Historical Narratives of East Asia in the 21st Century: Overcoming the Politics of National Identity 9780367818708, 9781003010555

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Historical Narratives of East Asia in the 21st Century

In the twenty-first century, East Asia has been increasingly marked both by tensions at a government level and a chauvinistic mood among the polity. While China’s rise is in one respect the proximate driver of these changes in tone, it draws on a range of unresolved grievances among the respective historical narratives of Mainland China, Taiwan, Japan, and the Koreas. These conflicting views of the region’s past are a crucial barrier to its cohesive and stable future. This book brings together East Asian scholars from a range of academic disciplines, including China historians, political historians, and political scientists, to illuminate the interconnectedness of East Asia and discuss how a shared historical narrative might be constructed. Their contributions are organized into three parts focusing respectively on historical narratives of China, historical narratives of East Asia, and reconciling historical narratives. The book will appeal to researchers interested in the historical narratives of international relations in East Asia. Tanaka Hitoshi is a professor in the Graduate School of Law and Politics, Osaka University and the editor of this volume. Areas of research include twentiethcentury Chinese politics and Chinese area studies.

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Historical Narratives of East Asia in the 21st Century Overcoming the Politics of National Identity Edited by Tanaka Hitoshi Translated by Odagiri Jake and Zhou Yufei

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 Hitoshi Tanaka Originally published in 2017 by Horitsu Bunka-sha, Publishers, Kyoto This English edition published in 2020 by Routledge by arrangement with Horitsu Bunka-sha, Publishers, Kyoto The right of Hitoshi Tanaka to be identified as editor of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-367-81870-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-01055-5 (ebk) Typeset in Galliard by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of contributors Preface for English readership

x xii

TAN AKA H I TOS HI

Original preface

xiii

TAN AKA H I TOS HI

General introduction The history controversy in East Asia in the light of China’s rise to a global power

1

3

TAN AKA H I TOS HI

Introduction 3 1 The emergence of East Asia’s “history problems” 3 2 Historical perception and “historical narrative” 6 3 National history and East Asia 7 4 Toward a common historical narrative in East Asia 11 Conclusion 14 PART I

Historical narratives of China 1 History of the Republic of China and “historical narrative” KAN E KO H AJ IME

Introduction: “narrating history,” history studies, and modern Chinese history 23 1 What is modern Chinese history? 25

21

23

vi

Contents 2 Modern Chinese history and the Chinese Communist Party’s “revolutionary historical perspective” 27 3 The emergence of the Republic of China’s historical research and relativized “narrative” 30 Conclusion: a perspective from Japan and studies of Republican Chinese history 34

2 Historical narratives of “democracy” in Republican China

38

M I ZU H A N OBU O

Introduction 38 1 “Democracy” in Republican China 41 2 The bottleneck for narratives on “democracy” 45 Conclusion: the “democracy” for us 47 3 The formation of the People’s Republic and the “historical narrative”

52

M ARU YAM A KŌ JI

Introduction: five legitimacies of the political rule by the Chinese Communist Party 52 1 The “historical narrative” in the CCP’s history: the “historical inevitability” for the establishment of the People’s Republic 54 2 A proper “historical account” (part one): was the formation of the People’s Republic via the People’s PCC agreed on by public opinion? 56 3 A proper “historical account” (part two): the acquisition of “legitimacy” by the People’s PCC 59 Conclusion: the “Common Programme” of the People’s PCC and the CCP’s rule 64 4 “Peaceful coexistence” and “historical narrative” in Chinese diplomacy Y O S H I D A T O Y O KO

Introduction 70 1 Peaceful coexistence from tactics to strategies 71 2 Toward a détente based on peaceful coexistence 74 3 The Bandung Conference and peaceful coexistence 77 Conclusion 80

70

Contents

vii

PART II

Historical narratives of East Asia 5 The discourse on Asianism in postwar Japan

85 87

TAKI G U C H I T S U Y O S H I

Introduction 87 1 Postwar Japan and Asia 88 2 Takeuchi Yoshimi’s view on Asianism 91 3 Asianism and the transnational turn in international relations theory 99 Conclusion 101 6 The perception toward China among Japanese communities in Dalian after World War I: a case study of the magazine Manmō

104

M ATS U S H I G E MIT S U HIRO

Introduction 104 1 Publishing of Manmō and articles regarding new Japan-China relations 105 2 Japanese awareness of Chinese and Chinese awareness of Japanese 109 3 Setbacks in new Japan-China relations and the answer to Chinese nationalism 113 Conclusion 117 7 Perceptions of atomic bombing in the United States and Japan

121

TAKAH AS H I KEIKICH I

Introduction 122 1 Views in the U.S. academic milieu 123 2 Atomic bombing perceived in the American public sphere 125 3 Hiroshima perceived in Japan: academic and public views 129 Conclusion 131 8 Transnational Asia and its changing dynamics at the turn of the twenty-first century LI U H O N G

Introduction: conceptualizing Transnational Asia 134 1 Governance and network 138

134

viii

Contents 2 Network and the state in Transnational Asia 140 Conclusion 143

PART III

Toward a generally accepted historical narrative in East Asia 9 Questioning the “empireness” of national history: East Asian history narrated in Korea, China, and Japan

149

151

Y U Y O N G TAE

Introduction 151 1 The tradition and publication of East Asian regional history 152 2 Two epistemological paradigms: the East vs. West dichotomy and the philosophy of self-defense 154 3 Empire, the dream of becoming an empire, and the making of empires 157 4 The possibilities and limitations of a self-reflective historiography 161 Conclusion 164 10 Historical perception in Taiwan and collaborative studies on East Asian history

168

H S U Y U - M ING

Introduction: the problem with textbooks in the context of the debate over “historical perception” 168 1 Research undertaken in Taiwan on Japan’s controversy over history textbooks 171 2 Taiwan’s concern on the cooperative compilation of East Asian history textbooks 174 Conclusion 177 11 Historical perception in China and collaborative studies on East Asian history J I AN G P EI

Introduction: the problems addressed in this chapter 180 1 The characteristics and crisis of the Chinese historical perception 183

180

Contents

ix

2 Perceptions of Sino-Japanese relations and regional relations in East Asia 186 Conclusion 191 Afterword

196

TAN AKA H I TO S H I

Timeline

Index

197 221

Contributors

Authors HSU Yu-Ming (許 育銘) is Associate Professor in the Department and Institute of History, National Dong Hwa University. Areas of research include modern and contemporary Chinese history. JIANG Pei (江 沛), PhD, is Professor in the Faculty of History, Nankai University. Areas of research include modern and contemporary Chinese history. KANEKO Hajime (金子肇), PhD, is Professor in the Graduate School of Letters, Hiroshima University. Areas of research include modern and contemporary Chinese history with a specialty in constitutional government after the twentieth century in China. LIU Hong (劉 宏) is Tan Lark Sye Chair Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs in the School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University. Areas of research include East Asian political economy and public policy. MARUYAMA Kōji (丸山 鋼二) is Associate Professor in the Faculty of International Studies, Department of International Understanding, Bunkyo University. Areas of research include modern and contemporary Chinese history and international relations in East Asia. MATSUSHIGE Mitsuhiro (松重 充浩) is Professor in the College of Humanities and Sciences, Department of History, Nihon University. Areas of research include modern and contemporary Chinese history and late nineteenth- to twentieth-century East Asian history. MIZUHA Nobuo (水羽 信男) is Professor in the Graduate School of Integrated Arts and Sciences, Hiroshima University. Areas of research include modern and contemporary Chinese history and culture studies. TAKAHASHI Keikichi (高橋 慶吉) is Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law and Politics, Osaka University. Areas of research include American diplomatic history and political relations.

Contributors

xi

TAKIGUCHI Tsuyoshi (瀧口剛) is Professor in the Graduate School of Law and Politics, Osaka University. Areas of research include Japanese politics and political relations. TANAKA Hitoshi (田中 仁), PhD, is Professor in the Graduate School of Law and Politics, Osaka University and the editor of this volume. Areas of research include twentieth-century Chinese politics and Chinese area studies. YOSHIDA Toyoko (吉田 豊子), PhD, is Former Associate Professor in the Faculty of Foreign Studies, Kyoto Sangyo University. Areas of research include modern and contemporary Chinese diplomatic history and international relations in East Asia. YU Yongtae (柳 鏞泰) is Professor in the Department of History Education, Seoul National University. Areas of research include modern and contemporary Chinese history and East Asian historical recognition.

Translators ODAGIRI Jake (小田桐 ジェイク) is a PhD student in the Graduate School of Letters, Osaka University. Areas of research include modern Japanese literature and paratextual research of literature books. ZHOU Yufei (周 雨霏), PhD, is Senior Research Fellow of History of East Asian Social Studies, Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien, Japan. Areas of research include the history of social sciences in modern East Asia, conceptual history, and global intellectual history. The Timeline was created by ZOU Can (鄒 燦), Assistant Professor in the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University. Areas of research include modern Chinese history and the history of political relations in modern East Asia.

Preface for English readership TANAKA Hitoshi

This book aims to provide the material and conditions for understanding and approaching historical problems in twenty-first-century East Asia. It aims to rethink the position of “political history” in order to create a plan for contemplation and dialog for the “historical narrative” that is currently used in East Asia. Following an account of historical problems in twenty-first-century East Asia in the “General Introduction,” there are three sections: “Part I: Historical Narratives of China,” “Part II: Historical Narratives of East Asia,” and “Part III: Toward a Generally Accepted Historical Narrative in East Asia.” Part I deals with the historical narrative in twentieth-century Chinese politics, Part II examines the historical narrative from a broad perspective, and Part III emphasizes the importance of cooperative studies and research for a desirable perspective on how history is viewed. With key changes in the structure of twenty-first-century East Asia and the rise of China as a global power, we believe that relations between the four regions that make up East Asia (Japan, China, Taiwan, and Korea) should be the center of dialog in order to diachronically and synchronically restructure the facts. The development and restructuring of East Asia were primarily motivated by Japan; therefore, Japan’s responsibility for colonialization and war become important issues that need a direct approach. These topics become an unavoidable premise when discussing historical issues in East Asia. Furthermore, a meaningful approach for East Asia’s historical issues is not limited to Japan’s responsibilities for colonialization and war, and incorporates a broader perspective. In other words, by rethinking the structure of East Asia from the perspective of the past/ present/future, it becomes essential to find new ways of thinking. This book was originally published in Japanese in 2017 and translated into Korean in 2018. In addition, the “General Introduction” and “Part III” have been included in publications in China. By overcoming language barriers in East Asia, I expect this volume to promote a significant dialog that will encourage readers to deepen their understanding of historical issues in twenty-first-century East Asia. I think that those reading this volume from the English world will not only be able to appreciate particular problems such as “comfort women issues” or “textbook issues,” but also enhance their understanding of the historical background. They will find clues to further promote discussion through the broad views and framework of this volume.

Original preface

In twenty-first-century East Asia, conflicts in the political arena resulting from how China became a global superpower along with sentiments of anti-foreignism have become significant. Historical issues are problems that cannot be avoided when discussing the future of East Asia’s stability and community structure. The goal of this volume is to provide the material and conditions for historical problems in twenty-first-century East Asia. It aims to rethink the position of “political history” in order to create a plan for contemplation and dialog for the “historical narrative” which is currently used in East Asia. Following an account of historical problems in twenty-first-century East Asia in the “General Introduction,” there are three sections: “Part I: Historical Narratives of China,” “Part II: Historical Narratives of East Asia,” and “Part III: Toward a Generally Accepted Historical Narrative in East Asia.” Part I deals with the historical narrative in twentieth-century Chinese politics, Part II examines the historical narrative from a broad perspective, and Part III emphasizes the importance of cooperative studies and research for a desirable perspective on how history is viewed. With keynote changes in the structure of twenty-first-century East Asia and the rise of China as a global power, in order to diachronically and synchronically restructure the facts, we believe that relations between the four regions which make up East Asia (Japan, China, Taiwan, and Korea) should be the center of dialog. There are introductory sections at the beginning of each chapter that will express how each author invites the reader into a dialog and thought regarding “historical narrative” in East Asia. There is no need to read each chapter in order. It is hoped that readers will choose topics in which they are interested after reading the “General Introduction.” It is our hope that this volume will provide a realization for each reader’s respectful interest and position by providing meaningful content. TANAKA Hitoshi, editor February 2017

General introduction

The history controversy in East Asia in the light of China’s rise to a global power TANAKA Hitoshi

Introduction The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a couple of geopolitical transformations as far as East Asia was concerned. In terms of economic development, the key area of the global economy seemed to start shifting from the Atlantic rim (the American continent and Europe) to Asia Pacific. Japan’s economic miracle, the establishment of the Asian Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), the success of ASEAN, and the rise of China’s economy after it announced the OpenDoor Policy in the 1980s were the most significant occurrences. In terms of politics, the democratization of Korea, Taiwan, and other East Asian countries significantly changed regional politics by replacing the developmental regimes that once dominated East Asia. In terms of international security and international relations, ASEAN, as a manifold and multi-layered inter-governmental organization, began replacing America’s so-called hub-and-spoke security system that had once emerged in the context of the East-West tensions of the Cold War. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, China became a member of the World Trade Organization and began to play an active role in the global economy. In only ten years, China, on its way to becoming a new global power, has already had a significant impact on international political and economic issues (Figure 0.1).1 However, its role in global governance is still quite restricted. This has led to internal and external tensions, as China’s increasing assertiveness in East Asia contradicts Deng Xiaoping’s maxim “tao guang yang hui” (韬光养晦 or “keep a low profile and bide your time, while also getting something accomplished”) in dealing with foreign affairs.

1 The emergence of East Asia’s “history problems” 1.1 Origin in the 1980s The “history problems” among East Asian countries can be traced back to the 1980s. In 1982, a Japanese textbook became a major diplomatic issue and evoked strong protests from China and Korea. Newspapers reported that Japan’s Ministry of Education advised a textbook to revise its wording, speaking of Japan’s “advance into” China instead of its “aggression in” China. As a response to

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40% 35% 30%

27.6%

U.S.

22.4%

China

13.3%

25% 20% 15%

11.7%

10% 5% 1.7%

Japan

5.9%

0% 1978 ’80 ’82 ’84 ’86 ’88 ’90 ’92 ’94 ’96 ’98 2000 ’02 ’04 ’06 ’08 ’10 ’12 ’14

Figure 0.1 Transition of world finances and occupying shares

reaction of Korean and Chinese authorities, the Japanese government adopted the “Neighboring Country Clause” (近隣諸国条項) in authorizing textbooks to calm the situation. Although the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals had already taken place in 1978, China and Korea did not start protesting against the Japanese prime minister’s official visits to Yasukuni Shrine until the 1980s. In the 1990s, China was in urgent need of a new ideological tool to replace socialism against the background of the shredding of the Iron Curtain and the Tian’anmen Square protests of 1989. A patriotic education campaign propagating “the great renaissance of the Chinese nation” came to serve as a legitimating ideology for the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule by generating a chauvinistic mood. In Korea, the “comfort women” issue began to attract public attention. In response, the Japanese government adopted the Kono Statement in 1993, which acknowledged that “the Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort station.” In 1995, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, the Murayama Statement was released during Murayama Tomiichi’s term of office, which was based on a coalition consisting of the Social Democratic Party of Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the New Party Sakigake (新党さき がけ). In Japan, the “history problem” began to draw people’s attention. For example, counter-movements actively opposing protests by China, Korea, and other neighboring countries arose. Against this background, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform was established in 1997.

1.2 Developments in the twenty-first century In the early years of the twenty-first century, anti-Japanese protests mushroomed in various provinces in China. Moreover, official visits to Yasukuni Shrine by

The history controversy in East Asia 5 Japan’s prime ministers and cabinet members greatly damaged Sino-Japanese and Japanese-Korean relations. In China, on the other hand, the National Day of Remembrance for the Nanjing Massacre and the Victory over Japan Day were made into national commemoration days. Also, the Korean government announced its plan to replace the existing history textbooks with state-authorized ones. Moreover, Japan’s troublesome relations with China and Korea on international issues such as the registration of some early industrial sites from the Meiji period as UNESCO World Heritage Sites, the inscription of documents recording the Nanjing Massacre in the UN body’s Memory of the World list, the increase in “comfort women” statues, and so forth, brought the “history problems” onto the international stage. On February 27, 2014, China’s Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress resolved that September 3 would be celebrated nationwide as China’s “Victory over Japan Day” and designated December 13 as a national Memorial Day for victims of the Nanjing Massacre, on which state observances would be held (People’s Daily, February 28, 2014). In July 2015, “Sites of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution: Iron and Steel, Shipbuilding and Coal Mining” were inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List. When Japan first requested these industrial sites be included on the list, the Korean government insisted that at seven sites, including Nagasaki City, 57,900 Koreans were brought in and forced to work against their will. Inscribing those sites, so maintained the Koreans, would contradict “the spirit of the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural Heritage and Natural Heritage to protect heritages that exhibit the universal value of human rights.” The controversy ended in Japan’s agreement to incorporate part of the Korean government’s requests. The selection of World Heritage Sites is based on the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural Heritage and Natural Heritage. By contrast, UNESCO’s Memory of the World Program, launched in 1992, does not have to rest on any international agreement to include documents in its register. Any individual or organization is welcome to nominate a documentary item for inscription on the register. In October 2015, “Return to Maizuru Port: Documents Related to the Internment and Repatriation Experiences of Japanese (1945–1956)” and “Documents of the Nanjing Massacre” were included in the Memory of the World Register. The former was accused by the Russian government of being used for political purposes. Meanwhile, Japan made the same accusation toward the latter case. In November 1990, a citizen group named the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military (韓国挺身隊問題対策協議会) was established. Its activities include requesting an official apology and monetary compensation from the Japanese government, organizing the “Wednesday Demonstrations” in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul on a regular basis, and building “statues of peace.” In December 2011, it managed to install a bronze comfort woman statue in front of the Embassy of Japan in Seoul, denouncing Japan’s reluctance in solving the comfort women issue. Thereafter, more than 40 comfort women statues were built in Korea. Even outside of Korea, in countries such as the U.S., Canada, Australia, and China, “statues of peace” have been installed.

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2 Historical perception and “historical narrative” Considering the “history problems” of the twenty-first century, Hattori Ryūji (2015) maintained that “this was not a typically Japanese phenomenon, rather, it came up in various forms after the end of the Cold War.” Based on different actors and media, Hattori then suggested the following six dimensions of the “history problem”: policy, impression, knowledge, education, memory, and emotion (see Table 0.1). In each of the six dimensions, the respective actors express their outlook through different media. Hereby, these expressions are all included under the term “historical narrative.” As Figure 0.2 shows, the relations between this “historical narrative” and historical perception can be summarized into four categories: common sense, knowledge, bon sense, and historical perception. As far as the “history problem” is concerned, “common sense” refers to historical knowledge provided to citizens in the form of history education. History education usually relies on history textbooks that are authorized by the government on the basis of administrative documents such as curriculum guidelines and so forth. However, students are free to also refer to general introductions Table 0.1 Six dimensions and subject/media of historical problems

Policy Impression Knowledge Education Memory Emotion

Subject

Media

policymakers and bureaucrats journalists, reporters critics educators, students persons concerned, surviving family citizens

parliament, diplomacy, publicity newspapers, magazines, TV, radio published works textbooks experiences, hearsay, exhibition conventions, Internet

Common sense

Perception

Knowledge

Bon sense

Figure 0.2 “Historical narrative” and historical perception relations

The history controversy in East Asia 7 and educational sources such as study-aid books to gain a more comprehensive “knowledge.” Furthermore, the “historical narrative” in the field of politics (domestic politics and diplomacy) and society presumes the criteria for evaluating the spectrum of various kinds of “knowledge”—the so-called bon sense. The background of bon sense is partly made up of systematized “knowledge”—the perception (historical perception). However, the “historical narrative” also includes the memories of the experiencers (experiences), emotional expressions through SNS, and other elements that have not yet been systematized.

3 National history and East Asia From 1989 to 1991, the world witnessed a series of events including the Tian’anmen Square Incident, the revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the end of the Cold War accompanied by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These events significantly affected East Asia’s regional political order and generated essentially new national histories in China, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan.

3.1 China In the 1970s, the People’s Republic of China became a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Meanwhile, its status as a Nuclear Weapons State under the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) had granted the country a significant role in East Asia’s regional politics. In the 1980s, after Mao’s death in 1976, the new head of state, Deng Xiaoping, led China through a farreaching change in strategy. China entered the era of economic reform and the Open-Door Policy. A decade later, Eastern Europe’s revolutions and the collapse of the Soviet Union triggered China’s political and economic reform. A marketoriented economy under the CCP’s dictatorship became China’s new norm. At the same time, the loss of the socialistic ideology’s credibility was compensated by the increasing emphasis on nationalism (or patriotism). In August 1991, a nationwide mobilization targeting mainly Chinese youth, named “The Patriotic Education Campaign,” was put in force by the following two documents: the “General Outline on Strengthening Education in Chinese Modern and Contemporary History and National Conditions” (Ministry of Education) and the “Notice about Conducting Education in Patriotism and Revolutionary Tradition by Exploiting Extensively Cultural Relics.” The major tasks of this campaign were to educate the Chinese people about their nation’s humiliating experiences in the modern era and to propagate the great changes that the CCP-led revolution had brought to China. All institutions subordinate to the Publicity Department of the CCP were mobilized to carry out the “Patriotic Education Campaign.” As a result, patriotism, now deeply rooted in China’s political institutions, turned out to be the CCP’s new ideological tool. According to the “Outline on the Implementation of Education in Patriotism” (CPC General Committee 1994), local governments were required to establish “patriotic education bases,” which was one of the core elements of the campaign. In March

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1995, the Ministry of Civil Affairs announced 100 sites as national-level “demonstration bases” for patriotic education. Among the 100 bases, 40 are memorials to China’s past conflicts or wars with foreign countries, 24 memorialize the civil war between the CCP and GMD (Guomindang, The Nationalist Party), 21 are sites relating to China’s myths and legends, and 15 are in remembrance of Chinese heroes. Among the first 40 sites, half are in remembrance of the Fifteen Year War against Japan (1931–1945) (Wang 2014: 144, 149, 155–157).2 In this fashion, the narratives on “national humiliation” in China are made up of family histories (fundamentalism), history textbooks (constructionism), and elite-led ideology campaigns (instrumentalism), which has led to various kinds of interpretation (Wang 2014: 204).

3.2 Taiwan In 1988, the process of democratization in Taiwan began to accelerate when Lee Teng-hui became the president of the Republic of China (ROC) after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo. Thereafter, martial law was lifted, the Temporary Provisions against the Communist Rebellion were abolished, and the so-called ten-thousand-year-old parliament was rejuvenated by Lee, with local representatives being elected from areas under the Republic of China’s control. These steps toward democratization finally resulted in Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996, which Lee won. In the following presidential election in 2000, Chen Shui-bian became the first president from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Taiwan underwent a peaceful regime change. In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou won the presidency as the official nominee of the GMD. The DPP’s nominee Tsai Ing-wen then replaced Ma and was elected as the president of the ROC in 2016. The aforementioned developments seem to confirm that the twoparty system has settled down in Taiwan. Recently, the process of democratization that started in the 1990s developed an ethno-political dimension as far as the localization of Taiwan’s politics is concerned. From the second half of the 1990s to the beginning of the 2000s, a vital transformation in the definition of Taiwanese identity could easily be observed (Figure 0.3).3 Meanwhile, when considering Taiwan under Japanese rule between 1895 and 1945, people now believe that Taiwan made the choice to inherit the legacies of this era in modernizing the local society, while refuting Japan’s attempt to “Japanize” the island. The trend of “localization” in Taiwanese politics brought about reforms in the educational system. In 1997, the textbook Understanding Taiwan (history section) was brought into use in Taiwan’s junior high schools. This textbook significantly changed the traditional history education, which focused on the history of the Chinese continent and the Republic of China, and therefore kindled contentious debates among Taiwan’s various social groups over the vocabulary used in depicting Taiwan’s history, including the usage of terms such as “Rizhi” (Japanese rule) or “Riju” (Japanese occupation) and “Zhongzhan” (end of war) or “Guangfu” (restoration). Moreover, the 95 guidelines for the curriculum

The history controversy in East Asia 9 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1990

1995 Both/indifferent

2000 Chinese

2005 Taiwanese

2010

2015 No answer

Figure 0.3 Changing identity of Taiwanese/Chinese Source: Election Study Center of NCCU

adopted in 2006, which separate the history of Taiwan from that of China, are widely considered to have had positive influences on Taiwan’s democratization (see Xu’s study in Chapter 3). Also, other narratives on Taiwan’s independent historical development and transformations over the past 200 years have been demonstrated. For instance, the former director of Academia Historica, Lu Fang-shang, posed the thesis of “Y-form history” (Asahi Shimbun, September 30, 2011) and argued that the legacy of the Republic of China and the history of Japan-ruled Taiwan had merged into the history of ROC’s development in Taiwan. Chou Wan-yao sketched Taiwan’s historical development from the Paleolithic era up to the era of Japanese occupation in her book A New Illustrated History of Taiwan, seeking to challenge the domination of Han Chinese-centered narratives in Taiwan’s history.

3.3 Korea In the beginning of the 1990s, a series of events, such as the admission of the two Koreas together as members of the UN (September 1991), the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and South Korea (August 1992), and the North Korean nuclear crisis (North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993) revealed a drastic change in the Korean Peninsula’s situation after the fall of the Cold War political order. South Korea, a country that experienced rapid industrialization and high economic growth from the 1970s onwards, embraced its transformation from an autocratic regime to a democratic system on the occasion of the 1987 presidential election.

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On the other hand, even though the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (signed in June 1965) guarantees normal bilateral relations between the two countries, Japan and South Korea have differed on their view of Japan’s 35-year colonial rule in the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. Japan insisted on the legitimacy of its occupation according to contemporary international laws, whereas South Korea firmly denied this argument. Both sides left room for further interpretations when the treaty was signed, but this unresolved issue then escalated at the beginning of the 1990s. In August 1991, Kim Hak-sun, the first former “comfort woman” to come forward and share her story, testified on the Japanese Imperial Army’s sex slavery. A month later, a lawsuit against the Japanese government was brought to the Tokyo District Court. The Korean government demanded Japan present a proper solution to this issue, and the comfort women controversy was upgraded to a diplomatic dispute between these two East Asian neighbors. Kimura Kan summarized the further unfolding of the dispute as follows: First, at the same time, some Korean feminist social activists were protesting against the popular “sex tours” by foreigners, especially by Japanese, aiming at Korean women’s sex services. Against this background, the comfort women issue was catching wide attention, since it provided a “previous case of foreign males trampling Korean women’s dignity.” Second, the forced labor during the war and the labor mobilization were then becoming attention-grabbing issues in Korea in terms of Japan’s different historical perceptions. The comfort women issue was seen as a part of this discourse. Third, in response to the “rediscovery” of the comfort women, the Japanese authorities lacked a coherent countermeasure. The Miyazawa government made the first apology without deeply studying the historical documents approving the government’s distance from this issue. Murayama’s official statement on the historical issues evoked various opinions within the government— some appeared to be provocations toward the Korean authorities and worsened Japanese-Korean relations. Meanwhile, the issue of historical perceptions now came on the scene as a major issue between Korea and Japan. Fourth, the messy handling of the history problem on the Japanese side was the result of the government’s and, moreover, the ruling elites’ loss of control over the social movement and public opinion upon the change of the governing parties in both Japan and South Korea. Kimura argued that the change in historical perceptions was an inevitable consequence of South Korea’s democratization. On its way to a democratic society, the Korean government constantly faced tension within public opinion. Therefore, in handling the comfort women issue, it had to bear in mind what the public were requesting (Kimura 2014: 209–213). As far as the “narrative on national history” is concerned, Korea was in a dispute with China over who Goguryeo belonged to. From 2002 to 2007, the Northeast Project (Serial Research Project on the History and Current State of the Northeast Borderland) conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science and local academic institutions investigated the history of Northeast China and the border making in this area. In 2004, Gaogouli/Koguryo relics were co-registered on the UNESCO World Heritage List as the heritage of both China and North

The history controversy in East Asia 11 Korea. The Chinese authorities claimed that Gaogouli was under the administrative power of an ethnic minority group on the periphery of ancient China, which evoked fierce criticism from the South Koreans. A diplomatic agreement between the two governments sought to guarantee that the dispute over the Gaogouli/ Koguryo relics would not spill over into the political arena (Kin 2008).

3.4 Japan In Japan, once the 1955 System came to an end, the country entered the era of a coalition system. After the short-lived Hosokawa cabinet, a coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) under the leadership of Murayama Tomiichi, the secretary-general of the SDP, began. In 1995, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, reviews and reflections on the war flourished. Against this background, the SDP’s resolution addressing Japan’s war responsibility had to go through numerous changes and modifications at the request of the SDP’s coalition partner. On June 9, the resolution posed by the three ruling parties was passed in the lower house; however, only half of the 502 representatives participated in the vote. This Diet resolution, together with a statement by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi on August 15 of the same year, was the main reflection of Japan’s review on the country’s past 50 years and its future prospects in the new political environment after the end of the Cold War. As was seen in many other countries, the end of the Cold War at the beginning of the 1990s also invalidated the dichotomy between “left” and “right,” which had been taken for granted. Once one of the most powerful parties, the SDP shrank considerably, which evidences the loss of “progressive” intellectuals’ influence on the Japanese. At the same time, this was also affecting the so-called conservatives. For instance, the early members of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, founded in 1997, shared “anti-American conservative” convictions, rather than a “pro-American conservative” attitude similar to the LDP’s political stance. Being critical toward postwar Japan’s political system, the so-called postwar regime, they accused the two mainstream influential camps in Japan’s public discourse—both the conservatives and the liberals—of being cooperating criminals who were responsible for the establishment of Japan’s “postwar regime” and therefore needed to be overthrown. By labeling the two camps as “old and rotten elites,” they positioned themselves as criticizers (Kimura 2014: 221–223).

4 Toward a common historical narrative in East Asia On August 14, 2015, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo issued a statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II and confirmed the following understandings: First, as the first country that had built a constitutional government and preserved its independence throughout, Japan lost sight of the overall trends in the world and turned out to be a challenger to the “new world order” that took

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shape after the Great Depression. Second, Japan will never again resort to any form of threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes such as incidents, aggression, and war. Third, the Japanese must not let their children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with the war, be predestined to apologize. Fourth, Japan will firmly uphold basic values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights as unyielding values and, by working hand in hand with countries that share such values, hoist the flag of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” and contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world more than ever before. The next day, editorial columns in Japan’s major newspapers such as The Nikkei, Mainichi Shimbun, and Yomiuri Shimbun published commentaries assenting that the Abe Statement was prospecting the future of East Asia based on the legacy of the statements issued by former Prime Ministers Kawano and Yamamura.4 On September 3 of the same year, China celebrated the 70th anniversary of the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War” in Tian’anmen Square. On this occasion, a military parade was organized. Invited guests-of-honor included Russian President Vladimir Putin, President Park Geun-hye of South Korea, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon of the United Nations, and so forth. Before the military parade started, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a speech, explicitly defining the Manchuria Incident of 1931 as the official beginning of the Chinese people’s tenacious fight against Japan and positioning China’s resistance as an indispensable component of the World Anti-Fascist War. Xi called for establishing a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation between China and the U.S. against the background of China’s rise as a new global power. His view on the “14-year antiJapanese war” obviously differed from that expressed in Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou’s statement on the war delivered one day before. At a commemorative event for the 70th anniversary of the Republic of China’s Anti-Japanese War and the Armed Forces Day5 of the 104th year of the Republic, Ma Ying-jeou reinforced that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937 marked the kickoff of the eight-year anti-Japanese resistance war under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek/ the national government and emphasized that it was a historical truth that greatly determined the international political circumstances after victory in World War II. In her speech on the 70th anniversary of National Liberation, President Park Geun-hye said that Abe’s statement fell short of expectations. However, Park said, We focused on the fact that Japan clearly acknowledged to the international community that it will not deviate from the position of previous cabinets based on apology and reflection on the pain and sacrifices of the Asian people as they were facing Japan’s invasion or colonial rule, and on the distress and sorrow of the women who were forced to act as military prostitutes. Moreover, Park claimed, “the Japanese government will have to support its declaration to succeed the perception of history possessed by previous cabinets with

The history controversy in East Asia 13 consistent and sincere actions to earn the trust of its neighboring countries and the international community.” This shows that it is possible for Japan and Korea to reach an agreement in the future, since both sides appreciate Japan inheriting the historical outlook of its previous cabinets. Besides, after having attended China’s military parade in Tian’anmen Square, Park and Xi suggested to hold the China-Japan-South Korea trilateral summit. Japan had responded positively. This shows that the three actors were searching for common ground and seeking to reduce the anxiety in East Asian politics caused by the Abe Statement and China’s military parade. Afterwards, attempts to resolve or reduce the political tension caused by the history disputes seemed to come to a satisfactory end. In December 2015, an agreement was announced in the form of parallel statements issued by the Japanese and Korean foreign ministers. They confirmed that “this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly,” and that the Japanese government would contribute one billion Japanese yen to a foundation to be established by the South Korean government to assist in the healing of the comfort women. In May of the next year, U.S. President Barack Obama paid the first visit by a sitting U.S. president to Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, and asserted that “among those nations like my own that hold nuclear stockpiles, we must have the courage to escape the logic of fear and pursue a world without them.” On August 6, when Matsui Kazumi, the mayor of Hiroshima, delivered the Peace Declaration, he also mentioned Obama’s speech and called for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Since the turn of the century, hostility toward China and Korea has become obvious in the Japanese society. This was proved by the Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy, conducted by Japan’s cabinet office (Figure 0.4). It seems to be a consequence of the numerous anti-Japanese demonstrations organized in China’s various cities and the worsening Sino-Japanese and Japanese-Korean relations due to the Japanese prime minister’s and cabinet members’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine.

90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1975

1980 China

1985

1990 U. S.

1995

2000 Russia

Figure 0.4 Changes in affinity between four countries

2005

2010 South Korea

2015

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On the contrary, ordinary Japanese people have shown a special affinity for the U.S. since the 1980s. This shows that even when there is a deep gap in historical understanding, such as Japan and the U.S.’s differing views on the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (contradicting narratives on war), it does not necessarily have to damage the diplomatic relations between two partners. Also, the construction of positive bilateral relations (international order)—a pragmatic political task—is imperative. Only under such circumstances (while keeping a certain distance on pragmatic issues) are reflections on and conversations about historical understandings realistic (see Takahashi’s study in Chapter 7). In other words, discrepancies in historical views do not have to result in tensions and crises between countries. As already asserted, the “history problems” in East Asia had been kindled by the Japanese history textbook controversy and visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese prime ministers and cabinet members in the 1980s. During the 1990s, China launched the Patriotic Education Campaign, former comfort women in Korea came forward and testified, and Japan issued the Murayama Statement despite a boom in historical revisionism. In the twenty-first century, the “history problems” took the form of internal institutionalization (China’s Victory Day and the National Day of Remembrance for the Nanjing Massacre) and international problems (rivalries concerning the registration of UNESCO World Heritage Sites and the World Memory List, the spread of Statues of Peace). I would argue that three factors are responsible for East Asia’s diplomatic crisis evoked by the “history problem”: first, the rise of China as a global power and its ambition to challenge the regional order and to remake the institutional conditions; second, the confrontations and compromises made by the three governments; and third, nationalistic voices being more strongly articulated through media such as SNS. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that not every historical event has been politicized in this situation. Rather, a couple of events have become especially problematic on different occasions, relating to different previous historical conditions (my argument is restricted to those politicized events usually considered as “history problems” in the context of East Asia’s historical and geopolitical environment). Therefore, while we are seeking to politically resolve the existing disputes (through compromises by each party), we need the wisdom to prevent further historical facts from being politicized as new “history problems.” Thereby, first of all, we should soberly examine why particular events became politicized and evoked fierce debates over historical understandings. Then, as far as the second subject is concerned, I think that self-relativization, cross-border conversations, and intellectual pursuits (historical research) are all-important.

