Hobbes Against Friendship: The Modern Marginalisation of an Ancient Political Concept [1st ed. 2022] 3030953149, 9783030953140, 9783030953157

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY SERIES EDITOR: GARY BROWNING

Hobbes Against Friendship The Modern Marginalisation of an Ancient Political Concept Gabriella Slomp

International Political Theory

Series Editor Gary Browning, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK

The Palgrave International Political Theory Series provides students and scholars with cutting-edge scholarship that explores the ways in which we theorise the international. Political theory has by tradition implicitly accepted the bounds of the state, and this series of intellectually rigorous and innovative monographs and edited volumes takes the discipline forward, reflecting both the burgeoning of IR as a discipline and the concurrent internationalisation of traditional political theory issues and concepts. Offering a wide-ranging examination of how International Politics is to be interpreted, the titles in the series thus bridge the IR-political theory divide. The aim of the series is to explore international issues in analytic, historical and radical ways that complement and extend common forms of conceiving international relations such as realism, liberalism and constructivism. This series is indexed by Scopus.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14842

Gabriella Slomp

Hobbes Against Friendship The Modern Marginalisation of an Ancient Political Concept

Gabriella Slomp School of International Relations University of St Andrews St Andrews, UK

ISSN 2662-6039 ISSN 2662-6047 (electronic) International Political Theory ISBN 978-3-030-95314-0 ISBN 978-3-030-95315-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95315-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Oleksiy Maksymenko/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

I became interested in friendship as a political concept thanks to an inspirational workshop organized by Preston King at the University of Granada in 2005. In the last ten years, I delivered a number of papers on friendship at conferences in Oxford, Amsterdam, Madrid, Barcelona, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and New Orleans. I wish to thank participants to these conferences and in particular: Deborah Baumgold, Adrian Blau, Charlie Bradley, Ruairidh Brown, Alexandra Chadwick, Heather Devere, Robin Douglass, Daniel Eggers, Ioannis Evrigenis, Patrick Hayden, John Horton, Maximilian Jaede, Juhana Lemetti, Johan Olsthoorn, Raja Prokhovnik, Timothy Raylor, Graham M. Smith, Patricia Springborg, Laurens van Apeldoorn. I wish to express my gratitude to a number of generous scholars who made the time to comment on ideas developed in this book: Marcus Adams, Kinch Hoekstra, S.A. Lloyd, A.P. Martinich, the late Glen Newey, Rosamond Rhodes, and Tom Sorell. I am indebted also to many colleagues at St Andrews for conversations and support; in particular, I wish to thank John Anderson, Tony Lang, Karin Fierke, Paul Hibbert, Fiona Mc Callum Guiney, Julie Ramage, and Gurch Sanghera. I wish to thank Political Studies for allowing me to use some ideas that I first introduced in (2019) ‘As Thick as Thieves: Exploring Thomas Hobbes’ Critique of Ancient Friendship and its Contemporary Relevance’, vol 67 (I) 191–206; and Wiley & Sons for allowing me to use v

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ideas I introduced in (2021) ‘In Search of “A Constant Civill Amity”: Hobbes on Friendship and Sociability’ in A Companion to Hobbes. Ed: Marcus Adams, 125–38. I wish also to thank very much Carol Thomas for her competent, efficient, and prompt assistance with copy-editing. I wish to thank two anonymous referees for very valuable feedback; the Palgrave Editor of the International Political Theory series, Gary Brown; my Palgrave Editor, Ambra Finotello and the Springer Book Production coordinator Geetha Chockalingam for their support and advice. Last but not least, I am very grateful to three close friends for their enormous help during two lockdowns: Penny Hood for weekly lovely walks around Cupar in Fife; Antonina Nobile Fidanza for amusing text messages from Genova, and Carme Vila for long telephone calls from Barcelona. I dedicate this book to Camillo and Phoebe. Gabriella Slomp

Note on Hobbes’s Texts: Editions and Abbreviations

Here are details and abbreviations of the editions of Hobbes’s works that have been used: Anti-White Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined. 1976. Trans. Harold W. Jones. London: Bradford University Press. Behemoth Behemoth or The Long Parliament. 2010. Ed. Paul Seaward. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Citizen On the Citizen. 1998. Eds. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Common Law Writings on Common Law and Hereditary Right. 2005. Eds. Alan Cromartie and Quentin Skinner. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Correspondence I and II The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes. 1994. 2 volumes. Ed. Noel Malcolm. Oxford: Clarendon Press. De Corpore ‘Elements of Philosophy’. 1839. Vol I of The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. Edited by William Molesworth. 11 vols. London: John Bohn. De Cive (English) De Cive: The English version. 1984. Ed. Howard Warrender. Oxford: Clarendon Press. De Cive (Latin) De Cive, Latin Version. 1983. Entitled in the first edition Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Tertia De Cive and in later editions Elementa Philosophica De Cive, a critical edition by Howard Warrender. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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NOTE ON HOBBES’S TEXTS: EDITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Elements The Elements of Law Natural and Politic. 1969. Ed. Ferdinand Tönnies. London: Frank Cass. History I and II The History of the Grecian War written by Thucydides 1843 translated by Hobbes; Vol VIII and IX of The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. Edited by William Molesworth. 11 vols. London: John Bohn. Human Nature Man and Citizen. Thomas Hobbes’s De Homine and De Cive also known as Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Governments and Society. 1972. Ed. Bernard Gert. New York: Anchor Books. Iliad Translations of Homer: The Iliad 2008 Ed. Eric Nelson. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Leviathan Leviathan 2012. 3 vols Ed. Noel Malcolm. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reason of State Reason of State, Propaganda and the Thirty Years’ war: An Unknown Translation by Thomas Hobbes. 2007 Ed. Noel Malcolm. Oxford: Clarendon Press. The Whole Art of Rhetoric Vol VI of The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. 1840. Edited by William Molesworth. 11 vols. London: John Bohn, 419–510. References to Behemoth are by Dialogue and page (e.g. Behemoth II, 32). References to Citizen are by chapter, article, and page (e.g. Citizen I: 2, 24). References to Elements are by part, chapter, article and page (e.g. Elements I. 8: 4, 34). References to Leviathan are by volume, chapter and page (e.g. Leviathan II:12,180); I also give page reference to the 1651 edition (e.g. 1651, 58). References to Human Nature are by chapter, article, and page (e.g. Human Nature XI: 7, 49). I have also used: Baumgold, Deborah. 2017. Three-Text Edition of Thomas Hobbes’s Political Theory. The Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents

1

Hobbes and Friendship 1.1 The Rise, Fall, and Resurgence of Friendship 1.2 A Vanishing Act: Hobbes on Friendship 1.3 Friendship: Definitions, Usages, and Modes 1.4 Map and Compass References

1 2 4 6 8 12

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In Search of the Hobbesian Friend 2.1 Hobbes’s Rendition of Aristotelian Philia 2.2 Hobbesian Friendship in Elements, Citizen, and Leviathan 2.3 Hobbesian Friendship in Later Writings 2.4 Hobbesian Friendship in Secondary Literature 2.5 Concluding Remarks References

19 20

Friend as Ally 3.1 An Archaeology of Negative Friendship 3.2 Hobbes on Alliances, Leagues, Confederacies, and Factions 3.3 Debates on Hobbesian Alliances 3.4 Hobbes on Negative Friendship: An Overview 3.5 Concluding Remarks References

41 42

3

22 27 30 33 37

47 53 54 56 62

ix

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CONTENTS

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Friend as Partner 4.1 An Archaeology of Positive Friendship 4.2 Hobbes on Systems, Partial Societies, Corporations, and Personal Friendships 4.3 Hobbes on Positive Friendship: A Critical Rejoinder 4.4 Concluding Remarks References

65 67 72 83 86 90

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Friend as Another Self 5.1 An Archaeology of Normative Friendship 5.2 Two Sayings of the Narrative on Normative Friendship 5.3 The Changing Foundations of Normative Friendship 5.4 Hobbes Against Normative Friendship 5.5 Concluding Remarks References

95 97 101 108 110 115 119

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The State as Artificial Friend 6.1 The Explanatory Function of Friendship: A Hobbesian Appraisal 6.2 Normative Friendship: A Hobbesian Evaluation 6.3 From Friendship to Sociability—A Shift of Norms 6.4 The King’s Two Bodies: Friends or Enemies? 6.5 Concluding Remarks References

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Friendship After Hobbes 7.1 Hobbes’s Legacy: The Critical Component 7.2 Hobbes’s Legacy: The Constructive Component 7.3 Hobbes’s Challenge 7.4 The Resurgence of Friendship 7.5 Concluding Remarks References

141 143 144 145 149 151 156

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Index

125 127 128 131 134 137

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CHAPTER 1

Hobbes and Friendship

The career of friendship in political studies has been eventful. Celebrated by Aristotle and the ancients, neglected by Hobbes and the moderns, friendship is currently being welcomed back by a growing number of political theorists, philosophers, feminists, sociologists, and specialists of international relations.1 Supporters of the revival of friendship highlight the cross-cultural character of the concept (Carpenter 1906)2 and its emphasis on people in relation to others rather than on individuals in isolation (King and Devere 2000; Blum 1980); they underscore its normative quality (Dallmayr 2000; Scorza 2004; Schwarzenbach 2009; Mitias 2012) and explanatory merits (Foucault 1997; Gadamer 1999/2009; Martel 2001; Hayden 2015). While the golden age of friendship [ιλ´ια, amicitia] in ancient philosophy has been the focus of an impressive number of studies,3 its marginalisation in early modernity has attracted less attention. On the one hand, the literature points to Thomas Hobbes— the seventeenth-century self-proclaimed founder of modern political science—as largely responsible for the decline of the concept (Yack 1993, 110; Dallmayr 2000, 105; King 2000, 13; Schwarzenbach 2009, 4; von Heyking and Avramenko 2008); for instance, we read: the devaluation of friendship is the result of a decisive new turn in philosophy […] Ever since Hobbes, modern moral philosophy, even when it © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Slomp, Hobbes Against Friendship, International Political Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95315-7_1

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has not followed his teaching about the state of nature, has conceived of men’s most important claims upon one another to lie outside the realm of friendship. (Pangle 2003, 3)4

On the other hand, interpreters have shown little interest in establishing the reasons for Hobbes’s devaluation of friendship5 or for his influence on the destiny of the concept. Yet an elucidation of the thoughts and concerns that led Hobbes to marginalise a notion that was central to the tradition he inherited may not only shed light on why his move was influential but also have a bearing on current debates about the possibility and desirability of re-introducing friendship to the foreground of political theory and theories of international relations. This study seeks to show that Hobbes did not deny or oppose the occurrence of practices of friendship between individuals, peoples, and states; rather, he rejected friendship as an explanatory and normative principle of peace and concord. His move was influential because it captured the spirit of modernity—its individualism, nominalism, pragmatic scepticism, and materialism. Throughout the chapters, we will see that ϕιλ´ια or amicitia was not a standalone principle; it rested on assumptions about man and morality that Hobbes and the moderns could not endorse. While in the Greco-Roman world friendship was not considered ‘true’ when giving rise to immoral behaviour (Plato 1991) or unpatriotic actions (Cicero 1991), in modernity, deprived of its classical underpinning, friendship became the name of an ambivalent phenomenon that could enhance people’s quality of life or undermine peace by giving rise to favouritism, corruption, and factionalism (Lewis 1960). The rest of this Introduction will identify this study’s entry point in current debates (Sect. 1.1); draw attention to Hobbes’s puzzling neglect of friendship (Sect. 1.2); highlight the difficulties of defining friendship and its modes (Sect. 1.3); raise the questions that this study addresses; and provide the compass for the navigation of the following chapters (Sect. 1.4).

1.1

The Rise, Fall, and Resurgence of Friendship

The following statements by Aristotle capture the spirit of an age that viewed friendship as the substance of concord and the best protection against divisions, factions, and revolutions.

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Friendship seems too to hold states together … For unanimity [concord] seems to be something like friendship, and this they [legislators] aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy. (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics VIII. 1. 1155a21–26, p. 1825) For friendship we believe to be the greatest good of states and what preserves them against revolutions; and Socrates particularly praises the unity of the state which seems and is said by him to be created by friendship. (Aristotle 1984b, Politics, II. 4. 1262b5–10, p. 2003)

Friendship was the paradigm of the ancient world (King 20006 ; Mitias 2012)7 it embodied ‘the major principle in terms of which political theory and practice [were] described, explained and analyzed’ (Hutter 1978, 2; von Heyking and Avramenko 2008, 1); it represented ‘an organic part’ of the polity so that ‘it is difficult to imagine the one without the other’ (Carpenter 1906, 41; Springborg 1987). As contemporary liberal democracies point to violations of human rights to expose the shortcomings of authoritarian regimes, likewise ancient democracies adopted friendship as an indicator of the quality of life of individuals and communities and a pointer of the flaws of tyrannies: indeed, the ancients agreed, ‘in tyranny there is little or no friendship’ (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII. 1. 161a31, p. 1835). The past twenty-five years have witnessed a ‘remarkable resurgence’ of interest in friendship (Badhwar 1993, ix).8 The expanding literature often rehearses the following story (e.g. Vernon 2005, 9): in antiquity, friendship stood in the foreground of moral and political thought, as it is apparent in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero (King and Devere 2000); the concept underwent a transformation during the Middle Ages, as it emerges from the work of Thomas Aquinas who combined Aristotelian philia with Christian charity (Schwartz 20079 ; Grayling 2013)10 ; during the English Renaissance a reawakening of interest in ancient philia took place (Carpenter 1906; Mills 1937; Lochman et al. 2011; Grayling 2013); however, the revived notion was different in character from the original one: instead of denoting a relationship between citizens taking place in the public sphere, early modern friendship referred to the intimate bond that individuals form in the private domain.11 In this way, modern friendship was confined to the private sphere and to the background of political discourse (Lochman et al. 2011); and there it remained until our times (Devere 2013).

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As mentioned earlier, supporters of friendship often suggest that Hobbes is partly to be blamed for the exile of the concept from modern political theory; they suggest that Hobbes devalued friendship because of his pessimistic view of human nature and his excessive emphasis on self-interest (Yack 1993, 124),12 fear (Schwarzenbach 2009, 4), desire (Murphy 1998, 1),13 and power (von Heyking and Avramenko 2008, 6).14 The engagement with such claims is the entry point of this study in current debates; we will see that Hobbes did not deny that men are capable of genuine friendship; he did not dispute the occurrence of practices of friendship; rather, Hobbes rejected friendship as an explanatory and normative principle of political action; indeed the demolition of Aristotelian philia and its foundations—as this study seeks to show— was a major aim of Hobbes’s political science and one of its lasting contributions to modern political thought.15

1.2

A Vanishing Act: Hobbes on Friendship

The paucity of references to ‘friend’ and ‘friendship’ in Hobbes’s political theory is well-known; what is often overlooked, however, is that such paucity is intentional and polemical. Hobbes knew that his readers expected references to civic friendship—indeed in ‘A Review and Conclusion’ to Leviathan, he lists a lack of ‘a constant civil amity’ as a critique levelled against his theory of the state.16 Although he opposed this criticism, Hobbes did not defend his theory by saying, for instance, that the network of overlapping ‘systems’ or partial societies discussed in Chapter 22 of Leviathan gave rise to civic friendship.17 Yet he knew that from antiquity to Bodin such frameworks of civic interaction had been referred to as friendship (Brunkhorst 2005). Hobbes’s reluctance to refer to friendship is puzzling, considering the expectations of his readers and the rhetorical purposes that a long string of scholars, from Quentin Skinner (1996) to Timothy Raylor (2018), have attributed to Leviathan. Throughout the chapters, we will see that neither Hobbes’s conception of human nature nor his theory of absolute state sovereignty required the eclipse of friendship18 ; we will note that Hobbes refrained from mentioning friendship even when—according to his own definition—he could have used the word; we will notice that, contrary to the early modern tendency to consider friendship as a relationship relegated to

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the private sphere (Lochman et al. 2011), Hobbes maintained that any personal friendship can acquire political significance. Hobbes was familiar with the so-called friendship tradition that stretched from antiquity to his times. He was well-versed in all the classical philosophical texts on philia and amicitia. He wrote a digest of Aristotle’s Rhetoric where friendship is discussed in some detail; he was acquainted with the Iliad (that he translated later in life) that is widely regarded as the most important contribution to the theme of friendship of the epic period (Carpenter 1906, 68); he was accustomed to the interstate flavour of friendship, as described by Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War (which he translated in 1629) or by the anonymous author of the manuscript on Reason of State (which he also partially translated). The fact that Hobbes was conversant with the classical literature on friendship can be seen by his direct references to such texts. For example, in Elements of Law, Hobbes refers to Plato’s Symposium and to Socrates’ claim that, if not consummated, erotic love for paidos kalos can enable access to philosophy.19 In Anti-White, Hobbes takes issue with the statement that ‘not the evil but the good have friends’, a widespread belief endorsed by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca. Throughout his writings, Hobbes makes remarks—especially concerning the problem of distinguishing friends from flatterers—that touch on common themes in the literature on friendship in western political thought spanning from Plutarch’s Moralia to John of Salisbury’ Policraticus, from Erasmus’ Adages to Bacon’s essay on friendship. The ‘rebirth’ of friendship had been the distinctive feature of the English Renaissance (Mills 1937, 1020 ; Lochman et al. 2011; Grayling 2013; Shannon 2002), differentiating it from the Italian Renaissance’s motif of a male courtier’s amore for the wooed woman. ‘The boke named the Gouernour’ by Thomas Elyot, published in 1531, made a significant contribution to this revival of the friendship principle in England and contains a thorough examination of varieties of friendship.21 Of course, Hobbes knew that since antiquity, friendship was associated ‘in the popular mind with courage, republicanism, and with the spirited resistance to injustice and tyranny’ (Pangle 2003, 1; see also Derrida 1997, 15). Although this association may explain Hobbes’s lack of enthusiasm for friendship, it does not shed light on the reasons for his neglect—after all, Hobbes discussed democracies in spite of being critical of them. Hobbes did not include books dealing with friendship among the seditious doctrines that can endanger the state (even though he did

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include books by Greek and Latin writers inciting tyrannicide); indeed, as argued in later chapters, Hobbes did not regard friendship as evil; rather, he stressed the ambivalent impact of friendship on politics. Finally, it is worth noting that Hobbes had good personal experiences of friendship. Indeed his biography (Aubrey 1982, 148–62; Malcolm 1996) and correspondence show that, in addition to patrons (Johnson Bagby 2009; Sommerville 1992; Malcolm 2002), Hobbes had a number of genuine friends who cared for him and for whom he cared. In sum, Hobbes’s limited references to friends and friendship are at odds with his humanist education, his cultural milieu, the rhetorical aims of the Leviathan, and the expectations of his readers. The long-standing association of friendship with the republican tradition may explain Hobbes’s ideological dislike but not his neglect of friendship nor his influence on later writers such as Kant who ‘conceded only one page in his lectures on anthropology to friendship’ (Gadamer 1999/2009, 3) or Rawls who also devoted little attention to friendship especially in his Theory of Justice.22

1.3

Friendship: Definitions, Usages, and Modes

In his anthology of 1906,23 Edward Carpenter talks of friendship as a widespread institution that goes back to the beginning of recorded history and that developed throughout the world ‘independently of classic or Christian ideals’ (Carpenter 1906, 109); he gives examples of friendship from a multiplicity of sources, including accounts of ancient historians (e.g. Tacitus) and journals of travellers and explorers (e.g. David and Charles Livingstone and Herman Melville); he illustrates ‘the honour paid to friendship’ throughout the world with legends and tales, originating in Congo, Zambia, the Pacific Islands, Persia, Arabia, and Syria. Although friendship is ‘a universal human phenomenon’, interpreters emphasize that ‘the way this phenomenon manifests itself is inevitably shaped by cultural factors’ (Hutter 2000, 131); in other words, the semantic input of friendship is contextual.24 From ancient times to our times, interpreters have struggled to define friendship. This is partly because, as Jacques Maritain once pointed out, ‘[t]here is no more thankless task than trying rationally to distinguish and to circumscribe – in other words, trying to raise to a scientific or philosophical level – common notions that have arisen from the contingent practical needs of human history’ (Maritain 1951/1998, 1).

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Indeed, in spite of being ‘the inventors of definitions’ (Gadamer 1999/2009, 4), the Greeks found it difficult to raise to a philosophical level the common notion of philia, as Socrates’ concluding remark in Lysis reminds us: [W]e are friends of one another – for I count myself in with you – but what a friend is we have not yet been able to find out. (Plato 1991, 27)

On the one hand, reflecting on usages of the term, interpreters have suggested that, across cultures and throughout time, friendship is the name of a relationship that is freely chosen, that entails reciprocity of goodwill and trust, that is driven by love of self, or love of other, or both (Annis 1987; Pahl 2000, 2002; Vernon 2005; Grayling 2013). Friends are loyal; friends are truthful; friends are open; friends have many things in common—possessions, truths, and beliefs. On the other hand, scholars have warned against ‘presentism’ (Silver 1989) in discourses about friendship: what trust means, what positive disposition entails, what love signifies, is not fixed but fluid and variable with time and space (Oelsner 2014, 4). For example, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle uses the term ‘philia’ to indicate a wide range of relationships, from the special attachment between mother and child, or between husband and wife, to the bond between companions; from the connection between master and slave to the relation between travellers or business partners. This is clearly at odds with current understandings of ‘friendship’. Although it is sometime suggested that friendship is the focus of a tradition of thought,25 no unitary perspective on friendship ever existed, not even among the Greeks; indeed, there are significant differences between the views of Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, and the Stoics (Hutter 1978). In other words, in the western tradition, there are multiple notions of friendship that often share with each other only a family resemblance (Mills 193726 ; Price 1989; Digeser 2016). There is consensus, however, that Aristotle is the founder of the archnarrative on friendship (Derrida 1997), a narrative that runs through western political thought like a river made up of a multiplicity of streams and channels that separate and merge now and again in the works of different writers. This study engages with three of these streams—or modes of friendship—with the aim of establishing Hobbes’s reasons for marginalising the concept and for his influence on later writers—and especially liberal writers.

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1.4

Map and Compass

Why did Hobbes disregard friendship? Why was his move influential? What can Hobbes contribute to contemporary debates on friendship? These are the questions that this study addresses with the ultimate aim of showing that the undermining of Aristotelian philia is an essential component of Hobbes’s political science and one of his major contributions to modern political thought. Chapter 2 adopts Hobbes’s rendition of Aristotelian philia in the digest of the Rhetoric as a template for exploring Hobbes’s own notion of friendship. I overview Hobbes’s remarks about friendship in his political, historical, legal, and philosophical writings; I argue that Hobbes’s understanding of friendship shares important characteristics with the Aristotelian concept. Chapter 3 explores a narrative that conceives friendship as a utilitybased relationship sought for protection from enemies (Ludwig 2010); I call this mode of friendship ‘negative’ or ‘friendship from’. The friend, in this view, is an ally. I interpret Hobbes’s leagues, alliances confederacies, factions, and sects as embodiments of negative friendship. I show that Hobbes parts company with contributors to this narrative by rejecting the claim that friendship can shed light on the origins of political associations. Chapter 4 considers a narrative according to which friendship is a utility-based relationship that people enter in order to satisfy their psychological, material, and spiritual needs. I call this mode of friendship ‘positive’ or ‘friendship to’. The friend, in this view, is a partner in the pursuit of ‘commodious living’. I interpret Hobbes’s ‘systems’, partial societies, corporations, and personal friendships as embodiments of positive friendship. I show that Hobbes parts company with contributors to this narrative by rejecting the claim that friendship is the essence of civic concord. Chapter 5 investigates the narrative that regards friendship as a way of pursuing and cultivating virtue (MacIntyre 1981). I call this mode of friendship ‘normative’. The friend, in this view, is a second self. I argue that Hobbes opposes normative friendship not because he denies that selflessness or altruism may occur among friends, but because he rejects the view that selflessness is per se a virtue, regardless of consequences. Conspirators may be more generous with their friends than merchants, but they are not virtuous for Hobbes.

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Chapters 6 and 7 reflect on the findings of previous chapters and explore Hobbes’s reasons for rejecting the explanatory power and normative value traditionally attributed to friendship. I draw attention to Hobbes’s demolition of the anthropological and ethical underpinning of ancient friendship and especially of Aristotelian philia; I suggest that Hobbes reverses the order of creation he found in the tradition before him: it is not friendship that creates the conditions for the political; rather, it is the political that creates the conditions for friendship. I argue that Hobbes’s legacy has both a critical and a constructive component and is still relevant for contemporary work on friendship.

Notes 1. Comprehensive accounts of the career of friendship in western political thought can be found in Devere and Smith (2010) and Devere (2013). Heather Devere (2013) offers a chronology of the main works on friendship and politics since 1900; she demonstrates that since the 1990s multiple works on friendship and politics have appeared year after year. Indeed a substantial number of books and articles have discussed the philosophical and historical nature of friendship (Caluori 2013; Vernon 2005; Pahl 2000; Roschin 2017) and explored its political forms, from civic (e.g. Schwarzenbach 1996, 2009; Digeser 2016) and regional friendship (Oelsner and Vion 2011) to international (Oelsner 2014; Roshchin 2006; Digeser 2009) and global friendship (Lu 2009; Smith 2011). An academic journal devoted to the topic has been launched (Amity: Journal of Friendship Studies 2013) and special issues have been dedicated to friendship and its modes (e.g. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2007; Journal of International Political Theory 2009). 2. Stories of exemplary friendships entailing reciprocity of loyalty and trust occur throughout societies; indeed, accounts of extraordinary friendships and rituals can be found in the diaries of early modern explorers of the North American new lands (see Carpenter 1906). Theoretical reflections on friendship can be found in Mencius (2004) and Confucius (1979). Confucius listed five types of relationship, all of which are hierarchical except the last, namely the relationship between friends.

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3. The literature is immense; among the most well-known works: Cooper (1977), Bolotin (1979), Herman (1987), Price (1989), Schroeder (1992), Schollmeier (1994), Stern-Gillet (1995), Konstan (1997), Mulgan (2000), Pangle (2003), Irrera (2005), Bryan (2009), Nichols (2009), and Mann (2012). 4. According to Schwarzenbach, ‘It was undoubtedly Thomas Hobbes who, at the dawn of the modern period, attempted the most trenchant defence of fear and enlightened self-interest as the sufficient political glue’ (Schwarzenbach 2009, 4). 5. The limited work on Hobbesian friendship (Stanlick 2002; Smith 2008) does not address these questions. On my part, I started to discuss this issue in Slomp (2019). 6. In his Introduction to the Challenge to Friendship in Modernity, Preston King argues that one age is relevantly distinguished from another by some dominant philosophical paradigm or ideology, that the dominant moral and political paradigm of our age is constituted by a widespread aspiration to liberty, grounded in power, while in the ancient world the concept that most nearly fitted the bill was friendship (King 2000, 1–14). 7. Mitias explains that ‘a paradigm is created when a community embraces a system of beliefs and values as the guiding principles of its action’ (Mitias 2012, 7). 8. Badhwar’s view is echoed by P.E. Digeser: ‘After having been exiled from political theory for centuries, friendship is making a comeback’ (Digeser 2016, xi). 9. Daniel Schwartz (2007, 1) argues that ‘(f)or Aquinas, friendship is the paradigm ideal for the relationships that rational beings should cultivate. The set of potential friends includes beside fellow human beings, also angels and God’. 10. On how friendship as a bond of society and ideal was transformed by the notion of faith, see Brian Patrick McGuire (1988/2010); Carolinne White (1992); Julian Haseldine (2000); and John von Heyking (1999). 11. In the early modern period, we witness a ‘transition from one model of friendship to another, from an older kin and alliance model to a newer individualistic model of intimacy and personal choice’ (Hutson 2011, 241). The first model of friendship was not completely abandoned; for instance, in Antiquities of Greece (1698,

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cited by Carpenter 1906, 147) Archbishop John Potter praised the way the Greeks used the law to encourage friendship in public life. 12. Bernard Yack claims that ‘Hobbes believes, we would be better off if we eliminated from social life expectations of friendship and the recriminations they often inspire’ (Yack 1993, 124). 13. ‘Friendship was much discussed by the ancients, while moderns have been rather mute on the subject. […] Hobbes and other early modern psychologists brought desire to the fore’ (Murphy 1998, 1). 14. According to von Heyking and Avramenko, Hobbes regards ‘human existence is best understood as a perpetual quest for power’ and ‘writes of friends as patrons or cronies’ (2008, 6). 15. On Hobbes and Aristotle see Bertman (1991); Sorell (1999); Stauffer (2016); and Gooding and Hoekstra (2020). 16. On this see Skinner (2016); for my views, see Slomp (2021). 17. Indeed, as we will see in a later chapter, in the Latin Leviathan, there is no reference to ‘forensic amicitia’—a notion that had occurred in the Latin De Cive. 18. The theorization of absolute state sovereignty did not require the elimination of friendship; indeed, Jean Bodin accommodated civic friendship within his theory of the state (Bodin 1955, 135–7). 19. See Patapan and Sikkenga (2008). 20. ‘The most potent single literary production in reviving the theme [of friendship] was Cicero’s De Amicitia’ (Mills 1937, 10). 21. Thomas Elyot (1531/1970) devotes Chapter 11 of Book 2 to ‘The true description of amitie or friendship’ (1531/1970, 142– 5) and mentions Aristotle’s notion of friendship as virtue as well as Cicero’s De Amicitia. 22. In Theory of Justice Rawls makes a few intriguing remarks about Hobbes, friendship, mutual trust, and the issue of stability (1972, 497–8). He pays more attention to amity and friendship in Political Liberalism (1993) and especially in his Lectures (2007); however, neither friendship nor amity secure a place in the analytical index of these works. On Hobbes and Rawls, see Rhodes (2002). 23. First edition was published in 1902; the second edition of 1906 is enlarged. 24. Simon Koschut and Andrea Oelsner argue that in international relations the meaning of friendship ‘varies according to historical periods, cultural and social contexts and regional spaces’ (2014, 4).

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25. Michael Pakaluk introduces his collection of excerpts on friendship from the works of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Aelread, Aquinas, Montaigne, Bacon, Kant, Emerson, Kierkegaard, and Elisabeth Telfer as ‘something like a tradition of thought’: ‘Almost all of the central philosophical writings on friendship produced in the West are gathered in this slim anthology. And together they constitute something like a tradition of thought’ (Pakaluk 1991, 7). 26. ‘It is obvious that it is inexact to speak of the classical theory of friendship, for there was no one theory; there were theories’ (Mills 1937, 6).

References Annis, David. 1987. The meaning, Value, and Duties of Friendship. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (4): 349–356. Aristotle. 1984a. Nicomachean Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University, Book VIII, 1825–39, and Book IX, 1839–52. Aristotle. 1984b. Politics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol II, Book I and Book II: 1986–2023. Aubrey, John. 1982. Brief Lives. ed. Richard Barber. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press. Badhwar, Neera K., ed. 1993. Friendship: A Philosophical Reader. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Bertman, Martin. 1991. Body and Cause in Hobbes: Natural and Political. Wakefield, NH: Longwood Academic. Blum, Lawrence A. 1980. Friendship, Altruism and Morality. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Bodin, Jean. 1955. On Sovereignty. Six Books of the Commonwealth. ed. M.J. Tooley. Oxford: Alden Press. Bolotin, David. 1979. Plato’s Dialogue on Friendship. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Brunkhorst, Hauke. 2005. Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to Global Legal Community Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. Bryan, Bradley. 2009. Approaching Others: Aristotle on Friendship’s Possibility. Political Theory 37 (6): 754–779. Caluori, Damian, ed. 2013. Thinking About Friendship. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Carpenter, Edward. ed. 1906. second edition, enlarged. Iolaus: An Anthology of Friendship. London and Manchester: Swan Sonnenschein & Co and S. Clarke. Cicero. 1991. De Amicitia, trans. Stanley Lombardo. In Other Selves. Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 79–116.. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Confucius. 1979. The Analects. trans. D. C. Lau. London: Penguin Books. Cooper, John M. 1977. Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship. Review of Metaphysics 30 (4): 619–648. Dallmayr, Fred. 2000. Derrida and Friendship. In The Challenge to Friendship in Modernity, eds. Preston King and Heather Devere, 105–130. London: Frank Cass. Derrida, Jacques. 1997. The Politics of Friendship. trans. George Collins. London: Verso. Devere, Heather. 2013. Amity Update: The Academic Debate on Friendship and Politics. AMITY the Journal of Friendship Studies 1 (1): 5–32. Devere, Heather, and Graham M. Smith. 2010. Friendship and Politics. Political Studies Review 8 (3): 341–356. Digeser, P.E. 2009. Friendship between States. British Journal of Political Science 39 (2): 323–344. Digeser, P.E. 2016. Friendship Reconsidered. What it Means and How it Matters to Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Elyot, Thomas. 1531/1970. The Boke Named the Gouernour. Facsimile reprint. London: The Scholar Press Limited. Foucault, Michel. 1997. Friendship as a Way of Life. trans. Robert Hurley. In Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow, 135–140. New York: The New Press. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1999/2009. Friendship and Solidarity. Research in Phenomenology 39 (1): 3–12. Gooding, Nick and Hoekstra, Kinch. 2020. Hobbes and Aristotle on the Foundations of Political Science. In Hobbes’s On the Citizen: A Critical Guide, eds. Robin Douglass and Johan Olsthoorn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Grayling, A.C. 2013. Friendship. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Haseldine, Julian, ed. 2000. Friendship in Medieval Europe. Stroud, UK: Sutton Publishing. Hayden, Patrick. 2015. From Political Friendship to Befriending the World. The European Legacy 20 (7): 745–776. Herman, Gabriel. 1987. Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hutson, Lorna. 2011. Afterword. In Discourses and Representations of Friendship in Early Modern Europe, 1500–1700, ed. Daniel T. Lochman, Maritere Lopez, and Lorna Hutson, 240–245. Farnham: Ashgate.

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Hutter, Horst. 1978. Politics as Friendship. Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Hutter, Horst. 2000. The Virtue of Solitude and the Vicissitudes of Friendship. In The Challenge to Friendship in Modernity, ed. Preston King and Heather Devere, 131–148. London: Frank Cass. Irrera, Elena. 2005. Between Advantage and Virtue: Aristotle’s Theory of Political Friendship. History of Political Thought 26 (4): 565–585. John of Salisbury. 1990. Policraticus: Of the Frivolities of Courtiers and the Footprints of Philosophers, ed. Cary Nederman Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Johnson Bagby, Laurie. 2009. Thomas Hobbes: Turning Point for Honor. Lanham and Plymouth: Lexington Books. King, Preston. 2000. Introduction. In The Challenge to Friendship in Modernity, ed. Preston King and Heather Devere, 1–14. London: Frank Cass. King, Preston, and Heather Devere, eds. 2000. The Challenge to Friendship in Modernity. London: Frank Cass. Konstan, David. 1997. Friendship in the Classical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Koschut, Simon, and Andrea Oelsner, eds. 2014. Friendship and International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Lewis, C.S. 1960. The Four Loves. London: Harper Collins. Lochman, Daniel T., Maritere Lopez, and Lorna Hutson, eds. 2011. Discourses and Representations of Friendship in Early Modern Europe, 1500–1700. Farnham: Ashgate. Lu, Catherine. 2009. Political Friendship among Peoples. Journal of International Political Theory 5 (1): 41–58. Ludwig, Paul W. 2010. Without Foundations: Plato’s “Lysis” and Postmodern Friendship. American Political Science Review 104 (1): 134–150. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1981. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Malcolm, Noel. 1996. A Summary Biography of Hobbes. In The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorell, 13–44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Malcolm, Noel. 2002. Aspects of Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Mann, Hollie S. 2012. Ancient Virtues, Contemporary Practices: An Aristotelian Approach to Embodied Care. Political Theory 40 (2): 194–221. Maritain, Jacques. 1951/1998. Man and the State. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Martel, James R. 2001. Love is a Sweet Chain: Desire Autonomy and Friendship in Liberal Political Theory. New York: Routledge. McGuire, Brian Patrick. 1988/2010. Friendship and Community: The Monastic Experience 350–1250. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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Mencius. 2004. Mencius. London: Penguin Books. Trans with an introduction by D.C. Lau. Mills, Laurens J. 1937. One Soul in Bodies Twain. Bloomington, IN: Principia Press. Mitias, Michael. 2012. Friendship: A Central Moral Value. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi Editions. Mulgan, Richard. 2000. The Role of Friendship in Aristotle’s Political Theory. In The Challenge to Friendship in Modernity, ed. Preston King and Heather Devere, 15–32. London: Frank Cass. Murphy, Peter, ed. 1998. Introduction to ‘Friendship.’ The South Atlantic Quarterly, Special Issue 97 (1): 1–4. Nichols, Mary P. 2009. Socrates on Friendship and Community. New York: Cambridge University Press. Oelsner, Andrea. 2014. The Construction of International Friendship in South America. In Friendship and International Relations, ed. Simon Koschut and Andrea Oelsner, 144–162. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Oelsner, Andrea, and Antoine Vion. 2011. Friends in the Region: A Comparative Study on Friendship Building in Regional Integration. International Politics 48 (1): 129–215. Pahl, Ray. 2000. On Friendship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pahl, Ray. 2002. Towards a More Significant Sociology of Friendship. European Journal of Sociology 43 (3): 410–423. Pakaluk, Michael, ed. 1991. Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Pangle, Lorraine S. 2003. Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Patapan, Haig, and Jeffrey Sikkenga. 2008. Love and the Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes’s Critique of Platonic Eros. Political Theory 36 (6): 803–826. Plato. 1991. Lysis, trans. Stanley Lombardo. In Other Selves. Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 3–27. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Price, A.W. 1989. Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Raylor, Timothy. 2018. Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rawls, John. 1972. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, John. 2007. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, ed. Samuel Freeman. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. Rhodes, Rosamond. 2002. Reading Rawls, Hearing Hobbes. Philosophical Forum 33 (4): 393–412.

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Roschin, Evgeny. 2006. The Concept of Friendship: From Princes to States. European Journal of International Relations 12 (4): 599–624. Roshchin, Evgeny. 2017. Friendship Among Nations: History of a Concept. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Schollmeier, Paul. 1994. Other Selves. Albany, New York: SUNY Press. Schroeder, D. 1992. Aristotle on the Good of Virtue Friendship. History of Political Thought 13 (2): 203–218. Schwartz, Daniel. 2007. Aquinas on Friendship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schwarzenbach, Sibyl. 1996. On Civic Friendship. Ethics 107: 97–128. Schwarzenbach, Sibyl. 2009. On Civic Friendship: Including Women in the State. New York: Columbia University Press. Scorza, Jason. 2004. Liberal Citizenship and Civic Friendship. Political Theory 32 (1): 85–108. Shannon, Laurie. 2002. Sovereign Amity: Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Silver, Allan. 1989. Friendship and Trust as Moral Ideals: An Historical Approach. European Journal of Sociology 30 (9): 274–297. Skinner, Quentin. 1996. Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Skinner, Quentin. 2016. Hobbes and the Social Control of Unsociability. In The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes, eds. A.P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra, 432–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Slomp, Gabriella. 2019. As Thick as Thieves: Exploring Thomas Hobbes’ Critique of Ancient Friendship and its Contemporary Relevance. Political Studies 67 (I): 191–206. Slomp, Gabriella. 2021. In Search of “A Constant Civill Amity”: Hobbes on Friendship and Sociability. In A Companion to Hobbes, ed. Marcus Adams, 125–138. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons. Smith, Graham. 2011. Friendship and the World of States. International Politics 48: 10–27. Smith, Travis. 2008. Hobbes on Getting by with Little Help from Friends. In Friendship and Politics: Essays in Political Thought, eds. John von Heyking and Richard Avramenko, 221–247. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Sommerville, Johann. 1992. Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Sorell, Tom. 1999. Hobbes and Aristotle. In Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa, 364– 379. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Springborg, Patricia. 1987. The Contractual State: Reflections on Orientalism and Despotism. History of Political Thought 8 (3): 395–433.

