History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline 9780199490363, 0199490368, 9780199095803, 0199095809

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History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

Title Pages Rajan Gurukkal

(p.i) History and Theory of Knowledge Production (p.ii) (p.iii) History and Theory of Knowledge Production (p.iv) Copyright Page

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries. Published in India by Oxford University Press

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Title Pages 2/11 Ground Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110002, India © Oxford University Press 2019 The moral rights of the author have been asserted. First Edition published in 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. ISBN-13 (print edition): 978-0-19-949036-3 ISBN-10 (print edition): 0-19-949036-8 ISBN-13 (eBook): 978-0-19-909580-3 ISBN-10 (eBook): 0-19-909580-9 Typeset in ScalaPro 10/13 by Tranistics Data Technologies, Kolkata 700 091 Printed in India by Nutech Print Services India

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Dedication

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

(p.v) Dedication Rajan Gurukkal

For Romila Thapar (p.vi)

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Preface

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

(p.ix) Preface Rajan Gurukkal

This book seeks to provide a brief account of the history and theory of knowledge production, notwithstanding the vastness of the subject. Of the two constituents of the theme, ‘history’ and ‘theory’ of knowledge production, the first is amazingly vast at the outset, for it may presuppose a chronological sequential narrative about major items of knowledge and their authors, demanding an encyclopaedic approach. Joseph Needham’s Science and Civilization in China, dealing with the history of scientific knowledge, or Charles Van Doren’s A History of Knowledge: Past, Present, and Future, dealing with 5,000 years of human wisdom, come to our mind when we think of writing a book like the present one. Nevertheless, this project is not to present the history of knowledge in the form of a history of intellectual formation or history of ideas, for, unless specified in time and space, such attempts are also too vast for a small introductory book like this. It is a textbook of historical epistemology, which, in spatio-temporal terms, historicizes knowledge production and contextualizes methodological development. What subject matter should go into the making of the book has been influenced and prompted by the academic requirement of the beginners in the field of research or knowledge production. Naturally, the principal objective is to make researchers or producers of knowledge conversant with the significant elements that underlie (p.x) the history of knowledge. These elements constitute contemporary compulsions that make and shape knowledge. Understanding what they mean and how they work is essential to prepare researchers to be self-consciously realistic about the socio-economic and cultural process of knowledge production. They should know at least tenuously what forces engender knowledge and how certain forms of it acquire precedence over the rest and why. What the book addresses itself is the historical process of the Page 1 of 2

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Preface social constitution of knowledge, that is, the social history (however tentative it may be) of the making of knowledge. I was fascinated by the idea of a book like this during my stay in the campus of the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bengaluru, India, where I was Soundararajan Chair Visiting Professor at the Centre for Contemporary Studies (CCS) during 2008–9, giving lectures as part of the centre’s open course in knowledge production. Although I had started the work at that time, I was seriously at it since 2012, when I was in the same chair again. Most parts of the book were lectured at the centre during 2014–16. It would not have been possible for me to do this book but for the unstinting academic patronage of Raghavendra Gadagkar, chairperson of the CCS. I am obligated to P. Balaram and Anurag Kumar, during whose tenures as the director of the IISc I was granted visiting professorship at CCS. I am thankful to Amrita Shah, Bitasta Das, and Uday Balakrishnan for all their immense help and encouragement as my colleagues at CCS. I acknowledge the benefits of discussion with T.K.A. Nizar. I am grateful to Zarina Khan for her guidance in matters relating to the Persian and Arabic texts and indebted to P.P. Sudhakaran for his sceptical check on generalizations. I owe my interest in imagining galactic science and its post-human future to my brother, P.M. Mohanan. My indebtedness to Jalaja as well as Krishnaraj, the absent cause and destination of whatever research I do, is beyond words. Last but not the least, I thank the team of Oxford University Press for the brilliant production of the book. Rajan Gurukkal Bengaluru, India

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Introduction

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

Introduction Rajan Gurukkal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199490363.003.0001

Abstract and Keywords It is the introductory chapter that seeks to explain the need to theorize the history of knowledge production through an overview of the compelling features that necessitate theorization. It points out the landmarks in the history of knowledge production during the hoary past. A brief discussion of the methodological preoccupation, the theory of social formation as the central framework, and a chapter-wise outline is given. Keywords:   knowledge production, technology, methodology, theory, history, homo habilis, mesolithic people, neolithic revolution, ceramics, weaving

At the outset, one thing that the book seeks to render explicit is the need to theorize the history of knowledge production. This demands an overview of the compelling features that necessitate theorization. The first and foremost feature that makes theorization inevitable is the baffling antiquity of knowledge—the antiquity as old as human beings themselves. Naturally, it is amazingly extensive too. Knowledge production being an incessant activity integral to the biological properties of the Homosapien-sapiens, the size of the accrued knowledge is inestimably vast. However, most of this very ancient corpus of knowledge is irrecoverably lost. What has survived to our times is an assortment of fragments belonging to disparate periods. Depending on the ‘out of Africa’ thesis about human origins widely accepted in the light of fossil-relics studies of the last century and the mitochondrial DNA studies of recent times, we locate the beginnings of knowledge in North Africa, to be precise, Olduvai George of the Lake Rudolf region in Kenya (see Table 1.1).

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Introduction

Table 1.1 Landmarks of Knowledge Production Knowledge

Antiquity

Region

Stone-tool technology

3.5 million years BP Lake Rudolf, Kenya

Making fire

1.9 million years BP Lake Rudolf, Kenya

Hut construction

500,000 years BP

Japanese Islands

Burial construction

70,000 years BP

Neander Valley, Germany

Painting

40,000 years BP

El Castillo Cave, Spain

Lunar calendar

35,000 years BP

France and Germany

Agriculture

14,000 years BP

Jericho, Mesopotamia

Animal husbandry

14,000 years BP

Jarmo, Mesopotamia

Ceramic technology

14,000 years BP

Yuchanyan Cave, China

Canoe

10,000 years BP

Holland

Weaving technology

9,000 years BP

Palestine

Copper-smelting technology 6,700 years BP

Egypt

Wheel technology

5,300 years BP

Mesopotamia

Writing

5,300 years BP

Egypt and Mesopotamia

Alloying copper into bronze

4,000 years BP

Mesopotamia

Astronomy

4,000 years BP

Egypt

Source: Author. Knowledge of flaking stone pebbles and shaping animal bones into tools goes back to 3.5 million years before present (BP), as Potassium-Argon dating of Homo habilis fossil relics from Lake Rudolf in Kenya shows. Homo sapiens of the same place knew the technology of the production of fire 1.5 million years BP. These (p.2) people, who spread all over the world through western Asia, seem to have acquired the knowledge to build a hut by 500,000 years BP as relics from Japan suggest. Homo erectus over 70,000 years BP in Germany had knowledge of the construction of crude burial monuments. Mesolithic people had practised painting, the earliest survival of which at El Castillo Cave paintings in Cantabria, Spain, goes back to 40,000 years BP. Drawings of the moon as a few sets of crescents in an order of varying sizes, seen on certain animal bones collected from some of the Mesolithic sites in France and Germany, show awareness of the lunar cycle. Most significant advances in knowledge and technology happened during the Neolithic period, which is often qualified with the suffix ‘revolution’ because of the techno-economic rupture that it marks in human history through the Page 2 of 16

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Introduction invention of agriculture, domestication of animals, pot-making, weaving, hut architecture, and sedentary (p.3) village life. Although human history of the Palaeolithic Age involved several lakhs of years, the quantum of knowledge generated was quite marginal, compared to the amazingly vast extent of knowledge that the human civilization could produce within the short span since the Neolithic times. Mesopotamia had invented agriculture and practised animal husbandry around 14,000 BP, as the Carbon 14 dating of Jericho and Jarmo indicates. About the same period, the Neolithic people in Holland had the knowledge to devise boats, and those in China had invented pottery. Around 9,000 years BP the Neolithic people had learnt the art of weaving in Palestine. Some of them in Egypt had learnt copper smelting way back in 6,700 years BP. Some people in Mesopotamia invented the planked wheel and the technique of writing about 5,300 years BP in Egypt as well as Mesopotamia. They invented the technology of alloying copper into bronze by 4,000 years BP. Almost at the same time some people in Egypt had started generating knowledge in astronomy. These are some of the landmarks in the bewilderingly vast domain of the history of knowledge. Often, new knowledge replaced the old, indeed with continuity, changes, and ruptures, leaving traces of genealogy in the bewildering ensemble of fragments. Knowledge had no codified existence for many centuries and what has survived to the present day remains embedded in archaeological objects relating to past practices. In societies of literacy, knowledge is codified but with a variety of hurdles in the path of comprehension, such as multiplicity of forms, cognitive encounters, and contestations among them, genealogies and ruptures, embedded and explicit existence, knowable and unknowable properties, and so on. They are direct and indirect, sui generis and diffused, simple and complex, orderly and disorderly, stochastic and synergistic, and so on. There is synthesis and aggregation, besides the problem of elusive circulation, dialectical expansion, and mutual nullification. All this makes the history of knowledge baffling and unwieldy, necessitating theorization.

Methodology Scholars have vainly thought about the methodology of intellectual history and published several texts, but hardly with anything new or (p.4) specific about its logic.1 Interdisciplinary studies having exposed the claims of discipline-based methodology as baseless and illogical, the discussion of the history of ideas as a distinct discipline has no relevance. This is true of philosophers who have discussed the history of knowledge as historical epistemology and published studies about it, but with little or no contributions to methodology.2 Since knowledge cannot have a history of its own independent of social history, there is no point in searching for any special methodology for doing history of knowledge. Hence, the methodology followed in the present study is historical, of which historical materialism stands out distinctly for explanatory depth.

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Introduction It is the theory of social formation based on historical materialism that helps us contextualize and organize the history of knowledge.3 Primitive social formation had knowledge accrued over many centuries and inherited as oral tradition through numerous generations, pertaining to the technology of the hunting/ gathering means of (p.5) subsistence manifest in ways of hunting/gathering, the preparation of stone/bone tools, designing of animal traps, the identification of objects to be foraged and methods of foraging, as well as the survival strategies manifest in the selection of rock shelters; use of tree barks, dry grasses, and animal skins for protection from the weather; and so on. Unlike what is often presumed, knowledge in primitive societies was not simple, for it comprised of methods of using certain natural objects as medicine and the capability to identify subtle indications of natural calamities. Inherited and transmitted orally with additions and interpolations, the knowledge was preserved with continuity and change over millennia. Autonomous ethnic groups living in the forests and along the fringes had their orally transmitted practical knowledge with inseparable links to subsistence and survival. Nevertheless, the innate faculty of knowledge production was not active in all people, for many of them had existed as subsumed and controlled by one kind of institution or the other, depriving them of their natural autonomy. Knowledge in slave-based social formations, which pertained to the technology of agriculture and long-distance exchange, was quite advanced. It comprised knowledge of script, mathematics, medicine, astronomy, metallurgy of copper, gold and silver, alloy metallurgy, monumental architecture, sculpture, lapidary, luxury textile, fine ceramics, weaponry, urbanity, ship building, and so on. Most of this knowledge got carried over to the feudal social formation with additions to various fields, of which the most influential was iron metallurgy. In the capitalist social formation, the revolutionary growth of science and technology made ‘science’ the hegemonic form of knowledge. Automatic machinery for manufacture, transport, and communication marked the highest form of technology of all times. Who decides what knowledge means or what should be recognized as knowledge is the fundamental question we seek to answer in the book. It can be answered only by resorting to the framework of comprehension based on the theory of social formation and critical political economy, which necessitates contextualization of knowledge within the matrix of multiple socio-economic and politico-cultural systems. Another question it seeks to address is about the methodological aspects of the production of knowledge at different points in the past cultures. This demands that we try and historicize the (p.6) ontology and epistemology of knowledge in time and place, which is not plausible unless we confine the exercise to broad categories, namely the non-European and the European. Further, the short canvas of the book constrains us to confine the discussion of the non-European mainly to the Indian hermeneutics with a particular focus on the methodological aspects of knowledge production. This is Page 4 of 16

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Introduction done primarily in a relationship of comparison between the Indian and European systems of knowledge and methods of production thereof, notwithstanding the problem of the latter setting the primary principles. Ideas of the nature, structure, and methods of knowledge in the Indian subcontinent are either embedded in the system of knowledge or discussed as part of logic. They have to be ferreted out and related to the system of knowledge concerned, unlike in the case of Europe whose intellectual history is distinct for treating knowledge itself as an object of knowledge and developing specialized knowledge about knowledge into a separate branch of philosophy called epistemology. This is not to deny the existence of epistemological insights in Indian systems of knowledge, but to point out the existence of epistemology as a specialized branch of knowledge. Nevertheless, the larger Asian scene of knowledge production is not neglected altogether. We have tried to summarize the major contributions of the Arab world. Both the pre-Islamic as well as the Islamic Arab scholars, who constitute a substantial number, have made several path-breaking discoveries that have revolutionized the domain of knowledge. Arab scholars were great translators and transmitters of knowledge from different cultures, the significance of which cannot be exaggerated. In fact, it was this Arab knowledge mission that sustained the fire of classical Graeco-Latin wisdom for Europe to blow up into the Renaissance inferno.

Contents Made up of seven chapters, including ‘Introduction’, the book primarily resorts to the secondary source material and deals with most of the key topics coming under the overall theme. However, the discussion of the homology between the social formation and the knowledge form, which has to provide illustrations, is based on the (p.7) primary source, but confined to the Indian system, in original or in translation as permitted by the technical competence of the present investigator. In that sense, the role of the primary source is supplementary and confined to the study of a few specific instances by way of illustrations. Although India and China are specifically focussed on in a chapter, the purpose is only to trace the non-European roots of systematic knowledge production. Therefore, there is no attempt at narrating the entire history of knowledge in the country from the earliest to the present. We have not attempted to study the history of knowledge production during the colonial times on the assumption that no new specialized systems of knowledge independent of the European emerged during the period. Almost all systems of codified knowledge either got retarded or ceased to grow further under the colonial rule due to various reasons. In India, caste, as well as gender discrimination and exclusiveness, was the major and most well-known reason. Colonial juridico-political measures against village crafts such as textile Page 5 of 16

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Introduction manufacturing and iron smelting, which led to deindustrialization, were a major reason. Direct and indirect influence of epistemic prejudices engendered by the authority of Western science was another reason. Epistemic injustice of the dominant groups in imposing their knowledge system through suppression, incorporation, reconstitution, subordination, marginalization, and even destruction of knowledge systems of ethnic groups, which had been part of history, took on an unprecedented intensity under British colonialism. Even though there could be indigenous ways and means in the production of knowledge in the countries under the colonial regime, we have not sought to study them, for the process was that of a massive imposition of the Western system with the entailing homogenization. Similarly, what happened in the independent Indian and Chinese domains of knowledge production has not been contemplated within the scope of the book. It is the development of logic, methodology, and epistemology that we intend to look for, since the central objective of the study centres around the ways and means of knowledge production, rather than the content of the knowledge. Following the introductory chapter, the social theory of knowledge production is discussed briefly with a view to pointing out the methodological preoccupation of the book. It is a primary requirement for (p.8) us to examine the interconnection between knowledge and society in an attempt at understanding the history and theory of knowledge production. A concise representation of the social theory of knowledge production is the main task that we try and summarize in the chapter. Tracing the antecedents of social theories about the origins of knowledge by briefly reviewing the ideas of Giovanbattista Vico and Auguste Comte, we focus on Karl Marx’s theory. Other theories explaining the social foundation of knowledge through multiple analyses of the influences of social affairs, conditions, and processes of human existence on the cognitive outputs have also been summarized. A few frameworks dealt with more specifically are of Émile Durkheim’s thesis of collective representations, Max Scheler’s concept of historical determination, Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin’s idealistic cultural determination, Karl Mannheim’s phenomenological materialism, and Michel Foucault’s discourse analysis. Stating various frameworks, the chapter deals slightly at length with Marx’s theory of social formation, for it is the homologous relationship between the socio-economic process of integration of unevenly evolved communities under the dominance of a superior community and the intellectual integration of their multiple knowledge forms under the dominance of the superior community’s knowledge that we consider important. What we sought to rely on is not the theory as left by Marx alone but the niceties and nuances developed by Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, Balibar, Barry Hindess, Paul Q. Hirst, Maurice Godelier, Nicos Poulantzas, Emmanuel Terry, Foster-Carter, Pierre Phillippe Rey, and others as well.

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Introduction As in the case of any other place on the Earth, the primeval context of knowledge production in the non-European world, especially in ancient India and China, was that of subsistence as well as survival and, naturally, the knowledge related to subsistence tools for hunting, gathering, and agriculture as well as weapons for defence. The survival strategies involved knowledge of magic, medicine, and architecture too, which was a combination of rational and irrational explanations even in the case of technology. Naturally, knowledge included aspects of eschatology, theology, philosophy, theory, art, aesthetics, amusements, and games. It is this historical scenario that the third chapter seeks to address by tracing the non-European roots of specialized knowledge production in the ancient times as illustrated by the (p.9) civilizations of the Indian and the Chinese regions. Examining the archaeology and ethnoarchaeology of the remains of the civilizations in the valleys of the Indus and Yellow Rivers, we try and capture the earliest knowledge in craft production technology like architecture, metallurgy, lapidary, and ceramics. Orally transmitted Vedic knowledge, eschatology, metaphysics, grammar, phonetics, astronomy, the post-Vedic systems of thought, Ayurvedic knowledge, architecture, nature of metallurgical texts, the Indian and Chinese textual traditions, and epistemological traces constitute other contents of the chapter. This chapter underscores early India’s methodologically distinct aphoristic structure of stating truth as astute observations generalized as self-validated principles, the logic of which corresponds to that of mathematical equations or formulas. As traces of knowledge about methods used for establishing the reliability of knowledge, the aphorisms are indications of epistemology. Those engaged in testing the reliability of knowledge considered inferences as an invalid means of knowledge unless its reliability could be established and they disapproved of the use of inferences in testing the validity of metaphysical truth. The progress of an inference towards truth was always a matter of uncertainty for them. They defined truth as complete in itself, as unconditionally established through direct observations, premises, and conditions. This epistemological position continues as fundamental to the ways and means of validating knowledge throughout the succeeding ages in India. Linguists the world over today recognize that the first ever accomplished state of epistemology distinct for its aphoristic theorization, algorithmic computation, and logical perfection was achieved in the production of knowledge about the Sanskrit language, thanks to Pāṇini. Another major landmark in the history of Indian epistemology was Nāgārjuna’s fourfold negation (catuṣkoṭī), namely affirmation, negation, equivalence, and neither. Perfecting it as the rigorously self-reflexive and extremely critical method of establishing the reliability of the knowledge, Nyāya sets the final standard for every system of thought in India. Ayurveda seems to have strictly adhered to it through its methodology of tantrayukti (method of reasoning). However, it was sustained with greater insistence on the production of proof in mathematical astronomy, which laid the Page 7 of 16

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Introduction foundation of the logic of infinity and the technique of differential calculation. (p.10) A distinct epistemic shift is explicit in the Indian astronomy of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries CE as the mathematical advances made by Mādhava of Sangamagrāma (c. 1340–1425 CE) in Kerala testify. Mādhava had made several new discoveries of which a better approximation of the value of pi and the sine– cosine infinite series along with their higher trigonometric functions constitute the most remarkable. There is no more controversy today over the issue as to who discovered calculus, for Mādhava’s discovery of the fundamental principle behind the infinite power series, over two centuries before J. Gregory, G.W. Leibniz, and Isaac Newton, has been accepted by the world of mathematicians. Mādhava’s mathematics were improved upon by several mathematicians of Kerala, particularly Nīlakaṇṭha Somayājī and Jyēṣṭadēva. Nīlakaṇṭha exemplifies the perfection of early Indian epistemic universals in knowledge production such as rationality, analytical understanding of the extant knowledge, introduction of new mathematical tools, generation of inductive mathematical proofs for previous theorems, and hermeneutic additions. It is with Jyēṣṭadēva that the insistence upon the production of proof becomes a primary epistemological necessity. His Yuktibhāṣā, written in Malayalam, is the earliest known book in calculus. The reason for the discovery of calculus in a small region in Kerala during the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries CE, which was characterized by agrarian economy and hierarchical society, dominated by the Nampūtiri brāhmaṇa landlords, has also been discussed in the chapter. Nampūtiris had socioeconomic as well as ritual reasons for acquiring knowledge in astronomy for predicting seasons and eclipses. Since an eclipse could make a Vedic ritual futile, bringing disgrace to its officiating priests and the patron, prediction of eclipses was extremely important. Although there were professional astrologers, it was the Nampūtiri brāhmaṇas who were experts in astronomy and in the higher calculation required for setting the calendar called pancangaganitam based on nakshatra-tithi-vārayogakaraṇa. The whole society was in need of the calendar, not only for the knowledge about seasons, but also for fixing auspicious moments (muhūrttam), about which people were obsessed. In short, competency in mathematics, the most effective tool of astronomical calculation, was indispensable. A discussion of the possibility of transmission of knowledge from India to other subcontinents and the uniformity of epistemological (p.11) parameters in the East as well as the West is a section in the chapter. It is a fact that knowledge had always circulated across regions within and beyond the Indian subcontinent. Often it spread to Persia and the Arab world in the West and to China and the larger Asia in the east, through long-distance traders. Similarly, there was a great possibility of overseas transmission of knowledge from the Kerala region Page 8 of 16

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Introduction to the Persian world and Europe through maritime traders and Jesuit missionaries. Certain correspondences between Nīlakaṇṭha’s model of the planetary motion and that of Tycho Brahe; between Jyēṣṭadēva’s formula showing a passage to infinity and the formula of Pierre Fermat, John Wallis, and Blaise Pascal; and between the results obtained by Bhāskara II’s continued fractions and those of John Wallis’s are exciting. There existed no difference in the epistemic parameters of mathematical astronomy of India and Europe in the seventeenth century. The chapter ends with a very concise discussion of the Chinese history of knowledge systems across the material cultures there, starting from the Bronze Age civilization and through the various periods like those of the Shang and Zhou rulers, the battling chieftains, and the Qin, Han, and Tang rulers, to the Song kings. Production of codified knowledge in China began during the period of battling chieftains and the thrust was naturally moral principles and metaphysical cosmology, attested by Yijing, or the book of changes. Inherited as oral tradition, moral principles comprised of old poetry, juridico-political ideas from the speeches of Zhou rulers, and historical chronicles. These were redacted and interpreted by Confucius into a moral way of life. Chinese knowledge remained largely uninfluenced by the outside world other than the Indian subcontinent. Indian thoughts, particularly Buddhism, had significantly impacted Chinese cosmology based on Taoism. Astronomical observations by the Chinese astronomers from the Han and Tang periods constitute a very valuable account that contains the world’s first record of a supernova (SN 185) experience. As early as in 190 CE, Chinese mathematicians had calculated the value of π up to the accuracy of five decimals. The Tang period witnessed four great inventions, namely papermaking, printing, the compass, and gunpowder. During the Song period, knowledge in mining, metal smelting, bronze metallurgy, and minting coins had (p.12) made considerable progress. There was advancement of knowledge in healthcare, astronomy, mathematics, geology, architecture, statecraft, and jurisprudence. King Su Song, a polymath himself, got an astronomical record and a medical compilation prepared by a team of scholars between 1058 and 1061 CE. He also built at Kaifeng in 1088 CE a rotating astronomical clock tower representing lines of celestial longitude, latitude, and various other astronomical features. During the Song period, two more supernovas, one SN 1006, the brightest in history, and the other SN 1054, now the remnant known as the Crab Nebula, were observed and recorded. Shen Kuo, another polymath, wrote in 1088 CE a book Meng Xi Bi Tan, which provides knowledge about various things such as fossils, geomorphological features, landscape formation, natural phenomena, mathematics, astronomy, woodcraft, and water-transport technology. He solved a few problems in geometry and measured the lengths of arcs of circles, eventually providing the Page 9 of 16

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Introduction basis for spherical trigonometry that Guo Shoujing subsequently established. Equally significant are his contributions to geology, geomorphology, geography, and experimental optics. His justification for reshaping the landscape due to soil erosion, land sliding, silting, flooding, and the like still makes sense. His other contributions are fixing of the antiquity of a site on the basis of archaic relics, identifying indicators of climate change in geography, and a dry-dock design for repair works. Ouyang Xiu’s method of generating historical knowledge by analysing marks on old stone and bronze objects opened up a new way of writing the history of artefacts and interpreting their specific features as textures of culture, long before the inception of archaeology and epigraphy in Europe. Chinese knowledge production acquired a new dimension during the Yuan and Ming periods of cross-cultural contacts, especially with the Arab Muslim world and the Indian subcontinent. Chinese astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, and technologies spread to these worlds and improved themselves. There is no indication of the making of epistemology in the Chinese knowledge system. Such a situation suggests axiological prescriptions and infallible metaphysics addressing the wholeness of the human in nature. It left Chinese knowledge invariably a priori and inherently inductive with little scope for reflexivity and theorization. It foreclosed the question (p.13) of epistemology or methodology reflecting on the mode of reasoning and strategies of truth verification. Egyptian civilization marks the beginning of the formal production of knowledge in architecture, astronomy, mathematics, and alchemy. All these domains witnessed an unprecedented advancement in the Greek civilization as the huge architectural and sculptural vestiges, bronze metallurgy, fine-quality ceramics, and lapidary art suggest. Mathematical astronomy of early Mesopotamia and Sumeria survived, improved upon by the Babylonians by way of redacted and supplemented lists of planets, stars, and constellations. Similarly, West Asia had produced a lot of knowledge in medicine, particularly surgery. They had made some achievements in mechanics as well. Referring to these backdrops of ancient times, the fourth chapter, devoted to the European roots of systematic knowledge production, first deals with the exponential growth of knowledge in the classical Greek and Hellenic civilizations. Ancient Greeks expressed their inclination to worldly life and material culture through the production of technology. As in the case of India, Greeks had a phase of eschatological questions and metaphysical answers, but with a lot of rational knowledge in them. Pre-Socrates intellectuals such as Thales of Miletus, the first known mathematician and geographer; Anaximander of Miletus, an eminent astronomer and mathematician; Heraclitus of Ephesus, the first known natural philosopher postulating fire as the primary substance; Anaxagoras, a scholar in astronomy and the first philosopher of Athens; Pythagoras of Samos, the first true mathematician of the world; and Empedocles of Agrigentum, another natural philosopher postulating that all the objects of the cosmos were made up of the Page 10 of 16

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Introduction four fundamental substances, namely the earth, water, air, and fire, were the main architects of ancient Greek knowledge. This phase, largely of metaphysics, dissolved itself into one of greater self-reflexivity and critical epistemology, as represented by Socrates and Plato of Athens and Aristotle of Stagira, the three most influential Greek philosophers. Inheriting their precursors’ wisdom, they enunciated theoretical knowledge about matter as well as ideas, letting it be debated towards perfection. Socrates was a great astronomer, mathematician, and philosopher and Plato, his great successor, whose central idea was an unchanging, indivisible, and the perfect eternal that is independent of the multitude objects of sense in a permanent flux precluding genuine (p.14) existence for any. Aristotle was his illustrious disciple, who became a school by himself, influencing generations of scholars. Euclid, the great Alexandrian mathematician; Eratosthenes of Cyrene, the first to calculate the circumference of the Earth quite accurately; Archimedes of Syracuse, a mathematician, astronomer, mechanist, technologist, and experimentalist natural philosopher; Claudius Ptolemy, mathematician, astronomer, geographer, and physicist who proposed the geocentric theory; and Claudius Galenus of Pergamon, now known as Galen, were all Aristotelians. In all these scholars, the theory of knowledge is a leavening influence coming from the thoughts of Socrates, who had treated knowledge itself as an object of knowledge. That shows the beginnings of epistemology. Dealing with the onset of the Dark Age against the historical background of the larger Asian intellectual contributions and the antecedents of knowledge production in North Africa, the chapter goes into the contributions made by the Achaemenid Persian Empire and its destruction by the Arab invasion. It then reviews knowledge production in the Byzantine Christian monasteries where Christian philosophers such as Anthemius of Tralles, John Philoponus, Paul of Aegina, Venerable Bede, Rabanus Maurus, and others were engaged in studying mathematics, astronomy, medicine, and mechanics. This is followed by a discussion of the Arab Muslim engagement with the classical Greek and Hellenic knowledge by way of translation, interpretation, and academic extension. Drawing the broad contours of the Arab epistemology, the section shows how the Arab scholars retained, improved upon, and carried forward the Greek scholarship in different fields, enabling Europe to trigger the Renaissance movement. It includes a review in recognition of the medieval Catholic scholars’ contribution to the growth of new knowledge in mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, and philosophy, which also had a role in the intellectual preparation for the onset of Renaissance in Europe. Eminent Arab scholars such as Muhammad Ibn al-Khwarizmi, Al-Kindī, Avicenna, Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyā al-Rāzī, Al-Batani, and so on are remembered in the context. Arab scholars of Islamic Spain made substantial academic contributions in carrying forward Graeco-Roman astronomy, mathematics, Page 11 of 16

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Introduction medicine, optics, mechanics, architecture, music, and jurisprudence. Great Arab polymaths such as Abbas Ibn Firnas, Abu al-Qasim al-Qurtubi al-Majriti, (p.15) Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyā al-Rāzī, Abulcasis, Arzachel, Ibn Bajja, Averroes, Ibn al-Baitar, and so on are examples. The production of knowledge over four centuries by these Arab experts in various fields demonstrates a systematic improvement of the Greek and Hellenic epistemology into what can be called the Arab experimentalist methodology and critical epistemology. A review of the features and dynamics of knowledge production in the age of Renaissance, noted for the spirit of inquiry and criticism, constitutes the opening section of the fifth chapter. It examines the impetus of great intellectuals such as Roger Bacon and others, the growth of natural philosophy of Copernicus, Galileo, Francis Bacon, Descartes, and Newton on the contemporary mode of knowledge production, which eventually led to the making of the Age of Enlightenment. How Newton’s theories of objects, position, relations, dynamics, and velocity, which went into the making of a new field of knowledge called mechanics in natural philosophy, explaining the fundamental laws of the motion of bodies under the action of forces, became the hegemonic model for the centuries that succeeded, is the core of the chapter. It shows how the Newtonian inductive theorization of absolute space as independent of objects and of the universal time revolutionized the entire domain of knowledge and became the epochal model. Further, it shows how the emulation of the method of Newton’s Principia led to the constitution of the Age of Enlightenment, distinct for its aweinspiring intellectual landmarks in the history of knowledge production. Newtonian methodology became an epochal imposition on the production of knowledge and scholars felt like insisting upon analysing everything in the light of reason and sustaining the conviction that understanding a phenomenon becomes complete only with the discovery of fundamental laws or principles thereof. Inquiries even into aspects of sociocultural life of manifold dimensions were influenced by the same methodological imperative. Elements of philosophy of science in Immanuel Kant’s writings, which contributed to enhance clarity about epistemological properties of reliable knowledge, become part of the discussion. It shows how Newton’s absolute inductive mechanics as knowledge of authority, authenticity, and universality led to the rise of foundationalism, positivism, and modernity. (p.16) Discussing the historiography and philosophy of the rise of universal knowledge in the nineteenth century CE, the chapter shows how the period discovered what had happened in natural philosophy through Newton’s Principia Mathematica as a scientific revolution, and the recognition accounted for the redesignation of Newtonian mechanics as science. An individual philosopher and historian of science responsible for it was William Whewell. He defined science as knowledge of the knowable world ascertained by observation, critically examined, systematically classified on the basis of general principles, and Page 12 of 16

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Introduction expressed in mathematical formalism. According to him, science grew up through new discoveries as well as fresh explanations of old discoveries by scientists who expanded and deepened the theoretical knowledge. It was he who coined and popularized terms like ‘scientist’ and ‘scientific.’ Contextualizing the process, the chapter reviews the theoretical history of science that began in the early nineteenth century against the backdrop of the Age of Enlightenment. It demonstrates the trajectory of scientific growth over several centuries culminating in the integration of a huge corpus of knowledge distinct for theories of universal application. How the establishment of the scientific method as the only reliable means of production of knowledge and the rise of the Enlightenment landmarks led to the emergence of grand theories of the same methodological preoccupation is another question dealt with. It involves a discussion of the overall academic impact that led to the caging of knowledge into disciplines and designating those disciplines specializing in human affairs as social sciences. A discussion of the rise of ‘new science’ and its impact on the production of knowledge constitutes the sixth chapter. It starts with a concise review of the features, dynamics, and process of knowledge production during the twentieth century CE in the form of new inventions, discoveries, and logical thoughts, which went into the making of the new science. Inventions and discoveries went hand in hand, theorizing knowledge regarding the micro- as well as macrouniverses. Virtually illuminating the invisible universe of subatomic dynamics through mathematical formalism and probability theory, rather than empiricism based on instrumentation, a new kind of science began to take shape. A subtopic the chapter discusses simultaneously is the rise of historiography of science as an academic discipline, primarily (p.17) for the purpose of educating the youth about the values of discoveries and inventions. Writing the history of science for teaching it in universities had a humanistic goal, for science was understood as the march of human progress and scientific values as the foundation of human unity. The history of science written during the early decades of the twentieth century CE was in the form of a compendium of discoveries and inventions in their chronological order, intended to be demonstrative of human progress in time and educative of scientific values. In the previous century, the purpose was almost entirely philosophical and hence focussed on epistemological analyses of scientific theories and their logical critique. That tradition was not entirely discontinued during the twentieth century CE. A team of neo-Kantian scholars, known as the Vienna Circle, holding experience as the only source of knowledge and logical analysis as the only way to resolve philosophical issues, continued the tradition of making science’s epistemological evaluation for ensuring its authenticity and unassailable certainty. Their logical empiricist enterprise was not just an academic exercise of epistemological

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Introduction rigour, but a committed political engagement for social emancipation from the clutches of theology and metaphysics. Another aspect highlighted in the chapter is the context of World War II, which had exerted enormous pressure on science and technology. Belligerent nation states, as part of establishing their research enterprises for devising powerful arms and ammunition, mobilized many scientists and technologists in universities and institutes. This had led to a good number of new discoveries and inventions, which could not only generate unprecedentedly destructive weapons but could also revolutionize the technology of communication and transport. In this connection, the War, the wartime growth of science and technology, and the post-War diplomacy have been viewed as part of the capitalist need for enhancing control over raw material and expanding the markets in order to come out of the economic depression of the 1930s. At the end of the chapter, it has been shown how, during the period, the domain of knowledge production got largely divested of its epistemological criticality, not only due to the World War, but also because of a series of path-breaking discoveries and inventions. Exceptions to this were Thomas Kuhn’s social theoretical history of science representing scientific revolutions as paradigm (p.18) shifts, Lakatos’s historiographical meta-method of analysing scientific theories, and Murton’s Puritan thesis explaining the genesis of scientific knowledge as social creation through negotiation. The creation of the new science through a series of strange discoveries constitutes the core of the chapter. Max Planck’s proposition of the quanta, Niels Bohr’s discovery of objects’ non-observable and immeasurable complementary properties, Erwin Schrodinger’s interpretation of the object–subject split as a figment of the imagination, Werner Karl Heisenberg’s enunciation of the uncertainty principle precluding the possibility of precision about certain pairs of physical properties of a particle, Kurt Friedrich Godel’s thesis of undecidability based on his incompleteness theorems demonstrating certain inherent limits of provability about formal axiomatic theories, Murray GellMann’s theory of complexity in particle physics, Richard Feynman’s thesis of quantum mechanics, and Einstein’s theories of relativity literally shook the Newtonian physics of certainty with problems of uncertainty and subjectivity. It raised major epistemological issues against the absolute induction of Newtonian physics with certainty, finality, authenticity, and logo-centrism. This challenge of new science demolished the intellectual foundation of various social science disciplines and the epistemic world view called modernity. Naturally, the new science’s features such as uncertainty, undecidability, complexity, tentativeness, and anti-logocentrism put up an altogether different epistemic position that engendered the onset of what is called the postmodern condition.

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Introduction Against the academic background of postmodernism rejecting all grand theories of absolute induction, teleological narration, and totalizing explanation for accepting the fragmentary, diverse, tenuous, and culture-specific analyses, the chapter provides an overview of discourse analysis, different perspectives of constructivism, new epistemologies, interdisciplinary approach, and convergence research influencing knowledge production. Sensitive to the linguistic and textual impact on the construction of specific reality and cultural specificity, postmodernism gives the local or the particular or the concrete precedence over the global or general or the abstract in the methodology of knowledge production. Constructivist epistemology views reality captured in academic writings as an outcome of interaction between human intelligence and worldly experience. Despite (p.19) the explicit homology between the post-War political economy and the production of scientific knowledge of application, several historians of science were content with narrating biographical accounts of scientists, stories relating to experimentation, episodes of laboratory life, and academic achievements of research institutions. It became purely a matter of choice whether historians of science should insist upon external social theoretical causality or be confined solely to the internal academic dynamic in their historicizing of science. An important aspect that the chapter examines is the phenomenon of the science of uncertainty giving birth to a technology of certainty, transforming the world radically. In fact, it was a process of science turning into technology or science and technology hybridizing each other. Several science-tech hybrid fields emerged accordingly. This is the result of the capitalist economy’s dependence on science and technology for using them as commodity and capital. Today’s capitalism, technically called techno-capitalist global economy, is popularly known as knowledge economy. Corporate houses have opened several huge experimentalist institutions for the production of marketable knowledge through research in the interface of science and technology. They are able to accumulate enormous capital out of transactions of marketable knowledge, patents, and intellectual property rights. At the end, the chapter makes a review of speculative thoughts and imagination about the dynamics of subatomic micro-universe as well as the mechanics of the galactic macro-universe. Studies based on anthropic imagination have shown the position of the Earth in the solar system and life forms there as an extremely strange coincidence of multiple factors. According to many, it appears that the universe is so constituted as to be suitable to have the evolution of life from its unicellular state to that of a conscious human being. Some think about the possibility of many Earth-like planets in the universe with lower and higher forms of life. They imagine the possibility of using the higher and higher sources of energy for evolving higher and higher forms of life outside the planet. Imagining the ontological union between the macro- and micro-levels of consciousness in the language of particle physics, many have generated a Page 15 of 16

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Introduction commendable body of speculative literature. Some of them combine the quantum field theory or quantum entanglement or quantum coherence to explain (p.20) the mysterious micro-universe of particles. They try and understand consciousness as quantum consciousness. Roger Penrose, putting the ‘matter-mind dichotomy’ to an end, categorically declares that the laws of new science about quantum gravity seem to govern consciousness too. Recapitulating some of the main elements of the discussion by way of a summary and an independent afterword, the book comes to an end. Notes:

(1) For examples of such detailed discussions, see Mark Bevir. 1999. The Logic of the History of Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also, see Donald R. Kelley. 2002. The Descent of Ideas: The History of Intellectual History. London: Ashgate. (2) Some of the scholars of historical epistemology have viewed conditions and possibilities transcending social causes and biographical idiosyncrasies as central. According to them, historical epistemology deals with the fundamental concepts that organize the knowledge of different historical periods. They define it as the knowledge area that introduces historical contingency into the ways of understanding, which appear inescapable. See Jurgen Renn. 1996. ‘Historical Epistemology and the Advancement of Science’, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Reprint, 36, p. 4; Ian Hacking. 1999. The Social Construction of What. Harvard: Harvard University Press, pp. 5–35. There is a clear exposition of it in Lorraine Daston. 1994. ‘Historical Epistemology’, in James Chandler, Arnold I. Davidson, and Harry D. Harootunian (eds), Questions of Evidence, Proof, Practice, and Persuasion across the Disciplines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 275–83. (3) See K. Marx. 1953. Grundrisse. Berlin: Marxist Internet Archive, p. 104. Also, see the relevant extracts in E.J. Hobsbawm (ed.). 1964. Pre-capitalist Economic Formations. London: Lawrence & Wishart, p. 12; B. Hindess and P.Q. Hirst. 1977. Pre-capitalist Modes of Production. London: Macmillan. pp. 10–11.

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

Social Theory of Knowledge Production Rajan Gurukkal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199490363.003.0002

Abstract and Keywords A concise representation of the social theory of knowledge production is the main task that we try and summarize in this chapter. Tracing the antecedents of social theories about the origins of knowledge by briefly reviewing the ideas of Giovanbattista Vico and Auguste Comte we focus on Karl Marx’s theory. Other theories explaining the social foundation of knowledge through multiple analyses of the influences of social affairs, conditions, and processes of human existence on the cognitive outputs have also been summarized. Keywords:   historical materialism, collective representations, historical determination, socio-economic process, intellectual integration, cognitive outputs, dominance, epistemic injustice, epistemic prejudice

‘Know’ is the root from which the word ‘knowledge’ derives, denoting the action of knowing or understanding something, although the linguistic and semantic rationale of the end syllable remains obscure. It is well known that a human being is a knowing animal, strikingly different from all other beings that are sentient. Knowledge is the output of the knower’s cognitive activity and it becomes an acquired property of embodied subjects who know not only the knowable material fact around them but also the abstract truth about them, as animals capable of knowing even about themselves.1 Here the knower is selfconscious about the process of knowing and reflexive about the very urge to know. In other words, a kowing animal is a being with self-awareness and is often capable of wondering about oneself and about everything that catches its attention. It is sensory perception interpreted by the brain at the instance of previous experiences stored as memory that constitutes knowledge or understanding. In self-awareness, everybody seeks to know about anything and Page 1 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production it (p.22) constitutes knowledge every time through a fresh cumulative process of cognition involving revision, addition, deletion, or even reconstitution of understanding, although not uniformly active in many, who in turn, go by what others broadcast as truth. In fact, it is the process of learning–unlearning continuum. How people experience, get impressions, organize ideas, and formulate knowledge have been matters of analysis and debate in philosophy from very early times onward.2 It is not the natural process of human knowing, organically linked up as part of the unconscious, that the philosophers analysed but the logical process of human cognition leading to the constitution of knowledge.

Social History Perspective The human brain is so capacitated as to be genetically capable of experiential learning unconsciously as well as consciously, memorizing, reproducing, rethinking, comparing, and improving knowledge from time immemorial. Over the years, the human faculty of reflexivity grew up tremendously, enabling the constitution of knowledge as an object of analysis, reconstitution of it, and production of it afresh. Nevertheless, the faculty has not been active uniformly in everyone due to biological and socio-economic reasons. Living in groups as subsumed by norms of the collective unconscious in primeval times, humans had to act not as they thought but the way their heads construed on the basis of what knowledge was according to them. In a band, the authority of thought and actions was the shaman; in the tribe, it was the head; in the slave society, the master; in the feudal society, the lord; and so on. It was indeed too complex a situation to be recounted in detail as empirically given. The study of knowledge production requires us to examine the interconnection between knowledge and society in the light of critical social theory that postulates a homology between the form of (p.23) knowledge and the formation of society—say, society as social formations and forms of knowledge as epistemic paradigms.3 Society consists of multiple aspects or features that would appear mishmash in the absence of a theory that explains their connectedness. The study of society makes sense only if we conceive it in terms of its constituents, relations, institutions, ideas, practices, structures, systems, and processes. The only comprehensive theory that serves the purpose is that of the social formation conceiving society as systems of epochal identity. Knowledge being integral to the subsistence and survival strategies of people, theoretically, modes of subsistence and survival would explain the mode of knowledge production (see Figure 2.1). In primordial societies, knowledge production was subsumed by material production and, hence, remained inseparable from the material processes of the use and development of means of production. In subsequent social formations with advanced division of labour based on hereditary specialization of arts and crafts, knowledge production began to involve two levels—one that was integral to practice and the other Page 2 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production distinguished as theory. The practical as well as theoretical knowledge of arts and crafts of hereditary specialization owed its production to communities, which inherited it as a tradition of continuity and change. Elders of the community of hereditary specialization were experts in both theory as well as practice, thanks to their long experiential learning by doing. As master craftsmen or master artisans, they had control over the practitioners of their trades, which was largely communitarian in character and hence inseparable from communitarian power. Theory is symbolic of power, for it controls practice. Naturally, theoretical knowledge has always been the string of control over practices, which accounts for the appropriation and alienation of theory by the dominant class. Knowledge is not always rational, although it pertains to the material processes of subsistence and survival. Bizarre beliefs and practices (p.24) often go mixed up with the use of technology and the communities seldom make any separation between the material tools and magical rituals. In pre-capitalist social formations, rational knowledge and irrational practices were inextricably commingled. Time and again, the rational knowledge owed its origins to irrational beliefs (see Figure

Figure 2.1 Production and Transmission of Knowledge Source: Author.

2.2). The rise of ancient Indian astronomy with advanced mathematical tools is a good example for this.

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production It becomes a pertinent question as to why a non-European concept of the past and theory of knowledge, say Indian particularly, is not relied upon in a study like this, in spite of the lurking threat of anybody’s branding of the enterprise as Euro-centric. History as a diachronic perspective of the sequential social development explained in terms of rational causality has no better substitute in the non-European historical traditions. Early Indian scholars had several logical strategies like sceptical procedures, highly critical (p. 25) and self-reflexive, for

Figure 2.2 Progress of Knowledge and Community Source: Author.

ensuring the reliability of knowledge, presupposing the prevalence of methods for epistemological evaluation. The level of knowledge production was also high. One could certainly try and use Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhatta in India or Analects of Confucius, which we are incapable of for want of competency. However, the basic concepts and categories of knowledge for Mahimabhatta and Confucius are not the same. Properties that determine the nature of reliable knowledge for the two are not mutually compatible. This ontological incompatibility does matter, because the epistemological meanings, measures and parameters what the world use today signify an altogether different characterization of reliable knowledge.

(p.26) Social Theory of Knowledge The social theory of knowledge explaining the relationship between social processes and human ideas had its antecedents as early as in the beginning of the seventeenth century CE with Francis Bacon (1561–1626 CE) attributing the origins of thoughts to impressions of nature imposed upon the mind.4 Antecedents of the sociology of knowledge can be discerned in the thoughts of Giovanbattista Vico (1668–1744 CE), an Italian historian and philosopher, whose discussions of new knowledge contain plenty of insights about the relationship between knowledge and society.5 Vico was the first to enunciate and practise a new methodology combining history and social thoughts. He conceives in his study two worlds—the natural world and the social world—that are understandable in two different ways. The natural world can be understood through the external or empirical source, while the social world can be known both internally as well as externally. Primarily focussed on historical Page 4 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production methodology, Vico theorizes that in order to study a society’s history one should go beyond the chronology of events and grasp the cultural traits of collective existence called the ‘civil world’. Cultural traits comprise thoughts, ideas, norms, myths, religious beliefs, rites, rituals, institutions, and actions, which are generated by the mind as social, structurally contingent products. These have to be analytically accessed, unlike the concrete physical world, for they are abstract and unstable entities like the mind that generates them. A historical perspective, which brings changes implicit in the individual and society, is viewed as essential here. Vico’s focus is the dialectical relationship between society and culture, which he thinks crucial in this historical perspective. It is said that Montesquieu and Karl Marx were influenced by Vico’s conception of cultural relativism and historicism. Several thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had reflected upon the question, but Auguste Comte (1798–1857 CE) was (p.27) the first to attempt a systematic history and theory of knowledge.6 He made a three-stage typology of knowledge forms and an order of their evolution in close correspondence with the three stages in the evolution of social structures. According to him, primordial society’s knowledge was theological, constituted by irrational explanations based on supernatural powers and personified gods. Knowledge in the society of a relatively advanced type was metaphysical, consisting of explanations in the form of conceptual abstraction. In the most advanced society, knowledge became philosophy, consisting of positivistic explanations. Marx theorized the genesis of ideas in the individual mind under the influence of the incumbent’s class position and function as required by the mode of production. He says: The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary their social existence determines their consciousness. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.7 A certain degree of intrinsic autonomy might be there as regards the juridicopolitical, religious, and cultural ideas. Similarly, logic, mathematics, and science, due to their methodology, would transcend the trap of ideology. Nevertheless, the class association, together with the relation to mode of production, with such systems of knowledge is explicit, which ultimately makes them ideological. Marx’s theory of social formation is the most comprehensive framework for analysing as well as interpreting the nature, position, and function of knowledge in relation to the socio-economic aggregate in time and space. It is therefore,

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production necessary to briefly state what the theory of social formation means and how it helps us explain the structure and function of knowledge.

(p.28) Other Social Theories The social theory of knowledge refers to a systematic explanation of the social foundation of knowledge. It comprises multiple analyses of the bearing of social conditions of human existence on the cognitive outputs covering the entire intellectual products. As an exercise in theorization, its scope is to try and construct a homologous relation between social processes and knowledge production. A host of American pragmatists such as C.S. Peirce (1839–1914 CE) and William James (1842–1910) persisted in maintaining that thoughts and ideas in themselves are bound by the social situation in which they originate. According to these scholars, the socially designed ideas constitute the situation for attempting their analysis against the homologous relations between the thinker and thinker’s audience. Actually, a major social theory of knowledge was put forward by Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), a French sociologist and Kantian philosopher who is famous for his theories in various issues such as the family, social structures, social institutions, political economy, and sociology of knowledge. Social explanation is his principal hermeneutic framework for any issue subjected to sociological analysis. Durkheim was the first sociologist to study social determinants of knowledge as a specialized topic and he sought to understand the social origins of the concepts and categories of logical thought. Durkheim enunciates his social theory of knowledge in his study of religious life founded on ideas/institutions, namely animism, naturism, totemism, myth, and ritual.8 His book goes into the depth of the social origins of religion, language, and logical thought, theorizing the social determination of their function and influence as well. Another vital constituent of Durkheim’s social theory of knowledge is the concept of collective representations (représentations collectives).9 Collective representations are symbolic images of ideas, beliefs, and (p.29) values generated and shared by the society. Following Kant, he maintains that the categories of space and time are not a priori, but to be understood empirically, for the former depends on communities for its geographical specification and the latter makes sense to us as part of the social rhythm of community life. He argues that certain aspects of logical thoughts are universal as products of social consciousness. The remaining particular aspects expressive of individual traits in their collective manifestation are social too. This accounts for the difference in thoughts from culture to culture. According to him, the social milieu determines the nature of concepts, ideas, thoughts, logic, and language, which took their birth out of it. Two American thinkers, Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929 CE) and George Herbert Mead (1863–1931 CE), have profoundly influenced the sociology of knowledge Page 6 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production through their social behavioural approach. Veblen’s contribution is the proposition of habits of thought as an extension of habits of life and thought styles as dependent on the community, especially on the occupational roles and positions. For example, those engaged in pecuniary occupations are likely to develop thought styles that differ from the styles of those engaged in industrial occupations. He argues that the scheme of thought/knowledge is what the scheme of life reverberates.10 Mead’s proposition of social behaviourism, pointing to the fact that the mind itself is a social product, underscores the social origin theory’s social psychological basis. According to Mead, the ‘mind arises through communication by a conversation of gestures in a social process or context of experience’.11 There is no specific theoretical framework for interpreting the social origins of knowledge for these scholars. Some of the American social theorists of knowledge have followed the Marxist framework, while others took insights from Durkheim. Max Scheler (1874–1928 CE), a German phenomenologist, has tried to emphasize the historical and social determination of ideas in his theory but without assigning any specific role to the class factor (p.30) and by adding a variety of other factors, including a speculative category of eternal essence.12 He believed that in the course of history certain factors would play a greater role in determining the nature of ideas, though there could no constancy and universality about them. He maintains that they could be economic or political or cultural or familial factors. According to him, the dominant real factors would be different at different historical periods and cultural systems. Leaving the metaphysical connotation of Scheler’s adoption of the eternal element aside, scholars found his theory of social historical determination of thoughts and idea an insightful contribution to the sociology of knowledge. Max Scheler pursued the sociological foundation of knowledge independently although there exist certain similarities in his findings with those of Durkheim, though not in approaches.13 Durkheim’s empirical approach seeking to grasp the social milieu of organic solidarity and Scheler’s phenomenological approach to community ethics as such do not converge, despite the uniformity of the same normative pressure. Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin (1889–1968 CE), a Russian American sociologist, pursued an explicitly anti-Marxist perspective of social development and altogether different causality of the cognitive sphere.14 He rejected the thesis of sequential social evolution and argued for cyclical change of recurrences, precluding any postulate of a social structural theory of knowledge. Rooted in the philosophical premise of idealism, he presupposed the relation between ideas and the cultural type, rather than the social structure. Naturally, his (p. 31) contention is about the cultural genesis of knowledge, which gives precedence to cultural types over socio-economic structures in explaining occurrences of science.15 According to him, each cultural type, expressed in terms of social structure and personality, has a characteristic mentality of its Page 7 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production own, which may or may not suit the production of science. He argues that certain specific types of knowledge are dependent on appropriate cultural premises that alone would enable and promote scientific knowledge. Most of the eminent social theorists either partly or fully accepted Marx before they theorized the sociology of knowledge.16 Karl Mannheim (1893–1947 CE), a German sociologist, ranks foremost among the Marxian social theorists, who sought to theorize the social structural origins of knowledge. He combined historical materialism and phenomenology in his studies of the sociology of knowledge, with special focus on ideology and utopia.17 In the combine, he sought to expand Marx’s theory preoccupied with the economic and class factors as determinants of ideas, into categories such as generations, status groups, and occupational groups. Mannheim defined the sociology of knowledge as social theorization of ideas and generalized that knowledge or ideas of all types, though in differing degrees, are ‘bound to a location’ within the social structure and part of the historical process. Unlike Marx’s theory (p.32) implicates, certain ‘detached intellectuals’ of today might attain ‘unified perspective’ not bound by social structural determination. His methodological preoccupation was to try and see whether empirical correlation existed between detached standpoints and social historical positions. Robert K. Merton (1910–2003), an American sociologist, has done scholarly studies in the sociology of knowledge, especially the sociology of science.18 His main book relates to the theory of social structure, in which he discusses sociology of knowledge and mass communication as a separate part (III), providing a detailed account of the sociology of knowledge. An extensive review of Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge is a significant component of the part. Another component of the part is an analysis of mass communication.19 In another part (IV), he gives an equally exhaustive account of the sociology of science. He discusses the relation between science and the social order as the first section of the part. A discussion of science and the democratic social structure is the next section. Merton explains how some social structures exert pressure on some people to be nonconformists rather than conformists. An exploration of the social conditions that facilitate or retard the search for scientific knowledge has been the major academic attempt of Merton. He sees social reality in terms of the development of institutions and patterns of variables that define roles within institutions. Language, conceived as a social product by all these theorists, structures and shapes the human experience of reality. Michel Foucault (1926–1984 CE), a French philosopher and theorist of knowledge, who enunciated the concept of discourse referring to the power–knowledge combine that acts on the individual consciousness and body through subjectification, goes deep into this aspect. According to him, there is nothing called pure language and (p.33) knowledge, but only the language and knowledge manipulated by power.20 Similarly, power Page 8 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production is not the state power that he means, but the ability of ‘X’ to control the action of an unencumbered ‘Y’ in a relationship of domination. It is discursively engendered power in the field where the subjects coexist and interact. Subjects are individuals inserted into discourses through the demonstration of knowledge that turns them into subjects. Production of knowledge and attribution of authenticity to it is related to power, as exemplified by science, the discursively authenticated form of knowledge. It is the pattern of organization of knowledge, which he means by the manipulation of knowledge by power. Initially, he thought about knowledge ordered by power into the discourse with an epistemic base or discursive formation of epochal dimension, delimiting the thought. Later, he conceived the coexistence of multiple discourses manipulating people’s subject positions through ‘technologies of power’ and ensuring certain determinate patterns of behaviour. It refers to the unobtrusive control of social behaviour through combines of knowledge–power. Foucault’s methodology involves archaeological and genealogical approaches to his object of study, that is, thought or knowledge—the former indicative of history in the synchronic or the past as present and the latter indicative of the diachronic or the history as process. According to him, authorial identity of knowledge is a discursive entity and, hence, its text requires discourse analysis that presumes authors as concealed figures. Knowledge is independent of the author for the historian or sociologist who examines its discursive dimension, for which the knowledge text and the authorial subjectivity embedded in it will do. He views the author as dead in the context of any textual study that involves discourse analysis. There is indeed an impressive body of literature on the sociology of knowledge, by way of books and articles, but not relevant for a review (p.34) here, since our context is that of the methodological preoccupation relating to the social theoretical foundation of knowledge. A study by C. Wright Mills, which analyses the sociology of knowledge, is directly connected to the topic under discussion.21 His subsequent studies stand out as distinct for their methodology of sociological imagination, combining Weber’s materialistic and Mannheim’s phenomenological characterization of the social structure.22 Another significant work of recent times is by Peter Burke, who probes into what knowledge history means and how it differs from the history of science, history of ideas, and the sociology of knowledge.23 It is inevitable to be self-consciously realist about the epistemological position of the study one undertakes, for nobody can escape the imposition of the history of knowledge production, with its rupture between the knowledge of certainty and uncertainty. One cannot approach the history of knowledge today by positioning oneself as moulded entirely by the epistemological certainty, finality, authenticity, and logo-centrism of Newtonian physics, which laid the foundation of modernity. Post-Einstein physics, distinct for its uncertainty, complexity, and Page 9 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production tentativeness, has cracked the epistemological foundation of modernity, and set in the postmodern condition, implicating all academic dealings with knowledge. Researchers’ reflexive self-awareness about the tentativeness, slipperiness, and ambiguity of knowledge on the one side and the linguistic complexity in the interrelationship between texts and meanings is no more a matter of choice. They are constrained to prefer knowledge of a fragmentary, diverse, tenuous, and culture-specific type as opposed to the absolute, inductive, totalizing, and essentialist type. As Jean Francois Lyotard (1924–1998 CE), a French philosopher and literary theorist, points out that the primary concern of the postmodern present is (p.35) who decides what knowledge means and who knows what needs to be done.24 What the present study seeks to underscore in the context of the theoretical preoccupation about understanding the history of knowledge is the need for a critical awareness about the limitations of modernity as well as the politically disengaging nature of the postmodern epistemology. Such an approach engenders a self-reflexive epistemological position of criticality, neither to be labelled as modern nor postmodern. In the ultimate instance, one may wish to identify it as the critical modern. In this qualified sense, we choose to follow the Marxist theory of social formation, which to the best of our knowledge is the only comprehensive theory for understanding the history of knowledge and analysing the historical epistemology.

Social Formation Theory Social formation theory that enables the conceptual characterization of the socio-economic aggregate in time and space is based on historical materialism. Accordingly, the characterization starts at the outset with a systematic understanding of the material processes of the social appropriation of nature for subsistence and the social processes of distribution of the appropriated means of the people in the past of a given region. Understanding material processes and social processes keeps us insightful about the nature of technology and the corresponding social relations. Technology informs the form of knowledge and social relations, the custodianship and control over it. With the knowledge about these fundamental processes of human existence, we are able to make sense of the meanings and functions of the ideas, institutions, and cultural practices of the people. Social formation is the name given to the structured outcome of the material and social processes involving social relations, institutions, customs, rituals, and cultural practices. They include the ‘discursive’ and ‘control’ (p.36) dimensions of authentication of knowledge in historically existing social formations. The social formation theory informs who decides what form of understanding in which social formation is the authentic knowledge when and why. There were many social formations in different parts of the world at different points of time, which can be grouped into four epochal types—the

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production primitive, the slave-based, the feudal, and the capitalist—on the basis of certain broad features universal across the comparable variables. The theoretical framework of comprehension called social formation, used for conceptual characterization of the socio-economic aggregate of people in time and space, is based on historical materialism. The characterization starts with understanding the material processes of social appropriation of nature, that is, the means of subsistence and the social processes of distribution of the appropriated material, that is, the mode of sharing the means by a people in a given region. Marx used the term ‘social formation’ (gesellschaftsformen) first in his economic manuscript to mean society as a system constituted by the economic, political, and ideological aspects in their interconnection.25 The expression is used in Marx and Engels to represent society in terms of its mode of production. Therefore, it means the social whole consisting of the same structural constituents of the mode of production.26 ‘A mode of production is an articulated combination of relations and forces of production structured by the dominance of the (p.37) relations of production. The relations of production define a specific mode of appropriation of surplus-labour and the specific form of social distribution of the means of production corresponding to that mode of appropriation of surplus-labour.’27 Historical materialism, the only comprehensive theory of history rendered plausible through the philosophy of dialectical materialism, unfolds stages of social developmental sequences in terms of the mode of production and explains the dynamic of change. Mode of production itself is a theoretical construct of a systemic combine of forces and relations of production, presupposing given labour processes and institutional forms of appropriation.28 The combine means three structures or levels or instances, such as the economic, juridico-political, and ideological, determined ‘in the last instance’ by the economic. This is well illustrated by Marx in a language of architectural analogy, conceiving the economy as the base, the juridico-political as well as the ideological as the superstructure. The economic encompasses the material processes of subsistence as well as survival; the juridico-political and the ideological consist of the entire gamut of social processes involving the making and working of institutional, ideational structures of control and cultural processes of the making and working of belief systems. It is well known that scholars have sometimes made the base-superstructure correlation and the schema of sequential stages unnecessarily rigid, the former to the extent of mistaking the analogy and the latter, the illustration, for theory. Marx has used the term ‘society’ here for social formation, which is explicit in the subsequent part of his statement. In fact, the term ‘society’ is unintelligible unless specified with respect to its basic structure, relations, and processes. For Page 11 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production Marx, society is intelligible only in terms of the system resulting from the aggregate of relationships (p.38) thereof. The core of the concept of social formation is best stated in the oft-quoted passage in Marx’s preface to The Critique of Political Economy, which runs as the following: In the social production of their means of existence, men enter into definite, necessary relations which are independent of their will, productive relationships which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The aggregate of those productive relationships constitute the economic structure of the society, the real basis on which a juridical and political superstructure arises and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of the material means of existence conditions the whole process of social, political, and intellectual life.29 According to Marx, an aggregate of human beings constituted a society when, and only when, the people were in some way related, not essentially in terms of kinship, but in a much wider sense, namely, the relations developed through production and distribution. Such a society is characterized by who produces by what implements, who exploits the production of others by what right, divine or legal; who owns the tools, the land, sometimes the body and soul of the producer; who controls the disposal of the surplus and regulates quantity and form of the supply. The bonds of production thus hold society together. The nature and basis of human relations are made clear by Engels in his remark that the most common feature of all social formations is ‘surplus labour’ (labour beyond the time required for the labourer’s own maintenance), and appropriation of the products of this unpaid surplus labour. Some of the concepts of Antonio Francesco Gramsci (1891–1937 CE), the most famous Italian Marxist, are quite relevant to the context, because they supplement the social formation theory in general and the class origins of dominant knowledge in particular. His philosophy of praxis, consisting of the concepts of class power, hegemony, organic ideology, organic intellectuals, ideology, and war of position, renders historical materialism as a much more directly (p.39) class-empowering theoretical weapon.30 It transforms critical theoretical knowledge into historical consciousness of the proletariat and collective action. What the praxis eliminates is the hiatus between class experience and history as well as between theory and historical consciousness. Several scholars have reinterpreted the theory of social formation, perhaps most creatively by theorists such as Louis Althusser, Balibar, Barry Hindess, Paul Q. Hirst, Maurice Godelier, Nicos Poulantzas, and a few others who broadly belong to the structuralist Marxist school. They made the expression ‘social formation’ rigorously Marxist by distancing it from commonsensical renditions common in sociology as well as anthropology.31 It was Louis Althusser and Balibar who Page 12 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production made the first major reinterpretation characterizing social formation as a ‘totality of “instances” articulated on the basis of a determinate mode of production’, which is an explanation of complex associations in a society.32 They identify the economic, political, and ideological as the three fundamental instances or essential constituents of any social formation, without which, according to them, an intelligible conception of human social existence is impossible. The economic instance refers to ‘the transformation of natural resources into socially useful products’, the political to ‘the reproduction and administration of collective social relations and their institutional forms’, and the ideological to ‘the constitution of social subjects and their consciousness’. These ‘instances’ are themselves distinct structural levels of ‘social relations’ and ‘practices’, each of which possesses a functional unity across more specific structures. The human agency is hardly decisive about ‘instances’ and ‘practices’, for they are relations determined ‘in the last instance’ by the economic, as distinguished from (p.40) the humanist, readings of historical materialism offered by Lukács, Gramsci, and others.33 In any given social formation, diverse practices exist always, but with the unfailing presence of the three instances, namely, the economic, political, and ideological, which function as a complex, interrelated, and interdependent system of ‘articulation’ involving unified relations of domination and subordination. This homologous unity of distinct and uneven modes of determination is called ‘structural causality’ by Althusser, who is sure of the ‘relative autonomy’ of ‘instances’ in the case of particular social formations of any region with unique patterns of development influenced by the given material environment, historical matrix, and cultural conditions of human existence. While Althusser recognizes the decisive role of the mode of production in determining the nature of the social formation, he rejects the mechanical presumption that the economic instance invariably determines the exact nature of other instances like superstructures, because of the relative autonomy of each instance as exemplified and illustrated by the difference in empirical experiences across regions.34 He maintains that each instance has its own relative autonomy securing a place and function in the complex unity of the social formation. ‘The “instances” are invariably “uneven” and the consequences of contradictions inherent in the assemblage of the variety of articulations are beyond prediction’. At the same time, the theoretically accessible link between the two and the primacy of the economic in ‘the last instance’ cannot be overlooked. Althusser’s argument is that there exists a structured hierarchy of determinations in relatively autonomous instances and practices, and that therefore, we cannot characterize social formation as a system in which everything causes everything else. We cannot characterize it in a structuralistessentialist totality where every practice as a part signifies the whole either. Althusserian ‘structural causality’ thus makes typological reduction of social formation unacceptable for its mechanistic determinism, but (p.41) not in any Page 13 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production way by implying eclectic indeterminacy, valid.35 He argues that social relations are manifestations of production relations realized, reproduced, and transformed through a relatively autonomous process. In the economic instance, contradictions prevail within and between forms of subsistence, despite the dominance of one or the other in terms of productivity. Similarly, in the political instance contradictions exist within and between relations of representation and relations of hegemony explicit in the conflicting interests of those in control of the institutions and processes of social organization and those deprived of control. In the ideological instance, contradictions exist within and between relations that empower social subjects and relations of subjection, which confine individuals to specific roles and functions. Althusser emphasizes ‘the contradictions between and within the structured relations and practices that constitute human beings as social subjects, and places, positions, and roles as the social space within which all human practice necessarily occurs’. In short, any social formation is ‘a complex hierarchy of functionally organized institutions or instances whose unity can be neither ignored altogether nor reduced to a single closed system’.36 We draw a lot of practical insights from the recuperation of the concept of social formation by structuralist Marxists, especially Althusser and some of the leading anthropological theorists among them, done in the light of their empirical experience. Althusser’s application of the Freudian concept of overdetermination that refers to the complex set of elements and associations in the context of causation, in fact, precludes the question as to whether the relations or the forces have primacy in a social formation. Nevertheless, he maintains that in any given historical epoch, one of the three structural levels, that is, the economic, the political, and the ideological in a social formation, may have greater influence and determinacy than the rest. A very significant lesson that a historian has to draw from Marx is what Althusser has noted as ‘a central epistemological premise of (p.42) Marx’s social theory, that is, the cognitive insistence up on the difference between phenomenal appearances and the basic underlying reality—the difference between surface appearances and underlying theoretical truth’.37 Althusser’s definition of ‘social formation’ as the total complex of economic infrastructure and superstructure renders plausible a very powerful framework of comprehension for understanding historical societies. It encourages us to focus on the interfaces of well-represented social systems, especially their transitional phases with greater significance, a practice not often followed in the textbooks of history. The perspective enables incorporation of insights from cognate disciplines and auxiliary branches of history, a method that opens up the possibility of maintaining better integration of historical narrative with social theory providing the discipline intellectual depth.38

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production Poulantzas has illustrated as to how the frameworks such as ‘mode of production’ and ‘social formation’ in historical materialism are effective in analysing particular situations of regional history through the study of ‘the elemental structures and practices whose specific combinations constitute a mode of production and a social formation’. He has maintained that it is through the study of the structure, constitution, and functioning of various modes of production and social formations, and the forms of their transition from one type to another, that historical materialism has constituted its object, namely the knowledge of history. According to him, what survives for analysis for a historian of social formations would be the relatively autonomous fragments of past modes of production. He says that it is the dominant mode of production that provides unity to a social formation. In his understanding, no social formation ever existed in the past exactly as one would construe theoretically, for several modes (p.43) of production along with their constituents co-existed in all periods. This is very much an extension of Marx’s observation that at the level of features and manifestations of any social formation, we see co-existence of the old and the new. Another contention of Marx that ‘no social formation ever perishes before all the productive forces have developed for which it is wide enough; and, new, higher productive forces never come into being before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself’ is equally significant to be recalled here. In Foster-Carter’s opinion, the precise definition of the social formation depends upon how we understand modes of production and their articulation in terms of the exact combination of forces and relations of production within, and how we identify the dominant among them at the structural level, and how it relates to the social formation.39 As Pierre-Philippe Rey has observed, a mode of production is dominant within a social formation when the coexisting modes are so structured as to be satisfying the requirements of its reproduction.40 The dominant mode in the social formation need not necessarily be the one that is superior in technology and productivity. Nevertheless, it is invariably the one whose conditions of reproduction and perpetuation are guaranteed by the juridico-political and cultural aspects which prevail. Stressing on the decisive importance of productive relations, that is, the crucial role that the institutional form of labour realization plays in the working of the social formation, E. Terray observes that a social formation can be understood only by analysing the relations of production, which form its base influencing the system as a whole.41 According to him, it is necessary to start the analysis, not only from the mode of production but also from the social formation of which it is a part, to understand the structure of relations of production. He says that not only the economic infrastructure but also the political (p.44) and ideological superstructures must be taken into account for a total characterization of the society.

