Honduras: Economic, Political and Social Issues 2020037147, 2020037148, 9781536185232, 9781536185546, 153618523X

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CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

HONDURAS ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES

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CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

HONDURAS ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES

ERIC S. RIORDAN EDITOR

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Riordan, Eric S., editor. Title: Honduras : economic, political and social issues / Eric S. Riordan, (editor). Description: New York : Nova Science Publishers, 2020. | Series: Central America and the Caribbean | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2020037147 (print) | LCCN 2020037148 (ebook) | ISBN 9781536185232 (Paperback) | ISBN 9781536185546 (Adobe PDF) Subjects: LCSH: Honduras--Emigration and immigration. | Agriculture--Economic aspects--Honduras. | Human security--Honduras. | Sustainable development--Honduras. | Plan for the Alliance for Prosperity. Classification: LCC JV7419 .H65 2020 (print) | LCC JV7419 (ebook) | DDC 338.1097283--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020037147 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020037148

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1

vii Elusive Prosperity: Rights, Emigration, and Displacement in Honduras Hugo Noé Pino, Ely Maritza Noé Domínguez and Tom Hare

Chapter 2

Agricultural Modernization in Honduras Arie Sanders

Chapter 3

Agricultural Competitiveness, Sustainable Landscapes and Markets: Challenges for Honduran Agricultural Value Chains Ingrid Fromm

Index

1

39

67 93

PREFACE This compilation first details the ways the Plan for the Alliance for Prosperity in Honduras sought to generate sources of employment, develop human capital, improve citizen security and access to justice, and strengthen institutions. The authors go on to explore the transformation of the Honduran agricultural sector in the context of the modernization process of the past four decades. A framework for discussion on agricultural value chains, competitiveness, sustainable landscape and markets is proposed in closing. Chapter 1 - As a result of the influx of unaccompanied minors arriving at the United States border in 2014, the United States, Inter-American Development Bank, Honduras and its neighbors Guatemala and El Salvador signed the Plan for the Alliance for Prosperity (PAP). The PAP was to increase employment, promote economic prosperity, reduce violence, and ultimately reduce emigration from Central America. Five years later, caravans of thousands of emigrants began to flee Honduras and emigration and displacement rates from the country hit highs not seen since the end of the 20th century. This chapter explores the PAP in Honduras from a rights perspective, detailing its formulation, execution and failure to produce the prosperity it promised. The lessons from the PAP are timely and urgent as the region and international cooperators seek

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to determine the most appropriate path forward given continued stubbornly high emigration and displacement. The lessons are also enduring as the development challenges facing Honduras that result in emigration (so called “root causes”) and the record of attempted solutions to these challenges, will require decades of sustained efforts to overcome. The chapter first details the ways the PAP in Honduras sought to generate sources of employment, develop human capital, improve citizen security and access to justice, and strengthen institutions. The authors then analyze the PAP from a human rights perspective in order to produce an integral and holistic framework within which to investigate. To accomplish this, the authors use the multidimensional social evaluation model established by Nirenberg, Brawerman, & Ruiz (2000). This rights perspective uses international human rights principles and norms and seeks to determine whether or not the PAP has corrected inequalities and discriminatory practices that hinder development. The initial progress indicators and the gaps in addressing critical challenges suggest that expectations for longerterm success are low. This, combined with the stark reality of the hundreds of thousands of emigrants that still leave Honduras each year, means there is little reason to believe that the PAP has improved much at all. Despite that, there are lessons to learn if the authors hope to ever see a prosperous Honduras. Chapter 2 - This chapter explores the transformation of the Honduran agricultural sector in the context of the modernization process of the past four decades. Modernization has promoted the insertion of the agricultural sector into the global market. Honduras became relatively successful at promoting the production of nontraditional export crops like palm oil, melon and shrimp. In spite of the agricultural modernization process, production growth and a decrease in rural poverty have yet to be realized and remain a challenge. For 80 per cent of the population, residing in a rural area means living in poverty or extreme poverty (62 per cent). Also food and nutrition insecurity is still a problem for the vulnerable population. The uncontrolled expansion of agricultural activities has led to deforestation and environmental degradation, especially in the more mountainous areas. The author will argue that the modernization of

Preface

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agricultural production, which always seeks to expand and accumulate opportunities, has made Honduras and its agricultural sector more vulnerable to internal and external shocks, such as commodity price fluctuations and climate change and that there is an urgent need for reflexivity about the current agricultural policy to face these challenges. Chapter 3 - The long agricultural tradition in Honduras has faced tremendous transformation over the past two decades and by all accounts, will face new challenges in the future. What was once an agricultural export-oriented economy, the quintessential “banana republic” now relies on the maquila industry as a main sector bringing in export revenues to the economy. Nevertheless, agriculture still plays and important role in the economy and is a source of employment for people in rural areas. One of the main challenges currently is the low productivity level in the agricultural sector, which, despite efforts to improve its competitive stand, still needs access to key inputs and investments so that small and mediumscale farmers can achieve better incomes. According to the World Bank Poverty and Inequality Brief (2019), 64 percent of Honduran households live at or below the national poverty line, with a higher number of homes below the poverty line living in rural areas, where 46 percent of the population lives. The Gini Index of 0.50 in 2017, places Honduras among the countries with the highest inequality rates of inequality in Latin America. The promotion of non-traditional, intensive farming-system export value chains, such as horticultural products, fruits, fish, crustaceous, vegetable oils and also forestry products have changed the agricultural landscape from the perspective of land use change, but other factors, such as environmental impact, merit a close examination. Because of the geographic location of Honduras in the Central American dry corridor and also the high exposure of the country to the Atlantic hurricane and tropical storm path, agriculture is risky business, especially with the extreme meteorological events registered in recent years. The drought in 2015 associated with El Niño weather cycle had a negative effect The World Bank (2015) estimated that the economic losses suffered between 1994 and 2013 due to climate-related disasters was on average 2.5 percent of GDP

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per year. In addition to the vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change, the rapid population growth exacerbates the problem. Settlements in marginal areas, typically degraded mountainous and forest areas, or in clandestine areas bordering rivers not only account for considerable environmental impacts, but also put the low-income population at a higher risk. The Honduran population has doubled in roughly 25 years, so the pressure on the already limited agricultural resources so more food is produced is high. Some of the challenges in the next decade are to increase agricultural productivity, have a better access to markets both at the local and international level while feeding an increasing population and doing so in a sustainable way. Resolving policy and infrastructure problems will be an important part of the solution. Agribusinesses should have better access to finance, agricultural insurances and other financial services to boost productivity. Agricultural policies have tried to improve the situation for producers, particularly in the export-oriented sectors, but the provision of services should also reach other farmers. Building resilience requires access to improved agricultural technologies. Improved logistics and infrastructure would also mean a better access to markets and improved competitiveness. Although milestones have been reached in the last two decades with the construction of better roads and improvement of ports, but many rural areas still have little access to roads and even basic services such as utilities. Areas in eastern Honduras, close the Mosquita region, for example, are still not connected to the national electric grid. Tackling the above-mentioned issues requires a concerted effort from different sectors. Not only are these problems to be resolved through targeted agricultural policies, the economic, social and environmental challenges require equal engagement from other sectors and through different channels. This chapter will discuss the challenges and propose a framework for discussion on agricultural value chains, competitiveness, sustainable landscape and markets.

In: Honduras Editor: Eric S. Riordan

ISBN: 978-1-53618-523-2 © 2020 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

ELUSIVE PROSPERITY: RIGHTS, EMIGRATION, AND DISPLACEMENT IN HONDURAS Hugo Noé Pino1,, Ely Maritza Noé Domínguez2 and Tom Hare3 1

UNITEC, Tegucigalpa, Honduras Consultant, Tegucigalpa, Honduras 3 University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, US 2

ABSTRACT As a result of the influx of unaccompanied minors arriving at the United States border in 2014, the United States, Inter-American Development Bank, Honduras and its neighbors Guatemala and El Salvador signed the Plan for the Alliance for Prosperity (PAP). The PAP was to increase employment, promote economic prosperity, reduce violence, and ultimately reduce emigration from Central America. Five years later, caravans of thousands of emigrants began to flee Honduras and emigration and displacement rates from the country hit highs not seen 

Corresponding Author’s E-mail: [email protected].

2

Hugo Noé Pino, Ely Maritza Noé Domínguez and Tom Hare since the end of the 20th century. This chapter explores the PAP in Honduras from a rights perspective, detailing its formulation, execution and failure to produce the prosperity it promised. The lessons from the PAP are timely and urgent as the region and international cooperators seek to determine the most appropriate path forward given continued stubbornly high emigration and displacement. The lessons are also enduring as the development challenges facing Honduras that result in emigration (so called “root causes”) and the record of attempted solutions to these challenges, will require decades of sustained efforts to overcome. The chapter first details the ways the PAP in Honduras sought to generate sources of employment, develop human capital, improve citizen security and access to justice, and strengthen institutions. We then analyze the PAP from a human rights perspective in order to produce an integral and holistic framework within which to investigate. To accomplish this, we use the multidimensional social evaluation model established by Nirenberg, Brawerman, & Ruiz (2000). This rights perspective uses international human rights principles and norms and seeks to determine whether or not the PAP has corrected inequalities and discriminatory practices that hinder development. The initial progress indicators and the gaps in addressing critical challenges suggest that expectations for longer-term success are low. This, combined with the stark reality of the hundreds of thousands of emigrants that still leave Honduras each year, means there is little reason to believe that the PAP has improved much at all. Despite that, there are lessons to learn if we hope to ever see a prosperous Honduras.

INTRODUCTION In 2014, the U.S. government detected an alarming increase in the number of children and youth from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (“Northern Triangle countries”) traveling to the United States without the company of an adult. According to the United States Customs and Border Protection (2016), the number of apprehensions of unaccompanied children rose from 3,304 in 2009 to 51,705 in 2014. Faced with this situation, the governments of the Northern Triangle countries entered into discussions with the United State and the Inter-American Development Bank for the development of a plan aimed at tackling the causes of emigration. The diagnosis identified unemployment, violence, and low economic growth as the “root causes” of emigration.

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The plan to address these root causes, known as the Plan for the Alliance for Prosperity (PAP), was signed by the governments of the region on November 14, 2014. The PAP came into effect in 2016 and was to last through 2020. The main objectives of Plan were: to energize the productive sector of countries in order to generate sources of work; develop human capital; improve citizen security and access to justice; and strengthen institutions. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze, from a human rights perspective, the PAP and its effect on the factors that drive emigration and forced displacement in Honduras. The human rights approach involves examining the plan and its implementation in the light of the principles and standards of human rights, and inquiring into whether the interventions have corrected inequalities arising from the concentration of wealth and power and discriminatory practices. As the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights states, these are the main problems that hinder development and result in emigration and forced displacement (2006, p. 15). For example, in the process of elaboration, presentation and implementation of the PAP, with the exception of the business sector, few sectors of society have had a say in decisions related to the plan. This absence of civil society is notable, but not novel, in regional development decision making. We will return to the consequences of this absence later in the chapter. Although the rights-based approach can be incorporated using different methodologies and techniques, this research makes use of the analytical scheme proposed in Nirenberg’s multidimensional social assessment model (Red en Derechos, 2011; Brawerman and Ruiz, 2000). We use the multidimensional social assessment model in order to determine whether the PAP is an instrument that can help to correct the structural roots of emigration, and whether it has the desired directionality based on the results it intends to achieve. This is accomplished by examining three dimensions: first, the internal consistency of the PAP (i.e., its budgetary relevance and adequacy); second, progress towards the fulfilment of its objectives; and third, aspects that were not considered in the PAP, but that are closely related to the objectives to be achieved.

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Hugo Noé Pino, Ely Maritza Noé Domínguez and Tom Hare

Taking into account the above, this chapter is structured in four sections: the following section presents what is meant by the human rights approach in order to highlight its main characteristics. In particular we focus on how economic, social and cultural rights are closely linked to the issue of emigration and forced displacement. The next section describes the main objectives of the PAP, as well as national funding sources and U.S. contributions. We discuss the main aspects of the plan that have been minimized or left out, and suggest areas that are prevalent in the literature to reduce emigration that were not considered in the PAP. Among these gaps are fundamental aspects such as the eradication of impunity and the transformation of the political regime. The remaining sections show the PAP’s impact on emigration and forced displacement, and the lessons that flow from its implementation. The images of over eight thousand people who left Honduras in the migrant caravans in 2018-2019 speak more than a thousand words about the initial results of the PAP (UNHCR 2018, 2019). The fact that the PAP did not survive to reach its full term in 2020 before being replaced by the “Growth in the Americas Initiative” also signals that long-term results might not be positive. What is uncertain is if the lessons that can be learned from the PAP will be incorporated into this new regional plan. The incorporation of learning from the recent past is dubious given the new plan’s similarity to the PAP, and its dependence on resources from the U.S. private sector for investment particularly in energy and infrastructure in the region. In this chapter, the reader will find the main reasons that motivate Hondurans, both adults and children, to leave their homes in search of better opportunities and lessons learned about national and regional development plans to address those reasons for emigration.

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BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH The rights approach is based on international human rights standards, namely the universal legal guarantees that protect individuals and groups against actions and omissions that interfere with their freedoms, fundamental rights, and human dignity (UNHRC, 2006, p. 1). The pillar of the definition of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals is the “Charter of Human Rights” which is composed of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Under these international treaties, all persons (without discrimination) have rights such as freedom and equality, nationality, work and freedom of association, private property, freedom of opinion and expression, public and fair judgment, and religion, among others. In accordance with the human rights-based approach, the State as the guarantor of rights has three levels of obligation: 1. It must respect rights, that is, it must refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of rights. 2. It must protect rights, that is, it must take measures to ensure that third parties do not interfere with the enjoyment of rights. 3. It must enforce rights, which according to the United Nations Population Fund (n. d.), and UNHRC (2006, p. 2) implies that States must take active measures and allocate resources to implement laws, policies and procedures that enable individuals to enjoy their rights. The last obligation also suggests that States carry out activities that strengthen people’s capacity to meet their own needs, ensure the direct provision of services to compensate for market gaps, and to assist groups that are unable to meet their own needs.

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Hugo Noé Pino, Ely Maritza Noé Domínguez and Tom Hare

Important for the analysis of the PAP, the economic, social and cultural rights guaranteed by the State are human rights relating to basic socio-economic conditions. They include the right to food, adequate housing, education, health, social security, participation in cultural life, water and sanitation, and work. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stipulates that each State party has a fundamental obligation to ensure the satisfaction of the minimum essential level of rights and that measures should be taken to progressively achieve the full effectiveness of those rights to the maximum extent of the resources available to them (UNHRC, 2006, p. 2). The fact that the PAP has been motivated for the most part by the emigration situation from Northern Triangle countries therefore requires a human rights analysis. From a human rights perspective, only those who can survive with dignity in their social environment of origin are considered voluntary migrants when they choose to leave. Forced displacement, on the other hand, occurs when people are forced from their homes to flee situations that endanger their lives or physical integrity. In other words, lack of protections or violations of human rights constitute persecution and are factors that force people to emigrate (Sánchez and Urraza, 2015, p. 58). Examining these factors with a rights focus helps highlight the distinction between voluntary emigration and forced displacement that will be explored further in the next section.

OBJECTIVES, CONTENT AND SCOPE OF THE PAP The governments of the Northern Triangle countries, with the strategic and financial support of the United States and the technical assistance of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), signed the PAP with the aim to, “implement measures to curb the migration phenomenon and the humanitarian crisis caused by the increase of unaccompanied migrant children to the United States in 2014” (2015, p. 3). To achieve this, the plan aimed to promote the coordination and articulation of joint actions among the countries of the Northern Triangle in order to “generate

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rootedness of the population in their countries, through structural change that provides economic opportunities and transforms the quality of life of citizens, mainly in the territories of greatest poverty, emigration and vulnerability” (2015, p. 4). To achieve the objectives of the plan, the governments of the Northern Triangle (2014, p. ii-20), proposed the following lines of action: 1. Energize the productive sector to create economic opportunities through private investment, promoting specific sectors (such as textiles, agro-industry, light industry and tourism) and the concentration of activities in strategic geographical areas. The PAP also considered the implementation of energy projects (especially hydroelectric, wind, solar, biomass, gas), logistics, and housing infrastructure projects. 2. Develop human capital by improving the link between labor supply and business demand, more effective vocational training, greater access and better quality of secondary education, and greater investment in children. 3. Improve citizen security and access to justice. 4. Strengthen institutions to increase people’s confidence in the State (especially justice sector institutions); strengthen social prevention of violence and the care of young people at social risk; and combat drug trafficking and organized crime. The estimated initial budget for the implementation of the PAP in the Northern Triangle from 2016-2020 was approximately US$5.37 billion for Honduras alone (see Table 1). In reality, the amounts approved for the PAP represented a ceiling, and disbursements in practice were less than the estimated total. In the case of Honduras, the first three years of the plan only amounted to US$2.92 billon, equivalent to 54.3% of the initially estimated funds.

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Hugo Noé Pino, Ely Maritza Noé Domínguez and Tom Hare Table 1. Estimated initial budget for the implementation of PAP for the period 2016-2020 per strategic axis (millions of USD)

Allocation

Guatemala El Salvador 4,977.00 3,563.00 2,315.00 2,034.00 300 592

Productive Sector Human Capital Strengthening Institutions and Security Total 7,592.00

Honduras Total Amount 3,563.00 12,103.00 1,414.00 5,763.00 393 1,285.00

6,189.00 5,370.00

Structure 63% 30% 7%

19,151.00 100%

Source: ICEFI, 2017.

Table 2. Funds approved by the United States Congress for Cooperation to Central America per fiscal year (in millions of dollars) Fiscal year 2016 2017 2018 2019

State Department: Foreign Operations and Related programs 750.0 655.0 615.0 527.6

Department of Defense 47.3 42.4 N/A N/A

Source: Washington Office on Latin America, (2019).

Funding for PAP was anticipated from Honduran government resources (about 80%), multilateral development banks (whether in the form of donation, financing or debt reduction), and the private sector through public-private partnerships (ICEFI, 2015, p. 11; PAP Guidelines, 2014, p. 23). It is important to note that normal budget allocations were incorporated as contributions to the plan. In other words, these were not additional or new resources that countries allocate for these objectives. The resources that the United States contributed to the implementation of PAP in the Northern Triangle were allocated under the U.S. relationship strategy with Central America. Unlike resources granted on other occasions, the U.S. resources did not constitute budgetary support for the countries of the Northern Triangle, in other words, they did not enter directly into the national treasuries. Instead, they were allocated within the

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budget of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The specific programs and projects to receive resources from USAID were those where there was a correspondence between the goals or priorities set out in the strategy of support from the United States to Central America and the PAP. In this way, the areas to be financed were the product of the dialogue between the governments and the United States. In most cases, these contributions were part of the existing bilateral economic aid with alleged increases. However, as can be seen in Table 2, the amount of aid approved decreased over the course of the implementation of PAP due to budget cuts by the new U.S. administration that entered early in the implementation of the PAP. This resulted in a reduction in support of nearly 30% from US$750 million in 2016 to US$527.6 in 2019. The first part of this section examines the consistency of the PAP from the point of view of the relevance of its design, its budgetary adequacy, and the consequences of its main interventions. The second part analyses the factors that were not taken into account in PAP design or those that were included, but not in the manner necessary to reduce the social problems that promote emigration.

