche stvennye organizatsiia) and, in this way, “a great army of persons was freed from criminal sentence.”17 The Orenburg regional Party commit tee, likewise, admitted that the 34 percent reduction in crime recorded for 1960 in their region was due to the fact that “some insignificant crimes [such as hooliganism] were not being sent to court but handed over to public (obshchestvennye) organizations and workers’ collectives” for correction and reform.18 The widespread underreporting of crime due to the use of off-thebooks disciplining made many of the statistics on crime open to doubt. The authors of a report to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet complained that in Kursk and “other regions” prosec utors were com piling information on crime that had no basis in reality and was a “muddle.”19 At a conference in July 1961, the prosec utor of the Tadzhik Republic lamented to his peers that “data on the number of crimes registered [for 1960] does not reflect the real existing state of affairs.”20 Warning that crime statistics might not match criminal activity, the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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satirical journal Krokodil cautioned its readers in 1961: “Numbers are a very subtle thing (tsifry—delo ved’ tonkoe). Everything depends on how you look at them.”21 At a special meeting of the USSR Procuracy, the head of the Central Committee Department of Administrative Organs, N. R. Mironov, announced his disbelief in central statistics that showed steep reductions in crime. Criticizing the assembled prosecutors for falsifying statistics and engineering a virtual drop in crime, he argued that statistics should reflect reality rather than distort it. It would seem that we could make the conclusion that the position with crime has improved but this is not so. . . . The statistical records of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Procuracy always used to accurately reflect the state of crime. We cannot pass off what we want for what really is and to adjust statistical information in order to cover up the real state of affairs. . . . It is important that things be real and correct. If a crime is committed then the statistics should reflect this because that is how it is in reality. . . . It is pleasant, of course, to see a reduction in the growth in crime, but it is pleasant when this reduction takes place in life and not only on paper.22
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Citizens also expressed skepticism about the cooked statistics the virtual victors cited on the crime decrease. A pensioner, for example, spoke about his skepticism toward crime statistics that a local prosecu tor cited during a speech to a meeting of retirees. In his [the prosecutor’s] speech he said that at present the number of crimes, such as hooliganism and banditry, has become less and less. . . . It would be interesting to know did the prosecutor make a simple slip of the tongue (ogovorilsia) when he spoke of the reduction of these crimes or did he speak simply in order to deceive? I don’t understand on the basis of what statistical information such a conclusion was made. I don’t know how it is in the rest of the USSR but here for the last few years and especially in 1959 the real situation directly contradicts what the prosecutor said in his speech.23
The USSR and its offic ials did not reduce hooliganism, they rerouted it by moving it out of the criminal justice system and into the collectives. As courtroom convictions and statistical indicators dropped, they pro claimed a virtual victory over deviance. By pointing to cooked statistics that seemed to show dramatic decreases in crime, local offic ials showed the center that crime was withering away and that public input in the policing and processing of petty offenders (an indicator of approaching communism and another key state priority) was progressing admirably. More important, they brought themselves to the attention of a state that
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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was willing to lavish praise and prizes on those who could realize their increasingly unrealizable campaign goals. The statistical sleight of hand created by the soft line was, in its way, a sign of the times that resonated strongly with the Party’s predictions on the waning of crime in the countdown to communism. It bore more than a passing resemblance to the contemporaneous Larionov affair of 1959 and 1960, in which Riazan’ officials padded their meat produc tion figures through dubious means and creative accounting to fulfill Khrushchev’s campaign pledge to overtake the United States in agri cultural output.24 Like the Larionov affair, the virtual victory over hooli ganism was a minor statistical scandal that resulted from the efforts of embattled and ambitious local agents to fulfill the utopian plans of their boastful superiors. However, the claims of a virtual victory over crime contradicted the knowledge of both public and state that crime remained a constant, if not growing, problem in Soviet society. As the informa tional distortion, off-the-books disciplining, and transparent claims of victory multiplied, anti-soft line sentiment began to grow among state elites and ordinary citizens.
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The Soft Line and Its Discontents The soft line was not only criticized for allowing crime to disappear t hrough a statistical sleight of hand, it was also criticized for coddling hardened criminals. Although the soft-line system was not open to them, critics noted that many work collectives were “groundlessly” sending peer reform petitions to the courts on behalf of dangerous criminals and recidivists requesting that they be remitted to their care.25 A collective in Irkutsk petitioned the court on behalf a man who stabbed his pregnant wife several times after finding a divorce notice from her in the local paper.26 The collective at the “Dawn of Communism” collective farm in the Altai region also petitioned the court to grant a suspended sentence to a man who had beaten his mother to death.27 Another collective farm sent such a petition in the case of a man who raped a fifteen-year-old girl.28 The collectives’ misuse of their petitioning powers not only slipped inappropriate offenders into the soft-line system, it prompted complaints that the soft line was shifting from a “humane form of public reformation” into “a means to save people who have committed dangerous crimes from criminal responsibility.”29 The large volume of groundless petitions for suspended sentences and peer reform, which some local courts estimated accounted for around 40 percent of all the petitions forwarded to them, required that
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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lower courts exercise diligent oversight to weed serious felons out of the soft-line system.30 However, the high acceptance rate for workplace petitions (91 percent in the RSFSR during the 1959–1960 soft-line peak) showed that the courts routinely rubber-stamped the requests that workplaces sent on behalf of their criminal colleagues with little or no oversight. Under acute pressure to over-fulfill the soft-line campaign, lower courts handed out suspended sentences and remanded violators to the custody of their labor collectives on a wide and often indiscrimi nate scale.31 As petition volumes and acceptance rates soared, judicial oversight of the petition process waned and allowed serious criminals, such as murderers and rapists, to be mistakenly admitted into the softline system—a move that would, in the end, greatly undermine support for large-scale, reform-based anti-crime policies.32 Opponents of lenient anti-crime policies argued that the soft line did not punish criminals severely enough. The widespread use of non custodial punishments and the practice of off-the-books disciplining, which bypassed the traditional punitive triad of court, prison, and camp, meant that many petty (and not so petty) criminals remained free despite their crimin al misconduct. Critics interpreted this as an injustice that degraded the law’s ability to deter future offenders from committing crime. Complaining that district-level prosecutors had an “incorrect understanding of the tasks placed before them,” the prosec u tor of the Belgorod region lamented that, even for serious crimes, courts were applying punishments “that frighten neither the criminal himself nor, even less, ordinary persons.”33 Armenian justice A. A. Aleksanian, at a September 1960 Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court, noted that “criminals are convinced that they [the courts] will not give them the full punishment.”34 He urged the USSR Supreme Court to increase punishments, proclaiming that “criminals should feel condemned and afraid . . . which at the moment they do not.”35 Even a fervent supporter of the new policy such as USSR General Prosecutor R. A. Rudenko was forced to admit that there were many instances when “instead of punishing we have indulged [criminals].”36 Looking at the situation the soft line had engendered, many hard-line advocates came to the conclusion that local police, prosecutors, and courts had “lost all sense of measure.”37 Instead of cutting down on crime by reforming redeemable offenders, the soft-line system, according to its critics, created an atmosphere of impunity and leniency that encouraged first-time petty crime. “The liberal approach to malicious criminals,” the prosecutor of the Stavropol
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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region complained, “has given rise to an unhealthy opinion among the population that now it is not so scary to commit a crime because obshchestvennost’ will come to your rescue.”38 By reducing the potential costs of committing minor offenses, critics argued that soft-line policies dismantled the structure of disincentives that scared people away from crime and opened an expanding space for relatively risk-free experimen tation with deviant behavior. “It is now possible to hear remarks among the undisciplined part of the youth,” a man from Ul’ianovsk wrote “that it is safe to commit a non-major crime at least once because they [the courts] will only give you a suspended sentence and hand you over to the collective [rather than to the prison].”39 Exemplifying the lack of concern many criminals felt about facing a soft-line crimin al justice system, two arrested criminals, when asked why they were not fright ened by their looming trial for theft, replied: “Why should we be [scared]? The collective will petition the court to give us a suspended sentence and remand us to its custody. Now this is the fashion.”40 As the soft line filtered down the social structure, critics argued that deviant communities picked it up and interpreted it as a license to engage in antisocial activities. “All the hooligans are well informed about this position,” a 1959 letter to Pravda warned the editors “Remem ber, they are literate too.”41 In these unofficial contexts, the state lost control of its soft-line rhetoric as offenders invested it with a different content that remade it into a justification for the crimes it was meant to curtail. The state’s soft-line rhetoric not only allowed it to advertise a new post-Stalinist system of crime and punishment and to score points in the Cold War clash of civilizations; it also inadvertently informed existing and potential offenders of the expanding parameters of per missible misconduct and gave a mixed message about the state’s stance on petty crime. Despite concern over the policy’s crime-promoting effects, rates of recidivism among soft-lined offenders were, according to official statis ism rates, tics, extremely low. Offic ials often pointed to these low recidiv in many places as low as 1 percent, as evidence of the viability of its soft tactics.42 In some localities, soft-line policies had seemingly conquered recidivism itself. Riazan’, Novgorod, Tomsk, Kaluga, and the Krasno dar regions all claimed, for instance, that there was no recidivism among criminals given suspended sentences and remitted for peer re form during the key 1959 kick-off year.43 However, anecdotal information suggests that recidivism was a per sistent problem for the soft-line system. A. N. Iakimenko, the chairman
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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of the Ukrainian Supreme Court, noted in a 1960 Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court that sending cases to the soft-line system “has brought great harm in the fight against crime,” because the “supervision (kontrol’) of such persons is very bad and they frequently commit new crimes.”44 Soft-line critics widely reported on the lapses and repeat offenses of soft-lined offenders in order to question the efficacy of reform-based anti-crime policies. In one telling example, Sasha, a twice soft-lined student in Leningrad, became the head of a gang of thieves and robbed seven local stores—all while presumably under the reformative care and supervision of his vocational school collective.45 Sasha’s story was a familiar one for the soft-line system. For the system’s critics, it was a story of unworthy offenders given inappropriate punishments. It confirmed their belief that the soft line was too lenient and only hindered rather than helped the problem of fighting crime. Yet, the story of Sasha also told another tale about the soft-line system: a tale of the peer collective, its attempt to redeem one of its own, and of the promises and problems that beset the process of converting criminals to the Soviet cause.
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Saving Criminals for the Soviet System In the soft-line vision, the workplace was the epicenter of the reform and reclamation process. It was where the transformative power of work and comradeship would take effect and where yesterday’s hooli gans would be converted into tomorrow’s model workers. Drawing on the reforging rhetoric of an earlier Soviet era, authorities saw the peer reform process as a conversionary experience in which the offender would, by working and being worked on by the collective, refind his place in Soviet society and rededicate himself to the task of commu nist construction. The soft line was centered around conversion and around faith: faith in (to quote Khrushchev again) “men and in their best qualities” and faith in the power of the collective to redeem lost men through patient reform and persistent reeducation. In theory, a collective’s decision to take part in the soft line and its hands-on program of converting criminals was voluntary. Collectives that wanted to reeducate a fallen comrade had to send a petition to the court indicating their willingness to do so. Upon receiving such a peti tion from the collective, the judge would then decide whether the offender’s character and crime warranted the granting of a suspended sentence and transfer to the collective’s care.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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In practice, local judges and prosecutors sometimes did not wait for the consent of the collective and often compelled labor collectives and factory directors to participate in soft-line programs. Instead of coming from the workers’ desire to reclaim their lost colleagues, watchdogs reported that in some areas, local Party officials and legal personnel forced peer reform petitions on workplaces.46 In many instances, the decision to soft-line an offender was decided for, rather than by, the collective. In at least one locality, the local police decided on behalf of local collectives that all minor offenders would be soft-lined and merely required local directors, without convening the collective, to sign off on a prearranged process.47 The decision to reform and reeducate an offender was not always based on the severity of the offender’s crime, the content of his character, or the collective’s willingness to perform the state’s reform agenda. Instead, the decision to reform was sometimes decided by the effective ness and density of the offenders’ friendship circles, kinship groups, and patronage connections. Rather than waiting for a collective to extend an offer for peer reform, offenders mobilized their family and friendship networks to intervene and influence collectives and to secure such petitions from them.48 In cases where collectives were unwilling to petition the courts for the release of offenders, criminals appealed to local Party and administrative patrons to pressure labor collectives into rethinking their refusals. In the most extreme cases, patrons secured soft-line sentences for their clients and got around stubborn collectives by forging workplace petitions themselves.49 In other instances, arrested criminals hired lawyers to lobby their work collectives to receive the petition needed for a soft-line sentence.50 By cajoling cautious collectives into signing petitions for suspended sentence and peer reform, family member, friends, and patrons hijacked the soft-line system for their individual ends and transformed it from a means of converting redeem able criminals to a way of extracting their intimates from the official criminal justice system.51 Such individua ls were interested in the soft-line system for reasons that ran counter to the state’s goal of converting redeemable wrong doers. They did not want to save petty offenders for the Soviet project. Instead, they sought to save their friends and fellow workers from the criminal justice system and the punitive sites of court and camp that were associated with it. Procuracy offic ials sent to the Kemerovo region in the fall of 1960 reported: “Meetings are summoned not in order to condemn the unworthy actions of a member of the collective but in
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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order to hide the guilty from court . . . and decisions are taken not in the interests of the state but out of a feeling of pity for the violator.”52 Anim ated by sympathy for the criminal, workplace assemblies became “a friendly form of rescue, a way to free a man from legal trouble.”53 These collectives saw the soft line as a way to come to the aid of crimi nal colleagues and, therefore, “extolled offenders in every possible way” for fear that, if they did otherwise, “they would put this person in prison.”54 Through their local actions, these collectives did not convert the criminal. Instead, they converted the system itself and its goals. By turning the soft-line system into a kindler, gentler way of concealing petty criminals rather than converting them, local collectives manipu lated the often unregul ated opportunity the soft line gave them to graft new meanings onto the peer reform and reclamation process. Shame was at the center of the soft-line system’s conversion drama. Before they could be saved for the Soviet system, offenders had to be shamed and made to acknowledge the gravity of their offense. To enact this process of shaming and status reversal, officials required that workplaces convene a special assembly for the public discussion and collective condemnation of the criminals in their care. Offenders (and sometimes their parents as well) were exhibited in front of the full col lective as their colleagues spoke out against their actions. After enduring the gaze and critique of their labor collective, the criminal would confess to his misdeeds, express thanks for the collective’s trust in him, and, at the height of the conversion drama, recommit himself to family, factory, and socialist society. Aside from exposure, speech was the collective’s key weapon in the fight to refashion the offender. The crucial importance of speech in the conversion process made language, and the ways in which it was used, an issue of vital importance to the assembly spectacle and the sequence of shaming and criticism/self-criticism at its foundation. Despite local watchdogs’ attempts to regulate, supervise, and script the workers’ assemblies, the state often had trouble getting workers to talk about their colleagues’ crimes in ways that were acceptable and that advanced the shame-based process of saving criminals. The assembly spectacle revolved around the familiar Soviet speech acts of criticism and self-criticism (kritika i samokritika) and followed a basic narrative plan of confrontation, confession, and conversion.55 Yet rather than being trapped within the ritualized confines of these genres, workers spoke out about crime and the criminal in a language that frequently went off-script and complicated the expected scenario of the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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workplace assembly. For example, workers often subverted expected assembly scripts by refusing to criticize their coworkers and engage in the expected ritual of collective condemnation. Instead of speaking critically and negatively about crime and the criminal, members of the collective used their voice and the limited autonomy the unregulated and ambiguous assembly format gave them to excuse, rationalize, and even praise their fallen colleagues. The prosecutor of Dagestan, for instance, reported in dismay that in workers’ meetings the particip ants did not attack the offender but “only speak positively [about him].”56 Rather than taking the floor to criticize their colleagues, regional judges noted that workers’ collectives stood up “in defense of malicious hooli gans and those who have committed dangerous crimes,” “extolled the offenders in every possible way,” and failed to give them “the necessary rebuffs.”57 By speaking about “the most horrible actions in glowing terms,” collectives departed from the general scenarios and scripts that dictated how they should talk about the crime and criminals before them.58 By refusing to follow such scripts and by opting out of collective condemna tion, workers undermined the supposedly critical and confrontational workplace assembly and remade it into a space that defended deviants as much as it disciplined them. They also showed that their languages about crime, especially the crimes of their comrades and coworkers, were more differentiated, complex, and flexible than the state had imagined. Crime was a constant concern for many Soviet workers during the post-Stalin era (see the letters in the next section). In their letters to those in power, Soviet workers spoke about crime and crimin als in harsh and unyielding terms, using images of elimin ation, disease, and dirt. How ever, when Soviet workers came face to face with offenders at the work place assembly, collectives found a new vocabulary to talk about the petty (and sometimes not so petty) misdeeds of their colleagues—a language of leniency that surprised a state conditioned to the harsh anti-crime imagery of workers’ letters. At its most extreme, workers turned the state’s anti-crime speech on its head by expressing their admiration of the criminal’s courage, remarking on his ingenuity, and wondering about how they could have committed a better crime and avoided capture.59 More common was the collectives’ use of language to contextualize criminal activity and to give a human face to the offender. By focusing on the offender’s youth, wartime service, family obligations, or naiveté
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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to explain away misc onduct, worke rs used the ass embly and the speaking opportunity it gave them to talk about crime in nuanced ways that balanced defense with denunciation. Collectives likewise sought to argue away bad behavior by placing it within the context of a hitherto well-lived life, “limit[ing] their remarks to the past accomplishments (zaslugy) of the violator rather than to the intolerability of his [present] behavior.”60 In their speeches, collectives often employed a productivist understanding of personal value that drew on earlier discourses of Sta khanovite labor. They would argue, critics noted, that “if [an offender] fulfills his quota then he’s a good person.”61 Instead of blasting the criminal and his crime, the collective often defended him by observing that “he works well” or that “he fulfills the plan.”62 Designed as a space where the community could speak out in one voice against crime and its local costs, the assemblies often became places where languages about crime clashed. If they were present, state representatives (such as local prosec utors) kept on-message and within the general scenario expected at such assembly meetings. However, the state’s shaming rhetoric sat uneasily with the collective’s more sympa thetic approach and its members’ unwillingness to “condemn either the behavior of violators or the crimes that they have committed” or to show the exhibited criminal “angry censure”—off-message accents that undermined the assembly’s ability to shame soft-lined offenders.63 The soft-line system was hindered, in part, by the mixed messages of the workplace assembly. It was, perhaps more fundamentally, harmed by the expectations it placed on its two key parties: petty crimin als and labor collectives. Soft-line supporters believed that petty criminals, such as non-malicious hooligans, were redeemable wrongdoers who, through the labor process and the patient guidance of their coworkers, could refashion themselves into proper Soviet subjects and refind their place in the common project of communist construction. Supporters of the new soft-line policy also had faith in local factory officials and labor collectives and in their ability and willingness to undertake the arduous process of remaking and reforming their fallen friends and comrades. These expectations would prove to be a troublesome problem for the soft line and would provide fuel to its growing chorus of critics. Instead of being willing subjects in the soft line’s conversionary project, many hooligans proved difficult objects to reform and reclaim. In some cases, the hooligans sent to collectives did not yield to attempts to reeducate them and were a continued hazard to productivity, labor discipline, and shop floor safety.64 In other cases, hooligans took
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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advantage of the system’s poor surveillance and oversight to slip out of the soft line and evade the influence of the collective. In its simplest form, hooligans exited the system by simply failing to report to their assigned work collective for reform. By going on the road, switching residences, or not going to work, hooligans avoided the soft line, stayed unmonitored and unrepentant, and put heavy demands on the system’s limited structure of regulation and oversight. A few hooligans slipped through the system’s cracks because they were unemployed and/or homeless and thus did not belong to a collec tive to which they could be transferred for reformative reeducation. Such rootless offenders were often attached to random labor collectives for reform or were given suspended sentences and allowed to slip through the system without being coupled to a collective.65 In an attempt to prevent homeless and unemployed offenders from avoiding the soft-line system, some local prosecutors delayed charging un employed suspects with crimes, pressured them to find employment, and waited for them to find a workplace to which they could be trans ferred for reeducation.66 Labor collectives often (though not always) proved as unreliable as the hooligans they sought to reform. On the most basic level, many labor collectives had no idea how to reform people, let alone refashion them into model Soviet subjects. Despite the frequent appeals collec tives sent for help and input into the criminal conversion process, local authorities provided little guidance on the everyday operation of shop floor reform and reeducation efforts.67 Lack of knowledge and low morale meant that collectives often ignored the criminals who were remanded to their workplaces and took little effort to counsel, mentor, or support them. Watchdogs often complained that “absolutely nobody does any work to reform these people [soft-lined offenders].”68 The Kostroma College of Lawyers, for example, outlined the reformation routine of an 18-year-old soft liner: “He doesn’t study anywhere. After work, he goes out onto the streets and engages in street brawls. Sometimes, he is drunk. Yet despite this, nobody in the collective worries about him.”69 These same lawyers also told of a 17-year-old transferred to a local labor collective for reeduca tion: “At work, he has violated labor discipline on several occasions. He doesn’t want to study and he doesn’t read anything. He rarely goes to the movies. As a rule, he avoids the theater. After work, he is left to his own devices.”70 In addition, many workers were less than enthu siastic about reaccepting violent criminals back into their collectives
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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and refrained from reforming them out of fear of current or future victimization.71 Following the workplace assembly, many collectives ended their reform efforts and failed to take additional steps to reeducate the offenders who were remanded to their care. The RSFSR Supreme Court, for instance, complained that some work collectives “consider the work of reform finished as soon as they have held a meeting and sent a peti tion for peer reform to the court.”72 Other collectives were content to accept first-time confessions and promises extracted during the assembly at face value as indicators of successful conversion. A speaker from the Leningrad branch of Znanie described such a case to his colleagues:
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They [a work collective] discuss the case of some drunk at a meeting. He [the drunk] leaves this meeting and says: “Listen everybody, I will not drink any more. I will tell my children not to drink and I will order my grandchildren not to drink.” Then they [the collective] make the mistaken conclusion that this man has reformed himself. If it were so easy to reform people, we would not be holding seminars on this topic, scholars would not be busting their heads thinking of new methods of reform. But the collective thinks: “Hurrah, hurrah! Long live the collective. This man has reformed himself.”73
Watchdogs complained that workplaces did not take the system seriously enough and carried out their peer reform requirements in a “formal” manner.74 To maximize attendance and limit disruptions to the production process, factory bosses would hold impromptu assemblies during smoking or lunch breaks—a move that resulted in short meetings (sometimes only the court’s sentence was read aloud and the meeting adjourned) that had limited audience input and little reform value for the offenders involved.75 In some factories, the collective abandoned its reform responsibilities, ejected unredeemable offenders, and allowed hard-core hooligans to escape the reform process by firing them. At a shipbuilding factory in the Krasnodar region, three of the ten hooligans sent to the factory collective for reeducation were fired after a short time “and their behavior was never discussed.”76 Sometimes soft-lined offenders were even fired, often at their own request, the day after they were trans ferred to the workers’ collective for reform.77 Such management moves destroyed the soft line’s reformative stance by separating hooligans from the labor collective and showed the often ambivalent or hostile attitude these collectives had toward the soft line and the reform project they were supposed to be undertaking.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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The imperfect operation of the reform process and the inability of many collectives to reclaim their fallen comrades did much to under mine support for the soft-line system as a whole. Although officialdom housed many hard-line critics of the state’s new soft-line anti-crime stance, the most vocal and viol ent opponents of Khrushchev’s new crime program came from among Soviet citizens themselves. “The workers,” Central Committee department head N. R. Mironov told republican prosecutors, “are amazed by the indecisiveness, softness and, sometimes, inactivity of state organs in the fight against crime.”78 As news of abuses spread, a politics of punishment emerged that pitted humane practices against harsh punishments and that positioned a soft-line state against a vocal, hard-line segment of its citiz enry.
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Popular Responses to Soft-Line Policies Many Soviet citizens, to judge by their letters to authority, were not supporters of the state’s soft-line stance on petty crime. Instead, they advocated a hard-line position of strengthening the law’s punitive force and called for a more confrontational and aggressive policy toward the hooligan. During a time when state actors were softening the system’s coercive power, many Soviet citizens argued for the reinstitution of severe punishments for criminals. Letter writers sought to discredit the new anti-crime discourse by attacking the keyword of the state’s soft-line policy: humaneness ( gumannost’). They argued that humaneness resonated with the criminal underworld rather than with the state’s core constituency of urban labor. A worker from Moscow, for example, wrote to the USSR Supreme Soviet: “The word humanism (gumanizm) sounds very noble . . . but this slogan is harmful to the people.”79 A letter from Sverdlovsk lamented that “It is good that we have such humane people in our country, but it is rare, very rare, that such humaneness serves any useful purpose for society. It only helps the criminal.”80 Humanism was rejected because it defended the criminal by shielding him from the punitive sites of court and camp and hindered real anti-crime efforts. A Muscovite wrote in a letter to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: “Why isn’t a single group in our government disturbed by ‘the humane approach’ to hooli gans. Do the representatives of the courts and the Ministry of Internal Affairs understand their mission as only to defend murderers and hooligans? Isn’t it time to end this comedy? Isn’t it time to begin a real fight against these criminals?”81
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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Letter writers blasted the soft line for its leniency. Again, they invested the keyword of the soft line discourse, humanism, with special contempt. A collective letter from a group of workers complained that “our laws are too soft and too humane.”82 A group of letter writers from Ul’ianovsk noted that “our laws weaken punishments and there is too much humaneness ( gumannost’) in them.”83 Letter writers decried the soft line policy for giving noncustodial punishments and sentences below the legal minimum. A letter writer from the Primor’e region wrote to the USSR Supreme Soviet asking them “in the interests of the simple, honest workers to renounce the theory of some jurists, who insist on reducing the sentences of criminals under the cover that this is humanism ( gumanizm).”84 Like other hardline advocates, letter writers doubted that weak laws and weak punish ments would deter people from committing crimes. “What will it cost a hooligan to beat a man,” a letter writer from Riga noted, “when he already knows that no serious punishment threatens him?”85 Many letter writers causally linked the weakness of the law with the growth of crime. A people’s representative (using a quote from Stalin) remarked to the chair of the USSR Supreme Soviet’s Presidium, K. E. Voroshilov: “Only the weakness of our laws in relation to punishment can explain why bandits and hooligans are now making attempts on the lives of Soviet citizens, the most precious capital in the world and the builders of communism.”86 At a time when many members of the legal community were working to make the laws more lenient, letter writers were calling for the passage of new laws that would punish criminals “severely” and “strictly.” A Donbass worker advised Voroshilov: “Do not be afraid to make the law as severe as possible because all honest people will only thank the Supreme Soviet and their elected representatives for this.”87 Factory workers from Ul’ianovsk wrote on the necessity of passing a “severe” anti-crime law: “Not only we but all honest citizens of the entire Soviet Union demand that a new severe law be passed. Everywhere we say that a man’s life is precious, but alas these are only words that exist on paper. Where is the good life? Why don’t we protect this life? They cut people like pigs in every street and alley in the Soviet Union. . . . It is a shame . . . and all because there are no strict measures.”88 A letter signed by twenty-five teachers complained that “for a long time the people have been waiting for a law from the government that would really punish enemies of the people, such as hooligans and bandits, and, even though the press has been covering their vile
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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deeds for quite some time, still there is no new law.”89 Many writers urged the government not to be afraid to adopt brutal measures of physical coercion in the anti-crime fight. Instead of reform and reintegration, many letter writers argued that criminals needed to be liquidated. In a letter entitled “We Declare Merciless War on Bandits and Hooligans,” a Muscovite wrote to the USSR Supreme Soviet: “All the people understand that we need to talk not about humanism, but about the physical destruction of all of these villains (mraz).”90 On the subject of hooliganism, factory workers advised Voroshilov: “We must not act liberally with hooligans but wage a cruel struggle against them that includes physical destruction.”91 A collective letter from a group of Moscow professors argued that it was useless to reform enemies of society and urged the government to “finish them [the hooligans] off without mercy.”92 Letter writers advised the state that petty criminals should be exiled from society, instead of being embedded in peer groups and reintegrated into their labor collectives as the soft line advocated. One advocate for exile wrote to Voroshilov: “There is no place for hooligans in our society and we must isolate them forever so that we will never have to see them again before our eyes.”93 A Party member from Magnitogorsk suggested that “we send them to the taiga so that they can never come back.”94 The rocky reception of the soft line shows us that not all of Khrushchev’s Thaw reforms found a positive and appreciative public. In our story, a soft-line state found itself, until 1960, working against the wishes of a hard-line segment of its society that wanted to use coercion and incar ceration to solve the USSR’s problem with petty crime. In its attempt to enact the soft line, the de-Stalinizing regime ran up against the Stalinist language and legacies that were still deeply embedded in certain layers of its society. Instead of capitul ating and reversing policy positions in the face of growing criticism, the heads of the USSR Procuracy and the USSR Supreme Court defended the government’s soft-line stance. Facing criticism from his republican-level colleagues, USSR General Prosecutor Rudenko commented defensively: “The line that the court and prosecu torial organs has taken, on orders from the Central Committee, is correct. . . . Of course, it is difficult to proceed without some mistakes in this great endeavor. However we cannot trace these few mistakes to the system as a whole.”95 Pressuring skeptical colleagues to subordinate the courts to central policies and the utopian political programs that buttressed them, A. F. Gorkin cautioned his fellow justices that they
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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must follow the center’s soft line. “This line is the political program for the activity of the courts and the operation of justice,” the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court declared. “We must consistently and stead fastly follow it in life.”96 In the face of growing evidence that local offi cials were manipulating the policies of peer reform to hide crime and criminals, Gorkin did not denounce the policy but instead recom mended that: “We must transfer cases to the comrades’ courts and workers’ collectives more boldly. . . . We cannot restrict such a practice but, on the contrary, we must strive to constantly expand its usage.”97 Gorkin and Rudenko informed their colleagues that, despite the abuses, the policy departure marked by the soft line was permanent and that it was neither possible nor desirable to return to the coercive positions of the past. At an address to the Komsomol Central Committee in February 1960, Rudenko claimed: “We do not have the same way of doing things that we had earlier under Beria. All those ways of operating vanished into eternity (kanuli v vechnost’) along with Beria.”98 On the defensive concerning soft-line abuses, Gorkin cautioned his colleagues that: “Nobody is allowed to return to the old, obsolete methods of fighting crime. There can be no talk about any turning back.”99 Little did Gorkin and Rudenko know that the RSFSR would repudiate many of its soft-line positions within a few weeks of their statements on the policy’s supposed irreversibility. The RSFSR, changing its policy direction, would take steps to refill rather than empty prisons and sanc tion the use of physical force rather than reintegrative reform as the principal plank of its anti-hooligan campaign. In the course of a few weeks in the summer of 1960, the policy on and campaign against petty crime swung from one extreme to the other.