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production Knowledge and Social Formations That any social formation is a combination of several uneven modes of production presupposes the knowledge scenario also to be of an ensemble of uneven sets of forces of production, for each mode of production has its own knowledge–practice combine. Of course, this ensemble in every social formation need not be invariably structured by the dominance of the relatively advanced forces of production. For instance, in the Iron Age agro-pastoral social formation, plough technology existed but not as the dominant component of the forces of production. The presence of a major technology like metal smelting in a social formation presupposes neither a uniform distribution of the skill across all modes of production, nor its application equally in every set of forces of production. Their levels of application across modes of production in a social formation significantly varied, as for example, in the Iron Age agro-pastoral social formation, iron technology was applied by hunters to their arrow-heads, primitive farmers to their digging stick, and advanced agriculturists to their ploughshare. In such social formations, largely of non-stratified relations of production, knowledge and praxis were inseparably mixed up with irrational beliefs and magic. In class-structured societies, knowledge begins to be distinguished from magic and irrational beliefs. However, expertise continues to be charismatic. Marx sees a homological link between the contents of knowledge and social relations. In this link, he discerns the rationale to distinguish true knowledge from the false and to base it for his theory of ideology. In Marxist characterization, false knowledge is ideology that distorts and hides truth about what it represents, especially the knowledge pertaining to the means, forces, and relations of production. It is ideology that ensures the easy maintenance of class control over these basic material sources of power. His critique of knowledge, which is his theory of ideology too, seeks to unmask the social truth that false knowledge or ideology hushes up. According to Marx, in bourgeoisie social formations even well-codified knowledge of specialization may be ideology in disguise. His critique of classical political economy unveils how contemporary (p.45) specialized knowledge of economic phenomena distorts or conceals truth about their dependence on social relations and processes by postulating the false concept of ‘natural equilibria’ of markets, as if the market were a sentient entity and commodity price determination a process free of the manufacturer’s control and the consumer’s choice. This is distortion of truth about the social relationships involved in commodity production as mere economic relationships in trade and market. Marx identifies the misrepresentation of the commodity as if it had an economic life of its own independent of its formal manufacturer, actual producer, and the consumer, as commodity fetishism. As Marx says:

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production [T]he commodity-form and the value-relation of the products of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material relations arising out of this. It is nothing but the definite social relation between people themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things … in the world of commodities with the products of their own hands.42 Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism shows how the false knowledge hides the process of the transformation of social products of use value into objects of exchange value. As the production and reproduction of the capitalist system advances, the distorted knowledge gets entrenched and the structure of reification sinks deeper into human consciousness.43 Marx’s theory attributing to material processes and social relations a decisive role in the determination of the content of knowledge makes it clear that the uncritical knowledge forms part of ideology. This raises the question as to where the theory of Marx belongs or how his critique differs from ideology. Marx clarifies that his theory becomes science in the hands of the working class and thus a prime mover, while it becomes ideology and thus yet another tool of exploitation in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Science, according to Marx, is truth as (p.46) distinguished from its distorted versions or ideology. He differentiates science from forms of knowledge that come under the category of pre-science, viewing the former as methodologically engendered and the latter as experientially accumulated under conditions of social labour. Science as theoretical knowledge transacted in the set-up of academic institutions naturally became elitist and got distanced from the practical knowledge of the folk. Similarly, engineering as production and practice of sophisticated technological knowledge became elitist too and distanced from the handicrafts practices of the folk. Under the pressure of enhancing the accumulative needs of the capitalist mode of production, science and technology have been phenomenally improving the productive forces. Marx had theorized long ago that the progress of science and technology would be dependent on their application to production, with the rate of progress as proportional to the rate of growth of material production.44 The dominance of capitalist economy over science alienates its methodologically ensured objective rationality and makes it bad knowledge wedded to ideology and integrated as part of the relations of production, leaving the social process of appropriation at the mercy of the general intellect.45 Science as knowledge of certainty, finality, authenticity, and universal validity becomes symbolic of political authority and thus the handmaiden of imperialism. Science becomes unscientific and its direction, out and out market-driven as decided by capitalists. A differentiation between science and bad science is virtually impossible in public communication today due to the reification of the ideological dimension. Marx’s critique of political economy anticipates all this Page 17 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production and postulates the convergence of social theory of knowledge and scientific methodology into a single science.46 In its latest version, capitalism uses science and technology not only as the foundation of its productive forces but also as its most sustainable source of accumulation. It transforms knowledge of use value into commodity of exchange value. New knowledge, invariably a combine of discoveries and inventions, serves both as commodity (p.47) and capital today. It generates commodities and regenerates capital. In the process, other forms of knowledge are being coopted, incorporated, subordinated, subjected, marginalized, or even destroyed, depending upon the levels of their amenability to profitable application. Knowledge is converted into an important source of personalized profit too, necessitating special juridical protection in the form of patents and intellectual property rights. New knowledge is the intangible asset of our times. Technically, this phase of capitalism is called techno-capitalism. Its popular name is knowledge economy. Knowledge economy turns knowledge into multiple commodities, each of which is differently priced on the basis of demand. As a result, knowledge is regarded as a commercial item licensed for exchange across the present-day world. If knowledge begins to be produced and transmitted as an object of exchange for accumulating profit, its production ceases to be a public good of sociocultural use value. Privatization of production and transmission of knowledge leads to disparity with respect to opportunities of accessing and sharing the benefit. Knowledge, as the philosophic means to a better life, is contrasted with knowledge as a commodity under capitalism. Commoditization of knowledge is a process of transformation of knowledge into an explicit, standardized, codified, applicable, and priced object of exchange value. It is conversion of human labour products into commodities transacted in the market. This strategic process, facilitating the transformation of social products of use value into objects of exchange value called commodities that people accept with a sense of obsessive devotion, is the phenomenon called ‘commodity fetishism’—an ideological veil of capitalism, as theorized by Marx. He says: As against this, the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material relations arising out of this. It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the (p.48) products of men’s hands. I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they Page 18 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.47 ‘Commodity fetishism’ postulates as if a commodity has an economic life of its own, independent of the volition of the labourer who produced it. It is a misrepresentation of the social relationships involved in production as economic relationships in trade and market, which masks the true economic character of the human relations of production. What it strategically conceals is truth about commodities as social products. Economists conceive the market as an independent, sentient entity, and market exchange as part of a series of selfdriven material processes at work, without any human influence. What becomes interesting is the uncritical acceptance of this inversion by the people as something quite natural. It goes too deep into everyone to recognize the contradiction. George Lukács said: ‘Just as the capitalist system continuously produces and reproduces itself economically on higher levels, the structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more fatefully, and more definitively into the consciousness of Man.’48 As capitalism advanced, it began to be too natural to be seen analytically and critically. Further, the entire corpus of theoretical knowledge was produced in the domain of neo-classical development economics, which made the commodity and market more real than society itself. Such a situation of dehumanized knowledge enjoying intellectual hegemony precluded the possibility of retrieving the truth about human relations and social processes out of the ideological veil. Today’s capitalism that depends heavily on commoditization of technology and science for accumulation is a new type called techno-capitalism.49 It involves a very advanced phase of commodity (p.49) fetishism, marking the shift of commodity from the tangible to the intangible consisting of new knowledge, creativity, and innovativeness in science-tech hybrid areas of research.50 Intangibles are said to account for as much as four-fifths of the total value of most products and services in existence today. What tangible raw materials, factory labour, and capital were to industrial capitalism is what the ‘intangibles’ are to techno-capitalism. Science-tech creativity is turned into both commodity and capital under techno-capitalism. Techno-capitalist enterprises the world over are being run by corporate establishments with a structure altogether different from that of the institutional set-up of the industrial capitalism of the past. All developed countries have corporate establishments investing heavily in the sector of knowledge production. They are rich in knowledge-based capital (KBC) or intangible assets turned capital. Investment and growth in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies are increasingly driven by intangible or knowledge-based capital. In many OECD countries, firms now invest as much or more in KBC as they do in physical capital such as machinery, equipment, and buildings. Easily distributed via global communication networks, knowledge with authorial ownership began to become an important source of personalized profit, necessitating special legal Page 19 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production protection. This accounts for the global recognition of patents and intellectual property rights under international laws. Corporate houses have given rise to new experimentalist establishments deeply entrenched in science-tech research, with the distinct goal of appropriating intellectual property rights and patents of the innovative youth.51 They (p.50) have globally established a powerful techno-military complex for the corporate appropriation of creativity and new knowledge in all forms. The progress of commoditization of knowledge, detaching it from the (user) person and making it an independent economic entity, has given rise to the phenomenon called capital fetishism, from which arose the practice of owning and controlling knowledge as intellectual property. Corporate houses compete with one another in buying patents and intellectual property rights, which increase their market power, and to be first to come up with new products and services. Software-based electronic communication is a site that exemplifies generation and transaction of amazingly huge sums of capital at the instance of one package or the other. There are many instances of sale and purchase of patents and intellectual property rights worth billions of dollars. This competition is leading to substantial theft of patented knowledge and infringement of intellectual property rights. Corporate establishments resort to various clever ways and means for the appropriation of research outcomes through new relations of power. Often, it becomes a reckless confiscation of the intangibles from the innovators. Naturally, one of the outcomes of this is increase in the litigations relating to the violation of intellectual property rights. Notes:

(1) See R. Tallis. 2005. The Knowing Animal: A Philosophical Inquiry into Knowledge and Truth. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, pp. 5–11. For a detailed analysis of what knowledge means, see K. Lehrer. 1990. The Theory of Knowledge. Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, pp. 1–19. (2) There is a good body of literature on the issue, mostly addressing the foundational aspects. See the first classic instance in David Hume. [1748]2004. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. J. Bennett. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, pp. 1–9. D. Pritchard. 2006. What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? London: Routledge, pp. 3–10. (3) For a detailed consideration of the question in the context of the development of knowledge by way of natural and human sciences, see J. Habermas. 1987. ‘The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory’, Knowledge and Human Interest, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro. Cambridge: Polity Press, Chapter III, pp. 43– 64. (4) See F. Bacon. [1605]1958. The Advancement of Learning, G.W. Kitchin (ed.). New York: Dutton. Page 20 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production (5) G. Vico. 1984. The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (6) A. Comte. 1896. The Course on Positive Philosophy in Six Volumes (1830–42). London: George Bell & Sons. For translated and condensed version, see Harriet Martineau. 2000. The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte. Kitchener: Batoche Books. (7) K. Marx. [1859]1913. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, M. Dobb (ed.). New York: International Publishers, pp. 11–12. (8) See E. Durkheim. 2012. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. K.E. Fields. New York: Free Press, pp. 45–67, 190–217. For an earliest scholarly appreciation of Durkheim’s study, see E.L. Schaud. 1920, ‘A Sociological Theory of Knowledge’, The Philosophical Review, 29(4), Duke University Press, pp. 319– 39. (9) See Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. (10) See T. Veblen. 1961. The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, and Other Essays. New York: Russell, p. 105. (11) See G.H. Mead. 1934. Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, C.W. Morris (ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 50. (12) See Max Scheler. 1973. ‘Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition’, in Selected Philosophical Essays, trans. David Lachterman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, p. 137. Also, see Max Scheler. 1960. ‘The Essence of Philosophy and the Moral Preconditions of Philosophical Knowledge’, in On the Eternal in Man, trans. Bernard Noble. New York: Harper & Brothers, p. 74. (13) For a detailed study of the question, see S. Gangas. 2011. ‘Values, Knowledge and Solidarity: Neglected Converges between Emile Durkheim and Max Scheler’, Human Studies, 34(4), pp. 353–71. (14) See P.A. Sorokin. 1943. Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time: A Study of Referential Principles of Sociology and Social Science. New York: Russel & Russel. Also, see his Society, Culture and Personality, California: University of California Press, Cooper Square Publishers (1962). (15) For a detailed study, see R.K. Merton and B. Barber. 1990. ‘Sorokin’s Formulations in the Sociology of Science’, in B. Barber (ed.), Social Studies of Science. New Brunswick: Transactions Publishers, pp. 45–55.

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production (16) Examples of some of the early studies are: L. Bailey. 1936. Critical Theory and the Sociology of Knowledge: A Comparative Study in the Theory of Ideology. Routledge & Kegan Paul; H. Speier. 1938. ‘Social Determination of Ideas’, Social Research, 5(2); H.O. Dahlke. 1940. ‘The Sociology of Knowledge’, in H.E. Barnes, H. Becker, and F.B. Becker (eds), Contemporary Social Theory. New York: Appleton, pp. 64–89; Gerald DeGre. 1943. Society and Ideology: An Inquiry into the Sociology of Knowledge. Columbia: Columbia University Press; W. Stark. 1958. Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge; K.H. Wolff. 1959. ‘The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory’, in L. Gross (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory. New York: Harper, pp. 567–602. (17) See K. Mannheim. 1953. Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, in P. Kecskemeti (ed.), London: Routledge. Also, see his Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Harcourt (1954). (18) See R.K. Merton. 1973. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (19) See R.K. Merton. 1968. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press. Also, see R.K. Merton. 1996. On Social Structure and Science. Chicago: University of Chicago; R.K. Merton. 2011. Sociology of Science and Sociology as Science. New York: Columbia University Press. (20) The original of this work, Les Mots et les Choses: Une Archéologie des Sciences Humaines, came in 1966. For the English translation, see M. Foucault. [1966]1994. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. London: RHUS. His L’archéologie du Savoir appeared in 1969. English translation came in 1972. See M. Foucault. 1972. The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge. (21) C.W. Mills. 1942. ‘A Sociological Account of Pragmatism: An Essay on the Sociology of Knowledge’, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin. (22) For its detailed exposition, see C.W. Mills. 2000. The Sociological Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (23) See P. Burke. 2000. Social History of Knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot. London: Polity Press. Also, see P. Burke. 2015. What Is the History of Knowledge? London: Polity Press. (24) The classic treatise of postmodernism is: J.F. Lyotard. 1979. La Condition Postmoderne: Rapport sur le Savoir. Paris: Éditions de Minuit. See the English translation, J.F. Lyotard. 1984. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Page 22 of 25

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production (25) See K. Marx. 1953. Grundrisse. Berlin: Marxist Internet Archive, p. 104. See the relevant extracts in E.J. Hobsbawm (ed.). 1964. Pre-capitalist Economic Formations. London: Lawrence & Wishart, p. 12; B. Hindess and P.Q. Hirst. 1977. Pre-capitalist Modes of Production. London: Macmillan, pp. 10–11; G.A. Cohen. 1978. Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 7; P. Anderson. 1983. In the Tracks of Historical Materialism. London: Verso, p. 14. See the discussion in J. Elster. 1985. Making Sense of Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–41; Andrew Levine, Elliot Sober, and E.O. Wright. 1992. Reconstructing Marxism. London: Verso, pp. 62–7. For a discussion of philosophical implications, see J. Habermas. 1968. ‘The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory’ in his Knowledge and Human Interest. London: Polity Press, Chapter III. (26) See D. Legros. 1979. ‘Economic Base, Mode of Production, and Social Formation: A Discussion of Marx’s Terminology’, Dialectical Anthropology, 4(3), pp. 243–9. Also see C. Meillassoux. 1971. ‘From Reproduction to Production: A Marxist Approach to Economic Anthropology’, Economy and Society, 1(1), pp. 90–110. (27) See Hindess and Hirst, Pre-capitalist Modes of Production, pp. 9–10. (28) For a detailed discussion of the theory of mode of production, see Hindess and Hirst, Pre capitalist Modes of Production. Also see Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism. (29) See K. Marx. [1853]1994. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Chicago: Kerr & Co., p. 11. (30) See A. Gramsci. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers, pp. 8–11. Also, see C. Mouffe. 1979. Gramsci and Marxist Theory. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 186–8. (31) For details of conceptualization, see E. Balibar. 1970. ‘The Fundamental Concepts of Historical Materialism’, in L. Althusser and E. Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster. London: New Left Books, pp. 31–3. (32) See discussion in Althusser and Balibar, Reading Capital, p. 2. Also see R. Paul. 1992. Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 61–4. (33) For details of ‘Various Levels and Instances of Social Formation’, see L. Althusser. 1969. For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster. London: Allen Lane, pp. 101, 166. Also, Althusser and Balibar, Reading Capital, p. 58. (34) See Rajan Gurukkal. 2010. Social Formations of Early South India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, Introduction, p. 4.

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production (35) Gurukkal, Social Formations of Early South India, p. 4. (36) See Althusser, For Marx, pp. 87–128. Also E. Terray. 1974. Marxism and Primitive Society, trans. M. Klopper. New York: Monthly Review Press, p. 79. (37) See the idea highlighted in Louis Althusser. 1971. ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,’ in his Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster. London: New Left Books, p. 17. Also, Andrew Levine et al., Reconstructing Marxism, p. 11. (38) Most of Romila Thapar’s articles and books substantiate it in general. For specific instances, see essays in her Ancient Indian Social History, New Delhi: Orient Black Swan (Second edition), 2004. Also see Romila Thapar. 1984. From Lineage to State, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. (39) See A. Foster-Carter. 1978. ‘The Modes of Production Controversy’, New Left Review, 1(107), pp. 52–4. Also see R. Miliband. 1977. Marxism and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 117–19. (40) See Pierre-Philippe Rey. 1975. ‘The Lineage Mode of Production’, Critique of Anthropology, 3, pp. 27–79. Also, his 1979, ‘Class Contradiction in Lineage Societies’, Critique of Anthropology, 4(13–14), pp. 41–60. (41) See Terray, Marxism and Primitive Society, pp. 13–16. (42) See Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, pp. 164–5. (43) See G. Lukács. 1967. ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, in History and Class Consciousness. London: Merlin Press, pp. 167–91. (44) See Marx, Grundrisse, p. 592. (45) See Marx, Grundrisse, p. 594. (46) See K. Marx. 1927. ‘Private Property and Communism’, in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Moscow: Progress Publishers. (47) See K. Marx. 1990. Capital Volume I. London: Penguin Classics, p. 165. (48) See Lukács, ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, pp. 167– 91. (49) It is called as a new version of capitalism. See A. Feenberg. 1991. Critical Theory of Technology. New York: Oxford University Press. Feenberg does not call it techno-capitalism. Nevertheless, his description of the features and processes thereof encourages us to believe that he would have named it accordingly.

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Social Theory of Knowledge Production (50) For a profound analysis of the phenomenon, see Louis Suarez-Villa. 2009. Globalization and Techno-capitalism: The Political Economy of Corporate Power and Technological Domination. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 46–7. Also, see Luis Suarez-Villa. 2012. Techno-capitalism: A Critical Perspective on Technological Innovation and Corporatism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 67–71. (51) For a detailed discussion of the process and to know how capital fetishism suddenly turned into intellectual property rights, a rather long dormant concept of the nineteenth century into a major field of law in the late twentieth century, see Michael Perelman. 2004. Steal this Idea: Intellectual Property Rights and the Corporate Confiscation of Creativity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Knowledge Production

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

Knowledge Production Non-European Antecedents Rajan Gurukkal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199490363.003.0003

Abstract and Keywords The chapter traces the non-European roots of specialized knowledge production in the ancient times as illustrated by the civilizations of the Indian and the Chinese regions. Examining the archaeology and ethno-archaeology of remains of the civilizations in the valleys of the Indus and Yellow rivers, we try and capture the earliest knowledge in crafts production technology such as architecture, metallurgy, lapidary, and ceramics. Orally transmitted Vedic knowledge, eschatology, metaphysics, grammar, phonetics, astronomy, the postVedic systems of thought, Ayurvedic knowledge, architecture, nature of metallurgical texts, the Indian and Chinese textual traditions, and epistemological traces constitute other contents of the chapter. This chapter underscores the early India’s methodologically distinct aphoristic structure of stating truth as astute observations generalized as self-validated principles, the logic of which corresponds to that of mathematical equations or formulas. It discusses the history of mathematical astronomy. A distinct epistemic shift is explicit in India’s astronomy of fourteenth to sixteenth centuries CE. Mādhava of Sangamagrāma (c. 1340–1425 CE) in Kerala marks the beginnings of this shift through his path-breaking mathematical advances in conceptualizing infinite series. The chapter ends with a concise discussion of the Chinese history of knowledge systems across the material cultures Keywords:   eschatology, theology, metaphysics, philosophy, Ayurveda, grammar, phonetics, astronomy, theory, art, aesthetics, aphoristic structure, epistemic shift

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Knowledge Production The chapter seeks to discuss primarily the early Indian antecedents of specialized knowledge production in the realms of practice and theory, the former on the basis of archaeology and the latter through textual analysis. We seek to try and extract the knowledge component with a special focus on methods explicit or implicit in the data that appear as concrete objects in the case of practice and as texts in the case of theory. However, a significant point is that in the past often theory had no existence independent of the practice. Concrete objects, be it small artefacts or big monuments, are theories and practices entangled. Even the texts are largely descriptions or prescriptions of practices rather than the theories behind them. In short, the knowledge that we seek in both the realms is mostly embedded in the data. As already pointed out, it is an interpretative exercise on fragmentary data precluding the possibility of grasping the subject matter in any comprehensive manner. Our discussion of the methodological knowledge in the realm of practice starts off only with the Metal Ages, for the very little that we know about the vast phase of the Stone Age is distinct for its universality. Discussion of knowledge in the Metal Ages relies on the archaeo-metallurgy of bronze and iron, the ethno-archaeology of lapidary and ceramics, and the archaeology of (p.52) architecture and sculpture. In the realm of theory, there exist eschatological or metaphysical speculations in the redacted and compiled form of the oral tradition. It is in the field of astronomy, grammar, and healthcare that codified knowledge existed, presupposing its systematic and methodological production.

Archaeo-metallurgy Long before its use as metal, copper ores were used in the Stone Age by flaking them into flint tools and ornaments or grinding them for colour pigments.1 Even during that hoary past, the essential knowledge to produce an artefact was not within the reach of everybody. In the Metal Age, the difference between a stonelike copper ore and the stone, and the latter’s property of malleability and ductility after heavy firing could be a shared knowledge among many in a community. Also, they must have easily learnt how to differentiate between the metallic copper found on the surface and its ores in the rock, thanks to their perceptible colour variations. Evolution of the kiln and techniques of firing could be part of the accumulated knowledge of the community concerned. People must have learnt the relation between the metal and the ore by observing the same green-hued flame occurring on smelting both the items. On the basis of their distinctive colours, many had identified different items in the ore, which modern chemists name as sulphides like the carbonates, malachite, and azurite and oxides like cuprite, besides metals called nickel, antimony, cadmium, zinc, chromium, titanium, cobalt, and so on. Bronze was a natural invention in the process of copper smelting, which provided chances to know about fast-melting metals in the ore and their casting properties. Craftsmen owed the invention of bronze to the chance provided by the process of copper smelting and the necessity of making copper harder.2 The Page 2 of 46

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Knowledge Production earliest bronze objects, dating back to the fifth-millennium BCE Mesopotamia, suggest that it was arsenic alloying that the smiths had learnt and practised first, (p.53) in spite of its high toxicity risk. The high arsenic content in the regionally available copper ore might have provided the chance for the invention of arsenic alloying. Soon tin alloying was found better for the production of harder and more durable bronze. It was through close observation of which metal in the ore melts first with what casting properties that the smelting community produced its knowledge. Similarly, it was through trial and error that they invented the appropriate firing strategy for melting the metal. Needless to say, their metallurgical practices were governed by tentative assessments based on experiential inferences, doubts, and guesses in the absence of adequate devices for precise measurements of melting points. Therefore, the actual smelting procedures could have been performed only by a very few wellexperienced persons, due to the virtual absence of transferable knowledge about the method. It constrained the practice to an extremely rare skill made up of non-transferable insights acquired through long-term experience. Naturally, smelting practice was magic even to the practitioner himself. Bronze metallurgy with its high-temperature kiln and firing strategies made the smelting of gold and silver easy. Bronze smithy by providing a set of very effective tools like knives, chisels, points, axes, toothed saws, and drills with hard and sharp edges enabled the rise of several other specialized cutting/ carving crafts, especially carpentry and lapidary.3 Lapidary involved various rare skills like gem cutting and bead shaping, their drilling and polishing, besides knowledge about the heat-induced colour change in stones, the technique of cooling them during drilling, and the method of putting abrasives on the lapping material at the time of perforation. Carpentry made wheeled carts and boats possible, facilitating transport of raw materials and finished goods to faraway places. These interconnected and mutually complimentary arts and crafts enhanced production and exchange. Iron metallurgy became known much more widely all over the world despite the metal’s very high melting point and complex smelting procedures. The efficiency of the metal in terms of hardness and durability was inferior to that of bronze as far as the early iron-smelting people were concerned, for they were yet to acquire (p.54) knowledge about exploiting its tensile strength. Still, iron became the most popular metal among all communities obviously due to the local presence of its ore in most landscapes of weathered rocks. On the contrary, bronze was always too scarce to be available for the ordinary folk. This must have encouraged communities to take to iron smelting in their own crude ways and often to migrate to landscapes of haematite-rich rocks, giving a phenomenal dimension to its diffusion. Iron smithies sprang up across agro-pastoral settlements in such regions along the Ganges and all over the peninsula. Naturally, iron became the first metal to be democratized. The iron ploughshare revolutionized agriculture by bringing the river deltas under the cultivation of Page 3 of 46

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Knowledge Production rice, wheat, and sugarcane, giving an unprecedented turn to the political economy of agro-pastoral chiefdoms. It was a major process, going back to the mid-first millennium BCE, witnessing a remarkable growth in population, specialization of arts and crafts involving integration of agro-pastoral descent groups as full-time functionaries and occupation groups, differentiated economy, accumulation of surplus, stratified society, and the formation of the state.4 The state comes into being in such a society of asymmetrical relations, the dominance of which is contested by chieftains. Iron democratizes their combats that eventually depersonalize the ruling power and institutes the state with monopoly over violence. State patronage of iron technology remarkably enhanced knowledge in metallurgy, lapidary, carpentry, art, architecture, and sculpture. Huge architectural monuments in rock were built as (p.55) statements of royal political power. Rock architecture and sculpture in the subcontinent is a record of the professional excellence achieved in them, in wood too, as the lasting facsimile of what has been lost. As a juridico-political apparatus necessitating a society of literate elites consisting of officials, financiers, and traders, the state requires institutionalization of writing and documentation as a primary instrument of governance. It becomes automatically necessary for the state to patronize literacy and learning. Naturally, knowledge production reaches an unprecedented height. Literacy enables the redaction of orally transmitted intellectual traditions of eschatological and metaphysical thoughts of the past and production of new theoretical knowledge.

Other Crafts Technology Archaeological remains of a variety of craft objects such as vessels, clay figurines, stoneware bangles, and faience artefacts from the Indus-Harappan and Gangetic post-Harappan sites show, technologically and aesthetically, a welldeveloped phase.5 Harappan ceramic objects such as glazed, polychrome, incised, perforated, and knobbed wares decorated with geometric patterns mainly in red, black, and green colours are among the earliest specimens of advanced pottery in the ancient world. Generally, archaeological studies seldom go beyond typology, distribution, context, and chronology, for their main objective is to gain insights into the socio-economic organization of the past. Some of them would do chemical characterization and analysis of the material through electron microscopy with energy-dispersive X-ray diffraction analysis, which, instead of understanding the old-time craftsmen’s knowledge embedded in the objects, would provide elemental data revealing the present-day science and technology about them. This results in the actual technical knowledge of the processes of crafts production remaining at large. (p.56) The scientific knowledge that we analytically generate deals with how it worked, which hardly bothered the craftsmen in history, and the procedure that we imagine need not necessarily be true to what the craftsmen had done in the past. Page 4 of 46

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Knowledge Production For instance, electron microscopy with energy-dispersive X-ray diffraction analysis of high-quality glossy bichrome pottery of the Indus Valley civilization (c. 2600–1900 BCE) can provide us elemental composition of the surface coat as a pale-grey, vitrified clay slip overlaid on a black slip with higher iron oxide.6 Its X-ray diffraction analysis can help us identify that both the pale and black slips contain hercynite, mullite, and quartz. Similarly, observation by scanning electron microscopy helps us know that the black slips contain higher amounts of coarser-grained hercynite. We discover from the elemental data that two different clay types were used to make the body and the slip respectively. Further, we learn that the bichrome effect is achieved by scratching off the palegrey slip laid over the black. Likewise, we understand that two overlying slips with contrasting iron contents produce the surface pattern on the ware, presupposing the use of two clay types of different provenance. Analysing the practices and procedures of the past craftsmen in the light of science, we cannot be presumptive of the level of their knowledge. For instance, we cannot assume that the ancient potters had knowledge about the fact that clay contains water in its elemental form in association with aluminium and silica, which escapes in a kiln providing the artefact a dense structure, or that they knew the pot structure contained colloidal silica with impurities like feldspar particles, iron oxide, mica, calcareous pieces, and the like. This is, in fact, the scientific knowledge that we read into the past objects, rather than what we ferret out of them. Therefore, what ontology should have precedence in our analysis is extremely important to capture the knowledge available to early craftsmen. Indeed, the craftsmen knew many things, but invariably in the form of experientially seasoned procedures that inform what to do. Certainly, a potter knew what type of clay to be chosen for obtaining which features or what (p.57) visible substances to be added or removed from the clay for retaining which property. For instance, he knew that adding more sand would give a coarse texture. This is not to say that they knew only simple methods. Some of the results produced by them are amazing, which presuppose very complex procedures. How the craftsmen of antiquity evolved these procedures, the question of primacy for a historian of knowledge, is elusive. It is here that ethno-archaeology comes to our help to a great extent. Ethnoarchaeological understanding of crafts technology, especially of ceramics and bead making, is extremely relevant, for the techniques and procedures show long continuity. Many questions regarding the character and level of past knowledge involved in ceramic production get answers through ethnoarchaeology. Similarly, techniques and procedures of manufacturing beads of semi-precious stones, their etching, bleaching, and drilling of beads are understood through ethno-archaeology. Often the beads of semi-precious stones were sourced from far-off places, as their archaeological occurrence at various points along the Arabian seaboard of the Persian Gulf suggests. Geo-archaeology of crafts production helps us locate their provenance, technology, and pattern of Page 5 of 46

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Knowledge Production distribution. Ethno-archaeological studies have shown that most techniques of making beads and pottery have not changed despite the time lag spanning over the millennia. Nevertheless, certain crafts like the making of faience ornaments have not survived, precluding ethno-archaeological studies.7

Vedic Knowledge Vedic knowledge is self-evident, unquestionable, and foundational, defying epistemological scrutiny. In the Indian knowledge tradition, the tṛayī (the three Vedas: Ṛig, Yajur, and Sāma) is the feasible starting point, which renders eschatology, as exemplified by the nāsatīya sūkta of the tenth maṇḍala (relatively late) of the Ṛig Veda, seeking the meaning of self against the metaphysical cosmology. (p.58) This is elaborated in the Upaniṣads, the pedagogic texts generated and maintained by upādhyāyas or ācāryas (teachers) over a long period, presumably between c. 800 and c. 200 BCE, for their pupils (brahmacāris). Systematized production of specialized knowledge in India goes back to the age of the Vedāṅgas (c. 600–c. 200 BCE), literally limbs of the Veda, which consist of six fields of knowledge, namely, śikṣa (phonetics), kalpa (ritual), nirukta (etymology), chandas (metrics), jyōtiṣa (astronomy), and vyākaraṇa (grammar) enunciated on the basis of the detailed analysis of the Vedic hymns. This specialized knowledge had its beginnings in the Brāhamaṇa and Āraṇyaka portions of the Ṛig Veda long before its being structured into aphorisms (stūra) and classified into six branches. It is reasonable to presume that these specialized studies owe their origins to normative pressure for ensuring perfect pronunciation of sounds, metrical chanting of hymns, meaningful use of terms, and flawless articulation of expressions as well as faultless observance of rituals with necessary knowledge in astronomy exactly as construed in the Vedas. Naturally, they must have been developed and transmitted as part of the content of contemporary instructional tradition. What makes this knowledge methodologically distinct is its aphoristic structure of stating truth in the most condensed and memorable form. It is the method of articulating knowledge as terse announcements of universal validity. Astute observations formulated as principles that validate themselves, they preclude the need for further logical procedures. Their validity is what they provide to themselves. This is like mathematical equations or formulas that present descriptive relationships precisely by using symbols for making a self-evident truth. In both the cases, the purpose of brevity, its logic, and the outcome are the same. Nevertheless, the marked difference between the two is that aphorisms attain their goal through the brevity achieved in the real language, while equations or formulas reach their goal through the brevity secured in a language of symbols. One thing that makes the mode of knowledge production in India

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Knowledge Production unique is this dependence on the real language for the exposition of even the most abstract concepts in eschatology and metaphysics.

(p.59) Eschatology and Metaphysics Eschatological and metaphysical knowledge had their beginnings in the Ṛig Veda. The nāsatīya sūkta in the tenth maṇḍala of the Ṛig Veda raises certain fundamental eschatological questions about the self and provides hard-core metaphysics about cosmology. Several such axiomatic statements are found even in the early maṇḍalas of the Ṛig Veda. These ideas are elaborately dealt with in the Upaniṣads, obviously gurukula texts generated and maintained by upādhyāyas or ācāryas (teachers) over a long period, presumably between c. 800 and c. 200 BCE, for the pedagogic purpose of brahmacāris, who learnt sitting close by the guru, as the word denotes. They constitute India’s earliest texts embodying specialized knowledge in eschatology and metaphysics. Vedic knowledge was considered self-evident and foundational for all forms of knowledge in India for over a millennium, despite the criticisms by heterodox schools such as the Jaina, Bouddha, Ājīvika, Cāṛvāka, and Bāṛhaspatya. Of the various groups of austere world views (parivṛājakas), like the Jain and Ājīvika orders, the Buddha represents an original thinker and admirer of new knowledge. The Buddha locates new knowledge not in existence but in transcendence and relates knowledge to suffering and not to the sufferer. He argues that human suffering ceases with people overcoming ignorance about existence and attaining deeper knowledge about transcendence, which relieves them from the fetters of worldliness. The knowledge in the Upaniṣads, which pertains to the eschatology of the self (ātma) and the metaphysics of the universe as the supreme consciousness (brahma), is known as Vedānta (the terminal of the Vedas) and brahmajnāna (knowledge about brahma), disclosed as sūtras (threads) of thoughts. They formulate knowledge about the self through a series of eschatological interrogations and reach out to the metaphysical knowledge about the ultimate or the absolute consciousness. The metaphysics maintains that, while the whole universe is subject to the objective categories such as space, time, and causation, brahma transcends all this and remain spaceless, timeless, and beyond causality. Brahma is the inaudible that exists in audibility, the unseen that exists in seeing, and the (p.60) inexplicable that enables explanation. Eternal, infinite, and unconditioned,8 Brahma is everything (sarvam khalvidam brahma), the cause and the result—the absolute combine that precludes the need for a creator.9 What the Upaniṣads underscore as the ultimate knowledge (brahmajnāna) is the ontological unity between the individual self and the universal consciousness. This knowledge is meant to empower every individual with the deepest self-awareness: ‘I am brahma (aham brahmāsmi),’10 that is the supreme consciousness or the universe (prajnānam brahma).11 With the acquisition of ultimate knowledge, an individual is emancipated from ignorance, desire, selfishness, and misery. The most profound metaphysicality about this Page 7 of 46

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Knowledge Production knowledge is the realization that the multiplicity of external manifestations in the material universe is only the apparent. The Upaniṣads represent, perhaps, the earliest mode of abstract knowledge production in northern India.

Epistemological Traces Though an exact counterpart of epistemology may not be identifiable among the knowledge fields of early India, there is plenty of evidence of certain logical procedures evolved and applied to ensure the reliability of knowledge. Traces of treating knowledge as an object of knowledge and constituting knowledge about the nature and proof of knowledge are seen in the Āraṇyaka and Brāhamaṇa parts of the Vedas and increasingly in the Upaniṣads. Being traces of knowledge about methods to be used for establishing the reliability of knowledge, they are indications of the philosophy of knowledge or epistemology and therefore of vital significance to the context. This embedded subject matter gradually becomes a specialized and codified branch of learning called Anvikṣiki that deals with logical procedures and exegesis. According to tradition, Medhātithi Gautama of c. sixth century BCE was the scholar who codified this field of knowledge. (p. 61) Anvikṣiki is considered as one of the four fields of knowledge (vidyā) along with the rest, namely, tṛayī, daṇḍanīti (knowledge of governance), vāṛtta (practical arts), according to the later Vedic tradition. Other scholars known as experts in Anvikṣiki are Ajita-Keśakambali, Bṛhaspati, Cāṛvāka, Kapila, Dattātreya, Punarvasu Atreya, Sulabha Maitreyi, and Aṣṭāvakṛa, presumably of the sixth to fifth centuries, who figure as sages of Upaniṣad wisdom and, hence, largely critical insiders of the Vedic tradition. Scholars in different fields like materialistic metaphysics, astronomy, healthcare, Vedānta, and the like, they seem to have had special interest in the nature, logic, and authenticity of the knowledge of their respective fields. Ajita-Keśakambali, the first known materialistic thinker is believed to have founded an explanatory framework for understanding natural phenomena without resorting to supernatural powers. Bṛhaspati codifies it in a set of aphorisms (Bāṛhaspatya-sūtra) that Cāṛvāka expands through interpretation. Epistemological questions acquire remarkable significance in the BāṛhaspatyaCāṛvāka materialistic thoughts popularly known as Lōkāyata, according to which perception (pratyaksha) is the only primary and reliable source of knowledge. They maintain that inference, having no means to establish its reliability, is uncertain and hence invalid as a means of knowledge. For instance, smoke need not be universally and always the reliable source of inference for the presence of fire. According to them, inference is not suitable to be used to ascertain metaphysical truth. Truth is merely an accident of inference rather than its unfailing character. The epistemological position here is that, as long as the observation remains not proved as unconditional, it is a matter of uncertainty. Truth is complete and final knowledge that becomes explicit on the Page 8 of 46

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Knowledge Production unconditional establishment of observations, premises, and conditions. These epistemological traits continue to influence the ways and means of validating knowledge. A significant aspect of the Cāṛvāka-Bāṛhaspatya epistemology is theorization using the possible minimum of pramāṇas (evidences). The mode of exposition of final knowledge has been fundamentally in the aphoristic structure and confined entirely to the use of the real language. It is not accidental that the first instance of the deepest and complete type of knowledge production pertained to the language itself.

(p.62) Grammar Production of knowledge about the Sanskrit language marks the first ever accomplished state of Indian epistemology that is distinguishable for the aphoristic structure of theorization, algorithmic nature of computation, and amazing perfection. Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyi (c. 500 BCE) is the best example. It occupies the most prominent position in the world map of classical linguistic studies for analytical completeness, observational exactness, and theoretical rigour.12 Pāṇini’s work makes an exhaustive and systematic characterization of Sanskrit language in terms of its grammatical rules coming to about 4,000 phonological segments, verbal roots of about 2,000 words, and many lexical items, together with the description of rules regarding deviational strings that mark the linguistic change since the Vedic age down to his own times. In short, Pāṇini’s sūtras provide the grammatical principle behind each correct utterance possible in Sanskrit. Pāṇini might have thought, under normative pressure, primarily about the easiest method of ensuring correct expressions in Sanskrit and hence described the rules in the most condensed form. However, Aṣṭādhāyi is not just an ordering based on the principle that the more specific rule applies prior to the more general rule and ‘elsewhere condition’ as some linguists think in the absence of explicit theorization about how the rules apply.13 The thoroughness of analytical comprehension that the text exhibits about the structure, composition, and functional contexts of the language is astounding. It is natural that such a meticulous work embodies discoveries of fundamental linguistic factors, the pattern of their relationships, and deeper correlations across them tantamount to theorization. Pāṇini discovers the logic of grammatical rules, which enables him to compresses them. There are rules within rules, rules overriding rules, and rules that (p.63) need to be read along with other rules. At the outset, Pāṇini theorizes on the basis of the basic assumption that the ultimate truth about rules rests in people’s utterances. This is a clear indication of his philosophical perspective that ultimate truth in its diversity and complexity resides in the real world. A striking feature of his theorization is that it involves only the smallest possible number of devices but generates the largest possible empirical data.

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Knowledge Production Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhāyi has to be seen as the first known work that lays down the foundation of Indian epistemology not only for linguistics but also for all profound fields of knowledge, namely, astronomy, mathematics, healthcare, logic, and philosophy. The fundamental property of knowledge according to Pāṇini is the theoretical generalization of the ideal, made inevitably at the instance of the empirically given reality, if possible after checking each specific instance. He holds that indeed the ideal is real, but some part of it always escapes theorization. Hence, the epistemological position is that the fundamental knowledge is not with the theory based on the ideal with which one explains reality relatively. This position shows a leavening influence across all profound fields of knowledge in India. The sūtra mode of exposition of knowledge in its perfect form as exemplified by Pāṇini seems to have set the epistemological stance for all the knowledge systems in India. This is comparable to how Euclidian axiomatic logic of mathematics set the epistemological foundation for the post-classical European knowledge. The Jain and Buddhist knowledge tradition that goes back to the turn of the common era is largely in the same epistemic tradition. Although basically aphoristic in the mode of exposition, the logic of Nāgārjuna (between c. 150 and c. 250 CE), namely, tetralemma or (catuṣkoṭī), the fourfold negation (namely, affirmation, negation, equivalence, and neither) and prajnāpāramitā-sūtra (or aphorism regarding the perfected way of understanding the nature of reality) relating to the basis of knowledge (pramāṇa) is considered to be a major epistemological landmark. With this logic, Nāgārjuna theorizes reality as emptiness and interprets the Buddha’s middle path in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. In this work, he sets down certain new epistemic properties of knowledge and propounds a new hermeneutic model that has been a significant influence on the interpreters of the underlying meanings of the Upaniṣads. (p.64) Several pervasive fields of knowledge emerged following the same epistemological parameters. Astronomy, mathematics, thoughts, theatre, healthcare, and architecture are prominent examples of analytically constituted and aphoristically articulated systems of knowledge.

Early Astronomy Another important field of knowledge that expressed itself in aphoristic form is geometry that had its beginnings in the Sulbasūtras of the Vedic times. What is called Vedic mathematics comprised the geometrical techniques to facilitate how different types of altars of Vedic sacrifices are built. The Sulbasūtras, containing geometrical prescriptions and rules of triangle, rectangle, rhombus, and circle, lay down the foundation of the knowledge in Indian astronomy. Out of it developed the Jyōtiṣa-sūtras, astronomical aphorisms constituting one of the six branches of the Vedic knowledge. Knowledge in astronomy has been advancing over the centuries along the epistemological track of Pāṇinian linguistic exegesis by accommodating mathematical procedures within the Sanskrit language.

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Knowledge Production Graeco-Roman contacts with parts of north and north-western India had led to a great deal of intellectual transactions. Astronomy and mathematics were remarkably benefitted by these cross-cultural exchanges. Astronomy of Hellenic Asia, Rig-Vedic geometry, and the later Vedic number theories got synthesized to herald a phase of theoretical mathematics. Number theories were important for memorizing the classificatory features of the hymns forming a huge corpus. It is in Āryabhaṭīyam that this synthesis becomes accomplished, making the text a landmark classic by Āryabhaṭa (476–550 CE). Āryabhaṭīyam presents astronomical knowledge with Pāṇinian classificatory rigour and aphoristic brevity. In 121 sūtras, it provides the basic astronomical concepts, arithmetic procedures, geometrical techniques, algebraic calculation, and uses of trigonometric functions in determining the positions of the planets at a particular time, describing their motions and computing eclipses. Several scholars had sustained engagements with this master text by way of interpretation (vyākhya), commentary (bhāṣya), compilation (p.65) (samhita), and analytical comprehension (saṅgraha). Although every vyākhya or bhāṣya was apparently an interpretative commentary of a previous text, in reality, it was an addition of fresh knowledge, sometimes even strikingly original. Although often stated as part of the original proposition, most of the elaborations and expansions made in the vyākhyas, bhāṣyas, samhitas, and saṅgrahas were fresh. Each of them proved to be a corrective exercise, of course in varying degrees from text to text, and each analytical comprehension an integrative function upon the extant corpus of knowledge. Any of the taxa like vyākhya or bhāṣya or samhita or saṅgraha of disparate ages and regions in traditional India would vouch for this fundamental feature of knowledge production and transmission. Mathematical astronomy in India shows a systematic exponential growth through the formulation of new theorems for higher trigonometric functions and through the enunciation of new theories of numbers, efficient enough to resolve complicated problems. It is purely a necessity-driven advancement of mathematical knowledge rather than the result of mathematicians’ pursuance of the ultimate axiomatic truth. Hence, the explicit epistemic distinction of Indian mathematical knowledge is its dependence on algorithmic and computational methods of solving issues specific to contingent astronomic needs. Mathematicians first attempted to solve the practical problem through algorithmic approximation and eventually perfected it by evolving theories of error and recursive procedures.

Systems of Thought or Daṛśanas Early Indian systems of thought (daṛśanas), six in number, well known as ṣaddaṛśana, are Sānkhya, Yōga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta, often divided into the āstikā (theistic) and nāstika (atheistic) categories.14 Although the exact chronology is not known, it is generally accepted that most of them had their beginnings between c. 600 BCE and c. 100 CE, and as evolved thoughts with (p.66) scholarly following, they belonged to disparate periods. Vedic Page 11 of 46

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Knowledge Production knowledge constitutes the undeniable foundational knowledge for all these systems of thought. All of them owe their metaphysical fundamentals and cosmology largely to the Upaniṣads and the aphoristic mode of exposition to the sūtras, of course with degrees of difference in the overall world view. Some of them are more or less like twins with the same metaphysics and cosmology. What matters to the context is the Anvikṣiki or epistemology of these thoughts rather than their content. What these systems of thought accepted as their means of knowing and the methods of making the known reliable constitute the subject matter of discussion. Initially, their epistemology seems to have insisted upon pratyakṣa, anumāna (inference), and śabda (verbal testimony), as the only reliable means of knowledge. As the thoughts develop through the works of ācāryas, new means of knowledge and methods of establishing the reliability are identified and differently prioritized. Though the exponential growth of these systems of thought is of a relatively brief period, they persisted through generations, obviously as part of the corpus of knowledge transmitted through the institutions of learning. The Sānkhya thought is based on the sūtras of Kapila (c. sixth century BCE) and its commentary, the Sānkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakrishna (c. 350 BCE). Sānkhya epistemology insists upon pratyakṣa and anumāna as the two reliable sources of knowledge. Yōga is linked to this system of thought as the frequent allusions of Sānkhya-yōga suggest. Nyāya is the system of thought that had a longer period of exponential growth and better epistemological advancement. A system of thought exclusively pertaining to logic, rules of reasoning, and epistemology far more than to metaphysics, the crucial importance of Nyāya in the discussion of knowledge production is explicit. Its foundational text is the Nyāyasūtra by Akṣapāda Gautama, probably of the period between 200 BCE and second century CE. The text, consisting of five chapters and 528 sūtras, might have been expanded over a few centuries by several authors. Nyāya defines knowledge (jñāna) as consciousness (anubhava), rendered plausible as apprehension (upalabdhi), and subsequently turned into a logically confirmed formal output through the process of cognition (buddhi). Syllogistic deductive reasoning, in which the inference gets established as conclusion on the basis of two or more empirically given or intellectually assumed premises, is (p.67) central to Nyāya.15 Similarly, Vaiśeṣika, another independent thought with its own metaphysics, ethics, soteriology, and logic, bases itself on the sūtras (Vaiśeṣika-sūtra) of Kaṇāda Kaśyapa (c. 200 BCE). Like Buddhism, it accepts perception and inference as the only two reliable means of knowledge. Over time, the Vaiśeṣika system became similar in its philosophical procedures, ethics, and soteriology to the Nyāya. Its cosmology is based on the deeper realization that all material objects in the physical universe are reducible to the particle or paramāṇu, the irreducible.

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Knowledge Production Mīmāṃsā is perhaps the earliest among the six systems of thoughts, for it relates to rituals. Mīmāṃsā deals with the faculty of close perusal and analytical reflection of the literary text in Sanskrit. It is the early Indian counterpart of hermeneutics. Its first detailed exposition in the form of sūtras seems to have been made by Jaimini (c. 300–200 BCE). Relegating the hermeneutics of the Vedic ritual (Karma-Mīmāṃsā) as the initial form (Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā), a more intellectually challenging version, namely, Jñana-Mīmāṃsā acquired prominence during the later period. It is this version of Mīmāṃsā, which subsequently becomes Vedānta as an independent system of thought with a longer duration of exponential growth in metaphysics and logic. This is not to mean that PūrvaMīmāṃsā phased out or dissolved itself into Uttaramīmāṃsā. In fact, through the later interpretations of Jaiminīya-sūtra, by Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (c. seventh century CE), Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā did make significant epistemological advancement through the logical assertion of pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna (comparison), arthāpatti (postulation), śabda, and anupalabdhi (non-perception or negative proof). At the most evolved state, the epistemology of the daṛśana holds pramāṇa as the most established property of knowledge that is about itself as well as about others. It validates itself and illumines other objects in pratyakṣa. The daṛśana epistemology recognizes two types of pramāṇas: pratyakṣa and parōkṣa. It does a meticulous detailing of the properties of pratyakṣa in contra-distinction with the parōkṣa (p.68) that consists of varieties smṛiti (memory), pratyabhijnā (direct knowledge), taṛka (a test of knowledge’s universal concomitance), anumāna, and āgama (textual testimony). Pratyabhijnā is direct knowledge deductively drawn following the means and methods of daṛśana. In its standardized form, the daṛśana epistemology insists on resorting to six reliable means of knowledge, namely, pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi (apprehension), and śabda. Anumāna is defined as sādhya (possible knowledge) out of sādhana or hetu (the causality), the fixed-in concomitance with sādhya. It considers memory (smṛiti), doubt (saṁśaya), error (viparyaya), and hypothetical reasoning (taṛka) as invalid means of knowledge, which shows that there exist valid or invalid types of knowledge. At its final stage of exponential growth, the epistemology of daṛśana is what the Nyāya system of thought has debated and established over the years. Perfecting it as a rigorously self-reflexive and critical method of ascertaining the status of the knowledge first based on each of the four means of knowledge individually and then collectively to arrive at the relatively final form, Nyāya sets the standard for testing the reliability of the means and methods of knowledge for every system of thought and field of knowledge. This rigorous epistemology apart, Vedic knowledge was the highest of all for the entire systems of knowledge. Every epistemological strategy for establishing reliability of knowledge stops in front of that, for it is the ultimate pramāṇa that needs no

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Knowledge Production extraneous confirmation. This is true of the Jains and the Buddhists too, for whom the ultimate pramāṇas are their canons.

Historical Epistemology In a natural condition, the human brain is genetically imbued with the capacity for unconscious experiential learning, memorizing, and reproducing from time immemorial. Over the years, the human faculty of reflexivity grew up tremendously, enabling formal constitution of knowledge through conscious analytical reasoning, comparison, rethinking, and improving the knowledge. Knowledge forms emerged in various fields under the compulsion of necessity and some of them acquired depth as driven by chance. (p.69) In most cultures, as in the Indian, it is metaphysics first and then systems of thought, co-existing, conflicting, and synthesizing with one another. The theistic and atheistic conflict with each other, while the abstract and concrete synthesize (see Figure 3.1). In the Indian subcontinent, Jainism, Buddhism, Ājīvikaism, Bāṛhaspatyam, and Lōkāyatam with multiple sub-sects representing atheism and Pūṛva-Mīmāṃsā, Yōga-sūtram, Śaivam, Bhāgavatam, Vāstu-śastram, and the like representing theism show the scene of conflicts witnessing the atheistic sometimes turning to theistic and theistic to meta-theistic. Systems of analytical thoughts also maintain the difference between the theistic and atheistic in metaphysics and, the abstract and concrete in cosmology, beside the opposition between the existential and transcendental. Jyōtiṛ-gaṇitam, Āyurvedam, Dharmaśāstram, Arthaśāstram, Vāstu-vidya, and so on exemplify the knowledge form of concrete cosmology and existential perspective, while Anvikṣiki, Pāṇinīyam, Sānkhyam, Nyāyam, Vaiśeṣikam, Uttaramīmāṃsā, Dvanyālōkam, Pratybhijnasidhāntam, and so on exemplify the transcendental systems of knowledge. Hetuvidya, Spōṭavādam, Pancasandhi, Vyaktivivekam, and so on exemplify the higher level of synthesizing. At some point of time, knowledge as such in its turn becomes an object of analysis, leading to its critical examination, validation, expansion, and reconstitution, possible only in a formal textual tradition. Historical epistemology of both the sramaṇic and Brahmanical forms of knowledge would show that they were culturally given too, in the sense that the Piṭaka, Nikāya, and Mahāvagga categories of Buddhist knowledge and the Vedic, Itihāsic, Sāstraic, and Puranic categories of Brahmanical knowledge had their pressures and impositions of the changing

Figure 3.1 Forms and Relations of Knowledge

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Knowledge Production material base and the entailing social power relations in time

Source: Author.

and space.16 For instance, the knowledge produced and preserved by the sṛamaṇas was primarily of a didactic kind with a pragmatic dimension due to the obvious factors related to their world view of differing degrees of austerity. Healthcare, a prominent (p.70) (p. 71) field wherein they generated knowledge, was driven by the purpose of dhamma, according to which treatment (cikica) of illness (vāti) was an important means to resolve the sorrow (āti) of the devoted people (upāsakas). It was more ontological in nature. However, for the purpose of debate, they did produce knowledge based on epistemic principles of objectivity, proof, veracity, and concept of truth. The logic of grammar and Nyāya thought was central to all forms of traditional Indian knowledge with hermeneutic primacy.

Ayurveda or Healthcare Knowledge Knowledge of healthcare as part of survival needs is one of the most ancient fields of knowledge, the earliest form of which exists in the Vedas with indications of classification of illnesses (jwara) and medicines (ouṣadha). For instance, the Vedas follow a kind of classification of medicines into prākṛtika (pancabhūta or the five natural elements), khanija (excavated minerals), samudraja (marine objects), prāṇija (creatures), and udbhija (herbs) with some references to their properties.17 An expanded form of the knowledge is there in the Jain and Buddhist (sṛamaṇas) canonical texts in Pāli and its codified and systematized form, called Āyurveda, in the samhita texts in Sanskrit. As accumulated, inherited, and preserved through oral transmission over centuries, the knowledge base of Āyurveda becomes profoundly enunciated in the samhitas of Suśṛuta (c. sixth century BCE) and Caraka (c. 200 BCE–200 CE). Buddhist monks who had set in the tradition of systematic recording of knowledge and treatment practices seem to have made a lot of fresh additions to the corpus of knowledge about healthcare practices by way of rules pertaining to drugs and treatments for specific ailments as provided for in the nikāyas and the piṭakas. The contribution of the Buddhist monasteries to the development of medicine by way of regularization of rules regarding the treatment of specific illnesses is remarkable. According to traditions, the Buddha, against the Brahmanical belief of karma-phalā, that is, the consequence of deeds (p.72) in the previous life, offered a rational causation of illness. It sought to explain illness as the consequence of imbalance in the combination (sannipāta) of pitta (bile), sehma (phlegm), vāta (wind). This theory of tridōṣa or humoral imbalance is central to Āyurveda. Dīghanikāya shows how monks acquired knowledge of human anatomy through the observation of animal bodies dissected by the butcher, exposing internal organs and structures.18 Another method of acquiring knowledge about the human body was through direct observation of the decaying cadavers left on the Page 15 of 46

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Knowledge Production charnel ground. Monks were advised to engage in continuous observation of the dead body until it was completely decomposed, all bones exposed, the skeleton became white, and eventually began to turn into dust. This is a clear indication of the conscious production of concrete knowledge on the basis of first-hand visual experience (pratyakṣa), experimentalist learning (anumāna), and reflective postulation (arthāpatti) of truth. It was not possible for those under the control of the Brahmanical notion of impurity and pollution to generate anatomical knowledge through direct observation and reflection in situ. Āyurveda owes its knowledge in human anatomy, external structures, and internal organs to the painstaking and patient observations made by the Buddhist monks. The monks’ engagement in the production of healthcare knowledge presupposes the monastery’s institutional involvement in the activity. It is natural that healthcare, the most vital field of service to the ailing, received significant attention in monastic establishments that were seats of learning, where monks engaged in the production and transmission of knowledge in different fields. Some of the monasteries like Takṣaśila were universities where legendary physician sages Atreya and Agniveśa taught and great physicians like Jivaka studied healthcare. They not only collected, redacted, and codified the available knowledge in healthcare, but also generated new knowledge in the field and treated the sick people by moving from place to place.19 In short, what came to be called Āyurveda had its codification and systematization with a lot of addition done by the Buddhist monks in their monasteries. (p.73) Efforts of codification and classification were continued by the individual physicians and teachers among whom Suśṛuta and Caraka rank the foremost. They made comprehensive texts (samhitas) that obviously helped as manuals for learners and practitioners in healthcare. Suśruta-samhita that deals with surgery (śalya-kriya) and Caraka-samhita that deals with the treatment (kāya-cikitsa) are the two major texts of this tradition. Their method of exposition follows the sequence of fundamental aphorisms, aetiology, theoretical knowledge about the body, taxonomy of illnesses, and treatment practice. The metaphysics of the humoral equilibrium is what prevails in Āyurveda, as its overarching framework of comprehension, explanation, and practice. Suśruta-samhita provides in detail the type of instruments, methods of handling them, types of surgery, consequences, and remedial and preventive strategies. Its explanation of the eight different procedures of surgery, namely, excision (chedyā), incision (bhedyā), scrapping (lekhyā), puncturing (vedhya), probing (eṣya), extraction (āhāryā), draining (viśrāvyā), and suturing (sīvyā), exemplifies the meticulous nature of the samhita. Quite similar is the approach of Caraka to the discussion of medical treatment in his samhita.20 According to the textual tradition, the Caraka-samhita seeks to redact the teachings of Atreya, the legendary author of the master text in Āyurveda. However, there are clear in-text indications to believe it to be strikingly original, especially in Caraka’s declarations of his sources of knowledge other than the teachers of the past or Page 16 of 46

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Knowledge Production the pieces of advice of the wise (āptōpadeśā) that constitutes the a priori component. For a specific example, he acknowledges how he acquainted himself with the wisdom flowing from the remote past, by observing what the shepherds, cowherds, and forest dwellers practised.21 Both Suśṛuta (p.74) and Caraka, great physicians themselves with amazing proficiency in theory and practice of medicine, show that Āyurveda had already become a well-expounded domain of healthcare wisdom enabling its practitioners to command enormous respect and ranking.22 Although the Atharva Veda mentions the classification of medicines into prākṛtika (pancabhūta), khanija, samudraja, prāṇija, and udbhija with some references to their properties, the level of knowledge in all this at that stage must have been relatively elementary. Nevertheless, the knowledge level of the theory and practice of Āyurveda is fairly high by the time of the samhitas that contain an elaborate list of herbs, medicinal properties of their roots, stem, flower, and fruit; the procedures of preparing the medicine out of them; and the ways of administering them when to whom, how, and against what illness. Among the khanija objects, they mention minerals, salts, and metals as elements of medicinal preparation. Some of the medicinal preparations, namely rasāyana, using metals even of toxicity are mentioned in the samhitas along with detailed procedures of their preparation based on principles of rasa-śāstra (metallurgy). It is evident that the processing involved the ways and means to turn the metal into its nanoparticles, ensuring metallic medicines free of side effects and toxicity. This is not to suggest that the texts vouch for the existence of knowledge about nanoparticles. Indeed, through trial and error, they had learnt about the side effects and found out the ways to overcome them. Further, they indicate the existence of the knowledge about medicinal properties of various other substances such as coral, seashells, and feathers, processed and administered against illnesses. Samhitas are largely aphoristic in structuring their exposition and selfreflexively realist about their epistemological traits, indicative of the explicit influence of the Nyāyasūtras. These texts consciously articulate the methodology of knowledge production, which makes clear that Āyurveda is a profoundly enunciated system of knowledge, conscious and reflexive about the epistemic procedures of its theorization and validation. Tantrayukti, or the way of doing and its logical plan, established by the Nyāya thought, is what the samhita texts state as their methodology. It lays down the method of constitution (p.75) and authentication of knowledge. According to tantrayukti, the concept of truth (daṛśana), proof of knowledge (pramāṇa), and logical procedure (yukti) are the three fundamental elements of knowledge production.23 These are of crucial importance even in the present-day epistemic principles. Āyurveda follows the critical reflexive method to reconfirm the pramāṇa by reviewing the causal basis of its constitution (pramā-kāraṇa), the logical procedures of its authentication (yukti), and the precepts of its argument (vāda-vidhāna), as enunciated in the Page 17 of 46

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Knowledge Production Nyāyasūtras. What it seeks to reassure is the unquestionability of the logical sequential connection between pramāṇa and the explanation or theory (sidhāntā). Tantrayukti insists upon transparency about the ontological unity of pramāṇa and theorization. At the same time, as in the case of Nyāya, the divinely ordained (deva-vipāśṛaya) is the ultimate truth rather than the logically sustained (yukti-vipāśṛaya). To state briefly the most relevant part of the discussion, of the various steps in the logical procedures (tantrayukti) of knowledge production articulated in the samhitas, the starting point is anubhava. It triggers jijnāsa or curiosity about sambhava (source) and leads to anuyōgā and pratyanuyōga, that is, questions and counter questions. This state engenders anumāna generating saṁśaya and necessitating vāda (debate) that involves discrimination of a series of binaries such as, pratyakṣa–parōkṣa (direct perception–indirect perception), hetu–ahetu (reason–fallacy), and as pṛamā–apṛamā (valid–invalid) about the basis of anumāna. Consequently, the process ends up with parihārā (amendment) to the anumāna and formulation of the sidhāntā, the acceptance of rejection of which depends on the logical success in establishing its ontological unity with pramāṇā.

Vāstu-vidya or Architecture A number of early monumental structures of the Buddhist and Jain monastic establishments of the period c. 300 BCE to c. 600 CE, besides the Āgamic temples of the period c. 400 CE to c. 600 CE, have (p.76) survived to our times as brilliant testimonies of Indian architecture. Rock-cut structures of Sanchi, Sarnath, Amaravati, Barhut, Ajanta, Ellora, Aurangabad, Bhaja, Karle, Kanheri, Udayagiri, Khandagiri, and Andheri vouch for the seasoned architectural practices of early India. They remain an enduring testimony of the amazing level of perfection achieved by the architectural designers, masons, craftsmen, and artisans of early India. A few scholars, but more in an antiquarian as well as aesthetic appreciation, have subjected architectural knowledge embedded in these monuments to analysis.24 The embedded knowledge in these monuments pertains to wooden architecture, for they are facsimiles of woodwork. Virtually they constitute the monumental record of architectural theories, concepts, procedures, designs, plans, experiments, and accomplishments in wood. Indeed, there must have been detailed drawings but we draw a blank about their mode, medium, means, measures, and so on. The Vāstu texts in Sanskrit, which we know are of the postsixth century CE, which need not be accidental, for textualization of architectural knowledge can begin only after many monuments are constructed by artisans and craftsmen using their inherited experiential knowledge incessantly perfected through trials and errors. It is natural that the architectural knowledge of India became explicitly coded and systematized on the basis of experience with accomplished monumental buildings. The Page 18 of 46

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Knowledge Production architectural and sculptural knowledge evolved through practice over the years in designs, plans, and principles during the construction of the Buddhist and Jain monuments was adapted to the Āgamic, Brahmanical cosmology, mode of worship, and iconography.25 Naturally, this adaptation must have led (p.77) to the making of separate texts prescribing the constituent structures, features, sculptural content, and iconographic cognizances for the Jain, Buddhist, and Āgamic monuments. The codification, classification, and textualization based on the heterodox and Āgamic monuments account for the constitution of architecture, sculpture, and other practical arts into a distinct knowledge domain called vāṛtta. It is at the well-evolved state of architectural knowledge of differing designs, patterns, styles, concepts, theories, and models extensively illustrated across the country through many monuments that their classification into the nāgarā, drāviḍā, and vesarā systems becomes possible. Bṛhat-samhitā, Viśvakarma-prakāśā, Samarāngaṇa-sūtradhārā, Aparājita-Pṛacchā, Rūpa-maṇḍanā, Mayamatā, Amśumad-bhedā, Agastya-Sakalādhikarā, Śilparatnā, and Mānasārā are the famous examples of texts of architectural analysis and classification. Mānasārā is perhaps the most comprehensive text on architecture, which discusses the subject matter in seventy chapters. It contains primarily the prescriptive as well as descriptive accounts of the standardized practices for the Jain, Buddhist, and Āgamic architecture, sculpture, and iconography, obviously on the basis of firsthand knowledge about several of the early monuments. What these texts prominently carry is the specific prescriptions of architecture, sculpture, and iconography of the cults and sects rather than the theory and practice of monument building. Once the architectural models got entrenched and their execution was made mechanical, the innovativeness in the production of knowledge in the related fields ceased. The so-called architectural texts of this degenerate phase became replete with superstitions contingent on the social structure. There are several such regional texts in the country, as Anka-śāstrā, Aparājita Vāstuśāstrā, Vāstu-tattvā, Vāstu-nirṇayā, Vāstu-puruṣa-lakṣaṇā, Vāstuprakāśā, Vāstu-pradīpā, Vāstu-mañjarī, Vāstu-vicārā, Vāstu-vidhī, Vāstusamgrahā, Vāstu-sarvasvā, Tantra-samuccayā, and so on that speak more about the restrictions of the caste society and its discriminations rather than the theory and practice of architecture. Having been incorporated into the caste system, the practices of artisans and craftsmen were subjected to upper-caste impositions enforced through textual appropriation. Vāstu texts best exemplify this through the mixing of caste-based social norms with architectural prescriptions. (p.78) We do not see anything epistemologically significant about the content of the Vāstuśāstra texts and hence we seek to focus a bit on the vāstu-vidyā, the architectural knowledge that is ingrained in the early monuments across the country. Historians of architecture have taken rock-cut cave architecture and built-structure architecture as almost mutually exclusive categories. Actually, Page 19 of 46

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Knowledge Production such a categorization or differentiation is hardly relevant to the discussion of the embedded knowledge of architectural engineering in early Indian monuments, for rock-cut cave architecture is built-structure architecture in wood and bricks carried forward to rock. In fact, the former is a mere replica of structures perfected in the carpentry and masonry of the latter. It is a blind imitation of the structure in its entirety without skipping even those features that are functionally quite irrelevant to the monolithic cave architecture. Analysing the ingrained engineering, it is not the theory of rock-cut cave architecture that we unravel but that of masonry and carpentry in built-structure architecture. Some of the major features like plinths, pillars, pilasters, abacuses, brackets, capitals, beams, ceilings, roofs, arches, vaults, beams, domes, and doorjambs are architectural elements, each of which has its own specific function of theoretical basis in built structures. On the contrary, none of these has any theoretically ordained function in rock-cut architecture. As architectural elements, the plinth forming the foundational platform, the pillar supporting the structure above it like ceiling or horizontal beam or roof, and the pilaster projecting from the wall in support of the beam have no theoretically ordained real functions in a rock-cut cave structure. Similarly, an abacus, generally in the form of a flat slab on the top of a pillar’s capital, designed to support the architrave, has no real function in it. Another architectural element of no real function in a monolith is the bracket like a corbel or a console projecting from the wall to support weight. Yet another element is the capital, the crowning member of a pillar, pilaster, pier, or anta, providing a structural support for the horizontal beam. This is true of all beams across the tops of pillars and pilasters or below the ceiling, or the roof, which are copied in rock-cut caves that preclude their actual architectural function. In short, these elements are there in rock art only because they are integral to the wooden structure copied in rock. The original structure in wood and bricks being deeply entrenched in contemporary consciousness, the absence of these elements, overtly (p.79) ornamental and decorative, automatically becomes a problem of aesthetic imperfection. Some of the significant architectural members, namely, the arch and vaults used for bridging the space, eliminating tensile stresses, and transmitting loads to the wall are retained in rock-cut cave architecture just to be true to the original rather than for their real functions. What it clearly shows is the prevalence of knowledge way back in the third century BCE about using the principle of arch action in constructions. It is in the Buddhist rock-cut caves that we see the arched facade at the entrance and the barrel vaults in the Caitya hall. When Āgamic temples come up across the country with huge built structures, the apsidal structure of the Caitya and dome of the stūpa are the only main architectural elements that got retained at least in a restricted way. Many temples retained the circular base and rounded vault in their central structure. However, the arched entrances and barrel vaults seem to have been Page 20 of 46

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Knowledge Production discontinued, most probably because the architectural features insisted upon by the Āgamas might not have required the arching and vaulting principles. It is through the use of pillars and lintels resting on them or through corbelling that the temple architecture substitutes the arch in spanning the space of entrance. The tensile stresses affecting the lower parts of the horizontal lintel resting on the pillars substantially limits the span of the entrance. Even the corbelled entrance is no match to the arch doorway. Monks were never builders or architects or designers. It is obvious that the ruling class and merchants executed the Jain and Buddhist rock-cut caves as upāsakas who had wealth and workforce at their disposal. They got the caverns excavated on rock formations at strategic points along the trade route for religious merit, social status, and power, often as political statements. In fact, the designs are those of palaces and other big mansions of the Mauryan and immediate post-Mauryan times (c. third century BCE to first century CE). The hard labour involved in cutting and shaping the rock into beautiful monuments was drawn from the enslaved artisans and craftsmen (dāsa-karmmakāras), deprived of natural autonomy. Although production and practice of knowledge for subsistence and survival were natural rights of all kinds of people, the dāsakarmmakāras suffered servitude under the contemporary socio-economic system subjecting them to forced labour and immobility. Owned and controlled by the (p.80) ruling class, other prominent households, and big merchants, they had to do hard labour as required by their masters. Many artisans and craftsmen in those days were turned into dāsa-karmmakāras. Nevertheless, artisans and craftsmen who had a relative autonomy in the domain of skilled practices could produce and preserve knowledge essential for their arts and crafts. Across differing social formations, artisans and craftsmen have been generating and improving knowledge in their hereditary trades, although no written texts enshrining it have survived to the present. As knowledge embedded in the practice and orally transmitted by its users across generations, it might not have been turned into texts at any point of time. This category of knowledge, heavily practice-oriented and experiential (vāṛtta), seems to have been an exception, primarily due to lack of explanatory knowledge, that is, theoretical knowledge about how it works in most cases. This accounts for the largely mythological and magical representation of the knowledge domain of arts and crafts in India. Therefore, even when texts appear, they hardly embody the hardcore knowledge of architecture (vāstu-vidya), and instead go about narrating factoids and myths of the Vāstupuruṣa. As a natural course, the texts become social structurally contingent, ideological narratives driven by the normative pressure of vaṛṇa and jāti.26 This is true of the entire arts and crafts, the knowledge of which remained inexplicable but was actualized only in performance and hence was not amenable to textualization.

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Knowledge Production Texts of Archaeo-metallurgy A field of knowledge where we get some texts, primarily prescriptive though, discussing the processes and procedures is archaeo-metallurgy. A few archaeometallurgical texts in Sanskrit, basically prescriptive, exist describing the techniques and steps of extracting metals and smelting them. Perhaps the earliest among them is Rasaratnākara (the ocean of metallurgy or alchemy), attributed to Nāgārjuna, the famous Buddhist scholar of c. 200 CE, and it relates (p.81) to zinc smelting. His text provides in detail the process of the extraction of zinc out of Rasaka, the ore of the metal, and its purification through the procedure of tiryakpatana, the downward distillation.27 Although Nāgārjuna, perhaps in humility, gives the impression of profundity about contemporary metallurgy through the text’s title connoting the knowledge area’s oceanic depth and expanse, the texts of the subsequent periods, like Rasāyanaśāstra or Rasendracūḍāmaṇi or Mānasōllāsa or Abhilaṣitārtha-cintāmaṇi or Rasaratnasamuccaya of c. twelfth century CE, hardly seem to vouch for it. Indeed, the practical achievement of the craftsmen was of high order, thanks to the rare skill and experiential learning they had through constant practice, rather than explanatory knowledge as to how things worked. It is the precedence of ‘knowing what to do’ over ‘how it works’ or so to say, the existence of practice without theory. Hard-earned craftsmanship out of long working experience, perfected through trial and error over generations, and inherited by the craftsmen, enabled them to produce artefacts of fine quality as evidenced by archaeology and ethnography.28 Texts cannot embody this rare skill that is inexplicable for want of knowledge in terms of principles and theories. They can provide only a standardized description of smelting procedures, but not the explanatory knowledge putatively embedded in the craftsmen’s products of the time, as Mānasōllāsa or Abhilaṣitārtha-cintāmaṇi do regarding the process of making metal (p.82) icons or as Rasaśāstra does about iatro-alchemy of metallic medicinal preparations.

