Holy War and Rapprochement English: Studies in the Relations between the Mamluk Sultanate and the Mongol Ilkhanate (1260-1335) 9782503531526, 2503531520

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HOLY WAR AND RAPPROCHEMENT Studies in the Relations between the Mamluk Sultanate and the Mongol Ilkhanate (1260-1335)

MIROIR DE L’ORIENT MUSULMAN Directeur de la collection Denise AIGLE &onVeil VcientiÀTue Denise AIGLE (Directrice d’études à l’EPHE-UMR 8167 « Orient & Méditerranée ») Reuven AMITAI (Professeur à l’Université hébraïque de Jérusalem) Michele BERNARDINI (Professeur à l’Université de Naples « L’Orientale ») Michal BIRAN (Professeur à l’Université hébraïque de Jérusalem) Antoine BORRUT (Professeur assistant à l’Université du Maryland) Abdallah CHEIKH MOUSSA (Professeur à l’Université Paris 4) Alain DESREUMAUX (Directeur de recherche émérite au CNRS-UMR 8167 « Orient & Méditerranée ») Anne-Marie EDDÉ (Directrice de recherche au CNRS-Institut de recherche et d’histoire des textes) Pierre LORY (Directeur d’études à l’EPHE-UMR 8584 « Laboratoire d’études sur les monothéismes ») Corinne LEFEVRE-AGRATI (Chargée de recherche au CNRS-UMR 8564 « Centre d’études de l’Inde et de l’Asie du Sud ») Charles MELVILLE (Professeur à l’Université de Cambridge) Françoise MICHEAU (Professeur à l’Université Paris 1-UMR 8167 « Orient & Méditerranée ») Christian ROBIN (Directeur de recherche au CNRS-UMR 8167 « Orient & Méditerranée »)

MIROIR DE L’ORIENT MUSULMAN

HOLY WAR AND RAPPROCHEMENT Studies in the Relations between the Mamluk Sultanate and the Mongol Ilkhanate (1260-1335)

Reuven AMITAI

F

Cover illustration Two Warriors in Combat (detail). Painting mounted in an album. Tabriz (?), Iran, ca. 1470-1490. ,VWDQEXO7RSNDS×6DUD\×0]HVL0V+IROE5HSURGXFHGZLWKNLQGSHUPLVVLRQRI WKH7RSNDS×6DUD\×0]HVL

© 2013 Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. D/2013/0095/259 ISBN 978-2-503-53152-6 Printed on acid-free paper

For Carina

Behold, a people cometh from the north, And a great nation and many kings Shall be roused from the uttermost parts of the earth They lay hold on bow and spear, They are cruel, and have no compassion; Their voice is like the roaring sea, And they ride upon horses; Set in array, as a man for war, Against thee, O daughter of Babylon. Jeremiah, 50:41-42

ABBREVIATIONS

AEMA

Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi

BSOAS

Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies

CAJ

Central Asiatic Journal

CIAP

Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum Palaestinae (Leiden: Brill, 1997-)

EI

Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition (Leiden: Brill, 1960-2002)

EI3

Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3rd edition, online

HJAS

Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies

IA

Annales Islamologiques

JAOS

Journal of the American Oriental Society

JESHO

Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient

JRAS

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society

JSAI

Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam

JSS

Journal of Semitic Studies

MHR

Mediterranean Historical Review

MSR

Mamluk Studies Review

RCEA

Répertoire chronologique de l’épigraphie arabe (Cairo, 1931-)

REI

Revue des Études Islamiques

RHR

Revue de l’Histoire des Religions

SI

Studia Islamica

TMEN

G. Doerfer, Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen (Wiesbaden, 1963-75), 4 vols.

2

Introduction

The relations between the Mamluk Sultanate of Syria and Egypt and the Mongol states of Iran and the steppes north of the Black Sea (the socalled Ilkhanate and Golden Horde respectively) have occupied me for VRPHWZHQW\ÀYH\HDUVVLQFHP\0$VWXGLHVDWWKH+HEUHZ8QLYHUVLW\RI Jerusalem. These relations were of a military, political-diplomatic, social or cultural nature, and they had a profound impact not only on these states themselves, their ruling elites and the general population, but also on neighboring regions and beyond. One can scarcely understand the history of the eastern Mediterranean, Anatolia (Rum), Arabia, the Caucasus and elsewhere without taking into consideration these complicated relations, and their impact was felt in the other Mongol states to the east, and in the more westerly and northern parts of Europe. We can perhaps even speak of a thirteenth century “world war”: on one side were arrayed the Mamluks, the Golden Horde, Genoa (mostly), the Byzantine empire (again, most of the time), and for a short while the kingdom of Sicily under the +RKHQVWDXIHQZKLOHRQWKHRWKHUVLGHZHÀQGWKH,ONKDQDWHWKH9HQHWLDQV (albeit trading with the Mamluks), western Europe, the Papacy, the Armenians of both the Caucasus and Cilicia, and Georgia. To these alignments we could add minor, but still important players, such as the Bedouin of Syria, the Seljuqs of Rum, the Turcoman of that country, and other local elements. Far away, the Mongols of Central Asia and the Great Khan also had an impact on affairs along the Mediterranean coast and southwest Asia. But this was not only a matter of war, which between the Mamluks and Ilkhanid Mongols continued from 1260 to ca. 1320. There were intricate diplomatic relations; polemics and ideological sparring; defections, LPPLJUDWLRQV DQG WUDQVIHUV RI SRSXODWLRQV FXOWXUDO LQÁXHQFHV DQG WKH impact on social life, economics and demography. This is complicated but interesting stuff indeed. In this small volume, I have attempted to give an overview of certain salient aspects of these relations between the Mamluk Sultanate (first established in Egypt in 1250, taking over Syria in 1260, and lasting until 1517) and the Mongols of Iran and the surrounding countries (starting there around 1220, the all but independent Ilkhanate from ca. 1260 to 1335, and smaller successor states for several decades onward). While touching on the role of the Golden Horde (enemy of the Ilkhanate and ally of the Mamluks), I have deliberately not devoted much space to it. Rather, my hope here is to present some of my thoughts and conclusions (a few still tentative, I confess) on an issue of major importance in Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, Asian and World history: the Mamluk-Ilkhanid war, its cessation and its implications. Certainly, there are aspects of these relations which are not treated here, or have been dealt with in only a cursory way, let alone many