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Stanlick, Nancy. 2002. Hobbesian Friendship: Valuing Others for Oneself. Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (3): 345–359. Stauffer, Devin. 2016. “Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy”: Hobbes’s Critique of the Classical Tradition. American Political Science Review 110 (3): 481– 494. Stern-Gillet, S. 1995. Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship. Albany, NY: SUNY. Vernon, Mark. 2005. The Philosophy of Friendship. Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. von Heyking, John. 1999. A Headless Body Politic? Augustine’s Understanding of a Populous and its Representation. History of Political Thought XX (4): 549–74. von Heyking, John and Avramenko, Richard., eds. 2008. Introduction. In Friendship and Politics: Essays in Political Thought, ed. John von Heyking and Richard Avramenko, 1–17. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. White, Carolinne. 1992. Christian Friendship in the Fourth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Yack, Bernard. 1993. The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought. Berkeley: University of California Press.

CHAPTER 2

In Search of the Hobbesian Friend

The following statement by Michael Silverthorne provides a useful introduction to this chapter—it reminds us of Hobbes’s deep acquaintance with classical writings, his sensitivity to the fluidity of different languages, his preoccupation with the definition of words: Thomas Hobbes received a humanist education which gave him an excellent knowledge of Latin and Ancient Greek, as well as of French, Italian and English. Throughout his life he read, wrote, and translated between these languages. …He was therefore very aware of the fluidity of natural languages. In the Preface to De Cive … Hobbes complains that, as a result of this fluidity, moral and political subjects have hitherto been treated more as rhetoric than as science. The fundamental requirement of a science is to fix the definitions of words. (Silverthorne 1996, 499)

Hobbes was familiar with many authors that celebrated friendship over the centuries—Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, Epictetus, Aquinas, and Bodin (Hamilton 1978). In his political theory, however, he made only a few references to ‘friends’ and ‘friendship’; certainly, for most readers, Hobbes’s views on friendship are summed up by the following cynical remark: All society, therefore, exists for the sake either of advantage or of glory, i.e. it is a product of love of self, not of love of friends. (Citizen I: 2, 24) © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Slomp, Hobbes Against Friendship, International Political Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95315-7_2

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In this chapter, I aim to show that there is more to Hobbesian friendship than proposed in the above statement. After examining the concept of philia that Hobbes ascribes to Aristotle (Sect. 2.1), I use that notion as a candle to illuminate Hobbes’s own conception of friendship as it emerges from the three expositions of his political theory (Sect. 2.2) and other writings (Sect. 2.3); I then review the secondary literature on Hobbesian friendship, benevolence, and egoism (Sect. 2.4) before drawing the conclusion that, in terms of motivations (e.g. utility, generosity), ingredients (e.g. trust, goodwill), and properties (e.g. reciprocity, transitivity), there are many parallels between Aristotelian and Hobbesian friendship (Sect. 2.5).

2.1

Hobbes’s Rendition of Aristotelian Philia

Hobbes was well-acquainted with all aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy, including the Nicomachean Ethics (Strauss 1963, 42). According to Leo Strauss, Aristotle’s Rhetoric is crucial for a full understanding of Hobbes’s political philosophy and anthropology; he writes: It would be difficult to find another classical work whose importance for Hobbes’s political philosophy can be compared with that of the Rhetoric. The central chapters of Hobbes’s anthropology, those chapters on which, more than on anything else he wrote, his fame as a stylist and as one who knows men rests all the time, betray in style and contents that their author was a zealous reader, not to say a disciple of the Rhetoric. (Strauss 1963, 35)

In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Sect. 4 of Book II elucidates the meaning of ‘friendship and friendly feelings’—‘towards whom these feelings are entertained, and why’. As Hobbes wrote a digest of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, it is worth citing part of his abridgement of this section because it sheds light on his understanding of Aristotle’s notions of love and friendship: To love is to will well to another, and that for others, not for our own sake. A friend is he that loves, and he that is beloved. […] A friend therefore is he; that rejoiceth at another’s good. And that grieves at his hurt. And that wishes the same with us to a third, whether good or hurt. And that is enemy or friend to the same man. We love them: that have done good to

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us, or ours; especially if much, readily, or in season. That are our friends’ friends. That are our enemies’ enemies… (The Whole Art of Rhetoric, 454–6).

Hobbes’s rendition of Aristotelian friendship highlights first of all the altruism and generosity implicit in the relationship: ‘to love is to will well to another, and that for others, not for our own sake’; the reciprocity of friendship: ‘A friend is he that loves, and he that is beloved’; the openness of friendship: [friends are] ‘such as are not ashamed to tell us freely their faults’ and ‘such as speak their mind’; the loyalty and trust expected in friendship: [friends are] ‘such as continue their friendship to the dead’ and ‘such as we may rely on’; the considerations of self-interest that occur in friendship: ‘We love them: that have done good to us, or ours; especially if much, readily, or in season’; [friends are] ‘such as we would do good to, except with greater hurt to ourselves’. While in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle (1984a) offers the famous distinction between friendship based respectively on utility, pleasure, and virtue, in the Rhetoric he emphasizes that all friendship entails both virtue (e.g. Aristotle 1984c Rhetoric Book II, 4. 1381a) and self-interest (e.g. Aristotle 1984c Rhetoric Book II, 4. 1381b 23–24),1 a view that Hobbes accurately retains in his abridgement. By Hobbes’s interpretation, then, Aristotelian friendship is a relationship that entails reciprocity of love, honour, trust, pleasure, and benefits between people. Hobbes’s rendition of Aristotelian philia not only concurs with the Oxford translation of the Rhetoric in The Complete Works of Aristotle (1984c, Book II, 4. 1380b 34–1382a 20) but also agrees with dominant interpretations of modern-day commentators: they, too, single out ‘reciprocity’ or ‘mutuality’ (Konstan 1997, 69; Pangle 2003, 38; Schollmeier 1994, 38; Nussbaum 1986/2009 344), ‘love’ and ‘goodwill’ (Konstan 1997, 74; Pangle 2003, 39; Price 1989, 138– 9, 197; Schollmeier 1994, 35–9), ‘openness’ (Pahl 2000), and ‘trust’ and ‘transitivity’ (Price 1989) as essential characteristics of Aristotelian friendship; they too highlight the virtuous selflessness (Konstan 1997, 76, 101; Schollmeier 1994, 51, 7–15;) and the considerations of self-interest (Price 1989, 131–61) that may occur in friendships. In sum, Hobbes’s interpretation of Aristotelian philia is not at odds with our own.

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2.2 Hobbesian Friendship in Elements, Citizen, and Leviathan Having sketched the Hobbesian understanding of Aristotelian philia, here I use the Aristotelian concept as a framework to introduce Hobbes’s own notion of friendship. In this section, I provide a preliminary survey of the characteristics of Hobbesian friendship, leaving more in-depth analysis and assessment of each feature to later chapters. First of all, Aristotle regarded friendship as natural, as Hobbes’s above abridgement clearly shows. Hobbes, however, is ambivalent on the naturalness of friendship; indeed, there are passages in his works that rule out the natural occurrence of friendship. For example, he remarks that ‘everyone is an enemy to everyone whom he neither obeys nor commands’ (Citizen IX: 3, 108), thereby suggesting that enmity, and not friendship, is natural2 and observes that: By nature, then, we are not looking for friends but for honour and advantage [commodum] from them. This is what we are primarily after; friends are secondary. (Citizen I: 2, 22, emphasis added)

But, after rejecting the view that we are driven ‘by nature’ to seek friends, Hobbes nevertheless states that ‘nature’ drives men to ‘seek each other’s company’: It is indeed true that perpetual solitude is hard for a man to bear by nature or as a man, i.e. as soon as he is born. For infants need the help of others to live, and adults to live well. I am not therefore denying that we seek each other company at the prompting of nature. (Citizen I: 2, 24 emphases added)

This inconsistency is felt throughout his political writings. Hobbes was well aware that his remarks about the natural unsociability of man were contentious; he explained: Since we see that men have in fact formed societies, that no one lives outside society, and that all men seek to meet and talk with each other, it may seem a piece of weird foolishness to set a stumbling block in front of the reader on the very threshold of civil doctrine, by insisting that man is not born fit for society. Something must be said in explanation. (Citizen I: 2, 24)

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Even if man were born in a condition to desire society, it does not follow that he was born suitably equipped to enter society. Wanting is one thing, ability another. For even those who arrogantly reject the equal conditions without which society is not possible, still want it. (Citizen I: 2, 25)

To shed light on Hobbes’s position it is worth reminding ourselves that Hobbes ascribed to man a number of passions (notably ‘curiosity’, which consists in the ‘Desire to know why, and how’ and ‘is in no living creature but Man’, Leviathan II: 6, 86; 1651, 26) that cannot emerge or be acted upon before the establishment of the political state. In Chapter 3, I will argue that, not unlike curiosity, man’s natural desire of company is dependent for its occurrence and fulfilment on the creation of artificial conditions that make trust and goodwill possible. Next, Aristotle understood friendship as a relationship between people, a view that is conveyed in Hobbes’s digest of the Rhetoric. Hobbes himself regards friendship as a relationship between individuals entailing power (Leviathan II: 10, 132; 1651, 41) and distinguishes it from dispositions, manners, and passions such as ‘kindness’ or ‘Love of Persons for society’ (Leviathan II: 6, 86; 1651, 26). In Elements of Law, Hobbes explains that some of man’s powers are ‘natural’, while others are ‘acquired’; Hobbes lists ‘friendship or favour’ among the latter, after ‘riches’ and ‘place of authority’ and before ‘good fortune’ or ‘the favour of God Almighty’ (Elements I. 8: 4, 34). In Citizen, we encounter again the connection between friendship and power; for instance, having noted that a man’s ‘enjoyment’ lies in the contemplation of his own power, he remarks that one’s ‘friends’ are a source of power and can then help obtain such joy (Citizen XV: 13, 177). In Leviathan, after renaming ‘acquired powers’ as ‘instrumental powers’ and listing friendship among them, Hobbes makes the famous statement that ‘To have friends, is Power: for they are strengths united’ (Leviathan II: 10, 132; 1651, 41). Furthermore, in all his works, Aristotle stressed the reciprocity of friendship; in Elements, Hobbes captures the reciprocity of friendship by saying that it is a sort of ‘contract’ (Elements I. 9: 17, 44): a Hobbesian man does a good deal for a friend with the expectation that the friend will someday return the favour.3 In Leviathan, Hobbes suggests that friendship is not a contract but a gift that nonetheless entails the return of services. He writes that.

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When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or from his friends; or in the hope to gain the reputation of Charity, or Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but GIFT, FREE-GIFT, GRACE: which words signifie one and the same thing. (Leviathan II: 14, 204, capitals as in the original; 1651, 66)

Whether a quasi-contract (as suggested in Elements ) or a gift made in the hope of gaining services from another (as stated in Leviathan), Hobbes maintains that friends expect the reciprocation of trust, goodwill, and benefits from one another. Assistance, support, and help give rise to obligations among Hobbesian friends, ‘[f]or benefits oblige’ (Leviathan II: 11, 154; 1651, 48). In the Rhetoric, Aristotle (1984c) stresses the bond of love between friends. On love too, as on the naturalness of friendship, Hobbes’s position is inconsistent both across writings and even in the same work. For example, in Elements he acknowledges ‘the love men bear to one another or the pleasure they take in one another’s company; and by which men are said to be sociable by nature’ (Elements I. 9:16, 43), and—almost in the same breath—he states that that the passion ‘sometime called love, but more properly good will or charity’ is nothing but a desire to display one’s power: There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth charity. (Elements I. 9:17, 44)

This inconsistency has given rise to a long-standing debate among scholars that is discussed in Section 2.3; here it is worth drawing attention to Hobbes’s remark that a man does not love another because he is member of mankind: For if man naturally loved his fellow man. Loved him, I mean, as his fellow man, there is no reason why everyone would not love everyone equally as equally men. Citizen I: 2, 22

Hobbes interpreted man’s love as selective. He indicates, however, that we can establish friendships with strangers:

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The affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefit on strangers, is not to be called charity, but either contract whereby they seek to purchase friendship, or fear, which maketh them to purchase peace. (Elements I. 9: 17, 44)

Hobbes highlights the occurrence of varied emotions in friendship; for instance, he observes that ‘some Weep for the losse of Friends; Others for their unkindnesse’ (Leviathan II: 6, 88; 1651, 27), he notes that even ‘conspirators aid and comfort one another, and share common designs’ (Anti-White, 479). Pity, care, and the sharing of goals bring Hobbesian individuals together. A further element that Aristotle acknowledged in the Rhetoric (as in other works) is the usefulness of friendship (‘we love them: that have done good to us, or ours: especially if much readily, or in season … And such as are officious towards us’, Hobbes’s rendition). In his writings Hobbes ascribes a wide range of potential uses to friendship, from obtaining feedback on one’s literary output (Citizen ‘Preface to the Reader’ 14) to receiving assistance in improving one’s way of life, from bringing succour in the state of nature to helping avoid punishment in the political state. The usefulness of friendship may not be present in every single transaction between Hobbesian friends, yet it is a fundamental characteristic4 ; indeed, Hobbes suggests that all friendship is normally sought for its benefits: We grieve over the loss of riches and of friends because we feel ourselves deprived of the potential and of the protection that have raised our hopes of advancement. (Anti-White 465). For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe, because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man his own Good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust, nor consequently of mutual help, nor of reconciliation of one man to another. (Leviathan II: 15, 230; 1651, 75)

Next, and perhaps most importantly, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle identifies the admiration of virtue as a key motivation for seeking someone’s friendship. Although Hobbes’s explicit views suggest that we desire friendship based on the other’s probable usefulness to us rather than out of admiration for their virtue, his reference to his ‘most noble and honored friend, Mr Sidney Godolphin’, shows that he countenanced that we may desire to be friends with individuals whom we admire for their virtue (Leviathan III

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‘A Review and Conclusion’, 1133). Hobbes’s major disagreement with Aristotle on the meaning and role of virtue in friendship is examined in Chapters 5 and 6. Furthermore, Aristotle establishes a link between honour and friendship. Being a vessel of power, friendship is source of glory and honour also for Hobbes (Leviathan II:10, 136–7; 1651, 43). Hobbes suggests that the connection between friendship, glory, and honour is a source of quarrel in natural conditions, where men are easily offended if someone shows ‘any sign of undervalue … in their friends’ (Leviathan II: 13, 192; 1651, 62), and in the political state where officials may bend rules and undermine equity and justice to help their friends.5 Important as friendship is for glory and honour, however, Hobbes intimates that riches or positions of authority or ancestry are surer mechanisms for enhancing one’s status: friendships are unreliable not only because they are prone to dissolution but also because we ‘participate’ in the dishonour of our friends (Elements I. 9:13, 42): when they fall, we fall too. Finally, Aristotle stressed the transitivity of friendship, namely we regard our friends’ friends as our own. Hobbes seems to agree with this view in so far as he suggests that men count on help from their friends’ friends, honour their friends’ friends, and expect favour from them; he also mentions that descendants of ‘conspicuous parents’ inherit the friends of their ancestors (Leviathan II: 10, 140; 1651, 44). However, Hobbes does not endorse the idea that friendship is transitive in a mathematical sense, so that our circle of friends will include a friend of a friend of a friend … of a friend—i.e. everyone! Unlike Thomas Aquinas (1991, 173) who thought it was possible to move from friendship with some individuals to friendship with all people, Hobbes suggests that there are limits to the spreading of friendship. Certainly Hobbes’s personal experiences was that friendship is not always transitive—he was a close friend to Mersenne who was a close friend to Descartes and yet he and Descartes disliked each other very much. When in Leiden René Descartes wrote to Marin Mersenne about Hobbes: I think it best if I have nothing to do with him [‘the Englishman’] ... I also beg you to communicate as little as possible to him of those of my opinions which you know, and which have not appeared in print. For ... he is aiming to make his reputation at my expense, and by devious means (Correspondence I, letter 33, 100).

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In letter 34, Hobbes himself confided to Mersenne the following feelings about Descartes: this quarrel was started by him [Descartes], as you yourself know (107) … I do not at all defend my errors; still less do I defend them obstinately. Unless M. Descartes behaves in the same way, I shall certainly be his superior in moral conduct (Correspondence I, letter 34, 112).

2.3

Hobbesian Friendship in Later Writings

Hobbes’s lack of interest in friendship as a political concept remained constant over time. In Human Nature the references to friendship are as rare as in his political writings; the relationship is described again as being valuable because it is empowering and useful: Friendships are good, certainly useful. For friendships, among other things, confer protection … (Human Nature XI: 6, 49) Friendships, moreover, are protection (Human Nature XI: 7, 49)

As in previous writings, in Human Nature Hobbes notes the variety of emotions that arise within friendships, ranging from compassion to anger: ‘friends also weep at some time or other when returning to favour after anger’ (Human Nature XII: 7, 60). He also claims that the drive for friendship is a consequence of man’s lack of self-sufficiency, a view that was contested by Cicero (1991) but widely held in antiquity (see Chapter 4); he remarks: Those that weep the greatest amount and more frequently are those, such as women and children, who have the least hope in themselves and the most in friends. (Human Nature XII: 7, 59)

As the lack of self-sufficiency prompts one to seek friends, so ‘selfconfidence’ drives one to ignore those who seek our favour (Human Nature XI: 13, 53). Hobbes explains the connection between dispositions, manners, vices, and virtues thus:

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Dispositions, when they are so strengthened by habit that they beget their actions with ease and with reason unresisting, are called manners. Moreover, manners, if they be good, are called virtues, if evil, vices. (Human Nature XIII: 8, 68; italics in original)

Hobbes reiterates the view expressed in his political writings that ‘it happens that the same manners are praised by some and condemned by others’ (Human Nature XIII: 8, 68) and that ‘a common standard of virtues and vices doth not appear except in civil life’ (Human Nature XIII: 9, 69). Indeed, friendship—the normative paradigm of antiquity—is never presented as a norm or virtue by Hobbes. Even if the conception of friendship that emerges from Human Nature is not significantly different from what we encounter in Elements, Citizen, or Leviathan, Hobbes’s discussion of love is clearer than that we find in his political writings. In Human Nature, Hobbes states unambiguously that man is capable of loving others for their sake rather than for his own; he distinguishes between love that is self-interested (‘when we wish ourselves well’) and love of others (‘when we wish well to others’); he illustrates this difference with an example that is less amusing today than it was in Hobbes’s times: a male neighbour is usually loved one way, a female another; for in loving the former, we seek his good, in loving the other, our own (Human Nature XII: 8, 60).

References to friendship that we encounter in Behemoth and Common Law confirm with historical examples the conceptualization of friendship that emerges from his political works and from Human Nature. In Behemoth, Hobbes speaks of the widespread disapproval of the King’s largesse towards his friends (Behemoth II, 192); he also describes how the King was compelled by his adversaries to ‘give up’, desert and ‘sacrifice’ his friends (Behemoth II, 212, 215) and even to betray them (Behemoth II, 222, 233); for sure, in Hobbes’s historical account, trust and loyalty are part and parcel of friendship, and the betrayal of a friend’s trust is a source of dishonour. In Common Law, Hobbes repeats that we partake in the honour and dishonour of our friends, and therefore, we assist friends who are disgraced or outlawed at our peril (Common Law, 104). Hobbes also reiterates that political discontent may be fomented if the King privileges

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his friends (Common Law, 15, 24); this reinforces the opinion expressed in his political writings that friendship among people in government undermines equity and fairness. From Hobbes’s Correspondence, friendship emerges as a mixture of care, goodwill, and exchange of favours; its nature is well captured by one of Hobbes’s friends, François Du Verdus from Bordeaux: What is human life if not a succession of favours which one does for one’s friends and from time to time not without inconvenience to oneself? (Correspondence I , letter 100, 358)

Indeed, the correspondence shows that Hobbes was fond of his friends (see, e.g., Correspondence I , letter 56 to Samuel Sorbiere, 164) and that his friends were fond of him and acknowledged Hobbes’s ‘trust, esteem and affection’ (Letter 75, 229), that he exchanged gifts and favours with them.6 In the correspondence, the sort of utility that Hobbes associates with friendship occasionally resonates with Renaissance themes: friends are said by Hobbes to be useful because they spur us to honourable action; they make us ‘more industrious’ in the pursuit of knowledge, and above all their conversations and criticisms foster our understanding (Correspondence I , letter 42 to Sorbiere). Moreover, we know from John Aubrey that Hobbes wanted to stay in London because he valued conversation with friends: He was much in London till the restauration of his Majesty, having here convenience not only of Bookes, but of learned Conversation. I have heard him say, that at his Lord’s house in the Countrey there was a good Library, and books enough for him […]; but he sayd, that want of learned Conversation was a very great inconvenience, and that though he conceived he could order his thinking as well as perhaps as another man, yet he found a great defect. (Aubrey 1949, 231)

From this perspective, although the ground of friendship is utility, the beneficiary of conversation between learned friends is the whole of mankind.

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2.4 Hobbesian Friendship in Secondary Literature In view of the scarcity of references to friends and friendship in Hobbes’s works, it is unsurprising that dictionaries of Hobbes’s most important concepts make no mention of ‘friendship’ at all (Martinich 1995; Lemetti 2012). Whereas one finds important references to friendship and patronage in historical discussions of Hobbes’s life and context (Sommerville 1992; Malcolm 1996; Johnson Bagby 2009), to date the secondary literature, with a handful of notable exceptions, has shown very limited interest in the role of friendship or love in Hobbes’s political theory.7 According to Nancy Stanlick, the disregard of Hobbesian friendship in the secondary literature is a consequence ‘of the “bad press” Hobbes regularly receives from most commentators’; his ‘almost maniacal interest in survival’ leads readers to dismiss what he did say about love and friendship (Stanlick 2002, 345). She observes: Hobbes’s position seems inconsistent with friendship or other-regarding actions; and if we require friendship means that we value our friends such that we wish for them the good irrespective of our own interests, then I suspect that Hobbes will be seen to have no concept of friendship at all. (Stanlick 2002, 345)

Stanlick finds in Hobbes’s works a thick concept of friendship thereby rejecting the mistaken and incomplete view that Hobbesian contractors, prior to the institution of government, are naturally isolated, warlike, uncooperative, self-interested to the point of being incorrigibly selfish, and mean. (Stanlick 2002, 345)

She interprets the desire of men for commodious living as a desire for a life with ‘relations with pleasant companions who feel mutual affection or respect for each other’ (Stanlick 2002, 346); she argues that ‘Hobbes recognizes the importance of feeling for others, and it is part of the foundation of his moral theory’ (Stanlick 2002, 352). In his richly researched essay on Hobbesian friendship, Travis Smith puts forwards an altogether different interpretation from that of Stanlick. He sees the desire for power as the ‘motor of friendship’ (Smith

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2008, 223), he interprets Hobbes’s position on friendship as an attack on patronage; he emphasizes that Hobbes’s ‘reflections on religion in particular illuminate his attack on friendship in general’ (Smith 2008, 236); he points out that Hobbesian friendship ‘is not a good in itself’ but always instrumental (Smith 2008, 224): Men do not enjoy friendships, or have any love for society itself for that matter, except for the safety they afford and the opportunities for success they bring. (Smith 2008, 224)

Neither Stanlick nor Smith see Hobbes’s stance on friendship as part of his overall project to undermine Aristotle’s philosophy, as the present study seeks to demonstrate. Even though work specifically on Hobbesian friendship is thus far limited, there is a vast literature on whether or not Hobbes endorsed psychological egoism.8 As some of this literature offers important if scattered remarks on Hobbes’s views on friendship, it is worth reminding ourselves of the terms of the long-standing debate on the type and extent of egoism that Hobbes attributed to man.9 One camp maintains that Hobbes conceived man as wholly selfinterested and incapable of other-regarding action, and that such a view was integral to his mechanical understanding of nature and nominalism (e.g. Stephen,10 Watkins,11 Gauthier,12 Spragens13 ) and to his political theory (Robertson,14 Wolin,15 King,16 Herbert17 ). Supporters of this camp have suggested that Hobbes ‘asserts the principle in the mind to be only the love of power, and delight in the exercise of it’ (Butler 1726/1969 footnote 1 to Sect. 6, 18), that the Hobbesian man never acts out of concern for others, that all friendship is formed and maintained to further self-interest and increase empowerment. In a nutshell, according to this camp, Hobbesian friends behave towards each other ‘with the cool calculation we expect of bankers and accountants’ (Yack 1993, 110, 127). There are certainly many quotes to support such reading; for instance, commenting on the combination of grief and joy that people feel when from the shore they witness the danger of men at sea in a tempest or from a safe castle the fight between two armies, he observes that oftentimes ‘men are content … to be spectators of the misery of their friends’ (Elements I. 9: 19, 46). In contrast, another camp argues that Hobbes held a more complex notion of human nature (Holmes 199018 , Gert 196719 , Lloyd 1992,

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2009) and that this is so especially in Leviathan (McNeilly 1968,20 Rawls 200721 ), in which Hobbes did not deny that men are capable of ‘friendship without hypocrisy’ (Hume 1777/1970, 29622 ), nor that they can engage in other-regarding action (Lloyd 2012; 2013), that people can genuinely care for family and friends (Sorell 198623 ), and that they include others in the well-being they aim to attain (Baier 1987), especially after the creation of the political state (Gert 1972, 11). According to this camp: Nothing in Hobbes’s theory requires that men not have friends for whom they are willing to make some sacrifice. (Gert 1972, 8) [Hobbes] does say in Chapter 6 that … we are capable of loving people ... He therefore does think that people are capable of benevolence and of genuine affection for other people, or concern for their good. (Rawls 2007, 45) Hobbes does not deny the existence of benevolent or conscientious actions, and he probably does not think that they always have an ulterior motive, though he is apt to see self-interest in any act of charity. But he certainly thinks that disinterested benevolence and action for the sake of duty are uncommon enough that political theory should not take much account of them. (Curley 1994, XV)

In sum, the few writers that examined Hobbesian friendship in any depth (e.g. Stanlick and Smith) put forward very different interpretations. The wider scholarly debate on the egoism of the Hobbesian man also contributed opposite views on friendship: according to one view, Hobbesian men are capable only of instrumental friendship; according to the other, Hobbesian individuals are able to love, care, and help others for others’ sake. While the first camp had the upper hand for the best part of the twentieth century, the second camp has gained increasing support in the twenty-first century. A growing number of readers of Hobbes now maintain that, although the pursuit of self-interest is common practice, Hobbesian individuals are capable of genuine acts of generosity and altruism.

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Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have shown that the concept of friendship that emerges from Hobbes’s political works can be loosely linked to Aristotelian philia as described in the Rhetoric. First, Hobbes retains the Aristotelian idea that friendship is a relationship, entailing reciprocity of goodwill and trust; the language of exchange and contract used by Hobbes to convey the mutuality of friendship reminds us of a market-oriented society (Pagden 1987) and arguably shows the early-modern transformation of the classical concept while retaining some of its original characteristics. Second, Hobbes emphasizes the empowering nature of friendship that Aristotle and the ancients often highlighted by observing that only gods and beasts don’t need friends because only they are self-sufficient. It is worth noticing that, in so far as Hobbes defines man as ‘motion’ (De Corpore XI, 137) generating, and generated by ‘power’, and defines friendship as power, it follows that friends are one of the sources of identity of the Hobbesian man-as-motion (Slomp 2021). Third, Hobbes underscores the occurrence of considerations of selfinterest in friendships; however, he does not maintain that all friendship is ruthlessly instrumental, nor does he uphold that it is beyond human nature to enjoy the company of friends, to care genuinely for them, and even to admire their virtue. In Human Nature, Hobbes unambiguously states that love, altruism, and generosity do occur in relations between people. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 investigate the reasons why Hobbesian friendship that prima facie shares with Aristotelian philia important ingredients (trust, goodwill), properties (reciprocity and transitivity), and motivations (utility, generosity), does not serve the same explanatory and normative functions in Hobbes’s and Aristotle’s political theories. In the course of the analysis, we will see that for Hobbes it is immaterial whether men are genuinely generous or incurably selfish in their dealings with others because it is not friendship but authority that can protect the commonwealth from discord and civil war.

Notes 1. Agnes Heller (1998) offers a most stimulating discussion of Aristotle’s typology of friendship and shows how Aristotle used the

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categories of time, space, quantity, and quality to highlight the main differences between his three types of friendship: at one pole, we encounter utility-friendship, namely a relationship that can be formed and dissolved in a very short amount of time, that can involve a large number of people, that does not require the daily sharing of residence, and that is usually superficial and short-lived (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics VIII, 1158a 17). At the other pole, we find virtue-friendship, namely a bond that takes time and effort to develop, that grows by means of day-to-day conversation and interaction, that is nurtured by living together, and that cannot possibly be extended to many people (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics VIII, 1158a 12). In other words, for Aristotle, friendships based on utility, pleasure, and virtue represent points on a continuum: relationships of crude instrumentality contain some virtuous characteristics such as trust and good will and can, occasionally and over time, develop and deepen into relations whereby friends foster each other’s virtue in the pursuit of the good life. 2. For an interesting discussion of this topic, see Maximilian Jaede (2018). 3. Hobbes notes that ‘[i]t happeneth many times that a man benefitteth or contributeth to the power of another without any covenant but only upon confidence and trust of obtaining the grace and favour of that other whereby he may procure a greater or no less benefit or assistance to himself’ (Elements I. 16: 6, 84). 4. The range of utility calculations that occur in Hobbesian friendship are examined in Chapters 3 and 4. 5. This issue is discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. 6. Requests of favours occur often in the correspondence; for instance, Mons. Thomas de Martel from Paris asks Hobbes to ‘tell one of [his] household to find some decent lodgings (two rooms)’ for a friend of a friend (Correspondence I , letter 69, 202); Samuel Sorbiere from The Hague asks Hobbes ‘if [he] can do anything for [his] friend du Prat’ (Correspondence I , letter 44, 137); friends send gifts to Hobbes—for instance de Martel sent a hat from Paris (Correspondence I , letter 72, 209); Hobbes too sends thoughtful gifts to his friends, such as the ‘looking-glasse’ for Henry Oldenburg (Correspondence I , letter 73, 211).

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7. Writing in 2002 Nancy Stanlick remarked: ‘[S]o far as I can tell, there is nothing written about love or friendship in conjunction with Hobbes or Hobbesian moral or political theory either in the distant or recent past’ (Stanlick 2002, 345). 8. Classical contributions can be found in Baumrin (1969). 9. I have discussed this debate in Slomp (2019). This section relies on the argument I put forward there. 10. ‘He was perfectly content to profess the most unblushing egoism and carry it out consistently. His essential aim was to be scientific, to accept the obvious facts, and to carry out the conclusions logically. His nominalism naturally went with individualism. Each man obviously is a separate thing which must be explained by its own properties, and not by reference to any mysterious bond of unity with other things …. Finally, his thorough materialism seems to make the assumption of selfishness inevitable’ (Stephen 1904, 143). 11. ‘Hobbes’s theory of human nature […] yields a uniformityprinciple and also what may be called an egocentricity-principle’ (Watkins 1965, 71. See also Watkins 1969, 237–62, reprinted in Bernard H. Baumrin 1969, 83–106). 12. ‘From this account of vital and voluntary motion, it follows that each man seeks, and seeks only, to preserve and to strengthen himself. A concern for continued well-being is both the necessary and the sufficient ground of human action. Hence man is necessarily selfish’ (Gauthier 1969, 7). 13. ‘Hobbes sees a rather large degree of ruthless egocentricity as a general human trait’ (Spragens 1973, 103–4). 14. Robertson (1886, 135) attributed to Hobbes a ‘conception of man as moved by purely selfish impulses’. 15. ‘[The Hobbesian Man is] calculating, egotistic, and alone even in society’ (Wolin 1960, 246). 16. ‘Hobbes veers between the notion that the individual is an animate solipsis … and the view. that he is merely selfish and egoistic … Man is not alone, but he carries an island within himself’ (King 1974, 191). 17. ‘Hobbes does not deny that many will reject his conception of man. Men will want to argue that … men are in fact capable of sincere, honourable, selfless compassion for other men. What Hobbes maintains is that the very actions and behaviour of his

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doubters “disavow what their discourses approve of”. The natural axiom of human behaviour is nothing more than that man, by natural necessity, desires his own good and shuns whatever is destructive of his well-being. All behaviour is egoistic, necessarily self-interested. … Every man seeks the society of others for his own benefit, not theirs’ (Herbert 1989, 114, 115). 18. ‘Why does [Hobbes] flirt with motivational reductionism even though, as I have amply documented, his portrait of the human psyche is actually rich and unparsimonious?’ (Holmes 1990, 144). 19. Bernard Gert consistently and vigorously rejected the association of Hobbes’s political theory with psychological egoism (Gert 1967, 1972, 2010). 20. ‘[T]he account of the passions in Leviathan … is not predominantly egoistic, although an unambiguously egoistic account is given in other works’ (McNeilly 1968, 95). 21. ‘Hobbes does not say in the Leviathan that people are psychological egoists, or that they pursue or care only about their own good’ (Rawls 2007, 45). 22. Hume drew a distinction between those according to whom ‘all benevolence is mere hypocrisy, friendship a cheat, public spirit a farce, fidelity a snare to procure trust and confidence; and that while all of us, at bottom, pursue only our private interest, we wear these fair disguises, in order to put others off their guard, and expose them the more to our wiles and machinations’ (Hume 1970, 295) and those who interpret ‘the most generous friendship, however sincere, [as] a modification of self-love’ because ‘whatever affection one may feel, or imagine he feels for others, no passion is, or can be disinterested; that the most generous friendship, however sincere, is a modification of self-love; and that, even unknown to ourselves, we seek only our own gratification, while we appear the most engaged in schemes for the liberty and happiness of mankind. By a turn of imagination, by a refinement of reflection, by an enthusiasm of passion, we seem to take part in the interests of others, and imagine ourselves divested of all selfish considerations: but, at bottom, the most generous patriot and most niggardly miser, the bravest hero and most abject coward, have, in every action, an equal regard to their own happiness and welfare’ (Hume 1970, 296).

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Hume associates Hobbes with the second group: ‘An epicurean or a Hobbist readily allows, that there is such a thing as friendship in the world, without hypocrisy or disguise, though he may attempt, by a philosophical chemistry, to resolve the elements of this passion, if I may so speak, into those of another, and explain every affection to be self-love, twisted and moulded, by a particular turn of the imagination, into a variety of appearances’ (Hume 1970, 296–7). The following anecdote related by Aubrey illustrates how Hobbes tended to explain acts of charity as instances of self-love: [Hobbes] was very charitable […] One time, I remember, goeing in the Strand, a poore and infirme old man craved his Almes. He, beholding him with eies of pitty and compassion, putt his hands in his pocket, and gave him 6d. Said a Divine […] that stood by‘Would you have done this, if it had not been Christ’s command?’ ‘Yea,’ said he. ‘Why?’ quoth the other. ‘Because,’ said he, ‘I was in paine to consider the miserable condition of the old man; and now my almes, giving him some reliefe, doth also ease me.’ (Aubrey 1949, 236).

In Slomp (2019) I argue that Hume attributes to Hobbes what Gert and others have termed ‘tautological egoism’ and distinguished from ‘psychological egoism’. On Hobbes and Hume see the interesting piece by Alexandra Chadwick (2021). 23. ‘If psychological egoism holds that people never act to benefit others, then Hobbes was never a psychological egoist’ (Sorell 1986, 98).

References Aquinas, Thomas. 1991. Summa Theologiae: Questions on Love and Charity. In Other Selves: philosophers on friendship., ed. Pakaluk, 146–84. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Aristotle. 1984a. Nicomachean Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University, Book VIII, 1825–39, and Book IX, 1839–52.

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Aristotle. 1984b. Eudemian Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Book VII, 1956–81. Aristotle. 1984c. Rhetoric. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, trans W. Rhys Roberts. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Book II.4, 2200–2202. Aubrey, John. 1949. Brief Lives. ed: Oliver Lawson Dick. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Baier, Annette C. 1987. Commodious Living. Synthese 72 (2): 157–185. Baumrin, Bernard, ed. 1969. Hobbes’s Leviathan: Interpretation and Criticism. Belmont California: Wadsworth Publishing. Butler, Joseph. 1726/1969. Upon Human Nature, Sermon 1 from Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Tolls Chapel, reprinted in Baumrin, Bernard H ed. 1969 Hobbes’s Leviathan: Interpretation and Criticism, 16–25. Belmont California: Wadsworth Publishing. Chadwick, Alexandra. 2021. Hobbes and Hume on Human Nature: “Much of a Dispute of Words?”. In A Companion to Hobbes. ed. Marcus Adams, 463–477. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons. Cicero. 1991. On Duties. eds. M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Curley, Edwin. 1994. ‘Introduction’ to Leviathan with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, VIII-XLVII. Gauthier, David. 1969. The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gert, Bernard. 1967. Hobbes and Psychological Egoism. Journal of the History of Ideas 28 (4): 503–20; reprinted in Bernard H. Baumrin. 1969. ed. Hobbes’s Leviathan: Interpretation and Criticism, 107–126. Belmont California: Wadsworth Publishing. Gert, Bernard. 1972. ‘Introduction’ to Man and Citizen. Thomas Hobbes’s De Homine and De Cive also known as Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Governments and Society, 2–32. Gert, Bernard. 2010. Hobbes: Prince of Peace. Cambridge: Polity. Hamilton, James. 1978. Hobbes’s Study and the Hardwick Library. Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (4): 445–453. Heller, Agnes. 1998. The Beauty of Friendship. The South Atlantic Quarterly 97(1, Winter): 5–22. Herbert, Gary. 1989. Thomas Hobbes: The Unity of Scientific & Moral Wisdom. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. Holmes, Stephen. 1990. Political Psychology in Hobbes’s Behemoth. In Mary Dietz, ed. Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, 120–152. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

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Hume, David. 1970. Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Reprinted from the posthumous edition of 1777. ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. Second edition. Jaede, Maximilian. 2018. Thomas Hobbes’s Conception of Peace: Civil Society and International Order. Palgrave MacMillan. Johnson Bagby, Laurie. 2009. Thomas Hobbes: Turning Point for Honor. Lanham and Plymouth: Lexington Books. King, Preston. 1974. The Ideology of Order: A Comparative Analysis of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. London: George Allen & Unwin. Konstan, David. 1997. Friendship in the Classical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lemetti, Juhana. 2012. Historical Dictionary of Hobbes’s Philosophy Lanham. MD: The Scarecrow Press. Lloyd, S.A. ed. 2013. The Bloomsbury Companion to Hobbes. London and New York: Bloomsbury Publishing. Lloyd, S.A. 1992. Ideals as Interests in Hobbes’s Leviathan: The Power of Mind over Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lloyd, S.A. 2009. Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Cases in the Law of Nature Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lloyd, S.A. 2012. Egoism. In The Bloomsbury Companion to Hobbes. ed. S.A. Lloyd, 125–127. London: Bloomsbury. Malcolm, Noel. 1996. A Summary Biography of Hobbes. In The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorell, 13–44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Martinich, A.P. 1995. A Hobbes Dictionary Oxford: Blackwell. McNeilly, F.S. 1968. The Anatomy of Leviathan. London: Macmillan St Martin Press. Nussbaum, Martha. 1986/2009. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pagden, Anthony, ed. 1987. The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pahl, Ray. 2000. On Friendship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pangle, Lorraine S. 2003. Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Price, A.W. 1989. Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rawls, John. 2007. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, ed. Samuel Freeman. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. Robertson, George Croom. 1886. Hobbes Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons Schollmeier, Paul. 1994. Other Selves. New York: State University of New York Press.