The Hard Line In the beginning of 1960, signs of anti-soft line backlash started appear ing. The central press began to escalate its criticism of the overapplication and abuse of soft-line measures and their unanticipated extension to serious criminal cases, such as murder and rape. Arguing that not every case was suitable for the soft line, Komsomolskaia pravda, in an editorial comment, complained that “it is impossible to transform the splendid words ‘suspended sentence and transfer to the collective’ into the obliga tory ending line of every judicial sentence.”100 Blasting the overextension of soft-line sentences, the secretary of the Leningrad Komsomol noted
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
one line short
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“that peer reform is a very good, correct, humane, and necessary measure, but this measure has become some kind of fashion.”101 However, it was not until the summer of 1960 that the anti-soft line position received official support from a top Party organ. In August 1960, the Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR (Biuro TsK KPSS po RSFSR) released the decree “On the State of the Fight against Crime in the RSFSR and Political and Reform Work in Places of Confinement” and put an end to soft-line practices in the RSFSR. The decree critic ized local legal workers for being “weak” and for misusing peer reform policies to coddle criminals. Arguing that the transfer of criminals to their labor collectives had allowed serious offenders to escape justice, the Bureau called for increased regulation and supervision of the punishment process.102 The effect of the decree on punishment practices was immediate. By bringing hooligans in from “offshore” sites and limiting off-thebooks discipline, the decree caused a sharp spike in convictions for hoo liganism. In 1961, the number of people convicted of hooliganism in the USSR jumped 120 percent from its 1960 soft-line low. In the RSFSR, hooligan conviction rates rose 125 percent from 1960 levels. The growth of simple hooligan convictions from 1960 to 1961 was particularly explosive, skyrocketing 563 percent in the USSR and 737 percent in the RSFSR. In both the USSR and the RSFSR, malicious hooligan convic tions doubled and petty hooligan convictions rose more than 60 percent. Following the fall of the soft line, conviction rates would stay at such relatively high levels for the rest of the Khrushchev period. The application of custodial measures of punishment increased across the board as courts abandoned loopholes and began to sentence more offenders to prisons and labor camps.103 Renewed state surveil lance of sentencing practices put local courts under pressure to incar cerate, even in cases of petty crime. The prosec utor of the Belorussian SSR, acknowledging the implicit and explicit pressures that powered the surge in incarceration rates, complained to his colleagues that “court and Procuracy workers have begun to get scared and even when they clearly don’t need to incarcerate they do anyway just to be safe.”104 The increase in courtroom convictions translated into increases in recorded crime rates as offenders, whose cases would have been dropped and transferred “offshore” during the soft line campaign, were now being sent to courts, convicted, and entered into crime registers. Higher crime rates in 1961 were not due to actual increases in criminality, but to the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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fact that more cases were now being sent to the courts and fewer cases were being transferred and hidden in alternative disciplinary sites, such as labor collectives and comrades’ courts.105 In concert with the hard-line shift, the mass media changed its reporting on crime, deviance, and socialist humanism. Instead of reforming and reinserting criminals back into society, articles in the Soviet press called for a harsh confrontation with the hooligan. In the summer of 1961, the Leningrad Komsomol organ, Smena, published an article by the mother of a man murdered by a hooligan. Entitled “Show the Hooligans No Mercy,” the article ended with a call for an intense campaign against deviants: “We must not show any pity or forgiveness [for criminals] but only anger and intolerance. . . . . Do not spare the hooligans. Do not indulge them. Fight against them mercilessly!”106 In the very next edition, Smena published another article that discussed the murder of a model Soviet worker and druzhinnik by a crimin al who had benefi tted from soft-line policies. Instead of portraying the deviant as a redeemable wrongdoer who could be saved for the Soviet cause, the article informed readers that “the hooligan hates everything that is dear to us: work, friendship, love, and our principles of communist morality. Can we show such a person any humaneness? . . . The hooli gan needs not a delicate touch, but a cruel hand that’s not afraid to strike out at these thugs.”107 The journalist ended the piece with the rhetorical question: “Isn’t showing compassion to the criminal also showing cruelty to honest Soviet citizens?”108 In the next issue of Smena, the editors published excerpts from the diary of the murdered dru zhinnik. Following these passages, the editors attacked the soft line by redefining the concept of socialist humanism at its heart. Instead of defining this key concept by referring to themes of rehabilitation and peer reform, the editors stated that “humanism has nothing in common with liberalism or an all-forgiving attitude. Soviet humanism means undying hatred for the enemies of our people.”109 The meaning of humanism in the Soviet criminal justice sphere had turned upside down. Soviet legal workers now argued that giving soft measures of punishment to criminals in order to reclaim them for the collective was “not an example of humanism but of a liberalism that is alien to the interests of strengthening Soviet justice.”110 Instead of giving lenient punishments to salvageable lawbreakers, humanism now meant applying “strict measures of punishment to persons guilty of serious crimes.”111 Instead of being just about showing “delicacy, attentiveness, and sympathy to people who have committed crimes,” a
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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justice of the USSR Supreme Court reminded readers of a prominent legal journal that “socialist humanism also has a second side. In neces sary cases it allows for the use of revolutionary violence, not just persuasion but also coercion and the application of strict and severe measures of punishment.”112 Instead of being told to stick to the soft line, judges and prosecutors were now reminded that “there are crimes which by their character do not deserve any kind of indulgence and in these cases humanism must be shown to society and to the victims of crime.”113 Coercive methods and confrontational attitudes were just as central to the state’s hard-line policy shift as the revival of courtroom convic tions and the rise in the application of custodial sentences. Following widespread calls for the use of coercive measures in the anti-hooligan campaign in the mass press, legal periodicals, and letters from the public, the RSFSR decided, in June 1962, to resort to physical force in its confrontation with the hooligan. Rubber truncheons, tear gas, and handcuffs (items Soviet propaganda had linked with the repressive equipment capitalist police used to combat their restive lower classes and racial minorities) were distributed to select regional police forces. A policy of “special measures” was drafted and enacted that enabled police to use nondeadly force against deviants. Almost two years after Rudenko announced the impossibility of returning to a coercive Beriatype style of criminal justice, the RSFSR moved from a soft-line stance emphasizing reform and reintegration to a position that echoed the public’s call for a harsh, merciless, and violent confrontation with the hooligan. Vocal and angry citizens had been calling for expanding the police’s ability to use viol ent force against hooligans since at least the mid-1950s. They argued that the law “disarmed” the police by depriving them of the ability to use violence in the apprehension of criminals.114 These citizens called for “expanding the rights of the police to use weapons and physical force” against criminals generally and hooligans specifi cally.115 To change the “tender” approach to the hooligan, they wanted to change the laws that made the police “afraid to lay their hands on the hooligans for fear that they will cause them some pain.”116 Some historians have argued that it was the June 1962 mass distur bance at Novocherkassk that prompted Khrushchev (who by nature seems to have been suspicious of strengthening police power) to support such confrontational policies and grant the police new coercive capabilities.117 However, evidence from K hrushchev’s public speeches
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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shows that he was contemplating arming the police and allowing them to use nondeadly force to preserve public order months before the Novocherkassk incident. In an April 1962 speech to the Komsomol, Khrushchev announced his new support for arming the police and allowing them to fight back against hooligans. As with the campaign to unleash obshchestvennost’, he presented the decision to use force against hooliganism as a self-defense measure that expanded the overly narrow parameters of permissible violence: “A hooligan can strike a policeman and then say to him: ‘You have no right to strike me back.’ The hooligan has the right [to strike a policeman] but the policeman has no right to defend himself. We in the government have come to the conclusion that this inequitable situation must be changed (shouts of approval and stormy applause).”118 Even earlier, at the XXII Congress of the Commu nist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961, Khrushchev and his colleagues had expressed their support for getting tough on crime and disorder. Presidium member and leading Party ideologue Mikhail Suslov, for example, explicitly endorsed the hard-line policies that advocated physical force, calling in his speech at the congress for the anti-crime campaign to be conducted “without any hesitation in the use of coer cion: our punishing sword must be brought down on malicious and dangerous criminals, hooligans, thieves, parasites, and other anti-social elements.”119 Following such una mb igu ous calls for esc alating coerc ion and confrontation, the Russian republic, in June 1962, gave the police the right to fight back against hooligans with rubber truncheons and hand cuffs. In the same month, the RSFSR Minister of Internal Affairs drafted an order and instructional letter outlining the distribution process and enumerating the rules of engagement in the state’s physical confronta tion with the hooligan. Impatient with the soft line and convinced that hooliganism could not be contained through reform and peer mentoring, the RSFSR decided to make viol ent force a prominent part of its antihooligan repertoire.120 The RSFSR MVD’s instructional letter permitted police units to use truncheons to stop malicious hooligans in cases when hooligans were assaulting citizens, government representatives, policemen, or druzhin niki and in cases when suspects resisted arrest or attempted to flee from police custody. The truncheons were first introduced in the Orenburg, Kuibyshev, and Primor’e regional police units, but the instructional letter allowed other regional police units to petition for the right to arm their units with truncheons as well. Calling for strict control of the use
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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of violent force, the RSFSR MVD cautioned against the abuse of trun cheons and limited their distribution to those policemen “who know the regulations concerning how to use them and can use them correctly.” All cases in which truncheons were used “and the reaction of the public to their use” were to be reported to local Party and government bodies and to the RSFSR MVD.121 The order to sanction the introduction of rubber truncheons in local police units was accompanied by a set of detailed top-secret instructions on how these “special measures” were to be adopted. The instructions forbade officers to use truncheons against women, children under 16, the elderly, invalids “who bear visible signs of disability,” and foreigners. It also strictly forbade the use of violent force within police stations or administrative buildings. The use of violence was supposed to be a “last resort” that the officer used only after warning the offender.122 The distribution of rubber truncheons was prefaced by an MVDinitiated media campaign that, in order to justify the use of violence, objectified the hooligan as a well-armed predator stalking the represen tatives of state and society. Officials prepared press releases on the “brazen acts of hooligans” for use in local press, radio, and television outlets in an effort to prepare public opinion for the new hard-line policy. The MVD prepared stands on which they displayed weapons that hooligans used. Many of these s tands were erected at meetings of labor collectives at which the new policy was announced.123 Before the new weaponization program was enacted, there was a flurry of public hearings at workplaces and other institutional sites. Activists addressed labor collectives and, sometimes, former victims of hooliganism added their own graphic testimonies. The media blitz the RSFSR MVD mounted in the r un-up to the new weaponization program put a spin on the government’s representation of the hooligan that was fundamentally different from soft-line ortho doxy. As we have seen, Khrushchev and others had represented the hooligan as an average person who had made a mistake or been led astray and who could and should be remade, via peer group mentoring, into a full and useful member of society. Such a view was central to the soft line. However, the MVD’s representation of the hooligan portrayed him as an irredeemable predatory animal that was a real and constant threat to public safety. Reform and reintegration were neither possible nor desirable. The relation of state and society to the hooligan was no longer that of mentor to misguided but one of mortal enemies locked in a “kill or be killed” struggle. In Orenburg, a worker in the local silk
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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factory whose eye had been “beaten out of her head” by hooligans addressed the factory assembly: “I am twenty-four years old. What you see on my face is the result of hooligan activity. The hooligan is a beast and he doesn’t care whether you are young or a woman or whether you are a child. We must destroy such beasts.”124 The new MVD spin on the hooligan coincided with the population’s hard-line stance toward hooliganism. In their new coercive and repre sentational tactics, they moved closer to the public’s vision of a cruel campaign of destruction against hooliganism and farther from former soft-line orthodoxies. At meetings of collectives and at specially held assemblies, many people expressed their enthusiasm and approval of the new policy of weaponization and confrontation. An engineer in Vladivostok, for example, declared “it’s about time that we expanded the rights of the police and put a real weapon in their hands.”125 After being showed weapons that the police confiscated from arrested hooli gans, a Vladivostok sailor exclaimed: “Against their [the hooligans’] brass knuckles and knives, we must raise our armed and punishing hand.”126 “We must do everything,” a lathe operator enthused, “so that the earth burns beneath the feet of hooligans and thieves.”127 “For every blow given by a hooligan,” said a worker in Vladivostok, “we must answer with two or three blows of our own.”128 Some people did, however, express their reservations about arming the police. They argued that the distribution and use of weapons long associated with police brutality and repression was not appropriate for a country that was approaching communism.129 Other workers argued that the police, never known to be a magnet of prime human capital, could not be trusted to use their new weapons in accordance with regu lations.130 Some workers asked that only the best policemen be given truncheons to limit their potential misuse. Others called on the police to review their cadre policy carefully to weed out those who might abuse their new powers.131 These voices of caution, however, were over whelmed by the voices of confrontation. The new policy of confrontation and violent coercion expanded in concert with the retraction of the soft line. In August 1965, the MVD RSFSR’s successor organization, the Ministry for the Protection of Public Order (MOOP), reported that rubber truncheons were being used in twenty-six regions in the RSFSR (the Bashkir and Komi autono mous republics; the Altai, Primor’e, Stavropol’, and Khabarovsk regions; and the Arkhangel’sk, Astrakhan, Volgograd, Vologda, Voronezh, Ivanovo, Irkutsk, Kaluga, Kamchatka, Kirov, Kostroma, Murmansk,
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
The Rise and Fall of the Soft Line on Petty Crime
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Moscow, Orenburg, Perm’, Rostov, Riazan’, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, and Smolensk regions) and five railroads (the Eastern Siberian, Northern Caucasian, the Northern, the Sverdlovsk, and the Far-Eastern rail roads).132 The MOOP RSFSR reported that, between July 1962 (when the Vladivostok police were first issued their rubber truncheons) and April 1965, police used rubber truncheons in 12,466 incidents involving hooligans. They noted that the application of special measures (spets sredstvo) was “effective” and that “after their application the hooligan stops his rowdiness and fulfills the legal demands of the policeman.” The public “supported,” according to the report, the policy of using truncheons against hooligans and there were no “negative reactions on the part of the population to the use of special measures.”133 The widespread adoption of special measures reveals the extent to which authorities in Russia rolled back the soft line on petty crime. Softline policies of reintegrative reform, increasingly discredited by state and society as ineffective and inoperative, were scaled back. In their place, a new hard line was defined that resonated with public demands to elevate the crime struggle into a campaign of physical confronta tion and violent coercion. The representation of the hooligan as a mis guided member of society who could be reclaimed for socialism through the influence of his peer group was also deemphasized. The hooligan was now seen as an animal that acted outside of the social collective and that had to be captured, encaged, and, if necessary, beaten into submission.
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Conclusion Despite the sharp policy turn from 1959 to 1962, the story of the shift from the soft line to the hard line should not be read as the complete abandonment of the former for the full-scale adoption of the latter. Like the dilemma of disentangling the intertwined public and private spaces discussed in chapter 2, the soft line and hard line coexisted throughout the Khrushchev era and reject easy analytical unpacking into pure policy stages. Rather than following one after the other serially, the soft line and hard line were interconnected throughout the Thaw. At some points during this period, one pole of this entangled orientation was empha sized over the other. In 1959, for example, soft-line positions were stressed and became dominant. By 1962, hard-line anti-hooliganism was ascendant. During neither of these episodes, however, was the opp osi ng ori ent at ion tow ard crime eit her comp letely eff aced or
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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eliminated; rather, elements of each continued to exist and operate even under the shadow of its other. As a result of this unstable mixture of opposites, contradictions riddled Khrushchev’s experiment in policing and punishing petty crime. As we have seen, the soft line hoped to reintegrate fallen citiz ens and return them to the social collective. Yet, during the heyday of softline domination, an a nti-parasite camp aign was int ens ifyi ng that promised to purify Soviet communities through giving their members the ability to exile persistent troublemakers.134 Likewise, the soft line stressed a style of punishment that favored persuasion and reform over coercion and force. Yet the same year that saw the soft line’s ascent also witnessed the reform of self-defense legislation and the activation of the druzhina, actions that seemed to encourage the use of vigilante violence against local hooligans. Even at the level of the individual, contradictions and tensions abounded. As we have seen, many Soviet citizens ( judging from their letters to authority) seemed uneasy with the humane polic ies of the soft line and favored Stalinist strategies of incarceration and confrontation. Yet when confronted with the hooligans in their own collectives, many of these same citizens found it difficult to condemn them in unequivocal terms and, instead, sought to save them from the harshness of the criminal justice system. These contradictions should not be explained away. Instead, they should be seen as the hallmarks of an uncertain era. Just as the Secret Speech and the petty hooligan campaign showed how an illiberal policy of arbitrary and unrestrained social repression could coexist with a call for liberalization and socialist legality, the contradictory undercurrents of the soft line show that reform and reaction were interwoven through out the Khrushchev era. Rather than creating a coherent forerunner of “socialism with a human face,” Khrushchev’s hesit ant reforms called into being a confused and unsettled socialism: a socialism of unresolved opposites within whose Janus face Soviet citizens saw both a past and a future filled with penalties and limits as well as promises and possibilities. In this way, the Thaw in petty crime policy (and, presumably, in other policy areas as well) resists easy separation into sequential stages of pure soft-line and hard-line positions. Such an easy bifurcation misses the messiness and the multidimensionality of what Stephen Bittner has provocatively termed the “lived experience of the Thaw.”135 Instead, reform and reaction existed in inseparable tension with one
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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another throughout the Thaw and called forth complex and difficult to categorize responses of unease, excitement, dread, confusion, and disgust from the era’s constituent institutions, factions, and participant observers. Seen in this manner, the rise and fall of Khrushchev’s soft line is not a story of the life and death of leniency in the treatment of non-malicious hooligans and other petty criminals. After the end of the soft-line campaign in 1962, suspended sentences and peer-based reform and re education programs would still be used for disciplining petty deviants, but on a smaller and subtler scale. Instead, the ebbing of the soft line marked an unexpected shift in the predominant social control style of the Khrushchev regime, a pendulum swing away from suspended sentences and peer reform and toward its intertwined opposite of using prison stays and armed police battalions as the primary means for punishing hooliganism. The waning of the soft line also showed the regime’s sagging faith in its own reformist agenda. With the swing away from the soft line, the regime began to lose faith in the efficacy of lenient, noncustodial measures in controlling crime rates, in the ability of local officials and obshchestvennost’ to carry out responsible reform efforts, and in the status of the hooligan as a redeemable wrongdoer who could be returned to respectable Soviet society. The post-1960 hardening of punishment policies was the action of a state second-guessing itself: a state questioning whether its reforms had gone too far too fast and wondering whether lenient measures were encouraging rather than eliminating anti-social activity. In response to pushback from the public and legal professionals over the lenient soft line and reeling from the continued existence of social disorder on a large (e.g., Novocherkassk) and small scale, the state had to rethink its relation to force and the application of violence to anti-social activity. The hard-line decision to hit out at hooligans, to arm the police, and to add nondeadly force to the unsettled state’s anti-hooligan repertoire was the result of this rethink. When placed into its historical perspective, the rollback of the soft line fits into a series of reform rollbacks that shifted the policy positions of the Khrushchev regime from cautious reform to conservative repres sion during the 1960 to 1962 period. In the cultural sphere, the Manezh exhibit of 1962 rolled back the regime’s limited experiment with avantgarde cultural expression and marked a return to state-supported socialist realist policies and exemplars.136 In the legal sphere, the death penalty began to be used with increasing frequency for a host of new
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
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nonp ol iti c al c rimes, inc ludi ng curr ency specu l at ion, bribe ry, and egregious theft of state property.137 In the social sphere, the anti-parasite campaign showed the regime’s desire to remove and repress undesir ables rather than reform and return them to the collective. Rather than deviating from the norm, the decline of the soft line in petty crime punishments followed a general trend of rethinking limited liberal and lenient positions and reemphasizing intolerant attitudes and heavy-handed tactics. The story of the soft line and its eclipse tells us something about the chronology (or chronologies) of the Thaw in the criminal justice sphere: a chronology that reached its peak in the late 1950s and then rolled back in on itself in 1962 as a diverse series of events, from the Novocherkassk riot to the Manezh exhibition, caused a reevaluation of soft-line reforms across a wide range of policy positions.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:32.
Conclusion
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Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose: Hooliganism after Khrushchev
In the summer of 1966, the Brezhnev regime unveiled a series of tough anti-crime measures. On July 23, 1966, the Communist Party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers released the decree “On Measures for Strengthening the Fight against Crime.”1 Three days later, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a companion decree “On Strengthe ni ng Res pons ibili ty for Hool ig ani sm.” 2 With these measures, the hard-line stance on hooliganism, which existed under the Khrushchev regime in the 1960s, was solidified and strengthened. The limited soft-line experiments of the Khrushchev era based on peergroup reform, punishment reductions, and the reintegration and re education of appropriate offenders were plainly and publicly renounced. A blow against reformist criminolog ists, the 1966 hard-line anti-hooligan campaign represented the total victory for advocates of tougher police power and increased incarcerations.3 The 1966 Brezhnev campaign is normally seen as a conservative reaction against Khrushchev-era polic ies.4 However, there was not, as we have seen, a single unitary Khrushchev-era policy. The Khrushchev era balanced soft- and hard-line practices and swung, at the end of 1960, from an emphasis on the former approach to a stress on the latter. Elements of the Brezhnev-era campaign that contemporary authors decried, such as the use of truncheons, were actually continuations of 199
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:43.
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Conclusion
ard-line policies initiated under Khrushchev.5 The 1966 campaign was h not a categorical rejection of Khrushchev-era practices. Instead, it was an à la carte policy that selectively appropriated some Khrushchev-era anti-hooligan practices and eliminated others. By balancing retention, revision, and rejection, the 1966 Brezhnev campaign created a hybrid style of social control in the anti-hooligan sphere that combined old elements with new approaches. To begin with what was new, the 1966 Brezhnev campaign, in contrast to the Khrushchev campaign of a decade earlier, sought to crack down on hooliganism by increasing punishments across the board. As we have seen, Khrushchev sought to get tough on hooligan ism by giving more people lighter sentences for less serious forms of anti-social behavior. By cracking down on minor misbehavior, the Khrushchev regime sought to stop the root causes that led to major crime. In its effort to cut down on criminal deviance, the Brezhnev regime took an opposite approach from its predecessors. By creating a new type of heavy-duty hooliganism that gave harsher punishments to the most egregious hooligan offenses, Brezhnev’s policy differentiated deviance upward rather than downward. Termed “especially malicious hooliganism” (osobo zlostnoe khuligantsvo), this more serious form of deviance was defined as hooliganism “accompanied by the use or attempted use of a firearm, knife, brass knuckles, or other object used to inflict bodily harm.” Its punishment, deprivation of freedom for three to seven years, was harsher and longer than any other form of hooligan punishment.6 Instead of watering down deviance and trying to stop hooliganism by giving more people smaller punishments, the Brezhnev regime sought to fight hooliganism by imprisoning offenders for a longer time under a harsher and more heavy-duty definition of hooligan activity. With its launching of a new hooligan label, the Brezhnev regime followed the trend, started in the Stalin era and continued in the Khrushchev period, of differentiating deviancy and creating new hooligan categories. As before, this move increased the menu of criminal misbehavior, multi plied category confusion among practical workers, and created new classes of hooligan actors and actions. By activating local police, prosecu tors, and judges and arming them with yet another category of hooligan crime, the 1966 Brezhnev campaign pushed the boundaries of this broad crime outward and boosted conviction rates upward.7 Instead of being caused by increased resistance, the rise in hooliganism that
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:43.
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accompanied the 1966 campaign, just as with the Khrushchev campaign, was caused by the ways increased repression, police empowerment, and the creation of new hooligan categories combined to expand the domain of deviance in Soviet society. The creation of an especially egregious form of hooliganism did not mean that the Brezhnev regime rejected the Khrushchev-era petty hooligan program. On the contrary, the Brezhnev regime saw petty hooliganism, along with alcohol abuse, as one of the primary causes ( pervoprichiny) of crime and sought to strengthen the petty hooligan system by revising it and rectifying its errors.8 To make sure that petty hooligan detainees were being used for mandatory physical labor and alleviate overcrowding, the RSFSR Ministry for the Protection of Public Order (MOOP) began to set up special holding centers (spetspriemniki ) specifically for petty hooligans in major cities and regional capit als.9 To counter critic ism that the system was insufficiently severe, detention conditions were roughened up. Detainees slept on plank beds, they were not allowed to smoke, they were not allowed to supplement their prison diet with outside foodstuffs or receive packages from relatives, and they were given hot food only every other day (on the days when no hot food was distributed, detainees received only their bread ration plus salt and water).10 To force detainees to perform their mandatory labor, the state authorized local judges to tack on additional thirty-day sentences to uncooperative and idle arrestees.11 The state also used food as an incentive to increase the productivity of petty hooligans by promising that detainees who exhibited a “conscientious attitude to their work” would be given hot food every day.12 The Brezhnev regime also continued to augment its policing and prosecutory powers by outsourcing cases to obshchestvennost’. Obshchestvennost’’s key organizational affiliates, the druzhina and the comrades courts, still functioned (at least in theory if not always in practice) as mass sites of volunteer activism and social self-policing. To improve their performance, authorities decreed that more awards and bonuses would be distributed to diligent obshchestvenniki.13 In opposition to the old regime, Brezhnev and his bureaucrats saw the organizations of obshchestvennost’ more as practical appendages to state power than as state substitutes or the seeds of a future communist society.14 Like Khrushchev, the Brezhnev regime sought to encourage physical con frontation between the collective and the criminal and to unleash the power of popular violence in the anti-hooligan struggle. In the 1966 decree, the state opened a wide space for citizens to practice violent
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:43.
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vigilantism, declaring: “Actions that are directed at stopping criminal acts or detaining criminals are legal and will not result in criminal prosecution even if these actions cause injury to the criminal.”15 These measures should be seen as part of a process, started a decade earlier under Khrushchev, to soft en restrict ive self-defense laws and to push out the boundaries of permissible violence in the fight against hooliganism. During the late 1960s, the prosecution of domestic hooliganism continued unabated. As we have seen, hooliganism was gradually domesticated during the Khrushchev period, as this flexible catchall category was increasingly used to criminalize domestic dysfunction, spousal battery, and child abuse. The novel linkage of hooliganism and home remade hooliganism from a crime of anonymous violence to a crime of intimate violence, problematized the entangled boundaries of public space and public responsibility, and expanded the state’s puni tive reach deeper down into the everyday world of home and hearth. It also created a new hooligan at odds with the stereotypic al street brawler that preoccupied the public imagination. During the Brezhnev period, local police, prosecutors, and judges continued the process of domesticating hooliganism. Many regions noted that the home was the main site of hooliganism and that hooli gans victimized their wives and children more than any other group.16 These developments show that the problematic Soviet domestic sphere was more than a zone of state intervention, a space for cultured leisure, or a site of unencumbered closeness, authenticity, and open communication. As some criminologists were beginning to suspect, the Soviet home was, for some unfortunate families, a place of disorder, dissipation, and intimate viol ence where deviance was taught to the next generation and future hooligans were formed from traumatized children.17 The history of hooliganism, however, does not end with Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Hooliganism is just as much a problem in today’s capi talist country as it was in yesterday’s socialist superpower. Yet while the crime remains the same, deviance’s legal definition and prosecution dynamics have continued to change in accordance with contemporary interests and agendas. Instead of expanding hooliganism’s legal defini tion, for instance, the Putin administration has narrowed it, manuf ac turing a precipitous drop in this once most common form of Russian crime.18 Such a shift contrasts with the loose construction and soaring conviction rates of the Khrushchev period.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:43.
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Yet both policies, past and present, underline one of the main argu ments of this study: conviction rates for hooliganism were (and are) extremely sensitive to the way this amorphous crime was (and is) defined in formal legal terms. Sharp statistical swings in hooliganism, thereby, were not driven solely by social disorder or moral panic over the appearance of new subcultures and behaviors. Rather, they often reflected the impact that new legal formulations of hooliganism had on the way local policemen, prosecutors, and judges understood and enforced the changing contours of this elastic criminal category. By re defining deviance in looser or tighter terms, such definitional shifts determined (and still determine now) how aggressively local actors could apply this elastic label to the ugly, everyday behaviors occurring around them. While its legal construction has recently contracted, hooliganism’s application and understanding in the post-Communist period have continued to evolve in unexpected ways to cover the new concerns, new contexts, and new crimes of a radically remodeled Russian society. By subsuming new types of actions under the elastic concept of hooli ganism, contemporary Russian law enforcers have created new classes of hooligans and new uses for this catchall criminal category. A dis turbing example of this creative process of opening hooliganism to new groups of people and types of practice is the hooliganization of hate crime in Putin’s Russia. In recent years, Russia has witnessed a series of violent skinhead and neo-Nazi-related hate crimes directed against ethnic minorities and foreign students. In regional centers such as Voronezh and showcase cities such as St. Petersburg, skinhead groups have assaulted and killed foreign students and Central Asian immigrants. In February 2004, a gang of Orel skinheads, nicknamed the “White Wolves,” attacked students from Buriatiia and an athlete from Mongolia.19 In Moscow, a group of skinheads brutally beat and stabbed three Caucasians in the Moscow subw ay foll owi ng the B eslan mass ac re (they rep orte dly shouted at their victims: “That’s what you get for terrorism”).20 In an especially tragic incident from February 2004, a group of skinheads armed with chains, bats, metal rods, and knives and shouting “Russia for Russians” stabbed to death a seven-year-old Tajik girl who was returning home from a skating rink with her father and cousin.21 When the verdicts were announced in the trial of the girls’ attackers, they were not found guilty of murder. They were found guilty of hooliganism.22 As this verdict suggests, extremist violence against foreigners is often
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:43.