10 | INTRODUCTION

matters related to both Mamluk and Mongol history that are left here untouched. I have certainly not provided here a chronological rendition of either military affairs or diplomatic missions. I can only hope that a short volume of this nature will be of use and interest to those delving into the intricacies of Mamluk-Mongol relations, providing some insight, and perhaps also of interest for scholars and students from other fields in Islamic and Mongol studies, as well as other historical specialties. 7KHYROXPHLVGLYLGHGLQWRIRXUFKDSWHUVWKHÀUVWRIZKLFKVHWVWKHVFHQH with a summary of the military aspects, certainly the dominant theme of these relations, at least until 1320. This chapter will discuss the dynamics RIFRQÁLFWZKLFKWRP\PLQGFDQEHVXPPHGXSLQWKHSKUDVH´0RQJRO aggression, Mamluk countermeasures.” Soldiers, tactics and strategies will EH FRPSDUHG DV ZLOO PDWWHUV RI IRUWLÀFDWLRQ HVSLRQDJH WKH ERUGHU ZDU clandestine warfare, and the search for a second front and other diplomatic démarches:LWKRXWJRLQJLQWRGHWDLOVWKHPDMRUÀHOGEDWWOHVZLOOEHGLVFXVVHG as will the question as to why the Mamluks were ultimately successful in the sixty year war. This chapter goes chronologically beyond my earlier book 0RQJROVDQG0DPOXNV7KH0DPOXNƺONKöQLG:DU (Cambridge University Press, 1995) and takes into account subsequent scholarship. The second chapter is entitled “Holy War: Mamluk Jihad vs. the Mongol Mandate from Heaven.” While the jihadi nature of the Mamluk state has been noted by many scholars, the fact that the Mongols were also waging a type of holy war has not received the attention that it deserves. The ideological-religious motives of both sides and the polemic between them will be compared and studied up to the end of the thirteenth century, when the Islamization of the Mongols in Iran passed a decisive threshold. It is at that point that we can discern the altering of the legitimizing effort of the Mongols and the changing nature of the ideological polemic between them and their Mamluk enemies. The changing ideological struggle in the aftermath of the conversion of the Ilkhanid Mongols to Islam will be discussed in Chapter Three. From the end of the thirteenth century, two Muslim enemies now square off. The Mongols, however, continue their aggressive policies towards the Mamluks, adding Islamic to their traditional Mongolian ideological motifs. 7KH0DPOXNVRQWKHRWKHUKDQGÀQGWKHZD\WRDQVZHUWKLVLGHRORJLFDO challenge. The “peace process” and its culmination (ca. 1320) will be discussed, as will the implications of the transition to peace on both ruling elites and the states that they ruled. In the last chapter, I will look at the Mongols and Mamluks from a different perspective, by comparing the way these two military elites of Eurasian steppe provenance presented themselves towards the Muslim societies that they ruled. From the beginning of their reign, the Mamluks employed a series of strategies to gain the support of the civilian population, not the least emphasizing their roles as defenders of Islam and the Muslims. The Mongols, on the other hand, initially devoted little if any efforts to winning legitimacy from their subject populations, but were

INTRODUCTION | 11

concerned rather with their ideological authority vis-à-vis both the TurcoMongolian ruling elites and the common tribesmen. In the aftermath of their conversion, however, they quickly adopted models of Muslim political culture, and sought therefore to present themselves as ideal Muslim rulers. In this way, they grew to resemble the Seljuq Sultans of two centuries before, and in some aspects they also drew close to certain political modes that characterized the Mamluks, their erstwhile enemies with whom they eventually made peace. The Mongols, however, did not forget their Inner Asian RULJLQVDQGHOHPHQWVRIVWHSSHSROLWLFDOFXOWXUHFRQWLQXHGWRSOD\DVLJQLÀFDQW role long after their islamization, and even collapse as a unitary state in Iran and the nearby countries. This comparative approach should shed new light on both ruling elites, and perhaps better explain some elements of the changing relations between them over the decades. While this study is based on a reading of primary sources and relevant modern research literature, here and there I have thought it appropriate to employ concepts from either modern history or the social sciences (e.g., ideology, imperialism and legitimacy). While I cannot claim a particularly SURIRXQGNQRZOHGJHRIWKHODWWHUGLVFLSOLQHV,KDYHDWWHPSWHGWRGHÀQH these concepts precisely, in a way that will be acceptable to at least some social scientists and historians of the modern era. * There has been a virtual explosion of publications related to both the Mamluks and Mongols in recent decades. Regarding the former, the now biannual publication of the Mamluk Studies Review, published for over a decade at the University of Chicago, provides clear evidence of the proliferating study of the Mamluk Sultanate, not only of the ruling elite, but also the society over which they ruled. A recent article by Stephan Conermann also provides a useful survey of some of the outstanding examples of new UHVHDUFKLQWKLVÀHOGSDUWLFXODUO\LQ*HUPDQ1 For the history of the Mongols during the time of the united empire and the successor states, a good picture of recent research is provided by the comprehensive article by Peter Jackson,2DQGODWHO\WKHQHZÀQDOFKDSWHUQR LQWKHVHFRQGHGLWLRQRI The Mongols by David Morgan.3 Here too, we see a thriving and dynamic ÀHOGRIUHVHDUFK,WLVQRWVXUSULVLQJWKDWJLYHQWKLVÁRZHULQJRIVFKRODUO\ activity in both Mamluk and Mongol studies, several scholars have been particularly instrumental in helping me to develop my own thinking in recent years, and provided me with much of the framework for my own studies, some of which can be said to be in dialogue with their work. 1. S. Conermann, “Es boomt! Die Mamlukenforschung (1992-2002),” in S. Conermann and A. PistorHatam (eds.), Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur der Mamlukenzeit. Zum Gedenken an Ulrich Haarmann  (Schenefeld, 2003), 1-70. 2. P. Jackson, “The State of Research: the Mongol Empire, 1986-1999,” Journal of Medieval History, 26 (2000), 189-210. 3. D. Morgan, The Mongols, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Malden, MA and Carlton, Victoria, 2007).

