Hitler and his generals : military conferences, 1942-1945 : the first complete stenographic record of the military situation conferences, from Stanlingrad to Berlin [First English-language edition.] 9781936274857, 193627485X

Citation preview

INTRODUCTION BY GERHARD L. WEINBERG, AUTHOR OF A

WORLD At ARMS

Gitta SerCrry

HITLER

AND

HIS

GENERALS

MILITARY

THE ril'.ST COT Ariel

CONFERENCES

19 4 2-1 9 4 5

STENOGRAPHIC RECORD MILITARY SITUATION CONFERENCES —FROM

70ill IGP.AD

BERLIN

Hitler and His Generals Military Conferences 1942-1945

The First Complete Stenographic Record of the Military Situation Conferences, from Stalingrad to Berlin

English edition Introduction by

Gerhard L. Weinberg Original edition Preface and Notes by

Helmut Heiber Editorial Advisor English edition

David M. Glantz

eniomo books New York

All rights reserved under the International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. Published in the United States by:

Enigma Books New York www.enigmabooks.com No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the written permission of Enigma Books.

Originally published in German under the ntie: HITLERS LAGEBESPRECHUNGEN Die Protokollfragmente seiner militarischen Konferengen 1942-1945

Translated by Roland Winter, Krista Smith, and Mary Beth Friedrich Copyright © Enigma Books 2002 Copyright © Dcutchc Vcrlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1962 Copyright © Deutche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1964 Copyright © Der Spiegel Verlag 1966

First English-language edition ISBN 978-1-929631-28-5 elSBN 978-1-936274-85-7 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data [Hltlers Lagcbesprechungen.] I Iitler and his generals : military conferences 1942-1945 / English edition introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg ; original edition introduction and notes by Helmut Ilciber ; English edition edited by David M. Glantz ; translated by Roland Winter, Krista Smith. — 1 st English language cd. p. ; cm. Includes mdex. ISBN: 978-1-929631-28-5 1. Ihtler, Adolf, 1889-1945. 2. World War, 1939-1945—Sources. 3. World War, 1939-1945—Communications—Germany. I. Weinberg, Gerhard L. II. Heiber, Helmut, 1924- III. Glantz, David M. TV. Winter, Roland. V. Smith, Krista. VI. Title: Hitlers Lagebesprechimgen. D743.5 .11514 2002 940.53

Table of Contents

Introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg.

i

Preface hy Helmut Heiber.

xi

Maps .. ...

xxxv

Conference Transcripts

1942 .

3

Evening Situation Report, December 1, 1942 .

4

Midday Situation Conference, December 12, 1942, in the Wolfsschanze.

18

1943 .

56

Midday Situation Conference, February 1, 1943, at the Wolfsschanze.

52

Evening Situation Report, March 4, 1943, at rht \\ ehrwolf_ 71 .Midday Situation Report, March 5, 1943, at the Wchnvolf Mid-March to March 21, 1943 . .. . . . ... ... „.

82 99

Fragment of an Evening Situation Conference, between March 12 and 15, 1943, probably at rite Wolfsschanze .. . 100 Midday Situation Report, March 21, 1943, at the Berghof ...

113

Meeting between the Fiihrer and Field Marshal Keitel, May 19,1943.

119

Meering between rhe Fiihrer and Sonderfithrer v. Neurath, May 20, 1943 . 132 Midday Situation Report, May 20 or 21, 1943 .L_:_ 144 Meeting of the Fiihrer with Field Marshal Keitel and General Zeitzler,June 8, 1943, in the Berghof.

155

Midday Situation Report, July 25, 1943 .

166

Evening Situation Report, |uly 25,1943 .

198

Second Evening Situation Report, July 25, 1943 .

212

Midday Situation Report, )uly 26,1943 . 218 Meeting of the Fiihrer with Field Marshal von Kluge, July 26, 1943.

252

Excerpt from an Evening Situation Report, probably October 3,1943. 267 Midday Situation Report, October 4, 1943, at the Wolfsschanze --..-- ..

.

268

Evening Situation Report, October 26, 1943, at the Wolfsschanze.. —.... 276

Hitu r and His Generals

Midday Situation Report, November 19, 1943. 285 Evening Situation Report, probably December 20, 1943 ... . 307 End of the Evening Situation Report, December 21, 1943 ... 322 Midday Situation Report, December 22, 1943 at the Wolfsschanze. 322 Meeting of the Fuhrer with General Zcitzler, December 27, 1943 ......

332

Meeting of the Fuhrer with General Jodi and, joining later. General Zeitzler, December 28, 1943 . 346 Meeting of the Fuhrer with General Zeitzler, December 29. 1943 . 3 1 Meeting of the Fuhrer with Field Marshal von Kiichler, December 30.1943 at the Wolfsschanze.375 1944 . 385 Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Commanding Officer (NSFO). 385 Meeting of the Fuhrer with General Reinecke, January 7, 1944, in the Wolfsschanze. 387 Midday Situation Report, Tanuary 28, 1944. 401 Telephone Conversation Betw een the Fuhrer and General Zcitzler, January 28, 1944.

416

Excerpt from a Situation Report, presumably from March 1944...... 418 Midday Situation Report, April 6, 1944 . 419 Evening Situation Report, May 18, 1944, at the Betghof .... 432 Evening Situation Report, June 18, 1944, at the Berghof .... 437 Meeting of the Fuhrer with Colonel General Jodi, July 31, 1944, in the Wolfsschanze.

444

Meeting of the Fuhrer with Lieutenant General Westphal and Lieutenant General Krebs, August 31, 1944, at the Wolfsschanze

...,,,.....»...___,

464

Midday Situation Conference, September 1, 1944, ar the Wolfsschanze^.^ . ..._.

^ .._...

..__4.6Q

Evening Situation Report, September 17, 1944, at the Wolfsschanze__..._..._...._ 492 Midday Situation Report, November 6, 1944 . 507 The Fuhrer’s Speech to Division Commanders, December 12,1944, at Adlerhorst. Meeting of the Fuhrer with Colonel General B1 askowitz,

533

December 28, 1944, at Adlerhorst.543

Copyng

Military CosttruncizS 1942-1945

The Fiihrer’s Speech to Division Commanders, December 28, 1944, at Adlerhorst......

554

Meeting of the Fiihrer with Major General Thomale, December 29, 1944, at Adlerhorst. 1945 .

568 585

Concluding Portion of a Midday Situation Report, presumably, January 9, 1945 .

585

Evening Situation Report, January 9, 1945, in Adlerhorst

591

Midday Situation Report, January 10, 1945, at Adlerhorst.. .

596

Midday Situation Report, january 27, 1945, in Berlin.

618

Evening Situation Report, February 24, 1945, in Berlin ....

667

Fragment of a Midday Situation Report, presumably March 1.1945.

675

Fragment of a Midday Situation Report, presumably March 2,1945.

677

Fragment of a Midday Situation Report, presumab|y on March 2, 1945. Final Part of the Midday Situation Report, March 2, 1945 . . .

683 685

Fragment of a Midt I ay Situation R eport, prcsumal >ly March 10, 1945 .

694

Evening Situation Report, March 23, 1945, in the Fiihrer’s apartment in Berlin. 697 Hitler’s Situation Reports, April 23, 25, and 27. 717 2nd Situation Report, April 23, 1945. 718 3rd Situation Report, April 23, 1945 .

719

Wednesday, April 25, 1945 .

720

2nd Situation Report, April 25, 1945 .

725

Friday, April 27, 1945 .

726

2nd Situation Report, April 27, 1945 . 731 3rd Situation Report, April 27, 1945 .

733

List of Participants.

739

Introducdon to the Notes by Helmut Heiber.

755

Notes.

759

Bibliography.1128 Index.1140 Acknowledgements.1159

Introduction

by Gerhard I - Weinberg

I

n the fall of 1942 a crisis of confidence developed in the German lead¬ ership. One of the results of that crisis was the creation of the source of

which the known surviving remnants are published in this book. W hat was that crisis and why did it produce such an outcome? The general long-term aim of the government Adolf Hitler hoped to establish in Germany and was enabled to create when appointed chancellor in 1933 was global conquest.1 Such a project in his eyes required a dictatorially ruled one-party state at home, a people imbued with racial awareness, and a series of wars. From 1933 domestic requirements dominated German internal policies and politics; the expected wars framed the rearmament pro¬ gram. It was assumed that a preliminary war against Czechoslovakia would be easy and short. There would follow the war against France and Britain, a war that was expected to be very hard—that was where Germany had had problems in the war of 1914-18. The rearmament of the early and mid1930s, therefore, was concentrated on weapons systems designed for the war in the W est. Victory over France and Britain was believed to be the necessary pre¬ liminary in securing the western border of Germany for the war in the East against the Soviet Union. 'Ihur conflict, however, was always expected to be easy: the Germans had defeated Russia in the last war in spite of having to maintain enormous forces on the Western Front; and in the meantime Rus¬ sia, by what Hider considered a stroke of good fortune for Germany, had

/ hru.R and His Generals

il

fallen under the control of rhe Bolsheviks, so rhar now the Slavic people he and most Germans believed to be inferior were also ruled by incompetents. No weapons systems needed to be developed for that war (and none would be until the Germans discovered in 1941 that they had miscalculated). The quick conquest of the Soviet Union would provide not only vast lands for German agricultural settlements but also the raw materials, espe¬ cially the oil, needed for the subsequent war against the United States, which, with its mixture of peoples, would be easy to defeat, but it was far away and had a large fleet. The weapons systems to overcome these practical handi¬ caps would take time to create, and therefore once the weapons for war against Britain and France seemed to be coming along by 1937, the inter¬ continental bombers and the blue-water navy that would take care of these concerns were ordered. At the last moment in 1938 Hitler drew back from the war against Czechoslovakia, a step he greatly regretted and was determined not to re¬ peat in 1939. Since the Poles would not subordinate their newly regained independence to Germany, they were included into the war against the West¬ ern Powers. That war appeared to go just the way it was supposed to. Poland was defeated quickly in an alignment with a Soviet Union that was willing to help Germany start and wage war—since the Germans w’ould crush the Soviet Union anvway, it made little difference to Berlin whether their army would subsequently have to go a few hundred kilometres more. Norway and Denmark were conquered quickly so that Germany could reach into the Atlantic, first against Britain and later against the United States. France was defeated and the British chased from the continent. The immediate concerns of both Hitler and Germany’s military leaders in the summer of 1940, as it seemed to them that the war in the West was over, were the next two wars: that against the Soviet Union and the one against the United States. While the attack on the Soviet Union was being discussed, with both Hitler and the army’s chief of staff still hoping to launch it in the fall of that year, orders went out to immediately resume the construction of a navy needed for war with the United States. By the end of July, it had become clear that the idea of attacking the Soviet Union that September was impractical; reluctantly, the invasion toward the east was set for the early summer of 1941. Troops had to be moved from west to east, supplies built up near the border, allies recruited, and the transportation system improved. There was considerable military planning, but most atten¬ tion, especially in the weeks before the attack, was concentrated on the ex¬ ploitation of the lands confidently expected to be conquered easily, the kill¬ ing of Jews and of substantial other portions of the population that would quickly come under German control—and the military operations in the

Military Coklhrunchs 1942-1945

Hi

Middle blast and northwest Africa that would follow the rapid defeat of the Soviet Union. The attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 produced the early victo¬ ries the Germans had anticipated but not the collapse of the whole system that they had assumed would follow. Uke Alexander 1 when Napoleon’s army had taken Moscow, but unlike first the Czarist government of Nicho¬ las 11 and then the Provisional Government of Alexander Kerensky, Stalin’s regime maintained control of the unoccupied portions of the country and mobilized its human and material resources to fight the invaders. The hor¬ rendous conduct of the Germans made this much easier for a government that now looked benign by comparison—an extraordinary accomplishment. After thinking in July that they had won, the German leaders began to real¬ ize in August and September of 1941—some earlier, some later—that in fact they really had not yet won and that the fighting in the east would con¬ tinue into 1942. And, furthermore, that they needed both bigger and better tanks to cope with those the Red Army had and that they also would have to send to the front in the East replacements for their own lost and damaged tanks from those held in reserve for the operations planned after w hat they had originally imagined would be a campaign lasting only a few weeks. The defeats inflicted on the Germans bv the Red Armv in November j

j

and December 1941 only underscored the fact that the German hope of a quick victory had been unrealistic. The campaign in 1942 would therefore have to deliver the decisive blow. The losses Germany and its allies had already suffered, however, precluded a repetition in 1942 of the sort of simultaneous offensive on all segments of the front that they had carried out in 1941. The decision to strike in the southern portion of the front was conditioned by the need to seize the oilfields of the Caucasus for Germany’s use and to deprive the Soviets of their main source of this vital supply. The German plan for the 1942 offensive, accordingly, had as its main focus a thrust toward the Caucasus, and, as a means of both supporting that thrust and protecting its northern flank, a push toward the Volga River, in particu¬ lar its bend at Stalingrad. While the first stages of the offensive appeared to go reasonably well for the Germans, problems soon appeared. Units of the Red Army were pulled back rather than allowing themselves to be surrounded as in 1941; the Germans simply did not have adequate forces for the double thrust into the Caucasus and toward the Volga; and Soviet resistance stiffened before both. It was in this context that the crisis in German headquarters devel¬ oped. In the face of the German defeat before Moscow in December 1941, Hitler had reacted by taking over command of the German army himself; now it looked as if the operation designed to bring victory in 1942 was not

tv

I Inu-.R and His Generals

going as planned. As he was being told that the German army was unable to punch through Red Army resistance in the western Caucasus on the road to Tuapse, while at the same time the German forces heading toward the main oilfields at Grozny and Baku, as well as those heading for Stalingrad, were making very slow progress—if any—Hider blew up. He temporarily took over command of Army Group A in the Caucasus himself; he replaced the chief of staff of the German army; and he considered replacing his imme¬ diate assistants in the High Command of the Armed Forces [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht—OKW]. It was under these circumstances that Hitler, unwilling to recognize that, at his insistence, Germany had taken on a project far beyond its strength, preferred to shift the blame for the looming disaster to his military advisors. If he was infallible—as he was quite certain he was—failure must be the fault of those who had not carried out his brilliant plans in the way he dictated. So that he could make sure in the future that he was obeyed in all respects and that none could claim to have received other directives. Hitler instructed stenographers to record the military situation conferences, at which the detailed orders for future operations were issued. There are indications that he had contemplated such a procedure some months earlier; now he had it implemented. For the remainder of World War 11 stenographers who once kept the record of debates in the German parliament—that had held its last meeting in April 1942—now kept shorthand records of the daily situation confer¬ ences and some related military conferences and then transcribed their notes. These notes and the transcriptions were collected at the same time, but were destroyed at the end of the war, ironically by order of General Walter Scherff, the man Hitler had designated to write a history of the war. When American soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division arrived in the area where the destruction by fire of the notes had taken place, a member of an intelligence team, Geoige R. Allen, had the captured stenographers reconstruct those fragments of the record that had not been burned com¬ pletely or at all. A full account of that operation can be found in the preface by Helmut Heiber that follows this Introduction.2 A few of the surviving conference texts were introduced as evidence at the Nuremberg trials, but the general public became aware of the existence of the transcripts through the publication by Felix Gilbert of a selection from them in 1950, under the title Hitler Directs His War.' Gilbert’s selection, like the Heiber publication, was based on a set deposited by Allen, along with other materials, at the lib ran- of the University of Pennsylvania.4 The following year George Fischer published the German text of an additional conference, that of June 8, 1943, which had originally been provided to another German agency, in the

MllJTARY CONFliRIiNCES 1942-1945

V

Journal of Modern History.5 He included an Knglish translation in his book Soviet Opposition to Stalin in 1952.6 It was in 1962 that the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich published the complete collection of the surviving transcripts that provides the basis for most of the translations in this new edition.7 Helmut Heiber as editor not only reconstructed the history of the documents but was careful to include all surviving readable transcripts and portions of transcripts. He also provided extremely useful notes and annotations, all of which are in¬ cluded here. He inserted at the appropriate chronological place the June 8, 1943 conference that Fischer had published. In addition, he included a fur¬ ther conference text, that of July 31, 1944, that had also been provided to another agency and hence survived the general destruction process. This conference is of special interest both because it reveals much about Hitler’s reaction to the attempt on his life on July 20, 1944, and because it provides the first clear indications of his thinking on a fumre counter-offensive in the W est, the operation that would eventually be known to the Germans as the Ardennes Offensive and to Americans as the Batde of the Bulge. Still another conference transcript, that of January 7, 1944, had sur¬ vived because a copy had been provided to the Nazi Party Chancellery7; I published its German text in the Journal of the German Institute that had issued the I leiber volume.8 This conference dealt with the introduction of political indoctrination officers into the German military. Subsequently it was learned that after most of the stenographers had left I lider’s bunker in Berlin in April 1945 at his direction, there had been some further conferences that Hider ordered taken down. These records were published by die German magazine Der Spiegel in 19662 Other than some military details about the final defense of Berlin, these transcripts are primarily of interest for Hider’s re¬ peated and detailed explication of his reasons for remaining in Berlin rather than moving to South Germany, as many of his associates urged. All of the known transcripts are included in this edition. Are there likely to be more? Just as several turned up after Heiber had expressed the opin¬ ion that this was most unlikely, one simply cannot exclude the possibility7. If an extra copy was provided to some office or agency7 whose records were captured by the Red Armyr, were not turned over to the former German Democratic Republic, and have not been completely screened in their cur¬ rent depositories, the remote possibility does exist that one or another such item may yet surface. Until and unless that happens, this edition is the onlycomplete one available. Why is this record of Hitler’s military conferences significant? Because it is here that both the general public and the specialist can see how deci¬ sions were actually reached at the highest level in World War II Germany. It

VI

HnuzR and His Giihun uj

is here that one can follow the role of key individuals in the German military and political hierarchy. It is here that one can observe how choices were made about weapons and units on the one hand, and broader strategic is¬ sues on the other. These documents, therefore, certainly provide additional details about the military history of the war, but a major interest lies else¬ where. I lere we see 1 litler in his dealings with the military and other leaders of the German war effort in full contemporary records. These are not sub¬ sequently edited minutes or reports. More important, they provide Hitler’s side of issues that have been very largely and deliberately obscured by the endless flood of memoirs published by German military leaders after the war. There are, to be sure, other important sources for Hitler’s views, such as his recorded table talk,"1 collections of his speeches," and special reports, like the one of January 29, 1944, on his views about Germany’s postwar birthrate;12 but it is the military field where the distortions have been most extensive. Anyone reading the memoirs of the German generals and field mar¬ shals might conclude not only that Stalin was able to arrange for it to snow and become freezing cold only on the German side of the front, while the Red Army enjoyed balmy weather, but also that any successes attained by Germany were due to the brilliance of the generals and all the defeats the result of I litler’s unwillingness to listen to their invariably wise advice. The possibility that when the Germans shortened their lines in order to facilitate the withdrawal of units into a reserve, it might also lead to a shortening of the lines of the Soviet forces facing them, never appears to have occurred to the self-proclaimed geniuses. Those who led more than ten million German soldiers under their command to death, crippling wounds and imprison¬ ment were eager to shift the burden of responsibility to the shoulders of the man they had served with enthusiasm and from whom the)- had gladly re¬ ceived not only promotions but enormous secret bribes.1’ Since Hitler com¬ mitted suicide, he was not around to correct them—and they knew it. Especially because some of the most mendacious of military7 memoirs have become widely known, are frequently cited, and have in some instances been translated into English, the unvarnished contemporary record ought to be considered in anv assessment of Germany’s role in World War II. J J Serious scholars have, accordingly, made considerable use of the originals in the 1 leiber edition, but here the full surviving record is accessible in English. None of this is to suggest that 1 litler was the military genius he claimed to be and as so many Germans originally acclaimed him at the time. The record shows him as a mean and suspicious individual who made decisions on the basis of preposterous beliefs about such countries as the Soviet Union and the United States. He had a clear view of his aims, of broader strategic

Military Cokmrunces 1942-1945

vtt

issues and their economic and political implications; in these matters he saw reality more clearly than the narrowly focused military professionals. He was also astonishingly familiar with a wide variety of technical details about weap¬ ons systems. What he lacked was an operational sense in the broad area between grand strategy and minute detail. And that could not be remedied by reminiscences of his experiences of the fighting in the trenches of the preceding conflict. Since the arguments over Hitler’s willingness or refusal to authorize sub¬ stantial withdrawals play such a large role in the literature, it may be appro¬ priate to call attention to a few major examples of this issue. When the German army group that had pushed into the Caucasus in 1942 was threat¬ ened with being cut off because of the Red Army’s victory at Stalingrad, 1 litler insisted that a small bridgehead across the Kerch Strait, separating the German-held Crimea from the northern Caucasus, be retained. This came to be called the Kuban bridgehead. Several German military leaders wanted the forces tied up there withdrawn to strengthen the southern portion of the front. Hitler insisted that the bridgehead be held because Germany would need the oil of the Caucasus to win the war, and it would be easier to resume the offensive in that direction if the Kerch straits had already been crossed. The bridgehead later had to be evacuated anyway—but that of course also released the Red Army units that had been tied down containing it up to that time. There is no evidence to suggest that an earlier shift of both sets of military units would have produced a different outcome at the southern end of the Fastern front. In the fall of 1944 three German army groups in different theaters of war were threatened by the real possibility < >f being cut off, essentially si multaneously, by the Allies. The army group defending southwest France was about to be cut off by a meeting of the Allied forces breaking out of the Normandy beachhead with those that had landed on the Mediterranean coast. Hitler authorized a withdrawal, and most of the two German armies in southwest France were extricated. The German army group in southeast Furope was about to be cut off by the Red Army’s occupation of Romania and Bulgaria, and then possibly joining Tito’s forces, which by this time controlled substantial portions of Yugoslavia. Hitler authorized a withdrawal that then took place. The German army group at the northern segment of the Fastern Front was threatened by a Red Army thrust to the Baltic Sea. Once cut off, a corridor was reopened to it; but when the Red Army again reached the Baltic, Hitler allowed some of the units trapped in western Latvia to be evacuated by sea but insisted that what came to be called the Courland bridgehead be held by the divisions he ordered to remain there. It was over this issue that General Heinz Guderian was dismissed in March 1945 from

vm

I Inu-.R and His Gukerala

his position as chief of the general staff of the German Army, a post he had held since July 1944. Why did Hitler want to hold on to western Latvia as opposed to south¬ west France, Greece, and Albania? The answer has to be found in his hopes of winning the war by the employment of new types of submarines. As the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, Admiral Karl Dbnitz assured him, holding Courland was essential for the control of the central Baltic, where the new submarines had to be run in before they could be sent into the Atlantic to turn the tide there once again, in Germany’s favor, and de¬ prive the American and British armies in the West of supplies and reinforce¬ ments. One is entitled to the opinion that these were the loony notions of the man who would succeed Hitler in 1945 and who maintained that he was Germany’s legitimate ruler until his death in 1980; but there was at least some coherence between this concept and Hitler’s simultaneous insistence on holding or destroying the ports on the French coast. As it was, the sol¬ diers stranded in Courland, like those holding some of the French Atlantic ports until the surrender of May 1945, became prisoners of war rather than additional cannon fodder, as Guderian preferred. The record shows that Hider believed until very late in the war that Germany still had a chance to win or at least to profit from a division within the coalition he himself brought together against Germany. But in this he was not alone. Donitz was one of many who still believed in achieving vic¬ tory late in 1944. Albert Speer, whom some imagine to have been a clearsighted if deluded Nazi, believed in the possibility of a German vic¬ tory or at least a satisfactory peace until late January 1945.14 Guderian ac¬ quired a stolen estate in German-occupied Poland during the war and ex¬ pected to keep it. Together with the senior officer on the rank list of the German army, Field Marshal Gcrd von Rundstcdt, he sat as judge on the court that threw out of the sendee those officers accused by the Gestapo of any connection with the effort to overthrow the Hitler regime in July 1944. At the time, both were secretly accepting bribes from their beloved Fiihrer; while the accused were not allowed to appear before the court themselves or to be represented. This travesty was called a Court of Honor (Ebrenof). It might well be suggested that Hitler and his generals deserved each other.

MlUI'AKY COiXtliRJiNCES 1942-1945

be

Notlsto nm Introduction

The best study of this issue is byjochen Thiess, Arcbitekt der Weltberrscbaft: Die “littd^iele” Hitlers (Diisseldorf: Droste, 1976). A good description from 1927 may be found in Gerhard L Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 2. There is an additional recent account by George R. Allen, “World War 11 Documents: The Find of a Lifetime,” A. II. Bookman’s Weekly, 87 (6 May 1991), pp. 1838-50. Felix Gilbert (ed. and trans.). Hitler Directs His War: The Secret Records of His Daily Military Conferences (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950). It should be noted that this edition contains less than a quarter of the surviving ma¬ terial. There is a full listing in Gerhard L. Weinberg, “Supplement to the Guide to Captured German Documents” (Washington, D.C.: National Archives, 1959), pp. 67-68. George Fischer, “Vlasov and Hitler,” Journal of Modem History 23 (1951), 58-71. George Fischer, Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War 11 (Cam¬ bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), Appendix II. Helmut Hciber (ed.), Hitlers IMgebesprechungen: Die Protokollfragmente seiner militarischen luigebesprechungen (Stuttgart: Deutsche Vcrlags-Anstalt, 1962). Gerhard I.. Weinberg (ed.), “Adolf Hitler und der NS-Fiihrungsoffizier” t ier/eljabrsbeftefur Zeityeschichte (1964), 445-56. “Zcitgeschichtc: Hider-Dokumentc,” Der Spiegel, January 10,1966, pp. 30-46. There are various editions of Hitler’s table talk in German and in English, but there is as yet no complete critical publication in eirher language. The most complete edition presently available for the war years is Max Domarus (ed.). Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945, Vol. 11, Untergang (1939-1945) (Neustadt a.d. Aisch: Vcrlagsdruckerci Schmidt, 1963. The linglish language edition is in two volumes but only the first one has appeared: Max Domarus (ed.), Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations 1932-1945, Vol. Ill, 7 be Years 1939-1940 (Wauconda, 1L: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 1997). An important addition: Heinz-Heinrich Wilhelm (ed.), “Hitlers Ansprache vor Generalen und Offiziere am 26. Mai 1944,” MiJitargescbbh/icbeMitteilungen 1976 No. 2, pp. 123-70. Oron |. Hale (ed.), “Adolf Hitler and the Post-War German Birthrate: An Un¬ published Memorandum," journal of Central European Affairs 17 (1957), 166-73.

/ Inu-.R and His Generals

13 Norman J. W. Goda, “Black Marks: Hitler’s Bribery of Senior Officers During World War II "Journal of Modern Histor)' 72 (2000), 413-52; Gerd R. Uebersdiar and Winfricd Vogel, Dimen and Verdienen: Hitlers Gescbenke an seine E/iten (Frank¬ furt: S. Fischer, 1999). 14 Alfred C. Mierzejewski, “When Did Albert Speer Give Up?” The HistoricalJour¬ nal31 (1988), 391-97.

Preface

by Helmut Heiber

T

T

he Stenographic Service at Fiihrcr Headquarters began during those late summer weeks of 1942 when the most serious crises of confi¬

dence and trust were taking place between Hitler and his military aides. The German army’s advance in the Caucasus, with the specific directive of tak¬ ing the road to Tuapse, was the source of the disagreements. The root cause, though, lay in I litler’s profound exasperation and apprehension regarding the failure of Army Group A to bring the oil fields of the Caucasus under German control. The campaign had stalled because of the overextended front lines, insurmountable difficulties with reinforcements, and growing Soviet resistance. By mid-August the military advance had practically come to a halt between Kuban and Terek. The August 30 war diary entry for military headquarters contains the following notes:

' The representations given in the first five sections, unless otherwise noted, are taken from the following sources: 1. Oral and written communication between the editor and Heinz Buchholz, Hans Helling, Ocrhard HcrrgcscU, Ludwig Kricgcr, Dr. Kurt Peschel and Dr. Ewald Reynitz. 2. Written records from Heinz Buchholz dated June 6, 1945, during his American assignment: “General Preliminary Re¬ marks on the Fragments from the Stenographic Service in the FHQ.” 3. George Allen: “Introduction to Hitler’s ‘Lagebcsprechungen,’” Supplement to the LB copy of the library at the University of Pennsylvania; in modified form, “On the DisA.V

/ Inu-.R AND His GhNEKALS

AV/

The Fuhrer is very much dissatisfied with the development of the situa¬ tion of Army Group A ... His criticisms were not directed at the original oiganization of the forces, but at the fact that the Army Group had not changed the deployment when it became clear that no further advance was possible. The Fuhrer sees little chance of success in taking the road to Tuapse. I Ic opposed the idea of pulling out the XXXXIX Mountain Corps from the Suchumer [Sochi] road to reinforce the Tuapse effort1

Hitler’s dissatisfaction affected not just the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A, Field Marshal Fist, but also the Chief of the General Staff, General Haider, who warned about severe dangers to the southern Eastern Front, from the Don River to the Caucasus. Haider had sent General }odl to inspect the situation in person, in order to lend additional strength and cred¬ ibility’ to his point of view. Jodi was Chief of the Military Staff at the Armed Forces High Command and was fully aware of 1 lalder’s opinions on strat¬ egy and leadership in the Russian operation, but was not directly involved with Army Group A. Jodi spoke with Fist at his headquarters in Stalino on September 7 and acknowledged after his return—on the basis of the conversation regarding the Field Marshal’s opinion—that the XXXXIX Mountain Corps should be pulled out and placed in the vicinity of Maikop for a breakthrough to the coast, i.e., in the direction of Tuapse. The Armed Forces 1 leadquarters staff war diary entry for September 8 noted: The Fuhrer is very disgrunded about General Jodi’s attitude, which is dia¬ metrically opposed to his own view. I le ordered that all transcripts of orders relating to the Army Group A command since the crossing of the Don River be placed before him.’

Hitler was particularly angered to have to hear Jodi cite his own direc¬ tions, and had to acknowledge that Fist had done nothing but follow and obey his—Hitler’s—orders. ' As a result of this confrontation with Jodi, the replacement of Keitel and Jodi by Kesselring and Paulus was left undecided until almost January 1943. This altercation must have already taken place on the evening of September 7 or in the early hours of the 8th, because not only were the communal meals at the Fuhrer Headquarters stopped from this day until the end, but on that morning cables were already being sent from Vinnitsa to Munich, leading to the establishment of the Stenographic Services of the Fuhrer Headquarters. The purpose of this service was to covery and Preservation of the Record” as introduction to Felix Gilbert, Hitler Di¬ rects His War, New7 York 1950. 4. Statements from General Buhle and General Warlimont.

Military Conferences 1942-1945

Nl/i

prevent such unjustified appeals, in Hitler’s opinion, to his words in the future. During the campaigns of the first two years of the war. Hitler had al¬ ready ordered twice-daily front-line military situation reports on positions at the front—a task that was at that time primarily carried out by Com¬ mander Jodi, in the presence of Keitel.The Commander-in-Chief and Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces branches were not regularly present at these meetings, but did attend on occasion to present reports or receive orders.4 With the beginning of the Eastern campaign, these conferences— enhanced by the sprawling layout of the “Wolfsschanze” headquarters near Rastenburg in East Prussia—became more systematic. According to the daily routine ordered by Hitler, the first and more extensive meeting, the “midday conference,” took place between noon and 3 p.m. and varied in length and number of participants, while the “evening conference,” held in the early or late evening hours, was usually limited to the discussion of changes that had taken place that day at the front. The scope of these situation conferences expanded again after Hider took over the direct command of the army in December 1941. From then on, his Commander-in-Chief was regularly included, at least at the midday briefings, and a regular program for the meetings began to develop. Until the end of 1942, the midday conferences opened with a general overview by Jodi, sometimes supported by reports by a Luftwaffe meteorologist regard¬ ing weather conditions and forecasts. The weather conditions report was given for the first time on December 8, 1941, and was provided as needed until the end of the war—however, usually before and during a German offensive, major enemy attacks or in special cases; the weather maps were normally only presented at the Luftwaffe situation reports. If such intro¬ ductions were not required (which was usually the case in the following texts), the appropriate general staff officers began with their individual situ¬ ational reports. The Army Chief of the General Staff usually began report¬ ing on the Eastern Front (for which, according to Hitler’s peculiar system of dividing and overlapping areas of authority, the Army High Command alone was responsible). Then came the situation report by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff or his representative, discussing the rest of the land war theaters. Jodi’s staff officers then presented the situation of their respective armed forces branches, both at sea and in the air. This sequence changed occasionally depending upon the current importance and activity level of each war theater. Hitler often concluded the proceedings—and also interrupted frequently during the meetings—by returning to the discussion of military activities that were important to him or arguing about political events. Contrary to what had become customary, political representatives

>:n>

Hitler and His Generals

were regularly present in later years. During the midday conferences, drafts of Armed Forces reports were presented for approval or modification, and at the end Hitler also frequently listened to foreign press reports, many of which were only loosely connected to military affairs. The conferences then became more casual and lost their original character, while the officers gradu¬ ally began to withdraw. Regular participants at the midday conferences—in addition to Hitler, his adjutants and the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command—in¬ cluded Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the Army Chief of the General Staff, along with a number of their staff members and adju¬ tants, and representatives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the Reichsfuhrer SS, and also Hitler’s war historian. Later, representatives of the Ministry' of Foreign Af¬ fairs and the Reich Press Chief appeared frequently, as well as occasionally with an official from the Ministry of War Production. In the last months of the war an official from the party office was also present on some occasions. If the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the Reichsfuhrer SS, the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe or the Chief of Naval Warfare happened to be at the Fiihrer Headquarters, they also took part in the conferences—which was often in fact the basic reason for their visit. Along with the commanding officers from the front, who were ordered to attend. Hitler also invited the participation of inter¬ ested department heads—primarily Ribbentrop, Dietrich and Speer—as well as foreign guests such as Mussolini or Marshal Antonescu.3 The evening conferences, by contrast, had a much smaller circle of participants—often only Hitler, with one adjutant, and those officers with delegated responsibil¬ ity for the Lastern Front situation report, the Armed Forces 1 ligh Com¬ mand war theaters, and the Luftwaffe. Beginning with the third week of the Eastern Campaign, I litler had had stenographic notes (in condensed form) taken during his “Table Talk.’’ These notes cover the period from July 5, 1941, through September 7, 1942. After the confrontation with Jodi in the evening following September 7, Hitler ordered that the stenographic record of the situation reports be kept as well. This measure had obviously been under consideration for quite some time, however, since a representative of Martin Bormann had sounded out Ministry Director Kienast, the Reichstag director, in mid-July about sending stenographers to the Fiihrer 1 leadquarters, and in the same month the OT [Todt Organization] was instructed to build a stenographers’ barracks at the Vinnitsa headquarters, then under construction. It is very likely that Hider had truly contemplated this earlier. Therefore, in light of his behavior at the end of the war, credibility should be given to his many explicit statements

Military Coslhri nchs 1942-1945

.\r

that the stenographic records were only indirectly intended to protect him from inaccurate reports from subordinates and false interpretations of his orders. His first priority' was to provide an accurate record for posterity' and history, assigning responsibility for every thing the German side did or did not do militarily during the war.6

11 ()n September 8 at 10:30 a.m., Hans Helling, Obergemeinschaftsleiter secretary and cryptographer at the Munich NSDAP head office, received orders to be ready to travel within the hour. He flew from Riem airport to Berlin, where he reported his arrival to Hitler’s adjutant in the afternoon. The next day he flew via Warsaw to Zhitomir, in the same airplane as Senior Government Official Dr. Kurt Haagen, a member of the Reichstag Steno¬ graphic C )ffice. C )n the afternoon of September 9, both reported for duty to Bormann’s adjutant, Heinrich Heim, in Vinnitsa and then to Bormann him¬ self. Here they found out for the first time the details of their intended assignment. Bormann had thought that the two alone could produce the stenographic records of Hitler’s military conferences, but the head of the party office was at first quite reluctant, since these requirements became clearly impossible to fulfill. It was a result of that discussion that, two days later, on September 11, two additional Reichstag stenographers, Dr. Kurt Pcschel and Karl Thot, arrived in the Ukraine. The Reichstag Stenographic Office had had little work since 1933. A department rarely allows itself to die a natural death, however, and Reichstag president Goring found use for stenographers in his numerous other func¬ tions and occasionally also “loaned” them out, so the de facto disappear¬ ance of the Reichstag did not also mean the end of the stenographic orga¬ nization. While parliamentary life had ended, the requirements of the bu¬ reaucracy in the ministries had grown. After 1933, Reichstag stenographers began to cover the proceedings of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry’ of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Transportation, etc. This had only been the case in limited form up to that point. They also assisted in various other areas: Gauleiter meetings, the Kiemoller trial, the proceedings of the Ger¬ man Legal Academy (including its various technical committees), the Kristallnacht Conference of November 12, 1938, the proceedings of the Defense Council, and the trial of General Fritsch, and the proceedings of the War Court, as well as the Criminal Law' Commission. Some stenogra¬ phers were drafted into military service when the war began, and whereas some of them were pro forma soldiers and given assignments in their area of expertise (for example, recording the conferences with the general in

•XV V

/ IrruAi and

His Ginhkals

charge of aviation production), most served in local defense units, propa¬ ganda companies, and Luftwaffe construction battalions. When Bormann requested stenographers for the Fiihrer Headquarters in September 1942, be told Ludwig Krieger, the head of the Stenographic Office, that the assignments meant a great deal of responsibility and that he therefore required highly qualified professionals who were also party mem¬ bers. But because there were vert' few individuals available who could fulfill both requirements, and military circumstances had to be taken into account as well, the political party affiliation requirement was dropped a few dap later with the new batch of stenographers. The two gentlemen who arrived at Vinnitsa on September 11 confirmed Bormann’s view that recording and editing daily meetings lasting two to six hours would require a much larger oiganization than was originally planned. In addition to recording the regu¬ lar situation conferences, stenographic services would be required at I litler’s “Sonderbesprechungen” or “special conferences,” which dealt with military engagements, operational plans, weapons issues, military-industrial questions, etc, with commanding officers or chiefs of staff from various units or army groups, with officers of the High Command or from the manpower and armaments production departments. Stenographers were also needed to lis¬ ten in and record Hitler’s telephone conversations. The military situation reports were first recorded on September 12, and four days later three addi¬ tional Reichstag stenographers joined the group: Senior Government Offi¬ cials 1 leinrich Berger, Or. 1 Ians Jonuschat and Or. Ewald Rcynitz, who be¬ gan working two days later after being sworn in. The scheduling of the two stenographic systems was based on three “tables,” or stenographer pairs: Table 1: Dr. Peschel/Dr. Jonuschat (Stolze-Schrev) Table 2: Dr. Reynicz/Thot (Gabelsberger) Tabic 3: Bcrgcr/Dr. Haagcn (Stolze-Schrey) Each pair had to record all discussions in a 24-hour period, then dictate the notes during the following two days. During the next few months, how¬ ever, it became obvious that this arrangement was still unsatisfactory. In December, when one stenographer became ill, it was decided to add another member of both systems to each group, allowing for a more flexible threeway rotation that would include rest davs and take illness and vacation into account. So on December 24, 1942, two new arrivals from the Reichstag office joined the group at the Fiihrer Headquarters (which had returned to East Prussia): Senior Government Officials Or. Fritz Dorr (Gabelsberger) and Heinz Buchholz (Stolze-Schrey). However, Or. Dorr found the emo¬ tional and physical strain of the Stalingrad campaign too taxing, and had to

AllUTARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

xvu

retire after little more than a month. Ludwig Krieger, director of the Reichstag Stenographic Office, replaced him on February 23, 1943. Krieger had been accompanying Goring on official trips for the past six months, but was now available. Dr. Peschel, who was familiar with the organization and its proce¬ dure, continued to act as head of the Stenographic Service at the Fuhrer I leadquarters. This arrangement continued unchanged until the end of the war, with one exception. Senior Government Official Berger was one of the victims of the July 20,1944, assassination attempt. Court Official Gerhard Herrgesell, who did not come from the Reichstag Office, but had served from 1928 to 1931 as parliament stenographer recording the proceedings of the provi¬ sional Reich Economic Council, replaced him. His Reichstag colleagues knew him from his activities during this period, and he used the required StolzeSchrcy system. After joining the Waffen SS in the artillery in 1940 due to a chance military transfer, Herrgesell had been recording government press conferences for the press office of the Reichsfuhrung SS. For the length of their tour of duty, the members of the Stenographic Service at the Fuhrer Headquarters were under the supervision and a part of the staff of Reichsleiter Martin Bormann for military and administrative concerns. However, technical orders could not be issued by Bormann, be¬ cause 1 litler had reserved this prerogative for himself—along with the right to grant permission to view the transcripts. Fiach one of the stenographers was personally sworn in by I lidcr before beginning work, and each had to sign a written statement promising to keep everything he saw and heard confidential, and agreeing not to take any notes for personal reasons or to make any copies of records or portions of records. The members of the Stenographic Service wore field-gray officers’ uni¬ forms with the Government Official insignia on their sleeve and were as¬ signed to a special barracks in Security District 1.1 litler’s adjutancy informed the stenographers about requirements for the meetings. If the conferences were taking place at field headquarters with their own briefing rooms or at the Berghof hall, well known for its panoramic window, the stenographers gathered with the other meeting participants to wait for Hitler. But if, as was the case in the final months of the war, the. meetings were held in his office in the Reich Chancellery8 or, later, in the bunker, the stenographers were regularly called to the meeting table before the other participants. They were the only ones seated (only toward the end of the war did the weakened Fuhrer join them at the table), either at both corners of the long sides or one at either of the short sides, with Hitler diagonally across and the other participants (at the midday meetings often 20 to 25 people) standing around the map-covered table. Both stenographers recorded the entire meeting.

Ni'tii

/ Inu-.R and His Ghnerals

Afterwards the transcripts were divided in half according to the noted time, and each stenographer dictated his half of the meeting notes, using the relevant section of his colleague’s notes as a control.9 The recording of these conferences, often many hours long—the long¬ est meeting lasted four hours—was extremely exhausting even for expert stenographers, which is why, from the beginning, it was customary to have double coverage for difficult assignments and parliament service.10 The to¬ tal length of the three regular daily meetings (two situation reports and one special conference) gradually increased as the war progressed. In 1942 the average number of transcript pages was 89; that number had grown to nearly 150 pages by 1945. Approximately 38 double-spaced pages corresponded to one hour of dictation time (the longest existing transcript, from the midday conference of January 27,1945, reached 95'A pages). As a general rule, each spoken word had to be recorded. Only rarely did Hitler make a sign that some unimportant parenthetical comment need not be recorded. As is cus¬ tomary in stenographic practice, random peripheral remarks unrelated to the topic of discussion were not recorded—such as Hitler’s occasional ques¬ tions about the time (he never wore a watch), his comments about his Ger¬ man shepherd Blondi, or other similar remarks. Otherwise, everything was recorded until the (often vague) end of the meeting—as a rule, as long as a general was still present or until his adjutant gave a sign. The final transcript was followed; dictated with two carbon copies—both on equal weight origi¬ nal document paper. The now outdated and therefore expendable situation maps for the relevant day were available to the stenographers at that point, and sometimes also a brief written outline of the situation report. If a loca¬ tion name or context was still unclear after reviewing these documents, the stenographers—who were of course unable to interrupt during the meet¬ ings—could now ask officers in the adjutancy or the operations staff (usu¬ ally Major Waizenegger) for clarification, although it was rarely necessary to do so. All three copies together with the two sets of shorthand notes, were given to Helling, who directed the Stenographic Service together with a colleague by the name of Lutz. The Stenographic Service had seven women typists, brought in from the NSDAP Headquarters, available to take dicta¬ tion from the stenographers. The designated “Fuhrer copy” and the two sets of original shorthand notes were collected and, when a certain num¬ ber had accumulated, periodicallv taken to Berlin by Helling or Lutz for storage in a vault in the Voss Strasse section of the Reich Chancellery. Helling and Lutz were allowed into this room only when accompanied by an officer of the security police. Before air strikes on German cities began Hitler had also ordered color slides (taken by Luftwaffe photographer

Ccfjyoght&d uatenal

MlLTlARY CoNFliRJiNCES 1942-1945

-VAV

Frenz) of culturally and historically important church windows to be placed in this vault. Of the two other copies, one was given to Hitler’s military historian Scherff to be used in writing the history of the war. The other was kept as a working copy in a safe in Helling’s office at the respective headquarters, available for reference in case of questions." For this purpose, Helling cre¬ ated a handwritten index for each transcript, which was placed in front of the document, copied by typewriter, filed in a folder and entered by Lutz into the document catalog. Also besides Scherff, the military leadership at the Fiihrer Headquarters often requested factual information from the tran¬ scripts, which could be easily located using the index. Earlier transcripts were also referenced about a dozen times to resolve arguments arising dur¬ ing situation conferences. The collection of working documents was complete with the exception of special conference S 29/42, which was the transcript of a presentation by Field Marshal Rommel. This meeting took place at the end of November 1942, after El Alamein, and the stenographers were given specific orders not to make any copies. In the Scherff collection there were also several other transcripts missing, as in some cases orders were given to make only' a single copy. Ill From the military perspective, claims have been made that these tran¬ scripts were no doubt falsified in Hitler’s favor. Apart from the tact that this statement would not apply to the great majority of the existing documents anyway—at least not those where a second transcription of the original shorthand notes is available—such an allegation is, after a careful examina¬ tion of the facts, clearly not the case in other situations either. Falsifying history—and ensuring that the falsification holds—is a laborious task requinng a great deal of diligence and care. It is unthinkable that Hitler him¬ self would have taken the time to edit the documents. Witnesses have also attested that he never once reviewed the transcripts.12 In fact, he was so sure of himself and his own infallibility (including militarily) that he would never have reviewed or corrected anything Any of the other persons in question either had no access to the transcripts or lacked the specialized knowledge to evaluate military events. None of the officers were allowed to view the records. Even Hitler’s official military historian. General Scherff, could only have made correc¬ tions to his own copy, which would not be of interest in this context. In any case, it is inconceivable that Hitler would order a man like Scherff, who—as

.w

/ Irru Ai and His Gunbrals

his writings show—was expected to function as military panegyrist and court historian,1' to doctor material whose meaning and importance was not yet clear. The stenographers or other Reichsleitung functionaries working at the Stenographic Service certainly did not possess the necessary authority. Be¬ cause of the circumstances of their work, there was never really the oppor¬ tunity or even the temptation. This was true also of Bormann himself, who, it is said, came to the office only once during a social evening. Because the Reichsleitung was not interested in the military situation conferences until 1945, and even then only occasionally sent a representative to participate, Bormann hardly concerned himself with the Stenographic Service at all. I le had his adjutants review the operations of the service only once—soon after the institution was established, on October 10, 1942. Revising the transcripts would have technically required the close coop¬ eration of Schcrff and Helling, which would have been nearly impossible considering that they worked in completely different divisions. And 1 litler was, in his almost self-hvpnotic manner, so convinced of the correctness of every single one of his decisions that a revision process of this sort would not even have been considered. On the contrary, he intended to use the transcripts to help catch (in supposed or actual mistakes) those gener¬ als who didn’t heed his advice. Even w hen Hitler gave the w ar up for lost, he didn’t order the transcripts destroyed—a low' level officer made that decision. I litler himself w’as much more concerned with specific arrange¬ ments for the last transcripts to be taken safely out of Berlin. He w'anted to leave a complete record that would demonstrate his innocence to posterity after the war. Errors, on the other hand, w’ere naturally unavoidable. One of the tw’o possible sources of mistakes (the other is addressed below7) wras in the re¬ cording of the meetings. Not just the length of the conferences but also the unfamiliar (at least initially) subject matter, chaotic discussion threads, and occasional individual conversations placed a great strain on the stenogra¬ phers and made reliable hearing difficult. Frequent comings and goings,14 telephone messages, noise outside the conference room, and other such distractions added to the difficulty7, as did certain peculiarities of the meet¬ ings, which Senior Government Official Buchholz noted as follows for the Americans on July 6, 1945: The military situation presentations were always based on maps, and usu¬ ally the individual sectors of the front w'ere indicated w ith a vague “here” and a general indication toward the map. Many questions were answered by refer¬ ring to written documents, which were then discussed without any clear expla¬ nation of their exact content. The Fiihrer and other participants w7ould fre-

Miutary Conferences

1942-1945

quently refer to questions that had been raised earlier, without explaining the subject very precisely. With his interposed questions, interjections and random transitions, the Fuhrcr expected a high degree of familiarity with the question at hand. For critical remarks in particular, he liked to use ironic or sarcastic expressions that could really only be properly understood by experienced lis¬ teners. The words of the Fiihrer sometimes contained a degree of ambiguity’, especially when he addressed a question at length or discussed the same subject repeatedly. It was sometimes only clear to the specialized participants if he was giving an order, making a suggestion, a rhetorical statement, a spontaneous utterance, or criticizing something. Aside from all these possibilities for random error, and excluding the circumstances of the second transcription discussed below, intentional^.hanges to the situation report transcripts can be ruled out.

IV By the second half of April 1945, when their work at Fiihrer Headquar¬ ters was coming to an end, the stenographers had accumulated around 103,000 pages of single-sided text.1' The night after Hitler’s 56th birth¬ day—when Goring, I limmler, Speer, and other prominent individuals, many airplanes, and a long column of trucks, left Berlin, by now threatened with being completely surrounded—six of the eight stenographers were also flown to Salzburg/Berchtesgaden. Drs. Haagen and Herrgesell, because of the rotation of stenographers, remained at the Fuhrer’s bunker in the Reich Chancellery to finish recording the last few meetings before the expected imminent shift of the Fiihrer 1 Ieadquarters to the “Alpenfestung” [the Al¬ pine Redoubt]. In addition to the members of the Stenographic Service, the Ju [Junkers transport plane], which took off in the early morning hours of April 21 from Berlin’s Schonefeld airport, also carried a number of boxes. These boxes contained the “Fiihrer copies” and shorthand notes of the situation report transcripts, which Helling and Lutz had removed from the vault in the Reich Chancellery during the night. After a short stop in Prague, the airplane arrived at Salzburg without any difficulties. From there, Helling took his material by car to Obersalzberg in the early morning where he stored it in an air-raid shelter behind the Berghof. The tunnel was to serve as a document bunker. He gave the key s to Dr. Peschel for safekeeping; but others must have had access to the hunker as well, as subsequent events would indicate. In Berlin, Haagen and Herrgesell recorded their last situation report on April 22, during which Hitler’s faith in victory—if not for the first time, at least for die first time publicly—collapsed. He believed the war to be lost.

-VA7/

/ IrruAi and His Generals

and decided to remain in Berlin for good.16 The two stenographers were released in order to take the records of the last 48 hours to their colleagues in Bavaria, so that—as Hitler expressly stated—the transcripts of those days would also be preserved for history. That same night Haagen and I lerrgesell flew out of Gatow. Although their aircraft was somewhat damaged by So¬ viet anti-aircraft batteries, they reached their destination and arrived at Riem at 6 a.m. on April 23. The members were all in attendance when the Steno¬ graphic Service of the Fiihrer Headquarters convened in a Berchtesgaden hotel the following day. War historian General Scherff also relocated to Berchtesgaden, and his influence was probably significant to the destruction of the transcripts. To¬ ward the end of April, he called the head of the Stenographic Service, Se¬ nior Government Official Or. Peschel, to raise the question of what should be done with the transcripts in light of the impending defeat and occupa¬ tion by American forces. Scherff made it plain that his opinion of Hitler as a general had changed, and he strongly criticized the military strategy of the last few years. Moreover, because he did not believe that any objective his¬ tory would be written in the coming decades anyway, he thought it best to destroy everything. Peschel agreed and did not change his mind despite sub¬ sequent objections from his colleagues.1 Scherff was not authorized to dispose of the copies that were under the administration of the Stenographic Service, but as the only specialist on location, he was no doubt able to exercise considerable influence. The actual order to burn the material was given by Senate President Muller, Bormann’s personal advisor. The execution of the order was carried out by a detail of the RSHA, probably part of the SD unit of SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr. Prank, which was stationed on the mountain. The destruction occurred on one of the first days in May, shortly before the American occupation. Buchholz and Lutz were present from the Stenographic Service for identifi¬ cation purposes. They drove with SS personnel to an OT barracks or work¬ shop in a wooded valley a few hundred meters beyond the I lintersee to the west of Berchtesgaden. The transcripts and shorthand notes had already been brought there (without the participation of the Stenographic Sendee), perhaps because of the April 25 RAP' air attacks on Obcrsalzberg or per¬ haps simply in preparation for the burning. The selected boxes were pulled out from under everything else, carried to an open place, emptied into a ditch and set on fire.18 But what happened to the two remaining longhand copies? Before he committed suicide in May, Scherff is supposed to have destroyed his copies, which, considering his previously expressed opinions, is highly likely.19 The other copies were stored with the Fiihrer copies in the vault of the Reich

MlLTlARY CoNtl’RIiNCES 1942-1945

xxiii

Chancellery when the Fiihrer Headquarters were transferred to Berlin in January 1945. These working copies were supposedly burned in the fur¬ nace of the Reich Chancellery immediately after the stenographers, with their shorthand notes and Fiihrer copies, traveled south during the night of April 21."" V American troops occupied Berchtesgaden on the afternoon of May 5. That evening they took over the Solekurbad Hotel where the stenographers and typists were staying, and asked them to leave with their private belong¬ ings and blankets to find different quarters—“if necessary to the church across the street.” They found lodging in the guestrooms of the neighbor¬ ing Cafe Grassl. Despite the civilian clothes they had brought with them, some of the staff were uneasy about their officers’ dress uniforms and ac¬ companying firearms, since the occupying troops could hardly be expected to understand the subtle differences between German uniforms. Those en¬ trusted with the “objective preservation of the spoken word” would sooner or later have to explain their presence in Bavaria, now that they faced the threat of internment or a POW camp. In response to publicly announced orders, firearms were collected and turned over to the Americans. Opinions about what to do next, however, remained divided. On May 7, Hertgesell and Dr. Jonuschat reported to local American military administration of¬ fices, identified themselves and offered to share their knowledge. They were sent to the Bellevue Hotel, where the previous Sunday Sergeant George Allen of the 101st Airborne Division had opened a Military Intelligence Service (MIS) station and was now screening applicants for the local admin¬ istrative positions which were almost completely vacant. Allen was fascinated by the prospect of being one of the first persons to be confronted with revelations about the life of the mysterious German dictator. In order to get the whole group together, Allen instructed his two visitors to bring their colleagues the following day. This was an arbitrary act on Allen’s part—and it is probably thanks to this decision that the transcript fragments of Hitler’s situation reports were saved. According to regulations, he should have arrested the stenographers and sent them to one of the numerous internment camps, where they would have disappeared among the local informers. But because of Allen’s call, on May 8—the day of Germany’s surrender—the seven men from the Fiihrer 1 leadquarters could begin assisting the American MIS. Only one member of the group did not come along and would be interrogated later by the Americans: Dr. Haagen had separated himself from the others and had found private quarters in

.v-wr

/ hru-.R and His Gunerals

another part of town. He was working as an interpreter tor the Berchtesgaden local administration.21 In the course of animated conversations between the stenographers and MIS personnel,22 as well as the war correspondents from American news agencies, the conversation turned to (either (in that day or the next) the documents brought to Berchtesgaden and the burning ceremony staged by the SS at the I lintersee. According to Allen’s recollections it was around May 10 when he drove out to the Hintersee with Dr. Peschel, Buchholz, and Herrgesell. There they rummaged unsuccessfully through the garage and workshop, looking for parts of the collection that may have been overlooked during the last week, but finding only files from the party chancellery, mili¬ tary maps and art objects. Then they' moved behind the building, between damaged Luftwaffe vehicles, to a ditch containing an ash heap more than half a meter high. With the help of the stenographers, Allen began to search carefully through the ashes to locate undamaged pieces On that day and the two that followed (when he returned alone) Allen located record remnants from approximately 50 conferences.’’ Some records were completely or al¬ most completely intact, while others consisted of only singed fragments or a few charcoaled pages. Some were typed transcripts, but most of them were shorthand notes—the latter in their protective envelopes, which is why in the respective cases both sets of shorthand notes, or parts of both sets, survived. The surviving documents were most likely on the edge or at the bottom of the pit, and were probably spared because of the obvious prob¬ lems of burning large quantities of paper that had been packed in too tightly. At the Bellevue Hotel, the stenographers were immediately put to work. The Stenographic Service operated in the same manner as at Fuhrer Head¬ quarters, but this time they were working for the Americans. Lour of the former Rcichsleitung typists, who were familiar with the material and the organization of the text, were available for transcription. The MIS provided typewriters, paper, and food from the former German military' supply7. De¬ spite all the denazification decrees. Dr. Peschel was again appointed to su¬ pervise the stenographers—although there was admittedly not a great need for leadership, since each person busied himself with his own fragments. The shorthand notes were again transferred to longhand, and the dam¬ aged portions were deciphered as much as possible. Generally, the same stenographer who had recorded and dictated the original notes worked on the same document once again. Only when it wras clearly advisable to adjust the division of labor, or in the case of transcripts by Berger and Dr. I laagen, did a different colleague familiar with the relevant system fill in. Neverthe¬ less, due to the length of time that had passed and the lack of supporting documents, mistakes w7ere unavoidable in the second transcription; as is evi-

Military Conferences 1942-1945

denced by the frequently misspelled or by now unidentifiable names of people and places. The other major cause of mistakes, and compared to the prob¬ lems mentioned above, likely the greater of the two sources of errors, was that factual errors will have naturally slipped in—especially when there were gaps in the text—however, one can say that these mistakes were exceptions. For the most part, even the contents of the second transcription can be considered an accurate portrayal of the conference proceedings. In order not to jeopardize the reliability of the second transcript, the stenographers rarely tried to fill in gaps from memory or rely on the context to supplement the existing text. All inferences from context, as well as words unclear due to fire damage, were placed in brackets. Indecipherable words and gaps due to fire damage were also indicated by punctuation. The frag¬ ments were numbered arbitrarily in the order in which they were processed, anti taken by Senior Government Official Buchholz, who operated as head clerk ihr the team. He catalogued the finished pieces, and forwarded them to the Americans in six copies. One copy, along with the original fragments, was sent to the U.S. Seventh Army Document Center.24 Three copies were given to the appropriate department of the War Crimes Commission, and two were retained by the MIS detachment of the 101st Airborne Division. Of these last two copies, one was designated for the division archives and the other remained with Allen, who later transferred the material to the University of Pennsylvania in his home city' of Philadelphia. The Institut fur Zeitgcschichtc obtained a microfilm from the University' of Pennsyl¬ vania in 1951. By early June the most extensive of the document pieces had been processed (at least those posing the fewest problems), and on June 6 Buchholz signed the previously mentioned “General Preliminary Remarks,” which would provide the Americans with a sort of user’s guide. Altogether, the stenographers’ work at the Bellevue Hotel in Berchtesgaden lasted about two months. The typists were released after the bulk of the tran¬ scription work was completed—when all that remained was the time-con¬ suming and puzzling work of deciphering the most heavily damaged pages. After the final pieces were deciphered and forwarded to Wiesbaden, and the Stenographic Service at the Fiihrer Headquarters (whose function Se¬ nior Government Official Krieger had already declared ended on May 4, before the Americans marched in) was finally disbanded.' In Wiesbaden, the War Crimes Commission selected three transcripts for use in the NuremThe team remained together, however (with the two exceptions of Dr. Peschel and Herigesell), and assisted the Americans in preparing for and conducting the Dachau trials.

I Inu.R and His Glnerala

.VA7 7

berg Trials and entered them into the prosecution’s list of exhibits: the evening conference of December 1, 1942 (1382-PS), the midday conference of De¬ cember 12,1942 (1383-PS), and the midday conference of January 27,1945 (3786-PS). The transcript from June 8,1943 (1384-PS), was also added from another source. Document 3786-PS, the transcript of the midday confer¬ ence of January 27, 1945, was included in volume 33 of the “Blue Series” (the trial of major war criminals before the IMG, Nuremberg, 1949). In addition, Felix Gilbert, a professor at Bryn Mawr College in Philadelphia, published an Fnglish translation of selected transcripts—about one-sixth of the total—in 1950. This collection, entitled Hitler Directs His lTWr(New York 1950), was, like the present work, based on the University of Penn¬ sylvania documents. Gilbert also published the original German text of the February 1, 1943, midday conference in Die Welt als Geschicbte in 1950 (vol. 10, pp. 226 ff.). The texts that follow are printed according to the 1945 compilation, for the most part without omission or abbreviation. Aside from the reduction of passages, often up to one-half page long, which were left out by the stenographers, < >nly single words without context were excluded. These some¬ times remained intact, isolated at the beginning or at the end of lines through¬ out three-quarters of a whole page. If some sense could be made from the context the relevant passages were included, even at the expense of read¬ ability-. Only obvious spelling errors were corrected, including, in clear-cut cases, names and units. Only two pieces were excluded: a)

b)

Fragment 19b, which consists of five multiple-line but gap-filled pieces. Four of these originated with the deceased Berger and were therefore dif¬ ficult to re-transcribe (one was a conference from the second half of July 1943, discussing measures against the expected defection of Italy). Fragment 54, which does not belong in the Stenographic Service tran¬ script collection. It is an insignificant eight-line piece, apparently the text or draft of one of Hider’s speeches. The date is unknown, and, as was typical practice in such cases, it was probably dictated by Hitler directly to a secretary (based on the format—“Fiihrer typeface” and wide spacing).

The collection recovered from the Hintersee is supplemented here by transcripts of two additional special conferences, which were the only previ¬ ously known transcripts from the series of conferences recorded by the Stenographic Service at Ftihrer Headquarters. These were probably extra copies that on special instruction had been filed in another department. One of these transcripts covers the previously mentioned meeting between Hitler, Keitel and Zeitzler on June 8, 1943, and the other is the record of a meeting with Jodi on July 31, 1944. With the addition of these two, all cur-

Miijtary Conferences

1942-1945

xxvu

rently known (and presumably all existing) verbatim transcripts and tran¬ script fragments are accounted for in this edition. To assist the reader, a general overview outlines the development of the military situation between the dates of the transcripts.

VI Goring confided toGoebbelson March 1,1943, that the working meth¬ ods at the Fiihrer Headquarters were thoroughly flawed, especially the new requirement that stenographers be present at situation conferences to record every word. “Eventually,” Goebbels noted in his diary, “the Fiihrer will be disadvantaged by this, as he never makes any secret of his opinions, while the generals always speak with the record in mind...’” Exactly the same criticism is made today by Hitler’s conversation partners—but in reverse. Which of the two parties is correct? Hitler? The generals? Or both? Or neither of the two? This problem is relevant in similar situations today, such as radio or television broadcasts of parliamentary sessions. The often-discussed dan¬ ger arising from such a recording process is also present in the case of the situation reports: I litler himself had, as already mentioned, indicated that the transcripts would play a role in the judgment of posterity, and the generals were no doubt aware of this. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this fact could have had a decisive influence on the course of the discussions. One can certainly address future readers in contemplative diary entries, and for some time one can also—especially when questions of destiny are at stake—speak thoughtfully while gazing out the window instead of to a crowd. But it is impossible to deliberate on the future judgment of histo¬ rians day after day for years, while not only speaking to future generations with every utterance but also making countless decisions that often dealt with matters of seemingly little importance and whose effects would not be immediately clear anyway. Moreover, it does not appear readily explainable how this falsified “view of posterity” was supposed to have operated. If Hitler’s opinion was that ' The sentence ends: “...Zeitzler, of course, excluded.” (Goebbels Diaries, pub¬ lished by Louis P. Lochner, Doubleday 1948, p. 265). This expression of sympathy is insignificant here, as it no doubt goes back to the united stand that both had taken against Alfred Rosenberg that day—and which is why Goebbels had written in his diary 20 pages earlier that he had “found in Zeitzler a good friend.” [NDT: Goebbels Diaries, p. 261, “T believe T have found a good friend in Zeitzler.”]

.VA77/V

HnuzR and His

Generals

Division X should be moved here or there, while General Y maintained that the units were needed more where they were and therefore argued against the transfer, then the two rivals would, of course, each be looking for the best possible outcome for the current situation. It is difficult to compre¬ hend why either 1 litler or General Y would have argued for a different solu¬ tion than the one he actuallv thought best, simply because his position was being recorded on paper. If hasty statements or decisions could be avoided through such a procedure, so much the better. But of course there was also the possibility—primarily on Hitler’s part— of subsequently placing the blame on others when an operation failed be¬ cause of poor decisions. For such an exercise a great deal of caution would be required, especially in view of the fragmented nature of this document collection. If a complete copy of the conference transcripts existed, there would be few unresolved problems regarding the evaluation of German military leadership, at least during the second half of World War II. It was not Hitler’s will but an unfortunate chain of seemingly minor events and decisions during the turbulent days of Germany’s collapse that prevented this. Nevertheless, the remains—perhaps one hundredth of the total collec¬ tion—that were saved by chance, provide a historical record that is not to be underestimated. 1 lere we have perhaps the only firsthand case where, in the postwar settling of accounts between the generals and Hitler, we can hear not only the accusers but also the accused. There are only a few other places, and unfortunately even here there are only a few single points, where is it possible to separate the decisions, interpretations, and opinions of Hitler from those of his generals and the generals from Hitler without relying on the words of just one of the parties. Hitler and the generals—or, more broadly and euphemistically—Hitler and the Armed Forces! The preparation, execution, and breakdown of a marriage of convenience between two partners with little love for each other begins with the Freikorps and putsch episodes of the years after World War I and continues through the Ulm military trial and the fall of Rohm to the rcintroduction of conscription, the Frirsch crisis, up until the ups and downs of the Second World War, and the July assassination attempt. There is a great deal of evidence of Hitler’s increasing antipathy toward the generals. Goebbels noted on March 9, 1943, in his diary: The Fiihrers opinion about the generals was unfavorable. They cheated him, he said, wherever they could. Besides, they were uneducated and did not even understand their own profession of arms—the least one could expect of them. They could not be blamed for lacking culture, for that wasn’t part of their upbringing, but the fact that they knew so little even about the purely material questions of war was absolutely against them. Their training had been

MlUTARY

CoNFl’RLNCES

1942-1945

.V.VAV

wrong tor generations. We could now see the results of such education in our corps of higher officers. 1 was able to give him some examples from my own experience to confirm the Fiihrcr in his views. (Gotbbds Diaries, p. 280.) And the contrite renegade 1 Ians Frank, in lm Angesicht ties Galgens, re¬ called even stronger pronouncements, which presumably were also made before July 20, 1944 when Frank spoke to I litler for the last time on Febru¬ ary 6, 1944: If there was anything in the world that Hitler was inwardly hostile to in German history, it was that circle of the general staff which “Moltke and Schlieffen had long since betrayed, forgotten and sold,” as he repeatedly said, and which had become a ‘‘special caste of particularly snobbish, pretentious airheads and destructive vermin to the nation, with no imagination, full of sterile fertility, cowardice and vanity.” Another time he said, “Those gentlemen with their purple stripes on their trousers are sometimes more repugnant to me than the Jews, since the Jews at least fully acknowledge to themselves that they never want to be soldiers, while the generals claim that entitlement only for themselves.” He was also the source of the often-quoted statement: “The gen¬ eral staff is the last order of Freemasonry that I have not yet done away with.” (Dr. Hans Frank: bn Angesicht des Galgens, Miichen-Grafelfing, 1953, p. 243.) On the other hand, it is entirely understandable that military scholars and experts were also unable to muster much sympathy for Hitler—the self taught upstart who suddenly established himself as a petty and critical commander, and who sometimes made them stutter and stammer with his detailed knowl¬ edge of specific areas. Already die “old gentleman,” Reich President and Field Marshal von Hindenbutg—whom Hitler, with his typical theatricality, had suggested should depart to Valhalla—had made snide remarks to his friends von Ahr’ anti I lalm about that “Bohemian soldier.” Should others, when re¬ sentment is added to self-importance, be expected to be more magnanimous? These human motivations would be enough—irrespective of doubts and ob¬ jections based on ethical, moral or other worthy reasons rooted in broad, established tradition—to oppose the rootless charlatan with his fatal readi¬ ness to assume criminal responsibility for everything he did. It is therefore hardly surprising that one finds very few among Hitler’s former military colleagues—with all self-evident reservations regarding the many other areas not to be discussed here—who do not view their com¬ mander-in-chief as an exclusively negative factor in the military7 strategy7 and conduct of the war. Aside from a few irrelevant exceptions and a handful of yes-men like Schmundt and Burgdorf, one can characterize the generals (at least those of the Army7) as having serious reservations about Hitler’s mili¬ tary leadership. Some of them were downright hostile. Some demonstrated

/ Inu-.R and His Generals

.XNVV

their opposition openly—often at the risk of their lives—and the rest af¬ firm it today quite plausibly in conversation and in an unending stream of memoirs. For the most part, we have been able to see Hitler the military leader only through the eyes of these generals. Especially during the years of self¬ justification this often led to grotesque situations. Tt was easy to accuse the Commander-in-Chief, all things being equal, for having lost the war and the battles (since he held overall responsibility and was in any case dead), while the no-less-impressive military successes were—sometimes rightly, some¬ times wrongly—attributed to others. Since then, this simplification has been revised. Not only foreign military writers but also German military experts who did not participate in (at least not influentially) key events at headquarters, have, in well-grounded analyses and demonstrations, de¬ bunked the view presented by the survivors, which had become the stan¬ dard interpretation. It is not true that—in simple black and white terms—the reasonable and promising ideas of Hitler’s General Staff were regularly overridden by the stupid ignorance of a nonsense-planning and nonsense-demanding amateur, and that the war (the new sage was hard to ignore) need not have been lost if the confused ideas of the “commanding corporal” hadn’t caused him to continually thwart, reverse and generally cancel the spectacular plans hatched by his assistants. It may suffice to refer to the two events which the revisionists used at that time, and which led to the most striking re¬ sults: the French campaign of 1940 and the Russian winter of 1941-42. While it is not our purpose to write an outline of the history of World War IT, we have attempted nevertheless—as an interim step—to provide at least a preliminary summary as far as the central figure of the situation reports is concerned. On the plus-side, I litlcr’s vision and instinct for operational questions and opportunities can no more be denied than certain positive and, at least in clear-cut situations, successful leadership qualities: steadfastness and forward-driving energy. In addition, he had an almost phenomenal talent for memorizing technical military literature and for mastering theo¬ retical military and historical information. He also had a good technical understanding and was therefore able to see potential applications for modern weapons. All of these capabilities astonished and confused the experts on more than one occasion. One can say without exaggeration that Hitler was one of the most knowledgeable and versatile technical military specialists of his time. And there is adequate evidence that his abilities went beyond simple rote memorization of instruction manuals, naval yearbooks, etc. J

Military Conllrlnces

1942-1945

AWAY

On the other hand. Hitler had no general staff training. And because he did not have it, he despised it. This attitude had a negative effect, especially when the retreat battles of the second half of the war placed demands on the military leadership that went beyond the “presuppositions of common sense” Moltke refers to. A general’s craft of being able to defeat an aggres¬ sive adversary through mobile and flexible defense, was not among 1 litlcr’s qualities. Because of his doubts about the aggressive spirit and combative energy of his generals (valid in part, and groundless at other times—and later taking on pathological characteristics), every countervailing influence was increasingly resisted. Isolated encircled pockets dug themselves in, hop¬ ing vaguely for offensives to come, while weakened and irrelevant positions were held numhly and stubbornly, and imaginary flanking movements were ordered to close gaps that had long since been closed. These activities were hardly suited to stave off impending disaster. The only question still open is whether or not the flexible military strategy recommended so highly today by Hitler’s adversaries would really have provided an alternative. In addition to his operational blunders. Hitler was interfering with increasing frequency in tactical movements on the battlefield, where he was often inspired by his experiences in the trenches of World War I. His interference clashed omi¬ nously with the traditional Prussian-German army chain of command, still deeply rooted despite some changes due to improved means of communi¬ cation. In these collected transcripts, how Hitler, with his time as military commander running out, took increasing refuge in reminiscences from the World War I strike us as grotesque—as if the experiences of a private could somehow show him the way out of new strategic dilemmas. Ultimately, however, the triumphant success in France in 1940 broad¬ ened Hitler’s sense of mission (which until then had been focused primarily on the internal politics of the Third Reich) to include his military activities. In the successes achieved in the west despite frequent disagreements with his colleagues, Hitler—tending toward hubris and driven onward by a sub¬ servient environment—saw confirmation of the fact that the assignment Providence had given him also extended to the area of military leadership. From then on, his opinion could really only be imparted ex cathedra. With regard to fundamental questions there could be no further mistakes—only adverse circumstances, subordinates’ failures and treacherous allies. Nevertheless, one must grant that many of Hitler^ military decisions until very near the end, were in the technical sense thoroughly reasonable— more reasonable, in any case, than the usual version of events would lead one to believe. In the published transcripts that follow there are a number of examples of Hitler’s decisions that are usually thought of as insane, overly confident, or based on blind emotion at best, but which were actually rooted

.V-V.V//

/ Inu-.R

and His Ghkerals

in considerations that at least at the time seemed plausible, even when in hindsight they cannot be judged as completely objective. And as already mentioned, there were also decisions that were fundamentally correct—even in hindsight—and which were successful or averted disaster. It would be difficult to reach a clear and unassailable judgment about whether or not 1 litler’s mistakes, all things considered, outweigh his intuitively correct de¬ cisions. But in any case, this is relevant only with regard to the progression of the war, not its outcome. Hitler, trusting in the guidance of Providence and in his military genius, had already taken fateful steps against the politi¬ cal outcome of the war, an area where he had in effect, already capitulated in 1941. Whatever one credits or does not credit Hitler with as military leader, and whatever pieces of the mosaic are missing from this collection that would complete his portrait, one point should not be overlooked under any circumstances: the German Armed Forces were not defeated in World War II because Hitler led them poorly and continually handicapped his generals, nor because the clever instincts of the Fiihrer were diluted or sabotaged by his generals, who were at the very least narrow-minded if not downright evil. However much his allies, secret agents, resistors or anyone else is to be blamed, whether or not there was betrayal or sabotage, and however disastrous 1 litler’s individual or even collective military strat¬ egy decisions were, militarily the war could not have been won after 1941, and it wasn't won before 1941, despite dazzling batdefield victories. The war itself and the constellation into which it had to be fed, were the result of Hitler’s politics, and only politically might it still have been possible to at¬ tempt to get out the of the war with as little damage as possible. The decisions to pursue “total war,” and “war until five minutes past midnight” were not military decisions but political ones. These and many others bur¬ dened Hitler the statesman, not the general. But here we are concerned only with the latter—not with Hitler the politician, not with the destroyer of Europe, the executioner of the lews, or the man with racial delusions and fantasies of extermination. Though all of these characterizations come together into a single person, we can examine the individual parts one by one, as long as we remain aware of the grim complete picture. The nega¬ tive hero cult, however, depicting Hitler as the demonic destroyer of gi¬ gantic proportions (in all areas, and often allowing one characteristic to take on undeserved importance), is still a hero cult. One must learn to un¬ derstand that overall there are some facets that can make this man appear average or even moderately good.

Military CoxthRi ^cm 1942-1945

•xxvsvV/

VII The following transcripts cover precisely the period when military for¬ tunes were changing and the turning point toward military defeat was reached. The path covered here stretches from the Caucasus to the Oder, from Cirenaica to Bologna, from the Atlantic to the Rhine. With the ex¬ ception of the amazingly stable Armed Forces High Command (OKW), we are missing a considerable number of names of the people who were involved in the fanfare of special communiques. Regarding the Army, not only Brauchitsch but also Haider finally faded back into civilian life, and of his two successors, one embodied only to a limited degree (and the other not at all) the typical character and training of the Prussian-German general staff. Also Admiral Raeder fails to reappear, and we see the re¬ placement of not less than four Chiefs of the General Staff at the head of the Luftwaffe. However, even the Hitler of 1943 is no longer the Hitler of 1940. He no longer fights easily with good fortune at his side, but now does battle only doggedly against his fate. Once the war lost its seasonal character, he buried himself in his headquarters—in that “mixture of monastery and con¬ centration camp,” as Jodi described the Wolfsschanze at Nuremberg—anti dedicated himself to military operations, relegating his position as Reich Chancellor to a mere sideline. The soldier who decided in 1918 to become a politician had now decided to become a soldier once again. Only occasion¬ ally did the Fuhrer of the Greater German Reich come up to the surface from his lair inside the bunker—for a stay at Berchtesgaden, to meet with his Axis allies for one of the increasingly essential “hypnotic treatments” as he called them or, more rarely, and only at first, to participate in acts of state in Berlin. Besides those exceptions. Hitler returned to his capital, the center of political life of the Reich, only in the final months of the war, and then practically as a fugitive fleeing the advancing Red Army. The person to whom he wanted to speak was transported in his pseudo-reality to East Prussia or the Ukraine. Hitler was interested in one subject alone: compelling the gods of war—by the force of all his fanatical will—to favor him again. All other issues became meaningless. For the second time in his existence, he experi¬ enced war as his vital element. In addition, in 1943 Hitler wras, aside from his disputed psychosis, physi¬ cally a sick, worn-out man. Only Dr. MorelPs suspicious quack drugs, whose side effects were unknown, slowed his quickening decline. In the winter of 1942-43, after suffering from stomach pains and dizzy spells for a year, he was further afflicted by a trembling of the limbs on the left side of his body, which soon made public appearances impossible. Today his illness would lie

XV.V//'

/ Iitler and His

Generals

diagnosed as paralysis ajytans, or Parkinson’s disease. Parkinson’s disease is a degenerative disease of the brain that causes serious nerve damage,but which also affects the patient’s mental and emotional faculties, frequently leading to paranoid and delusional thoughts. These elements, which carry weight on both sides, should not be for¬ gotten when reading anti attempting to draw conclusions from the tran¬ scripts. Once again, regardless of other reservations, momentous revela¬ tions should not be expected due to the fragmentary character of the collec¬ tion. At best, the information should certainly be viewed as preliminary evi¬ dence; partial evidence of a Hitler who, in endless arrogant ranting, criti¬ cised only others and saw mistakes and failures only in others, a Hitler who interfered in tactical military operations to the point of deploying regimen¬ tal groups and artillery battalions, who displayed a staggering ignorance in the evaluation of foreign peoples (for example the United States!), and who showed increasing symptoms of political wishful thinking, which led to un¬ founded hypotheses and a readiness to grasp at straws. This should also be seen as evidence of a Hitler who can captivate his audience through his amazing command of detail, a Hitler who for some decisions was capable of offering a logical rationale, and a Hider who appears not to have been as isolated in his decisions opposing the rational rest of the world as we are often led to believe. There is also evidence on the other hand favorable to those who were part of 1 litlcr’s military entourage—its emphadc representation of its own opinions, as well as its silence, agreement and compliance is also apparent. Reading even these comparatively few recovered pages is enough to create quite a clear picture of many of the people who were involved in military decisions—their content and their character. Before reaching the end, the attentive reader will know in each single case the role each person played and what kind of evaluation that person deserves. The reader will know that some challenged Hitler at considerable risk, but also that some willingly knew and accepted more, without resisting, than they would later be willing to admit. This book offers an inside view of the German High Command and military’ leadership and the opportunity to get to know its personnel, a con¬ tribution to the portrait of Hitler, and some insight into the course of mili¬ tary history—more should not be expected from this collection of tran¬ scripts. But even considering the fragmentary nature of the compilation and all the reservations we have mentioned, this collection should be viewed as a unique historical document, because it would be hard to find another place where considerations and decisions at the highest military level were the subject of regular verbatim records.

MAPS

XXXV

Map 1. Hie Mediterranean between autumn 1942 and 1943. Schematic representation of the progressive withdrawal of the German and Italian armored divisions from Egypt and Libya, as wefl as the battles in Tunisia and Sicily.

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„ something, if I could propose to the Duce—if I meet with him—to establish 6 Fascist divisions, which he would take out of the M-divisions259 and we would establish, organize and train in Germany. They should consist of only tried and true Fascists. We could help them with the command and provide them with weapons. I’m thinking here of Italy, too, because to him two such divisions—one in Rome and the other (in northern Italy) are not less than ... God knows what ... Let’s see, what the Duce ... thinks. We keep having to (supply) weapons anyway. There is no point in continuing like we have been. 1 can be quite frank (with the Duce), because he has ... told, that I’m going to tell him the whole truth about (the losses) in the East. I’ll tell him: if you ... set up from scratch, you won’t achieve anything Of course, (you could) make up for it, provided you (had a) decent officer corps.

Military Ccwylrlxcls 1942-1945

77

If you don’t have that (and) if you don’t start from scratch, the new forma¬ tion will be doomed from the very beginning. In that case you would have to begin with (Adam and) Eve, otherwise the work would be useless. He has (good) people among diem, of course, but they can’t prevent the whole ... The M-battalions were included in the various divisions, but they’re worn down there and don’t haw any value or impact. This will only change when he himself establishes 6 divisions to start with, and then 8, 10, or 12 divisions. If we have to supply weapons to them, then let’s supply them for these units. They’ll be excellently armed and give him support in his own country. As soon as he has four such divisions at his disposal, he’ll be in a position to have his way and start disbanding the pathetic army divisions or integrate other officers ... in order to bring about a gradual improvement. (Without them) he can’t do it. (This is) in our own interest. If there were Fascist (units) trained by us in North Africa, they’d be better than four such divi¬ sions, (who because of) their incapable commanders and their ... take off at the first gunshot.... told me: one sees among the people many wonderful...; but they didn’t succeed in ... separating them. They just ... around every¬ where ... and don’t have any zeal. The officers have no sense of responsibil¬ ity; their only thought is to go (to) the coffee shop.

Norway JODL: We should implement the following changes in Norway: The 280th [Infantry] Division should move up from this area and take control of the northern sector, which could not be commanded from Bergen as it was completely separated. In exchange, die 214th [Infantry] Division should move in here, and the 710th [Security] Division, having been strengthened by add¬ ing another regiment, should take control of the entire southern coast uTiere the danger is small. The majority of these changes have already been carried out. The 730th Infantry Regiment has been pulled out. It’s to be relieved by a battalion. Three siege battalions have come in for that The 280th [Infantry] Division has taken control of this sector. It’s the least exposed, ... Sogne Fjord has, but no ... behind ... the 730th Regiment has been brought down here (and has) relieved the 367th [Regiment]. The 367th Regiment was moved to the Stavanger (area), which is, of course, very important. This area has been taken over by the 214th Division with two infantry regiments and 3 siege battalions ... for the most part carried out. (Because of the unsuitable weather conditions) we have seen relatively tew’ air operations in Norway dur¬ ing the last week. 7,000 mines have been (laid). Due to snowdrifts, the road north of Fauske is completely impassable. That is unusual (because) this road can normally be kept open. But (at the moment) it’s closed.

7,S'

HnuiR and His Geu\erals

Situation in the air CHRISTIAN: Last night, 5 mines and 19 high-explosive bombs were dropped on seven towns in the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area, re¬ sulting in 11 dead and 69 wounded. During the air raid against Hamburg, a total of 22 mines, 360 high-explosive bombs and 40,600 incendiary bombs were dropped in 28 places. 2 mines and 31 high-explosive bombs were dropped on Hamburg alone, and 20 mines, 300 high-explosive bombs, 30 incendiary bombs and 21 phosphorus bombs on WedelA" THE FUHRER: Were there not many more in Wesel? CHRISTIAN: In Wedel261 there were considerable losses: 20 dead, 150 wounded, 10 (missing). Out of the total of 700 homes, two-(thirds) are (either destroyed) or damaged. ... out of 8,000 inhabitants ... are (home¬ less). The station was heavily damaged. Traffic is ... maintained. An optics factory had some buildings damaged, resulting in a production loss of 20%. This factory produces 50% of the optical systems for Panzers (and) ... optical systems, of which 20% were lost. Last night’s total losses in the Reich were ... dead, 295 wounded and 17 missing persons. (Today) from 10 to 11:05 a.m., bomber formations of initially 50 to 60 aircraft penetrated the territory of the (Reich), but the majority of them were driven away by fight¬ ers.262 20 to 25 aircraft then flew on to Hamm, where a total of 28 buildings, including the station post office, were destroyed. Direct hit on the wire industrv. There arc two factories there, one owned bv United Steelworks, the other by Krupp. For the time being, 50% of the production facilities of the two factories are damaged. But production will be maintained by immedi¬ ately relocating the factories. Only one track at the station was temporarily interrupted by a time bomb ... relatively few dead and injured people ... (but) one more report concerning this matter. It states that... (a number of) people are still trapped in the works’ air-raid shelters. (It’s not yet clear) whether they will be rescued. If they can’t be dug out (alive), the number of the dead would increase to ... THE FUHRER: How many were brought down? CHRISTIAN: Ten! One of which is not yet confirmed. The fighters and the anti-aircraft artillery are still quarreling about it. Apart from that, noth¬ ing out of the ordinary is happening in the West. Today there are ... no reports about our action in the Mediterranean region. The enemy attacked Reggio and Trafpani), but didn’t cause any damage. T/m1 East ZEITZLER: Generally speaking, the large-scale attack from the north has been driven back. It wTasn’t conducted on a broad front. A major part of the

Military Cokthrlacih 1942-194 5

79

heavy fire was of a diversionary nature. The temperature in the region of the Seventeenth Army is now minus two degrees. Rain has turned to snow, so they still have problems. There was no action along the entire front. Up here the enemy attacked, apparently in order to penetrate here and get this group out, as these ... not get through (anymore). But he was driven back ... suffered losses from the (flank) attack ... won and pushed them back ... was pressed in further, but they’re ..., they put up very fierce resistance. CHRISTIAN: The air transports improved today (because of) the frozen ground. Details (are not yet) available. ZEITZLER: A minor scouting raid took place in this ... area of Army Group South. A single tank attacked here and was destroyed. This is the place were the lines were penetrated, but they don’t wish to do anything about it because it’s very’ difficult to bring the front back. (It’s in) a deep gorge. Nothing out of the ordinary on this front. It’s not been confirmed yet whether the motorized corps are ready. Up here, we again see a north¬ ward movement. All in all, the advance to the Donets was quite successful. The 62nd (Infantry ! Division has advanced to this point, and the 19th (Panzer! Division has cleared out this curve. The 19th (Panzer] should be withdrawn and will stay behind the lines to provide emergency help if required. It has been relieved by tire 62nd Division. The 3rd Panzer Division has also ad¬ vanced to this point. They’ve also pushed forward to here. It’s not quite clear yet hoyv far they’ve advanced. THE FUHRER: Do they believe that they’re in the position ... during muddy conditions, if the 19th Panzer Division ... ? ZEITZLER: I think he intends to ... On this front, too, they (advanced) as far as the Donets. (The) ... division moved closer and moved into these ... They’re supposed to clear out this curve and then stay up there. The 17th Panzer Division was attacked in the morning and launched a counterattack during (the afternoon). The result is (not yet quite) clear. (The advance) into this area yvas relatively unsuccessful. Part of the reason was that (the terrain) was still in poor condition. They advanced a little further along the road. Also, the bulk of forces were needed for the pocket. They moved in on the pocket 263 from all sides. According to the army group, quite a number of troops are in the pocket; this is quite possible. He’s still radioing desperately from the pocket. Here are a few radio messages sent by one of the tank corps. The 18th Tank Corps reported, “We can’t cross the Donets with our heavy equipment; we hay'e to leave it over there.” (Here it is) good enough that we can drive ... (to Stalino). These movements ... one can drive through this area. It’s only ... into Stalino. This (route), too, will be passable soon. Here’s one ... it will be OK on March 11. According to forecasts by inhab¬ itants and meteorologists, there’ll be frost until March 7, then temperatures

SO

Hitler and His Generals

will be around the freezing point... and this is when the muddy period will begin. CHRISTIAN: Today, there were difficulties here (because of) adverse weather.264 ZEITZLER: There was little action on this front, except for (a minor) at¬ tack here. THE FUHRER: Is the fellow encircled there? ZEITZLER: Generally speaking, yes. Here there’s only one small gap. Noth¬ ing unusual on this front. Just one attack here. The 167th [Infantry] Divi¬ sion is advancing up there, in order to get to that place. CHRISTIAN: The Luftwaffe focused on this area, with the First and Fourth Panzer Armies and with the majority of the men in the encirclement. The action was interrupted by several snow showers caused by bad weather. Tonight’s conditions are acceptable ... a very clear and good night, probably ... low temperatures, around minus 6 degrees ... ZEITZLER. Everything went according to plan in the south. The sector is now completely occupied ... [the enemy] is retreating The 332nd [Infantry] Division takes over (this sector), and the 4th Panzer Division will be placed at the flank. Little action was seen (on this) front. Only one attack near Sumy; (it was) driven bade ... The division is moving its last convoys. It came in very well. In the “hatch”265 here in the center, the situation is still (unclear). Aerial reconnaissance reported a column in this area, but (there’s still) a question mark. The Hungarian covering division266 that was (in this circle) withdrew without an order. It’s questionable whether the enemy has already advanced to this point. Up there, the enemy advanced to Sercdina Buda and the next village. The part of the Hungarian covering division that is located in this area will probably pull out, too. But now parts of the 3rd Mountain Division have arrived—one regiment—and diey’ll be pushed for¬ ward to provide security themselves. Nothing much happened here, bur more powerful attacks occurred in this area. Again, he attacked from all sides ... Strong ... had moved into the sector of the 707th [Security] Division. Field Marshal Kluge26'... is taking the (position) back. His final aim is ... will be massively flooded afterwards ... a muddy period following ... He mounted a major attack against the... division. (Fortunately,) the 78th [in¬ fantry] Division with its numerous assault guns is there. All attacks were driven back with very severe losses among the enemy. Nothing in particu¬ lar on this front. (Here, too,) nothing’s happened yet. However, we see downward movements from up there. Here, he didn’t attack as fiercely as during the previous day's. He (mainly) attacked the 208th [Infantry] Divi¬ sion and the 5th and 9th Panzer [Divisions] ... All attacks were driven back ... decided to (deploy) the 296th [Infantry] Division up there after

Military Conflrlnces 1942-1945

SI

all. It will arrive there tomorrow. He hadn’t yet decided whether to deploy it here or there. But he knows that there’s a considerable threat to this area up here. Regarding these movements, he followed where the three red ar¬ rows are. He then mounted a major attack against the 2nd Panzer Division and the 337th Jlnfantry] Division, but was driven back, suffering heavy losses. This is still the old position; there’s still one piece of the old position in there. Up there, he just probed the area with reconnaissance parties. Tonight they’ll move back to the broken green line, while this line will be held for one more day. ... there are still indications that any ... and that he moves ... somewhat closet THE FUHRER: We should try to defend this position (as long as) possible, because if ... attacks, as soon as he gets to the old (position) ... he’ll find it difficult. When will they occupy this line? ZEITZLER: He gives one order at a time ... They won’t move tonight. It (is not yet) clear whether he will do it tomorrow. It depends on the weather. (There are still) movements in this corner. That’s why he transferred two heavy Army artillery units to the ... Luftwaffe field division.’1’8 In addition, if anything (should happen) here, while withdrawing he intends to move the 2nd Panzer Division to here and the 206th [Infantry'] Division back to here, so as to release the 8th Panzer Division and move it gradually into that area. He would then have two mobile forces behind the front. THE FUHRER: He attacks here. ZEITZLER: He may relieve them, but I would prefer to keep the 8th Panzer Division up here. THE FUHRER: If he attacks, he’ll attack here. The only reason would be if he tried to get behind it. As soon as the route is open, he’ll (reach around) and try' to get to Smolensk from (the tear). ZEITZLER: Maybe it’s only a local (matter, and they) want to do something about the bands. CHRISTIAN: The Luftwaffe operated (together with) the 78th Infantry Division. Details arc not reported. ZEITZL1 \R: Down here there’s only activity' by reconnaissance patrols. (Apart from that,) nothing much happened. Tin’s is where this morning’s attack took place, where the heavy shelling was reported. Ill ere was heavy gunfire along this entire front (all morning). Then the attack started, in precisely the way7 the captured officer had predicted: -1 to 5 divisions were brought to¬ gether closely and moved against the left flank of the 32nd [Infantry] Divi¬ sion. The attack has been driven back everywhere. The 32nd Division now has many heavy- weapons seized from the enemy, but no tanks. They report “heavy enemy losses.” The attack along this front started at the same time. Again, it was driven back completely. The same applies to the entire north-

82

Hitlbr and His Coverals

ern front up to Staraia Russa. He was driven back everywhere. Only here— at this point of penetration, he advanced to the next village. But here again, big losses are reported. It seems to have been his major operation ... when they intend to take back ... take back behind the river section ... CHRISTIAN: The entire Luftwaffe is (deployed) here. ZEITZLER: Nothing unusual in the northern section of Leningrad ...). find: 10:12 p.m. *****

Midday Situation Report, March 5, 1943, at the WEHRwoLF2,’,,

Bight trine: 12:38 p.m. The Hast ZEITZLER: No major developments, generally speaking, There arc prob¬ ably also infantry divisions in the “hatchway”-" to the south of the two panzer armies. But the “hatchway” is relatively narrow, and the first trains of these three divisions are now starting to arrive. Then somehow a new Rus¬ sian tank appeared. THE FUHRER: It was already reported at Stalingrad. ZEITZLER: It’s a very heavy tank. It wasn’t seized by our men, but officers crawled up to it and sketched it from a distance of 300 m. It weighs between 50 and 80 tons and has two turrets. A 7.5-cm shell would not have pen¬ etrated.2 1 This is really the first time. 1 copied die company’s combat re¬ port. It’s actually quite interesting But the tank was seen only in one place. W e can’t generalize. (Maybe it) is a new tank. I don’t believe it’s an old American (tank). THE FUHRER: That can be ruled out. ZEITZLER: It has rounded contours all over. THE FUHRER: Then it must have been cast. ZEITZLER: Regarding the Seventeenth Army, nothing out of the ordi¬ nary. Fewer troops crossed the river than on previous days, but still 1,300 horses [cavalry]. Nearly 12,000 horses have crossed. He’s trying to bring in reinforcements here ... large ships moved in yesterday. Gunfire forced them to veer off. Parts of a mountain brigade have crossed. On this front, they were only probing; a small attack was launched here. Yesterday’s at¬ tack by one or two regiments took place here. More ground was won in the counterattack. Here, too, he was driven back further. The temperature was about 1 degree below zero, but that wasn’t enough to make the roads

Military Conferiznchs 1942-1945

S3

passable. On the other hand, the condition of the airfields today is said to have improved, so they think they’ll be able to fly today. There are plans to evacuate 800 wounded by air today. Along this front we didn’t see any loosening-up of the situation. It appeared that two corps had withdrawn, but we could not find out whether this was true. (Here) there was only strong artillery fire yesterday, and (breaches) in two places. 1 le still has five crossing points here. These are small makeshift bridges, some of which are laid across the ice. An informer said that more troops are moving in. Here, 3 brigades are using the same route. These movements continue. The two tank corps can be tracked by radio, and we see that they’re mov¬ ing further up. Here in front was the one infantry column. It’s very pos¬ sible that he’ll move around here. (A) prisoner said that the two headquar¬ ters have been deployed here for quite some time. We hadn’t caught them before. Here there was a drive against a small bridgehead, which we con¬ trol, with a bridge. Two tanks were destroyed. For the most part, we can say that the Donets [River] has been reached by the entire front. Only a few things arc left. The 62nd [Infantry] Division has replaced the 19th Panzer Division as an emergency force. For the rest, reports are coming in from everywhere that he’s moving troops in. They are probably the same troops we detected several days ago. This front is advancing. The 15th [Infantry] Division is forcing its way into this curve. He always (comes) out of Balaklaia to attack. This (here) is one of the major centers of the attack. (The) 11 th Panzer Division is now free and will be (deployed) there. On the way; they’re to finish off those who managed to get out of the pocket. Here, a small group has been taken care of already. The shape of the pocket is like this. They (think) they’ll be able to finish it off today’. There are still occasional attempts to break out. They move in on them from both sides. Yesterday they advanced relatively slowly. Because they were held up for 2 or 3 days, he was able to move in troops. They’re con¬ sidering the reorganization of forces for another push. 8 trains of the 106th [Infantry7] Division will arrive today. There was a small raid up here, and substantial enemy forces are said to be hiding in this forest. Other¬ wise, nothing unusual from this whole front on up. The 46th [Infantry] Division, which liberated the area, will be rallied. Everything went accord¬ ing to plan down there for Army Group Center. The majority of the 4th Panzer Division retreated; it’s supposed to move toward Glukhov, to this area up here. Parts of the 255th [Infantry] Division caught up and will be deployed here, so we’ll have a long-term reinforcement in that area. Fur¬ thermore (compared to previous days), he stepped up his efforts to seek contact with the Second Army’. There’s movement here, and they’re bring¬ ing up fresh troops, so we can expect major attacks during the next few

84

Hitler and His GemzRals

days. The command structure in the “hatchway”2 2 isn’t quite clear, though. The 3rd Army was located, and it is clear that it’ll advance in this direction. It’s not known (whether) the 21st Army will move this way or that. Infan¬ try [rifle] divisions (were) detected in the area of Seredina Buda (and) to the south. It’s not yet known whether they’re just providing cover for this thrust or whether this is the main advance. Probably they are just provid¬ ing cover. But here, the security units of the covering regiment have al¬ ready arrived, namely 2 battalions, one battalion of the mountain division as well as smaller units. Apart from them, two-thirds of the 45th [Infan¬ try] Division has already arrived. The first train of the 72nd [Infantry] Division will arrive today; the same is true of the 251st [Infantry] Divi¬ sion, which withdrew on our order so that the situation could improve during the next few days. The attacks against the southern edge contin¬ ued. They were particularly fierce at this flank and against the 78th [Infan¬ try] Division, which is located up here. Supplies are also reported to be on the way. The 45th [Infantry] Division will now be brought in to strengthen it. Numerous small attacks, probably some land of probing, occurred along this front for the first time. We presume (that the) large group that stopped here is preparing for a major attack, because the movements are still con¬ tinuing. Up (there), near the 208th [Infantry] Division, he attacked along the entire front from the 208th Division to the ... the Division all day yesterday, but was always driven back. The 296th [Infantry] Division closed in very rapidly; one of its battalions is already in. The train transports as well as the makeshift solutions are working very (well), I must say. The 296th [infantry] Division was pulled out of here and is moving back, partly by rail and partly by truck. THE FUHRER: I wonder whether it’s correct to withdraw them already— in case something might happen here. ZEITZLER: Well, Field Marshal Kluge thinks that the situation up there273 is absolutely dangerous. He says it’s become a huge focal area. Yet, another division has joined the fighting, including many tanks. Yesterday they re¬ ported 1,000 dead. The enemy paid a high price in that attack. Yesterday’s attack against this front involved 2 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades, so it was a relatively strong attack. On the other front, they just pressed ahead. He took position today at the place marked by the arrow. Quite a number of troops will pass through Rzhev. Along the other front, he was driven back everywhere. They plan to retreat to the dotted line. This position has already been given up. (This) is not a proper position; actually, the last proper posi¬ tion was still located up here in this corner. Now the ... Division will be ... moved out by train. The 251st [Infantry] Division and the ... Division are already on the train ..., the latter on the first ...

Military Coxylrlixcls 1942-1945

85

THE FUl 1RER: When docs he think that’ll be finished? ZEITZLER: He hasn’t specified the date; he evaluates die situation day-today. In view of the weather conditions, etc., he intends to stay another few days. The weather is good, down to (minus) ten degrees. THE FUHREiR: When does he think he can finish it? ZEITZLER: 1 le’ll need another ten days, if everything goes according to schedule. THE FUHRER: Where’s the line now? ZEITZLER: In front of this railway line. I’ll have it marked tomorrow. We still hold this rail junedon. JODL: The army group will retreat then. ZEITZLER: They haven’t announced that yet. They’ll probably go back to Minsk. We don’t quite know what they plan to do in that area. What I mean is that pardsan-rclatcd skirmishes and other little things. The bands tried to break through to the north. There’s little radio traffic or patrol activity up there, so there might something be brewing. No major attacks have been reported so far today in the north. Down here, nothing much happened yesterday—just a few skirmishes and movements into assembly areas, which were destroyed by gunfire. Yesterday’s attacks, which 1 reported last night, occurred mainly at this wing and involved heavy gunfire along the entire front, whereas the attack here was launched more by battalions or regiments against individual positions. Generally speaking, they were all pushed back. This is the only place where he advanced a little. Fighting hasn’t yet started today. THE FUHRER: We’ll have to smash this up someday with massive artillery. ZEITZLER: Yes, they need this corner up here. THE FUHRER: If he were to move here, it would be less dangerous. This matter must be sorted out anyway. ZEITZLER: Yes, once in a while he comes out from there. We’re aware of that. THE FL'HRER: We need to make a concerted effort. ZEITZLER: Yes, Sir. 1 will speak to the army group. They’ll retreat behind this line on March 10. Movements are starting again (here) in this area. Strange developments in radio traffic have been reported from this area up here. One army headquarters announced that radio traffic should be reduced, and the other one stopped radioing entirely-. Then there was a major artillery duel at Shlissel’burg Station,2 4 so there was no rail traffic all day yesterday. Nothing out of the ordinary on this front. Unless there are political consid¬ erations to prevent it. Field Marshal Kuchler plans to deploy the Spaniards |the 250th Spanish Blue Division] here, where it’s a bit quieter, a little south of the Volkhov front.2 '

86

Hitler and His Generals

THE FIT IRER: I hope ir’ll stay quiet there. They’ll return to their old front. The Luftwaffe field division will be pulled out. Maybe it’s possible to turn them around here and move them back to their old front. ZE1TZLER: There’s no reason not to. His only concern is that something might happen up there. T1 IE FUHRER: But the Spaniards are not too bad. The fact (that they) caved in doesn’t prove anything. The troops here caved in too, in many places. There is a statement by a Russian prisoner who was involved up there. He said that they didn’t attack the Spaniards (because) they are so fanatical. ZE1TZLER: I can discuss with him again what his reasons are. Tunis JODL: We have relatively little news from North Africa. The Bersaglieri 76 reconnaissance troops are advancing further, as they didn’t detect strong enemy forces opposite the front. Very strong sustained gunfire here. There has been a partial reinforcement of enemy troops, as reported yesterday. Obviously, they called off the attack2

without having announced it. The

enemy then appeared east of Sheitla for the first time; he was detected by ground reconnaissance in the area of Sidi bou Zid. Several tanks and other movements. The southern area is now completely free. The 58()th Recon¬ naissance Detachment moved forward to the mountain pass of Faid. The Africa Infantry Regiment, which was in the combat group, was pulled back behind the left wing of the Mareth position, as Rommel expects a possible attack in that area at any time—its conditions arc most favorable for the enemy. Further to the south, the terrain is open to our own artillery. The losses that the Fifth Panzer Army-7* have reported so far are considerable. I have not yet received a detailed report. According to rumors, 19 Panzer Ills ... Panzer IVs and 7 Tigers u'ere lost. THE FUHRER: The loss of the 7 Tigers can only be explained by prob¬ lems with the gearshift that arc only too well known to us, which caused the tanks to be abandoned.271 JODL: Rommel doesn’t intend to go on leave right now, in spite of the recommendation of his doctor. He plans to stay until March 15 because he wants to launch the counterattack.2H0 THE FUHRER: The only option we have is to move in more forces as quickly as possible. JODL: This is the reply to the telegram. A number of ships arrived yesterday, with cargo as follows: 2,000 tons of ammunition, 1,000 tons of provisions, 600 tons of equipment, 180 vehicles, six 7.5-cm antitank guns, nine 5-cm antitank guns, one four-barreled gun, two 17-cm guns, one lightweight field

Military CoNmRkxcts 1942-1945

87

howitzer, one heavy infantry gun, 21 -cm mortars, launchers, listening equip¬ ment, searchlights and 2,200 German troops on the destroyers.281 Situation at sea The Navy reported heavy artillery action in the Baltic Sea and intensive truck traffic to Seiskaari.282 This may be due to the fact that they need to stock up on provisions before the ice breaks. At any rate, it’s still possible to go there by truck. The escort vessels returning from the Arctic Ocean made contact with all submarines operating in that area, which, because of poor (visibil¬ ity), fierce defense, and ice floes, weren’t successful. Last night, the escort vessels were 110 nautical miles south-south (west) of Bear Island.283 Seven boats checked the routes in the Arctic Ocean, and all sea lanes have been reopened.284 Very intense but completely unsuccessful fire from the Fisherman’s Peninsula toward a convoy headed to Petsamo.285 In the Black Sea, no action outside of the Kerch Strait because of the weather. Even the planned departure of the naval ferries for Anapa also had to be cancelled because of weather conditions. There was a fairly heavy storm, strength 6, near the landing stage on the eastern side causing enough hindrance that 5 ferries were damaged by the waves.286 It is still not possible to use Temriuk for loading—otherwise the successes would be even greater—because the route is almost completely blocked by ice, even though there are just a few ice floes in the harbor and at the mouth of the harbor. Yesterday 168 men, ... tons of supplies were ferried across to the Taman’ Peninsula, while 1,839 men, ... horses, 434 vehicles (including 4 guns) were ferried back. Numerous mines were swept from the German Bay in the North Sea. The Elbe River had to be closed between Hamburg and Stade because of the risk of mines.28 The March 4 air raid against Rotterdam caused damage to the shipyard and losses among Dutch shipyard workers. A coastal defense boat was damaged. Part of the escort route had to be stopped south of Boulogne because of mines. ... Last night, motor torpedo boat flotillas were deployed against a southbound convoy off the east coast of England.288 One motor torpedo boat—the S 70—sank off the English coast after hit¬ ting a mine. No reports are in yet about the others. Another motor torpedo boat flotilla was deployed in the western Channel against an eastbound con¬ voy. Again, no report as yet. At the Cape, a submarine operating 100 nautical miles south-southwest of Durban detected a convoy consisting of ten steam¬ ers on a southeasterly course. V. PUTTKAMER: To Australia. JODI.: Of this convoy, the submarine sank 6 freighters and one tanker with a total of 48,000 terns. All ships were loaded to capacity.28' Furthermore, the

88

Hrru-R and His Genkrals

British California Star, 8,300 tons, was sunk 600 nautical miles east-southeast of Newfoundland. It came from New Zealand and was bound for England. It was loaded to capacity with butter and meat.2" Another submarine sank a ...a fast steamer with a capacity of 9,000 tons and a speed of 16 nautical miles in the same area; the steamer had ammunition on board and exploded after it was hit.291 [—] The Mediterranean The following vessels were moored in the port of Gibraltar on March 4: ... battleships, one carrier, 14 destroyers, 26 corvettes, ... escort vessels, 6 pas¬ senger ships, 8 tankers, 50 freighters. Consequently, after a sharp temporary dip, available cargo ship capacity in Gibraltar is back to the normal level.292 West of the Straits of Gibraltar, intense enemv293 air reconnaissance and sweeping for mines was detected. The assumption is that the enemy is expecting a convoy from the Atlantic Ocean and also feels threatened by our submarines. The following ships arrived in Tunis, at the port of Bizerte: the Caterina Costa with a capacity of 6,000 tons, the Saluqgo with a capacity of 3,740 tons, the Pierre Claude carrying 1,780 tons and 9 Navy ferries. Five destroyers carrying German troops came into the port of Tunis. They are already headed back to their home base. The convoy of ships that arrived in Bizerte during the night of March 4 had been attacked unsuccessfully with aerial torpedoes. The two war transports 13 and 14 returned to Palermo. Furthermore, a submarine west of Alexandria torpedoed a steamer of ... tons that belonged to a travelling convoy of 5 steamers. They were unable to observe the sinking of the steamer. We received a report from the Aegean Sea that for the first time, a submarine was detected near Melos294 again. Norway

j

In Norway there was a short firelight 30 km southeast of Trondheim, be¬ tween the SD and some Norwegian or other activists. One civilian is dead, another wounded. Details are not yet known. France In France, they’re making further progress with the supplies ... men of the 60th Motorized Division have arrived. Here the first train from one regi¬ ment arrived that is to be part of the 113th [Infantry] Division. The trans¬ portation of the first regiment of the 94th [Infantry] Division, which will be

Military Conferences 1942-1945

H9

moved in here, has also starred here. Then there are 3,200 men of the 24th Panzer Division also in place. The 106th [Infantry] Division left. 5 trains with parts of the 39th [infantry] Division have left, and 1,700 men of the 44th [Infantry] Division have arrived. A new rapid reaction unit is now in Holland. THE FUlIRER: I talked to Zeitzler last night, and he shares my opinion, of course. We can deal with Leningrad in mid-June or early July at the earliest—an earlier date is out of the question. We must not waste time now. Zeitzler agreed with me that we should take advantage of the muddy period. We should try to reinforce these few panzer groups, (in particular) the SS Panzer Group and the two other panzer (groups) so that we can launch an attack with them as soon as the muddy period is over. For this purpose we would need more troops in that area. The question is what we do with the West. I think we should move to the West all those vehicles that are not quite in order yet.295 They can do it as well there. It’s only a sign of laziness when people say that these vehicles can’t be sent there. So it would be best to transfer the Panthers and all free Tigers there, where they can be repaired and then returned to the East. The same applies to the assault guns. This is the production that moves the fastest. In particu¬ lar, smaller units should be equipped with these assault guns, so that all of them get an assault gun company and we have emergency troops every¬ where. The Large tanks are better than anything else in the West anyway, because they were designed primarily to drive back attacks by enemy tanks and not to carry out independent strategic movements.296 I must say that I prefer a Panther there to one in the East where 1 have to move it around. I’m not certain what 1 could do with it there. In the West, where roads are good, I could drive it to some place and, at the very worst, bury it like the Russians do and just use the long gun. The same is true for the Tigers. Buhle and Speer will come tomorrow. Then we’ll find out about the con¬ dition of the individual vehicles. This would mean that, initially, the bulk of the Panzer IVs would be transferred to the East, plus some of the assault guns and motor vehicles. But 1 emphasize: it’s absolutely necessary that wc put the emergency units in order; including the l.uftwaffc field division that is now at ...theim. We’ll have a final discussion tomorrow, after we’ve been informed about the weapons output. One thing is quite clear: if the Russians deploy such huge tanks, our only option would be to attack them with dive bombers297 because I’m currently unable to deploy heavy antitank weapons everywhere. There’s certainly no defense available at the moment, when these huge tanks appear. Only hollow-charge pro¬ jectiles would not ricochet. In the end, I wonder if the antitank units might not be equipped with a shorter 15-cm gun and hollow-charge projectiles.2‘ H

90

Hitler and His Clnerils

JODI,: That will be the ultimate goal, because a gun as long as the 15-cm cannon is not suitable as an antitank gun. THE FOHRER: Yes, it all boils down to that, and even then (it isn’t quite) certain that it won’t ricochet.299 7 he Balkans JODL: This affair in the Balkans is developing into something like the batde of Konigsgratzd"" The enemy stops and avoids contact with us and appar¬ ently concentrates all (his) forces in this area. That’s why the ... Division succeeded in forging ahead considerably in three columns. T1 IE FUl 1RER: The battle of Kbnigsgratz wasn’t bad either! JODL: No. He sent a ... group after them on the road to Livno from Bos. Grajovo, and the reconnaissance detachment took the road leading west. We’re not quite sure yet where they are at the moment. The enemy also evacuated this area—where, according to yesterday’s report, a large force was positioned—so these columns gained a lot of ground. I can only imag¬ ine that he used up all his ammunition. But he must have major supplies near Prozor and the mountain pass, because he’s attacking there with a large number of forces. New artillery and anti-aircraft guns were brought in, and he’s launched tierce attacks against the 717th and 718th |Securitv] Divisions. And now another regiment—the 749th—that was covering the rear is now advancing. These forces will make their presence felt in the near future. The eastern group pushed through here as well. The resistance became weaker, and the Cctniks, coming from the south, arc moving both northward to this ridge and along the valley to the west. The Italians are the only ones missing on the battlefield. We don’t have any reports about them. Here, though, the enemy seems to be prepared to fight with us, in spite of the threat from both flanks and from (the rear). T1 IE FU11RER: Probably because he has his stores here, and besides, where else could he go? The region is controlled by the Cctniks. So he’ll probably take up a position there and we’ll have to fight it through. Japan JODL: The military attache from Tokyo will give you an overview of the distribution of Japanese forces. THE FUHRKR: The japanese have had bad luck with this big convoy, if the reports are true. The convoy seems to have been broken up.301 JODL: Regarding the overall strength, the military attache reports the fol¬ lowing figures: 63 divisions, 6 infantry brigades, 2 armored divisions, 4 mo-

Military Conferences 1942-1945

91

torized brigades and 18 reserve divisions of rhe reserve army at home. The Kwantung Army Group has apparendy been weakened. At least we had earlier supposed their number to be greater. On the northeastern front there are 15 divisions and 2 armored divisions. There’s another army, which includes the Manchurian divisions, further to the south: 2 infantry divi¬ sions, 2 infantry brigades, one cavalry division, one motorized brigade. THE FUHRER: And these three? JODL: These three belong to Korea. Well, this ... the Korea Army and the Peking Army can be brought in. THE FUHRER: Then it adds up to 20 divisions after all. JODL: Yes. We had assumed there would be more, namely ... divisions. Tl IE Ft 1IRER: What are the estimates? JODL: According to estimates, there are 20 infantry divisions, 4 brigades ... cavalry divisions, 2 armored brigades and 3 motorized brigades. THE FUHRER: Those men are the best the Japanese have. JODL: These are excellent divisions. There’s the China Army Group and the Southern Group with 14 infantry divisions. Some of them arc brigades. Then there’s the Chinese National Army, which is included at a lower fight¬ ing value. Here there are 8 divisions and 2 infantry brigades deployed in the northern part. The Kwantung Army, with 4 infantry divisions and 2 infantry brigades, is also part of the China Army Group. The 1,500,000-man Chunking Force is deployed in the entire area. Next is the Southern Army Group with one army in Rangoon, which used to contain 5 divisions and has now been increased to 6. Then, behind the lines, the covering forces (and) 5 Thai divisions. One division with limited strength is stationed in Indochina, and another division is in Singapore. The forces on other islands are relatively weak. There are two divisions on Sumatra and more than one division of occupying forces on Java. Weak occupation forces on Borneo and Celebes. One army made up of two divisions is stationed in Manila. The new South¬ east Army Group has now been established; it’s comprised of two armies in Rabaul, which were recruited primarily from these forces and will now be transferred there. [—| The evacuation of Guadalcanal was obviously suc¬ cessful,*'2 and a new Eastern Front is being established. To this end they’re launching several attacks in order to bring the enemy down on New Guinea. The enemy has two American and two Australian divisions on New Guinea, plus 5 American divisions, one Marine division and a division from New Zealand on the eastern islands. Three American divisions and one from New Zealand are stationed in the New I lebrides. THE FUHRER: That makes 14 to 15 American divisions in all. JODL: He deployed major forces on the Aleutian Islands as well. The Japa¬ nese limited themselves to keeping one reinforced regiment up there. But

92

Hitler .and His Generals

they don’t have an airstrip. The number of aircraft reported for the enemy is not very large either. There are 8 British divisions and some 350 aircraft and 2 Chungking divisions in Burma, and there are some 250 aircraft on the Solomon Islands, 350 aircraft on New Guinea, 500 aircraft in Australia, 200 aircraft in ... and 100 in the New Hebrides. The Japanese are con¬ vinced that the main action in 1943 will continue to take place in the Euro¬ pean theater of operations. THE FUHRER: That doesn’t please us greatly. JODL: The evacuation of Guadalcanal was successful. THE FUHRER: We must not attach undue importance to what the Japa¬ nese say. I don’t believe a word. JODL: One can’t believe them, for they’re the only people who intentionally tell you a big lie with an expression of sincerity. TI IE FLU IRER: They’ll tell you a pack of lies—their reports and represen¬ tations are calculated on something that proves to be deception later on. I IE WEE: The general public in America believes this to be the main theater of operations. THE FUHRER: I read a statement from Dieckhoff.303 He disputes this. There isn’t a bit of truth in it. if you want to win over the Americans, you only need to say the following: first, the war is being waged in America’s interests; second, the British Empire will be liquidated; third, the Japanese are the main enemy. With these remarks you will get an overwhelming ma¬ jority'. 'ITie Jews are against it, but they’11 have the overwhelming majority. The English are now starting to complain (more and more) about the politi¬ cal developments, as they arc afraid that things will turn against their empire. HEWEL: It would be interesting to learn something about the condition of the American divisions in North Africa. Neurath305 arrived from Tunis last night. He tells interesting stories. He questioned some American prisoners of war and (says) that they tell crazy stories. Most of them came over in order to earn money or for the excitement and adventure of it to see some¬ thing different and be a part of it. No trace of political aims. They’re just rowdies who will disappear quickly—they won’t be able to get through a crisis.306 He says he talked to hundreds of them. None of them had any political conv ictions or any great ideas. THE FI T IRER: They will never become Rome. America will never be the Rome of the future. Rome was a peasants’ state. HEWEL: But the Americans have good human material somewhere. JODL: That’s only an outward appearance. THE FUHRER: Not as much as one might imagine. They live in the few regions where the Europeans are dominating. But on no account do they have the large ... centers. The farmers are impoverished. I saw photographs.