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tried as hooliganism rather than under Russia’s hate crimes statute.23 “Skinheads who are arrested are charged with hooliganism, as a rule,” a journalist noted, “not with inciting ethnic discord.”24 The fact that hooliganism was sometimes used during the Soviet period to punish incidents of racial slurs and assault gives the contem porary hooliganization of hate crime historical precedent and perspec tive.25 However, human rights groups criticize and accuse regional police officials and prosecutors of using hooliganism not to punish hate crime, but to hide it and trivialize it.26 Through transforming skinheads into hooligans, local law enforcement officials translate the troubling new phenomenon of violent neo-Nazi street gangs into a familiar and less threatening category of misbehavior. In the process, though, they misuse the hooligan label to coddle perpetrators with light sentences and to sweep embarrassing incidents under the table. By making hate crime “hooligan,” they open up new understandings of what it means to be hooligan in post-Soviet Russia. By refusing to investigate or to prosec ute racially motivated incidents as hate crimes, they also encour age interracial violence and turn a blind eye to the growth of xenophobic extremism on the Russian street. Hooliganism has not only been reimagined in today’s Russia in rela tion to the topic of hate crime; in addition, the political authorities have also started to use the hooligan label as a useful weapon against postSoviet civil society. The use of hooliganism as a way to punish politic al opposition and critical speech has been employed since the Brezhnev era, when Soviet law enforcement began to use deviant categories as a way to stifle and stigmatize dissent without drawing the negative atten tion and international embarrassment of political show trials.27 Their post-Soviet successors have continued this process of selectively apply ing hooliganism as an easy way to silence independent speech and stop political protest. As a flexible instrument of easy incarceration and intimid ation, the Khrushchev-era category of petty hooliganism has become an en trenched part of the anti-civil society arsenal of your average postSoviet dictator—one that illiberal leaders across the former Soviet space have used to hooliganize and harass a wide array of independent actors, from political protesters to independent journalists. In the unfree politic al environment of Belarus, for example, the authorities used the charge of petty hooliganism both to detain a political protestor who ripped apart a picture of Belarusian dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:43.
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and to arrest the hundreds of demonstrators who publicly protested the rigged March 2006 presidential elections.28 In Russia, the fast-track punishment process and flexible ambiguity of the petty hooligan category have made it a useful weapon for punish ing and preempting political opposition. In July 2000, a Vladivostok judge, for example, detained local newspaper editor Irina Grebneva on petty hooligan charges for publishing the telephone transcripts of conversations in which regional politicians conspired to rig local elections.29 In another incident, police arrested Andrei Babitskii, the much-persecuted reporter for Radio Liberty, at a Moscow airport for petty hooliganism and detained him for five days to prevent him from traveling to the scene of the then-unfolding Beslan hostage crisis.30 More recently, Noize MC, a popular and controversial Russian rapper, was given a ten-day punishment for petty hooliganism after allegedly cursing at policemen during a 2010 Volgograd concert: an incident that was widely interpreted as aimed at silencing and intimidating a popular voice critical of police brutality and political corruption (the chorus of Noize MC’s best known anti-police anthem proclaims: “Citizen, halt! Halt! Turn out your pockets, slap, slap. Now your kidneys, kick, kick. Well, off you go. . . .”).31 The catchall crime of hooliganism played a similar suppressive role in the March 2012 “elections” that returned Vladimir Putin to the presi dency. To prevent the round-the-clock mass protests that brought down the Kuchma regime in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, Moscow’s mayor Sergei Sobianin, a loyal client of Putin’s political machine, warned that anyo ne att empti ng to set up a M aidan-style tent city in Mosc ow (modeled on the one that occupied Kiev’s Independence Square follow ing the corrupt and contested 2004 presidential elections) would be immediately arrested and tried for hooliganism.32 In other cases of politi cally motivated hooliganism, those who were successful in critiquing the unfair and corrupt campaign process were also quickly silenced and whisked off the public stage through this conveniently all-purpose and easily prosec utable criminal label. The femin ist Russian punk band Pussy Riot, for instance, was detained and charged with hooliganism in early 2012 for barging up to the iconostasis and holding an impromptu performance of their anti-Putin song “Holy Shit” at Moscow’s Christ the Savior Cathedral, a space closely associated with the post-Communist political establishment and cozy, state-connected religious hierarchs (parts of the purposefully offensive and provocative song mocked the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:43.
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musical mode of the Russian Orthodox liturgy and contained lyrics calli ng on the “Holy M other of God to cast out [the evil s pirit] Putin”).33 Petty hooliganism, in particular, continued to provide authorities with a quick and easy tool for seizing, quieting, and intimidating critics of the 2012 election. At Putin’s own polling station in Moscow, for instance, three members of Ukraine’s infamous femin ist/protest/exhi bitionist organization FEMEN were arrested for petty hooliganism after they took off their tops, shouted that Putin was a thief, attempted to steal the ballot box, and exhibited anti-Putin slogans on their naked chests (“I will steal [votes] for Putin”).34 A Khabarovsk activist for reforming Russia’s electoral process was likewise arrested for petty hooliganism after he organized a “flash mob” outside a local polling center and laid a makeshift funeral wreath at its entrance that mourned the death of free and fair elections (the policeman who arrested the activist initially claimed that he had littered by placing a handful of red carnations on the sidewalk outside the polling station and had, thereby, committed a petty hooligan act).35 Hooliganism has emerged on the political scene not only as a flexible weapon for suppressing civil society, it has also become an unlikely asset that savvy handlers can use to combat political competition, mobilize voters, and attract media attention in the rough and tumble world of Russia’s managed democracy. Kremlin-affiliated political parties, for example, have been accused of outsourcing some of their security and “attack” operations to notorious deviant gangs, such as the Spartak soccer hooligans. In a recent incident, thirty to forty masked men armed with baseball bats and allegedly wearing symbols of the pro-Kremlin Nashi youth movement attacked a meeting of members of radical youth organizations and seriously injured some of the partici pants. By using these nonstate deviant subcontractors as hired muscle to rough up opposition groups, the Kremlin has co-opted select hooli gans into its struggle against independent youth groups who they fear of conspiring to create a colored revolution in Russia.36 Hooliganism has also emerged in the unlikely arena of post-Soviet politics as an effective campaign practice and style of self-presentation. In the realm of self-promotion, political spectacle, and media grand standing, Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party and Eduard Limonov’s National Bolsheviks have achieved surprising electoral success and popular support by using hooligan personas and tactics to appeal to alienated voters and disaffected youth.37 Although hooliganism
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:43.
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has been an embarrassing and unplanned part of Russian and Soviet political spectacle since Khrushchev’s shoe and Yeltsin’s drunken con ducting, Zhirinovsky has perfected the art of purposefully using out rageous action, obscenity, and provocative speech to score political gain.38 In separate incidents, he has punched a woman, spat at his fellow parliamentarians, and started fistfights in the Duma (for which the Procuracy considered stripping him of his parliamentary immunity and charging him with hooliganism).39 In an age of Kremlin-controlled media and managed democracy, Limonov (himself a former petty criminal and street tough who has written widely on his experience growing up amid the hooligans and stiliagi of the urban underworld of Soviet Khar’kov) and his National Bolshevik Party have been able to spread its anti-Putin ideology and capture public attention through hooligan stunts such as occupying the offices of the Ministry of Health, throwing a portrait of Putin out the window, and shouting “ministers to the guillotine.”40 Another favorite tactic of the National Bolshevik’s self-described “velvet terror” is throwing mayonnaise and tomatoes at Kremlin-connected politicians and cultural personalities, like former Prime Minister Mikhail Kas’ianov and film director Nikita Mikhalkov.41 Instead of witnessing the death of hooliganism, the post-Soviet period has seen its displacement onto new sites and situations. Hooliganism has found renewed usage as a way to hide hate crime, as a way to control civil society, and as a way to aggressively court political support. Out side the formal legal arena, the hooligan label has continued to function in the wider world of everyday Russian speech as a blanket term for decrying irresponsible, repugnant, and socially undesirable behavior, a usage loose enough to allow Putin to publicly condemn the American government’s expansionary monetary and fiscal policies as a form of economic “hooliganism.”42 By creating new applications and under standings of what it means to be hooligan in a post-Soviet age, the practices of contemporary policemen, demagogues, politicians, and publicity-seekers have added yet another dimension of meaning to the elusive and unfolding catalog of hooligan crimes. They have also primed the deviant production process to make a new generation of hooligans out of a diverse collection of present-day actions and actors (even one as unlikely as Barack Obama).
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:43.
Copyright © 2012. University of Wisconsin Press. All rights reserved. LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:43.
Notes
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Introduction 1. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), fond (f.) 9474, opis’ (op.) 16, delo (d.) 645, list (l.) 54. 2. Tsentral’nyi munitsipal’nyi arkhiv g. Moskvy (TsMAM), f. 493, op. 1, d. 420, l. 72. In another sex-related case, a woman was arrested for hooliganism and sentenced to four years for having sex “on the riverbank close to the road.” Interestingly, her male partner was given only a fifteen-day administrative punishment. For this case, see GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 469, ll. 96–97. For the case of a woman whose communal apartment neighbors denounced her as a hooligan for bringing multiple sex partners to her room, see TsMAM, f. 1918, op. 2, d. 92, ll. 3–4. 3. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 443, l. 35. 4. R. W. Burchfield, ed., A Supplement to The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. 2 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1976), 145–146. The dictionary also lists such little used derivatives as the adjective “hooliganic” and the verb “to hooliganize.” 5. As the subject of sensationalized crime reporting and music hall burlesque, the hooligan straddled the worlds of popular anxiety and popular entertainment. For the possible derivations of the word, see Sean McMahon and Jo O’ Donoghue, Brewer’s Dictionary of Irish Phrase and Fable (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004), 375–376; Eric Partridge, A Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English (New York: Routledge, 1984), 1383; and Hugh Rawson, Wicked Words: A Treasury of Curses, Insults, Put-Downs, and Other Formerly Unprintable Terms from the AngloSaxon Times to the Present (New York: Crown, 1989), 197–198. For a treatment of hooliganism in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century England, see Geoffrey Pearson, Hooliganism: A History of Respectable Fears (New York: Schocken Books, 1984); and Stephen Humphries, Hooligans or Rebels? An Oral History of Working Class Childhood and Youth, 1889–1939 (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1981). For an interesting firsthand account of the early English hooligans, see
209
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Notes to pages 4–5
Clarence Rook, The Hooligan Nights: Being the Life and Opinions of an Unrepentant Criminal (London: G. Richards, 1901). 6. This does not mean that there were not examples of soccer hooliganism in the Soviet Union. For cases of soccer hooliganism during this period, see Sem Narin’iani, “V odnom gorode,” Komsomolskaia pravda, October 29, 1955, 2; and A. Akimov, “Silovaia bor’ba? Net, grubost’,” Izvestiia, May 31, 1959, 6. For a cartoon on outrageous fan behavior in the soccer stadium, see the cartoon “There Are All Kinds of Spectators at the Stadiums,” Krokodil, no. 31 (1955): 1. For information on soccer hooliganism during the Soviet period, see Robert Edelman, Serious Fun: A History of Spectator Sport in the USSR (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 53, 56, 95, 99, 210, 213. 7. Depending on the year, hooliganism was either the first or second most common offense tried in Soviet criminal courts. The only other crime that was as common was petty theft of state and public property (melkoe khishchenie gosudarstvennogo i obshchestvennogo imushchestva). For more information on the frequency of hooliganism over the Khrushchev period, see GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 57; and GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 418, ll. 78–80. 8. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 418, l. 83. 9. At the beginning of the Khrushchev period on April 1, 1953, hooligans formed 6.5 percent of the Gulag’s total inmate popul ation (2,224,566). The percentage of inmates in the Gulag for treason (the largest contingent of the counterrevolutionary crimes group) was only slightly higher at 8.3 percent. For the full population breakdown, see Marc Elie, “Les anciens détenus du Goulag: libérations massives, réinsertion et réhabilitation dans l ’URSS poststalinienne, 1953–1964” (PhD diss., L’École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2007), 451. The reader who wants to learn more about crime, prisoners, amnesties, and much more during the Khrushchev era could do little better than to consult Elie’s admirable and exhaustive work. 10. Gulag (Glavnoe upravlenie lagerei), 1917–1960, ed. A. I. Kokurin and N. V. Petrov (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond Demokratiia, 2000), 437. This shift in the criminal composition of the detainee population towards offenses like hooliganism and away from counterrevolutionary crimes was due to changes in amnesty policies and crime-fighting priorities after 1955 that favored the expansion of the former cohort and the shrinkage of the latter. For more on these internal shifts in the Gulag, see Steven A. Barnes, Death and Redemption: The Gulag and the Shaping of Soviet Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 237. 11. As Joan Neuberger has shown, the hooligan figure was the subject of popular anxiety and police persecution in the urbanizing areas of European Russia prior to the advent of Soviet power. As the immediate post-Revolutionary writings of Lenin also demonstrate, the hooligan remained a focus of regime repression even in the first stages of the formation of the Soviet state. For hooli ganism in the Imperial period, see Joan Neuberger, Hooliganism: Crime, Culture, and Power in St. Petersburg, 1900–1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Interestingly, Lenin, in the immediate post-Revolutionary period, equated the hooligan with a diverse array of agents who sought to destabilize the new socialist state and called for their summary execution. In “The Socialist
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 5–6
211
Fatherland in Danger,” he wrote: “Agents of the enemy, such as speculators, participants in pogroms, hooligans, counterrevolutionary agitators and German spies, should be shot on sight.” For Lenin’s remarks on hooliganism, see the February 2, 1918, decree of the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) “The Socialist Fatherland in Danger” and the May 4, 1918, Sovnarkom decree “On the Revolutionary Tribunals” in V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochin eniia, vol. 35, 358. However, these Russian/Soviet campaigns against the constant crime of hooliganism cycled between activity and inaction and were marked by irregular on-again, off-again rhythms. Despite the wave of decriminalization that drove down prison sentences for other offenses, courtroom convictions and custodial sentences for hooliganism were high during the immediate post-Revolutionary period, especially during the mid-1920s. Following this campaign peak, convic tion rates fell sharply as hooligan cases were punished administratively through fines or handed off to alternative disciplinary venues, such as factory comrades’ courts and rural lay courts, to relieve an overcrowded criminal justice system. From this momentary lull, anti-hooligan efforts increased sharply in the mid1930s as the state struggled to contain a wave of violent street crime and crafted longer custodial sentences for more serious types of hooliganism involving knife fighting and physical assaults. Before falling sharply during the war years, hooliganism reached its prewar peak in 1940 as the state’s attempt to uphold labor discipline led it to institute a new range of anti-hooligan initiatives that created hundreds of thousands of new hooligan criminals. For more informa tion on these a nti-hooligan campaigns, see David R. Shearing, Policing S talin’s Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924–1953 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 53–57, 183–189, 231–233; Paul Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926–1941 (Wash ington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), 158–161, 177–178, 317–320; Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 58–59, 132–133, 224–225, 332; Peter H. Juviler, Revolu tionary Law and Order: Politics and Social Change in the USSR (New York: Free Press, 1976), 58. For more on the use of alternative and noncustodial punish ments for hooliganism, see Solomon, “Criminalization and Decriminalization in Soviet Criminal Policy, 1917–1941,” Law and Society Review, no. 1 (1981–1982): 9–44. For hooliganism in the post-WWII period, see Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 12. Haro ld Berm an, Just ice in the USSR: An Interp ret at ion of Sov iet Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 66–96. 13. This study is certainly not the first to point out this tension. Scholars such as Harold Berman, Yoram Gorlizki, and Miriam Dobson have also explored this claim. This study is the first, however, to examine this tension through the commonplace crime of hooliganism. 14. The literature on the sociology of deviance is immense. My goal in this short historiographical introduction is not to give an exhaustive overview of this corpus but to focus on those canonic interpretive frameworks that have influenced the way historians have looked at hooliganism in Russia.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 6–7
15. For the classics of the social disorganization school, see Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, The City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Robert E. L. Faris, Social Disorganization (Chicago: Ronald Press, 1948); Clifford Shaw, Frederick M. Forgaugh, Henry D. McKay, and Leonard S. Cottreel, Delinquency Areas (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1929); and Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas: A Study of Rates of Delinquency in Relation to Differential Characteristics of Local Communities in American Cities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). For historical background on the social disorganization theorists and the Chicago School of sociology, see Stephen Pfohl, Images of Deviance and Social Control: A Sociological History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 169–213. 16. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1972). For expansions and critiques of Cohen’s model, see Kenneth Thompson, Moral Panics (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1994). 17. Geoffrey Pearson, for example, has traced early twentieth-century English fears over hooliganism to upper-class concerns involving England’s declining imperial power, worsening social harmony, and restless lower classes. See Pearson, Hooliganism. 18. In her study of hooliganism in turn-of-the-century St. Petersburg, Joan Neuberger argues that the hooligan was a potent symbol of the unease urban intellectuals felt toward industrial modernization and the ill-effect it had on the empire’s identity categories and social control capabilities. State-sponsored processes of rapid industrialization flooded the empire’s expanding cities with migrant wage labor and gave birth to new working-class subcultures that chal lenged established elite notions of correct city conduct and cultured living. By creating new classes of upwardly mobile urbanites that did not fit into the empire’s outmoded system of estate-based social categ ories, industrial modern ization, Neuberger argues, undermined old regime status distinctions and created an identity crisis among the urban elite. Caught between social change and status insecurity, urban intellectuals, Neuberger explains, used the hooli gan “other” to reaffirm their distinctive core values and fashion a stable sense of group identity in an unstable world. Expressing anxiety over hooligans in the mass press allowed the old urban elite to reaffirm the validity of its moral vision, assert its social difference from newly mobile peasants and professionals, and to protest against the industrial modernity that was rapidly undermining and remodeling the urban old regime. For Neuberger’s discussion of hooligan ism, see her studies Hooliganism and “Stories of the Street: Hooliganism in the St. Petersburg Popular Press,” Slavic Review, no. 2 (1989): 177–194. Hooliganism, according to Neuberger, was primarily a phenomenon of the urban street. Neil Weissman disagrees, arguing in an article on hooliganism during the imperial period that hooliganism was primarily a rural and Russian problem that resulted from the infiltration of urban culture into the previously closed world of the peasant village. Like Neuberger, Weissman identifies the migrant rural laborer and the mass media as Russia’s key producers of deviance. These actors and institutions, according to Weissman, carried destabilizing
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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urban influences and anti-authoritarian attitudes from city to country. Weiss man does not deny that rural drinking culture and the declining authority of state and clerical authorities played a part in precipitating hooliganism in the underpoliced countryside. However, he argues that hooliganism’s primary producer was the social change wrought by industrial modernization, a trans formative process that injected capitalist consumerism and urban culture into the peasant village, undermined traditional patriarchal power relations, and fueled internal conflict. Although they situate the main site of hooliganism in different locations, both Neuberger and Weissman argue within the contours of the social disorganization and moral panic paradigms by linking pre-Soviet hooliganism to social change, uprooted urban migrant labor, cultural competi tion, anxious authorities, and emerging mass media technolog ies such as the penny press. Neil B. Weissman, “Rural Crime in Tsarist Russia: The Question of Hooliganism, 1905–1914,” Slavic Review, no. 2 (1978): 228–240. Although they situate the main site of hooliganism in different locations, both Neuberger and Weissman argue within the contours of the social disorganization and moral panic paradigms by linking pre-Soviet hooliganism to social change, uprooted urban migrant labor, cultural competition, anxious authorities, and emerging mass media technologies. Studies of Soviet-era hooliganism also locate deviance during times of social stress and anxiety over cultural competition and ideological challenge. For example, Anne Gorsuch, in her study of 1920s youth culture, argues that the state’s anti-hooligan hysteria reflected its larger ideological anxiety over the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the corrupting influence they feared it was having on Soviet youth. As Western popular culture and mass entertainment invaded the Soviet city, youth subcultures, Gorsuch maintains, multiplied in the unsupervised urban underworld and created cultural clash between official state ideology and alternative street-level lifestyles. By tracing the disease metaphors that authorities deployed in their anti-deviance discourse, Gorsuch shows that the regime’s anti-hooliganism revolved around its preoccupations with regaining its ideological integrity and reinstituting control over a wild youth lost to NEP-era compromises with Western-style capitalism, consumer ism, and cosmopolitanism. Anne Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthu siasts, Bohemians and Delinquents (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2000), 167–176; and Anne Gorsuch, “Flappers and Foxtrotters: Soviet Youth in the Roaring Twenties,” Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no. 1102 (1994): 1–33. Themes of cultural contamination and social instability also inform treat ments of post-Stalinist hooliganism. Miriam Dobson argues that mass Gulag amnesties and state fears over the attraction of the camps’ criminal subculture to its youth led to a surge in anti-hooliganism at the beginning of the Khrushchev era. Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime and the Fate of Reform after Stalin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 109–132. In his study of mass public disorder in the post-Stalin period, V. A. Kozlov also relies on social disorganization to explain hooliganism during the 1950s. By focusing on amnesty polic ies, the effect of war-related mortality on childrearing practices, youth unemployment, and the underpolicing of high-migration
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 7–11
factory towns, Kozlov treats hooliganism as the outgrowth of an unstable society undergoing disorderly change. V. A. Kozlov, Massovye besporiadki v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve (Novosibirsk, Russia: Sibirskii khronog raf, 1999), 184– 216. For an abridged English translation, see V. A. Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR, trans. and ed. Elaine McClarnand MacKinnon (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002). 19. Neuberger, Hooliganism. 20. Neuberger, “Culture Besieged: Hooliganism and Futurism,” in Cultures in Flux: Lower Class Values, Practices, and Resistance in Late Imperial Russia, ed. Stephen P. Frank and Mark D. Steinberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 185–204. Weissman’s imperial-era hooligans, like Neuberger’s, were resisters whose deviance had both a generational and a class component. By lashing out against elders and Stolypin homesteaders, rural hooligans, Weiss man p oints out, worked within the salient social cleavages of the late imperial village, striking out at the forces of patriarchal authority and Stolypin-style agrarian reform. Weissman, “Rural Crime in Tsarist Russia,” 228–240. 21. V. A. Kozlov, Massovye besporiadki v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve (Novosibirsk, Russia: Sibirskii khronograf, 1999), 184–216. For an abridged English translation, see Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR. 22. An inspiration for my approach is the work of Peter Solomon. Solomon, in his study of the Stalinist criminal justice system, shows the campaign rhythm underlining the state’s anti-hooliganism. Overworked and understaffed, the criminal justice system quixotic ally brought its attention to the perennial hooli gan problem intermittently and irregularly. By underlining the difficulties that the authorities had in making ill-trained and nonprofessional legal workers carry out strict central polic ies in regard to hooliganism, he shows us how local actors could subvert state anti-hooligan campaigns and implement them in unforeseen ways based on their unique local understandings and interests. Solom on, Soviet Crimin al Justice under Stalin, 225, 330–331. 23. The notion of ascribed identity is taken from Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Ascrib ing Class: The Construction of Social Identity in Soviet Russia,” The Journal of Modern History, no. 4 (1993): 745–770. 24. For the classic works in labeling theory, see Howard Becker, ed., The Other Side: Perspectives on Deviance (New York: Free Press, 1964); Howard Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: Free Press, 1963); Edwin Lemert, Social Pathology: A Systematic Approach to the Theory of So ciopathic Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951); and Edwin Schur, Labeling Deviant Behavior: Its Sociological Implications (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). 25. For the slipperiness of the label “Trotskyite,” see J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 272–274. For the slipperiness of the “kulak” label, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants: Resist ance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 28–32. 26. Emile Durkheim, The Rules of the Sociological Method, trans. W. D. Hall (New York: Free Press, 1982). 27. Kai Erickson, Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: Wiley, 1966). Walter Connor, in his study of Soviet juvenile delinquency
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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and alcoholism, argues in a functionalist fashion that deviance was not a sign of ussia’s unsettled and disordered society. For Connor’s take on the functionality R of Soviet deviance, see Walter D. Connor, Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). 28. Of course, that does not mean that there were no anti-regime acts of hooliganism during the Khrushchev period. Certainly, there were such cases, and the fluid line between hooliganism and Article 58 offenses shows the diffi culties authorities faced in disentangling deviance from dissidence. For example, a man, after breaking a window, climbed onto the ledge at the Belorusskii train station in Moscow. He began throwing broken glass at pedestrians and shout ing that the police were “fascists” and “vermin” and that “all communists were traitors.” After being dislodged and detained with the help of a fire hose, the man was not convicted for anti-Soviet agitation. Instead, he received an adminis trative punishment for petty hooliganism. For this case, see TsMAM, f. 1078, op. 1, d. 173, ll. 1–5. For a stimulating collection of essays that has something to say about the relation between crime and resistance, see Lynne Viola, ed., Con tending with Stalinism: Soviet Power and Popular Resistance in the 1930s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002). 29. For information on the link between hooliganism and alcohol, see chapter 1. For data on the percentage of hooligans who were drunk when arrested, see GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 34, ll. 12–13; and GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 363, l. 12. 30. For data on the age breakdown of convicted hooligans, see chapter 1 and GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 58. 31. For data on the gend er dist rib ut ion of conv icted hool ig ans, see GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 95, l. 28. Hooliganism’s gendered nature should, perhaps, not come as a surprise. Criminologists, studying a wide range of societies, have long recognized that men are more prone to commit many types of crime than women. 32. On the distinction between rough and respectable working-class cultures, see Stephen Meyer, “Work, Play, and Power: Masculine Culture on the Auto motive Shop Floor, 1930–1960,” Men and Masculinities, no. 2 (1999): 115–134; and Stephen Meyer, “Rough Manhood: The Aggressive and Confrontational Shop Culture of Auto Workers during World War II,” Journal of Social History, no. 1 (2002): 125–147. My ideas on manliness, working-class culture, and rough masculinity have also been influenced by the following works: Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); and Lisa Fine, The Story of Reo Joe: Work, Kin, and Community in Autotown USA (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004). 33. Neuberger, Hooliganism, 1–21; and Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR, 206–216.
Chapter 1. A Portrait of Hooliganism and the Hooligan during the Khrushchev Period 1. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5206, l. 29. 2. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4031, l. 88. 3. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5663, ll. 76–77.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 17–22
4. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5206, l. 35. 5. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5663, l. 80. 6. Ibid., ll. 79–80. 7. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4031, l. 80. 8. Ibid., l. 88. 9. See, for example, the January 1, 1954, letter from S. N. Kruglov, the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, to the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, K. E. Voroshilov. GARF f. 9415, op. 3, d. 254, l. 38. 10. On “survivals of the past,” see Walter Connor, Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 50–51, 168–169. 11. One criminological study of hooliganism listed these harmful bourgeois influences as “egotism, uncomradely relations toward members of the work collective, lack of culture, disrespect for women, and a lack of discipline and self-control.” N. F. Kuznetsova, Ugolovnaia otvetstvennost’ za narusheniia obshche stvennogo poriadka (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literature, 1963), 6. 12. A collective letter to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) from Novosibirsk, for example, accused foreign agents of fomenting crimes such as hooliganism to create dissatisfaction among the public and to erode citizens’ support for the state. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3, d. 254, l. 123. 13. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5302, l. 142. 14. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 199. A Leningrad resident declared to procuracy offic ials that: “All hooliganism as a rule is born out of excessive drinking ( p’ianka).” For this letter, see GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4597, l. 49. The link between alcohol and deviance was one of the rare things on which both legal workers and hooligans agreed. Hooligans themselves often blamed their crimes on drunkenness. “When cases of hooliganism are tried in court,” a Moscow prosec utor reported, “the defendants explain to the court that they committed their crimes because they were drunk.” For the prosecutor’s state ment, see GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 453, ll. 27, 67. 15. Although vodka production did dip slightly in 1959 and 1960 during the anti-alcohol campaign, it quickly recovered following 1961 and grew through out the rest of the Khrushchev period. For detailed breakdowns of alcoholic beverage output, see Vladimir G. Treml, Alcohol in the USSR: A Statistical Study (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1982), 5. 16. See, for instance, Kruglov’s May 14, 1955, letter to Voroshilov. GARF, f. 7523, op. 107, d. 124, ll. 77–78. 17. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 342, l. 105; and GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4597, l. 51. 18. For more information on single mothers, see Mie Nakachi, “Replacing the Dead: The Politics of Reproduction in the Postwar Soviet Union, 1944–1955” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2008), chapter 4. 19. For more on the dynamic urban growth of this period, see Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomen on: A Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 30–42. 20. For more information, see Gregory D. Andrusz, Housing and Urban Development in the USSR (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984).