12 | INTRODUCTION

The series of essays on the Yasa, or Mongol law, by my late mentor David Ayalon (1914-1998) are a starting point for the discussion of various aspects of Mongol-Mamluk relations.4:KLOHWKHVHDUWLFOHVPD\QRWDWÀUVWVHHPD OLNHO\SODFHWRVWDUWIRUWKLVÀHOGWKH\DUHIXOORIUHOHYDQWLQIRUPDWLRQDQG insights, not just on the impact of the Yasa on the Mamluk Sultanate, but on the larger question of Mongol-Mamluk relations. John Masson Smith, Jr., has produced a series of learned and thought-provoking papers on aspects of the Mamluk-Ilkhanid war, stressing the importance of logistical issues. While I do not always agree with Prof. Smith’s conclusions, his ideas and analysis are impressive and innovative and have revolutionized our thinkLQJDERXWZDUIDUHLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWLQWKHODWH0LGGOH$JHVÀUVWDQGIRUHmost between Mamluks and Mongols.5 I will return to these matters in due course below. David Morgan, my former teacher in London, has also taken up the matter of logistics and likewise has touched upon some of the larger issues of Mamluk-Mongol relations.6 I have found inspiration and knowledge throughout the books and articles of Peter Jackson, who was also one of my doctoral supervisors. Even those studies that do not impinge directly on the topic of this book have provided me with valuable background and context. His latest book on 7KH0RQJROVDQGWKH:HVW7 will surely long remain the standard study of the complicated connections between the Ilkhanids and the European rulers (and much more besides). One can scarcely now conceive of working on Mongol-Mamluk relations without recourse to this seminal study by Prof. Jackson’s for the larger context and diplomatic picture. Several scholars have worked consistently over the past years to produce a respectable body of work dealing with Mongol-Mamluk affairs, not so much in the military sphere, but rather in the realms of politics, diplomacy, culture and ideology. All scholars have combined in their work Arabic material from the Mamluk Sultanate with the various sources emanating form the Ilkhanate, most importantly in Persian. Only the thorough and integrated use of both bodies of sources can lead to a profound understanding of the relations between these two regional powers; this is the approach that I have tried to employ in my own work. For some two decades, Charles Melville has produced a series of important articles on a variety of topics

 ' $\DORQ ´7KH*UHDW¶$EG$OOöKE)DŐO$OOöK@7D·UƮNKL :DɓɓöI> 7DM]L\DWDODPɓöUZDWD]ML\DWDOD¶ɓöU@ (Bombay, A.H.1269/1852-1853; rpt., Teheran, $6K OLQHV7KLVHYLGHQFHLVGLVFXVVHGE\-06PLWK´¶$\Q-öOɫWµ 329; R. Amitai, “Whither the Mongol Army?,” 230.

22 | CHAPTER I

EHPDGHWKDWPXFKPRUHGLIÀFXOWSHUKDSVHYHQLPSRVVLEOH$O¶8PDUƮFDOOV these agents “the bravest among men” (DMOöGDOULMöO), and they stayed with local contacts, tellingly referred to as DOQXɓɓöƤ, in Mongol territory, alternatively hiding out in mountains or valleys. With the approach of the Mongols and when conditions were ripe – i.e. windy days – the inciters would – so we are told – release wild foxes, with burning rags tied to their tails. Hungry dogs were then let go to chase after the foxes, and thus the ÀUH ZDV VSUHDG 2QH ZRQGHUV LI WKHVH ODVW GHWDLOV ZHUH UHDOO\ WKH FDVH Dragging boxes of foxes and dogs around the frontier region – besides being highly inconvenient – was bound to arouse the suspicion of Mongol frontier troops and scouts. I wonder if this is not a topos, an earlier echo of which might be the famous story of the tactic employed by Samson against the Philistines as reported in Judges 15:4-5. Without a doubt, several men on horseback with torches in their hands would have done the work just as ZHOOLIQRWEHWWHU,QDQ\HYHQW,EQ¶$EGDOˈöKLU·VELRJUDSK\RI%D\EDUV provides us with a couple of concrete examples of such inciters (PXQDZZLUɫQ), in 1262 and 1272.26 Still, we might ask another question: how exactly did the inciters get the job done, when the Mongols usually began their campaigns in the fall and early winter, when the winter rains had probably commenced, and the grasslands were green and wet? This is a topic that certainly deserves further investigation. $VDUHVXOWRIWKHÀJKWLQJRQWKLVIURQWLHUWKHUHZDVH[WHQVLYHGDPDJH and depopulation on both sides of the border, although the Mongol side VHHPVWRKDYHVXIIHUHGPRUH5DVKƮGDO'ƮQWKHFRQYHUWHG-HZZKRVHUYHG the Mongols as ZD]ƮU´ÀUVWPLQLVWHUµ DQGRIÀFLDOKLVWRULDQG DQG who probably wrote at the very beginning of the fourteenth century, has this to say: The entire population of some provinces, because they were frontier [regions] DQG ZHUH WUDYHUVHG E\ DUPLHV ZDV HLWKHU NLOOHG RU ÁHG VXFK DV« SDUWV RI $EXOXVWD\QDQG'L\öU%DNUWKXVƩDUUöQ5ɫƤD> (GHVVDXVXDOO\JLYHQDV5XKö@ 6DUɫM DQG 5DTTD DV ZHOO DV PRVW RI WKH FLWLHV RQ WKLV DQG WKDW VLGH RI WKH Euphrates, were completely uncultivated and abandoned.27

:LWKUHJDUGWRWKH0RQJROFRQWUROOHGDUHDWKLVUHSRUWLVFRQÀUPHGE\ ,EQ6KDGGöGDOƩDODEƮLQKLVKLVWRULFDOJHRJUDSKLFZRUNWKDWKHFRPSOHWHG at the beginning of the 1280s. Indeed, the impression gained from his fairly detailed survey is one of abandonment by the local population, compounded by the movements and heavy-handed rule of the local Mongol troops and RFFDVLRQDOH[SHGLWLRQDU\IRUFHVWKDWSDVVHGWKURXJKWKHUHJLRQ,EQ6KDGGöG·V

26. ,EQ¶$EGDOˈöKLU5DZŐ 135-136, 396. 27. 5DVKƮGDO'ƮQ-öPL¶DOWDZöUƮNKHG%.DUƮPƮ7HKHUDQ$6K$+ FIWKH translation by W.M. Thackston, Rashiduddin Fazlullah’s Jami‘u’t-tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles. A History of the Mongols (Cambridge, MA, 1998-1999), 3:756.

THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT: MONGOL AGGRESSION, MAMLUK COUNTERMEASURES | 23

evidence for the Mamluk side of the Euphrates is less unequivocal. Some towns and small cities of north Syria remained populated, and some may have even thrived. Others were abandoned.28 This situation on the Mamluk frontier resulted from several causes: the presence of small but active 0DPOXNJDUULVRQVLQZHOOIRUWLÀHGDQGVXSSOLHGFDVWOHVDQGRWKHUSRLQWV (see below); patrols of Mamluk troops “to show the colors”;29 the quick reaction of the Mamluk leadership to Mongol raids and campaigns, by the dispatch of large relief forces from central Syria or even Egypt; communication systems to connect key points on the frontier with the center (more DERXW WKLV EHORZ  DQG ÀUP FRQWURO RI WKH QRPDGV DV VHHQ DERYH  ZKR otherwise might have interfered with the local inhabitants. On the whole, these locals appear generally to have been encouraged to stay, contributing to WKHIHHOLQJWKDWWKH0DPOXNVZHUHÀUPO\LQFRQWURORIWKHIURQWLHUUHJLRQ The key to the whole frontier system along the Euphrates River were WZRLPSRUWDQWIRUWUHVVHVDORQJLWVEDQNRIWKH(XSKUDWHVDO%ƮUDDQGDO 5DƤED7RGD\DO%ƮUDDFWXDOO\RQWKHHDVWEDQNRIWKHULYHULVLQVRXWKHDVW 7XUNH\QRWIDUIURPWKH6\ULDQERUGHUDQGLVNQRZQDV%LUHFHN$O5DƤED is found these days in Syria. During the reign of Baybars, the former was WKHPRUHSURPLQHQWDOWKRXJKODWHURYHUWKHGHFDGHVDO5DƤEDVXIIHUHG its share of attacks too. In general, both forts withstood every attack and siege, although in 1303 Ghazan received the symbolic submission of the fort’s governor,30DVGLGgOMHLW.KDQ DWWKHEHJLQQLQJRI31 In neither case, however, was the fort actually occupied by Mongol forces or even a governor. This ability of the Mamluk frontier forts to resist Mongol attacks was due in no small measure to the prompt dispatch of relief by the Sultan. 5HJDUGLQJ%D\EDUVKLVRIÀFLDOELRJUDSKHUZURWH The people were reassured that the Sultan did not neglect an act, [but rather] carried it out, and he did not abandon his servants. The hearts of the castle defenders (DKODOTLOö‘) were calmed at this, and they said: “The Sultan moves quickly to our aid, and his armies reach the besieging enemy before news [of his approaching armies] comes.”32

28. 7KHLQIRUPDWLRQIURPGLIIHUHQWSDUWVRI,EQ6KDGGöG·VDO$¶OöTDONKDɡƮUDis discussed in R. AmitaiPreiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 204. 29. )RUH[DPSOHVVHH,EQ6KDGGöGDOƩDODEƮ7D·UƮNKDOPDOLNDO˂öKLU'LH*HVFKLFKWHGHV6XOWDQ%DLEDUV , HG$ƩXɡD\ɡ:LHVEDGHQ 0XIDŐŐDO,EQ$EƮDO)DŐö·LODO1DKMDOVDGƮGZD·OGXUUDOIDUƮGIƮPö ED¶GLEQDO¶DPƮG, ed. and tr. E. Blochet as “Histoire des sultans mamlouks,” in Patrologia orientalis, vols. 12, 14, 20 (Paris, 1919-1928), 554-555. 30. 5DVKƮG DO'ƮQ HG .DUƮPƮ  >  : 7KDFNVWRQ Compendium of Chronicles, 3:655-656]; A. Broadbridge, Kingship and Ideology, 93. 31. R. Amitai-Preiss, “New Material from the Mamluk Sources,” 29-31. 32. ,EQ¶$EGDOˈöKLU5DZŐ, 227.

24 | CHAPTER I

These forts had several functions: guarding the fords on the river; IRUZDUGZDUQLQJVWDWLRQVWKDWZRXOGZLWKVWDQGWKHÀUVWVKRFNRID0RQJRO campaign; centers for the gathering of intelligence on the other side of the frontier and bases for raids against the Mongol enemy. The importance of DO%ƮUDLVUHYHDOHGE\6KöÀ¶E¶$OƮ\HWDQRWKHU0DPOXNRIÀFLDOcum author of royal biographies, who wrote that it was the “lock of Syria” (ZDKL\DTXÁ DOVKöP).33 If nothing else, we would know how important these forts were by the many attempts the Mongols made to take them during their sixtyyear war with the Mamluks. To the north, vis-à-vis Cilicia and Anatolia, were some smaller but still important forts, or rather fortified towns: ¶$\Q7öEDQG¶$]ö]7KHIRUPHULVUHIHUUHGWRE\,EQ6KDGGöGDOƩDODEƮDV “a watch-post (UDɓDG) for fresh developments coming from the land of the Armenians and Rum.”34 Over the decades the Mamluks tried numerous times to gain control over several forts that were controlled by the Kingdom of Lesser Armenia centered in Cilicia. Yet, in spite of many devastating raids into Cilicia, the Mamluks were ultimately unsuccessful, at least in the period dealt with in this book, in asserting their authority over this important frontier area. This can be seen by the frequent mention of the same fortresses time and again in negotiations between the Sultan and the Armenian NLQJ7KHLPSRVVLELOLW\RIPDLQWDLQLQJODUJHIRUFHVLQWKLVIDUÁXQJFRUQHU RIWKH6XOWDQDWHDVZHOODVWKHGLIÀFXOW\RIUXVKLQJUHLQIRUFHPHQWVWRLWLQ WLPHVRIGLIÀFXOW\OHGWRWKHUHODWLYHO\IHHEOH0DPOXNFRQWUROKHUH35 The quick dispatch of relief forces to besieged or endangered border fortresses was predicated on a communications system, or systems, which could quickly convey urgent messages of impending Mongol attacks, or WKRVHWKDWKDGDOUHDG\VWDUWHG)LUVWRIDOOIURPERWKDO%ƮUDDQGDO5DƤED WKHUHZHUHFKDLQVRIERQÀUHVWKDWFRXOGEHOLWGXULQJWKHGD\DQGHYHQLQJ to send concise but quickly delivered messages that trouble was afoot. More detailed information could be sent by pigeon post: the sources often report the arrival of an urgent ELɡöTD (small pieces of paper), with news of D0RQJRODWWDFNLQWKHRIÀQJ)LQDOO\EHWZHHQWKHPDLQFLWLHVRI6\ULDDQG linking that province and Egypt, there was the system of postal horserelays, known as the EDUƮG, limited to state use, which obviously could convey detailed missives, as well as individuals whose presence was desired quickly. It is reported that the average time of the EDUƮG between Damascus and

33. 6KöÀ¶E¶$OƮƩXVQ, 87. 34. ,EQ6KDGGöG$¶OöT, ed. A.-M. Eddé, 376, 382, 385. 35. There is a very good discussion of the Mamluk frontier with the Armenians in the new book by Sara Kate Raphael, Muslim Fortresses in the Levant between Crusaders and Mongols (London and New York, 2011), 108-120, 193-202. This book contains an excellent, comprehensive and unprecedented treatment of early Mamluk rural fortresses in Syria, examined within the context RIODUJHUSROLWLFDODQGPLOLWDU\LVVXHV6HHDOVRWKHÀQHERRNE\$'6WHZDUWThe Armenian Kingdom and the Mamluks. A more cursory treatment of some of the strategic issues of the IRUWLÀFDWLRQSROLF\DQGWKHIURQWLHULQJHQHUDOLVIRXQGLQ5$PLWDL3UHLVVMongols and Mamluks, 76-77, 202-207, upon which some of the observations in the previous paragraphs are based.

THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT: MONGOL AGGRESSION, MAMLUK COUNTERMEASURES | 25

&DLURZDVIRXUGD\V,QVKRUWHIÀFLHQWFRPPXQLFDWLRQVHQDEOHGWKHUDSLG deployment of forces, from Egypt to Syria, and from the latter towards the frontier on the north or northeast.36 Since the campaigns of the Mongols towards Syria, be they raids or fullÁHGJHG DWWDFNV ZHUH DOPRVW LQYDULDEO\ LQ WKH ZLQWHU WKH 0DPOXNV DOVR had the problem of moving large bodies of troops from Egypt, where the lion’s share of the army was concentrated in normal conditions, to Syria, where the external dangers – from Mongols and Franks – were most pressing. As is well known, Palestine and Syria are crisscrossed with seasonal streambeds (awdiya; in the singularZöGƮ) that can become raging torrents during the winter rainy seasons, and these might severely slow down an army advancing to meet an enemy approaching from the north or the FRDVW7RIDFLOLWDWHWKHXUJHQWPRYHPHQWRIWURRSVLQGLIÀFXOWFRQGLWLRQV bridges were built (or rebuilt) in Palestine, probably most notably at 'öPL\\DRYHUWKH-RUGDQ5LYHUDQGDW/\GGD/XGG RYHU:öGƮ-LQGöV37 2QH H[DPSOH RI D 0RQJRO DWWDFN DW DO%ƮUD DQG WKH 0DPOXN UHVSRQVH ZLOO VXIÀFH WR VKRZ WKH UHODWLYH UDSLGLW\ DQG VHULRXVQHVV RI WKH 0DPOXN reaction and its impact. This is the second example of the border war that I referred to above. In late November 1272, Sultan Baybars was in Damascus with much of his army. On the 28th, he learnt that the Mongols were headLQJ WRZDUGV DO%ƮUD ZLWK D ODUJH IRUFH %D\EDUV VHW RXW ZLWK KLV WURRSV which included a large corps from the Egyptian army that was already in Syria. Baybars advanced via Hama, collecting boats to be used for crossing the Euphrates. At Aleppo, scouts were sent ahead. These returned reporting that a Mongol force of 3000 was on the east side of the Euphrates waiting for the Mamluks. The Mamluk sources note, however, that this force actually numbered 5000, under the command of Chinqar, and these troops had prepared a palisade (Mongolian sibe) behind which the Mongols planned to ÀJKWGLVPRXQWHG7KHPDLQ0RQJROIRUFH²ZKLFKLQFOXGHGDFRQWLQJHQWRI WURRSVIURP6HOMXT5XP²ZDVFRPPDQGHGE\'XUEDL7KLVRIÀFHUD GLYLVLRQDOFRPPDQGHUKDGOHGDQHDUOLHU0RQJRODWWDFNDJDLQVWDO%ƮUDLQ 1264. The Mongols were busy prosecuting the siege at the fort, including constructing PDMöQƮT, mainly referring probably to trebuchets, both the traction and counterweight variety. Baybars and his troops reached the Euphrates on 11 December 1272, DQGÀUVWVHQWIRRWDUFKHUVDOUDMMöODDOXTML\\D) in boats across the river to scout out the enemy on the other side. Then the Mamluk army began crossing the river in earnest. The soldiers had no choice but to swim, KROGLQJRQWRWKHLUKRUVHV4DODZXQ²WKHIXWXUHVXOWDQ²ZDVLQWKHÀUVW

36. Ibid., 74-75; J. Sauvaget, La poste aux chevaux dans l’empire des Mamelouks (Paris, 1941), esp. 10-13 for the establishment of the EDUƮG under the Mamluks. 37. P. Thorau, Baybars, 166; Ibn al-Furat, 7D·UƮNK, ed. Q. Zurayk (Beirut, 1942), 7:6; RCEA, 12:174-175 (s.a. 671).

26 | CHAPTER I

wave, while Baybars followed in the next contingent. After crossing, the 0DPOXNVHQJDJHGLQÀHUFHKDQGWRKDQGÀJKWLQJWKH0RQJROVHYHQWXDOO\ being defeated, in spite of their advantageous position; Chinqar himself was killed. The Mongols besieging the fort, upon hearing of their comrades’ defeat, fled leaving the PDMöQƮT and other equipment behind them. A 0DPOXN IRUFH SXUVXHG WKHP GHHS LQWR WKH -D]ƮUD 8SSHU 0HVRSRWDPLD  and before withdrawing with his troops, Baybars rewarded the governor of the fort and its defenders with suitable presents. The Ilkhan had been denied yet again a bridgehead into Syria.38 This is just one example, albeit an extreme one, of the ongoing warfare on the border and the Mamluks’ response. To this we can add the several large-scale campaigns of the Mongols into Syria, mentioned above, which ZHZLOOGLVFXVVEULHÁ\EHORZ.KZöUD]PVKöK@-DOöO DO'ƮQ«1RQHEXWWKH\> WKH4LSFKDTL0DPOXNV@GHIHDWHGWKH0RQJROV50

Yet, there was obviously some difference between these two enemies: the soldiers of one side came directly from a pastoral nomadic milieu, while the others were plucked out of this milieu at a young age, becoming professional soldiers after having undergone years of training, living in the cities, evidently riding larger horses and employing professionally manufactured equipment. This being said, I do not go nearly as far as John M. Smith, Jr., who sees a wide chasm between the abilities of the Mamluk super-troops and the amateurish Mongols, who made up for their inferior equipment and training (and smaller horses, it can be added) by larger numbers and the DWWHPSW WR H[SORLW WKHLU PRELOLW\ RQ WKH EDWWOH ÀHOG51 Smith continues