Military Conferlkchs 1942-1945

93

Never before have I seen such pitiful and stunted farmers—nothing but uprooted beings wandering around.307 CHRISTIAN: No intellect, no inner (attitude). JODL: Nothing like that. HEWEL: You only have to look at the posters they use to publicize the war. They are impossible! THE FUHRER: There is no doubt that of all the Anglo-Saxons the English are the best. JODL: With the English you have the feeling that they fight for their coun¬ try and empire, but with the Americans, you don’t have that feeling. THE FUHRER: That might explain why the English say that they can al¬ ways handle the Americans. HEWEL: That’s a very thoughdess attitude. They can’t “deal with” them, if only because they’re economically and in even- other respect dependent on them. But they consider themselves superior to the Americans both politi¬ cally and militarily to such an extent that they say, “We will recapture the lost territory in 10 years.” Tins is what the English are saying. Very thoughdess indeed. THE FUHRER: There’s one thing, Jodi, that’s also clear, when it comes to strength, it’s not only the population that counts, but also the size of the territory. Just look at the Chinese empire. The fighting has been going on for five years and part of the country is occupied, but the whole block is still standing. JODL: And, what’s more, with hardly any weapons. THE FUHRER: Ibis will definitely be the end, unless we can expand our space. Space is one of the most important military factors. You can only operate if you have space. The wars of the future will be won by those who have space. This is the bad luck of the French. During a single offensive last year we occupied more territory than during all of our Western offensives. So France was finished in 6 weeks, while we’re enduring here in a huge territory. If we had experienced such a crisis along the old border on the Oder-Warthe bend, Germany would have been finished. But here in the East wc can do something about it. We have a theater enabling us to operate. JODL: Things have changed. Germany was an expanse during the Roman wars. In the Middle Ages, armies marched through Germany in all direc¬ tions, and now, in the era of tanks and aircraft [—J THE FUHRER: Tt doesn’t take more than an hour and a quarter to go from one end of the old Reich territory to the other in a fast plane. JODL: But the Russian space is a space that is impossible even for aircraft, as illustrated by the industrial region in the LIrals. You can’t get there. CHRISTIAN: It takes 2Vi hours to fly from Cologne to Kdnigsberg.

Hitler and His Generals

94

THE FUHRER: If the aircraft has a speed of 600 km per hour, it takes 1V4 hour from Stettin to Munich. In the pre-war era, Germany was noth¬ ing more than Schleiz-Greiz,

etc., as far as the fragmentation of German

territory was concerned. It was ridiculous compared with the rest of the world. Here we speak of entire continents: America, East Asia, or Russia. And Australia! Seven million people have an entire continent to themselves. This was one of the craziest proposals: the Prince of Windsor said back then that the Germans should settle in northern Australia.30* He always was in favor of our getting that region. But then we would have settled there and one day the English would have taken it. HEWEL: Australian agriculture is German! The German element has been the most creative one in Australia. THE FUHRER: That’s precisely why they want the Germans in that region. I told him that we don’t attach much importance to it. Australia to the Aus¬ tralians! [—] l don’t believe what the Japanese are saying. JODL: The statements don’t specify what they’re doing there. On the other hand, they’re saying that Vladivostok is unbearable in the long run. To avoid a fragmentation of forces, the Japanese won’t attack the Soviet Far East right now, unless American bases were to be set up there or the So¬ viet Union collapses. In any case, the Japanese war economy is prepared for a long war. According to them, they don’t think that 1943 would be the decisive year. THE FUHRER: If they’re prepared for a long war, then they’ll have to dig in there, because the Americans will certainly establish bases in that area. HEWEL: They’ll have to go to northern Australia. THE FUHRER: It is surprising that Stalin recently gave the Americans a slap in the face 310 HEWEL: I don’t imagine that Churchill congratulated Stalin for it. JODL: They must move in here. HEWEL: Yes, this is the area from which they get their raw materials—their resources and their wealth—and as long as these resources last, they’ll launch new attacks. THE FUHRER: Imagine how much the Japanese have accomplished in so short a period! It’s ridiculous to believe that Japan is unable to put up more than 30 infantry divisions. Japan has a laiger population than Germany in the territory of the old Reich. They should be able to establish 120 divisions. But we don’t really know how many they have in reality. It stands to reason that they don’t say how many they have, in order to be on the safe side. Then all of a sudden it turns out that they have not 15 but 30 infantry divisions up there. ' [NDT] Tiny principality in 18th Century Germany.

Military C.om i-m.scia 1942-1945

95

JODI,: You never know with the Japanese. HEWEL: If they operate in this area, it’s not a fragmentation of their forces. The operations are quite independent. TI IE FUHRER: The only issue for them on which I can’t give an opinion is the issue of tanks. Do they or don’t they have a modem tank? What was Oshima’s answer? I assume that this question was put to him. HEWEL: He didn’t tell me. THE FUHRER: I believe he said that they do have modern tanks. CHRISTIAN: He’s not properly informed31' by his people. Their announce¬ ments on tanks are just as sparse as those regarding aircraft. THE FUHRER: They didn’t say anything about ships, either, and then all of a sudden there they were with the heaviest ships on earth.11: They didn’t speak about aircraft carriers, and suddenly it turns out that the} have the largest number of aircraft carriers.' ' I lowever, after the war, they’ll have to mothball their large battleships, because then only planes will he used. Even over there all talk centers on aircraft. HEW EL: The Japanese have been bombed repeatedly; for instance, near the Midway Islands and down there.314 They came too close. THE FUHRER: Nobody dares use such large ships anymore. W hat would be unpleasant for them would be if they couldn’t get control of it quickly, i.e., that it might become a base for submarine warfare. I’m convinced that the Japanese will completely establish their base here before they start ac¬ tion. They’ll probably not engage in maritime traffic, but might start with a blockade. One thing is certain. That’s something we most certainly won’t find out. lhcsc people send an ambassador and another ambassador to Washington to moan there and they themselves have no idea what they’re talking about. I can imagine good old Kurusu waddling around there.315 He has no idea what’s going on and when he arrives at the W hite House, he’s shouted at, “You’re playing dirt}- tricks.” The little Japanese was dumbfounded, as he had no idea that Pearl I larbor had been attacked. They don’t say a word.316 I don’t say anything cither. HEWED Maybe they realized that it’s necessary to build tanks first. CHRISTIAN: Large tanks arc of no use in the jungle. THE FUHRER: We don’t drive around Yugoslavia in our heaviest tanks. Why should I take a Tiger to finish off a sniper? In view of the incredible Japanese secrecy and cleverness, in this regard, it’s entirely conceivable that the Japanese have built heavy tanks, but don’t use them for the time being so that the Russians don’t notice anything. One day, they’ll use them.31' So we shouldn’t be too concerned if they have two armored brigades and two armored divisions here because we can imagine what the Russians have there. They’ve been bled white three to five times already.

96

Hitler .and His Generals

JODL: Whereas Japan has first-class troops. THE FUHRER: Yes, Russia has been bled white. If it were to start all of a sudden, one would assume it would crackle faster than elsewhere. Maybe they’ll do it quite differently and will push in this direction.318 CHRISTIAN: They got a thrashing in their border conflicts with the Rus¬ sians. THE FUHRER: Only once. 11 Stalin ... had ... They were encircled. CHRISTIAN: Their air force also suffered. THE FUHRER. T don’t know about that. They drove back ... all the at¬ tacks. There’s only this single case, where they were ambushed. Stalin said, “1 don’t want to wage war against the Japanese, but if they raise a fight with us, they’re mistaken, because we’re also prepared.” CHRISTIAN: That was at the time of the old Russian Army of the Far East. THE FUHRER: That was still one of the best ones. The Japanese have usually defeated the Russians, and they’ll continue to do so if they have nearly equivalent equipment. In this case, they waged war against the Chi¬ nese. The ship sent there was the ltsomu,, launched in 1899—an old tub in¬ deed.3-' That was the flagship. They only deployed very old ships and didn’t attack a single ship. They saved their really good ones. We didn’t fire on the Westerplatte with our most modern ships, either.321 JODL: He describes the armaments as follows: (Text is read) THE FUHRER: If they plan something they’ll never tell us. And if they draw our attention to the fact that they’re planning an operation in the south, one could more likely expect something in the north instead. I told the foreign minister, “Dear Ribbcntrop, do whatever you’re able to do, and what¬ ever you’re able to do, do it. They’ll take advantage of the time. They would be crazy if they didn’t. As long as they notice that forces are being with¬ drawn, they say ... with Asian cunning. Let him bleed white. But the mo¬ ment they realize that the situation could become stable here and reinforce¬ ments may be moved to the East, you’ll see swift action on their part and they’ll be there in time.” Situation in the air Cl 1RISTTAN: It was reported that a 13th aircraft was shot down during last night’s raid against Hamburg. During the incursion to attack the station at Hamm, some aircraft, probably because of an emergency, dropped some of their bombs on Brielle in the Netherlands. 27 civilians are dead, mainly chil¬ dren.322 In the Reich, the number of dead increased to 82 because two fac¬ tor}’ shelters were hit. The number of injured also increased to 161. A total of three air-raid shelters were hit, including the two factory shelters. During

Military CoNHiKUNcm 1942-1945

97

the night, 10 incursions were reported over the Reich territory (via Sealand), the area of Goteborg, the Swedish south coast, the Gulf of Danzig—then they returned via Flbing They probably laid mines. There were also intru¬ sions via the West Frisian Islands to Juist. They are also suspected of laying mines. 15 aircraft were observed in Nordhorn, west of Munster, south of Dortmund, Diisseldorf, Euskirchen, Trier. Thus far, there have been re¬ ports regarding the dropping of 15 high-explosive bombs and several in¬ cendiary bombs in various places. The production facilities of an industrial factory in Bochum were destroy ed by 3 high-explosive bombs, but this won’t cause major production losses. THE FUHRER: If we went to the “Felsennest” '

again and stay ed for only

three days, Euskirchen and the surroundings would be destroyed, and that would be a great pity. We must not do it CHRISTIAN: Forty' buildings are slightly damaged; the rest is damage to agricultural areas. Regarding our own raids, we received this report: the fighterbomber attack could not be carried out this morning because of heavy fog and a sea like glass. Tl IF. FI 1IRER: Do the planes float? CHRISTIAN: No, but they have to start at a low altitude and it’s feared that the fighter-bombers may have problems in the fog. The weather won’t change during the day'. The fighter-bomber attack is scheduled for the day after tomorrow. Tomorrow the fighter-(bombers) will escort the 6 destroyers through the Channel. They’re now in Cherbourg and all fighters wall be assembled there.32'* Then we received an inquiry whether the 6th Bomber Wing, which took part in the raid on London, could be rc-transf erred to (south France) to continue its training THE FUHRER: This is possible. But a new spirit has to be instilled in them. When will the Reichsmarshal come? [—] We can’t go on like this; we’ll never break the English if we act like this. We need another person there—an¬ other person must take over the command. It’s not that we don’t have the planes which would disturb him continuously and cause problems for him. We need another man there. I’m convinced that there’s a tough guy some¬ where in the East. I’m convinced that if (Droschel)325 were given the order, he’d carry out the mission. With the present situation, it won’t work. Cl 1RTSTTAN: An enemy convoy west of Cape Finisterre was attacked by 3 fighters; the convoy consisted of 20 ships sailing north. A merchant ship of 8,000 tons was hit and began to list.326 ... fighters attacked a southbound convoy of 50 ships. So there seems to be considerable traffic from England down to here, and pretty close to the coast. A fire broke out on a 7,000-ton merchant ship, which was listing badly; there were close-range hits of an 8,000-ton merchant ship, which caught fire as well. Apart from this, (noth-

98

Hitler and His Generals

ing out of the ordinary) from this area. (Close-range) combat forces as¬ sembled in the Mediterranean area: 19 fighter-bombers, 28 dive-bombers, and 32 fighters. Another 18 fighter-bombers attacked the airstrip near Medenine and, while flying in front of the lines, destroyed one gun and a number of trucks, and strafed columns and dropped bombs on the remain¬ ing parts of the northern sector. 10 trucks were destroyed, and artillery positions were put out of action. All in all, 452 sorties were flown. Eighteen bombers were deployed during the night, 14 of which attacked ships in the port of Philippeville. Three merchant ships from 6,000 to 9,000 tons were damaged. Additional hits between the ships and on the harbor installations were observed.'2 Two airstrips in Tunisia were again raided by the enemy yesterday. There was no damage. Fifteen fighters raided one of our convoys in the sea territory east of Bizerte, but caused no damage. Air Force 4 at¬ tacked convoys and towns on the left wing of ... with fighters and divebombers. As for the rest, the forces were mainly deployed north of the Don River, mostly in front of the First and Fourth Panzer Armies. Emphasis was placed on the destruction of the 3rd Tank Army. Details have not been reported. 40 fighters attacked the Valuiki-Kupiansk railroad line. The track and warehouses were hit. Three trains were damaged. Luftwaffe Command East attacked yesterday in the area of Dmitriev, mainly to assist in the de¬ fense of the 78th [Infantry] Division. Eighteen tanks and 60 vehicles of various types were destroyed, and numerous vehicles were damaged in this combat area. Columns were hit. More then 500 aircraft were in action. This is good, in view of the limited number of forces we have. THE FUHRER: Who’s responsible? CHRISTIAN: General Greim'

is the commanding officer of Luftwaffe

Command East. These are the detachments. I must admit, if the commander is not a tough guy, he can t order his subordinates to do such things. THE FUHRER: The major who came recently made an excellent impres¬ sion on me. CHRISTIAN: The one who was at Kharkov? Tit at was Prcsslcr!'2" THE FUHRER: An excellent impression. That is the man who flew (up to...) sorties with a dive-bomber formation. CHRISTIAN: That’s what they always do. At Luftwaffe Command East they have a combat formation and a dive-bomber formation, and they fly a lot of sorties—up to eight a day. THE FOHRER: There’s no doubt that the battle against England is charac¬ terized by great laziness. The upshot of this sloppiness is that we rejected all warnings and recommendations as well. The command is to blame. This is unacceptable. The worst is the attitude of avoiding anything that could pro¬ voke the enemy. People like him should be transferred for a while to Co-

Military CoNtuRLNChs 1942-1945

99

logne and Munster, to the Western region in general. Then they would quickly learn who’s provoking whom. CHRISTIAN: The leaders of the units are not to blame. [—] Air Force 1 attacked forest camps, assembly areas, positions and railroads close to the front. Tl IE FUl IRER: An English pilot wrote an article mentioning those damned searchlights. I sent it to the Reichsmarshal and Field Marshal Milch. ” CHRISTIAN: This is unbelievable. The British planes are still brightly painted and look like silver birds in the light of the searchlights. |—] The losses were as follows: 4 of our own and 12 enemy planes in the West, 4 of our aircraft and no enemy aircraft in the South, and ... of our own and 14 enemy air¬ craft in Russia. THE FUHRER: The figures are gradually starting to reflect the true situation. Ci 1R1STLYN: As far as the weather is concerned, a new disturbance, cur¬ rently over Noway, is approaching. But this time it should affect only the front part of our combat area and then move eastward, toward Moscow. This means that the weather will improve. Good weather in the northern sector. In the central sector some snow, but winds at 40 to 50 km per hour and driving snow. Snow is blowing up. A few isolated snowfall areas in the south sector—several snow showers, but nothing significant. The sorties arc in full swing, and the transports to the Taman Peninsula arc also going well because of the frozen soil. The temperature was minus 6 degrees on the Taman Peninsula last night, minus 9 degrees in the Crimea, and minus 14 degrees in the Donets region. The temperature was measured at minus 9 degrees in the central sector. It was warmest in the north—minus 2 to minus 6 degrees. In view of the overall situation, the Fourth Air Fleet was ordered to maximize anti-aircraft artillery in the area. {Order is read aloud.) Hud: 1:50 p.m. *****

Mid-March to March

21, 1943

On March 6, Rommel advanced from the Mareth Line, but had to fall back that the same day. Two days later he left Africa to (unsuccessfully) obtain the order to evacuate Tunis. Hitler, who apparently was still dreaming of offensives reaching Casablanca, and who, out of consideration for Italy, was obliged to keep the “Tunis bridgehead” so as to protect the south flank of “Fortress Europe,” sent the “Desert Fox” on vacation. After initial at¬ tacks had started on March 16, the British launched a frontal assault on the Mareth Line on the night of March 20, combined with a flanking movement by the New Zealand Corps.

wo

Hni j

k

axi> Hi.v G/• \hhai

\

While the situation in Africa became more critical, the 1 eastern Front consolidated further. Army Group Center successfully carried out the “Buf¬ falo movement,” i.e.,the evacuation of the Rzhev-Iukhnov salient, reaching the new Spas-Demensk-Belyi line. In the south, the SS Panzer Corps recap¬ tured Khar’kov in fierce street battles bet ween March 12 and 15 and, under pressure from rhe German assault, the Russians retreated to behind the middle segment of the Donets River. 'Hie German southern front gained a continuous and straight defensive position from Taganrog to Belgorod, and along the Mius and Donets [Rivers]. This was essentially the same position from which Hitler, nine months earlier, had set out to the Don River, the Volga River and the Caucasus—an effort that had cost 75 divisions and huge amounts of materiel. (A laps 1, 3, 7 and 9)

Fragment of an Evening Situation Conference, bf.twf.f.n March

12

and

,

, probably

15 1943

at the Wolfsschanze 131

The East ZEITZLER: ...was pushed into this region ... Grossdetitschland [Panzer Grenadier Division] ’v is still covering the flank. The 206th [Infantry] Divi¬ sion, which was pulled out up there, launched an assault near ...The right wing of the Second Army is advancing quite well. It’s marked more clearly on the other map. JODL: Is it still the plan to move the ... infantry up there? ZEITZLER: Not quite completely. JODL: The 39th [Infantry Division], then the 6th [Infantry Division], and then the 38th |Infantry Division]. THE FUHRER: The question is what they’ll destroy in doing this. That’s what it depends on. ZEITZLER: It looks as if the group that’s being brought in will be assigned exclusively to defense, so they probably aren’t planning any major actions for the time being. The 106th [Infantry Division] will somehow ... Then the 39th [Infantry Division] can arrive, and then we have to wait for the 38th [Infantry’ Division] [

| adv anced well, generally’ speaking, between 12 and

15 km. The vanguard detachments are here. They said that their aim was this line. I don’t think they can advance further. They won’t be able to do it ... Grossdeutschlandshould draw up an echelon... Manstein would like to see the entire Second Army advancing somewhat.

Military CoNn-RUKCEis 1942-1945

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THE FUHRER: That’s not possible. It’s much better to have forces at one’s disposal and finish the business down there. That’s much better ... ZE1TZLER: ... so many forces are ... available. Maybe, if we succeed, ... THE FCHRER: Say that again ... ZHITZLER: Maybe something’s brewing there. TI IE FL’ 11RER: That we do it here and then there and then destroy a group again. That’s a possibility. ZEITZLER: The 4th Panzer Division has advanced up to that point. Army Group Center now intends to move the 88th and 82nd [Infantry Divisions] to the north, and the 4rh Panzer to this area for now via ... We would then have somewhat less here. As a next step, they’ll try to link up with ... Other¬ wise, the army group will try to advance further... in order to improve its position. Apart from this, there’s nothing out of the ordinary' along the entire front. He attacked various places up there near die “Buffalo Move¬ ment.”335 Here on the main road again, and here a few minor attacks. Tanks were involved up there. Today they’re pulling back from the advanced posi¬ tion to the “B” position. It’s between these two. We don’t yet know the precise line. Up there they’re pulling back to the green dotted line. (THE FUHRER): ... So we would move to that position anyway? ZEITZLER: ... dotted line ... THE FUHRER: Oh, here it is. ZEITZLER: It’s a drawn-out line, at ... where they intended to retreat at one go. But we don’t want them to do that. No reports are in yet from the left wing. Nothing out of the ordinary in the southern area controlled by Army Group Nordi. Here there were attacks along the entire front. Here as well, at this breakthrough “hatchway.” Generally speaking, everything’s in order. Here he moved in further, with tanks and mounted infantry. That’s only because they plan to retreat to ... position tonight... if they give some¬ thing ... They have a large mass in the position already. This is the inner group, with artillery and parts of the two light infantry divisions in this position. Barrages up there. I inquired about this matter here. They said they wanted to do it on the 18th. But then they had to throw the 30th into the battle. But they’re firmly determined to sort this out. They know that this is serious. It must be sorted out.... They brought in the smoke mortars ’34 from the 1 .eningrad Front so that they are available to the ... artillery and can handle everything with one division. Nothing here; successful defense here. These were very persistent attacks, apparentlv involving numerous heavy enemy tanks. THE FUHRER: Apparently there are many foreigners with the tanks.They’re constantly moving in. ZEITZLER: There were 20 motorized sleds on Lake Ilmen’. Eight were destroyed. Then here near Rovgorod ... it’s possible to lay a pontoon. These stand-by troops were shelled.

102

Hnu R and His Generals

THE FUHRER: This is nothing but diversion; they only tie down our forces. It’ll start up there! ZEITZT.ER: We’re seeing more active traffic again. Near ShlisseTburg, the railroad is constantly disturbed by artillery fire. That’s why he moved the •

m

m

*

bulk of the traffic back to the road. The ice is still solid. There were stand¬ by troops there. I Iere, the army group fired several thousand volleys on a narrow assembly position and believes to have destroyed it. Generally speak¬ ing, there’s nothing special here, just the usual traffic across this area. THE FUHRER: Here 6 assault guns and 3 tanks, and here 4 Tigers. How many do they have in that place? [—] 6 assault guns, another 6 assault guns here, and again here. [—] There is nothing left here. ZEITZLER: We could transfer another 20 up there this month as replace¬ ments. North Africa JODL: This was a quiet day in Africa, mainly due to heavy rain; the wholearea is quite muddy at the moment, ... so that along the entire front of the Fifth Pander Army ... this will be a center of attack ... a very strong group here is very difficult. I don’t think ... I think the focal point will remain in that area. There’s no doubt, however, that this group is gradually being rein¬ forced. THE FUHRER: The British are very skilled at preparing such a move care¬ fully. They take their time. Italian troops for the Bast

JODL: There’s still the information from the Commdo Supremo concerning the new establishment of ... a corps in the East. The Alpine troops won’t stay in that area. But it could ... maybe we should suggest that they transfer a good Alpine division ... to Tunis.335 That would be a gain in this moun¬ tainous area ... have long clamored for mountain troops anyway ... THE FUHRER: ... stopped their work [—] JODL: In Turin. THE FUHRER: Yes, indeed. They demanded a pay rise. JODL: Communist machinations. THE FIJI IRER: But that it’s possible for workers of eight factories to stop working at the same time. That would be unthinkable for me. And now, they don’t dare resort to drastic measures. Well, the strike failed, but they have not yet decided whether they should take rigorous action or not. I’m con¬ vinced if you show the slightest weakness in a case like this, you are lost. I’ve

Military Conferlxcls 1942-1945

103

been saying this all the time. Unless the Duce transfers a division there, to he established by us, ... Just once I’d like to place at his disposal the resis¬ tance and fire power of, say, Hollidt’s force. He needs to see the resistance of a German alarm company that was able to stop the Russians for a full two or even three weeks. He needs to see it and compare it to his own troops’ defense and posture. I must point it out to him, especially in the presence of Ambrosio.336 I’m of the opinion that it doesn’t make sense to send the weapons away. I’ll tell the Duce that it doesn’t make sense. We bring in weapons, and it’s nothing but a repetition of the self-deception to which we succumbed ... It’s just the same ... and the result is a disaster. He attacks where the (Italians) ... They can’t even be assigned so-called defen¬ sive tasks.’

Why do we supply them with weapons? This year we can’t

meet all requests. (BUHLE?): It’s all a waste! THE FUHRER: We can’t meet all requests this year; we can’t allow our¬ selves to do this. ZEITZLER: Otherwise German weapons would not be available for Ger¬ man units. THE FUHRER: That’s clear. If we want to outfit our 21 divisions, we need the weapons ourselves. JODE: They do have ... a few rifles and machine guns anyway. We can’t do it at once anyway. We can’t give away everything. THE FUHRER: It’s impossible for us to equip another 700,000 men.33H This is completely out of the question. We can’t do it. That’s ridiculous. We’re short on weapons ourselves. First of all, there’s the so-called Sixth Army in the East, the former Hollidt group3'"—it’s only a phantom—not only with regard to the men (which can be corrected more easily), but also with regard to the weapons. It’s ridiculous. They’re not ready at all. Imagine what we have to do ft) put this right! And the same applies to the West. If what’s-his-name says, “I’ll throw in the available troops even if 1 have to equip them with sticks”—then it’s absolutely correct and taken for granted. But ... JODL: ... THE FUHRER: Yes, but if a major attack ... we can’t discuss armaments today ... All calibers are ... introduced ... today. If something starts ... then only on condition that they don’t shoot. But what are we to do if suddenly heavy fighting breaks out? We don’t have the Russian guns yet We don’t have the ammunition for them either. Production must be launched. 1 can’t say that we have the Russian guns, but the ammunition has yet to be produced. And the other weapons which we have at the moment ... ma¬ chine guns and guns from all over the world. I can’t regard this as fighting

104

Hitler and His Generals

strength. But what’s more important is that I get these units in order ... like die Romanians ... , for we don’t know what they’re doing Nobody knows that. As far as the Romanians are concerned, it’s necessary to relieve several units in the Crimea. Those who say that the Romanian Army is good tor anything nowadays are dreamers. He’s now recruiting between 600,000 and 700,000 men and we demand for the year ... if you believe that it’ll be possible ... to train them. The Romanians are now starting to recruit. This will take all of March, April, through May, and then, in August, there’ll be an “armed forces”! There will be nothing! Only our weapons will be gone by August. That’s the only sure thing. At least for this year, we can’t use these men in combat ... (ZEITZLER?): ... need all this ourselves, my Fiihrer. THE FUHRER: When we have increased our weapons production ... this is again a matter of labor. We base our deliberations on a factor—I’ll talk to Sauckel540 tomorrow—which is not quite certain yet, for on the one hand, between 800,000 and one million men are to be released341—this is abso¬ lutely necessary—and on the other hand production in all areas must now ... and in the next few months ... be tripled.’42 ... better if German weap¬ ons were exclusively used by us. If they say that it doesn’t make sense until they have the same equipment as we do, I’ll tell them that it’s not a matter of equipment. I’ll drive that message home to these people. Because the Ital¬ ians arrived with weapons and equipment, which from the artillery point of view, was utterly ridiculous. If I look at the units ... after wre ... had weeded them out in order to give them to others, and built up the resistance, then one must say ... The ammunition was also outrageous—ridiculous. The Russians themselves made a judgment: they killed them like rabbits. ... The Russians also say that the others just killed them. They probably killed all those invalids they didn’t like ... only those who wrere good for something. Otherwise, they just ... As I said before. I’m absolutely against getting in¬ volved in anything ... I’ll tell the Duce that it would be much better if he took all these units and got them in order on our territory. I’m very' much in favor of doing that, but not in the way it’s currently done. It makes no sense. The weapons arc given away and no longer have any value; they’re not used effectively. When you read ... today’s alert reports you’ll see that they’re in conformity with ... He’s afraid that these Communist... He has Jews everywhere. He can’t get rid of them, because the clerics are suddenly protecting the Jews.443 ... just as it was during the revolution of 1918 in our country. The 1918 revolution urould not have been possible without our dear clerics of the two denominations. To me, Erzberger is in any case more ... danger¬ ous ... was just artificially built up by other members of the Center. At any rate, Erzberger was a subversive reality.544

Military Confurlxcls 1942-1945

105

JODI,: What the Duce could do is to use his best people ... establish a firstclass Alpine division and transfer ii to Turns, where everyone is clamoring for mountain troops. T1 IE FUl1RHR: Father to Tunis or to Sardinia. JODL: ... T1 IE FLU 1RER: I would prefer the Balkans ... That would be better in any case. It would give us the opportunity to ... counter ... If we’re able to settle this matter and help the Croats to establish their thing up there, there won’t be any problems here. As I said, it doesn’t make sense now to give the Ital¬ ians weapons to help them build “an army” which will lay down arms at the first sight of any enemy. It doesn’t make sense, either, to establish an army whose beliefs and convictions (are doubtful) ... to place, in a step-by-step process, two, four, six, eight divisions at the disposal of the Duce to ensure that domestic problems don’t develop in Italy ... They’re useless in the battles with foreign troops. I won’t be deceived again! “Armaments!” It looks as if a hare or a sheep were dressed in the skin of a lion ... First the lion must... it can more easily put up with a sheepskin than the other way round, don’t you agree? Generally speaking, they have the required people; there’s no doubt about it. They have to be selected and then pooled in a group with a firm Fascist ideology. But they themselves are ... I received (a letter) from Farinacci ' and will be pleased to answer it. They’re ... This is very difficult. It’s like this: they came about at a time—maybe this is because we Germans are of the brooding ty pe—which might not have been the right one, after all. The Duce once told me, “1 myself didn’t know how Fascism was going to win; I only knew that Italy would be lost unless Fascism prevailed.” Now they’ve taken ... the basis. It is similar to the National Socialist Movement in Austria or in the Sudetenland—it never really became strong The same happened in Italy. Only in Italy ... die personality of the Duce who bridged the gap, plus the courage of his own active Fascist fighting organization— there’s no doubt about that. What they are lacking is a sound ideological basis and worldview. From the letters of ... I have ... The Balkans JODL: ... apparently the enemy vanished from this front, too. Only a few units seem to be hiding, scattered in these mountains so that the ... moun¬ tain division will be redeployed in order to comb through the area. At the 369th (Infantry Division]... sharply eastward in two columns. Here in front of the 217th [Infantry] Division’s front ... still ... of the enemy. The 417th Division trail parties should stop here. Since the expected alignment of the enemy didn’t take place, this group turned south and set out on this road.

106

Hiru-K axd His C.i-xihai s

These troops are confirmed. They are stopped ... by Cetniks, who ... for the time being ... THE FUHRER: Yes, he can have ... We’ll give him cavalry troops. JODI.: Th en at least he'll have something, because the police ... personal guards are important. Thai is to say ... if anything should happen. THE FUHRER: Let’s hope the guards don’t hang him. The East

(CHRISTIAN?): ...Troops arc deployed in the usual form in the East, but there are no reports from the operational area yet. The only interesting re¬ port is from the Fourth Air Fleet. According to evidence given by a de¬ serter—a member of the staff ... of the Russian 6th Guards Rifle Corps— the (losses) ... in the area of Losovaia are extremely high. ... The infantry division that’s still in that theater ... is to ... the Russian Guards in the next few weeks ... ZEITZLER: My Fiihrer, 1 have checked this statement. There’s an “Armv High Command”-Line ... Dnieper [River], etc. This is ... THE FUHRER: I’m not aware of it. ZEITZLER: I thought as much. They must be eliminated. It’s likely that this wasn’t submitted either. l’HE FUHRER: They never reported anything. ZEITZLER: That is why it is called an “Army Iligh Command”-Line. I was astonished, too, when I saw the map. THE FUHRER: They didn’t report a single word! ZEITZLER: This is the relevant order. THE FUHRER: Ask ... ! ZEITZLER: No, Heusinger also says that it wasn't reported. ... 'Ihis is Melitopol’, this ... everything within the line ... is included in the maps. In reality, there isn’t anything in this area. I’ll demand the destruction of this order THE FtJI 1RER: It doesn’t exist. ZEITZLER: The question, my ftihrer, is whether we should issue orders regarding this small corner up here. It could be that army groups ... might start doing something. THE FUHRER: An order for this small corner is possible. ZEITZLER: They’ve done tins right behind the front. THE Ft)I IREll: The most decisive area is this corner. 1 don’t think that civilian workers could do it. ZEITZLER: So we’ll issue an order for this corner and then move them closer to here.

*1

Military Confluences 1942-1945

107

THE FUHRER: Yes, move them closer and concentrate the troops. Here as well, to the extent that they can actually build. It’s possible here, ... They must stay here at all costs. I’m only concerned that if we make too many concessions— ZKITZLER: I’ll tell them: this is the only order that is valid for this area. It’ll state that they must have a front ... behind ... one after the other ... THE FUHRER: They didn’t report anything. ZEITZLER: I was horrified when I read it. A major order. THE EUHRER: I can only say— ZEITZLER: No, Heusinger himself said that he has a very bad conscience— he pulled it out and told me not to show it to anyone. One can see it at one glance by the army groups. 1 was astonished how ... to defend this large bridgehead. If they want to capture Novorossiisk, they would have to ... They would have reconnoitered ... German divisions and Romanian ... plus one at the Kerch Strait ... In the Crimea ... plus Romanians—nine all in all. That would free up just one division. That isn’t acceptable in my opin¬ ion. But if we go ahead with this matter at the front and leave a total of ... in the Crimea, we will be able to do it as well. Besides, the Crimea looks OK right now ... and deploy a panzer division closely behind it—that would work for me. From the artillery point of view, quite a lot happens in the Crimea, as indicated by the figures. (Presentation.) If we really were to move three ... to the Crimea, ... that would make four, even six if the two on Taman were included. That would add up to ... THE EL’HRER: I think we should move more to the Crimea. ZEITZLER: ... In the Crimea, where they ... still being trained for six months, and another panzer division, that would be sufficient. If we do this at the front, then we need ... at least two divisions to stop ... THE FUHRER: On the other hand, to do it with just... But the other can free up 20 divisions in this area. ZEITZLER: If we free up ... here ... he should free up ... 16. THE FUHRER: He knows that we can’t attack here any more. ... If he wants to back this, he can do it with a few divisions ... so as to disengage a few divisions. ZEITZLER: Naturally, he’ll also get something. THE FUHRER: Manstein has to understand that 16 divisions will probably...Perhaps you can give me the precise number of divisions by tomorrow ... ZEITZLER: ... TH hi FUHRE R: ... Manstein ... heavy troops away. We have to be aware of this. ZEITZLER: My Fuhrer, I studied very closely ... combed through during the three days of my stay here ... whatever we can do as far as replacement

108

Hitler akd His Generals

is concerned ... it’ll be relatively acceptable, if we make everything available ... According to the order, we have 85% of die mobility and are lacking 6% of personnel. THE FUHRER: By April 15? ZEITZLER: I’ve set the deadline of April 15. Manstein thought it would be later. But I’m in favor of finishing ... push it through. I took steps to have Wagner346 and his repair shops ready. I’m confident they’ll be able to fix quite a lot ... THE FUHRER: That’s obvious, Zeitzler. But it doesn’t match the ideal of what’s-his-name. ZEITZLER: Not at all, even if I wish it were so. T1 IE FUJI1RER: Yes, indeed. But we must be uncompromising ... I can’t allow this year to pass '4^ ... and gets so much.. .materiel, which we don’t ... ZEITZLER: He’ll wear us out before we’re able to dismandc these things. THE FUHRER: He’s in a condition now that we would be mad not to take advantage of it. ZEITZLER: Absolutely! I met G... ,s and he asked for the future plans. Tl IE Fid IRER: We must have this on the side ... ZEITZLER: We want to have do it on the side. It’ll be possible in July/ August. But today? ... THE FIJI IRER ... if Panthers, etc., return. Concerning the East, our posi¬ tion must be that we can’t allow this matter to go on much longer. We simply can’t allow this to happen—10 divisions! ZEITZLER: ...which we removed from the center. If the 198th [Infantry Division] moves in, ... then wc would have six good infantry divisions plus these six panzer divisions. That w ould result in an acceptable ... The follow¬ ing troops will come from the West: the 38th [Infantry Division] is sched¬ uled to arrive on March 20, and the arrival of the other is planned for April 1. I don’t know whether Jodi will really be able to have them ready. I would really like to have them. Then we would have ... to set this ... in order. ... w7hat I can do with regard to smoke mortars and other equipment in order to strengthen this group. Three assault gun units are at least something. That is the most wc can get out of this. They should be sufficient. Now, my Fiihrer, a comment concerning the 1st Mountain Division. It’s very difficult if the air division also ... from the Eastern front... immediately ... It’ll be difficult ... If wre move the 1st Mountain Division to another theater of war, we will, of course, lose 10 days ... can’t transport anything. THE FUHRER: Let me tell you something: Down there a catastrophe may happen at any time. You can see how weak the Italians are internally. As for the air division, it has to be removed at any rate—this doesn’t mean that wTe give it away—so as to ...

Military C'onmsR/^vchj 1942-1945

109

ZEITZLER: ... so thar we can get an idea of ... THE FUHRER: What I would like, of course, is for the air division to be moved back over to the corps, so that the entire corps would be on the other side. This here would naturally secure the division. As soon as the division arrives, this one can leave. They will certainly be moved out ... (if course, as reserves ... ZEITZLER: ... THE Ft HRER: What Jodi said yesterday was correct ... we can’t move them rapidly to somewhere ..., because from a certain point they will have to ... by planes ... If we haw two such parachute divisions, they are, of course, elite troops that don’t exist in any other force; 1 can assure you ... voluntarily reported, that he ... per month ... jumps from an altitude of 2,000 or 3,000 meters ... ZEITZLER: My Fiihrer, it would be ideal if we had five or six air divisions around Berlin. THE FUHRER: I would prefer to have them in France, no matter how they get there. It’s just a difference of one day. They’ll be moved there very rap¬ idly. ZEITZLER: ... THE FUHRER: That means that ... ZEITZLER: Although I was given authority, I interfered as little as possible to avoid their whining. It is quite a lot. I can’t get any more. The only thing about which ... will be sad is the 25% cut in the staff ... of the Panther troops. THE FUHRER: They’re not available? ZEITZLER: ... they agreed to the transfer of the tanks, my Fiihrer, ... the motorized units over there... we’ll not be able ... He’ll have to accept the 25%. They’ll get all the things listed in this document and part of the equip¬ ment listed here. THE FUIIRER: Nothing can be done about that. ZEITZLER: ... [The] Hermann Goring demands a lot ... vehicles. This is a painful decision. I kind of moved them there on the side... plus rear ser¬ vices_If he gets 1,280, he should be ... satisfied. THE FUHRER: He’ll be satisfied. ZEITZLER: T would think so. THE FUHRER. 1 would ... the Estonian and Latvian SS [Divisions] ... with captured enemy materiel ... ZEITZLER: Yes. They won’t be ready in two months, either. THE FCHRER: They’ll get the Russian things in exchange. ZEITZELR: I’ll speak to the Reichsfuhrer himself. THE FUHRER: I’m sure he will agree to it.

1W

Hivij-r

am) His Ghnurais

ZEITZLER: I’d be pleased to help him. But one can ... tine Germans ... THE Ft HIRER: ... will give him Russian infantry guns, so he has some¬ thing right away. We will get tine things together. ZEITZLER: ... he will also come up with something ... the army troops, ... signal troops and all dial materiel left behind ... This matter should he carried our ... My Fiihrer, Em actually pleased ... to the hill. THE FL'HRER: Completely? ZEITZLER: If lie attacks from up there, he’d have a small spearhead of Panzers. THE FUHRER: He must get that. ZEITZLER: Very well. I’ll see to the 1 Oth Motorized [Division], my Fiihrer. I’d like to suggest that the 14th and 36th Motorized [Divisions], whose situ¬ ation with regard to the vehicles is like this: (Presentation) Required strength: 3,000 ... They are operational and ready for combat ... so that we have partial motorized troops ... then a full body. THE FUHRER: He can make up for it later. ZEITZLER: ... partially motorized ... to be enhanced later ... THE FUHRER: They will be proper panzer divisions anyway. ZEITZLER: They will be proper panzer divisions. TI IE FCl IRER: Only one thing is important: We must see if it’s possible to put more assault guns at the disposal of what’s-his-name up there. ZEITZLER: ... more in South and Center ... 1 think North should be given some more. If the focus is on South and Center, I will get 160, 170 ... as replenishments. Those are assault troops. For Manstein’s Donets front ... give to Manstein. Well put them in down here. TI IE FOl IRER: The Donets region is the most important one for us. I le’ll be attacked. It’s most important that we don’t lose anything there. That’s why 1 asked Manstein for an overall chart indicating the areas down there that are suitable for attack by tanks. ZEITZLER. ... as early as March ... THE FUHRER: ... out. 1 also spoke to Richthofen,who also ... behind ...no surprise tank attacks. Well he able to cope (with the) infantry. ZEITZLER: I think so, too. Maybe we could give a little more to [the] North, if it’s needed there, because it’ll be very difficult to ... TI IE El l IRER: ... asked for a list of antitank guns available to him hut, to be honest, all French 7.5-cm fire with hollow-charge projectiles ... are really antitank guns. ZEITZLER: Yes, Sir. I’ll ask for it again. ... I’ll phase it out anyway. [—J If it goes like that, well have been quite successful ... (Presentation) As a next step, my Fiihrer, I evaluated the experience from the withdrawal ... exam ined details ... since the situation calmed down a little. I discovered a great

Military Confurukcgs 1942-1945

111

mess regarding clothing and other things. Here, for instance, a letter about clothing ... it’s distressing to look into such a thing and to learn from letters ... THE FUHRER ... ZEITZLER: ... a few more vehicles and everything ... However, we can’t afford it... tarpaulins are used as packaging material for wrapping weapons. That’s a bad thing ... civilians wearing German coats ... military coats ... so that they’re available for the auxiliary service draftees and any other ... THE FtHRER: l don’t know ... ZEITZLER: ... THE FUHRER: I have my doubts ... ZEITZLER: All that.... THE FUHRER: And if we took it away from them again? ZEITZLER: Including the German ones they have stolen. TH E FU H RHR: We can’t say whether they were stolen or not. Many worked in the labor Service. In the winter they come ... boots ... free up ... They say they can’t do it unless they arc given boots, because they don’t have any footwear ... ZEITZLER: ... Well, you can interpret a lot into such a situation ... The officers, for instance, have so and so many hunting rifles ... etc. This shows that they take too much with them. I’d like to have a kind of ... drawn up, an order requiring the commanders in charge of division clear-out350 ... to report ... so that they don’t carry along so many things. This only fills ... as is indicated by the applications for compensation. Somebody is asking for 500, even 520 marks for a hunting rifle. Why docs ... such a precious hunt¬ ing rifle351...? I also want to ... this cable ... a Krumpervvagen. THE FUHRER: During the Great War, my unit had the following practice: whenever we left a position after a longer stay, a clear-out detail was set up; when we departed ... removed everything else.... the division commander. ZEITZLER: Everyone rides. Everyone has a sled for ... Naturally, one of the reasons is the long war—every soldier should have two sets of every¬ thing ... (.Presentation) This starts with several interesting points. This here is actually the usual stuff back here. This is also very interesting Many such small ..., my Fiihrer, that, in part, are also tremendous ... THE FUHRER: ... What a mess! ... such a squad leader ... what can 1 do about it? I’ve been fighting for it for years. I issue orders to avoid these matters ... that one can’t ... on the way ... endless court martial proceed¬ ings ... ZEITZLER: Precisely in case of self-mutilation.352 THE FUHRER: I absolutely agree that we have to change this practice. ZEITZLER: Yes, Sir.

112

Hitler and His Glmerau

THE FUHRER {reading): Another petition for clemency? ... Tin is is a mat¬ ter—1 can tell this only to you—if the man sees that thousands of tons of materiel are lost, then he has no understanding of such a thing ... if guns are blown up, even light rifles are too much for them. ZEITZLER: ... to travel from here and ... on site ... to save fuel and artillery ammunition ... maybe a final order should be issued after the busi¬ ness there is finished. Would you like me to prepare a draft? (Presentation) This was the order given to Army Group South. But the situation is such that we thought that [Army Groups] South and Center deserve some kind of recognition. THE FUHRER: Ell do that—I’ll do it right away. ZEITZLER: ... my Fuhrer, I prepared ... to be taken down there1"

in

case ... with the foreigners, and it is very short. I’d like to do it like that. {Presentatioti) This was the initial situation at ... after so many days it looked like that, so the development is very clear ... records ... with assessments of the troops. THE FUHRER: Yes! ZEITZLER: This, for example, was written by an artillery commander. It is shocking to read ... THE FUHRER: ... these Hungarian ... always quite good. ZEITZLER: Yes, always good. THE FUHRER: In contrast to the infantry. ZEITZLER: This is unbelievable. I want to prepare a small map for every ally and give it to them, my Fuhrer. THE FUHRER: Very good. ZEITZLER: Next 1 want to ask you about the idea concerning the field training divisions, if maybe I could ... reinforce there ... I could take several such skeletons.'"4 THE FUHRF.R: You must only get the people; I think the best would be if former SA andSS members were included,not members of ... spirit. ... So the question is ... to detail ... troops who can withstand ... The best thing to do would be to have the people, division commanders, etc., here one time to bring them together, and this would ... battalion commanders ... we should get them together and the spirit of the whole ... make clear, so ... ZEITZLER: ... THF1 FUHRER: I don’t know how long I’ll be staying down there.3-'5 Maybe ... comeback up here anyway ... again right away ... ZEITZLER: ... 100 general staff officers have just started.’56 I’d like to have them ... trained in the right spirit, the way I want it. I’ll use the time when 1 go to Munich, I want to use one day to check whether the instructors are doing it properly. Do you agree?

Miijiarv Co\hi

Ki

\c:h.\ 1942-1945

in

T11H FTJ1IRER: Yes! I, for my part, would ]ust ask you to ... ZEITZLER: I low this came about is shown by these orders. THE FUHRER: ... “The Konigsberg Line”... ZEITZLER: This should be in the files. I’ll find it. That’s all, my Fuhrer. THE FUHRER. ... not possible; we can’t do it now. Right now is not the most favorable time. Nor may we say that this year we will fight minor battles, next year the major ones. Maybe the war will be decided this year.337 I don’t know. ... Now the other is also ... ZEITZLER: If our units were to strike now, we could achieve great things. 1 HE FUHRER: You must see to the SS ... getting the necessary person nel ... ZEITZLER. I’ll ... with the Reichstuhrcr ... THE FUHRER: ... say that we will leave the recruits in the West and move the better-trained troops to the East. It’s up to him, but this or a similar decision is required. ZEITZLER: ... using a huge amount of fuel. We must check the calcula tions. The ideal is quite acceptable. THE FUHRER: ... *****

Midday Situation Report, March

,

, at the Berghof358

21 1943

beginning. 12:16 p.m. Situation at sea JL'NGE: During the night of March 20, the following vessels reached the port of Gibraltar from the Atlantic: three destroyers, two British auxiliary aircraft carriers with one destroyer, two corvettes and one ... THE FUHRER: Down in Sardinia. I’m afraid it’ll start there, and that ... JUNGE: Three U.S. destroyers left for the Atlantic The following ships were in the port of Gibraltar on March 20, at 1 p.m.: Malaya in the harbor ... According to an Italian report, the heavy group was probably in the area of ... on March 20. Little convoy traffic off the Algerian coast Around noon, a merchant ship headed west was sighted near Philippeville. No ... from the eastern Mediterranean [

] Tunis with German troops ... arrived in Trapani

yesterday morning Nothing out of the ordinary in the Aegean Sea. No damage caused by air raids on Pctsamo on the 18th and 19th. 45 vessels were on their way in the Norwegian area. Motor torpedo boats weren’t de ployed in the Black Sea. The Kerch/Taman’ traffic on March 20 ...

114

Hitler and His Generals

The West JODL: ... T talked with the Commander-in-Chief West. Over there it’s ... But it was completely quiet, with no signs of ... A slight increase. He plans to ... the distribution of forces |—] I had all commanding officers of forti¬ fied areas spoken to. ... was reported there. There are only a very few ... considered suitable for latge-scale battle. Measures were taken to replace them. THE FUHRER: ... The best, most fanatical people must be deployed there ...[—] JODL: ... Some of them are a bit older. Here ... Commander SchneiderVvl is 61 years of age and well (suited) for large-scale battle on the strength of his personality and intellectual capacities. The FUHRER: It depends on the personality.

H Situation in the air THE FUHRER: What about the air situation? CHR1STLAN: ... a mixed unit of 15 aircraft (attacked) the railway repair works in 1 ecuwen, Belgium. ... Heavy damage was caused, but only a few dead ... at Antwerp and an army arsenal. [—] In the Mediterranean region, the air ... started yesterday afternoon ... tanks moving eastward ... col¬ umns west of Speiden. 3 planes were shot down. [—J Action with 595 tons on board—174 tons of fuel, 133 tons of supplies, the rest was equipment.360 They brought back 257 injured, 297 soldiers, 207 tons of equipment. [—] Luftwaffe Command East committed 75 dive bombers against positions north of Zhizdra, 75 fighters and dive bombers against targets north of Spas-Demensk; planes flew raids of diversion against targets northwest of Seredina Buda and columns ... four were shot down in [—j the Fourth Air Elect laid mines in the lakes near Gclcndshik. Several railroad stations [—] He is reported to have major logistics problems. ... spoke with Field Mar¬ shal Richthofen about whether anything more could be done. THE FUHRER: Yes. CHRISTIAN: He said he will try himself [—] (The following is a telephone conversation between the Fiihrer and General Zeit^lei) The Hast ZEITZLER: ... along the eastern front and the old northern front, north¬ east of Khar’kov ... also the advance from Bjelgorod ...

Military Confbrizxcls 1942-194 5

115

THE FUIIRER: If, then, at Izium. I must always call attention back to the fact that if any advance is going to make sense, it will be an advance at Izium. ZEITZLER: 1 ... with Field Marshal Manstein today. There’s no point.[—| THE FUHRFLR: ... or as retaliation if the enemy does anything. In both cases, we have things ready. If the enemy really attacks, advances from Khar’kov to the (Southeast), ... him with this offensive completely in the back. ZEITZLER: On the southern wing the Second Panzer Army is advancing well. Thirty minutes ago, we received a report that the 4th Panzer (Division] (linked up with the 10th [102nd Hungarian Division]).’61 Tl IF FUI IRER: Good! ZEITZLER: That means that this comer is now closed. The enemy is still putting up considerable resistance. Today he ... Field Marshal Kluge holds the view ...|—] ... nothing out of the ordinary with regard to the Second Panzer Army, my Fuhrer. In the sector held by Corps Group Scheele,302 the attack of the ... and the 12th Panzer [Division] ... this bulge has become somewhat flatter near the 9th Panzer ... but then further north, in the area of the Fourth Army, very heavy attacks were launched north of ... in the same place he attacked yesterday. [—] The projecting bulge of this move¬ ment—the 36th Motorized |Division], 14th Motorized [Division], and 67th [Infantry Division]—has pulled back as planned. He will be up there in ... until the evening of the 21 st... The attacks of the 7th Air Division have by and large been driven back. 1 le succeeded in ... including further north ... The entire Army Group North [—] ... reached of troops ... Further north, my Fuhrer, we see signs of an attack being planned against this salient ... in the north, south of ShlissePburg. (T'Hepburn Hue is interrupted) THE FI HRER:... groups of destroyers moved down? CHRISTIAN: Yes! THE FUHRER: ... CHRISTIAN: ... hasn’t yet been transferred, my Fuhrer. (THephone conversation with Zeit^/er continues) ZEITZLER: My Fuhrer, the line was interrupted. THE FUI IRER: You were just getting ready to discuss the attack south of Shlissel’burg. ZEITZLER: We see more and more evidence of an attack being prepared to gain control of the railroad ... a group containing the 21st and 223rd [Infantry] Divisions ... more penetrations... bv us from the left wing of the 223rd ... [—] ... there a considerable, but very narrow indentation resulted from it. Our early-morning counterattack broke through it, so that... there

116

Hll IJ K JXI) HI. V C.t Nh K A\.\

were heavy attacks again later in the morning ... the penetrations is very narrow, though, so that they could ... close it. [—] THE FUHRER: ... It makes no sense for the Army Group South to con¬ tinue its offensive in the direction of Kursk.353 ZEITZLER: Very well. THE EUHRER: Instead we should try to replace the units and build up the group in such a way that it... if possible ... back against Izium ... ZEITZLER: Yes, that’s what I told the Field Marshal this morning ... and will again ... [—] ZEITZLER: I’he army group l talked to today is very grateful and will be pleased about it. THE FUHRER: Wry good, f—] Thank you very much. Heil! ZEITZLER: Heil, my Fuhrer! (End of the telephone conversation)

THE FUHRER:... later bring up the 58th [Infantry Division]. This is nothing serious, just a bunch of diversionary activity. [-] THE FUHRER: ... attacks, so that he’s worn down. KEITEL: He’s being worn down. T1 IE Ft)! IRER: When the right moment has come, we’ll seize the element of action. JODL: Ihe unit that comes from the south [—] THE FUHRER: ... if that happens, we’ll have to be prepared for it. Up there, a major battle will be fought, no question about that. That’s the only sure thing. We have to build up our own forces anyway. So it would be better to bring it up. JODL: ... to free up other units ... is still valid? THE FUHRER: ... They’ll have to manage. [-] THE FUHRER: As soon as he overcomes his psychosis (that these are) armies here, the matter will look quite different. Of course, 1 would have liked very much ... to pull out the SS Panzer Corps ...

[-1 THE FUHRER: It was brought in with 23,000 [men]. ( ... ?): 23,000—that’s more than the target. THE FUHRER: There were at least 18,000 to 19,000 troops. (...?): 18,000 troops, I should say.

l-J THE FUHRER: ... our operation along the Dnieper River last year was really the first successful preliminary engagement ... KEITEL: If we ...

Military Confurlkchs 1942-1945

117

THE FUI fRF.R: The same thing happened last year.

H THE FUHRER: ... it goes without saying that this accumulation of forces here ... it would be best to combine the three SS divisions. JODL: He planned to substitute the 39th and 6th [Infantry Divisions] for the 11th Panzer [Division]. THE FUHRER: ... and keep Grossdeutschland [Panzer Grenadier Division] here, so that we ... still have striking power with all those tanks [—] (... ?): ... This would be an important improvement. T would pull them out as well. Their movement down here seems to have been quite successful. And then the rear

H (THE FUHRER?): ... dealt him a blow that forced him once more to ... forces ... As soon as we are on the other side, we can do something, if he increases the pressure by interfering with the flank. The most important thing for us is to cross the Donets ... The Russians never had a great de¬ ployment in depth ... in contrast to us ... [—] There’s no doubt: the more we succeed in realigning the front, the fewer forces we will need, and we could then interrupt his railroad line at Briansk. He himself ... the railroad again ...This would not result in an extension, but a shortening [—] An order should be issued now. KEITEL: Zeit/ler should be told. THE FUHRER: I’ll speak again to Zeitzler. KEITEL: The 1 iking [SS Panzer Division]! JODL: The Viking, and the 17th Panzer [Division].

[-] JODL: He doesn’t have any more at the moment. Plus a fifth being replen¬ ished. THE FUHRER: ... in this short period of time to destroy them completely with the panzer divisions—it’s ridiculous. I’m convinced; (the longer we) wait here, the more this character will consolidate his forces ... in order to do what can be done |—■] 1 think the correct thing would actually have been to make a push in this direction and bring in the others, including the other units. The vermin there will be shown to be an “army” that is not backed by anything. KEITEL: He doesn’t have fresh forces. We can rule out that he has new, fresh forces up here. What we see broken up in this area is everything he has ... also proven by charging ahead ... THE FUHRER: One must imagine that they ... 1 don’t know from where ... operations, it is OK ... [—] Just imagine that! KEITEL: Not down here, outside Zaporozh’e.

IIS

Hitler and His Gls.lr.aij

THE FUHRER: If he ever comes here, everything will be in disarray. He won’t have anything left afterwards. This new line would help reduce the number of troops required, because he’s now wasting his energy in uncoor¬ dinated efforts. ... not the Donets |River| either ... [—J ( ... ?):... the most ideal line for the defense would be the one from Belgorod to Lisichansk via Kupiansk. The good thing about this line is that it gives us a number of important rail lines and (takes them away) from the enemy ... especially Kupiansk ... but the main advantage, that [—] (THE FUHRER):... hides great risk of a later accumulation of attack forces ... In such as case, the army groups ahvays reject beforehand ... But 1 (ex¬ perienced) it myself at the Don River, where 1 always warned against the forests, where the)' always said [—] could be used for the production of timber. That’s why 1 firmly believe that it is now necessary to, first, pull the SS Panzer Corps'64 out as soon as possible so that, if need be, the Grossdeutschland Division could be committed at the left wing of the army group ... as a mobile reserve behind it [—] toward Kupiansk. The advance toward Kupiansk is no more daring than the advance mounted by the GrossdeutschlandX)'xv\s\ox\ from Akhtvrka towards Belgorod ... (Tomarovkaf) or the advance ... The Belgorod—Kupiansk—Lisichansk line would, firstly, reduce the threat to the Donets region, considerably, and secondly,... result in a permanent position, which ... and finally ... perhaps ... the weather conditions [—] Otherwise the whole time would be wasted. 1 am of die opinion: if we were to ... a soft ... [—] save forces for the army group, shorten the division combat sectors, and the new front could be held by ... who arc now ... or by the divisions ... [—] and thus result in a situation that is favorable in ever)' respect so that, in my view, road and weather conditions permitting, such an operation could be imagined. It’s not impossible that such an operation ... in 14 (days) [—] Moreover, the matter up there won’t go away, while I’m convinced (that the situation here) will be a growing source of danger [—] was outside Zaporozh’e, then the elimination of the salient is not a greater ... than what was already [—] I read an opinion yesterday arguing that we can’t count on a long (continuation of) the muddy period. He would need several days in any case [—] advance towards Kupiansk. That’s no more daring that the advance to Belgorod [—J quite apart from the fact that T’m convinced that this character is so weak ... there are lots of “units” there, but [—J These forests are never dangerous if you face them, but in the event of a crisis—at the Donets, for instance—they can be dangerous. We experienced this several times ... (End is Missing)

Military CoiXtuRTNcus 1942-1945

119

May 19-21, 1943 The situation in the East hasn’t changed; bodi sides are busy rehabilitating and replenishing units thinned during the winter campaigns. Hitler, who is resolved to develop a strategic defense, still plans (as part of an operation with a tactical goal) to attack the Kursk bulge of the Russian front. However, he hesitates and postpones the offensive several times—on the one hand, be¬ cause of the situation in the Mediterranean region, and on the other, because he wants to be able to deploy the new “Panther” tanks. In the meantime, the battle on African soil ended on the Tunisian peninsula of Mauin on May 12. Once again, 250,000 troops—half of them Germans—were taken prisoner, and again immense quantities of war materiel were lost. Where will the AngloAmericans turn now? Southern France? Corsica and Sardinia? Sicily? Greece? The situation is worsened by the uncertainty of the Italian attitude. The Italians control all of the Mediterranean coasts with the exception of the Peloponnesian Peninsula. Within Italy, there are only remnants of German units that were unable to reach Tunis. Because of the planned offensive against Kursk, and also because of Mussolini’s vanity, a stronger presence is not possible. New German units arc now hastily being built up from marchbattalions, and newly established full divisions are beginning to arrive. Prepa¬ rations arc discussed at Hitler’s headquarters in order to be ready to help the Italians in the case of extreme danger with or without Mussolini’s approval, but also—and above all—for the Germans to be able to organize the de¬ fense of the Italian-controlled regions should Italy suddenly collapse. (Maps 1, 7, and 9) sfc $ %

$

Meeting Between the FOhrer and Field Marshal Keitel, May 19, 1943365 Present:

7 be piibrer,

field Marshal Keitel\

I Jen ten ant General Buhle (joined later),

l Jen tenant General Warlirnont

Mediterranean Pander armaments

THE FUHRER: During the last few days, and especially during the night last night, I reflected about what would happen if we were to lose the Balkans. There is no question that the consequences would be serious.306

120

Hnu R and His Generals

KEITEL: Certainly much more serious than if we had to screen ourselves off somewhere along this Italian front. The question is very difficult to answer, because too many different people live in the Serbian, Romanian, and Hungarian areas. THE FUHRER: This would result in problems for our allies, and also in the loss of the Romanian oil fields and the bauxite and chrome mines.’KEITEL: And copper. THE FUHRER: We would also lose the copper.,6S In view of this situation, I consider it necessary to take precautions against a possible attack on the Peloponnesian Peninsula. We are currently bringing in a division, the Luftwaffe field division,but we don’t have any pander unit there. WARLIMONT: The Luftwaffe field division is not stationed on the Peloponnesian Peninsula, but instead at the Isthmus of Corinth. THE FUHRER: It is stationed at the Isthmus of Corinth. But we don’t have any panzer units there at all. That is why 1 think it is necessary' to move one there. Too much depends on it, and in a critical situation it would take longer to move one there than to another place. It takes less time to trans¬ port a panzer unit from the West to the East than to move it there. So we have to move a panzer division there, whether we like it or not. The only question is where do we bring it from? KEITEL: The only one ready to go in the West is the 24th |Panzer Divi¬ sion]. THE FUHRER: Yes, that’s the only one we could take from the West. And at the moment, I don’t expect any problems in the West. KEITEL: I would have to study the map closely and check the distribution of reserves. THE FUHRER: The 1st [Panzer Division] and the 24th [Panzer Division] have advanced the farthest. WARLIMONT: The 26th [Panzer Division] as well. KEITEL: Next is the 24th [Panzer Division], then the 16th [Panzer Division], which is now being moved to Italy, and then the 14th [Panzer Division], WARLIMONT: In the near term, then, it’s only the 24th [Panzer]. THE FtJHRER: What shape is the 1st [Panzer] in? W ARLIMONT: The 1st Panzer Division has some 50 operational tanks. KEITEL: Several of them were previously transferred. This morning I dis¬ cussed the shape of the individual divisions with Buhle, in case we move the 16th Panzer Division to Italy. Buhle is better informed than I am. THE FUHRER: Everything indicates that the situation down there is the most critical, because so many economic problems are connected with it and because our allies are so uncertain. In the past, we were lucky that we had arranged for a sufficiently large marshalling area in good time.

Mil .11AK) Co\'hhUl \r h.\ 1942-1945

121

KEITEL: To be able to attack Yugoslavia then. TI IF FLU IRER: The Italians can’t be relied upon. On the other hand, I’m convinced that relatively few forces would be required if some sort of mess were to develop in Italy. Especially since the first combat troops will arrive within ten days anyway, according to Zeit/ler’s report. KEITEL: If he starts now and the transportation goes according to plan, they would lie on site in ten days. THE EL HRER: He says combat-ready units will arrive. He is dispatching 60 trains per day, which means that even’ two days a division will arrive. WARIJMONT: Some of them will have to go to the Balkans, or we will be too late there. One-third of the Eastern trains will have to go to the Balkans. But according to our calculations, he will still have the bulk of the Gisela units3 *' and the parachute corps for Italy. THE FUHRER: I would prefer to take the three SS divisions to Italy, be¬ cause they are most familiar with Fascism. WARLIMONT: They would have to be moved first. THE FUHRER: If only those in the West were already better! KEITEL: It’s been a long time since we did something for the benefit of the West. THE El HRER: No, it’s OK as is. As a precautionary measure, I will ask for a report on the current strength of the 9th and 10th SS Banker Divisions in the West. They have young people, of course, who are inexperienced. KEITEL: Cadre personnel and the 1925 age group.3"1 THE FUHRER: They don’t have the experience

including politically

or

the agility of my old SS division members, who are propagandists. I’m con¬ vinced if we move in the three best SS divisions, thev will be thick as thieves with Fascism after only a very short while. KEITEL: Buhle says that 150 more of the Panzer I Vs will be transferred to the East, and then we’ll be on top of that. I asked him this morning, “When can we give something to the West?” He answered, “I think it will be pos¬ sible to transfer 60 tanks to the 16th Panzer Division for Italy. That’s the most we can do.” I told him, “Then we have to give 15 to die Rhodes unit.” He replied, “Well have to see if that’s possible. W hcdicr they arc transferred to Rhodes first depends on the time.” THF. FUHRER: This doesn’t mean anything Once the trained crew has arrived, we could assign them to the 26th [Panzer Division] just as wrell. WARIJMONT: The 26th [Panzer| is complete. THE FI HRF.R: But it doesn’t have any tanks. WARLIMONT: It also has about 50 tanks. TI IE FUHRER: Equipment for another detachment could be sent later so that it could be moved to the Balkans—let’s say the Athens region—in good time. Then they could be deployed in the Pcloponncsc.

*1

122

Hitler and His Generals

KEITEL: In the area of Athens, south of Larissa. THE FUHRER: The risk is that they get a foothold on the Peloponnesian Peninsula. WARL1MONT: If we want to be sure that they are available in the Peloponnese, they must be transferred to the peninsula itself because of the narrowness of the Isthmus of Corinth. So the question arises whether the 117th [Panzer Division] might not serve the same purpose. THE FUHRER: It is a bit too weak. If he lands in one place there, the only thing we could do would be to divide the 117th [Panzer] to shield the land¬ ing points and secure the airfields at least. WARLIMONT: He will be joined by five fortress battalions, which will be available soon—in early June—but they are from the 999th (Infantry] Divi¬ sion. It was planned that way so that all of the 117th will be available again. THE FUHRER: That’s only two divisions—that’s no a lot. If something should happen down there, we don’t have many units—and that should be clear to everyone. I have to be prepared for the worst case, which would mean problems nearby. Then we couldn’t bring down the units from the Serbian sector. WARL1MONT: Absolutely not. THE FUHRER: That is why units should be brought down there in any case. WARLIMONT: We had planned to transfer the two panzer divisions to Greece, once they are on their way from the East? KEITEL: Yes, we had this in mind. Considering the poor state of the rail¬ road from Salonika, the transportation will take a long rime, and 9XA trains will be required. THE FUHRER: Transports from the West would be the quickest. For a panzer division, we would need 15 days from the beginning of the opera¬ tion. Allowing another seven days for preparation, the panzer division couldn’t be down there in less than 3 weeks from now, at the earliest. WARLIMONT: According to our calculations, it would take at least 30 days to drive a division from the East to the region of Bucharest, and then to march on from there. THE FUHRER: Now, we can’t forget that we may not bring in the condi¬ tions of 1941 again. We can’t because the conditions of 1941 are not com¬ parable, as we had two huge bridges over the Danube back then. That’s missing this time. WARLIMONT: We can only cross on the bridge at Cernaroda and on the ferry at Giurgiu; it is set up for that. KEITEL: Nevertheless, the ferry at Giuigiu provides a good deal of ser¬ vice, especially in the summer months, when the water conditions are favor-

Muir ARY CoXbliRhiYChS 1942-1945

123

able. A lot could be done in three days and three nights. If we pull out an armored division from the West, we should at least make a point of taking a unit that can be replenished. Even a skeleton unit that would have to be fleshed out with tanks—whether captured or training Panzers—would be better than nothing. Tl IE FL 11RER: Couldn’t we set up a North African division in the West, by scraping together the available men into a division and moving it to the

West?372 KEITEL: The mobile ones—one each from the Fifteenth, Twenty-First, and Tenth [Armies]—and set up a new one with the personnel.'3 1 believe they have been transferred to the improvised units. Tl IE FL 11RER: To pull out a unit, a division X, says that more than 30 percent of the men from his panzer regiment alone are there. They could provide a base. It will probably not be possible to give them more tanks in the foreseeable future. The situation in the West will improve as soon as the two SS panzer detachments with the Panthers are operational. KEITEL: Unless everything is again absorbed by the East. Tl IF. FI 11RF.R: If it should become necessary, the two detachments could be assigned to one of the two panzer divisions—they would have to be divided up—or to the two SS divisions. If the two divisions have 100 Pan¬ thers, they will be in excellent condition and will be very efficient and effec¬ tive divisions. WARLIMONT: I’m thinking less about the requirements of the West and more about the needs that might come up in northern Italy if we can only get the first troops tor this purpose from the West. THE FUHRER: In this case, the two panzer detachments could be used, provided we have a little more time. They ate being trained now', and the tanks will arrive by the 15th of next month at the latest. WARLIMONT: Yes. THE FUHRER: But for security' reasons, I believe it is necessary to transfer a w'holc division there at once. In my view; it w'ill take too long for them to arrive from the East, and wre must not forget that in the East only— (/ Jen tenant General B ablejoins the wee ting.) Buhle, after much reflection, and based on this document 1 received from the Comando Supremo,r4 T have come to the conclusion that the Balkans are almost an even greater threat to us than Italy—which, if worst comes to worst, we could seal off in some place. If a landing takes place in the Balkans, say on the Peloponnesian Peninsula, Crete will be lost soon, too. We have supplies there for six months. KEITEL: Yes, average supplies for six months. WARLIMONT: You speak of the average, but there are a few exceptions.

124

Hitler and His Generals

KEITEL: There are some exceptions. There was a certain delay in moving food supplies because of the billeting question. Ammunition is available, but not all types; scarce ammunition is in short supply. All in all, they have supplies for six months, but this doesn’t apply to the Italians. THE FUHRER: If we lose the Peloponnesian Peninsula, further supplies will be blocked. We can’t deceive ourselves about that. We won’t be able to supply them any ltinger. So the control of the Peloponnese is a precondition of everything else. They are already starting to use their position finding planes for torpedo attacks. Right now several small German units are de¬ ployed on the Peloponnesian Peninsula, and a division, the 117th, is being moved there as well. Part of the Luftwaffe field division is stationed in Ath¬ ens, another part at the Isthmus of Corinth, which means that it is not completely available. The next-nearest units are in action in Montenegro. If there are any problems, especially with the Italians, we can’t count on those units at all, because we won’t be able to get them out. We would need them to occupy the Montenegrin-Dalmatian coast and disarm the Italians. So I have decided to transfer a panzer division to the Peloponnese in any case—perhaps to the area of Athens, but the Peloponnesian Peninsula itself would be better. As tilings stand now, it can only be taken from the West. 1 want to draw on the East only as a last resort, of course—such as in the event of an Italian crisis. I don’t wish to draw on the East only because of a landing operation. As long as the Italians stick with us, I don’t want to interfere with the East. We should only draw on the East if there are signs of internal problems in Italy or if the Italians are starting to collapse. There are plans for the 16th Panzer Division to be transferred to Italy, but it is not yet equipped. BUHLE: It needs to get tanks first. It has 8 Panzer IVs and 8 command tanks.375 THE FUHRER: That’s negligible—so the 16th (Panzer] is not armored. BUHLE: It will get more at the end of the month. To reach the number for the East, another 40 tanks will have to be transferred to the SS corps. So many tanks have been shipped to the East. This month,376 ten tanks will be shipped to the Hermann Goring |Parachute Panzer Division] and ten to Bulgaria. THE FUHRER: How many Panzer IVs docs the Hermann Goring have? BUHLE: Twenty. It will get another ten, which have just arrived in Italy. That makes thirty; another ten in May, which will make forty, plus 43 Panzer Ills. Ten for Bulgaria, ten for the 25th Panzer Division, plus the ten for the Hermann Goring—all in all another thirty. They have just been shipped. We

can now make plans for other panzer divisions. KEITEL: They should reach the 16th [Panzer Division] in time, as it is not scheduled to move until early June. So the first June deliveries should go to the 16th Panzer Division.

Mil IIA RV C()\ hh Kh \Ch.\ 1942-1 94 5

125

Ti Hi lil IRIiR: They should reach the others in time as well. KEITEL: Yes, because it doesn’t go any faster, is what I meant. BUHLE: It depends on which division we choose. THE FUHRER. Which division do you personally regard as most suitable to be shipped to the Balkans right now? BUHLE: The 1st Panzer Division. THE FUHRER: Isn’t it already there? KEITEL: The second was the 5th [Panzer Division]. WARIJMONT: In the cold light of day, the 1st Panzer Division is the only operational one. BUHLE: It’s by far the best. It has 60 Panzer lYs, 12 flame-thrower tanks,' and a dozen command tanks. A Panther detachment is being trained now. The personnel are available and the first vehicles are said to have arrived. This division has 60 Panzer IVs today. KEITEL: What about the 26th [Rtnzer Division]? THE FUHRER: When will the Panther detachment be ready for the 1st [Panzer Division]? BUHLE: Not before the end of June or middle of July, my ELihrer. Tt de¬ pends on when it gets the equipment. According to the current schedule, it will be the next in line after the two SS divisions™ If the two SS divisions have to be supplied first, the earliest possible date will be July. THE FUHRER: Why? BUI ILE: We will get 300 this month. That will be sufficient for two detach¬ ments and a weak SS detachment; twenty vehicles were shipped to the schools, so that all these men can be trained. We will need at least the total June output in order to build up the two SS divisions. THE FUHRER: This proves one thing: if we had attacked in the East3 9 there would have been a gap of six weeks in our supply of tanks, which we couldn’t have bridged. We would have been unable to catch up. KEITEL: And what about the 26th |Panzer Division]? BUHLE: The 26th Panzer Division has about 35 Panzer Ills at the mo¬ ment, half of them with 5-cm long guns, the other half with 7.5-cm short guns. In addition, they have three Panzer IVs with short guns. Those arc the ones that were left behind. The others were taken away. Plus one makeshift armored vehiclew and a dozen flame-thrower tanks. They are lacking the 50 Panzer IVs that were taken away. WARLIMONT: They are also lacking combat experience. Unlike the 1st Panzer Division, this one hasn’t yet seen action. BUHLE: This is a panzer division that hasn’t yet been deployed. KEITEL: The 24th [Panzer Division] is in even worse shape. BUHLE: It hardly has anything.

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\

Til I1. ILI IRER: So the 1st Panzer Division is the only one worth consid ering. BLJHEE: If an operational panzer division is to be moved there, then it has to be the 1st Panzer Division. KEITEL: What about the 3rd and 29th Motorized [Divisions]? BUHEE: The 3rd and 29th [Divisions] are nor usable—at least not for the time being. The 45 assault guns required tor the 29th [Motorixed| are on their way, and should arrive in two days. I Iowevcr, they don’t yet have enough vehicles. THE KUHRER: Docs the 1st Panzer Division have enough vehicles? BUHLE: It’s the best in this respect as well, because the 1st [Panzer Divi¬ sion] had been earmarked for action in the past. THE PU1IRER: So how many panzer divisions will we have in the West, after the 16th and 1st [Panzer divisions] arc taken out? BLIHLE: Disregarding the 16th and 1st [Panzer Divisions], we have the following there: the 24th, the 26th, and the 14th [Panzer Divisions], and three panzer grenadier divisions—the 3rd, the 29th and the 60th—plus the two SS divisions. KEITEL: Then there are the two SS divisions mentioned earlier, plus the three—but they are extremely weak. THE FUHRER: ... their assault guns? in Brittany. BUHLE: It will be pulled out this month. These are the first 100 it got. Tl IE FUI IRER: Two very strong Panther detachments will soon be avail¬ able in the West. KEITEL: With the SS Panzer Divisions. THE FUHRER: They will have Panthers. These will be delivered in time so that we have a high-class force in the West. BUI 1EE: They will be ready in July. THE FUHRER: So they can be employed in July. Sepp Dietrich is very prudent and cautious. Before he accepted the tanks, he had Inis men in the factories for eight wrecks to test drive them. BUHL.E: They won’t get the tanks before mid-)une. THE FUHRER: If there’s a tough fight, he’ll finish earlier. But he is cx tremely cautious, because he is an old tank hand. I Ie doesn’t believe in mak¬ ing promises he can’t keep. But if worst comes to worst, they w ill be avail¬ able. What is the situation in the West regarding the Tigers? Do we have any Tigers besides the ones made by Porsche?181 BUHLE: The first of the other Tigers are being shipped now. The 202nd Tiger Detachment, which was also earmarked for the Eastern front, w ill get 30.

Military Conferlkces

1942-1945

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THE FUIIRER: Will they be shipped to the East or the West? BUHLE: To the West. That detachment was taken there in place of the 505th [Tiger Detachment], which was pulled out. THE FUI iRER: It is not intended for the East? BUHLE: It had been assigned to that operation originally. We discussed it here once, without reaching a final decision. THE FUHRH.R: It must be moved to the East. If I launch the operation in the East'*2 I want to have everything ... BUHLE: We can get 130 [tanks] for the Tiger detachments that were in¬ tended for the operation in the south ... THE FUHRER: Then we should assign one of the Tiger detachments to Army Group North in the event of a crisis. BUHLE: The Leningrad [Tiger] Company has always been up with the Army Group North and, in principle, belongs to this detachment, which has just been established in the West but which was designated for the East. KEITEL: If they are intended for this purpose, the situation is different. In tltis case only the two SS Panzer divisions would be available as the next reinforcements in the West. With the exception of the assault guns for the 3rd and 29th |Panzcr Grenadier Divisions], it would cause considerable delay. THE FUHRER: How many Panzer I Vs does the I jeibstandarte (SS Panzer Grenadier Division]383 have? BUHLE: As you ordered, the SS corps will be provided with another 75 Panzer IVs. 1 don’t know the precise number tor the corps, but 1 assume that the Leibstandarte will get at least 25, so it will have a total of 60 Panzer IVs. It will get 14 Tigers, and it currently has 32 assault guns, according to my records. THE FUHRER: No, 22. BUHIE: Yesterday or the day be ft >rc, 30 assault guns were dispatched r< > the SS Corps, so they will have those at least. THE FCtHRER: It should have the required number of assault guns. Then it will have at least 90 to 95 heavy weapons. 1 don’t know yet what the con¬ sequences of the disaster in the West will be.184 I really don’t know yet... WARLIMONT: According to today’s report it’s not so bad. THE FUHRER: The consequences will be felt during the three summer months. If it’s a dry year, it will be an outright disaster. But if the Ruhr gets sufficient water, we can manage. BLJHLE: After June the bulk of the tank output will be shipped to the West anyway—at least 120 Panzer IVs will be shipped to the West. Otherwise they never get anything. The maximum we can supply to the East in July will be 100.

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THE FUHRER: And how many assault guns? BUHLE: Regarding the assault guns, the question of activating assault-gun detachments would have to be taken up with Zeitzler. In my view, it is abso¬ lutely impossible to organize three new assault-gun detachments each month until the end of December. We don’t have the required number of vehicles. THE FUI IRER: So let’s organize tank destroyer companies. BUHLE: It is not acceptable that Guderian commands the tank destroyer troops while the other assault gun detachments are commanded by Guderian and the General Staff.185 Otherwise we would have to give Guderian an¬ other 80 assault guns, but require him to integrate them into the tank de¬ stroyer detachments of the infantry divisions. TI IE FIJI IRER: That doesn’t make sense; the weapons are useless and we are building units at the same time. KEITEL: Although the General Staff is opposing it and demanding an end to the build-up. They say that they will get everything that is required. THE FUHRER: Well, 1 will simply make the decision. KEITEL: They have everything-—field kitchens, the whole setup. BUI ILF.: The 18th and 20th [Panzer Divisions] will go to the West. KEITEL: That will delay everything If only we had gotten them! BUHLE: One should be moved to the Balkans right now. KEITEL: It that had happened on May 3—I had arranged for it during my stay at Berchtesgaden—the 18th and 20th would have been pulled out and transferred to the West. The skeleton units were our trump card in the orga¬ nization of the 15 divisions. In addition, we will get the three skeleton units from the three rudimentary divisions that arc still involved in Operation “Zitadelle” [Citadel] ;'H6 these will form the core of the new units. Every¬ thing will be postponed accordingly. THE FUHRER: That’s why I don’t believe in activadon based on skeleton units, hecausc they arc never released. It’s a shame. Everyone says it’s more practical to rehabilitate them. Of course it’s more practical. But it never happens, because no one will release them.38 BUHLE: If this doesn’t happen, they have to be removed. KEITEL: They have to be removed. Besides, they arc just the rudiments and of no use to him. BUHLE: The convalescents are all blocked for these core divisions; they’re kept at home. THE F0I IRER: That’s why all these so-called ideal plans fail. KEITEL: Everyone agreed to it completely back then. Everything was clear up to May 3. I was told that I could expect them after June 1, and now it won’t be possible. We’ll have to raise the matter with him,RS again because these formations are not combat-ready.

Miljiar) Co\hi Ki \fi-\ 1942-1945

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T11H FU11KIK: But we don’t need them now either ... BUI ILE: No, we don’t need them until early July. Otherwise the 1st Panzer Division would be the only one. We could reinforce it by adding additional panzer detachments during the next three months. THE FUHRER: It has 60 Panzer IVs? BUHLE: Yes, 60 Panzer IVs. TI IF FUHRER: Does it have assault guns as well? BUI ILE: No. It has 12 flame-thrower tanks and command tanks. KEITEL: 72 combat vehicles. BUHLE: The division personnel are being trained on Panthers. KEITEL: They actually belong to the division. BUHLE: Yes, the second detachment. THE FUHRER: Then they would have to be somewhat reinforced no mat¬ ter what so that they can be moved there in any case. That way, we’ll have a first-class panzer division in the Balkans. KEITEL: Then we would certainly have the best one available. BUHLE: As soon as we have replenished the 24th Panzer Division, we will have a first-class panzer division. THE FUHRER: The 24th doesn’t have a Panther detachment at all? BUI ILE: No, not yet. They only have captured tanks and 14 flame-thrower tanks. None of the new formations have tanks so far, because until May every thing was shipped to the East. KEITEL: But now they will get equipment and be operational very soon. That should happen by June, provided the flow of supplies to the East slows down. BUI ILE: The 16th [Panzer Division] must get at least 50 or 60 Panzer IVs in early June. THE FUHRER: Yes, but without a panzer division we can’t achieve any¬ thing in the Balkans. BUHLE: The 18th and 25th [Panzer Divisions] have always been featured in the overall planning. TI IE FIJI IRER: In the event of a crisis, the forces currently deployed there will be useless—and we have to be prepared for a crisis. I can’t leave it to chance that nothing will happen. I have to be prepared for the worst case. Just look at today’s reports. Pirzio Biroli, v' or whatever his name is, knew perfectly well where Mihailovic was hiding KEITEL: He’s known it for months. TIIL 111 IRER: We’re trying to capture this character because he is in the service of the Entente, but he is aware of it and remains inactive. KEITEL: Having begun quite well, it still looks as if the operation will be completed in eight to ten days.

*1

no

HniJ K a\i) His Ghmhrais

WARLIMONT: I think the prospect is favorable, since the division arrived today in Ni... KEITEL: I was always concerned that the tube would get squeezed out down there. WARLIMONT: That is one of die main reasons for transferring the panzer division, because there is a shortage of trucks in the Balkans. If the division is there it can also be used for this purpose. TI IE FI IIRER: Be that as it may, we need it in any case. I don’t think the English will land in the West just now. Should anything happen right away, we still have something there until the Tiger detachment is moved out. It’s being established now with 30 Tigers? BUHLE: Yes, they are working on it. THE FUHRER: If we have another two or three weeks, at least the first supplies designated for the two SS divisions will he transferred to the Pan¬ ther detachments. KEITEL: But the first Panzer IVs, even in other divisions, may have to stay there THE FUHRER: Then this thing will take on a better picture. If we had the 16th Panzer Division brought to Italy, it would be good. I always ask myself a question. We have quite a few tanks in Sicily now. There are 17 Tigers there. KEITEL: Seventeen Tigers and about 45 modem IVs with long guns. BUHLE: Six or eight Panzer Ills. KEITEL: We have about 70 tanks there; 72 I think, with 17 Tigers that are in Sicily. TI IE ITT IRER: I low long will it he before the 16th Panzer Division leaves, anyway? WARLIMONT: The Commander-in-Chief South will have to arrange that. Maybe hell let the I lermann Goring [Parachute Panzer] Division leave first. THE FUHRER: Yes, 1 think it should leave first; the 16th |Panzer Division] should be second. WARLIMONT: Even if the number of trains is not increased. This means that the 16th will arrive in mid-June at the earliest. If he can increase the number of trains, we could gain ten days. TIIE FI I IRER: Today is the 19th. They will need at least ten days to get down there. So the 16th can't start in less than 10 days. KEITEL: No, I didn’t expect so. THE PCI IRER: The picture will he clearer by then. 1 would still reconsider whether we can make do in Sicily without anv additional troops, and keep the 16th in Italy and move others to Sardinia.”0 This requires careful con sideration. Maybe we can get one thing or the other. I’m always afraid of

*1

Military Conflrlkcls 1942-1945

131

having too much on my plate if I can’t be one hundred percent certain that contact can be maintained. KEITEL: I share your feelings. Down there we’re like bees in a bag that someone is closing at the top. We really can’t afford such a thing anymore, 1 am also of the opinion, my Fiihrer, that we must consistendy bring the units of the Hermann Goring together, so that it will finally be complete again. It is always fragmented: parts of it are deployed in Sicily, parts in Apulia, parts are being shipped, other parts are still in France, They need to be brought together. THE FUHRER: So we would at least have a division. KEITEL: ConrathV’1 entire division staff down there is almost a rein¬ forced division staff, considering the original strength of the division. THE FUHRER: How many tanks does it have besides the ones in Sicily that can’t be included? BUHI.E: At the moment, the Hermann Goring has 48 Panzer Ills and 20 Panzer IVs, several command vehicles and 22, or rather 20, assault guns, because two are to be transferred to Sardinia. They were sunk, but will be replaced. Ten Panzer IVs are on the way and another ten will arrive before the end of this month. THE FUHRER: 40 Panzer IVs, 40 Panzer Ills and 20 assault guns—so 100 tanks all in all. Under these circumstances, we should prepare the 1 st Panzer Division. KEITEI.: Yes, indeed—preparing them for transport to the Balkans. Tl IE FU11RER: I’m absolutely convinced that nothing will happen in the West. WARL1MONT: A pattern is emerging: they destroy supplies first and attack the front only later. THE FUEHRER: It won’t be possible in the West, where the defensive posi¬ tions have been consolidated and improved. If they plan an attack, they will attack only in Italy and die Balkans, of course. The Balkans are dangerous. We have to take everything into consideration. If something happens in Turkey and we have to pull out forces from the blast anyway, I will be left with only one reserve to fall back on there—the Bulgarians. KEITEL: I have just examined the delivery lists for Bulgaria. No problems, really. We still have to give them tanks. BUHLE: They will get ten this month. At the moment they have 15 tanks. KEITEL: A total of 13 have arrived so far. BUHLE: They will get 10 now and another ten next month, along with five assault guns. KEITEL: Only 12 Panzer I Is are behind schedule; everything else, includ¬ ing ammunition and weapons, was shipped to Bulgaria. Yet I would suggest.

132

HniJ K am) His Ghkhrais

for the third stage of the main shipment, to continue supplying them, because besides the Finns, the Bulgarians—provided they have arms19’—are the best fighters we have. They were excellent in the Great War. They are brave, a peasant nation. If they get good weapons, we can count on their assistance. WARN MONT: If we have a problem in Italy, we would need ai least five reliable Bulgarian divisions in the coastal zone, according to our calculations. THE FU1 IRI'.R: It doesn’t matter under these conditions, even if we bring in forces from the East. One division on the spot is more useful to me than three that are still on the wav. a

BUHI .H: One was to be moved down there, according to our plans. KEITEL: This is the most difficult transport route at the moment. No prob¬ lem up to Salonika—9Va trains leave the city even, day, and they have to live down there as well. It is a difficult task. If you have decided to bring one in down there, my Fiihrer— WARN MONT: 1 submitted the order that General Fellgiebel393 be installed there in the next few dajvs. BUHLE: I would see lhat 120 Panzer IVs will he made available in June, half of them for the 16th Panzer Division and half for the West. Tn addition, the West will get 100 assault guns so that every panzer division will get some. TI IE FCl 1RER: Yes, you should do that. End: 3:28 pm. *****

Meeting between the FChrer AND SONDERFtlHEER V. NeURATH, MAY 20, 1943194 Present:

The Fiihrer

Ambassador Havel

Field Marshal Keitel

Major General Schmundt

I ield Marshal Rommel

Colonel Scherff r

General Lobf395

Lieutenant Colonel Langemannsw

Lieutenant General Brener™

Sonderjtihrer u Nenrathm

! mu tenant

Hauptstnrmfiihrer Giinsche

General Warlimont

Beginning: 1:19 p.m. Italy THE FOHRER: You were in Sicily? V. NEURATH: Yes, my Fiihrer. 1 was there and spoke with Roatta,*10 whom 1 know very well from a long time ago because he was head of the group of

*1

Military Confbrlkchs 1942-1945

153

attaches in Rome, where I met him. Among other things, he told me that he is not very optimistic about the possibility of defending Sicily. He claimed he was too weak and the equipment of his forces was inadequate. He com¬ plained that he had just one motorized division; all the others were ground troops. Day in, day out, the Knglish attack the locomotives of the trains in Sicily, and he is aware of the fact that obtaining supplies and engine replace¬ ments will be very' difficult or maybe even impossible now. In addition, when we crossed from Giovanni to Messina, my impression was that almost all traffic had ceased on this short route. Of the ferries that had previously operated there—1 believe there were 6 of them—only one has survived. This ferry is “under museum protection,” as they called it—they treat it as gently as possible and plan to preserve it for better purposes. THE FUHRER: W hat are “better purposes”? V. NEURATH: Well, my Ftihrer, the Italians often say; “When the war is over,” and they also say “One never knows what the future will bring.” At any rate, this ferry wasn’t in operation. Maybe there was some technical problem. But the German gentlemen I met there said that there was no such problem. The German forces in Sicily have become relatively unpopular; there is no doubt about that. The situation is easy to explain; the Sicilians claim we brought war to their island, we ate—with more or less appetite— every thing they owned, and now we’re going to make the English land there as well. But on the whole—I noticed this again and again—the Sicilian peas¬ ants are not too sorry about this, because they assume that their suffering will soon be over. It’s easy to understand, because the ordinary peasants don’t sec many other things and take the easiest goal as the next one. The war will be over when the English arrive—this opinion is shared by many people in southern Italy. They also believe that once the English have landed, the war will end sooner if the Germans have left than if they stay on and cause problems. THE FUf1RER: What is the official Italian response to counter this opinion? V. NEURATH: The prefects and the other authorities do little about it, as far as 1 can tell, my Fiihrer. They see and hear it, but always say'—1 have pointed this out to the gentlemen on several occasions and told them, “If a Gennan soldier is publicly abused in the street as a crook”—something one can frequently hear, particularly in Sicily—“what is done to counter this attitude? Because this is unacceptable in the long run.”They answered, “W hat do you expect us to do? That’s public opinion. The people see it that way— and they didn’t make themselves popular with the people; they seized things and ate their chickens.”—“We are not here as travelers, for our pleasure, but because of the war!” Because of this, a very difficult relationship exists. They answer, “We can’t do anything about it. German soldiers insult Italian

134

Hitler and His Generals

soldiers too.” In my opinion, more vigorous action should be taken by offi¬ cial authorities, to bring the most striking cases to account. THE FUHRER: They won’t take vigorous action. V. NEURATH: It’s very7 difficult. They don’t resort to drastic measures. One reason might be the Sicilian temperament, which differs from the north¬ ern Italian one. By and large I can say that it is hard to accept how they let matters slide. The threat from the air or the air superiority7 over Sicily is tremendous; there is no question about that. This is certainly not news to you. Palermo has been smashed up—large residential areas, including nu¬ merous beautiful old buildings, and, in particular, the harbor. The impres¬ sion I gained in conversation with several gentlemen is that the English have prepared the harbor in such a way that at least they won’t be able to use it themselves either. In contrast to this, the result of English raids against Cagliari on Sardinia is said to be different. It was striking, I was told, that the city and the warehouses were blown up, but all port installations and quays were relatively well preserved. THE FUHRER: That is the report-— WARLIMONT: Admiral Ruge4411 said the same. V. NEURATH: My Fiihrer, the Italian Crown Prince is the supreme com¬ mander of the Italian forces—but I’m not well informed. Is he the supreme commander of the Italian forces in Sardinia or in Sicily or in Sicily and southern Italy or only in southern Italy?402 THE FUHRER: When did you arrive? V. N EUR ATI I: I was in Berlin on Sunday.403 THE FUHRER: And what’s happening there? V. NEURATH: It’s striking that he is organizing many inspections and that General Roatta devotes a lot of time to him and that General Roatta’s staff includes numerous officers—Italian staff officers—who are well-known Anglophiles. Some of them have English wives or other relationships with the English. THE FtlHRER: What have I always said?! V. NEURATH: Personally, the only thing I can say is that 1 wouldn’t trust him for a minute. THE FUHRER: No! V. NEUR ATH: T always thought him very clever. THE FUHRER: Clever? He is the Fouche of the Fascist revolution, an unprincipled spy. He is indeed a spy.4"4 V. NEURATH: He’s a born spy7—indeed the prototype of a spy. At any rate, I’m convinced that he is playing a game. The German gentlemen confirmed my impression; that it was striking how he increasingly used the Crown Prince, how he tried to create a platform with him that would stand him in

Military CoxYhRhxchs 1942-1945

155

good stead if the English attack on Sicily came. I can’t tell whether he is able to do this; I have no knowledge of it, but 1 think it is safe to say that he is a dangerous gambler. THE FU1IRER: l share your opinion! V. NEURATH: There’s no doubt that he is the absolute ruler in Sicily. He knows this. 1 le is based in Enna where he has his headquarters. Everyone dances to his tune—I saw plenty of proof—and everyone says that nothing happens without General Roatta’s approval. THE FUHRER: Did you discuss this matter with Kesselring? V. NEURATH: 1 told General von Rintelen,405 my Fiihrer. THE FUHRER: We must be very cautious. Kesselring is a great optimist and we have to make sure that because of his optimism he doesn’t miss the hour when optimism is no longer called for and drastic measures are re¬ quired.4"6 V. NEURATH: The German Luftwaffe is certainly having a very hard time in Sicily at the moment. The air raids are fierce and 1 imagine the losses at the airstrips will be high. They may not even be able to take off from several of them. WARLIMONT: Yesterday the situation was just the other way round: ... 27 planes attacked, 7 were shot down, no losses on our side. THE FIJI IRER: There are too few airstrips anyhow. KEITEL: They are too concentrated. V. NEURATH: They are indeed concentrated. Even the mood varies in Rome, my Fiihrer. It is very unpleasant; the plutocratic clique, whose way of thinking we know—it toes the British line, of course—and the ordi¬ nary people now interpret the measures carried out resolutely by the Duce4'1 as the beginning of a more equal sharing of the war burden. But on the other hand, I think it’s already a bit late for these measures. I don’t believe that it will be possible to stop the black markctccring that has taken hold of the people and spread like cancer. 1 le won’t make himself popular with this drive. THE FUHRER: How could one stop it in a country' where the leading representatives of the armed forces and the state, etc.—where everyone is corrupt? Have you also been in northern Italy? V. NEURATH: No, my Fiihrer, I just passed through it. THE FUfIRER: How long did you stay in Rome? V. NEURATH: I was in Rome for only seven days. THE FUHRER: Seven day's. What is the attitude of the man on the street toward the Germans? V. NEURATH: It is such that there are no German soldiers to be seen in the streets. The German soldiers stay in uniform at the forward operations cen-

136

HnU R AND HlS CthiShR Us

ter or at the railroad station. Because of these arrangements, the details of which I don’t know, the command centers were moved out of the city, in order to ... the military character of the city—408 WARLIMONT: This dates back to the time— V. NEURATH: No, this is nothing new. 1 think it w'as a request by the Vatican. Otherwise the character of Rome is still— THE FUHRER: Peaceful? V. NEURATH: Yes, peaceful; no one can doubt that. Arriving from Africa, the street scene always struck me as if nothing had happened for two years. The reason they give is that they are a poor nation; they don’t have clothes and boots for their soldiers and therefore it is better to allow them to go for a walk in the streets. THE FUHRER: They should have given us workers; they could have worked at least. ROMMEL: The plutocrats wouldn’t like that. The workers would be “spoiled” by us. V. NEURATH: Yes, as the Italians see it, the people would be “spoiled” by our progressive social measures. THE FUHRER: How many workers are now in Germany? Do you know, I lew'el? HEWEL: There were 230,000;4"0 they were to be sent home starting in June. THE FUHRER: Starting in June? HEWEL: Em not entirely sure of it. T can find out. THE FUHRER: You can do that later. KEITEL: Call Sauckel—he knows the exact figures. THE FUHRER: And Roatta himself?—I formed my opinion long ago: from the very beginning, a certain class in that country has consistently sabotaged the war. From the very beginning! Initially in 1939. Because of this sabotage, these people succeeded in preventing Italy from joining the war. That is to say: Italy didn’t actually have to join the w7ar. Because if Italy had issued a declaration of solidarity with Germany—as it \vas bound to do by the agreements—the war would not have started; the British and the French would not have started fighting. What happened w-as the fol¬ lowing: two hours after the decision w as made—it wras immediately re¬ ported to London—that Italy would not take part, England signed the mutual assistance pact with Poland.41" It hadn’t been signed until then. Two hours after the end of this conversation the pact was signed. We saw this later. Everv memorandum 1 sent to the Duce wras immediately made known to the English. That is why I only included things I wanted the English to know. That was the best way to inform them without delay. V. NEURATH: This fact still plays a great role in our dealings with England. The night before yesterday, when I w’as traveling by rail, the commanders of

Mil ji aK) Goxhhio

x(I-\ 1942-1945

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the submarines stationed in La Spezia said that they have first-class evidence that the battleship (l etitroyAUS) had radio communication with Malta from 8 to 10 a.m. even* morning. A German counterintelligence officer who inves¬ tigated it found this out and was then arrested by the Italian authorities for suspected spying when they realized that he hail found out their tricks.There is no question about that. 111H FUIIRLR: Is a representative of the Navy there? [—] But that isn’t necessary. We have to make sure that the submarines in the Aegean Sea— KEITEL: I’ve made a note of it already. We will include everything.412 New ideas and points come up all the time. THE FUHRER: The vessels and all the other things, and above all the sub¬ marines. KEITEL: All the auxiliary7 ships are already included in our notes. WARLIMONT: On the southern coast of France— THE FUHRER: If they’re on the southern coast of France, they may stay there, but not in Italian ports—in La Spezia, etc. [—] Giinsche, measure the distance between England and Munich on the map and the distance as the crow7 flies between Munich and Corsica! Roatta is a spy after all! V NEURATH: it’s no different as far as the Goring is concerned. The prob lem is that we won’t get it out of Sicily unless the gentlemen help out. THE FUHRER: As I have said already, we must examine whether it makes sense at all to move the Goring Division. My view is that this should possibly not be done.41 ’ KEITEL: My impression from the start is that it should be kept in southern Italy. ROMMEL: It won’t return. I don’t share Field Marshal Kesselring’s opinion that it will cross the straits under enemy pressure. Maybe a few individuals will succeed in returning, but not the bulk of the troops and the materiel— they will be lost. *•

KEITEL: Yes, all that will be lost.414 My proposal was that parts of the Goring Division be moved to southern Italy so that we still have control of

the division as such, and don’t send any more of the / lermaitn (taring across. [—] Can this ferry be repaired? V. NEURATH: Field Marshal, that should not be a problem. THE FUHRER: There you are! V. NEURATH: It could even be done without such a ferry7. THE FUHRER: Well, the point is this: the decisive element is not the ferry, but the will. V. NEURATH: It’s only the characteristic element! THE FUHRER: Where there is a will there is a ferry7. Out of the 20 or 30 ferries operated by the Italians and by us, 60% of ours were operative and

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10% of the Italian ones. They were constantly plagued with problems. Probably it was no different with tanks. 1 have seen the number of Italian tanks shrink very fast in each operation—after two or three days, there was hardly an Italian tank left. They were all being repaired. I’d say it’s a problem of will. SCHMUNDT: The distance from England to Munich is 1,000 km and 750 km from Corsica to Munich. THE FUHRER: Another point—write this down—is the following: the provision of ammunition for our anti-aircraft artillery' down there must be carried out in such a way that the supply can be stopped at any time and that we don’t have large stores there. There should be just enough! WARLIMONT: Yes! For the anti-aircraft artillery we give to the Italians? THE FUHRER: All the anti-aircraft artillery'. ROMMEL: My Fiihrer, wouldn’t it be possible for the Italians to send more troops to Sicily and defend it instead of us? THE FUHRER: Everything is possible. The only question is whether they mint to defend it. If they really want to defend, then anything could be done. What worries me is not the inability—for if one really wants to defend it, there is no doubt that it is possible, and we could bring in troops, too—no, what worries me is these people’s lack of desire, and we do see this. The Duce can try as hard as he wants, but he is sabotaged. I read Bastianini’s411 speech. It was lazy, full of flimsy excuses—there’s no doubt about that. The speech was—I don’t know if you’ve read it— KEITEL: No, 1 haven’t read it. Just a short notice this morning stating that he had spoken. THE FUHRER: I received a dispatch; I have it over there. The tenor of the speech is this: Italy and Germany stand for justice, etc., the others lor injustice, and the Italians would not accept an unconditional surrender and so on. Italy rallies around her king and will defend her army and king. When he spoke of the “king,” certain senators applauded conspicuously. So there you are! GUNSCHE: My Fiihrer, the distance from the northern tip of Corsica to Munich is 600 km and the distance from the southeast of England to Munich is 800 km. (Presentation by Ambassador Hewe/.4'1') THE FUHRER: By way of introduction, Bastianini, the Under Secretary of State, pointed out that— {Reading aloud.) “Earlier it was different: ‘Mare Nostrum,’ [‘Our Sea’—the Mediterranean] etc.”(Readingcontinues.) “...to the goal.” They would have ruled Croatia themselves, and 1 don’t know what all else. They did have the “goal”—it’s only the ability that was lacking. “Italy was the first in Europe...” (Readingcontinues) “...in which we believe.” “Di¬ vine commandments”! “On the Crimea!”