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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217
21. Building design features such as multiple floors and multiple apartment units per entry have been correlated with increased crime and fear of crime. For the pioneering studies on American urban neighborhoods, see Oscar Newman and Karen Franck, “The Effects of Building Size on Personal Crime and Fear of Crime,” Population and Environment, no. 5 (1982): 203–220; and D. D. Perkins, J. W. Meeks, and Ralph Taylor, “The Physical Environment of Street Blocks and Resident Perceptions of Crime and Disorder,” Journal of Environmental Psychol ogy, no. 12 (1992): 21–34. Building layouts that feature off-street construction, poor lighting, overgrown foliage, and poor sight lines have been reported to increase fears of victimization. For more on this, see Bonnie Fischer and Jack L. Nasar, “Fear of Crime in Relation to Three Exterior Site Features: Prospect, Refuge, and Escape,” Environment and Behavior, no. 24 (1992): 35–65. 22. Harrison E. Salisbury, The Shook-Up Generation (New York: Harper, 1958). 23. Salisbury, To Moscow and Beyond: A Reporter’s Narrative (New York: Harpers Brothers Publishers, 1959), 84–85. 24. For more on the separate apartment, see Steven E. Harris, “Moving to the Separate Apartment: Building, Distributing, Furnishing, and Living in Urban Housing in Soviet Russia, 1950s–1960s” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2003). 25. For a stimulating discussion of the anxiety, opportunity, and excitement that the Thaw generated, see Stephen V. Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow’s Arbat (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). 26. Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia (Cam bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 70–84. 27. This point is indebted to Walter Connor’s functional interpretation of Soviet deviance, developed in Deviance in Soviet Society, 246–247. 28. On the relative success of the command economy in the post-Stalinist 1950s, see G. I. Khanin, “The 1950s—The Triumph of the Soviet Economy,” Europe-Asia Studies, no. 8 (2003): 1187–1212; and Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (New York: Pearson Longman, 2003), 48–69. 29. For example, V. A. Kozlov, explaining the origins of the hooligan epidemic in his study of mass public disorder in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union, remarks: “The explosion of criminality, including hooliganism, . . . coincided with the mass amnesty of condemned criminals after the death of Stalin, which had been initiated by secret police chief Lavrentii Beria.” Although malicious hooligans were excluded from the March 27, 1953, amnesty, reports of serious hooliganism were, almost immediately, linked to returnees and their recircula tion back into society. For more information, see V. A. Kozlov, Massovye bespo riadki v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve (Novosibirsk, Russia: Sibirskii khrono graf, 1999), 185–186. For more on the 1953 amnesty, see Nanci Adler, Beyond the Gulag: Beyond the Soviet System (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002), 78–79, 81, 86, 89. For docum ents related to the March 1953 amnesty, see Reabilitatsiia kak eto bylo: dokumenty Prezidiuma TsK KPSS i drugie materially, mart 1953-fevral’ 1956 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond demokratiia, 2000). For crime and the
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to page 25
March amnesty, see Miriam Dobson’s works Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees. Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer sity Press, 2009); and Miriam Dobson, “Show the Bandits No Mercy! Amnesty, Crimin ality and Public Responses in 1953,” in The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era, ed. Polly Jones (New York: Routledge, 2005); as well as Steven A. Barnes, Death and Redemption: The Gulag and the Shaping of Soviet Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 206–207. 30. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 58. Of course, this does not mean that they were not committing hooliganism. It just means that they were not being convicted of it. 31. Kozlov, Massovye besporiadki v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve, 190–191; and Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 39–40. 32. The fact that Soviet statistics show that the overwhelming majority of hooligans (87 percent in 1953 and 89 percent in 1954) were first-time offenders rather than ex-convicts suggests that amnestied prisoners did not fuel the growth of hooligan convictions in the 1950s. Kozlov himself is forced to admit that, in the post-1953 period: “All the blame for the crime wave was put on amnestied prisoners, although . . . a significant portion of the most serious crimes were carried out by persons without a criminal record.” Kozlov, Mas sovye besporiadki v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve, 190–191. 33. Like its economic output data, the crime statistics produced by the Soviet state should not be seen as entirely accurate and objective indicators of crimi nality. They are, like all statistical data sets on crime, imperfect and incomplete sources that produce imperfect and incomplete pictures of actual “on the ground” activity. Soviet crime statistics understated real crime rates by excluding esti mates of unreported crimes from year-end totals (a common problem for most national crime statistics). In this way, the widespread underreporting and non reporting of crime at the local level distorted the aggregate data downward and deflated unionwide crime figures. GARF, f. 8131, op. 28, d. 2536, l. 4; and GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 24, l. 2. Nor did the statistics reflect changes in the way deviance was defined or categorized. More troublingly, Soviet criminal statis tics on hooliganism, because they are based on courtroom convictions, did not include the many hooligans who were processed outside formal criminal justice venues in such “offshore” institutions as comrades’ courts or workers’ collectives (see chapter 5). Nor did they count the many people, especially juve niles, whose hooliganism was handled administratively through fines, warnings, or community service assignments. By failing to account for “off the books punishment practices,” conviction-based statistics draw from a limited sample of the full range of hooligans and understate the real level of deviant activity, especially among youth under age 18. The statistics also severely skewed conviction rates by counting only the worst types of hooliganism and excluding lesser categories, especially simple hooliganism, from their samples (GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 497, ll. 344–347). Moreover, the statistics severely understated the total level of hooliganism by excluding administratively arrested petty hoo ligans from the statistical sample.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 25–26
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34. In the mid-1950s, a commission headed by USSR General Prosecutor R. A. Rudenko was charged with formulating ideas to halt the rise in postStalinist crime and social disorder. The Rudenko commission was composed of R. A. Rudenko (Chair), S. N. Kruglov, V. V. Zolotukhin, V. S. Riasnyi, I. V. Kapitonov, E. A. Furtseva, K. P. Gorsheinin, K. F. Lunev, A. N. Shelepin, L. N. Solov’ev, and N. V. Popova. For fragmentary information on the work of the committee, see A. A. Fursenko, ed., Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, vol. 2 (Mos cow: Rosspen, 2006), 114–122, 922; and GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4029, l. 7; and GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4011, l. 253. 35. On October 25, 1956, the USSR Council of Ministers and the Central Committee passed the secret decree “On Measures for Improving the Work of the MVD USSR.” This decree was chiefly directed at the structural decentraliza tion of police power in the USSR. But, it also sought to improve the recruitment and education of the police officers, something that was achieved, in part, by drafting Party members into the police. See A. V. Afanas’ev and Iu. V. Galkin, Rossiiskaia militsiia: kratkaia khronika, oktiabr’ 1917–2000 (Saratov, Russia: Sara tovskii iuridicheskii institut, 2001), 120–121; A. M. Beda, “Kurs pravitel’stva na detsentralizatsiiu pravookhranitel’noi sistemy v 1953–1958 gg.,” in Politsiia i militsiia Rossii: stranitsy istorii (Moscow: Nauka, 1995), 260–261; Kozlov, Massovye besporiadki v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve, 204; and Louise Shelley, Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control (New York: Routledge, 1996), 42. 36. In spring of 1955, Khrushchev ordered the Moscow Party committee and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs to intensify police patrols in select areas of Moscow during the evening and night hours. During the rest of 1955, police patrols were intensified in cities across the Soviet Union. For the stepping up of patrol activity, see GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 464, ll. 94–97, 134–136; and Kozlov, Massovye besporiadki v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve, 191–192, 204–205. In June 1954, the Komsomol central committee passed the decree “On the Struggle of Komsomol Organizations against Signs of Hooliganism among the Youth.” As a part of this decree, Komsomol volunteers patrolled city streets looking for hooligans and drunks. Raids (reidy) were carried out and posts were set up in clubs, parks, and palaces of culture to help catch hooligans. For more on this decree, see R. S. Mulukaev and N. N. Kartashov, Militsiia Rossii: istoriko-pravovoi ocherk (Orel, Russia: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’sko-poligraficheskoe predpriiatie Oka, 1995), 172–173. 37. The 1956 RSFSR Petty Hooligan Decree, which we shall explore in depth in chapter 3, is the most obvious example of how campaigns and the creation of new hooligan categories pushed conviction rates upward during the mid-1950s. By giving the police a new open-ended and ill-defined category of deviance that punished even the most minor misbehaviors as hooligan, the 1956 petty hooligan decree (not the March 1953 amnesty) created the biggest hooligan boom of the Khrushchev era. In the first few years of its operation, it produced 1.4 million new hooligans annually. 38. Rather than Gulag downsizing increasing the number of deviants on provincial city streets, it was, as the prosecutor of the Khabarovsk region noted, “the strengthening of the police’s work in relation to the struggle against
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 26–31
hooliganism” that caused the conviction spike that made the hooligan problem visible in statistical terms. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 1743, ll. 64, 281. The anti-hooligan campaign boosted the policing and punishment practices that, as the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court noted in a 1957 report, “will cause and has already caused, especially in relation to hooligan cases, an increase in the . . . criminal statistics.” GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 24, ll. 10–11. 39. Ibid. 40. N. F. Kuznetsova, “Izuchenie i preduprezhdenie khuliganstva,” in Kriminologiia, ed. A. A. Gertsenzon (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1968), 441–442. At the time, Ninel Fedorovna Kuznetsova was an instructor (dotsent) at Moscow State University and a pioneer in the rehabilitation of Soviet crimi nology in the post-Stalinist period. 41. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 618, ll. 62–63. 42. Kuznetsova, “Izuchenie i preduprezhdenie khuliganstva,” 442. 43. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 418, l. 84. Valerii Chalidze also emphasizes the ambiguity of hooliganism in his Ugolovnaia Rossiia (New York: Khronika Press, 1977). 44. Joan Neuberger, Hooliganism: Crime, Culture, and Power in St. Petersburg, 1900–1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 15–22. 45. V. I. Dal’, Tolkovyi slovar’ zhivogo velikorusskogo iazyka, vol. 4 (St. Peters burg: M. O. Vol’f, 1909), 1243. The third edition of the dictionary was greatly enlarged under the editorship of the linguist Jan Niecisław Ignacy Baudouin de Courtenay. 46. Neuberger, Hooliganism, 130. 47. Many authorities connected hooliganism to the Native American tribes of North America. One Soviet writer believed that the term “hooligan” origi nally referred to “two North American Indian tribes that were mercilessly exterminated by the colonists.” The labeling of English deviants with this term was meant to underline their outsider status. “By this word ‘hooligan’ (or ‘apache’),” he argued, “they wanted to underline the foreignness (chuzhdost’) of people who belong to the criminal world to the rest of society: a society whose culture is diametrically opposed to the morals and habits of the criminal world.” See M. Isaev, “Sudebnaia praktika po delam o khuliganstve,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 12 (1941): 5. 48. Ugolovnyi kodeks RSFSR: ofitsial’noe izdanie (Moscow: Gosud arstvennoe izdatel’stvo sovetskoe zakonodatel’stvo, 1933), 34. 49. A. N. Trainin, ed., Sovetskoe ugolovnoe pravo: chast’ osobennaia (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1957), 425–433. 50. B. M. Volin and D. N. Ushakov, eds., Tolkovyi slovar’ russkogo iazyka, vol. 4 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo innostranykh i natsional’nykh slo varei, 1940), 1198. 51. M. D. Shargorodskii and N. A. Beliaev, Sovetskoe ugolovnoe pravo: chast’ osobennaia (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1962), 364. 52. For the definition of malicious hooliganism, see Trainin, Sovetskoe ugo lovnoe pravo, 432. For the creation of malicious hooliganism as a legal category in the mid-1930s, see Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 201–202. For additional
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 31–37
221
information on the 1935 anti-hooligan campaign, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, Every day Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times (New York: Oxford Univer sity Press, 1999), 151–152. 53. I. G. Filanovskii and I. I. Solodkin, Bor’ba s khuliganstvom (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1957), 6. For the most exhaustive and up-to-date information on the issue of passport restrictions and regime cities in the post-Stalinist period, see Marc Elie, “Les anciens détenus du Goulag: libérat ions massives, réinser tion et réhabilitation dans l’URSS poststalinienne, 1953–1964” (PhD diss., L’École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2007), 244–250. Elie has dis covered that nearly 860,000 convicted hooligans were subject to residence restrictions between 1953 and 1957 and forbidden to live in regime cities. Ibid., 250. 54. A confused jurist, for example, cautioned his colleagues that: “The term malicious hooliganism is controversial (sporen) . . . in relation to this term we must give an explanation.” Likewise, another jurist remarked that: “It is neces sary to make the meaning of malicious hooliganism more precise because this definition opens up a wide space for arbitrary interpretation.” For their remarks, see GARF, f. 7523, op. 45a, d. 302, ll. 18, 26. 55. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 62. 56. Trainin, Sovetskoe ugolovnoe pravo, 426. 57. Complicating hooliganism’s diversity of criminal meanings was the fact that each republican law code defined hooliganism in its own way, making the legal definition of deviance different across many of the republics. 58. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45a, d. 302, ll. 18, 26; and GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 62. 59. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 673, ll. 2–4. 60. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 295, ll. 11–12. 61. P. I. Grishaev and B. V., eds., Zdravomyslov, Voprosy osobennoi chasti Sovetskogo ugolovnogo prava v UK RSFSR 1960 goda: uchebnoe posobie (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Vsesoiuznogo iuridic heskogo zaochnogo instituta, 1962), 173. 62. B. S. Nikiforov, Nauchno-prakticheskii komentarii ugolovnogo kodeksa RSFSR (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1964), 438–439. 63. George Feifer, Justice in Moscow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), 58. 64. Wright Miller, Russians as People: A Unique Portrait of Modern Russia, Its Land and People (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1961), 153. 65. “Oberegat’ obshchestvennyi poriadok,” Izvestiia, January 6, 1956, 1. 66. On a wall display entitled “Shame to Drunks and Hooligans,” public activists (obshchestvenniki) in the Khabarovsk region placed pictures of drunks and hooligans beneath which they wrote satirical comments. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5199, l. 145. 67. Ts. Solodar’, “Forma i soderzhanie,” Iunost’, no. 4 (1956): 110. 68. I. Kostiukov, “Robkie liudi,” Krokod il, no. 21 (1961): 6. 69. I. Shatunovskii, “Na nashe ulitse,” Komsomolskaia pravda, May 11, 1955, 3. 70. Leonid Lench, “V raznykh izmereniiakh,” Krokodil, no. 29 (1961): 2. 71. Krokodil, no. 29 (1961): 2. 72. D. Federov, “V Moskve, na Bol’shoi Bronnoi,” Pravda, November 30, 1956, 6.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 37–41
73. “Oberegat’ obshchestvennyi poriadok,” Izvestiia, January 6, 1956, 1. 74. See, for instance, the cartoon in Krokod il, no. 18 (1961): 8. 75. For visual representations of such hooligan fashions, see Krokodil, no. 19 (1957): 5; Krokodil, no. 25 (1956): 15; and Krokod il, no. 24 (1956): 9. 76. For examples, see Iunost’, no. 1 (1956): 64; and Krokodil, no. 30 (1956): 8. 77. For examples, see Krokodil, no. 9 (1959): 2; Krokodil, no. 20 (1964): 7; and Krokodil, no. 32 (1961): 5. 78. Iunost’, no. 4 (1956): 110. 79. Iunost’, no. 2 (1957): 113. 80. D. Evgen’ev, “Tikhii i skromnyi mal’chik,” Vecherniaia Moskva, October 15, 1957, 3. 81. For one example of the tattooed hooligan, see Krokodil, no. 22 (1964): 6. 82. Commenting on the connection between Mania and the rural peasantry, D. S. Baldaev claims in his dictionary of criminal slang that “Mania” is a stereo typical name for a village girl. See D. S. Baldaev, V. K. Belko, and I. M. Isupov, Slovar’ tiuremno-lagerno-blatnogo zhargona (Moscow: Kraia Moskvy, 1992), 135. For samples of representations of hooligans with “Mania” tattoos, see Krokodil, no. 20 (1959): 8–9; and Iunost’, no. 1 (1957): 113. 83. The article notes sarcastically: “It appears that this timely and vitally important question is driver Bulkin’s dearest concern.” K. Yurev, “O tekh, kto meshaet nam otdykhat’,” Trud, June 28, 1956, 4. 84. For samples of typic al hooligan tattoos, see D. S. Baldaev, Tatuirovki zakliuchennykh (St. Petersburg: Limbus Press, 2001), 134; and Iu. P. Dubiagin and E. A. Teplitskii, Kratkii anglo-russkii russkii-angliiskii slovar’ ugolovnogo zhargona (Moscow: Terra terra, 1993), 247, 278. 85. Yurev, “O tekh, kto meshaet nam otdykhat’,” 4. 86. Krokodil, no. 34 (1961): 5–6. 87. For baklan as a slang for hooligan, see D. S. Baldaev, Slovar’ blatnogo vorovskogo zhargona v dvukh tomakh, vol. 1 (Moscow: Kompana, 1997), 25. The dictionary also lists the verbs derived from baklan, such as baklashit’/baklanit’. 88. Krokodil, no. 35 (1956): 11. 89. The police also attributed deviant identity based on dress and demeanor. Noting the importance of highly visual fashion in defining deviance and attract ing the gaze of the law, a British policeman, visiting Moscow on an exchange, remembered that: “Every person wearing long sideburns or peculiar clothing is suspect. . . . String and cord ties and the occasional colored shirt, winkle picker shoes are coming into fashion, catching the eye of the wary policeman.” C. V. Hearns, Russian Assignment: A Policeman Looks at Crime in the USSR (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1962), 66. 90. Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 125–128. 91. For the avtorskaia pesnia, see Rachel Platon ov, “Marginal Notes: Avtorskaia Pesnia on the Boundaries of Culture and Genre” (PhD diss., Harvard Univer sity, 2004); and Inna Sokolova, Avtorskaia pesnia: ot fol’klora k poezii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi kul’turnyi tsentr-muzei V. S. Vysotskogo, 2002). For Vysotskii, see Lev Anninskii, Tri barda (Moscow: Tret’ia voina, 1999); and Christopher Lazarski, “Vladimir Vysotsky and His Cult,” Russian Review, no. 1 (1992): 58–71. For more on the bard movement, see Gerald Stanton Smith, Songs to Seven
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 41–46
223
trings: Russian Guitar Poetry and Soviet Mass Song (Bloomington: Indiana Univer S sity Press, 1984). I would like to thank Alan Barenberg for the Platonov citation. 92. Ross iisk ii gosu d arstv enn yi arkh iv s otsial’no-politicheskoi ist or ii (RGASPI), f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 118. 93. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 95, l. 29. 94. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 401, l. 5. 95. Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1956 godu: statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1957), 19. 96. For the 1954 breakdown, see GARF, f. 7523, op. 107, d. 124, l. 73. 97. Narodnoe khozia istvo SSSR v 1963 godu: statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1964), 28. 98. For a case of frequent employee petty hooliganism threatening produc tion output in the coal industry, see GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 34. 99. The hooliganism in some workers’ dormitories became so severe that, in one extreme case, a temporary police post had to be established in the Red Corner of a dormitory. (The Red Corner was an area of a dorm specifically set aside for educational and cultural enrichment. It was ideally stocked with books, periodicals, musical instruments, and other accoutrements of selfimprovement and cultured leisure.) For more information on this case, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 8, d. 674, l. 19. In another case, students who were alarmed over the crime in their dormitory formed a guard to patrol the dorm during the daytime hours. That the students had to miss classes to be on duty was wearily noted by Komsomol organs. For more information, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 46, d. 168, l. 2. 100. In 1958, men accounted for 45 percent of the population. Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1958: statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe statisticheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1959), 8. In 1963, for example, 97.6 percent of the hooligan convictions in the USSR and 97.5 percent in the RSFSR were men. For the USSR data, see GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 228, l. 149. For the RSFSR data, see GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 95, l. 28. 101. Slovar’ sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo iazyka, vol. 17 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 525. 102. A 1963 RSFSR report typically found that only 2.5 percent of the republic’s hooligan convicts were women. The available data shows a slight in crease in the amount of female hooliganism in the post-Khrushchev period, in creasing from 2.1 percent in 1965 and 3.6 percent in 1967 to 4.2 percent in 1970 and 1973. Nevertheless, despite these increases, hooliganism remained an over whelmingly male crime. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 228, l. 149. 103. For the case of a female hooligan who carried on a running war with her neighbor, see GARF, f. 8131, op. 28, d. 4256, ll. 27–60. 104. For an illustration of a female hooligan spiking her neighbor’s soup, see Krokodil, no. 14 (1955): 5. 105. Dubiagin and Teplitskii, Kratkii anglo-russkii russkii-angliiskii slovar’ ugo lovnogo zhargona, 158. 106. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 95, l. 29. A 1963 USSR Supreme Court age break down, for example, showed that the 30 to 39 age group (31 percent) had 10 per cent more hooligans than either the 20 to 24 age group (21.6 percent) or the 25 to
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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224
Notes to pages 48–51
29 age group (21.5 percent). The rest of the age distribution was 40 to 49 (8.4 percent); 18 to 19 (8.1 percent); 14 to 17 (5.8 percent); 50 to 59 (3.2 percent); and 60 and over (0.4 percent). A joint United Nations and Russian study of the age distribution of Moscow hooligans between 1988 to 1993 likewise found that the largest age cohort in the statistical sample was the 30 to 39 age group, with 45 percent of convicted hooligans within this age range in 1993. Marina Alexeyeva and Angela Patrignani, eds., Crime and Crime Prevention in Moscow (Rome: United Nations Publication, 1994), 64. 107. A 1962 RSFSR Supreme Court report found that 61.7 percent of the hooligans convicted in the RSFSR in 1961 were over 25 years of age. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 401, l. 5. In 1963, the RSFSR reported that most convicted hooli gans fell into the following age categories: 30 to 39 (32.7 percent); 25 to 29 (20.9 percent); 20 to 24 (20.3 percent); 40 to 49 (8.7 percent); 18 to 19 (7.3 percent); 17 and younger (6.4 percent); 50 to 59 (3.3 percent); and 60 and over (0.4 percent). GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 95, l. 28. 108. See, for instance, the age breakdown for Soviet men listed in Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu: statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1960), 12. 109. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 58. Unfortunately, no data exists on the prevalence of learning disabilities or cognitive handicaps among the convict group. Mental health data is also anecdotal. Only one report that I have found noted a high level of mental illness in the hooligan population and suggested it as a possible reason for deviance. See GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 418, l. 111. Many court case records held in Moscow’s Central Municipal Archive (TsMAM) indi cate that those arrested for hooliganism underwent psychiatric evaluation. However, most were found competent to be put on trial and held responsible for their activities. For such cases, see TsMAM, 1918, op. 2, d. 320, ll. 1–5; and ibid., f. 1078, op. 1, d. 75, ll. 1–2. 110. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 410, l. 6. A 1962 letter from the Komsomol Central Committee claimed that 25 percent of convicted hooligans had only an elementary education (nachal’noe obrazovanie). For this letter, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 67, d. 9, l. 143. 111. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 228, l. 155. 112. Kuznetsova, “Izuchenie i preduprezhdenie khuliganstva,” 442. Yet even though they were more likely to have completed their secondary schooling, the text asserted that the poor educ ational level of their parents often had a negative impact on the morality of younger hooligans. 113. Narodnoe khozia istvo RSFSR v 1959 godu: statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Mos cow: Gosstatizdat, 1960), 47–49. 114. Ibid. 115. The educational achievement of the ordinary Soviet patrolman was reported in a draft of the Central Committee decree “On Serious Shortcomings in the Work of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and Measures to Elimin ate Them” in Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964, vol. 2, 233–234. 116. For the data from 1962 and 1964, see GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 228, l. 163. For the 1966 data, see N. F. Kuznetsova, “Izuchenie i preduprezhdenie khuli ganstva,” in Kriminologiia, ed. A. A. Gertsenzon (Moscow: Iuridic heskaia litera tura, 1968), 441.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 51–54
225
117. Ibid. 118. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5681, l. 65. For population statistics on the RSFSR relative to the USSR, see the series Narodnoe khozia istvo SSSR: statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1958–1965). 119. Neil B. Weissman, “Rural Crime in Tsarist Russia: The Question of Hooliganism, 1905–1914,” Slavic Review, no. 2 (1978): 228–240. 120. A 1960 RSFSR Supreme Court report, for example, showed that 90 percent of the hooligans convicted in the RSFSR were drunk at the time of their arrest. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 363, l. 12. Another report found that 82.7 percent of those convicted of hooliganism throughout the USSR were drunk when they committed their crime. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 228, l. 34. In 1962, the percentage of hooligans in the USSR drunk at the time of their arrest dropped slightly to 79.7 percent. Ibid., l. 158. 121. Ibid., l. 111. When drunkenness among hooligan convicts is disaggre gated according to republic, however, some variation becomes apparent in the link between alcohol and the commission of deviant acts. One would expect the Slavic, Baltic, and Caucasian republics to show higher levels of hooligan drunken ness than the majority-Muslim republics of Central Asia, reflecting the different cultural attitudes and/or religious restrictions that revolved around alcohol consumption in these different Soviet subpopulations. However, the available evidence does not support this generalization. Certainly, the RSFSR showed a high percentage of hooligans who were drunk during the commission of their crime (86.6 percent), but some republics, including some in Islamic Central Asia, showed similar or higher amounts: Estonian SSR (95.3 percent), Moldavian SSR (85.4 percent), Lithuanian SSR (84.4 percent), Kirgiz SSR (82 percent), Belo russian SSR (78 percent), Ukrainian SSR (75.3 percent), and Kazakh SSR (75.5 percent). While other Central Asian and Caucasian republics showed sharply lower correlations between drinking and deviance: Uzbek SSR (55.1 percent), Azerbaijani SSR (53.2 percent), Tadzhik SSR (45.3 percent), and Armenian SSR (41.3 percent). Perhaps the drunkenness varies according to the size of East Slavic diaspora in the republican population with republics with high amounts of Russian in-migration showing both higher amounts of alcohol consumption and drunken hooliganism. Again, however, the lack of data on the national and ethnic composition of hooligan offenders makes such a generalization impos sible to prove. All this data is taken from the year 1964. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, 228, l. 115. Even higher percentages of drunkenness were reported among hooli gan convicts in other union republics during other years. It was reported, for instance, that 92 percent and 97 percent of the hooligans convicted in the Ukraine and Latvia in 1958 were drunk when they committed their crime. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 34, ll. 12–13. 122. GARF, f. 9415, op.1, d. 16, l. 61. 123. A people’s judge in Velikie Luki, for example, dismissed a petty hooli gan case because the offender “acknowledged his guilt, was a member of the Communist Party and had arrived [in town] for his studies.” V. Piliugin, “Primenenie ukaza ob otvetstvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo sudami Veliko lukskoi oblasti,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 6 (1957): 56. 124. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 410, l. 7. In 1963, 7.8 percent of those committing hooliganism in the USSR were Komsomol members (in the Belorussian SSR,
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
226
Notes to pages 54–62
the percentage was 15.5). For this information, see GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 418, l. 113. 125. On average between 1962 to 1973, Komsomol members comprised 16.6 percent of the hooligans convicted in the 14 to 19 age range, with Komsomol members committing hooliganism more than any other crime. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 228, l. 157. 126. Krokodil, no. 31 (1956): 2. 127. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 401, l. 6. 128. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 95, l. 28. For the 70/30 urban/rural split in the late 1960s and early 1970s, see GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 228, l. 160.
