Home Rule and the Irish Question (Seminar Studies) [1 ed.] 0582352150, 9780582352155

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SEMIN AR STUDI ES IN HISTORY

Editor: Patrick Richardson

Horne Rule and the Irish Question Grenfell Morton

First published 1980 by Longman Group Limited Tenth impression 1992 Published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint af the Taylor & Francis Group, an infarma business Copyright © 1980, Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any clectronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notices Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience broaden our understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices, or medical treatment may become necessary. Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any inforrnation, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safetyand the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility. To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors, assurne any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein. ISBN 13: 978-0-582-35215-5 (pbk)

Set in 10/11 Press Roman, IBM

Contents

INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Part One: The Background 1 THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN ANDIRELAND The eighteenth-century parliament The Union

2 DANIEL O'CONNELL ÄND REPEAL The Repeat Movement Federalism

Part Two: The Horne Rule Solution

3 ISAACBUTT ANDTHE GENESIS OF HOME RULE Famine, emigration and the American dimension Emergence of Horne Rule

4 NEW DEPARTURES Rise of Parnell Tenants versus landlords

5 THE RESOURCES OF CIVILISATION

v vi 1 1 2

4 7 7

9 11 11 11 13 17 17 20

Eviction and obstruction Gladstone's Land Act, 1881 Kilmainham and after The election of 1885

24 24 26 27 30

6 THE CRISIS OF HOMERULE The first Horne Rule Bill The great debate

33 34 36

7 PARNELLAND GLADSTONE

41 41 43 45

Resolution and reform The fall of Parnell The second Horne Rule Bill

8

EVOLUTION AND DEVOLUTION

'New Ireland' Constructive Unionisrn The devolution crisis

9 REDMOND AND THE SUPERSESSION OF HOME RULE The Irish Council Bill The crisis of 1910 Carson and Craig The third Horne Rule Bill The sound of rnarching

10

11

Part Three: Assessrnent HOME RULE IN NORTHERN IRELAND CONCLUSION

47 47 50 51 54 54 55 57 59 61 65 65 70 70 70 71

The parliarnentary tradition Transatlantic Ireland The northern iron The rniddle way

72

Part Four: Docurnents

74

BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

114 120

MAP

Unionist constituencies in Ulster, 1911

58

Introduction to the Series

The seminar rnethod of teaching is being used increasingly. It is a way of learning in smaller groups through discussion, designed both to get away from and to supplement the basic lecture techniques. To be successful, the members of a seminar must be informed - or else, in the unkind phrase of a cynic - it can be a 'pooling of ignorance'. The chapter in the textbook of English or European history by its nature cannot provide material in this depth, but at the same time the full academic work may be too long and perhaps too advanced. For this reason we have invited practising teachers to contribute short studies on specialised aspects of British and European history with these special needs in mind. For this series the authors have been asked to provide, in addition to their basic analysis, a full selection of documentary material of all kinds and an up-to-date and comprehensive bibliography. Both these seetions are referred to in the text, but it is hoped that they will prove to be valuable teaching and learning aids in themselves.

Note on the System 01References A bold number in round brackets (5) in the text refers the reader to the corresponding entry in the Bibliography seetion at the end of the book. A bold number in square brackets, preceded by 'doc.' [docs 6,8] refers the reader to the corresponding items in the seetion of Documents, which follows the main text. PA TRICK RICHARDSON General Editor

Acknowledgements

I should like to express my grateful thanks to the students in my adult classes "in The Queen 's University, Belfast, and in Lisburn , Oungannon, Bangor , Holywood and Armagh , all of whom Iistened patiently and whose critical appraisals of the complexity of modern Irish history helped my own comprehension of the subject. I should also like to thank my colleagues who have so generously shared their knowledge of modern Ireland: Dr John Whyte , Professor Oavid Harkness , Or Con O'Leary, Professor R.J. Lawrence , Or A.T.Q. Stewart, Professor J.C. Beckett, Rev. Professor R.F.G. Holmes, Mrs Oeirdre Flanagan , andMr Noel Mitchel who kindly read the manuscript. I am also greatly indebted to the late Dr Brian Kennedy , to the late J .K.C. Armour , of Campbell College, to Mr D.A. Lyttle and to Mr J. Magee, of St. J oseph's College of Education. As always an author's life is made pieasant by the kindly and courteous staffs of the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, the National Library of Ireland , the Library of The Queen's University , Belfast , and the Linenhall Library, Belfast. Finally, I worked under the inspiring memory of my Father, the late Rev. Benjamin Brooke Morton, H.C.F ., and sustained by the loyalty and forbearance of my wife and children who had to live with this book for so long! GRENFELL MORTON Department of Extra Mural Studies The Queen's University of Belfast

We are indebted to Her Majesty's Stationery Office for permission to reproduce extracts and a map from lrish Unionism 1885-1923 (HMSO Belfast 1973) by P. Buckland, reproduced with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office. The cartoon on the cover is reproduced by perrnission of the National Library oflreland, Dublin .

Part One: 1

Background

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland

I shall not make the Italians a subject race to the Trojans, Nor do I seek this rea1m for my own: let both our peop1es, Unconquered, as equa1 partners be joined in a 1eaguefor ever. Virgil, Aeneid XÜ, 189-91, translated by Cecil Day Lewis

The Act of Union in 1800, by whieh the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was established, brought to an end the historie Kingdom of Ireland established by Henry VIII in 1534. It also terminated the long-standing institution of an Irish parliament, a body originating in the medieval Lordship of Ireland in the thirteenth century. Even though the Trist parliament represented the lords and communities of the Pale,. and those areas which accepted English law, yet a distinctive tradition evolved, notunlike that of the Three Estaits in Scotland. Indeed, by 1494, Henry VII's Lord Deputy, Sir Edward Poynings, was forced to curb the growing independence of the Irish parliament by bringing proposed legislation under the joint control of the Irish and English Privy Councils. Under the Tudor monarchs parliament, although seldom summoned, remained an essential part of the constitution, so that when the paral1el process of plantation in Ulster, Virginia and New England began, it was as natural for James I to strengthen the Irish parliament by the creation of new boroughs as it was for the House of Burgesses to arise in Virginia (114). The 'Glorious Revolution' at the end of the seventeenth century established civil and religious liberty in England, but made people in both Ireland and the American colonies more aware oftheir subordinate status. William Penn's proposal for colonial unity in 1697 was mirrored in Ireland by the publication in 1698 of William Molyneux's pamphlet

The Case of Ire/and being bound by Acts of Parliament in Eng/and, stated, in which he condemned the undermining of the lrish parliament's authority by aseries of English legislative encroachments. The union of the English and Scottish parliaments in 1707 provided a striking paral1el with the later measure of 1800. The Scots parliament, meeting in Edinburgh, came to an end amidst widespread opposition, riots in the capital and corruption of the nobility. Henceforward Scot-

2

Background tish constituencies were to be represented in the House of Commons at Westminster, and the nobles by a contingent of representative peers. A Scottish identity was preserved by the recognition of the established Kirk and the continuity of her distinctive legal system. Yet this union, though strongly opposed as a 'sell-out', was, on balance, destined to operate successfully (11).

The eighteenth-eentury parliament Daniel Defoe, in his History ofthe Scotch Union, argued in favour of a further union of Great Britain and Ireland, and in July 1707 there was a current of opinion in the House of Commons which favoured a 'more comprehensive union'. However, political ineptitude and commercial jealousy combined to thwart this statesmanlike course, a design which stood as good a chance of ultimate success as did the union with Scotland, a union which required to be sealed and consolidated in the bloody suppression of the J acobite Highlanders in 1745-6. Instead, Ireland suffered the indignity of being subjected to the Declaratory Act 1719 (6 Geo. 1), by which the legislative supremacy of the English parliament was affirmed, particularly in the matter of being able to legislate directly for Ireland. Significantly, an Act couched in similar terms was passed in 1766 to affirm the supremacy of Westminster over the colonial assemblies in America. The Protestant mling dass in Ireland resented their kingdom and its parliament being placed on a par with some remote colonial dependency, and their increasing resentment was brilliantly expressed by Jonathan Swift, the Tory pamphleteer who had toppled Marlborough and who now occupied the Deanery of St Patrick's cathedral in Dublin. Beginning with an attack on the commercial restrictions imposed on Ireland, Swift in his Drapier's Letters (1724) not only exposed the cormpt scandal by which Walpole allowed Wood to coin debased halfpence for circulation in Ireland, but proceeded to reassert the independence and integrity of the historie Kingdom of Ireland, and the consequent nullity of measures which had not been sanctioned by the domestic legislature; 'government without the consent of the governed was the very definition of slavery' (8, 9). In the 1750s the Irish parliament refused to transmit surplus revenue to the Exchequer in London, and thenceforward such moneys were spent on such public works as the widening of the streets in Georgian Dublin, the constmction of inland waterways and grants to the University of Dublin. This nascent body of 'Patriot' opinion amongst the Irish parliamentarians, country gentlemen and the enterprising merchants of Belfast was greatly stimulated and inspired by the rapidity with which 2

The United Kingdom

0/ Great Britain and Ireland

changes began to occur in the American colonies after 1763. The Stamp Act crisis, the Declaratory Act , the Townshend duties and the successive troubles in Boston were all followed with deep interest in Ireland, as the cause of the colonists came to be regarded as identical with that of the 'Patriots' (12). The 'Patriot' interest, led by Henry Grattan in parliament, was, however, in a different situation from that of the colonial merchants of Boston or Philadelphia, or the plantation owners in Virginia. For one thing , America was separated from Great Britain by the Atlantic Ocean, whereas Ireland was but one of the British Isles: as Grattan himself said, 'The ocean forbids union, the channel forbids separation'. For another, apart from negro slaves and white indentured servants, male franchise was virtually the norm in the American colonies, whereas in Ireland both Roman Catholics and Dissenters (mainly Presbyterians) were excluded from active citizenship. Finally, simple geographical proximity made it easier for the Irish parliament to be kept in a subordinate position than the thirteen separate assemblies in America. The Irish parliament was 'corrupt, unrepresentative, unable to control the executive, its very laws still subject to a royal veto exercised on behalf of the British government of the day ' (121). The Lord Lieutenant and the officials of the admin istration in Dublin Castle were appointed by and responsible to the ministry in London. This continued to be the case even after the repeal of 6 Geo . I in 1782 and the Renunciation Act of 1783, insisted upon by Henry Flood, by which the British parliament specifically renounced all claim to legislate Ior Ireland (97). Henry Grattan was regarded as the hero of the hour in 1782. But it was a hollow victory: Grattan did not lead a disciplined political party , but achanging and amorphous 'interest group', the parliament remained unreformed and it had no control over the executive (3 , 1). This formed a striking contrast to the solid achievements of the American colonists in successfully uniting to defeat the British , and in creating their federal constitution. The American Revolution was the fulfilment of that heritage of English law and constitutional practice which the original settlers had brought with them to the New World. Locke and Blackstone meant more to men like Otis, Dickinson and John Adams than did Rousseau or Voltaire. The DecIaration of Independence with its listing of specific grievances contrasted sharply with the Declaration of the Rights ofMan. As an Atlantic island and a European country Ireland was bound to be influenced by both (8, 9, 12). To radicals generally in the British Islcs thc events and ideas of the French Revolution appeared to offer solutions to the continuing frustrations presented by unreformed and unrepresentative parliaments. In

3

Background 1791 the young Dublin lawyer, WolfeTone (1763-98), helped to found the Society of United lrishmen in Belfast, then the leading centre of liberal and radical thought in Ireland. This body aimed at parliamentary reform and catholic emancipation, and sought to achieve these ends by uniting together 'Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter under the common name of Irishrnan' (8, 12). When war began in 1793 the United Irishmen became a treasonable organization, and after 1794 they became a secret, oath-bound association, preparing for an uprising with French help, aiming at the establishment of an independent Irish republic. There followed the bloody but ineffective rebellion in 1798. Confined to the north-east aad south-east of Ireland - areas where the population was largely of immigrant, non-Irish stock, and lacking widespread support throughout the country or effective help from France - it was soon crushed. Its chief legacy to later Irish history was the creation of a tradition of revolutionary violence, which manifested itself again in 1803 with Robert Emmet's abortive rebellion in Dublin, with the Young Irelanders in 1848, the Fenians (the Irish Republican Brotherhood) in 1867, the rising in Easter week 1916, and during the guerrilla warfare of 1919-21. Unlike the American Revolution, which achieved its- objective of securing independence at the first attempt, this lrish revolutionary tradition was similar to those in France (1789 to 1968) and Russia from 1825 onwards (7,10). Yet it must be stressed that this revolutionary and separatist tradition was a minority tradition, standing in sharp contrast to the parliamentary and legalistic approach which aimed at securing legislativeindependence and appealed more widely to the underlying conservatism of lrish political and sociallife.

The Union The 1798 rebellion forced Pitt to face what the Victorians labelIed the 'Irish Question' [doc. 1], that is the problem of what constitutional relationship, if any, should exist between Great Britain and Ireland. He had to ask himself whether 'there was any middle course between the extremes ofUnion with Great Britain and total separation'. Pitt reached the conclusion that Union was the answer, being the solution to the lrish problem 'most likely to give Ireland security, quiet, and internal repose; that it would remove the chief bar to her advancement in wealth and civilization; that it would vastly augment her material prosperity, and that it would tend powerfully to unite the higher and lower orders of her people'. To these arguments Pitt added the suggestion that the admission ofCatholics to parliament could be part ofthe Unionarrangements, as 'a United legislative body promises a more effectual remedy

4

The United Kingdom o[Great Britain and Ireland for their grievances, than could be likely to result from any local arrangements' (4, 8). Grattan strenuously opposed these proposals for the ending of that parliament of whose constitutional liberties he was the champion. He condemned the 'corruption, threats, and stratagems' being used by Pitt and his ministry to silence opposition; methods, it must be added, quite usual in eighteenth-century politics, but in this case employed on a very large scale. Under such conditions a union might be inevitable, but it would be unlikely to become perpetual: 'the Constitution may, [or a time, be so lost ... the character of the country cannot be so lost. The ministers of the Crown may, at length find that it is not so easy to put down for ever an ancient and respectable nation by abilities, however great, by power and corruption, however irrestible. Liberty may repair her golden beams, and with redoubled heart animate the country' (9). The Act of Union received the royal assent on 1 August 1800. As from 1 January 1801 the parliaments ofGreat Britain and Ireland were to be united. Ireland was to be represented in the House of Lords by four spiritual and twenty-eight ordinary peers, while one hundred M.P.s were to represent Irish constituencies in the House of Commons. Nonrepresentative Irish peers were eligible for election to the Commons; Palmerston, for example, was so elected in 1807. The established churches of England and Ireland were to be united into one protestant episcopal church, 'and the continuance and preservation of the said church ... shall be taken to be an essential and fundamental part of the union.' Trading privileges and bounties were to apply equally to the citizens of Great Britain and Ireland, although for a time the two kingdoms were to retain their separate exchequers and national debts, the proportionate contributions of the two partners to United Kingdom expenditure being fixed in the ratio of 15 : 2, a formula indicative of the vast difference in wealth between agrarian Ireland and the rising fortunes of 'the first industrial nation' (4, 5). Like Scotland, Ireland preserved something of her identity as a distinct kingdom. The courts of law, the twenty-two departments of the administration supervised by the Chief Secretary's office in Dublin Castle, the separate army establishment, based at Kilmainham, the Church establishment, and at the head of affairs, a Lord Lieutenant representing the Sovereign, all these indicated that the new United Kingdom was not a fully integrated political organism (25). Nonetheless, it was perfectly reasonable to suppose that the union of Great Britain and Ireland would prove as durable and successful as the union of England and Scotland in 1707. The circumstances of the two Acts of Union were superficially similar: both introduced during a major European

5

Background war, both strongly opposed at horne, both apparently consolidating the military security and the political unity of the British Isles. However, it can be argued that England and the Scottish Lowlands had more in common than had Britain and Ireland in 1800. By then the 'take-off into sustained economic growth' caused by the industrial and agricultural revolutions had begun to transform the economy of parts of England and the Scottish Lowlands (5, 11), while on the international scene the French Revolution, in destroying the institutions and assumptions of the ancien regime, stirnulated both democracy and nationalism throughout Europe. It was not for nothing that Wolfe Tone's search for outside help should have led hirn to Paris via Philadelphia. Irish history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was dominated politically by the struggle to modify or terminate the Act of Union. This struggle was fuelled by the involvement of the Catholic masses in the fight for Catholic emancipation, by the hungry desire of the tenant farmers to possess their holdings, and by the rise of a selfconscious national feeling in Ireland and among numerous Irish emigrants to the United States.

6

2

Daniel O'Connell and Repeal

Let Cork county and Yorkshire be put on a footing-let England and Ireland be identified. But for this purpose equality of rights, laws and liberties is essentially necessary. We desire no more, we will not take less. Areal effectual union, or no union - such is the alternative! Daniel O'Connell, 1837 The Union instead of solving the question of how Ireland was to be governed presented Great Britain with a profoundly discontented partner in the new body politic. Many people regarded the Union as a violation of Ireland's national rights; others saw the denial of Catholic emancipation, which had been hoped for with the Union, as a flagrant injustice. Indeed, this now became a major question in British politics: 'Year after year a petition from Ireland forced the subject on Parliament's attention, and kept alivea Brobdingnagian debate, which, .stretching over a quarter of a century, fills hundreds of columns of Hansard'

(44).

The Repeal Movement The dominant figure of the post-Union period was Daniel O'Connell, the scion of a minor Catholic landowning family in Kerry. Born in 1775, O'Connell entered the legal profession and quickly built up a substantial practice as a barrister. His political stance quickly became apparent: a conservative Catholic parliamentarism, which initially expressed itself in opposition to the revolutionary violence of the United lrishmen in 1798, but also in opposition to the ending of the historie parliament of Ireland. Indeed, O'Connell declared that he would choose the re-enactment of the penal laws against the Catholics to the Union with Great Britain on the grounds that he would prefer to entrust the granting of full emancipation to his Protestant fellow-countrymen in an lrish parliament than have to leave the matter to Westminster! He was essentially a typical early nineteenth-century liberal and pragmatist, imbued with the national and liberal ideals ofthe Enlightenment (108).

7

Background O'Connell rejected the concept of an independent republic propagated by Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen, the founders of the militant tradition in modern Irish affairs. Instead, he aimed at a simple repeal of the Act of Union, and areturn to the 'constitution of 1782', a constitution in which Catholics would hope to share [doc. 4] . For repeal to be meaningful, emancipation was essential. In the protracted struggle which followed O'Connell became 'almost completely identified with the hopes and aspirations of a Catholic Ireland slowly emerging from that inarticulateness which had characterised it for so long' (49). The organisation of the plain people of Ireland in their parochial Catholic Associations, the necessary involvement of the parish c1ergy, the raising of the humble, but collectively large 'Catholic rent', the expression of popular support in enormous meetings at historie sites such as Tara - all these gave the Catholic masses a new self-confidence and purpose such as they had never hitherto possessed. O'Connell guided and enlarged this nascent democracy, directing it into constitutional and non-violent channels, and so establishing one of the main patterns of Irish political life. Having at last gained Catholic emancipation in 1829, O'Connell was able to turn with some confidence to agitation for repeal of the Union, but by now there was the disadvantage that it had been in existence for a generation. Further, O'Connell was far from being doctrinaire on the subject: "May not Repeal be dispensed with, if we get beneficial measures without it?' (45). This may have been wishful thinking, for not even a four-hour speech in the Commons saved his motion for repeal from ignominious defeat [doc. 2]. Clearly he was swimming against the tide of public opinion in the United Kingdom as a whole, just as his successful struggle for Catholic emancipation had largely been assisted by the reforming spirit of the time. In Ireland itself, the wholehearted support for the Emancipation campaign was not repeated. From 1835 until 1841 O'Connell formed an uneasy alliance with the Whigs,who, through the activities of Thomas Drummond as Under-Secretary, established a proper constabulary, reformed the administration ofjustice, swept away the corrupt municipal corporations, introduced a Poor Law and considered the lines on which an efficient railway system should be constructed. For his part, O'Connell in August 1838 founded the Precursor Society, a body whose name reflected the influence of Miranda and Bolivar in Venezuela, and whose purpose was to 'precede' justice for Ireland by obtaining through Westminster specific reforms, such as equalization of the franchise, a proper proportion of Irish M.P.s, and the ending of tithe payments to the established Church, a grievance which both Catholics and Dissenters shared. Should these demands not

8

DanielO'Connell and Repeal be met, the society would transform itself into a Repeal Association (113). Indeed, in 1840 O'Conneli outlined a plan for a restored lrish parliament. He proposed a House of Commons of 300 members, 127 for the boroughs and 173 for the counties , so giving particular weight to the landed gentry, whom O'Connell, himself of that dass , not surprisingly regarded as the mainstay of society. Announced as 'Repeal Year', 1843 was to culminate in a monster meeting at Clontarf on the north-eastern outskirts of Dublin, and the scene of the historie defeat of the Danes by Brian Boru in 1014. Peel's government , fearing that grave disorder might arise from such a gathering, so near the capital , banned the meeting. O'Connell, true to his profound belief in lawful and non-violent methods, accepted this ban, and in doing so really acknowledged the defeat of his movement for repeal. It was a moment which may be compared with the failure of the Chartists in England and Wales in 1849.

Federalism After this gigantic non-event, O'Connell toyed with the idea of federalism. This concept was in men's minds following the successful application of the Durham Report in Canada, and the major success of the federal constitution in the U.S.A. Why should there not be a general congress at Westminster to oversee the welfare of the British Isles as a whole, while in Britain and in Ireland local parliaments would be responsible for internal affairs? Lord Palmerston scoffed at the whole idea as doing little more than providing in Dublin 'a large quarter session, meeting in College Green for merely local and domestie purposes' (45,

49,6).

Sharman Crawford, the liberal Ulster landlord, whose main interest was the extension of Tenant Right (mainly protection from eviction for reasons other than non-payment of rent), was a much more convinced proponent ofthe federal solution than the wavering O'Connell. Crawford originally disapproved of the repeal agitation, on the grounds that it tended to disturb the public peace, but he later took the view that some form of legislature was required in Ireland [doc. 3]. He thought that O'Connell's idea of a simple repeal of the Act of Union was impracticable, implying as it did areturn to two independent legislatures linked only by a common Crown, a relationship which had caused crises in 1784 and 1788 [doc. 4]. Instead he advocated 'a national representative body, which would operate most effectuaIly and beneficially in conducting the local interests and local taxation of the country' [doc. 3] . Ta this end he suggested that the Irish M.P.s should hold a meeting

9

Background

in Dublin prior to the opening of the session in Westminster. He also reached the logical, but unacceptable, view that federalism implied the creation of regional parliaments for England and Scotland as well as for Ireland , an to be kept 'under control and regulation, by the central power of imperial representation '. Not surprisingly the federalist idea was rejected by those who still desired a simple repeal of the Act of Union ; more significantly both federalism and repeal were rejected as makeshift devices, not only by the merchants of Belfast [doc. 5] but also by the idealist nationalism of the Young Irelanders , led by Charles Gavan Duffy , Thomas Davis and Fintan Lalor [doc. 6]. They were immersed in the romantic nationalism which attracted so many young men in the Europe of the early forties and regarded federalism as an unacceptable dilution of Repeal. Sharman Crawford, unlike O'Connell, was aware of the strength and simplicity of their arguments: 'they will allege that my proposition would place her rather in the position of a colony' (96). The massive natural disaster of the Famine intervened to sweep away both the Young Irelanders, the uncertain views of the ageing and ineffectual O'Connell, and any serious discussion of federalism. Indeed, the aid programme set up by Sir Robert Peel's administration and the inflow of private charity served to emphasise the view that Ireland was not really capable of solving her own problems , and required substantial assistance from her partner in the United Kingdom. So by 1849 repeal of the Union was no longer a living issue. O'Connell had died in 1847 at Genoa, the Young Irelanders' attempt at an armed uprising in 1848 had ended in farce, their ideas surviving only amongst a limited circle, and the flight from the land had begun to reduce the population and create new Irelands overseas, particularly in the United States (31, 9).

10

Part Two: 3

The Horne Rule Solution

Isaac Butt and the Genesis of Horne Rule

The descent from O'Connell to Mr Butt has been the natural declension of a political disease, which we had no right to hope would be cured by any one remedy. Anthony Trollope, Autobiography, chapter iv. The union of Great Britain and Ireland was designed to solve the Irish question by merging the two kingdoms, and in so doing to preserve and pratect the Protestant interest, which had hitherto dominated the political and social scene. However, the nineteenth century turned out to be aperiod of rapid change, contrasting sharply with the long period of relative tranquility between the Williamite wars and the rebellion of 1798. There were three main reasons for this. Firstly, Ireland, as part of the United Kingdom, was increasingly affected by the reforming and utilitarian spirit of the age; then there was the land problem of which 'the Famine was the supreme manifestation'; and, lastly, the massive transatlantic migration, which not only reinforced the existing bonds with the United States, but created a second Ireland removed from British influence or control.

Famine, emigration and the American dimension The major natural disaster of the Famine underlined the difference which yawned between industrial Britain and largely rural Ireland, and made people realise that the prasperity which Pitt had postulated as a necessary consequence of the Union was largely confined to Belfast and the Lagan Valley, and had not percolated to the mass of the people. There was an obvious need to do something for the 'starving peasantry' and consider the position of the 'alien church' in order to offset the revolutionary and separatist tradition propagated by the Young Irelanders [docs. 1,6]. Both Gladstone and Isaac Butt were greatly impressed by the dimensions of the Irish question at this time. 'Ireland', wrote Gladstone in 1845, 'is likely to find this country and parliament so much employment for years to come.... Ireland! Ireland! That cloud in the west! That coming storm! That minister of God's retribution upon 11

The Horne Rule Solution

cruel, inveterate, and. but half-atoned injustice! Ireland forces upon us these great socialand religious questions' (48). Isaac Butt, born in 1813, the son of a Church of Ireland rector in Co. Donegal, and educated at Trinity College, Dublin, had been at first looked on, like Gladstone, as one of the rising hopes of 'the stern and unbending Tories' . He read law, graduating in 1836, and was appointed to a lectureship in political economy. His outlook was that ofa conventional Unionist, tinctured by the Orangeism of his native province. Abandoning his academic post, he was called to the Bar, where he defended some of the Young Irelanders in 1848. Impressed with their sincerity and romantic idealism, though their politics were antipathetic to his own, he learned something of the profound discontents which underlay their pathetic attempt at rebellion. The period 1848-68 was one of slow recovery from the Famine. The process was assisted by the rapid diminution of the population through emigration. In the eight years 1847-54 some 1,316,761 persons went to the United States, and a further 378,532 in the period 1855-62. This building up of a new Ire1and in America, mainly in the urban centres of the eastern seaboard, created a new situation in Anglo-Irish affairs and made it impossible for either British statesmen or Irish politicians to attempt to solve Ireland's problems as if they were simply a matter of domestic concern (14, 18,33). Butt spent most of this time in England, striving to earn an income commensurate with the debts piled up by his kindness and self-indulgence. Meantime, in parliament the 1850s saw the formation of an independent Irish party, held together largely by an interest in tenant right, but split by personal rivalriesand sectarian issues (55). This party, shortlived and ineffective though it was, formed a link in the chain stretching from O'Connell's 'tail' to the parliamentary party led by Isaac Butt and Charles Stewart Parnell. In significant contrast, the embers of the revolutionary movement flared again when societies were founded on both sides of the Atlantic in 1858. In New York the Fenian Brotherhood was founded by John O'Mahony, and in Ireland James Stephens of Kilkenny launched the Irish Republican Brotherhood, dedicated to the creation of an independent, democratic republic. The members on both sides of the Atlantic were popularly termed 'Fenians'. These 'advanced' bodies were revolutionary organisations from the outset, unlike the United Irishmen or the Young Irelanders, both of which had begun as groups for achieving reform by constitutional methods. Indeed, at a convention held in Chicago in November 1863, while the American Civil War was at its height, the delegates of the Fenian Brotherhood proclaimed the 'Republic of Ireland to be virtually established'! In 1867 the vacillating Stephens was replaced in 12

Isaac Butt and the Genesis o[Home Rule the leadership of the movement in Ireland by a group of ex-Civil War officers, and rebellion broke out. The coastguard station at Caherciveen in Co. Kerry was seized, and in England an ambitious scheme to seize the arms in Chester castle , travel to Holyhead and thence launch an armed invasion ofDublin, was quickly and easily foiled . The main effort took place in early March, but the risings in Dublin , Cork, Tipperary and Limerick were poarly led, ill coordinated and easily crushed. About twenty-four people lost their lives. Complete anticlimax was only avoided by the execution of the 'Manchester Martyrs', three Fenians who had attempted to rescue some of their colleagues from a police van, an incident which had resulted in the killing of a police sergeant. Th is episode created a cult and helped to blanket the callous brutality of the dynamite explosion at Clerkenwell prison (30, 47). The trials of accused Fenian prisoners brought Isaac Butt back into active politicallife. He defended them in the courts, as he had previously defended the Young Irelanders , and supported the plea for amnesty of condemned prisoners by maintaining 'they were not a mere band of assassins, actuated by base motives - but real and earnest patriots moved by unselfish thoughts, and risking a11 in that which they believed to be their country's cause' (54). In this way Butt built up an 'understanding' with the revolutionary left-wing of Irish politics, without which it is unlikely that either he or Parne11 could have achieved what they did in building up the Irish parliamentary party. Meantirne, the result of 'shooting Niagara' in the second parliarnentary Reform Act of 1867 was to return the Liberals to power in 1868. Now at last Gladstone had his opportunity to settle the Irish question by laying his axe to the roots of the 'upas tree' of Protestant ascendancy. In 1869 the Church, of Ireland was disestablished on generous terms (26) . Bitterly opposed , this move was a major breach in the terms of the Act of Union, and destined to be an advanced sap against the whole pro-Union position in Ireland . In 1870 a Land Act began the process of attempting to deal with the complex and vexed relationship of landlord and tenant, a process continued much more effectively by the Land Act of 1881 (32, 34).