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Silverthorne, Michael. 1996. Political Terms in the Latin of Thomas Hobbes. International Journal of the Classical Tradition 2 (4): 499–509. Slomp, Gabriella. 2019. On benevolence and Love of Others. In Interpreting Hobbes’s Political Philosophy., ed. Lloyd, 106–121. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Slomp, Gabriella. 2021. In Search of “A Constant Civill Amity”: Hobbes on Friendship and Sociability. In A Companion to Hobbes, ed. Marcus Adams, 125–138. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons. Smith, Travis. 2008. Hobbes on Getting by with Little Help from Friends in John Heyking and Richard Avramenko (eds) Friendship and Politics: Essays in Political Thought, 221–247. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Sommerville, Johann. 1992. Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context. New York: St Martin Press. Sorell, Tom. 1986. Hobbes. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Spragens, Thomas A. 1973. The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes. With Forward by Anthony Flew. London: Croom Helm Stanlick, Nancy. 2002. Hobbesian Friendship: Valuing Others for Oneself. Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (3): 345–59. Stephen, Leslie. 1904. Hobbes. London: Macmillan & Co. Strauss, Leo. 1963. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis. trans. Elsa M. Sinclair. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Watkins, John W. N. 1965. Hobbes’s System of Ideas. London: Hutchinson. Watkins, John W.N. .1969. Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes . In Hobbes Studies, ed. K.C. Brown, 237–262. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; reprinted in Bernard H. Baumrin. 1969. ed. Hobbes’s Leviathan: Interpretation and Criticism., 83–106. Belmont California: Wadsworth Publishing. Wolin, Sheldon. 1960. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Yack, Bernard. 1993. The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought. Berkeley: University of California Press.

CHAPTER 3

Friend as Ally

Friends protect each other. Abandoned and betrayed by everyone, Philoctetes laments that ‘blessed is a friend’s protection’ (Sophocles 2015, 34). Epicurus held the view that ‘in this present span of life the most reliable source of protection lies in friendship’.1 Provision of shelter and help was a feature of ritualized or guest friendship.2 Athenaeus tells us that the Lacedaemonians used to offer sacrifices to Love before going to battle ‘thinking that safety and victory depend on the friendship of those who stand side by side in the battle array’3 ; Diogenes Laertius remarks that security ‘is most easily achieved through friendship’ (1994, 34); and Adam Smith reminds us that, before executing his fatal resolution, Cato made all the necessary arrangements for the safety of his friends (Smith 1984, 48). While protection and aid are recurring features of all friendships, interpreters have identified in the western tradition one narrative that stretches from Plato to postmodernity, according to which agents seek friends with the exclusive purpose of protecting themselves against an enemy (Ludwig 2010).4 In this study, I call this form of friendship ‘negative’. Its premise, and precondition, is the existence of an enemy, and its essence is captured by Socrates who observes that ‘[i]f the enemy were to go away, the friend is no longer, it seems, a friend to us’ (Plato Lysis 2006, 220e).5 We encounter negative friendship so understood not only in the conceptual armoury of philosophers but also in the practices of peoples, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Slomp, Hobbes Against Friendship, International Political Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95315-7_3

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cities, kings, and states (Roshchin 20176 ). In the early modern period, the text of the Peace Treaty of 1622 between King Massasoy and King James provides a vivid example of negative friendship between kings and peoples: That neither he [King Massasoy] nor any of his should. injure or doe hurth to any of our people […..] If any did unjustly warre against him, we would ayde him; if any did warre against us, he should ayde us. He should send to his neighbour Confederates, to certifie them of this, that they might not wrong us, but might be likewise comprised in the conditions of Peace [….]Lastly, that doing thus, King JAMES would esteeme of him as his friend and Alie. (1622)7

The Treaty highlights the security focus and protective purpose of negative friendship; it also illustrates the reciprocity 8 of advantage and the transitivity 9 of the relationship. This chapter aims to show that, on the one hand, Hobbes shares many views with former writers on negative friendship and on the other hand, that he parts company with most of them on one crucial point: for Hobbes, leagues, alliances, and confederacies neither create nor facilitate the conditions for the establishment of the political state. In a nutshell, Hobbes does not dispute that individuals and people practice negative friendship; rather, he rejects negative friendship as an explanatory principle for the attainment of peace. For Hobbes it is the creation of authority and not the development of friendships, that can protect. This chapter proceeds in steps: I start by outlining some recurring themes in the western narrative on negative friendship (Sect. 3.1); next, I examine Hobbes’s discussion of alliances, confederacies and leagues in natural conditions, in the political state and in international relations (Sect. 3.2); this is followed by a brief overview of debates in the secondary literature on cooperation (Sect. 3.3); and finally, I reflect on the findings and draw a few conclusions (Sects. 3.4 and 3.5).

3.1

An Archaeology of Negative Friendship

In the western narrative on negative friendship, one encounters a number of recurring themes that can help set the stage for an exploration of Hobbes’s own views.

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First, writers emphasize the vulnerability of agents and their lack of selfsufficiency in securing survival. Sometimes it is suggested that the threat is posed by a challenging environment; in Protagoras , for instance, we encounter the myth that men gathered into cities to protect themselves against wild beasts: [Men] lived at first in scattered groups; there were no cities. Consequently they were devoured by wild beasts, since they were in every respect the weaker … They sought therefore to save themselves by coming together and founding fortified cities. (Plato 1956, 54)10

More often, however, the threat to man’s survival is said to be posed not by the natural environment but by other men. Indeed, from Plato to Jean Bodin, from John Milton to Hans Morgenthau, protection from enemies is repeatedly given as the reason why agencies bind themselves together into leagues and alliances. Jean Bodin observes that we learn from the Scriptures, Plutarch, and Thucydides, that in ancient times there was licence and impunity, and that the insecurity and disorder ensued from them compelled men […] to join together as friends for mutual defence one against another, and institute communities and brotherhoods. (Bodin 1955, 136)11

Similarly, John Milton notes that [Men] agreed by common league to bind each other from mutual injury and jointly to defend themselves against any that gave disturbance or opposition to such agreement. (Milton 1991a, 8) [M]en first gathered to form a state so that they might lead a life safely and freely without suffering violence or injuries. (Milton 1991b, 63)12

According to the western narrative on negative friendship, no individual or state is strong enough to afford to remain without friends; as Grotius writes: There is no state so powerful that it may not some time need the help of others outside itself, either for purposes of trade, or even to wear of the forces of many foreign nations against it. In consequence we see that even

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the most powerful people and sovereigns seek alliances. (Grotius 1957, article 22, 17)

Conversely, no individual or state is so weak that it can be discarded as a worthless friend or ally; Erasmus remarks: No one is so weak but that he may at some time be a friend who can help you or an enemy who can harm you, however powerful you may be yourself. (Erasmus 1997, 12)13

For sure, as long as there is ‘but one enemy’, there is danger—this is the message of the anonymous author of Altera Secretissima Instructio, the propaganda pamphlet produced by the Habsburg side during the Thirty Years’ War and translated by Hobbes: When there are many friends, and but one enemy, yet is there no security. (Malcolm 2007, 140–1; see also 158)

Next, contributors to the narrative on negative friendship stress the inevitability of enmity; they suggest that the occurrence of enmity among individuals and states must always be assumed because it is a consequence of human passions such as the desire of power and greed. In his account of the Peloponnesian war, for instance, Thucydides famously identifies the Athenian pursuit of power as the decisive cause of hostilities; in Hobbes’s translation: The truest quarrel, though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power; which putting the Lacedaemonians into fear necessitated the war. (History I, 27)14

This diagnosis of enmity, resulting from agents’ desire for dominion and power over others, is a leitmotif of the western story on negative friendship: for instance, Bernardo, one of the speakers of Francesco Guicciardini’s Dialogue on the Government of Florence, observes: It seems to me, unless I’m mistaken, that men have a natural desire to dominate and be superior to others [… ]And in fact one sees this happening every day, not just among those who are unrelated to each other, such as princes or republics, who continually try to obtain lordship

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over neighbourly lands and states, but even among those who form part of the same body. (Guicciardini 1994, 36)15

Writers also point to fear and calculations of self-interest as the driving forces of all bonds created against enemies. Even by the time of Thucydides’ History these concepts provide a joint foundation for the formation and evolution of leagues and confederations: while the Mytilenians argue that ‘in an alliance the only safe guarantee is an equality of mutual fear’ (Thucydides 1972, III. 11.7–8, 199),16 the Corinthians put forward the famous claim that ‘identity of interest both among cities and among individuals is the surest of all guarantees’ (Thucydides 1972, I. 124.3–4, 107). Albert Hirschman (1997) observes that references to self-interest rather than to the passions become more prominent in the early modern period17 ; certainly, in the so-called reason of state literature of the sixteenth century, self-interest is key to the explanation of all inter-state leagues and alliances.18 For instance, Giovanni Botero writes: in the deliberations of princes, interest wins the argument and therefore one mustn’t trust the friendship, alliance, league or the bond of anyone unless solidly grounded on their interest. (Botero 1997, 41)19

In Altera Secretissima Instructio the reader is left in no doubt that ‘reason of state’ is ‘the great cause, cause of causes’ of the formation and collapse of all alliances and the explanation for the transformation of enemies into friends and vice versa (Reason of State, Malcolm 2007, 144–5). In this tract, an agent’s pursuit of self-interest is presented as a patent truth, such that the question ‘does every man love himself best?’ does not even require an answer (Malcolm 2007, 178–9, footnote 243). Additionally, writers highlight the expectations of loyalty and trust between allies; the breaking of promises is not just dishonourable and morally wrong, but may be against an actor’s self-interest. For instance, in Thucydides’ History, we see how Mytilene’s disloyalty was severely punished by Athens, and how Athens’ ally Plataea was disciplined by Sparta after its capture. Further, many writers show that, in the ancient world, alliances operated at different levels—between individuals, groups, and states— and blurred the distinction between private and public, domestic and foreign. A number of Platonic dialogues20 illustrate how in ancient

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Greece it was customary for upper-class men to be friends not just of individual foreigners but of also of whole cities and distant communities. Gabriel Herman’s study of the institution of xenia, namely of ‘guest or ritualised friendship’,21 shows how during the Hellenistic period personal, domestic, and international spheres were closely interconnected by personal friendships: The ancient world was thus united at its highest social level by a web of complex alliances. (Herman 1987, 162) In the Hellenistic age most cities were manipulated if not effectively ruled by leaders of factions supported by rulers abroad. The simultaneous involvement of the upper classes with the city and with foreign rulers had important consequences too for the structuring of the societies outside the city. (Herman 1987, 164)

In Thucydides’ History and especially in his account of events at Corcyra,22 alliances between internal factions and foreign powers are all examples of negative friendship that aim to remove a particular government that is viewed as a common enemy. Finally, in the early modern period, many writers emphasize that what endangers security, what constitutes self-interest, and who the enemy is, is a matter of judgement. As Erasmus questioned the objectivity of attributing ‘just cause’ to any war and asked, ‘who is there who does not think his cause just?’ (Erasmus 1997, 104), likewise, he queries men’s objectivity in naming friends and enemies. He writes: Nowadays the Englishman generally hates the Frenchman, for no better reason than that he is French. The Scot, simply because he is Scot, hates the Englishman; the Italian hates the German, the Swabian the Swiss, and so on. (Erasmus 1997, 107–8)

In sum, in the western tradition, we find a notion of friendship that is used to shed light on the formation of political associations and of inter-state alliances against real or imagined enemies. This form of friendship—that I call negative—is a utility-based relationship that is aimed at security and is predicated on the assumptions of the inevitability of enmity and the vulnerability of all agents.

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Hobbes on Alliances, Leagues, Confederacies, and Factions

Hobbes was, of course, very familiar with the narrative on negative friendship outlined in the previous section.23 Among other things, he produced a powerful translation of Thucydides’ History and of the Reason of State (Malcolm 2007) pamphlet24 cited above where negative friendships among cities and citizens play a major role. Certainly, Hobbes maintained that friendship can provide protection against enemies. In Human Nature we read: For friendships, among other things, confer protection. (Human Nature, XI: 6, 49)

and Friendships are protection. (Human Nature, XI: 7, 49)

In Hobbes’s theory, we encounter all the themes of the narrative on negative friendship identified in the previous section. To begin with, like many writers before him, Hobbes highlights the vulnerability of agents. the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe. (Leviathan II: 13, 188; 1651, 60)

He is more emphatic than most writers in pointing out the natural occurrence of enmity by claiming that ‘everyone is an enemy to everyone whom he neither obeys nor commands’ (Citizen IX: 3, 108). He agrees with former theorists that ‘mutual aid is necessary for defence’ (Elements I. 19: 3, 101) and maintains that agents create leagues, confederations, and coalitions because ‘friends … are strengths united’ (Leviathan II: 10, 132; 1651, 41). He points out that in a state of nature others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another’. (Leviathan II. 13, 190; 1651, 61)

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Not unlike Thucydides, Hobbes refers both to ‘fear’ and to ‘interest’ as drivers of the formation of protective leagues. In Citizen he stresses that if all fear were removed, men would be carried by nature to obtain dominion rather than to establish any form of association: It is true that the advantages of this life can be increased with other people’s help. But this is much more effectively achieved by Dominion over others than by their help. (Citizen I: 2, 24)

In Leviathan, he argues that a correspondence of interests grounds leagues and societies, whereas a clash of interests prefigures their dissolution (Leviathan II: 17, 256; 1651, 85–6). Hobbes also agrees with former narratives that the commonest source of enmity is the appetite for superiority, glory, and reputation. In all three formulations of his political theory, Hobbes makes a comparison between ants and bees on the one hand, and men on the other. Hobbes observes that goods are in short supply for bees and ants, and yet they cooperate to maximize their collective chances of survival; therefore, for man it is not the scarcity of resources per se that is source of conflict, but the pursuit of the resources of others, sought in order to gain power over them.25 Echoing Thucydides,26 who had explained the Athenians’ actions, at the time of the Peloponnesian war, was motivated by ‘three very powerful motives … security, honour and self-interest’ (Thucydides 1972, 80), Hobbes tells us that: In the nature in man, we find three principall causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second for Safety; and the third, for reputation. (Leviathan II: 13, 192; 1651, 61)

Friendship itself is at times a source of conflict in the Hobbesian state of nature: indeed, men come to blows for the slightest sign of disrespect towards themselves or towards their friends; they resort to violence for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name. (Leviathan II: 13, 192; 1651, 62)

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Hobbes also agrees with previous writers (notably Erasmus) in emphasizing the poor judgement of agents when identifying friends and enemies. On the one hand, individuals are diffident and tend to view all strangers as potential enemies (even in the political state they lock not just their houses but their drawers and cabinets to thwart potential thieves), on the other hand, people are credulous and easily led to regard any persuasive preacher or demagogue as a friend. Hobbes remarks that men’s judgements on such matters are often unsound and, moreover, rarely coincide: indeed, ‘he that by one part is held for an enemy is by another part held for a friend’ (Leviathan II: 17, 258; 1651, 86). In the same vein as Thucydides, Hobbes illustrates in Behemoth how personal friendships and alliances between private citizens and foreign princes connect and potentially destabilize both domestic and international spheres; he highlights the short-sightedness of states that help friends to rebel in neighbouring countries. In the Third Dialogue, we read: Speaker B (The Lawyer): If the King had escapt into France, might not the French haue assisted him with forces to recouer his Kingdome […] Tis methinks no great policy in neighbouring Princes to fauour, so often as they do one anothers Rebells… They should rather first make a league against Rebellion, and afterwards (if there be no remedy) fight one against another. (Behemoth III, 301)

In sum, Hobbes agrees with contributors to the negative friendship narrative on many issues: he concurs that agents are vulnerable; he endorses the view that enmity is inevitable; he singles out fear and interest as the glue that binds parties together; he regards greed and desire of glory as a major source of conflict; he warns of potentially dangerous alliances between private citizens of one country and public authorities of another; and he finds that men disagree in identifying friends and enemies. However, in spite of sharing all the above views with contributors to the narrative on negative friendship, Hobbes nevertheless distances himself significantly from them in maintaining that ‘leagues of friends’ cannot deliver man from the misery of the state of nature. Hobbes stresses the volatility of leagues and alliances and remarks: it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting, which is a Common Power

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to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit. (Leviathan II: 17, 260; 1651, 87)

Hobbes points to both psychological and practical reasons for the ineffectiveness of alliances in the state of nature. Psychologically, man is naturally fearful for his life and therefore untrusting of his confederates (Baumgold 2013). Practically, leagues in the state of nature are small, prone to dissolution, and therefore inadequate sources of lasting protection. A small league, Hobbes remarks, offers little protection: the mutual aid of two or three men is of very little security. (Elements I. 19: 3, 101) security is not furnished by an accord [consensio] between two or three persons. (Citizen V: 3, 70) Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them … security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the victory. (Leviathan II: 17, 256; 1651, 85–6)

The exact size of a league capable of offering adequate protection cannot be established in advance, because ‘the Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security is not determined by any certain number, but by the comparison with the Enemy we feare’ (Leviathan II: 17, 256; 1651, 86). For Hobbes, leagues are prone to dissolution because men often disagree on what has to be done and are unable to ‘direct their actions to one and the same end’ (Elements I. 19:4, 101). He observes that ‘however many come together in a coalition for defence, nothing will be gained if they fail to agree on the best way of doing it’ (Citizen V: 4, 70) and emphasizes that divided opinion ‘concerning the best use and application of their strength’ hinder and weaken a league’s efforts (Leviathan II: 17, 256; 1651, 86). Even when agreement is reached, it does not last long: ‘Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgement, for a limited time’ (Leviathan II: 17, 258; 1651, 86). For Hobbes, all leagues that arise in the state of nature eventually fail because:

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by the diversity of judgements and passions in so many men contending naturally for honour and advantage one above another: it is impossible, not only that their consent to aid each other against an enemy, but also that the peace should last between themselves without some mutual and common fear to rule. (Elements I. 19: 4, 101–2; see Leviathan II: 17, 258; 1651, 87)

The only way to establish peace is to create the body politic ‘which may be defined to be a multitude of men, united in one person by a common power, for their common peace, defence and benefit’ (Elements I. 19: 8, 104). For the sake of peace, Hobbes forbids the private naming of friends and enemies within the state and attributes this function exclusively to the sovereign power27 : No citizen may privately determine who is an ally or public enemy of the commonwealth. (Citizen XVII: 11, 214)

Hobbes refers occasionally to the commonwealth or body politic as ‘a League of all Subjects together’ (Leviathan II: 22, 370; 1651, 121) but maintains that the state-league is not a spontaneous development of a league that springs up in the state of nature. The institution of Sovereignty, and not a network of friends, is what protects Hobbesian men from the dangers created by enemies to their self-preservation. In so far as Hobbes highlights the similarities between the state of nature and inter-state relations, characterizing both as environments of anarchy and hostility (Citizen, X: 17, 126), one would expect leagues between states to be as ineffective as leagues among natural men. Not so: Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not only lawfull, but also profitable for the time they last. (Leviathan II: 22, 370; 1651; 122)

Hobbes does not expand on the above statement, but presumably the different degree of ‘profitability’ of leagues in natural conditions and in inter-state politics derives from the different degree of vulnerability of individuals vis-à-vis states, referred to in Leviathan (II: 13, 196; 1651, 63).28 We may surmise that, while a league of a few friends does not improve the chances of survival of the individual in the state of nature, a league of a few states can increase state security; moreover, while the betrayal by one’s friend can cost a man his life in the state of nature, a

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state is less likely to have its survival compromised by an ally’s breach of trust. As a result, while transient leagues are inadequate for the longterm well-being of individuals, they can be as ‘profitable’ to states as more durable ones. In Hobbes’s argument, we find references to the formation of friendships against enemies also within the political state. For Hobbes, defence is already the major aim of the sovereign power; as the whole commonwealth is ‘no more than a league of subjects together’, it follows that any league created by private citizen for the sake of defence is at best ‘unnecessary’, at worst ‘savour[s] of unlawful design’ (Leviathan II: 22, 370; 1651, 122) and may indicate the presence of a faction aimed at undermining the state.29 Hobbes writes: The Leagues of Subjects (because Leagues are commonly made for mutuall defence) are in a Common-wealth (which is no more than a League of all the Subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go commonly by the name of Factions, or Conspiracies. (Leviathan II: 22, 370; 1651, 121–2)

For Hobbes, ‘Princes who permit faction are as good as admitting an enemy within the walls. This is against the citizens’ safety, and therefore also against the natural laws’ (Citizen XIII:13, 149). Protective friendship can only be beneficial when it unites the whole citizenry under the command of the Leviathan against a foreign enemy; indeed, whereas the sharing of an enemy is not a sufficient condition to create unity within a league in the state of nature, the threat of a foreign enemy consolidates domestic unity within the political state: no great popular Common-wealth was ever kept up; but either by a forraign Enemy that united them. (Leviathan II: 25, 412; 1651, 136)

To conclude, Hobbes concurs with writers in the friendship tradition that all agents seek the help of friends to protect themselves against enemies. He agrees that fear of the enemy and calculations of self-interest are at the foundation of leagues, alliances, and confederacies. However, Hobbes is adamant that alliances per se do not deliver man from the disorder of the state of nature. The establishment of authority, and not the development of friendships, is what provides security and peace. In

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his account, the practice of negative friendship is ineffective in the state of nature, beneficial but transient in international relations, and potentially dangerous if it materializes within the political state as it may signal the formation of a faction or a conspiracy.

3.3

Debates on Hobbesian Alliances

During the past century, a considerable literature has enriched our understanding of the nature, role, and dynamics of Hobbesian leagues and alliances in the state of nature, in the political state, and in inter-state relations. From the 1960s to the 1980s the focus of attention has been the study of cooperation and conflict in the state of nature. David Gauthier (1969) and John Watkins (1965) have led the camp that highlights the role of fear and self-interest in the formation of alliances; Gregory Kavka (1986), Jean Hampton (1986), and a long string of game-theorists have discussed the dynamics and failure of cooperatives in natural conditions. Since the 1980s, a growing number of interpreters have contested the game-theorists’ findings (e.g. Patrick Neal 1988); in 1998, Richard Tuck stressed that ‘Hobbes never supposed that even quite a high degree of mutual aid was impossible in the absence of a sovereign’ (1999, 134); more recently, Ioannis Evrigenis has argued that men’s awareness of their vulnerability is ‘enough to transform solitary and suspicious individuals into beings willing to cooperate temporarily to fight off the common enemy’ (Evrigenis 2008, 122; 2014). In the past twenty years, the scholarly debate about leagues and alliances has shifted its gaze from individuals in the state of nature to groupings within states (e.g. Susanne Shreedhar 2010) and to inter-state relations (e.g. Arash Abizadeh 2011; Glen Newey 2008; Lechner 2019). The influential interpretation put forward by Charles Beitz in the 1970s, according to which ‘Hobbes’s hypothesis [is] that forming alliances increases the chances of war’ (1979, 37), has been challenged by many (e.g. Howard Williams 2003; David Boucher 2015; Arash Abizadeh 2011; Lechner 2019; Douglass 2020), and notably by Noel Malcolm who has called the view as ‘one of the strangest modern misunderstandings of Hobbes’ (Malcolm 2002, 450). For Malcolm, ‘Hobbes does not argue that alliances as such must either increase or decrease the quantity of fighting (though they must by definition increase the quantity of cooperation)’ (2002, 451). In sum, the secondary literature on Hobbes’s leagues, confederacies, and alliances has debated a wide range of issues, from the question

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of whether Hobbesian agents manage to form cooperatives in natural conditions to the question of whether leagues and alliances foster war or peace in international relations. This substantial scholarship, however, has not explored Hobbes’s stance on leagues vis-à-vis the western narrative on friendship that according to interpreters (e.g. Paul Ludwig 2010) stretches from Plato to Schmitt and postmodernity. The aim of the present chapter is to fill this gap.

3.4

Hobbes on Negative Friendship: An Overview

Having outlined the main themes and claims of the western narrative on negative friendship and Hobbes’s stance on those themes and claims, three questions are in order: (i) Is it appropriate to consider Hobbesian alliances, leagues, confederacies, factions, and sects as practices of negative friendship? (ii) As Hobbes shared many assumptions with contributors to the western narrative on negative friendship, what prevented him from concluding (as many of them did) that the practice of friendship provided a stepping stone towards—and the concept of friendship can be used to explain—the establishment of political states? (iii) Is there any other form of friendship, apart from friendship against enemies, in Hobbes’s theory? The first question is answered by the findings of Chapter 2. If the ‘marks’ of Hobbesian friendship are, as I argued there, empowerment, reciprocity of trust, and goodwill, and calculations of self-interest, there is no doubt that Hobbesian alliances, leagues, and confederacies are forms of Hobbesian friendship. Hobbes himself highlighted the protective nature of friendship (Human Nature XI: 7, 49). The second question was addressed in Sect. 3.2; while in Elements, Citizen, and Leviathan we encountered all the themes of the narrative on negative friendship, in Hobbes’s comparison between men and bees we stumbled upon the reasons why friendship cannot deliver the Hobbesian man from the state of nature. It is worth revisiting a key point in the comparison30 : Why therefore may not men, that foresee the benefit of concord, continually maintain the same without compulsion, as well as they [bees]? To which I answer…those living creatures aim everyone at peace and food common to all; men aim at dominion, superiority, and private wealth, which are distinct in every man and breed contention. (Elements I. 19: 5, 102)

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[T]he natural appetites of bees and similar creatures are uniform, and make for the common good, which among them does not differ from private good; but for man virtually nothing is thought to be good which does not give his possessor some superiority and eminence above that enjoyed by other men. (Citizen V: 5, 71) [A]mongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not from the Private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent. (Leviathan II: 17, 258; 1651, 86)

In the world of bees and ants, according to Hobbes, there is natural harmony between ‘private good’ and ‘common good’; in contrast, in the world of men, there is constant tension between self-interest and common interest; endless friction between desire of personal power and the requirements of common power. This opposition in Hobbes’s argument undermines all confederacies and alliances in the state of nature. Leagues of friends fail because something more is needed, an element of fear to prevent an accord on peace and mutual assistance for a common good from collapsing in discord when a private good subsequently comes into conflict with the common good. (Citizen V: 4, 71, emphasis as in the original)

Granted that there are enemies and that individuals are vulnerable, longlasting protection can come only from authority, not from friendship. In Hobbes’s view, friendships cannot create the conditions for the political state; rather, it is the political state that creates the conditions—the trust, the common language, and the shared values—that make friendships possible. The third question, namely whether Hobbes considered negative friendship to be the only form of friendship that can exist at personal, domestic, and international levels, will be answered negatively in Chapter 4. Unlike Carl Schmitt who took the western discourse on negative friendship to its extreme conclusions (Slomp 2009), Hobbes also considered other forms of friendship that are not a response to enmity and that contain proto-liberal elements. As future chapters will illustrate, for Hobbes (unlike for Schmitt) friendship is selective but not necessarily exclusionary. Indeed, we will see that it is a function of the Leviathan to ensure that exclusion is not the outcome of selective friendships (Chapter 4).

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3.5

Concluding Remarks

In the Introduction to this work, I referred to the concept of friendship as a visible thread that runs through the fabric of western political thought over the centuries and suggested that in order to assess Hobbes’s overall stance on friendship, it was necessary to disentangle the thread’s various strands. In this chapter, I have focussed on one such strand, that stretches from Plato to Carl Schmitt and postmodernity, that has security as its main focus, and enmity as its counterpart: I called this ‘negative friendship’. There is a long-standing debate as to whether the term friendship is, generally speaking, a misnomer when describing alliances and leagues created for protection against an enemy. Indeed, a long string of writers from Cicero to Martin Wight have challenged the idea that an alliance created in response to enmity deserves the title of friendship. In de Amicitia Cicero, by means of Laelius, dismisses the idea that any bond created ‘for the sake of protection and assistance’ qualifies as ‘friendship’; he blames ‘certain individuals ‘who are regarded as ‘wise men in Greece’ for promulgating such an opinion: [these wise men say] that friendship is desirable for the sake of protection and assistance …thus the less any individual has of moral and physical strength, the more he demands friendship. This they say, is why mere weak women are more anxious for the protection afforded by friendship than are men, poor men more anxious than rich men, and the unfortunate more than those who would be considered lucky. What a magnificent philosophy! (Cicero 1991, 97)

Many centuries later, in Power Politics, Martin Wight is equally contemptuous of the view that a relationship aimed at mutual protection qualifies as friendship. Wight agrees that enmity, vulnerability, and security are the core ingredients of alliances and that ‘a natural ally is made by a great common danger that lasts a long time, preferably for several generations’ (Wight 1978, 2004, 122.) He also concedes that there is similarity between alliances and friendships and points out that ‘alliances are as various as friendships, in their character, their purpose, their occasion, their duration, the relative position of those who make them (Wight 1978, 2004, 122).31 Wight argues that alliances cannot qualify as friendship ‘unless as Aristotle observed, we apply the word friendship to relationships based on utility. Alliances cannot be disinterested’ (Wight 1978/2004, 122). He suggests that true friendship entails self-sacrifice

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and is thus a misnomer for all forms of states’ alliances, be they economic, military, cultural, or political (125–6). On his view, ‘[t]he range of friendship extends to where a man lays down his life for his friends; but the height of self-sacrifice is not permissible to governments whose duty is to protect the interests of their people’ (Wight 1978/2004, 122). Pace Cicero and Wight, many contemporary writers maintain (e.g. Preston King 2000) that there is a virtuous side to any form of friendship, even one based on utility, because for the relationship to exist there must be some degree of mutual trust, loyalty, care, and positive disposition. They argue that Aristotle himself did not see virtue friendship as the opposite of utility friendship. For sure, even the most virtuous type of Aristotelian friendship entails pleasure and benefits: people enjoy spending time with true friends, and they benefit from their care and advice. Conversely, even the most utilitarian form of friendship entails some virtue, namely the ability to trust and to be trustworthy. Moreover, the fact that protective alliances originate in self-interest does not entail that they are motivated by narrow selfishness. Indeed, one’s self-interest may well include the well-being of another: for instance, commenting on the utility-based treaty of alliance between the United Kingdom and Russia, the diplomatic correspondent of the Times wrote on 12 June 1942 that ‘A country … naturally desires to see its partner strong in all forms of defence, economic, military, and territorial’ (cited by Wight 1978/2004, 123).

Notes 1. This view is attributed to Epicurus by Cicero (1994, 1.67, 64). 2. Normally ‘ritualised friends would help each other solve some of the trivial problems of daily life’ but ‘in crisis or in extreme adversity, a ritualised friend acted as a haven of refuge for his unfortunate partner’ (Herman 1987, 28). 3. Athenaeus cited by Carpenter (1906, 25). 4. The idea that friendship and enmity are opposite sides of the same coin can be found in many works in international relations (see, e.g., Kupchan 2010). 5. This translation of Plato’s Lysis 220e is by P. Ludwig (2010, 134); C.D.C. Reeve renders the passage thus: ‘It has become clear to us that it was a friend for the sake of (heneka) an enemy. Take away

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the enemy and it seems that it is no longer a friend’ (Plato 2006, 22; see also Plato 1991, 24). On Plato’s Lysis, see Versenyi (1975). 6. In his highly researched work, Evgeny Roshchin (2017) discusses in great depth international defensive friendship. 7. From ‘G. Mourt.1622. A relation or Journall of the Beginnings and Proceedings of the English Plantation settled at Plimouth in New England by certain English Adventurers’ in Molly Harrison and O.M. Royston (1963, 308). 8. As argued in Chapter 2, friendship assumes reciprocity: ‘a man becomes a friend when he is loved and returns that love, and this is recognized by the two men in question’. Aristotle (1984b), Eudemian Ethics Book VII 2. 1236a15, p. 1958; see also Aristotle (1984a) Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1155b33–35, p. 1826. 9. Chapter 2 emphasized the transitivity of Aristotelian friendship: ‘[we feel friendly] to our friends’ friends, and to those who like, or are liked by, those whom we like ourselves’ (Aristotle (1984c) Rhetoric Book II 4. 1381a15, p. 2200; Hobbes rendered the passage thus: ‘We love them: (…) That are our friends’ friends. That are our enemies’ enemies’. (The Whole Art of Rhetoric, 454). 10. The rest of the quote suggests that fear of an external enemy is not sufficient to sustain a political association. We read: ‘but when they gathered in communities they injured one another for want of political skill, and so scattered again and continued to be devoured. Zeus therefore, fearing the total destruction of our race, sent Hermes to impart to men the qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice, so as to bring order in our cities and create a bond of friendship and union’ (Plato 1956, 54). 11. Bodin’s The Six Books of a Commonweale was first published in 1576 (London G. Bishop, 1606), abridged and translated by M.J. Tooley 1955 as Six Books of the Commonwealth; the quote is from Book iii, chapter vii, 136—this passage is not included in the 1992 CUP edition of Bodin. 12. Milton’s Preface (Milton 1991b) reminds us of Cicero’s De Amicitia which was very popular at the time. 13. Erasmus stresses the importance for survival of establishing and keeping friendly relationships with neighbouring countries: ‘The good and wise prince will try to be at peace with all nations but particularly with his neighbours, who can do much harm if they are

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hostile and much good if they are friendly; no state can survive for long without good relations with them’ (Erasmus 1997, 94–5). 14. M.I. Finley’s edition reads: ‘What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta’ (Thucydides 1972, 49). 15. In the same spirit, in the twentieth century Morgenthau (1948/1993) singles out animus dominandi as the engine of international politics and the main source of conflict. Appealing to the wisdom of Thucydides, Lord Salisbury, George Washington, and Max Weber, Hans Morgenthau wrote in 1948: ‘The idea of interest is indeed the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place’ (Morgenthau 1948/1993, 10–11). 16. Hobbes translates: ‘But the equality of mutual fear is the only band of faith in leagues’ History I. 278; the remark that pacts are kept ‘more for fear than for love’ is at History I, 279. 17. Albert Hirshman discusses the ideological transformation that occurred during the early modern period and the rise of ‘interest’ as a new paradigm in (1997). For a discussion of the early development of the concept of ‘interest’, see Elliott Karlstadt, (2016). 18. See Malcolm (2007, 94 footnote 8). 19. The full passage reads: ‘Tenga per cosa risoluta, che nelle deliberazioni de’ Principi l’interesse e’ quello che vince ogni partito, e percio’ non deve fidarsi d’amicizia, non di affinita’, non di lega, non d’altro vincolo, nel quale chi tratta con lui non abbia fondamento d’ interesse’; (Botero 1997, 41; see also 187). 20. See, for example, Plato (1994, Gorgias 507 d, 105). 21. Herman reminds us that according to Hesychious’ famous definition, philos was a friend from the same town, whereas xenos was a friend from abroad (see also Oxford Classical Dictionary, 591). Herman defines xenia as ‘a bond of solidarity manifesting itself in an exchange of goods and services between individuals originating from separate social units’ (Herman 1987, 10). At the same time ‘[t]ransactions of ritualised friendship (…) appeared not as an end in itself but as a means for creating a moral obligation’ (Herman 1987, 10). 22. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Corcyra was a democracy and an ally of Athens; helped by Corinth, an ally of Sparta,

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an oligarchic faction within Corcyra managed to win Corcyra over to the Corinthian side (Thucydides 1972, 236). As a result of all these manoeuvers and agreements between citizens of Corcyra and foreign powers, Peithias, the leader of the pro-Athenian democratic party, was assassinated and so were some sixty others members of the Council and private individuals (Thucydides 1972, 237). This set in motion an unprecedented stasis that even involved slaves and women (Thucydides 1972, 238). The impact of this event on the development of the war was immense, Thucydides claims: from that moment on, ‘it became a natural thing for anyone who wanted a change of government to call in help from outside’ (242 emphasis added). Whereas at the start of the war, the agencies of alliances were cities and their governments, after Corcyra, Thucydides emphasizes, private citizens often tried to establish friendship with foreign powers with the aim of bringing about regime change at home. Thucydides suggests that this strategy was resorted to indiscriminately by supporters of democracy or oligarchy, and by sympathizers of Athens or Sparta. 23. Many of the books mentioned in Sect. 3.1 (e.g. Guicciardini, Grotius, Erasmus, Bodin, Botero) were in the library available to Hobbes (Hamilton 1978). 24. The anonymous author of Altera Secretissima Instructio makes constant references to friends and friendship. Although occasionally the author distinguishes between friends and confederates (Malcolm 2007, 168), and between intimate and superficial friends (142), on the whole a friend means nothing more than ally (138, 140, 172, 174), and friendships emerge as leagues of convenience (140, 162, 166). Indeed, we are told that friendship can be bought (138, 139), and that is ‘chargeable’ (150). Rather than replicas of Theseus or Pylades friends turn out to be accomplices and conjurators (180, 181) or flatterers, incapable of truthful and reliable advice (128, 129, 130). Friends are trusted at one’s own risk (144), because they are inconstant (socii mobiles, 196), and their intentions are obscure and doubtful (ingenia dubia, 199). In the circumstances, the protection one gets from friendship is completely inadequate (140–1; 158). Only in the dedicatory letter, the author refers to figures of friends proverbial for their loyalty; see Chapter 5. 25. I argue this case in Slomp (2007).

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26. There is a considerable literature examining the correspondence of views between Hobbes and Thucydides; for their concordance of opinion on the origins and dynamics of conflict, see George Klosko and Daryl Rice (1985); Clifford Orwin (1988); Gabriella Slomp (1990). 27. In the judgement of who is friend and enemy, Evrigenis argues, ‘Hobbes locates the essence of politics and it is by the transfer of this judgement that the sovereign emerges and the commonwealth is instituted’ (Evrigenis 2008, 123). 28. Glen Newey has emphasized the different dynamics of alliances inside and outside the state: ‘It is important to see that, in part, the international system fails to mirror the no-holds-barred state of nature precisely because, in their international make-up, sovereign states are not anarchic. The civil peace bestowed by government makes room for cooperation both within civil societies and between them. Hobbes allows for at least a rudimentary form of international civil society’ (Newey 2008, 246). 29. ‘In all Common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants, than the government of his estate, and lawful employment he has for them requires, it is Faction, and unlawfull. For having the protection of the Common-wealth, he needeth not the defence of private force’ (Leviathan II: 22, 372; 1651/122). 30. The full comparison of the three passages can be found in Deborah Baumgold (2017, 200–2). 31. Wight devotes a whole chapter to the discussion of alliances that he categorizes into equal and unequal, offensive or protective, political or economic or cultural, permanent or temporary, bilateral or multilateral (Wight 1978/2004, 122). In many respects Wight’s notion of political alliance is very close to what in this chapter we have called negative friendship in that both relationships are entered for the sake of security, grounded in self-interest, and created against a danger or enemy or, to use Wight’s expression, a ‘third party’.