Relevance: Emigration or Forced Displacement? According to the International Organization for Migration (n. d.), the “migrant” leaves his or her country of origin free of external factors in order to improve socio-economic conditions. Meanwhile, a displaced person moves by force, bound by factors beyond his or her control that threaten life and subsistence. Although the most obvious forced displacement is caused by violence, it can also be caused by the structural and systematic lack of economic, social or cultural rights in the country of origin (Orozco [based on the interpretation of the 1951 Geneva Convention] cited in Sánchez and Urraza, 2015, p. 81; IOM, n. d.). This means that things like poverty, unemployment, low wages, hunger or environmental degradation that affect living conditions and involves

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damage to health or food also cause forced displacement (Sánchez and Urraza, 2015, p. 81). The less obvious nature of the forced displacement caused by the deprivation of economic, social or cultural rights causes it to be mistaken for willful emigration. This is a situation that is exploited both by the recipient countries as a reason to not admit refugees, and by the countries of origin to avoid the State’s responsibility to ensure the full protection of rights (Jiménez and Soledad Suescún, 2008). The prevailing notion in the PAP document and the publicity surrounding it is that Hondurans and other Central Americans choose to migrate freely and voluntarily. However, this idea contrasts with the reality of migration flows in the region, which, as we show below and elsewhere (Hare, Pino, et al., 2019), have the many of the characteristics of forced displacement by violence and deprivation of rights. The findings of a statistically representative study conducted by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2014, p. 24) shows that the majority of migrant children and young people from the Northern Triangle are forcibly displaced:   

To escape the violence perpetrated by organized crime or by the State.1 To escape domestic abuse or violence. For having suffered or fear of violence in society and at home.

Other examples of the systematic violations of economic, social and cultural rights in Honduras that have led to and continue to cause forced displacement include: 1

Violence by the State of Honduras against its citizens, especially children and young people, has been well documented. This trend is seen in the increasing incidence of extrajudicial executions of children and young people. In Honduras between 1998 and 2013, 8,854 extrajudicial executions and violent deaths of children and young people under the age of 23 were recorded, 41% (3,631) carried out in the last 45 months of that period (Casa Alianza, 2014, p. 20). According to the OAS (2007) between 1998 and 2006, nearly 3,700 adolescents and young people were killed by "social cleansing" groups, assuming they were linked to gangs. However, of the 3,700 young people killed, only 34% had a history of gang activity. (See also IACHR, 2018, pp. 5-13).

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1. Violation of protection against hunger. Interviews conducted with migrant children and young people show that deprivation of the right to food is a factor that promotes emigration (Casa Alianza and Catholic Relief Services, 2016, p. 33). According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Honduras is one of the five hungriest countries in Latin America where approximately 1.4 million people were undernourished during 2015-2017 (2018, pp. 135-147). 2. Violation of the right to water. The right to water, both for human consumption and for agricultural production, has been undermined by land concessions to mining, power generation and timber companies. 3. Violation of the right to education. As noted by the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, the National University of Lanús (2015) and Casa Alianza, et al. (2016, p. 34), the population also migrates due to the lack of educational opportunities. In 2013, only 55.4% of the population in Honduras between the ages of 3 and 17 attended a school (Center for Gender & Refugee Studies et al. 2015, p. 85) and in 2017, more than one million did not access any level of schooling (Casa Alianza, 2017, p. 2). According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, approximately 10% of poor children complete secondary education, compared to 75% of rich children (UNESCO, 2017, p. 38). The lack of funding in public schools for adequate infrastructure, equipment and technological resources (CONADEH, 2010, p. 48), school feeding, free enrollment, and school transportation (IDB, 2016, p. 7) has contributed to inequity in education. 4. Violation of the right to health and social security. According to estimates by the Honduran Ministry of Health, approximately 18% of the population does not have health care coverage (2015, p. 16), and only 18.2% has some form of social security coverage (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLAC]; 2018). Honduras is among countries in the region with

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Hugo Noé Pino, Ely Maritza Noé Domínguez and Tom Hare the largest shortage of personnel and medical resources with only 0.4 doctors per 1,000 inhabitants, and eight beds per 10,000 inhabitants (ECLAC 2015, p. 54). This results in a wait of one to three days to see a doctor for both children and adults. In regional hospitals, the waiting time is between two and six months to get an appointment, and in the case of hospitals such as the Hospital Escuela Universitario, Mario Catarino Rivas, and the social security hospital, the wait is between six months and one year (CONADEH, 2014, p. 15). 5. Violation of the right to work. As noted by UNHCR (2014) and Casa Alianza et al. (2016, p. 34), the unyielding search for decent employment is also a cause of emigration. Some of the modalities violating the right to work with the greatest impact in the country, according to the complaints received by the National Commissioner for Human Rights are: inequitable and unsatisfactory conditions of work, illegal dismissals, violations of labor standards and physical, psychological or sexual harassment (CONADEH, 2017, p. 69). 6. Violation of land rights. Forced displacement associated with agriculture, tourism, and mining activities is also occurring (UNHCR, 2017a, p. 4). The UNHCR warns that in infrastructure and large agro-industrial projects, tourism, or local development works, the rights of communities have been violated, disrespecting not only the right to prior consultation and the right to use and enjoy goods for public use (such as beaches, water sources, etc.). The use of violence against communities that oppose projects and exposure of leaders and members of the communities to the risk of forced displacement is also common (2017a, p. 43). Due to agricultural or land tenure conflicts, people are also continually threatened and rights violated, sometimes with the complicity or omission of public officials (UNHCR, 2017a, p. 43). In 2016, the UNHCR warned of the defenseless situation of those involved in agricultural conflicts such as human rights activists, indigenous

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people, and peasants who were forced to move due to persecution, threats, intimidation and murder (El Nuevo Herald, 2016). Given the lack of effective mechanisms to ensure protection in communities of origin or residence, the population is forced to move to initially seek protection in other communities within the country. Many families are forced to move internally two or more times before they are eventually forced to cross borders in search of international protection (CIPPDV 2015, p. 37).

Correspondence between the PAP and the Causes of Human Mobility Although the systematic human rights violations that have been documented to cause forced displacement are numerous, according to the PAP, the main causes of mobility are a lack of economic and labor opportunities, violence, and family reunification. Even within this limited perspective, the PAP primarily focuses on the economic causes of mobility. As stated in the plan: “Close to nine percent of the population has decided to leave our countries... most of them are men and women between the ages of 15 and 30 looking for jobs that provide them with a higher socioeconomic level and better opportunities for their children” (2014, p.12). Subsequently, the plan mentions, “The intensity of the problems we are living with today will be greater tomorrow if we do not shorten the time to achieve concrete results that mean real improvements in the employment, income, and social welfare prospects in our countries. This means fully leveraging a regional platform to address common obstacles to economic and productive development, increasing domestic resource mobilization, establishing strategic alliances with the private sector, and implementing effective implementation mechanisms.”

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Source: Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (2017). Figure 1. Estimated budget for PAP-TN (2016-2020) by country, according to strategic axis (in percentages).

This economic-driven emigration perspective can be further evidenced through budgetary analysis. Analysis of the estimated PAP budget shows that the dynamization of the productive sector is the core with 63% of the total PAP funds. Interventions aimed at developing human capital and improving security and institutions were allocated only 30% and 7% respectively. In the case of Honduras, this trend is even stronger. As seen in Figure 1, Honduras intended to allocate over two thirds of the total estimated funds to the promotion of economic activity. While the PAP recognizes that, “low and unexclusive economic growth has not generated the necessary employment [for development],” the strategy proposed in the PAP to promote growth and increase employment remains primarily the same as what has been in place for more than two decades: attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and creating special economic zones to which tax and non-tax privileges would be granted (2014, p. i). This FDI attraction strategy is part of the comparative advantages model which promotes the attraction of FDI through traditional factors (such as the availability of natural resources or raw materials, unskilled or semi-qualified cheap labor, infrastructure development, and the granting of tax and non-tax privileges). According to

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Dunning (1994), this approach attracts only resource-seeking FDI or “extractivism.” A growth strategy based on the attraction of this type of FDI has multiple drawbacks. Most significantly is that the value created may be limited to a small elite so it is unlikely that this type of investment could lead to the social development necessary to reduce mobility (Deloitte LLP, 2014, pp. 5-13). Incentives such as tax exemptions have been used in Honduras in recent decades under the justification of promoting exports and activities aimed at the domestic market. In 2012, it is estimated that the State lost the equivalent of 6.57% of GDP or 42% of the total collection of taxes given these exemptions (Special Commission for the Analysis and Control of Exemptions, Exemptions and Customs Franchises, 2013, p. 5). The tax exemptions reached seven percent of GDP in 2018 equivalent to 37% of revenues (Sefin, 2019). The Honduran government increasingly waives the acquisition of revenue from the most profitable economic sectors of the country. These exemptions increase the inequity of the economy as they benefit high-income businesses and individuals. At the same time, indirect taxes have increased for the poorest (FOSDEH, 2018). This means that poorer households that are vulnerable to forced displacement pay more tax in proportion to their income than wealthiest households. The PAP measures, by reinforcing a regressive tax system, have a negative impact on the purchasing power of these families. Households in the lower income segment spend a greater proportion of their income paying taxes on goods, which diminishes their ability to purchase food, goods and services necessary for their livelihood and capacity building (UNDP, 2012). In addition to the potentially adverse impact that the PAP strategy has on individuals and their potential for displacement, it failed to revive the economy or raise employment levels. Although the information available does not allow us to quantify the exact magnitude of the impact of PAP on employment and growth, the data are clear enough that that the situation did not improve during PAP’s tenure. For example, the national unemployment rate increased from 5.3% in 2014 to 5.7% in 2019 (INE, 2014, 2019). Even the maquila sector, one of the main sources of employment within the manufacturing industry and one of the strategic

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sectors of the PAP, slowed over time. In the 1990s, the maquila sector grew above 20% per year,2 while in 2018 it grew at a rate of 5.6%, and in 2017 it only grew by 1.2% (Banco Central de Honduras, 2019 and 2018). While this strategy has not been effective in incentivizing job creation, the biggest drawback it generates (as well as similar measures applied in previous decades) is that the jobs created are of low quality. These jobs lack security, stability, and social security coverage, and often have poor working conditions and low wages. In the 1990s, Honduras showed a strong trend of flexibility in the labor market. The mechanisms usually used for the introduction of labor flexibility reforms followed two main strategies: a) worker protection laws, and b) conditionalities to make the labor market more flexible for free trade agreements (Dole, Pineda, Fernández, & Lanza, 2003). Given that the labor code in Honduras has not been legally repealed, there are decrees on casual work for contractors and intermediaries that include rules on flexibility for contract or working days in which the right to social security is annulled. Even though this regulation was designed for the recruitment of temporary staff, in practice it is applied to staff who work permanently with the public and private sectors. Further, in the USCentral America Free Trade Agreement, the labor chapter does not establish any mechanism for workers or the State to sue enterprises for non-compliance with labor rights. However, companies can sue the State when an action in labor matters is deemed to affect trade or labor flexibility. Like most countries in the Central American region, in Honduras flexibility of work resulted in temporary employment contracts, diversity of full-time and part-time working hours, and the emergence of new forms of wages (hourly wage-salary performance, division of work processes, and absence of social protection). Following Weller and Roethlisberger (in ECLAC, 2011), we use the underemployment rate as a proxy indicator of the quality of employment. As seen in Figure 2, the invisible underemployment rate in 2019 increased

2

Reaching up to 29.3% in 1995 (BCH, 2001, p.6).

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by 22.9% compared to 2014 and 26.9% compared to 2001. That equates to more than one million people who were employed, but who received income below the minimum wage. In terms of informality of work, in 2014 63.0% of jobs were informal, with a slight reduction to 60.1% in 2016 (CEDLAS and World Bank, 2020). Despite this reduction, the level of informality continues to be above the levels observed in the 1990s. This is vitally important because it is the generation of quality jobs versus precarious jobs that can substantially and sustainably reduce poverty. The best way to summarize the effects of the PAP on economic activity so far is to revisit the assertion of Manuel Orozco who commented, “The proposed strategies of investment and economic growth in agriculture and tourism can hardly create the opportunities that people need to stay in their countries” (Inter-American Dialogue, 2017, p. 9). We would add that there are many more factors that the PAP did not include, or that it included inappropriately, that contribute to its ineffectiveness. We examine those factors next.

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Encuesta Permanante de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (May of each year). Figure 2. Honduras: Invisible Underemployment Rate, 2001-2019.

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An Insufficient Approach: Violence, Institutional Weakness, and Corruption With only seven percent of the budget (see Table 1), violence, institutions, and corruption were less of a focus of the PAP, despite being often-cited reasons for emigration from the Northern Triangle (UNHCR, 2014, p. 24; Casa Alianza and Catholic Relief Services, 2016, p. 33). According to official statistics, the homicide rate in Honduras was reduced from 68 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2014 to 41.3 in 2018 (University Institute in Democracy, Peace and Security [IUDPAS], 20142018); however, the rate is still more than twice the overall homicide rate in the rest of the Americas (UNODC, 2019, p. 11). The situation of widespread violence particularly affects minors who are recruited, threatened, killed, tortured, victimized sexually, and displaced (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2016, p. 3). Although official reports highlight a reduction in homicide rates as the main evidence of the decline in violence in the country, in practice there has been no reduction in levels of insecurity given that: 1. The intensity of lethal violence has increased: In parallel with the decrease in the homicide rate, there has been an increase in multiple homicides, suggesting that common crime is being displaced by organized crime, with the latter being responsible for an increasing share of murders committed in Honduras (InSight Crime, 2015). 2. Murders have become increasingly violent: In 2017, 166 people were found in public spaces inside plastic bags, sacks, sheets and/or dismembered. Although there is no data available on the total number of people who were found in these circumstances during 2018 and 2019, statements from the director of the Honduran Observatory of Violence based on their records indicate an upward trend (El Libertador, 2018).

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3. Criminal groups’ control over public spaces remains unchanged: 59.8% of homicides in 2017 and 61.6% in 2018 were registered on public roads (IUDPAS, 2018 and 2019). 4. Higher levels of State-involved crime: There is an amount of violence such as extrajudicial executions, kidnappings, arbitrary detentions, and forced displacement attributed to state forces (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2018, p. 5) which increases the perception of insecurity among citizens. Injuries caused by police or military officers have also increased, from 425 in 2016 to 665 in 2018 (IUDPAS, 2017-2019). 5. Murders of human rights defenders, environmental activists (Berta Cáceres, for example), and ethnic groups are worrying. The femicide rate in Honduras is also one of the highest in Latin America (5.1 per 100,000 according to ECLAC, 2018). Finally, despite a focus on the reduction of homicides, the PAP’s security strategy is not aimed at reducing the availability of firearms even though firearms are used in more than 70% of homicides recorded during 2016-2018 in Honduras (IUDPAS, 2017-2019). This is well above the 50% average number of firearm homicides worldwide. A 2017 study showed how the availability of firearms is a contributing factor to violent deaths; a one percent increase in the number of guns in circulation can increase the homicide rate by two percent (LifeInstinct, 2017). In addition, the presence of a weapon in the home increases the risk of a woman being killed as a result of domestic violence by 272% (Szabó, n. d.). These statistics are just one measure of the widespread violence affecting the population, as violence can take multiple forms such as nonlethal violence [injuries, rapes, threats, extortions etc.] or self-inflicted violence [such as suicides], which have increased in recent years and contribute to the reproduction of violence.3

3

According to Patel, Simon, & Taylor, 2013, to observe or be a victim of these forms of violence increases the likelihood of becoming a perpetrator of violence in the future.

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Hugo Noé Pino, Ely Maritza Noé Domínguez and Tom Hare

Source: IUDPAS 2006, 2016-2019. Figure 3. Honduras: Self-inflicted violence and non-lethal violence.

It has been shown that the higher the level of perceived government corruption, the more likely the population is to migrate (LAPOP, 2014; Casa Alianza & Catholic Relief Services, 2016, p. 34). Honduras has some of the highest levels of perception of corruption in Latin America, and those levels are increasing (Transparency International, 2019). The most glaring example of an increase in perception of corruption was the electoral process of November 2017. The electoral process was marred by a lack of transparency and irregularities, which is why the Organization of American States considered that there was no certainty as to the outcome and called for new general elections4 (2017, p. 7). Despite 4

Some of the irregularities that compromised the veracity of the results according to the OAS report (2017) were: the Integrated Electoral Scrutiny and Disclosure System presented failures, interruptions and service exits from one of the servers, which were not duly justified by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; one of the servers was "stepped" and the

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this, twenty-one days after the elections were held, the election tribunal chaired by a well-known governing party militant - declared the incumbent the winner of the elections. The obvious irregularities undermined the legitimacy and credibility of the electoral process, resulting in numerous nationwide protests that were suppressed by the state through an indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2018, p. 2) and the suspension of constitutional guarantees for ten days.5 Ineffectiveness in the prevention, detection and punishment of this and less evident corruption is prevalent in the Northern Triangle countries. Central to this ineffectiveness is the lack of capacity and political will among institutions with the responsibility to oversee public criminal proceedings and carry out investigations of corruption-related crimes (ICEFI, n. d., p. 3). To combat this reality, the Mission to Support against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH) was created by national decree with the support of the Organization of American States in 2015. The MACCIH was born in response to the demonstrations of thousands of citizens who requested the resignation of the president and the creation of an international commission against impunity in Honduras. However, MACCIH began to be weakened when powerful groups considered it a threat to impunity6 (CLALS, 2018, p. 6-8) until it disappeared in January

5

6

evidence altered on the primary database server what prevented the audit of the OAS Mission (OAS 2017, p.6). Only 64% of the ballots planned to be scanned and transmitted from the polling stations were received at the OAS computing center (2017, pp.27-30). Executive Decree No. PCM-084-2017, published in the Official Journal the Gazette on December 1, 2017. Evidence of this are the reforms to Articles No.16 and No.131 of the Organic Budget Law approved by the National Congress in January 2018. These reforms prevent MACCIH and the Attorney General from investigating corruption cases before the Audit of the High Court of Auditors concludes (one year after the end of MACCIH' term) and seeks, in addition, to be handed over to the High Court of Auditors of You count the documentation that had been seized by the Special Tax Unit against Impunity and Corruption (UFECIC) and MACCIH in the Ministry of Finance; preventing the use of the relevant evidence to sanction those responsible for criminal wrongdoing (MACCIH, 2018). Additionally, in May 2018, the Special Tax Unit Against Impunity and Corruption (UFECIC) which had investigated corruption cases involving senior officials and former government officials was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court

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2020 after the Government of Honduras refused to sign the agreement for renewal of the Mission. In summary, throughout this section we showed how the main economic, social and institutional indicators that the PAP intended to change showed no improvement, nor any signs that in the medium term the deterioration can be reversed. This may be telling us that the PAP’s emphasis and interventions do not lead in the right direction, an argument that is supported by analyzing the low impact that the PAP has had in containing emigration. The following section presents the aspects that were not included in the design of the PAP and that are indispensable to reduce the situations of deprivation and violence that afflict the population in order to achieve significant transformations in the quality of life for Hondurans and to decrease forced displacement.