Conclusion In the East Asia of the twenty-first century, a historical narrative on a common past has been split and scattered by the borders of “countries” (including the Taiwan Strait and the 38th parallel north) and sub-disciplines within one “country” (politics, public opinion, and mass media). In such a circumstance, scholarly

The history controversy in East Asia 15 engagements have been obliged to bridge the gaps between different realms and seek to create a historical narrative that is generally accepted in East Asia.6 What is characteristic of the East Asia of the twenty-first century is that diverse voices from both political authorities and society, articulated through both mass media and the Internet, are being heard. Though to varying degrees, that applies to Japan, China, Taiwan, and South Korea.7 Therefore, we need to promote grassroots conversations to deepen mutual understandings. Let us discuss the relationship between political subjects and war memorials in the context of the historical controversy in East Asia during the twenty-first century (Figure 0.5). The left side of Figure 0.5 shows political subjects of Japan, China, Taiwan, and Korea, respectively. On the right side are the respective monuments that symbolize the memory of war in each country. This correlation can be summarized as follows: 1

2

3

The already-politicized historical issues demand political resolutions based on bilateral compromises (the Prime Minister’s Official Residence, Japan; the “Gate of New China” in Zhongnanhai Compound, China; Office of the President of the Republic, China/Taiwan; Blue House, South Korea). As East Asian countries have started to put up different monuments in remembrance of wars they fought in (Hiroshima Atom Bomb Dome in Japan, the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall in China, and the Statue of Peace in South Korea), a narrative on war that unifies their memories has already become impossible. It is difficult to make a case for Taiwan’s monument symbolizing its narrative on war.

Yet, the “generally accepted historical narrative” in East Asia is a viewpoint not necessarily shared by all parties. It should guide us toward tolerance of different voices, give us the capacity to integrate different standpoints into our own contemplation, and allow people to raise objections as far as they express certain understandings. *** The following explains how the different chapters in this book are related to the history problem in East Asia. Considering China’s dominant role in reshaping East Asia’s regional order in the twenty-first century, “Part I: Historical narratives of China” has four chapters on Chinese politics in the twentieth century. Chapter 1, “History of the Republic of China and ‘historical narrative’” (Kaneko Hajime), introduces two historiographies, namely the “revolutionary historiography” that functions as the official historiography in today’s China, and the “Republican China-centered historical narrative” that gradually becomes an established framework in Japan’s study of modern Chinese history since the 1980s. Chapter 2, “Historical narratives of ‘democracy’ in Republican China” (Mizuha Nobuo), discusses how the Chinese intellectuals of the 1930s–’40s perceived liberty and democracy and how their

Japan: Prime Minister’s Official Residence

China: “Gate of New China” in Zhongnanhai Compound

Hiroshima Atomic Bomb Dome

Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall

Taiwan: Office of the President of the Republic of China

South Korea: Blue House

Statue of Peace

Figure 0.5 Political subjects and war memorials Sources: Statue of Peace (bottom right), Office of the President of the Republic of China (left second to bottom), Blue House (bottom left), Hiroshima Atomic Bomb Dome (top right)—all acquired from PhotoAC (www.photo-ac.com) Prime Minister’s Official Residence (top left)— acquired from the official home page (www.kantei.go.jp) “Gate of New China” in Zhongnanhai Compound (second to top left), Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall (second from top right)—both acquired from Wikipedia (https://zh.wikipedia. org/wiki/新华门, https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/侵华日军南京大屠杀遇难同胞纪念馆)

The history controversy in East Asia 17 perception guided them to different paths during the early years of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), because these two concepts are relevant to China’s current politics as well. Chapter 3, “The formation of the People’s Republic and the ‘historical narrative’” (Maruyama Kōji), strives to replace the official narrative of PRC’s founding with the true story by critical text exegesis of newly released historical documents. In 2010, China had become the world’s second largest economy, but a stern attitude had replaced the principle of international cooperation that had defined its diplomatic policy until then. Chapter 4, “‘Peaceful coexistence’ and ‘historical narrative’ in Chinese diplomacy” (Yoshida Toyoko), discusses how the principle of “peaceful coexistence” has taken shape since the 1950s and provides insights on the logic behind today’s Chinese diplomacy. Since China’s rise to a global power in the twenty-first century has its roots in the transformation of the regional order in East Asia in the post-Cold War era, the four major clusters of questions in “China’s political development in the twentieth century,” namely 1) the revision of “revolutionary historiography” (Chapter 1); 2) “liberty and democracy” in Chinese politics (Chapter 2); 3) the political implication of the PRC’s establishment (Chapter 3); and 4) diplomatic strategies in Cold War international relations (Chapter 4), need to be re-examined in the context of their respective connections to that transformation. Part II, “Historical narratives of East Asia,” reflects on East Asia’s history problem and comprises four chapters that seek to provide a complex picture of the diachronically developing and multi-faceted East Asia. Chapter 5, “The discourse on Asianism in postwar Japan” (Takiguchi Tsuyoshi), focuses on the continuity of intellectual Takeuchi Yoshimi’s thoughts on Pan-Asianism in prewar and postwar periods, arguing for their actuality in examining our current problems. Chapter 6, “The perception toward China among Japanese communities in Dalian after World War I” (Matsushige Mitsuhiro), sheds light on Manmō, a Japanese general magazine published in Japan’s colonial administrative center Dalian in the 1920s. By analyzing the opinions and narratives published in the magazine, this chapter seeks to trace the logic behind the contest between the international cooperativism of the Washington System and the Chinese nationalism, which ultimately led to the Manchurian Incident. Chapter 7, “Perceptions of atomic bombing in the United States and Japan” (Takahashi Keikichi), focuses on U.S. President Barack Obama’s Hiroshima visit in May 2016 and analyzes the conflicting views of the U.S. and Japan on atomic bombing from a comparative perspective. From the author’s viewpoint, the friendly bilateral relation between the two countries, despite their opposing interpretation of history, provides an alternative benchmark for us to reconsider the history problem in East Asia. Chapter 8, “Transnational Asia and Its Changing Dynamics at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century” (Liu Hong), defines the situation in East Asia around the twenty-first century through the concept of “Transnational Asia,” reconstructing the historical process of the flow of goods and ideas within the region from the pre-modern times up to today. The regional order in East Asia has experienced the following four stages chronologically: 1) the China-centered multi-faceted regional order; 2) the world

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order dominated by the Western powers; 3) the Cold War system after World War II; and 4) structural transformation after the end of the Cold War. Among these, Japan has played the dominant role in 2) and 3), and China in 1) and 4). As far as the historical problem in East Asia is concerned, its origin can be traced back to the 1980s. The collapse of the Cold War system intensified it in the 1990s, while in the 2000s it gained new momentum due to the aggravating Sino-Japanese and Japanese-Korean relations, as well as domestic politics’ institutionalization of the problem and the articulation of the problem as international issues. To question Japan’s responsibilities in its military invasion and colonial rule in Asia, we need to question its role in the Western-dominated order in East Asia (Chapter 6) and in the transformation of East Asia’s regional order after the end of the Cold War (Chapter 5). The regional order in East Asia during the Cold War era was under the overwhelming influence of the U.S. and unfolded in the form of each country’s bilateral relation with it. In contrast, as China becomes a global power in the twenty-first century, entanglement of and cooperation among East Asia’s countries are gradually replacing the old diplomatic structure. The ASEAN-centered multi-layered regional order that is characterized by multi-national interaction has transformed the region significantly. Therefore, Chapter 7, which examines the history problem between two countries (Japan and the U.S., Japan and China, as well as Japan and Korea), in light of the multi-faceted regional order in East Asia in the new century, provides us highly meaningful insights to understand the issue. Chapter 8 also presents a vital aspect—it seeks to diachronically and synchronically construct an overall picture of East Asia using the concept of “Transnational Asia” that describes the region’s new nature. Part III, “Toward a generally accepted historical narrative in East Asia,” has three chapters, which discuss how the construction of that narrative (joint research of East Asian history) could be made possible and present crucial arguments from the authors’ respective standpoints. Chapter 9, “Questioning the ‘Empireness’ of national history: East Asian history narrated in Korea, China, and Japan” (Yu Yongtae), argues that a critical reflection of the “empireness” of one’s own nation’s historical narrative is the precondition for the construction of a generally accepted historical narrative in East Asia. Chapter 10, “Historical perception in Taiwan and collaborative studies on East Asian history” (Hsu Yu-Ming), seeks to design a joint research on the history problem from the standpoint of Taiwan, where Taiwanization and de-Sinicization are the current mainstream thoughts. Chapter 11, “Historical perception in China and collaborative studies on East Asian history” (Jiang Pei), calls for serious reflection on the tradition of evaluating historical events through a moral standard and national arrogance, two elements deeply embedded in China’s thoughts on history. This chapter underlines the importance of jointly undertaking research projects on East Asian history. The transformation of East Asia in modern eras had been driven primarily by Japan’s activities. Hence, Japan’s confrontation with its colonial past and its war responsibility is vital and is obviously the precondition to analyze East Asia’s history problem. On the other hand, a valid approach in examining East Asia’s history problem should not restrict the investigation into Japan’s responsibility

The history controversy in East Asia 19 over its invasion and aggression; in fact, it should reconsider the past, present, and future of international relations within East Asia and promote a cognitive revolution in understanding this issue. The three chapters in Part III are written by authors who, in the beginning, shared this common concern. Japan’s standpoint and role in East Asia’s regional order of the twenty-first century should be related to that of the previous two eras, namely the transformation of Japan to a colonial power after all its wars (late nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth century) and the making of East Asia’s regional order against the backdrop of the region’s growing economy during the Cold War era. From the 2010s, the history problem in East Asia has intensified, negatively influencing the region’s politics, economy, and diplomacy. The idea of constructing a generally accepted historical narrative in East Asia guided us to conduct joint research in history. In our search for related topics, we realized that multiple subjects and various media have contributed to the multi-faceted history problem (see Table 0.1 and Figure 0.2). During our discussions, we came to the agreement that the focus must be on the historical narrative and systematic historical perception of such narratives. Therefore, we included both surveys of historical facts and articles on East Asia’s historical perception in this book, to provide material for further contemplation and conversation on East Asia’s history problem in the twenty-first century.

Notes 1 In 2010, China overtook Japan as the world’s second biggest economy. As a result, Japan’s 42-year reign in the number two spot behind the U.S. was taken by China. In 2000, China’s GDP was 25% of Japan’s, and in 2005 it was 50%. In 2010, China’s economy equaled that of Japan, and in 2015 it had grown to 200% of Japan’s (rough estimation). 2 After being selected as Patriotic Educational Bases, many memory sites received financial support from the government for construction or renovation and enlargement. All of these bases have hosted numerous organized visits from schools, the army, and government agencies. For instance, the Chinese People’s Memorial Hall of the Anti-Japanese War (built in 1987 and enlarged in 1995) and the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall (built in 1985 and enlarged in 1995) have received nine to ten million visitors to date. 3 Since 1992, the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University (Taiwan) has been conducting opinion research on the national identity of people living in Taiwan. The data show that around the time of Taiwan’s first direct presidential election (mid-1990s), half of Taiwanese identified themselves as “both Chinese and Taiwanese,” and those identifying themselves either as “Taiwanese” or “Chinese” made up 20%–30%. After 20 years, data from 2016 showed that 60% considered themselves as “Taiwanese” and 30% “both Taiwanese and Chinese.” Less than 10% saw themselves as “Chinese.” 4 In its editorial from August 15, the Asahi Shimbun questioned why Abe had issued a new statement and said that he should not have done this. On the other hand, the Sankei Shimbun warned that Japan should prepare for a “war over historical narrative” against China and South Korea. 5 In 1955, the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China decided to unite several Memorial Days and make September 3 the “Armed Forces Day” for

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the Army, Navy, and Air Force, on which celebratory events would take place. Since then, September 3 has been set as Taiwan’s Armed Forces Day. 6 Kajitani (2015) argued that the lack of “public consciousness” in East Asia has resulted in an insular situation for all discourses on East Asia’s current state. He emphasized the importance of a shared awareness of “democracy,” “human rights,” and “public consciousness” and blisteringly criticized the mode of thinking that shifts the responsibly for social problems to external factors. 7 Since the 1990s, Taiwan’s and South Korea’s authoritarian regimes have been transformed into democratic systems. In China, the acceleration of marketization has brought obvious changes to Chinese society. According to Qian Liqun (2012), the three main grassroots powers in the China of the twenty-first century are rights protection movements, supervision of Internet users, and NGOs.

Bibliography Chou, Wan-yao 周婉窈, translated by Hamashima Atsutoshi 濱島敦俊. Zōhoban: Zusetsu Taiwan no Rekishi 増補版 図説台湾の歴史. Heibonsha 平凡社, 2013. Hattori, Ryūji 服部龍二. Gaikō Dokyumento Rekishi Ninshiki 外交ドキュメント歴史 認識. Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 2015. Kajitani, Kai 梶谷懐. Nihon to Chūgoku, “Datsu Kindai” no Yūwaku: Ajiateki na Mono o Saikō suru 日本と中国, “脱近代”の誘惑――アジア的なものを再考する. Ōta Shuppan 太田出版, 2015. Kimura, Kan 木村幹. Nikkan Rekishi Ninshiki Mondai to ha Nani ka: Rekishi Kyōkasho, “Ianfu”, Popyurizumu 日韓歴史認識問題とは何か――歴史教科書・「慰安婦」・ ポピュリズム. Mineruva Shobō ミネルヴァ書房, 2014. Kin, Kōrin 金光林. “Chūkan Ryōkoku no Rekishi/Bunka Masatsu ni Taisuru Bunmeishi-teki Kōsatsu 中韓両国の歴史・文化摩擦に対する文明史的考察,” Bulletin of Niigata Sangyō University, no. 20, 2008. Qian, Liqun 钱理群, translated by Hane Jirō 羽根次郎 et al. Mōtakutō to Chūgoku: Aru Chishikijin ni yoru Chūka Jinmin Kyōwakoku-shi 毛沢東と中国――ある知識 人による中華人民共和国史, II. Seidosha 青土社, 2012. Tanaka, Hitoshi 田中仁. “Sengō 70-nen to 21-seiki no Higashi Ajia: ‘Sensō no Katari’ to Rekishi Ninshiki 戦後70年と21世紀の東アジア――「戦争の語り」と歴史認 識,” in Akita Shigeru 秋田茂 and Momoki Shirō 桃木至朗 (ed.), Gurōbaru Hisutorii to Sensō グローバルヒストリーと戦争. Osaka University Press, 2016. Tang, Cheng 唐成. “Chūgoku no Keizai Seichō 中国の経済成長,” in Iechika Ryōko 家近亮子 et al. (ed.), Shinpan 5 Bunya kara Yomitoku Gendai Chūgoku: Rekishi, Seiji, Keizai, Shakai, Gaikō 新版 5分野から読み解く現代中国―歴史・政治・経 済・社会・外交. Kōyō Shobō 晃洋書房, 2016. Wang, Zheng 汪铮, translated by Itō Makoto 伊藤真. Chūgoku no Rekishi Ninshiki ha dō Tsukurareta no ka 中国の歴史認識はどう作られたのか. Tōyō Keizai, 2014. Xu, Yuming 許育銘, translated by Wada Hideo 和田英男 and Zhou Yan 周妍. “Higashi Ajia Kyōdō Kenkyū to Taiwan no Rekishi Ninshiki 東アジア共同研究と 台湾の歴史認識,” Discussion Papers in Contemporary China Studies, Osaka University Forum on China, no. 7, 2015.

Part I

Historical narratives of China

1

History of the Republic of China and “historical narrative” KANEKO Hajime

Abstract: Do you know the term “revolutionary historical perspective?” “Revolutionary historical perspective” is a term for an apologetic view of history for the political justification of the Chinese Communist Party in modern Chinese history and is still used in present-day China as the officially recognized historical view. In fact, even in postwar Japanese research on modern Chinese history, there was a time in which this “revolutionary historical perspective” had a heavy influence. The background reflected the pre-World War II Japanese invasion of China and the sympathy of historians in Japan in regard to the successful establishment of the Communist Party via the Chinese Civil War. However, in the midst of the demystification of the CCP’s revolution in the 1970s and 1980s, the “revolutionary view of history” began to lose its magical appeal, and in its stead a new framework of historical recognition, “the people’s view of history,” appeared. In this chapter, the process of how the Japanese reflected on prewar invasions of China and the method of discussing the recognition of modern Chinese history will be evaluated by re-reading Japanese research on modern Chinese history and the relationship of these two views. It is my hope that through this process the dialog regarding historical perspectives of modern Chinese history will be opened to all Anglophone readership.

Introduction: “narrating history,” history studies, and modern Chinese history From the standpoint of history studies, how can the keyword of this book, “historical narrative,” best be tackled? Furthermore, what approach would prove to be valid from the perspective of research on modern Chinese history? For this chapter, first, the question “What is history?” will be our starting point. According to history studies, “history” is not “facts” from the past. If this is the case, what is the difference between “history” and “facts”? I think that the “facts” of the past are chosen by people for a fixed purpose, and as a result these “facts” are reconstructed into “history.” In other words, “history” is formed through the process of people of past eras and people living now working from the “facts” of the past.

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History is considerable as a field of “study” because it has a method to prove facts, via analysis and verification, by critically looking at historical documents. Through this, as much as possible, history studies are able to remove any arbitrary “facts” and then reconstruct “facts” into history in a convincing manner. In other words, history studies are not allowed to conveniently “speak of history” for itself. Of course, it is well known that the formalists emphasized that “history is a story.”1 However, this exists in a different dimension because it is not permissible to only conveniently choose “facts” in order to reconstruct a nice “history” and pretend that “history is a story.” However, even if a “historical narrative” can be controlled by the method of proof based on historical documents, there is the worry that this method will only serve to limit historical studies. This is the issue of “historical perspective.” Here, the term “historical perspective” will be defined as choosing “facts,” connecting them, and reconstructing them as a guide. This means that the aforementioned choice of “facts” of the past and their reconstruction for “a set purpose or point of view” is equivalent to “historical perspective.” This “historical perspective” causes problems for historical studies because it often appears as ideological and political. As long as humans are social creatures, it is unavoidable that “historical perspective” will violate the effect it has on social and political conditions, as well as thought and cultural environments. However, when a “historical perspective” has a strong ideological and political charge, in extreme cases, it will inevitably become the convenient “historical narrative” for a certain state, people, social class, political party, etc. Moreover, proof based on historical documents will be limited by “historical perspective” and the risk of “history” being self-righteously reconstructed becomes apparent. The issues of “historical narrative” addressed in this chapter are about the relationship between “historical perspective” and historical researches on modern Chinese history undertaken by Japanese scholars. In Japan, until the 1970s, modern Chinese history was under the influence of the revolutionary government’s apologetic justification of the “revolutionary history perspective.” The “revolutionary government” here points to the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party; however, the correctness of the Chinese Communist Party that was apologetically presented in Mao Zedong’s “revolutionary historical perspective” had an especially strong influence. Meanwhile, the formation of the framework of research on the “Republic of China” was realized after the 1980s and the new “Republican China-centered historiography” was proposed. In retrospect, the appearance of the “Republican China-centered historiography” could be seen as a shift in Japan’s understanding of modern Chinese history. This chapter will introduce the “revolutionary historical perspective” prompted by the Chinese Communist Party and how the “Republican China-centered historiography” was relativized as a “historical narrative.” Then, the meaning of research on the “Republic of China” from the standpoint of Japanese people “speaking” and awareness of modern Chinese history will be analyzed.

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1 What is modern Chinese history? Before exploring this topic, a general idea of “modern Chinese history” and its historical development will be briefly explained (Table 1.1). By giving an outline of modern Chinese history, it should make it easier to understand the features of the “Republican China-centered historiography” and issues of the “revolutionary historical perspective.” Typically, modern Chinese history starts around 1840 with the First Opium War and continues to the 1949 establishment of the People’s Republic of China. This 100-year span looks at the history of the changes of the country from the continuation of the Qing Dynasty until 1912. Following this was the birth of the Republic of China which continued from 1919 until 1949, and the present-day People’s Republic of China, ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. The Qing Dynasty decayed in a series of disastrous conflicts including the First and Second Opium Wars, the Sino-French War, two Sino-Japanese Wars, and internal struggles caused by civil unrest, such as the Taiping and the Boxer Rebellions. This resulted in the advancement of modernization (Westernization) movements, for example, the Self-Strengthening Movement, Hundred Days’ Reform, New Policies, etc., which led to the fall of Qing and closed the curtain on the autocratic dynasty in the 1911 Xinhai Revolution (or Revolution of 1911). The Republic of China, which was formed through the Xinhai Revolution, is often divided into the early period (1912–1928) and the later period (1928– 1949). The early period of the Republic of China, in which the capitol was moved to Beijing, was an unstable era full of power shifts. It began when Sun Yat-sen handed down presidential authority to Yuan Shikai and Yuan pressed for unity in the country; then, it shifted when Yuan aimed at returning to the empire and there was a strong defense of the “military” in all areas. However, this era was also a time when the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and other civil movements caused capitalists, workers, students, and intellectuals to heighten their awareness of citizenship. In the height of this energy, two revolutionary parties, the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party, made their appearance in the 1920s. National revolutions continued to develop after the two parties came to the First United Front in 1924. At the same time, labor movements and civil revolutions, such as the May Thirtieth Movement in 1925, intensified, and the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek continued the Northern Expeditions. However, as the result of all the occurrences, the First United Front fell after Chiang opposed the Communist Party, Beijing was occupied after Northern Expeditions, and the representative political power of the Republic of China was placed in Nanjing. The history of the latter half of the Republic of China is characterized by the establishment of the Nationalist Party, the Anti-Japanese War, and postwar Chinese Civil War. While Chiang’s Nationalist Party was advocating for the realization of democracy in the future, the Communist Party was losing power due to the defense of the rural community and opposing forces in the one-party system. Further, there was progress in the establishment of a unified modern nation.

New democratic revolution era

ROC

Second half

First half

1840 First Opium War 1851 God Worshiping Society, Taiping Establishment (Taiping Rebellion 1851–1864) 1856 Second Opium War (Arrow War) 1860s (first half) Self-strength Movements begin (–94) 1894 Sino-Japanese War 1895 Hundred Days’ Reform begins (–98) 1899 Boxer Rebellion (–1900) 1901 New Policies begin (–1911) 1911 Xinhai Revolution 1912 Republic of China established 1915 Japan’s Twenty-One Demands 1919 May Fourth Movement 1920 Formation of Chinese Communist Party 1924 Reorganization of the Chinese Nationalist Party, First United Front established 1925 May Thirtieth Movement 1926 Northern Expeditions begin 1927 Division of the Chinese Nationalist Party 1927 Establishment of Nanjing Nationalistic Government (Nationalistic Revolution begins) 1931 Establishment of China-Soviet Communist Temporary Government 1937 Second United Front established, Anti-Japanese War begins 1941 Asian Pacific War begins 1945 End of World War II, Victory in Anti-Japanese War 1946 Chinese Civil War begins 1949 Republic of China moved to Taiwan People’s Republic of China established

Qing

Former democratic revolution era

Semicolonial/ semifeudal society

Major events

Country

Revolutionary historical perspective

Table 1.1 Flow of modern Chinese history and era division

Shōwa

Taishō

Meiji

Edo

Japan

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However, Japanese aggression intensified after the Manchurian Incident in 1931. As a response, the Communist Party was guided by Mao Zedong to join the Nationalist Party. The Second United Front emerged and launched in eight years of fighting in the Anti-Japanese War from 1937. All the democratic factions’ insistence on Western democratic government and communist parties resulted in the strengthening of political remarks in postwar China. At that time, in agreement with Mao Zedong, Chiang Kai-shek attempted to recreate a harmonious and peaceful situation between the communist and democratic parties. Then, in the summer of 1946, a decision was made to aggressively attack the Communist Party, which resulted in civil war. However, in 1949, after losing the trust of the people and due to the eventual weakening of the Nationalist Party, Chiang unavoidably had to flee to Taiwan and re-establish his Republic of China there. In October of the same year, Mao declared the establishment of the new People’s Republic of China in Beijing. Viewing the ups and downs of modern Chinese history in this manner—Qing Dynasty, Early-Republic of China, Late-Republic of China, and the People’s Republic of China—a fact that stands out is that the change of power was realized through “revolution.” These historical features are emphasized by breaking off from the former system and the danger of self-justification promoted by a “historical narrative.” The final “revolution” that is “told” in modern Chinese history is that of the Chinese Communist Party’s “revolutionary historical perspective.”

2 Modern Chinese history and the Chinese Communist Party’s “revolutionary historical perspective” Until the 1980s, there was a strong influence of the Chinese Communist Party’s (Mao Zedong’s) “revolutionary historical perspective” in Japan. It can be thought that factors such as sympathy for the 1949 revolution, the victory of the revolution which led to trust regarding the Chinese Communist Party, a focus on class struggles and struggles of the people, the assurance that there was a historical need for the Communist Party (from the perspective of world history), etc. had a strong influence on Japanese researchers. However, as was already confirmed in the last section on modern Chinese history, the Chinese Communist Party did not always occupy the historical center stage. In what framework did Mao Zedong “narrate” modern Chinese history? How was the Communist Party’s successful victory in the 1949 revolution justified?

2.1 The standard for the revolution’s characteristics in era division As shown in Table 1.1, Mao Zedong divided more than 100 years of modern Chinese history into the “former democratic revolution era” (1840–1919) and the “new democratic revolution era” (1919–1949). In other words, even though the revolution’s characteristics are divided, the 1919 May Fourth Movement draws the line between the two revolutionary periods. The reasoning for Mao dividing these periods with the May Fourth Movement is explained in the following.

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Kaneko Hajime Until the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (the May Fourth Movement came after the Great Imperial War of 1914 and the Russian Revolution of 1917), the Bourgeois Democratic Revolution political leaders in China were the petite bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie (their intellectuals) of China. (. . .) Even after the May Fourth Movement, the Chinese national bourgeois continued to participate in the revolution; however, the political leaders of China’s Bourgeois Democratic Party were no longer bourgeoisie, they had become China’s proletariats. (Mao 1940: 89)

The May Fourth Movement, which is well known as a student-driven civil movement, split China’s “Bourgeois Democratic Party Revolution” into “new” and “old,” and shifted the movement’s political leaders from “bourgeoisie” to “proletariats” in Mao’s perspective. The Bourgeois Democratic Party Revolution refers to the representative feudal system of the pre-modern era which led to the revolution of the modern capitalist society, which was probably modeled after the French Revolution. The class which usually led the revolution was the bourgeoisie; this class is expressed as the “civil class” in history textbooks. Regarding the Old Democratic Revolution, it was a Bourgeois Democratic Revolution which was led by the bourgeoisie, typical of the West. According to Mao, the Chinese bourgeois, which was representatively led by Sun Yat-sen, lacked leadership power as a revolutionary body when thoroughly compared to the Western bourgeois. Instead of the weak bourgeoisie, the role of the China’s Bourgeois Democratic Revolution in taking responsibility for leadership was because it was the foundation of the Communist Party’s proletariat (or working class). Mao saw the proletariats leading the new type of Bourgeois Democratic Revolution as the basis of the New Democratic Revolution in the May Fourth Movement and he explained the need for the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in the revolution.

2.2 An emphasis on civil struggle The historical tradition of civil struggle is the consistent emphasis regarding the two Old and New Democratic Revolutions as explained earlier. Mao explains it as follows. Imperialism and China’s feudalism have been linked to one another, and the process in which China changed from being a semi-colony to a colony was brought upon by the Chinese people resisting imperialism. The First Opium War, Taiping Rebellion, Sino-French War, Sino-Japanese War, Hundred Day’s Reform, Boxer Rebellion, Xinhai Revolution, May Fourth Movement, May Thirtieth Movement, Northern Expansion; from the Land Wars to the Anti-Japanese War of to-day, all of this is because of the strong resistant nature of the Chinese people who had no reconciliation and submission to the pawns of imperialism. (Mao 1939: 40)

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This extensive list of events beginning from the First Opium War in regard to the “resistant people” and “imperialism and China’s feudalism” was, for Mao at the time of writing in 1939, the concrete content of the Old Democratic Revolution and the New Democratic Revolution. Although there is a mention of the Sino-Japanese War, there is an ambiguity in the categorization of Mao’s New Democratic Revolution because of the people’s resistance to “imperialism” and “feudalism” during the Qing Dynasty. However, Mao’s goal was not strictly academic, but it was to converge and systemize the history of the “people’s resistance” and the need for the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party for the New Democratic Revolution. Through this, the party could justify its revolution as the embodied successors of the historical tradition of civil struggle. Furthermore, in the same document, Mao states that “in Chinese feudal society, the rural class struggles and rural uprisings were the true power that unfolded history” (Mao 1939: 32). Movements in cities were noticeably restricted by the Chinese Communist Party via the oppression of the National Party and there was a need to expand their power in villages. This claim, which can be called the “rural revolutionary war historical perspective,” furthered the need to justify the existence of the Communist Party as the embodied successor of the “revolutionary” tradition of the rural Chinese.

2.3 The “semi-colonial/semi-feudal society” view and the revolution of 1949 The final framework comprising the “revolutionary historical perspective” that will be discussed is the modern Chinese society view that streamlined the revolution via the Chinese Communist Party; in other words, the “semi-colonial/ semi-feudal society” view. The following is a related statement by Mao Zedong. The great imperialistic powers which invaded China, on the one hand, promoted the dismantling of China’s feudal society, generated the ideas of capitalism in China, and changed the society from feudal to a semi-feudal society; however, on the other hand, the great imperialistic powers cruelly ruled over China and changed the independent China from a semi-colonial to a colonized China. (Mao1939: 38) In this statement, it appears as though the role of progress in Chinese society— from a feudal to a semi-feudal society—was proactively carried out by the “imperialistic powers.” However, in a different section of the same document, Mao states the following: The new change of the development of capitalism after the invasion of imperialism in China is only a change on the surface. There is another side which, by coexisting with this change, will prevent any change. Imperialism colludes with China’s feudal power and suppresses the growth of China’s capitalism. (Mao 1939: 35)

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If anything, the point is that the “great imperialistic power” would tie into China’s “feudal power” and prevent China from changing to a capitalist system. It is important to note that this logic was based on the block of “imperialism” and “feudal power,” as explained by “semi-colonial/semi-feudal society,” which lacked the opportunity to construct an assimilation or revolution from within itself and can be understood to be an unchanging society. In this “semi-colonial/ semi-feudal society,” it is impossible to change into a normal, independent capitalism. According to Mao, the “national capitalists” who would provide for an independent capitalism had already fallen; the joint “imperialism” and “feudal power” which would provide the deformation of a “bureaucrat capital” and “comprador capital”2 progression were already promoting the collapse of China’s entire financial system. Furthermore, the ruling power of the Qing Dynasty, the “warlord,” and the Nationalist Party were all subordinates of “imperialism” and based on the “feudal power” of the landed class. Therefore, it was impossible to overcome the “semi-colonial/semi-feudal society” (Kubo 1982; Okumura 1990) and overturn this stagnant “society” without a strong civil-struggle-opposition to the “semi-colonial/semi-feudal society” and without the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. In this manner, the revolution of 1949 as the New Democratic Revolution was justified by the need for a historical “semi-colonial/ semi-feudal society” perspective. Although this is only a rough summary, the separation of eras, strengthening of civil struggles, and the three points of Chinese societal views were the framework from which Mao “narrated” modern Chinese history. That is to say the characteristics of the Chinese Communist Party’s “revolutionary historical view” can be understood. According to Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, modern Chinese history, especially as will be explained in the next section, the era of the Republic of China (1912–1949) was an era when the Chinese people were to be “liberated” from the “bureaucrat-comprador power” that was formed by “imperialism” and “feudalism.” Furthermore, this was an era in which there was a need for apologetic justice, justification, and necessity of a revolution in order to obtain political power.

3 The emergence of the Republic of China’s historical research and relativized “narrative” 3.1 A background for the Republic’s historical research In the 1980s, interest in Republican China began to gain momentum among Chinese historians on modern history. One of the themes that was to be clarified in China was that of the “history of the rise and fall of political rule and China’s final assimilation system.” However, as opposed to former research which had a dense ideological bias regarding revolutionary power obtained through civil struggles and the Communist Party, there was a new objective and demonstrative perspective taken regarding “warlords” and the Republic of China’s political power, etc. in order to overturn the subject matter down

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to the “revolutionary historical perspective.” With the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1976,3 the political change of the “reform and openness” policy4 as the starting point of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the end of 1978, academic freedom was acquired, and this is what pushed the progress of historical studies on the Republic’s historical research (Zhang, Xianwen 張憲文 1989; Zhang, Yufa 張玉法 1989). With this trend in China following the end of the Great Cultural Revolution, the separation from the “revolutionary historical perspective” began to resonate in Japanese research on modern Chinese history. One of the most important landmarks in this research was the journal Being Nearby,5 which was headed by the late Nozawa Yutaka. The 15th and 16th issues, published in 1989, were organized as special issues called “Issues and Outcomes of Research on the Republic of China’s History” and featured articles by researchers from China, Taiwan, Korea, the U.S., and other countries with various perspectives on Chinese history. Furthermore, Nozawa edited a book published in 1995 called Japan’s Research on the Republic of China’s History 6 which was a collection of articles from the journal regarding various research themes on the era of the Republic. With this publication, the Republic’s historical research became mainstream alongside research on modern China’s history. However, at the time when studies on the history of the Republic mushroomed in the 1980s, there was a high priority placed on individual demonstrative research regarding the era of the Republic, which is thought to have put pressure on the researchers and resulted in weakness in original research. The student- and civilian-driven Tian’amen Square Protest, a movement for the Chinese Communist Party to become democratic in 1989, completely cleared any air between researchers who had illusions regarding the political parties. At the same time, this became an opportune moment to call for the importance of building a framework to historically understand the “revolutionary historical perspective” by replacing it with the “Republican China-centered historiography.”

3.2 A Unique view of the Republic’s historical research It was Yamada Tatsuo who appealed to the importance of the “Republican Chinacentered historiography” by investigating the Tian’amen Square Protest. According to Yamada, a modern Chinese political history specialist, the Tian’amen Square Protest should be looked at from the “Republican China-centered historiography” which would give it the “ability to be academically recognized from various standpoints” and not included in the political theoretical “revolutionary historical perspective” of the past. Compared to the “revolutionary historical perspective,” what strong points are included in the “Republican China-centered historiography?” Two main points that Yamada made can be summarized as follows. First is Yamada’s point of view that the role of the Chinese Communist Party in the history of Republican China is relative and has the ability to pursue various political powers. Yamada stated that up until now, the central focus of modern

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Chinese history or revolutionary history has been based upon the Chinese Communist Party and whether it is favorable as the standard on which its role has been evaluated. Yamada continues by stating that, however, even if this was able to mark the justification of the Communist Party’s rule, it does not allow the ability to investigate modern Chinese history from various perspectives. While pointing out the features and issues of the “revolutionary historical perspective,” Yamada explained a differing perspective of the “Republican China-centered historiography” in the following. With the appearance of the “Republican China-centered historiography” instead of the revolutionary historical point of view, various political powers which actively played a part in the era of the Republican China can be laid out and the roles of specific political parties or movements can be evaluated against one another. At the base of this, there is an awareness of competition for power in political and social structures that have a similar feature of a varied political power. Although the differing features of political powers in the viewpoint of opposing powers based on a specific political power can be distinguished, their similar features cannot be distinguished. This point of view draws up history from a one-sided perspective by connecting justice and injustice from a moral judgement, or revolution and anti-revolution from an actualization value perspective. The “Republican China-centered historiography” is striving to overcome this one-sidedness. (Yamada 1990: 87) The stance that is being expressed here is that a “specifc political power”—not only the Communist Party but the power in the Republic, as well—is not absolute and while the individuality and commonality in all power is understood, by comparing their relations, the various possibilities of studying modern Chinese history can be deepened. The second feature of the “Republican China-centered historiography” as emphasized by Yamada is the viewpoint of current-day communist China in the historical continuation of twentieth-century China. As researchers of the Republican China, it is not appropriate to only study it per se. We need to think about modern Chinese history through the structural features of the historical continuation of twentieth century China and the research which we have already established up until now. To think about present-day Chinese history is not to only think about present-day China but to at least think about the progress that present-day China is making while moving toward the twenty-first century. I think that we need relativize and to look objectively at China entirely as China itself in the twentieth century. (Yamada 1996: 10) The impact of the 1949 revolution established an awareness in Japanese researchers of modern Chinese history, a reception of the “revolutionary historical

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perspective,” as well as an understanding of the excessive nature of historically separating eras before and after the revolution. In other words, the Chinese Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China had accepted the eradication of the illusion of “semi-colonial/semi-feudal society” in the era of the Republic as a “new country.” In 1996, as Yamada was writing the earlier statement, that historical awareness was in the process of hiding in the shadows. However, by understanding the relationships between “structural features of twentieth century China” that were being revealed by researchers, Yamada’s suggestion to have a perspective of a relativized communist China became very important to rethinking the historical awareness of the “Republic’s historical perspective” and the framework of its range.