Textual Domination Only those who could wield control were able to generate knowledge and dictate it for others to blindly follow. In a band, the authority was the shaman; in the tribe, the head; in the slave society, the master; in the feudal society, the lord, and so on. It is indeed a complex situation that precludes a detailed recounting of the process as empirically given. In stratified and structured societies of specialization, the sections that could own and control decided what should prevail as knowledge of authority, authenticity, and credibility. They textualized the knowledge of authority and established the dominant form of knowledge. Always the powerful and the dominant in the society decided what was to be recognized as knowledge. In the case of the society of caste-based differentiation and hierarchy of the Indian subcontinent, the power relations structured by the dominance of the upper castes (trivarṇikas), competitively decided knowledge by using their command over material and cultural Page 22 of 46

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Knowledge Production resources. This accounted for the privileging of the Brahmanical against the sramaṇic or the precedence of the former over the latter or the obliteration of the multiple forms of knowledge and practices among the lower castes and various ethnic groups. Elaborate textualization of knowledge and its preservation as part of orality with strategies ensuring continuity and error-free recollection made the Brahmanical texts different from the sramaṇic knowledge that had resorted to literacy. Knowledge, being symbolic of status and ranking, was contested primarily between the brahmaṇas and sramaṇas over a long period, which involved the use of all intellectual means of debate (tarka), rituals and methods of enhancing royal status (yajña, hiraṇyagarbha, and tulābhāra), genealogical strategy of the divinization of royalty (the puranic process and praśastis), political means of appointing scholars as royal preceptors, and creation of noble status (sāmanta) in the social hierarchy of power relations. At some point, the sramaṇas secured dominance over the brahmaṇas with some precedence of the Pāli texts of knowledge over the Sanskrit texts but lost it for good in a couple of centuries and the latter established their dominance all over (p.83) the subcontinent with an undeniable status of intellectual authority attributed to Sanskrit texts. Sramaṇas themselves took to learning Sanskrit not only to debate with the knowledge texts thereof but also to acquire cultural legitimacy and status. Nevertheless, there was always a process of absorption and extraction of knowledge from the non-Brahmanical other, namely, the sramaṇic and the parallel streams of ‘the knowledge-practice combine’ of the lower strata. Caraka and Suśruta in their texts acknowledge as to how they produced knowledge by learning and analysing ‘the knowledge-practice combine’ of the people of the forest and the lower castes. Textualization or the constitution of the samhita was the result of the process of extraction or absorption. It was mostly a one-way process, for caste-based social differentiation and distancing precluded the dissemination of the textualized Brahmanical knowledge. Also, there was institutionalized prevention of the flow of formal knowledge from above as borne out by the prescriptions in the Dharmaśāstra. Indeed, there was dissemination from above (abhisaṅkramaṇa) and below (pratisaṅkramaṇa), primarily of ideological elements that the latter had to accept invariably, for they were integral to the process of domination. In the process, the Brahmanical knowledge seldom went into the hands of people belonging to the other vaṛṇas. However, the textualized or the processed form of knowledge in the custody of the sramaṇas did percolate to the practices of the lower castes to a great extent as the ethnographic survival of the scholarship of Sanskrit and the repository of textualized knowledge systems and practices based on scholarly texts in astronomy, architecture, and healthcare among the lower castes indicates. At

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Knowledge Production any rate, absorption from below was perceptibly far more than dissemination from above. What one observes as the major epistemic difference between the textually ordained knowledge of upper-caste exclusiveness and ‘the knowledge-practice combine’ of the lower castes is that the former is a self-consciously realist academic product while the latter, an unconscious cultural practice, wherein it was issue-based, knowing how to do rather than asking why it works. The former constitutes a concrete body of knowledge in the form of the text that is amenable to open interventions leading to additions to as well as the improvement of (p.84) the knowledge whereas the latter is an abstract and closed practice undergoing changes as culturally given. This is not to say that there is nothing culturally given about the former. Knowledge is purely objective in no society, for everywhere and always it is rendered plausible as the discursively tempered and manipulated, under the inescapable structure of power relations.29

Irrigation Technology The Tamil South and Sri Lanka had the beginnings of the reservoir system of irrigation based on overground water sources during the period from the seventh to tenth centuries, with the consolidation of organizational and institutional facilities appropriate for the technology of agriculture in general and irrigation in particular in the temple-centred brahmadeyas as well as the non-brāhamaṇa urs. Both the perennial and inundation techniques of irrigation were extensively used in the suitable areas in the Tamil region under the Pallava, Pāṇḍya, and Cōḻa kings, where the cultivation of paddy and sugarcane had to depend almost entirely on rain-fed reservoirs from the seventh century onwards. In the reservoir system, the main technology was that of building embankments at required points around a depression, often covering an area of one to two or more kilometres, for harvesting and preserving the inundation water and water from perennial sources like streams and rivers. Often, its distributive arrangements were not local, for there existed huge reservoirs (perumkuḷam) and big channels (perumkāl) irrigating several villages. Every agrarian village had a network of channels (vāykkal) for irrigating each field, leading from the village reservoir (ūrkkuḷam) or the big channel of the locality (nāṭṭupperumkāl) connected to certain huge reservoirs either rain-fed or river-fed. There were wells attached to fields for supplementing irrigation from reservoirs. Remains of bunds and sluices of the period indicate the technical skill involved in the reservoir system of irrigation. (p.85) An important technological aspect of the reservoir system is the adequate knowledge involved in choosing the most suitable points and ascertaining the correct sill level. People in those days knew the exact points where embankments were to be raised for maximizing the storage efficiency of the reservoir. They had appropriate knowledge about the landscape, its precipitation Page 24 of 46

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Knowledge Production level, the quantity of water that flows on the surface of the ground, the extent of the area drained into the water source, and so on. Development of the technology involved in the construction of the reservoir system shows a trajectory starting from the primordial and moving on to the standardized. In the primeval phase, the construction of embankments was characterized by the use of mud, laterite, and rubbles. Gradually, bricks replaced rubbles during the eighth century CE. Throughout the ninth and tenth centuries CE, the construction of bunds, sluices, wells, troughs, and the like becomes distinct for the use of chiselled granite for paving and piling along the string-line, which replaces the old method of randomized mud and rubble packing. Tūmpus or sluices were the main devices used for regulating the supply of water. A tūmpu consisted of two granite pillars installed in the reservoir on either side of the sluice mouth. The pillars of varying height according to the depth of the reservoirs are connected to each other by a series of cross-slabs from the base of the sluice to the top. Each cross-slab had a hole in the centre with a diameter of about five to eight inches. At the base of the system, a rectangular enclosure was built in granite with a rectangular opening of one to two feet. A stone above the opening had a long aperture and the stones on either side of the opening had slots, obviously for the movement of the shutter plank. Through the series of holes in the cross-slabs, a wooden rod connected to the shutter plank was lowered to the sluice mouth. It was operated by lifting the rod attached to the shutter plank, which was not difficult since a little opening would cause enough of an upward thrust from the flow of water to enable an easy sliding of the shutter plank. Sluices had underground conduits, which led water to a well called etirakkiṇaṛu and built outside the embankment. Unlike ordinary wells, the etirakkiṇaṛu was constructed upwards from the ground level. It had openings at its base to the channels going to various directions. Flow of water through the channels required no contrivance since it worked on (p.86) gravitational force. For lifting water from the wells attached to fields, people had depended on the various types of piccotah systems based on the human and animal power. In certain types simple methods like putting a heavy stone at the point of operation for counter balancing the water-lifts were used in order to reduce effort for the sake of mechanical advantage. Another sluice system was the kumiḻi or the pit with which the flow of water from the reservoir could be regulated. In this case, the sluice mouth was a pit, also enclosed, and with a circular opening on the surface. The post lifts the stone shutter open whenever necessary, taking advantage of the upward thrust of the water that starts escaping as in the previous system. Here the difference was in the nature of the valve of the sluice. In the case of the tūmpu system, water from the reservoir flowed into the sluice from the side, and, in that of the kumiḻi from above. A tūmpu opens at the side whereas the kumili opens from above. Sluices were generally installed a little off the bank and often those who operated them had to swim across or resort to some conveyances like a small boat to reach Page 25 of 46

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Knowledge Production them. Scholars sometimes viewed the positioning of the sluice off shore as an attempt to check the surreptitious operation of the sluice by water thieves.30 It appears that the actual purpose was different. Theoretically, sluices are to be installed at points of maximum depth ensuring availability of water even in peak summer and enough pressure for water to flow out. So, their positioning off the bank has to be viewed indicative of contemporary technical know-how in fixing the correct sill level. Normally, a reservoir would be increasingly shallow towards the embankments, where the installation of sluices was of no use. (p.87) For better outflow of water from the reservoir, sluices had to be invariably placed at points of maximum depth that would, naturally, be considerably far from the embankments. So it is the technical knowledge of the designers in fixing the correct sill level that is to be appreciated here. Distribution patterns of reservoirs vouch for the knowledge about the ‘cascade system’, meaning linking up of a series of reservoirs together for effective storage and sustainable distribution of water for irrigation.31 A lot of other insightful practices like sustainable water harvesting, storing, and distribution feasible in the ecological, socio-economic, and cultural environment were part of the system. Water from the upper parts of the cascade was used and reused several times before it reached the outlet. Cascading shows the awareness about its sustainability in rainwater harvesting and the technology of maintaining soil moisture and groundwater strength. The technology of irrigation had advanced further involving more mechanics during the Sultanate and Mughal periods.32 Persian and Arabic knowledge in mathematics, astronomy, alchemy, optics, mechanics, and medicine interacted with the knowledge available in such fields during the Sultanate and Mughal regions in India. The translation movement in the Arab, Persian, and Muslim world facilitated cross-cultural transactions of languages and knowledge forms. Art and architecture show the spread of new knowledge in their technology. Lapidary, especially gem works, heralded a higher phase of technology and aesthetics. Paper technology and metallurgy had advanced during the period, besides the technology of weapons, (p.88) transport, and navigation.33 Another sector that witnessed a significant advancement of knowledge was that of the textile industry. Several inventions and discoveries in the manufacture of textiles became popular in India during the period. High-quality weaving and dyeing as well as various methods of knitting, sewing, and matting crafts spread across the townships and villages of India during the Sultanate and Mughal periods. Kalamkari textile works is an illustrious example. It is well known that the textile industry of the Mughal times had ranked top in the world in terms of technology and productivity.

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Knowledge Production There happened an extensive spread of textile industry in South India during the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries CE, obviously as a result of the migration of the weaving community from the north and north-west India.34 It was the pitloom and the hand-driven shuttle system of the Persian and Arabic textile workers that became common in the Deccan and Andhra first and subsequently in the Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala regions. This technology continued as the basis of the hereditary textile works of various weaving communities known as Kaikkolar, Pattariyar, and Caliyar, until the time of modernization by the Basel Mission activists. As in the case of other crafts, there is no contemporary knowledge text on the technology of textile works and crafts, though it had necessitated awareness of principles and procedures pertaining to the production of yarn and its dyeing, besides loom preparation and weaving. Like several other crafts, early textile works hardly provide details about the methodology of the production of knowledge. But unlike in their case, ethnoarchaeology does not help due to extensive modernization in the handloom sector.

Advanced Knowledge Production Knowledge production in early India, which was an individualistic meditative enterprise (tapas), was improved upon through dialectics (tarka), and hermeneutics (mīmāṃsā) advanced through (p.89) textualization of interpretation (vyākhya), commentary (bhāṣya), compilation (samhita), and analytical comprehension (saṅgraha). Although every vyākhya or bhāṣya was apparently an interpretative commentary of a previous text, in reality it was addition of fresh knowledge, sometimes even strikingly original. Textualization of knowledge, primarily in Sanskrit, was part of the pedagogic purpose of storing knowledge for learners (brahmacāris and śṛamaṇa monks) as well as practitioners (ācāryas and parivṛājakas). There is no such tradition of specialized subject-specific textualization of knowledge in the śṛamaṇa tradition and, hence in Pāli, similar taxa are not seen. Further due to the scriptural sanctity of the Piṭaka, Nikāya, and Mahāvagga texts, hermeneutic exegesis on their knowledge components could not take on. Subsequently when, under the Mahāyāna order, monks began textualization of specialized knowledge, they did it in Sanskrit. Most knowledge areas reached a plateau stage due to the profound depth already attained at the early phase itself as Vyākaraṇa and Āyurveda exemplify, leaving little scope for further epistemic advances. One area wherein knowledge production consistently advanced over centuries is astronomy. It was the beliefs around the Vedic sacrificial ritual that necessitated advancement of knowledge in astronomy, the seeds of which are present in the Ṛig Veda itself. An entrenched belief that the incidence of eclipse during the conduct of sacrifices would make the ritual futile had acted as an inescapable compulsion for advancing knowledge in astronomy. Being elaborate, long-lasting, and expensive in terms of goods, services, and rewards, it was quite important that the Vedic sacrificial rituals once commenced should have their successful completion. Page 27 of 46

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Knowledge Production Losing a sacrifice due to the incidence of eclipse was ignominious to the priest who officiated and the king who patronized its performance. Therefore, ability to predict every eclipse well in advance was a crucial need for both the priest and the king. Production of deeper and precise knowledge about the planetary position, movements, and velocity was inevitable. Measuring being central to this knowledge, mathematics began to grow as the fundamental tool of astronomy that had ritual pressure in producing predictive knowledge about planetary positions and movements. Although there was imposition of politico-ritual beliefs on scholars, that hardly affected their rational approach to knowledge. It only (p.90) strengthened their adherence to epistemic properties like rationality, objectivity, verifiability, proof, and notion of truth in their enterprise of knowledge production.35 An inquiry into the aspects of historical epistemology such as premises, inferential logic, proof, concept of truth, and method of confirmation of knowledge is feasible here for visualizing the development of methodological preoccupation in terms of the concept of objectivity, rationality, and methodology at distinct stages of the formulation of knowledge.36 At once, this convergence of supernatural belief and objective rationality appears as a paradox. However, a deeper probing makes it clear that the real pressure was ultimately materialistic in nature. Though the belief was irrational, it worked as undeniable knowledge with socio-economic and politico-cultural power. It is important that the central epistemic distinction of traditional Indian astronomy was the knowledge’s theoretical nature transcending the empirically given and mathematical articulation. Another significant epistemic feature was the determinate linearity about the progress of knowledge through contributions to the extant corpus by way of interpretations of the master text. Addressed to gaps in explanation and absence of proofs in the master text, the pursuit of knowledge was invariably of cognitive encounter. Interpretations and elaboration of the master text were utterly impersonal and entirely intellectual. Contemporary knowledge production was a rigorously empirical enterprise as well. Long-term direct observation, systematic recording, and measuring by means of mathematical tools characterized it. Mathematics was the object of understanding, tool of analysis, track of heuristics, field of hermeneutics, subject of discovery, and medium of articulation. (p.91) Initially, theorems were stated without proof. Strong traditions were often resorted to for accepting certain statements of precursors sustainable as pramāṇa or a rule of thumb. A pramāṇa is an all-inclusive abstraction stated in verse (ślokā), almost like a formula or an equation, but with a prescriptive tone. It is a statement of observational results but often without disclosing the cognitive strategies followed to arrive at them. Sometimes a precursor’s statement was adopted and sustained as pramāṇa for the reason that he had stated it affirmatively. This initial attitude apart, it began to be routine for a Page 28 of 46

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Knowledge Production vyākhya or bhāṣya to delve seriously into an earlier claim, made as a pramāṇa by a precursor and to try and make explicit the basic premises of the claim and to develop on the inferences thereof. Constitution of evidence was not yet explicitly insisted upon as the primary epistemic condition in those days. Their main intellectual concern was bringing maximum precision to results of studies, which were given as statements as if axiomatic (pramāṇa). Every previous text of authority was interpreted, reinterpreted, commented upon, and comprehended by succeeding scholars from time to time. Āryabhaṭīyam, the most widely cited text of authority in time and space, had acquired empirical base and proof for its theoretical propositions only during the successive ages through scholarly interpretations and elaborations.37 However, something culturally significant about the tradition of reinterpretation in Indian astronomy is the retention of Āryabhaṭa’s authority as the highest in spite of corrections, additions, and improvements on his findings by others through independent perception. In the perspective of historical epistemology, when the previous claims are explained in the light of new perceptions, variations occur even at the level of the basic structure as a result of historical changes. In fact, this text was subjected to the greatest number of reinterpretations and additions, of which probably the first known case that improved Āryabhaṭa’s results was by Haridattan who is said to have added graded tables of the sines of arcs of anomaly. Similarly, Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita’s Gaṇita Kaumudi and an algebraic treatise called Bījagaṇitāvatamsā are said to have added a (p.92) methodological discussion of mathematical operation to Āryabhaṭa’s theory of planetary positions. There is a perceptible epistemic shift in traditional Indian knowledge production in general and astronomy in particular since the time of Mādhava of Sangamagrāma (c. 1340–1425 CE) in Kerala. It has been shown that Mādhava discovered the series for the sine, cosine, tangent, and arctangent functions, the series approximations of the sine and cosine functions, and the series approximation of the sine function, the power series of ‘p’, the solution of transcendental equations by iteration, and the approximation of transcendental numbers by continued fractions.38 Mādhava’s text, Veṇuāroha, has survived to our times, extending certain results found in earlier works, including those of Bhāskara and Āryabhata.39 He is said to have significantly improved Āryabhaṭa’s model for Mercury and Venus. Working on all the inferential items of Āryabhaṭīyam to see whether they could be developed into reliable knowledge, Mādhava had made several new discoveries such as a better approximation of the value of pi, theory of certain transcendental equations, concept of infinity, the sine-cosine infinite series, their various trigonometric functions, and strange relations in geometry. He is said to have correctly computed the value of pi to nine decimal places (p.93) and thirteen decimal places, and produced sine and cosine tables to nine decimal places of accuracy. Of all the contributions, what is distinct is his estimate of an error term, which presupposes his deeper insights Page 29 of 46

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Knowledge Production into the limit nature of the infinite series. It is clear today that Mādhava had discovered the fundamental principle behind the infinite power series, their rational approximations, and trigonometric functions. Discoveries of the series for the sine, cosine, tangent, and arctangent functions were known as the first, second, and third order Taylor series until recent times. Similarly, the approximation of the sine function as well as of the power series of ‘p’ was attributed to G.M. Leibniz (1646–1716 CE). Until recently, the credit for the discovery of calculus was disputed among Gregory, Leibniz, and Newton of the seventeenth century. It is a matter of worldwide recognition now that the concept of infinity and knowledge of power series go back to Mādhava of Sangamagrāma.40 Paramesvaran (c. 1380–1460 CE), Puthumana Somayājī (c. 1410–1490 CE), and Nīlakanṭha Somayājī (c. 1444–1544 CE) have improved upon Mādhava’s theories and method. Certain inferences of Mādhava secured proof and empirical support through long-sustained observational verification by Paramesvaran, the former’s pupil. Paramesvaran seems to have done direct astronomical observations for fifty-five years, systematically recorded the results, and wrote a treatise on Dṛggaṇitā, a mathematical model of astronomy, and an example par excellence for the epistemic tradition. His mastery over the extant knowledge and sizeable contribution to it in the form of new theorems are embodied by the bhāṣyas that he wrote on Mahābhāskarīyā, Āryabhaṭīyā, and Līlāvatī of Bhāskara II. He is said to be the first mathematician to provide the radius of a circle with an inscribed cyclic quadrilateral.41 Likewise, Nīlakanṭha Somayājī in his Tantṛasaṅgrahā carried the process further, producing more clarity in pre-existing theories, particularly expansion of the sine-cosine series of Mādhava. He is (p.94) acclaimed for expanding the methods and theories of Mādhava, particularly by elaborating his derivation, improving proofs for his series of the arctangent trigonometric function, and other infinite series. Tantṛasaṅgrahā is in 432 ślokās in Sanskrit and in eight chapters, generally on the epicyclical and eccentric models of planetary motion, but specifically dealing with the motions and longitudes of the planets, various problems related with the sun’s position on the celestial sphere, including the relationships of its expressions in the three systems of coordinates, namely ecliptic, equatorial, and horizontal coordinates, the lunar and the solar eclipses, the deviation of the longitudes of the sun and the moon, the rising and setting of the moon and planets, and a graphical representation of the size of the part of the moon that the sun shines on. Nīlakaṇṭha’s study is a clear indication of how new knowledge is created lineally by developing on the results of the previous studies. He is an example worth citing in the context of epistemic universals about knowledge production in traditional India, such as rationality, analytical comprehension of the extant Page 30 of 46

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Knowledge Production knowledge, new tools of observations, methodological modifications, systematic recording of observational results, mustering of inductive mathematical proofs for previous theorems, hermeneutic additions, and scholarly integration. Tantṛasaṅgrahā embodies these epistemic distinctions, which one of its contemporary bhāṣyas, namely Yuktidīpika, is said to have highlighted.42 His Graha-parīkṣā-kramā is a methodological manual of observations in astronomy and the use of observational tools. Siddhāntadarpaṇā is another of Nīlakaṇṭha’s significant works, often noted for the interest he exhibited in methodological instructions. Nīlakaṇṭha’s Āryabhaṭīya-bhāṣyā, his masterpiece, provides a heliocentric model of the planetary system excluding the earth. This was the model that Tycho Brahe (1546–1601 CE) subsequently presented in Europe. Nīlakaṇṭha’s equation for the centre for the planets remained the most accurate until the time of Johannes Kepler (1571–1630 CE). (p.95) Insistence upon the production of proofs was increasingly gaining precedence over the logic of explanation and was getting entrenched as the primary epistemic essential. Production of the proof as the basis epistemic requirement is best manifest perhaps for the first time in the work of Jyēṣṭadēva, namely Yuktibhāṣā, a text in Malayalam prose rather than in Sanskrit verse and the first book of calculus in the world.43 It is interesting to note that proofs for Mādhava’s series expanded by Nīlakaṇṭha into sine, cosine, and inverse tangent series were given only after a century by Jyēṣṭadēva in his Yuktibhāṣā, which is in a way his bhāṣya of Tantṛasaṅgrahā. Nīlakaṇṭha’s methodological rationality is best highlighted and pursued further by Jyēṣṭadēva, who has given many rational approximations based on continued fractions, which scholars have not made out as yet. What has been shown as totally new is a convergent infinite process capable of attributing the value of pi to arbitrary accuracy. Jyēṣṭadēva shows that the astronomers of Kerala knew several such processes. There are two methods given in Yuktibhāṣā for the calculation of the circumference: one gives an algebraic recursion relation involving a square root that converges to the exact value, and the other demonstrates a way without involving square roots. What turns out as a matter of epistemic significance in Yuktibhāṣā is the onset of the practice of providing proofs rather than just statements of results.44 Another significance of the text is its use of the regional language (Malayalam) instead of Sanskrit and replacement of the poetic genre with prose. In short, it is quite evident that the basic epistemic concept called objectivity was the cognitive motor in traditional Indian knowledge production and it progressively persisted as the central string of control across every vyākhya or bhāṣya.

(p.96) Socio-economic Origins As discussed above, after several centuries of persistent efforts and systematic progress in mathematical astronomy, the fundamental theorization of calculus was achieved in Kerala during the fourteenth to sixteenth century CE. It is Page 31 of 46

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Knowledge Production significant to inquire as to what accounted for the discovery of calculus in a small region in Kerala. There has been controversy among historians of science whether they should look for the socio-economic and politico-cultural background of discoveries and inventions. Nevertheless, our view is that, in the final analysis, social matrix matters along with the creativity of the individual in the happening of discoveries and inventions. Kerala of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries CE was characterized by an agrarian society, hierarchically structured by the dominance of the Nampūtiri brāhmaṇa landlords. Nampūtiris had socio-economic as well as ritual reasons for acquiring knowledge in astronomy for predicting seasons and eclipses. Prediction of eclipses had greater importance because there was the strong belief that the conduct of Vedic sacrificial rituals would be futile with the incidence of lunar or solar eclipse during their performance. Mathematics began to grow as the most fundamental tool of astronomy under the ritual pressure for generating predictive knowledge about planetary positions and movements. It cannot be altogether accidental that the great mathematicians of Kerala had written manual-like texts on the calculation of the planetary motion, obviously in order to enable the prediction of lunar and solar eclipses. Interestingly, most of them were Nampūtiri brāhmaṇas of Vedic tradition as well. Their association with the Vedic tradition is evident from the honorific suffix somayājī indicative of the priestly status of the Soma sacrifice, seen with their names. Further, Nampūtiri brāhmaṇas had a strong belief in the auspicious time (muhūrttam) for the various observances of daily life as well. Naturally, these beliefs became contemporary social obsession and brāhmaṇas set the calendar, pancangagaṇitam, based on nakshatra-tithi-vārayogakaraṇas, for the whole society, not only for economic practices but also for rituals. This accounted for the growth of knowledge in astronomy and arithmetic functions. Arithmetical competency enabled the landlords to be precise about the measuring of the productive lands and their yields. Inscriptions on the temples that were the headquarters of the agrarian settlements of Nampūtiri brāhmaṇas (p.97) and a few copper-plate charters vouch for the precise measurements of dues in terms of decimals. There was a preponderance of the cult of devotion to Āgamic gods and the entailing irrational beliefs. Naturally, this brought a marked shift from astronomy to astrology at the knowledge practices at the popular level, quite explicable in relation to contemporary social compulsions on the one side and the declining critical intelligence of the scholarly generation on the other. Viewed in the perspective of historical epistemology, the process was that of an uncritical return to the axiomatic and the traditionally given, from the threshold of proof construction shown by Jyēṣṭadēva in calculus.

Overseas Transmission of Knowledge Circulation and progressive accretion of knowledge across regions in India had always gone beyond the subcontinent to Persia and the Arab world in the west and to China and the larger Asia in the east, thanks to the long-distance Page 32 of 46

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Knowledge Production itinerant traders. Long-distance trade hardly meant mere exchange of material goods. It inevitably involved exchange of cultures to which transaction of knowledge was integral. Production of new knowledge in a region was often catalysed by elements drawn from the knowledge of another region. Cultural transactions during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that marked extensive and frequent overseas voyages by merchants and missionaries were of an unprecedented dimension. Often, regional sharing carried knowledge forward to higher phases, the accomplishment of which would normally be within a larger geographical entity with a knowledge-language of intra-regional use for sustained scholarly enterprises, unless socio-economic and politico-cultural changes become totally unsuitable. A very significant factor was the unprecedented possibility of overseas transmission of the knowledge from the Kerala region to the Persian world and Europe through maritime traders and Jesuit missionaries.45 Moreover, Europe after the Renaissance was witnessing a phenomenal techno-economic, sociocultural, and politico-intellectual development providing an ideal environment for the production of new knowledge, thanks to the primacy of reason, (p.98) critical intelligence, and curiosity of the age. Nīlakaṇṭha’s model of the planetary motion was the same that Tycho Brahe presented subsequently. Jyēṣṭadēva’s formula showing a passage to infinity, which facilitates calculation of areas under parabolas, is an essential constituent of the theory of calculus.46 It is the same formula that seventeenth-century European scholars like Pierre Fermat (1607–1665 CE), John Wallis (1616–1703 CE), and Blaise Pascal (1623– 1662 CE) had used. Similarly, what Wallis obtained as his results on continued fractions is identical to those of Bhāskara II’s.47 There exists a running thread of the same epistemological control across the cognitive exercises involving empirical scrutiny, rational analysis, and theorization in the mathematical astronomy of India and the West. In both the invention of the concept of infinite series is central. Jyēṣṭadēva’s constitution of proofs for Madhava’s power series show that they had known calculus as theory and practice earlier. What we see in the power series of Leibniz or in the reckoning of Newton is the further development and extensive application of the same mathematics. Between the East and West, there was no paradigm shift in terms of epistemic parameters regarding the production of astronomical knowledge in the seventeenth century. Actually, what Europe developed subsequently was a linear advancement of the same epistemic tradition with additions enabling improvement of knowledge as well as cognitive means to go further. Their mathematical approach through the development of infinite series for understanding and reckoning planetary positions and movements were methodologically the same. That there exists no linearity but instead an epistemic rupture about the progress of mathematics between India and Europe is a matter taken for granted under the influence of the long-sustained belief about the East as the opposite of the West in all respects. Over the (p.99) Page 33 of 46

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Knowledge Production years, the West had built up this contrast through the historical process of representing the East on the basis of unfounded ideas, imaginary notions, and prejudices, which subsequently gave rise to the myriad of discursive strategies of Eurocentrism for distinguishing the West from the East in every aspect of culture.48 Scholars were engaged in addressing intellectual issues in the domain of knowledge of their choice, a process that inevitably transcended the region and Sanskrit, the language of specialized traditional scholarship, and facilitated their subcontinental convergence. It becomes clear that intellectual perception comes into being out of interaction with the community of scholars and their scholarship on the one side and under sociocultural compulsions on the other. The traditional Indian intellectual culture, disrupted and alienated by colonialism, is inaccessible today not solely because it is all in Sanskrit but also because we do not know its knowledge-language that is ontologically different and culturally disconnected. It is a language of historically and culturally unique constructs that are not mere words or tropes but established traditional practices. Thanks to the studies by a few dedicated modern scholars, we realize that there existed a single cognitive thread of epistemic control in the production of knowledge. The long-protracted and persistent vyākhya/bhāṣya tradition demonstrates a clear linearity about the progress of methodological preoccupation in knowledge production of pre-colonial India from the axiomatic through proof creation to the scientific over centuries. There was no rupture in the process although the next higher phases were manifested not in regions across India but in Europe. What emerges is the universality of epistemic properties that make deeper knowledge distinct irrespective of its geography. Any inquiry into the methodological ideas of knowledge production in precolonial India starting with mathematical astronomy and proceeding to other areas discovers this epistemological unity. An instance of the preservation of local knowledge is the Hortus Malabaricus, the earliest Asian compendium of the available knowledge about the medicinal properties of the flora in Kerala, prepared (p.100) first in Latin over a period of three decades under the initiative of Hendrik van Rheede, the Dutch governor of Malabar, and published in twelve volumes in Amsterdam during 1678–93. It is a detailed description of some 742 plants with excellent sketches and their traditional classification as followed by the Āyurvedic medical practitioners.49 It was prepared by a team of local practitioners of Āyurvedic medicine, consisting of three Gouda Saraswata Brahmana scholars, namely Ranga Bhat, Vinayaka Pandit, and Appu Bhat; and a Tiyya scholar by name Itti Achutan, first in Malayalam and Konkani. Subsequently, Emmanuel Carneiro, a resident of Cochin, translated it into Portuguese. This huge Dutch project of Van Rheede was given patronage by the raja of Cochin. What it does vouch for is the

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Knowledge Production prevalence of physical, practical, and scholarly knowledge of the herbs and their uses in a region of the Indian subcontinent.

Chinese Knowledge The archaeologically attested earliest phase of knowledge production in China goes to prehistoric times as elsewhere in the world. Yuchanyan cave in southern China has yielded the world’s oldest pot-shards dating beyond 14000 years BP.50 Similarly, China is known for its mining antiquity traced back to c. 3000 BCE. Based on the thick layer of phosphate rock and carbon found on the ground at Xi Nan Qiao Shan of Guangzhou suburb, it is presumed that some of the prehistoric people who lived there had noticed the material expanding under fire and contracting on cooling, the basic knowledge essential for mining.51 The tin-rich Yunnan seems to have given rise to bronze metallurgy in China around 2000 BCE and along the Yellow River, a civilization (p.101) with the Shang ruling lineage in c. 1600 BCE. A change in knowledge production synchronizes with the rise of a differentiated economic manifesting in the form of proliferation of arts and crafts, which in political history may be the process of decline and disintegration of the ruling power. Some of the earliest inventions of China like Kongming lanterns and the ‘shadow clock’ belong to this period. It is said that, during the second millennium BCE itself, the Chinese had discovered the phenomenon of magnetic attraction. That was the period representing the life and environment through the myths and legends as well. Over a millennium, the Zhou dynasty that replaced the Shang dynasty disintegrated itself into small warrior principalities. Material development brought about numerous households of prominence fighting against one another for power. It was during the period of battling chieftains (c. 500–221 BCE) that Chinese metaphysics and cosmology acquired principles of morality. Yijing or the book of changes is perhaps the earliest consolidated text of oral traditions providing the main tenets of ancient Chinese cosmology. According to that, the fundamental principle of Chinese cosmology is qi (way of the universe—dao), the external manifestations of which constituted all the inorganic and organic objects as an assembly of undifferentiated wholeness. What the years of sociopolitical turmoil badly required was production of concrete knowledge about moral principles rather than metaphysical abstractions about cosmology. Knowledge of contemporary China, obviously inherited as oral tradition, was told in five classics: Book of Odes dealing with old poetry, Book of Documents dealing with juridico-political documents including speeches of the early Zhou ruling class, Book of Rites dealing with occult ritualism, Book of Changes recording a historical account of the chieftaincy of Lu (the native province of Confucius), and the Spring and Autumn Annals. Confucius (551–479 BCE), a scholar and teacher in the classics, seems to have redacted, supplemented, organized, and interpreted these classics as the basis of his moralistic world view.52 Confucius believed (p.102) that people’s welfare depended on their moral cultivation. This shows the beginnings of textualization of oral compositions and their Page 35 of 46

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Knowledge Production exegetic analysis for the production of moral knowledge through hermeneutics. Another thinker of moral principles, who lived during the period of Confucius, was Lao-Tze. Unlike Confucius who focussed on the power of social morality, Lao-Tze focussed on the harmony of nature (Tao), whose work Tao Te Ching became the scriptural base of Taoism. Chinese scholars were not influenced by the scholarship outside the Chinese world, except that of the Indian subcontinent. They had drawn closer to Indian thoughts over the centuries through personal acquaintance and adoption of ways of life like Buddhism. A fusion of Buddhism and Taoism constituted the knowledge base of their cosmology. Opposed to the ordered metaphysics of Confucianism, Zen promoted spontaneous thinking. The economy thrived and led to the formation of a state power under the Qin rulers in 221 BCE. Bronze metallurgy developed extensively using the method of piece-mould casting along with jade carving during the whole period of political turmoil.53 During the period, especially under the years of political strife, iron smelting also flourished, improving knowledge both in better casting for greater hardness of artefacts and in designing agricultural implements as well as weaponry. It made the economy richer and the state power stronger, which led to the opening up of new mines. Systematic recording of astronomical observations was a persistent activity among scholars from the Han period (206 BCE–220 CE) onwards. It is well known that the first recorded astronomical observation of a supernova (SN 185) is in Chinese. It is said that as early as in 190 CE Chinese mathematicians calculated pi to the accuracy of five decimals. It was under the Tang rulers (618–906 CE) that knowledge production marked a major height through a series of inventions. Most important among them, well known as the Four Great Inventions, are papermaking, printing, the compass, and gunpowder. That the first invention was of paper and then printing implies the pressure of the need for documentation both in the administrative and (p. 103) pedagogic sectors. Naturally, recording of knowledge for transmission is integral to it. In fact, technological knowledge in printing dates a few centuries anterior as attested by the relics of printed clothes, though the use of the printer for recording seems to have begun only in the age of the Tang rulers. Similarly, though the antiquity of knowledge about the magnetic attraction of a needle is attested by the Louen-heng (c. 20 CE–100 CE), it is said that in 271 CE Chinese mathematicians were about to make the magnetic compass. However, the concrete evidence of the use of a magnetic compass dates back only to 1086 CE. As regards the invention of gunpowder, the production of necessary knowledge took place in 300 CE with the alchemist Ge Hong’s discovery of the chemical reactions in heating saltpetre, pine resin, and charcoal put together.54 It is hardly necessary to mention how transforming and fundamental these four inventions have been to the whole world. Other significant inventions of the Tang period were cast iron, the iron plough, the horse collar, the multi-tube seed drill, the wheelbarrow, the double-action piston pump, dry docks, the suspension Page 36 of 46

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Knowledge Production bridge, the propeller, the parachute, natural gas fuel, the raised-relief map, the sluice gate, and the pound lock. During the Song period (960–1276 CE), mining and metal smelting including alloying copper with tin and lead made remarkable progress, providing materials for metallic coinage and currency. Expansion of knowledge enabled economic growth; the impacts in their turn enabled further advancement of knowledge in various fields like healthcare, astronomy, mathematics, geology, architecture, statecraft, and jurisprudence. In 1070, Su Song (1020–1101 CE), a royal personage himself and versatile scholar in various fields of knowledge such as alchemy, medicine technology, mathematics, and astronomy, composed his Xin Yixiang Fayao (1086) and compiled (1058–1061 CE) jointly with a team of scholars an illustrated pharmacopoeia (Ben Cao Tu Jing). This elaborate compilation of knowledge (p.104) about medicinal substances, compounds, and their composition covers a scholarly exposition of medicinal plants, animals, minerals, and metals as well. A deep scholar in astronomy, he produced new knowledge in astronomy about the Earth’s status in relation to other celestial bodies like moon, sun, and stars. He is famous in history for engineering the rotating astronomical clock tower of Kaifeng in 1088 CE, driven by a waterwheel and based on an escapement mechanism, and crowned by a bronze armillary spherical framework of rings centred on Earth or the sun, representing lines of celestial longitude, latitude, and other basic astronomical features. During the Song period, Chinese astronomers made two notable supernova observations, one, SN 1006, the brightest ever recorded in history, and the other, SN 1054, whose remnant is known as the Crab Nebula. Chinese metaphysics and cosmology take shape during the period through the thesis of Zhu Xi (1130–1200 CE), a thinker of the Song period who explained the origins of everything out of the taiji (ultimate truth or power), the ontological union of qi, the underlying principle, and li, the consciousness.55 Monism of the original Confucian metaphysics based on the five classics and Yijing becomes dualism in Zhu Xi. According to him, changes in everything that brought about differentiation and separate identities are conceived as the Way (dao) of the cosmos, the dynamic of yin and yang, symbolic of the female and male powers, figuratively ‘shade’ and ‘light’ or ‘lower’ and ‘higher,’ obviously a direct reflection of the social experience of gender discrimination and hierarchy under economic differentiation. It is a Buddhist version of the Yijing cosmology, notwithstanding the difference with the social perspective of the Buddha. Shen Kuo, another versatile scholar, wrote in 1088 CE a book Meng Xi Bi Tan (Dream Pool Essays or Dream Torrent Essays) that provides knowledge about a wide variety of things such as fossils, a rational explanation of geomorphological features, causation of landscape formation, natural phenomena, mathematics, astronomy, woodcraft, (p.105) and water transport technology and so on.56 Shen Kuo had deeply involved himself in solving problems in geometry, which Page 37 of 46

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Knowledge Production resulted in his production of knowledge about the lengths of arcs of circles. This eventually laid the foundation of spherical trigonometry for Guo Shoujing (1231– 1316) to establish. Shen Kuo had made several experimental studies in optics and contributed significantly to astronomy. Equally significant are his contributions to geology, geomorphology, and geography. His logic of explanation regarding the reshaping of landscapes in nature over time due to soil erosion, landsliding, silting, and flooding, is intelligible even to the present day. Based on the observation of fossils embedded in a cliff-side at Taihang, he derived knowledge about the area’s antiquity as an ancient seashore, shifted hundreds of miles east over a period spanning many centuries. Similarly pointing at the petrified bamboo bushes underground in the dry northern region where they had never grown, he spoke about climate change appearing geographically over time and bringing about fundamental landscape-ecosystem transformations. He is known also for his designing of a drydock to make boat repairing easy. A notable factor about Shen Kuo is his perception of any object, not only natural but also human-made, as embedded knowledge. Therefore, he was able to extend his curiosity and rationalist approach to even ritual objects in terms of the knowledge ingrained in them. For instance, he viewed ancient vessels, traditionally believed as products of sages, only in terms of their embedded craft and aesthetics, rather than ritualistic and cultural value. Pursuing Shen’s methodological perspective, Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072 CE) engaged in production of knowledge about the past by analysing and recording ancient rubbings on stone and bronze objects. This opened a new field of systematic knowledge production in the history of artefacts and cultural textures on them, which after several centuries came to be called (p.106) archaeology and epigraphy in Europe. Analysing and preparing catalogues of ancient objects way back in the eleventh century itself shows China’s lead in the systematic and rational documentation of facts about past relics, by confronting factoids. This is not to say that there were no errors and intentional distortions. For instance, adhering to the systematic rational approach, Hong Mai (1123–1202) exposed the description of certain vessels as belonging to the Hang period in the Bogutu catalogue, prepared during the reign of Huizong (1100–25), as false on the basis of a comparative analysis of features and cultural textures. Techno-economic growth expressed in merchandises of arts and crafts with a strong agrarian base had enabled China to be the most populous as well as prosperous land of the contemporary world. The Yuan hegemony for a while hardly had any serious negative impact on its domain of knowledge. The exponential growth of Chinese knowledge tradition continued during the Yuan and Ming periods with a lot of additions by way of contributions from crosscultural transactions. Chinese knowledge fields were immensely benefitted through contacts with the knowledge systems of both the Arab-Muslim world and the Indian subcontinent. Chinese astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, and Page 38 of 46

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Knowledge Production technologies could exert lasting influence on both of them too. It is relevant here to recapitulate the salient features and foundational elements of the knowledge systems of Song China before they were historically subjected to the transforming influences from alien countries. In other words, it becomes necessary here to inquire into the epistemic traits of what may be called the Chinese knowledge.

Chinese Methodology The influence of Chinese metaphysics and cosmology based on Yixing indivisibility and the qi and li duality was too subsuming to enable critical thinking.57 Thinking about the nature and basis of knowledge (p.107) in traditional thought in terms of methodological parameters will be difficult. The situation precludes the possibility of critical reflexion on the limitation of the culturally contingent metaphysics that dictates the Way (dao) to reach correct knowledge about anything. The Way (dao) is reality, an unending flow of continuity and change. This irrefutable pattern of nature is expressed in Yin and Yang. It combines the metaphysics of cosmological wisdom with the morality of knowledge. Hence, knowledge production would mean the articulation of the combine through the medium of language. In this metaphysics of wholeness, which speaks about the fundamental unity of life of morality as conceived by Confucius and the environment of yin-yang rhythm as conceived by Lao-Tze, virtually there is a denial of the necessity of an independent logical procedure for the production of knowledge. Under such a structurally ordered holistic world view and axiologically engendered premises, what becomes feasible is a review of the unique characteristics, the pattern of cognitive process, and the logic of discourse in ancient Chinese thoughts.58 It is a unilineal track of understanding as justified by the ultimate wisdom or the infallible concept of truth about itself and its way. Discourses are based on hermeneutical exegesis on texts, but not dialectical processes of examination and re-examination of sources of knowledge as well as logical procedures of establishing the reliability of proof. Such a situation can engender only axiological prescriptions and the infallible metaphysics of the human and nature combine. They make a single wholeness, with differences confined to nuances rather than the central framework of comprehension. It is invariably a priori reasoning, inherently inductive. This accounts for the absence of theorization and its hypothetical deductive reasoning in knowledge production.59 It forecloses the question of methodology, mode of reasoning, and procedures of truth verification. Scholars have accounted for the absence of epistemology and lack of science in ancient China. However, it does not mean that there (p.108) was no knowledge production in ancient China. Pre-modern Chinese knowledge was more technological and practical than theoretical. There were important inventions in China, but not much theory. Even in areas of specialized knowledge where China Page 39 of 46

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Knowledge Production made world-famous contributions, there is no fundamental theorization, but only practical procedures and prescriptions. In a culture of anthropic cosmology, eschatological questions, and metaphysical answers based on ontological unity between human life and nature, there cannot be a critical procedure for the production of new knowledge. In pre-modern Chinese thought, there is no possibility of epistemology as a field of specialized knowledge independent of its metaphysical representation of the cosmos and human existence. Hence, in Chinese tradition there is no knowledge without metaphysical bonding for the moral principles that govern the truth about social practices. This situation of Chinese knowledge of social truth being inextricably comingled with cosmic truth precludes intellectual chances for a critical evaluation of the nature and foundation of knowledge. It is this holistic perception that renders knowledge production plausible in all intellectual fields of pre-modern China wherein a systematically articulated methodology implying epistemological traits is absent. The procedures of knowledge production are driven by the contingency-related needs emanating out of the trial and error contexts. There is no passion for theorization of the phenomena and the reduction of deeper knowledge to the irreducible minimum of words or signs for precise communication. It is pragmatic and utilitarian ethics rather than epistemic attributes that constitute Chinese epistemology.60 Notes:

(1) We owe the related technical details in the section to S.F. Ratnagar. 2007. Makers and Shapers. New Delhi: Tulika Books, p. 95. (2) It is relevant here to remember J. Monod. 1972. Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Biology. New York: Vantage Books. (3) For a detailed discussion, see Ratnagar, Makers and Shapers, pp. 102–21. (4) An exhaustive review of the archaeology and socio-economic processes of the region is given in R.S. Sharma. 2004. Material Culture and Social Formations in Ancient India. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 195–9. He argued that around first millennium BCE the Gangetic plain began to be deforested, thanks to the knowledge of iron technology, and expanded agriculture leading to the formation of class and state with a steady growth of specialization and subjection of the Sudras. See pp. 236–40. With little differentiation between the primordial and advanced, there is an attempt to link the caste system with agriculture in M. Klass. 1980. Caste: The Emergence of the South Asian Social System. Philadelphia: Institute for Human Issues, pp. 62–5. Klass presumes the transformation of the tribe into caste, but without any clarity about the historical process thereof.

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Knowledge Production (5) See G.F. Dales. 1991. ‘Some Specialised Ceramic Studies at Harappa’, in R.H. Meadow (ed.), Harappa Excavations 1986–1990, Monographs in World Archaeology No. 3. Madison: Prehistory Press, 1991, pp. 61–9. For a detailed analysis, see Ratnagar, Makers and Shapers, pp. 34–63. (6) See K. Krishnan, I.C. Freestone, and A.P. Middleton. 2005. ‘The Technology of Glazed Reserved Slip Ware—A Fine Ceramic of the Harappan Period’, Archaeology, 47(4), pp. 691–703. (7) See J.M. Kenoyer. 1996. ‘Craft Traditions of the Indus Civilization and Their Legacy in Modern Pakistan’, Lahore Museum Bulletin, 9(2), pp. 1–8. (8) Kenōpaniṣad, 1:5–8. (9) Chandōgyōpanishad, 3:14.1. (10) Brihadāraṇyakōpaniṣad, 1:4.10. (11) Aitareyōpaniṣad, 3:1.3. (12) Paul Kiparsky calls it ‘a complete, maximally concise, and theoretically consistent analysis’ of Sanskrit grammatical structure. ‘Pāṇini’s grammar is a complete self-contained system of rules.’ See Paul Kiparsky. 1993. ‘Pāṇinian Linguistics,’ in R.E. Asher (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 1(6), pp. 2918 and 2920. (13) Kiparsky, ‘Pāṇinian Linguistics,’ p. 2920. (14) For details of these systems of thoughts, see Radhakrishnan S. and Charles A. Moore (eds). 1989. A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press (rpt). (15) For a detailed appreciation of the system of thought, see Sundar Sarukkai. 2008. Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd (Second edition). (16) See D.D. Kosambi. 1958. Introduction to the Study of History, Mumbai: Popular Prakashan. Also, his Myth and Reality: Study in the Formation of Indian Culture. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan (1962); and Culture and Civilisation in Ancient India in Historical Outline. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House (1964). (17) For details, see M.R.R. Varier. 2016. ‘Origins and Growth of Āyurvedic Knowledge’, Indian Journal of History of Science, 51(1), INSA, pp. 40–7. (18) See Dīghanikāya 22. 6. (19) See Kenneth Zysk. [1998] 2000. Medicine in the Veda. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 38–43. Page 41 of 46

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Knowledge Production (20) For a brief discussion, see M.S. Valiathan. 2016. ‘Caraka’s Approach to Knowledge’, Indian Journal of History of Science, 51(1), INSA, pp. 33–9. (21) The verse from Caraka samhitha Sutrasthānam, Chapter I, Dīrghamjīvitiyam, 121. Oṣadhīr nāmarūpābhyām jānate hy’ajapā vane | avipāścaiva gopāśca ye cānye vanavāsinah || 1.1.121 ||

Shepherds and other pastoral groups (ajapas and gopas) of the forest areas are well versed in the knowledge of herbs. (22) See the discussion in D. Chattopadhyaya. 1977. Science and Society in Ancient India. Calcutta: Research India Publications. (23) For a detailed discussion, see A. Singh. 2003. ‘Tantra-yukti: Method of Theorization in Āyurveda’, Ancient Science of Life, 22(3), pp. 64–74. Also see V. Nair and D. Sankar. 2016. ‘Knowledge Generation in Āyurveda: Methodological Aspects’, Indian Journal of History of Science, 51(1), INSA, pp. 49–55. (24) See A.K. Coomaraswamy. 1914. Viśvakarmā: Examples of Indian Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Handicraft. Bombay: Messrs. Taraporevala; E.B. Havell. 1915. The Ancient and Medieval Indian Architecture of India: A Study of Indo-Aryan Civilisation. London: John Murray; P. Brown. 1956. Indian Architecture (Buddhist and Hindu), UK: Tobey Press (Second edition); M. George. 2000. Hindu Art and Architecture. London and New York: Thames and Hudson. (25) This evolution is discussed in detail in R. Benjamin. 1967. The Art and Architecture of India: Buddhist-Hindu-Jain. New Delhi: Penguin Books (Third revised edition). (26) For an analysis of this aspect, see R.V. Achari. 2016. ‘From the Mythology of Vāstuśāstra to the Methodology of Vāstuvidya’, Indian Journal of History of Science, 51(1), INSA, pp. 156–66. (27) See discussion in S. Sreenivasan. 2016. ‘Metallurgy of Zinc, High-tin Bronze and Gold in Indian Antiquity: Methodological Aspects’, Indian Journal of History of Science, 51(1), INSA, pp. 22–32. Also, see V.J. Deshpande. 1999. ‘History of Chemistry and Alchemy in India from Pre-historic to Pre-modern Times’, in A. Rahman (ed.), History of Indian Science, Technology and Culture. AD 1000– 1800, as part of D.P. Chattopadhyay (ed.), History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, Vol. III, Part 1. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 158.

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Knowledge Production (28) See P.T. Craddock, I.C. Freestone, L.K. Gurjar, A.P. Middleton, and L. Willies. 1998. ‘Zinc in India’, in P.T. Craddock (ed.), 2000 Years of Zinc and Brass, British Museum Occasional Paper No. 50, pp. 29–72; S. Srinivasan. 2014. ‘Bronze Image Casting in Tanjavur District, Tamil Nadu: Ethnoarchaeological and Archaeometallurgical Insights’, in S. Srinivasan, S. Ranganathan, and A. Giumlia-Mair (eds), Metals and Civilizations, Proceedings of BUMA VII, Bangalore, National Institute of Advanced Studies, pp. 215–23. (29) Knowledge is modulated by power that oozes from anywhere in the fields of human co-existence and interaction. It is called ‘discourse’—the powerknowledge combine that acts decisively on the human body through subjectification. See discussion of ‘discourse’ in M. Foucault. 1972. Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge. (30) See R.A.L.H. Gunavardhana. 1984. ‘Intersocietal Transfer of Hydraulic Technology in Precolonial South Asia: Some Reflections Based on a Preliminary Investigation’, South Asian Studies, 22(2), p. 126. Also, see C.M. Madduma Bandara 1985. ‘Catchment Ecosystems and Village Tank Cascades in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka: A Time-Tested System of Land and Water Management’, in J. Lundqvist, U. Lohm, and M. Falkenmark (eds), Strategies for River Basin Management. Linkoping, Sweden; C.R. Panabokke. 2000. The Small Tank Cascade Systems of the Rajarata: Their Setting, Distribution Patterns, and Hydrography. Colombo: Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka. (31) See R. Gurukkal. 2010. Social Formations of Early South India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 330–5. (32) For details, see I.H. Siddiqui. 1986. ‘Water Works and Irrigation System in India during Pre-Mughal Times’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 29(1). The Netherlands: Brill, pp. 52–77. Also, see I. Habib. 2008. Technology in Medieval India. New Delhi: Tulika Books; I. Alam. 1986. ‘Textiles Tools as depicted in Ajanta and Mughal Paintings’, in Aniruddha Ray and S.K. Bagchi (eds), Technology in Ancient and Medieval India. Delhi, pp. 129–41; Also, see his ‘Cotton Technology in India Down to the 16th Century,’ in A. Rahman (ed.). 2004. India’s Interaction with China, Central and West Asia, III(2). New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 445–63. (33) See Habib, Technology in Medieval India. (34) For details, see V. Ramaswamy. 1985. Textiles and Weavers in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Also, see her The Song of the Loom: The Weaver Folk Traditions in South India. New Delhi: Primus Books (2013). (35) See B.K. Matilal. 1971. Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.

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Knowledge Production (36) See J. Renn. 1996. ‘Historical Epistemology and the Advancement of Science’, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science Preprint, 36, p. 4; I. Hacking. 1999. The Social Construction of What. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 5–35. There is a clear exposition of it in L. Daston. 1994. ‘Historical Epistemology’ in J. Chandler, A.I. Davidson, and H.D. Harootunian (eds), Questions of Evidence, Proof, Practice, and Persuasion across the Disciplines. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 275–83. (37) For details, see K.S. Shukla and K.V. Sarma. 1976. Āryabhaṭīya of Āryabhaṭa. New Delhi: Indian National Science Academy. (38) See C.T. Rajagopal and A. Venkataraman. 1949. ‘The Sine and Cosine Power Series in Hindu Mathematics’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 15, pp. 1–13; C.T. Rajagopal and T.V. Iyer. 1952. ‘On the Hindu Proof of Gregory’s Series’, Scripta Mathematica: A Quarterly Journal Devoted to the Philosophy, History, and Expository Treatment of Mathematics, 18, pp. 65–74. (39) For the text and Malayalam commentary of Veṇuāroha, see Acyuta Piṣāraṭi, Veṇuāroha of Madhava of Sangamagrāma, critically edited with introduction and appendix by K.V. Sarma, Tripunithura: The Sanskrit College Committee, 1956. See discussions in G.G. Joseph. 2009. A Passage to Infinity: Medieval Indian Mathematics from Kerala and its Impact. New Delhi: SAGE Publications. Also, see his Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Routes of Indian Mathematics. London: Princeton University Press, paperback (2010). See V.M. Mallayya and G.G. Joseph. 2009. ‘Indian Mathematical Tradition: The Kerala Dimension’, in G.G. Joseph (ed.), Kerala Mathematics: History and Its Possible Transmission to Europe. New Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation. (40) See C.T. Rajagopal and M.S. Rangachari. 1986. ‘On an Untaped Source of Medieval Keralese’, History of Exact Sciences, 35, pp. 91–9. (41) See J.L.E. Dreyer. 1890. Tycho Brahe, a Picture of Scientific Life and Work in the Seventeenth Century. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Back. (42) For the contents of Tantṛasaṅgrahā, see K.V. Sarma (ed.). 1998. Tantrasamgraha of Nilakantha Somayaji, trans. V.S. Narasimhan, Indian Journal of History of Science, 33(1), pp. 1–47. (43) See P.P. Divakaran. 2007. ‘The First Textbook of Calculus: Yuktibhāṣa’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 35, p. 417. Also, see his ‘Notes on Yuktibhāṣa: Recursive Methods in Indian Mathematics’, in C.S. Seshadri (ed.). 2010. Studies in the History of Indian Mathematics. New Delhi: Hindustan Book Agency. (44) See C.K. Raju. 2001. ‘Computers, Mathematics Education, and the Alternative Epistemology of the Calculus in the Yuktibhasa,’ Philosophy East and West, 51(3), pp. 325–61. Page 44 of 46

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Knowledge Production (45) See discussion in Mallayya and Joseph, ‘Indian Mathematical Tradition: The Kerala Dimension’. (46) For a scholarly analysis of the question of transmission, see Mallayya and Joseph, ‘Indian Mathematical Tradition: The Kerala Dimension’, pp. 35–58. See details in Joseph, A Passage to Infinity: Medieval Indian Mathematics from Kerala and Its Impact. (47) For a detailed discussion, see Dennis F. Almeida and George G. Joseph. 2004. ‘Eurocentrism in the History of Mathematics: The Case of the Kerala School’, Race and Class Series, 45(4), Institute of Race Relations. London: SAGE Publications, pp. 53–4. (48) For conceptual details, see Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge. See application of the concept of discourse in Edward Said. 1979. Orientalism. London: Vintage Books. (49) For an English edition, see K.S. Manilal, Van Rheede’s Hortus Malabaricus, English Edition, with Annotations and Modern Botanical Nomenclature (12 Vols), Trivandrum: University of Kerala, 2003. For later commentary, see T. Whitehouse. 1859. Historical Notices of Cochin on the Malabar Coast. Kottayam: CMS Press. (50) For details, see R. Kerr and N. Wood. 2004. ‘Ceramic Technology,’ Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 5, Part XII. Cambridge University Press, pp. 171–3. (51) See R.E. Murowchick. 1991. The Ancient Bronze Metallurgy of Yunnan and its Environs: Development and Implications. Michigan: Ann Arbor. (52) For details of the five classics, see M. Nylan. 2001. The Five ‘Confucian’ Classics. New Haven: Yale University Press. The texts of Confucius are examined in D.K. Gardner. 2007. The Four Books: The Basic Teachings of the Later Confucian Tradition. Indianapolis: Hackett. Also, see Y. Huang. 2013. Confucius: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Bloomsbury. (53) For a detailed history of arts and crafts development, see S. Lee (ed.). 1998. China 5,000 Years: Innovation and Transformation in the Arts. New York: Guggenheim Museum. (54) Ge Hong has recorded his experiment in his Baopuzi Neipian (Book of the Master of the Preservations of Solidarity). For details, see Ge Hong, Baopuzi Neipian (Book of the Master of the Preservations of Solidarity), trans. S.J. Obed, A Study of Chinese Alchemy. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936. Also see Ho Peng Yoke, J.P.C. Moffett, and C. Sungwu (eds). 2007. Explorations in Daoism: Medicine and Alchemy in Literature. London: Routledge.

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Knowledge Production (55) For a detailed consideration, see Wing-tsit Chan. 1987. Chu Hsi: Life and Thought. Lady Ho Tung Hall: Chinese University Press. Also, see J.A. Adler, Reconstructing the Confucian Dao: Zhu Xi’s Appropriation of Zhou Dunyi, SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. New York: State University of New York Press, rpt. 2015. (56) For the text’s detailed excerpts in English, see J. Needham. 1986. Science and Civilization in China, Vols III–VI. Taipei: Caves Books, Ltd. The excerpts are in different pages of the volumes, but particularly in Vol. III, pp. 415–16. Also N. Sivin. 1995. Science in Ancient China: Researches and Reflections. Brookfield, Vermont: Variorum, Ashgate Publishing, pp. 44–5; J. Makeham. 2008. China: The World’s Oldest Living Civilization Revealed. Thames & Hudson, p. 239. (57) For a distinction between the Western and Eastern epistemologies, see H.S.P. Northrop. 1951. ‘Methodology and Epistemology: Oriental and Occidental’, in Charles A. Moore (ed.), Essays in East-West Philosophy: An Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 151–60. (58) For details, see Hans Ken, and Gregor Paul (eds). 1993. Epistemological Issues in Classical Chinese Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press. (59) See discussion in Li Ma. 2015. ‘Epistemological Reasons for Lack of Science in Ancient China’, Open Journal of Social Sciences, 3(9), pp. 167–71. (60) For detailed discussion, see G. Jane. 2002. On the Epistemology of the Senses in Early Chinese Thought. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. J.S. Rošker. 2008. Searching for the Way: Theories of Knowledge in pre-Modern and Modern China. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Also see ‘Traditional Chinese Epistemology: The Structural Compatibility of Mind and External World’, Zheng da Zhong wen xue bao, 17, pp. 1–16 (2012).

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European Roots

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

European Roots Progress of Greek and Hellenic Knowledge in the Arab World Rajan Gurukkal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199490363.003.0004

Abstract and Keywords This chapter discusses the Greek and Hellenic history of thoughts and ideas. It is followed by a discussion of the Arab Muslim engagement with the classical Greek and Hellenic knowledge by way of translation, interpretation, and academic extension. Drawing the broad contours of the Arab epistemology, the section shows how the Arab scholars retained, improved upon, and carried forward the Greek scholarship in different fields, enabling Europe to trigger the Renaissance movement. It includes a review in recognition of the medieval Catholic scholars’ contribution to the growth of new knowledge in mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, and philosophy, which also had a role in the intellectual preparation for the onset of Renaissance in Europe. Keywords:   Greek, Hellenic, Arab epistemology, translation, Catholic scholars, Renaissance, mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, philosophy

Relics of archaic knowledge production in Europe go back to 70,000 years BP with the rudiments of architecture found in a burial of the German land about 34,000 years BP and with traces of astronomy seen on a bone tool in a prehistoric cave of France. Indications of the earliest known lunar calendar and a few constellations have been seen in the prehistoric cave drawings in France and Germany. It appears that the old Stone Age shamans had produced some astronomical knowledge about the lunar annual cycle and solstices, marking seasonal changes. Many of these lunar calendars were made on small handy pieces of stone, bone, or antler. The massive remains of the Stonehenge at Page 1 of 30

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European Roots Wiltshire in England and certain other parts of Europe indicate knowledge of astronomy and its devices in the third millennium BCE. Archaeological vestiges, by way of structural remains of the high-craft in the Mycenaean of the third to first millennia BCE, invite us to learn the artefacts belonging to the Aegean civilization, and the accomplished state of stone architecture, bronze metallurgy, fine-quality ceramics, and lapidary art of the Minoan civilization. Aegean knowledge production becomes systematized and codified in the Greek culture during the middle of (p.110) the first millennium BCE. This significant phase has to be discussed against the background of knowledge production in the civilizations of the larger Afro-Asian region as part of the roots of European knowledge.

Knowledge of Arts and Crafts Knowledge of alloying tin with copper for making bronze developed in Crete under the Minoan civilization. On the mainland, in Greece under the Mycenaean civilization, their architectural engineering, fine ceramic technology, and lapidary skill continued even after the disintegration of civilizations, though monumental architecture had an interregnum till the rise of the Greek city states. The heights of classical perfection attained by Greek art and sculpture in stone, wood, metal, glass, and terracotta continue to amaze the world even today. That the term ‘metallurgy’ derives from the Greek word metallourgos helps us presume its growth during the classical Greek times. However, there is no codified knowledge in textual format containing principles and procedures of metal mining, smelting, and casting, which, as in the case of any other ancient civilization, were transmitted orally from generation to generation. Largely, all this involved inexplicable knowledge acquired through experience about how it appears rather than how it works, which precludes knowledge about the principles behind appearances. It is in this vacuum of theoretical knowledge that people see practices as magico-ritual.1 What we read into contemporary arts and crafts objects by way of embedded knowledge was not actualized in those days although the craftsmen knew how to make their products. This was the case with objects of ceramic goods, lapidary, and glass works. Structural remains at the Acropolis of Athens like the Parthenon, Apollo, Tholos temples, the Delphi theatre, and many other structures of c. fifth century BCE, in different parts vouch for the great heights achieved by the classical Greeks in architecture. Evolved into (p.111) three styles, namely, the Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian, classical Greek architecture remains a marker of great achievements.2 The Parthenon temple of the early classic phase (Doric style), the Erechtheum temple of the middle classical phase (Ionian style), and the Apollo temple at Bassae (Corinthian style) are typical examples of the Greek architectural orders, each of which excites as a classic by itself. Every architectural monument is a beautiful sculpture on the landscape, much more so with temples in which every structure looks as if it was conceived as a sculptural object, often raised on a small hill so as to be visible as an elegant monument Page 2 of 30

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European Roots from all angles. They portray a well-accomplished level of architectural knowledge with wonderful mathematical insights. Architectural proportions and elements like the facade and rectangles circumscribed at various points in the structure of the temple approximate the golden ratio, making the monument into a mathematical inspiration. As regards the embedded knowledge in ancient Greek architecture, the most striking element is the post- and lintel-principle. Historically, Hippodamus of Miletus (fifth century BCE), a Greek philosopher known as the father of urban architecture far back in the days of Aristotle himself, is regarded as the inventor of the orthogonal design in urban planning. However, since there are archaeological remains of ancient Egypt showing orthogonal elements, Hippodamus might have only improved upon this design. The ancient Romans had employed regular orthogonal designs in architecture, obviously under the Greek, Hellenic, and Etruscan influences. Hundreds of towns and cities were built as right-angle designs in square grids throughout the Roman Empire, mostly on the banks of rivers for the advantage of easy water supply, sewage disposal, and transport. From the grid ran roads to four quarters, usually to the four directions. They had the necessary architectural knowledge to construct bridges resting (p.112) on barrel arches that merge with pillars.3 Actually, pillars with the lintel beam and arches were the main elements in the classical Graeco-Roman architecture. Arching is considered to be an ancient Roman contribution to world architecture. A massive example of this principle’s extensive use in late Roman architecture at the centre of the city is embodied in the world-renowned Colosseum or the Flavian Amphitheatre, the largest structure ever built of a mixture of lime and sand, during the period between 72 and 80 CE.4

Ancient Greek Knowledge Unlike the ancient Egyptians who strongly believed in afterlife and eternity, the ancient Greeks showed great concern for worldly life and yearned for its material culture through production of technology and theoretical knowledge. Indeed, they had their concept of heaven, heavenly gods, and a commendable body of myths around them. Huge temples were built and consecrated with different gods, but in the domain of knowledge production, they spent little time developing theology or theistic metaphysics. An irrepressible curiosity to know and to take on struggles adventurously in order to improve the quality of life on the Earth to match that of the heavenly world of Zeus is eminently embedded in their myths. Prometheus, the eponymous hero of fire and human welfare in several myths, is the embodiment of this adventurous passion. Another mythological instance of the Greek culture of curiosity and adventure for acquiring knowledge about the cosmos is evident in the myth of Ulysses. All discoveries and inventions, which characterized the Hellenic era, vouch for the culturally contingent thirst of the Greeks for knowledge.