STRUCTURAL FACTORS NOT CONSIDERED IN THE PAP Although the PAP recognizes the multi-causality of the emigration phenomenon, its measures are not a frontal fight against inequity, corruption, impunity and lack of rule of law, which have generated and continue to generate the conditions of chronic violence and poverty experienced in Honduras. Honduras has one of the highest levels of economic inequality in the world. In 2014, it was ranked seventh globally and moved up to third place in 2017 (World Bank, n. d.). Inequity limits a country’s economic growth (Blomstrom & Kokko in OECD, 2001, p. 3), by hindering the efficiency of human capital, affecting governance (UNDP, 2010, p. 23), and restricting investment opportunities. According to the National Survey of Perceptions on Human Development, 85.6% of the Honduran population considers social inequality to be a source of insecurity and violence (UNDP, 2012, p. 17; Wilkinson and Marmot, 2003, p. 22; Pearce, 2007, p. 294; Adams, 2017). of Justice. This decision further weakened MACCIH by eliminating its most important national counterpart (CLALS, 2018, p. 9).

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The high degree of economic inequality in the country is an obstacle that prevents a substantial (and sustained) reduction in poverty. Ferreira & Ravallion (2008) show that it takes 35 years for a country to reduce poverty by 20%, given GDP growth of two percent per year and high levels of inequality (Gini 0.60). The same can be done in only 11 years under low inequality (Gini 0.30). This inequality extends to the labor market. Most of the population in Honduras works in the informal sector with low pay and no access to social protection, while a minority working in the formal sector receive ever higher wages and social protection (World Bank, 2012, pp. 6-7). The labor market is one of the areas where a company’s distribution structure is defined (Beccaria & Galin, 2002, p. 7). However, in Honduras the labor market has not had a predominant role in the distribution of resources as the distribution of labor income has barely changed in two decades (World Bank, n. d.). Opportunities to access and conclude quality learning in the education system are conditioned by the socio-economic level of households. According to the Education Policy and Data Center (n. d.) approximately 41% of male adolescents and 34% of women aged 12 to 16 are out of high school. Although there are disparities between the rates of out-of-school children in urban and rural areas, the biggest disparities can be seen between the richest and poorest quintile where the majority (62%) of out of school youth are poor. Corruption in Honduras is present not only in public administration, but also in security forces and the judiciary. This generates a climate conducive to the development of organized crime and perpetuates a “culture of impunity” (Transparency International, n. d.). Although official statistics show that the homicide rate has been reduced, prosecution of homicides remains the exception and not the rule. In a study conducted between 2010-2012 in the cities of San Pedro Sula, Comayagua and Tegucigalpa, the investigators found that evidence (including the victim’s body) was only collected at the crime scene in 61% of homicide cases, only eight percent of cases resulted in a criminal investigation, seven percent had enough evidence to prosecute, three percent reached the oral

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and public trial stage, and only one percent resulted in convictions (Transparency International, 2015, p. 7). Given that, Honduras is among the 13 countries in the world with the highest levels of impunity (University of the Americas Puebla & UDLAP Jenkins Graduate School & Center for Studies on Impunity and Justice, 2017). The high and persistent levels of impunity not only pave the way for perpetrators to reoffend, but also increase the public’s distrust in the ability and/or will that the authorities may have to ensure their protection. As crimes are not brought to trial, the belief that the authorities are corrupt and that they are co-opted by criminal groups is reinforced (InSight Crime, 2018). According to Transparency International (2015, p. 6), the main drivers of the low investigation and prosecution of crimes in Honduras are structural (such as lack of resources, limited technical capacity, lack of information, and problems of coordination among the entities responsible for justice), and factual (such as corruption and co-opting of the justice system by political, economic and organized criminal groups). The result is a lack of the rule of law. Rule of law is a condition in which all people, institutions (public and private), including the State itself, are subject to the law. This requires separation of powers, equality before the law, an equitable system of justice and security, non-arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency (United Nations Security Council, 2004). The rule of law is fundamental to achieving lasting peace, to effectively protect human rights, and to achieve sustained economic development, and its absence is one of the main obstacles to reversing poverty and inequity. In Honduras, far from getting stonger, the rule of law has deteriorated over the years. According to Freedom House (2018), the World Bank (n.d.) and the World Justice Project (2018), adherence to the rule of law has gone down in recent years in Honduras. And Honduras is now among the 10 countries with the worst adherence to the rule of law in the world (World Justice Project, 2018). One of the areas of the rule of law that has deteriorated most in Honduras is in “government power restrictions,” which is whether power is distributed in such a way that no governing body has the capacity to exercise uncontrolled power. In Honduras that

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uncontrolled power belongs to the executive branch. For example, there has been a growing concentration of power in the executive through the impeachment by the National Congress of four judges from the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court in 20127 and the discretionary management of public finances starting in 2013.8 In summary, while the PAP recognizes the multi-causality of the emigration phenomenon, the main triggering factors of violence, poverty, and emigration (inequality, corruption, impunity and lack of the rule of law) were left out. So it is foreseeable that in Honduras, despite the PAP, the deterioration in living conditions will deepen and thereby increase forced displacement going forward.

CONCLUSION The PAP has not been effective in countering emigration or forced displacement. Emigration levels from the Northern Triangle increased 52% between 2014-2018 and experienced a large increase in 2019 (Leutert and Spalding, 2019; Inter-Agency Commission for the Protection of Persons Displaced by Violence, 2015, p. 12; Network of Civil Society Organizations for the Prevention of Displaced Persons, 2018). The three countries of the Northern Triangle remain among the top ten asylumseeking countries in the world (International Organization for Migration, 2018). The PAP measures are based on the assumption the emigration is voluntary and primarily economic. Instead, the emigration phenomenon in Honduras and the Northern Triangle currently has the characteristics of forced displacement. By focusing on a voluntary emigration approach, the PAP has proved ineffective in reducing forced emigration (both in-country and beyond borders), with some counterproductive measures such as 7

The dismissal of the judges was made ignoring the provisions of article 314 of the Constitution of the Republic being "an arbitrary, abusive and defective act of the public administration" (National Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013, p. 8). 8 When the National Congress empowered President Hernandez to use the Central Administration's current revenue surpluses on a discretionary basis.

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support for agribusiness, tourism, and mining that have aggravated some of the structural conditions that cause forced displacement. The main lessons that can be drawn from the PAP for future plans are: 1. The PAP was the result of a dialogue between governments and the private enterprise of the Northern Triangle countries with the influence of the United States and very little participation from civil society. This resulted in a plan based on an economic growth strategy aimed primarily at incentivizing free trade between the Northern Triangle and the United States, leaving out politicallycharged rights issues that actually exacerbate forced displacement. 2. The resources allocated to the PAP by the Northern Triangle countries were mostly budget allocations that already existed and that were grouped together under the PAP. Contributions from the U.S. came from existing development cooperation accounts that were reduced over the course of PAP implementation. This made the PAP more of a marketing strategy than a new investment. 3. The strategic components of the PAP were not a comprehensive response to the phenomenon of emigration, nor do they reflect benefits for the migrant or displaced populations. The PAP’s bias toward the dynamization of the productive sector was evident when looking at official budgets and indicators – measures aimed at promoting economic integration in the region progressed rapidly, while measures aimed at increasing human capital and reducing poverty progressed slowly. 4. Honduras’ current economic and political model that maintains inequality and corruption is an obstacle to overcoming the structural roots of emigration and displacement. The PAP was not aimed at reducing inequality, corruption, impunity, and lack of rule of law even though they are key factors in reducing situations of deprivation and violence afflicting the population, and despite the fact that they have been shown to directly contribute to forced displacement.

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5. The Honduran state has failed to fulfill its obligation to guarantee the rights of the population, as many displaced persons are forced to flee situations of violence inside and outside the home, or situations of systematic deprivation that put their lives at risk. In summary, without significant structural changes that no single plan can provide, emigration and forced displacement will continue to be the only option for thousands of Central Americans.

REFERENCES Adams, T. (2017). How Chronic Violence Affects Human Development, Social Relations, and the Practice of Citizenship: A Systemic Framework for Action. Accessed 15 July 2018 from https://www. wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/chronic_violence_final_by_tani _adams.pdf. Banco Central de Honduras (BCH). (2019). Informe de bienes para transformación y actividades conexas. Anual 2019 y perspectivas 2019-2020. [Report of goods for processing and related activities. Annual 2019 and Outlook 2019-2020.] Accessed 25 January 2020, de https://www.bch.hn/download/maquila/informe_bienest2018.pdf. Banco Central de Honduras (BCH). (2018). Informe de bienes para transformación y actividades conexas. Anual 2017 y perspectivas 2018-2019. [Report of goods for processing and related activities. Annual 2017 and Outlook 2018-2019.] Accessed 25 January 2020 de http://www.bch.hn/download/maquila/informe_bienest2017.pdf. Banco Central de Honduras (BCH). (2014). Informe de bienes para transformación y actividades conexas. Anual 2014 y perspectivas 2015-2016. [Report of goods for processing and related activities. Annual 2014 and Outlook 2015-2016.] Accessed 25 January 2020, de http://www.bch.hn/download/maquila/informe_bienest2014.pdf. Banco Central de Honduras (BCH). (2001). La actividad maquiladora en Honduras 2001 y persperctivas para 2002. [Maquiladora activity in

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Honduras 2001 and persperctivas for 2002.] Accessed 25 January 2020, https://www.bch.hn/download/maquila/maquila-2001.pdf. Beccaria, L., & Galin, P. (2002). Regulaciones laborales en Argentina. Evaluación y propuestas” OSDE-CIEPP. [Labor regulations in Argentina. Evaluation and Proposals” OSDE-CIEPP.] Accessed 2 October 2018, https://www.fundacionosde.com.ar/pdf/biblioteca/ regulaciones%20laborales.pdf. Casa Alianza. (2014). Observatorio de Derechos de Niñas, Niños y Jóvenes en Honduras. Niñez y juventud en las redes del crimen organizado, una aproximación a las principales formas de involucramiento y participación de niños, niñas y jóvenes en los grupos delictivos de Tegucigigalpa. [Observatory for the Rights of Girls, Children and Young People in Honduras. Children and youth in organized crime networks, an approach to the main forms of involvement and participation of children and young people in the criminal groups of Tegucigigalpa.] Accessed from http://www.casaalianza.org.hn/images/documentos/Informes.Especiales/Inf.2014/1.%2 0informe%20niez%20y%20crimen%20organizado%20en%20teguciga lpa_cah.pdf. Casa Alianza. (2015). Niñez y migración en Centro y Norte América: causas, políticas, prácticas y desafíos. [Children and migration in Central and North America: causes, policies, practices and challenges.] Accessed from http://casa-alianza.org.hn/images/ documentos/Comunicados/CAH.2015/Informes.Especiales.2015/ninez -migracion-derechoshumanos_fullbook_espaol_1.pdf. Casa Alianza, Pastoral de Movilidad Humana & Catholic Relief Services. (2016). Niñas y niños migrantes. Factores de expulsión y desafíos para su reinserción en Honduras. [Migrant children. Expulsion factors and challenges for reintegration into Honduras.] Accessed 1 September 2018, http://casa-alianza.org.hn/images/documentos/CAH.2016/02. Infor.Especiales/02.%20e_book_nias%20y%20nios%20migrantes.pdf. CEDLAS & World Bank. (2020). Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). Accessed 27 January 2020,

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January 2020, https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/ 39867/S1500739_mu.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. (2018). CEPALSTAT. Database and statistical publications. Accessed 17 September 2018, from http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_ CEPALSTAT/estadisticasIndicadores.asp. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. (2018). Feminicidio. Accessed 5 March 2020. https://oig.cepal.org/es/ indicadores/feminicidio. El Libertador. (2018). En costales y en partes, en alza carnaval macabro del crimen en Honduras. [On coasts and in parts, in macabre carnival of crime in Honduras.] Accessed 25 January 2020, http://www.web. ellibertador.hn/index.php/noticias/nacionales/2962-en-costales-y-enpartes-en-alza-carnaval-macabro-del-crimen-en-honduras?fbclid= IwAR0KiqL076iR9XNwQn1tVnQd9EO89RYkl67L6I7m_zt0ZdunifI koXhElNE. El Nuevo Herald. (1 June 2016). La violencia en Honduras dispara los desplazamientos forzosos. [Violence in Honduras triggers forced displacement.] Accessed 28 September 2018, https://www. elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/article81220437. html. Ferreira, F., & Ravallion, M. (2008). “Global Poverty and Inequality: A Review of the. Global Poverty and Inequality: A Review of the Evidence. Review of Economics and Statistics. (D. R. The World Bank, Ed.) Policy Research Working Paper. Accessed 2 September 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23723485_Global_ Poverty_and_Inequality_A_Review_of_the_Evidence. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2018). El estado de la seguridad alimentaria y la nutrición en el mundo. Fomentando la resiliencia climática en aras de la seguridad alimentaria y la nutrición. [The state of food security and nutrition in the world. Promoting climate resilience for the sake of food security and nutrition.] Accessed from http://www.fao.org/3/I9553ES/ i9553es.pdf.

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Freedom House. (2018). About Freedom in the World. Accessed 2 October 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world. Hare, T., Pino H.N., et al. (2019). Central America and Emigration: Beyond the “Root Causes.” Notre Dame Initiative for Global Development Policy Brief Series. https://pulte.nd.edu/assets/323587/ central_america_and_emigration_beyond_the_root_causes_ndigd_poli cy_brief_series_.pdf. InSight Crime. (19 de Diciembre de 2014). Honduras resuelve el 1% de los casos de homicidio: Informe. [Honduras solves 1% of homicide cases: Report.] Accessed from https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/noticiasdel-dia/honduras-casos-homicidio-informe/. InSight Crime. (3 de Diciembre de 2015). Disminuyen homicidios pero aumentan masacres en Honduras. [Homicides decrease but massacres are on the rise in Honduras.] Accessed from https://es.insightcrime. org/noticias/noticias-del-dia/disminuyen-homicidios-aumentanmasacres-honduras. InSight Crime. (24 de Agosto de 2017). Tráfico de armas de fuego en Honduras: Introducción y hallazgos principales. [Trafficking in firearms in Honduras: Introduction and main findings.] Accessed from https://es.insightcrime.org/investigaciones/trafico-armas-fuegohonduras-introduccion-principales-hallazgos/#ftn1. InSight Crime. (30 de Octubre de 2018). 3 factores que empujan a migrantes del Triángulo Norte al éxodo. [3 factors that push migrants from the Northern Triangle into the exodus.] Accessed from https://es.insightcrime.org/noticias/analisis/3-factores-empujan-exodomigrantes-triangulo-norte/. Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI). (2017). Nota de coyuntura 06-2017. Plan Alianza para la Prosperidad del Triángulo Norte. [Joint note 06-2017. Northern Triangle Alliance Joint note 062017. Northern Triangle Plan for the Alliance for Prosperity]. Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI). (2015). Posición ante el Plan de la alianza para la prosperidad del Triángulo Norte. [Position before the Plan for the Alliance for Prosperity of the Northern Triangle.] Accessed 10 de Noviembre de 2018,

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https://icefi.org/sites/default/files/posicion_ante_el_plan_de_la_alianza _para_la_prosperidad_del_triangulo_norte_ca_03-2015.pdf. Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI). (n. d.). La corrupción: Sus caminos e impacto en la sociedad y una agenda para enfrentarla en el Triángulo Norte Centroamericano (Resumen ejecutivo). [Corruption: Its paths and impact on society and an agenda to confront it in the North Central American Triangle (Executive Summary).] Accessed 26 de Noviembre de 2018, https://icefi.org/ sites/default/files/resumen_ejecutivo_la_corrupcion_sus_caminos_e_i mpacto_en_la_sociedad_y_una_agenda_para_enfrentarla_en_el_triang ulo_norte_centroamericano.pdf. Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad. (2006). Observatorio de la Violencia. [Observatory on Violence.] Accessed from https://iudpas.unah.edu.hn/observatorio-de-la-violencia/boletinesdel-observatorio-2/boletines-nacionales/. Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad. (2016). Observatorio de la Violencia. [Observatory on Violence.] Accessed from https://iudpas.unah.edu.hn/observatorio-de-la-violencia/boletinesdel-observatorio-2/boletines-nacionales/. Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad. (2017). Observatorio de la Violencia. [Observatory on Violence.] Accessed from https://iudpas.unah.edu.hn/observatorio-de-la-violencia/boletinesdel-observatorio-2/boletines-nacionales/. Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad. (2018). Observatorio de la Violencia. [Observatory on Violence.] Accessed from https://iudpas.unah.edu.hn/observatorio-de-la-violencia/boletinesdel-observatorio-2/boletines-nacionales/. Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad. (2019). Observatorio de la Violencia. [Observatory on Violence.] Accessed from https://iudpas.unah.edu.hn/observatorio-de-la-violencia/boletinesdel-observatorio-2/boletines-nacionales/. Inter-American Development Bank. (2016). La Eficiencia del Gasto Público en Educación y Salud en Honduras, 2003 – 2013. [The Efficiency of Public Spending on Education and Health in Honduras,

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2003 – 2013.] Accessed from https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/ handle/11319/7601/La-eficiencia-del-gasto-publico-en-Educacion-ySalud-en-Honduras.pdf?sequence=1. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (2018). Observaciones preliminares de la visita de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos a Honduras. [Preliminary observations of the interAmerican Commission on Human Rights’ visit to Honduras.] Accessed from https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2018/ObsPrel Hnd.pdf. Inter-American Dialogue. (2017). Central American Migration. Current Changes and Development Implications. Washington, D.C. International Organization for Migration. (n. d.). Los términos clave de migración. [Key migration terms.] Accessed 1 September 2018, https://www.iom.int/es/los-terminos-clave-de-migracion#Desplazadosinternos. Jiménez, C., & Soledad Suescún, J. I. (2008). Migraciones y conflictos. El desplazamiento interno en Colombia. [Migrations and conflicts. Internal displacement in Colombia.] Accessed 1 September 2018, http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S140514352008000200008#nota. Leutert, S., & Spalding, S. (2019). How Many Central Americans Are Traveling North? Retrieved from Lawfare website: https://www. lawfareblog.com/how-many-central-americans-are-traveling-north. Misión de Apoyo contra la Corrupción e Impunidad en Honduras (MACCIH). (24 January 2018). Comunicado. [Press release.] Tegucigalpa. Accessed 02 de Octubre de 2018, http://www.web. ellibertador.hn/index.php/noticias/nacionales/2668-presidente-delcongreso-hondureno-es-investigado-por-corrupcion. Norwegian Refugee Council. (2016). ¿Esconderse o huir? La situación humanitaria y la educación en Honduras. [Hide or run away? The humanitarian situation and education in Honduras]. Nirenberg, O., Brawerman, J., & Ruiz, V. (2000). Evaluar para la transformación: Innovaciones en la evaluación de programas y