3.3 Accumulated results of demonstrative research From the 1980s, when the mainstream research on modern Chinese history became focused on the Republican Chinese history, until present-day, there have been a great deal of accumulated demonstrative research results. Based on the two points of view of the “Republican China-centered historiography,” as emphasized by Yamada, there has been a surge of research regarding the pursuit of a possible diverse political power system in modern Chinese history and the opposing ideas of differing political ideas and societies which carried China’s modernization. Furthermore, regarding the historical continuation of twentieth-century China, the establishment of the country, constitutional government history, liberalism, industrialization, and business operating history as themes, the continuation of history in the shift from the Qing Dynasty to the People’s Republic of China has become an important focus of research. Although the detailed results of these respective fields of research cannot be introduced here, one example of research pertaining to the historical continuation of administrative and financial structures will be briefly introduced. It is my thought that the financial system of the Qing Dynasty was not separated by national and regional financial affairs; furthermore, taxes were collected to support the regional governments, meaning that there was a dependency on sending tax money back and forth between the central and regional governments. The system of collecting taxes country-wide, including central payments, was present from the beginning of the Qing Dynasty. After the Taiping Rebellion, this system became more difficult to maintain and in order to secure central payment, it was necessary to shift the policies so that all branches of government had a fixed system of contributions. The Qing Dynasty freed itself from this financial structure and, after the New Policies in the early twentieth century, by separating the national and regional financial affairs, an attempt was made to acquire a fixed source of central resources. This policy was called the “separation of financial affairs.” Although this “separation of financial affairs” policy was a financial system brought in from the West in order to reform the Dynasty’s financial system, after the Xinhai Revolution ended the Qing Dynasty, the Republic’s government

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became the successor. Then, after the Yuan Shikai administration, even though it was intermittent, there was a persistent pursuit of this system which was aggressively enforced by the Republic’s government, and it greatly strengthened the central Chinese financial system while contributing to the modernization of the country. However, it should be noted that the administration of the Communist Party, which drove the Republic to Taiwan, varied greatly from the succeeding government in the era of the Republic. The “socialistic” financial system of the newly established People’s Republic was, it seems, a throwback to their ancestors in the Qing Dynasty, as it once again separated the tax collection into that of national and regional financial systems. At this time, as expected, the communist administration governed all of China’s financial affairs. However, after this there was a system of separating the tax collection in the national and regional sectors respectively, which forced every region to take on the responsibility of tax collection after the 1988 “Chinese Economic Reform.” This resulted in a system just like the one in the Qing Dynasty. This situation changed after the enforcement of a system of tax distribution in 1994; this was a version of the “separation of financial affairs” by the Communist Party. From this point of view, before the introduction of the tax distribution system, the “socialistic” system was able to be interpreted as a continuation of the Qing’s traditional structure. The era of the Republic, which is situated in the narrow space between the Qing Dynasty and the People’s Republic of China, was a very unique period because of the way that they were able to overthrow the dynasty through the Western “separation of financial affairs” system. However, on the other hand, the enforcement of the tax distribution system in the communist administration meant that there was a return to the Western system that the Republic government was aiming for, and this demonstrates that there is a continuation of the Republic in present-day China (Kaneko 2008, 2009). Presentday communist China is situated dually between the present and the continuation of twentieth-century China. Whether that explanation is correct or not, this is a financial historical perspective of “twentieth century China’s structural features” that I was able to analyze. This positioning of present-day China in historical continuity is also able to be seen in many other academic arguments.

Conclusion: a perspective from Japan and studies of Republican Chinese history In conclusion, while looking over the points that were argued in this chapter, a look at the significance of Japan’s research on the Republic’s history will be taken and what it means to be a Japanese (person) “narrating” the awareness of modern Chinese history will be considered. After the Chinese Civil War following World War II, the political situation between Taiwan (the Republic of China) and China (the People’s Republic of China) has become fixed. It can be said that because of this situation, both parties have a strong tendency to apologetically argue the justification for revolutions and

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understanding of modern Chinese history, especially the history of the era 1911– 1949. As was repeated in this chapter, a factor which heavily influenced Japanese research on modern Chinese history was that of the Communist Party’s “revolutionary historical perspective.” However, the influence of this “historical narrative” was, as concisely alluded to by Kubo Tōru in the following excerpt, not only seen in the narrow field of researchers but extended to Japan’s historical understanding. It is difficult, even now, to fully and objectively understand China’s history in the twentieth century. As a result of the government changing three times through revolutions, the new government emphasized the points of the former government being behind and the bad features of the government which they just threw over. The Communist Party continually criticized the Republic’s government which was aggressively taken over by Japan. Even though the Japanese invasion was wrong, the idea that the situation in China at the time was terrible may have an influence on the deep-rooted historical perspective in Japan. The historical perspective of a rationalized invasion must first be shed. (Kubo Tōru 2015) If the Communist Party’s “revolutionary historical perspective” had a serious infuence on the Japanese people’s historical perspective, the meaning behind the “Republican China-centered historiography,” which relativized the “revolutionary historical perspective,” becomes even more important. However, the appearance of this perspective in the 1980s may have been too late. Although Nozawa Yutaka was quick to reanalyze and rethink the Republic in postwar Japan, Nozawa also points out that the victory of the Communist Party in the Chinese Civil War and the representative voice of Mao Zedong for the Republic of China at this time “gave birth to the lack of understanding of a historical perspective of the Japanese in Asia due to a negligent questioning of historical meaning to understand the overall situation of the Republic” (Nozawa 1995: iii). Presently, the influence of the Republic’s “revolutionary historical perspective” is losing power due to the administrative change in Taiwan to democracy. However, even though there is demonstrative historical research being performed in China, it is a very unlikely possibility that the Communist Party will shed the “revolutionary historical perspective” in order to secure a justification for supporting “the great Republic’s revival.” In the midst of this situation, through understanding the Republic’s history and its relationship to the possibilities of modern Chinese history in present-day China, we are able to dig into our awareness of China and build a “historical narrative” framework in order to have a conversation with Taiwan and China. However, it is my impression that in recent years the framework of the “Republic of China’s history” has become self-evident between researchers and there is a strong tendency for researchers to independently perform demonstrative historical research without actually understanding this history. It may be time to re-evaluate the “method” in which the Republic’s historical research is carried out. Previously, I wrote the following statement.

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Kaneko Hajime The framework of researching “history of Republican” once had the role of overcoming the unnecessary emphasis on “revolutionary history.” However, in recent years the individualization of demonstrative research has caused the framework and methodology, which was built for close examination, to become very shallow. (Kaneko 2008: 18)

This opinion remains unchanged. The need to not only build the achievements of demonstrative research but also conceive a method to understand the total history of the Republic of China through those individual results in order to “narrate” modern Chinese history is even more important than ever.

Notes 1 The linguist Saussure, who is called the “father of structuralism,” claimed that one cannot read the truth by creating an awareness through the medium of language. Therefore, “truth” as correct historical data created through language becomes impractical and the claim that “history is a story” becomes valid. 2 “Comprador” originally suggests a mediator that deals with foreign business, especially in China. Although there have been contributions to modern financial success, in the “revolutionary historical perspective” this term has become a target of criticism. 3 This began as a 1966 political struggle in which Mao Zedong set the objective of stopping the revival of capitalism and destroying feudal culture/thought. This created much confusion as there were purges and the storm of destructive activities raged on until Mao’s death in 1976. 4 This was a policy started by Deng Xiaoping for domestic revival and diplomatic openness. By actively introducing market principles and foreign capital, a reform was adopted in agriculture, and it remains one of the major starting points of present-day China. 5 The first issue was printed in 1981 by Nozawa and continued until the 60th issue in 2011. It was a journal that welcomed internal and external research on modern Chinese history and had a large contribution to the research field. Full Japanese name: 近きに在りて――近現代中国をめぐる討論のひろば Chikaki ni Arite: KinGendai Chūgoku o meguru Tōron no Hiroba; full English name: Being Nearby: Discussions on Modern China. 6 Original title: Nihon no Chūka Minkoku-shi Kenkyū 日本の中華民国史研究, Kyūko Shoin 汲古書院.

Bibliography Kaneko, Hajime 金子肇. Kindai Chūgou no Chūō to Chihō: Minkoku Zenki no Kokka Tōgō to Gyōzaisei 近代中国の中央と地方－民国前期の国家統合と行財政. Kyūko Shoin, 汲古書院 2008. Kaneko, Hajime 金子肇. “Seiji Seido no Hensen to Chūō-Chihō Kankei 政治制度の 変遷と中央・地方関係,” in Iijima Wataru, Kubo Tōru, and Murata Yūjirō 飯島 渉・久保亨・村田雄二郎 (ed.), Shirīzu 20 Seiki Chūgoku-shi シリーズ20世紀中国 史, vol. 2 Kindai-sei no Kōzō. Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppan-kai 東京大学出版会, 2009. Kubo, Tōru 久保亨. “Senkan-ki Chūgoku Keizai-shi no Kenkyū Shikaku o megutte: ‘Han-shokumin Han-hōken’ Gainen no Sai-kentō 戦間期中国経済史の研究視角

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をめぐって－『半植民地半封建』概念の再検討－,” Rekishi-gaku Kenkyū 歴史 学研究, no. 506, 1982. Kubo, Tōru 久保亨. “‘Uchimuki’ Dasshi Hiroi Shiya o 「内向き」脱し広い視野 を,” Asahi Shinbun 朝日新聞, 10 October 2015. Mao, Zedong 毛沢東. “Chūgoku Kakumei to Chūgoku Kyōsan-tō 中国革命と中国 共産党,” in Shin-Minshu Shugi-ron 新民主主義論. Otsuki Bunko Edition 大月文 庫版, 1939. Mao, Zedong 毛沢東. “Shin-Minshu Shugi-ron 新民主主義論,” in Shin-Minshu Shugi-ron 新民主主義論. Otsuki Bunko Edition 大月文庫版, 1940. Nishimura, Shigeo 西村成雄. “‘Gendai Chūgoku-ron’ to ‘Chūka Minkoku-ron’ no Taiwa no Kokoromi 『現代中国論』と『中華民国論』の対話の試み,” Chikaki ni Arite 近きに在りて, no. 30, 1996. Nozawa, Yutaka 野澤豊. Nihon no Chūka Kokumin-shi Kenkyū. Kyūko Shoin 日本の 中華民国史研究, 1995. Okumura, Satoru 奥村哲. “Kyū-Chūgoku Shihon Shugi no Kiso Gainen ni tsuite 旧 中国資本主義論の基礎概念について,” in Chūgoku-shi Kenkyū-kai 中国史研究会 (ed.), Chūgoku Sensei Kokka to Shkai Tōgō: Chūgoku-shi Zō no Sai-kousei II 中国専 制国家と社会統合－中国史像の再構成Ⅱ. Bunrikaku 文理閣, 1990. Yamada, Tatsuo 山田辰雄. “Ima koso Minkoku-shikan o 今こそ民国史観を,” Chikaki ni Arite 近きに在りて, no. 17, 1990. Yamada, Tatsuo 山田辰雄. “Chūka Minkoku to Gendai 中華民国と現代,” Chikaki ni Arite 近きに在りて, no. 30, 1996. Yokoyama, Hiroaki 横山宏章. “Minkoku Seiji-shi no Bunseki Shikaku: Seiji-gaku no Gawa kara Hitotsu no Shiron 民国政治史の分析視角－政治学の側からの一つ の試論,” Chikaki ni Arite 近きに在りて, no. 30, 1996. Zhang, Xianwen 張憲文. “Chūka Minkoku-shi Kenkyū no Genjō to Tenbō 中華民国 史研究の現状と展望,” Chikaki ni Arite 近きに在りて, 1989. Zhang, Yufa 張玉法. “Taiwan ni okeru Chūka Minkoku-shi Kenkyū 台湾における中 華民国史研究,” Chikaki ni Arite 近きに在りて, no. 15, 1989.

2

Historical narratives of “democracy” in Republican China MIZUHA Nobuo

Abstract: China’s modern history is the history of cooperation and confrontation between the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party. It can be understood as a series of nation-strengthening attempts led by a dictatorship, first directed by the Nationalist Party (1928–1949) and then by the Communist Party (1949–), with the “dream” of becoming a world power coming true today. As the Sino-Liberalism theory (Fairbank 1992) elucidated, the aforementioned political narratives aimed at establishing a powerful government have many affinities to the narratives that refute the liberal traditions in Chinese political thought. However, as the Cold War order collapsed, opinions emerged arguing that China should move on the path towards democratization on the basis of its intellectual tradition of liberalism (Mitter 2004). In fact, social activists in China are still demonstrating for liberty and democracy (Mizuha 2012). Today, efforts for liberty are continuing in spite of the difficult political situation (Ishii 2015; Ishii and Ogata 2015). In order to foresee China’s future political trends, focusing merely on the superstructure that is now intensifying dictatorship is not enough. Furthermore, the historical narratives of “democracy” will provide hints to understand Japan and Asia’s contemporary problems.

Introduction This chapter examines the discourses of the concept of “democracy” in Republican China (1912–1949), shedding particular light on the time period of the 1930s and 1940s, which was characterized by rising tension with Japan and the status of “total war” after 1937. According to Yamanouchi’s observation, governing groups usually intensify wartime control in order to pave the way for total war. Guaranteeing the rights and property of citizens is also a pressing task for wartime governments (or to show a willing gesture to do so) to gain people’s voluntary contributions to the war effort (Yamanouchi 2015). This observation also applies to China. In wartime China, discussions about democracy witnessed an upsurge. This chapter takes the rising concern for democracy during this period as its research object. It is noteworthy that the concept of “democracy” was originally used as the antithesis of the concept of “monarchy” and therefore has multi-faceted

“Democracy” in Republican China 39 meanings that go beyond the concept of “democracy” in the context of Western political philosophy. For instance, in the midst of the proletarian Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong defined the people’s disregard for human rights and the folk’s lynching of his own political rivals as “grand democracy.” In other words, the immediate exertion of power by the people was justified and legitimized. This example vividly represents how the Chinese interpretation of “democracy” differs from its original connotations. This chapter focuses on the “democratic” aspects of the Chinese interpretation of the term “democracy.” As aforementioned, from the beginning of the twentieth century, the intellectual endeavor of those who sought to pave the way for democracy in China is still ongoing, despite recessions due to the authorities’ intensified suppression after 1989. However, the concept of democracy is equivocal. I will first touch upon this problem from my own standpoint. Taking the Kokugo Jiten (国語辞典 Japanese Dictionary) as an example, the explanation of the term “democracy” is as follows: The etymological origin is the Greek word demokratia, a compound that comprises demos (people) and kratia (rights). It refers to the conviction that the political power of any authority comes from people and should be exercised by people, and to the political systems that is based on such conviction. (. . .) Basic human right, liberty and equality are the main characteristics of democracy, together with the principles of majority rule, constitutionalism and so forth. In addition, the realization of the aforementioned principles is requested. (Kōjien 広辞苑 6th edition in DVD-ROM, 2012) On the one hand, the devotion to a welfare state is concretized as “the principle for equality.” On the other hand, “majority rule” and “basic human right[s]” are also underlined. In the long run of history, these two principles have often been in contradiction. Therefore, under “constitutionalism,” the distinction between “rule by law” and “rule of law” is essential. For example, the rule of law that violates human rights is to be defned as “rule by law,” but it contradicts the “rule of law.” The “law” in the latter plays the role of guaranteeing liberal values based on constitutionalism that places the highest importance on “the dignity of individuals.” For that reason, the prelude of The Constitution of Japan is worded as follows. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. In other words, The Constitution of Japan underlines both “government for the people” and “government by the people.” These two factors are preconditions for all kinds of political systems, not only democracy. Even in a case where the people’s voting rights are guaranteed and social welfare policies are undertaken by the government, if the principle of constitutionalism

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that defines every individual as sovereign, not only the liberal value, is not clearly articulated, even the democratic system itself could be in danger. It is universally known that in 1933, the Reichstag under the Weimar Constitution, the “most democratic constitution of the world,” adopted the Enabling Act of 1933 and laid the legal foundation for Adolf Hitler’s dictatorship. Similarly, Japan in the 1930s was a democratic state in which universal suffrage had been carried out with a functioning two-party system. Along with Japan’s increasing involvement in expansion wars, the politics gradually shifted toward a freedom-oppressing political mechanism. The historical experience that confirms the importance of the “government of people” and the difficulty of holding on to this principle is the precondition for today’s Japanese constitution. In terms of the contradicting relation between democracy and liberalism, the Chinese who witnessed one of the most miserable tragedies of the twentieth century, the Cultural Revolution, are in my opinion even more sensible than the Japanese. For instance, liberal Chinese intellectuals such as Hu Weixi (胡伟希) differentiate between “liberalism as purpose” and “democracy as means,” and seek to confront the danger of democracy (Hu 1996: 239).1 Focusing on the aforementioned concern, I will first elaborate my own considerations on this problem. Due to space restrictions, this chapter sheds light on Luo Longji (罗隆基) and Wang Zaoshi (王造时). It will also briefly make mention of Hu Shih (胡适) and intellectuals related to the China Democratic League.2 Luo Longji was born in 1898. He took part in the May Fourth Movement in 1919 as a student of Tsinghua University. In 1921, Luo moved via the United States to Great Britain where he was trained under the supervision of Harold Laski, the leading polemicist of the Labour Party. After his return to China, Luo actively participated in public discourses as a scholar of political science. In the early 1930s, Luo was considered to be one of the human rights activists of the Xinyue (新月) circle. From the mid-1930s onwards, he no longer collaborated with Hu Shih and sought to retain liberal principles while co-existing with the communists. After 1949, he stayed in the People’s Republic as the leading theorist of the China Democratic League, and later served as the Minister of Forestry and Industry. After the 1957 Anti-Rightist campaign, Luo withdrew from China’s political scene and died in 1965. Wang Zaoshi was born in 1903. He was associated with Luo since their time as students at Tsinghua University. He studied political science in the United States and received a PhD from the University of Wisconsin. After his return to China, Wang was active both as an academic and as a public intellectual. In 1936, Wang was arrested by the GMD authorities due to his anti-Japan activities, such as organizing the Jiuguohui (Saving the Nation Association). Like Luo, Wang also decided to stay in the People’s Republic after 1949. Due to his critical attitude toward the Soviet Union, Wang became a neglected actor in China’s political life. In the Anti-Rightist campaign, he was labeled as a “Rightist” and died in prison during the Cultural Revolution in 1971. Hu Shih was born in 1891 and was Luo and Wang’s generation’s mentor. He moved to the United States in 1910 and studied pragmatism under John Dewey.

“Democracy” in Republican China 41 In 1917, Hu Shih returned to Beijing University, where he became a lecturer while criticizing the GMD’s dictatorship in journals such as Xinyue and seeking to advance the New Culture Movement. Aiming to pave the way for liberalism in China, Hu Shih was repeatedly involved in debates with Chinese communists. In 1938, he began to serve as the Ambassador of the Republic of China in the United States. In the middle of China’s proletarian revolution, Hu Shih left the country for the United States in 1949 and moved back to Taiwan in 1958, where he directed the Academia Sinica. He died in 1962. The China Democratic League was established in 1944 as the successor organization of an association of democratic political groups that had been resisting the GMD’s dictatorship since the 1920s. From 1946 onwards, it became a significant political power that shouldered “a new stage of peace and democracy.” Due to the gradual withdrawal of anti-communist intellectuals, this association showed increasing sympathy toward communists and was banned by the GMD in 1947. In 1949, it helped the Chinese communists launch the People’s Republic and still functions today.

1 “Democracy” in Republican China 1.1 “Political democracy” and “economic democracy” According to John K. Fairbank’s clarification of his invented term “Sino-Liberalism,” the Chinese political atmosphere that differs fundamentally from Western liberalism is characterized by its particular concern for the nation, rather than for the individual. Against such a background, Luo was rarely seen as a liberalist in the full sense of the word, who strove against “the dignity of individuals.” Recently, re-examinations of Luo’s intellectual engagement have been published in American academia. My own re-assessment of Luo has been undertaken in the same context (Mizuha 2007). The substance of Luo’s thought is distinctly expressed in the following formulation: “The state is one of necessary apparatus in the human life, but not the only one” (Luo 1931: 9). For Luo, the designation of life was to “be myself at my best” (Luo 1929: 6–7). Therefore, he passed sharp criticisms on the GMD because “we are against any kind of dictatorship that acts as the only judge and the royal guard of its own rights” (Luo 1930: 11). In his writings from 1945, Luo elaborated his standpoint as follows: Under democracy, each individual is the lord of his or herself. The goal of “being my self at my best” is fulfilled and everyone finds the most complex expression. In a democratic society, people are human beings in the true sense of the word, they are the lords of themselves and all the political and economic apparatus must guarantee the goal to be realized.3 Luo and the China Democratic League were critical of the GMD’s one party dictatorship. However, they also elaborated a set of theories that legitimated such a political situation. China comprises a number of different ethnic groups.

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The land area of the country, only smaller than that of Russia, is even larger than all the European countries combined. To maintain a stable political circumstance in China is extremely diffcult, not to mention the fact that the people were still in a primitive stage of political awareness. The GMD had allegedly been distrustful of the Chinese folk. In 1934, when Japanese aggression intensifed, Ding Wenjiang (丁文江), the discoverer of Sinanthropus pekinensis, sought to establish a “new type of dictatorship.” Ding is generally considered as a liberal intellectual who studied Geology in Great Britain. Ding’s argument is worded as follows: The majority of Chinese are entirely ignorant of the politics. For Chinese, being able to read equals being able to understand sports news and to read detective novels. Unless directly related to their own interests, they don’t wish to tackle any political issues. (. . .) If we let the 4 hundred million fools govern themselves, we will never witness the construction of a new country.4 We can hardly overlook the fact that the intensifcation of Japan’s aggression toward China had given birth to the supportive attitude of dictatorship. Intellectuals like Ding Wenjiang sought to save the country by establishing despotism. In contrast, intellectuals like Luo Longji sought solely to make the dream of democracy come true. Their arguments are representatively expressed in Hu Shih’s following explanation: Two heads are better than one. If one discussed thoroughly with even an ordinary man, he or she would barely land on an entirely wrong decision. Education on the level of Graduate School is not the precondition for perusing democracy. Even kindergarten graduates are qualified for democracy. (Yokoyama 1996: 148–149) In the United States, a country that is generally considered as highly democratic, the citizens are not necessarily highly educated. What Hu Shih emphasized was the fact that even those who did not know “All Correct” and only used the abbreviation “OK” were able to act in a democratic system. However, at the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Luo Longji criticized the opinion that “when liberty and equality is legally guaranteed, the aim of turning the state into the people’s instrument can be achieved.” Luo underlined the significance of “economic democracy” as follows: Economic democracy referred to societies where the property and wealth is relatively distributed in a fair manner. In such societies, people’s living and labor rights are guaranteed and therefore, people hold rights for liberty and equality in terms of their economic endeavors. Only when liberty and equality are guaranteed in terms of economic, can political liberty and political equality make real sense. Economically liberal and equal people are in the

“Democracy” in Republican China 43 position to govern the country, and only in such situation can the state be transformed into an instrument of people.5 As far as the earlier-cited document illustrates, Luo understood the relation between political and economic democracy as follows: “Only under political democracy could economic democracy be gradually realized. In other words, we need to apply political democracy as an apparatus to guarantee economic democracy” (Nomura et al. eds. 2011: 212). In addition, in the “Political Report of the Provisional National Congress of Chinese Democratic League” (1945), Luo noted that the parliamentary democracy in the West was not problematic at all as a political system. According to Luo’s argument, the attempt in the Soviet Union to pursue economic democracy enriches the idea of political democracy in the West. For Luo, both political and economic democracies were equally important. However, I argue that Luo understands political democracy as nothing more than a means to give birth to economic democracy. In 1944, Luo’s shift of emphasis on political democracy reveals the political circumstances that surrounded him. In other words, Luo and other like-minded people needed to prioritize discussions of the GMD’s dictatorship. They had to draw a blueprint in which the government undergoes a democratic transformation; other parties also take part in the process of political decision-making (the realization of political democracy) and the way is paved for economic democracy. If the dictatorship of the GMD did not undergo a transformation (preferably in a peaceful way, according to Luo), there would be no prospect of solving pragmatic problems and achieving economic democracy. In the document from 1945, Luo argued that an unfulfilled economic democracy caused difficulties in practicing political democracy. Therefore, establishing parliamentary democracy and party politics was not Luo’s main concern. His priority was the realization of economic democracy and for Luo in 1945, the urgent task for China was to establish an authority that could realize economic democracy. The old dilemma within contemporary discourses of democracy was the main cause of Hu Shih’s and Luo Longji’s different attitudes toward democracy. For Luo, political democracy was, theoretically speaking, not the final destination. If a certain political power is able to pursue economic democracy, even when it appears as a strongly centralized administration, it would gradually be transformed into a democratic system. The following paragraphs will examine Luo’s consideration of this problem against the backdrop of his life and intellectual development.

1.2 The criticisms of “political democracy” and its relation to “economic democracy” What was political democracy for Luo Longji? In order to discuss this question, I will first introduce Luo’s doctoral dissertation submitted to Columbia University in 1928 entitled “The Mechanism of British Parliamentary Election.” The first

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chapter, “The Legal Procedure of Election,” was a revised version of a discussion of the same topic in Luo’s master’s thesis submitted to the University of Wisconsin in 1925. Chapter II, “Election Campaign,” was newly written after Luo’s sojourn to Great Britain during which he was under the supervision of Laski. Chapter III was titled “Corruption and Fraud in Election Fraud Political Petition” and was also a revised version of a part of his master’s thesis based on his observations of the electoral process in England. From the structure of the book, we can observe that during his sojourn in England, Luo had been a careful observer of England’s parliamentary elections. The first chapter reveals Luo’s negative evaluation of the reality of England’s parliamentary democracy. In his dissertation, Luo frequently tackles the reality of election fraud and criticizes the fact that the court was not seriously attempting to impeach malfeasance. Moreover, there were no essential differences in the proposed policies promised by the respective electoral candidates. For him, the candidates were not intending to demonstrate their own political standpoints at all. They merely took the electoral process as an opportunity to make themselves known to the public. Meanwhile, Luo laid great emphasis on the operational procedure to ensure the working class’s political participation. He made fun of the uneducated nature of the local constituencies’ candidates and pointed out that “banality is necessary for the defense of modern political principles in local constituencies. Intellectuals in the true sense would usually avoid it” (Lo 1928: 78). For Luo, the high moral standard and the outstanding intelligence of intellectuals should play a great role in political development. However, the reality in England was different. As early as the late 1920s, Luo was already suspicious of England’s parliamentary elections. We need to note that this attitude laid the groundwork for his critical arguments against the existing parliamentary system in the 1940s. In fact, Luo’s distrust of Western democratic systems was widely shared by Chinese intellectuals. Their skepticism of parliamentarism in the European or American style was deeply rooted. Two factors were responsible for their pessimism: First, during their experiences in Europe and America, intellectuals like Luo Longji keenly felt the limitations of parliamentary democracy; second, the failed attempt of establishing a parliamentary system in China was a historic reality. Although Luo showed a supportive attitude toward guaranteeing the political participation of the masses, he also viewed the lack of political awareness of the Chinese as a main cause of China’s immature parliamentary politics. Based on the aforementioned understanding, Luo naturally viewed the improvement of productive force as the most urgent task and sought to first realize “economic democracy.” As a means to practice “economic democracy,” Wang Zaoshi suggested that a powerful government should take control of the country’s economic life and pursue socialism. Wang’s suggestion certainly originated from the idea of “productive force comes first.” For a country like China that was suffering from poverty and alleged backwardness, industrialization was the most important issue and therefore socialism and a planned economy seemed to be reasonable solutions. I argue that discussions of this kind can be viewed as

“Democracy” in Republican China 45 one typical category of arguments made by Chinese liberal intellectuals to foresee the country’s reforms (Mizuha 2007, 2011). It is noteworthy that by socialism, Wang Zaoshi did not refer to “scientific socialism” (Marxism-Leninism), but a broader concept that also comprises ideologies proposed by the Labour Party of Great Britain. In Wang’s imagination, socialism is a system that overcomes the Soviet Union’s one-party dictatorship. The Soviet Union had realized “the politics for people,” yet the “government of the people, by the people” was still a blueprint. Therefore, the Soviet model was still far away from Wang’s ideal political system (Wang 1935: 226). Nonetheless, the emphasis on “economic democracy” succeeded in the party program of the China Democratic League, which was committed to the private ownership of wealth, while demanding that the state conduct the centrally planned economy. In the perspective of the League, the growing wealth of peasants would contribute to the enlargement of the internal market and pave the way for the development of capitalism. Land reform and the birth of the class of independent farmers would be the inevitable and expected result. However, the League also envisioned the nationalization of land and collective farms. They suggested that the government should socialize monopolistic concerns and guarantee the working-class control over collective companies and large-scale enterprises through social policies. Moreover, the aforementioned discussion of a “big government” was revealed in Mao Zedong’s 1945 article “On Coalition Government” and in the resolution on China’s postwar reconstruction passed by the GMD, the Chinese Communist Party, and the China Democratic League at the political consultative conference in 1946 (Mizuha 1992). According to my own observations, a number of Chinese intellectuals decamped the GMD and turned to support the Chinese Communists because they believed that the Chinese Communists would adopt policies that would help realize economic democracy in China; put another way, the GMD was unable to thoroughly apply these policies. In addition, intellectuals like Luo Longji and Wang Zaoshi were pessimistic about the Chinese masses’ political awareness. As a result, they principally supported the masses’ political participation, but under the condition that China’s reform must be shouldered by those fully enlightened leaders who had received decent training and were spiritually purified by the ideology of self-sacrifice (Mizuha 2011). Their supportive stance to the top-down reform led by the social elites was another reason for their positive vision of a Chinese reform under the leadership of the CCP.

2 The bottleneck for narratives on “democracy” Mōri Kazuko has already pointed out the ambiguity of the concept of democracy. However, she listed three basic conditions for a democratic system: 1) a political system that guarantees citizens’ political participation; 2) a pluralist system that makes possible political decisions; and 3) a system that supervises and checks political powers (Mōri 2012). Related to my own viewpoint, Mōri has analyzed the perfection of politics “by people” as a problem of institution, namely, how to

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guarantee the “politics of people.” Mōri’s explanation is unique, for it does not define “politics for people” as the basic condition for democracy. As related to this viewpoint, discussions that took place within the circle of the League on the form of the government are highly interesting. According to the principle proposed by the League, the highest organ of people’s sovereignty was a parliament that is divided into two parts: The first house of representatives emerges from the general election, and the second house of representatives comes from provincial parliaments and autonomous regions of ethnic minorities. For the checks and balances of different ruling organizations, they suggested the separation of the administration, legislation, and judicature; a responsible cabinet system; and juridical independence. As far as the relation between provinces and the central authority is concerned, they allowed for the establishment of provincial constitutions and foresaw the election of provincial leaders and district heads by direct election. The agreement from the 1946 political consultative conference also echoed this set of ideas. However, considering the GMD’s influence, the National Convention was defined as an equal pedant of Legislative Yuan, and the separation of three powers became the separation of five powers; the essential principles of the League had been succeeded upon at the political consultative conference (Mizuha 1992). In addition, with regard to the process of establishing a new government to carry out the proposed policies, each political power needed to make public its own plan in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of the ruling power. As a representative of the League, Luo Longji proposed the following four-stage plan at the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War: 1) a joint conference of representatives from different political parties; 2) a tentative joint government of different parties; 3) a formal public opinion organization; and 4) a formal government. Furthermore, in 1948, as the situation of China’s civil war gradually became clear and the CCP’s triumph became inevitable, a five-step model that adds the additional step of “a tentative public opinion organization” between the first and second was widely admitted among Chinese Communists who were active in the public sphere. At that time, people, including the Communists, deemed it indispensable to guarantee the legitimacy of power to ensure that a public opinion organization emerged from the election, rather than seeking consensus among different parties. It was assumed that a parliament based on the election would take place at the turning point from the temporary government to the formal government (Mizuha 2015). Luo’s ideas are hidden behind the aforementioned design of the political system: Pessimistic people deemed the most important task for the Chinese politics the remake of human mind, rather than the construction of a new institution. (. . .) [However], we believe that exactly because people damaging the country are large in number, the institution will play an important role. The function of the institution is to minimize the possibility of corrupted individuals to fall into crime. (Luo 1930: 24)

“Democracy” in Republican China 47 During the 1930s and 1940s, Luo was involved in movements that sought to establish a democratic constitution in China. However, in “The Organic Law of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China” adopted in 1949, the aforementioned blueprint for institutional construction was not revealed. In other words, under the CCP’s rule, the National People’s Congress based on a general election—a model for democratic centralism—was proposed. For the time being, the political consultative conference comprised functionspecifc representatives that were directly designated by the CCP and functioned as the National People’s Congress. The general election of the Congress representatives started from 1953 onwards. However, until today, elections are only undertaken at the grass-roots level. It contradicts the balance of power based on power separation. Furthermore, in terms of the relation between the central authority and regional administrations, the provincial constitution is a non-issue. By the provision that “the State Council of each province and city appoints/dismisses the local commissars based on proposals from the Central People’s Government Committee,” the possibility of electing a local magistracy was completely denied. The details of the process of how the CCP established power have been thoroughly described by Ashizaki Gunji (2015). Thus, I will only note that the five-stage model of government building was denied in 1949. The people’s government had immediately been established after the People’s Consultative Congress. However, the coalition government ultimately positively supported the economic democracy that was demanded by Luo Longji and Wang Zaoshi.

Conclusion: the “democracy” for us Luo Longji and Wang Zaoshi, both leaders of the Chinese Democratic League, were supportive of the People’s Republic that arose from China’s civil war. In the international tension caused by the intensifying Cold War, they were so obsessed with the idea of improving China’s industrialization that they ignored the notion of politics by the people that is institutionally guaranteed by politics from the people. As they saw the possibility of realizing economic democracy and politics for the people, their priority was to defend the authorities who were in the position to carry out such policies. Political democracy was only of secondary importance. However, in China in the 1940s, Hayek’s (1899–1992) economic theory, which exactly opposed the aforementioned stances, was said to have circulated widely (Kubo 2011). The following argument by Hu Shih in September 1948 indicates the influences of Hayek’s political thought: In the modern history of the world, all the supporters of thorough reforms ended up on the path of absolutistic tyranny without exception. (. . .) Because only absolutistic tyranny is the most brutal method to fulfill their wish of a thorough reform, regardless of the means and the price paid for fundamental reforms. They will never recognize the irrationalities of their own standpoint, nor do they deem the arguments of their opponent as being

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Mizuha Nobuo worthy of consideration. For that reason, they will leave no space for free speech and free thinking for those who think differently than themselves.6

Hu Shih’s standpoint can be interpreted as “negative liberty,”7 a concept proposed by Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997). However, according to my own observations, such a stance is an extremely rare yet important argument for modern China (Mizuha 2013). Therefore, I have great respect for Hu Shih, who refuted the CCP’s rule over Mainland China and sought to realize democratization under the National government in Taiwan, and also for the diffcult lives led by GMD intellectuals and democrats in Taiwan. However, I do not intend to label intellectuals like Luo Longji and Wang Zaoshi as miserable “ronggong” (admitting communism) intellectuals who were mesmerized by communism. For both Hu Shih and intellectuals like Luo, the CCP’s seizure of power did not result merely from the fact that it had to confront another dictatorship—the GMD— and defeated it. Rather, the core assertion of Luo and Wang’s intellectual endeavors still clearly reveals the problems inherent in democracy itself. This is the chief concern of my own analysis. In his 1941 State of the Union Address, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt famously called for the realization of the “four liberties” in which freedom from “want” was contained. In the context of discussions related to the present article, it can be understood as the result of the United States’ attempt to achieve economic democracy. It is universally known that the fundamental principle of American democracy is equal opportunity rather than absolute economic equality. Although this principle will logically give birth to a polarized society, it is precisely competition that contributes to a society’s dynamic. Poverty is seen as the result of personal problems. If one is dissatisfied with poverty, he or she simply needs to make more of an effort to change that reality, for opportunities are equally offered to all. However, during the 1930s, supporters of totalitarianism in capitalistic countries severely criticized those with vested interests. With the help of the poor, they gained political power and destroyed the democratic mechanism. The American political leaders carefully watched over the situation. However, whether or not the U.S. government had properly treated the same problem in their own country is another issue. How does one realize economic democracy? Let us put aside President Roosevelt’s dilemma and return to Luo Longji. Based on Luo’s experiences, the starting point of his political thought was industrial development accelerated by political democracy, and the execution of social policies that equally redistribute wealth. In that sense, to realize the politics of the people by institutionalizing “the politics by the people” is of more importance than politics for the people. However, this idea did not come to fruition. Luo had a certain expectation for the Chinese Communist Party, and the Party at that time was considered able to respond to such expectations. On the other hand, they designated the masses as the subjects of sovereignty, while viewing them as politically weak. From their point of view, China needed a powerful authority that properly represented the voices of its people. For them, this was intended to be the true rights of “the

“Democracy” in Republican China 49 people.” That their assumptions were far from correct has already been proven by the historical reality. We also need to pay attention to Metzger’s observation of the Chinese intellectuals’ approach to democracy (1995). Metzger assumes that democracy is not a means to realize the ideal political forms of human society, but rather a tool to avoid the worst situation (“worse than the worst”). According to his explanation, the background of Western democracy is the pessimistic view of humanity. Humans are selfish and do not hesitate to harm others’ rights for their own benefit. Therefore, it is necessary to make a set of rules that limits every individual’s activities. It is also necessary that the mechanism that guarantees the rules functions correctly. However, Chinese intellectuals understood democracy as a “magic wand” that could solve China’s complex problems all at once. For some of them, democracy was even reduced to an issue of a moral decision concerning political attitude. The Chinese held an abstract and optimistic view of democracy. If we seriously consider Metzger’s argument, we will come to the following conclusion: Based on the presumption that human nature is evil, rather than improve the power division system in order to realize social equality, people usually tend to argue meaninglessly over justice and equality. Most of all, building a democratic system that is suitable for China still presents difficult problems. China is a multi-ethnic nation with a vast land area. What kind of relationship between the central government and local authorities should be developed? Is the federal system of the United States suitable for China? If China could establish a parliamentary system based on multi-party politics, what does this parliamentary system that is capable of protecting minority rights and making effective discussions look like? This issue, if related to criticisms of Japan’s democracy and parliamentary system, is not simple to resolve. The problem of improving the polarization between the rich and the poor continues to be an important issue. Due to the scope of this chapter, I cannot here thoroughly depict the intellectual world of the learned men in Republican China and their ideology of protecting liberalism and the dignity of the individual. However, many discussions in this chapter were devoted to “democracy” and related issues. This is exactly why we should always learn from history.