Ernergence of Horne Rule By 1870 Butt had moved away from his earlier stiff Unionism, a position which he realised had been seriously eroded by the onward march of reforms in both Church and state. He had now come under Sharman Crawfard's influence, and published a parnphlet, lrish Federalism , in which he maintained that a federal relationship between Britain and

13

The Horne Rule Solution Ireland implied no lowering of the national flag, as some of the repealers and all of the Young Irelanders thought. Instead he pointed to the adoption of the federal principle in Canada under the British North America Act 1867; the victory of the Federals and the preservation of the Union in the bloody American Civil War; and the resolution of Austro-Hungarian tensions by the ausgleich by which the Dual Monarchy was established in 1867. Butt concluded that federalism was 'a practical plan for constituting an Irish parliament which involves nothing revolutionary in its character'. To his conservative mind the division of powers between an Irish parliament having complete control over Irish revenue, resources and internal administration, and the parliament in Westminster retaining control over the Crown, foreign, imperial and colonial affairs, would be a stabilising influence in the British Isles (54, 106). In his view no people were less disposed to democracy than the Irish. According to Butt the 'real danger of democratic or revolutionary violence is far more with the English people. The time may not be far distant when a separate Irish parliament might be the Conservative element in the British Confederation.' On 19 May 1870 aHorne Government Association meeting was held in the Bilton Hotel, Dublin. This body, with its deliberately vague and homespun name, was 'in the main, liberal and Conservative with a tang ofUnionism and Orangeism'. By July 1871 the movement had broadened its base, although it still presented to its critics 'too much the appearance of a Dublin shop-keeping movement'. Given its antecedents, it was hard to see how the Horne Government Association could be more than a Dublin-based pressure group, a group divorced from the main sources of Irish political energy: the tenant farmers, the landlords, the rural clergy and the merchants of the provincial towns. The Catholic clergy, to take one obvious examp1e, were naturally suspicious of a body in which Conservative and Protestant groups participated so actively, in marked contrast to O'Connell's Catholic Association in which their influence had been unquestioned (117). Horne Government candidates contested fourteen by-elections in the period 1870-73, of which they won nine and lost five. This was such slow progress that a conference of the movement was summoned to the Rotunda, Dublin in November 1873. The main outcome was the formation of a more broadly based Irish Horne Rule League. This body was dedicated to the propositions that a domestic legislature should be restored to Ireland, based on the inalienable right of the Irish people to self-government; that such government should be by the Queen, Lords and Commons of Ireland; that there should be a federal arrangement between Dublin and London, and, finally, that the Irish executive should 14

Isaac Butt and the Genesis ofHome Rule

be controlled by the Irish parliament [doc. 7] . These proposals were much eloser to Sharman Crawford's concepts than O'Connell's simplistic idea of areturn to the unreformed parliament of 1782 [docs. 2,3,4] . The dissolution of parliament in January 1874 caught the Horne Rulers largely unprepared, and the election was of particular interest as it was the first to be held after the Secret Ballot Act 1872, areform of far-reaching significance. The effect of this Act on electoral patterns was soon apparent in Ulster, where all but two of the nineteen constituencies were contested compared with only six contests in 1868. The result of the 1874 election was that of the 103 Irish members, 59 were Horne Rulers, 32 Conservativesand 12 liberals, compared with 5 Horne Rulers, 41 Conservatives and 57 Liberals before the dissolution. This election gave a elearer indication of the emerging pattern of Irish public opinion than had been possible since 1800. In Ulster the success of the tenant right movement and the remarkable swing towards Horne Rule in Leinster, Munster anti Connacht was more than the temporary success of political adventurers or Liberal turncoats, although such men were in evidence on the political scene. This election also marked a deeline in the numbers and influence of the Protestant landed gentry in the Horne Rule League; many of them left the League because they saw the links between Horne Rule and elerical, tenant and liberal interests steadily increasing (lOS, 109). Indeed the modern polarisation of political outlook in Ireland between nationalist and unionist began to emerge in 1874, though not so starkly as in the crucial election of 1885 (63). Significantly, the conservative Belfast News Letter advised 'the gentry, artisans and farmers' of Ulster to join the Orange Order, 'the most thoroughly complete political organization in the country,' so making it more powerful and more useful in promoting the interests of Protestantism. The Irish Liberals suffered the fate their English counterparts were later to meet with the rise of the Labour Party: they were caught between two larger parties and squeezed out. Gladstone's administration was replaced by Disraeli's Conservative ministry, a change which had the effect of enhancing the value to the Liberals of a possible entente with the Irish Horne Rulers. In effect this made Horne Rule a key issue in United Kingdom politics right up to 1914 (117). The election of 1874 appeared to be a massive endorsement of Butt's policy of Horne Rule. However, on eloser examination, the fifty-nine M.P.s who with varying degrees of comprehension and sincerity supported Horne Rule appear more like an eighteenth-century interest, somewhat like the 'Patriots' who supported Grattan in the Irish parliament, than the well-organised and closely-knit party of Parnell's time. 15

The Home Rule Solution In fact the Irish M.P.s were in much the same inchoate state of organisation as the Whig/Liberals before the establishment of the Liberal Registration Association in 1861, or the Conservatives before 1870, when their Central Office opened. Some of the Irish mernbers were ex-Liberals, some were 'mock Horne Rulers', others were tainted with Whiggery. Only the green-tinted optimism of The Nation could possibly have regarded the 59 of '74 as asolid and disciplined phalanx of Horne Rulers; the reality of the situation was indicated clearly by the fact that only 46 of the 59 troubled to attend a conference on party strategy summoned by Butt in February 1874 [doc. 14] (54). The lack of consistency and cohesion among the Horne Rule parliamentary group was compounded by Butt's indecisiveness as aleader. The result was disastrous. An amendment to the Queen's speech at the opening of parliament in March 1874 calling for an investigation into Irish dissatisfaction with the Union was defeated by 314 votes to 50. A more specific motion in favour of Horne Rule was defeated by 458 to 61 in June. Clearly Butt and his followers had totally failed to interest either the British electorate or their elected representatives in the issue of Horne Rule, a factor absolutely essential to any chance of success. Further, there was a failure to broaden the basis of support for Horne Rule in Ireland. Butt, hounded by creditors, divided in mind between the pressing need to earn money at the Bar and the need to provide leadership for the Irish party, failed signally in both. The time was ripe for new men and new methods if progress was to be made.

16

4

N ew Departures

He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils; for time is the greatest innovator. Francis Bacon, Of Innovations A parliamentary third force such as the Irish party must either ally itself with one or other of the two main parties, or endeavour to steer an independent course between them. Clearly, if it pursues the former course of action, it ceases to be a completely independent body; but the basis of the second course is that the business of parliament must be obstructed in order to gain concessions from whichever of the two major parties is in power. Isaac Butt never grasped the logic of this situation. He was at heart conservative, a good House of Commons man (when he was there) and an admirer ofthe British Empire in which Irishmen had played so striking apart; above all, he sought to win over English public opinion to acceptance of Horne Ru1e by the force of reasonable argument and the proper observance of parliamentary tradition. In this he made precisely as much progress towards the desired goal as O'Connell had towards securing repeal of the Union. Without a working alliance with the Liberals, Butt's charm and persuasiveness had no hope of success. Neither bo1d nor consistent, he was too moderate to please anybody: 'It was the constant absenteeism of the leader and the cynical apathy of so many of his followers, the diminishing energy of the party and apparently declining volume of Irish business which caused them increasingly to lose confidence in his leadership' (54).

Rise of Parnell Already opposition to this lethargy had become apparent. J.G. Biggar, a Belfast provision merchant and a foundation member of the Horne Government Association, had been elected M.P. for Cavan in 1874. In the following year he indicated his advanced views by becoming a member of the Fenian Brotherhood (from which he was subsequently expelled in 1877) and by adopting the methods of parliamentary obstruction to serve the ends ofthe Irish party. In debate he spoke for hours, quoting 17

TheHorne Rule Solution extensively from newspapers and Blue Books, being frequently inaudible and almost entirely unintelligible. So began a process, perfectly within the existing rules of debate, which protracted the business before the House for several days (117). This new approach was carefully observed by Charles Stewart Parnell, the newly elected M.P. for Co. Meath. ParneII's great-grandfather was Sir lohn Parnell, the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1785, friend to Grattan and the 'Patriots', and determined opponent of the Act of Union. His son WiIliam inherited the estate of Avondale, Co. WickIow, and lived the uneventful life of a country gentleman, as did lohn Henry ParneII, ParneII's father. The latter visited the United States and married Delia Tudor Stewart, a lady of ScotchIrish ancestry, and daughter of the famous Commodore Stewart ('Old lronsides'), commander of the U.S.S. Constitution in the Anglo-American war of 1812-14. ParneIl, born in 1846, was thus an AngIo-American lrishman, remarkably well placed to lead an Irish party, backed by American funds, in Westminster. From his mother ParneII inherited a critical attitude to English rule, stemming from the traditions of the American Revolution (121). As Mrs Parnell said, 'We have no objection to the English people; we object to the English dominion. We would not have it in America. Why should they have it in Ireland?' Such an attitude also reflected the colonial nationalism of many of the gentry in the later eighteenth century. ParneII was, arid largely remained, a countrygentleman in this tradition; it is doubtful if he ever troubled to comprehend the problems or attitudes of either the native Irish or the people of planter stock in Ulster. Not a reader, his interests confined to country life, cricket and dabbling in mathematics, Parnell had been sent down from Cambridge without graduating in 1869. He might well have sunk into a life of provincial obscurity, had his latent interest in Irish affairs not been awakened by the Fenians. Not only did they appeal to hirn as men of action, albeit futile action,but they had a footing on both sides of the Atlantic and they irnpressed ParneIl, as they had earlier irnpressed Butt, as 'enthusiasts of great hearts and lofty minds ... with a deep and honest conviction of the righteousness of their cause' (51). The passing of the Secret Ballot Act 1872 opened up possibilities of political change, now that the electors were freed from the many corrupt pressures ofthe open hustings [doc. 8] . Reluctantly, Parnell became a parliamentary candidate and at the age of twenty-nine entered the House, where he sat silently, only giving abrief revelation of his feelings in the peroration of his maiden speech: 'Why should Ireland be treated as a geographical fragment of England? Ireland is not a geographical fragment. She is anation.' That there was a majority of people in Ireland

18

New Departures who looked on themselves as forming as distinctive anational group as the Scots or the Norwegians was indisputable; that this community necessarily filled the whole area of the island of Ireland was not, and herein lay a fundamental weakness in the nationalism of Parnell and indeed of the Fenians. The latter Parnell had come to regard as 'the key of Irish nationality; and if he could or would not have the key in his hands, he was certainly resolved never to let it out of his sight' (51, 47). In this lay the seeds of the convoluted relationship between the parliamentary approach to the Irish Question, and that of the 'advanced men'. Parnell's emphasis on Ireland's separate and distinctive nationality implied an end offederalism, on which Butt had placed so much reliance. Why should Ireland be interested in a federal assembly for the British Isles? Would there not be, of necessity and of right, interference by the federal parliament in matters affecting Ireland? Would it not mean a surrender ofIreland's claim to have her own parliament restored (6)? Parnell cemented his entente with the Fenians when in 1876 he refuted Sir Michael Hieks Beach's statement that the Fenians executed in Manchester in 1867 were murderers: 'I never shall believe that any murder was committed in Manchester.' To the average English M.P. this was heresy; to many people in Ireland the executed men were martyred victims; today they would probably have been committed for manslaughter. One thing was certain: Parnell had made his mark. That October he and O'Connor Power were sent to the United States to present an address of congratulation to President Grant on the first centennial of the Declaration of Independence, an address whieh diplomatie protocol subsequently demanded should be presented through the British Ambassador. This was of course perfect1y correct, since British subjects were involved; Parnell, however, took the opportunity on his return horne in November to press for Horne Rule, under which Ireland would be anation once again (19, 14,41). It was significant that it was Parnell and not Butt who had been chosen to go to the United States. Butt was by now beginning to be regarded as an increasingly ineffective and indeed embarrassing figurehead. This attitude was especially apparent amongst the members of the English Horne Rule Confederation. This society had been founded in 1875 to organise support for Horne Rule amongst the substantial, and, in some constituencies, crucial Irish electorate in Great Britain (122). They noted with approval the new departure in parliamentary practice marked by ehe adoption of wholesale and systematic obstruction. From the outset in 1877 notices of motion of opposition to every important English and Scottish Bill before the House were entered, thus blocking effective legislation until the end of that session. Bills were talked out in debate until 19

The Horne Rule Solution 12.30 a.m., after which no notice of motion could be taken, numerous amendments were proposed and the adjournment frequently moved [doc. 9] . Butt reacted angrily against established techniques of obstruction being applied in such a ruthless manner, averring that 'he was not responsible for the Hon. Member for Meath, and could not control him'. By this damaging admission he revealed ciearly his own ineptitude and the extent of the challenge to his rapidly diminishing authority [doc. 10]. Finally, Parnell was elected President of the Horne Rule Association of Great Britain in 1877, and Butt 'with his leonine head, beaming face, sparkling eyes and the merry laugh was replaced by the cold and reserved, dignified and almost austere Parnell' (54).

Tenants and landlords A dominant motif of Irish history is the struggle for the ownership of land. The vast increase of population in the second half of the eighteenth century led to endless subdivision of holdings and created the subsistence economy which collapsed during the Famine years. It was a rural crisis comparable only to conditions in south Poland or the Mezzogiorno in Italy; on a smaller scale it mirrored the enormous and helpless poverty of India. Indeed, the conditions in the south and west of Ireland in the l840s were remarkably similar to those prevailing in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland. The solution to the problem was also similar (11). The crofter tenants were evicted from their holdings, the new landlords, many being of Irish Catholic stock, sought to profit by their purchases under the Encumbered Estates Act, and sheep and cattle grazed where men had once scraped a living from the rocky soil (5, 20). Michael Davitt, one of the most remarkable men of Victorian Ireland, sprang from peasant stock in Co. Mayo. As a child he had seen his parents evicted from their holding, and had been taken to live in the grim setting of Haslingden in industrial Lancashire. He became a child worker and lost an arm while operating some unguarded machinery. He became involved with the Fenians, and was arrested in 1867 and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. There he seems to have suffered more than the usual harsh treatment in Victorian prisons, although neither this experience nor those of his earlier life made him embittered as so many revolutionaries tended to become. In December 1877 he was released from Portland on ticket-of-leave, and returned to Ireland in January 1878 (53, 38). Davitt's views on the land question were strongly influenced by those of the Young Irelander James Fintan Lalor. Lalor wanted to see Tenant Leagues in every county of Ireland, all aiming at peasant owner20

New Departures ship: 'Ireland her own, and all therein, from the sod to the sky. The soil of Ireland for the people of Ireland.' The land question was 'an engine ready-made - one, too, that will generate its own steam without cost or care - a self-acting engine, if once the fire be kindled' (32, 112). Davitt at once set to work to impress Parnell with the idea that a war against landlordism would rouse the nation, and bring in its train the restoration of the Irish parliament. The time was certainly ripe for such a move, for Irish agricuIture was seriously affected by the economic depression which began in the 1870s. The really serious effects were feIt in 1878, a year in which aseries of wet seasons and bad harvests began. This natural misfortune coincided with an increasing volume of grain exports from the cuItivated prairies of the Mid-Western U.S.A. Domestic prices fell in the British Isles, and the small farmers in Ireland were faced with a catastrophic fall in income. This in turn led to an increase in the number of evictions for non-payment of rent, a factor which can be directly correlated with the increase in agrarian crimes. Davitt went to the United States in August 1878, already interested in attempting to win over lohn Devoy and the Irish-Americans of Clanna-Gael to active interest in the plight of the tenant farmers and to giving support to Parnell's forward policy in the House of Commons. This was no easy or straightforward task, for both Devoy and his colleague lohn Boyle O'Reilly had more extreme and simplistic views on the land question than Davitt thought either helpful or prudent (14, 38). They accepted uncritically Lalor's idea of linking a revolutionary with a socialistic movement to 'hound on the peasantry against the landlords, the real English garrison'. They also needed to be shown the difference between Butt's brand of federalism and Parnell's concept of a 'fighting Irish party' in parliament, whose activities would in combination with a vigorous agitation of the land question aim at the establishment of a peasant proprietary and self-government for Ireland. Davitt succeeded in convincing Devoy, O'Reilly and Breslin that they should support this new alliance (110), aIthough the orthodox republicans like Charles Kickham disapproved of any departure from their narrow objectives, and disliked the taint of any compromise with parliamentarism (47). Meantime, Davitt feIt that the agrarian crisis was approaching a climax, so on 19 AprH1878 he organised a meeting of tenants at Irishtown, Co. Mayo, to protest against the increase of rents on a nearby estate. This estate was the property of Canon Burke, a Catholic clergyman who could hardly be described as a typical representative of the 'English garrison'! Under pressure Canon Burke gave way and agreed to reduce his rents by 25 per cent - a notable success at the start of the agrarian campaign. Parnell, though hitherto maintaining his usual impas21

The Home Rule Solution

sive silence, could no longer afford to ignore the rise of a populist movement of such potential. Indeed, at Tralee in November 1878 he had publicly committed hirnself to 'proprietorship of the soil by the people who cultivated it'. Perhaps the time wascoming when the agrarian engine would be connected to the Horne Rule carriages (38, 41, 51). In May 1879 Isaac Butt died, and with him his belief in achieving Horne Rule by sticking to the rules of the parliamentary game and relying on English good will and fair play. He had summoned forth from defeat the instinctive nationalism of the Irish people, and permanently established the ideal of an Irish national party ... he had ensured that no Irish party could ever again accept anything less than federal Horne Rule as the ultimate solution of the Irish Question ... by his achievement Butt had made possible the political phenomenon ofParnell (54). Davitt now arranged another land protest meeting at Westport, and invited Parnell to address it. Parnell sounded Kickharn on the subject: 'Do you think that the people feel very keenly on the land question?' 'Feel keenly on the land question?' retorted Kickham, 'I think they would go to hell for it!' Accordingly, Parnell went to Westport on 7 June 1879 and spoke to eight thousand people - a mass meeting reminiscent of those addressed by Daniel O'Connell - advising them to press for lowered rents and to avoid eviction by keeping a firm grip of their homesteads. From that moment, and with this emotive battlecry, the tenants' organisation spread rapidly and by August the National Land League had been established. It aimed at the eventual expropriation of the landowners and, in the short term, would endeavour to protect the tenants by publicising 'the injustice, wrong or injury which may be inflicted ... either by rack-renting eviction, or other arbitrary exercise of power', by blacklisting guilty landlords and people who rented holdings from which the previous tenants had been evicted. In short, it was a tenants' combination which, given the existing economic crisis, Parnell could not afford to ignore. In doing so, he was deliberately seeking to widen the basis of support for his parliamentary activities, and also seeking to prevent the new populism from flowing into purely Fenian channels. By now Davitt had severed his connection with the latter, and concentrated his energies and organising ability on the land question. In October he arranged a meeting in Dublin at which the lrish National Land League was formed, with Parnell as President. In this way the 'new departure' in lrish politics was cemented. Significantly, Parnell's first task as President of the Land League was to go to the United States

22

New Departures to rally support amongst the Irish-Americans. In January 1880 Parnell and John Dillon arrived in the U.S.A. This was Parnell's third visit to America, the second having been in 1876, and the first in 1871 to visit his brother in Alabama. In two months Parnell and Dillon visited sixtytwo cities and travelled over 10,000 miles, collecting over $200,000. Parnell was aided by the young T.M. Healy, then parliamentary correspondent of T.D. Sullivan's paper The Nation, who went with him to Canada: 'We had a great meeting at Toronto. But the biggest meeting lever attended was at Montreal. It was here he was first called the "uncrowned king" . . . . Parnell sat like a sphinx the whole time, he seemed not to be a bit touched by the demonstration .... Everyone was affected but hirnself (51). March 1880 saw not only Parnell's return from his triumphal tour of the United States, but the dissolution of parliament. Disraeli attempted to make Horne Rule the chief election issue, condemning it as an idea destructive of the power and prosperity of the whole United Kingdom [doc. 1] ; he even suggested that the power of England and the peace of Europe depended on the outcome of this election. To this Gladstone made the stinging reply that the enemies of the Union were the party which maintained an unjust land law and an alien church, and emphasised the need to bind the British Isles together by liberal and equal laws (116). So opened Gladstone's twelfth election campaign, the second in his Midlothian constituency, in which he relentlessly hammered at the edifice of Beaconsfieldism (39, 48). The result of the election was Liberals 347, Conservatives 240 and Irish nationalists 65, of whom 35 were Parnellites, 26 were led by the moderate William Shaw and 4 were uncommitted. Parnell hirnself was elected M.P. for the constituencies of Mayo, Meath and the city of Cork, and chose to represent the last. In May, when parliament reassembled, Parnell was elected leader of the Irish parliamentary party, defeating Shaw by five votes.

23

5

The Resources of Civilisation

On the day in 1880 when Lord Beaconsfield was finally quitting the official house in Downing Street, one who had been the ablest and most zealous supporter of his policy in the press, called to bid hirn good-bye. The visitor talked gloomily of the national prospect; of difficulties with Austria, with Russia, with Turkey, of the confusions to come upon Europe from the doctrines of Midlothian. The fallen minister listened. Then looking at his friend, he uttered in deep tones a single word. 'Ireland! ' he said. I. Morley, Life of W.E. Gladstone, ii, p.2IS Parnell took the view that the lrish parliamentary party should be independent of both Liberals and Conservatives, a view opposed to that of Butt and Shaw, who advocated an alliance with the Liberals. Parnell wished to retain his freedom of action, strengthened in his conviction by the freedom from political pressure provided for the lrish electorate by the Secret Ballot Act, 1872.

Eviction and obstruction The first great parliamentary battle was over the Compensation for Disturbance Bill, by which it was proposed that evicted tenants should be compensated if they could prove that owing to the hard times they could not pay their rent. This Bill was passed by the Commons, but was rejected by the Lords; its summary dismissal signalled a fresh wave of agrarian crime in Ireland. Parnell saw his opportunity. At Ennis, Co. Clare on 19 September 1880 he urged the tenants to resist eviction and to keep a firm grip on their homesteads. They should send to a 'moral Coventry' those who broke the Land League's unwritten code of laws. The celebrated case of Captain Boycott, followed by that of Bence Iones of Clonakilty, demonstrated the strength of the lrish peasantry, and added a new word to the language. Parnell's object in leading this potentially revolutionary force was to use it to put pressure on Gladstone's ministry to settle the land question and eventually to allow Ireland to govern herself. He made this plain in a speech at Galway: 'I would not have taken off my coat to this work if 1 had not known that we were laying 24

The Resources 01Civilisation the foundation in this movement for the regeneration of our legislative independence' (32, 51). The winter of 1880-81 was another appalling season of distress . General Gordon, a seasoned observer of Victorian poverty, wrote that 'the state of our fellow-countrymen is worse than that of any people in the world ,let alone Europe' (21). As evietions multiplied so did outrages and lawful government faeed a major ehallenge in the Irish countryside, comparable to that faced by the Italian government in Sieily in 1860. The Liberals, who under Gladstone's leadership had set out to paeify Ireland in 1868, now had to decide whether they would govern or abdicate. The Chief Secretary, W.E. Forster, decided that the leaders of the Land League should be prosecuted for eonspiring to prevent the payment of rent, resisting the processes of lawful ejection, intimidating incoming tenants of farms from which the previous holders had been evicted, and generally creating disaffection and ill-will amongst Her Majesty's subjects. Amongst those named in the prosecution were Parnell, Dillon, Biggar and Thomas Sexton, M.P. for West Belfast (40, 48) . Forster's decision to prosecute excited both ridicule and anger in Ireland; as Biggar put it, 'D--d lawyers, sir. Wasting the public money. Whig rogues;Forster d--d fool' (51). Yet , as Cowper emphasised, Gladstone's ministry was determined to rule, if at a11 possible, by the due processes of law, before having to resort to sueh coercive measures as the suspension of Habeas Corpus . The trouble about law enforcement in Ireland was that the majority of the population , through fear or favour, supported the peasant agitators. On a more historie level, as the political centre of gravity was outside Ireland , law was seen as something alien and not based on the authority of popular support from within. In January 1881 the trial ofParnell and the Land League leaders took place , ending in acquittal. This was interpreted as a victory for the League, and strengthened the case for stronger measures by the government in order to re-establish 'the protection of person and property and the security of liberty'. ParneII's response was to rally his parliamentary party for a marathon fight against the proposed coercive measures . The debate on the first reading occupied five nights, the second reading took four and the committee stage occupied ten days [doc. 11] . This prolonged debate revealed a gulf between the Irish and English viewpoints. To Forster it was simply a matter of arresting the 'village ruffians' who were responsible for the League outrages; to Parnell eoercive measures were an attempt to bully a weak and starving nation. Finally, the Irish party's abuse of obstruction was met by a change in parliamentary procedure . Mr Speaker Brand stopped the debate on 2 February [doc. 12]. This applieation of the ctäture by the Speaker's authority was closely 25

The Home Rule Solution followed by the suspension of thirty-two Irish members for refusing to aeeept the authority of the Chair (122). These delaying tacties were nevertheless sufficiently effeetive to prevent the passage of the Proteetion of Property and Person Bill into law until March 1881.

Gladstone's Land Act , 1881 The arrest of hundreds of Land Leaguers failed to justify Forster's theory that the real trouble-makers were simply knots of village tyrants. Crime and agitation inereased and formed a diseouraging backdrop to the introduction of Gladstone's complex measure of land reform , which virtually proposed a revolution in landlord/tenant relationships in Ireland. Parnell was now in the invidious situation of really wanting a sweeping reform which would satisfy the tenants, yet for taetical reasons he and his party feit bound to oppose the government. Nevertheless, Parnell realised that the Bill was perfectly safe and that opposition by his followers could not prevent its passage. Indeed, ParneIlites gave valuable , if unostentatious, support during the crucial committee stage. FinalIy , the bulk of the lrish M.P.s voted with the government on the third reading and the Bill became law in 1881. Gladstone's Land Act 1881 gave legal force to the 'Ulster custom' by which tenants holding by the year were undisturbed in their tenancy as long as they paid rent regularly ; they could seil their interest in the farm on leaving it , that is they received compensation for the goodwill and any improvements they had carried out; they could also transfer to an assignee a11 the interest in the farm recognised by custom. These 'customs' dated back to the Plantation of Ulster in the reign of James I, and varied in detail from one estate or area to another and, especially in the poorer western districts of the province , acted as a brake on progress. The tenants' interest in the farm could be regulated by the landlord and was usually assessed at any figure between five and twenty years' ren tal of the holding, And , although there was usually a custornary 'free sale' of this interest by the outgoingtenant, the landlord retained a veto over the incoming tenant. The Land Act of 1870 had placed the three Fs (fair rent, free sale and fixity of tenure) on a statutory instead of the more flexible customary basis, and so appeared to fulfil Palmerston's dictum : 'Tenant Right is Landlord Wrong', although in the conservative Kildare Street Club in Dublin some members were heard to refer to the three Fs as 'Force, Fraud and Folly' (32). However, the 1870 Land Act failed because there was no guaranteed perpetuity of tenure or any definition of fair rents. Eviction for non-payment of rent was not regarded as a disturbanee for which the tenant could

26

The Resources of Civilisation legally obtain compensation and there was no way of preventing the landlord from arbitrarily raising the rent. The provisions of the 1870 Act collapsed when tested by the appalling weather and poor harvests of the late seventies. Evictions for nonpayment increased, as did agrarian crime, and the rejection of the Compensation for Disturbance Bill brought matters to a head. In truth, Irish agriculture was both inefficient and obsolete; the growing imports of wheat and agricultural produce from North America only aggravated a situation which effectively put an end to the golden years of 'High Farming' in Britain, and presented stimulating challenges to the efficient and adaptable cultivators in Denmark and the Netherlands. The Land Act of 1881, by introducing what was virtually a system of dual ownership, did little or nothing to improve the competitive or productive side of Irish farming (34); it was concerned more with land tenure than with land use, and therefore largely satisfied the Land League's essentially political aim of curtailing or terminating the existing system of land ownership, for so long the essential basis of influence and authority in the state. By September 1881 Parnell and the Land League had made up their minds to test the fairness and efficiency of the Land Act's provisions by bringing selected cases before the courts. To Gladstone this represented achallenge to which he replied in a speech at Leeds on 7 October: 'If it shall appear that there is still to be fought a final conflict in Ireland between law on the one side and sheer lawlessness upon the other ... then I say ... without hesitation, the resources of civilisation against its enemies are not yet exhausted' (48). So Gladstone threw down the gauntlet to Parnell - something the latter wanted. He wasted no time and at Wexford on 9 October he referred to Gladstone as a 'rnasquerading knight-errant ... prepared to carry fire and sword into your homesteads'. Parnell maintained further that the Union had been a manifest failure, and that 'Irishmen have established their right to govern Ireland by laws made by themselveson lrish soil' (51). Such a statement pleased both the Horne Rulers and the more advanced separatists.