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proyectos sociales. [Evaluation for transformation: Innovations in the evaluation of social programs and projects.] Buenos Aires: Páidos. Organization of American States. (2007). Definición y categorización de pandillas. [Definition and categorization of gangs.] Accessed from https://www.oas.org/dsp/documentos/pandillas/AnexoVI.Honduras. pdf. Organization of American States. (26 November 2017). Misión de Observación Electoral. Informe final. Elecciones generales Honduras. [Final report. General election Honduras.] Accessed 1 de Octubre de 2018, http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2017/CP38551SMOEH.pdf?fbclid=IwA R27rvuzJf7qNSoR5yJm_zEorE4CTY8T2MNSoe1oqSfez8LY6mPEja w8ccQ. Oxfam. (n. d.). ¿Cuál es el impacto de las concesiones de recursos naturales (Agua, Bosque, Minería) en territorios indígenas de Honduras? [What is the impact of natural resource concessions (Water, Forest, Mining) on indigenous territories of Honduras?] Accessed from http://sicsal.net/articulos/files/Informe%20_Impacto_ Concesiones_RRNN.pdf. Patel, D., Simon, M., & Taylor, R. (2013). Contagion of Violence: Workshop Summary. Accessed 28 January 2020, https://download.nap. edu/cart/download.cgi?record_id=13489. Plan Alianza para la Prosperidad del Triángulo Norte. (2015). Plan Regional. [Regional plan.] Guatemala City, Tegucigalpa and San Salvador. Plan Alianza para la Prosperidad del Triángulo Norte. (n.d.) Principales avances y logros 2017-2018. [Main progress and achievements 20172018.] Accessed 1 de Octubre de 2018, http://www.sefin.gob.hn/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/avancestriangulonorte.pdf. Red en Derechos. (2011). El enfoque basado en Derechos Humanos: Evaluación e Indicadores. [The Human Rights-Based Approach: Evaluation and Indicators.] Accessed from http://www.redenderechos. org/webdav/publico/evaluacionEBDH_final.pdf. Sánchez, R. C., & Urraza, X. A. (2015). Cuadernos Deusto de Derechos Humanos. ¿Migración o desplazamiento forzado? Las causas de los

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movimientos de población a debate (Núm. 81). [Deusto Human Rights Notebooks. Migration or forced displacement?. The causes of population movements under discussion (No. 81).] Accessed 4 September 2018, http://www.deusto-publicaciones.es/deusto/pdfs/ cuadernosdcho/cuadernosdcho81.pdf. Seoane, J., Taddei, E., & Algranati, C. (2012). Recolonización, bienes comunes de la naturaleza y alternativas de los Pueblos. [Recolonization, natural common goods and alternatives for idigenous people.] Buenos Aires: Diálogo de los Pueblos y Grupo de Estudios sobre América Latina y el Caribe (Geal). Accessed from http://www.ibase.br/userimages/liv_ibase_dialogo_web.pdf. Szabó, I. (n.d.). El impacto de las armas en la violencia: el caso de Brasil. [The impact of weapons on violence: the case of Brazil.] Brasil. Accessed from http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd57/szabo.pdf. Transparency International. (2015). Primer Informe sobre Impunidad: Casos de Homicidios en Comayagua, San Pedro Sula y Tegucigalpa 2010-2012. [First Report on Impunity: Homicide Cases in Comayagua, San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa 2010-2012.] Honduras. Accessed 10 de Octubre de 2018, https://www.flipsnack.com/ ASJHONDURAS/estudio-de-impunidad-honduras-2010-2012.html. Transparency International. (2019). Accessed 29 January 2020, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019. Transparency International. (n.d.). Honduras: overview of corruption and anti-corruption. Accessed 2 October 2018, https://knowledgehub. transparency.org/helpdesk/honduras-overview-of-corruption-and-anticorruption. United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO). (2017). Informe de seguimiento de la educación en el mundo 2016. [World Education Monitoring Report 2016] Accessed 2 de Octubre de 2018, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002485/ 248526S.pdf. United Nations Development Programme. (2010). Informe Regional sobre Desarrollo Humano para América Latina y el Caribe. [Regional Report on Human Development for Latin America and the Caribbean.]

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Accessed 2 September 2018, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/ rhdr-2010-rblac.pdf. United Nations Development Programme. (2012). Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano. Honduras 2011. [Human Development Report. Honduras 2011.] Accessed from http://www.undp.org/content/dam/ honduras/docs/publicaciones/INDH2011Completo_sin%20anexos.pdf. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2006). Preguntas frecuentes sobre el enfoque de Derechos Humanos en la cooperación para el desarrollo. [Frequently Asked Questions about the Human Rights Approach to Development Cooperation.] Accessed 10 September 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ FAQsp.pdf. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2014). Children on the Run. Accessed from http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/ 56fc266f4/children-on-the-run-full-report.html?query=Children%20on %20the%20Run. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2017). Informe sobre tierras, viviendas y desplazamiento forzado en Honduras. [Report on land, housing and forced displacement in Honduras.] Accessed 25 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ 11239%20%281%29.pdf. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2018). Regional Response to Caravans’ Refugees and Migrants in Central America. 01 – 15 November 2018. Accessed 25 January 2020, https://www.acnur. org/op/op_fs/5bf3380e4/respuesta-regional-a-las-caravanas-derefugiados-y-migrantes-en-centroamerica.html. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2019). Interagency response to mixed movements from northern Central America. 14–17 January 2019. Accessed 25 January 2020, https://www.acnur.org/ op/op_fs/5c42880f4/respuesta-interagencial-a-los-movimientosmixtos-desde-el-norte-de-centroamerica.html?query=caravana. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2019). Global study on homicide. Executive summary. Accessed 26 January 2020, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet1.pdf.

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United Nations Population Fund. (n. d.). El enfoque basado en los derechos humanos. [The human rights-based approach.] Accessed 3 September 2018, https://www.unfpa.org/es/el-enfoque-basado-en-losderechos-humanos. United Nations Security Council. (3 August 2004). El Estado de derecho y la justicia de transición en las sociedades que sufren o han sufrido conflictos. [The rule of law and transitional justice in societies that suffer or have suffered conflicts.] Accessed from http://www.un.org/ en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2004/616&Lang=S. University of the Americas Puebla, UDLAP Jenkins Graduate School & Centro de Estudios sobre Impunidad y Justicia. (2017). Índice Global de Impunidad. [Global Impunity Index.] Accessed 4 de Octubre de 2018, https://www.udlap.mx/cesij/files/IGI-2017_esp.pdf. Washington Office on Latin America. (2019). Monitoreo de la cooperación de Estados Unidos a Centroamérica. [Monitoring of U.S. cooperation to Central America.] Accessed from https://www.wola. org/es/ monitoreando-asistencia-centroamerica/. World Bank. (2012). Mejores Empleos en América Central: El Rol del Capital Humano. [Better Jobs in Central America: The Role of Human Capital.] Accessed from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 465631468016219619/pdf/729210ESW0Whit00empleos0en0Hondura s.pdf. World Bank. (n. d.). Database. Accessed 25 January 2020, https:// datos.bancomundial.org. World Justice Project. (2018). The WJP Rule of Law Index 2017-2018. Accessed 5 de Octubre de 2018, https://worldjusticeproject.org/ourwork/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2017%E2%80%932018.

Reviewed by Charles Call (American University), Dario Euraque (Trinity College), and Rafael del Cid (independent).

In: Honduras Editor: Eric S. Riordan

ISBN: 978-1-53618-523-2 © 2020 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 2

AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION IN HONDURAS Arie Sanders* Zamorano University, Honduras

ABSTRACT This chapter explores the transformation of the Honduran agricultural sector in the context of the modernization process of the past four decades. Modernization has promoted the insertion of the agricultural sector into the global market. Honduras became relatively successful at promoting the production of nontraditional export crops like palm oil, melon and shrimp. In spite of the agricultural modernization process, production growth and a decrease in rural poverty have yet to be realized and remain a challenge. For 80 per cent of the population, residing in a rural area means living in poverty or extreme poverty (62 per cent). Also food and nutrition insecurity is still a problem for the vulnerable population. The uncontrolled expansion of agricultural activities has led to deforestation and environmental degradation, especially in the more mountainous areas. I will argue that the modernization of agricultural production, which always seeks to expand *

Corresponding Author’s E-mail: [email protected].

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Arie Sanders and accumulate opportunities, has made Honduras and its agricultural sector more vulnerable to internal and external shocks, such as commodity price fluctuations and climate change and that there is an urgent need for reflexivity about the current agricultural policy to face these challenges.

Keywords: agricultural development, Honduras, agriculture modernization

INTRODUCTION In this chapter I explore the transformation of the agricultural sector in the context of the modernization process of the past four decades, during which Honduras has undergone important changes. I accomplish this by analyzing how economic reforms and globalization have affected the rural context of the agricultural sector. Since the modernization program of the nineties, the Honduran agrarian structure and production systems have undergone a number of changes. The modernization process of the Honduran agricultural sector focused on becoming more efficient by increasing scale and production and by stimulating non-traditional exports, such as horticultural products, shrimp and palm oil (Jansen et al. 2006; Thorpe 2002). While the modernization program was not directly focused on reducing the number of small scale farmers, the reduction and/or elimination of state-owned programs/services, such as credits, land reforms and agriculture extension had a wide ranging impact on the small scale sector (Baumeister and Wattel 1996). Modernization, as I will argue, has promoted the introduction of the Honduran agricultural sector into the global market, creating a high degree of dependency on such inputs as agrochemicals, fertilizers, and seeds, as well as on commodity prices. At the same time, the uncontrolled expansion of agricultural activities combined with deforestation and environmental degradation has made Honduras more sensitive to climate change. The impact of changes in production systems as a result of drought or other climate-related threats for the already impoverished rural households had an important effect on the households subsistence strategy. Most poor farm

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households pursue a multiple-income strategy by combining farming with off farm employment (Ruben and Berg 2001). However, (illegal) migration to the United States is increasingly becoming an important survival strategy for many rural households (Brogan and McGuinness 2013) Farmers are now exposed to two different kind of risks, economic and climate-related; this can undermine their ability to appropriately respond to external shocks. Leichenko and O'Brien (2008) called the combined effects of globalization and climate change “double exposure.” According to their framework, simultaneous exposure to the negative (or positive) impacts of climate change and economic globalization could result in some groups, countries or regions becoming “winners” and some “losers.” The authors argue that it is necessary to analyze the interactions between economic and environmental change to get a better understanding of how those two processes influence exposure and society’s capacity to respond to a wide variety of external shocks. This chapter examines the modernization strategy in the Honduran agricultural sector in a setting of increasing vulnerabilty to climate change. In this framework, I refer to economic globalization with market liberalization and free trade, as the main components of the modernization strategy in Honduras. The consequences of climate change in agriculture means extended droughts during the planting season, causing important yield loses in the most impoverished areas of the country; but also high exposure to climate related hazards such as floods, landslides and tropical storms that influence negatively agricultural production. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews agricultural modernization as a social technical imaginary, and its consequences for the sector. Section 3 presents a short history of the implementation of the agricultural modernization policy, followed by section 4, which presents the current situation. Section 5 describes how the modernization process had caused the agricultural sector to become more vulnerable in the face of international trade and climate change. Section 6 analyzes the current government policy’s failure to seek alternatives for dealing with the rising threat of climate change. Finally, section 7 sets out some conclusions about

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the transformation of the rural sector in Honduras in the context of agriculture modernization.

AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION (Jasanoff 2015) notes that the capacity to imagine futures is an important element of social and political life, and she uses the concept of “sociotechnical imaginaries” to describe such collective visions of desirable and feasible sociotechnical futures. The creation of a vision for the future based on the possibilities of science and technology is embedded in social organization and practices and is normally considered to be an implicit shared understanding of what is considered to be good and desirable (Jasanoff and Kim 2009). Sociotechnical imaginaries are not only produced by the government, but can involve many different actors. It is also important to recognize the existence of a great variety of potential futures, the different kinds of scales and their political importance. Imaginaries can influence political decision making and the promotion or exclusion of certain political strategies. Imaginaries are real, have real consequences and can take on a form of agency which can shape the present (Jasanoff 2015). The modernization of the agricultural sector can be seen as a sociotechnical project, requiring the sector’s physical (e.g., land), technological (e.g., seed) and social (e.g., government, agroindustry, and farmers) reconfiguration. This involves substantial consequences for smallscale farmers and, as we will see, has broad social implications. The poverty and “backwardness” of the Honduran agriculture sector required a strategy for increasing food production and avoiding further social and political turmoil. Modernization is a key concept for leading to a convergence between smallholder mode of production and modern and technified agriculture. It involves restructuring a sectorial’s social, economic, political and cultural aspects. For the agricultural sector, modernization generally means a transformation from subsistence to market-oriented production, from food

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to cash crops, enclosure of common lands (land reform) and the introduction of the “green revolution” package, consisting improved seeds and agrochemicals (Ploeg 2018). The massive state-led modernization process in most all of third world countries reshaped the dynamics and structure of the agrarian sector. As far as Latin America is concerned, there are many examples of how government programs in the seventies and eighties tried to modernize the agrarian sector with a significant impact on its structure. Some successful examples of this policy are flower production in Colombia, horticulture in Mexico, fruits in Costa Rica, soy beans in Brazil and grapes in Chile. The “sophistication” of those crops is the result of intensive processes of technological innovation and modernization of its productive structure. However, the impact of this modernization process was not homogenous and included only a small number of products and regions (Piñeiro, M. 2005). In the nineties, when Latin America introduced the structural adjustment programs imposed by Breton Woods institutions, the role of governments in the agricultural sector was drastically reduced. Agricultural finance, technical assistance and marketing boards were dismantled, and a more important role was given to the market. The strong focus on the market is seen as a promising scenario for modernizing the agricultural sector and at the same time reducing rural poverty and increasing food security. The market will not only distribute the production factors (capital, land and labor) more efficiently, but will also foster innovation and demand for new and emerging agricultural technologies. In national policy, the vision of a modernized agricultural sector promises solutions to many challenges, leading to a better future with increasing production, exports and food security and a reduction in rural poverty. The influence of the agricultural modernization policy is reflected in the current development ideas and the daily practices of agricultural development projects in Honduras. For example, small scale farmers´ integration into agricultural value chains through upgrading has become a widely applied development approach, and this is also the case in Honduras. The current focus on upgrading Honduran farmers to increase their competitiveness through product development and improvements in

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production techniques reflects the “ideological” pro-market and minimal state intervention perspective of the Honduran Government. This desire or “the will to improve” is clearly expressed in the overall multiple-year strategies developed by the Government of Honduras since 2010. There are two national-level plans, “Country Vision” and the “National Development Plan”, and two plans on the implementation level, the “National Food Security and Nutrition Strategy” (ENSAN),” and the “National Investment Plan for the Agrifood Sector” (PIPSA). Both implementation plans have a strong focus on productivity: the agricultural sector must be transformed to reach the highest levels of agricultural production possible in the context of open markets (Government of Honduras 2013). According to Ploeg (2013) independent of modernization’s “success” level or locality, its general impact on the agricultural sector involved an increase in the scale of production, an outflow of labor force, an increase in technology use and an intensification of production. These changes go hand in hand with a process of commoditization, where former relations of production (for example exchange of seed for labor) become more market related. The incorporation of farmers into the marketplace, whatever the market, implies that farmers have to change their production methodologies pursuant to the market logic. The more a farmer is incorporated into the market, the more the market will influence his/her way of production.

THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR’S PATH TO MODERNIZATION Agricultural modernization had already started during the ‘70s in the 20th century with the introduction of green revolution technologies, such as fertilizers and high yielding seed varieties. At the same time, in the sixties the Government of Honduras (GOH) adopted an import substitution strategy to protect and promote its domestic industry. The role of the agricultural sector, as explained in the paragraph above, was to generate the necessary surplus to finance this process. The GOH took a technical

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approach to agricultural development. In this context, agricultural sector policy focused on maintaining low food prices by offering technical assistance, subsidized interest rates and reduced import tariffs for agricultural inputs like fertilizers. High yielding varieties and agrochemicals were widely introduced by the larger commercial farms. This agricultural policy had a strong bias toward intermediate and larger farmers. While the large-scale sector was relatively successful in increasing production, small-scale farmers remained mostly at a subsistence production level. The success of the export sector created an increasing demand for land by large landowners. This demand resulted in a process of “forced” internal migration of subsistence farmers from the flat valleys to hillside areas, which are less appropriate for agriculture (Baumeister and Wattel 1996; Stonich 1991). Honduran import substitution policy had created profound financial imbalances (trade deficits and high foreign debt) affecting the country’s economic and political stability. Honduras had to shift away from the import-subsistution strategy towards a new focus on “export-oriented growth” (Tavares 2001). During the eighties, the Honduran economic performance was poor and its real annual gross domestic product growth of 2.5% was the lowest in the region. Between 1980 and the end of 1987, its total external debt almost doubled to about US$3 billion, of which over two thirds was owed to the World Bank and IMF. In 1988, the GOH signed the first Structural Adjustment Loan for US$50 million with the World Bank to address its liquidity crisis (World Bank). For the agricultural sector, the eighties was a period of transition during which it promoted the export of non-traditional crops. Noteworthy for the agricultural sector was the integration of Honduras into the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The CBI was an US government initiative to promote the economic development and export diversification of the Caribbean and Central American countries (Tavares 2001). Through this trade agreement, Honduras obtained access to the US agricultural market. This was an important incentive for producers of non-traditional agricultural crops, especially horticultural products, which doubled their export value in the period from 1983 to 1990 (Merrill 1995).

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Accompanying the structural adjustment loans in the nineties, were the Washington Consensus-supported Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). The aim of the SAP was to capitalize on the reforms introduced in the eighties by implementing new policies to further open the Honduran economy to international trade and to reduce public spending. In 1990, the average import protection tariff was 41.9%, the highest in the region. Five years later, the average tariff had dropped to 8.1% to become the lowest in the region (Morley, Nakasone, and Piñeiro, V. 2008). The effect of trade liberation on the economy during the next decade was disappointing. The average per capita growth between 1990 and 2000 was a half percent per year, the lowest growth rate in all Latin America. With trade liberalization, there was a strong increase in imports, including staple crops (corn), while exports remained stable, leading to an increase in the trade deficit (Morley, Nakasone, and Piñeiro, V. 2008) A critical aspect of the SAP for the agricultural sector was the implementation of the Agricultural Modernization Law (AML) in 1992 (Baumeister and Wattel 1996; Thorpe 2002). This law was a continuum of the ongoing policy of government reduction and a more prominent role of private agribusiness in export production associated with market and price liberalization (Boyer 2010; Sunderlin and Rodriguez, J. 1996). With a further reduction of agricultural extension and research programs, government spending in the sector decreased from 11% in 1990 to 4% in 2005 (Serna 2007). According to Roger Norton, policy advisor for the Agricultural Policy Analysis for Honduras (APAH/USAID) who collaborated with the GOH to design the AML, the fundamental idea of the AML was to “alleviate poverty and initiate a new process of economic growth by establishing clear, stable and uniform rules of the game among sectors and industries” (cited in:Sunderlin and Rodriguez, J. 1996, 15). A fundamental precept of the neoliberal way of thinking is that secure land tenure is a basic precondition for increasing investment in the agricultural sector. After three decades of government intervention in the distribution of land to the rural landless, the modernization law focused more on increasing land tenure (Jansen et al. 2006) with the GOH establishing a land tenure program to support land titling. One of the

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outcomes of this program was a transformation from the land cooperatives formed in the sixties to increasing cultivation of private plots (Merrill 1995). This resulted in a large group of small farmers opting to sell their land to large-scale producers, which lead to the reconcentration of land that was previously distributed during the land reforms of the eighties (Boyer 2010). In spite of the structural adjustment program, Honduras remained one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere with low economic growth and high external debt. In 2000, Honduras qualified for Highly Indebted Poor Country status and, with support from the World Bank, it began to draft a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Honduras reached the completion point in April 2005, qualifying the country for major debt relief; the resulting savings were to be used for social programs to reduce its poverty levels. In 2004, the trade liberalization process got another boost when Honduras signed the Dominican Republic and Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) with the United States. While corn and beans, the most important Honduran staple food, were still protected by import tariffs in the CBI agreement, they lost their protection status with DR-CAFTA. Jaramillo and Lederman (2005) analyzed the possible impact of the elimination of import tariffs for United States corn for Honduran households. According to their findings, food prices will decrease and will cause a positive effect on the welfare of the urban poor because they are net food buyers. However, the impact will be negative for the net producers (farmer households that sell more that they consume). It appears that corn is the most sensitive crop in the trade agreement because competition from imports is likely to create greater pressure on Honduran producers (Jank 2004). During the 2006-2008 period, like the rest of Latin American countries, Honduras experienced an increase in food product prices. These high prices have affected the standard of living of Honduran households, with the most affected being households that are net consumers of basic grains. A Honduran’s basic diet is highly monotonous; close to 80% of the calories come from only ten foods, with corn and beans making up 81% of

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total calorie consumption (Government of Honduras 2013). Part of the Honduran government’s response involves the implementation of a voucher program as a measure aimed at increasing grain supply and at capitalizing rural savings and credit associations known as “Cajas Rurales” as an instrument to provide sustainability to the future financing of improved seeds and fertilizers. Because of high poverty rates and the country’s vulnerability to climate change, during the last decade the Honduran government has concentrated its rural development efforts on the “dry corridor” of western Honduras. The pro-poor geographical targeting strategy promoted through the governmental flagship program “Alianza para el Corredor Seco” (Alliance for the Dry Corridor, ACS), has converted the area in large recipient of international development projects. It is out of my scope to evaluate whether rural development projects achieve their honorable goal of poverty eradication in Honduras. However, the number of people still living in poverty is still high; according to the national plan of Honduras, almost 60% of the population lives in poverty and 36% in extreme poverty (Government of Honduras 2013). Over 80% of the extreme poor lives in the rural area. Poverty reduction, especially in rural areas, remains a big challenge in Honduras. Multimillion-dollar rural development projects still dominate the rural landscape as the visible hand that corrects rural markets and transfers resources to the impoverished rural population. The design of those projects has changed over the decades, moving from integrated rural development in the 1990s to the current “market for the poor” approach. What has not changed is the desire of the Honduran government and international donor community to reduce rural poverty and their confidence that free markets are the most-efficient mechanism to achieve this.