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Chapter 2. Private Matters or Public Crimes? 1. Krokodil, no. 24 (1956): 9. 2. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 72. 3. For the text of the circular, see Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 22 (1935): back page. See also Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times, Soviet Russia in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 48. 4. One justice openly questioned: “What is domestic hooliganism? What does it mean? Where in our criminal legislation can you find the term ‘domestic hooliganism’?” GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 122, l. 68. 5. Ibid., l. 54. 6. Ibid. 7. For the April 29, 1939, decree of the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court entitled “On Judicial Practice for Hooligan Cases,” see GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 618, l. 229. The italics are mine. 8. For the August 22, 1940, decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet entitled “On Criminal Responsibility for Petty Theft at Workplaces and for Hooliganism,” see Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 28 (1940): 2. 9. In particular, the decree was drawn up to close a loophole that some wily workers had used to evade the draconian June 26, 1940, USSR Supreme Soviet decree that forbade workers from leaving their work places without permis sion. To engineer their dismissal despite such restrictions and free up their abil ity to enter new employment, these workers committed minor disciplinary infractions at work that were designed to get them fired from unwanted jobs but were not serious enough to get them convicted of crimes or brought before the court. Through its 1940 decree, the USSR Supreme Soviet noticeably increased the costs of this unorthodox strategy for switching jobs. Rather than furnishing a roundabout path to alternative employment, misbehavior in workplaces and on the factory floor would be handled as criminal hooliganism and would earn the unlucky offender one year in prison. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 301–334. 10. Paul Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926–1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 317. 11. For more on this point, see Jochen Hellbeck, “Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi, 1931–9,” in Stalinism: New Directions, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (New York: Routledge, 2000), 94.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 62–70
227
12. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 618, ll. 227–228. The italics are mine. 13. GARF, f. 9474, op. 33, d. 2089, ll. 2–15. 14. On April 21, 1954, Ivan’s conviction was overturned. GARF, f. 9474, op. 33, d. 875, ll. 1–14. The story of the accused hooligan, Vladimir, is similar. Vladimir drank “systematic ally,” beat his wife, and threatened to kill her. While at his parents’ house in February 1962, Vladimir repeatedly punched and kicked his wife after she refused to give him some money for vodka. During a drinking party with some friends in his apartment, he tried to strangle his wife and threatened to kill her after she pleaded with him to stop drinking. After this incident, Vladimir’s wife went to the police and filed a complaint. Less than a month later, Vladimir attacked his wife with a razor during a family argument and caused her “serious” wounds. He was convicted of malicious hooliganism and sentenced to five years imprisonment. However, two weeks later, Vladimir’s conviction was overturned and the case of malicious hooliganism brought against him was dropped. The court justified its action by stating that Vladimir’s actions lacked “the elements of the given crime because the scandals were based on family relationships. He com mitted no act that viol ated public order or that touched on the interests of the other residents of the house or any other people.” For Vladimir’s case, see GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 788, l. 123. 15. GARF, f. 9474, op. 33, d. 259, l. 1. 16. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 139, l. 252. 17. The case is cited in K. Cherniavskii and V. Kleiner, “Usilit’ bor’bu s khuli ganstvom,” Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost’, no. 4 (1952): 36–37. 18. Although the domestication of hooliganism occurred gradually during the Khrushchev period, the first shots against the public paradigm of hooligan ism were launched in the period of High Stalinism. As in many other areas, the seeds of Khrushchev-era change were planted at the end of the Stalin era and straddled the 1953 rift between the end of Stalinism and the emergence of the post-Stalinist period. The forum for the first open assaults against the public paradigm was in the specialized legal periodicals, especially in the journal Sotsia listicheskaia zakonnost’. 19. Cherniavskii and Kleiner, “Usilit’ bor’bu s khuliganstvom,” 37. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., 38. A local prosecutor simil arly ended his article in Sotsialistichesk aia zakonnost’ by expressing the hope that “the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court will in the nearest future give the courts a directive on how to handle hooligan cases.” Gablin, “Usilit’ bor’bu s khuliganstvom,” Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost’, no. 8 (1952): 36–38. 22. At the Supreme Court’s March 20, 1953, Plenum, A. A. Volin made a report on judicial practice and proposed an amendment to the 1939 directives on hooliganism that the justices accepted unanimously without comment or qualification. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 180, ll. 6–7; and GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 176, l. 128. 23. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 618, ll. 227–228. The italics are mine. 24. Ibid. 25. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 295, ll. 11–12.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 71–75
26. I. M. Sadovnikov, “Nekotorye voprosy otvetstvennosti za khuliganstvo,” Sovetskoe gosud arstvo i pravo, no. 2 (1957): 119. 27. I. I. Solodkin and I. G. Filanovskii, “Osnovnye voprosy bor’by s khuli ganstvom,” Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i prava, no. 3 (1956): 108; and Sadovnikov, “Nekotorye voprosy otvetstvennosti za khuliganstvo,” 119. 28. They applauded the USSR Supreme Court’s March 1953 decree as being “more correct,” and also “more closely correspond[ing] to the actual practice of local courts,” which were trying cases of interpersonal conflict as hooliganism in increasing numbers in the 1950s. V. V. Trufanov, “Nekotorye voprosy ugolov noi otvetstvennosti za khuliganstvo,” Uchenye zapiski Vsesoiuznogo iuridicheskogo zaochnogo instituta, no. 7 (1959): 135. 29. I. Krukovskii, “K chemu vedet otsutstvie chetkogo opredeleniia poniatiia khuliganstva,” Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost’, no. 5 (1955): 50. 30. The public paradigm enshrined in the now-emasculated 1939 USSR Supreme Court decree, a lecturer at the Saratov Legal Institute complained, “no longer corresponds to the ideas of the majority of Soviet legal theorists and to the ideas put forward in the legal textbooks.” I. S. Noi, “O ponia tii sostava khuliganstva,” Uchenye zapiski Saratovskogo iuridicheskogo instituta imeni D. I. Kurskogo, no. 5 (1957): 185. 31. P. I. Grishaev, Prestupleniia protiv poriadka upravleniia, obshchestvennoi bezopasnosti i obshchestvennogo poriadka (Moscow: Ministerstvo Vysshego obrazo vaniia SSSR, 1957), 71. 32. GARF, f. 9474, op. 33, d. 897, ll. 5–6, 9. 33. Grishaev, Prestupleniia protiv poriadka upravleniia, obshchestvennoi bezo pasnosti i obshchestvennogo poriadka, 64. 34. Ekaterina Gerasimova, “Public Privacy in the Soviet Communal Apart ment,” in Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc, ed. David Crowley and Susan E. Reid (Oxford, UK: Berg, 2002), 207–230. For stimulating discussions of the public/private dichotomy in the post-WWII period, see Stephen Lovell, The Shadow of War: Russia and the USSR, 1941 to the Present (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 138–175; and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Mapping Private Spheres in the Soviet Context,” in Borders of Socialism, 1–21. 35. P. Skomorokhov, “Dela chastnogo obvineniia,” Literaturnaia gazeta, August 11, 1955, 2. 36. Sem. Narin’iani, “Za zakrytymi dver’mi,” Krokodil, no. 14 (1955): 5. 37. M. Isaev, “Sudebnaia praktika po delam o khuliganstve,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 13 (1941): 6. 38. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 897, l. 3. 39. For more on the move to the separate apartment, see Steven E. Harris, “Moving to the Separate Apartment: Building, Distributing, Furnishing, and Living in Urban Housing in Soviet Russia, 1950s–1960s” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2003) and Mark B. Smith, Property of Communists: The Urban Housing Campaign from Stalin to Khrushchev (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010). 40. For the privacy problems of the separate apartment, see Steven E. Harris, “I Know All the Secrets of My Neighbors: The Quest for Privacy in the Era of the Separate Apartment,” in Borders of Socialism, 171–190. For the standardized
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 75–81
229
nature of separate apartment life, see Susan E. Reid, “The Meaning of Home: ‘The Only Bit of the World You Can Have to Yourself’” in Borders of Socialism, 145–170. 41. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 122, l. 58. The italics are mine. 42. I. G. Filanovskii and I. I. Solodkin, Bor’ba s khuliganstvom (Moscow: Iuridi cheskaia literatura, 1957), 6–7. 43. Grishaev, Prestupleniia protiv poriadka upravleniia, obshchestvennoi bezo pasnosti i obshchestvennogo poriadka, 64. 44. N. F. Kuznetsova, Ugolovnaia otvetstvennost’ za narusheniia obshchestven nogo poriadka (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1963), 3. 45. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4032, l. 20. 46. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4031, ll. 85–86. 47. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 347, l. 61. 48. Narin’iani, “Za zakrytymi dver’mi,” 5. 49. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 345, l. 124. 50. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 348, l. 61. 51. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 347, l. 59. Lack of sleep was a common theme in letters to authority and was one of the most hated disruptions that the domestic hooligan caused his victims. Equating the disruption of his sleep cycle with the hooligan disruption of social life, a worker from the Sverdlovsk region com plained to the Supreme Soviet about his neighbor’s disruptive late night drinking bouts: “They [the police] say it is not hooliganism, but I think that it is hooliganism not to let a person sleep at night.” GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 350, l. 121. 52. GARF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 1951, l. 77. 53. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 340, l. 60. 54. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 343, l. 148. 55. Alexander Prokhorov, “Soviet Family Melodramas of the 1940s and 1950s: From Wait for Me to The Cranes Are Flying,” in Imitations of Life: Two Centuries of Melodrama in Russia, ed. Louise McReynolds and Joan Neuberger (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 208–231. 56. For more on melodrama in the Russian context, see McReynolds and Neuberger, Imitations of Life, 4–5. 57. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 395, l. 38. 58. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 418, l. 6. 59. The 1955 draft decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet stated: “We must include in public places, for which criminal responsibility for hooliganism is established, multi-family apartments and dormitories.” GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4029, l. 7. 60. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 295, ll. 11–12. 61. P. I. Grishaev and B. V., eds., Zdravomyslov, Voprosy osobennoi chasti Sovetskogo ugolovnogo prava v UK RSFSR 1960 goda: uchebnoe posobie (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Vsesoiuznogo iuridicheskogo zaochnogo instituta, 1962), 173. 62. E. A. Andrusenko, “Poniatie khuliganstva i mery bor’by s nim” (Candi date diss., Tadzhikistan State University, 1963), 9. 63. Kommentarii k Ugolovnomu Kodeksu RSFSR 1960 g. (Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1962), 350. The section on hooliganism was
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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230
Notes to pages 81–89
written by N. P. Grabovskaia, a member of the Criminal Law Department of Leningrad State University. 64. “Otvetstvennost’ za khuliganstvo: kommentarii k novym kodeksam,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 3 (1961): 18. 65. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 418, ll. 84–85, 176–177. For later sudebnye praktiki see Sbornik postanovlenii Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR, 1924–1986 (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1987), 709; and Sbornik postanovlenii Plenuma Verkhov nogo Suda RSFSR, 1961–1983 (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1984), 338. 66. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 462, ll. 21, 34. 67. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4011, l. 491. 68. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 72. 69. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5659, l. 30. 70. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4011, l. 491. 71. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 981, l. 48. 72. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 977, l. 153. 73. GARF, A-358, op. 26, d. 297, l. 2; and GARF, A-577, op. 1, d. 118, l. 123. 74. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 418, ll. 85–86. 75. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 788, l. 3. 76. “Iskorenim khuligany!” Agitator, no. 14 (1961): 22. 77. GARF, A-358, op. 26, d. 297, l. 2; and GARF, A-577, op. 1, d. 118, l. 123. 78. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 514, l. 28. 79. A. A. Gertsenzon, Ugolovnoe pravo i sotsiologiia: problemy sotsiologii ugolov nogo prava i ugolovnoi politiki (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1970), 92. 80. GARF, f. 9474, op. 32, d. 21, l. 22. 81. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 418, l. 85. 82. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 348, l. 53. 83. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4031, l. 84. 84. Krokodil, no. 20 (1956): 13. 85. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 340, l. 40. 86. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 465, l. 34. 87. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 351, l. 235. 88. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 340, l. 60. 89. Ugolovno-Protsessual’nyi kodeks RSFSR (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia litera tura, 1962), 16–17. 90. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 351, l. 21. 91. In closing, he demanded of the authorities that “you must study this [issue of punishing domestic hooligans appropriately].” Ibid. 92. Bunia, “O bor’be s khuliganstvom,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 6 (1957): 54. 93. E. Koval’chuk, “Ugolovnaia otvetstvennost’ za khuliganstvo,” Otvety na voprosy trudiashchikhsia, no. 66 (1956): 46. Koval’chuk was a senior consultant for the management of judicial organs at the RSFSR Ministry of Justice. 94. Bunia, “O bor’be s khuliganstvom,” 54. 95. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 351, ll. 67–68. 96. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 564, l. 219. 97. See for example, Iu. Kornilov, “Eto i vashe delo, Tovarishch Prokuror!” Trud, November 13, 1955, 1; “Eto ne lichnoe delo,” Izvestiia, August 12, 1955, 2; and N. Monchadskaia and N. Syrtsov, “Eto ne lichnoe delo,” Izvestiia, July 23,
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 89–92
231
1955, 2. On communist morality during this period, see Deborah Field’s works, “Irreconcilable Differences: Divorce and Conceptions of Private Life in the Khrushchev Era,” Russian Review, no. 4 (1998): 600–603; and Deborah Field, Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia (New York: Peter Lang, 2007). 98. In the Kaliningrad and Sverdlovsk regions, 33 percent of convicted hooligans performed their hooligan acts against their families; in the Kostroma region, 35 percent; in the Ivan ovo region, 38 percent; in the Murmansk region, 35 percent; in the Novosibirsk region, over 40 percent; and in the Gor’kii region, 40 percent. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 410, l. 7. 99. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 498, l. 34. 100. GARF, f. 9474, op. 32, d. 21, l. 22. 101. Gertsenzon, Ugolovnoe pravo i sotsiologiia, 92. 102. Andrei Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, trans. Manya Harari and Max Hayward (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 74. 103. Iurii Dombrovskii, “Zapiski melkogo khuligana,” in Iurii Dombrovskii: roman, pis’ma, esse (Yekater inburg, Russia: U factoriia, 2000), 636. 104. For more on the privatization of Soviet life, see Vladimir Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-Stalin Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 105. RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 635, l. 81. 106. RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 637, l. 27. 107. For more on the intrusiveness of the Khrushchev era, see Oleg Kharkhor din, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 279–313. 108. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 344, l. 192. 109. For information on the comrades’ courts and druzhina, see chapter 4. 110. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 343, l. 104. 111. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 350, l. 124. A court in the Sakhalin region, for example, wrote to the USSR Supreme Soviet advocating “the active interfer ence of society in the personal life of each of its members.” GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 347, l. 124. In addition, an Armenian pedagogue urged the USSR Supreme Soviet to project state power into personal relations, proclaiming that: “It is necessary in every possible way to encourage the courts to involve themselves in fights between relatives, friends, neighbors, and even spouses.” GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 345, l. 28. 112. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 350, l. 124. A single mother in the Krasnodar region, for example, encouraged the Supreme Soviet in a letter to “go into the personal issues of everyday life (lichnyi byt) more thoroughly.” GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 343, l. 213. 113. K. Bel’skii, “Strannye l’goty,” Izvestiia, November 12, 1965, 3. During this period, there were four levels of labor colonies: general, enforced, strict, and special regime. General regime colonies were the most lenient and were composed of first-time petty offenders and all women not classified as “espe cially dangerous recidivists.” George Feifer, Justice in Moscow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), 351. 114. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 346, l. 33.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
232
Notes to pages 92–99
115. GARF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 1895, l. 146. 116. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 345, l. 17. 117. GARF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 1895, l. 146. 118. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 142, l. 123. 119. Ibid., l. 32. 120. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 347, l. 126. 121. GARF, A-577, op. 1, d. 116, l. 138. 122. On “survivals of capitalism,” see Walter D. Connor, Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency and Alcoholism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 50–51, 168–169. 123. For a discussion of this decree, see GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 382, ll. 31–32, 327. Radio hooliganism is also touched on in GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6976, l. 54. For more on radio hooliganism, see Valerii Chalidze, Ugolovnaia Rossiia (New York: Khronika Press, 1977), 149–156.
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Chapter 3. Making Hooliganism on a Mass Scale 1. Stephen Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Mem ory in Moscow’s Arbat (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). 2. Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia (Cam bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 88–192; and Peter J. Schmelz, Such Freedom, If Only Musical: Unofficial Soviet Music during the Thaw (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 3. Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw. 4. For the importance of communist morality during the Khrushchev era, see Deborah A. Fields, Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia (New York: Peter Lang, 2007). 5. Pia Koivunen, “The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival: Propagating a New, Peaceful Image of the Soviet Union,” in Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev, ed. Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith (New York: Routledge, 2009), 45–65. For the anxieties generated by the festival, see Kristin Roth-Ey, “‘Loose Girls’ on the Loose? Sex, Propaganda and the 1957 Youth Festival,” in Women in the Khrushchev Era, ed. Melanie Ilic, Susan Reid, and Lynne Attwood (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 75–95. 6. See the October 10, 1956, draft decree of the Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers in Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964, ed. A. A. Fursenko, vol. 2 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2006), 459. 7. “Ob otvetstvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,” Pravda, December 21, 1956, 5. 8. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Crimin al Justice under Stalin (New York: Cam bridge University Press, 1996), 224–225; and David R. Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924–1953 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 227–237. 9. All of the Union Republics, save one, passed their own petty hooligan legislation between December 1956 and January 1957. The last republic, the Turkmen SSR, passed petty hooligan legislation in May 1957.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 100–101
233
10. The residents of Leningrad’s Frunze district complained that: “The police often do not press charges against such trifles or if they do then the Procuracy drops them because of the insignificance of the crime. But we think such trivial actions as striking a stranger or cursing are hooliganism.” GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4597, l. 30. A November 1955 report of the USSR Procuracy noted that hooligan cases “only go to court when the hooliganism takes an extreme (krupnye) and cynical form. Until this [point], a person committing hooliganism is frequently not punished.” GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3338, ll. 92–93. 11. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4011, ll. 8, 20. 12. The USSR Procuracy argued, for instance, that: “The main reason for the growth of crime is that a significant number of people go unpunished. An atmosphere has been created in which criminals . . . [believe that] they will be able to avoid punishment.” Creating petty hooliganism would restore consist ency to the practice of punishment. It would encourage judges not to dismiss minor offenders or give them “off the books” punishments that had little power to deter wrongdoers. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3338, ll. 92–93. 13. N. F. Kuznetsova, Osvobozhdenie ot ugolovnoi otvetstvennosti s peredachei dela v tovarishcheskikh sudakh (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1964), 10. 14. For the RSFSR Supreme Court’s remark, see GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 522, l. 1. For Kruglov’s statement, see GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 186, l. 139. 15. Hool ig ani sm, acc ordi ng to legal exp erts, was a “prim ary s chool (nachal’naia shkola) for the commission of more serious crimes.” Every fourth criminal recidivist convicted of murder, rape, or robbery was earlier convicted of hooliganism. For hooliganism as a gateway crime, see N. F. Kuznetsova, “Izuchenie i preduprezhdenie khuliganstva,” in Kriminologiia, ed. A. A. Gertsen zon (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1968), 439. 16. On the relative success of the command economy and rising living standards in the post-Stalinist 1950s, see G. I. Khanin, “The 1950s—The Triumph of the Soviet Economy,” Europe-Asia Studies, no. 8 (2003): 1187–1212; and Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2003), 48–69. 17. For more on b roken wind ows pol icing, see George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities (New York: Free Press, 1998); and Ralph E. Taylor, Breaking Away from Broken Windows: Baltimore and the Nationwide Fight against Crime, Grime, Fear, and Decline (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 3–26. 18. At a June 1957 meeting, the head of the USSR Procuracy, R. A. Rudenko, called the decree “humane” because it “serves as a warning, does not have serious consequences, allows the person to keep his job, and gives him the possibility to reform himself.” GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 32, l. 7. 19. The January 1955 decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet “On Criminal Responsibility for Petty Theft of State and Public Property” reduced punishments to six to twelve months of corrective labor or deprivation of freedom for three months. Repeat offenders would be jailed for one to two years. For interpreta tions of the petty hooligan decree as a form of liberalization, see Harold Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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234
Notes to pages 101–103
University Press, 1963), 73; and Peter H. Solom on, Jr., Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy: Specialists in Policy-Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 81. 20. In August 1940, the USSR Supreme Soviet, seeking to reduce hooligan ism in the workplace, imposed a one-year sentence on simple hooliganism. This measure kicked off a campaign that ensnared a broad range of Soviet citiz ens both inside and outside the workplace and marked a major escalation in the fight against hooliganism. It also marked a small revolution in how hooligan cases were proc essed. Ant icip ati ng campaign-related case inc reases, the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR (Narkomiust SSSR), the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD SSSR), and the USSR Procuracy issued a joint order that simplified and speeded up the processing of cases of simple hooliganism. The Narkomiust, NKVD, and Procuracy order ended the extensive investigation and trial of simple hooligan cases. In lieu of formal investigation, the police would cut processing times by drawing up a short report on the incident. The trial, based on this pared-down protocol, would be drastically telescoped through tight deadlining. To speed up turn over times, hooligan cases would be required to be heard by judges within 48 hours. Special facilities were set aside for telescoped trials in special court chambers (dezhurnye sudebnye kamery pri narodnykh sudakh). Out of the 1940 decree, a fast-track system of hooligan processing was born aimed at cutting hooligan-associated workloads and punishing hooligans “on the fly.” For more on the 1940 campaign, see Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin, 311, 328. For a description, see Paul Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926–1941 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), 318–319. 21. For the growing interest in reviving the 1940 system among mid-1950s legal workers, see RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 36, ll. 31–32; GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4013, l. 184; and GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4032, ll. 6, 47. 22. E. Koval’chuk, “Ugolovnaia otvetstvennost’ za khuliganstvo,” Otvety na voprosy trudiashchikhsia, no. 66 (1956): 44. 23. On December 7, 1956 (less than two weeks before the RSFSR petty hooli gan decree was released), an offic ial at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) sent Central Committee Secretary P. N. Pospelov a note on a September 1956 article about the Soviet Union published in the Observer entitled “Specula tors and Hooligans.” By concentrating on such negat ive phenomena as stiliagi and “cases of public, unpunished hooliganism,” the article, the MID official argued, gave a bad impression of the USSR. He demanded that something be done about deviancy in the run-up to the arrival of the foreign delegations for the 1957 World Youth Festival. The official closed his note by suggesting that the government “turn its attention . . . to possible measures that would stop similar phenomena in the future.” RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 179, l. 87. 24. “Ob otvetstvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,” 5. 25. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 333, l. 68. 26. To inform the public of the new decree, a number of different media were used. A day after its promulgation, local and republican newspapers printed the decree with accompanying explanatory material and local radio
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 103–106
235
aired informational programs on it. The executive committees of local Soviets printed the decree on posters that they hung in enterprises, institutions, and other public places. At factories, clubs, and other organizations, police, court, and Procuracy workers held lectures, discussions, and conversations to acquaint the public with the decree and explain its significance. In the first 11 days after the passage of the decree, law enforcement personal in Molotov oblast’ held 3,908 lectures and conversations with the public encompassing more than 86,000 people. GARF, f. 9415, op. 1, d. 16, l. 21. 27. Krokodil, no. 4 (1957): 15; Iunost’, no. 1 (1957): 113; and Iunost’, no. 2 (1957): 113. 28. Krokodil, no. 30 (1956): 8. The cartoon’s caption reads: “The last hooligan will be shown today in the zoo. No admission for children under sixteen.” 29. Initial reports showed that only 30 percent of arrestees were age 25 or less (only 5–6 percent were between the ages of 14–18). For this age breakdown, see RGANI, f. 13, op. 1, d. 558, l. 23. Around 70 percent of the petty hooligans arrested in 1957 were reported to be workers. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 57. Of the petty hooligans tried in the first half of 1966, 70 percent were workers, 75 percent were over the age of 25, and 75 percent had an education up to the 7th class level. The overwhelming majority of petty hooligans were drunk when they committed hooliganism. For example, 95 percent of those arrested for petty hooliganism in the RSFSR during 1966 were drunk when they engaged in deviant behavior. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 498, l. 4. 30. In Stalino, the majority of petty hooligans (659 out of 806) who were arrested in the beginning of 1957 were detained for cursing. Of the 1,403 petty hooligans arrested in Latvia during the first few months of the decree’s opera tion, more than 30 percent (552) were detained for “using foul language in a public place.” GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 53. 31. GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 111, l. 7. 32. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 96. 33. The bad neighb or got fift een days and the coll ect ive f armer five. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, ll. 38, 106. For the case of the office worker, see E. Koval’chuk, “Iz praktiki primeneniia ukaza ob otvetsvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 3 (1957): 63. 34. Expressions and phrases foreign to the ideological lexicon of official Soviet speech were reread as forms of anti-social deviancy punishable under the petty hooligan decree. For example, a woman was turned into a petty hooli gan not for cursing in public, but for using a vaguely religious expression while on the phone with the deputy chair of the local executive committee. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 462, ll. 62–63. In another example of interpreting an alien expression as hooligan speech, a man was arrested under the petty hooligan decree for addressing one of the workers at the local housing agency as “Mrs. (missis).” GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 30. 35. A 43-year-old Muscovite was given fifteen days for exposing himself in a store. For this case, see GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 99. 36. For the snowball and drinking buddy cases, see ibid., ll. 98, 323. 37. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 126. 38. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5199, l. 18.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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236
Notes to pages 106–110
39. Koval’chuk, “Iz praktiki primen eniia ukaza ob otvetsvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,” 63. 40. GARF, f. 9474, op. 10, d. 197a, l. 93. The interpretive agency and authority that the decree instilled in police personnel gave them the ability to transform any insulting expression or gesture, even an imagined one, into an offense punishable under the relaxed standards of petty hooliganism. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 337. Behaviors that did not violate public order but were frowned on or were unorthodox were reinterpreted through the lens of petty hooliganism into imprisoning offenses. A man, who lay on a couch in the lobby and declared he was an American spy after he was refused a room at the Donbass Hotel received a ten-day sentence. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 59. 41. GARF, f. 9474, op. 10, d. 197a, l. 94; and GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 469, l. 105. 42. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 59. 43. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 469, ll. 106–107. 44. For the April 19, 1961, decree “O dopolnenii ukaza Prezidiuma Verkhov nogo Soveta RSFSR ot 19 dekabria 1956 ‘ob otvetstvennosti za melkoe khuli ganstvo,’” see Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, no. 16 (1961): 248. 45. A. Radontsev, “Pravil’no primeniat’ ukaz ob otvetstvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 20 (1964): 29. 46. Koval’cuk, “Iz praktiki primeneniia ukaza ob otvetsvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,” 63. 47. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 107. 48. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5290, ll. 80–82. 49. Ibid., l. 246. 50. Ibid., l. 70. 51. See, for instance, TsMAM, f. 901, op. 1, d. 637, l. 74; GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5290, ll. 80–82; and GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, ll. 45, 113, 335. 52. Iurii Dombrovskii, “Zapiski melkogo khuligana,” in Iurii Dombrovskii: roman, pis’ma, esse (Yekaterinburg, Russia: U factoriia, 2000), 636. 53. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 617, l. 137. 54. Recidivism was a pressing problem in the petty hooligan program. Tech nically, deviants could only be arrested for petty hooliganism three times in one year. Offenses past the three-strike-per-year limit would be tried as simple hooliganism and merit criminal rather than administrative punishment. How ever, the three strikes rule was often difficult to enforce and many petty hooli gans became chronic repeat offenders who were constantly circulated through the petty hooligan system. 55. GARF, A-385, op. 26, d. 111, ll. 20–21; and RGANI, f. 13, op. 1, d. 677, l. 58. 56. GARF, A-385, op. 26, d. 111, l. 58. 57. V. Titov and Z. Iur’ev, “100 interv’iu s khuliganami,” Krokodil, no. 34 (1961): 5. 58. For information on the proportion of former petty hooligans in the sample of convicts for criminal hooliganism, see Kuznetsova, “Izuchenie i preduprezhdenie khuliganstva,” 441. 59. A key lobbyist for differentiating deviancy, USSR Minister of Justice K. P. Gorshenin, noted at a July 1954 meeting: “There are various types of hooli ganism. There are cases when they bring to responsibility a law-abiding person
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 111–112
237
who while in a drunken state causes a ruckus. But there is another type of hooli ganism: When a person inspires fear in the residents of some settlement. We must distinguish between such things. [These less serious offenders] must answer for the actions they have committed, but not to the same degree as malicious hooligans.” At an October 1954 meeting, Gorshenin continued his campaign to differentiate deviancy: “Hooliganism is a disgusting form of crime that is alarming our citizenry. But there are various types of hooliganism. In one case, a hooligan with a knife terrorizes his whole neighborhood. We must really punish this person and force him to feel responsibility before society. There are also cases in which a person, even a family man, drinks too much and commits hooligan actions in a drunken state. It is impossible to forgive him, but it is also impossible to place him on the same docket with the hooligan who terrorizes the population.” For the July 1954 remarks, see GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 18, l. 17. For the October 1954 remarks, see GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 19, l. 32. 60. GARF A-385, op. 26, d. 111, l. 6. 61. See Protocol #46b for the Presidium session of October 20, 1956, in Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964, ed. A. A. Fursenko, vol. 1 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004), 172. 62. Judges had constant difficulties understanding the practical difference between petty and simple hooliganism. One of the justices declared at the July 1958 Plenum of the RSFSR Supreme Court: “The USSR Supreme Court does not give us any concrete suggestions on how to differentiate petty hooliganism from hooliganism . . . and it’s very hard to do this.” The Ukrainian Supreme Court requested that a ruling be issued that would make “a clear-cut distinction between petty and simple hooliganism,” arguing that “in practice it is difficult to establish this border.” See GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 295, l. 2; and GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 618, l. 97. 63. G. Mendel’son and Iv. Tkachevskii, “Otvetstvennost’ za melkoe khuli ganstvo,” Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost’, no. 11 (1957): 57. Convictions for simple hooliganism in the USSR fell from 30,160 in 1956 to 19,965 in 1957. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 95, ll. 1, 5; and GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 61, l. 7. 64. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 469, ll. 106–107; and Mendel’son and Tkachevskii, “Otvetstvennost’ za melkoe khuliganstvo,” 56. 65. G. Eremenko, “Iz praktiki rassmotreniia materialov o melkom khuli ganstve,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 1 (1957): 57. 66. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 498, l. 38. 67. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 410, l. 22. 68. For instance, physical assault (izbienie) accounted for 374 of the 1,403 cases of petty hooliganism in Riga in 1957. In Stalino, the infliction of knife wounds accounted for 102 of the 806 petty hooligan cases studied in the same year. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 53. However, the decree also served as the basis for criminalizing trivial forms of assault and childhood roughhousing. In the Tiumen’ region, it served as the basis for sentencing a 16-year-old boy to fifteen days for throwing snowballs. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 323. 69. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 54. The case of an unemployed man who committed “systematic hooliganism” in his apartment illustrates the serial misuse of the petty hooligan category to cover up crimes and the mounting
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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238
Notes to pages 112–115
escalation this prompted in the criminal’s behavior. On his first encounter with the police, the man was arrested for petty hooliganism after he “started an argument, burnt his wife’s possessions, and destroyed her passport.” Less than three months later, the same man was detained for fifteen days for petty hooli ganism because “he broke the dishes, chased his family from the apartment and threatened a police officer with an axe.” Less than a month later, the same man was arrested again for petty hooliganism for eight days. Then, again less than a month later, the police sent the man to a comrades’ court after he showed up at his wife’s workplace, began to beat her, and “broke her head open with a lump of asphalt.” The comrades’ court did not discuss the man’s behavior. Two months later, the police arrested him again for beating his wife. However, this time the judge finally decided to throw out the petty hooligan case and bring the man to criminal responsibility and he was given two years for malicious hooliganism. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 410, ll. 22–23. 70. GARF, f. 7523, op. 107, d. 27, ll. 18–19. 71. “Praktika primeneniia ukazov ob otvetstvennosti za melkoe khuli ganstvo,” Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, no. 10 (1958): 39. 72. GARF, f. 9474, op. 10, d. 197a, l. 58. 73. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 465, l. 38; and GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 457, l. 35. 74. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5290, ll. 80–82. 75. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 59. 76. Ibid., l. 58. 77. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 341. 78. For the arrest of the mentally ill as petty hooligans, see Eremenko, “Iz praktiki rassmotreniia materialov o melkom khuliganstve,” 58. Another article confirmed that police, in some cases, delivered to the judge violators “whose mental stability was doubtful.” S. Borod in, “K voprosu o merakh administrativnogo vozdeistviia, nalagaemykh narodnymi sudami,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 11 (1958): 28. A RSFSR Procuracy report noted many cases of secondary school students, age 14 to 16, being arrested for petty hooli ganism despite the fact that those under age 16 legally could not be subjected to compulsory physical labor and despite the fact that these youngsters were incarcerated with adult offenders who frequently exercised a bad influence on them. GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 111, l. 41. For the case of a man in the Altai region who was arrested for petty hooliganism after stealing two cars from the kolkhoz garage, see GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 498, l. 36. 79. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5095, l. 158. The frequency of frivolous and groundless convictions resulted in around 10 percent of petty hooligan cases being thrown out by the courts. See GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5093, l. 197; and GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 418, l. 88. The USSR Supreme Court reported in 1957 that the lower courts threw out 61,237 groundless cases unionwide. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 59. 80. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 418, l. 83. 81. A. Rubichev, “Za vsemernoe ukreplenie sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v rabote sudov i organov iustitsii,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 1 (1957): 10. 82. Eremenko, “Iz praktiki rassmotreniia materialov o melkom khuliganstve,” 57. For the Procuracy’s attempt to assert control over the petty hooligan program,
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 115–117
239
see GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 111, ll. 27, 30, 32, 37–38. See also the differing opinions on prosecutorial oversight in I. Sapozhnikov and L. Kozak, “Praktika primeneniia ukaza ob otvetsvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,” Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost’, no. 3 (1957): 23; and Koval’chuk, “Iz praktiki primeneniia ukaza ob otvetsvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,” 64. 83. GARF, f. 9474, op. 10, d. 197a, l. 58. 84. In the Moscow region city of Pushkino, less than 10 percent of petty hooligan cases were tried within the required one-day period. In areas of the Kaliningrad region, only 25 percent of petty hooligans were turned over within the t wenty-four hour targ et. In parts of the Stavr op ol reg ion, more than 50 percent of all petty hooligan cases were sent to the courts after a three-day delay. RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 292, l. 58; and GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 161. Personnel shortages and infrastructure constraints frequently attenuated case processing. Illness, business trips (komandirovki), and prior trial obligations robbed the system of judges who were on hand to try petty hooligan cases within the twenty-four hour period and delayed case turnovers. Limited floor space in detention centers often forced localities to delay and even postpone cases to relieve overcrowding and create room for future detainees. The isolation of some detention centers from the nearest court, the lack of transportation, and the need to wait for police escorts to become available kept some petty hooli gans from getting to courts within the twenty-four hour period and boosted the number of late cases. In the Leningrad region, these factors alone rolled 35 percent of petty hooligan cases over the twenty-four hour deadline. Ibid., l. 122. 85. Composing comprehensible case materials at times overwhelmed the linguistic competence of ill-educated policemen. Local prosecutors complained that “frequently the police carelessly and incorrectly compose incident reports and case materials on petty hooliganism that are incomprehensible, ungram matical, and do not always confirm to reality.” Like ambiguity, unintelligible writing made it difficult for judges and prosecutors to use case materials, pass sentence, and overrule errors. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 112. 86. One essential piece of case information sometimes missing from case reports was names. For example, the names of witnesses were often omitted or only the first names of the witnesses were listed. Ibid. Sometimes, the names were given in full, but the case report lacked the proper accompanying signa tures. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, ll. 126–127. For example, a beat cop wrote up a petty hooligan case report that nobody, not even the arresting officer him self, signed and in which only the witnesses’ first names were given. Yet that report became the basis on which the accused was convicted. Radontsev, “Pravil’no primeniat’ ukaz ob otvetstvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,” 30. 87. GARF, f. 9474, op. 32, d. 645, l. 34. 88. Sapozhnikov and Kozak, “Praktika primeneniia ukaza ob otvetsven nosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,” 20. 89. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 110. 90. In Kaluga, three people were arrested on the basis of an anonymous protocol that was sent to the police. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 897, l. 12. 91. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6670, l. 62. 92. GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 149, l. 56.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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240
Notes to pages 117–120
93. Dombrovskii, “Zapiski melkogo khuligana,” 624. 94. Ibid., 625. 95. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5290, l. 80. A Procuracy official noted: “Even when the accused denies his guilt there has not been a single case in which the judge has checked the correctness of what is written in that case report.” Radontsev, “Pravil’no primeniat’ ukaz ob otvetstvennosti za melkoe khuli ganstvo,” 30. 96. When it became apparent that the name of the person who was delivered to the prison did not match with the arrest decree, the judge simply crossed out the old name and replaced it with the new (and presumably) right name. Ibid. 97. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 110. 98. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 13. In Moscow’s Soviet, Lenin, and Lenin grad districts, the local prison would not accept those convicted of petty hooli ganism for less than ten days. Prisons cited high turnover and limited area as only some of the reasons for turning away petty hooligans. Prison administrators argued that the extremely short prison stays to which most hooligans were sentenced, when coupled with the time-consuming prison entry and registration process, made microstays impractical. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 112. 99. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 26. 100. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 112. 101. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5290, l. 80. Doubling up on bunks may also have been due to a lack of bedding materials, a shortage that required many petty hooligans across the country to sleep on plank beds or to bring their own bedding with them. For more on this, see GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 26. 102. Dombrovskii, “Zapiski melkogo khuligana,” 628. 103. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 26. 104. Ibid. 105. Ibid., l. 43. 106. RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 232, l. 59. 107. GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 111, l. 15. 108. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 3. 109. Ibid., ll. 32, 40, 112. In Prison no. 1 in Voron ezh, adult and juvenile arrestees were held together. In the Saratov region, arrestees were held together with the general convict population. GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 111, l. 15. 110. RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 232, l. 59; GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 13; and GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 514, l. 4. Petty hooligans’ access to outside stores and foodstuffs (through their travel to off-prison worksites as well as through the packages they were allowed to receive from relatives) made them valua ble prison trading partners and back-door suppliers of coveted illicit commodities such as alcohol. Their mobility also made petty hooligan detainees vital commu nication links for ferrying information between criminals in the prisons and their relatives and criminal colleagues in the outside world. 111. Far from model prisoners, detainees served as vehicles for the penetra tion of prison space and as instruments of contagion. Their refusal to work and the limited rules of engagement governing their treatment made them models of resistance to authority whom guards and wardens had little means to disci pline. In addition, their propensity to return from undersupervised work details
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 120–124
241
drunk made them constant sources of internal disorder. Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court V. V. Kulikov noted, for example, that petty hooligan detainees “exercise a corrupting influence on the other prisoners.” GARF, f. 9474, op. 32, d. 21, l. 89. 112. Drafts show that early versions of the decree featured a slightly higher thirty-day sentence. See GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4011, ll. 8, 20. 113. On the reforging rhetoric of the 1930s, see Katerina Clark, “Little Heroes and Big Deeds: Literature Responds to the First Five-Year Plan,” in Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978). 114. Such a sentiment is illustrated by a Krokodil cartoon in which two women comment as the police lead a petty hooligan detainee away: “Maybe five or ten days for petty hooliganism will teach that do-nothing (bezdel’nika) Zhora how to work.” Krokodil, no. 3 (1957): cover. 115. A local police chief, for instance, requested the right to shave the heads of arrested petty hooligans not just for sanitary reasons, but also because “cutting the hair has a great moral influence and impact, especially on the young.” GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 111, l. 67. 116. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5095, ll. 154–155; GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 28; and GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 40. 117. Ibid. 118. A. Galkin, “Eto ne kompaniia,” Komsomolskaia pravda, November 2, 1958, 3. 119. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 31. 120. Ibid., l. 113. 121. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 45. 122. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 47. 123. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5290, l. 80; and GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5302, ll. 194–195. 124. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 30. In 1965, Izvestiia reported that only one third of petty hooligan detainees were actually used in the labor projects the decree required. V. Baskov, “Porok istseliat’ trudom,” Izvestiia, April 1, 1965, 3. 125. Galkin, “Eto ne kompaniia,” 3. 126. Ibid. 127. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 350, l. 17. 128. GARF, f. A-577, op. 1, d. 882, l. 46. 129. V. Moskin, “Posadite menia na desiat’ sutok!” Komsomolskaia pravda, February 18, 1960, 4. 130. Krokodil, no. 19 (1957): 5. 131. GARF, f. 9415, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 60–61. 132. GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 149, l. 51. 133. Ibid., l. 41. 134. GARF, f. 7523, op. 107, d. 27, ll. 18–19; and GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 111, l. 81. 135. GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 111, l. 68. 136. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 117.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 124–127
137. The Gor’kii Scientific Institute of Epidemiology and Hygiene, for example, paid 3,000 rubles in escort expenses for detainee labor valued at only 1,206 rubles. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, ll. 61–62. 138. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 514, l. 4. 139. TsMAM, f. 2842, op. 1, d. 65, l. 18. 140. Ibid., l. 113. 141. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 323. 142. Ibid., l. 112. 143. Ibid., l. 8. 144. GARF, f. A-428, op.3, d. 514, l. 5. 145. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 31. 146. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 514, l. 4. 147. TsMAM, f. 2842, op. 1, d. 65, l. 18. 148. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 79. 149. GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 111, l. 32. 150. GARF, f. 7523, op. 107, d. 27, ll. 18–19. 151. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 8. 152. Baskov, “Porok istseliat’ trudom,” 3. 153. GARF, f. A-577, op. 1, d. 63, ll. 5–6. 154. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 13. 155. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 45. 156. GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 149, l. 31. 157. M. Grigor’ev, “Khuligan pod mikroskopom,” Krokodil, no. 5 (1965): 5. 158. GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 505, l. 400. 159. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 124. 160. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 6. 161. GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 111, l. 16. 162. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 281, ll. 1–2. 163. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 26. 164. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 62. 165. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3, d. 370, ll. 47–48, 179. 166. GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 505, l. 399. 167. For example, 21 enterprises in the Kaluga region paid 477 rubles to the local government for almost a year of detainee labor. But this did little to cover the 5,175 rubles the local government spent to feed the same detainee popula tion. In one police station in the Mari Autonomous Republic, sixty-two petty hooligans were held at various times during a five-month period in 1957. Col lectively, these detainees worked for 44 days (they should have worked a total of 640 days) and 155 rubles and 70 kopecks were paid into the state budget for this labor. The police spent 2,144 rubles on food for these detainees over the same period. Ibid., l. 400. 168. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 79. 169. For example, 700 hundred qualified workers of the Budennovugol’ mine were imprisoned for petty hooliganism during the first half of 1957 alone, resulting in 7,000 lost workdays and a drop in coal output of 75,600 tons. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 34. 170. These petty hooligan detainees were charged one ruble per day to cover food costs. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6612, l. 70.