49. $Eɫ6KöPD7DUöMLPULMöODOTDUQD\QDOVöGLVZD·OVöEL¶DOPD¶UɫIEL·OGKD\O¶DOöDOUDZŐDWD\Q, ed. 0DO.DZWKDUƮ&DLUR FLWHGLQ'$\DORQ´7KH(XURSHDQ$VLDWLF6WHSSHµ 50. K. Lech (ed. and tr.), 'DV0RQJROLVFKH:HOWUHLFKDO¶8PDUƮV'DUVWHOOXQJGHUPRQJROLVFKHQ5HLFKHLQ VHLQHP:HUN0DVöOLNDODEɓöUIƮ·OPDPöOLNDODPɓöU, “Asiatische Forschungen,” 14 (Wiesbaden,  WUDQVODWLRQIURP'$\DORQ´)URP@WKHJRLQJXS of the sun to [his] going down [He] has delivered all the lands to Us; We hold them. Except by the command of God, how can anyone do [anything]? Now you must say with a sincere heart: “We shall become [your] subject; we shall give [our] strength.” Thou in person, at the head of the kings, must all together at once come to do homage to Us. We shall then recognize your submission. And if you do not accept God’s command, and act contrary to Our command, We shall regard you as enemies.25 24. J.M. Smith, “The Mongols and World-Conquest,” 207-208, 210. 25. 7KHWH[WLVLQ3HUVLDQH[FHSWIRUWKHÀUVWVHQWHQFHRIWKHWH[WWKDWLVLQ7XUNLVKWKHWUDQVODWLRQ is by J.A. Boyle, in I. de Rachewiltz, Papal Envoys to the Great Khan (London, 1971), 213-214. See also: E. Voegelin, “The Mongol Orders of Submission,” 386-388 (French and Latin translations), and 395 for some discussion; see also P. Golden, “Imperial Ideology,” 72. For a beautiful reproduction of this document, see: http://asv.vatican.va/en/doc/1246.htm.

+2/DO0XMƮUƮ@UHWXUQHGIURPKLVORQJ VWD\ZLWKWKH0RQJROVDIWHU*KD]DQKDGGLHGDQG.KXGöEDQGöK gOMHLW  became king – as we shall relate at the appropriate time – he came to the house of my Father – may Allah have mercy on him – and I was with him listening.

>$O0XMƮUƮ@VDLG :KHQ,FDPHEHIRUH0DƤPɫG*KD]DQKHSODFHGPHIDUIURPKLPDQGVSRNHWR me via four chamberlains (ƤXMMöE +LVÀUVWZRUGVWRPHZHUH´:KDWLV\RXU QDPH"µ , VDLG ´g]GHPUµ +H VDLG ´:KDW LV \RXU laqab and how are you known?” I said: “My laqabLVƩXVöPDO'ƮQDQG,DPNQRZQDVDO0XMƮUƮµ+H said: “You [=the Mamluks] have three names for each person so that it will VHHP WKDW WKHUH DUH PDQ\ RI \RXµ $O0XMƮUƮ VDLG ´, NLVVHG WKH JURXQG DQG I said: ‘May God protect the Khan! The merchants buy us in [far-away] countries when we are young, and bring us to Egypt. We have one name. Then we get a nisba in accordance with the merchant who brought us. When we grow older, we receive a laqab7KHPDPOXN·VQDPHLVg]GHPUDQGWKHQDPHRIP\PHUFKDQW ZDV0XMƮUDO'ƮQDQGWKHPDPOXNLVNQRZQDVDO0XMƮUƮ$QGZKHQ,EHFDPH older, and became known among the Mamluks (DOQöV) by the laqabRIƩXVöP DO'ƮQ·µ7KXVVDLGDO0XMƮUƮ´,KHDUGKLPVD\¶&RUUHFW·7KHQ,VDLG¶:HUHFHLYH nisbas [derived from the name of] the merchant because of the similarity of our names one to the other. Nothing distinguishes between us except for the nisba to the merchant who brought us.’” Then he said, “What is your race (jins)?” I said: “Qipchaq.” He said: “Correct.” Then he order to bring me closer, and spoke to me via one chamberlain. This was after many questions. He would ask me a question, and I was honest with him, and did my best to answer him with the help of almighty God. Among all of these questions, he said to me: “What is your position with the King of Egypt?” I said: “A soldier (MXQGƮ).” He said: “The King of Egypt sends to one like PHDVROGLHU"$UHQ·W\RXRQHRIKLVRIÀFHUV"µ,VDLG´ZRPHQ@DQGVWDUWHG using youths’ – meaning by that “beardless youths” (PXUGöQ >$O0XMƮUƮ@VDLG “I knew that he wanted to kill me and hurt me. I had no choice but to give the answer,” he said, “so I said to myself: ‘Everything is from and to God,’ and I said: ¶0D\ $OODK SURWHFW WKH .KDQ 2XU RIÀFHUV GLG QRW NQRZ DQ\WKLQJ DERXW WKLV

,H %öE DOƩDGƮG WKH ´,URQ *DWHµ 'DUEDQG LQ WKH &DXFDVXV 7KH UHIHUHQFH LV WR RQH RI WKH battles between the Ilkhanid army with that of the Golden Horde in the 1260s. On these, see J. Boyle, “Dynastic and Political History,” 352-354, 356. The command of Abaqa may refer to KLVFRPPDQGRIWKHDUP\XQGHU+OHJG RUDIWHUKLVDFFHVVLRQWRWKHWKURQH0\JXHVV is that it refers to the former. 6. In the text: TɫO(!), an obvious mistake for qul. 7. This term must be referring to the people of North Africa (al-maghrib). 8. Qur’an, 17:58; 33:6.

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[matter], it is something that started in our country when Turghai9 came to us from you. He brought with him Mongol youths, and the men became infatuated ZLWKWKHPLQVWHDGRIZRPHQ·>$O0XMƮUƮ@VDLG¶:KHQ>*KD]DQ@KHDUGWKLV answer he was angry and furious. He turned to one of the Mongol notables who was around him, and spoke to him in Mongolian. I knew that I was dead, without a doubt, and I was standing in front of him.’” 7KHQKHVDLGWRWKHFKDPEHUODLQ´7HOOKLVFRPSDQLRQ24DGLGR\RXFRQÀUP what your friend said in the presence of the Khan?” The chamberlain repeated WKLVWR¶,PöGDO'ƮQEDO6XNNöUƮZKRVDLG´$O0XMƮUƮ@VDLG¶,VPLOHG·>¶,PöGDO'ƮQ@ VDLGWRPH¶2ƩXVöPDO'ƮQ,VWKLVWKHWLPHIRUODXJKWHU"·,VDLG24öŐƮ©6D\ No one will hurt us except what God has written for us.»11 $O0XMƮUƮVDLG´2QHRI*KD]DQ·VTXHVWLRQVWRXVEHIRUHWKLVZDV¶+RZPDQ\ Turks (=Mamluks) are there like you in the army of Egypt?’ I said: ‘More than ·>$O0XMƮUƮ@VDLG*KD]DQWXUQHGWRWKHRIÀFHU¶$OƮE.DUDEHNE%HUNH Khan,12 who was far from him. He called for him, and said: ‘Do you hear what he