THE OUTCOME In spite of the implementation of the Agricultural Modernization Law which mainly included the elimination of the state as an active actor in the

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agricultural sector and the opening of markets by reducing import tariffs, the expected modernization, production growth and decrease in rural poverty has yet to be realized and remains a challenge. Of the eight million inhabitants, roughly half reside in rural areas, mostly relying on agriculture to make a living. For 68.2% of the population, living in a rural area means living in poverty or extreme poverty (57.2%) (National Institute of Statistics 2020). Also food and nutrition insecurity is still a problem for the vulnerable population; this situation has worsened in recent years because of ongoing droughts in the parts of the country that are already the driest (Parker et al. 2014). The majority of agricultural land in Honduras is used for subsistence agriculture on small hillside plots which are too small to make a living or ensure household food security. Many of the government programs do not reach the majority of small producers, who depend for their livelihood on cultivating such plots of degraded land. In spite of the land reform in the fifties, land distribution and insecure land tenure remain a controversial problem. In 2008, more than a quarter of rural households (161,000) were landless and about one fifth had less than one hectare of property, and the problem is increasing (Boyer 2010). Land grabs in the Aguán Valley in northern Honduras had already costs many lives: between September 2009 and August 2012, there have been 52 recorded cases of peasant murders in the context of the Aguán agrarian conflict (Kerssen 2013). Others have raised concerns about land grabbing in eastern Honduras by narco middlemen engaged in the local logistics of drugs trafficking (McSweeney et al. 2018). Areas originally owned by Miskitos and Garifunas are sold to those “middlemen” and are normally converted to cattle pasture. With exception of World Bank´s Land Administration Project in Honduras (PATH II), which mainly works in urban areas, there are no large initiatives to resolve the rural land tenure problem in Honduras. An estimated one million Hondurans live in the United States, about 60 per cent of whom are believed to be undocumented (Meyer 2014). In 2019, international remittances to Honduras reached US$5.4 billion (Central Bank of Honduras 2019), equivalent to 19% of the Gross

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Domestic Product and almost 28% of household income. Some authors have linked lack of access to land (Baumeister 2010), violence (Clemens 2017) or climate change (McLeman and Hunter 2010) to the migration flow to the United States, which has become an important livelihood strategy for rural Hondurans. Such migration involves principally young males and females. The outflow of young people has had a dramatic impact on the demographic profile of rural communities. More and more, the traditional demographic pyramid has become an “hourglass”, indicating a predominance of older members and young children. Modernization over the last decades has resulted in a structural transformation of the economy. Agriculture’s contribution to GDP has gradually diminished from 24.8% in 1990 to 11.8% in 2018 (Central Bank of Honduras 2019). In addition to its reduction in the contribution to the economy, the sector also faces a low level of productivity (Quijada and Sierra 2014). According to the World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank 2019), agricultural productivity, measured as value added per worker, has almost stagnated since 2001. The productivity in the Honduran agricultural sector reached in 2018 about USD 2,155 per worker, while this number for Latin America and the Caribbean for the same year was more than three times as many (USD 7,100). This will naturally lead to new challenges since a third of the population derives the majority of its income from agriculture. There have also been structural changes in the agricultural sector. While banana and coffee have been historically important crops for Honduras, the latter has drastically expanded its growing area. Coffee is perceived by the GOH as a crucial export crop for generating foreign currency and accelerating the country’s economic development. The combination of production incentives, improved infrastructure and privatization of public and communal land encouraged its expansion (Tucker 2008). In the last 20 years, the coffee growing area increased by more than 60%, directly affecting thousands of hectares of secondary forest. Approximately 90% of Honduran coffee farmers are smallholders with less than five hectares of land who rely on family labor (Baumeister 2010). Coffee helped to boost the number of small scale farmers.

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Both banana and palm oil are plantation crops with highly vertical integration (from production to processing) and, in the case of Honduras, the plantations are mainly on the humid north coast. High world prices made palm oil one of the most profitable crop in Honduras, and have led to a growth of the crop at the expense of bananas. African palm requires less labor per hectare than banana and is relatively easy to grow. During the 2000-2019 period, Honduras increased its production from 148,000 MT to more than 580,000 MT, converting the country in the eighth-largest producer worldwide (USDA 2020). However, the spread of large-scale African palm in northern Honduras is not without problems. Palm oil plantations are an important driver of deforestation and the loss of local ethnic community territory (León Araya 2019). Land grabbing by large corporate firms has caused renewed tension in the area and led to violent confrontation with peasant organizations (Kerssen 2013). Melon production is the other export crop that has increased its importance in the export portfolio. The sector is dominated by four large companies and employs between 30 and 40 thousand workers on plantations and in packing centers around the country. Most work is temporary because of the peak in export demand. Increasingly, the Honduran agricultural sector is becoming dominated by national and international corporations. The free market and privatization-oriented modernization policy led to an organizational restructuring of the Honduran agricultural production and processing industry. As in many other Latin American countries (Wilkinson 2010), there is a process of horizontal (in like sectors) and vertical (integrating downstream and upstream markets) integration, leading to a concentration of economic and political power among the national agribusiness class in the San Pedro Sula area. While the export of non-traditional crops has increased its importance for the economy, the history of corn, the country’s most important staple crop, is less straightforward. There are approximately 312,000 farmers depending on maize as their major source of subsistence. Maize yields in Honduras are quite low by Latin America standards and averaged 1.8 metric tons per hectare in 2018 compared to a regional average of about

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three metric tons per hectare (FAO 2019). Yields have increased only marginally over the last two decades, and the production area has been reduced. Honduras is a net importer of maize, and imports have been stable over the last decade. The import to consumption ratio for maize is approximately 45%. However, there is an important group of medium and large-scale farmers in the maize sector who produce the crop in valleys and in other areas with a high productive potential. These farmers normally use high levels of purchased inputs, such as transgenic seeds and fertilizers. Their average yield is about 6-7 metric tons per hectare, and the production is normally sold to processing industries (Falck Zepeda et al. 2012). During the past decade, the Honduran government has become more concerned about climate change as a threat to food security. Because of its geographic location, Honduras is a climate change “hotspot” and is particularly vulnerable to extreme weather, such as drought and tropical hurricanes (Imbach et al. 2017). Climate models estimate a 10 to 20% reduction in precipitation and an increase in temperature of between 1.0 and 2.5°C (Parker et al. 2014). In a study by Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean about the impact of climate change on the agricultural sector, it is estimated that average yield losses will reach between 8 and 10% in the most pessimistic scenario (Ordaz et al. 2010). The crops that will be most affected are maize and coffee. Because agriculture is intrinsically highly sensitive to climate change, its impact for a country like Honduras can be dramatic (Sanders et al. 2019). Hurricane Mitch in 1998 not only killed 10,000 persons, but also destroyed thousands of hectares of agricultural land as a result of hillsides flash floods. Honduras’ main problem is its low adaptive capacity (UNDP 2013). While it is difficult to forecast the impact of climate change for the agricultural sector, in the end it will be highly related to the mitigation efforts undertaken and adaptation capacity of the sector at local level. The modernization process has also had consequences for the agrarian structure and how production is organized. On one hand, modernization intensified the dual agrarian structure involving a large impoverished peasant sector and a small modern large-scale or plantation sector, which is fully integrated into the global market. Clearly the agricultural

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modernization law and export promotion have facilitated the creation of a successful agribusiness sector (Thorpe 2002), but the expansion of African palm cultivation on the north coast of Honduras has also created many landless rural labors (Kerssen 2013; León Araya 2019). A similar situation can be found in southern Honduras, where large scale shrimp farms have enclosed communal mangrove forests, thereby excluding artisanal fishery (Box and Bonilla Salgado 2009). The concentration of land and other natural resources facilitates modern large scale production. The corporations involved are in the vanguard and use their resulting influence to jealously guard their privileged position in the agricultural modernization process.

BECOMING MORE VULNERABLE The modernization of agricultural production, which always seeks to expand and accumulate opportunities, has made Honduras and its agricultural sector more vulnerable to internal and external shocks, such as commodity price fluctuations and climate change. Nevertheless, climate change and trade shocks will not affect all crops, farmers or regions with the same intensity (Leichenko and O'Brien 2008). This trend can be seen on different fronts. First, the Honduran agricultural sector became highly dependent on external inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers and agrochemicals. Most of the inputs are imported or made from imported resources, whose prices are linked to that of petroleum on the world market. Honduran production has become increasingly reliant on international trade. Almost 46% of Honduran export value (free trade zones not included) in 2018 involved commodities, mainly coffee, banana and palm oil (Central Bank of Honduras 2019). Because of the high dependency on a few commodities for its export earnings, price fluctuations have a direct impact on poor households, which depend on primary commodities for their livelihoods. Low coffee prices have a lasting impact on rural communities because of its multiple downsteram and upstream linkages in its value chain.

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Price fluctuations also affect large firms. In the case of palm oil, in 2018 export income dropped by 21.1% as a result of a 23% price decrease and a 4.3% decrease in production volume (Central Bank of Honduras 2019). However, the decline in production volume was due to such factors as crop diseases caused by the weevil, white scale and mites, in addition to the drought caused by El Niño. There is concern that the African palm oil plantations will experience the same history as banana plantations in the thirties and forties of the last century, where black sigatoka almost destroyed total banana production (Soluri 2005). Second, Honduras has the agricultural potential to grow enough staple crops of maize, beans and rice to feed its own people and export the surplus to its neighbor countries. With the gradual reduction of import tariffs for corn as agreed in DR-CAFTA negotiations, corn imports from the United States increased from 5,476 MT in 2002 to 8,964 MT in 2009 (CDPC 2013). In 2009, 42% of the main staple crop was imported. The increase in commodity prices in 2007-2008 diminished the country’s food security situation significantly. At household level, Dodd et al. (2020) found that approximately one quarter of subsistence farmers in northern Honduras experienced insufficient food availability for a six-month period. Larson, Castellanos, and Jensen (2019) used the Food Insecurity Experience Scale index to measure food insecurity in western Honduras. According to their results, nearly a quarter of women suffer severe food insecurity, and about half reported mild and moderate food insecurity. Third, the modernization process led to an increase in the cultivated area of mainly two crops, coffee and African palm. Both crops have directly and indirectly caused an accelerating deforestation process, a reduction in biodiversity and a weakening of ecosystem resilience (Myton et al. 2014). The Arabica coffee variety is particularly sensitive to climate extremes. Higher temperatures and long droughts interrupted by intense rainfall during recent years have negatively impacted crop yields, threatening the livelihood of coffee growers. Coffee production is highly dependent on rainfall patterns. For example, flowering is activated with the first rains, the lack of enough precipitation may affect the full development of the coffee fruit (Avelino et al. 2015). The impact of coffee rust, a

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devastating fungus, reduced yields by more than 16% in 2012/2013 (IHCAFE 2013). Rust can be treated with intensive chemical use; however, moving to higher forested areas seems to be the most logical solution for the majority of poor farmers. In the case of palm oil, its most important disease is basal stem rot caused by the fungus Ganoderma boninense. This disease already had caused severe yield losses in South East Asia, and the fungus has been recorded also in Honduras. Inadequate treatment of the fungus is a threat for the current production, and can easily create a similar situation as a century ago when the banana plantations almost disappeared because of a similar problem with Panama disease (Soluri 2005). Fourth, the increase of cattle ranching in the eighties and the current expansion of non-traditional export crops like palm oil has replaced thousands of small famers in the lower areas. As a result of this transformation, small farmers pushed the agrarian frontier into the higher areas, including the national parks in the northeastern part of the country, affecting thousands of hectares of primary and secondary forest. This replacement has caused an endemic problem of soil erosion and deforestation because of the increase in the number of subsistence farmers tilling marginal sloping land. Soil erosion and nutrient run-off lead to a reduction in soil productivity and, in the end, to a drop in crop yields. At the same time, deforestation can impact micro climates, leading to increased temperatures and reduced precipitation. These additional impacts of climate change make it more difficult for farmers to face drought, intense rains and higher temperatures. Reduced crop yields will further marginalize subsistence farmers who depend on these basic grains as household food staples and on sales of the harvest for income. Fifth, the agricultural sector’s increasing vulnerability to the consequences of climate change has been mentioned in the points above. It also important to consider the consequences of modernization and climate change with respect to the type of agricultural producers. Farmers whose rainfed production systems are located on marginal lands in the mountainous areas of Honduras are more vulnerable than farmers in the flat valleys with access to irrigation and better infrastructure. In Honduras,

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the most impoverished rural households are female-headed, and unsurprisingly, female-headed households are more likely to be affected by any form of environmental degradation: “Rural women in particular have been identified as being potentially more vulnerable to both climate change and trade liberalization, relative to men” (Leichenko and O'Brien 2008, 70). Because of the lack to access to credit, for the most marginal groups it is more difficult to adopt such measures as improved seeds, fertilizers and irrigation to increase production and resilience. The “treadmill” of agricultural modernization has led to an increase in production by means of exploiting new land areas, which leads to deforestation and higher productivity through the use of agrochemicals. It exemplifies market thinking in ideal form. However, the modernization process has created greater dependency on external inputs from the international market and caused a great number of unforeseen side effects for the agro-ecological system. The fragility of the “modern” agro-system has been demonstrated through a couple of examples, and it has become clear that the situation could worsen and lead to destabilization as a result of climate change impact.

THE NEED FOR REFLEXIVITY Current agriculture policy in Honduras is a sociotechnical imaginary of a modernized agricultural sector that would be achieved through technological deployment. The success of the green revolution in the seventies in other developing countries for increasing agricultural production demonstrates that agricultural modernization has been the dominant imaginary for achieving a successful agro-export country. The instrumental vision of modernization was strengthened in the seventies and eighties with a highly interventionist state, but this changed in the nineties with the introduction of structural adjustment programs. While the imaginary modernization remained in force, the role of the state as an active actor in the market changed totally. As mentioned before, the stateled modernization was not successful, resulting in high external debt and

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low economic growth. With the support of international development agencies, a market approach was introduced to take over the role of the state to promote more efficient agricultural modernization. Technology has to be promoted and introduced by private companies while the State will be responsible for creating the right market climate to reduce the information asymmetry and assure private intellectual property rights. With the support of the international donor community, the Government of Honduras has started an array of initiatives to increase food security and mitigate the risk posed by climate change. It has implemented multiple projects, either specific to agriculture and food security or dealing with ecosystem resilience in natural protected areas. Beyond its commitment to mitigation through energy efficiency and renewable energy use, the focus of the Honduran Government and donor agencies has been on adaptation through new technologies, such as irrigation, droughttolerant crops (including transgenic seeds) and infrastructure for rainwater catchment. The approach to current problems is not very different from the ideas of twenty years ago - only modern agriculture can feed the growing Honduran population. The intimate connection between market policy and technology as sociotechnical imaginaries for increasing agricultural productivity and reducing rural poverty is what Jasanoff (2015) called a coproduction of science, technology and society in modernity. These imaginaries implicitly suppose that rural poverty is a result of technological failure and that modern technologies, such as drip-irrigation or transgenetic hybrid seeds, can provide a possible solution. This is strongly embedded in the agricultural sector, not only by governmental, international donor agencies and corporations, but also by academic circles and individual farmers. The fact that impoverished smallholders are only marginally included in the dominant modernization imaginary raises the question whether there is place for one or more alternative sociotechnical imaginaries at the same moment. As we have seen, different agro-technical agendas are formed at moments of crisis and opportunities and endure as competing imaginaries. However, some imaginaries are less competitive (powerful) than others. The food sovereignty agenda set by the peasant unions never became a

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competing alternative for the ongoing modernization process in Honduras. It seems that the “smallholder” mode of farming has become outmoded due to modern agriculture, but at the same time there are thousands of smallholders using its traditional maize-beans production system for their subsistence. Maize – beans production is still working for them: some of them use landraces and others use a mixture of landraces and high yielding varieties. There is a complex integration of technologies in which old and new are becoming hybridized. Much of Honduran´s maize-bean system relies on those hybridized maize varieties, adopted outside government programs or induced by markets. The discussion that an “older” paradigm should be replaced by a “newer” one denies the bigger picture of technology and its embeddedness in a complex and imperfect society. Agricultural societies like Honduras should generate multiple sociotechnical imaginaries by creating the conditions so that farmers can choose their own development path. The green revolution showed that agro-technology has been relatively satisfactory at spreading across different areas and/or farmers. Current policy, as a product of agricultural modernization not only reinforces the power relations in the agrarian structure, but also risks creating a technological monoculture that will further marginalize a large part of the Honduran rural society. It has blocked the spread of knowledge among farmers about modern genetics. Leaving the economic development of rural Honduras to the market has not been very successful; markets simply lack pro-poor incentives. Authors such as Altieri et al. (2015), Ploeg (2013) and Rosset et al. (2011) suggest that small-scale and/or agro-ecological agriculture could be a feasible solution to creating a more resilient production system. There is an overwhelming body of evidence suggesting that small farms are significantly more productive. Small scale and/or agro-ecological farming not only reduce the dependency for external inputs it also contribute to the creation of a more resilient production system to face climate change (Altieri et al. 2015). Small scale or agro-ecological farming will not be enough to guarantee food security; even current worldwide overproduction does not guarantee food availability to all people (Magdoff and Tokar 2010). Land access and national food sovereignty are of great importance

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for countries like Honduras because of both the food insecurity situation and the thousands of impoverished rural households. Honduras needs a new kind of agri-food system that can guarantee food security while at the same time be environmentally sound and resilient to face climate change. Relying only on large scale agriculture and the import of staple foods is not a long term answer to the agrarian question. It is important to increase national food production and at the same time to employ more rural labor to slow the migration to urban areas where job opportunities are scarce. The current Honduran agricultural situation is a contradiction in itself. While the GOH and donor agencies recognize that climate change threatens agriculture and the food system, there is a lack of awareness that the situation was created by its own modernization policy. This makes it very difficult to bring about a paradigm shift in the current agricultural modernization model. There is need for agricultural production that can not only maintain food security and create rural employment, but can also end the ongoing trend of becoming increasingly exposed to external risks. Becoming in Ulrich Beck´s term reflexive of the double exposure problem is a crucial step. If Beck (2008) is right, this reflexivity will create a growing role of sub politics, such as farmers’ initiatives and new social food movements, which can form the basis for a new generation of alternative sociotechnical imaginaries.