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WARLIMONT: A historical survey. TI IE Fiji IRER: I low many Italian soldiers fought on the Crimea in 1856? LOHR: One Italian division was there. THE FUHRER: But that took a long time. “ This goal...” (Rending aloud.) “...to defend. I .ively applause by die Senators. Shouts: ‘Long live the King.’” “In view of the terrorist methods employed by our enemies...” (Reading aloud.) Well, that was a different kind of spint. “There is no intention to

destroy or humiliate France...” (Reading aloud.) “...but also to settle all mat¬ ters that are still pending in her relationship with her conquerors.” To say such a thing in public! The French deny having been defeated by the Italians. (Reading continues) All in all a bad speech, a very bad speech. It only confirms

my feeling that a crisis may erupt at any moment, in the way that we just discussed. Lohr, you will have to consider your objective and all the prob¬ lems in this light,41

namely—

KEITEL: The ideas that you discussed with him yesterday and the text that I showed you yesterday, my Fiihrer, have all been discussed—he’s aware of everything. T.OHR: Yes! THE FUHRER: And you as well? BREUER: Yes, Sir! THE FUHRER: We have to be on guard like a spider in its web. Thank God, I have a good nose for such things and can usually anticipate these developments beforehand. KEITEL: Colonel General Ldhr’s staff talked again to our men yesterday, to discuss issues that might worry us as far as supplies are concerned. Today they saw the Quartermaster General about the shortage of ammunition, to find out the details. 1 discussed everything with them. We will then report everything that has been arranged. We haw to use the time available now. The unfortunate thing is, as the Colonel General pointed out to me yester¬ day, that they’re still working on improving the railroad, both the line to Salonika and from there to Athens. The work won’t be completed before mid-June. THE FUHRER: And that would mean the ability to run more frequent trains? T.OlIR:From 15 ... an increase from 12 to 18 on the track to Salonika, and from Salonika on |—] 1HE FUHRER: That’s not so dangerous. KEITEL: At the moment, it’s even a problem for the railroad construction units, the track-laying units, etc. THE FUHRER: Nevertheless, we have to assume this risk now and see the matter through.

140

Hnu:R and His Genkrals

KEITEL: By all means! T also asked if we couldn’t do something with the people, since we have a labor shortage. In addition, I wanted to take the Labor Service away from the Colonel General. It is supposed to join the Armed Forces on July 1. But since it concerns only one or two detachments, I would like to keep them there until the construction work is completed. 1 have to make a telephone call so that we can defer their entry into the ser¬ vice, if necessary, and put all our effort toward making the railroad opera¬ tional, so that we can transport larger volumes. THE FUHRER: So far, every difficult situation has eventually resulted in an improvement for us. KEITEL: I’m not worried about it either. But we have to help him—espe¬ cially with regard to Crete, Rhodes, and the supplies for the south. THE FUHRER: It is extremely critical that we maintain control of the Balkans: copper, bauxite, and chromium.418 And, above all, we have to make sure that there won’t be an endless disaster there if the Italian problem starts. LOHR: The difficult thing is the time it will take before the 117th [Infantry] Division can be ready to intervene. It’s not there yet, and also ... not vet ready. Tl IE FUl IRER: Maybe we can move the 1st [Panzer Division] down there in die meantime. LOHR: If only we had a few tanks there! j

THE FUHRER: The 1st (Panzer] will leave in such a way that they [—] KEITEL: The combat squadron! This time we fixed it according to the pattern that we also used in the East. [—] And then Colonel General Lohr just needs to be told that regarding the individual instructions for which no one is called to account, he must inform only those who really need to know about them. No one needs to know. THE FUHRER: No one needs to know the reasons; all orders that you give are based on your knowledge. Don’t tell people more than they need to know to carry out their assignments. That is to say, if somebody asks about occupation, tell him it is not his concern. Every step has to be checked against this requirement. Our motive must always be to be careful, so that in the event of a collapse—which we have to expect—we can step in and help. This must be our leitmotif, right? LOHR: Yes, Sir! THE FUHRER: It could happen quite differently, of course. [—■] Do you have anything else? KEITEL: This morning the Duce paid a visit to the king and postponed the appointment with Rintelen. THE FOHRER: When will he see Rintelen?4'9 WARLIMONT: He promised to let us know as soon as he was allowed in. The last conversation I had with him was at 11:15.

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THE Fill IRER: What is the time now? WARLIMONT: 2 o’clock. THE FUHRER: When will Zeitzler arrive? KEITEL: General Zeitzler will arrive at 3:30. (Presentation by Ambassador Hen'el.) 1IEWEL: Just some of my ideas. THE FI HRF^R: These two worlds are nothing new. They have always ex¬ isted, as early as the year ... of his Ethiopian offensive. If I had attacked Italy at that time, it would have collapsed immediately. I pointed it out to him back then, that he didn’t ... 1 told him at the time, “I will never forget this.”'2" And we will never forget it. Back then, on the occasion of the re¬ ception in Rome421—I still remember it—I noticed these two worlds quite acutely: on the one hand the Fascist warmth of the reception, etc., and on the other the chilly atmosphere surrounding the military and courtiers— people who are either insignificant or cowards anyway. In my opinion, all people who have assets of more than 250,000 marks generally become cow¬ ards, because they want to live off of their money and sit on their 250,000 marks. They lose all courage. If someone has 1 or 2 million, you can be reassured—those people won’t start a revolution or anything else. That is why they oppose all wars, even if their compatriots are starving—they couldn’t care less. So much for the ones who wear Russian leather \]ucbtenledernen\. If everything were dhided fairly in such a country—if everyone at least got his ration—even the English would have a certain predisposition to approve the possibility of imperial expansion. But this is not the case. These people live like lords; they can afford—and have—everything Only the poor devils are doing badly. In Rome I saw how Fascism was. It couldn’t prevail against the courtly world. A reception at court—which is a disgusting concept to us, and I would not even speak about it—but also by the Duce, and why? Be¬ cause the courtly world is closely involved there. The same is true of Ciana422 I was to take Countess Edda Ciano to the table. But then suddenly Philip42’ and his Mafalda424 burst in and the whole plan was wrecked. There was utter confusion, and 1 was given Mafalda as a dinner partner. How does Mafalda concern me at all? To me, Mafalda is the wife of a German senior president [Oberprasident]—period. That’s it. Besides, her intellecmal qualities are not so outstanding that I could say she was captivating—and I’m only referring to the spiritual beauty, not the physical one, mind you. But this incident indicated again what the situation is like: the Quirinal is infiltrated with such scum. The separation was very clear when the Fascists and bodyguards were present. The court officials call them_To me, the most important ques¬ tion is this: what is the state of the Duce’s health?42-’ That is critical for a man who has to make such difficult decisions. And secondly, what oppor-

142

Hitler asp His Coverals

tunities does he see for Italy in the event that the Fascist revolution or the royal house fades away? Those are the two problems. Either the royalty takes over from the Fascist revolution—and what opportunities does he see for his people in that case?—Or what does he expect if the royal house itself assumes power? And it is difficult to say. When he was at Klessheim, he made a comment over dinner. Suddenly he said, “My Fiihrer,426 I don’t know; I don’t have a successor in the Fascist revolution. A successor as a head of government can be found, but there is no successor to lead the revolution.” That is, of course, tragic. His complaint began already in 1941, when we were down in the second headquarters—in the railway viaduct— during the Russian campaign. KEITEL: Yes, indeed. Down there in Galicia, where the large tunnel was located. THE FU11RER: At night we spoke about the Russian commissars, and how it is impossible to have two powers,42

etc. He became very pensive, and

then I ate with him on the train. He suddenly told me, “What you said, Fiihrer, is correct; there must not be two powers in one army. But what can one do, Fiihrer, if one has officers who have ... reservations about the regime and the conception of the state?” They say, because they arc officers, that they have reservations. When one refers to the conception of the state or the reasons for the state, they say: “We are monarchists; we are subordi¬ nate to the king.” That’s the difference. So that was the problem already in 1941. It was even more acute on October 28, 1940, when I ... returned—it was in 1940. 1 le said suddenly, “You see, I trust the soldiers, but I don’t trust my generals. I can’t trust them at all.”428 This is what he told me on the day when die offensive against Greece or Albania was launched. If die Duce were 15 years younger, this wouldn’t be a problem at all, but at age 60, it’s a bit more difficult—so the quesdon is, how is his health? But in my view, these two worlds have always existed. The one world wasn’t eliminated; it has continued to spin its threads. I see it in all our people from down there. This evening—what’s his name—will probably... KEITEL: Djurisic!429 THE FOHRER: He will probably meet with the king today. Maybe it will turn out that this robber chief is a relative of the king.4’" Yes, a middle-class family would find it difficult to marry a daughter off when the father is a sheep thief and imprisoned x number of times. But in courtly life that is no scandal; rather, it’s a great honor, and the princes scramble for the prin¬ cesses. And good old Nikita431 was nothing more than a rogue who escaped from Austria, practiced one blackmail scheme after the other, and always played Italy off against Austria. The guy even used the World Postal Union [Weltpostvereifi\ to commit fraud—he cheated the Austrian state out of 1%

Military Contlrlkcls 1942-1945

143

million crowns. The Kaiser had to pay it from his private coffers.432 What a scandal! But it’s fine for aristocrats to do that. KEITEL: I have another question, my Fuhrer. Szombafhclyi4’’ sent me an¬ other telegram, requesting 250 submachine guns for the security brigades. 1 think he should get them. THE EL I IRER: Immediately! KEITEL: Initially, the General Staff recommended giving him 100 a month. But that doesn’t make sense. I said he should be given the number required for three months—for both divisions at once. T request your approval. THE FUHRER: Yes. KEITEL: My Fuhrer, vve have some additional thoughts—which are not fully developed yet—regarding the general instructions on which the de¬ ployment of Rommel’s army could be based,434 and the matter concerning Lohr, which I showed you last night. Ldhr has been informed about our ideas. He knows, but he won’t be given a document to take along. THE FUHRER: We have to be extremely careful with documents this time. KEITEL: I know that that’s what you want. Matters are added every day— for example, the submarine issue. (Presentation.) This is a general introduc¬ tion that doesn’t mean anything and doesn’t commit anyone. But the impor¬ tant part afterward is the command, the forces, and precautionary matters which will have to be considered. Every day additional points are added, such as the submarine issue today, the issue of anti-aircraft artillery, etc. I would like to include more ideas and suggestions. Rommel read it once, so he is familiar with the general idea. ROMMEL: Yes, indeed. It was presented to me. KEITEL: He would like to use it as a basis for some other things. It’s an intellectual exercise. Plus the orders for relief, bringing in forces, and similar such matters. But there are a few things that we have to do. Someone has to go over to the Commander-in-Chicf West to discuss with him how he might be able to move forces to the West, and how he could take over that part of the Mediterranean coast that is now occupied by Italy.435 The individual items come together gradually; you think of them only when you write them down. That’s why we’ve written everything down now. THE FUHRER: Rommel, I assume you agree that it would be best to retain the two parachute divisions? ROMMEL: Yes, absolutely!

THE F0IIRER: Then you can use the two divisions in coordination with your own operations. KEITEL: They could be deployed in northern Italy. ROMMEL: I’m verv much concerned, my Fuhrer, that the Italians will suddenly cave in and seal off the border, in particular the Brenner [Pass], be-

Hrru K -txi) His Ghkhrais

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cause this lot has worked on it for many years, and Gambara450 and also Navarini4’ have occasionally dropped a hint that they might possibly turn against us. 1 don’t trust these guys. If they change sides, they could, as a sort of gift to the English, actually say, “Let’s seal off the border and not allow any Germans in or out.” That’s why it might be good for these two divisions to stay outside for now. 1’HE FUHRER: I can look at it later, on my own. KEITEL: Yes! It’s not yet in the right format, I should say; it still needs to be polished. Hut we would like to retain the ideas. 1'hey have to be written down, or something will get lost. If you’d like, the introduction could be changed or amended, but the bulk of the ideas— THE FUHRER: I will read it in my own time. WARL1MONT: The part concerning the Southeast is down below. KEITEL: That would be the basis for Rommel’s work.438 WARLIMONT: Tf you still need the maps for that— THE FUHRER: No, I don’t need any W ARLIMONT: There are excellent maps. Maybe I could send them to you, my Full re r. THE FUHRER: That might be a good idea. Finei: 3:30 p.m. )|c 3|r $

4c

Midday Situation Report, May 20 or 21,1943439 (7 be beginning is missing.) The Has/ BODENSCHATZ: This dam is said to be much stronger. We’ll have to examine that.4+1 BUHLE: Ours are ... BODENSCHATZ: These are made of reinforced concrete, and ours are stone. THE FL HRER: Zaporozhe wasn’t reinforced concrete, but compressed concrete. So we have to take one thing into consideration: that the tor¬ pedo nets ... ZEITZLER: ... (Presentation.} TlIE FUl1RER: ... The four-barreled gun? BUHLE: Three or four. CHRISTLYN: A four-barreled gun has three. TI IE ELI IRER:... includes something else, namely the 60-cm searchlights. ZEITZLER: Yes, indeed! ... night fighting took place. That’s good. In the South, several movements have been reported, my Eiihrer—also further

*1

Military CoxtLRhxchs 1942-1945

145

south. The picture didn’t change. There is, of course, the possibility that these maneuvers could mean something more. There was ... My Fiihrer, I (sent) someone down here to the (Second) Army (which) ... will (check) the precautionary measures against gas attacks, in this sector from here to here, from those companies all the way back to the rear. They had fabulous things here in a gas presentation several days ago. If you ask them to what extent ... it is not quite clear. Now I intend to check a division from front to rear. That’s one of those with heavy losses. There it would be best to ... The ... operations up here441 suddenly made contact with the enemy—this is rather gratifying—all three of them. He’s putting up stiff resistance here. In the center, too ... and appears to have encircled them somewhat. I was con¬ cerned that they would slip through everywhere. I already issued the order concerning the Desna |River| position, to reconnoiter it closely so that we can get an exact map and start our actions. [—] Then I wanted to ask if these movements could be prepared at the General Staff level—only the chiefs—as a lot of work is involved, and that way they won’t be completely surprised. I would ask the chief of Army Group Center and two corps commanders to come here. Or should I wait on that? THE FUHRER: Yes, wait a bit still! ZEITZLER: Wait and see what else comes down there. THE FUI 1RE.R: Yes, I’ll let you know as soon as I have a clearer picture of the situation down there. ZEITZLER: Yes, Sir! A new unit appeared for the first time up here on the main road that otherwise goes to Smolensk. If it’s confirmed, it would seem that a group is being formed here after all. It’s amazing that he is ... pulling troops away from this point ... pressure point. But it may be pure coinci¬ dence. Nothing is happening further north. [—] Army Group North re¬ ports that systematic artillery fire started this morning south of Leningrad, and all connections, headquarters and supply lines are affected; the fire was more systematic than usual. It might be a coincidence, of course—maybe it is a response to our artillery firing on Leningrad. But it may also be ... as wc mentioned several days ago that something is happening up there. THE FUHRER: How many Tigers are there up here? BUHLE: Six Tigers. THE FUHRER: Six Tigers, 12 assault guns and nine tanks ... ZEITZLER: Those are the small ones. BUHLE: The accompanying tanks. ZEITZLER: Then there is the decision regarding the construction of the Luga Position [Defense Line]. Where should the focus be—at the front in the Luga Position or on these things? I already told them that they should at least deploy up front in the Luga Position along this road.

146

Hitler and His Generals

THE FUHRER: There they can use the inhabitants in that area. ZEITZLER: So that we ... something more ... THE FUHRER: I don’t see the need to take absolutely only ... people from the front line. In addition, I moved in five engineer construction battalions from the south. They should mainly—1 believe the OT |Todt Organization] has about 14,000 men who can be employed. Now we must consider where to use them: in the rear area,... in the Desna position or somewhere else entirely. ZEITZLER: And what can be obtained there, so there aren’t major trans¬ port movements. THE FUHRER: Yes, so we avoid major transport movements. ZEITZLER: We’ll use all we can get (for the) Desna position. All the others will be employed up here. Otherwise, there was nothing in particular, my Fiihrer. Sepp Dietrich asked me to pass on his greetings. He sent me a letter: “I regret to report that we have now been put on hold.”442 He had waited for an occasion to launch an attack, but it didn’t come, and they were all very disappointed; now they have moved back through ... THE FUHRER: ... His mood will improve as soon as he gets his Panthers. WAR 1.1 M()NT: {makes a report to the I 'iihrer, which the stenographers cannot under¬ stand because of the noise made by removing and folding the situation maps.) ZEITZLER: ... also considered, because North, of course ... if 1 move this over there. But if the major transport movement is driven down at [speed] 60,1 can’t make a cross-connection. If something bad should start near Army Group North and the northern section of Army Group Center, I would not be able to bring anything else in up there. That’s why 1 didn’t want to move those reserves under any circumstances, but take them from these two points instead. That would be the 5th Mountain Division, and the 3rd [Division] is ... It will take c^uite some time, too, of course, ... and considering the large sectors, I don’t really recommend it. I already thought that we could [—] THE FUHRER: But it’s difficult, and there are many reasons for doing it this way. The other infantry divisions arc available; they can be put on trains and taken there. This movement is such that they can simply be transported in large numbers from Khar’kov and Orel. ... Because relieving them always takes a long time. WART.TMONT: The purpose of their employment takes priority, of course. The Balkans

THE FUHRER: What’s the situation here? WARLIMONT: We saw very little of the enemy, my Fiihrer. The bulk of SS Division Prin%F,ugenu' has assembled here and is standing by to attack this

Military CoNtBRiiNcus 1942-1945

147

large Communist group. The forward units of the central and northern groups have reached their final positions in the Piva sector. Three Commu¬ nist brigades have been reported in this area, so it is possible that the staff is still here where it was before the start of the operation. There was contact with the enemy only by the (118th) Division, which forced its way through the position south of Foca and whose reconnaissance detachment advanced as far as the valley of this stream. The Taurinense [Division] 444 continues to pick fights as we hoped it would; it put out feelers toward the east and southeast, apparently—but the Commander-in-Chief Southeast wasn’t sure—to ... and to smoke out the Communists who are supposed to be in this sector ... will follow the Bulgarians u' behind the left wing of the 104th [Infantry] Division in order to take over the right wing of the 1st Mountain Division under the command of this German division. They will relieve the troops there and release this regimental group so that it can advance on Podgorica. There, at 6:30 p.m. this evening, the attack—initially by the Brandenburgs battalion—began, aimed at the relief of (Biroc). The Italians requested this urgently and were so shaken by the situation that they ... would have extended an almost cordial welcome to the Chief of Staff ... THE FUHRER: Maybe the telegram from the Ducc contributed to this cordial reception. WARI.IMONT: They even offered to make trucks available to speed up the transportation. The Duce’s instructions apparently hadn’t been received yet. ...of the conversation was declined. It hasn’t happened yet. In addition, they are weakening. After some difficulties, they ... made available the train from Mostar to ... Nicsic, which is extremely important for the supply lines. The Commander-in-Chief Southeast believes that the Mostar airstrip, which they had blocked until recently and, in spite of urgent relief requests, didn’t make available to the Luftwaffe ... apparently cleaned out the ration sup¬ plies. The population of the region was heing fed from these rations until now. The people can’t survive without such additional supplies. Employing our services, the Commandcr-in-Chicf Southeast uigcntly requested Rome to correct this situation and ensure that the people are again fed by the Italians.4'1' The overall assessment made by the Commandcr-in-Chicf South¬ east is that he will ...engage the Communists ...except for those who slip through on forest trails, and that in a second action—according to Italian plans—an operation against the Cetniks could soon be launched, because numerous Cetniks got (tut. The Cetniks won’t go over to Albania. A Serb would be devoured there. (That is why) they are assembled here on this coastal sector and can be caught relatively easily— THE FUHRER: That’s true. Everyone says that Albanians and Serbs hate each other—they’re mortal enemies.

14chllrri

223

Mliii’AR)' Cn\hi Hi \( i- \ 1942-1945

GORING: At least the guns ... IIIMMLER: Then the training commands are also down there. JODL: When may I send this order down? THE FOHRER: ... can give ... JODL.: I’ve just transmitted an order to Kesselring. GORING: Are we really giving these orders? I I IE FUHRER: They all come by encoded telex. JODL: It’s perfect. THE FUHRER: By encoded telex? W hat do you want? Otherwise we can’t give anything—no orders at all anymore. Otherwise he won’t know what we want. GORING: I thought that in this case it could be done with special secret couriers. THE FUHRER: Couriers are even more dangerous, if they have anything on them. This must be enciphered again. GORING: Memorized! THE FUHRER: But they can’t memorize too many things. Besides, they memorize it anyway because ... was also here; that’s essentially how it was down there as well. SCI 1ERFF: Probably here ... in the event of a coup. HIMMLER: I can send something down to his people by radio. GORING: It would certainly be most disastrous if they gave this here to the English. That would be disastrous, of course. That would be just fantas¬ tic. |—] They have the task of disarming them? SCHERFF: Only very generally: to act if necessary. Then they usually lead them to the possibility— THE FUHRER: They arc informed about the possibility of a coup, both of them, since in that case— GORING: ... THE FUHRER: No, they should get a signal. If we communicate it to them, it would cause difficulties. With them we can ... radio ... I IIMMLER: 1 can also radio to my division in Rome. THE FUHRER: Enciphered? HIMMLER: Yes, indeed. Enciphered. TI IE FI 1IRER: And is that completely secure? HIMMLER: Completely secure. We’ve agreed on a brand new key. Yester¬ day we made the last key. I can give them the order that they ... with their ... GORING: ... it must be secure. JODL: That can only go to Kesselring, because otherwise he won’t know what the further intentions are. The news that he then receives ... a totally different situation again ...

1 hhn

rhllrii

224

HnIJ K -1 SI) Hi.v C.t

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T1 llv FUII RE R: Jodi, so for the march in here ... pull in to get in here first or to get across the Brenner? JODL: 1 don’t see any difficulties in getting across the Brenner [Passj. The trains simply run through there. THE FUHRER: Yes, but if they suddenly occupy this? JODL: Then there’s the other point of view— HTMMLF.R: And South Tyrol rebels!457 THE FUHRER: But there are no South Tyrolese. They’ve all been called up! HIMMLER: There arc still men there. The Italians are ... if \vc seize them ... They have to enter Lheir bunkers anyway. I’m quite sure of that. THE FUHRER: ... Innsbruck garrison ... and makes his Tigers available for this purpose ... have you already spoken with Thomale about the affair? (JODL: Yes.) Also about that? SCHERFF: Thomale was here anyway. JODL: We spoke with him already. At least over there in the east we have— the next closest regiment is there in Tarvisio. 11IMMLER: That’s what I was going to say. This regiment came there ... this is now undamaged here ... this mountain regiment. We can bring it up easily. THE FUHRER: W hat kind of police regiment is this here? HTMMLF.R: That’s the police regiment that’s in Marseilles. My Fiihrer, we could ... this with Laibach and Trieste ... JODL: The crossing points that we ... from Agram to ... IIIMMLFR: It is important to me that we hold this in Laibach. THE FUHRER: But this we could bring over here. HIMMLER: I can do that easily. THE F'Ul 1RFR: Shouldn’t we do that right away? JODL: I suppose they will do this anyway because they have the order to safeguard ... —we will find that out today—to use increased security. We won’t have anything else. HIMMLER: Here I would get over much easier; we’re located here already. So I would reach it more easily if I were to take Tarvisio from here. If I go in there, ... and rhen I have to say, of course: how far should we go up to this point we can ... go up. THE FUHRER: Well, if the tanks come the whole rabble will run away immediately like cowards. It’s just good that I— HIMMLER: Are our panzer units going down there as well? GORING: They won’t fight! I IIMMLFR: Where arc they going? Tl IF FUIIRER: I Icrc, but we’ll have to see. The Ltibstandarte [Panzer Grena¬ dier Division] will leave its tanks behind and get them hack here.

MllJTARY CoNFURIiKCES' 1942-1945

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GORING: I’m not concerned. That these cripples will oppose us at the Brenner [Pass]—that’s totally impossible. THE FI HRF.R: If our Panthers come— GORING: 1 think it’s very good, the paratroopers jumping. 1 limmler’s people can do it better than mine. Immediately! THE FIJI IRFR: They can’t jump. They have to land! G( )RING: Some of them will land, yes. KEITEL: ... Six o’clock in the morning goes up to ... THE FUHRER: He should come here! KEITEL: He will come here at once. Yes, Sir. THE FUHRER: ... GORING: Yes, that’s my opinion as well. THE FUHRER: ... the Italians mad. GORING: I mean that he did write the letter there! LINGE: My Fiihrer, Field Marshal Kluge and General Zeitzler have arrived. Would you like the gentlemen to come right away? THE FUHRER: Yes. (Meeting is interrupted by a discussion with / de/d Marshal u Kluge.638) The East ZEITZLER: In the Seventeenth Army area, the counterattacks down here were somewhat successful. They started again today. Until 5 a.m.... So far it has gone quite well. 1 le has pushed only a little from the side. Then an attack began here ... Here, my Fiihrer, the relief has already been reported: here the mechanized corps by the guards infantry corps and here the mechanized corps ... We ought to keep a particularly close eye on these movements, to see if they’re being shifted by train or if they’re just being pulled down ... and want to engage in a minor local action there. That could be possible. I spoke with Manstein ... He is already considering whether or not he should stay here with all the antitank guns. [—] The keyword—what’s going on ... could last quite a while anyway. [—] The \ Mbstandarte [Panzer Grenadier Division] leaves tomorrow evening; they’re already quite close. Here there was only local pressure, so we can assume that there might not be anything major going on at the moment, or he is still regrouping. He put the Viking [SS Panzer Grenadier Division] there and ... the downward movement from up above. THE FUI 1RF!R: But that’s all that’s going through? (ZEITZLER: Yes, Sir.) The 1st Panzer [Division] has 49? ZEITZLER: But it will be here for weeks still.

226

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Till, FIJIIRER: These here have 45 Panzer lVs and 10 Panzer Vis? That should actually be more. They can give those away at once. They only have 28 tanks anyway. They can give those to the Reich, [SS Panzer Grenadier Division Das Reich\, and later, when the Reich is transported out, they will hand die package on again. (ZEITZLER: Yes, Sir.) How many assault guns does he still have? ZEITZLER: Thirty. THE FUHRKR: Thirty. And how many does he have? ZEITZLER: Thirty-two. THE FUHRER: And how many (tanks) docs he |SS I Iking Panzer Grena¬ dier Division] have? ZEITZLER: One hundred and twenty. TI IE Fid IRER: Then ... the I iking... can give some away. ZEITZLER: Yes, and this could be filled up somewhat. THE FUHRER: Perhaps we could give him more assault guns here. It makes no sense to take them along. ZEITZLER: Certainly. It will be arranged so that this one will give them away, and, in return, will get those coming in that would otherwise be used as replacements. It will get a detachment when it gets there. THE FUHRER: It doesn’t make sense to take the Tigers along, either. He can either give them to the Reich for the time being or— BUHLE: A Tiger detachment for the heibstandarte can he ready within 14 days, especially if the personnel— TI IE FCl IRER: They will be ready in 14 days? BUHEE: I le can get ... 90 Panzer IVs by August 8. THE FUHRER: He doesn’t need 90. BUHLE: According to the thinking of the General Staff, though, some will be diverted from the 1st Panzer Division ... THE FUHRER: He doesn’t need 90 if he’s going to get his 90 Panzer Vs anyway. ZEITZLER: If he gets Inis Panzer Vs, we can share ... with the ... so these stay here. THF. FUHRER: It’s enough if he gets 50. ZEITZLER: He has the Tiger detachment and the Panther detachment. BUHLE: The Panther detachment gets 71. TI 1UMALE: These are the companies ... until now four platoons ... four companies to he reduced from 22 to 17 ... so that he has a total of 21 vehicles. TI IE FUT IRER: That’s plenty. THOMALE: Regarding the figure for the Leibstandaiie Adolf Hit hr forma¬ tion ... Can I ... , my Fiihrer, ... ?

227

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THE F0HRER: Yes. ZEITZLER: I lerc cast of Khar’kov there was more movement again. We have to watch and see whether it might possibly be these two things, which he may be regrouping. There arc many indications that something could happen here [at Khar’kov], or up here [at Belgorod], at these two pressure points. Maybe this panzer can also ... or a part of it. Then something else new could happen—this matter here ... the 168th |Infantry] Division ... Here, another tank attack ... it began today. THE F0HRER: Those are these movements! ZEITZLER: Yes, indeed. Those arc probably these movements ... went ahead ... 6th Panzer [Division] now, after the sortie. THE FUHRER: Then here the 19th, the 11th and here the 6th [Panzer Divisions]. ZEITZLER: Then we left the 7th [Panzer Division] up here because ... pull in behind, of course. THE FUHRER: And the 3rd [Panzer Division] will be reserved ... {Italy) ]ODL: (Presentation.) THE FUHRER: July 25? What’s today's date? (JODL: The 26th.) ’ Is that in here? JODL: Yes, Sir. I wrote it in here. [—] These arc the instructions for the 715th [Security'Division] regarding the safeguarding of Mussolini. [—•] Then this is about the potential withdrawal of the forces from Sicily to6W Sardinia. THE Fl ’11RER: I las anyone spoken with the Grand Admiral [Dbnitz] about the possibilities yet? DONITZ: No. JODL: He just knows that the embarkation area available for this purpose is at least as large as or even larger than the one used for the Strait of Messina. DONITZ: ... up to 7,000 men daily in the Strait of Messina. Since the troops will be without equipment, we calculated 10,000 men. THF. FUHRER: So thev could be over theTe within two days? j

j

DONITZ: Tn any case as many as in the Strait... without equipment 1,500 tons, easily. T1 IF! FUHRER: But with guns, etc. DONITZ: Yes, of course. JODL: That was calculated based on crossing this way. If it has to be forced now, we should expect these figures to increase. DONITZ: Yes, indeed. I believe that bringing the people in will require more time than ... the same applies to the strait between Sardinia and Corsica.

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TfIK FUI1RER: ... it the matter is secured ... all their forces there. DONITZ: Up here—from up here. THE FUHRER: ... or a part of it. DONITZ: Yes, indeed. Because I think we should, if possible, take control of it up to La Spezia, because of the fleet... would be a base in this area that is closer than that one. The only difficult)’ is that right now we have our supply base here, too. But we should get a base here in this area, maybe in Salerno. That’s important. GORING: Has the sequence of the crossing here been ordered? TI IE FUI IRF.R: We have to leave that to the commanders here. |ODL: That’s the responsibility of the XIV Corps. [—] Then this track is completely full at the moment. Eleven trains of the 26th Panzer Division arc still underway here ... of the 1st Parachute Division four trains arc still underway. THF. FUHRFR: What are ihese now? JODL: Those are the units that are there in their entirety. [—] ... 4 trains in France. There is now the question of whether they shouldn’t be stopped and deployed at the French coast. DONITZ: . ..that we.not give them ... these four with the Italians ... }ODL: ... taking over by the Fourth Army. GORING: For that, the paratmop things are with ... JODL: Much more, even! Fifty trains of the 26th Panzer Division have not yet been loaded! THE FUIIRFR: Fifty?! JODL: It’s supposed to have more than 100 trains. These are all things that still ... THF FUHRFR: Not loaded yet? [—] Then it’s coming here anyway? JODL: It will come here in any case. There are reports from the 1st Para¬ chute Division that 45 trains have not yet been loaded. THF FUHRFR: From the 1st Parachute Division? JODL: From the 1st Parachute Division, yes. THE FUHRER: What are they? Probably not parachutists? JODL: No, all the accessory equipment."' there, of course.

I don’t know everything that is in

JFSCHONNEK: Rear staff, everything that— THF FUHRFR: Then it has even more than ... rear things. JESC1 iONNEK: Not only the 1st Parachute Division but also General Stu¬ dent"61 wanted to push down some additional things belonging to the corps troops; everything that was down there from the combat units of the 1st Parachute Division— JODL: But they don’t take ... These troops also have their winter equip¬ ment with them, of course.

I It hi 'Mrtorhtlrn rwtribOli’f*'* Mnfurtal

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JHSCHONNEK: But they take these troops ... JODL: There are 6 trains that have not yet been loaded with Navy units. THE FUHRER: Regarding the sequence,662 I would say: first the paratroops, second the Goring division, third the panzer division, fourth the remains of the Africa divisions, and last the 29th |Panzer Grenadier Division], because it also has the least there. But we have to leave this to the Army anyway. We can’t do it schematically. But the whole front must ... that goes back by leaps and bounds. The parachute division is, of course, the most important thing because it’s the most valuable. GORING: He uigcntlv needs paratroopers. They are also the fastest to be redeployed again, 'lire deployment of the 2nd Parachute Division should be discussed again. If we can’t stop this ... the corps actions ... not clear yet. JESCHONNEK: Absolutely. The 2nd is not coming down by rail. This division can be stopped at once. THE FUHRF1R: We shouldn’t burden the rail system with such things. JODI.: It’s urgent that these combat troops be transported on this railway line. GORING: There’s nothing down there anymore anyway, so we can stop them ... JODL: Then the decisive question is that the Italians stop these paratrooper units because ... can’t take in ... at the Brenner.663 Then the moment will come when I will no longer stop at this barrier. For now, of course, we must— Tl IE FL 11RHR: That will happen the minute we occupy Rome. JODL: Then the ... together ... must... acute. THE FUHRER: The occupation of Rome ... has the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division and all the units that they ... must still draw in there. At the same time, that will also be the signal for ruthless acuon along the whole front. The critical thing is: the ... absolutely must come down here. GORING: May I ask again about the parachute division, my Fiihrer? I low do you see the dropping of the parachute division? JODL: The dropping of the parachute division first aims at preventing any¬ one from escaping from Rome ... THE FL'HRER: It must be completely occupied—all arterial roads. That requires only very small teams. They will take up all-round defense posi¬ tions, and then nothing else can happen anyway. GORING: So not all of them simultaneously ... The ones assembling on the airfield ... THE FOHRER: Everything else that we bring into the city will be landed on an airfield. I don’t know which one at the moment. We must make sure that we leave the airfield quickly, though, because we have to expect the

230

Hitler and His Generals

Allies to launch an attack very quickly. We have to leave the airfield in¬ stantly. J

GORING: And blow up whatever we can blow up! JESCHONNEK: That could only be done if a courier were sent down to southern France today or tomorrow, to General Student or the 2nd Parachute Division, to tell them where to go. G( )RING: Where exactly it is that they have to jump? JESCHONNEK: Because it won’t be possible to have a clear view of the situation this afternoon or tomorrow morning. THE FUHRER: The situation will always be the same. Rome remains Rome. The arterial roads ... must be occupied. And that is something we abso¬ lutely can do. GORING: Who would be best to block off the Vatican from the capital? THE FUHRER: That’s the responsibility of the units coming in—first of all the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division; they must do that. Then whatever is dropped afterward ... Now here are three so-called active Italian divisions. But I don’t believe that they will do much if they’re laced with force. JODE: The 12th [Infantry Division] is in Rome. The others are further away. THE FUHRER: ... heard that Fascist Italy ... constitutes a world. KEITEL: 1 thought they didn’t have any military down there and that they wanted to take it out as far as possible? HEWEL: They have apparently prepared everything very well—the news¬ papers ... the posters—everything is prepared. The president of the “Stefani” has shot himself, and such things. THE FUHRER: Who? HEWEL: The president of the “Stefani” news agency has shot himself/'64 There are rumors to that effect right now, anyway. HIMMLER: My Fuhrer! People were also arrested—I regard this news as ...—Germans. At least as far as they don’t belong to the embassy and aren’t under suspicion somehow for having played a role in terms of intelligence or something. Also women. THE FUHRER: The Foreign Office must receive that immediately so that our ambassador there can declare at once, “/Ml Germans must be released immediately or we will take the harshest measures.” [—] The whole thing must be done very quickly,of course. That’s the important thing. ... Speed is of the essence here. So, Rommel, it’s a matter of first drawing the forces over here because we can’t hold Sicily any longer; that’s impossible. Whether you can hold the boot is also a question, but that really doesn’t matter. The essential point is to maintain coherence so that we can fight at all. JODL: I’d like to say with respect to the command: Field Marshal Rommel will have the command down there ... or we have to make a separadon, so

251

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that Field Marshal Rommel ... this action. ... and that Field Marshal Kesselring will bring in these new forces from the south. As soon as they arrive there they will be put under the command of Field Marshal Rommel. It won’t work otherwise; from Munich it is ... THE FtJHRER: Granted, but nevertheless I think that the command ... must be given to Rommel. JODL: Then ... to go to the south in order to ... THE FL 11RF2R: Marshal Kesselring doesn’t have the name. We have to go public with it the moment we jump ... Marshal Rommel!6*5 Second, all Fascist divisions and units that join ... We want to get the Fascists over at once; that must be our goal. ... destroyed units, also regular divisions ... and volunteers. I limmler had a very good idea there. We want Farinacci to declare that every man can go home—we want to involve him today al¬ ready. Every Italian soldier can go home ... we will then get ... We won’t get the others who go home. They are useless at the moment.*66 HIMMLER: It might be better to take them to Germany afterward as workers. Tl IE FIJI 1RER: They are useless anyway, of course. [—J The second would be the attempt to take units away from here. This is the general task here, irrespective of the security here. The third is the occupation of Rome—by dropping paratroops and moving in the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division. GORING: But that must be ordered down there on site. It absolutely can’t be ordered from Munich. THE FL 11RER: It will be ordered, and the commanders will be responsible for carrying it out. And then, in parallel, the German units marching in. Unfortunately, we don’t have enough paratroopers to do this here com¬ pletely. I’m really sorry that we have this division over here. It would be good to have two divisions here right away. Then the German divisions would approach here. As far as border-crossing points are concerned, we should harmonize this then, of course. And it will take some time. The units ... Here’s the Feldherrtihalh [Panzer Grenadier Division], even though it’s not fully mobile—that doesn’t matter. One task force is missing; the other will come afterward. But we must occupy this anyway... As soon as even one unit threatens to resist, ruthless shooting will start immediately. That’s the only possibility. The action must be carried out... Including the Her/mm Gorittg, there are six divisions—very good divisions instead. GORING: Our opponents will, of course, call to the Allies for help and beg tor their protection. So where will the enemy land then? THE Ft HRER: But it will take some time before he is readv to land. j

GORING: He can land paratroopers just as well as we can, of course. THE FL HRFR: Of course he can do that, but that makes—

232

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GORING: 1 just think it should be considered. TI IE Ft’IIRER: At first, they are astounded—as always in such a case. GORING: If Rome surrenders there will be no call for help to the Allies anymore. THE FUHRER: Actually, there will be. Some will run away because the Italians are ... Italy is divided and the Fascists are being pursued, f—•] Who shot himself? The director of the “Stefani”? IIEVC EL: Yes, the director of the “Stefani” shot himself. THE IT I IRER: So, one can see that they w^ere anything but unified. That will ... overthrow. That’s one who ... himself f ascist... that people wait for some signal, and then it w ill go on. We have to immediately ..., for example, the “Fascist Freedom Armv.” HIMMLER: ... which has the panzer division, if we ... the commander again ... THE EUHRF.R: There w?e will have to see ... is the task of a ... We must establish a provisional Fascist government right away, which will sit there and give the orders that the ... All Fascist soldiers and officers immediately have a National Socialist f—■] We must deliberately ... the National Social¬ ist ... It is critical that these Fascist soldiers and officers join the National Socialist units immediately/*’ This elderly 73-year-old668 [—] HIMMLER: May I hand the order down to my Obersturmbannfiihrer669 ... urgent ... that have their training ... must come. THE FUI IRER: I le won’t be able to do it. I IIMMI.ER: That’s a different division. These are actually only militiamen. THE FUHRER: But there are so many others among them! GORING: Then at least there are Germans sitting on the tanks and as¬ sault guns. THE FUHRER: Our people who arc there. Otherwise nothing is done. There is time. They wall get the order. If this has to happen, they’ll get the order as well. They hear the appeals; hopefully they won’t seal their ears. Then he won’t need to keep anything secret anymore ... when the radio speaks openly. When “Stefani” radio publicly— JODL: ... this training command has been initiated. THE FUHRER: Now; of course, many details have already been discussed here. There are divisions here ... the others must he eliminated. If the po¬ litical propaganda in these Eastern divisions ... Many of these people don’t w'ant to be destined to die ... KEITEL: They don’t w?ant to die. These are Eastern divisions. They’ll dis¬ perse. Militia divisions, with very few— THE FUHRER: What do they have here? One moment! The 65th [Infan try Division], the 94th [Infantry Division], the 571st [Infantry Division],

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Mil,ii ARy Cu\hhRh.\c h.\ 1942-1945

253

the 24th |Panzer Division), and the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division ... I’m missing ... Where does it go-* JODL: This was the reverse compilation, to form an operational army to¬ gether with the Italians. That has changed now. Now, the 305th [Infantry Division] and the 44th [Infantry Division] go in here to the north, while the 305th |lnfantry Division]67:1 remains down there. THE FUHRER: ... not there yet either?

JODL: No. THE FUHRER: It’s coming here to the north anyway. Here there are more divisions coming How many formations are coming here? The 76th [Infantry Division], the 305th [Infantry Division], then the 44th [Infantry Division]— JODL: The 65th[lnfantry Division]. THE FOHRER: The 65th. All of them to the north. JODL: The 24th Panzer Division, which is being planned on without the formations he’s taking over here—he’s taking over the 389th [Infantry Divi sion], the 376th [Infantry Division] and ... THE. FUHRER: So the 76th, the 305th, then the 44rh, and then the 65th. Tell me, where does the 371st go? JODL:... THE FUHRER: And the 94th? JODL: It comes in place of the ... the 44th, the 94th, then the 76th and the 65th— T1 IE FU11RER: Just a moment! Once again! JODL: The 44th, the 94th, the 76th, the 65th, the 305th, the 24th Panzer, TI IE El IIRER: And in addition the 3rd Panzer Grenadier, which is there anyway? JODL: Yes, the 3rd Panzer Grenadier and the 2nd Parachute Division. TI IE El l IRER: And the 2nd Parachute Division. So that’s eight divisions. JODL: ... not the 26th Panzer [Division], THE FUHRER: Then to—Zeitzler, when does die advance guard of the \jcibstandarte [SS Panzer Grenadier Division] arrive? ZEITZLER: On August 2. THE FUHRLR:

Is

the advance guard arriving?

ZEITZLER: The first train will depart tomorrow night. Then it will pre¬ sumably arrive August 2. THE FUHRER: And it will need altogether? ZEITZLER: At a tempo of 12 to 18 initially. Between the 2nd and the 8th it will be there in its entirety. j

THE FUHRER: So in addition the Leibstandartv will come, and right after that the Rjstcb [SS Panzer Grenadier Division]

I khPriennchtiri

M.ifunal

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ZE1TZLER: Yes, indeed. 'Hie Retch? 1 TI IE El l IRER: Then two additional panzer divisions will arrive. JODL: They will be transported via Villach-Tarvisio anyway. THE FUHRKR: That I don’t know. But that’s two again. HIMMLER: When they come from the East, that’s the most urgent. THE FUHRER: Then we have 10 divisions already ROMMEL The supply from the East has, of course, the disadvantage that they...very many...are ... Then we are seriously delayed ... Isonzo [River]. THE FUHRER: Then comes the next: the Indian472—the eleventh. JODL: But by the time it arrives, all these routes to France will still be fully blocked. Il might arrive at a moment when either ... do, or when it hasn’t started yet at all—the other action. THE FUHRER: What do you think about this matter here, Rommel? That must happen very quickly ... The faster it happens the easier it will be ... all the other things ... in one moment ... that we go in; that’s decisive. For this we have two divisions available, plus those units of the 26th Panzer Grcna dier Division, plus those units that aren’t yet very far along. JODL: There is an urgent need for a general command. The SS General Command will come along anyway. TI IE EC! IRER: ... comes after it. That will probably be— ZEITZLER: Between the 1st and the 2nd, I think. Between the Leibstandar/e and the Reich. JODL:... the General Command IV'1 1 is planned, as there is no corps staff at all down here ... to take over the Italians’ sector, the Fourth Italian Army. Then we have released this one here from the front. But this one is not yet ready. That will take until mid-August—or at least it should take that long. GORING: Where is the Parachute General Command? JODL: We could take that for this thing. This is the only operations staff. TI IE FLTIRER: Who is it? JODL: Student. THE FUHRER: Excellent! That’s the man for something like this—out¬ standingly qualified. |ODL: Now we need one for all these divisions that art coming in. It could perhaps be advanced to mid August, so that this could come over here as well. It’s not very much, though. {Presentation of a discussion between Mackensen and Eadig/io by Ambassador Hewel) THE FUHRER: What untruthful nonsense! Listen! {Reading a loud.) “Funda mental cooperation”! J—J What impertinence! HEW'EL: Now he’s making an effort! THE FUHRER: If I could catch this filthy pig! GORING: The insolence with the letter!

'hllrri

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THE FUIIRER: He’s still a tricky old enemy of ours. He was the one who, on August 25, 1939, was at the forefront of those who saw to it that Italy ¥

•»

•

didn’t join the war—a fact that caused the English-French declaration of war and the signing of the Polish alliance.6 4 GORING: But a thing like this with his letter! A spectacle, really—a Punch and ) udy show! Sicily THE FUHRER: How are things here? JODL: There was nothing in particular here ... The location of the 50 ships and larger units that were reported yesterday hasn’t yet been further clarified ... The enemy has attacked more forcefully along the coastal route, on the right wing of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, on this line indicated in blue. The new commander has now taken over the 29th and reports that the division had only ... since it was rarely in combat ... crumbled further. GORING: But if we ... here ... all this becomes a very strict German affair. This whole crossing here— THE FUHRER: Most importantly, the antiaircraft unit stays until the last man is gone. DONITZ: We have to hold the entire width. Situation at sea (Mediterranean) THE FUHRER: Where is this convoy that’s heading east? JUNGE: We have the following report about it: a convoy ... east of Palermo yesterday afternoon, with 8 larger ships and approximately 40 to 42 smaller ships, possibly landing craft ... 0 The precise location is unknown. A re¬ port that we received this morning might be connected to it—a report stat¬ ing that 30 to 40 miles north of the Straits of Messina a convoy of 16 smaller vessels—presumably landing craft—was seen heading north this morning It is likely the same convoy, but that hasn’t been confirmed. No special significance can be drawn from it, except that the enemy is able to move fairly freely here. Tl IE rOl 1RER: Is he being attacked here? JUNGE: There are no combat forces here. There are only two submarines and the motor torpedo boats available here. THE FUHRER: No, bv the Luftwaffe! JUNGE: The report just came in. CHRISTIAN: The intentions with regard to this matter are not yet known. JUNGE: In addition, there will ... from the eastern Mediterranean Sea con¬ siderable enemy movement... quite lively activity taking place on the north-

236

Hitler and His Generals

ern coast and that ... already reported. There are also ... back from the 23rd, probably during the return transport from Palermo, 5 barges were attacked. Four of them were damaged so heavily that they had to destroy themselves. The rest tried to escape ... Sea rescue service by 10Ju 52s. Out of three minesweepers that were used in this action, one was sunk. The minesweepers shot down two aircraft. Finally, a torpedo boat and an Italian corvette were damaged during an air raid against Messina yesterday. An at¬ tack carried out with a ... had no effect because of the already damaged state of the ship They tried to recover the steamer ... a large ship of 8,700 tons, but the effort failed.676 '1’hen regarding our own situation, one significant thing is the report that along the entire southern coast all planned mine barriers were released in accordance with a coherent plan, i.e., there are German mine layers ... The reports about traffic here are sparse. No report at all about traffic from Sardinia; from Corsica only one vessel going back, and from here two submarines. [—] In the Greek area it should be reported as significant that ... the ... Navy commander of ... was shot down when he was flying over Corfu in a Ju 88 some days ago. [

] Convoy traffic in the

Aegean Sea is running as planned. Here a larger troop convoy. THE FUHRER: Who shot him down? JUNGE: An English ... In the Black Sea the enemy ... attacked, achieving the success that his ... was shot dowrn ... continuous unsuccessful... Traf¬ fic was disturbed again by the dropping of mines. ... Italian fleet DONTTZ: My Fiihrer! ... came back. It’s just that there is a constant con¬ nection ... that 90% of his officers would come w ith us. I don’t know. THE FUHRER: That couldn’t be right DONITZ: That’s too much. I can’t do anything to prevent ... submarines ... were in La Spczia and Toulon and that 5 or 6 of them anchor near La Spczia. The right thing would be—if the propaganda didn’t work—to seize the ships as soon as possible. THE EDI 1RER: Thcv will be ... in Toulon ... DONITZ: Yes, perhaps they can be seized before. I myself have submarine j

crews in La Spezia, too.67 But they have nothing but shotguns or pistols, and they are not equipped with anything else. So if you want to seize the ships, the troops have to be equipped with the appropriate weapons. But I actually believe the Italians will let us seize them. THE FUHRER: Do you haw any idea [—]? GORING: We have people in there. DONITZ: But they are not mobile—perhaps 300 men. We have 2 subma¬ rines in there. With 300 men you can’t do much in the way of propaganda.

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Obviously, they are not trained for this—they are sailors. T think, my Fiihrer, we should try lo prevent these people from putting to sea. THE FUHRER: I have said before that a special squadron or troop should be made available for this purpose. DONITZ: Let’s wait and see. You never know GORING: But you are there in front with submarines? D( )NITZ: I will immediately be there with submarines if they put to sea. We have to wait and see how it develops. It’s also possible that there will be a split within the fleet—that the young officers will arrest the old ones.6 H GORING: But keep the group prepared for action! JUNGE: You can let them know that there are submarines there. FtJIIRFR: No, for God’s sake, no! DONITZ: That is still premature... Situation in the air

Cl IRISTIAN: Near ... it is noticeable that the enemy was very restrained in the air yesterday. One attack against... , specific damage not reported. Two aircraft were shot down then ... also has, and that is striking, with 50 ..., so that he simply has ... this transportation ... the island of Corsica and has a photo imaging system ... shot down 10 aircraft. Then, the night before last, our Luftwaffe attacked with 99 aircraft ... sank, one of them hit by a torpedo ... , 13 other hits by torpedoes.67'5 THE FUHRER: Altogether 56,000 tons. God Almighty! |—J Boy, do you have the thing, where this ... happened? In the long run this would have become unbearable for the guy. It would have to become unbearable! Of course, if we did anything new here, it would have been the same. CHRISTIAN: The information given by the police seems to be ... THE FUHRER: I like it better that way Cl 1RISTIAN: From.. .there is only the report.. .on the usage of destroyers. THE FOHRER: If I count a total of only 50,000 tons as temporary loss, and if 1 count a daily loss of 20,000 or only 10,000 tons here, that adds up to 300,000 tons per month and in 3 months it will be 1 million tons, which he loses in the Mediterranean region alone. And the damaged vessels—ex¬ cept for those that have been sunk—he has to bring back, to transport back. That’s a loss of 90,000 to 100,000 tons. That is 300,000 per month, or 1 million per year. HIMMLER: 20,000 a day! THE FOHRER: No, I calculate 10,000 tons a day. That’s 300,000 tons per month, 900,000 in three months, so 1 million roughly. That is about half the ship capacity that he always has here.

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DONITZ: If we finish them off, he will have nothing left for the operations. CHRISTIAN: No further reconnaissance over La Spezia ... GORING: It is very remarkable that he hardly flew at all yesterday, since he’s always bombarding us with whole squadrons otherwise. Action against Koine JODL: In my view, the most important thing is to bring Student’s staff to Kesselring immediately. Secondly, we need to send a courier to Kesselring, who can discuss the Rome action with Kesselring and Student verbally be¬ cause he doesn’t know about it, and who can then report back to us with what forces he might have and when he can bring them together so we can fix a rough date. THE FUf IRER: We have to fix the date, or it won’t actually happen—it will keep getting delayed, and that won’t work. We have always determined this ourselves. We also determined it in the Serbian case and fixed it ourselves. Wc can’t leave this to the organization down there. JODL: But the organization down there can only tell me at the moment what is available there besides the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division. THE FUHRER: The rest is up to us. We can ... the paratroop ... JODL: ... only the people down there, Kesselring and Student, who ... the transport area [—J GORING: We already know about the paratroops from up there. Tl IE FUIIRER: When can they jump? GORING: There arc 9 battalions. JESCHONNEK: Nine infantry battalions have to be armed quickly. They have to fly in three waves. I would like to suggest that the second wave should possibly be undertaken in agreement with Field Marshal Kesselring, who has to determine where to land ... also involved will be the 1st Para¬ chute Regiment ... Naples. THE FI1 HRER: The first wave can’t land without... impossible. The first thing we have to do is to close the exit roads instantly. Detached units must block them. JESCHONNEK:... the first wave, without the Italians recognizing... when the intention is clear that Rome will be closed off. JODL: We should do this under all circumstances. We could only afford a random drop if the whole division could fly at the same time and could drift down together. THF1 FUHRER: But who can guarantee that he won’t get wind of it imme¬ diately? All the airfields are swarming with Italians, and if so many para¬ troopers come?

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JODL: I think it will be possible, provided the paratroopers go to Sicily. That the Italians will act in a hostile way against the paratroopers as long as they are landing, [—] T1 IK FUHRER: They won’t do that. JODL: 1 don’t believe so. But the moment they jump, it will be completely different. THE FUHRER: Then a part of them will run away and the action will have failed—we must be aware of this. GORING: There is a parachute division in Sicily. JODL: It’s all full of paratroopers ... will be unloaded. GORING: Perhaps we can do it in such a way that all transport ... we ... directly with the Italians ... but that flights are only made to Rome and landings made there ... above all the transportation area ... need reinforce¬ ments here for the first wave ... THE FUHRER: Then I wouldn’t say that the paratroops [—| GORING: No, the 1st! JESCHONNEK: The 1st Parachute Division. GORING: Supply tor them. We officially announce that here we don’t ... anymore, that wc need trains to bring them to Sicily. That would be the first wave. Then they fly back and we say officially, “We can only go to Rome because the places here are destroyed, and we can’t fly over because of yesterday’s loss.” All this will be recorded. We have had the losses when flying over it ... In my view, we risk too many crews during the flight there, so wTe can only go to Rome ... Then, we officially announce to the Com undo Supremo.: wc need trains for the paratroopers to cross to Reggio, since they are part of the division. And then the second wave comes. JESCHONNEK: Not all the planes that arrive will be ready for paratroop¬ ers, if all of them want to jump. THE FUHRER: How many could jump? jESCHONNEK: At the moment, with General Student—in the 2nd Para¬ chute Division itself and in the region—which today ... southern Italy 90Ju 52s plus 45 He Ills. G( )RING: How many do they calculate on average now? JESCHONNEK: On average, with weapons, 10 men ... together with these planes 2'/^ to 3 battalions. GORING: That’s landing space for—? THE FUHRER: That would be 1,200 men. JESCHONNEK: If we add everything together, that would be 160 Ju 52s, 98 He Ills—so around a hundred Ills—6 Me 313s and 80 towing air¬ planes. GORING: How many Ills did you say are ready to jump?

240

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JESCHONNEK: 1 have 20 Ills plus 7U equals 90 and now altogether 162 Ju 52s. GORING: You just said 45! JESCHONNEK: No, 20 plus 70 is 90 and 45 11 Is. THE FUHRER: ... different again; if they left, they can come down right away. They can be re-supplied later; they should stay for now. BUHEE: The question of shifting the concentration and equipping the ve¬ hicles! The General Staff has considered it already... it’s possible to move it there, including the 60. ZEITZ1 .ER: I ’ll scrape everything together from the less important things ... come quickly. THE FUHRF.R: What kind of units are they? BUHLE: Those are only units that are intended for assignment to the West, to northern Italy and to ... , which still have a larger reserve of vehicles—the 24th [Panzer Division], which is nearly complete, and the 60th |Panzer Grenadier Division Feldbcrrnballc\. KEITEL: The 60th, i.e., the Veldbernihalle, and the 24th. ZEITZLER: It’s on the way; it started this morning already. GORING: Then we can use a strengthened regiment, 3'/2 battalions, in the first wave. We can finish it in three waves—the first wave tomorrow and the second following quickly in the early morning. JESCHONNEK: The first wave starting tomorrow?! GORING: In the early morning! Tl IE EL I 1RER: Then I would start the first wave tomorrow evening GORING: This is the announced one; they won’t get trains at once. Tl IE FfJI 1RER: But the other must be done in the morning I can only do this together with the infantry advance. So the jump absolutely has to start at the crack of dawn, when the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division drives in. GORING: The first wave we want to land based on the need for it to come here. It lands here and then it meets over there. Then the second wave would come tomorrow for reinforcement. Tl IE F( 11RER: At the first light of dawn the second wave jumps. )ESCHONNEK: ... that the planes go back. THE FUHRER: lhat’s two days, as 1 said before! GORING: ... give the order immediately; this has to be emphasized. JESCHONNFiK: If it could still be postponed by one day, I would sug¬ gest that. KEITEL: A telegram arrived from Rome, my Euhrer. The second-in-com¬ mand of rhe Comando Supremo says: “Marshal Badoglio ... functions. Sec¬ ond: The Chief of the Luftwaffe High Command, General ... , reports directly to the king. Third: [—]” {Further reading aloud.)

1 khotenoeMirn

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Miiji ar) Co\hhRh xc k\ 1942-1945

241

Till i EL 11RER: Things will most certainly change! They will see how things arc going to change. That’s the same fuss like with the Yugoslavs back then ... “The Duce came on 24th. He would have remained in the minority, which resulted in his resignation ... government by Marshal Badoglio. Dur¬ ing the night of the 25th there was excited cheering—especially from young people—for the royal house and for Marshal Badoglio. Popular riots were mainly against ...” (Reading aloud.) That’s good. As I’ve always said ... JODL: ... suffer a setback ... to throw both operations together. THE FUHRER: 1 don’t think so. They were scared back when rhe first German division showed up in western Epirus. JODL: Maybe we should add support here and over there. |—] Anyway, the supply situation in Sicily is secured for the time being. (Presentation of the Armed tones report.) May 1 ask for a decision? In my opinion, the following must happen: Today a courier should fly to Rome, who will verbally ... give to Kesselring ... regarding the Rome action, and Student must also go there to be informed at once. THE EL I IRER: We don’t need two; instead. Student comes here first and brings the courier along. GORING: Student must come at once! JESCHONNF.K: That will take even more time, if 1 mav say so. General Student is in southern France. T11E Ft 1 IRER; In any case, this can’t happen tomorrow morning early. How long will it rake him to get here from rhe south of France? JESCHONNEK: General Student can come here today. Then he can start early in the morning. Tf IE FIJIIRER: I think it would be right to bring General Student here, to order him to come here. Then he can take over the matter. KEITEL: Informing the government, too. THE FUHRER: Wc’rc not ready for that yet anyway. Finally, when could the first squadron from the [—] JODL: That has nothing to do with the Rome action. Paratroopers wall arrive, other troops will arrive, and this will go on step by step. But when they jump, Rome will be alarmed. THF. FUHRER: They’ll take it that way at first. GORING: Kesselring will simply say that due to the threats here, the paratroopers— Tl IE E L I IRER: Because of the losses here! GORING: No, because of the threat here they will be unloaded in Rome and from there a train will bring them to Reggio. But we have to wait, if possible, until the second wave can join in, so that they can come down together. THE FUHRER: Yes.

1 k hater tochtlrJi

M;itarial

242

HriLtR ,4Ad His Generals

Southeast WARLTMONT: There arc no particular events to he reported from the Southeast or from the eastern Mediterranean. Our own movements also went as planned. This morning, Colonel General Lohr visited the com¬ mander-in-chief of the Eleventh Italian Army,6*" which Field Marshal Rommel had planned to do. The result is that this army didn’t have an order from Rome yet. He declared that he approved of the regulation, but couldn’t follow it until he received an order. Yesterday, it was agreed with Rome that the order should be ... given. An inquiry should be made in Rome, and we should pressure them into giving the order.681 Additionally, the Commanderin-Chief Southeast reported on the new distribution of forces, my Ftihrer, which he thinks appropriate. (Presentation.) The situation on Rhodes and Crete is unchanged. THE FOHRER: And how is it here? WARLTMONT: ... strengthened the 92nd Regiment,because he believes it to be urgently necessary to fill this region between Montenegro and the north¬ ern Greek border, which otherwise would be empty of German troops ... THE FUHRER: This regiment is here anyway. They don’t need to fear that ... KEITEL: The transport always takes the longest time. The follow-up is always quicker ... WARLIMONT: For the same region he also provided the 100th Jager [Light Infantry] Division, which originally should have gone to the Peloponnesian Peninsula, but which is going very slowly because all the trains are backed up. It should come here, too, to occupy the coast of Albania, if necessary. THE FUHRER: It can’t do that WARLIMONT: It depends mainly on these two bases, mv Fiihrcr, Valona and Durazzo, just as the whole “Konstantin”682 Plan is set up without fur¬ ther support from troops from the East. These bases that arc marked here once again should be occupied so that we will at least have the main ports— marked here—in German hands. THE FUHRER: But they are not secured. WARLIMONT: With weak bases. THE FUHRER: When will Weichs arrive here? KEITEL: He’ll be here tomorrow. lie leaves Nuremberg this evening and will arrive tomorrow morning. ROMMEL: Weichs will probably come down here? THE FUHRER: Do you have doubts? ROMMEL: No, ... already said that the division would be here.

Military CoxmRhiXcns 1942-1945

243

THE Ft IIRER: I don't know how healthy Weichs is; he is a very quiet man. KEITEL: I talked to him; he is ready for any assignment immediately. THE FI HRER: Then he must really be an extraordinary officer. KEITEL: Weichs was a mountain man at first. WAL1MONT: Nonetheless, the Commander-in-Chief Southeast will ... the order ... to form ... The order of the divisions could come a little later.6*’ The other proposals of the Commander-in-Chief Southeast are within the ... to bring the existing divisions closer to the coast, provided the 1st Panzer Division stays at the Isthmus of Corinth so that it can be used to the north. THE Ft HRER: There is only one single division besides the 1st Panzer Division anyway. It should stay out there in front. \\ ARL1MONT: And the four siege battalions. THE FUI IRER: Besides this division there’s only one other one there. WARLIMONT: The 117th [Infantry Division] he intends to shift closer to the western and southern coast. The 104th [Infantry Division] and the 1st Mountain Division have the same assignment. Then, another battalion from the Brandenburg Regiment, which is engaged in a mopping-up opera¬ tion, will move in closer here. One division is already here in the region west of Belgrade, and the other is about to follow in the next couple of days. THE FL HRER: When will the police regiment arrive? WARLIMONT: From Finland? It should depart from Danzig on August 1, but it will probably take two weeks to get down here. HIMMLER: It would come down here. WARLIMONT: The 18th Police Regiment should come to this area. THE F1JHRER: And the Prin^ Eugen [Division]? WARLIMONT: It should come here, too, but as long as he doesn’t have any other forces, it should stay here, since it could become necessary to occupy the bases on the coast. Then the same will apply to the 114 th Jager [Light Infantry] Division. There is also the 297th [Infantry] Division near Belgrade ... , which is not ready yet. THE FUHRER: It must ... quicker here... WARLIMONT: If you, my Fiihrer, agree, then the 100th Jager Division should come to Crete, not down here, so we absolutely occupy at least these two main bases. THE FUI IRER: Rommel, what’s your opinion? ROMMEL: ... then he breaks in from here, only where the Italians are. If he takes (Arkoudi) beforehand, he will certainly go ... ; if he doesn’t take (Arkoudi), he will start from the air base to push in here. Here, he has—I saw this yesterday—... the indigenous units are more or less badly divided,

244

Hitler and His Ghxhr ils

but they have old regimental commanders turning up again from Greek regiments. So the two divisions ... are not in a very favorable situation. Yesterday, the southern division didn’t make the connection ... backwards on the road ... was blocked and now receives supplies over the water, and is surrounded by water to the left and to the right. It can’t reach the coast; it can only secure the road. As for the Bavarian division, the situation is very bad there, too. It also has water on both sides, and hasn’t yet reached the coast. And it’s no use with the Italians. THE FUHRER: They will drop out anyway. GORING: As I said, my Fiihrer, maybe we should give the order to try to immediately disarm the divisions that are there, because they are going to sell their weapons anyway. HIMMLER: I already did that yesterday with the Italians. WARLIMONT: The Commander-in-Chief Southeast issued the general order to take all weapons away from the Italian troops as soon as they start to waver in their current formation. THE FUHRER: They sell them! GORING: They sell the last button of their trousers for English pounds!684 WARLIMONT: He also asks if, with the addition of Bulgarian forces ... other divisions will be available in case of an attack. That had been dis¬ cussed earlier with the king... will be maintained in the present situation. THE FUHRER: We have to wait and see. WARLIMONT: Finally, he asks if the region of Fiume-Trieste will be placed under his command immediately if Italy breaks up. THE FUHRER: Lohr?—I can imagine that! Rommel should get that re¬ gion; it is part of Italy. WARLIMONT: Part of Italy, yes. THE FUHRER: He can’t do it with his forces anyway. WARLIMONT: Then we can proceed with this proposal with rhe exception of the 92nd Regiment. THE FOHRER: He can bring the other here for now. I think a big tank force is needed here, which can push through here as well as down there. WARLIMONT: He has to prepare them for transport in Salonika anyway. ROMMEL: Then it would be much better, ... then the motorized divi¬ sions ... squeezed in. THE, FUHRER: An infantry division, and equip it with assault guns! GORTNG: But the roads arc very bad here; thev will be very late. THE FUHRER: Here is a road that comes over from Larissa. It has been destroyed, but it must be repaired. Then the north-south road is good, and here, in the old Albanian part, and especially in the Austrian part, the roads are not so bad—at least you can drive better there than here.

Military

Confurlkces 1942-1945

245

GORING: That’s for sure, but in front it is necessary to f—] THE FUHRER: Incidentally, we have waged war with panzer divisions here, too. GORING: Right, but it became clear— KEITEL: We went down to the Peloponnese! GORING: —that for the infantry divisions, on the other hand ... KEITEL: Sepp Dietrich at that time rushed through with his division im¬ mediately. GORING: As soon as a firm decision is made. You can’t evade him here ... ROMMEL: We have to close off here completely, so they can’t come in at all, and that they have a way out here. WARLIMONT: A meeting of top Mihailovic people took place in the inner Balkans on July 23.685 In a nutshell, it mean immediate activation of all sabotage ... , stopping the hostilities against Tito and cooperating with him by order of the King of Yugoslavia ... in addition to that, Roosevelt and Churchill have guaranteed to restore the state. Stalin had declared himself uninterested. Preparation to land 20,000 paratroopers—of course, that is a Balkan exaggeration—the implementation of a Serbian State Guard, a Serbian Border Guard and a Serbian Volunteer |HIW1] Corps.'h" Fighting with these forces will be forbidden in the future. There are also some other regulations against ... THE FUHRER: And the war here? WARLIMONT: Nothing in particular, my Fiihrer. The West Nothing new can be reported from the West, except the message that, yes¬ terday in Paris, the military police seized a truck belonging to this well-known sabotage organization, which ... official orders from the London ... about the destruction of locomotives and railway installations in case of an Allied landing ... Otherwise, nothing new from the theaters of war, my Fiihrer. Situation at sea, additions JUNGE: Nothing special from the Aegean region. Damage resulting from the air raids are mostly known. [—J It must be emphasized that in Novorossiisk the traffic with ... not known until now. In a ... 7 shot down by aircraft flak, without anything happening. ... submarine group ordered by the Grand Admiral toward the Mediterranean."7 [—] One damaged block¬ ade runner departing and ... torpedoing completed. A big tanker torpedoed near Durban in South Africa.688

246

Hitler and His Generals

THE FUI IRER: How big are the losses this month, until now? DONITZ: Eighteen boats, tonnage up to now: 340,000 by the subma¬ rines.689 THE FUHRER: So that is more than 300,000 tons. The Mediterranean theater costs him quite a lot. DONITZ: That won’t improve until the submarines, in terms of arms [—]690 Situation in the air (cont.)

CHRISTIAN: Yesterday there was a daytime air attack by about 250 aircraft, Americans, in two run-ups—first a feint approach on the coast and then the main approach into this area, with the final attack against Kiel. Kiel was well screened by artificial smoke; nonetheless, there was heavy damage, including to the dockyard. There arc no details as yet reported by the Luftwaffe. JUNGE: The Howaldt Factor)’ has serious damage; the Germania Dock¬ yard and the Deutsche Dockyard seem to have only minor damages; 3 mo¬ tor torpedo boats. Cl IRIST1AN: There was an attack on Hamburg, primarily against the port area. Altogether, 25 aircraft were shot down by fighters, and another 6 by flak. There was a simultaneous attack by 80 aircraft in this area—in a purely diversionary attack against Amsterdam, against the Schipol Airport, and against smaller villages near Ghent. Only houses were damaged; no mili¬ tary damages. Fighters here shot down six aircraft. In this area there were a few incursions, but only as nuisance raids against locomotives; one loco¬ motive was damaged in this raid, and a Mustang was shot down. A heavier raid with 300 to 400 aircraft reported so far, with at least 1,200 stick-type incendiary bombs... According to current findings, there were 180 killed, 300 injured ... Hamhorn, Gladbach, Mulhcim; no damages reported yet. Night pursuit was initiated with 81 aircraft. The night fighter division had until now ... minus 7 aircraft; four of them arc used for the open night pursuit. GORING: How many anti-aircraft guns are in Essen? CHRISTIAN: Anti-aircraft artillery near Essen: 31 heavy batteries, 4% light, and 6V2 searchlight batteries. In the rest of the area there were only a few nuisance flights, with no attacks reported. [— | Our Luftwaffe set off with 51 aircraft for Hull, 47 of them reaching the target. Exact results are not yet available. Three aircraft are missing, and hostile night fighters shot one down over our own territory. [—] Today, at about 11 a.m., stronger units flew against the Deutsche Bucht [German Bight]. At first, the target wasn’t apparent. The units first flew toward Kiel-Hamburg, then turned

Military Conthri^ncks 1942-1945

247

to the south and, in the meantime, attacked Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Hanover, and Hamburg. No details have been reported. Fighters were in the air, Herr Reichsmarshal. GORING: ... The first units came here, and the fighters were deployed against them immediately, since the unit was quite strong Then the forma¬ tion went up there, and the fighters followed, but then turned off course here. At the same time, this big unit arrived here. As a consequence, the fighters were called back from here to be used against this unit. Then, when the other one noticed this, he made this turn, while the fighters ... hung on with the big unit. It shows how difficult it is to solve this matter with so few fighter troops available here. There is no doubt that this will improve within a short time, if the fighters are supported by the heavy [Model Me ] 410 fighter.',JI Then the success rate will increase. But every thing possible was deployed, and it came closer at the end, etc. However, it also shows the extreme difficulty of maneuvering with so many units. CHRISTIAN: One aircraft entered the circle of Berlin, near Brandenburg Berlin had a public air-raid warning At the same time, there was an incursion over 1 lolland. Right now, there is an attack underway against the coast near Dunkirk. [—] In the East, the deployment is against the focal points near Krymskaia [in the Taman’], primarily the Fourth Air Fleet and the 16th Panzer Grenadier Division near Izium. Some of the close-combat forces were em¬ ployed in the defensive fights near Belgorod. Parts of the Sixth Air Fleet also operated nt >rtheast and southeast of Orel yesterday, and ... the Sixth Air Fleet again reports 17 tanks destroyed and three others damaged. Four of the 17 tanks were shot by anti-aircraft artillery, and 13 were shot from the air; 19 were destroyed by the Fourth Air Fleet and 17 by the Six tit Air Fleet. The enemy operated only during the day in this area, especially south of Odessa. The First Air Fleet reports heavy support for enemy attacks, particularly south of Shlissel’burg, by hostile fightcr-hombcr operations. Our own fighters were used against them, and 7 aircraft were shot down; 20 others were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery'. At night, the nuisance combat group was deployed, especially against hostile movements near the front, where 46 aircraft fought. In the North, the operations were against ship targets. Some aircraft didn’t locate the ships and attacked alternative targets instead ... Yesterday in die East we had 13 losses compared with 60 enemy losses. GORING: How manv? CHRISTIAN: Thirteen of ours, 61 of the enemy’s. GORING: That includes the 10 damaged aircraft. I’ve just seen the new Russian fighter-bombers692 and also the Russian fighters, and I must say that 1 am relieved ... that it repels only machine-gun fire ... 2 cm and above and it gets through. I have clearly seen this, my Fiihrer; you only need to see

24 H

HlTLtLR ,4AD HlS G'/iJVER^U

the profiling. This is the last type that was shot down. Tts tank is in the rear. They will all burn; the tank is not protected. So this is very primitive, par¬ ticularly their latest design—it’s the weakest performance I’ve seen from Russia. Pander armaments THOMALE: 1 must report on the Panther Detachment of the Lribstandarte Adolf f Idler [SS Panzer Grenadier Division]. The Leibstandarte has a de¬ tachment with 71 Panthers; there are 60 now, and we have another eleven left from Erlangen, so the division is ready to depart with 71 Panthers. It means that the company is ... with 17 vehicles instead of 22/' ' The motor vehicles are missing. Motor vehicles can be taken at once from the 1/26 11 st Battalion of the 26th Regiment], which is there, and has given the Panthers to the 52nd |Panzer Detachment], that is in Russia. As a result, all motor vehicles must be taken at once, mostly they need the maintenance platoon. The rest will be brought in later, and will be there at the latest on Wednes¬ day, so the l jeibstandarte Adolf HitkrwxW be ready to depart from Grafenwbhr on Wednesday evening with the vehicles, the cars and the Panthers. Sec¬ ond: the [SS] Reich [Panzer Grenadier Division] is ready to depart on Sat¬ urday, the 31st, also with 71 Panthers. Now, it will receive ... agreed with the Army General Staff, including the maintenance platoon, so that this week on Wednesday evening the \ jeibstandarte Adolf Hitler will be ready with its vehicles, and the Reich detachment on Saturday evening with its vehicles, too. THE FUHRER: Are they trained, Thomale? THOMALE: They arc trained enough so that they can be deployed. The majority of the Leibstandarte is good. The Reich is good, too. They have young replacements who arc not well trained with tanks, but it’s OK, since we decreased from 96 to 71/,4 It can be corrected by doing that THE FOHRER: That’s quite good. THOMALE: It means that two Panther divisions will be ready this week. THE FUHRER: Arc all the innovations included in the Panthers? THOMALE: Yes, Sir. They have all had modifications, of course. The op¬ tics are in order, as well as the rudder steering mechanism. THE FUHRER: The membrane?695 THOMALE: The membrane and all those things are fine, too. Addition¬ ally, wre will get from Mr. Saur696 of the Munitions Ministry the very expe¬ rienced Lieutenant Colonel Stollberg,697 who was the engineering officer there and who carried out this reconstruction excellently at that time. We will also get the support of the Munitions Ministry, so these figures were

Military CoNFURHNChs 1942-1945

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added in addition. The 71 for the L&'bstandarte will be available already this evening, that’s clear,... and 1 now have ... until Saturday for the Panthers ... that will clearly be all right. I was concerned about the vehicles. But T have been promised for certain that 1 can immediately get the vehicles from the 1/26 fl st Battalion of the 26th Panzer Regiment], which is ... in Grafenwbhr. That’s one less thing to worry about. The other maintenance platoon for the Reich—at least Colonel Stieff'1’" promised me this thing [—] THE FUHRER: When does the 26th Panzer get its Panthers? BUHLE: The drivers are on their way with them toward the East. THOMALE: 1 need to report that. We do have trained Panther detach¬ ments. TI IE FUl IRF.R: The drivers are—? THOMALE: They have to leave then. It has been ordered, that the 1/26 ... the vehicles ... THE FUHRER: But then vice versa again, right? THOMALE: Yes, Sir. Then vice versa. But now the 51st | Panzer Detach¬ ment], which has been filled up with tanks and now has 52, gives these two divisions ... THE FUHRER: But before you said 200, and now only 91!? THOMALE: No, they are still at 96. They have been brought to 96; Tire 51st Detachment transferred its vehicles to the 52nd Detachment, so that it has at least 96, and the 51st was brought to 96 by the I/26th ... Now, there have been human losses in the meantime, due to the fighting, so we allowed them to take drivers from the 1 /26th so they will have drivers immediately. Drivers arc, in fact, the most valuable thing. Only I sent Colonel Marx6'1 there as a neutral observer to prevent them from taking too many. 1 told him to let them take only as many as they really need ... THE FUHRER: Then he simply takes the soldiers out? THOMALE: That’s clear. BUHLE: In any case, many soldiers are taken out. THE FOHRER: So the I/26th loses its drivers, f—] But one detachment is ready, isn’t it? THOMALE: I have another detachment in Kdnigsbriick, the 1/201 [1st Battalion, 201st Panzer Regiment].It is in individual training in Kdnigsbriick, with the 23rd Panzer Division. However, at the moment—just now found this out for sure; we’ve been having constant telephone conversations about it—I can’t get it. It will take another 10 to 14 days. We won’t get any other Panthers earlier, either; we have assigned all our Panthers through the end of the week. Then we have to start again to get an additional 71 Panthers. That’s the maximum we could scrape together. [—] Also, we’ve trained the 1st Battalion of the 1st Panzer Regiment. But it’s intended for the Balkans

250

Hitij k ami His Gk.NH.KAis

and should be equipped with Panzer I Vs,70" so the 1/1 is out of question for the Panthers. THE FUHRER: The question is, where is it to go? THOM ALE/ Yes, Sir. 1 would like to report, my Fiihrer, that we still have trained tank crews there. First, there’s the 1/201, which is in Kbnigsbriick, and the 1/1, which can he brought in. THE FUl 1RFR: When can the ones from the 1st Panzer [Division] finish their training? THOMALE: The 1/1 has completed individual training, but they need a little time still, probably about 10 days for company and unit training. Then it would just about be OK for the Panthers to start going ... RUHr.F.: If the T/l is equipped with Panzer TVs, that would be the first stronger fighting unit that could be brought in here—right into the Salonika region, not down there ... THOMALE: From our side we also request that the 1/1 ... can't use the Panthers in the Balkan region. On the other hand,... because tanks can be used there. Thus, the Panzer TVs ... [—] Then, I must also report on the so-called Uberrashungskkommandos [surprise commandos]. This evening at7 o’clock ... ready to depart from Paderborn with 3 Tigers each ... enough armor-piercing shells, ammunition, trucks with fuel in Paderborn ... There are 2 Tiger groups with 3 Tigers each; additionally, 2 Hornet groups"1’1 in Coetquidan ”2 with ... 4 each. They were trained in Coetquidan. That’s the so called V/25, wadi 45 1 Iornets altogether, so we could also take away 8 I lornets from them. BUHLE: A complete division can be moved in here. One belongs to the 26th Panzer Division, hut it hasn’t started yet—a complete division still. KEITEL: They should crack the bunkers ... THE FUHRER: Not the Hornets, hut the 4 groups of Tigers have to be put in there... BUHI.H: They certainly will hack their way through. THE FUHRER: To Tarvisio and to the Brenner [Pass], so that nothing happens there! BUHLE: The detachment can be brought here, to the Feldberrtiballe and to the 715th, here in this area. T1 IE FI IIRT7R: It would be good if they could also be available near Laibach. THOMALE: That will be possible as well. THE FUHRER: Laibach or Fiume

into this region, anyway. That’s die

one; that’s Tarvisio. [—] There are 3? KEITEL: Three each, and the others have Hornets. THOMALE: We structured the Hornets deliberately with four in each group. KEITEL: Two groups of 4.

I khotoMQChtlrri g*ftr?h0l7rpa3 MaUvtal

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251

Co\hhK/ \(h.\ 1942-1945

'l l iOMALH: The detachment has 45. THE FI HIRER: Forty-five Hornets—that’s another tremendous waste, because there’s no enemy here. BUHLE: Ibis is the antitank defense detachment of the 26th Panzer Divi¬ sion, which left. Ii has to go down anyway. THE FUHRER: Only there is no enemy here right now. f—] Continue! TI IOMALH: Then, briefly, the equipment of the panzer divisions: the 14th Panzer Division currently has 30 assault guns, 28 Panzer Ills with 8-cm long guns’1 ’ and 4 Panzer lVs with the short gun, so altogether 62 vehicles and assault guns. That also includes the 5 cm long gun. THE FUHRER: That’s the 14th? BUHLE: One has Panzer TVs with the long gun, with 38 assault guns. THOMALE: Thirty-eight assault guns. Yes, indeed. THE FUHRER: When can the 14th be ready? THOMALE: It will be ready on August 31. THE FUHRER: Good! THOMALE: The 24th Panzer Division has a complete assault gun detach¬ ment with 42 assault guns'”' and 5 Panzer TVs with the long gun—so 47 vehicles if you add them all together. TI IE FCl 1RER: The 24th Panzer Division? THOMALE: The 24th Panzer Division. Yes, Sir. THE FUHRER: It’s of no value. THOMALE: It’s supposed to go to the East now. In addition, it has 14 flame-thrower tanks to ... the enemy ... THE FUHRER: Then perhaps a Panzer detachment should be brought into the 24th Panzer, because otherwise the division is good. BUHLE: It is very good. THOMALE: The 201st [Panzer DetachmentJ could be brought into it. It will be the next one that’s ready. THE FUHRER: We should do that. THOMALE: Yes, Sir. To provide the division with a backbone. The Feldberr/tfiej/le [Panzer (f renadierj Division has 30 assault guns, 18 Panzer 11 Is with the short gun, 9 Panzer Ills with the long gun ... and the old training equipment"5 That equipment is not too valuable ... I’d like to report as well that the 24th Panzer Division has ... 300 vehicles...trucks ... THE FUHRER: We don’t need them here. ... THOMALE: These are the things that are still there [—) Of course, these can’t be separated from the detachments because it takes a lot of training time to be able to guide the remote-controlled tanks at distances of 900 to 1,000 meters.™ It is possible to do it for the first 50 or 70 or 80 meters, but for greater distances the people have to work well together. Therefore, I

1 hh«b Cu\hHRHM h.\ 1942-1945

267

Excerpt from an Evening Situation Report, prouahi.y October 3, 1943’32 1. During (be (insinuation regarding lbe situation on (be Hosiern Trout, Army Group North (THE FUHRHR: l*he Spanish demanded that we withdraw the HJue Ditisioti) the Spanish one, immediately. H ZEITZLER : Yes, indeed. I’ve heard it. JODL: it’s obvious that the weapons will stay there, since the people want to leave like vacationers. So only ... will go. (ZEITZLER): ... should be discharged decently. THE FUHRHR: Including provisions in Germany! All this has to be (pre¬ pared) carefully. These people are not responsible. These people must be treated well. 2. During (be report on (be situation in Italy JODI.:... men assaulted a vehicle, an Armed Forces motor vehicle. ... They had been supplied with explosives and money. They were then arrested. THE FUHRHR: What will happen to those two? (JODL): ... arrested. They were normal uniformed paratroops, hut they belong ... But that can also be found out about dead people. They won’t say anything.34 ... 3. During the report on the situation at sea THE FUI1RER: Also, the British have admitted that a (passenger steamer) was sunk without rescuing a single person. IIEWEIThey announced the number of people. There (should have been) 500 on board. THE FOHRER: Plus the crew of 300—(altogether) about 1,000 people! V. BELOW: Five hundred people in the cabin class, they say. THE FUHRHR: Without rescuing a single person! JODL: At that time it was ... (There must) have been others (besides) the first-class passengers. But the others are not counted. THE FUHRER: That’s the “rabble.” VOSS: The Grand Admiral reports on the last convoy action'35 ... that he personally believes that out of all of these destroyers, not a single man would have been rescued except..., but they died anyway: So one shouldn’t (calcu¬ late) ... (men) as I did it today, but in lus opinion the crews of die destroyers that were hit are in fact gone. ... lie sees evidence tor that in the present careful approach of the English ... 4. Regarding a presentation submitted by Genera! Jodi concerning the combat command in Italy, especially the deployment of tbe German \jifhvafft

1 hhnbwmochlin

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Hitij-k axd His Ghnhrais

JODL: ... it36 is no longer (able to attack the ships) without fighting the enemy air force. THE FUHRER: I think this is a ... Because at sea you fight with bombers (and against the enemy air force you take fighters. We pull back now) and say, “We’ll attack the airfields.” That’s ridiculous—it’s useless. (Such in¬ structions) are impossible. Based on this story, there will be no air combat, nor will the (ships be attacked); then nothing will happen anymore. This is the flight into complete obscurity. This shouldn’t be embellished with such timidity (then one should sav), “We are not able to combat the ships and those things.” What should be used to combat the air force? It can only be fought with fighter planes. Only those bit in the air have any purpose, not the others. If they tell me that they want to wipe out the airfields—they7’ will lose one or two (aircraft) that way. The result is basically zero. They spread them out. The results can’t be (controlled) at all. It means nothing to destroy his planes. I must destroy his crews. Planes he produces in masses. That’s ridiculous. [—] Submit this to me again tomorrow! Under no circumstances ... JODT.: Yes, Sir. This must be omitted. T can submit it again tomorrow. (THE FUHRER): They seek cover this way, so they’ can do nothing for a while. (Then) we can’t control them. To combat ships—that’s the decisive thing. That’s quite dear. JODL: That’s what has been ordered up to now. s)t * * * *

Midday Situation Rlport, October

,

,

4 1943 at the Wolfsschanze73*

The Balkans

JODL: ... In Greece, my Fiihrer, there is nothingin particular except mop¬ ping-up actions in tins area, ... where the commander was killed, ... again this battalion of this Probationary Brigade or Penal Brigade_These are the regions where the 81st [Infantry Division], the 264th [Infantry' Divi¬ sion] ... corps should come in. ... The situation in Tuzla is very unpleas ant, too. This mountain Jjiger pight infantry] brigade, which was intended to relieve Tuzla, ... attacked Tuzla with German forces, including parts of the 369th [Infantry Division], the (157th) and the Brandenburg Regiment and recaptured it again. In a company of the 369thDivision, a plan was discovered to kill the German officers.’39 ... So in all these regions there are a lot of ... the whole division is useless, but such elements can exist anywhere. ... relatively quiet, at least no major ... impression that nothing

I hhr

achlirn npsnhntztre M;itanal

Military Confurlkcls

1942-1945

269

would come out of the movement... dissolves. He is in opposition ... and against the British as well.740 THE FUHRER: Against the British? JODL: ... would mainly be in opposition, since they ... requested that they unite with the Tito movement, while the Tito movement (has) the stronger impetus—which will get even stronger. I hope that due to these significant reinforcements, consisting of three full divisions—the 264th, the 181st (and the) Cossacks,'4' of which about half is there—we will be in a position to take on this group ... was done ... by the ... division ... in order to ... their mobility ... might be equipped with wheels in order (to be) able to move at all. BUI 1LE: With French vehicles. JODL: If they get more vehicles, it is not ... THE FUIIRER: I am convinced we should take more out of Italy, and the interest ... BLTHLE: That will come out. JODL: In addition, Kcssclring requested another motor vehicle transport regiment from us. BUHLE: He is, of course,... THE FUHRER: Nevertheless, if one gets a whole country motorized, ... JODL: Somewhere in this country there must be some cities, like Naples, that do have motor vehicles, 42 ... BODENSCHATZ: They’ve all been taken away. Tl lit FUI IRER: Everyone took something for himself and won’t give any¬ thing up. Everyone says: Who knows when I will get something again... JODL: ... We don’t get this via the normal report channel. THE FUHRER: It’s quite ridiculous. We just have to calculate how many vehicles we have in this part of Italy ... even-tiling will be taken away anyway ... There must have been at least 40,000 to 50,000 trucks.

The

West

JODL: ... transport of the Bosnian Division. 43 The replacement is in progress here: the 242nd [Infantry Division] is moving in to relieve the 356th [Infantry Division]. 44 Thirty-five trains from the 384th [Infantry Division] have arrived and are assembling here, and then the 245th and the 244th [Infantry Divisions] are beginning to form ... very lively again yesterday. The exposure created by pulling out the 371st [Infantry Division]745 can now be accepted in October ... strong But major attacks can’t be expected. Al¬ though the situation up here is completely ..., are still south of this line ... capable British divisions and approximately seven armored divisions.

270

Hnu:R and His Generala

THE FUHRER: But wasted 20 divisions as well. (I have) the feeling that die British don’t want to shoot their last powder, and they will say, “We will take care of ourselves; if something happens here [—■]” Situation at sea (REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NAVY): ... Gibraltar nothing unusual. Again strong convoys. The coverage of Gibraltar is still unchanged. [ At Philippeville ... report of a nice success has taken shape. The subma¬ rine U 410 reported that they sank 8,000 tons on their way back to their home port. Additionally, five detonations were heard. Now the command¬ ing officer reported when he returned that ... 6,000 ... 7,000 ... were sunk. That means the boat had a 39,000-ton success with one stroke. 16 The boat arrived in Toulon. [—] Up here: submarine chase. [—] The com¬ manding admiral of Italy reports the commissioning of two Italian mine¬ layers ... in La Spezia and one Italian minelayer in Venice. |—] The evacu¬ ation transports from Corsica should be ... 11 p.m. We haven’t received the final report yet either. :

... A submarine chaser hunted the subma¬

rines that were reported here yesterday ... one submarine sunk. 48 [—] During the night of October 2 there was a motor torpedo boat advance against a convoy here, but ... In the Aegean region, one steamer here with Italians to Athens, one steamer to Crete ... carried out and the ... re¬ treated back to ... That was reported yesterday evening already: ... cruis¬ ers and destroyers. [—J Attacks on the Crimea ... Kerch Strait as planned ... port facilities were blown up in Scnaia and Taman’.'49 ... region, noth¬ ing unusual, f—] Twenty-three planes located over the North Sea. ... as planned. Lively activity in the air ... in the Baltic Sea. One patrol boat was sunk in an air raid. In the Channel area, a significant artillery battle took place between the opposing batteries, triggered initially by a single convoy. The steamer Ijetuta, which was ... shot at by ... batteries ... Hostile bat¬ teries shot at a German convoy, which crossed here, a little later. That caused another duel between the two batteries. The artillery commander reports: Effective hits were observed in the area of the one battery over there. East night, north of ... there was an engagement between German torpedo boats and English destroyers. There are no details vet. 30 Fortytwo planes located over the [Bay of] Biscay. ... reports on the convoy ... that last night for the first time ... was warded off ... anti-aircraft artillery of these boats ... are going east toward this convoy, which is expected to come from the east. No further reports.

Military CoNYhRhxcLs 1942-1945

271

Situation in the air CHRISTIAN: Yesterday during the day, a very strong ... activity with ap¬ proximately ... attacks, primarily against airfields, against ... Despite the heavy attacks on the airfields—four-engine aircraft were also involved ... were caused. The airfields can be used. ... some damage to the airfield facilities, damage to hangars ... actually nothing serious. [—j ... deployed, in fairly strong numbers. 10 aircraft were brought down for certain, and probably eight others as well. The British report 15. In addition, there were these two, which were shot outside here—a Thunderbolt M and a Typhoon. S2 [—] During the night ... approached first in a relatively nar¬ row front ... and a few high-explosive bombs. The return flight of some of the aircraft—so that we assumed at first that he was going ..., then assumed he would drop over Hanover and return. Then, he turned away with the rest toward the south ... our own fighters in this area between Hanover and Berlin, but had them positioned closer to Hanover. ... im¬ mediately went down to Kassel, where the majority of the forces have been in action. Two hundred and sixty-four fighters were in the ... In Kassel there are 28 heavy, 8 light,... 8 searchlight batteries at the moment. Damage—it was determined that ... 600 mines and detonation bombs, 50,OCX) incendiary and 10,000 phosphorus bombs ...—were mainly in in¬ dustrial ... No conflagrations. Numerous large fires and several hundred small fires. According to reports received thus far, 60 houses ... destroyed, ... damaged,... I lenschel factory: Factory I, seriously damaged. The Junk¬ ers factory wasn’t hit. The Hohenlohc school was heavily damaged. Spinnfaser AG was seriously damaged, but it was already quite ineffective before. The Hansa weaving mill was damaged. In addition to those, a num¬ ber of smaller factories as well— a church and hits on the Orangerieschloss [Orangerie Palace]. Heavy damage to the slaughterhouse. ... freight depot ... damage to various tracks. Casualties: 54 dead reported so far ... num¬ ber of injured persons ... can’t be determined yet153 ... and had an air-raid warning for about 20 minutes. Reports so far of aircraft shot down: 15 for certain, plus another 21. England has just reported 24. The other 21 have not been confirmed yet. But 15 were definite. Now the English report 24. Defense was a bit handicapped again. There was a thick haze on the ground here, so the number of hits was lower than could have been expected from the number of fighters in action. In addition, during the day, one intrusion into this area ... and then after 20 minutes it flew out here ... In addition ... disappeared, for example; it was gone. We don’t know if he was over Munich. All in all, 30 fighters flew on defensive patrol at the time of the first incoming flight. Then another defensive patrol was flown when

272

Hitler and His Generals

the second group of aircraft was reported. Except for the two fighter patrols in two-ship formation that were already above, ... lines of planes in the air ... Only sound reported—no visual reports. Today during the day—the last report—there was an intrusion by about 100 aircraft into the area of the Deutsche Bucht |German Bight]. No bombs were dropped ...in the area of Frankfurt-am-Mein. Bomb dropping ... Heddernheim. Undercover agents informed us about the attack, so the Commander of the Center Sector had been warned beforehand. ... reception group near ... was accompanied for quite a long distance. An incursion by 100 aircraft with fighter protection to ... in the south of Germany ... the attack on Bolzano is still coming ... a connection was made through the attack from the south, so in fact a very [—] THE FUHRER: What was here? Did we bring aircraft in here or not? CHRISTIAN: Yes, everything was brought in here, ... of the 3rd Fighter Division. In addition, the ... was deployed already during the approach, and during the departure as well. ... and pulled in the long-range destroyers from the south. ... (JODL?): The Anrimacchia airfield was taken after stiff enemy resistance. That’s the essential thing. By October 3 at 10 p.m.—that was yesterday evening—800 prisoners had been taken, including 200 British. The landing craft are all returning CHRISTIAN: Disturbed ... the enemy’s ... with 22 planes yesterday, in¬ cluding 14 Messerschmitts. All of the planes arriv ed at the target and dropped their bombs onto the airfields—on 10 ... altogether ... recognized the land¬ ing facilities. THE FUHRER: Yesterday I spoke with die Reichsmarshal. 1 prefer, despite everything that was explained to me, ... constantly attacking the towns. CHRISTIAN: ... are so confused that way,... THE FUHRER: They arc confused, but thev come. CHRISTIAN: ... go there before, at the start. So far we have been there during the landing only. THE FUHRER: That makes no difference; but they come. CHRISTIAN: ... when we constantly attack towns, ... THE FUHRER: Then we would have to ... a total of 10 to 12 ... over there ... every night ... CHRISTIAN: This reverse encircling attempt was ... by five, and later by a second deployment—the number wasn’t mentioned ... A tank landing craft was also damaged during this action754 ... only limited deployment... The total losses are lowr—I had them ... over here yesterday, but I can’t re¬ member them anymore—in 1,300 sorties, a total of 19 Ju 32s plus a few “Savoias”

and 4 or 5 Messerschmitt 323s

were lost; altogether very

273

Musyarv Cn\HKi\r i- \ 1942-1945

limited ... 14 Ju 52s are ... concentrated here. 1 don’t know it we ..., be¬ cause if he really ..., we should have had considerably more losses. THE FUHRER: Now a message has come, as ... announce officially, ... 1 must say, “Spiegelberg, 1 hear you running!” It was said yesterday out of the blue that the ships wouldn’t be attacked anymore; instead ... again ... CHRISTIAN: ... set up by rhe Armed Forces Operations Staff. We can’t oppose it. It doesn’t come from the Luftwaffe. TI IE Ft)! IRER: No, first of all... ships attacked ... What docs that mean? In the air you can only use fighters to attack, and for attacking ships ... still fighting ships. Here, more fighters will be deployed. If fighter planes are free, we can take them here as well. CHRISTIAN: ... the thing was set up here, and General Korten ” and I were informed yesterday. I said, “Nothing to see” ... my inquiry—that 1 think it’s wrong—has been answered, that is ..., this is the express wish of the Luftwaffe. The other way would not be possible. Because unless they ... the Luftwaffe ... It was a complete reversal ... THE FUHRER: Attacks are being made continuously with all units ... CHRISTIAN: It’s assumed that this version came about because one sup¬ poses that if ... THE Ft I IRER: That’s just great. So they should go on attacking ships. Because they won’t destroy the airfields here. They won’t be able to do it. It’s not feasible at all. [—] In addition, there’s one more small thing: do the\ really think these little trees7'8 that are planted here will (keep out) the gliders? CHRISTIAN: That’s another matter for the Fiihrer Headquarters to address. Tl IE El l IRER: I’m just askingif these little trees ..., if these would present the slightest obstacle at all? Cl IRISTIAN: I saw them yesterday for the first rime. Tl IE FUI IRER: They’re put into the ground, and the first glider plane that comes along will pull them out... I only want to ask one thing: if the place here is going to be mined, let me know beforehand so that my Blondi ' won’t be blown up. CHRISTIAN: I mean, not to prevent the gliders, but because of the whole air situation. TI IE FUI IRER: That can he done cheaper. This will come off soon. It will be disappointing. Overnight, the picture changes. I have nothing against it in the winter. (... ?):..., my Fiihrer, that since our special equipment has become avail¬ able, he has disturbed the shipping traffic, the ferry traffic, less than be¬ fore ... this strange thing ... and this thing, too. In any case it’s all a bit exaggerated. ...

I hhRbflriorhlIrn {jeschOtzliM

274

Hi t7 J

K -1XI)

HI.V GhNhRAI ,\

THE FU1 IREK: We will see what happens in (the Far Fast). Yesterday, the Japs—Oshima—told me that they will

I can’t say where ... (With the)

Japanese you never know. They are concluding major agreements as well, of course. ... said something crazy: Matsuoka had to go because he wanted to ... the fight against Russia. Nl The Navy said: we can’t do that because we won’t get any more oil; within a short time we will run out of oil. (... ?): He’s the one who ... after our occupation ... JODL: The British didn’t want to. CHRISTIAN: The new figures for the contribution have arrived. The pri¬ mary task of the Luftwaffe ... continued attacks against aircraft... combat ing hostile landing operations ... THF. FOHRF.R: ... when it reads: “The support of the Army must not be weakened by it,” or “must not be adversely affected.” (... ?): ... submitted these letters again, which were sent by a French minis¬ ter from North Africa to his wife ... as a fraud—but a very clever one— from the creator of falsified news... THF. FUHRER: Those scoundrels! If they are a bit ... in time they will get reallv ... ¥

JODL: It was absolutely implausible. T1 IE FtvI 1RF.R: It happened that way anyway. JODL: It’s happened similarly, anyway5. THE FUHRER: I say—if 1 only (wanted) to earn money, 1 could have earned something there ... Some of these things ... (Cl IRISTIAN?): Strong deployment to support the Army near Kos. &1 To¬ day, only dive bomber units were deployed. Protection by armed reconnais sance units in this area, against returning Navy forces; preparation and as¬ sembly for new sorties. To the south ... as well as ... In addition, my Fiihrcr, the following is to be reported from this area: We have changed to standard time.

The Finns aren’t joining in on that. ... bad because of the oil re¬

gion.76J ... transmission of all these times in the aircraft warning service ... one comes ... Tl 11 1 be! IRF.R: Why did he refuse it, anyway? Cl IRISTIAN: It plays a role for them economically, of course. Then they have to go to bed by 3 o’clock, or [—] TI IE FIJI IRF.R: They don’t have to. HEWEL: It’s shifting a bit. CHRISTLAN: Now, we have Central European Time ... on Eastern Euro pean Time ... with daylight saving time ... This might be economical for them, if they also ... THE FUHRER: In the end, the one who has to bear the major load, must possess... also economic ...

I hhi'^MPThlir'i

M.itarial

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Cl1RIST1AN: All the others joined. (... ?): ... the Russian shoots with artillery ... not much more can he done with smoke. In addition, Stare Councilor Pleiger64 said ... again this 35,000 thing. He wanted to plan the smoke action tor Nikopol'. THE FUHRER: This small bridgehead was disastrous from the very begin¬ ning. Of course, it’s not unimportant ... CHRISTIAN: We weren’t asked at all, but I first said: ... TI IE rOl IRER: ... wc have to put in there ... to give to Nikopol’. Nikopol’ itself is hard to attack from the air. Just a few minor things there—the power station, etc.—can be attacked ... The mine pits are CHRISTIAN: Shall we leave the smoke thing as it stands, my Fiihrer? THE FUHRER: T would leave it at Zaporozhye as long as we (have) the power station, yes!7’6 In any case, we still have time to build the other one up then. If wc ... have to build up ..., then it’s clear anyway ... CHRISTIAN: ... improved weather conditions in general ... ate due to this heavy precipitation. The danger is, ... dries out again. {Presentation of press reports and the Armed Forces reportfollous.) WAIZF.NEGGER: T added 5 aircraft to the English reports. Find: 1:44 p.m. 4^ 4* * ’k

October 26, 1943 In the East, the Red Army began its fall offensive on October 6, along a front stretching practically from Ncvel' to the Taman’ Peninsula. East of Nevel’ the Russians succeeded in penetrating the lines between Army Group North and Army Group Center, tearing a broad gap in the front. Intense combat has been in progress since October 7 in the area around Kiev, which the Fourth Panzer Army has held thus far with only local losses. However, the Russians threw back the German Dnieper defenses southeast of Kremenchug on October 17, and on October 24 on both sides of Dnepropetrovsk. On the Sea of Azov, the breakthrough occurred on Octo¬ ber 23 near Melitopol’; in less than one week, the land connection to the Crimea near Perekop will he cut. The Kuban bridgehead has been evacu¬ ated. In Italy, the intermediate posidons on the Volturno and the Bifcmo [Rivers], which are now being attacked by the English and the Americans, are still being held. To the rear, on the Garigliano and the Sangro [Rivers], another line is being prepared, which is to be held as long as possible.

[Maps 5, 7, and 10)

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* * * * *

Evening Situation Report, October 26,1943, at the Wolfsschanze767

Beginning: I0.-03p.nz. Tlze Eos/

ZEITZLER: All in all, no fundamental change for the worse. Basically, it has remained as it was at midday. THE FUHRER: Is he 68 pulling the 13th Panzer Division down? ZEITZLER: The 13th Panzer Division has been partially deployed already, and he put one regiment from the 335th [Infantry] Division in trucks and brought it in, so something has come down from there. He mainly set him¬ self up in this one place here, which he has held bravely since yesterday. The occupation force in there is doing extremely well. They held it the whole day yesterday. Today there were heavy attacks, and they held the whole day again, so that he couldn’t get any further. I lere, only one reconnaissance patrol— more or less—continued in that direction, and the thrust went to ... Parts of the 13th Panzer Division and the 17th [Panzer Division], plus the ma¬ jority of the 97th Jager [Light Infantry] Division are in there, as well as the 73rd [Infantry] Division and the 111th [Infantry] Division; one regiment of the 335th [Infantry] Division, which he took out above, has already arrived. The intention is to go back to this line, as was reported yesterday. The complete cavalry corps'69 is also in there. The 4th Mountain Division is still on its way over, as is the 50th Assault Division. " Then on this front, the retreat was completed back to this line, as the radio message reported two days ago. Here there is still fighting on the island. He hasn’t had any success breaking through. In this place there was a penetration. At this location, he wasn’t able to push any further. The situation there cased up due to the presence of the 14th Panzer Division. An enemy group is in down here, but should be cleared out. It’s only a fairly small group. Nothing in particular on this front, either. There was a small en¬ gagement underway here. Here we don’t know any of the particulars, but he doesn’t seem to be pushing forward. He’s not interested in it. A few reconnaissance tanks were sighted here. So he seems to be making the thrust here first. Up there, most of them were driven back again. [—] There was nothing (unusual) along this whole front. On the other hand, they believe that this action is going (to start) again tomorrow, and they want to assign the 7th Panzer Division to the Eighth Army, and to keep the 8th Panzer Division on hand near Kiev. I think we have to agree to it.

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[—] Nothing in particular in the area of the Second Army. This matter has gradually been straightened out. Also here, only maneuvers were reported. Up there the breakthroughs are, for the most part, back under control. The 268th [Infantry] Division is approaching Then there were a few minor things here. All in all, the line held completely, with the exception of this little dent here. Today he attacked again, but not to the extent that he did yesterday. Then new attacks started on the road to Orsha, but also not as extensively as on the previous days—just to the north. Here, certain reinforcements have arrived now. Here there have been a few shifts, so the thing will probably move to the north. The Luftwaffe field division brought back the first stage into this position. Tl IF. FUl IRFR: This is already the final position? ZH1TZLER: Yes, Sir. These points are the final line. The white part was the very first line. The position should be good. I spoke with ... [—] Army Group North has nothing in particular to report. Some movement was reported up near Staraia Russa. There were night frosts up there again, so we don’t know if the muddy period is coming or if it’s just a short transition period. Up there some movement has been reported—other¬ wise nothing. Here in this location there were a few maneuvers. THE Ft HRER: What can we do now so that the 50th [Infantry] Division on the Crimea can be quickly replaced with something else? The biggest danger on the Crimea, as I see it, is not sea landings but airborne landings— he could drop an airborne brigade on the isthmus of Feodosiia. 1 ZFITZLFR: The agents report the following: An action is planned here, but it couldn’t be verified. In my opinion, it’s too much tonnage—they can’t carry that much. I’ve given it to a Navy liaison agent. THE FUHRER: He’s going to land here and here ZEITZLER: Yes, they say that simultaneously w ith this action, there will be an action in Feodosiia and another in Yalta.772 I can hardly believe that he would be able do it with his shipping capability. THE FI HRER: No, I don’t believe it. (He) will make an airborne landing Perhaps he will try to support (it), once the airborne troops take possession of the batteries. ZEITZLER: Some of the 336th |Infantry| Division has come in (here). But they are still there in the back. This (corner) is, of course, a bit unpleasant, because there is nothing there. THE FIT IRER: That can’t be allowed. I le has to put in something from the 336th [Infantry] Division. He absolutely has to put in a unit. ZEITZLER: Yes, that’s actually more important than up there. THE FUl IRER: And then the Navy again! VOSS: I spoke with the Grand Admiral.

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THE FUHRER: This is the most important thing: that at least this flank is covered. Anything that can shoot must come over here. If there really is a landing, then it’s do or die. VOSS: Even the Navy landing craft must fight against destroyers then, if there’s no other way. JODL: 1 lere, the Luftwaffe has proposed to withdraw the three light anti¬ aircraft batteries from Nikopol back to Nikolaev, since it believes that no more air attacks will be made here. ZEITZLER: The important thing is that we protect this railway bridge up here. THE FUHRER: Then they should leav e one battery here. Two light batter¬ ies are enough there. ZEITZLER: It seems that the Kherson Bridge is well protected. Another air raid was driven back again. The railway bridge near Nikolaev will prob¬ ably be ready the day after tomorrow—since here we will gradually come under pressure with the supply if the weather is bad. Perhaps something should be prepared by the Luftwaffe, in case pressure arises there. We now have two movements 3 initiated by the quartermaster general. The first uses this railway, and the other one is here with large transport vehicles. THE FUHRER: How is this coming in here? When will the next division come after the 14th Panzer Division? ZEITZLER: Thus far, things have gone as planned. Even the first trains of the ljeibstandarte [SS Panzer Grenadier Division] left today as scheduled. Tl IE FUI1RIiR: The Panther detachment of the /jeibstandarte has gone? BUHLE: All of it has gone. ZEITZLER: The 384th (Infantry] Division is coming ... Then the 76th [Infantry] Division will arrive after November 2, and then the combat elements of the 25th Panzer Division (will follow), after November 5. Those (are) the dates at the (moment). Until now, we’ve hecn pushing them all up a bit. THE FCHRER: And the Uibstandartd ZEITZLER: The \ jeibstandarte arrives in Vienna on October 28.'*4 The first trains have left. Then it has to get the order to pass through, so that it can (then) go on through immediately. Then the ... combat elements will arrive, while the 1st Panzer Division will arrive all disorganized, since we’re actually just driving it on the way it left from down there. THE F011RER: T spoke with Goebbels. A message has come; an English¬ man writes that interrogation of the British exchange prisoners produced the following picture: in Germany there is great pessimism. When the Brit¬ ish left the hospitals they were told, “We hope you will be back again, before the Bolsheviks come. Tine Englishman now draws the following conclusion

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from this: it proves how effective our bomb raids are; therefore, it is of utmost importance that they be continued with the greatest energy. [—] We have to bring this, too—also into the hospitals. If such a bastard said such thing, ... to demoralize the German people ... to continue with new bomb raids. Italy JODL: There is a heavier attack underway against the ... Panzer Grenadier Division, against this town of Pictravccchio. The attack is still going on. Otherwise, there is no particular action, except here against the right wing of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, and here a few isolated attacks against the front in the middle of the parachute division, and against the right wing, with very strong fighter-bomber support. Fighter-bomber deployment was heavy today in general. Aside from that, no unusual action. [—] Here is a picture of how this position looks: (Presentation.) It was taken directly behind the front line. It’s the Volturno valley. Tanks can hardly be used there. They have to cross the mountains there, and then there’s this ground, and here is our position. It’s quite a strong position already. Of course, all the |railroad] bridges and road bridges have been destroyed. This picture (New presenta¬ tion.) was taken a bit further to the south, but also in this valley. Fie has to climb up the mountains there. h in land THE FUHRER: ... received a (letter), and ... (given to) ... the prime minister. In this letter"75 he writes more or less that he ... consider how to proceed; it would (be) very serious. (One) has to understand one thing— that Finland has a different constitution—and he describes the whole thing. (The) envoy emphasized this. I said, “Democracy (here), democracy (there). Do you think that in America, which wants to be a democracy, it would be possible for someone to go to Switzerland to negotiate officially with the Germans, and then to make this public? Do you think (that) a democracy has no possibility of taking action against such treason? Then everything would end! Your theory, which you always preach—that it was a war of the Great Powers, which doesn’t concern Finland and in which Finland is not interested, and that Finland could just go its own way to get out of this wfar of the Great Powers776—ufould give our people exactly the same right. Germany could end its war of the Great Powers as soon as some understanding could be reached, without taking the small powers into con¬ sideration.” To this he replied, very subdued, that that would mean the

280

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destruction of Finland. But in the last few days they’ve been making fine declarations. They probably suspect by now that the others won’t lift a finger for them anyway.7 7 The Balkans 0ODL): ... Then in the ... pushed through (as far as) Lipseni. So it is now our intention to create a connection along the big road tomorrow, and to push forward from both sides. THE FUHRER: We’ll get the road, these pigs will go to the side, and when we’re gone they’ll go down again. Nevertheless, one can’t say that we will do (nothing). To me, that would be like a lice-covered soldier saving, “If I take away the lice at one seam, they’ll come back the next day anyway, so I’ll just leave them. [—]” But one has to start the fight against the lice anyway. An energetic fight and the lice disappear. It’s exactly the same here. All these territories were once occupied by one state. Then it w7as just like now’, and he nevertheless managed to gradually pacify the territories. But now wrc must change to another system. We need to have a gendarmerie here that is not stationed in Agram and Laibach, but is everywhere out there in small groups, controlling things town by town. We have to take it by the root. The [parti¬ san] bands can’t keep forming—even in the towns the bandits have to be fished out individually. That is the prerequisite to pacifying this area. But if the British could cope with the nomads in the northwestern provinces of India, we can (manage this here, too). JODL: 1 ... cause difficulties. Especially ... chased the heavy weapons off die streets ... captured (guns) and so on, so ... w ill ... THE FUHRER: It’s quiet here now? JODL: Yes, there it’s quiet. Nothing more has been (reported) from there. THE FUHRER: So here we should already have a system to control the area tow n by town—who is there, who comes into the tow n, where he comes from—and to arrest such people immediately and send them away. In that way we could gradually free the area of drifting elements, because only the drifting elements arc dangerous. The Hast again Zcitzler, two divisions are supposed to be set up in the Crimea now7. When can wre bring them in? BUHLE: They are permanent staffs that had to leave the East. s ZEITZLER: Today 1 gave the order to pull out the division staffs. We need to be very strict. They cling to their division staffs, of course, and come up

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with some sort of assignment. But that has no use anymore. They have to come out anyway. (THE FL'HRER: If we) ... leave a division (at) the Kerch Strait, keep the (coastal) batteries sufficiently manned—and (also) the anti-aircraft batter¬ ies—and the Luftwaffe is ready for action here, and (the) Navy covers the whole territory between Feodosiia and Yalta, then, I believe, nothing more can happen. THE FUHRER: I just had an artillery officer down with me, who has taken a look at the Army coastal batteries. There they have a lot of (HIWIs) vol¬ unteers

as ammunition carriers, and these people are starting to deterio¬

rate, too, which leads to fights among the HIWIs. Some of them want to participate and some of them don’t anymore, so now they’re beating each other up. This poses a certain danger in case of a landing But we had to do it that way because at that time there were no men there. Italy again JODI.: I lere is a first general overview of the coastal batteries available on the parts of the Italian west coast occupied by us. The red ones are present but not ready for action yet, and the blue ones are ready for action. {Presentation.) Tl IF. FUHRER: This is quite a distance, of course. It’s 200 km, but he can’t land everywhere along these 200 km. ... (How is it) in Istria? JODL: There’s nothing there yet; (something) must go (there). Tl IE FIJI IRER: Yes, something must go (there) as well. I le won’t land any¬ more. He’s much too cowardly for that. 'Ihis (landing) in Salerno he did in agreement with the Italians.