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References Abizadeh, Arash. 2011. Hobbes on the Causes of War: A Disagreement Theory. American Political Science Review 105 (2): 298–315. Aristotle. 1984a. Nicomachean Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University, Book VIII, 1825–39, and Book IX, 1839–52. Aristotle. 1984b. Eudemian Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Book VII, 1956–81. Aristotle. 1984c. Rhetoric. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, trans W. Rhys Roberts. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Book II, 2152–2269. Baumgold, Deborah. 2013. “Trust” in Hobbes’s Political Thought. Political Theory 41 (6): 838–855. Baumgold, Deborah. 2017. Three-Text Edition of Thomas Hobbes’s Political Theory. The Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Beitz, Charles R. 1979. International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bodin, Jean. 1955. Six Books of the Commonwealth, abridged and translated by M.J. Tooley. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Bodin, Jean. 1992. On Sovereignty, ed. Julian Franklin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Botero, Giovanni. 1997. La Ragion di Stato (editions of 1589, 1590, 1596), ed. Chiara Continisio. Roma: Donzelli Editore. Boucher, David. 2015. Hobbes’s Contribution to International Thought, and the Contribution of International Thought to Hobbes. History of European Ideas 41: 29–48. Carpenter, Edward (ed.). 1906. Jolaus: An Anthology of Friendship, 2nd ed. enlarged London and Manchester: Swan Sonnenschein & Co and S. Clarke. Cicero. 1994. ‘On Goals’ Text 26: 1.65–70. In The Epicurus Reader Selected Writings and Testimonia, trans by Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson, with an Intro. D.S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis: Hackett. Cicero. 1991. De Amicitia. In Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 77–116. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Diogenes Laertius. 1994. ‘The Principal Doctrines’ Text 5: 10. 139–154, Doctrine XXVIII, in The Epicurus Reader Selected Writings and Testimonia, trans. Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson, with an Intro. D.S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis: Hackett. Douglass, Robin. 2020. Hobbes and Political Realism. European Journal of Political Theory 19 (2): 250–269.

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Erasmus, Desiderius. 1997. The Education of a Christian Prince, ed. Lisa Jardine, trans. Neil. M. Cheshire and Michael J. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Evrigenis, Ioannis. 2008. Fear of Enemies and Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Evrigenis, Ioannis. 2014. Images of Anarchy: The Rhetoric and Science in Hobbes’s State of Nature. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gauthier, David. 1969. The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Grotius, Hugo. 1957. Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace, trans. Francis Kelsey, with and intro. Edward Dumbauld. New York: The Liberal Arts Press. Guicciardini, Francesco. 1994 Dialogue on the Government of Florence, ed. Alison Brown. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hamilton, James. 1978. Hobbes’s Study and the Hardwick Library. Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (4): 445–453. Hampton, Jean. 1986. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harrison, Molly, and O.M. Royston. 1963. How They Lived: An Anthology of Original Accounts Written Between 1485 and 1700, vol. II. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Herman, Gabriel. 1987. Ritualised Friendship & The Greek City. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hirschman, Albert. 1997. The Passions and the Interests Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Karlstadt, Elliott. 2016. The Place of Interests in Hobbes’s Civil Science. Hobbes Studies XXIX (2): 105–128. Kavka, Gregory. 1986. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. King, Preston. 2000. Introduction. In The Challenge to Friendship in Modernity, ed. Preston King and Heather Devere, 1–14. London: Frank Cass. Klosko, George, and Daryl Rice. 1985. Thucydides and Hobbes’s State of Nature. History of Political Thought VI: 405–409. Kupchan, Charles. 2010. How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lechner, Silviya. 2019. Hobbesian Internationalism: Anarchy, Authority and the Fate of Political Philosophy. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Ludwig, Paul W. 2010. Without Foundations: Plato’s ‘Lysis’ and Postmodern Friendship. American Political Science Review 104 (1): 134–150. Malcolm, Noel. 2002. Aspects of Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Malcolm, Noel (ed.). 2007. Reason of State, Propaganda and the Thirty Years’ War An Unknown Translation by Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Milton, John. 1991a. The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates. In Political Writings, ed. Martin Dzelzainis, 1–48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Milton, John. 1991b. A Defence of the People of England. In Milton Political Writings, ed. Martin Dzelzainis, 49–254. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Morgenthau, Hans. 1948/1993. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, rev. Kenneth Thompson. Boston: McGraw-Hill. Neal, Patrick. 1988. Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory. Western Political Quarterly 41: 635–652. Newey, Glen. 2008. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes and Leviathan. Abingdon: Routledge. Orwin, Clifford. 1988. Stasis and Plague: Thucydides on the Dissolution of Society. Journal of Politics 50: 831–847. Plato. 1991. Lysis. In Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 3–27. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Plato. 2006. Plato on Love: Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades, with Selections from Republic and Laws, ed. C.D.C. Reeve. Hackett Publishing: Indianapolis/Cambridge Plato. 1956. Protagoras and Meno, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Plato. 1994. Gorgias, trans. and ed. Robin Waterfield. Oxford: World’s Classics. Roshchin, Evgeny. 2017. Friendship Among Nations: History of a Concept. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Slomp, Gabriella. 2009. Carl Schmitt and the Politics of Hostility. Violence and Terror: Palgrave Macmillan. Slomp, Gabriella. 2007. Hobbes on Glory and Civil Strife. In The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. P. Springborg, 129–147. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Slomp, Gabriella. 1990. Hobbes, Thucydides and the Three Greatest Things. History of Political Thought XI: 565–586. Smith, Adam. 1984 The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Sophocles. 2015. Philoctetes, ed. Will Jonson. Marston Gate: Amazon Publishing. Sreedhar, Susanne. 2010. Hobbes on Resistance: defying the Leviathan Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Thucydides. 1972. History of the Peloponnesian War translated by Rex Warner with Introduction by M.I. Finley London: Penguin Books. Tuck, Richard. 1999. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Versenyi, Laszlo. 1975. Plato’s Lysis. Phronesis 20 (3): 185–198. Watkins, John WN. 1965. Hobbes’s System of Ideas. London: Hutchinson. Wight, Martin. 1978/2004. Power Politics. New York and London: Continuum. Williams, Howard. 2003. Kant’s Critique of Hobbes: Sovereignty and Cosmopolitanism. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

CHAPTER 4

Friend as Partner

It could be argued that Friendships are of practical value to the Community. Every civilised religion began in a small group of friends. Mathematics effectively began when a few Greek friends got together to talk about numbers, and lines and angles (Lewis 1960, 82)

The friendship to which C.S. Lewis refers in the above passage is not the relationship examined in the previous chapter, namely a bond created and maintained by individuals and groups to protect themselves against real or imagined enemies. Rather, Lewis is alluding to the groupings and societies that individuals create for the advancement of their quality of life. Indeed, in the western tradition, alongside the narrative on friendship in response to, or anticipation of, enmity, we encounter another storyline that stretches from Aristotle to Althusius, from Cicero to Adam Smith, from Adam Ferguson to C.S. Lewis, according to which friendships are sought for their practical value: they enable men not just to live, but to live well. The network of such relationships is sometimes called ‘civic friendship’ (Schwarzenbach 1996) or ‘public friendship’ (Lu 2009) or ‘international friendship’ (Digeser 2016), depending on whether it materializes within or between states; here, I prefer to use the term ‘positive friendship’ in order to: (i) highlight the contrast with ‘negative friendship’ examined in the previous chapter; (ii) indicate that it can take place not only among citizens but also between states; and (iii) signpost that it can also designate personal friendships. In other words, ‘positive friendship’ © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Slomp, Hobbes Against Friendship, International Political Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95315-7_4

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as used in this work may coincide with ‘civic’ or ‘public’ friendship, but occasionally its meaning is broader or narrower than such terms. Both negative and positive friendship are predicated upon man’s insufficiency in meeting his many needs. However, the needs they address are separate and involve different emotions and inclinations: while negative friendship is normally driven by fear and concern for self-preservation, positive friendship is animated by the desire to improve the quality of life. The distinction between positive and negative friendship may recall to the mind Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative liberty—positive friendship is a relationship that empowers one to attain one’s goals, while negative friendship is a relationship that protects one from the interference of enemies. Many ancient and early modern explanations of how and why men came to live in political associations commingle positive and negative friendships.1 The two narratives, though intertwined, are distinct, and in this chapter my focus is on positive friendship. I aim to show that, on the one hand, Hobbes shares assumptions with contributors to the narrative on positive friendship and that his partial societies, corporations, and systems can be interpreted as forms of positive friendship; on the other hand, in Hobbes’s argument, partial societies inside and outside states can easily turn from beneficial to detrimental to the commonwealth—positive friendship can generate enmity and threaten peace. We will see that, according to Hobbes, as the concept of negative friendship cannot shed light on the attainment of peace (Chapter 3), likewise the notion of positive friendship cannot help the understanding of how concord and peace are maintained or strengthened. In Hobbes’s political theory, authority and not friendship is key to the explanation of how men attain, maintain, and strengthen peace. After reviewing the main tenets of the narrative (Sect. 4.1), I consider Hobbes’s discussion of systems, partial societies, and corporations (Sect. 4.2) and argue that Hobbes’s discourse contains a critical rejoinder to the narrative on positive friendship (Sect. 4.3) before drawing a few conclusions (Sect. 4.4). For Hobbes, positive friendship is not a standalone principle and is by itself neither beneficial nor detrimental; positive friendships can foster the health of a commonwealth or be a cancer within it.

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An Archaeology of Positive Friendship

The narrative on positive friendship is rich and varied; here, I highlight a selection of its recurring themes to set the stage for my discussion of Hobbes’s understanding of cooperation within and between political states. To begin with, contributors to the narrative have focussed their attention on man’s inability to live well on his own. Adam Ferguson (1767, 1995) reminds us of the ancient view that men, driven by their material and psychological needs and by their self-interest, are bound to develop friendship: There are some circumstances in the lot of mankind,’ says Socrates, ‘that shew them to be destined to friendship and amity; those are their mutual need of one another; their mutual compassion; their sense of mutual benefits; and the pleasures arising in company. (Adam Ferguson 1767/1995, 24)

Although Aristotle’s most significant contribution to the Western narrative on friendship is his discussion of ‘virtue friendship’ examined in the next chapter, there is agreement among interpreters that he helped develop the notion of public or civic friendship, which he regarded as an example of utility-based friendship. In Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle conveys the view that ‘civic friendship is based on utility’ (Aristotle 1984b, Eudemian Ethics VII: 10.1242b 22–3, p. 1969). In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle recounts that ‘it is for the sake of advantage that the political community … seems both to have come together originally, and to endure’ (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics VIII: 9. 1160a 11–13, p. 1833). For Aristotle, man’s natural sociability combined with his lack of self-sufficiency in meeting his many needs is key to explaining why men live together in societies: [A] social instinct is implanted in all men by nature. (Aristotle 1984d, Politics, I: 2. 1253a 30, p. 1988) The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing… (Aristotle 1984d, Politics, I: 2. 1253a 25–6, p. 1988)

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But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god. (Aristotle 1984d, Politics, I:2. 1253a, 28–9, p. 1988)

Lack of material and psychological self-sufficiency were fundamental to Greek accounts of civic friendship; in spite of their disagreements, Epicureans and Stoics shared the view that friendship is a ‘reasoned’ relationship, established and maintained to address man’s deficiencies (see Hutter 1978; Fiore 1997). As mentioned in the previous chapter (Sect. 3.5), Cicero rejected the opinion of those ‘adjudged wise men in Greece’ that friendship is sought because men lack self-sufficiency (Cicero 1991, 96).2 He pointed out that if that was the case, women would desire friendship more than men, and, among men, the weak, the poor, the unfortunate would pursue friendship more than the strong, the rich, and the lucky (Cicero 1991, 97). For Cicero, the view that need is the engine of friendship is theoretically flawed and empirically false. Building on the Aristotelian notion of man’s natural sociability, Cicero stressed that ‘nature abhors solitude’ (Cicero 1991, 111) and explained friendship as originating from man’s gregarious instinct: ‘friendship takes its beginning from our very nature rather than from our sense of inadequacy’ (Cicero 1991, 90). He observed that man’s inclination to form bonds with others is an essential component of humanity and applies equally to the wise and to the obnoxious: Yes, even if a man is so antisocial and so abnormal in his nature that he shuns and loathes any meeting with his fellows … still he would be completely unable to refrain from searching out someone in whose presence he might pour out the vials of his wrath. (Cicero 1991, 110)

Cicero maintained that friendship is essential to economics and politics (Cicero 1991, 88) but suggested that the multiple material advantages of friendships are the felicitous by-product of man’s sociability rather than the conscious and calculated motivation for man’s search for the company of others. The sixteenth and seventeenth century witnessed a revival of interest in the Aristotelian and Ciceronian views on friendship; many writers endorse Aristotle’s and Cicero’s explanation of the role of positive friendship in the creation of states, the maintenance of peace, and the improvement of living conditions.

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Jean Bodin points to the ‘sociable and companionable instinct’ as the drive that led men to establish friendships and found communities: We have shown how men led by a sociable and companionable instinct, proceed to the foundation of communities of various kinds, estates, corporate associations, and guilds, till finally they achieve a commonwealth. After God, such communities have no surer foundation than friendship and goodwill among men …. (Bodin 1955, 142, emphasis added)3

For many early modern writers, positive friendship is underpinned by the natural sociability of man. Francis Bacon emphasizes that the predisposition to friendship is part and parcel of humanity and modifies Aristotle’s dictum—according to which a man that does not need friends is either a beast or a god—as follows: whosoever in the frame of his nature and affections, is unfit for friendship, he taketh it of the beast, and not from humanity. (Bacon 1991, 202)4

Althusius too engages with Aristotle’s dictum (Althusius 1995, 25) and argues that man’s lack of self-sufficiency is part of a divine plan: God distributed his gifts unevenly among men. He did not give all things to one person, but some to one and some to others, so that you have need for my gifts, and I for yours. […] God therefore willed that each need the service and aid of others in order that friendship would bind all together, and no one would consider another to be valueless. (Althusius 1995, 23 emphasis added)

Althusius emphasizes that ‘no man is self-sufficient (autarkes), or adequately endowed by nature to lead a comfortable life on his own’ (Althusius 1995, 7).5 John Milton cites Cicero’s De Amicitia and reasserts that even the least agreeable of people looks for friends … to confide the venom of their fury (Milton 1991, 62).6 Contributors to the narrative on positive friendship concur that the benefits of civic friendship are considerable and wide-ranging; from Cicero to Adam Smith, many writers see friendship as key to a country’s economic development. For instance, Cicero points out that ‘if the mutual love of friends were to be removed from the world, there is no single house, no single state that would go on existing; even agriculture would cease to be’ (Cicero 1991, 88).

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In Bodin’s opinion, religion consolidates the networks of friendships among citizens: Even atheists agree that nothing so tends to the preservation of commonwealth as religion since it is the force that at once secures the authority of kings and governors, the execution of the laws, the obedience of subjects, reverence for the magistrates, fear of ill-doing, and knits each and all in the bonds of friendship. (Bodin 1955, 179)

As with the narrative on negative friendship (Chapter 3), so in the narrative on positive friendship we encounter the view that friendship provides a stepping stone towards the creation of political associations— rather than fear of enemies, it is man’s desire of a commodious lifestyle that explains why men live in cities. In many accounts, however, more emphasis is given to the role of friendship in underpinning communities: friendship secures civic concord, fosters civilization, prevents the occurrence of domestic conflict, and even safeguards against revolutions. Aristotle made well-known statements in this respect in both Nicomachean Ethics and Politics: Friendship seems to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than justice. (Aristotle 1984a Nicomachean Ethics VIII: 1, 1155a 23–4, p. 1825) For friendship we believe to be the greatest good of states and what best prevents them against revolutions; and Socrates particularly praises the unity of the state which seems and is said by him to be created by friendship’. (Aristotle 1984 Politics II:4, 1262b 6–10, p. 2003)

In the same spirit, Cicero saw civic friendship as protective against internal divisions and enmity: If this seems a bit difficult to understand, we can readily see how great is the power of friendship and love by observing their opposites, enmity and ill will. For what house is so firmly established, what constitution is so unshakable, that it could not be utterly destroyed by hatred and internal division? From this we may judge how much good there is in friendship. (Cicero 1991, 88)

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Centuries later, writers such as Jean Bodin reiterated the view that friendship binds civil associations and underpins human society: ‘A society or a community is rooted in mutual affection’ (Bodin 1955, 136). Furthermore, contributors to the narrative build on Aristotle’s following claim that friendship is even more important than justice for maintaining civil concord: Lawgivers [seem] to care more for it [friendship] than for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality (Aristotle 1984a Nicomachean Ethics VIII: I, 1155a 22–8, p. 1825)

For instance, Bodin suggests that friendship drives men to compassion, understanding, and forgiveness, while legal justice is cold, formal, and may generate resentment and enmity. In his words: Justice is never pitiful. Involving as it does strict exaction of rights, it often makes enemies of friends. But mutual affection leads men to make concessions and secures that natural justice shall prevail. (Bodin 1955, 137)7

Another theme of the narrative is the discussion of the relationship between civic friendship and different political systems. In his analysis of the optimal political forms (kingship, aristocracy, timocracy, or politeia) and their deviations (tyranny, oligarchy, democracy), Aristotle stressed that in imperfect political systems true friendships are rare, and this is particularly true of the worst political system, namely tyranny: It [friendship] exists least in the worst form; in tyranny there is little or no friendship (Aristotle 1984a Nicomachean Ethics VIII: 11, 1161a 33–5, p. 1835)

Aristotle’s view that there is scarcely any friendship in tyrannies was widely shared in classical antiquity: Who can love someone he is afraid of or someone who is afraid of him? When tyrants fall, it becomes clear that they had no friends. (Cicero 1991, 53)

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The narrative that coupled tyrannical regimes with absence or deficiency of friendship also viewed civic friendship as a formidable defence against tyranny and a vehicle of resistance; in early modern writings, the view that the intricate pattern of public friendship protects commonwealths against tyranny is conveyed forcefully by Bodin: the tyrant tries to eradicate them [guilds and corporate associations] altogether, knowing full well that unity and bonds of friendship among his subjects spells his inevitable ruin. (Bodin 1955, 143)

Bodin argues that partial societies, corporate associations, and guilds are as fatal to tyrannies as they are beneficial to the preservation of popular governments: Therefore in answer to the question whether it is a good thing to have Estate and colleges, or whether the commonwealth can well dispense with them, I hold that there is nothing that contributes more to the security of popular states and the ruin of tyrannies. (Bodin 1955, 143)

To recap, in the western tradition leading up to Hobbes, we encounter a narrative according to which man has many needs—material, psychological, and spiritual—that cannot be met in solitude. Following their nature (both reason and instinct), men establish relationships of friendship with one another and come to live in cities. Positive friendship is driven not by fear of an enemy but by the desire to live well: not only does it foster economic prosperity and cultural life but also strengthens concord and peace.

4.2 Hobbes on Systems, Partial Societies, Corporations, and Personal Friendships As a first step towards reconstructing Hobbes’s rejoinder to the narrative on positive friendship (Sect. 4.3), this section reviews (i) his notion of ‘commodious living’, (ii) his reference to forensic amicitia in the Latin De Cive, (iii) his discussion of systems in Leviathan, and (iv) his scattered remarks on personal friendships throughout his writings. A wide range of authors have found Hobbes’s discussion of these topics to contribute significantly to a variety of narratives. For instance, Otto Gierke highlighted how Hobbes’s discussion of partial societies

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gave impetus to the ‘centralist’ tendency versus the ‘federalist’ tendency within theories of associations; how Hobbes led the camp that identified the formation of human society with the creation of the State, a move achieved by previously isolated individuals through the conclusion of a single contract. After Hobbes, according to Gierke, it became impossible to regard any intermediate groups, of any description, as natural ‘group-steps’ standing between the Individual and the State [and leading up from the one to the other]. They could only be secondary foundations which had come into existence within the State, and after it had been created. The natural-law system, as we find it in Spinoza, Rousseau, Justi, Fichte, Kant and many other writers, knows only the Individual and the State. (Gierke 2001, 164)

While agreeing with Gierke that the Hobbesian state is not a development of partial societies, Norberto Bobbio has argued—contra Gierke—that for Hobbes there are not two elements of civil society—the individual and the sovereign—but three, the third being ‘intermediate societies’ (Bobbio 1993, 174). This discloses for Bobbio the conservative (as opposed to proto-liberal) character of Hobbes’s vision of politics. The literature has also shown how Hobbes’s theory of corporations contributed to the modern move that brought ‘economic activity away from religious charge and under political control’ as well as to the establishment of the ‘new languages of early modern societies’ (Pagden 1987). Interpreters have argued that Hobbes’s discourse on partial societies is greatly influenced by its historical context (Sommerville 1992); advances our understanding of his anthropology (Stanlick 2002; Baier 1987); and provides insights into his notion of citizenship (Dietz 1990; Curran 2007), elites (Baumgold 1988), resistance groups (Sreedhar 2010), and religious sects (Smith 2008). It also illuminates Hobbes’s stance on the function and effect of colonization and the impact of financial corporations on domestic and international peace (Tuck 1999; Malcolm 2002; Sorell 2006; Newey 2008). This considerable literature, however, has shown relatively little interest in adopting the perspective of this chapter, namely investigating Hobbes’s pronouncements in relation to former narratives focussed on civic or public or international friendship. However, it is only by looking at Hobbes from the viewpoint of such narratives that we can uncover his reasons for marginalizing friendship as a political concept.

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(i) The desire of ‘commodious living’’ To begin with, we may recall that Hobbesian men’s drive to enter the social contract is born not only from their ‘Feare of Death’ but also from their ‘Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their industry to obtain them’ (Leviathan II: 13, 196; 1651, 63). In his three descriptions of the state of nature (Baumgold 2017, 127–40), Hobbes makes clear that man’s desire to live comfortably can never be met outside the political state. To support his claim, in Elements Hobbes reminds the reader of the miserable living conditions of contemporary ‘savages’ as well as ‘old inhabitants of Germany and other now civil countries’, without the ‘ornaments and comforts of life which by peace and society are usually invented and procured’ (Elements I. 14: 12, 73). In Citizen, Hobbes explains how civilization itself is the result of man’s striving for a commodious way of life (Citizen XVII: 12, 214–5). In Leviathan, we are told that Hobbesian citizens join together in the political state to trade, to engage in industry, to develop the arts and sciences, to master navigation of the seas, and to engage in a variegated multitude of projects and activities that are necessary partly to live, partly to live well. The political state seeks to rectify the deficiencies encountered in the state of nature, where: there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (Leviathan II: 13, 192; 1651, 62)

As discussed in Chapter 2, the secondary literature disagrees regarding Hobbes’s understanding of human nature; in particular, there is divergence of opinion about the role of ‘others’ in one’s attainment of a commodious lifestyle. For centuries, the mainstream position (expressed forcibly by Sheldon Wolin (1960), Preston King (1974), and Bernard Yack (1993), among others) is that ‘others’ are mere means for the Hobbesian man to attain his independently chosen ends. However, a number of interpreters, from David Hume (1970) to John Rawls (2007),

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from Bernard Gert (1967) to Patapan and Sikkenga (2008), have intimated that the Hobbesian man is capable of altruism (David Van Mill 2001, 127), of genuine care (Nancy Stanlick 2002), and that this is particularly true in Leviathan (Malcolm 2002). It is undeniable that Hobbes enumerates ‘the love men bear to one another, or pleasure they take in one another’s company’ (Elements I. 9: 16, 43) among the passions of man; when describing the deplorable attributes of life in natural conditions, he lists ‘solitary’ before ‘poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Leviathan II: 13, 192; 1651, 62) thereby suggesting that men dislike solitude more than early death; in his discussion of natural laws, he indicates that even the most obnoxious of men dreads being cast out of society. In other words, rather than maintaining that man is unsociable towards all others and always guided by ruthless calculations in his relations with them, the balance of textual evidence indicates that, according to Hobbes, man is self-interested but nevertheless capable of caring for family and friends. Indeed, family and friends are not just a means to live a comfortable existence, but part and parcel of living well. The selectiveness and partiality of man’s love and affections, rather than his universal unsociability, are an essential component of the political problem that Hobbes sought to address (as I will argue in Chapter 6). (ii) Forensic amicitia In the Latin version of De Cive, Hobbes reckons that human interaction within political associations gives rise to forensic quaedam amicitia (De Cive: The Latin Version 1983, 90). The reference to ‘forensic amicitia’ has been lost in the available English translations. The seventeenth-century translation, once attributed to Hobbes, now to Cotton, renders ‘forensic quaedam amicitia’ as ‘a certain Market-friendship’ (De Cive: The English Version 1983, 42)8 ; the twentieth-century English translation of the same passage by Silverthorne turns the Latin expression ‘forensic quaedam amicitia’ into ‘a kind of political relationship’: Men’s purpose in seeking each other’s company may be inferred by what they do once they meet. If they meet to do business, everyone is looking for profit not for friendship. If the reason is public affairs, a kind of political relationship develops, which holds more mutual fear than love; it is

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sometimes the occasion of faction, but never of goodwill. (Citizen I: 2, 22 emphasis added)

As pointed out by Kinch Hoekstra (2011),9 Cotton’s rendition of ‘forensic quaedam amicitia’ as ‘a certain market-friendship’ arguably overemphasizes the market element of the forum but has the merit of retaining the meaning of amicitia; on the other hand, Silverthorne’s translation of forensic amicitia as ‘a kind of political relationship’ has the merit of recalling something that we associate with the forum, but downplays the friendliness conveyed by the Latin amicitia. It may be impossible to find a translation that will not lose or alter some meaning of the original phrase. This, however, should not prevent us from noticing that Hobbes links this type of friendship not to the state of nature, nor to concerns with defence against an enemy, but to the public arena, to public affairs and business, and to ‘commodious living’. Hobbes’s forensic amicitia connects to the narrative on positive friendship discussed in this chapter—it is utility-based and enables citizens to increase their wealth, to raise their standard of living, and to pursue their own notion of a good life.10 We may also observe that while Hobbes devotes a full chapter of Leviathan to the discussion of the network of corporations, partial societies, and groupings within political states, he mentions such networks only briefly in Elements of Law 11 and Citizen.12 A plausible explanation for the de-emphasis of friendship13 in his earlier works is that Hobbes’s main focus was on the origin and nature of law and government, while in Leviathan he extended the scope of his investigation to establish what binds citizen together, which types of partial society can advance concord and facilitate governance, and which affiliations can hinder or endanger it. (iii) Systems; Worthy or Warty In Chapter 22 of Leviathan, we happen upon the word ‘friend’ on only a couple of occasions; even so, it is in this chapter that we find Hobbes’s fullest description of forensic amicitia, which had been foreshadowed in the Latin De Cive. At the beginning of Leviathan, in the famous comparison of the state to a living body, Hobbes remarks that wealth and riches are the strength of the political body; in Chapter 22, we are introduced to the ‘muscles’ that promote the health of the organism and give it

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strength (Leviathan II: 22, 348; 1651, 115). Similarly, in the Introduction of Leviathan Hobbes tells us that sedition is the sickness of the state; in Chapter 22, we are helped to recognize the ‘Wens [Warts], Biles, and Apostemes’ of the commonwealth that harbour sickness and indicate pathology (Leviathan II: 22, 374; 1651, 123). Hobbes refers to the substructures within the body politic as ‘systems’ and explains that By SYSTEMES; I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest or one Businesse’. (Leviathan II: 22, 348; 1651, 115)

The term ‘system’ has a wide range of applications; indeed, Hobbes uses ‘system’ to refer to all manner of affiliations and societies, from corporations of merchants to corporations of beggars, gypsies, and thieves, to institutions as diverse as colonies, provinces, families, churches, colleges, and universities; ‘system’ also signposts ‘meetings of men at church’, people ‘attending a public show’, and indeed ‘any concourse of people’ either driven by ‘design’ or ‘proceeding only from a similitude of wills and inclinations’. Hobbes emphasizes the range and diversity of systems that exist in a political association: The variety of bodies is almost infinite: for they are not only distinguished by the several affairs for which they are constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversity; but also by the times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. (Leviathan II: 22, 358; 1651, 117)

Moreover, not only do systems join citizens within states but also link up the domestic with the international sphere, through a network of corporations, financial companies, trading institutions, provinces, and colonies.14 Hobbes’s discussion of systems is interesting in three main respects. First, the state is not a collection of atoms connected merely by the bonds of rights and duties, as some interpreters have suggested (e.g. Wolin 1960); rather, citizens are bound together through a variety of group formations, with each citizen participating in a number of different systems simultaneously. Men choose which systems to join—a church gathering or a merchants’ meeting—based on their individual preferences, inclinations, and designs. It is not given, though, that these systems are necessarily congregations of like-minded individuals; Hobbes suggests

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that in many of these systems individual members should be ready to voice their opinions and disagreement: It is manifest by this, that in Bodies Politique subordinate, and subject to a Soveraign Power, it is sometimes not onely lawfull, but expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the Representative Assembly, and cause their dissent to be Registered, or to take witnesse of it; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by other men. Leviathan II: 22, 356; 1651, 117.

Second, Hobbes acknowledges that systems can be beneficial to the commonwealth, but also warns of their potential danger. On his account, muscles are those systems that strengthen concord and peace, and warts are those that undermine it. Third, Hobbes maintains that the legal system (and therefore ultimately the Leviathan, which is the source of law) distinguishes those systems that are muscles from those that are warts: Systemes, and Assemblyes of People, which may be compared (as I said,) to the Similar parts of mans Body: such as be Lawfull, to the Muscles; such as are Unlawfull, to Wens, Biles, and Apostemes, engendered by the unnatural conflux of evill humours. (Leviathan II: 22, 374; 1651, 123).

The narrative from the ancients to Bodin (1955, 137) had suggested that friendships were more conducive to peace than legal justice, while for Hobbes this relationship is inverted: the law decides which friendships are muscles and which are warts.15 Some systems are unquestionably legal and beneficial, such as those created by the state (e.g. colonies, provinces), while other groupings, such as the aforementioned corporations of beggars, thieves, and gypsies, or ‘the corporation of men, that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers Dominion for the easier propagation of Doctrines and for making a party, against the Power of the Commonwealth’ are obviously illegal, as are all factions (Leviathan II: 22, 368; 1651, 121). Between the legal and illegal poles, however, lies a wide spectrum of human activity; presumably Hobbes maintained that it cannot be known a priori which of the endless variety of groups and societies originated by citizens is beneficial or damaging to peace, as it depends entirely on their activities. For instance, while financial corporations can contribute

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not only to the wealth of their members but also enrich the commonwealth and promote international peace, they can also engage in courses of actions that are detrimental to the state, as in the case of the London merchants whose greed and short-sightedness contributed to the English Civil War (Behemoth I). Similarly, universities, colleges, and royal societies may foster learning, advancing the arts and the sciences and thereby promoting ‘commodious living’, but at the same time they can allow their members to engage in pursuits that undermine concord and peace, as Hobbes tirelessly reminds his readers. Hobbes suggests that it is the role and responsibility of the Leviathan to monitor all systems and their activities, continuously evaluating if they be worthy or warty. Even a gathering of people for a show can turn from a harmless manifestation of ‘commodious living’ into a breach of the peace. Concourse of people, is an Irregular Systeme, the lawfulnesse or unlawfulnesse, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawful, and manifest, the concourse is lawful; as the usuall meeting of men at Church, or at a publique Shew, in usuall numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them is to be judged conscious of an unlawfull, and tumultuous designe. (Leviathan II: 22, 374; 1651, 123)

Thus, the Leviathan will interrogate each system individually, stamping out rogue associations that might have ‘an unlawful and tumultuous design’ and compromise peace. As discussed in Chapter 6, in order to differentiate the lawful from the unlawful, the Leviathan must apply the criterion of salus populi, ‘by which must be understood, not the mere preservation of [men’s] lives but generally their benefit and good’ (Elements II. 9: 1, 179). Although the Leviathan’s decisions are not arbitrary but guided by the laws of nature, they are nevertheless discretional.16 (iv) Personal friendships and the unstable divide between private and public. Hobbes does not offer a crystallized account of personal friendship in his writings. Nevertheless, his scattered comments on the topic offer insights into how citizens relate to one another within and across systems,

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and how personal friendships can consolidate, develop, or undermine the framework of forensic amicitia and ultimately peace. In Hobbes’s account, as in Bacon’s, friends are above all useful. Sometimes, friends are called upon or even hired to help in disputes, for instance: But if he, whose private interest is to be debated and judged in the Assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is no Injustice; because in this case he is no part of the Assembly. And though he hire such friends with mony, (unless there be an express Law against it,) yet it is not Injustice. (Leviathan II: 22, 372; 1651, 122)

The notion of paying friends for their help and service probably sounded less mercenary in Hobbes’s times than in our own; indeed, it reminds us of the medieval practice whereby the wealthy paid their (impecunious) friends to undergo the punishments, be they prayers or sacrifices, imposed upon them by religious authorities. Hobbes understands personal friendships to be utility based for the most part, and as having ‘favours’ as its most common currency: the magnitude of ‘favour’ is the number that goes into utility calculations. Indeed, ‘favour’ is a crucial ‘mark’ or keyword used by Hobbes to explain how friends empower one another. Sometimes, Hobbes combines the words, suggesting a single form of acquired power: ‘friendship or favour’ (Elements I. 8: 4, 34). In this way, the conceptual link in Hobbes’s mind between ‘friend’ and ‘favour’ is evidenced by their coincidence in the text. As ‘good fortune’ is described by Hobbes as the ‘favour of God Almighty’, so friendship is explained as the ‘favour of men’ (Elements I. 8: 4, 34). The experience and perception of favours and favouritism in the seventeenth century poses real challenges to the modern reader. Indeed, one cannot assume that—in the intervening centuries and across the shifting cultural sands—the meaning of the word ‘favour’ has been preserved. That this word may signify one thing for Hobbes and another thing for us is illustrated in Elements, where he defines freedom as ‘the honour of equality of favour’ (Elements II. 4: 9, 134)—a definition that does not resonate today. Aristotle examined friendship between equals and unequals (see e.g. Nicomachean Ethics VIII: 1158b, 1–30, pp. 1830–1) and highlighted the levelling function of friendship. Similarly, we may scrutinize two scenarios

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in Hobbes’s references to friendship in order to understand how friendship can connect and act as a bridge between people from different social strata. This will help to elucidate Hobbes’s understanding of the single concept of ‘friendship or favour’. In the first scenario, a friend does a favour to another in the expectation that the favour will eventually be returned. Here, trusting a friend amounts to trusting that the helpful act will be reciprocated. This type of friendship is normally between individuals with comparable spheres of influence (i.e. they share the same social status). The second scenario in which we see personal friendship does not feature the symmetry of the first case. Rather, a friend does a favour for another with the knowledge that the other will not be able to return the favour per se, but will reciprocate in some other way. This case takes place between people of differing social statuses and may remind us of the relationship between patron and client. In Chapter 10 of Leviathan, we encounter this form of friendship between unequals, where, in return for the gifts and favours of the superior, the subordinate offers honour, respect, and recognition. Thus, Hobbes suggests, both parties gain from the relationship: the more powerful man benefits insofar as he reinforces his dominance over the other party; his less powerful friend receives the assistance he needs to attain his goals. Whereas the example of friendship between equals receives little air-time in Hobbes’s political texts, friendship between unequals is given more attention—indeed some interpreters have suggested that Hobbes conceives of friends only as patrons or cronies.17 Hobbes underlines man’s pervasive desire to make powerful friends (Citizen X: 6, 119). The most interesting aspect of Hobbes’s references to personal friendships is that he conveys the view that any private relationship can acquire political significance. This can be illustrated by means of three examples that one encounters in Hobbes’s texts. .

First, by bestowing gifts and favours, Hobbes tells us, a single individual can gain widespread popularity and thereby build a broad support base. This, in turn, makes him the potential leader of a faction. Hobbes remarks that ‘private power has a certain limit beyond which it will ruin the commonwealth’ (Citizen X: 7, 120) and recalls that ‘at Rome those who sought popularity with the plebs by favours were put to death on the ground that they were aiming for kingship’ (Citizen X: 7, 121 emphasis added).

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Second, personal friendship can have political implications in the case of cronyism and corruption: officials may relax rules and regulations in order to dispense favours to their friends (see e.g. Elements II. 9: 6, 182). Only appropriate punishment of abuses of office, according to Hobbes, can prevent officials’ partiality and safeguard the commonwealth from rising discontent. Third, even a King’s personal friendships can acquire political significance, highlighting the tensions arising from the King’s two bodies (this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). Though the sovereign is the source of civil honour and can therefore award favours at his discretion, Hobbes suggests that a ruler’s partiality in favouring his friends can bring about discontent and even foment rebellion (Elements II. 5: 5, 142; Citizen X: 6, 119; Leviathan II: 19, 290; 1651, 96–7; Common Law, 15). In all his works, Hobbes explores the consequences of favouritism and partiality towards one’s friends. On the one hand, he maintains that ‘the enriching now and then of a favourite [is] to the wealth of the Kingdom … inconsiderable’ (Common Law, 15) and suggests that much of the wealth that favourites receive from the monarch eventually ‘falls down again upon the common people’ (Common Law, 24) so that, anticipating the modern notion of trickle-down economics, all may benefit from the patronage of a few. On the other hand, Hobbes finds that the unfairness that a ruler’s favouritism entails is a major source of discontent, which cannot be ignored or overlooked (Common Law, 38).18 For Hobbes, phenomena such as partiality and favouritism affect all political regimes and are a consequence of human nature (Citizen VI: 13, 83–4); he stresses, however, that a monarchy is preferable to an aristocracy, and a fortiori preferable to a democracy, exactly because there is a limit to the number of friends and favourites that a single man can have vis-à-vis an assembly of men. In other words, Hobbes concedes that democracies may foster friendship relative to monarchies; however, this is an indicator not of cohesion within democracies, but of their potential to act as incubators for partiality and bias. In Common Law, the Philosopher reminds the Lawyer that ‘Salus populi is suprema Lex’ (Common Law, 70): the safety of the people must be the only criterion used by the sovereign for the rewarding of citizens and for the distribution of favours, for the decision of who constitutes

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a public friend or public enemy, and for the establishment of which friendships are legitimate or illegitimate among citizens. In conclusion, in Hobbes’s account of civic life, individuals join a potentially infinite variety of affiliations and activities within the state, following their particular inclinations and designs, and often participating in many systems simultaneously. The Hobbesian citizen encounters the state and other citizens both as an individual and as member of multiple systems. Systems are the muscles of the commonwealth not just if their existence is allowed by law, but if all their activities are consistent with the purpose of law, which is peace. It is the sovereign’s responsibility to supervise every system and its activities; it is up to his practical judgement to decide, case by case, which systems and activities enhance the health of the commonwealth and which can harbour its sickness. All a philosopher can do is to spell out the guiding criterion that should inspire the Leviathan’s legislation and censorship: salus populi.