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European Roots Breaking away from mythological imagination, the Ancient Greek thinkers engaged in producing analytically sound, evidence-based, (p.113) rational, and explanatory knowledge about life and its material environment from c. 600 BCE onwards for about a millennium. It had the single distinct feature of being inevitably inclined to the quest for the fundamental principles of the phenomena around. A survey of all their explanations or theories is not within the scope of the present study that seeks to review only the methodological aspects. Ancient Greek knowledge production is triggered by questions directed to the nature and limitations of the source and process of knowing. Hence, the central discussion pertains to the role of sensory perception in the acquisition of knowledge and that of reason in determining its reliability with a rare passion for it. It is this passion or love for deeper knowledge that gives rise to philosophy. As in the case of societies elsewhere, it shows a brief stage of eschatological questions and metaphysical answers, only to phase out soon in the wake of a high-order critical self-reflexivity, letting their ethics remain and encouraging epistemology. Early thinkers enunciated the material principle (archê) of origin and existence of objects based on fundamental substances, and without resorting to mythology.5 Perhaps the earliest instance of such a discovery of knowledge dating back to c. 700 BCE can be seen in the practice of rubbing amber for obtaining the phenomenon of attraction. Thales of Miletus (c. 624–c. 546 BCE), mathematician and geographer, is the first known thinker who stated water to be the basis of all objects and his successor Anaximander of Miletus (c. 611–547 BCE) presumed the first principle as an undefined and unlimited substance of no qualities on the basis of which the basic opposites like hot–cold or moist–dry were identified. Around 600 BCE, Anaximander is said to have discovered the angle between the plane of the Earth’s rotation and the plane of the solar system as the ecliptic angle. It appears that in c. 600 B.C Thales proposed that nature should be understood by replacing myth with logic and that all matter is made of water. In c. 585 BCE, he is said to have correctly predicted a solar eclipse. Anaximenes of Miletus (c. 585–c. 528 BCE) is known for enunciating the principle of air thickening into clouds and fire as well as thinning into water, wind, and the earth. In c. 500 BCE, he is said to have introduced the ideas of condensation and rarefaction. The effort (p.114) made to improve the extant knowledge is exemplified by Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535–c. 475 BCE), who postulated that fire is the primary substance and that the principle of unity and flux is fundamental to the cosmos. He speaks of the metaphysics of everything originating out of fire and ending up in fire only to rise again as part of a continuum in which, according to him, everything is in a perpetual flux. According to him the process of flux is germination of differences in objects. These differences in the case of certain objects are so sharp that they even look exactly like their opposites. No change is identical and it never remains the same at another time. Heraclitus thus brings forth a greater depth to the Page 4 of 30

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European Roots metaphysics of the cosmos. Nevertheless, he identifies everything as logos (the ultimate logic) to mean that all things are one and the same. It is the fundamental ontological unity across the apparent differences, which he philosophises. Heraclitus was the first European thinker to transcend physical theory seeking the metaphysical foundations and moral implications. It is the fundamental ontological unity across the apparent differences that he philosophizes. He is the first philosopher who seeks to build a theory of knowledge.6 Pythagoras of Samos (c. 582–504 BCE), though, began with the metaphysics of the perfect harmony in the cosmos and its understanding enabling human life to be harmonious too. He was established as the first true mathematician of the world. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c. 500–c. 428 BCE), a great scholar in astronomy, was the first philosopher of Athens who proposed the view that each star was a sun. Anaxagoras deals with the metaphysics of the ordering principle as well as a material substance. While he regards the latter as an infinite multitude of imperishable and qualitatively distinguished primary elements, he conceived divine reason or mind (nous) as ordering them. He is known for establishing the philosophical mode of exposition of knowledge in Athens, the city that witnessed its highest accomplishments for about a millennium. (p.115) Probably the first remarkable advance in the early Greek method of knowledge production is the discrediting of sensory experience that used to be treated as the reliable source of knowledge. Instead, it gives precedence to logical procedures for establishing truth over personal experience. Parmenides of c. 500 BCE is believed to have initiated this move towards an epistemological invalidation of sensory data. His contemporary, Melissus of Samos, set down the logical procedures for constituting stable premises. These two philosophers are known as Eleatics, who viewed the metaphysics of Heraclitus, explaining all objects in the cosmos according to the principles of perpetual flux and the ontological unity across differences, as a thesis of completion. Combining the elements of the early and Eleatic philosophers, the Greek mode of knowledge production once again sought to rely on the thesis of fundamental substances. Empedocles of Agrigentum (c. 490–c. 430 BCE) believed that all the objects of the cosmos are made up of four fundamental, unalterable, and permanent substances, namely, the earth, water, air, and fire. He was the first to enunciate a theory of evolution of the species. It was Leucippus of the fifth century BCE who formulated the first distinctly materialistic theory of the cosmos with a concept of the smallest particle, further irreducible. His disciple, Democritus of Abdera (c. 460–c. 370 BCE), who asserted the indestructibility, indivisibility, and infinity of the smallest particle, is considered as the first philosopher to theorize the properties of the particle. According to him, objects varying in number, size, shape, and arrangement happened as part of the process of smallest particles moving eternally through the infinite void, colliding and uniting. He is famous as the founder of the doctrine of the indestructible, in number. Page 5 of 30

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European Roots Socrates of Athens (469–399 BCE), Plato of Athens (427–347 BCE), and Aristotle of Stagira (384–322 BCE), the three most influential among ancient Greek philosophers, who inherited a vast fund of their precursors’ wisdom, enunciated lasting theoretical formulations about the role of reason in explaining the material processes of the cosmos.7 They let their knowledge be debated and critiqued towards (p.116) perfection through the cognitive process called dialectics. This is not to mean that all the philosophers of Socrates’ time followed the method of dialectics. For instance, Philolaus of Croton (c. 470–c. 385 BCE), a Greek contemporary of Socrates, was an eminent astronomer and mathematician of the Pythagorean system. Conceiving the sun as the huge cosmic fire at the centre and other planets at each one’s respective order of distance moving around, Philolaus had a heliocentric view of the planetary system. His On Nature is probably the first book based on Pythagorean perception and methodology. There were several such philosophers. Archytas (428–347 BCE), another astronomer and mathematician of the Pythagorean methodology, is an example.8 Socrates’ great successor is Plato, who in his philosophy demonstrates the former’s dialectical method as an evolved system. Plato combines the Eleatic doctrine of Single Principle (One) with Heraclitus’s theory of a perpetual flux and with the Socratic concepts. His central idea is about the unchanging, indivisible, and perfect eternal (archetype) that is independent of the multitude objects of sense in a permanent flux precluding genuine existence for any. Aristotle, who ranks the foremost among the disciples of Plato, is a name almost equal to his master in the history of philosophy. What Plato explains within the macro-metaphysical concept of the unchanging eternal of the cosmos is what Aristotle elucidates at the micro level of personal experience. He starts with the empirically given facts and seeks to establish the fundamental basis of things inductively by recognizing the purpose in all things. It is the logical process of synthesizing a number of facts into a universal by way of a posteriori conclusions. Aristotle in his Organon lays down fundamental laws of human understanding, which ultimately determine the universal knowledge derived out of the particular. He accepts matter as the basis of all that exists, for it is potentiality actualized with form. (p.117) There is a long genealogy of scholars who pursued the Aristotelian method of knowledge production over several centuries. Most philosophers were ardent followers of Aristotle. Pyrro of Elis (c. 360 BCE–c. 270 BCE), a contemporary of Aristotle, is the first philosopher of scepticism among the Greek intellectuals, who believed that even the most convincing explanation could have an equally convincing counter explanation. Some of the astronomers and mathematicians of the immediate post-Aristotelian centuries were not followers of Aristotle. For instance, Aristarchus of Samos (c. 310–c. 230 BCE), an astronomer and mathematician, seems to have perfected Philolaus’ heliocentric view into the theory of a solar system with the Earth revolving around it. Like Anaxagoras of Page 6 of 30

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European Roots the pre-Socrates period, he felt that the stars were like the sun and that the earth revolved round the sun. He successfully calculated the diameter of the earth. Nevertheless, his astronomical ideas were not accepted, for the scholars of the period largely believed in the geocentric theory of Aristotle. Euclid (c. 300 BCE), a great Alexandrian mathematician and astronomer, wrote his Stoicheion (Elements), a classic on geometry, which was a seminal and fundamental treatise in geometrical theorization for a long period. Experimenting with the division of geometrical patterns into their parts and discovering several relations of ratios, he produced knowledge in the form of many theorems. He is hence known as the father of geometry that we know today. In spherical astronomy, his theories regarding the determination of the position of objects and, in optics and catoptrics, his mathematical equations regarding the pattern of mirror reflections had been of far-reaching influence. Greek knowledge in astronomy, geometry, and mathematics made systematic advancement through several other philosophers of the period. Euclid’s contemporary, Eratosthenes of Cyrene (276–194 BCE), and Archimedes of Syracuse (c. 287–c. 212 BCE) are the most famous among them. Eratosthenes, the first to calculate with amazing precision the circumference of the Earth and the tilt of its axis, was an eminent Aristotelian astronomer, mathematician, and geographer.9 He is also said to have calculated the distance from (p.118) the Earth to the sun and invented the leap day. Eratosthenes’ lasting contribution to mathematics is the introduction of his sieve principle in number theory, which provides a very effective method of identifying prime numbers. His contribution to the field of geography is so fundamental that the discipline owes its technical nomenclature to him. It was Eratosthenes who created the first map of the world with parallels and meridians, based on the available geographical knowledge of the era. A great scholar in various fields, he is said to have served as the chief of the library of Alexandria, which by the time had a collection of more than 500,000 books. Archimedes of Syracuse, a mathematician, astronomer, mechanist, technologist, and experimentalist natural philosopher of Aristotelian approach, is a landmark in the history of the exponential growth of knowledge.10 His contributions to mathematics, astronomy, and experimentalist natural philosophy are remarkable, although the whole world knows him as the discoverer of hydrostatic principles. In mathematics, his application of the concepts of infinitesimals with the technique of exhaustion, derivation of new trigonometric functions, enunciation of various theorems with geometrical proofs, derivation of the area of a circle and that of the surface, means to calculate the volume of a sphere, and method of measuring the area under a parabola, anticipated calculus. The Aristotelian methodology of knowledge production continued during the initial centuries of the Current Era. Perhaps a strong check was the scepticism of Sextus Empiricus (c. 160–c. 210 CE) and Anesidemus (c. first century CE), which maintained that philosophers should abstain from conclusive assertions Page 7 of 30

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European Roots because human knowledge would continue to remain incomplete. Claudius Ptolemy (c. 100–170 CE) and Aelius Galenus or Claudius Galenus of Pergamon (129–c. 216 CE) are illustrious examples of the Aristotelian philosophers of the period. Claudius Ptolemy, a great astronomer, mathematician, geographer, and mechanic had proposed the geocentric theory.11 Having (p.119) made a detailed catalogue of visible stars and describing for the first time the closer galaxy, the sphere is known after his name. His mathematical treatise, Mathematika Synthaxis, running into thirteen volumes, comprises many astronomical observations, calculations, theorems, and geometrical proofs. Ptolemy’s major contribution is the application of mathematics to physical phenomena and the devising of a method to derive the closest approximation of pi. In mechanics, his contributions are equally significant. It was he who discovered the principle of the lever, and invented the screw pump, compound pulleys, and several other machines. Aelius Galenus or Claudius Galenus of Pergamon, now known as Galen, was a physician and surgeon. He was responsible for the development of knowledge in various fields of medicine, which subsequently came to be known as anatomy, physiology, pathology, neurology, and pharmacology. Similarly, old fields like philosophy and logic were also immensely benefitted by his contributions. In the history of knowledge, it is the ancient and early Greek phase that marks the first unprecedented intellectual explosion, thanks to the strange phenomenal rise of a series of philosophers with rare erudition and ingenuity. Greek philosophers were literally lovers of new knowledge, who had unending curiosity, inexhaustibly engaging themselves with the mysteries of nature, accounting for the amazing discoveries and inventions they made. Perhaps the ancient Greek thinkers were the first to generate knowledge about knowledge by subjecting it to analysis.

Greek Epistemology Greek Philosophers, as early as c. 650 BCE, were able to turn knowledge (episteme) itself into a scholarly subject and an intellectually challenging object through their logical procedures for establishing the reliability of the known. They thought about episteme in terms of its basis, concept of truth, nature of belief, and logical process of justification or the method of production of proof. This study of (p.120) episteme itself as the analytical object is called epistemology. Socrates sees episteme as an important object of itself for interrogation. He is said to have asked Theaetetus (c. 417–369 BCE), a mathematician of his times, what the word ‘knowledge’ (episteme) means.12 Theaetetus is said to have given three replies, namely, episteme means perception; episteme means true judgement; and episteme means true judgement plus a logos (the basic logic). Socrates raises new questions on the basis of the answers and it goes on. Socrates defined episteme as knowing what we do not know. This exemplifies the Socratic method of knowledge production or the method of scrutinizing the thought through an interrogative relationship Page 8 of 30

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European Roots of cognitive encounter by advancing questions against the fundamentals of answers until arrival at an intellectual consensus. Ancient Greeks, through their logical encounters with archaic forms of knowledge, first defined the properties of what even the modern world recognizes as rational theoretical knowledge. Parmenides, a pre-Socratic philosopher of early fifth century BCE argues that rational knowledge is one that represents the world as a unified entity precluding change or any subdivision. He believed being to be the sole truth and argued that no one would utter or even think anything as true knowledge except about it. Only fragments of the writings of Parmenides remain and they are found mainly in the dialogues of Plato. Towards the middle of the fifth century BCE, the logical constituents of reliable knowledge were well entrenched by the time of Plato, who was an important contributor to the emerging rationalist intellectual tradition. Plato’s epistemological understanding of knowledge is moulded by the reflexive thoughts of pre-Socratic philosophers, especially of Parmenides and Heraclitus. Of course, the transforming influence of Plato was the philosophy of Socrates, his teacher. In fact, Socrates’ philosophy exists only in Plato’s depiction that perfects the Socratic epistemological element into a system. It has been still a major influence in the domain of knowledge. Plato integrates Theaetetus’s answers by showing that (p.121) ‘episteme of something means true belief about it plus an account of the composition of that something’. Following Socrates, Plato views episteme as awareness of the absolute, acquired from beyond the reach of senses, the non-reliable.13 According to him, epistemology relates to knowledge of universal notions and descends to knowledge of particular imitations. Aristotle looked at epistemology in another way, postulating it as the result of observation of particular phenomena, which ascends to the status of deeper knowledge through the logical course of causality.14 According to him, episteme is factual apprehension of the universal principle that exists independent of the subject seeking to comprehend it. He gives instances of such epistemologically valid expositions of knowledge made by his precursors like Eratosthenes, Archimedes, and others. Eratosthenes’ calculation of the circumference of the Earth, Archimedes’ laws of hydrostatics and other mechanics are examples of epistemological validity in terms of explanatory premises, theoretical conclusions, and production of proof besides metaphysical insights into the cosmos. Aristotle expects knowledge to provide a rational description of what is there, to offer a metaphysical imagination of why it is there. Aristotle introduced what may be called a purely empirical method and had believed in the primacy of the empirically given particular as the starting point of universal philosophical generalization. This hardly means that he equated the empirically given with the universal truth, which invariably remained distinct as a creative discovery. Aristotle is not arbitrary about imposing universal truth on Page 9 of 30

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European Roots the particular through induction either. He is ultimately relying on the logical strength of causality, often grounded in deductive reasoning (p.122) and argued through syllogisms as demonstrated as part of ‘posterior analytics’ in Organon.15 There is neither a de facto distancing from induction nor any total exclusiveness about deduction in him, obviously due to the conviction that no deduction proceeds without induction. In short, Aristotle considers senseperception as the primary vehicle for knowing and deeper knowledge, according to him, results from intuition. Logical-conclusion-based analytical reasoning supported by evidence is the core of Aristotle’s methodology. These procedures of knowledge validation pursued by the Greeks are comparable to those followed by the various systems of knowledge of classical India. At the same time, they bear no comparison with those of pre-modern China, where traces of critical self-reflexivity and traits of epistemology are absent.16

The Dark Ages Barbarian invasions from the east, the Arab invasion from the south, and the Persian wars completed the economic decay of the Western Roman Empire that was steadily declining since the third century CE with a corresponding fall in trade and urbanism. All this badly affected the ruling class, the landed aristocracy, and big merchants. It was a period of catastrophic collision of primordial economies leading to the dissolution of the social formation dependent on slave labour into feudalism. The stabilization of the feudal economy with its fetters of serfdom, political fiefdom, and seigniorial jurisdiction reinforced by the people turned into (p.123) an uncritical mass by the Catholic Christian dogma.17 Using the knowledge in art, architecture, and sculpture, Christians established their headquarters at Constantinople (Byzantium) with several huge monumental structures. Local ruling chieftains, churches, feudal barons, merchant lords, and several migrant artisans and craftsmen dominated the material resources and people. A regime of massive cultural devastation that lasted many years, involving extensive marches and migrations of people, it uprooted the rare knowledge produced and persevered over several centuries.18 A fall in economic surplus would adversely affect full-time learning and production of new knowledge, for those engaged in that also require other people to produce for them. For a long period, the land and people thus remained in darkness with no leeway for continuing the pursuit of learning and scholarship. Naturally, literacy and learning declined in the West along with the decline in the economy and urbanism. With the circulation of goods and services localized, channels of communication shrank and sharing of knowledge ceased. Most texts of learning being confined to Greek, lack of circulation of knowledge gradually limited the access to deeper knowledge to the literati of a small world. Soon the Greek language became largely unfamiliar to Europe and classical learning went into oblivion, and to many, it remained alien. Marches and migrations of people led to large-scale relocation of many families with the inevitable consequence of Page 10 of 30

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European Roots cultural uprooting. It divested the young generation of its land, people, and intellectual heritage. Nevertheless, as often said, nothing was lost or forgotten completely since the light of learning was kept burning, but only in the monasteries. There were several priests who pursued deeper learning with great interest. Some of the Catholic bishops themselves had genuine passion for new knowledge and their contribution to (p.124) its production is education persisting exclusively in the monasteries and church establishments; the larger world outside became replete with illiterate masses and characterized the epoch as the Dark Age. While in the Eastern Roman Empire, education continued with a mandatory focus on Greek and Latin literature as well as grammar, West Europe got almost entirely cut off from the legacy of the classical Greek civilization. In a century, classical learning ceased completely with education confined to the biblical texts. By the sixth century CE, education became unknown outside the church schools and serious learning sustained itself in the monasteries but mainly as theological exegesis. In the regions of Italy, Spain, and southern Gaul under Roman influence, learning continued without much interruption. It was more or less the same with Ireland and the Celtic region where learning expanded by the seventh century CE. However, the dissemination of Greek knowledge into the culture of the Latin West during the period helped the recovery of many Greek manuscripts, their preservation, processing, classification, translation, interpretation, and new knowledge production that subsequently led to the reawakening of Western Europe. Further, the West Asian world played a major role in the sustenance of classical Greek learning. In fact, the contribution of the Arab world to the enterprise of transmission of classical Greek learning through translation and commentaries was immense.

Experience of Afro-Asia This section seeks to provide an overview of the larger Afro-Asian experience of knowledge production with methodological preoccupation, starting with the Persian world and then China. However, it is necessary to briefly review the progress of knowledge production in North Africa, keeping in view its bearing on the West Asian region. According to the ‘out of Africa’ thesis of human origins and expansion, people spread all over the world through West Asia where they made the earliest major landmark inventions such as agriculture and animal domestication about 16,000 years BP and 14,000 years BP respectively in Mesopotamia, where the knowledge to make weapons and musical instruments was attained about 10,000 years BP and (p.125) 7,000 years BP, respectively, the wheel around 5,500 years BP, and writing about 5,300 years BP. It was in Palestine that the invention of weaving happened around 8,500 years BP. Nevertheless, in Africa, the people who migrated to Egypt and Levant perished in a global freeze-up that turned North Africa into a desert. Subsequently, Page 11 of 30

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European Roots another group that crossed the Mediterranean to Levant rounded the landscape and reached Egypt after many centuries and prospered. There the people learnt the technique of smelting way back in 6,500 years BP and invented the sun dial about 5,000 years BP in Egypt. Primeval societies spread far and wide from their source over centuries, met again, and exchanged knowledge and technology subsumed by the culture. Often their interaction was violent, which sometimes went to the extent of one group even decimating the other. This had been continuing from the Stone Ages to the Bronze Age civilizations over the millennia between Africa and Asia. The Early Bronze Age (3300–2100 BCE) cities of Sumer came up through a millennium-long exchange network across the Mediterranean Sea and Egypt, linking East Asia, the Aegean, and beyond. The exchange of bronze artefacts communicated the technology of alloying and casting of bronze among coppersmelting societies, gave rise to crafts production, and brought about slave society, differentiated economy, military conquests, and state power. Replication of technology and crafts production hardly affected the demand for artefacts of one culture in another, because cultural differences made crafts and craftsmanship unique from place to place. Exchange took metal casting even to places where copper or its alloys were not available and led to the rise of rare craftsmanship and unique artefacts. Knowledge production in ancient Egypt advanced in astronomy, mathematics, architecture, alchemy, and medicine. Ancient Egypt wanted mathematics for measuring the flood level of the Nile, ritual timings, seasons, areas of land, and architectural angles of pyramids. Hieroglyphics, Egypt’s ancient system of writing, influenced the Phoenician script from which originated the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and West Asian scripts. Learning in Egypt had reached its zenith in the cosmopolitan city of Alexandria that had the largest library of the contemporary world. Pyramids vouch for not only advancement in architectural technology, astronomy, and mathematics but also for the (p.126) alchemy of the mummies interred in them. Of all the pyramids, the Giza complex of pyramids is inexplicably amazing for the architectural and mathematical knowledge embedded in the monuments.19 It involved astronomical knowledge enabling precise determination of the equinox, understanding of the Earth’s spherical shape, and accurate calculation of the Earth’s latitude and longitude. A huge structure, 481 feet high, built of big boulders weighing between 2.5 to 9.5 tonnes, finished with casing stones providing originally a very smooth surface, the Giza pyramid of the Pharaoh Khufu is the first among the monumental wonders of the world and was the tallest for over 3,800 years. Its total gravity has been estimated as weighing 6.5 million tonnes.20 How such humanly impossible weights were mobilized and put in place in the ancient Bronze Age civilization of wood and rope technology is still a mystery. We do not know the

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European Roots knowledge and technology, which the exterior, interior, and manifold objects thereof signify.21 Similarly, the widely held view that the pyramids were built with slave labour is becoming unconvincing. Egyptian medicine, though ritualistic as in the case of any of the ancient civilizations, shows a remarkable advance in rational and empirical knowledge about the human body, illnesses, and treatments.22 Mummification involved the removal of all internal organs like intestines, stomach, liver, and heart for treatment with resin and a mineral salt called natron made up of hydrated sodium carbonate; rinsing the inside body with wine and spices; and wrapping in bandages. Mummifiers naturally had good chances to generate knowledge about the positions and functions of (p.127) internal organs in the body. Although done on a corpse, it required care, and hence, development of surgical knowledge was part of the process. Mummifiers had expertise in removing the brain by inserting a hooked instrument through the nostril and breaking the tender bone inside. All this accounts for the knowledge in surgery, dentistry, autopsy, anatomy, internal organs, their functions, the role of fluids, the consequences of their presence in the dead body, the use of blood as a transpiration medium for vitality, as well as waste and the like. It is ritualbelief-driven acquisition of knowledge. Often the pressure of religious or ritual beliefs leads to the production of knowledge in strange areas. Original documents of Egyptian medicine are the nine principal medical papyri that have survived, through copies made several times over centuries. Three of them are known after their original owners, namely, Edwin Smith, Chester Beatty, and Carlsberg; two of them called after the sites where they were discovered, namely, Kahoun and Ramesseum; three of them after the city where they are kept, namely, Leyden, London, and Berlin; and one for their editor, Ebers.23 It is said that the most ancient, even among the copies, is the Kahoun Papyrus (1950 BCE), actually discovered at Fayoum though mistakenly known after Kahoun. Consisting of human medicine, animal medicine, and mathematics in three independent sections, besides an account of the pharoahs copied mainly in hieratic handwriting and partly in hieroglyphics, this papyrus is of special interest for Egyptologists. The Edwin Smith papyrus, the most prominent, provides evidence of empirical knowledge about the brain, general anatomy, iatrochemistry, various illnesses, their treatment, the surgical methods with sharp-edged bronze tools, and methods of prevention as early as in c. 1700 BCE. The papyrus contains attempts at identifying what factors cause different illnesses and how wounds heal, including tumours of the breast or epilepsy. Egyptian physicians under the pharoahs were famous for their methods of treatment, with knowledge in some kind of non-invasive surgery and ways of repairing bones. Contemporary surgical tools collected as part of burial goods have shown that they included different types of knives, saws, forceps, hooks, pincers, (p.128) scales, drills, and spoons. They had burnt incense at the time of surgery with the knowledge about its healing effect, although not about the Page 13 of 30

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European Roots aseptic environment the smoke created. It seems that the medical knowledge comprised some insights into human pathology and ways of bringing an anaesthetic effect as evident in the tradition of surgery and procedures of mummification. Mathematical astronomy was the major knowledge field of early Mesopotamia, which culminated in the Sumerian astronomy that survived through the notes in their writing system called the Cuneiform going back to c. 3500–3200 BCE. Ancient Babylonians owed their mathematical astronomy to the Sumerian astronomers, who had developed the method of dividing a circle into 360 degrees, of 60 minutes in each hour. Babylonian astronomers in their turn developed a seasoned empirical approach to astronomy during the eighth and seventh centuries BCE, which enabled them to constitute a predictive planetary system based on the internal logic. Babylonian astronomers redacted the Sumerian lists of planets, stars, and constellations into sets of star catalogues supplemented by details from other contemporary sources.24 Subsequently, the Greeks took the Babylonian knowledge and developed the basis of Hellenic astronomy. It is medicine that West Asia developed substantially as early as during the period of the Bronze Age civilization there. A third millennium BCE skull discovered in Shahr-e Sukhteh of south-eastern Iran provides evidence of a successful cranial surgery done on it curing a thirteen-year-old girl suffering from hydrocephaly.25 This suggests that the ancient Persians had generated empirical knowledge in medicine almost on par with ancient Egyptians. However, we do not know about the nature of the knowledge base of such surgical practices in the hoary past. The earliest textual evidence of ancient Persian medicine comes from the surviving part of Zend-Avesta, dated to c. 1700 BCE. Most parts of the concluding section of (p.129) the Vendidad in the sixth book of Zend-Avesta are full of information about medicine.26 It speaks about herbal and surgical treatment of illnesses besides the magico-religious healing. A relevant allusion in translation reads as: ‘Of all the healers O Spitama Zarathustra, namely those who heal with the knife, with herbs, and with sacred incantations, the last one is the most potent as he heals from the very source of diseases.’ Nevertheless, we know virtually nothing about the actual knowledge out of the text, which alludes not even to the procedures but only to the practice. Certainly, knowledge did exist and there were some methods of establishing its credibility. In the Vendidad, there is an allusion to the establishment of proficiency required of physicians, by curing three sick persons out of the followers of Divyasnān. Those who failed in proving their proficiency in this test were not permitted to practice medical treatment. Another domain in which knowledge production advanced is technology. Babylonia witnessed a relatively advanced knowledge production in astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, and medicine. Babylonian Page 14 of 30

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European Roots astronomy and mathematics had evolved certain empirical basics in the subject matter. Their technical knowledge in various arts and crafts was remarkable too. The Babylonian technology of agriculture is noted for the invention of windwheels for the purpose of irrigation as early as in c. 1700 BCE. In a millennium, they turned it into a full-fledged windmill. In the knowledge of medicine, the Babylonians are said to have prepared lists of various illnesses and medicines. In their early attempts at mathematically describing natural phenomena, they generally lacked underlying rational theories of nature. The Persian eschatology acquiring the dimension of an imposing religion and the exposition of its teachings having an epic nature, there was little scope for metaphysics. This seems to have led to the production of knowledge in mechanics. It is said that Babylonians of the Parthian Era invented the first batteries and used them for iatro-alchemy, facilitating the plating of a thin metal on the surface of another metal. (p.130) Contemporary knowledge was empirically grounded and highly pragmatic due to their obvious problem-driven nature. As regards the embedded knowledge in amazing monuments like the Giza pyramids and temples, striking for their massiveness rather than architectural principles that are primarily posts and lintels as well as arches and vaults, the geological awareness, astronomical meanings, and mathematical insights are largely anachronistic to contemporary level of scholarship. However, there is no textual evidence of such knowledge for us to probe further and vouch for the articulated existence of deeper principles and theories. Naturally, there is hardly any indication of a reflexive approach to the production of knowledge and the practice of raising epistemological questions.

Arab Intellectual World Through the circulation of spices and silk in ancient times from the East to the West from the mid-sixth century BCE onwards, cultures of China, India, Greece, Persia, and Rome were exchanged between Asia and Europe. Along with material goods and techno-economic culture, juridico-political and religious ideas were exchanged. Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Manicheism, Nestorianism, and Islam spread through the trade routes. The exchange of goods led to building up of social relations (kinship and family), communication of culture including the techno-economic, constitution of extended families, and the establishment of communities of religious identity through different levels of networking. Nevertheless, many traits, including faculty, remained unique in spite of imitations and replications of arts, crafts, and technology across places and peoples. Actually, the phase of exchange involved the process of technoeconomic and cultural communication transforming the network of extended families into the network of communities along seaboards and establishing wider networks.

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European Roots Learning and production of new knowledge had received a great fillip in the later Egyptian civilization as well. Several papyrus scrolls preserved in the great library of Alexandria vouch for it. Many books of this huge library, founded by Ptolemy I (c. 367–283 BCE), were burnt down during the wars and conquests under Julius Caesar in 48 BCE and Aurelian’s attack in 270–5 CE, besides under the decree of (p.131) Coptic Pope Theophilus of Alexandria in 391 CE. During the massive attack by a ravaging mob in 415 CE, and the Arab invasion in 642 CE also, the library lost a lot of its collection. Nevertheless, Alexandria and Antioch, destroyed in wars, were rebuilt by the Arabs, but not with the instituted practice of learning under the Romans. It is a fact that several Byzantine Christian philosophers and polymaths were engaged in the production of new knowledge by carrying forward what the Greeks left.27 Anthemius of Tralles (c. 474–c. 534 CE) had made significant contributions to the development of mathematics and architecture in which his works constituted the main source books in the Arab world and Western Europe for a few centuries. He is said to have been the master architect of the Hagia Sophia, the largest building in the world at that point of time. John Philoponus (c. 490–c. 570 CE), also known as John the Grammarian, a Christian Byzantine philosopher, revolutionized contemporary knowledge of mechanics that was primarily based on the analytics of Aristotle. In the process, Philoponus introduced a new notion of inertia and the invariant acceleration of falling objects, which remained repressed in the Byzantine world under religious pressure. However, it subsequently became relevant to the thoughts of natural philosophers in Europe and the Arab world. Similarly, Paul of Aegina (c. 625–c. 690 CE), considered to be the greatest Christian Byzantine surgeon by many, had prepared a multi-volume encyclopaedia of medicine and manual of surgery, which Europe and the Arab world held authentic for over a millennium. The Venerable Bede (c. 672–735 CE), a Christian monk of the monasteries of Wearmouth and Jarrow, was the authority on natural philosophy of his times and had authored several books in mathematical astronomy of which the most widely followed was the one on the reckoning of time. He (p.132) had original knowledge about the tides and various other natural phenomena. Rabanus Maurus (c. 780–856 CE), another Christian monk and teacher, who later became the archbishop of Mainz, was an expert in astronomical observations and in the reckoning of time. His scholarly work De Universe and teachings earned him the rare honour of being called Praeceptor Germaniae, meaning the teacher of Germany. The history of knowledge production in the early cultures of West Asia shows an illustrious course with the invention of agriculture, the wheel, metallurgy, and writing. All this enabled the circulation of knowledge across generations with greater authenticity and credibility and impacted human societies in Asia as well as Europe. Agriculture, metallurgy, the technology of wheeled transport, and script from Mesopotamia not only enabled techno-economic growth in other Page 16 of 30

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European Roots societies to herald the phase of civilizations but also triggered the production of knowledge beyond the immediate survival needs, for instance, for the sake of knowledge itself. Systematic recording of observations and measurements laid the foundation for the structure of codified knowledge of intellectual depth. With the epoch of the Pahlavi literature, we see the instance of codification of medical knowledge and practice in the form of a treatise attached to Dinkart, an encyclopaedic compendium containing in altered form some 4,333 diseases. Enterprises of textualization of new knowledge, in theory and practice, with procedures, continued to advance later under the reign of the Achaemenid dynasty. King Darius I (c. 550–486 BCE), well known for his interest in learning, especially medicine, is said to have revived the institution of medical education in Sais, Egypt, which was ruined by the invaders. Achaemenid Persia is credited for institutionalizing medical treatment by establishing hospitals. A big hospital is said to have been there attached to the Medical Academy of Gundishapur in the Persian kingdom. Several big educational institutions and centres of learning seem to have sprung up in different parts of Persia during the period, obviously witnessing the production of knowledge through empirical observations and experimentation, a methodology that had a long tradition in the land. A lot of scholarly theoretical and procedural texts must have been produced at the centres of learning for practical and pedagogic purposes during the early centuries of the Current Era. (p.133) Most of these institutions and their libraries were ruined and scholars killed in the wake of the Arab invasion (630 CE). Nevertheless, the Persian scholarship and the tradition of institution-centred knowledge production was revived during the Islamic period by translating many texts in Pahlavi into Arabic. Arabic became a knowledge language enriched by translations of scholarly texts from Persian, Sanskrit, Latin, and Greek. There were systematic efforts by Arab scholars to supplement the knowledge borrowed from different cultures, which made Arabic a language of intellectual convergence facilitating transactions of knowledge between the Eastern and the Western worlds. This accounts for the emergence of a good number of Arab scholars in different fields like astronomy, mathematics, optics, mechanics, medicine, geography, music, and so on, where their contributions of knowledge are substantial.

Arab Islamic Scholarship Arab Islamic intellectuals in Spain between the eighth and fourteenth centuries CE played a remarkable role in the preservation of classical Graeco-Roman scholarship as well as production of new knowledge based on the Hellenistic systems of thought, at a time when the rest of Western Europe was almost entirely lost in the Dark Age. Islamic Spain was a fertile oasis of knowledge production at the edge of the European desert of academic barrenness. Its contributions to carrying forward Graeco-Roman astronomy, mathematics, medicine, pharmacology, optics, agriculture, architecture, music, and Page 17 of 30

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European Roots jurisprudence are awe-inspiringly vast.28 In the field of mathematics, the world owes the advancement of algebra to the scholars in the Arab world. Muhammad Ibn al-Khwarizmi (c. 780–c. 850 CE), a Persian astronomer, mathematician, and geographer, is famous in history along with the Greek Diophantus (c. 201–285 CE), as the father of algebra, a term derived from al-jabr, the method that Ibn alKhwarizmi used to solve quadratic equations. It occurs in the title of the compendium (p.134) of his 830 manuscripts in mathematics. Likewise, the term ‘algorithm’ is derived from Algoritmi, the Latin form of al-Khwarizmi. His experiments in calculation led to the systematic formulation of the method of solving linear and quadratic equations and enabled access to trigonometric functions. He was the mathematician who spread the Hindu-Arabic number system all over West Asia and Europe, as evidenced by his manuscript, Al-kitāb al-mukhtaṣar fī ḥisāb al-ğabr wa’l-muqābala (The Compendious Book on Calculation by Completion and Balancing). He has a separate manuscript written in 825 CE on the calculation with Hindu numerals, the Latin is Algoritmi de numero Indorum. Al-Khwarizmi is known for his Kitab surat al-ard that has improved Ptolemy’s Geography with respect to the values for the Mediterranean Sea, Asia, and Africa. In instrumental astronomy, his contributions are attested by his texts on certain mechanical devices like the astrolabe and sun dial. Caliph al-Ma’mun had appointed him as the chief of a huge team of geographers, in order to determine the Earth’s circumference. Al-Kindī (c. 801–873 AD) is the first known Aristotelian philosopher of the Arabs, a great scholar in Aristotelian metaphysics, who produced knowledge not only in metaphysics but also in mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, medicine, and music. His contribution to the synthesis, adaptation, and promotion of Greek and Hellenistic knowledge in the Arab world is substantial. He was a scholar in Indian mathematics and astronomy as well. His synthesis included the introduction of Indian numerals to Graeco-Arab mathematics. A pioneer in cryptanalysis, a trick of coding letters with numerals for hiding the meaning, AlKindī devised several ways of cracking ciphers. Abbas Ibn Firnas (810–887 CE), an Arab polymath of Spain, was a great inventor in a variety of fields, especially of glass making. He had experimented with crude ways of gliding and met with a major accident in an attempt at flying a hang glider in the year 875 CE. Likewise a scholar in mathematics and medicine, he developed a scale enabling physicians to determine the potency of medicines. Another Arab polymath in Spain, namely Abu al-Qasim al-Qurtubi al-Majriti (c. 950–1008 CE), popular as Maslamah Majriti, was an eminent mathematician, astronomer, and chemist, who made significant contributions in the respective fields, enabling their development in Islamic Spain as well as in Christian Western Europe. His (p. 135) invention of new techniques for surveying, updating, and improving the astronomical tables of al-Khwarizmi is widely appreciated. Another important contribution of Maslamah was his invention of a process for producing mercuric oxide. Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyā al-Rāzī (854–925 CE), a physician, Page 18 of 30

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European Roots philosopher, and iatrochemist of Persia, was a great contributor to experimental medicine who authored over 200 manuscripts. Abu Mansur Muwaffaq (842–891 CE), another scholar in medicine, compiled Ketāb al-abnīa (Materia Medica) in 950 CE, travelling and collecting knowledge extensively in Persia and India. He was a scholar in alchemy too and hence evolved a method of distinguishing between what is called sodium carbonate and potassium carbonate today. He seems to have learnt about arsenious and cupric oxides, besides silicic acid and antimony, knowledge extremely relevant to alloying of copper to make bronze. His descriptions vouch for the prevalence of knowledge about the toxicological effects of copper and lead compounds. It is significant that several Byzantine Christian scholars were continuing their intellectual enterprises complementing the works of the Arab Muslim scholars. For instance, Pope Sylvester II (c. 946–1003 CE), a great scholar, teacher, and mathematician, was responsible for the reintroduction of the abacus and armillary sphere to Western Europe, where they were forgotten centuries ago. He was also responsible in part for the spread of the Hindu-Arabic numeral system in Western Europe. Constantine the African (c. 1020–1087 CE), a Christian physician of Carthage, is best known for his translation of ancient Graeco-Roman medical texts from Arabic into Latin during his career at the Schola Medica Salernitana of Salerno in Italy. Among the works he translated were those of Hippocrates and Galen. Adelard of Bath (c. 1080–1152 CE) was an Anglican scholar, known for his work in astronomy, astrology, philosophy, and mathematics. He had translated into Latin the works of several Arab scholars in such subjects, facilitating transmission of the Arabian knowledge to Europe.29 (p.136) Abulcasis (936–1013 CE), an Arab physician in Muslim Spain, who wrote several medical texts, is hailed in history as the father of modern surgery for his invention of various surgical instruments and methods. His texts of medical practice and surgical procedures were widely used in Europe until the Renaissance. Al-Zarqali, popularly known as Arzachel (c. 1028–1087 CE), was foremost among the astronomers of Muslim Spain during the early years of the second millennium CE and had remarkably improved the knowledge about planets and invented the method of obtaining universal latitudinal measurements essential for navigation. Ibn Bajja alias Avempace (c. 1085–1138) was a famous physicist from Muslim Spain who had an important influence on later physicists such as Galileo. Ibn Rushd or Averroes (1126–1198 CE) and Ibn Suhr or Avenzoar (1094–1162 CE) were great physicians who made lasting contributions to the production of knowledge in the theory and practice of medicine. Ibn al-Baitar (1085–1248 CE), a botanist and pharmacist in Muslim Spain, researched over 1400 types of plants, foods, and drugs and compiled pharmaceutical and medical encyclopaedias documenting his research.

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European Roots Hellenic learning of Cordoba in the tenth century made it the second Alexandria in knowledge production. A total of 400,000 volumes in the royal library there were more than the aggregate of what survived in the libraries elsewhere in Europe. Production and preservation of books in the Muslim world was of better durability, for the Arabs had learnt from China the technology of paper as early as in the fifth century CE. Cordoba was the city of new learning, its institutionalization, and practice. The latest method of knowledge production of the contemporary world was what Cordoba put forward. Its institutional form of healthcare learning and practice in medicine set the model for the cities in subsequent Europe. A detailed discussion of the scholars and their contribution is beyond the scope of a concise volume like this. However, a brief review of knowledge production during this remarkable period can never be irrelevant here. Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyā al-Rāzī, a scholar in various fields and a thinker, has left many texts substantially contributing to practical medicine, as a physician and iatro-alchemist.30 His student, (p.137) Abu Bakr Joveini, is known for his comprehensive text in medicine, the first of its kind in Persian. There are several other Persian documents, distinct for accuracy, containing knowledge about illnesses and substances used for treatments in general and about different types of headaches, their symptoms, causes, their remedies, and preventive measures, in particular. Another illness with symptoms and treatment mentioned in the document is epilepsy. Abū-Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn-Abdallāh Ibn-Sīnā (980–1037 CE), famous as Avicenna, often hailed as the greatest teacher (almuallim al-awwal) after Aristotle, was the first to codify and systematize the knowledge of Persian medicine into an encyclopaedic compilation, al-Qānūn fī aṭṬibb (the canon of medicine) around 1025 CE.31 His work contains five chapters, the first of which discusses the basic humoral, constitutional, temperamental, and functional causes of illnesses; the metaphysics, cosmology, and the fundamental natural elements that bind the human subject; dietary restrictions (regimen); and the general procedures of treatment. In the next chapter, he provides an alphabetically arranged list of medicines and a vivid description of their properties. Similarly, in the following two books, there are detailed discussions of diagnosis and treatment of illnesses specific to each part of the body and those covering the entire body, respectively. His compilation ends up with the formulary chapter that explains the basis and context of prescribing remedial drugs. In various ways, the perspective and authority of Persian medicinal knowledge is comparable to traditional Indian healthcare, especially the one based on Āyurveda. Avicenna’s medicine in its turn had influenced the healthcare practices in India as well. Contemporary Unāni system of medicine popular in different parts of India owed its knowledge and practice to the Persian-Islamic medicine.

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European Roots We know about Avicenna’s philosophy and methodology of knowledge production from the references in his autobiography (p.138) (Abū-‘Ubayd alJūzjānī) and in works dealing with logic and philosophy. His method of exposition was theoretical or doctrinal, presupposing the perspective of holism. Comprehension of the extant knowledge in different fields and critical analysis of the structure of his understanding across them are evident in his works. Avicenna was primarily an Aristotelian in his approach and syllogistic in the making of knowledge. All his works, especially Kitāb al-Burhān, vouch for it. An intellectual well versed in multiple fields of knowledge such as philosophy, logic, astronomy, mathematics, geography, optics, music, and medicine, Avicenna was an accomplished scholar trained in Alexandria.32 Largely a world view that combined Islamic theology, metaphysics, and mysticism with the classical Greek humanism, empiricism, and rationalism, his perspective was well received in Europe. There was no cognitive encounter between the West Asian and Western knowledge, for the latter turned out to be the Greek refurbished and strengthened. Naturally, his knowledge was by and large acceptable to Europe. There is nothing strange about the prevalence of his canonical compilation as the foundational text of medicine till the end of the eighteenth century. His Kitābe al-Shifa (the book of cure) was the basic text of medical practitioners all over Europe. Astronomy is another field of codified knowledge based on observations and their systematic recording of the motion of certain stars, planets, and the moon as thousands of inscribed clay tablets of Mesopotamia substantiate. These tablets were the source for Hipparchus, and fifteen centuries after him for AlBatani (858–929 CE) of Turkey, to calculate the Earth’s axis, the value of which (54.5 arc-seconds per year) is close to the current value (49.8 arc-seconds per year). The Mesopotamian arithmetic computation of stellar motions, the changing length of daylight in the course of the year, the recurrence of appearances and disappearances of the Moon, and prediction of eclipses of the sun and moon are notable achievements of the period. Such computations of the solar year, the lunar month, (p.139) and the duration of the week made by Mesopotamian astronomers like Kidinnu of Chaldea are still the basis of Western calendars. It improved through Babylonian mathematical devices enabling better access to astronomical phenomena. Abd al-Rahman al-Sufi (903–986 CE), a tenth-century Persian astronomer, was the first to record the earliest observation of a galaxy (Andromeda Galaxy) way back in 964 CE, which he called ‘a little cloud’. Al-Biruni (973–1048 CE), a versatile genius of his times, well versed in astronomy, mathematics, and mechanics, was a deep scholar in the thoughts of Aristotle, Ptolemy, Āryabhaṭa, Muhammad, Brahmagupta, Rhazes, al-Sijzi, Abu Nasar Mansur, and Avicenna. In history, Al-Biruni is the pioneer of several new areas of knowledge such as experimental psychology, anthropology, and Indology. He wrote in 1000 CE an encyclopaedia of astronomy, which proposed the possibility of the Earth rotating around the sun. Page 21 of 30

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European Roots Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyā al-Rāzī, considered to be the founder of practical mechanics, is known for his invention of the net weight of matter. His contemporary, Abu Ali al-Hasan ibn al-Haytham (c. 965–1040 CE), known as the father of optics for his experiments with lenses and mirrors, discovered vision as resulting from light reflected into eyes rather than light emitted and reflected back by eyes themselves as Aristotle thought. His reflection-refraction studies show that atmosphere having a definite height, refraction of solar radiation from beneath the horizon causes twilight. According to him, rays of light are emitted from objects rather than from the eyes. He shows a close acquaintance with epistemological procedures of cognitive encounter with the extant knowledge in his fields. In the process of his exposition, he not only substantiates his theories but proves the pre-existing theories wrong. Using this method, he substantiates his intromission theory of vision on the one side and questions the ancient emission theory of vision supported by Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Euclid, on the other. He generated experimental proof in support of what he theorized in his Kitāb al-Manazir (Book of Optics) about vision, light, colour, and other issues in catoptrics. His Optics is revised and updated in Kamal al-Din al-Farisi’s Kitāb Tanqih al-Manazir. Al-Biruni, a great scholar in several fields including optics, suggests the speed of light is finite. His Kitāb al-Jawahir (Book of Precious Stones) is a famous treatise on mineralogy of his times. (p.140) Kamal al-Din Al-Farisi (1267–1318 CE) is known for his mathematical explanation of the rainbow phenomenon and the colours, which reformed Ibn al-Haytham’s theory of refraction. There are several other Arab scholars who took Greek and Hellenic knowledge forward, but one deserving special mention is Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406 CE), a North African Arab Muslim historian and historiographer, hailed in history as a rare genius on the threshold of modernity in knowledge production distinct for reflexive methodology and critical epistemology. He is the progenitor of the philosophy of history, critical historiography, social history, sociology, demography, and political economy. He is best known for his Muqaddimah (prolegomena in Greek meaning introduction), an amazingly rich compendium of strikingly new theoretical knowledge relating to the methodological perspectives in human affairs and socio-economic and politico-cultural processes in various civilizations. Actually, it is the introductory volume to his Kitāb al-ibar (1377 CE), a seven-volume broad history of humankind. While the volumes from the second to the fifth deal with the history of mankind up to the time of Ibn Khaldūn, the remaining two volumes cover the history of the Berbers, written on the basis of his personal documents and direct acquaintance. His work is full of theoretical insights into social evolution, causes of social conflicts, foundation of social cohesion (aṣabiyyah), political economy, political theory, urban processes, biology, alchemy, and climatology.

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European Roots Arab Epistemology An overview of the history of knowledge in West Asia is enough to be convinced of the exponential growth of the region’s intellectual formation over centuries. It encourages looking into the nature of questions raised in the domain of knowledge production with a view to understanding the features of the Arab concept of knowledge, its epistemological and methodological aspects.33 Arab scholars had an (p.141) innate thirst for knowledge, which compelled them to move out in search of it and that accounts for their initiative in acquainting themselves with the classical Greek writings. Adventurously, in search of knowledge, they learnt Greek, drew very close to the scholarly writings in it, and translated them into Arabic. Some of them were good scholars in Sanskrit as well and translated Indian systems of thoughts into Persian and Arabic. Arab translations of knowledge texts in other languages, especially Greek, had acquired the dimension of a phenomenal movement lasting over two centuries.34 Arab translations of the works of Aristotle, Archimedes, Galen, Ptolemy, Euclid, and several others, carried forward knowledge production with significant improvements. Arab scholars were genuinely interested in the production of new knowledge and hence their approach to the knowledge translated from other cultures was not that of uncritical acceptance and mere reproduction, but that of scrutiny and evaluation involving improvement.35 Thorough with the classical Greek-Hellenic knowledge in astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, and philosophy, they became not only good interpreters of the extant knowledge but also contributors of criticisms, additions, alternative propositions, and new theories. This involved a procedure from the text to the natural phenomenon, its object for a fresh appreciation all over again in order to be convinced of the reliability of the knowledge.36 Arab scholars combined observations, experiments, and rational arguments to support their proposition. Ibn al-Haytham is a classic example of adherence to epistemological procedures for substantiating the theory proposed on the one side and on the other, exposing the (p.142) pre-existing theories as baseless.37 He emphasizes the role of empiricism, induction, and syllogistic procedures as distinguished from the Aristotelian metaphysical induction. Highly reflexive and conscious about the possibilities of errors in both experimental as well as empirical observations, he evolved methods to avoid them for attaining accuracy. Arab scholars in general were empirically well grounded and inclined to the logic of induction at the level of theorization. Ibn al-Haytham insisted upon epistemological properties like concept of truth, definition of the premises, and procedural building of theoretical conclusions. Generating as many instances of observations as possible and arriving at a single value through critical analysis is one of his methods, a method followed even today, to overcome biases. A concept of truth independent of theological or metaphysical belief systems and driven by the cause of truth itself is what ensures its logical strength.38 All this

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European Roots applies to Al-Biruni’s method of sustained experimentation and devising of the mechanics, which stands out as a distinct example. Arab scholars do not seem to have brought forth epistemology per se as a specialized area of knowledge. However, there are two distinct texts, Kitāb alBurhān by Avicenna and Muqaddimah by Ibn Khaldūn, which contain related concepts and theories of knowledge. Kitāb al-Burhān provides elements of epistemology, by way of his theory of knowledge at the instance of the question as to how knowledge becomes possible against sceptical challenges.39 Avicenna’s theoretical (p.143) discussions of his methodology shows that his procedure is not seeking to justify his knowledge with a priori truths or sense data or a combination of both. Avicenna does not provide an a priori foundation for knowledge; instead he insists upon the a posteriori. His concern is with describing the mental processes and the proper tools involved in the formulation of knowledge, rather than the normative pressure behind it. Avicenna divides knowledge roughly into the knowledge acquired through demonstration and the knowledge of the first principles. His theory of demonstrative knowledge presupposes the importance of logic and the primacy of heuristic aids in the act of seeking reliable knowledge. It emphasizes causal relations, for causal relations alone can guarantee certainty that is fundamental to reliable knowledge. As regards the first principles, his approach is empirical, heading for metaphysical abstraction, but without being inductive. Avicenna follows the philosophy of knowledge in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics as examples in Kitāb al-Burhān vouch for in contexts relating to fields of knowledge such as medicine, mechanics, mathematics, and metaphysics. However, unlike Aristotle, Avicenna discusses the certainty conditions required of reliable knowledge of first principles, in the acquisition of which sensory perception has a role. Aristotle’s truth condition is implicit in Avicenna’s certainty condition. Avicenna uses ‘certainty’ in two distinct ways, one referring to assurance of knowledge and the other referring to the inevitability of causality thereof to be maintained in the premises and conclusions, independent of the knower’s syllogisms. In Avicenna’s theory, there is an intimate link between logic and the seeking of reliable knowledge. It is not mere justification or verification of propositions, but laying bare the underlying causality, which is done primarily through a logical analysis of empirical data. In short, the fundamental epistemological factors in Avicenna’s methodology are the centrality of the relationship between logic and reliable knowledge on the one side and the primacy of causality on the other. His insistence upon identification of the methods or logical tools for acquiring demonstrative knowledge makes the first explicit. Likewise, his priority about the description of mental processes behind ascertaining the causal relations for acquiring first principles makes the second clear.

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European Roots Ibn Khaldūn is the first Arab scholar who provides a theory of knowledge and its methodology, by way of an introduction (Muqaddimah) (p.144) to his study (Kitāb al-ibar). Muqaddimah presents Khaldūn’s general scheme of history and theory of civilization in the first five chapters. The last chapter is exclusively devoted to the theoretical exegesis of knowledge and methodology, which jointly constitutes his epistemology.40 Muqaddimah gives Khaldūn’s perspective, theoretical framework, and methodological foundation of the study of human history, culture, society, and civilization. Khaldūn describes the socio-cultural processes of knowledge production as part of its sociology. He examines knowledge against its logic, hierarchical classification, and socio-economic as well as politico-cultural influences, anticipating long ago the emergence of historical epistemology as a specialized knowledge area. Although a thinker of the Aristotelian philosophical foundation, Khaldūn’s theory of knowledge, ideas about the factors that influence knowledge, the hierarchy of knowledge, and the sociological context in which knowledge gets transformed into the source of a civilization’s prosperity and so on are highly original. A methodological critique of historiography, Muqaddimah explains with enormous insights into the issues relating to the internal and external limitations of sources of knowledge about the past. It cautions the historian against the limitation that all source material is inherently erroneous due to partisanship towards a creed or opinion. Similarly, it cautions the readers of history against the historian’s false beliefs, biases, prejudices, and selfish goals like acquisition of high ranks through praising the powerful or spreading their fame. At a deeper level, it warns against the superficiality of the historical accounts due to the historian’s over-confidence in the source, inability to understand its purport, incompetence to place the event in its actual context, and, on top of all, the ignorance of the laws governing the transformation of human society. The last point regarding the historian’s ignorance is extremely important in the context of knowledge production, for it underscores the inevitability of theoretical scholarship in discovering new knowledge about the past. Perhaps Khaldūn was the first historian to recognize the primacy of the theory in writing history. While he insists upon theorization, there is a stress on the (p.145) need for maintaining uncertainty about the theory. This caution and openness make his methodology self-reflexive and critical. Khaldūn maintains that social phenomena are not accidental but driven by determinate laws of their own. These laws have to be discovered and applied in the study of society and civilization. It is the ignorance of these laws that makes history a bewildering object of knowledge. History becomes amenable to comprehension when approached with a theory that enables to distinguish the lawful and orderly history below the disordered events on the surface. Khaldūn’s methodology is least metaphysical in theorizing about laws governing the transformation of human society. It depends solely on his self-critical methodology guided by the logic of cognitive processes. In this sense, Page 25 of 30

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European Roots Muqaddima, as the most comprehensive methodological text of rational principles for reliable ordering of knowledge, anticipated modern epistemology. Notes:

(1) For a detailed consideration of the magico-ritual aspect of ancient Greek metallurgy, see S. Blakely. 2006. Myth, Ritual and Metallurgy in Ancient Greece and Recent Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 13–31. (2) For details, see J. Boardman, J. Dorig, W. Fuchs, and M. Hirmer. 1967. The Art and Architecture of Ancient Greece. London: Thames and Hudson. Also W.B. Dinsmoor. 1950. The Architecture of Greece: An Account of Its Historic Development. London: Batsford (Third edition); and A.W. Lawrence. 1996. Greek Architecture. New Haven: Yale University Press (Fifth edition); J.J. Coulton. 1982. Ancient Greek Architects at Work: Problems of Structure and Design. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. (3) See discussion in J. DeLaine. 1990. ‘Structural Experimentation: The Lintel Arch, Corbel and Tie in Western Roman Architecture’, World Archaeology, 21(3), pp. 407–24. Also D.S. Robertson. 1969. Greek and Roman Architecture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Second edition); F.E. Winter. 2006. Studies in Hellenistic Architecture. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. (4) For a detailed study, see D.L. Bomgardner. 2000. The Story of the Roman Amphitheatre. London: Routledge. (5) For details, see Jonathan Barnes. 1982. The Pre-Socratic Philosophers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Vol. 1, Chapter 4. (6) For a detailed discussion of his theory of knowledge, see E. Hussey. 1982. ‘Epistemology and Meaning in Heraclitus’, in M. Schofield and M.C. Nussbaum (eds), Language and Logos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33–59. See a re-evaluation of the hermeneutics of Heraclitus’ language, in C.H. Kahn. 1979. The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19–25. (7) Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar (eds). 2005. A Companion to Socrates. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Also, see G. Rudebusch. 2009. Socrates. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. See studies in H. Benson (ed.). 2006. A Companion to Plato. Oxford: Blackwell. Also, see G. Fine (ed.), Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. J. Barnes. 1995. The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; C. Shields. 2012. The Oxford Handbook on Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (8) For scholarly reference, see C. Huffiman. 2005. Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher, and Mathematician King. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Page 26 of 30

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European Roots (9) See E.A. DeLacy. 1963. Euclid and Geometry. New York: Franklin Watts. For a specific analysis, see I. Mueller. 1981. Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Structure in Euclid’s Elements. Cambridge: MIT Press. Also, see B. Artmann. 1999. Euclid: The Creation of Mathematics. New York: Springer. (10) For details, see B.W. Carroll. 2007. Archimedes’ Principle. Ogden: Weber State University. (11) For details, see Edward Luther Stevenson (trans. and ed.), 1991. Claudius Ptolemy: The Geography. New York: New York Public Library, Reprint. New York: Dover. Also, see J.L. Berggren and J. Alexander. 2000. Ptolemy’s Geography: An Annotated Translation of the Theoretical Chapters. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. (12) See S. Benardete. 1984. Commentary to Plato’s Theaetetus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Also F.M. Cornford. 2003. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist, a later edition. Mineola: Dover Publications. (13) See the detailed discussion in W. Runciman. 1962. Plato’s Later Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also, see N.P. White. 1976. Plato on Knowledge and Reality. Indianapolis: Hackett. (14) See the discussion in A. Gotthelf. 1987. ‘Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality’, in A. Gotthelf and J.G. Lennox (eds), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 204–42. Also, see D. Charles. 2001. ‘Teleological Causation in the Physics’, in L. Judson (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics: A Collection of Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 101–28. (15) See J. Barnes. 1994. Posterior Analytics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, (Second edition; translated with a commentary). Also, D.J. Furley. 1999. ‘What Kind of Cause is Aristotle’s Final Cause?’ in M. Frede and G. Stricker (eds). 1999. Rationality in Greek Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 59–79. (16) For a distinction between the Western and Eastern epistemologies, see H.S.P. Northrop. 1951. ‘Methodology and Epistemology: Oriental and Occidental’, in Charles A. Moore (ed.). 1951. Essays in East-West Philosophy: An Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 151–60. (17) See P. Anderson. 2013. Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. London: Verso, (New edition), p. 128. Also, see R. Hodges. 1982. Dark age Economics: The Origins of Towns and Trade AD 600–1000. New York: St Martin’s Press.

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European Roots (18) For the relevant characterization of early medieval society, see M.O. Boyle. 1997. Devine Domesticity: Augustine of Thagaste to Teresa of Avila. Leiden: E.J. Brill, p. 68. (19) See C. Rossi. 2007. Architecture and Mathematics in Ancient Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (20) For details regarding the volume, see F.W. Petrie. 1883. The Pyramids and Temples of Gizeh, 1880–82. London: Field & Tuer, pp. 120–5; J.H. Cole. 1925. Determination of the Exact Size and Orientation of the Great Pyramid of Giza. Cairo: Government Press. Also, see I.E.S. Edwards. 1986. The Pyramids of Egypt. London: Max Parrish (Reprint), pp. 284–6. (21) See discussions in B.J. Kemp. 2005. Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization. Taylor & Francis Routledge (Second edition), pp. 68–81. (22) For a detailed and up-to-date study, see J.F. Nunn. 2002. Ancient Egyptian Medicine. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. (23) For a detailed study of the documents, see Nunn, Ancient Egyptian Medicine. (24) For a detailed discussion, see J.H. Rogers. 1998. ‘Origins of the Ancient Constellations: I. The Mesopotamian Traditions’, Journal of the British Astronomical Association, 108(1), pp. 9–28. (25) See S. Dehesh. 1975. ‘Pre-Islamic Medicine in Persia’, Middle East Journal of Anaesthesiology, 4(5), pp. 377–82. (26) For details, see R.C. Zaehner. 1961. The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism. New York: Putnam, p. 160. Also J. Kellens. 1989. ‘Avesta’, in Encyclopedia Iranica Vol. 3. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 35–44. (27) See A.C. Crombie. 1969. Augustine to Galileo: The History of Science A.D. 400–1650, Rev. ed. New York: Penguin; E. Grant. 1996. The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional and Intellectual Contexts. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Also, see J. Hannam. 2011. The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages Launched the Scientific Revolution. Washington, DC: Regnery; P.T. Keyser and G.L. Irby-Massie. 2008. Encyclopedia of Ancient Natural Scientists: The Greek Tradition and Its Many Heirs. London: Routledge. (28) See N.G. Wilson. 1992. From Byzantium to Italy; Greek Studies in the Italian Renaissance. London: Duckworth. Also, see F. Rosenthal. 1992. The Classical Heritage in Islam, trans. Emile and J. Marmorstein, in Arabic Thought and Culture Series. London: Routledge.

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European Roots (29) For an analysis of many such instances, see J. Hannam. 2009. God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science. London: Icon Books. (30) See A. Iskandar. 2006. ‘Al-Rāzī’, in History of Science, Technology, and Medicine in Non-western Cultures. New York: Springer (Second edition), pp. 155–6. Also, see H.A. Hameed. 1986. Exchanges between India and Central Asia in the Field of Medicine. New Delhi: Institute of History of Medicine & Medical Research, pp. 1–38. (31) See S.M. Afnan. 1958. Avicenna: His Life and Works. London: G. Allen & Unwin. Also, see E.M. Micahel. 1967. ‘Avicenna’, in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. (32) For details, see D.C. Reisman. 2002. The Making of the Avicennan Tradition: The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sīnā’s al-Mubāḥaṯāt (The Discussions). Leiden: Brill. Also, see the essays in P. Adamson (ed.). 2013. Interpreting Avicenna. Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (33) See discussion in F. Rosenthal. 1970. Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam. Leiden: Brill. (34) See D. Gutas. 1998. Greek Thought Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Bagdad and Early ‘Abbāsid Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries). New York: Routledge. (35) See A.I. Sabra. 1987. ‘The Appropriation and Subsequent Naturalisation of Greek Science in Medieval Islam: A Preliminary Statement’, History of Science, 25(69), pp. 223–43. It is reproduced in A.I. Sabra. 1994. Optics, Astronomy and Logic. Aldershot: Variorum. (36) See the Introduction, ‘The Major Breakthrough in Scientific Practice’, in S. Rahman, T. Street, and H. Tahiri (eds). 2008. The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition Science: Science, Epistemology and Their Interactions. New York: Springer, pp. 32–4. (37) See the discussion in H. Tahiri. 2008. ‘The Birth of Scientific Controversies, The Dynamics of the Arabic Tradition and Its Impact on the Development of Science: Ibn Al-Haytham’s Challenge of Ptolemy’s Almagest’, in S. Rahman, T. Street, and H. Tahiri (eds), The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition Science: Science, Epistemology and Their Interactions. New York: Springer, pp. 183–228. (38) See A. Back. 2008. ‘Islamic Logic?’, in S. Rahman, T. Street, and H. Tahiri (eds), The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition Science: Science, Epistemology and Their Interactions. New York: Springer, pp. 255–80.

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European Roots (39) This section on Avicenna’s ideas of methodology is based on the commendable study by J. McGinni. For details, see J. McGinni. 2008. ‘Avicenna’s Naturalised Epistemology and Scientific Method’, in S. Rahman, T. Street, and H. Tahiri (eds), The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition Science: Science, Epistemology and Their Interactions. New York: Springer, pp. 129–52. (40) For details, see Z. Ahmad. 2004. Epistemology of Ibn Khaldun: Culture and Civilisation in the Middle East. London: Routledge.

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The Rise of Science

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

The Rise of Science Rajan Gurukkal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199490363.003.0005

Abstract and Keywords A review of knowledge production in the Age of Renaissance, impetus of great intellectuals like Roger Bacon, growth of natural philosophy of Copernicus, Galileo, Francis Bacon, Descartes, and Newton on contemporary knowledge production; and the making of the Age of Enlightenment constitute the fifth chapter. How Newton’s theories of objects, position, relations, dynamic, and velocity went into the making of a new field of knowledge called mechanics in Natural Philosophy, explaining the fundamental laws of the motion of bodies under the action of forces, became the hegemonic model for the centuries that succeeded, is the core of the chapter. It shows how the Newtonian inductive theorization of absolute space as independent of objects and of the universal time revolutionized the entire domain of knowledge and became the epochal model. Keywords:   Newton, absolutist induction, Principia mathematica, mechanics, position, velocity, predictability, inductive theorisation, Enlightenment

Derived from the Latin scientia meaning knowledge, the word ‘science’ acquired a privileged semantic status in sense, reference, presupposition, and implication in the nineteenth century CE when it gained currency as knowledge of certainty due to its provability or amenability to tests of confirmation. This does not presuppose the absence of differentiation or discrimination of knowledge in terms of reliability prior to the period. Discussions of logical properties establishing the reliability of knowledge was a common practice in early Indian as well as classical Greek traditions. In the previous two chapters, we have shown how self-reflexive and methodologically preoccupied the knowledge Page 1 of 39

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The Rise of Science production in Sanskrit and Greek was and how the former nurtured the tradition, while the latter lost it but it was sustained and improved by the scholars in Persian and Arabic. Several Christian Byzantine philosophers and polymaths of the early thirteenth century CE had a significant role in advancing the classical Greek knowledge as improved by the Arab Muslim scholars in Western Europe. It is necessary here to recapitulate this advancement of knowledge in Europe by Christian philosophers who took the cue from the Arab scholars of the art of establishing the explanation of the observed natural phenomena through the method of experimental confirmation rather than the means of logical procedures.

(p.147) Antecedents of Constituent Elements The primary constituent element that anticipated science was the experimental method of confirmation. There were quite a few among the leading personages who insisted on confirmation of explanations through experiments. Robert Grosseteste (1168–1253 CE), Roger Bacon, and Peter Peregrinus of Maricourt are the best known experimentalist natural philosophers.1 Grosseteste seems to be the forerunner of the method of experimental confirmation of explanations based on the logic of Aristotelian induction, and Peter Peregrinus is generally known in history as the master of experiments. Roger Bacon was famous among his contemporary thinkers for his insistence upon experimental proof to treat an explanation as valid. Scholars with great curiosity in natural phenomena, they acquired deep knowledge in a variety of fields like mathematics, astronomy, optics, geometry, and languages, often influencing one another. Albert the Great (c. 1193–1280 CE), famous as Doctor Universalis, was an eminent scholar in Greek classics and Islamic improvements on them, who made a difference through his interpretation of Aristotelian theses. According to him, the production of valid knowledge required the discovery of causality that would not confirm the widely accepted explanation. Another great scholar of the period was John of Sacrobosco (c. 1195–1256 CE), a famous teacher of astronomy at the University of Paris.2 His works Tractatus de Sphaera and Algorismus are believed to have introduced the Indian and Arab numerals among European mathematicians. His near contemporary, Jordanus de Nemore, was an eminent mathematician who had generated new knowledge in mechanics of weights involving algebraic, geometric, and mathematical projections besides certain advanced methods of arithmetic reckoning. All this in general, and the optics of Grosseteste and Bacon in particular, is said to have strengthened the foundation of experimental methodology of knowledge production in Europe. (p.148) Other fields where production of knowledge advanced through the experimental method of confirmation were iatrochemistry and alchemy, which flourished in the field of healthcare.3 William of Saliceto (1210–1277 CE), Bishop Theodoric Borgognoni (1205–1296 CE), and his pupil Henri de Mondeville (1260–1316 CE) made important contributions to surgery and healing of wounds. Others such as the famous Aristotelian philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1227–1274 CE) and Page 2 of 39

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The Rise of Science Arnoldus de Villa Nova (c. 1235–c. 1313 CE) expanded contemporary European knowledge in experimental iatrochemistry by using Arabic texts. Arnoldus de Villa Nova translated various medical texts in Arabic including Avicenna’s famous al-Qānūn fī aṭ-Ṭibb (Canon of medicine). The experimental method in surgery received a further fillip in Mondino de Liuzzi (c. 1270–1326 CE), a physician/surgeon from Bologna. He practised dissection of cadavers for the confirmation of knowledge in anatomy, which helped in the great advancement of surgery and medicine. Jacopo Dondi dell’Orologio (1290–1359 CE), another Italian physician/surgeon, carried the experimental method forward through his studies in medicine, surgery, pharmacology, astronomy, and mechanics. Jean Buridan (c. 1295–1363 CE), a French priest, famous as the forerunner of the Copernican revolution in natural philosophy, developed the concept of impetus, the primary step towards the Newtonian concept of inertia. Contemporary experimental knowledge in European healthcare was codified in Chirurgia Magna by Guy de Chauliac (1300–1368 CE), who was a French physician/ surgeon by profession. He is well known in the history of medicine as the first physician who put forth the differential attributes of the bubonic and pneumonic types of plague. Pointing out the contagious character of the illness, he recommended the infected to be put in quarantine as a measure to check its spread as an epidemic. John Arderne (1307–1392 CE), an English physician/ surgeon, improved upon contemporary techniques of creating an anaesthetic effect through an experimental alternative that involved (p.149) administering a combination of hemlock, henbane, and opium in a particular ratio. Some of these scholars were experts in mathematics, astronomy, and mechanics. Jacopo Dondi dell’Orologio, though a physician, was a scholar with original contributions to astronomy and mechanics. An astronomical clock designed by him is famous as a solid testimony to his experimental mechanics in astronomy. His contemporary, Richard of Wallingford (1292–1336 CE), had designed an astronomical clock and certain mathematical tools for calculating the longitudes of the major planets known to the period, which enabled prediction of solar and lunar eclipses. Jean Buridan, a French priest and theologian, formulated an experiment-supported explanation of the dynamic of impetus behind the movement of projectiles and objects in free-fall. This anticipated the discovery of the fundamental principles of mechanics, which came about only three centuries later. Giovenni Dondi dell’Orologio (c. 1330–1388 CE), a later Italian scholar, designed an astronomical clock and developed a planetarium, probably showing an early awareness about the escapement mechanism. Probably he is the first to have attempted a mathematical explanation of the dynamics of the solar system. Side by side with the progress of the experimental confirmation of explanation, there was progress in the art of articulation with logical precision, the next vital constituent of science. William of Ockham (c. 1285–c. 1350 CE), a Franciscan friar, trained under a famous Aristotelian philosopher called Duns Scotus, brought forth the argument that an explanation bound to be based on sound Page 3 of 39

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The Rise of Science logic should also be adhering to the principle of parsimony, insisting upon economy of words and simplicity of expression.4 This principle advocating the need to choose the simplest among the equally valid explanations for a phenomenon became famous as Ockham’s razor. It anticipated all-inclusive theoretical statements in the mathematical language of equations and formulas, which subsequently became the characteristic feature of science. Nicole Oresme (c. 1320–1382 CE), a French Bishop and natural philosopher who had written several scholarly (p.150) works in astronomy, mathematics, philosophy, and several other fields of knowledge, is perhaps the most prominent thinker after Ockham and before the Renaissance scholars. Although his thoughts were under scriptural control, there existed a free intellectual in him, who surfaced at times in his writings as the voice of a sceptic cautioning against all conclusive statements.

Spirit of Inquiry During the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries CE, the dissolution of the feudal order into a new social formation was accompanied by a series of historical phenomena such as the black death; peasant uprisings; marches and migrations of people from agrarian villages; growth of trade; rise of towns under a new landed gentry; emergence of an unencumbered category of workers released from serfdom; revival of the classical Greek learning and Hellenic humanism with a rare spirit of inquiry, criticism, and freedom under the Renaissance; adventurous voyages and discoveries; reconstitution of the juridico-political system; and transformation of the Christian religion. Several intellectuals engaged in the production of new knowledge about natural phenomena began to find it difficult to make their enterprises entirely conformable to the dominant truth ordained by Christian scholasticism. However, most of them continued to let the criticality of their knowledge domain, called natural philosophy, be subsumed by faith. The natural philosophers engaged in Renaissance knowledge production had to bear an as yet unsettled tension between the power of reason and faith. This was primarily due to their preoccupation with the experimental method of confirmation applied to what they generated by way of new knowledge. Voyages to unknown lands and discoveries of the new world in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries CE sustained an atmosphere of adventure, emboldening intellectuals to raise questions of reason, triggering critical consciousness about the unquestioned dominance of the Catholic religious order. Critical ethical questions against religious domination synchronized with a passion for secular doctrines in the domain of knowledge. Arrival of printing technology revolutionized the mode of dissemination of knowledge and the amazing extent of its reach in no time democratized learning and literacy among the (p.151) well-to-do people. With the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Byzantine scholars who were well informed in the Arabic knowledge system acquired an added mobility to the West European regions, which facilitated the fusion of classical Page 4 of 39

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The Rise of Science intellectualism into Renaissance humanism, providing an unprecedented fillip to the production of new knowledge. They popularized algebra among West European scholars in mathematical astronomy and mechanics. Nikolaus Copernicus (1473–1543 CE), a Prussian astronomer-mathematician well grounded in geometric optics and cosmography, made a major leap in Renaissance natural philosophy by putting across his revolutionary thesis of a heliocentric universe in his De Revolutionibus. Copernicus’ was a theoretical project about the general structure of the universe, highlighting the principles of spherical astronomy and explaining the ostensible motions of the sun and the related phenomena. In particular, he described the orbital motions of the moon and the longitudinal as well as latitudinal motions of planets other than the Earth. His method was of explanatory induction based on particular empirical observation, detailed computation of observational data, and mathematical experimentation to confirm the theory. Another prominent scholar of the period was Tycho Brahe (1546–1601 CE), a Danish astronomer and alchemist, who resorted to the experimental method to confirm his observational generalization into principles of universal application. An astronomer who had set the standard for correct measurement, Tycho’s observations were distinct for precision, indeed notwithstanding errors in the generalization about partial heliocentrism. Paracelsus von Hohenheim (1493–1541 CE), a hermetic physician and alchemist of occult powers who explained life as a chemical process and disease as the consequence of chemical imbalance, was the father figure for iatrochemists. Paracelsus as a hermetic believed in three humours (salt representing stability, sulphur representing combustibility, and mercury representing liquidity). For him, it was the absence of one humour or the other that created illness. Andreas Vesalius (1514–1564 CE), a physician, took the experimental method of confirmation to a great height in his De Humani Corporis Fabrica, a landmark study of human anatomy, which disproved several notions of classical Greek anatomy. He carefully dissected the cadaver and thoroughly observed and meticulously described the skeletal, muscular, (p.152) vascular, circulatory, and the nervous systems, besides the various organs, in the human body. This experimental tradition was taken to a great height by William Harvey (1578– 1657 CE), who discovered the system of blood circulation.5 His Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus (An Anatomical Exercise Concerning the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals), published in 1628 CE, is still a classic noted for several experiments and discoveries enabling detailed characterization and theorization of organic functioning. An added rigour in the method of confirmation became perceptible in knowledge production with the philosophical influence of scepticism, which was acting as a check on truth claims.6 This reminds us of the Indian theory of doubt, which was integral to the method of confirmation in the Brahmanical as well as the Jain and Buddhist knowledge, as discussed in the chapter on non-European antecedents. Scepticism in Western civilization goes back to the classical Greek philosopher Page 5 of 39

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The Rise of Science Pyrro (c. 360 BCE–c. 270 BCE), whose exposure to the Buddhist perception is well known. It acquired more philosophical depth in Sextus Empiricus (c. 160–c. 210 CE) and Anesidemus (c. first century CE), who brought about greater clarity as to why humans whose knowledge remained handicapped by limitations should refrain from judgements. Scepticism made serious scholars rather obsessed with doubts on the truth they sought to establish. Essays of Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592 CE), first published in 1580 with Renaissance insights, showed how fragile human nature and thoughts were. His elaborate treatise on the design in writing (p.153) proceeds by airing a strong scepticism about human accomplishments. He exposed human hollowness through self-exemplification, a classic instance of which was his statement that he had never seen a greater monster or miracle than himself. This intellectual self-denigration had a lasting impact on contemporary writers, which often manifested in the form of academic humility, self-reflexivity, and extreme caution in making claims or judgements. In the field of knowledge production, it reasserted the primacy of informed reasoning and the inevitability of confirmation by proof. What became strikingly significant in the wake of the normative pressure of scepticism was the growth of epistemology, making scholars sceptical even about knowledge of unassailable empirical base.7 Two scholars who should be recalled here in the context of methodological reflexivity are Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679 CE), an Anglican philosopher, and René Descartes (1596–1650 CE), a French natural philosopher and mathematician. Hobbes, well known for his political theory, draws closer to Michel de Montaigne in the art of self-exemplification for driving home his characterization of the brutishness in human nature. Descartes is famous for his methodological scepticism, well known as Cartesian doubt, a logical process of subjecting all truth claims to a rigorous scrutiny. Nevertheless, he was optimistic about discovering the orderly universe and its laws using rational methods and mathematical tools. The Cartesian urge to ensure reliability of knowledge through the strict observance of epistemological rationalism has been a leavening influence on scholars across centuries.