I -Weapons (Rockets) JODL: A question concerning the deployment of the A 4 K": Should it be announced? Should we speak about it or not? I ask because the various press reports are coming in now—also inquiries from Budapest—as a result of the speech by Lev,7-1 which announced that within 6 weeks wc will de¬ ploy a new weapon that is supposed to level entire cities in England. Should we speak about it in general? THE FUHRER: No! JODL: I wouldn’t give a time frame at all, because otherwise there will be disappointment again. It has been said on different occasions, in general terms, that we do have something, and that doesn’t do any harm. THE FUHRER: Yes, indeed. They know that. The only ones who don’t knew are the German people as a whole. All the others know it. They ...

2S2

Hrru-k AM) His C.i \i h ai

\

Sweden

JODL: Tins is the report from the military (attache in) Stockholm, about the exchange in GotcboigF82 (Presentation.) THE FCHRER: The Swedish crown princess (is) English. She’s an enemy of ours, who is filled with (hatred). She’s one of the main driving forces in Sweden. Ihe fact that this worm speaks very fluent German makes her even more disgusting. s Situation in the air V. BELOW: Regarding the deployment of the Luftwaffe, it is to be reported that in the West, relatively little happened today because the weather condi¬ tions were bad. Nothing much is to be expected during the night, cither. [—] In the East, the deployment of the Fourth Air Fleet has been quite good since 10 o’clock. The Sixth Air Fleet was unable to fly because of the fog and bad weather, and the same holds for the First Air Fleet. [—] In the Southeast, sorties were flown against T,cros—about 55 fighters and dive bombers in total. [—] In the South, 34,000 GRT were damaged in attacks against the harbor at Naples the night before last. No other deployment was possible today. Armaments BUI ILF.: F.xcept ... That makes about 140 altogether. THE FUHRER: And ammunition? BUHLF: Five to six combat loads are sitting up there. THE FU11RER: We have to bring them there in huge quantities. They should shoot whatever goes out. BUHLF.: 1 hope that I can get another 23 out in 10 days. We will get 170 to 180 in total.788 THE FUHRER: If we bring in 150 there and have 5,000 rounds every¬ where, that would make 700,000 to 800,000 rounds. BUHLF,: But 1 hope another 30 might come together in the next 10 days. KF.ITF.T.: We follow every single gun on its way. BUHLF.: The Luftwaffe Field divisions in the West™3 are all unarmed; they don't hav e any guns like this anymore. But what we received from Italy was complete garbage. KEITEL: Lots of stuff in bad condition! TI IF. FUHRER: \\ hat’s the overall picture of the Italian spoils we received? (BUI ILE: Concerning the) guns, it’s terrible! ... one 12-cm gun. That is (a gun that) ... was in rhe approach.

I Hhi

rhlirn Qtttfthnfrtes M.itonal

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THE FUHRER: But we should do one thing: If the factory fittings are there, we should not impose our things on them, but just build the Italian ones; that is much easier. For example, a (12-cm) gun like that can be, if nothing else, deployed for coastal defense purposes. There we (are) happy to have them. We should also continue producing their 9-cm anti-aircraft gun. We can use it for coastal purposes then; we can use it for that without any interruption. That’s much better than an alteration. If we convert the factory, nothing will be produced for at least two years. They always say the that conversion will be complete in one year. But if you take a closer look, one gun will come in January 1945, another gun in February 1945, another two in March, two guns in April as well—so practically nothing at all. Meanwhile, we could have continued production of at least 12 to 15 pieces a month. They should go on producing, if they’re making the Ansaldo. We should immediately deploy the 9-cm anti-aircraft gun for coastal defense purposes, which will free up German anti-aircraft artillery. That way we can take advantage of it. In the other situation we don’t use it, but do a conver¬ sion in hope of some future benefit. I would also say that we should con¬ tinue building the 7.5 cm. We can always ... it for [—] “ THE FUHRER: They should not convert, (but) continue producing their things. (We) won’t get anything for tins war anymore. Before, if we had continued working instead of making that stupid conversion at Skoda, we could have gotten our howitzers there, and today we would have at least 1,000 good field howitzers.7* So we got nothing at all. This conversion didn’t help us much. It’s the same here. People are focused on one kind of model. Before they can produce a second model, the machines have to be altered, etc. Tit at makes no sense. With our immense need for coastal guns, this 9-cm anti-aircraft gun would also be excellent. Also the 7.5 cm can be deployed against landing craft and anything else. The 7.5 cm Ansaldo anti¬ aircraft gun shoots just as high as the 8.8 cm. BUI II.E: We shelled the small steel bunkers. But the way Speer reported it, with a reduced charge, it doesn’t give a true picture—with the 15.2 cm re¬ duced charge it would correspond to a range of 3,000 m. If I fire at it vertically with the 15.2—they can’t (shoot) in any other way—it doesn’t re¬ sult in [—J (THE FUHRER): Was it mounted? (BUHLH): No, it was just set down. (They) needed 6 shots to get the gravel and the earth off, to expose the bunker. So it was 7 shots altogether. (That) is not an accurate comparison. I have ordered another shelling in more real¬ istic conditions, using the correct ammunition.788 THE FCHRER: Yes, indeed. In more realistic conditions of war—and then we should do one more thing: put a layer of concrete blocks on top.

284

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BUHLE: It took them 6 shots to get the concrete blocks away. THE FUHRER: Until they get 6 hits on such a small thing! BUHLE: Several hundred rounds are needed for that. KEITEL: It’s a lucky hit; in the installations outside Verdun we waited months for a hit. A hit like that is coincidence. The dispersion over a normal dis¬ tance is at least 100m. TI IE FIJI IRER: T would like to use the Italian armor-plate capacity for that. Then we could make it out of real armor material. (BUHLE: If it) is 100mm of real armor material, then ... (THE FUHRER: Then) we don’t even need the ... we have to put a cover around it. Uiid: 10:36 p.m. jfc

%

jfc

jf; jf;

November 19, 1943 On the easternmost tip of the Crimea, the Russians have now landed near Kerch, but even the very narrow peninsula with the town will be de¬ fended successfully until April. While the extended Nikopol’ bridgehead is still being held on the southeastern side of the great bend in the Dnieper [River] bend, the enemy is already attacking Krivoi Rog again from the north¬ east, up to the point where the penetration had taken him in October. The major Russian attack on the Kiev area started November 3; the town was lost only three days later, and the Soviets drove the Fourth Panzer Army back—toward the southwest past Fastov and to the west past Radomvsl’ and Zhitomir, as well as on to Korosten’. On the southern flank of this penetration, in the Zhitomir—Fastov area, a German counterattack has been underway since November 11; this counterattack is halting the Russian progress and will allow the Germans to retake Zhitomir on the day of this meeting. Meanwhile, Army Group Center’s Second Army, to the north, has been pushed back south of Gomel’, whose evacuation Hitler had forbid¬ den. Rechitsa, to the west of this town, was lost on November 17, and at Ovruch the enemy is already standing less than 100 km west of the Dnieper. The Soviets also achieved a breakthrough in the Ninth Army’s lines at Propoisk, threatening Mogilev from the south and producing fierce com¬ bat. Along the Smolensk—Orsha highway, on the other hand, the Russians are trying for the third time—although in vain—to achieve a breakthrough. The penetration at Nevel wasn’t cleared up, but the enemy is still refraining from taking operational advantage of his success. In Italy, the German units have retreated to the Sangro and the Garigliano [Rivers], but are still holding the high position on both sides of Mignano,

AIlUTARY CONFEREXCliS

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outside Rapido, which practically creates the connection. The Americans tried to take this position during their November 6-12 attack, but were un¬ able to do so. (A taps 5, 7 and 10) a|c ♦ * jfc jfc

Midday Situation Report, November 19, 1943 89

Beginning: presumably at 12:30 p.m. The East

ZE1TZLER: Today there is a lot of action in the area of Army Group Center. (Presentation of the Armed Forces report follow si) THE FUHRER: I’ve feared many times that they would station their sub¬ marines in our supply places.'1"’ VOSS: We only have observations that there are carrier-based aircraft... WAIZENEGGER: So far the British have reported 32 aircraft shot down. ZE1TZLER: All in all it was rather a quiet day on the Crimea again yester¬ day. But there seems to be a tank brigade over there now; so, depending on the weather conditions, we could face a major attack. THE FUHRER: Assault guns? ZEITZLER: The assault guns are coming now. Titus far 5 have arriv ed. The others are lying on that thing there, so the assault gun detachments will come in there. In general, the air transport went well yesterday. About 1,000 men came over. Today a total of 860 men on leave are supposed to come over. 1 lere there was a small advance—otherwise nothing in particular. [—■] I made tables showing all the losses and supplies once during die whole time. (Presentation.) These are the losses. |—] This is the overall situation during the whole time—ours and the Romanians. There you see the rela¬ tion—many more Romanians are there nevertheless. That’s what there was up to then, and this is two days later, because 1 receive the losses later. So with losses we are at least over that. In November IVe scheduled another 8,000 men for abom 10 days or so. Then it will continue at exactly the same rate. The pressure won’t start before December, of course. Then we have to think about distributing this among all the replacements on the Eastern front. But for another ten days it’s fine. [—| They can be very satisfied w ith the assault guns as well. This is what’s coming over here. (Presenta¬ tion.) There’s nothing else unusual to report from Army Group A. The last

of the 13th Panzer Division is now' pulling up there. Here there’s nothing special, my Fuhrer, but the preparations tor the attack are a little closer now.

286

HrrunR akd His Gexurals

Here there are movements, minor advances, 70 tanks. 1 counted all of this together here. In total, we have 118 tanks and assault guns in here, excluding the 13th Panzer Division. Manstein has pulled the 13th over here in order to have it available, because the 11th [Panzer Division] is leaving. He will also have it available if it becomes dangerous here. I think it’s best to have it here for the time being. There were individual attacks on this front this morning, and one here, where they are still fighting. Here his assembly area was de¬ stroyed. Here the fighting continues. No other significant action. Here there is still quite a lot of garbage. The 11th and the 6th Panzer [Divisions] are going to close in here as quickly as possible. Parts of the 1 thing [SS Panzer Grenadier Division], which were supposed to block here, came in here I have pointed out the Smela railway station to the army group. ” Thats the only German connection into here. Otherwise, the other connection will haw to go via Transnistria afterward. That’s probably why he’s moving forward here with the 6th and the 11th, because he knows that. That could bring great pressure on us. 1 am only concerned that they might arrive too late, now that the weather conditions are so bad. If he comes in time, it would be good. |—] This is estimated at about two infantry divisions. Then down there [near Smcla| [partisan! bands and some of the paratroopers have approached. Obviously this had been prepared with the parachutists for a long time. THE FUf 1RER: I have the same worry here: that it will start here all of a sudden. ZEITZLER: Yes, Sir. That is just what the feelings are here at the moment. THE FLHRER: If it doesn’t work here, he will attack here immediately. He’ll do it quickly. ZEITZLER: He is starting to throw up entrenchments here in this old bridge¬ head. It reallv does seem that he wants some sort of defense here'"2 It has been relatively calm along this front. Then here it’s very orderly: The two combat groups of the 268th and 23rd [Infantry Divisions] have advanced to the highway and have driven back attacks. Then this ring was closed last night by the 7th and 8th Panzer [Divisions]. Parts of the 1st Panzer [Divi¬ sion] are in there. There is fighting in Schi ... Troops are also lining up against it from the south. Up there the attacks were driven back. He made a relatively strong attack, with tanks. Here again arc the enemy losses from the 8th through the 17th: 9,300 dead, 658 captured, 332 tanks, 409 antitank guns. What’s striking is the extensive equipment with antitank guns that’s now being reported by all the regimental commanders. The panzer regiment commanders say that the enemy tanks haven’t done them too much harm— it’s the antitank guns.7’’4 Otherwise, the intentions are still the same as I reported yesterday: first clearing out this encircled area up to here, then preparing here with the left wing along the road.

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THE FURRIER: I’m afraid it will be very difficult here, because he’s stop¬ ping a long time, building up one position after the other. ZEITZLER: It’s just because of the good road condition. THE FUHRKR: Granted. But if we can’t advance, the good road isn’t much use. [—] But I’m still convinced that it will be easy and that we’ll break out of this whole block. ZEITZLER: Because of how it went yesterday and today, the army group is convinced that they will be able to come up here. Tl IE FLU 1RER: The Ijeibstandarte has no attacking power here. That’s al¬ most 60 km. ZEITZLER: The whole 1st Panzer, 7th Panzer and the Leibstandarte will go in there—so all three, not just the one. Tie wants to cover with the infantry and the 8th Panzer [Division], which is there. So he’s creating a big focal point there, with the 19th Panzer [Division] from down here as well. The 25th [Panzer Division] has deteriorated greatly. Guderian has an officer down there, and I want to talk to him about the causes when he comes back. It has deteriorated drasticallv. Tl IE FtJHRER: And how long has it been in combat without a break now?! ZEITZLER: The 1st Panzer [Division] has held itself together well—the best, actually. THE FU1IRER: There are still 27 here, too. j

ZEITZLER: Nearly 100 are out altogether. BUHLE: Of these, 70 are out. Tl IE EUIIRI ’R: I mean Panthers. That’s an incredible loss.’95 Thirty of the others are out. So how did this happen? It’s heavily armored and has double the losses of the Panzer IV. ZEITZLER: And it even joined the battle later. THE FUHRER: So something must be wrong. It’s impossible. This can’t be. Both detachments were equally strong—they had about 90 [tanks]. There are 61 Panzer I Vs, and only 27 of the others, which means that the one lost about 60 and the other 39. And its armor plating is better. He has 17 Tigers and 23 assault guns. It’s like this: one-third of the tanks are gone, one-third of the assault guns are gone, one-third of the Panzer Vis—he had 17—are gone, and two-thirds of the Panzer Vs are gone. There must be some con¬ nection. PFEIFFER: But they can all be repaired quickly. THE FUHRER: I don’t care; at the moment they are all gone. I hear about quick repairs everywhere, but they never come back—they always stay away. T am curious as to when they will appear again. They always say: in a short time. ZEITZLER: Short-term repairs do come back in and cover the losses a bit, of course. But with the Vs the number is too high.

28 8

Hnu.R

a.xp

His

Gemurals

THE FUHRER: But the others have losses, too. There the losses reach 30%. ZEITZLER: They were deployed a few days later. HEUSINGER: The 25th [Panzer Division] came in on the 8th and the 1st Panzer Division on about the 12th [—] ZEITZLER: They came in up there during the attack. THE FOHRER: But there must be some reason. This is ridiculous. BUHLE: I was supposed to remind you again about the Panther detach¬ ment 1/31 and the two Panzer Assault gun Detachments. ZEITZLER: The Panther detachment of the 5th Panzer [Division] and the other detachment are coming. 1 haven’t suggested anything yet because wc still have 5 more days to decide. Then tilings might look different. The de¬ tachment that’s departing first is the one for the 5th Panzer. Tt’s leaving tomorrow. So initially 1 have them earmarked from us in the General Gov¬ ernment [Poland], for the 5th [Panzer]. But if it becomes urgent—I will ask again in 5 days—we will put them in up there or down here. We’ll do it that way with the others as well. At first they are assigned to an actual standing division. But when wc have to decide in the General Government, I’ll bring this up. THE FCHRER: Which standing divisions are here? BUHLE: The 10th Panzer Grenadier [Division], and the other is in the 20th |Panzer Division]. ZEITZLER: So both of them would do well if they came down here. The only thing would be with the 5th Panzer. Then we would have to consider if we want to have a gigantic tank local point here, and let them die out up there, or do we want to put something in there? THE FUHRER: With the 10th Panzer Grenadier, I still haven’t made my mind up if it’s right to put them in there. If the) will somehow mature more quickly that way is a big question. ZEITZLER: The critical point is up above. Wc can put them in there. THE FUHRER: I believe the critical point is more here instead. ZEITZLER: But there are still 5 more days to go, my Fiihrer. Down here he has pushed somewhat forward. Here [north of Kalinkovichi] the situation has grown increasingly tense. Here the 5th Panzer [Division] and 4th Panzer [Division] have lined up. But not much has come of it. Here there were very strong counterattacks. Everything is suffering from (the) weather as well. They can’t get really close, so the whole thing has gotten stuck. Then here the enemy has advanced to the railroad, apparently with the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, and has encircled this base of ours [Kalinkovichi]. As a result, Busch % called half an hour ago and he’s made up liis mind to take out the 4rh and 5th Panzer Divisions and to attack that man, because he is worried about the base. I believe, my Fiihrer, that we have to do that. This

AlrUTARY CONHUUiNOiS 1942-1945

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base back here has the entire supply for the Second Army down there. It’s a hard decision, but at the moment I can’t sec any other option. Later they will both be stuck, he won’t be able to get them out, and everything will be cut off behind. Up here the thing is like this: some of the guards cavalry are advancing up to here, apparently with that as the target there. Parts of this tank corps here are crossing the Dnieper [River]. Now, Busch wanted to come over this afternoon, if the weather was favorable. But I don’t believe it will be possible today. He won’t be able to fly. He has great ideas about taking it back. In my opinion, we could at most come to the point where we say: forget about this attack at stage 1, and first push up with both divisions to cover the rear of Mogilev, then attack here with the 4th and 5th [Panzer Divisions] to cover this thing, and then we’ll see what we can do after that. THE FUHRER: I also think that would be best. ZE1TZLER: It’s the only thing to do, really. And the weather is horrible as well. Everything gets stuck in the mud. But we’ll have to do it. So I may say that for the present? THE FUHRER: Yes. ZE1TZLER: And then we’ll have to wait for today. He has gotten through with the cavalry. That’s dumb. They’ll come through the woods now. THE FIT IRER: They don’t have any assault guns for that. ZEITZLER: Yesterday they had very heavy combat because they were con¬ tinuously attacked from out of the woods and had to lead a very strong fight. Then a very fierce battle started here. That report arrived a quarter of an hour ago. He is also intensifying his attacks there a bit. [—] Then here, the battles are still going on. Some of them have been driven back. Very heavy aircraft deployment, while we can’t fly. THE FCHRER: How can that be explained? ZEITZLER: Because they can go out behind and we can’t. KORTEN: The weather is such that there is just a very narrow front. A high is coming in and we hope that by' noon we will be able to get in and out. Tomorrow it will be better. It’s because of this very' narrow edge pushing in that he can fly and we can’t. ZEITZLER: In general, nothing unusual to report front the Ninth Army. [—] Those were the attacks against the border. THE FUHRER: This is a nasty thing ZEITZLER: Yes, it’s very' unpleasant. That happened just a quarter of an hour ago. It will be bad if that comes in still. THE FUHRER: Hopefully he has assault guns here. ZEITZLER: He still has a few assault guns here. THE FUHRER: We don’t know where they are positioned.

290

HnuER and His Glnerals

ZEITZLER: They’re always marked with the combat group they belong to. |—] Nothing out of the ordinary with the Ninth Army on the northern wing. The Ninth Army believes that nothing will come here, and wants to loosen up somewhat here. I am a little bit concerned, because there is a great deal here. THE FIJI IRER: I am concerned, too. ZEITZLER: Yes, this question mark has been around for quite some time now; so it will start soon. ... highway yesterday were driven back. Thirty-one tanks destroyed. The officers that were sent to the front say that the Russian losses were so incredible here—like we haven’t seen for quite a while. They speak about large-scale slaughter. It could be. THE FIJI IRFR: With the bad infantry, it had to come to that. ZEITZLER: Here are some decent sectors. There are about 120 infantry¬ men for 1 km. We’ve hardly ever looked that good. 'Hie army group has done that very well. THE FUl1RER: But it’s just as good in the Army Group North area. ZEITZLER: The North is good as well. [—] Here there is only a small concentration. Nothing has happened there yet. Today a strong attack started here and broke through here to some degree. THE FIJI IRER: We could have predicted that, after he pulled that awray. ZEITZLER: We will at least have to block off this narrow place here. There are fewer forces and lakes there. He won’t be able to come through there so easily. Here a few tanks came over. These tanks have been destroyed. Here the action should start today. THE FOHRER: That won’t get very far. ZEITZLER: He’ll have to do it. Otherwise he will be sitting on the road, and that would be terrible for him. THE FOHRER: I don’t believe that will come too far. ZEITZLER: If this pushes in here and destroys tanks? THE FUl IRER: Would that have any effect, if this were pushed back here? ZEITZLER: I believe so, yes. Because this up here will take another 10 or 12 days. THE FUHRER: Where is the assault gun detachment? ZEITZLER: The assault gun detachment is in here. They arrived with 10. The others are on the train—the Tiger detachment, the one assault gun detachment and then the tank destroyer detachment. THE FUHRER: He must bring something more in here, so that nothing happens here. If he gets to Vitebsk, the whole affair will break down. Here there are two dangers: that he forces his way through, even if he doesn’t come via the road to Vitebsk, but here. ZEITZLER: Yes, Sir. That is a big danger, and there’s a smaller one here.

A Inil ARY

CoNH-RBXCES

1942-1945

291

THE FCHRER: There they just have one road. ZEITZLER: And here we will have to sec, if nothing else can be done, how we can hold this narrow place at least. It’s relatively short. If the attack comes in 10 days, we will have to do something up there, because it would be very hard for him to hold this here for 14 days. Here we heard some radio messages saying that he has very little ammunition, so we re¬ ally can hope to get this thing in order. |—| My Fiihrer, I wanted to hand this out in written form as well, to make it even clearer. (Presentation.) These are the things we had on the map yesterday. I wanted to give this out afterward for emphasis. [—] There’s nothing much to report from up here¬ in the Army Group North area. [—) There was a minor attack here, which was driven back. Then these radio messages that I mentioned before, stat¬ ing that they had ammunition difficulties and that there were a few local shifts here. [—] Nothing in particular here, either, probably because of the bad weather. THE FCHRER: I must point out again that if we can fly here, that’s the most important—these are the most important points—to destroy them as far away as possible. Tine further we go back, the better Rzhev and so on. Every train that doesn’t arrive here—even- ammunition train that is de¬ stroyed—will be missed by those people at the front. Overland transport up here would be very difficult, considering the poor roads. Plus it always burns a lot of fuel. KORTEN: Everything’s ready. We can start right away, as soon as the weather permits. ZEITZLER: On this front here, nothing unusual. Here a local shift was reported, here a few tanks and some artillery fire, and there one division has been brought to the front from the reserves. THE FCHRER: That doesn’t mean anything ZEITZLER: No, these are insignificant things. THE FUHRER: 1 don’t believe he’ll do anything major. ZEITZLER: He probably won’t come until winter. THE FUHRER: And he doesn’t have that many forces vet. ZF.ITZLF.R: I can see no concerns, as Field Marshal Kiichler said, up here. The worries are down here, for the Eighteenth Army as well. Stef flea J couldn’t fly out today. He will come tomorrow. THE FUHRER: I won’t be here tomorrow, unfortunately. ZEITZLER: So he might have to wait another day. He’s on the train; he wanted to ride to I r-mberg [L’vov], then flv. But I don’t believe he will be able to fly from there either, so it will be a day later anyway. THE FUH RER: I wouldn’t let him fly anyway, if it’s not very good. We can’t afford a mishap there. Psychologically it’s very bad if something happens.

Hi i u.r a.\p His Glxeiials

292

We don’t know—there are so many enemy swine down there who would say immediately that he has been killed.'9® Wc have to be unbelievably careful. Better by train. ZE1TZLER: Then, if possible, he could stay here until you arrive. THE FUHRER: With weather as bad as it is here, he shouldn’t fly. I spoke with Giesler

yesterday evening. I Ie told me how they circled around until

they were able to come down. Then the)' were supposed to come back again, but on the way back there was nowhere to land, and then gradually they ran out of fuel. I’ve been on trips like that myself. ZE1TZLE.R: Also Busch, who wanted to come, has been warned against it. He wanted to try to come in the afternoon. I IEUSINGER: He called it off. Pander armaments BUHLE: My Fiihrcr, I was supposed to speak to you about the Panther, concerning the turrets. TI IE EL I 1RER: Where are the Panzer experts? ZE1TZLER: 1 inquired about this myself, and they said the following: this can be operated by hand first, and then there is a small electrical thing that enables one to turn the tower. But the electricity has to be recharged by the engine again. The engine doesn’t have to be running all the time, though; it only recharges this electrical thing from time to time. It’s similar with the ventilation. It’s supposed to be a hand-operated thing, which again is re¬ charged by the engine. THE FUHRER: This is critical. But in the design that the gentlemen showed me—which they had discussed with the tank people—they just wanted to take the cupola off and put it on this concrete block, in the West. That was when General Jacob*"" was here. Weren’t you there? BUHLE: No. THE FUHRER: General Jacob was here and he brought this design, which had been discussed with the tank people. The idea was that initially we would only use a temporary foundation in the West—because I wanted to install 60 there, too ... but right next to it build concrete bunkers with revolving gun mounts ... Then I said,“You can’t do that because you need the engine to turn the tower.” Then he said, “No, the tower is turned by hand. It has a hand swivel. The only time it can’t be turned by hand is if it’s tilted.” BUHLE: It’s a little slow, but it works. THE FIJHRER: They say a thousand turns are necessary to turn the tower around. You can’t destroy a tank like that. BUHLE: A motor can be built into this little thing

MILITARY CONFlUUzXCliS

1942-1945

293

THE FUHRER: I told those people, “A Volkswagen engine or something similar must be installed.” Then they said, “No, it was only necessary for the ventilation.” This has to be clarified. Get in contact right away. Otherwise none of these actions makes any sense.54,1 ZKITZLER: I told Gudcrian yesterday evening that he should speak with you about it. BUHLE: Guderian brings out a weak personnel section for this, so that the driver and especially the gunner arc there, so they can wait outside and be in heated boxes when danger is imminent ZE1TZLER: That’s the danger of driving in. THE FUHRER: If they work, they can drive in. If they don’t work, they can’t go in. Usually they don’t work. ZEITZLER: And when they’re out front, they have to run the engine from time to time, and that is unpleasant. Because the engine can’t run on the front lines. THE FUIIRER: Then they should be installed in such a way as to enable them to be heated at any rime. ZEITZLER: But the engine must run from time to time anyway. THE FUHRER: Why? ZEITZLER: To recharge the batteries that runs the exhaust. THE FUHRER: Yes, when he’s firing. But if he doesn’t fire it doesn’t need to run. But the engine must be heated, so that it will start immedi¬ ately. Because the engine must always start. In the one situation he needs to drive in first, and in the other he is already inside. So we could build the roof over it in such a way that it can be completely heated. 1 have a feeling that these Panzer people are hanging around again, saying to themselves: it’s a crime; look at this tank—they are going to dig it in, and it’s running wonderfully. (—] It’s ridiculous. ZEITZLER: They arc angry about it. THE FUHRER: But it doesn’t run, so 1 can’t use it. ZEITZLER: One can tell that from the losses down there. THE FUHRER: If we had installed the Panthers—the more than 600 that we’ve lost in the East—solidly into the defensive front, we’d have had per¬ fectly sound armor protection in the dangerous places. Then some things would never have happened. Like this we have nothing. Situation in the air, the Hast BUCHS: In the Plast there was only limited action yesterday. Twenty-four of our nuisance raiders attacked troop targets north of Zaporozh’e. The enemy also made individual sorties in the area south of Gomel. Deploy-

294

Hii u.r a.\p His Gextsraus

ment won’t be possible for us today until the improvement from the east reaches our units’ quartering area. The ground condition in the areas of |Army Groups] North and Center is very muddy because of the continu¬ ing rainfall. The traffic in the South is not being held up too badly on the main roads; it is said to be worse on the smaller roads. In the Kiev—Zhitomir area there is a strip that is relatively good. There the smaller roads are also more or less passable. Because of the frost arriving from the south, an improvement in the road conditions is expected first in the area of ArmyGroup South.

Italy KEITEL: In general, no new incidents along this front. On the east wing, the only thing reported was that a few units have been observed in the Gulf of Gaeta. They are believed to be mine sweepers. Eight units there have moved further to the northwest. That obviously concludes the move¬ ment of the 50th British Division, which has been brought into this re¬ gion. No other movements have been identified. The relief is finished in the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division sector. So they have taken over the sector completely'. The 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division has come out. A few smaller operations after an artillery preparation—here in platoon strength, here in company strength—can only be regarded as reconnais¬ sance measures. It’s doubtful that a repetition of this attack in this strongly attacked sector of the front will take place in the next few days. For the present, there are no signs of it. THE FUHRER: The British put out reports that they have created the nec¬ essary conditions to push forward here. These are reports that have apparently been spread by journalists. KEITEL: We can wait for that quite calmly. Then I already reported yester¬ day evening about the situation on the east wing with the 16th Panzer and the 65th [Infantry] Divisions. There were two attacks yesterday afternoon. A stronger one after an artillery preparation with smoke, past this town here against these crossings—this is the town of Arando—and the other attack against Archi. The occupying forces initially caused severe enemylosses and held the towns, but then after driving back the attacks they withdrew; now the battalion of the 1st Panzer Grenadier Division802 has withdrawn back behind the Sangro sector. The enemy didn’t manage to reach the Sangro anywhere or to cross it. Four tanks were reported de¬ stroyed y esterday. Altogether 6 tanks have been destroyed in the course of these attacks. Twenty tanks participated. THE FOHRER: But he is only advancing with a few things.

AIiutary ConhuuzXces 1942-1945

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KEITEL: Obviously. But these are preparatory measures. It might be that they want to control the entrance to this valley. In any case, no other combat action has been reported today. On the other hand, all die coverage here has been taken back to the Sangro. THE FUHRHR: A side note: to make sure that nothing happens here, we should take one of these heavy tank turrets—as soon as it’s ready—down there and install it temporarily. We should temporarily install it on the firing range with the actual equipment that’s inside now—with the engine they have now, with the pivot they have now—and cover it completely. I had another thought when I heard this. Hand me a sheet of paper. [Sketch by the Fiibm' follows.)*There might still be some danger. Here’s the turret with the gun. This is the upper level. I lere is the way down to the lower level. If the gases aren’t eliminated completely’, there is danger of them sinking down where the people are. KEITEL: The seats are on the sides. TI IE

F0IIRER: But there arc two levels. If

the gases come down here and

get pulled through there, and they don’t have ventilation from above down there, then I don’t know if they can stand it. We need to find out now quickly. It’s just a question of ventilation. Then we’ll have to install a venti¬ lation system. BUHLE: One should be installed right away. KEITEL: One has to say that if a real British offensive operation should develop out of these reconnaissance or advanced guard actions, it would be very unpleasant, of course. The 16th Panzer Division is being taken out right now—parts of it are already out—and the 65th [Infantry7] Division’s sector is becoming extraordinarily broad for only a six-battalion division. There is also this difficult obstacle at the front, and here as well there are some obstacles facing the front. But any major attack could become quite uncomfortable, of course. We’ll have to wait. THE FUHRER: We can’t wait. We have to tell Kesselring right away that the 16th [Panzer Division] is coming out. KEITEL: The 16th is coming out. THE FUHRER: But in good time. Kesselring sayrs to himself that for the moment, they still have the 16th here; if something happens I’ll get it back immediately7. KEITEL: No, that’s not possible.

THE FUHRER: Wc absolutely must have them for the East. KEITEL: This map only shows the movements in general—the departing movements. Now there are already 62 trains of the 2nd Panzer Division, which is quite a considerable addition of combat strength. From the 44th [Infantry] Division, 3 trains have left, and from the 16th Panzer Division the tracked vehicles have left.s,w Likewise the shifts here.

296

Hnu.R ,'ixo His (.i-Xi ious

THR FUHRER: I would like to know what that one has. But otherwise you’ll never get it out of the Italian area. They should take whatever they can take along. At least dial is out. BUHLE: ... some vehicles out now—several thousand trucks. THR FUHRER: I’m a bit skeptical and would like to see the division that’s getting weaker there. ZEITZLER: There arc also difficulties with winter clothing. Lots of winter clothes were lost at Zhitomir. I would to get some winter clothes out of the Italian supplies, but they’re vert' difficult to get out of the Italian area. KEITEL: And it’s not much, anyway. It’s just standard uniforms and un¬ derwear. ZEITZLER: Underwear, primarily. THE FL’HRER: It’s very hard to get anything out of there. Back then, to keep individuals from stealing stuff for themselves, Rommel built up a bar¬ rier here and held everything back. KEITEL: I le can’t do that very- well. We sent off 36,000 railroad cars. BUHLE: At the moment, the administrations are claiming that the first re¬ lease took place because everything was blocked off where you yourself, my Fiihrer, had decided this. The first troops were released for the East several days ago. KEITEL: That happened four days ago. THE FUHRER: That’s very good. I just don’t want everything to be left in these rooms down below. There were 900,000 Italians ... (...?):... already complaining that they don’t have a jacket or a single boot anymore. How it can happen is a mystery to them. THE FUHRER: To me, too. But it’s all the same whether their pants are taken off them by the British or by us. KEIT1 iL: We have ... moved 36,310 cars with evacuation goods and house¬ hold goods across the border. THE FtJHRER: They are not so much concerned about household goods; they are having the machines transported out. KEITEL: The other things we had ready right from the start, military mate¬ riel. That’s the essential part. There are 32 Armed Forces trains going over the border, 23 of them supply trains. They crossed the border yesterday. The Balkans

Here, by withdrawing forces—there were still some parts of the 44th [In¬ fantry Division] and the 14th Police Regiment, wliich have been pulled back now—the enemy has gradually started moving and is progressing toward this road again. Ihosc are the forces that had been driven to the south before.

AIiutary ConfiiRUXces

1942-1945

297

THE FUHRER: If the British were to say that Germany has the assign¬ ment of putting the whole Balkan area back in order, we’d be busy for the next 30 years; march in, march out, turn around again, beat them up, and out again. KEITEL: Here there was a mopping-up action in the area west and north¬ west of ... ; that is finished. But here parts of the 162nd Turkish Division, the Lefort group*'*5—and also troops that were brought in from the north from the same combat group—have quite a hard battle against enemy forces on the heights between Tre ... and Stre ...8U6 THE FUHRER: How many times has this area been cleared out by now? KEITEL: In these areas there is always something coming together, to the east ... That’s a very well-known point, where the enemy always ... [—] Here, the operation against the encirclement of these forces in the German area has been delayed and made more difficult by very heavy snowfall. The enemy has settled himself here on the Blegos8'1" heights and is allowing himself to be attacked up there. The attack is underway by the Gevers group, which consists of a field replacement battalion of the 163rd [Infantry Divi¬ sion], two reserve mountain Jager [light infantry] battalions, parts of the Italian militia battalion—which doesn’t do anything—and the Karst Train¬ ing Battalion of the Reichsfiihrcr.8"8 They are attacking here. Here in the north, the 19th Police Regiment has been successfully blocked off, because at the moment no one can come into this mountain area without mountain equipment. This bridge is still blocked. It will be available again on Decem¬ ber 31. It had been blown up. Departure of the 44th Division with 19 trains. The transportation movement of the 901st Regiment, to the main opera¬ tion in the central Serbian area, and of the troops assigned to form the new Agram division, is in progress.80" THE FUHRER: Are they running away down here? KEITEL: The situation here looks like this. Here, from Rhodes, the com¬ mander of Rhodes explored this island, did some reconnaissance, and re¬ ported it to be clear of the enemy; then troops were sent over, and they also reported it clear of the enemy. However, it is reported—For ...Rl" reported it this morning verbally—that an British Commando operation has obvi¬ ously taken place in the area of Sidi. Sidi is manned by two officers and 50 Fascists, who had been, so to speak, dispatched there by us. We don’t know yet what happened there. We haven’t received a report yet. But it will be reported by the British as well. The islands are free now. They were all confirmed yesterday during the day. Also, on the island of 1 .eros, 180 Ger¬ man prisoners were freed, while here 240 Italians in N ... For ... is clear of the enemy. Now the first observations have shown that the enemy is obviously fleeing to Turkey from Samos in small craft. It looks like they

298

Hn u ii and His Glnerals

don’t want to take up the fight on Samos anymore. And it hasn’t been con¬ firmed yet, of course. So, with the exception of some small islands that the Italians are still sitting on, the whole affair has been mopped up.811 THE FtJHRHR: Those few will have to leave, as well. KEITEL: We’ll have to comb them out, of course, but that won’t cause any difficulties. 'Fine main thing was this area, where naval forces kept interven¬ ing in the battles. [—] Again two heavy air attacks against the two airfields in Athens and in Larissa, which the Luftwaffe will report on. Departure of the 1st Mountain Division as before, to the operation that is being prepared up here in this area. Debar was taken yesterday and mopped up, and the forces that were deployed there will take on other mopping-up actions further north. And here is the town of Peschkopia. It was also occupied by hostile gangs, and has now been cleared out. An occupation force will stay there until the Bulgarian self-defense force arrives. Somewhat unexpectedly, a minor skirmish took place here in the assembly areas for the operation against Tito in this area. It was quite a successful skirmish, and was appar¬ ently initiated by the two Brandenburg regimental groups and Combat Group Pfeiffer;812 with two battalions of the 197th [Infantry] Division and two Brandenburg battalions. Four battalions made surprise attacks in these two towns and cleared out Kachevo. This action resulted in 260 enemy dead, 150 captured ... reported, actually an operation to reach their assembly area later. Still weak enemy forces here; they tried to intervene in the fights yesterday, but will obviously come too late. Here a rather unpleasant situ¬ ation. Bulgarians advanced against the town of Krem ..., and were driven back. The battalion can’t be found at the moment; it seems not to have held out. Here the battle was fought through yesterday by both sides. Com¬ bat Group Prin^ Eager/ from the north, the other one penetrating into M ... There was an Ustasa [Ustasi] occupation force81’ that freed them. The enemy, unfortunately, could neither be caught nor destroyed, and some enemy troops escaped onto these two islands. There will probably be no other option but to clear these islands as well, after we’ve mopped these up. Yesterday movement was reported. We assumed that it might have been a retreat movement already, while no decision was reported up here. The enemy tried to relieve M ... An SS battalion was sent against it and was withdrawn from the attack against M ..., which is in our hands. The Ustasa [Ustasi] have been freed. Up here the usual local disturbances by [partisan] bands. Here the SS Battalion Nkderiande ['"'‘Netherlands”]*14 undertook a perhaps somewhat rash push against Krotovica, and didn’t get through. The operation will be prepared again a little more thoroughly. It obviously started a little carelessly and thus wasn’t successful. [—] Yesterday there was al¬ ready a report saying that the battle on Leros had changed rapidly because

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of this—a report from the Branden burger-— ... that a first lieutenant stormed the bunkers with his platoon, captured the general, and demanded of him: either I will shoot you or you will capitulate immediately THE FUI 1RER: Bravo! KEITEL: Obviously he handled things well. That broke the resistance down completely. I wanted to suggest him for the Knight’s Cross. THE FUHRER: He will get the Knight’s Cross, especially because he de¬ clared right away: if you don’t capitulate, 1 will shoot you. That’s the right way to deal with these people. KEITEL: Then there’s another report, which sounds plausible. According to reliable sources, the Allies are supposed to be drawing up a unit of Yugoslav prisoners of war in Italy, consisting of about 18,000 men, who, according to Tito’s order, will be brought to the country’s Adriatic coast in about two weeks. THE FUHRER: It’s not impossible. KEITEL: No, it’s not impossible, because they still have prisoners of war, though in limited numbers. It could be possible/" Tl IE FI 1IRER: It’s just that the prisoners of war don’t want to fight any¬ more. 'lliat’s a very old experience. Neither side will succeed. And that’s why it’s nonsense to believe that the Italians will fight. They won’t fight on the other side either; they are of no value anymore. KEITEL: A report from the Intelligence office [Abwrehrstelle] in Hamburg— I can’t judge if it is of any importance—says that according to sources in Portugal, Romanian and I lungarian consultations with the Allies are sup¬ posed to have ended in Lisbon on the afternoon of November 15.816 Both countries are to request an armistice in die next few- days on the basis of provoked unrest. I don’t know if that’s significant. It is definitely true that discussions like diis have taken place in Lisbon again. THE FUHRER: Both of them certainly won’t do it. One w ill do it, and the other will immediately march in because of the unrest. If unrest develops in Hungary and the Romanians tell us about it, then they would ask us to help them restore order in Hungary. The North

KEITEL: From Finland, lively enemy reconnaissance patrols are reported on the southeastern front. That’s coming from the Finns. On the northeast¬ ern front nothing unusual. Temperatures from plus 2 to minus 12. In Den¬ mark a number of cases of sabotage have occurred, especially on one night— the night of the 17th. A signal box and transformer building at the Aarhus railw ay station and a railroad bridge near Langern w ere destroyed. Three km

300

Hitler and His Generals

west of the Aarhus railway ... damaged in several places by explosions. At die railway station ... a railroad car tilled with straw was set on tire. In the center of Copenhagen an Armed Forces staff official was shot on Novem¬ ber 18. The upcoming sentencing of 15 saboteurs by the authorized author¬ ity' is expected to be a deterrent; I don’t know if it will be enough. THE FLU 1RER: I think the other procedure is better.81 KEITEL: The Reichsfuhrer wanted to recommend this procedure to the commander and especially to the authorized agent of the Reich. It’s prob¬ ably the only thing that’s effective against these acts of sabotage. THE FUHRER: We just can’t wait until it’s too late. KEITEL: We have to do it as a precaution, before it happens. THE FUHRER: Best818 will refuse it, I’m sure. I don’t know about Hanneken.81*' Best will refuse because he is undiplomatic. KEITEL: 1 lanneken is quite willing, if we tell him something. THE FUHRER: It’s the only procedure. Situation at sea ASSMANN: A large convoy of 74 merchant ships was observed by air re¬ connaissance yesterday about 450 km west of Lisbon.820 The submarines that were stationed a bit too far west in the reconnaissance patrol w'ere then directed a little to the northeast. The convoy was then observed again several times in the afternoon and evening by the Luftwaffe. Yesterday afternoon one submarine approached the convoy, but was immediately subjected to heavy depth-charge pursuit from a group of submarine chas¬ ers, and reported strong air cover. Unfortunately, the boat wasn’t able to report contact with the convoy until last night because of underwater pres¬ sure. Then another boat made contact with the convoy this morning. That boat will probably be able to stay with them, and the Luftwaffe will prob¬ ably report again today as well. It reported the convoy again this morning, so the second reconnaissance patrol, lying further to the south, will hope¬ fully make contact with the convoy tonight. The new 290th Reconnaissance Group—they didn’t expect German aircraft to appear—managed to get as close as 300 meters to the convoy. They exchanged signals and then the planes flew on. In the Atlantic one wide shot w-as fired against an unac¬ companied ship, probably missing because of the great distance.821 Here an aircraft provided direction-finding signals for the convoy yesterday. Un¬ fortunately the signals were heard by only one submarine. It is not yet clear if the distance w?as too great or if the boats didn’t hear them for other reasons. |—| In the Finnish Bay, another Russian swreeper unit is clear¬ ing the area around Saiskaari.822 It was fired on by land batteries—by the

MILITARY CoKTHRLKCES

1942-1945

301

“Bismarck” land battery. It has three 15-cm guns. One Russian vessel was sunk and another was damaged. There were Russian torpedo-bomber at¬ tacks against our steamer traffic at Baltischport (Baltic port] and west of Pernau, without success. |—| During sabotage actions in Denmark, a radio direction finding station at the entrance to the Aarhus harbor was also destroyed. During yesterday’s flights into the Oslo Fjord, one aircraft was shot down in the Skagerrak by outpost forces, which were bombed as well. Very strong convoy activity along the Norwegian coast—84 ships in total. One of our troopships ran aground southwest of Tromso. The sal¬ vage operation is underway. THE FUHRER: If we try to imagine it, we can only say that it’s not that big in the Mediterranean with those forces either. VOSS: One and a half million a month. THE FUIIRER: Couldn’t we get a list for some specific date, showing how much tonnage is located in the harbors of Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik, so we can get a picture? ASSMANN: Yes, Sir. (—] In the North Sea no unusual events. Our own convoy activity, with strong cover, is going according to schedule. The very large convoys underway right now are quite gratifying; they arc being led through the Ijssel-Meer and the Zeeland waters. Yesterday 5 convoys with 37,000 GRT were reported again. In the Channel, activity by the outposts and escorts is impaired by the continuing very strong swell. The weather situation in the Channel has now somewhat improved. THE FUHRER: I .et’s have some English voices now. One should not al¬ ways criticize. ... (Reading aloud) ASSMANN: More enemy air reconnaissance in the |Bay of] Biscay, with 41 aircraft. THE FUHRER: It’s too bad we can’t get really clear pictures from East Asia. ASSMANN: Yesterday in Gibraltar there was a convoy of about 53 freight¬ ers and 8 tankers. A convoy of 8 freighters sailed out of the Mediterranean. The only traffic at all in the Mediterranean yesterday was departing. Numer¬ ous cruisers, two submarines and destroyers arrived in Gibraltar, also com¬ ing from the Mediterranean. The weather conditions were so bad in the Tyrrhenean Sea and the Adriatic yesterday that reconnaissance was severely limited. Our mine operation in the Ligurian Sea went according to plan. In the Bay of Gaeta, as already reported, there were enemy mine sweepers. Supply traffic to Salerno. In the Aegean, our torpedo boats and submarine chasers set out with 240 prisoners and capmred weapons to Svra, and from there to Piriius.H23 The clearing of the islands was carried out yesterday bythree submarine chasers and three mine sweepers under the command of the Chief of the 21st Submarine-Chaser Flotilla. On Eeros a naval battery

302

Hour and His Gunurals

has now been manned—I don’t have the caliber yet—and the Leros radio station is ready for deployment, in the Turkish waters, no substantial enemy units were reported yesterday—only some small vessels sailing toward Samos, which might possibly be connected to an evacuation of Samos. (—] In the Black Sea, continuing enemy submarine activity' by 5 subma¬ rines in the northwestern Black Sea and south of the Crimea. Our convoy of 10 Navy ferries left Odessa yesterday with 16 assault guns, 17 trucks and 80 tons of ammunition. That’s 10 Navy ferries. The convoy was at¬ tacked from the air, but unsuccessfully. Tn the Kerch Straits, Navy ferries made contact with the enemy last night. One landing craft was sunk, and another with about 15 men—Russians—was destroyed by coastal batteries. Because of the very bad weather there were only 5 Navy ferries in the south¬ ern part of the Kerch Strait last night. One submarine—Lr 18—sank a freighter of 1,500 GRT off the Caucasus. [—] That is all, my Fiihrer.

Situation in the air BUCHS: During the day yesterday, 100 aircraft flew into the Norwegian area, near Oslo, and attacked Kelle, the local front repair workshop ... and Daimler-Benz. Two hundred high-explosive bombs were dropped, result¬ ing in severe damage—70 to 80% temporarily destroyed. The partial re¬ sumption of work is expected in about a week. Stocks of spare parts suf¬ fered few hits. THE FUHRER: I’ll say something about that in a minute. 1 received an¬ other report. What’s-his-name told me that he was ... in Schwcinfurth ... 60,000 completed ball bearings ... 1 don’t know if they were destroyed or not—because they were still in there/24 It’s left in the factory for a week or a month and is collected on such and such a date. He says we can’t do this with such valuable things. He was, 1 believe, in Suhl and Zella-Mchlis, where there are at least 200 heavy anti-aircraft guns alone. They are standing there completely ready; they will be delivered later. We have to intervene. Buhlc, the things that are completed must leave the factories immediately. We can store them anywhere away from there, wherever they are supposed to go ta We can’t be responsible for these things being destroyed. And do the same with the Luftwaffe. KORTEN: Yes, Sir. Immediately. BUCHS: Twenty bombs on the airfield ...; no damage. The ... jettisoned bombs ... and one freighter was attacked, without causing any damage. Nine aircraft were shot down by fighters. One of our own aircraft was destroyed, and two are missing The only other incidents in the Norwegian area were coastal approaches by individual aircraft. One of them, a Mosquito, was

Military Confurlkcls 1942-1945

303

shot by a Ju 88 at a height of 80 m. In this area during the night there were only nuisance raids. J

THE Ft'HRER: We can’t not let those people fly here anymore. With that kind of flying they’ll never get anywhere. I’ll see that with the Reich Com¬ missioner.82' 1300 IS: In the West... mouth of the Seine ... before this fighter attack ... also railway stations. Two engines damaged. ... by 3 Liberators. One Libera¬ tor shot down. Also only a few approaches during the night in the French area. Bombs were dropped onto the airfield ..., no damages reported. No attacks in this area. [—] Regarding the intrusions into Reich territory,*126 it is reported that a total of 400 to 450 aircraft approached, in two large groups. One northern main group with about 200 aircraft came into the area around Berlin. Only 70 to 80 of the airplanes in this group flew against Berlin itself. Part of the group flew further to the north. Individual attacks were reported near Kremmen ... Greifenberg, about 30 aircraft in the Stettin area. Bombs were dropped on Politz, but nothing was damaged. From Ber¬ lin itself is reported that numerous high-explosive bombs and several thou¬ sand firebombs were dropped ... {Readingaloud.) I reported the individual districts yesterday evening already. About 20 houses destroyed. Then in¬ dustrial damages—mostly fire damage to individual factories ... Public buildings were also hit. Personal losses so far are about 30 dead, the same number of slightly injured, about 900 homeless. [—J The second wave of attacks, with 200 aircraft, flew into the Frankfurt-Mannheim area, and individual aircraft continued on to the Stuttgart—Nuremberg area. This attack, with Mannheim as the main target, was a little stronger than the attack against Berlin; there were about 150 aircraft over the urban area. KORTEN: Turning in like this, approaching from the south, while the other came like this. This here is wrong. BUCHS: It was reported that about 500 to 600 high-explosive bombs were dropped, primarily on the northern part of town, and fairly serious fires were caused in industrial plants. Isolated fire damage ... at Daimler-Benz,as well as the ... stock was hit. Some damage to public buildings. Personal losses were very limited. Reported thus far arc one dead, six injured. In Ludwigshafen itself only very limited damage to houses, and no casualties. [—] There were attacks on the Rhineland-VVestphalia industrial area in three waves—nuisance raids of about 20 Mosquitoes. Bombs were dropped on Essen, Aachen and Dusseldorf. There were no damages except from some minor damage to houses. Our defense was impaired to some degree by the weather. In total, 111 aircraft were deployed, and according to the latest reports 17 confirmed ... 18 confirmed and 10 probable are claimed alto¬ gether. This morning the British admitted to 32 losses. In addition, there

304

Hou r and His G'/iAter ilj

were three emergency landings on Swedish sovereign territory. A few bombs were supposedly dropped on Swedish territory. KORTEN: Here’s what happened here. The weather was so bad that fighter deployment wasn’t worth it. Because of this, those using the “Zahme Sau” [“Tame Sow”]*"

snuck in and flew along as far as Greater Berlin, then

veered off. 1 lere the anti-aircraft fire was very effective. One hundred fight¬ ers had been assembled tor the attack, but because of the bad weather, unfortunately, only a few of them came out. BUCHS: No activity on our part in the western Mediterranean or in Italy because of the bad weather. Limited enemy reconnaissance activity in the area around the front. [—] In the Balkans, two Spitfires attacked the Knin railroad station during the day; one locomotive was damaged. In the Greek area yesterday, there were renewed attacks against our ground organiza¬ tion; over Eleusis there were about 50 four-engines escorted by 15 fight¬ ers, and over Larissa 40 twin-engines with fighter protection. In contrast to the previous attacks, these attacks caused only minor damage. In Larissa two aircraft were damaged and in Eleusis one aircraft. That is partly be¬ cause the fighter defense here apparently prevented the approaching units from dropping their bombs very precisely. Because the bombs were placed very badly—outside the field. Other than that, there were only a few other flights against the islands in the western Greek area. Nineteen reconnais¬ sance aircraft in the area north of Crete. During the night some gang supply. Four aircraft attacked K ...; damages have not been reported yet. Six reconnaissance aircraft north of Crete. Ten aircraft attacked Iraklion; one was shot down by anti-aircraft artillery. [—] The overall weather situa¬ tion in the East has been reported already: this increasing ... current, which is moving along the front here from the south ... will bring a gradual dis¬ persal and ... from the east, and then the frost will arrive ... In the Mediter¬ ranean ... bad weather... also in the Po plain ... in the Reich territory and also in England considerable clearing. Before this layer of fog... dispersing, moving in again during the night, so that gradually on both sides ... activity in the air ... will be made difficult. [—| There are intrusions over the Reich territory now; about 140 aircraft with strong fighter cover have been re¬ ported, approaching there from die south into the Rhineland-Westphalia industrial area. So far, reports have only been received regarding bombs dropped on Bocholt. All aircraft on opposite course again. According to an intercepted English radio message, all bombs are supposed to be jettisoned and the remrn flight should begin. THE FUHRER: It’s the fog. BUCHS: Either on their side or ours. THE FUHRER: They’re supposed to return home?

505

MilIIAK) Co\hH Hi.v C,/• NhKAI.\

(Army Group North Ukraine) ZEITZLER: Tine First Panzer Army (was excellently) supplied,1114 so that the supply ... is ... The army group is against that, of course,... one or two days still ... the First Panzer Army some transport (capacity) [—j THE FUHRER: We must ... also the small roads— ZEITZLER: That they possibly ... everything is occupied. For that rea¬ son the general (command) ... had this sector here up to up above ... there later, we can ... the one German ... pull in again. Then the general command has ... With the First Panzer Army it progressed as planned.

[-] ZEITZLER: He had ... stand near the unification. It is ... front itself under Zhukov111" advanced ... gave orders from here. He sees that... and mixes them up a bit. From down here ... movements up to the north. The attack of the II SS Panzer Corps"

reached here. Right now there’s a detachment

here without fuel. [—] Then I had a ... with the First Panzer Army now ... (Presentation.) The last thing is positive. I had ... considered worse. This didn’t ... Those were small combat groups. THF1 FUHRER: Three panzer divisions ... many. ZEITZLER: The majority is actually still intact |—] ZEITZLER: On this front ... The 100th Jager [Light Infantry] Division had ... very good ... finished early today and is ... come. Also on this front,"1

Friebe" * (actually) advanced quite well (despite the bands) in

these forest areas, which are in here, so we can hope (that the) connection can be made, because they are also pushing forward now. (There) they’ve pushed a front line further forward into this corner now. There are actu¬ ally only bands in here. [—] TI IE FUI1RER: ... received, it would be nearly ... to be able to pull down. ZEITZLER: I ... too, that they deploy down here, ... that they are as¬ sembled so far behind. ... but is because they ... not at the ... get into some kind of mess. KEITEL:They’re always bound to this ... (Army Group Center) ZEITZLER: In Army Group Center’s sector today there is [—] The rail¬ way (fighting) ... Luftwaffe has ... backlog of l7 trains ... otherwise al ways 12 trains ... KORTEN: There ... attack during the night. (Presentation.) The trains come out with difficulty ... during the night, immediately after the attack ... That’s the additional second attack then ... result. There we can sav that J

>rhtlrn

MilII ^K) Co\hH

Hi.\

C.i \t H Ai

\

(THE FUHRER): ... lined up. Inhere are ... (GUDERIAN):... the Vistula_at Corps Detachment Ea ... hold against it tight away. [—] There’s nothing in the bridgehead yet. It’s still quiet there. Then here there were attacks against the SS “T,” \TotenkopfSS Panzer Divi¬ sion] 1332 at the intersection between the SS “T” and the Viking. So far noth ing in particular. [—] In Warsaw progress has been made. ’ WENCK: That’s the old map—and here’s the new one. GUDERIAN: The comparison of both battle territories shows that quite good progress was made. TI IE ELI 1RER: This here is the most important. GUDERIAN: The bank is in our hands now. WENCK: Probably this part, too. FEGELE1N: That’s the central part of Warsaw, (according) to the acnal view. (Presentation.) WENCK: That was the ghetto. (THE FUHRER: That has) been eliminated now? (FEGELEIN): ... as such already everything1' 4 ... (GUDERIAN: I had an) officer there; he came back yesterday (and reported a) high level of absenteeism among the officers and (sergeants). (FEGELEIN: Especially) the non-commissioned officer problem is verv (urgent. We still have) men but no commanders—very few non-commis¬ sioned officers, in particular. The relation of troop absence to non-commissioned officers is about 2 to 1. So we urgently need sergeants. GUDERIAN: The house to house combat costs us a lot of sergeants. If the officers and sergeants don’t lead out, the men don’t follow. FEGELEIN: A change will come when Viking really [—] GUDERIAN: My Fiihrer, T had already suggested putting the Viking in down here. FEGELEIN: The blocking lines arc blocked off toward the south— Makotow—the)' won’t come through anymore—with an air force unit or anything else. THE FUHRER: We get the impression that (nothing is leaking) through into the city from outside. (...?):... they take after the round ... (...?):... the current picture. That will be ... to totally eliminate ... (GUDERIAN): East night they (tried to establish contact). But they (failed). FEGELEIN: We’re having difficulties taking all the housing blocks down, my Fiihrer. GUDERiAN: It costs us a lot of ammunition. FEGELEIN: Therc’s hardly anything left standing there. THE FIIHRER: Here, where things arc really burned out, wc should really use the T.uftwaffe—they can drop mines and destroy the whole thing then.

Military Coxylrlkcls

1942-1945

473

FEGELEIN: For rhe ghetto, my Fiihrer, it took us half a year in those days, 1 think.1335 THE FUHRER: Look at the towns in our country here, where mines are dropped. When the houses are burned out they aren’t strong anymore. They’re only walls standing there, which can be taken down immediately by the mines. I low many mines do we have? 8 or 10 thousand? (KREIPE): I don’t know the exact number in stock. ... probably. (GUDERIAN: He also made) small advances here. ... with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which ... has. ... penetratk >n, which is bl< >cked off ... up to C< rnrland ... conveyances, so that with ... count on, with renewed ... THE FUHRER: What about the Hungarian cavalry division here? GUDERIAN: We wanted to pull out a division that had proven itself up here in the area of the Fourth Army—the 542nd [Infantry Division]— and relieve it with a new formation that’s arriving now; and then relieve the Viking and the Hungarian cavalry division with the reliable 542nd. Both

will work. The cavalry division has only a relatively small sector there. We will manage both of them. In this way, wrc can bring a battle-experienced young division in here. The Viking will get a quick refitting behind the front in the territory south of Warsaw; and can then relieve the Hungar¬ ians, so the Hungarian cavalry division will be free. The transportation of both the reserve divisions and reserve corps is in process. The I lungarians have no particular value to us anymore. [—J (Then), up here, there were no unusual battle actions. (The enemy has) ... gotten closer again ... with some parts. It is ... successful. I lere also a ... shortening of the front by ... Colonel General Reinhardt ... that the entire march ... and not toward the north, ... the opinion that he ... As consequence, die ... Army Group North with General Kleffell3V> ... reported on it yesterday. [—] Here we succeeded in pulling out the majority of the 7th Panzer Division, which we’ll initially have prepared as a reserve. Here in the panzer divisions of the XXXIX and XXXX [Panzer] Corps, some of the tanks have been taken back behind the front for repairs and renovations. Those divisions’ fronts are quite extended, though, and therefore very weak from an infan¬ try perspective. Artillery ammunition was all that could be put in up there. The artillery battle has been initiated as much as possible. [—] Here we have a considerable deployment in depth with Group Kleffel. Everything has been done—considering our circumstances at least, and the condi¬ tions in the East—that could be done, according to our best judgment, to prepare the defense for the upcoming attack.1’3" THE FUHRER: Guderian, we need (a success) here. It’s very important today. That is (decisive). (GUDERIAN): ... especially today, my Fiihrer.

474

Hni j k axi> Hi.v G/• ,\hhai \

(T1IK HUIIRER: 1 don’t) care at all. We have to (become active again), ... that (we take hold of the law of action) again. And 1 still see the possibility of success in it, that we (actually) ... take position. (GUDERIAN): '1 "hat’s why (I’ve) initially forbidden that ... be used in an attack against the Russian assembly area east of Stockmannshof. That would be of no use. THE FUHRER: That would be of no use. We should let them get going and see what happens there. If they suffocate and keep lying there them¬ selves, then it’s like this, according to Schbrner’s ™ judgment: the infan¬ try—the commander of the infantry regiment of the 20th Panzer Grena¬ dier Division,133’ who was just in there, also told me this yesterday—the infantry is bad, so awful that the men somehow turn around, and if thev don’t have tanks, they run away immediately, bo that’s bad. It may not be like that in general, though. Of course, this is different. They also have motor¬ ized units. GUDERIAN: They also have good ones. THE FU11RER: Those are the better units. GUDERIAN: But up here, in Schdrncr’s opinion ... was actually also ... that the division ... will be squeezed in... first lets itself get picked off. (THE FUHRER): ... isn’t enough either. These ... if we want to get rid of them ... They must be well ... decisive, that we ... this thing ... GUDERIAN; That’s the precondition. THE FUHRER: Maybe we can make a surprise movement and get in the rear of this whole thing,1340 and obtain what’s necessary for the panzer divisions again: open territory, so they can be employed in their own ele¬ ment. Tf this were to turn out well it would provide relief there anyway. I le would be forced then to bring in units from up there. He doesn’t have anything else here. GUDERIAN: We still have something: the 6th Panzer Division, which is located behind the front of the Second Army. THE FUHRER: I would take this one here, too, if there’s something here. GUDERIAN: If that happens, and the thing remains (solid) down there, we can also get the 6th up here. THE FUHRER: Then we can bring it up here as well. (GUDERIAN): ... I would leave it. (THE FUHRER): ... of course, here a total ... (GUDERIAN): ... had a defensive success, ... maybe even very ... (THR FUHRER): ... must ... the Grossdeutschland ... GUDERIAN: The Grossdeutschlandat least. Possibly the 6th from below up here. THE FUHRER: The 6th and maybe also the 5th Panzer Division, because the 5th is still relatively good with regard to the number of tanks.

MilIIAto Co\hH\hi RH\c:h.\ 1942-1945

523

TI lit FU1 IRER: The “VB” has commented on this Finnish Ministry of the Interior statement in the most idiotic way. Look at this. DIETRICH: 1 only read the first one yesterday, my Ftihrer, in the Sunday evening paper. THE FUHRER: That one is good. DIETRICH: That was because of your order The “VB” [editor] did it him¬ self, before he read this. THE FUHRER: That doesn’t matter. It is childish. They can repeat that. But even better [—] DIETRICII: Yes, Sir. Then we will do that.14 "' S'outcast again JODL: The Second Panzer Army has, for the most part, taken this moun¬ tain pass posilion; also now in ihe center, with the XV Corps, where (he last units have fought through from Drnis1499 to Knin. On these passes the front is blocked oft" to the west. Nothing out of the ordinary has happened in Croatia or the area around Agram. Finland In Finland it was reported this morning that these Russians and Finns have actually been united stardng from Ivalo. Not the Russians but the Finns are pursuing along the road to Varanger Fjord.111111 THE ELI IRER: News is now coming from Finland—and not from us anymore, bur from other sources—that the resistance in Finland is really starting to organize. The disbanding of the White Guards: they'd have refused that; they couldn’t allow themselves to be disarmed. The statements of the Minister of the Interior arc to be understood in this context. They certainly did have their reasons. This worsening mood didn’t appear out of nowhere. I am convinced that clever propaganda should be able to subvert this.1501 JODL: If wc come here now, and if wc stand here, and they might likely be forced to attack here—the Finns—then I think it might be possible—if we might possibly undertake a counterattack in winter—that we could, in con¬ junction with the propaganda, cause this to be disbanded. THE FUHRER: We should really set up a Finnish Free Corps within our own forces.1'" and they should make an appeal. We shouldn’t make it; they should. JODE: No pressure at all on the XIX Mountain Corps. The 6th Mountain Division has withdrawn to here. THE FUHRER: That’s very surprising

524

Hnu

k axi)

His

('.i xi h ai s

JODL: I le doesn’t push here; at the moment it is only the Finns. I lere there’s no particular pressure. The 6th Mountain Division with its spearhead is moving over to (Narvik) with its motorized units. The majority of the 6th Mountain Division is marching up here to the Lyngen Fjord.Hl> THE FUHRER: They don’t have the vehicles for transportation. JODL: Tire Navy doesn’t have vehicles yet. THF. FUHRF.R: By columns. Are there vehicles there? JODL: With vehicles, that might work. They do it more intensely here, my Fuhrcr. But 1 believe we’ll be in time, because the demands on the Navy are quite high at the moment. The 560l1i has to transport them. Up here they have transport vessels as well, because they’re taking out the wounded and everything else, and obviously have to deploy heavily while clearing the coastal batteries. But this is being hurried along as much as possible. THF FUHRF.R: And this is the 2nd [Infantry Division]? JODL: The 2nd has now reached Porsanger Fjord. The 163rd [Infantry Division] is at the border and the 169th [Infantry Division] north of Ivalo.1504 (Presentation.) This is another overview of the battery clearings. The red bat¬ teries have been destroyed, the violet ones have been cleared or arc being cleared right now, and of the violet ones, which arc dismanded up here, these green ones have been build up again already. One can sec that these batteries here arc still ready for action. They’re being dismanded. THF. FUHRF.R: A green one has been builr up here? JODL: Yes, indeed. One has been builr up there! Bur that can only he a mobile one. Because it won’t stay. That was there where they brought a battalion in as well. THF FUHRER: Where is the Tirpiljf™ VOSS: Here! THE FUHRER: Couldn’t we bring something more over here? JODL: A new one just arrived there. THE FUHRER: On this island. This one is most at risk; there’s no doubt about it. VOSS: Tomorrow morning 1 will get another map of the Navy batteries, my Fuhrcr. Maybe wc can put this aside until tomorrow. THE FUHRER: So he evades the heaviest Navy batteries. I am convinced he will give the 40-cm batteries a wide berth. Smdm JODL: I have confirmed this press report from Stockholm about rhe pur¬ suit onto Swedish territory of a Norwegian man with wife and child; the following was reported. It was quite far to the south—here is Oslo—it was in this location. Tt is more or less correct.1'’"'' (Presentation!)

Military CoxmRusctis 1942-1945

525

THE FU1 IRF.R: We have to give a very clear order now. |ODL: It’s doubtful that it’s necessary to punish someone. THE FUHRFR: Don’t punish anyone! JODL: That wouldn’t make any sense. And the other question up there, about this straw—that comes next—that seems exaggerated. (Presentation.) Tl IE FIJI IRER: Violation of neutrality of the Finns; Sweden: building up a Norwegian corps.1*'" JODL: Up there we are in a region where nobody knows where the border is. So this will be a regular request; that’s why we will get an official from the Foreign Office.1508 THE Fi HRER: Do you know what I feel? 1 personally have the feeling that the Swedes will take this as an opportunity to bring up reinforcements themselves. They won’t be bringing up the reinforcements because of us, though, but because of the Russians. But they are afraid to declare this officially.1509 That’s why they come here and say we took a small heap of straw. That’s the whole reason. That’s why they’re moving a division up here. We should say this calmly, “They should not be so cowardly about why they’re coming up here.” We should say it quite openly. Wouldn’t that be the best wray? Talk to your minister, and see if it wouldn’t be best to w rite calmly in the press that they’re planning to bring some divisions up here, and they motivate this by a tnan having taken some hay from a Swed¬ ish barn. They should not be so cow'ardly and should just admit that they’re afraid of the Russians.1510 West JODI.: Concerning the situation in France: this corps is still dispersing around—Hertogenbosch and is pulling forces—the 15th—probably in the direction of Nijmegen and Arnhem, and the 7th Division in the direction of the bridgehead at Venlo, where the attacks have increased significantly. THE FUHRFR: The bridges at Mocrdijk have been blowm up? |ODL: The bridges at Moerdijk have been blown up, although the bridge¬ head is still holding; it’s been pushed in at one place here, and also here, but the bridges are gone. Here the counterattack made quite good progress. Some of the Americans—including parts of the 28th American [Infantry] Division, which is new*—have been cut off here and encircled.1'" THE FOHRER: This is Steinhoff, or w'hat’s his name? JODU Schmidt, the one with the ... transport movements,1512 in spite of the unbelievably strong aLtacks, have been quite good, so the 272nd [In¬ fan tn:] Division w'ith 30 trains is there. The 9th Mortar Brigade is approach¬ ing and will reach the region of (Diiren) on the 7th. The 12th Volksgrenadier

526

Hitler and His Generals

Division has arrived with 6 trains, and the 212th [Infantry Division] is here— it departed from East Prussia, from Lotzen—with 8 trains arriving on the 7th. Twenty-two trains are there from the 25th Volksgrenadier Division. The 277th |lnfantry Division] will arrive here between November 7 and 18. Of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division, 14 trains have arrived. From the 401st Volksartillerie [Peoples Artillery] Corps, 3 trains have arrived. From the 708th [Infantry] Division, the first trains will arrive on the 7th, having departed with 7 trains from Slovakia. [—] The plans of the Commander-inChief West have arrived now. [—] Then another [formation], the 401st Ar¬ tillery Corps, which has arrived with 3 trains, will come in here. Here in Middelburg—on an island in a town with 30,000 men—is a group of some hundred Germans, mainly supply troops. " 1 THE FUHRER: With 30,000 men? JODL: Thirty' thousand inhabitants. THE FUHRER: You said: with 30,000 men. JODL: With 30,000 inhabitants. There are about a hundred soldiers facing fire from all sides. It must be quite chaotic in the city; The forces down here are still partly holding here and here, and a group here. The battery was even taken again, but it has been lost again. No entry into the Schelde [Estuary] yet. But in the mouth of the Schelde there is minesweeper activity.1514 [—] In the area of the Fifteenth Army, this westernmost corner post, near Willemstad at the mouth of the Rhine, was pushed in during the course of the concentric attack against the 346th [Infantry] Division along this road and along the eastern road. The attack against the bridgehead in front of the Mocrdijk bridges, against the 711th [Infantry] Division, has pushed back the west wing. The bridgehead is still holding. The heavy equipment has been pulled back. THE FUHRER: That’s good. JODL: And not by using the bridges—but they [the bridges] weren’t being used even before, because they had continuous artillery fire. So it didn’t make any sense to keep them. Otherwise an explosive charge or cable might have been shot through. [—] Then the bridgehead of-—Hertogenbosch has been pushed back by an attack, mainly from the southwest, but also from the south. [—] Here the situation is more difficult at the moment, because the crossing—the bridge was destroyed beforehand—didn’t go as smoothly as here, because of the strong waves. May be the ferries here are not as good. So here it seems that not all the equipment is safe yet. Consequently, a counterattack was led by the 712th Division to gain time. [—] Then the opponent attacked our small bridgehead again. But we held him off, and he was thrown back again by a counterattack. [—] There’s very heavy artil¬ lery fire here. It’s starting to get livelier. There’s nothing more down to Aachen,

Military ConferiiXces 1942-1945

527

except a very strong sudden concentration of fire against the 3rd Panzer Grena¬ dier Division, with 10,000 rounds impacting in their sector. THE FUHRER: Against the 5th or the 3rd? JODL: Against the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division. That means that here our movements toward the front have been crushed. But 10,000 shots were fired against this sector of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division. The penetra¬ tion area around Germeter looks like tliis: the 116th Panzer Division look Vossenack, then came up over these hills here into the area south of Vossenack, then turned to the south and connected with the regiment of the 89th [Infantry Division]. That cut off the American forces here in KommerscheidL151'’ Then down here some of our bases are still holding THK FUHRKR: Anyway, here’s a whole [—] JODL: Here it’s blocked off. THE FUHRER: Here’s a group of bunkers. JODL: Here’s the connection. [—] Tlus is to the south on the next map. THE FU1IRER: Where’s the atlas? (presentation of the maps of the Western Wall.) JODL: On November 4 and 5, there were 63 VI launches with 5 failures and 14 V2 launches on Antwerp. |—| No changes along the whole front. It is still just the American V Corps, with thin occupation; there are about four divisions in the whole corps sector.1516 THE FUHRER: Which sector is it? |ODL: From here up to south of Monschau. It’s not entirely clear if this is the 4th [Infantry] Division. Here’s the 2nd [Tnfantry] Division and the 8th [Infantry] Division. THE FUHRER: So it’s 60 or 70 km as the crow flies. Each division has 20 km. JODL: Nothing has changed with regard to the occupation. On the other hand, there have been new attacks from the region south of Luxembourg against our combat outposts south of the Moselle [River]. They were at¬ tacked suddenly and quite fiercely. In one place there was very difficult close combat around these small villages. Three tanks were destroyed. In the end, he threw the combat outposts back over the Moselle, and the southernmost bridgehead was given up. This could be preparation for an attack north of Diedenhofen, or maybe it’s only cover for this area. Maybe he just felt uncom¬ fortable using this as the starting point for an easier reconnaissance in depth. [—] In the region of Metz nothing new has come up. The divisions here are quite numerous. No immediate preparations for attack can be identified yet.15r THE FUHRER: Twenty km per division! JODL: The left wing of the First Army hasn’t been attacked anymore. The Nineteenth Army is fighting [—] THE FUHRER: One can only imagine, if we consider our own propor¬ tions: the attack against Verdun at that time took place with 7 divisions on a front of ... km. Here there arc ... divisions on 11 km.

52S

HiriJ K AM) Hl.\ GkNkRAIA

JODI.: There were never more than 3 battalions in the first wave. THE FtHRER: Very close to each other—it was practically a division every 2 or 2Vi km. JODI.: The Nineteenth Army has faced some quite lively battles. One was around Raon l’Etapc, where our counterattack threw the enemy back to the edge of the forest west of Raon l’Etape. The other group was at St. Die. This forest block held there as well, and a breakthrough further to the south was thrown back during a counterattack. Two or three battalions attacked here, so almost a regiment’s strength. The attacks around here were weaker but recurring. THE FOHRER: What happened here? JODL: Here a small breakthrough was eliminated. | ] The attacks in bat talion strength from the southeast against Gcrardmcr were weaker, but repeated six times. But they were driven back. Down here the French are keeping rather quiet. The only group still fighting here is the 2nd French Armored Division. [NDT: 2nd DB] THE FUHRER: They’re very harsh, though. Also the statement by dc Gaulle. I le shouldn’t be so impertinent—not so impudent!1’1* JODL: 1 think 1 reported tills yesterday already—this thrust at La Rochelle. THE FUHRER: He shouldn’t forget that they’ve been defeated! Even more amazing is the impudence of Herr Franco.1’1' HF.WF.L: Tandy! We don’t need to do anything. KEITEL: He really deserved it. HEWEL: He deserved it. TI IE FLU 1RER: One always counts on the decency of others. KEITEL: I’m surprised he wasn’t struck dumb—to even say something like this! THE FUHRER: What would he do now if we said that the thing only failed back then because we weren’t willing to relinquish our colonial clause, and we made the agreement with Pctain out of loyalty and only under the condition that the French |—]’’2)c J|
1. JODL: But there was nothing here—only a few minor posts. THE FUHRER: Is this in our hands now? JODL: Forstfeld, yes.

602

Hnu ii and His Glwrals

THR FUHRER: |—] ZIMMERMANN: On the 12th—the day after tomorrow—early in the morning, with at least a reinforced regimental group. Whatever can come in will be allocated there. JODL: Forty-seven trains are on their wav; 14 were there last night.

H JODL: There’s not much in there; on the edges, of course, there arc some fighter commandos.s THE FUHRER: It’s probably full inside; they’ve mined everything there. JODL: ... made a mess, but nothing else. He needs all that for the batde now. ZIMMERMANN: There are four to five tanks that appear, and he pushes them forward on the roads where he’s received a report THE FUHRER: Can’t we at least still bring the one platoon here to the attack? JODL: ... both Iluntcr Tigers, yes. THE FUHRER: It doesn’t matter how many there are. There may be two or three bunkers, but they can hold something like that But if we have I lunter Tigers there in front, it’s possible that we might be able to break through [—] It will be a similar story here ... There’s nothing in the rest of the sector anyway? JODL: It’s quiet on the rest of the front. [—] That was after the situation report at four. He has to cover the withdrawal of the forces there, of course, and spread out over the whole front.

[—] TI IE FUHRER: One thing T have to say. Himmler has done very well with the few minor actions he has undertaken. He has investigated everything very well. JODL: The transfer of the XIV Corps was well prepared. That was in coor¬ dination with the la [operations officer] of the 553rd, who is very good.1699 According to reports from my General Staff officer who was there, the transfer across the Rhine was a textbook transfer. It was like a peacetime river crossing—admittedly without resistance. But still, a Rhine crossing is a matter that requires some engineering and technical ability. Italy THE FCHRER: Italy? JODL: There were no battles in Italy Although the weather improved and the aerial activity increased again yesterday, ... According to the available reports, it appears as follows here: this whole area ...

MttJ7>mr

CoNFimiixais 1942-1945

603

TKE FUHRER: But he can conie in here later, through these canals? |—] Or how is it? Can wc even determine what we have available there now, and what kind of forces we can count on? JODI,: Two heavy antitank guns, two Nashdrner [Rhinoceros],17""1 and a regiment of the 114th Jagcr Division is coming in here now. In total there are 17 light field howitzers employed in two detachments—one to sweep the front, another detachment to sweep the ... That will now be reinforced by the 114th Jagcr Div ision, which is coming over, and by five ..., which will also be brought over here. Then the Navy is there ... with two torpedo boats standing by, various motor torpedo boats ..., to step in if any landings arc attempted. The Southeast There was a small operation near |the island of] Rhodes. A sailing vessel appeared here—escorted by three destroyers—which wanted to land on Alimnia, but it was sunk by antitank guns there. Then 20 to 30 persons, probably from the destroyer, landed on Calchi, which is not occupied by us.1[—| Tonight Prijepolje will probably be cleared out by the rear guard. At the end there are now two regiments of the 22nd (Infantry Division] and 966th Fortress Brigade. The third regiment of the 22nd Division is march¬ ing in the direction of Viscgrad. The previous rear guard, Combat Group Steyrer,1 112 is approaching Sarajevo and will then be disbanded. The fortress battalions will join other divisions. |—| No particular action here. After this situation here... fairly ... we left a regiment of the 7th SS Mountain Divi¬ sion as an occupation force.

H THE FUHRER: Have you heard that the Fifth Bulgarian Army was dis¬ banded? It was announced over the radio—because of the total unreliability of the officer corps and the men.

H JODI.: ... reinforce parts of a regiment of the 11th Air Force Field Divi¬ sion ... Cossacks located ..., without leading to larger-scale combat ac¬ tion. [—] The report about the lining up of these two regiments hasn’t yet arrived, and there was no fighting here in the whole area of Bihac. There have been reports in the inner circles regarding a few cases of unreliability in the Ustasi units; two companies disobeyed, left the position, and ... marched off.

604

Hitler a.\p His Gentsrmjs

West again

Here I have another overview of the artillery, my Fiihrer. (Presentation.) First, these are the lengths of the fronts, if you include the coast of the Netherlands: 1,175 against 1,800 km.: ' With regard to fortress artillery we are relatively good, with 1,145 guns against 1,062 in the East. But most of these are positioned at the front and on the coast. This here is a second security' line, where the fortress batteries are standing. In the Army artil¬ lery, without mortars, we have 51 1/3 motorized detachments against 94 in the East. We’re somewhat better in the immobile or partially mobile category: 41 against 15. [—] This is the observation artillery. It is much stronger in the East: 39 observation detachments against 13. The assault artillery in the East is also considerably stronger, with 31 detachments against 11. THE FUHRER: Yes. Now, this is not decisive. The critical question is: What is being fired by the Russians, per German round? ... That, of course, gives a different picture.

H JODI.: ... will be done by the end of the month, ... the entire division won’t be there before the 24th. THE FUHRER: It’s unfortunate that they’re coming so late. Those are two divisions that we could send to the East. Sweden

JODL: ... Sweden’s entry into the war on the other side.1 114 THE FUHRER: ... JODL: 1 don’t think it’s likely either. The preparations, of course, would include blocking the Small Belt completely, and possibly pushing up north near Narvik to a more favorable position. But that has its advantages and disadvantages. Should we make special preparations? THE FUHRER: No. JODL: I believe it will happen the way the statement indicates at present. HEWEL: Here’s the report on the Swedish/Scandinavian issue. (Presenta¬ tion.)

JODL: They would become allies of Russia, then. The same direction ... we can think about it, but I don’t believe anything more is necessary cither. GORING: It is the intellectual left-wing circles ... but they have concerns about them. ... l70S

H

Miisiary Conferexces 1942-1945

605

Situation in the air

BUCHS: My Fuhrer! There are no particular reports from the Reich area or the West or East, because of bad weather. The delivery of supplies to Budapest was only possible with very limited forces, because of the bad weather.1 116 Yesterday 39 aircraft were employed during the day; 22 of them reached the target, including four Ju 52s that landed. |—| Regarding the weather situation: the center of a low-pressure area is currently over Germany. There is only limited cloud cover but extensive banks of fog and high fog, which, in the course of the day, only burned off in a few places, especially in the West. It cleared up today in the upper Rhine area, in the south of Germany, and in the Po [River] plain, because the temperature on the ground ... Tn northern Ttaly it’s minus 16 degrees. THE FUHRER: In northern Italy minus 16 degrees, in Kbnigsbcrg minus 3 degrees, and in I lammerfest probably minus 1 degree. The East

[-1 HERMANI1707: No action in the area of the Second Panzer. The 118th lager Division has taken over the sector of the 3rd Combat Brigade, which was relieved with the rest. One detachment has been ordered to stay down below. The tank battle continues north of Szekesferhervar [Stuhlweissen burg]. This morning there were attacks again from the south against Sarkeresztes and the salient west of Patka. So far this morning, four tanks had been destroyed. I haven’t been able to find out about our own tank losses yet. Here 70 tanks were seen by ground observation.1’ ' We are mak¬ ing a counterattack against a hill that was lost here. The attack against the Waldgebirge [Forest Mountains] is gaining ground again, against stiff op¬ position. New here is an attack against the whole front at Bicske, Zsambek and Dag; it was driven back. The operation yesterday evening, to break through to Budapest [from the southwest] ... has met with strong antitank resistance ... Prisoners confirmed the presence of the 93rd Guards Rifle Division, which was previously up here at Lacenes, and which has now obviously been pulled down to here. THE FUHRER: So there will be a rest pause up there [south of Esztergom]?!

H THE FUHRER: But that makes no sense! HERMANI: ... but hasn’t started yet. THE FOHRER: Absolutely useless! Three days have now been wasted here, while we go on hoping, when we’ve run into a barrier—while the enemy is

606

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS

steadily adding reinforcements and we're not getting any stronger — that some miracle will enable us to advance. HERMANI: He managed to ... not only the road, but also both of these ... [— ] The situation at the Budapest bridgehead is very serious. Here's where the attacks against the Eastern front took place. {Presentation.) Because there's no place to land, the supply is very strained, and an airfield absolutely must be built up I have a city map of 1 :25,000, which we can use today to review the blocks of houses that have been lost, my Fiihrer. (Presentation) This is a fortification on the outskirts of town; it's not shown on the map because the map unfortunately doesn't reach that far. That was the position on January 8, and this morning we got a radio message with the position of the current main battle line. I drew it in quickly here. The occupying forces are pushed together in this area. THE FUHRER: There's no airfield there anymore. HERMANI: No. there's no airfield anymore. [ — ] I'd like to present figures that the Russian Army reported regarding the battle in the Budapest area: "several residential areas" were taken on December 30,1944, "several residential areas" on December 31,1944, and from January 1 to 8 — taken together — 1,761 [city] blocks.... the outer suburb.1709 It is generally correct, while in detail. I just received a radio message about the daily report from yesterday, which says: ... heaviest defensive battles at the eastern bridgehead because of the shortening of the main battle line ... led to deep penetrations ... heavy street fighting and sustained . . . heavy casualties on both sides; on the western bridgehead sudden concentrations of fire. [ — ] The supply situation forces us to be extremely economical. Air supply ... up to now 3 tons in the castle .. . from the ship, which is on the Danube ... food secured ... How it came to that, 1 don't know either. [ — ] THE FUHRER: How long is this here, anyway? HERMANI: The scale is 1 :25,000.1710 KEITEL: One centimeter equals 3 kilometers. HERMANI: Yes, that's 3 kilometers. THE FUHRER: Is this ice? HERMANI: There's ice on the Danube, yes. THE FUHRER: That's too bad! This is 1,5 kilometers. Can you land a seaplane on 1,5 kilometers? GORING: Yes, it depends, my Fiihrer THE FUHRER: With the Ju!?

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

607

GORING: We've landed on the Danube with a Ju before. CHRISTIAN: In principle it needs only... with heavy bombs ... GORING: But the area is very short,... JODL: Now, Guderian has developed this idea1711 — HERMANI: General Wenck will come this evening The Colonel General has just spoken with the Fiihrer — he called him. JODL: — the idea to go to the west bank and then get more space up here to create an airfield. THE FUHRER: Impossible! All these airfields are just ideas that can't be employed because every location is under artillery fire. JODL: I don't know if the idea was developed internally. THE FUHRER: It doesn't matter who had the idea, but every airfield ..., which is not set back 4 to 5 kilometers,... When they fire on it with mortars, they can't land; it is impossible. They see every plane that arrives at night, ... CHRISTIAN: The report from yesterday, which claimed that four aircraft landed — I don't know where — must be confirmed. THE FUHRER Perhaps they landed on the troop training ground. HERMANI: That was here on the ... CHRISTIAN: Here it was still possible yesterday. [ — ] THE FUHRER: Could you find out what's happening with the ice floes here? If the ice is breaking up, nothing will work — that is clear — but it could be that the ice is not flowing. [ — ] We don't have light planes or anything like that? [ — ] GORING: But we do that with the piggy-back plane,1712 too. THE FUHRER: Yes, and do we have gliders? GORING: We have gliders. THE FUHRER: Gliders — they could land. There are enough of them. GORING: We brought them in quickly. They were in Graz. THE FUHRER Gliders can always land. GORING: They could certainly land here. THE FUHRER: There are countless places for gliders. They're the only ones. Send the gliders here at once — all that we have! GORING: There are areas here and here for gliders. They just have to avoid the tall houses. THE FUHRER: Gliders can go anywhere. If worst comes to worst, we could land them on streets like one — Andrassy [street], [ — ] How wide are the gliders? GORING: That varies. THE FUHRER: They have to open up a street like Andrassy, by tearing out the streetlights and everything. [ — ]

608

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS

GORING: But a glider is always more or less lost. CHRISTIAN: He has 200 gliders. THE FUHRER: (How much will they carry? [— ] One ton?) CHRISTIAN: One ton, yes. [— ] CHRISTIAN:... but actually only in limited numbers. GORING: We still have them, but I always say: if something is broken, adjustment a half year later it comes ..., when we need it. THE FUHRER: For gliders I don't need a lot of stuff. GORING: No, that's not a major concern. The Hitler Youth do it. The Hitler Youth have gliders at their schools. THE FUHRER: And then we don't risk the expensive tow planes. GORING: No, they release. THE FUHRER: They will float down in the night. WEISS: There is a parade ground below the castle — 800 meters long as smooth as glass ..., open area ... landing and starting again. THE FUHRER: Gliders can definitely get in?! WEISS: We'll have to examine it again, to be sure. THE FUHRER: We have to try everything, anyway! [ — ] HERMANI: Right now there are attacks here. GORING: You know that area, Weiss? WEISS: Yes, Herr Reichsmarshal. In the spring I saw it with General Schmundt — I drove there. At least one regiment was being drilled on it. It's as smooth as glass. There are no barracks or .. . JODL: I'm familiar with it, too. It's the best anyway, because the castle is right next to it, with all the cellars. GORING: I can confirm it with a radio message. WEISS: It is very easy to find; it's below the castle. GORING: The castle protects it from the wind, which is very good. [ — ] Could you arrange for that whole area to be cleared of every obstacle — trenches, etc., so that it's leveled off? THE FUHRER: Flak is definitely [— ] CHRISTIAN: I'd like to report the following. We have gliders in four locations: in the southeastern area around Iinz and Weis — they have already been ordered here, but the others are in Wittstock, and they must be driven to southern Germany ... THE FUHRER: At first we can use those that are in the East already; the others will be brought by train, by priority transport.1713 [ — ] They don't have much there, so it would be good if they were actually to get the Tiger detachment brought in in for the attack, because there's no sense in having Tigers, etc., here! [ — ] HERMANI: At least you can drive them around.

MnSTAfCi

C'ONFERIiXCES

1942-1945

609

THE FCHRER: And further north? HERMANI: North of the Danube [River], the 20th Panzer Division began its attack early this morning and pushed through to Ogyalla. Another group from the 20th Panzer Division is attacking Perpeto. Parts of the 208th [In¬ fantry Division] that pushed ahead from Komoram [Komorn] forced an enemy tank group to turn away. We took Naszdav and Imely yesterday. They are attacking further to the southeast now. An attack—which has been held off thus far—against the front of the 211th [Volksgrcnadier Division], which has built up a blocking front again, ... At this time there are enemy attacks against Kurt from the southeast and east. THE ITTHRER: It’s a mystery where rlais guy brings these tanks from again. [—] But here there’s a very strong relief attack. HERMANI: In the Eighth Army area, only battles near (Putna); Putna has been lost again. Attacks to the east of it were driven back ... an attack against the Hungarian 16th [Infantry Division] was driven back. Here there was a small penetration, down there. Apart from that, no battle action here ... our anti-aircraft fire in this area was very good, according to a radio report. ... should be taken out after the reconnaissance mission |—[ GORING: And that we bring as many troops in there as possible, or there’s no point to it! 11ERMANI: We also found out by aerial reconnaissance that there are two ice bridges here, eight ice crossings here and twelve here. ... [—] Reinforce¬ ments are being brought to the Magnuszew bridgehead, where there is also mine-clearing activity, according to radio intelligence. [—| Army Group Center reports no combat action. Here, according to prisoners’ reports, tank bridges are also being built over the second trench, anil artillery is being pulled forward over the ice. Orders have been given to lay mines in the Romint Heath area, according to a radio report. Here north of the Romint Heath, again according to aerial reconnaissance, is a concentration of artillery—about 170 guns per kilometer. That is a confirmation of what was reported as 150 guns a few days ago. Otherwise, no batdes or other incidents. GORING: Could you send a few more tanks? I would suggest Grossdeutschiand [Panzer Corps] first. That division has only 36 Panzer IVs instead of 81, only 45 Panzer Vs instead of 79, and instead of 42 assault guns—that’s not bad—only 32, and onlv 18 ... instead of 45. THE FtlHRER: I believe they an: being added continually, as far as I know. In any case, Thomale recently said again that they are being added all the time.

H THE FOHRER: Just imagine—there is division after division there! That can’t continue long term.

610

Hnu.R and His GenizRaui

KEITEL: .. . what kind of organization of forces the East still has [—) I read it, toa THE FOHRER: It can’t be any other way. KEITEL: Artillery has held up quite well, but some of the numbers, includ¬ ing heavy weapons, have been reduced considerably. TI IE FCHRF.R: It can’t be done any other way. Then his combat strength is also |—] he does it for two or three days, then the action will end. KEITEL: Average combat strength: 5,000 men. IIERMANI: From the 31st |Infantry| Division, two ships have left.1714 JODL: In contrast to the attacks in Russia itself, the force of the attacks here has weakened significantly. He never attacks anywhere with [—] TI IE FIJI IRFR: But the normal division—only with 10,000 men ... would be

120,000 men. If you take the total, it would be 360,000 men. Of those,

he doesn’t have 130,000 men here—more than 1 million men ... he doesn’t have at all. Those look like Chinese divisions. [—] Is Wenck coming this evening? [—] I am always horrified when I hear something about having to retreat somewhere in order to be able to “operate.” I’ve seen it for two years, and it always leads to disastrous results. {Presentation: Incendiary shrap¬ nel am munition, February 1944' '*) Armament issues “Smoke trail”? I don’t know how to assess it. I don’t know how they desig¬ nate “smoke trails” as victories in aerial combat. Are they all counted?1"16 BUHLE: No, they’re not counted—only these confirmed numbers. Wher¬ ever it says, “smoke trail,” it wasn’t counted. This is the Luftwaffe report from that time. THE FUHRER: I just saw this column—I hadn’t seen it before. KEITEL: Thaf’s the number that produces the total here. BUHLE: And there are 25 smoke trails in addition to those. THE FUHRER: One aircraft shot down with every 205 rounds—that would be huge, of course. It would already be a lot if we could get an aerial victoryafter 1,000 rounds, because that would mean for every million rounds only 1,000 aerial victories [—] BUHLE: Ten times what it is now. GORING: One thousand would also be a good result. BUHLE: The current average is such that altogether we ... without those that are shot down in training, ... only one aircraft shot down per 10,000 rounds, ... to bring down an aircraft.1717 THE FUHRER: We should deploy them where real mass attacks are made. The way they are used now, it’s hard to get a clear picture. We have to pro-

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

611

tect some obscure place with just those for once — outfit 30 or 40 batteries with just those. [ — ] We never know who does what, which always leads to deceptive reports. The fighters come and claim they've done it, then another battery comes and claims it did it. [ — ] Here's a letter to the editor of an English newspaper — it shows again what crazy things are happening over there. Here's another thing — but first: this is the B 29, isn't it?1718 [ — ] It flies in formations of 20 to 40 aircraft and holds the division together ... then a few of our little fighters come between them, and they're shot down before they even have a chance to shoot. Because they bring a few little guns against this giant, and tumble down without ever hitting the colossus. That's why it's not... That is a complete developmental failure, like the Heinkel

1771719

and all the dive bombers — the

inadequate arming of the fighter. All developmental failures by people who lack the imagination to see what is necessary. GORING: The dive bomber wasn't a development that [ —

].1720

THE FUHRER: But to continue it with the big one! It is not because of a developmental failure that I have fighters, either. But I am opposed to fighters with inadequate weapons, since they have no effect against these formations at this range. One sees that it's totally useless, unless they can ...the fight from below... but then these little fighters come and tumble down — most of them head off at once, and disappear^ — ] showed that it is utter nonsense ... I see the development : he exchanges this heavy four-engine bomber for a heavier one, and comes with absolute security ... up to 20 and 24 guns ... It is nonsense — technical nonsense, nothing more. It is irresponsible not to introduce long-range weapons that are effective from a greater distance. He can't have any effect with the 5-cm gun, or with the 3.7 either; he is dependent on all the small guns. But, of course, he would . . . probably not... the fighter at all . . . if he gave away all the small guns. The only possibility is that...

I spoke again with Saur today . . . and Galland told me personally, ... the

probability of approaching. The fact is that they can't do it anymore, although we build more and more aircraft, and the number of our sorties is . . . When I imagine that we now [ — ] That is technical nonsense and childishness — just as dumb as ... if we knew that the . . . would come in a group. We couldn't assume that we would fight it this way long term. In the end, we could only do it in the East, and we can do it today only because the Russians don't have masses of small defensive weapons. If they had those defensive guns, like the British and the Americans, we couldn't do it there either.

612

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either. But with them, the low-level flights and the ... of aircraft stop when wc have enough defensive guns. When we plaster them with 2 cm, with 12 mm, etc.., it stops at once—that is quite clear. It is a complete developmen¬ tal failure, that month by month [—] They haven’t taken them for fighter combat anywav, because thcv’re too slow. They arc too slow at low altitude and too slow up high. Down there it’s the same. T always get the combat results from down there when fighter-bombers are involved: 1:4,1:5. One can’t say every time: Yes, because they can’t fly there! [—] That is all the more unfortunate. Then I have to ... come to something else. The only possibility is to come in with a weapon that is effective even at greater distances and to which the opponent can’t respond. Because with his 12 mm and those other things, he couldn’t shoot 1 or IV2 km, and I realize that the possibility of hits will be low. But every hit by a heavy projectile like the 5 cm will destroy the plane. Then even the big ones will crash, while we can’t do anything with these small guns.1721 I say, yes: the best proof is our armored assault aircraft, of which 30 or 31 were recently destroyed in an attack by 43 ... Then I really have to ask: how long can wc allow ourselves to do this? Also a ratio [—] ... if 1 want to build in advance in such cases ... the B 24’

’ or 29 is now being added ... we can’t afford

that... I’ve always been told that we don’t have a fast enough rate of fire ... have to come closer to reach it at all ... aircraft have better armor,... so the losses will probably decrease. That’s the situation, right? 1 see a huge dan¬ ger. We can’t take it easy and say, “That won’t happen—he won’t deliver that!” I le’ll deliver it! The Japanese are seeing it today already—he flies these enormous distances, and in a short time he will flv them here in our area as well. They have been used, so 1 can’t say: I don’t believe it. 1 have to believe! ... He has no losses, or only very limited losses ... That’s a parade exercise on a sunny day! And with them he can do it even better and more easily; no one is in any danger, and then one day he won’t need fighters anymore either. Then it’s possible that he could eliminate his fighters en¬ tirely. If 1 imagine that German aircraft, on the one hand, defend against fighters, and, on the other hand, also need to attack, then they come into a hailstorm and the effect is—I’ve spoken with many people and they saw the same—like Bormann said of Mecklenburg,1

a fox hunt, and our

planes just can’t do that forever. One can imagine how it affects the popu¬ lation; the impression on the population is disastrous. |—J So that is a technical dead end. At the beginning of the w-ar, our fighters were equal to the others or superior. [—]' 4 Now the fighters are of less interest to me. We can handle the fighters with our new defensive weapons, if they make low-level attacks. But the bombers are our destruction. If we can’t take action against them, and continue stubbornly along a path that has been

MlUTARl CONFURENChS

1942-1945

613

proven false, because the fighter still has its mad fascination—I find that unbearable, and I see a great danger there. That’s why I mention it today, too. One has to understand the developmental failure. It is such that in a case like this, the Air Force takes the point of view

: “it’s not as hot

when you eat it as when it’s cooked,” they won’t come! [—] That’s not the case; these planes will come. No one can say either, “lie won’t attack japan!” But now he attacks it, with 70 to 100 aircraft. But in a short time these 70 to 100 aircraft will be 200, then 500, then 1,000 and 2,000. He shifts everything He can manufacture it industrially in mass production. And what else does he need? He can destroy everything with it. The brav¬ ery of individual airmen is of no use then, because the aircraft are not equal. ... One can’t say that he does (not) have 18-ton bombs.172

In the

past, wc didn’t believe a lot... That the 6,000-kg bombs and more ... it was said: There is no such thing,... they have no penetration depth. And today they fly almost to f—] For the last year, test flights have been underway with the biggest aircraft in the world—enormous planes, carrying 18 tons or 124 fully outfitted soldiers, wingspan of more than 70 meters, 2,600 horsepower engines. ... If the first 200 to 300 come here, they could carpet-bomb with 2,000-kg bombs ... so we can’t say, “Get to work—that will be taken care of again!” It won’t work—it is completely impossible. And we build our little fighters with 2-cm [guns] and test to see if we should change to 3cm, etc., short guns Then he would have to come within 50 meters, and even then he won’t destroy it. The 5-cm caliber is the smallest that can be used here today, in my opinion. I spoke with what’s-his-name today. He thinks we can install the 5 cm even in the 262 ... that doesn’t matter. But it would be a major victor}’ if it could be installed at once, ... then the fighter wouldn’t have to go within 50 meters ... doesn’t matter at all ... If they don’t shoot down 4 aircraft from every formation on even’ incursion, that’s enough. He can’t sustain that long term, either. Now, when we lose 10,20 or 36 planes in every attack—and the enemy less than a quarter of that, sometimes nothing—1 have to say: that’s no mission. What should the people do, if they don’t have good planes? Here we have, I’d like to say, ... on the wrong object ... do against these formations? [—] He has enough fuel ... GORING: The range is not important to him. It’s just important that we protect the tactical aircraft from the enemy fighter cover—that’s the dan¬ ger. ...

H THE FOHRER: But at first it’s so fast that the enemy fighter [—]. Our victory, of course, now consists of the fact that I absolutely can’t reach the same penetration depth with a jet aircraft as I can with the normal engine fighter.

614

Hnu.R A.\n His Glxeralj

GORING: At this moment, not yet. No. THE FUHRER: J am happy if \vc can eliminate them in 6 months or a year—that is a victory. And he can’t escort them with jets. He doesn’t have them—at least not at this time. He can’t escort them. So that gives me another possibility. GORING: With the gun, the 262 can still maintain a speed of 700. That can be done, although 650 |—| THE FUHRER: He claims it would be the same weight. GORING: That doesn’t matter. It’s the armaments that are decisive. THE FUHRER: If they fly in and shoot with a 5 cm [gun] from a distance of 1,000 m, a whole swarm of 40 [Me-] 262s can shoot from a distance of 1,000 m—so only 2 or 4 will fly out, and if we have no losses and the enemy has 10 or 12, then the action is as it should be.... They may even shoot into the formation from a distance of 2,000 m—then it will certainly break apart. [-} GORING: So far that’s quite clear. We don’t have the latest reports on how the [Me-] 262 works in its current state against the four-engine aircraft; that’s being tested. THE FUHRER: ... GORING: It can approach differently from below—it can go below them. THE FUf 1RER: The closer they have to come, the greater ..., if they ap¬ proach to 50 m. GORING: It has to get into the dead space. THE FUHRER: If the current fighter has a speed of 600 km, then the fantasy numbers that the Mr Force has always given are clearly impossible. But even at a speed of 600 km, 8 or 12 guns can defend against it, so it will achieve no result—as is the case today. That’s no fantasy of mine—I don’t invent such things. You can see that that is not the case. It means gaining 120 km and doubling the aircraft armaments ... So I double the defensive strength and increase the offensive strength by ... about 20%. Otherwise we won’t reach the goal—it’s the wrong mute. The more we insist on it, the worse it will become, and then nothing will be of any use ... and shoots in all directions. [—] I once had a meeting with armor specialists in Berlin. KEITEL: I was there, to His C, lxerals

THE FCjHRKR: Guderian, it’s like this. Anything that gets to Pillau can be brought over. We can’t bring over any more than what gets to Pillau. The bottleneck isn’t there; the bottleneck is Pillau. And here again the bottleneck isn’t Pillau; it’s the quantity of supplies. ASSMANN: The quantity of supplies is what really matters. Cl IRISTIAN: The Luftwaffe emergency service has brought back a total of 43,415 refugees and 7,000 wounded people out of the Eastern regions, us¬ ing air traffic control boats and also air traffic control ships.1937 (.Presentation.) Tl IE FIJI 1RER: You are transporting more by sea than in the air. You fight better on land than in the air ... ASSMANN: Refugee transport now completed: 491,000. I—] Also to be reported from the Baltic: light enemy air activity in the areas of Windau and Courland. The destroyers and torpedo boats from the Konigsberg sea canal couldn’t be employed yesterday because of the weather conditions. It was due in part to heavy seas, and in part to the ice in this area. An enemy submarine has been located north of Stolpmundc. Then 1 must report that the dav before yesterday the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal had to be closed because of mines that had been dropped. [—| Strong southwest winds in the North Sea. Also northwest winds at the canal exit, so that motor torpedo boats couldn’t be employed. With regard to employment during the night before last, I must add that two flotillas of motor torpedo boats were employed against a convoy heading south near Great Yarmouth. Our motor torpedo boats couldn’t reach the convoy because of the defense, and also because they didn’t get the actual convoy itself. It must have passed through already. In the south there was mining in the area of the Thames-Schelde traffic. The mines were laid according to plan. Torpedo attack on a convoy heading to Ostende with landing craft—those are supply convoys using landing craft—but without success. [—] Regarding the submarine war; a submarine reports the sinking of 25,000 GRT in the North Channel and in the Irish Sea.L93# The boat is now on its way back. The report so far is only 25,000 tons. We calculate that to be four ships. The boat will give a detailed report after it arrives. Another boat reports sinking a freighter and a destroyer off Gibraltar. THE FUHRER: If only we still had the Atlantic harbors! ASSMANN: Then we would be in a position to have a stronger presence in the Atlantic, whereas now we’re restricted to the English area. THE FUHRER: Although the submarine bunkers don’t have the necessary strength anymore either. 7 meters would still work for a while. ASSMANN: Also from the Mediterranean: air photographic reconnaissance photographs of Leghorn. The occupation ... Also aerial photographs of Bari, Brindisi and Taranto. In Taranto, in addition to two old Italian battle-

MlUTARY CoNHiREKCES 1942-1945

689

ships, there are 20 destroyers, but then also three combat-vehicle landing craft, three troop transporters and special-purpose ships. Landing boats have nor been identified here. Hut in Bari there are 50 auxiliary landing boats. In Brindisi there is a special-purpose ship and 35 auxiliary landing boats. THE FUHRER: But it’s possible that they’ll be used for transport over there. ASSMANN: We can’t yet conclude from this that he’s collecting transport space here. He has also used a lot of auxiliary landing boats for supplyservice. I le still has about 120 combat-vehicle landing ships and 230 com¬ bat-vehicle landing boats in the Mediterranean right now, so he would be able to move five or six divisions simultaneously for a landing operation in the Mediterranean. But the reports we’ve received in the Adriatic area are such that we can’t yet conclude that a serious landing operation is planned. Situation in the air BUCHS: In Hungary, sorties again in search of locomotives in the area southeast of Budapest. Two locomotives were destroyed. This employment, escorted by fighters, took place at the same time some units flew back into the 1 lungarian area after their approach on Vienna and dropped isolated bombs on Plattetisee [Lake Balaton] as well. Six of the fighters entered into aerial combat. They shot down three aircraft—two four-engine planes and one fighter. However, four of the six fighters were shot down. Two pilots were killed. The fighter-bombers engaged here in the area east of Budapest reported—but the report has yet to be confirmed—that American units have landed at Xombor airfield. They saw 20 four-engine aircraft on the airfield, and 15 more that were in the process of landing. In addition, two more were shot down by flak during this intrusion. [—] In the Breslau area ... in the Zobtcn area and for free intercept in the area of Breslau itself, where the enemy was engaged very heavily yesterday. Thirty-five motor vehicles were destroyed and three aircraft were shot down. Success¬ ful engagement again yesterday with bridge attacks by 65 fighter-bombers with fighter protection. The bridges were photographed afterward. It showed that a 30-meter section of the Gorlitz bridge was destroyed, and thal there were two direct hits on the Lebus bridge. In Pomerania 97 aircraft were engaged, primarily against convoys in the Rummelsbutg area. About 50 motor vehicles and 8 guns were destroyed, and 18 tanks damaged. In East Prussia we engaged in limited free intercept activity. One aircraft was shot down. [—] Regarding enemy activity; we can report that until midday when the cold front ... was stronger in the area close to the front, in support of the battle: about 300 fighter-bombers in the Cologne-Dusseldorf area, plus about

690

HrruzR A.\n His Gexurals

300 aircraft in overlapping waves in the Ruhr area. Our own sorties were early at first, with five Messerschmitt 262s dropping bombs on Duren and Linnich. That was done without losses. Then 120 fighters from the 17th Fighter Division were employed in two fighter missions in the morning, to provide support in the area of Munich-Gladbach. The first mission had 62 aircraft, of which 51 engaged in aerial combat in individual groups with a total of 100 enemy aircraft, mostly the Thunderbolt model. Most of the aerial battles took place at an altitude of about 1,000 meters, only for one unit from 1,000 to ... THE FUHRF.R: At the altitude where the others are absolutely superior, or at least equal! BLJCIIS: Right aircraft were shot down. Six Thunderbolts and two Austers1919—those are artillery observation aircraft, which were flying with a very strong fighter protection of 30 'thunderbolts—were shot down. Our own losses, in this first action for the moment: 11 aircraft missing. Then we flew a second fighter mission with 67 fighters, all of which engaged in aerial combat with numerous enemy fighter groups of 20 to 40 aircraft, again at an average altitude of 1,000 meters. These fought less successfully than the first and were only able to shoot down two aircraft. Our own losses, accord¬ ing to current reports: ten missing and another four total losses. So, for these two employments, that’s ten certain and two probable aircraft shot down against—still provisionally—21 missing and 4 total losses. In the Rhine Main area 31 aircraft were employed to fight low-flying airplanes. They engaged in aerial combat at an altitude of ... m with a unit of ten Thunderbolts, of which they shot down five, with two of ours missing. In the Mannheim-Ludwigshafen area 31 planes were employed, which also engaged in aerial combat with 25 Thunderbolts at an altitude of about 2,500 m. They also shot down three aircraft. Two of our aircraft are miss¬ ing and there were two total losses, but without losing the pilots. So in total, with a employment of 199 fighters—188 of which engaged in aerial combat—18 enemy aircraft were shot down, with 25 planes missing and six total losses on our side. THE FOHRER: The missing ones are gone. BUCHS: We can calculate that on average, one-tliird of the crews return. THE FLTIRFR: I want a report ever}- day about which missing ... BUCHS: The enemy is attacking the V2 launching positions mostly with Spitfires and Tempests,1940 with bombs in diving attacks. Flak [antiaircraft] platoons have been used, which have successfully shot down aircraft. In the last few days, five fighter-bombers have been shot down by light flak at the V2 positions themselves. THE FUHRFR: What kind of platoons are those?