Kilmainham and after This defiant speech led to Parnell's arrest and imprisonment in Kilmainharn, an imprisonment deliberately courted because it offered an escape from the dilemma of either remaining at the head of a mounting and increasingly lawless Land League movement or breaking with it immediately. In truth, Parnell had grasped the fact that the Land Act had effectively beaten the Land League, and that there was no future in

27

TheHomeRule Solution agrarian agitation [doc. 13]. After Parnell's arrest and imprisonment the Land League issued a 'No Rent' manifesto, aIthough this action was criticised by John Dillon as a barefaced repudiation of debt. It was also condemned by the Catholic hierarchy, and failed to be widely adopted. Nonetheless, anarchy, intimidation and a mounting degree of lawlessness and crime marked the winter months of 1881-82. The determination of the government was matched by that of the Land League, and so by March 1882 M.P.s on both sides of the House were calling for a fresh policy. Accordingly, in May, Parnell and his colleagues were released from prison on the basis of an agreement which was popularly labelled the 'Kilmainham Treaty', By this the government undertook to deal with the problem of unpaid arrears of rent, and to extend the fair rent c1auses of the Land Act of 1881 to leaseholders, who had previously been exc1uded. Parnell, for his part, undertook to use his influence to stop agrarian outrages and was prepared (as he had been all along) to accept the Land Act as a 'practical settlement of the land question'. Further, he agreed to cooperate cordially with the Liberals in forwarding Liberal principles and measures of general reform (92). In this way, he was enabled to escape from his increasingly dangerous and embarrassing Land League commitments and could resurne his role as a purely politicalleader (103). In protest against what they not unreasonably regarded as Gladstone's surrender, both Lord Cowper and W.E. Forster resigned. Their worst fears about the deterioration of the Irish situation appeared to be completely justified by the appalling murder in May 1882 of the incoming Chief Secretary, Lord Frederick Cavendish, and the Under-Secretary, Thomas Burke, in Dublin's Phoenix Park not far from the Viceregal Lodge. This crime was committed by a group of terrorists calling themselves the Invincibles, and excited particular horror because the victims were killed with surgical knives. Parnell, Dillon and Davitt immediately condemned this murder, Parnell being so upset by the crime and by the prospect of losing all his recent political gains at a stroke that he offered to resign the leadership of the Irish party. Not surprisingly, Gladstone's administration feIt strengthened in its resolve to apply more coercive measures against violent crime. A new organisation was now required to take the place of the Land League, and so, on 12 September 1882, by the 'Avondale treaty', Parnell, Dillon and Davitt agreed on the formation of aNational League. Its objects were political: Horne Rule [doc. 16], county boards for local self-government, an extension of the franchise and, as a sop to the agrarian interests which had hitherto been in the centre of the stage, land reforms and eventual peasant proprietorship. The National League 28

The ResourcesofCivilisation became a formidable organisation, providing the necessary political machinery for the parliamentary party in each consistuency. By 1885 there were some 1,200 branches (50) [doc. 14] . For the two years 1883 and 1884 Parnelllay low, partly because he was in financial difficulties , partly because of the problems of his private life. His mistress , Mrs Q'Shea, wife of Captain Q'Shea, M.P. for Co. Clare, was living in expectation of a substantiallegacy from her aunt , Mrs Wood, a legacy which would have enabled her to free herselffrom her marriage and regularise her relationship with Parnell. Mrs Wood, however , lived on , unwittingly preventing a defusing of the situation which was eventually to destroy Parnell . Parnell's political inactivity came to an end in 1884. In that year the third Reform Act extended the male electorate in Ireland from 220,000 to about 740 ,000. Although this measure was opposed as inevitably leading to 'confiscation of property, ruin of industry, withdrawal of capital, - misery, wretchedness and war', Gladstone insisted thatIreland should be treated fairly on principles of justice and equality. Parnell, for his part , took the disenchanted view that 'Englishmen will not give anything to Ireland out of justice or righteousness. They will concede your liberties when they must , and no sooner.' As in 1882 , so in 1884 Parnell saw the politieal opportunities inherent in the changed situation. In a major speech at Cork he called for the restoration of an Irish parliament as an essential element in the fulfilment of Ireland 's nationhood [doc . 17] . This speech marked Parnell's return to the stage; as John Morley wryly wrote, 'Ireland never blows over!' Five years earlier at the outset of his ministry, Gladstone had considered a measure of Horne Rule , largely as an expansion of loeal government in order to relieve 'Great Britain from the enormous weight of the government of Ireland unaided by the people' [doc. 15] . Now , in April 1885 , Joseph Chamberlain produeed an ingenious and detailed plan for loeal self-government in Ireland (94). It was municipal government on a large scale, but failed beeause the national spirit to which Parnell appeal ed would no longer aeeept loeal or central Boards as a substitute for a proper parliament in Dublin [doc, 18] . Gladstone's second ministry fell on 9 June 1885, defeated by a combination of Conservatives and Parnellites. Lord Salisbury reluetantly formed a minority administration. It was astrange result. Parnell wished to emphasise his party's independence by supporting the Tories , and it is more than probable that the Liberals, torn by the growing rift between the Whig and Radical groups, wished to quit office at this stage. Gladstone now had some time to reflect on his Irish poliey, after the summary rejection of Charnberlain's 'Central Board' scheme. He concluded

29

The Horne Rule Solution that three courses lay before him. One was to repeal the Act of Union ; the second was to establish a relationship akin to that of the AustroHungarian Dual Monarchy; the third was to give Ireland the same degree of self-government as Canada. Gladstone . .. always placed Irish national aspirations above party considerations. He owed his eonscienee about Ireland to many different impulses. A mission to Corfu, Burke on the Ameriean eolonies , Cobden's gospel, the ugly phenomenon of Fenianism, Cavendish's murder, the Parnellite threat to parliamentary government, and idealization of the Ausgleich in Austria-Hungary, and a sense of destiny (48). All these faetors led Gladstone towards gradual aeceptanee of the idea of Horne Rule [doc. 1S] . The Conservatives were also anxious to find a solution to the lrish problem. Lord Carnarvon, the Lord-Lieutenant, invited Parnell to secret talks in a vaeant house in Mayfair. To his astonishment, Parnelllearnt that Carnarvon favoured Horne Rule and greatly disliked eoercion. Carnarvon saw Horne Rule in an imperial setting, having been much impressed with the successful eonstitutional developments in Canada since 1867, and having had to devise a framework for the South African eolonies in the years after the humiliating Boer vietory at Majuba. The Parnell/Carnarvon talks were indicative of an anxiety to settle the perennial lrish Question, and this led Parnell to believe that his poliey of independenee from an English party alliance was going to pay dividends. However, it was sadly true that Carnarvon was mueh in advanee of eurrent thinking in his party, partieularly that of Lord Salisbury, who mueh preferred to procrastinate and await events. The majority of Conservative backbenehers still probably regarded Ireland as 'England's baekyard, which, with the exeeption of Dublin, the Midlands and Ulster was a wasteland beyond either moral or material redemption' (37). So by October the Carnarvon talks were over,-although Salisbury continued a eonciliatory line, neither clearly aceepting nor rejeeting the concept of an Irish parliament (122).

The election of 1885 Gladstone, too, was eautiously awaiting events, aware nonetheless that the problem of Ireland could no longer be sidestepped. In November he moved to Seotland, where he launched'his seeond 'Midlothian eampaign'. In 1880 he had begun the demolition of 'Beaconsfieldism'. Now he had two objectives : one was to seeure a sufficiently large majority in the 30

TheResources 01Civilisation Commons to free the Liberals from dependence on the lrish party; the second was to obscure the extent to which he had already moved towards acceptance of the Horne Rule position. Gladstone really hoped for an agreed bipartisan solution of the problem, and to this end had several conversations with Salisbury's nephew, the deceptively languid Arthur Balfour. The latter treated Gladstone's demarche with typically eourteous seepticism. On 17 Deeember Gladstone sounded Lord Hartington on the question. On the same day, in sehemes published in the Leeds Mercury and the Standard through the well-meaning intervention of Gladstone's son Herbert, it was revealed that the Liberal leader had apparently accepted the principle of Horne Rule. Gladstone's ambiguity and patient diplomacy were swept aside, and the grave possibility of a split in his party became a likelihood [doc. 19] . The Conservatives saw their opportunity and at onee reaffirmed their belief in the 'unity and integrity of Empire' which must take preeedence over Irish national aspirations. In short, both Gladstone and Salisbury misunderstood one another's intentions in late 1885 , with fatal results for the emergence of abipartisan poliey on Ireland. The general eleetion lasted from 22 November until 19 December 1885. It was the first to be held sinee the franchise extensions of 1884 , and eonsequently provided an invaluable index of male public opinion throughout the British Isles. RESULT OF THE GENERAL ELECfION 1885

English and Welsh boroughs London metropolitan eonstituencies English and Welsh counties Scottish burghs Seottish counties Ireland

Totals

Liberals 93

Conservatives 86

26 152

36 101

30

3

32

o

7 18

85

333

251

86

lrish party 1

o o o o

These results showed clearly that Gladstone had failed to secure the independent majority he had wished for. Significantly, Conservatism remained entrenehed in the crucial London constituencies, although in the counties the Liberals, with their promises of agrarian reform ('three acres and a cow') largely displaced the former Tory lead. In Britain, Horne Rule was not the main eleetion issue, even though Parnell had decided to instruct lrish voters in British constituencies to oppose the 31

The Home Rule Solution Liberals as the party of coercion [doc. 20]. This certainly offended many Liberals, and ultimately deepened the split in the party. In Ireland, the result of the 1885 eleciion was momentous. Democracy there may have been; compromise and flexibility were missing. In Morley's telling passage 'the whole of the Liberal candidates in Ulster fell down as dead men. Orangemen and Catholics, the men who cried damnation to King William and the men who cried "To Hell with the Pope", joined hands. . . . It is true the paradox did not last, and that the Pope and King William were speedily back on their old terms again' (48). Parnell indeed regarded the Irish Liberals as more dangerous political enemies than the Irish Conservatives, and encouraged his supporters to vote for Orange candidates in East and South Belfast, and in North Derry. In North Antrim, a constituency with a strong liberal/radical tradition, Parnell's candidate deliberately split the vote and a Conservative won the seat. The province of Ulster was evenly divided, as a consequence of these activities, between eighteen nationalist Horne Rulers (who were mainly Catholic, and represented constituencies principally in the west and south of the province), and seventeen anti-Horne Rule Conservatives (who were Protestants, and largely represented constituencies in the eastern and more prosperous part of the province). This regional concentration of pro-Union sentiment was a fact of the most profound significance for the future (27, 63), for in the three southern provinces the anti-Horne Rulers were a scattered minority, oflittle or no political weight outside Dublin (115). The obliteration of the southern Irish Conservatives meant that effective opposition to Horne Rule now rested in the hands of the Ulstermen. The sixteen Ulster M.P.s formed a distinctive group, and they could count on the support of at least twelve other Irish Conservatives who sat for mainland constituencies. At first it was decided to support the lrish Loyal and Patriotic Union, a body formed quietly in Dublin in 1885, and openly reorganised in early January 1886 [doc. 21]. However, it soon became clear that the territorial base in the north-east had a powerful attraction, and provincial pride and self-sufficiency were expressed in the formation of the Ulster Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union. This body, though with several changes of name, evolved into the central core of the Ulster Unionist party. So not only did the results of the 1885 election foreshadow the eventual political division ofIreland, but the divisions within the Unionist ranks were also of a significance which was largely overlooked at the time (58, 63).

32

6

The Crisis of Horne Rule

YDU may reject this Bill, but its record will remain. The history of England and Ireland can never be as if this offer had never been made. You may kill it now, but its ghost will ever haunt your festivals of coercion. Sir William Harcourt, speaking in the House of Commons , J une 1886 The fall of Lord Salisbury's administration at the end of January 1886 brought Gladstone and the Liberals into power for the third time. Gladstone knew that he faced a grave and complex crisis. He had failed in his efforts to assist the emergence of abipartisan policy; Irish liberalism was to all intents dead; his own party sharply divided on the question, now unavoidable, of Horne Rule. Lord Hartington, whose brother had been assassinated in Phoenix Park in 1882, refused to take office; Chamberlain and George Trevelyan joined the ministry most reluctantly and resigned office on 15 March. John Bright's refusal of support was perhaps most serious of all. Bright, now the Liberal eider statesman , had long advocated reforms in Ireland , but objected to the halfway house of devolution; in his graphie phrase , 'the Irish parliament would be constantly struggling to burst the bars of the statutory cage in whieh it is sought to confine it' [doc. 22] . Meantime the opposition to Gladstone in Ireland focused on Ulster, where the Ulster Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union arranged aseries of monster meetings, rousing the masses as O'Connell had done in the 1840s, and appealing to the hardline militancy of a popular Protestantism which would make no concessions to Horne Rule. The cuImination of this agitation was an immense meeting in the Ulster Hall, Belfast, addressed by Lord Randolph Churchill. In playing this 'Orange card' Churchill suggested to his ecstatie hearers that they would not stand alone in the fight against Gladstone's policy ; and subsequently he provided the Ulster militants with their watchword 'Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right' [doc. 23] . This was dangerous talk in a city which exploded into three months of bloody disturbances from June to September 1886 (13, 15); but it must also be said that Churchill was one of the few Englishmen of his day who understood the stark realities of Irish politics (17).

33

The Horne Rule Solution

The first Horne Rule Bill Undeterred and unflinching Gladstone introduced his Government of Ireland Bill on 8 April 1886. First he pointed to the manner in which the rule of law was discredited in Ireland. Coercion had manifestly failed, having been timid, hesitating and ineffective in execution. There was need to restore the confidence of people in Ireland in the impartiality of the law, and to protect the liberty of every citizen in the exereise of every legal right. Again, one should consider the essence of the Union : 'before the Act of Union there were two independent, separate , coordinate Parliaments ; after the Union there was but one'. It was not the intention of this Bill to impair the supreme statutory authority of Westminster; the Bill aimed instead at a modification of the Act of Union, not at repeal. Accordingly, a legislature was to be established in Dublin , which would be responsible for Irish as distinct from general or 'Imperial' affairs, and which would have an executive responsible to it. This in itself was a great advance on 'Grattan's Parliament' to which the Dublin Castle administration was not responsible, and it reflected a trend already visible in Canada and the Australian colonies. The Irish legislatu re was to be composed of two Orders sitting and deliberating together, but possessing-the reserve power of voting separately. This allowed one Order, if it so wished, to veto a measure for a term of three years or until a dissolution of the local parliament. The first Order was to be composed of the existing twenty-eight representative peers who, under the terms of the Act of Union , already sat in the House of Lords; in addition there were to be seventy-five members elected for a term of ten years by constituents who occupied land to the minimum value of f.25 per annum. The second and lower Order was to consist of the present 103 Irish M.P.s, plus 101 new representatives. The resultant Irish legislature would therefore be composed of 307 members (64) . The Lord Lieutenant, as the Queen's representative, was to be the nominal head of the executive responsible to the lrish parliament. It was proposed that he would cease to be a party nominee , changing with each successive British government. Further, with the proposed removal of all religious disabilities, the Lord Lieutenant could be a Catholic. Judges were to hold officedurante beneplacito. They were to be appointed on the advice of the government, their salaries were to be charged to the Irish Consolidated Fund, and they could only be removed from office on a joint address of the two Orders. Existing judges were to be confirmed in office on the same basis. One of the most complex problems was that of the connection between the parliaments in Dublin and Westminster. Gladstone proposed

34

The Crisis 0/ Horne Rule that the Irish peers and M.P.s should be excluded from Westminster altogether, because of the immense difficulty of distinguishing between matters of Imperial and purely British interest. Representation in both parliaments would disparage the Irish legislature and reduce the Irish members in Westminster to second-class status. This was a Gordian solution of the problem of proper representation; it was a 'stone of stumbling and rock of offence' to the radicals, but Gladstone was at the time convinced that the benefit of excluding the Irish members from Westminster would be enormous, even though it raised the crucial question of taxation without representation. As the Bill was, in the government's view, designed to lighten the pressures on Westminster through devolution of local responsibility and in so doing to strengthen the fundamental unity of the empire, it was thought proper to define the subjects which were to be excluded from the competence of the Irish legislature and reserved for Westminster. These were the Crown and the succession, peace and war, the defence forces, treaties with foreign states, titles and honours, treason, trade and navigation, posts and telegraphs, lighthouses, coinage, weights and measures, copyright and patents. The Irish legislature could not alter the terms of the Government of Ireland Act, nor was it to be allowed to establish any religious denomination [doc. 24] . The administration of the Post Office in Ireland was to be left an open question, as were the operation of the decennial census and quarantine regulations. It was proposed that the British government would retain control of the Royal Irish Constabulary for the present, but with the intention of allowing control to pass ultimately to Dublin. The present system of policing Ireland Gladstone regarded as a 'waste of treasure and enormous expense, not with good results, but unhappy'. In this sphere, and in that of the Civil Service, it was hoped to secure considerable retrenchment in expenditure, a topic always dear to Gladstone's heart. Finance was at the heart of this complex measure. Gladstone proposed to retain control in London of the Customs and Excise service, while allowing the proceeds arising in Ireland to be used to discharge Ireland's fiscal obligations. Thus he sought to preserve fiscal unity by means of a Zollverein. This was in line with the free trade dogmas of Liberalism, but at variance with Parnell's protectionism. But what proportion of the general (imperial) charges should Ireland pay? Under the Act of Union this fraction had been settled at two-seventeenths; now it was proposed to be one-fifteenth, paid annuaHy as a contribution transferred from the Irish to the English Exchequer. The Irish parliament would of course possess a general power of raising taxation for local purposes. In a full financial year Gladstone calculated that the Irish 35

TheHomeRule Solution Exchequer would receive f.8,350,000 from customs and excise, stamp duties, income tax and non-tax revenue. Against this was to be set the 'imperial contribution' ofsome f.3,242,000, the payments for the Royal Irish Constabulary, civil charges of f.2,500,000, revenue and sinking fund charges of f.l ,550,000, leaving a credit surplus at the disposal of the Dublin administration of approximately f.404,000 annually (21, 40). Gladstone concluded his speech of introduction by moving to a lofty pinnacle of history and morality: 'it is sometimes requisite not only that good laws should be passed, but that they should be passed by the proper persons.... We stand face to face with Irish nationality [which] vents itself in the demand for local autonomy' (48). Parnell welcomed the Bill as 'the first cup of cold water that has been offered to ournation since the recall ofLord Fitzwilliam'. Significantly, he stressed the support for the measure from both the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States, and asserted that many nativeborn Americans, as distinct from immigrant Irish, thought that it would bring peace not only between Ireland and England, but between the Irish-Americans and England: in short, that it was the bountiful harvest of the 'New Departure'. Nevertheless, Parnell thought that the Bill as it stood had 'great faults and blots' (51). There was the question of control of the Customs, of the lack of immediate control over the police, of the size of the 'imperial contribution'. Would one-twentieth not be a more reasonable and realistic proportion than the suggested one-fifteenth? On this point Parnell was probably right [doc. 25] ; Ireland was overtaxed in relation to her resources and productivity and Gladstone, in his zeal for financial uniformity, tended to overlook the vast economic differences between the two islands (5, 20). Parnell also pointed to the diminutive credit balance left at the disposal of the Dublin government. How could Ireland float loans, for example, on such an inadequate sum, apart from initiating schemes for improvement or investment? Finally, he objected to the powers of veto over legislation possessed by the first Order, a body 'elected by a fancy franchise', one which indeed satisfied Gladstone's essentially aristocratic outlook!

The great debate The debate on the Bill extended over fourteen nights. The whole question of devolution was fully examined [doc. 26], with particular stress being laid on the position of the Irish Unionists [doc. 27] , on the implications for English party politics, on the potential threat to the security of private property [doc. 28], on the degree to which the unity of the British Isles would be impaired, and on the profound signi-

36

The Crisis 0/ Home Rufe

ficance of this devolutionary proposal for imperial relationships [doc. 29] , particularly that with lndia. The debate also revealed a profound distrust of Parnell's ultimate aims, and grave doubt whether Horne Rule would provide a lasting settlement of Anglo-Irish affairs, as Gladstone had postulated. There was also the feeling that they were not dealing with one nation whose will had been expressed in 1885, but with an island containing two widely divergent communities. Finally, there was a general desire to maintain the supremacy of Westminster over the British lsles as a whole, a view shared by both supporters and opponents of the Bill (17, 37, 52). The strongest opposition to the Bill came as might have been expected from the Unionists of Ulster (63, 115). Colonel Waring (North Down) for example, looked on the supporters of Horne Rule in Ireland as potential rebels and traitors . He regarded Horne Rule as no more than a stage on the road to complete Irish independence; further, he made clear his profound distrust of paper guarantees. If it became necessary the Ulster Unionists would take such steps as might be advisable to seeure their connection with Great Britain and to resist all attempts to change their allegiance. Logically, he suggested that there was a case for Horne Rule within Horne Rule for the north-eastern counties . Colonel Waring's militancy was supported by Mr R.T. O'Neili (Mid-Antrim), who said that the Ulster loyalists would defend themselves against being handed over to an lrish majority by whom 'grievance after grievance would be agitated, untiI total separation resulted'. A third proponent of this militant opposition was Mr William Johnston, of Ballykilbeg (South Belfast), a fiery Orangeman who alleged that if Horne Rule were to be introduced 'the dictates of that lrish Parliament would be resisted by the people of Ulster at the point of the bayonet' (58, 59) . The core of the opposition to the Bill, and by far the most effective, came from those Liberals who disagreed with Gladstone's policy. It was this which gave the entire debate a profound and melancholy signifi. cance for British party politics, for from this rift on Horne Rule the Liberals never really recovered (17) . It wasMrTrevelyan (Border Burghs) who stressed that the Liberals were not wholly aHorne Rule party. He had resigned from the government because, like many others , he believed that there could be no intermediate stage between entire separation and imperial contro!. In a 'degenerate Ireland' the powers of the police and judiciary would be undermined. The lrish parIiamentary party , by the laxity of its attitude towards crime, had not established such a title as would justify the handing over to them the lives, the property or the freedom of Ireland. 'What is wanted in Ireland is justice, firmness, courage, and patience, which is the highest kind of courage.' 37

The Horne Rule Solution As for Joseph Chamberlain, it could be argued that the main difference between his approach to the lrish Question and that of Gladstone was really one of emphasis. WhileGladstone thought of devolution as a means of giving Irish people responsibility for their own affairs, Chamberlain looked on it as 'the largest possible extension of local government consistent with the integrity of the Empire and the supremacy of Parliament'. Chamberlain disapproved of the proposal to restore an Irish legislature as 'tantamount to a proposal for separation. It would set up a temporary and unstable form of government, which would be a source of perpetual irritation and agitation until the full demands of the Nationalist party were conceded.' Specifically, Chamberlain objected to (a) the cessation of Irish representation at Westminster, (b) the surrender of the right of imperial taxation in Ireland, a matter which raised the fundamental principle of 'No taxation without representation'; (e) the surrender of the right to appoint judges and magistrates; (d) the principle of excluding specifically reserved matters, instead of specifying precisely what the Irish Parliament could do. He also made the telling point that Ireland would have no voice in international affairs. She would have no say in military, naval or imperial affairs: 'Where in all this is the integrity of the Empire?' Further, it was probable that the English taxpayer would have to face increased financial burdens because of the reduced flow of taxation from Ireland, and of the increased costs of the Royal Irish Constabulary. In short, Chamberlain thought that a clean break would be preferable to the hotch-potch of Horne Rule: 'I would prefer that Ireland would go free altogether from any claim on the part of this country, provided also that we might be free from the enormous responsibility a sham Union would certainly entail' (17, 27). Finally, Lord Hartington, speaking for the Whigs in the Liberal party, reiterated the view that Horne Rule would simply become the minimum of the Irish national demand. A restored Irish parliament would be quite different from Grattan's Parliament, a parliament in which the landlords were supreme: The Parliament which would be restored would not be a Protestant, but would be a Roman Catholic Parliament. The Established Church has been swept away; and instead of a Roman Catholic priesthood, which at the time of the Union was without political influence at all, we have a Roman Catholic clergy wielding a large political influence. Hartington denied that the examples of Sweden and Norway, AustriaHungary or the United States provided useful parallels for Anglo-Irish relations because there wasno supreme federal authority, or any equality between the partners. He went further and refuted any analogy with

38

The Crisis o[HorneRule such self-governing colonies as Canada and Australia, for they enjoyed a purely voluntary connection which gave them virtual independence. Perhaps there should be Horne Rule all round? Why should there not be domestic legislature in Ireland, Scotland and Wales, plus an English parliament dealing with purely English affairs, as weIl as the imperial legislation of the whole Empire. Why should this ridiculous situation not be absurd when applied to Ireland alone? Instead, he advocated a gradual extension of local self government in Ireland and the dropping of the divisive concept of devolution. In this he was supported by Mr GJ. Goschen (Edinburgh, E) who suggested that the Commons was being made to believe that there was no viable alternative to Horne Rule. To hirn separation was impossible, because the interests of Great Britain and Ireland were so intertwined; surrender to the Parnellites would mean 'that every subject race, that India, that Europe would know that we were no longer able to cope with resistance, if resistance were offered'. Many M.P.s saw the whole question of Horne Rule in the context of imperial relations, especially Anglo-Indian relations. Already the Raj had begun to feel the rising winds of nationalism in the subcontinent, particularly since the formation of the Congress party. It was one thing to grant self-government to New South Wales or New Zealand, quite another to initiate a process which might weIl lead to disintegration of the Pax Britannica [doc. 29] , disintegration likely to be accompanied by bloodshed. Mr Ashmead-Bartlett (Sheffield, Eccleshall), was convinced that the Horne Rule Bill contained the certain seed of civil war. Further, if Britain was unable or unwilling to rule Ireland, would she have the capability of ruling India? The Attorney-General, Sir Charles Russell of Killowen, looked on the case of Ireland as being widely different from those of Scotland or Wales. A mere tinkering with local government would not suffice. Irishmen must be given the right of domestic legislation. To hirn, as to both Gladstone and James Bryce (Aberdeen South), the force of Irish nationality was areal issue. They agreed that the force which had underlain the recent unification of both Italy and Germany , and which had led to the transformation of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1867 clearly also fuelled the just demands for self-government in Ireland. Horne Rule worked elsewhere, for instance in Iceland, Schleswig-Holstein, Poland and in the Grand Duchy ofFinland. The proposed Irish legislature would be subordinate to that at Westminster; there would be a veto by the Lord-Lieutenant exercised on the advice of the Queen's ministry in Dublin; appeals could be made against Irish legislation to the judicial committee of the Privy Council: 'this Bill may be called a Parliamentary

39

TheHorne Rule Solution compact, by which it is intended that the Irish people shall have the exc1usive right to deal with matters that concern themselves.' The militant opposition in Ulster was no more than mere bluster, indeed 'no words are too strong for those who fan the flame of religious rancour, and who divide, while they plunder, the farmers ofUlster' (51). Winding up the debate Parnell, in one of his most effective speeches, warned the House: 'If you reject this Bill ... you will have to resort to coercion ... it will be inevitable ... there is no half-way house between the concession of legislative autonomy in Ireland and the disfranchisement of the country and her government as a Crown Colony'. Finally, the Prime Minister warned that Any rejection of the conciliatory policy, might have an effect that none of us could wish in strengthening that party of disorder which is behind the back of the Irish representatives, which skulks in America, which skulks in Ireland, which ... will lose ground in proportion as OUf policy is carried out .... HaveHon gentlemen considered that they are coming into conflict with a nation? Can anything stop a nation's demand? Ireland stands at your bar expectant, hopeful, almost suppliant we hail the demand of Ireland for what I call a blessed oblivion of the past ... (40,46). The House divided, and the Bill was defeated by 343 to 313, no fewer than 93 Liberals voting against the government. It was a momentous defeat, and Gladstone at onee made up his mind to go to the eountry. He was convinced that his policy was morally and politically justified, and believed that the demoeraey of Great Britain would support hirn. In this judgement he was to find hirnself mistaken (116, 119).

40

7

Parnell and Gladstone

Remember our chief! - (who can guide us no more) He rests on his laurels, his troubles are o'er; He's gone that longjourney where all ends in peace, Where all controversy and politics cease. Ah! had we but one for to put in his place, And not leave our country in sorry disgrace! We can't find his equal, alas! we know well; Our chieftain is gone, Charles Stewart Parnell. from a ballad by Edward Mayfield, Dublin 1891 Parliament was dissolved on 26 June 1886 and by mid-July, after the election had been held, it was elear that no party possessed an absolute majority: the Gladstonian Liberals held 191 seats, the Parnellites 86 and the Conservatives, together with the dissident Liberals led by Chamberlain and Hartington, had 314 (48, 119). In this situation the Conservatives depended on the dissident Liberals as much as the Gladstonian Liberals depended on the Irish party. The election results showed elearly that the majority of the English electorate was opposed to Horne Rule, while support was mainly to be found in Scotland, Wales and Ireland. The result, however, was sufficiently elose for Gladstone to retain Horne Rule as a main plank in his political platform (17, 36). As for Parnell, he remained steadfast, strangely indifferent to the necessity of winning over the English democracy, an essential precondition of success within the parliamentary framework of the United Kingdom: 'we cannot persuade the English people. They will only do what we force them to do' (51).