Notes 1 While actively supporting the Cultural Revolution, Wei Jingsheng felt desperate about the gap between the ideal and the reality. Wei criticized the CCP and called for China’s democratization. Today, Wei is living in the United States. In March 1979, Wei openly argued that “democracy must, firstly ensure a liberal social system, and guarantee a unity that is based on freedom, voluntary cooperate, and relatively consistent interests. (. . .) Democracy is a means to protect freedom. Idealism is in its nature anti-democratic and tends to contribute to dictatorship and despotism” (Wei Jingsheng, “Human Rights, Equality and Democracy,” translated by Ozaki Shōtarō. Testimony of Chinese Democratic Activists: Records of the Wei Jingsheng. Nicchū Publishing, 1989, p. 167, p. 170). 2 This chapter is a revised version of my own article. For details of each arguing point, please refer to my original article and its references.

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3 “Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng linshi quanguo daibiao dahui zhengzhi baogao 中国民主同盟临时全国代表大会政治报告,” in Zhongguo minzhutongmeng zhongyang wenshiziliao weiyuanhui 中国民主同盟中央文史资料委员会 (ed.), Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng lishi wenxian 1941–49 中国民主同盟历史文献 1941– 49. Wenshi ziliao chubanshe 文史资料出版社, 1983, p. 5. For my own Japanese translation, see Rekishi kenkyūkai 歴史学研究会 ed. Dainiji sekai taisengo: reisen to kaihatsu 第二次世界大戦後 冷戦と開発, The 11th Volume of Sekaishi Shiryo. Iwanami Shoten, 2013. 4 Ding Wenjiang 丁文江, “Minzhu zhengzhi yu ducai zhengzhi 民主政治与独裁政 治,” in Duli pinglun 独立评论, no. 133, p. 5f. 5 Luo Longji, translated by Mizuha Nobuo, “Seiji minshu shugi to keizai minshu shugi 政治民主主義と経済民主主義,” (written in Feb. 1944) in Nomura et al. eds. 2011: 210. 6 Hu Shih, translated by Mizuha Nobuo, “Jiyū shugi 自由主義,” in Sunayama Yukio 砂山幸雄 (ed.), Sekai Reisen no Naka no Sentaku 世界冷戦のなかの選択. Iwanami Shoten, 2011, p. 133f. 7 Isaiah Berlin positioned Hayek as a neo-liberalist and supporter of small government. I hereby use Berlin’s concept of “passive freedom” to indicate his philosophical stance. Berlin and Hayek are both “heroes in a calm era”; however, differences in their philosophies—for example, Hayek emphasizes “individual liberty” rather than Berlin’s “negative liberty”—are topics for the field of political philosophy. For a more rigorous discussion, see Watanabe Mikio 渡辺幹雄. Haieku to gendai riberarizumu: “anchi gōri shugi riberarizumu” no shosō ハイエクと現代リベラリズム 「 アンチ合理主義リベラリズム」の諸相. Shunshū-sha, 2006.

Bibliography Fairbank, John K. China: A New History. Harvard University Press, 1992. Hu, Weixi 胡偉希. “Lixing yu wutuobang: ershi shiji zhongguo de ziyou zhuyi sichao 理性与烏托邦: 二十世紀中国的自由主義思潮,” in Gao Ruiquan 高瑞泉 (ed.), Zhongguo jindai shehui sichao 中国近代社会思潮. East China Normal University Press, 1996. Ishii, Tomoaki, ed. Gendai Chūgoku no Riberarizumu Shichō: 1920 Nendai kara 2015-nen made 現代中国のリベラリズム思潮──1920年代から2015年まで. Fujiwara Shoten 藤原書店, 2015. Ishii Tomoaki 石井知章 and Ogata Yasushi 緒形康, ed. Chūgoku Riberarizumu no Seiji Kūkan 中国リベラリズムの政治空間. Bensei Shuppan 勉誠出版, 2015. Kubo, Tōru 久保亨. “Sengo Chūgoku no Keizai Jiyūshgi 戦後中国の経済自由主 義,” in Murata Yūjirō 村田雄二郎 (ed.), Riberarizumu no Chugoku リベラリズム の中国. Yushisha 有志舎, 2011. Lo, Lung-chi 羅隆基. The Conduct of Parliamentary Election in England. Julius Lewin & Son, 1928. Luo, Longji 羅隆基. “Lun renquan 論人権,” Xinyue 新月, vol. 2, no. 5, October 1929. Luo, Longji 羅隆基. “‘Renquan’ shiyi 人権 釈義,” Xinyue 新月, vol. 3, no. 10, August 1931. Luo, Longi 羅隆基. “Women yao shenme yang de zhengzhi zhidu 我們要什麼様的 政治制度,” Xinyue 新月, vol. 2, no. 12, 1930. Metzger, Thomas. “Modern Chinese Utopianism and the Western Concept of Civil Society,” in Chen Sanjing 陳三井 (ed.), Guo Tingyi xiansheng jiuyi danchen jinian

“Democracy” in Republican China 51 lunwenji 郭廷以先生九秩誕辰紀念論文集. Academia Sinica 中央研究院近代史研 究所, 1995. Mitter, Rana. A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World. Oxford University Press, 2004. Mizuha, Nobuo 水羽信男. “1940 Nendai Kōhanki ni okeru Chūgoku Minshuha Chishikijin no Kokka Tōgō o Meguru Roncho 1940年代後半期における中国民主派 知識人の国家統合をめぐる論調,” in Yokoyama Hide 横山英 and Soda Saburo曽 田三郎 (ed.), Chūgoku no Kindaika to Seiji-teki Tōgō 中国の近代化と政治的統合. Keisui-sha 渓水社, 1992. Mizuha, Nobuo. Chūgoku Kindai no Riberarizumu中国近代のリベラリズム. Tōhō Shoten 東方書店, 2007. Mizuha, Nobuo. “1930 Nendai Chūgoku ni okeru Seiji Hendō to Seiji Gakusha 1930年代中国における政治変動と政治学者,” in Murata Yūjiro (ed.), Riberarizumu no chūgoku リベラリズムの中国. Yushisha 有志舎, 2011. Mizuha, Nobuo. Chūgoku no Aikoku to Minshu 中国の愛国と民主. Kyōko Shoin 汲 古書院, 2012. Mizuha, Nobuo, translated by Zheng Xiaolin 鄭暁琳. “Zhongguo ziyou zhuyi zhe de fenqi: 1930 niandai de hu shi he luo longji 中国自由主義者的分岐──1930年 代的胡適和羅隆基,” in Pan Guangzhe 潘光哲 (ed.), Hu Shi yu xiandai zhongguo de lixiang zhuixun: jinian hu shi xiansheng 120 sui danchen guoji xueshu yantaohui wenji 胡適与現代中国的理想追尋：紀念胡適先生120歳誕辰国際学術研討会論 文集. Xiuwei zixun keji gufen youxian gongsi 秀威資訊科技股份有限公司, 2013. Mizuha, Nobuo. “Jitsugyōkai to Seiji Sanka 実業界と政治参加,” in Fukamachi Hideo 深町英夫 (ed.), Chūgoku Gikai 100-nen-shi 中国議会100年史. Tokyo University Press, 2015. Mōri, Kazuko 毛里和子. Gendai Chugoku Seiji: Gurōbaru Pawā no Shōzō 現代中国政 治──グローバル・パワーの肖像. Nagoya University Press, 2012. Morisaki, Gunketsu 杜崎群傑. Chūgoku Kyōsantō ni yoru “Jinmin Daihyō Kaigi” Seido no Sosei to Seiji Katei: Kenryoku to Seitosei o megutte 中国共産党による「 人民代表会議」制度の創成と政治過程──権力と正統性をめぐって. Ochanomizu Shobō 御茶の水書房, 2015. Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūsho Chūgoku Bukai 日本国際問題研究所中国部会, ed. Shin Chūgoku Shinryō Shūsei 新中国資料集成, II vols. Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūsho 日本国際問題研究所, 1986 (3rd Edition). Nomura, Kōichi 野村浩一, Kondō Kuniyasu 近藤邦康, Sunayama Yukio 砂山幸雄 eds. Kyūkoku to Minshu: Kōnichi Sensō kara Daini-ji Sekai Taisen e 救国と民主―― 抗日戦争から第二次世界大戦へ. 岩波書店, 2011. Wang, Zaoshi 王造時. “Shixing tongzhi jingji de xianjue wenti 実行統制経済的先決 問題,” (originally published in September 1933), in Wang Zaoshi. Huangmiu ji 荒 謬集. Ziyou yanlun she 自由言論社, 1935. Wang, Zaoshi. Zhongguo wenti de fenxi 中国問題的分析. Commercial Press, 1938. Yamanouchi, Yasushi 山之内靖. Sōryokusen Taisei 総力戦体制. Chikuma Shobō, 2015. Yokoyama, Hiroaki 横山宏章. Chūka Minkoku-shi: Sensei to Minshu no Sōkoku 中華民 国史──専制と民主の相剋. Sanichi Shobō 三・一書房, 1996.

3

The formation of the People’s Republic and the “historical narrative” MARUYAMA Kōji

Abstract: Present-day China is governed by the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP). Why did democracy not succeed in China? Why has the CCP been able to maintain control of the government? What is the legitimate reason for this political control? Further, what kind of “historical narrative” is made in modern China? How does it comply with the victory of the Chinese Revolution, and what are the factors behind the formation of the People’s Republic of China as well as the “legitimacy” of the CCP’s rule? Is the People’s Political Consultative Conference (the People’s PCC) able to be claimed as a basis for the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule? Can it be said that “the establishment of the People’s Republic of China through the People’s PCC” was considered as a “reflection of gaining the consent of the people’s will?” These points will be critically evaluated with historical materials to show a proper shape of history based on these words: “History books should be written as it is from an objective point of view” (Hu Qiaomu 1994) in order to present a proper “historical account.”

Introduction: five legitimacies of the political rule by the Chinese Communist Party From the formation of the People’s Republic of China (People’s Republic) in October 1949 to the present day, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has consistently been the central power of the administration. What is the reason for this political power legitimacy? Three factors are typically indicated.1 The first factor was the acquisition of state legitimacy through diplomatic approval from foreign governments. This is specifically an important basis for the legitimacy of a “provisional government” established by a revolution or a coup d’état. The People’s Republic was recognized by the Soviet Union two hours after its declaration on October 1, 1949. The next day, October 2, the establishment of diplomatic relations was announced, following the example set by the establishment of socialist states in Eastern Europe. The issues of establishing a “provisional revolutionary government” had been actively discussed between the Chinese and Soviet parties since 1948. The second factor was the acquisition of legitimacy via election. Typically, the election of a president or prime minister and a congress or parliament via

The Republic and “historical narrative” 53 general election under a constitutional system is considered the basis of legal legitimacy and lawfulness. In October 1949, the People’s Republic was “founded as a nation” by the decision of the People’s Political Consultative Conference (People’s PCC). A total of 610 representatives of 46 parties and organizations participated in the first Plenary Session of the People’s PCC, culminating with the adoption of “the Common Programme” as a provisional constitution. In 1954, through a formal regional representation system,2 a National People’s Congress (NPC) was held, and the first Constitution of the People’s Republic was adopted. Since then, the NPC system continues until the present day and it is the underlying reason for the CCP’s claim to being a “(socialistic) democracy.” The NPC is promoted in the Constitution as the state’s supreme power on each level. Through this system, the legitimacy for the party’s control of the government was systemically secured (Kamo 2006: 26–69). Third, achievements of the administration in charge are manipulated for purposes of building legitimacy.3 In present-day China, with the booming economy and the rise of an affluent society, achievements have been actually utilized in this manner. The legitimacy given by the original CCP’s government is in “danger of being overrun” and exposed to “the crisis of effectiveness” which makes the CCP lose power for achieving political goals. The CCP is forced to aim for the restoration of “legitimacy” through economic policies and market principles. In addition to these three reasons for the perceived legitimacy of the CCP’s rule, there are the fourth and fifth points that also must be noted. Fourth, the “founded nation” of the People’s Republic itself is still functioning as the reasoning behind the CCP’s government.4 In other words, the achievements and contributions of a successful revolution and the establishment of a new government became the continuing narrative described as a “bright history” or an “everlasting history” of the Chinese Revolution. The phrasing of “founded nation” for the establishment of the People’s Republic on October 1, 1949, must be understood as being connected to the “historical narrative.”5 Japan’s Founding Day, the 11th of February, is based on a myth. So, it is considered as a historical subconscious of the Japanese people that even if the country falls, Japan as a nation will exist eternally.6 In contrast, the Chinese people think that the Chinese civilization and Chinese world are eternally immortal, but the state is not eternal and will instead rise and fall. Therefore, the historical awareness of the CCP needs to be reevaluated from the perspective of the Chinese people’s concept of history and the CCP’s notion of a “bright history.” Fifth, there are issues regarding the ideological legitimacy. It is a typical example of a “religious state” based on Catholicism or Islam. In a like manner, the legitimacy of ideology as the “communist state” was questioned based on Marx-Leninism. At that time the Cominform existed.7 The situation was similar to the removal of names from the Comintern (Communist International) considered a matter of life or death. In fact, when the Yugoslavian Communist Party, led by Tito, was removed from Cominform in June 1948, both the Eastern and Western European communist parties, as well as the CCP, faithfully followed Stalin’s lead by publicly criticizing the Yugoslavian Communist Party. In the international communist

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movement, Stalin, who was “the one and only power,” solely held the authority to decide the removal of a name. By extension, the CCP and Mao Zedong were absolutely obedient to Stalin at that time, and without the approval and acquiescence from Stalin, Mao’s political status within the party was also restricted. Indeed, this is directly connected to the international legitimacy of the People’s Republic as a communist state, as well as Mao’s legitimacy in both internal and external relations.

1 The “historical narrative” in the CCP’s history: the “historical inevitability” for the establishment of the People’s Republic How is the establishment of the People’s Republic and the legitimacy for CCP’s administration narrated in present-day China? First, the contents of the book which is considered to be the best scripture of the CCP’s history must be confirmed.8 It is stated that the leadership position of the Chinese Communist Party was not to be established by any one person’s desire or arbitrary decision, and that the establishment of the People’s Republic under the leadership of the Communist Party and subsequent shift from a new democratic society to a socialist society was a solemn and historical choice made by the Chinese themselves because it was seen as a necessity of history. In other words, after victory in the Chinese Revolution, the establishment of the People’s Republic and the shift toward socialism was described as being “historically inevitable.” This section will explain the factors behind the victory in the Chinese Revolution (in which historical inevitability can also be expressed as “legend”) by summing up and analyzing the following three narratives: the uniqueness of the Chinese Revolution, the independence of the CCP, and the people’s consent to establishing the People’s Republic through the People’s PCC. Section 2 will analyze the civil war and the establishment process of the People’s Republic while looking at the following: 1) the old and new Political Consultative Conference (PCC), 2) establishment of a provisional government, and 3) the people’s agreement regarding the People’s PCC. Section 3 will critically analyze the following points while looking at historical sources: 1) the collaboration policies with the democratic parties, which were the biggest “split” problem between the Chinese and Soviet parties; 2) perception conflicts within the party regarding national bourgeois class; and 3) the legitimacy of the track taken while creating the People’s PCC. Through this process, the “legitimacy” (toughness) and fictionality (weakness) of the CCP’s rule will be analyzed in the context of the original historical framework and in the proper “historical account.” This is because it is the original goal and role of history.

1.1 The uniqueness of the Chinese revolution: “Mao Zedong Ideology” and rural revolution method The uniqueness referred to here is typically shown as the term “Mao Zedong Ideology” defined as the “product that combined the fundamental principles of Marx-Leninism with the specific practices of the Chinese Revolution.” The

The Republic and “historical narrative” 55 uniqueness and originality of the Chinese Revolution had been emphasized as being “Chinese-ized.” Of special note, the CCP’s rural revolution method of a “siege on the city from rural areas” has been described as a revolution that contrasts with the Russian revolution as the urban proletarian revolution. In the first place, was there really the direction of a proletarian revolution in the CCP and Mao Zedong? This chapter will analyze that the CCP originally had a position of aiming toward a proletarian dictatorship from the beginning. That position was incompatible with its collaboration policies for the national bourgeois class.

1.2 The independence of the CCP and Mao Zedong: China-Soviet party relations Emphasis is placed on the claims of the Chinese Revolution’s uniqueness along with the independence and autonomy of the CCP. In particular, there is a tendency to ignore facts regarding the support and instructions from foreign countries as a result of emphasis on independence from Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party. The independent nature of the Chinese Revolution is as true as the victory of the Yugoslavian Communist Party; however, there are no references to the economic and military support from the Soviet Union and the instructions from Stalin, which became prominent at the end of the civil war. What exactly were the relations between the Chinese and Soviet parties, and also the personal relations between Stalin and Mao while the People’s Republic was being formed? The earnest desire for Mao and the CCP to achieve legitimacy as an international communist party from the Soviet Party and Stalin, as well as the obedience attitude they expressed, will be briefly discussed in this chapter.

1.3 Agreement to the People’s Republic through the People’s PCC (recommended representatives): “A historical perspective of the Chinese revolution” The third factor of the victory in the Chinese Revolution was the so-called mass line of “from the masses to the masses,” on which the emphatic characteristics of the people’s revolution were based, as well as the importance of united front with the democratic parties. This can also be expressed as “a historical perspective of the Chinese Revolution” because the People’s Republic was established after victory in the Chinese Civil War that was named the “people’s liberation war.” As an achievement of success in the revolution, the People’s Republic was established upon the decision of “the People’s PCC,” a patriotic national united front organization. The People’s PCC was a council of representatives who were not elected but recommended by parties and organizations. Furthermore, the People’s PCC claimed that “it has the characteristic of representing all citizens of the whole country with their full trust and support,” which asserted the legitimacy of a new political rule by a non-democratic logical gap.

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This leaping logic allowed the legitimacy of a “provisional revolutionary government” to be acknowledged for the time being. Therefore, for domestic legitimacy, it was important that a political process to elect representatives must be open and lawful. Finally, in 1953, there was a nationwide general election, albeit incomplete, and the first National People’s Congress (NPC) was held in 1954. Can it really be argued that the creation of such a representative political delegation relationship, or the continuation of incomplete general elections, has gained support and consent from the people?

2 A proper “historical account” (part one): was the formation of the People’s Republic via the People’s PCC agreed on by public opinion? 2.1 The old and new political consultative conference To begin with, the original name was the “Political Consultative Conference (PCC).” When the second Plenary Session of the new PCC was held on September 17, 1949, “People’s” was hastily added and the original name was changed to “the People’s PCC,” just prior to the establishment of the People’s Republic.9 The Political Consultative Conference, or PCC, refers to the political conference held in January 1946 based on the Double Tenth Agreement and Chongqing Negotiations (August 28 to October 10, 1945). The conference was attended by 38 representatives from the Nationalist Party, Communist Party, and democratic neutralist parties. The conference resulted in the China White Paper which consisted of five major resolutions as follows: 1) Government Organization, 2) Programme for Peaceful National Reconstruction, 3) Militaristic Issues, 4) the People’s Assembly Proposal, and 5) the 1963 Constitution Draft. Further, the proposal of a coalition government under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership was approved.10 However, the Nationalist Party ignored these resolutions. In November 1946, the National Assembly for establishing the constitution was forcefully held, resulting in the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of China. Following an election in 1947, the National Assembly for enforcing the constitution was held in 1948. Chiang Kai-shek was elected as president (generalissimo), and “lawful legitimacy was claimed.” Nevertheless, the Nationalist Party and the Constitution could not avoid criticism of having dictatorship and repression against public opinion. As a result, the party was unable to stop the “erosion of their legitimacy (delegitimation).” The Chinese Civil War broke out in June 1946. On October 10, 1947, Mao coined the slogan “Down with Chiang” under the public banner of the People’s Liberated Army Headquarters. Seeking to gain a wider range of the public’s support, Mao called for the formation of the National Unified Front in cooperation with the democratic parties and patriotic democratic personages, as well as the establishment of the Democratic Coalition Government. Then, the establishment of a new government remained as a political program and was not recognized as a specific political entity.

The Republic and “historical narrative” 57 However, three months later, at the 1947 December Conference, the specific program for the “Foundation of a New China” was raised as a major topic. At the conference, some advocated for the immediate establishment of a central people’s government. Serious debates resulted in the opinions that the time had not yet matured. Therefore, the promulgation of a new constitution, which had been prepared to confront the Constitution of the Republic of China, remained as an issue. It was four months later, April 30, 1948, when the establishment of the new government was finally on the agenda of the CCP. They adopted the May Day slogan that the democratic parties, the people’s organizations, and social intellectuals should rally for the purpose of immediate formation of a new PCC. They called for the convening of the people’s congress to establish a democratic coalition government. Members of the social intellect group were representatives of a sector of the original PCC. These representatives became identified as politically unaffiliated independent democrats because a part of them was originally from the Nationalist Party. The CCP insisted on the immediate commencement of the new PCC. However, to this point they had made efforts to hold a “provisional consultative council” at the regional level. Some councilors were to be elected by the citizens, while others were invited by the administration and recommended from mass organizations, which made the “consultative council,” an advisory board of the same characteristics as the new PCC. The CCP tried to avoid using the name “consultative council” on the grounds that it would create a negative impression of the Provincial Assembly Council in the Nationalist Party era. Instead, the CCP began to hold meetings called the “people’s representative conference” or “various representative circle meeting” in the middle of 1948 (Morisaki 2015: 199). However, the name of “consultative council” was still used when the Northern China People’s Government was established through the merger of Jin Ji Lu Yu Bianqu (晋冀魯豫辺区) and Jin Cha Ji Bianqu (晋察 冀辺区) in 1948. In fact, “seats of both district consultative council were guaranteed” (Morisaki 2015: 171). In January 1946, the PCC criticized the Nationalist Party for its one-party system and its reluctance to consider people’s suffrage. The PCC acted as a symbol of the political and democratic movement that allowed the existence and activity of the CCP and democratic parties. This made it possible for the PCC to secure the legitimacy of a new power creation. To expand their control and overthrow the Nationalist Party, in April 1948, the CCP reused the democratic symbol of “PCC,” which the Nationalist Party had failed to make use of.11

2.2 Issues with the establishment of a provisional government: September Conference (1948) The CCP held the September Conference from September 8–13, 1948. For the first time, the establishment of a provisional government became the main topic of the conference. During this conference, a considerable amount of time was spent discussing the relationship with capitalists and the bourgeois class.

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Liu Shaoqi stated, “We must keep calm toward the bourgeoisie.” Liu did not hide his vigilance regarding the bourgeois revolts and transformation of the regime. He also referred to the possibility of preparing a bloody revolution again.12 However, at that time, it was anticipated that the overthrow of the Nationalist Government would take five years (from July 1946) and, even though the issue was intensively discussed, the struggle with the bourgeois class was not considered as an urgent issue (Yang 2006: 108–109). After the September Conference, Mao planned a fourth secret trip to the Soviet Union in November,13 earnestly hoping “to report directly to the Soviet party and my master, and to heartfully receive any guidance”14 (Shen 2015a: 283). The September Conference determined the direction of cooperation with the Soviet Union as well as the establishment of a socialist people’s government. They also re-declared the pro-Soviet position by stating “not to be inclined to a certain nation, but socialism” (Xu 2011: 116). When Mao made preparations for the second visit to the Soviet Union in April 1948, he had already placed a high priority on the China-Soviet Union relationship in his new China foreign policies (Hu 1994: 547–548). However, in the fall of 1948, the Communist Army won the battles of Liaoshen, Huaihai, and Beiping. By January 1949, the military power of the Nationalist Army eventually vanished from the north of the Yangtze. A peace negotiation was raised by the government, and as many neutral democratic personages rushed into CCP-controlled areas, the establishment of a coalition government became a very pressing issue for the CCP. Only two months after the September Conference, it was obvious that it would take only one more year to defeat the Nationalist Party instead of the three years previously predicted (Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室 1996b: 194; Waiwen Chubanshe 外文出版社 1968: 379). Further, the cooperative relationship between the CCP and the democratic parties advanced as an agreement on a new PCC was formed in November 1948 in Harbin, the capital of the liberated northeast area.15

2.3 Is an “indirect political delegation” a reflection of “gaining the people’s consent”? The People’s Republic was formed via the decision of the People’s PCC without an election. The CCP insisted that the new PCC was essentially “a congress which represented all citizens”; therefore, “the People’s PCC could exercise all official power instead of the National People’s Congress (NPC) until the general election was held.”16 Stating that the People’s PCC “gained the trust and support of all citizens of the whole country,” the CCP claimed the legitimacy of a new political rule by replacing the recommended representative to an elected representative. To what extent could the logic of “gaining representativeness through the trust and support of the people,” and such “indirect political delegations or recommended representative relationship” secure the legitimacy of the new political system?17

The Republic and “historical narrative” 59 At the time, there were already opinions and suspicions, such as whether the People’s PCC “could exercise all official power of the NPC and establish a government with authority though it wasn’t elected by the people”; “If the People’s PCC was not elected by the people in a legitimate election, how could it represent the will of the people of the whole country?”; and “Why were they so hastily trying to establish the people’s democratic dictatorship system?” There were also concerns heard from Shanghai’s industrial sector that questioned the policies against the U.S. and England as well as the policy aimed toward the Soviet Union.18 Hua Gang, the secretary of the CCP Shanghai Work Committee, flatly rejected these suspicions by stating, “The People’s PCC included the representatives of the democratic parties and the people’s organizations throughout the country, and each representative was elected by each group.” He also added that “there are no grounds to state that the will of the people is not being properly represented.”19 Insisting that the People’s PCC could represent the will of the people of the whole country, Hua tried to grant legitimacy of the People’s PCC. He concluded that, even without a direct election, the People’s PCC was recognized as the representative and legislative body by the citizens of the whole country and, therefore, in theory it would be possible to directly organize a central government.

3 A proper “historical account” (part two): the acquisition of “legitimacy” by the People’s PCC 3.1 A collaboration with the democratic parties: the big “split” problem between the Chinese and Soviet parties In a politburo meeting held in January 1949, Mao stated that the relationship with the democratic parties was “an issue of utmost importance,” showing vigilance toward them. He also mentioned that dealing with the representatives of the bourgeois classes was a matter of immediate concern; however, it would become one of the biggest political issues after entering the cities. Mao warned the senior cadres that the fundamental principle of dealing with this issue was to maintain class analysis and a class position (Yang 2006: 110). In a telegraph to Stalin, Mao listed four issues to be discussed by both Chinese and Soviet Parties: the PCC, coalition government, foreign policies, and economic policies. It can be understood that the pending issues of concern between the China-Soviet parties were economic policies as well as the People’s PCC and a coalition government in which the democratic parties or representation of the national bourgeois also participated (Shen 2015a: 359). Treatment of the bourgeois class was a matter directly connected to the democratic party faction. With victory in the civil war at hand, the time was rapidly approaching to decide whether to adopt 1) an equal distribution policy through the poor people’s movement based on the experience and ideology of the party or 2) a market-oriented policy in order to avoid worker unemployment, bankruptcy, or

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defection of corporations. Most party members advocated the former policy as a proletariat revolution line. By the time the Soviet Party politburo member, Mikoyan, visited secretly in January and February 1949, the issues of cooperation with the bourgeois class or the democratic parties were already supposed to have been resolved in a way that the CCP side accepted the opinions of the Soviet Party and Stalin. Accordingly, Mao emphasized to Mikoyan that a New-Democracy system differed from the Soviet administration on the basis of errors in the past civil capital confiscation policy and the “intellectual uprising.” Even in a meeting on June 6, Mao only mentioned that “we won’t confiscate the capital of private corporations in order to provoke an angry response of the national bourgeois” (Morisaki 2015: 111–112). However, reality played out differently. From the occupation of Shijiazhuang in November 1947 to the seizure of Tianjin in January 1949, the CCP continued to emphasize an adherence to class position and the persecution of the “poor people’s track.” As the result, management of the cities was to be left to the poor people and fringe executives themselves. This drove workers and employees to bring the rural revolution method into the cities. It was common to see them fighting factory managers and store owners to liquidate the companies. There were 53 cases of aggressive liquidation in Tianjin alone within a month of occupation, forcing many capitalists to flee to Hong Kong (Yang 2006: 110–111). Cooperation with the democratic party faction was a matter directly linked to the CCP’s national bourgeois class policy. Regarding this issue, Mao had already sent a telegraph to Stalin on March 15, 1948. On April 20, Stalin rewired orders for the CCP to cooperate with the national bourgeois. With notably high praise, Stalin replied by stating, “Your decision to establish the Chinese Central Government and to have the representatives of the bourgeois participate in the government is absolutely correct” (Shen 2015a: 252; Xue 2009: 237). On April 26, a telegraph sent by Mao requesting a visit to the Soviet Union began with the words “completely agree,” implying that Mao did not feel there had been a split between the China-Soviet parties on the issue of the democratic party faction. However, years later in a 1960 report on his visit to China,20 Mikoyan stated “the biggest split between the CCP and Soviet Party I encountered was how the CCP had to deal with the democratic party faction after taking control.” Further, Mikoyan mentioned that “as we all know, the CCP accepted Stalin’s opinions and changed its policies for dealing with the bourgeois parties” (Lieduofusiqi 2004: 17). In fact, after Mikoyan’s visit to China, the CCP clearly changed the national bourgeois class policy to a positive policy, while directly recognizing the imminent crisis of economic collapse. However, as the establishment of a nationwide government and the occupation of large cities approached, the CCP’s leaders increased vigilance regarding the conflict and struggle with the bourgeois class. This ominous tone in the party affected Mao. He felt an obvious sense of hesitation despite the moment when it was an imminent realistic matter to take over the large cities and establish a new government. Mikoyan was amazed by the irresistible force with which the

The Republic and “historical narrative” 61 CCP’s army moved, and he was seemingly befuddled by Mao’s lack of urgency to take over Nanjing, Shanghai, or other large cities in order to firmly establish the nationwide government. Mao’s answer was “there is no rush.” Mao understood that the establishment of a new government would require coalitions to be formed with many parties. The Communist Party must assume the responsibility of aligning these parties, and it would always be troublesome (Lieduofusiqi 2004: 24). Regarding when the central government was to be established, Mikoyan advised Mao to “not delay or slow the establishment of the Chinese Revolution Government.” Mikoyan said that “the Chinese Revolution Government should be established on the foundation of the coalition as soon as possible.” Adhering to the Soviet Party’s position, Mikoyan continued, after capturing Nanjing or Shanghai, you should immediately declare the establishment of a new revolution government. If you do, it will be advantageous in international relations and you won’t need to maneuver so frequently. Then, you can approach the international community as a legitimate new government in a position of vantage to fight against Chiang Kai-shek. Delaying the establishment of the government will only weaken the power of the revolution. (Shen 2015a: 373) The CCP leaders had only superficial ideas of how and when the new government would be established, without concrete administration plans nor state organ proposals. According to Mikoyan, “There were no such agencies that could form the basis of the government” (Shen 2015a: 419). So, Mao suggested to Mikoyan that the CCP would like to send a specialized mission to Moscow to learn about the Soviet Union’s experiences. Learning and imitating the experience of the proletarian dictatorship had already been a major goal of Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1948. Mao expressed this desire again, and finally from June to August, the CCP’s specialized mission, led by Liu Shaoqi instead of Mao, was sent to Moscow.21 It can be understood that the administration plan of the new government was that of an imitation of the Soviet model. After Mikoyan’s visit, on March 15, 1949, Stalin also sent a telegraph regarding the issue of the national bourgeois, repeating, “You should not eliminate the national bourgeois, rather you should look at them as an allied power in the fight against imperialism” (Lieduofusiqi 2004: 187).

3.2 The conflict within the CCP over the National bourgeois: March to July 1949 At the Seventh Term CCP Second Central Committee General Meeting (Second General Meeting) held March 5–7, 1949, the conciliatory policies for the capitalists were adopted on the basis of the following three reasons: 1) the Soviet experience of the transition to socialism finally began in l929, twelve years after the October Revolution of 1917; 2) Lenin’s theory that a nation must first pass

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through capitalism to reach socialism; and 3) Stalin’s insisting that the cooperation with the national bourgeois is important for the opposition against imperialism. The CCP decided that about 15 years should be spent in a peaceful competition and coexistence with the bourgeois class and capitalists and they should be given an important position as respected leaders of the new China. These ideas were present in the drafting and debate of the Common Programme in the People’s PCC and also were embodied as economic policies in Liu Shaoqi’s “Tianjin Lectures” (April–May).22 The Second General Meeting is known as the pivotal meeting that shifted focus from the rural areas to the cities and signaled the beginning of the “period when cities led rural areas” from the traditional rural revolution method. At the Meeting, Mao demanded the integrity of a unified front line. He insisted that “we must unite representatives of both the city small bourgeois and national bourgeois, and that we must give them posts suitable for their duties and authority” (Foreign Languages Press, 1968: 489). At the time, it was impossible for the CCP alone to design a system that would force the democratic party faction to follow loyally, and it was also recognized that trying to do so would endanger the legitimacy of the CCP’s control. Mao also mentioned to Mikoyan that the democratic personages were “afraid of the word ‘dictatorship’” (Shen 2015a: 425). The democratic party faction, of course, had anticipated the new PCC and a coalition government, and therefore supported the CCP. However, cautiousness toward the democratic party faction was still continuing. The CCP issued the instruction of “how to deal with the democratic party factions” on February 17, and prohibited the militarization of the democratic parties and formation of new parties as well as the development of the organization (Zhongyang Tongyi Zhanxian Bu, Zhongyang Dang’anguan 中央統一戦 部・中央档案館 1988: 257–259). In “the direction on nature of the Democratic Alliance” on May 25, the CCP demanded that we would obtain agreement by means of education”; while in the same instruction “the need for partial reconstruction deemed suitable by the New Democracy,” and “to shift into communist members” were also ordered. This demonstrated the level of vigilance regarding the possibility of regime change or an overthrow by the bourgeois class (Zhongyang Tongyi Zhanxian Bu, Zhongyang Dang’anguan 中央統一戦部・中央档案館 1988: 267). At the Second General Meeting, Mao declared that “all conditions for convening the People’s PCC and establishing a democratic coalition government are already mature.” Mao also confirmed that “all members of the democratic parties, people’s organizations, and independent democrats all stand on our side” (Foreign Languages Press, 1968: 486). Mao also spoke of plans to establish a coalition government in Beijing after occupying Nanjing between April and May. However, the establishment of the People’s Republic had been delayed for about half a year on October 1. Shortly thereafter, Liu visited the Soviet Union, and met with Stalin in August prior to returning. When Stalin asked about the establishment of the central government, Liu answered that it was scheduled for

The Republic and “historical narrative” 63 January 1, 1950. Stalin advised Liu to not miss the opportunity, causing the CCP to immediately advance the new government’s establishment date to October 1. The CCP received direct instructions from Stalin regarding the nature of the new government, or state system, as well as the time schedule for its establishment. In March, the CCP moved its headquarters to Beijing and executed policies to shift the main focus to the construction of cities. Six hundred sixty-two representatives attended to hold the first Plenary Session of the new PCC in Beijing from June 15–19. A Preparation Committee of the new PCC was inaugurated to formulate the new Common Programme23 and a proposal of governmental organization. Mao was appointed as the chief. As a result, the CCP also held control over the convocation of the new PCC which was essentially considered to be the National People’s Congress. In Mao Zedong’s People’s Democratic Autocracy, announced on June 30, he clearly stated that “the national bourgeois cannot become leaders of a revolution and cannot hold major positions in the state administration,” thus emphasizing the control over the national bourgeois and the superiority of the Communist Party. Whether it was the People’s Representative Meeting (meaning the PCC) or Central People’s Government, the original concept of “provisional” was completely abolished and they were to be established directly without temporary or provisional stages. In this way, the idea that the Central People’s Government could be established directly through the People’s PCC, was all but formulated as the “People’s PPC Track.” In order to take firm control of the leadership of the Preparation Committee of the new PCC, the CCP decided to establish the New PCC Preparation Group/Group Director Committee on July 11. The CCP had set up a system to review and judge political issues such as the Common Programme and ordinance proposals in advance (Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, Zhongyang Dang’anguan 中共中央文献研究室・中央档案館 2008: 111–113, 321–322).