4.3 Hobbes on Positive Friendship: A Critical Rejoinder From the ‘Review and Conclusions’ of Leviathan, it emerges that Hobbes clearly understood that his readers expected him to engage with the friendship narrative; indeed, he lists among the criticisms levelled against his theory the view that there is no civic amity within the Hobbesian state. He writes: there has been an argument taken, to inferred an impossibility that any one man be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of Civill duty. […] And to consider the contrary of mens Opinions, and Manners in general, It is they say, impossible to entertain a constant Civill Amity with all those, with whom the Businesse of the world constrains us to converse. (Leviathan, A Review and Conclusion, p. 1132, emphasis added)

On the one hand, Hobbes rejects his critics’ claim that ‘a constant Civill Amity’ is impossible within the Hobbesian state; on the other, in his defence he refrains from stating that the systems described in Chapter 22 of Leviathan create a network of interaction that facilitates the development and strengthening of civic friendship. Hobbes could easily have made such a claim; by his account, many systems (such as

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corporations) display the characteristics of his own definition of friendship, including empowerment, trust, and positive disposition (Chapter 2). So, what prevented Hobbes from meeting the expectations of his readers? Why did he refrain from using words such as ‘friend’ and ‘friendship’ in Chapter 22? As a first step towards understanding Hobbes’s infrequent use of these terms, we may take inspiration from Norberto Bobbio’s reflections on the term ‘system’, used by Hobbes to indicate partial societies. According to Bobbio (1993), Hobbes wanted to break from the beliefs of his time, which he saw as misguided—a new political vocabulary would allow him to build his theory unencumbered by the weight of existing words and their associations. For this reason, he adopted a term of Greek origin, ‘system’, over the more commonplace Latinate term ‘corporation’, to describe partial societies. Similarly, we may surmise that Hobbes did not refer to public or civic ‘friendship’ in Leviathan (or to forensic amicitia in the Latin Leviathan) because he did not want his ideas to be associated with a narrative whose mode of thought was inspired by Aristotle’s philosophy and, to Hobbes’s mind, therefore, flawed due to Aristotle’s misconceptions about anthropology, morality, and politics. Inevitably, there are some continuities between tenets of the narrative on positive friendship and Hobbes’s account of commodious living and civic life. Hobbes, too, describes man as lacking self-sufficiency and driven to cooperate with others by the desire to live a commodious life; he lists love of company among the passions of man and claims the isolation of the state of nature is a source of misery; he suggests that each person’s life is inextricably interwoven with that of others; he shows that Hobbesian citizens encounter the state and all other citizens not just as independent individuals or self-contained agents, but as endlessly connected members of a vast array of groups and societies, with their own ends and projects. Hobbes also agrees with the narrative that partial societies are potential vehicles of economic prosperity, of cultural advancement, of societal cohesion, and of international cooperation. Indeed, such a view of partial societies was confirmed by Hobbes’s own experiences: he was a shareholder of a financial corporation and conscientiously attended most meetings (Malcolm 2002); he was part of an intellectual circle of friends and exchanged ideas and favours with many of them; he often chose to stay in London, in spite of his apprehension about health issues, because he was keen to discuss his ideas with others. In a nutshell, Hobbes was personally aware that we need others to live well. However, his points

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of agreement with the narrative on positive friendship are offset by some crucial differences. First, Hobbes inverts the previously held view that civic friendships are a stepping stone towards the creation of the political state; rather, the political state creates the conditions—common language, shared values, mutual trust, and positive disposition—that facilitate the establishment of civic friendships (in the form of partial societies, financial corporations, universities, churches, and so on). Even seemingly robust personal friendships depend for their existence and growth on the shared context created by the Leviathan. Whereas many ancient writers suggest that friendship is always valuable, Hobbes concludes that the value of all forms of friendship is uncertain: they may enhance the quality of life and promote peace; however, they may also engender partiality, foment discontent, and undermine concord. As a result, all friendships must be monitored and regulated; even private friendships can lead to the formation of sects and conspiracies that threaten the Commonwealth. In Hobbes’s argument, therefore, we can see an asymmetry: while friendship cannot rescue man from anarchy, it can precipitate him into it. A second point of difference lies in the mutability of the categories of friendship. In the western tradition, positive and negative friendships emerge as related yet separate concepts, whereas in Hobbes’s discourse one form of friendship can develop into the other. More specifically, positive friendship (friendship for ‘commodious living’) can easily transform into negative friendship (or friendship against an enemy)—unless closely monitored by the state, muscles can become warts, systems can become sects, conspiracies, or factions.19 The third divergence follows from the second. While the existing narrative had regarded friendship to be both endangered by tyranny and a bastion against it, for Hobbes friendship is a challenge to all governments, and to democracies above all. The Leviathan, be it an assembly or a single person, must discriminate between bad and good friendships, using salus populi as its criterion. Democracy is the type of government that is least likely to discharge this duty reliably, because the more people in power, the more friends they have and the more temptations they face to bend the rules in favour of those friends. Finally, and most importantly, Hobbes firmly believes that legal justice and fairness are paramount in maintaining concord and peace; as discussed in Chapter 6, Hobbes is adamant that only equity prevents discontent and disobedience. Hobbesian judges are required to be fair and just, not

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compassionate and caring. Equity is the skeleton of a healthy commonwealth and fundamental to peace, according to Hobbes, because love is selective and often a source of partiality and unequal treatment. In Chapter 6, I will further investigate the link between friendship and partiality and argue that Hobbes replaces the ancient norm of friendship with a set of laws of nature that can be summarized with the dictum: ‘treat everyone as a friend, and every friend as anyone’.

4.4

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have focussed on positive friendship—a relationship that men establish and maintain in order to improve the quality and conditions of their lives. Section 4.1 set the stage with former narratives on positive friendship, and Sect. 4.2 drew back the curtains on the Hobbesian play. We observed different scenes of social cooperation: merchants attending corporation meetings, scientists exchanging manuscripts, officials drinking with friends, conspirators sneaking into clandestine lodgings, and gangs of thieves gambling under a bridge. Upstage, we saw the rising sun of wealth and civilization on one side, while on the other the thick clouds of corruption, favouritism, and sectarianism loomed, threatening sedition and civil war. On the apron, surveying the variety and value of these different manifestations of positive friendships, stood Hobbes’s hero: the Leviathan. Productions of plays about positive friendship continued after Hobbes and received impetus from the Scottish Enlightenment.20 Hobbes’s insight into the ambiguous effect of friendship on politics echoed through modernity: as Lewis writes, ‘Friendship is both a possible benefactor and a possible danger to the community’ (Lewis 1960, 83). In particular, Hobbes’s concern that friendships can jeopardize equity, fairness, and justice—a concern that the ancient notion of ‘true friendship’ could not raise (see Chapters 5 and 6)—resonated with the modern audience, especially with liberal writers who often highlighted the difficult marriage of friendship and politics. Even Adam Smith, the champion of eighteenth-century friendship, stressed the paramount importance of fairness and justice vis-à-vis friendship. To some extent, Smith adhered to ancient and early modern views on negative and positive friendship—he observed that man ‘can subsist only in society’, and that ‘among well-disposed people, the necessity or conveniency of mutual accommodation, very frequently produces a

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friendship not unlike that which takes place among those who are born to live in the same family’ (Smith 1984, 223). Just as Cicero and Milton had maintained that friendship is also valued and sought by disagreeable sections of society (see Sect. 4.1), likewise Smith claims that it is not only ‘the tender and the delicate’ but also ‘the rudest vulgar of mankind’ who seek friendship for the happiness that this relationship carries with it (Smith 1984, 39). Smith also suggests that economic advantage is not the only outcome of commercial societies; on the contrary, commercial society fosters a wide variety of social passions such as generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, and above all mutual friendship and esteem (Smith 1984, 38). However, Smith diverges from Aristotle and Cicero on the primacy of friendship in social relations. If all friendship, goodwill, and beneficence were to disappear, according to Smith, society would not break down because justice is the cornerstone of lasting associations: beneficence is less essential to the existence of society than justice. Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it. (Smith 1984, 86)

Positive friendship, which was a core ingredient of Aristotelian and Ciceronian politics and economics, became, after Hobbes, an optional seasoning, added with a delicate hand even by those who enjoyed its flavour. Indeed, in modernity, the use of the concept of friendship in the field of morality became even more circumspect, as discussed in the Chapter 5 and 6.

Notes 1. For example, Althusius, who attributed to friendship an important role in his Politica, emphasizes that man befriends others both to defend himself against ‘wild beasts and enemies’ and to provide more easily ‘the necessities of life’ (Althusius 1995, 24–5). 2. Benjamin Fiore (1997, 60) notes that ‘the prevailing view is that Cicero cannot be tied to any particular sources or school of thought for his views on friendship but that the treatise rather represents an eclectic sampling of views as well as ideas prevalent in the popular culture of the day … [Cicero] does not see friendship

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to be simply a reasoned relationship, as a Stoic might. On the other hand, he rejects the Epicurean idea of friendship as originating in necessity … and sees its origins rather in nature alone’. 3. For Bodin, ‘a group of families bound together by mutual trust forms a corporate associations or community, and a group of corporate associations or communities bound together by sovereign power forms a commonwealth’ (1955, 135). Bodin reiterates the ancient view that amicitia is the bond of civil associations and the foundation of human society; he emphasizes that ‘A society or a community is rooted in mutual affection’ (1955, 136). 4. Bacon opens his essay on friendship with Aristotle’s dictum that a man that does not need friends is either a beast or a god and comments thus: ‘It had been hard for him that spake it, to have put more truth and untruth together, in few words, that in that speech; whosoever is delighted in solitude, is either a wild beast, or a god’ (Bacon 1991, 202). According to Bacon, a man requires friends in order to obtain good counsel, to receive emotional support, and to attain practical help. 5. Althusius highlights the lack of self-sufficiency of man throughout his existence: ‘For when he is born, destitute of all help, naked and defenceless, as if having lost all his goods in a shipwreck, he is cast forth into the hardships of this life, not able by his own efforts to reach a maternal breast, nor to endure the harshness of his condition, nor to move himself from the place where he was cast forth. By his weeping and tears, he can initiate nothing except the most miserable life. Bereft of all counsel and aid, for which he is then in greatest need, he is unable to help himself without the intervention and assistance of another’ (Althusius 1995, 17). Indeed, dependency on others is not limited to infants; he adds: ‘Nor in his adulthood is he able to obtain in and by himself those outward goods he needs for a comfortable and holy life, or to provide by his own energies all the requirements of life. The energies and industry of many men are expended to procure and supply these things. Therefore, as long as he remains isolated and does not mingle in the society of men, he cannot live at all comfortably and well while lacking so many necessary and useful things’ (Althusius 1995, 17–18).

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6. Milton points to the defensive, material, psychological, and spiritual needs of man as his drive to live together with others (Milton 1991, 63). 7. Bodin gives the example of Switzerland: ‘In every town the fraternities and craft guilds have their guildhalls where they hold frequent banquets and festive meetings. The smallest village never lacks a communal hall for such purposes. Disputes are normally settled amicably, and the sentence recorded in chalk on the table at which they have eaten’ (Bodin 1955, 136). 8. The passage reads: ‘How by what advice Men doe meet, will be best known by observing those things which they doe when they are met: For if they meet for Traffique, it’s plaine every man regards not his Fellow, but his Businesse; if to discharge some Office, a certain Market-friendship is begotten, which hath more of Jealousie in it than True love, and whence Factions sometimes may arise, but Good will never’ (English De Cive 1983, 42 emphasis added). 9. Personal correspondence. 10. I discuss Hobbes’s stance on the good life vis-à-vis Aristotle in Chapter 6. 11. In Elements, Hobbes devotes only 12 lines to the discussion of subordinate unions and corporations created ‘for counsel, trade and the like’ (Elements I. 19: 9, 104; a few lines on corporations also at Elements II. 8: 7, 174). 12. In Citizen (V: 10, 73) too, Hobbes mentions only briefly the case when ‘many citizens, by the permission of their commonwealth, unite as one person, for the purpose of transacting certain business. These now will be civil persons, as companies of merchants are, and any number of other groups’. 13. On changes between various works see F.S. McNeilly (1968). 14. On Hobbes’s international political economy see Sorell (2006), Malcolm (2002), and the 2021 issue in Hobbes Studies. 15. For illuminating discussions of Bodin and Hobbes, see King (1974) and Evrigenis (2008). 16. On sovereign discretion see the excellent article by Laurens van Apeldoorn (2021). 17. ‘Thomas Hobbes, for whom human existence is best understood as a perpetual quest for power, writes of friends as patrons or

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cronies’ (von Heyking and Avramenko 2008, 6); for a stimulating discussion of this topic, see Smith (2008). 18. I have argued (Slomp 2015) that Hobbes seems torn on whether favouring individuals is normal and part of the King’s prerogative, or dangerous and potentially part of his downfall. I argued that one possible explanation for the differing messages is that Hobbes was addressing two different audiences, the citizens and the King; on the one hand, his message for the citizens was that they needed to cope with the phenomenon of favouritism for it’s a consequence of human nature and can be found in all political systems. On the other hand, Hobbes’s message for the King was different: he warns him of its potentially calamitous consequences. 19. This claim will be discussed in Chapter 6. 20. It is well-known that interpreters vastly disagree on the type of friendship that different representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment associate with commercial societies. For opposite views see, for example, Allan Silver (1999) who attributes to members of the Scottish Enlightenment the view that commercial societies foster free choice and therefore also freely chosen friendships; in contrast, Lisa Hill and Peter McCarthy (2000) argue that it is inaccurate to make omelettes of Smith’s, Hume’s, and Ferguson’ broken eggs and highlight crucial differences on the effect of the market on social relations.

References Althusius, Johannes. 1995. Politica. An Abridged Translation of Politics Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples, ed. and trans. Frederick S. Carney and Intro. Daniel Elazar. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Aristotle. 1984a. Nicomachean Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University, Book VIII, 1825–39, and Book IX, 1839–52. Aristotle. 1984b. Eudemian Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Book VII, 1956–81.

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Aristotle. 1984c. Rhetoric. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. W. Rhys Roberts. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Book II.4, 2200–2202. Aristotle. 1984d. Politics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol II, Book I and II, 1986–2023. Bacon, Francis. 1991. Of Friendship. In Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 202–207. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Baier, Annette C. 1987. Commodious Living. Synthese 72 (2): 157–185. Baumgold, Deborah. 1988. Hobbes’s Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baumgold, Deborah. 2017. Three-Text Edition of Thomas Hobbes’s Political Theory. The Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bobbio, Norberto. 1993. Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition. Chicago and London. Bodin, Jean. 1955. Six Books of the Commonwealth, abridged and trans. M.J. Tooley. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Cicero, Tullius. 1991. De Amicitia, trans. Stanley Lombardo. In Other Selves. Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 79–116. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Curran, Eleanor. 2007. Reclaiming the Rights of the Hobbesian Subject. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Dietz, Mary G. 1990. Hobbes’s Subject as Citizen. In Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, ed. Mary G. Dietz, 91–119. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. Digeser, P.E. 2016. Friendship Reconsidered: What it Means and How it Matters for Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Evrigenis, Ioannis D. 2008. Fear of Enemies and Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ferguson, Adam. 1767/1995. Essay on the History of Civil Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fiore, Benjamin. 1997. The Theory and Practice of Friendship in Cicero. In 1997 Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship Atlanta, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, 59–76. Georgia: Scholars Press. Gert, Bernard. 1967. Hobbes and Psychological Egoism. Journal of the History of Ideas 28 (4): 503–520; reprinted in Baumrin, Bernard H (ed.). 1969. Hobbes’s Leviathan: Interpretation and Criticism, 107–126. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing. Gierke, Otto. 2001. Natural Law and the Theory of Society: 1500–1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Hill, Lisa, and Peter McCarthy. 2000. Hume, Smith and Ferguson: Friendship in Commercial Society. In The Challenge to Friendship in Modernity, ed. Preston King and Heather Devere, 33–49. Frank Cass: Ilford. Hume, David. 1970. Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Reprinted from the posthumous edition of 1777, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hutter, Horst. 1978. Politics as Friendship. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. King, Preston. 1974. The Ideology of Order: A Comparative Analysis of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. London: George Allen & Unwin. Lewis, C.S. 1960. The Four Loves. London: HarperCollins Publishers. Lu, Catherine. 2009. Political Friendship Among Peoples. Journal of International Political Theory 5 (1): 41–58. McNeilly, F.S. 1968. The Anatomy of Leviathan. London: St Martin’s Press. Malcolm, Noel. 2002. Aspects of Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Milton, John. 1991. Political Writings, ed. Martin Dzelzainis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Newey, Glen. 2008. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes and Leviathan. Abingdon: Routledge. Pagden, Anthony, ed. 1987. The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Patapan, Haig, and Jeffrey Sikkenga. 2008. Love and the Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes’s Critique of Platonic Eros. Political Theory 36 (6): 803–826. Rawls, John. 2007. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, ed. Samuel Freeman. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. Schwarzenbach, Sibyl. 1996. On Civic Friendship. Ethics 107: 97–128. Silver, Allan. 1999. Friendship in Commercial Society: Eighteenth Century Social Theory and Modern Sociology. American Journal of Sociology 95 (6): 1474– 1504. Slomp, Gabriella. 2015. Limiting Leviathan: An Advice Book for Rulers? Social Theory and Practice 41 (1): 149–163. Smith, Adam. 1984. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Smith, Travis. 2008. Hobbes on Getting By with Little Help from Friends. In Friendship and Politics: Essays in Political Thought, ed. John Heyking and Richard Avramenko, 221–247. Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Sommerville, Johann. 1992. Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Sorell, Tom. 2006. Hobbes on Trade, Consumption, and International Order. The Monist 89: 245–258. Sreedhar, Susanne. 2010. Hobbes on Resisxtance: Defying the Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Stanlick, Nancy. 2002. Hobbesian Friendship: Valuing Others for Oneself. Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (3): 345–359. Tuck, Richard. 1999. The Rights of War and Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press. van Apeldoorn, Laurens. 2021. Hobbes on Property: Between Legal Certainty and Sovereign Discretion. Hobbes Studies 34 (1): 58–79. Van Mill, David. 2001. Liberty, Rationality and Agency in Hobbes’s Leviathan. New York: State University of New York Press. von Heyking, John, and Richard Avramenko, eds. 2008. Friendship and Politics: Essays in Political Thought. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Wolin, Sheldon 1960. Politics and Vision. Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Yack, Bernard. 1993. The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought. Berkeley: University of California Press.

CHAPTER 5

Friend as Another Self

Alongside the narratives on ‘friendship as alliance’ and ‘friendship as partnership’, in the western tradition, we encounter a discourse that celebrates friendship as a relationship that assumes, displays, and cultivates virtue; the friend is viewed as another self. For instance we read: To the query, ‘What is a friend?’ [Aristotle’s] reply was, ‘A single soul dwelling in two bodies.’ (Diogenes Laertius 2006, I, 463) I was surprised (mirabar) that myself who was to him a second self, should be able to live after him. Well said one of his friend, Thou half of my soul: for I still thought my soul and his soul in two bodies: and therefore was my life a very horror to me, because I would not live by halves… (Augustine 1912, IV: vi, 167 emphasis added)

A bond moulded by virtue, rather than grounded in utility, represented for the ancients the ‘true’ (or ‘virtuous’ or ‘complete’ or ‘perfect’) form of friendship; I call this relationship ‘normative friendship’ as it provided a norm and an ideal for individuals and communities. The tale of Damon and Phintias, as told by Valerius Maximus, illustrates the virtues—loyalty, selflessness, and courage—that the ancients associated with true friendship:

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Damon and Phintias …were joined together in a completely loyal friendship. Dionysius of Syracuse wanted to kill Phintias, but he granted him some time to go home and organize his affairs before his death, and Damon did not hesitate to offer himself to the tyrant as a hostage on behalf of his friend. …Damon claimed that he had nothing to fear when it came to his friend’s loyalty. At one and the same time, the deadline fixed by Dionysius and the man who had agreed to that deadline arrived. The tyrant was amazed at the courage of both men. (Valerius Maximus 2004, book 4.7, 153)

According to Plutarch, stories of ‘steadfast friends’—including Theseus and Peirithous, Achilles and Patroclus, Orestes and Pylades, Phintias and Damon, and Epameinondas and Pelopidas—captured ‘the goodwill and graciousness combined with virtue’ at the core of true friendship (Plutarch 1928, 50–51). In Letters from a Stoic, Seneca describes virtue-based friendship with the following thought: What is my object in making a friend? To have someone to be able to die for, someone I may follow into exile, someone for whose life I may put myself up as security and pay the price as well. (Seneca 1969, Letter IX, 50)1

The ancients rehearsed representative stories of true friendship not just for their beauty (Heller 1998)2 but also for their educational value (Nichols 2009); they conceived virtuous friendship as a path to pursue inner fulfilment (Schall 1996); they maintained that the practice of virtuous friendship facilitated one’s journey towards ‘the good life’ and/or the philosophical contemplation of ‘the good’ and ‘the beautiful’ (Nussbaum 1986/2009); they regarded the occurrence of true friendship as rare and yet sufficiently common to offer a credible ideal for individuals and communities; finally, they believed that the health and desirability of different political systems could be measured by the extent to which they nurtured virtuous friendships. The discourse on virtuous friendship continued into the Middle Ages.3 Often, Christian accounts echoed ancient themes. For example, just as Seneca in the above quote asserts that true friendship entails the willingness to die for one another, so Aelred of Rievaulx recalls Jesus Christ’s proclamation of the same:

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greater love than this, he says, no man has, that a man lay down his life for his friends. (Aelred 1991, 137)

Medieval writers, however, sought to accommodate virtuous friendship within Christian teaching; it was therefore necessary to adjust the concept that for the ancients described an exceptional bond between superior people, to fit the Christian principles of equality of all children of God and of universal charity; this transformed the meaning and significance of the original notion. During the Renaissance, there was a revival of interest in the classical notion of virtuous same-sex friendship (Mills 1937; Lochmanet al. 2011); however, the renovated concept came to describe an intimate relationship without any obvious tie to the ancient concept of ‘good life’. Virtuous, deep, and unique as Michel de Montaigne’s friendship with Estienne de la Boete was, it no longer symbolized the contemplation or pursuit of the good, it no longer represented the norm and ideal of individuals and communities. Rather, it became the prerogative of the moderns to decide what their friendships were about. As Montaigne (1991, 193) put it: ‘Our friendship has no other model than itself, and can be compared only with itself’. The interplay between normative friendship and ‘the good’, which evolves and transforms in ancient and medieval through to early modern times, is the background against which this chapter contextualizes and interprets Hobbes’s views on normative friendship as they emerge from his political writings. After reviewing some recurring themes within the narrative on normative friendship (Sects. 5.1 and 5.2), this chapter describes the changing foundations of the concept in ancient, medieval, and early modern times (Sect. 5.3); it then examines Hobbes’s concerns with normative friendship (Sect. 4.4) before drawing some conclusions. While previous chapters have shown that Hobbes made some concessions to the narratives on negative (Chapter 3) and positive friendship (Chapter 4), this chapter and Chapter 6 will argue that Hobbes’s theory contains a forceful and uncompromising rejection not only of the ancient model of normative friendship but also of the model of normative friendship of the early modern period.

5.1

An Archaeology of Normative Friendship

In his seminal study of ancient friendship, Horst Hutter argues that Plato and Aristotle formulated two notions of virtue-based friendship that

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provided the framework for all subsequent conceptions in the western tradition (Hutter 1978, 91). Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of virtue friendship are ‘alike in the political importance which they assign to friendship’ (Hutter 1978, 92) but dissimilar in many other respects. The disparities may have been born from a difference in approach and aims; Plato attempted to develop a theory of ideal friendship, while Aristotle observed empirical practices of friendship and created a typology based on his observations on how and why people befriend one another.4 Hutter argues that eros is the driving force behind Platonic virtuebased friendship (Hutter 1978, 92). Virtuous friendship, therefore, ultimately consists of sublimated love: the lover shows his true friendship by abstaining from consummating his passion and by respecting and fostering the beloved’s virtue. Plato urges the move from ‘love of friend’ to ‘love of friendship’, from the concrete experience of having a friend to the contemplation of the form of friendship. In Plato’s vision (2006), the sublimation of eros that takes place in a close virtuous relationship between friends results in the general love of mankind (Hutter 1978). For Aristotle, man is an animal living in cities, driven by nature to love and care for others. It follows that, for Aristotle, love for mankind is the premise and not the result of friendship (Hutter 1978, 92); for Plato, this relation is inverted. Although love and affection occur among friends, Aristotelian friendship is not a feeling or a passion, but a ‘state’ of mind (Aristotle 1984a Nicomachean Ethics VIII: 5, 1157b 29–33, 1829). Influential as Plato’s ideas were, it was nevertheless Aristotle who originated ‘the arch narrative’5 on virtuous friendship that still appeals to readers today. Although the concept of philia is one of the most controversial and debated aspects of Aristotle’s moral theory (Mulgan 2000, 15), there is concordance of opinion among Aristotelian commentators that virtue-based friendship, unlike its imperfect counterparts, enables man to attain his telos or purpose and has both a moral and a political dimension. No matter how close or genuine a relationship appeared, and regardless of the depth of affection or loyalty it involved, the ancients did not consider any bond in which a man asked another to do something ‘base’ or ‘immoral’ to be true friendship (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics VIII:8, 1159b 4–8, p. 1832). Aristotle maintained that true friendship can occur only among ‘the best of men’ (Aristotle 1984b, Eudemian Ethics VII:2, 1236a 33–37, p. 1958). He regarded true friendship to be rare and Diogenes Laertius attributed to him the famous dictum: ‘Dear

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friends, there are no friends!’6 Aristotle’s views on the infrequency of complete friendship and the impossibility of having many true friends were commonplace in antiquity: A strong mutual friendship with many persons is impossible, but, just as rivers whose waters are divided among many branches and channels flow weak and thin, so affection, naturally strong in a soul, if portioned out among many persons becomes utterly enfeebled. (Plutarch 1928, 51)

Its rarity notwithstanding, virtuous or true friendship was considered politically significant for a number of reasons: first, it depended for its existence on the polis (Cooper 1993, 303, 1977); second, it was regarded as character-building and therefore influential on one’s behaviour not just towards one’s few friends but also towards every other citizen; third, as mentioned in previous chapters, the ancients postulated a connection between constitutional arrangements and friendship; in particular, they considered popular governments to be promoters and facilitators of friendship, including virtuous friendship, and tyrannies to be its undoing. Certainly in antiquity, virtue-based friendship was considered not just a school of virtue but also a school of civic virtue. Throughout the centuries, the moral dimension remained the hallmark of true friendship vis-à-vis inferior or incomplete forms; this is captured by Boethius in The Consolation of Philosophy: And as for friendship, the purest kind is counted as a mark not of good fortune, but of moral worth, but all other friendship is cultivated for the sake of power or pleasure. (Boethius 1969, 80)

Medieval writers put forward concepts of moral friendship that often built on classical models. Augustine’s notion of friendship contains both Platonic and Ciceronian aspects (Schall 1996; Grayling 2013); Aelred openly praises ‘Cicero’s treatise, On Friendship, in which in a delightful style he treats at lengths all those matters which appears to pertain to friendship’ (Aelred 1991, 132) and seeks to combine Ciceronian amicitia with Christian beliefs: For what more sublime can be said of friendship, what more true, what more profitable, than that it ought to, and is proved to, begin in Christ, continue in Christ, and be perfected in Christ? (Aelred 1991, 133)

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Aquinas famously reformulates the Aristotelian distinction between utility-based friendship and virtue-based friendship as ‘love of concupiscence’ and ‘love of friendship’. He highlights and develops the Christian character of the latter and provides a comprehensive casuistry of Christian friendship along Aristotelian lines (Schwartz 2007). The moral aspect of perfect friendship persists into the early modern period (Shannon 2002). Like in ancient times, the true friend is still portrayed as someone loyal, trustworthy, and virtuous; the friend tells the truth unlike the sycophant who deceives and is steadfast unlike the flatterer who absconds the moment the friendship becomes disadvantageous. In his renowned essay, Montaigne emphasizes the profound moral breadth of his friendship with Estienne de la Boete and makes clear what was always implicit in classical theories of friendship, namely that the ‘sacred bond’, in its highest form, occurs only among men, not women; and among men, only among the best. He writes: To tell the truth, the ordinary capacity of women is inadequate for that communion and fellowship which is the nurse of the sacred bond; nor does their soul seem firm enough to endure the strain of so tight and durable a knot. (Montaigne 1991, 190)

Early modern friendship in its highest form is same-sex and male, as it was in antiquity; women may be equal children of the Christian god, but—as Montaigne explains—are condemned by their limited intellectual capacity and emotional volatility to experience only lower types of friendship, aimed at protection or pleasure. Modern writers often acknowledge that their concept of friendship is derived from ancient sources; as discussed in Chapter 4, Francis Bacon (1991, 202) engages with an Aristotelian statement at the opening of his essay on friendship and presents a portrait of the friend that is evocative of the characterization offered by Plutarch (1927)—both accounts point out that we are our own greatest flatterers and need a friend in order to establish the truth about ourselves. Much like the link between friendship and morality, the connection between friendship and politics persisted through the centuries. Indeed, a recurring motif in the friendship narrative was its role in resistance against tyranny and fortification of republicanism (Pangle 2003, 1; Derrida 1997, 15). Even the most celebrated stories of true friendship, such as the legend of Damon and Phintias, demonstrated that virtuous friends may

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occasionally be disobedient subjects (the tyrant Dionysius had condemned Phintias to death for a reason). As a result of this tension, a recurring political theme was the question of how should one behave when friendship and political obligation make conflicting claims: should one choose loyalty to friends or loyalty to country? Over the centuries, the answer to this question has swung from one to the other, as discussed later in this study.

5.2

Two Sayings of the Narrative on Normative Friendship

‘Friends have all things in common’, ‘friends do not need justice’, ‘the friend is another self’, ‘whosoever does not need friends is either a wild beast or a god’, ‘friends are one soul in bodies twain’, ‘like is a friend to like’, ‘friends share the same truth’, ‘dear friends, there are no friends!’, ‘Plato is my friend, but Truth is my better friend’: these are just a few of the most well-known adages associated with the narrative on virtuous friendship. Of the multiplicity of recurring sayings and themes of the narrative, in this section the focus is on two: (i) the statement that a true friend is another self and (ii) the claim that only good people are capable of true friendship. Not only are these maxims central to the narrative, but they also both help to shed light on Hobbes’s stance on normative friendship. 5.2.1

The Friend as Another Self

The maxim of the friend as a ‘second’ or ‘another’ self was inspired by the following remark by Aristotle: As the virtuous man is to himself, he is to his friend also – for his friend is another self . (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics IX:9 1170b 6, p. 1850)

This is one of Aristotle’s most intriguing pronouncements on friendship and represents an exegetical challenge: interpreters disagree on the meaning of the claim, on its significance in the context of Aristotle’s philosophy, and on its role in the development of the narrative on friendship.7 For our purposes, it is interesting because it encourages reflection on the conditions under which an ‘excellent person’ sees a friend as

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‘another himself’ and on the extent to which selflessness is entailed by seeing a friend as another self. Regarding the first issue, namely what drives a man to see another as a second self, one camp maintains that, according to Aristotle, true friends are fundamentally alike and therefore identify with one another (Grayling 2013). According to another camp, for friends to see each other as second selves, they must be similar in one, fundamental respect only, namely in an equally strong commitment to the pursuit of virtue. Aristotle’s notion of the true friend resembles the virtuous friend in Plato’s Laws, as cited by Erasmus in his Adages: we say that like is a friend to like as far as virtue is concerned, and equal to equal. (Erasmus 2001, 50)

The view that friends emulate each other’s virtue is adopted by Cicero, who observed that ‘the man who keeps his eye on a true friend, keeps it, so to speak, on a model of himself’ (Cicero 1991, 88). Among Christian writers, Augustine in his Confessions stresses the similarity of pursuits and activities between himself and his unnamed deceased friend and offers a poignant account of what it means to lose a friend who is another self: Whatever I cast mine eyes upon, looked like death unto me. Mine own country was a very prison to me … Mine eyes roved about everywhere for him, but they met not with him; and I hated all places for they had not him; nor could they tell me, Behold, he will come shortly, as when he was alive they did whenever he was absent. (Augustine 1912, IV: vi, 161)8

In the early modern period, Erasmus lists ‘simile Gaudet simili’ (Erasmus 2001, 1.ii.21, 50–51) among his adages and cites statements by Aristotle and Plato on similarity and differences between friends as precedents of the phrase that similarity is the mother of affection. Montaigne, however, highlighted the difficulty of explaining the reasons that drive one to consider another as a second self: In the friendship I speak of, our souls mingle and blend with each other so completely that they efface the seam that joined them and cannot find it again. If you press me to tell why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed, except by answering: because it was he, because it was I . (Montaigne 1991, 192, emphasis added)9

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Montaigne suggests that there is no formula to produce virtuous friendship or to predict whether, say, Damon will become a true friend to Phintias. Rather, true and perfect friendships are the result of ‘many coincidences’, and therefore occur infrequently, even ‘three centuries’ apart (Montaigne 1991, 188). As salvation is, according to Paul, a gift from God and not the reward of a sinner’s efforts, so the highest form of friendship is, according to Montaigne, the product of chance and accident, not the result of effort and industry. In addition to inviting reflection on the circumstances that lead one to consider another as a second self, the ‘another self’ trope has raised questions about the extent of selflessness and generosity involved in true friendship. Aristotle articulates that, in a true or complete friendship, the friend is loved for his own sake, not for another (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics VIII:3, 1156b 7–11). The true friend is never just a tool or a means to achieve one’s ends— he is an end in himself. Indeed, the best friendship is the one where the friend is loved for his virtue and character, not for his services. This does not mean that true friends do not bring benefits. On the contrary, for Aristotle, friends are source of pleasure, support, and help. However, these advantages are the by-products of true friendship, not its engine. Some interpreters find a high degree of altruism in Aristotle’s account of virtuous friendship (e.g. Schollmeier 1994). Conversely, other interpreters (e.g. Pakaluk 1991, 29), point out that in Aristotle’s writings the relationship between friendship and self-love is very complex and cannot be reduced to the modern binary distinction between altruism and egoism. On the one hand, there are passages in Aristotle’s works where he maintains that it is more proper to a friend to confer benefits than to receive them (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics IX:9, 1169b 11–12, p. 1848); on the other hand, to ‘the question whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest goods, e.g. that of being gods’ Aristotle suggests that there are limits to the generosity that virtuous friends have for each other. Now if we were right in saying that friend wishes good to friend for his sake, his friend must remain the sort of being he is, whatever that may be; therefore it is for him only so long as he remains a man that he will wish the greatest good. But perhaps not the greatest goods; for it is for

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himself most of all that each man wishes what is good. (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics VIII:7, 1159a 5–12, 1831–1832)

In other words, we want our friend to flourish with moderation—he should remain ‘whatever sort of being he is now’ because if he were to become a god, he would no longer need us as a friend and that would affect us because friendship is ‘good’. Aristotle adds that ‘it is for himself most of all that each man wishes what is good’ (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics VIII:7, 1159a 5–12, 1831–1832). Aristotle held that true friends care genuinely and profoundly for one another without renouncing altogether the notion of ‘love of self’. Seneca stressed the coincidence of interests of true friends: If a thing is in your interest, it is also in my own interest. Otherwise, if any matter that affects you is no concern of mine, I am not a friend. Friendship creates a community of interest between us in everything. We have neither successes nor setbacks as individuals; our lives have a common end. …You should live for the other person, if you wish to live for yourself. (Seneca 1969, letter XLVIII, 96)

The discussion regarding the degree of selflessness required by true friendship persisted into the Middle Ages and received a notable contribution from Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas quotes Leviticus (19:18 ‘love your friend as yourself’), providing biblical support for the Aristotelian insight that ‘love of self’ and ‘love of another’ are not necessarily opposing concepts as the former can serve as a basis for the development of the latter (Grayling 2013, 73). He distinguishes between ‘love of concupiscence’ and ‘love of friendship’ and attributes benevolence and genuine care for others only to the latter (Aquinas 1991, 172). Aquinas’ typology is considered historically significant in the narrative on friendship: although it reminds us of the Aristotelian differentiation between utility-based friendship and virtue-based friendship, it is not a reformulation of the Aristotelian view but rather the origin of the modern binary distinction between egoistic and altruistic love in friendship (Pakaluk 1991, 147). In the early modern period, the questions regarding the role of selfishness and selflessness in friendship generated a range of responses. At one end, one encounters Montaigne, for whom true friends’ ‘souls mingle and blend with each other’; at the other end, one finds Bacon, for whom ‘a

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friend is another self’ in so far as he can assist our advancement in public life and, as it were, blow our trumpet for us. [I]t was a sparing speech of the ancients, to say, that a friend is another himself : for that a friend is far more than himself . (…) A man can scarce allege his own merits with modesty, much less extol them: a man cannot sometime brook to supplicate or beg: and a number of the like. But all these things, are graceful in a friend’s mouth, which are blushing in a man’s own. (Bacon 1991, 207 emphases in the original)

On Bacon’s account, the friend is not totally selfless in his buccinatory activities: by advertising us, he improves also his public image because everyone admires a loyal friend, according to Bacon. In sum, from ancient to early modern times, the ‘friend as second self’ trope captured a major characteristic of the highest form of friendship, namely normative or true friendship. The ancients—and especially Aristotle—stressed the generosity of true friends but played down the possible tension between ‘love of self’ and ‘love of friend’; indeed, the binary distinction between selfless and selfish love in friendship was unknown in antiquity. Not unlike Aquinas, the moderns highlighted the difference between altruism and egoism in friendship; while Montaigne maintained that ‘love of self’ and ‘love of other’ can coincide only in extraordinary friendships that materialize very rarely, Bacon reconciled the conflicting claims of egoism and altruism by turning one’s generosity towards one’s friends into a means for promoting one’s self-interest. Bacon’s interpretation of the ancient trope must have sounded very amusing to Hobbes’s ears; however, before exploring Hobbes’s views, the next step is to examine another maxim that was central to the narrative on normative friendship. 5.2.2

Only Good People Are Capable of True Friendship

A recurring and significant saying that we encounter in the narrative on virtuous friendship centres on the belief, widespread among the ancients, that only good people are capable of true friendship. Plato explains in Lysis: only the good is a friend, and only to the good, while the bad never enters into true friendship with either the good or bad. (Plato 2006, 14)10

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Whether friendship can arise among all sorts of people is one of the first questions that Aristotle raises in his study of friendship. Without hesitation, he replies that true friendship is accessible only to good men. According to Aristotle, the principle of similarity mentioned earlier sheds light not only on the trope of the friend as another self—we love as second selves people who are very similar to us—but also on the saying that only good people are capable of true friendship. His reasoning is that good people seek good people and bad people seek bad people; the former value virtue and so they cultivate the highest form of friendship. Cicero took an extreme position on the matter. While Aristotle had conceded that bad people, though incapable of virtuous friendship, could develop utility-based forms of friendship, Cicero excluded the possibility that bad people could experience friendship at all: friendship can exist only between good men (Cicero 1991, 86). without virtue, friendship cannot exist at all (Cicero 1991, 87).11

Ancient writers were not oblivious to the fact that friendship could facilitate phenomena such as favouritism, corruption, and sectarianism (Herman 1987, 156–171). Indeed, Cicero demonstrates an awareness of the connection between personal attachments, wrong doing, and conspiracies (Cicero 1991, 94 ff), but he vehemently denies that such relationships can be classified as friendships (Cicero 1991, 94–95). For Cicero ‘the laws of friendship’ can never require a man to do something morally reprehensible or unlawful; indeed, if someone asks another to do something immoral or illegal, he is not a true friend. Wrongdoing, then, is not excused if it is committed for the sake of a friend (Cicero 1991, 94); after all, the thing that brings friends together is their conviction of each other’s virtue. Let us then lay down this law for friendship: we must not ask wrongful things, nor do them, if we are asked to. (Cicero 1991, 95)

In particular, for Cicero (1991), true friendship can never spur wrongdoing against Rome: the duties of friendship cannot undermine political obligation. In relation to Aristotle who had remarked that:

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it is true of the good man that he does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary die for them (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics IX:8, 1169a 18–20, p. 1848)

Cicero advances the stronger claim that true friends are true patriots willing to risk their lives for Rome.12 Cicero’s contention that friends can never ask anything immoral of one another, and that only virtuous people can be friends, is a recurring theme of the western friendship narrative, one particularly significant contributor to this subject was Augustine. On the one hand, in his Confessions, Augustine praised friendship; on the other, he denounced the potential evil of friendship when separate from the love of God. Recalling his theft of pears as a sixteen-year-old boy, Augustine states that he did not steal the fruits because they appealed to him. He repeats several times that alone he would have not stolen a single pear—it was pressure from his friends that caused the theft. The anecdote leads Augustine to conclude that friendship can be good, but it can also be corrupting. While Cicero refused to call any relationship that led to immoral actions friendship, Augustine calls the friendship that leads to wicked acts, ‘unfriendly friendship’: Alone, I would have never committed that theft, wherein what I stole did not so much content me, as because I stole it; which would never have pleased me so well to have done alone, nor would I ever have done it. O friendship too unfriendly! (Augustine 1912, II: ix, 93 emphasis added)

For Augustine, it is not love of country but love of God that is essential to true friendships—only good Christians can be true friends. In the early modern period, the saying that ‘only good people can be true friends’ occurs in many writings on friendship, including Montaigne’s essay (1991). Montaigne relates the friendship between Tiberius Gracchus and Caius Blossius; he reminds us that, after Gracchus was condemned for treason, Caius Blossius was interrogated by the consuls in his capacity as Gracchus’ best friend and confidant. To the question of how much he would have been willing to do for Gracchus, Blossius replied ‘everything’; to the question of whether, if commanded, he would have set fire to the temples’, Blossius’ first reply was that ‘He [Gracchus] would have never have commanded me do that’, but when pressed further, Blossius eventually conceded that he would have obeyed. (Montaigne 1991, 193)

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Montaigne remarks that Blossius’ last confession was unnecessary and that he should have reiterated what he had said first, namely that he knew Gracchus’ will like his own and that Gracchus would have never asked for the destruction of the temples. He reiterates the Ciceronian view that true friends never ask anything immoral: if the actions of friends were to go astray ‘they were by my measure neither friends to each other, nor friends to themselves’ (Montaigne 1991, 193). As we have seen, from ancient to early modern times, writers on friendship often engage with two recurrent sayings in the tradition: one that sees a friend as a second self and another that regards only good people as capable of true friendship. This broad overview has shown that, in spite of similarities, these maxims evolved and were approached differently by ancient, medieval, and early modern writers. We can now focus more deeply on the underpinning of the concept of normative friendship in the western tradition before Hobbes.