CONCLUSION The agricultural modernization imaginary is deeply rooted in Honduran society and has been dominant in determining the direction in which the agricultural sector is and should be going. As we have observed, the key actor in the creation of this imaginary is the government with help of the international development agencies. The construction of this imaginary cannot be isolated from the worldwide trend of economic modernization based on a neoliberal agenda. The increasing role of markets, international trade and agroindustry reshaped the agrarian structures and coproduced the expansion large-scale agriculture in

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Honduras, further reinforcing the marginalization of the smallholder mode of production. Agricultural modernization has created a dynamic non-traditional crop export sector, involving palm oil, melon and capital-intensive transgenic corn. By improving its productivity and increasing production Honduras became Central America’s leading exporter of coffee, palm oil, shrimp and melon. With the exception of the coffee sector, the agricultural export sector is becoming increasingly managed by horizontally/vertically integrated corporations. However, this success has not been generalized for the whole agricultural sector. Thousands of subsistence producers are struggling to make a living on the country’s marginal hillsides. Rural poverty and undernourishment are still mayor challenges, and for many rural households, migration to urban areas or the United States is perceived as the only way to achieve a decent life. Modernization has led to an increasing gap between the large agricultural corporations and small scale farmers. Agriculture is becoming more and more dependent on imported inputs like fertilizers and seeds, while the production of staple crops has stagnated and been replaced by increasing food imports. Deforestation, biodiversity loss and land grabbing, especially in the northern part of the country to meet the increasing demand for land to cultivate nontraditional export crops, will further aggravate the current situation. Even before accounting for the problems that will probably be caused by climate change effects, the outlook for the agricultural sector is far from optimistic. With the help of the international donor community, the GOH intends to confront this problem by fostering an increase in production through the introduction of the latest modern technology. In spite of the limited success of 40 years of agricultural development, the GOH continues to pursue its modernization policy. As argued in the chapter, there is an urgent need for reflexivity to address the current situation and to devise an alternative sociotechnical imaginary based on food sovereignty, where the “smallholder” mode of production could play an important role in producing enough local food in a sustainable way.

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Clemens, Michael A. 2017. “Violence, Development, and Migration Waves: Evidence from Central American Child Migrant Apprehensions.” CGD Working Paper 459. Dodd, Warren, Marvin Gómez Cerna, Paola Orellana, Sally Humphries, Margaux L. Sadoine, David Zombré, Kate Zinszer, Amy Kipp, and Donald C. Cole. 2020. “Factors Associated with Seasonal Food Insecurity Among Small-Scale Subsistence Farming Households in Rural Honduras.” International journal of environmental research and public health 17 (3). https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17030706. Falck Zepeda, J., Arie Sanders, Rogelio Trabanino, and R. Batallas. 2012. “Caught Between Scylla and Charybdis: Impact Estimation Issues from the Early Adoption of GM Maize in Honduras.” AgBioForum 15 (2): 138–51. FAO. 2019. FAOSTAT. http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data. Government of Honduras. 2013. Government of Honduras’ Proposal to the Global Agricultural and Food Security Program. Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Technical Unit for Food Security and Nutrition (UTSAN). IHCAFE. 2013. Annual Statistical Report: Harvest 2012-2013. Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Instituto Hondureño del Café. Imbach, Pablo, Megan Beardsley, Claudia Bouroncle, Claudia Medellin, Peter Läderach, Hugo Hidalgo, Eric Alfaro et al. 2017. “Climate Change, Ecosystems and Smallholder Agriculture in Central America: An Introduction to the Special Issue.” Climatic Change 141 (1): 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-017-1920-5. Jank, Marcos Sawaya. 2004. Agricultural Trade Liberalization: Policies and Implications for Latin America. Washington, D.C. Inter-American Development Bank. Jansen, Hans G.P., Angel Rodriguez, Amy Damon, John Pender, Jacqueline Chenier, and Rob Schipper. 2006. “Determinants of Income-Earning Strategies and Adoption of Conservation Practices in Hillside Communities in Rural Honduras.” Agricultural Systems 88 (1): 92–110. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agsy.2005.06.005. Jaramillo, C., and D. Lederman. 2005. DR-CAFTA: Challenges and Opportunities for Central America.

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Jasanoff, Sheila. 2015. “Future Imperfect. Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity.” In Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power, edited by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, 1–33. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press. Jasanoff, Sheila, and Sang-Hyun Kim. 2009. “Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea.” Minerva 47 (2): 119–46. Kerssen, Tanya M. 2013. Grabbing Power: The New Struggles for Land, Food and Democracy in Northern Honduras. 1st ed. Land & sovereignty series No. 1. Oakland CA: Food First Books. Larson, Janelle B., Paige Castellanos, and Leif Jensen. 2019. “Gender, Household Food Security, and Dietary Diversity in Western Honduras.” Global Food Security 20:170–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.gfs.2019.01.005. Leichenko, Robin, and Karen O'Brien. 2008. Environmental Change and Globalization: Double Exposures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. León Araya, Andrés. 2019. “The Politics of Dispossession in the Honduran Palm Oil Industry: A Case Study of the Bajo Aguán.” Journal of Rural Studies 71:134–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2019.01.015. Magdoff, Fred, and Brian Tokar, eds. 2010. Agriculture and Food in Crisis: Conflict, Resistance, and Renewal. New York: Monthly Review Press. Magdoff, Fred, and Brian Tokar. 2010. Agriculture and Food in Crisis: An Overview. In Magdoff and Tokar 2010. McLeman, Robert A., and Lori M. Hunter. 2010. “Migration in the Context of Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change: Insights from Analogues.” Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Climate change 1 (3): 450–61. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.51. McSweeney, Kendra, David J. Wrathall, Erik A. Nielsen, and Zoe Pearson. 2018. “Grounding Traffic: The Cocaine Commodity Chain and Land Grabbing in Eastern Honduras.” Geoforum 95:122–32. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.07.008.

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Merrill, Tim. 1995. Honduras: A Country Study. 3rd ed. DA pam 550-151. Washington D.C. Federal Research Division Library of Congress. Meyer, Peter. 2014. Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service. Morley, Samuel, Eduardo Nakasone, and Valeria Piñeiro. 2008. The Impact of CAFTA on Employment, Production and Poverty in Honduras. IFPRI Discussion Paper. Washington D.C. IFPRI. Myton, Becky, Francisco Silva, Manus McCaffery, Jorge Betancourt, Carlos Ponce, Scott Solberg, and Amy Rogers. 2014. Honduras Tropical Forest and Biodiversity Assessment. National Institute of Statistics. 2020. Continuous Multipurpose Household Survey 2019. https://www.ine.gob.hn/V3/ephpm/. Ordaz, Juan Luis, Diana Ramirez, Jorge Mora, Alicia Acosta, and Braulio Serna. 2010. Honduras: Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture. Mexico D.F. CEPAL. Parker, John, Kelly Miller, Luis Caballero, Rosa Escolan, Edas Muñoz, Alfonso del Rio, Roberto Banegas, Olman Rivera, and Anton Seimon. 2014. Vulnerability and Resilience to Climate Change in Western Honduras. Washington DC: USAID-Honduras. Piñeiro, M. 2005. Rural Development in Latin America: Trends and Politics. Washington DC: IADB. Ploeg, Jan Douwe van der. 2013. Peasants and the Art of Farming: A Chayanovian Manifesto. Rugby, Warwickshire, United Kingdom: Practical Action Publishing. Ploeg, Jan Douwe van der. 2018. “From De-to Repeasantization: The Modernization of Agriculture Revisited.” Journal of Rural Studies 61:236–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.12.016. Quijada, José Alejandro, and José David Sierra. 2014. Productividad Total De Los Factores En Honduras: Diagnóstico Y Posibles Determinantes. IDB-PB-221. [Total Productivity of Factors in Honduras: Diagnosis and Possible Determinants.] Rosset, Peter Michael, Braulio Machín Sosa, Adilén María Roque Jaime, and Dana Rocío Ávila Lozano. 2011. “The Campesino-to-Campesino

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Agroecology Movement of ANAP in Cuba: Social Process Methodology in the Construction of Sustainable Peasant Agriculture and Food Sovereignty.” The Journal of peasant studies 38 (1): 161–91. Ruben, Ruerd, and Marrit van den Berg. 2001. “Nonfarm Employment and Poverty Alleviation of Rural Farm Households in Honduras.” World Development 29 (3): 549–60. Sanders, Arie, Thimothy Thomas, Ana Rios, and Shanila Dunston. 2019. “Climate Change, Agriculture, and Adaptation Options for Honduras.” IFPRI Discussion Paper 1827. Soluri, John. 2005. Banana Cultures: Agriculture, Consumption, and Environmental Change in Honduras and the United States. 1st ed. Austin: University of Texas Press. Stonich, Susan C. 1991. “The Promotion of Non-Traditional Agricultural Exports in Honduras: Issues of Equity, Environment and Natural Resource Management.” Development and Change 22: 725–55. Sunderlin, William, and Juan Rodriguez. 1996. “Cattle, Broadleaf Forests and the Agricultural Modernization Law of Honduras: The Case of Olancho.” Occasional Paper. 7. Tavares, José. 2001. “Crisis and Recovery: Central America from the Eighties to the Nineties.” In Economic Development in Central America: Growth and Internationalization, edited by Felipe Larraín. 2 vols, 53–87. Harvard Studies in International Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Thorpe, Andy. 2002. Agrarian Modernisation in Honduras. Latin American studies 18. Lewiston, N.Y., Lampeter: E. Mellen Press. Tucker, Catherine M. 2008. Changing Forests: Collective Action, Common Property, and Coffee in Honduras. Berlin: Springer. UNDP. 2013. Climate Risk Management for Smallholder Agriculture in Honduras. New York: United Nations Development Programme. USDA. 2020. “Crop Explorer.” https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/cropexplorer/ cropview/commodityView.aspx?cropid=4243000. Wilkinson, John. 2010. The Globalization of Agribusiness and Developing World Food Systems. In Magdoff and Tokar 2010, 155–69.

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World Bank. Program Completion Report: Republic of Honduras. Washington, D.C. World Bank. World Bank. 2019. World Development Indicators. https://databank. worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators.

In: Honduras Editor: Eric S. Riordan

ISBN: 978-1-53618-523-2 © 2020 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 3

AGRICULTURAL COMPETITIVENESS, SUSTAINABLE LANDSCAPES AND MARKETS: CHALLENGES FOR HONDURAN AGRICULTURAL VALUE CHAINS Ingrid Fromm* School of Agricultural, Forest and Food Sciences Bern University of Applied Sciences, Zollikofen, Switzerland

ABSTRACT The long agricultural tradition in Honduras has faced tremendous transformation over the past two decades and by all accounts, will face new challenges in the future. What was once an agricultural exportoriented economy, the quintessential “banana republic” now relies on the maquila industry as a main sector bringing in export revenues to the economy. Nevertheless, agriculture still plays and important role in the economy and is a source of employment for people in rural areas. One of the main challenges currently is the low productivity level in the Corresponding Author’s E-mail: [email protected].

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Ingrid Fromm agricultural sector, which, despite efforts to improve its competitive stand, still needs access to key inputs and investments so that small and medium-scale farmers can achieve better incomes. According to the World Bank Poverty and Inequality Brief (2019), 64 percent of Honduran households live at or below the national poverty line, with a higher number of homes below the poverty line living in rural areas, where 46 percent of the population lives. The Gini Index of 0.50 in 2017, places Honduras among the countries with the highest inequality rates of inequality in Latin America. The promotion of non-traditional, intensive farming-system export value chains, such as horticultural products, fruits, fish, crustaceous, vegetable oils and also forestry products have changed the agricultural landscape from the perspective of land use change, but other factors, such as environmental impact, merit a close examination. Because of the geographic location of Honduras in the Central American dry corridor and also the high exposure of the country to the Atlantic hurricane and tropical storm path, agriculture is risky business, especially with the extreme meteorological events registered in recent years. The drought in 2015 associated with El Niño weather cycle had a negative effect The World Bank (2015) estimated that the economic losses suffered between 1994 and 2013 due to climate-related disasters was on average 2.5 percent of GDP per year. In addition to the vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change, the rapid population growth exacerbates the problem. Settlements in marginal areas, typically degraded mountainous and forest areas, or in clandestine areas bordering rivers not only account for considerable environmental impacts, but also put the low-income population at a higher risk. The Honduran population has doubled in roughly 25 years, so the pressure on the already limited agricultural resources so more food is produced is high. Some of the challenges in the next decade are to increase agricultural productivity, have a better access to markets both at the local and international level while feeding an increasing population and doing so in a sustainable way. Resolving policy and infrastructure problems will be an important part of the solution. Agribusinesses should have better access to finance, agricultural insurances and other financial services to boost productivity. Agricultural policies have tried to improve the situation for producers, particularly in the export-oriented sectors, but the provision of services should also reach other farmers. Building resilience requires access to improved agricultural technologies. Improved logistics and infrastructure would also mean a better access to markets and improved competitiveness. Although milestones have been reached in the last two decades with the construction of better roads and improvement of ports, but many rural areas still have little access to roads and even basic

Agricultural Competitiveness, Sustainable Landscapes and Markets 69 services such as utilities. Areas in eastern Honduras, close the Mosquita region, for example, are still not connected to the national electric grid. Tackling the above-mentioned issues requires a concerted effort from different sectors. Not only are these problems to be resolved through targeted agricultural policies, the economic, social and environmental challenges require equal engagement from other sectors and through different channels. This chapter will discuss the challenges and propose a framework for discussion on agricultural value chains, competitiveness, sustainable landscape and markets.

Keywords: agricultural productivity, value chains, sustainability, Honduras

INTRODUCTION For Honduran agricultural value chains, achieving and maintaining competitiveness will be a matter of adaptation to the challenges that lie ahead. The transformation of agriculutre over the last 3 decades has been notable in some sectors and geographic areas. In the northen coastal valleys where banana production once dominated the agricultural landscape, the transformation of the agriculutral landscape is larger. On one hand one can attribute this transformation to the expanding presence of the maquila industry in the Sula Valley. However, policies pursued by the government since the early 2000s to promote the growth of high-value export agricultural commodities, namely palm oil, have also contributed to the transformation of the agricultural landscape. In the Comayagua Valley, the promotion of mainly export-oriented agricultural production has led to an intensification of agricultural production in the area. Likewise, the southern region has experienced a similar development, as the exports of shrimp, melon, watermelon and other horticultural products. Larger companies In the highlands of Honduras, coffee production accounts for over 30% of the agricultral GDP. The diversity of agricultural production in Honduras is due to its geographic position in the Central American ithmus which results in various climates, and distinct dry and rainy seasons. One of the important

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features of the country is the largest tropical rainforest in Central America, The Mosquita, which covers 15% of the land area in Honduras. An estimated 48% of the land area of the country is forest, including broadleaf and coniferous forests (Timber Trade Portal, 2019). In terms of topographical composition, 80% of the territory is mountainous, with an extensive interior highlight in the east and west of the country and two smaller coastal plains in the Caribean lowland and one in the Pacific lowland, at the edge of the Gulf of Fonseca. These alluvial plains, are fertile areas ideal for agricultural activity. According to CGIAR (2019), roughly 25% of the land area is used for agriculture. It’s worth highlighting that not all agriculutral activity takes place in the northern coastal valley or central valleys, but also in marginal areas or mountainous terrain. Honduras has been identified as the second most affected country by climate change over a period of 20 years, from 1998 to 2017. The Global Climate Risk Index (CRI), developed by Germanwatch (Eckstein et al., 2019), analyses quantified impacts of extreme weather events both in terms of fatalities as well as economic losses that occurred. The average weighted ranking (CRI score) of 13 and 66 extreme weather events registered in Honduras in this time period, including extreme rainfall, droughts, variation in rainfall patterns and loss of soil, reflect the precarious situation for agricultural production. Hurricane Mitch, which hit Honduras in October 1998 completely decimated the agricultural production, and it took years for producers to recover. As part of the dry corridor of Central America, it is expected that the climate scenario will not be favorable, as El Niño Southern Oscillation is projected to have an impact on the rainfall pattern in this region in the next decade. The almost 2 million small scale grain farmers in the region are expected to be severely affected (Vaqué, 2017). An additional negative effect is decreased health of the vulnerable population, especially will little improvement of socio-economic conditions (Bradatan, 2020). According to CGIAR (2019), for maize alone, it is foreseen that production losses could amount to about 120,000 tons annually by 2025, or a loss of about US$ 40 million. The basic grain production has not only been hindered by variation in the rain (CEPAL, 2016), but also by increased pests and diseases that have spread

Agricultural Competitiveness, Sustainable Landscapes and Markets 71 due to climate change. This is the same situation for coffee production and the spread of the roya disease. One of the most relevant questions yet to be resolved is How can Honduras increase agricultural productivity and competitiveness, have a better access to markets both at the local and international level, while feeding an increasing population and doing so in a sustainable way, considering the challenge of climate change? This is truly one of the biggest and most complex challenges the country is facing and there are repercussions of having a portion of the population vulnerable to climate change and food insecure. Honduras ranks 73 out of 110 countries in the Food Security Index (2019). According to the WFP (2019) an estimated 1.6 million people in the Central American dry corridor are food insecure. In the second half of 2018, the Honduran government declared a state of emergency because of food shortages caused by severe drought. In the departments of Valle and Choluteca, 72% of corn and 75% of the total bean production was lost (SAG, 2018). The Ministry of Agriculture reported that 65,000 families required assistance in 34 different municipalities in this period. According to the World Food Program (2020): “The country’s vulnerability to extreme climatic events exacerbates food insecurity. In the southern and western regions – corresponding to Honduras’ Dry Corridor – four years of continuous drought have eroded people’s ability to secure sufficient nutritious food all year round. In 2015, irregular rainfalls resulted in the loss of more than half the crops. To cope, people have resorted to migration or the sale of productive assets.” Migration has become one of the main socio-economic and political issues at the present time.