Baconian Empiricism How to make knowledge certain had been a haunting question among natural philosophers for quite some time. Falling back on empiricism was always the most acceptable alternative in spite of scepticism not approving it. Francis Bacon (1561–1626 CE), an eminent (p.154) Anglican intellectual of Renaissance accomplishments, hailed as Lord Chancellor Sir Francis Bacon, was perhaps the most prominent natural philosopher of his times, who theorized knowledge and its problems of confirmation.8 He strongly believed in the precedence of the power of empiricism over the sheer logic of arriving at truth through a priori induction. This made his inductive reasoning unique for its primacy of independent empirical observations facilitating universal generalization. However, his empiricism was distinct for its conditioning by an Page 6 of 39

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The Rise of Science elaborate theory of obstacles that impede the accession of right knowledge. Bacon is famous for his two profound treatises on empiricist natural philosophy, namely, The Advancement of Learning Novum and Organum Scientiarum, which subject the problems of human understanding and limitations of knowledge to theoretical probing to evolve the method of overcoming them. A matter of primary importance to the methodology of knowledge in Bacon’s natural philosophy is his theory of idols, which deals with sources of biases like the inherent as well as the acquired false concepts causing distorted reflections. Sometimes love for certain concepts leads to their blind acceptance without enough supporting evidence. Bacon detects the deepest fallacies of the human mind, which distort intellectual anticipations.9 In the context, he distinguishes the ideas of the divine mind implicit in the objects in nature from the idols of the human mind.10 Bacon’s theory presupposes a method to cultivate senses as freed from biases. Bacon’s Novum Organum seeks to introduce a new method to free the senses of their contingent forces of distortion and enable an unencumbered perception that leads to right knowledge.11 He proposes an (p.155) experimental method to correct the sensory perception into proper understanding, which enables arriving at reliable knowledge through progressive stages of varying degrees of certainty attained in the process of inquiry drawing deeper and deeper. At the accession of right knowledge or the cleansed truth, certain laws are postulated under the pressure of inevitability. This is induction based on empirical rationality, involving an indispensable transformation of the untrue sensory data into true facts of experimental confirmation. According to Bacon, facts are not gathered from nature through sensory means, but constituted through the method of ascertaining the empirical basis for inductive generalizations. His method proceeds from a state of more liberty and less certainty to a state of less liberty and more certainty. According to him, explanation of natural phenomena can become complete only when it is based on the full grasp of the matter’s inscrutably hidden structure and mechanisms of functioning. He classifies the knowledge ingrained in natural philosophy into physics, seeking variableoriented particular causes, and metaphysics, focussing on the generality of constants. In his The Great Instauration consisting of six parts, he has devoted the entire second part for discussing the directions concerning the interpretation of nature and articulating the new method of knowledge production.12 In the last part of the book, he describes the properties of the new system of knowledge. What Bacon discovers in natural philosophy is a methodology of knowledge, which subsequently became famous as scientific methodology.13 It comprised delineation of the basic properties of the knowledge of certainty anticipating scientific epistemology. Similarly, the philosophy of science owes its foundation to Bacon’s discussion of the cosmology of knowledge combining the micro-dynamic of matter (physics) with the macro-dynamic of nature (metaphysics) as (p.156) the ontological unity between the materiality Page 7 of 39

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The Rise of Science of the matter and the spirituality of nature (God’s will), but without compromising on the conviction that religion and the knowledge system of certainty should never be mixed up.14 Bacon’s project of knowledge production was distinct for its insistence upon the reliability of procedures, the purport of experimentation, and the assurance of state sponsorship. It was a strategy destined for the conquest of nature for the welfare of humankind.15

Newtonian Mechanics Certain remarkable methodological advances were made by Galileo Galilei (1564–1642 CE), an Italian polymath, well versed in mathematical astronomy, thanks to his telescope that significantly improved the efficiency and accuracy of observation.16 His empirical methodology of experimental confirmation was noted also for the insistence upon the production of mathematical proofs for claims of truth. He confirmed the Copernican heliocentric theory with improved observational and mathematical proofs. Living under house arrest, he consolidated his four-decades-long experimental results and the mathematical theorization thereof in his seminal book that laid the foundation of kinematics and mechanics of materials. Johannes Kepler (1571–1630 CE), (p.157) a German astronomer-mathematician, advanced further the method of mathematical reinforcement of the theoretical explanation. He theorized planetary motions through the mathematical illustration of gravity and deduced the laws thereof. Isaac Beeckman (1588–1637 CE), a Dutch scholar in natural philosophy, was perhaps the first to clearly articulate the fundamental knowledge in atomism through mathematical tools. Mathematical formalism made a giant leap forward with the introduction of the probability theory by Blaise Pascal (1623–1662 CE), a French physicist and mathematician. Instrumentation-based efficient observation and mathematical computation acquired a higher dimension in the astronomical studies of Christiaan Huygens (1629–1695 CE), a Dutch astronomer mathematician. Robert William Boyle (1627–1691 CE), a pious Anglican scholar in theology and natural philosophy, who had indulged a lot in alchemy, could carry forward the experimental method of arriving at knowledge based on proof. He is known in history for his law regarding the inverse ratio between absolute pressure and volume of a gas under the condition of constant temperature. Boyle’s law (pv = k) arrived at through empirical observation and experimental confirmation thus laid the foundation of modern chemistry. His work, The Sceptical Chymist, a landmark in the history of modern chemistry, shows, as made explicit in the caption, how cautious he was in his truth claims. Women were not altogether absent in the field of experimental natural philosophy, despite the imposition of socio-religious restrictions on their scholarly pursuits. However, such women who enjoyed some freedom to acquire higher learning were invariably powerful as the famous instance of Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673 CE), the duchess of Newcastle, illustrates. She was a participant in the Royal Society of London at its inception. Apart from rare Page 8 of 39

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The Rise of Science exceptions like this, women were largely out of the intellectual field and those with an irresistible passion for knowledge had to be pursuing it surreptitiously. In their writings, they had to be either anonymous or to be known by male names. Isaac Barrow (1630–1677 CE), an Anglican mathematician credited for his construction of the fundamental theorem of calculus, was responsible for a breakthrough contribution to the development of infinitesimal calculus. A profound experimental physicist, Huygens produced new knowledge about gravitation, laws of motion, (p.158) and mechanics. Similarly, the instrumental method and applied mechanics of Robert Hooke (1635–1703 CE), an Anglican polymath renowned for his microscopic observation and applied mechanics, led to the production of new knowledge in the physics of gravitation. It was James Gregory (1638–1675 CE), a Scottish mathematician and astronomer, a contemporary of Hooke, who developed the infinite series enabling certain advanced trigonometric functions and recognition of new relations in geometry. He is famous for his design of the reflecting telescope, known as Gregorian after his name and made for the first time by Hooke in 1673 CE, not successfully though.17 Mathematical formalism enabled Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716 CE), a German polymath, to discover calculus through his notation and differential method. Edmond Halley (1656–1742 CE), an Anglican geophysicist and astronomer-mathematician, contributed to instrumental observation, generation of data through extensive expeditions, and their mathematical computation for cataloguing the stars, noting planetary transits, determining the absolute size of the solar system, and obtaining high-precision measurements of distance between the Earth and the sun. His Synopsis Astronomia Cometicae is an eminent treatise noted for the use of long-term astronomical data relating to the visits of comets to identify them and determine their pattern of recurrences with predictive power. Identifying the comet sighted in 1456, 1531, 1607, and 1682 as the same, he predicted its recurrence in 1758, which came true, and subsequently, the comet was named as Halley’s Comet. Natural philosophy became unprecedentedly distinct for its methodology based on instrumentation, experimentation, and mathematical application with the ascendance of Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727 CE), an Anglican scholar hailed in history as the greatest genius of his times.18 Knowledge production heralded a clearly distinct phase of Renaissance perfection in terms of methodological strategies of confirmation and definition of epistemic properties of truth in natural philosophy. This is not to treat him as a bolt from the blue, which (p. 159) he himself denied by placing him privileged to see farther on the shoulders of his precursors. Newton was tremendously influenced by Leibniz, Descartes, More, Boyle, and several others, although he utterly relegated most of them. In fact, the approach of Leibniz was explicitly opposed to both Descartes and Newton in various ways. Newton’s discovery of the generalized binomial theorem, his theory and application of the infinitesimal calculus using the Page 9 of 39

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The Rise of Science method of geometrical analysis through ‘first and last ratios’, his theory of gravity, and laws of motion were path-breaking both in methodology as well as knowledge.19 With the publication of his Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical principles of natural philosophy), in 1687, Newton literally shook the world through the declaration of his general theory of gravity and mechanics, which explains how all celestial objects are attracted to one another and set in motion around the sun. Using the same theory, he explained how the same gravitational force accounts for the falling of objects on earth. It was a new thesis of mechanics applicable to objects both celestial and terrestrial, which he put across integrating the genealogy of propositions in mathematical astronomy from Copernicus through Kepler to Galileo and others. Principia provided a set of mathematical (p.160) tools based on infinitesimal calculus, enabling the solution of complex computational problems regarding the self-moving and orbiting planets under acceleration. What Newton presents in Principia is not empirically given knowledge. It is not intuitively gained either. Instead, it consists of the discovery of a series of natural principles or laws and their integration into a general theory, based on instrumental experimentation and mathematical proofs. He calls it mechanics that deals with the position along with other intrinsic properties of each particle in the universe at a particular time and how the position changes as time flows. It was almost a branch of mathematics rather than physics. Many physical problems were reduced to mathematical ones that proved amenable to solution by increasingly sophisticated analytical methods. His calculus provided a powerful tool for dealing with highly complex problems. Within Newtonian mechanics, the specification of the positions of all particles in the universe at a particular time and the sort of particles they are amounts to a specification of the type of force operating on each of those particles at that time. Newtonian mechanics explains how positions of particles change by unravelling the laws that govern the motion of a particle in the universe. This knowledge is predictive of the entire future of the universe with absolute certainty. The Newtonian theory of the universe is based on an absolutist idea of space. Newtonian conception of space is independent of objects as well as their relations. According to this, every entity must somehow connect with space in some way against the universal time. This Newtonian space is non-relativistic and Euclidian with universal time of a constant rate of passage, independent of the state of motion of the observer. Objects of finite volumes of space, according to Newton, are assemblages of particles. According to him, these particles determine the behaviour of objects. In Newtonian mechanics, the force that acts to maintain or alter the motion of a particle arises exclusively between pairs of particles. Moreover, the forces that any two particles exert on each other at any given time depend only on what sorts of particles they are and on how their positions relate to each other. Newtonian mechanics represents in absolute terms everything that could be said about the physical history of the universe, Page 10 of 39

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The Rise of Science everything that existed, and every event that occurred such as what particles (p.161) existed, what their masses and intrinsic properties were, and what positions they occupied. Newtonian cosmology maintains that the universe is made up of infinitesimal material particles that are in pairs or groups forming systems. Actually, the space-time metric tensor not only encodes for spatiotemporal structure, but also represents the gravitational energy. Here, the philosophical controversy, as to whether space-time can exist without matter, becomes tendentious whether one counts the gravitation field as something material or not.

Institutional Role The earliest known instance of institutionalized production and transmission of knowledge goes back to the Buddhist establishment at Takshasila and Nalanda in early India. Institutionalized production of knowledge and learning in Europe goes back to classical Graeco-Roman times. Greek philosophers had classified knowledge into different branches. Aristotle had viewed Poetics, Politics, and Metaphysics as distinct fields of knowledge. Classical scholars knew that specialization caused lack of holistic understanding, and they tried to overcome this by making themselves polymaths. Their assembly became universitas scientiarum out of which the medieval universities emerged. During the medieval period scholars followed two broad divisions: (i) the trivium (rhetoric, logic, and grammar) and (ii) the quadrivium (music, geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy). In Europe its institutional counterpart, with a long history of persistent contribution to the production and transmission of knowledge, is the university. Other institutions of equally long history in discharging the same services are the academic societies and colleges. Most scholars, especially of the immediate pre-Renaissance and Renaissance periods, had studied under the tutelage of professors in universities or colleges. For instance, Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon were associated with the University of Oxford, the institutional role of which in facilitating and circulating their studies cannot be exaggerated. Similarly, the College of St James in Paris had a major role in enabling the philosophical pursuits of Thomas Aquinas. Several scholars of the period were eminent ecclesiastical personages and naturally they had the institutional support of the pontifical education centres. Several (p.162) monasteries and churches played their role in setting up libraries and learning centres, enabling production and transmission of knowledge as part of scholasticism. Prominent ruling families of Europe, especially those in Germany and France, had built up prestigious royal libraries at the palace. Some of them had established societies and academies for facilitation of scholarly convergence and promotion of learning. Among the Renaissance scholars, Descartes had the benefits of education in eminent institutions and was a professor at Utrecht University, which had a major role in the dissemination of his thoughts. Similarly, Francis Bacon was a product of the University of Poitiers. Galileo was educated at the University of Page 11 of 39

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The Rise of Science Pisa first and then joined the University of Padua where he served as professor of geometry. Kepler learnt Greek, Hebrew, mathematics, and astronomy at University of Tubingen. The institution of chairs hugely endowed with funds for experimental studies in knowledge fields like mathematical astronomy or optics, often named after the donors, began to be common in various universities of Europe. Universities started inviting eminent scholars to such chairs. Cambridge University’s Lucasian Professorship endowed by Henry Lucas (1610–1663 CE), an Anglican clergyman and member of the university’s parliament, is an illustrious example. Isaac Burrow, the famous exponent of infinitesimal calculus, was the first invitee to the chair. Isaac Newton was invited as his successor to the Lucasian Professorship in Mathematics during 1642–1726 CE. Big libraries and laboratories with personal collections of books and experimental data made some of the universities into centres of exceptional learning, attracting learners even from far-off places. Such institutional resources of Cambridge University had a major role in the making of Newton. Georg Ernst Stahl (1659–1734), a famous German chemist and physician, owed his major studies to Halle University. Universities of the Netherlands in the seventeenth century CE had played a significant role in the advancement and dissemination of new knowledge. They translated Principia into Danish and made it available to students in the Dutch region. Some of the students of Willem ‘s Gravesande at the University of Leiden had the lead in diffusing Newtonian mechanics to the universities of Harderwijk, Franeker, and Amsterdam, when most universities in (p.163) Europe were teaching Descartes’ mechanics as such or as modified by Leibniz. Great mathematicians of the period like Isaac Beeckman and Christiaan Huygens were products of some of these universities. Another kind of institution that had a remarkable role in fostering the production and dissemination of new knowledge were the natural knowledge societies of the seventeenth century CE. Perhaps the first of its kind was the Royal Society of London founded under a royal charter in 1662 CE for the promotion of natural knowledge. France was next in founding a similar society called Académie Royale des Sciences, in 1666 CE at Louvre in Paris, under the royal grant of Louis XIV and as the brainchild of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, for scholars in natural philosophy to meet and transact their new knowledge. These societies began printing and circulating new discoveries among individual member scholars and selected libraries of the suburban universities. That gave rise to the practice of publishing periodicals carrying reports on the development of knowledge. Perhaps the most prominent example of such a publication is Philosophical Transactions launched by the Royal Society of London in 1665 CE under a special grant of King Charles II, and edited by Henry Oldenburg, the secretary of the society. It marked the illustrious beginnings of the publication of academic journals in the nineteenth century CE. Four years later, the French Académie Royale des Sciences also started a similar publication called Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences, letting the new Page 12 of 39

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The Rise of Science experiments and discoveries of the scholars in France become known widely. The Royal Prussian Academy called Königlich-Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften was founded in 1700 CE with the same objectives. These societies of natural knowledge acquired precedence over universities in commanding the circulation of higher knowledge. Broadly speaking, all institutions of knowledge production were elitist and far removed from ordinary people. Nevertheless, the situation was changing little by little, thanks to the spread of high literacy with the Renaissance spirit of inquiry and criticism. The earliest example of spontaneously evolved public culture of academic transactions can be seen in the ‘coffeehouse system’ that sprang up around the premises of Oxford towards the latter half of the seventeenth century CE. It facilitated, to a certain extent, social dissemination of higher knowledge generated by experts in institutions like universities, societies, (p.164) and academies. It provided a platform for sharing new thoughts and ideas of natural knowledge among the educated commoners. Several other diffuse cultural centres of social convergence like theatres, clubs, and crafts-lodges also came into existence augmenting the public space for discussing even advanced mathematical questions, astronomy, medicine, results of experiments, and theoretical postulates. Some of the leading discussants in the popular academic culture of the coffeehouse were John Aubrey (1626–1697 CE), Samuel Pepys (1633–1703 CE), Robert Hooke (1635–1703 CE), and James Brydges (1642– 1714). As a result, people in the mainstream, fast emerging as actors under the new socio-economic and politico-cultural milieu, were being transformed intellectually. In short, the nature and quality of people’s knowledge and their method of knowing underwent a remarkable improvement. An important development in association with the instituted practice of academic communication was the need for explanation of terms coming up as part of new knowledge. Terms came up spontaneously as part of writing by the creator of new knowledge and they gained currency through transmission, especially printed material. Soon, the terms constituted a new language within the language. This necessitated translation and translation inaugurated semantic confusion, which in its turn, necessitated systematization of terms and standardization of their meaning. An early example is Fundamenta Botanica (1736) by Carl von Linné (1707–1778), who prepared it basing on what he called ‘the structure of concept system and rules’.

Hegemonic Knowledge Model Newtonian mechanics occupied the top position among other knowledge forms in the eighteenth century CE, and Principia, the awe-inspiring model and the inviolable standard of knowledge in natural philosophy for any scholar in search of truth. Newton’s method of knowledge production, as made explicit in the second edition of the Principia, was fundamental analysis and absolute inductive theorization of natural phenomena by using mathematical formalism as the tool, Page 13 of 39

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The Rise of Science means of communication, and proof. It meant a rigorous computational heuristics and analytical deduction of the phenomenon into its essential properties for ascertaining the underlying laws in (p.165) order to render absolute induction plausible. Newtonian methodology became universal for the production of fundamental knowledge about the principles underlying natural phenomena. A theorem of Thomas Bayes (1702–1761 CE), having wider applications in different kinds of calculations involving probabilities, acquired great prominence as the major method of mathematical confirmation of the theory, thanks to the insistence of proof in the Newtonian model. Newton’s impact on the eighteenth-century knowledge systems was profound because of his analytical method and mathematical deduction for absolute induction. Newtonian mechanics or theory soon became a synonym of epistemologically unassailable knowledge of certainty, finality, authority, authenticity, credibility, and universal applicability. As a result, any effort to pursue Newton’s method began to be considered as the most powerful source of legitimacy and any move to apply his theoretical mechanics began to be viewed as the most legitimate enterprise. Chemistry was the first field that significantly responded to the Newtonian challenge of discovering fundamental laws, for it had already made considerable progress in experimental methods with the establishment of Boyle’s Law. Knowledge in chemistry advanced through studies in reactions under the pressure of air in general and gases in particular. Joseph Black (1728–1799 CE), a Scottish physician and iatrochemist influenced by Newtonian mechanics, was the most notable contemporary name in the field of experimental chemistry. However, the real Newtonian phase in chemistry began with the discoveries by Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier (1743–1794 CE), who unravelled the principles of combustion reaction and unseated the Phlogiston theory through his balance experiments proving that combustion involved the union of bodies with a gas he named oxygen. He successfully decomposed water and proved it not an element but a compound of oxygen and an inflammable gas called hydrogen. A revolution in the theory as well as method of chemistry, it heralded the phase of analytical chemistry generating knowledge about materials in terms of the fundamental constituent substances and measuring the properties of analytes through gravimetric quantification.20 (p.166) In natural philosophy of living organisms, it took a slightly different turn. Cartesian and Harveyan mechanistic models could not explain the various bodily functions like appetite, digestion, and the like. At the same time, several scholars like Diderot (1713–1784) and D’Alembert (1717–1783 CE), though intellectually Newtonian, however, felt the mechanistic view inadequate to explain living organisms. Diderot offered a materialistic explanation based on chemical materials and resisted the Cartesian view of living organisms as mere mechanical systems based on physical principles. Iatrochemists argued that all these were part of chemical processes in the body. Iatrochemists had an upper Page 14 of 39

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The Rise of Science hand on the iatromechanists of the eighteenth century because of the outstanding intellectual status attained by chemistry through a series of pathbreaking discoveries. Lavoisier, noted for his discovery of oxygen (1778) and hydrogen (1783), extensive list of elements (the first of its kind), and prediction of the existence of silicon (1787), was the epochal name behind most of the fundamental discoveries of his times. His explanation of respiration as a form of oxidation, confirming the relevance of chemical processes to the functioning of living organisms, was of special relevance to the debate between mechanists and chemists. Luigi Galvani, at the end of the eighteenth century, demonstrated that the transmission of nerve impulses was associated with electric current. Generally, Newton’s influence on the natural philosophy of the world of living things was not prominent immediately, but it did strongly introduce the perception of organisms as mechanical systems to be looked upon as thermodynamic machines. Some of the chemists felt like representing life forms as chemical machines operating on the basis of the laws of thermodynamics. However, most chemists preferred a unified framework called the chemical paradigm, which helped them explain life as an extremely complex chemistry and the entire biological processes as chemical transformations of matter and energy, amenable to description in terms of physical quantities. Newtonian revolution had significantly impacted knowledge production in philosophy. It is best represented by the works of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804 CE), a great German thinker, who insightfully engaged himself with epistemological questions relating to the fundamental theorization of nature. In his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (1786), generally translated as (p.167) Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, he has been found to be profoundly influenced by Newtonian mechanics.21 Kant’s basic presumption, well expressed in the work, is that inborn cognitive structures, namely, ‘categories’ such as space, time, objects, and causality, go into the making of knowledge. He seeks to harmonize the Leibnizian metaphysics of monads with the Newtonian mechanics of absolute space, since for both of them the primary reality (the reality about Leibnizian monads and Newtonian particles) precludes space (external relations), for the intrinsic properties of the primary reality need no external relations to exist as it is, though it can only coexist presupposing external relations. Leibnizian metaphysics conceived the happening of monads first and their joining together into space as a secondary development. Newtonian mechanics discloses the fundamental forces of the existence of particles (attraction and repulsion) and the fundamental laws of their coexistence. With the theory of universal gravitation, he explains the existence and coexistence as the single comprehensible phenomenon of nature, precluding the sequencing by the Leibnizian metaphysics. Newtonian metaphysics, extending from his mechanics based on mathematical principles, attributes to God both the existence as well as coexistence of particles as an ontological unity. It is the absolute force of universal gravitation stated Page 15 of 39

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The Rise of Science differently. Kant takes the metaphysics of Newton’s absolute space as well as time and the theory of universal gravitation central to his understanding of nature. It is this metaphysical perception of the space that enables Kant to explain the motion of celestial as well as terrestrial bodies. Kant’s epistemological analysis acquires a different dimension in his Critique of Pure Reason where the analytical deduction of the a priori reasoning in its pure form is improved upon through a posteriori reasoning based on transcendental deduction. His transcendental deduction holds the objectivity of time, space, and cause, in order to differentiate the subjectivity of sensory experiential knowledge from the universal objectivity. Kant’s idea of reason as the source of morality (p.168) and the faculty of disinterested judgement as the source of aesthetics exemplify this objectivity. He sees it as the outcome of the synthesis between pure intellect (rational metaphysics) and pure intuition. In fact, it embodies the spirit of Newtonian mathematical perception. According to Kant, mathematical knowledge is part of intuition. Nevertheless, he disagrees with Newton’s transcendental realist position about space and time for metaphysical reasons. Further, on metaphysical grounds, Kant refuses to accept Newton’s treatment of space as absolute, infinite, imperceptible, and causally inert. In mechanics, Pierre-Simon, marquis de Laplace (1749–1827 CE), known as Newton of France, was the first to dare a finishing touch upon Newtonian mechanics through his cognitive encounters with problems of calculus and the theory of probability. A great natural philosopher deeply interested in mathematical astronomy and mechanics, Pierre-Simon was successful in gaining analytical comprehension of the extant knowledge in classical mechanics. His five volumes of Mécanique Céleste (Celestial Mechanics), containing auxiliary questions and new interpretations of amazing theoretical insights, vouch for it. Laplace was ambitious of finding a complete solution to the celestial mechanical problem of the solar system. He was equally ambitious about theorizing in perfect harmony with the observation, so that it would preclude empirical equations. Sceptical about analysis done merely as a heuristic means to explore physical problems, Pierre-Simon carried out his analyses with extraordinary thoroughness and in amazing depth. Sophie Germain (1776–1831 CE), another French physicist and mathematician, was primarily self-educated in her father’s library and went ahead to acquire higher knowledge despite strong objections even from her learned father. A victim of contemporary gender prejudice, she could not secure the career of an academic professional.

Epoch of Enlightenment Newtonian methodological hegemony hardly denied scholars their Renaissance freedom to think differently but compelled them to maximize their faculty to reason, to attain the fundamental truth. ‘Dare to know! Have courage to use your reason’—was the call of (p.169) enlightenment, which made the eighteenth century the Age of Reason.22 It is the accomplished state of Page 16 of 39

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The Rise of Science individual freedom enabling public exercise of reason in all matters. According to Kant, to be enlightened means to be emancipated from the self-imposed inability to use reason. He firmly believed that such liberation alone would bring enlightenment to humankind. In fact, enlightenment to him meant the state of intellectual freedom to produce new knowledge through transcendental deduction. What the Age of Reason or Epoch of Enlightenment aspired to through the celebration of intellectual freedom was the attainment of the epistemic depth that Principia symbolized. We see the abundant presence of this in all the major academic writings of the age, which are globally acclaimed as enlightenment landmarks. Creative waves of enlightenment swept across all of Europe, giving rise to its various culturally contingent manifestations in England, France, Scotland, Germany, Switzerland, and so on. Enlightenment thinkers approached knowledge through different objects of analysis, but they uniformly made it profoundly enunciated. It is not accidental that all of them became awe-inspiring masterpieces. A significant epochal factor is that the age witnessed a major advancement in several fields of knowledge such as astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, optics, medicine, and chemistry. Nevertheless, there was no perceptible increase in the number of universities and academic population in European countries during the eighteenth century CE with the exception of Britain, where they marked a tremendous growth, thanks to her economic prosperity and the rise of aristocracy. In general, many aristocratic male youths had a professional interest in law, medicine, and theology while several of them were interested in natural philosophy for scholarly pursuits. Mathematics and mechanics were inspiring fields of knowledge for the brilliant youth, obviously due to the unsurpassed academic authority of Principia, the unmatched fame of Newton, and the liberal academic patronage extended to the fields by Cambridge University. Classical learning was the priority of most universities in Europe. (p.170) However, several German universities like Göttingen made a major break by discouraging Greek and Latin studies on the one side and promoting mathematics, medicine, and mechanics in German language under the royal patronage that was immense for the production and publication of new knowledge through experimentation. On the contrary, French universities of the Age of Enlightenment gave priority to teaching and not to production of new knowledge, which was the institutional mandate of the royal academy. In France, some twenty new royal academies came up during the period between 1720 and 1760 CE.23 Royal academies and societies, as the prime institutional category in the context of production and publication of new knowledge, proliferated in Europe, especially at important places such as Bologna, Bordeaux, Barcelona, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dijon, Dublin, Edinburgh, Göttingen, Lyons, Mannheim, Munich, Padua, Turin, Uppsala, and so on. They were as many as over seventy by the latter half of the eighteenth century CE. Societies began to be established under the joint endeavour of scholars for the production of new knowledge and the Page 17 of 39

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The Rise of Science phenomenon secured for the period the qualification as ‘the Age of Academies.’24 They popularized experimentation through regular public demonstrations. Experimental Physics Society (Societas Physicae Experimentalis), established at Danzig in 1742 CE under the initiative of a group of learned associates of Daniel Gralath (1708–1767 CE), an eminent scholar in mechanics, is a good example. Another example may be the Lunar Society of Birmingham (1766–91 CE), established by natural philosophers and other intellectuals for enjoying deliberations on new knowledge together with a moonlight dinner. Being the custodians of latest knowledge and bodies of experimentalists competent to find solutions to problems, these societies were closer to state power. During the Age of Enlightenment, the royal libraries and the private book stores of prominent households, accessible to scholars (p.171) and the rich, began to be public libraries available to all who desired to acquire knowledge in the fields of their interest. They rendered deeper knowledge possible among the people through the translation of path-breaking texts. Voltaire’s or Émilie du Châtelet’s translation of Newton’s Principia is an example. Continuing from the previous century, a coffeehouse of eighteenth-century Britain, where the educated commoners congregated, was a vital point of popular reading material, intellectual deliberations, and exchanges of new ideas. A major development of the period was the publication of lexicons and encyclopaedic compilations of technical knowledge as public reference books. As a result of the experimental enterprises of societies and academies, new knowledge accrued, necessitating efforts to redact, classify, and edit it into reference compendia for the learners to access without hassles. It was perhaps the French encyclopaedists who responded to it for the first time. Perhaps the most famous encyclopaedic compilations were made by Diderot and d’Alembert. John Harris’ Lexicon Technicum and Chambers’ Cyclopaedia were prominent among such reference works that clarified the doubts in natural knowledge from Newtonian mechanics to Lockean philosophy. Mathematical method of natural knowledge began to be copied in spirit for the production of knowledge about social matters. Production of knowledge in economic, social, political, and religious affairs began to be predominantly theoretical under the inescapable methodological influence of Newtonian mechanics. A Treatise on Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (1739 CE) by David Hume (1711–1776 CE) is the first work to be cited as the foremost.25 Hume’s experience-based and experiment-supported empirical methodology is explicit in this principal work’s title itself. A thinker of the sceptical tradition, he was extremely cautious about the limitations of knowledge and the problem of induction. It is well known how his sceptically and experimentally reasoned knowledge had influenced Adam Smith, awakened Kant, caused the scales to fall from the eyes of Jeremy Bentham, and helped Charles Darwin to shape his Page 18 of 39

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The Rise of Science theory of evolution. Hume argues that the main limitation of human knowledge is (p.172) inductive reasoning, which invariably goes beyond the empirically given to the unobserved. He was sceptical about the claim of reason that nature would continue to be uniform or that things would behave in a regular manner or patterns of the behaviour of objects would be the same in the future. Hume remained sceptical about it because the rational justification for such claims would inevitably be based on past experience as well as circular reasoning. Hume’s alternative, therefore, is radical empiricism reinforced by experiment, of course notwithstanding the inevitability of contexts making causal reasoning based on relations of ideas. Enlightenment epistemology was significantly sharpened under the sustained pressure of Hume’s methodological scepticism and radical empiricism. The Spirit of the Laws (1748 CE) by the French scholar, Montesquieu (1689– 1755 CE), is another landmark in the history of methodological development in the Age of Enlightenment. It is his cross-cultural comparative analysis and a posteriori reasoning that stand out as the main methodological contribution to theoretical knowledge production in the juridico-political field. His classification and categorization of the different aspects of socio-political processes laid the foundation of several fields of knowledge, which were to be opened up as disciplines. Voltaire (1694–1778 CE) wrote Essay on the Universal History, the Manners and Spirit of Nations: From the Reign of Charlemagne to the Age of Lewis XIV (1756 CE), the first theoretical attempt at studying the social dynamic of human affairs. His effort was to produce reliable knowledge about the universal past in terms of social customs and intellectual achievements including accomplishments in arts. François Quesnay, another Enlightenment scholar of France and a leading physiocrat, generated strikingly fresh theoretical knowledge on the economy of the French state. His Tableau Économique (1759 CE) questioned the thesis widely accepted at the instance of Holland positing commerce as the basis of a country’s prosperity and the stock of precious metals (gold and silver), by asking why then Spain, equally strong in trade and industry, was backward. He replaced the mercantilist thesis by theorizing agricultural surplus in the form of rent, wages, and purchases as the real source of wealth. Adam Smith (1723– 1790 CE), a Scottish intellectual, presented a historical theory of justice and rights in his The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759 CE) and a theory of wealth in his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of (p.173) the Wealth of Nations (1776 CE), explaining how rational self-interest in a free-market economy leads to economic well-being.26 Similarly, Adam Ferguson (1723–1816 CE), another Scottish intellectual in his The Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767 CE) theorized the moral history of humankind as structured within the four sequential stages of social development from that of hunting and gathering through those of herding and farming, to trading. He, for the first, time enunciated the thesis of ‘the class’ power as the central dynamic of the society. Page 19 of 39

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The Rise of Science Similarly, John Millar (1735–1801 CE), yet another Scottish intellectual, in his Observations on the Distinction of Ranks: An Inquiry into the Circumstances which Give Rise to Influence and Authority in the Different Members of Society (1771 CE), theorized the processes and social dynamic of status and ranking. Thomas Malthus (1766–1834 CE), an Anglican political economist, in his The Essay on the Principle of Population (1798 CE) put forward his lasting theory of demography in the form of the ‘iron law of population.’ All these Enlightenment scholars insisted that everything should be analysed in the ‘cold light of reason’, in which nothing was to be accepted on the basis of faith. They also insisted that the methodology of empiricism should be used for understanding life in its manifold aspects and that their understanding would be complete with the discovery of the underlying laws or principles. The ambitious model of reliable knowledge and the legitimate method of its production for them were Principia and its mathematical analysis respectively. Likewise, it is Hume’s radical empiricism that runs through the landmark studies and their epochal theories based on observation, measurement, computation, deduction, and a priori reasoning as well as induction. A prominent anti-Enlightenment voice that echoed during the late eighteenth century was that of George Wilhelm Hegel (1770–1831 CE), whose most famous maxim held the rational as real and the real as rational. Hegel philosophized the historical evolution of consciousness from sensory through perceptual to higher consciousness or the Kantian transcendental deductive reasoning to the rational or real (p.174) consciousness, as part of his Phenomenology of Mind. His method of knowledge production was out and out anti-Newtonian, as exemplified in the discussion of the philosophy of history.27 However, it hardly made any sense to the Age of Reason that held Newton’s mathematical experimentalist methodology far above the Hegelian phenomenological methodology of philosophical speculation. An interesting contrast is Hegel’s heavy dependence on the transcendental logic of Kant whose metaphysics was founded on Newtonian mechanics. Often, the contrast made between Hegelianism and Newtonianism was simplistically equated to the one between blind assertions and tested knowledge. In the Age of Enlightenment, the situation slightly improved, offering some chances to women scholars. In Italy, Laura Bassi (1711–1778 CE), an Italian physicist and the first woman academic in Europe to secure a doctoral degree in natural philosophy, was appointed as a professor in the University of Bologna, perhaps the first instance of its kind in history. Hailing from a very rich and influential family, she had inherited political power. Maria Gaetana Agnesi (1718–1799 CE) was the next Italian woman academic and a notable mathematician of significant contributions who became professor in the same university. As anywhere else, in France too, it was extremely difficult for a woman to be educated and be an academic of recognition because of the Page 20 of 39

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The Rise of Science patriarchal society that always opposed women’s education. Émilie du Châtelet (1706–1749 CE), a very brilliant physicist and mathematician, was the first woman academic to come up in France, in spite of social as well as familial oppositions. She was perhaps the first woman translator and commentator of Principia, which rendered Newton’s advanced mathematical tools and theorizations accessible to the larger community of learners in France. Her work is still celebrated as the most accurate and insightful French translation of Newton’s work. What she added to Newtonian mechanics, by way of her commentary and interpretation, was original like several of her articles, and remain lasting contributions to knowledge in mechanics. Her addition of new conservation law for total energy is an illustrious example.

(p.175) Science as a Construct What is this thing called science and what is science are not the same questions. One needs to be inevitably historical in answering the former, for the metaphor ‘thing’ demands a description of what it connotes, whereas it need not be so in the case of the latter that seeks only what the term denotes. Indeed, the denotation need not end up with the conceptual semantics of the term ‘science’ and be as brief as a small terminological definition. It can be as elaborate as a big philosophical discourse. Either way, its analysis ought not to be teleological. On the contrary, a description of what the metaphor ‘thing’ connotes has to start with the history of the ‘thing’ in itself. It would require us to narrate the historical making of the ‘thing’ called science, involving who started using the word ‘science’ as a term with what semantic difference, when and why, rather than presuming the birth of science as the most superior form of knowledge, the incarnation of the final truth at a particular point of time as a natural consequence of intellectual evolution. Such a presumption is fallacious, for it proceeds as if knowledge is a sentient entity with an autonomous course of its own evolution or as if there is a history of knowledge independent of human social history. It is true that knowledge advanced over many centuries from its beginnings in the ancient past through sustained engagements, questioning, systematic corrections, conscious rethinking, and well-thought-out improvements. Anthropologists describe this long historical process in a trajectory of transformation from magico-religious beliefs through metaphysical propositions to rational explanations with proofs.28 We have discussed at length in preceding chapters how knowledge advanced through innate inquisitiveness, new challenges, odd experiences, critical thinking, unprecedented necessities, (p. 176) and unexpected chances. A notable phase of systematic advancement of knowledge is that of the faculty for meta-cognition or critical self-reflexion, which made knowledge an object of critical analysis. This intellectual concern led to formulation of rules, measures, and parameters for the evaluation of knowledge and constitution of logical devices for establishing its reliability. As a result, it became possible to develop theories about knowledge and found a Page 21 of 39

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The Rise of Science separate field of knowledge about knowledge, namely epistemology.29 Advancement of knowledge involved new discoveries and inventions that naturally led to a steady expansion of experimentation and instrumentation, which in their turn went on adding further discoveries and inventions. Simultaneously, the faculty to construct mathematical formalism made remarkable growth, which accounted for the success in accessing the measurements of complex positions and multiple velocities of celestial objects. Thanks to this accomplished state of knowledge of the seventeenth century CE, the mysterious universe turned out into an amazing ensemble of numerous systems operating in perfect alignment with a large number of principles and laws. Nevertheless, that knowledge was not distinguished with the word ‘science.’ Originally, the English word ‘science’ came from old French, which adapted itself from the Latin scientia meaning knowledge in a very general sense. For several centuries, fundamental knowledge was called philosophy. Even when production of knowledge involved (p.177) the discovery of fundamental principles of nature, the word ‘science’ was not in use to distinguish that from other types of knowledge. Newtonian mechanics of the seventeenth century, which made knowledge remarkably different and revolutionary through discoveries of fundamental laws of the universe, was part of natural philosophy. It was only in the nineteenth century CE that the word ‘science’ became a technical term referring to a particular type of knowledge produced through systematic observations of specific facts, their analytical reasoning, and logical organization with proof. This distinct knowledge often comprised discoveries of laws and principles underlying natural phenomena. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the word ‘science’ became increasingly exclusive about knowledge of a particular type presupposing a definite epistemic distinction. Accordingly, the words ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ became conceptual terms denoting new meanings. William Whewell (1794–1866 CE), an Anglican priest and a Cambridge University philosopher of science, best known for his works in history and philosophy of science, was first to coin the word ‘scientist’.30 It is said that in 1834 he coined the term ‘scientist’ to replace the then prevailing terms such as ‘natural philosophers’ or ‘cultivators of science’ or ‘practitioners of science.’ As a result, his contemporary, the greatest experimentalist of the time, Michael Faraday (1791–1867 CE), an illustrious Anglican mathematician and electrochemist, whom Einstein had adored on par with Newton and Maxwell, was addressed as a scientist. It is to be noted that the word ‘scientific,’ denoting a distinct method, came in use only in the 1840s, thanks to Whewell. Interestingly Newton, celebrated in history as the first scientist, died without knowing that he was a scientist and that his method was scientific. Whewell identified inductive reasoning as the main epistemological trait of science and the procedures enabling induction as scientific methodology.31 According to him, Page 22 of 39

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The Rise of Science inductive (p.178) reasoning consisted of three procedural stages: selection of the fundamental idea or primary categories like number or quantity and cause, formation of the conception, and determination of magnitudes. Auguste Comte (1798–1857 CE), the French philosopher well known as the founder of positivism and perhaps the most obsessed among the followers of Newtonian mechanics, was the first to undertake an ambitious project of doing a detailed epistemological review of the extant knowledge systems. He published this as The Course on Positive Philosophy in six volumes during 1830–42, dealing with six systems of knowledge in the descending order from mathematics through astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology to social physics. Comte had felt the need for synthesizing contemporary knowledge into intelligible systems. Having studied the philosophy of these knowledge systems, he has earned the title of the first philosopher of science. His main goal was to try and do social physics with the rigour of Newton’s Principia, which he found too ambitious for his epoch that had witnessed the enunciation of mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry and biology, the relatively easy disciplines. Naturally, his methodology, known as positivistic, was quantitative analytical empiricism with the primacy of mathematical generalization. According to Comte, it was too early to venture upon tackling the physics of society, an extremely challenging field of complex variables, least amenable to quantification. This bewildering field of knowledge was sociology for him and he maintained that it would be the last knowledge field to become a science. He discerned a sequence in the rise of knowledge systems and an order in their coming into being as science. Moreover, he discovered a law that governed the process, which he illustrated through his theorization of the process into stages of intellectual growth. Comte viewed intellectual evolution as homologous to social evolution, presupposing the decisive link between growth of knowledge and its social matrix. Growth of knowledge in his schema shows a trajectory of three phases, which represent theology, metaphysics, and science in the descending order. Comte’s method is of enumerative induction based on the extant empirical experience tested and confirmed. Inspired by Newtonian mechanics, he insisted upon sustained analysis of the data as part of the rigorous search for universal laws of predictive ability. He called his philosophy as positivism that (p.179) was determined to produce knowledge methodologically strengthened enough to be unassailable by metaphysics. Compte’s Positive Philosophy, an elaborate framework of comprehension enabling discovery of scientific laws of predictability, as distinguished from Baconian empiricist induction, is the first grand theory inspired by Newtonian epistemic rigour. It makes an epistemological assessment of knowledge systems in order to grade them into the sequential order showing their evolution into science as a unique level of recognition of truth outside the empirical field and beyond pure logic. An epistemological review of knowledge forms in different fields, positivism became at once a philosophy of knowledge wherein both philosophy of science and Page 23 of 39

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The Rise of Science political philosophy converged. Comte’s analysis shows the epistemological position of science as a unique system of knowledge commanding the highest academic status, ranking, and universal acceptance. Several experimentalist physicists and mathematicians of the nineteenth century CE were known as scientists during their lifetime. James Clerk Maxwell (1831– 1879 CE), a Scottish mathematician-physicist who authored A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field (1865 CE), is remembered for his well-enunciated theories of electric and magnetic fields travelling through space as waves moving at the speed of light, explaining the causality of electromagnetic phenomena and electromagnetic radiation. The theories united electricity, magnetism, and light (the second great unification in physics) as manifestations of the same phenomenon, for the first time. Similarly, Rudolf Julius Emanuel Clausius (1822–1888 CE), a German physicist and mathematician, and William Thomson (1824–1907 CE), a Scotch-Irish physicist and mathematician, were the founders of the first and second laws of thermodynamics. Clausius was the first to discover the second law of thermodynamics way back in 1850 CE and formulate the concept of entropy after fifteen years. Thomson was the one who consolidated the laws of thermodynamics into a new knowledge area of applied physics. Science became symbolic of this hegemonic position, which accounted for the great interest of scholars in securing the status of science for their fields of knowledge. Naturally, different fields of knowledge got the term ‘science’ suffixed to their names. Social sciences or human sciences are the best examples. Science thus got constructed (p.180) as an academic and sociocultural package of authority, authenticity, certainty, finality, and universality, under the epistemological compulsion of a special type of knowledge that was an experimentally or analytically provable explanation stated as an all-inclusive abstraction of truth presupposing predictability. ‘Scientific’ was an extension or adjunct of this construct of the nineteenth century and, much more significantly, the procedure that made production of science epistemologically unassailable. This prefix ensuing from the construct called ‘science’ thus became established as an epistemologically loaded term signifying the power of academic legitimization. It enabled the recognition of what is subsequently called the scientific revolution in history.32 In due course, the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ with their technical semantics of epistemic distinction got entrenched. They became symbolic of rare academic authority, authenticity, credibility, and legitimacy. This symbolic power made the terms covetable for reasons of recognition, acceptance, and status. As a result, every academic tended to use them for legitimacy, and gradually, the terms began to be increasingly metaphorical and lexical rather than terminological. Even when the terms are used in their epistemic context, their historical context is often forgotten. Many use the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ very freely, as if they make sense across ages and places with respect to forms of knowledge and their Page 24 of 39

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The Rise of Science methods of production in different cultures.33 Actually, in the technical sense, expressions like Babylonian science, Greek science, Indian science, Chinese science, (p.181) Meso-American science, and so on are misnomers. Similarly, usages like ‘ancient science’ and ‘medieval science’ are anachronistic. Although the method as well as methodology of knowledge production, as discussed in earlier sections, had been evolving interconnectedly over centuries from observational support of inferences (Copernicus), further verified in the light of instrumentation (Tycho), and experiments enabling discovery of laws (Kepler), heading for theoretical generalization (Galileo), strengthened by mathematical rationality (Descartes) to theorization improved by differential equations for universal theorization (Newton). Nevertheless, the method acquired a distinct meaning of higher legitimacy in the nineteenth century CE with the term ‘scientific’ as prefix. This method, as a set of procedures consisting of systematic empirical observation, identification of measurable categories, analytical reasoning, constitution of inferences, and confirmation through experimentation or mathematical applications, deserved to be qualified as scientific. Similarly, methodology as the science of the selection, administration, and justification of the method deserved to be called scientific too. Methodology comprised the framework with which the phenomenon under investigation would be comprehended, new knowledge acquired, and its integration done. In fact, it would make the method scientific through its right selection and appropriate administration and enable the generation of reliable evidence to prove the theory or disprove it. Method and methodology differ according to variations in the nature of the problem of inquiry, but there are certain epistemic universals across them to determine what is scientific or unscientific.

Women Scientists Several women played a significant role in the production of new knowledge in astronomy and mathematics in the nineteenth century CE, who got recognition as scientists. Caroline Lucretia Herschel (1750–1848 CE), a German astronomer who lived in Britain serving as her astronomer brother William Herschel’s lifetime chief assistant, was the first woman to be paid for her academic service. She made remarkable contributions to astronomy by discovering several comets and revising the pre-existing star catalogue. It is after her name that the comet 35P is called Herschel-Rigollet. In honour of her contributions (p.182) to astronomy, the gold medal of the Royal Astronomical Society in 1828 CE and its honorary membership in 1835 CE were awarded to her. After three years, Herschel was conferred honorary membership of the Royal Irish Academy too. King Frederick William IV of Prussia presented her a gold medal on the occasion of Herschel’s ninety-sixth birthday in 1846 CE in honour of the lasting contributions that she made to astronomy. Similarly, King George III granted Herschel a pension in recognition of her merit in the same field.

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The Rise of Science Mary Fairfax Somerville (1780–1872 CE), a Scottish astronomer-mathematician, was the fellow recipient of honorary membership in the Royal Society of Astronomy along with Herschel in 1835 for the significant contributions made to knowledge. An advocate of women franchise, she was the first signatory in the mass petition organized by John Stuart Mill. On her death, the London Post hailed her as the ‘Queen of 19th century Science’. She was denied the opportunity to study in her homeland because she was a woman. Subsequently, on her return after acquiring a doctorate from Gottingen University in Germany, she was denied a job for political reasons. Nevertheless, a great scholar in mathematics, she got recognition later though, and became an elected full professor at the University of Stockholm in Sweden. This hardly meant the end of discrimination against women scientists. Ensuing from the socio-economic and politico-cultural system of patriarchal dominance, the practice continued for many years. Another illustrious woman who made a lasting imprint on learning was Sofya Vasilyevna Kovalevskaya (1850–1891 CE), the first Russian mathematician to take a doctorate in mathematics from a European university.

Grand Theories Capitalism in Western Europe, spread during the Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment, was the motor of the expansion of European empires.34 Productive forces began to acquire greater (p.183) improvement during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries CE. Technological responses to the need for better accumulation of surplus accounted for its growth and expansion through several inventions. Technological expansion in its turn accounted for higher productivity and greater surplus accumulation. It created the context for the dominance of humanistic and rationalistic thoughts, which flourished over a couple of centuries coping up with the capitalistic expansion. Just as experimental knowledge production and its technological application owed their growth to the economic pressure in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries CE, the economy owed its growth in the mid-nineteenth century CE to the new technology of agricultural and industrial production. Unlike often made out, this mutually dependent process was simultaneous rather than sequential. As a natural course under the market pressure, the process expanded from the realm of subsistence to that of survival. Medical sciences and allied technology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries CE acquired a revolutionary dimension through the discovery of the germinal causality of illnesses and the invention of preventive vaccines in the nineteenth century CE exemplified the process. Growth of experimental knowledge production about natural phenomena, discovery of laws that rule the physical world, enhancement of human control over nature, derivation of postulates, prescriptions of norms for action, development of abstract speculative thoughts, and the formation of the capitalist society are all interdependent. Science and technology in Western Europe provided the capitalist economy its forces of production, and the speculative grand theory generated its ideological reinforcement. Production of scientific Page 26 of 39

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The Rise of Science knowledge and material culture are coeval to each other. Changes in the technology necessitated changes in the social relations of production; the nature of surplus expropriation and the level of surplus accumulation determined the structure of the social organization as well as the character of the juridicopolitical system; and all this influenced speculative theorization. Having the scientific method firmly entrenched as the authentic means of production of knowledge and the fundamental nature of the Enlightenment classics widely acclaimed, the nineteenth century witnessed the ascendency of grand theories based on systematic reduction of empirical observations into abstract speculative (p.184) thoughts of induction.35 It is an unprecedentedly sharp empirical observation highly responsive to deeper reality, which characterized grand theorization. In short, grand theories were engendered by the same political economy of the scientific and technological advancement, which created the industrial revolution and transformed the barons into the bourgeoisie class. Isaac Newton presented the first major well-formulated grand theory in macromechanics, as articulated through mathematical formalism, developed out of experimental data, which was at once both method and paradigm for the Age of Enlightenment or Reason. However, in human science, the first grand theory was a critique of Newtonian mechanics. This theory belonging to the beginnings of the nineteenth century saw Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind that presented a historical ontology of the evolution of consciousness from the primordial through a series of sequential stages to the highest, namely the all-inclusive rational consciousness that understands ‘idea’, the zeitgeist. Hegel philosophizes the development of consciousness from the sensory to the level of the Kantian transcendental deductive reasoning through the long process of aeons witnessing different forms of consciousness as part of the dialectical dynamic of idea. According to him, these forms of consciousness resulting from the dialectics of idea are reflected in every developmental manifestation of human civilization, namely, the family, the civil society, and the state anticipating its world model in the ascending order. This inscrutably hidden dialectical process leading to the higher and higher manifestation of idea is what Hegel calls the philosophy of history. His speculative thought goes into deeper philosophical questions about logic, the universal, the particular, the individual, the being, the essence, the concept, the abstract right, the morality, the ethical life, the family, the civil society, and the state as well as generating new knowledge in the domain. What he consistently maintains all along is that changes in knowledge (p.185) and its institutional forms happen as a result of the dialectics of idea. Hegel had been a major influence throughout Europe in the nineteenth century CE, inspiring many eminent philosophers like Ludwig Feuerbach, Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels. The Origin of Species of Charles Darwin (1809–1882 CE) enunciated the next grand theory of the nineteenth century CE, providing an all-encompassing framework of comprehension for explicating the biosphere as a theatre of Page 27 of 39

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The Rise of Science evolution by means of natural selection or preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. This theory of biological evolution was known over a century ago as rendered by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829 CE). He had subscribed to the view that animals changed their behaviour according to environmental pressure but theorized that the characteristics thus acquired could be passed on to their offspring. An explanation of the emergence of new biological structures as part of evolution, Lamarck’s theory contained the revolutionary insight that Charles Darwin carried forward. John Herschel, Charles Lyell, and William Whewell were others who influenced Darwin. Thomas Malthus, who propounded the theory of competitive struggle for survival, had tremendously influenced him too. Taking the cue from Malthus, Darwin’s first epistemic shift from Lamarckian proposition was the theorization that the population would grow if all offspring in every species survived to reproduce, and that despite periodic fluctuations, population size would remain roughly the same. He states at the end of the introduction of his classic work his thesis in a nutshell: Although much remains obscure, and will long remain obscure, I can entertain no doubt, after the most deliberate study and dispassionate judgement of which I am capable, that the view which most naturalists entertain, and which I formerly entertained—namely, that each species has been independently created—is erroneous. I am fully convinced that species are not immutable; but that those belonging to what are called the same genera are lineal descendants of some other and generally extinct species, in the same manner as the acknowledged varieties of any one species are the descendants of that species. Furthermore, I am convinced that Natural Selection has been the main but not exclusive means of modification.36 (p.186) He theorized that a struggle for survival ensued since resources such as food were limited and relatively stable over time. This is elaborated further in his theory that individuals less suited to the environment are less likely to survive and less likely to reproduce; individuals more suited to the environment are more likely to survive and more likely to reproduce and leave their heritable traits to future generations, which produces the process of natural selection. He inferred that this slow process resulted in populations changing to adapt to their environments, and ultimately, variations accumulated over time, resulting in the origins of new species. Darwin’s thesis was appropriated by many conservatives for justifying their selfinterest as inevitable for social progress. Imperialists misused the theory of the survival of the fittest to justify aggressive competition for resources on the earth, colonization, and subjection of the weak. It inspired Eurocentrism and gave rise to the myth of racial hierarchy. Nazis found Darwinism helpful to fabricate their theory of racial superiority and develop the praxis of extermination of Jews for the preservation of the German racial purity. The Page 28 of 39

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The Rise of Science scientific re-reading of Darwin has engendered production of new knowledge in the form of specialized theories about the complex phenomenon of evolution, expressed as the ‘synergism hypothesis’. It has enabled a successful restoration of the holistic perspective of Darwinian evolutionary biology, namely ‘holistic Darwinism’ (Peter Corning) representing evolution as a multilevel process and the interdependent co-evolution as an omnipresent phenomenon in nature. Scientists have resuscitated Darwin’s group selection theory that was discarded for several decades. A grand theory that really shook the world during the nineteenth century was historical materialism or dialectical materialism of Karl Marx (1818–1883), who said that philosophers had tried to interpret the world, but the point was to change it. His grand theory literally did it through its revolutionary praxis intervention. Marx’s theory interpreted human history as a history of changing means, forces, and relations of material production for subsistence and survival, which manifested as certain modes of production in a sequential order through class struggle, culminating in communism. It is in The German Ideology that Marx outlines his theory of history in its original form, which he sustains all along with added clarity and (p.187) cohesion.37 In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels put up the framework of historical materialism as distinguished from the Hegelian idealism that was dominant in contemporary German thought. Material conditions of human existence, which is the aggregate of means of production, forces of production in operation, the ensuing relations of production, the pattern of distribution stabilizing the structure of power relations, and the reinforcing culture; constitute the history. They maintain that the forces of production become increasingly powerful across modes of production determining the structure of the economy as well as the juridicopolitical superstructure. When the relations of production lose development compatibility with the forces of production, the economic base goes into a stasis and encounters a crisis of production at the point of absolute use incompatibility between the two. An epochal revolution sets in then, dissolving the mode of production into another. Marx rendered his theory of historical materialism in a popular format in The Communist Manifesto when the Communist League in its annual meeting of 1847 resolved to require from him a political manual of revolutionary praxis.38 The theory of mode of production is the core of his historical dialectical materialism. History is viewed as the long developmental evolutionary process of the formation and transformation continuum from the primitive through feudal to capitalist modes of production. A mode of production is a self-recreating, perpetuating techno-economic, juridico-political, and cultural aggregate that Marx termed as gesellschaftsformen (social formation) till the maximization of its productivity. It articulates its conditions of existence and expansion by structuring the circuit of distribution and pattern of consumption. He uses the architectural analogy of the base and superstructure to illustrate a mode of Page 29 of 39

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The Rise of Science production as consisting of (p.188) its economic base, juridico-political superstructure, and ideological superstructure. In his preface to Critique of Political Economy (1859 CE), he summarizes the process the following famous oft-quoted passage: In the social production of their means of existence, men enter into definite, necessary relations which are independent of their will, productive relationships which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The aggregate of those productive relationships constitute the economic structure of the society, the real basis on which a juridical and political superstructure arises and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of the material means of existence conditions the whole process of social, political and intellectual life.… An aggregate of human beings constitutes a society when, and only when, the people are in some way related. The essential relation is not kinship, but much wider; namely, that developed through production and mutual exchange of commodities. The particular society is characterised by what it regards as necessary; who gathers or produces the things, by what implements; who lives of the production of others, and by what right, divine or legal—cults and laws are social by-products; who owns the tools, the land, sometimes the body and soul of the producer; who controls the disposal of the surplus, and regulates quantity and form of the supply. Society is held together by bonds of production.39 Marx’s primary objective was to study the origins of capitalism and his theory of history was its grand framework of comprehension. His Das Capital in three volumes (volume I was published in 1859, volume II in 1867, and volume III posthumously in 1894) provides a detailed analysis of the beginnings, features, and dynamic of the capitalist mode of production. However, the locus classicus of his theoretical exposition is in the first volume of Capital and it embodies the grand theory; it was written originally as Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy much before. (p.189) With regard to religion, Marx fully accepts Ludwig Feuerbach’s thesis that belief in God distracted people from their power to act but theorizes it by explaining as to why people fall into religious alienation and how they can get out of it. Feuerbach’s view of religious belief as a misunderstanding that can be easily corrected through persuasion is incomplete to Marx for whom religion is a response to alienation in material life, which will remain until the alienation ends. Alienated labour and impaired communal existence are central to alienation in material life. Impaired through a differentiated economy, the religion provides the false consciousness to believe that all are equal in the eyes of God. Later when the renaissance criticality exposes the truth about it, the Page 30 of 39

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The Rise of Science state creates the illusion that all are citizens equal in the eyes of law. Marx, explaining this, identifies here the need for ending alienation in the material conditions of existence by restoring the community of socio-economic equals liberated from religion and the state. It is in Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts that Marx goes deep into the question of alienated labour that is central to his grand theory. He explains the four levels of alienation that the working class suffers under capitalism, namely, alienation of the labour by turning labour into a mechanical process, alienation of the product by taking it away from the producer, alienation of the humanness by subjecting the humans into mere tools, and alienation of the social being by treating the labourers as a low category outside the society. Marx explains how labour generates surplus value and converts money into capital that advances through reinvestment, enabling capitalism. A labourer freed from social systemic obligation is subjected to labour for the maximum time with the wage of the minimum time, which is the reward for the labour necessary as the means of subsistence. Here the major part of the labour remains unpaid and the value generated thereby becomes unpaid surplus or profit that has high reinvestment potential. Marx was the first philosopher to theorize the mechanism of surplus value as the basis of profit and prove labour power as variable capital for its being the only commodity capable of adding more value to other commodities or the constant capital incapable of generating no additional value. This truth about the surplus value is hushed up through the market situation and commoditization of the social product, the phenomenon that Marx theorizes as ‘commodity fetishism.’ (p.190) ‘Commodity fetishism’, conceived by Marx, relates to the postulation of a commodity as an object with an economic ‘life of its own’, independent of the volition and initiative of the worker who produced it. According to Marx, it is a clever misrepresentation of the social relationships involved in production (the relation between who makes what, who works for whom, the production-time for a commodity), the relationships among people, as economic relationships in trade and market—the relationships between the seller and buyer, between the cost and price, and between money and capital. In short, ‘commodity fetishism’ masks (obscures) the true economic character of the human relations of production, between the worker and the capitalist. Actually, in the economics of markets, there is no relation between the social products—the products of labour—and the commodities appearing as priced objects for exchange involving a series of material relations. It is a strategic concealing of truth about goods as products by people through relations among them and its dehumanized presentation as commodities as if self-born in the markets with an altogether different set of consumer relations. Marx calls this ‘the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities’.40 Page 31 of 39

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The Rise of Science Marx criticized contemporary political economists’ concept of the ‘natural equilibria’ of markets, for its assumption that the price (value) of a commodity was independent of the volition and initiative of the capitalist producers, buyers, and sellers of commodities. Economists conceive the market as an independent, sentient entity, and market exchange as part of a series of self-driven material processes at work, without any human influence. What becomes interesting is the uncritical acceptance of this inversion by the people as something quite natural. It goes too deep into everyone to recognize the contradiction. Georg Lukács said: ‘Just as the capitalist system continuously produces and reproduces itself economically on higher levels, (p.191) the structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more fatefully, and more definitively into the consciousness of Man.’41 As capitalism advanced, it began to be too natural to be seen analytically and critically. Further, the entire corpus of theoretical knowledge produced in the domain of neo-classical development economics made the commodity and market more real than society itself. Such a situation of dehumanized knowledge enjoying intellectual hegemony precluded the possibility of retrieving truth about human relations and social processes out of the ideological veil. Though thinkers like Robert Owen, St Simon, Charles Fourier, and a few others had already explained social inequality as materialistically determined, they had no strategy to change the contradictory material conditions, rather than dreaming about equality. Marx responded to the predicament through his postulate that the proletariat would secure power to emancipate them first and then to create conditions for realizing the community of equals. Nevertheless, Marx in his theory of dialectical materialism hardly attributes any significant role of human agency by way of conscious intervention in the transformation, other than the one comparable to what a midwife in a natural delivery. As he observes in his Critique: ‘A social system never perishes before all the productive forces have developed for which it is wide enough; and, new, higher productive forces never come into being before the material conditions for their existence have been brought to maturity within the womb of the old society itself.’42 Marx, however, overlooks this in advocating a working-class revolutionary praxis in the case of capitalism that was only at its infancy during his times. In the Communist Manifesto, he joins Engels to say: ‘The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a (p.192) Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.’43

Breakthroughs in Science and Technology Nineteenth century witnessed a series of discoveries and inventions as breakthroughs in survival strategies, health security, material production, transport, and communication. An exhaustive enlisting of them is neither possible nor relevant here. Nevertheless, a mention of the explosion of Page 32 of 39

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The Rise of Science knowledge, which revolutionized science and technology, is quite pertinent. In medicine and biology, the growth of germ science and invention of germicide were the major advances. Edward Jenner (1749–1823), an English physician and scientist pioneered the invention of vaccination against smallpox virus in 1796. Similarly, Louis Pasteur (1822–1895) invented vaccination against rabies virus. Another much wanted invention was of surgical anesthetic. In 1846 William T.G. Morton (1819–1868), an American dentist; and John Collins Warren (1778–1856), an American surgeon, proved the use of ether gas inhalation as a safe and effective anesthetic. Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen (1845–1923), a German mechanical engineer cum physicist, revolutionized medical treatment through his discovery of electromagnetic radiation of X-rays and its use in photographing the bone. In chemistry, theorization of the atom by John Dalton (1766–1844) and the construction of the periodic table of elements by Dmitri Mendeleev (1834–1907) brought forth giant leaps in the progress of knowledge. Likewise in physics, theoretical discoveries of Michael Faraday (1791–1867), Andre-Marie Ampere (1775–1836), and James Clerk Maxwell (1831–1879) led to the understanding of new phenomena like electromagnetism. Another major advancement in physics was the discovery of the laws of thermodynamics, which revolutionized the science and technology of heat and energy. Both chemistry and physics took a new turn through discoveries of the constitution of matter and the structure of the atom. In mathematics, the use of (p.193) complex numbers and the subsequent formulation of analytical theory by Karl Weierstrass (1815–1897) enabled comprehension of real and complex variables in terms of their functions. Advances in electrical science revolutionized physics and the entailing new technology. Thomas Alva Edison (1847–1931), an American electrical engineer and physicist, literally illuminated the world. Marie Skłodowska Curie (1867– 1934), a Polish physicist and chemist discovered two unknown elements called polonium and radium. Her invention of the techniques of isolating radioactive isotopes, and discovery of the theory of radiation exerted far-reaching impact in physics, chemistry, and medicine.

Summing Up Knowledge production in natural philosophy from sensory perception, observation, logical reasoning, and metaphysical ideation to radical empirical, sceptical, experimental, and mathematical methods of reasoning as well as confirmation reached amazing heights in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries CE. This glorious period in the history of knowledge was identified and hailed as the age of scientific revolution in the nineteenth century CE that constructed and coined the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ for a distinct sense of authenticity and source of legitimacy. It was the nineteenth century CE that discovered Isaac Newton’s Principia to have served as the hegemonic method and model for producing and structuring reliable knowledge throughout the Age of Enlightenment or the Age of Reason. It was the age that produced Karl Marx’s Page 33 of 39

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The Rise of Science Capital as the hegemonic method and model for producing and structuring reliable knowledge throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries CE. The age immortalized both Newton and Marx, the former for making history in science and the latter for making science in history. Marx was a great admirer of science and scientific method, which Newton had enunciated in the seventeenth century CE. His method was Newtonian mathematical induction. Marx’s premises are empirically grounded, rather than arbitrary, but based on them, theories can be abstracted only by way of speculation. What Marx produced as theoretical knowledge was not the empirically given as in the case of Newtonian science, but analytically discovered as causality, (p.194) correlations, and laws out of verifiable empirical situations. Just as what Newton did in physical science, Marx discovered the social reality of inherently mutable systems, in which changes happened as part of the dynamic of internal contradictions and conflicts. One can see the same Newtonian kind of regularity in Marx’s formulation of causality. As Marx aspired, his philosophy literally changed the world. His impact on knowledge production has been astoundingly deep and amazingly extensive, almost on par with that of Newton’s. Notes:

(1) See A.C. Crombie. 1971. Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100–1700. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (2) See J.W. Dreyer. 1906. A History of the Planetary Systems from Thales to Kepler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Second edition (1953), A History of Astronomy from Thales to Kepler. New York: Dover. (3) Lawrence Conrad et al. 1995. The Western Medical Tradition: 800 BC To AD 1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also, see M. Lindemann. 2010. Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; L.M. Principe. 2013. The Secrets of Alchemy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. (4) For relevant discussions, see R. French and A. Cunningham. 1996. Before Science: The Invention of the Friars’ Natural Philosophy. Aldershot: Scholar Press. (5) See R. Frank. 1980. Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists: Scientific Ideas and Social Interaction. Berkeley: University of California Press; R. French. 1994. William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also, see A.C. Crombie. 1953. Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100–1700. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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The Rise of Science (6) For details, see R. Popkin. 1960. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes. Assen: Van Gorcum (Revised edition); Second edition. 1979. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza. Berkeley: University of California Press; Third edition. 2003. The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle. Oxford: Oxford University Press; M. Steup. 2005. ‘Knowledge and Scepticism’, in P. Sosa and M. Steup (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 1–13. (7) For a discussion of epistemology, see A. Rand. 1979. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. New York: Meridian. Also, see L.P. Pojman. 2002. Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Boston: Gengage Learning (Third edition). (8) For a detailed study, see P. Rossi. 1968. Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science. London: RKP, pp. 15–20. Also, see S. Gaukroger. 2001. Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (9) What Pierre Bourdieu developed in recent years as the thesis of biases in his reflexive methodology is essentially a re-articulation of the Baconian theory of Idols. For details, see P. Bourdieu and Loic J.D. Wacquant. 1992. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (10) See J. Spedding, R.L. Ellis, and D.D. Heath (eds). 1901. The Works of Francis Bacon, Vol. IV. London: Longmans & Co. (Reprint), p. 51. (11) See Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, The Works of Francis Bacon, p. 69. (12) For details, see C. Webster. 1975. The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine, and Reform 1626–1660. London: Duckworth. (13) See A. Wolf. 1925. Essentials of Scientific Method. London: Allen & Unwin; Second edition 1928. Also, see C. Singer (ed.). 1917–21. Studies in the History and Method of Science, 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917–21; Second edition, 1955. Also, see N.R. Hanson. 1958. Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (14) For details, see F.H. Anderson. 1948. The Philosophy of Francis Bacon. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Also, see B. Farrington. 1964. The Philosophy of Francis Bacon. Chicago: Chicago University Press; Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy. Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science; P. Urbach. 1987. Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science: An Account and a Reappraisal. Illinois: La Salle.