Resolution and reform Gladstone now resigned and Lord Salisbury took office, with Sir Michael Hicks Beach as Chief Secretary and Lord Randolph Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer, a post in which he was shortly afterwards replaced by Edward Goschen. This new administration was faced with the problem of governing Ireland on lines which some people hoped would be an application of the panacea of twenty years of reso41

The Horne Rule Solution lute government [doc. 31] , and others like Arthur Balfour thought of it as an opportunity for positive and constructive reform within the United Kingdom (37). The defeat of the Horne Rule Bill shifted interest to the land question. In this agitation two remarkable men took the lead, William O'Brien and lohn Dillon. O'Brien had been born at Mallow, Co. Cork, in 1852, the son of an ardent Young Irelander. He became a student at Queen's College, Cork, whence he moved into journalism and became editor of Parnell's organ, United Ireland. He had a pleasant personality, was a voluble talker and a prolific writer, but lacked that judgment or steadiness which inspire confidence in others (50). His comrade lohn Dillon was the son of lohn Blake Dillon, another Young Irelander. He was a year older than O'Brien, had studied medicine and, like O'Brien , became a Fenian sympathiser and a supporter of the Land League. Di1lon was elected M.P. for Tipperary in 1880 and in 1885 was elected for East Mayo - a seat he held until his defeat in 1918 by Eamonn de Valera (43). O'Brien and Di1lon now launched a 'Plan of Campaign' by which they proposed that the tenants on each estate were to 'consult together and decide by resolution on the amount of abatement (of rent) which they would demand' (102). Parnell disapproved of this active revival of agrarian agitation because it distracted attention from his political objectives, and further because the campaign appeared in England to be an unlawful conspiracy against property rights. Ireland however, was suffering more than her neighbour from the effects of the Great Depression which had lowered agricultural prices, restricted credit and made regular payments of rent difficult to maintain. This prolonged rural crisis reached a peak in 1886-88, and highlighted the need for urgent redress of grievances. The period also saw an increase in the number of evictions and an increased flow of emigration to the United States (18). The Cowper Commission looked at the evidence for the fmancial plight of the small farmer and recommended arevision of the judicial rents fixed under the terms of the Land Act, 1881 (32, 34) . To face these complex problems Salisbury appointed his nephew Arthur Balfour as Chief Secretary in March 1887. Balfour was then aged thirty-eight, a Cambridge graduate endowed with a first-class mind and a sense of effortless superiority, a man whose capacities were underrated and ignored at first by his opponents. Balfour wasted little time in adumbrating his Irish policy : 'I shall be as relentless as Cromwell in enforcing obedience to the law, but, at the same time, 1 shall be as radical as any reformer in redressing grievances, . .. Hitherto English governments : .. have been all for repression or

42

Parnell and Gladstone for reform. I am for both: repression as stern as Cromwell; refonn as thorough as Mr Parnell can desire.' This policy was nicknamed 'Killing Horne Rule with kindness' ; in fact it was an endeavour to make the Union succeed, as it had done in eastern Ulster (37) [doc. 31] . Balfour's resolution to govern was soon put to a test. A clash occurred between a rioting crowd and the R.I.C. at Mitchelstown , Co. Cork, in which two persons were killed and several injured . An interested spectator of the affray was a young Dublin lawyer, Edward Carson, then beginning to make his way at the lrish Bar (69). Balfour fully supported the police in the action they were forced to take , so earning hirnself the nickname 'Bloody Balfour', an interesting progression from the 'Niminy-Piminy' image of earlier days. Balfour shared old John Bright's view that people who continued to agitate for Horne Rule were essentially 'rebels'. This seemed to him to be particularly true of the agrarian agitation led by O'Brien and Dillon. To deal with the 'Plan of Carnpaign', Balfour considered the underlying agrarian grievances and typically had a twofold answer. First , an ameliorative Land Act in 1887 by which the fixed rents which had been serious1y affected by the depressed prices of 1881-86 were to be reviewed: 100,000leaseholders were to be admitted to the benefits of the 1881 Act; new adjudicated rents were to be placed on a sliding scale related to price movements, and were to be valid for a short term of three years only (32) . Balfour hirnself favoured land purehase : 'the whole of our Horne Rule controversy has been hampered and embarrassed by having to defend not only the Union but the landlords.' It was his hope that a settlement of the land problem might disconnect Fintan Lalor's agrarian engine from the rest of the train, and so leave the Horne Rule carriages in a siding.

The fall of Parnell Meanwhile, a remarkable series of articles entitled Parnellism and Crime appeared in The Times. In these the links between Parnell and the 'advanced' men were explored, and finally a letter was printed which appeared to substantiate Parnell's approval of murder in general, and the Phoenix Park murders in particular. Salisbury now thought that The Times articles showed conclusively that Gladstone had made a trusted ally of a man who was 'tainted with the strong presumption of conniving at assassination'. Strangely, although his supporters were gravely disturbed, Parnell remained impassive; not until July 1887 did he ask for a select committee of the House to Investigate the affair. This was refused , and instead a commission of three judges was appointed. 43

The Home Rule Solution

In effect, Parnell and his party were to be subjected to a 'grand compulsory investigation into the connection of the national and land leagues with agrarian crime'. The Commission first met on 17 September 1888 and held its final session on 22 November 1889, having heard over 450 witnesses answer 98,000 questions. Pigott, a journalist, being exposed as the forger of the letters in The Times, fled to Madrid where he committed suicide on 1 March. Finally, when the report of the Commission was published in February 1890 Parnell was exonerated from involvement in agrarian crime and the Phoenix Park murders; more important, perhaps, 'the abstract merits of Horne Rule were untouched'. With the exposure of the Pigott forgeries, the 'Chief appeared to be at the peak of his career (111). In February 1890 Parnell was cited as co-respondent in a divorce case initiated by Captain O'Shea. The case dragged on for months, creating a steady erosion of Parnell's personal and political position, ending on 17 November when he was found to be the guilty party in the case, a fact profoundly shocking to the opinion of the time in both Britain and Ireland. Gladstone was now placed in an awkward dilemma. How could he reconcile his desire to retain Horne Rule as agreed liberal policy with the grave and obvious political dangers of continuing to cooperate with Parnell? He conc1uded that Parnell must relinquish his party leadership, and expressed this opinion in a letter to Morley [doc. 30]. Morley warned Parnell that if he set British opinion at defiance and tried to ride out the storm, he would ruin the cause of Horne Rule at the next election. To this advice Parnell turned a deaf ear, as he wished to force Gladstone to attack his leadership publicly. This would have the advantage of underlining Parnell's settled conviction that Horne Rule for Ireland was to be regarded as a policy absolutely independent of either of the two great British parties. In fact, the only realistic hope of attaining an Irish legislature by lawful methods within the United Kingdom context was by an entente with the liberal party, and through this slowly winning over the support of a majority of the English electorate. On this issue many Irish M.P.shad a greater sense of political realism than their leader, and were weIl aware of the links which bound them to the Liberals,and which in turn bound the liberals to them. The leadership crisis in the Irish parliamentary party was slowly resolvedduring days of stressful debate and bitter acrimony in Committee Room 15 in the House ofCommons. Parnell and his followers continued to emphasise the principle of maintaining the independence of the Irish party: 'They would be independent nationalists, they would still believe in the future of Ireland a nation; and they would still protest 44

Parnell and Gladstone that it was not by taking orders from an English minister that Ireland's future could be saved, protected or seeured.' This proud and unyielding stance reflected that of Parnell himself; the anti-Parnellites led by Justin McCarthy, showed a more realistic acceptance that Parnell must go if the liberal alliance was .to be saved. It was a dilemma to which there could be only one solution: the party split into two sections, the majority of fifty-four following Justin McCarthy, the minority of thirty-two supporting Parnell, The latter returned to Ireland where he fought three bitter by-elections at North Kilkenny, Carlow and North Sligo. In each case the Parnellite was beaten. Parnell's oratory became more and more extreme, appealing to the revolutionary tradition of the 'hillside men' which lay not far below the surface in seetions of Irish life [doc. 32}. Did this mean that in despair he had turned away from lawful and constitutional paths? Or did Parnell simply wish to attract support for his crumbling position from the Irish-Americans? To many of his former supporters he now appeared to have taken leave of his senses. He abandoned moderation, turned with fierce vituperation on former allies, refused to retire even temporarily from the scene. It was a classical tragedy only concluded by Parnell's death in October 1891 (42).

The second Horne Rule Bill Parnell's legacy was of the utmost importance in Anglo-Irish relations. it was quite simply that the restoration of an Irish legislature for Irish affairs would be the minimum acceptable to most Irishmen. Extensions of local government, or well-meaning attempts to make the Union work, were no longer realistic solutions to the Irish problem. Gladstone fully understood this, so when the liberals won the election of 1892 Horne Rule remained as party policy. The 1892 election also endorsed the acceptance of the liberal alliance by the Irish electorate, for seventy-one anti-Parnellites were elected and the Parnellite wing of the party was reduced to nine. Fortified by this support Gladstone, now aged eightyfour, introduced his second Horne Rule Bill on 13 February 1893. This Bill was similar to the first, with the important modification that eighty Irish M.P.s (instead of the existing 103) were to sit at Westminster, but they were not to vote on motions or Bills expressly confined to Scotland or England and Wales. This scheme was quite impracticable, just as exclusion from the House had been shown to be in the debates of 1886, so that in the end the Irish M.P.s were to be left to vote as they chose omnes opera (for all purposes). Exc1usion necessarily meant taxation without representation, inclusion omnes 45

The Home Rule Solution opera allowed of Irish intervention in mainland affairs, while inc1usion for limited purposes meant the constant possibility of a government being defeated by the Irish vote on an Imperial question. The Bill proposed an Irish parliament of two Houses: (a) a Legislative Council of 48 members, elected for single member constituencies, by voters who owned or occupied land of noo annual valuation and (h) an Assembly of 103 M.P.s from the existing constituencies. Disputes between the two Houses were to be settled by dissolution or by the majority decision of the two Houses sitting together. Gladstone's presentation of this Bill was brilliant, although he must have known that his chance of success was limited. Yet the Bill passed the second reading by a majority of 43 votes (347 to 304). The third reading was carried by a majority of 34 (301 to 267). Exc1uding the Irish M.P.s there was a majority against the Bill of only 23, although in England and Wales alone the majority against was 48. Having passed the Commons, the House of Lords threw Horne Rule out by 419 to 41. Gladstone now retired in March 1894, after nearly 63 years in public life, having disestablished the 'alien church', laid the foundation of the resolution of the land problem and having presented the electorate with blueprints for devolution as an alternative to the weary cyc1e of outrage and coercion (40,46,48).

46

8

Evolution and Devolution

Devolution is the Latin for Horne Rule.

T.P. O'Connor, M.P.

Gladstone's retirement in 1894 marked the end of an era in politics in the British Isles. The second failure to achieve Horne Rule led to an inerease in disenehantment with parliamentary methods and with the endless bickerings within the Irish parliamentary party. There was also a marked desire on the part of the Liberals under Rosebery to disengage themselves from the Irish albatross (107); as for the Conservatives they began to pursue actively their policies of amelioration, of 'constructive Unionism', policies which led them insensibly towards devolution of lrish affairs.

'New Ireland' The period from Parnell's death to the Liberal victory of 1906 was far from being a sterile wasteland. It was aperiod in which new movements , fresh people and stimulating ideas began to appear ; in particular, it was the period in which the rediseovery of the riehness and variety of Ireland's Gaelic heritage offered alternative interests to those which the parliamentary party and its methods had failed to fulfil. To begin with , the Gaelic Athletic Association (G.A.A.), a popular and non-intellectual movement (founded in 1884) , spread an interest in such native sports as hurling and Gaelie football. It emphasised things Irish, and frowned on the anglicising influence of such sports as rugby, cricket, polo and croquet. Both Parnell and Davitt became patrons of this movement , and two thousand members , armed with hurling sticks, marched in Parnell's funeral procession. More significant was the foundation of the Gaelic League in 1893. This followed a famous lecture given by Douglas Hyde, son of the Church of Ireland rector of Frenchpark, Co. Roscommon, on 'The necessity of de-Anglicising Ireland'. To Hyde, as to Eoin MaeNeill, Ireland was rapidly becoming nothing more than a cultural province of English life and language. They argued that Ireland was losing her claim to distinetive nationality beeause she was losing

47

The Home Rule Solution her own language and customs. Their remedy was to engage in a scholarly study of the Gaelic past, the publication of texts, the increased teaching of the Irish language in schools and colleges, and the encouragement of its use as the vernacular. Hyde saw all this as the recovery of a heritage in which all Irishmen could take pride and claim to have apart, a view shared by Canon Hannay ofWestport (the novelist George Birmingham) among others [doc. 33]. To Hyde it was not sectional, nor would he have agreed with the conservative Londonderry Sentinel that the Gaelic League was like the G.A.A., 'covered with a coat of Horne Rule tar!' Indeed the Gaelic League, with its encouragement of music, dancing, folk singing and story-telling - a literary folk art - successfully crossed sectarian boundaries and provided an adult education movement reminiscent in a way of that so successfully begun by Bishop Grundtvig in Denmark (72). So began a cultural revival which reached its highest expression in the field of Anglo-Irish literature and drama. The rediscovery of the Gaelic past so compellingly resurrected in books like Standish O'Grady's History of Ireland influenced and inspired W.B. Yeats, Lady Gregory, I.M. Synge and T.W. Rolleston. Their work had an influence far beyond Ireland, and the Abbey Theatre, perhaps the greatest achievement of the literary movement, provided a stage for plays which provided audiences with a view of Ireland and a hope for a future very different from that to which the ageing parliametary party pointed. These new ideas and organisations were bound to lead to fresh political attitudes. In 1900 a body called Cumann na nGaedheal (the Gaelic Society) began to advocate the cause of Irish independence by 'cultivating a fraternal spirit amongst Irishmen'. Its founder was Arthur Griffith, who had been born in Dublin in 1871. He had been trained as a printer, and after aperiod in South Africa, returned to Ireland where he became editor of the weekly United lrishman. Like Swift and Davis, Griffith was a propagandist and an educator. In 1904 he astonished and puzzled people by his book on The Resurrection ofHungary, His thesis was that Ireland should copy Kossuth and Deak and the Hungarian patriots whose efforts eventually led to the power-sharing agreement of 1867 with Austria. Griffith wanted the Irish M.P.s to cease to attend Westminster, and instead to remain in Dublin. This idea was not new, for it had been suggested earlier by Gavan Duffy, and even hinted at by Parnell in a speech in 1885. Griffith wished to retain the Crown as a shared link between Britain and Ireland. Indeed, he was blinded by the golden haze which then commonly surrounded Grattan's Parliament, an idealistic and romantic assessment which that body in sober truth did not deserve (2, 97). Griffith's second passion was proteetion for

48

Evolution and Devolution Irish industries; he ignored , or was ignorant of, the highly sueeessful shipbuilding and linen industries which dominated the eeonomy of eastern Ulster, and was coneerned to provide protection for indust ries which were either struggling or did not even exist. In this he was partly inspired by Sir Robert Kane's book on The Industrial Resources 01 Ireland (1844) in whieh the utilisation of the peat-bogs , the harnessing of the rivers and the tides and the exploitation of mineral resources was advoeated, and partly by the teaehings of Friedrieh List , the exponent of eeonomic nationalism , a poliey whieh had played a major role in the expansion of Prussian power. Griffith was also following the teaehings of Dean Swift , whose advoeacy of Ireland developing her own resourees eould be summed up in his aph orism 'Burn everything English, except their people and their eoals!' In 1905 Griffith formulated the programme of Sinn Fein , a name provided by Edward Carson's cousin Maire Butler, and meaning 'Ourselves' or 'Self-relianee'

(21,60). Meantime, the Gaelic revival had attraeted the attention of the Irish Republiean Brotherhood , who saw in it the ereation of a movement wh ich could be made to serve their political ends . Their early attempts to dominate the inner eouncils of the G.A.A. were frustrated , but they eventually succeeded in moving that body towards a narrow and exclusive nationalism. Similarly, the 'advanced men' had inflltrated the Gaelic League. They restated its objeetives in essentially politieal terms (30), and Douglas Hyde, in whose view the Irish language should be a unifying and not a divisive force, eventually resigned in 1915. All this meant, as did the later movement of Sinn Fein away from Arthur Griffith's non-violent idealism, a steady growth of interest in 'Irish Ireland' and a gradual undermining of the Horne Rule policy of the parliamentary party - a position whieh many of the younger generation looked upon as belonging to the age of horse-drawn trams and aspidistras (101)! Nonetheless , these new ideas and interests in the 1890s were largely confined to a minority of the people with the exception of the popular G.A.A . The parliamentary party still enjoyed widespread support, and by 1900 managed to overeome the disastrous effects of the 'split' of 1890 by uniting under the ehairmanship of the Parnellite lohn Redmond (66). Two years earlier the momentous Local Government Act had introduced eleetive eounty councils, and this effectively ended the predominant influence of the landed gentry in local affairs, and opened an avenue to public life to a mueh wider cross-section of the population. Inevitably , Nationalist and , in north-east Ulster , Unionist control over local affairs followed. This democratisation of local 49

The Home Rule Solution

government was to prove the most significant reform of Victorian times, providing as it did a widespread experience of the responsibilities and the temptations of local affairs, and so giving considerable momentum to the demand for self-government.

Constructive unionism Meantime, the Conservative administration had turned away from coercion towards policies of conciliation and cooperation. The recognition that Ireland needed special ameliorative measures was shown by the establishment of the Congested Districts Board in 1891, to deal with the pressing problems of the western counties. Piers were built, fisheries encouraged, cottage industries established and better farming assisted by the consolidation of small holdings into more viable units. This process culminated in the establishment of a Department of Agriculture in 1899 and in a much-needed expansion of technical instruction. A leading figure in all this was Sir Horace Plunkett, a Unionist landowner, third son of Edward, sixteenth Baron Dunsany. Plunkett was educated at Eton and Oxford, where he graduated in 1877. He founded a Co-Operative Society at Dunsany and preached the need for 'self-sacrifice, unselfishness, public spirit and mutual toleration', The idea of self-help and mutual self-improvernent gradually spread, and by 1891 there were seventeen co-operative creameries, mainly located in the poor areas of the south and west. Balfour invited Plunkett to become a member of the Congested Districts Board, but, after a tour of duty in the West, he found himself repelled by the paternalism on the one hand and the mendicant sycophancy on the other. He approved of the policy of compulsory land purchase and the subsequent rationalisation and redistribution of holdings, on the lines pioneered by the work of William O'Brien on Clare Island. By 1894 the co-operative movement had grown so large that the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society (which still flourishes) was established to supervise and encourage the movement. Here was proof of Plunkett's belief that self-help was better than state aid. He cited the syndicats agricoles in France, the Raffeisen credit banks in Germany and the inspiring achievements of Denmark to support his view that the policy required in Irish affairs was 'the more business you introduce into politics and the less politics into business the better for both'. Such a dictum was regarded with profound suspicion by those who feared that the processes of economic betterment and collaboration with Unionists would diminish the 'national demand' for se1f-government. Plunkett was indeed critical of ihe Nationalist policy of putting 50

Evolution and Devolution

Horne Rule first because he thought it led to a 'lack of initiative and shrinking from responsibility ... moral timidity, the intense dread of public opinion caused by boycotting'. On the other hand he criticised the Unionists for trying to uphold the Union by force rather than by reconciling the lrish people to it (61). To William O'Brien the solution of the land problem was not to be sought either in cooperation or in the activities of the Congested Districts Board, but in a combination of agrarian and political activities. So in 1898 he founded the United Irish League, an attempt to awaken memories of the United Irishmen of 1798 and of the Land League. O'Brien sought the breaking up of the vast grazing 'ranches' in the west of Ireland, the acceleration of land purchase and, above all, the winning of the largest possible measure of self-government for Ireland. The activities of the League contributed to the reunion of the lrish parliamentary party in 1900 (66); it also waved an 'olive branch' of reconciliafion by supporting the summons to a conference, to discuss the problem of landlordism, made by Captain Shaw-Taylor, a Co. Galway landlord. A conciliation committee largely of southern landowners was set up under Lord Dunraven, and a conference assembled in December 1902 in the Mansion House, Dublin. It rapidly reached agreement that the existing system of dual ownership must be replaced by the sale and transfer of land to tenant occupiers. This provided the solid foundation for the great Land Act of 1903, an Act associated with George Wyndham, who had become Chief Secretary in 1900, and who was of Anglo-lrish descent. Wyndham's Act provided money for transfer of lands to be raised by Treasury guaranteed Land Stock at 2% per cent. Landlords were to be paid in cash, not stock, and enjoyed a bonus of ±:12 per ±:l00 of the purchase price. The lump sum paid to the landlord, when invested at 3 or 3% per cent would yield hirn an income equivalent to his rents, after deduction of expenses. The tenants purchasing their farms paid an annuity of 3Y.. per cent for each ±:100 they borrowed (32, 34). This Act pleased both landlord and tenant, although Michael Davitt still hankered after Henry George's idea of land nationalisation, while Dillon feared that the agrarian engine had at last been detached from the Horne Rule train (38).

The devolution crisis Horace Plunkett, Lord Dunraven and William O'Brien all believed in the efficacy of conciliation and conference as a method of solving Ireland's problems. The Land Committee was reconstituted as the Irish Reform

5]

The Horne Rule Solution Association, a body which upheld the parliamentary Union with Great Britain as 'essential to the political stability of the Empire' , yet believed that this was not incompatible with the devolution to Ireland of a larger measure of self-government than she then possessed. It was suggested that two modes of devolution should be considered: (a) decentralisation of Irish finance, and (b) private billlegislation as already applied to Scottish matters. It is a comment on the state of Unionist opinion that even this modest proposal was looked on as being 'Horne Rule by instalments'. Lord Dunraven wished to work out a more detailed scheme, and consulted Sir Anthony MacDonnell, a Catholic Irishman who had had a distinguished career in the Indian Civil Service, and had been appointed Under-Secretary in 1902. MacDonnell was interested in the settlement of the land problem , higher education and administrative reforms. He sought from Wyndham an assurance that he would be given 'freedom of action within the law' to achieve these ends. Not surprisingly MacDonnell thought that 'the landlords would regard him with distrust and his Irish friends would consider hirn a traitor'. The plan of devolution which emerged proposed to establish a financial council to take control over purely Irish expenditure. This council was to consist of the Lord Lieutenant together with twelve elected and twelve nominated members , of whom one was to be the Chief Secretary . Decisions of the council could only be nullified by a three-quarters majority vote in the House of Commons. The council was to prepare Irish financial estimates for submission to parliament, the moneys to be either all Irish revenue less an 'imperial contribution', or a standard contribution from the Exchequer to Ireland based on estimates for a number of previous years, or perhaps specified sources of revenue might be granted to Ireland with a 'topping-up' contribution from the Exchequer. Finally , it was proposed that other Irish business should be delegated to a statutory body to be composed of the Irish representative peers, the Irish M.P.s and the members of the financial council (98) . This scheme for devolution was published by the Irish Reform Association in September 1904 and was at once disowned by Wyndham, who failed to realise the significance of MacDonnell's involvement with Dunraven. The Irish Unionist Alliance, as was to be expected, condemn ed the scheme and attacked the lrish Reform Association as unrepresentative and as deviating from the principles of lrish Unionism. In Ulster the reaction was much stronger and had sinister undertones. A letter from two leading Unionists appeared in the BelfastNews-Letter, in which they suggested 'that the present would be an opportune moment to revive on a war footing for active work the various Ulster defence associations. Lord Dunraven and his associates can be ignored, but the 52

Evolution and Devolution

administration which, though masquerading as Unionist, plots behind them, eannot'. Three weeks later a Unionist eonferenee met in Belfast which not only condemned the devolution scheme as disguised Horne Rule, but proposed a fuller meeting of all Ulster Unionists to consider the formation of a eentral Ulster Unionist Association (90). That conference was held in December 1904 and a central body formed, to be named the Ulster Unionist Council in March 1905 [doc. 34]. The political storm over these devolution proposals not only raised questions of the implications of MacDonnell's actions, but of the terms of his appointment. The Ulster M.P.swere so ineensed that they snuffed treachery with every tainted breeze, and they even joined forees with John Redmond and the Nationalists in supporting his amendment declaring that 'the present system of government in Ireland is in opposition to the willof the Irish people'. The House divided, and Balfour's government survived by fifty votes. Finally, Wyndham, who had to aeeept responsibility for MacDonnell's activities, resignedoffiee (68). It wasa blow to the diminishing authority and credibility of the government, which was destined to be swept away by the Liberallandslide in 1906. But perhaps the most important result ofthese critical years was to establish the Ulster Unionists firmly in the van of the opposition to Horne Rule in any shape or form. Not only had the southern Unionists demonstrated their political ineffectiveness, but by the formation of the Ulster Unionist Couneil the northerners had once more demonstrated their independenee and their determination, if necessary, to 'go it alone' (98).

53

9

Redrnond and the Supersession of Horne Rule

Minorities have their rights ; they also have not only their rights but susceptibilities which ought to be considered and provided for. H.H. Asquith The election of 1906 saw a swing in favour of the Liberals so large that it made them independent of the Irish parliamentary party, a position Gladstone always desired but never attained. The Liberals had been pursuing a policy of disengagement from Horne Rule during the period from 1894 up to 1905. Accordingly, in November 1905, CampbellBannerman formulated a policy of giving Ireland an 'instalment of representative control' which might eventually lead up to Horne Rule (75). It was possible to consider this compromise as a practical possibility because Sir Anthony MacDonnell was still prominent in the Dublin Castle administration, and still interested in introducing into Ireland something approximating to the provincial devolution of powers with which he had been familiar in India .

The Irish Council Bill MacDonnell drafted a fresh scheme for devolution which in many ways resembled Joseph Chamberlain's 'Central Board' scheme in 1885. There was to be an Executive Council of thirty members to advise and assist the Lord-Lieutenant. While the supremacy of the parliament at Westminster was to be untouched and especially its control over police, justice and the financing of land purchase , certain departments of whieh the Loeal Government Board, the Congested Districts Board, the Department of Agriculture and Technieal Instruction and Publie Works were to be transferred to the control of the Irish administration. A Department of Edueation was to be established and Irish finanees would be controlled by the Couneil, subject to a five-year agreement with the Treasury. Essentially this was a measure of administrative devolution and as such unlikely to satisfy Redmond, even though in the autumn of 1905 he had agreed not to oppose a measure of devolution as a step towards Horne Rule. Instead he and 54

Redmond and the Supersession 0/ Home Rule

Dillon proposed that the Irish M.P.s should meet in session as the Council for Ireland. Dillon certainly thought that MacDonnell's basic idea was to 'get a kind of Indian council composed of that favourite abstraction of amateur solvers of the Irish problem, non-polltical business men' (91,93). These proposals were discussed in the cabinet and in the corridors of power in London and Dublln from February 1906 until May 1907. Finally, the Irish Council Bill emerged. It proposed an Executive Council of some 107 members, three-quarters of whom were to be elected directly by the local government electorate every three years. Twenty-five members were to be nominated, and the Lord-Lieutenant was to remain a party political nominee instead of being, as MacDonnell had originally proposed, a non-party appointee holding office for a fixed term. In May 1907 the Bill was introduced by Augustine Birrell, who had replaced James Bryce as ChiefSecretary in January 1907, and who was to remain in office until 1916 (73). It had little chance of success. Redmond, anxious to hold his party together, condemned it as falling short of the legislative devolution they had always wanted. This was a deliberate rejection of the 'half-a-loaf offered, and merely emphasised Redmond's failure to secure any advantage for Ireland. Such a failure gave added impetus to those, like Arthur Griffith and Sinn Fein, who had begun to regard the parliamentary party as incapable of securing legislative autonomy and had begun to consider more radical and revolutionary methods of attaining their ends, For MacDonnell the defeat of the Bill was a profound disappointment. He had hoped to free Irish affairs from the domination of extremists from both camps, and seeure a position for the forces ofmoderation and commonsense. As for the Liberals, the long-term effect of the defeat of Birrell's Bill was to make it plain that there was no middle position between Horne Rule and Union which they could support (93). In the short term, the government could thankfully shelve the Irish problem and concentrate attention on the reforms which effectively laid the foundation of the modern Welfare State. In Ireland, for example, they introduced measures to improve housing, and to deal with the problems of evicted tenants, and they settled the complex problem ofhigher education by the Irish Universities Act, 1908.

The crisis of 1910 These years of disappointment for Redmond and the Horne Rulers ended in 1909 when Uoyd George introduced a budget so radical that 55

The Horne Rule Solution

the House of Lords could no longer ignore the challenge. The crisis between the upper and lower Houses, latent since the rejection of the second Horne Rule Bill in 1893, now dominated the scene and opened new prospects to Redmond and the Nationalists. They could now put pressure on Asquith to abolish or limit the existing veto power of the Lords, and so clear away the major constitutional block to Horne Rule. To their delight the Lords rejected the Budget proposals and Asquith decided on an election. This first election of 1910 gave the Liberals 275 seats, the Unionists 273, leaving the balance between the two major parties in the hands of the 40 Labour and 71 Irish nationalist members. Redmond was now in Parnell's position of being able to make or break the government, although in practice depending entirely on the Liberals for a measure ofHome Rule. In May Edward VII died, and during the first six months of George V's reign efforts were made to settle the constitutional crisis by inter-party talks between the two major groups (65). When this policy of conference and conciliation failed, a second election took place in November and largely produced the same results as the first: Liberals 272, Unionists 272, Labour 42 and Irish Nationalists 83 (ofwhom 73 followed Redmond). The year 1910 marked the closing of a chapter in the history of the Irish parliamentary party. Redmond's policy of fostering the Liberal alliance had at last succeeded and its opponents Tim Healy and William O'Brien were discredited. The power struggle within the party had now ended, though in reality the whole constitutional movement had lost much of its appeal, appearing to many in the younger generation and particularly those who were influenced by the new ideas of the 1890s to be a tired irrelevancy from Victorian days. Between 1890 and 1910 the leaders of the Irish parliamentary party had sought to perpetuate the essentials of the Parnellite system, while at the same time preventing the chairman from emulating Parnell's personal ascendancy. There were superficial resemblances between the party of 1886 and that of 1910: the party pledge, which formed the basis of party discipline under the 'Chief, the skilful use of the United lrish League 'machines' in the constituencies to rally the faithful and organise elections, the theoretical independence of all other parties. But in 1910 Redmond's party manifestly lacked the spirit and unity of purpose of the hightide of 1886. Redmond was no Parnell; he was more in Isaac Butt's tradition as a House of Commons man and a believer in the British Empire to which Irishmen had made so great a contribution. Further, the choice of parliamentary candidates had shifted away from the centre into the hands of the constituencies, and the Conservative opposition, particularly that of the Ulster Unionists, was much more articulate and 56

Redmond and the Supersession 0/ Horne Rule

better organised in 1910 than it had been in 1886. Finally, the Liberal alliance necessarily ruled out the concept of freedom from entangling alliances with one or other of the British political parties and this implied hostility between Nationalist and Unionist (66). The southern Unionists were still an influential minority in 1910. They were backed by powerful connections in England, no fewer than 86 out of 104 peers with Irish interests having links with the three southern provinces. In the Commons the southern Unionists had twenty seats, but significantly only two of these were constitueneies in Ireland (57, 3). By comparison the Ulster Unionists with their strong territorial base in the north-east returned sixteen M.P.s, had two British seats and could claim eighteen peers. Such a group clearly presented a serious challenge to Horne Rule being effective over the whole of Ireland, and also provided the Conservatives with powerful backing for their opposition to Horne Rule as a threat to property, a divisive factor in the very heartland of the Empire and something which had already led to a realignment in British party politics (58).