3.3 Acquisition of legitimacy of the People’s PCC track: September 1949 On September 30, 1949, the People’s PCC closed with the adoption of the “Common Programme,” the “Central People’s Government Organization Act,” and the “People’s PCC Organization Act.” The Common Programme, considered to be a provisional constitution, became the legal basis for policy making and policy implementation. Then, the Central People’s Government Committee was inaugurated. The two major powers of personnel rights and the convocation of the National People’s Congress was delegated to Mao, who was appointed as the president. Now “officially institutionalized,” the People’s PCC was recognized to hold the power to approve all personnel, resolutions, and bills; thus the “formalized People’s Democratic System”24 was complete. The People’s PCC was not provisional, and by being positioned as the “formal and legitimate” national congress and legislative body, the CCP was able to gain full control over the establishment of the constitution.25 Further, the CCP

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controlled the power to draft bills and important decisions, such as administrate policies or election acts, organization acts and so on. The legitimacy of the CCP’s rule was now lawfully protected by the Central People’s Government Organization Act and the People’s PCC Organization Act (Morisaki, 2015: 53–54). It has been pointed out that the grounds for the legitimacy of power in the newly liberated rural areas shortly after the founding of the nation, were not based within the society, but they could be seen as “imported” or “absorbed” through the southern movement of the People’s Liberated Army. (Tahara 2004: 254) Therefore, it can be said that the legitimacy of the CCP’s control during the period when the People’s Republic was being established was obtained via military force. Now that the CCP was “a revolutionary government in the moment it succeeded in taking down the former controlling class,” it could not control the subjects with violent threats and it needed them to follow voluntarily (Maruyama 2015: 102–103). Whether it was ruled by violent threats or ideology, the internal voluntary consent or agreement and support from the people was absolutely necessary. According to the political doctrine of the CCP, the People’s PCC was considered as an ideal “democratic system” through which the people’s consent and support was gained and the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule was secured. It was depicted as an admirable method of justifying the Chinese Revolution and assuming power from the old government by overthrowing it with military force. In this way, it could be confirmed that the first Central People’s Government established through the People’s PCC was not temporary at all, rather an official directly established government.

Conclusion: the “Common Programme” of the People’s PCC and the CCP’s rule The establishment of the People’s Republic, on the one hand, politically legalized the CCP’s rule and the control of the military and, on the other hand, restricted the autocratic rule of the CCP as it was the coalition government based on the Common Programme, thus giving the system the nature of duality. Under the guise of a coalition government in which the bourgeois parties participated, however, the trilateral power of the People’s PCC (parliament, legislative power), Central People’s Government Committee (administrative power), and the People’s Revolution Military Committee (military power) was monopolized by the CCP. In this way, in October 1949, the autocratic rule of the CCP was practically realized. Even after implementing the Common Programme, the CCP’s policies aimed toward workers and poor people had a negative impact on the capitalist industrial sector that continued to decline. The Chinese economy lost its power and

The Republic and “historical narrative” 65 momentum after the foundation of the new nation. As a correctional measure, the CCP held a nationwide United Front Work Department meeting in March and April 1950. Mao felt that most of the cadres now responsible for the industries and businesses did not understand the CCP’s new policies for the bourgeois class. He critically admonished them through direct instructions.26 Zou Enlai more directly and critically stated that currently our commerce has lost its vitality, and we must devise a better policy. Some say that we should eradicate the small businesses, but if all of the small stores and town factories are crushed, won’t this just create more problems?27 In June of the same year at the Seventh Term Third General Meeting, Mao stated critically that “the majority of the members of the party do not even understand what the Common Programme is. Many comrades do not want to cooperate with the capitalists. They are against them, and harming them.”28 When the policies for industries and businesses were adjusted based on Mao’s proclamations, the positive effects appeared immediately in the second half of 1950, and the amount of production and transaction visibly began to rise. Even though the Common Programme stipulated that the national bourgeois could participate in the New Democratic State of the People’s Democratic Dictatorship System, there were many CCP’s cadres who did not understand what this meant. The majority still continued to adhere to the proletarian revolution line and pursued a confrontation with the bourgeois. Mao had once accepted the advice of Stalin and maintained a position of collaboration with the national bourgeois before and after the establishment of the People’s Republic. However, Mao finally decided to confront the bourgeois in 1952. After a dispute within the party, he gave the instructions of “general line for the transitional period” in 1953. The fate of the national bourgeois class was completely sealed. Through military victory in the civil war, the ruling status of the CCP in the People’s Republic, the so-called leadership of the party was solidified. From the beginning, the People’s PCC track made light of “systematic democracy” and reinforced the characteristics of a “formalistic” democratic system. As a result, the opportunity to build a true democracy on the Common Programme eventually collapsed.

Notes 1 Morisaki (2015: 20–28) has compactly organized the issues regarding the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule. 2 This was not a general election, rather a limited, multi-layered, indirect election in which both the People’s Liberated Army and overseas Chinese had representation. 3 Yamaguchi Yasushi pointed out that “legitimacy” differs from “rightfulness (legitimateness),” which is rated at the level of “whether the government system or political system is able to meet the expectations for ‘efficiency’ or ‘utility’ from the viewpoint of being profitable for the citizen’s daily life or professional benefit

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5 6 7 8

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Maruyama Kōji of interest groups.” He also mentioned that, if a socialist state “continues to fail in fulfilling ‘utility’ in the long term, the inherent ‘legitimacy’ will be worn down and dismantled” (Gendai Seiji-gaku Sōsho 3 Seiji Taisei 現代政治学叢書 3 政治 体制, Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai 東京大学出版会 1989: 273). Mōri Kazuko pointed out that after the Deng Xiaoping era CCP “was forced to secure the power legitimacy anew through economic development because the CCP’s original legitimacy could not be maintained by the issue of revolution” (Shinpan Gendai Chūgoku Seiji 新版 現代中国政治, Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai 名古屋大学出版会 2004: 245). Nowadays, since the revolution legitimacy in the sense of “a dramatic change in society” cannot be claimed, there is a strong tendency to appeal to patriotism or nationalism. The anniversary of the “founded nation” of the People’s Republic (Founding Day) is set on October 1. According to Nihon Shoki, this is when the first emperor was enthroned; in the Meiji era it was repackaged as “Empire Day” (紀元節). The Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was established by the European Communist and Worker’s Parties in October 1947. The original is Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangshi Yanjiushi 中共中央党史研究室著, Hu Sheng 胡縄 ed., Zhongguo Gongchandang de Qishinian 中国共産党的七十 年, Beijing, Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe 北京･中共党史出版社, 1991 (The Japanese translation is Chūgoku Kyōsantō Shōshi (jō-ge kan) 中国共産党小史 (上 下巻), Beijing Waiwen Chubanshe 北京･外文出版社､1995). This book is still very influential in research regarding the history of the party even after more than 20 years since its publication. The first Plenary Session was held three months earlier, in June. Regarding the “nature” of the coalition government in January 1946, CCP defined that the “bourgeois class shall lead, but the proletariat class can also participate in the coalition government,” which went against Mao’s People’s Democratic Autocracy in 1949, and they admitted the acceptance of the Nationalist Party’s leadership. It can also be said that CCP had to use this as a façade because of restrictions that existed at the time. Later, in the Tianjin Lectures (Tianjin Jianghua 天津講話) of April and May 1949, Liu insisted on a harmonious relationship with the capitalists. Immediately after the announcement of the Tianjin Lectures, they were heavily criticized by the party members. They were considered as one of the historical crimes of Liu Shaoqi during the Cultural Revolution, and even today, their historical evaluation has not been determined. Until Mao officially visited the Soviet Union as the State Chairman, it is thought that he requested visits to the Soviet Union five times. The first was in mid-1947, and Stalin sent an approval telegraph on June 15; however, it was delayed on July 1, 1947. The second was unofficially arranged for a visit in July 1948, but Mao moved it up to May on April 26 and Stalin agreed via telegraph on April 29; however, it was extended until May 10 by Stalin. For the third request, Mao sent another telegraph on July 4, but because of provisions procurement, Stalin suggested an extension until November on July 17. The fourth request was reconfirmed by Mao on September 28, 1948, but due to poor health, Mao himself requested a postponement until December. Stalin once again denied the request (it is well known that Mikoyan, instead, visited the headquarters of CCP and there were meetings held at that time). For the fifth request, in April 1949 Mao requested to visit the Soviet Union; however, Stalin advised Mao to not leave the leadership post, when Mao was recognized as the leader of the Chinese Revolution (Liu Shaoqi visited the Soviet Union as Mao’s representative from June to August 1949).

The Republic and “historical narrative” 67 14 This secret visit to the Soviet Union was eventually postponed. 15 “Guanyu Zhaokai Xinde ZhengzhiXieshang Huiyi Zhuwenti de Xieyi 関於召開 新的政治協商会議諸問題的協議” (11 November, 1948), in Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshanghuiyi Quanguo Weiyuanhui Wenshi Ziliao Yanjiu Weiyuanhui 中国人民政治協商会議全国委員会文史資料研究委員会編 (ed.), Wuxinghongqi Cong Zheli Shengqi 五星紅旗从这里昇起. Wenshi Ziliao Chubanshe 文史資料出 版社, 1984, pp. 211–214. Two months later on January 31, 1949, Beijing was peacefully occupied and the new PCC was moved to Beijing from Harbin. 16 See Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo Chūgoku Bukai 日本国際問題研究所中国 部会, 1964: 591. 17 See Nishimura (2011: 164). 18 “Guanyu Shanghai Chanyejie dui Mao Zedong ‘Lun Renmin Minzhu Zhuanzhi’ Fanying de Piyu he Dianbao 関於上海産業界対毛沢東『論人民民主専制』 反応的批語和電報,” Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, Zhongyang Dang’anguan 中共中央文献研究室・中央档案館, 2008, pp. 268–269. 19 Lin Shifu 林石父 “Lun XinZhengxie yu Xin Zhongguo 論新政協与新中国,” Qunzhong 群衆, no. 127, 6/1949, pp. 595–596. Lin Shifu 林石父 “Cong Fengjian Dinzhu Guanliao Zichan Jieji Zhuanzheng dao Renmin Minzhu Zhuanzheng 従封建地主官僚資産階級専政到人民民主専政,” Qunzhong 群衆, no. 129, 7/1949, pp. 630–632. Lin Shifu (林石父) is the penname of Hua Gang (華崗), the editor of the former-CPP newspaper XinhuaRibao 新華日報. On the other hand, at that time some members insisted that “the People’s Democratic Dictatorship is a de facto proletarian dictatorship.” This was evidence of theoretical confusion within the party (Morisaki 2015: 315). 20 Mikoyan submitted this report to the chair of the Soviet Party Central Committee on September 22, 1960, titled “Report of Visit to China, January–February, 1949.” However, it must be noted that the Sino-Soviet Confrontation had come to the fore. 21 About the CCP’s request for interviews and inspections regarding the Soviet national organization, Ministerial Conference, and party organizations, see “Liu Shaoqi zhi Sidalin Han: Guanyu Fang Su Anpai Wenti 劉少奇致斯大林函：関於 訪蘇安排問題” (6 July 1949) (Shen 2015b: 84–85). 22 In the “Tianjin Lectures” Liu explained that “exploitation through capitalism is not a crime but an achievement” and also asserted that “to damage the capitalists is the same as damaging middle-class farmers in the rural areas.” As already mentioned, he emphasized a united policy with capitalists. 23 The first and second drafts of the Common Programme had been prepared as the “Chinese People’s Democratic Revolutionary Programme Draft” in November of 1948 (Morisaki 2015: 258–259). 24 Karl Schmidt stated that the administrative status achieved through “legal” institutions using “numbers” as a fundamental principle, is nothing more than a “lawful justification” of “falling prices, falling quality, and contentless formalismfunctionalism” (in Gōhōsei to Seitōsei 合法性と正当性, Miraisha 未来社 1983: 34). Maruyama Masao also stated that a “formal legality” is nothing more than “a legality and it fundamentally differs from substantive legitimacy” (Maruyama 2015: 54). 25 “The person who establishes the constitution as the fundamental law that defines the basic conditions of the state will have enormous power” (Morisaki 2015: 54). 26 Mao Zedong 毛沢東, “Zai Quanguo Tongzhan Huiyi Gongshangzu Taolunhui de Yifen Fayan Jilushang de Piyu 在全国統戦会議工商組討論会的一份発言記録 上的批語” (April, 1950 from: Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 中共中 央文献研究室, 1987, pp. 292–294). 27 Quoted from p. 116 of Yang (2006). This differs from the applicable phrases found in Zhou Enlai 周恩来, “Fahui Renmin Minzhu Tongyi Zhanxian Jiji Zuoyong de

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Jige Wenti 発揮人民民主統一戦線積極作用的幾個問題” (13 April 1950, from: Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室, 1992, p. 180). 28 “Mao Zedong zai Qijie Sanzhong Quanhuishang de Jianghua 毛沢東在七届三中 全会上的講話” (6 June 1950). “Buyao Simian Chuji 不要四面出撃,” Mao Zedong Xuanji 毛沢東選集, no. 5, Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 1978, pp. 21–24.

Bibliography Hu, Qiaomu 胡喬木. Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong胡喬木回憶毛沢東. Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe 北京・人民出版社, 1994. Kamo, Tomoki 加茂具樹. Gendai Chūgoku Seiji to Jimin Daihyō Taikai 現代中国政 治と人民代表大会. Keiōgijuku Daigaku Shuppankai 慶應義塾大学出版会, 2006. Lieduofusiqi 列多夫斯基. “Migaoyang Fuhua de Mimi Shiming 米高揚赴華的秘密 使命 (January–February 1949),” in Mao Zedong yu Sidalin, Heluxiaofu Jiaowanglu 毛沢東与斯大林、赫魯暁夫交往録. Dongfang Chubanshe 東方出版社, 2004. Maruyama, Masao 丸山眞男. Seiji no Sekai ta Jū-hen 政治の世界　他十篇. Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 2015. Mōri, Kazuko 毛里和子. Shinpan Gendai Chūgoku Seiji 新版 現代中国政治, Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai 名古屋大学出版会, 2004. Morisaki, Gunketsu 杜崎群傑. Chūgoku Kyōsan-tō ni yoru “Jinmin Daihyō Kaigi” Seido no Sōsei to Seiji Katei: Kenryoku to Seitōsei wo Megutte 中国共産党による “人 民代表会議” 制度の創成と政治過程──権力と正統性をめぐって. Ochanomizu Shobō 御茶の水書房, 2015. Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyū-jo Chūgoku Bukai 日本国際問題研究所中国部会. Shin-Chūgoku Shiryō Shūsei 新中国資料集成 (1948–1949). Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyū-jo 日本国際問題研究所, 1964. Nishimura, Shigeo 西村成雄. Nijū Seiki Chūgoku Seiji-shi Kenkyū 20世紀中国政治史 研究. Hōsō Daigaku Kyōiku Shinkōkai 放送大学教育振興会, 2011. Schmidt, Karl シュミット・カール, Tanaka Hiroshi 田中浩 Harada Takeo 原田武雄 trans., Gōhōsei to Seitōsei 合法性と正当性, Miraisha 未来社, 1983. Shen, Zhihua 沈志華, edited by same 同主編. Eluosi Jiemi Dang’an Xuanbian: Zhong Su Guanxi 俄羅斯解密档案選編――中蘇関係, vol. 1 Diyijuan 第一巻 “January 1945–February 1949.” Dongfang Chuban Zhongxin 東方出版中心, 2015a. Shen, Zhihua 沈志華, edited by same 同主編. Eluosi Jiemi Dang’an Xuanbian: Zhong Su Guanxi 俄羅斯解密档案選編――中蘇関係, vol. 2 Di’erjuan 第二巻 “March 1949–July 1950.” Dongfang Chuban Zhongxin 東方出版中心, 2015b. Tahara, Fumiki 田原史起. Chūgoku Nōson no Kenryoku Kōzō: Kenkoku Shoki no Erīto Saihen 中国農村の権力構造──建国初期のエリート再編. Ochanomizu Shobō 御茶の水書房, 2004. Waiwen Chubanshe 外文出版社. Mao Zedong Xuanji 毛沢東選集, no. 4. Beijing, Waiwen Chubanshe 北京・外文出版社, 1968. Waiwen Chubanshe 外文出版社. Mao Zedong Xuanji 毛沢東選集, no. 5. Beijing, Waiwen Chubanshe 北京・外文出版社, 1977. Xu, Wenhong 許文鴻. Zhonggong “Yibiandao” Zhengce de Xingcheng 中共“一辺倒”政 策的形成. Beijing, Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe 北京･知識産権出版社, 2011. Xue, Xiantian 薛銜天. Minguo Shijqi Zhongsu Guanxishi 民国時期中蘇関係史(下). Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe 中共党史出版社, 2009. Yamaguchi, Yasushi 山口定. Gendai Seiji-gaku Sōsho 3 Seiji Taisei 現代政治学叢書 3 政治体制, Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai 東京大学出版会, 1989.

The Republic and “historical narrative” 69 Yang, Kuisong 楊奎松. “Kyōsan-tō no Burujowa: Seisaku no Henten 共産党のブルジ ョワ──政策の変転,” in Kubo Tōru 久保亨 (ed.), 1949 Nen Zengo no Chugoku一 九四九年前後の中国. Kyūko Shoin 汲古書院, 2006. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室, edited by same 同 編. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong Wengao 建国以来毛沢東文稿, vol. 1 Diyice 第１ 冊Diyice. Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe 中央文献出版社, 1987. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室. Jianguo yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian 建国以来重要文献選編, vol. 1 Diyice 第１冊. Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe中央文献出版社, 1992. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室, edited by same 同 編. LiuShaoqi Nianpu 劉少奇年譜 (Xiajuan 下巻). Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe 中央文献出版社, 1996a. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室. Mao Zedong Wenj毛沢東文集, no. 5 第５巻、. Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe 中央文献出 版社, 1996b. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室, edited by same 同 編. Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi Wengao 建国以来劉少奇文稿, vol. 1 Diyice 第１冊. Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe 中央文献出版社, 1998. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, Zhongyang Dang’anguan 中共中央文献 研究室･中央档案館, edited by same 同編. Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai Wengao 建国 以来周恩来文稿, vol. 1 Diyice 第１冊. Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe 中央文献 出版社, 2008. Zhongyang Tongzhan Bu, Zhongyang Dang’anguan 中央統戦部･中央档案館. Jiefang Zhanzheng Shiqi Zhonggong Zhongyang Tongyi Zhanxian Wenjian Xuanbian 解 放戦争時期中共中央統一戦線文件選編. Dang’an Chubanshe 档案出版社, 1988.

4

“Peaceful coexistence” and “historical narrative” in Chinese diplomacy YOSHIDA Toyoko

Abstract: In the present day, there are emerging formations of new international and regional orders. If we turn our eyes to East Asia, the importance of China’s global and regional power has dramatically increased recently. In this state of affairs, it is crucial to consider how to interact with China and how China should associate with the world, whether that means with its neighboring countries or entire regions. Taking this issue as a clue to China’s foreign policies, this chapter will look at how China made “peaceful coexistence” central to its foreign affairs, starting with the Cold War. This chapter will historically reconstruct China’s relations with the Soviet Union, with the U.S., among other Western powers, and with newly independent Third World nations. Considering the regulations and factors involved in the mutual relations of internal affairs, this chapter will discuss East Asia and China’s future diplomacy throughout Asia and around the world.

Introduction In Chinese diplomacy, the most important set of principles is the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” In other words, 1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) mutual non-aggression, 3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 4) equality and mutual benefit, and 5) peaceful coexistence. To obtain support from Third World countries during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, these principles were established between India and Burma in 1954. In 1955, the principles were universally accepted at the Bandung Conference, and after the Poland-Hungary incident of 1956, the principles were applied to socialist states, as well. The original principle of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence was based on Lenin’s ideas on establishing coexistence between socialist and capitalist states. The other principles were the standard of relations among the sovereign states of Europe (Okabe 2001). However, some Third World countries showed a mixture of the characteristics of socialism and capitalism. Furthermore, China’s peaceful coexistence principles were established when the state was eager to join the international community under secure, peaceful circumstances. In particular, to become a member of the United Nations meant considering relations with Western powers imperative.

Peaceful coexistence, historical narrative 71 Thus, it did not make sense to only focus on Third World states. It is important to show the historical process of how China accepted the other four principles, which were already the international standard. Previously, I considered the situation regarding how a secure, peaceful international environment figured into the establishment of a state, the steps China took to join the United Nations as a World Power in place of Taiwan, and the Chinese diplomacy of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union around the time the nation was founded, in 1956 (Yoshida 2016). Recently, more research has focused on “sovereign independence” and “peace” in diplomacy, which differs from the previous emphasis on “committed to the Soviet,” regarding changes in China-Soviet relations around the late 1950s. A key trend in that research has been understanding the “Five Principles of Peaceful Existence” (Zhang 2012; Qi and Li 2014). This chapter will focus on China’s “commitment to the Soviet” as well as its efforts to respect “sovereign independence” with the aim of clarifying the historical process behind the peaceful coexistence that was established between the two. Considering the geopolitical circumstances coming out of U.S.-Soviet relations, this analysis will discuss the effect of China’s internal desire for a secure, peaceful international environment so that it could establish itself as a new nation. It will cover China’s foreign affairs with the Soviets, the Americans, the emerging independent nations of the Third World, as well as the United Kingdom, France, and Japan. This chapter is a first attempt to reconstruct the history that led to the establishment of the peaceful coexistence in Chinese diplomacy. It examines the factors and timeframe in which China showed a desire for peace during the development of the Cold War. Though peaceful coexistence is situated between “moving forward with the Soviet” and “sovereign independence,” at every step of the process, there were tactical and strategic moves in relations, policies, and rules. We will first look at the steps that led to it becoming a universal principle.

1 Peaceful coexistence from tactics to strategies 1.1 New China’s foreign policy and peaceful coexistence diplomacy The Chinese Communist Party began planning the founding of the nation as their civil war victory became clear. To sever the ties, historical pressure, and long-term humiliation of imperialism, it was thought that the relations with the Western powers would be difficult due to choosing the Soviet camp during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. Therefore, originally the plan was not to rush into forming relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Western powers and other newly independent Asian nations. However, with the founding of the nation approaching and the decision to join the Soviet camp in the Cold War between the East and West, Mao Zedong proclaimed the “People’s Democratic Autocracy” on June 30, 1949. There was a clear intention to follow the Soviet Union, but there was also a rush to establish relations with the Western powers

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and newly independent nations. The reason for this shift was that other nations’ recognition of China as an independent nation and the establishment of foreign relations would strengthen the power in the East and secure China’s position for joining the United Nations. Economic restoration and growth would fulfill the requirements to secure a position in the now stable international society. Moreover, China could avoid interference from the U.S. regarding Taiwan’s release. Under Stalin’s counsel and at China’s request, in the provisional constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the role of “Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,” the following was established regarding new China’s foreign policies. First, it was to be “committed to the Soviet.” In other words, existing between the international pacifism democracy camp and the aggressive imperialism camp would be impossible. China belongs to the former camp (Article 11). Second, it was to secure a peaceful international environment. In Chapter 7 under “Foreign Affairs,” it says, “The principle of the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy is to preserve the country’s independence, freedom, and sovereignty; to protect international peace and the friendly alliance between the citizens; to oppose the aggressive policies of imperialism and war” (Article 54). Third, under the precondition of fair reciprocity in relations between non-socialist nations and respect for territorial sovereignty, China’s foreign relations would be established through political negotiations (Article 56). Efforts would be made to establish economic relations to develop and restore trade relations with nations with which it would be difficult to establish political relations (Article 57). Even in the case of a nation with whom China did not have political relations, it could realize an economic relation. That would establish a basis on which future economic relations could transpire, particularly with the Western powers. In short, while the new Chinese foreign policy was “committed to the Soviet,” it had characteristics that differed from Lenin’s advocacy regarding the peaceful coexistence between socialism and capitalism, including relations with the Western powers and newly independent countries in Asia. However, these were very tactical, compared to later times. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Formation meeting on November 18, 1949, Zhou Enlai stated, “The foreign maneuvering is double-sided. On the one side, a coalition; on the other side, a fight (. . .) we are against imperialistic nations’ strategic actions, but it is possible to form a coalition, tactically on a personal level.” However, China recognized the “personal level” as imperialism. The “imperialistic nations” included the U.S., U.K., and France. On December 16 of the same year, at the 11th Policy Affairs Meeting, Zhou Enlai gave a report regarding foreign issues, in which he summarized China’s stance on the three imperialistic countries; the U.K. leaned toward China, France had a two-sided policy, and the U.S. still could not be recognized by China (Yoshida 2016). Before the outbreak of the Korean War, how did China regard the establishment of relations with non-socialist nations? Though in the West camp of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the U.K., it was thought, had rights to colonial Hong Kong and was recognized by the new China on January 6, 1950. The Chinese Communist Party recognized India, Burma, and Indonesia, believing they were under the influence of

Peaceful coexistence, historical narrative 73 imperialism at the time; they were later understood to be democratic nation-states. Then, China initiated a system of “diplomatic negotiations” initiated by China and diplomacy was established. Of those three countries, India became the model for “diplomatic negotiations” (Gao 2011; Pan 2008; Fan 2012; Miyake 2014). Diplomatic relations were characterized by surrounding countries approaching China. In the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, these countries’ stance of “peaceful neutrality” had a complicated structure; three of its articulations will be discussed here. First, the newly established Asian communist nation of China could not be ignored. Second, the newly established free or independent surrounding countries would try to strengthen their stances as independent nations. Third, from a geopolitical standpoint, the surrounding countries desired stable relations with China, just as China desired a stable surrounding environment in the postwar period.

1.2 The Korean War standstill and strategic peaceful coexistence diplomacy With the completion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in February of 1950, China emphasized establishment and recovery. However, on June 25, the Korean War broke out, resulting in the Cold War spreading throughout Asia. While one feature of the Asian Cold War was the advancement of a “hot war” in the Korean Peninsula by the U.S., the U.S. Seventh Fleet was also sent to Taiwan to declare neutrality. Then, the Treaty of Peace with Japan was executed and the Treaty of San Francisco was signed on the same day as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan was concluded. A strict anti-China “shut-down” strategy was established. It resulted in the China-Soviet alliance and the Japan-U.S. alliance becoming a competitive militaristic, political situation that shaped the Asian Cold War. In 1951, the Korean War came to a standstill. Around the same time, negotiations began for a truce and a peace treaty was proposed at the 6th General UN Meeting by the Soviet Union. For the peaceful resolution of the Korean War and Indonesian issues, the Soviet Union, U.S., U.K., France, and China were to join this treaty as the “Five Powers.” This made it possible to refer to peaceful coexistence with the Western powers. Then on October 23, at the First Nationwide Political Consultative Conference, Zhou Enlai stated in a report that the basis of the “Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference” of 1949 was to be able to “peacefully coexist” with countries that had differing politics. Under that premise, China should try to proactively and diplomatically establish trade relations with other countries. This form of peaceful coexistence resulted in strategies that affected the political resolution of the Korean War (Yoshida 2016). In 1952, Stalin and Malenkov stressed the necessity of maintaining an internal and external peaceful coexistence. Rejecting interventions, direct and indirect alike, from outside countries was part of the Cold War. Thus, Malenkov argued that peaceful coexistence indeed depended on a policy of “noninterference in internal affairs” (Ulam 1974). That policy is thought to have had a strong influence on China.

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Nonetheless, the “total war” fighting of the Korean War and the shift in China’s economic system from new democracy to socialism meant China’s policies decidedly continued on a path to socialism. Truce negotiations took place at the First Five Year Plan, and from 1953, China began establishing socialism. Peaceful coexistence became even more important to China. At that time, Stalin was not actively involved in the Korean War cessation agreements, due to his strong interest in the European state of affairs.

2 Toward a détente based on peaceful coexistence 2.1 Stalin’s death and the relaxation of strained relations After Stalin’s death in March 1953, Soviet foreign policies began to change. Molotov once again became the minister of foreign affairs in the new administration and declared the Soviet Union’s foreign policy to be peaceful coexistence, shifting it from a tactical to a strategic stance. In a telegraph to the World Peace Council on April 28, 1953, Zhou Enlai emphasized that though the change in the Soviet Union’s policies would have an effect, ensuring a peaceful international environment was necessary to establishing socialism in China and pursuing the “Five Powers” was of the utmost importance. In the telegraph, under the principle of peaceful coexistence between differing social systems and politics, China agreed to and supported the proposition of the “Five Powers” peaceful promise made by the Soviet Union and the World Citizen’s Peace Declaration (Yoshida 2016). The Korean Armistice Agreement was reached in July 1953. The Soviet Union, on September 28, requested two foreign affair meetings with the U.S., U.K., and France. One of the meetings was to discuss measures for relaxing international strained relations, and the other was to discuss issues regarding Germany. Both involved four countries in the foreign affairs discussions and excluded China. In preparation for these meetings, all the issues were discussed (Niu 2013a). On October 8, 1954, an agreement was announced for a foreign affairs meeting to be held in Zhou Enlai’s name. The expected topics for this meeting included enforcing the Korean War cessation and the U.S.’s acceptance of China’s request to join the United Nations. It was emphasized that China’s joining the UN was imperative because it needed to be part of the resolution of international issues around the world, especially the relaxation of strained relations in the Far East. The meeting also tabled concrete measures for resolving international disputes, via discussion and peaceful coexistence policies. The Four Country Foreign Ministers Meeting took place in Berlin from January 25 to February 28, 1954. The participants discussed Germany’s issues and agreed to hold the “Five Powers” Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva. The Four Country Foreign Ministers Meeting came first because the Soviet Union sought to prepare a path for China to participate in the “Five Powers” meeting (Niu 2013a). After the Berlin Meeting, Khrushchev declared the Soviet Union would adhere to the peaceful coexistence foreign policies and would follow

Peaceful coexistence, historical narrative 75 measures for resolving international disputes so as to relax strained international relations (Ulam 1974).

2.2 China’s “peaceful coexistence” before and after the Geneva Conference China proactively advanced diplomacy based on peaceful coexistence with India and Burma before and after the Geneva Conference. The goal, shared by the Soviet Union, was to maintain their presence in the “center group” of Southeast Asia, form alliances with the U.K. and France via those countries, and control the U.S. and oppose its organizing of an “invading group” in Southeast Asia. In December 1953, in negotiations with India, regarding trade and transportation in Tibet, Zhou Enlai presented the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” In April 1954, during a visit to India, Zhou Enlai announced that they had reached an agreement. In June, during a visit to Burma, Zhou Enlai stated the two countries were preparing to act on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Moreover, China, India, and Burma reached agreements to recognize the need to adopt policies that included many international relations rather than bilateral ones. After that, China’s diplomatic documents began regularly including the words “peaceful coexistence.” Until that moment, peaceful coexistence had consisted of policies encouraging the mutual respect of territories, fair reciprocity, mutual non-negation in internal affairs, and peaceful coexistence; then, the item of “mutual non-aggression” was added. To establish China as a nation, a peaceful environment needed to be created with the newly independent nations of Asia, and it was certainly China’s intention to dissipate the image of it as “warlike nation” that had come from its participation in the Korean War. At any rate, this is how the so-called Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence originally took shape. It is important to remember that by “peaceful coexistence” China meant coexisting with nations with differing political systems, followed by the four other items included in the principles. The Geneva Conference was new China’s first international platform; so, what position did China’s diplomacy receive? That the conference was even held materialized the notion of the “Five Powers” that the Soviet Union had been encouraging. However, the most prominent goal of the event was to make it possible for China to officially represent the Republic of China (Taiwan) at the United Nations. From 1950, the Soviet Union emphasized that China was a member of the Five Powers (牛 2013a, 2016). Even though the U.S. showed resistance at the conference, in the end, the Soviet Union’s insistence proved successful. In remarks on issues in Indochina, Zhou Enlai proposed peaceful coexistence without actually using that phrase. Instead, he used the words “peaceful treatment.” He did so for several reasons. First, the phrase “peaceful coexistence” comes from Communist Party terminology, and there were ideological differences and fear of a communist invasion in the Indochinese nations. Second, it was a historical consideration; before there was forceful Western imperialist

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colonization, there was a tributary system in place between China and the surrounding countries. Third, from the perspective of geopolitics, China did not want to present itself as a big threatening power to other Asian countries since it was a newly formed entity (Li 2013, 2016b; Zhai 2014). To advance the establishment of socialism, in September 1954, the Chinese Communist Party held its first National People’s Congress. It declared the cessation of wartime military and general administrative district systems and adopted the first constitution, which replaced the “joint platform.” Regarding foreign diplomacy, the preamble stated, “on the basis of the principles of fairness, reciprocity, sovereignty, and preservation of territory, relations will be made with other nations and we will grow.” In other words, China would evaluate and conduct foreign diplomacy according to the peaceful coexistence policy. It would make its motto, “We will strive to achieve the noble goal of world peace and human progress.” The Soviet Union agreed with China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Their agreement was confirmed in the declaration of collaboration between China and the Soviet Union, given by Khrushchev, after visiting China, in October 1954. After Stalin’s death, the desire to be equal with the Soviet Union became symbolic of the “rise” of Mao Zedong and a reality necessary to establishing socialism. Furthermore, since the new Soviet Union’s leadership was not yet solidified, it actively supported the establishment of socialism in China and measured progress in terms of their ability to show unity in the socialist camp. For China, the prospect of support for establishing industries was especially meaningful. Therefore, after Stalin’s death, China-Soviet interactions brought about the shared goal of a close relationship.

2.2 Movement toward peaceful coexistence from the Western powers The Geneva Conference, Four Country Foreign Ministers Meeting, and clarification of China’s peaceful coexistence diplomacy were indications of the relaxation of international strain. Thus, there began to be movements to establish and strengthen relations between China and the Western powers during and after the Geneva Conference. The U.K. had direct contact with China via Foreign Minister Eden at the Geneva Conference, which resulted in the establishment of a chargé d’affaires between the two countries. Then, following that Conference, China enjoyed a “public diplomacy” for a short time. China accepted visits from the U.K.’s Labour Party delegates in August and Japan’s Parliament and MEXT delegates in October 1954. At this time, China was anticipating the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the U.S., via mediation from the U.K. and Japan. Furthermore, regarding India, China requested a statement indicating it intended to experience peaceful coexistence with the U.S. and have a peaceful resolution with Taiwan. When France’s delegates visited, China made a request to establish a complete diplomatic relationship, which differed from that of the U.K. However, to reach that level of relationship, the exchange of culture and science would need to be strengthened and trade

Peaceful coexistence, historical narrative 77 relations would need to be advanced. It resulted in a transitional, “semiofficial” situation (Yoshida 2016).