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

691

BUHLE: They are four-barreled platoons, which Kammler1941 has at the V2 sites. They belong to the batteries. BUCHS: The heavy units flew into the southern German area yesterday to carry out major terror attacks on a number of cities. 1942 Ulm was especially affected. Then there was a very heavy attack on Mannheim. In all the attacks, in addition to damage to houses, there was also very strong damage to railway installations. There were eight Messerschmitt 262s from a group currently in transfer, which happened to be carrying out practice sorties; two had enemy contact. They shot down two aircraft themselves — a bomber and a fighter. But they were both shot down as well, apparently by fighters. The exact reason they went down is unknown. CHRISTIAN: The two were flying single or in a two-ship formation. The other six had no contact with the enemy. The two saw the unit and threw themselves on it — which is forbidden. They just went into the enemy unit without orders, and reported it via radio message. They were shot down themselves. THE FUHRER: But that's exactly the result I predicted. It can't be done like that. That will only change if we have different armaments. BUCHS: In the southwestern German area a total of seven aircraft were shot down by flak. The enemy admits to 34 — 12 bombers and 22 fighters. 1943 The intrusion to attack MoosBierbauml944 yesterday was in a different form; it was one attack spread out over four hours. The enemy flew in 14 waves, in numerous small groups, pparently with the intention of confusing the defense that way. A total of 2,500 high-explosive bombs were dropped, most of which fell on open fields. According to the reports received so far, total cessation of production, again for an indefinite time. [ — ] In the East only limited employment during the night. THE FUHRER: Especially if they're coming in very small groups, we should be able to destroy them. Then we can't say, "These are enormous masses; this is superior power" — instead, we should be able to destroy them. GORING: That's right. BUCHS: From the West yesterday a Mosquito intrusion toward Berlin. Then very strong night fighter-bomber employment of our own, with 265 aircraft. We had very good success, especially in the area west of Cologne, against villages near the front, movements, and with some units also in the Goch area. Five Ju 87s are missing and there was one total loss, but the crew was saved. Only individual nuisance raids into the Erfurt and Kaiserslautern areas. GORING: The performance of the Ju 87 should be emphasized. BUCHS: Using the moonlight. [ — ] Regarding the weather conditions: Over the Reich there are heavy showers today with very high wind speeds — on the coast up to 100 km on the ground, and in the interior up to 80 km. Also,

692

Hitler and His Generals

especially on the north side of the mountains, there were very strong snow and sleet showers, which very much hindered our employment in the Munsterland again this afternoon around two o’clock. These rain fronts will continue to move further east and will diminish during the night, as will the cloud cover. High pressure is moving in from the northwest, so tomorrow we can expect limited clouds in the whole area and only a few isolated show¬ ers. Wind speeds will decrease as well. [—] One hundred ninety-six fighters started against die attack in die central German area today, despite die weather conditions. 'Hie attacks took place at exactly the time when the main showers were moving over the Berlin area. The groups had isolated contact with the enemy, because they couldn’t assemble. Other groups landed again because diey couldn’t get through in these weather conditions. There was also quite heavy icing, which varied considerably in the degree of coverage. It must be expected that aircraft will also have been lost due to weather conditions. CHRISTIAN: It was impossible to supply1'4'1 tonight due to the weather conditions. There was a 100 km wind. Armament questions (Presentation by General Bub/e.) THE FUHRER: What does that mean in practice? BUHLE: Using a different head,1''46 we’ve managed to achieve the same penetration effect with half the explosives. At the same time, I can reach a range of 150 m—50 m further—because the head is lighter. I save 0.9 kg per round. That’s exactly the explosive content of one field howitzer round. That’s an enormous gain. THE FUHRER: Who did that? BUHLE: It was various people. THE FUHRER: The people who do something like that really must be honored. We can’t look at that from a small, bureaucratic point of view. We have to give every such man 200,000 to 300,000 marks. It must be an incen¬ tive. We can’t be petty. BUHLE: Some of them are soldiers. THE FUHRER: That doesn’t matter—all the more, then. Why should I pay less to a soldier? KEITEL: It’s a sizeable savings and a greater firing range. THE FOHRER: If we get the explosives for one million field howitzer shells, we can’t pay the man enough. The Panzerfaust (antitank grenade launcher] goes 100 m further, has greater penetration, and takes half the explosives. That gets me a million field howitzer shells. BUI ILE: One hundred fifty m range. Yesterday someone fired from 200 m and hit. It will become the w eapon. It is actually such that a man has a tube

r9cht|ic.h gescfiul/tes Mate* al

Military Conferences 1942-1945

693

today and can load it again and again. Before he had to throw it away. That was one of the limitations. We have to reach 1.2 million again. We can’t drop below that again, further explanations of the presentation by General liable.) THE FOHRER: How about the 7.5 cm? What do you have there? BUHLE: The 7.5 works, as 1 recently reported. The shell case is reusable— at the lowest load 6,400 m, then up to 10,200 m with an intermediate load— so 1 have two additional loads and always only have to put one into the field and can do the next load with tubular powder.'"4 But for that I have to use the good powder. That reaches 11,400 m. That’s our calculation for the maximum distance for now. I can reach 13,000 m. The dispersion is very high. It’s the same load with a powder usage that’s more than double. 1 jump immediately from 1,200 gr to 3 kg; it’s huge. THE FUHRER: That’s not possible now. We can do that later. [—] And how often can one shoot the cartridge? BUHLE: I shot it more than five times. Nothing ever happened. But in practice, it really can’t be shot more than five times, so let’s say five times. Regarding the powder, there is daily testing to see how it can be done most inexpensively. The powder issue is really the bottleneck. THE FUHRER: It’s particularly important that we be able to use inferior powder. BLJI1LE: It makes hardly any difference. [—J You should speak to me again about the production of the 10-cm gun, Saur told me: “We had ordered ten percent initially.” THE FUHRER: I’m still convinced that we have to start doing the mixed things again. I have divisions in Courland that have done it that way on prin¬ ciple. Every detachment has two 15-cm batteries and one 10-cm battery.1948 BLIHLFi: A good share of the Army artillery still has it. it’s just bad in the infantry divisions. The 10-cm gun can’t be drawn by horses at the moment. ... They have to be driven separately. THE FUIIRER: In the Great War, the 10-cm guns were already transported in two loads. The 15-cm was transported in two loads. I have to transport the 15-cm howitzer in two loads, even if it’s possible to do it with horses. That doesn’t change anything Why is that still being discussed? 1 have to transport the 15-cm howitzer in two loads, too. BUHLE: Yes, indeed. The heavy field howitzer is driven in two loads. THE FUHRER: What results have the 8.8-cm anti-aircraft ammunition had this month? I would like to know our stock sometime. ... I want to tell Saur that he should go out and, instead of letting the Hunter Tiger just stand there, he should install the 8.8.1949 BUHLE: That’s what has been ordered. Hurl: 7:45 p.m.

694

Hitler and His Generals * *

* X

Fragment of a Midday Situation Report, PRESUMABLY MARCH 10, 19451950

BUCHS: An 80 m section of the canal was tom up then; the water has leaked out of that part of the canal. THE FUHRER: Is that this part here? CHRISTIAN: It’s not at Ladbergen; it’s between Ladbergen and Gravenhorst. BUCHS: Until now it was always at Ladbergen. Yesterday at ... the junction of the Dortmund Ems Canal and the Lippe was attacked; an 80 m section was torn up. |—] Our employment, initially only in the upper Rhine area, [was] against low-flying aircraft. Seventeen aircraft saw the enemy, with Ty¬ phoons. The losses were caused by technical reasons ... 29 aircraft employed in very bad weather yesterday to reconnoiter the bridges—three were Arado 234s,which ... attacked with 500-kg bombs from 500 m without closer observation of the effect. One of those aircraft is missing. In addition ... employment of 24 fighters with bombs, which reported these hits. Indi¬ vidual planes engaged in aerial combat with the fighter protection over the bridge; one Mustang1952 was shot down. Then two aircraft were employed, Fw 190s, with SC 500Trialen, but the results couldn’t be observed because of the fighter defense, which engaged in aerial combat at the same time. There were ten fighters over the bridge at the time of the attack. A total of three aircraft are missing.

M BUCHS: The ceiling above our telephone exchange1953 is exactly 80 cm. THE FUHRER: If a military agency built that— JODL: ... a 15-cm concrete thing, with a floor in between! BOCHS: Both floors in between have 15-cm concrete ceilings, then here the main ceiling, w hich is above the telephone exchange, is 80 cm—all with pressure doors. This part here is underground; this here above ground. THE FUHRER: Where repairing the cracks is much more difficult then, if something goes in from the side. BUCHS: ... THE FUHRER Exactly. That’s even worse. It happened to me twice: at my place two bombs went directly in. If (the ceiling) hadn’t been so strong, it would have pressed them right together. Your little bunker here would very likely be completely gone. And those w^ere just light little bombs of no more than 250 kg. I don’t think they were 500s. If a 2000-kg bomb had come in here, it would have given us some bad cracks. Even the 250s wrcre enough to cause cracks so bad that water ran in. Howr strong is the ceiling out there? V. BELOW: Fifty cm concrete. CHRISTIAN: Our bunker has 42 m of earth over it. It w^as built in 1936.1934

Military Conferuncus 1942-1945

695

THB FUHRER: You have ... in clever foresight... bunkered in! ClIRISTIAN: Into the mountain. THE FUHRER: But the question is how the concrete is put in on the inside. CHRISTIAN: It has about 2 m concrete. THE FUHRER: You believe that! [—J Reinforced concrete? CHRISTIAN: I believe it’s reinforced concrete. THE FUHRER: Children, don’t make fools of yourselves! V. BELOW: 1 don’t think it has more than 2 m. CHRISTIAN: And then inside the mountain! THE FUHRER: Forty-two m? I don’t believe that, because there isn’t even a 42 m high mountain here. V. BELOW: It’s the tunnel down inside. THE FUHRER: Bring me the plans; then you’ll sec how that shrinks! [—] And I also want to see die plans for those “magnificent buildings” out there! [—] BUCHS: ... the area of high pressure stretching further east, the sudden drop in temperature more in the eastern Ruhr area. In the western combat area a certain improvement has taken place. THE FUHRER: “Improvement”? A worsening! BUCI IS:—a worsening has taken place. Today it was still very bad in the central sector of the Rhine; low clouds were rolling in at around 150 m. It was a little better only on the upper Rhine and in the lower-lying areas. THE FUHRER: If we could get out of here, all our [Me-] 262s and what¬ ever we have would ... GORING: (The number of sorties) would be much higher if we ... had more engines. THE FUHRER: How many 262s were in action? BUCHS: In the bomber formations only? THE FOHRER: In action altogether?! BUCHS: I’ll have to get those numbers first. THE FUHRER: And for the Arados as well! GORING: They would be even higher if we ..A'” the aircraft that are at the front. As I just said, the teething troubles are behind us; they’ve already been through follow-on equipment 1, 2, and 3 and have everything built in now. ... The others have to get the follow-on equipment first. Tl IE FUJI IRE.R: ... civilian population ... behind the labor forces. Even if the workforce is really bad, I need 800,000 additional workers just to (bring) the railway (into working order). We can’t afford that. It’s sheer lunacy. The people come and say: we want to start doing this. [—] If I don’t (get that in order) everything else will be wasted as well. In the end, the workforce is one of the most critical factors today; whether it’s girls or women, it doesn’t matter at all: everyone has to be employed. At first, we had doubts here because of the gigantic treks. But fine. We have 1.3 million horses [—]''JS6

696

Hitle r and His Generals

CHRISTIAN: During the ... a total of 187 (Me 262s) delivered. The most always come out in the first few days. At the end of the month, there’s always a hold-up in the industry, and then the planes always come in fairly high numbers. ... We put them into the follow-on equipment, and then they’ll be delivered. THE FCFIRER: By the way, the rumors from Krems regarding the nickel. Now I’m hearing from all sides: yes, we calculated that without this and without that. Now I’m curious! GORING: I know what was said about the nickel back then. I was there. I thought it was complete nonsense. It was said back then that we had almost unlimited supplies of nickel. THE FUHRER: Now they say they’re calculating ... But that’s always the case if wc expose something. Then the military- authorities came (and told the scientists what had to be done) because there are big military advantages, and then the leading economic men arc so stupid and say the same, instead of right from the start... Wc could just as well have stayed at Pctsamo1957 as down there, I guarantee you—it’s all the same. GORING: It would be a great help to us, my Fiihrer,if you could push hard for us to get engines as well as aircraft. THE FUHRER: I push and push, but all the pushing is of no use if a factory is built and then destroyed! GORING: But we have them down inside the mountain now. It’s already going!1958 THE FUHRER: I’ve pushed so much that I’ve said: I’m not even going into this mine, because 25 percent of all engines— that makes a difference! (find of the fragment) ^

Matrh 23, 1945 The Soviet attacks in Courland have still gained only limited ground. In East Prussia the remnants of the Fourth Army at Heiligenbeil and the Balga Peninsula have been pressed together even further. The situation in Samland is unchanged. In West Prussia the remnants of the Second Army are fight¬ ing on a stretch of coast that is now only 10 to 15 km wide, between the mouth of the Nogat and Rixhoft Rivers; on this day the German forces are cut in two by a Russian penetration to Zopot. On the lower Oder, the Sovi¬ ets have now thrown the German troops back over the river and the bay, and have completely occupied Eastern Pomerania. A last bridgehead east of Stettin had to be given up on March 20. In Upper Silesia the enemy attacked the German Oder front between Oppeln and Ratibor on March 15, and—

MlUTARY CoNh'ERENCUS 1942-1945

697

as before in Lower Silesia—advanced to the eastern edge of the Sudeten Mountains. At Plattensee (Lake Balaton|, the German offensive that began on March 9 has been unable to advance, and now the Russians are penetrat¬ ing into Hungary and Slovakia with the objectives of reaching Vienna and Briinn (Brno]. In Yugoslavia the situation is unchanged. The break in the fighting in Italy is only occasionally disturbed by minor operations. On the Rhine, the Americans reached Cologne on March 5 and, two days later, were able to build a bridgehead on the right bank of the Rhine River at Remagen. In the meantime, the Eifel had been crossed and Andemach occupied on March 9. Since the following day, the entire Rhine line from Emmerich to Koblenz has been in Allied hands. Then on March 15 Patton’s concentric attack against the Moselle—Saar—Rhine triangle began as well. The First Army on the Saar River and the Seventh Army on the Moselle River were smashed. The German forces that weren’t cut off by American tank spearheads attempted to reach the Rhine in a state of chaotic disintegration. On March 20 the Americans were already in Worms, in Bingen the following day, and in Mainz on the 22nd. Now, on the 23rd, there is fighting in Ludwigshafen. Only between Speyer and Karlsruhe are the Ger¬ man bridgeheads on the left bank of the Rhine able to hold until March 25. Patton crossed the Rhine the night before at Oppenheim. {Map 13) 2* * *

jfc

Evening Situation Report, March 23,1945, in the FOhrer’s apartment in Berlin1959

Present: The Fiihrer Genera! Burgdotf

I Jen tenant Colonel Borgmann Major BrudermiUkr

Ambassador Henri Colonel v. Below

Major Johannmeyer Sturmbannftihrer Giinsche

Stabsleiter Sundermann

Sturmbannjuhrer Gohler

Uentenant Colonel de Mai^iere

Hauptsturmfiihrer Kersten

1 alter:

H anptbereichskiter Zander

Beginning: 2:26 a.m. (March 24) The 1 Vest BRUDERMt LLER: Here in the area south of Arnhem there was artillery fire as in the previous days. 1,375 motor vehicles were identified here through

698

Hitler and His Generals

air reconnaissance, including 233 tanks. Also strong concentrations of mo¬ tor vehicles identified in this area. On both sides of Rees, the enemy—in company strength, according to reports received so far—crossed the Rhine with amphibious tanks. The 8th Parachute Division assesses the situation to be such that they can clear this thing out with their reserve regiment. THE FOHRER: No. BRUDERMULLER: The army group immediately released the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division for that purpose anyway; it’s coming down to clear it out and throw the enemy into the water.1960 The 116th Panzer Division is mov¬ ing up into the area of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. |—] Strong fighter-bomber employment during the entire day, far into the rear area. Also here very strong artillery fire since 5 p.m., and conspicuously strong fighter-bomber and tactical aircraft activity in this area, so the Commanderin-Chief West expects an attack here in the Wesel area. [—] I can report on the bridgehead1961 using the small map. Here in the northern part strong motorized movements. Otherwise, here on the eastern front of these two corps there was only artillery fire and fighter-bomber activity into the rear area. Among other things, the command post of Army Group “B” was attacked again. The enemy continued his attacks to the east here, and suc¬ ceeded in achieving a few deeper penetrations. A blocking position was erected here. Down here the enemy was caught up along this line. According to an unconfirmed report, there arc 30 tanks in Nicdcrbicbcr. No new reports about the occupation of Neuwied. A counterthrust by a regimental group of the 18th Volksgrenadier Division stalled in front of an antitank gun de¬ fensive line here. [—] Here west of Mainz smoke screening and vehicle traffic reported. Army Group “B” reports that they don’t believe they can pull out the 6th SS Mountain Division right now. A battalion is being kept on alert, though, so that it can be driven over here at any time on short notice. [—] Fighter reconnaissance reported a bridge here.1962 THE FUHRER: Is the entire Luftwaffe in position here to eliminate this at least? V. BELOW: Today Me 262s and Arado 234s were sent out, as well as Otto fighters.1963 The fighters barely got through, though, because they became involved in aerial combat beforehand. BRUDERMULLER: The Luftwaffe is now asking whether the main focus should be up here at Wesel or over here. THE FUHRER: It must be established down here immediately BRUDERMULLER: Colonel General Jodi suggests that the main focus remain here, first, because we are much weaker on the ground here than we are up there, and also because we couldn’t fly here or up above tomor¬ row if the units are transferred.

Miutary Conferences 1942-1945

699

V. BELOW: We’ve already flown here today. BRUDF.RMULLF.R: According to the latest telephone reports from the Commander in Chief West, a counterattack started from north to south in the late hours of the evening. An attack from west to east is planned for tonight. We don’t know if that has started yet or not. Field Marshal Gen¬ eral Kesselring| ,&+ has driven in this area here himself. [—] The Commander-in-Chief West has ordered that the bridges from the lower reaches of the Main [River] up to Hochst be blown up, and that the bridges in Frankfurt be ignited. The other bridges on the Main up to Miltenberg are to be prepared for demolition. A senior engineer officer has been assigned the responsibility for the technical preparation of this operation. THE FUHRER: The best thing would be to try to get a few 1 lunter Tigers as well. BRUDERMOlXER: The serviceable Hunter Tigers from the 653rd De¬ tachment are so caught up in combat in the area left of the Rhine that they can’t be pulled out now. The tanks that were brought over for maintenance— there are 16—are to be sent to the Oppenhcim bridgehead immediately after the maintenance is completed. There’s no report yet on when that will be, though. THE FfJIlRER: Then we have to supply them with the necessary spare parts by air immediately. It must be ordered immediately, so they get them right away. Has Saur been contacted yet? BRUDERMOlXER: I’ll speak with General Thom ale again right away. [— ] In the Ludwigshafen area the enemy pushed through into the center of the city. Heavy house-to-house combat and very severe losses are reported. It’s emphasized that the district leader has provided outstanding support for the fighting here. In the Ludwigshafen area there are still 70,000 civilians who are hindering the combat. [—] The Commander-in-Chicf West has now ordered—because a cohesive command is no longer possible, and also be¬ cause there’s no relevant time savings in his opinion, if the fighting contin¬ ues here—that Lieutenant Colonel Loffler,'*0 the former commanding of¬ ficer of Coblenz, move over with the remnants of the occupation force, because he’s badly needed as a combat commander in the western sector. (THE FUHRER Yes.) [—] During these battles seven tanks were knocked out. The ferries and bridges at Speyer were blown upi Here the enemy is attacking Speyer from the north. Also attacks here. 11c has taken Bergzabern, in order to advance toward the east then and push forward to 1 lerxheim. THE FUHRER: According to American reports, there’s hardly any resis¬ tance here. They report sixteen thousand, seven thousand, nine thousand prisoners per day.|,JM>

700

Hitler asd His Generals

BRUDERMULLER: The bulk of 16th Volksgrenadier Division’s artillery is there; no reports on the infantry yet, though. The bulk of the 36th Volksgrenadier Division’s artillery is there, plus a regimental group; one regi¬ mental group is still missing [—] I must correct myself here. From the 16th, twelve guns are there. [—•] The position of these divisions, which are marked in here, is unknown at the moment. The Southeast, Italy In the Southeast and in Italy nothing significant. [—J I’d also like to present an evaluation that came in tonight from Field Marshal Kesselring (Presen¬ tation.) (.Haupfherelchs/eiter Zander enters.) THE FUHRER: Show me all the reports that have come out of the Breslau Fortress so far. (ZANDER: Yes, Sir.) 7 he

Hast

DE MAIZIERE: In the Second Panzer Army’s sector, the fighting in this salient here is over. 150 prisoners taken so far, and here1'"' built up. [—] With the Sixth Army, the situation continues to intensify.1™8 This town of Balatonfuzfo,1969 which was fought over today, is securely in our hands. But the Russians advanced with tanks to just outside this town. Veszprem is in enemy hands. To the east of Veszprem, and west in the direction of the railway, security has been built up, as well as here in front, by units of the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Divisions, the 9th SS [Panzer] Division, and here the 3rd Panzer Division. THE FUHRER: The connection to the lake19 0 must not be lost under any circumstances. If it’s lost, it’s all over. DE MAIZIERE: Yes, that has been ordered already. [—] Here are the still preliminary numbers of the units that came out from the 1st Panzer Divi¬ sion and the [44th] Hoch- und Deutschmeister Division. The commander of the Hoch- und Deutschmeister Division and his la [operations officer] have supposedly fallen. That’s General Rost.1 1 There’s a gap between Marko and here, but we don’t have any further details yet. Bases of the Lelhstandarte Division are being held here and here. THE FUHRER: Is Fegelein here? GO! ILER: No, the Gruppenfuhrer is in bed. 1 le’s not feeling very well. THE FUHRER: I demand one thing now: that the last man, wherever he may be hidden, be sent immediately to the Heihstandarte, to the entire Sixth Panzer Army. [—| But immediately!

Miutary ConferIzNCES 1942-1945

701

(GOHLER: Yes, Sir.) Sepp Dietrich has to be informed of that immediately. Right now! If I catch only one man, then God have mercy on him! GOHLER: Yes, Sir. He has already received a telegram from the Reichsfuhrer yesterday; the Reichsfuhrer gave him specific orders that the troop strength should not be allowed to decrease under any circumstances. THE FUHRER: What does “decrease” mean? It means nothing. The last man that the Sixth [SS] Panzer [Army] has must be sent in. (GOHLER: Yes, Sir.) DE MAIZIERE: North of that is another gap. It’s not yet clear how far the Russians have penetrated into the woods. It’s holding here, along the Klara position. This town has been lost. Here a counterattack by units of the 6th Panzer Division and the 2nd SS [Panzer] Division. Strong attacks against the whole front south and southeast of Komarom, in each case in battalion or regiment strength in various places; all were driven back. However, that made it necessary to pull back these units of the 2nd SS Panzer Division, which had been taken forward in the attack. Here’s the small bridgehead, and in here there are still five battalions that have the order to fight their way through tonight. TT IE Fi'T IRER: Over here or here? DE MAIZIERE: Over here, like this! THE FUHRER: Do we want to hold the bridgehead? DE MAIZIERE: Na It’s up to the army group. I have orders to present this order here, which the Chief of General Staff issued this evening (Presentation.) THE FUHRER: We can’t count on that at all yet. DE MAIZIERE: Yes, indeed. That will take quite some time. [—] Up here on the Gran [Hron] [River], at this little bridgehead, this town was taken back. The army group has now been ordered to carry out the final evacuation of the rest of the bridgehead. No other engagements up here on the Gran. THE FUHRER: I don’t understand that. What happened there on the Gran? What was taken back there? DE MAIZIERE: This town was recaptured by us, and now there’s only a small bridgehead here, and die army group has the order to evacuate it for good. THE FUHRER: It’s quite clear: it’s better for them to go over here, so that there won’t be trouble here, too. DE MAIZIERE: Yes, Sir. [—] Artillery ranging along the Gran front, clear¬ ing mines, bringing in forces. About 1,500 vehicles identified by air recon¬ naissance. The situation in the area south of Neusohl is becoming increas¬ ingly tense. West of the Gran, the enemy advanced into the area southwest

AllUTARY CoNFUREXCliS 1942-1945

703

Strong employment of fighter-bombers. Tanks knocked out: here 25, here 24, here 18. Here we can also report that in this small corner, where there were units of a mechanized corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army, the enemy was pushed out and this thing was straightened. In Breslau only weaker attacks against the southern front. THE FOHRER: T want to find something out again: A few days ago, a report arrived from Breslau that the enemy was using the heaviest weap¬ ons against which the city—or, rather, the fortress—had no equivalent countermeasures. Now it’s presented as if bringing in six heavy infantry guns would hinder the transport of ammunition. I won’t have that. The heavy infantry guns will be flown in and the ammunition will come as well. That’s only six aircraft in total; everything else is transporting ammunition anyway. That has been arranged by the Luftwaffe again, of course. DE MAIZIERE: Three of the heavy infantry guns were flown in last night. One made a crash landing, so two are there ready for action. The next three should come in tonight. [—] Weaker attacks against the south¬ ern front; they have been driven back. THE FtllRER: Pass that on immediately. They absolutely must be flown in. Hanke is a panzer man; he has no idea what a heavy infantry gun even looks like. They were just complaining that they don’t have any weapons to combat the heaviest things. So I ordered that heavy infantry guns be sent in immediately. Go to your chief of transport; he’s responsible for that V. BELOW': Yes, Sir. DE MAIZIERE: Concentrations in the southern part of Glogau. Other¬ wise no particular engagements. Daytime reconnaissance identified 25 tanks here today, along a wide front. It could almost be a deception, if tanks are appearing here so openly during the day. THE FUHRER: I have one great worry here. Here’s the one panzer group. DE MAIZIERE: Here’s the panzer group of the 21 st Panzer Division, which has about 50 tanks, according to the latest data. Bl RGDORE: He wants to pull out the entire 21st during the next few days. DE MAIZIERE: With the fortress battalions that are being brought in, either the bulk of the 21st Panzer Division or—it hasn’t quite been de¬ cided yet—some units of the Brandenburg Division should come out. f—] Notable up here is a employment of 200 fighter-bombers in the rear sec¬ tion of the front, especially against small villages. In the Kiistrin1 2 area there were attacks against the Klessin base from north and south. The occupation forces are pushed together in the town. Here the Russians attacked again all day, without success. The main focus of the attacks was on both sides of the road leading out of Kiistrin to the west. Here is a minor local penetration, against which an attack is taking place. The num-

704

Hitler a,\d His Gexeraus

ber of tanks disabled was reported as 116 yesterday—20 of those by the Luftwaffe—and 42 today, according to reports received thus far. Tonight the 20th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 25th Panzer Grenadier Divi¬ sion were to attack side by side in an east-southeast direction, toward the Oder. The report on the execution hasn’t yet been received. THE FOHRER: These numbers of tanks disabled seem so fantastic to me because they contradict the number of attacking enemy tanks that were reported at first. At first it was said that there were 60 tanks attacking. DE MAIZIERE: Yes, indeed. According to the number of units em¬ ployed—they’re listed here—it would still be possible. Here there are: the 259th Tank Regiment, tw o tank brigades of the 11th Tank Corps, another separate tank brigade and an assault gun regiment. That’s about 240 tanks. THE FUHRER: If they’re all complete! DE MAIZIERE: Yes, indeed—if they’re all complete. According to a radio report, a unit of the 2nd Guards Tank Army was deployed in here [Kustrin area] yesterday. It couldn’t be proven, though, whether it’s a brigade or less or more. Without a doubt, the numbers reported do seem very high. THE FUHRER: The first report said there were 60 tanks in total attacking here. That’s not unimportant. If they’ve disabled that, that’s good; I just don’t believe it. DE MAIZIERE: Other than that, no combat in Army Group Vistula’s area. |—] In the Second Army’s area there are penetrations that have been sealed off. This attack w>as still in progress. No new reports from the Zoppot area since the afternoon situation. Here local penetrations have been sealed off. There wras a new strong attack against the front southwest of Danzig, with strong penetrations. The situation here is not completely clear yet. Attacks against the southern front wrere driven back. All mobile units fac¬ ing the Second Army confirmed again: six mobile units. THEi FUHRER: We can only do something here with an enormous con¬ centration of all Naval forces, and really only at this one point here, aban¬ doning all other actions. There’s no other option but to give up this thing here and to go to the Vistula here. That w ill cost us the road from the Nehrung, of course. We’ll have to see about that tomorrow. DE MAIZIERE: Fourth Army: All day long attacks in battalion and regi¬ ment strength against the front, leading to no success during the day. The report just came in about a strong Russian attack against the XXXX1 Panzer Corps, in which this town and the heights here were lost. That’s all the more regrettable because from here one can overlook all the lowlands. The em¬ ployment of aircraft limited today due to the weather. [—] The Chief of the General Staff gave the following order to Colonel General Weiss1'0 to¬ night. (Presentation) No unusual occurrences in Courland here. Here all at¬ tacks were driven back except for one local penetration, which is still in

AIllSIARY

CoNHiRUXCES

1942-1945

705

progress here. 1 lere a local penetration and bringing in of forces from the east and northeast. Here a new pressure point could develop. The Chief of the General Staff has already indicated that the army group should assemble this panzer brigade of the 12th Panzer Division in this area, so that there are reserves here in time. Here the attacks were driven back. I lere there are still local difficulties. There’s still a small group behind there, and there’s another one there. The West agun THR FUHRER: When will the two parachute regiments come up from Italy? BRUDERMULLER: I can’t report on that at the moment. I’ll find out. DR FOHRER: He asks for units that have great combat effectiveness here. At least 15 strong units were lost by leaving the Western Wall, because one could supposedly fight better in the open. There you see the result of all this talk. It wasn’t Kcsselring’s fault. BURGDORF: No, he’s done all he could now. THR FUHRER: The worst thing is this second bridgehead here at Oppenheim. Is there still one of our panzer brigades or anything at all oper¬ ating? [—] Didn’t the others1974 get through at all? V. BELOW: There were 117 fighters employed to attack with bombs and on-board weapons. Some of the units didn’t reach the bridgehead because of previous aerial combat. Nine aircraft are missing. Some did reach it. THE FCHRER: Some, so not only the Me 262s? V. BELOW': No, also some of the other fighters. THE EL I 1RER: Have they' been able to attack the bridge? V. BELOW': There’s no report on that yet. Tl 1K FOHRER: What shocks me with the Luftwaffe are the so-called num¬ bers of aircraft missing, where it just says: Missing—over German Reich territory! One can’t imagine them to be completely blown up so that noth¬ ing can be found. In a few days that should be clarified. What’s-his-name mentioned a certain suspicion today—totally independent from me, but it’s also my conviction—because they don’t report on these things anymore; they maintain complete silence1 75 Situation in the air V. BELOW: The American four-engine units attacked traffic installations in the Rhine, Munster and Osnabruck areas today, with another group in the Bochum, Essen, Iserlohn, Hagen and Dinslakcn areas. The British fourengines also attacked traffic installations in the area of Bocholt and flew attacks with some units against Bremen and the Quakcnbriick air base Ac-

706

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS

cording to reports received thus far, a total of 17 Me 262s were employed. In total, according to reports so far, four aircraft were shot down without anv losses on our side. 1976 THE FUHRER: By the 262s? V. BELOW: By the 262s! THE FUHRER: The others don't get close? V. BELOW: No, the others don't get close. [ — ] From the south there was an attack of 600 American four-engine aircraft on the Schwarzheide hydrogenate plantsl977 and industrial targets in the same area of the Lausitz. In addition, 200 aircraft attacked traffic installations near St. Valentin and in the Vienna area. [ — ] In the East fighter-bomber employment against the bridges. There were three hits on the bridge at Lebus and one hit on the bridge at Goritz-Mitte [central Goritz], Tonight there's another employment of a few Ju 88s — six of them. That's basically all. The West again

THE FUHRER: The greatest danger I see is really in this second bridgehead — the Oppenheim bridgehead. BURGDORF: Also because he got the bridge-building equipment there so fast. THE FUHRER: A pontoon bridge! HEWEL: The Rhine isn't that wide there either. THE FUHRER: It's a good 250 m! It just takes one person who's asleep at a river barrier, and there could be a terrible disaster. The upper bridgehead is probably the reason some units were rescued down there. If it hadn't been built, and the enemy had advanced with all his forces straight south along the Rhine, nobody would have gotten out. The instant we allow ourselves to be pushed out of the fortifications, it's all over. Here the leadership acted in an absolutely pathetic way. They've fed the troops the idea — from above — that one can fight better in the open than in here. Miscellaneous

BURGDORF: Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels requests permission to convert the east-west axis in Berlin into a runway. For that it would be necessary to take away the streetlights on both sides and to cut away a further 20 m of the Tiergarten [zoo] on each side. He thinks it would be good, in that wfe could widen the east-west axis sometime later. THE FUHRER: He can do that. But I don't think it's necessary. Fifty m width Fifty m width should really be enough. ZANDER: I just have the last three radio messages from Hanke here. (Presentation.)

AllUTARY CONFERlzXCES 1942-1945

707

THE FUHRER: l want to have all of the latest radio messages. ZANDER: They’re in the alternative quarters of the party chancellery. I’ll have to request them. THE FUHRER: Ask for them immediately! A telegram came in, in which he wrote that the enemy is now using the heaviest weapons, against which they have no countermeasures. After that the heavy infantry guns were requested. Now the heavy infantry guns arc being played around with, as always in these cases. The army group was to provide them. But I ordered that it be done from here, from the headquarters, and I had it confirmed whether the heavy infantry guns were there at all. Buhle acted surprised then. In reality they should be provided by the Commander of the Re¬ placement Army. The army group has no heavy infantry guns. It took ages then. Then it was said that they wouldn’t fit into the aircraft. Then, they would fit if taken apart. Then again, they couldn’t land. In truth it’s the aversion to landing. Now they explain, “If we bring in the heavy infantryguns, we can’t bring in any ammunition.” In reality that’s six aircraft—six transport Riders. The rest are available for ammunition. But I lanke is a panzer man; he has no clue about that. If they really need weapons to shoot the enemy out of individual blocks accurately, there are, of course, even better things; but those can’t be brought in. There’s no weapon that’s more effective that can be brought in than the heavy infantry gun. If we bring in 18 rounds of ammunition, though, that’s a fiasco. We can’t do anything with 18 rounds of ammunition, even though a heavy infantry gun can rear a house down to the cellar with one shot, of course. BURGDORF: Can I allow Reich Minister Goebbels to do this? THE FUHRER: Yes, but I don’t see why it would have to be made wider. We don’t land there with “Goliaths.” It’s 52 m wide. V. BELOW: If the |u 52 has to land there in the dark later, it would be difficult with the streetlights. THE FUHRER: The streetlights—fine. But to cut down 20 to 30 m of the Tiergartcn to the left and right— V. BELOW: That’s hardly necessary. THE FUHRER: We don’t need any more than 50 m width. And it’s use¬ less anyway, because it can’t be reinforced to the left and right. It’s com¬ pletely pointless. JOHANNMEYER: It’s only the sidewalk and then the embankment. V. BELOW: I don’t think it’s necessary to cut down 20 m either, but the streetlights should be removed. THE FUHRER: He can take away the streetlights .|,J7* BURGDORF: 1 will send that out. THE FUHRER: But it just occurred to me: we could also let Me 162s and Me 262s take off on the east-west axis.

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

709

have a high bunker with 3.5 m reinforced concrete on top of it and with four floors one underground and three above ground. I say that by chance. THE FUHRER: That has been completely concealed from me until now. V. BELOW: It's the German Air Force bunker. Before, the Air-raid Defense For example, General Krebs, School was out there, and then the bunker was built by the German Air Force about two years ago.1985 THE FUHRER: It's like this. Nothing is absolutely safe, of course. That's clear. But against bombs of up to 1,000 kg these bunkers here1986 are generally safe. So some can always be accommodated here. I can still throw some other things out here. We can do that, in principle. Some can be accommodated there Zossen isn't safe out there, and that's not because it couldn't be safe in principle, but because it was built by the Army and not by a building contractor. If the OT [Todt Organization] and a real building contractor had built it, 1 m concrete walls would hold at least so that those underground wouldn't be penetrated easily. But I saw a bomb come in sideways and go through 1 m underground right away. Then I've also seen the armoring. On the outside an armoring of two layers at most and on the inside also an armoring of two layers at most. That's a joke, of course. That just means we've built concrete buildings. The earlier buildings of Speer are not that excellent either — we have to be aware of that. Even these buildings here are only very massive because these huge buildings are standing over them and because the buildings offer a protection that’s enormous in itself. But it’s not completely safe. The Army1987 buildings are completely fraudulent. We have to say that very ... If really heavy carpet bombing comes down on it, the houses in Zossen will all be swept away — all the buildings that are there. First, what's above ground, anyway, but also the two underground bunkers. They're weak, too. Now the question is: can this whole thing work if all the buildings above ground are gone? BURGDORF: Yes, indeed. They can work down below. THE FUHRER: Is that enough for the staff? BURGDORF: Yes, for the smaller operations staff that's already in there now. DE MAIZIERE: Many are already working underground there, where the facilities up above haven't been repaired. For example, General Krebs, the Chief of the Operations Section,1988 works mostly underground. For the staff that's there now, it works, even if the buildings above ground are destroyed. THE FUHRER: We have to count on that, of course. Because they obviously get the news now about what's been destroyed. Now I fear that here, just like at the Reich Chancellery, foreign workers will ingeniously have been used to clear the place. Then they get the news via their organization 14 days earlier, about what has been damaged.

710

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS

V. BELOW: I'll find out about that. THE FUHRER: Because the attack will be repeated — that goes without saying — and when the attack is repeated, one day we have to expect them to blast the installations away. I presume that with the underground bunkers the second floor — the first-floor ceiling is only 1 m thick, which is nothing, and I don't even know, since it doesn't show in the drawing, whether the ceilings have girders at all — JOHANNMEYER: They do have girders. You can even see some of them. I lived down there for four weeks myself one time. BURGDORF: You see them running along the ceiling, just like here1989, even above, when you come in. THE FUHRER: Main girder? (JOHANNMEYER: Yes, indeed.) Normally, one can expect that 1 m won't be penetrated by a 1,000-kg bomb, but it blows up, it comes in about 50-60 cm, and breaks through the whole thing immediately — so the upper floor would be gone with a bomb like that. BRUDERMULLER: The first two battalions of the 6,000 paratroopers have marched out of the engagement area today and are to be loaded near Bolzano [Bozen], But right now, the Brenner route is still being interrupted by air attacks. So we're calculating three days into the Bolzano area. Empty convoys will be used as far as possible; there are very few, though, because there's very little shooting right now. But the majority will have to march on foot into the Bolzano area. THE FUHRER: Then they won't reach Bolzano in three days. From there to Bolzano is a threeweek route — 20 days, or 14, or at least 10 days. BURGDORF: From Trent to Bolzano is already a one-day march. BRUDERMULLER: A time calculation is very difficult at the moment, and there are very few empty convoys driving back because they have relatively [little] to drive forward at the moment, because they don't shoot much and therefore have relatively limited supply. BURGDORF: Couldn't they go at least part of the way by train? They can always get off and get on again. There's nothing to unload — it's just the people with their small arms. THE ceilings have girders at all —: The important thing is to have the other 7,000 men ready for these 6,000, so they can be immediately integrated when they come in. The 6,000 men should be instructed en route already, so they know what it's all about and they can form divisions from them immediately. At least they'll be suitable for defensive purposes then. We'll have to see then, where to bring them. We don't have to determine that now. [ — ] These are two units that could arrive. The other two units — 1 don't know yet; they must be homeland units, so we'll have to improvise a little with that.

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

711

BRUDERMULLER: Now he'll get the "Donau" [Danube] Shadow Division [Schattendivision] as well.1990 THE ceilings have girders at all —: It won't woik with only that. BRUDERMULLER: He can, of course, fill up other worn-out divisions with it. BURGDORF: In my opinion, Military Districts XI, IX, and VII haven't drawn anything up so far,1991 at least not the way all the other military districts have been plundered. We should be able to do something there, somehow. THE FUHRER: Would you take that up with Jiittner right away? That absolutely must be done. BURGDORF: Yes, Sir. I will say again that Military Districts XI, IX, and VII must make some kind of contribution now. THE FUHRER: We don't know what all is strolling around out there. Now I hear for the first time, to my surprise, that a Ukrainian SS Division has suddenly appeared. I didn't know anything about this Ukrainian SS Division. GOHLER: That has existed for a very long time. THE FUHRER: But it's never been mentioned in our discussions. Or do you remember? GOHLER: No, I don't remember. THE FUHRER: Maybe it was reported to me a long, long time ago. I don't know. How strong is the Ukrainian Division? GOHLER: I'll find out. THE FUHRER: Either the unit is reliable or it's not reliable. I can't draw up units in Germany today because I don't have any weapons. It would be nonsense for me to go and give weapons to a Ukrainian division now that's not completely reliable. Then I'd rather take the weapons away from them and draw up a German division. Because I assume that they are very well armed — probably better than most of the German divisions we're forming today. BURGDORF: It's the same with the Latvian 20th. It shattered immediately down there as well. DE MAIZIERE: The Latvian [division] is fighting up in Courland right now, and very well. The one down there was the Estonian [division].1992 BURGDORF: Yes, the Estonian one was gone immediately. We have to imagine it psychologically as well. It's asking a bit much of these people. THE FUHRER: What are they still supposed to be fighting for, anyway? They're gone from their homeland. BURGDORF: If there are a lot of fainthearted people even with us, we really can't demand it of those people. THE FUHRER: We need to ind out exactly what's still there now in terms of foreign formations. For example, the Vlasov division is either good for something or not. There are only those two possibilities. If it's good for

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something, it has to be addressed like a fully effective division. If it’s good for nothing, it’s idiocy to ami a division of 10,000 or 11,000 men, while at the same time I’m unable to draw up other German divisions because I have no weapons. Then I’d rather go draw up a German division and give all the armaments to them. BORGMANN: The Indian Legion!'995 THH FUI1RKR: The Indian Legion isa joke. There are Indians who couldn’t kill a louse, who’d rather be eaten themselves. They wouldn’t kill an English¬ man either. To have them face the English of all people is really a stupid idea, I think. Why should the Indians fight more courageously for us than they fought in India itself, under Bose’s'994 leadership? They put Indian units into action in Burma, under Bose’s leadership, to free India from the English. They ran away like sheep. Why should they be braver with us? 1 think that if the Indians were used to turn prayer wheels or something like that, they’d be the most untiring soldiers in the world. But to use them in real bloody combat is ridiculous. How strong are the Indians? [—] Besides, it’s nonsense. If we had an abundance of weapons, we could afford such jokes for propagandistic reasons. But if we don’t have an abundance of weapons, these propagandistic jokes just can’t be justified. [—J What’s with this socalled Galician division anyway? Is that the same as the Ukrainian division? BORGMANN: l can’t tell. THE FUHRER: There’s still a Galician division wandering around out there. Is that the same as the Ukrainian? [—] If it consists of Austrian Ruthenians, we can’t do anything other than take their weapons away imme¬ diately. The Austrian Ruthenians were pacifists. They were lambs, not wolves. They were terrible, even in the Austrian Army. It’s all just self-deception. Is this LJkrainian division the same as the so-called Galician division? GOHLER: No, the Galician [division] is the 30th and the Ukrainian is the 14th. I think the 30th is being refitted in Slovakia. I >’ THE FUHRER: Where has it been fighting? GOHLER: The Galician, the 30th, was originally employed in the Tarnow area and hasn’t been used again since then. DE MAIZIERE: The division was employed under the command of First Panzer Army during the fighting for Lemberg [L’vov]. I believe it was encircled back then with the XIII Corps, and only a few units returned. It hasn’t been employed since then, as far as I know THE FUHRER: And it’s constantly being refitted?! Docs it have weapons as well? GOHLER: I’ll have to find out. THE FUHRER: We can’t afford this kind of joke when I can’t equip other divisions because I don’t have the weapons. It’s ridiculous.

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Hitler a.\p His Generals

700 horses, 81 vehicles, 61 cars, five motorcycles, and twelve eastern model caterpillar tractors,2""' of which eleven are ready for action. THE FUHRER: What is the Indian Legion supposed to do? GOHLER: 1 can’t saw It’s been getting refurbished for a quite long time. THE FUHRER: But it hasn’t fought yet. GOHLER: No. THE FUHRER: I consider a unit to be in refurbishment if it has fought heavily and is now being refurbished again. Your units are always refurbish¬ ing replenishing themselves and never fighting. The West again BRUDERMULLER: Army Group “H” reported at three o’clock that the enemy has also deployed for an attack 1.5 km south of Wesel and at Mehrum. No reports on strength or further developments yet. That was to be ex¬ pected. There had been remarkably strong fire since 5 p.m., both here on the main battle line and far into the rear area. THF. FUHRER: Since 1 o’clock? BRUDERMULLER: No, at 3 the message reached the Commander-in-Chief West. Now itk 3:30. THE FUHRER: But it must have been expected here, in principle. BRUDERMULLER: We expected it here. The Commander-in-Chief West announced already this evening that he expected the attack on Wesel as w ell after there had been very strong artillery fire since 5 p.m. and also conspicu ouslv strong fighter-bomber and artillery observation aircraft activity. THE FUHRER: Are there paratroopers here? BRUDERMULLER: The 180th [Infantry] Division is here. But it’s rela¬ tively strong. THE FUHRER: It should have 8,000 men. BRUDERMULLER: It has already been filled up. It has nearly full battal¬ ions. (Presentation.) In terms of artillery, including the secondary batteries, it has 22 batteries altogether right now—so 22 are in this sector—includ¬ ing eight heavy batteries. THE FUHRER: These2™" arc the subordinate ones? BRUDERMULLER: The ones with the squares that aren’t filled in are the subordinate ones, and the filled-in squares are their own. BORGMANN: General Thomale and General Buhle report that there is no unit ready that can be moved to Oppenheim right now. In the Scnnelager™'2 there are only five Hunter Tigers that will be ready today or tomorrow and could be employed in the next few days. Tit ere will be two more in a few days, so the unit could be increased to seven. All the others are already in action, and there’s nothing else that’s almost ready at the moment.

A IlIJI ARY CoNHUUiKChS 1942-1945

715

TKE FUHRER: They’re at the Sennelager? BORMANN: Yes, Sir. THE FUHRER: They were originally intended for the upper bridgehead. BORGMANN: Yes, indeed. For Rcmagen—for the 512th Detachment. THE FUHRER: When will they leave? BORGMANN: They’ll be ready today or tomorrow. They can probably roll out tomorrow evening THE FUHRER: Then we’ll see about that tomorrow. If we only knew which of the 16 or 17 that were brought back could be repaired, and when! That would be the most important thing. BORGMANN: I’ll ask again, so that General Thomale can give us a clear picture of those 16 by midday or afternoon tomorrow. BRUDERMULLER: I’ve already informed General Thomale that every¬ thing must be done to repair them as quickly as possible, even if the spare parts need to be brought in by air transport, and that if necessary, it’s pos¬ sible that an engineering officer from here, who knows about things, could be sent there. He also reported that he has relieved the detachment com¬ mander, the adjutant and the intelligence officer of their duties, because his officers who were down there had told him that they were lacking in energy. He is sending the best man he has by car tomorrow morning. THE FUHRER: 1 didn’t get the impression from the detachment com¬ mander that he was a real lion.-w’3 JOHANNMEYER: He was in “Adlcrhorst” back then. BURGDORF: If I want to speak with the Inspector General20'*4 about filling a detachment on the basis of our information, I immediately have a quarrel _It’s not possible at all. They keep all the special detachments for themselves. THE FCHRER: He didn’t give a particularly lively impression back then. Or did you have that impression? JOHANNMEYER: No, he didn’t make a particularly good impression. He talked a lot, but in my opinion there wasn’t much behind it. General Thomale was very convinced by him at the time. THE FUHRER: I don’t know. JOHANNMEYER: He’s a man who was very severely wounded. He was wounded eight times, I think. I le couldn’t be that capable physically, either. THF! FUHRER: Granted. But that doesn’t always prove anything. BURGDORF: Especially in the panzer troops we have a great number of young, fresh people because they’ve all come from active units. There wc have very good new blood—much better than in the infantry. Miscellaneous A telegram has also arrivedfrom Gauleiter Forster.*** (Presentation.) It concerns pulling out 450 specialists for the security service. There are 12,000 men up there in total.

716

Hitler a.\p His Gexerajs

THE FOHRER: They claim they don’t have enough. But if it’s psychologi¬ cally wrong, wc have to refuse. BURGDORF: Should I respond that they must stay? THE FUHRER: Contact Kaltenbrunner2006 immediately! Kaltenbrunner said he could hardly do without them. But he says that if it’s psychologically bad for keeping the thing there, they have to stay. V. BELOW: I’d like to ask again about the aircraft. Should the 335 be built now, with the units that arc planned?2011' (THE FUHRER: Yes.) When wc end production, Speer has suggested stopping the [Me-] 109 totally, right then, so that all the people who are busy with the preparations now won’t be used for that anymore, so that everything will stop immediately. (THE FOHRER: Yes, indeed.) And the [Me-] 190 should be turned out in the next four months. THE FUHRER: Yes. The 190 is better than the 109? V. BELOW: Yes, indeed. It’s better. It has a better engine and it’s more useful as a fighter-bomber than the 109. It would be phased out and be replaced as a fighter-bomber by the 152. It shouldn’t be used as a fighter at all.2"0* THE FUHRER: Yes. 1 just think we need fast aircraft with an absolutely superior speed and great security, so they can land even when one engine fails, in order to fight the Mosquito attacks that are becoming more and more frequent. They don’t disturb us much, because we’re sitting in this deep basement, but they’re very unpleasant for the people. A twin engine aircraft is better for that than a single-engine aircraft—there’s no doubt. That’s the case with tins plane,2""1 and 1 would prefer it to the tank fighter. V. BELOW: The tank shouldn’t be used in the Reich area or as a fighter at all, but only as a fighter-bomber. THE FUHRER: But then we’d still need a plane, as long as the 262 isn’t completely safe. I’d think those things would be better for that. V. BELOW: Then 1 wanted to suggest that we have a meeting with you some time, with all the people who are involved with the Me 262 now. I would suggest getting together the Reichsmarshal, General Roller, then Kammhuber,20,11 then General Peltz, who is leading the engagement, then Speer, Saur, Degenkolb,2011 Messerschmitt2012 and Dorsch—perhaps at the beginning of next week. There are still some questions that only you can clear up. THE FUHRER: What what’s-his-name said today, I’ve said the whole time: there’s such a disparity between the production and the actual engagement numbers. No other country in the world has that, and it wasn’t like that with us before either. End: 3:34 a.m.

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717

*****

Hitler’s Situation Reports, April 23, 25, and 27* Aday, April 23, 1945

Marshal Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front and Marshal Koniev’s 1st Ukrainian Front—with 2.5 million soldiers, 41,600 guns, 6,250 tanks, 7,560 aircraft—are tightening the screws on the Reich capital. On this day, Red Army units occupy Potsdam and Dobcritz west of the city. Fighting is already taking place in the northern and eastern city districts of Frohnau, Friedrichshain, Tegel, Pankow, and kdpenick. Underground |sub\vay] lines C, D and E ccasc operating, and in Kantstrassc the inhabitants hang the first white flags out of their windows. In the Fiihrer bunker under the Reich Chancellery, not far from Potsdamer Platz, Adolf Hitler appoints Artillery General Helmuth Weidiing as commanding officer of the Berlin defense area. Using random units—44,630 soldiers, 42,531 Volkssturm men, 3,532 Hitler Youth, Labor Service men, and members of the Todt Organization— General Weidiing is supposed to withstand the pressure of the 2.5 million Soviet soldiers; only one of every two German defenders has a rifle. Wenck’s “army” (three weak divisions)—ordered by Hitler to carry out a relief op¬ eration on behalf of the capital—still remains 60 kilometers southwest of Berlin. To the south of the Reich, American and French troops reach the Danube River on this day, in the area of Donaueschingen; to the north¬ west and north, British and Canadian forces attack Delmenhorst and Ham¬ burg; and in the cast, Soviet troops arc fighting in the Lausitz and in East Prussia. From Berchtesgaden, Reichsmarshal Goring telegraphs to Fiihrer Headquarters that if no other order is issued, he will take over govern¬ mental responsibilities. At 9 a.m. Hitler orders—in vain—that Goring be arrested.

***** Present (April 2.3): Adolf Hitler Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel[ Chief of the Armed Forces High Com¬

mand (OKW) General Hans Krebs, Provisional Chief of the Army General Staff General Wilhelm TSurgdorf, Chief Ad jutant of the Armed Forces

* [NDT: In these final transcripts, Hitler is identified by name, rather than as ‘The Fiihrer.”!

718

Hiiij.r A.xn His Glxerala

S'S Gruppenjiibrer Hermann Fvgeleint Deputy to the Reichsfuhrer SS at the Fiihrer Headquarters Colonel Ernst Kaether, from April 22 to 23 commanding officer of the Berlin Defense Area IIITLER: When can we expect the auxiliaries to arrive? KREBS: That issue is still unresolved. Except for the two promised battal¬ ions, additional forces are not immediately available. Whatever we could get has been brought in here. KEITEL: The two battalions won’t be here before tomorrow morning, even if everything runs smoothly. HITLER: It’s very late. Bv then he [the Russian] could already be standing in the city center. There can be no discussion of a real defense if no troops arc there. [—] I heard shocking news again: in one area the troops withdrew. The Volkssturm and Hider Youth repaired the thing again. The troops had received withdrawal orders from someone. KREBS: There was action there. The thing was brought under control again at the cost of numerous and bloody losses. Except for the NordlandDivi¬ sion, there are no units of foreign origin on any part of the front. HITLER: An entire corps has disappeared completely. Only the SS Divi¬ sion Nordlandis there. Everything else has disappeared, including the corps commander. The only unit that didn’t follow that is Kordland. That’s so dis¬ graceful! If I think about it all, why then still live at all! KEITEL: The Wenck unit must throw something in the way of motorized vehicles into Berlin immediately. BURGDORF: Wenck has four German I .abnr Service Divisions and no weapons! HITLER: Then naval units must come as well. KREBS: The enemy’s general offensive is becoming dangerous, because, for the moment, he’s still making no attempt to go into Berlin, but instead to seal it off. HITLER: All available reserves must be provided to Wenck, even if they’re poorly armed, in order to fill in the gap. No additional reinforcements are to be given to Steiner.2013 Keitel, find out what battalions arc still coming in. KEITEL: Y es, my Fiihrer, everything will be done. * * X * H*

2nd Situation Report, April 23,1945

HITTER: Forces must be brought into Berlin by all possible means in order to cover the Grunewald. Berlin is now the main point of attraction for the enemy. The enemy knows I am here. The enemy will do everything in order

A//U7MRT CONHUUzXCES 1942-1945

719

to concentrate here. That could provide the best opportunity for us to lead him into a trap here. But that presupposes that we finally recognize the significance of this hour on our side, and work very obediently according to the plan ordered from above. Everyone must work honestly! This up here [indicating Army Group Steiner, which was to line up from the north for a relief attack on Berlin] is not honest! Steiner has too many doubts in view of the defensive front standing before of him. KREBS: I believe we still have four days’ time. HITLER: In four days the thing will have been decided * * * * *

3rd Situation Report, April 23, 1945

HITLER: The following should be brought in during the course of the afternoon, if at all possible: two battalions of the Grossdeutscb/and Divi¬ sion. It may be possible to add some other battalion to that. In the gov¬ ernment quarter, there are the following reserves: the Fiihrer Escort Com¬ pany, except for two platoons that are already employed; a Volksstorm battalion from the Propaganda Ministry with three companies; and a Volksstorm company of the Reich Chancellery. Together a strength of around 3,500 men. The Reichsfiihrcr SS wanted to send his battalion over here as a last reserve as well. KREBS: Volunteer soldiers and SS men have strengthened the forces man¬ ning the innermost defensive ring in the government cjuarter. IIITLHR: We have to watch out that Seydlitz’s soldiers and officers don’t come in here as well.2014 Up here on the Havel [northwest of Berlin) a diffi¬ cult situation arose. If this threatens to collapse, it will be a mess and a serious mistake on the part of the command. Everything that comes in should be employed against that now. We also have to pull everything out from here. The 7th Panzer Division must be employed here in order to eliminate tins mess. |—| The current enemy pressure indicates that the enemy’s initial intention is to encircle Berlin and thus cut off the supply lines to Berlin. The Luftwaffe must take absolutely everything they still have and concentrate it up here, and quickly! We’re dealing with minutes. Also here between Treuenbrietzen and Schwielowsee, everything must be thrown for¬ ward in order to cut this off here. The thing up on the Havel must also be brought under control as quickly as possible. FEGELEIN: 'lhe important thing is to clear the street system. HITLER: In Potsdam we must hold at all cost. Group Steiner has to move down the Havel [River]. KAETHER: New reports just arrived. There arc ten to twelve very heavy enemy tanks on I.andsberger Strasse east of the main fighting line, suppos-

35chjtztos Mater

720

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS

edly Stalin models. Behind that, innumerable additional tanks. Therefore, [they are] considerably stronger than originally reported. Not only the stated 40, but considerably more. As far as the eye can see. Luftwaffe support was ordered, and engagement has been announced. Artillery commands were ordered to act against that with concentrated fire. HITLER: We have to go down low with bombers and really destroy them. Our assault guns are a bit too weak when faced with these things.

Wednesday, April 25, 1945

The Soviet ring around Berlin closes. At around 1 p.m., the attacking spearheads of the 4th Guards Tank Army, advancing from the south, and the units of the Soviet 47th Army advancing fromthe north, link up at Ketzin, twelve kilometers northwest of Potsdam. In the Reich capital, the Soviets push forward from the south to the Neubabelsberg-Zehlendorf- Neukolln line. In Spandau, Hitler Youth under the leadership of National Political Education Institute chief, SS Gruppenfuhrer Heissmeyer, are encircled. Weidling, the city commander explains to Hitler with the help of a standard city map that the German front is being systematically pushed back to the city center. Acting against a Fuhrer order, General Busse's Ninth Army doesn't fight its way through to Berlin from the southeast of the German capital, but instead attempts to break through to the west into American captivity. On the front east of Berlin, the the Soviets reach Gorlitz, Bautzen and Kamenz, and, in the southeast, Briinn. The British reach a line between Bremen on the Weser and Horneburg on the Elbe. The Americans advance through the Bavarian forest to the south; in central Germany they meet the Soviets' western advancing spearheads at Torgau:the remainder of the Reich is cut in half. HITLER: The British and the Americans are being quiet on the Elbe [River], They are probably agreed on some kind of demarcation line. In Berlin it looks worse than it really is. The Berlin area must be cleared, emptied of people, in so far as possible. The 12th [Wenck] and 9th [Busse] Armies, which are forming fixed fronts in the west and east, must be pulled into Berlin. The divisions in Berlin must be filled up however possible, using the local population. Recruiting columns must be set up in order to bring everyone in. In Berlin, General Weidling has the the central command; Colonel Kaether is his deputy. One division staff or another will still come in. The cadre units will be put in order and replenished again, so we'll have divisions. Everything else that comes in will be integrated into these

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

721

divisions so that a real order will develop. [ — ] Southwestern Germany is fragile. Even my influence from Berchtesgaden couldn’t have prevented that. The defeatist mood was there [even] earlier. The three men responsible are no longer alive. They have poisoned the whole Western Front from the beginning—a society corrupted by its luxury. [—] I can achieve success here alone. If I do achieve a success, even if it’s only a moral one, at least it’s an opportunity to save face and gain time. One thing I do know. It’s totally useless to go south, because I have no influence and no armies there. I would be there with just my staff. I could only hold a southern German Ostmark mountain block, even though Italy could also be maintained as a war theater. But there as well, total defeatism dominates the leadership, which is devoured from the top down. GOEBBELS: In Berlin we can achieve a moral success on a global scale. This success can only be achieved here, where the eyes of the entire world are directed. The fact that the Russians are marching into Brandenburg won’t be regretted as much as if Berlin were to be taken into their possession. But if they are driven back in front of Berlin, then that would be the basis for a great example for the world. HITLER: If it’s really true. I received news that the talks between Eden and Molotov apparently did not reach a compromise. The Russians demand the whole area. That would mean the whole war would be lost for the British. England started this war because I demanded a corridor to East Prussia and Danzig, with approval under Allied control. And now they’re supposed to allow a power that now dominates practically the whole of Europe already and extends into East Asia to advance even further? [—] I believe that the moment has come when the instinct for selfpreservation will cause the others to stand up anyway against this immoderate and proletarianBolshevist colossus and Moloch [Devil], If I were to run away from here today like a coward, the result would be that the others would try to erect in southern Germany a kind of neutral line, and that would be all. Then National Socialism would be eliminated and the German Reich as well. If I strike here successfully and hold the capital, then the hope might grow among the British and the Americans that they might possibly be able to oppose this danger with a Nazi Germany after all. And I am the only man for this. GOEBBELS: If such a conception is possible at all, which is debatable, then it would only be possible through you and only in this place. If you leave this city, you lose everything else as well. You can’t give up Berlin with the idea that you can defend yourself here or somewhere else. HITLER: I have said that to the gentlemen as well. I said, “The situation is not such that I have a completely stable front down here in southern Germany and have a buffer zone and don’t want to leave Berlin out of sheer obstinacy.” I see where the development is going. All my attempts to influ-

722

HrriMR and His Generals

ence the tactics are simply useless. Insane and catastrophic mistakes were made during the defense of the Rhineland as well as in other places. All the plans 1 worked out failed simply because the ground was pulled out from under them through the arbitrary acts of junior commanders. KREBS: Field Marshal Keitel has issued the following orders. The combat group of the 7th Panzer Division goes to Nauen and then to Berlin. One of our assault gun groups will go to Berlin immediately. The command struc¬ ture according to Jodi’s proposal. Subordination of Army Group Vistula under the Armed Forces Operations Staff in Rheinsberg, as of this evening Wenck will take over the command as soon he has influence over Group Holste. The thrust to the south from Lowenberg will start this evening GOEBBELS: The war situation is such today that only a visible symbol can achieve something. IIITLER: As an inglorious refugee from Berlin, I would have no authority in either northern or southern Germany, and in Berchtesgaden even less. GOF^BBF.LS: In 1933 the party was so weakened that without your per¬ sonal action only further failure would haw come. Only by means of your personal effort was everything else swept along If you had left Berlin on Sunday, Berlin would not be in our hands today. IITTLER: With what was I then supposed to hold the south against the west? You see, it’s like that everywhere: a name guarantees a certain order. Wherever there’s a name, a personality, there’s order. As long as there was a personality in Italy, there was a certain order here. Under Victinghoff, the demoralizing influences again became stronger/"15 f—•] It was those smart¬ asses that Clausewitz warned of—people who always see the easier way as more intelligent. Actually, the easier way is stupider. And then the false cleverness on top of that. For me there’s no doubt: The battle has reached a climax here. [—] If it’s really true that differences will arise among the Allies in San Francisco—and they will arise—then a change can only come about if I strike at the Bolshevik colossus at one point. Then the others might come to the conclusion after all that there is only one who is in a position to stop the Bolshevik colossus, and that is I and the party' and today’s German state. [—] If fate decides differently, then 1 would vanish from the stage of world history as an inglorious refugee. But I would consider it a thousand times more cowardly to commit suicide at the Obersalzberg than to stand here and fall. [—] One shouldn’t say, “You, as the Fuhrcr...” [—] I am the Fiihrer as long I can really lead. I can’t lead by setting myself on a mountain somewhere; I must have authority' over armies that obey. Let me achieve a victory here, and even though it may still be difficult and hard, then I will have the right again to eliminate the lazy elements that are constantly creating obstructions; then I will work with

MlUTARY C'ONFERlzNCES 1942-1945

723

the generals who have proven their worth. Only a heroic attitude can en¬ able us to stand this difficult time. [—] Also earlier in history, the Asian assault wasn’t broken by the fact that everyone surrendered; somewhere he must be stopped. We experienced ourselves once, how difficult it is to negotiate with Molotov. We were at the height of our power then. Here stands the Asian khan, who wants to conquer Europe. England realizes quite clearly that Bolshevism will continue to devour beyond the points already reached today. This is now the decisive battle. [—] If I win this battle, then I expect nothing from it for my personal name. But then I will be rehabilitated. Then I can eliminate a number of generals and lower officers, including in the SS, who have failed at decisive points. But for all those T accuse of withdrawing, T have to provide an example, so that T don’t withdraw myself. [—J It’s also possible that I will fall here. But then I will have perished in a decent way. But that would be still better than if I would sit as an inglorious refugee to Berchtesgaden, giving orders from there that are of no use. This so-called southern fortress is not self-suffi¬ cient. That’s an illusion. The armies down there arc fragile. There’s just nothing that can be done in the south, f—] I can see the possibility of repairing the thing only if I achieve a success in some place. Bear in mind the repercussions on the British. If we defend Berlin successfully today— and certain signs of an anti-Russian mood are emerging—then they will see that the people who possess the appropriate farsightedness will again take a bit of courage in the face of this colossus. These people might then say to themselves: if we were to go with Nazi Germany, then maybe we could hold our ground against this colossus after all. GOEBBELS: It would also be encouraging for the other side. If Stalin sees this development in the Western States that’s based on a German victory in Berlin, then he would say to himself, “1 won’t get the Europe that I had in mind. I’m only bringing the Germans and the British together. So I will strike a balance with the Germans and make some sort of agreement.” Frederick the Great was once in a similar situation. He also got all of his authority back after the Battle of Leuthen. If the Fuhrer proves that it can be done—that one can stay, and that one can win a battle by staying—then these executions will have an educational meaning and not a crushing effect. HITLER: It’s simply unbearable for me personally to have other people shot for things that I do myself. I wasn’t born just to defend my Berghof alone. GOEBBELS: If the thing in the south and west had been different, and if it had just been about a Battle for Berlin—like, for example, for Breslau— then I would have strongly protested against your coming to Berlin and making a prestige issue out of it. But the developments have now made this Battle for Berlin into a prestige case after all. The Fuhrer has decided to

724

Unu K axis His Generals

oppose the Russian enemy in this place, and has appealed to the German people of Berlin to follow him one last time. This situation must be fought through now, in one way or another. HITLER: There was no problem for me here at all. It’s the only possibility at all to restore my personal reputation. Somewhere, the power of the Greater Asian Khan must be broken. Back then it was the Battle of Vienna [1683]. Now it’s the Battle for Berlin. When Vienna was freed, the entire Turkish power wasn’t broken instantly. It took years still. But it was a signal. If the Viennese had surrendered like cowards at that time, then Turkish power would have continued to advance. GOEBBELS: It seems important to me that as long as we’re not getting any relief from the outside, we have to keep our defense area around Berlin as large as possible. HITLER: The narrower we are, the worse it is. [—] The Allies will have created a demarcation line on the basis of diplomatic agreements. But the Russians certainly aren’t thinking about observing it. I know how it was in the winter of 1940.1 didn’t go to war against Moscow out of carelessness, but because, on the basis of certain information, I knew that an alliance between England and Russia was being prepared. The question was whether we should begin to strike ourselves or whether we should wait and be crushed to death sometime. [—] Now, 1 became acquainted with Molotov at that time. The Russians hadn’t achieved any overwhelming international successes at that time. They were defeated in Finland. Then they occupied a few areas. In the Polish campaign they waited too long—until we were well past the agreed demarcation line. Then came our campaign in the West, in which we achieved a huge victory. The Russians hadn’t expected that at all. It was the biggest victory in the history of the world. Then came the various demon¬ strations by our Luftwaffe against England. And in this whole situation, Molotov demanded things from us in Berlin that were outrageous. [—] He demanded from us that we withdraw from bases on Danish territory at the exit to the North Sea. He had already announced a claim to that back then. He demanded Constantinople, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland—and we were the winners at that time! How w ill this Molotov act now toward the British and the Americans with such victories and after these catastrophic failures of the Allies. [—] Now this Asian conflict is added to that. In America, sober thinkers will say: what do we want here anyway? Capital investment, perhaps? But we won’t gain markets here. There are resources for us in China. On the other hand, they don’t want Russia to enter the war against Japan. They say: we’ll handle Japan alone. GOEBBELS: If the Soviets advance up to the Elbe, including the Protec¬ torate [of Bohemia], then the Americans will disappear from here. Only 20 to 25 British divisions will remain. Pacifist and salon Bolshevik propa-

Military ConferizNcus 1942-1945

725

ganda will begin among the British troops. Stalin will militarize his area, including the German area. I le will fight with propaganda against the West¬ ern forces because they destroyed the cities. He’s a better propagandist than the British. [—] The Soviets can play on all pianos. A conflict will arise here in a very short time. 1 can’t imagine that there are intelligent Englishmen who don’t see that. HITLER: Now it’s going to happen. What Lloyd George2016 once told me: the provisional peace treaty. Back then Lloyd George declared in a memo¬ randum, “The Peace of Versailles can’t be maintained and is insane. En¬ gland is destroying the European balance.” It was a classic prophetic memo¬ randum by Lloyd George. [—| If we were to leave the world stage so dis¬ gracefully, then we would have lived in vain. It’s completely unimportant if we continue to live for a while still or not. Better to end the battle honorably than to go on living in shame and dishonor for a few more months or years. GOEBBELS: If the thing goes well, it’s fine anyway. If it doesn’t go well and the Fiihrcr were to find an honorable death in Berlin and Europe were to become Bolshevik, in five vears at the latest the Eiihrer would be a legendary personality and National Socialism a myth. He would be hal¬ lowed by his last great action, and everything human that they criticize in him today would be swept away in one stroke. HITLER: That’s the decision: to save everything here and only here, and to put the last man into action—that’s our duly. Jfc

3f
His Gexeraus

1939

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

Total

737

2,852

3,373

4,337

4,649

2,287

_

18,235

605

2,746

3,744

5,515

10,898

25,285

4,936

53,729

—

-

1,041

947

1,988

134

603

507

1,249

3,266

5,496

1,104

12,359

164

971

1,079

1,067

1,117

1,686

216

6,299

Total production 2,518

10,247

12,401

15,409

24,807

40,593

Bombers Fighters Jet aircraft Fighter-bombers

—

-

—

Reconnaissance planes

7,540 113,515

it is necessary to bear in mind that, for the most part, these models were practically obsolete by the time they came off the assembly line and were unable to challenge enemy air supremacy. In the bomber category, for ex¬ ample, there was nothing comparable to the American four-engine planes and in the fighter category there was nothing equal to the American all-weather and long-range fighters. (In addition, repairs must also be considered, and in the figures for the last years, “production” did not necessarily mean “ready for action” or “received by the troops.”) But while the production curve contin¬ ued to increase until 1944, the shortage of personnel was felt earlier, particu¬ larly after 1943. The primary cause was the incorrect estimate of the war’s duration by Goring and jcschonnck in the first years of the war. This led to a massive consumption of fuel at the front, at the expense of training, which received only 15 to 20% of its requirements. The Germans paid for this im¬ balance in the later years of the war, particularly when the heavy losses during large-scale Luftwaffe supply operations—on Crete, at Demiansk, in Africa to El Alamein, and especially in Stalingrad—created gaps that could no longer be filled. Later, after the enemy side implemented permanent fighter cover, the shortcomings of the Luftwaffe were felt above the Reich as well.—Source: Baum bach, p. Hi; Kc .wiring: Die ciattsche Luftwaffe, p. 145; Rieckboff, p. 265. Meaning the low number trained. 231 The He 177—called the “FlyingTinderbox” by the troops—was the unfortu¬ nate result of the need to develop a distance bomber. Goring had neglected this aircraft type following the decision not to build up a German strategic Luftwaffe after the death of General Wever in 1936, and the breakup of the coordinated Luftwaffe leadership the following year. The original, senseless demand of the General Staff (Jeschonnek) for a four-engine aircraft w ith div¬ ing capability' forced the designers to use double aggregates, i.e., arranging each pair of engines on one crankshaft and with one propeller (tandem ar¬ rangement). This double-Vr engine did not stand the test, though part of the problem was also the fact that it had been rushed to deployment prematurely. From the first day of deployment in September 1942—after the diving re¬ quirement had been abandoned—there were problems with piston seizure, inadequate cooling, and oil leaks that caused vibration and frequent engine fires. Of the aircraft participating in the air supply of Stalingrad, for example,

MllSIARY CoNhliRIiXCliS

807

1942-1945

four planes were lost through engine fires in one squadron alone, and the rest were soon out of action as well. Later, the Fie 177 was brought to the front for use—as originally intended—as a heavy bomber, after the elimination of the many problem areas and this time as a new development with four single en¬ gines, lifting surface [wings] that had been lengthened by 1 m and a fuselage lengthened by 2 m; however, production was cancelled in July 1944 in favor of the fighter program. (Data: Tiefdecker aircraft, 5-man crew, 540 km/h, 1-ton bomb load, 6,000 km range; production numbers: 1942: 166, 1943: 415, 1944: 565.)—Source: Baumbacb, pp. 151 and 314; Schneider, p. 235; Bart* p. 83: Lusar, p. 45. 2S2 Dr of Engineering Ernst Heinkel; bom January 24, 1888; technical college; diploma and doctoral examination; 1912 engineer for the Berlin-Johannistal Aviation Company; 1913 chief designer, Albatros Factories; 1914 technical director, Hansa Aircraft Factories; and 1922 founded the Ernst Heinkel Air¬ craft Factories. Heinkel, built mopeds, motor scooters, etc., since 1950, as well as aircraft engines and licensed models since 1957, died on January 30,1958.— Source: Muncqnger Archive.

231 There were various plans during the second half of the war for a distance bomber that could attack the industrial areas of the Urals as well as the USA (the best-known example was the Me 324). Unless the discussion concerned the possibility of further developing the FW 200 “Condor” or the FW 191, the reference here was probably to further discussion of a project study that had been presented in May 1942 by Focke-Wulf but never executed. The pro¬ posal was for a six-engine distance bomber, FAX 400, originally with a range of 10,000 km and a 5-ton payload.—Source: Baumbacb, p. 158; I M.rar, p.

68.

The name cannot be identified, but the reference was to a Soviet industrial area in the Urals.

213 Meaning no Russian flak. 236 The following table gives an approximate—but not necessarily completely re¬ liable—overview of the enemy air raids against the Reich during World War I: 1914

1915

1916

1917

1918

Bombs dropped

33

940

1,817

5,234

7,717

Dead

11

116

160

79

380

Wounded

42

329

352

323

797

1 _

0.83

1.38

6.3

15.5

ca. 50

_

376

657

Property' damage in millions of marks Number of attacks

Most of the attacks in 1914, 1915 and again in 1918 were made during the day, while in 1916 and 1917 the raids were primarily (1916: 78%) flown at night. Targets were the armaments industry', some military installations, and—dur¬ ing the final phase—also the civilian population. Most of the damage was caused not by the raids themselves but by the confusion and frequent distur¬ bances that followed. The trouble that nightly air-raid warnings caused for the

808

Hi i u .r and His Generals

armaments factories on the western border of the Reich forced Commerce Councilor Rochling, chairman of the board of the Dusscldorf Steelworks Association, to send a letter to the Supreme Army Command on November 20, 1916. The letter included the following: “At today’s board meeting, the significant disturbances caused by air raids against the steel factories on the western border were discussed. The continuing reduction in the nightly pro¬ duction as a result of these disturbances has caused not only a 30% drop in the steel production, on average, but has also led to fears that night operations may soon he discontinued altogether. ...” So Hitler was not entirely wrong in this case.—Source: Der I Jtftschut^, pp. 64 and 1)5. J

Hitler addressed this topic again in detail nearly two years later.

23B The “Mosquito” was a light twin-engine two-seater introduced by the RAF in September 1941. It was used for close reconnaissance and as a single-seat fighter (Mosquito model 11)—with eight rockets of 27.2 kg each to attack ship targets—and also as the “Pathfinder” during large-scale attacks on Ger¬ man cities after August 1942. Above all, it was used as a medium bomber with the ability to carrv initially 900 and later 1,800 kg. The Mosquito appeared for the first time at the front in this capacity on May 31, 1942. As a result of its high speed of nearly 700 km/h—which could not he matched by any German fighter except the Me 262 jet fighter—the Mosquito could, until the end of the war, eliminate all armaments in favor of a larger bomb load. In addition, the only attacks on these aircraft that promised any success—diving from a very high altitude—were impossible due to the high altitude of the Mosqui¬ toes’ flight. The Mosquitoes were also very difficult to locate electronically because of their timber construction (Canadian spruce). The result of the continuous annoyance by these planes—deployed more and more frequently in small formations—was the introduction of the public air-raid warning in Germany. Due to the grumbling of the vexed population (“The fat one can’t even finish off a few lousy Mosquitoes!”), Goring established two special units with highly tuned engines and the soothing designation “Fighter Wing 25” and “Fighter Wing 50,” though they were actually only reinforced squadrons. The two units did not shoot down even a single Mosquito and were disbanded in the fall of 1943.—Sonne: Ruwpfp. 82; Feucbter,p. 214;Ga!land,p. 227; Hebrani, p. 197. 2,r See also p. 59. Only small pieces of the remaining pages of this shorthand record were preserved, with no coherent sentences. The only thing that could be gathered from the remaining fragments was that Hitler continued to dis¬ cuss Luftwaffe issues, particularly relating to the He 177.

4 Transcript number unknown—Fragment No. 38—The transcript was burned in the upper left-hand corner. Hitler had been staying since February 18 in his “Wehrwolf” quarters in western Ukraine, on the road from Vinnitsa to Zhitomir. He had also directed the war effort from there the previous year, from July 13 (Greiner: July 16) to November 1. A few days after this meeting and the following one, he moved back again to Rastcnburg, where he arrived on March 13.

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

241.

809

From the summer of 1940 (1940: 22 admitted English raids) until the battle of Berlin on November 18, 1943, the capital of the Reich was the target of periodic Allied air raids of increasing strength. These attacks caused serious losses, but did not significantly alter the appearance of the city. During the first quarter of 1943, for example, the Armed Forces High Command report noted the following attacks on Berlin: January 16 and 17 in the evening, January 30 during the day, March 1 in the evening (Armed Forces High Command report of March 2, 1943: "British aircraft came over Berlin last night and dropped demolition and incendiary bombs onto the Reich capital and towns nearby. There was damage from incendiary and demolition bombs in residential districts and to public buildings. The population suffered losses."), as well as during the nights of March 27 and 29. During the same time period, the German Luftwaffe attacked London on the evenings of January 17 and 18, and on January 20 at midday, as well as the night of March 3 mentioned here (Armed Forces High Command report of March 4, "During night of March 3 the German Luftwaffe bombed the area of greater London with heavy demolition bombs and thousands of incendiary bombs.") — Source: Armed Forces High Command reports; Kumpf, pp. 61 and 67; Galland, p. 193.

242.

The Mareth Line — the border fortifications between Tunisia and Libya — were dismantled after the French armistice with the Axis powers at the end of June 1940, but the concrete bunkers, though light, still provided good support for Rommel's withdrawing army.

243.

The 8.8 cm [88 mm] anti-aircraft artillery gun 41 — an advanced version of the 8.8 cm anti-aircraft artillery guns 18, 36 and 37 — was then being deployed and tested in Tunis for the first time. The essential characteristic of this weapon, which was unrivaled even several years after the end of the war, was the significantly increased initial velocity (V„: 1,000 instead of 820 m/sec), which thus increased the range (vertical 14,930 instead of 9,750 m, horizontal 19,700 instead of 14,800 m). As a result of the enormously increased stress on the barrel, however, the barrels' the number of rounds was again increased to 4,000. Additional advantages of the new gun were the low trunnion height and strengthened carriage, as well as the electronic discharge and mechanical ammunition rammer, which increased the rate of fire from 15 to 20 rounds per minute. — Source: Koch: Flak, pp. 114 and 209.

244.

For the fluctuations in the tank forces in Africa, see below.

245.

After the complete abandonment of Italian North Africa, the German-Italian panzer army under Rommel was placed directly under the command of the Comando Supremo for a time. In this arrangement, Field Marshal Kesselring represented the German interests.

246.

Rommel proposed to restrict the final defense of Tunis to a position approximately 150 km long, in the northern part of the country ("Enfidaville position").

247.

Regarding the takeover of French tonnage, see above. It turned out to be particularly difficult to arm these vessels with a sufficient number of antiaircraft guns.

H10

Hitler and His Generals

7JX In the Mediterranean, the tanker capacity in particular was extraordinarily lim¬ ited, so the sinking of tankers always had very serious consequences. From November 1942 to February 1943, British submarines, surface forces and air¬ craft repeatedly caught Italian tankers and sank them. By January 22, 1943 (the end of sea traffic to Libya after the evacuation of Tripoli), the Italian merchant fleet had lost a total 1,345,000 tons, with an additional 1,195,000 tons damaged—equivalent to all the available ship capacity at the beginning of the war, plus 275,000 tons of newly constructed, confiscated, conquered and German tonnage.—Source: Tritgtno, p. 5). 24 The reference is to the British steamer Chateau Roux, which was damaged during this raid. A Panamanian tanker of 7,000 GRT was sunk during the raid on Philippeville (Fast Algeria). 3Z8 Robert Ritter v. Greim; born June 22,1892; Cadet Corps; 1913 Second Lieuten¬ ant in the Field Artillery; 1915 joined the Luftwaffe; 1917 First Lieutenant and Commander, 34th Fighter Squadron, later of the fighter formation Greim; “Pour le merite”; 1919 law studies; junior lawyer; 1924-27 served with the Chinese Air Force in Canton; returned to military' service in January' 1934 and was appointed commander of the first fighter squadron of the new Luftwaffe; February 1939 Commander, 5th Air Division; 1940 Lieutenant General and until March 1942 Commanding General, V Air Corps (in the West, then after June 1941 in the East), which wras reorganized as Luftwaffe Command East on April 1,1942, and renamed Sixth Air Fleet on May 5,1943. He wras promoted to Colonel General in February 1943. On April 25, 1945, Hitler appointed Greim to be Field Mar¬ shal and Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe—and for this purpose he had to fly into the encircled city' center of Berlin. After being captured by the Ameri¬ cans, he committed suicide on May 24,1945.—Source: Muwynger Archive; Siegler, f). 120, Seemen; Geschichte der Ritter... I, p. 402. Major Gustav Pressler, who was awarded Oak Leaves, was born October 13, 1912; joined the police in 1932; w as transferred to the Luftwaffe as a Second Lieutenant in 1935; and became a member of the Imme/manndive-bomber squad¬ ron in 1937 (serving as group commander in the end).—Source: DNB of January 28, 1943; Seemen.

Erhard Milch; born March 3, 1892; 1911 Second Lieutenant; 1915 joined the Luftwaffe; in World War I as a captain and Commander, 6th Fighter Group; discharged in 1920; and served with border troops and the police flight squad¬ ron in East Prussia. When the squadron wfas disbanded, he joined Lloyd-Ostflug, a civilian aviation company, then Danzig Airmail; he wrorkcd as head of flying operations at Junkers from 1923, and in 1925-26, after the merger of the avia¬ tion companies, he sat on the board of Deutsche Lufthansa. He was appointed Goring’s deputy in the Reichs Commissariat for Aviation on February 4, 1933. From February 22, 1933, Undersecretary for Aviation; October 1933 Colonel; 1935 Lieutenant General; 1936 Air General; October 1938 Colonel General and

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

825

Luftwaffe Inspector General; July 1940 Field Marshal; November 1941 (following Udet's suicide) General in charge of aircraft production and also Commander, Fifth Air Fleet in Norway from April 12 to May 10, 1940; and head of the Stalingrad relief mission from January 15 to February 3, 1942. On June 20, 1944, the positions of Undersecretary for Aviation and General in charge of aircraft production were eliminated; on January 7,1945, Goring relieved Milch — who, as a matter of form, had served as Speer's deputy in the Ministry of Armaments and War Production— of his post as Luftwaffe Inspector General and deputy of R.d.L. and Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. In April 1947 Milch was sentenced in Nuremberg (Case 2) to life imprisonment (the sentence was reduced to 15 years in 1952); he was released on parole in 1954. — Source: Munzinger Archive; VB of March 20,1942; Frankfurter Zeitung of Nov. 3,1938; Siegler,p. 132. 331. Transcript number unknown — Fragment No.32 — The (destroyed) date of this meeting can be more or less reconstructed as follows: Hitler had returned to Rastenburg from Vinnitsa (Wehrwolf) on March 13, and he made a speech in Berlin on March 21 to mark Veterans Day, which had been postponed by a week "because of the military situation" (Volkischer Beobachter wrote on March 22, 1943, that only now the situation in the East was such that "the Fiihrer dared to spend a few hours in Berlin"). He then traveled to Berchtesgaden, where he received the first of a series of satellite leaders on March 31. Since the date of March 20 is mentioned, this meeting could not have taken place any later than March 18, or Zeitzler would have spoken of "tomorrow" or "today." In addition, the "Buffalo Movement" [Operation Buffalo] was apparently still in progress, so the discussion may have taken place on March 16, the day on which that operation was completed. Preparations for "down there," on the other hand, indicate that it took place at Wolfsschanze — as the stenographer noted — that is to say not earlier than March 11 . The reference to a strike in Turin gives another clue. The Fiat factory there was the center of the strike action, where 40,000 to 50,000 employees failed to report for work on March 12. Therefore it may be assumed that this fragment dates to a period between March 12 and 15. [ — ] Of the two original sets of shorthand notes, one was completely destroyed while the other was so heavily charred that only about half of the text — spread over the page — is legible. According to a note on the fragment, the first transcription of the text yielded 45 typed pages; the second yielded only 28. 332.

Panzer Grenadier Division (Panzer Division after the winter of 1943-44) Grossdeutschland was an elite army force with members from all the German ethnic groups. It was not included in the regular division numbering system and, among other duties, it had to assign guards to the Fiihrer Headquarters. The division was established in May 1942 from the Grossdeutschland Regiment, which was set up in the summer 1939 from the Wachregiment Berlin — probably including parts of the Doberitz Infantry Training Regiment and 92nd Infantry. The regiments and battalions that were given priority in terms of replacements and armaments were all called divisions. Grossdeutschland was deployed on the Eastern front until 1945. — Source: Order of Battle, p. 303; Gorlitz, p. 195.

826

Hitler and His Generals

m Planned evacuation by Army Group Center of the salient projecting along the front between lukhnov and Rzhev. 334 Smoke mortars consisted of a mobile launcher that could fire multiple pow¬ der rockets (15-cm and 21-cm caliber) at targets several thousand meters away at very short intervals. Originally designed in the inter-war period for the de¬ livery of gas or smoke ammunition, they were relied on more and more heavily by artillery units as the war progressed. The name is probably derived from their original use; some, however, believe that it is a reference to the inventor, Dr. of Engineering Rudolf Nebel. During the war, the smoke mortar troops were grouped in special brigades and regiments.—Source: Lusar, p. 88; Order of Hattie, p. 4 74. 335 Alpini and Bersaglieri divisions were always considered to be the best Italian units. ”b Vittorio Ambrosio; born July 28,1898; Second Lieutenant of Cavalry; took part in the Italian-Turkish War as aCaptain; 1915 to 1918Chief of Staff, 3rd Cavalry Division; 1918 Colonel; 1923 commanding officer of a cavalry regiment, later at the Cavalry Academy; 1927 Brigadier General and Chief of General Staff of an Army Corps; 1932 Division General and Commander of the 2nd Mobile Divi¬ sion; 1935 Commanding General of an Army Corps on Sicily; December 1938 Army General and Commander-in-Chief, Second Army (he was in Croatia from April 1941 to January 1942 with this army, where he openly favored the Cetniks); from January 1942 to January 1943 Army Chief of General Staff; and on Janu¬ ary 30, 1943 succeeded Cavallcro as Chief of the Comando Supremo. Ambrosio was one of the conspirators against the Fascist regime and was appointed In¬ spector General of the Army by the Badoglio government, but soon applied for his discharge.—Source: Mtot^iger Archive; A fieri, pp. 214, 220 and222; Sitgier, p. 93. 3r Regarding Hitler’s comments on his allies’ troops, the reader should bear in mind that the Italians and the Hungarians did not adopt as their own objective the German invasion to conquer Russia’s space (and the winter battles that such a campaign required). The Romanians, after recapturing of Bessarabia, did not have a clear war aim anymore cither. In addition, the characteristics of the three allies didn’t prepare them for the stress and strain of heavy fighting The brave and persevering Romanian soldiers had the best record, and the original Italian Expeditionary Corps (CSIR) had proven its worth. But even these formations lacked suitable non-commissioned officers, and inadequate combat training caused relatively large losses that had a negative impact on the morale of the troops. Weapons—in particular antitank weapons—and equipment wrere obso¬ lete and inadequate, and the relationship between officers and men was cold (think of the different rations). The command—with the exception of the out¬ standing commander of the Romanian Third Army, Colonel General Dimitrescu, or General Lascar—were not up to the challenges of the Russian campaign either. In addition, there were political differences within the officer corps and national tensions between individual allies (Hungarians and Romanians, for ex¬ ample, could not be deployed together!). In view of this situation, independent

MlLTIARY CoNhTzRliNCUS 1942-1945

827

deployment of allied troops, as required by the High Command, caused consid¬ erable problems to the German commanders at the front. Because Hitler had ordered the assault across the Don towards the Volga River, it was not possible for the Germans to take any precautions. With many misgivings (which proved justified in the end), the allies were entrusted the area of the Don that was relatively easy to defend. After that disaster, Italians and I Bulgarians disappeared from the Eastern theater of war—the Italians forever, the Hungarians until July 1944; only the Romanians stayed, with 8 divisions at the bridgehead on Kuban and in the Crimea.—Source: Manstein, p. 210; Schroler, p. 49; Hillgruher: pp. 162, 171, and elsewhere; Friessner, p. 233. 3,8 This refers to the outfitting of 700,000 Italians in addition to the Germans’ own large needs. Mussolini always generously offered troops, but they lacked the required equipment and weapons. r, After the Polish campaign, the former Sixth Army, which was established at the beginning of the war from the command of Fourth Army Group (Leipzig), was renamed Tenth Army. It was commanded by Field Marshal v. Reichenau until December 30, 1941, then by Panzer General Paulus. After the capitulation of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, the Sixth Army was reestablished from the com¬ mand of Army Detachment Hollidt and remained at the Eastern Front until the capitulation.—Source: Siegkr, p. 27. ,4" Fritz Sauckel; bom October 27, 1894; trained as a sailor; 1914-19 prisoner of war in France, then blue-collar worker, enrolled for two years at a polytechnic; 1919 Deutschvolkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund; 1921 joined NSDAP [Nazi Patty); 1927 Gauleiter [Party leader) of Thuringia; 1930 member of the Thuringia State Assembly; August 26,1932 appointed Chairman of the State Ministry and Interior Minister of Thuringia; 1933 Member of the Reichstag; May 5, 1933 appointed Reichsstatthaltcr of Thiiringia; on September 1, 1939 Rcichs De¬ fense Commissioner in Military District IX (Kassel); March 21,1942 appointed General Representative for Work Assignment for the commissioner of the FourYear Plan (GBA). Sauckel was accused at the Nuremberg main trial (primarily in connection with the slave labor issue), sentenced to death by hanging, and ex¬ ecuted on October 10, 1946.—Source: Der Grossdeutsche Reichstag. In 1943, in addition to the 550,000 men whose birth year made eligible for military service, the Armed Forces were able to add 1.5 million persons from earlier age groups who were released from other industries. Due to the increase in foreign labor and women entering the workplace, the work force in the Greater German Reich was (despite conscription) increased by some 1,765,000 individuals that year—from 26,935,000 on January 1,1943, to 28,700,000 late in December 1943. (The GBA report, “Die deutsche Industrie...” indicates even higher numbers—16 million men, 14 million women and 7 million for¬ eign workers and prisoners of war for mid-1943.) The screening of the poten¬ tial labor force through compulsory registration and the requirement to close businesses based on the regulations of January 27 and 29, 1943, added 833,000 full-time and 793,000 part-time workers to the labor force; the reorganization (AZS action) carried our in the second half of 1943 added another 396,000

H2H

Hmj:r asd His Glnerals

workers to the armaments industry.—Source: Weidemtann, passim; Die deutscbe Industrie. ..,p. 46; GBA Report of Dec. 12, 1943: “DerArbei/seinsat^im Grossdeutschen Reich vom 1. Januar bis 31. December 1943 ” (Nbg. Dok. NG-3996). 342 It is no longer possible to identify exactly what output was to be tripled. Gen¬ erally speaking, the German ammunition output tripled from 1940 to 1944, while the weapons output experienced a nine-fold increase. For individual weapons whose output was especially accelerated, the multipliers were as fol¬ lows: submarines 4 to 6, aircraft 4 to 5, tanks approximately 17. It should be kept in mind, though, that the differences between output figures and absorp¬ tion figures grew' tremendously during this period, so the number of opera¬ tional weapons did not grow at nearly the same rate. -v,} Racial policy measures were introduced by Italy at the time of the Abyssinian campaign, but application of the provisions was initially limited to the colo¬ nial territories (in order to prevent the development of a mixed population). Apart from a few' sectarian and fanatical organs and spokesmen (/m 1 7ta haliana.; Farinacci), these issues were not taken up by official publications until spring 1938, after the stabilization of the Axis. Mussolini made his first comment about the matter at the end of July. According to the decision of the Fascist Grand Council of October 7, 1938, the position of Jews was settled by a statute and relevant legislation w'as adopted, but numerous privileges were permitted for mixed marriages, old Fascists, veterans, etc. The removal of Jews from the Italian armed forces began in 1938, but most of them reap¬ peared in their previous (or other) positions later. The resistance of the Italian people (who were not particularly enthusiastic about racial measures) was backed up by the Catholic Church, which protected Jew's who had converted to its faith. As early as September 18, 1938, Mussolini spoke of “unexpected friends who suddenly appeared.” Priests continued to give their blessing to “mixed mar¬ riages” that were prohibited by the “law for the defense of the Italian race.” These marriages could not be sanctioned through the civil ceremony that was optional in Italy at that time. In addition, primary and secondary schools run by the Catholic Church had become a refuge for Jewish children of the Catholic faith when they and their Jewish teachers were expelled from public schools late in 1938.—Source: Blabut,passim; Rotbrbein,pp. 74 and 78; Ptni, p. 301; Wagcnfubr p. 9. |NDT: see also Renzo De Felice, The Jen s in Fascist Italy: A History, Enigma 2001, pp. 278-284] Matthias Erzbogcr; born September 20, 1875; elementary school teacher and editor; from 1903 Member of the Reichstag (left wing of the Center), initially annexationist, then in favor of a negotiated peace during World War I; in 1918 undersecretary without portfolio, signatory of the armistice on November 11, 1918; from June 1919 to 1920 Finance Minister; on August 26, 1921, shot dead by two former officers, Schulz and Tillessen. 345 Roberto Farinacci; born October 16, 1892; a railroad worker who became an attorney, was a right-wing radical Fascist who distinguished himself by his vitriolic attacks against the Jewry and political Catholicism and therefore was held in high regard by leading German national socialists. After the slaying of

MILITARY CONHzREKCUS 1942-1945

829

Matteotti, he was appointed Secretary General of the Fascist Party in 1924, but resigned in 1926 to protest the rapprochement between Mussolini and the Vatican. He then lived a secluded life as the publisher of Regime Fascista in his hometown of Cremona, which he developed into a power base. A strong pro¬ ponent of the Axis alliance, he also promoted anti-Semitism. He was executed by partisans in 1945. In 1938 he was given the position of a state minister; he was also a member of the Fascist Parliament.—Source:Mun^inger Archive; vari¬ ous mentions by Wisktmann, Ciano, Rinte/en and Anfuso. 346 Eduard Wagner, born April 1, 1894; 1914 Second Lieutenant in the 12th Ba¬ varian Field Artillery Regiment; Freikorps [Free Corps] Epp; Reichswehr; from 1933 in the Quartermaster Division of the Army General Staff; 1935 Lieuten¬ ant Colonel; 1936 Chief of the 6th Detachment of the Army General Staff; August 1940 Major General and Army Quartermaster General; 1942 Lieuten¬ ant General; and August 1943 General of Artillery.—Source: Munsynger Archive; Keilig211 / 353. 34

This statement could be completed as follows:... “without attacking the Rus¬ sians, and limiting myself to defense.”

348 He probably refers to Guderian, who was appointed Inspector General of Panzer Troops and given extraordinary powers by Hitler on February 20, 1943 (see note 385). '4'' Wolfram Baron v. Richthofen; born October 10, 1895; regular army officer dur¬ ing World War I; hussar, later airman in the Richthofen Fighter Wing; left the service in 1920, enrolled at the Technical College in Hannover; recommissioned and in 1929 Captain and academic degree of Dr. of engineering; left service again in 1933 and joined RLM; was officially accepted into the Luftwaffe as a Major in 1935; January 1937 Chief of General Staff of the Condor Legion; November 1938 Major General and commander of the legion; during the campaign against France and Russia, Commanding General, VIII Air Corps; June 1942 Commander, Fourth Air Fleet; after his mission in Stalingrad, pro¬ moted to Field Marshal on February 17,1943; and from June 1943 to fall 1944 Commander of the Second Air Fleet in Italy. Richthofen underwent brain surgery in August 1944 and died on July 12, 1945, of complications resulting from the surgery.—Source: Mnnginger Arcbii't; Siegler, p. 134; Seemtn; Order of Batik, p. 611. The term “commander-in-charge of division clear-out” was probably coined by Zcitzlcr; at any rate, this or a similar designation is not known. 351 Applications for compensation could be filed for private property lost during withdrawal. This regulation applied mainly to officers’ uniforms, which were private property, because—except for the clothing allowance—they had to pay for their uniforms out of their own pockets. The processing of applica¬ tions for property lost during the major withdrawals in the winter of 1942-43 indicated the volume of superfluous things that was carried along. According to the 1935 military criminal law, section 81, paragraph 2, selfmutilation was punished with one to five years’ imprisonment; according to the special wartime penal regulation of November 1, 1939, section 5, para-

Hitu r and His Generals

830

graphs 1 to 3, this offence was regarded as “demoralization of the armed forces” and carried the death penalty. 553 After “Veterans Day,” Hitler went to Berchtesgaden and used the following month to receive his satellite leaders and bolster their morale, which had been sapped by changing fortunes in North Africa and Russia. He received the following personalities “down there”: on March 31, the Bulgarian Tsar Boris on April 7-10, Mussolini on April 12-13, the Romanian “Conducator” [Leader] Marshal Antonescu on April 16-17, the Hungarian Admiral v. Horthy tin April 19, the Norwegian “Prime Minister” Quisling on April 23, the Slovak State President Tiso on April 27, the Croatian “Poglavnik” [Chief] Pavelic on April 29, the French Prime Minister Laval In spite of the expression “at his headquarters” that was used in the communiques, the receptions usually took place at Klessheim Castle or the Berghof, as shown by the published photographs.— Source:KeesingsArchive 1943, pp. 5893, 5898, 5902, 5902, 5907, 5910, 5913, 5917 and 5919 and also VB of the relevant period. m As far as has been determined so far, the German field army included eight so-called field training divisions (the 147th,153rd,* 155th, 381st, 382nd, 388th,* 390th,* and 391 st*). They were stationed in the occupied territories and served as both training units and occupation forces. Another purpose was to deceive enemy intelligence and, as their food had to be made available by the countryin which they were stationed, ease the strain on supplies from the Reich. These were skeleton reserve armies, which continued to report to the Reserve Army in the West, whereas in the Hast they were incorporated into the field army and received orders from the army groups. The latter could train their replace¬ ments as they saw fit, based on their experience. In addition, the regular divi¬ sions in the East had special field training battalions for refresher and other courses, familiarizing the reserve troops with conditions in the Hast, etc.— Source: Order of Battle, pp. 18 and 358; Keilig 15/63 (the four field training divisions listed as belonging to the field army in the “organisation of the field army, as of midSeptember 1943” are marked with an asterisk). !I” Again, the reference is to Berchtesgaden. 356 In March 1943, the “General Staff Courses” (organized after 1940 as a re¬ placement for the War Academy; which had been closed at the beginning of the war) were increased in size to 150 participants and designated again as a “War Academy.” During this discussion, they were probably speaking about this institu¬ tion, unless they were referring to a special course for General Staff officers that might have taken place at Sonthofcn.—Source: \irfurth: Genera/stab, p. 223. 35

These were just words. Hitler, in particular, should have had no doubt about the year 1943; at best it could bring some relief, but never a positive change in the military situation. Any statement to the contrary simply reflects the dan-

Military ConllrjzXCLS 1942-1945

831

gerous political wishful thinking to which he succumbed more and more fre¬ quently (without actually taking any steps to make his dreams come true). 358 Transcript number unknown—Fragment No. 50—One of the two sets of short¬ hand notes was completely destroyed, while the other was charred to such an extent that only one quarter of each page was legible. These gaps, amounting to three-quarters of the page, arc indicated by dotted lines. The first transcription yielded 35 typewritten pages. Date, place and time are probably not correct, because on that Sunday I litler attended a celebration and made a speech at the Berlin memorial to mark Veterans Day, which had been postponed by a week. Although the hour of that event cannot be ascertained because of the security measures taken, the shadows in an available photograph suggest that it was the afternoon (according to the report by the NZZ the celebration took place “at noon”). The date given is confirmed by the following text, and the hour cannot be determined, but the location was probably wrong; the discussion most likely did not take place at the Berghof, but in the Reich Chancellery. In another pre¬ liminary remark to the second transcription made in May 1945, the stenogra¬ phers stated that at that time they did not remember whether the 1943 Veterans Day had been moved, but gave March 14 as the date and thus the date of Hitler’s presence in Berlin. They probably relied on a pocket calendar or some other printed calendar. It may therefore be assumed—and it seems reasonable to do so—that the locations were added only during the (first) transcription of the original text, so that the locations given in the preserved minutes and the second transcription or the fragments of the minutes were later reconstructions (1945). 359 Karl Schneider; born August 10,1881; 1902 Ensign; 1920 discharged as Lieu¬ tenant Commander; May 1940 reinstated as Commandant of Diinkirchen Port until the capitulation, June 1941 Commander z.V., April 1944 Captain z.V. 360 Probably supplies for Tunis. tyhere js n() doubt that this number is wrong. A Tenth Army did not exist at the time, the 10th Panzer Division fought outside Tunis, and the 10th Panzer Grenadier Division fought in the central sector, while the 10th SS Panzer Di¬ vision was stationed in France. v’2 Hans-Karl v. Schcclc; born May 23, 1892; 1912 Second Lieutenant, 3rd Guard Infantry Regiment; Reichswehr, 1935 Lieutenant Colonel; 1937 commanding officer. Training Group A; Hannover War Academy; 1938 Colonel; 1939 Com¬ mander, 191st Infantry Regiment; 1941 Major General and Commander, 208th Infantry Division; March 1943 Lieutenant General and (after February) Com¬ mander of the Scheele Corps, then LII1 and LII Army Corps; December 1943 General of Infantry and head of the Armed Forces Patrol Service; and Novem¬ ber 1944 President of the Reich Military Court.—Sonne: Order of Hattie, p. 617; Seemen; Das dentsebe lleer, p. 798, Kangiiste 1944-45, p. 17; Kei/iji 211/290. 363 A comment by Manstein: “When Khar’kov and Belgorod were captured, the army group’s second counterattack ground to a halt. The operations could not be continued because of the worsening mud. The army group had planned to complete it by cooperating with Army Group Center to shorten the front by

832

Hitler asd His Generals

clearing out the Kursk salient, which projected far into the German front in the west. This plan did not materialize, since Army Group Center was not in a position to help.”—Source: Man stein, p. 467. 344 The first SS General Command, commanded by SS Obergruppenfuhrer Hausscr, was established in Germany in May 1942, and later on in France. Until further SS general commands were set up during the second half of 1943, it was known as SS Panzer Corps (without number), later on it was known as II SS Panzer Corps. At the end of the war, there were altogether seven genuine SS general commands: I SS Panzer Corps {I Abstandarte Adolf Hiller) II SS Panzer Corps III (German) SS Panzer Corps IV SS Panzer Corps V SS Mountain Corps VI SS Volunteer Corps (Latvian) IX Waffen SS Mountain Corps (Croatian) plus five SS general commands which were formed at the end of 1944 from the Reserve Army, the customs border guards, Volkssturm [militia]. Eastern battalions, etc., some of which were commanded by police generals and one even by an Army general (XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII SS Corps). The Waffen SS was not in a position to set up the staffs of the latter corps, so personnel had to be recruited from the Reserve Army. They were established because Himmler wanted to have as many “SS units” as possible.—Source: Order of Battle, />. 333; Hausser, pp. 17, 76, 104, 189 and 270. 345 Transcript number unknown—Fragment No. 4—The preserved shorthand record was somewhat charred; only parts of it could be used for the second transcription. 346 At this time. Hitler was again worried about the Balkans. Folio-wing the Ger¬ man Italian collapse in Tunis, the Allies had open access to the southern flank of “Fortress Europe” via the Mediterranean. Theoretically speaking, their next target could be either the Balkans or Italy. Even after the Allied landing on Sicily (July 10, 1943), and later in the Bay of Salerno (September 8, 1943), Hitler remained concerned about the Balkans. Bauxite deposits: Transylvania, Dalmatia, Phokis (northwestern Greece), is¬ land of Naxos; chrome deposits: northern Albania, northern Greece, eastern Bosnia, Banat. 348 Copper is mined primarily in the largest European copper deposit at Bor (Serbia), southwest of the Iron Gate. Other deposits: northern Serbia, Macedonia, Banat, northwestern Bulgaria. w The 11th Luftwaffe Field Division. 3 " “Gisela” was the code name for a planned German operation that was to advance from southern France toward Spain. Suggested by the Navy, it was a late revival of the old Felix Plans, aimed at Gibraltar and Portugal. It soon became clear that the implementation of this plan depended on Spanish sup-

Military Conferences 1942-1945

833

port, which was now even more out of the question than before. The main purpose of the venture was a thrust into the flank of the Anglo-American con¬ centration in North Africa. The operation, which was first discussed in Decem¬ ber 1942, was finally called off by Hitler on May 14, 1943 (i.e., five days before this meeting), because of increasing danger from the Spanish guerilla war and in consideration of the Tunis disaster.—Sonne: Him ley, p. 226. The 9th SS Panzer Division Hobenstaufen and 10th Panzer Division Frundsberg consisted of draftees and were new regular units that had been built up in France during the winter of 1942-43. 2 A reference to the sub-units of German divisions which, because of transpor¬ tation problems, had stayed behind on the Italian mainland or on Sicily while the rest of the divisions were destroyed in North Africa. ’ According to the order of battle of (October) 1943, the 21st Panzer Division was equipped only with light tanks, while the 15th and 10th were panzer grena¬ dier divisions.—Source: Keilig 15/52 and 15/58. 4 This is a reference to a situation report in which the C.omandoSupremo, in contrast to its earlier view that the next Allied push would be directed exclusively against the Italian islands, included in his considerations an enemy landing operation on the Balkan peninsula. [NDT: Some of these opinions about a possible Balkan landing by the Allies may have been planted as disinformation by French intelli¬ gence through its double agents inside the SIM (Servizio Informazioni Militare). See Paul Paillole, Fighting the Nagts, Knigma, New York 2003.| s “Command tanks” were special Panzer III models (Sd.kfz [Sondcr kraftfahrzeug—Special Motor Vehicles] 266, 267 and 268) manufactured by Wegmann in kassel. The guns were replaced by wooden dummy guns, and the tanks carried wireless communication equipment consisting of two transmit¬ ters and two receivers. These command tanks w’ere used in the Panzer III and Panzer IV units. The Panther and Tiger units had command tanks of the same type (Sd.kfz 172 and 183), but because more space was available in these models they kept their guns and simply carried less ammunition. 6 The number of tanks produced during this month could not be ascertained. The following output can be assumed for the first half of 1943: 500 Panzer Ills, 1,400 Panzer IVs, 300 to 400 Panthers and 60 Tigers. The overall Ger¬ man annual output of armored vehicles (i.e., including tank destroyers and assault guns) showed the following trend:

light medium heavy J

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

800

2,300

3,600

7,900

10,000

1,400

2,900

5,600

9,400

12,100

—

—

100

2,500

5,200

A Swiss source specifics only the medium and heavy armored fighting ve¬ hicles (it can be proven, however, that the number of Tigers listed was several times the actual output):

HrnjzR

834

1940

His

Generals

1941

1942

1943 349 [?]