5.3

The Changing Foundations of Normative Friendship

From ancient to early modern times, the foundations of virtuous friendship underwent major changes that altered the meaning and affected the role and significance of the concept. These transformations were the result of developments that transcended the narrative on friendship and that are traditionally associated with the transition from antiquity to the Middle Ages, and from the Middle Ages to modernity. Of all the adages associated with virtuous friendship, the one that I find especially useful in illustrating the changing foundations of virtuous friendship is a statement attributed to Aristotle: Amicus Plato, Magis Amicus Veritas, rendered by Heller as ‘Plato is my friend, but Truth is my better friend’ or ‘I love Plato, but I love Truth more’ (Heller 1998, 7). Aristotle’s maxim is usually regarded as prescriptive and not descriptive. Some commentators evince from the statement the rule that ‘in case of conflict between friendship and truth, the philosopher should … choose truth’ (Heller 1998, 7), while others understand it as a recommendation to consider truth as an essential property of true friendship: ‘we cannot be friends unless we place truth higher than, or constitutive of friendship’ (Schall 1996, 132). For our purposes, the maxim is important in so far as it invites reflection on the meaning, role, and value of ‘the truth’ in friendships and

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offers a vantage point to note significant shifts in the western narration on virtuous friendship. Plato and Aristotle maintained that there was a truth that existed independently and prior to any friendship, a truth that philosophers did not invent but uncovered, a truth that set the meaning and significance of virtuous friendship (Hutter 1978). For Plato, virtuous friendship provided knowledge and access to the contemplation of the form of ‘the beautiful’ (Carpenter 1906). For Aristotle, virtuous friendship facilitated man’s pursuit of his telos and was anchored to the notion of the ‘good life’ (Mulgan 2000, 15). Indeed, for the ancients, ‘the good’ and ‘the truth’ existed independently from the will of man and set the standards that a bond of friendship needed to meet in order to qualify as true, or perfect, or complete. For medieval writers, truth was revealed to all men and not discovered by philosophers: Christ replaced the ancients’ ‘good’ and ‘beautiful’ and became an essential component of true friendship. Indeed, Augustine insists that no bond, however strong, can qualify as true friendship unless the Holy Ghost is a constitutive part of the relationship. In spite of experiencing before his conversion a ‘very sweet friendship’ (Augustine 1912, IV: iv, 158) with a man, whose death afflicted him profoundly, Augustine maintained that the bond was not ‘true friendship’ because their relation was unimbued with God: But yet was he not so truly my friend, no not at that later time even, as true friendship should be indeed: for true it cannot be, unless thou solderest it betwixt such parties as cleave together, by that love which is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us. (Augustine 1912, IV: iv, 157, 159)

Hence, from a Christian perspective, the treatment of a friend as another self does not constitute true friendship unless combined with love of God—Christian friendship depends on recognition in one’s friend of the image of God, not the image of oneself. Hence, for Christian writers ‘the relationship that binds people together as friends and fellow citizens … rests ultimately on God, the supreme good’ (Fortin 1993, 47). Modern writers adopt yet another distinctive approach to truth and to the good, exemplified by Montaigne’s essay. On one level, Montaigne’s account of virtuous friendship reminds us of classical formulations, with Montaigne openly appealing to the wisdom of Aristotle and Cicero and

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suggesting that only good people are capable of friendship. On another level, however, it becomes apparent that the relationship Montaigne is describing lacks the external foundations and standards of Aristotelian and Ciceronian friendship. While the latter was moulded by the conception of the good life, Montaigne’s friendship instead ‘has no other model than itself’ (Montaigne 1991, 193). The terms of Montaigne’s friendship—its standards, expectations, and boundaries—are not eternal truths, but decided by the friends themselves and dependent on their wills. Modern friends may indeed share the same truth, but it is their invented truth, and not a universal standard (Fortin 1993; Schall 1996). Whereas the pre-modern absolute, ideal truth was amenable to external verification—it was in principle possible to establish whether a friendship was striving for the ‘good life’, or embracing the Holy Spirit—the modern, relativistic notion of truth in friendship was refractory to the judgement of outsiders—the effect of friendship on politics became unpredictable. Having recognized this shift, we are better placed to unpack and understand Hobbes’s critique of normative friendship and the role he attached to the state.

5.4

Hobbes Against Normative Friendship

Chapters 1 and 2 argued that Hobbes was conversant with the narrative on friendship; he was particularly well-acquainted with virtuous friendship, which is prominent in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and in Plato’s Convivium (also known as Symposium). Hobbes comments on the Platonic view on love and friendship, drawing attention to the ‘honourable pretence for the old to haunt the company of the young and beautiful’ (Elements I. 9: 17, 45). Indeed, Hobbes joins a line of critical readers of the platonic account of love and friendship, that extended from Cicero to Montaigne. Montaigne mentions the ‘licentious Greek love justly abhorred by our morality’ (Montaigne 1991, 191) and reminds us of Cicero’s questions on the issue: ‘For what is this love of friendship? Why does no one love either an ugly youth, or a handsome old man?’ (Montaigne 1991, 191). Hobbes was also familiar with the Iliad that celebrates virtuous friendship and with Bacon’s essay on friendship (Skinner 2002); he recognized how fashionable references to friendship were in dedicatory epistles; for instance, in the dedicatory letter of Altera Secretissima Instructio, that

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Hobbes translated, the author compares his own friendship with Frederic the V to archetypal friendships: to Achates, friend of Aeneas; Theseus friend of Pirithous; Pylades friend of Orestes’ (Malcolm 2007, 125 footnote 2).13 In the dedicatory letter of Leviathan to Francis Godolphin, Hobbes himself offers a portrait of Francis’ brother, Sidney Godolphin, that reminds one in every detail of the ‘virtuous friend’ praised by the ancients: For there is not any virtue that disposeth a man either to the service of God or to the service of his Country, to Civill Society, or private Friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature. (Leviathan, Epistle Dedicatory, 4)

There is consensus of opinion among interpreters that Hobbes rejected the ancient notion of virtuous friendships (von Heyking and Avramenko 2008, 6; Smith 2008, 219); indeed, a vast literature has highlighted the range and extent of Hobbes’s disagreement with Aristotle’s views on ethics. Here, I limit myself to the exploration of Hobbes’s stance on the two adages discussed in Sect. 5.2—the notion of the ‘friend as another self’ and the saying that ‘only good people are capable of true friendship’. This examination will provide a vantage point from which to understand Hobbes’s misgivings with the western narrative on normative friendship, and his conscious decision not to employ the concept of friendship in his new science of politics. To begin with, as discussed above (Sect. 5.2), the saying a ‘friend is a second self’ meant to Aristotle, among other things, that a ‘friend wishes good to [a] friend for his sake’ (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics VIII:7, 1159a 9, p. 1831). Aristotle ascribes a high degree of disinterested love and care to virtue-based friendship vis-à-vis utility-based friendship: whereas utilitarian friends see each other as a means to attain their independently chosen ends, virtuous friends see each other as ends in themselves. The assumption that friends are capable of generous and selfless love has been singled out by some interpreters as a major reason why Hobbes rejected virtue-based friendship. Indeed, the literature has suggested that Hobbes’s rejection of virtuous friendship is a corollary of his anthropology (e.g. Yack 1993; Schwarzenbach 2009). Of course, according to

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Hobbes, man is generally self-interested and utilitarian, but this is something that even Aristotle conceded. Indeed, as discussed in Sect. 5.2, Aristotle posits limits to man’s altruism towards his friend and also highlights the role of self-love in true friendship. For Aristotle, ‘most people fall short of true virtue … and most friendships are really associations of utility’ (Pangle 2003, 45). It would therefore be a mistake to think that the absence of Aristotelian virtue friendship from Hobbes’s theory is a necessary product of his notion of the self-interested nature of man. Undoubtedly, one can offer a number of arguments to support the claim that Hobbes could have accommodated the trope of treating ‘a friend as another self’ within his theory. First, it can be argued that Hobbes’s description of human nature does not exclude the possibility of one man considering another to be ‘a second self’. This is demonstrated by Hobbes’s portrait of ‘the good counsellor’,14 who advises others for their sake and not his own: A Counsellour … (by the definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefit, but his whom he adviseth. (Leviathan II: 25, 402; 1661, 133)

Hobbes contrasts ‘good’ counsellors, who act in the interest of the counselled, with ‘corrupt’ counsellors, who are ‘bribed by their own interest’ (Leviathan II: 25, 402; 1661, 133). Admittedly, a counsellor is not a friend; nevertheless, the case demonstrates that it is not beyond human nature, even for Hobbes, for one to advise for the sake of another.15 Second, Hobbes does not preclude man from acting generously towards a selected few, even if he rules out universal love for mankind. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the occurrence of genuine love of others and friendship in Hobbes’s descriptions of man has been noted by a long list of writers that stretches from David Hume (1970) to contemporary commentators.16 If Hobbes saw friendship among men as possible and not less rare than sociability, the question arises as to why his laws of nature, discussed in the next chapter, recommend ‘sociability’ (Elements I. 17: 15, 95) and not friendship. We can conclude based on the foregoing arguments that Hobbes could easily have built the ‘another self’ jamb of normative friendship into his political construction. That he did not do so must be for reasons that have little to do with his anthropology. Rather, Hobbes’s motive for disliking virtuous friendship comes to light when we consider the other saying of

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the narrative on virtuous friendship discussed in Sect. 5.2. Indeed, though he de-emphasized friendship in his work, Hobbes was vocal in his rejection of the classical maxim according to which ‘not the evil but the good have friends’ (Anti-White 1976, 479).17 He wrote that this claim was ‘patently false’ and raised the question: And depraved though they are, do not conspirators aid and comfort one another, and share common designs. (Anti-White 1976, 479)

Aristotle had rejected the idea that wicked people could develop true or virtue-based friendships, which would enable them to reach their telos and live the good life. Hobbes, of course, had serious issues with Aristotelian ethics, and it was part of his overall project to undermine it. As he discarded Aristotle’s teleology and the notion of the ‘good life’ (Zarka 2016; Rutherford 2003), so he rejected the Aristotelian understanding of virtue. Aristotle had famously argued that ‘[Virtue] is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect’ (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics II.6, 1107a 2–3, p. 1768) and maintained that ‘temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and they are preserved by the mean’ (Aristotle 1984a, Nicomachean Ethics II.2, 1104a 25–6, p 1744).18 Hobbes rejected this understanding of virtue, condemning ‘the Writers of Morall Philosophie’ for placing virtue ‘in a mediocrity of passions’ and challenged the view that ‘the Degree of daring, made Fortitude’ or ‘the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality’ (Leviathan II: 15, 242; 1651, 80; see also Elements I. 17: 14, 94). For Hobbes, then, it is not the amount of loyalty, truthfulness, or generosity, that makes a friendship or an affiliation virtuous or vicious, good or bad; rather, it is the effect of that relationship on peace. In Hobbes’s rejection of Aristotelian notion of virtue, we can recognize two separate arguments running simultaneously: an argument against the Aristotelian view that virtue lies in the middle between vices (i.e. Hobbes disagrees with Aristotle on how to read the measuring tape); and an argument that loyalty, truth, generosity are the things to be measured (i.e. Hobbes disagrees on which measuring tape to use). For Hobbes peace and the safety of the people are the criteria by which we can establish whether a friendship, a partial society, a corporation, or any grouping is a muscle or a cancer of the commonwealth.

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Hobbes rejected unambiguously the ancient notion of friendship as a norm, or virtue, or moral ideal not because he considered man incapable of loving or caring genuinely for another, but because he disallowed the Aristotelian concepts of virtue and good life. Hobbes rejected the idea that friendship per se is a virtue, that one can define virtue without considering its consequences, and that the consequences of so-called true friendship are necessarily good for the commonwealth. By arguing in Chapter 22 of Leviathan that societies and affiliations can be a source of either sickness or health for the commonwealth (see Chapter 4), and by rejecting in Anti-White the ancient view that genuine friendship is the prerogative of good people, Hobbes took and voiced a position on friendship that distinguishes the moderns from the ancients—he stressed the ambivalence of friendship. Indeed, C. S. Lewis characterizes the struggle on friendship between the ancients and the moderns thus19 : Friendship (as the ancients saw) can be a school of virtue; but also (as they did not see) a school of vice. It is ambivalent. It makes good men better, and bad men worse. (Lewis 1960, 97) Friendship is both a possible benefactor and a possible danger to the community. (Lewis 1960, 82)

However, the Aristotelian model of virtuous friendship was not the only source of concern for Hobbes’s theory of political obligation; the early modern model of friendship also contained an insidious challenge that emerges from the following statement by Montaigne: ‘A single dominant friendship dissolves all other obligations’ (Montaigne 1991, 195). While the ancient friendship tradition recalled to the mind, alongside the Aristotelian philos who loved his city and the Ciceronian amicus willing to die for Rome, a commitment to liberty and republicanism, the emerging modern model of friendship could potentially open the door to civic disobedience and anarchism. Chapter 6 discusses how Hobbes’s theory of political obligation copes with the challenge; we will find in Hobbes’s political writings a new model of friendship where the Leviathan replaces the external entity—the good, God—that anchored ancient and medieval models of friendship.

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Concluding Remarks

In the Greco-Roman world, true or normative friendship was not just a relationship between self and other; it entailed a third external entity— ‘the good’ or ‘the beautiful’—that ancient philosophers regarded as the ‘truth’ they had uncovered, not invented. For Aristotle and Cicero, the ‘good life’ set the standard and boundaries of what friends could expect and demand of each other. For medieval writers, friendship came to lean against a different pillar— the Christian God. Christian teaching set new standards and boundaries to true friendship. Different as the Christian and classical pillars were, they nevertheless provided an external third entity that sustained and regulated the relationship between friends. For instance, we read Aelred of Rievaulx saying to his friend Ivo: Here we are, you and I, and I hope a third, Christ, is in our midst. (Aelred 1991, 131 emphasis added)

In early modernity, the traditional pillars of friendship started to disintegrate. Although writings on friendship from this period appear to resemble the ancient texts, the likeness is superficial only. Early modern friendship is no longer anchored to an external entity—the Good or the Beautiful or the Christian God—which is ‘outside of and higher than’ the friends themselves (Fortin 1993, 47).20 In modernity, friendship changes from a triadic relationship into a dyadic relationship21 (Schall 1996), a relation limited to ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ (Fortin 1993, 47). Modern friendship does not refer to anything beyond itself; its goals and boundaries depend entirely on the friends’ will. This shift, from the external truth that grounded Aristotelian and Augustinian friendship to the internal will at the root of Montaigne’s friendship, transformed the nature and dynamics of the relationship: whereas ancient and medieval friendship served a moral purpose, modern friendship exists independently from the moral status of individuals.22 In modernity, friends ‘become laws unto themselves’, a point made succinctly by James Schall: When the friend does not exist in truth, that is, when both friends do not have a common good in which each exists, they become laws unto each other, precisely what they cannot be in friendship as Aristotle understood it. (Schall 1996, 134 emphasis added)

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The view that the bond of friendship dissolves all other obligations and the fact that friends become laws unto each other are the beginning of the modern journey that led E. M. Forster to declare three centuries later that: If I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friends, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country. (Forster 1938/1972, 68)

Faced with the crisis of the traditional model of friendship and envisaging the dangers of the modern model of friendship, Hobbes’s response was to undermine further the former and oppose the latter by proposing the creation of an artificial entity—a mortal god—in charge of determining what is true or false, good or evil: the state. Chapter 6 will argue that in Hobbes’s theory we find a triadic model of friendship: the Leviathan replaces the third entity (the good, the Christian God) that supported and regulated ancient friendship with the task of monitoring all practices of friendship from public societies and corporations to personal relationships, using the safety of the people as its yardstick.

Notes 1. Seneca discusses the different views on friendship held by Epicureans and Stoics in various letters (e.g. Letters IX and XLVIII). 2. Agnes Heller explains: ‘All representative stories of friendship are beautiful not because they are beautifully written, but because they are the stories, the recollections, of a true friendship’ (Heller 1998, 16). 3. For interesting discussions of Christian friendship, see Brian Patrick McGuire (1988/2010), Carolinne White (1992), Julian Haseldine (2000) and John von Heyking (1999). 4. Interesting insights into Aristotelian friendship can be found in Konstan (1997), Cooper (1993), Stern-Gillet (1995), Irrera (2005), and Price (1989). 5. I borrow the term from Derrida (1997) and Heller (1998). 6. Derrida (1997) took this pseudo-Aristotelian dictum as the starting point of his reflections on friendship.

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7. For example, Grayling interprets the figure as meaning that true friends share the same interests, tastes, and opinions; he believes this view distorts, rather than enhances, our understanding of friendship: ‘in my view the overemphasis on Aristotle’s “another self” phrase in all the subsequent history of discussion about friendship has been the single most distorting aspect of our understanding of it, for the very good reason that it has to be part of the voluntary obligations attached to being a good friend to accept the differences between oneself and one’s friend – which involves giving one’s friend space to have some interests and tastes different from one’s own, and to agree to disagree about some things’ (Grayling 2013, 35). 8. Following tradition, Augustine compares disagreement among friends with the inner debates one has with oneself during the process of deliberation and suggests that friendship forges unity out of multiplicity (Grayling 2013). 9. For an interesting discussion of Montaigne’s statement see Schall (1996). 10. On this see Hutter (1978, 95), Bolotin (1979), and Price (1989). 11. Cicero explains that good men are those who ‘follow nature as the best guide to the good life’ (1991, 87), that ‘ there is nothing so worthy of love as virtue’ (Cicero 1991, 90), that there can be no higher form of friendship that the one that binds us to the virtuous, that ‘we are not led to friendship by the hope of material gain; rather, we judge it desirable because all its profits are encompassed by the feeling of love which it generates’ (Cicero 1991, 31). 12. For a discussion of two different networks of interpersonal relations—the amicitia and the clientele—in ancient Rome, see Neal Wood (1988). 13. In Chapter 3, we saw that the anonymous author of this pamphlet offers a cynical utility-based understanding of friendship. However, in the dedicatory letter, he compares his friendship to three figures proverbial for their loyal friendship; in his words, translated by Hobbes, When you began, I helped you, when you grew I applauded, when you reigned, I instructed you…. I am Achates, Thinke me Theseus or Pylades; I will be both to you. When you committee to ye sea yor Ship, I will tye my boate to ye sterne, that it may eyther rest

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in ye same port, or be whirled about wth the same tempest. Nulla meis sine te quaeretur gloria rebus. I may prosper amisse wth you, but neuer well without you. (Reason of State, 124–125)

14. I discuss the good counsellor in Slomp (2016). 15. Hobbes stresses that good counsellors are rare; he points out that counsellors to the representative person of a commonwealth have often their own agenda; in keeping with his realism, he sets down ‘for the first conditions of a good Counsellour, That his Ends and Interest, be not inconsistent with the Ends and Interest of him he Counselleth’ (Leviathan II: 25, 404; 1661, 134, emphasis in the original). 16. Writers that have opposed the reading of psychological egoism in Hobbes include Gert (1967, 2010), Van Mill (2001, 126), Sorell (1986), Patapan and Sikkenga (2008), Rawls (2007: 45), Stanlick (2002), Lloyd (1992, 2009). I discuss Hobbes’s stance on benevolence and love of others in Slomp (2019b). 17. I discuss Hobbes’s critique of this maxim in Slomp (2019a). 18. On Aristotle’s moral virtue as ‘mean’ see Schollmeier (1994, 26– 28). 19. The notion that the effect of friendship on peace inside and outside states is ambivalent has become a common place (Lu 2009). 20. Ernest Fortin reflects on the implications of the change: ‘As the use of such unnatural words as “I” and “Thou” reveals, however, the new understanding is the product of a process whereby one prescinds from the actual end or ends to which individuals or communities are dedicated. It presumes that there are no preestablished, naturally knowable, or divinely ordained ends in the attainment of which human beings find their perfection, and it dismisses as meaningless any talk of such ends’ (Fortin, 1993, 47). 21. I borrow the term from Hayden (2015). 22. ‘Modern friendship is concerned primarily with the friend, no matter what the friend is in his moral status or no matter what he holds with regard to truth’ (Schall 1996, 135).

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References Aelred of Rievaulx. 1991. Spiritual Friendship. In Other Selves. Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, , 131–145. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Aquinas, Thomas. 1991. Summa Theologiae: Questions on Love and Charity. In Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. M. Pakaluk, 146–184. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Aristotle. 1984a. Nicomachean Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University, Book VIII, 1825–39, and Book IX, 1839–52. Aristotle. 1984b. Eudemian Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. 1984. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Book VII, 1956–1981. Augustine. 1912. Confessions 2 volumes Loeb edition Latin and English; translated by William Watts Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bacon, Francis. 1991. Of Friendship. In Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 202–207. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Boethius. 1969. The Consolation of Philosophy. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Bolotin, David. 1979. Plato’s Dialogue on Friendship. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Carpenter, Edward Ed. 1906 Jolaus: an Anthology of Friendship. London and Manchester: Swan Sonnenschein & Co and S. Clarke, 2nd edition enlarged. Cicero. 1991. De Amicitia. In Other Selves. Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 79–116. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Cooper, John M. 1993. Political Animals and Civic Friendship. In Friendship. A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar, 303–326. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Cooper, John M. 1977. Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship. Review of Metaphysics 30 (4): 619–648. Derrida, Jacques. 1997. The Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins. London: Verso Diogenes Laertius. 2006. Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 2 volumes, vol. 1 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Erasmus. 2001. The Adages of Erasmus. Selected by William Barker. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Fortin, Ernest L. 1993. Augustine and the Hermeneutics of Love: Some Preliminary Considerations. In Richard John Neuhaus, ed. Augustine Today, 35–59. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co. Forster, Edward Morgan. 1938/1972. Two Cheers for Democracy. London: Edward Arnold.

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Gert, Bernard. 1967. Hobbes and Psychological Egoism. Journal of the History of Ideas 28 (4): 503–520. Gert, Bernard. 2010. Hobbes: Prince of Peace. Cambridge: Polity. Grayling, A.C. 2013. Friendship. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Haseldine, Julian, ed. 2000. Friendship in Medieval Europe. Stroud: Sutton Publishing. Heller, Agnes. 1998. The Beauty of Friendship. The South Atlantic Quarterly 97 (1, Winter): 5–22. Hume, David. 1970. Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Reprinted from the posthumous edition of 1777, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. Second edition. Hayden, Patrick. 2015. From Political Friendship to Befriending the World. The European Legacy 20 (7): 745–776. Herman, Gabriel. 1987. Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hutter, Horst. 1978. Politics as Friendship. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Irrera, Elena. 2005. Between Advantage and Virtue: Aristotle’s Theory of Political Friendship. History of Political Thought 26 (4): 565–585. Konstan, David. 1997. Friendship in the Classical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lewis, C.S. 1960. The Four Loves. London: HarperCollins. Lloyd, S.A. 1992. Ideals as Interests in Hobbes’s Leviathan: The Power of Mind over Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lloyd, S.A. 2009. Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lochman, Daniel T., Maritere Lopez, and Lorna Hutson, eds. 2011. Discourses and Representations of Friendship in Early Modern Europe, 1500–1700. Farnham: Ashgate. Lu, Catherine. 2009. Political Friendship Among Peoples. Journal of International Political Theory 5 (1): 41–58. Malcolm, Noel, ed. 2007. Reason of State, Propaganda and the Thirty Years’ War: An Unknown Translation by Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. McGuire, Brian Patrick. 1988/2010. Friendship and Community: The Monastic Experience 350-1250 Reprinted with new Preface and Introduction. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Mills, Laurens J. 1937. One Soul in Bodies Twain. Bloomington: Principia Press. Montaigne, Michel de. 1991. Of Friendship. In Other Selves. Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 185–199. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.

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Mulgan, Richard. 2000. The Role of Friendship in Aristotle’s Political Theory. In The Challenge to Friendship in Modernity, ed. Preston King and Heather Devere, 15–32. London: Frank Cass. Nichols, Mary P. 2009. Socrates on Friendship and Community. New York: Cambridge University Press. Nussbaum, Martha. 1986/2009. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pakaluk, Michael. 1991. Ed Other Selves. Philosophers on Friendship. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Pangle, Lorraine S. 2003. Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Patapan, Haig, and Jeffrey Sikkenga. 2008. Love and the Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes’s Critique of Platonic Eros. Political Theory 36 (6): 803–826. Plato 2006. Plato on love: Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades with Selections from Republic and Laws. Ed C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Plutarch. 1927. ‘How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend’ Vol I Moralia, 16 volumes; Loeb edition with Greek and English; Trans Frank Babbitt, 264–395. Plutarch. 1928. ‘On Having Many Friends’ vol II Moralia, 16 volumes; Loeb edition with Greek and English; Trans Frank Babbitt, 46–69. Price, A.W. 1989. Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rawls, John. 2007. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, ed. Samuel Freeman. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. Rutherford, Donald. 2003. In Pursuit of Happiness: Hobbes’s New Science of Ethics. Philosophical Topics 31 (1/2): 369–393. Schall, James V. 1996. Friendship and Political Philosophy. The Review of Metaphysics 50: 121–141. Schollmeier, Paul. 1994. Other Selves. New York: State University of New York Press. Schwartz, Daniel. 2007. Aquinas on Friendship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schwarzenbach, Sibyl. 2009. On Civic Friendship: Including Women in the State. New York: Columbia Unversity Press. Seneca 1969 Letters from a Stoic. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Shannon, Laurie. 2002. Sovereign Amity: Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Skinner, Quentin. 2002. Visions of Politics, volume III: ‘Hobbes and Civil Science’. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Slomp, Gabriella. 2016. The Inconvenience of the Legislator’s Two Persons and the Role of Good Counsellors. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 19 (1): 68–85.

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Slomp, Gabriella. 2019a. As Thick as Thieves: Exploring Thomas Hobbes’ Critique of Ancient Friendship and Its Contemporary Relevance. Political Studies 67 (I): 191–206. Slomp, Gabriella. 2019b. On Benevolence and Love of Others. In Interpreting Hobbes’s Political Philosophy, S.A. Lloyd, 106–121. Smith, Travis. 2008. ‘Hobbes on Getting by with Little Help from Friends. In Friendship and Politics: Essays in Political Thought, ed. John Heyking and Richard Avramenko, 221–247. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Sorell, Tom. 1986. Hobbes. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Stanlick, Nancy. 2002. Hobbesian Friendship: Valuing Others for Oneself. Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (3): 345–359. Stern-Gillet, S. 1995. Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship. Albany: New York. Valerius Maximus. 2004. Memorable Deed and Sayings. One Thousand Tales from Ancient Rome, trans Henry John Walker. Indianapolis: Hackett. Van Mill, David. 2001. Liberty, Rationality, and Agency in Hobbes’s Leviathan. Albany: State University of New York Press. Von Heyking, John. 1999. A Headless Body Politic? Augustine’s Understanding of a Populous and Its Representation. History of Political Thought XX (4): 549–574. Von Heyking, John and Avramenko, Richard, eds. 2008. Friendship and Politics: Essays in Political Thought. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. White, Carolinne. 1992. Christian Friendship in the Fourth Century Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wood, Neal. 1988.. Cicero’s Social and Political Thought. California: University of California Press. Yack, Bernard. 1993. The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought. Berkeley: University of California Press. Zarka, Yves Charles. 1995/2016. Hobbes and Modern Political Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

CHAPTER 6

The State as Artificial Friend

In the first scene of Bertolt Brecht’s play, Galileo talks with young Andrea about the exciting recent discoveries: Everything moves, my boy. (Brecht 1978, 20) And the earth rolls happily round the sun, and the fishwives, merchants, princes, and cardinals, and even the Pope, roll with it. (Brecht 1978, 22) The old age is past and a new age is here … What is written in the old books no longer satisfies them [men]. For where belief has prevailed for a thousand years, doubt now prevails. … The most solemn truths are being tapped on the shoulder; what was never doubted is now in doubt. (Brecht 1978, 21)

In the play, all the truths of antiquity are put in question: Galileo warns against the blind trust in Aristotle—‘the man had no telescope!’ (Brecht 1978, 54), while Sagredo raises doubts about the wisdom of the ancient dictum, ‘I love Plato, but I love the truth more!’ and proclaims: ‘I love science, but I love you more, my friend!’ (Brecht 1978, 45). As for Galileo1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Slomp, Hobbes Against Friendship, International Political Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95315-7_6

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[o]vernight the universe has lost its centre and this morning it has countless ones. So that now each – and none – is regarded as its centre. (Brecht 1978, 22)

Likewise for Hobbes, the moral world has lost its traditional core—the summum bonum—and now contains countless definitions of the good— one for every man: For there is no such Finis ultimus (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the books of the old Morall Philosophers. (Leviathan II: 11, 150; 1651, 47) [S]carce two men agreeing what is to be called good, and what evil; what liberality, what prodigality; what valour, what temerity. (Elements I. 5:14, 23)

In the stormy waters of the seventeenth century, the traditional anchor of friendship—Aristotelian anthropology and ethics—began to give way under the pressure of the contrary currents and opposing winds of scepticism, materialism, nominalism, and modern individualism; it is then that the ship of friendship started to go adrift. Although commentators are divided on the influence of scepticism on Hobbes’s theory, attention to the friendship theme appears to lend support to the claims made by Richard Flathman and Glen Newey that a pragmatic brand of scepticism plays an important role in Hobbes’s theory. Newey explains: But Leviathan is certainly strongly marked by what might be called practical scepticism. This asserts that, whether or not we can actually attain knowledge, disagreement in fact rages about questions of politics, religion, morality, and so on, and that this state of affairs will go on for as long as there is no authority to impose uniformity. (Newey 2008, 25)

Practical scepticism drives Hobbes to acknowledge that each individual has his own understanding of felicity and good life (Flathman 1993/2002)2 ; nominalism prompts him to regard the ‘truth’ as nothing more than a property of propositions (Watkins 1965); materialism prevents him from understanding friendship as a mingling or blending of souls (Stephen 1904; Frost 2019); individualism drives him to reject the Aristotelian notion of ζùoν πoλιτικ´oν (Schmitt 1938/2008; King 1974;

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Flathman 1993/2002) and to postulate a different attitude towards the common interest by man vis-à-vis animals like bees and ants. Building on previous analysis, this chapter reviews Hobbes’s stance on the explanatory function (Sect. 6.1) and normative value of former narratives on friendship (Sect. 6.2) before exploring the guidance that natural law offers to rulers regarding domestic and international friendships and groupings (Sect. 6.3); it will then argue that the ancient narrative of friendship meets the medieval notion of ‘the King’s two bodies’ in Hobbes’s Leviathan (Sect. 6.4), and draws some conclusions (Sect. 6.5).

6.1 The Explanatory Function of Friendship: A Hobbesian Appraisal As discussed in previous chapters, from ancient to early modern times, many writers employed the concept of utility-based friendship to shed light on the origins of political associations and the bonds between citizens; in particular, they utilized the concept of negative friendship to explain why men live together in cities and the concept of positive friendship to elucidate the nature of civic concord. Regarding negative friendship, we found in Hobbes’s argument an endorsement of many premises of the narrative—Hobbes agrees that man is vulnerable, that he has enemies, and that friendship is empowering; indeed Hobbes’s leagues, confederacies, alliances, factions, and sects can be interpreted as embodiments of negative friendship. However, Hobbes rules out that friendship delivers man from the state of nature; he argues that in natural conditions, there is a war of all against all and leagues fail because fear is boundless, diffidence is supreme, trust is unwarranted, and no contract—not even the contract of friendship—is binding. Similarly, regarding positive friendship, Hobbes shares assumptions with contributors to the narrative—he subscribes to the view that man lacks emotional and material self-sufficiency and seeks interaction and cooperation with others in order to live well. Indeed Hobbes’s network of ‘systems’ inside and outside states can be interpreted as an embodiment of this type of friendship. However, Hobbes emphasizes the ambivalent impact on peace of all affiliations and groupings; he stresses that ‘systems’ can be ‘muscles’ or warts (‘wens’) of the political body—they can improve its health or cause its sickness and death. Again, according to Hobbes, authority and not friendship ensures concord and peace.

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In other words, Hobbes acknowledges the occurrence of practices of positive and negative friendship but denies that such practices can shed light on the origins of political associations or the nature of civic concord. Hobbes’s reasons for holding such a view emerge from his famous discussion of the differences between the behaviour of bees and ants on the one hand, and that of man on the other (Baumgold 2017, 200–201). While bees and ants ‘aim everyone at peace and food common to all’ (Elements I. 19: 5, 102); while they are driven by their ‘natural appetites’ to ‘the common good, which among them does not differ from private good’ (Citizen V: 5, 71); while their ‘Common good differeth not from the Private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit’ (Leviathan II: 17, 258; 1651, 86), man instead perceives his self-interest as different from the common interest and regards his personal power as threatened by the common power. Although power and self-interest have been associated with friendship since antiquity—indeed Aristotle himself stressed the empowering dimension of friendship and maintained that most men seek friends in order to advance their interests—nevertheless Hobbes’s position is different in one fundamental respect: the Hobbesian man is an individualist (Flathman 1993/2002; Schmitt 1938/2008; King 1974) and not a zoon politikon. In a world of individualists, instead of strengthening cooperation and peace, friendship can generate enmity and conflict. Indeed, driven by mistaken beliefs about his self-interest and personal power vis-à-vis the common interest and the power of the commonwealth, the Hobbesian man may form exclusive societies and groupings that give rise to envy and resentment; or he may favour his friends in public affairs, thereby generating discontent3 and potentially undermining peace. In Hobbes’s account, harmony between a man’s self-interest and the common interest materializes spontaneously only when fear brings all citizens together against a foreign enemy.4 In sum, the endorsement of individualism is the theoretical move that led Hobbes to maintain that the concept of friendship (in its negative and positive forms) cannot be pressed into service of explanations of the origins of political associations and of the requirements of peace and concord. Hobbes’s emphasis on man’s perceived tension between self-interest and personal power vis-à-vis common interest and societal power; his

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views on the partiality of man towards his friends; his belief in the ambivalent effect of friendship on peace have become part and parcel of many discussions of modern friendship (e.g. Lewis 1960, 97).

6.2 Normative Friendship: A Hobbesian Evaluation Alongside notions of friendships that are utility-based, we have found in the western tradition a concept of friendship that is driven by virtue and consists in loving the friend as a second or another self. According to the ancients, the experience of virtue friendship fostered moral growth, was character-building and life-changing. The transformative feature of friendship was lost in modernity; in contrast to Aristotle who maintained that one’s experience of friendship with a few would affect one’s behaviour towards all, Kant questioned the move from personal to civic friendship and observed: ‘to be the friend of everybody is impossible, for friendship is a particular relationship’ (Kant 1991b, 217). Chapter 5 argued that the ancient and medieval model of friendship was triadic: it was fastened to an eternal truth—the good, the beautiful, the gods, or God—that set well-known boundaries to what friends could do, ask, or expect of each other; in contrast, the early modern model of virtuous friendship was dyadic and entailed only a relationship of self and other (Fortin 1993)—the friends themselves decided the core values of their relationship thereby becoming ‘laws unto each other’ (Schall 1996, 134). On the one hand, Hobbes rejected the external truth—the summum bonum—that anchored Aristotelian virtuous friendship; on the other hand, he opposed indirectly but unambiguously the dyadic character of modern friendship. Indeed, from a Hobbesian perspective, when individuals decide their own criteria of good and evil, or virtue and vice, they precipitate into the chaos of the state of nature (Pettit 2008; Slomp 2019b). Hobbes’s theory contains an alternative model of friendship, which is different from that associated with modernity because it is not just a relationship between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ but entails a third entity— the state; it is also different from the ancient model because it replaces the external anchor—the good and beautiful—that existed independently from man’s will with a human construction, the Leviathan. In Hobbes’s theory, the state sets the rules of good and evil, right and wrong that regulate behaviour; the state supervises all domestic and

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international ‘systems’, from financial corporations and colonies to small groupings and personal friendships, ensuring that no ‘system’ or partial society undermines peace—no friendship is outside its control because a man with many friends can become the leader of a sect or faction. While Aristotle utilized the concept of ‘good life’ (that he uncovered but not invented) to separate his ideal type of friendship from utility-based relationships; Hobbes singles out salus populi (by which word Hobbes does not mean only survival but also commodious living) as the yardstick that enables the Leviathan to distinguish between good/beneficial and bad/detrimental friendships. Although throughout the centuries a long list of interpreters have argued that the Hobbesian sovereign ‘may act towards [ a citizen] as he pleases’ (Kant 1991a, 84), many contemporary commentators maintain that the content of the Leviathan’s decisions is not arbitrary (Letwin 2005; Lloyd 2009; Lang 2016; van Apeldoorn 2021). Indeed Hobbes not only identifies the overall goal—salus populi—but also indicates the norms that should guide legislation: the laws of nature. He remarks that the civil laws should capture the spirit of the laws of nature (Leviathan III: 43, 952; 1651, 330), thereby suggesting that the third entity of Hobbes’s model of friendship—the man-made state—is ultimately accountable to an entity that is not created by man—God. The next step is to examine the guidance that natural law offers to rulers for the monitoring and regulations of friendships inside and outside states.