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Notes to pages 127–130
243
171. GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 506, ll. 34–35. 172. GARF, f. 9415, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 61–62. 173. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 61. 174. Galkin, “Eto ne kompaniia,” 3. For the USSR MVD and USSR MinFin order, see Rossiiskii gosud arstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (RGAE), f. 7733, op. 46, d. 13, l. 123. 175. GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 505, l. 399. 176. GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 506, ll. 34–35. 177. In 1961, the Iaroslav’ region sent only 2 percent of petty hooligan cases to the comrades’ courts and in 1962 only 4 percent (see GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 788, l. 121). The Altai krai people’s courts in 1961 only sent 4 percent of petty hooligan cases to the comrades’ courts and workers’ collectives. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 977, l. 12. 178. For the April 19, 1961, decree, see Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, no. 16 (1961): 248. 179. For information on the amount of petty hooligan cases transferred to the comrades’ courts, see chapter 4 and GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 95, l. 21. 180. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 428, ll. 20–21. 181. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 788, ll. 10, 41 The fact that many comrades’ courts were Potemkin institutions that, by 1961, were either nonexistent or non functional constrained the ability of some courts to offload petty hooligan cases to these alternative disciplinary sites. In a 1964 report, the Arkhangel’sk regional court, for example, explained that local courts could not send a “significant amount of materials” to the comrades’ courts because many of them were not functioning. Ibid., l. 25. 182. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 514, l. 9. 183. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 428, ll. 13–14. 184. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 788, l. 8. One police chief in the Kalinin region levied fines on 197 people. Sixty of them did not pay. For this case, see GARF, f. A-385, op. 26, d. 297, l. 6. 185. On the Secret Speech, see William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and his Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 270–277; and William Tompson, Khrushchev: A Political Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 153–161. 186. In October 1956, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a decree mandating that gypsies cease their vagrant lifestyle (brodia zhnichestvo) and adopt a new life of settled wage labor. Those gypsies who refused would be sentenced to five years exile and corrective labor. For the October 5, 1956, Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet “O Priobshchenii k trudu tsygan, zanimaiu shchikhsia brodiazhnichestvom,” see Sbornik dokum entov po istorii ugolovnogo zakonodatel’stva SSSR i RSFSR (Kazan: Izdatel’stvo Kazanskogo universiteta, 1992), 31. For more on the 1956 gypsy decree, see Alaina Lemon, Between Two Fires: Gypsy Performance and Romani Memory from Pushkin to Postsocialism (Dur ham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 103, 135. For the student crackdowns, see Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, 79–84. 187. For more on the functionalist interpretation of deviance, see Emile Durkheim, The Rules of the Sociological Method, trans. W. D. Hall (New York: Free Press, 1982); and Kai Erikson, Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: Wiley, 1966).
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 130–134
188. See also Walter D. Connor, Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 246–247.
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Chapter 4. Empowering Public Activism 1. George Feifer, Justice in Moscow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), 112. 2. “Obshchestvennost’” in Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, ed. S. I. Vavil ov, vol. 30 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1954), 418; B. M. Volin and D. N. Ushakov, eds., Tolkovyi slovar’ russkogo iazyka, vol. 2 (Mos cow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo innostranykh i natsional’nykh slovarei, 1940), 728–729; Catr io na Kelly and Vadim Volk ov, “Obshchestvennost’, Sobornost’: Collective Identities,” in Constructing Russian Culture in the Age of Revolution: 1881–1940, ed. Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 26–27. For more on obshchestvennost’ in the pre-Revolutionary period, see Joseph Bradley, “Voluntary Associations, Civic Culture, and obshchestvennost’ in Moscow,” in Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Society, ed. Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow, and James L. West (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1991), 131–148. 3. For the female movement of obshchestvennost’ in the Stalin era, see Mary Buckley, “The Untold Story of Obshchestvennitsa in the 1930s,” Europe Asia Studies, no. 4 (1996): 569–586. 4. For changes in the meaning of obshchestvennost’ in the Khrushchev era, see George Breslauer, “Khrushchev Reconsidered,” in The Soviet Union Since Stalin, ed. Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Robert Sharlet (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 52–58. 5. For such a representation, see Krokodil, no. 20 (1959): 8–9. 6. Quoted in L. Smirnov, “Usilit’ bor’bu s prestupleniiami i s khuligan stvom,” Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost’, no. 1 (1959): 29. 7. For the growing anti-police sentiment among the population in the mid1950s, see V. A. Kozlov, Massovye besporia dki v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve, irsk, Russia: Siberskii khronograf, 1999), 1953-nachalo 1980-kh gg. (Novosib 199–200. 8. See, for instance, G. Ryklin, “Khudaia trava,” Izvestiia, December 8, 1955, 3; and “Obuzdat’ khuliganov,” Trud, January 13, 1956, 2. 9. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4031, l. 121. 10. Krokodil, no. 24 (1956): 9. 11. Krokodil, no. 32 (1961): 5. 12. A. A. Fursenko, ed., Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964, vol. 2 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2006), 233–234, 260. 13. See the October 10, 1956, draft decree of the Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers “On Shortcomings in the Work of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and Measures to Eliminate Them,” in Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964, vol. 2, 456–462. 14. Kruglov’s successor as Minister of Internal Affairs was N. P. Dudorov, till then head of the Construction Department of the Central Committee. For
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 134–137
245
the accusations against Kruglov, see the General Prosecutor R. A. Rudenko’s April 18, 1955, letter to N. A. Bulganin, chair of the USSR Council of Ministers in GARF, f. 7523, op. 107, d. 124, ll. 53–57. 15. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3, d. 636, l. 136. 16. A miner recommended to the USSR Procuracy that the state should “send us a battalion of good soldiers and they will restore order in a month. All disorder (bezobraziia) will be stopped. I no longer have any hope in our local police.” GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5663, ll. 76–77. 17. S. Golovanivskii, “Eto kasaetsia vsekh,” Izvestiia, January 22, 1956, 3. 18. M. Fomushkin, “Khuligany poluchili otpor,” Komsomolskaia pravda, May 29, 1955, 4. 19. For such a cartoon, see Iunost’, no. 1 (1956): 64. 20. In addition, since the mid-1950s the state began to experiment with using volunteer Komsomol brigades to police unsafe city streets and set up pilot public policing projects along those lines in many cities. For more on this, see R. S. Mulukaev and N. N. Kartashov, Militsiia Rossii: istoriko-pravovoi ocherk (Orel, Russia: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’sko-poligraficheskoe predpriiatie Oka, 1995), 172–173. 21. For more on the comrades’ courts, see Harold Berman and James W. Spindler, “Soviet Comrades’ Courts,” Washington Law Review, no. 4 (1963): 842– 910; Albert Boiter, “Social Courts in the USSR” (PhD diss., Columbia Univer sity, 1965); Albert Boiter, “The Comrades’ Courts: How Durable?” Problems of Communism, no. 2 (1965): 82–92; Feifer, Justice in Moscow, 103–129; Leon Lipson, “The Function of Extrajudicial Mechan isms,” in Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences, ed. D. W. Treadgold (Seattle: University of Washing ton Press, 1967), 144–167; and Samuel Kucherov, The Organs of Soviet Adminis tration of Justice: Their History and Operation (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), 154–197. For an early history of the Soviet comrades’ courts, see Lewis Siegelbaum, “Defining and Ignoring Labor Discipline in the Early Soviet Period: The Comrades-Disciplinary Courts, 1918–1922,” Slavic Review, no. 4 (1992): 705–730. 22. Harold Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 82, 286; Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union Is Governed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 297, 301–302; and George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Polit ics (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 13, 75, 271. 23. Breslauer, “Khrushchev Reconsidered,” 50–57. 24. Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 279–283. 25. Yoram Gorlizki, “Delegalization in Russia: Soviet Comrades’ Courts in Retrospect,” The American Journal of Comparat ive Law, no. 3 (1998): 403–425. 26. Berman noted that the druzhina’s “rough” and “discourteous” nature was due to their “lacking the training of the regular police.” Berman, Justice in the USSR, 288. 27. Sem. Narin’iani, “Vmesto blagodarnosti,” Pravda, September 30, 1956, 3. Semen Davydovich Narin’iani (1908–1974) was Pravda’s main feuilleton writer, a member of the editorial board of Krokodil, and a member of the Union of Soviet Writers.
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246
Notes to pages 137–142
28. Ibid. 29. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5206, l. 27. 30. Narin’iani, “Vmesto blagodarnosti,” 3. 31. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5206, l. 30. 32. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 136, l. 248. 33. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5206, l. 30. 34. Ibid. By equating violent vigilantes with the criminals they were fighting against, a man from Stalingrad likewise wrote that: “They have created an atmosphere in which citizens are afraid even to object to the hooligan.” Ibid., l. 31. 35. GARF, f. 9492, op. 1, d. 1951, l. 11. 36. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5206, l. 22. 37. For the October 4, 1956, Presidium decree “On the Article of S. Narin’iani ‘Instead of Thanks,’ which was Published in Pravda on September 30, 1956,” see Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964, vol. 1, 169–170, 963, and vol. 2, 446–447. 38. Rud enko added: “We unders tand very well that we cann ot allow lynching (samosud ), but we also cannot allow these perversions (izvrashenii ) of justice.” GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4011, ll. 477–478. 39. See, for example, the interview with USSR Supreme Court chairman A. A. Volin, “K voprosu ob ukreplenii sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti,” Literatur naia gazeta, November 10, 1956, 2. 40. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 205, l. 236. 41. V. A. Boldyrev, “Na strazhe zakonov,” Komsomolskaia pravda, December 8, 1956, 2. 42. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5096, l. 79. 43. “Molodye stroiteli kommunizma, vysoko nesite znamia Lenina! Rech’ tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva na XIV s’ezda Komsomola 19 aprelia 1962 goda,” Pravda, April 21, 1962, 2. 44. P. Tat’ianicheva, “Verit’ liudiam—eto znachit . . . ,” Oktiabr’, no. 12 (1959): 118. In one case she described, hooligans gave a Komsomol member seven knife wounds. 45. See, for example, N. Alexandrov, “Ubiitsa druzhinnika prigovoren k rasstrelu,” Izvestiia, September 17, 1960, 4; and B. Gusev, “Vozmezdie,” Izvestiia, August 6, 1961, 6. For an earlier case, see K. Yureev, “On umer na postu,” So vetskaia Rossiia, June 9, 1957, 4. 46. For an example of this, see GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 351, l. 112. 47. Maurice Hindus, Houses without a Roof: Russia after 43 Years of Revolution (New York: Double Day, 1961), 376. 48. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6456, l. 195. 49. The decree also punished those who disobeyed a lawful order or demand of the druzhina or police with incarceration for up to fifteen days, corrective labor for a period of up to one month, or a fine of up to twenty rubles. Those who insulted a member of the druzhina or the police were liable to incarceration for up to six months, corrective labor for up to a year, or a fine of up to one hundred rubles. “Ob usilenii otvetstvennosti za posiagatel’stvo na zhizn’, zdorov’e i dostoinstvo rabotnikov militsii i narodnykh druzhinnikov,” Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 8 (1962): 220.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 142–147
247
50. Berman specifically mentions the “rough” behavior of the druzhina. Berman, Justice in the USSR, 288. For critical articles in the Soviet press, see O. Bitov, “Sem ovets i dobrye pastyri,” Komsomolskaia pravda, November 19, 1959, 2; “Pod maskoi druzhinnika,” Komsomolskaia pravda, May 5, 1961, 4; “Pokroviteli prestupnikov,” Izvestiia, June 23, 1961, 6; and V. Volnov, “Udar bez protokola,” Komsomolskaia pravda, October 5, 1965, 2. 51. For such an article, see R. Zubareva and V. Bezborodova, “Razve tak nuzhno borot’sia so stiliagami?” Izvestiia, July 19, 1957, 2. 52. See, for example, the representation in Krokodil, no. 20 (1959): 10; and Krokodil, no. 26 (1961): 15. 53. In addition, they also reflected the fact that in some areas a third of druzhina members were reported to be women. Tat’ianicheva, “Verit’ liudiam— eto znachit . . . ,” 117. 54. Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia, 286. 55. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 351, l. 112. 56. For an article on the awarding of the medal “For Bravery” to a druzhinnik, see “Podvig druzhinnika,” Izvestiia, November 20, 1959, 6. 57. In one Leningrad region factory, there were 762 workers, including 151 Komsomol members, but the factory druzhina numbered only 22 people. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6199, l. 211. 58. B. Gusev and Iu. Feofanov, “Veret ekhinskaia piaterka,” Izvestiia, April 3, 1963, 4. 59. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 405, l. 21. 60. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 465, l. 53. 61. Gusev and Feofanov, “Veret ekhinskaia piaterka,” 4. 62. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 405, l. 21; and GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6456, l. 131. 63. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 170; and GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 301, ll. 19–20. 64. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 405, l. 21. 65. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 412, l. 131. 66. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 411, l. 106. 67. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 412, l. 132. 68. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 465, l. 53. 69. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 493, l. 14. 70. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 979, l. 74. 71. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 979, l. 74. 72. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 333, l. 171. 73. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 412, l. 132. 74. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6456, l. 199. 75. GARF, f. A-577, op. 1, d. 118, ll. 45–46. 76. TsMAM, f. 493, op. 1, d. 452, l. 6. 77. For an overview of the comrades’ courts’ functions, see Berman, Justice in the USSR, 288–291. 78. Gorlizki, “Deleg alization in Russia,” 403–425. 79. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 474, l. 2. In 1961, the Iaroslav’ region sent only 2 percent of petty hooligan cases to the comrades’ courts and in 1962 only
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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248
Notes to pages 148–150
4 percent. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 788, l. 121. The Altai region’s courts sent only 4 percent of petty hooligan cases to the comrades’ courts in 1961. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 977, l. 12. In the Kemerovo region, only 6 percent of petty hooligan cases were sent to comrades’ courts, the overwhelming majority being processed through the people’s courts. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 788, l. 51. 80. Berman, Justice in the USSR, 93–94. 81. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 351, ll. 289–299. 82. Ibid., l. 322. 83. Ibid. A comrades’ court chairman from Moscow wrote eighteen months after the publication of the draft statute to berate the government for not confirming the statute complaining that “there is still nothing to guide us in making our decisions.” For the lawyer’s remark, see TsMAM, f. 493, op. 1, d. 452, l. 18. 84. Many courts, lacking any information on how to hold a trial, copied their legal procedures from the people’s courts, blurring the lines between institu tions with confusing jurisdictional overlays and giving a false impression of their relationship to state power. Many comrades’ courts aped established people’s court rituals, beginning their sessions with the command to rise (Vstat! Sud idet!). Comrades’ courts often gave their decisions in the name of the repub lic. A comrades’ court in Moscow, for example, issued its decisions in the name of the RSFSR. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6456, l. 136. 85. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 426, ll. 161–162. 86. TsMAM, f. 493, op. 1, d. 452, ll. 10, 12. Noting that the volunteer court’s questionable legal status robbed it of the support of local state and judicial bodies, a comrades’ court staffer complained that due to the absence of an approved law: “The executive committees and people’s courts consider the comrades’ courts with some reservations.” GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 351, ll. 289– 299. A comrades’ court chairman from Moscow likewise asked the USSR Supreme Soviet “to quickly confirm the Law on the Comrades’ Courts because the absence of a law results in the people’s courts and police ignoring the comrades’ court.” Ibid., l. 222. 87. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 351, l. 342. The lack of a comrades’ court statute hindered the operation of the new courts. For example, the courts had no legal right to force defendants to show up at their trial. So, many hooligans evaded discipline by simply not coming. This placed many comrades’ courts in a delicate position. They did not want to hold a trial in which the defendant was not present because this would limit the vospitanie or educational effect of the proceedings on defendant and public. In addition, the trial of defendants in absentia appeared to be a violation of socialist legality and too much akin to the discredited tactics of the Stalinist past. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 345, l. 57. 88. GARF, f. 9474, op. 32, d. 67, l. 239. 89. TsMAM, f. 493, op. 1, d. 557, l. 9. 90. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6669, l. 195. 91. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 426, l. 7. The comrades’ courts sometimes made illegal decisions because their members did not study or know the law. At a meeting of the Presidium of the Moscow College of Lawyers, a speaker com mented that “in the majority of comrades’ courts, the chairmen and members
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 150–154
249
are not familiar with the basic laws and do not know the statute on comrades’ courts well.” TsMAM, f. 493, op. 1, d. 557, l. 9. The USSR Supreme Court even reported that in many republics and regions, members of the comrades’ courts could not even get or find a copy of the statute that had created them. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 426, l. 139. 92. GARF, f. 9474, op. 32, d. 67, l. 230. 93. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 351, l. 342. The state’s inability and unwilling ness to educate comrades’ court judges in the legal dimension of their duties often aggravated volunteer malpractice and the culture of incompetence. Volunteer education, when any such training was attempted, emphasized theo retic al knowledge, canonical Party texts, and contemporary policy statements over the study of practical legal and administrative questions. A 1960 study plan spent twice as much time on lectures concerning theoretic al topics such as “Marxist-Leninist Theory of State and Law” than on explaining such basics as “criminal responsibility for different types of crime.” In fact, topics such as fire safety and “on the protection of shrubbery” were given as much weight in the curriculum as outlining what was and was not a crime. Moreover, the required readings for the class did not include a single handbook on the criminal code. Instead, it included such seminal volumes on police work and criminal law as Lenin’s State and Revolution and Khrushchev’s On Control Figures for the Develop ment of the People’s Economy of the USSR, 1959–1965. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 333, ll. 184–185, 189–190. 94. For a brief overview of the druzhina, see Berman, Justice in the USSR, 286–288. 95. K. Yurev, “O tekh, kto meshaet nam otdykhat’,” Trud, June 28, 1956, 4. 96. For “guests of the druzhina,” see RGANI, f. 13, op. 1, d. 768, l. 67. For “zor’kii,” see GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4011, l. 461. For “heroes not of our time,” see GARF, f. 5451, op. 28, d. 1892, ll. 12–13. For the quotes, see GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6199, ll. 209–210. For the case of the attacking man, see GARF, f. 9474, op. 17, d. 4759, ll. 5–7. 97. T. Golubev, “Vospitatel’naia butylka,” Izvestiia, April 12, 1964, 3. 98. GARF, f. 5451, op. 28, d. 1892, ll. 12–13. 99. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6199, l. 209. 100. Stuart Hall et al., Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978). 101. For the use of the hooligan label in these cases, see Valerii Chalidze, Ugolovnaia Rossiia (New York: Khronika Press, 1977), 73–93. 102. “Vyzyvaiushchie zanaveski,” Komsomolskaia pravda, June 29, 1962, 2. 103. “Pestryi platochek,” Izvestiia, March 31, 1961, 3. 104. N. Kolesnikova, “Patrul’ v korotkikh shtanishkakh,” Komsomolskaia pravda, December 13, 1960, 2. 105. Ibid. 106. V. Prival’skii, “Strogo zapreshchenno,” Ogonek, no. 41 (1959): 55. 107. D. Novopl’ianskii, “Pod maskoi druzhinnika,” Komsomolskaia pravda, October 6, 1960, 2. 108. “Sovetskii dzhaz zhdet svoikh kompozitorov,” Komsomolskaia pravda, December 25, 1960, 4.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 155–159
109. P. Koriagin, “Shtany v piatom aspekte,” Izvestiia, October 12, 1960, 6. 110. A. I. Markov, “Obshchestvennost’ Kuibyshevskogo raiona g. Moskvy v bor’be s narusheniiami sovetskoi zakonnosti i pravil sotsialisticheskogo obshche zhitiia,” Sovetskoe gosudartsvo i pravo, no. 10 (1960): 56. 111. Tat’ianicheva, “Verit’ liudiam—eto znachit . . . ,” 118. 112. Berman, Justice in the USSR, 287. 113. GARF, f. A-259, op. 42, d. 6518, l. 24. 114. Novopl’ianskii, “Pod maskoi druzhinnika,” 2. 115. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 342, l. 36. 116. V. Prival’skii and A. Spektorov, “Spravedlivyi, tovarishcheskii,” Iz vestiia, June 1, 1963, 4. 117. N. F. Kuznetsova, “Izuchenie i preduprezhdenie khuliganstva,” in Kri minologiia, ed. A. A. Gertsenzon (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1968), 441. 118. A Leningrad engineer reflected this view when he recommended that the authorities increase the print run of “entertaining literature,” such as Wilkie Collins’s The Moonstone (Lunnyi kamen’), claiming: “I can guarantee that the youth who occupies himself with reading this book will not loiter on the streets aimlessly.” GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4597, l. 46. 119. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 67, d. 9, l. 143. 120. GARF, f. 5451, op. 24, d. 1543, ll. 104–105, 246. 121. GARF, f. A-577, op. 1, d. 117, l. 56. 122. RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 626, l. 44. 123. Ibid. 124. Edward Crankshaw, Russia without Stalin: The Emerging Pattern (New York: Viking Press, 1956), 100, 104. Harrison Salisbury, the New York Times reporter in Moscow, noted the centrality of boredom to life in the Soviet Union, declaring that it was the young people’s “central concern.” Harrison Salisbury, A New Russia? (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 13. 125. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 906, l. 26. 126. “In the last couple of years our people have more free time,” a justice noted at a 1964 Supreme Court Plenum, “but not everybody knows how to spend this free time wisely. Free time . . . is frequently spent playing games of chance and drinking rather than planting trees in the courtyards (dvory), building sporting grounds, or playing sports.” GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 418, ll. 112–113. 127. For a thorough examination of leisure culture in the Khrushchev era, see Gleb Tsipursky, “Pleasure, Power, and the Pursuit of Communism: StateSponsored Youth Popular Culture in the Soviet Union, 1945–1968” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2011). 128. See the description of the activities of the Leningrad Palace of Pioneers in Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 135. 129. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 8, d. 674, l. 15. 130. GARF, f. 5451, op. 24, d. 1543, ll. 104–105, 246. 131. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 118. 132. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 906, l. 26. 133. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4011, l. 455. In addition, for-profit pricing policies called into question the status of the workers’ club as a site of cultured leisure
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 159–162
251
for the masses. A man from Kuibyshev wrote to the Central Committee that the clubs and houses of culture were concerned foremost with “commercial goals” rather than with the moral education or vospitanie of the workers. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI), f. 5, op. 30, d. 409, l. 115. 134. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 400, l. 180. 135. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4011, l. 455. Many clubs, such as the club of the Red Aksai factory in the city of Rostov on the Don, found themselves under attack for being “refuges for hooligans.” For more on this club, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 906, l. 26. 136. For example, the average construction worker in 1955 spent 71 rubles on vodka, wine, and tobacco and 29 rubles on theater and movie tickets, books, magazines, newspapers, sporting equipment, musical instruments, cameras, and radios. RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 128, l. 108. 137. Illustrating the centrality of alcohol to everyday life, a worker from Ufa insisted: “Without wine the people cannot live. People have their joys and their pains. People are born. They die. They get married. They celebrate holidays and all of this is accompanied by alcohol.” For this letter, see RGANI, f. 5, op. 32, d. 26, l. 46. 138. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4032, l. 154. 139. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 343, l. 139. 140. Ibid., l. 162. 141. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 348, l. 70. 142. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 343, l. 162. 143. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 348, l. 64. 144. On December 15, 1958, the Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers released the decree “On Strengthening the Struggle against Drunken ness and Bringing Order to the Sale of Strong Alcoholic Beverages.” For more on the Khrushchev anti-alcohol campaign, see V. V. Nagaev, Chelovek i alkogol’: sotsiologicheskie aspekty (Syktyvkar, Russia: Syktyvkarskii gosudarstvennyi uni versitet, 1994), 43–44; Stephen White, Russia Goes Dry: Alcohol, State, and Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 59; and Boris Segal, The Drunken Society: Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism in the Soviet Union (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990), 78–79. For information on alcohol output and the liquor industry, see Vladimir Treml, Alcohol in the USSR: A Statistical Study (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1982). 145. GARF, f. 9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 85. 146. Ibid. 147. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4032, l. 86. 148. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 405, l. 10. 149. Ibid., l. 2. 150. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 465, l. 68. 151. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 405, l. 2. 152. This remark was made about the Primor’e region. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 410, l. 4. 153. “If, for example, in the Ukraine . . . the making of any type of home made alcohol is dealt with in the criminal system,” the Ukraine SSR complained to the USSR Supreme Soviet, “then in some other republics these questions are
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 163–166
decided in some way that, it seems to us, does not correspond with the law.” GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 120, ll. 322, 338–339. 154. Ibid. 155. Deborah Field, Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia (New York: Peter Lang, 2007); and Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 208–212. 156. Catriona Kelly, Refining Russia: Advice Literature, Polite Culture, and Gender from Catherine to Yeltsin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 321–340. 157. Field, Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia. For the Party’s intrusive concern with family life in the High Stalinist and Khrushchev eras, see Edward Cohn, “Sex and the Married Communist: Family Troubles, Marital Infidelity, and Party Discipline in the Postwar USSR, 1945–64,” Russian Review, no. 3 (2009): 429–450. 158. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3, d. 318, l. 21. The Tula region prosecutor reported: “One of the main causes of hooliganism is the low level of educ ational and cultural (vospitanie) work among the workers. No leisure activities are organized for the workers and this leads to drinking and to the commission of hooligan ism.” GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 979, ll. 159–160. 159. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 453, l. 27. 160. For more on the shortcomings of the vospitaleli, see GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5665, l. 135; and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 8, d. 674, ll. 17, 67. 161. GARF, f. A-577, op. 1, d. 117, l. 43. 162. A letter writer from the Primor’e region wrote to the USSR Supreme Soviet that in “every case of a crime [by a juvenile under 16 years of age] . . . both the child and his parents or guardians should be held legally responsible.” For this letter, see GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 347, l. 209. A pensioner from Groznyi wrote to the Central Committee that holding deadbeat parents legally respon sible for the outcome of their childrearing would make them “care about the upbringing (vospitanie) of their children.” For this letter, see RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 470, l. 204. Critics argued that poor parenting and parental neglect forced the state to rely on ineffective law enforcement techniques to defeat a deviance that began at home. An anonymous letter to the USSR Supreme Soviet proclaimed: “We would not need such a stupid law if children had parents who were more responsible to the state for the upbringing (vospitanie) of their children.” For this letter, see GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 342, l. 105. 163. The police and prosecutor of Khar’kov advocated fining the parents of juvenile criminals from 100 to over 500 rubles for poor parenting and bad upbringing (vospitanie). For more information, see GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4061, l. 10. Workers in Leningrad’s Fruzenskii district suggested to the Procuracy that parents of hooligans be fined 1,000 rubles. For their letter, see GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4597, l. 51. 164. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 347, l. 129. 165. GARF, f. A-358, op. 26, d. 297, l. 25. 166. RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 312, l. 13. 167. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45a, d. 304, l. 166.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
Notes to pages 166–171
253
168. For information about the pronatalist 1944 Family Law, see Mie Nakachi, “N. S. Khrushchev and the 1944 Soviet Family Law: Politics, Reproduction, and Language,” East European Politics and Society, no. 1 (2006): 40–68. 169. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3, d. 338, ll. 332–333; and GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 346, l. 241. 170. Ibid. 171. For the draft Central Committee letter to Party organizations “On Serious Shortcomings in the Vospitanie of Children,” see Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1958, vol. 2, 114–122.