3 The Bandung Conference and peaceful coexistence 3.1 The international peace united front and U.S.-China resistance China actively moved to establish diplomatic relations with the Western powers because of Mao Zedong’s support and Zhou Enlai’s awareness of the international situation and proposals for diplomatic policies. Zhou Enlai returned to China during a break from the Geneva Conference, and at the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, held on July 7, 1954, he emphasized the need for establishing diplomatic relations with the Western powers as well as Southeast Asian countries, because of the relaxation of international tensions. Upon receiving the report, Mao proposed a diplomatic policy called “international peace united front” in China. Mao stated, “In other words, we will enforce this policy internationally. If nations can unify on the grounds of peace and through establishing relations, we can protect our country, protect socialism, and work hard to establish the great socialist nation.” Mao’s opinion is noteworthy, given the next day there was the Political Consultative Conference, regarding U.S. relations based on this policy of “international peace united front.” Mao emphasized that the U.S., as a nation, should not be viewed as an enemy and the government should leave it alone as an isolated warlike nation; the ultimate goal of the “international peace united front” was to relax relations between China and the U.S. and establish a diplomatic relationship (Li 2016b; Chen 2016). However, China would not surrender on the issues surrounding “Taiwan’s liberation.” Based on the relaxation of international tension, discussed at the Geneva Conference, China released a leading article in the People’s Daily on July 23, directly after the completion of the Geneva Convention, stating they would certainly liberate Taiwan. In a telegram to Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong stated that the most important goal—more important than the Military Alliance Treaty Between the U.S. and the Republic of China (Taiwan)—was to raise awareness of the People’s Government and cautiously stimulate a passion to establish the nation, to use the conflict to strengthen the national defense, and to obtain tactical maritime operation capacity. On September 3, Mao ordered the People’s Liberation Army to open fire on Kinmen, which began the socalled First Taiwan Strait Crisis. In response to this attack, John Foster Dulles, the United States Secretary of State, held a press conference on November 16, declaring the U.S. would protect Taiwan with military force. On December 2, the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the U.S. and the Republic of China (Taiwan) was officially enforced. Then on September 8, the U.S. established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) which included the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. As a result, under the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. further “shut down” China.

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3.2 The origin of the Bandung Conference and the decision to invite China It was decided that the Bandung Conference, or the Asian African Conference, would be held twice at the Southeast Asian Summit. To discuss the Indochina situation, a five-country foreign minister meeting, called the Colombo Conference, would consist of India, Burma, Pakistan, Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka), and Indonesia and would be held in Colombo, the capital of Ceylon, from April 28 to May 2, 1954. At the conference, Indonesia’s Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo proposed that the following conferences should have a similar atmosphere and should include not only Asian nations but also African ones. This possibility was discussed in the final communiqué of the conference. On December 28–29, the decision to hold the Asian African Conference was discussed in Indonesia’s city of Bogor (Li 2016b). Because socialism can be very influential, quite different from the “liberalism” of the Western world, the U.S. was wary of China’s participation in these meetings with the “newly independent nations” of Asia and Africa. If China was invited to the conference, that would only heighten its international prestige. If the other participating countries added their support, the conference could become an opportune situation for China to form diplomatic relations with those countries. Due to that possibility, the U.S. tried to prevent China’s participation in the conference. The anti-China participation proposition, given by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali, at the Bogor Conference was directed by the U.S. However, Burma’s Prime Minister U Nu and India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru insisted that China participate in the conference, which caused multiple discussions. Eventually, the prime ministers decided that China would be invited, along with the other 29 independent nations, to participate in the conference in Indonesia during the last week of April 1955 (Li 2016b). China’s active acceptance to participate in the conference was reinforced by the “international peace united front” policy. However, the Soviet Union began changing their anti-Asia-Africa policies. Stalin was not completely aware of the civil liberation movements in Asia and Africa that immediately followed the end of World War II; nonetheless, he was aware of the fomenting of anti-imperialistic proletariat allied armies among national bourgeoisie around the world in the 1950s. Stalin died before the idea could reach fruition, and the new leader, Nikita Khrushchev, actively wanted to create policies that would spread the Soviet Union’s economic influence and militaristic power throughout Asia and Africa (Ulam 1974).

3.3 The Bandung Conference and China Compared to the Geneva Conference, China kept a cautious, low profile at the Bandung Conference. The goal was to prepare and earn the trust of the attending Asian and African countries while isolating the U.S. To achieve this aim, China

Peaceful coexistence, historical narrative 79 diligently presented a peaceful image. One measure of caution was to send a smaller representative group than what China had sent to the Geneva Conference. The “Schemes for Participating in the Asia-Africa Conference” (January 1955) is a very important document for observing China’s preparation maneuvers. Using the international peace united front, the aim was to develop concrete measures for demanding a relaxation of international tensions, isolating the antiChinese U.S., and establishing relations with Asia and African nations. The document recognized 1) “peaceful, neutral” countries: India, Burma, Indonesia, and Afghanistan; 2) close to “peaceful, neutral” countries: Egypt and Sudan; 3) close to opposing “peaceful, neutral” countries: Japan and South Vietnam; and 4) opposing “peaceful, neutral” countries: Thailand, the Philippines, and Turkey. China proposed to unify with group 1, to win over group 2, to influence group 3, and to isolate group 4. There were two other goals aimed at these groups, aside from these “schemes.” The ultimate one was to realize peaceful promises and/or peaceful declarations with the participating Asian and African countries. It was based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, anti-colonization, the demand for peace, and opposition to war. An officially announced report of promises was set as a minimum goal. For China to realize these goals at the Bandung Conference, Zhou Enlai instructed the representatives to follow three important diplomatic behaviors. First, they should oppose the anti-communist countries, which were secretly supported by the U.S. From the first days of the Conference, Iraq and Pakistan aggressively attacked and spoke about their opposition to communism. As a countermeasure, Zhou distributed a manuscript of “main remarks,” which was prepared beforehand as a sign of desiring to seek peace; at the Conference, he also performed the provisionally prepared “supplemental remarks.” Zhou’s remarks began by stating that China’s representatives “did not come to fight,” their purpose was to “seek the same and leave different,” and they had a “spirit of compromise”; they were met with praise by many of the participating countries. The second diplomatic behavior can be seen in the drafting process of the “Final Report of the Asian-African Conference.” One focus was colonial opposition. Amid aggressive debates, Zhou wrote to deny all Western and Eastern “colonies,” by which he meant nations with U.S. military alliances and Eastern European countries of the Soviet Union, respectively. Another edit was the replacement of the wording “peaceful coexistence” with “peaceful treatment” (Li 2016b). Burma’s Prime Minister U Nu proposed that the draft should be based on the spirit of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Charter of the United Nations. India’s Prime Minister Nehru felt the communist phrase “peaceful coexistence” was too aggressively opposed to India. As a result, Zhou proposed to change the wording from “peaceful coexistence” to “peaceful treatment.” The participating nations accepted the wording, because “peaceful treatment” falls within the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. Zhou had already realized

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this notion when he was dealing with the Southeast Asian countries at the Geneva Conference, at which the wording “peaceful treatment” was also used. The third diplomatic behavior was to accept Zhou’s seven-article principle proposal to guide all the Asian-African nations. That proposal included a mutual respect of territories and sovereignty; not threatening or attacking one another; non-interference with internal affairs; equal acceptance of all races; equality among all nations, regardless of size; citizens must enjoy freedom and rights to choose their own lifestyles and political affiliations; and not inflicting damage on one another. Even though the word “peaceful treatment” does not appear in the proposal, the concept is clearly reflected in the seven articles. This is undoubtedly due to Zhou’s thoughtful consideration. The Conference ultimately announced a “Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation,” which is also known as the “Bandung 10 Principles” or “10 Principles for Peace” (Li 2016b, 2016c; Yoshida 2016). Following the Bandung Conference, there was an upsurge in the establishment of diplomatic relations with “newly independent nations,” which differed from the diplomacy that centered on socialist nations, when China was being established and close relations were being formed between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 1956, achieving peaceful coexistence became even more important to the establishing of China as a nation. Even though the secret speech, in which Khrushchev criticized Stalin, at the Twentieth Soviet Union Communist Conference in February is very famous, Khrushchev also proposed in the central committee report a peaceful coexistence with the West. Khrushchev’s proposal for peaceful coexistence was made amid stressful relations between China and the U.S. On April 25, Mao Zedong proposed a policy that would construct its own form of socialism, independent from the Soviet Union, in the “Ten Great Relations.” It was reflected especially in foreign policies. While China emphasized advancing peaceful coexistence and relaxing international tensions, it also tried to uphold the motto, “Learn from the Soviet Union but do not blindly follow,” and meant “Learn from socialist nations outside of the Soviet Union” when it said, “Learn from every nation.” In the fall of that year, under the influence of Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin, the Poland Incident occurred. China criticized the Soviet Union’s militaristic intervention as having been overly focused on becoming a great power and emphasized the equality of socialistic nations and suggested spreading the peaceful coexistence principle to other socialist nations, to which the Soviet Union agreed. However, at the Hungary Incident, which directly followed, China recommended that the Soviet Union intervene with military power. The reason was that this incident reflected an opposition to the nature of socialist nations’ benefit (Ishii 2010; Shen 2013; Zhu 2013).

Conclusion The peaceful coexistence of China’s diplomacy was traditionally based on one of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, rather than the peaceful coexistence

Peaceful coexistence, historical narrative 81 Stalin recommended in the 1920s between capitalism and socialism. The other four ideas were standards that had been established among Europe’s sovereign nations. Even with an international standard of norms and logic, the historical environment shaped the process of acceptance. The receiving end may find that the characteristics are not the same as they were in the beginning. This chapter looked at the history of the notion of peaceful coexistence in China’s diplomacy from a commonly overlooked perspective. Some important points have been made in this process, which should be reviewed. First, beyond the traditional, Lenin-style peaceful coexistence, there exists another, different peaceful coexistence in China’s foreign policies. The former’s main purpose was for China to enter the United Nations and find a peaceful resolution to “Taiwan’s liberation.” The latter advocated “neutralism” in the face of the Cold War between the East and West and established relations with non-Asian “newly independent nations,” which could be socialist or capitalist. Second, the various notions of peaceful coexistence have been reflected concretely in history and they have progressed substantially. The founding of the nation was based on the political relations involved in mutually respecting territories and sovereignty and the financial relations of fair trade. It made it possible to build economic relations on previous political relations even under the difficult circumstances between the East and West. The article on non-interference with internal affairs was later added between two Asian countries. The purpose was to lessen newly independent nations’ concerns over the historical fact of China as a “big power,” once having had a tribute system in place with neighboring nations. Third, there was the important addition of the military-related mutual nonaggression policy, especially amid the opposing U.S.’s political and militaristic actions. It was an attempt to maintain a secure, peaceful environment in order to establish the nation, to win the support of the important, newly independent nations, like India, Burma, and Indonesia, and to rid the image of China as a “warlike country” due to their involvement in the Korean War. In 1954, China was able to realize mutual non-aggression with the three aforementioned countries. In summary, it took historic steps to concretely form the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and make it the main premise of China’s diplomacy. Peaceful coexistence was added before the other five principles. Even though the Lenin-style peaceful coexistence formed the foundation, this version had its own distinct Chinese characteristics. While advocating political socialism, it also introduced economic market mechanisms. That point is even clearer when compared to present-day Chinese socialism. In retrospect, immediately after the Chinese Civil War and during the reconstruction period, the “hot war” between the U.S. and the Korean Peninsula raged on. China stood on the frontlines of the Asian Cold War. Amid the fears of a nuclear war, why was it China who urgently advocated peace among the people of the world? It is a reminder that, as already touched on in this chapter, in 1952, Malenkov said that if nuclear war broke out, it would probably be the end of humankind. In the present day, a new world order and new Asian order are forming, and there are again the shared issues, among all people, of the progression and

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maintenance of peace. In the current situation, China, not only as a world power but also as a power in Asia, has a uniquely Chinese and universally valuable diplomacy of peaceful coexistence, which continues to be historically important.

Bibliography Borisov, O.B. and B.T. Koloskov, translated by Takizawa Ichirō 滝沢一郎. So-ren to Chūgoku: Yūkō to Tekitai no Kankei-shi Jō ソ連と中国――友好と敵対の関係史 上. Samairu Shuppan-kai サマイル出版会, 1977. Chen, Yangyong 陳揚勇. “Xin Zhongguo chengli hou Mao Zedong dui Zhanzhang yu Heping de Sikao yu Yingdi ‘Mao Zedong Nianpu (1949–1976)’ 新中国成立後 毛沢東対戦争与和平的思考与応対──『毛沢東年譜（1949−1976）』,” Dang de Xenxian 党的文献, no. 4, 2016. Fan, Hongwei 范宏偉. Heping Gongchu yu Zhongli Zhuyi: Lengzhan Shiqi Heping Gongchu de Chengjiu yu Jingyan 平和共処与中立主義──冷戦時期平和共処的成 就与経験, Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe 世界知識出版社, 2012. Gao, Guowei and Gai Guangjing 高国偉・高広景. “Zhong-Yin Jianjiao de Lishi Kaocha 中印建交的歴史考察,” Dangshi Yanyanjiu yu Jiaoyu 党史研究与教学, no. 3, 2011. Ishii, Akira 石井昭. “1950 Nendai no Chūgoku Gaikō: Kakumei, Shien, Heiwa Kyōzon, Hangarī Jiken 1950 年代の中国外交――革命・支援・平和共存・ハン ガリー事件,” Gendai Chūgoku Kenkyū 現代中国研究, no. 27, 2010. Li, Qianyu 李潜虞. “Shilun 1954 nian Zhong-Yin, Zhong-Mian Zongli de Hufang 試論1954年中印・中緬総理的互訪,” Nanyang Wenti yanjiu 南洋問題研究, no. 4, 2013. Li, Qianyu 李潜虞, trans. Yoshida Toyoko 吉田豊子. “Amerika no Ajia-Afrika Kaigi Seisaku ni kansuru Shiron アメリカのアジア・アフリカ会議政策に関する試論,” Shakai Shisutemu Kenkyū 社会システム研究, no. 32, 2016a. Li, Qianyu 李潜虞. “Guoji Heping Tongyi Zhanxian yu Zhongguo dui Wanlong Huiyi de zhengce 国際平和統一戦線与中国対万隆会議的政策,” Zhonggong Lishi Lilun Yanjiu 中共歴史理論研究, vol. 2, 2016b. Li, Qianyu 李潜虞. Cong Wanlong Dao Aerjier: Zhongguo yu Liuci Yafei GuojiHuiyi (1955–1965) 従万隆到阿爾及爾──中国与六次亜非国際会議 (1955–1665). Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe 世界知識出版社, 2016c Miyake, Yasuyuki 三宅康之. “Jianguo Chuqi Zhongguo yu Di-san Shijie Waijiao: Yi Yinni Jianjiao wei Shili 建国初期中国与第三世界外交：以和印尼建交外交為事 例,” in Xu Lan 徐藍 (ed.), Jinxiandai Guojiguanxi shi Yanjiu 近現代国際関係史 研究, vol. 6. Shjie Zhishi Chubanshe 世界知識出版社, 2014. Niu, Jun 牛軍. Lengzhan yu Xin Zhongguo Waijiao de Yuanqi 1949–1955 冷戦与新 中国外交的縁起 1949–1955. Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe 社会科学文献出 版社, 2013a. Niu, Jun 牛軍. “Lun Xin Zhongguo Waijiao de Xingcheng jiqi Zhuyao Tezheng論新 中国外交的形成及其主要特徴,” in Lengzhan yu Xin Zhongguo Waijiao Juece 冷戦 与新中国外交決策. Jiuzhou Chubanshe 九州出版社, 2013b. Niu, Jun. “Lun Zhongguo dui Yinduzhina Tingzhan Zhengce de Yuanqi yu Yanbian 論中国対印度支那停戦政策的縁起与演変,” in Li Danhui 李丹慧 (ed.), Guoji Lengzhanshi Yanjiu 国際冷戦史研究, No. 1. Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe 世界知識出 版社, 2016.

Peaceful coexistence, historical narrative 83 Okabe, Tatsumi 岡部達味. “Chūgoku Gaikō no 50 Nen,” in Okabe Tatsumi (ed.), Chūgoku o meguru Kokusai Kankyō 中国をめぐる国際環境. Iwanami Shoten 岩波 書店, 2001. Pan, Jingguo 潘敬国. “Zhong-Yin Jianjiao yu Xin Zhongguo Waijiao Jueze 中印建 交与新中国外交抉択,” Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu 当代中国史研究, vol. 15, no. 1, 2008. Qi, Pengfei and Li Baozhen 斉鵬飛・李葆珍. Xin Zhonguo Waijiao Jianshi 新中国外 交簡史. Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 2014. Shen, Zhihua 瀋志華. Mao Zedong, Sudalin yu Chaoxian Zhanzheng 毛沢東、斯大林 与朝鮮戦争. Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe 広東人民出版社, 2003. Shen, Zhihua 瀋志華. Wunai de Jueze: Lengzhan yu Zhong-Su Tongmeng de Yunming 無奈的抉択──冷戦与中蘇同盟的運命. Shehui Wenxian Chubanshe 社会科学文 献出版社, 2013. Ulam, Adam B., translated by Suzuki Hakushin 鈴木博信. Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–73 膨張と共存――ソヴエト 外交史. Samairu Shuppan-kai サマイル出版会, 1974. Westad, O.A., translated by Sasaki Yūta 佐々木雄太, Ogawa Hiroyuki 小川浩之, et al. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times グロ ーバル冷戦史――第三世界への介入と現代世界の形成. Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai 名古屋大学出版会, 2010. Xu, Youzhen 徐友珍. “Zouxiang Daibanji Guanxi: 1950–1954 nian Zhong-Ying Jianjiao Tanpan 歩向代弁級関係：1950–1954年的中英建交談判,” in Xu Lan 徐 藍 (ed.), Jin-Xandai Guoji Guanxishi Yanjiu 近現代国際関係史研究, 第6輯. Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe 世界知識出版社, 2014. Yoshida, Toyoko 吉田豊子. “Shixi Jianguo Chuqi Zhongguo de “Heping Gongchu” Zhengce yu Sulian 試析建国初期中国的“平和共処”政策与蘇聯,” in Xulan 徐蘭 (ed.), Jinxiandai Guoji Guanxishi Yanjiu 近現代国際関係史研究, vol. 9. Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe 世界知識出版社, 2016. Zhai, Qiang 翟強. “Zhou Enlai he Wanlong Huiyi 周恩来和万隆会議,” in Lengzhan Niandai de Weiji he Chongtu 冷戦年代的危機和衝突. Jiuzhou Chubanshe 九州出 版社, 2014. Zhang, Baijia 章百家. “Zhongguo Waijiao chengzhang Licheng zhong Guannian Bianqian: Cong Geming de, Minzu de Shijiao dao Fazhan de, Quanqiu de Shiye 中 国外交成長歴程中観念変遷──従革命的、民族的視角到発展的、全球的視野,” in Xu Zhenjiang and Wang Weihua 許振江・汪衛華 (ed.), Zuzhu, Lijie, Hezuo: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai Guanxi 60 nian 自主・理解・合作──中 華人民共和国対外関係60年. Dangdai Shijie Chubanshe 当代世界出版社, 2012. Zhu, Dandan 朱丹丹. “Geming Lixiang Zhuyi yu Shehui Zhuyi guojia Guanxi Xinyuanze 革命理想主义与社会主义国家関係新原则,” Waijiao Pinglun 外交评论, vol. 3, 2013.

Part II

Historical narratives of East Asia

5

The discourse on Asianism in postwar Japan TAKIGUCHI Tsuyoshi

Abstract: This chapter discusses Asianism, as posed by Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910– 1977), a doyen in Chinese literature and an influential literary critic in Japan. Seeking to explore the significance and actuality of his writings of this genre, this chapter intends to provide an overview of Japanese discourse on Asianism. Takeuchi’s intellectual engagement as a critic started before the outbreak of World War II and proceeded until the postwar era. In his various intellectual endeavors, the relationship between Japan and Asia in modern times had been a core issue concerning him. Takeuchi argued that both Japan and her Asian neighbors should appreciate their subjectivity and seek to establish a relationship from the perspective of Asianism. By doing so, Takeuchi criticized the Japanese government’s policy of modernization following the Western model. Takeuchi’s contemplations on Asianism were deeply associated with Japan’s public attitude towards war responsibility and Japan’s understanding of its past. In his view, focusing on the history of Japan’s relation to Asia since the Meiji-era could provide us prospects for the future. This practical concern urged him to confront the complicated relationship between “aggression” and “connection.” His analysis of Asianism bridges Japan’s intellectual sphere of the wartime and postwar period and, at the same time, functions as the starting point of almost all successive discussions on Asianism in Japan. Takeuchi’s writings on Asianism were primarily accomplished during the Cold War and, therefore, were coined by their contemporary political environment. Conversely, these writings—as open texts that continuously pose new questions—remain relevant and still attract readers. Indeed, Takeuchi’s view on Asianism had an apparent nationalistic tinge. Nevertheless, they cast new light on Transnational Asian regionalism and provide a critical viewpoint on the globalized modern “rootless nationalism.”

Introduction This chapter examines the discourse over Asianism in postwar Japan based on Takeuchi Yoshimi’s writings. As a trend of thought that persistently looks back to the past and inquires into Japan’s relation to Asia, Asianism constitutes a substantial aspect of postwar Japan’s historiography in terms of its historical entanglement with Asia. From 1990 onwards, debates over and reappraisals of Asianism began to mushroom in Japan. A quantitative investigation on how frequently the keyword “Asianism” appears in the database showed that in the 1980s only 26 articles

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were published on this topic. This figure reached 63 in the 1990s and 169 in the 2010s. From 2010 onwards, Asianism again seemed to lose popularity. The flourishing literature on Asianism in the two decades after 1990 was apparently influenced by several factors, including the end of the Cold War, the intensifying intercultural exchanges in the more globalized world, the Asian financial crisis, and the emergence of the discourse on a possible East Asian community. A qualitative investigation showed that research on Asianism has revealed a diversifying tendency. Leaving aside the link between Asianism and the East Asian community, Asianists from outside of Japan have started to catch the attention of scholars. Some researchers have tried to explore the concept of “Asia” and Japan’s perceptions of it in pre-modern times. Some applied humanistic methodologies such as orientalism and deconstructionism in interpreting Asia, and demonstrated how modernity can be overcome. Others reapproached Asianism from the viewpoint of networks or sought to reconstruct the entanglement between Asianism and “the Greater East Asian War” based on extensive empirical documents. It is remarkable that external factors from outside of Japan began to attract attention, and comparative approaches have been applied. Meanwhile, research on postwar Japan’s regional diplomacy became the order of the day. However, it seems paradoxical that Asianism blossomed exactly at the time that Asian countries achieved political and economic independence. Asianism was originally termed “pan-Asianism” and propagated “the solidarity of Asian nations under Japan’s leadership to resist against the Western expansion to the Asian continent” (Sakai 2005). As things change over time, Asianism constantly poses new questions. Therefore, it provides a research object that keeps responding to the time and context in which it is situated. Care has to be taken to avoid Asianism becoming just a passive perception of Asia; it also needs to play an active role in shaping Asia. By casting light on Takeuchi Yoshimi’s contemplations of Asianism, this chapter discusses Japan’s Asianism in the era of the Cold War and decolonialism. Takeuchi devoted himself to pondering the problem of Asianism from the prewar to postwar period. The influences he had on the entire discourse on Asianism made him a must-read author for anyone exploring Japan’s postwar Asianism.

1 Postwar Japan and Asia 1.1 The Cold War and nationalism in Asia The point of departure for postwar Asianism was movements toward decolonialization and “Asian nationalism.” After the end of World War II, the Cold War structure became the new world order. At the same time, as a new sign of geopolitical change, independence movements in Asia and Africa began to intensify. In the process of liberating the developing nations, voices of selfassertion rose as part of what was termed “Asian nationalism.” The presence of developing nations in the international arena was signified by the Afro-Asian Conference in 1955 (the Bandung Conference). As is well known, representatives from 29 countries, including the president of Indonesia, the premier of the People’s Republic of China, Zhou Enlai (周恩来), and the prime minister of

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Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, attended the Bandung Conference. Despite their ideological differences, the representatives cosigned a “10-point declaration” to promote world peace and cooperation. The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP)’s Hatoyama (鳩山) administration regarded the Bandung Conference as an opportunity for Japan’s “return to Asia.” However, when confronted with pressure from the U.S. to stay in the anti-communist camp, Japan chose to strengthen its economic ties with Asian countries while leaving political issues untouched (Miyagi 2008). Against the background of worldwide national liberation movements, the subsequent Japanese administrations adopted a diplomatic strategy termed “Asian regionalism diplomacy” that stressed Japan’s official developmental assistance to Asian countries (Hoshiro 2008). In particular, Kishi Nobusuke’s (岸信介) Southeast Asia diplomacy clearly revealed his own pan-Asianistic desires. Kishi certainly aimed at producing an equal bilateral relation between Japan and the U.S. by renewing the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; however, he also took a stab at strengthening Japan’s ties with Southeast Asian countries within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As far as Sino-Japanese relations were concerned, the Kishi administration, carefully taking its cue from the U.S. and Taiwan, kept politics and economics separate. Moreover, after Kishi, the following Japanese administrations continued employing the strategy of “isshin ittai” (一進一退; one step forward, one step back) in their negotiations with China. Takeuchi opposed the Japanese administrations’ Asian policy outlined earlier. As an expert in modern Chinese literature and a public intellectual who openly addressed the authorities’ policies, Takeuchi protested against Kishi’s renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and resigned from Tokyo Metropolitan University. What he advocated was the restoration of Japan’s diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

1.2 “National mission” and war responsibility 1.2.1 National mission Concern over their Asian neighbors among ordinary Japanese people, though relatively low in the immediate postwar period, has gradually risen. This partly resulted in a positive attitude toward Asian nationalism in the Japanese public sphere. In 1960, Iizuka Kōji (飯塚浩二) posed his overoptimistic view in Nationalism in Asia that the nationalism of Asian nations—different from that of Japan and European nations—comprised a certain kind of internationalism that contained lessons on how to restrain national egoism. So, how should such Asian nationalism be related to Japan? Takeuchi argued that the conjunction of Japan with Asian nationalism would only be possible when the relation between prewar Japan’s “national mission” and the expansionism of Japan’s total empire underwent a thorough re-examination. For instance, he wrote, Even if Japan now has to integrate itself into Asian nationalism, it will necessarily fail to forge a new pathway without re-examining its national mission

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Takiguchi Tsuyoshi in the past. But the Japanese’s sense of national mission was an indispensable component of the Japanese empire’s expansionism. Is it possible to draw a clear line between the two? If so, how? The sense of a national mission won’t be fulfilled without such a separation.1

Meanwhile, Takeuchi opposed those modernists in postwar Japan who advocated a complete break with Japan’s national tradition. However, on the other hand, he also criticized postwar Japan’s amnesia toward the “bloody nationalism” that prevailed in the prewar period.2 Takeuchi belonged to those nationalists who claimed the necessity of critically reapproaching the prewar and wartime experiences. It is noteworthy that he neither absolutized his own country’s nationalism nor committed to statism.

1.2.2 On war responsibility The debate over the double identity of “the Greater East Asian War” was a significant factor that inspired Takeuchi’s contemplation of Asianism. In Overcoming Modernity (1959), Takeuchi manifested the double identity of “the Greater East Asian War”: whilst Japan’s aggression against China was to be rightly defined as a war of conquest, its action toward the U.S. should be considered as a combat between imperialistic powers. This viewpoint had its origin in Takeuchi’s article “The Greater East Asian War and Our Resolve (Declaration)” (1942). Based on his understanding of the ambiguous character of the war, Takeuchi conceptualized his attitude toward war responsibility as follows: “The Japanese are surely responsible for their aggressive war, but as far as Japan’s confrontation with other imperialistic powers is concerned, we should not be blamed onesidedly.”3 It is noteworthy that Takeuchi’s notion of war responsibility essentially differed from Hayashi Fusao’s (林房雄), as seen in “Affirmation of the Greater East Asian War,” due to its explicit claim on the aggressiveness of war (in terms of Japan’s relation to Asian nations), which for Takeuchi resulted from modern Japan’s desire to “leave Asia.” Takeuchi’s notion of war responsibility included “civilization-monism,” which posed a Euro-centric worldview. According to Takeuchi, the judgments by the Tokyo tribune—with the exception of Radhabinod Pal’s claim that none of the accused were guilty—represented “civilization-monism” and needed to be revised from the viewpoints of Asian nations. He believed that Western “civilization” had fallen into hypocrisy due to its own colonialism. The independence movements of modern Asia thus needed to reveal a broader “understanding of civilization.” Takeuchi (1980–1982) deemed that the only loyal successor of the “classic view of civilization” was America, which “is principally on the opposite side of Asia.” As advocators of modernization theory such as Takeyama Michio (竹山道雄) correctly argued, postwar Japan transformed itself based on the Western European model. However, Takeuchi, accusing European civilization of hypocrisy, insisted that Japan should independently explore a value system that differed from that of Western Europe with the help of the “Asian principal” (アジアの原理). Such

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arguments partly constituted the intellectual context in which Takeuchi explored his views on Asianism, which required modern Japan to “proactively take responsibility for Asian nations.” He wrote, “If the Japanese could revive their tradition from the Meiji era onwards and again proactively feel their responsibility to their Asian neighbors,” the cardinal task in Asia’s geopolitics—Japan’s restoration of its diplomatic relations with China—might be possible.

2 Takeuchi Yoshimi’s view on Asianism The article “Japan’s Asianism” (日本のアジア主義, 1963), which best represents Takeuchi’s view on Asianism, was originally written as an annotated introduction to the collective volume Ajiashugi (筑摩書房, 1963), edited by Takeuchi himself.4 This source book, grounded in Takeuchi’s criteria for selection, was comprised of four sections: prototype (原型), disposition (心情), argumentation (論理), and renaissance (転生). Writings by representative thinkers were picked out for each section: I) Okakura Tenshin (岡倉天心) and Tarui Tōkichi (樽井藤 吉) (prototype); II) Miyazaki Tōten (宮崎滔天), Hirayama Shū (平山周), Sōma Kokkō (相馬黒光), and Fujimoto Naonori (藤本尚則) (disposition); III) Uchida Ryōhei (内田良平), Ōkawa Shūmei (大川周明), and Ozaki Hotsumi (尾崎秀実) (argumentation); and IV) Iizuka Kōji, Ishimoda Tadashi (石母田正), and Hotta Yoshie (堀田善衛) (renaissance). The following pages will explore Takeuchi’s introduction and his related views on Asianism with reference to selected articles from this volume.

2.1 Definition 2.1.1 Asianism as an inclination Takeuchi (1980–1982) first considered how to appropriately define Asianism. He wrote that Asianism existed as “an inclination surfacing as multifarious ideas resting on other thoughts rather than a coherent ideology that can be objectively defined.” Also, Takeuchi deemed Asianism as thoughts “without a traceable historical lineage” and launched his analysis on Asianism. By suggesting a definition in this fashion, Takeuchi broadened the scope of Asianism. For Asianism was usually considered to have strong relations to rightwing ideology and statism in modern Japan’s discourses. However, by shedding light on Asianism’s nature as an inclination that could gain meaning only by annexing it to other thoughts, Takeuchi disclosed the tie between Asianism and rightwing statism. For Takeuchi, the democrat Yoshino Sakuzō (吉野作造), the Marxist Ozaki Hotsumi, and even Ishibashi Tanzan (石橋湛山) were cast into the category of Asianists. By characterizing Asianism as an “inclination without a traceable historical lineage,” Takeuchi hit on the ambiguous aspect of Asianism that is otherwise difficult to capture. Therefore, his definition is still widely quoted to this day. In discourses that presume the diversity of Asianism, and in research on Asianism

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as a network or contemporary project, Takeuchi’s definition has been widely put into use (Shiraishi and Hau 2009).

2.1.2 Solidarity among Asian nations Even when he was trying to minimize any positive evaluation of Asianism, Takeuchi (1980–1982) did not hesitate to recognize “one single characteristic that prevails in all Asianists’ minds—the prospect of the solidarity of Asian countries (regardless of whether or not this solidarity is realized by means of expansion).” Takeuchi saw the core of Asianism as the desire for the solidarity of Asian nations and emphasized “regardless of whether or not by means of expansion.” Such a definition reveals his strategy of underlining Japan’s proactive involvement in Asia. Takeuchi’s equivocalness in not drawing a clear line between expansion and solidarity provoked severe criticism from historians. In response, Takeuchi argued that his starting point was to question the dichotomy of expansionism vs. solidarity, and to explore different types of possible interconnection between them. Moreover, according to his explanation, human beings are not “transparent creatures” that have learned to intelligibly distinguish intentions and means. Their “self-concepts and perceptions of others are in permanent flux” (1980–1982). Thus, history is nothing but a construction that can be shaped, disaggregated, and deconstructed.5 It was exactly the merging of expansionism and solidarity that characterized Asianism in prewar Japan.

2.1.3 “The Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” as the ideology of “leaving Asia” On the other hand, Takeuchi criticized the self-styled Asianists who were often seen in the era of “the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” and stated that their thoughts did not deserve to be treated as “thoughts.” His criticism of Hirano Yoshitarō’s (平野義太郎) The Historical Basis of Greater Pan-Asianism was particularly keen. According to Takeuchi’s criteria, the Asianism propagated by the Genyōsha (玄洋社) could justifiably be cast into his category of Asianism. This was because it, despite having a certain aspect of expansionism, scorned the buttering up of authorities. Following this criterion, the Asianism of politicians was not Takeuchi’s concern. Takeuchi saw from the very beginning that “the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere” contradicted Asianism. In his diary from the time when he was embarking on “Explanation of the View of Asianism,” Takeuchi wrote, From my viewpoint, I’d like to consider the “Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere” as an extreme case that made Asianism “un-Asianistic.” However, if that didn’t happen, Asianism would become nothing but a remnant from the past. How unbearable! But to make such an argument must be extremely difficult.6

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2.2 Emergence and divergence (the 1880s) 2.2.1 The precondition for the emergence of Asianism Takeuchi’s studies started from the Bakumatsu period, when the aspiration for overseas ventures flourished and the esprit of restoration blossomed. However, he refused to define those ideas as Asianism. For Takeuchi, the origin of Asianism lay in the intrinsic situation when the early Japanese nationalists in China sought to utilize and at the same time support the rising nationalism in China. For instance, the relation between Miyazaki Tōten, a democrat who longed to expand Japan’s influence abroad, and the army’s service agent Arao Sei (荒尾精) was clarified by Takeuchi (1980–1982) as an “artful combination and division between expansionism and cohesiveness.”

2.2.2 The Genyōsha (dark ocean society)/Kokuryūkai (black dragon society) The 1880s witnessed rising tension in Sino-Japanese relations due to the countries’ conflicting interests in the Korean Peninsula. Takeuchi distinguished this period as the turning point for Asianism. As representative intellectual events, Takeuchi named the Genyōsha’s (玄洋社) switch from defending people’s rights to supporting state power, which was demonstrated by the publication of Ōi Kentarō’s (大井 憲太郎) article “On the Cooperative Relation of Expansion and Domestic Renovation” and Tarui Tōkichi’s (樽井藤吉) On the Confederation of the Great East, as well as the appearance of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s (福沢諭吉) theory on “leaving Asia.” The Genyōsha was founded by Tōyama Mitsuru (頭山満) in Fukuoka in 1881, with Hiraoka Kōtarō (平岡浩太郎) as its first leader. During the 1880s, as the Korean problem was severely deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations, the Genyōsha shifted its direction from fighting for civil rights to fighting for state power. In 1901, the Kokuryūkai (黒龍会) was founded by Uchida Ryōhei (内田 良平), one of the Genyōsha’s key members, and was actively involved in promoting the Donghak religion (one of the main causes of the First Sino-Japanese War), supporting the authorities in the Russo-Japanese War, and paving the way for a Japan-Korea annexation. In these early Japanese radicals’ “alliance with the Korean peasants,” Takeuchi (1980–1982) discovered their self-giving “awareness of solidarity” and confirmed in it “a sort of Asianism sprout.” Both the Genyōsha and the Kokuryūkai, containing at the same time elements of expansionism and a feeling of belonging, moved toward serving state power and supporting expansionism, as Japanese imperialism was gradually reaching its climax.

2.2.3 On the Confederation of the Great East In the 1880s, Tarui Tōkichi’s On the Confederation of the Great East (1893) came into being. Tarui’s idea that Japan and Korea form an annexation as two equal powers to resist the aggression of European imperialism was celebrated by

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Takeuchi as an “unparalleled invention.” However, it ended up with an annexation pursued one-sidedly by Japan. Takeuchi (1980–1982) noted that these naïve Asianists failed to learn the lesson that the so-called equal coalition will necessarily end up with one-sided annexation and therefore can’t be absolved of their responsibility to learn from history. If they could do so, the founding of Manchukuo should be related to the independence of the Korean peninsula.7

2.2.4 On Leaving Asia Fukuzawa Yukichi’s On Leaving Asia (1885) came to life in the same circumstances. After his support of the Korean reformist Kim Ok-gyun (金玉均) met a dead end, Fukuzawa wrote this article, arguing against a coalition of Asian nations from a civilizational viewpoint. Takeuchi (1980–1982) deemed it significant to Asianism, since “if Fukuzawa’s value proposition did not have a counterpart, Asianism could not establish one hypothesis.” In fact, history would wait another ten years to witness such a principal of Asianism, when the principal of Asianism propagated by intellectuals such as Okakura Tenshin and Miyazaki Tōten took to the stage. Besides, Takeuchi (1980–1982) mentioned Hotta Yoshie’s (堀田善衞) article “The Japanese Intellectuals,” which positioned Nakae Chōmin’s (中江兆民) Dialogues politiques entre trois ivrognes (1887) in the postwar Japanese intellectual environment and discussed the fate of those thoughts that “made Asianism un-Asianistic, and Un-asianismus asianistic.” Thereby, Takeuchi sought to indicate the permanent existence of momentums that transformed Asianism into something it was not supposed to be.