9. The leader of the Oirats who arrived in the Sultanate as ZöÀGL\\D in 695/1296. On this incident DQGUHODWHGHYHQWVVHH'$\DORQ´:DÀGL\Dµ1DNDPDFKL1REXWDND´7KH5DQNDQG Status of Military Refugees in the Mamluk Army: A Reconsideration of the :öÀGƮ\D,” MSR, 10/1 (2006), 59, 66, 69, 72-74, 79-80. 10. The Muslim declaration of faith: OöLOöKLOOöDOOöKPXƤDPPDGUXVɫODOOöK (“There is no god but $OODKDQG0XƤDPPDGLVWKHPHVVHQJHURI$OODKµ  11. Qur’an, 9:51. 12. +HDSSHDUVWREHDJUDQGVRQRI%HUNH.KDQOHDGHURIWKH.KZöUD]PL\\DLQ6\ULDZKRZDV killed near Homs in 1246; R.S. Humphreys, From Saladin to Mongols, 287 and passim. Two of the latter’s sons – one named Karabek – served in the Mamluk army, and his daughter was PDUULHGWR6XOWDQ%D\EDUVDQGERUHKLPDVRQDO0DOLNDO6D¶ƮG%HUNH.KDQU )RU this Karabek, his brother and their connections to Jerusalem, see M.H. Burgoyne, Mamluk Jerusalem, 110. A. Broadbridge, Kingship and Ideology, 89, notes that in the summer of 1302, a 6\ULDQ0DPOXNGHVHUWHUQDPHG¶$OƮ6KƮUDQGVRPHFRPSDQLRQVFDPHRYHUWRWKH0RQJROV DQG KH PLJKW EH LGHQWLÀHG ZLWK WKH FKDUDFWHU PHQWLRQHG LQ WKH VWRU\ DERYH VHH 5DVKƮG DO'ƮQHG.DUƮPƮWU:7KDFNVWRQ 

AN INFORMATIVE AND AMUSING EPISODE FROM MAMLUK-ILKHANID DIPLOMACY | 113

said? Are his words correct?’ He had heard what I had said, and he said: ‘By the WUXWKRIWKHKHDGRIWKH.KDQ+HGLGQRWVSHDNWKHWUXWK7KHUHDUHQRWÀYH people in Egypt like him.’ [Ghazan] said to me: ‘Listen to his words!’ I said: ‘Who LVWKLV",GRQ·WNQRZKLP·>*KD]DQ@VDLG¶7KLVLV$PLU¶$OƮLEQ%HUNH.KDQZKR was with you (i.e., in the Mamluk army).’ I kissed the ground and said: ‘May God protect the Khan! What he said isn’t true. He is one of those whom our Lord the Sultan did not want to employ in the army of Egypt. [The Sultan] gave him [a salary or an LTɡö¶ with the equivalent income worth] 4000 dirham [a year] in $OHSSR 7KHQ >¶$OƮ@ DVNHG IRU WKH LQWHUFHVVLRQ RI WKH DPLUV VR DV WR JHW >D command] worth ten [horsemen] in Aleppo. If he had found [a salary] of 4000 GLUKDP LQ (J\SW KH ZRXOG QRW KDYH ÁHG WR \RX· >$O0XMƮUƮ@ VDLG >*KD]DQ@ WXUQHGWRKLPDQGVDLGWRKLP¶2¶$OƮDUH\RXLQWKHDUP\RI(J\SWRUWKHDUP\ RI6\ULD"·>$O0XMƮUƮ@VDLG>¶$OƮ@ZDVVLOHQW*KD]DQVDLG¶+HVDLGWKDWKHZDV RQO\ IURP WKH DUP\ RI (J\SW· $O0XMƮUƮ VDLG ¶%\ WKH WUXUWK RI WKH KHDG RI WKH.KDQ+HLVWKHORZHVW>RIÀFHU@LQWKHDUP\RI6\ULDLQ$OHSSRQRW>HYHQ@ LQ 'DPDVFXV ,I KH ZDV IURP (J\SW KH ZRXOG WDNH RXW KLV RIÀFHU·V GLSORPD WRGLVWLQJXLVKKLVWUXWKIURPKLVOLH·>$O0XMƮUƮ@VDLG>*KD]DQ@JDYHRUGHUVWR WKHFKDPEHUODLQDQG$PLU¶$OƮZDVWDNHQDZD\IURPEHIRUHKLPµ $O0XMƮUƮVDLG´:KHQZHZHUHWDNHQRXWVRDVWREHWKURZQIURPWKHPDQJRQHO an order came out that we were to be imprisoned in the madrasa. No one was permitted to come to us, and we could not leave or go anywhere. They made our conditions very tough throughout this period.” He said: “We knew that Ghazan’s anger was upon us.” ,,EQDO'DZöGöUƮ VDLG´7KHHQGRIKLVVWRU\ZLOOFRPHZKHQPHQWLRQLQJKLV release and his arrival to Egypt, if God wills it.”

* There is much in this story that tells us about the nature of the Mamluk V\VWHPDQGDUP\DQGKRZDIDLUO\ROGPLGGOHUDQNLQJ0DPOXNRIÀFHUVDZ the military society in which he lived. This itself is very interesting and makes the passage worthy of study. But for us there is some precious and VLJQLÀFDQWHYLGHQFHRQVRPHRIWKHG\QDPLFRI0DPOXN,ONKDQLGUHODWLRQV especially in the immediate post-conversion period. Here we are, away from the bombastic diplomatic missives and proclamations, and for that PDWWHUWKHLQVFULSWLRQVDQGRWKHURIÀFLDOH[SUHVVLRQVRISRZHU First, we may note that the fact that Ghazan is a Muslim is taken in stride, without much excitement one way or another. From this text, one would never know that this is a matter for a polemic, and that such worthies as Ibn Taymiyya were devoting so much attention to it. The only point where there is a hint of a little criticism of the Islam of the Mongols by our Mamluk narrator is the mention how Mongol women are not modest enough, and by extension that their men-folk are somehow remiss LQ SHUPLWWLQJ WKLV VLWXDWLRQ ² SHUKDSV D UHÁHFWLRQ RI WUDGLWLRQDO VWHSSH norms – to continue.