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Chapter 5. The Rise and Fall of the Soft Line on Petty Crime 1. The use of the term soft line was inspired by Sheila Fitzpatrick’s essay on cultural policy in the 1920s, “The Soft Line on Culture and its Enemies,” in Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 91–114. Despite my use of the same term, however, I am using it to describe a different policy area during a different period in Soviet history. 2. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., “Criminalization and Decriminalization in Soviet Criminal Policy, 1917–1941,” Law and Society Review, no. 1 (1981–1982): 9–44. 3. Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 143. For more information on poruka, see H. W. Dewey and A. M. Kleimola, “Russian Collective Consciousness: The Kievan Roots,” The Slavonic and East European Review, no. 2 (1984): 180–191. 4. For more information on the thief and his post-Congress life, see Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 146–151. 5. Tretii s’ezd pisat elei SSSR: stenog rafic heskii otchet (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1959), 25. 6. For more on Makar enko, see Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 90–97, 102–119, 200–212; and James Bowen, Soviet Education: Makarenko and the Years of Experiment (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962). 7. The conviction that every criminal was reformable and capable of being saved for socialism became orthodoxy. One unlucky Moscow lawyer was subject to a formal censure for telling a colleague that “There are pathological people who are completely unreformable. . . . Such people should be given the most severe punishments.” In its censure, the Moscow College of Lawyers wrote that the statement was “completely at odds with the policy [liniia] and practice of punishment and contradicts Marxist teachings.” TsMAM, f. 493, op. 1, d. 420, l. 22. 8. Seemingly every instance in which the Soviet system was described as humane was recorded and reported to central elites. The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs reported to high-level Central Committee members that, on an August 1959 visit to Butyrka prison, American activists from the National Council on American-Soviet Relations “were amazed above all by the humane ( gumannyi ) relationship of the guards to the prisoners.” RGANI, f. 5, op. 30,
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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254
Notes to pages 171–174
d. 312, l. 96. The MVD also made certain to report then-governor of New York Averell Harriman’s approving remarks during a visit to a corrective labor camp in the Moscow region in May 1959. When showed the rooms where inmates could visit with their wives and children, the report recorded that Harriman “judged it as humane.” Ibid., l. 38. The MVD also kept note of similar reactions from Soviet citizens. The USSR Minister of Internal Affairs reported reactions of prisoners to Khrushchev’s Writers’ Congress speech. They were careful to quote the prisoners’ use of the word “humane” in their response to the policy statement. One prisoner was reported to have declared about Khrushchev’s speech: “It is a great reward to us, the highest form of humaneness (gumannost’).” GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 506, l. 236. Another prisoner was reported as thanking the Soviet government for its “magnanimity and humanism ( gumanizm).” Ibid. A prisoner in the Moscow region was heard saying that “the meeting of Khrushchev with the former thief was an act of justice and humanism (gumanost’) on the part of our government.” RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 312, l. 63. 9. For the importance of both humanism and Beccaria to another promin ent Russian reformer, Catherine II, see Isab el de Madariaga, Catherine the Great: A Short History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 28, 30. 10. Incomplete information suggests that hooliganism convictions de creased in all union republics of the USSR during the 1959 to 1960 period. For more information, see GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 95, l. 5. 11. Ibid., l. 2. The drop in hooligan convictions was not matched by increases in convictions for banditry and simple assault, two crimes that often acted as surrogates for hooliganism. In 1960, only 179 people throughout the USSR were convicted of banditry, representing a 59 percent decrease from 1959 figures. The percentage of those convicted of simple assault (menee tiazhkie telesnye povrezhdeniia) fell 24 percent from 1959 to 1960. 12. V. Shaposhnikov, “Mnogoobrazny puti bor’by s perezhitkami,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 12 (1959): 54. 13. Ibid. 14. A typical claim of virtual victory can be seen in the Perm’ region’s report of a 69 percent drop in registered cases of hooliganism during 1959. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 457, l. 35. 15. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 44, l. 5. 16. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 351, ll. 25–26. 17. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 465, l. 38. Yet rather than stopping this practice, the Saratov regional Party committee reported in 1960 that 3,000 people were transferred to comrades’ courts without having formal charges filed against them and, hence, without ever appearing on crime registries. RGANI, f. 13, op. 1, d. 770, l. 11. 18. RGANI, f. 13, op. 1, d. 769, ll. 20, 140. 19. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 335, l. 27. 20. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6670, ll. 61–62. 21. V. Titov and Z. Iur’ev, “100 interv’iu s khuliganami,” Krokodil, no. 34 (1961): 6. 22. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6670, ll. 30–31, 35. 23. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 347, ll. 227–228.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 175–178
255
24. For the Larionov scandal, see William Tompson, Khrushchev: A Political Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 214–215; and Roy Medvedev and Zhores Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power (New York: Columbia Uni versity Press, 1976), 96, 99–100. 25. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 322, l. 4. V. V. Kriukov, a member of the RSFSR Supreme Court, remarked before a June 1960 Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court that many collectives were wrongly petitioning courts on behalf of people who had committed serious crimes. The prosecutor of the Omsk region likewise noted that when the practice of remanding crimin als to their collec tives for reform was first broached, many directors and labor collectives wrongly sent petitions for peer reform on behalf of dangerous criminals and that local prosecutors did nothing to stop this. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 492, l. 3. The prosecutor of the Tula region also complained that local judges were illegally dropping the cases of recidivists and dangerous criminals and sending these people to the collectives for reform. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 1278, l. 14. 26. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 977, l. 183. 27. Ibid., l. 13. 28. The petition argued that “he admitted a mistake in his internship ( prakti cheskaia rabota), but it would be unreasonable to deprive him of freedom.” GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6669, l. 143. 29. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6456, l. 121. 30. The Altai regional court, for example, estimated that 40 percent of the petitions for peer reform that collectives sent the courts were “groundless.” GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 977, ll. 12–13. 31. According to information from 50 RSFSR regional governments, the USSR Procuracy reported that courts accepted 91 percent of the soft-line petitions that obshchestvennost’ submitted in 1959. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 335, l. 74. 32. In especially egregious cases of oversight, local courts granted a soft-line sentence to a malicious hooligan who had shot a woman in the back during a street corner rampage and a man who had committed murder “from base motives.” GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 333, ll. 28–29; and GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 335, l. 47. 33. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 465, l. 20. 34. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 322, l. 3. 35. Ibid. 36. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 213. 37. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 322, l. 7. 38. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 465, ll. 9–10. 39. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 351, l. 193. 40. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 335, l. 49. 41. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 346, l. 37. 42. The rate of recidivism for criminals who received conditional sentences and were transferred to workplaces in 1959 was given as only 1.1 percent, according to information released by 15 regional governments of the RSFSR. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 335, l. 75. 43. Ibid., l. 82. 44. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 322, l. 2.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 178–181
45. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 172. 46. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 977, l. 166. 47. Rather than being a matter for collective discussion, the Arkhangel’sk police sent local factory directors preprinted peer reform petitions and form letters indicating the collective’s desire to carry out reform and reeduc ation efforts and instructed them only to sign them and send them back. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 335, l. 74. 48. “Frequently there are cases,” the Vologda Regional College of Lawyers noted, “in which the friends and drinking buddies (sobutyl’niki) of the accused try to sway the collective and add any falsehood they can in order to save their friend.” GARF, f. A-577, op. 1, d. 118, l. 182. Influence peddling and manipula tion were so widespread that the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, at a 1960 Plenum, ordered local Komsomol organizations “to put an end to attempts by buddies (druzhki ), relatives, and acquaintances to save criminals from responsibility by subverting the opinion of the labor collective.” RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 101. 49. To secure the soft-lining of one of his workers, the director of a collective farm in the Kirov region forged a peer reform petition, complete with the signa tures of 1,055 collective farmers, asking the court to soft-line a man convicted of premeditated murder (GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6669, l. 143). In another example, the secretary of a local district executive committee talked the collective of the “Thirty-Six Years of October” cooperative (artel’) into taking his driver into its care even though this man had stolen 32,000 rubles from them. The cooperative’s petition asked the court “to give our comrade to the joint care ( poruka) of our collective, but if that is impossible, because of the severity of the crime that he has committed, then lighten his sentence.” GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 333, l. 137. 50. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 978, l. 97. 51. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6199, ll. 219–220. 52. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 333, l. 135. One worker, even though he had never returned to the factory collective to which he was originally transferred, committed another crime and the factory again petitioned for his soft-lining. Pondering the question of why a collective had petitioned the courts for the peer reform of a repeat offender the Procuracy responded: “The collective did not know him really well and they did it simply out of pity.” GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 335, l. 48. 53. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 160. The Vologda Regional College of Lawyers wrote to the RSFSR Council of Ministers: “Several collectives mis takenly consider that their workers are always innocent, whatever crime they may have committed. They think that it is necessary to rescue [their comrade] by any means.” GARF, f. A-577, op. 1, d. 118, l. 182. 54. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 465, l. 11. 55. For more on the criticism/self-criticism ritual in Soviet life, see J. Arch Getty, “Samokritika Rituals in the Stalinist Central Committee, 1933–1938,” Russian Review, no. 1 (1999): 49–70; and Alexei Kojevnikov, “Rituals of Stalinist Culture at Work: Science and the Games of Intra-Party Democracy circa 1948,” Russian Review, no. 1 (1998): 25–52. 56. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 465, l. 51.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 181–186
257
57. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 978, l. 57; and GARF, f. A-577, op.1, d. 118, l. 182. 58. Ibid. 59. In other instances, the offender’s crime itself “was never discussed” in the assembly, a move that destroyed the assembly’s anti-crime message and blunted the condemnatory and conversionary power of the meeting. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 977, l. 183. 60. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 333, l. 135. 61. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 465, l. 21. 62. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 977, l. 183. 63. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 465, l. 51. 64. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 493, l. 41. 65. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 171. 66. For example, a local prosecutor delayed transferring an unemployed man for a month and a half until he had found a job to whose collective his reform could then be entrusted. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 333, l. 104. 67. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 493, l. 41. 68. GARF, f. A-353, op. 13, d. 978, l. 97. 69. GARF, f. A-577, op. 1, d. 116, l. 212. 70. Ibid. 71. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 333, l. 104. In some cases, the labor collective refused to accept violent offenders back into their collective despite court orders that mandated them to their care. For example, a hooligan who had severely beaten a fellow collective farmer and was released by the court for reform and reeducation ( perevospitanie) was refused reentry to the farm by his fellow farmers. It turned out that the directors of the collective farm had never discussed the petition with the other collective farmers, but had just signed it themselves under pressure from the hooligan’s relatives. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6199, ll. 219–220. 72. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 351, l. 16. 73. GARF, f. 9547, op. 1, d. 1311, ll. 332–333. 74. The USSR Procuracy complained that “not all collectives” treat the process of petitioning for peer reform “with the necessary seriousness.” GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6456, l. 121. 75. In the city of Komsomol’sk, a work collective discussed eight hooligans during a smoking break. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5199, l. 132. 76. GARF, f. A-461, op. 11, d. 493, ll. 17, 41. 77. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 335, l. 47. 78. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6670, ll. 19, 30–31. 79. GARF, f. 9474, op. 10, d. 197a, l. 30. 80. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 351, l. 247. 81. GARF, f. 9474, op. 10, d. 197a, ll. 32–33. 82. GARF, f. 7523, op. 78, d. 1372, l. 10. 83. GARF, f. 9474, op. 10, d. 197a, l. 43. 84. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 347, l. 204. 85. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 344, l. 144. 86. GARF, f. 9474, op. 10, d. 197a, l. 36.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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258
Notes to pages 186–192
87. GARF, f. 9474, op. 10, d. 147, ll. 182–183. 88. GARF, f. 9474, op. 10, d. 197a, ll. 43–44. 89. GARF, f. 7523, op. 75, d. 1582, l. 211. 90. GARF, f. 9474, op. 10, d. 197a, ll. 32–33. 91. GARF, f. 9474, op. 10, d. 147, l. 198. 92. Ibid., l. 147. 93. Ibid., ll. 182–183. 94. RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 470, l. 216. 95. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 322, l. 7. 96. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 44, l. 28. 97. Ibid., l. 29. 98. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, ll. 214–215. 99. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 322, l. 8. 100. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45, d. 335, l. 45. 101. A leader in the Leningrad branch of Znanie declared before a conference on communist morality: “At one time there appeared a fashion among us to transfer criminals to their collectives for reform. Here is a hooligan on the trolley. The police arrest him and the court convicts him, but the enterprise intervenes and takes him under its reformative influence. This brought us great harm.” RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 171. 102. RGANI, f. 13, op. 1, d. 768, ll. 1–5. 103. GARF, f. 9492, op. 6, d. 44, l. 22. 104. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 6670, l. 53. 105. GARF, f. 9474, op. 1, d. 322, l. 5. 106. M. P. Rukodanova, “Ne davat’ poshchadu khuliganam!” Smena, no. 16 (1961): 16. 107. V. Gusev, “Etogo trebuet narod,” Smena, no. 17 (1961): 30. 108. Ibid. 109. “Zhizn’ i smert’ Grigor’eva,” Smena, no. 18 (1961): 22. 110. I. Grishanin, “Vdumchivo podkhodit’ k naznacheniiu nakazaniia,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 23 (1961): 3. 111. Ibid. 112. G. Anashkin, “Gumanizm sovetskogo zakona,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 24 (1961): 2. 113. Ibid. 114. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5206, l. 25. 115. GARF, f. 7523, op. 45a, d. 30, ll. 123–124. 116. GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 4031, ll. 92–93. 117. Yoram Gorlizki, “Policing Post-Stalin Society: The Militsiia and Public Order under Khrushchev,” Cahiers du monde russe, no. 2–3 (2003): 477–478. For more on the Novocherkassk Riot, see Samuel H. Baron, Bloody Saturday in the Soviet Union, Novocherkassk, 1962 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). 118. “Molodye stroiteli kommunizma, vysoko nesite znamia Lenina! Rech’ tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva na XIV s”ezda Komsomola 19 aprelia 1962 goda,” Pravda, April 21, 1962, 2.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 192–197
259
119. Quoted in Anashkin, “Gumanizm sovetskogo zakona,” 3. 120. For information on the decree allowing the distribution of rubber trun cheons, tear gas, and handcuffs, see RGANI, f. 13, op. 2, d. 435, ll. 55–56. For the RSFSR MVD order on arming units with rubber truncheons, see ibid., ll. 57–59. For the RSFSR MVD instructions specifying how the rubber truncheons are to be used, see ibid., ll. 63–64. 121. Ibid., ll. 57–59. 122. Ibid., ll. 63–64. 123. Ibid., ll. 68–69. 124. Ibid., l. 73. 125. An engineer, at a similar meeting, closed his remarks by stating: “It would be good to carry out some public shootings of the more inveterate hooli gans.” Ibid. 126. Ibid., l. 70. 127. Ibid., l. 74. 128. Ibid., l. 74. 129. The secretary of a factory Party cell in Vladivostok exclaimed: “We are building communism and we speak out strongly against the use of rubber trun cheons and handcuffs.” After being strongly criticized at the meeting, the Party secretary withdrew his earlier objections and supported the armament policy. Ibid., l. 71. 130. At a meeting at a riverboat station, four workers expressed their dis sent: “It is impossible to introduce truncheons because not every policeman can be trusted to use them properly.” Ibid. 131. Ibid., ll. 82–84. 132. Ibid., l. 80. 133. Ibid., ll. 80–82. The 1965 MOOP RSFSR report stated that police used their truncheons incorrectly in only 47 cases (less than 1 percent of cases). The report did not elaborate on the punishment handed out to the errant policemen. 134. For more on Khrushchev’s anti-parasite campaign, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Social Parasites: How Tramps, Idle Youth, and Busy Entrepreneurs Impeded the Soviet March to Communism,” Cahiers du monde russe, no. 1–2 (2006): 377– 408; Harold Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cam bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 291–298; Leon Lipson, “The Future Belongs to . . . Parasites?” Problems of Communism, no. 3 (1963): 1–9; Leon Lipson, “Hosts and Pests: The Fight against Parasites,” in The Soviet Politic al System, ed. R. Cornell (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970), 323–332; R. Beerman, “The Parasites Law,” Soviet Studies, no. 2 (1961): 191–205; and Russell E. Burford, “Getting the Bugs Out of Socialist Legality: The Case of Joseph Brodsky and a Decade of Soviet Anti-Parasite Legislation,” The American Journal of Comparative Law, no. 3 (1974): 465–508. 135. For this and many other striking insights, see Stephen Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow’s Arbat (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 1–18. 136. For more on the uproar over the 1962 Manezh exhibit, see Priscilla Johnson and Leopold Labedz, eds., Khrushchev and the Arts: The Polit ics of Soviet
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 198–201
Culture, 1962–1964 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965); Nina Moleva, Manezh god 1962 (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1989); and Ernst Neizvestnyi, Govorit Neizvestnyi (Moscow: Rossiiskoe filosofskoe obshchestvo, 1992). 137. For more information on the expansion of the death penalty, see Leon Lipson, “Execution: Hallmark of Socialist Legality,” Problems of Communism, no. 5 (1962): 21–25; Ger Van Den Berg, “The Soviet Union and the Death Penalty,” Soviet Studies, no. 2 (1983): 54–74; and R. Beerman, “Capital Punishment,” in Encyclopedia of Soviet Law, ed. F. J. M. Feldbrugge, vol. 1 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1973), 93–94.
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Conclusion 1. A. F. Afanas’ev and Iu. V. Galkin, Rossiisskaia militsiia: kratkaia khronika, oktiabr’ 1917–2000 (Saratov, Russia: Saratovskii iuridicheskii institut, 2001), 131. 2. “Ob usilenii otvetstvennosti za khuliganstvo,” Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 30 (1966): 582–586. For information on the implementation of this decree in the RSFSR, see GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 522, ll. 1–18. 3. For the genesis of the 1966 anti-hooligan decree, see Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Criminologists and Criminal Policy: Specialists in Policy-Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 81–90. 4. See Peter H. Juviler, Revolutionary Law and Order: Polit ics and Social Change in the USSR (New York: Free Press, 1976), 84. 5. For the use of truncheons, see Andrei Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Sib eria, trans. Mania Harari and Max Hayward (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970). 6. “Ob usilenii otvetstvennosti za khuliganstvo,” 584. 7. In the RSFSR, the number of convictions for hooliganism increased 128 percent, increasing from 77,359 convictions in 1965 to 176,734 in 1966. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 522, l. 2. 8. For information on the post-1966 petty hooligan campaign in the RSFSR, see GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 498, ll. 1–29; and GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 514, ll. 1–33. 9. See V. M. Suslov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov vnutrennikh del s serediny 50-kh do nachala 80-kh godov,” in Politsiia i militsiia Rossii: stranitsy istorii, ed. A. V. ich, A. N. Dugin, and A. Ia. Malygin (Moscow: Nauka, 1995), 282. Vladimirov 10. See the decree “O poriadke primeneniia ukaza Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ot 26 iiulia 1966 goda ‘Ob usilenii otvetstvennosti za khuliganstvo’” Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 30 (1966): 587. 11. G. S. Sark is ov, Pred up rezhd en ie naru s hen ii obshc hestv enn ogo pori a dka (Erevan, Armenia: Aiastan, 1972), 24. 12. “O poriadke primeneniia Ukaza Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ot 26 iiulia 1966 goda ‘Ob usilenii otvetstvennosti za khuliganstvo,’” 587. 13. For more on the role of obshchestvennost’, see R. S. Mulukaev and N. N. Kartashov, Militsiia Rossii: istoriko-pravovoi ocherk, 1917–1993 (Orel, Russia: Oka, 1995), 173–175. 14. For the practicality of Brezhnev in comparison with Khrushchev, see Juviler, Revolutionary Law and Order, 86.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 202–204
261
15. See Sbornik dokumentov po istorii ugolovnogo zakonodatel’stva SSSR i RSFSR, 1953–1991 (Kazan, Russia: Izdatel’stvo kazanskogo universiteta, 1992), 91. 16. See GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 498, l. 34; GARF, f. 9474, op. 32, d. 21, l. 22; GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 514, l. 28; and A. A. Gertsenzon, Ugolovnoe pravo i sotsio logiia (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1970), 92. 17. Out of these observations, a new subfield of family criminology was born that explored the connection between domestic disorder and deviant behavior. For information on “family criminology,” see D. A. Shestakov, Semei naia kriminologiia: sem’ia, konflikt, prestuplenie (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo S-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 1996). 18. Peter H. Solo m on, Jr., “Crimi n ali zat ion, Dec rimi n ali zat ion, and Post-Communist Transition: The Case of the Russian Federation” (Paper pre pared for the symposium “Building Justice in European Transitions: Processes of Criminalization within Newly Emerging Democratic Societies” University of Stirling, Scotland, December 10–11, 2009), 10–11. In 1997, Russia’s anti-hooligan legislation was changed so that only acts involving “light body blows” and “minor” injuries to the victim would be considered as hooliganism. These changes were meant to exclude mere drunk and disorderly conduct from being classified as hooliganism. Later, starting from 2003, Russia’s criminal code defi nition of hooliganism was changed so that only “crude violations of public order” using “a weapon or an object used as a weapon” could be tried as hooli ganism. This last change produced a drop in Russia’s hooligan convictions from 114,052 in 2003 to 24,810 in 2004, a 459.7 percent reduction. I would like to thank Peter Solomon for sharing his insights with me about the shifting defini tion of post-communist hooliganism and for allowing me to read and cite his unpublished paper on this topic. 19. N. Popova and A. Riskin, “Craniocerebral Resolution,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, April 1, 2004, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, no. 13 (2004): 14. 20. K. Filatov, “Just Ordinary Close-Cropped Young People,” Vremia novostei, September 20, 2004, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, no. 38 (2004): 15. 21. V. Matveev, “Murder of Young Tajik Girl Serves as Wake-Up Call to Authorities,” Vremia novostei, February 11, 2004, in Current Digest of the PostSoviet Press, no. 6 (2004): 6. 22. Salimjon Aioubov and Bruce Pannier, “Verdict in Trial of Tajik Girl’s Murder Shocks Public,” Radio Free Liberty/Radio Europe, March 23, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/03/1b581aac-d61d-40f5-859996e220df54e1.html/ (accessed March 24, 2006). 23. T. Lokshina, ed., Nationalism, Xenophobia and Intolerance in Contemporary Russia (Moscow: Moscow Helsinki Group, 2002), 16, 176. 24. Popova and Riskin, “Craniocereb ral Resolution,” 14. 25. For the case of a man who was charged with hooliganism for telling a Mongolian train conductor that “the Chinese have become worse than the Americans,” see RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 429, l. 2. 26. “Russian authorities still do not regard ethnically based crimes as a problem of national scope,” an article on extremist viol ence observed. “They prefer to downplay them as ordinary, run-of-the-mill hooliganism.” Filatov, “Just Ordinary Close-Cropped Young People,” 15.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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262
Notes to pages 204–206
27. For an example, see Liudmila Alekseeva, Istoriia inakomysliia v SSSR (New York: Khronika Press, 1984), 339. 28. For information on the man who was arrested for petty hooliganism for ripping up a picture of Lukashenko at an anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, see United States Department of State, “Country Report on Human Rights Pract ices 2000: Bela rus,” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/ eur/682.htm (accessed October 2, 2011). For information on the use of petty hooliganism to detain demonstrators protesting the 2006 presidential elections, see Vince Crawley, “US, Europe Call for Release of Jailed Belarus Protestors,” Bela rus News and Analy s is, http://www.data.minsk.by/bela r usn ews/ 032006/441.html (accessed March 22, 2012). 29. Sherry Ricchiardi, “Under Siege,” American Journalism Review, http:// www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=806 (accessed March 22, 2012). 30. For information on the Babitksii incident, see V. Maksimov, “Ban on a Profession?” Novye Izvestiia, September 3, 2004, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, no. 35 (2004): 8. 31. Alexander Bratersky, “Irate Cops Jail Rapper for Hooliganism,” The Moscow Times, August 4, 2010. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/ article/irate-cops-jail-rapper-for-hooliganism/411638.html (accessed August 6, 2010). 32. Sof’ia Doronina, “Sergei Sobianin nameknul zhelaiushchim protestovat’ na khuliganstvo,” Firstnews.ru, March 1, 2012. http://www.firstnews.ru/news/ society/palatka-nomer-nol/ (accessed March 18, 2012). The word “Maidan” derives from the Ukrainian for Independence Square (Maidan nezalezhnosti) and is used in Russian discourse to refer to the mass protests of the Orange Revolu tion, especially the occupation of public space through tent cities. 33. Timur Rakhimov, “Pussy Riot zaderzhali za khuliganstvo,” Utro.ru, March 4, 2012. http://www.utro.ru/articles/2012/03/04/1032429.shtml (ac cessed March 16, 2012). Pussy Riot has held unauthorized performances on Red Square, outside of a prison, and in a subway station; has openly called for an Arab Spring–style movement in Russia; and has mocked Putin for being scared of the people. 34. Aleksandr Boiko, “Obnazhivshiesia na vyborakh feministki nakazany za khuliganstvo,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, March 4, 2012. http://kp.ru/online/ news/1097881 (accessed March 20, 2012). FEMEN has achieved global notoriety for taking off their clothes and protesting seemingly any and all issues, from sex tourism and the lack of public toilets in Kiev to Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and the use of anorexic models in fashion shows. 35. The arrested “petty hooligan,” Aleksei Vorsin, is a blogger and out spoken local advocate for “honest elections.” For information on this case, see “Organizatora fleshmoba v Khabarovske zaderzhali za to, chto musoril tsvetami,” Komsomol’skaia Pravda, March 11, 2012. http://hab.kp.ru/daily/ 25848.5/2818342/ (accessed March 25, 2012). 36. Julie A. Corwin, “Are Soccer Hooligans Being Used by the Kremlin?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 19, 2005. http://www.rferl.org/ featuresarticle/2005/9/E107C9F7-58E0-48E9-9112-31A1B90C0DAB.html/ (ac cessed September 20, 2005).