Panzer III

895

1,845

Panzer IV

280

480

2,555 964

—

—

—

—

—

—

Panther Tiger Konigstiger r

and

1944

3,073

3,366

—

1,850

3,964

78

674

—

—

623 379

— Source: Pie deutsche Industrie, pp. 71 and IS2; Wiener, H. 3, p. 72. Flame-thrower tanks were 12.6-ton special-purpose tanks (thickness of ar¬ mor: 15 cm, speed: 50 km/hour),equipped with two powerful flame-throwers (range: 60 m) in addition to a machine gun. Some of them used trailers to carry the flame-oil tanks.—Source: Guderian: Pan^er-Marscb!p. 235; Laser, p. 35.

18 The 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions. Meaning that if the attack near Kursk had been launched in mid-April as origi¬ nally planned, instead of waiting—at Hitler’s insistence—for further shipments of tanks, especially the new Panther model. 380 This should read: panzer command vehicle. Wl Design plans for the Tiger rank had originally been submitted by Henschel and Porsche. Both prototypes were then demonstrated at Berka in May 1942. While Hitler preferred the Porsche design—not the least because of his close relationship with Volkswagen—tank experts decided in favor of Henschel’s Tiger. Irritated, Porsche built about 50 units of his model (later known as rank destroyer Ferdinand)—more or less on his own initiative. 382 At Kursk. 383 Sepp Dietrich established the first units of the Leibstandarte Adolf I li/ter as armed units as early as 1933; in 1936 the Leibstandarte reported to the new “Support Troop Inspection” at the SS headquarters. When the war broke out, the Leibstandarte was initially deployed as a reinforced motorized regiment and expanded into the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibs/andarte-SS Adolf Hitler in 1940 and early 1941 (until the summer of 1942 it was classified as a panzer grena¬ dier division). The I SS Panzer Corps general command Leibstandarte yido/f Hitler was formed in 1942-43 with personnel who had been released from the division. The LAII, which had priority with regard to supply of men and material, participated as part of the Tenth Army (Reichenau) in the Polish campaign, and was deployed on the right wing with the Eighteenth Army (Kiichlcr) in the Western campaign. It was deployed in southern Yugoslavia during the Southeast campaign, and in the East it fought in the southern sec¬ tor from the beginning of the campaign until summer 1943—with an inter¬ ruption in mid-1942. It was deployed briefly in northern Italy, then in the fall of 1943 again in southern Russia, then in mid-1944 during the invasion in France and eventually in 1945 in the final battles in Hungary.—Source: Hausser, passim; Order of Wattle, pp. 333 and 336. W4 Two days earlier, on May 17,19 British Lancaster bombers of the 617th Squad¬ ron—formed specifically for that purpose—had bombed the dams of the F.der, Mohne, and Sorpe reservoirs. They used cylindrical special-purpose

MlUTARY CONhliRENCES 1942-1945

835

bombs containing a device that set the bomb spinning upon release. When released at a predetermined speed, altitude and distance, the bomb would dam¬ age the dam at the most effective depth. The dam of the Sorpe reservoir was missed, but the damaged Eder and Mdhne dams (which held, respectively, 130 and 202 cubic meters of water) released huge floods into the valleys, causing tremendous losses—in human lives and material assets. This disaster also had a major impact on the water and power supply of the Ruhr area. The Armed Forces High Command report of May 17 stated: “Weak British air squadrons penetrated the territory of the Reich last night and dropped a limited number of high-explosive bombs in several places. Two dams were damaged; the re¬ sulting flood wave caused heavy losses among the civilian population. Eight of the attacking planes were shot down...”—Source: brickhill, p. 78 and elseud/ere; C a Hand, p. 213. (Gal!and speaks incorrectly oj a daytime attack.). ws After having been in disgrace for more than a year, Guderian was appointed Inspector General of Panzer Troops on February 20, 1943. Having the rank of a Commandcr-in-Chief of the Army, he was the superior officer over all panzer troops, panzer grenadier, motorized infantry, panzer reconnaissance troops, tank destroyer troops and heavy assault gun units. He had requested that Hitler put all assault gun units under his control, but the General Staff succeeded in pushing through this limitation, which in the end resulted in quite a lot of friction. In his area, Guderian was responsible for organization, training, technical development, vehicle distribution, and the activation anti rehabilitation of units.—Source: Guderian: Erinnerungen,p. 260. m Code name for the attack on Kursk. 3* Like the Army General Staff, I litler held the view that the rehabilitation of battle-weary divisions was the most appropriate way of creating or maintaining combat-ready units. The development of the overall situation repeatedly forced the High Command to set up new operational reserves, as the existing ones were completely worn out. However, such reserves were only available to the High Command if thev were stationed in Germany, the then General Government [Poland], or France. So the required number of battle-weary divisions (“skel¬ etons”) had to be transferred to those areas for rehabilitation. But despite weeks of preliminary planning, these initiatives often failed, as the command posts at the Eastern front—usually justified by the circumstances—would not release the divisions earmarked for rehabilitation. Then the High Command had no other alternative but to set up the required reserves through new activation. m

Zeitzler, who did not wish to release the rump divisions that were still in combat in the East, despite the fact that they were only “skeletons.”

,v A conflict flared up between the Italian governor of Montenegro, General Pirzio Biroli, and the German commanders, during a joint Gcrman-Italian operation against partisans in the Balkans. A great stir was caused when a Montenegrin citizen, who was a relative of the Italian queen and who had cooperated for a long time with Italian authorities, was arrested. This incident, which could not be resolved locally, caused Hitler to write a letter to Mussolini in which he accused the Italian generals of playing into the hand of the en-

836

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS

emy, thus sabotaging joint efforts. Von Rintelen, the German general at the Comando Supremo and military attache in Rome, delivered this letter to Mussolini the following day. — Source: Rintelen, p. 202. 390. Having been reconstituted in France after its in Stalingrad, and prepared for transfer to Italy, the 16th Panzer Division remained on the mainland. The 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, commanded by General Lungershausen, was formed for Sardinia — primarily from march battalions. — Source: Order of Battle, p. 296. 391.

Paul Conrath; born November 21, 1886; war volunteer; 1917 Second Lieutenant; 1920 joined the Prussian State Police force; promoted in 1924 to Captain and in 1934 to Major; 1935 transferred to the Luftwaffe;

1938 Lieutenant Colonel;

1940 Colonel and

Commander, General Goring Anti-Aircraft Regiment; July 1 942 Major General and Commander, Panzer Parachute Division Hermann Goring, September 1943 Lieutenant General; May 1944 Commanding General, Parachute Training and Replacement/ Reserve Troops; and January 1945 General of Parachute Forces. 392.

Bulgaria was the only friendly country whose army Germany substantially assisted in organizing and supplying with modern weapons. The first discussions about this matter were held by the chief of the operations branch of the Bulgarian General Staff at the Armed Forces High Command headquarters as early as the summer of 1941. The first weapons were delivered to the Bulgarians in the winter of 1941-42. By August 1944, 10 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division and 1 armored division were equipped.

393.

Erich Fellgiebel; born October 4, 1905; Lieutenant, 2nd Signal Battalion; 1914 instructor at the Spandau Telegraphers' Academy; during World War I, primarily General Staff positions; Reichswehr; 1930 Commander, 2nd Intelligence Department; 1934 Colonel and Inspector of the Signal Corps (in the Seventh Army, later also entrusted with the responsibilities of the Inspector of the Armed Forces communication lines in the Armed Forces High Command 1938 Major General; and 1940 General of the Signal Corps. Fellgiebel belonged to the group of conspiring officers and was to sever the communication lines of the Fiihrer Headquarters following the assassination He was arrested on the evening of the same day, sentenced to death by the Volksgerichtshof on August 10, 1944, and executed on September 4. — Source: Munzinger Archive; Pechel, p. 329; WheelerBennett, p. 760 and elsewhere; Das deutsche Heer, p. 27; Rangliste 1944-45, p. 15; Keilig 211/82.

394.

Transcript No. S 97/43 — Fragment No. 5 — Completely preserved.

395.

Alexander Lohr; born May 20, 1885 in Turnu-Severin; infantry officer in the k.u.k. Army Detachment; after 1913 in the General Staff; played a leading role in the organization of the Austrian Air Force after World War I, in the end Major General and Commander of the Air Force and Chairman of the Luftwaffe Department of the Defense Ministry. He was accepted into the German Armed Forces at the rank of a Lieutenant General; April 1938 Commanding General of the Luftwaffe in Austria (changed in August 1938 to Luftwaffe Command Austria, and in March 1939 to Fourth Air Fleet), Commander, Fourth Air Fleet

AI/UTAR) Confurexces 1942-1945

837

in the campaign against Inland and the Southeastern and Eastern campaigns until June 1942; May 1941 Colonel General; July 1942 Armed Forces Com¬ mander Southeast (Twelfth Army) which became Commandcr-in-Chicf South¬ east (Army Group E) in 1943 (from August 26, 1943, to March 24,1945, he was only Commandcr-in-Chief of Army Group E, as the Commandcr-in-Chief of Army Group F, Baron v. Wcichs, served as Commandcr-in-Chicf Southeast). Lohr was extradited to Yugoslavia in May 1945 and sentenced to death in early 1947 because of the bombing of Belgrade in 1941. lie is said to have been executed on February 16,1947.—Source:Mttn^fngerArchive;Seemea;Staler, p. 130. Probably the then Commander of Crete (1942 to June 1944), Lieutenant Gen¬ eral Bruno Brauer, previously Commander of the 1st Parachute Regiment (Iraklion Task Force during the Crete operation). Brauer, who had been ap¬ pointed General of the Parachute Forces, was executed by a Greek firing squad on May 20, 1945.—Source: Order of Battle, p. 532; Hon, p. 133. Appointed “Representative of the Fuhrer for the Recording of War History,” Colonel Walter Scherff was asked by Hitler to attend as often as possible and probably attended the previous meetings as well. 1 lis task was primarily to write essays for newspapers; these essays were also collected and published in the following brochures: /.wolf Kriegsmefsatire, Berlin 1943 Feldherr aus Schicksal: Der Feldherr im Urteilseiner Zeit, Berlin 1943 Vert renteti and G/aube: Fin Bekenntnis %um Feldberrn dieses Krieges, Salzburg 1944. It is striking that these publications center around one subject only: the “military' genius,” “the Ftihter’s qualities as a military leader” and include almost intoler¬ able flattery and praise, but still raise a number of questions which—though they were naturally answered in conformity with the political line—were more or less taboo at the time. “Die grosse Bewahrung” (April 1942) states: “There were skeptics who alluded to the many sycophants even at a time when—in the midst of the victorious Balkan campaign—on April 20, 1941 the Fuhrcr’s quali¬ ties as a military leader were duly praised by the German press. Even the great success of the Eastern campaign in 1941 did not bring about a change. Even these people who, based on their education, had preconceived ideas of military leadership qualities and the conduct of war, found it difficult to believe in the phenomenon embodied in the person of Adolf Hitler.” In “Dcr Feldherr im Urteil seiner Zeit” (April 1943), he wrote: “The German [sic!] people are fortu¬ nate to have such a leader. Unconditional confidence and trust in him will bol¬ ster the fighting power of the entire nation. He who doubts him might ask himself where he could find a man to take his place and fulfill his numerous responsibilities as well as he docs.” “ This is probably a reference to the la [operations officer] of the 22nd Infantry Division stationed on Crete who is referred to as Lohrs’ companion: Heinz Langemann; born August 27,1905; 1935 Captain, 1938 lb; 1940 la [operations officer] 22nd Infantry Division; 1942 Lieutenant Colonel; July 1943 Chief of General Staff, XXIII Army Corps; August 1943 Colonel; August 1944 in Army General Staff; and February 1945 Chief of General Staff of the Fourth Army.

838

HnuzR and His Glxhivujs

Constantin Alexander v. Ncurath, the only son of the former German foreign minister, had earlier, as SS Sondcrfiihrcr, been sent as the representative of the Foreign Office to Rommel’s army in Africa. Recently he had been dispatched to Sicily, presumably to deliver a message from Ribbentrop or Himmler.—Sonne: Speidel, p. 85 4'w' General Mario Roatta; born February 2,1887; 1934-1936, founder of the Servizio Informazioni Militarc (SIM), the main Italian military intelligence unit operating from 1934-1943; 1936-38 Spanish campaign; |ulv to October 1939 military attache in Berlin; November 1939 under Graziani (who was not trained tor a position in the General Staff) he was Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Army; March 1941 he was appointed Graziani’s successor as Chief of General Staff of the Army; 1942 Commandcr-in-Chief of the Second Army in Croatia; later and up to this period, Commander-in-Chief of the Sixth Army on Sicily. He returned to the post of Chief of General Staff of the Army at the end of May 1943. I.ater, Roatta joined Badoglio, bur was replaced by General Bernardi in Decem¬ ber 1943 because of a pending Yugoslav indictment for war crimes. He was given a long prison sentence in 1945, but managed to escape to Spain. The Supreme Court of Appeal annulled the sentence in 1948. The following year, the military tribunal in Rome also cleared Roatta of the charge of having sur¬ rendered the Italian capital without a fight in September 1943.—Source: At un^inger Archive; Kesselring, pp. 234 end242; Rintekn, pp 78,201 and240; Badoglio, pp. 104 and 147; Westpbal, pp. 216 and 288. 401 Friedrich Ruge; born December 24, 1894; active officer; POW after Scapa Flow; Navy (among other things involved in mine development and mine sweeping); 1937 Commander of Mine Sweepers; 1941 Commander of Secu¬ rity, West, February 1943 Vice Admiral, March 1943 Special Staff for Escort Matters (Tunis) with the German Naval Command Italy, May to August 1943 Commander German Naval Command Italy and German Admiral at the Ital¬ ian Admiralty, November 1943 Admiral with Army Group B (Rommel) and later with Commander in Chief West, and November 1944 Chief of the De¬ sign Office Naval High Command/Naval Armaments. Ruge was accepted into the Federal Navy in 1956.—Source:Mun^inger Archive; Webrkunde 1956,p. 206; T jobmann / T ti/debrand 291/311. 4112 Umberto of Savoy, Prince of Piedmont, was Commandcr-in-Chief of the Ital¬ ian Army Group Crown Prince, which he commanded in southern and central Italy from April 1942 until the Italian capitulation on Sicily.—Source:Siegkr,p. 94. 403 May 16. 404 Hitler had made a similar comment about Roatta as early as February 1942: “This Roatta is a spy. He sabotaged the plan to enter the Rhone valley in June 1940.” Hitler was so suspicious of this Italian general that he endeavored to have him appointed Ambassador to Berlin two months after Mussolini was toppled, in Older to remove him from the top of the Italian army. Kesselring and Rintelen, on the other hand, evaluate Roatta positively—they described him as open and honest and doubted the “general accusation of Roatta as an enemy and traitor.” They- said that he was very sarcastic and that they did not like his

MllSIARY C'OtS’HiRHXCliS

1942-1945

839

manner, but he was more forthcoming than his comrades who only exchanged pleasantries and said comfortable, polite things (see also pp. 221 and 326).— Source: Picker, p 204; Kesselring, pp. 234 and 242; Rintehn, pp. 78, 201 and 240. 4"'’ Enno von Rintclcn; born November 6,1891; 1912 Second Lieutenant, 2nd Grena¬ dier Regiment; during World War I in the adjutancy and General Staff; accepted as a Captain bv the Rcichswchr; 1934 Battalion Commander, 48th Infantry Regi¬ ment; 1935 Colonel; after October 1, 1936 military attache in Rome; 1939 Major General; September 1940 keeping his rank, he served as a German general in the headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces; 1941 Lieutenant General; and 1942 General of Infantry. On August 31,194.3—a few days before the Italian capitulation—Rintclen was recalled and replaced by General Toussaint; he was not given another assignment.—Source: Rintelen,passim. 4I"', Allusion to Kesselring’s trust in the reliability of the Italians and his unflinch¬ ing belief in their professed loyalty. According to Kesselring’s own account, the headquarters considered him to be an Italophile and suitable only for friendly dealings with the Italian royalty. Rommel was used for the times when a tougher course had to be steered. Others also criticized kesselring tor his unshakable trust in the Italians and his great optimism in assessing the situation. Hitler reputedly said of him: “Kesselring is too decent for these people, who are born traitors.”—Source: Kesselring, p. 233; Rintelen, pp. 194,201 and240; Westphal, pp. 224 and 257; Hagen: Unternehmen Hern hard, p. 124; Sk.or*eny,p 111. During the ten days preceding Neuraths report, Mussolini had adopted the following reforms: 1. Increasing work discipline. 2. Instruction to prefects to make confiscated hoarded goods available to needy families or works canteens. 3. Closing down of renowned fashion boutiques for violation of price con trols, with the requirement to continue paying wages. 4. Expulsion of an industrialist from the party for unjustified price increases and obtaining orders by unfair means. 5. Stricter tax controls of the real estate and share markets. 6. Handing over confiscated black-market goods to hospitals and charities. —Source: NZZ of May 10 (noon edition), 14 (evening edition) 18 (morning and evening editions) and 19 (evening edition), 1943. ",h When the number of air raids against Italian towns increased during the last months of 1942, people wondered whether Rome, the Holy City, would be spared. Using the good services of the Vatican, the Italians contacted the British ambas¬ sador to the Holy- See, Sir Francis Osborne, and were given an evasive answer; with references to the importance of the city as a railroad junction, to air fields and to the Comatido Supremo and other Italian and German command centers. As a result, the military headquarters were transferred to areas outside the city. The Italians had the impression that the British were mainly interested in the re¬ moval of the German operational headquarters. Although there was no real German headquarters in Rome (the staff of Commandcr-in-Chicf South, for

840

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS

example, was already stationed at Frascati), but only liaison staff which kept contact with the Italian authorities and worked together with them. Because not all Italian military authorities and German soldiers could be removed from Rome, the order was issued that the staff of the German authorities in Rome had to wear civilian clothes and their official cars were to have civilian number plates. On May 19, one day before this meeting, Undersecretary of State in the British Ministry of Aviation, Balfour, when asked whether there was a tacit understanding to abstain from bombing Rome, stated in the House of Commons, "Rome is not an open city and there is no agreement to this effect. We will not hesitate to bomb Rome if this action is dictated by the progress of war and seems to be useful." Exactly two months later, the severe air raid on July 19, 1943, preceded the overthrow of the Fascist regime. — Source: Rintelen, p. 184; Ciano, p. 496; NZZ of May 20,1943 (morning edition). 409.

Tables prepared by the authorized representative for the deployment of labor indicate the following number of Italian civilians employed in Germany in 1942 and 1943: July 10, 1942:

211,618 (of which 17,906 were women)

August 20, 1942:

207,398 (of which 18,386 were women)

October 10, 1942:

205,005 (of which 28,792 were in agriculture; 170,575 in industry; 1,742 as household help; 3,896 in commerce, authorities, technical service, etc.)

June 30, 1943:

160,000 (negotiations were held about their return)

August 15, 1943:

131,491 (to which 500,000 military internees were soon added)

— Source: Nbg. Dok NG447, NG-940, NG-1153 and NG-3996. 4io. Hitler had made such an assertion on several occasions, as confirmed by Goring and Ribbentrop, whereas the English and the Italians rightfully denied such a connection. It is correct that the mutual assistance pact between England and Poland was indeed signed on the afternoon of August 25, 1939, when Mussolini, who had been undecided until the last minute, was persuaded by his foreign policy consultants to have a thinly veiled refusal delivered to Berlin. This made it clear that the Italians declined entry into the war, at least for the moment. However the two events have their own independent history: the EnglishPolish negotiations on one hand (the English guarantee of Poland's sovereignty on March 31, 1939) and the Roman indecisiveness concerning participation in the war on the other. It is true, however, that London was very well informed about the behind-the-scenes fighting in Rome and the uncertain Italian attitude, so that when Mussolini finally made the decision in the morning or at noon of that day, the English were probably very quickly informed of its content. But there is no evidence that the signing of the pact, which had been pressed by the Polish party and delayed by England, was speeded up by news from Rome, especially by the events that had taken place in Palazzo Venezia one or two hours earlier. To what extent the British attitude was reinforced by Italy dissociating itself from its Axis ally is hard to say, as it is difficult to identify intangible factors in

MlUTARY CONhKRIzXCES 1942-1945

841

the piles of relevant documents. But one thing is clear: between “Munich” and August 1939, there had been the “Kristallnacht” and the entry of Hitler’s forces into Prague.—Source: Hofer,pp. 81 and 107; Ciano.pp. 130 and 136; Documents 3/ VII,pp, 168, 220, 224 and 249; IMT (in German) IX, p. 660; Ribbentrop, p. 187. 411 The reference is to the Italian battleship T 'ittorio T reneto. "

Reference to the orders to be prepared by the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the event of a turnaround in Italy. Because of the anticipated blockade of the straits of Sicily and Messina, ships sailing on behalf of the Germans had to get out to the eastern Mediterranean in good time.

41' Those units of the 1st Panzer Parachute Division Hermann Goring that had not stayed in Tunis were scattered across Sicily, southern Italy and southern France. 414 kesselrmg, who disagreed with Rommel and Keitel, was correct. When it hap¬ pened in August, in spite of strong enemy pressure, all four German divisions crossed the straits, taking the bulk of their material along. This success was due to the skillful and lasting destruction of the withdrawal routes in the area of Messina, which were filled with numerous manmade obstacles. 415 Giuseppe Bastianini; born 1899; journalist; early member of the Fascist party; 1921 Deputy- Secretary General of the Fascist Party’; 1923 member of the Fas¬ cist Grant Council; 1927 joined the Foreign Service (Envoy in Tangiers, Lisbon and Athens, Ambassador to Warsaw); 1938 Lindersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs; October 1939 to June 1940 Ambassador in London as Grandi’s succes¬ sor; May 1941 appointed Governor of Dalmatia; and after February 1943 after Ciano’s dismissal he served again under Mussolini as Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs. As early as Mussolini’s visit to klessheim in April 1943, Bastianini had unsuccessfully tried to make it clear to Ribbentrop that Italy could not continue the war. Perhaps 1 Iitlerk aversion dates back to that period. Bastianini survived the wrar; a Yugoslav request to extradite him in December 1947 w^as not granted.—Source: Mun^inger Archive; Wiskemann,p. 296. 416 On the day of this meeting. May 20, 1943, Undersecretary of State Bastianini gave a speech at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the occasion of the budget deliberations for 1943-44. He said (excerpts commented on by Hitler): “Once again, it is necessary to emphasize the importance of the fundamental principles to w’hich Italy and Germany wish to remain faithful in order to lay the foundations of the newr world onler.The small states will not be oppressed in any way by the great powders. Their distinctive national qualities w ill not be eliminated or restricted... Our policies have alw'ays defended this principle of nationality, for the others as well as for ourselves, and it w’as never our goal to oppress or enslave other European peoples. Italy has always been the first to speak out against terri¬ torial injustices and unequal administration of law^... Our country’ did not join the war with the intention of or the stupid ambition to impose this or that political institution on the peoples of different races; rather, wre were imbued with the ideal of genuine justice and fairness that is directly related to the Word of God in w'hich we believe...Italy is not in the habit of renouncing her honor—the only possession of poor peoples. From Novara to the Piave it has had a king and an army to defend it. In view’ of the terrorist methods employed by our enemies,

842

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS

who expect an unconditional surrender — which can only be imposed on rebellious tribes — we invoke everything our people did in order to become a nation. Italian-French relations are grounded in the principles formulated by Italy and Germany as the basis of the new European and worid order. We do not intend to destroy or humiliate France. However, in order to be able to take part in the econstruction of Europe, France must understand the need to make sacrifices and not only to take part in the production and the military effort of the Axis countries, but also to settle all matters that are still pending in her relationship with her conquerors. — Source: NZZ of May 20,1943 (evening issue). 417. Regarding his conduct and the measures to be taken in his area of command in the Balkans in the event that Italy collapsed. 418. As indicated in a memorandum written by Speer in the fall of the following year, chromium, which was required for the production of high-grade steel, was a bottleneck for the Germans, while the supplies of copper, nickel and bauxite were sufficient for the time being. — Source: Wilmot, p. 466. 419. Rintelen was to deliver a letter from Hitler that he had received as a telegram regarding the matter of Pirzio Biroli. In his reply, Mussolini covered the Italian generals, stating that they only carried out his orders and that he was responsible for their actions. — Source: Rintelen, p. 202. 420. When Austria's annexation by Germany was accepted without opposition by Italy, the Great Power most directly concerned, Hitler sent a telegram to Rome on March 13, 1938, "Mussolini, I will never forget this!" 421. In May 1938. 422.

Count Galeazzo Ciano; born March 18,1903, as the scion of a politically important family from Leghorn; early member of the Fascist party; entered the diplomatic corps in 1925; married Edda Mussolini in May 1930; 1934 Undersecretary of State for Press and Propaganda; 1935 served as Air Captain in Ethiopia; and June 1936 to February 1943 Foreign Minister, then ambassador to the Vatican and member of the Fascist Grand Council. There, on July 25, 1943, he voted against his father-in-law. Nevertheless, he and his entire family were placed under house arrest by the Badoglio administration. With German assistance, he escaped to Germany at the end of August and there he initially made amends with Mussolini, who had been liberated in the meantime. Later, though, after his return to his home country — probably at the urging of family and friends — Mussolini had him and the other disloyal members of the Fascist Great Council tried by a special court in Verona. There, Ciano was sentenced to death on January 11, 1944, and executed that same day Attempts by his wife Edda to buy his life — in exchange for the delivery of his dreaded diary — failed. — Source: Munzinger Archive; Anfuso, passim (especially p. 258). [NDT: see also Galeazzo Ciano, Diary 1937-1943], Enigma 2002, the complete edition, edited by Renzo De Felice; Ray Moseley, Mussolini's Shadow: The Double Life of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Yale 1 999]

423.

Philip, Prince of Hesse, from the family of the Electors of Hesse whose property was confiscated in 1866; nephew of Kaiser Wilhelm II; born November 6, 1896; 1915 joined the Army as a private; 1918 discharged as a lieutenant; after 1922 worked in Rome as an interior designer; 1925 married Princess Mafalda of

Military CokflrizXCls 1942-1945

843

Italy, daughter of King Victor Emmanuel 111; 1930 joined the NSDAP |Nazi Party); June 1933 to September 1943 served as Senior President of I lesse-Nassau; and 1938 SA Obergruppcn fiihrer. Hitler sent Philip to Rome as a courier on several occasions, especially to announce unexpected foreign policy moves. Af¬ ter the defection of Italy, he was arrested at the Fiihrer Headquarters by Rattenhuber and Muller on September 8, 1943, and spent the rest of the war in the concentration camps of Flossenbiirg and Dachau.—Source: Manager Archil*. 424 Mafalda; royal princess of Savoy; born on November 11, 1902; daughter of Victor Emmanuel III of Italy; and after September 23, 1925, wife of Prince Philip of Hesse. After the abolition of the Italian royalty. Hitler had the princess, who was in Rome at that time, arrested. She was lured to the German Embassy under the pretext of a telephone call from the prince, driven to the airport on the alleged request of her husband, and put on a waiting airplane and flown to Germany. She died in the Buchenwald concentration camp on August 28,1944, from injuries sustained during a recent Anglo-American air raid on the camp. 4:

Since the end of September 1942, Mussolini, who had previously had a stom¬ ach ulcer, had again been plagued by severe stomach trouble. For a consider¬ able amount of time, he could take only liquid food, and suffered a significant physical decline.—Source: Kintelen, p. 218; Ciano, Diary, numerous notations of Mussolini's ailments in 1942-1941, pp. 548, 149, 552, 551, 554, 555, 559, 561, 567.

426 Unless the stenographer misheard, this is was a “echte Fehlleistung” (a real slip), as Mussolini certainly addressed Hitler as “Fiihrer” and not “My Fiihrer.” 4r Hitler’s ideal was a leader who would stand out both because of his firm po¬ litical and ideological attitude and his excellent military skills—more or less the type of leader the Waffen SS sought to develop. 428 According to Italian reports, Mussolini must have mentioned his domestic concerns to Hitler for the first time when he visited Berchtesgaden in January 1941. The Duce, who had been reduced to a mere “wing man,” could not get over—according to Anfuso—confiding in a friendly, condescending foreigner. The reawakening of a certain anti-German resentment in Mussolini dates back to that time. Ciano noted in his diary on January 20, 1941, “Mussolini said that he brought Hitler up to date on Italian matters, including the undecided atti¬ tude of the King, which, however, has no influence and finally also about the Badoglio case, which Hitler compared to the Fritsche case.” It must not have been easy for a dictator, speaking “among colleagues,” to admit that he was a “paper tiger.” The comment of October 28, 1940, to which Hitler last re¬ ferred, may only have been intended as motivation for the attack on Greece.— Source: Anfuso, p. 141; Ciano, p. 415. 4:I> Colonel Pavle Djursic was one of Mihailovic’s subordinates and the command¬ ing officer of the Cetnik units in Montenegro. Djursic, who—as is shown by this comment—had already cooperated with the Italians, was among the first Cetnik leaders to conclude an agreement with the Nedic Administration in the fall of 1943, following the re-orientation of the German Balkan policies under Neubacher. In those September days, all the national Serbian forces, including

844

Hitler and His Generals

the Serbian State Guard and the Ncdic Administration’s Serbian Volunteer Corps, actually united under Draza Mihailovic.—Source: Matt:Jugoslamen, p. I11; Fotitcb, p. 164; Kissing, p. 183. 4 " Another one of Hitler’s allusions to the German-Italian disputes which should have been settled at “the highest level’’: a battalion of Cctniks, led by a Montenegrin brother-in-law or nephew of the Italian king, had been taken pris¬ oner by German forces some time before. 4,1 Prince (1860—1910), later (until 1918) King Nikolaus or Nikola (mistakenly called Nikita most of the time) of Montenegro, born 1841, died 1921. Gained inde¬ pendence from Turkey in 1876-78 and added territory to his country. Later, he followed the Russian political line more and more closely, which may explain the resentment that Hitler—who, after all, was an Austrian—expressed here. The king immediately sided with Serbia in August 1914, but after the occupation of his country he concluded a special peace treaty with Austria—which he later revoked on Allied urging. In November 1918 he unsuccessfully opposed the uni¬ fication of Montenegro with Serbia (Yugoslavia), which had been decided by the Yugoslav parliament. Nikolaus became famous for his private war against Skutari after the end of the First Balkan War, when he took the town in contravention of the decision made by the Great Powers (and probably by bribing the command¬ ing officer) and, with his intransigent attitude, again raised the specter of a world war. Nikolaus yielded surprisingly, and, as a result of his bull market maneuver¬ ing, earned millions from a stock market speculation. He also became known as a clever father, since the husbands of the seven daughters of this “sheep thief” included King Peter 1 of Serbia, Grand Prince Nikolai Nikolievitch, and, fi¬ nally—this is the reason for Hitler mentioning it—Victor Emmanuel III. 412 Emperor Franz Joseph had made generous gifts to King Nikolaus of Montenegro on various occasions. In view of the emperor’s sense of propriety, it can hardly be assumed that he was prepared to cover the Montenegrin’s supposed fraudu¬ lent activities at the Universal Postal Union from his own private coffers. Hitler liked to tell anecdotes and make up stories for the officers at his headquarters— who had very little knowledge of Austrian affairs—in order to give the impres¬ sion that he had a profound understanding of the Balkan political background. Hitler never seriously dealt with the problems of the multinational Habsburg Empire, although he occasionally purported to be an expert on issues relating to the Danube region. 45' General Ferenc Szombathclyi wras the Honvcd |Hungarian) Chief of Staff from September 1941 to March 1944. 4,1 At this time, Rommel was beginning the establishment of his “Munich Labor and Rehabilitation Staff,” later knoum as Army Group B, which w-as initially intended to lead Operation Ataric, as Hitler planned to have Kesselring replaced by Rommel at a suitable time. In July the decision was made to present this change to Mussolini at Feltre as part of the general reorganization of the com¬ mand structure in Italy. Goring and Ambassador v. Mackensen, in particular, succeeded in changing Hitler’s view at the very last minute before his departure. They argued that Rommel, who was regarded as the person responsible for the

A Inn IK) ConflrjzXCLS

1942-1945

845

loss of Libya, would not be welcome in Italy. So the topic “change of com¬ mand” was not discussed at Feltre; the status quo was maintained for the time being, and Rommel was earmarked for the Balkans a few days later. 4” While “residual France” was being conquered after the landing of Anglo-Ameri¬ can forces in North Africa in November 1942, the Italians took over the securing of the French Mediterranean coast and the hinterland up to a point west of Toulon. 4i6 General Gastone Gambara commanded the corps of Italian volunteers in Spain served as ambassador in Madrid until Italy joined the war in June 1940. After October 1941 he was Chief of General Staff with Marshal Bastico in Libya, where he had several disputes with Rommel—some of which were personal in nature, but others concerned fundamental strategic differences. An investiga¬ tion instituted by his personal nemesis, the chief of the Comando Supremo, Ugo Cavallcro, because of incidents during the war in Spain, resulted in Gambara’s dismissal in March 1942. After having held a command post in Bolzano lor a short while, he was put up tor consideration for a new command. Although Gambara had emetged untainted from the proceedings, he was not given an¬ other front line command. After the Italian defection, Gambara and Marshal Graziani put themselves at the disposal of Mussolini, although, strangely enough, another reason for Gambara’s dismissal in Libva had been an offhand remark J

made at the officers’ mess, “1 hope l live long enough to lead an Italian army to Berlin.” Gambara was married to a woman from South Tyrol. Before the Italian capitulation, the German side suspected him of cooperating with the Allies.— Source: C.iatio, p. 449; Anjuso, p. 310; Rommel Papers, pp. 152, 171, 175, 178 and 186. 43

General Enea Navarini commanded the Italian XXI Corps in Africa and, in contrast to Gambara, was highly valued by Rommel.—Source: Rommel Papers, pp. 253, 357 and elsewhere; Westphal, p. 199.

i38 According to instructions given by the Armed Forces High Command, Rommel was to prepare his own more detailed orders for a possible assumption of the High Command in Italy. Keitel’s remark docs not apply to Warlimont’s preced¬ ing comment, but follows on his own earlier remarks, 4,‘' Transcript number unknown—Fragment No. 48—One of the two shorthand records was completely destroyed, while the other was so severely damaged that only part of each page could be deciphered. The first transcript had consisted of some 35 typewritten pages. The date of the meeting was determined on the basis of the events reported. It certainly must have taken place between May 17 and 24, as the dates on pp. 243 and 244 indicate. 440 These comments were probably prompted by the British air raids on the Eder, Mdhne and Sorpe dams a few days before. 441 Against partisans operating in the rear area. 442 The 1st SS Panzer Division Lribstandarte Adolf Hitler, which at that time was still commanded by Sepp Dietrich , was set aside for use either in the planned attack in the Kursk area or in Italy. 443 The 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division Prin* Engm was established in the Serbian Banat in late 1941. The division’s first commander w'as the former Ro-

846

Hitler asd His Generals

manian division general Artur Phleps, who had joined the WafFen SS as a volun¬ teer; the troops were composed of 15,000 ethnic Germans from the Southeast regions. The term “volunteer division” was soon significant only for psychologi¬ cal and propaganda reasons, as the character of the volunteer unit was officially revoked as early as 1942, and all ethnic Germans living in the Serbian Banat were drafted on threat of punishment. The inconsistent prior training the troops had received in the various armies caused considerable difficulty, and also the weapons consisted primarily of captured weapons of diverse origins. In Octo¬ ber 1942 the division was used on Ibar for the first time and fought bravely until the end of the war, but not without the customary atrocities against Yugoslav partisans that were the trademark of other troops fighting in the Balkans. In July 1943, together with three Army divisions and the Muslims of the 13th Waffen SS Mountain Division Handscbar; the division was merged into the V SS Moun¬ tain Corps commanded by SS Obetgruppenfuhrer Phleps.—Source:Hausser,p. 106 and elsewhere: Krdtscbmer, p. 203; Sbg. Dok. ISO-1649. 444 Name of an Italian division. 445 Bulgaria was also an occupation force in Yugoslavia. The southernmost part of the territory-—northern Macedonia and a strip of southeastern Serbia—was placed under Bulgarian civil administration by the Germans in 1941. The Bulgarian occu¬ pation zone remained generally free of partisans until the end of the war; how¬ ever, at German request, units of the Bulgarian occupation corps, whose strength was equivalent to several divisions, took part in the fighting in other areas. 446 Originally established by and reporting directly to the Defense/Foreign De¬ tachment of the Armed Forces High Command, this detachment, initially the 800th Training Regiment for Special Duty, was made up of hand-picked, spe¬ cially trained staff and was responsible for the administration and pooling of military agents, and later also for special missions, commando operations and acts of sabotage behind enemy lines. This unit was also known as the Brandenburg Regiment because the core established in the spring of 1939—originally just a company which had been enlarged to battalion strength (800th Construction Training Battalion) by 1941—had General Ordnance Services barracks in Brandenburg on the Havel. The unit was made up of volunteers, including numerous ethnic Germans living outside the Reich; parts of it were put at the disposal of army groups when required. When military developments caused the preconditions for commando operations to deteriorate after early 1943, the bulk of Brandenburg was employed against partisans in the Southeastern theater, while only individual battalions stayed on in Russia, Italy and southern France in 1943-44. These units, in contrast to their original purpose, were also increasingly deployed as regular infantry units. During the last years of the war, the regiment was expanded to a panzer grenadier division; it included— in addition to a legion battalion, a coastal fighter detachment, and an intelli¬ gence detachment, and the 1st through 4th Brandenburg Regiments. A 5th regi¬ ment—the Kurjurst training regiment, which had been given the original tasks of the Brandevbnrger—became independent.—Source: Koch: Division Brandenburg, passim; Kriegsbeim, passim; Gbrlitg II, p. 75; Order of Battle, p. 312.

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

447.

847

The local command of the Italian occupation forces in this economically important area, which formed part of the Italian occupation zone, refused at that time not only to take part in joint actions against the strong groups of partisans operating in the area, but even threatened to prevent the entry of German troops into the Italian zone by force of arms. The reason for this very unusual behavior between allies was the quiet deal-making between the Italians and the Cetniks. Italy, which as early as 1941 had been anything but confident of victory, intended to try to retain as much influence as possible in the Balkans, and erect a barrier against the frightening German aspirations. Because the Italians also held the view that they would not be able to defeat both enemies — Cetniks and Communists — at the same time, the idea of establishing contacts with the Cetniks presented itself. These contacts resulted initially in local truces and later on in actual alliances. In addition, the practice developed among the Italians of exchanging their prisoners for food and ammunition. This resulted in serious German-Italian friction, as the Italian-occupied parts of Yugoslavia (Montenegro, New Albania, western Croatia) were seen as "soft spots" and were naturally preferred by partisans as concentration zones. In September 1943, 16 to 18 battle-wean' Italian divisions capitulated in that area. These divisions were so demoralized that for the most part they did not want to wait for the Allies' arrival, which was expected by their commanders, but just discarded their weapons. — Source: Yourichitch, p. 49; Ciano; Fotitch, p. 208.

448. During the war, Turkey maneuvered between the British demand to join the war (based on the English-Turkish Assistance Agreement of 1939), the fear of a German invasion, and the fears of a Soviet victory. At the Adana conference on January 30-31, 1943, between Churchill and President Inonii and several high- ranking military officers, Turkey once again managed to resist British pressure, but did accept military assistance. The Turkish national assembly gave in to the pressure of the Allies only in the final stages of the war, and broke off diplomatic relationswith the German Reich on August 2,1944. Hitler, on the other hand, whose original concept had been based on maximum quiet in the Balkans — quiet which had been disturbed in an unwelcome and embarrassing way by Mussolini's unsuccessful raid against Greece — never really considered operations against Turkey. The situation would have become awkward for Turkey only if the German pincer movement against the Near East had not been forced open at El Alamein and Stalingrad. — Source: Papen, p. 515; Churchill IV/ 2, p. 324. 449. The Bristol Beaufighter was an English twin-engine two-seater fighter, with four guns and six machine guns, 500 km/h. Beaufighters, first deployed in early 1941, were mainly used as night interceptors and light bombers. — Source: Hebrard, p. 329; Feuchter, pp. 172 and 183. 450. The Handley Page Hampden, a medium-range two-engine bomber, was one of the RAF's standard bombers (six machine guns, top speed 425 km/h) in the early years of the war, before the advent of four-engine bombers. By late 1941, Hampdens were no longer deployed in sorties against the Reich, but

848

Hitler and His Glneraus

were mainly used for convoy and coastal protection and as transport planes. The reference here is to the first attacks with Beaufigbter planes against Ger¬ man convoys off the southwestern Norwegian coast between May 13 and 16, 1943. Before then, the older and slower Hampden was mainly deployed in that area.—.Source: Hebrard, p. 192; Feuchter, pp. 98, 183 and 216. 151 The protection of convoys—and the leapfrogging deployment this required— and maritime reconnaissance required quite a great deal of fuel. Fuel had been rationed as early as 1942 for Luftwaffe training. F.xplicit orders had also been given to reduce private flights and travel, etc,, so as to save fuel. On the front, however, economy measures were probably not ordered before 1944. 4V A reference to the Knaben molybdenum mines near the Flekke Fjord between Stavanger and Kristiansand, which, after the loss of North Africa—were the only molybdenum deposits controlled by the Germans (molybdenum is re¬ quired to harden steel, especially in the production of armor plating). The Knaben works were attacked by two Mosquito units on March 3. While the actual mines remained intact, the ore washing plant and the crushing installa¬ tion were destroyed, and five civilians, including the German manager, were killed. The pre-war output of this mine reached 700,000 tons, and that Figure had increased in the meantime. Two-thirds of the output was made available to the German armaments industry, while one-thinl had to be supplied to Sweden, as the Swedish Johnson group held the majority of the shares in the mine.—Source:!\ZZ of March 5, 1943 (evening edition). 45i From a technical point of view, the German anti-aircraft artillery was certainly up-to-date and perhaps even superior to the weapons developed by the en¬ emy. The German artillery was successful against daylight precision attacks flown in clear weather, but was initially almost powerless against nighttime terror attacks—following the elimination of radar equipment through the Diippel process—and even later was effective only to a limited extent. How¬ ever, the guns developed at the beginning of the war were no match for the technical developments in enemy aircraft design, particularly where altitude and speed were concerned. A more effective massed deployment of the newdy developed guns with their high v( (e.g., 1,000 in the 8.8-cm anti aircraft gun 41, compared with 820 in the 8.8-cm anti-aircraft guns 18, 36 and 37; failed, like so many other things, because of the limited production capacity of the German armament industry. The bottleneck affected primarily the ammuni¬ tion sector, as the strong armor of enemy planes required larger calibers (in¬ creased use of the 10.5-cm anti-aircraft gun 39 and 12.8-cm anti-aircraft gun 40), despite the German gunpowder shortage. Remote control and rocket supplements were also hampered by the shortage of raw materials; the Ger¬ man anti-aircraft rockets Schmcttcrling [“Butterfly”], Wasserfail [“Waterfall”] Rheintocbter [“Daughter of the Rhine”], Endian [“Gentian”], and Fener/i/it [“Fire Lily”] did not advance beyond the trial stage. From the tactical point of view, it should be pointed out that one battery, even if it has maximum mobility, could only protect one particular object—meaning that in a target area as

Military

CoNHUUzXciis 1942-1945

849

large as Germany, the protection of any given site always took place at the expense of other potential targets. Enemy bombers frequently attacked un¬ protected locations for this very reason, so as to establish new focal areas. This gave rise to the impression that the mobile anti-aircraft forces were “chasing” the attacks. During the last year of the war, the key armament industrysites were transformed into “anti-aircraft artillery fortifications,” at the ex¬ pense of less important potential targets. These sites were built up to include as many as 900 guns (Lcuna, Ilcvdcbrack). In the meantime, the light and medium anti-aircraft artillery—a total of 6,000 guns at the beginning of the war—had grown to more than 40,000 guns at the end of the war, while the heavy anti-aircraft artillery was up from 2,600 to 15,000 guns. Hitler’s com¬ ments must not hide the fact that he was always convinced of the value of anti-aircraft artillery, and always—unless his decisions were moderated by the senior military commanders—gave it priority until the very end, even at the expense of other weapons.—Source: Koch: Flak., passim; 1 Jtsar, p. 38; Feuchter, p. 304; Baumbach, p. 216; Hcbrarcl, p. 433. The 4-cm Bofors was a captured anti-aircraft gun. With regard to the 3-cm gun, this was probably either misheard or written down incorrectly; he prob¬ ably referred to the 3.7-cm German gun. The designations 3/4 and 4/5 meant that these made up 3 or 4 platoons of the total hatterv. 453 Experts deemed anti-aircraft barrage fire—one of Hitler’s favorite ideas— feasible only in cases where no measurement data were available. So barragefire zones were established for certain barrage-fire batteries, i.e., captured heavy batteries, which were not equipped with anti-aircraft directors. In addition, when streams of bombers approached—the technique was useless against in¬ dividual small formations—other batteries could also be forced to shoot bar¬ rage fire without sighting by using the Diippel technique or active interference w ith radar devices; however, this type of fire was regarded more as a measure aimed at pacifying the civilian population and the operational headquarters than as effective defense. In contrast to Hitler’s insistence—in principle not unjustified—on keeping the enemy away from certain objects, the ambitious anti-aircraft gunners, who wanted to score as many hits as possible, pointed out—out of consideration for the morale of the troops—that bringing down a plane was the best form of defense, and that attempts to create a psycho¬ logical effect through mere firing was futile, particularly against the later, pri¬ marily instrument-flown attacks. Motivated by Hitler’s frequent insistence on barrage fire, the Luftwaffe officers that summer calculated a “barrage fire cube,” which indicated the number of rounds required to protect a space against enemy bomber formations. For a formation that was 2 km wfidc, 3 km deep and had an altitude variation of 1 km, 6 million shells would have to be fired simultaneously—i.c., 6 million guns w'ould have been required. With object protection provided by 200 guns, the chances were 1:30,000 that the cnemy formation would be hit. Even when effective anti-aircraft centers were even¬ tually established, it w-as argued that directed fire from 30 or more batteries produced barrage fire as a secondary effect.

850

Hitler a.\p His Gexerau

,M The Luftwaffe’s anti-aircraft artillery indeed put great store in shooting rather too long than too short, if it was not possible to reach the target exactly, because in that case the trajectories cross the target area, creating at least the opportunity for a direct hit. In addition, the above-mentioned difference could also have been due to the different types of fire control predictors, and, last but not least, to personnel. While the Navy anti-aircraft artillery, up to the very end, had active personnel with complete Navy training, the Luftwaffe anti-aircraft artillery had eventually become the largest branch in the Armed Forces, com¬ prising 1,190,000 “men.” But because the majority' of the active personnel had to be released for ground duty or tor the Luftwaffe field divisions, prisoners of war, women and children made up a large percentage of this figure. Thus, in reality, about half of the personnel were practically unusable. 457 In Kiel. 45b Target range and arms school of the Luftwaffe anti-aircraft artillery in Mecklenburg (already renamed “Rerik” at that time). 45

In the first months of 1943, quite a few night air raids against harbors on the North African coast were flown from southern France and Italy, also resulting in the destruction of a number of Allied troopships.

4611 The renaming of Air Command East into Air Force 6 was done by order of the Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief on May 11,1943. Apparently (see above note 439), this modification was made effective about 10 days later. 4,11 Draft orders of the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the event of Italy’s defection or collapse (Alaric for the Italian area, Konstantin for the Balkans. 442 Reference to the Commander-in-Chief West. The Fourth Italian Army was deployed in his area on the French Mediterranean coast. 463 Phillip, Prince of Hesse. 464 If a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini was considered here—as it ap¬ pears—it did not take place at that time. Altogether the two dictators met seventeen times: June 14-15, 1934

Venice

September 25-29, 1937 Munich, F.ssen, Berlin May 3-9, 1938 Rome, Naples, Florence September 29, 1938 March 18, 1940

Munich (Munich Conference) Brenner

June 18, 1940

Munich Brenner

October 4, 1940 October 28, 1940

Florence (originally planned for November 6; ad¬ vanced because of the Italian adventure in Greece)

January 19-20, 1941 June 2, 1941 August 25-29, 1941

Berchtesgaden Brenner

April 29-30, 1942

Klessheim

Rastenbutg, Lemberg, Cm an (visit to the Army Group Rundstedt and the CSIR)

Military Confurexchs 1942-1945

851

(A meeting scheduled for mid-December 1942 was cancelled because Hitler didn’t want to leave Rastenburg, and Mussolini, who was annoyed, pretended to be sick and sent Ciano instead.) April 7-10, 1943

Klcsshcim

July 19, 1943

Feltre

September 14, 1943

Rastenburg (after Mussolini’s liberation)

April 22-23, 1944

Klessheim

July 20, 1944

Rastenburg (after the assassination attempt)

—Source: Wiskemann, passim; Anfuso, passim; Ciano, passim; I 'B. [See also. Sand Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini: The Secret Meetings, Enigma 2000.] 4b5 This transcript is not from the Berchtcsgaden collection. It seems to be a sur¬ plus copy for the quartermaster’s department of the Armed Forces Operations Staff (see also Hitler’s remark during his meeting with Field Marshal Keitel and General Zeitzler,June 8, 1943: “Perhaps with the aid of today’s shorthand report...”). It bears the circulation stamp of this department and the initials of the Deputy Head of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, General Warlimont, Colonel Baron Trcusch v. Buttlar-Brandcfcls for the Army Operations De¬ partment, Colonel v. Tippelskirch for the Quartermaster’s Department, and also the officials of this department. The document, which was incorporated into the Nuremberg series and was given number 1384-PS, is incomplete. On the last available page (27), the last line was transferred—obviously from the following page—by handwriting, most likely by Warlimont. The adjournment time is missing. This transcript was published in German by George Fischer in the Journal of Modern History (Chicago) vol. XXIII, no. 1 (p. 62), and in English as Appendix II to his book Soviet Opposition to Stalin, Cambridge (Mass.) 1952, p. 176. 46f' Aside from the closed “domestic” formations that were established later, the German field troops in the East had tried from the very beginning to replace some of their losses on-site by using Soviet prisoners of war as interpreters, grooms, cannoneers, baggage drivers, kitchen aids, craftsmen, etc., in their units. In the middle of 1943, the number of these “Hiwis” (HilfswiUigc—auxiliary volunteers) was, according to Herre, about 320,000 men, with 70 to 80% of them being used as noncombatants. In the rear services, the “Fliwi” portion of the overall personnel was often 50% or more; in the combat units, one could find up to 20% auxiliary volunteers. During the course of the war, the “Hiwis” reached at least an approximate equalization under law with the German sol¬ diers. In the present discussion, Zeitzler gives the number of auxiliary volun¬ teers as only 220,000; however, he may have had every reason to keep that figure as low as possible when discussing it with Hider. The statement given by Schmundt that the Eighteenth Army alone had 47,000 auxiliary volunteers, also contrib¬ utes to the greater credibility’ of the figure mentioned above by Herre. A list compiled by the staff of the generals of the Eastern troops that same month (June 1943) also included the estimated number of those “Hiwis” who were concealed bv the units; it estimated 600,000 auxiliary volunteers. The largest

852

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS number estimated is that of 1 million auxiliary volunteers, a few months before the end of war. — Source: Thorwald: Wen sie ... pp. 129 and 245; Heinz Danko Herre: Deutsche Erfahrungen in der Verwendung von Kriegsgefangenen gegen die Sowjetunion (Thorwald materials in the IfZ); Ernst Kostring: Erfahrungen mit den Freiwilligen aus dem russischen Raum im KampfRaum im Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus 1941-45 (Thorwald materials in the IfZ); Dallin, pp. 536 and others; Fischer, p. 45.

447. Andrei Andreewich Vlasov; born September 1, 1900; in Lomakino near Nizhnyi Novgorod; 1919 Red Army; 1930 Communist Party member; 1938-39 military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek; 1939 Commander, 99th Rifle Division; 1941 Commanding General, 4th Tank Corps and defender of Kiev; then, Commander, 20th Army under Zhukov as defender of Moscow; Lieutenant General after the battle of Rzhev; and March 1942 Deputy Commander, Volkhov Front and Commander, 2nd Shock Army. There, Vlasov was captured in June or July when he tried to lead his army in an escape from encirclement south of Leningrad. His group was encircled and gradually destroyed. This experience made him an anti- Bolshevist, and he put himself at the disposal of the Germans, with the aim of overthrowing the Soviet system from the head of a Russian National Army On September 10, 1942, he signed the first leaflet that was dropped over the Russian lines. That same month, accommodations were provided for him in Berlin, and German military agencies began to promote Vlasov's plans. The entire action, which in late fall led to the formation of a "Experimental Central Unit" — which was dissolved by Field Marshal v. Kluge in December — had to be organized with extreme caution. Considerable difficulties could be expected from the disclosure of the unit's activities — both from Rosenberg's Ministry for the East, which pursued a policy of "decomposition" of the Eastern area by promoting the minorities, and from Hitler and his headquarters, where Vlasov was viewed as a mere pawn to be shifted on the propaganda chessboard. — Source: Fischer, p. 26; Thorwald: Wen sie...,p. 135. 448.

Operation "Silberstreifen" ("Silver Stripe") was a large-scale desertion-promotion action planned by the Foreign/Defense Intelligence Office. It was intended to support the spring offensive near Kursk, and was to start simultaneously with the military action. The organizers had prepared 18 million leaflets, which they intended to drop along the entire Eastern Front. "Leaflet N° 13" had been written specifically for this purpose; it contained general phrases and a printed pass. They also intended — and the originators of the plan expected the most from this — to drop older leaflets from the so-called Smolensk Committee, in which the opinions of the Vlasov people on the reconstruction of Russia were stated. "Leaflet N° 13" was countersigned by General Gehlen and also approved by Zeitzler, while the rest of the plan, including a personal assignment for General Vlasov, was forbidden by the German leadership. Because the offensive against Kursk also had to be postponed, "Silberstreifen" was launched separately during the night May 6, 1943. It was a failure. Only a few hundred deserters turned themselves in along the entire Eastern front. — Source: Heinz Danko Herre: Die Aktion Silberstreif (Thorwald materials in the IfZ); Thorwald: Wen sie..., p. 220; Dallin, p. 570).

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

853

469. This sentence is deleted by hand in document 1384- PS. 470. This part of the text was subsequently corrected in document 1384-PS. The original version read: "...That is Leaflet 13." Regarding Leaflet No. 13. 471. Number "13" is deleted by hand in document 1384- PS. 472.

The position "General of the Eastern Troops" (later "General of the Volunteer Units") in the Army High Command was established in mid-December 1942 as inspector of the Hiwis [auxiliary volunteers] and volunteer units from the East. The General of the Eastern Troops was initially General Heinz Hellmich (1941 Commander of the 21st Infantry Division , replaced before Moscow and from then on commander of a reserve division in Poland), who had been in Russian captivity and had learned adequate Russian. Hellmich was replaced by General of Cavalry Kostring at the end of 1943. As field agencies, there were "Commanders of the Eastern Troops seconded for special duty" in the army groups, the armies and the Armed Forces Commands.

—

Source: Thorwald: Wen sie..., pp. 126, 248

and 322; Fischer, p. 45; Dallin,p. 543. 473.

On March 30, 1940, the Japanese had proclaimed a so called "National Government of the Peoples Republic of China" headed by Wang After Wang's death on November 10, 1944, the "National Government" faded away until the Japanese surrender, unnoticed and insignificant.

—

Source: Jones

/

Borton Pearn, p. 13; Schulthess 1939-40; Keesing's /

Archive 1940-1944. 474. Since the beginning of World War I, a "Polish Legion" consisting of three brigades — led, for all practical purposes, by Pilsudski (de jure Commander of the 1st Brigade) — had fought Russia within the framework of the Austro- Hungarian Army. After the proclamation of a Polish satellite state by the Central Powers on November 5, 1916, the Central Powers tried to use the Polish forces for the further benefit of the German-Austrian war effort by forming a Polish Army. The collapse of Tsarist Russia in the following year and the Bolshevist renunciation of Poland, however, thwarted these plans, as the Polish could be offered better chances in the other camp now. On February 15, 1918, after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the last Polish unit, the 2nd Brigade, crossed over to the other side in the Bukovina region. The Polish change of sides was not in the least caused by machinations of the legionnaires. It took place rather inevitably because the Poles had chosen the lesser of two evils, and now that the greater one had disappeared, they naturally started trying to do away with the lesser one as well. Nevertheless, the situation of the Eastern volunteers was, of course, somewhat similar. 475.

—

Source: Komamicki, p. 91.

Alfred Ingemar Berndt; born April 22, 1905; 1922 NSDAP; 1929 Editor at W.T.B; 1933, Editor-in-Chief of DNB; 1936 Ministerial Councilor in the Ministry of Propaganda and head of Dept. IVa (German Press) and Reich

854

Hitler asp His Generals

Press Chief; 1938 Assistant Director and head of Dept. Vill (Literature); 193941 head of Dept. Ill (Broadcasting), Ministerial Director; 1941-44 heat! of Dept. II (Propaganda); 1941-43 Rommel’s Ordnance Officer in Africa; 1943 Air War Damage Inspector; late 1944 Commander of a panzer unit of the Waffcn SS; and died in Hungary on March 28, 1945.—Source: Horse nblattf dt. Buchbandel of Dec. 29, 1938. 4b As the Russians were able to call up only a few age groups prior to their with¬ drawal, the number of men between 17 and 43 years of age who were avail¬ able in Congress Poland and Polish Lithuania in 1916 was estimated at 1.4 million, in addition to 1 ()(),() The reference is probably to the Allied naval unit off the north coast of Sicily. 641 Plans to occupy the Vatican, and to kidnap the Pope and bring him under secure German influence, were obvious to the National Socialist mentality, of course, and are mentioned repeatedly in the literature. Gisevius moves them to the spring of 1943, where Oster had heard about the plans and Canaris had thwarted them by giving Rome a hint. Rintelen and Abshagen, on the other hand, move these plans to the months between Mussolini’s overthrow and the defection of Italy. Another source indicares that Goebbels and Ribbcntmp had torpedoed the plan. Weizacker gives an even later date. After numerous rumors and press reports, he got a hint from the Vatican as late as October 1943. Despite various efforts and explorations, however, he was unable to get a confirmation or a reliable denial of these rumors until the day the Allies entered Rome.—Source: Gisevius,p. 470; Abshagen, p. 337; Rintelen, p. 235; Gilbert, p. 71; Wei^sacker, p. 362. 612 The reference is to Manstein and his planned relief attack, which is mentioned repeatedly above; “them” refers to the three SS divisions scheduled to be trans¬ ferred to Italy. Once Goebbels had arrived at the Fiihrer Headquarters on July 27, he was in¬ structed by Hitler to “take care of the prince” and to keep him away from Italian affairs. The role of the Prince of I Iesse did not come to an end until the surren¬ der of his father-in-law.—Source: hochner,p. 413. 444 Italian fortifications along the passes in the Alps. 645 Transcript number unknown (presumably 430/43)—Fragment N a 16—Because the preserved shorthand record was heavily charred, the second transcription was possible only with large gaps. 646 The evacuation of Sicily. 64

After the first Russian winter, Horthy had appointed Nikolaus v. Kallay the new prime minister on March 10, 1942, under the assumption that he would be the suitable man to “take steps to bring about more friendly relations with the AngloSaxons while preserving the foreign relations with I Iitler and Germany and with¬ out aiding the Soviets.” After establishing initial contact through Polish exile circles, Kallay managed to get in direct contact with the F.nglish via Turkey in

Military ConferjzNcizs 1942-1945

883

the summer of 1942. He offered to take active measures against Germany as early as 1943, provided that a way could be found to geographically link the operations of the armed forces of the two countries. On September 9, 1943, a first meeting took place between an official Hungarian representative and the English ambassador in Ankara, Sir Hugh knatchbull-Hugcsscn—behind the back of the Hungarian envoy in Turkey, who was unreliable for such purposes. It can be supposed that Hitler was informed about this Hungarian-English en¬ tanglement.—Source: Horffjy,p. 251; KaJIay, p. 369. A4K Himmler, Donitz and Rommel, like Goring and other high-ranking Nazi per¬ sonalities, were summoned to Rastenbutg to discuss the events in Italy. 449 Sardinia. 650 Northern Italy. *5i jn prance> 652 This judgment was also confirmed many times by other unprejudiced parties. Because these divisions consisted of specially selected young people, their atti¬ tude is not surprising. This procedure of gathering together an elite in a few privileged divisions also had a negative side. The military was deprived of young conscripts, as these youths were missing when their age groups were called up. A huge number of these boys died as young soldiers; had they survived until they were somewhat older, they would have provided an outstanding new crop of non-commissioned officers and officers for the whole army. 453 Friedrich Dollmann; born February 2,1882; 1901 Second Lieutenanr; 1914 Cap¬ tain; Reichswehr; 1930 Colonel; 1931 Commander, 6th Artillery Regiment; 1932 Major General and Artillery Commander, VII; 1933 Lieutenant General; 1934 Commanding General, IV Army Corps; April 1936 General of Artillery; after October 1939 Commander-in-Chief, Seventh Army on the Upper Rhine front and later in northwestern France; and July 1940 Colonel General. On )une 27, 1944, during the invasion battles, Dollmann died of heart failure while at his command post.—Source: I 71 of July 1, 1944; Seemen; Das deutsebe Heer, p. 144; Kattgliste 1944-4 5, p. 14; Keilig 211167. ','’4 Johannes Blaskowitz; born July 10, 1883; 1902 Second Lieutenant; 1914 Cap¬ tain; in World War 1 company commander, battalion commander and General Staff officer; Reichswehr; 1922 Major; 1929 Colonel; 1930 Commander, 14th Infantry Regiment; 1933 inspector of the Arms schools and Lieutenant Gen¬ eral; 1935 Commander in Military District [Wehrkreis] II; 1936 General of the Infantry; 1938 Commander-in-Chief, Third Army Group; 1939 Colonel Gen¬ eral; in the Polish campaign, Commander-in-Chief, Eighth Army (kutno, War¬ saw); and after October 1939, Commander-in-Chief East. Blaskowitz’s memo¬ randum about the excesses of the SS in Poland was taken amiss by Hitler, to the extent that Blaskowitz was given only a reserve command in the French cam¬ paign and thus did not receive the marshal’s baton. From October 1940 to May 1944 Blaskowitz was inactive as Commander-in-Chief of the First Army in the West; he subsequently became Commander-in-Chief of Army Group G in South¬ ern France, which, however, was disparagingly designated k‘Armeegruppe” [Army Group] at first. After the retreat from the mouth of the Rhone to the Vosges

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

885

Holland as the divisional commander of the paratroopers (7th Air Division); initiator and commander of the paratroop action against Crete in May 1941 (XI Air Corps), which involved heavy losses; in September 1943 together with Skorzeny assigned by Hitler to liberate Mussolini; May 1944 Commander-in- Chief, Parachute Army; July 1944 Colonel General; November 1944 to end of January 1945 Commander-in-Chief Army Group H; in the second half of April 1945, Commander-in-Chief, Parachute Army; and, in the last days of the war, Commander-in-Chief Army Group Vistula. In May 1946 Student was sentenced by a British military court in Liineburg to 5 years of imprisonment. — Source: Munzinger Archive; Siegler, p. 139; Order ofBatde, p. 631; Hove, passim. 662.

During the evacuation of Sicily.

663. After Mussolini accepted German aid for Libya during the Berchtesgaden meeting of January 19-20, 1941, there were, in principle, no difficulties surrounding the transport of German units to Italy.However, the troops had to be reported to the Italians were subordinated — at least formally — to the Comando Supremo, or, after May 1943, to the German Commander-in-Chief South at the Comando Supremo. Supposedly because of the expected difficulties, and also to maintain the element of surprise, Ramcke's 2nd Parachute Division, intended for use in Operation Alaric, was not transported by land from southern France but was suddenly and surprisingly dropped at the Pratica di Mare airfield near Rome — without even informing Kesselring about it beforehand. 664. This was most likely the result of the situation report at hand. Shortly thereafter, several German divisions marched into Italy by land and occupied the passes in the Alps. Rome was notified of the border crossing only afterward, and the divisions were not subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief South (who was no longer accredited to the Comando Supremo) but to Rommel's Army Group B in Munich. The Italians protested in vain. The German march onto the Po plain and the securing of the passes in the Alps were, among other things, issues discussed in the meeting between Ribbentrop and Keitel, and Guariglia and Ambrosio in Tarvisio on August 6, 1 943. In addition, there was very nearly a serious incident when the Italian General Gloria gave his men the order to fire on the 44th Infantry Division which was entering South Tyrol. — Source: Rintelen,p. 226; Kesselring, p. 234; Rommel Papers, p. 433; Westphal, p. 223. 665. Due to the Italian news ban, reports about this matter did not trickle through to the international press until July 28. That day in the same issue of the Neue Ziircher Zeitung there were two different articles about the former director of the Stefani agency, Senator Morgagni: his resignation was reported from the Italian border, and the Italian press reported his death. Two days later the newspaper published rumors about Morgagni's suicide and that of Virginio Gayda. Giulio Morgagni, born in 897, had been director of the Stefani agency since 1924 and a senator since 1 939. Roberto Suster succeeded him. — Source: NZZ of July 26 (morning edition), July 28 (evening edition) and July 30 (evening edition) 1943. 666. Hitler intended to give Rommel the command over all of Italy as soon as the Axis partner went over to the other side. This plan however, was not implemented — not even when Italy finally renounced Germany on September 3 and

886

Hnu.ii A.\n His Gexuraui

8, 1943. Rather, Rommel had the command in northern Italy only, and even there he led and kept it only until mid-November 1943. Differences between Rommel and Kesselring had already emerged during the African campaign, on one hand due to the opposition between Luftwaffe and Army, which was be¬ coming obv ious elsewhere, and on the other because of differing evaluations of the Italian attitude and position. The new division of the command in Italy (army group border line: Elba—Ancona) only brought new conflicts, of course. Because of the relatively favorable developments in the military situation in Italy—developments that had been predicted by Kesselring—Hitler, after much vacillation, decided in favor of Kesselring and his strategic concept (defense south of Rome). Kesselring, as Commander-in-Chief Southwest, was given the supreme command of the Italian theater, effective November 21,1943.—Sonne: Tipptlskircb, p. 412; Romm/ Papers, p. 425; Kesselring, passim; Westpbal, p. 236. ®66 In southern Italy, where they could have made considerable difficulties for the German troops, the war-weary Italian units later simply dispersed. Kesselring, accurately assessing the situation and the Italians’ numerical strength, let them go or called for local amicable agreements. In this way, the Carboni corps, hesi¬ tantly still in the Rome area, surrendered and was subsequently released. In north¬ ern Italy, on the other hand, Rommel—who tried to force Kesselring to take similar measures—interned the Italian units, a practice wrhich drove many of them into the partisan camp.—Source: Tippelskircb,p. 375;Kesselring,p. 255; Rommel Papers, p. 445; Westpbal, pp. 229 and 233. u,. These somewhat implausible ideas generated in the first hours were never actuallv implemented. A “Fascist Freedom Army” never existed, but in September, during their first talks after Mussolini’s liberation, the two dictators did agree formally on the reconstruction of the “forze armate.” In practice, however, the Germans hindered the immediate training and appropriate ideological indoctri¬ nation instruction of the half-million military internees they were holding. The operational planning of the Armed Forces High Command—due to not unjus¬ tified distrust—also limited the Italian contribution to the defense of the Apennine Peninsula to the deployment of construction battalions and, later, coastal fortification batteries. In 1944, four Fascist divisions (SanMarco, Monterosa, Italia and 1 Jttoria) were eventually built up in Germany over the course of the year. They were armed from German arsenals and trained by the German Armed Forces, but the personnel was recruited in Italy—and only a small fraction of them came from the internment camps—as the German authorities (for a vari¬ ety of reasons, including the labor shortage) continued to forbid voluntary en¬ rollment in Germany. Mussolini had also just inspected these divisions when he arrived at the Fiihrcr Headquarters on July 20, 1944, in order to negotiate, among other issues, the transportation and deployment of these units. When the four divisions arrived in northern Italy in October 1944, many of their personnel deserted. The rest were used in the fight against the partisans and made brief contact with Allied forces only in the Garfagnana valley. (See also above note 588.)—Sources: Anfuso, pp. 249, 254, 273, 295, 301, 310, 323, 328, and 331; Moellhausen, p. 265; Toynbee: Hitler’s Europe, p. 325.

AilUTARY CONFUREXCES

1942-1945

887

668 Badoglio turned 73 in September 1944. Victor Emmanuel 111 had reached this age in November 1942. 669 The reference here is either to Lcincr again (see above note 656) or Himmler’s personal envoy in Italy and rival of Kapplcr, the regular police attache there, SS Obersturmbannfuhrcr (after November 9, 1943, Standartenfuhrer) Dr. Eugen Dollmann. Dollmann, born August 21, 1900, was originally an art his¬ torian, and had made his way as a guide in Italy. He made himself indispens¬ able as an interpreter during Himmler’s visit to Libya, then joined the SS and was taken into the German embassy in 1939. The smooth schemer, who be¬ came known for his relations with the gilded youth of the Roman aristocracy, had worked against the house of Savoy since 1941 and—as the Italian em¬ bassy in Berlin was informed—for Farinacci. During the period of the Re public of Said, Dollmann was an influential police commander in Germanoccupied Italy. I le is the author of a book, Roma uagis/a, that is full of dubious information.—Sources: Wi$kemann,pp. 157, 285, and325; Skorgeny,p. 112; Hagen: Untemebmen Hern hard, p. 124. f,T" The division number is incorrect in one of these two cases. f’ 1 The 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich remained in the East at the time. 2 “Indian” is hardly likely; this was either a misunderstanding or Hitler’s ironic term for a unit consisting of foreign personnel. 6 ' Reconstitution of the General Command IV Army Corps, which had been de¬ stroyed in Stalingrad; it remained in the southern sector of the F’astern Front, however.—Soum: Older of Battle, p. 117; Mamtein, p. 550 and ot/jers. f> 4 Badoglio—comrade-in-arms with the French in World War 1 and certainly against the German alliance from the very beginning—had argued against Italy’s joining the war in 1939. This stance was based simply on the knowledge he had acc]uired in his role as Chief of General Staff of the desperate state of the Italian armed forces and armaments. However, one can hardly speak of a keyrole for Badoglio, as Hitler wants to know here. Badoglio resigned on Decem¬ ber 6,1940, in connection with the miserable result of the Italian invasion of Greece, and since then he had lived a private life in quiet opposition. (See also above note 410.)—Source: Ciano; Wiskemann; Citibri^gi; Badoglio. 075 Presumably these were Allied naval units operating north of Sicily in support of the Allied troops’ advance along the coast. 6 6 This was the Italian steamer X 'iminule, which was recovered in Palermo on Janu¬ ary 3, 1941, after having been damaged by British midget craft, and was towed to Messina. The ship was torpedoed and sunk by the British submarine Unbend¬ ing off Cape Vaticano on July 25, 1943, at 3 a.m. 6

At this point. La Spczia was still a German submarine base, where boats of the 29th Submarine Flotilla anchored.

f’T* The Germans settled in Italy in the coming weeks, waiting for the Italian defec¬ tion. They tried at the end of August (with two divisions) to secure La Spezia, where the bulk of the Italian fleet was anchored, saying that this port must have particularly strong protection against a potentially hostile landing. I lowcvcr, the Italians saw through this game and moved other forces to La Spezia, declaring

888

Hn u

R and

His

Generals

the protection of this base by their own forces to be an issue of prestige. Thus, the Italian fleet under Admiral Bergamini, fulfilling the armistice condi¬ tions, was able to put to sea during the night of September 8 from La Spezia— joined by other minor elements from Genoa, Taranto, Pola, etc—and follow a zigzag course to Malta for internment, even though it was part of the Ger¬ man Achse (or, previously, the Alaric) plan to prevent the Italian units from fleeing in case of a collapse. The German command, as well as some of the Italian army officers, obviously including Bergamini himself, were misled by messages about putting to sea for an upcoming decisive battle. All in all, the British were able to intern 5 battleships, 8 cruisers, 31 destroyers and torpedo boats, 40 submarines, and numerous small craft, as well as 170,000 GRT in merchant ships. Some units were sunk by the Germans—for instance, the battleship Ronra was destroyed by a remote-controlled glider bomb. Four war¬ ships were interned in Spain and held there until January 1945. Fifty ships were scuttled in ports under the control of the Germans or the Japanese. Only the popular “Decima MAS” midget craft combat unit—the 10th MAS Flotilla (,niotoscafi anti-sommergibi/r. motor torpedo boats) under the leadership of Prince Valerio Borghese—remained loyal to Mussolini. Some other shipping was taken over by the Germans, mostly after smaller sabotage actions or sinkings in shal¬ low waters, such as the battleships Cavourand Impero, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 caus¬ ers, and various torpedo boat and destroyer flotillas in the Ligurian Sea, the upper Adriatic and the Aegean. However, practically without the Italian crews, the smaller units (which only the Germans preferred and which only the Ger¬ mans put into commission) all had to be manned by German crews. Mussolini at Salo was extremely outraged by this inglorious end to "his” fleet.—Source: Tippelskircb, p. 368; Huge: Seekrieg, p. 256; Anfuso, p. 262; Rintelen, p. 248; de He lot, p. 226; Westpbal, p. 226; MoeUbausen, p. 257; Tri^gino, p. 121. An attack by the German torpedo squadron (K.G. 26) off the Algerian coast. The commander of the Eleventh Italian Armv in southern Greece was General Vecchiarelli. 681 During this time, the German side was trying to implement a better—and safer— division of orders in the Balkans. They proposed that the Italians place their Eleventh Army in Greece under the command of the German Commander-in Chief Southeast/Army Group FI (Lbhr). In return, the German troops in the region—especially the LXVIII Army Corps (Felmy)—should be placed under the command of this Eleventh Army. 682 The Adriatic coast of the Balkans as well as the Greek regions along the Ionian Sea, except the Peloponnese, remained occupied by Italian troops. They were not expected to resist an Allied landing very seriously, regardless of where it might take place, but German troops could not replace them before the com¬ plete defection of Italy. Thus, the Konstantin plan called for German units to move from the hinterland to the coast in preparation. However, the German defense would not have been able to resist a landing either—due to weak forces, the neglect of the coastal fortifications by the Italians, and the constant partisan

AtllSI ARY CoNHUUzXCIiS

889

1942-1945

warfare. Thus, an Allied invasion through the Balkans toward Central Europe had a very good chance of success, despite the difficult terrain. 683 It took place one month later. M44 I litlcr’s and Goring’s assertions w ere not completely unfounded. s The reason for this conference was probably a letter dated May 7, 1943, from Foreign Secretary Eden to the prime minister of the Yugoslav government-inexile; the letter was passed on to Mihailovic on May 28 and its contents were confirmed on June 1 by the general. In this letter, Eden promised the Cctniks increased support, but requested intensified activity against the Axis troops on their part, no further contact with Prime Minister Nedic or the Italians, and an end to the constant friction with the Tito partisans. In London, however, in the next few weeks, the die was cast against Mihailovic, and in the course of the year the tone of the British press towards both Yugoslavian rivals began to change as wrell. Due to constant pressure from Churchill, the Allied support for the Cetniks stopped; how'ever, he wras not able to get Tito to recognize King Peter. Finally, Teheran and Churchill’s speech in the House of Com¬ mons on May 24, 1944, brought to light the final consequences of this devel¬ opment.—Source: Yotitcb, p. 223; Mall, p. 99; Churchill Vf2, p. 166. 686 The “Serbian Volunteer Corps (SDK),” consisting of five battalions, and the “Serbian State Guard,” 18,000 men together with the “Serbian Border Guard,” were the armed formations created in 1941 or 1942 by the Nedic government.— Source: Mat/, p 110. tS The relocation of another submarine group into the Mediterranean Sea did not start before September 1943. In July, no submarines came from the Atlantic into the Mediterranean. C,8H On July 23, the VI97 sank a 9,583 GRT Swedish motorized tanker, the Pegasus. near Durban. f’8" As a result of the German tonnage wrar, a British source quotes the following monthly totals of Allied and neutral shipping capacity sunk in 1943: GRT

January February

50

ships

totaling

73 120 64

t
6 Zeitzler corrects him here because there was no 529th Division. The reference is probably to the 17th Panzer Division, which had been pulled out of the Sixth Army—for the time being remaining under the command of Army Group South—on the lower Dnieper and sent to the Fourth Army on the threatened north flank of Army Group South. This movement was the begin¬ ning of the castling to the left wing, which Manstein had ordered by telex from the Fiihrer headquarters. The 17th Infantry Division was also located on the

932

Hmj R and His Generals

lower Dnieper, near Nikopol’, but no major movements of that division were recoaled during this period.—Source: Manshift, p. 566. 908 The 16th Panzer Division, together with the 4th Mountain Division (see the following discussion), the 1st Infantry Division and the General Command [Headquarters! XXXXV1 Panzer Corps of Army Group South, was supposed to be made available to the threatened Fourth Panzer Army.—Source:Manshift, p. 567. On Christmas day the te/dbermhalk Panzer Grenadier Division had deployed southeast of Vitebsk to defend against a Russian attack that threatened the Vitebsk-Orsha road.—Source: Heidkamper,p. H6. 91u The reference may be to a Russian unit, as the only German division with this number—the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division—was in Italy. Confusion with the 329th Infantry Division cannot be excluded, but this division was already fighting in the front sector of Army Group North. 91

Meaning the evacuation of the tip of the position west of Nevel’, which could

no longer be held. 912 On December 24 Vatutin’s 1st Ukrainian Front conducted a major offensive against the German Fourth Army west of Kiev to smash the northern flank of Army Group South’s front line, which projected far to the east by the lower Dnieper, further back to the west. The Russians created an 80 km wide and 40 km deep gap in the German front near RadomysP and captured that town as well as Brusilov. This, of course, strengthened the argument for a quick and rimely evacuation of the front salient in the Dnieper bend north of the Black Sea. That is why Manstein, in his evaluation of the situation, expressed the opin¬ ion that “the time for trying to master the situation on the north wing of the army group through individual measures, such as the addition of single divi¬ sions, is over.’’ Within the next few weeks, in the region of Korosten’—Zhitomir— Berdichev—Vinnitsa the decision would be made as to whether the south wing of the FAstern Army would be cut off from its rear connections and finallypushed aside. To avoid that, Manstein called for the abandonment of the east¬ ern part of the Dnieper bend and the withdrawal of the front to a new line in Dnieper bend west of Nikopol’ and Krivoi Rog. Six of the 12 divisions that would be saved by shortening the front were to be shifted to the northern wing of the army group, together with First Panzer Army headquarters, and deployed from the east against the enemy penetration spearhead at Zhitomir. The rest of the divisions were to remain with the Sixth Army along the lower Dnieper. With further additional forces that the Army High Command was to bring in, the redeployed First Panzer Army forces were to line up from the west against the Soviet penetration spearhead after the blocking the encircling movement that threatened the north wing of the Fourth Panzer Army. [—] Hitler refused to evacuate the eastern Dnieper bend and the Nikopol’ bridgehead at this time (and also again in January), based on the doubtful attitude of Turkey if the Crimea were to be lost. Later, on December 31, he did approve the transfer of the First Panzer Army to the northwest (which had been ordered by the armygroup), but this could only be carried out with weaker forces than suggested.

Miutary Conferences

1942-1945

933

due to the continuing efforts to hold the Dnieper bend.—Source: Tippelskircb, p. 428; Mansiein, p. 566. 913 The double-track main line from Fastov via Belaia Tserkov and Smela to Cherkassy or into the industrial area. The two branch lines mentioned further below: from Bcrdichev via kazatin as well as from Vinnitsa to ZvenigorodkaSmela. 914 Could not be identified. 915 The Romanians administered part of the occupied Soviet territory: the area between the Dnestr and the Bug, including the harbor city of Odessa. Because the satellites in the southeast were usually extremely mindful to maintain their sovereignty rights, the use of their facilities frequently required lengthy initial discussions and then still often resulted in difficulties. 916 From the term introduced bv the quartermaster general for the road connection between Lemberg [L’vov]—Tarnopol-Vinnitsa-Kirovograd-Krivoi RogDnepropetrovsk—Stalino—Rostov (the route in the sector mentioned here: Vinnitsa-Gaissin—Uman—Novo Archangelsk-Xovo Ukrainka-Kirovograd). There were a few large East-West connections of this type (e.g., the D V: Brest Litovsk-Kha’rkov), which didn’t necessarily follow main roads bur also included secondary roads that were especially maintained by the road construction au¬ thorities. These connections were crossed by the North—South connection PK

[PC] (Petersburg—Crimea). [—] Perhaps this mention reminded Hitler of his Eastern colonization plans, in which the D IV had played a role. German settle¬ ment bases were to have been established along this route to connect the “Gotengau” (Crimea and Chcrson area)—which was to have been totally colo¬ nized by Germany—with the German settlement area. [See also 11. Trevor-Roper, 91

Ed., Hitler's Table Talk 1941-1944, Enigma 2000, pp. 339, 577,578.] Regarding the 4th Mountain Division, see above note 908.

918 During their attacks against the German Dnieper front, the Soviets concen¬ trated against Kiev on November 3, tore apart the German front on the 6th and broke through to the town of Fastov, 60 km southwest of Kiev, on the 7th. The German salient, projecting far to the east along the lower Dnieper, began at Fastov. To make sense, the passage here should probably read: “...and not car¬ ried out the Fastov action...” because the reference is likelv to the German counterattack in mid-November.—Source: TippelskJrcb, p. 396. 919 Hitler agrees here not to Manstein’s suggestion, but only to a minor regrouping, due to which—as is stated below—one division will be set free: the 4th Moun¬ tain Division. Zeitzler also argues for the larger evacuation, as can be seen clearly from the discussion that follows. ' " In pursuit of his favorite plan for an operation (even though limited) in south¬ eastern Europe, Churchill also spoke with the Turks in early December 1943 in Cairo, following Teheran, regarding preparations for Operation “Saturn.” After the completion of Turkish air bases with Allied help. Allied air forces were to land in Turkey during the first half of February to enable operations in the Aegean Sea, and Salonika. Because of “Cicero” those preparations were well known to the Germans, but they’ expected, as the result of some error, a sudden

AilUTARY C'ONbliRIiXCliS

1942-1945

935

Meaning the Crimea. The Seventeenth Army, then with five German and seven Romanian divisions, as well as individual coastal defense units, was still in the Crimea when the German front fell behind the Dnestcr in April of the follow¬ ing year, and in fact suffered Stalingrad’s fate to a great extent. The rear units of the divisions, the main body of the army following, and the majority of the Romanians were successfully transported out of Sevastopol’, but most of the army’s combat units were captured (exactly one year before tire end of the war) after a three-week occupation of the fortress. The transportation was delayed too long, and in the end there was a shortage of small ship capacity to assist in the embarkation, as the transporters stood ready in open water outside the range of the Russian artillery.—Source: Wdtersbausen, passim; Picker/,passim. 929 In the Crimea at that time, in addition to three German divisions—the 98th Infantry Division near Kerch and the 50th and 336th Infantry Divisions in the north—there were seven Romanian divisions. Later two additional German di¬ visions were brought over to the Crimea: the 73rd Infantry Division (Kerch) and the 111th Infantry Division (Army reserves, later in the north), while the Romanian forces decreased and were evacuated first in the final partial evacua¬ tion of the Crimea. However, the reason for this was not only consideration for Antonescu, but primarily the unreliability of those troops. In the end, the troops could not be used at the front anymore, as they rightly doubted the sense of those battles at a point in time when their homeland was already seriously threat¬ ened. The Romanian formations involved were the I Mountain Army Corps with three mountain divisions, two cavalry divisions and two infantry divisions.— Source: Pickert, p. 142; Weitersbausen, passim. The 16th Panzer Division had been reconstituted in France in the spring of 1943 after its destruction in Stalingrad, and had been used since then in Italy, until the fall. It had recently been relocated to the Eastern front and put under the command of Army Group Center. Now, according to the following consid¬ erations, it was to be deployed in the area of Kiev, which, of course, meant further weakening of Army Group Center.—Source: Order of Batik, p. 295. Here the reference is already to the retreat from the Volkhov River and Lake ll’mcn’ to the Narva-Lake Peipus line, i.e., on the old Estonian border (sec also the meeting that took place two or three days later between Hitler and /.eitzler and Kiichlcr, on December 29 or 30,1943.). This retreat was then forced by the Soviet winter offensive in January and February 1944.—Source: Tippe/skircb, p. 441. 'J As Hitler correcdy assumed, the Red Army attacked Vitebsk fiercely starting in January. In February the German front had to be pulled back to the so-called Outskirt [Stadtrand] position. But Hitler combined the permission for that with the statement that Vitebsk must be “held at all cost as the last major Russian city, for reasons of prestige.” In fact the Soviets did not succeed in taking the city until the end of June 1944.—Source: Tippe/skircb, pp. 446 and 535;for details on the battle of Vitebsk: Heidkdmper, passim. 0ii The first closed volunteer unit of the Waffen SS was the “SS Flander’s Legion,” whose members were recruited primarily from the DcVlag organization Staf dc Clerq. It had been deployed since the winter of 1941-42 in the East, first within

936

Hitler a.\p His CIexerals

the scope of the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade (mot.) in the Svir offensive in the area of Leningrad, and after mid-March 1943 under the command of the SS Police Division. The legion had been expanded to the 6th SS Volunteer Assault Bri¬ gade Langemarck in the fall of 1943, but Hitler’s remark here hints at the size of the unit at that time. In the fall of 1944 it was expanded and renamed the 27th SS Volunteer Panzer Grenadier Division Hangemarck, but it was not deployed collectively anymore, f—] Previously there was a Ixtngemarck Regiment, the original 4th Totenkopf Regiment, which, like the Inlander's Legion, had been deployed with the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade (mot.) in the winter of 1941-42, but it was pulled out later and replaced by the Netherlands Legion. In the early summer of 1942, this IMttgtmarck Regiment was then added as a mobile regiment to the SS Keich Division, which had been reorganized as a panzer division in France. The Flemish members of this unit were placed under the command of the SS As¬

sault Brigade I Mgemarck^ which took over the tradition of the Flander’s Legion, as well as that of the SS lamgemarck Regiment, in the fall of 1943.—Source: Order of Jluft/e, pp. 337 and 348;Sche/long,passim; Hausser,p. 69; Himmler's Order of the Day for March 27, 1943 and lintuuif Draft' KISS/ Pen. Slab betr. SS Assault Brigade

‘7 mu gem arch ” o.D. (Himmler files in IfZ 2/11 / 7). ,4 Friedrich (Fritz) Fromm; born October 8, 1888; 1908 Second Lieutenant; Reichswehr; 1933 Colonel; 1934 Head of the General Army ()ffice; 1935 Major General; 1939 General of Artillery and Commander of the Replacement Army [Ersatzheer] and chief of Army armaments; and July 1940 Colonel General. Later, Fromm played a not entirely clear role in the events of |ulv 20, 1944. Although he refused direct participation and was confined by the conspirators to his private rooms (on word of honor), he gave Colonel General Beck the opportunity to commit suicide after his liberation by Renter's men, and had Olbricht, Stauffenberg and others shot in Bendlerstrasse without orders. Be¬ cause of this, Fromm was taken into custody on word of honor that same night and relieved by Himmler as Commander of the Replacement Army the follow¬ ing day. lie was executed for cowardice on March 12,1945.—Source: Munspnger Archive; Zeller, passim; Kei/ig 211/92; Das deutscht Heer, p. 22.

935 Transcript number unknown—Fragment No. 10. Almost completely preserved. ”f> Manstein’s evaluation of the situation (already discussed with Zeitzler earlier) and his suggestion to significantly shorten the Army Group South positions along the Dnieper bend. One week later, on January 4, 1944, Manstein pre¬ sented his wishes personally at the Fiihrcr Headquarters, but with no more suc¬ cess. [—] Jodi had probably not been at the headquarters during the last few* days—perhaps over Christmas—and was just now hearing about Manstein’s re¬ quest (tor which the Armed Forces Operations Staff was not in principle re¬ sponsible). The discussion regarding the deployment of the Langemarch Assault Brigade indicates that the date is correct and that this meeting realty did take place one day after the meeting between Hitler and Zeitzler (Fragment No. 7). Zeitzler had spoken about it with 1 limmler in the meantime. 7 Should probably be: “that he tries via Kirovograd or Krivoi Rog...”

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

938.

937

Nikopol' was economically important as the center of the largest European manganese ore deposits, which provided for a third of the requirements of the German steel industry. Krivoi Rog was a center of the iron and steel industry. Both towns were strategically important to the extent that Hider still believed that the connection with the cut-off Crimea could be restored from this position on the lower Dnieper. Nikopol' was lost on February 8, and Krivoi Rog at the end of February.

939.

Manstein pressed for a decision on the request he had submitted by telegram on December 25, but he received from Zeitzler only the prospect of adding three divisions, which had been agreed to the day before. — Source: Manstein, p. 567.

940.

Thirty-five km southwest of Vinnitsa, beyond the Bug and so already in Transnistria. The double-track Tarnopol-Odessa line also ran via Zhmerinka.

941.

Marshal Antonescu.

942. This

is an ironic repetition of the assumptions imputed to Manstein. The contrast between

" these" and "these" or "here" and "here" means in most cases "Dnieper bend" vs "Northern flank in the area of Zhitomir-Berdichev-Kazatin." Here it probably means "Germans" and "Russians." 943. The

25th Panzer Division was established in Norway at the beginning of 1942 and was

held in reserve until the summer of 1943, when it was first relocated to northern France, and then in October to the southern sector of the Eastern Front, in the Kiev area. There the division was immediately engaged in heavy combat, for which it was not prepared, due to a lack of experience. But Hitler also had a sharp eye on the division because the former commander, Lieutenant General v. Schell, had provoked his displeasure in his previous position as deputy general of the motor transport service. — Source: Order of Battle, p. 301. 944.

Beginning with the Norwegian campaign in 1940, Hider had shifted command of the Army directly to the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) in individual theaters, eliminating the Army High Command (OKH). In the end, the Army High Command (OKH) commanded only in the East. As a result of this extremely significant separation of responsibility, Zeitzler, as Army Chief of General Staff, became Hitler's only advisor for the East, while Jodi took over the same assignment for all other theaters of war, and Hitler and Hitler alone overviewed the general situation. Only the exceptionally difficult situation on the southern wing of the Eastern Front and the possible need to withdraw forces from the Southeast, South or West (as demanded by Manstein), led Hitler to discuss Manstein's request also with Jodi that evening.

945.

The mobilization and new activation of infantry divisions took place in so-called waves. The active divisions of the Peacetime army had formed the 1st wave, and another three waves had been planned in the original mobilization plan. The activation of the six (seven, including the 274th Fortress Division, which had already existed since the summer) divisions of the 22nd wave — from remnants of destroyed units — began in December 1943 (second activation of the 271st, 272nd, 275th [this one for the first time], 276th, 277th, and 278th Infantry Divisions). [ — ] The wave designation indicated personnel strength, organization and equipment, and therefore also to some degree the combat value of the

938

Hitler and His Generals

relevant divisions. The following year, the divisions of the 32nd wave already received an externally differentiated designation: the “Volksgrenadierdivisionen” [“People’s grenadier divisions”].—Source: MtuHer-HiUebrand1, p. 68 and 11,p. 161; Order of Hattie, p. 222; Keilig 100/3.

",4'J To the West; however, the “Hermann Goring” and the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division ultimately remained in Italy. 94' Hermann Moth; born April 12, 1885; 1905 Second Lieutenant; 1914 Captain in the Great General Staff; Reichswehr; 1924 Major; 1929 Lieutenant Colonel and Commander, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment; 1932 Colonel and Com¬ mander, 17th Infantry Regiment; 1943 Major General and Infantry Commander Ill; 1935 Commander, 18th Division; 1936 Lieutenant General; 1938 General of Iniantry and Commanding General, XV Army Corps (Jena; in the Western campaign Panzer Group I loth); July 1940 Colonel General; November 1940 Commander, Third Panzer Group; October 1941 Commander-in-Chief, Sev¬ enteenth Army in southern Ukraine; and after May 1942 Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Panzer Army. In December 1942 Hoth led the unsuccessful relief at¬ tack on the Stalingrad pocket. In early September 1943, after the failure of the offensive near Belgorod against the southern flank of the Kursk salient, his army was operationally penetrated by the Soviet counteroffensive and could no longer establish a continuous front even in retreat. He was barely able to withdraw the army across the Dnieper River north and south of Kiev. As a result, Hoth was removed from his command (as of December 10) and was not reemploved again until shortly before the end of the war, as “Commander Erzgebirge.” In the Armed Forces High Command trial he was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment. He was released on parole in 1954.—Source: Army High Command staff files (Sbg. Dok. 240KW-141); Mnn^inger Archive; Tippe/skirch, p. 383; Siegier, p. 124.

*eb«M'dchtlic.h 91

Elites. Mate-.-al

946

Hmj R and His Generals

1021 Rcinecke’s name is consistently reproduced in the transcript as “Reinicke.” This spelling mistake was corrected; the rest of the document is printed ver¬ batim. 10 ’ On the first page of this document, Martin Bormann made the following hand¬ written notes: “1) Pg Klopfer z.K. [zur Kenntnis—F'VTJ 2) Pg Friedrichs z.K. p] 3) II Pg Ruder B. (ormann) Jan. 24, 1944. Secret Reich matter, only to be given confidentially from hand to hand! B. 24/1.” Undersecretary of State Dr. Gerhard Klopfer and I lelmuth Friedrichs, both senior employees of the party chancel¬ lery, initialled the transcript on January 29, 1944. Willy Ruder’s initials have the date of Fcbruarv 1, 1944. u '’ Martin Bormann, Secretary of the Fuhrer, I lead of the Party Chancellery. i(>24

Marshal General Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the Armed Forces High Com¬ mand.

u’25 Lieutenant General Rudolf Schmundt, Chiefi Adjutant of the Armed Forces at the Fuhrer Headquarters. Major General Walter ScherfF, |Representative] for the Recording of Military History. 1027 Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Borgmann, Adjutant of the Army at the Fuhrer Headquarters. 1' “ Probably meaning Keitel’s order of February 6,1944 (Hetjugutigett, p. 259) and Reinecke’s Implementing Regulations of February 9 (loc. cit., pp. 261 -67). 1029 So the official channel was presented accurately to Hitler, see Besson loc cit., p. 79. 10v The reference is to Alfred Rosenberg’s office as representative of the Fuhrer for rhe supervision of the entire intellectual and ideological training and educa¬ tion of the NSDAP. Regarding the cooperation of this office with the Armed Forces, see the unpublished dissertation of Herbert P. Rothfeder, “A Study of Alfred Rosenberg’s Organization for National Socialist Ideology,” Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1963, pp. 309-24. 1031 See Ernst Deuerlein, “Hitlers Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr,” in this journal Hierteljabrsbejtejiir Zeitgescbkbte 7 (1959), pp. 177-227. 1 The Commander-in-Chief Southwest, Field Marshal Kesselring. 12,36 On the Island of Elba, the Anglo-Americans had landed in the early hours of June 17. Although the German occupation troops succeeded at first in pushing the enemy back into the sea at some positions in the north and the southeast, the German troops were finally forced together into the northeastern part of the island and had to be withdrawn to the mainland during the night of June 20.— Source: Armed Forces High Command reports of June 17-20, 1944. 12"' The enemy. 1"1'' The Armed Forces High Command had earlier ordered that the OrbctelloSpoleto—Civitanova line be held, but the enemy had already crossed this line in places when the order reached the troops. Most likely it is the position in front of the Trasimeman Sea that is meant here.—Source: TippelskJrch, p. 456. If Kesselring’s statement is correct there is a misunderstanding here, because he indicates as the “Albert” Position a line before Orvieto that had already been crossed. Wherever the error may lie, the reference is certainly to one of the intermediate positions between the Trasimenian Lake and the planned final “Green” Position in the Apennines north of the Pesaro-Urhino—Florence-Pisa Line. This “Green” Position cannot be what is referred to here (despite the mention of the “Green Line”), because, firstly. Hitler knew very well that work was being done on that position (and had been since the fall of 1943), and secondly, Kcsscling was so dissatisfied with the status of the line’s development that he tried to extend the resistance of the intermediate positions for as long as possible.—Source: Kesselring, pp. 266, 292 and 297. 12,0 On Elba.

972

Hitler and His Generals

Meaning further back, corresponding to the withdrawal proposed by the Comntander-in-Chief Southwest. Probably meaning the Gulf of Genoa and the Riviera. I2n The four divisions of the 26th wave, built up from replacement troops in May 1:1

1944, had no numbers, but names. They were used—as in this case—for filling out destroyed divisions.—Source: Keilig WO/4. 1214 See above note 569 and note 1070. 12,: The Armed Forces High Command report of the following day said, “A North American bomber group flew into northwestern Germany and carried out terror attacks against several towns. Damage and personal loss were especially severe in the residential areas of Hamburg, Bremen, Hannover, and Wescrmunde. Sixteen enemy aircraft were destroyed by Luftwaffe and Navyanti-aircraft artillery.” 12lr> This refers to the Stulcken shipyard in Hamburg, diagonally opposite the St. Pauli piers on the southern shore of the (northen) F.lbe River. 121 Meaning between 50 and 80 percent cloud coverage at 500 m cloud height. l2Ib Rudolf Mcister; born August 1, 1897; 1915 Lieutenant; Reichswehr; 1931 Cap¬ tain; 1933 transferred to Luftwaffe; 1935 Major; 1937 Lieutenant Colonel; 1938 tactics instructor at the Luftwaffe War Academy;January 1940 Colonel and Chief of Staff, I Air Corps; October 1940 Chief of Staff, VIII Air Corps; March 1942 Chief, 1st Department Luftwaffe General Staff; September 1942 Major Gen¬ eral; March 1943 Lieutenant General;June Chief of Luftwaffe Operational Staff; September 1943 Commanding General, IV Air Corps;January 1944 Command¬ ing General Replacement Staff East;June 1944 again Commanding General, IV Air Corps; September 1944 General of Aviation; October 1944 Commanding General of German Luftwaffe in Denmark; and December 1944 Chief of Luftwaffe Personnel Office. Meister died on September 11, 1958. 1219 Buhle here resists using the captured Russian guns, as there was no ammuni¬ tion available for them and it could not be produced without delaying the production of existing ammunition types. Furthermore, he judged the perfor¬ mance of some of the guns to be insufficient. 122 At the start of a new ammunition production process, all cartridges have to be newly produced for some time; later one can expect a certain return of used cartridges. 1221 After the end of the battles that had been going on since May 12, and which finally led to Rome’s surrender on June 4. 1222 Hitler’s claims about the Czech captured guns of 1939 are considered untenable by military experts of the time. The fbllowig can be established: The very good Czech heavy field howitzer had been stockpiled and was distributed in large numbers at the front during the war. The production of the Czech 21 -cm gun continued after the occupation, as the foreign order from Sweden (mentioned above) was still being processed until 1943. When Hitler, as happened quite often, placed a “huge order” that was not fulfilled, the reason was that the production capabilities were not available. Furthermore, a significant share of the captured Czech materiel had been stored in German ordinance depots.

'dchtlicH

Mate* al

Military Confurunces 1942-1945

973

and at the end of 1939 the 5th and 6th wave of infantry divisions were equipped with those supplies. This setup would not have been possible writh German equip ment at that time. 1223 This transcript is not from the Berchtesgaden collection, but was made available to the Institute of Contemporary History by the State Institute for War Docu¬ mentation in Amsterdam. According to the State lnsitute, it belongs to the Himmler archives, which had initially been stored in the Berlin Document Center after the war. It was found in the file N 101 (N = Persdnlicher Stab RFSS). It is probably this copy which is now' found in the Dept. Rcc. Br. Alexandria (EAP 13m/10-l). The record has the diary number S 121/44 of the Stenographic Service at the Fuhrer Headquarters, and was dictated by the stenographers Krieger and Dr. Reynitz in the usual manner. It is complete. A printed excerpt can be found in Baumbach: Z// spat?, p. 211. 1224 Meaning the combat troops —the fighting troops. 1“" He no doubt means “if.” 1226

After the loss of France, the success rate of the German submarine war in the Atlantic in fact decreased to zero in the month of October, but increased again slightly during the last months of w-ar (see above note 821). Tungsten is important tor steel production (tools and magnetic steel) and for electrical engineering (filaments and cathodes). The most important European deposits are in Portugal and Spain, with France following at some distance. The French tungsten output was capable of significant development, as w'as proven by the 56-fold increase from 1938 to 1954 (from 10 tons to 560, while Portugal

increased from 1,831 to 2,508 tons during that same time span). 122s Hitler is constantly criticized by his former military colleagues for his habit of counting the theoretical number of dvisions without regard to their mobility or readiness for action. This method of counting (which Hitler himself criticizes here) is seen as one of his cardinal faults. If this is justified (which can hardly be doubted, ensidering the multitude of statements), then this passage proves the presence of occasional lucid intervals in the mania and delusions of grandeur that have been so reliably testified to 122 This happened some months later in the Ardennes offensive and eventually during Operation “Bodenplatte” against enemy airfields in Belgium and north¬ ern France on January 1,1945 (see below' note 1473). liV> Hitler is referring to the July 20 attempt on his life. ,2M The Communications Inspector, General Fcllgicbcl (sec above noc 393), and the Army Quartermaster General, General Wagner (see above note 346 and below' note 1313), belonged to the circle of the July conspiracy. '

Possibly Hitler meant “intelligence” also in a different sense. The military Abwehr (Intelligence Scrvice| (Foreign Intelligence Offce of the Armed Forces I Iigh Command/Armed Forces Operations Staff) under Admiral Canaris had already been abolished by Hitler’s order (on February 12, 1944) regarding the establishment of a unified reporting service under the Reichsfiihrer SS. The Intelligence Sections 1 and II, namely espionage and sabotage, were first formed as an independent Military Section in the RSHA, and the Intelligence Section

974

HrruzR and His Generals

III was integrated into its Section IV (Gestapo). Now', after July 20, the Mili¬ tary Section was integrated more and more into Section VI (Foreign Security Division ).

1 ' With his next sentence Hitler already limits the claim again. It is, of course, totally absurd to blame the development and outcome of the war on he infor¬ mation given here and there to the enemy by convinced opponents of the re¬ gime. However one wishes to judge such behavior, it has been factually estab¬ lished that the extent and success of those actions could not have been suffi¬ cient to justify even a weak connection.

1234 By the spring of 1943, a substantial portion of the military conspiracy against I fitter had already been uncovered. The Customs Investigation Office in Prague had arrested two employees of the Munich Inteligence Intelligence Office [Abwehrstclle] on account of totally private foreign exchange affairs. In the hope of clearing themselves, they gave statements regarding an anti-Nazi conspiracy in Intelligence Central [Abw'ehrzentrale|. On April 4,1943, the Gestapo arrested Reich legal counsel v. Dohndnyi, the closest colleague of Major General Oster, the head of the Central Section in the Foreign Intelligence Office. Oster him self who imprudently tried to cover for Dohndnyi and remove incriminating papers during a search of his office, was suspended immediately. He was re¬ moved from office at the end of the year and lived from then on under supervi¬ sion in a suburb of Leipzig. Two relatives of Dohndnyi, pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Justus Delbriick, and the Munich lawyer Dr. Josef Muller wrere also involved in this affair and arrested. The investigations extended until July 20, 1944—on the one hand because of delaying tactics by Admiral Canaris and chief judge Dr. Sack, but on the other hand because of remarkable caution, apparent blind confidence, and a conspicuous lack of interest on the part of Himmler and his Gestapo chief Muller. To this day it remains unclear just how far into the circle of conspiracy Himmler and his people W'ere able to follow' the threads—which had fallen into their hands by accident—by July 20. It is widely acknowledged that Himmler’s behavior toward the entire military conspiracy w as not unequivocal.—Source: GiseviusII,p. 277; Absbagen,p. 356; Kilter: Goerdeler, p. 352; Zeller, pp. 24 and 142. 12V It is correct that German tanks and assault guns had been drastically improved during the wTar, but it is a pure untruth when Hitler speculates that the quality of the Russians’ materiel had decreased. The amount of American materiel alone that wnt to the Soviet Union within the last few years makes this claim absurd.

123 Regarding the attitude of Turkey, see note 448, note 844, note 920 and note 1494; regarding the attitude of Finland, note 776, note 1391 and note 1502. I2i Turkey broke off diplomanc relations two days later, on August 2.

1 " Regarding the attitude of Bulgaria, see below note 1386. UJ9 Hungary leads Europe in the output of bauxite; the resources are located in the Bakony Forest, in the Vertes Mountains, and in the area south of Pecs [Fiinfkirchen], Manganese resources are mined in the Bakony Forest.

Military Conferences 1942-1945

975

124/1 The “coup d’etat against Mr. Horthv” was initiated on October 15, 1944, but failed due to German preventive measures (see above note 1130 and below note 1453).

1241 See below note 1491. Regarding Hitlers fears concerning an enemy landing in the eastern Mediterranean, see above note 158 and note 366. He probably meant at the Strait of Dover |Pas de Calais); Hitler moves to the West now. Regarding the fears expressed concerning further landings, see note 1096.

1243 Italy. 1244 Carl Heinrich v. Stulpnagel; born January 2,1886; 1906 Second Lieutenant, 115th Infantry Regiment; 1918 Captain in the General Staff; 1932 Colonel and Section head in the Reichswehr Ministry; 1935 Major General and division commander; 1937 Lieutenant General; 1938 Senior Quartermaster II in the Army General Staff; 1939 General of Infantry and (October) Senior Quartermaster I; June 21, 1940 Chairman of the German Armistice Commission for France; February to November 1941 Commander-in-Chief, Seventeenth Army; and February 1942 successor to his distant cousin Otto v. Stulpnagel as Military Commander in France. Stulpnagel had been taking part in the putsch plans since 1938, and became one of the most active members of the military opposition against Hitler. During the night of July 21, 1944, he successfully carried out an over¬ throw in Paris, eliminating the SD. After the failure of the putsch in Berlin and the refusal of the Commander-in-Chief West v. Kluge to support the mission, he had to withdraw his orders. Stulpnagel was ordered to the Fiihrer Headquar¬ ters immediately. He attempted suicide on the way there, at Verdun; however, he only lost his eyesight. I le was sentenced to death by the People’s Court on Au¬ gust 30, 1944, and was executed that same day.—Source: Zeller; pp. 22, 301 mid 424; Hitler: Coerdeler, pp. 245, 274 and398; Schramm (U'.J, passim; Munynuer Archive; Kei/ip 211/333. ,J,“ Somme—Marne-Saone—Jura. This position [Defense Line] had already been reconnoitcred by the Commander-in-Chief West in December 1943 on an order from the Armed Forces High Command or Hitler (see below p. 463). Hitler issued the written construction order for the establishment of the field posi¬ tions on ugust 2. The speed of the Allied advance in France made all efforts useless.

14 This was in fact Montgomery’s plan. Eisenhower’s, in contrast, called for regular attacks along a wide front, without establishing any centers, in order to “reach the Rhine along its entire run” before attacking inner Germany. The final deci¬ sion was made when Eisenhower took over the immediate leadership of the ground operation on September 1, after Montgomery'had explained his opinion again on August 23—now directly, but again without effect. (See also below note 1418.)—Source: Wilmot,p. 486.

124 This idea of a “Special Staff” had already been implemented by Hitler during the Norw egian campaign. Now, in 1944, Jodi was able to prevent the threatened restriction of his authority b establishing a special working group within the Armed Forces Operations Staff for this assignment. Stationed in the Fiihrer

976

Hitijr amd His Generals

Headquarters, this group consisted of a single officer. Lieutenant Colonel kleyscr, and was a pure farce. 1''t" See also below p. 450. In the Black Forest, the relevant location was probably the “Tannenburg” headquarters at the Kniebis, west of Freudenstadt. The “Tanncnbutg” had been used from June 27 until July 1940. Like the “Fclscnncst” near Munstereifel in the Eifcl region (which was occupied from May 10 to June 8, 1940), it was built for the Western campaign. Because of Hitler’s state of health and the development of the situation in the F.ast, the Fiihrer Headquar¬ ters were not relocated int the West in the summer of 1944. Not until Novem¬ ber did Hitler travel to Berlin, from where he moved on December 10 (for about a month) into the West, in order to lead his plannd offensive more effec¬ tively. This time, however, he was further to the rear—toward Zicgcnbcrg near 1240

Bad Nauheim (“Adlerhorst”). establishment of the Fiihrer Headquarters was the responsibility of I litler’s adjutancy.