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There is more than a hint of psychological warfare here in the narrator’s DWWHPSWWRH[SODLQZK\WKH0DPOXNVORVWDW:öGƮDO.KD]QDGöU(YHQVR some of it does not ring false. Indeed, this defeat was due inter alia to the situation that the Mamluks had learnt to disdain the Mongols a little after so many decades of Mamluk victories (although it was more like forty years and not sixty). It thus may well be that this cockiness played a role in the Mamluk defeat in 1299.13 The excuse that only part of the Mamluk army was at the battle is a specious argument; hints of it are also found in the OHWWHU VHQW LQ DO1öɓLU 0XƤDPPDG·V QDPH WR *KD]DQ WRZDUGV WKH HQG RI 1301.14 In reality, just about the entire Egyptian Mamluk army made its way to Syria in the late fall of 1299 and it was joined there by the Syrian contingents. I cannot believe that anyone really took this line of thought seriously. No less important, and certainly more entertaining, is the repartee related WRVH[XDOPDWWHUV*KD]DQWULHVWREDLWDO0XMƮUƮZLWKDOLQHWKDWZHZRXOG WRGD\ FDOO KRPRSKRELF $O0XMƮUƮ ULVHV WR WKH FKDOOHQJH DQG DQVZHUV LQ a way that according to him leaves the Ilkhan speechless. Ghazan, however, adopts another tack, and raises the issue of Mongol vs. Mamluk women. It may be that he was trying to get his interlocutor to admit that Mongol women were considered the more desirable. Certainly, the Mamluk sultans had plenty of them as wives.15+RZHYHUDO0XMƮUƮUHWRUWHGWRWKLVRSHQLQJ in a different way: he challenges the modesty of the Mongol women and extols that of the wives and daughters of the Mamluks. Here, as said before, might be an oblique swipe at the quality of the Islam of the Mongols. But, it seems more likely that this is a criticism of the mores of the Mongol women, DQG SHUKDSV HYHQ WKHLU YLUWXH WKXV HYHQ FDVWLQJ GRXEW RQ WKHLU ÀGHOLW\ towards their Mongol husbands, who come out looking – certainly in Mamluk eyes - a little ridiculous. In short, we have here an old-fashioned insult match between two guys, making insinuating remarks about the other side’s sexuality and the loose morals of their women. No ideology of world conquest here, no claims of the right to rule the Muslim umma, no mutual criticism of real or supposed crimes against the Muslims. 13. See R. Amitai, “Whither the Mongol Army,” 229, 256. 14. ,Q¶$\QƮ1XZD\UƮDSSHQGL[LQ0DTUƮ]Ʈ´7KHEDWWOHKDSSHQHGZLWKWKRVH who were present from our victorious armies, who put their faith in the word of Almighty God, «+RZRIWHQDOLWWOHFRPSDQ\KDVGHIHDWHGDQXPHURXVFRPSDQ\"» 4XU·DQ µ$O¶$\QƮ  VWDWHVWKDWWKLVOHWWHUZDVEURXJKWE\DO0XMƮUƮDQG,EQDO6XNNDUƮDQGWKLVVHHPVWREH FRQÀUPHGE\DO0DTUƮ]Ʈ ZKRDGGVDQRWKHURIÀFHUWRWKHOLVWRIHQYR\VEXWZLWKRXW WKHWH[WRIWKHOHWWHUDWWDFKHGDWWKLVSRLQWXQOLNHDO¶$\QƮ·VYHUVLRQ ,WPD\EHKRZHYHUWKDW this Mamluk answer was actually delivered to the Ilkhan by his own returning envoys and it DSSHDUVWKDWDO0XMƮUƮDQG,EQDO6XNNDUƮDUULYHGODWHUZLWKDQRWKHUPLVVLYHFI$%URDGEULGJH Kingship and Ideology, 82, 87; H. Horst, “Eine Gesandtschaft,” 366-367. The resolution of this matter, however, is not germane to my argument here. 15. 6RPH GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKLV LV IRXQG LQ 30 +ROW ´$Q1öɓLU 0XƤDPPDG E 4DOöZɫQ   +LV$QFHVWU\.LQGUHGDQG$IÀQLW\µLQ89HUPHXOHQDQG'GH6PHWHGV  (J\SWDQG6\ULDLQWKH)DWLPLG$\\XELGDQG0DPOXN(UDV, (Leuven, 1995), 313-324.

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Maybe this hints that in some ways the issues between the Mamluks and Mongols were more than the ideological polemic often leads us to think: it was also a question of power, wealth and control that each side had, and in the case of the Mongols, had wanted to take away from the Mamluks. The Mamluks responded in every way they knew, and as we have seen were ultimately successful, until their enemies gave up and accepted the status quo. * Might I conclude on a personal note? One of the conclusions that I have GUDZQIURPP\RQJRLQJVWXG\RIWKH0DPOXN0RQJROFRQÁLFWLVWKDWHYHQ the most intractable of struggles can be resolved over time. Even before the public manifestation of the rapprochement, quiet contacts may be taking place, and other factors may be at play that lay the groundwork for diplomatic démarches and eventual reconciliation. Perhaps, we can hope that the events and developments of the early fourteenth century in the 0LGGOH(DVWZLOOSURYHDSUHFHGHQWIRURWKHUFRQÁLFWVVRPHHYHQFORVHWR home.

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$EɫDO)LGö·DO0DOLNDO0X·D\\DG,VPö¶ƮO$O0XNKWDɓDUIƮDNKEöUDOEDVKDU. &DLURDO0DɡED¶DDOƩXVD\QƮDO0LɓUL\\D3DUWLDOWUDQVODWLRQ in P.M. Holt, tr. 7KH0HPRLUVRID6\ULDQ3ULQFH$EX·O)LGö·6XOWDQRIƩDPöK  . “Freiburger Islamstudien,” Band IX. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1983. $Eɫ6KöPD6KLKöEDO'ƮQ¶$EGDO5DƤPöQE,VPö¶ƮO7DUöMLPULMöODOTDUQD\Q DOVöGLVZD·OVöE¶DOPD¶UɫIEL·OGKD\O¶DOöDOUDZŐDWD\QHG0XƤDPPDGDO.DZ WKDUƮ&DLUR0DNWDE1DVKUDO7KLTöIDDO,VOöPL\\D Aigle, Denise. “Les inscriptions de Baybars dans le Bilâd al-Shâm. Une expression de la légitimité du pouvoir.” SI. 96 (2003), 57-85. Aigle, Denise. “La légitimité islamique des invasions de la Syrie par Ghazan Khan.” Eurasian Studies. 5/1-2 (2006), 5-29. $LJOH'HQLVH´7KH/HWWHUVRI(OMLJLGHL+OHJDQG$EDTD0RQJRO2YHUWXUHV or Christian Ventriloquism.” Inner Asia. 7/2 (2005), 143-162. $LJOH 'HQLVH ´7KH 0RQJRO ,QYDVLRQV RI %LOöG DO6KöP E\ *Kö]öQ .KöQ DQG ,EQ7D\PƮ\D·VWKUHH¶$QWL0RQJRO·)DWZDVµMSR. 11/2 (2007), 89-120. $LJOH'HQLVH´/HVFRUUHVSRQGDQFHVDGUHVVpHVSDU+OHJDXSULQFHD\\RXELGHGH 6\ULHDO0DOLNDO1öɓLU