Carson and Craig The Ulster Unionists needed a charismatic figure to lead them and they found him in a remarkable and brilliant man, Sir Edward Carson. Carson was a southern Unionist, born in Dublin in 1854 and educated at Trinity College, Dublin. He took silk and was called to the Irish Bar in 1877. He soon established a formidable reputation and was appointed Solieitor-General for Ireland in 1892. In that year he also entered political life, being elected as one of the M.P.s for Dublin University, a seat he held until1917. Carson, like most southern Unionists, believed passionately in the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom as a whole. However, the increasing pressure of circumstances and a sense of realism impelled him to place his considerable gifts at the disposal of the Ulster Unionists, who since the formation of the Ulster Unionist Council in 1905 had been moving steadily away from the idea of defending the Union for the whole of Ireland towards the formation of a secure anti-Horne Rule 'camp' in Ulster (69,72,88). In 1911 the Parliament Act solved the inter-House crisis by curtailing the veto powers of the House of Lords. Henceforward that House could only delay legislation for a couple of years. This made the introduction of a third Horne Rule Bill, and its passage into law, only a matter of time - so long as the Liberals held office. This was the crunch for which the Ulster Unionists had being preparing. So, in September 1911 Carson visited Belfast, where he met James Craig. Craig was an 57

Unionist constituencies in Ulster,

1911

Provincial boundary

County boundary Parliamentary constituency

boundary

Unionist constituencies

in Ulster Present border between

Northern Ireland and Republic 01Ireland Provincial boundary

o

58

40 km

Present border between Northern Ireland and Republic 01 Ireland

Redmond and the Supersession ofHome Rule Ulsterman, born in Belfast in 1871, son of a prosperous whisky distiller. He had served against the Boers in the South African War and had been elected M.P. for East Down in 1906. He was a man oflimited and provincial outlook, but quite single-minded in his aim to preserve Ulster from the imagined horrors ofHome (and Rome) Rule [doc. 35]. Indeed, in pursuit of this aim he was even prepared to consider armed rebellion against the Crown. This militancy, which had been a feature of life in Belfast and in the province, particularly since 1886, came into the open once more at a meeting held in the grounds of Craigavon, Craig's horne in Belfast. Carson outlined the plan for setting up a provisional government in Ulster 'of those districts of which we have control' on the day on which Horne Rule passed into law. This was stern talk. Essentially it reflected that hardening of Conservative attitudes which was also seen in the choice of Bonar Law, a tough man of UlsterCanadian stock, as Balfour's successor in the leadership of the party. It was he who encouraged the Ulster Unionists to play the Imperial card, a strong one at that period. Rudyard Kipling, for instarice, offered DO,OOO to Carson as the nucleus of a fighting fund, for, like many English Conservatives, he regarded the maintenance of the British Empire as being insidiously threatened by the very concept of Horne Rule, an idea which had played a considerable part in the great Horne Rule debate of 1886. Another reason for the growth of this hard-line militancy was that since the passing of the Parliament Act there was no longer any constitutional way of preventing Horne Rule from becoming law. It was an imperial, national and social crisis of the first magnitude, comparable indeed to the deep divisions to be found in England on the eve of the Civil War in the seventeenth century (74, 89).

The third Horne Rule Bill In April 1912 Asquith introduced the third Horne Rule Bill. In it he proposed to establish an Irish parliament with two chambers - a Senate and a House of Commons - subordinate to the supreme power and authority of the United Kingdom parliament. The Senate was to have 40 members, nominated by the cabinet initially and subsequently by the Lord-Lieutenant on the advice of the Irish Executive. They were to sit for a term of eight years and ten of their number were to retire every two years. The Commons was to have 164 M.P.s: 59 from Ulster, 41 from Leinster, 37 from Munster and 25 from Connacht, together with two from 1)ublin University. The life of this House was to be five years, or until a dissolution. Disputes between the two Houses were to be resolved by both sitting as one body and reaching a majority deci59

The Home Rule Solution

sion. (This was reminiscent of the two Orders in the 1886 Bill.) It was also permissible for a man to be a member of both the Irish and the British legislatures. The Irish parliament was to concern itself with the good government of Ireland, subject to the following exceptions: the Crown and the succession, peace and war, defence of the realrn, foreign affairs, titles, treason and alienage, navigation and overseas trade, lighthouses, coinage and weights and measures, and patents. Certain matters were also to be reserved to Westminster. These were land purchase, old age pensions, national insurance, labour exchanges, the collection of taxes, public loans originating before 1912 and control over the police, a matter which was to be transferred after aperiod of six years. As in 1886 and 1893, no laws were to be passed to establish or endow any religious body. There was to be the right of appeal to the judicial committee of the Privy Council on the validity of any Irish Act. As for the executive, the Lord-Lieutenant was to be appointed for a term of six years, and need not necessarily be a Protestant; he retained the right of veto over Irish legislation acting on the advice of the ministry in London; he was the nominal head of an executive which was responsible to the Irish parliarnent. An Irish Exchequer and Consolidated Fund was to be set up and, to avoid the problem of taxation without representation, forty-two Irish M.P.swere to sit in Westminster. This was similar to the proposals of 1893, but unlike 1886, when Gladstone at first favoured total exclusion from Westminster. The Irish Parliament was to be empowered to add to the rates of excise duties, customs duties on beer and spirits, stamp duties and land tax. In addition it was permissible to add to income tax, death duties or customs imposts up to a total of 10 per cent of the yield. Further the Irish Parliament could levy new taxes for its own internal purposes. (This forms an interesting contrast to the 'block grant' system of finance for Scotland and Wales proposed by the Kilbrandon Report in 1973). Meanwhile, until the flow of revenue stabilised there would be a balancing transferred surn paid by the Imperial Exchequer to the Irish Exehequer until equilibrium was achieved between Irish incorne and expenditure (27,64). Would this modest measure of devolution have worked? Was it, as so rnany people had postulated of the 1886 Bill, merely a halfway house to a larger measure of fmancial control and eventual political independence? Was it relevant to the changed moods and aspirations of the day? In what ways were the Unionist minority in Ireland, and especially in the north-east, to be safeguarded [doc. 36] ? Or was the Billno more than a party manoeuvre which Asquith had reluctantly been forced to introduce in order to placate his political allies? Above all, 60

Redmond and the Supersession 0/ Home Rufe

how could the Ulster Unionists be coerced into acceptance of a Bill which they implacably opposed?

The sound of marehing Baeked by Bonar Law and tlre Conservatives the Ulster Unionists pledge themselves by a Solemn League and Covenant reminiseent of seventeenth-eentury Seotland to 'use all means whieh may be found neeessary to defeat the present conspiraey to set up aHorne Rule parliament in Ireland ' [doc, 37] . Here was a defianee of the authority of the govemment and indeed of the rule of law by a determined minority, a minority moreover whieh believed in baeking up words with deeds. Military drilling had begun in 1911 and early in 1913 the Ulster Unionist Couneil decided to knit together the various militant bodies into an Ulster Volunteer Force. This paramilitary force, as yet unarmed, posed a number of problems. First, were they to fight against Horne Rule in the whole of Ireland, or were they to concentrate on Ulster? Should this be the whole of the nine-county province, or should they consider the exclusion of apart of the province from the operation of Horne Rule? If so, what area should be selected? It soon became clear that the hope, dear to Carson's heart , of saving the whole of Ireland for the Union would have to be abandoned (74) . The scattered southern Unionists from the nature of their situation, were not militant and instead sought a compromise solution, and it was also clear that , under pressure , Asquith 's govemment would not beeome involved in a civil conflict in Ireland , but would instead follow the easier path of appeasement. The Nationalists in the south regarded talk of civil war as ridiculous, while those in Ulster, led by J oe Devlin and the Ancient Order of Hibernians , were anxious to avert the possibility of Ulster being excluded from the operation of the Horne Rule Bill, a possibility blandly suggested by Carson as a ploy to wreck the entire Bill. So, between Devlin and Carson there was little likelihood of flexibility or eompromise . Others however , led by Uoyd George and Winston Churehill , began to look for some sensible way out of this Serbonian bog. Should there not be 'Horne Rule within Horne Rule'? Would such an arrangement be compatible with a form of federal solution within Ireland? Asquith suggested the exclusion of the four eounties of Antrim, Down, Armagh and Londonderry from the Horne Rule parliament for aperiod of six years, a proposal rejeeted by Carson who compared it to 'a sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years' (64, 69). Meantime, while these discussions continued, others acted. 61

The Horne Rule Solution It was E6in MacNeill, the enthusiastic Gaelic Leaguer and now Professor of Early Irish History at University College, Dublin, who praised the northerners for leading the way by the establishment of the Ulster Volunteer Force and who publicised the need for a similar force in the south (70, 72). Accordingly, in November 1913 the Irish Volunteers were founded, their name reminiscent of the colourful Volunteer movement in the late eighteenth century. This second paramilitary force, though as yet unarmed, presented not only achallenge to Asquith's government, but to Redmond and the parliamentary party. Certainly the outlook for moderation and gradualism at the opening of 1914 seemed bleak, a point underlined by the resignation of some fiftyeight Army officers at the Curragh camp in March. They did this in anticipation of the possibility that they would be called upon to take active steps to crush the Ulster opposition to Horne Rule. Shortly afterwards in April arms for the U.V.F. were successfully landed at Larne, Bangor and Donaghadee, the culmination of activities which might have come straight from a John Buchan thriller (74). This move not only strengthened the bargaining position of the Ulster Unionists [doc.38] but indicated the weakness and indecisivenessofthe government which in William O'Brien's words had 'neither the foresight to conciliate, nor courage to bite Ulster'. Asquith's reply was to introduce an amendment to the Horne Rule Bill by which he proposed to allow counties to opt out of the operation of the Horne Rule Bill for a term of six years. The Lords proposed that this should be the whole of Ulster for an unspecified period, and this torpedoed the suggestion. Then in July, with fateful events in Europe rolling forward, Asquith summoned the Nationalist and Unionist leaders to a conference at Buckingham Palace. However, this came to nothing; it now seemed that Professor Dowden's view was correct: 'Two ideas, essentially antagonistic, will confront each other - now as in 1886 - until one or the other has obtained the mastery' (21, 89). Then, a few days before the assassination at Sarajevo, guns for the Irish Volunteers were landed at Howth near Dublin from Erskine Childers's yacht Asgard. This brilliant piece of showmanship matched the daring, though not the scale, of the gun-running at Larne and also raised in the public mind the question of who really controlled the Irish Volunteers. Early in June Redmond had decided that he would have to ride the tiger and so he demanded and obtained the addition of twenty-five persons nominated by the parliamentary party to the provisional committee of the Volunteers. To this MacNeill agreed, though the more advanced men like Bulmer Hobson, who were separatists and members of the I.R.B., resented Redmond's intrusion. The truth was

62

Redmond aOO the Supersession 01HomeRufe th at in taking this action Redmond was seeking to shore up a rapidly crumbling position (99). When war was declared on 4 August Redmond, true to his basic loyalties, first of all declared that the Volunteers would defend Ireland against invasion and so release the British garrison to fight in Flanders; later, he declared that they should be prepared to fight anywhere against the common enemy [doc. 39]. This stance split the Volunteers, the majority of whom, the National Volunteers, supported Redmond, while the minority, the lrish Volunteers, under Pearse, MacDonagh and Plunkett, began to plan ahead for a fresh manifestation of the Irish revolutionary tradition [doc, 40] . Was Imperial Germany not a potential ally in the fight for Ireland 's freedom , perhaps more effective than France or Spain in the past (107)? The Irish Volunteers were influenced by the I.R.B. and they were joined by James Connolly's socialist Irish Citizen Anny in a commitment to revolution - a commitment which the cautious Professor MacNeill did not fully endorse. The result was the Easter rebellion in 1916, when for a bloody week central Dublin was a battlefield. This had a dramatic effect on the whole Horne Rule movement. As a young Dublin barrister wrote, 'It is we constitutional Horne Rulers who stand to lose most by this piece of criminal folly.' To this a friend of his , also a young Protestant Horne Ruler replied , 'the exclusion of Ulster seems to me to be the only possible basis of settlement. Moreover , it seems to me to be the only hope for an ultimately united Ireland. Ulster forced into an all-Ireland Horne Rule will be a very determined and consolidated opposition' . This condemnation of the 'Sinn Fein ' rebellion, as it was then commonly described , was widespread , particularly as it was feit that Horne Rule had been dealt a body blow (104) [doc. 41]. However, precisely the opposite was true . Asquith himself crossed over to sound Irish opinion. He wished to conciliate , and was nervously aware of the impact ofthe rising on public opinion in the still neutral United States. The result was that the govemment made an offer of immediate Horne Rule, subject to the exclusion of the six north-eastern counties which had in them a substantial Unionist population [doc , 42] . To discuss this problem and to try to find an agreed moderate solution of the Irish Question, a Convention was summoned to meet in Trinity College in 1917. Its meetings were boycotted by organised labour and by Sinn Fein, while fruitful discussions within the conference chamber were nullified by the adamant refusal of the Ulster Unionists, inspired by Craig's hardheaded realism, to consider the possibility of Horne Rule for the whole of Ireland. The failure of this Convention really marked the end of the road for the constitutionalists. Events outside the walls of

63

The Horne Rule Solution

Trinity College were rapidly moving towards armed conflict and revolution. The winds of change were heralded by the Sinn Fein victory in the North Roscommon by-election in January 1917, followed soon after by three other by-elections, all won by Sinn Fein, of which the most symbolic was the winning of East Clare from John Dillon by Eamonn de Valera, the leading survivorof Easter week. In October 1917 de Valera was chosen President of Sinn Fein (now a much more revolutionary body), and also became President of the reorganised Irish Volunteers. The moment of truth. for the Irish parliamentary party came in the general election of 1918. Uoyd George and Bonar Law, now colleagues of the wartime coalition, stated in their manifesto that they regarded it as 'one of the first obligations of British statesmanship to explore all practical paths towards the settlement of this grave and difficult question, on the basis of self-government'. This was in many ways an astonishing statement and vividly illustrated the fact that war acts as a catalyst to change. Horne Rule, which had been knocking on the door for thirty years was now admitted as a sensible solution for Irish affairs (89). But was this what the Irish electorate now thought? The Irish parliamentary party which had held sixty-eight seats was now reduced to six, four of them being in Ulster; William O'Brien's group, plus some independents, who between them had held ten seats, were swept away completely; the Unionists moved up from eighteen to twenty-six seats; most dramatic of all was the victory of Sinn Fein, who before 1918 had only seven seats, and who now had seventy-three. Yet in this crucial election , the most significant since 1885, one third of the electors abstained, Sinn Fein polled only 47 per cent of the total votes cast, and as many as twenty-six seats were unopposed, although there were far fewer uncontested seats than in previous elections. Nobody , however, could deny that nationalist Ireland had voted for full independence or that this was the end of the road for the old Irish parliamentary party (104) . Redmond had died during the Convention in March, sadly aware of the failure of his policy, not fully aware, perhaps, of how far his constitutional nationalism had been upstaged by the militancy of the 'new Ireland' . His comment on the Convention , 'Bett er for us never to have met than to have met and failed', would have seemed a fitting epitaph for the Irish parliamentary tradition in 1918 (6). But,as the Government ofIreland Act 1920 and the establishment and subsequent political stability of the Irish Free State were to demonstrate, parliamentary democracy proved more durable than revolutionary violence.

64

Part Three: 10

Assessment

Horne Rule in Northern Ireland

The Act of 1920 did not so much create Northern Ireland as admit that to all intents and purposes it already existed. R.J. Lawrence (80) The 1918 election clearly indicated that Horne Rule, as pursued for so long by the Irish parliamentary party, was no longer a meaningful or acceptable policy. What was Lloyd George to do when faced with this challenge? The Ulster Unionists had already concluded that six counties should be excluded from the operation of whatever provisions were to be made for the rest of Ireland [doc. 43] . They provided a viable area, indeed a twentieth-century version of the medieval Pale, within which the Protestant community could maintain their distinctive pattern of life and their connection with Great Britain. It was, however, some time before this idea was accepted. A cabinet committee in October 1919 decided against county option, or choice by counties, as both undesirable and indeed unworkable. They looked at the possibilities of havingan Ulster committee in the Dublin parliament withspecial powers of veto, and they considered the simple exclusion of Ulster from the operation of the Horne Rule Act. This implied direct rule from London, something the Government was anxious to avoid on the grounds that their critics, particularly those in the United States, would argue that they were ruling a substantial Nationalist minority against their will, and in so doing were supporting the Unionists in their refusal to unite with the rest of Ireland. In the end compromise emerged. Lloyd George and the cabinet settled on the idea of providing Horne Rule for both Northern and Southern Ireland. In doing so he believed that he had at last solved the vexed lrish Question. Like Salisbury, he had come to accept the reality of the two divergent communities in Ireland. The map of post-Versailles Europe was being criss-crossed by new boundaries created by the successor states to the old empires, so why should partition not apply to Ireland also? The problem in Ireland was that the division was in men's minds and outlook, and so could not be drawn accuratelyon a map. The influx of settlers into Antrim and Down, and the Jacobean Plantation had left a

65

Assessment population pattern so complex, such a 'tesselated pavement', that it was simply found most eonvenient to accept the counties of Antrim, Down, Londonderry, Tyrone and Fermanagh as the area of Northern Ireland without modification. This meant the ereation of a substantial minority problem, like that of the Sudeten Germans in the new state of Czechoslovakia. The Government of Ireland Aet 1920 was the fourth attempt to apply the Horne Rule solution to Ireland. It was designed to provide Home Rule for both Northern and Southern Ireland, and was a carefully considered attempt at devolution. There was to be a Lord-Lieutenant for both parts of Ireland, a Council of Ireland was to deal with matters of common interest, and hopes were expressed that these arrangements would eventually lead to reeonciliation amongst Irishmen. However, in 1919 Sinn Fein had already set up a Republican parliamentfüäil Eireann) in defiance of the existing administration. This led gradually to aperiod of guerrilla warfare against the Crown forces which began in the south of Ireland, which only concluded with the 'Articles for an Agreement' in December 1921 (79). By this Anglo-Irish 'Treaty', ratified by Däil Eireann and the Westminster Parliament, Southern Ireland became the lrish Free State, a self-governing Dominion enjoying a relationship with Great Britain similar to that of Canada, Australia or New Zealand. By a curious irony Tim Healy, the veteran Horne Ruler and bitter antiParnellite, became the first Governor-General! This arrangement upstaged the mueh more modest Horne Rule proposal für Southern Ireland under the Act of 1920 [doc.44] and made Northern Ireland's position isolated and anomalous. How far could it be considered a fully integrated part of the United Kingdom when, like the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands, it possessed its own legislature for loeal affairs? Again, it was only part of the province of Ulster, with its main population and resourees outside the areas of the Stuart Plantation. Finally, it was endowed with a long and artificialland boundary, which included areas such as large parts of South Armagh, South Down and Fermanagh, where the Nationalist population would have preferred to be in the jurisdiction of the lrish Free State. (There was widespread nationalist expeetation that such areas would be transferred to the Irish Free State under a Boundary Commission provided for in the Anglo-Irish Treaty. In fact, the Commission eollapsed in 1925, and the territorial limits of Northern Ireland were confirmed.) There was, accordingly, a minority in the north and a majority in the south who questioned not only the viability but the legitimacy ofNorthern Ireland as an entity. The Government of Ireland Act excepted certain topics from the competenee of the parliament in Belfast. These were similar to those

66

Horne Rule in Northem Ireland which had been specified in the earlier Horne Rule Bills, namely, the Crown, peace and war, defence, foreign affairs, titles, trade, coinage, weights and measures, copyrights and patents. The Supreme Court, Post Office, Customs and Excise and Inland Revenue were all reserved topics, while a few crumbs were transferred: stamp duties, death duties and motor vehicle taxation. Again, as in the Horne Rule Bills, it was specified that there should be no discrimination on religious grounds and that property should not be confiscated without compensation. The subordinate nature of the parliament of Northern Ireland was made quite clear by article 75 of the Act which stated that: Notwithstanding the establishment of the Parliament of Southern and Northern Ireland of the Parliament of Ireland or anything contained in this Act, the supreme authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters, and things in Ireland and every part thereof. Nowhere was dependence on Great Britain more quickly seen than in the field of finance. The amount of reserved taxation to be handed over to the Northern Ireland Ministry of Finance was determined by a joint Exchequer Board. But, there were necessary deductions to meet the cost of the reserved services, such as the Post Office, and to defray the 'imperial contribution' payable by Northern Ireland for her share of general United Kingdom expenditure. It meant in practice that the local Ministry of Finance could never tell in advance what funds would be available to service Northern Ireland government expenditure. These financial arrangements, which were ofGladstonian complexity and were not unlike those proposed in the Horne Rule Bill of 1886, soon proved unworkable. The initial 'imperial contribution' was fixed at f.7·9 million, and the cost of the reserved services at 1.2·2 million - a total of 1.10·1 million. The estimated reserved revenue was f.14·7 million and transferred revenue was ±:l·8 million, a total of 1.16·5 million. Therefore the sum of 1.6·4 million was available to Northern Ireland. But within three years serious financial problems had arisen and in 1925, the Colwyn committee recommended that the 'imperial contribution' should no longer be a first charge on the revenue account but should be met only after local expenditure had been covered. It was further suggested that such expenditure should increase at the same rate as in Great Britain, bearing in mind the lower prices, wages and living standards in Northern Ireland (80, 84). The depression years of the 1920s and 1930s saw Northern Ireland grappling with massive unemployment, a problem common to both seetions of Ireland and one of longer standing and worse proportions 67

Assessment than in Great Britain. In 1925 a quarter of the insured workforce was unemployed. There was a chronic shortage of money for much-needed progress in such areas as health, housing, roads and schools; indeed, in 1939 'Ulstermen still suffered poverty, unemployment, ill-health, poor housing, inadequate roads and indifferent education' (80). Essentially, fiscal parity with Great Britain could not be maintained without a flow of money from the Treasury to Northern Ireland, and the lack of financial freedom - for example in imposing provincial taxes for local purposes - prevented the Northern Ireland parliament at Stormont from pursuing appropriate regional policies. Finance, although the key sphere, was not the only area in which problems arose. The legislature consisted of two Houses, Commons and Senate, but as both were dominated by the Unionist majority the value of the Senate as a revising chamber was diminished. The Unionist domination of affairs prevented any polarity of political viewpoint developing and meant that no alternation of parties could hold office in provincial affairs. Such a situation led to a condition of continual frustration on the part ofthe substantial Nationalist minority, who formed roughly one-third of the population and feIt themselves discriminated against by the majority in such areas as housing, employment and electoral arrangements. They were an impotent opposition, as powerless to effect changes or to share in office as Grattan and the 'Patriots' had been in the eighteenth-century parliament in Dublin (76,85). Further, debates in Stormont were restricted by the Speaker's ruling against discussion of topics defined as either excepted or reserved in the 1920 Act. This left little room for manoeuvre, as 89 per cent of finance was reserved and only 11 per cent transferred! This meant that the Ministry of Finance was mainly concerned with administration of funds over which the local government had no control. In what ways was this experiment in devolution a success? To what extent were the labours of the central legislature eased? Administratively, the setting up of aseparate Civil Service, with a nuc1eus formed by people who wished to be transferred from Dublin in 1921, was advantageous. The small scale and the detailed knowledge of local problems provided many practical benefits in such fields as health, agriculture, housing and education (87). The benefits of devolved government were perhaps particularly seen during and after the 1939-45 war, when Northern Ireland, up to the late 1960s, began to move forward from the doldrums of the inter-war period. This progress had, of course, to be measured in terms of the endeavour not to fall too far behind mainland standards. Following the passage of the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 and 68

Horne Rule in Nothem Ireland the subsequent establishment of the Horne Rule parliament in Belfast, the convention developed at Westminster by which motions or questions relating to matters under the control of Stormont could not be accepted by the Speaker for consideration by the Commons there. This practice of non-interference tended to support the false public image of Stormont as a sovereign parliament, an image reinforced by such trappings as a mace, a Speaker, Black Rod and formal state openings. This was to prove a dangerous illusion, round which c1ustered the remarkably streng sentiment in favour of Stormont, a sentiment rudely shaken on 24 March 1972 when the British government, having become direct1y involved with Northern lrish affairs with the increase in civil disorder in 1969, invoked artic1e 75 of the 1920 Act, suspended Stormont and was thereby forced to impose direct rule on the province.

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11

Conc1usion

The parliamentary tradition Historically, one of the most impressive factors in Irish history since the late eighteenth century is the strength and popularity of the parliamentary tradition. This tradition had its roots in the medieval period and although the parliament was essentially a colonial assembly, yet with the growth of the Patriot interest it attracted widespread support outside its walls. Grattan, Ponsonby, Hussey de Burgh and Flood became popular heroes and the first especially achieved a farne which increased with passing of time, as did the unrepresentative parliament on College Green of which he was a member. With O'Connell's speIl-binding and limitless oratory a romantic aura quickly surrounded the 'constitution of 1782' and made repeal of the supposedly iniquitous Act of Union appear to offer a simple short-cut back to a golden age. O'Connell's great achievement was to make the plain people of Ireland politically conscious, to introduce them to the parliamentary tradition and to rouse what was in effect a 'Catholic nation', anation which was destined to displace that brilliant 'Protestant nation' to which Grattan had so confidently and proudly appealed. O'Connell also had the great merit of eschewing revolutionary violence as a means of achieving his aims; he consistently sought to achieve his object by lawful and constitutional methods through parliament. He was indeed, one of the earliest 'Christian democrat' leaders in European history . He also appealed to and increased the rising spirit of nationalism in Ireland. Inevitably too there grew up that identification between this rising spirit of nationality and the Catholic faith of the majority which was to prove such a· divisive factor and to negate the ideals of the United Irishmen. This equation played a significant role in the Irish parliamentary party, though not in its leadership.

Transatlantic Ireland The Famine of the late 1840s greatly increased the flow of emigration from Ireland to the New World. Emigration in the eighteenth century had been chiefly from Ulster by people who laid the foundations of 70

Conclusion the Scottish-Irish settlements in New England, Pennsylvania and the Carolinas. They had played their part on the frontier and during the War of Independence, and subsequently in the building of the nation. But during and after the Famine floods of emigrants, mainly from the south and west, poured into the seaports on the eastern seaboard of the United States, laying the foundation of that Irish-American interest which made so distinctive a contribution to American politics and also contained within itself the seeds of a bitter revolutionary fervour which longed for an Irish republic completely separated from English rule and domination. Parnell, as an Anglo-American Irishman, realised the potential of this community and made it his business to harness as much of their energy and dollars as he could to support hirn and his party in parliament. Indeed, Parnell was always aware of this 'American dimension', and of the simplistic and revolutionary view of Irish realities which were common among the Irish in the U.S.A. The strategy of the 'New Departure' was brilliant, but it was also both necessary and dangerous. Parnell managed it with superb skill, aIthough his commitment prevented hirn from becoming a complete House of Commons man like Butt or Redmond. Was it not the reliance on the Irish-American connection which sustained the apparent contempt which Parnell feIt for the House of Commons and its forms and ceremonies, and which may weIl have underlain his last desperate appeals to the 'hillside men' in 1890?

The northern iron A third factor which both Parnell and Gladstone (as weIl as Irish nationalists of all shades) failed to comprehend was the rise of a militant and popular support for the Union among Ulster Protestants. In the 1790s Ulster had been the horne of active sympathy with and support for the American and the French Revolutions. The United Irishmen had been founded in Belfast, and many Ulstermen shared in the general radical movement in the British Isles, a movement fired by the early ideals of democracy and national feeling implicit in Paine, Godwin and Rousseau, and in the first stages of the French Revolution. The brief but bloody battles of 1798 put an end to this militant radicalism. Industrial development began in the north-east and many former radicals became involved in the rapid growth of Belfast as a major manufacturing city. By the 1840s opinion in the north had begun to change, but it was not until the Horne Rule crisis began in the 1880s that the strength of Ulster Unionism became fully apparent. For it had not only healed the breach between the Church of Ireland and the Dissenters, it had also captured 71

Assessment the Protestant urban proletariat in the towns and the newly enfranchised labourers and small farmers in the countryside. In short, Unionism in Ulster derived its aggressive militancy from its regional concentration and from its widespread popular base. Here was democracy, a Protestant democracy which differed from the well-to-do Unionist minority of landowners and professional and business people in the southern provinces. Furthermore, in many ways this community in Ulster (just over half the population of the entire province) was a, mirror-image of that Catholic democracy which O'Connell had led and which largely supported the Irish parliamentary party in its endeavour to win Horne Rule. Should this object be attained, the Ulster Unionists saw themselves doomed to minority status and rule by a majority whose ideals they did not share.

The middle way In retrospect it seems strange that so mild and modest a compromise as Horne Rule should have led to such fiery passions. Was it not simply a matter of devolution of limited powers of domestic legislation to a parliament sitting in Dublin, a parliament, moreover, which would be carefully limited in its areas of legislation and whieh would be operating under severe financial restrietions? All this, moreover, would be within a legal and constitutional framework in which (as in the case of article 75 of the 1920 Act) the supremacy of the parliament at Westminster would be maintained. The working models of the Grand Duchy of Finland, of Norway and Sweden, of Canada, and of the Dual Monarchy of Austria/Hungary were all cited as examples of successful devolution, not to say in the latter case of power-sharing, and of astability which must appeal to moderate and reasonable men. In Ireland moderation has seldom had a fair hearing, and so the via media of the Horne Rule solution was condemned by those who thought that there could be no halfway house between Union and separation. It is true that nationalism in European history was a powerful and elemental force, destined to break up the old empires and to energise the drive towards the unifications of both Germany and Italy. But why should independent statehood necessarily be the goal of Irish nationality? Scotland was an undoubted and historie nation, and yet she benefited by her union with England. In the United States many widely different ethnie groups lived in a successful federal union under a common constitution. Why should the two communities in Ireland not share in the work of a limited Horne Rule legislature in their domestic concerns, while still enjoying the wider opportunities offered by Britain and her Empire?

72

Conclusion Such was Redmond's dream, avision shattered by the Great War. Horne Rule, in the modern guise of devolution, is still with us. In the United Kingdom the discussions about the impact of devolution on Scotland and Wales have revived some of the issues so ably debated in 1886, while in Northern Ireland there is a lively interest in the restoration of some equitable form of devolved government. This interest in the devolution of powers is not confined to the British Isles, but also finds expression in that regionalism which is a mark of the European Economic Community today, and which looks to 'Horne Rule' as a valuable counterpoise to an overloaded centralism.