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The Rise of Science (15) See H. Jonas. 1984. The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of Ethics for the Technological Age, trans. David Herr, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Also, see A. Pérez-Ramos. 1988. Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (16) The technology of making lenses had become fairly well developed by the end of the sixteenth century CE for Galileo to design and use them in his highpowered telescopes. For a detailed study, see Vincent Ilardi. 2007. Renaissance Vision from Spectacles to Telescopes. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, pp. 137–8, 203–4, 213–14, and 218–19. (17) See F. Watson. 2006. Stargazer: The Life and Times of the Telescope. Cambridge: Da Capo Press (New edition), p. 134. (18) See F. Manuel. 1968. A Portrait of Isaac Newton. Cambridge: Belknapp Press. (19) The discovery of calculus is often disputed between Leibniz and Newton. It is a matter of worldwide recognition now that the concept of infinity and knowledge of power series go back to Sangamagrama Mādhava of the fourteenth century CE, as already discussed in Chapter 3. Since it is Leibniz who had published his notation and differential method after Mādhava, the power series in the initial phase of calculus has been referred to these days as Mādhava-Leibniz series. Recent studies show that the first book on calculus was Jyēṣṭadēva’s Yuktibhāṣa (sixteenth century CE). See P.P. Divakaran. 2010. ‘Notes on Yuktibhāṣa: Recursive Methods in Indian Mathematics’, in C.S. Seshadri (ed.), Studies in the History of Indian Mathematics. New Delhi: Hindustan Book Agency, pp. 287–351. For a detailed history, see G.G. Joseph. 2009. A Passage to Infinity: Medieval Indian Mathematics from Kerala and its Impact. New Delhi: SAGE Publications. Also C.T. Rajagopal and A. Venkataraman. 1949. ‘The Sine and Cosine Power Series in Hindu Mathematics’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 15(1–2). Calcutta, pp. 1–13. C.K. Raju. 2001. ‘Computers, Mathematics Education, and the Alternative Epistemology of the Calculus in the Yuktibhāṣa’, in Philosophy East and West, 51(3). Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 325–61. (20) For a relevant discussion of the history of chemistry, see J.R. Partington. 1935. Origins and Developments of Applied Chemistry. London: Longmans. (21) For a detailed study of the Newtonian influence on Kant, see Michael Friedman. 2013. Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (22) This call is what Immanuel Kant identified as the motto of the Age of Reason. See his ‘What is meant by Enlightenment?’ in Mary J. Gregor (trans. and

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The Rise of Science ed.), Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996: pp. 11–22. (23) See Michel Delon (ed.). 1997. Encyclopaedia of the Enlightenment, Vol. I. London and New York: Routledge, p. 16. (24) Bernard de Fontenelle called the eighteenth century as ‘the Age of Academies.’ See the discussion in R. Porter (ed.). 2003. The Cambridge History of Science, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 90. (25) See P.H. Nidditch (ed.). 1978. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Second edition). (26) For a critical appraisal of his economic theories, see J.A. Schumpeter. 1954. A History of Economic Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 179–86. (27) For a detailed discussion of the question in several scholarly articles, see M.J. Petry (ed.). Hegel and Newtonianism. Dordrecht & London: Springer. (28) See discussion in J.G. Frazer. 1933. Condorcet on the Progress of the Human Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. He discusses the transition of knowledge from magical beliefs to religious doctrines before it became science. Also, see B. Malinowski. 1948. Magic, Science and Religion, and Other Essays. Glencoe: Free Press, pp. 1–17. According to him, knowledge advanced through abstract thinking that gave rise to symbolic logic, geometry, and allied branches of mathematics in ancient Greece, India, Arabia, and other centres of civilizations. (29) Several scholars have tried to see the connection between Puritanism and science. See discussions in H.F. Kearney, ‘Puritanism, Capitalism and the Scientific Revolution,’ in C. Webster (ed.). 1974. The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 218–42. Also, see his ‘Puritanism and Science: Problems of Definitions’, in C. Webster (ed.), The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 254–61; C. Hill. 1974. ‘Puritanism, Capitalism and the Scientific Revolution’, in C. Webster (ed.). 1974. The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 243–53. T.K. Rabb. 1974. ‘Religion and the Rise of Modern Science’, in C. Webster (ed.). 1974. The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 262–79. Also, see his ‘Science, Religion and Society in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, in C. Webster (ed.). 1974. The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 284–5. (30) See W. Whewell. 1837. History of the Inductive Sciences. London: John W. Parker Strand; and W. Whewell. 1840. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon Their History. London: Harrison Co., Printers, St. Martin’s Lann. Page 37 of 39

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The Rise of Science For a detailed discussion, see M. Fisch. 1991. William Whewell: Philosopher of Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (31) See Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences. (32) For a detailed illustration, see J.O. Lindsay. 1951. The History of Science: Origins and Results of the Scientific Revolution. London: Scientific Book Club. Also, see A.R. Hall. 1954. The Scientific Revolution, 1500–1800. London: Longmans; Second edition, 1983. The Revolution in Science, 1500–1750. London: Longman; J.O. Lindsay. 1963. From Galileo to Newton, 1630–1720. London: Collins; F. Cohen. 1994. The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry. London: University of Chicago Press. (33) See L. Zhmud. 2006. The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. Also see A. Crombie. 1952. Augustine to Galileo: The History of Science A.D. 400–1650. London: Falcon; A.C. Crombie (ed.). 1963. Scientific Change: Historical Studies in the Intellectual, Social and Technical Conditions for Scientific Discovery and Technical Invention, from Antiquity to the Present. New York: Basic Books. (34) For studies in the relation between economic growth and science, see A.E. Musson (ed.). 1972. Science, Technology and Economic Growth in the Eighteenth Century. London: Methuen. (35) ‘Grand theory’ was first coined by C.W. Mills to mean a highly abstract framework of comprehension for understanding the social world. See his Sociological Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press (1976). The expression is used here to distinguish a totalizing theory that has the dimension of an epistemology by itself from small theories explaining the niceties and nuances of natural or social phenomena. (36) See C. Darwin. [1859]1926. The Origin of Species. London: John Murray, p. 2. (37) See K. Marx and Friedrich Engels. [1845] 1968. The German Ideology. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Also, see the discussion in G.A. Cohen. 1978. Karl Marx’s Theory of History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. x. For specialized study, see G. Browning. 1993. ‘The German Ideology: The Theory of History and the History of Theory’ History of Political Thought, 14(3), pp. 455– 73. (38) See K. Marx and Friedrich Engels. [1848] 1969. The Communist Manifesto, in Marx/Engels Selected Works, Vol. One. Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 98– 137. (39) See K. Marx. [1859]1993. A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy. Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 51. Page 38 of 39

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The Rise of Science (40) K. Marx. [1859]1993. A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy. Moscow: Progress Publishers. See the passages in K. Marx. 1964. Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, trans. T.B. Bottomore. London: McGraw-Hill, pp. 175–6. Also, see Capital, Vol. I, first published in 1867. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1996, pp. 456–7. (41) See George Lukács. 1967. ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, in History and Class Consciousness. London: Merlin Press, pp. 167– 91. (42) See Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 52. See the quote reproduced in E. Burns (ed.). 1970. A Handbook of Marxism. New York: Haskel House Publishers Ltd, p. 372. (43) Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Chapter IV, the concluding sentences. See the full text in Marx/Engels Selected Works, Vol. 1. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, pp. 98–137.

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Science of Uncertainty

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

Science of Uncertainty Rajan Gurukkal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199490363.003.0006

Abstract and Keywords This chapter virtually illuminates the invisible universe of subatomic dynamics through mathematical formalism and probability theory rather than empiricism based on instrumentation. A series of strange discoveries go into the making of the New Science and a discussion of the process constitutes the core of this chapter. Max Planck’s proposition of the Quanta, Niels Bohr’s discovery of objects’ non-observable and immeasurable complementary properties, Erwin Schrodinger’s interpretation of the object-subject split as a figment of imagination, Werner Karl Heisenberg’s enunciation of the Uncertainty Principle precluding the possibility of precision about certain pairs of physical properties of a particle, Kurt Friedrich Godel’s thesis of Undecidability based on his incompleteness theorems demonstrating certain inherent limits of provability about formal axiomatic theories, Murray Gell-Mann’s theory of Complexity in particle physics, Richard Feynman’s thesis on quantum mechanics, and Einstein’s theories of relativity, literally shook Newtonian physics of certainty with problems of uncertainty and subjectivity. At the end, the chapter makes a review of speculative thoughts and imagination about the dynamics of subatomic micro-universe as well as the mechanics of the galactic macro-universe. Keywords:   relativity, uncertainty, complexity, undecidability, subjectivity, new science, constructivism, incompleteness, quantum mechanics

Advancement of the industrial economy through colonialism and nationalism towards its higher phase led nations into battles for control over natural resources and markets. This induced science and technology, the capitalist productive forces, to render battles more effective, which accounts for several Page 1 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty scientific discoveries and technological inventions of destructive power. In the process, the economy grew up in West European and North American countries, turning their states imperialistic and their conflicts into the World War. A significant manifestation was in the form of a series of technological innovations and scientific discoveries, which enhanced knowledge about both the visible universe of celestial bodies and the invisible universe of particles. It was primarily the Newtonian methodology that guided them in the early decades of the twentieth century CE. As an adjunct to the development of technology and science, there were attempts at nuancing the logic of theorization and posing auxiliary questions to scientific theories of absolute induction. Though after Thomas Bayes, there had been hardly any new ground to break in the method of confirmation with regard to a scientific theory, there were other compulsions to sharpen logical positivism. A critical reappraisal of the science of certainty, which had held sway over intellectual minds for three centuries, was in progress on its own as well. This chapter seeks to do a concise review of the features, dynamics, (p.196) and processes of knowledge production during the period, involving technological inventions, scientific discoveries, and renewed logical thoughts, which jointly went into the making of ‘new science’.

Emergence of New Science An exhaustive listing of inventions and discoveries of the twentieth century CE is beyond the scope of this discussion. Only those that had revolutionized the production of new science alone have relevance to the context. Max Karl Ernst Ludwig Planck (1858–1947 CE), a great German scientist of thermodynamics who made fundamental contributions to theoretical physics and laid the foundation of quantum mechanics that brought about a paradigm shift in the micro-dynamic of atomic and subatomic structures, deserves to be mentioned first, both for the chronology and the discovery.1 He made his path-breaking discovery of quanta in 1900 CE, which anticipated the making of what is known as ‘new science’. Another major breakthrough was made by Albert Einstein (1879–1955 CE), who way back in 1905 CE resolved several auxiliary questions, thrown up against Newtonian mechanics, through a set of new mathematical equations ensuing from his special theory of relativity. Einstein’s relativity theory, the concept of space-time, and new mathematical proofs led to a new turn in physics. According to him, science, the principle out there independent of the scientist, is indeed discovery, but inevitably beyond mere ordering of the empirically given. Einstein’s theory of relativity, both the general and special, as theorization of the principle of the constancy of light’s velocity, exemplifies this best. His methodology, distinct for constructive theorization resulting from discoveries of principles through mathematical analysis of observations, is that of reasoning beyond kinematics.2 This methodological perception of theorization together with the new heuristics anticipated what subsequently became famous as ‘new science’. (p.197)

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Science of Uncertainty Inventions and discoveries went hand in hand, revolutionizing production of knowledge regarding the micro- as well as macro-universes simultaneously. Sometimes technological invention followed discoveries and, at other times, vice versa. Way back in 1913 CE, much before the invention of the transmission electron microscope in 1931 CE by Ernest Ruska (1906–1988 CE) and an advanced version of it by Max Knoll (1897–1969 CE) in 1935 CE, Niels Bohr (1885–1962 CE) and Ernest Rutherford (1871–1937 CE) had discovered the structure of the atom. This major discovery opened up a new domain of physics wherein the mechanics of particles did matter. Similarly, as early as in 1927 CE, Werner Heisenberg (1901–1976 CE) enunciated his uncertainty principle, proving the impossibility of determining the position and velocity of a subatomic particle. In 1932 CE, James Chadwick (1891–1974 CE) theorized the structure of the atom with a nucleus at its centre consisting of protons and neutrons. Soon Ernest Lawrence (1901–1958 CE) discovered the cyclotron, enabling theorization of micro-mechanics based on studies in the acceleration of atomic particles. In a couple of years, Enrico Fermi (1901–1954 CE) designed the first controlled nuclear reactor, earning the title ‘the architect of the Nuclear Age’. All these contributions, illuminating the yet invisible universe of subatomic dynamics, were made through research based on applications of the probability theory and mathematical speculations, rather than instrumentation. Nevertheless, the explosion of knowledge about the macro-universe was triggered by certain major inventions in technology, which indispensably relied upon instrumentation. For instance, Edwin Powell Hubble (1889–1953 CE) owed his discovery of a new galaxy to the Hooker telescope, the world’s largest (2.5 m) of the time, invented in 1917 CE, opening a fresh window to the macrouniverse. Georges Lemaître (1894–1966 CE), through his theory of the big bang speculating the physics of the origins of the universe, revolutionized the knowledge about the unending space. Hubble extended the big bang theory to explain the expansion of the universe.

Historiography of Science History and philosophy of science, as an epistemological assessment of the growth of scientific knowledge through discoveries and (p.198) inventions, was well known to nineteenth-century polymaths who were both scientists and philosophers. Several of them were keenly interested in the nature of knowledge generated in science and were seriously engaged in philosophical discussions of confirmation and reliability of the theory. William Whevell is the best example of an accomplished philosopher scientist of the period who had bothered to study the growth of science and assess the logical structure of theoretical knowledge therein, as discussed in the previous chapter. Whevell’s method of comprehending theoretical discoveries in science and assessing their epistemological status was continued by philosopher scientists such as Ernst Mach (1838–1916 CE), Pierre Henri Poincaré (1854–1912 CE), and Page 3 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty Pierre Duhem (1861–1916 CE) during the turn of the twentieth century. They made insightful epistemological observations of the rare scientific discoveries and technological inventions made by their contemporaries. Ernst Mach was fascinated by the theory embedded and practice explicit in mechanics, which accounts for his studies in the history and philosophy of science and technology.3 Poincaré, a mathematician and astrophysicist himself, who had made several significant discoveries in his fields as pointed out elsewhere, was a philosopher of science too. His epistemological appraisal of contemporary scientific theories and their rare efficiency in solving problems of laws in Newtonian mechanics is distinct for its intellectual depth.4 Pierre Duhem, a French physicist distinguished for his insightful theories in statistical thermodynamics, was a great scholar in history and philosophy of science as well. He, along with Willard Van Orman Quine, developed the thesis famous as Duhem-Quine thesis, (p.199) establishing that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation, for any empirical tests of a hypothesis in science require one or more auxiliary assumptions. Perhaps Duhem’s fivevolume history of science, Le système du monde: Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, covering all the intellectual achievements from classical times with Plato down to the beginnings of Renaissance perception of Copernicus, was the first major attempt at a voluminous history of science.5 Never to be mere compendia of discoveries and inventions in their order of chronological sequence, his volumes make a systematic examination of the logical texture of doctrines and a comprehensive philosophical interpretation of their cosmology. He discerns two parallel streams in the course of history of science: one of theories in succession involving replacement of the old by the new and the other of better conceptualization of the universe through mathematical confirmation. First, he describes the logical empirical aspect of both and then explains how they resolve problems in physics. His analytical study of the history of science had convinced him of the persistence of the classical tradition of discoveries and inventions through the medieval times to the Renaissance. He was one of the few historians of science who wrote extensively in recognition of the medieval Catholic scholars’ contribution to mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, and philosophy. Examining the epistemology of theories in physics and speculating their higher levels in metaphysics, he builds his philosophy of science.6 Edwin Burtt (1892–1989 CE), an American philosopher of religion, was fascinated by the predominant role of religion that he discerned in the history of scientific progress. He contemplated the history of (p.200) scientific discoveries as a process under the influence of one religious world view that would be epochal. According to him, even hard-core physical knowledge would not escape this influence, and therefore, any scientific theories would be structures built on a strong metaphysical foundation.7 He views scientists as philosophers who express the world view of their times. Exemplifying Newton, Page 4 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty Burtt argues that the scientist as a philosopher is engaged in the metaphysical preparation of the society against the fast advancing mathematical reasoning. In the initial decades of the twentieth century, the history of science as a systematic compilation of scientific discoveries and inventions in the chronological sequential order began as an academic offshoot of the accretion of knowledge in science and technology, primarily as a pedagogic need in universities, where that kind of history was slowly turning into an academic discipline by itself.8 It was George Alfred Leon Sarton (1884–1956), a Belgian American chemist and historian, who started compiling the history of science through his journal Isis at the University of Ghent in Belgium from 1912 onwards. He launched history of science as an independent academic discipline on his joining Harvard University after World War I and offered to teach it. In 1927, he published a huge introductory as a reference book in the subject, discussing scientific discoveries and inventions from the days of classical Greek scholars to the times of Omar Khayyam from the perspective of great personages and their thoughts.9 In the second (p.201) and third volumes, Sarton reviews the history of scientific achievements of the period up to the fourteenth century CE. According to him, the history of science makes us aware of the fundamental truth and unveils before us the ultimate unity of science itself. He says: The history of science establishes the unity of science in at least two different ways. First, the progress of each science is dependent upon the progress of the others; this implies of course that the sciences are not independent, but interrelated in a number of ways, and that the interrelations are not accidental but organic. Second, the simultaneity of scientific discoveries made in different places and sometimes by means of different methods implies also an internal congruency….10 Sarton perceived a thread of intellectual power in progress across the varying contributions of individual scientists, integrating differences for the leap forward. He thought that this fundamental unity pushing human civilization to progress would ultimately resolve the problem of disunity among people. It was the conviction that education in the history of science would accelerate the unification of humankind that encouraged him to start the Institute for the History of Science and Civilization in 1917. Fascinated by science as the most profound form of knowledge that the human brain ever produced, the basis of the progress of civilization, and the unique power of integration of humankind, Sarton believed that the history of science is a very essential component of higher education. Teaching and writing history of science was his dedicated mission under this humanistic desire, what he called ‘new humanism,’ for the unity of the human world.11 (p.202)

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Science of Uncertainty An article of Boris Hessen (1893–1936 CE), a Soviet physicist, criticized and dismissed Sarton’s work as unscientific.12 Hassen’s study, drawing insights from Marxism, proposed a fundamental connection between economy and science. He postulated economic determinants behind scientific knowledge production. His work done following the methodology of historical materialism became foundational in interpretative historiography of science and led to modern studies of scientific revolutions and sociology of science. His method of studying history of science became known as externalism, looking at the manner in which science and scientists were affected and guided by the global as well as the local compulsions of their times. Anti-Marxists and non-Marxists branded Hassen’s study vulgar Marxism. They gave rise to what is called internalism, contrasting the method of studying history of science based on externalism.13 Internalist histories of science focussed on reconstruction of the history of scientific ideas under the strong presumption that the development of scientific ideas was a phenomenon confined wholly within the scientific world. Both the groups branded each other unscientific. George Clark (1890–1979 CE), a British economic historian, criticized Hessen’s Marxist interpretation of Newton’s intentions and intellectual achievements as economic, quite crude, and mechanical, because many non-economic factors, particularly religion and culture, must have had their role in shaping them.14 According to Clark, we owe some of the amazing discoveries to scientists’ ‘disinterested desire to know’, that is, to ‘the impulse of the mind to exercise itself (p.203) methodically and without any practical purpose’.15 Nevertheless, Clark found Hessen’s interpretation of technological development in sectors like military, mining, and navigation as a consequence of the state’s interest, quite tenable. In fact, Hessen’s thesis is not about the causality of what explicitly manifests in personal behaviour but about the social causality at the deeper level. It is not Newton’s personal economic motives that Hessen discovers, but the economic motives of the age, that is, the dominant class motive. According to Newton himself, his motive was investigating the works of God. Hessen’s thesis that seeks to establish the decisive role of the social matrix in moulding the scientist’s thought has been a leavening influence on the thoughts of several subsequent writers in the subject. There were attempts at work on history of science from a political economy perspective that associated scientific progress to the rise of capitalism. Works of Leonard Olschki (1885–1961 CE), Edgar Zilsel (1891–1944 CE), and a few others vouch for it. Edgar Zilsel, an Austrian historian of science, believed that science owed its origins to a given kind of social structure. According to him, growth of science in Western Europe since the sixteenth century CE was not just accidental, but a phenomenon very much integral to the structure of contemporary economy and society.16 He postulated industrialization as the motor of scientific growth. According to him, the rise of industrial capitalism necessitated attributes such as collective rational consciousness, quantitative Page 6 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty thinking, instrumentality, and an unprecedented sense of precision. Interestingly, these attributes that science fosters are what sustain science. Zilsel claimed that the rise of capitalism involved integration of specialized artisans and craftsmen for commercialized production of goods, which in turn necessitated invention of more efficient production technology. According to him, it was the interaction between scholars (the literate elites) and craftsmen (the illiterate poor), a situation unthinkable in the pre-capitalist ages, which facilitated the growth of science and technology. Scholars, (p.204) traditionally not exposed to crafts, began theorizing them by acquainting themselves with craft practices and becoming superior craftsmen. Zilsel thinks that it is the superior craftsmen’s theoretical investigations into crafts that have led to the development of experimental science. In the early capitalist society, scientists became specialists in one or more sciences or but inevitably with the necessary craft outlet. Scientists were thus technologists too, under the pressure of the dominant economy. Scientists soon become professionals engaged in the production of science that is authentic knowledge about the knowable in nature. Production of science got entrenched as a rational activity, open and transparent enough for any competent person to disprove or improve upon. Technologists became increasingly confined to workshops and busy with the specific task of improving mechanical efficiency. Science has been largely under the guidance of trials and errors in its track of procedural distinction as well as methodological preoccupation. Technological improvement invariably involved innovation, often without knowledge about the science of it. In most cases, the science of why the technology works becomes available only subsequently. Such scientific knowledge, indeed, helps technologists optimistically work for an improved alternative technology, but inevitably through the path of trial and error—the characteristic path of engineering. Although there is still the belief that science precedes engineering, the history of science and technology shows it to be the other way around. The engineering mode of knowledge production has always been an autonomous field, never to be bound for scavenging the science, unlike as often made out, especially by scientists. As learned specialists, both technologists and scientists are intellectuals in their society. Their activities always demand rational and critical faculty. Nevertheless, the history of science informs us that all these intellectuals were not imbued with scientific temper, though they had to think rationally about the science that they handled. It is also explicit that scientists and technologists are never people of their own interests independent of socio-economic and politicocultural influences. According to Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937 CE), the famous Italian Marxist, intellectuals are the most educated with specialized expertise, but belonging to two categories, namely the (p.205) ‘traditional’ and ‘organic’.17 Ensconced in traditional scholarship and thinking that they are objective and neutral, ‘traditional intellectuals’ see themselves distinct from the Page 7 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty ordinary people, and hence remain rhetorical and exclusive in their behaviour. On the contrary, ‘organic intellectuals’ are critical, ethical, and empathetic, always using their scholarship and expertise to counter and subdue the ‘traditional intellectuals’. They are socially conscious intellectuals with class awareness and involvement in activities of social transformation. According to Gramsci, they assume a ‘war of position’ against the ‘traditional intellectuals’. Extending Gramsci’s social theory to history of science, we can say that scientists who do not think beyond their science hesitate to relate themselves to the larger society and refuse to involve in social transformation are ‘traditional intellectuals’. Most scientists belong to the category of ‘traditional intellectuals’, who believe that science and technology are the highest forms of knowledge representing the intellectual means to a higher quality of life. They do not understand the relation between the capitalist economy and their enterprises. Naturally, they fail to detect the fact that they are unconsciously consenting to the dominant economy to exploit them. Marxist historiography of science was first to focus on the difference between the scientists with social commitment and scientists who distance themselves from the ordinary people. Historical analysis of science in that perspective became notable with the works of Benjamin Farrington (1891–1974 CE), who wrote on the antiquity of science, its politics, the philosophy of Francis Bacon, Darwin’s ideas, and so on, but with the matrix of capitalist economy and its bearing on scientist in mind.18 Scholars such as Hyman Levy (1889–1975 CE), (p.206) J.B.S. Haldane (1892–1964 CE), Joseph Needham (1900–1995 CE), and J.D. Bernal (1901–1971 CE) are examples of socially conscious and peoplecentred scientists, and they pushed interpretative historiography of science ahead, viewing broadly the development of science and technology as the basis of social change. Compared to others whose publications in the history of science were not many, the contributions of J.D. Bernal and Joseph Needham were voluminous and specific.19 J.D. Bernal, well known for his contributions in the field of X-ray crystallography, viewed the growth of science as a direct consequence of the pressure of economic circumstances.20 Obviously, this explanatory history of science by Bernal is largely of the Marxist framework, as applied by Boris Hessen. However, Hessen’s Marxist interpretation of science, widely discussed during the period, had hardly excited any response from Bernal. Like Sarton, Bernal was convinced of science’s decisive role in human liberation and social progress. This pragmatic optimism of Bernal faded in the wake of the rising state control of science, production of nuclear weapons, and the spread of war. The historiography of science took a liberal hermeneutic turn in Robert K. Merton (1910–2003 CE), an American sociologist, (p.207) famous as the founder of sociology of science.21 He has produced several famous works, apparently following Hessen’s thesis, but with substantial modifications by way Page 8 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty of clarifications and refinements, amounting to total deviation turning the thesis into antithesis. In the process, Merton constitutes a thesis of his own, namely, the Puritan thesis that hinges on the presumption that religious passions and values acted as the dominant world view of the seventeenth century CE, exerting decisive influence on every endeavour in society including intellectual. His central thesis is that since Puritanism had been dominating the everyday sociopolitical and intellectual life of seventeenth-century England, science owed its exponential growth to the dominant values that promoted experimental research. Merton introduces his thesis of the catalytic role of Puritanism in the growth of science during the period, as if supplementing Hessen’s technological determinism under capitalism. Similarly, Merton attempts to disaggregate Hessen’s economic category into smaller constituents of the decisive function, as if in defence of the latter’s thesis. Actually, what Merton underscores is the sociocultural function of Protestantism in legitimizing the scientific profession. He then postulates that this religious legitimacy enjoyed by scientists, thanks to Puritanism, was the inspiration behind discoveries and inventions. Merton’s thesis thus assigns Puritanism precedence over the external materialistic causality and makes it explicit that the real forces behind scientific development are matters internal to science. His thesis further postulates an idealized conception of science with four institutional imperatives—universalism, Communism, disinterestedness, and organized scepticism—governing scientific enterprises.22 Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961), a Polish medical microbiologist, brought out a study in 1935 providing insights into the beginnings (p.208) of the concept of syphilis as an illness.23 A work in the history of medicine, it deals only with the case of a single disease though and embodies a social interpretation of the origins of medical science. It highlights the role of extra-scientific factors in the production of scientific knowledge. Enunciating a distinct theory of the structure of scientific knowledge made up of certain basic elements called ‘thought styles’ (denkstil), Ludwik made a significant hermeneutic turn. According to him, thought styles consist of the epistemological, conceptual, and linguistic constituents of scientific (but also non-scientific) ‘thought collectives’ (denkkollektiv), which enable a scientist to produce science. Fleck maintains that all scientists are locked up in the prison house of ‘thought collectives’ or ‘thought styles’ and scientific truth exists as subsumed by the ‘thought style’. Since scientists belong to different ‘thought styles’, the development of truth beyond the ‘thought style’ is an unattainable ideal. As evident from the title of his book, Fleck’s contention is the social origins of the scientific fact that as such guarantees no epistemological stability for us to be definitive about whether it could be true or false in itself. According to Fleck, the occurrence of new knowledge was not just a natural process, but the result of conscious efforts to overthrow the old knowledge.

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Science of Uncertainty Sociology of knowledge became a distinct branch of specialization through the writings of Karl Mannheim (1893–1947 CE), a Hungarian-born phenomenologist and Lukácsan sociologist. Mannheim theorized knowledge as the product of historically and social structurally conditioned cognitive frameworks, conceptual schemes, and perspectives.24 According to him, knowledge production in general and science production in particular is not an individualistic enterprise independent of the socio-economic matrix. It is a process inseparable from the socio-economic as well as politico-cultural processes and inevitably regulated by the dynamic of social power relations. Mannheim maintains that knowledge is ultimately shaped by the aggregate thoughts of the ruling class but confronted by the exploited who struggle to change the society. As a result, it contains their ideas (p.209) with the utopian layer of ethical postulates and ultimately making knowledge production as part of the ideological enterprise.25 That is why Mannheim conceptualizes knowledge production as a historical and social structural enterprise. In short, knowledge production has no history of its own independent of the social history. Science in theory is supposed to be truth, but the social structural compulsion makes it succumb to be part of the dominant ideology. Both in America and Europe, studies in the history of science began to be encouraged with the distinct understanding that it would promote public awareness about science’s predominant role in national development and justify the heavy revenue expenditure for the maintenance of a large contingent of scientists and engineers. History of science, conceived as a linear manifestation of the inevitable march of progress engendered by human intellect, was very optimistic. There was influence of anthropocentrism and more significantly of the providential design in the whole perception of the past. Herbert Butterfield (1900–1979 CE), the chairperson of the Cambridge History of Science Committee, who played an important role in the consolidation of history and historiography of science into an academic discipline in the post–World War II years, named this perspective as Whiggish. Whigs, who were democrats opposing the loyalists called Tories, in the British parliament, saw history as the march of human progress from tyranny to democracy and from ignorance to science. Butterfield coined the terms ‘Whig’ and ‘Whiggish’ as prefix to their historiography to highlight the present-centred nature of its perspective. Joseph Needham (1900–1995 CE), the famous British historian of Chinese science and an accomplished biochemist, ranks foremost among Marxist historiographers of science. His lifetime research was in the history of science, technology, and medicine in China, which he formally began in 1948 as a project at the Cambridge University and the first volume came out in 1954.26 He wrote twenty-six volumes in four (p.210) decades, mostly in collaboration with Wang Ling whom he had brought from Lizhuang to Trinity College as a faculty.27 Needham’s history of science is an encyclopaedic compendium that comprises contextualized description of scientific discoveries and inventions along with Page 10 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty their theoretical substance. It is an interpretative narrative of the socioeconomic origins of science, democratizing its meaning and purpose.

Logical Empiricism Knowledge production in the early twentieth century had become increasingly discipline specific and highly specialized, making polymaths rare. Scientists were not generally interested in philosophical questions and very rarely some of them turned out to be Kantians or Comteans engaged in epistemological reviews of scientific theories. Whewellian kind of philosophers and historians of science were largely uncommon. As an exception, some of the mathematicians and physicists of the old tradition of versatile scholarship with epistemological preoccupations began to engage in logical questions, and the practice acquired the dimension of a movement in the initial decades of the twentieth century. These scholars included Hans Hahn (1879–1934 CE), an Austrian mathematician; Otto Neurath (1882–1945 CE), an Austrian sociologist; Philipp Frank (1884–1966 CE), a philosopher physicist of Vienna; Moritz Schlick (1882– 1936 CE), another philosopher physicist of Germany; and a few others. Largely inspired by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, they used to hold logical deliberations, regularly converging in a coffeehouse at Vienna.28 Known as the (p.211) Vienna Circle, the collective seriously deliberated on the question of knowledge, its source, logic, authenticity, reliability, and the like, and strongly advocated the consensus that experience was the only source of knowledge and logical analysis, the only way to resolve philosophical issues. This began to be serious advocacy far more than mere academic exegesis for making philosophy scientific by liberating it from the clutches of theology and metaphysics. Soon the scholars of the Vienna Circle constituted a formal body called the Ernst Mach Society with several scholars like Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951 CE), Friedrich Waismann (1896–1959 CE), Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970 CE), Hans Reichenbach (1891–1953 CE), Karl Popper (1902–1994 CE), Kurt Friedrich Godel (1906–1978 CE), Gustav Bergmann (1906–1987 CE), and so on as active participants. Most of them were neo-Kantian thinkers who wanted complete liberation of knowledge from metaphysics and, therefore, insisted that any inductive inference should be empirically testable. How to achieve epistemic compatibility amongst different sciences was a significant philosophical concern of logical empiricists. They believed that mathematical logic could act as the best methodological tool assuring epistemic reliability across sciences. Hence, they were preoccupied with the intellectual challenge of turning production of knowledge in every field into a logical empiricist enterprise by integrating mathematics with it. These exercises in logical empiricism were not mere passtime academic exegesis but political engagement by way of the scientific preparation of critical social outlook for emancipation from theological and metaphysical moorings. It became a political movement aiming at the

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Science of Uncertainty modernization of contemporary society and culture with passions and values of science. Neurath perceived the need for theoretical unity of sciences.29 He insisted that there should be no a priori methodological hiatus between the natural and social sciences, so that they could jointly resolve many a complex problem that humankind encounters. (p.212) Wittgenstein was in general agreement with Neurath’s logical empiricism but always maintained that there was nothing called logical truth outside its structure. Neurath and most other logical positivists disagreed with Wittgenstein’s thesis of logical ineffability and they found metaphysics haunting his linguistic philosophy. His contemporary, Friedrich Waismann’s contributions to logical positivism were in relation to probability theory, causality, and linguistics. Rudolf Carnap supplemented Neurath’s notion of theoretical unity through his interpretation of it as the holistic conception of concepts.30 He argued that the unity of the language of science should have precedence over the unity of the laws of science and anticipated a shared inferential structure across all sciences and thought of identifying a given concept with a unique place within the shared overall structure, which according to him would ultimately enable the formulation of one basic concept for all forms of knowledge. It is logical probability that he considers central. Karl Popper got enrolled among the logical empiricists only in 1928. He argued that the fundamental property of science was its amenability to falsification.31 According to him, a theory inductively reasoned on the basis of the empirically given is scientific, for a contradictory empirical observation that methodology cannot foreclose would falsify it. Any scientific theory, be it that of Newton or Einstein, is provisional, waiting to be revised through new formulations or new facts. This is true of experimental proof too, for no experiment can guarantee the same proof in future. What can be methodologically assured is not certainty but probability. Karl Popper, therefore, (p.213) conceived the methodological function to be quite simple, for it consists of formulating a hypothesis and testing it for falsification. According to him, verification of a scientific theory was not a feasible proposition. Instead the attempt should be to falsify it. In fact, this is what a scientist does through the various techniques of testing the hypothesis. Hans Reichenbach, the leading philosopher of science among logical positivists, preoccupied with empiricist epistemology, made significant studies in verifiability, probability, causality, objectivity, and realism of scientific theories.

World War Disruption and the Big Science As we have noted earlier, the logical positivist movement that began in Germany in the 1920s spread all over Europe in the 1930s. It got disrupted in the wake of the marches and migrations during World War II. Most of the leading logical positivists like Hans Reichenbach, Herbert Feigl, Rudolf Carnap, Hempel,

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Science of Uncertainty Bergmann, Philipp Frank, Edgar Zilsel, and others migrated to North American universities on the eve of the War. The War environment impacted production of science and technology traumatically, since nation states, especially the despotic and belligerent ones, went about establishing experimentalist enterprises for strengthening their arms and ammunition as part of self-aggrandizement. Individually and jointly, they funded a series of huge projects for inventing more powerful arms and technology of communication as well as transport. They established huge research laboratories with hundreds of scientists and engineers under the state control and imposed experimental projects upon some of the leading universities like the University of California and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Aircrafts of increased size and speed with the facility to carry explosive weapons, anti-aircraft guns, powerful searchlights, proximity radars, and bombs were manufactured. Proximity microwave radars and atom bombs, which marked the highest level of wartime physics and its technological application, constituted ‘big science’ in history. Naturally, science and technology made a big leap during and in the immediate post–World War II period. Vannevar Bush (1890–1974 CE), an American engineer and science administrator known for his work on analogue computing, (p.214) and James Bryant Conant (1893–1978 CE), a well-known chemist and president of Harvard University, were made to lead the atom bomb project, notorious in history as the Manhattan Project in the wake of World War II. Ever since the great success of this project, the state power became the authority of decisive control in science and technology research, especially in the United States and the Soviet Union, under the Cold War pressure. A strikingly fresh feature of wartime knowledge production under the state sponsorship of scientific research was the precedence of invention science over discovery science. This was, in fact, the capitalist requirement facilitated through the state power. Though fascists led the War, the real catalyst was the capitalists’ economic exigency under the phenomenal recession that urgently required a rapid and aggressive penetration into potential areas of raw materials, labour, and market. Capitalists were frantically searching for the ways and means of achieving an instant recovery, for which the War provided the occasion. A quick advancement and worldwide expansion of productive forces and relations was essential. Actually, the War occasioned the opening up of better infrastructure facilitating faster circulation of resources, labour, commodities, and capital. In the case of subjugated nations, the War literally meant aggressive penetration of markets and resource control into them for the capital gains of imperial states. It also meant the opening up of diplomatic relations for economic exchanges. All this accounted for the revolutionary growth of transport and communication, contingently for meeting the

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Science of Uncertainty operational needs of the War, but permanently as part of the infrastructure of the capitalist economy. Europe was not able to sustain much of its epistemological criticality in the field of science and technology, which had become radically different due to a series of revolutionary inventions induced by the context of the War. Logical empiricism picked up in North American universities during the 1940s and 1950s, thanks to the migration of several well-known logical empiricists like Hans Reichenbach, Herbert Feigl, Rudolf Carnap, Hempel, Bergmann, Philipp Frank, Edgar Zilsel, and others. An environment of academic freedom was ensured there through strong ties with pragmatists like Charles Morris. One of the main logical positivist projects in America was the ‘International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,’ designed by Neurath. (p.215) This project, though left incomplete, owed its success in publications largely to the ingenuity of Morris.32 Ideological differences apart, the movement everywhere had social modernization through democratization of scientific thinking as the common agenda. Logical empiricists argued for the method of verification to be the heart of logical analysis, experiment to be the foundation of reliable knowledge, and theory to be the inductive construct out of experimentation. Other than the entrenchment of verification as methodological inevitability, what has really gone down in history as the lasting legacy of logical empiricists is the project of theoretical unification of Neurath and the probability theory of Carnap. Philosophers maintained epistemological vigilance upon scientists’ theories until the 1950s.

Social Theory of Science The history of science takes a remarkable hermeneutic turn in the path-breaking analytical study by Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922–1996 CE), an American physicist and philosopher of science who enunciated a social theory of scientific knowledge.33 He explains the process of how scientific theories get entrenched for some time and then get replaced by certain others on convincing grounds. A key metaphor that Kuhn uses is paradigm, by which he means an epochal framework of comprehension that enables scientists to produce their theories. A paradigm represents a grand theorization that facilitates production of scientific knowledge within its explanatory limits. Newton’s theory of gravity or Einstein’s theory of relativity exemplifies a paradigm in Kuhn’s analysis. Kuhn argues that the history of science is a history of paradigm shifts manifesting as scientific revolutions or radical (p.216) transformations of epochal grand theorizations. Science is normal when it functions as a regular problem-resolving theoretical system, witnessing a steady and cumulative growth. It is revolutionary when a potential original theory challenging some of the cumulative scientific practices gets enunciated. Each paradigm shift is conceived to be representing the process of one epochal paradigm getting replaced by another. A paradigmatic grand theorization phases out when auxiliary questions raised against it remain

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Science of Uncertainty unsolved, for the proposed solution upsets issues already settled and sets in a theoretical crisis. Gradually, the theoretical crisis recedes when the successful among the contending alternatives establishes itself as the new paradigm by resolving the unresolved questions that fails the old paradigm. It is this historic emergence of the alternative paradigm that Kuhn calls scientific revolution. Kuhn argues that paradigm shifts manifesting themselves as scientific revolutions presuppose the non-existence of anything called the ultimate scientific truth, for every new paradigm gets its own truth entrenched. Every paradigm encounters irresolvable auxiliary questions, and in due course, it phases out. This does not mean that each paradigmatic theorization is intellectually exhausted and sterile at the point of its recession. Ascendancy of the alternative paradigm is no proof of the theoretical invalidation of the preceded. It is not just the epistemic status of science, but the sociological dynamic as well, which renders scientific revolution plausible. Accordingly, Kuhn does not ascribe the causes of scientific revolutions solely to the rise of auxiliary questions exposing anomalies in the dominant paradigm. Various factors like the material, institutional, and human resource support and patronage are decisive about the ascendancy of a paradigm. Support of the community of scientists and scientific research establishments does matter in the rise and fall of paradigms in the history of science. An aspect of Kuhn’s theory that excited serious criticism is the incommensurability concept, according to which scientific theories encounter at some point of time a fundamental failure of comparability. It has been pointed out that the problem of incommensurability seldom holds good, if the progress of scientific theories is conceived as a linear process of the improvement of the old theory by the new. Nevertheless, Kuhn does not agree with such a simplified statement; for instance, he cannot see Einstein’s theory as an improvement on (p.217) Newton’s, for epistemological reasons. According to him, there is no common yardstick to distinguish the truth effect between the two cases, and hence the incommensurability thesis. For anyone to make a comparative judgement over theories of two different periods, it is essential to know the epochal framework of comprehension external to them. One cannot escape one’s contemporary consciousness that generates its own method of sensing the reliability of knowledge. Imre Lakatos (1922–1974), an eminent Hungarian philosopher of science and scholar in mathematics, proposes a critical method based on the analysis of the contradictory dynamic of theorization for evaluating scientific theories.34 It is well known as the dialectical meta-method in the historiography of science. Lakatos’ first premise is the Kantian dictum that philosophy of science without history of science is empty and history of science without philosophy of science is blind. Adapting Karl Popper’s view, he views science as a distinct form of Page 15 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty knowledge based on a methodology of rational procedures leading to empirical inferences and experimental confirmation. According to him, all this procedure is carried out under a competitive environment.35 This he illustrates with the instance of history and historiography of science as understood by means of what he calls the framework of dialectical meta-methodology. At the outset, he seeks to describe the history of science and scientific revolutions as they appear in the source and interpret it against his dialectical historiographical metamethodology. The theoretical core of this methodology maintains that a scientist’s production of knowledge takes place as a dialectical process of competitive encounter with rival scientific research programmes.36 (p.218) His explanation involves certain fresh expressions, namely, research programme, problem shift, positive heuristics, negative heuristics, hard core, and protective belt. A research programme is a field of science production enabled by a genealogy of theories. It is the shift from a preceding theory to its immediate successor in the field that the problem shift denotes. This can be either theoretically progressive through the enunciation of a new theory of enhanced predictability or empirically progressive through experimental confirmation. A research programme, not registering progress at least in one respect, degenerates without scientists. Lakatos defined science as structured by research programmes made up of sequences of theories welded together into continuous research programmes, consisting of negative and positive heuristics, enabling scientists to decide which programme to be avoided and which to be pursued. It is strict adherence to a host of heuristic claims, which enables scientists to progress through the production of new, but sequentially integrated, theories in a research programme (see Figure 6.1). Heuristic claims of the positive kind constitute what is called the protective belt around the hard core that sustains the research (p.219) programme. They save scientists from the distractions of auxiliary hypotheses and pressurize them to undertake new experiments for refuting counter-evidence and thereby reinforcing the hard-core observations. It is the Figure 6.1 Lakatos’ Meta-Methodology continued production of new Source: Author. theoretical as well as empirical knowledge capable of countering the auxiliary questions that challenge the hard core that strengthens the protective belt. The negative heuristic represents counter observations that challenge the hard core. Page 16 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty In order to protect the hard core, counter observations or auxiliary hypotheses have to be rejected and the new knowledge thereof added to the protective belt for enabling it to contain the anomalies. A famous British sociologist M.J. Mulkay (born in 1936 CE) put up a thesis assimilating the social theory of knowledge by Karl Mannheim, logical positivism of Karl Popper, the paradigmatic template of Thomas Kuhn, and the sociology of scientific knowledge of Robert K. Merton.37 Mannheim’s social determinism, Popper’s logical falsification, Kuhn’s paradigms, and Merton’s internalism converge in his perception. He explains how scientific knowledge is a social creation and argues that it is created through negotiation. According to him, science owe its growth to the rigidity of scientists rather than their flexibility in their adherence to the paradigm. Likewise, he believes that scientists owed their knowledge and technical claims to their social position. While he readily adapted these elements from the theories of their enunciators, their limitations provoked him to articulate a theory of his own. Mulkay starts by identifying the philosophical justification for viewing science as a unique form of knowledge. Then through a critique of philosophy of science, he exposes the lack of epistemological justification for excluding scientific knowledge from (p.220) the purview of sociological analysis. This made the stake of sociology of science a legitimate question of tacit recognition in the academia and set in the practice of utilizing the conceptual categories and insights from other social sciences like economics, anthropology, psychology, and culture studies in perceiving science. With the rise of environmentalism, the crisis of development, and questions of sustainability, the sense of optimism about science and technology as the march of progress came to be questioned by the rational perception of history of science. It upset the optimism of science and technology by challenging their capability to solve the consequences of growth. Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994), a German philosopher of science, who trotted across continents as an academic professional, brought out an irrational caricature of science by depriving it of its methodological objectivity.38 According to him, the contemporary world of science with scientists as embodiments of irrefutable wisdom condescending towards everything other than their own practices resembles the domain of a medieval church. He finds the state power as another formidable structure of control imposed over science.39 In the certainty, finality, authenticity, and uniformity of science, he sees absolute political authority. Therefore, he forcefully advocates an indispensable separation between science and the state for ensuring a free environment of knowledge production. Questioning the methodological universality of science, he argues that science owes whatever progress it has made, not to its uniformly accepted procedures but to the erratic nature of scientists going astray in utter transgression of rationality. He conceives the domain of creative science anarchic, though it exists as aggressively glossed over by an elitist inflexibility of procedural regimentation. In his view, this rigidity of enforced uniformity is part of the scientific Page 17 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty establishments’ ideological conspiracy and it impairs criticality, the innate quality of science. It is not uniformity of theories but their plurality that he sees (p.221) ideal for nurturing true scientific creativity. ‘Anything goes’ is the slogan that he prescribes for the proliferation of scientific theories and sustenance of their plurality. This is the philosophy he discerns in the history of science as the underlying and significant trait of scientific methodology.40 In the first half of the twentieth century CE, science came to be understood as a structured outcome of the mediation between rationality and logical processes. It naturally got recognized as the most fundamental, open, transparent, and verifiable knowledge of finality. It was Karl Popper who delineated the epistemological properties of science by defining it as the form of knowledge that recognizes a genuine theory outside the empirical field and the one that is beyond pure logic. Popper distinguished science from other forms of knowledge by privileging its object-driven methodological selection and pointing out its openness, transparency, and amenability to falsification. Science as the knowledge of certainty, authority, authenticity, credibility, and universal validity became so entrenched that nobody could think of questioning it. With the beginnings of the second half of the twentieth century, new questions and auxiliary hypotheses, which were raised in the first half, began to acquire prominence. As a reflection of them, the history of science with its widely recognized status of a specialized field of knowledge began to ask whether empiricism could legitimately demonstrate history of science as a separate methodology. Other questions were about the character of historical evidence in the case of the history of science, the historians’ role in recording the history of science; the importance of social theory in the historical understanding of science; whether the theoretical approach legitimately constitutes history of science as a separate epistemology, and so on.41

(p.222) The New Science Science has become an entrenched domain of knowledge noted for its abstract mathematical axioms, postulates, hypotheses, theorems, and proofs over the past three centuries since Newton.42 Ever since its articulation in Principia, it has been clear that the constituents of mathematical structure, invented independent of empirical experience, cannot be the outcome of the empirically given. Sophisticated mathematical equations, indeed, lead to expected or unexpected solutions. One can manipulate mathematical postulates and hypotheses for deductive inferences. They get verified not through empiricism, but through their deductive consequences. At the end, conclusions are checked with the empirically given, although this seldom forces anybody to abandon the mathematical inference through empirical scrutiny. Nevertheless, changes were being brought about systematically and little by little, through a series of discoveries by scientists all along the first half of the twentieth century, making science altogether different in its attributes.

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Science of Uncertainty Thomas Young’s famous two-slit experiment of 1802 showed that light consisted of waves first. On careful examination of it in low-intensity light, the experiment showed as if light consisted of particles. Henri Poincaré is well known for his pioneering contributions to non-Euclidean geometry and the three-body problem —the problem of taking an initial set of data specifying the positions, masses, and velocities of three bodies at a particular point of time for determining the motion of the three bodies on the basis of Newtonian laws. He had pointed out the importance of paying attention to the invariance of laws of physics under different transformations. His other contributions such as practical observations and theoretical appraisal of clock synchronization besides the discovery of the remaining relativistic velocity transformations and obtaining of perfect invariance of all of Maxwell’s equations had anticipated Einstein’s special theory of relativity. Max Plank (1858–1947) in 1900 CE, extending Young’s (p.223) proposition further, discovered electromagnetic radiation taking place in discrete packets or quanta. This discovery quaked the certainty question and dismissed the predictability of science by proving that both ‘position’ and ‘velocity’ cannot be measured at the same time with same accuracy. Albert Einstein added to it through his special and general theory of relativity. Ernest Rutherford, a New Zealand physicist, the father of nuclear physics and the greatest experimentalist since Michael Faraday, is known for his significant discoveries in the mechanics of radioactivity. He is the scientist who discovered the radioactive half-life, the radioactivity in nuclear transmutation of one chemical element into another, and the alpha and beta radiation, besides the difference between them. Discovering the structure of a chemical atom through an experimental model, he made a major break with classical mechanics. Niels Bohr discovered and put forward his complementarity principle, establishing that objects have non-observable and immeasurable complementary properties.43 Erwin Schrödinger (1887–1961) concluded that object–subject split was a figment of the imagination.44 Werner Karl Heisenberg enunciated his uncertainty principle, asserting a fundamental limit to the precision with which certain pairs of physical properties of a particle, such as position x and velocity p, can be measured.45 It deprived physics of certainty, a property widely (p. 224) approved of as fundamental to the science. Heisenberg confirming that the action of measuring affects the accuracy of the measurement and Schrödinger concluding object-subject split as imaginary, the objectivity claim of science became baseless. J.B.S. Haldane, a British-born Indian scientist known for his discoveries in abiogenesis, biostatistics, evolutionary biology, genetics, and physiology, made fundamental contributions to life science.46 His ‘primordial soup’ theory of organic molecules had proposed abiogenesis, the physical model for the chemical origins of life, anticipating the perspective of quantum biology. He took biology to new frontiers by demonstrating for the first time the genetic linkage

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Science of Uncertainty in mammals and seeking to unify Darwin’s thesis of evolution based on natural selection with Mendel’s theory of genetics. Murray Gell-Mann (born in 1929 CE) enunciated his theory of complexity in particle physics, adding on to the uncertainty and subjectivity issues of theoretical generalizations.47 He formulated his ‘eightfold way’ of bringing order out of the chaos by observing 100 particles in collisions involving atomic nuclei. Through subsequent experiments, he found out that all of those particles, including the neutron and proton, were composed of fundamental building blocks, namely quarks, with extremely strange properties. Gell-Mann described the phenomenon of quarks being permanently restrained by forces released through the exchange of gluons. This description led to the construction of the quantum field theory of quarks and gluons or quantum chromodynamics, which explains the dynamics (p.225) of nuclear particles. Kurt Friedrich Godel presented in 1931 his thesis of undecidability through two incompleteness theorems demonstrating certain inherent limits of provability about formal axiomatic theories, which have serious implications in mathematical logic.48 They made scientific theorization guarded by mathematical reliability often problematic. Richard Feynman (1918–1988), a theoretical physicist of rare eminence, immortalized in the history of science for his contributions to quantum mechanics, quantum electrodynamics, and particle physics, pointed out the problem of imprecision as an inevitable aspect of scientific theorization. Simultaneously, new discoveries tended to justify Newton in positing absolute space, absolute time, and absolute motion in his theory. Einstein’s theory of special relativity rejects absolute simultaneity and necessitates replacement of the absolute space and the absolute time with an absolute space-time.49 Einstein sees the space-time metric tensor as connotative of the spatiotemporal and denotative of the gravitation possessing mass. Whether space-time exists without mass is a controversial question as to whether or not the gravitation presupposes mass. Einstein’s field theory and relativity made the contrast between mass and empty space irrelevant, for it theorized space-time as integral to the material universe as mass. The theory presupposes the concept of physical reality as a continuous field and forecloses the notion of particles playing a fundamental role. Physical objects are extended as fields irreducible exactly as particles, which are inseparable functions of the space-time coordinates. This means that there is nothing called empty space. At the same time, particles can mean only a specified zone in space with high-density energy. The philosophy of science now started privileging the new solution of spacetime, rather than the old question of absolute space, time, and motion. What is real about physics has been an incessantly raised philosophical question since Einstein’s theories. A crucial point of (p.226) contention about reality concerned the interface between macro- and micro-mechanics, where the measurement of position and velocity became an extremely bewildering and Page 20 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty elusive problem. Einstein argued about the feasibility of measuring particle interactions, against Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Light behaves like a wave in one context, like a particle in another, without contradiction. Niels Bohr called this exclusionary relation ‘complementary’. He could show those complementary concepts codified in uncertainty relationships are not operationally definable in a single experimental context. Thus, in the case of the two-slits experiment, any attempt to determine which slit the photon passes through leads to an uncertainty in its position sufficient to destroy the interference pattern. The quantum postulate implied limitations on the ‘mutual definability’ of old time concepts. But therein lay the key to what Bohr called the ‘generalization’ of Newtonian mechanics, some of which like ‘space-time description’, ‘causation’, ‘particle’, and ‘wave’, if given operational meaning in a given experimental context, excluded the use of others. As a result, phenomena were to be described and explained, in a given context, using only a subset of the total set of Newtonian concepts, with mutually exclusive experimental contexts. Whether the theory explains an actual phenomenon or its experimental context began to be an all the more unsatisfactorily resolved philosophical question. It is against this background that the most influential answer came from the theory of a new mechanics called quantum mechanics—a theory prolific in predicting new and astounding effects, with so vast a scope, but still not without difficulty.50 A genuine revolution in our understanding of the physical universe, it is the best candidate yet for a fundamental theory of the mechanics of the cosmos. At the heart of the quantum revolution is Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Max Plank, Einstein, Bohr, De Broglie, Schrödinger, Pauli, Heisenberg, and Dirac were the (p.227) leading scientists who provided a theoretical foundation to quantum mechanics. Despite his own theories’ complimentary convergence, Einstein thought of quantum mechanics as an incomplete proposition in physics. As the most revolutionary representation of the physical universe, quantum mechanics still remains as the best fundamental theory of the universe. Proving the uncertainty about the level of precision in terms of position or velocity of particles, quantum mechanics makes the possibility of assigning exact values to all physical quantities unlikely. Quantum mechanical uncertainties provide physics with an epistemologically unassailable theoretical ground in making a rupture with Newtonian mechanics. Nevertheless, philosophical questions about the meaning and nature of the uncertainty principle persist. The primary philosophical question is about the way to relate the rigorous mathematical description of quantum mechanics to empirical observations, and how to conceive the relation in physics and communicate it in verbal language. Whether or not one succeeds in carrying the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics forward to the

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Science of Uncertainty empirically observable realm to discover and theorize the fundamental principle, it is a fact as Heisenberg points out: We can no longer speak of the behavior of the particle independently of the process of observation. As a final consequence, the natural laws formulated mathematically in quantum theory no longer deal with the elementary particles themselves but with our knowledge of them. Nor is it any longer possible to ask whether or not these particles exist in space and time objectively. … the idea of an objective real world whose smallest parts exist objectively in the same sense as stones or trees exist, independently of whether or not we observe them … is impossible.51 Quantum entanglement, signifying the complex phenomenon of particles originating or interacting in pairs or groups, makes a separate description of the quantum state of each particle impossible. Hence, the description has to be inevitably of the quantum state of the system as a whole. Schrödinger calls the quantum entanglement (p.228) as the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics. As remarked by Feynman: If I say [electrons] behave like particles I give the wrong impression; also if I say they behave like waves. They behave in their own inimitable way, which technically could be called a quantum mechanical way. They behave in a way that is like nothing that you have seen before…. I think I can safely say that nobody understands Quantum Mechanics.52 What becomes clear is the fundamental difficulty to grasp the collapse of the wave functions, or the difficulty of measurement in standard quantum mechanics. Meanings of wave functions and matrix mechanics changed over the years through different formulations such as Schrödinger’s equation about the universal electron wave function (1925 CE), Niels Bohr’s complementarity principle (1927 CE), Heisenberg’s Copenhagen interpretation (1927 CE), de Broglie-Bohm’s pilot-wave theory (1927 CE), Max Born’s electron probability density (1927 CE), Everett’s relative-state and many worlds theories (1957 CE), J.S. Bell’s quantum entanglement (1967 CE), Dieter Zeh’s quantum decoherence (1970 CE), and others. Some of the theories remain partly valid while others have gone totally redundant, letting questions of realism, determinism, certainty, completeness, causality, and the like continue to intrigue philosophers of science again. Scientists as usual went metaphysical about dimensions that turned out to be uncertain and complex in physics. Theories of Kenneth G. Wilson (1936–2013 CE), an American theoretician of particle physics, focussed on the underlying dimensions that would not necessitate explicit description. Approximations and phenomenological equations serve the purpose in the case of such sub-structural aspects in various specialized branches of science. In quantum mechanics, the Page 22 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty metaphysical dimension is made explicit by Feynman in his discussion of the mysterious phenomenon of wave-particle duality, absolutely inexplicable within classical mechanics.53 (p.229) New science advanced further, discovering various aspects of the macromechanics in the micro-universe of the particle as well as the micro-mechanics in the macro-universe. Rosalind Franklin photographed the double helix structure of DNA in 1951 CE and her associates James Watson and Francis Crick developed on it, theorizing the building block of life.54 Grand unified theory of the origin of the universe by Stephen Hawking in 1960 CE was another landmark in discovery science. Similarly, Murray Gell-Mann theoretically postulated quarks, antiquarks, and gluons as the underlying elementary objects in the structure of the subatomic particle called hadron in 1964 CE. Pulsar, a highly magnetized rotating neutron star that emits a beam of electromagnetic radiation within a very precise interval between pulses, was identified in 1967 CE by Jocelyn Bell Burnell and Antony Hewish, which enabled indirect confirmation of the existence of gravitational radiation. Dorothy Hodgkin, who described the molecular structure of insulin, made a major leap towards structural genomics through X-ray crystallography, possible in 1969. Hence, fresh knowledge about both the macro- and micro-universes made science and technology unprecedentedly new. Computerized tomography (CT scan) enabling the visibility of soft tissues was a major invention in the turn of the 1970s. Gilbert Hyatt and Intel made the first commercial computer microprocessor in 1971 CE, realizing the transition from analogue electronics to digital electronics complete with far-reaching results in the domain of data management and information processing. Similarly, in 1975, Cesar Milstein and his associates developed monoclonal antibodies, often called as the magic bullets that could control various microorganisms causing illnesses. An invention that revolutionized knowledge storage and transmission happened in 1990 CE through the designing of the World Wide Web by two consultant particle physicists, Tim Berners-Lee and Robert Cailliau. The production of a sheep by cloning a single mammary cell in 1996 CE was a major achievement in genetic engineering.

(p.230) New Science Literature Corresponding to the growth of new science, there were certain developments in the field of history and the philosophy of science. Although the science of uncertainty has been posing a major epistemological question, the philosophy of science hardly seems to have witnessed any path-breaking contribution, compared to what the science of certainty excited since the nineteenth century CE through the writings of logical empiricists and neo-Kantians. Barring a few scientists like Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Feynman, and Gell-Mann who were the main architects of the science of uncertainty, we do not find a philosopher of new science among its professionals.55 A major reason could be lack of philosophers among them and the loss of interest among scientists in doing Page 23 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty serious history and philosophy of science. As knowledge began to be bewilderingly voluminous and complex, specialization at the cost of holistic understanding became the feasible practice in the academic world. This made polymaths a rare species. Nevertheless, there were some philosophers and social theorists responding to the intellectual predicament cast by the theories of uncertainty, complexity, and subjectivity in science. First, this juncture in the history of knowledge production helped them realize how central the role of Newtonian epistemological certainty, finality, authenticity, and logo-centrism was in the making of the intellectual foundation of modernity. Then it helped them discern the new science’s features like uncertainty, complexity, tentativeness, and anti-logocentrism as symptomatic of the tottering of the foundation of modernity and the onset of the postmodern condition. They discussed (p.231) the epistemic crisis of human sciences in the wake of the dissolution of their scientific foundation at the collapse of modernity. Postmodernism is characterized by the knowledge seeker’s reflexive selfawareness about the tentativeness, slipperiness, and ambiguity of knowledge as well as about the linguistic complexity in the interrelationship between texts and meanings. It rejects knowledge of an absolute, inductive, totalizing, and essentialist nature, for the notion of truth that it maintains is fragmentary, diverse, tenuous, and culture-specific. The influence that the language and the text exert in the construction of reality and cultural identity is a matter of serious concern for postmodernism. What it privileges in the methodology of knowledge production is the local and specific contextualization of the concrete particular rather than the theorization of the abstract general. Its stress is on the placement of the human against the texture of time and history. According to Jean Francois Lyotard (1924–1998 CE), a French philosopher and literary theorist, the primary concern of postmodernism is who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided.56 Such decisions about knowledge do not involve the modernist/humanist qualifications for making knowledge reliable or ethical parameters for determining its goodness or aesthetic properties for judging it beautiful. Lyotard argues that production of knowledge is based on the paradigm of a language game, as conceived by Wittgenstein. A perspective of knowledge in philosophy of science, which at times overlaps between new science and postmodernism, is constructivist epistemology that views reality as a product of human intelligence interacting with experience in the real world.57 According to (p.232) constructivism, reality is a construct of the human mind, and hence inherently subjective. It rejects objectivity that is a subjective construct, assuming human capability to know the reality of the natural world through experimentation and scientific approximation, in terms of varying degrees of measurement and accuracy. There is no single universal method of knowledge production for constructivists and hence they see scientific theory as a construct of sensory experience in the natural world. Constructivist epistemology does not accept the logical positivist position that scientific Page 24 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty knowledge is the result of scientific method of accessing reality. Instead, it views science as subjective knowledge that scientists produce under conditions of methodological plurality. Opposing the dogma of objective truth, constructivism clearly overlaps with postmodernism in its approach to epistemology. Both presume the act of knowing as the result of experience-based activities; knowledge is produced through cognitive procedures like imagination, understanding, intuition, representation, and so on. Despite the common philosophical position, constructivists across Europe and America differed in their concepts and theories. An eminent Anglican constructivist, G. Bateson (1904–1980 CE), is known for his meta-science of epistemology, which seeks to integrate the systems theories of different scientific fields.58 H. Simon (1916–2001 CE), an American political theorist and social scientist, is famous for his pioneering contributions to new scientific fields like artificial intelligence, systems theory, and high-power computing.59 Similarly, Heinz (p.233) von Foerster (1911–2002 CE), an Austrian-American polymath but mainly a physicist and philosopher, inspired by the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle, especially Ludwig Wittgenstein, was a true new science constructivist. Although famous for his invention of second-order cybernetics, electro-optics switching devices and theories in cybernetics, and high-speed electronics, his contribution to philosophy of science by way of theorization of constructivist epistemology, theory of memory, and theory of knowledge, is remarkable. One of the classical statements of Von Foerster widely quoted reads: ‘Objectivity is the delusion that observations could be made without an observer.’60 A few among the constructivists are known as radicals after Ernst von Glasersfeld (1917–2010 CE), an American philosopher and psychologist who created a strand called radical constructivism, asserting that he had no illusion about human power.61 Richard Rorty (1931–2007 CE), an American philosopher, argued that the radical aspect of constructivism was the epistemological criticism of the faithful dependence of positivists and foundationalists on the postulate of mind independent of external reality.62 He rejected, on the grounds of constructivist epistemology, their logical and genealogical efforts to show inference independent of imagination knowledge in order to prove knowledge self-evident. According to him, the notable intellectual impact of modern science on academics in philosophy and the humanities is the enchantment of objectivity that inspired them to imitate scientific methods. J. Piaget (1896–1980 CE), a Swiss child psychologist, is world renowned for his constructivist theory of knowing, especially the theory of cognitive development in children. Qualifying himself as a (p.234) constructivist genetic epistemologist, he named his theory as ‘genetic epistemology’, combining the explanation of cognitive development and the description of the construction of knowledge.63 Piaget defined his ‘genetic epistemology’ as the science of the Page 25 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty process of thinking and the stages of intellectual development in children as part of the species’ evolutionary biology of adaptation involving assimilation and accommodation. He theorized the development of cognitive structures as part of the evolutionary differentiation of biological regulations. Piaget believed what he defined as genetic epistemology had its own problems and methods. In constructivist epistemology, Piaget theorized the inseparability between the act of knowing an object and the knowing subject’s act of knowing itself. It is through the interaction of the two that the action of knowing organizes the world while it organizes itself. E. Morin (born in 1921), another French philosopher and social theorist who worked on complexity and complex thought, has extended constructivism from sociology, politics, and education to systems biology, visual anthropology, communication, and media studies, through his profound studies.64 P. Valery (1871–1945 CE), a French poet and mathematician, is well known for his contributions to constructivist epistemology. Jean-Louise Le Moigne (born in 1931), another French philosopher and constructivist, has significantly enriched the field of systems theory through his analytical insights in constructivist epistemology. His statement is that new knowledge is produced as inseparable from the very act of constructing it, exactly like the path emerging as one walks. Those still interested in philosophical or sociological history of science were comfortable with masterpieces in the field. (p.235) Thomas. S. Kuhn’s renowned thesis, not outdated as yet despite criticisms from across a variety of disciplines, is perhaps the most important example. Kuhn has been a persistent influence in the field of history and philosophy of science even after decades. Cognitive encounters of critics hardly succeeded in putting up any contending alternative to his thesis. A study by Paul Hoyningen-Huene aiming at exploring Kuhn’s philosophical foundation attempts an epistemological review of his social theory of scientific revolution.65 From a logical empiricist perspective, Paul seeks to carry forward Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions, by elaborating and justifying notions of paradigm shifts, normal science, incommensurability, and theorizations in worlds apart. Although the post-War techno-economic processes and the nature of science production were inextricably interconnected, several writers tried to narrate the history of science as episodes on scientists, their experimentation, laboratory conditions, and contributions confined to their universities or research institutions. Such narratives devoid of philosophical preoccupations generally do not seem to critique contemporary scientific theories in logical positivist terms. Production of knowledge at the instance of science targetting the public has been increasing as part of the business of the publication industry, outside the institutional set-up of the university system. Most of them sought to cater to the pleasure of the general readership through a popular teleology of science based on a grand theory of the origins of the universe and evolutionary biology or the origins of mankind. There is a commendable body of literature in the field, which Page 26 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty has sensationalized scientific discoveries and inventions to the extent of even going bizarre about them under the cover of fiction. Scientists do not write works under this category. Non-fiction writers and novelists, particularly those with interests in technological imagination, write them. Nevertheless, there are some popular works in physics and biology written by eminent (p.236) scientists committed to academic quality, scientific rationality, and universality.66 A new category called science studies, distinguished from the usual history of science, has come into vogue recently, seeking to understand science in terms of micro-histories based on the archive from an interdisciplinary perspective in the context of social history and philosophy. They facilitate convergence of multiple methodological perspectives ranging from empiricism, historicism, phenomenology, and so on. Science study practitioners analyse the process of production, the means of communication, the context of reception, the epistemic basis, and the semiotic function of scientific knowledge. The analysis involves objects such as the material milieu, principles, theories, instruments, and laboratory life.67 Bruno Latour, a French philosopher and social theoretician of knowledge, who has highlighted the importance of the history of science written with philosophical and sociological insights, is an example.68 According to him, science is what scientific practice unveils and the history of (p.237) science embodies its interpretation in the social context and technical content. This explains why he seeks to analyse science and technology in action. He examines the role of scientific literature, the activities in the laboratory, and the institution, besides the process through which discoveries and inventions are recognized. Similarly, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, a German philosopher of science, analyses the thread of epistemic control across the experimentation, conceptualization, and instrumentation as well as the institutional and sociopolitical bearing on knowledge production in life science.69 A host of scholars of constructivist perspective, theorizing how human actions determine technology, have argued that the mode of operation technology can be understood only by discovering the social context ingrained in it. How scientific discoveries and technological inventions are socially constructed was the question that engaged the constructivist historians of knowledge like Thomas P. Hughes, Trevor Pinch, Wiebe Bijker, Sergio Sismondo, and others.70 (p.238) Many who preferred to stick to the perspective of internalist historiography have been naturally critical of the social constructivist interpretation of science. Lorraine Daston, an American historian of science heading the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science and a leading critic, maintains that science studies and history of science are of two mutually incompatible perspectives.71 Distinguishing themselves as seriously engaged in the history of science, analysing varieties of scientific experience and moral authority of nature, they consider practitioners of science studies to be relativistic and archive-centred micro-historians following the concept of historicism construed by Michel Foucault. Postmodern historicism has been posing several methodological and Page 27 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty epistemological issues in historiography. Positivist history’s methodology, understanding of the past, the logic of its narrative, reliability, truth claim, and the evidence base came under attack. Several philosophers and social theorists debated over the epistemological status of historical knowledge. W.B. Gallie (1912–1988 CE), a social theorist; Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005 CE), a French philosopher best known for combining phenomenological description with hermeneutics; Arthur Danto (1924–2013 CE), an American philosopher; Michel de Certeau (1925–1986 CE), a French philosopher of history; Heydon White (1928–2018 CE), an American historian; and F.R. Ankersmit (born in 1945), an intellectual historian of Netherlands are a few examples.72 Adding to the debate, (p.239) J.C. Polkinghorne (born in 1930), an English theoretical physicist, theologian, and philosopher of science, put up a different perspective of history and philosophy of science by resuscitating the old question of relationship between science and religion, through his writings.73

Science Communication Growth of science, science education, and science writings has been increasingly encountering the problem of academic communication due to the rise of a large number of technical terms. Terms proliferated as disciplines diversified and cross-disciplinary communication of specialized knowledge became extremely difficult, not only between the science and non-science domains, but even within fields under each of them as well. Further, the terms began to be transported from one discipline to another, often at the expense of their technical meanings. For instance, several technical terms of social science form part of the language of bioscience, and vice versa, notwithstanding problems of semantic disorder in scientific communication. Sometimes terms of one domain play their semantic role analogically in the other domain, while a few do as if their technical meaning applies to all domains. Certain terms are metaphorical even in their home domain and hence with no denotative semantic function anywhere. This situation, of the connotative meaning becoming the denotative, has set in a lot of semantic flexibility and uncertainty. Now and then such indiscriminate rendering of terms of conceptual and theoretical signification fails scientific communication, for the scientific meaning in a domain turns up unscientific in another. Quite a few scholars have discussed the problem, but generally scientists are not perturbed by (p.240) the predicament because most of them hardly ever indulge in cross-disciplinary communication. Nevertheless, the quandary is becoming sombre since disciplines today tend to draw increasingly closer to one another and even converge. Problems of knowledge communication were catching the attention of scholars from very early times on, and preparation of a glossary was seriously put forward as the solution. Special dictionaries explaining the technical semantics of terms by distinguishing them from ordinary words began to be written. L.L. Zamenhof (1859–1917 CE), a physician of Poland, even constructed an international language of science communication (Esperanto) to resolve the Page 28 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty problem. Terminology emerged as a special branch of linguistics and claimed to be the science of terms or expressions of precise meaning integral to theories in specialized fields of knowledge, thanks to Eugen Wüster (1898–1977 CE), a German electrical engineer and an activist of Esperanto.74 His efforts were to eliminate ambiguity from technical languages by means of standardization of terminology as an efficient tool of communication and establish terminology as a discipline with the status of a science. Wüster wanted to sharpen the distinction between terminology and linguistics in order to arrive at an autonomous discipline theorizing conceptual terms as clusters of universally integrated signs across linguistic and non-linguistic systems. Scientific knowledge is universal, independent of cultural differences and variation comes out of the diversity of languages. Hence, Wüster saw terminology transcending linguistic differences as the best resolution to the problem of inter/intra-lingual synonymy making standardization of words impossible. He wished scientists and technologists to be international through terminology, so that linguistic difference would not impede their intellectual communication. Despite such serious academic efforts, terminology has not developed much due to the lack of follow-up over several decades. Discipline-based development of sciences and their narrow specializations (p.241) giving rise to sub-disciplines adding on rigidity has been the main reason. Neglect of standardization of terms was also due to the fact that learning with the precedence of parts over the whole under the tutelage of disciplinary knowledge production hardly needed cross-disciplinary communication. Rigid disciplinary confinement and loose subdisciplinary adaptation of terms from the parental and other disciplines have made semantic confusion common. Terms and words became interchangeable with their semantic function and imprecise, playing their conceptual role of one domain as metaphorical or analogical in another domain. Such indiscriminate rendering of terms of conceptual and theoretical signification made crossdisciplinary scientific communication ambiguous. There has been a reassertion of Eugine Wüster’s principles of terminology by his critical exponents like Henning Bergenholtz, Kyo Kageura, Teresa Cabré Castellvi, and others using insights of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913).75 They reiterate that standardization of terms through terminology is indispensable to perceive concepts; to enable the placement of concepts in a concept system; to guarantee the transfer of concepts without ambiguity or distortion; to facilitate comprehension, interpretation, and translation. They underline the need for theorizing terminology as a specialized field of knowledge based on universally acceptable epistemological parameters for the formulation, unification, and standardization of terms ensuring precision and stability of the term—concept homology.