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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Notes to pages 206–207
263
37. The National Bolsheviks are a radical youth movement created in 1994 by counterculture icon and underground author Eduard Limonov, Eurasianist politic al ideologue Aleksandr Dugin, and rock musicians Egor Levtov and Sergei Kurikhin. The movement has a self-proclaimed membership of around 30,000 to 50,000 and has a substantial presence in the provinces as well as in the two capitals. For more information on the National Bolshevik Party and Eduard Limonov, see Markus Mathyl, “The National Bolshevik Party and Arctogaia: Two Neo-Fascist Groupuscules in the Post-Soviet Space,” Patterns of Prejudice, no. 3 (2002): 62–76; Vladimir Sapon, “Apostles of the Other Russia: Mikhail Bakunin and Eduard Limonov on Paths of Radical Social Transformation,” Russian Politics and Law, no. 6 (2005): 43–61; and Alexander Verkhovsky, “UltraNationalists at the Onset of Putin’s Rule,” Nationalities Papers, no. 4 (2000): 707–722. 38. For Khrushchev’s infamous United Nations shoe-banging incident, see William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and his Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 475–476, 657–658. For Yeltsin’s drunken conducting and other incidents, see Leon Aron, Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 344–348, 575. On Zhirinovsky, see Sergei Kibalnik, Zhirinovsky as a Nationalist Kitsch Artist (Washington, DC: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 1996); and Graham Frazer and George Lancelle, Absolute Zhirin ovsky: A Trans parent View of the Distinguished Russian Statesman (New York: Penguin Books, 1994). 39. For Zhirinovsky being investigated for hooliganism, see “Zhirinovsky Faces Criminal Investigation for Hooliganism,” BBC News Online, March 18, 1998. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/66655.stm (accessed October 2, 2011). 40. For his stunt, seven members of the National Bolsheviks were charged with malicious hooliganism. For more information, see O. Kashin, “The Sickle and Violence Everywhere,” Kommersant, December 18, 2004, 1, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, no. 51 (2004): 5–6; V. Perekrest, “I Hate You, Bolsheviks! Prosecutor Shouts at Mothers of Convicted NBP Members,” Izvestiia, December 21, 2004, 1, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, no. 51 (2004): 6. For Limonov’s own description of the “storming” of the Ministry of Health, see Eduard Limo nov, “You Can Kiss Your Tzar [sic] on His Ass!” NBP-INFO, http://nazbol .cc/2004/09/kiss-your-tzar-on-his-ass/ (accessed March 22, 2012). 41. The Nat ional Bolshev iks also hit Mik hail Gorb ac hev and P rince Charles in the face with flowers. For more on the National Bolsheviks and their “velvet terror,” see Victor Yasmann, “National Bolsheviks: The Party of Direct Action,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 29, 2005, http://www.rferl .org/content/article/1058689.html (accessed October 2, 2011). 42. Ira Iosebashvili, “Putin Calls US Monetary Policy ‘Hooliganism,’” The Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO20110420–707680.html (accessed June 20, 2011).
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
Copyright © 2012. University of Wisconsin Press. All rights reserved. LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:52:52.
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State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii) Fond A-259: Council of Ministers of the Russian Republic (Sovet ministrov RSFSR) Fond A-353: Ministry of Justice of the Russian Republic (Ministerstvo iustitsii RSFSR) Fond A-385: Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic (Verkhovnyi Sovet RSFSR) Fond A-428: Supreme Court of the Russian Republic (Verkhovnyi sud RSFSR) Fond A-461: Procuracy of the Russian Republic (Prokuratura RSFSR) Fond A-577: Juridical Commission of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Republic (Iuridicheskaia komissiia pri Sovete Ministrov RSFSR) Fond R-5451: A ll-Union Cent ral Counc il of Trade Uni ons (Vses oiuzn yi tsentral’nyi sovet professional’nykh soiuzov) Fond R-7523: Supreme Soviet of the USSR (Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR) Fond R-8131: Procuracy of the USSR (Prokuratura SSSR) Fond R-9401: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Ministerstvo vnutrennykh del SSSR) Fond R-9415: The Main Police Administration of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Glavnoe upravlenie militsii Ministerstva vnutrennykh del SSSR) Fond R-9474: Supreme Court of the USSR (Verkhovnyi sud SSSR) Fond R-9492: Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Ministerstvo iustitsiia SSSR) Fond R-9547: All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge (Vsesoiuznoe obshchestvo Znanie)
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Central Municipal Archive of the City of Moscow (TsMAM) (Tsentral’nyi munitsipal’nyi arkhiv g. Moskvy) Fond 493: Presidium of the Moscow City College of Defense Lawyers (Prezidium Moskovskoi gorodskoi kollegii zashchitnikov) Fond 1078: People’s Courts of the Soviet District (Narodnye sudy Sovetskogo raiona) Fond 1918: People’s Courts of the Dzerzhinsk District (Narodnye sudy Dzer zhinskogo raiona) Fond 2842: Procuracy of the City of Moscow (Prokuratura g. Moskvy) Russian State Archive of Recent History (RGANI) (Rossiiskii gosud arstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii) Fond 2: Transcripts and Accompanying Materials of the Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Steno grammy i materialy Plenumov TsK KPSS) Fond 5: Institutional Apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Apparat TsK KPSS) Fond 13: Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Biuro TsK KPSS po RSFSR) Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE) (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki ) Fond 7733: Ministry of Finance of the USSR (Ministerstvo finansov SSSR) Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii) Fond M-1: All-Union Leninist League of Communist Youth (Vsesoiuznyi Leninskii kommunisticheskii soiuz molodezhi) Copyright © 2012. University of Wisconsin Press. All rights reserved.
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LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:53:00.
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Baldaev, D. S., V. K. Belko, and I. M. Isupov. Slovar’ tiuremno-lagerno-blatnogo zhargona. Moscow: Kraia Moskvy, 1992. . Slovar’ blatnogo vorovskogo zhargona v dvukh tomakh. Moscow: Kompana, 1997. . Tatuirovki zakliuchennykh. St. Petersburg: Limbus Press, 2001. Burchfield, R. W., ed. A Supplement to The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. 2. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1976. Dal’, V. I. Tolkovyi slovar’ zhivogo velikorusskogo iazyka. St. Petersburg: M. O. Vol’f, 1909. Dubiagin, Iu. P., and E. A. Teplitskii. Kratkii anglo-russkii i russkii-angliiskii slovar’ ugolovnogo zhargona. Moscow: Terra terra, 1993. McMahon, Sean, and Jo O’ Donog hue. Brewer’s Dictionary of Irish Phrase and Fable. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004. Partridge, Eric. A Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English. New York: Routledge, 1984. Rawson, Hugh. Wicked Words: A Treasury of Curses, Insults, Put-Downs, and Other Formerly Unprintable Terms from the Anglo-Saxon Times to the Present. New York: Crown, 1989. Slovar’ sovremennogo russkogo literat urnogo iazyka. Moscow: Nauka, 1965. Vavi lov, S. I., ed. B ol’shaia sov etsk aia ents iklopediia. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1949–1958. Volin, B. M., and D. N. Ushakov, eds. Tolkovyi slovar’ russkogo iazyka. Moscow: Gosu d arstv enn oe i zdatel’stvo inn ost ran ykh i n atsional’nykh slov ar ei, 1940.
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LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:53:00.
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LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:53:00.
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LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:53:00.
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Kozlov, V. A. Massovye besporiadki v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve. Novosi birsk, Russia: Sibirskii khronograf, 1999. Kucherov, Samuel. The Organs of Soviet Administration of Justice: Their History and Operation. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970. Lemon, Alaina. Between Two Fires: Gypsy Performance and Romani Memory from Pushkin to Postsocialism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000. Lewin, Moshe. The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. Lipson, Leon. “Execution: Hallmark of Socialist Legality.” Problems of Commu nism, no. 5 (1962): 21–25. . “The Function of Extrajudicial Mechanisms,” in D. W. Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967. . “The Future Belongs to . . . Parasites?” Problems of Communism, no. 3 (1963): 1–9. . “Hosts and Pests: The Fight against Parasites,” in R. Cornell, ed., The Soviet Political System. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970. Lokshina, T., ed. Nationalism, Xenophobia and Intolerance in Contemporary Russia. Moscow: Moscow Helsinki Group, 2002. Lovell, Stephen. The Shadow of War: Russia and the USSR, 1941 to the Present. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Mathyl, Markus. “The National Bolshevik Party and Arctogaia: Two Neo-Fascist Groupuscules in the Post-Soviet Space.” Patterns of Prejudice, no. 3 (2002): 62–76. McReynolds, Louise, and Joan Neuberger, eds. Imitations of Life: Two Centuries of Melodrama in Russia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002. Medvedev, Roy, and Zhores Medvedev. Khrushchev: The Years in Power. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. Moleva, Nina. Manezh god 1962. Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1989. Mulukaev, R. S., and N. N. Kartashov. Militsiia Rossii: istoriko-pravovoi ocherk. Orel, Russia: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’sko-poligraficheskoe predpriiatie Oka, 1995. Nagaev, V. V. Chelovek i alkogol’: sotsiologicheskie aspekty. Syktyvkar, Russia: Syktyvkarskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1994. Nakachi, Mie. “N. S. Khrushchev and the 1944 Soviet Family Law: Politics, Reproduction, and Language.” East European Politics and Society, no. 1 (2006): 40–68. . “Replacing the Dead: The Politics of Reproduction in the Postwar Soviet Union, 1944–1955.” PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2008. Neizvestnyi, Ernst. Govorit Neizvestnyi. Moscow: Rossiiskoe filosofskoe obshche stvo, 1992. Neuberger, Joan. “Culture Besieged: Hooliganism and Futurism,” in Stephen P. Frank and Mark D. Steinberg, eds., Cultures in Flux: Lower Class Values, Practices, and Resistance in Late Imperial Russia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1994. . Hooliganism: Crime, Culture and Power in St. Petersburg, 1900–1914. Berke ley: University of California Press, 1993.
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LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:53:00.
Index
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a bortion, 101 alcohol. See hooliganism: alcohol and Aleksanian, A. A., 176 Alma-Ata, 107 Altai region, 175, 194 Amalrik, Andrei, 89 anti-parasite campaign, 5, 15, 196, 198, 259n134 apartments. See domestic hooliganism: communal and separate apartments as sites of Arkhangel’sk, 194 Astrakhan, 151, 194 Babitskii, Andrei, 205 Baku, 127 Bashkir ASSR, 83 Belarus, 189, 204 Belgorod, 144–45, 161, 176 Beria, Lavrentii, 169, 188, 191 Berman, Harold, 135, 233n19, 245n26, 247n50 Beslan massacre, 203 Bittner, Stephen, 196 boarding schools, 167 Breslauer, George, 135 Briansk, 118 broken windows theory, 100–101
Butyrka prison, 118 byt, 15, 87, 90–91, 102, 231n112 cases of private complaint (dela chast nogo obvineniia), 86 Cent ral Comm itt ee Bur eau for the RSFSR, 189 Cheliabinsk, 141, 155, 157 Chicago School of Sociology, 6 childrearing. See hooliganism: faulty parenting and Cohen, Stanley, 6 Cold War, 17, 23, 98, 100, 102, 164 collectives. See hooligans: collectives and the rehabilitation of communal apartments. See domestic hooliganism: communal and separate apartments as sites of communist morality, 88, 97, 164. See also domestic hooliganism: commu nist morality and comrades’ courts: arbitrariness ( proiz vol) and, 16, 148–50, 248n84, 248– 49n91, 249n93; function of, 147; in act ivi ty of, 146; lack of guidi ng statute and, 148–49, 248n83; over burdened court system and, 136, 147; oversight of, 150, 248n86; petty
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LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:53:06.
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comrades’ courts (continued ) hool ig ani sm and, 128–29, 147, 243n177, 243n181, 247–48n79; public activism (obshchestvennost’) and, 15, 132–33, 169, 201; socialist legality and, 147–49, 248n87; softline campaign and, 188, 190 Crankshaw, Edward, 158 crime: drunkenness and, 20–21; dys functional families and, 94, 261n17; improper parenting and, 22; sta tistics on, 172–74; “survivals of the past” and, 19–20, 47–48, 94; un punished minor misbehavior and, 100; urbanization and, 22–23; vospi tanie and, 163–64; Western espio nage and, 20, 22 cursing. See petty hooliganism: foul language and Dagestan, 181 Dal’, Vladimir, 29 death penalty, 93, 197 de-Stalinization, 5–6, 10–11, 19, 23, 28, 96–97, 114, 130–31 Dobson, Miriam, 25, 213n18, 218n29, 218n31 Dombrovskii, Iurii, 89, 108–9, 117–19 domestic hooliganism: ambiguity en ables application of, 62–63, 67–68, 70–72, 75, 82, 95; child abuse and, 14, 59, 65, 72, 79–80, 89, 165; com munal and separate apartments as sites of, 59–60, 74–79, 81, 83–84, 90, 229n59; communist morality and, 88–89, 230–31n97; conceptions of the Soviet family and, 87–88; con troversy over ambiguous meaning of, 60–61, 71, 82, 226n4; criminolo gists and legal w orkers’ role in legitimization of, 64, 68–69, 71, 75– 76, 80, 89–90, 94, 227n18, 227n21; distinction between public affairs/ priv ate matt ers and, 60, 65, 67, 72, 75, 84, 87–91, 231n111; distinc tion between the individual and the collective and, 63, 66–68, 72;
Index dysfunctional pers onal relation ships and, 62, 64–66, 68–72, 85, 94; fami ly men as perp et rat ors of, 59–60, 89, 94; Narkomkhoz RSFSR and Nark om iust R SFSR’s 1935 circ ul ar on, 60–61; neighb ors as victims of, 60, 63–65, 70, 78–79, 85, 229n51; public/private spaces and, 14, 60–63, 73–74, 84, 87, 90; punish ments for, 92–93; rel uct ance to prosecute cases of, 70–71, 82, 85–87; RSFSR Criminal Code of 1960 and, 81–82; spousal abuse and, 14, 59– 60, 63, 66, 72, 80, 86–87, 89, 93–94, 227n14, 231n98, 231n112; USSR Supreme Court decree of April 1939 and, 61–62, 68–69, 228n30; USSR Supreme Court decree of March 1953 and, 69–72, 227n22, 228n28; USSR Sup reme Sov iet dec ree of August 1940 and, 61–62, 72–73, 76; victims’ role in legitimization of, 64, 77–80, 89–90, 94 dormitory guardian (vospitatel’), 165 drunkenness. See hooliganism: alcohol and druzhina: expansion of hooliganism and, 150–56; lack of supplies and, 145; nonexistence or inactivity of, 145–46; numbers of, 143, 247n53; protection of, 142, 246n49; public activism and, 15, 132–33, 169, 201, 219n36, 245n20, 247n56; public/ priv ate dist inct ion and, 155; re cruitment problems and, 143–45, 247n57; shami ng pract ices and, 151; violence and, 16, 136, 141–42, 190, 196, 201–2, 245n26, 246n44, 247n50 Dudorov, Nikolai, 128, 244n14 Durkheim, Emile, 11 Esen in, Sergei, 41 FEMEN, 206, 262n34 Filanovskii, I. G., 76 functionalist theory of deviance, 11
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:53:06.
Index
Gaidai, Leonid, 122 Gertsenzon, A. A., 84, 89 Gor’kii, 17, 83, 119, 122, 124–26, 151, 160, 231n98 Gorkin, Aleksandr, 82–83, 187–88 Gorlizki, Yoram, 136 Gorshenin, Konstantin, 236–37n59 Gorsuch, Anne, 213n18 Grebneva, Irina, 205 Gulag, 4, 24–25, 210n9, 219n38 gypsies, 5, 15, 243n186
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Hall, Stuart, 152 hool ig ani sm: alc oh ol and, 11–12, 20–21, 37–38, 45, 53, 151, 156–58, 160–61, 216n14, 225nn120–21, 251n137, 251n144, 252n158; ambi guity of, 28, 31–33, 151–52, 221n57; anti-hooligan campaigns as cause of, 26–27, 220n38; Art ic le 58 of fenses and, 215n28; ascribed iden tities and, 10; boredom and, 158–59, 250n124; campaign of 1966 against, 199–202; catchall nature of, 8–11, 28, 61, 63; collective farmers and, 12, 42–44; crimes of intimate vio lence and, 72; cultural performance categories and, 34, 39–40; cultured ness (kulturnost’) and, 37–38; do mestication of, 14, 59–60, 64, 72, 94, 202; everyday criminality and, 4, 8; factory directors and, 21, 164; factory dormitories and, 164–65; fashi on/s elf-presentation/style and, 34–39, 153, 222n89; f aulty parenting and, 21–22, 94, 165–67, 231n112, 252nn162–63; “gateway crimes” and, 100, 233n15; Gulag amnesty of 1953 and, 24–26, 217n29, 219n38; hate crime and, 203–4, 261nn25–26; hum anen ess ( gummanost’) and, 168, 170–71, 175–76, 185–87, 190–91, 253–54n8, 254n11, 254n14; juvenile delinquency and, 21–22, 46, 48–49, 238n78; late Impe rial per iod and, 7, 210n11, 212– 13n18; legal confusion surrounding,
27–28, 66–68; legal definitions of, 4, 28–34, 66, 68, 81–82, 200, 261n18; leis ure pract ices and, 21, 157– 58, 250n118, 250n126, 251n136, 252n158; livi ng stand ards and, 23–24; moral education (vospitan ie) and, 21–22, 156–57, 170, 252n158; motives of, 62, 64–69, 70–72, 81; number of people convicted of, 4, 17–19, 24–25, 41, 52–53, 103, 171–74, 189, 210n7, 218n33, 260n7; “off the books” punishments and, 50, 172– 74, 176, 189, 218n33, 233n12, 254n17; origins of word, 3, 28–29; political theater and, 206–7; popular music and, 41; popular understandings and representations of, 29–30, 33– 41; post-Communist political dis sent and, 203–6, 262n28, 262n35; p re-Khrushchev era camp aigns against, 168, 210–11n11, 212–13n18; publ ic disc ont ent over, 17–18; public paradigm of, 61–62, 72–74; puni shm ents for, 4, 29, 31–32, 100, 168, 200–201, 221n53, 233n10, 259n125; Putin era and, 202–7, 261n18; radios and, 95, 232n123; rec idi v ism and, 25, 50–52, 177; rough masculinity and, 12, 41, 44– 46; sexu al rel at ions and, 209n2; shaming practices and, 39, 120–21, 151, 166, 180, 182, 221n66; shifting definitions as a cause of, 24, 27–28; smoki ng and, 36–37, 39; socc er and, 3–4, 210n6; soft-line campaign a gainst, 168–99, 253n7, 255n25, 255nn31–32, 255n42, 256nn47– 49, 256nn52–55, 257n59, 257n66, 257n71, 257nn74–75, 258n101; spaces where committed, 59, 73–74, 83–84; “survivals of the past” and, 20, 94, 216n11; tattoos and, 38–39; teachers and, 21; time when com mitted, 157; urbanization and, 12, 22–23, 56–57, 217n21, 226n128 hooligans: age range of, 12, 22, 46–49, 223–24nn106–7; alleged cowardice
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:53:06.
278
hooligans (continued ) of, 135, 141; class identity of, 12–13, 42–44; collectives and the rehabili tation of, 16, 169, 178–84, 256n47; educational attainment of, 49–50, 224n110, 224n112; gender identity of, 44–46, 209n2, 223n100, 223n102, 223n104; Komsomol members as, 54–55, 225–26n124, 226n125; men tal illness and, 224n109, 238n78; Party members as, 54–55, 225n123; slang terms for, 39, 45, 220n47; as Soviet everyman, 40, 44, 50, 57–58; use of truncheons against, 191–98, 259n120, 259nn129–30 Iakimenko, A. N., 177 Iaroslavl’, 83 Il’ichev, Leonid, 90 Irkutsk, 175, 194 Ivanovo, 17, 67, 83, 119, 126, 166, 194, 231n98
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juvenile delinquency. See hooliganism: juvenile delinquency and Kaganovich, Lazar, 111 Kalinin, 84 Kaluga, 121, 125–26, 177, 194 Kamchatka, 194 Kas’ianov, Mikhail, 207 Kemer ovo, 179 Khabarovsk, 77, 141, 194, 206, 219n38 Kharkhordin, Oleg, 135–36 Khimki, 118 Khrushchev, Nikita: economic poli cies of, 23; obshchestvennost’ and, 132–33, 135; s oft-line camp aign and, 168–69, 193; Third Congress of Sov iet Write rs and, 170; UN s hoe-banging inc id ent and, 207, 263n38; use of force against hooli gans and, 140–41, 191–92; utopian ism and, 169–70, 175 Kirov, 149, 194 Komsomol, 20, 25, 54–55, 125, 127, 141, 152, 159, 188, 190–92, 219n36, 245n20
Index Koms om olsk aia p ravda (newsp aper), 122, 135, 152–53, 155, 157, 188 Kostroma, 183, 194, 231n98 Koten ochkin, Viacheslav, 36 Kozl ov, V. A., 7, 25, 213–14n18, 214n21, 217n29, 218nn31–32 Krasnodar, 177, 184 Krasnoiarsk, 146 Krokodil (satirical journal), 36, 39, 55, 59–60, 74, 77, 85, 94, 103, 109, 122, 133–34, 174 Kruglov, A. A., 100 Kruglov, Sergei, 134 Kuibyshev, 86, 88, 173, 192 Kursk, 173 Kuzn ets ova, N. F., 26–27, 76, 100, 216n11, 220n40, 233n15 labeling theory, 10 Larionov Affair, 175 lawyers, 183 leisure. See hooliganism: leisure prac tices and Lenin, Vladimir, 91, 210–11n11 Leningrad, 111–12, 119, 122, 124, 126, 139, 145, 151, 178, 184, 188 Liberal Democratic Party, 206 Limonov, Eduard, 206–7, 263n37 Literaturnaia gazeta (newspaper), 74, 137 Lombroso, Cesare, 163 Lublino, 83 Lukashenko, Aleksandr, 204, 262n28 Magnitogorsk, 187 Makarenko, Anton, 170 malicious hooliganism: ambiguity of, 31, 33, 221n54; communal apart ments and, 84; definition of, 31; in dividual cases of, 65, 67; number of people convicted of, 18, 171, 189; punishments for, 31, 99 Manezh exhibit, 197–98 melodrama, 79–80 Mezhdurechinsk, 146 Mikhalkov, Nikita, 207 Mironov, Nikolai, 174, 185 Mogilev, 161
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:53:06.
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Index
Molotov, 105 “Moral Code of the Builders of Com munism,” 164. See also communist morality moral edu c at ion. See hool ig ani sm: moral education (vospitan ie) and moral panic theory, 6–7, 22–23, 98 Mordovian ASSR, 89 Moscow, 78–79, 83, 86, 92, 105–7, 118, 122, 124, 137, 146, 149–50, 185, 195, 203, 205–6 Murmansk, 194, 231n98 arin’iani, Semen, 137–39, 245n27 N Nashi (youth group), 206 National Bolsheviks, 206–7, 263n37, 263nn40–41 Neo-nazis, 203–4 Neuberger, Joan, 7, 210n11, 212n18, 214nn19–20, 220n44, 220n46 Nikolaev, 155 Noize MC, 205 Novgorod, 177 Novocherkassk riot, 191–92, 197–98 Novosibirsk, 107, 126, 231n98 Nu pogodi (animated series), 36
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279
obshchestvennost’, 16, 33, 136, 140–44, 146–50, 156, 172, 177, 192, 197. See also comrades’courts; druzhina Odessa, 107 Ogonek ( journal), 153 Oktiabr’ (literary journal), 155 Omsk, 146 Orange Revolution, 205, 262n32 Orenburg, 173, 192–93, 195 palaces of culture, 158–59 parasites. See anti-parasite campaign patronage networks, 179 Perm’, 195 Peter the Great, 37 petty hooliganism: anti-hooligan cam paign of 1940 and, 97, 101–2, 129–30, 226n9, 234n20; “broken wind ows” pol ici ng and, 14–15, 100–101; catchall quality of, 15, 98, 102–3, 105–7, 109–14, 235n35,
236n40, 237n62; civilizing mission and, 98, 102, 130–31; compulsory labor and, 120–27, 201, 241n113, 241n124, 242n137, 242n167; comrades’ c ourts and, 128–29, 147, 243n177, 243n181, 247–48n79; cost of campaign against, 44, 126–29, 242nn169–70; definition of, 31–32, 102–3, 232n9, 236–37n59; domestic disorder and, 105, 107–9, 113–14, 116–17, 237–38n69; drunkenness and, 106–7, 240–41n111; druzhin niki and, 142; educational outreach and, 234–35n26, 235n28; fast-track puni shm ents and, 15, 115–18, 239n84; foul language and, 12, 32, 65, 67, 102, 105–6, 109, 112–13, 117, 235n30, 235n34; humaneness ( gumannost’) and, 101, 233nn18–19; numb er of peop le det ained for, 15, 103–4, 109, 115–16, 126, 171, 189, 219n37; punishments for, 14, 32, 99–100, 120, 128–29, 241n112, 241nn114–15, 243n184; recidivism and, 108–9, 236n54; repressive in tolerance and, 15, 97, 101–2, 114–15, 130, 206; serious crimes and, 112– 13, 237n68, 237–38n69; soc iali st legality and, 97, 114–15, 118, 129– 30, 238–39n82, 239nn85–86, 240n95 petty hool ig ans: alc oh ol and, 103, 106–7, 235n29, 240n110; common crimi n als and, 120, 238n78, 240nn109–10; demographic charac teristics of, 103, 235n29, 238n78; detention and, 118–20, 122–23, 201, 240n98, 240n101, 240n109; escape attempts and, 123–25; laziness of, 123–26, 128 petty theft, 4, 101, 110, 150, 210n7, 233n19 police, 133–34, 219nn35–36, 245n16 Pravda (newspaper), 17, 36, 137–38 Primor’e region, 186, 192, 194 public activism. See obshchestvennost’ public/private dichotomy. See domes tic hool ig ani sm: publ ic/priv ate spaces and
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:53:06.
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Pussy Riot, 205–6, 262n33 Putin, Vladimir, 202–3, 205–7
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Red Corners, 158, 223n99 Riazan’, 17, 175, 177, 195 Riga, 186 Rostov, 77, 195 RSFSR Ministry for the Protection of Public Order (MOOP RSFSR), 194– 95, 259n133 RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, 119, 192–93 RSFSR Ministry of Justice, 75, 102 RSFSR Supreme Court, 56, 84, 89, 111, 145, 149, 184 RSFSR Supreme Soviet, 102, 107, 111, 128 Rudenko, Roman, 82–83, 107, 139, 176, 187–88, 191, 219n34, 233n18, 246n38 Salisbury, Harrison, 22, 250n124 samogon, 162–63, 251–52n153. See also hooliganism: alcohol and samokritika, 166, 180 Saratov, 146, 173, 195 Secret Speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, 130–31 self-defense laws, 137–40, 142, 196, 246n34, 246n38 shaming. See hooliganism: shaming practices and simp le hool ig ani sm: amb ig ui ty of, 111; definition of, 31; number of people convicted of, 18, 111, 171, 189; punishments for, 31 sing le mothe rs. See hool ig ani sm: faulty parenting and skinheads, 203 Smena (newspaper), 190 Smolensk, 195 Sobianin, Sergei, 205 Sochi, 153 social disorganization theory, 6, 8 socialist legality, 5, 97, 114–15, 118, 129–30, 147–49 Solodkin, I. I., 76
Index Solomon, Peter H., Jr., 214n22, 232n8, 234n20, 261n18 Spartak (soccer club), 206 speculation, 118, 128, 150 Stakhanovites, 182 Stalin, Joseph, 169, 186 Stalingrad, 73, 121 Stavropol’, 176–77, 194 stiliagi, 40, 234n23 summer camps, 167. See also hooligan ism: leisure practices and Suslov, Mikhail, 192 Sverdlovsk, 17, 125, 185, 195 Tadzhik SSR, 173 Tatar ASSR, 83, 128, 146 Thaw, the: exp eri m ent at ion and, 96–97; reformist and reactionary elem ents of, 195–97; rep ress ion and, 6, 97, 130 Tiumen, 124 Tokarev, A. M., 90 Tomsk, 177 Tula, 126 Udmurt ASSR, 91 Ukrainian Supreme Court, 27, 178 Ul’ianovsk, 177, 186 Union of Soviet Writers, 108 Ushakov, D. N., 30, 132 USSR Council of Ministers, 128 USSR Ministry of Finance, 127 USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, 43, 126–27, 174 USSR Procuracy, 5, 77, 122, 139, 146, 174, 187 USSR Supreme Court, 26, 28, 32–33, 65, 69–70, 73, 75, 80–81, 83, 95, 111, 114, 137, 139–40, 176, 178, 187–88, 191 USSR Supreme Soviet, 61–62, 78, 87, 91, 112, 142, 150, 173, 185–87 Uzhno-Sakhalinsk, 125 Vladivostok, 194–95 Volgograd, 194 Vologda, 150, 194
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:53:06.
281
Index Voronezh, 106, 194 Voroshilov, Kliment, 186–87 vospitanie. See hooliganism: moral ed ucation (vospitan ie) and Vyborg, 151 Vysotsky, Vladimir, 41
w orkers’ dorm it or ies, 158, 164–65, 223n99 World War II, 48 World Youth Fest iv al of 1957, 98, 232n5, 234n23 Yeltsin, Boris, 207, 263n38 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 206–7 Znanie (organization), 184, 258n101
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Weissman, Neil, 212–13n18, 214n20 workers’ clubs, 159–60, 250–51n133, 251n135
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia : Defining, Policing, and Producing Deviance During the Thaw, University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uh/detail.action?docID=3445274. Created from uh on 2023-02-19 15:53:06.