2.3 Value, disposition, and argumentation 2.3.1 Okakura Tenshin As Asianists who opposed the civilization concept revealed in On Leaving Asia, Takeuchi named Okakura Tenshin and Miyazaki Tōten. In “The Ideals of the East” (1903), Tenshin presented another prototype of Asianism alongside that of Tarui’s On the Confederation of the Great East. According to Takeuchi, Tenshin’s renowned “Asia is one” thesis was a narration that romanticized Asia’s rehabilitation to its original manner as “ideal” after suffering an awful lot of scorn and insult. Tenshin, assuming beauty to be the ultimate value, was for Takeuchi an opponent of imperialism from the very beginning. In addition to his experiences in Europe and America, Tenshin had also traveled extensively in China and visited India several times. He strongly recognized the diversity of the reality in various Asian countries. For Tenshin, Asia differs essentially from Europe in its deepest being. It is exactly this differentness that forms Asia as a homogenous entity. If we relinquish our effort to explore the Asiatic essence, we will never be able to rescue civilization from hypocrisy.8

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In his separate engagement “Okakura Tenshin” (1962), Takeuchi made the argument that despite our awareness of the diversity of different Asian countries, we should consider Asia as nothing but one single entity since all Asian nations share the same universal value. Tenshin’s discovery of the trinity “Beauty=Spirit=Asia” as that universal value was warmly embraced by Takeuchi. Tenshin’s spiritual view on “Asia,” which presupposed Asia’s diversity, in a way echoed Takeuchi’s own ideology. Recent scholarship usually assesses Tenshin’s Asianism together with that of Ōkawa Shūmei (大川周明), evaluating their thoughts as a “proactive reception and reinterpretation of the orientalism that emerged in Europe,” and deems them as the starting point of Takeuchi’s endeavor (Shiode 2011). However, we should not forget Takeuchi’s indication that Tenshin’s theory did not apply in the age of imperialism. For example, after pointing out the affinity between Tenshin and Tagore, the apostle of beauty, Takeuchi wrote, “Though they were successfully involved in the independence movement, they failed to appreciate the masses. That is why their thoughts were regrettably denounced as the ideology of expansionism.”9 For Takeuchi, Tenshin’s limitation was due to his ignorance of the masses.

2.3.2 Miyazaki Tōten Takeuchi greatly appreciated the continuity of the “longing” for a coalition among Asian countries. For him, Miyazaki Tōten, who devoted himself to Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary movements, was, through his autobiography My ThirtyThree Year’s Dream, a representative of such longing. In the section Shinjō (disposition), Takeuchi also included a couple of other Japanese supporters of Sun Yat-sen, such as Yamada Yoshimasa (山田良政), one of Miyazaki’s fellow travelers, and Sōma Aizō (相馬愛蔵) and his wife Kokkō (黒光), who aided the Indian revolutionary Rash Behari Bose in fighting for his nation’s independence.

2.3.3 The split between emotion and rationality: Kita Ikki and Ōkawa Shūmei After having reviewed Asianism as a “value” and “disposition,” Takeuchi (1980– 1982) posed the following question: Why, in the twentieth century, had “Asianism run in the direction of Genyōsha=Kokuryūkai?” He identified Kita Ikki (北一 輝) and Ōgawa Shūmei as “a new type of Asianist in the age of imperialism,” and asked how their theories became subordinated to the ideology of expansionism and resulted in a split between emotion and rational thinking. After the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution, Kita traveled to China as a member of the Kokuryūkai to assist with radical movements led by Sun Yat-sen’s opponent Song Jiaoren (宋教仁). The misfortune of his revolutionary activities in China brought his interest back to the reform and reorganization of Japan. Afterwards, in the February 26 Incident, Kita was arrested and executed for his association with the rebels. Ōkawa Shūmei, on the other hand, had founded nationalistic political clubs in the Taishō era, together with Kita and Mitsukawa Kametarō (満川亀太郎). Ōkawa also participated in coup d’état attempts by the

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Imperial Japanese Army, such as the March Incident (1931) and the Imperial Colors Incident. After World War II, Ōkawa was arrested as a class-A war criminal, but remained unprosecuted due to his mental distortions. Takeuchi seems to have paid extraordinary attention to Ōkawa and selected two articles by him, including his memoir, for this section. However, a thorough study on Ōkawa is not the main purpose of the present study.

2.4 The recurrence of the Meiji spirit in the Shōwa era 2.4.1 Ozaki Hotsumi Takeuchi asked why—with the exception of Ozaki Hotsumi—the discourse over Asianism had been dominated by rightwing intellectuals from the late Taishō era onwards. After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Ozaki was affiliated with Konoe Fumimaro’s (近衛文麿) political think-tank Shōwa Kenkyūkai (昭和研究会). Together with Miki Kiyoshi (三木清), Rōyama Masamichi (蝋山 政道), and others, Ozaki participated in the controversy over the Toa Kyōdōtai (東亜協同体) (East Asian Cooperative Body). Ozaki built up his reputation as a renowned China expert and later became associated with Richard Sorge’s spyring. Takeuchi deemed Ozaki’s ideology on the East Asian Cooperative Body as a leftist approach to Asianism. Even up to today, Ozaki’s approach still occasionally attracts scholars and is sometimes regarded as an attempt at reform during wartime (Ishii et al. 2010).

2.4.2 The watershed: Uchida Ryōhei and Kōtoku Shūsui For Takeuchi, people’s ignorance of leftwing nationalism had ultimately resulted in Asianism’s conspirator role in Japan’s expansionism. Therefore, he returned to the time point when leftwing and rightwing Asianism diverged: the Meiji era. Takeuchi mentioned the close friendship between the rightist Tōyama Mitsuru and Nakae Chōmin, the transmitter of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work, as well as their common view on Japan’s East Asian policy. However, their successors’ generation began to reveal a problem. For instance, Tōyama’s successor Uchida Ryōhei propagated a Russo-Japanese War based on civilization theory. In contrast, Nakae Chōmin’s adherent Kōtoku Shūsui (幸徳秋水) neglected the aspect of nationalism in his arguments against war. In Takeuchi’s opinion, it was Asianism that should pass a verdict on the hypocritical theory of civilization that sought to legitimize the Russo-Japanese War. However, as Takeuchi had observed in the case of Uchida and Kōtoku, without demonstrating such a standpoint, Asianism was unconsciously absorbed into the ideology of expansionism.

2.4.3 “Permanent revolution” and Saigō Takamori At this point, Takeuchi (1980–1982) returned to his evaluation on the Genyōsha and wrote, “Early nationalism was necessarily involved in expansionism. Without

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such a historical condition, Japan would never have entered the course of modernization. The question was, how was it related to the extension of ordinary people’s freedom?” Then, he referred to the Genyōsha’s conversion to the side of state power, and indicated that concealing internal social problems by expanding toward the outside was the repeated trick played until the end of World War II. According to Takeuchi, it was the weakness of the ordinary people that resulted in the earlier-mentioned situation. He believed that the cardinal question of present-day Asianism was whether or not we could find a momentum in history that might have prevented us from doing so. Before finishing his arguments along the main track, Takeuchi mentioned the “dual character” of Saigō Takamori (西郷隆盛), who resigned from his government position due to his view concerning the imminent invasion of Korea. Whilst quoting Ōkawa Shūmei and Uchimura Kanzō (内村鑑三), Takeuchi argued that Saigō was seeking a second revolution within the Meiji Restoration. If we “overlook Saigō’s ‘token for a permanent revolution,’ we can hardly give Asianism a definition” (Takeuchi 1980–1982). Here lies, according to Takeuchi’s announcement at the end of his article, his own standpoint.

2.5 The problem of Ōkawa Shūmei 2.5.1 Nationalism and Asianism For the later generation’s reinterpretation of Asianism, Takeuchi’s writings from 1963 provided several influential allusions, such as his definition of Asianism as a cluster of thoughts without a concrete genealogy, his binding of Fukuzawa’s appellation of “leaving Asia” and Okakura Tenshin’s ideal of “Asia is one,” as well as his identification of the prospect of Asia’s solidarity as an emotional desire. What puzzles us most is that Takeuchi returned to the Meiji era to search for the concept of “permanent revolution” before he began his contemplation of “the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.” According to Takeuchi, the Meiji intellectuals’ desire for the solidarity of Asian countries contained the legitimation of the weak’s resistance against the powerful, and the self-conception that Japan was one among the weak countries. That differed from the viewpoint of Takeuchi, a Meiji Asianism essentially different from the Pan-Asianism that emerged decades later.10 On the other hand, Takeuchi saw in Saigô the prospect for a permanent revolution in Asia. Some scholars considered this viewpoint the result of Takeuchi’s equalization of nationalism and Asianism, which deserves a more deliberate interpretation that goes beyond the scope of this chapter.

2.5.2 Solidarity and invasion The overlapping of nationalism and Asianism is a crucial problem, for it leads to the following question: How do we theoretically distinguish solidarity from invasion? In Takeuchi’s study on Asianism, searching for Japan’s tradition of proactively getting involved in Asia’s fate played a significant role. For Takeuchi, the

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trend of “proactively thinking over (the fate of Asia)” in prewar Japan was of great importance, for expansionism also revealed a “distorted aspect of the feeling of belonging” and was therefore much healthier than ignorance and disregard.11 It goes without saying that Takeuchi’s original intention to adjudicate Japan’s aggression toward its neighbors from an Asiatic point of view was thereby becoming obscure. Matsumoto Ken’ichi (2000) argued that two factors in Takeuchi’s thoughts—his positioning of “the Greater East Asian War” as an attempt to “leave Asia” and the nationalistic tinge to his Asianism—had blurred his starting point. However, years later, when Takeuchi reviewed the thoughts of his instructor Ōkawa Shūmei, he seemed to realize his own problem. Takeuchi claimed that in Ōkawa’s mind hid a critical aspect of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

2.5.3 On Ōkawa Shūmei In his lecture entitled “Ōkawa Shūmei’s Studies on Asia” (1970, in Takeuchi Yoshimi Zenshū, vol. VIII), Takeuchi for the first time made a serious examination of Ōkawa. This article started with Takeuchi’s recollection of his encounter with Ōkawa at the Institute for Islamic Studies during the war, and ended with the conclusion that although Ōkawa represented a certain type of Japanese fascism, his endeavor in Islamic studies deserved to be positively re-evaluated. Takeuchi (1980–1982) summarized Ōkawa’s view on Asia as follows: Asia had given birth to “precious values such as internal freedom and spiritual latitude.” Nonetheless, due to its negligence in realizing such values in reality, Asia fell behind Europe. Therefore, Asia had to “seek the power to awaken itself from its negligence.” Takeuchi believed that Ōkawa had adopted the idea from Okakura Tenshin that internal freedom was an Asiatic characteristic and Asia had to strengthen itself to realize this ideal. However, on the other hand, Takeuchi saw the weakness of Ōkawa’s view on China as the lack of awareness of the suppressed masses that made up the bottom layer of the Chinese revolution. This was because Ōkawa’s starting point was an idealized China based on its Confucian ethics. Takeuchi indicated that Ōkawa’s critiques of China’s reality were heavily based on this idealized image of China. Even so, Takeuchi wrote that Ōkawa did not unconditionally support Japan’s expansion into Asia. According to Takeuchi’s explanation, up to the point when Ōkawa was actively engaged in the Mukden Incident and the nationalist reform movements, he was committed to Japan’s subjectivity under the condition that it could act as a moral subject. That the Mukden Incident finally caused the escalation of the Sino-Japanese conflict tortured Ōkawa, since he did not see any contradictions between China’s national rejuvenation and Japan’s moral duties. In the end, Ōkawa misunderstood the reality, but he did not lose his logical coherence. During the Pacific War, when Ōkawa ranked among the popular writers of the day, he had already lost his creativity as a thinker. After this article was published, later studies on Ōkawa Shūmei more or less fell under the influence of Takeuchi’s interpretation. For instance, Matsumoto Ken’ichi (2004) considered Ōkawa’s interest in Islamic studies as a token for overcoming nationalism in its modernistic sense. Moreover, Usuki (2010) shared

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Takeuchi’s questioning and took up Ōkawa as one of the founding fathers of Japan’s Islamic studies.

2.6 Ishibashi Tanzan, the Asianist Takeuchi had never found any Asianist who unconditionally opposed “the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” until he found the aspect of Ishibashi Tanzan as an Asianist in the beginning of the 1970s. After evaluating Ishibashi’s criticism of the Twenty-One Demands and his efforts as prime minister in improving Sino-Japanese relations, Takeuchi (1980–1982) identified Ishibashi as a liberalist Asianist and wrote “for years I’ve been looking for this type of liberalist Asianist and I’ve almost given up hope of finding one.” After the publication of Ishibashi’s oeuvre, Takeuchi was greatly surprised to discover that he belonged to this type. Takeuchi openly spoke of his prejudice toward liberalists. Also, he was afraid that among his Japanese intellectual contemporaries—no matter in the leftist camp or the rightist—there was nobody who could understand those “open nationalists” equipped with a deep insight into Chinese nationalism.12 This indicates that Takeuchi’s study of Ishibashi came very close to the theory of open nationalism.

3 Asianism and the transnational turn in international relations theory 3.1 Asianism as an international system If history was—according to Takeuchi’s assertion—a construction that could be resolved, seeking various methods of decomposition was our duty. For example, against Takeuchi’s insistence on the affinity between Asianism based on a feeling of belonging and pan-Asianism, Hatsuse Ryūhei (初瀬龍平) isolated the two. He made a comparison between the former and the logic of “leaving Asia” that represented the double structure of the European state system (Hatsuse 1982). The European state system defined European nations as equal players in its balance-of-power system and refused to recognize any nation-state’s sovereign right outside of Europe. The non-European world was either colonies or spheres of influence. As a representative example of prewar Japan’s view toward Asia, Fukuzawa’s theory of “leaving Asia” actually sought to integrate this system of double standards. On the other side, Asianism based on a feeling of belonging, as Miyazaki Tōten, Ishibashi Tanzan, and other intellectuals had demonstrated, offered aid to the suppressed Chinese and Korean nations and tried to regard them as sovereign states in the international system. In contrast, pan-Asianism as propagated by the Kokuryūkai sought to establish a Japanese version of SinoBarbarian dichotomy and negate the international system posed by Europe. “The Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” was a mixture of the “leaving Asia” philosophy and pan-Asianism. By bringing the approach of the international system into the discussion on Asianism, the desire for solidarity was clearly separated from expansionism. Such an approach was itself the result of the changing of time.

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3.2 The end of the Cold War and the transformation of Asia After the second half of the 1960s, a new world order that essentially differed from the historical background of Asianism began to emerge. Miyagi Taizō (宮城 大蔵) summarized various rival theories on Asia’s independence and geopolitical order into four categories: theories of the Cold War (pro- or contra-communism), theories of revolution (from “revolutionary diplomacy” to the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”), theories of decolonization (on the influences of former colonial powers)，and theories of development (on Asia’s development and economic growth). According to Miyagi (2008), after the “10 years of transformation” (1965–1975), the first three paradigms gradually faded away. Asia took its leave from the “age of politics” and embraced the “age of economics.” The changing situation has brought studies on Asia (or on Asianism) to a new stage. In his post-Takeuchi writings on the prospects of Asianism in the 1980s, Uemura Kimio (上村希美雄) argued that, on the one hand, the “neglected Asia” began to come into sight due to the conflictual reality and economic growth. However, on the other hand, along with the boom in Southeast Asian studies in the 1970s, “grassroots Asianism” presented a new direction. Uemura (1986) sought to position “the last Asianism” of Takeuchi’s “Asian studies” within this changing trend.

3.3 Toward transnational relations The 1980s was an era that cast doubt on the legitimacy of the modern nationstate and showed attention to non-state actors. Regionalism that lay between state and general organizations, local public entities that were subordinate to the state and NGOs, began to gain more attention. In the postwar political reality, the European Union gradually took shape, whilst ASEAN launched in Asia. Asianism was reinterpreted according to the new framework. For instance, Miwa Kimitada (1986) distinguished Asianism in the sense of “overcoming nationalism and statism” from the Asianism that emerged from Japan’s modern nationalism. Based on this separation, he further discussed the ambiguity of the expansionism and the rhetoric of liberation embedded in the ideology of “the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.” Hatsuse (1989) discussed postwar Asianism in an article published in 1989. After the end of World War II, Asian countries achieved national independence one after another. The prewar rhetoric that postulated the liberation of Asia from the hands of European powers lost its actuality. However, the bond between the Asian people that was reborn after the end of the war still exists. First, one source of momentum for the solidarity of Asia was the grassroots’ ideas and actions for the “co-existence of Asian nations” that were promoted by NGOs and were based on an appreciation for universal human rights. Second, the remnants of pan-Asianism had partly remained. The attitude of the leaders in Japan’s financial circles that were engaged in Official Development Assistance (ODA) activities revealed this pan-Asianist view. Hatsuse also mentioned “cultural Asianism” on the level of pop culture, such as the circulation of pop songs and manga in Asian countries.

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Following on in this fashion, in the 1980s, the discussion on Asianism underwent some changes. From the intellectual viewpoint, this echoed the trend of relativizing the modern nation-state. On the real political level, it frequently shed critical light on the relationship between Asian countries and Japan, a rising economic power. As early as the 1960s, Takeuchi spoke of the “state as a fiction” and “the illusion that there exists a single nation in Japan.”13 In his contemplation of nationalism, Takeuchi did not liken the nation to the state. We could argue with good reason that the seeds for Asianism’s new interpretations were already embedded in Takeuchi’s mind.

Conclusion The questioning of the role that Japan ought to play in the era of the Cold War and the trend of independence movements after having fought a war with a “double character” constituted the background against which Takeuchi’s concept of Asianism came into being. Against such a background, Takeuchi called for a renaissance in the Asiatic style in contrast to Western cultural values and the Aufhebung of “Asia” as a universally valid value through reforms. In his article “Asia as a Method,” Takeuchi explained his concept of treating Asia as a method as follows: The Orient must re-embrace the West, it must change the West itself in order to realize the latter’s outstanding cultural values on a greater scale. Such a rollback of culture or values would create universality. The Orient must change the West in order to further elevate those universal values that the West itself produced.14 According to Matsumoto Ken’ichi (2005), such a conception resembles the logic of the dialectic that modernism (thesis) and nationalism (synthesis) are reconciled to form a synthesis. This logic itself potentially has an “Asiatic characteristic.” Asianism asks if there exists a certain regional system or value (civilization) that can overcome the dichotomy of the specific (nationalism and tradition) vs. the universal (globalism and modern/Western values). Therefore, Asianism is the ideas and movements that were repeatedly repositioning Asia’s own past and traditions. On the other hand, Takeuchi criticized the idealization of Asia. For instance, his criticism of Okakura Tenshin’s “failure to discover the masses” and Ōkawa’s weakness in “ignoring the longings of the suppressed folk” is significant. In his article “The Japanese’s View on Asia,” Takeuchi wrote, “To understand the Other by empathizing with their hardness and sorrow is in line with emotional Asianism in our tradition since the Meiji era.” Also, he asked if “we can revive it in a new form.”15 This questioning revealed his understanding of the principle of “the feeling of belonging.” Indeed, the historical background to Takeuchi’s activities, which includes prewar, wartime, and postwar Japan, differs greatly from our contemporary age.

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However, Takeuchi’s paradigm shift from “bloody nationalism” to “open nationalism” might be read as a criticism of the current transnational regional system and the “rootless nationalism” of our Internet society (Tsurumi et al. 2007). As open texts, Takeuchi’s writings on Asianism are constantly posing new questions in accordance with the changes of time.

Notes 1 Takeuchi Yoshimi. “Ajia ni okeru Shinpo to Handō アジアにおける進歩と反動” (1957). In Takeuchi, Nihon to Ajia 日本とアジア, Chikuma Shobō, 1993. The following quotations, unless otherwise specified, are all from Nihon to Ajia. 2 Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Kindai-shugi to Minzoku no Mondai 近代主義と民族の問 題” (1951). In Takeuchi Yoshimi Zenshū 竹内好全集, vol. VII, Chikuma Shobō, 1981. 3 Takeuchi Yoshimi. “Sensō Sekinin ni tsuite 戦争責任について” (1960). 4 The original title of this article was “Explanation of the View of Asianism” (解 説・アジア主義の展望). 5 Takeuchi Yoshimi. “Gakusha no Sekinin ni tsuite 学者の責任について” (1966). 6 Takeuchi Yoshimi. “Tenkei-ki 転形期” (1963). In Takeuchi Yoshimi Zenshū, vol. VI. 7 Takeuchi Yoshimi. “Okakura Tenshin 岡倉天心” (1962). 8 Takeuchi Yoshimi. “Ajia no Naka no Nihon アジアの中の日本” (1974). In Takeuchi Yoshimi Zenshū, vol. V. 9 Takeuchi Yoshimi. “Nihonjin no Ajia-kan 日本人のアジア観” (1964). In Takeuchi Yoshimi Zenshū, vol. V. 10 Takeuchi Yoshimi. “Waga Ishibashi Hakken わが石橋発見” (1971). In Takeuchi Yoshimi Zenshū, vol. VIII. 11 Takeuchi Yoshimi. “Sengo wo dou Hyōka suru ka 戦後をどう評価するか” (1965). In Jōkyōteki: Takeuchi Yoshimi Taidan-shū, Gōdō Shuppan, 1970. 12 For the complete translation, see What Is Modernity. Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi. Edited, translated, and with an introduction by Richard F. Calichman, Columbia University Press, 2005. 13 Takeuchi Yoshimi. “Nihonjin no Ajia-kan 日本人のアジア観” (1964).

Bibliography Hatsuse, Ryūhei 初瀬龍平. “Ajia Shugi to Kokusai Shisutemu: Miyazaki Tōten no Baai アジア主義と国際システム――宮崎滔天の場合,” in Abe Hitozumi 安倍博純 et al. (ed.), Nihon no Kindaika wo Tō 日本の近代化を問う. Keisō Shobō 勁草書房, 1982. Hatsuse, Ryūhei. “Ajia Shugi no Tenkan: Genjiten アジア主義の転換――現時点,” Kobe Hōgaku Zasshi 神戸法学雑誌, vol. 39, no. 1, 1989. Hoshiro, Hiroyuki 保城広至. Ajia Chiikishugi Gaikō no Yukue: 1952–1966 アジア地 域主義外交の行方1952–1966. Bokutakusha 木鐸社, 2008. Inoue, Toshikazu 井上寿一. Ajia Shugi o Toinaosu アジア主義を問い直す. Chikuma Shobō 筑摩書房, 2006. Ishii, Tomoaki 石井知章, Yonetani Masafumi 米谷匡史, and Kobayashi Hideo 小林 英夫, ed. 1930 Nendai no Ajia Shakairon: “Toa Kyōdōtai”-ron o Chūshin to suru Gensetsu Kūkan no Shosō 1930年代のアジア社会論――「東亜協同体」論を中心 とする言説空間の諸相. Shakai Hyōron-sha 社会評論社, 2010. Matsumoto, Ken’ichi 松本健一. Takeuchi Yoshimi “Nihon no Ajia Shugi” Seidoku 竹 内好「日本のアジア主義」精読. Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 2000.

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Matsumoto, Ken’ichi. Ōkawa Shūmei 大川周明. Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 2004. Matsumoto, Ken’ichi. Takeuchi Yoshimi-ron 竹内好論. Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 2005. Matsuura, Masataka 松浦正孝. “Dai Toa Sensō” wa Naze Okita no ka: Han-aijia Shugi no Seiji Keizai-shi 大東亜戦争はなぜ起きたのか――汎アジア主義の政治 経済史. Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai 名古屋大学出版会, 2010. Matsuura, Masataka 松浦正孝 et al., ed. Ajiashugi wa Nani o Kataru no ka: Kioku, Kenryoku, Kachi アジア主義は何を語るのか――記憶、権力、価値. Mineruva Shobō ミネルヴァ書房, 2013. Miwa, Kimitada 三輪公忠. Nihon 1945-nen no Shiten 日本・1945年の視点. University of Tokyo Press 東京大学出版会, 1986. Miyagi, Taizō 宮城大蔵. “Kaiyō Kokka” Nihon no Sengo-shi 「海洋国家」日本の戦 後史. Chikuma Shobō 筑摩書房, 2008. Nakajima, Takeshi 中島岳志. Ajia Shugi: Sono Saki no Kindai e アジア主義――その 先の近代へ. Ushio Shuppansha 潮出版社, 2014. Sakai, Tetsuya 酒井哲哉. “Ajia Shugi アジア主義,” in Inoguchi Takashi 猪口孝 et al. (ed.), Kokusai Seiji Jiten 国際政治事典. Kōbundō 弘文堂, 2005. Shiode, Hiroyuki 塩出浩之. Okakura Tenshin to Ōkawa Shūmei: “Ajia” o Kangaeta Chishikijin-tachi 岡倉天心と大川周明――「アジア」を考えた知識人たち. Yamakawa Shuppansha 山川出版社, 2011. Shiraishi, Takashi 白石 and Caroline S. Hau. “‘Ajia Shugi’ no Jubaku o Koete: Higashi Ajia Kyōdōtai Saikō 「アジア主義」の呪縛を超えて――東アジア共同体再考,” Chūo Kōron 中央公論, vol. 124, no. 3, 2009. Sun, Ge 孙歌. Ajia o Kataru koto no Jirenma: Chi no Kyōdō Kūkan o Motomete アジ アを語ることのジレンマ――知の共同空間を求めて. Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 2002. Saaler, Sven and J. Victor Koschmann, ed. Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders. Routledge, 2007. Saaler, Sven and Christopher W.A. Szpilman. Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, vols. 1–2. Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. Takeuchi, Yoshimi 竹内好, ed. Ajia Shugi アジア主義. Chikuma Shobō 筑摩書房, 1963. Takeuchi, Yoshimi 竹内好. Nihon to Ajia 日本とアジア. Chikuma Shobō 筑摩書房, 1993. Takeuchi, Yoshimi 竹内好. Jyōkyōteki: Takeuchi Yoshimi Taidan-shū 状況的――竹内 好対談集. Gōdō Shuppan, 1970. Takeuchi, Yoshimi 竹内好. Takeuchi Yoshimi Zenshū 竹内好全集, vols. 1–17. Chikuma Shobō 筑摩書房, 1980–1982. Tsurumi, Shunsuke 鶴見俊輔 et al. Mukon na Nashonarizumu o Koete: Takeuchi Yoshimi o Saikō suru 無根なナションナリズムを超えて――竹内好を再考する. Nihon Hyōronsha 日本評論社, 2007 Uemura, Kimio 上村希美雄. “Sengoshi no Naka no Ajia Shugi: Takeuchi Yoshimi o Chūshin ni 戦後史の中のアジア主義――竹内好を中心に,” Rekishigaku Kenkyū 歴史学研究, no. 561, 1986. Usuki, Akira 臼杵陽. Ōkawa Shūmei—Isuraamu to Tennō no Hazama de 大川周 明――イスラームと天皇のはざまで. Seidosha 青土社, 2010. Yonetani, Masafumi 米谷匡史. Ajia/Nihon アジア／日本. Iwanami Shoten 岩波書 店, 2006.

6

The perception toward China among Japanese communities in Dalian after World War I A case study of the magazine Manmō MATSUSHIGE Mitsuhiro

Abstract: This chapter will introduce a diverse “narrative” of the development of a critical point of leased land, namely Dalian in northeastern China, and how these events in a post-World War I situation led to the Manchurian Incident and the justification of the establishment of the “Manchurian Nation.” Examples will be given from the general journal of Manmō, the most widely read journal in Dalian at the time, to concretely introduce the depth of the invalid opposition in these various “narratives.” At the same time, even though there was an indivisible relation between all of the core elements, there were intense contradictions and oppositions, which sometimes violently collided within mutual relations and acceptance. In present-day international society, the invitation and establishment of these relations cast an “inquiry” of what practice or methodology was needed to make this into a reality, and how we can view the potential of contradictions and oppositions in order to avoid this type of violent collision in the future.

Introduction As previous research has regularly clarified, World War I (1914–1918) brought about many changes to the international order, especially in the broadly influential concepts of “ethnic self-determination” and the “illegalization of war” in the international community; great powers and colonies, or great powers and subordinate areas and the content of these relations were changed. Japan was no exception in the East Asian check of spreading power following the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War into World War I. Including the importance of overseas war efforts and the “expansion of national destiny,” the strong awareness to expand Japan abroad was stressfully positioned, and the country had to rethink its position regarding typical outward expansion and international order.1 In Japan’s colonies and territories, this situation became a serious problem. That is to say that Japan’s overseas conceptions were being practiced and proven daily in these colonies and territories.2 Under such circumstances, a territory of Japan, Dalian, was very important, irrespective of war results abroad. However, as an “open port” it broadly opened and stabilized trade in the international community by accepting profits, and became a large connecting city of Japan’s national worth to the international

Perception of China in Dalian after WWI

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order which, as previously stated, furthered the direct seriousness of Japan’s problems after World War I. At the same time, it must be remembered that the Japanese community in Dalian and the new discussions of international order conceptions began a new dialog about Japan-China relations. The population of Chinese in Dalian surpassed the Japanese after World War I (Figure 6.1; the decrease of population in 1931 is thought to be due to the Manchurian Incident). These Chinese were not submissively obedient to the Japanese; they ignored the Japanese workers and relied on their own abilities to grow, and aggressively cut ties with Japanese production. They became a tough rival to the Japanese and it encouraged the establishment of Chinese production in Dalian (Tsukase 2004). How these tough Chinese workers unified their own governance becomes an important and practicable topic among the Japanese in their stable progression. Japanese society in Dalian was in a situation in which there was a need to pursue a reconstruction and an inseparable Japan-China relationship in the new international order. This study attempts to confirm the path of the new Japan-China relationship construct in Japanese society in Dalian leading up to the Manchurian Incident, by introducing the Japan-China relations shown in Manmō’s articles.3 This study will also show how historical changes were made in realistic relations in Dalian, where “pain” was real, and Japan-China relations during the so-called painless war, in which Japan had very little burden to bear from World War I.

1 Publishing of Manmō and articles regarding new Japan-China relations 1.1 Introduction to Manmō First, I would like to provide a bibliographical overview of Manmō, the source of the primary historical materials discussed in this study.4 Manmō was edited and published by the Manmō Bunka Kyōkai (満蒙文化協 会).5 It was established in 1920, and changed to Nicchu Bunka Kyōkai (日中文化 協会) in 1926 and Manmō Bunka Kyōkai (満蒙文化協会) in 1932; until the 78th issue in October 1926, it was known as Manmō Bunka Kyōkai, and until the 143rd issue in March 1932 it was Manshū Bunka Kyōkai (満洲文化協会). After 1932, it was known as Manmō Sha (満蒙社); however, even when the name was the same, there was no continuation from previous editing or publishing organizations. According to the first article of the organization, the aim was to form an organization with the centralization of Japanese in Dalian and domestically in Japan, including all of the northeastern territories and any other territories. The goal was to “invest in cultural expansion in Manchuria and eastern Russia with the need of establishing facilities in order to introduce general production” (Volume 1, Book 1, Sept. 1920, p. 114). By the end of 1924, there were 2,308 people (1,924 Japanese, 384 Chinese: Volume 6, Book 7, May 1925, p. 4) in Dalian, and this number continued to grow until the Manchurian Incident. As can be seen in Figure 6.2, there was a heavy financial reliance on the South

Japanese Korean

Chinese

Foreign

(domestic) 1906

8,248

-

10,601

23

1907

16,688

-

14,582

54

1908

21,593

7

17,561

47

1909

22,877

24

17,882

61

1910

26,001

21

19,755

89

1911

29,752

23

21,032

96

1912

32,862

23

22,908

95

1913

35,416

23

36,963

82

1914

37,278

34

36,018

94

1915

34,563

39

42,466

116

1916

36,378

36

46,570

69

1917

38,455

73

51,762

95

1918

41,592

149

55,401

89

1919

45,370

216

62,564

78

1920

50,778

240

94,832

118

1921

51,624

245

79,087

150

1922

53,921

315

87,759

161

1923

55,139

345

89,946

254

1924

71,512

602

110,744

343

1925

75,486

591

121,473

359

1926

77,441

684

123,598

346

1927

80,056

823

135,801

400

1928

84,273

896

137,296

382

1929

88,793

1,071

168,445

484

1930

96,434

1,158

183,431

618

1931

99,172

1,137

172,286

561

Figure 6.1 Dalian city population movement (unit: people) Source: Made by author via 『大連市史』, 1936, pp. 15–16

Description

Revenue

Amount (Yen)

Subsidy*

32,000,000

Membership revenue

15,180,540

Advertising revenue

6,805,710

Miscellaneous revenue

503,300

Received interest

228,980

Book sales

8,616,540

Total

63,335,070

Wages

16,817,860

Bonuses

2,555,000

Travel expenses

320,200

Repair costs

103,140

Rent

296,770

Telephone fees

112,900

Electricity fees

64,670

Water fees

18,220

Shipping/transport fees

1,452,500

Wear and tear expenses

1,300,350

Expenses Book purchase expenses Printing fees Financial incentives

887,920 27,988,140 2,171,750

Meeting costs

187,700

Entertaining expenses

932,265

Miscellaneous expenses

2,134,540

Advertising expenses

4,569,580

Retirement fund

――

Anticipated expenses

――

Carry over balance Total

1,421,565 63,335,070

*A large amount of this subsidy was from the Kantō Agency. Figure 6.2 Manmō Bunka Kyōkai (満蒙文化協会) 1921 year-end profits Source: Made by author via Manmō, Book 26, 1922, p. 75

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Manshū Railway Company (南満洲鉄道株式会社) and Kantō Agency (関東庁), which made the organization act like a semigovernmental corporation. Some of the activities included printing, public lectures, surveys, Japan-China relation projects, education, and so forth in order to spread culture; moreover, a monthly journal was printed, Tōhoku Bunka Geppō (東北文化月報, first issue published in 1922),6 and the Chinese Girls Handicraft School (中華女子手芸学校, est. 1926) was established. These establishments included Japanese as well as Chinese in their activities. Manmō’s inaugural printing was in September 1920 in Dalian.7 Manmō, a Japanese monthly periodical, was packaged as a general magazine (総合雑誌) with 41 topics which included general issues, politics, the economy, education, religion, geohistory, literature, and so forth. It also contained academic articles, essays, and photographs.8 Furthermore, many of the editors of this magazine were employees of the Railway or temporary employees, many of whom were affiliated with the Railway or agency. This implies that ideas from the Railway and other agencies in Dalian society were strongly reflected in the magazine. There were 33,700 copies of the magazine printed by the end of 1924 (Volume 6, Book 7, May 1925, p. 5), which leads to the praise of Manmō Bunka Kyōkai as an alphamale of printing alongside Mantetsu Chōsa-bu (満鉄調査部; Okamura 2012: 19).