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Science of Uncertainty Technology of Certainty The science of uncertainty has given rise to a technology of certainty, changing the world unbelievably faster and making it unrecognizably different. Today the meaning of technology is so entrenched that none of us wants to ask what it means. We take it for granted that it means the capability to apply scientific knowledge for designing machinery and devices to satisfy necessities, the meaning of which (p.242) is too entrenched to require definition. Who decides the necessity? Global economy, popularly knowledge economy and academically techno-capitalist global economy, decides the necessity.76 For this, technology is the explicit, standardized, and codified competency in designing marketable machinery and devices as products of enormous exchange value. This competency is a super commodity with intellectual property rights (IPR) and patents, which generates several other commodities making technology both commodity and capital. Techno-capitalist global economy is heavily dependent on commoditization of science and technology. Production of pure science for the sake of science has come to a halt. Scientific discoveries that fail to generate commodities would attract no funding. Social necessity is no more the mother of invention. Corporate houses decide which sciences should be researched and what technology should be developed. Corporate houses have their experimentalist establishments for turning science into technology, and for transforming technology into commodities. They have globally built up a juridico-political system of electronic sophistication for confiscating the intangible assets of scientists and technologists through transactions of patents and IPR. Four-fifths of their total turnover is from the transaction of technology both as commodity and capital. Looking at what the huge corporate experimentalist establishments are doing, we learn what future necessity means. They have opened up several science-tech hybrid areas of research such as functional genomics with automated methods based on microarray technologies for analysing gene expressions, use of X-ray crystallography and robotic crystallization procedures for determining gene structure in structural genomics, high-field Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) spectroscopy for determining protein structures, DNA barcoding for species identification, layer-by-layer assembly of nano-films, advanced bioengineered molecular processors, nanotech sensors and transmitters, graphene engineering, synthetic bioengineering, bioinformatics, bio-mimetic, biometrics, bio-pharmacology, agro-biotech, and robotics. Advanced software-based communication devices; alternative-energy-based, low-power, high-speed transport (p.243) technology; brain-computer interface devices; holographic interfaces; cloud computing; galactic exploratory technology; and so on are the most preferred science-tech areas of research.

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Science of Uncertainty Science-tech hybrid areas are going to dominate research, because of their trade prospects in technology. Pure science researches are enormously expensive due to their dependence on the enormously expensive and sophisticated electronic instrumentation. They are becoming increasingly theoretical, computerautomated, and high-power computing dependent. Higher education is constrained to competitively provide science-tech knowledge base, mathematical computational proficiency, high-power computing skill, micro-engineering technology, and innovative faculty. Research aptitude means laboratory skill in handling advanced instrumentation and expertise in computer-simulated experiments. Competency to handle sophisticated IT tools, ability to work in interdisciplinary environments, competency in developing research networks, familiarity with corporate research culture, entrepreneurial skill, and ability to assess research impact on the environment constitute the graduate attributes the world over. Under techno-capitalism, ‘new knowledge’ and ‘creativity’ are the most valuable resources, as much as what raw materials and factory labour used to be under industrial capitalism.77 These new organizations, referred to as experimentalist organizations these days, are deeply grounded in technological research, as opposed to manufacturing and services production of the phase of industrial capitalism. They are heavily dependent on the corporate appropriation of research outcomes as intellectual property. Techno-capitalism is a very advanced phase of commodity fetishism, which is rooted in (p.244) technological innovation and corporate power. Intangibles, most of all knowledge and creativity, are the core of techno-capitalism, equal to what the tangible raw materials, factory labour and capital, were to industrial capitalism. Intangibles already account for as much as four-fifths of the value of most products and services in existence. Conversely, the tangible resources that were most valuable for industrial capitalism are losing value relative to those intangibles in every product or service. Technological creativity is turned into both commodity and capital under new techno-capitalist corporate regimes that are primarily oriented towards research and intellectual appropriation. Progress of commoditization of knowledge, detaching it from the (user) person and making it an independent economic entity, has given rise to the phenomenon called capital fetishism from which arose the practice of owning and controlling knowledge as intellectual property. It has been critically examined how capital fetishism suddenly turned the concept of intellectual property rights, a nineteenth-century concept quite dormant for a long time, into a major field of law in the late twentieth century.78 Easily distributed via global communication networks, knowledge with authorial ownership began to become an important source of personalized profit, necessitating special legal protection. This accounted for the global recognition of patents and intellectual property rights under international laws. It has been shown from a critical political economy perspective how corporations have erected a system of intellectual property Page 31 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty rights to confiscate creativity, with profound impacts on the economy, science, technology, and culture.79 Corporate houses compete with one another in buying patents and intellectual property rights, which increase their market power, and to be first to come up with new products and services. The competition is leading to substantial theft of patented knowledge and infringement of intellectual property rights. Corporate establishments resort to various clever ways and means to appropriate research outcomes through new relations of power. Often it becomes a reckless confiscation of the (p.245) intangibles —‘new knowledge’, ‘creativity’, and ‘innovativeness’ of the researchers. Naturally, one of the outcomes of this is increase in the litigations relating to IPR theft and infringement.80 Any huge experimentalist establishment today engages thousands of young scientists and engineers addressing human needs projected to a few decades ahead. Every such establishment invents annually about 2000 new products on an average and secures US patents for more than half the number. Such research establishments’ innovation delivery system is able to generate billions of dollars out of new products. Looking ahead at the value, they profusely fund the pursuit of new discoveries and inventions in this line. Thousands of young scientists of advanced instrumentation environment, qualified to be the innovators of tomorrow, are working like robots in corporate research establishments busy with multiple capital-intensive projects on artificial intelligence, robotics, engine management, nanotech sensors/transmitters, graphene engineering, bio-mimetics, and brain-computer interfaces.81 A fundamental institutional feature of techno-capitalist globalization is the emergence of corporatocracy, ensuring the ever-intensifying grip of corporations over public governance around the world. It is a new type of governance that enmeshes and destroys democracy, in order to virtually surrender the state power at the feet of corporations.82 A group of transnational elites tied to corporate power constitute the principal actors in the system. They penetrate into the democratic system and reconstitute it as the government of, for, and by corporations, rather than of, for, and by the people. In actual practice, it quells democracy from within and substitutes it with a new form of imperialism based on the global corporate power, imbued with an array of highly sophisticated and intrusive technologies. It has globally established a powerful techno-military complex for the corporate appropriation of creativity and new knowledge in all forms. This setup of neo-imperialism is certainly heading for a series of major social, economic, and political consequences in the low GDP world (p.246) including India, where corporatism is ever more intrusive and rapacious through its militant control over technology and innovation.83

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Science of Uncertainty Science-Tech Imagination As production of science and technology, an inseparable combine unveiling the mechanics of the micro-universe and enabling better access to the mechanics of the mysterious macro-universe, advances, imagination stretches its wings across the horizon of new ignorance in the twilight of metaphysics and physics. Imagination flies around the question as to why the universe has the fundamental physical constants that fall within the very narrow range of possibilities, essential for accommodating human life. It goes into the fact that the universe is so constituted as to be inevitably suitable to have conscious human life within it. According to Brandon Carter (born in 1942), an Australian theoretical physicist, the universe’s fine tuning is implicit in the fact that only in a universe capable of supporting life, there will be living beings capable of observing and reflecting upon fine-tuning. Extremely rare coincidences like dimensionless combinations of fundamental physical constants and cosmological parameters urge many physicists to stress the peculiar nature of the universe. A small change in the neutron-to-proton mass ratio in the universe would have been disastrous both for the production of hydrogen as well as the existence of sequence stars. Any slight modification of the actual values would have resulted in the production of a universe unsuitable for life. This delicate balance of the constituents of the universe, the ideal combination of initial conditions and fundamental constants, has forced many physicists, cosmologists, philosophers, and theologians to imagine a ‘fine-tuning’, presupposing a ‘fine-tuner’. Until the enunciation of Einstein’s theory of relativistic cosmology, the universe as defined by Newton was vague, raising several paradoxes. Why were the ether, the solar system, and the whole universe not subject to the Boltzmann-Maxwell law? How could the ‘stability and permanence’ of the ‘collective universe’ have been assured forever through a ‘recurring change’? Nevertheless, fundamental (p.247) characteristics of a (general relativistic) mathematical model of the universe make sense within Einstein’s universal theory of gravitation and Hubble’s empirical law. Surveys of distant radio sources, the accumulation of other astrophysical evidence (concerning quasars, X-ray sources, and the like) and the theoretical physics of the general relativity corroborate the big bang model of the ever-expanding universe. Particle physics has shown that the sizes and masses of stars and planets are such that they are in harmony with the phenomena of matters not exceeding the required cosmological quantities. There is a perfect balance of high-energy cosmology about the barrier between the stable hydrogen stars emitting convection energy (red dwarfs) and others emitting radiation energy (blue giants). Today, the universe is no more a matter of speculation, but an intelligible system governed by physical laws such as those of the quantum field theory, general relativity, thermodynamics, and so on, which apply to the universe as a whole from the basic elements of strings to stars. Astrophysicists know that all the objects in the universe, including huge celestial bodies like stars, black holes, planets, satellites, and other objects of Page 33 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty smaller size, are made up of protons, neutrons, and electrons. Nevertheless, various aspects of the universe still remain mysterious and hence depend on metaphysical reasoning. Numerous macro-bodies of the universe are unknown as yet, and almost every fortnight, a new planet is discovered and catalogued. Early in the next decade, a new kind of space telescope using the interference of light beams may help discover many more. Astronomers may compile an encyclopaedia of precise co-ordinates of hundreds of Earth-like planets. However, space physicists are forced to believe that the Earth is the only one of its kind in the solar system and that it emerged solely by chance.84 Its biosphere of amazingly diverse organisms evolved over billions of years, consisting of only objects and phenomena of a particular occurrence in harmony with the initial principles, but not deducible from them, precluding predictability. This imagination of the Earth as the rarest of the rare is not approved by many. Several of them believe that there must be many Earth-like planets with lower and higher forms of life existing in (p.248) infinite variety and for infinitely long ages in the universe. They have argued about the possibility using the extant knowledge in astrophysics. Some decades ago, a Russian astrophysicist, Nikolai S. Kardashev (born in 1932), the director of the Russian Space Research Institute, put up the possibility of the universe comprising certain galactic civilizations probably billions of years ahead of the human civilization on the Earth.85 According to him, the Earth is indicative of a very early phase of civilization. He has classified and ranked the galactic civilizations on the basis of their technological growth and the potential to consume energy. His classification, well known as the Kardashev scale, puts forward a basic framework for evaluating the technological advancement of the civilization from a cosmic perspective. Kardashev measures a civilization’s level of technology in terms of its capacity to utilize energy and classifies the type on his scale of three designated categories. A civilization achieving the technology to utilize and store energy from the planet’s nearest star is type I. The type II civilization is the one that utilizes the energy of the entire star (as in the hypothesis of the Dyson sphere encompassing the entire star and transferring its energy to the planet).86 A civilization with the technology to utilize the energy of the entire galaxy is the type III. Though hypothetical, the Kardashev scale is based on a rigorous analytical methodology for assessing energy consumption at the cosmic level. Its physical basis rests on the presumption that a higher type of civilization would acquire technology capable of using antimatter in large quantities to secure energy many magnitudes above what the preceding type achieved. The logic is that in antimatter-matter collisions, the entire mass of particles would be converted into radiant energy with the density at about four orders of magnitude (p.249) greater than what nuclear fission could emit and about two orders of magnitude greater than what nuclear fusion could yield. It is estimated that the reaction of 1 kg of antimatter with 1 kg of matter would produce 1.8×1017 Joules of energy. Page 34 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty Although antimatter is sometimes proposed as a source of energy, this does not appear feasible today, for according to the current understanding of the laws of physics, the production of antimatter would mean conversion of energy into mass first, precluding any net gain. Theoretically, by means of large-scale engineering, antimatter can be generated as a by-product amenable to recycling. Nevertheless, for a civilization with the technology to convert matter into antimatter, the utilization of the latter as energy source rather than energy storage would be feasible. As estimated by Kardashev, a civilization with the technology to harness the energy radiated to its planet from the nearest star, in the Dyson Sphere model, would reach the energy consumption level of about 4×1033 erg/sec. According to Guillermo A. Lemarchand, an astronomer, this level of energy utilization is almost the same as that of the luminosity of the sun, that is, about 4×1033 erg/sec (4×1026 Watt). In the type II civilization, the same technology might be applied to many planets in various solar systems. It could be the technology to harness photons emitting from the accretion disc through the Penrose process.87 Perhaps an advanced technology would enable utilization of energy by lifting part of a star in an administered mode. It is further presumed that in the case of a galaxy of multiple-star systems, in a civilization with the technology to lift star-matter out of each star, the energy consumption level would be at around 4×1044 erg/sec. In G.A. Lemarchand’s assessment, the energy level is comparable to that of the brightness of the entire galaxy, that is, roughly 4×1044 erg/sec (4×1037 Watt). In the type III civilization, the technology would enable the process of energy consumption extended to the entire stars of (p.250) several galaxies. Theoretically, tapping of energy out of white holes is part of the same technology. At this advanced state of technology, the tapping of the high-energy electrons emitted from quasars is a theoretical possibility too. It might enable the tapping of energy even from the black hole that probably forms the centre of each galaxy. According to Robert Zubrin (born in 1952), an American aerospace engineer, it is the range of expansion in space, rather than the level of energy use, which should be given precedence in identifying the civilization type of a planet.88 In his characterization, the type I civilization has the technology to spread across its planet, while the type II has the technology required for colonizing the entire stellar system concerned. As regards the type III, technology enables the colonization of the galaxy. Zubrin thinks that it is metrics rather than energy consumption that enables acquisition of mastery over the planet. Further, he considers technological mastery over the planet system, the galaxy, and so on, more important than the technological level in terms of energy consumption. Carl Sagan (1934–1996 CE) suggested the information available to the civilization as an additional quantifiable criterion. He quantifies it by assigning the letter A to represent 106 unique bits of information as the basic unit and each successive letter to represent the order of increase in magnitude, as to see Page 35 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty the level Z civilization having 1031 bits of information. Accordingly, his assessment showed in 1973 that the Earth was at 0.7 H civilization, with access to 1013 bits of information. He believed no civilization in the galaxy to have reached the level Z as yet, because the universe seemed to him too young to be capable of exchange information across intergalactic paces. According to him, mass-energy equivalence of the type I civilization of the Kardashev scale implies the conversion of about 2 kg of matter into energy per second. Theoretically, this level of energy can be achieved by fusing about 280 kg of hydrogen into helium per second, that is, roughly 8.9×109 kg/year. In his assessment, at the rate of 1011 kg of hydrogen per one cubic km of water, the Earth’s oceans contain about 1.3×109 cubic km of water, and it is sufficient for humans to sustain over geological time-scales. Michio Kaku (born in 1947), an American theoretical physicist, identifies (p.251) the present-day civilization of the planet as the zero type that is at its closing phase heading towards the type I of Kardashev scale. He theoretically anticipates that the production of antimatter and deployment of intelligent robots may be feasible before the end of the zero type. Further, he adds the type IV civilization as the end point on the scale, presumably the highest level of energy consumption harnessing the universe’s entire sources including even the extragalactic dark energy.89 It is tentatively estimated that the power output of the visible universe could be a few orders of magnitude of 1045 W. Physics today theorizes the phenomenon of the space-matter-antimatter combine enabling the retention of atom. It defines gravitation as the phenomenon of pushing matter against matter, and antimatter against antimatter. Particle physics has theorized certain one-dimensional objects called strings interacting against one another and replacing point-like particles across space. A string looks exactly like a particle, the state of vibration of which determines its mass, charge, and other properties. String theory is an independent mathematical device capable of explaining the basic structure and mechanics of matter, which anticipates an all-inclusive abstraction of the particle physics of gravity. Theoretical astrophysics permits the imagination of travel against gravitation, that is, the force conveyed through the quantum mechanical particle called graviton, by pumping positron through the space-matter-antimatter-carbon combine. This enables the imagination of galactic conveyors of the space-matterantimatter-carbon combine for journeying from one star to another or from one galaxy to another by transcending light years. In an advanced type of civilization capable of using energy from many stars in the galaxy, such travel across milky ways in the universe and the production of self-replicating robots may be possible. Life forms of the type IV civilization, the highest stage of energy consumption, may be abstract non-biological existence as the absolute super consciousness, the one and many at the same time. It can teleport itself to any of the milky ways in the universe; turn galaxies, milky ways, nebulae, black holes, and universes Page 36 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty into its laboratories for creating stars and planets; and, nurturing higher forms of life, gene-edit, improve, and promote them to the higher type. It can (p.252) transform the space-matter-antimatter combine into strings and exist in them, where gravitons are limited and photons, absent. It can create black holes and turn them into universes through their collision. What is consciousness has been a long protracted philosophical question, debated over dichotomies such as the mind versus matter, the physical versus and mental, brain versus matter, and so on. It acquired a new dimension in particle physics that showed matter and brain converging at the subatomic level through quantum mechanics. David J. Bohm (1917–1992 CE), an American theoretical physicist, is famous for his theory of implicate and explicate orders, which postulates the mathematical working of the brain at the level of neurons with quantum effects.90 A metaphysical notion of relationship between matter and consciousness in terms of particle mechanics is what the implicate order represents. It is the quantum entanglement that the explicate order signifies. Roger Penrose is another scientist who has made certain seminal studies in the relation between fundamental physics and human consciousness.91 According to him, laws of new physics based on what he termed as the correct quantum gravity may help understand the mechanics of consciousness. Consciousness is integral to brain function dependent on electromagnetic system of neurons, which at the subatomic level forms part of quantum physical processes. A great deal of this being yet to be demonstrated in terms of physics, metaphysical imagination is on its wings flying high. Notes:

(1) For details, see J.L. Heilbron. 2000. The Dilemmas of an Upright Man: Max Plank and the Fortunes of German Science. Harvard: Harvard University Press. (2) See A. Einstein. 1954. Ideas and Opinions. New Jersey: Crown publishers, p. 228. Also, see I. Walter. 2007. Einstein: His Life and Universe. New York: Simon and Schuster. (3) See, for instance, E. Mach. 1919. The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of Its Development. London: The Open Court Publications Co. (4) See J.W.A. Young. 1902. ‘Poincaré’s Science and Hypothesis’, Science, 20(520). London: Scientific Books, pp. 833–7. Also, see A. Lalande. 1954. ‘From Science and Hypothesis to Last Thoughts of H. Poincaré (1854–1912)’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 15(4), pp. 596–8; J. Giedymin. 1982. Science and Convention: Essays on Henri Poincaré’s Philosophy of Science and the Conventionalist Tradition. Oxford: Pergamon; P. Galison. 2003. Einstein’s Clocks, Poincaré’s Maps: Empires of Time. New York: Norton.

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Science of Uncertainty (5) A smaller version of it was written first entitled, To Save the Phenomena: An Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory from Plato to Copernicus, 1908. The French text of the book was published in five volumes between 1913 and 1917. The English translation, the first volume of The System of World: A History of Cosmological Doctrines from Plato to Copernicus. Paris: A. Hermann, 1913– 1959, ran into ten volumes. (6) His two books: P. Duhem. [1954]1991. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press (Second edition) and P. Duhem. 1908. To Save the Phenomena: An Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory from Plato to Galileo. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (7) See E. Burtt. 1924. The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science. London: Kegan Paul. (8) For a detailed narrative on the subject, see S.F. Mason. 1953. A History of Sciences: Main Currents of Scientific Thought. London: Routledge and Kegan. (9) Sarton’s original plan was to do his history of science in nine volumes but could complete only three of them before he passed away. See G.L. Sarton. 1927. Introduction to the History of Science, Vol. I, ‘From Homer to Omar Khayyam’. Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company; 1931. Vol. II, ‘From Rabbi Ben Ezra to Roger Bacon’, Pt. 1&2. Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1947– 48. Vol. III, ‘Science and Learning in the Fourteenth-century’, Pt. 1&2. Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company. Also, see his A Guide to the History of Science. Waltham: Chronica Botanica Company (1952); G.L. Sarton. 1936. The Study of the History of Mathematics. Harvard: Harvard University Press; G.L. Sarton. 1936. The Study of the History of Science. Harvard: Harvard University Press; G.L. Sarton. 1948. The Life of Science: Essays in the History of Civilization. New York: Henry Schuman; G.L. Sarton. 1954. Galen of Pergamon. Kansas: University of Kansas Press; G.L. Sarton. 1955. Appreciation of Ancient and Medieval Science during the Renaissance. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press; G.L. Sarton. 1957. Six Wings: Men of Science in the Renaissance. Indiana: Indiana University Press. (10) Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science, p. 31. (11) For an interpretation relevant to the context, see A. Thackray and R.K. Merton. 1972. ‘On Discipline Building: The Paradoxes of George’, Isis, 63(219), pp. 473–95. (12) See B. Hessen. 1931. ‘The Socio-Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia’, in Nicolai I. Bukharin (ed.), Science at the Crossroads. London: Second International Congress of the History of Science. Also, see the independent

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Science of Uncertainty reprint that was brought out subsequently: The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia. New York: Howard Fertig, 1971. (13) For aspects of externality of science, see S. Shapin. 1982. ‘History of Science and its Sociological Reconstructions’, History of Science, 20(13), pp. 157–211. Also, see his ‘Discipline and Bounding: The History and Sociology of Science as Seen through the Externalism-Internalism Debate’, History of Science, 30, 1992, pp. 334–69. (14) See G. Clark. 1937. Science and Social Welfare in the Age of Newton. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (15) Clark, Science and Social Welfare in the Age of Newton, pp. 75–80. (16) See E. Zilsel. 1945. ‘The Genesis of the Concept of Scientific Progress’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 6(3), pp. 325–49. Also, see E. Zilsel. 2003. ‘The Social Origins of Modern Science’, in D. Raven, W. Krohn, and R.S. Cohen (eds), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Springer. (17) See A. Gramsci. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers, pp. 9–16. For a detailed study, see John W. Cammett. 1967. Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism. California: Stanford University Press, pp. 192–206. (18) See B. Farrington. 1950. Science in Antiquity. London: Oxford University Press. Also, see his Science and Politics in the Ancient World. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1939; B. Farrington. 1944. Greek Science: Its Meaning for Us (Thales to Aristotle). London: Penguin Books, reprinted with Part II in 1953; B. Farrington. 1951. Francis Bacon, Philosopher of Industrial Science. London: Lawrence & Wishart (First edition); B. Farrington. 1964. The Philosophy of Francis Bacon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; and B. Farrington. 1966. What Darwin Really Said: An Introduction to His Life and Theory of Evolution. London: Schocken. (19) The Scottish mathematician and Marxist political thinker H. Levy’s main work in history of science is Modern Science: A Study of Physical Science in the World Today. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1939. Also, H. Levy. 1940. Science: Curse or Blessing? London: Watts & Co. J.B.S. Haldane, a British-born Indian Marxist and biologist was inspired by the revolutionary nature of science and its impact on human life, politics, and culture. See his Science and Human Life. London: Harper and Brothers, 1933; and the philosophical study, The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences. London: Random House, 1939. (20) See J.D. Bernal. 1926. ‘On the Interpretation of X-Ray, Single Crystal, Rotation Photographs’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 113(763), pp. 117–60. Also, his Aspects of Dialectical Materialism. London: Watts & Co., Page 39 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty 1934; The Social Function of Science. London: George Routledge, 1944; Science in History, 4 volumes. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971. (21) See R.K. Merton. 1938. ‘Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England’, Osiris, Vol. IV, Pt. 2. Bruges: St. Catherine Press, pp. 360–632. Also, see the reprint with a fresh introduction by him, R.K. Merton. 1970. Science, Technology and Society in 17th Century England. New York: Harper & Row. (22) For a different perspective, see B. Barnes and R.G.A. Dolby. 1970. ‘The Scientific Ethos: A Deviant Viewpoint’, British Journal of Sociology, 2(1), pp. 3– 25. (23) See Ludwik Fleck. 1979. Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, trans. F. Bradley and T.J. Trenn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (24) See K. Mannheim. 1963. Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p. 3. (25) Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 244. (26) See J. Needham and W. Pagel (eds). Background to Modern Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also, see J. Needham. 1954. Science and Civilisation in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and J. Needham. 1969. The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West. London: Allen & Unwin. (27) See G. Blue. 1977. ‘Joseph Needham: A Publication History’, Chinese Science, Vol. 14. London: International Society of East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine, pp. 90–132. Also, see M. Davies. 1997. ‘Joseph Needham—1900–1995’, British Journal for the History of Science, 30(1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 95–100. (28) See K. Victor. 1953. The Vienna Circle: The Origin of Neo-positivism, a Chapter in the History of Recent Philosophy. New York: Greenwood Press. Also, see S. Sahotra. 1996. The Legacy of the Vienna Circle: Modern Reappraisals. New York: Garland Publications. For a detailed study, see S. Friedrich. [2001]2015. The Vienna Circle: Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism. New York: Springer. (29) For details, see D. Zolo. 1990. Reflexive Epistemology and Social Complexity: The Philosophical Legacy of Otto Neurath. Dordrecht: Kluwer; J. Symons, O. Pombo, and J.M. Torres (eds). 2011. Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science, The Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science Series No.18, VIII. Dordrecht: Springer.

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Science of Uncertainty (30) For details, see R. Carnap. 1932–4. The Unity of Science. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Also, see R. Carnap, C. Morris, and O. Neurath (eds). 1970. Foundations of the Unity of Science: Towards an International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vols 1 and 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (31) See K. Popper. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson; Originally published as, Logik der Forschung zur Erkenntnistheorie der Modernen Wissenschaft, Vienna, 1935. Also, see his Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: RKP, [1963] 1989 (Fifth edition); Karl Popper. 1972. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (32) See C. Morris. 1962. ‘On the History of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science’, in R. Carnap (ed.), Logic and Language (Festschrift Studies on the occasion of R. Carnap’s 79th birthday), Synthese library. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 242–6. (33) See T.S. Kuhn. 1962. The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Also, see T.S. Kuhn. 1957. The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in Western Thought. Harvard: Harvard University Press; and T.S. Kuhn. 1977. The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (34) See I. Lakatos. 1961. Essays in the Logic of Mathematical Discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also, see his History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions. New York: Springer, 1970. (35) See I. Lakatos. 1970. ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in I. Lakatos and Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 90–196; and see his Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. (36) For details, I. Lakatos. 1980. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (37) See M.J. Mulkay. 1979. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Allen & Unwin. Also see his The Social Process of Innovation: A Study in the Sociology of Science. London: Macmillan, 1972; M.J. Mulkay. 1975. ‘Three Models of Scientific Development’, Sociological Review, 23(4–5), pp. 509–26; M.J. Mulkay. 1976. ‘Norms and Ideology in Science’, Social Science: Information, 15, pp. 637–56. Mulkay shows strong commitment to sustained engagement with the task of analysing the basis of exponential growth of scientific research in his

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Science of Uncertainty The Word and the World: Explorations in the Form of Sociological Analysis. Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1985. (38) See P.K. Feyerabend. 1970. ‘Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge’, in M. Radner and S. Winokur (eds), Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 17–51. Also, see the book form published by Verso in 1975. (39) See P.K. Feyerabend. 1978. Science in a Free Society. London: Verso, pp. 14– 18. (40) See discussions in P.K. Feyerabend. 1981. Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; P.K. Feyerabend. 1981. Problems of Empiricism: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; P.K. Feyerabend. 1988. Farewell to Reason. London: Verso; and P.K. Feyerabend. 1991. Three Dialogues on Knowledge. New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. (41) For a related perspective about the Indian context, see D. Raina. 2003. Images and Contexts: Studies in the Historiography of Science in India. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (42) For a concise characterization of science, see A.F. Chalmers. 1990. Science and Its Fabrication. Buckingham: Open University Press (Reprint). Also, A.F. Chalmers. 1994. What Is This Thing Called Science? Buckingham: Open University Press (Reprint). (43) See Niels Bohr. 1911. ‘On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules’, Philosophical Magazine, 26, pp. 1–25. Also, see his ‘Atomic Theory and Mechanics’, Nature (Supplement), 116, 1925, pp. 845–52; For a detailed exposition, see his Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1934] 1961. Niels Bohr. 1937. ‘Causality and Complementarity’, Philosophy of Science, 4, pp. 289–98; R. Batterman. 1991. ‘Chaos, Quantization, and the Correspondence Principle’, Synthese, 89, pp. 189– 227. (44) See E. Schrödinger. 1935. ‘Discussion of Probability Relations Between Separated Systems’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, 31, pp. 555–63; and 32, 1936, pp. 446–51. Also, see W. Moore. 1989. Schrödinger, Life and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 220–2. (45) See H.P. Robertson. 1929. ‘The Uncertainty Principle’, Physical Review, 34, pp. 573–4; Reprint in John Archibald Wheeler and Wojciech Hubert Zurek. 1983. Quantum Theory and Measurement. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 127–8. For a detailed exposition, see D.C. Cassidy. 2009. Beyond Uncertainty: Heisenberg, Quantum Physics and the Bomb. New York: Bellevue Literary Press. Page 42 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty (46) See J.B.S. Haldane. 1929. ‘The Origin of Life’, Rationalist Annual, Vol. 148, pp. 3–10; Reproduced in J.B.S. Haldane. 1929. Science and Life. London: Pemberton Publishing, pp. 1–11; J.B.S. Haldane. 1930–32. ‘A Mathematical Theory of Natural and Artificial Selection’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, 26–8 (I–IX), pp. 137–42. Also, see J.B.S. Haldane. 1932. The Causes of Evolution. London: Longmans Green. (47) See M. Gell-Mann and J.B. Hartle. 1990. ‘Quantum Mechanics in the Light of Quantum Cosmology’, in W.H. Zurek (ed.), Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 425–58. (48) For details, see E. Nagel and J.R. Newman. 2001. Gödel’s Proof. New York: New York University Press. (49) See A. Einstein, ‘My Theory’, The Times (London), 28 November 1919, p. 13; Reprinted as ‘What Is the Theory of Relativity?’, in Ideas and Opinions. New York: Crown Publishers, 1954, pp. 227–32. (50) For the fundamentals, see J.J. Sakurai. 1993. Modern Quantum Mechanics (Revised edition). Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. Also D. Griffiths. 1995. Introduction to Quantum Mechanics (Second edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall; R. Liboff. 1998. Introductory Quantum Mechanics (Fourth edition). San Francisco: Addison-Wesley; N. Zettili. 2009. Quantum Mechanics: Concepts and Applications. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. (51) See the discussion in W. Heisenberg. 1970. Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science. New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, pp. 15, 128. (52) See R. Feynman. 1967. Character of Physical Law. Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, pp. 128–9. (53) See R. Feynman. 1971. Lectures on Physics, Vol. III. Boston: Addison Wesley, pp. 7–20. (54) For details, see R. Olby. 1974. The Path to the Double Helix. London: Macmillan. (55) See E. Schrödinger. 1950. What is Life? Cambridge: Macmillan. Also, see his Space-Time Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950; Expanding Universes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956; Also his My View of the World. Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press, 1983; and What Is Life & Mind and Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974; See W. Heisenberg. 1970. Philosophical Problems of Quantum Physics. Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press (Second edition); W. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy; and W. Heisenberg. 1970. The Physicist’s Concept of Nature. New York: Praeger. See R. Feynman. 2005. The Meaning of It All: Thoughts of a Citizen-Scientist. New York:

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Science of Uncertainty Basic Books. See M. Gell-Mann. 1995. The Quarks and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and Complex. New York: Little Brown Book Group. (56) The classic treatise of postmodernism is: J.F. Lyotard. 1979. La Condition Postmoderne: Rapport sur le Savoir. Paris: Éditions de Minuit. See the English translation, The Postmodern Condition, A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. (57) For details, see R. Bernstein. 1983. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Also, see J. Golinski. 1988. Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–12; M. Nelson and K. Poulin. 1997. ‘Method of Constructivist Inquiry’, in T. Sexton and B. Griffin (eds), Constructivist Thinking in Counseling Practice. New York: Teachers College Press, pp. 157–73. For relevant discussions, see P. Galison. 1997. Image and Logic: The Material Culture of Microphysics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (58) He has authored several books and articles. Perhaps one of the most relevant to the context is the book edited by him. See G. Bateson (ed.). 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; and G. Bateson (ed.). 1979. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (Advances in Systems Theory, Complexity & the Human Sciences). New York: Hampton Press (New edition). (59) For details, see his main study, G. Bateson. 1969. The Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge: MIT Press (First edition). Also, see G. Bateson. 1983. Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford: Stanford University Press. (60) See the quotes in E. von Glasersfeld. 1995. Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learning. London: Falmer Press, pp. 7, 11. (61) See E. von Glasersfeld. 2001. ‘The Radical Constructivist View of Science’, in A. Riegler (ed.), Foundations of Science, Spl issue on ‘The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science’, 6(1–3), pp. 31–43. (62) For the detailed analysis, see R. Rorty. 1991. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Also, see his Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. (63) There is a commendable body of writings by him. For details relevant to the context, see J. Piaget. 1971. Genetic Epistemology. New York: W.W. Norton. Also, see J. Piaget. 1973. To Understand is to Invent: The Future of Education. New York: Grossman Publishers. For an academic appreciation of his contributions, Page 44 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty see G.M. Bodner. 1986. ‘Constructivism: A Theory of Knowledge’, Journal of Chemical Education, 63(10), pp. 873–8. (64) For details, see E. Morin. 2007. ‘Restricted Complexity, General Complexity’, in C. Gershenson, D. Aerts, and B. Edmonds (eds), Worldviews, Science and Us: Philosophy and Complexity. Singapore: World Scientific, pp. 5–29. (65) See Paul Hoyningen-Huene. 1990. Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science. Chicago: Chicago University Press. For related discussion, see S. Fuller. 2000. Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for our Times. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (66) A few examples of serious works in popular biology are: C. Sagan. 1986. Dragons of Eden: Speculations on the Evolution of Human Intelligence. London: RHUS; J. Diamond. 2006. The Third Chimpanzee: The Evolution & Future of the Human Animal. New York: Harper Perennial; B. Sykes. 2001. The Seven Daughters of Eve: The Science That Reveals Our Genetic Ancestry. New York: W. W. Norton & Company; Similarly examples of those in physics are: S. Hawking. 1981. A Brief History of Time. New York: Bantam Books; S. Hawking and L. Mlodinow. 2010. The Grand Design. New York: Bantam Books; B. Greene. 2010. The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory. New York: W. W. Norton & Company (Reprint); M. Kaku. 2006. Parallel Worlds: A Journey Through Creation, Higher Dimensions, and the Future of the Cosmos. Hamburg: Anchor (Reprint). (67) See K.K. Cetina. 1999. Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Harvard: Harvard University Press. (68) See B. Latour. 1979. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Also, see B. Latour. 1987. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Also, see B. Latour and Steve Woolgar. 1979. Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts. London: SAGE; Second edition, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Also, see B. Latour. 1987. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society. Milton Keynes: Harvard University Press. (69) See B. Latour. 1997. Toward a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesising Proteins in the Test Tube. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Also, see B. Latour. 2010. An Epistemology of the Concrete: Twentieth-Century Histories of Life (Experimental Futures: Technological Lives, Scientific Arts, Anthropological Voices). Durham: Duke University Press Books.

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Science of Uncertainty (70) See T.P. Hughes. 1969. ‘Technological Momentum in History: Hydrogenation in Germany 1898–1933’, Past and Present, 44(1), pp. 106–32. Also, T.J. Pinch and W.E. Bijker. 1984. ‘The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other’, Social Studies of Science, 14(3), pp. 399–441; A. Pickering. 1984. Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; W.E Bijker, T.P. Hughes, and T.J. Pinch (eds), The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; T.P. Hughes. 2000. ‘Technological Momentum’, in A.H. Teich (ed.), Technology and the Future. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s (Eighth edition); and his ‘Technological Momentum’, in M.R. Smith and L. Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994, pp. 101–13; S. Sismondo. 1993. ‘Some Social Constructions’, Social Studies of Science, 23(3), pp. 515–53. Also, see his An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009 (Second edition). (71) See L. Daston. 1988. Classical Probability and the Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University; Also, see L. Daston. 1991. ‘The Ideal and Reality of the Republic of Letters in the Enlightenment’, Science in Context, 4(2), pp. 367–86; L. Daston. 2001. Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750. Massachusetts: MIT Press. Daston. 1999. ‘Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective’, in M. Biagioli (ed.), The Science Studies Reader. New York: Routledge, pp. 110–23; and L. Daston. 2009. ‘Science Studies and History of Science’, Critical Inquiry, 35(4), Summer, pp. 798–813. (72) See W.B. Gallie. 1964. Philosophy and the Historical Understanding. London: Chatto & Windus. Also, see his ‘What Makes a Subject Scientific?’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 8(30), 1957, pp. 118–39; P. Ricoeur. 1965. History and Truth, trans. C.A. Kelbley. Evanston: Northwestern University Press; A. Danto. 1969. Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also, see his Narration and Knowledge. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1985. F.R. Ankersmit. 1983. Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Language. Den Haag: Nijhoff. Also, see F.R. Ankersmit. 1989. The Reality Effect in the Writing of History: The Dynamics of Historiographical Topology. Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche. F.R. Ankersmit. 2006. Michel de Certeau, Analysing Culture. London: Bloomsbury Academic; W. Hayden. 1975. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. (73) See J.C. Polkinghorne. 1996. Beyond Science: The Wider Human Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also, see his Faith, Science and Understanding. New Haven: SPCK/Yale University Press, 2000.

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Science of Uncertainty (74) Wüster prepared an International Electronical Vocabulary in 1938 as Terminologielehre (guideline of terms) and drew out the basic principles of terminology. H. Felber compiled the terminological principles of Wüster by depending on the latter’s lecture notes and it came out in English as Introduction to the General Theory of Terminology, Vienna: Springer, 1979. (75) For a detailed analysis, see M. Teresa Cabre Castellvi. 1999. Terminology: Theory, Methodology and Applications, trans. Janet Ann DeCesaris. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. (76) This economy is identified as a new version of capitalism in A. Feenberg. 1991. Critical Theory of Technology. New York: Oxford University Press. (77) Louis Suarez-Villa, eminent political economist, relates the emergence of techno-capitalism to the process of globalization and the growth of technocapitalist corporations. He argues that it is a new version of capitalism that generates new forms of organization designed to exploit ‘intangibles’ such as ‘new knowledge’ and ‘creativity’. See Louis Suarez-Villa. 2009. Globalization and Techno-capitalism: The Political Economy of Corporate Power and Technological Domination. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 46–7. See Luis Suarez-Villa. 2012. Technocapitalism: A Critical Perspective on Technological Innovation and Corporatism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 67–71. (78) See Michael Perelman. 2004. Steal This Idea: Intellectual Property Rights and the Corporate Confiscation of Creativity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (79) Perelman, Steal This Idea. (80) Perelman, Steal This Idea. (81) See Suarez-Villa, Techno-capitalism, pp. 68–70. (82) For a detailed study, see Suarez-Villa, Globalization and Techno-capitalism, pp. 47–50. (83) For relevant insights, see the detailed conceptual analysis in Suarez-Villa, Globalization and Techno-capitalism. (84) See J. Monod. 1972. Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology. New York: Vintage Books. (85) See N. Kardashev. 1997. ‘Cosmology and Civilizations’, Astrophysics and Space Science, 252(1), pp. 25–40. (86) Dyson spheres or Dyson swarm are hypothetical megastructures originally described by Olaf Stapledon in his science fiction, Star Maker (1937 CE), and subsequently popularized by Freeman Dyson, an English-born American Page 47 of 48

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Science of Uncertainty theoretical physicist through his paper, ‘Search for Artificial Stellar Sources of Infrared Radiation’, Science, 131(3414), 3 June 1960, pp. 1667–8. It is a system of orbiting solar power satellites around a star, which captures its entire energy output. (87) It is a process theorized by Roger Penrose (born in 1931 CE), an English mathematician and physicist, wherein energy can be extracted from a rotating black hole, for its energy is on the outside of it. For details, see R. Penrose. 1995. Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Also, see R. Penrose and S. Hameroff. 2011. ‘Consciousness in the Universe: Neuroscience, Quantum Space-Time Geometry and Orch OR Theory’, Journal of Cosmology, 14, pp. 1–18. (88) See R. Zubrin. 2000. Entering Space: Creating a Spacefaring Civilization. New York: Tarcher Perigee (Reprint). (89) See Kaku, Parallel Worlds. (90) See D.J. Bohm and Mark Edwards. 1991. Changing Consciousness: Exploring the Hidden Source of the Social, Political and Environmental Crises Facing Our World (a dialogue of words and images). New York: San Francisco. (91) See R. Penrose. 1989. The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Summing Up

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

Summing Up Rajan Gurukkal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199490363.003.0007

Abstract and Keywords This chapter summarizes the main discussions in the preceding chapters and provides a brief account of the history and theory of knowledge production, in Asia as well as Europe, from the earliest times to the rise of new physics, largely following the theoretical perspective of Social Formation and depending on the secondary works, except for analysing the homology between the Social Formation and the knowledge form, in the third chapter, where the illustrations are drawn from the primary source. In that sense the role of the primary source is supplementary and confined to the study of specific instances of the concepts, designs, and methodology of Indian knowledge production. Tracing through a variety of thoughts, the birth of science, the making of new science, the book ends up with consciousness as a problem of particle physics. Roger Penrose, dismissing the matter–mind dichotomy, declares that laws of new science about the quantum gravity seem to govern consciousness too. Keywords:   anthropic reasoning, homology, new physics, concepts, methodology, quantum consciousness, Roger Penrose

The attempt in the preceding six chapters was to provide a brief account of the history and theory of knowledge production in Asia as well as Europe from the earliest times to the rise of new physics, largely following the theoretical perspective of social formation and depending on the secondary works, except for analysing the homology between the social formation and the knowledge form in the third chapter, where the illustrations are drawn from the primary source. In that sense, the role of the primary source is supplementary and

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Summing Up confined to the study of specific instances of the concepts, designs, and methodology of Indian knowledge production. It is the bewilderingly vast, amazingly antique, widely varied, frustratingly incomplete, and absolutely intractable nature of knowledge that the first chapter intends to represent. Knowledge was generated, inherited, and orally transmitted across uneven communities of diverse situations, with a lot of additions and interpolations over millennia. Bands in the forests, ethnic groups along the fringes of the forests, and animal herders in the pastoral tracts had their oral compositions embodying knowledge essential for everyday subsistence and survival. Although production of knowledge is a biologically ingrained faculty in all people, it was always a minority that actively engaged in the process, by sensitively or creatively responding to necessities and chances. Many did not have the autonomy to be creative, for they had (p.254) to live under subjection of one kind or the other. Knowledge always got transformed, replacing the old in the rhythm of continuity and change, and people uncritically followed everything as part of their age-old tradition. There were ruptures as well as continuities of knowledge as traces in the ensemble of bits and pieces suggest. Knowledge had codified existence only at a very late period, and therefore, for many centuries, what survived happened to be the art or craft of doing rather than awareness about the related phenomena. Practices or procedures remained the knowledge for a very long period, enabling the practitioners with the awareness about what to do rather than with the grasp of how it worked. In the ancient craft objects, what we discover as embedded knowledge can very well be what we read into it but rarely what we ferret out from them. In societies of literacy, knowledge is made explicit, codified, and tacit through a complex process of cognitive encounters, contestations and multiple forms of resistance, genealogical connections and ruptures, dialectical growth and mutual nullification, and so on. Formation of knowledge involved aggregation and synthesis, order and disorder. Knowledge sometimes had an elusive course of transmission. Such aspects of complexity make the history of knowledge a baffling subject necessitating a sound theoretical framework. We have found that the social theory of knowledge production, though attempted by a good number of scholars from the Age of Enlightenment to the present, is still problematic in one way or the other. Of all the social theories of knowledge, the relatively most viable is Marx’s theory of social formation. Social formation is an ensemble of several unevenly evolved economies structured by the dominance of one among them. Each economy with its determinate strategies of subsistence and survival presupposes a knowledge system of its own. Knowledge systems of uneven economies in the ensemble coexist and interact with one another but are structured by the dominance of the dominant economy’s knowledge system. It is the process of socio-economic integration of unevenly Page 2 of 12

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Summing Up evolved communities under the dominance of the superior community on the one side and the corresponding integration of multiple knowledge systems under the dominance of the superior community’s knowledge system on the other. We have drawn insights from other theories of social structural origins of knowledge with different (p.255) perspectives and frameworks such as those of Emile Durkheim’s thesis of collective representations, Max Scheler’s concept of historical determination, Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin’s idealistic cultural determination, Karl Mannheim’s phenomenological materialism, and Michel Foucault’s discourse analysis. Holding on to Marx’s theory of social formation as central, we have found Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, Maurice Godelier, Nicos Poulantzas, Emmanuel Terry, Foster-Carter, Pierre Phillippe Rey, and others like Pierre Bourdieu, quite helpful in understanding the niceties and nuances about the society–knowledge interface. Knowledge systems in Asian regions flourished through their coexistence and interaction over centuries until the spread of European science through colonialism and imperialism. In almost all branches, codified knowledge became fossilized under colonial economic exploitation and cultural enmeshing. Village crafts like textile manufacturing and iron smelting declined, drying up all the main hinterland points of exchange. Western cognitive encounters with strong prejudices against indigenous knowledge systems were other related causes. Naturally, it involved the imposition of European knowledge as part of the colonial agenda of the modernization of natives. It was a relationship of cultural subordination and political subjection for economic gains, which in effect meant destruction of knowledge systems. This process of a serious phase of epistemic injustice was not part of the present study. The process within the Asian world involving the dominant groups’ imposition of their knowledge system on the lowlier orders through suppression, incorporation, reconstitution, subordination, marginalization, and even destruction of their knowledge systems is also not addressed. Both are not manageable in a concise book like this. Nevertheless, it is all there in the background of our discussion of historical epistemology. As part of the antecedents of knowledge production in the non-European world, particularly in ancient India and China, the primeval phase as in the case of elsewhere, which was that of subsistence as well as survival, has been discussed. Naturally, the knowledge was related to tools of hunting, gathering, and primordial agriculture as well as weapons for self-defence. People had the faculty to unconsciously grasp subtle indications of nature with which they (p. 256) regulated their subsistence and survival. This knowledge was more biologically and environmentally given than culturally and consciously acquired. Knowledge in primeval social formations was tacit but inherently complex and never articulated or codified or systematized, precluding the possibility of its users being conscious enough to think about the nature of their knowledge. This feature persisted in agrarian social formations, structured by the dominance of plough agriculture and hierarchical relations with their institutionalization Page 3 of 12

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Summing Up through the system of hereditary occupations and caste as in India. Knowledge involved in crafts production is the best example for it. Actually, knowledge in the social formation was quite advanced, in the sense that it consisted of literacy; astronomy; arithmetic; medicine; smelting of copper, gold, silver, and iron; alloy metallurgy; monumental architecture; sculpture; lapidary; ceramics; and so on. Nevertheless, craftsmen knew the procedures of how to do but not much about how it worked. Even the procedures were not articulated, systematized, and codified into written texts. They retained the craft of doing in their minds, as a complex ensemble of subtleties not amenable to be sorted out into procedures for anybody to practise. Much of this craft-knowledge was a faculty, experientially acquired by observing and doing, which cannot be transmitted even orally. It is a capability of identifying multiple subtle indications and regulating the procedures of making of the craft goods. Similarly, the knowledge in the realm of survival strategies meant magic, medicine, and architecture, as a combination of the rational and bizarre types. Knowledge of the dominant economy comprised eschatology, theology, metaphysics, philosophy, art, aesthetics, amusements, games, and theory. Non-European roots of specialized knowledge production as exemplified by the history of knowledge production in India and China becomes perceptible with the Bronze Age civilization. Civilizations of the Indus and the Yellow Rivers vouch for the existence of advanced craftsmanship in bronze metallurgy, fine ceramics, and lapidary. This is true of the Vedic civilization of India and the Shang civilization of China. Advancement of specialized knowledge in early India is attested to by Vedic eschatology and metaphysics; the Vedanga aphoristic knowledge in phonetics, etymology, poetics, grammar, astronomy; and the postVedic systems of thought and (p.257) Āyurvedic knowledge that survived long as oral tradition, which subsequently got redacted and textualized as the dominant community’s wisdom. Likewise, the Chinese oral traditions also had a course of their redaction into texts as owned and controlled by the dominant community’s wisdom. A high-water mark of craftsmanship in stone art, architecture, and sculpture; iron metallurgy; ceramics; and lapidary is evidenced by archaeological remains of monuments as well as artefacts. Archaeological and ethno-archaeological analyses of the past craft products have shown the level of technological knowledge manifest in crafts production, particularly in the technology of archaeo-metallurgy, lapidary, and ceramics. Tracing the non-European roots of specialized knowledge production in the ancient times as illustrated by the civilizations of India and China, we examined the archaeology and ethnoarchaeology of the architecture, metallurgy, lapidary, and ceramics of the civilizations in the valleys of the Indus and Yellow rivers.

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Summing Up In accordance with the changing vicissitudes and suitable environments across the various reign periods of the Shang and Zhou rulers, the battling chieftains, the Qin, Han, and Tang rulers to the Song kings, knowledge expanded, mainly by way of critical response. Codified knowledge as texts of moral principles and metaphysical cosmology, as Yijing or the book of changes suggests, appeared in China during the period of lawlessness under battling chieftains, obviously as a necessity. Oral poetic compositions of moral principles, juridico-political ideas of Zhou rulers, and historical traditions redacted and interpreted by Confucius constitute the main compendium. Chinese knowledge changed through contacts and interactions with the outside world, especially the Indian subcontinent and the Arab world. Buddhism was a major transforming influence on the Chinese world view, the foundation of which was Taoism. The record of astronomical observations of the Han and Tang periods, mathematical accounts, paper manufacturing, printing technology, the compass, and gunpowder of the Tang period constitute the main source of early Chinese knowledge. It was during the Song period that the technology of mining, metal smelting, bronze metallurgy, and minting of coins developed. Advancement of knowledge in healthcare, astronomy, mathematics, geology, architecture, statecraft, and jurisprudence took place during (p.258) the period. Two major compilations, one in astronomy and the other in medicine, made under the patronage of King Su Song, a versatile scholar, constitute another important source. A rotating astronomical clock of Kaifeng was engineered by the same king. Meng Xi Bi Tan written by Shen Kuo, another polymath, provides knowledge about various things such as fossils, geomorphological features, landscape formation, natural phenomena, mathematics, astronomy, woodcraft, water transport technology, and so on. Knowledge in experimental optics advanced during the period. Ouyang Xiu’s analysis of the marks on old stone and bronze objects for understanding history and culture is a notable methodological development, because archaeology and epigraphy came up in Europe only centuries later. A review showed that early India’s method was presenting knowledge derived out of astute observations, generalized into self-validated principles as aphorisms with the logic of mathematical equations or formulas. They are indicative methodological traces of knowledge about the ways and means of constituting the knowledge of reliability. Linguists all over the world agree that Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhāyi is the first ever accomplished text of aphoristic theorization, algorithmic computation, and logical perfection. Similarly, Nāgārjuna’s fourfold negation (catuṣkoṭī), namely, affirmation, negation, equivalence, and neither is the best example of early Indian epistemology. It is the typical example of the most rigorously self-reflexive and extremely critical method of establishing the reliability of the knowledge. Subsequently, Nyāya entrenched the final standard for any knowledge system to follow for ensuring its reliability. Āyurveda adhered to it through its own methodology (tantrayukti) but entirely based on the Nyāya stipulations, as the samhitas of Suśṛuta and Caraka demonstrate. Knowledge in Page 5 of 12

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Summing Up astronomy had registered considerable progress as the text of Āryabhaṭa, the subsequent commentaries thereof, and new treatises by others indicate. In southern India, especially in the Tamil region, technology of water management had made a significant progress. It shows the trajectory of technological improvement starting from the primeval to the relatively advanced as exemplified by the method of harnessing water in small natural depressions strengthened by mud embankments and huge reservoirs with stone structures, granite sluices, conduits, and distributaries irrigating fields of several villages. (p.259) Knowledge about the sill level for installing the sluices at the right sill level, geographical insights in planning gravity-based distributaries for irrigating the fields of several settlements, and judicious arrangements for the out-of-turn supply of water to fields of top priority are very impressive. Analytical discovery of underlying principles and attempts at theorizing them for attaining knowledge of universality and predictability were aimed at by several scholars. Such knowledge made up of context-free elements, beyond subjectivity, adhering to holism, and amazingly profound began to be accomplished. Some of the strikingly impressive theories are Spōṭavāda, Hetuvidya, Vyaktiviveka, and Dhvanyālōka. Spōṭa (bursting) is a unique theory in Indian linguistics and grammar governing the articulation of speech. It deals with how the brain orders linguistic units into a coherent discourse and semantics. Speculative theories were inevitably moulded by the epistemological parameters of Nyāya. Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyaloka reaches the pinnacle in the Indian theory of aesthetics and the literary theory of criticism. Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa, another instance, also deals with poetics, developing an alternative theory of grammar and aesthetics as the antithesis of Dhvanyālōka. A further improvement in epistemological parameters and methodology is seen in the mathematical astronomy of the fourteenth century CE, by way of the practice of greater insistence upon the production of proof as exemplified by Mādhava of Sangamagrāma in Kerala. His discoveries, like the nine-digits approximation of the value of pi, the sine-cosine infinite series along with their higher trigonometric functions, and a few new equations, enabled the measurement of planetary positions and velocity. Mādhava is accepted by the world of mathematicians today as the first mathematician who discovered the power series at least over two centuries before J. Gregory, G.W. Leibniz, and Isaac Newton. Other great astronomers of Kerala, particularly Paramesvara, Puthumana Somayājī, Nīlakanṭha Somayājī, and Jyēṣṭadēva rendered higher mathematics possible, through their rationality, analytical comprehension, and production of mathematical proofs for pre-existing theorems. With Jyēṣṭadēva, who wrote the first book on calculus (Yuktibhāṣā) in the world, production of proof became the inevitable epistemological requirement for the validation of knowledge. Indeed, after a point, there was mathematical imperative (p.260) as its own motor; there was a socio-economic context for it. Prediction of Page 6 of 12

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Summing Up eclipses was the central purpose, for an eclipse could make a Vedic ritual futile, a matter of disgrace for the patron king and priests. There are certain very interesting correspondences between the formulations of mathematicians of Kerala and what European mathematicians developed subsequently. Nīlakanṭha’s model of the planetary motion developed in the early fifteenth century and the one introduced in Europe by Tycho Brahe a century later are the same. Similarly, the formula developed by Jyēṣṭadēva in the sixteenth century and the formula used by European scholars like Pierre Fermat, John Wallis, and Blaise Pascal century later is the same. What Wallis obtained as his results on continued fractions is identical to those obtained by Bhāskara II. These correspondences have encouraged historians of mathematics/astronomy to explore the possibilities of overseas transmission of knowledge. We see the antecedents of systematized knowledge production in North Africa. It is in the Egyptian civilization that we see the beginnings of specialized knowledge as architecture, astronomy, mathematics, and alchemy exemplify. Mesopotamian, Sumerian, and Babylonian contributions to astronomy and mathematics were remarkable. West Asia generated new knowledge in mechanics and medicine, especially in surgery. All these fields witnessed an explosion of new knowledge during the classical Greek and the Hellenic cultures with a remarkable growth of rational and humanist perception. Even in Greek eschatology and metaphysics, there was a strong stratum of rational knowledge. Mathematicians like Thales and Anaximander of Miletus and Pythagoras of Samos, natural philosophers like Heraclitus of Ephesus and Empedocles of Agrigentum, and astronomers like Anaxagoras had made the domain of knowledge profound. A phase of critical self-reflexivity came up with Socrates and Plato of Athens, and Aristotle of Stagira, influencing multiple fields of knowledge. Aristotle became a school by himself, influencing several generations of scholars like Euclid, Eratosthenes of Cyrene, Archimedes of Syracuse, Claudius Ptolemy, and Claudius Galenus of Pergamon. They let the knowledge advance along the secular track. Epistemology was a leavening influence in their philosophies. Europe soon witnessed the onset of the Dark Age, while the larger Asian and the West Asian world experienced intellectual progress. (p.261) Similarly, Achaemenid Persia’s extensive compilation of knowledge and its destruction by the Arab invasion were significant too. It was a fact that several Byzantine Christian theologians like Anthemius of Tralles, John Philoponus, Paul of Aegina, Venerable Bede, Rabanus Maurus, and others had made significant contributions to mathematics, astronomy, medicine, mechanics, and optics. A good number of Arab Muslim scholars through their translations and scholarly interpretations of the classical Greek and Hellenic systems of knowledge had led to the production of new knowledge in West Asia, whereby the Arab scholars like Al-Khwarizmi, Rhazes, Avicenna, Averroes, and several many others (c. 800–1100 CE) not only Page 7 of 12

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Summing Up retained but also considerably improved upon and carried forward the Greek scholarship in various fields. It facilitated the intellectual resources for Europe to trigger the Renaissance movement. Several eminent Arab scholars of Islamic Spain such as Abbas Ibn Firnas, Abu al-Qasim al-Qurtubi al-Majriti, Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyā al-Rāzī, Abulcasis, Arzachel, Ibn Bajja, Averroes, Ibn alBaitar, and so on made substantial academic contributions to carrying forward the Graeco-Roman astronomy, mathematics, medicine, optics, mechanics, architecture, music, and jurisprudence. Features and dynamics of knowledge production in the Age of Renaissance characterized by the spirit of inquiry and criticism induced an unprecedented rigour in European knowledge production. Its impetus through the works of great intellectuals like Copernicus, Galileo, Francis Bacon, Descartes, and Newton revolutionized the knowledge in natural philosophy. Newton’s theories of objects, position, relations, dynamics, and velocity went into the making of a new field of knowledge called mechanics in natural philosophy. Newton’s theorization of the principles he discovered in the natural phenomenon of motion, which led to the constitution of the fundamental laws of motion of bodies under the action of forces, set the epochal model. His inductive proposition of absolute space, independent of objects and of the universal time, revolutionized the entire domain of knowledge. Newtonian methodology became an epochal imposition on the production of knowledge and scholars felt like insisting upon analysing everything in the light of reason and sustaining the conviction that understanding a phenomenon becomes complete only with the discovery of fundamental laws or principles (p.262) thereof. The emulation of the method of knowledge production in Newton’s Principia, which acquired the dimension of a movement, went into the making of the Age of Enlightenment, giving rise to a number of universal theories as intellectual landmarks in the history of knowledge production. Inquiries even into aspects of sociocultural life of manifold dimensions were influenced by the same methodological imperative. Elements of philosophy of science in Immanuel Kant’s writings brought about enormous epistemological clarity in the properties of reliable knowledge. Newton’s Principia, symbolic of absolute inductive knowledge of universality, became the foundation of knowledge in all fields, accounting for a movement called foundationalism. It triggered positivism and ultimately turned out to be the ultimate basis of modernity. It remained the hegemonic model of the most reliable knowledge for centuries. William Whewell of the nineteenth century CE was the first to write a history of science, identifying Newton’s Principia Mathematica as a marker of scientific revolution. It was he who re-designated Newtonian mechanics as science. In fact, the terms such as ‘science’, ‘scientist’, and ‘scientific’ were nineteenth-century constructs. Whewell’s definition of science and scientific methodology marked the climax of the hegemonic status of Newtonian physics.

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Summing Up The rise of new science fundamentally impacting the production of knowledge during the twentieth century began in the form of new inventions, discoveries, and logical thoughts, enabling theorization of the micro- as well as macrouniverses. Max Planck’s proposition of the quanta, Niels Bohr’s discovery of objects’ non-observable and immeasurable complementary properties, Erwin Schrödinger’s interpretation of the object-subject split as a figment of the imagination, Werner Karl Heisenberg’s enunciation of the uncertainty principle precluding the possibility of precision about certain pairs of physical properties of a particle, Kurt Friedrich Godel’s thesis of undecidability based on his incompleteness theorems proving the inherent limitations of formal axiomatic theories, Murray Gell-Mann’s theory of complexity in particle physics, Richard Feynman’s thesis of quantum mechanics, and Einstein’s theories of relativity are examples. All this, highlighting the problems of uncertainty and subjectivity, literally shook the Newtonian physics of certainty. It virtually illuminated the otherwise invisible subatomic (p.263) universe through sophisticated experimentation, mathematical formalism, and probability theory. A new kind of science began to take shape, raising certain fundamental epistemological issues against the absolute induction of Newtonian physics. Its macro-mechanics of certainty, finality, authenticity, and logo-centrism was found irrelevant to the micro-universe. Repercussions of the new science of uncertainty were serious in social and human sciences, for they got divested of their intellectual foundation. With its characteristic features like uncertainty, undecidability, complexity, tentativeness, and anti-logocentrism, the new science upset the epistemological world view of modernity and put up an antithetical epistemic position leading to the postmodern condition. Simultaneously, there began the rise of historiography of science with a humanistic goal of spreading the passions and values of science. Science was widely understood as the march of human progress and scientific values as the foundation of the human unity. The pedagogic method being the most effective means of dissemination in the university, constitution of history of science as an independent academic discipline by compiling scientific discoveries and inventions, began. Initiatives taken for writing the history of science in the early decades of the twentieth century CE in the form of chronicles of discoveries and inventions account for it. Previously, the purpose of history of science was philosophical and hence it was written as epistemological reviews of scientific theories and their logical structure. A team of neo-Kantian scholars, known as the Vienna Circle, revived this tradition as well during the same period. These philosophers of science believed that experience was the only source of knowledge and philosophical issues could be solved only through logical methods. They undertook the task of epistemological evaluation of scientific theories for confirming their authenticity. It was a logical empiricist enterprise, conceived not as an epistemological exercise alone, but as a political movement

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Summing Up for liberating the people from the shackles of irrational beliefs and metaphysical concepts. World War II had a traumatic effect on science and technology. Nation states as part of their self-aggrandizing schemes floated several research projects for devising powerful arms and ammunition by mobilizing scientists and technologists in universities and technological institutes. Various new discoveries and inventions (p.264) resulted from them, especially those leading to the production of heavily destructive weapons. Since technological development of transport and communication was of great strategic importance to these belligerent states, certain revolutionary inventions took place in that sector too. Actually, the rise of big nation states, their wars, and finally the World Wars were part of the political economy of capitalist development. Processes of the aggressive growth of science and technology during the War and peaceful international negotiations during the post-War period were essentially political manifestations of the capitalist agenda for enhancing control over raw materials and markets, extremely urgent in the context of the great depression of the 1930s. During the period, the domain of knowledge production lost its epistemological criticality, not only due to the World War, but also because of a series of path-breaking discoveries and inventions. One of the exceptions is Thomas Kuhn’s social theoretical history of science proposing scientific revolutions as paradigm shifts. Similarly, Lakatos’s meta-methodological analysis of scientific historiography and Murton’s thesis of Puritanism explaining contemporary genesis of scientific knowledge are also exceptions. Under the influence of postmodernism engendered by ‘new science’ or the science of uncertainty, all grand theories were set aside. As a result, there began the trend of dismissing absolute induction, teleological description, and totalizing interpretation on the one side and celebrating the validity of fragmentary, diverse, tenuous, and culture-specific analyses on the other. Postmodernism popularized the particular and the concrete against the general and the abstract in the methodology of knowledge production. In the wake of the process, constructivism, alternative epistemology, interdisciplinary approach, and convergence research began to influence knowledge production. According to constructivist epistemology, reality represented in academic writings results from the interaction between human intelligence and worldly experience. In spite of the obvious homologous relation between the post-War political economy and the growth of applied science or technology, most historians of science were happy to describe biographical accounts of scientists, recount events in the laboratory, narrate stories of experimentation, and list academic achievements of research institutions. Whether historians of science should engage themselves in analysing social theoretical (p.265) foundation of science or confine themselves only to the description of scientific experiments and discoveries became a matter of personal choice.

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Summing Up Discoveries that established the new science of uncertainty, complexity, complimentarity, undecidability, and unpredictability led to the phenomenal development of a technology of certainty tending to change the perception of the world fundamentally. This transformation has constrained science to become technology or made science and technology hybridize each other. Today’s most enterprising researches are of science-tech hybrid fields emerging accordingly. Capitalism is the driving force behind the process. Techno-capitalism, popularly called knowledge economy, is heavily dependent on science and technology, using them as both commodity and capital. Techno-capitalist corporate houses have built up everywhere their huge experimentalist establishments for the production of new knowledge with fabulously high exchange value, through research in the interface of science and technology. Transacting new knowledge and commodities based on it, besides the entailing patents and intellectual property rights, corporate houses accumulate enormous capital. A brief review of the capital-intensive researches in the institutes of space studies and astronomy show that they have triggered a lot of science-tech speculative thoughts and imagination relating to the dynamics of subatomic micro-universe as well as the mechanics of the galactic macro-universe. According to anthropic reasoning, several scientists believe that the position of the Earth in the solar system is an amazingly strange coincidence. It is an extremely strange coincidence of multiple factors that has made life forms possible on the Earth. Many think that the universe is specifically constituted for the evolution of life from their primeval forms to that of human being, an animal of higher level consciousness. Several scientists think that the existence of many Earth-like planets with lower and higher forms of life is not unlikely in the universe. They speculate higher forms of life to have built up galactic civilizations distinguishable in terms of their technology to tap the source of energy in the universe. According to Nikolai Kardashev, a Russian astrophysicist, the human civilization on the Earth is millions of years behind many galactic civilizations. The civilization on the Earth has not even attained the technology to (p.266) exploit the energy even from its nearest star. Galactic civilizations of higher technologies for using the energy from the entire stars of the galaxy, of the entire galaxies, and of the universe in the ascending order are speculated accordingly. Imagining higher and higher forms of life with greater and greater levels of consciousness, several scientists have advanced their metaphysical speculations about the ontological union between the macro- and micro-levels of consciousness. Discussing the subject in the language of particle physics, many have generated a lot of speculative but non-fictional literature. Some of them combine quantum field theory or quantum entanglement or quantum coherence with quantum consciousness in order to explain the possibilities of the mysterious micro-universe of particles. Consciousness has been a problem of particle physics for quite some time now, encouraging the assumption that it Page 11 of 12

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Summing Up should be taken with insights of quantum field. Roger Penrose, dismissing the matter–mind dichotomy, declares that the laws of new science about the quantum gravity seem to govern consciousness too.

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Afterword

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

(p.267) Afterword Rajan Gurukkal

What is this phenomenon called curiosity, the irrepressible desire to know? All of us know that it is inquisitiveness that triggers the spirit of inquiry and enables exploration, investigation, and experimentation. It is where knowledge takes its genesis. Is knowledge a property distinctive of human species alone? Are all human beings capable of generating knowledge or is it an individualistic twist, a conscious quirk, or an unconscious eccentricity? What necessitates knowledge? Is it entirely an existential and survival necessity? All these questions often take us to historiography of knowledge and human biology but only to get dissatisfied by contradictory answers. Historiography of knowledge, primarily anthropocentric, celebrates knowledge as an exclusive human attribute. It describes knowledge production as an exclusively humanspecific enterprise and interprets its progress as socially contingent. Hence, historians of knowledge have the shared assumption among them that knowledge cannot have a history of its own, independent of human social history. Nevertheless, philosophers discuss history of knowledge in terms of the logical sequential development of epistemic stances, without coming to terms with social history. What they deal with, in other words, is historical epistemology. Several biologists view progression of knowledge production as a biologically contingent process of cognitive improvement, which (p.268) accounts for the acquisition of complex knowledge. Therefore, according to them epistemic complexity is more biological than social or philosophical. They would illustrate it by asking us to imagine the epistemic complexity of a seed that comprises genes with the script of DNA sequences of protein-coding and other genome functions. Although science is yet to unravel the epigenetic rules of the cellular dynamics in the seed, it has become clear today that DNA is not just a micro Page 1 of 4

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Afterword compendium of rules, but very much a source of interpretation as well. Interpretation presupposes consciousness with adequate knowledge base. There is knowledge of multiple dimensions regarding the entire pattern of evolution embedded in it to enable growth and sustenance. Applying the theory of complementarity principle in particle physics, quantum biologists explain complex knowledge, as resulting from bio-chemical processes of inter-cellular semiotic communication and protein synthesis. Can this cellular exchange of ideas and meanings of relations be considered as a conscious process, is a question more or less irrelevant to quantum biologists today. It is scientific truth for them, for they proceed on the basis of the orchestrated objective reduction (Orch-OR) theory of consciousness. They do not see consciousness as resulting from the enhanced complexity of computations in cerebral neurons alone. Orch-OR theory maintains that consciousness is the result of non-computable quantum processing across a collective of cellular microtubules. It is perhaps a quantum field. Quantum physicists explain that self-generating particles, using energy under the inevitable application of the second law of thermodynamics, store knowledge that is essential to build relations through multiple interactions with other particles. Quantum biologists share this knowledge and postulate the presence of consciousness and embedded knowledge in a self-replicating particle. Consciousness presupposes capacity to identify, measure, and remember the properties in order to simulate with a sense of the self. It means that even a particle is a knowledgeable system of epistemic complexity and capacity to ensure systemic durability. Particles unite and reassemble themselves into complex structures of higher functions based on second law of thermodynamics. This is not merely a chemical process of communication across molecular systems under (p.269) thermodynamics. There is consciousness and embedded knowledge of the evolutionary dynamics as well as the subsequent phases of expressive structuration. What technologists tend to succeed in copying are the algorithms of mechanical functions ostensible in the process of inter-cellular communication and action. Artificial intelligence is entirely in the domain of technology and material culture, never to have anything to do with the chemical system of living organisms. As poetically articulated by Erwin Schrödinger in his What Is life?, genetic code is a predetermined package of plan, craft, rules, and power to execute an organism’s total developmental phases between the evolutionary past and the culminating future. Scientists are yet long way off from the fundamental point of turning the inscrutably hidden secret of life into science. Formerly it was believed that human brain would comprehend only macro processes, and affairs at the micro level would not be amenable to its analytical understanding. Immanuel Kant was the first to enunciate the thesis of Page 2 of 4

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Afterword philosophical inaccessibility to phenomena parallel to the human due to barriers of mind. It is the nature of consciousness and embedded knowledge, which provide the framework of perception for understanding its own domain. This framework helps understand other domains only in its own way. Human framework, therefore, has its inherent barriers that disable understanding parallel domains. Quantum science has been encouraging attempts at transcending the Kantian barriers for understanding parallel domains. To a certain extent these efforts have proved to be fruitful in building up models to comprehend them. They have enabled human knowledge to use several constructs of reality not only about the macro universe, but also about the parallel multiverse. However, the human mind lacks the faculty to fully conceptualize the universe beyond Kant’s barriers. Knowledge of quantum universe enables the use of its mechanics in technology and enhances computing power to amazingly high magnitude. It helps mimic the action in algorithmic language, but too mechanically. Nevertheless, this able penetration of knowledge into the parallel universe, beyond the Kantian barriers, helps only widen the hiatus between science that theorizes and technology that manipulates. (p.270) If knowledge production is not a characteristic trait of human brain, the question is whether the difference of knowledge that the human cerebral neurons render plausible pertains only to scale. Although epistemic complexity is not a distinguishing mark of human made knowledge, so far we have no information about any species other than the human that can go critically self-reflexive about its own knowledge. It is in this context the philosophical inquiry into the epistemological properties like ontological structure, composition, functions, and reliability becomes important. A disinterested craving for objective, accurate and complete knowledge seems to be characteristic to human inquiry. Idiosyncrasies of individuals apart, there is something called purely human by way of uncompromising insistence upon the ethics of objectivity and objectivity of ethics, in the human pursuit of knowledge. Various socio-cultural factors in time and space impeded this urge for the systematic improvement of human knowledge towards perfection. It shows the relevance of historiography of knowledge, which unravels these impediments and explains how, in spite of such hurdles, the logic of knowledge improved systematically over the centuries. Ultimately, it is cerebral neurons and the chemical processes that matter in the production of knowledge. Therefore, philosophers of science give precedence of biology over social history in the making of discoveries and inventions. Science as the most transparent and authentic form of knowledge focussed on specific discoveries and their general theory, according to them, is not socially or culturally determined. They maintain that pure reason enables science and technology to be epistemologically independent. Their contention is that science is validated in itself independent of Page 3 of 4

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Afterword social or cultural factors. Moreover, there is no science as yet to explain the social process of science production. Whatever explanation we have is in the form of speculative theories about the bearing of the political economy and socio-cultural matrix on scientific discoveries and technological inventions. Nevertheless, necessity and chance, which account for scientific discoveries and technological inventions, belong primarily to the material as well as social conditions of human existence. It is the material and socio-cultural milieu that engenders which phenomenon should be subjected to scientific explanation and what (p.271) technological device should be invented. Indeed, it decides necessities and gives rise to chances. Although the material and socio-cultural milieu does not decide the science or technology as such, it decisively influences the ways, means, and objects of using science or technology. Ideal use of science and technology never happens wanting ideal social conditions. Material conditions of social life are always made up of asymmetrical relations of people independent of their volition. These unequal material conditions determine people’s consciousness and their intellectual life. This is not to say that ordinary people never get the benefit of scientific discoveries and technological inventions. They do get certain benefits, but mostly the unwanted, and this imposition deprives them of their freedom to secure what they genuinely need. History shows that unevenly evolved knowledge systems have always coexisted. It was only with the onset of the construct of science as the most authentic and epistemologically unassailable system of knowledge, the autonomy of knowledge systems impaired. Science and technology super-imposed themselves over all other knowledge systems and crafts with an enmeshing effect involving epistemic injustice. This relationship of domination and subjection has been universal. It made science and technology symbolic of economic dominance and political control. Science under capitalism inadvertently decided what should be recognized as knowledge. Existence of ideal science and technology is thus precluded. This precludes the possibility of scientists and technologists of selfdetermination today, because techno-capitalists decide what scientists and technologists should do. History of knowledge as an unencumbered course of knowledge production becomes an unfounded imagination.