THE CHANGING AGRICULTURAL LANDSCAPE The long agricultural tradition in Honduras has faced tremendous transformation over the past decades. What was once an agricultural export-oriented economy dominated by monoculture, hence the term

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“banana republic”, now relies on the maquila industry and more diversified agricultural exports as a main sector bringing in revenues to the economy. The “banana republic” is no more. Banana producion has decreased and the presence of multinational companies producing and exporting bananas has been dramatically reduced in the last 3 decades (Figure 1). As of 2018, Honduras exported 670,000 tonnes of banana, which is less than half the amout exported in the early 1980s. As Kerssen (2013) states: What was once an agricultural export-oriented economy, the quintessential “banana republic” now relies on the maquila industry as a main sector bringing in export revenues to the economy. But this change, in particular in the Sula Valley, cannot be attributed to the presence of the maquila industry. Other export commodities, namely palm oil, has replaced banana produciton. The areas where banana was once cultivated, have now been replaced by palm oil plantations. The first commercial plantations were started in 1936, and by the 1970s there were 11,000 hectares planted by United Fruit Company throughout the northern part of Honduras. The United Fruit Company also managed all the banana produciton in the Sula Valley at that time. The growth rates of palm oil production over several decades oscillated from 2.2 to 7.6 percent annually (Fromm, 2007a). Perhaps not paradoxically, as the banana sector in Honduras has declined in terms of area and production volume, the palm oil industry keeps expanding. For the last decade, the expansion of the industry has been accompanied by targeted policies to promote the sector, with the idea to increase the production of biofuels. Government policies sought to increase palm oil production since 2006 by expanding the production area, providing producers with training and subsidies. It has been 80 years since the African Palm was first introduced in Honduras. It was initially brought as an exotic plant to the Lancetilla Botanical Garden and Experimental Station. The palm oil industry in Honduras has expanded rapidly over the past thirty years, creating employment opportunities in rural areas, as well as forward and backward linkages to complementary industries. It is estimated that over 100,000 people are directly employed in the palm industry. According to FHIA (2016), there are over 160,000 hectares of palm oil production concentrated entirely in the northern Atlantic coast of

Agricultural Competitiveness, Sustainable Landscapes and Markets 73 the country in the departments of Atlántida, Colón, Cortés and Yoro. Colón accounts for 40% of the total land area. Over the last 10 years, the palm industry has grown steadily, with a rate of 7.8% in terms of expansion (UPEG, 2015). In Latin America, Honduras is recognized as a major palm oil producer, fourth behind Colombia, Ecuador and Guatemala in production volume, which currently stands at 580,000 MT (Statista, 2019). The steady increase in palm oil production in Honduras can be grounded on the interest in producing biofuels, which initially started as a reaction to the steady rise in crude oil prices since 2001 . In Latin America, Brazil has led the way in the use of alternative sources for biofuels, such as ethanol produced from sugar cane. Policies were put in place to promote this sector, expand cultivation area and increase production. As observed by Furumo and Aide (2017), a potentially important institutional factor contributing to the expansion of oil palm in Latin America was the was the creation of recent biofuel programs by governments in Latin America. Biofuel initiatives introduced after the 2006–07 global financial crisis and increase in petroleum prices have sustained further investment in the oil palm sector aimed to meet future energy goals. One important point raised by the authors is that governments often require that biofuel targets be met by domestic consumption. This involves governments in creating the structure of financial incentives (e.g., tax breaks, credits) that help perpetuate expansion. Government policies in Honduras perfectly exemplify this point made by Furomo and Aide (2017). In 2006, the Honduras government received funding from the Central American Bank for Economic Integration to initiate a palm oil expansion plan, which sought to:      

Expand the production area by 200,000 hectares Generate 300,000 new jobs, 100,000 of them directly linked to the industry Produce over 760 million liters of biodiesel Save US$ 370 million in crude oil imports Reduce dependence on foreign oil Reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the country

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The Honduran government passed the “Law for the Production and Consumption of Biofuels” in November 2007. Three ministries were assigned to work on the design and implementation of policies to produce biofuels and their promotion in the market: The Ministry of Industry and Trade (SIC), the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (SAG), and the Ministry of Natural Resources (SERNA). Through the Biofuels Law, a legal basis for assigning funds and expanding production was in place. The legal framework also provided incentives and funds to purchase equipment, materials, and services used for the planting, design, installation, construction and set-up of biofuel processing pilot plants. In the initial phase of the expansion plan, which also began with the construction of a biodiesel pilot plant, 1.7 million seedlings were imported and distributed among producers in different areas of the country. The Aguán Valley in the northern Atlantic coast of Honduras is another major area of agricultural production. This is where in 1982 Coapalma Ecara was founded. It is also a farmers’ cooperative and the production facilities are in Tocoa, Colón. Coapalma has suppliers from 13 different cooperatives or associations and independent producers

Agricultural Competitiveness, Sustainable Landscapes and Markets 75 (Coapalma 2020). Although there are 12 extractors located in the Sula Valley and the Aguán Valley, Hondupalma and Coapalma are the biggest players in each region. Both companies play a dominant role in this industry. They have plantations but they also source from associated and independent producers. Most of the farmers work under a contract scheme with these extracting firms. In the early1970s, palm oil production was promoted as a means to diversify agricultural production in the Aguán Valley, despite the fact that palm oil is typicaly grown in monoculture plantations. In these early years of palm oil expansion in the northern valleys of Honduras, the export potential of this crop was not overlooked. Job creation was another important factor which was mentioned in the 1971 “Fomento del cultivo de palma africana en el Valle del Aguán”, which was a guide published the Interamerican Development Bank (BID), the Inter-american Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA) and the now defunct Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Superior de Planificación (CONSUPLAN) (Maradiaga et. al., 1971) . Although it was estimated in this 1971 guide that Honduras would produce about 46,000 MT by 1995, the actual volume was exceeded and by 1995 Honduras reported 75,500 MT of produced palm oil (Figure 2). The reality is that palm oil production expanded at a higher and faster rate than was initially projected, which led to more land use for this crop, particularly in the Aguán Valley. The agricultural landscape in this region dramatically changed in 3 decades. In the agricultural landscape in the Sula Valley and also in southern Honduras, the sugar cane industry has historically been an important economic sector. Sugar cane production in Honduras generates approximately 200,000 direct and indirect jobs. This industry accounts for 13% of the agricultural GDP in Honduras and about 1.5% of the total and a contribution of US$80 million to the balance of payments. About 55,000 ha planted in 2019, about 10,000 more hectares than a decade ago (APAH, 2020).

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Source: FAO, 2020 Figure 2. Sugar Production 1980-2018.

A change in the agricultural landscape was also observed in the Comayagua Valley, starting in the 1990s. Accounts of agriculture in the Comayagua Valley in the 1950s describe agriculture in the region as smallscale, consisting mainly of beans and maize cultivated for susistence and sale. Dozier (1958) reports farming in the surrounding foothills of Ajuterique and Lejamaní as difficult because of the dry conditions and observes that in the dry limestone hillside soils, there was an abundance of sorghum cultivation, proving the difficult agricultural conditions for smallholders in these marginal areas. In his account, Dozier also mentions cotton grown in larger estates, under irrigation. In the Humuya river basin, soils were more fertile than in the higher areas of San Sebastian, which exemplified a typical savannah, with thorn-branched leguminous bushes. Despite the dry conditions and somwhat poor soils, the Comayagua Valley is a productive zone, where numerous export crops are grown. Since the early 1990s and probably because of new irrigation techniques, such as drip irrigation, it was possible to plant vegetables for export in intensive farming systems. Specialized companies started growing mainly oriental

Agricultural Competitiveness, Sustainable Landscapes and Markets 77 vegetables for markets in the United States, Asia and Europe. Some of these higher-value vegetables are eggplant, okra, bitter melon, hairy cucumber and fuzzy squash. These vegetables are mostly exported to “oriental” markets in the United States. Up to 3,500 containers are exported to these markets each year. Okra alone, accounts for about US$ 30 million of export earnings (Senasa, 2020). About 3000, mostly small and medium scale producers in 4200 ha produce oriental vegetables for the export market. In addition to oriental vegetables, other horticultural crops are widely produced in the Comayagua Valley, such as tomatoes, cucumbers and peppers. One of the main changes in the landscape in the Comayagua Valley has been the shift from cultivation of beans and maize for subsistence purposes to highly intensive farming for export markets. Although Honduras was referred to as the “Grain bowl of Central America” in the 1950s and 1960s, the country now produces and exports horticultural crops and imports a substantial amount of beans and maize. Many farmers, who once relied on subsistence farming to maintain their livelihoods, have found employment in export vegetable sector. According to Senasa (2020), aproximately new 10,000 jobs have been created in the area. Currently, 10 agro-exporting companies also provide jobs, mostly for women, in the processing and packaging facilities where they work preparing the boxes of export vegetables. In terms of export volumes, the Comayagua Valley still lags behind the southern departments of Valle and Choluteca. The the most important agricultural product and main export crop in Honduras is coffee (Fromm, 2007b; Fromm, 2007c;Hartwich et al., 2010; Wyss et al. 2012). Production of coffee has grown seven-fold since 1980 (Figure 3). The export of coffee is a significant source of revenue for the country, generating 13% of the export revenues, which totaled US$ 1.17 billion in 2017 (OEC, 2020). This places coffee as the second largest export product after knit T-shirts.

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Coffee is grown in most of Honduras, in 15 of the 18 departments (IHCAFE, 2020). Because most of the production takes place in smaller plantations, of less than 5 ha. With the increase of coffee production, especially in the years after Hurricane Mitch, Honduras has become the largest producer of Arabica coffee in Central America. According to Bunn (2018), an estimated 110,000 families depend on coffee as a primary about 1 million people are employed directly or indirectly in coffee production. One critical aspect that cannot be overlooked is the fact that coffee production has expanded in higher altitude areas and in 20 years, the coffee production area has doubled (Figure 4). Coffee exports have increased significantly in recent years due to an improved distribution infrastructure, more efficient production practices, and successful efforts to curtail phythopathogenic outbreaks (Herrell et al., 2017). Coffee production in Honduras is vulnerable in several ways. One major weakness is the volatility of international coffee prices, which has sparked several coffee crises in the last two decades. Most recently, in 2019, coffee prices fell so dramatically, that production cost were not met. Despite efforts from the Instituto Hondureño del Café (IHCAFE) to renovate coffee plantations and

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replace coffee varieties with more resistant varieties, an outbreak of coffee rust (Hemileia vastatrix), a fungal disease which can destroy a coffee plantation. Changing climate patterns in the highlands of Honduras are posing an additional challenge in the control of diseases like coffee rust (Reyes et al., 2016). This disease typically did not affect coffee production in higher altitudes, but with the increase in temperature in areas over 1000 masl, integrated pest management has become more challenging. With poverty being prevalent among small-scale coffee-producing families, implementing strategies to counterbalance the negative effects of climate change is a larger challenge. Finally, in the southern zone of Honduras, particularly in the department of Choluteca, an increase in monoculture is evident. Honduras has become a major exporter of melon (cantaloupe) and watermelon to the United States and production has dramatically increased since the 1990s (Figure 5). In addition to production of cucurbitaes, shrimp production in the area has translated to increased job opportunities to the local population. It is worth mentioning that this particular region is prone to droughts and although these export crops are irrigated, water management will become not only one of the biggest challenges to sustain productivity in this region, but it is sure to negatively impact the entire melon and watermelon export industry.

AGRICULTURAL COMPETITIVENESS AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABILITY The prospects of achieving competitiveness in the agricultural sector, in an economy where over 60% of the households live under the poverty line, especially in the rural areas, are low. In addition to poverty, Honduras is among the countries with the highest inequality rates of inequality in Latin America. One of the main challenges is still to improve the productivity level in the agricultural sector, which, despite efforts to improve its competitive stand, still needs access to key inputs and

Agricultural Competitiveness, Sustainable Landscapes and Markets 81 investments so that small and medium-scale farmers can achieve better incomes. In terms of achieving competitiveness, there’s a huge potential. Hernandez Ore et al. (2016), in a systematic country diagnosis prepared for the World Bank summarize the competitive advantages of Honduras: 1. Location: First, its strategic location places Honduras as a potential investment destination. Indeed, the country has relatively high levels of Foreign Direct Investment (about 6 percent of GDP) flowing into fast-growing sectors including telecommunications, manufacturing, and financial intermediation. Honduras’ location is also helped by the connectivity provided by its deep-water port in the Caribbean Coast (Puerto Cortés) which has good access to US ports in the Caribbean Gulf and the East Coast. Puerto Cortes was also part of the first wave of ports included in the Secure Freight Initiative by which US officials can inspect the merchandise before departing the port towards the US. 2. Industrial Base: The country’s industrial base can support an expansion of the tradable sector. At about 20 percent of GDP, the manufacturing sector is relatively large compared to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and other middle-income countries, and given the country’s small size, this expansion could have plenty of benefits due to economies of scale or the possibility of specialization. Although the maquila model (mainly concentrated in textiles) still plays an important role, the country has been making efforts to diversify to other areas including machinery and electrical devices. 3. Trade-to-GDP Ratio: Honduran economy has the second largest trade-to-GDP ratio in LAC and its 2 Overview efforts to diversify exports in the last decades not only have been successful in increasing the number of exported goods and destination markets, but also have developed internal competencies in the management of external trade, a valuable platform from which to further grow the country’s presence in international markets.

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4. Demographic Change: With a young and growing population, Honduras has the opportunity to harness a demographic dividend. With about a third of its population between the ages of 10 and 24 and population growth rates declining, Honduras is in the early stages of the demographic transition and therefore in position to benefit from a demographic dividend. One of the major challenges ahead is to adapt and mitigate the effects of climate change and minimize impact at the farm level. Achieving sustainability entails efforts from different points in the value chain and in a system as a whole. That is, it includes the use of natural resources beyond the productive inputs.

Source: FAO, 2020 Figure 6. Share of Permanent Crops in Agricultural Land.

As the land area used for permanent crops has increased over the years (Figure 6) and as the forest land cover is decreasing (Figure 7), the conservation of the environment and the sustainable use of the natural resources must become a priority.

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The dynamics of the landscape, where agriculture, people and the sustainble use of resources indwell, can no longer be overlooked. Under this lens, it is increasingly important to address the issues of sustainability and climate change adaptation as a strategy to reduce adverse risks that can affect the agricultural sector, but also the society as a whole. There is a sense that people, especially those living in the main productive areas of the country, have a loss of power over their local landscape (Appleton, 2018). A disconnection to the land, people and its capacity to satisfy the need for food, resources such as water supply and also maintain its regulatory function (i.e., environment) may have negative consequences for society (Chandrasekharan Behr et al., 2015). It is society that engages in promoting legislation to monitor and protect the landscape for the purpose of also making sensible use of critical resources, such as water reservoirs and watersheds. According to Vignola et al. (2015), strategies to protect watersheds in Honduras must include support to farmers in the process of adapting soil and forest conservation practices. Farming methods that preserve these resources also have a positive effect on the landscape, which also includes watersheds and reservoirs. Access to water is becoming a critical issue in the urban development of Tegucigalpa. In

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hillside agriculture in Honduras, practices such as organic or conservation agriculture have the potential to restore and maintain soil functions (Wollni and Adersson, 2013). Enfasis must be placed on hillside agriculture because of its direct association to watersheds and forest conservation. At the forefront of this effort are smallholder farmers. They are a major priority group for climate change adaptation strategies (Holland et al., 2017). Changes at the policy level are vital to promote these adaptation strategies. For example, strategies to conserve, but also promote agroforestry systems as an alternative to climate change mitigation and adaptation have the potential to reduce environmental impacts, increase incomes, conserve soil and protect watersheds. In a study of cocoa agroforestry systems in Honduras Kupferschmied et al. (2017) provide evidence that it is possible to secure an income in cocoa agroforestry systems. Project, programs and policies which seek to promote adaptation to climate change and resilience in food production must strengthen capacities at the local, national and regional levels to increase resilience. The landscape approach presents this opportunity to effectively manage these systems of agricultural production and value chains, resource management and the use of resources in the context of an increasing population, increased urbanization in Honduras and all the consequences these changes entail.

CONCLUSION The conundrum of increasing agricultural productivity, remaining competitive in international markets with agricultural exports, which are still the backbone of the Honduran economy, and doing so in a sustainable way is not exclusively a national problem, but rather a challenge which requires solutions at many levels. The issue of climate change and climate change adaptation requires action on a global level. However, at the national level, resolving policy and infrastructure problems will be an

Agricultural Competitiveness, Sustainable Landscapes and Markets 85 important part of the solution. The promotion of one agricultural sector through targeted policies can bring about economic growth and an increase in export earnings, but experience shows that if these policies are not accompanied by measures to promote sustainability, the effects can be negative. Throughout the last two decades, some agricultural sectors have grown, but the positive effects of trade sometimes do not trickle down to small-scale producers. In the case of the Comayagua Valley, with the growth in horticultural production under intensive schemes, large-scale farming has been favoured but small-scale farmers who are most vulnerable to climate change, have become food insecure. Without adequate know-how, coping to shocks like droughts have left them with few alternatives. Although the initiatives promoting climate-smart agriculture are positive, the outreach and implementation cannot be carried out fast enough. In the case of larger agribusinesses, some options to help them remain competitive are better access to finance, agricultural insurances and other financial services to boost productivity. Agricultural policies have tried to improve the situation for producers, particularly in the export-oriented sectors, but the provision of services should also reach other farmers. Building resilience requires access to improved agricultural technologies. Improved logistics and infrastructure would also mean a better access to markets and improved competitiveness. Although milestones have been reached in the last two decades with the construction of better roads and improvement of ports, but many rural areas still have little access to roads and even basic services such as utilities. Areas in eastern Honduras, close the Mosquita region, for example, are still not connected to the national electric grid. With the increased population growth and the concentration of people in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, it seems that this area of the country has received a lower priority when it comes to improved infrastructure.

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Tackling the above-mentioned issues requires a concerted effort from different sectors. Not only are these problems to be resolved through targeted agricultural policies, the economic, social and environmental challenges require equal engagement from other sectors and through different channels. Often overlooked is the link between an agricultural sector which is vulnerable to climate change and migration, both rural-tourban and transnational. Part of the solution to curve the exodus of people from the rural area is to implement programs to adapt Honduran agriculture to the challenge of climate change. Rural extension, educational programs for farmers such as farmer field schools and vocational training programs should be designed to address these issues at the farm-level. Another interesting approach is through value chain development programs, where competitiveness could be seen through the lens of entrepreneurship in agribusinesses. Honduran agricultural policies have long favoured and promoted export markets, but opportunities in the local market are sometimes overseen. One perfect illustration of this statement is the coffee sector. Up until the early 2000s, the best Honduran coffee was exported. Local roasting and retailing of coffee were relatively unknown. In the urban areas of Honduras, a local market for high-quality coffee is expanding, bringing about opportunities for entrepreneurship and job creation. Coffee shops are opening everywhere, targeting local consumers and young baristas now explain to customers what the particular flavors and aromas of home-grown coffee are. Policies should be geared at integrating economic growth with favourable opportunities to make a decent living out of agriculture while taking good care of the environment. In view of the current changes in the Central American dry corridor, and the mounting scientific evidence which present unfavourable scenarios for agriculture, these policies cannot be implemented and promoted soon enough. Not only are these problems to be resolved through targeted agricultural policies, the economic, social and environmental challenges require equal engagement from other sectors (i.e., private sector) and through different channels.