6.3 From Friendship to Sociability---A Shift of Norms5 The correct interpretation of Hobbes’s laws of nature has been subject to controversy and intense debates; interpreters disagree on whether Hobbes’s natural laws are prudential rules discovered by reason to protect one’s (way of) life (Bobbio 1993; Abizadeh 2018; Gauthier 1969) or contain genuine moral considerations (Lloyd 2009); whether they constitute a deontology (Taylor 1938), embody Christian values (Warrender 1957; Martinich 2021), or make up a virtue ethics (Boonin-Vail 1994); in what relationship they stand vis-à-vis contractual obligations (Rhodes 2002, 2009; Eggers 2009), civil laws (Finkelstein 2005; Dyzenhaus and Poole 2012), and international legislation (Lang 2016). For our purposes

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it is sufficient to assess the guidance that natural laws offer to legislators in order to attain and maintain salus populi. First of all, it is easy to observe that the laws of nature do not recommend friendship—a relationship with others—but encourage sociability—a disposition towards others. While Aristotle believed that people are naturally sociable (Konstan 1997, 102),6 Hobbes ruled out natural sociability; however, he maintained that men can and ought to become sociable.7 In Elements Hobbes presents the laws of nature as laws of sociability The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be sociable … And the same is the sum of the law of nature; for in being sociable, the law of nature taketh place by the way of peace and society …. (Elements I. 17:15, 95)8

Although related to a family of dispositions such as courtesy, kindness, politeness, civility, and amity (Bryson 1998; Thomas 2018; Pagden 1987; Bejan 2017; Skinner 2016),9 Hobbesian sociability cannot be reduced to any of them—indeed Hobbesian sociability is a norm or master virtue that entails all the virtues recommended by the laws of nature, from modesty to gratitude, from equity to temperance. While Hobbesian friendship is motivated by the passions (for instance, by fear of enemies or desire of ‘commodious living’), sociability is recommended by reason and facilitates the interaction of individuals and groups by softening the hard edge of the passions. Sociability drives the Hobbesian man to become agreeable, to exercise restraint, and to demonstrate sensitivity towards other people’s feelings. Hobbes maintained that the ancients regarded ‘Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest’ as virtues for the wrong reasons, namely for some supposedly inner characteristic rather than for their effect on peace: But the Writers of Morall Philosophie, though they acknowledge the same Vertues and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodnesse; nor that they come to be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity of passions. (Leviathan II. 15, 242; 1651, 80)

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Considering Hobbes’s dislike of Aristotelian ethics, it is interesting to look at the Hobbesian laws of nature against the backdrop of Aristotelian philia. While Aristotelian value-friendship facilitated the journey towards ‘the good life’, the Hobbesian natural laws aim at the protection of (a way of) life; while Aristotle maintained that virtue friendship was accessible only to the very best of men, Hobbes emphasizes that the natural laws can be understood by the person with ‘the meanest capacity’ (Leviathan II: 15, 240; 1651, 79). However, as Aristotelian philia could not exist without mutuality (Heller 1998), likewise the Hobbesian laws of nature recommend ‘to be sociable with them that will be sociable’ (Elements I. 18:15, 95). In Hobbes’s argument, the reciprocity of sociability rests ‘on the principle of the commutativity of the self and of the other’ (Zarka 2016, 128).10 The Hobbesian laws of nature ‘being rules of reason, make a claim on anyone capable of exercising reason, exempting only children and madmen’ (Lloyd 2016, 264); they apply to natural individuals, states, citizens, and rulers; some laws, however, seem to address specific agents under special circumstances. Indeed, from A. E. Taylor (1938) to Larry May (2013) and Johan Olsthoorn (2013), many interpreters have drawn attention to the natural law of equity and pointed out that this law concerns mainly people involved in legislation and arbitration (Finkelstein 2005; Dyzenhaus and Poole 2012)11 : equity is about limitations on sovereign law-making, where failing to stay within limits is an encroachment against the people …. (May 2013, 73 fn. 14)

In so far as rulers are ‘Subject to the Laws of God both Written and Unwritten’ (Common Law, 25) and the laws of nature are given to man by God, they should never patronize anyone out of personal like or dislike; the only ground for the distribution of rewards to citizens should be the advancement of the common good: [I]t belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign, to apply his Rewards always so, as there may arise from them benefit to the Commonwealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End; and is then done, when they that have well served the Common-wealth, are with as little expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible, so well recompenced, as others

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thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it better. (Leviathan II: 30, 544; 1651, 183)

Indeed, the laws of nature demand that the Leviathan treat his friends no differently from anyone else: Natural law commands: in awarding rights to others, you should be fair [aequalis] to both sides … This law forbids us from giving more or less to one person as a favour. For if you do not keep to natural equality but give more or less to one than to another, you are insulting the person who is not favoured. (Citizen III:15, 50 emphases in the original)12 It is also a law of nature, That men allow commerce and traffic indifferently to one another. (Elements I. 17: 12, 87 italics in the original)

Although there is room for debate, the Hobbesian laws of nature seem to exhort Hobbesian agents to ‘Treat everyone as a friend’ with the proviso for officials and rulers to ‘Treat every friend as anyone’. In sum, the laws of nature—and their emphasis on sociability and equity—provide the Leviathan with some guidance on how to safeguard the safety of the people; multiple factors—from fear for salvation to fear for personal safety—provide incentives for rulers not to abuse their power but to govern well. In practice, however, the task of protecting salus populi is fraught with difficulties and dangers because rulers are people and people are passionate and their judgement is poor. Indeed Hobbes has no hesitation to acknowledge that all rulers—not just members of assemblies but also monarchs—are fallible. This brings us to investigate more closely the relationship between rulers and ruled.

6.4

The King’s Two Bodies: Friends or Enemies?

In his seminal if controversial masterpiece, Ernst Kantorowicz (1997) draws attention to the way in which Shakespeare’s tragedy of Henry V immortalized the metaphor of ‘the king’s two bodies’: Twin-born with greatness, subject to the breath Of every fool, whose sense no more can feel But his own wringing. What infinite heart’s ease Must kings neglect, that private men enjoy?

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(Shakespeare 2007a 4.1. 188–91, 1073)13 The king’s two bodies indicated a legal distinction that was a commonplace in England since the turn of the sixteenth century and made famous in 1603 by Francis Bacon who ‘suggested for the crowns of England and Scotland, united in James I, the name of “Great Britain” as an expression of the “perfect union of bodies, political as well as natural”’ (Kantorowicz 1997, 24). Although Kantorowicz makes the case that in legal theory the King’s two bodies ‘is an offshoot of Christian theological thought and consequently stands as a landmark of Christian political theology’ (Kantorowicz 1997, 506), in the Epilogue to his book he addresses the question of whether there is ‘a classical pagan parentage of the metaphor’: ‘Is the concept of the King’s Two bodies of pagan or of Christian origin?’ Although ultimately Kantorowicz dismisses the similarities between the late-medieval juridical notion of the king’s two bodies and ‘disconnected pagan concepts’, he nevertheless concedes that ‘the dichotomous concept of rulership might have had roots in classical Antiquity’ and that the distinction between a man and his office ‘was certainly not beyond the imagination of classical thinkers’ (Kantorowicz 1997, 497). In particular, Kantorowicz draws attention to passages from Aristotle’s Politics, Plutarch’s Lives, and Seneca’s Epistles that show awareness of the twinned nature of leaders (Kantorowicz 1997, 498). Indeed, as suggested by William Lambert Newman, Aristotle was among the first to make use of metaphors to indicate that a monarch has two identities: the identity of natural man and the identity of ruler (Newman 1902, 301).14 From our perspective, it is interesting to note that ancient writers tended to highlight the twinned nature of rulers when discussing their interaction with friends. This can be easily shown by referring to Plutarch’s Lives where awareness of the king’s two bodies emerges on various occasions. To begin with, as observed by Kantorowicz, Alexander is presented by Plutarch as someone who clearly distinguished between his friends as private man, and his friends as office holder: And in general he [Alexander] showed most affection for Hepaestion, but most esteem for Craterus, thinking, and constantly saying, that Hephaestion was a friend of Alexander, but Craterus a friend of the king. (Plutarch 1919, 361 emphasis added)

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Plutarch expands on this claim and observes that, during the Indian expedition, when Hepaestion and Craterus came to confrontation, and the friends of each of them were about to take sides and help, ‘Alexander rode up and abused Hephaestion publicly, calling him fool and a madman for not knowing that without Alexander’s favour he was nothing; and in private he also sharply reproved Craterus’ (Plutarch 1919, 361). Also, Plutarch’s portrait of Pericles shows the latter’s awareness of the challenges faced by people in authority; for the whole period he worked for the polis—and it was a long one, Plutarch reminds us—Pericles changed his way of life; he withdrew completely from social life, declined to attend his friends’ parties, and could not be seen anywhere in the city except along the road going to the agora. Again, he was concerned with ensuring that he was not accused of preferential treatment of personal friends (Plutarch 1968, vol II, 200). Even Plutarch’s portrayal of Brutus highlights the difference between Cassius who hated Julius Caesar as a man, and Brutus who opposed Caesar as a ruler (Plutarch 1968, 428)15 —a theme explored by Shakespeare in The Tragedy of Julius Caesar where Brutus declares to have loved Cesar as a man but to have loved Rome more (Shakespeare 2007b, 3.2, 17–20, 1835). In sum, the classical anticipation of the concept of the ‘king’s two bodies’ is often found in accounts of how rulers relate differently to friends in their private or public capacity. Interestingly, in his account of the English civil war, Hobbes too brings up the theme of friendship to show how Charles-as-office-holder acted in ways that cost Charles-asman his life—indeed he emphasizes that Charles’s special treatment of his personal friends was ‘the greatest’ source of discontent (Common Law, 15) and the ultimate reason why he was condemned to death as ‘enemy of the people’ and traitor of the commonwealth. Having stated in his political works that ‘sovereigns are obliged by natural law to impose the burdens of the commonwealth upon the citizens equally’ (Citizen XIII: 10, 147) and noted that ‘it may sometimes happen that [people’s] complaint is justified, namely when the burdens of the commonwealth are imposed on the citizens unequally’ (Citizen XIII: 10, 147), in his legal and historical writings Hobbes demonstrates that civil war materializes when the ‘king’ as natural man fails to treat the ‘King’ as political body with equity, thereby turning from Friend to Enemy of the people. In this way Hobbes’s theory can be said to be the place where the modern concept of fairness offers a solution to the challenges that

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the world of experience, depicted by the ancient narrative of friendship, posed to the legal late-medieval concept of the King’s two bodies.

6.5

Concluding Remarks

Throughout the chapters, we have seen that friendship—in its negative, positive, and normative form—was never a standalone principle but rested on beliefs about anthropology and morality that were challenged in early modernity by the arrival of a new way of thinking about the world. On the one hand, under the influence of modern individualism, Hobbes emphasizes that men are driven to undermine concord and peace by the conviction that their self-interest and personal power are different from—and often threatened by—the common interest and the common power. As a result, the concept of friendship cannot shed light on how large political associations are established and maintained. On the one hand, driven by nominalism, materialism, and pragmatic scepticism16 , Hobbes rejected the notion of good life that infused Aristotelian virtuous friendship and that set well-known moral rules for relationships between friends. While Aristotle and Cicero (1991) ruled out that true friends would damage the commonwealth, modern friendship is a boat without sail or engine—it can be taken by the wind to any shore. In Hobbes’s modern science of politics, it is not friendship that creates the conditions of the political; rather, it is the political that creates the conditions—the trust, the common language, the shared values—for lasting friendships; it is not friendship that brings and maintains peace; rather, it is authority that monitors all partial societies and friendships thereby preventing disruption to peace and encouraging the advancement of commodious living. To Plato who proclaimed that ‘a lawgiver ought to aim at his city’s being … a friend to itself ’ (Plato 1980, book 3: 693B, 77 emphasis added), according to this chapter Hobbes responded that the conditio sine qua non for a commonwealth to become ‘friend to itself’ is the implementation of the laws of nature that can be summarized with the dictum of treating everyone as a friend, and every friend as anyone. How relevant are Hobbes’s views on friendship for us today? This is the topic of the final chapter.

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Notes 1. Hobbes met Galileo whom he ‘extremely venerated and magnified’ when he travelled to Florence (Aubrey 1982, 161). 2. ‘My claim is that the primary unit of Hobbes’s thinking is the individual person and her makings, unmakings and remakings of herself and her worlds, the primary objective of his political and moral thinking is to promote and protect each person’s pursuit of her own felicity as she herself sees it’ (Flathman 1993/2002, 8–9). 3. Hobbes warns about the ‘disturbance of the common peace’ that can occur when people take upon themselves to punish magistrates ‘corrupted by gifts, or intercession of friends’ (Elements II. 9: 6, 182). An excellent essay on corruption is Blau (2009) ‘Hobbes on Corruption’. 4. ‘And therefore no great Popular Commonwealth was ever kept up; but either by a forraign Enemy that united them’ (Leviathan II: 25, 412; 1651, 136). 5. In this section and elsewhere in this chapter I draw ideas from Slomp (2021) and Slomp (2019a). 6. ‘Sociability, Aristotle notes, has no name of its own … it resembles philia but differs from it in that the sociable person lacks feeling and affection for those with whom he mingles’ (Konstan 1997, 102). 7. For Hobbes ‘ought’ assumes ‘can’—see Plamenatz (1965, 76); on the importance attached by Hobbes to training and education, see Laurie Johnson Bagby (2009) and Sorell (1986). 8. In Leviathan, sociability is linked to the fifth law of nature: A fifth Law of Nature is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say, That every man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest. For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society, a diversity of Nature, rising from their diversity of Affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an Aedifice. …The observers of this Law, may be called SOCIABLE, (the Latines call them Commodi) The contrary, Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, Intractable. (Leviathan II: 15, 232; 1651, 76)

Regarding this law of nature, see the insightful essay by Rosamond Rhodes (2009).

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9. Bryson notes ‘the increasing use of the word “civility” during the seventeenth century’ (Bryson 1998, 223) and points to Hobbes’s natural law of complaisance as underpinning ‘civil association’. 10. Important insights into the reciprocity of natural law can be found in Lloyd (2009, 2016). Zarka highlights ‘the alternative between the unilateral perspective of the individual self which subtends the state of war and the required reciprocity as condition sine qua non for peace’ (Zarka 2016, 128 ff). 11. See Luc Foisneau (2004) and Johan Olsthoorn (2013) for a stimulating discussion of equity and justice. A. E. Taylor’s essay of 1938 has become a classic: it points out that ‘Inequity, which can exist in “the state of nature” or in the conduct of the sovereign, who, since he is not subject to his own command, cannot be guilty of injustice proper, is violation of the “natural law”, which is also, according to Hobbes’s repeated explanation, the moral law’ (Taylor 1938, 408). According to Larry May ‘equity … is the dominant moral category in Hobbes’s political and legal philosophy’ (May 2013, 67) and imposes limitations on state’s power: ‘This law [equity] is singled out and given a higher status than the others when Hobbes discusses the duties of the sovereign. The reason for this seems to be that equity, unlike all the other laws of nature, applies only to those men who are trusted to judge between man and man’ (May 2013, 73). May highlights the fact that Hobbes develops the concept of equity in the transition from Elements to Leviathan and expands it further in the Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of Law (May 2013, 73). Larry May sees a connection between John of Salisbury and Hobbes in so far as they both argued the prima facie contradictory claim that the King is ab legibus solutus and at the same time bound by consideration of equity. I discuss May’s interpretation in Slomp (2015). 12. Divine law reinforces natural law and recommends that: ‘[man] should esteem his neighbour worthy all rights and privileges that he himself enjoyeth; and attribute unto him, whatsoever he looketh should be attributed unto himself; which is no more but that he should be humble, meek, and contented with equality’ (Elements I. 18: 6, 97). 13. Cited by Kantorowicz (1997, 24). 14. In his classical commentary of Aristotle’s Politics, Newman (1902, 301) draws attention to Aristotle’s metaphor that a king is an

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extraordinary body with multiple ears, eyes, hands, and feet; Aristotle writes: ‘It is already the practice of kings to make to themselves many eyes and ears and hands and feet. For they make colleagues of those who are the friends of themselves and their governments. They must be friends of the monarch and of his government’ (Aristotle 1996, 89; Politics Book 3 16 1287b 28–31; see Newman 1902, 301). 15. ‘Cassio odiava Cesare più per motivi suoi personali, che come tiranno nocivo alla collettività … Si dice che Bruto mal sopportave il regime, Cassio odiava il reggitore’ (Plutarch 1968, 428). 16. ‘Practical scepticism makes no controversial claims about whether we can know the truth about these questions, or indeed whether there is any truth to be known about them’ (Newey 2008, 25).

References Abizadeh, Arash. 2018. Hobbes and the Two Faces of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aristotle. 1996. The Politics and The Constitution of Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aubrey, John. 1982. Brief Lives, ed. Richard Barber. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press. Bagby Johnson, Laurie. 2009. Thomas Hobbes; Turning Point for Honor. Lanham: Lexington Books. Baumgold, Deborah, ed. 2017. Three Text Edition of Thomas Hobbes’s Political Theory: The Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bejan, Theresa. 2017. Mere Civility: Disagreement and the Limits of Toleration. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Blau, Adrian. 2009. Hobbes on Corruption. History of Political Thought XXX (4): 596–616. Bobbio, Norberto. 1993. Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Boonin-Vail, David. 1994. Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brecht, Bertold. 1978. The Life of Galileo. London: Eyre Methuen. Bryson, Anna. 1998. From Courtesy to Civility: Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Cicero. 1991. De Amicitia, trans. Stanley Lombardo. In Other Selves. Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 79–116. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Dyzenhaus, David and Poole, Thomas, eds. 2012. Hobbes and the Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Eggers, Daniel. 2009. Liberty and Contractual Obligation in Hobbes. Hobbes Studies 22: 70–103. Finkelstein, Claire. 2005. Hobbes on Law. Farnham, England: Ashgate Publishing. Flathman, Richard. 1993/2002. Thomas Hobbes. Skepticism, Individuality, and Chastened Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Foisneau, Luc. 2004. Leviathan’s Theory of Justice. In Leviathan After 350 Years, ed. Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fortin, Ernest L. 1993. Augustine and the Hermeneutics of Love: Some Preliminary Considerations. In Augustine Today, ed. Richard John Neuhaus, 35–59. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co. Frost, Samantha. 2019. Hobbes, Life, and the Politics of Self-Preservation: the Role of Materialism in Hobbes’s Political Philosophy. In Interpreting Hobbes’s Political Philosophy, ed. S. A. Lloyd, 70–92. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gauthier, David P. 1969. The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Heller, Agnes. 1998. The Beauty of Friendship In Peter Murphy, ed. ‘Friendship’, special issue The South Atlantic Quarterly 97 (1): 5–22. Kant, Immanuel. 1991a. Kant’s Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1991b. Lecture on Friendship. In Other Selves. Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 210–217. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Kantorowicz, Ernst. 1997. The King’s Two Bodies. A Study in Medieval Political Theology. Princeton: Princeton University Press. King, Preston. 1974. The Ideology of Order: A Comparative Analysis of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. London: George Allen & Unwin. Konstan, David. 1997. Friendship in the Classical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lang, Anthony. 2016. Thomas Hobbes and a Chastened “Global” Constitution. Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy 19 (1): 103–119. Letwin, Shirley. 2005. On the History of the Idea of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lewis, C.S. 1960. The Four Loves. London: HarperCollins. Lloyd, S.A. 2009. Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Cases in the Law of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Lloyd, S.A. 2016. Natural Law. In The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes, ed. A.P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra, 264–289. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Martinich, A.P. 2021 Hobbes’s Political Philosophy: Interpretation and Interpretations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. May, Larry. 2013. Limiting Leviathan: Hobbes on Law and International Affairs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Newey, Glen. 2008. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes and Leviathan. Abingdon: Routledge. Newman, William Lambert, ed. 1902. The Politics of Aristotle with an Introduction, Two Prefatory Essays, and Notes Critical and Explanatory. Volume 3. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Olsthoorn, Johan. 2013. Hobbes’s Account of Distributive Justice as Equity. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (I): 13–33. Pagden, Anthony, ed. 1987. The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pettit, Philip. 2008. Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Plato. 1980. The Laws of Plato, ed. T. Pangle. New York: Basic Books Plamenatz, John. 1965. Mr. Warrender’s Hobbes. In Hobbes Studies, ed. K.C. Brown, 73–100. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Plutarch. 1919. Lives. Vol VII. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Plutarch. 1968. Vite Parallele. Vol II and vol III. Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore. Rhodes, Rosamond. 2002. Obligation and Assent in Hobbes’s Moral Philosophy. Hobbes Studies 15 (1): 45–67. Rhodes, Rosamond. 2009. Hobbes’s Fifth Law of Nature and Its Implications. Hobbes Studies 22 (2): 144–159. Schmitt, Carl. 1938/2008. The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Shakespeare, William. 2007a. The Life of Henry the Fifth. In Complete Works, ed. Jonathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen, 1026–1097. Houndmills: Macmillan. Shakespeare, William. 2007b. The Tragedy of Julius Caesar. In Complete Works, ed. Jonathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen, 1801–1858. Houndmills: Macmillan. Schall, James V. 1996. Friendship and Political Philosophy. The Review of Metaphysics 50: 121–141. Skinner, Quentin 2016 ‘Hobbes and the Social Control of Unsociability’ in The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes Eds., A. P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 432–450. Slomp, Gabriella. 2015. Limiting Leviathan: An advice book for rulers? Social Theory and Practice 41 (1): 149–163.

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Slomp, Gabriella. 2019a. ‘As Thick as Thieves: Exploring Thomas Hobbes’ Critique of Ancient Friendship and Its Contemporary Relevance. Political Studies 67 (I): 191–206. Slomp, Gabriella. 2019b. On Benevolence and Love of Others. In Interpreting Hobbes’s Political Philosophy, ed. S.A. Lloyd, 106–121. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Slomp, Gabriella. 2021. In Search of “A Constant Civill Amity”: Hobbes on Friendship and Sociability. In A Companion to Hobbes, ed. Marcus Adams, 125–138. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Sorell, Tom. 1986. Hobbes. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Stephen, Leslie. 1904. Hobbes. London: Macmillan & Co. Taylor, A.E. 1938. The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes. Philosophy 13: 406–424. Thomas, Keith. 2018. In Pursuit of Civility: Manners and Civilization in Early Modern England. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. van Apeldoorn, Laurens. 2021. Hobbes on Property: Between Legal Certainty and Sovereign Discretion. Hobbes Studies 34 (1): 58–79. Warrender, Howard. 1957. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Watkins, John W. N. 1965. Hobbes’s System of Ideas. London: Hutchinson. Zarka, Yves Charles. [1995] 2016. Hobbes and Modern Political Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

CHAPTER 7

Friendship After Hobbes

Throughout human history the relationship between friendship and politics has been difficult: It is not clear that friendship and politics mix all that well … There are many occasions when our political and personal obligations come into conflict. (Shklar 1991/1998, 14)

Granted that ‘only an obligation can beat an obligation’ (Williams 1985, 180), people disagree on whether the duties of friendship should take precedence over other responsibilities. Even when an external entity—the gods, the good, or God—regulated friendship, what friends could ask of each other was not fixed and constant but fluid and variable. During the epic period, the duties of friendship overruled political obligation (Herman 1987, 1). Indeed, in the Iliad, Diomedes and Glaukos refrain from battle because their grandfathers were bound by guest-friendship1 ; here are Diomedes’ words in Hobbes’s translation: Henc forth my Guest in Argos you must be, I yours in Lycia, when I thither come. Mean time let’s one another Spear decline; […] And that our Friendship may the more appear, I will present you with these Arms of mine; © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Slomp, Hobbes Against Friendship, International Political Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95315-7_7

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And you to me present the Arms you wear. (Iliad, Bk VI, 219–228, p. 98)

In contrast, during the classical period of the polis, civic duties acquired priority over friendship; in the following passage from Xenophon’s Hellenica, the King of Sparta declares: [I]n the Greek states, also, men become xenoi of one another. But these men, when their states come to war, fight with their fatherland even against their xenoi, and if it so happens, sometime even kill one another. (Xenophon cited in Herman 1987, 1)

In the western tradition, Cicero (1991) is associated with the view that a true friend will never ask one to damage the fatherland; conversely, Dante2 who placed ‘Brutus and Cassius in the lowest circle of Hell because they had chosen to betray their friend Julius Cesar rather than their country Rome’ is credited with the idea that disloyalty to a friend is worse than treason (Forster 1938/1972, 68). In spite of differences and variations, however, from ancient to modern times, democracies, popular governments, and republicanism are regarded as the custodians of friendship; conversely, tyrannies and despotic governments are deemed to be its oppressors. As argued in Chapter 4, Bodin argued that the intricate pattern of public friendship protects commonwealths against tyranny and is beneficial to the preservation of popular governments (Bodin 1955, 143). In the twentieth century, writers have celebrated friendship as the last bastion against nationalism and totalitarianism (Forster 1938/1972; Lewis 19603 ) and the greatest protection against ‘bad regimes’ (Shklar 1991/1998, 14). According to Judith Shklar, the relationship between duties of friendship and political obligation depends on the government people live under: Friendship often flourishes in despotic states as it does in no others. Friends form their private polity which protects them against the state and gives them an alternative moral universe …. (Shklar 1991/1998, 14 emphasis added) It is in free societies that the claims of friendship become politically ambiguous. It is not self-evident that friendship must in all cases have

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a greater call on our loyalty than our country and its elected government’ (Shklar 1991/1998, 15 emphasis added)

From a Hobbesian perspective, the traditional discussion—about the conflicting claims of friendship and civic duties and about the relationship between political regimes and friendship—is misguided and flawed. As previous chapters have shown, according to Hobbes, the political state creates the conditions for lasting friendships; if the state were to collapse, friendship too would wither away. It follows that political obligation must always take precedence over the claims of friendship. Also, for Hobbes, friendship is not an undiluted blessing but can have a disastrous impact on peace: it can fuel favouritism, partiality, and iniquity in rulers, officials, and citizens. As the end or aim of government—regardless of whether led by an individual or an assembly—is salus populi, all governments—whether monarchic or democratic—ought to prevent networks of friends from damaging the commonwealth through corruption, bribery, sectarianism, and so forth. As it happens, according to Hobbes, monarchy is preferable to democracy because one man has necessarily fewer friends—and therefore fewer incentives to be partial, unfair, and corrupt—than the many people that make up an assembly. This concluding chapter draws together different strands of previous arguments with the aim of highlighting Hobbes’s legacy on friendship and its significance for contemporary political studies. Sections 7.1 and 7.2 review the critical and constructive components of Hobbes’s stance on friendship; Sect. 7.3 argues that Hobbes’s theory contains a challenge for theorists of civic friendship; Sect. 7.4 provides a broad overview of the revival of friendship studies; and Sect. 7.5 draws a few conclusions.

7.1

Hobbes’s Legacy: The Critical Component

The entry point of this study into current debates has been the exploration of the recurring claim that Hobbes is partly responsible for the modern marginalisation of a concept—friendship, philia, amicitia—that loomed large in ancient political philosophy. Throughout the chapters, this study distinguished between friendship as a practice in the world of experience and friendship as an interpretative principle of political action; it argued that while Hobbes acknowledged the occurrence of friendly practices in domestic and international politics, he rejected friendship as explanatory and normative concept. More

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specifically he dismissed the claim that he found in the tradition before him that friendship could (i) elucidate the origins of political associations, (ii) capture the essence of civic concord, and (iii) provide a norm and ideal for individuals and communities. We argued that the theoretical move that allowed Hobbes to discard friendship as an explanatory principle of peace and concord emerges from his famous comparison between man, bees, and ants: here Hobbes challenges the ancient conception of man as a political animal who perceives his self-interest as largely harmonious with the common interest. As to friendship as normative principle, Hobbes sows the seeds of its dismissal in his argument against the notion of summum bonum and Aristotelian virtue. More generally, to the original question—why did Hobbes neglect friendship? Why was his move influential?—this study has responded: first, ancient philia was not a standalone concept; rather, it was an explanatory and normative principle anchored to anthropological and ethical assumptions whose demolition Hobbes saw as his mission to accomplish. Second, Hobbes’s move was influential because it captured the spirit of modernity—its individualism and the binary distinction between self-interest and common interest; its pragmatic scepticism and the view that there is no notion of good life that is valid for everyone; its materialism and the dislike for metaphors such as the ‘one soul in bodies twain’ trope; its nominalism and the reluctance to consider anything universal but names. Deprived of its classical underpinning, friendship becomes with Hobbes the name of a practice whose impact on politics is ambivalent and dependent on other factors; from being a master concept of political philosophy, friendship turns into a secondary tool of political theorizing.

7.2 Hobbes’s Legacy: The Constructive Component According to the interpretation put forward in this study, Hobbes’s legacy on friendship is double sided; alongside a critical component, it contains constructive aspects,4 of which the most distinctive is the role assigned to the state: the state creates the context and conditions (positive disposition, trust, common language, shared values) that make friendships possible and durable; the state is in charge of facilitating affiliations, partial societies, and friendships that can strengthen the commonwealth and of stamping out those that can endanger it.

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As discussed in previous chapters, the ancient model of philia was triadic and public: it entailed not just a relationship of self and other but also a third external entity—the gods, or the Good—that regulated the relationship between friends and made possible the prediction of their behaviour towards each other and towards the polity. Conversely, the early modern model of friendship was dyadic and private: it indicated an intimate relationship between self and other, at the exclusion of everything else—the friends determined the terms and standards of their bond and their behaviour in civic life became unpredictable by outsiders. As Hobbes was critical of the ancient model of friendship, likewise he could not endorse the model of friendship of his contemporaries; for Hobbes, when it is up to individuals to decide norms and standards, when personal judgement triumphs, the chaos of the state of nature inevitably follows; indeed, at the moment of entering the political state, Hobbesian individuals give up their right to define good and evil and assign it to the sovereign. Hobbes’s theory contains a triadic model of friendship where the external third entity—the good—that grounded ancient philia is replaced with a man-made construction—the state: the Leviathan has the task of distinguishing between good and evil systems, including beneficial and detrimental friendships that can endanger peace and security. Any friendship is in principle open to scrutiny because any friendship can be the kernel of conspiracies and rebellions or the source of corruption and iniquity. In so far as the Leviathan is accountable to God for its actions, it follows that every intrusion in private friendships must be justifiable in terms of salus populi and follow the recommendations of natural law. In sum, while Hobbes’s critical legacy consists in the rejection of friendship as an explanatory and normative principle of peace and concord, his positive legacy resides in the appointment of the state as arbiter and regulator of practices of friendship. Far from being theoretically irrelevant, Hobbes’s triadic model of friendship—with the Leviathan at the helm of the ship of friendship—poses challenges to recent theories of civic friendship, as shown in the next section.

7.3

Hobbes’s Challenge

A long list of writers have suggested that Hobbes was instrumental to the modern devaluation of friendship in political studies (e.g. Pangle 2003, 3; Schwarzenbach 2009, 4). Although of course post Hobbes does not

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entail propter Hobbes, it is nevertheless the case that Hobbes’s views on friendship—the ambivalent effect of friendship on politics; the connection of friendship with corruption and sectarianism; the inadequacy of friendship as an explanatory and normative principle of civic cohesion and concord—have become part and parcel of the modern stance on friendship. While a minority of critics of friendship have highlighted the utopianism of invocations of civic friendship and the hidden nostalgia of a golden age (e.g. De Jouvenal 1957),5 the majority of opponents of civic friendship maintain that the marriage of friendship and politics was never really happy. Indeed, friendship recalls to the mind partiality, preferential treatment, favouritism, iniquity (Healy 2011; Whiting 1986, 1991)—the diet of an unhealthy society. For instance we read: Friendship requires a form of partiality to a particular other yet the civic relationship has to exclude this type of partiality; justice and fairness require a form of impartiality. Justice enables us to consider others as rights bearers, as having worth that does not depend on being liked. (Healy 2011, 237)

Already in antiquity friendship entailed preference for one person over another (Hurka 2013, 201) and referred to a relationship with very few people (Plutarch 1912, 304–314)6 ; however, in modernity, with the rise of individualism and moral scepticism, the selectivity, partiality, and exclusivity of friendship became a major source of concern. Indeed Hobbes, Kant (1991), and the moderns emphasize the importance of ‘amity’— a disposition that can be extended to all—rather than ‘friendship’—a relationship that can be established only with some (Slomp 2021). But Hobbes did not only anticipate modern views and concerns about friendship; he also set a challenge to future theorists of civic friendship, namely that the state and not friendship is key to concord and peace.7 The difficulty that contemporary theorists of civic friendship have encountered in dealing with Hobbes’s challenge can be illustrated by means of two examples. The first example is the stimulating work on civic friendship by Sibyl Schwarzenbach (2009). In the ‘Introduction’, Schwarzenbach suggests that there is a world of difference between Hobbes’s theory and her own; she points out that, while Hobbes regarded fear and self-interest as the glue of political associations, she instead considers friendship and care as crucial to civic cohesion and concord (Schwarzenbach 2009, 4).

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However, it is easy to show that Schwarzenbach follows Hobbes’s lead on a number of issues and eventually falls victim to his challenge. First, like Hobbes, Schwarzenbach discards the ancient third entity— the good life—that supported Aristotelian philia. She writes: A civic friendship between citizens today can no longer refer to a state … where citizens all share the same ‘thick’ values (belief in one God, one way of life, and so forth). (Schwarzenbach 2009, 67)

Second, like Hobbes, Schwarzenbach refrains from using the dyadic model of friendship that is associated with modernity and Montaigne. Third, like Hobbes, she advances a triadic model of friendship where the ancient anchor—the Aristotelian good life—is replaced by an artefact. It is at this point—in choosing the artefact—namely a set of ‘constitutional essentials’ aimed at ‘including women in the state’ (Schwarzenbach 2009, 67) that Schwarzenbach falls victim to Hobbes’s challenge. Indeed although she may appear to update Aristotle’s approach (Digeser 2016, 128), the similarity with Aristotle is only superficial: while the underpinning of Aristotelian philia represented an eternal truth (Fortin 1993; Schall 1996), Schwarzenbach’s ‘constitutional essentials’ are the product of—and dependent on—agreements among people. In so far as a citizen may challenge, oppose, and reject the ‘constitutional essentials’ of their communities, it follows that the custodian of those essentials—the liberal state—plays a major role in Schwarzenbach’s theory of civic friendship. Cohesion, concord, and peace, then, do not come from care, love, and friendship but from the careful monitoring of citizens’ relations by the liberal state; the state will prevent, control, and restrain any threat to the ‘constitutional essentials’ and any challenge to the ‘inclusion of women’. Ultimately, Schwarzenbach’s discourse does not manage to overcome Hobbes’s challenge that in modernity the state and not friendship is key to concord and peace. The second example of a theory that struggles to overcome Hobbes’s challenge is the thought-provoking non-Aristotelian ‘sober defence’ of civic friendship by E. P. Digeser (2016). Unlike Schwarzenbach, Digeser takes a middle-ground approach: her goal is ‘to carve out a position between whole-hearted endorsement and complete rejection of friendship as a political concern’ (Digeser 2016, xiii). Although Digeser does not engage with Hobbes, her theory reminds us of Hobbes in places, probably because she is interested in developing ideas and insights by

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Michael Oakeshott and Richard Flathman—two of the finest interpreters of Hobbes in the twentieth century. To begin with, Digeser questions the opposition of friendship and individuality that is often assumed in friendship studies; she observes: For many critics and defenders of friendship in politics, there is something about friendship and individuality that is like oil and water … For some defenders of friendship, recovering a notion of friendship is a way to overcome a modernity that is all too alienating and atomizing. Individuality is the problem. Friendship is the solution. (Digeser 2016, xiv).

Digeser argues that not all practices of friendship prevent the expression of individuality, and not all conceptions of individuality preclude friendship (2016, xiv); she casts doubt on the credibility of an all-inclusive civic friendship and favours an interpretation of civic life as a network of multiple overlapping practices of friendship—a notion that emerged in the ancient world (Brunkhorst 2005) and that resembles very closely the intricate set of ‘systems’ discussed by Hobbes in Chapter 22 of Leviathan. From a Hobbesian perspective, the problem with Digeser’s theory is not about what it contains but about what it leaves out. Indeed Digeser’s theory offers a thorough and stimulating discussion of how practices of friendship can enrich domestic and international politics; it also acknowledges the range of problems that friendships can bring to political life, including sectarianism, factionalism, cronyism, and corruption. However, Digeser is mainly silent about the potential conflict between practices of friendship; about networks of friends seeking to oppose or undermine the very existence of other networks; about the impact of these tensions and antagonisms on the wellbeing, peace, and security of communities. In other words, Digeser does not tell us who or what—if not the state—will ensure that friendships enrich communities rather than destroy them. She claims that ‘friendship is making a comeback’ (Digeser 2016, xi) but the friendship-as-marginal concept arguably never left—it is the friendship-as-master concept that has been exiled for centuries. In conclusion, Hobbes’s views about friendship as the potential source of partiality, corruption, unfairness, and divisions are still dominant in political studies. Recent works on civic friendship struggle to overcome the challenge contained in Hobbes’s theory, namely the claim that the state and not friendship is essential to domestic concord, the state and not friendship is the master concept of modern political theorizing.