1250 Hitler left behind several harbors as “fortresses” in advance of the weakening front, some of whch were able to hold out util the end of the war (see note 1485). In fact, the Allies suffered considerable supply difficulties when their armies advanced into Belgium and eastern France, because all of their sup¬ plies still had to be transported via Bayeux and Cherbourg. In October, after they had taken Dieppe and Ostende without a fight, and the “Fortresses” of Lc Havre, Boulogne and Calais had been conquered, the desperate supply situation slowly improved. However, the Allies still had to deal with the lack of big dock cranes, which would have been able to unload the heavy equipment arriving directly from the United States. German troops had rendered the cranes in Cherbourg and Le Havre inoperable before the evacuation. The equipment was available only in the Antwerp harbor, which fell into English hands almost intact on September 4, but it could not be used until the end of November because of German blockades across the mouth of the Schelde (see below note 1513 and note 1514).—Source: Wilmot, pp. 501 and 578. ,:’>l Kluge had taken over from Rundstedt as Commander-in-Chief West (Army Group D) on July 3, and had also taken charge of Army Group B after Rommel’s departure on July 17, as a takeover by SS General Ilausser (suggested by Schmundt) was feared. This joint staff arrangement, which Jodi justly attacks here, remained until September. Kluge led from the headquarters of Army Group B in La Rochc-Guyon, while the connection to the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chicf West in St. Germain, 65 km away, was maintained by tele¬ phone calls and trips by staff officers. Model, who initially replaced Kluge on August 18 in both positions, also had to adopt this leadership technique. At the insistence of the staff, and with Model’s agreement, Rundstedt returned as Com¬ mander-in-Chief West on September 5—this time to Arnberg, near Koblenz.— Source: Hlumen/nil, p. 240; Siegler, pp. 16 and 18; Speidel, p. 142. 1252 See above note 1245. Hitler had already declared on July 23 that he agreed that preparations for a possible reuse of the Western Wall should be initiated.

Military Contlrlscls

1942-1945

977

,ZlJ See below p. 592. 12,5 These captured Russian guns were also used in the fall to help build up the antitank defense of the Western Wall. But they were not remodeled into splittrail carriages (as happened earlier, since the old box-trail carriages of those guns had too limited traversing capability). Instead, they now received a spe¬ cially constructed stationary makeshift carriage with a wider traversing capabil¬ ity. Authorities at that time doubted that there were 1,200-2,000 such captured guns still available and in a functional state. i25« 'phis headquarters was one of the newer facilities. Huge complexes were also built at the Zobten in Silesia and in Ohrdruf. Like Diedenhofen, these had never been used. 121 See below note 1725. i2>»

pejreiein

combines the names “Hofacker” and “Rahtgens” (see below note

1289 and note 1314). He meant Lieutenant Colonel of the Reserves Dr. Caesar v. Hofacker; born March 11, 1896; war volunteer; 1918 First Lieutenant and Squadron Captain; 1921-1925 studied law, various industry positions; after 1936 company secretary [Prokurist] of the United Steelworks; 1940 Luftwaffe Wing Commander; 1941 official in charge of the iron and steel industry in the military administration of France; after October 1943 on Stiilpnagel’s staff (although he was an officer seconded for special duty and not Chief of Staff— here he is mixed up by Fegelein again, this time with Colonel v. Linstow). Hofacker, who was a cousin of Stauffenberg, provided the connection be¬ tween the Paris group of the military conspiracy and the Berlin headquarters. He stayed in Berlin for the last time from July 10 to 17, to inform Beck and Stauffenberg about his report to Rommel on July 9. The field marshal had judged the military situation in the West to be very dark, and had emphasized the necessity of concluding an immediate peace treaty detaining Hitler through an action at a central position. Hitler had returned to Rastenburg from Bcrchtesgaden on July 14, and it is not impossible that Hofacker was also there on tat occasion. Hofacker was arrested on July 24, sentenced to death by the People’s Court |Volksgenchtshof) on August 30, and executed on Decem¬ ber 20.—Source: Leber, p. 259; Zeller, pp. 190, 222, 233, and others; Wheeler-Hen nett, pp. 684, 706 and 761; Speidel, p. 133.; Schramm (W.), passim. ,J

Hitler cither means the large Jobourg Peninsula (Cap de la Hague) northwest of Cherbourg, where the last German bases were ocated until July 1, or the Cap Levi Peninsula in front of the harbor in the cast—the former location of the “Hamburg” naval battery. Furthermore, it was primarily his fault that Cherbourg was lost sooner than necessary. Although the fall of the fortress was just a ques¬ tion of time after the blockade of the Cotcntin Peninsula (considering the in¬ creasing enemy superiority' and the inadequate fortification on the land side), I Iitler repeatedly ordered various advance lines to stop, making it impossible to man the fortifications adequately and in ime, and thus hastening the loss of the city.—Source: Wilrnot, p. 338; llayn.pp. 41 and 59.

12' I Iitler is obviously referring to the breakthrough at Avranches in Brittany, which was practically complete already. There te Americans spread out from the town

978

Hitler and His Generals

(which had fallen on the evening of July 30) and won a bridgehead over the Selune at Pountaubault. The next day, Army Group B received the following order from the Fiihrer Headquarters: “The enemy must under no circum¬ stances be allowed to operate in the open. Army Group B prepares a counter¬ attack together with all panzer units, to break through up to Avranches, to cut off the enemy penetration and to destroy it. All available panzer units are to be pulled from their current employment without replacements...The out¬ come of the campaign in France depends on this attack.” When Warlimont arrived at Kluge’s headquarters on August 2 (see below note 1267) and was received by the field marshal in the early hours of the following morning, he did not in fact deliver—as Wilmot said—“the order from the Fiihrer that the front must be reestablished.” At the time of Warlimont’s departure from Rastenburg and thus at the time of the present conference, the temporary closure of the breach near Avranches was expected (this passage confirms that) and the staff of the Fiihrer Headquarters were of the opinion that the war in France would continue for the time being with slowly retreating fronts— as had been the case thus far in Normandy.—Source: Speidel, p. 151; Wilmot,pp. 416 and 423. 1261

Analogously: “...which could fall into the enemy’s hands in the case of a break¬ through...”

1262

The commander at Cherbourg had been Lieutenant General Karl Wilhelm v. Schlieben, who, in the usual obituary in the German press, was described as the “brave defender of Cherbourg.” According to a German report about those battles, Schlieben was not captured until June 26, during the house-to-house fighting in the inner city. He was captured in his subterranean bunker after hav¬ ing fought for many hours alongside his staff, with infantry weapons, at various bunker exits. Of course, something else was obviously stated in the foreign ra¬ dio service reports, which Hitler received and to which he no doubt refers here. The foreign press reported on an order of the day from Schlieben, whih the Americans had intercepted on June 24, stating that anyone who did not con¬ tinue the resistance until the end would be shot. The capture of the German commander was described in a June 27 LIP report as follows: “[v. Schlieben and Rear Admiral Hennecke, the Navy Commander in Normandy,] were captured when the Americans stormed the entrance of an underground fort. A Ger¬ man lieutenant suddenly appeared in front of the fort, waving a white flag. The officer arrived at the Allies’ line and declared that v. Schlieben and I lennecke were inside the fort and were ready to surrender, together udth the rest of the occupying forces. A few minutes later the lieutenant returned to the fort, and both officers came out with hands raised, leading a line of more than 300 sol¬ diers. Lieutenant General v. Schlieben, who, in an order of the day a few days before had ordered the garrison to resist until the last, was imprisoned.”—Sonne: Hayn, p. 63; Wilmot, p. 346; i\ / Z of )une 26 (morning edition) and June 2S (midday edition), 1944.

1263

Remer (see below note 1869).

Military ConferizNCLs

1942-1945

979

lzw See above note 523.

1265 At Avranches, where the enemy’s strategic breakthrough had not been discov¬ ered yet (see above note 1260). 1264 In 1806 the Prussian fortresses were—following the strategic considerations of those times—neglected, as they were assigned to officers who had become unfit for military field service through age or illness. Not until after the Battle at Jena was the order given to arm the fortresses—and by that time the enemy was already advancing. The moral strength of the commanders collapsed under the impact of the rapid sequence of events. Erfurt, Stettin, Kiistrin, Hameln, Neinburg, Plessenburg, Spandau, Magdeburg and Danzig capitulated practi¬ cally without a fight. In Silesia, Schwcidnitz fell after only four days, Breslau and Glogau—heavily armed—capitulated after only 20 days, and the totally neglected Brieg fell as well. The handover of Glatz and Silbcrberg did not take place because of the peace treaty. Neisse was overwhelmed after 36 days of brave defense. Only three fortresses—Kosel, Graudenz and Kolberg—held up against the enemy until the end of the campaign.—Source: Alien, p. 541. 1267 In Kluge’s headquarters. Warlimont’s trip was actually the unofficial reason for the present conference. His visit to Normandy (where so far, since the begin¬ ning of the invasion, only junior officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff— up to major—had looked around), had originally been planned for the days immediately after July 20 and therefore had to be postponed. But now such a project had to be taken on with care. The matter had to be raised delicately with Hitler, as he feared that such journeys brought a defeatist influence to the front. This meeting was therefore planned by Jodi—his manner of speaking shows this—to get I litler to give Warlimont a general overview of the situation and his opinion, and to a certain extent an oral agreement wih Kluge for the discussion of the possible—as was still assumed at this hour—case of an enemy breakout from Normandy. The actual reason, the trip to the West, was then included casually in the discussion. The next day. Hitler toyed with the idea of recalling Warlimont, who was on his way through Germany. Jodi made a note in his personal diay on August 1: “The Fiihrer has concerns about sending Warlimont into the West. I offered to flv there myself, but the Fiihrer docs not want me to. He lets Warlimont travel ahead based on my argument that calling him back would attract attention.” As Jodi reported after the end of the war. Hitler had suspected that Warlimont could discuss a new attempt on his life with Kluge. This was probably meant as a joke, since both suspects were hardly suited to revolution. (See also above note 1260.)

12 " General Carl Heinrich v. Stiilpnagel (see above note 1244). 12 Otto Abet2; born March 26, 1903; 1927 art teacher; 1930 founder of the “Sohlberg Circle” (German-French youth meetings); 1933 France Adviser of the Reich Youth Leadership; 1943 French expert for Ribbentrop’s office; July 1939 residence prohibition in France; 1940 deputy for the Foreign Office at the Military Commander France; anf from August 1940, German ambassador based in Paris. [—] Despite numerous disagreements regarding the treatment of France and despite the judgment given here by Hitler, Abetz was not relieved until the

980

Hmj

R and

His

Generals

middle of November 1944 from his position as German representative at the French overnment-in-exile in Sigmaringen. In 1949 he was sentenced to 20 years of forced labor by a French military tribunal, but was released in April 1954. Abetz died in an accident on May 5,1958.—Sou nr: A befy passim; Munfinger Archive. u; Ludwig Beck; born June 29, 1880; 1899 Second Lieutenant; after 1913 and in World War I in the General Staff; transferred into the Reichswehr as Major; 1931 Major General; 1932 Lieutenant General; October 1933 chief of theTrop Office [Truppenamt] at the Army Command; and 1935 General of Artillery and Army Chief of General Sraff. In this position Beck became more and more opposed to Hitler’s military policy and pursued, before the Sudetenland mis¬ sion, a collective step of the generals against Hitler, bt he was abandoned by Brauchitsch at the decisive moment. As a consequence, Beck handed in his resignation in ugust 1938 (effective October 31, 1938, with reassignment to the post of Colonel General in the reserve). He then became a central figure in the conspiracy against Hitler, which reached its climax with the July assassi¬ nation attempt. After the mission’s failure, General Fromm forced him to sui¬ cide, which had to be concluded by a coup de grace.—Source: Beck, passim; tverster, passim; Kei/ig 211 /18. - 1 Maurice Gamelin; born September 20, 1872; colleague of Joffre in World War I as chief of the Operations Department in the primary French headquarters; 1925-1929 Commander-in-Chief in Syria as Weygand’s successor; 1931 Army Chief of General Staff; and 1935 Army Inspector General, Vice President of the Supreme War Council, and thereby also Generalissimo in the event of war. After the French failures in the German Western campaign, Gamelin was re¬ lieved by Weygand on May 19,1940, whose replacement so far had failed due to Daladier’s resistance. Vichy France put him—without issuing a verdict—before the National Law Court in Riom. He was held by the French until April 1943, and was then in German custody afterward. In May 1945 he was freed by American troops in Germany. Gamelin died on April 18,1958.—Source:Munspn^r Archive. Beck had been in Paris from June 16 to 20, 1937, officially as a guest of his personal friend, the military attache Lieutenant General Kiihlcnthal, and as visi¬ tor to the World Fair, and he naturally also took this opportunity to pay a cour¬ tesy visit to the leaders of the French army. In reality, however, Beck had four quite extensive talks with Gamelin during those days, and he characterized Gamelin in his official travel report as follows: “After my repeated meetings with General Gamelin, 1 must say that he gives me an unusually fresh, youthful impression. He is clear, military and highly educated. He say's little and keeps his w ord. His outward behavior is also excellent.” Therefore, it is correct that Gamelin impressed Beck. However, Hitler could have known of his supposed enthusi¬ asm only second hand, as the Chief of General Staff had not given him a rport on his visit to Paris.—Source: Beck, p. 295; f oerster, p. 63.

1273 Hitler (or his source) probably exaggerated a bit here, but back then even Kesselring w7as not satisfied with the development. He had visited the Apennine position at the beginning of July and had noticed some progress

MlLTI ARY CONh'l:RliSCIiS 1942-1945

981

and satisfactory results, but considered other parts—in particular the focal point patrols |Schwerpunktstreifen|—to be “far behind.”—Source: Kesselring,p. 297. ' 1 lie most likely meant General Forster, who was followed by Hitler with almost pathological aversion (see above p. 66 and below p. 594). 12

Regarding General Kitzinger, 1941 ArmedForccs Commander Ukraine, see be¬ low note 1647.

1278 In his Verlorenen Siegen, Manstein states that the Dnieper Line had initially been improved against Hitler’s will, but was later described bv him with great exag¬ geration as the “Eastern Wall.” Manstein also described asa “Developed Posi¬ tion” the Melitopol’—Zaporozh’e T.ine mentioned here. The Sixth Army bad withdrawn to this line at the end of September 1943, and, after a Soviet break¬ through at the end of October, the line was “taken back surprisingly quickly toward the West.” \\rken Manstein establishes this in his usual careful phrasing, one can easily imagine Hitler’s indignation and his search for the guilty par¬ ties.—Source: Manstein,pp. 557, 544 and 550. 12 Regarding Jaco, sec above note 800; regarding Dorsch, note 1084. 1278 Because there were practically no steel ties in the East, the problem of a suitable rail cutter was not that urgent until the beginning of the rerrear from France. Furthermore, no special equipment was needed for steel ties, as they could be ripped out using a standard steel cable wound around the end of the tie. From the 35 possible models that were shown to Hitler in September 1943 in Arys, a reconstruction of a Soviet type was finally selected. It was mass-produced by Schwarzkopf as a “track wolf” for wooden ties. 12

A presentation of the Armed Forces Operations Staff on July 28 regarding the “combat procedure in the event of an enemy breakthrough in Normandy,” which

suggested to I litler a retreat from the coastal front. 1230 •pyie gty, SS Cavalry Division “Florian Geyer” (see above note 1180) and the 22nd SS Volunteer Cavalry Division (which had just been built up using parts of the 8th SS Division).—Source: Order of Hattie, pp. 141 and 147. 12"' Damage to both eardrums and an irritation of the auditory canal were the worst effects on Hitler’s health resulting from the July 20 bomb explosion. Only after a lengthy period of bed rest did those injuries heal. He also had burns on his leg, a wound on his right elbow, and a bruise on his back from a collapsed ceiling beam.—Source: Bullock, pp. 746 and 767; GorlitsJQuint, pp. 605 and 611. 12-2 Hitler had received the attendees of a meeting of “the men responsible for armaments and war production,” called by Speer, nd had spoken to them. The text of this speech was published by DNB on July 5. According to the recollec¬ tion of a participant, this meeting had already taken place on June 26 in the Platterhof at the Obersalzbetg. The attendees—about 100 armament experts— had been brought by special train from their meeting point at Linz to Freiburg/ Berchtesgaden. Hitler had obviously given several other speeches around that time as well, which are also possibilities—for example, aspecch before the gen¬ erals and officers on June 22, also at the Platterhof.

1283 The reference here is probably to Sonnleithncr, who had joined the meeting in the meantime, though he is not included in the List of Participants. Sonnleithner

982

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS

had taken part in the situation report on July 20, when Stauffenberg made the assassination attempt. i284.Today, physicians assume that Hitler’s severe nerve problem was paralysis agitans, or Parkinson’s Disease (not to be confused with the progressive paralysis of syphilitic origin), a degenerative disease of certain brain parts, which manifests itself in serious organic nerve damage and also influences the mental and emotional life, often leading to paranoid and manic delusions. The illness first appeared — probably as a result of the stress of the first Russian winter—at the beginning of 1942, with heavy dizzy spells. At the same time, the stomach problems he had complained about for long time worsened. That same year, or in early 1943 at the latest, he also began to suffer from a shaking of the limbs on the left side of his body (first the arm, later also the leg), which steadily worsened—apart from the temporary improvement mentioned here, which was obviously the result of the shock from the attempted assassination. Hitler’s physician, Dr. Morell, treated him with 28 different medications, both pills and injections. These medications, however, did not prevent his illness from worsening toward the end of the war, to the point where he usually had to use a cane for walking, and he attempted to use his right extremities to keep the left ones as still as possible. Physically, Hitler was a sick man after 1943, in the fall of 1944 (September to November), and again even severely ill in April 1945. — Source: Bullock, pp. 720 and 767; Zoller, pp. 64 and 70; Trevor-Roper: Hitlers letzte Tage, pp. 62; Gorlitz/Quint, pp. 579; Guderian: Erinnerungen, pp. 402. i285.See below note 529. i286.See list of participants. Krebs, General of Infantry as of August 1, 1944, became Chief of General Staff of Army Group B in the West, as the successor to Speidel, at the beginning of September. i287.Record number unknown—Fragment No. 46 — A first transcription, of which the lower third was destroyed on the first 15 pages. i288.Since 1942, Kluge — then Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Middle in the East — had been wooed constantly by the conspirators, who thought they needed an active field marshal with troop command to start their actions. The la [operations officer] of the army group, Colonel v. Tresckow, who belonged to the resistance group, had meaningful personal influence on Kluge, but was unable to get more from him than an assent in the case of Hitler’s death. Kluge stepped down in October 1943 after an accident, and did not receive a new front command for three-quarters of a year. On July 3, 1944, he took over from Rundstedt as Commander-in-Chief West, and then on July 18 also took over from the wounded Rommel as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group B. In these positions he maintained his wait-and-see attitude toward the conspiracy, and gave his final rejection to Stiilpnagel only on the evening of July 20, after Hitler’s survival had been confirmed. Throughout the course of the following weeks, news filtered into the Fiihrer Headquarters about the ambiguous attitude of the field marshal, who was also incriminated by involuntary or forced statements from those who had been arrested. The statements made by Hitler here indicate that Kluge was finally pulled into the assassination

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

983

investigation only on August 30 — that is, 11 days after his suicide (see also below note 1318). Another issue in his removal had obviously been the suspicion that Kluge was flirting with the idea of a separate peace in the West (see below note 1320), as well as Hitler’s anger over the Americans breaking out of their beachhead and the encirclement of the Seventh Army at Falaise. But in a file note from Bormann, dated August 17, 1944, regarding Kluge’s discharge, it was already stated that he has been “the commander-inchief over Tresckow and other traitors.” The note said: “Field Marshal Kluge’s behavior is not entirely acceptable; according to investigations conducted thus far, Kluge must have known about individual thoughts and ideas of individual traitors. He did not report these.” Because Hitler no longer trusted him completely, he could not remain commander-in-chief. Without prior announcement, Kluge was replaced by Field Marshal Model on August 17 and was ordered to report to headquarters immediately. Kluge wrote a letter to Hitler—in which he emphasized the necessity of signing a peace treaty soon, but which was at the same time a panegyric to Hitler’s greatness (see Wilmot, pp. 779ff.) — and got into his car for the trip home on the morning of August 19. Between Clermont-en-Argonnes and Domnasle he pulled off the road and poisoned himself.— Source: Bormann’s file note of August 17,1944 (Archive IfZ, Fa 116, Bl.13); Wheeler; Bennett, pp. 551., 609, 650, 684. and 693.; Wilmot (Engl.), pp. 420; Zeller, passim; Schramm (W.), pp. 65, 335. and others. 1284. The Public Law Court trial concluded on August 30. Accused were the Military Commander in France, General of Infantry Heinrich v. Stiilpnagel, his Chief of Staff Colonel v. Linstow, Kluge’s Senior Quartermaster, Colonel Finckh, as well as the Lieutenant Colonels v. Hofacker, Rahtgens and Smend. All the accused were sentenced to death and executed that same day, except v. Hofacker (December 20, 1944) and Smend (September 8, 1944). — Source: Zeller, p. 427; Pechel, p. 335; Wheeler-Bennett, p. 759. 1285. Kluge was without connection to his headquarters for more than twelve hours on August 15, after he left at 9:30 a.m. for a trip into the Falaise pocket. After his return, he reported that he had spent most of the day in a trench because of heavy artillery fire and a fighterbomber attack. His staff officers considered this claim to be true, and it is supported by Hitler’s accusations here, which the Allied side has not yet confirmed. In any case, nothing is known about a released German officer who was supposed to get in touch with Kluge. Despite Schramm’s repeated explanation of the escort officer Tangermann, the behavior of the field marshal remains peculiar that day. At this critical moment, the CommanderinChief West goes to a front area—which, as no one could know better than he, was made practically impassable by the swarms of enemy fighter-bombers—to seek death on the battlefield, but then, facing death, chose rather to spend the afternoon sleeping in a shelter (see also below p. 478). When the message arrived at the Fiihrer Headquarters on July 16 around 6 o’clock that Kluge had established contact again, Hitler had already called Model back from Russia a few hours before and ordered him to imme-

984

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS

diately take over of both of Kluge’s commands. [—] The field marshal’s son, Lieutenant Colonel in the General Staff v. Kluge, had been appointed by his father as head of the Eberbach group, which was located inside the pocket. — Source: Wilmot, pp. 444.; Liddell Hart: The German Generals, pp. 246; Schramm (W.), pp. 353. 1284.

Hitler’s reproaches against the staff of the Seventh Army were probably based mostly on his aversion to the long-time commander-in-chief of this army, Colonel General Dollmann, who died of a heart attack during the battle in Normandy on June 27 (29?). On August 31, General of Panzer Troops Eberbach had just been replaced by General of Panzer Troops Brandenberger as commander of this army.

1285.

The Seventh Army, together with the Fifteenth Army, had been under Field Marshal Rommel until his car accident during the fighter-bomber attack on the afternoon of July 17. It cannot be stated for certain whether Hitler already knew at this point about Rommel’s involvement in the July 20 assassination attempt (which forced Rommel to suicide on October 14), as the following text suggests. But it can be assumed that this whole complex was initiated by the proceedings against Stiilpnagel and his officers at the end of August. Zeller points out that Rommel’s house in Herrlingen, near Ulm, had been under observation by Bormann’s representatives long before October 14. Also, his Chief of General Staff, Speidel, had been recalled without explanation on September 5 and arrested September 7—one week after this meeting — and taken into the cellar at Prinz Albrecht Street. — Source: Speidel, pp. 170 and 175; Zeller, p. 309.

1286. Hitler meant the Italian theater of war, because it had never been considered for the West. — Regarding Rommel’s “pessimism” see also p. 45. 1287.

That was Hitler’s opinion, but it was less justified after the reserves coming over the Mediterranean failed.

i288,Obviously, Hitler has the picture of the retreat movement in mind, since it should be “on the right side.” He is referring to the western Egyptian Qattara depression, a sand-drift desert of about 20,000 square kilometers, 134 meters below sea level at its lowest point, sprinkled with numerous salt lakes and impassable for motor vehicles. South of El Alamein, the Qattara comes closest to the coast — within 65 km. i289.Hitler’s claim is a bit bold. On the evening of October 23, 1942, the English prepared to attack the German-Italian Alamein position, after the Axis troops that had reached the Alamein line on June 30 had failed to break through to the Nile 70 km away. The massed Allied forces and English air superiority put such heavy pressure on the German-Italian units (which were suffering from lack of supplies) that on the evening of November 2, Rommel asked the Armed Forces High Command and the Comando Supremo for permission to retreat—an action he had already initiated. This report from Rommel is the one referred to by Hitler here. It had in fact been presented to him late due to a mistake by the Armed Forces Operations Staff officer in charge. It arrived on November 3 at 3 a.m., but did not reach Hitler until about 10. (The officer in charge was demoted

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

985

and put into a penal punishment unit, and General Warlimont fell out of favor for some time.) In response, Hitler, not understanding the seriousness of the situation, ordered Rommel to hold the position and not to give up a single meter of territory: “It would not be the first time in history that the stronger will has ruled over the stronger battalion. You can only show your troops the way to victory or death.” Rommel initially obeyed and reversed the retreat movement, under considerable difficulty. But the following day, the English — in addition to breaking through the German lines — were able to create a 20km-wide hole in the front after the destruction of the Italian XX Corps. Rommel had no more reserves to fight back the danger, and he ordered a retreat to the Fuka Position on the early afternoon of November 4. This retreat, however, took on an avalanche-like character and really only ended on May 7-12 in Tunis. Hitler agreed to this November 4 retreat command the next day, via radio message. That first order from the Fiihrer, on November 3, actually did reach Rommel belatedly (1:30 p.m.), which resulted in more difficulties, especially in relocating the Italian troops. However, Rommel would have been defeated by the English the following day in any case — after a quiet night. — Source: Tippelskirch, pp. 334.; Westphal, pp. 186.; Rommel Papers, pp. 317.; Rintelen, pp. 176. i284.He is probably referring to Rommel’s demands to end the war, which the field marshal had presented to Hitler during his visit to the West on June 17 and again during his report in Berchtesgaden on June 29. Otherwise, Hitler could already be speaking about Rommel’s contacts with the July men, which militarily could hardly have happened yet, as long as men like Speidel, for example, were still at large. — Source: Speidel, pp. 118 and 127; Blumentritt, pp. 233. i285.In fact, Hitler would rather have avoided war against the “Germanic brother nation” and was never able to understand why England refused to give him continental supremacy. When he speaks here of “renouncing everything,” he means only English territory and English reparations, of course. A renunciation of his conquests so far would never have been considered. The remark about the year 1936 means the appointment of Ribbentrop as German ambassador to London, who was given the explicit command to probe the possibility of a German-English understanding. “Ribbentrop, bring me the English union!” are said to have been Hitler’s words of farewell. Further above, Hitler speaks of the “offer” that he made to the English ambassador Henderson on August 25, 1939: He would agree to the British Empire and was willing to commit himself personally to its existence—as well as, if necessary, to use the strength of Germany for its defense—under the preconditions that a) the Danzig corridor problem would be “solved,” b) the colonial demands of Germany would be met, and c) his obligations toward Italy and the Soviet Union would not be touched. After the French campaign, Hitler—without mentioning any details—made an “appeal to reason” during his Reichstag speech on July 19, 1940: He had never planned to “destroy or even damage” the British Empire and therefore did not see any reason for the continuation of the war. — Source: Hofer, p. 94; VB of July 20, 1940; Ribbentrop, pp. 91.

986

Hitler and His Generals

Robert Gilbert Vansittart; born June 25, 1881 and after 1941 Baron of Denham, had entered the British diplomatic service in 1902 and held office from 1928 to 1930 as Assistant Under-Secretary of State for foreign Affairs; 1930-37 as Per¬ manent Undcr-Sccrctary also in the Foreign Office; and 1938-41 as Chief Dip¬ lomatic Advisor to the Foreign Secretary. Vansittart was used by Gocbbels as a symbol of anti-German behavior and was constantly attacked. He died on Feb¬ ruary 14, 1957.—Source: Who is Wbo 1950, p. 2856; Vansittart,passim. ]tl'1 Model (see above note 718) had taken over the command of Army Group Center on June 28, 1944, from Field Marshal Busch, whose entire front had heen torn open by the Soviet attack that started June 22.—Source: Tippelskircb,, p. 530; Sugkr, p. 132. itoi Here Hitler is probably repeating Rommel’s statements, which were made dur¬ ing the meeting between Hitler, Rundstedt and Romme on June 17, 1944, near Soissons. (Compare here Speidel, p. 112, where the above-mentioned points are not discussed.) ■"' Hitler himself had ordered the transportation of both SS panzer divisions into the East on March 25,1944; they had been employed in front of Tarnopol (see above note 1116). Furthermore, he had been notified several times about materiel and personnel shortages among most of the Western units. In fact, the 700-series of divisions located on the so-called Atlantic Wall were in no shape for a major battle—neither with respect to personnel nor equipment. They were immobile fortress divisions with, in many cases, older age groups, and equipped with captured French, Czech and Russian weapons. All other divisions were only present in the West temporarily—either for initial formation or for reha¬ bilitation before being sent back into the Fast or to Italy. The latter was true also for the panzer divisions, with the exception of the 21st Panzer Divison. This division had been set up 1943 in the West and equipped laboriously with captured French vehicles, but, like the 700-series divisions, it had no battle ex¬ perience. ” ' Of the possible Schulenbuigs, tbe one probably meant here is Friedrich Werner Graf v. d. Schulenburg, born in 1875. Schulenburg, who succeeded Nadolny as ambassador in Moscow from October 1934 until June 1941, had welcomed the German-Soviet rapprochement of 1939 as a resumption of Bismarck’s tradi¬ tional orientation toward the East, and was disturbed by Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. After Stalingrad, he joined the conspirators and com¬ peted w ith Ulrich v. Hassell as Stauffenberg’s candidate for Foreign Minister in a possible Goerdeler cabinet, as he had asked for an immediate peace w-ith Rus¬ sia, provided that contact could be made with Stalin. Even though Ritter in his Goerdeler book in no wrav characterizes Schulenburg as a blind adherent of an “Eastern Solution,” his political concept of Hitler’s situation at the time is likely presented correcdy here. Schulenbuig was executed on November 10,1944.— Source: Goerdeler, pp. 364, 379, 534, 542 and 602; '/Setter, pp 391 and 432; WbeeterBennett.pp. 352, 637 and 764. ' With those remarkable words, 1 litler judges his own policy during the final years of the war. If he considered it so “stupid” to play the Russians off against the

A Inil ARY

C'ONFliREXCES

1942-1945

987

English, his expansion of the war toward Stalingrad and Tunis, and at least up to Avranchcs, could have the single purpose of lengthening his life and the lifespan of his regime at the expense of the German people—while his propaganda slogans trumpeted that the cause must be more important than anything else, and that even the last German must be willing to give himself up. It is correct that Hitler lived in his headquarters in dangerously unrealisti isola¬ tion—in an atmosphere that Jodi in Nuremberg called a cross between a monas¬ tery and a concentration camp—and that he gave up all private life. The time span mentioned here is to be taken with a grain of salt, however, as Hitler’s isolation was not that intene in the first years of war, and was of quite limited duration. It was not until partway through the war, for instance, that he finally gave up his habit of watching films after dinner.—Source: IMT XT ’, p. 525; Bullock, p. 725. Rudolf Gerckc; born August 17, 1884; 1904 Second Lieutenant; Reichswehr; 1923 left the sendee as brevet Major, 1933 re-entering as Major and detachment leader in RWM; 1937 Colonel and Chief of the Transportation Department in the Army General Staff; 1939 Major General and head of the Armed Forces Trnsportation System (in both positions until the end of the war); 1940 Lieuten¬ ant General; and 1942 General of Infantry- Gercke died in 1947 in American cap r ivi tv.—Source: Kei/jg 211 /98; Semen, p. 285; Order of Batlle, p. 55 5; Das deutsche Heer,p. 11; Rangliste 1944-45, p. 16. 151)7 Wit the )ulv 20 events. 1 m Here he refers to Army Group Center in the East, where, in Hitler’s opinion, the collapse of June 1944 was accelerated by the fact that the Soviets used captured German officers to cross hack over the line (made possible by the total break¬ down of the front), rejoin the command system, and cause confusion. No evi¬ dence came to light after the war that could support this claim; the only certain thing is that several of the German generals and officers captured during this Soviet offensive did immediately step over to the side of the National Commit¬ tee and offer themselves to the Russians. ' Only in Paris did the conspirators—led by the Military Commander in France, General Carl Heinrich v. Stiilpnagel—experience a brief triumph on July 20, despite the first indecisive then negative attitude of the Commander-in-Chief West. At 11 p.m., when everything was already over in Berlin, they had rounded up the senir SS and police commanders in France, including Gruppenfiihrer Oberg and the men from his headquarters on Avenue Foch, and, within half an hour, had secured the vast majority of the 2,000 men (Schramm: 1,200) in the Parisian SS and SD forces, and had put them out of action. At dawn on July 21, the captured men had to be set free again, in consideration of the hopeless general situation and Kluge’s attitude.—Source: Wheekr-Bennett, p. 685; Schramm (lty.J,passim. 1510 Gunther Blumentritt; born February 10, 1892; 1912 Second Lieutenant; Reichswehr; 1933 Major; 1938 Colonel and Chief, 4th Section in the Army Gen¬ eral Staff; 1940 Chief of Staff, Fourth Army; 1941 Major General; January 1942 Senior Quartermaster I in the Army I ligh Command; September 1942 Chief of

988

HnuiR

A.\n

His

Glkeraus

Staff, Array Group D and Lieutenant General; and April 1944 General of In¬ fantry. After this meeting, Blumcntritt was replaced by Wcstphal during the first few days of September. In October 1944 he became Commander, XII SS Corps; January 1945 Commander, Twenty-Fifth Army; end of March Commander, 1st Parachute Army; and after April 15, Commander-in-Chief, Blumcntritt Army. Hitler’s opinion about Blumcntritt was also shared by his commandcr-in-chicf, Rundstedt, who wrote in his assessment on September 9, 1944: “He deserves special mention for his clear position and his firm measures surrounding the events of July 20,1944, in the area of the Commander-in-Chief West.”—Source: Army f 1igb Command staff files; (Nl%. Dok. NOKW-141); Order of Battle, p. 530; Siegler, p. 113. 1111 F.berhard Finckh; bom November 7, 1899; came from the 41st Artillery Regi¬ ment; 1934 Captain, War Academy; 1938 assigned to the 10th Section of the Army General Staff;November 1942 Colonel in the General Staff Senior Quar¬ termaster for Army Group Don/South; and after April 1944, Senior Quarter¬ master for the Commander-in-Chief West. On August 30,1944, as a participant in the July conspiracy, Finckh was sentenced by the People’s Court to death byhanging and was executed that same day. (See also above note 1291.)—Source DNB of May 11, 1944; Das dtutsebe Heer, p. 12; Manstein, p. 326. nn See above note 346. Wagner, who had been close to Beck and who already agreed with his attitude toward Hider before the war, had been a participant in the July 20 conspiracy and had committed suicide on July 23 (22?), 1944.— Source: WheeUr-Bcnnett, pp. 481 and 765. un Neither Kluge’s promotions nor his decorations were particularly unusual. He had been Colonel General for only nine months when he received the marshal’s baton during the great field marshal promotion on July 19,1940. At that time, however, when ranks were even skipped, this quick success was nothing out of the ordinary. The highest award he received was the Schwerter [swords], while Hitler had already awarded the Brilliantcn [diamonds] to four Army generals (Rommel, Hube, Model and Balck) that same day. But Kluge—like all generals from the army commander rank upward—had, in addition to his field marshal salary of 36,000 Reich Marks [RM] (gross), received special tax-free bonuss from Hitler’s private funds. He also received a check from Hitler for more than 250,000 RM for his 60th birthday on October 30, 1942, as well as a building permit for his property in Brandenburg worth about half of that sum. Kluge had accepted the check as well as the building permit.—Source: Whnkr-Bennett,p. 552; Schlabnndotff, p. 61. 1,14 See above note 1289. Karl F.rnst Rahtgens, Lieutenant Colonel in the General Staff, was a relative of Kluge, as his mother was born a v. Kluge—probably a cousin of the field marshal. 11

Roland Freisler; born October 30, 1893; law studies; Communist; from Russian war imprisonment Bolshevik commissioner; after his return lawyer in Kassel; after 1925 member of the NSDAP; 1932 Landtag member in Prussia; March 1933 as Ministerial Director head of the Personnel Department in the Prussian Ministry of Justice; that same year Under-Secretary of State (after the unfica-

Miiji ary CoNbhRiiXCES

1942-1945

989

tion of the Reich Ministry of Justice); and Prussian State Council and member of the Reichstag. As Thicrack’s successor, Frcislcr became president of the People’s Court in August 1942, and tried to compensate for this demotion and his politically dubious past by carrying out his duties with extraordinary enthu¬ siasm and an excess of toughness and cruelty. Frcislcr died during an air raid on Berlin on February 3,1945,in the cellar of his office building.—Source; ReiebsfagsHatidbiicher; Slun^jnger Archive; Schlabrendorff, p. 213.

1516 Stieff (see above note 698) had contacted the conspirators via Tresekow and was one of the actors in the July 20 assassination attempt. In the main trial, the “smallest and youngest Armed Forces general” was sentenced to death by hang¬ ing on August 8, 1944, and executed two hours later. IJr Hrich 1 Idppner; born September 14, 1886; 1906 Second l.icutenant; Reichswehr; 1933 Colonel; 1936 Major General; 1938 Lieutenant General and Commander, 1st Mobile Division;November 1938 Commanding General, XVI Army Corps (Berlin); 1939 General of Cavalry; with his corps in Poland and France; July 1940 Colonel General; and in the Eastern campaign Commander, Fourth Panzer Group (October 1941 renamed Fourth Panzer Army). On January 8, 1942, Hoepner received his dishonorable discharge from the Army, “for cowardice and disobedience,” because he had carried out unauthorized retreat movements and because he had spoken disparagingly—which had reached HitlerV ears— about the “non-professional leadership.” At the end of 1943, Hoepner was in¬ troduced to the revolt plans by Olbricht, his neighbor in Dahlem, and was tapped for the role of commander-in-chief of the Replacement Army. He was also sentenced to death by hanging by the People’s Court on August 8, 1944, and executed that same day.—Source: Mimspnger Archive; Sigler, p. 124; Keikg211 j 139; teller, passim; and others.

At that time (since the end of December 1941) Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center, to which Hoepner’s Fourth Panzer Army belonged. 1" It is not quite clear what Hitler meant here. He, at least, was certainly not silent “back then.” 1 v" Kluge’s death was not made public; on short notice Hitler prohibited the planned burial ceremony on his [Kluge’s] Bohne estate in Altmark. According to Blumentritt’s statement, a tate funeral was originally planned as well, but was cancelled after the poison was discovered during an examination of the corpse (ordered by Keitel); at first, only a heart attack had been discussed. After the field marshal’s corpse had been stored in the Bohne church for nearly two weeks, and tumult was increasing among the population, the propaganda department emphasized via verbal propaganda that Kluge had died of a heart attack. Keitel informed the military district commanders of the death on Au¬ gust 31, and requested that the generals be informed in a “suitable way.” This text said: “From a letter Kluge left behind, we read that he obviously acted under the impression that he bore heavy responsibility fo the outcome of the battle in Normandy.” And, in conclusion: “There will be no further discussion of these events.” The discussion began, though, at least abroad, since the Al¬ lies captured this order at the end of December 1944.—Source: KdScbr.

990

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS Parteikanzlei 219 / 22gRs.; Report RpropAmt Dessau Sept. 5, 1944 and others (Archive IfZ, Fa 116, Bi 18 ); Files of the Propaganda Department in the German central archives in Potsdam, Bd. 863; Schramm (W.),p . 376; NZZ Dec. 29,1944 (midday edition). 1321.

Record number unknown — Fragment No. 43 — A first transcription, the majority of which was destroyed. The damage, starting in the lower left-hand corner, became worse with each successive page, and on the last four of the 85 pages there was not a single completely legible sentence.

1322.

After Manstein's and Kleist's retirement on March 30, 1944, Army Group South was renamed North Ukraine (Model, and after June 28 Harpe) and Army Group A became South Ukraine (Schorner, and after July 25 Friesser). On September 20, both staffs were renamed again, keeping their commanders-in-chief, but now vice versa: North Ukraine became "A," and South Ukraine became South. South remained under Wohler (after December 23) and Rendulic (after April 7, 1945) until the capitulation. "A" (after January 17 Schorner) was renamed again as Center on January 25, 1945, while the Army Group Center, which had existed since 1941, was renamed North and the previous Army Group North was renamed Couriand that same day. So the resulting arrangement of the German army groups is as follows: North (ex. C)

April 1, 1941 May 1942 July 15, 1942 Nov. 22,1942 Feb. 14, 1943 Mar. 30, 1944 Sept. 20,1944 Jan. 25, 1945 April 2, 1945 Capitulation

Center (ex. B)

South (ex. A)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

"

"

disbanded

-

-

-

Couriand

North Vistula Disbanded

-

-

-

-

-

A

-

B B Don (ex. 11th Army) South North South Ukraine Ukraine A South Center -

-

-

-

-

-

-

— Source: According to Siegler, p. 18. 1323.

Hermann Winkler; born August 11, 1888; 1919 Second Lieutenant, 102nd Infantry Regiment; Reichswehr; 1934 Colonel; 1937 Commander of the Psychological Testing Office II; 1941 Major General and Commander, Dept, of Aptitude Tests XI; June 1942 Field Commander of Nikolaev; and after September 1944, Commander, 153rd Field Training Division in Romania, April 1945 Lieutenant General. Winkler was executed in Nikolaev in 1946 — Source: Keilig 21 1/366; Order of Battle, p. 643.

1324.

Friedrich Mieth; born June 4, 1888; 1907 Second Lieutenant, 2nd Jager [Light Infantry] Battalion; Reichswehr; 1935 Colonel; Infantry 1935 Colonel; 1936 Commander, 27th Infantry Regiment; 1938 Major General and Chief of General Staff, XII Army Corps; 1939 Chief of Staff First Army; spring 1940 Senior Quartermaster I in the Army High Command and Lieutenant General; December 1940 Commander, 112th Infantry Division; April 1943 General of Infantry and Commanding General, Corps Mieth; and after July 1943, Commanding General, IV Army Corps.

MllSIARY CoNHiRHXCES 1942-1945

991

Corps. Micth had especially distinguished himself on the bridgehead at Nikopol’ at the end of 1943. The news of his death turned out to be true and was offi¬ cially acknowledged the next day.—Sonne: Siegler, p. 132; I 73 March 5 and Oct. 3, 1944; Das deutsche Heer,p. 164; Rangbste 194445, p. 17; Keilig211/221. l\?i

On August 23 a political revolution took place in Romania, after rival armisticecontacts had already been made at the end of 1943: by the two Antoncscus with the Soviets (Mine, Kollontai) in Stockholm, and by the Democrats under the Farmers’ Party leader Maniu with the Anglo-Americans in Cairo. The major Soviet offensive of August 20 helped speed things up. The hesitant Antonescus gave their Stockholm negotiators authority to arrange official armistice discus¬ sions, and, as a result, the Maniu group advanced their coup—originally planned for August 26—by 3 days. With the help of the king, the regime was over¬ thrown, the Antonescus arrested, and the cessation of hostilities announced. That same day the new Romanian government offered free retreat to the Ger¬ man troops, as long as they refrained from any kind of hostility. But the next day, August 24, the first skirmishes took place between German and Romanian troops, along with German air attacks on Bucharest. Consequently, Romania declared war on the Reich on August 25—an action that had been planned for later anyway. Nevertheless, the Western powers gave Maniu the cold shoulder and pointed to Moscow-, which continued the war as if nothing had happened and agreed to sign an armistice declaration only on September 12, after occupy¬ ing all of the country except for Transylvania (Siebenburgen]. Romania then had to agree to take part in the w-ar against Germany with at least 12 infantry divisions. In the meantime, Romanian units had already taken up the fight against the Germans and Hungarians in Transylvania—a fact wrhich did not prevent 130,000 Romanian soldiers from being taken captive by the Soviets before Sep¬ tember 12. All in all, the change of fronts went fairly smoothly. In Transylvania, as later in Hungary and Slovakia, the Romanian armies (5th, 4th and 1st with 21 infantry and five cavalry divisions, as well as a tank division—altogether 386,000 men) fought against the German and Hungarian forces and suffered severe losses (approximately 78,000 dead with only- 90,000 wounded).—Source: Brefbo/% p. 93; Hi/lgniher, pp 209 and229; Toynbee: Hitler's Europe,p. 625; Seton- Wat con, p. 87; Friessner, p. 8 5.

1126

Hitler speaks of Bulgaria, wrhosc northern border w as reached by the Red Army in the Dobrudja and along the Danube River. The Regentcy Council under Prince Kyrill had reigned there since the death of Tsar Boris HI on August 28, 1943 (see above note 799) on behalf of Boris’s underage son, Simeon. In a letter to Hitler, Prince Kyrill had mentioned his w-ish that Bulgaria would not need to take part in the war. (See also below note 1386.)—Source: Ausarbeitung H I ’St/ Kriegstagebuch iiber Rumdtiien, p. 69 (N//g. Dok. 1806-PS).

112T

During 1944 a Maquis [resistance], consisting primarily of deserters, had formed in the Tatra Mountains and in the western Beskydy. The group’s command, the Slovakian National Council, in expectation of the advancing Red Army and in agrcccntwith the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovakian government-in-cxilc, ended th uprising on July 27. At the beginning of August—about at the same

992

Hitler axd His Gemeraus

time as the Warsaw uprising—separate partisan group actions began, which soon forced the Slovakian government to declare a state of siege. On August 25, the actual revolt was started, and most of the Slovakian troops allied them selves with the partisans The most important cities in central Slovakia were occupied and the entire country was practically at war; because the govern¬ ment was unable to get the rebels in the higher Waag and Gran valleys under control, the Germans marched in on the 29th to occupy the country and dis¬ armed the rest of the troops that had remained loyal to the government. On September 1, SS Obcrgruppcnfuhrcr Berger took over the command as Ger¬ man General in Slovakia. The overthrow of the rebels, to which belonged War Minister Catlos and into whose hands the gold and currency holdings of the National Bank were played by the Slovakian economic dictator karvas, still needed some time, however. Not until October 27—two days before the Red Army crossed the Slovakian border—did the Germans conquer the uprising centers of Banska Bystrica (Neusohl) and Zvolen (Altsohl). The riot leaders were executed, but individual guerrilla battles continued.—Source: Toynbee: Hitler's fiurope, p. 602; Seton-Wa/son, p. 14 6; Frauds, passim; Brugel, passim; jilemnicky, passim; Die Vertreibung tier deutschen Berdlkerung aus der Tschechoshnakai\ p. 158; Alik us, p. 185.

U2S Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North Ukraine (see above note 504 and note 1322). 1,21 Wrilhelm Berlin; born April 28, 1889; 1910 Second Lieutenant; Reichswehr; 1936 Colonel; 1937 Commander, 33rd Artillery Regiment; 1939 commander, 101st Artillery Command [Arko]; 1940 Major General and Commander, jiiterbog Artillery School; 1942 Lieutenant General; 1943 Commander, 227th Infantry Division; May 1944 Commander, XXVI Army Corps; and after July 21, 1944 General of Artillery in the Armed Forces High Command.—Source: Kei/ig 211/24; Das deutsebe fleer, p. 500.

The 1 st Ski-Jager-Division, a special unit set up as the 1 st Ski Brigade in( )ctober 1943 (Division after the summer of 1944), was set up in the Vistula River bend in September 1944 and was relocated later to Slovakia.—Source: Order of Battle, p. 313.

1131 The German troops had unsuccessfully attacked the three Soviet bridgeheads west of the [Vistula during the month of August. The Russian positions on the west shore, established in July/August, were located: 1. Near Magnuszew on the mouth of the Pilica River, about 50 km south of Warsaw; 2. 60 km further upstream, near Pulawy, on the easternmost point of the Vistula bend; and 3. Near Sandomierz and Baranow, between the mouth of the W isloka and the San Rivers, 80 to 100 km further upstream. The Russians were able to hold and extend these bridgeheads; from there they began their attack toward the Oder Ri\er on January 12 and 13,1945. (See also below note 1688.)—Source: Tippe/skircb, pp. 546, 556 and 612.

Mil If ARY I M2

CoNFl-RliXCES

1942-1945

993

The SS “Totenkopf” |“Dcaths Hcad”| Division was set up in October 1939 from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd “Totenkopf” Regiments (6,500 men out of 14,000 men total in the “Totenkopf” units), used for the KL, plus police reinforcement under the command of the KL and TV inspector Theodor Eickc. The division, which was reorganized as the 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf” in late fall 1942, was employed in the Warsaw area during the fall of 1944.—Source:Hausser, p. 15; Order of Buttle, p. 338; Nbg. Dok. NC-5792 and NO-1995.

I VO

When the armies of Rokossovsky’s 1st Belorussian Front were advancing in¬ exorably toward the Polish capital at the end of July, the Western-oriented Polish underground movement [the Home Army] claimed that the hour for revolt had arrived. On July 30, the canon thunder from the front could be clearly heard, and the German civilians had left the city. Two days later, the uprising of the Home Army of 40,000 men and more than 4,000 women broke out. The uprising was directed against the German occupation as well as the Soviet-oriented Lublin Committee and its “People’s Army,” which the Soviet government had organized. Two-thirds of Warsaw was controlled by the rebels, the railway stations were occupied, most of the German offices in the city were cut off from the outside, and all through roads were blocked off. The Russian offensive continued, however, and the Soviets made it difficult to supply the city by air from the West, due to landing prohibitions for the air¬ craft, etc. Thus, the Germans succeeded in regaining control over their en¬ circled offices and the railway stations, and pushing the rebels together into individual districts, although they still lacked the strength for a total clearance. On September 5, a repeated German demand for capitulation was rejected by the Polish genera! Bor-komorowski, in expectation of the Red Army attack against the Vistula bridgehead east of Warsaw, which would begin five days later. On September 13-14, Rokossovsky took the Praga suburb, located on the eastern shore of the Vistula, but did not cross the river or help the rebels for several days. Facing the employment of strong SS and police forces under the command of SS Obergruppenfiihrer von dem Bach-Zelewski (see above note 72), the Poles could do nothing but capitulate at last. After taking over several rebel districts in the last few days of September, the capitulation agree¬ ment was signed in Ozarow on October 2. Six Polish generals and 12,000 members of the Home Army—15,000 members had been killed during the fighting—were imprisoned by the Germans; the German side had 10,000 dead and 7,000 missing.—Source: Toynbee: Realignment (Auth. Sidney Loiee/y), p. 166; Tippe/skircb, p 545; I 'B of Oct. 3-7j8, 1944; Korbonski, p. 350; Bor-Komorowski, passim.

1VO

See below note 1335.

1JJS

Fegelein is probably understating. The Warsaw ghetto had been already partly destroyed by the Luftwaffe in the month-long fighting that began on April 19, 1943, and continued until May 16. On June 11, Himmler repeated his not vetfulfilled order of February 16, 1943, “that the city area of the former ghetto be totally flattened, and every cellar and every sewer be filled up. After completing this work, topsoil will be placed over the area and a large park will be laid out.”

994

Hitler and His Clneraijs

The work started July 19, 1943, during a great labor shortage; on October 9, a third of the area was reported destroyed. When the advance of the Red Army finally forced the work to stop on July 29, 1944, the ordered destruction was practically completed, but the leveling out was not finished and Himmler’s park had not been laid out.—Scurve: Nbg. Dok.. NO-2496, NO-2514/16; Reitlinger: Undid sung,p. 315. nM Philip Kleffel; born December 9, 1887; 1907 Second Lieutenant; Reichswehr; 1929 Major; 1935 Colonel; 1936 Commander, 14th Cavalry Regiment; 1938 Se¬ nior Cavalry Officer 4; 1939 Major General and Deputy' Chief of Staff, XI Army Corps; 1940 Commander, 1st Infantry Division; 1941 Lieutenant Gen¬ eral; 1942 General of Cavalry and Commanding General, L Army Corps; Janu¬ ary 1944 Commander, Military District IX (Kassel); July 1944 Commanding General with General Command Kleffel (from November 1944 on XVI Army Corps);and March/April 1945 Commander,Twenty-Fifth Army.—Source: Army High Command staff files (Nbg. Dok. NOKW-141); Order of Battle, p. 377; Siegler, p. 126; Keilig 21 If 165.

1 vr In the Tukkum area, the Russians were indeed unable to advance up to the Gulf of Riga again. The second and final cutting off of Army Group North took place at the beginning of October in Lithuania and was completed on the 10th near Polangen, north of Memel.—Source: Tippelskirch, p. 162. im Then Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North (see above note 981). I,VI Probably the panzer grenadier Colonel Karl Mellwig, who had received the Knight’s Cross from Hitler the day before. 1}*' Meaning in the tear of the enemy facing the Third Panzer Army and especially Group Kleffel. Hitler and Guderian had already considered the idea of attack¬ ing the enemy’s flank during the successful German advance to the Gulf of Riga. This operation, an attack near Bauske, proved impossible in view of the balance of forces.—Source: Tippelskirch, p. 547.

1M1 Meinrad v. Lauchcrt; born August 29, 1905; 1924 Corporal; 1931 Second Lieu¬ tenant, 5th Cavalry Regiment; 1937 Captain in 5th Antitank Defense Detach¬ ment; 1938 Captain and Commander, 2nd Battalion, 35th Panzer Regiment; 1941 Major; in the summer of 1943 Commander, 51st Panzer Detachment, the first German panzer detachment (see above 255) employed at Kursk; August 1943 Lieutenant Colonel and Commander, 15th Panze Regiment, 11th Panzer Division; 1944 Colonel and (December) Commander, 2nd Panzer Division; and Match 1945 Major Gcneal.—Source: Order of Battle, p. 586; Das deutsche 1 leer, p. 609; Rangliste 194445, p. 83; DNB Feb. 25, 1944; Keilig 211/192. ! ,,J The ideas developed by Hitler regarding the tactical use of tank weapons were shared by the tank people. Guderian repeated his well-known principle: “Big groups, not small ones” [“Klotzen, nicht kleckern!”] ,w The reference here is to the river combat group of Rear Admiral (Ing.) Zicb. While the German Black Sea Fleet relocated to Varna and was finally scuttled off the Bulgarian coast, the head of the Senior Shipyard Staff in Constanza built up a river combat group—after blowing up the coastal weapons, the ship-

996

/ Iitijr asd His Generals

have transported 800,000 people, 16,000 head of cattle and 1 million tons of food, fuel and ammunition over the lake during the siege of Leningrad. Not only did they succeed in supplying the city and the troops, but they also sup¬ plied Leningrad industries with raw materials on a fairly large scale. The Ger¬ man Luftwaffe was unable to interrupt the steady stream of ships crossing the lake during the summer mouths, and was equally unable to prevent the con¬ struction of a railway over the frozen lake in the winter. The German and Finnish air forces were not entirely unsuccessful, however. They sank—ac¬ cording to their own reports—22 vessels in 1941 and 27 in 1942, including a torpedo boat and at least four steamers of more that 1,000 GRT.—Source: Ricker, p. 44; Meister, p. 190.

046

report from Domtz probably refers to the American air attack on Kiel two days earlier, on the afternoon of August 30.

1 u During this withdrawal, the majority of all seaworthy mine sweqiers and patrol boats, as well as individual torpedo boats and mine sweepers, were withdrawn though the straits to the cast without significant losses. Here and in the following statements the discussion concerns the “coastal for¬ tresses” that had to be left behind in front of the lines—on Hitler’s orders— during the German retreat in the West. (Sec also below note 1485.) 134!' Probably an odd-sized French caliber. nso Meaning the German Navy coastal battery lie de Cezembre (a fortified island off of St. Malo), which—after the city’s citadel had fallen on August 17, 1944, following eleven days of heavy fighting—still resisted despite continuous en¬ emy fire, including from a battleship. The battery, under Lieutenant Colonel (MA.) of the Reserves Richard Seuss, was mentioned several times in the Armed Forces report. The battery blocked the entrance to the harbor of St. Malo until succumbing to the enemy’s superior strength on September 2, after five weeks of battle. Seuss received Oak Leaves in addition to the Knight’s Cross, which had been awatded to him in the middle of August.—Source: Armed Forces High Comm and reportsfrom Aug. to Sept. 4, 1944.

mi p^e f0U0Wing statements apparently refer to northern Jutland. A landing in Denmark had, however—as far as can be determined—never seriously been considered on the Allied side. 1 ” Devices for preventing or impeding the clearance of blockades. Such devices included, for example, explosive buoys, which were designed to destroy mineclearing equipment. 1

During the final phase of the war, the Navy developed a number of so-called midget craft, which were employed in particular during the landing operations in Italy and France. The following weapons were included in this category: Murder Marten]'. A sharp torpedo attached to a torpedo without explosive

charge or warhead, manned by a torpedo commander looking through a glass dome installed in the center. The “Marder” could thus be steered toward a tar¬ get and fired. It could make short dives (before the improvement that brought the diving capability, it was known as “Nigger,” as it was only usable at night due to its low speed). Production: about 500 units.

Miutary

CoNi TzRlzXaiS

1942-1945

997

Biber [Beaver]: Single-man submarine of 6.3 t, 8.7 m long, speed of 6 nautical

miles [per hour], 30 m diving depth, Opel Kapidin engine, radius of acdon 80 nautical miles (200 nautical miles with additional tanks), armed with wo electric torpedoes hung outside along the hull. Production: about 325 units. Mold) [Newt or Salamanderj\ enlarged “Biber” [“Beaver”), 11 t, 10.8 m long,

speed of 4 nautical miles [per hour], 13-hp electric engine. The “Molch” was a developmental failure. Huge losses occurred due to diving problems and gas development in the interior. From the mission presumably referred to here, in the mouth of the Schelde, only 8 percent of the employed “Molche” returned. Production: about 305 units. Other mini-submarines employed in the following months were the not combat-ready “Hecht” |“Pike”| (11.8 t) and the improved, very reliable “Seehund” [“Seal”] (15 t). —Sonne: Lnsar, p. 139; Lnsar: Seebunde.passim. Meaning the northern part of Jutland. 1355 Stuttgart. ns* -pkc Nineteenth Army’s divisions retreating from the Mediterranean Sea up the Rhone Valley, some of whose rearguards were then fighting near Valence at the mouth of the I sere River. 1357 Then Commander-in-Chief of Army [Armeegruppe] Group “G” (after Sep¬ tember 10, 1944: Army Group [Heeresgruppe] “G;” see above note 654. Must be “Lucht.” Walther Lucht; born February 26, 1882; 1902 Second Lieu tenant; 1925 Major; 1932 left the serv ice as brevet Colonel; 1936 Training Com¬ mander, Karlsruhe; 1937 reentered the service; 1938 Colonel; 1939 Training Commander, Hcilbronnl 1940 Major General and commander, 44th Artillery Command [Arko]; 1941 Commander, 87th Infantry Division;January 1942 com¬ mander, 310th High Artillery Command [llarko];March 1942 Commander, 336th Infantry Division; November 1942 Lieutenant General; July 1943 Commander, Kerch Strait; and end of 1943 General of Artillery and Commanding General, LXVI Reserve Corps (later Army Corps) on the French Mediterranean coast and during the retreat. In April 1945 Lucht became Commander of the Kleventh Army.—Source: Army High Command staff files (Nbg. Dole.. KOKW-141 );Sieg/er, p. 130; Order of Battle, p. 590.

1339 Plateau de Langres. The remains of the First Army retreated over the plateau from the Bay of Biscay and from southwest France, worn out from fighting the French resistance movement. So to a certain degree, there was a projection of the German lines—to the extent that they can be considered lines at all—be¬ tween the Allied forces coming from the Channel and from the Mediterranean. Under the command of Fifth Panzer Army, released from the front, the Ger¬ man forces wanted—according to the Rastenburg plans—to lead an attack north¬ ward against the southern flank of the American Third Army, which was ad¬ vancing toward Metz. But even before enough forces could be brought to¬ gether, the northern sector of the salient was thrown back over the Moselle River, and an enemy push via Nancy to Luneville tore a gap in the German positions. Thus, the forces of the Fifth Panzer Army were now desperately needed for defense.—Sonne: 7ippelskircb, p. 518.

998

HriuiR and His Genurals

' ’' The Western Wail had been totally dismantled since the winter of 1940-41. Only in the summer of 1944 was armament and occupation by local personnel started again. Because of the speed of the Allied movement, however, this could only be done in an improvised manner. I>M 8.8 cm was the largest antitank gun caliber. 133.2 Guderian had taken over the preparation of trench positions behind the East¬ ern Front. These were equipped with security guards to prevent the troops from simply running across the lines during retreat. All possible sorts of men and materials had been collected for this project. The fortress antitank gun detach¬ ments mentioned here also belonged to the units—which, of course, were any¬ thing but high quality—originally set up for this purpose. 133.3 Probably meaning the Metz Infantry School, as the preceding text fragments indicate. 1 v>'1 The 501st and 504th Antitank Gun Detachments were not among those some¬ what doubtful fortress antitank gun units; they were good motorized and towed Army troops. iw5 prom here on (page 34 of the transcription) the lower parts of the typewritten pages are missing entirely, as nothing useful could be deciphered from the to¬ tally charred remains. 1

Walter Schroth; born ]une 3,1882; 1903 Second Lieutenant, 46th Infantry Regi¬ ment; Reichswehr; 1931 Colonel; 1933 Commander of an infantry school; 1934 Major General; 1935 Commander, 1st Infantry Division; 1936 Lieutenant Gen¬ eral; 1938 General of Infantry and Commanding General, XI1 Army Corps; May 1942 Commander, Military District IV; and after May 1943, Commander, Military District XII (Wiesbaden). Schroth was killed in an accident on October 6, 1944. Hitler’s praise back then did not hinder Schroth from leading the gener¬ als’ seniority roll with a date of rank of February 1,1938.—Source: Siegler, p. 138; Rangliste 1944-45, p. 15; Keilig211/ 307.

1367 Military District XIII: Nuremberg (Frankcn, Upper Palatinate, western Sudetenland); Military District V: Stuttgart (Wurttemberg, Baden, Alsace). 1

The improved Tiger model (special motor vehicle 182), which became known by the enemy name “Konigstigcr” [“King Tiger”] had five instead of four outer wheels and rounded, sloping surfaces, one gun with caliber length L 71 (barrel length 6.25 m compared to 3.97 m for Tiger I), and increased mobility.—Source: Von derPanqerattrappe...,p. 27; I jtsar,p. 30; Senger-Etteriin,p. 27.

1V>V Before the war, the upper Rhine had been fortified to a limited depth—in asso¬ ciation with the Western Wall—by concret combat positions, which, in consid¬ eration of flood danger, had to be built not under water but above the ground, and which were easily neutralized by methods known in 1944. The necessary field improvements to the upper Rhine positions had been made at the begin¬ ning of the war, but those positions had mostly collapsed again over the course of the years. 1’

This refers to the transfer of trucks from the Luftwaffe to the Army ). By this time, relations between Hitler and Goring had already cooled significantly; just

Military CownRuxcm 1942-1945

999

half a year earlier Hitler probably wouldn’t have made such a decision without consulting Goring. 1 Hitler’s remark about the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces as a “Reich Defense General Staff” is a fantasy that even he could not really have believed in anymore. The former Reich War Minister v. Blomberg had estab¬ lished the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the highest command authority over the branches of the Armed Forces, as early as 1933, but it had never gotten off the ground. The Army General Staff, as well as the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy and the Luftwaffe, had taken care right from the beginning to maintain their independence. Their resistance, after Blomberg’s departure in February 1938, was not directed against I litler, who, from this pointon, held not only the representative but also the actual com¬ mand over the entire rmed Forces as head of the Armed Forces High Com¬ mand; rather, they fought against thecoordinating activities of a superior op¬ erations staff. Hitler himself further weakened the Armed Forces High Com¬ mand when he did not name a successor to Blomberg, but was satisfied with the weak personality of Keitel as—in effect—“Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command” (abbreviated “Chief Armed Forces High Command”). Even if one claims that this German arrangement of the top military leader¬ ship represented a barely functional solution at the beginning of the war, its basic concept was upset in 1940 already by the establishment of the so-called Armed Forces High Command war theaters. From that time on, there were essentially two Chiefs of Gccral Staff. So when the highest command began to interfere more and more in the operational command of the various branches of the Armed Forces, and even in their tactical command (Hitler as Commander-in-Chief of the Army), severe tensions were unavidable. In addition, the unequal influence of the personalities also played a role. The efforts by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy and the Luftwaffe to maintain inde¬ pendence made an actual Armed Forces command possible only through the person of the “Fiihrer and Commander-in-Chief” while the relatively weak personalities of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff could never prevail against him. The influence of the Armed Forces High Command in all armament matters—in any case not significant—was taken away by Speer, to some degree as early as 1940, and then completely in the summer of 1942. And with the change of the Chief of General Staff of the Army in September 1942, the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was finaly and also officially excluded from the Armed Forces command. From that point on, the Armed Forces Opera¬ tions Staff was left only with its name, and it was in fact was no longer Hitler’s military staff for the entire conduct of the war, but instead an incomplete operations staff for those parts of the Army employed in the Armed Forces High Command theaters of war in the North, West and South—with virtually no influence on the Navy and Luftwaffe. The entire command was still led only by the “Fiihrer and Commander-in-Chief.” There was no Chief of Staff

Mill!

IK)

CoNFIzRlzXCES 1942-1945

1001

artillery corps’’] (see below note 1377)—was handpicked by the Army Person¬ nel Office. The officers were not allowed to transfer to other units, since they were regarded as the nucleus of the National Socialist “Volksheer” [Volks Army— “People’s Army”] which I litler intended to establish after the war. (See also below note 1407.)—Source: Order of Battle, p. 140; Gorhtg II, p 369; Wilmot, p. 509. 1’

With this objection, Buhlc wanted to prevent I litler from taking guns—as often happened—for which plans had already been made. The reference here is to the Volksartillery [People’s Artillery] Corps that were being developed at that time, and which, like the Volksgrenadier divisions, were intended to form the core of a National Socialist Volks Army (see also note 1376). These formations were being built up, first of all, in response to the American and Russian model of concentrated artillery employment, and, second, because of the loss of practi¬ cally all the artillery located in France. The Volksartillery Corps, which were equivalent to artillery brigades, were equipped with 7.5-cm atitank guns, 10.5cm, 15-cm and 17-crn guns, as well as 21-crn heavy howitzers. The numbers of the twelve Volksartillery Corps: 388,401,402,403,404, 405,407,408,409,410, 766 and 1095 (according to Keilig also 406, but not 1095).—Source: Order of Battle, pp. 39 and435; Gdr/it%II,p. 369; Frit^Lucke: Deutsche Volksartilkrie; in: I B of Feb. 19, 1945; Guderian: hrinnerungen,p. 32d; Keilig 11219.

u 8 Commander of the Replacement Army, i.e., since the July assassination attempt, Himmler. 1,79 See above note 1359. m> From Brest (see above note 137). ' ‘"l See above note 1356. , ’'*2 Guderian rightfully criticizes the confusing mess of conflicting and overlapping areas of authority, which was typical of the Third Reich and which i litler constantly and intentionally created in all areas. IW In the Apennines. 1

1 At that time, all the Po River bridges had fallen victim to hostile air raids. All attempts to repair the bridges proved useless because of the overall air supremacy of the enemy.

m5 The events taking place in Romania and soon also in Bulgaria made the evacua¬ tion of the German positions in Greece urgently necessary, although I litler had forbidden such preparations just days before. On the day of this meeting, Sep¬ tember 1, the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group “F.,” who had been or¬ dered to Rastcnbutg, received permission for the “abandonment” of Greece. During the evacuation operation, all men and as much equipment and supplies as possible were to be brought back. On the following day, September 2, the transports from Crete and the Aegean Islands began—first from Rhodes and Kos. The excellent 22nd Infantry Division, which was located on these islands (see below note 1835), was brought by air transport to the mainland without all of its heavy equipment, as it was the task of this unit to secure the with¬ drawal routes and railways from Salonika—Skopje—Belgrade to the east. Be¬ cause a complete evacuation of the island could not be guaranteed due to the tense air transportsituation, the decision was made around September 20 to

1002

Hitler and His Generals

leave behind occupation forces (which could defend themselves) on the most important islands—besides Crete, the islands designated were Rhodes, Leros, Kos, Milos, Piskopi and Simi. These Aegean islands, except for Simi and Piskopi (see below note 1933), held until the capitulation.—Source: Schmidt- Rich berg, pp. 34 and 38; Alet^sch, p. 62. ivh(>

Meaning the Bulgarians. In fact, the following day would bring not only the defection of Finland, but also Bulgaria. Bulgaria withdrew from the war on September 2, following armistice talks that the government had been holding in Ankara and Cairo since the middle of January. Those talks failed because of the Allied demand for unconditional surrender, which was technically impossible, since there were no Western troops located near the Bulgarian border and the country was not at war with the Soviet Union—it even still had diplomatic rela¬ tions with the USSR. When the Red Army reached the Bulgarian border on September 2, a new government was established under the commander of the right wing of the opposition Farmers’ Party, Muraviev —and is this the leader’s or the party’s name, in Sofia. The new government immediately declared the neutrality of Bulgaria; however, Soviet machinations prevented the originally intended declaration of war against Germany at the same rime. On September 5, the USSR took the hesitation, provoked by them, as an excuse for the Soviet declaration of war—which was necessary for the occupation of the country, and which could no longer be influenced by the belated Bulgarian declaration of war against Germany on September 8. On September 9, the coup d’etat by the “Vaterlichen Front” [“Patriotic Front”]—instigated by the Communists and the professional revolutionary Zveno League—finally gave the country into Soviet hands.—Source: Bretbo/~ p. 53; Toynbee: / lifter's Europe, p. 627; Seton\Y’atson,p. 96.

1387

Hitler meant the tanks that Germany had delivered to Bulgaria. As Guderian reports in his memoirs, until September 1944 Hitler did not believe the gloomy reports of officers who were located in Bulgaria. Instead, he continued the Ger¬ man deliveries of weapons to Bulgaria until the end (see above note 392).— Source: Guderian: Erinnerungen, p. 331.

138#

As the main traffic route between Salonika and Belgrade, the railway and the road along the Vardar River and the Morava River via Skopje and Nish seemed suitable for the retreat of Army Group “E” to Serbia. A side route, branching off in Skopje, also went through Kosovska Mitrovica and Kraljevo to the north. Both routes were frequently damaged by demolition and air raids, etc., and were at times interrupted. It is not known when the main rute through Nish (the town itself was lost on October 14)was cur off; however, the Russians finally cut both routes to Belgrade southeast of the capital on October 10, so that oly the route over the mountains and the Drina to Bosnia remained.—Source:Schmidt-Richberg, p. 40; Metsgcb, p. 65.

1389

Transcript number unknown—Fragment No. 42—A first transcription, of which approximately half was destroyed. The lower part of pages 1-45 was missing; the gaps arc indicated with dotted lines. Pages 46-53 were preserved with onlysmall gaps.

Miltiary CoNi'hRhxaiS 1942-1945

I MO

1003

Here and in other places (see the evening situation report on January 9, 1945), the situation is presented by Lieutenant Colonel Waizenegger, Jodi’s Army adju¬ tant. It had become the rule toward the end of the war that Jodi was represented by someone else—either entirely or at least for the report—in the second meet¬ ing around midnight, during which only the changes of the last few hours were

1391

discussed. The 7th Mountain Division, which had been in Finland since the spring of 1942, covered the German retreat to Norway. On August 25, after various preliminary talks, Finland had finally asked to initiate peace negotiations in Moscow. As a precondition, the Soviets demanded an immediate break with Germany and the withdrawal of the German troops in Finland by September 15. On September 2, the Finnish parliament accepted these demands and brokeoff relations with the Reich. On the morning of September 4, Finnish troops stopped fighting; the Russians did so as wrell after a delay of 24 hours. The removal of the German troops and agencies from southern Finland went smoothly from September 7 to September 13. However, the Twentieth Moun¬ tain Army under Rendulic, located in Lapland, finally received Hitler’s deci¬ sion on September 5—due to economic interests (Petsamo nickel)—not to withdraw to northern Norway but to move into the Ivalo position on Finnish territory. Because of this decision—and, in addition, after the German forces had made an unsuccessful surprise attack on the island of Suursaari (Hogland) in the Gulf of Finland on September 14 and 15—combat between German and Finnish troops still occurred in Lapland in September. The fighting be¬ came increasingly fierce because of the German destruction tactics. So the Finns had been fighting the Twentieth Mountain Army since the end of Sep¬ tember—supported by Soviet forces—although they did not officially declare war on the Reich until March 1, 1945. It took until the end of April until the last German troops left Finnish ground, although Petsamo had already been in the possession of tc Soviets since October 15,1944, and the nickel mine in kolosjoki since October 21.—Source: Mannerbeim,p. 525; Erj'urth: Derfinniscbe Krieg,pp. 270 and287; Bliicher,p. 397; Toynbee: The Realignment, p. 261; Meister: Die let^te Landungsoperation, passim.

1392

Combat Group “Nord” [“North”], which had been in Oslo and Bergen since 1940 and which consisted of two reinforced “Totenkopf” regiments, was reor¬ ganized as the 6th SS Mountain Division “Nord” [“North”] in the early summer of 1941, after the transfer to Finland in April/May. This division had been in action on the Finnish front throughout the entire year, and was now withdraw¬ ing into Lapland with the Twentieth Mountain Army. The evacuation of its positions, which had pushed forward the furthest toward the east, had initiated the German retreat during the night of September 8; during the next night the Seventh Mountain Army followed. Both divisions belonged, together with Divi¬ sion Group “K,” to the southern wing of the XVII Mountain Corps, which formed the Lapland Army.—Source: Order of Battle, p. 340; Rendulic: Gekdmpft..., p. 291.

1393

The LVI1 Panzer Corps was located on the new Maros front, which had been occupied after the evacuation of the Szekely salient from September 7 to Sep-

1004

HmJ R amd His Generals

tember 13; the Franlrish-Sudeten German 46th Infantry Division was on its left wing in the eastern Carpathians.—Source: Fnessner, pp. 112 and 116. 1 M In order to relieve the struggling Sixteenth Army south of Riga, the German panzer forces that had advanced up to the Gulf of Riga (see above p. 484) had resumed their attacks west of Elgava [Mitau] again.—Source: Tipptlskmb, p. 548.

1Probably the Cyklades island of Thira (Santorini). 1396 See above note 1325. 13'* Could not be identified with certainty*. Because Temeschbutg is located near the Serbian border, and because the 4th SS Police Panzer Grenadier Division— probably the only major German unit (see Rendulic, pp. 129 and 259)—had just been transferred from Yugoslavia into that area. Dr. Hermann Behrends is likely the officer referred to here. Behrends was born May 11, 1907; 1926-30 studied law; 1930 junior lawyer; 1932 SS; 1933 Untersturmfuhrer;1934 Obersturmbannfuhrer; 1936 government assessor; 1937 SS Oberfuhrer and Stabsfuhrer the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle head office; 1941 Brigade Commander; 1943-44 Hauptsturmfiihrcr or Sturmbannfuhrcr of the Reserves in various Waffcn SS units (lastly with the 13th SS Volunteer Mountain Division “Handschar”); March 1944 High SS and Police Commander in Serbia; August 1944 Gruppenfuhrer and Lieutenant General of the Police; and November 1944 Fuhrer Reserves. It can be assumed that Behrends participated in the defense of Serbia and the Banat as reserve commander of the Waffen SS together with an alarm unit consisting of members from various SS offices.—Source: SS staff files (Nbg. Dok. IXO-4066); SS Dienstalterslistm.

1

This most likely refers to the disarming of the Bulgarian 15th Infantry Division in the area of Prilep (until then southern Serbia, occupied by Bulgaria). The last units of the 4th SS Police Panzer Grenadier Division—which were on their way to Belgrade and then further to the area of Temeschburg—participated in this action.—Source: Scbmidt-Kicbberg, p. 56.

1 w‘ The following section discusses the Anglo-American airborne operations be¬ tween Neerpelt and Arnhem. Montgomery had planned at the beginning of September to drive a corridor northward from his position along the MeuseSchcldc Canal to Arnhem, in order to advance to the Zuider Zee from there, and also to encircle the Ruhr area in the north. To achieve this goal, it was necessary to seize the bridges located between the English Neerpelt bridgehead on the Meuse-Schelde Canal and Arnhem. These bridges were: 1. at Zon over the Wilhelmina Canal 2. at Vechel over the Zuid Willems Vaart 3. at Grave over the Meuse 4. at Nijmegen over the Waal and 5. at Arnhem over the Rhine At noon on September 17 (the day of this meeting), the following divisions jumped to begin the capture of the five bridges: the American 101st Airborne Division between Eindhoven and Vechel the American 82nd Airborne Division between Grave and Nijmegen the British 1st Airborne Division northwest of Arnhem

MlLIIARY CoNFEREXCliS 1942-1945

1005

At the same time, English armored forces (X Corps) advanced northward from the Neerpelt bridgehead to establish the connection with the airborne troops and extend the corridor. The attackers immediately took the bridges near Yechel and Grave, while the bridge near Zon had already been blowm up by German troops. The Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges remained in German possession. During the course of the operations, which w'ere disadvantaged by unfavorable weather conditions, the. link-up with the 101st Airborne Division was estab¬ lished on September 18 and w-ith the 82nd Airborne Division on September 19. On September 20, Nijmegen and its bridge, which had remained undamaged due to a German mistake, fell into the hands of the Anglo-Americans. However, the 1st Airborne Division near Arnhem failed, with heavy losses. Thus, the op¬ erational goal of the entire mission remained unfulfilled. Out of a division that had landed with about 10,000 men, only 2,163 were withdrawn to the southern bank of the lower Rhine during the night of September 25; 6,450 men wrere captured and 1,130 killed.—Source: Wilmot,p. 550; 1'ippelskirch,p. 523. 1+1 Karl Maria Demelhuber; born May 27, 1896; 1935 transferred from the Bavar¬ ian State Police to the SS as Obersturmbahnfuhrer; 1936 Regimental Commander and Commander SS Regiment “Germania”; 1939-40 Commander, SS Regiment “Germania” in Poland and France; end of 1940 Commander of the Waffen SS in the General Government (Poland) and brigade commander; May 1941 Com¬ mander, SS Mountain Division “Nord” [“North”]; May 1942 Commander of the Waffen SS in the Netherlands; and June 1944 SS Obergruppenfuhrer. In October, Demelhuber was appointed an Inspector General of the Waffen SS in the SS Chief Command Office, after his previous position was eliminated when the replacement troops w’ere withdrawn into the Reich.—Source: SS Dienstalterslisten.

1401 Meaning enemy transport gliders. 1W2 Originally a division headquarters for the reserve units of Military District VI (Munster), it was thrown into the Arnhem area with alarm unit activations.— Source: Order of Batik, p. 259.

141'' The bazooka, i.e., the 8.8-cm antitank rocket launcher 44 “Panzerschreck,” was the most important antitank closc-combat weapon at that time. It wras a 1.64 m long tube with a gun shield (weight: 9.2 kg), out of which an 8.8-cm caliber rocket with an electrically ignited hollow-charge shell was shot from the shoul¬ der. The maximum range of this weapon, which could be operated by one man, was 400 meters. The most effective range was 100 to 150 meters. An antitank rocket launcher had already been produced in February 1942; however, it w'as perfected only after the Americans used their bazooka—a smaller one—in North Africa. The “Panzerschreck,” which wras practically an imitation of the Ameri¬ can bazooka, with a larger caliber, reached the troops in the fall of 1943. By the end of the war there was also a 2 m long model with a 10 cm caliber, but it is uncertain whether this weapon was ever used.—Source: Schneider,p. 236; Ljtsar,p. 37; Etser, p. 39.

On September 4, Colonel General Student (sec above note 661)—with his First Parachute Army headquarters, which had been functioning as a training and

1006

HnuzR and His Generals

maintenance organization in Italy, Germany and France up to that time—took over the front along the Albert Canal between Antwerp and Maastricht and closed the gap in northern Belgium. The core of his army consisted of initially six parachute regiments, which, in this emergency situation. Goring had surpris¬ ingly offered the Army, together with the promise of additional formations. 1405

1406

(See also below pp. 514 and 657)—Source: Wibnot, p. 509; Siegler, p. JO. An 18-ton armored patrol car did not exist. The “8-ton” is probably meant here, meaning the heavy patrol car of 8.3 t, armed with the 5-cm or 7.5-cm gun. Military District X: I lamburg (Schleswig-Holstein, Oldenburg, East Friesland], northwestern Lower Saxony); Military District XI: Hanover (Lower Saxony, Braunschweig], Magdeburg, Anhalt).

1407

The 363td VGD [Volksgrcnadier Division!—a reconstitution of the old unit which had been destroyed at Falaise—and other divisions of this kind were indeed used against the English airborne troops near Arnhem. These Volksgrenadier divisions of the 32nd wave, whose formation had been ordered less than a month before, were employed prematurely (sec above note 1376). The first official announcement about these last-minute emergency measures said wistfully: “The Volksgrenadier divisions are among the troops that have been employed in the last few weeks and which have already helped to catch the Anglo-American armies outside the western border of the Reich.” They were formed by Reichsfiihrer SS Himmler in his capacity as Commander of the Re¬ placement Army. The men of this division are, on average, 18 to 20 years old, have completed a thorough training, and a commander of one of those divi¬ sions characterized them as follow’s: ‘These soldiers are like young lions who want to compete with a strong enemy. If necessary, they will fight against tanks with ‘only a simple gun.’ ... These units of the Volksgrenadier divisions consist half of young, wrell-trained soldiers, but who do not have combat experience. The others, especiallv the junior commanders and the officers, are battle-hard¬ ened soldiers from the East, South and West ... The new’ Volksgrenadier divi¬ sions are therefore an excellent mixture of young, inexperienced men and older, experienced soldiers and commanders. After occasionally being used as block¬ ing units, they passed their critical test defending against the air attack on the Netherlands, and additional divisions have bloodily driven back numerous North American attacks on the Fafel front and on the Moselle.”—Order of Wattle, p. 249; l 75 of Oct. 11, 1944.

140H

Already before the beginning of the invasion, the Germans had considered the possibility of dropping the V 1 from aircraft. It was determined that the V 1, released from an] He 111—for example, from a height of 200 m—could reach an approach height of 3,500 m with its own propulsion. The practical applica¬ tion of the method was first attempted on September 17, the day of this meet¬ ing, after the destruction of the northern French launching ramps (see above note 853)—which had been cut off from supply by the hostile advance on Antwerp—finally had to be halted on September 5.The lie 111 started with its cargo in Oldenburg, flew’ to a certain point over the Dutch islands, and then released its load. The English fighter defense, how’ever, caused such heavy air-

Military

Coni 'lrlxcls 1942-1945

1007

craft losses that the systematic employment had to be discontinued after a certain time, in total, about 1,200 V Is (another source claims—probably wrongly—only 150) were released in this way, aimed at London; only about 80 reached the urban area. (See also above note 780 and below note 1605.)— Source: Waumbacb, p. 260; Ijtsjr, p. 97; Armed Forces High Command reports from Sep/. 2, 5 and 17, 1944.

1409 See below note 1583. 1410 Near Stolberg. 14.1 A town halfway between Metz and Nano,'—unless it was written incorrectly anil Nomexy, 15 kilometers north of Epinal, was meant. 14.2 Halfway between Epinal and Vcsoul. Jusscy lies about 40 km west-southwest of Fougetollcs. 1413 It is unclear whether the reference is to Rundstedt or Blaskowitz. 14,4 The 16th Infantry Division had sustained heavy losses in the last few days in the area around Nancy, and, with the addition of numerous local units, had to be practically reconstituted as the 16th Volksgrenadier Division of the 32nd wave. However, the First Army may actually have been meant here, since the Ninetenth Army—which was moving up the Rhone Valley from the French Mediterranean coast and which was finally put into action in Upper Alsace—was located con¬ siderably further south.—Source: Order of Wattle, p. 144. I41' From central and southern France. ,4lfi Meaning the Russians. 141 The 1 st Cossack Cavalry Division, under the command of Lieutenant General Hclmuth v. Pannwitz (see below note 1839), which had been established during the first half of 1943 in Mielau, had been involved in the partisan operations in Yugoslavia (see above note 484 and note 741) since September 1943. When Pannwitz faced materiel difficulties in the summer of the following year, during the enlargement—at his request—of his division into a corps under the Army High Command, he established connections with the SS in July and interested them in his Cossacks. On August 26 he spoke with Himmler and defined the essential elements of the takeover by the SS and the enlargement to the XV (SS) Cossack Cavalry Corps; insignia and uniforms were to remain unchanged “ini¬ tially,” but the Cossacks would be educated about the SS and its spirit. In addi¬ tion, Pannwitz was promised the unified command of the Cossacks wrho were located in the area ruled by Germany, including the units then trekking to the Adriatic coast after their hasty flight through Russia. The Cossacks mentioned here in connection with the Western Front were probably the reserve units that had been located in France and which consisted of several thousand men. (See also below note 1452)—Source: Ak/ennoti^ KI SS from Aug. 26, 1944 (Nbg- Dok. NO-2423); Thorwald: Wen sie..., pp. 249, 311 and345; Aufcticbnungen von Constantin Wagner und Artur Timm (Thorwald Material in the I/Z).

141 “ In 1940, while breaking through the Maginot Line. J—] Hitler’s assumptions about the hostile attack plan were wrong, though in principle operationally cor¬ rect. The Allies proceeded differently at that time, to the great annoyance of Montgomery. While he was demanding the bulk of forces and supply, in order

1008

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS

to —just as Hitler assumed here — invade the northern German lowlands via Belgium and the Ruhr area, Eisenhower was not ready to decide on that. Instead, he left it in the hands of the Bradley's American army group to advance on southern Germany, with the result that both army groups remained stuck at the beginning of winter in the area of the Western Wall. (See also above note 1246.) — Source: Wilmot (Engl), pp. 460 and 562. i4i9.In East Prussia. The 349th Infantry Division was replenished in August/September after heavy losses during the Soviet summer offensive, and was also reorganized into a Volksgrenadier division. The division was based in East Prussia (Military District I) and was also located there at the time of this meeting. — Source: Order ofBatde, p. 245. 1420. The Fiihrer-Grenadier Brigade was established as an independent Army unit at the beginning of 1944. It consisted of two panzer grenadier battalions, one panzer detachment, one assault gun detachment and one anti-aircraft detachment. The brigade, which was well equipped with staff and materiel, was located in Rastenburg in order to secure the Fiihrer Headquarters — until it took part in the Ardennes offensive in December with the Fifth Panzer Army. Afterward it was pulled out of the Western Front once again and filled up to form a division, then employed in the East with Army Group Vistula — first in Pomerania, and then in Kottbus during the final weeks of the war. (See also below note 1809.) — Source: Order of Battle, p. 86; Tippelskirch, p. 603. 1421. The reference is to an airborne landing in the area of the Fiihrer Headquarters in East Prussia. 1422. With their special trains, Goring ("Asien" |"Asia"]), Himmler ("Heinrich") and Ribbentrop ("Westfalen" ["Westphalia"]) usually remained near Rastenburg in order not to lose contact with the "court." 1423. To the West. The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division had suffered severe losses during the summer in the area of Minsk, and was located at that time in Grafenwohr for replenishment. The division would now be thrown into the Lorraine front. — Source: Order of Battle, p. 309. 1424. Not ascertained. The former Commander, X Expeditionary Headquarters, Major General Georg-Thilo Baron v. Werthern, could hardly be meant here. 1425. The employment of the Replacement Army against airborne landings, labor unrest among foreign workers, etc. had been restructured by Colonel General Fromm at the end of 1943. The new system defined, for example, how an operational battalion should be formed out of a replacement regiment and how it should be employed. 1426. These new orders were released with the code name "Valkyrie," which the Bendler Strasse people tried to use during the failed mobilization of the Replacement Army against the SS and the party on July 20, 1944. When Himmler became Commander of the Replacement Army, he formed units for the front using the "Valkyrie" system. It is these units that are referred to here. Stationary artillery detachments, equipped partly with German — but mostly captured — weapons, activated in France in late summer because of the heavy artillery losses. — Source: Order of Battle, p. 39. * Map made using the diagrams from the book Geschichte des zweiten Weltkriegs by Kurt von Tippelskirch, with the kind from the publisher Athenaiim in Bonn.

MlUTAKi C'ONHiRIiXCES

14

1942-1945

1009

An English military mission had already been with the Tito troops since May 1943. Jodi’s claim that the English had also been identified with the “nationalist partisans” is probably based on a mix-up with the Americans. At the end of May 1944, the British government recalled its representative to the Cctniks, who had been there since October 1941. An American mission under Colonel McDowell, on the other had, stayed until November 15, 1944, with the Mihailovic units, which were on their way from liberated Serbia—now ruled by Tito—to Bosnia, etc.—Source: Churchill I V2, p. 169; Dedi/er, pp. 189 mid 203; Votitch, pp. 202, 268, 277 and 282; f mcptch, p. 63. The DNB reported the morning of September l7 from Madrid:

Inform ado ties’

reports from Buenos Aires that the news coming from the Brazilian-Uruguayan border speaks of serious events in Brazil. Although the strict Brazilian press censorship did not allow any news to come through, it is known that all tele¬ phone and telegraph connections have been disconnected tor the last 48 hours. People speak of a military movement and the arrest of numerous generals and leading Brazilian personalities. The troops were in their garrisons, and the mili¬ tary parade that had been planned for the Brazilian national holiday was can¬ celed.” No further reports followed.—Source: DNB of Sept. 17, 1944. UJI> According to a report published that day. General Eisenhower had ordered that a proclamation, signed by him, be posted in all German towns occupied by the Allies. The proclamation contained the following statements: “We come to you as victors, but not as oppressors. We will extinguish National Socialism in all its forms; all racial laws—and all laws in general, which were passed under the ideology of the Nazis—will immediately be repealed.” The proclamation also named thirty state and party oiganizations that had been disbanded. The follow¬ ing day Eisenhower announced the establishment of the Allied Military Gov¬ ernment for Germany. Nothing is known about a German counter-proclama¬ tion.—Source: NZZ of Sept. 17 and 19, 1944 (morning edition). 14314 See above note 429. 1431 Siegfried Kasche; born June 18, 1903; cadet institute; 1918 participant in the Spartakiad competitions; 1919 Baltic Freikorps; various position in industry; 1926 NSDAP; 1928 to 1931 deputy Gauleiter Ostmark, 1930 MdR [member of the Reichstag], 1932 Commander SA group Ostmark; 1934 SA group Lower Saxony; 1937and SA group Hansa and SA Obergruppenfiihrer. On April 20, 1941, Kasche was named one of five “SA diplomats” to be sent to the Southeast to the German legation in Agram. In contrast to the German authorized repre¬ sentative, General Glaisc-Horstcnau, who had in the meantime been replaced by Lieutenant General Juppe at the beginning of September 1944 and later (in December) by SS Obctgruppcnfiihrcr Priitzmann, he was unconditionally on the side of Pavelic and significantly overestimated the unstable Ustasi regime. On June 7, 1947, in the trial of Kvatcrnik and others, Kasche was sentenced by the Supreme Court of VR [the Free Republic of] Croatia to be hanged.— Source: VB of April 21, 1941; lllus/rierter Beobachter of Aug. 14, 1941: Math Jugoslamen, p. 106; Keesings Archive 1946A7,p. 1109; Kisgling, pp. 171 and others.

1010

1412

1433

HnusR and His Ghnerals

Dr. Ante Pave lie, the Croatian “Poglavnik,” held a speech at a Ustasi meeting on September 7. Among other things, the following was explained: “Even if the enemy is achieving some success at the moment, and even if certain statesmen become weak, I personally believe in our victory and the victory of our allies. We want to work and fight, and the victory will be ours. We will endure it to¬ gether with our allies and we will win together with our allies. The Croatian people will not betray themselves or their allies.” At that time, Pavclic had just reorganized his government; he had excluded the former Minister of the Inte¬ rior Lorkovic, the War Minister Vokic and others from the Ustasi, and had or¬ dered their arrest.—Source: Keedngs Archive 1944,p. 6516. The “Danish National Council” in London had called upon its people to strike— from oon on September 16 until September 18—in protest against the transpor¬ tation of about 190 Danish political prisoners out of the concentration camp in Froeslev to Germany. The transfer of the prisoners into the Reich was thought to be a reprisal in response to increased Danish sabotage action, and had already caused spontaneous strikes the day before in the area of Froeslev, in northern Schleswig. The strike order, which had been spread by flyers, was followed, de¬ spite the German threat of drastic countermeasures. The strike mostly affected the traffic system, which was paralyzed in places, so the German military occu¬ pied several railway stations and German railway workers took over the western routes. Because the strike threatened to become a general strike, the High SS and Police Commander Denmark, SS Obergruppentuhrer Pancke, declared— on Hitler’s orders—a police state of emergency on the morning of September 19, and ordered the Danish police disarmed. In most of the cities, this measure brought about a two-day general strike. There was also shooting in front of the castle in Copenhagen when the royal guards thought they would be disarmed as well. The incident cost 8 lives and was only settled when the Danish king stepped in. There had also been a general strike in Copenhagen on June 30, 1944, pro¬ testing 8 death sentences against Danes accused of sabotage; in mid-August a smaller strike had broken out in Jutland.—Source: NZZ of Sept. IS, 1944 (midday edition); Nbg. Dok. NG-5812 and KG-5244; Toynbee: Hitter’s Europe, p. 532; Ausarbeitung ll' ESt/KTB (Armed Forces Operations Staff/War Diary] “Der nbrdtiche Kriegesscbaup/at% II. Teil" (Xbg. Dok. 1795-PS).

1414

Wipcrt v. Bltichcr; born July 14, 1893; since 1911 in the foreign service; 1931 envoy in Teheran; and envoy in Helsinki from May 1935 until the breaking off of diplomatic relations on September 2,1944.—Source: Digeners Werist’s,p. 140; Bliicber, passim.

1435

Antti Hackzell; born September 20, 1881; before World War I lawyer in St. Pe¬ tersburg; after the war. A long-time Finnish envoy in Moscow; 1932 to 1936 Foreign Minister in the Kivimaki cabinet; one of the leaders of the Sammlungspartei [Unity Party]; and and chairman of the Finnish employer as¬ sociations. Hackzell was named Prime Minister on August 8, 1944, after the presidential change and the resignation of the Linkomy cabinet (see above note 776), and led the delegation to Moscow for armistice negotiations in September. On September 14, the first day of the conference there, he suffered a cerebral

AtlUTARh CoNhEREXCliS

1942-1945

1011

stroke, which ended his political career. On Saturday, September 16, the follow¬ ing medical bulletin was published in Moscow: “During the last 24 hours, the condition of the Finnish Prime Minister Hackzcll has worsened considerably as a result of an inflammation of the lower part of the right lung. The patient is gradually losing consciousness. The paralysis has not changed. This state of the

143ft

patient remains serious.” The Hackzcll cabinet resigned after the negotiations concluded on September 22.—Source: B/ueber, pp. IS, 58 and 390; Mannerbeim, pp. 524 and 531; NZZ of Sept. 17, 1944. I lermann Neubacher; born June 24, 1893; 1912 Vienna College of Agricultural Sciences; 1919 forestry engineer; 1920 Dr. of Agricultural Science; until 1934 in the Public Economy Housing and Building Material Institute (finally as Direc¬ tor General); 1925 founder of the Austrian-German Volksbund (People’s Union]; December 1934 NS country leader for Austria; 1935 imprisoned for member¬ ship in the illegal NSDAP and Anschluss [Union] Movement; March 1938 mayor of Vienna; 1939 SA Gruppenfiihrer (1944 Obergruppenfuhrer); January 1940 with the German legation in Bucharest as special envoy for economic issues, and later authorized representative for oil matters in the Southeast; October 1942 special representative of the Reich for economic and Financial issues in Greece, and after August 1943, special deputy representative of the Foreign Office for the Southeast, responsible for the coordination of German policy in Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and—soon after—Albania, and also for the unified leadership of the fight against Communism in the Southeast. This assignment explicitly included the authority to organize the national anti-Communist forces in the individual countries and to negotiate with the “partisan band leaders.” Neubacher’s appointment, for all practical purposes, initiated a new German policy of cooperation with the national resistance groups in the Southeast that were threatened by advancing Bolshevism. In August 1951, Neubacher was sen¬ tenced by the military court in Belgrade to 20 years in prison; however, he was released in November 1952. He then became an economic advisor and city planner in Addis Ababa, and, later, was active in the administration of various state institutions in Austria.—Source: Nbg. Dok. NC-2861 (SA staff files) and SC3439; M unginger Archive; Math Jngoslamen, p. 108; Neubacher, passim; Siiddeutscbe Zeitungof Jan. 19, 1959.

14-37

Meaning to go over to the other side. Tito had guaranteed every Croatian who joined the “People’s Liberation Army” by September 15,1944 would go unpun¬ ished. This led to the break up of almost all regular Croatian units. The hated Ustasi,of course, could not count on any pardon.—Source:Mat/:Jugostamen,p. 108.

143S

See above note 587. See also note 1431.

1434

Lothar Rcndulic; born November 23, 1887; 1910 Second Lieutenant k.u.k., 99th Infantry Regiment; after World War I Austrian Federal Army; studied law (Dr. of Law); 1933 Colonel and Austrian military attache in Paris; 1938 Armed Forces, Chief of Staff, XVII Army Corps; 1939 Major General; 1940 Com¬ mander, 14th Infantry Division; after October, commander, 52nd Infantry Di¬ vision; 1941 Lieutenant General; end of 1942 Commanding General, XXXV Army Corps and General of Infantry; April 1943 Commander-in-Chief, Second

1012

Hrru.R a.\p His Clnerals

Panzer Army (Southeast); April 1944 Colonel General; June 1944 Commanderin-Chief, Twentieth Mountain Army in northern Finland and Norway; January 1945 Commander-in-Chief, Army Group North; March 1945 Commander-in Chief, Army Group Courland; and (March 25) Commander-in-Chief, Army Group South. In Nuremberg in 1948, Rendulic was sentenced to 20 years in prison; he was released in December 1951.—Source: Rendu/k, passim; Mun^inger Archive; Siegler, p. 134; Keiiig 2111267. ,44" Glaise-Horstenau and Rendulic, as well as Neubacher and Sonnleirhner, were from Austria. '11 Artur Phlcps; born N ovember 29,1881 in Transylvania; cadet school in Pressburg [Bratislava]; Austrian officer; 1918-19 Chief of Staff of a Transylvanian divi¬ sion; transferred to the Romanian Army and promoted to division general; 1941 released at his own request and joined the Waffen SS as volunteer; SS brigade commander and commander of a combat group in the Ukraine; 1942 com¬ mander of the newly established 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division “Prince F.ugen”; and summer 1943 as Obergruppenfiihrer and Commanding General, V SS Mountain Corps. Phleps flew to Transylvania in September 1944 in order to help with the defense of his homeland, and was supposedly killed in action there on September 21, i.c., four days after this meeting. The circumstances of his death, however, have not been completely clarified. He was supposedly shot after his capture by a Soviet officer, to prevent his escape during a German air attack; however, it was also said—although it is probably sheer speculation— that Phleps was killed on Himmler’s order.—Source: Kratschmer; p. 202; Hausser, p. 106; SS Diensta/tersliste 1942; Reitlingpr: The SS,p. 200; Kent, p. 160. ,44’ See above p. 513 and note 1433. " ' The medium armored personnel carrier Sd.Kfz. [Special Motor Vehicle] 251— originally (251/1) equipped with two machine guns—was armed in the 251/9 version with the 7.5-cm StuK [assault gun] I./24, in the 251/21 version with a 2cm or 1.5-cm three-barreled anti-aircraft gun, and in the 251/17 version with a 2-cm anti-aircraft gun.—Source: Se/tger-Etfer/in, p. 48. 1444 Transcript No. 567/44—Fragments Na 2 and 3—Completely preserved. 1445 Szolnok ad been lost on November 4.—Source: Fn'essnrr,p. 171. 14441 The panzer advance against the Russian flank just outside Budapest had come from the northeast, starting in the Pits area and moving in the direction of Lljhartyan. The enemy then retreated from the penetration area on the southeast edge of Budapest back behind the Taksony—Monor line on November 6, the day of this meeting.—Source: Friessner,p. 168. 144 The 44th Infantry Division, after May 1943 the German Infantry Division I lochuud Deutschmeister, was established in 1938 from the Viennese 4th Regiment “Hoch- und Deutschmeister” and had been employed in the Polish and French campaigns as well as in the suthern sector of the Eastern Front. The division was destroyed in the Stalingrad pocket, but was newly formed in France in April 1943 and was employed in Italy after August 1943 (see above note 609).—Source: Order of Rattle, p.1 >}; Ronnefarth, passim.

1014

Hitler asd His Generals

leader of the Fascist Movement, signs of disintegration in the three Hungarian armies nevertheless increased. The Commander-in-Chief of the First Army, Colonel General Miklos, deserted with a few of his troops; the Commander-inChief of the Second Army, Colonel General Verres, gave the order to retreat and had to be arrested; and in the Third Army, an extensive purge was carried out in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief, Colonel General Hoszlenyi. I lowevcr, most of the Hungarian units remained, although unreliable and warwean,'. This discussion here concerns several penetrations of the Hungarian IX Army Corps lines, which eventually led to the loss of the upper Theiss as well.—Source: Macartney II, p. 391, especially p. 415; Friessner, pp. 141 and 172; Hortby, p. 2X1; Kdllay, p. 45X. h>4

'p[ic

18th SS Volunteer Panzer Grenadier Division Horst Wessel was set up in

Hungary in the spring of 1944, by expanding the 1st SS Infantry Brigade (mo¬ torized). The division was employed in October to put down the Slovakian re¬ volt.—Source: Order of battle, p. 345. l45“ Meaning a frontal attack instead of a push into the flank or the rear. 1456 District towm on the middle Wisloka River. W’enck is mistaken. This area was not one of the focal points of the Russian offensive in January7. 1457 Most likely meaning,

.if it does not need to go to the bridgehead...”or some¬

thing similar. The 25th Panzer Division had come back to the Eastern Front in the fall from Denmark, where it had gone in April for replenishment after experiencing heavy losses during the retreat from the Ukraine.—Source: Order of battle, p 301. ,4'" The 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf. See also note 1332. Regarding Soviet artillery, see below note 1602. In the Armed Forces report of November 6 it says: “The city of Goldap in East Prussia has been freed from the Bolshevists. In three day of bitter combat, the trapped Soviet regiments were for the most part destroyed, and the survivors were arrested. Fifty-nine tanks and assault guns, 134 guns of all kinds, and countless heavy and light weapons fell into our hands. Many dead Bolshevists covered the battlefield.” 14> The Russians had learned quite quickly to use the wide expanse of their terri¬ tory—mostly at night, of course—to escape encirclement, while on the Ger¬ man side, the expansive territory' and decreasing troop strength made it more and more difficult to encircle the areas properly. In addition, there was the tough¬ ness of the Russian flanks and the utter contempt for death that the Soviet soldiers demonstrated under the eyes of their commissars. 1,61 See below p. 530. Hitler probably means—correct in the long term—the great bend in the Vistula River. ,4

The following discussion concerns the area I litler intended to use for the winter offensive. Since the establishment of this front line in September, the front sector between the Ruhr and the Moselle Rivers had been calm, providing a replenishment area for units of the Bradley’s American Army Group, which were organized according to their attack plans and operational goals. So in the north there were 16 divisions on the approximately 65 km front line between Geilenkirchen and Monschau, in the south 10 divisions on the 95 km Saar front, and 5 divisions along the whole 160 km in between. Two of these divisions were lying in the north between Monschau and Butgcnbach (2nd and 99th) and two or three (106th after the beginning of December, 28th and 4th) and an inexpe¬ rienced armored division (9th) between Butgcnbach and the Moselle (the Ameri¬ can 8th Division, also mentioned here, was—at least at the time of the German attack—further north near the Ruhr dams). North of Monschau, the 78th Divi¬ sion joined in, and was also attacked later by the Germans. On the German side, the following troops lined up (from north to south): 1. from the Fifteenth Army, parts of the 272nd Volksgreandier Division; 2. the Sixth SS Panzer Army (246th Volksgrenadier Division (VGD), 326th YGD, 277th VGD, 3rd Parachute Division, 12th VGD, 12th SS Panzer Division, 1st SS Panzer Division, and 150th Panzer Brigade); 3. the Fifth Panzer Army (18th VGD, 560th VGD, 116th Panzer Division, 4.

2nd Panzer Division, 26th VGD, and Panzer Lehr-Division); and from the Seventh Army (5th Parachute Division,352nd VGD, 276th VGD, and 212th VGD.

—Source: Wilmot, pp. 608 and 621. 1517

The attack against Diedenhofen and Metz began on the morning of November 8 in the area south of Metz, and continued the following day also north of town.—Source: Armed Forres High Command reports from Non 8 and 10, 1944.

15IK

On a trip through Savoy, General de Gaulle had announced at a rally in Annecy on November 4 that the war was still not over. To win, one had to cross the Rhine and then finally dictate the law of freedom.—Source: NZZ of Nor. 6, 1944 (morning edition).

151V

Franco, in an interview with a United Press representative on November 4, had declared that Spain had never been Fascist or National Socialist, and had never been allied with the Axis powers—neither in secret nor in any other way. In any case, Spain could never ally with Germany or any other country that was not led by the principles of Catholicism. The Spanish regime would not hinder coop¬ eration with the Allied forces—including Russia. The presence of Spanish vol¬ unteers in the Soviet Union was certainly not the result of a hostile design against any country, and the Spanish government had taken the necessary steps to ar¬ range for the return of these volunteers to Spain when the government learned “that the presence of these volunteers might have an influence on the relation¬ ship with the Allied countries with which Spain had friendly relations.” In a

Military Conihriischs 1942-1945

1031

short note, the German press also brought out the tenor of this Franco inter¬ view on November 9 (see also below note 1529).—Source:NZZ of Nov. 6, 1944 1520

(midday edition); I B oj Nov. 9, 1944. Hitler is speaking here about the Spanish agreement to the attack on Gibraltar, which had been planned four years earlier. On December 11, 1940, Operation “Felix”—scheduled for January 10,1941—was delayed by Franco’s refusal when Canaris asked him on behalf of I litler for his final agreement. Ifntil then, Spain had agreed half-heartedly, though their continual excuses must have shown that they were not particularly enthusiastic about the whole affair, and they tried to deflect Hitler’s urging whenever possible. Franco’s arguments on the one hand concerned Spain’s poor supply situation with regard to food and other neces¬ sary goods, and on the other hand he declared his worries about the fate of the Canary Islands and other overseas properties in the face of the superior strength of the British Navy. The territorial demands of the Caudillo, how’ever—one cannot say if they were serious or if they w-ere simply designed to create artifi¬ cial obstacles at a time when Franco’s belief in Hitler’s immediate victory had already been shattered—included French Morocco and Oran, in addition to Gibraltar. Although Hitler was in principle not opposed to the idea, he shied away from an open and binding agreement because of the French colonial armies, some of which were fighting against the F’nglish. If it is an exaggeration to call the result of the Montoire and I lendaye discussions “Hitler’s option on France,” he at least thought to reduce Franco’s demands in Africa for the moment, so that even two years later the Spanish ambassador Vidal, in a discussion with State Secrtary Weizsackct, was able to place the responsibility for the aborted joint Gibraltar operation on the Reich’s deliberate sparing of French interests in Africa. So there is certainly a partial truth to Hitler’s assertions. [—] The agree¬ ment writh Petain mentioned here could be the protocol concerning the situa¬ tion in Africa, printed by Abetz. Point four says: “The Fiihrer showed the French head of state that after the defeat of England and after the return of the Ger¬ man colonies by the peace treaty, a general revision of the property situation on the African continent must take place. Considering mutual interests, this reallo¬ cation must take into account the political necessities and economic demands of the participating European nations. For this redistribution, Germany', Italy, France and Spain wnll be considered first. If the revision in Africa necessitates a change in the actual French colonial properties, the Axis powers wall compen¬ sate France territorially through the peace agreement with England, so that the future colonial property in Africa will be just as valuable as the current one.”—Source: Abefyp. 158; Trevor-Roper: Hitlerund Franco, passim; Girard, passim; Aron, p. 293; Greiner, p. 152; Seraphim, passim; 7 ippelsk.ircb, p. 135; Nbg. Dok. NG-3026.