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Part Four:

Documents

Disraeli's definition of the Irish Question

document 1

The Young England group in parliament wished to attack Peel's minis-

try, so Disraeli, then a rising politician and novelist, chose to indict the ministry 's Irish policy. Hence his brilliant, but misleading, definition

which ignored not only the contribution of the many improving landlords but also the remarkable success ofindustrial growth in the northeast. I want to see a public man come forward and say what the Irish question is, One says it is a physieal question, another a spiritual. Now it is the absence of aristocracy, then the absence of railways. It is the Pope one day, potatoes the next. Consider Ireland as you would any other country similarly situated. You will see a teeming population which, with referenee to the cultivated soil, is denser to the square mile than that of China; ereated solely by agrieulture, with none of the resourees of wealth which develop with civilization; and sustained, consequently, upon the lowest eonceivable diet, so that in the case of failure they have no other means of subsistence upon which they can fall back. That dense population in extreme distress inhabits an island where there is an established Chureh whieh is not their Church and a territorial aristoeraey, the riehest of whom live in distant eapitals. Thus you have a starving population, an absentee aristocracy, and an alien Church, and in addition the weakest executive in the world. That is the Irish question. Benjamin Disraeli in the House of Commons, 1844, Hansard, 3rd ser. vol. 72, 1016.

O'Connell and the repeal of the Union

document 2

In 1843 Daniel 0 'Connell led a major agitation for the repeal of the 74

Documents Act of Union. The chief effect was to establish[irmly in people's minds the right of Ireland to have a domestic legislature. O'Connell's programme was set forth in nine propositions placed before the Dublin Corporation, and on which he spoke for four hoursl First: The capability and capacity of the Irish nation for an independent legislature. Second: The perfect right of Ireland to have a domestic Parliament. Third: That that right was fully established by the transactions of 1782. Fourth: That the most beneficial effects to Ireland resulted from her parliamentary independence. Fifth: The utter incompetence of the lrish Parliament to annihilate the lrish Constitution by the Union. Sixth: That the Union was no contract or bargain; that it was carried by the greatest corruption and bribery, added to force, fraud, and terror. Seventh: That the Union produced the most disastrous results to Ireland. Eighth: That the Union can be abolished by peaceable constitutional means, without the violation of law and without the destruction of property and life. Ninth: That the most salutary results, and none other, must arise from the repeal of the Union. Quoted in R. Dunlop, Daniel O'Connell, Putnam, 1900, pp. 337-8.

Sharman Crawford's federal scheme for Ireland

document 3

In November 1844 Sharman Crawford, the enterprising Co. Down landlord who [avoured tenant right, published details ofhis planfor a federal relationship between Ireland and Great Britain. In doing so he was injluenced by the success of the relationship between Upper and Lower Canada established by the Act of 1840, and by the hope of' influencing O'Connell's flirtation with federalism. Crawford's scheme had an injluence on subsequent plans for altering Anglo-Irish constitutional relations. Laws 1. That this parliament shall be competent (with the royal assent) to make all laws neeessary for Ireland and to impose and apply all neeessary taxes. 2. That all bills which may be passed by the loeal parliament which 75

Documents make any provisions with regard to religion or religious worship or pecuniary grants or payments for the purposes of religion ... shall ... lie for thirty days on the tables of the Houses of the imperial parliament; and in case the said Houses shall address the Sovereign to withhold the Royal assent, such assent shall not be given. 3. That all acts of the imperial parliament which regard the succession to the throne ... shall be binding on Ireland ... Taxation 4. That the local parliament shall have power to impose and apply, with the consent of the Crown, all taxation necessary for the purposes ofIreland ... 5. That the Imperial parliament shall retain apower similar to that provided by the 43rd seetion of the Canada Act - to impose all duties for the purposes of commerce over the United Kingdom. 6. That the nett produce of all duties so imposed shall be paid into the Irish Exchequer and placed at the disposal of the local parliament ... 7. That it be a fundamental law that no duties shall be imposed by either parliament which would impede the perfeet freedom of trade between Great Britain and Ireland. Contribution to General Expenditure 9. That Ireland shall pay a certain quota to the military and naval establishments and other expenses of the Empire ... 10. That Ireland shall pay the expenses of all her civil establishments and institutions out of her own revenue. General Provisions 11. That no law made nor tax imposed by the local parliament of Ireland shall have operation beyond the limits of Ireland; and that all foreign and coloniallegislation of every description shall remain under the control and authority of the Imperial parliament. 12. That no law or act ofthe Imperial parliament made after the passing of the Act and operating locally in Ireland shall be binding in Ireland unless assented to by the local parliament ... 13. That all laws and statutes now in force shall be binding on Ireland till altered or repealed according to the power given by this Act. 'Sharman Crawford's Federal Scheme for Ireland', in H.A. Cronne, T.W. Moody and D.B. Quinn, eds, Essays in British and lrish History, 19, Muller, 1949, pp. 250-1

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Documents

document 4 Isaac Butt on the meaning of simple repeal of the Union This is a useful explanation of the precise implications ofrepeal of the Act of Union and areturn ofthe miscalled 'constitution of 1782~1782~ Let us suppose that an act were passed declaring the Union null and void. We would return to the state of things that existed after 1782 . In the first place you must have all bills passed by the Irish parliament approved of by the English Privy Council, and sanctioned under the Great Seal of England , by ministers responsible only to the English parliament. . .. You would have no lrish administration reaIly responsible to your lrish parliament; you would have your internal, your local affairs, managed by ministers dependent for their continuance in office upon the votes of an English parliament at Westminster coming in and going out with an English party, and, lastly, you might find yourselves plunged into all the dangers and horrors of war by advice given by an English ministry. . .. Remember that simple repeal would hand over all the colonial and foreign possessions of the British Crown to the British parliament, a parliament in which Ireland would have no voice. From Proceedings of the Home Rule Conference, held in Dublin in November 1873, Dublin 1874.

Opposition to repeal in Belfast

document 5

In 1800 Belfast was a prosperaus town and seaport of some 20,000 inhabitants. By 1841 the population had risen to weIl over 70,000 and it had beeome the premier Irish port. The manufaeture oflinen had begun to replace eotton spinning, and shipbuilding and engineering were ready for their take-off into aperiod of sustained expansion. No wonder that the former radicalism and Whiggery were in decline and that the leaders of Belfast opinion were reluetant to upset the politieal conditions whieh fostered economic growth. . . . If you come to Belfast you should be prepared.... Observe, Belfast is prosperous and you need not expect that they have sufficient patriotism to induce them to do anything for the rest of Ireland unless they were convinced tha t it would not stop the progress of their own prosperity. . . . They are all freetraders in principle. They must be satis77

Documents

fied that the free commercial relations with Great Britain would not be disturbed. Then how can this be secured in the case of two independent parliaments? No one need attempt to argue the subject with hope of success in Belfast, unless that question can be answered.... There a person arguing for the repeal of the Union, must show practically, not theoretically, what would be the measures of a local parliament, which would be advantageous and which could not be obtained from an imperial parliament. Sharman Crawford to Smith O'Brien, 8 September 1847, in lrish Historical Studies, vi, no. 24 (1949), pp. 271-2.

The challenge of Young Ireland

document 6

This passage illustrates the clash of generations between the ageing and domineering O'Connell and the Young Irelanders. They were inspired by Mazzini and the fashionable romantic nationalism which [uelled the revolts of 1848 in Europe. They rejected O'Connell's cautious conservatism in being inspired by Wolfe Tone and the ideals ofthe United lrishmen. However, they were prepared to cooperate with the Repealers up to a point, for they lacked the slngieminded obsessions which characterised the proponents ofphysicalforce in the post-Famine years.

He considered it no less than common justice to say of those gentlemen to whom allusion was made, that they were the very last men, in his opinion, that would look for place or betray the cause of Ireland. He meant Mr Meagher, Mr O'Gorman, Mr Mitchel, Mr Duffy, and others. He could not avoid speaking of a gentleman who was an ornament to Ireland, and who was now no more - he meant Thomas Davis. He did not think it necessary that Mr O'Connell should be defended by aspersing others without cause. As regarded the controversy, he agreed with Mr Meagher, who declared that for the practical purposes ofthe Repeal agitation he was fully convinced of the propriety of having recourse to none other than peaceful and constitutional means; but he could not subscribe to the doctrine, nor could he consent to continue a member of the Association if such were rendered an indispensable qualification, that no phase of circumstances, no contingency could occur in a national history or in a nation's struggle for liberty in which aresort to physical force was justifiable. Sir Charles Gavan Duffy , Four Years oflrish History 1845-49, Cassell, 1883, pp. 203-4.

78

Doeuments

The platform of Horne Rule

docurnent 7

This was the programme drawn: up by the Conference in Dublin in 1873. It placed Home Rule firmlyon asound historical basis, and was designed to have a wider national appeal than the Dublin-based Home Government Association. 1. That ... we declare our conviction that it is essentially necessary to the peace and prosperity of Ireland that the right of domestic legislation on all Irish affairs should be restored to our country. 3. That, in accordance with the ancient and constitutional rights of the Irish nation, we claim the privilege of managing our own affairs by a parliament assembled in Ireland, and composed of the sovereign, the lords, and the commons of Ireland. 4. . .. we adopt the principle of a federal arrangement ... leaving to the imperial parliament the power of dealing with all questions affecting the imperial crown and govemment, legislation regarding the colonies ..., the relations of the empire with foreign states, and all matters appertaining to the defence and stability of the empire at large ... 6. .., it is essential that there should be in Ireland an administration for Irish affairs, controlled, according to constitutional principles, by the Irish parliament, and conducted by ministers constitutionally responsible to that parliament. 8. . .. no change shall be made by [the lrish] parliament in the present settlement of property in Ireland, and that no legislation shall be adopted to establish any religious ascendancy in Ireland. 9. . .. with a view to rendering members of parliament and their constituents more in accord on all questions affecting the welfare of the country, it is recommended by this conference that at the close of each session of parliament the representatives should render to their constituents an account of their stewardship. 10. That ... an assocation be now forrned to be called 'The Irish Home Rule League' ... to obtain for Ireland by peaceable and constitutional means, the self-government claimed in those resolutions. From Proceedings of the Home Rule Conference held in Dublin in November 1873, Dublin, 1874.

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Documents

An election meeting in Roscommon

document 8

CaptainKing-Harman typified those Protestant landownerswho initially supported Home Rule along with 'leading merchants, magistrates, bankers', all of whom disapproved of the idea of separation. However, by 1886 he had become Conservative MP. for Kent, Isle o[ Thanet, and strongly opposed to Home Rule, which he saw as a cause of increased taxation in England and the jlooding of the English labour market with Irishmen 'who would have no employment in their own country when the landlords were gone'. Very Rev. Canon McDennott proposed the first resolution.

A voice - Horne Rule and nothing else. Canon McDermott - A friend of ours in the crowd says 'Horne Rule and nothing else'. I say Horne Rule and sornething more (cheers). Captain King-Harman - He believed he had been the first man in Ireland who used the words 'Horne Rule' - he was quite satisfied he had been the first in Ireland who raised the banner of Horne Rule on an election platfonn - the first to fight the battle of Horne Rule against Whiggery and English ascendancy (cheers). A voice - Ah! that's an aristocratic notion for you. There's an aristocrat! Another voice - King-Harrnan's the man for Sligo (cheers). A slight disturbance took place in the crowd owing to the ejaculations of a small man, who persisted in crying out that he would 'vote independent', and that he 'did not care'. This, however, was speedily suppressed.

Captain King-Harman was retumed unopposed as M.P. for Sligo. In an editorial Freernan's Journal commented: We regret extrernely that it is not as a Liberal Horne Ruler Captain King-Harrnan is returned to Parliarnent, for although the people of Ireland have dissevered every connection with the English party which assurnes the name of Liberal, they have certainly not rejected those Liberal principles of governrnent which in old times found their stoutest champion in ... O'Connell. The claims, political and personal, of Captain King-Harman on the county of Sligo could not, however, be overlooked, and in him the country will, we venture to say, flnd a

80

Documents Conservative Horne Ruler whose devotion to Horne Rule principles will prove honest, sincere and practical. From the files of the Freeman 'sJournal, March 1877.

Obstruction in the House of Commons

document 9

Obstruction was not novel in parliamentary affairs; Gladstone, for instance, having made twenty-nine speeches against a Divorce Bill in 1857, and in 1870 repeated motions for the adjoumment of the House delayed the passing of the Coercion Bill. The novelty lay in Joseph Biggar's deliberate use of obstructive tactics for Irish party purposes. Ir was this filibustering which attracted Pamell's attention, and which displeased Butt. At 12.15, after the vote for the Sultan Zanzibar question was agreed to, The Chancellor of the Exchequer said he should now agree to report progress. Mr Pamell objected (hear, hear). It was clear the object of the Govemment was to get to the other business before the half-hour was reached. He should strongly oppose this business because he feared if the Govemment resorted to these tactics they should have a recurrence of the lamentable scenes of last session - scenes which did not tend to raise the House in the eyes of the country (hear, hear, and laughter). Mr Whalley said he did protest most solemnly against the ridicule to which they exposed themselves (laughrer) , by going on with business at this late hour. He could not continue it , and he should retire immediately (loud laughter). Let them see they did not expose themselves to ridicule. Whenhe found the Hon. Member who had just spoken , who was not there for any Imperial purpose -

Mr Pamell - I never said that. Mr Whalley - Last session I was prevented by the rules of the House from calling the attention of the House to a much rnore significant declaration of the Hon. Member. I can show that he is not here for any purpose whatsoever (loud laughter). Any recognised purpose (laughter). The Chairman said that Mr Whalley was out of order in discussing the Hon Member's purposes. Mr Whalley asked the Hon. and gallant Member for Limerick what he thought of the attempt of the Horne Rulers to kill Hon. Members by late hours (laughter). 81

Documents Mr Butt - I have to say in reply it is not the intention of the Horne Rule members to kill any member of this House (laughter). Mr Biggar explained his position in regard to the notice of motion on the paper. He did not desire to obstruct business, but to prevent it coming on late at night. Half-past twelve had now arrived so the debate was adjoumed, and so no further opposed business could be taken. Report ofproceedings in Parliament, Freeman's Journal, 27 Feb 1877.

The party leadership crisis of 1877

document 10

Butt to Biggar, 29 March 1877

The power of a minority to obstruct the progress of a measure by repeated motions of adjournment is to my mind one of the most valuable privileges of members of the House of Commons. But it is plainly one that ought not to be exercised lightly or frequently .... I would say as a general rule that such motions ought not to be persevered in unless there was a minority of such a number as to entitle them to consideration from the majority.

Parnell to Butt, 14 April 1877 I must, then, in future claim for myself that liberty of action upon Imperial and English matters which has hitherto been granted to every member of the party, while I shall continue to follow your lead in regard to Irish questions.

Butt to Parnell, April 1877

The alienation of our English friends is not the only or the worst result of our creating any unnecessary delay in the progress of public business.... I have never assumed the right, and never have had the wish, to dictate to any one on the course he should pursue. The influence of any one who fills such a position must be, to a great extent, a personal one. His authority cannot be defined by any compact or enforced by any rule, but yet the influence of a party will be generally in proportion to the influence of their leader, and that will greatly depend upon the confidence exhibited by the party toward himself.

Parnell to Butt, 24 April 1877

Had you exhibited any energy at the commencement of the session, and directed and availed yourselftheri of the opportunities in the ballot,

82

Documents which organization can secure for our party, you could without fail have secured a day for the University Bill.... The attendance of Irish members has been so bad, seldom at late hours exceeding five or six.... At no time during the session have you shown that you had any policy at all, much less that you were carrying it out 'boldly or actively'. I, on the other hand, am denounced because I have not joined the majority in doing nothing, in inactivity, and in absenteeism - because I have shown the country that they have apower that they know little of, to use it if they desire for the enforcement of their just claims.' From the files of the Freeman 's Journal, March - April, 1877.

Obstruction in committee

document 11

The lrish party not only obstructed the readings of the Coercion Bill in the House o[ Commons, but also prolonged the committee stage as far aspossible. Here ls one extractwhichillustrates thisprocess. Mr J.C. McCoan (Wicklow): The Govemment had no right to ask for more than the powers adequate for the preservation of the public peace in Ireland. He would not say that they asked for the power to be cruel, and that they would be vindictive; but he must apply that to the general action of the Govemment on this Bill. The Chairman: The hon. Member is repeating what I distinctly stated was an act of disorder and contempt of the House if applied to Members sitting in this House. Mr McCoan: said, he meant his remarks to apply rather to the policy of the Government than to any individual. The Chairman: The hon. Member must not use those words. Mr McCoan: said, he would not take advantage of his position to use impertinent language to the House or the Government; but The Chairman: The hon. Member has not yet approached the Amendment before the Committee. Mr McCoan: said, - he would merely add a word to commend the adoption of this humane Amendment. He had another Amendment on the Paper. ... Chairman: Having directed the attention of the Committee to the irrelevancy of his remarks, I rule that the hon. Member discontinue his speech.

Hansard, 3rd ser. vol. 258, (18), col. 1058, January 1881. 83

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document 12 Speaker Brand's Application of the closure in the House of Commons The lrish party's opposition to the Coercion Bill of1881led toseveral all-night sittings and to forty-one hours of continuous debate. The Speaker then took the unprecedented action of putting the question. Six years later a Standing Order permitted an ordinary member to move a closure. The net effect of these changes, and of the 'gulllotine' closure, which enables undiscussed clauses in a Bill to be carried without further debate, was to strengthen the control of the Cabinet over the House ofCommons. Monday, 31 January - The House was boiling over with indignation at the apparent triumph of obstruction. On Tuesday, after a sitting of twenty-four hours, I saw plainly that this attempt to carry the bill by continuous sitting would fall, the Parnell party being strong in numbers, discipline and organization, and with great gifts of speech.... I sent for Mr Gladstone on Tuesday (February 1), about noon, and told hirn that I should be prepared to put the question in spite of obstruction on the following conditions:1. That the debate should be carried on until the following morn ing.... 2. That he should reconsider the regulation of business, either by giving more authority to the House, or by conferring authority on the Speaker. I arranged with Playfair [Sir Lyon Playfair (Leeds, South)) to take the chair on Tuesday night about midnight, engaging to resurne it on Wednesday morning at nine. Accordingly at nine I took the chair, Biggar being in possession of the House. I rase, and he resumed his seat. I proceeded with my address, and when I had concluded I put the question . The scene was most dramatic ; but all passed offwithout disturbance , the Irish party on the second division retiring under protest. Quoted in Morley (48) , ii, p. 219

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Three pen-portraits of Parnell

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Michael Davitt He struck me at once with the power and directness of bis personality. There was the proud, resolute bearing of a man of conscious strength, with a mission, wearing no affectation, but without a hint of Celtic character or a trait of its racial enthusiasm. An Englishman of the strongest type, moulded for an Irish purpose ... [He] was not afflicted with rhetorica! tendencies, and seldom spoke on any phase of the Irish question except with the object of making bis meaning clear and unambiguous.... Mr Parnell never went in thought or in act a revolutionary inch, as an Irish nationalist, further than Henry Grattan. Davitt (38), pp. 110-15.

Joseph Chamberlain I have often thought that Parnell was like Napoleon. He allowed nothing to stand in his way. He stopped at nothing to gain his end .... He did not harbour enmity. He was too great a man for that. He was indifferent about the means he used to gain his object. Quoted in O'Brien (51), ii, p. 131.

John Morley Mr Parnell showed himself acute, frank, patient, closely attentive, and possessed of striking though not rapid insight. He never slurred over difficulties, nor tried to pretend that rough was smooth.... He measured the ground with a slow and careful eye, and fixed tenaciously on the thing that was essential at the moment. Of constructive faculty he never showed a trace. He was a man of temperament, of will, of authority, of power; not of ideas or ideals, or knowledge, or political maxims, or even of the practical reason in any of its higher senses, as Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson had practical reason. But he knew what he wanted. Morley (48), ii. p. 408.

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Horne Rule party discipline

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These passages clearly demonstrate the distinction between Butt's gentlemanly approach to politics and Parnell's insistence on a tightly controlled and coherent party.

(a) Resolution adopted at Conference in the City Hall after the General Election, 1874 That, deeply impressed with the importance of unity of action upon all matters that can affect the Parliamentary position of the Horne Rule party or the interests of the Horne Rule cause, we engage to each other and to the country to obtain that by taking counsel together, by making all reasonable concessions to the opinions of each other, by avoiding, as far as possible, isolated action, and by sustaining and supporting each other in the course which may be deemed best calculated to promote the grand object of national self-government which the Irish nation has committed to our care. From Freeman 's Journal, 24 May 1877.

(b) The pledge adopted required of a11 Horne Rule candidates for the Election of 1885 'I ... pledge myself that in the event of my election to parliament 1 will sit, act and vote with the Irish parliamentary party and if at a meeting of the party convened upon due notice specially to consider the question, it be decided by aresolution supported by a majority of the entire parliamentary party that I have not fulfilled the above pledge I hereby undertake forthwith to resign my seat.' Harrington papers (National Library of Ireland).

docurnent 15 Gladstone's ideas of local govemrnent for Ireland, 1882 Gladstone and the Liberals were interested in local government reform as a means of spreading responsibility and of encouraging economical and efficient local government. The extension of such reforms to Ireland was no more at this stage than apart of the general Liberal programme.

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Documents The restitution o[an Irish Parliament was, as Parnell would have agreed, aseparate question. About local government for Ireland, the ideas which more and more establish themselves in my mind are such as these. I. Until we have seriously responsible bodies to deal with us in Ireland, every plan we frame comes to lrishmen, say what we may, as an English plan. As such it is probably condemned. At best it is a one-sided bargain, which binds us, not them. 2. If your excellent plans for obtaining local aid towards the execution of the law break down, it will be on account of this miserable and almost total want of the sense of responsibility for the public good and public peace in Ireland; and this responsibility we cannot create except through local self-governrnent. 3. If we say we must postpone the question till the state of the country is more fit for it, I should answer that the least danger is in going forward at once. It is liberty alone which fits men for liberty. This proposition, like every other in politics, has its bounds; but it is far safer than the counter doctrine, wait till they are fit. 4. In truth I should say, that for the Ireland of today, the first question is the rectification of the relations between landlord and tenant ... ; the next is to relieve Great Britain from the enormous weight of the government of Ireland unaided by the people, and from the hopeless contradiction in which we stand while we give a parliamentary representation, hardly effective for anything but mischief without the local institutions ofself-government which it presupposes, and on which alone it can have asound and healthy basis. Gladstone to W.E. Forster, 12 April 1882, in Morley (48), pp. 223-4.

Horne Rule defmed

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lohn Redmond, whose [ather was Home Rule M.P. for Wex[ord, first met Parnell during an election meeting at Enniscorthy in 1880. Shortly afterwards he became M.P. for New Ross. He travelled widely in the U.SA. and in Australia, where he married. This passage makes it clear that to Redmond Home Rule for Ireland was a matter to be considered in an Imperial and a parliamentary setting. What do I mean by Horne Rule? I mean by Horne Rule the restoration

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Documents to Ireland of representative government, and I define representative government to mean government in accordance with the constitutionally expressed will of a majority of the people, and carried out by a ministry constitutionally responsible to those whom they govern. In other wards, I mean that the internal affairs of Ireland shall be regulated by an Irish Parliament - that all Imperial affairs, and all that relates to the colonies, foreign states, and common interests of the Empire, shall continue to be regulated by the Imperial Parliament as at present constituted. The idea at the bottom of this proposal is the desirability of finding some middle course between separation on the one hand, and over-centralization of government on the other. 'Horne Rule - its real meaning', lecture delivered Melbourne, July 1883, printed in J.E. Redmond, Historical and Political Address, 1883-1897, Dublin 1898.

Parnell's speech at Cork, January 1885

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One of Parnell's finest speeches. It marked his return to active politics after a period of two years inactivity. Here he deliberately makes an appeal wide enough to satisfy his domestic supporters and to appeal to the influential Irish-Am ericans. Yet, this speech would appear to give some substance to the belief that Horne Rule would merely be a stage in 'the on ward march of the nation '. I come back to the great question of national self-government for Ireland (cheers). I do not know how this great question will be eventually settled.... It is given to none of us to farecast the future, and just as it is impossible for us to say in what way or by what means the national question may be settled, in what way full justice may be done to Ireland, so it is impossible for us to say to what extent that justice should be done. We cannot ask for less than restitution of Grattan's parliament (loud cheers), with its important privileges and wide and far-reaching constitution. We cannot under the British constitution ask for more than the restitution of Grattan's parliament (renewed cheers), but no man has the right to fix the boundary to the march of anation (great cheers). No man has the right to say to his country, 'Thus far shalt thou go and no further,' and we have never attempted to fix the ne plus ultra to the progress of Ireland's nationhood, and we never shall (cheers). . . . and while we struggle to-day for that which may seem pos88

Documents sible for us with our eombination, we must struggle for it with the proud eonsciousness that we shall not do anything to hinder or prevent better men who may come after us from gaining better things than those for which we now contend (prolonged applause). Reported in The Freeman's Journal, 22 January 1885, printed in E. Curtis and R.ß. McDowell, Irish Historical Documents, pp. 283-4.

document 18 Joseph Chamberlain's central board scheme, 1885 In 1885 Joseph Chamberlain produced this impressive scheme for Irish local government coupled with a largedegree of devolution to a central board. This scheme provided a sweeping and radical change in local government in Ireland (which was destined to stay as it was until the Local Government Act 1898) though stopping short of legislative independence. However, what was good for Birmingham was rejected by Irish nationalism. Henry Labouchere (Liberal M.P. [or Northampton) said of this that Chamberlain was 'just as amazed at anyone not accepting his inspired plan asMoses would have been had an Israelite suggested an amendment in the Ten Commandments '. 1. County boards, to be elected in every county, one-third to be renewed annually; the voting to be by ballot. In the English municipalities the franchise is household or rate-paying suffrage, but in England the whole of the rates are paid by the tenants. As in Ireland a considerable proportion, probably one-third, is paid by the owners of the land it would be fair to give to the latter a proportionate representation, and the boards might accordingly be elected, one-third by the owners ofland and two-thirds by the oeeupiers. The county boards would have extensive powers of taxation and full authority to deal with alllocal matters. In defining their funetions regard might be had to the preeedent above referred to of the English municipalities; but deviations from this might be permitted in those eases in which the cireumstances of Ireland and past legislation have made it expedient. These deviations, however, would be in the nature of an extension and not of a limitation of loeal authority. 2. A eentral board. This board should have if possible some distinctive title, as for instanee, the 'national board of Ireland' . Its members should have an official designation indicated by letters attached to their names; and in every way an effort should be made to giveimportance and dignity to its proeeedings.

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It might be elected at the same time as the county boards either by the same constituencies voting in classes and in their several districts, or if preferred it might be returned by second election by the vote of the several county boards each electing delegates according to population. In the latter case the representatives on the county boards of the landlords and of the tenants would vote separately each for their own proportion of members. The central board would have independent power of direct tax ation and it would enjoy legislative as weIl as executive authority in reference to the matters committed to its decision. The principal of these would be: (1) National education in all its branches, university , secondary and primary. (2) Public works, including all proposals for reclamation, harbours, drainage, and communications. All grants ofmoney of guarantees forloansnowmade by the imperial government for such purposes would be handed over and administered through the central board, care being taken that the proportion reserved to Ireland in such assistance was on a scale commensurate to its population and contribution in taxes . .. . The establishment of [the centra/ board] would involve the practical disappearance of what is known as 'Castle ' administration. The various boards which now , under government supervision and control , regulate local administration would disappear and every purely Irish qucstion would be dealt with by an exclusively Irish authority without reference or responsibility to any external body. Although the above proposals do not necessarily involve a furt her change , I believe that it would be desirablc to complete and emphasisc the proposed reform by the abolition of the lord lieutenancy and the appointment of an Irish secretary of state to represent , in the government, Ireland's share in imperial questions. Memorandum by Joseph Chamberlain, 25 April 1885. CD .G. Howard , ' Documents relating to the lrish 'central board' scheme, 1884-5'; in lrish Historical Studies, viii, no . 31 (1953), pp. 255-7.

Gladstone's 'Hawarden kite'

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Gladstone hoped to see the emergence of a bipartisan policy on Ireland,

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Documents or would have supported a Conservativeplan, had there been one. Both he and Salisbury were waiting on events, and it was only the premature disclosure in the press by Herbert Gladstone of the trend of his father's thinking that forced Gladstone into the open and enabled Salisbury, with relief, to look fotward to an end to his caretaker administration. The conditions of an admissible plan are: 1. Union of the empire and due supremacy of parliament. 2. Protection for the minority - a difficult matter on which I have talked much with Spencer. 3. Fair allocation of imperial charges. 4. A statutory basis seems to me better and safer than the revival of Grattan's parliament. 5. Neither as opinions nor as intentions have I to any one alive promulgated these ideas as decided on by me. 6. As to intentions, I am determined to have none at present, to leave space to the government - I should wish to encourage them if I properly could - above all, on no account to say or do anything which would enable the nationalists to establish rival biddings between us. Letter to Lord Hartington, 17 December 1885, quoted in Morley (48) ii, p. 377.

document 20 Parnell's manifesto to the Irish electors in Great Britain, 1885 Parnell wished to maintain the principle of independence from either Liberals or Conservatives in the election of 1885. His conversations with Carnarvon may also have led him to believe that the Conservatives were slowly moving towards Home Rule, whereas Gladstone's deliberate silence and the record of his second ministry, which, though it had solved the land problem had offended many in Ireland through its attempts to enforce the rule of law, reinforced the decision to oppose the Liberals. In the event this alienated many Liberals and later contributed to the split of the party over Home Rule. Perhaps the most dangerous enemy Parnell made by this manoeuvre was Chamberlain. The Liberal Party are making an appeal to the confidence of the electors at the General Election of 1885, as at the General Election of 1880, on False Pretences. To Ireland more than to any other country it bound itself by most 91

Documents solemn pledges, and these it most flagrantly violated. It announced its opposition to Coercion , and practised a system of Coercion more bru tal than that of any previous administration, Liberal or Tory. Under this system juries were packed . .. Twelve hundred men were imprisoned without trial ; and for aperiod every utterance of the popular press and of the popular meeting was as completely suppressed as if 'Irel and were Poland and the Administration of England a Russian Autocracy'.. . . Reform of Procedure means a new gag, and the application to all enemies of Radiealism in the House of Commons of the despotie methods and mean machinery of the Birmingham caucus . The spurious demand for a majority against the Irish party is an appeal for power to crush a11 Anti-Radical Members of Parliament first ; then to prop ose to Ireland some scheme doomed to failure because of its unsuit ability to the wants of the Irish people ; and, fina11y, to force down a halting measure of self-government upon the Irish people by the same measures of wholesale imprisonment by which durability was sought by the impracticable Land Act of 1881. Under such circumstances we feel bound to advise our countrymen to place no confidence in the Liberal or Radical Party, and so far as in them lies to prevent the Government of the Empire fa11ing into the hands of a party so perfidious , treacherous, and incompetent . . . (signed) T.P.O'Connor President of the Irish National League of Great Britain Justin McCarthy Thomas Sexton

T,M. Healy James O'Ke11y J .E. Redmond J.G. Biggar

From a collection of pamphlets on Horne Rule in the National Library ofIreland.