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The Resurgence of Friendship

Heather Devere’s richly researched discussions and surveys (Devere and King 2000; Devere and Smith 2010; Devere 2013) have shown that the interest in friendship of political theorists and philosophers was dormant for most of the twentieth century. In the first part of the century, the concept and practice of friendship attracted the attention of two very unusual writers: Carl Schmitt8 and Hannah Arendt.9 Different as they were, Schmitt and Arendt arguably shared the conviction that the time of grand theories was over, that philosophy had grown increasingly disconnected from the world of experience, that the disregard of friendship was a theoretical loss. From the 1970s to the 1990s, several writers highlighted and questioned the neglect or marginalisation of friendship in mainstream political studies. As Devere points out, during this period a number of works appeared where friendship was more conspicuous in the title than in the body of the work; examples of this trend are a collection entitled Friendship by Maurice Blanchot (1971) that devotes only one essay to the subject10 and Love and Friendship by Allan Bloom (1993) that focuses more on the challenges to love and friendship than on the experience of the same. Writers started to analyze and evaluate continuities and variations in the western narrative on friendship (e.g. Francesco Alberoni 1984/2016)11 ; perhaps the most famous contribution to this literature is the work by Jacques Derrida (1993, 1994) who explored strengths and limitations of the narrative from Plato to Carl Schmitt. Devere argues that the revival of the narrative on friendship started in earnest at the turn of the century and proceeded from a variety of perspectives and orientations, including feminism, communitarianism, cosmopolitanism, postmodernism, critical theory, poststructuralism, and liberalism. Indeed, Alasdair MacIntyre’s claim that liberal theory could not accommodate friendship (1985, 156)12 has been repeatedly challenged in the past twenty years (Scorza 2004; Schwarzenbach 1996, 2009; Leland 2019).13 Many writers (e.g. Vernon 2005; Pahl 2000, 2002; Murphy 1998) have drawn attention to the ‘explosion of interest’ in friendship in popular culture (Murphy 1998, 2) and noted how the social media ‘prompted a new public reflexivity about friendship’ (Blatterer and Magaraggia 2016, 1). Interestingly, it is above all in international and global politics that interpreters (Berenskoetter 2007; Oelsner and Koschut 2014)14 have highlighted a wide-ranging disconnection between, on the one hand,

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the neglect of friendship in mainstream theories of international relations and, on the other, well-established practices of cooperation and assistance between people, countries, and states. While some writers have continued to investigate the friendship tradition from historical and philosophical perspectives (e.g. Badhwar 199315 ; Caluori 2013; Mitias 201216 ; Roshchin 2006, 2017), others have started the process of rethinking anew the meaning, role, and significance of friendship, outside the categories of antiquity or the binary distinctions of modernity. For instance, in his short but dense essay Hans-Georg Gadamer (1999) goes beyond friendship as an abstract concept amenable to subdivisions and distinctions; he looks into its linguistic usages with the aim of capturing what it means today to be or have a friend: We must address the question of what true friendship is and what a friend is in a world that at one and the same time is a world of shared institutions and firm regulations – and is a world of the greatest diversity of conflicts and of understandings, which make communal action possible. (Gadamer 1999, 4)17

Thinking about friendship outside the framework inherited from the past—and in particular outside the constraints imposed by the modern dualism of self /other or different/same—is the first step towards the exploration of how friendship can help us think about citizenship, solidarity (Gadamer 1999; Kahane 1999; Walhof 2006), group formation, and recognition (Hayden 2015) in a postmodern world. In sum, as the above brief survey illustrates, a growing number of scholars are revisiting the historical and philosophical origins, development, and significance of the so-called friendship tradition. Scholars of international relations emphasize the disconnection between, on the one hand, contemporary practices of friendship in international politics and, on the other, mainstream theories of international relations. Political theorists and philosophers suggest that a revised concept of friendship can foster the understanding of practices of cooperation of a postmodern world.

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Concluding Remarks

In his seminal work on the science of politics, Eric Voegelin (1952) draws attention to three levels of enquiry: the observation of people’s experiences; the exploration of society’s self-interpretation, and the investigation of how past philosophers theorized people’s and societies’ experiences and self-interpretations. Voegelin suggests that a three-level approach is valuable not only as a method to study politics but also as a perspective to interpret the development of political theory. He reckons that during times of great transformations and upheaval, people’s experiences, societal self-interpretation, and political theory become disconnected: while people’s practices undergo major changes, political theory remains fastened to a world that no longer exists. It is during these exceptional times, according to Voegelin, that the most innovative theories have emerged—they have introduced novel concepts and ideas in order to grasp and capture a new reality, thereby reconnecting political philosophy to the world of experience. Inspired by Voegelin, we could interpret the journey of the concept of friendship from ancient to modern times as follows. In ancient times Aristotle’s theory of friendship stood out among others (Hutter 1978), because it established a striking correlation between the world of experience, the realm of consciousness, and the sphere of philosophy. It captured the imagination of people; it shed light on their ways of life; it provided an ideal for individuals and communities, a standard to evaluate political systems and constitutions, a barometer to measure individual and collective happiness and wellbeing; it offered a school of politics: it taught how to disagree and compromise, how to listen and converse; how to help and seek assistance. In the Middle Ages, the link that joined theories and practices of friendship weakened but did not break thanks to the inventiveness of many Christian writers and especially Aquinas, who updated Aristotelian friendship with the introduction of Christian beliefs and values. The triangle of the relationship that characterized ancient friendship—self, other, the good—was preserved by means of the replacement of the good life with the Christian God. Any friendship that did not include God became for Augustine an ‘unfriendly friendship’ and Aquinas is accredited with the origin of the distinction between love of self and love of others.

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In early modernity, however, in spite of frequent references to Aristotelian philia in essays and poems, the connection between ancient theories and current practices of friendship became feeble—certainly Hobbes thought so, as two examples from his work can illustrate. First, Hobbes challenged as ‘patently false’ the ancient belief that only good men are capable of true friendship and pointed out that ‘depraved’ as they are, conspirators can be good friends (Anti-White 479). Second, he rejected the Aristotelian view that friendship is concord, by pointing out that concessions to friends had been the sparkle of the recent civil war (Common Law, 15). Interestingly, as ancient philosophers did not provide any detailed argument to support their claim that only good people are capable of friendship, likewise Hobbes does not expand on his unabashed rejection of the same belief. This suggests that the ancients and Hobbes expected their respective audiences not to need much convincing in accepting their views. Indeed, Hobbes does not even defend the claim that favouritism cost Charles his throne and life, thereby suggesting that such view was popular among his contemporaries. Certainly the early modern period witnessed major crises including wars and civil wars; Hobbes’s ground-breaking theory of state sovereignty sought to make sense of people’s dramatic experiences, influence people’s interpretation of those experiences, and offer guidance to future practices. The aim of this study has been to show that Hobbes’s stance on friendship was an essential component of his overall effort to reconnect political philosophy with the world around him. On the one hand, we have seen that Hobbes’s views on friendship are still relevant in contemporary political studies and set an interesting challenge to contemporary theories of civic friendship. On the other hand, the revival of interest in friendship raises the question of whether Hobbes’s theory, and more generally the political theories of modernity, are becoming increasingly incapable of shedding light on the practices of collaboration, support, and assistance of a postmodern world. Whereas to address such question is outside the scope of this study, the investigation of Hobbes’s stance on friendship carried out in the previous chapters is hopefully of some use to those seeking to answer it. But this study has also been driven by another aim, namely to demonstrate that the demolition of Aristotelian philia is an essential, if often overlooked, component of Hobbes’s new science of politics. Indeed, Hobbes’s political science reverses the traditional order of creation: it is not friendship the illuminates the dynamics of formation

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of states; rather, it is the state that creates the conditions—the trust, common language, positive disposition, and shared values—for amity and friendships to develop spontaneously and grow. It is not friendship that is essential to concord; rather, it is the state that is essential to domestic peace. It is not friendship that guides individuals towards the good life; rather, it is the state that enables individuals to pursue their own understanding of good life. According to this study, an exploration of Hobbes’s stance on friendship brings multiple benefits: it enabled us to see changes between Hobbes’s political works that may otherwise go unnoticed (Chapter 4); it sheds light on aspects of Hobbes’s argument that have a bearing on the long-standing debate about the authoritarian and proto-liberal credentials of Hobbes’s political theory (Chapter 6); it enriches our understanding of Hobbes’s contribution to different strands of western political thought (Chapters 3–5), including the narrative of the King’s Two Bodies (Chapter 6). In conclusion, this study hopes to have shown that Hobbes’s marginalisation of friendship as explanatory and normative principle of concord and peace played a significant role in his attempt to reconnect philosophy with the world of experience; it deserves the same attention as his overstudied references to conflict, enmity, and war, last but not least because of the enduring relevance and influence of his work on contemporary political studies.

Notes 1. As mentioned in Chapter 3, in ancient Greece, guest-friendship or ritualized friendship (xenia) and friendship (philia) were closely related concepts in terms of obligations and duties; while philoi belonged to the same social system or world, xenoi belonged to different social systems or worlds (Herman 1987, 12). Herman explains that ‘With respect to ideology, linguistic usage and actual practice, ritualised friendship overlapped to a great extent with two tangential categories of social relation, kinship and friendship’ (Herman 1987, 16). 2. Dante 1954 ‘Inferno’, Canto XXXIV 64–67, p. 247. 3. C. S. Lewis (1960) suggests that, from headmasters to governments, people in authority feel threatened by the bond between friends.

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4. For instance, in Chapter 2 we have seen that Hobbes makes friendship one of the sources of man’s identity and recognition—a trait of modern friendship (Hayden 2015). 5. De Jouvenal discusses social friendship in Chapter 8 of his book (1957, 123–138). He suggests that factors such as the size of contemporary societies, the diversity of people, and the variety of cultures undermine the social and moral harmony theorized by philosophers like Plato and Rousseau. He makes the point that social friendship ‘is something which must grow of itself by way of men’s ordinary intercourse’ (1957, 132). De Jouvenal warns against the nostalgia for a world that no longer exists. 6. Plutarch maintained that one cannot have a plurality of friends; Grayling argues that this idea travelled through time and space and found resonance in the English proverb, ‘A friend to all, is a friend to none’ (Grayling 2013, 60). 7. Here I elaborate on ideas I discussed in Slomp (2019). 8. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Carl Schmitt claimed that ‘the friend’ was as important as ‘the enemy’ to his concept of the political (Schmitt 1963/2002). I discuss Schmitt on friendship in Slomp (2009). 9. According to Jon Nixon (2015, viii) ‘The notion of friendship is central to Hannah Arendt’s conception of politics’; Nixon sees an interesting interconnection between Arendt’s analytical account of friendship and her real life experiences of friendship: ‘Friendships were a vital part of her lived experience, just as the notion of friendship is a crucial element within her constantly developing framework of ideas’ (Nixon 2015, viii). Patrick Hayden (2015) has drawn attention to the triadic structure of Arendtian philia: it entails a relationship of self, other, and the social space between them; Hayden explains that for Arendt all persons ‘depend upon the existence of an enduring common world, one that is shared between them and which renders them visible to others’ (Hayden 2015, 755); he shows that for Arendt friendship is a vehicle of identity formation and intersubjective recognition. 10. I am referring to essay 29 written by Maurice Blanchot on the occasion of the death of Georges Betaille (Blanchot 1971/1997, 289–292). Blanchot highlights the dyadic nature of modern friendship—a relationship with no witnesses and no external truth.

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11. Francesco Alberoni puts forward as thesis of his book that ‘friendship continues to be an essential part of our lives, and probably holds the same degree of significance it held in antiquity’ (1984/2016, 15–16). He also points out that friendship maintains its usual characteristics: ‘Friendship always requires some reciprocity’ (Alberoni 1984/2016, 20); ‘true friends even today cannot ask each other to bear false witness …’ (Alberoni 1984/2016, 9–10). 12. Alasdair MacIntyre has suggested that because of its self-avowed moral pluralism modern liberal political society lacks the bond of friendship: ‘They have abandoned the moral unity of Aristotelianism, whether in its ancient or medieval forms’ (MacIntyre 1985, 156). 13. For instance, Jason Scorza (2004) argues that far from being politically irrelevant for liberalism, the concept of friendship as interpreted for instance by Ralph Waldo Emerson can promote liberal citizenship. Similarly, R. J. Leland argues that ‘compliance with public reason helps establish and maintain civic friendship’ (Leland 2019, 73) in spite of the challenges posed by moral religious and philosophical pluralism. 14. Berenskoetter argues that in international politics today, the link between states is one of friendship (2007, 648). He draws attention to the gap between practices and theory; he points out that ‘claims of friendship’ and ‘special relationships’ are found regularly in statements of government officials and political commentators, but on the other hand there is ‘no in-depth thinking about the meaning of friendship between states’ (Berenskoetter 2007, 648); Berenskoetter develops a concept of international friendship aimed at capturing ‘why it exists, what its characteristics are, and how it structures international politics’ (2007, 648). Andrea Oelsner and Simon Koschut argue that ‘friendship can be an agent of change in international politics’, that ‘not only does international friendship exist, but the process of building and maintaining friendship actually transforms small pockets of the international system by revealing alternative forms of order as well alternative pattern of interaction among particular actors, which also affect their immediate environment’ (Oelsner and Koschut 2014, 3). In this sense friendship is transformative, as Aristotle had claimed (1984).

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15. Badhwar (1993, ix) highlights the ‘remarkable resurgence of philosophical interest in friendship’. 16. Some stress the normative value of friendship. Michael Mitias (2012, 1) writes: ‘There is an urgent need for a critical, systematic, and comprehensive analysis of the concept of friendship as a central moral value in human life’. Damian Caluori’s collection (2013) examines the nature of friendship, its relationship to reason, morality, and the notion of good life. 17. For an interesting discussion of Gadamer’s phenomenology of friendship and the politics of solidarity see Walhof (2006); on Gadamer’s account of friendship as an alternative to an account of intersubjectivity, see Vessey (2005).

References Alberoni, Francesco. 1984/2016. Friendship. Leiden: Brill. Alighieri, Dante. 1954. La Divina Commedia. Torino: Societa’ Editrice Internazionale. Aristotle. 1984. Nicomachean Ethics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University, Book VIII, 1825–39, and Book IX, 1839–52. Badhwar, Neera Kapur, ed. 1993. Friendship: A Philosophical Reader. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Berenskoetter, Felix. 2007. Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International. Millennium 35 (3): 647–676. Blanchot, Maurice. 1971/1997. Friendship. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Blatterer, Harry, and Sveva Magaraggia, eds. 2016. Introduction: Encountering Friendship with Francesco Alberoni. In Friendship, 1–4. Leiden: Brill. Bloom, Allan. 1993. Love and Friendship. New York: Simon & Schuster. Bodin, Jean. 1955. Six Books of the Commonwealth, abridged and trans. M.J. Tooley. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Brunkhorst, Hauke. 2005. Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to Global Legal Community. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Caluori, Damian, ed. 2013. Thinking About Friendship: Historical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Cicero. 1991. De Amicitia, trans. Stanley Lombardo. In Other Selves. Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 79–116. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Derrida, Jacques. 1993. Politics of Friendship. American Imago 50 (3): 353–391.

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Derrida, Jacques. 1994. The Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins. London: Verso. Devere, Heather. 2013. Amity Update: The Academic Debate on Friendship and Politics. AMITY the Journal of Friendship Studies 1 (1): 5–32. Devere, Heather, and Preston King, eds. 2000. The Challenge to Friendship in Modernity. London: Frank Cass. Devere, Heather, and Graham M. Smith. 2010. Friendship and Politics. Political Studies Review 8 (3): 341–356. Digeser, P.E. 2016. Friendship Reconsidered. What It Means and How It Matters to Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Forster, E.M. 1938/1972. What I Believe. In Two Cheers for Democracy, 65–73. London: Edward Arnold Publishers. Fortin, Ernest L. 1993. Augustine and the Hermeneutics of Love: Some Preliminary Considerations. In Richard John Neuhaus, ed. Augustine Today, 35–59. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1999. Friendship and Solidarity. Research Phenomenology 39 (1): 3–12. Grayling, A.C. 2013. Friendship. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hayden, Patrick. 2015. From Political friendship to Befriending the World. The European Legacy 20 (7): 745–764. Healy, Mary. 2011. Civic Friendship. Studies in Philosophy and Education 30 (3): 229–240. Herman, Gabriel. 1987. Ritualised Friendship & The Greek City. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hurka, Thomas. 2013. The Goods of Friendship. In Thinking About Friendship: Historical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Damian Caluori, 201–217. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hutter, Horst. 1978. Politics as Friendship. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. De Jouvenal, Bertrand. 1957. Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good, trans. J.F. Huntington. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kahane, David. 1999. Diversity, Solidarity, and Civic Friendship. The Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (3): 267–286. Kant, Immanuel. 1991. Lecture on Friendship. In Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk, 210–217. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Leland, R.J. 2019. Civic Friendship, Public Reason. Philosophy & Public Affairs 47 (1): 72–103. Lewis, C.S. 1960. The Four Loves. London: HarperCollins. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1985. After Virtue. London: Duckworth. Mitias, Michael. 2012. Friendship: A Central Moral Value. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi Editions.

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Murphy, Peter. 1998. ‘Introduction’ to ‘Friendship’. Special issue, The South Atlantic Quarterly 97 (1): 1–4. Nixon, Jon. 2015. Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Friendship. London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. Oelsner, Andrea, and Simon Koschut, eds. 2014. Friendship and International Relations. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Pahl, Ray. 2000. On Friendship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pahl, Ray. 2002. Towards a More Significant Sociology of Friendship. European Journal of Sociology 43 (3): 410–423. Pangle, Lorraine S. 2003. Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Plutarch. 1912. Moralia. London: J. M. Dent & Sons. Roshchin, Evgeny. 2006. The Concept of Friendship: From Princes to States. European Journal of International Relations 12 (4): 599–624. Roshchin, Evgeny. 2017. Friendship Among Nations: History of a Concept. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Schall, James V. 1996. Friendship and Political Philosophy. The Review of Metaphysics 50: 121–141. Schmitt, Carl. 1963/2002. Vorwort to Der Begriff des Poltischen Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien. Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt. Schwarzenbach, Sibyl. 1996. On Civic Friendship. Ethics 107: 97–128. Schwarzenbach, Sibyl. 2009. On Civic Friendship: Including Women in the State. New York: Columbia University Press. Scorza, Jason. 2004. Liberal Citizenship and Civic Friendship. Political Theory 32 (1): 85–108. Shklar, Judith. 1991/1998. Redeeming American Political Thought, ed. Stanley Hoffman and Dennis Thompson. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Slomp, Gabriella. 2009. Carl Schmitt and the Politics of Hostility, Violence and Terror. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Slomp, Gabriella. 2019. As Thick as Thieves: Exploring Thomas Hobbes’ Critique of Ancient Friendship and Its Contemporary Relevance. Political Studies 67 (1): 191–206. Slomp, Gabriella. 2021. In Search of “A Constant Civill Amity”: Hobbes on Friendship and Sociability. In A Companion to Hobbes, ed. Marcus Adams, 125–138. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Vernon, Mark. 2005. The Philosophy of Friendship. Houndmills and New York: Palgrave. Vessey, David. 2005. Gadamer’s Account of Friendship as an Alternative to an Account of Intersubjectivity. Philosophy Today 49 (5): 61–67. Voegelin, Eric. 1952. The New Science of Politics. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

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Walhof, Darren. 2006. Friendship, Otherness and Gadamer’s Politics of Solidarity. Political Theory 34 (5): 569–593. Whiting, Jennifer. 1986. Friends and Future Selves. The Philosophical Review 95: 547–580. Whiting, Jennifer. 1991. Impersonal Friends. The Monist 74 (1): 3–29. Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana Press.

Index

A Abizadeh, Arash, 53, 128 Aelred of Rievaulx, 96, 115 Aid, 25, 41, 47, 50, 51, 53, 69, 88. See also Help Alberoni, Francesco, 149, 155 Alighieri, Dante, 142, 153 Alliance, 8, 10, 42–47, 49, 50, 52–57, 60, 61, 125. See also Faction; League Ally, 45, 51, 52, 56, 59 Althusius, Johannes, 65, 69, 87, 88 Altruism, 8, 21, 32, 33, 75, 103, 105, 112 Amicitia, 1, 2, 5, 76, 88, 99, 117, 143 Amity, 11, 67, 129, 146, 153 Annis, David, 7 Anthropology, 6, 9, 20, 73, 84, 111, 112, 124, 134, 144 Aquinas, Thomas, 3, 10, 12, 19, 26, 100, 104, 105, 151 Archaeology, 42, 67, 97 Arendt, Hannah, 149, 154

Aristotle, 1–3, 5, 7, 11, 12, 19–26, 31, 33, 34, 56–58, 65, 67–71, 80, 84, 87–89, 95, 97–99, 101–113, 115, 117, 118, 123, 126–130, 132, 134–137, 147, 151, 155 Association, 5, 6, 36, 48, 69, 71–73, 79, 84, 87, 88, 112. See also Commonwealth; Partial society; Political association Athenaeus, 41, 57 Aubrey, John, 6, 29, 37, 135 Augustine, 95, 99, 102, 107, 109, 117, 151 Authority, 26, 33, 42, 49, 52, 55, 66, 70, 78, 80, 125, 133, 134, 153 Avramenko, Richard, 1, 3, 4, 11, 90, 111 B Badhwar, Neera K., 3, 10, 150, 156 Baier, Annette, 32, 73 Baumgold, Deborah, 50, 61, 73, 74, 126

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Slomp, Hobbes Against Friendship, International Political Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95315-7

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162

INDEX

Baumrin, Bernard, 35 Beitz, Charles R., 53 Bejan, Theresa, 129 Benevolence, 20, 25, 32, 36, 104, 118 Berenskoetter, Felix, 149, 155 Berlin, Isaiah, 66 Bertman, Martin, 11 Blanchot, Maurice, 149, 154 Blatterer, Harry, 149 Blau, Adrian, 135 Bloom, Allan, 149 Blum, Lawrence, 1 Bobbio, Norberto, 73, 84, 128 Bodin, Jean, 4, 11, 19, 43, 58, 60, 69–72, 78, 88, 89, 142 Boethius, 99 Bolotin, David, 10, 117 Boonin-Vail, David, 128 Botero, Giovanni, 45, 59, 60 Boucher, David, 53 Brecht, Bertold, 123, 124 Brunkhorst, Hauke, 4, 148 Bryan, Bradley, 10 Bryson, Anna, 129, 136 Butler, Joseph, 31

C Caluori, Damian, 9, 150, 156 Carpenter, Edward, 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 57, 109 Cato, 41 Chadwick, Alexandra, 37 Cicero, 2, 3, 5, 11, 12, 19, 27, 56–58, 65, 68–71, 87, 99, 102, 106, 107, 109, 110, 115, 117, 134, 142 Citizen, 3, 22, 47, 49, 52, 60, 65, 70, 74, 76–79, 82–84, 89, 90, 99, 109, 125, 126, 128, 130, 133, 143, 147

‘Commodious living’, 8, 30, 72, 74, 76, 79, 84, 85, 128, 129, 134 Common interest, 55, 125, 126, 134, 144 Commonwealth, 33, 51, 52, 61, 66, 69, 70, 72, 77–79, 81–83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 113, 114, 118, 126, 133, 134, 142–144 Concord, 2, 3, 8, 54, 61, 66, 70–72, 76, 78, 79, 85, 98, 125, 126, 134, 144–148, 152, 153 Confederacy, 8, 42, 47, 52–55, 125. See also Alliance; Faction; League Confucius, 9 Conspiracy, 53 conspirator, 8, 86, 152 Contract, 23–25, 30, 33, 73, 74, 78, 125, 128 Cooperation, 42, 53, 61, 67, 84, 86, 125, 126, 150 Cooper, John, 10, 99, 116 Corporation, 8, 66, 72, 73, 76–78, 84–86, 89, 113, 116, 128 Corruption, 2, 82, 86, 106, 135, 143, 145, 146, 148 Cotton, Charles, 75, 76 Curley, Edwin, 32 Curran, Eleanor, 73 D Dallmayr, Fred, 1 De Jouvenal, Bertrand, 146, 154 De Martel, Thomas, 34 Democracy, 3, 5, 59, 60, 71, 82, 85, 142, 143 Derrida, Jacques, 5, 7, 100, 116, 149 Descartes, René, 26, 27 Devere, Heather, 1, 3, 9, 149 Dietz, Mary G., 73 Digeser, P.E., 7, 9, 10, 65, 147, 148 Diogenes Laertius, 41, 95, 98 Douglass, Robin, 53

INDEX

Du Prat, Abraham, 34 Duty, 32, 57, 77, 83, 85, 106, 141–143 Du Verdus, François, 29 Dyzenhaus, David, 128, 130 E Eggers, Daniel, 128 Egoism, 20, 31, 32, 35–37, 103, 105, 118 Elyot, Thomas, 5, 11 Enemy, 3, 8, 20–22, 41, 43–47, 49–58, 61, 65, 66, 70–72, 76, 83, 85, 87, 125, 126, 129, 131, 133, 135, 154 Enmity, 22, 44, 46–49, 55–57, 65, 66, 70, 71, 126, 153 Epictetus, 19 Epicurus, 19, 41, 57 Equality, 45, 59, 80, 97, 131, 136 Equity, 26, 29, 85, 86, 129–131, 133, 136 Erasmus, Desiderius, 5, 44, 46, 49, 58–60, 102 Evrigenis, Ioannis, 53, 61, 89 Exchange, 29, 33, 59, 84 F Faction, 2, 8, 46, 47, 52–54, 60, 61, 71, 76, 78, 81, 85, 89, 125, 128, 148. See also Alliance; League; System Fairness. See Equity Favour, 23, 26, 27, 29, 34, 80–82, 84, 85, 90, 126, 131, 133, 148 Favourite, 82 Favouritism, 2, 80, 82, 86, 90, 106, 143, 146, 152 Fear, 4, 10, 25, 44, 45, 48, 49, 51–53, 55, 58, 59, 66, 70, 72, 75, 96, 125, 126, 129, 131, 146

163

Ferguson, Adam, 65, 67, 90 Finkelstein, Claire, 128, 130 Fiore, Benjamin, 68, 87 Flathman, Richard, 124–126, 135, 148 Flatterer, 5, 60, 100 Foisneau, Luc, 136 Forster, Edward Morgan, 116, 142 Fortin, Ernest L., 109, 110, 115, 118, 127, 147 Foucault, Michel, 1 Friend as ally, 8, 44, 60 as another self, 95, 101–103, 105, 106, 109, 111, 112, 117, 127 as partner, 7, 8 See also Flatterer Friendship civic friendship, 4, 11, 65–73, 83–85, 127, 143, 145–148, 152, 155 forensic amicitia, 11, 72, 75, 76, 80, 84 guest or ritualized friendship, 41, 153 international friendship, 58, 65, 73, 125, 155 negative friendship, 8, 41–44, 46, 47, 49, 53–56, 61, 65, 66, 70, 85, 86, 97, 125, 126, 134 normative friendship, 2, 4, 8, 9, 28, 95, 97, 101, 105, 108, 110–112, 115, 125, 127, 134, 143–146, 153, 156 personal friendship, 5, 6, 8, 26, 46, 49, 55, 65, 72, 79–82, 85, 127, 128, 133 positive friendship, 7, 8, 65–70, 72, 76, 83–87, 97, 125, 126, 134, 153 public friendship, 3, 65–67, 72, 73, 75, 76, 83, 84, 116, 142, 149

164

INDEX

utility friendship, 8, 21, 29, 34, 46, 56, 57, 67, 80, 95, 100, 104, 106, 111, 112, 117, 125, 127, 128 virtue friendship, 8, 11, 21, 25, 26, 28, 34, 57, 67, 95–100, 103, 104, 106, 111–114, 127, 130 See also Amicitia; Philia; Practice; Reciprocity; Transitivity Frost, Samantha, 124 G Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 1, 6, 7, 150, 156 Galileo, 123, 135 Gauthier, David, 31, 35, 53, 128 Generosity, 20, 21, 32, 33, 87, 103, 105, 113 Gert, Bernard, 31, 32, 36, 37, 75, 118 Gierke, Otto, 72, 73 God, 10, 33, 68, 69, 88, 97, 100, 101, 103, 104, 107, 109, 111, 114–116, 127, 128, 130, 141, 145, 147, 151 Godolphin, Sidney, 25, 111 Gooding, Nicholas, 11 Good life, 34, 76, 89, 96, 97, 109, 110, 113–115, 117, 124, 128, 130, 134, 144, 147, 151, 153, 156 Good will, 7, 20, 24, 29, 33, 34, 54, 89 Grayling, A.C., 3, 5, 7, 99, 102, 104, 117, 154 Grotius, Hugo, 43, 44, 60 Guicciardini, Francesco, 44, 45, 60 H Hamilton, James, 19, 60 Hampton, Jean, 53

Harrison, Molly, 58 Haseldine, Julian, 10, 116 Hayden, Patrick, 1, 118, 150, 154 Healy, Mary, 146 Heller, Agnes, 33, 96, 108, 116, 130 Help, 22–26, 32, 41–44, 48, 49, 52, 57, 59, 66, 67, 77, 80, 81, 88, 101, 103, 133, 150, 151, 155. See also Aid Herbert, Gary, 31, 36 Herman, Gabriel, 10, 46, 57, 59, 106, 141, 142, 153 Hill, Lisa, 90 Hirschman, Albert, 45 Hoekstra, Kinch, 11, 76 Holmes, Stephen, 31, 36 Honour, 6, 21, 22, 26, 28, 29, 35, 48, 51, 80–82, 110 Hostility. See Enmity Human nature, 4, 31, 33, 35, 74, 82, 90, 112 Hume, David, 32, 36, 37, 74, 90, 112 Hurka, Thomas, 146 Hutson, Lorna, 3, 10, 97 Hutter, Horst, 3, 6, 7, 68, 97, 98, 109, 117, 151

I Iliad, 5, 110, 141, 142 Individualism, 2, 35, 124, 126, 134, 144, 146 Interest. See Common interest; Self-interest International, 1, 2, 9, 11, 42, 46, 49, 53–55, 57, 59, 61, 73, 77, 79, 84, 89, 128, 143, 148–150, 155 Inter-state, 5, 45, 46, 51, 53 Irrera, Elena, 10, 116

INDEX

J Jaede, Maximilian, 34 John of Salisbury, 5, 136 Johnson Bagby, Laurie, 6, 30, 135

K Kahane, David, 150 Kant, Immanuel, 6, 12, 73, 127, 128, 146 Kantorowicz, Ernst, 131, 132, 136 Karlstadt, Elliott, 59 Kavka, Gregory, 53 King James, 42 King Massasoy, 42 King, Preston, 10, 57, 74 King’s two bodies, 82, 125, 131–134, 153 Klosko, George, 61 Konstan, David, 10, 21, 116, 129, 135 Koschut, Simon, 11, 149, 155 Kupchan, Charles, 57

L Lang, Anthony J., 128 Language, 19, 33, 55, 73, 85, 134, 144, 153 Law, civil, 128 Law of nature, 129, 131, 135 League, 8, 42, 43, 45, 47–56, 59, 60, 125. See also Alliance; Faction Lechner, Silviya, 53 Leland, R.J., 149, 155 Lemetti, Juhana, 30 Letwin, Shirley, 128 Leviathan, 52, 55, 79, 83, 85, 86, 114, 116, 127, 128, 131, 145. See also State, political state Lewis, C.S., 2, 65, 86, 114, 127, 142, 153

165

Lloyd, S.A., 31, 32, 118, 128, 130, 136 Lochman, Daniel T., 3, 5, 97 Lopez, Maritere, 3, 97 Lu, Catherine, 9, 65, 118 Ludwig, Paul, 8, 41, 54, 57

M MacIntyre, Alasdair, 8, 149, 155 Magaraggia, Sveva, 149 Malcolm, Noel, 6, 30, 44, 45, 47, 53, 73, 75, 84, 111 Manners, 23, 27, 28, 77, 83 Mann, Hollie, 10 Maritain, Jacques, 6 Martel, James R., 1 Martinich, A.P., 30, 128 Materialism, 2, 35, 124, 134, 144 May, Larry, 130, 136 McCarthy, Peter, 90 McGuire, Brian Patrick, 10, 116 McNeilly, F.S., 32, 36, 89 Mencius, 9 Mersenne, Marin, 26, 27 Mills, Laurens J., 3, 5, 7, 11, 12, 97 Milton, John, 43, 58, 69, 87, 89 Mitias, Michael, 1, 3, 10, 150, 156 Modernity, 1, 2, 86, 87, 108, 115, 127, 134, 144, 146–148, 150, 152 Monarchy, 82, 143 Montaigne, Michel de, 12, 97, 100, 102–105, 107–110, 114, 115, 117, 147 Morgenthau, Hans, 43, 59 Mulgan, Richard, 10, 98, 109 Murphy, Peter, 4, 11, 149

166

INDEX

N Natural law, 52, 75, 125, 128–131, 133, 136, 145. See also Law of nature Neal, Patrick, 53 Newey, Glen, 53, 61, 73, 124, 137 Newman, William Lambert, 132, 136, 137 Nichols, Mary P., 10, 96 Nixon, Jon, 154 Nominalism, 2, 31, 35, 124, 134, 144 Nussbaum, Martha, 21, 96 O Obligation, 24, 59, 101, 106, 114, 116, 117, 128, 141–143, 153 Oelsner, Andrea, 7, 9, 11, 149, 155 Oldenburg, Henry, 34 Olsthoorn, Johan, 130, 136 Orwin, Clifford, 61 P Pagden, Anthony, 33, 73, 129 Pahl, Ray, 7, 9, 21, 149 Pakaluk, Michael, 12, 103, 104 Pangle, Lorraine S., 2, 5, 10, 21, 100, 112, 145 Partial societies, 4, 8, 66, 72, 73, 76, 84, 85, 113, 128, 134, 144. See also Corporation; System Patapan, Haig, 11, 75, 118 Peace, 2, 25, 42, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 61, 66, 68, 72–74, 78–80, 83, 85, 86, 113, 118, 125–129, 134–136, 143–148, 153. See also Concord Pettit, Philip, 127 Philia, 3–5, 7–9, 20–22, 33, 98, 130, 135, 143–145, 147, 152–154 Philoctetes, 41 Pity, 25

Plamenatz, John, 135 Plato, 2, 3, 5, 7, 12, 19, 41, 43, 54, 56–59, 97, 98, 101, 102, 105, 108–110, 123, 134, 149, 154 Pleasure, 21, 24, 34, 57, 67, 75, 99, 100, 103 Plutarch, 5, 19, 43, 96, 99, 100, 132, 133, 137, 146, 154 Political association, 8, 46, 58, 66, 70, 75, 77, 125, 126, 134, 144, 146 Political science, 1, 4, 8, 152. See also Science of politics Politics, 6, 9, 51, 59, 61, 68, 73, 84, 86, 87, 100, 110, 124, 136, 141, 143, 144, 146, 148–151, 154–156 Poole, Thomas, 128, 130 Popular government, 72, 99, 142. See also Democracy Power, 4, 9–11, 23, 24, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 44, 46, 48, 51, 52, 55, 59, 60, 70, 80, 81, 85, 88, 89, 99, 126, 131, 134, 136 Practice, 2–4, 32, 41, 42, 53, 54, 80, 96, 98, 116, 126, 131, 137, 143–145, 148–153, 155 Price, A.W., 7, 10, 21, 116, 117 Private sphere, 3, 5 Protagoras , 43 Protection, 2, 8, 25, 27, 41, 43, 47, 50, 55, 56, 60, 61, 100, 130, 142 Public safety. See Salus populi R Rawls, John, 6, 11, 32, 36, 74, 118 Raylor, Timothy, 4 Reason of state, 45 Rebellion, 49, 82, 145 Reciprocity, 7, 9, 20, 21, 23, 33, 42, 54, 130, 136, 155 Republicanism, 5, 100, 114, 142

INDEX

Resistance, 5, 72, 73, 100 Rhetoric, 4, 6, 19 Rhodes, Rosamond, 11, 128, 135 Rice, Daryl, 61 Robertson, George Croom, 31, 35 Roshchin, Evgeny, 9, 42, 58, 150 Royston, O.M., 58 Rutherford, Donald, 113

S Salus populi, 79, 82, 83, 85, 128, 129, 131, 143, 145 Scepticism, 2, 124, 134, 137, 144, 146 Schall, James V., 96, 99, 108, 110, 115, 117, 118, 127, 147 Schmitt, Carl, 54–56, 124, 126, 149, 154 Schollmeier, Paul, 10, 21, 103, 118 Schroeder, D., 10 Schwartz, Daniel, 3, 10, 100 Schwarzenbach, Sibyl, 1, 4, 9, 10, 65, 111, 145–147, 149 Science of politics, 111, 134, 151, 152. See also Political science Scorza, Jason, 1, 149, 155 Sect. See Alliance; Faction; League Self-interest, 4, 10, 21, 28, 30–33, 36, 45, 46, 48, 52–55, 57, 61, 67, 75, 105, 112, 126, 134, 144, 146 Self-sufficiency, 27, 43, 67–69, 84, 88, 125 Seneca, 5, 12, 19, 96, 104, 116, 132 Shakespeare, William, 131–133 Shannon, Laurie, 5, 100 Shklar, Judith, 141–143 Sikkenga, Jeffrey, 11, 75, 118 Silver, Allan, 7, 90 Silverthorne, Michael, 19, 75, 76 Skinner, Quentin, 4, 11, 110, 129

167

Smith, Adam, 41, 65, 69, 73, 86, 87, 90 Smith, Graham, 9, 149 Smith, Travis, 10, 30, 31, 32, 90, 111 Sociability, 67–69, 112, 128–131, 135 sociable, 24, 69, 129, 130, 135. See also Unsociability, unsociable Society. See Partial society; Political association Socrates, 3, 5, 7, 41, 67, 70 Sommerville, Johann, 6, 30, 73 Sophocles, 41 Sorbiere, Samuel, 29, 34 Sorell, Tom, 11, 32, 37, 73, 89, 118, 135 Sovereign, 4, 11, 44, 51–53, 61, 73, 82, 83, 88, 89, 128, 130, 133, 136, 145, 152 Spragens, Thomas, 31, 35 Springborg, Patricia, 3 Sreedhar, Susanne, 73 Stanlick, Nancy, 10, 30–32, 35, 73, 75, 118 State, 2, 3–5, 11, 22, 24, 28, 33, 42–45, 49, 51–53, 57, 61, 65–70, 72–74, 76–79, 83–85, 87, 98, 107, 110, 116, 118, 124, 125, 127, 128, 130, 136, 142–148, 150, 152, 153, 155 political state, 23, 25, 26, 32, 42, 49, 52–55, 67, 74, 76, 85, 143, 145 state of nature, 2, 25, 47–55, 61, 74, 76, 84, 125, 127, 136, 145. See also Leviathan Stauffer, Devin, 11 Stephen, Leslie, 31, 35, 124 Stern-Gillet, S., 10, 116 Strauss, Leo, 20 Summum bonum, 124, 127, 144

168

INDEX

System, 4, 8, 10, 61, 66, 71, 72, 77–79, 83–85, 90, 96, 125, 128, 145, 148, 151, 153, 155, 156. See also Corporation; Partial society T Taylor, A.E., 128, 130, 136 Thomas, Keith, 129 Thucydides, 5, 43–49, 59–61 Transitivity, 20, 21, 26, 33, 42, 58 Trust, 7, 9, 11, 20, 21, 23–25, 28, 29, 33, 34, 36, 45, 52, 54, 55, 57, 60, 81, 84, 85, 88, 123, 125, 134, 136, 144, 153 Tuck, Richard, 53, 73 Tyranny, 3, 5, 71, 72, 85, 100, 142 Tyrant, 71, 72, 96, 101 U Unsociability, 22, 75 unsociable, 75. See also Sociability, sociable Utility, 20, 33, 57, 67, 76, 80 V Valerius Maximus, 95, 96 Van Apeldoorn, Laurens, 89, 128 Van Mill, David, 75, 118 Vernon, Mark, 3, 7, 9, 149 Versenyi, Laszlo, 58

Vessey, David, 156 Vion, Antoine, 9 Virtue, 21, 25, 27, 28, 33, 34, 57, 95, 96, 98, 99, 102, 106, 111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 128, 129, 144 Voegelin, Eric, 151 Von Heyking, John, 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 90, 111, 116 Vulnerability, 43, 46, 47, 51, 53, 56 W Walhof, Darren, 150, 156 War, 44, 46, 48, 53, 54, 59, 60, 125, 136, 142, 153 civil war, 33, 86, 133, 152 Warrender, Howard, 128 Watkins, John W.N., 31, 35, 53, 124 White, Carolinne, 10, 116 Whiting, Jennifer, 146 Wight, Martin, 56, 57, 61 Williams, Bernard, 141 Williams, Howard, 53 Wolin, Sheldon, 31, 35, 74, 77 Wood, Neal, 117 Y Yack, Bernard, 1, 4, 11, 31, 74, 111 Z Zarka, Yves, 113, 130, 136