1521 1522

Regarding the revolt in Slovakia, see above note 1327. The 167th Volksgrcnadicr Division was the reactivation of an infantry division that had been surrounded and practically destroyed in the Korsun’ (Cherkassy') pocket duringthe previous winter. It came to Slovakia for training and relieved the 708th Volksgrenadier Division, which w^as the reactivation of a division that

1032

HniizR and His

Gesurals

had been destroyed in Normandy and which was moved to the Alsatian front in the West.—Source: Order of battle, pp. 190 and 281. 152’ The 11th SS Volunteer Pander Grenadier Division “Nordland” was placed un¬ der the III (German) SS Panzer Corps and fought on the northern section of the front after January 1944, now in Courland. The 23rd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment “Norge” [“Norway”] (Norwegian Nu 1) and the SS Panzer Grena¬ dier Regiment “Danmark” [“Denmark”] (Danish No. 1) belonged to this divi¬ sion.—Source: Order of battle, pp. 334 and 342; Aufstellung SSFHAfhm March 26, 1945 (Nbg. Dok. NO-175). hm “flruno” was tiie name of a type of railway gun—old 28-cm Navy barrels that had been taken over by the Army in 1936 and set onto railway mounts by Krupp. “Bruno N.” might mean a special version of this gun; the only parameters known are the lengths of he barrels and the different v [initial velocity] and ranges of the various types: kz. (short, barrel length 1,120 cm), lg. (long, 1,260cm) and s. (heavy, 1,400 cm) as well as “Theodor-Bruno” (840 cm), with a caliber of 24 cm (ranges: 29.5 km, 37 km, 36 km and 26.5 km, respectively).— Source: Schimer, p. 111. 1525 “Siegfried” railway gun, 38-cm caliber, barrel length 1,976 cm, range: 54.8 km.— Source: Schimer, p.111. 1526 “K 5” was a Krupp railway gun, caliber 28 cm, barrel length 2,128 cm (L/76). The number 5 means that the original range of this gun was about 50 km (ac¬ cordingly the names K 3, K 12 and so on show the range, divided by 10). “K 5” was a first-class, very modern railway gun, whose range could be increased to 150 km with sabot projectiles.—Sonne:Scbirmer,p. 111. t52' A railway gun with a 32-cm caliber is not known. Either the reference is to the Czech 30.5-cm Skoda howitzers or—in a transposition of the numbers—the (also Czech) 23-cm guns on the 30.5 howitzer mounts, which, writh electric mo¬ tor propulsion, could also run on rails. The reference could also be to the nine 31 -cm coastal guns, built from Rhine metal, that were originally intended tor Tur¬ key—for defense of the straits—but were never delivered because of the war. Buhle probably means the Krupp gun of Sevastopol’—the 60-cm mortar “Thor.” It weighed 120 tons and, from a barrel of only 5‘/a meters length, shot 2,200- and 2,500-kg shells to distances of 2.5 to 6.4 km. There were 3 or 4 guns of this type, which were all blown up or scrapped after bomb hits.— Source: 1 Jtsar, p. 20. The English press had rejected Franco’s statements (sec above note 1519)—as at least the VB registered with malicious joy on November 9—as impudent, ridiculous and fantastic, and had called the Caudillo a usurper and an enemy of democracy. 151 A corresponding notice appeared, for example, in the VB on November 7, un¬ der the headline: “Soviet-enslaved newspapers in Finland.” It said: “As Nya Dag (a Swedish newspaper) has reported, the Finnish Communist newspaper \apaa Sana appeared for the first time on November 6. Also the radically left-wing pro-Soviet Social Democratic opposition has created itself a new mouthpiece with the weekly magazine called l dpaa Pobjola. The Helsinki correspondents of

Military Conferences 1942-1945

1033

the Stockholm press emphasize that these publications are providing further impetus for Communist and radically left-wing propaganda in Finland. In addi¬ tion to Vapaa Sana, the Communists are planning to publish another weekly magazine, called Kommunisti, which will have the character of a Communist/ Marxist magazine. Also, the association in support of the rapprochement be¬ tween Finland and the Soviet Union is planning ‘a new mouthpiece.’ All these papers will promote Bolshevism.” 1531 After British and American oil companies had been negotiating with Iran since the fall of 1943 regarding concessions in the south of the country, the Soviet Union also demanded, in September 1944, a concession for a region of about 200,000 square km in northern Iran. The Iranian government decided not to give any concessions at all for the duration of the war, and not to start negotiationsbefore the Allied troops had departed. After this, the Soviets mobilized the Iranian “Freedom Front,” especially the pro-Communist Tudeh Party, and di¬ rected massive diplomatic attacks against the government of Mohammed Saed. The government was accused of mantaining a pro-Fascist attitude as well as tolerating hostile action against the Soviet reinforcement lines. Street demon¬ strations and attacks by the Iranian left-wing press joined in as well. On Novem¬ ber 9, the Sad government resigned, but the Soviets were unable to reach their aims with the successors either. Hitler must have followed these incidents in Iran with special interest, because here the contrast between the Allies of World War II appeared first and was initially the harshest. On November 6, the date of this meeting, TASS brought up new accusations against the Saed cabinet, while AP expressed the surprise of American government circles regarding the Soviet action, after Imstiia had severely attacked th government of Iran the day be¬ fore.—Source: Kirk.,p. 474; VB of Non 5, 7, 8 and 10, 1944;NZZ of Non 6, 1944 (evenin edition). 15,2 According to the VB of the following day', the report from Tokyo sounded a little more modest. According to this report, a submarine sank an aircraft carrier east of the Philippines during the night of November 3, while on November 5 a Kamikaze special attac corps sank a carrier west of the Philippines and dam¬ aged another one, as w-cll as heavily damaging another carrier cast of the Philipincs. The Kamikaze “death corps”—in English, “divine wind”—were new'Japanese special units of “suicide fighters.” The Kamikaze airmen, understanding the desperate situation of their fatherland, threw themselves with their cargo of bombs onto American ships to tr to turn back the disaster that threatened their country—in a similar manner to the mythological “divine w ind” that was said to have destroyed the invading fleet of Kublai Khan in the Middle Ages. The first non-spontaneous (see above note 215), planned and scheduled sacrifice attack with an undamaged aircraft had been flown by Rear Admiral Arima on October 15, 1944, in the battle over Leyte. This provided the impetus needed to set up the long-discussed units, and, on October 25, the first 10 Kamikazes threw' them¬ selves onto a group of American aircraft carriers; one of them sank, and four were severely damaged. The American leadership was deeply concerned about the Kamikazes.—Source: Ruge: Hntscbeidung,p. 286.

1034

IS33

Hitler asp His Generals

Probably the reference here is to the Republican presidential candidate Dewey (see above note 1135), who, in the last days before the election on November 7, had held several speeches.

1534

On November 5, the prevously latent Finnish governmental crisis had wors¬ ened dangerously as a result of the splitting up of the Social Democratic party in view of the new pro-Soviet direction. The opposition against Tanner had increased, and the Social Democrat Fagerholm and the union leader Wuori threat¬ ened to relinquish their offices as ministers if serious changes in the govern¬ ment did not take place. On November 8, Social Minister Fagerholm and La¬ bor Minister Wuori resigned, after an expansion of the government to the left had failed; on November 11 the whole Castren cabinet resigned. The disband¬ ing of the “Defense Corps,” a militia organization, and the demobilization led to further tensions. Organizations promoting a stronger relationship with the Soviet Union and branches of the Communist Party sprang up everywhere.— Source: NZZ of Nov. 6 (evening edition), Non 9 (evening edition) and Nov. 12, 1944.

1535

The Soviet lTnion had literally at the very last minute refused to participate in the international aviation conference in Chicago, which started on November 1, 1944, even though the Soviet delegation had already reached Canada. The re¬ fusal was based on the participation of Spain, Portugal and Switzerland—none of which had diplomatic relations with the L1SSR, and which had pursued antiSoviet policies for years. In Washington and London this reasoning aroused amusement and surprise, and one guessed that the Russians were trying to main¬ tain the unrestricted sovereignty of their airspace.—Source: NZZ of Nov. 1 (evening edition), Nov. 2 (midday edition), Nov. 3. (evening edition) and Nov. 6 (morning edition); DNB of Nov. 7, 1944; VB of Nov. 8 and Dec. 2f3, 1944.

1536

The conference revealed a discrepancy between the North American and Brit¬ ish interpretations, which was symptomatic of the rising concerns about post¬ war competition between the national economies. While the Knglish argued for an international organization that would have the authority to assign national traffic shares and establish transport taxes, etc., the Americans favored free com¬ petition between the airlines and were only willing to agree to the issuing of international orders regarding technical ejucstions. So instead of a real interna¬ tional flight authority, only a corporation of consultative character would be established. |—| Dietrich worked quickly, and, following Hitler’s directions, had the following DNB report about this “aviation affair” released that same evening: “At the so-called international civil aviation conference currently taking place in Chicago, the Americans made an instructive suggestion reflecting Roosevelt’s goal of extending the U.S.-American predominance into the civil aviation sec¬ tor. This American suggestion calls for the election of an ‘executive aviation committee,’ composed of a number of permanent members, in which only the bigger states are to have seats and again the biggest states are to have a double vote. The Americans regard themselves and the Soviet Union—which is not even represented, as Stalin refused participation—as states that should be given the double vote. The British Commonwealth would not have a joint representa¬ tion, but would be represented by the individual dominions. Now, obviously

Military CokflrjzXchs

1942-1945

1035

based on Hnglish suggestion, the representatives of the South American repub¬ lics have issued a joint statement in which they reject the American suggestion and demand an organization in which every nation would have a seat and an equal vote. The British Reuters office stated that, in view of the joint opposi¬ tion to the U.S. idea by the South American republics, the conference might experience ‘drastic changes.”’—Source: McNeill, p. 514;NZZ of Non 1-6, 1944; DNB of Nov. 6, 1944, No. 65. 153

A number of rumors were circulating in the F.nglish press at that time, claim¬ ing that Hitler had been driven out as head of state—at least de facto—by Himmler. There were various suggestions that Hitler had succumbed to ill¬ ness, nervous breakdown, exhaustion, flight, death or imprisonment.—Source: NZZ of Nov. 14, 1944 (morning edition).

153“ The Ardennes offensive. ]l,v' Transcript number unknown—Fragment No. 28—During the second transcrip¬ tion in May 1945, the stenographer remarked: “In preparation for the Ardennes offensive starting on December 16, 1944, Hitler spoke on December 11 and 12 to about 20-30 senior officers—army leaders, commanding generals, and divi¬ sion commanders with their staff officers. These officers had been called to the ‘Adlerhorst’ headquarters for an introduction to their assignments during the attack. This fragment contains the first part—about half—of the speech held on December 12. Hitler spoke without a script; the machine transcription is only a fragment and was made from the stenographic record with only minor stylistic changes. The stenographers who had been responsible for recording the original meeting deciphered the fragment—very poorly preserved, especially the severely burned upper portion of the pages. The parts in parentheses were added based on the meaning and on 1 litler’s mode of expression.” Hitler had arrived at the “Adlerhorst” command post—fitted out for him in Ziegenberg at Bad Nauheim—with a small operations staff on December 10.—Source: Westpbal, p. 279. 134 A gap of about three lines; the gaps below are generally smaller. mi A speech of a similar kind had preceded this, on December 11 (see above note 1539). 1542 Hitler tries to justify initiating the war (also below on p. 594) and the moment chosen to initiate it. This means admitting responsibility for a preventative war, which was denied at this time in the official propaganda. 11 This memorandum was printed as document 052-L in the “Blaucn Rcihc” [“Blue Series”] Der Process gegen die Hauptkricgsverbmber t or dem Internationakn Militargericbtskcf [The war Crimes Trial before the International Military Tri¬ bunal], vol. XXXVII, pp. 466. It is dated October 9, 1939, and is directed to the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces branches and the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, under the title Denkscbriff und Ricbtlinien Hirer die \uhrung des Krieges ini Western [“Memorandum and Guidelines for the Conduct of War in the West”] I lere I litler had written quite clear-sightedly on page 7: “Time—in this war, as in the course of all historical events—is not a factor that has inherent value in and of itself, but one which has to be evalu-

1036

Hmj:R amd His Generals

ated. In the current situation, under these conditions, time can be seen as an ally of the Western forces rather than an ally of ours.” And further below, on page 16 and following, under the headline, “The Dangers of the German Situation”: “The first danger for Germany is that in a long war, some states might be drawn to the opposite side, cither because of their economic necessity or because spe¬ cial interests have arisen. The second danger is that a long war could alarm states that might in principle wish to join Germany’s side—they might remember the last war and take it as a warning, and therefore refrain from joining us. The third danger in a long war is the difficulty of securing nourishment for the people, based on the restricted food and raw-material base, and getting the means to conduct war. Also, the mental attitude of the people will at least be burdened by it.” 1544

Already in his speech before the Reichstag on September 1, 1939, Ilitler had stated that he had spent “more than 90 billion for the building up of our Armed Forces.” This number is in contrast to the statements of Schwerin-Krosigks, who calculated 60 billion Reichsmark for Armed Forces and armament costs between January 1,1934, and August 1, 1939 (sec above note 862). This figure is validated by all the documents available today. Hitler might have included all costs that contributed to armament even indirectly—such as railway, canal, and street construction, and similar investments—and he probably rounded up to achieve the desired propaganda effect. That Hitler’s statements are not quite correct is evident from the fact that in the time span mentioned, total Reich expenditures were 101.5 billion RM.

1545

The KV I was a heavy tank of 43.5 tons, and the famous T 34 a medium tank of initially 26.3 tons (after 1944 T 34-85 of 30 tons), both armed with a 7.62-cm KwK L/30.5 (T 34-85: 8.5-cm KwK L/53). At first, they dominated everything the German attacking armies could bring up and hindered their mobile warfare. A KV II is unknown; Hitler probably meant the KV I S with the 7.62-cm KwK I./41.5.—Source: Settger-fitterlin, pp. 120 and 240.

1546

Here Hitler is fantasizing freely. Although Britain did start arming in 1936 as a result of the Ethiopian War and the German conscription measures, neither universal conscription nor a two-billion-pound credit was introduced. On the contrary, after one year, on January 6, 1937, the British Minister of Defense, Sir Thomas Inskip, explicitly declared that the government was not thinking—de¬ spite problems with replacements—of introducing universal conscription. The armament credits were 119 million pounds in the fiscal year 1935-36 and 188 million pounds in the fiscal year 1936-37. Not until a white paper was published on February 16,1937, did the government demand 1.5 billion pounds for arma¬ ment purposes, to be spent over the next 5 years. Because 400 million of this sum was to be covered by a loan granted on February 18, this meant an increase in the defense budget of only about 220 million pounds per year over the fol¬ lowing five years. Perhaps Hitler confused pounds and marks, in which case it would be correct that the English defense budget surpassed 2 billion RM in 1936 for the first time.—Source: Keesing Archive 1935-37; Timesfrom Jau. 7, Feb. 17, and Feb. 19, 1937.

Military Conttrlscls 1942-1945

1037

111 In this famous, disastrous term—here supplemented by a strange concept of “territorial armament”—Hitler’s policy of war lies in nine. Today it seems unbe¬ lievable how widely accepted an axiom could have become back then, when— even just considering the unavoidable and significant overlapping of claims—it could only have been valid for a small minority of desperados. 154S Here Hitler was talking about the “war in sight” crisis of 1875, but he confused the facts for his own purposes. It is true that the Prussian General Staff under Moltke had been rattling swords quite heavily and had approved a preventative war because Moltke thought—which later proved to be wrong—that France would not be able to support its armament weight much longer and would have to free itself of it soon through war (the origin of this crisis was a new French Army organization law, which was quite overrated in Germany at this time). But the plans for this preventative war did not foil, as Hitler pretends here, because of the “internal German parliamentary situation,” but because of Bismarck’s dislike for preventative war, at least after 1870—which has been substantiated, even if the chancellor was using the threat of war to further his political chess game at that time. Also, this crisis—in which Bismarck tried to halt the French rearmament program through intimidation and bluffing—was the first time, as a prelude to later alliances, that England and Russia took France’s side.—Source: Ritter:Staatskunst, p. 289: Eyck: Bismarck Ill, p. 149; / hrsfeJd, p. 222;Meyer, A.O., p. 513; Oncken /, p. 145;Jeismann,p. 91. 1549 See above note 154, note 553, and note 821. 1550 See above note 830. ,5>l This is, of course, just the opposite of reality: The allies dropped out when an offensive war was no longer possible. Hitler expanded on this thought in his daily order to the Armed Forces on January 1, which included the following: “If in this immense struggle—which is fought not only for Germany, but for the future of Europe—we have had to bear setbacks, the responsibility does not lie with the German people and its Armed Forces, but with our European allies. From the breakdown of the RomanianTtahan Hungarian front along the Don and the subsequent total dispersal due to sabotage of our joint warfare, to the Italian royalty, to the putsch against the Fascist Italy of the Ducc who was on our side, it is a straight line of betrayal. It has continued with the dreadful ca¬ pitulation of the Finnish state leaders, with the breach of faith by the Romanian King and his circle, with the self-abandonment of Bulgaria, and with the dis¬ graceful conduct of the former Hungarian State Administrator. These betrayals had serious effects on the political and military warfare.”—Source: I 'B of Jan. 2, 1945. This passage is not clear, as there are no known memoranda or files from the year 1917 to which Hitler’s statements could apply. Perhaps he is referring to the peace resolution of the majority parties, which demanded a compromise peace and the explicit renunciation of annexations; the Reichstag accepted the resolu¬ tion on July 19, 1917 by a margin of 212 votes to 126. llis1 Compare above on p. 477 the completely opposite statements Hitler made to a smaller circle.

103,S

Hmj R asd His Generals

"'4 The decision to take offensive action in the West had developed in Hitler’s mind as early as during the Polish campaign, where the extent of German military successes brought up this possibility in answer to the unexpected entry of the Western forces into the war. Hitler’s ideas had met with immense resistance, especially among Army General Staff. The resistance was based on various rea¬ sons: a general reluctance to engage in war, concerns about violating the neutral¬ ity of Belgium and the Netherlands, objections against the winter date initially suggested by Hitler, and other issues. The decisive factor was undoubtedly the fact that the leaders of the Army High Command obviously did not have the necessary strategic genius, which was soon found in Hitler and the Chief of General Staff of Army Group “A,” Lieutenant General v. Manstcin. Only later did the General Staff accept the plan for the attack internally and then—apart from the usual exactness of the composition—expanded the plan significantly [check this whole note...]. (See also below note 1601.)—Source:Jacobsen:hallGelb, passim, especiallyp. 145. 1533 Regarding these statements by Hider, see below- p. 566 and note 1605. 1556 In the European and North African theater, American deaths totaled 174,000 in World War II. Even if Hitler here—as w-as common practice—used the term “losses” to include wounded and imprisoned as well as deaths, his number seems very high for a period of only three w-eeks. 153 Transcript number unknown—Fragment No 41—The stenographer made the follow-ing introductory remark during the second transcription in May 1945: “This was a meeting that took place in preparation for the last German offen¬ sive in lower Alsace and the Saar, with the Commandcr-in-Chief of Army Group “G” and the Commander-in-Chief West. Following almost directly after this meeting was Hitler’s speech to the participating division commanders, etc. (see fragment No. 27). The upper half of the typed fragment of the individual pages is almost totally burned.” IU SS Obergruppenfuhrer Felix Steiner did not carry out Hitler’s order to inter¬ vene in the Battle of Berlin with “Group Steiner.” 21,14 General Walther von Seydlitz was vice president of the Communist “National Committee fora Free Germany” [Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland] estab¬ lished by the Soviets in July 1943 in the Krasnogorsk prison camp. In March 1945 Colonel General Heinrich von Vietinghoff was made Commander-in-Chief Southwest, succeeding Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. 2I,|

2«»2i»

21121

1942-1945

1127

Field Marshal General Ferdinand Schdrncr was, since January 1945, Commandcrin-Chief of Army Group Center, fighung in Czechoslovakia, lieutenant General Rudolf I lolstc was, as of April 20,1945, Commanding Gen¬ eral of the XXXXIX Army Corps. Alfred Hugenberg was leader of the extreme right German National Peoples’ Party [Dcutschnationalcn Volkspartci], and belonged to Flitler’s government as Reich Economic Minister from January to June 1933. General Schleicher was Hitler’s predecessor as Reich Chancellor, from December 1932 to January 1933. Field Marshal General Werner von Blomherg was Reich War Minister from 1933 to 1938.

Bibliography

Aaltonen, B.X., Das fmnischc FreiwilligenbataiUon derWaffen-SS, in: Waffenbruder Finnland. Bin Buch die deutschen Soldaten in Filmland, hrsg Von Hptm. Dr. Ruppert, Leipzig u. Berlin 1942, S. 113f. Abetz, Otto, Das offene Problem, Koln 1951 Abshagen, Karl Heinz, Canaris. Patriot und Weltbiirger, 9.-11. Tsd., Stuttgart 1950 Alfieri, Dino, Deux dictatcurs face a face, Paris 194H v. Altcn, Georg, Handbuch fur Hccr und Flottc, Bd. 9, Berlin 1912 Anfuso, Filippo, Roma-Bcrlino-Salo, o.O. 1950 Anfuso, Filippo, Rom-Berlin im diplomatischen Spiegel, Miinchen 1951 Arntz, Prof. Dr. I lelmut. Die Menschenverluste der Beiden Weltkriege, in: Universitas, 8 Jg (1953), S. 703fF. Aron, Robert, I listoire de Vichy 1940-1944, Paris 1954 Assmann, Kurt, Deutsche Schicksalsjahre, Wiesbaden 1950 Badoglio, Pietro, Italien im 2. Weltkrieg, Miinchen 1947 (L’ltalia nella seconda guerra mondiale] Bartz, Karl, Als der Ilimmcl branntc, Hannover 1955 Bauer, Firnest, Italien und Kroaden 1938-1945, in: Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, 26,Jg. (1955), S. 112ff. Baum bach, Werner, Zu spat? Miinchen 1949 Baumonr, Maurice, Gloines et tragedies de la I IF Republique, Paris 1956 Das Bayernbuch vom Weltkriege 1914-1918, 2 Bde., Stuttgart 1930 Bechtoldt, Heinrich, Moskau und die Meerengen, in: Aussenpolitik, 4. Jg. (1953), S. 786ff. Beck, Ludwig, Studien, hrsg. Von Hans Speidel, Stuttgart 1930 de Belot, Ravmond,The Struggle for the Mediterranean 1939-1945, Princeton 1951 Benoist-Mechin, J., Geschichtc des Deutschen Heeres seit dem Waffenstillstand, Berlin 1939 [Histoire de l’armce allemande] Berber, Fritz, Das Diktat von Versailles, Fissen 1939 Berger, Gottlob, Zum Ausbau derWaffen-SS, in: Nation Europa, 3.Jg. (1953), I left 4, S. 55f. Bertram, Hptm., Das Regiment General Goring, in: |ahrbuch der deutschen Luftwaffe 1940, Leipzig 1940, S. 133ff. v. Bcthmann Hollweg, Th., Bctrachtungcn zum Weltkrieg, 2 Tic., Berlin 1919 u. 1921 Beyer, Hans, Der Plan cincr Balkaninvasion, in: Siidostdcutschc Hcimatbliittcr, 4. Jg. (1955), Heft 3 Bilanz des Zwcitcn Weltkrieges, Oldenburg u. I lamburg 1953 Blahut, Theodor, Die Entwicklung des Rassengedankens im Faschismus, in: ItalienJahrbuch 1938, Essen 1939. S. 232ff. Bley, Dr. Curt, Gcheimnis Radar, Hamburg 1949

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v. Bluchcr, Wipcrt, Gcsandtcr zwischcn Diktatur und Dcmokratic, Wiesbaden 1951 Blumcntrict, Gunther, von Rundstedt, London 1952 Bohn, Helmut, Hie patriotische Karte der sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik, in: OstProbleme, 7. Jg (1955), p. 1446ff. Bor-Komotowski, T., The Secret Army, New York 1951 Bossi Fedrigotti, Anto Graf, Bersaglieri paradieren im Laufschritt,in: Der Frontsoldat erzahlt, 19. Jg (1955), Nr. 10 Bracher, Karl Dietrich, Die Auflosung der Weimarer Republik, 2. Aufl., Stuffgart u. Dusscldorf 1957 Brcnncckc, Jochcn, Schlachtachiff “Tirpitz.” Das Drama der “Einsamcn Konigin des Nordena,” Hamm 1953 Bretholz, Wolfgang, Ich sah sie stiirzen, Mnchen 1955 Bretton Henry L., Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles, Stanford 1953 Brickhill, Paul, The Dam Busters, London 1951 Brtigel, ). W., Vor zehn Jahren in der Slowakei, in: Die Zukunft, |g 1954, S. 253w. Buchner, Alex, AngritT iiber einen Fluss, in: Wehrkunde, 4. Jg. (1955), S. 372t'f. Die Biiste der Konigin Nofretete, Berlin 1954 Bullock, Alan, Hitler. A Study in Tyranny, London 1952 Busch, Harald, So war dcr U-Boot-Kricg, Bielefeld 1952 Byrnes, J. F., In allcr Offenhcit, Frankfurt/M. o. J. Chevalier, A., Die deutschen meteorologischen Unternehmungen in der Arktis wahrend des Kricges 1939-1945, in: Marine-Rundschau, 50. |g. (1953), S. 97ff. (iibernommen aus: I.a Revue Maritime Nr. 78, Oktober 1952, S. 1235) Churchill, Winston Spencer, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 6 Bde., Bern 1949-1954 Ciano, Galeazzo, Diario, 2 Bde., o.O. 1946 Ciano, Galeazzo Graf, Tagebiicher 1939-1943, 2. Aufl., Bern 1947 Cilibrizzi, Saverio, Pietm Badoglio. Rispetto a Mussolini e di fronte alia storia, Napoli o.J. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945 (Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers), Washington 1955 Conradis, Heinz, Nerven, Harz und Rechenschieber, Gottingen 1955 v. Conrady, D.H.D., Die Kriegsmarine im Schwarzen Meer 1941 bis 1944, in: Ma¬ rine-Rundschau, 53. Jg. (1956), S. 67ff. v. Conrady, Heinz Detrich, Quer durch Fiuropa. Die Geschichte zweier Uberfuhrungen, in: Marine-Rundschau, 54. Jg (1957), S. 60ff. Court, W.H.B., Coal (History of the Second World War), London 1951 Crankshaw, Edward, Gestapo, London 1956 Dallin, Alexander, German Rule in Russia 1941-1945. A Study of Occupation Poli¬ cies, London 1957 Deane, John R., Ein seltsames Biindnis, Wien 1946 Dcdijcr, Vladimir, Tito, Berlin 1953 Dcgcncrs Wcr ist’s? 1935 Denzel, E., Die 21. LW-Feld division (Adler-Division) und lhr Weg, in: Luftwaffenring, Jg, 1957, H. 9 und folgende

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Das deutsche Fuhrerlexikon 1934/35, Berlin 1934 Das deutsche Heer 1939, hrsg. von H. H. Podzun, Bad Nauheim 1953 Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945, Berlin 1954 Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP. Bearbeitet von der SS-Personalkanzlei, Berlin 1934, 1936, 1938, 1942, 1944 Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, hrsg. von E. L. Woodward und Rohan Butler, 3. Serie Bd. VII, London 1954 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D (1937-1945), Vol. VIII: The War Years, Washington 1945 Dornberger, Dr. Walter, V2 — Der Schuss ins Weltall, Esslingen 1952 Einsiedel, Heinrich, Graf, Tagebuch einer Versuchung, Stuttgart 1950 Eisenhower, Dwight D, Kreuzzug in Europa, Amsterdam 1948 Elser, Gerhard, Die Bewaffnung der Deutschen Infanterie 1939-1945, in: Feldgrau, 4.Jg (1956) Erfurth, Waldemar, Der finnische Krieg 1941-1944, Wiesbaden 1950 Erfurth, Waldemar, Die Geschichte des deutschen Generalstabs von 1918 bis 1945, Gottingen 1957 v. Esebeck, Hanns Gert, Afrikanische Schicksalsjahre, Wiesbaden 1949 Ewald, Gustav, Die Schaffung des Lufdagebildes, in: Luftwaffenring, 2. Jg (1953) Eyck, Erich, Bismarck, 3 Bde., Erlenbach u. Zurich 1941/44 Eyck, Erich, Das personliche Regiment Wilhelms II., Erlenbach u. Zurich 1948 Fabre-Luce, Alfred, Une tragedie royale. L'affaire Leopold III., Paris 1948 Feis, Herbert, The Road to Pearl Harbor, Princeton (New Jersey) 1950 Feuchter, Georg W, Geschichte des Luftkriegs, Bonn 1954 Fischer, George, Soviet Opposition to Stalin, Cambridge (Mass.) 1952 Flicke, W. E, Die Rote Kapelle, Hilden 1949 Foerster, Wolfgang, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck. Sein Kampf gegen den Krieg, Miinchen 1953 Fotitch , Constanrin, The War We Lost, New York 1948 Franssen, Theo. La bataille d' Anvers, Antwerpen 1945 Frantis, Dr. Kurt, Der Aufstand von Banska Bystrica, in: Der europaische Osten, Jg. 1954/55 Freksa, Friedrich, Kapitan Erhardt, Berlin 1924 Friessner, Hans, Verratene Schlachten. Die Tragodie der deutschen Wehrmacht in Rumanien und Ungarn, Hamburgl956 Fuller, J.F.C., Der zweite Weltkrieg 1939-1945, Wien 1950 Galai, N., Geschichte der sowjetischen Panzerwaffe, in: Ost-Probleme, 7. Jg. (1955) Galland, Adolf, Die Ersten und die Letzten, Darmstadt 1953 Gebirgsjager, Die 1. Gebirgsdivision 1935-1945, Bad Nauheim 1954 The German Replacement Army (Ersatzheer) February 1945, hrsg. von der Militery Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington (1945) Die Geschichte des Panzerregiments 2, Kleve 1953

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1131

Feschichte der Ritter des Onlens “pour le mcrite” im Weltkrieg, 2 Bde., hrsg. von Hans Moller, Berlin 1935 Gilbert, Felix, Hitler Directs His War, New York 1950 Girard, Louis-Dominiquc, Montoire—Verdun diplomatique, Paris 1948 Gisevius, I Ians Bernd, Bis zum bittern Ende, 2. Bd.: Vom Munchner Abkommen zum 20. Juli 1944, 2. Aufl., Zurich 1946 Goebbels, Joseph, Vom kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, 38. Aufl., Miinchen 1942 Goebbels-Tagebiicher, als z.T. ungeddrucktes Manuskript im Archiv If/ Gorlitz, Walter, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 2 Gde., Stuttgart 1951 Gbrlitz, Walter und Herbert A. Quint, Adolf Hitler, Stuttgart 1951 Gollwitzer, Helmut, Und Fiihren, wohin Du nicht willst, Miinchen 1951 Goudima, Robert, L’Armee Rouge dans la paix et la guerre, Paris 1947 Grams, Rold, Die 14. Panzer-Division 1940-1945, Bad Nauheim 1957 Greiner, I lelmuth. Die Oberste Wehrmachtfuhrung 1939-1943, Wiesbaden 1951 Groner, Krich, Die Schiffe der deutschen kriegsmarine und Luftwaffe 1939-45 und ihr Verbleib, Miinchen 1954 Der Grossdeutsche Reichstag, IV Wahlperiode, Berlin 1938, 1943 Guderian, Heinz, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, Heidelberg 1951 Guderian, Heinz, Panzer—Marsch! Miinchen 1956 Hadeler, Wilhelm un Erich Groner, “Yamato” und “Musashi” der japanischcn Ma¬ rine, die grossten Schlachtschiffe der Welt, in: Marine-Rundschau, 52. Jg. (1955), S. 71 ff. Hagcdorn, H., Americans, New’ York 1946 Hagen, Walter, Die Geheime Front, Linz u. Wien 1950 Hagen, Walter, Untemehmen Bernhard, Weis 1955 Hahn, Assi, Ich spreche die Wahrheit, Esslingen 1951 Haupt, Werner, Die Flieger der “Esquadron Azul,” in: Der deutsche Soldat, 22. Jg. (1958), S. 152 Hausser, Paul, Waffen-SS im Einsatz, Gottingen 1953 Hayn, Friedrich, Die Invasion. Von Cotentin bis Falaise, Heidelberg 1954 Hcbrard, }., Vingt-cinq annccs deviation militairc, Bd. II, Paris 1947 Hcidkampcr, Otto, Witcbsk. kampf und Untcrgang der 3. Panzerarmcc, Heidel¬ berg 1954 Heilmann, Will, Gebt uns endlich die Me 262! in: Der Frontsoldat erzahlt, 19. Jg. (1955), S. 184f. Heilmann, Will, “Bodenplatte” kostete das Riickgrat, in: Der Frontsoldat erzahlt, 19. |g. (1955), S. 2Iff. Heilmann, Will, Rakere mit 10000 Stundenkilometern, in: Der Frontsoldat erzahlt, 19, Jg (1955), S. 298ft'. Herhudt v. Rohden, Hans-Detlef, Die Luftwaffe ringt urn Stalingrad, Wiesbaden 1950 Herzfeld, Hans, Die moderne Welt, Teil I, Braunschweig o. J. Ilevdel, Hugo, Der englische Handstreich auf St. Nazaire, in: Marine-Rundschau, 50. Jg (1953), S. 45ff.

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J. Heydel, Hugo, Der englische Handstreich auf St. Nazaire, in: Marine-Rundschau, 50. Jg. (1953) Hillgruber, Andreas, Hitler, Konig Carol und Marschall Antonescu, Wiesbaden 1 954 Hinsley, F. H., Hitler's Strategy, Cambridge 1951 Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, 145.-146. Aufl., Miinchen 1935 Hitler's Europe (Survey of International Affairs 1 939/ 46), hrsg. von Arnold Toynbee, Oxford 1954 Hitler’s Tischgesprache, hrsg. von Henry Picker, Bonn 1951 Hoare, Sir Samuel, Gesandter in besonderer Mission, Hamburg 1949 Holter, H., Die Probleme des deutsch-finnishcen Koalitionskampfes, in: Wehrkunde, 2-Jg (1953) Hofer, Walther, Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Welfkriegs, Stuttgart 1954 Hoffmann, Karl Otto, Das Geheimnis Radar, in: Der Frontsoldat erzahlt, 18. Jg. (1954) Horn, Walter, Finnland, Russland und Deutschland, in: AuEenpolitik, 5. Jg. (1954) v. Horthy, Nikolaus, Ein Leben fur Ungarn, Bonn 1963 v. Hove, Alkmar, Achtung Fallschirmjager! Leoni 1954 Hurstfield, J., The Control of Raw Materials (History of the Second World War), London 1953 Huyssen, Hans, Wie starb Generalfeldmarschall Model? in: Der Frontsoldat erzahlt, 16. Jg. (1952) The Initial Triumph of the Axis (Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946), hrsg. von Arnold und Veronica M. Toynbee, Oxford 1958 Internationales biographisches Archiv (Munzinger-Archiv), Ravensburg Italien-Jahrbuch 1938, Essen 1939 Italien-Jahrbuch 1939, Essen 1940 Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf, Fall Gelb. Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1940 ( Veroffentlichungen des Instituts fur europaische Geschichte Mainz, Bd. 16), Wiesbaden 1957 Jacobsen,

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Lazitch, Branko, La tragedie du general Draja Mihailovitch, o. O. 1946 Leber, Annedore, Das Gewissen entscheidet, Berlin u. Frankfurt/Main 1957 Lee, Asher, The Soviet Air Force, London 1950 Leeb, Emil, Aus der Riistung des Dritten Reiches (Oas Hecreswaffenamt 1938-1945) (Beih. 4, Wehrtechnische Monatshefte), Frankfurt, Mai 1958 Liddell Hart, B. H., The German Generals Talk, New York 1948 Lochner, Louis P., Goebbels Tagebiicher, Zurich 1948 Lodewyckx,

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Poll, Bernhard, Das Schicksal Aachens im Herbst 1944, Aachen 1955 Postan, M. M., British War Production (History of the Second World War), London 1952 Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Mili- targerichtshof Niirnberg, 14. November 1945- 1. Oktober 1946 (Blaue Reihe),42 Bde., Nurnberg 1949 v. Puttkamer, Jesco, Irrtum und Schuld, Neuwied 1948 Rangliste des deutschen Heeres 1944/45, hrsg. von Wolf Keilig, Bad Nauheim 1955 The Realignment of Europe (Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946), hrsg. von Arnold und Veronica M. Toynbee, Oxford 1955 Reichstags-Handbuch, Berlin 1920 (I. Wahlperiode),

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MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

1137

Rudel, Hans-L'lrich,Trotzdem, Waiblingcn/Wttbg. O.J. Ruge, Friedrich, Entscheidung im Pazifik, Hamburg 1951 Ruge, Friedrich, Der Seekrieg 19391945, Stuttgart 1954 Rumpf, Hans, Der hochrote Hahn, Darmstadt 1952 v. Salomon, Ernst Das Buch vom deutschen Freikorpskampfer, Berlin 1938 Sava, George, The Cetniks, London o. J. Schellong, Conrad, Langemarck, in: Nation Europa, 5. Jg (1955) Schellong, Conrad, Langemarck, in: Wiking-Ruf, 3. Jg. (1954) Schirmer, Friedrich, Die deutsche Artillerie 1939-1945, in: Feldgrau, 6. Jg. (1958) v. Schlabrendorff, Fabian, Offiziere gegen Hitler, 3. Aufl., Zurich o. J. v. Schmidt-Pauli Edgar, Geschichte der Freikorps 1918-1924, Stuttgart 1936 Schmidt-Richberg, Erich, Der Endkampf auf dem Balkan. Die Operationen der Heeresgruppe Evon Griechenland bis zu den Alpen, Heidelberg 1955 Schneider, Erich, Technik und Waffenentwicklungim Kriege, in: Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Oldenburg u. Hamburg 1953 Schramm, Percy Ernst, Die Treibstoff-Frage vom Herbst 1943 bis Juni 1944, in: Mensch un Staat in Recht und Geschichte Festschrift fur Herbert Kraus, Kitzingen 1954 Schramm, Wilhelm Ritter von, Der 20. Juli in Paris Worishofen 1953 Schroter, Heinz, Stalingrad, Osnabriick o. J. Schulthess' Europaischer Geschichtskalender, Miinchen Schwendemann, Karl, Versailles nach 15 Jahren, Berlin 1935 Schwerin v. Krosigk, Lutz Graf, Wie wurde der Zweite Weltkrieg finanziert? in: Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Oldenburg u. Hamburg 1953 v. Seemen, Gerhard, Die Ritterkreuztrager 1939-45, Bad Naueheim 1955 v. Senger und Etterlin, Dr. F., Taschenbuch der Panzer 1943-1954, Miinchen 1954 v. Senger und Etterlin, Dr. F. M., Die Entwicklung des Schiitzenpanzerwagens, in: Wehrkunde, 3.Jg (1954) Seraphim, Hans-Giinther, "Felix" und "Isabella," in: Die Welt als Geschichte, 15. Jg. (1955) Seton-Watson, Hugh, The East-European Revolution, London 1950 Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins, New York 1950 Shulman, Milton, Die Niederlage im Westen, Giitersloh 1949 v. Siegler, Fritz Frhr., Die hoheren Dienststellen der deutschen Wehrmacht 1933-1945, Miinchen 1953 Skorzeny, Otto, Geheimkommando Skorzeny, Hamburg 1950 Die Sondereinheiten in der friiheren deutschen Wehrmacht, Kornelimiinster 1952 Speidel, Hans, Invasion 1944, Tubingen u. Stuttgart o. J. Stacey, C. P., Six Years of War, Ottawa 1955 Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich, 59. Jg. 1941/42 u. a., hrsg. vom Staristischen Reichsamt, Berlin 1942 Stegemann, Hermann, Geschichte des Krieges, Bd. IV, Stuttgart u. Berlin 1921 Steiner, Felix, Die Freiwilligen. Idee und Opfergang, Gottingen 1958 Stettinius Jr., Edward R., Roosevelt and the Russians, New York 1949

1138

HITLER AND HIS GENERALS

St. George Saunders, Hilary, The Fight is Won (Royal Air Force 1939-1945, vol. Ill) Strohle, Albert, Von Versailles bis zur Gegenwart, Berlin 1928 Tansill, Charles Callan, Die Hintertiir zum Kriege, 3. Aufl, Diisseldorf 1957 Teske, Hermann, Die silbernen Spiegel, Heidelberg 1952 Thorwald, Jiigen, Es began an der Weichsel Stuttgart 1950 Thorwald, Jiigen, Das Ende an der Elbe, Stuttgart 1950 Thorwald, Jiigen, Wen sie verderben wollen, Stuttgart 1952 v. Tippelskirch, Kurt, Geschichte des zweiten Weltkriegs, Bonn 1951 Togo, Shigenori, Japan im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Erinnerungen des japanischen Aussenministers 1941-42 und 1945, Bonn 1958 Trevor-Roper, H. R., Hitlers letzte Tage, Zurich 1946 Trevor-Roper, Hugh, Hitler und Franco, in: Der Monat, 5. Jg (1953) Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, 15 Bde. (Grime Reihe), Washington o. J. Trizzino, Antonino, Die verratene Flotte. Tragodie der Afrikakampfer, Bonn 1957 Ustascha-Bewegung, Zagreb 1943 Vansittart. Lord, The Mist Procession, London 1958 Vanwelkenhuyzen, Jan, Die Krise vom Januar 1940, in: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 5.Jg. (1955) Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevolkerung aus den Gebieten ostlich der Oder-Neisse (Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa, Bd. 1/1), hrsg. von Theodor Schieder, Gross-Denkte o. J. Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevolkerung aus Tschechoslowakei (dass. Bd. IV/1), Bonn 1957 Von der Panzerattrappe zum Patton-Panzer, in: Der Frontsoldat erzahlt, 17. Jg. (1953) v. Vormann, Nikolaus, Tscherkassy, Heidelberg 1954 Wagenfuhr, Horst, Italien, Leipzig 1943 Wagner, Fritz, Geschichte und Zeitgeschichte. Pearl Harbor im Kreuzfeuer der Forschung, in: Historische Zeitschrift, Bd. 183 (1957) Waite, Robert G. L., Vanguard of Nazism, Cambridge (Mass.) 1952 Weidermann, Alfred Der rechte Mann am rechten Platz, in: Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Oldenburg u. Hamburg 1953 Weisenborn, Gunther, Der laudose Aufstand, Hamburg 1953 v. Weitershausen, Die Verteidigung und Raumung von Sewastopol im Mai 1944, in: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 4 Jg. (1954) v. Weizsacker, Ernst Erinnerungen, Munchen 1950 Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918, Bd. 10: Die Operation des Jahres 1916, Berlin 1936 Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918, Bd. 14: Die Kriegfuhrung an der Westfront im Jahre 1918, hrsg. von der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Forschungsanstalt des Heeres (Bundesarchiv), Berlin 1944 (Koblenz 1956) Wer leitet? Die Manner der Wirtschaft und der einschlagigen Verwaltung 1940, Berlin 1940 West, Rebecca, The Meaning of Treason, New York 1947 Westphal, Siegfried, Heer in Fesseln, Bonn 1950 Wheeler-Bennett, John W., Die Nemesis der Macht, Dusseldorf 1954 Who is Who 1950, London 1950 Who's Who in Germany and Austria, London (1945) Wiener, Fritz, Die deutsche Panzertruppe 1939-1945, in: Feldgrau, 5. Jg. (1957) Wiener, Fritz, Die Typen-Numerierung der Kraftfahzeuge der Deutschen Wehrmacht 19351945, in: Feldgrau, 6. Jg. (1958), Wilmot, Chester, The Struggle for Europe, London 1952 Wilmot, Chester, Der Kampf um Europa, Frankfurt/M. 1954

MlLTIARY CoNFIzRIiiXCES 1942-1945

1139

Winzer, Otto, 12 Jahre Kampf gegen Faschismus und Krieg, Berlin 1955 Wiskemann, Elizabeth, The Rome-Berlin Axis, New York, London 1949 Wood house, C. M., Apple of Discord. London 1948 Wuorinen, John H., Finland and World War 11 1939-1945, New York 1948 Yuorichitch, Evguenive, Le process Tito—Mihailovitch, Paris 1950 Zantke, Siegfried, Wir halfcn Kowel durchhalten, in: Dcr Frontsoldat crzahlt, 18. Jg. (1954), S. 54f. Zeller, Eberhard, Geist der Freiheit, 3.Aufl., Miinchen 1956 Ziemssen, Dietrich, Der Malmedy-Prozess, Brackenheim 1952 (z. T. abgedruckt bci: Hausser, Paul, Waffcn-SS im Einsatz, Gottingen 1953, S. 247ft.) Zilliacus, K., Tito of Yugoslavia, London 1952 Zoller, Albert, 1 litler privat, Diisscldorf 1949

Index

A

Arrese, Jose Luis de

Aaltonen, B. X. 1025, L128

Arntz, Helmut 1089, 1128

Abetz, Otto 458, 770, 797, 979-80, H2S, I lb I

Aron, Robert 797,1031,1128 Asensio Carlos [Franco’s War Minister]

Abraham, Erich 9, 40, 766

8L5

961

Abshagcn, Karl I Icinz 882, 974,1128 Absolon, Rudolf 756

Assmann, I Icinz 300-01,401,411-13, 425,428-29,619,653-54,687-89,

Adalberto di Savoia, Duke of Bergamo 175-76, 862-63

744

Adam, Wilhelm 800

Assmann, Kurt 890, 912-13, 969,971, 1128

Adler, G. 858 Ahlfen, I Ians von 1102

Auchinleck, Claude 811 Axmann, Arthur 727, 734

Ahr\ von xxix Albrecht, Eric 761

Axthclm, Walthcr von 756, 789

Alexander, Sir Harold 522, 966,1021 —

B

022

Bach-Zelewski, I irich von dem 17,678,

Alexander I [Emperor of Russia] iii

773-74,993,1105-106

Alexander I [King of Yugoslavia] 910

Backe, Herbert 158-59,855

Alexandra, Princess of Greece 928

Badoglio, Pietro 20L 203-04, 206-07,

Alfieri, Dino 826.1128

213-14, 218, 234, 240-41, 252,

Allen, George R.

266, 802, 826, 838, 842-43, 862,

iv, ix, xi, xxiii-xxv,

760-61

874, 878, 88L 887, 894, 952-53, 1128-129

Altcn, Georg 979, 1128 Ambrosio, Vittorio 103, 826, 875,881, 885

Balbo, ltalo 788 Balck, Hermann 623.988,1068,1074075

Amery, John 859 Amery, Leopold Stennert 859

Baldwin, Hannson 1096

Amsbcrg, Erik von 444,492, 499,505.

Balfour, Arthur James

840

740 Anfuso, Filippo 802,829.842-43,845,

Bartz, Karl 807,923. 1069-072, 1120, 1128

851,862, 875, 886, 888, 910, 931,

Basso, Antonio 864—65

1128

Bastianini, Giuseppe 138, 841

Angelis, Maximilian de 685-86,1111—

112

Bastico, Ettorc 770,845

Antonescu, Ion xiv, 44, 310, 781, 830,

Battenberg, Ludwig von 906 Bauer, Ernest 910, 1128

917, 935,937, 939, 991,1132 Arima, Masafumi 1033

Baumbach, Werner 806—07,849, 867— 68, 870, 891, 900, 905, 921, 923,

Arlt, Fritz Rudolf 896

923,1007.1017,1069-072,1115.

Arnim, Hans-Jurgcn von 770, 815

1125, 1128

1140

AllLHARY CoKFkRhXCES 1942-1945

Bailment, Maurice 773, 1128 Baur, Hans 189, 872

1141

Bliicher, Wipert 502,903,1003,1010Dll, 1122

Bechtoldt, Heinrich 1021,1128 Beck, Ludvig 458-59,581.588.936.977. 980, 988,1059, 1063, 1128, 113Q Becker, Karl 60,129

Blume, Walter 756 Blumentritt, Gunther

467, 756, 884,

976, 985, 987-89, 1129 Boden, Friedrich 1027,1101 Bodcnschatz, Karl 5, 14,22, 32, 144,

Becker, SybiUe 758 Behrends, Hermann 494, 1004 Beisswanger, 11 ugo 756 Belot, Raymond de 788, 863, 865,888, 910,953, 1128 Below, Nicolaus von 63, 70, 267,282,

149-51, 153, 205-07, 209, 211, 216-17, 269, 750 Boehm-Tettelhach, Karl 744 Bogomoloff, Alexander 928 Bohme, Hermann 756

618, 647, 649, 652, 672, 694-95,

Bohn, Helmut 1092,1122 Boldt, Gerhard 760

697-99,703,705-10,716, 727,729,

Bona Margherita, Princess of Bergamo

135,738,240,754, 797,822,1122

863 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich 974

Bcntiecke, Gotz 746,277, 983,986-88 Benoisr-MechinJ. 1100,1128

Bonin, Bogislaw von 746

Berber, Fritz 876,1128

Bor-Komorowski, Tadeusz 993, 1129

Berg, Karl

Borchardt, Ludwig 962

744

Bergamini, Alberto

888

Bctger, Gottlob 756,784,951,992,1025,

Borghese, Prince Valerio Borgmann, Heinrich

888

332, 346, 348,

351-52, 354-55, 364, 375, 387,

1128 Berger, Heinrich xvi-xvii, xxiv, xxvi, 795 Berlin, Wilhelm 471, 586,992,1061

401, 432, 437, 596, 667, 697, 712, 714-15, 739, 946

Bernard!, Tullio 838 Berndt, Alfred Ingemar 156, 853

Boris III [Bulgarian Tsar] 830,862,907, 991

Bertram, Hptm. 789, 11 28

Bormann, Albert 1016

Besson, Waldcmar 945-46

Bormann, Gcrda 947

Best, Werner 300,330, 9.11-12

Bormann,Martin xiv-xvii,xx, xxii, 386, 387, 388, 392-96, 398, 514, 612,

Bethmann-Hollweg , Theobald von 157,

754, 854, 879, 934, 245, 946, 947,

854,1128 Beyer, Mans 791, 1128

983, 984, 1016, 1072,1077, 1110,

Biroli, Pirzio 129, 835, 842 Bismarck, Otto von 534, 986, 1037,

1122

1092, 1114, 1130, 1134

Bor ton, Hugh 1132 Bose, Subhas Chandra 712, 1123

Blahut, Theodor 828, 1 128

Bossi, Ferdigotti 815,1122

Blaskowitz, Johannes

Bottai, Giuseppe 878

221, 481, 487,

543-46,548-49,552,644-46,763, 883-84, 969, 1007, 1089-091

Bovensiepen, Otto 911 Brachcr, Karl Dietrich 1101, 1129

Bley, Curt 720,867,870,890,913,915, 1128

Bradley, Omar 1008,1030 Brandcnbcrgcr, Erich 7,764

Blomberg, Werner von 7 36,999, 1127

Brauchitsch, Bcmd von xxxiii, 596,618,

Bliicher von Wahlstatt, Gcbhard 655, 1025, 1049

749 Braun, Eva 738

1142

Urn j ,r and His Generals

Brauer, Bruno 132, 837 Breith, Hermann 593,638, 1064, 1088 Brennecke, Jochen 1027,1129 Bretholz, Wolfgang 991, 1002, 1129 Bretton Henry L. 876,1129 Brickhill, Paul 835, 1027, 1073, 1122, 1129 Briigel, J. W. 1129 Brooke, Alan 924 Brudcrmullcr, Hermann 697-99, 700, 705,710-11,714-15,?42 Briigel J. W. 992,1129 Briiller, Captain 865 Buchholz, I leinz xi, xvi, xx, xxii, xxiv— xxv Buchner, Alex 1046,1129 Buchs, 1 lerbert 293, 302-04, 3H, 322, 326, 331, 401, 406, 414, 421-22, 430-31, 437, 441, 444, 469, 47677,492,495-96,500-02,504,507. 513-18,596,605,618,639-40,654, 689-91,694-95,743, 1 < 184-085 Buffarini-G uidi, Guido 195—96,874—75 Buhle, Walter xii, U, 17-19,32, 38-9, 51, 64, 68, 89, 103, 119-21, 12332,144-45,173-74,178-79,193— 95,201,203-06,208-09,218,226, 240, 249-51, 269, 278, 280, 28284, 287-88,292-93, 295-96, 302, 310,315-17,319-22,437,440,442, 469, 481, 486-87, 492, 495-96, 498-500, 505, 507, 330, 534-35, 571-72,574,576-79,581-83,587, 596, 599, 610, 618, 626, 637-38, 651-52, 692-93, 707, 714, 744, 756, 768, 774, 906, 923, 926, 947, 972.1001.1032 Bulanov [Russian collaborator] 927 Bullock, Alan 759, 981-82, 987, 1129 Buniatshchenko, Seigei 1085 Burgdorf, Wilhelm xxix, 469.492.499. 597, 618, 636, 650, 655-57, 659-

715-18,739,748,787,1099,1103104,1106 Burmeistcr, Arnold 568. 570,1050 Busch, Ernst 288-89, 292, 325, 372, 790, 800, 894-95, 907,986 Busch, Harald 890,913, 916, 1129 Busse, Theodor 405,720,72". "29-30, 733,735, 948,1121 Buttlar-Brandefels, Horst von, Baron Trcusch 401,743,851 Byrnes, J. F. 1044,1129

60, 662-65, 667-68, 672-73, 675, 678, 680-82, 697, 703, 705-11,

933-34,942,952-53,1009,1020021, 1042-044, U29

C Canaris, Wilhelm 815, 882, 949, 973— 74,1031,1128 Cartellieri, Wolfgang 756 Cass, Frank 902 Catlos, Ferdinand 992 Cavaliero, Ugo 63, 802, 826, 845 Charlemagne [King of the Franks| 1108 Chemiakhovsky, Ivan 1065 Chevalier, A. 1097,1129 Chcvallcric, Botho von 7 Chevallerie, I lelmuth von der 7 Chcvallcric, Kurt von der 7, 41,763 Chiang Kai-shek 852—53 Chiappe,Jean 772 Christ, Torsten 756 Christian, Eckhard 27, 29, 41, 51, 53-5, 63, 67, 72, 78-82, 93, 95-9, 106, 114-16, 144, 149-53, 180-81, 184-90,202,205,208-09,211-15, 235,237-38,246-47,271-75,507, 514-17,521-22,529,532,607-08, 616,646, 657, 676, 684, 688, 69192,694-96, 742, 750 Christian X |king of Denmark] 397 Christiansen, Friedrich 1090-091 Churchill, Winston Spencer 94, 245, 466, 534, 555, 790-92, 802, 811, 813, 816, 847, 859, 867, 880, 889, 891-92, 911, 920, 924-25, 930,

Military ConfizR1z\ces 1942-1945

Ciano, Edda 141, 842 Ciano, Galeazzo 141, 203, 206-07, 785-86, 529, 840-43, 845. 847, 851,862, 864, 874-75, 887,1122 Cilibrizzi, Savcrio 887, 1129 Clausewitz, Kad von 722, 1077 Clerq, Staf dc 935 Conrady, D.H.D. von 162, .1125 1122 Conrady, Heinz 762, 995,1122 Con rath, Paul 131,756, 836 Corvaja, Santi 851,875 Crankshaw, Edward 930,1129 Cross, General 1029 D Daladier, Edouard 772-73,980 Dallin, Alexander 852-54,856-58,1122 Daniels, General von 1092 D’Annunzio, Gabriele 880 Durges, Fritz 189, 20", 332, 345-46, 367, 401,437, 740 Daser, Wilhelm 1029 De Courbiere Guillaume, Rene von 1028 De Felice, Renzo 828, 842 De Gaulle, Chades 528, 925 Deane, John R. 782,1129 Decker [labor Leader] 734 Dedijet, Vladimir 222,962,1009,1020,

1122 Degenkolb, Gerhard 716, 1126 Dcgrcllc, Leon 801,941 Deichmann, Paul 756 Delbruck,Justus 974 Demany, Fernand 756 Dcmclhubcr, Karl Maria 494, 1005 Denzel, E. 805,1129 Dessloch, Otto 824 Dcuerlein, Ernst 946 Dewey, Thomas K. 424, 923, 959-60, 1034 Dicckhoff, Hans-Hcinrich 428—29, 819-20 Dietrich, Joseph (Sepp) xiv, 40, 126, 146, 245, 261, 437, 507, 322-33,

1143

573, 582, 586, 701,783, 834, 845, 893, 896, 927, 1060-061, 1109 Dietrich, Otto 754 Dimitrescu, Joan 801,826 Dirkscn, Herbert von 863 Dirlewanger, Oskar 896 Djursic, Pavle 142, 501, 843 Dohnanyi, von [Reich legal counsel] 974 Dollmann, Eugen 861, 887 Dollmann, Friedrich 169, 221,861,883, 887,1090 Domarus, Max ix, 945-47 Donitz, Karl viii, 227-28, 235-38, 246, 469,478-80,485,733,737,751,812, 879, 883, 890,212,247,996, 1110 Dornbcrger, Walter 799, 905, 1066, 1114, 1126,1130 Dorr, Fritz xvi Dorr, Hans 756 Dorsch, Xaver 411, 460, 716, 951,981 Dreyfus, Alfred 772 Duce, see Mussolini, Benito Dumitrache, Joan 801 li Ebcrbach, General 464,984 Ebert, Friedrich 1100 Kchnaton [Egyptian Pharaoh] 962 Eden, Anthony 721, 811, 889, 918, 1042-043' Ehrhardt, Hermann 1107 Eickc, Theodor 884, 993,1086 Kinem, I Ians-Egon von 632,1083 Einem, Kurt von 756 Einsiedel, Heinrich von 1092, 1130 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 3, 318, 436, 501, 881, 924-25, 953, 965, 975, 1008-009,1038, 1043-045, 1048, 1090-091, 1104,1111,1130 Elias, Hendrik 941 Elser, Gerhard 1005,1046,1065,1088, 1130 Encioglu, Menem 802 Engel, Gerhard 60-1,739,756,795,1121 Er/.betger, Matthias 104,528, 1107

1144

Hnu R asd His Generals

Erdmengcr, Hans 812 Eremenko, Andrei 767 Erfurth, Waldemar 801,810,903,1003, 1025-026,1110 Escbeck, Hanns Gcrt von 862, 1130 Esscr, Willi 756 Esteban-Infantes, Emilio 897 Etzdorf Hasso von 821 Ewakl, Gustav 867, 896, 1130 Eyck, Erich 722,1037,1130 E Fabre-Luce, Alfred 880, 1130 Fagerholm, Karl-August 1034 Falkenhausen, Alexander von 880,941 Falkenhayn, Erich 854 Farinacci, Roberto 105, 195-96, 203, 231, 253,828,861, 874-75, 887 Fegelein, Hermann 401,403, 426-27, 429, 444, 455, 461-62, 469, 47273, 486, 502, 509, 511, 517-18, 645-47, 657, 660, 663, 665-66, 628, 200, 718—19, 752, 922, 993, 1013,1019,1078,1084-085,1090 Feis, 1 Icrbert 822-23, 1130 Fellgiebel, Erich 132,836,923,1061 Felmy, Helmuth 73, 810—11 Fcnski, Horst-Arno 899 Feuchter, Georg W. 794, 808, 847-49, 867, 891, 899, 923, 931, 954-55, 959, 1016-012, 1069-023, 1113, 1115,1120,1130 Feuchtinger, Edgar 568, 572, 678,680, 1049,1106 Ficbig, Heinz 2, 766 Fiebig, Martin 431, 963 Finckh, Eberhard 462,983,988 Fischer, Adolf 650, 1094 Fischer, George iv-v, ix, 851-53. 85658, 896, 1085, 1094,1130 Flickc, W. F. 876, 1130 Focke, Wolf 807, 1125,1130 Foerstcr, Wolfgang 980,1130 Foertsch, Hermann 909, 1109-110

Forster, Albert 715,1125 Forster Otto 66, 580, 756, 772, 80304,981, 1057, 1058 Forstner, Baron von 772 Fortsch, Herrmann 682, 1109 Fotitch, Constantin 792,844,847,889, 928-29,1009,1130 Franco, Francisco 427 , 5?8t 531, H67, 961, 1030-032, 1138 Frank, August 551, 581, 1040 Frank, Bernhard 1122 Frank, Hans xxii, xxix Franssen, Theo 1062, 1130 Frantis, Kurt 992,1130 Franz Joseph I, Emperor of Austria 844 Frederick 11 [King of Prussia] 397,468, 539, 555, 583, 655, 723 Frederick Wilhelm I [King of Prussia] 655 Freisler, Roland 468, 988=89 Freksa, Friedrich 1100, 1130 Frenz [photographcr| xviii Freyend, Ernst John von 401,469,596, 618,742, 757 Freytag von Eoringhoven, Bernd 469, 618,638 Frick, Wilhelm 1 tOO Fricke, Ludwig 1082 Fricbc, Helmut 420, 957 Friedrichs, Helmuth 946 Friessner, Hans 256, 827,957,991,995, 1004,1012,1014,1074,1088,1130 Fritsch, Werner von 398, 947 Fromm, Friedrich (Fritz) 346,936,980,

1008 Frot, Eugene 772-73 Fuller, J.F.C. 868,11311 Funk, Walter 1101 G Galai, N. 782,1130 Galbiati, Enzo 874 Galland, Adolf 516,611, 808-09, 813, 835, 868, 891, 914-15, 923, 964, 1017-018, 1071, 1120, 1130

MUJIARY CoNFlzRIzXCES 1942-1945

Gambara, Gastonc 144. 845 Gamelin, Maurice 458-59, 980 Ganzenm tiller, Albert 590, 1064 Gariboldi, Italo 761 Gayda, Virginio 885,895 Gehlen, Reinhard 852 Geilenberg, Edmund 1119 George VI [King of England] 1042— 043 Gercke, Rudolf 46", 98? Gerland, Karl 934 Gcvers, Colonel 297, 909 Giesler, Paul 292, 908 Gilbert, Felix iv, ix, xii, xxvi, 786, 792, 882, 895, iI3J Gillc, Herbert 587, 638, 958, 1062, 1068, 1088 Girard, Louis-Dominique 59,318,797, 925.1131 Giraud, Henri-Honore 925 Gisevius, Hans Bernd 882,974, 1131 Glaise-Horstenau, Edmund 196, 503, 875,1009,1012 Glantz, David M. 902 Gleason, Everett 822-23, 900,1133 Gloria, Alessandro 885 Glucks, Richard 636, 1086 Goebbels,Joseph xxvii—xxix, 278,393, 395-96, 656, 706-07, 721-727, 730-32, 735, 793, 814, 874, 879, 882, 893, 934, 986, 1044, 1099, 1101,1110,1131,1134-135 Goebbels, Magda 1101 Goerdcler, Carl 896,974-75,986,1136 Goerlitz, Walter 1001 Gohler, Johannes 596, 619, 697, 700— 01, 711-14, 753,1123-121 Gollwitzer, Helmut 1092, 1131 Gonell, General 1080—081 Goring, Hermann x\; xvii, xxi, xxvii, 50, 6$, 73, J09, 124, 130-31, 137, 151, 172-73, 203, 206, 217, 2202 5,228-32,234-41, 244-47, 263, 352, 365, 428, 433, 484, 495, 586, 589-90, 596, 599, 604, 606-11,

1145

613-19, 622, 626, 629-30, 632, 634-37, 639-41, 643-46, 648-49, 651-53, 655-65, 6^8, 684, 691, 695-96, 717, 748, 750, 768, 785, 787, 789, 794, 801, 805-06, 824-25, 836, 840-41, 841, 854, 858, 874, 877, 879, 883-84, 889, 901, 938, 947, 962, 998-99, 1006, 1008, 1016-018, 1057, 1060-062, 1066. 1070, 1073, 1076. 1079, 1084-085,1089,1093,1099,1104, 1106.1110, 1122, 1128. 1133 Gorlitz, Walter ~6S, ”82. 784,825, 846, 861, 868, 890, 895, 905, 921, 98182, 1039, 1047, 1057, 1063, 1068, 1074,1077,1081, 1101-102, 1106, 1116-117,1120,1131 Gottberg, Curt von 378, 895,943 Goudima, Robert 782. 891, 1131 Grabmann, Walter 756 Grams, Rold 938, 1131 Grandi, Dino 874, 828 Graziani, Rodolfo 838, 845, 863, 875 Greim, Robert Ritter von 98,749,800, 804, 824 Greiner, 1 lelmuth ix-x, 759,1031,1131 Grippa, Jacques 875 Groeben, Peter von 896 Grbner, Erich 1098,1131 Groos, Otto 76,813 Groza, Peter 801 Guariglia, Raffaclc 885 Guderian, I leinz vii—viii, 128,218,252, 287, 293, 469-76, 481-91, 498, 586-90, 592, 607, 618, 621-39, 645-48, 650-52, 664-65, 678-80, 683-86, 688, 708, 745, 748, 76869, 784, 803, 829, 834-35, 892, 982, 994, 998, 1001-002, 1046, 1051, 1056, 1068. 1077, 1079, 1081, 1083, 1087, 1096, 1106. 1108, 1110-111, 1121-122, 1124 Giinsche, Otto 132, 137—38, 208,437, 469, 485, 492, 498, 504, 507, 596, 619,697, 741

1146

HituzR as:d His Generals

Guss [Soviet reporter] 726 Gustav VI, Adolf [King of Sweden] 206 Gyllenbrok, Colonel 958 II Haagen, Kurt xv—xvi, xxi-xxiv, 385. 760-61 Hacker, Oskar 782 Hackzell, Antti 502, 1010-011 Hadder, Wilhelm 821, 113.1 I lagedorn, IL 960, 1131 1 lagen, Walter 839, 875, 878, 887, 894, 930.1151 Hahn, Assi 1092, 1131 Haider, Franz xii, xxxiii, 581, 1059 Hale, OronJ. 9,945 Halm xxix Hammerstein, General 732 Hanke, Karl 668, 672, 703,713, 1101 — 102

I lannebitter, SS Sturmbannfiihrer 927 Hanneken, Hermann von 300, 330,678,

Heiber, Helmut iv-vi, ix, xi, 385. 758, 947

Heidkampcr, Otto 756, 917, 927, 932. 934-35, 942-43. 948. 1131 Heilmann, Will 905,923, 1017,1131 Heim, Heinrich xv Heinkel, Ernst 69, 415. 430, 611, 807. 922, 963 Heinz-Heinrich, Wilhelm ix Hcitz, Walther 67,804 I Idling, I Ians xi, xv, xviii, xix—xxi I lellmich, I leinz 853 Henderson, Sir Neville 985 I lennecke, Walter 978 Henschel |German industrialist] 271, 782, 834 Herman, August 247 Hermani, Lieutenant Colonel 596,60510, 1068

Herrc, Heinz Danko 756, 851—52 Herrgesell, Gerhard xi, xvii, xxi-xxv,

680,911-12.1106 I lannibal [Carthaginian General] 615,636 Hansen, Walther 970 1 iansen-Nootbaar, Jan-llcinrich 469, 751 Harnack, Arvid 876 Harpe, Josef 168,470, 860 I Iarteneck, Gustav 901 Hartmann, Alexander von 67,652, 804 Hassell, Ulrich von 945, 986

Herrmann, Hajo 915 Herzfeld, Hans 1037,1131 Hess, Rudolf 894 Hetz, Karl 1092 Heusinger, Adolf 23, 25-6, 28,31-4, 39-40, 43, 45, 106-07, 288, 292, 322-26, 401, 403, 405, 745-46 Hewel, Walther ^4,92-5,132,136.138, 141, 148, 154, 172, 176, 195-96, 198, 204, 207-08, 211, 215-17,

Hauck, Friedrich Wilhelm 433. 964 Haupt, Werner 815. 1131 Hauser, Eduard 636, 1D87 llausser, Paul 593, 645—46, 660, 756, 764. 775, 795-96, 832. 834. 846. 936, 976, 993, 1012, 1089-091, 1111,1131,1139 Hayn, Friedrich 977-78,1131 Hebrard J. 808, 847-49, 899, 905, 923, 931. 1016, 1070, 1072-073, 1115,

230, 232, 234, 267, 274, 401, 408, 416, 507, 513, 519, 528, 532, 591, 596, 604, 618, 651-53, 655-57, 666-67, 697, 706,708, 753,1110 Heydel, Hugo 952,1131 Heygendorff, Ralph von 858 Hildebrand, Hans H. 755-56,813,838, 961, 1027, 1134 Hildebrandt, Friedrich 934 Hillgruber, Andreas 827,911, 939, 963, 966, 991,1132 Hillila, Kaarlo Henrik 1022-024

1131 lleggenrainer, Heinz 176-77,863

Miui:no CoNFhRizXCES 1942-1945

Himmler, Heinrich xxi, 13, 196, 21925,230-32, 234, 237,243-44,543, 541 550-53, 601-02, 636, 643, 683. 726, 752, 773, 779, 832, 838, 857, 861, 865, 883-84, 887, 894, 896,909, 922,936, 941,951, 97374,993-94,1001.1006-008,1012, 1025.1035,1039-040,1042,1067, 1077 078, 1080 082, i 84, 1086, 1090-091, 1093-094, 1106, 1114, 1121.1123 1 lindenbuig, Paul von xxix, 732 Hinsley, F. EL 833,890, 919,1132 I loare. Sir Samuel 897, 1132 Hoenmanns, Major 930 Hoepner, Erich 803,989 Hofacker, Caesar von 977, 983 Hofer, Franz 306, 841,916,985 Hofer, Walther 1132 Hoffmann, Albert 514, 1016 Hoffmann, Albrecht 627, 1107 Hoffmann, Karl Otto 6>27, 790, 86769, 891,902, 1132 Holliclt, Kari 10,43,103,374,767,77678, 785, 796 Holste, Rudolf 722, 727-29, 1127 Holter, IL 903, 1132 Holzbauer [Junkers test pilot] 11169 Hopkins, Harry 960,1137 Hoppner, Erich 468, 989 Horn, Walter 903,1132 I lornlein, Walter 6, 8, 763 I Iorthy, Nikolaus 448,830,882-83,959, 975,1013-014,1132 Hossbach, Friedrich 958, 1083 I loszlenyi, Vitez-Josef 1014 1 loth, Hermann 18. 56, 353, 355,390, 776-77, 779, 784, 938-39, 946 Hottl, Wilhelm 874 1 love, Alkmar 786, 885, 1132 Hube, Hans 214, 215. 307, 374, 730, 798, 882, 942, 956, 988 Hugenberg, Alfred 732,1127 Hull, Cordell 822, 1020, 1134

1147

Humboldt Dachroeden, Hubertus von 667-71,728,242 Hurstfield,J. 920.1132 Huyssen, Hans 895,1132 1 Imrcdy, Adalbert 959 Inbnii, Ismet 802, 847, 918 Inskip, Sir Thomas 1036 Isabella, Princess of Bavaria 863

J Jackeln, Friedrich 378, 943 Jacob, Alfred 292, 321, 410, 460, 757, 908, 981, 1057 Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf 930, 1038,1047048,1132 Jaenecke, Erwin 62-3, 310, 801,917 Jaschke, Erich 8,765 Jauer, Georg 757,1076 Jedlicka, Ludwig 757 Jeismann, Karl-Ernst 1037,1132 Jeschonnek, Hans 64, 66, 68—70, 202, 205, 219, 228-30, 238-41, 742, 749-50, 806, 877, 1070 Jilemnicky, Peter 992, 1132 Jodi, Alfred xii—xiv, xxvi, xxxiii, 4—7, 11_4, 16, 19-20, 25-6, 29-33, 35, 37, 39,46, 48-55,64-8,72-7,857,90-6,100,102-03,105-06,10809,114,116-17,170,172-79,18182, 190-93, 196, 200-24, 227-35, 238-39, 241, 267-69, 272, 274, 278-82, 311-12, 314-16, 322, 326-30,346-54,358,363-66,368, 370, 401, 407-12, 416, 432-44, 449-54,457-62,469,480-83,488, 490-91, 493, 495, 497-505, 50708,517-30,532,543, 547,586-87, 590, 596, 599-604, 607-08, 610, 617-18, 628, 638-43, 645-650, 661-63,666,675-77,679-87,694, 698,722,733,742, 762,764,77071, 773, 802, 817, 863, 871, 897, 920. 928, 936-37, 970, 975-76,

1148

Urn j ,r asd His Cemerals

979. 987. 1003. 1009, 1013, 1024, 1062.1067-068.1077.1079,1089, 1091, 1110-111 Joffre, Joseph 980 Johannmever, Willy 543,667,674,697, 707,710,715, 740 Jones, F. C. 823, 853. 1132 Jonuschat, Hans xvi,xxiii Joyce, William 859 Joyc, Pierre 875 Junge, Wolf U3, 174, 176, 179-81, 183-85,187,235-37,245-46,394, 396, 596, 744, 947 Juppe, General 1009 Jurgens, Hans 789,1132 Juttner, Hans 636—37, 1086 K Kaether, Ernst 718—20 Kaiser, Hans K. 905, 1132 Kalinow, Kyrill D. 782,1133 Kallay, Nikolaus von 882-83, 911,959, 1014.1133 Kallner, Hans 1079 Kaltenbrunner, Ernst 716,1125 Kaminski, Bronislav 259,509,895,896, 1013 Kammerer, Albert 517, 788, 1133 Kammerer, Friedrich 1019 Kammhuber, Josef 716,1126 Kammlcr, Hans 691, 1113—114, 1116 Kappler, I lerbert 887 Karcher F. W. 757 Karvas, Emmerich 992 Kaschc, Siegfried 502-04,1009 kaufmann, Karl 934 Keilig, Wolf von 755,763-67,780,784, 787, 797-98, 801, 803-04, 814, 829-31, 833, 836, 857, 860, 864, 883, 892, 895, 898, 901, 907, 910, 912, 9JJi 936, 938, 940, 952, %]_, 964, 972, 975, 980, 987, 989-92, 994. 998, 1001, 1012, 1029, 1050, 1060 061,1064, 7, 1076, ID

084, 1087, 1094-095, 1100, 1105. 1109-110,1118,1121, 1133, 1135 Keitel, W ilhelm xii, xiii, xxvi, 7, 14,17, 65, 67, 69, 116-17, 119-32, 13544.148.154-59.163-68.171.173. 177-78, 181-82, 184-85, 194-95, 197,200-02,204-12,215-23,229, 234, 238, 241. 248-51, 253-54, •, 282, 284,294-300, 310, 313, 315, 319, 321_, 328, 346, 387-90, 392, 395-99, 401, 4U, 415, 420. 422-29, 432, 464, 466-67, 469, 481-82, 484, 486, 488, 492-94, 496, 498-99, 503, 507-08, 519, 528, 530, 543, 545, 548, 550-52, 554, 586, 596, 599-601, 606, 610, 614, 617-18, 622, 637, 639-41, 645-46, 652, 657, 660-62, 664, 675, 677-78, 680, 684, 692, 717— 18, 722, 727, 733, 741, 759, 771, 783, 841, 845, 851, 858, 876, 879, 885, 910, 946-47, 989, 999, 1061, 1068, 1078,1100 kempf, Werner 167, 860 Kennes, Werner 757 Kerensky, Alexander iii, 158 Kern, Erich 1012. 1 133 Kersten, Heinz 697, 741 Kcrwin, Bruno von 1084 Kessclring, Albert xii, 46, 48,-50, 634,72-3,75,135,137,214,219,223, 231, 238, 24E 269, 295, 327, 365, 465, 585, 699-700, 705, 770-71, 786-88, 802, 806, 809, 838-39, 841, 844, 863, 865, 878, 881-82, 884-86, 899, 949, 964-67, 971, 980-81,1061, 1109, 1126, 1133 Killinger, Manfred von 1107 Kimura, Masanori 818 King, Ernest 1044 Kinzel, Eberhard 1081 Kirchcn |Policc Commissioner] 927 Kirchheim, Heinrich 680,1109 Kirchner, Friedrich 627,1075 Kirk, Geoige 1021,1033,1153

Military Conlerexces 1942-1945

Kiszling, Rudolf 792, 844, 873, 8”5, 898, 909, 962,1009. 1133 Kitzinger, Karl 580, 981,1057-058 Klagges, Dietrich 1100 Klatt, Paul 8, 765 Kleffd, Philip 473,294 Klcikamp, Helmut 7.57 Kleinmann, Wilhelm 11)64 Kleist, Ewald von 264, 363, 367, 369, 796, 800, 896-97, 990 Kleyser, Colonel 976 Klopfer, Gerhard 946 Kluge, Gunter von 80,84,115,15", 160, 165, 171, 199, 225, 252-60, 26265, 453, 457, 464, 468, 781, 814, 852, 856, 859-61, 876-77, 895, 975-76, 978-79, 982-84, 987-89 Knarchbull-I lugessen. Sir Hugh 883 Koch, Erich 158-60.340.633.774.7 809, 846, 849, 854, 867, 921, 934, 948

Koch, Horst-Adalbert 1000,1073,1084, 1133 Koga, Yneichi 801 Koller, Karl 618, 636, 716, 750, 1122, 1133 Kollontai, Alexandra 991 Komarnicki, Titus 853—54, 11 33 Koniev, Ivan 418-19, 506, 717, 1065, 1074-075 Konoye, Prince Futnimaro 900 Konrad, Joachim 1102, 1104, 1133 Konrad, Prince of Bavaria 863 Korbonski, Stefan 993,1133 Kordt, Erich 918.1133 Kortcn, Giinthcr 273. 289. 291. 302— 06,401411-13,415-16,420,425, 429-31, 749, 793 Kostring, Ernst 852—53, 858 K ran ckc, Theodor 12-4, 19,28,49-50, 52,251 Krappc, Gunter 1106 Kratschmer, Ernst-Giinther 783, 846, 873, 943, 1062, 1066, 1068, 1090, 1105,1133

1149

Kraus, Herbert 1134. 1137 Krebs, Hans ‘161-65,468,673,685,709, 717-19,722,727-29,733-35,737. 746-47,982, 1121-122 Krcipc, Werner 469,473,4TT, 484,488. 489, 499,242 Kricgcr, Ludwig xi, xvi-xvii, xxv, 385, 759-60,973,1133 Kriegsheim, Herbert 846, 1079, 1 1.33 Kruger, Friedrich-Wilhelm 1078 Krupp von 870, 1032 Kube, Wilhelm 943 Kublai Khan 1033 Kubv, Erich 1086-087, 1133 Kiichler, Georg von 27,37,85,160,291, 374-75, 377-84, 406, 757, 780, 796, 834, 856, 895, 943-44, 248 Kuckoff, Adam 876 Kuhl, Hermann 1047, 1133 Kuhlenthal, Erich 980 Kuhlmann, Arthur 995,1133 Kurzbach 62 Kurusu, Sabuto 821-22 Kvaternik, Slavko 1002 Kyrill (Bulgarian Prince] 221 L Lahousen, Erwin 815 La Marmora, Alfonso 815 Lakatos, Edler 801 Lammerding, Heinz 1077 Lammcrs, Hans-1 lcinrich 160,165,652, 1094 Lammineur, Robert 757 Lang, Hubert 427 Lang, Joachim-Fricdrich 960 Lang, Viktor 961 Lange, Eitel 1018,1133 Langemann, Heinz 132 Langcr, William L. 822-23, 837, 900. 1133 Langhacuscr, Rudolf 1121 Langheld, Wilhelm 927 Langkeit, Willy 1121 Lanz, Hubert 960

1150

HmjiR AXD His Ghxhrals

Lascar, Mihai 62,801,826 Lasch, Otto 633, 1083-084 Lauchcrt, Meinrad von 476, 994 Laval, Pierre 78, 830 Lawrence, T. E. 1099 Lazitch, Branko 792, 1009, 1133 Le Fort, Peter von 909 Leber, Anncdorc 977, 1133 Lee, Asher 902, 1133 Lccb, Emil 802,319, 1046, 1088,1123 Leeb, Wilhelm Ritter von 780,799 Leemans, Joseph 875 Leiner, Karl 884, 887 Lenin, Vladimir 138 Leonardi, Priam 176, 863 Leopold III [King of the Belgians] 880, 1130 Levetzow, Admiral 732 Lewinski, F.rich von, see Manstein, Erich von Ley, Robert 281, 341,396, 905, 934 Liddel Hart, Sir Basil 984, 1133 Lindcmann, Georg 162-63, 383, 857, 867, 944 Linge, Heinz 225,741 Lingner, Hans 1044 Linkomies, Edwin 903 l.innarz, Viktor 507, 748 Linnell, Francis 934 Linstow, Hans von 977, 983 Lippisch 922 List, Wilhelm xii Lloyd George D. 725,1126 Lochner,Louis P. xxvii, 814,879,882, 894, 934,1134 Lodewyckx, A. 820,1134 Loffler* Walter 699,1117 Lohmann, Walter 755, 813, 838, 961, 1026-027,1134 Lohr, Alexander 132,139-40,143,242, 244, 685-86, 836-37, 877, 888, 1020,1111 Lorenz, Heinz 596, 66’’, 754 Lorey, Hermann 427, 961

Loringhoven von Bcrnd, Baron Freytag

246 Lorkovic, Mladen 1010 Lossberg, Bernhard 1047,1134 Louise Mountbattcn, Lady 906 Lousse, Emile 757 Liihbc, Vollrath 168, 860 Lucht, Walter 997 Luck, Hans-Ulrich von 437, 481,967 Lucke, Fritz 1001 Ludendorff, Erich 152,161, 854,1134 Ludwig von Battcnberg, Prince 906 Lungershausen, Carl I Ians 757, 836, 864-65

Lusar, Rudolf 251, 768-69, 790, 802, 818, 826, 834, 849, 867, 869-70, 890-91, 893, 900, 905, 916, 923, 971, 997-98, 1005, 1.007, 1032, 1041, 1046, 1048, 1051-052, 1065, 1067, 1069, 1071, 1088, 1115, 1125 1134 Lutge, Friedrich 924, 1134 M Maass, Bruno 757 MacArthur, Douglas 818 Macartney, C A. 879, 1014, 1134 Macek, Vladko 911 Mackcnscn, Frau 208 Mackenscn, Hans Gcoig von 195-96, 202, 204, 208, 216, 234, 844, 87374 Maeek, Croatian politician 910 Maerchker 1100,1134 Mafalda, Princess of Savoy 141,842-43 Magirus [German industrialist] 783 Magli, Giovanni 865 Maisel, Ernst 748, 787 Maiziere, Ulrich dc 697, 700-04, 709, 711-12, 747, 1122 Malyschkin, Vassily 970 Maniu, Julius 991 Mannerhcim, Carl Gustav 801, 903, 1003, 1011,1023,1025,1134 Mansergh 811

Military Conflrexces 1942-1945

Manstein, Erich von 9,18, 22, 3D, 33, 42-3,57-8, 100,107-08,110,115, 171, 198, 225, 260-61, 286, 335, 338, 340-42, 346, 348, 332, 333, 357, 361, 363, 368, 371, 374, 403, 622,682,232, 266, 775-77, 77980, 784-85, 795—98^ 800-01, 813, 827, 831-32. 86E 816, 877, 882, 887, 894-97,201,926-27,931-33. 936-39, 942-43,243,947-48,955, 981, 988, 990, 1000, 1038, 1107, 1134 Manteuffel, I lasso von 573, 1052-053 Marcks, Werner 242,822 Maria, Princess of Bavaria 863 Marie Jose, Princess of Savoy 880 Marshall, George C. 924 Marrienssen, Anthony 1113, 1134 Martin, Carl E. 222,1134 Marx, Colonel, see Marks, Werner Massow, General 177-78 Matl, Josef 222,889,898,910,929,1134 Matsuoka, Yosuke Yogu 274, 822-23, 900 Mattenklott, General 958 Mattern, Ernst 1080 Matteotti, Giacomo 829 McDowell, Colonel 1009 McNeill, William Hardy 1035, 1063, 1134 Meandrov, Mikhail 1085 Meier-Wclckcr, Hans 757 Meister, Jiirg 902, 914, 972, 995-96, 1003,1015,1134 Meister, Rudolf 750, 972 Mcllini, Ponce dc Leon 875,1134 Mellwig, Karl 994 Mende, Gerhard von 774, 856 Menemencioglu 918 Mcssc, Giovanni 762, 1134 Messerschmitt, Willy 716,922, 1126 Metzsch, Friedrich-August 1002,1067, 1094, 1134 Mever, Adolf 1037, 1047,1134 Meyer-Detring, Wilhelm 543, 743

1151

Michael I [King of Romania] 1037 Michaux, Theo 812, 824, 1134 Micth, Friedrich 462, 990-91 Mihailovic Draza 129, 245, 504, 79192, 844, 889, 898, 928-29, 1£ 1133 Miklos, Vitez 1014 Mikus, Joseph A. 992, 1135 Milch, Erhaid 99, 757, 824-25 Model, Walter 247,255,259,262,401, 410, 415, 436, 466, 468, 575, 597, 643, 681, 800, 814, HDi, 894-95, 947-48, 976, 983, 986, 988, 990, 1053,1091,1109 Moellhausen, Eitel Friedrich 886, 888, 1 135 Mohnke, Wilhelm 727, 731-32, 734, 737-38 Molders, Werner 1018, 1102 Molotov, Vyacheslav 721,723—24, 903 Moltke, Helmuth von xxix, xxxi, 537, 655, 818, 820, 1037 Montgomery, Bernard Law 3, 18, 674, 785, 291, 863, 975, 1004, 1007, 1044, 1116-117, 1135 Mordal, Jacques 788,1135 Morell, Theodor xxxiii, 982 Morgagni, Giulio 885 Morison, Samuel Eliot 803, 819, 890, 913,1135 Moritz 927 Moseley, Philip E. 1092, 1135 Moseley, Ray 842 Mueller Hillebrand,Burkhart 799,938, 1135 Muller, Dietrich von xxii, 843,974,1076 Muller, Friedrich Wilhelm 1101 Muller, Hans 1020 Muller, Heinrich 330,930 Muller, Josef 974 Muraviev, Konstantin 1002 Munoz-Grandes, Augustin 801, 897 Musmanno, Michael A. 1049,1135 Mussert, Anton 941

1152

Hhu:r

Mussolini, Benito 46, 50, 76, 103—05, 119. 135-36, 138, 140-42, 147. 153-54,195-96.201-04.206.213, 221-22, 227, 241, 252-53, 255, 644, 761.770. 779. 781. 785. 802, 815,827-30,835-36,838-45, SI"7, 850-51,861,863-64,874-75,878, 882, 885-86,888,893-94,902-03, 920, 930, 1037, 1090, 1106, 1129, 1135-136 Mussolini, Edda, see Ciano, Edda N Nadolny, Rudolf 986 Napoleon iii, 459 N atzmer, Okhvig von 636, 1087 Navarini, Enea 144, 845 Nebel, Rudolf 826 Nedic Milan 328, 792, 889, 929 Ncfcrtiti |wife of Egyptian Pharaoh] 962 Nehring, Walthcr 67", 634,1074,1076079

Nerianin, Colonel 1085 Neubacher, Hermann 502—04, 1011— 012,1135 Neurath, Constantin Alexander von 92, 132-37, 820, 838-39, 874 Nicholas II [Emperor of Russia] iii Nicolai, Walter 393,947 Nicdermayer, Oskar Ritter von 163— 64, 857-58, 970 Nikita, see Nikolaus, King of Monte¬ negro Nikolai Nikolievitch, Grand Prince of Yugoslavia 844 Nikolaus [King of Montenegro] 142. 844

Nomura, Kichisaburo 822 Nowack, Wilhelm 820. 11 35 Nycop, Carl-Adam 925, 957. 1135 O

Oberliinder, Theodor 775 C )hstfelder, I Ians von 543, 1109 Oehmichen, Hermann 1056

and

His

Generals

Oertzen, E W. von 1108,1135 Olbricht, Friedrich 936. 989 Oncken, Hermann 1037,1135 Oppenhoff, Franz 1086 Orlando, Vittorio Emanuclc 874 Osborne, Francis 839 Oshima, Hirosho 821 Oster, Hans 882, 974 Oven, Wilfried 934, 1135 P Paetel, Karl O. 1092. U35 Paillole, Paul 833 Palmer, Captain 761 Pan eke, Gunter 911,1010 Pannwitz, Hclmuth von 650,775,1007, 1094-095,1112 Papen, Franz 63, 802, 847,934, U35 Parseval, Joseph von 648, 1091 Pattee, R. 815, 1135 Patton, General 533, 697,1043,1117 Paul, Prince Regent of Yugoslavia 879 Paulus, Friedrich xii, 56,59-60,62,656, 785, 797-801, 803, 827, 1092093 Pavelic, Ante 830,880, 898,910,1009010

Pavolini, Alessandro 875, 895 Peam, B. R. 1132 Pechcl, Rudolf 836, 983,1135 Peiper, Joachim 597, 1066 Pcltz, Dietrich 185, ~ 16, 870 Pemsel, Max-Josef 75? Peron. Juan Domingo LQ87 Peschel, Kurt xi, xv—xvii, xxi-xxii, xxivxxv, 759-61 Petacci family 8^4 Petain, Philippe 528. 1031 Peter I |King of Serbia| 844 Peter II, King of Serbia 791,879, 889, 928-29 Pctcrsdorfj Horst von 679. 680. 682. 757. 1108. 1110 Petrov, Ivan 1075 Pfeffer, Max 678-80, 682, 11116

Military Conflrlxces 1942-1945

P tetter, Fritz von Salomon 13 OH Pfeffer, Franz von Salomon 1108 Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, Karl 1068,1106 Pfeiffer, Hellmuth 281, 298, 375 Pfeiffer, Georg 910 Pfeiffer, Hans 741 Philip, Prince of Hesse 141, 154, 174, 177, 204, 217, 842-43, MO, M2 Phleps, Artur 504, 846, 1012 Picker, Henry 829, 894, 902, 935,1125 Pickert, Wolfgang 902, 935,1135 Pilsudski, Jozef 853 Pini, Giorgio 828, 1135 Plauen, O. E. 1069 Playfair, I. S. O. 811,1135 Pleiger, Paul 275,858,901 Pohner, Ernst 1107 Pokrowsky, J. W, 773 Poll, Bernhard 1086, 1133 Popov, General 871 Porsche, Ferdinand 126,782, 834 Postan, M. M. 920, 1135 Prangc, Gordon W. 822 Praun, Albert 757, 1061 Pressler, Gustav 98, 824 Preuss, Maximilian 896 Priitzmann, Hans 943,1009 Puttkamcr, Karl-Jesko von 61—2, 87, 313,311,401, 432,431,591, 596, 618, 654, 667, 672-74, 680, 740, 800-01, 1092, 1135

1153

Rangell [Finnish Minister) 903 Rathenau, Walther 1107 Rattenhuber, Hans 843 Rcichcnau, Walter von 827,834 Reinberger, Hellmuth 930 Reinecke, Hermann 386—99, 945 4~ Reinefarth, Heinz 6^8,726,896, 1105006 Reinhardt, Hans 473,633, 916—17.927. 1083 Rcitlingcr, Gerald 1086,1114,1136 Reitsch, Hanna 1017,1069,1136 Relecom, Xavier 875 Remer, Otto F.rnst 659,978,1088,1100 Remlinger, Heinrich 1081 Rendulic, Lothar 503, 504, 636, 792, 990, 1003-004, 1011-012, 1024, 1026-027, 1066, 1083, 1087, 1136 Resega, Aldo 931 Retzlaw, Reinhardt 927 Reuter, von 772 Revnitz, Rwald xi, xvi, ^611, 973 Rhode, Gotthold 1042,1136 Ribbentrop, Joachim von xiv, 96, 466, 741, 753, 838, 840-41, 879, 882, 885, 979, 985,1008, 1025, 1136 Richards, Denis 1136 Richthofen, Wolfram von 110,114,214, 425,429, 800, 803, 829 Rieckhoff, II. J. 806,1136 Ricker, Kariheinrich 996, 1136 Rintclcn, Enno von 135,140,762,771,

Rackham, I lorace R. 945 Raeder, Finch xxxiii, 251 Rahtgens, Karl Ernst 977,983, 988

757, 779, 802, 829, 836, 838-40, 842-43, 861-63, 874-75, 878, 881-82, 885, 888, 920, 985,1136 Ritter, Gerhard 896, 961,974—75, 986, 1136-037, 1109 Rirz, Hans 927,929 Roatta, Mario 132, 134-37, 213, 838, 862, 881 Rbchling, Hermann 808 Rodenbuig, Carl 757

Rainer, Gauleiter 880 Ramcke, Bernhard 46, 488,786-87

Roeder, Manfred 876, 1136 Roehrbein, F.rich 828,1136

Q Quint, Herbert A. 981-82, 1047.1101. 1131 Quisling, Vidkun 649, 652,830, 1093— 094 R

1154

HniJzR ASD HlS GhSHR. UA

Rohden, Herhurdt von 794

S

Rohm, Ernst xxviii, 183

Sack, Carl 974

Rohden, Hcrhudt von 794, 1131 Rohwer, Jurgen "56,819,822,1015,1136

Sacd, Mohammed 1033

Rokossovsky, Konstantin 767, '■'98,871,

Salomon, Ernst von 1108-109,1136

Sager [German industrialist] 951 Saracoglu, Siikru 802

993,1065 Rommel, Erwin xix, 3—4, 46—8, 56, 63, 71—2,74,86,99,132, 136-38.14344,153,173-74, I'M, 202,207-08, 218, 230-31, 234, 242-45, 296,

Saudtel, Fritz 104. 136. 259. 341. 770. 827, 934 Saucken, Dietrich von 627, 628, 651, 757. 1074, 1076-077

321,465-66,770-71,785-88,809,

Saur, Karl Otto 248,320-21,575,577-

815, 838-39, 841, 844-45, 854,

78, 611 617 652, 693, 699, 716,

863, 873, 877-79, 883-86, 919,

757. 892

,

,

948, 965, 967, 969-71, 976-77,

Sava, George 792,1136

982, 984-86, 988, U36 Rdnncfarth, Hclmuth K.G. 1012,1136

Schaub, Julius 485, 1000

Roosevelt, Franklin D.

Scheidt, Wilhelm 507, 745,761

245. 317-18,

Scheele, Hans-Karl von 115, 831

415.424,726,791,822,918, 923-

Scheliha, Rudolf von 876

24, 960, 1020, 1034, 1043-044,

Schell, Adolf von 937

1062,1126,1132

Schcllong, Conrad 865, 936, 941,1136

Rosenberg, Allred xxvii, 20, 155-56, 158-59, 161, 165, 389, 393, 529, 852, 854,946,962,1110 Rost, Hans-Giinther (Czeppan) von 700.1118

Scherer, Theodor 784 Scherff, Walter iv, xix-xx, xxii, 132,155, 223-24, 252, 332, 348, 375, 387, 398, 401, 432, 437, 543, 596, 618, 744, 760, 837, 945-46

Rothbaucr, A. M. 1135

Scheuerlen, Heinz

Rothfeder, Herbert P. 946-47

Schieder, Theodor von 1020, 1138

Rudcl, Hans-L'lrich

Schirmer, Friedrich 10.32, 1136

636, 1086—087,

1136

1020

Schlabrendorff, Fabian

Ruder, Willy 386, 946 Rugc, Friedrich 134, 762, 816-17,819, 822. 838, 888, 890, 910, 9JA926. 1015-026, 109"-098, 1113,1136 Rumohr, Joachim 1080 Rum pi, Hans 793, 808-09, 813, 868, 914,1136 Rundstedt, Gerd von viii, 221-22.453.

896, 988-89,

1132 Schleicher, Kurt von 329,732,929,1127 Schlicbcn, Karl Wilhelm von

978

Schlieffen, Alfred von xxix, 655 Schmidt, Arthur 9, 59, 62, 65-6, 525, 785, 797 Schmidt, Hans 1029 Schmidt, Rudolf

895

467, 543-50, 552, 568, 803, 850,

Schmidt-Pauli, Edgar 1108,113.7

863, 884, 965, 96^, 969-70, 976,

Schmidt-Richbcrg, Erich

982, 986, 988, 1007. 1039, 1066. 1109,1117,1129

898, 1002,

1004,1020,1067,1094,1112,1137 Schmundt, Rudolf xxix, 27,76,132,138,

Ruoff, Joachim, 732

155, 162-63, 165, 346, 358, 375,

Ruppert, Dr. 1128

386-88,390-92,395-99,401,437,

Ryti, Risto

438, 608, 739, 851,946, 976, 1099

902-03

Military Costlrlxcls 1942-1945

Schneider, Erich 757. 768. 799. 807, 818.867.893.905.961.1005.1046. 1137 Schneider, Karl 114, 831 Schorncr, Ferdinand 374, 399,4~4,530. 626, 628-29, 636, 647, 655, 727, 734-35, 800, 942, 947, 990,1075, 1077,1087. 1127 Schramm, Percy Ernst 765, 1137 Schramm, Wilhelm Rirter von 921,975, 977. 983-84, 98", 990,1132 Schrotcr, Heinz 763.767,777,785,794. 797-801, 804, 827,1132 Schroth, Walter 482,998 Schulenburg, Friedrich Werner von 326, 466, 928, 286 Schulte 24,26, 30, 32, 40-1,222 Schulz, Friedrich 828,1075 Schulze, Richard 507. 240 Schulze-Boysen, Harro 876 Schuschnigg, Kurt 875 Schuster, Oskar 619,620, 750 Schwartzkopf [German, industrialist] 281 Schweitzer, Colonel 763 Schwcndemann, Karl 876, 1137 Schwerin, Gerhard von 940 Schwerin von Krosigk, Lutz Graf xviii— xix, xxi—xxii, 757, 924, 1137 Seeckt, von 635 Seemen, Gerhard von 763—66,769, 781, 783-84, 786, 79K 801, 803, 824, 829, 831, 837, 860, 870, 883, 910, 918,940,957,967,987,1029,1050, 1062. 1064. 1073, 1076. 1081. 1084,1087.1090.1095.1105-106. 1109,1121, 1126, 1137 Senger-Etterlin, Ferdinand 757. 769, 899, 998, 1012. 1036. 1040-041, 1051-052,1055-056,1060. 1075, 1097,1137 Senger-Etterlin, Fridolin von 757 Seraphim, I Ians-Gunther 1031, 1137 Seton-Watson, 1 lugh 991-92,1002,1137 Seuss, Richard 996

1155

Seydlitz-Kurzbach, Walter von 59-60, 62, 65-6, 396-97, 719, 797-98, 803. 947, 1092.1126 Scyss-lnquart, Artur 875 Sherwood, Robert E. 918,923,925,960, 1044.1137 Shulman, Milton 1044.1137 Siebert, Ludwig 908 Siegler, Fritz 764, 771, 783-84, 78687,793-94,802,804.811,813-14. 824-27, 829, 837-38, 857, 860, 862, 864, 873, 879, 884-85, 895, 897, 907, 917, 938, 943, 969, 976, 986. 988-91, 994, 997-98, 1006, 1012. 1018, 1020, 1057, 1073, 1075-076, 1087. 1089, 1090-091, 1109-112, 1124, 1126, 1137 Siegling, Hans 509,1013 Simon, Max 927 Simonds, G. 1029 Simovic, Dusan 879 Skoropadsky, Paul 854 Skorzcny, ()tto 678, 839, 885, 887, 894, 1105-106,1137 Smend, Gunther 746, 983 Sonnleithner, Franz von 469,492,501— 04, 507, 519, 753, 757, 981, 1012, 1019 Speer, Albert viii, x, xiv, xxi, 11, 89, 283, 319, 437, 442, 461, 615-17, 709, 716, 753, 768, 796, 879, 922, 951, 963, 9M, 999, 1018, 1040, 1046,1049,1053,1055-056,1073, 1110, 1119 Spcidcl, Hans 838, 967, 969, 976-78, 982, 984-86,1128, 1137 Sperrle, Hugo 824 Stacey, C. P. 926, LL32 Staemmlcr, K. I). 1102 Stalin, Joseph iii, v-vi, ix, 20, 94, 96, 188, 245, 501, 587, 720, 723, 725, 730,735,771,871,956.986,1020021,1034,1043 Starace, Achille 875

1156

HmJ R

Stauffenberg, Schenk von 977,982,986 Stavisky, Alexandre 772-73 Steflea, Ilia 291,310,907 Stegemann, Hermann 1047, 1137 Stegmann 1075 Steiner, Felix 718-19, 729, 734, 1020, 1081,1126, 1137 Stettinius Jr., Edward R. 1020, 1044, 1137 Steyrer, Ludwig 782-83, 1067 Stieff, Hclmuth 249, 468, 892, 989 Stollberg, Friedrich 248, 892 Strachwitz von Gross-Zauchc Hyacinth 918 Strachwitz, Mauritz, Baron 917 Strccker, Karl 65, 797, 803 Strohle, Albert 876,1137 Srucken, Rudolf 1134 Student, Kurt 228, 230, 234, 238-39, 241, 495, 643-46, 676, 884-85, 929, 1005,1089,1090 Stulpnagel, Carl Heinrich von 450,975, 977, 979, 982-84, 987 Stulpnagel, Otto von 975 Stumpff, I lans-|iirgen 516, 757,1018 Sun Yat-sen 853 Siindennann, Helmut 697,754 Suster, Roberto 885 Svericw, Colonel 1085 Szalasi, Franz 1013 Szombathelvi, Ferenc 143, 844 Sztojay, Dome 959 T Tangermann, Albrecht 983 Tanner, Vain6 958,1034 Tansill, Charles Callan 822, 1137 Teodorini, Cornello 801 Terboven, Josef 914, 1093 Teske, Hermann 801, 1137 Thietack, Otto 989 Thomalc, Wolfgang 11,224, 226,24851, 469, 482-90, 569-78, 581-83, 588, 609, 699, 714-15, 748, 757, 768,1049, 1056

Ai\p His Generals

Thomsen, Hans 651,757, 1095 Thorwald,Jiigen 775,852-53,856-58, 896, 970, 1007, 1013,1074, 1076, 1077,1081,1084-085,1095,1102, 1137 Thot, Karl xv—xvi, 760 Thutmosis [Egyptian sculptor] 962 Tiemann, Otto 7, 9, 764 Tillessen, Heinrich 828 Timm, Artur 1007,1095 Tippelskirch, Kurt von 758, 762, 767, 774, 777, 781, 785, 796, 804, 813, 819, 861, 882, 886, 888, 895, 899, 901-02,907,917-18,926,933-35, 938-39, 948-49, 955-58, 971, 985-86, 992-94, 997, 1004-005, 1008, 1029, 1031, 1039, 1044, 1047-048, 1063, 1065,1068-069, 1075,1077,1081-083,1089,1096097, 1099, 1102-104, 1108, 1112, 1117-120,1122-123,1137 Tippelskirch, Werner von 757, 851 Tiso, Josef 830 Tito (Josip Broz) vii, 245,269, 503,520, 830, 889, 910, 928-29, 962, 1009, 1011,1129,1139 Todt, Fritz 799, 892, 951,963 Togo, Shigenori 821,900, 1137 Tolsdorff, Theodor 1099 Toppe, Alfred 757 Toussaint, Rudolf 839,881 Toynbee, Arnold 811, 886, 900, 941, 991-93, 1002-003, 1010, 1132, 1136 Toynbee Veronica M. 811, 886, 900, 1010, 1132, 1136 Tresckow, Henning von 896, 982-83, 989 Trevor-Roper, Hugh R. 933, 945, 947, 982, 1031,1049, 1138 Trizzino, Antonino 810,863,888, 1138 Troost, Paul Ludwig 754 Trott, von 1123 Truchin, Fedor 1085 Truman, Harry S. 1126

MILITARY CONFERENCES 1942-1945

1157

Tschiicke, Colonel 9

Waite, Robert G. L. 1108, 1138

Tuboeuf, Anton von 1099

Waizenegger, Heinz xviii, 205, 275, 285,

Tukhachcvsky, Mikhail 397, 947

432, 435, 437, 444, 469, 492- 95, 507,

Twiehaus, Hans 1084

591, 593-96, 618, 742-43, 1003

Tzschockell, Paul 9, 766

Walker, David 1095-096 Wallenstein, Albrecht von 589,1063

U

Walter, Helmut 915-16, 922

Ueberschar, Gerd R. x Umberto of Savoy, Prince

Walter, Paul 858

of Piedmont 838, 880

Wang Ching-wei 853

Ungermann, Siegfried 1095

Wangenheim, Hubert von 1097

Uthmann, Bruno von 651,757,1095

Warlimont, Walter xii, 38, 119-22, 123, 125, 127, 130-32, 134-41, 144, 146-49,

V

154, 176, 178-79, 181-83, 188, 192, 242-

Vansittart, Rober Gilbert 466, 986, 466, 986,

45, 422-28, 444, 458, 469, 743, 755-56,

1093, 1138

845, 851, 859, 978-79, 985

Vanwelkenhuyzen, Jan 930, 1138

Wartenberg, Bodo von 970

Vatutin, Nikolai 871, 932, 956

Watter, Oscar 1108

Vecchiarelli, Carlo 888

Wecke, Walter 789

Veesemeyer, Edmund 959

Wege, General 173

Vercellino, Mario 813

Wegener, Martin 1084

Verres, Lajos Dalnoki 1014

Weichs, Maximilian von 800, 837, 873,

Victor Emmanuel III [King of Italy] 843-44, 887

879, 1020

Vietinghoff, Heinrich von 1126

Weidermann, Alfred 828, 1138

Vlasov, Andrei ix, 155, 161-65, 635, 852, 857-59,

Weidling, Helmuth 717, 720, 726-27,

896, 950, 1013, 1085

736-38

Vogel, Wiinfri x Vokic, Ante 1010

Weinberg, Gerhard L. i, ix, 385-86, 947

Vormann, Nikolaus 955, 1138

Weinrich, Karl 934

Voss, Hans-Erich 152-53, 267, 277-78, 285, 301,

Weis.Karl 951

305, 312-16, 319, 322, 330, 437, 439, 441, 469,

Weise, Hubert 790

478, 492, 507, 513, 524, 596, 618, 727, 729-30,

Weisenborn, Gunther ,876, 1138

733, 735, 752

Weiss, Rudolf 596, 598, 608, 704, 748, 958

W

Weiss, Walter 1118

Wagenfiihr, Horst 828, 1138

Weissenberger, Theodor 922

Wagner, Adolf 108, 467, 469, 822, 908, 973, 988,

Weitershausen von 902,935,1138

1042, 1095, 1110

Weizsacker, Ernst 821, 882, 1031,1138

Wagner, Constantin 1007

Wenck, Walter 469, 476, 472, 499, 507-

Wagner, Eduard 829

13, 607, 610, 636, 708, 717-18, 720, 722,

Wagner, Fritz 1138

727-30 733, 735, 746-47, 757, 1091,

Wagner, Gerhard 751

1121

Wagner, Herbert 1083

Werthern, Georg-Thilo von 499, 1008

Wagner, Wolfgang 1136

West, Rebecca 859, 1138

/158

Hitler anp His Generals

Wcstphal, Siegfried 464, 467, 469,490, 543, 549-51, 573-74, 673, 757, 771, 838-39, 845, 862, 864, 875, 878, 881, 885-86, 888, 901, 985, 988,1035,1043,1045, 1103,1138 Wever, Waller 806 Weygand, Maxime 980 W'heeler-Bennett, John VC., 836, 977, 983,986-88,1138 Wide, Jef van de 941 Wiener, Fritz 768-69, 787, 834, 877, 893.1138 Wilhelm II [Kaiser] 772,816,842,1113, 1130 Willkie, Wendell 424, 959, 960,959 W”ilmot, Chester 768,791,842,895,913, 918, 921, 925-26, 953-54, 959, 965, 967, 969, 971, 975-78, 98384, 1001, 1005-006, 1008, 1017, 1029-030, 1039, 1043-045, 1048, 1053-054,1092,1103-104,1109, 1116-117,1138 Wilson, Henry Maitland 210, 880, 925 Winkler, Hermann 469, 990 Winter, August 596,618,622, 638,640, 743,757 Winzcr, Otto 1092, 1139 Wiskemann, FClizabeth 829, 841, 851, 887.1139 Witzell, Karl 615,1073 Witzig, Rudolf 12, 769 Wocrncr |Gcrman industrialist] 951 Wohler, Otto 41,586-87,590,623,758, 784, 990, 1068 Wolff, Karl 752, 874 Woodhousc, C. M. 1043, 1139 Wulf [deputy' police chief of Khar’kov] 927 Wuori, Eero Aarne 1034 Wuorinen, John H. 903, 1139

Y Yamamoto, Isoroku 801, 822 Yourichitch, Evgueniye 792,847, 1139 Z Zander, Wilhelm 619, 697, 700, 70607, 754 Zantke, Siegfried 958, 1139 Zanussi, Giacomo 881 Zehender, August 1080 Zeitzlcr, Kurt xxvi-xxvii, 7-10, 18-45, 57-63, 78-82, 84-6, 89, 100-04, 106-17, 121, 128, 131, 144-46, 148,154-55,158,160-73,176-77, 198-201, 203, 225-27, 233-34, 240,252-67,276-78,280,285-93, 296, 307, 313-16, 318, 323, 338, 349-63, 365-68, 372-84, 391, 401-07, 417-22, 424, 745, 758, 764, 778, 795, 814, 825, 829, 835, 851-52, 860, 881, 895, 897, 916, 923, 931, 933, 935-37, 944, 946,

1000 Zeller, Eberhard 896,936,974-75,977, 983-84, 986, 989, 1139 Zhukov, Georgi 418,420,441,618,674, 717,852,956, 1065, 1081 Zieb, Paul W illy 994-95 Ziemssen, Dietrich 1066,1139 Zilliacus, K. 792,1020,1139 Zimmermann, Bodo 596—600, 602, 1065 Zitzewitz, Coelestin von 61,800 Zoller, Albert 982,1139 Zvetkovic [Yugoslavian politician] 879, 929

Acknowledgements

The publisher wishes to extend a special thanks to David Kahn for his initial suggestion that Enigma Books pub¬ lish this English-language edition and to Dr. Gerhard L. Weinberg for his expert advice and introduction. We also wish to thank Mr. Jean Paul Dop for his help in the field of aeronautics history and attorney Walker Mang for his expertise in German military terminology. The arduous task of translating and editing this document belongs to a Berlin team directed by Ronald Winter, with Krista Smith and Mary Beth Friedrich. The publisher wishes to thank them all. In New York we thank Jay Wvnshaw and Asya Kunik for their excellent work on the final English text.

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