Aims of the lrish Loyal and Patriotic Union

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The I.L.P.U was conceived as apressure group representing the large and influential minority in Ireland who supported the Union. However, as a Dublin-based organisation it reflected the views o[ southern Unionists rather than those of the more compact and consequently more militant Ulster Unionists. This is seen in the appeal to business and commercial interests and in the emphasis on the I.L.P. U as a propagandist

pressure-group.

To form one United Association for a11 Ireland for the purpose of main92

Documents taining the Union existing between Great Britain and Ireland, and upholding the rights and liberties to which every Irishman is entitled under the laws and constitution of the United Kingdom ... To ... invite all Unionists, especially those who have capital invested in commercial undertakings, or who are otherwise interested in lrish industrial enterprises, irrespective of creed or party, to join ... To make proper arrangements for the supplying of accurate information on lrish affairs to Members of Parliament ... To endeavour to form asound public opinion by the spread of literature bearing upon the disastrous effect produced by the so-called Nationalist agitation upon all trade and commerce in the country. To organise public meetings throughout the United Kingdom ... and properly represent the condition of Ireland and the true character of the so-called Nationalist movemerit. Report in The Irish Times, 9 January 1886.

John Bright's opposition to Horne Rule

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lohn Bright was an elder statesman in 1886 and his opposition to Home Rule had an immense impact in the Liberal party. He had been sympathetic to Ireland and had supported the disestablishment 0/ the Church of Ireland, land purchase and local government reforms. However, like Chamberlain, he refused to contemplate legislative independence and looked on the Home Rulers as a 'rebel party'. [20 March 1886) Downing Street. Long interview for 2 hours with Mr Gladstone at his request .... He explained much of his policy as to a Dublin Parlt. and as to Land Purchase. I objected to the Land policy as unnecessary . . . . As to a Dublin Parlt. I argued that he was making a surrender all along the line. A Dublin Parlt. would work with constant friction, and would press against any barrier he might create to keep up the unity of the 3 Kingdoms. What of a volunteer force, and what of import duties and protection as against British goods? He would not object, but any armed force must be under officers appointed by the Crown; and he did not think duties as against England would be imposed. Mr G. is in favour of excluding all Irish representation from the Imperial Parlt. Thinks Irish members in Dublin and at Westminster not

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Documents possible. Irish members think they could not supply representatives for both Houses. I told hirn I' thought to get rid of the Irishmen from Westminster, such as we have known them for 5 or 6 years past, would do something to make his propositions less offensive and distasteful in Gt. Britain, tho' it tends to more complete separation.... I thought he placed far too much confidence in the leaders of the Rebel Party. I could place none in them, and the general feeling was and is that any terms made with them would not be kept, and that, thro' them, I -could not hope for reconcilation with discontented and disloyal Ireland.

The Diaries oflohn Bright, ed. RJ.A. Walling, Cassell, 1930.

Lord Randolph Churchill and the 'Orange card'

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Was Churchill the only realist amongst English politicians or was he guilty, as lohn Morley suggested, of 'contingent sedition and hypothetical coercion'? Was he seeking primarily to support the growing strength of Unionism in Ulster, or was he really hoping to secure adhesions to his 'Fourth Party'? To an opponent like Sir CharlesRussell he deserved to be lampooned: Stiff in opinion, often in the wrong, Everything by starts and nothing long, But in the course of one revolving moon, Was green and orange, statesman and buffoon.

Churchill to Fitzgibbon, 16 February 1886 (a) I decided some time ago, that if the G.O.M. went for Horne Rule, the Orange card would be the one to play. Please God may it turn out the ace of trumps and not then two ... (b) It may be that this dark cloud which is now impending over Ireland, will pass away without breaking. If it does, I believe you and your descendants will be safe for a long time to come. Her Majesty's Government hesitates. Like Macbeth before the murder of Duncan, Mr Gladstone asks for time. Before he plunged the knife into the heart of the British Empire he reflects, he hesitates.... The Loyalists of Ulster should wait and watch - organise and prepare. Diligence and vigilance ought to be

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Doeuments your watchword; so that the blow, if it does come, may notcorne upon you as a thief in the night and may not find you unready and taken by surprise .... No portentous change such as the Repeal of the Union, no change so gigantic, could be accomplished by the mere passing of a law ... I do not hesitate to tell you most truly that in that dark hour there will not be wanting to you those of position and influence in England who would be willing to cast in their lot with you and who, whatever the result, will share your fortunes and your fate.

Ce) Speech in the Ulster Hall, Belfast, 22 February 1886 If political parties and political leaders, not only Parliamentary but local, should be so utterly lost to every feeling and dictate of honour and courage as to hand over coldly, and for the sake of purchasing a short and illusory Parliamentary tranquillity, the lives and liberties of the Loyalists of Ireland to their hereditary and most bitter foes, make no doubt on this point - Ulster will not be a consenting party; Ulster at the proper moment will resort to the supreme arbitrament of force; Ulster will fight, Ulster will be right; Ulster will emerge from the struggle victorious, because all that Ulster represents to us Britons will command the sympathy and support of an enormous section of OUf British community.... Quoted in W.s. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, ii, pp. 59, 62, 65.

Cardinal Cullen on Horne Rule

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Here is the 'international conspiracy' theory 0/ Home Rule by a distinguished prelate, who had been deeply moved by the forcible ending 0/ the Temporal Power 0/ the Papacy in 1870. Cullen 's views were propagated as a leaflet by the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union in 1886. Later on, Cullen came to adopt a more sympathetic and realistic attitude to Home Rule. My first duty is to approach all questions from my own standpoint, that is, as abishop, and to examine into and see what the effect of any great political change would be on religion and the Church's interests.... I must admit, then, that I do not like this new movement for what is 95

Documents called Horne Rule, forofthisI arn convinced, that the first future attack on the liberty of the Church and on the interest of religion will corne from a native Parliarnent if we ever have one.... I am convinced, that the moving spring in this new agitation in Ireland is identical with that in Italy , that is the spirit of the revolution so loudly and so authoritatively condernned by the Holy See; but for this power and this spirit the rnovernent in Ireland would have no strength. We all know what the Revolution has done in Rome and in France. It first drove the Pope from the Eternal City .. .. In Paris what have we seen? - an archbishop shot down in the streets and priests murdered in that city .. . . France was once as Catholic as Ireland, but the Revolution undermined her faith . Should an Irish Parliament, whose strength, I believe, will come from revolutionary sourees, pass laws that are subversive of justice, morality, or religion, it will be the duty of the bishops to speak out to warn their flocks and to condemn such acts.... With this conviction in my mind, I for one can never advocate this revolutionary movement, as I believe it to be, for Home Rule.

The Tablet, 27 March 1886.

Economic arguments for Horne Rute

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It was widely believed among proponents of Home Rule that the restoration of an Irish legislature would lead to a growth of prosperity, and the case of Grattan's Parliament was often cited. We now know that the increasing prosperity of the fourth quarter of the eighteenth century, indeed up to 1815, owed little to measures passed by the Irish Parliament. Any connection was coincidental and not contingent. However, the misreading of Irish history common in the 1880s led to both lyrical outbursts and wishful thinking about the effect of a restored parliament on the Irish economy.

(a) Joseph Cowan, (Newcastle upon Tyne) Horne Rule will send a quickening stir of grateful life through a dissevered and discontented land, which has long been rent with civil feuds. . . . It will dress the labourer's face with smiles, lift him in the scale of civilization, imbue him with the true spirit of human toil. It will educate and enrich him. It will cover the barren rocks with soil; drain the sterile swamps, clothe 'the brown heath with verdure, and

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Documents people the storm-swept gorges of Ireland's old grey hills with beneficent activity and enduring peace.

(b) Justin McCarthy, (Longford, North) Our capital under aHorne Rule Government would be induced to flow, for we should have industry and trade. We would bring all the resources of the country into play, as to Irish fisheries, piers, harbours, canals, navigation, roads - in fact, with regard to almost everything concerning the internal traffic and life of the country ... it will not be a Parliament of politicians, but one of earnest, energetic, practical men, anxious to restore the prosperity of their country.

(e) Sir Lyon Playfair, (Leeds, South) In Ireland the Union did not promote peace and tranquillity, and capital refused to go to Ireland. The growth of manufactures is, however, most important to draw off pressure upon land, and they are necessary factors for the prosperity of a nation. We are responsible for the good government of Ireland; but we have failed to produce peace and contentment among the people, and industrial capital will not embark on a sea of political troubles. Yet even in Ireland there is capital in abundance if there were security for its investments.... Ireland naturally has advantages which Switzerland, Holland, and Norway do not possess, and yet they are active manufacturing countries. . . . We have failed by our system of government to givethat contentment to the population which is necessary to give prosperity to agriculture, or other forms of productive industry.

Hansard, 3rd ser. vol. 305, May 1886, cols. 1372-3, 1674-5.

England's easeagainst Horne Rule

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A. V. Dicey was Vinerian Professor of Engltsh Law at Oxford. He was originally a Liberal and a follower oflohn Bright. He sympathised with lrish nationalism, but the extremism of the Irish-Americans and the bombings in London in 1884 alienated him. He abandoned Home Rule and became one of the most effective Unionist propagandists. Horne Rule does not mean National Independence.... Anation is one

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thing, astate fonning part of a federation is quite another. ... A bona fide Horne Ruler cannot be a bona fide Nationalist .... In America or in Switzerland federalism has developed because existing states wished to be combined into some kind of national unity. Federalism in England (sie) would necessarily mean the breaking up of a nation in order to form a body of states ... The vast majority of the United Kingdom, inc1uding a million or more of the inhabitants of Ireland, have expressed their will to maintain the Union. Popular government means government in accordance with the will of the majority, and therefore according to all the principles of popular government the majority of the United Kingdom have a right to maintain the Union. Their wish is decisive, and ought to terminate the whole agitation in favour of Horne Rule The principle that the will of the majority should be sovereigncannot be invoked to determine a dispute turning upon the enquiry which of two bodies is the body the majority ofwhich has sovereignty. A.V. Dicey, England's Case against Home Rute, 1886, pp. 32-3,54, 67-8,69,70.

document 27 Gladstone and Parnell on the Ulster problem, 1886

Gladstone I will deviate from my path for a moment to say a word upon the state of opinion in that wealthy, intelligent and energetic portion of the lrish community which predominates in a certain portion of Ulster. Our duty is to adhere to a sound general principle, and give the utmost consideration we can to the opinion of that energetic minority. The first thing of all, I should say, is that if ... violent measures have been threatened in certain emergencies, I think the best compliment I can pay to those who have threatened us is to take no notice whatever of the threats, but to treat them as momentary ebullitions.... I cannot conceal the conviction that the voice of Ireland, as a whole, is at this moment c1early and constitutionallyspoken. I cannot say it is otherwise when five-sixths of its lawfully chosen representatives are of one mind in this matter. Certainly, sir, I cannot allow it to be said that a Protestant minority in Ulster, or elsewhere, is to rule the question at large for Ireland. I am aware of no constitutional doctrine tolerable on which such a conc1usion could be adopted or justified. But I think that the Protestant

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Documents minority should have its wishes considered to the utmost practical extent in any form that they may assurne. Speech on the Government of Ireland Bill, 7 June 1886, Hansard, 3rd ser. vol. 304, cols. 1036--85.

Parnell But the right hon. Member for West Birmingham (Mr Joseph Chamberlain) has claimed for Ulster aseparate Legislature- for that Province of Ulster. WeIl, Sir, you would not protect the loyal minority of Ireland even supposing that you gave aseparate Legislature to the Protestants of Ulster, because there are outside the Province of Ulster over 400,000 Protestants who would still be without any protection ... but you would not even protect the Protestants of Ulster because the Protestants, according to the last Census, were in the proportion of 52 to 48 Catholics. . . . WeIl, being driven away from the fiction of Protestant Ulster and the great majority of Protestants which until recently was alleged to exist in Ulster, the opponents of this Bill have been cornpelled to seek refuge in the north-east corner of Ulster, consisting of three counties. . .. Seven-twelfths of the Protestants of Ireland live outside these three counties ... in the north-east corner of Ulster, and the other five-twelfths ofthe Protestants ofIreland inside those counties. So that, whichever way you put it, you must give the idea of protecting the Protestants either as a body or as a majority by the establishment of aseparate legislature, either in Ulster or in any portion of Ulster. No, Sir, we cannot give up a single Irishman. Speech on the Government of Ireland Bill, 7 June 1886, Hansard, 3rd ser. vol. 304, cols. 1179-80.

Economic arguments against Horne Rule

document 28

Ireland's progress When Ireland ente red on her career of prosperity in 1852, she had not a third of the resources at her command that she has now; and we confess ourselves utterly unable to comprehend by what process of perverse reasoning the conclusion has been arrived at that she is on the brink of ruin, and must inevitably sink into the abyss, unless the Constitution 99

Docurnents under which she has so abundantly prospered be abrogated, and that under which she went to decay, from 1782 to 1800, established in its stead. To our mind, the progress of Ireland since the Union, and especially since the famine, affords the strongest presumptive proof that her future should be even more prosperous than her past. When she rose from her ashes, in 1852, there might have been reason to look doubtfully towards the future; and yet we see how she has progressed since. Why should we fear the future now, when we are so much better prepared to meet it?

The Union Vindicated. Ireland's progress 1782-1800-1886, a pamphlet published by the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union, 1886.

Irish securities The introduction of Mr Gladstone's Horne Rule Bill was followed by a heavy fall in all Irish securities. In October, 1885, the market value of the !6,719,000 which constituted the paid-up capital of the Irish banks was f:l8,207,000, and in May, after Mr Gladstone's scheme had been submitted to Parliament, the market value of the same amount of paidup capital had fallen to !14,934,000 - a drop of nearly 3)2 millions. Since the advent of the Unionist government however, there had been a gradual recovery, and a considerable portion of what was lost has been regained.

Economist, 18 May 1889; reprinted in a leaflet, Horne Rule and Irish securities, issued by the Irish Unionist Alliance in 1893.

Horne Rule in an Imperial framework

document 29

An ingenious solution ofthe lrish Question, by an ardent Irnperalist. The problem they had to solve was how they could satisfy the aspirations of Ireland for Horne Rule without endangering the State. They must first secure the safety of the Empire. Ireland must cease to be the battle-ground of Party. Both the great Parties in the State must combine to pass just and good laws far the government of Ireland, and having passed those laws, to maintain them and execute them. They should place in Ireland a Viceroy who should no longer be liable to be

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Documents removed when the Party he represented went out of office.... The next thing to be accomplished was the Imperial Federation. Under that system ... he believed it would be possible to have an Imperial Parliament sitting at Westminster in which every part of the Empire should be represented according to the bur den they bore of Imperial taxation. With that Imperial authority they might safely concede Horne Rule, not only to Ireland, but to Scotland and Wales, and even England.

Hon, M.E.G. Finch-Hatton, (Lincolnshire, Spalding), Hansard, 3rd ser, vol. 305.

Gladstone's breach with ParneU

document 30 1 Carlton Gardens 24 Nov. 1890

My Dear Morley, Having arrived at a certain conclusion with regard to the continuance ofMr Parnell's leadership of the lrish party, I have seen MrMcCarthy on my arrival in town, and have inquired from him whether I was likely to receive from Mr Parnell himself any communication on the subject. Mr McCarthy replied that he was unable to give me any information on the subject. ... I thought it necessary to acquaint Mr McCarthy with the conclusion at which I had arrived. It was that notwithstanding the splendid services rendered by Mr Parnell to his country, his continuance at the present moment in the leadership would be productive of consequences disastrous in the highest degree to the cause ofIreland .... The continuance I speak of would not only place many hearty and effective friends of the Irish cause in a position of great embarrassment, but would render my retention of the leadership of the liberal party almost a nullity. W.E. Gladstone Quoted in Morley (48), ii, p. 507.

Lord Salisbury on coercion

document 31

I never said that I was in favour of twenty years of coercion, and I 101

Doeuments never spoke in that sense, which is more important. The object of my observations was to show that the application of the word 'coercion' to the measures recommended by us was wholly unsuitable and improper; and coercion, according to the ordinary use of the term, means legislation in restraint of liberty and directed against political disaffection.... What we have desired to recommend is legislation in protection of liberty - legislation to defend the innocent population against the unlawful acts of criminal men and criminal associations. This has never been called coercion up to this time. If it is coercion ... it ought to be recommended, not only for twenty years, but for ever, and not only in Ireland, but in every civilized country. Speech in the House of Lords, 4 JUDe 1886, Hansard, 3rd ser. vol. 306, col. 987.

Parnell's last campaign

document 32

During his last politieal eampaign, while he was fighting for survivaland in failing health, Parnell appeared to be abandoning a purely constitutional stanee in favour of an appeal to the 'advaneed men' who had given him taeit support. Was this the produet of despair. or did it represent an aspeet of his thinking whieh The Times had endeavoured to establish in aseries of articles in 1887? More probably, it meant that Parnell in his last days, had turned away from any effort to look for sympathy or support in Britain to seek it in Ireland and in the United States. I have, in answer to this, to announce, in no undecided tones and with a clear voice, that I have appealed to no section of my country. My appeal has been made to the whole Irish race, and if the young men are distinguished among my supporters it is because they know what I have promised them I will do. I have not promised to lead them against the armed might of England. I have told them that, so long as I can maintain an independent Irish party in the English Parliament, there is ho pe of winning our legislative independence by constitutional means .... So long as we can keep our Irish party pure and undefiled from any contact or fusion with any English parliamentary party, independent and upright, there is good reason for us to hope that we shall win legislative independence for Ireland by constitutional means. So long as such a party exists I will remain at its head. But when it appears to me that it is 102

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impossible to obtain Horne Rule for Ireland by constitutional means, I have said this - and this is the extent and limit of my pledge, that is the pledge which has been accepted by the young men of Ireland , whom Michael Davitt in his derision calls the hillside men - I have said that when it is clear to me that I can no longer hope to obtain our constitution by constitutional and parliamentary means, I will in a moment so declare it to the people of Ireland , and, returning at the head ofmy party, I will take counsel with you as to the next step. Parnell's speech during the Kilkenny by-election, 1890.

The Anglo-Irish and 'New Ireland'

document 33

This letter reveals the sympathetic attitude ofa perceptive Anglo-Irishman to the new movements emergingin the 'nineties, coloured, however, by a remarkable nostalgia and a lack of political realism.

I cannot help recognising that the Union of 1800 has brought in its train a series ofm ost intolerable evils for Ireland . The power ofthe Protestant gentry has been broken during the last hundred years and their leadership is almost entirely gone. I regard this as amisfortune for Ireland so great, that even an immense increase of material wealth would be no compensation. Our gentry are by far the best class in the country . . . [but] their eyes were dazzled with England's greatness and the prospect of imperial power. As a result of the Union they have served England and the empire instead of serving Ireland - I speak of the dass generally. . . . Instead of our gentry we now have as leaders priests and demagogues . .. I hold that the people of Ireland are beginning to find this condition intolerable . There are signs on an sides of intellectual and moral awakening and several forces are at work promoting this awakening. The Gaelic League ... is one. The propaganda of the Sinn Fein party is another. The literary, dramatic and artistic revival is a third, working indirectly, but really. A fourth, perhaps the greatest of all, is Horace Plunkett's work . In a few years I hope that our people will be sufficiently educated and awake to make a dissolution of the present union with England safe and highly advantageous to us. If the knot is cut, as I hope it will be cut, decisively at one blow I feel absolutely certain that our gentry will regain their ancient position of rulers in Ireland. Then we shall have an

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Documents Ireland united to England by the link of the crown and made genuinely friendly to England by community of national interests. Canon J.O. Hannay ('George Birmingham', the novelist) to H. de F. Montgomery, 29 May 1907, quoted in (59).

Formation of the Ulster Unionist Council

document 34

This was the response of the Unionists in Ulster to the proposals for devolution prepared by Lord Dunraven in consultation with Sir Anthony MacDonnell, with the apparent approval of the government. The formation of this council marked an important stage in the differentiation between the Unionists of south and north, and foreshadowed eventual political separation.

UlsterCouncil and Ulster Union of Constitutional Assoeiations.

MEETING OF ULSTER UNIONISTS. Y.M.C.A. MINOR HALL, WELLINGTON PLACE, BELFAST,

On Friday, 2nd December, 1904, AT TWO O'CLOCK.

Chairman-Rt. Hon. COL. SA UNDERSON, MP, Chairman 01 the Ulster UnionistParliamentary Party. AGENDA 1. Letters of apology. 2. Introduetory Statement. 3. RESOLUTION-'That an Ulster Couneil be formed, and that its objeets shall be to form an Ulster Union for bringing into line all Loeal Unionist Assoeiations in the Provinee of Ulster, with a view to eonsistent and continuous politieal action; to act as a further eonnecting link between Ulster Unionists and their Parliamentary representatives; to settle in eonsultation with them the Parliamentary Poliey, and to be the medium of expressing Ulster Unionist opinion, as eurrent events may from time to time require, and generally to advance and defend the interests of Ulster Unionism in the Unionist Party."

Public Record Office of Northern Ireland.

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Horne Rule not Rorne Rule

docurnent 35

This leaflet was published by the Home Rule Council in 1911 to refute the idea that Ireland under Home Rule would necessarily be domina ted by the wishes of the Catholic hierarchy and the ideas ofMaynooth.

HOME RULE NOT ROME RULE. The belief that "Horne Rule means Rome Rule" is a common Tory bogey.

Public Opinion and the Priests. Wherever self-government exists in Catholic countries, the power of the priesthood, Catholic as weH as Protestant, is kept in check by public opinion. It is so in France, Austria, Italy and Belgium, and it is more and more being brought under such restraint in Spain and Portugal.

Catholic Majorities do not Persecute. In the German Empire, the Catholics form more than a third of the total population; in Bavaria, Baden and Alsace-Lorraine they are largely in the majority. But neither religion "dominates" the other at any point. An Irish Horne Rule Parliament will have no power to establish Catholicism, or to inflict any disability upon Protestants. IT WILL NOT WANT TO DO SO. Horne Rule in Ireland will mean peace and toleration between Catholics and Protestants as it does in Germany , Switzerland and Austria-Hungary.

Vote for HOME RULE and Religious Liberty for both Catholics and Protestants. Nationallibrary of Ireland.

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Doeuments

Minority and majority

document 36

The Home Rule Council published this ingenious and amusing presentation 01 the case for solving the Irish problem by simply counting heads, something which Gladstone had assumed would be the case alter the 'momentary ebullition' in Ulster had subsided. Salisbury was perhaps nearer the mark when he postulated the theory that the island ofIreland contained not one but two nations; certainly the two communities which had clearly emerged by the end 01 Victoria's reign had markedly different aspirations and ideals, exacerbated by religious differences. From another point 01 view, 01 course, the 'tail' could be looked upon as representing the Irish section 01 that majority in the United Kingdom who had clearly rejected Home Rule in 1886, and who represented a substantial minority in 1912.

TUE ULSTER TAIL SHALL IT WAG THE IRISH DOG? Tories declare that Ulster will not have Horne Rule and Ireland must not have aHorne Rule Government, because Ulster does not want it. This is a case of the tail wanting to \Vag the dog. The population of Ulster is 1,581,696. The total population of Ireland is 4,381,951, so that Ulster has about a third of the total population of the country. All the rest of Ireland wants Horne Rule. Ulster only is divided upon the question. Of Ulster's 33 Members of Parliament, 16 are Horne Rulers, against 17 Unionists. Roman Catholics in Ulster number 690,816, or nearly half the population. Not only so; but there are thousands of Protestant Horne Rulers in Ulster. The Ulster Unionists are not entitled to speak for the whole of Ireland, and not even the whole of Ulster. Is a Tory minority to rule Ireland? National Library of Ireland.

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Doeuments

Ulster's Solemn League and Covenant, 1912

document 37

This remarkable pledge was in the tradition 0/ the Scottish League and Covenant, 1643. It was said to be signed by over470,000 people, some 0/ whom did so in their own blood. The Covenant was supported by the main Protestant denominations, all ofwhich hall separately declared against Home Rule. It was ademonstration 0/ how widespread the opposition to Home Rule was in Ulster, with support from all social groups and its core firmly established in the industrial city 0/ Bel/ast, which by 1901 had a population 0/350,000.

Ulster's Solemn League and Covenant. Being convinced in our consciences that Horne Rule would be disastrous to the material well-beingof Ulster as weIl of the whole of Ireland, subversive of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship, and perilous to the unity of the empire, we, whose names are underwritten , men of Ulster, loyal subjects of His Gracious Majesty King George V, humbly relying on the God whom our fathers in days of stress and trial confidently trusted , do hereby pledge ourselves in solemn covenant throughout this our time of threatened calamity to stand by one another in defending for ourselves and our children our cherished position of equal citizenship in the United Kingdom , and in using aII means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up aHorne Rule Parliament in Ireland. And in the event of such a Parliament being forced upon us we further solemnly and mutually pledge ourselves to refuse to recognise its authority. In sure confidence that God will defend the right we hereto subscribe our names. And further , we individually declare that we have not already signed this Covenant.

Bel/ast The above was signed by me at "Ulster Day," Saturday, 28 September, 1912 Edward Carson God Save the King Public Record Office of Northern Ireland.

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The role of the Ulster Volunteer Force

document 38

This letter opposed the idea of armed rebellion by a force wishing to maintain the connection with Great Britain, and emphasised instead the use of moral persuasion of the kind which the original Volunteers had used with such effect on Lord North in 1779. I quite understand that Unionist Politicians would very much like to be able to assert in their speeches that the Volunteers will undoubtedly come out and fight at the first attempt to administer the Horne Rule Act, but I venture to express a strong hope that this assertion will not be made or encouraged by the leaders of the Unionist Party .... What I am asking for is briefly this - (1) that our men shall not be ordered to mobilise against the forces of the Crown and (2) that they shall not be placed in such a position that they may be branded as cowards if they should remain quiescent when the Horne Rule Act commences to operate. Our political position as Passive Resisters, supported by a large body of arrned Volunteers, should be a strong one - whereas if even a single British soldier or sailor was killed or wounded in Ulster, I am afraid that our future prospects would be extremely gloomy. Lord Dunleath to Sir Edward Carson, 9 March 1915 (59).

Redmond and the Irish Volunteers

document 39

In 1914 on the passing of the third Home Rule Bill Redmond was faced with the problem of trying to control and influence the Irish Volunteers. He wished to secure the sort ofrecognitton for them which Kitchener was willing to grant to those Ulster Volunteers who formed the Ulster Division. He also needed to reassure opinion in England that an Ireland which could now look fotward to self-govemment would loyally support the war effort. The Woodenbridge speech, however, only emphasised thedifferences between theconstitutionalists and those who saw the war as an opportunity to appeal once more to physical force aiming at the separationofIreland from the United Kingdom. This country at this moment is in astate of war, and the duty of the manhood of Ireland is twofold. Its duty is at all cost to defend the 108

Documents shores ofIreland frorn foreign invasion. It has a duty more than that, of taking care that lrish valour proves itself on the field of war as it always has proved itself in the past. The interests of Ireland, of the whole of Ireland, are at stake in this war. This war is undertaken in defence of the highest principles of religion and rnorality and right, and it would be a disgrace for ever to our country ... ifyoung Ireland confined their efforts to rernaining at horne to defend the shores of Ireland frorn an unlikely invasion.... I say to you, therefore, your duty is twofold. I arn glad to see such magnificent material for soldiers around rne, and I say to you: go on drilling and rnake yourselves efficient for the work, and then account for yourselves as rnen, not only in Ireland itself, but wherever the firing-line extends, in defence of right and freedorn and religion in this war. Quoted in Stephen Gwynn, lohn Redmond's Last Years, p. 155.

docurnent 40 Jarnes Connolly's view of the third Horne Rute Bill A left-wing critique of Home RuZe by the founder of the lrish Citizen Army. SubsequentZy Connolly was executed for his Zeading part in Easter Week, 1916. What is a free nation? A free nation is one which possesses absolute control over all its own internal resources and powers, and which has no restriction upon its intercourse with all other nations similarly circurnstanced except the restrietions placed upon it by nature. Is that the case of Ireland? If the Horne Rule Bill were in operation would that be the case ofIreland? To both questions the answer is: no.rnost emphatically, NO! A free nation rnust have cornplete control over its own harbours, to open or close thern at will.... Does Ireland possess such control? No. Will the Horne Rule Bill give such control over Irish harbours in Ireland? It will not. ... How would you like to live in a house if the keys of an the doors of that house were in the pockets of a rival of yours who had often robbed you in the past? ... This is the condition of Ireland today, and will be the condition of Ireland under Redmond and Devlin's precious Horne Rule Bill. A free nation rnust have full power to nurse industries to health, either by governrnent encouragernent or by governrnent prohibition of

109

Documents the sale of goods of foreign rivals.... Ireland has no such power, will have no such power under Horne Rule. A free nation must have full powers to alter, amend, or abolish or modify the laws under which the property of its citizens is held in obedience to the demand of its own citizens for any such alteration, amendment, abolition, or modification. Every free nation has that power; Ireland does not have it, and is not allowed it by the Horne Rule Bill. ... Her postal service, her telegraphs, her wireless, her customs and excise, her coinage, her fighting services, her relations with other nations, her merchant commerce, her property relations, her national activities, her legislative sovereignty - an the things that are essential to a nation's freedom are denied to Ireland now, and are denied to her under the provisions of the Horne Rule Bill. And Irish soldiers in the English Army are fighting in Flanders to win for Belgium, we are told, an those things which the British Empire, now as in the past, denies to Ireland. From the Workers' Republic, 12 February 1916, quoted in P.B. Ellis ed.,James Connolly: Selected Writings, Penguin, 1973 pp. 140-2.