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Bibliography

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

(p.272) Bibliography Rajan Gurukkal

Bibliography references: Achari, R.V. (2016), ‘From the Mythology of Vāstuśāstra to the Methodology of Vāstuvidya’, Indian Journal of History of Science, 51(1). New Delhi: INSA, pp. 156–66. Adamson, P. (ed.) (2013), Interpreting Avicenn: Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Adler, J.A. (2015), Reconstructing the Confucian Dao: Zhu Xi’s Appropriation of Zhou Dunyi, SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. New York: State University of New York Press (Reprint). Afnan, S.M. (1958), Avicenna: His Life and Works. London: G. Allen & Unwin. Ahbel-Rappe, Sara, and Rachana Kamtekar (eds) (2005), A Companion to Socrates. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Ahmad, Z. (2004), Epistemology of Ibn Khaldun: Culture and Civilisation in the Middle East. London: Routledge. Alam, I. (1986), ‘Textiles Tools as Depicted in Ajanta and Mughal Paintings’, in Aniruddha Ray and S.K. Bagchi (eds), Technology in Ancient and Medieval India. Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, pp. 129–41. ——— (2002), ‘Cotton Technology in India Down to the 16th Century’, in A. Rahman (ed.), India’s Interaction with China, Central and West Asia, III(2). New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 445–63.

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Bibliography Almeida, Dennis F., and George G. Joseph (2004), ‘Eurocentrism in the History of Mathematics: The Case of the Kerala School’, Race and Class, 45(4), Institute of Race Relations. London: SAGE Publications, pp. 53–4. Althusser, L. (1969), For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster. London: Allen Lane. (p. 273) Althusser, L. (1971), ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, in his Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster. London: New Left Books. Althusser, L. and E. Balibar (1970), Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster. London: New Left Books. Anderson, F.H. (1948), The Philosophy of Francis Bacon. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Anderson, P. (1983), In the Tracks of Historical Materialism. London: Verso. ——— (2013), Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. London: Verso (New Edition). Ankersmit, F.R. (1983), Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Language. Den Haag: Nijhoff. ——— (1989), The Reality Effect in the Writing of History: The Dynamics of Historiographical Topology. Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche. ——— (2006), Michel de Certeau, Analysing Culture. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Artmann, B. (1999), Euclid: The Creation of Mathematics. New York: Springer. Back, A. (2008), ‘Islamic Logic?’ in S. Rahman, T. Street, and H. Tahiri (eds), The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition Science: Science, Epistemology and Their Interactions. New York: Springer, pp. 255–80. Bacon, F. (1605), The Advancement of Learning, ed. G.W. Kitchin (1958). New York: Dutton. Bailey, L. (1936), Critical Theory and the Sociology of Knowledge: A Comparative Study in the Theory of Ideology. Pennsylvania: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Balibar, E. (1970), ‘The Fundamental Concepts of Historical Materialism’, in L. Althusser and E. Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster. London: New Left Books. Bandara, M.C.M. (1985), ‘Catchment Ecosystems and Village Tank Cascades in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka: A Time-Tested System of Land and Water Page 2 of 32

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Bibliography Management’, in J. Lundqvist, et al. (eds), Strategies for River Basin Management. Sweden: University of Linkoping. Barnes, J. (1994), Posterior Analytics, Second edition, translated with a commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ——— (1995), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Barnes, B. and R.G.A. Dolby (1970), ‘The Scientific Ethos: A Deviant Viewpoint’, British Journal of Sociology, 2(1), pp. 3–25. Bateson, G. (1969), The Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge: MIT Press (First Edition). ——— (ed.) (1972), Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (p.274) ——— (1979), Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (Advances in Systems Theory, Complexity & the Human Sciences). New York: Hampton Press, new edition. ——— (1983), Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Batterman, R. (1991), ‘Chaos, Quantization, and the Correspondence Principle,’ Synthese, Vol. 89, pp. 189–227. Benson, H. (ed.) (2009), A Companion to Plato. Oxford: Blackwell. Bevir, Mark (1999), The Logic of the History of Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blakely, S. (2006), Myth, Ritual and Metallurgy in Ancient Greece and Recent Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Benardete, S. (1984), Commentary to Plato’s Theaetetus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Benjamin, R. (1967), The Art and Architecture of India: Buddhist-Hindu-Jain, Third Revised edition. New Delhi: Penguin Books. Berggren, J.L. and J. Alexander (2000), Ptolemy’s Geography: An Annotated Translation of the Theoretical Chapters. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Bernal, J.D. (1926), ‘On the Interpretation of X-Ray, Single Crystal, Rotation Photographs’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 113(763), pp. 117–60. Page 3 of 32

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Bibliography ——— (1934), Aspects of Dialectical Materialism. London: Watts & Co. ——— (1944), The Social Function of Science. London: George Routledge. ——— (1971), Science in History, 4 volumes. Massachusetts: MIT Press. Bernstein, R. (1983), Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Bijker, W.E., T.P. Hughes, and T.J. Pinch eds. (1987), The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Blue, G. (1997), ‘Joseph Needham: A Publication History’, Chinese Science, Vol. 14. London: International Society of East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine, pp. 90–132. Boardman, J., J. Dorig, W. Fuchs, and M. Hirmer (1967), The Art and Architecture of Ancient Greece. London: Thames and Hudson. Bodner, G.M. (1986), ‘Constructivism: A Theory of Knowledge’, Journal of Chemical Education. Birmingham: ACS Publications, 63(10), pp. 873–8. Bohm, D.J. and E. Mark (1991), Changing Consciousness: Exploring the Hidden Source of the Social, Political and Environmental Crises Facing our World. New York: Edwards, HarperCollins. Bohr, N. (1911), ‘On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules’, Philosophical Magazine, Series 6, Vol. 26, pp. 1–25. (p.275) ——— (1925), ‘Atomic Theory and Mechanics’, Nature (Supplement), Vol. 116, pp. 845–52. ——— (1937/1961), Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ,

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Bibliography Brown, P. (1956), Indian Architecture (Buddhist and Hindu), Second edition, UK: Tobey Press. Browning, G. (1993), ‘The German Ideology: The Theory of History and The History of Theory’, History of Political Thought, 14(3), pp. 455–73. Burke, P. (2000), Social History of Knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot. London: Polity Press. ——— (2015), What is the History of Knowledge? London: Polity Press. Burns, E. (ed.) (1970), A Handbook of Marxism. New York: Haskel House Publishers Ltd. Butterfield, H. (1931), The Whig Interpretation of History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (1949), The Origins of Modern Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cammett, John W. (1967), Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism. California: Stanford University Press. Carnap, R. (1932–4), The Unity of Science. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Teubner and Co. Carnap, R., C. Morris, and O. Neurath (eds) (1970), Foundations of the Unity of Science: Towards an International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vols. 1 and 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Carroll, B.W. (2007), Archimedes’ Principle. Ogten: Weber State University Press. Cassidy, D.C. (2009), Beyond Uncertainty: Heisenberg, Quantum Physics and the Bomb. New York: Bellevue Literary Press. Castellvi, M.T.C. (1999), Terminology: Theory, Methodology and Applications, trans. Janet Ann DeCesaris. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Cetina, K.K. (1999), Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Chalmers, A.F. (1990), Science and Its Fabrication. Buckingham: Open University Press (Reprint). (p.276) Chalmers, A.F. (1994), What Is This Thing Called Science? Buckingham: Open University Press (Reprint).

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Bibliography Chan, Wing-tsit (1987), Chu Hsi: Life and Thought. Lady Ho Tung Hall: Chinese University Press. Chattopadhyaya, D. (1977), Science and Society in Ancient India. Calcutta: Research India Publications. Charles, D. (2001), ‘Teleological Causation in the Physics’, in L. Judson (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics: A Collection of Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 101–28. Clark, G. (1937), Science and Social Welfare in the Age of Newton, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cohen, C.A. (1978), Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cohen, F. (1994), The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry. London: University of Chicago Press. Cole, J.H. (1925), Determination of the Exact Size and Orientation of the Great Pyramid of Giza. Cairo: Government Press. Comte, A. (1975), The Course in Positive Philosophy, written between 1830–42, original text. Conrad, L.I., M. Neve, V. Nutton, R. Porter, and A. Wear (1995), The Western Medical Tradition: 800 BC To AD 1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coomaraswamy, A.K. (1914), Viśvakarmā: Examples of Indian Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Handicraft. Bombay: Messrs. Cornford, F.M. (2003), Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist. Mineola: Dover Publications. Coulton, J.J. (1982), Ancient Greek Architects at Work: Problems of Structure and Design. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. Craddock, P.T., I.C. Freestone, L.K. Gurjar, A.P. Middleton, and L. Willies (1998), ‘Zinc in India’, in P.T. Craddock (ed.), 2000 Years of Zinc and Brass, British Museum Occasional Paper Series No. 50, pp. 29–72. Crombie, A.C. (1952), Augustine to Galileo: The History of Science A.D. 400– 1650. London: Falcon. Reprint Penguin (1969). ——— (1953), Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science, 1100–1700. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Reprint Clarendon Press, 1971.

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Bibliography ——— (ed.) (1963), Scientific Change: Historical Studies in the Intellectual, Social and Technical Conditions for Scientific Discovery and Technical Invention, from Antiquity to the Present. New York: Basic Books. Dahlke, H.O. (1940), ‘The Sociology of Knowledge’, in H.E. Barnes, H. Becker, and F.B. Becker (eds), Contemporary Social Theory. New York: Appleton. (p. 277) Dales, G.F. (1991), ‘Some Specialised Ceramic Studies at Harappa’, in R.H. Meadow (ed.), Harappa Excavations 1986–1990, Monographs in World Archaeology No. 3. Madison: Prehistory Press, pp. 61–9. Danto, A. (1968), Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (1985), Narration and Knowledge. Columbia: Columbia University Press. Darwin, C. (1926), The Origin of Species (first published in 1859). London: John Murray, Reprint. Daston, L. (1988), Classical Probability and the Enlightenment, Princeton: Princeton University Press. ——— (1991), ‘The Ideal and Reality of the Republic of Letters in the Enlightenment’, Science in Context, 4(2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 367–86. ——— (1994), ‘Historical Epistemology’, in J. Chandler, A.I. Davidson, and H.D. Harootunian (eds), Questions of Evidence, Proof, Practice, and Persuasion across the Disciplines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ——— (1999), ‘Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective’, in M. Biagioli (ed.), The Science Studies Reader. New York: Routledge, pp. 110–23. ——— (2001), Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750. Massachusetts: MIT Press. ——— (2009), ‘Science Studies and History of Science’, Critical Inquiry, 35(4) (Summer). Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 798–813. Davies, M. (1997), ‘Joseph Needham—1900–1995’, British Journal for the History of Science, 30(1), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 95–100. DeGre, G. (1943), Society and Ideology: An Inquiry into the Sociology of Knowledge. Columbia: Columbia University Press.

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Bibliography Dehesh, S. (1975), ‘Pre-Islamic Medicine in Persia’, Middle East Journal of Anesthesiology, 4(5), Beirut: American University of Beirut Medical Centre, pp. 377–82. DeLacy, E.A. (1963), Euclid and Geometry. New York: Franklin Watts. DeLaine, J. (1990), ‘Structural Experimentation: The Lintel Arch, Corbel and Tie in Western Roman Architecture’, World Archaeology, 21(3), London: Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 407–24. Delon, M. (ed.) (1997), Encyclopaedia of the Enlightenment, Vol. I. London and New York: Routledge. Deshpande, V.J. (1999), ‘History of Chemistry and Alchemy in India from Prehistoric to Pre-modern Times’, in A. Rahman (ed.), History of Indian Science, Technology and Culture A.D 1000–1800, as part of D.P. Chattopadhyay (ed.) (p. 278) History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, Vol. III, Part 1. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Diamond, J. (2006), The Third Chimpanzee: The Evolution & Future of the Human Animal. New York: Harper Perennial. Dinsmoor, W.B. (1950), The Architecture of Greece: An Account of its Historic Development, Third edition. London: Batsford. Divakaran, P.P. (2007), ‘The First Textbook of Calculus: Yuktibhāṣa’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 35(5–6), p. 417. ——— (2010), ‘Notes on Yuktibhāṣa: Recursive Methods in Indian Mathematics’, in C.S. Seshadri (ed.), Studies in the History of Indian Mathematics. New Delhi: Hindustan Book Agency. Doren, Charles Van (1992), A History of Knowledge: Past, Present, and Future. New York: Ballantine Books; Reissue edition. Dreyer, J.L.E. (1890), Tycho Brahe, a Picture of Scientific Life and Work in the Seventeenth Century. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Back. Dreyer, J.W. (1953), A History of Astronomy from Thales to Kepler. New York: Dover. Duhem, P. (1908), To Save the Phenomena: An Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory from Plato to Galileo. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ——— (1913–59), The System of World: A History of Cosmological Doctrines from Plato to Copernicus, Ten Volumes. Paris: A. Hermann.

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Bibliography ——— (1954), The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Second edition, first published in 1954. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Durkheim, E. (2012), The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. K.E. Fields. New York: Free Press. Edwards, I.E.S. (1986), The Pyramids of Egypt. London: Max Parrish, Reprint. Einstein, A. (1919), ‘My Theory’, The Times (London), 28 November, p. 13 ;

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Bibliography ——— (1981), Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (1981), Problems of Empiricism: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (1982), Science in a Free Society. London: Verso. ——— (1987), Farewell to Reason. London: Verso. ——— (1991), Three Dialogues on Knowledge. New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. Feynman, R. (1967), Character of Physical Law. Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press. ——— (1971), Lectures on Physics, Vol. III. Boston: Addison Wesley. ——— (2005), The Meaning of It All: Thoughts of a Citizen-Scientist. New York: Basic Books. Fine, G. (ed.) (1999), Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fisch, M. (1991), William Whewell: Philosopher of Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fleck, L. (1979), Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, Eng trans. F. Bradley and T.J. Trenn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Foster-Carter, A. (1978), ‘The Modes of Production Controversy’, New Left Review, 1(107). London: New Left Books. Foucault, M. (1972), The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge. ——— (1994), The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. London: RHUS, Reprint. Frank, R. (1980), Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists: Scientific Ideas and Social Interaction. Berkeley: University of California Press. Frazer, J.G. (1933), Condorcet on the Progress of the Human Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. French, R. (1994), William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. French, R. and A. Cunningham (1996), Before Science: The Invention of the Friars’ Natural Philosophy. Aldershot: Scholar Press.

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Bibliography Friedman, M. (2013), Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (p.280) Friedrich, S. (2015), The Vienna Circle: Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism, Second edition. New York: Springer. Fuller, S. (2000), Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Furley, D.J. (1999), ‘What Kind of Cause is Aristotle’s Final Cause?’, in M. Frede and G. Stricker (eds), Rationality in Greek Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 59–79. Galison, P. (1997), Image and Logic: The Material Culture of Microphysics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ——— (2003), Einstein’s Clocks, Poincaré’s Maps: Empires of Time. New York: Norton. Gallie, W.B. (1964), Philosophy and the Historical Understanding. London: Chatto & Windus. ——— (1957), ‘What Makes a Subject Scientific?’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 8(30). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 118–39. Gangas, S. (2011), ‘Values, Knowledge and Solidarity: Neglected Converges between Emile Durkheim and Max Scheler’, Human Studies, 34(4), pp. 353–71. Gardner, D.K. (2007), The Four Books: The Basic Teachings of the Later Confucian Tradition. Indianapolis: Hackett. Gaukroger, S. (2001), Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ge Hong, Baopuzi Neipian (Book of the Master of the Preservations of Solidarity), trans. S.J. Obed, (1936), A Study of Chinese Alchemy. Shanghai: Commercial Press. Gell-Mann, M. (1995), The Quarks and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and Complex. New York: Little Brown Book Group. Gell-Mann, G. and J.B. Hartle (1990), ‘Quantum Mechanics in the Light of Quantum Cosmology’, in W.H. Zurek (ed.), Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information. Boston Mass: Addison-Wesley, pp. 425–58. George, M. (2000), Hindu Art and Architecture. London and New York: Thames and Hudson. Page 11 of 32

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Bibliography Gertrud, Lenzer (ed.) (1975), Auguste Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings. New York: Harper. Giedymin, J. (1982), Science and Convention: Essays on Henri Poincaré’s Philosophy of Science and the Conventionalist Tradition. Pergamon: Oxford University Press. Golinski, J. (1988), Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gotthelf, A. (1987), ‘Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality’, in A. Gotthelf and J.G. Lennox (eds), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 204–42. (p.281) Gramsci, A. (1971), Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. Grant, E. (1996), The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional and Intellectual Contexts, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Greene, B. (2010), The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Reprint. Griffiths, D. (1995), Introduction to Quantum Mechanics, Second edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Gunavardhana, R.A.L.H. (1984), ‘Intersocietal Transfer of Hydraulic Technology in Precolonial South Asia: Some Reflections Based on a Preliminary Investigation’, South Asian Studies, 22(2), pp. 115–46. Gurukkal, R. (2010), Social Formations of Early South India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Gutas, D. (1998), Greek Thought Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Bagdad and Early ‘Abbāsid Society’ (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries). New York: Routledge (Reprint). Habermas, J. (1968), ‘The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory’, Ch. III in Knowledge and Human Interest. London: Polity Press. ——— (1987), ‘The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory’, Chapter III, Knowledge and Human Interest, English tr., Cambridge: Polity Press. Habib, I. (2008), Technology in Medieval India. New Delhi: Tulika Books. Hacking, I. (1999), The Social Construction of What. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 5–35. Page 12 of 32

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Bibliography Haldane, J.B.S. (1929), ‘The Origin of Life’, Rationalist Annual, Vol. 148, pp. 3– 10; reproduced in London: Barrie & Rockliff. Haldane, J.B.S. (1968), Science and Life, Pemberton Publishing with Barrie & Rockliff, pp. 1–11. ——— (1930–2), ‘A Mathematical Theory of Natural and Artificial Selection’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, Vols. 26–28, Parts I–IX, pp. 137–42. ——— (1932), The Causes of Evolution. London: Longmans Green. ——— (1933), Science and Human Life. London: Harper and Brothers. ——— (1939), The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences. London: Random House. Hall, A.R. (1954), The Scientific Revolution, 1500–1800. London: Longmans ; Revised edition,

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Bibliography Heilbron, J.L. (2000), The Dilemmas of an Upright Man: Max Planck and the Fortunes of German Science. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Hessen, B. (1931), ‘The Socio-Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia’, in Nicolai I. Bukharin (ed.) (1971), Science at the Crossroads. London: Second International Congress of the History of Science. ——— (1971), The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia. New York: Howard Fertig. Heisenberg, W. (1970), Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science. New South Wales: Allen & Unwin. ——— (1970), Philosophical Problems of Quantum Physics, Second edition, Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press. ——— (1970), The Physicist’s Concept of Nature. New York: Praeger. Hill, C. (1974), ‘Puritanism, Capitalism and the Scientific Revolution,’ in C. Webster (ed.), The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 243–53. Hindess, B. and P.Q. Hirst (1977), Pre-capitalist Modes of Production. London: Macmillan. Hobsbawm, E.J. (ed.) (1964), Pre-capitalist Economic Formations. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Hodges, R. (1982), Dark Age Economics: The Origins of Towns and Trade AD 600–1000. New York: St Martin’s Press. Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1990), Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Huang, Y. (2013), Confucius: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Bloomsbury. Huffiman, C. (2005), Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher, and Mathematician King. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hughes, T.P. (1969), ‘Technological Momentum in History: Hydrogenation in Germany 1898–1933’, Past and Present, 44(1), pp. 106–32. (p.283) ——— (1994), ‘Technological Momentum’, in M.R. Smith and L. Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. 101–13. ——— (2000), ‘Technological Momentum’, in A.H. Teich (ed.), Technology and the Future. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, Eighth edition. Page 14 of 32

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Bibliography Hume, D. (2004), An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Reprint by J. Bennett. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Hussey, E. (1982), ‘Epistemology and Meaning in Heraclitus’, in M. Schofield and M.C. Nussbaum (eds), Language and Logos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33–59. Ilardi, V. (2007), Renaissance Vision from Spectacles to Telescope. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society. Iskandar, A. (2006), ‘Al-Rāzī,’ in History of Science, Technology, and Medicine in Non-western Cultures, Second edition. New York: Springer, pp. 155–6. Jane, G. (2002), On the Epistemology of the Senses in Early Chinese Thought, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Jonas, H. (1984), The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of Ethics for the Technological Age, trans. David Herr, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jonathan, B. (1982), The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Joseph, G.G. (2009), A Passage to Infinity: Medieval Indian Mathematics from Kerala and Its Impact, New Delhi: SAGE Publications. ——— (2009), ‘Kerala Mathematics: Motivation, Rationale and Method’, in G.G. Joseph (ed.), Kerala Mathematics: History and Its Possible Transmission to Europe, Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation. ——— (2010), Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Routes of Indian Mathematics, London: Princeton University Press. Kahn, C.H. (1979), The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaku, M. (2006), Parallel Worlds: A Journey Through Creation, Higher Dimensions, and the Future of the Cosmos, Hamburg: Anchor, rpt. Kant, I. (1784), An Answer to ‘What is meant by Enlightenment?’ in Immanuel Kant Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed., by Mary J. Gregor (1996), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kardashev, N. (1997), ‘Cosmology and Civilizations,’ Astrophysics and Space Science, Vol. 252, No. 1, London: Springer, pp. 25–40. ——— (1960), ‘Search for Artificial Stellar Sources of Infrared Radiation,’ Science 3 Vol. 131, No. 3414, New York: American Association for the Advancement of Science, pp. 1667–8. (p.284) Page 15 of 32

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Bibliography Kearney, H.F. (1974), ‘Puritanism, Capitalism and the Scientific Revolution,’ in C. Webster (ed.), The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 218–42. ——— (1974), ‘Puritanism and Science: Problems of Definitions,’ in C. Webster (ed.), The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 254–61. Kellens, J. (1989), ‘Avesta’. Encyclopedia Iranica, Vol. 3., New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 35–44. Kelley, Donald, R. (2002), The Descent of Ideas: The History of Intellectual History, London: Ashgate. Kemp, B.J. (2005), Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization, Second edition, Taylor & Francis, Routledge. Keyser, P.T. and G.L. Irby-Massie (2008), Encyclopedia of Ancient Natural Scientists: The Greek Tradition and Its Many Heirs, London: Routledge. Kenoyer, J.M. (1996), ‘Craft Traditions of the Indus Civilization and Their Legacy in Modern Pakistan,’ Lahore Museum Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 1–8. Ken, H. and G. Paul eds. (1993), Epistemological Issues in Classical Chinese Philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press. Kerr, R. and N. Wood (2004), ‘Ceramic Technology,’ in Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 5, Part XII, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 171–3. Kiparsky, P. (1993), ‘Pāṇinian Linguistics,’ in R.E. Asher (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Vol. 1(6), Oxford: Pergamon Press. Klass, M. (1980), Caste: The Emergence of the South Asian Social System, Philadelphia: Institute for Human Issues. Kosambi, D.D. (1958), Introduction to the Study of History, Bombay: Popular Prakashan. ——— (1962), Myth and Reality: Study in the Formation of Indian Culture, Bombay: Popular Prakashan. ——— (1964), Culture and Civilisation in Ancient India in Historical Outline, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. Krishnan, K., I.C. Freestone, and A.P. Middleton (2005), ‘The Technology of Glazed Reserved Slip Ware—A Fine Ceramic of the Harappan Period,’ Archaeometry, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 691–703.

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Bibliography Kuhn, T. (1962), The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ——— (1957), The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in Western Thought, Harvard: Harvard University Press. ——— (1977), The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (p.285) Lakatos, I. (1961), Essays in the Logic of Mathematical Discovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (1970), History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions, New York: Springer. ——— (1970), ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’ in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 90–196. ——— (1976), Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (1980), The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers, Cambridge University Press. Lalande, A. (1954), ‘From Science and Hypothesis to Last Thoughts of H. Poincaré 1912,’ Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 596–8. Latour, B. (1979), Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, Princeton: Princeton University Press. ——— (1987), Science in Action: How to follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, Milton Keynes: Open University Press. ——— (1997), Toward a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesising Proteins in the Test Tube, Stanford: Stanford University Press. ——— (2010), An Epistemology of the Concrete: Twentieth-Century Histories of Life Experimental Futures: Technological Lives, Scientific Arts, Anthropological Voices, Durham: Duke University Press Books. Latour, B. and Steve Woolgar (1979), Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts, London: SAGE ;

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Bibliography Makeham, J. (2008), China: The World’s Oldest Living Civilization Revealed, London: Thames & Hudson. Malinowski, B. (1948), Magic, Science and Religion, and Other Essays, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. Mallayya, V.M. and G.G. Joseph (2009), ‘Indian Mathematical Tradition: The Kerala Dimension,’ in G.G. Joseph (ed.), Kerala Mathematics: History and Its Possible Transmission to Europe, Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation. Manilal, K.S. (2003), Van Rheede’s Hortus Malabaricus, English edition, with annotations and modern botanical nomenclature, 12 Vols., Trivandrum: University of Kerala. Mannheim, K. (1953), Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, P. Kecskemeti (ed.), London: Routledge. ——— (1954), Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, New York: Harcourt. ——— (1963), Ideology and Utopia, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Manuel, F. (1968), A Portrait of Isaac Newton, Cambridge: Belknap Press. Marx, K. (1859), A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, M. Dobb (ed.), rpt. (1913) New York: International Publishers. ——— (1927), ‘Private Property and Communism,’ Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Moscow: Progress Publishers. ——— (1953), Grundrisse, Berlin: Marxist Internet Archive. ——— (1964), Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, trans. T.B. Bottomore, London: McGraw-Hill. ——— (1990), Capital, Vol. I, London: Penguin Classics. ——— (1994), A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, first published in 1853, rpt., Chicago: Kerr & Co. (p.287) ——— (1996), Capital, Vol. I, first published in 1867, Moscow: Progress Publishers. Martineau, Harriet (2000), The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte. Kitchener: Batoche Books. Marx, K. and Friedrich Engels (1968), The German Ideology, first published in 1845, Moscow: Progress Publishers.

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Bibliography ——— (1969), The Communist Manifesto, first published in 1848, in Marx/Engels Selected Works, Vol. I, Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 98–137. Mason, S.F. (1953), A History of Sciences: Main Currents of Scientific Thought, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Matilal, B.K. (1971), Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, The Hague: Mouton Publishers. McGinni, J. (2008), ‘Avicenna’s Naturalised Epistemology and Scientific Method,’ in S. Rahman, T. Street, and H. Tahiri (eds), The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition Science: Science, Epistemology and Their Interactions, New York: Springer, pp. 129–52. Mead, G.H. (1934), Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, C.W. Morris (ed.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Merton, R.K. (1938), ‘Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England,’ Osiris, Vol. IV, Pt. 2, Bruges: St. Catherine Press, pp. 360–632. ——— (1970), Science, Technology and Society in 17th Century England, New York: Harper & Row. ——— (1973), The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ——— (1968), Social Theory and Social Structure, New York: The Free Press. ——— (1996), On Social Structure and Science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ——— (2011), Sociology of Science and Sociology as Science, New York: Columbia University Press. Merton, R.K. and B. Barber (1990), ‘Sorokin’s Formulations in the Sociology of Science,’ in B. Barber (ed.), Social Studies of Science, New Brunswick: Transactions Publishers, pp. 45–55. Meillassoux, C. (1971), ‘From Reproduction to Production: A Marxist Approach to Economic Anthropology’, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 93–104. Micahel, E.M. (1967), ‘Avicenna,’ The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, New York: Macmillan. Miliband, R. (1977), Marxism and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Bibliography Mills, C.M. (1942), ‘A Sociological Account of Pragmatism: An Essay on the Sociology of Knowledge,’ Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wisconsin. (p.288) Mills, C.W. (1976), Sociological Imagination, New York: Oxford University Press. ——— (2000), The Sociological Imagination, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Monod, J. (1972), Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Biology, New York: Vantage Books. Moore, W. (1989), Schrödinger, Life and Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 220–2. Morin, E. (2007), ‘Restricted Complexity, General Complexity,’ in C. Gershenson, D. Aerts, and B. Edmonds (eds), Worldviews, Science and Us: Philosophy and Complexity, Singapore: World Scientific, pp. 5–29. Morris, C. (1962), ‘On the History of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,’ in R. Carnap (ed.), Logic and Language (Festschrift Studies on the occasion of R. Carnap’s 79th birthday), Synthese library, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 242–6. Mouffe, C. (1979), Gramsci and Marxist Theory, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Mueller, I. (1981), Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Structure in Euclid’s Elements, Cambridge: MIT Press. Mulkay, M.J. (1972), The Social Process of Innovation: A Study in the Sociology of Science, London: Macmillan. ——— (1975), ‘Three Models of Scientific Development,’ Sociological Review, Vol. 23, pp. 509–26. ——— (1976), ‘Norms and Ideology in Science’, Social Science: Information, Vol. 15, No. 4–5, pp. 637–56. ——— (1979), Science and the Sociology of Knowledge, London: Allen & Unwin. ——— (1985), The Word and the World: Explorations in the Form of Sociological Analysis, Winchester Mass: Allen & Unwin. Murowchick, R.E. (1991), The Ancient Bronze Metallurgy of Yunnan and its Environs: Development and Implications, Michigan: Ann Arbour Publishers. Musson, A.E. (ed.) (1972), Science, Technology and Economic Growth in the Eighteenth Century, London: Methuen. Page 21 of 32

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Bibliography Nagel, E. and J.R. Newman (2001), Gödel’s Proof, New York: New York University Press. Nair, V. and D. Sankar (2016), ‘Knowledge Generation in Āyurveda: Methodological Aspects,’ Indian Journal of History of Science, Vol. 51, No. 1, New Delhi: Indian National Science Academy. Needham, J. (1954), Science and Civilisation in China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (1969), The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West, London: Allen & Unwin. ——— (1986), Science and Civilization in China, Volumes III–VI, Taipei: Caves Books, Ltd. Needham, J. and W. Pagel eds. (1938), Background to Modern Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (p.289) Nelson, M. and K. Poulin (1997), ‘Method of Constructivist Inquiry,’ in T. Sexton and B. Griffin (eds), Constructivist Thinking in Counselling Practice, New York: Teachers College Press, pp. 157–73. Nidditch, P.H. (ed.) (1954), A Treatise of Human Nature, Second edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Northrop, H.S.P. (1951), ‘Methodology and Epistemology: Oriental and Occidental,’ in Charles A. Moore (ed.), Essays in East-West Philosophy: An Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 151–60. Nunn, J.F. (2002), Ancient Egyptian Medicine, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. Nylan, M. (2001), The Five ‘Confucian’ Classics. New Haven: Yale University Press. Olby, R. (1974), The Path to the Double Helix, London: Macmillan. Panabokke, C.R. (2000), The Small Tank Cascade Systems of the Rajarata: Their Setting, Distribution Patterns, and Hydrography, Colombo: Sri Lanka: Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka. Partington, J.R. (1935), Origins and Developments of Applied Chemistry, London: Longmans. Paul, R. (1992), Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page 22 of 32

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Bibliography Penrose, P. (1989), The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ——— (1995), Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Penrose, R. and S. Hameroff (2011), ‘Consciousness in the Universe: Neuroscience, Quantum Space-Time Geometry and Orch OR Theory,’ Journal of Cosmology, Vol. 14, pp. 1–18. Perelman, M. (2004), Steal this Idea: Intellectual Property Rights and the Corporate Confiscation of Creativity, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Pérez-Ramos, A. (1988), Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Petrie, F.W. (1883), The Pyramids and Temples of Gizeh, London: Field & Tuer. Petry, M.J. (ed.) (1993), Hegel and Newtonianism, Dordrecht & London: Springer. Piaget, J. (1971), Genetic Epistemology, New York: W.W. Norton. ——— (1973), To Understand is to Invent: The Future of Education, New York: Grossman Publishers. Pickering, A. (1984), Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pinch, J.J. and W.E. Bijker (1984), ‘The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other,’ Social Studies of Science, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 399–441. (p.290) Piṣāraṭi, Acyuta (1956), Veṇuāroha of Madhava of Sangamagrāma, critically edited with introduction and appendix by K.V. Sarma, Tripunithura: The Sanskrit College Committee. Pojman, L.P. (2002), Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings, Third edition, Boston: Gengage Learning. Polkinghorne, J.C. (1996), Beyond Science: The Wider Human Context, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (2000), Faith, Science and Understanding, New Haven: SPCK/Yale University Press. Popkin, R. (1960), The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, Assen: Van Gorcum. Page 23 of 32

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Bibliography ——— (1979), The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, Berkeley: University of California Press. ——— (2003), The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Popper, K. (1959), The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson. ——— (1989), Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Fifth edition, London: RKP. ——— (1972), Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Porter, R. (ed.) (2003), The Cambridge History of Science. Vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Principe, L.M. (2013), The Secrets of Alchemy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pritchard, D. (2006), What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? London: Routledge. Rabb, T.K. (1974), ‘Religion and the Rise of Modern Science,’ in C. Webster (ed.), The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 262–79. ——— (1974), ‘Science, Religion and Society in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,’ in C. Webster (ed.), The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 284–5. Radhakrishnan, S. and C.A. Moore (ed.) (1989), A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, rpt. Raina, D. (2003), Images and Contexts: Studies in the Historiography of Science in India, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rajagopal, C.T. and A. Venkataraman (1949), ‘The Sine and Cosine Power Series in Hindu Mathematics,’ Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. 15, pp. 1–13. Rajagopal, C.T. and T.V. Iyer (1952), ‘On the Hindu Proof of Gregory’s Series,’ Scripta Mathematica: A Quarterly Journal Devoted to the Philosophy, History, and Expository Treatment of Mathematics, Vol. 18, New York: Yeshiva University, pp. 65–74. (p.291) Rajagopal, C.T. and M.S. Rangachari (1986), ‘On an Untaped Source of Medieval Keralese,’ History of Exact Sciences, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 91–9.

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Bibliography Raju, C.K. (2001), ‘Computers, Mathematics Education, and the Alternative Epistemology of the Calculus in the Yuktibhaṣa,’ Philosophy East and West, Vol. 51, No. 3, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 325–61. Rahman, S., T. Street, and H. Tahiri eds. (2008), The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition Science: Science, Epistemology and Their Interactions, New York: Springer, pp. 1–40. Ramasubrahmanian, K., M.D. Srinivas, and M.S. Sriram (1994), ‘Modification of the Earlier Indian Planetary Theory by the Kerala Astronomers (c. 1500 A.D.) and the Implied Heliocentric Picture of Planetary Motion,’ Current Science, Vol. 66, No. 10, pp. 784–90. Ramaswamy, V. (1985), Textiles and Weavers in India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. ——— (2013), The Song of the Loom: The Weaver Folk Traditions in South India, New Delhi: Primus Books. Ramavarma and A.R. Akhilesvara Iyer (1928), Yuktibhasha, Trissur: Mangalodyam. Rand, A. (1979), Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, New York: Meridian. Ratnagar, S.F. (2007), Makers and Shapers, New Delhi: Tulika Books. Reisman, D.C. (2002), The Making of the Avicennan Tradition: The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sīnā’s al-Mubāḥaṯāt (The Discussions), Leiden: Brill. Renn, J. (1996), ‘Historical Epistemology and the Advancement of Science,’ Berlin: Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Preprint 36, pp. 1–24. Rey, Pierre-Philippe (1975), ‘On the Lineage Mode of Production,’ Critique of Anthropology, Vol. 3, No. 11, pp. 27–79. ——— (1979), ‘Class Contradiction in Lineage Societies,’ Critique of Anthropology, Vol. 4, Nos 13–14, pp. 41–60. Ricoeur, R. (1965), History and Truth, trans. C.A. Kelbley, Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Robertson, H.P. (1929), ‘The Uncertainty Principle,’ Physical Review, Vol. 34, pp. 573–4. Robertson, D.S. (1969), Greek and Roman Architecture, Second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Bibliography Rogers, J.H. (1998), ‘Origins of the Ancient Constellations: I. The Mesopotamian Traditions,’ Journal of the British Astronomical Association, Vol. 108, No. 1, pp. 9–28. Rorty, R. (1979), Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (p.292) Rorty, R. (1991), Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rosenthal, F. (1970), Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam, Leiden: Brill. ——— (1992), The Classical Heritage in Islam, trans. Emile and J. Marmorstein, in Arabic Thought and Culture Series, London: Routledge. Rossi, C. (2007), Architecture and Mathematics in Ancient Egypt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rossi, P. (1968), Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, London: RKP. Rošker, J.S. (2008), Searching for the Way: Theories of Knowledge in Pre-Modern and Modern China, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. ——— (2012), ‘Traditional Chinese Epistemology: The Structural Compatibility of Mind and External World,’ Zheng da Zhong wen xue bao, Vol. 17, pp. 1–16. Rudebusch, G. (2006), Socrates, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Runciman, W. (1962), Plato’s Later Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sabra, A.I. (1987), ‘The Appropriation and Subsequent Naturalisation of Greek Science in Medieval Islam: A Preliminary Statement,’ History of Science, Vol. 25, No. 69, pp. 223–43. ——— (1994), Optics, Astronomy and Logic: Studies in Arabic Science and Philosophy, Variorum Collected Study Series 444, Aldershot: Variorum. Sagan, C. (1986), Dragons of Eden: Speculations on the Evolution of Human Intelligence, London: RHUS. Sahotra, S. (1996), The Legacy of the Vienna Circle: Modern Reappraisals, New York: Garland Publications. Said, E. (1979), Orientalism, London: Vintage Books. Sakurai, J.J. (1993), Modern Quantum Mechanics (Revised edition), Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. Page 26 of 32

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Bibliography Sarma, K.V. (1990), Observational Astronomy in India, Department of Sanskrit, Calicut: University of Calicut. ——— (ed.) (1998), ‘Tantrasangraha of Nilakantha Somayaji,’ trans. V.S. Narasimhan, Indian Journal of History of Science, Vol. 33, No. 1, New Delhi: Indian National Science Academy. Sarton, G.L. (1927), Introduction to the History of Science Vol. I ‘From Homer to Omar Khayyam,’ Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company. ——— (1931), Vol. II, ‘From Rabbi Ben Ezra to Roger Bacon,’ Pt. 1&2, Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company. ——— (1947–48), Vol. III ‘Science and Learning in the Fourteenth-century,’ Pt. 1&2, Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. ——— (1936), The Study of the History of Mathematics, Harvard: Harvard University Press. (p.293) ——— (1936), The Study of the History of Science, Harvard: Harvard University Press. ——— (1948), The Life of Science: Essays in the History of Civilization, New York: Henry Schuman. ——— (1952), A Guide to the History of Science, Waltham: Chronica Botanica Company. ——— (1954), Galen of Pergamon, Kansas: University of Kansas Press. ——— (1955), Appreciation of Ancient and Medieval Science during the Renaissance, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. ——— (1957), Six Wings: Men of Science in the Renaissance, Indiana: Indiana University Press. Sarukkai, S. (2008), Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, Second edition, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Schaud, E.L. (1920), ‘A Sociological Theory of Knowledge,’ The Philosophical Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, Duke University Press. Scheler, M. (1960), ‘The Essence of Philosophy and the Moral Preconditions of Philosophical Knowledge’ in On the Eternal in Man, trans. Bernard Noble, New York: Harper & Brothers.

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Bibliography Sismondo, S. (1993), ‘Some Social Constructions,’ Social Studies of Science, Vol. 23, No. 3, London: SAGE, pp. 515–53. ——— (2009), An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, Second edition. Sivin, N. (1995), Science in Ancient China: Researches and Reflections, Brookfield, Vermont: Variorum, Ashgate Publishing. Sorokin, P.A. (1943), Socio-cultural Causality, Space, Time: A Study of Referential Principles of Sociology and Social Science, New York: Russel & Russel. ——— (1962), Society, Culture and Personality, California: University of California Press, Cooper Square Publishers. Spedding, J., R.L. Ellis, and D.D. Heath eds. (1901), The Works of Francis Bacon, Vol. IV, London: Longmans & Co. rpt. Speier, H. (1938), ‘Social Determination of Ideas,’ Social Research, Vol. 5, No. 2, Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V., pp. 182–205. Sreenivasan, S. (2016), ‘Metallurgy of Zinc, High-tin Bronze and Gold in Indian Antiquity: Methodological Aspects,’ Indian Journal of History of Science, Vol. 51, No. 1, New Delhi: INSA, pp. 22–32. Srinivasan, S. (2014), ‘Bronze Image Casting in Tanjavur District, Tamil Nadu: Ethnoarchaeological and Archaeometallurgical Insights,’ in S. Srinivasan, S. Ranganathan, and A. Giumlia-Mair (eds), Metals and Civilizations, Proceedings of BUMA VII, Bangalore: National Institute of Advanced Studies, pp. 215–23. Stark, W. (1958), Sociology of Knowledge, London: Routledge. Steup, M. (2005), ‘Knowledge and Scepticism,’ in P. Sosa and M. Steup (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 1–13. Stevenson, E.L. (trans. and ed.) (1991), Claudius Ptolemy: The Geography, 1932, New York: New York Public Library, rpt., Dover. (p.295) Suarez-Villa, L. (2009), Globalization and Techno-capitalism: The Political Economy of Corporate Power and Technological Domination, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. ——— (2010), Techno-capitalism: A Critical Perspective on Technological Innovation and Corporatism, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. ——— (2012), Techno-capitalism: A Critical Perspective on Technological Innovation and Corporatism, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Page 29 of 32

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Bibliography Sykes, B. (2001), The Seven Daughters of Eve: The Science That Reveals Our Genetic Ancestry, New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Symons, J., Olga Pombo, J.M. Torres eds. (2011), Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science, the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science Series No. 18, VIII, Dordrecht: Springer. Tahiri, H. (2008), ‘The Birth of Scientific Controversies, The Dynamics of the Arabic Tradition and Its Impact on the Development of Science: Ibn AlHaytham’s Challenge of Ptolemy’s Almagest, in S. Rahman, T. Street, and H. Tahiri (eds), The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition Science: Science, Epistemology and Their Interactions, New York: Springer, pp. 183–228. Tallis, R. (2005), The Knowing Animal: A Philosophical Inquiry into Knowledge and Truth [Paperback], Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Terray, E. (1972), Marxism and Primitive Society, trans. M. Klopper, New York: Monthly Review Press. Thackray, A. and R.K. Merton (1972), ‘On Discipline Building: The Paradoxes of George,’ Isis, Vol. 63, No. 219, pp. 473–95. Thapar, R. (1984), From Lineage to State, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. ——— (2004), Ancient Indian Social History, Second edition, New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan. Urbach, P. (1987), Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science: An Account and a Reappraisal, Illinois: La Salle. Valiathan, M.S. (2016), ‘Caraka’s Approach to Knowledge,’ Indian Journal of History of Science, Vol. 51, No. 1, New Delhi: INSA. Varier, M.R.R. (2016), ‘Origins and Growth of Āyurvedic Knowledge,’ Indian Journal of History of Science, Vol. 51, No. 1, New Delhi: INSA. Varma, A.R. Raja (1990), Jyotiprakāśakam, originally published in 1896, rpt. Trivandrum: Kerala University Press. Veblen, T. (1961), The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, and Other Essays, New York: Russell. Vico, G. (1984), The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (p.296) Victor, K. (1953), The Vienna Circle: The Origin of Neo-positivism, a Chapter in the History of Recent Philosophy, New York: Greenwood Press.

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Bibliography Yoke, H.P., J.P.C. Moffett, and C. Sungwu eds. (2007), Explorations in Daoism: Medicine and Alchemy in Literature, London: Routledge. Young, J.W.A. (1904), ‘Poincaré’s Science and Hypothesis,’ Science, Vol. 20, No. 520, London: Scientific Books, pp. 833–7. Zaehner, R.C. (1961), The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism, New York: Putnam. (p.297) Zhmud, L. (2006), The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. Zettili, N. (2009), Quantum Mechanics: Concepts and Applications, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Zilsel, E. (1945), ‘The Genesis of the Concept of Scientific Progress,’ Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 325–49. ——— (2003), ‘The Social Origins of Modern Science,’ in D. Raven, W. Krohn, and R.S. Cohen (eds), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 200, New York: Springer. Zolo, D. (1990), Reflexive Epistemology and Social Complexity: The Philosophical Legacy of Otto Neurath, Dordrecht: Kluwer. Zubrin, R. (2000), Entering Space: Creating a Space-faring Civilization, New York: Tarcher Perigee, rpt. Zysk, K. (2000), Medicine in the Veda, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, rpt.

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Index

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

(p.298) Index Académie Royale des Sciences, 163 Achutan, Itti, 100 Acropolis of Athens, 110 advanced knowledge production, 88–95 Aegean knowledge production, 109–10 Aelius Galenus, 118–19 Afro-Asian knowledge production, 124–30 Āgamic monuments, 76–77, 79 Age of Academies, 170 Age of Enlightenment, 170–74, 182, 184 Age of Reason, 168–69 Agnesi, Maria Gaetana, 174 Al-Biruni, 142 Albert the Great, 147 al-Haytham, Ibn, 141–42 Althusser, Louis, 8, 39 Ampere, Andre-Marie, 192 Analects of Confucius, 25 Anaxagoras, 13 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, 114 Anaximander of Miletus, 13, 113 Anaximenes of Miletus, 113 Anesidemus, 118, 152 Ankersmit, F.R., 238 Anthemius of Tralles, 131 anumāna, 68 Apollo temple, 111 Aquinas, Thomas, 148 Arab knowledge mission, 6, 130–33 Arab translations of knowledge, 141 epistemological and methodological aspects, 140–45 Page 1 of 15

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Index Islamic scholarship, 133–40 mathematical astronomy, 131–32 archaeo-metallurgy, 80–82 Archimedes of Syracuse, 117–18 Arderne, John, 148 Aristotle of Stagira, 115, 121–22 Posterior Analytics, 143 arsenic alloying, invention of, 53 artificial intelligence, 269 Āryabhaṭa, 91–92 Āryabhaṭīyam, 64, 91 Aṣṭādhāyi, 62–63, 258 (p.299) astrophysics, 248, 251 Aubrey, John, 164 Avicenna, 142–43, 148 Āyurveda, 9, 71–75 Bacon, Francis, 26, 153–54, 162, 205 knowledge production, 156 Bacon, Roger, 147, 161 Balibar, 8, 39 Barrow, Isaac, 157 Bassi, Laura, 174 Bateson, G., 232 Bayes, Thomas, 165 Beatty, Chester, 127 Bede, Venerable, 131 Beeckman, Isaac, 157, 163 Bell, J.S., 228 Bergenholtz, Henning, 241 Bergmann, 213–14 Bergmann, Gustav, 211 Bernal, J.D., 206 Berners-Lee, Tim, 229 Bhat, Appu, 100 Bhat, Ranga, 100 Bhāskara II, 11, 98, 260 Bijker, Wiebe, 237 bioengineering, 242–43 Black, Joseph, 165 Bohr, Niels, 18, 197, 223, 226, 228 complementarity principle, 228, 268 Borgognoni, Bishop Theodoric, 148 Born, Max, 228 Boyle, Robert William, 157 Boyle’s law, 157, 165 Brahe, Tycho, 98, 151 Brahma, 59–60 brahmaṇas, 10, 82, 96 bronze metallurgy, 52–53, 100 Page 2 of 15

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Index alloying and casting of bronze, 125 bronze artefacts, 125 Brydges, James, 164 Buddhism, 63, 67 Buridan, Jean, 148–49 Burke, Peter, 34 Burnell, Jocelyn Bell, 229 Burtt, Edwin, 199–200 Bush, Vannevar, 213 Butterfield, Herbert, 209 Byzantine Christian philosophers, 131 Caeser, Julius, 130 Cailliau, Robert, 229 capital fetishism, 50 capitalist social formation, 5 Caraka, 83 Carnap, Rudolf, 211, 213–14 Carter, Brandon, 246 cascade system, 87 Castellvi, Teresa Cabré, 241 Catholic Christian dogma, 123 Cavendish, Margaret, 157 ceramic production, 57 Certeau, Michel de, 238 Chadwick, James, 197 Châtelet, Émilie du, 174 Chauliac, Guy de, 148 Chinese knowledge, 11, 100–6 Chinese epistemology, 108 deductive reasoning in knowledge production, 107 Han and Tang periods, 11–12 Han period, 102 metaphysics and cosmology, 106–7 production, 12 Song period, 103, 257 specialized knowledge, 108 Tang period, 102–3 Yin and Yang, 107 Zhou period, 101 Christian scholasticism, 150 (p.300) Clark, George, 202–3 Claudius Galenus of Pergamon, 118–19 Claudius Ptolemy, 118 Clausius, Rudolf Julius Emanuel, 179 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 163 collective representations, 28–29 commodity fetishism, 45, 47–48, 189–90 complexity theory, 18 Comte, Auguste, 8, 26–27, 178–79 Page 3 of 15

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Index Conant, James Bryant, 214 concrete objects, 51 Confucius, 101 Constantinople (Byzantium), 123 constructivist epistemology, 18, 231–34, 264 Copernicus, Nikolaus, 151 Coptic Pope Theophilus of Alexandria, 131 Crab Nebula, 104 craft production technology, 9 crafts production, 55–57 geo-archaeology of, 57 technical knowledge of, 55–56 Crick, Francis, 229 Curie, Marie Skłodowska, 193 D’Alembert, 166 Dalton, John, 192 Danto, Arthur, 238 Dark Ages, 122–24 Darwin, Charles, 171, 185–86 Daston, Lorraine, 238 De Broglie, 226 dell’Orologio, Giovenni Dondi, 149 dell’Orologio, Jacopo Dondi, 148–49 Democritus of Abdera, 115 Descartes, René, 153 detached intellectuals, 32 Dharmaśāstra, 83 dialectical meta-methodology, 217 dialectics, 116 Diderot, 166 Duhem, Pierre, 198 Duhem-Quine thesis, 198 Durkheim, Emile, 8, 28 Dyson Sphere model, 249 Early Bronze Age, 125 Edison, Thomas Alva, 193 Egyptian knowledge, 13, 125–30 ancient system of writing, 125 Babylonian astronomy and mathematics, 129 Egyptian medicine, 127 Giza pyramids, 126, 130 mummification, 126–27 Sumerian astronomy, 128 Einstein, Albert, 196, 223, 225–26 relativity theory, 196 theory of relativistic cosmology, 246 El Castillo Cave paintings, 2 Empedocles of Agrigentum, 115 Empiricus, Sextus, 152 Page 4 of 15

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Index empty space, 225 engineering mode of knowledge production, 204 epistemic injustice, 7, 255 epistemology, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 60–61, 107 Arab, 14, 140, 142 beginnings of, 14–15 critical, 140 Greek, 119–22 Indian, 6, 60–61, 63, 66–68, 90, 98 Eratosthenes of Cyrene, 117–18, 121 Erechtheum temple, 111 Ernst Mach Society, 211 eschatological knowledge, 59–60 (p.301) ethno-archaeology, 57 Euclid, 117 European systems of knowledge production, 6 experimental method of confirmation, 146 alchemy, 148, 151 anaesthetic effect, 128, 148–49 chemistry, 166 Copernican revolution, 148 discovery of causality, 147 empirical observations, 153–56 iatrochemistry, 127, 148 in healthcare, 148–49 institutionalized production and transmission of knowledge, 161–64 Newtonian concept of inertia, 148 Newtonian concepts, 156–61 principle of parsimony, 149 production of fundamental knowledge, 165 spirit of inquiry, 150–53 false knowledge, 44 Faraday, Michael, 177, 192, 223 Farrington, Benjamin, 205 Feigl, Herbert, 213–14 Ferguson, Adam, 173 Fermat, Pierre, 98 Fermi, Enrico, 197 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 189 Feyerabend, Paul, 220 Feynman, Richard, 225, 228, 230, 262 flaking stone pebbles and shaping animal bones, knowledge of, 1 Fleck, Ludwik, 207–8 Foster-Carter, 8 Foucault, Michel, 8, 32, 238 Frank, Philipp, 210, 213–14 Franklin, Rosalind, 229 fundamental knowledge, 63, 157, 165, 176–77 Galilei, Galileo, 156, 162 Page 5 of 15

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Index Gallie, W.B., 238 Galvani, Luigi, 166 Gell-Mann, Murray, 18, 224, 229–30, 262 George, Olduvai, 1 Germain, Sophie, 168 Godel, Kurt Friedrich, 211, 225 Godelier, Maurice, 8, 39 Gouda Saraswata Brahmana scholars, 100 Gralath, Daniel, 170 Gramsci, Antonio, 8, 38–39, 204–5 Greek knowledge, 13, 146 ancient, 112–19 astronomy, geometry, and mathematics, 117–18 epistemology, 119–22 Greek culture of curiosity and adventure, 112 in architecture, 110–12 metallurgy, 110 Mycenaean civilization, 110 role of sensory perception, 113 urban architecture and urban planning, 111 Gregory, James, 158 Grosseteste, Robert, 147, 161 Guo Shoujing, 105 Hahn, Hans, 210 Haldane, J.B.S., 206, 224 Halley, Edmond, 158 Harappan ceramic objects, 55 Harris, John, 171 Harvey, William, 152 Hegel, George Wilhelm, 173 (p.302) Heisenberg, Werner Karl, 18, 197, 223, 226, 230 uncertainty principle, 18, 197, 223, 226–27, 262 Hempel, 213–14 Heraclitus of Ephesus, 13, 114 Herschel, Caroline Lucretia, 181–82 Herschel, John, 185 Hessen, Boris, 202–3 Hewish, Antony, 229 Hindess, Barry, 8, 39 Hippodamus of Miletus, 111 Hirst, Paul Q., 8, 39 historical epistemology, 4, 4n2, 35, 68–71, 90–91, 97, 105, 255, 257 historical materialism, 35, 37–40, 42 historiography of science, 197–210, 263 Fleck’s work, 207–8 Gramsci’s work, 204–5 Kuhn’s work, 215–16 Mannheim’s work, 208–9 Marxist, 205–6 Page 6 of 15

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Index Merton’s work, 206–7 Needham’s work, 209–10 Zilsel’s work, 203–4 Hobbes, Thomas, 153 Hohenheim, Paracelsus von, 151 Hong Mai, 106 Hooke, Robert, 158, 164 Hortus Malabaricus, 99 Hoyningen-Huene, Paul, 235 Hubble, Edwin Powell, 197 Hughes, Thomas P., 237 Huizong, 106 Hume, David, 171–72 Huygens, Christiaan, 157, 163 Hyatt, Gilbert, 229 Indian systems of knowledge advanced knowledge production, 88–95 archaeo-metallurgy, 80–82 Āyurveda, 9, 71–75 early astronomy, 64–65 epistemological insights of, 6, 60–61 grammatical rules, 62–64 historical epistemology, 68–71 irrigation techniques and reservoir system, 84–88 mode of knowledge production, 7–9, 58 overseas transmission of knowledge, 97–100 Pāṇini’s work, 9, 62–64 production of specialized knowledge in, 58 socio-economic and politico-cultural background of discoveries and inventions, 96– 97 sūtra mode of exposition of knowledge, 63 textualization of knowledge and its preservation, 82–84 thought (daṛśanas), 65–68 Vedic knowledge, 57–58 Vāstu-vidya or architecture, 75–80 inductive reasoning, 17–178 industrial capitalism, 49, 203, 243–44 infinite power series, 10 institutionalized production of knowledge and learning, 161–64 intellectual property rights (IPR) and patents, 242, 245 internalism, 202 International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, 214 Iron Age agro-pastoral social formation, 44 (p.303) iron metallurgy, 53–55 iron-smelting, 53–54 iron smithies, 54 irrigation techniques and reservoir system, 84–88 James, William, 28 Jenner, Edward, 192 Page 7 of 15

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Index John of Sacrobosco, 147 Jordanus de Nemore, 147 Jyēṣṭadēva, 10–11, 95, 98 Jyōtiṣa-sūtras, 64 Kageura, Kyo, 241 Kaku, Michio, 250–51 Kant, Immanuel, 166–68, 210 Kantian barriers, 269 Kantian scholars, 17, 211, 219, 230, 263 mathematical knowledge, 168 Kardashev, Nikolai S., 248–51, 265 Kepler, Johannes, 156–57 Khaldūn, Ibn, 140, 142–45 Kitāb al-Burhān, 138, 142–43 Knoll, Max, 197 knowledge advancement of, 176 commoditization of, 47–48, 50 economy, 47, 265 eschatological and metaphysical, 59–60 false, 44 fundamental, 63, 157, 165, 176–77 in astronomy, 64–65 in class-structured societies, 44 in Upaniṣads, 58–60, 63, 66 institutionalized production of knowledge and learning, 161–64 Jain and Buddhist knowledge tradition, 63 of arts and crafts, 110–12 overseas transmission of, 97–100 role in social formations, 44–50 Vedic, 57–59 knowledge-based capital (KBC), 49 knowledge production, history of, 1–3, 267, 270 during Neolithic period, 2–3 in ancient India and China, 7–9 in Metal Ages, 51–52. See also Metal Age in slave-based social formations, 5 landmarks, 2 methodology of intellectual history and published several texts, 3–6 Kovalevskaya, Sofya Vasilyevna, 182 Kuhn, Thomas, 17, 215–17, 219, 235, 264 Lakatos, Imre, 217–19, 264 Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste, 185 Lao-Tze, 102 lapidary, 53 Latour, Bruno, 236 Lavoisier, Antoine-Laurent, 165 Lawrence, Ernest, 197 Leibniz, Gottfried, 93, 158, 159n19, 163 Page 8 of 15

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Index metaphysics, 167 Lemaître, Georges, 197 Lemarchand, Guillermo A., 249 Levy, Hyman, 205 Linné, Carl von, 164 Liuzzi, Mondino de, 148 living organisms, natural philosophy of, 166 logical empiricism, 210–13 Lucas, Henry, 162 (p.304) Lukács, George, 48, 190 Lunar Society of Birmingham, 170 Lyotard, Jean Francois, 34, 231 Mach, Ernst, 198 Malthus, Thomas, 173, 185 Manhattan Project, 214 Mannheim, Karl, 8, 31, 208–9 Marx, Karl, 8, 186–92 aggregate of human beings, 38 concept of commodity fetishism, 45–48 Das Capital, 188 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, 189 mechanism of surplus value, 189 ‘natural equilibria’ of markets, 190 on science, 45–46 on social formation, 27, 31, 35–38, 44–45, 187 progress of science and technology, 46 social theory of knowledge, 46 The Communist Manifesto, 187, 191 The Critique of Political Economy, 38, 46, 188 mathematical astronomy, 9, 11, 13, 64–65, 96, 98–99, 128, 131, 151, 156, 159, 162, 168, 259 mathematical method of natural knowledge, 171 mathematics, 10, 90, 92–95, 98 polymath, 12 trigonometry, 12 Mādhava of Sangamagrāma, 10, 92–94 power series, 98 Mānasārā, 77 Mathematika Synthaxis, 119 Maurus, Rabanus, 132 Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, 238 Maxwell, James Clerk, 179, 192 Mead, George Herbert, 29 Melissus of Samos, 115 Mendeleev, Dmitri, 192 Merton, Robert K., 32, 206–7, 219 Mesopotamia, 3 Metal Age arsenic alloying, 52–53 Page 9 of 15

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Index invention of, 53 bronze metallurgy, 52–53 iron metallurgy, 53–55 measurements of melting points, 53 metallic copper and its ore, 52 ores, identification of, 52 smelting procedures, 52–54 metaphysical knowledge, 59–60 Millar, John, 173 Mills, C. Wright, 34 Milstein, Cesar, 229 Mīmāṃsā, 67 mitochondrial DNA studies, 1 Moigne, Jean-Louise Le, 234 Mondeville, Henri de, 148 Montaigne, Michel de, 152 Montesquieu, 172 Morin, E., 234 Morris, Charles, 214 Morton, William T.G., 192 Mulkay, M.J., 219 Muqaddimah, 144 mythology, 113 Nampūtiri brāhmaṇa, 10, 96 natural philosophy, 150, 155 Needham, Joseph, 206, 209–10 Neurath, Otto, 210–12 new science, 196–97, 222–29 literature, 230–39 (p.305) Newton, Sir Isaac, 156–61, 184, 221, 262–63 binomial theorem, 159 conception of space, 160, 168 cosmology, 161 general theory of gravity and mechanics, 159 generalized binomial theorem, 159 mechanics, 16, 156–62, 164–65, 167–68, 171, 174, 177–78, 184, 196, 198, 226–27 metaphysics, 167–68 method of knowledge production, 164–68 Philosophia Naturalis Principia Mathematica, 16, 159–60, 164, 171, 173–74, 178 theory of universe, 160 Nāgārjuna, 9, 63, 80–81, 258 Nīlakaṇṭha Somayājī, 10–11, 94–95, 98 Āryabhaṭīya-bhāṣyā, 94 equation for centre of planets, 94 methodological rationality, 95 Tantṛasaṅgrahā, 93–94 Nova, Arnoldus de Villa, 148 Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) spectroscopy, 242 Nyāya system of thought, 9, 66–68 Page 10 of 15

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Index objective reduction (Orch-OR) theory of consciousness, 268 observed natural phenomena, 164 Ockham’s razor, 149 Olschki, Leonard, 203 Oresme, Nicole, 149 ‘out of Africa’ thesis of human origins, 124 Ouyang Xiu, 12, 105 Pandit, Vinayaka, 100 Papyrus, Kahoun, 127 Paramesvaran, 93 parōkṣa, 67 Parmenides, 115, 120 Parthenon temple, 111 particle physics, 247 Pascal, Blaise, 98 Pasteur, Louis, 192 Paul of Aegina, 131, 226 Peirce, C.S., 28 Pepys, Samuel, 164 Peregrinus, Peter, 147 Peregrinus of Maricourt, Peter, 147 Persian medicine, 128–29 Philoponus, John, 131 Piaget, J., 233–34 Pierre-Simon, 168 Pinch, Trevor, 237 Planck, Max, 18, 196, 222, 226 Plato of Athens, 115–16, 120–21 Poincaré, Pierre Henri, 198, 222 Polkinghorne, J.C., 239 Popper, Karl, 211–12, 217, 219, 221 postmodernism, 18, 231 Potassium-Argon dating of Homo habilis fossil, 1 Poulantzas, Nicos, 8, 39, 42 Pratyabhijnā, 68 pratyakṣa, 67–68 primitive social formation, 4–5 printing technology, 150–51 Ptolemy I, 130 Puthumana Somayājī, 93 Pyrro, 152 Pyrro of Elis, 117 Pythagoras of Samos, 13, 114 quantum mechanics, 18, 196, 225–28, 252, 262, 268 (p.306) Quesnay, François, 172 Quine, Willard Van Orman, 198 Rasaratnākara, 80–81 Reichenbach, Hans, 211, 213–14 Rey, Pierre-Philippe, 8, 43 Page 11 of 15

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Index Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg, 237 Richard of Wallingford, 149 Ricoeur, Paul, 238 Ṛig Veda, 57–59 rock architecture and sculpture, 55 Roman architecture, 112 Röntgen, Wilhelm Conrad, 192 Rorty, Richard, 233 Ruska, Ernest, 197 Rutherford, Ernest, 197 Sagan, Carl, 250 Sānkhya epistemology, 66 Sanskrit language, 9, 62, 99 Sarton, George Alfred Leon, 200–1 scepticism, 152–53 Scheler, Max, 8, 29–30 Schlick, Moritz, 210 Schrödinger, Erwin, 223–24, 226, 230, 269 science Age of Enlightenment, 170–74, 182, 184 Age of Reason, 168–69 as construct, 175–81 breakthroughs in, 192–93 communication, 239–41 empirical observations, 153–56, 210–13 historiography of, 197–210 literature, 230–39 new, 196–97, 222–29 science-tech imagination, 246–52 social theory of, 215–22 spirit of inquiry, 150–53 technology of certainty, 241–46 World War II and, 213–15 science studies, 236 science-tech hybrid, 243 scientific revolution, 180–81 Scotus, Duns, 149 self-awareness, 21–22 semi-precious stones, 57 Sextus Empiricus, 118 Shen Kuo, 12, 104–5 Simon, H., 232 Sismondo, Sergio, 237 sluice system, 85–86 smelting procedures, 52–54 Smith, Adam, 172 Smith, Edwin, 127 social formation theory, 35–44 Gramsci’s concepts of class power and hegemony, 38–39 Page 12 of 15

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Index in terms of mode of production, 36–37 knowledge, role in social formations, 44–50 Marx’s conceptual characterization of socio-economic aggregate of people, 35–36, 38, 187 material processes and social processes, understanding of, 35 mode of production and social formation, 40–43, 187 social formations, types of, 36 surplus labour, 38 social theory of knowledge production, 7–8 Comte’s three-stage typology of knowledge, 26–27 cultural traits, 26 Durkheim’s, 28–29 (p.307) Foucault’s sociology of language and knowledge, 32–33 hereditary specialization, 23 interconnection between knowledge and society, 22–23, 26 Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, 31–32 Marx’s theory of social formation, 27, 31, 35–36 Mead’s proposition of social behaviourism, 29 Merton’s sociology of knowledge and mass communication, 32 non-European historical traditions, 24 primordial society’s knowledge, 27 rational knowledge and irrational practices, 24 Scheler’s adoption of eternal factors, 29–30 social processes and human ideas, relationship between, 26, 28 Sorokin’s cultural genesis of knowledge, 30–31 Veblen’s proposition of habits of life, 29 social theory of science, 215–21 Socrates of Athens, 115–16, 120–21 software-based electronic communication, 50 Somerville, Mary Fairfax, 182 Sorokin, Pitirim Alexandrovich, 8, 30–31 Sramaṇas, 82–83 Stahl, Georg Ernst, 162 Stone Age shamans, 109 string theory, 251 structural causality, 40 stūpa, 79 Su Song, 12, 103, 258 Xin Yixiang Fayao, 103 Sulbasūtras, 64 Suśruta, 83 syllogistic deductive reasoning, 66 Tantṛasaṅgrahā, 93–94 tantrayukti (method of reasoning), 9 techno-capitalism, 47–49, 243–44, 265 techno-capitalist global economy, 19, 242 techno-capitalist globalization, 245 technology of certainty, 241–46 Terry, Emmanuel, 8, 43 Page 13 of 15

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Index textualization of knowledge and its preservation, 82–84 Thales of Miletus, 13, 113 Theaetetus, 120 theoretical knowledge, 23 Thomson, William, 179 traditional intellectuals, 205 transmission of knowledge, 10–11 type II civilization, 248–49 type III civilization, 249–50 type IV civilization, 251 ultimate scientific truth, 216 uncertainty principle, 18 universal knowledge, 16 Upaniṣads, 58–60, 63, 66 Vaiśeṣika system, 67 Valery, P., 234 van Rheede, Hendrik, 100 Veblen, Thorstein, 29 Vedic knowledge, 9, 57–59 six fields of knowledge, 58 Vedic mathematics, 64 Vedānta, 59, 61, 65, 67 (p.308) Vesalius, Andreas, 151 Vico, Giovanbattista, 8, 26 Vienna Circle, 17, 211, 263 Voltaire, 171–72 von Foerster, Heinz, 232–33 von Glasersfeld, Ernst, 233 Vāstupuruṣa, 80 Vāstu-vidya or architecture, 75–80 vyākhya/bhāṣya tradition, 99 Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhatta, 25 Waismann, Friedrich, 211 Wallis, John, 98 Warren, John Collins, 192 wartime knowledge production, 213–15 Watson, James, 229 Weber, Max, 34 Weierstrass, Karl, 193 West Asia, knowledge production in, 13, 124, 132 ancient system of writing, 125 medicine, 128 Whevell, William, 198 Whewell, William, 177, 185 White, Heydon, 238 William of Ockham, 149 William of Saliceto, 148 Wilson, Kenneth G., 228 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 211–12, 231, 233 Page 14 of 15

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Index World War II, 213–15, 263 Wüster, Eugen, 240–41 X-ray crystallography, 206, 229, 242 X-ray diffraction analysis, 55–56 Yōga, 66 Young, Thomas, 222 Yuchanyan cave, 100 Yuktibhāṣā, 10, 95 Zamenhof, L.L., 240 Zeh, Dieter, 228 Zhu Xi, 104 Zilsel, Edgar, 203–4, 213–14 Zubrin, Robert, 250

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About the Author

History and Theory of Knowledge Production: An Introductory Outline Rajan Gurukkal

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780199490363 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199490363.001.0001

(p.309) About the Author Rajan Gurukkal

Rajan Gurukkal is vice chairman of the Kerala State Higher Education Council, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India. Formerly he was Soundararajan Chair Visiting Professor at Centre for Contemporary Studies/Indian Institute of Science, Bengaluru, India. He was also vice chancellor, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala, India. He earned his PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. His publications include Rethinking Classical Indo-Roman Trade (Oxford University Press, 2016), Social Formations of Early South India (Oxford University Press, 2010), Cultural History of Kerala, vol. I (1999), and The Kerala Temple and the Early Medieval Agrarian System (1992).

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