Agricultural Competitiveness, Sustainable Landscapes and Markets 87

REFERENCES APAH (2017). Asociación de Productores de Azúcar de Honduras, Memoria de Sostenibilidad 2017. Tegucigalpa, D.C., 68 p. [Association of Sugar Producers of Honduras, Sustainability Report 2017] Appleton, J. (2018). The Honduran Production Valleys: Finding Balance Between People and Environment. MSc Thesis, TU Delft Landscape Architecture, Faculty of Architecture, TU Delft, The Netherlands. Bradatan, C., Dennis, J. A., Flores-Yeffal, N. & Swain, S. (2020). Child health, household environment, temperature and rainfall anomalies in Honduras: A socio-climate data linked analysis. Environmental Health, (19), 10. Bunn, C., Lundy, M., Läderach, P., Girvetz, E. & Castro, F. (2018). Climate Smart coffee in Honduras. International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Cali. CO. 27 p. CEPAL (2016). La Economía del Cambio Climático en Honduras: Mensajes clave 2016. Ciudad de México, 40 p. [The Economics of Climate Change in Honduras: Key Messages 2016] CGIAR (2019). Exploring the Future of Agriculture in Honduras. Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security. Accessed Jan. 15, 2020, https://ccafs.cgiar.org/ news/ exploring-future-agriculture-honduras-prioritize-investments-climatechange-adaptation#.Xm4yUBNKj4c. Chandrasekharan Behr, D., Robins, L. & Russell A. J. M. (2015). How Forests Enhance Resilience to Climate Change: What We Know and Case Studies from Burkina Faso, Honduras and Lao PDR. Program on Forests (PROFOR), Washington, D. C. COAPALMA (2020). COAPALMA: Responsabilidad Ambiental. Accessed Jan. 22, 2020, Available at: http://www.coapalmaecara.com/ index.php/responsabilidad/responsabilidad-ambiental. [COAPALMA: Environmental Responsibility.]

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Dozier, C. L. (1958). Indigenous Tropical Agriculture in Central America: Land Use, Systems and Problems. National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council. Washington, D. C. 134 p. Eckstein, D., Hutfils, M. L. & Winges, M. (2019). Global Climate Risk Index 2019: Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-related Loss Events in 2017 and 1998 to 2017. Germanwatch e. V., Bonn. 36 p. Euraque, D. (1996). Reinterpreting the Banana Republic: Region and State in Honduras 1870-1972. The University of North Carolina Press. FHIA (2016). Manual de Buenas Prácticas Agrícolas para la Producción Sostenible de la Palma Aceitera por Pequeños Productores. Centro de Comunicación Agrícola de la Fundación Hondureña de Investigación Agrícola. La Lima, Honduras. [Manual of Good Agricultural Practices for the Sustainable Production of Oil Palm by Small Producers.] Fromm, I. (2007a). Integrating Small-scale Producers in Agrifood Chains: The Case of the Palm Oil Industry. Paper submitted to the 17th Annual Food and Agribusiness Forum and Symposium. Parma, Italy June 2326, 2007. Fromm, I. (2007b). Targeting Differentiated Markets: A Strategy for Small-scale Coffee Farmers in Honduras? Agriculture and Rural Development, Nr. 01/07. Fromm, I. (2007c) Upgrading in in Agricultural Value Chains: The Case of Small Producers in Honduras, GIGA Working Paper Series, Hamburg. Furomo R. & Aide, T. M. (2017). Characterizing commercial oil palm expansion in Latin America: Land use change and trade. Environmental Research Letters, Vol. 12(2). Hartwich, F., Fromm, I. & Romero, G. (2010) Innovation Trajectories in Honduras’ Coffee Value Chain: Public and Private influence the use of New Knowledge and Technology among Coffee Growers, International Journal on Food System Dynamics, Vol. 1(3). Hernandez Ore, M. A., Sousa, L. & Lopez, J. H. (2016). Honduras: Unlocking Economic Potential for Greater Opportunities. Systematic Country Diagnostic. World Bank, Washington, D. C.

Agricultural Competitiveness, Sustainable Landscapes and Markets 89 Herrell, K., Tewari, R. & Mehlhorn, J. (2017). Honduran Coffee Trade: Economic Effects of Fair Trade Certification on Individual Producers. Paper presented at the 2017 Southern Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, Mobile, Alabama, 21 p. Holland, M. B., Shamer, S. Z., Imbach, P., Zamora, J. C., Medellin Moreno, C., Leguía Hidalgo, E., Donatti, C. I., Ruth Martínez-Rodríguez, R. & Harvey, C. A. (2016). Mapping adaptive capacity and smallholder agriculture: applying expert knowledge at the landscape scale. Climatic Change, 141, 139–153. IHCAFE (2020). Producción Nacional Instituto Hondureño del Café. Accessed Mar. 10, 2020. Available at: https://www.ihcafe.hn/ produccion-nacional/. [National Honduran Coffee Institute Production.] Kerssen, T. (2013). Grabbing Power: The New Struggles for Land, Food and Democracy in Northern Honduras. Institute for Food and Development Policy. 170 p. Kupferschmied, K., Fromm, I. & Rouanet, A. (2017). Estudio socioeconómico de un proyecto de reforestación implementado a pequeños productores de cacao en Honduras, Revista Ceiba, Vol. 55 (1). [Socioeconomic study of a reforestation project implemented to small cocoa producers in Honduras, Ceiba Magazine] Maradiaga, J., Pagoada Figueroa, B., Rosales, E., Murillo, S. B., Robleda Castro, R., Reyes Hernández, G., Lagos López, M. & Paredes Hernández, I. (1971). Fomento del Cultivo de Palma Africana en el Valle del Aguán, Ejercicio Práctico. Tegucigalpa, 228 p. [Promotion of African Palm Cultivation in the Aguán Valley, Practical Exercise. Tegucigalpa] Reyes, B., Vasquez, M., Larosa, F., Gomez, L., Espinal, M., Wiegel, J., van Loosen, I., Jäger, M., Rodriguez, I. & Lundy, M. (2016). Traditional Markets for Poverty Reduction and Food Security: Exploring Policy Options in Honduras and Nicaragua. CIAT Policy Brief No. 29. SAG (2018). Decretos y Acuerdos Agosto 2018. Gobeierno de la República de Honduras. Accessed Jan. 22, Available at:

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http://transparencia.scgg.gob.hn/index.php/regulacion/481-decretos-yacuerdos-agosto-2018. [Decrees and Agreements August 2018. Government of the Republic of Honduras] SENASA (2020). Estadisticas Servicio Nacional de Sanidad e Inocuidad Agroalimentaria. Gobierno de la República de Honduras. [Statistics National Service of Health and Food Safety. Government of the Republic of Honduras] Statista (2019). Country Report 2019. Accessed Feb. 26, 2020. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/510033/share-of-economicsectors-in-the-gdp-in-honduras/. Timber Trader Portal, (2019). Honduras: Industry Profile. Accessed Feb. 21, 2020, https://www.timbertradeportal.com/en/. UPEG (2015). Análisis de Coyuntura del Cultivo de Palma Africana en Honduras.Unidad de Planeamiento y Evaluación de la Gestión (UPEG), Área de Estadísticas, Análisis y Estudios Económicos, Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería, Tegucipalpa, Honduras. 26 p. [Analysis of the Situation of African Palm Cultivation in Honduras, Management Planning and Evaluation Unit (UPEG), Area of Statistics, Analysis and Economic Studies, Secretariat of Agriculture and Livestock, Tegucipalpa, Honduras] Vaqué, J. (2017). Cronología del Corredor Seco: El acelerador de la resiliencia en Centroamérica. Agronoticias, FAO. Accessed Dec. 18, 2019, http://www.fao.org/in-action/agronoticias/detail/es/c/1024540/. [Chronology of the Dry Corridor: The Accelerator of Resilience in Central America. Agronoticias, FAO.] Vignola, R., Procter, A., Díaz Briones, A., McDaniels, T., Locatelli, B., Rafanoharana, S. & Chandrasekharan Behr, D. (2015). PROFOR Working Paper How Forests Enhance Resilience to Climate Change: The Case of Drinking Water in Supply in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Program on Forests (PROFOR), Washington, D.C. Wollni, M. & Andersson, C. (2013). Spatial patterns of organic agriculture adoption: Evidence from Honduras. Ecological Economics 97: 120– 128.

Agricultural Competitiveness, Sustainable Landscapes and Markets 91 World Bank (2015). Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Honduras for the period FY16-FY20, Washington, D.C., 99 p. World Food Programme (2019). Evaluación final del Proyecto “Respuesta al fenómeno de El Niño en el Corredor Seco”, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua, 2016-2018. [Final evaluation of the Project “Response to the El Niño phenomenon in the Dry Corridor”, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, 20162018.] World Food Programme (2020). Country Brief Honduras. Accessed Jan. 24, 2020. Available at: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP0000112445/download/?_ga=2.138538613.756780363.1584543991760358227.1582536960. Wyss, R., Fromm, I. & Garcia, M. (2012). Socio-environmental certifications: Risks and opportunities for small-scale coffee farmers in Central America, International Journal of Developing Societies, Vol. 1(4).

INDEX A access, vii, viii, ix, x, 2, 3, 7, 11, 23, 45, 50, 55, 58, 68, 71, 80, 81, 85 adaptation, 52, 57, 69, 83, 84, 87 agencies, 57, 59 agricultural development, 40, 43, 45, 60 agricultural exports, 72, 84 agricultural market, 45 agricultural modernization, v, viii, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 53, 56, 58, 59, 60, 65 agricultural producers, 55 agricultural productivity, x, 50, 57, 68, 69, 71, 84 agricultural sector, vii, viii, ix, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 68, 80, 83, 85, 86 agriculture, ix, 12, 17, 40, 41, 42, 45, 49, 50, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 67, 68, 70, 76, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90 agriculture modernization, 40, 42

B basic services, x, 69, 85 benefits, 26, 30, 81 biodiesel, 73, 74 biodiversity, 54, 60 biofuel, 73, 74 biomass, 7 budget allocation, 8, 26 budget cuts, 9

C Caribbean, 11, 28, 30, 31, 37, 45, 50, 52, 81 challenges, viii, ix, x, 2, 28, 29, 40, 43, 50, 60, 67, 68, 69, 71, 80, 82, 86 children, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 23, 28, 30, 37, 50 citizens, 7, 10, 19, 21 civil society, 3, 26 climate, ix, 23, 31, 40, 41, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 68, 70, 71, 80, 82, 84, 86, 87

Index

94

climate change, ix, x, 40, 41, 48, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 80, 82, 84, 86, 87, 90 climate extremes, 54 coffee, 50, 52, 53, 54, 60, 69, 71, 77, 79, 80, 86, 87, 91 competitiveness, vii, x, 43, 68, 69, 71, 81, 85, 86 construction, x, 59, 68, 74, 85 consumption, 11, 48, 52, 73 corruption, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 36 crops, viii, 39, 43, 45, 46, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 60, 71, 76, 80, 82 cultivation, 47, 53, 73, 76, 77

D deforestation, viii, 39, 40, 51, 54, 55, 56 demographic transition, 82 demonstrations, 21 displacement, vii, 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 19, 22, 25, 26, 27, 31, 32, 36, 37 distribution, 23, 46, 49, 79 domestic industry, 44 drought, ix, 40, 52, 54, 55, 57, 68, 71

E earnings, 53, 77, 85 economic activity, 14, 17 economic development, 24, 45, 50, 58 economic growth, 2, 14, 17, 22, 26, 46, 47, 57, 85, 86 economic integration, 26 economic losses, ix, 68, 70 economic performance, 45 economic reform, 40 economies of scale, 81 ecosystem, 54, 57 education, 6, 11, 23, 34

educational opportunities, 11 educational programs, 86 El Niño, ix, 54, 68, 70 El Salvador, vii, 1, 2, 8, 91 emigration, vii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 22, 25, 26, 27, 32 employment, vii, viii, ix, 1, 2, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 30, 41, 59, 67, 72, 77 employment levels, 15 employment opportunities, 72 environment, 82, 83, 86, 87 environmental change, 41 environmental degradation, viii, 9, 39, 40, 56 environmental impact, ix, 68, 84 export market, 77, 86 export promotion, 53 exports, 15, 40, 43, 46, 69, 77, 79, 81 exposure, ix, 12, 41, 59, 68 external shocks, ix, 40, 41, 53 extreme poverty, viii, 39, 48, 49 extreme weather events, 70

F families, 13, 15, 71, 79, 80 farmers, ix, x, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 68, 70, 74, 77, 81, 83, 85, 86, 91 fertilizers, 40, 44, 48, 52, 53, 56, 60 financial, x, 6, 45, 68, 73, 81, 85 financial crisis, 73 financial incentives, 73 financial support, 6 firearms, 19, 32 fiscal year, 8 fluctuations, ix, 40, 53, 54 food, viii, x, 6, 10, 11, 15, 31, 39, 42, 43, 45, 47, 49, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 68, 71, 83, 84, 85 food production, 42, 59, 84

Index food security, 31, 43, 44, 49, 52, 54, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 71, 87, 89 food sovereignty, 57, 58, 60, 61, 65 free trade, 16, 26, 41, 53

G governance, 22 government intervention, 46 government policy, 41 government spending, 46 governments, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 26, 43, 73 green revolution, 43, 44, 56, 58 gross domestic product, 45 growth, viii, 14, 15, 23, 30, 39, 45, 46, 49, 51, 69, 72, 85 growth rate, 46, 72 Guatemala, vii, 1, 2, 8, 35, 73, 91

H health, 6, 10, 11, 70, 87 history, 10, 41, 51, 54 homicide, 18, 19, 23, 32, 38 Honduras, v, vii, viii, ix, x, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65,66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91 horticultural crops, 77 housing, 7, 37 human, vii, viii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 22, 24, 26, 29, 38 human capital, vii, viii, 2, 3, 7, 14, 22, 26 human dignity, 5 human rights, viii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 19, 24, 29, 38

95 I

import substitution, 44, 45 imports, 46, 47, 52, 54, 60, 73, 77 income, x, 13, 15, 17, 23, 30, 41, 50, 54, 55, 68, 81, 84 income distribution, 30 industry, ix, 7, 15, 51, 67, 69, 72, 73, 75, 80 ineffectiveness, 17, 21 inequality, ix, 22, 23, 25, 26, 68, 80 inequity, 11, 15, 22, 24 informal sector, 23 infrastructure, x, 4, 7, 11, 12, 14, 50, 55, 57, 68, 79, 84, 85 insecurity, viii, 18, 19, 22, 39, 49, 54, 59, 71 institutions, vii, viii, 2, 3, 7, 14, 18, 21, 24, 43 integration, 43, 45, 51, 58 intellectual property, 57 intellectual property rights, 57 intensive farming, ix, 68, 76, 77 international trade, 41, 46, 53, 59 investment, 4, 7, 15, 17, 22, 26, 46, 73, 81 irrigation, 55, 57, 76

L labor force, 44 labor market, 16, 23 land tenure, 12, 46, 49 landscape, vii, ix, x, 48, 68, 69, 75, 76, 77, 83, 84, 89 Latin America, ix, 8, 11, 19, 20, 28, 30, 31, 37, 38, 43, 46, 47, 50, 51, 52, 62, 64, 65, 68, 73, 80, 81, 88 living conditions, 9, 25 logistics, x, 7, 49, 68, 85

Index

96 M

majority, 10, 23, 49, 50, 55 management, 25, 80, 81 mangrove forests, 53 melon, viii, 39, 60, 69, 77, 80 migration, 6, 9, 10, 25, 28, 29, 34, 36, 41, 45, 50, 59, 60, 62, 63, 71, 86 modernization, vii, viii, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 multidimensional, viii, 2, 3 multinational companies, 72

N natural disaster, x, 68 natural resources, 14, 53, 82 negative consequences, 83 nutrition, viii, 31, 39, 49

O oil, 51, 54, 60, 72, 73, 75, 88 oil production, 72, 75 open markets, 44 opportunities, ix, 4, 7, 13, 17, 22, 40, 53, 57, 59, 80, 86, 91

P palm oil, viii, 39, 40, 51, 53, 54, 55, 60, 69, 72, 73, 75 policy, ix, x, 32, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 51, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 68, 84 population, viii, ix, x, 7, 11, 13, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 36, 39, 48, 49, 50, 57, 68, 70, 71, 80, 82, 84, 85 population growth, x, 68, 82, 85

poverty, viii, ix, 7, 9, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 39, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 57, 60, 68, 80 poverty eradication, 48 poverty line, ix, 68, 80 power generation, 11 power relations, 58 producers, x, 45, 47, 49, 60, 68, 70, 72, 74, 77, 85 protected areas, 57 protection, 10, 11, 13, 16, 23, 24, 46, 47 public administration, 23, 25 public finance, 25 public health, 30, 62 public officials, 12 public schools, 11 public-private partnerships, 8

R rainfall, 54, 70, 87 rainforest, 70 reality, viii, 2, 7, 10, 21, 75 reflexivity, ix, 40, 59, 60 reforms, 16, 21, 40, 46, 47 resilience, x, 31, 54, 56, 57, 68, 84, 85 resource management, 84 resources, x, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 23, 24, 26, 37, 48, 53, 68, 82, 83, 84 resource-seeking, 15 response, 21, 26, 37, 48 rights, iv, vii, viii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 16, 26, 27 rural areas, ix, x, 23, 48, 49, 67, 68, 72, 80, 85 rural development, 48 rural population, 48 rural poverty, viii, 39, 43, 48, 49, 57, 60

Index S security, vii, viii, 2, 3, 7, 11, 14, 16, 19, 23, 24, 31, 43, 57, 59 services, iv, x, 5, 40, 68, 74, 85 shrimp, viii, 39, 40, 53, 60, 69, 80 smallholder, 42, 58, 60, 62, 65, 84, 89 small-scale farmers, 42, 45, 85 social development, 15 social environment, 6 social evaluation, viii, 2 social organization, 42 social problems, 9 social programs, 35, 47 social security, 6, 11, 16 social welfare, 13 society, 3, 10, 33, 41, 57, 58, 59, 83 sociotechnical imaginaries, 42, 57, 58, 59, 63 sociotechnical imaginary, 56, 60 soil erosion, 55 solution, x, 55, 57, 58, 68, 85, 86 sovereignty, 57, 58, 60, 63 soy bean, 43 structural adjustment, 43, 46, 47, 56 structural changes, 27, 50 structure, 23, 40, 43, 52, 58, 73 subsistence, 9, 40, 42, 45, 49, 51, 54, 55, 58, 60, 77 subsistence farming, 77 subsistence production, 45 sustainability, 48, 69, 80, 82, 83, 85, 87

T technical assistance, 6, 43, 45 temperature, 52, 80, 87 tourism, 7, 12, 17, 26 trade, 16, 45, 46, 47, 53, 56, 81, 85, 88 trade agreement, 45, 47

97

trade deficit, 45, 46 trade liberalization, 46, 47, 56, 62 transformation, vii, viii, ix, 4, 35, 39, 40, 42, 47, 50, 55, 67, 69, 71 transformations, 22 transparency, 20, 24, 36

U United States, vii, 1, 2, 6, 8, 26, 30, 41, 47, 49, 54, 60, 63, 65, 77, 80, 87 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 5 urban, 23, 47, 49, 59, 60, 83, 86 urban areas, 49, 59, 60, 86

V value chains, v, vii, ix, x, 43, 67, 68, 69, 84, 88 vegetable oil, ix, 68 vegetables, 76, 77 vertical integration, 51 violence, vii, 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 36, 50 vocational training, 7, 86 vulnerability, x, 7, 48, 55, 68, 71

W wages, 9, 16, 23 water, 6, 11, 12, 80, 81, 83 workers, 16, 51 working conditions, 16 working hours, 16

98 World Bank, ix, 17, 22, 23, 24, 28, 31, 38, 45, 47, 49, 50, 66, 68, 81, 88, 91 worldwide, 19, 51, 58, 59

Index Y young people, 7, 10, 11, 28, 50