The significance of the 1916 Easter Rising

document 41

lohn Dillon, Nationalist M.P. [or East Clare, made an impassioned speech in the House of Commons in May 1916, waming the Government of the consequences of the policy which they were pursuing in Ireland. Redmond disapproved of this speech, for he and many others could see in it a recognition of the rising support for Sinn Fein which was destined to supplant the parliamentary party in 1918. ladmit they were wrang; I know they were wrong; but they fought a clean fight, and they fought with superb bravery and skill, and no act of savagery or act against the usual custom of war that I know of has been brought horne to any leader or any organized body of insurgents.... As a matter of fact the great bulk of the population were not favourable to the insurrection, and the insurgents themselves, who had confidently counted on a rising of the people in their support, were absolutely disappointed. They got no popular support whatever. What is happening is that thousands of people in Dublin, who ten days aga were bitterly

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Documents opposed to the whole of the Sinn Fein movement and to the rebellion, are now beeoming infuriated against the Government on aeeount of these exeeutions [ofringleaders of' the rebellion] and, as I am informed by letters reeeived this morning, that feeling is spreading throughout the eountry in a most dangerous degree.... We who speak for the vast majority of the Irish people , we who have risked a great deal to win the people to your side in this great crisis of your Empire's history , we who have endeavoured, and successfully endeavoured , to secure that the Irish in America shall not go into alliance with the Germans in that country - we, I think, were entitled to be eonsulted before this bloody course of executions was entered upon in Ireland.

Hansard, 5th ser. vo182, eols, 945, 950.

The partition of Ulster

document 42

The decision to partition the province of Ulstermeant abandonment of Donegal. Cavan andMonaghan and.from the viewpoint of the Unionists in those counties, an abrogation of the terms of the Solemn League and Covenant of 1912. It could be argued that this process of contraction began in 1904 with the formation of the Ulster Unionist Council, an act which implied rejection of the southem Unionist hope ofpreserving the Union for the whole of Ireland. Note the emphasis on sacrifice, something soon to be underlined by the battle of the Somme. Note too, the threat ofmilitant action. We, the delegates eonstituting the Ulster Unionist Council representative of the Unionist population of the Provinee of Ulster , have eonsidered the proposals laid before us for an adjustment of the Home Rule question on the basis of the definite exclusion from the Government of Ireland Aet, 1914 , of the six counties of Ulster, in view of the critieal situation of the Empire arising out of the European war, dec1are as follows: That, as Unionists, proud of our eitizenship in the United Kingdom, we reaffirm our unabated abhorrence of the poliey of Home Rule, whieh we believe to be dangerous to the security of the Empire, subversive of the best interests alike of Ireland and of the United Kingdom ; and we deeline to take any responsibility for setting up such a form of Government in any part of Ireland. As, however, the Cabinet - which is responsible for the Government 111

Documents of the country - is of opinion that it will tend to strengthen the Empire and to win the war in which it is now engaged, if all questions connected with Horne Rule are settled now, instead of - as origina11y agreed - at the termination of the war; and as these suggestions by the Government put before us by Sir Edward Carson have been made with that view; we feel, as loyal citizens , that, in this crisis of the Empire's history , it is our duty to make sacrifices, and we consequently authorise Sir Edward Carson to continue the negotiations on the basis of the suggestion made to this meeting, and to complete them if the details are arranged to his satisfaction. We further desire to make it clear that if, from any cause the negotiations referred to prove abortive, we reserve to ourselves complete freedom of action in the future, in opposition to the policy of Horne Rule for Ireland. Resolution of the Ulster Unionist Council, 12 June 1916 (59) .

The problem of exc1usion

document43

An interesting comparison is drawn in this letter between the six counties to be excluded from Home Rule and the medieval English Pale of Dublin, Louth, Meath and Kildare. There is also the case presented for the six counties as the minimum area to be excluded, large enough to form a significant region o[ the United Kingdom and small enough to ensure Unionist dominance. I think a11 the members of the Irish Unionist Alliance have more or less admitted the correctness of my contention that the necessity of excluding six counties from any scheme of Horne Rule, is in the present state of public opinion in Great Britain and Ireland, by far the most effective barrier against any form of Horne Rule. When, at the time of the Buckingham Palace Conference just before the war, the bone of contention was whether two or four counties should be excluded, the fact that in County Tyrone the Unionists were able to hold the County Council and five of the Distriet Councils was taken together with the evidence that the Protestants in Tyrone paid more than two-thirds of the rates, a strong argument in favour of including Tyrone in the Ulster Pale. The Unionists lost control of Fermanagh County Council by mismanagement. If the Tyrone County Council and most of the District Councils go, the case for the inclusion of Fermanagh and 112

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Tyrone inside the pale will be much weakened, there being an R.C. majority, that is, presumably, aHorne Rule majority, according to the ceIlSUS on both these counties. If the area which is bound to get separate treatment is reduced from six counties to four, it appears to me that the Ulster barrier that now exists against Horne Rule for any part of Ireland is substantially weakened....

H. de F. Montgomery, Blessingbourne, Co. Tyrone, to Lord Farnharn, 25 March 1919, Public Record Office ofNorthern Ireland D627/437.

Balfour's views on Horne Rule in 1921

docurnent 44

A perspicacious analysisofthe complexities ofthe lrish Question shortly after the passage of the Govemment of Ireland Act, 1920 by a statesman who had had a lengthy knowledge of the subject. This is an account of what was said in Cabinet and recorded in Thomas Jones, 'Whitehall Diary' (79).

Balfour: A phrase occurred in one of the letters about 'an opportunity of bringing peace to the country'. But the Horne Rule Act is the seizing of that opportunity. We have given it in full measure. Why should we modify it or give it on other terms? If you are going to negotiate, it means you are going to alter the terms.... Underlying all the superfieial strata of the Horne Rule controversy there was this fundamental difficulty: - the Horne Rulers said, 'This is not justice to Ireland'. Behind lrish politics, behind the moderates, there is the real force making for change and that force always makes for independence, which this Cabinet won't give. If you have a truce you'll modify fiscal proposals in the direction of Dominion Horne Rule; then again, the people who want a Republic will still want it; ... I want no further concessions made, for if made they'll only strengthen the Republicans. The main thing we hope for from the Horne Rule Act is - not that Ireland is going to be better governed but that we've made our Irish policy on all fours with OUT European policy of self-determination, and which no American can say is unfair. Thomas Jones, (79), pp. 64-5.

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Bibliography EIGHTEENTH~ENTURYBACKGROUND EIGHTEENTH~ENTURY

1 Beckett, J.C. The Making 0/ Modern Ireland 1603-1923, Faber, 1969. 2 Beckett, J .C. Confrontation. Studies in lrish History , Faber, 1972. 3 Beckett, J.C. The Anglo-Irish Tradition , Faber 1976. 4 Bolton, G.C. ThePassingo/theIrishAeto/Union,Oxford , 1966. 5 Cullen, L.M ~ , ed. The Formation 0/ the Irish Economy, Mercier Press, 1969. 6 Farrell, B., ed . The Irish Parliamentary Tradition, Gill and Macmillan, 1973. 7 Johnston, Edith M. Ireland in the Eighteenth Century (Gill History of Ireland, 8), Gill and Macmillan, 1974. 8 Lecky, W.E.H. History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century, 5 vols. Longmans, Green, 1892; abridged (with an introduction by L.P. Curtis, Jr), Chicago University Press, 1972. 9 Lecky, W.E.H. Leaders 0/ Publie Opinion in Ireland, Longmans Green, 1903. (Essays on Swift , Flood, Grattan and O'Connell.) 10 Moody , T.w. and Martin, F .x., eds. The Course of Irish History , Mercier Press, 1967 . 11 Mitchison, R. A History 0/ Seotland , Methuen, 1970. 12 O'Connell, M.R. Irish Politics and Social Conflict in the Age 0/ the Ameriean Revolution, Philadelphia, 1965.

IRELAND IN THE UNITEDKINGDOM

13 Beckett, J.C. and Glasscock , R. , eds. Bel/ast: the Ortgin and Growth 0/ an Industrial City, B.B.C., 1967. 14 Brown , T.N . Irish-American Nationalism, Philadelphia and New York, Lippincott , 1966 . 15 Budge, I. and O'Leary, C. Bel/ast: Approach to Crisis. A study 0/ Bel/ast politics, 1613-1970, Macmillan, 1973 . 16 Ensor, R.C. England 1870-1914 (Oxford History of England , xiv),Oxford, 1960. 17 James, R.R. The British Revolution, British politics, 1880-1939 I. From Gladstone to Asquith, 1880-1914, Hamish Hamilton, 1976. 18 Jones, M.A. American Immigration, University of Chicago, 1960. 19 Kee, R. The Green Flag. A History oflrish Nationalism , Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972. 20 Lee, J . The Modernisation of' Irish Society, 1848-1918 (Gill History of Ireland, 10), Gill and Macmillan, 1973. 114

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21 Lyons, F .S.L. Ireland Sinee the Famine, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971; Fontana, 1973; rev. ed, 1974. 22 McCaffrey, LJ. The lrish Question, 1880-1922, University of Kentucky, 1968. 23 MacDonagh, O. Ireland, Prentice-Hall, NJ., 1968. 24 McDowell, R.B.British Conservatism, 1832-1914, Faber, 1959. 25 McDowell, R.B. The lrish Administration, 1801-1914, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964. 26 McDowell, R.B. The Chureh ofIreland, 1869-1969, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. 27 Mansergh, N. The lrish Question, 1840-1921, Allen & Unwin, 1965 (revised version of Ireland in the Age ofReform and Revolution, 1940). 28 Moody, T.W. and Beckett, J.C., eds. Ulster since 1800, IA politieal and eeonomie survey; Il. A social survey, B.B.C., 1955, 1957. 29 Murphy, J.A. Ireland in the Twentieth Century (Gm History of Ireland, 11), Gm and Macmillan, 1975. 30 O'Broin, L. Revolutionary Underground. The story of the Irish Republiean Brotherhood 1858-1924, Gill and Macmillan, 1976. 31 O'Tuathaigh, G. Ireland before the Famine 1798-1848 (Gm History of Ireland, 9), Gill and Macmillan, 1972. 32 Pomfret, J.E. The Struggle for Land in Ireland, 1800-1925, New York,1930. 33 Schrier, A. Ireland and the Ameriean Emigration 1850-1900, Minnesota, 1958; Russell & Russell, N.Y., 1970. 34 Solow, B. The Land Question and the lrish Economy, 18701903, Harvard, 1971. 35 Strauss, E. Irish Nationalism and British Demoeraey, Methuen, 1951. PARLIAMENT AND PEOPLE FROM O'CONNELL TO PARNELL

36 Cooke, A.B. and Vincent, J.R. The Governing Passion. Cabinet government and party polities in Britain 1885-86, Harvester Press, 1974. 37 Curtis, L.P. Coercion and Coneiliation in Ireland, 1880-92. A study in Conservative Unionism, Princeton, N.J., 1963. 38 Davitt, M. The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland, Harper, 1904; Irish University Press, 1970. 39 Feuchtwanger, E.J. Gladstone, Allen Lane, 1975. 40 Hammond, J.L. Gladstone and the lrish Nation, Longmans, 1938. 41 Hurst, M. Parnell and Irish Nationalism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968. 115

Bibliography 42 Lyons, F.S.L. The Fall of Parne1l1890-91, Routledge & Kegan Paul,1960. 43 Lyons, F .S.L. lohn Dillon: a Biography , Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968. 44 McDowell, R.B. Public Opinion and Government Policy in Ireland, 1801-1846, Faber, 1952. 45 MacIntyre, A. The Liberator. Daniel 0 'Connell and the lrish Party 1830-47, Macmillan, 1965. 46 Magnus, Sir P. Gladstone, Murray, 1954. 47 Moody, T.W.,ed. The Fenian Movement, Mercier Press, 1968. 48 Morley, J. The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, 2 vols, Lloyd, 1930. 49 Nowlan, K.B. The Politics of Repeal. A study in the relations between Great Britain and Ireland, 1841-50, Routledge & Kegan Paul,1965. 50 O'Brien, C.C. Parnelland his Party, 1880-90, Oxford, 1962. 51 O'Brien, R.B. The Life of Charles Stewart Parne1l1846-1891, 2 vols, Smith, EIder, 1898. 52 O'Donnell, F.H. History of the lrish Parliamentary Party, 2 vols, Longmans, 1910. 53 Sheehy-Skeffington, F. Michael Davitt. Revolutionary agitator and Labour leader, Fisher Unwin, 1908; MacGibbon & Kee, 1967. 54 Thornley, D.IsaacButt and Home Rule, MacGibbon & Kee, 1964. 55 Whyte, J.H. ThelndependentlrishParty, 1850-59, Oxford, 1958. HOME RULE - THE FINAL CRISIS

56 Armour, W.S. Armour ofBallymoney, Duckworth, 1934. 57 Buckland, P. lrish Unionism, I. The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland 1885-1922, Gill and Macmillan, 1972. 58 Buckland, P. Irish Unionism, Il. Ulster Unionism and the origins ofNorthern Ireland 1886-1922, Gill and Macmillan, 1973. 59 Buckland, P. Irish Unionism 1885-1923: a documentary history, H.M.S.O., Belfast, 1973. 60 Davis, R. ArthurGriffitn and non-violent Sinn Fein, Anvil, 1974. 61 Digby, M. Horace Plunkett. An Anglo-American lrishman, Blackwell, 1949. 62 Edwards, O.D. and Pyle, F. 1916. The Easter Rising, MacGibbon & Kee, 1968. 63 Gibbon, P. The Ortgins of Ulster Unionism. The formation of popular Protestant politics and ideology in nineteenth-century Ireland, Manchester University, 1975. 64 Jenkins, R. Asquith, Collins, 1964. 116

Bibliography 6S Keir, Sir D.L. The Constitutional History of Modern Britain 1485-1937, A. and C. Black, 1943. 66 Lyons, F.S.L. The Irish parliamentary party, 1890-1910, Faber, 1951. 67 McDowell, R.ß. The lrish Convention, 1917-18, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. 68 Mackail, J.W. and Wyndham, G. Life and Letters of George Wyndham, 2 vols, Hutchinson, 1925. 69 Marjoribanks, J. and Colvin, I. Life of Lord Carson, Gollanz, 1932-36. 70 Martin, F,X" ed. Leaders and Men of the Easter Rising: Dublin 1916, Methuen, 1967. 71 Nowlan, K.B., ed. The Making of 1916: studies in the history of The Rising, Stationery Office, Dublin, 1969. 72 O'Brien, C.C., ed. The Shaping of Modern Ireland, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960. (Essays on Douglas Hyde, Michael Cusack, John Redmond, T.M. Healy, Arthur Griffith and Sir Edward Carson.) 73 O'Broin, L. The Chief Secretary. Augustine Birrell in Ireland, Chatto & Windus, 1969. 74 Stewart, A.T.Q. The Ulster Crisis, Faber, 1967. 75 Wilson, J. C.-B., a Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Constable, 1973. PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN MODERN IRELAND

76 Barritt, D.P. and Carter, C.F. The Northern Ireland Problem, Oxford,1962. 77 Chubb, B. The Government and Politics ofIreland, Stanford and Oxford, 1970. 78 Hull, R.H. The Irish Triangle. Conflict in Northern Ireland, Princeton, N.J., 1976. 79 Jones, T. WhitehallDiary, III Ireland 1918-1925, ed. K. Middlemass, Oxford, 1971. 80 Lawrence, R.J. The Government of Northern Ireland: Public Finance and Public Services, 1921-1964, Oxford, 1965. 81 McCracken, J.L. Representative Government in Ireland. Dail Eireann 1919-48, Oxford, 1958. 82 McManus, F., ed. The Years ofthe Great Test 1926-39, Mercier, 1967. 83 Mansergh, N. The Irish Free State: its government and politics, Allen & Unwin, 1934. 84 Mansergh, N. The Government of Northern Ireland: A study in 117

Bibliography devolution, Allen & Unwin, 1936. 8S Rose, R. Goveming without Consensus, Faber, 1971. 86 Whyte, J.H. Church and State in Modem Ireland 1923-70, GilI and Macmillan, 1971. 87 Wilson, T., ed. Ulster under Horne Rule, Oxford, 1955. ESSAYS ANDARTICLES

(Abbreviation: IHS - Irish Historical Studies) 88 Beckett, J.C. 'Carson - Unionist and rebel', in Martin, ed. (70), pp. 81-94. 89 Boyce, D.G. 'British conservative opinion, the Ulster question, and the partition of Ireland, 1912-21', IHS, xvii, no. 65 (1970) pp. 89-112. 90 Buckland, P. 'The unity ofUlster Unionism, 1886-1939',History, Ix, no. 199. (1975), pp. 211-33. 91 Fanning, R. 'The Unionist Party and Ireland 1906-10', IHS, xv, no. 58 (1966), pp. 147-71. 92 Hawkins, R. 'Gladstone, Forster and the release of Parnell, 18828', IHS, xvi, no. 64 (1969), pp. 417-45. 93 Hepburn, A.C. 'The lrish council bilI and the fall of Sir Anthony MacDonnell, 1906-7', inIHS, xvii, no. 68 (1971), pp. 470-88. 94 Howard, C.D.H. 'Joseph Chamberlain, Parnell and the Central Board scheme',IHS, viii, no. 32 (1953), pp. 324-61. 9S Jupp, P. 'Irish M.P.s at Westminster in the early nineteenth century', Historical Studies, vii, ed. J .C. Beckett, Belfast, 1969. 96 Kennedy, B. 'Sharman Crawford's federal scheme for Ireland', in H.A. Cronne, T.W. Moody and D.B. Quinn, eds, Essays in British and Irish History in Honour of James Eadie Todd, Muller, 1949, pp. 235-54. 97 Lee, J. 'Grattan's Parliament', in B. Farrell, ed., The Irish Parliamentary Tradition, pp. 149-59. 98 Lyons, F .S.L. 'The Irish Unionist Party and the devolution crisis of 1904-5',/HS, vi, no. 21 (1948), pp. 1-22. 99 Lyons, F .S.L. 'DilIon, Redmond and the Irish Horne Rulers', in Martin, ed. (70), pp. 29-42. 100 Lyons, F.S.L. 'The two faces of Horne Rule', Nowlan, ed. (71), pp. 99-124. 101 Lyons, F .S.L. 'Decline and fall of the Nationalist Party', Edwards and Pyle, eds. (62), pp. 52-61. 102 Lyons, F.S.L. 'John DilIon and the plan ofcampaign, 1886-90', IHS, xiv, no. 56 (1965), pp. 313-47. 103 Lyons, F .S.L. 'Charles Stewart Parnell'; and 'The Irish Parliamen-

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tary Party', in Farrell, ed. (6), pp. 181-94 and 195-207. 104 Lyons, F.S.L. 'The passingofthe Irish Parliamentary Party (191618)', in T.D. Williams,ed., The lrish Struggle 1916-26, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966, pp. 95-106. 105 McCaffrey, L.I. 'Horne Rule and the General Election of 1874', IHS, ix, no. 34 (1954), pp. 190-212. 106 McCaffrey, L.I. 'Irish Federalisrn in the 1870s: a study in conservative nationalism' , Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, new ser.lü, 6. 107 McCready, H.W. 'Horne Rule and the Liberal Party, 1899-1906', IHS, xiii, no. 52 (1963), pp. 316-48. 108 McDonagh, O. 'The contribution of O'Connell', in Farrell, ed., The lrish Parliamentary Tradition, pp. 160-9. 109 Mansergh,N. 'TheGovernrnent ofIreland Act, 1920', in Historical Studies, ix (ed. I.G. Barry), Blackstaff, 1974, pp. 19-48. 110 Moody, T.W. 'The new departure in Irish politics, 1878-9', in H.A. Cronne, T.W. Moody and D.B. Quinn, eds. Essays in British and lrish History , Muller, 1949, pp. 303-33. 111 Moody, T.W. 'The Times versus Parnell & Co., 1887-90' in Historical Studies, vi (ed. T.W.Moody) Dublin, 1968, pp. 147-82. 112 Moody, T.W. Thomas Davis 1814-45. A centenary address, Hodges, Figgis, 1945. 113 Nowlan, K.B. 'The rneaningof repeal in Irish history', in Historical Studies, iv (ed. G.A. Hayes-McCoy), Dublin, 1963. 114 Quinn, D.B. 'Ireland and sixteenth-century European Expansion' in Historical Studies, i (ed. T.D. Williams), Bowes, 1958. 115 Savage, D.C. 'The origins of the Ulster Unionist Party, 1885-6' in IHS, xii, no. 47 (1961) pp. 185-208. 116 Steele, E.D. 'Gladstone and Ireland', in IHS, xvii, no. 65 (1970), pp. 55-88. 117 Thornley, D. 'The Irish conservativesand Horne Rule, 1869-73', in IHS, xi, no. 43 (March 1959), pp. 200-22. 118 Thornley, D. 'The Irish Horne Rule party and parliarnentary obstruction, 1874-87', in IHS, xii, no. 45 (1960), pp. 38-57. 119 Walker, B. 'The Irish electorate, 1868-1915', in IHS, xviii, no. 71 (1973), pp. 359-406. 120 Ward, AJ. 'Arnerica and the Irish problem, 1899-1921', in IHS, xvi, no. 61 (1968), pp. 64-90. Addenda 121 Lyons, F.S.L. Chor/esStewart Parnell, Collins, 1977. 122 O'Day, A. The English Face of lrish Nationalism, Gill and Macrnillan, 1977. 119

Index

allen church, 23,46,74; see also Church of Ireland America, 2,3,4,12, 13,14,18,19, 23,27,30,40,71,98 Anglo-Irish relations, 12, 37, 38, 45,75,78; 'Treaty' (1921), 66 Asquith, H.H., 56, 59, 61, 62, 63 Balfour, A., 31,42-3,50,53,113 Belfast, 2,4,10,11,17,32,33,53, 57,59,66,69,71,77,78,95, 104,107 Biggar,J.G. (1828-90), 17,25,81,84 Boycott, Capt., 24; boycotting, 51 Bright, J., 33, 43, 93, 94, 97 Bryce, J. (Chief Sec. for Ireland, 1905-7),39,55 Butt, I. (1813-79), 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19,20,22,24,56,71,77,81,82 Carson, Sir Edw. (1854-1935),43, 49,57,59,61,107,108,112 Catholic(s), 3,4,6,7,14,20,21,28, 32,34,38,70,105 Cavendish, Lord Frederick (Chief Sec. for Ireland, 1882), 28, 30 Charnberlain, J., 29, 33, 38, 54, 85, 89,90,91,99 Church of Ireland (Anglican), 5, 8, 12, 13,38,71,74,93 coercion,25,28,30,32,34,40, 92,101,102 Compensation for DisturbanceBill (1881),24,27 Conservative Party, 14, 15,23,24,29, 30,41,47,57,91 Crawford, S. (1781-1861),9,10,13, 15, 75, 76, 78 Dail Eireann (1919), 66 Davis, T. (1814-45), 10,58,78 Davitt, M. (1846-1906), 20,21,22, 28,47,51,85,103 Declaratory Acts (1719, 1766),2,3 devolution, 35, 36, 38, 39, 46, 47, 51·3,54,60,68,72,73,89,104

120

Dillon, J. (1851-1921), 23, 25, 28, 42,43,51,64,110 Disraeli, B., 15,23,24,74 Dissenters, 3,4,8,71 Dublin,2,4,9, 10, 13, 14,26,30,32, 34,35,39,48,51,55,63,68,72, 75,79,110,112; University, (Trinity College), 2, 12,57,59,64; Castle,3,5,34,36,54 Easter Week, 1916, 5, 63,109,110 Elections, General: (1874) 15; (1880) 23,91;(1885) 31,86,91; (1886) 41; (1906) 53,54;(1910) 56; (1918) 64,65 emigration, 11,42, 70 Encumbered Estates Act, 20 evictions, 21, 24-7, 42 Farnine (the Great Hunger), 10, 11, 12,70,71,78 Federalism (ist), 9, 10, 14, 19, 21, 38, 61,75,76,79,98 Fenians (Irish Republican Brotherhood),4,12,13,17,18,19,20, 22,30,42 finance, 2, 5,34,35-6,38,45,51, 52,54,55,56,60,67,68 Forster, W.E. (Chief Sec. for Ireland, 1880-2),25,26,28,87 Gladstone, W.E., 11-15 passim, 23-47

pasrim,54,71,81,84,86,90-106 passim

Government of Ireland: Act (1914) 111; (1920) 64, 65-9, 72, 113 Grattan, H. (1746-1820), 3,4,5,15, 18, 68, 70; Grattan's Parliarnent, 34,38,48,68,70,88,91,96 Hartington, Lord, 31, 33, 38, 91 Healy, T.M. (1855-1931),23,56,66 Horne Rule; Association of Great Britain, 20; Bill (1886) 67, 100, 106, (1893) 45, 56, (1912) 59, 108, 109,110; Confederation (1875) 19 Hyde, D. (1860-1949),47,49

Ireland: kingdom of, 1, 2, 5; Northern, 65-{i9 passim, 73; Southern, 65, 66 lrish: -Amerieans, 21, 23, 36, 45, 71, 88,97,111; citizen army, 63,109; Conservatives, 32, 36,52,53, see also Unionists; Couneil Bill, 54-5; Free State, 64, 66; Liberals, 32, 33; Loyal and Patriotie Union, 32, 92, 95,100; M.P.s, 16, 26, 35,44,45, 48, 55; Nationalists, 15,22, 23, 36, 38,49,53,56,57,61,65,68,91, 93, 97;Parliamentary party, 12, 17,22-31 passim, 37, 41, 47, 49, 51-{i passim, 62-5 passim, 70, 83, 84,102: Republican Brotherhood, 4,11,49,62,63; Unionist Alliance, 52,100,112; Volunteers, 62, 63, 64,108 Kickham, C. (1826-82),21,22 Kilbrandon Report (1973), 60 Lalor, F. (1808-49), 10,20,21,43 Land: Aet (1870) 13,26,27, (1881) 13,26,27,28,42,92,(1887)43, (1903) 51; Committee, 51; League, 24-8 passim, 42, 44, 51; lords, 13, 14,15,21,22,26,27,38,51 Liberals, 13-17 passim, 23-57 passim, 80,86,91,93 Lloyd George, D. 55,61,64,65 local government, 28, 29, 35, 39,45, 86, 87, 89;Act (1898) 49, 50, 89 McCarthy, J., 45,97,101 MeDonnell, Sir A., 52, 54, 55, 104 MeNeill,Prof. Eoin. (1867-1945),47 62,63 Manchester 'martyrs', 13, 19 Morley, J., 29, 33,44, 85, 94,101 'new departure', the, 22, 36, 71 'No rent' manifesto, 28 Northern Ireland, see under Ireland 'No taxation without representation', 35,38,45 O'Brien, W. (1852-1928),42,43,50, 51,56,62,64 obstruction, parliamentary, 17, 19, 20,24,25,80,83,84 O'Connell, D. (1775-1847), 7-17 passim, 22, 33, 70, 72, 74,80 Orange(ism), 12, 14, 15, 32; 'eard', the, 33, 94 Parnell, C.S. (1846-91), 11-32 passim,

36-48 passim, 56, 71,80,82,85, 87,88,91,98·103 passim Parnellites, 23, 29, 30, 39, 41, 45, 56 Phoenix Park murders (1882), 28, 33, 43,44 Pitt, W., 4, 5, 11 Plunkett, Sir H., 50, 51,103 Privy Counei1: English, 1, 77; lrish, 1; judicial committee of the, 39, 60 Protection of Property and Persons Act, (1881), 26 Protestant, 2, 4, 7,11,13,15,32,33, 63,65,70,71,72,80,98,99,107 Radieals, 3, 4, 32,42,71,77 rebellion (1798), 4,11,71 Redmond, J. (1856-1918),49, 53-{i passim, 62-4 passim, 71, 73,87, 108-10 passim Reform Act: (1867) 13; (1884) 29,31 Renunciation Act (1793), 3 Royal lrish Constabulary, 8, 35, 36, 43,60 Salisbury, Lord, 29-33 passim, 41, 43, 65,91,101,106 Seotland, 2, 5,10,30,39,41,60,61, 72,73,101 Secret Ballot Act (1872),15,18,24 separation, Ireland from Great Britain, 4,8,12,27,38,39,45,48,62,63, 64,72 Sinn Fein,49, 55, 63, 66,103,110,111 Stormont (N. Ireland Parliament), 68,69 Tone, T.W. (1763-98),4,6,8,78 Ulster, 8, 9,15,18,26,30,32,33,37, 40,43,52, 53,56,57,59,61-{i pa~im, 70,71,72,95,98,99,104, passim, 92 108,111 Union, Great Britain and Ireland, 2,4,5,7,11,23,38,39,45,65, 71,93 Unionists, 12, 13, 14,32,37,49,53, 56,57,61-5 passim, 92 United States of America, 3,5,6, 8-12 passim, 15, 18-23 passim, 38,63,65,70-7 passim, 87,102 Wh~s,8,16,25,29,38, 77,80 United States of America, Wyndham, G. (Chief Sec. for Ireland, 1902-5),51-2 Young Irelanders,4, 10, 12, 13,14,20, 42,78

121