1.2 Grasping the new Japan-China relationship structure In 1920, the inaugural issue of Manmō was published, directly following the end of World War I. There was an argument regarding the expectation of the new international order in the opening words. Therefore, after the meetings, in order for world peace and for the spread of happiness among mankind, it was decided to reduce arms. Also, at this facility in Manchuria, our sincere instructions and expansion will be for peace in Japan and China, while, at the same time, for the great mission of our country. Here, toward the motto, with more courage, we will bring the blessing of world culture to mankind. (“Daisannen no Haru o Mukaete 第三の春を迎へて” Book 17, January 1922, p. 7) With the revolution of recent colonial ideas following the end of the European war, a great change has come through the realization of democracy and the high tide of internationalism. Therefore, just as the dream of all countries’ colonial policies under the ideal of militarism, the extreme destruction of these tendencies is true. To see the absolute reality of the international life in which self-determined ethnic ideals and racism are abolished, to respect the autonomy of a nation is not such a remote feeling, we should delight in the progress of international policies which have recognized the level of independent equality. (“Manmō no Kaihatsu to Kokusaiteki kyōchō no Hitsuyō: Honshi Sōritsu Mansanshūnen o Mukauru ni Saishite 満蒙の開発と国 際的協調の必要：本誌創立満三週年を迎ふるに際して” Book 38, September 1923, pp. 2–3)

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Here, we can see the change from a classic central military hard-power to a socalled soft-power in the shape of “culture” and “civilization” (Iwanaga Yūkichi, “Manmō Bunka Kyōkai ni Nozomu 満蒙文化協会に望む” Volume 1, Book 1, September 1920, p. 15), and the strong expectation for a shift to a new international order construct in the shape of a more respectful “internationalism,” “democracy,” and “independent equality”; this desire can also be confrmed in the movement goals of the Japanese located in northeastern China. Moreover, as can be seen in another article, there is a desire for international cooperation (“Kokusai Yūgito Kokusai Jiyū 国際友誼と国際自由” Issue 20, April 1922, p. 7). Through what kind of methodology could this new Japan-China relationship in northeastern China be concretely constructed? In Manmō there is a repeating plea which was based on the survey of the truth of the construction of this relationship. The pressing mission unified and organized is in the introductory survey of the truth of Manmō culture. Exactly, the truth of the introductory survey. Just as the err of the layman, by means of the spreading of false reports and truths, we must take a stand, it is expected to stand only on the vivid truths. (“Manmō Bunka Kyōkai Setsuritsu Shui Sho 満蒙文化協会設立趣意書” Volume 1, Book 1, September 1920, p. 11) The perspective of the possibility of using objectivity and scientifc data in the expansion of northeastern China through an organization has been regularly drawn on from Gotō Shinpei’s paper.9 However, it needs to be understood that the new Japan-China relationship was predicated on the awareness of “harmonious growth of both parties” and with backing from an objective or scientifc survey. This objective or scientifc awareness reveals the view of the possibility of building a harmonious relationship for both parties by solving any misunderstandings. As will be stated later, this may have been an overly optimistic view in the diffcult reality of Japan-China relations; however, on the pages of Manmō, in various publicized survey results by the Railway Company, and the diverse reports in the magazine, this optimistic view was refected in the contents.

2 Japanese awareness of Chinese and Chinese awareness of Japanese 2.1 Japanese sense of mission and anti-Chinese awareness The last section confirmed the possible view of a structure built on objective or scientific truth and new Japan-China relations after World War I as seen on the pages of Manmō. In this context, how was the existence of the Chinese framed? This is the question that will be considered in this section. The basis on which the Japanese placed the Chinese was based on the logic that their culture was given to them through the direction of the more advanced Japanese. Gao (2008) points this out while quoting from Manmō; however, it is

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important to understand the self-justification of the Japanese at that time and to recognize the redundancy. When an advanced nation works to further undeveloped nations, a new civilization must be brought to life that cannot be built by the hands of the natives. By simply saying that area has been materially opened up, it only serves to show that one country is more prosperous than another and this does not mean that their eyes are more open than the other. (. . .) Just because Japan has given priority to Manchuria and Mongolia does not mean that only the natives have prospered, to not recognize that the Chinese have built a civilization we cannot justify being in Manchuria. In other words, because Japan has given priority to Manchuria, this gives proof that world culture has progressed and that we are entitled to having priority. This means that there is a need to disburse mankind’s civilization. (Iwanaga Yūkichi “Manshū Bunka Kyōkai ni Nozomu 満洲文化協会に望む” Volume 1, Book 1, September 1920, p. 15) From this passage it can be understood that the Japanese had guaranteed their priority in northeastern China through their cultural superiority. With this premise, the Chinese were directed to be “Chinese with excellent discernment” and “idealistic Chinese citizens,” while the Japanese spoke of their noble mission (Ishikawa Tetsuo 石川鐵雄 “Manmō ni okeru Bunka Seisaku no Teishō 満蒙に 於ける文化政策の提唱” Volume 1, Book 2, October 1920, p. 11). At the same time, it can be confrmed that this optimistic view and the aforementioned contradicting objective or scientifc proof was closely tied to the Chinese living in the area and their being convinced of Japanese superiority. What kind of actual existence were the Chinese under the guidance of the Japanese? Manmō reveals that there are two patterns. First, the threat of China breaking the newly built order can be confirmed. The threats of China’s internal and external conditions are deep in the serious pessimism of the young men that hold onto archaic and deteriorating ways of the old country. Thus, this pessimism continues to guide the new ethnical enlightenment. This can be seen as nothing more than a struggle in the old power and the fight in which the fresh young men are working to unify the north and south. Thus, they are struggling to establish a new country. Present day China, standing in the midst of a rebuilding journey! Your uncertainty is the same as the uncertainty shared by all mankind. (“Gendai Shina no Fuan 現代支那の不安” Book 21, May 1922, p. 7) Here it can be seen that there was a so-called counterpart image of the Chinese compared to the Japanese which had a mission that was related to the new JapanChina relationship structure. Moreover, the pages of Manmō repetitively showed

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articles that anticipated the continuing movement of the new order, which was to defeat the Chinese government. However, at the same time, there were many articles in Manmō that reconfrmed the classic Chinese image. The Chinese, which have habits deeply rooted in their suspicious ways, differ from us Japanese which are undertaking the opening of this new project to which we both have a passion. But it is clear that there is a doubt in their eyes to the especially important social safety and a dislike of the Japanese to which there are many dull factors. (. . .) If, even once, they are trusted, it will not invite a warm and lasting relation. (. . .) The Chinese strive to maintain the old ways and build ways to prevent new order which comes in from an outside source. In regards to the individualistic nature of working for oneself, the Chinese work very hard to have no relations with society which is one of their biggest downfalls. Also, while at work, many Chinese smoke cigarettes and become involved in idle talk which greatly decreases their productivity. Thus, there are many examples in which the lower classes are made to work every day until around 10 pm. There is a great need to train them how to treat one another with equality, which they do not have now, in this current uncivilized working order. (. . .) It is easy for them to fall in line with this system; therefore, it should be beneficial to prioritize this system as a method of work. The system is from the Qing system which gives permission to foreigners for the benefit of bringing strength from outside joint ventures while limiting foreigners establishing companies. If the goal was to restrict foreign companies, there is no need to question the performance. However, the Chinese rarely wish to use this system for average business. It is not rare for businesses to end in failure because of the vague expansions of employees and complicated spending. (. . .) It is especially difficult for a foreigner to plan business with the Chinese government because there are no clear regulations regarding private benefit and there exists damages occurring from bribery in business with the government; therefore, this becomes a very sad truth regarding the Chinese nation. (Manchurian Railways Survey Report “Manshū ni Okeru Gōben Jigyō no Genjō 満洲に於ける合辦事業の現状” Book 28, December 1922, pp. 11–12) Although this is a long quote, it clearly shows the Japanese awareness regarding the Chinese from the perspective of joint business ventures between Japan and China. Furthermore, the image portrayed of the Chinese is that of having shallow law-abiding personalities while prospering with suspiciousness and self-serving attitudes. This is the image that comes from how the Chinese were trained. From these two images of the Chinese presented as truth comes a diffcult to eradicate stereotype while losing an understanding of the relationship structure as a whole. However, without the error of the individual truth of the surface of the “present,” there is a point at which “realization” is achieved. The optimistic view of starting a new Japan-China relationship with objective or

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scientifc truth was dealt a blow due to the widespread confusion and the obstacle that was encountered regarding the speed of the Chinese awareness. Here, the problem that will be addressed is how the Japanese at the time re-created a unifed image of the Chinese as an ambivalent group, and how this logic and practice were needed.

2.2 Perception toward Japan/Japanese in China How did the Chinese perceive the Japanese and Japan? In the Chinese society of Dalian at the time, with a centralization of many immigrant workers from North China, a Chamber of Dalian Public Commerce and a Chamber of Shōkōshi Commerce were formed, and a social layer was burdened primarily by central political activities by the residents of the Chinese community. Moreover, regarding the new Japan-China relations built on the predicate of “culture” and “civilization,” the Chinese Youth of Dalian Group (大連中華青年会, formed in 1920), which was formed primarily in the aforementioned political activities of the Chinese community, worked under the ideal of social contributions with “noble grace” and through “morals, knowledge, physical, group, beauty” education; they created a Chinese general magazine called Shin Bunka (新文化) in February of 1923 to positively influence further activities. The aim here is to confirm how the Chinese thought of the Japanese via the pages of Manmō. However, it must be remembered that these articles and narratives of the Chinese were recorded and edited by Japanese editors. Therefore, it is necessary to reconstruct the truth in these testimonies given by the Chinese regarding their awareness of the Japanese. However, this reconstruction will need to be performed at another time in order to stay within the parameters of this chapter. On the pages of Manmō, the awareness of the Japanese by the Chinese can be seen in descriptions of their spirit of self-denial and willingness to work (Wang Chaoyou王朝佑 “Nicchū Ryōkokujin no Shūheki 日中両国人の習癖” Book 104, December 1928, p. 80) and the smug line: “Those from China are stupid” (Yu Chengqi 宇澄棲 “Kajin K-shi no Manshū Inshō-ki: Dekimatsuroku 華人Ｋ 氏の満洲印象記 滌沫録” Book 73, May 1926, p. 106). The majority of articles followed the latter tone. Just seeing the high collar Japanese in Shanghai riding their rickshaws reminds me of Westerners. They just ride without looking at the price. Also, they continuously make chopping sounds with their canes. The rickshaw man thinks to himself “these people don’t have any feeling even though they are from This and That Japan-China Friendly Company” which just makes him so angry. But, as we know, they just tolerate it because of the high wages. The money from the Westerners is not even comparable to the dirty money from the Japanese. (. . .) The Japanese in Manchuria are ruthless with their national prestige, and the Japanese in southern China are followers of the West. The former are violent like wolves, and the latter are stingy like foxes. Ruthless national prestige and Western followers,

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wolf-like violence and fox-like stinginess, this is by no means Japan’s attitude toward China. (Yu Chengqi 宇澄棲 “Kajin K-shi no Manshū Inshō-ki: Dekimatsuroku 華人Ｋ氏の満洲印象記 滌沫録” Book 76, August 1926, p. 96) There was clearly despair toward the authoritarian and stingy Japanese attitudes. A large gap was felt between the “culture” and “civilization” that was promoted on Japan’s side and the actual image of the Japanese; along with the distrust of the Japanese, both the Japanese and Chinese were on the same page with differing objectives (Itō Ihachi, 伊藤伊八 “Shina Jogakusei no Mita Nihon 支那女学 生の観た日本” Book 55, January 1925, pp. 71–79). Under these circumstances, the new Japan-China relationship ideal gave rise to the beginning of Chinese nationalism.

3 Setbacks in new Japan-China relations and the answer to Chinese nationalism 3.1 Continuation of cooperation Following the campaign of “Retrieve Lushun and Dalian” in 1923,10 Chinese nationalism began to actualize in the northeastern regions of China. In particular, the movement against the establishment of Maozishan affiliation in April 1927 justified the movement of the ideology of a new international order that was shown after World War I; this violently revealed the contradictions between the ideology in Japan and the actuality in China (Matsushige 1997). In addition, tensions began to increase between Japan and China with the long recession of Japanese companies and the cessation of negotiations regarding anti-Japanese policies under the Zhang Xueliang 張学良 administration (1929–1931). This brought about many trials for the aforementioned new Japan-China relationship ideals. Regarding this situation on the pages of Manmō, the classic methodologies were repeated with renewed emphasis. The importance of scientific methodology was espoused in the “Kagaku no Manshū’ Tokushū 『科学の満洲』特輯” special (Book 125, September 1930), the wider understanding of China/Chinese and customary knowledge was put forth in the “Densetsu no Shina Tokushū 伝説の 支那特輯” special (Book 69, January 1926), and regarding the aforementioned “new China” that symbolized the existence of Chinese women, there was the “Tokushū ‘Shina no Onna’ 特輯『支那の女』” special (Book 105, January 1929). Along with the idea to reconfirm and re-emphasize the classical ways, there were new surveys that were deepened to further understand Chinese society and the Chinese (“Kantōgen: Shina no Atarashii Mikata 巻頭言：支那の新しい観 方” Book 55, January 1925, p. 3); emphasis was also placed on the need to work toward removing the awareness that was blocking the understanding of both Japan and China.11

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Matsushige Mitsuhiro There are many Japanese that have a strong disdain for the Chinese buried deep in their hearts. The misunderstanding which has come from this distasteful influence in anti-Chinese ideologies prevents an understanding of Japan’s true intentions. It is well known that both the Beijing and Tokyo governments have not properly represented themselves. Especially from parties that only wish to self-profit by taking an opposition toward the traditional international relations between Japan and China. We must not forget that many citizens are carrying the burden from corrupt governments, corrupt parties, and unsatisfactory militaries. Both Japanese and Chinese citizens need to better understand and form an alliance. We should clearly and openly be aware of the need for interactions. Thus, there is a need for a thorough plan to further the rooting of a new culture in East Asia. (“Pekin no Kokkai to Tōkyō no Kokkai 北京の国会と東京の国会” Book 31, December 1927, p. 1) The actual interactions between neighboring Japan and China need to shift from aimlessly coloring each other to a personal relation that will move humanity. (“Saimatsu no Kotoba 歳末の言葉” Book 92, December 1927, p. 1) Awake!/For true peace in Asia/Thus to correct the meaning of human existence/Within all feelings, the distaste of war is being taught./Everything is a humorous masked play./Now, throw the mask away! The raw power of us humans will finally overcome boarders, real relations, harmony, and the fruit of friendship will be raised up. (“Ikugō no Ji 育号の辞” Book 100, August 1928, p. 1; “/” represent new lines)

It can be seen here that there was a shift in direction in the discussion relative to nationalism as seen politically in the people of both Japan and China and the statement “I want to be a true Cosmopolitan” (“Bikushō 微苦笑” Book 65, September 1925, p. 1). However, even with these statements, there never was an actual prescribed plan of how to shift the discussion to nationalism. The problem here was as follows: Could this ideology and its direction have become a barrier for the pressing waves of Chinese nationalism? More specifically, could there have been a continuance in the cooperation toward a new Japan-China relationship construct with the changing face of Chinese nationalism at the forefront, forcing the Japanese who had profits and abilities to further expand in northeastern China? In reality, the need for cooperation and the lack of a solution was regularly seen on the pages of Manmō (Ueda Kyōsuke 上田恭輔 “Omohideru mama no Ki 思ひ出るまま の記” Book 119, March 1930, pp. 47–48; “Kobō Jūnen 顧望十年” Book 125, September 1930, p. 1; Sue Sono 恵須園 “Iwayuru Nihon no Bunkateki Shinryaku ni tsuite 所謂日本の文化的侵略に就て” Book 137, September 1931, p. 1; Tamura Yōzō 田村羊三 “Manmō ni okeru Kagaku Bunmei no Sōzō 満蒙に於け

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る科学文明の創造” Book 137, September 1931, p. 6). With no end in sight for the relaxation of the Japan-China relationship situation, this began the process leading to the Manchurian Incident.

3.2 Re-justification of “Manchurian interest” and tension in Japan-China relations The process leading to the situation discussed in the last section made its debut on the pages of Manmō, along with the abandonment of the new international order ideology following World War I, where there were articles opposing Chinese nationalism to justify rebuilding for the sake of personal interest. There are many fallacies included in internationalism. Even though international life has a nice ideal which can be understood, the realization of that day cannot be predicted. Therefore, the actuality of internationalism will not be accepted and Japan will argue, without any need for consideration, that there is a special interest in Manchuria. However, in the past there were imperial international relations under the pretext of “justice” and “cooperation” and the voiced opinion for open doors (30 January 1909, Japan-England alliance), or special interest with international understanding (2 November 1917, Ishii Lancing Agreement) etc. Even though there were topics with complicated issues, it was only to expose the incompetence of the politicians. Not only will the aforementioned problems arise in internationalism with Manchuria, if Japan is able to enter Manchuria there will be immutable rights and the right to express international interactions fairly. (. . .) Therefore, Japan’s special interest with Manchuria will be built up right now and will not participate in the nonsensical theory of internationalism. It is time to further our work into Manchuria. (Ueda Toshio 植田捷雄 “Kokusaishugi to Manmō 国際主義と満蒙,” Book 111, July 1929, pp. 20–24) The famous international law academic Ueda Toshio wrote this article and the interest in understanding from an international law perspective of “Manchuria Special Interest” which does not end at the academic level because many Japanese in Manchuria at the time understood these ideas (“Kantōgen: Chūgoku no tame no Shinjitsu 巻頭言：中国のための真実” Book 26, October 1922, p. 7). There are many academic papers and articles in Manmō which point to this and they do not only return to anti-Japanese policies during the Zhāng Xuéliáng administration and the predicament of Japan- and China-based companies. These articles also point to the reliance on the government and lack of effort for technological or administrative revolutions in Japan and this realization on Japan’s side (Kawai Masakatsu 河合正勝 “Manmō Shokumin Mondai to Nicchuu Ryōkokujin Seikatu Teido to no Kankei 満蒙植民問題と日中両国人生活程度との関係” Book 77, June 1930, pp. 56–57; Nanba Katsuji 難波勝治 “Mantetsu Ensen ni okeru Shokuminteki Sisetsu ni tsuite 満鉄沿線に於ける植民的施設に就て” Book

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122, June 1930, p. 24). However, in a lengthy recession, many of the smaller Japanese-focused companies and Japanese society in Dalian had a larger interest in furthering the economy, more so than the new Japan-China relationship construct, by involving the Japanese government (including military factions) to solve the problems (Yanagisawa 1999). In the midst of problems such as the Japanese population and food issues, potential threats from the Soviet Union, impaired treaties in China (international treaties), and so forth (Tamura Kenjirō 田村謙治郎 “Sekka ni Sono Go o Odosaruru Manmō 赤化に其後を脅さるる満蒙” Book 52, November 1924, pp. 14–22; Yamada Takeyoshi 山田武吉 “Manmō Mondai ni taisuru Shuchō 満蒙問題に対する主張” Book 87, July 1927, pp. 21–27; Kimura Sōjū 木村 莊十 “Hōkai Tetsudō o Miru 奉海鉄道を観る” Book 97, May 1928, p. 45), the situation in Japanese society in Dalian was at “the time when ethnic selfdetermination directly strengthens the will for self-preservation and the empty complaint becomes constant” (Chiba Toyoharu 千葉豊春 “Nihon no Jinkō Ryōshoku Mondai to Taimanmōsaku: Gaijin no Me ni Eijitaru 日本の人口糧 食問題と対満蒙策――外人の目に映じたる” Book 34, May 1923, p. 20). This grasping for logic in justification of the new Japan-China relationship construct spread the situation in which the “pain” of the reality was largely receding. A young man came to Manchuria. His ideal was cosmopolitan. He was boasting how his being in this international city of Dalian was for the love of humanity and it didn’t matter if they were Japanese or newcomers or Chinese or even if they were the same humans. Then, very soon, came his pessimism. (. . .) Coexisting is not a combination of the mind, the final punch is only in the benefit of a financial friendship. The sad time has come when we must make the final decision for Japan and China’s friendship. (M. A. “Ugoku Shina no Shosō: Aa! Seinan Jiken 動く支那の諸相： 嗚呼！済南事件” Book 98, June 1928, pp. 68–71) In these circumstances, when the Manchurian Incident took place, the opening lines of the 1931 New Year issue of Manmō had a “prediction” of this new situation. It is clear that, in 1931, there will be movement with the motto “Policy of Forced Self-sacrifice” in internal and external activities of China. However, it is not difficult to imagine the difficulties of anything more than anti-military as the year goes on. There are active movements of anti-Japanese foreign policies, or pressure against the railway, or country-wide anti-Japanese movements, etc. will be seen continuously. In this critical time for China, it is possible that Japan will also have difficulties with foreign policies. I fear that this year, 1931, will be a time of citizen revolutions in the Asian continent, and will be a dangerous year, and we must anticipate error-free discretion. (Takeda Nanyō 武田南陽 “Shinshun ni Chokumen shite Chūgoku no Shōrai wo Kakusu 新春に直面して中国の将来を劃す” Book 129, January 1931, p. 27)

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Conclusion This chapter has confirmed the circumstances of the new Japan-China relationship construct in post-World War I Japanese society in Dalian that was shown on the pages of Manmō. In other words, the anticipation regarding the new relationship construct was depicted in the inaugural issue of Manmō and the deeply rooted contempt for China in Japan. The difficultly of realizing a strategy for a “Japan-China alliance” due to the long recession in Japan and the rise of Chinese nationalism, as well as the lack of a concrete long term plan for mutual understanding and mutual acceptance, led to the events that became known as the Manchurian Incident. It can be said that the manifestation of a weakness in the so-called Washington System (or the lack of a concrete method to deal with the strong relationship between the Soviet Union and Chinese nationalism) brought about the path of bankruptcy for Japan’s “Manchurian interest” under the international cooperation system in East Asia. However, there is content on the pages of Manmō that shows a new direction for the Japan-China relationship. However, it should be noted that (. . .) learning Chinese has recently become popular in Japan. The way that we used to say things has changed. Four or five days ago, Sūn Chuánfāng who lives in Dalian was visited by a friend who said “genpō 減俸 (salary reduction)” and because of living in seclusion his eyes went wide just at that word; we should pay special attention to these kinds of examples. (. . .) At this rate, a day will come when Japanese has become Chinese. There are too many deceptive tricks in this Japan-China relationship. Even Confucius admonished flattery. But this flattery threatens the national language, and makes it difficult to actually open one’s heart. People from differing countries will not be able to attain the chance for a friendship because of words with distant meanings. Therefore, I think that Chinese should be made Japanese. (Opening words “Chūgokugo no Nihongoka 中国語の日本語化” Book 135, July 1931, p. 1) An example of Pidgin Japanese is given and there are many examples of Pidgin Chinese in Manmō (“Nihonjin Shinago no Shōtai 日本人支那語の正体” Book 55, January 1925, p. 79). With setbacks to the new Japan-China relationship construct, there was a reproduction of the power relation involving Japan’s rule over China, as well as there being signs of interactions and acceptance amongst the communities. There is also the point of the inherent direction of the “five tribe harmony” and “paradise of the royal road” ideology in Manchuria Nation (満洲国, 1932), that of a new world order following World War I. In this situation, Japan will operate to form one group from the Korean, Manchurian, and Mongolian people and establish an independent nation. We will strive to establish in Manchuria, while under the guidance of Japan, a

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Matsushige Mitsuhiro removal of the oppression of the Red Russia and Chinese people. (. . .) Even in Europe the ethnic self-determination of the people is recognized and the Korean, Manchurian, and Mongolian people are grouped with the “Ural, Altai” peoples and the independence between the Chinese and Slavs is to evoke an emotional response from the world. Therefore, it is only natural for Japan to also help the abrupt uprising of the people’s system. (Hayashi Senjūrō 林銑十郎 Manshū Jiken Nisshi 満洲事件日誌. Mimizu Shobō, 1996, pp. 40–44)

Even though this is not an article from Manmō, the contents confrm the usage, adaptation, and shift toward granting justifcation of the “Manchurian Nation”; this can also be seen on the pages of Manmō. Not only can the falsehood of the ideology of constructing the “Manchurian Nation” be confrmed, the truth of how the ideology of constructing the “Manchurian Nation” was embedded in the frst steps of a new international order following World War I can also be seen. These two directions show that, within Japanese society in Dalian before the Manchurian Incident, there was progress in the mutual interaction and acceptance between Japan and China. However, the possibility of confronting issues regarding the construct of the new Japan-China relationship never came to pass. This means that the reason it did not work was because there was pressure on Japan’s side to find a concrete remedy for independent equality and the ethnic self-determination of the people. The gap between the ideology of constructing the “Manchurian Nation” and the realization of an actual government was provided in arguments on the pages of Manmō, and this chapter has re-introduced the path that was taken via the contents of the magazine.

Notes 1 Regarding the relations of self-determination and the establishment of ideologies for war crimes on an international scale following the end of World War I, see Yamamuro et al. eds. (2014), and Mimaki (2014). 2 The adaptation of war crimes on the “mainland” was slow (Ikō 2002). 3 Unless noted, all data from Manmō will be shown in parentheses as author, issue, year. Moreover, all articles from Manmō were taken from the 1993–2003 Fuji Shuppan replica editions. 4 More information regarding the actual state of printing and speech in Dalian can be anticipated; however, other than issues due to the situation of newspaper printing and financial troubles, there is activity that can be observed (Zhang 2011). 5 Regarding the process and features of the establishment, Okamura (2012) has analyzed where the “Manchurian Nation” was in the midst of the printing world, as well as Japan’s involvement with the spread of interest in the northeastern region of China and the intentions of the organization. Gao (2008) has investigated this point of view. Based on the results from these arguments, this study takes the stance of reevaluating the awareness of the Japanese in the process of establishment. 6 See Gao (2008) for more information. 7 The first edition was Manmō no Bunka 満蒙之文化, and this was changed to Manmō 満蒙 in Issue 33, April 1923; it was known by this name thereafter. In the

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10

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aforementioned replica publications it continues until Issue 121, October 1943; however, the final issue and its number are unknown. Refer to the index and general contents in Fuji Shuppan, 2003; for further reference regarding the articles in Manmō, see http://kery.sakura.ne.jp/researchfurtherance/index.html. These are fundamental policies of Japanese-Manchurian management as stated by one of the first employees of the Railway, Gotō Shinpei. “Non-military facilities that can immediately be changed into military facilities” (Kitaoka Shin’ichi “Gotō Shimpei: Gaikō to Vijon 後藤新平――外交とヴィジョン” Chūkō Sinsho, 1988, p. 95). It was implicated that by “bringing in tools (royal roads) of civilization,” “it will make relations that will be difficult to fight against in Japanese management” (ibid. p. 96); moreover, “science” was emphasized by “elaborate letters” (Nishinomiya Kō 西宮絋 “Gotō Shinpei no Manshū Keiryaku 後藤新平の満州経 略” in Nakami Tatsuo et al. “Manshū to wa Nan datta no ka 満洲とは何だったの か” Fujiwara Shoten, 2004). The so-called Twenty-one Demands that extended the lease of Lyushunkou and Dalian had a section that invalidated the “Treaty regarding South Manchuria and East Mongolia” (established 1915), and there was a movement to return these lands to China, including the organization of anti-Japanese boycotts. Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan maintained a lease on the Liaodong Peninsula that expired on March 26, 1923. For more information on this movement in the northeastern region of China, see Hirano Ken’ichirō “1923 Nen no Manshū 1923年 の満州” (in Hirano Ken’ichirō 平野健一郎 ed. “Kindai Nihon to Ajia: Bunka no Kōryū to Masatsu 近代日本のアジア――文化の交流と摩擦” 東京大学出版会 Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1984). The shift to further understand the Chinese did not only take place in the Japanese societies in Dalian and the northeastern regions of China, but there were also activities in publications aimed at the “mainland.” There was a large antiChinese awareness gap between the Japanese societies in Dalian and the northeastern regions of China and the “mainland” (“Henshū Shiki 編輯私記” Book 131, March 1931, p. 161; Sue Sono 恵須園 “Waga Manmō Shisatsusha ni Atau わが満 蒙視察者に与ふ” Book 133, May 1931, p. 1). There are some interesting topics on how the “unification” was actually directed regarding the events leading up to the Manchurian Incident. This will be further investigated in another paper.

Bibliography Dairen Shishi 大連市史. Dairen Shiyakusho 大連市役所, 1936. Gao, Hongmei 高紅梅. “Tōhoku Bunka Geppō” to Manmō Bunka Kyōkai: Chūgokujin no Tainichi Ninshiki no Shikaku kara Miru 『東北文化月報』と満蒙文化協会： 中国人の対日認識の視角から見る. Fuji Xerox Kobayashi Setsutarō Kinen Kikin 富士ゼロックス小林節太郎記念基金, 2008. Gu, Mingyi 顧明義 et al., ed. Dalian Jinbainian Shi 大連近百年史 (I. II.). Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe 遼寧人民出版社, 1999. Ikō, Toshiya 伊香俊哉. Kindai Nihon to Sensō Ihōka Taisei: Dai’ichiji Sekai Taisen kara Nicchū Sensō e 近代日本と戦争違法化体制：第一次世界大戦から日中戦争 へ. Yoshikawakobunkan 吉川弘文館, 2002. Li, Zhenyuan 李振遠, ed. Changye, Shu: Zhimindi Tongzhi Shiqi Dalian de Wenhua Yishu 長夜・曙：殖民地統治時期大連的文化芸術. Dalian Chubanshe 大連出版 社, 1999年. Ma, Lifen 馬麗芬 and Han Yuexing 韓悦行, ed. Dalian Jinbainian Shi Jianwen 大連 近百年史見聞. Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe 遼寧人民出版社, 1999.

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Matsushige, Mitsuhiro 松重充浩. “Kokumin Kakumeiki ni okeru Tōhoku Zaichi Yūryokushasō no Nashonarizumu 国民革命期における東北在地有力者層のナシ ョナリズム：奉天総商　会の動向を中心に,” Shigaku Kenkyū 史学研究, vol. 216, 1997. Matsushige, Mitsuhiro 松重充浩. “Shokuminchi Dairen ni okeru Kajin Shakai no Hatten: 1920 Nen Shotō Dairen Kashō Dantai no Katsudō wo Chūshin ni 植 民地大連における華人社会の展開：1920年代初頭大連華商団体の活動を中心 に,” in Soda Saburō 曽田三郎 (ed.), Kindai Chūgoku to Nihon: Teikei to Tekitai no Hanseiki 近代中国と日本：提携と敵対の半世紀. Ochanomizu Shobō 御茶の 水書房, 2001. Matsushige, Mitsuhiro 松重充浩. “Dai’ichiji Taisen Zengo ni okeru Dairen no ‘Santōban’ Chūgokujin Shōnin 第一次大戦前後における大連の『山東幇』中国 人商人,” in Honjō Hisako 本庄比佐子 (ed.), Nihon no Chintao Senryō to Santō no Shakai Keizai: 1914–22 Nen 日本の青島占領と山東の社会経済：1914–22年. Zaidan Hōjin Tōyō Bunko 財団法人東洋文庫, 2006. Mimaki, Seiko 三牧聖子. Sensō Ihōka Undō no Jidai 戦争違法化運動の時代. Nagoya Daigaku Shuppansha 名古屋大学出版会, 2014. Okamura, Keiji 岡村敬二. Manshū Shuppanshi 満洲出版史. Yoshikawakobunkan 吉 川弘文館, 2012 Shinozaki, Yoshirō 篠崎嘉郎. Dairen 大連. Osakayagō Shoten 大阪屋号書店, 1921. Tsukase, Susumu 塚瀬進. Mansū no Nihonjin 満洲の日本人. Yoshikawakobunkan 吉 川弘文館, 2004. Yanagisawa, Asobu 柳澤遊. Nihonjin no Shokuminchi Taiken 日本人の植民地体験. Aoki Shoten 青木書店, 1999. Yamamuro, Shin’ichi, Okada Akeo 山室信一, 岡田暁生 et al., ed. Gendai no Kiten Dai’ichiji Sekai Taisen 現代の起点 第一次世界大戦 （全4巻）、. 岩波書店, 2014. Zhang, Feng 張楓. “Dairen ni okeru Taitō Nippō no Keiei Dōkō to Sinbun Ronchō: Chūgokujin Shakai to no Kankei wo Chūshin 大連における泰東日報の経営動向 と新聞論調：中国人社会との関係を中心,” in Kase Kazutoshi 加瀬和俊 (ed.), Senkanki Nihon no Sinbun Sangyō: Keiei Jijō to Sharon o Chūshin ni 戦間期日本の 新聞産業：経営事情と社論を中心に. （Tōkyō Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūjo Kenkyū Shirizu 東京大学社会科学研究所研究シリーズ № 48）. Tōkyō Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūjo 東京大学社会科学研究所, 2011.

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Perceptions of atomic bombing in the United States and Japan TAKAHASHI Keikichi

Abstract: According to John L. Gaddis’s opinion in his article “The Long Peace,” previous scholarship on international relations is characterized by paying much attention to the causes of past wars, while the question of why the third world war has not yet occurred has generally been ignored. A similar tendency is also observed regarding studies of historical disputes. Much has been written on the clash of historical understanding between Japan and China as well as between Japan and Korea, and the causes for these disagreements have been examined thoroughly. Conversely, the question of why the clash of historical understanding has not occurred between Japan and the United States, despite their divergent understanding of the past, has not yet been thoughtfully studied. What did happen seems to attract more attention than what did not. Nonetheless, as Gaddis’s article has demonstrated, people draw insight by focusing on what did not happen. This may also apply to studies of historical disputes. Stated plainly, against the background of Japan’s fierce conflicts with Korea and China, regarding interpreting East Asia’s history, the question of why disagreements of this kind never occurred between Japan and the United States is highly stimulating. This chapter does not address the aforementioned problem, per se. Instead, it aims to identify the discrepancies between Japan and the United States in understanding history. It focuses on Barack Obama’s visit to Hiroshima on May 27, 2016, and illuminates the contradictory views toward the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the Japanese and American sides, respectively. This chapter examines academic discourse and public opinion in the United States and Japan on why the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan and whether the use of nuclear weapons in these circumstances was inevitable. As a response to Obama’s visit in Hiroshima, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo visited the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in December 2016, which made 2016 the year of reconciliation over historical issues between Japan and the United States. As is well known, French-German reconciliation after World War II is universally considered to be exemplary for similar issues worldwide. By successfully restoring and maintaining positive diplomatic relations despite clashing interpretations of historical issues, U.S.-Japanese reconciliation provides us with an alternative to the French-German case. In this sense, the U.S.-Japanese relations could serve as a unique paragon for similar conflicts.

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Introduction Over 72 years have passed since the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On May 27, 2016, Barack Obama became the first sitting U.S. president to visit Hiroshima. Obama toured the Peace Memorial Museum together with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, laid wreaths at the cenotaph, and delivered a speech calling for “courage” to pursue a world without nuclear weapons. After the speech, Obama also approached two aging survivors of the bombing. In Obama’s speech, he affirmed that “over 100,000 Japanese men, women and children” had lost their lives. Nonetheless, he offered neither an apology nor explanation for why the atomic bombs needed to be dropped. In fact, the nature of Obama’s speech had been decided long before his visit to Hiroshima. When the May 10 announcement of Obama’s visit to Hiroshima was released, Ben Rhodes, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Speechwriting, noted that the president “will not revisit the decision to use the atomic bomb at the end of World War II.” Moreover, in his interview with NHK recorded a few days before the official visit, Obama also revealed that he was not going to apologize and that questioning the propriety of dropping the atomic bombs was the job of historians. According to news reports, the Obama administration was heedful in arranging the Hiroshima visit, given the dominant U.S. view that the bombings were justified, despite some dissenting voices. This chapter will explore American discourses over the atomic bombings that had been highlighted by Obama’s Hiroshima visit. In this context, this chapter will also touch on perceptions and opinions from the Japanese side. Concretely speaking, it will focus on the two points of contention—the reason for the atomic bombings and the necessity of using nuclear weapons—and scrutinize voices from both academia and the public sphere in Japan and the U.S. During the 1990s, the so-called Smithsonian controversy led numerous scholars to investigate Japanese and U.S. perceptions of the atomic bomb issue. Among these many studies, Asada Sadao’s (1997a, 1997b) survey reveals a similar concern to the present study. As for the issue of the legitimacy of the atomic bombing, Sadao maintained that the contradictions between Japanese and American views were a result of their different explanations why atomic bombs were dropped (Sadao 1997a). Similar to Sadao’s survey, the relevant scholarship of the 1990s generally articulated, or even emphasized, the gap between Japanese and American perceptions on this issue. Without turning away from the previous scholarship, the present study reconsiders the two countries’ perceptions of the atomic bombing based on the new trends resulting from Obama’s Hiroshima visit. It not only seeks to include the most current events and updated data but also analyzes Obama’s Hiroshima visit in relation to its thematic concern.

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1 Views in the U.S. academic milieu In response to the two points of contention posed in the preface, American scholars have provided three major explanations: the orthodox, the revisionist, and the compromise explanation. The orthodox views support the postwar assertions of Harry S. Truman and Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of the Army and the person virtually in charge of the atomic bomb projects. According to their vision, the dropping of the atomic bombs hastened the end of the war and was a necessary decision. Without dropping atomic bombs, the Americans would have had to launch the proposed Operation Downfall, in which American casualties alone would have ranged from 500,000 to one million. Operation Downfall was the allied plan for the invasion of Japan proposed in mid-June 1945 when the Battle of Okinawa was about to end. It had two parts: the landing operation in South Kyūshu and a planned invasion of the Kantō plain. Ultimately, the former would have been undertaken in November 1945 and the latter in March 1946. Currently, Wilson D. Miscamble, a professor of American history at the University of Notre Dame (Indiana), is the representative proponent for the orthodox explanation. In 2011, he published a monograph entitled The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs and the Defeat of Japan. One day after Obama’s Hiroshima visit was announced, Miscamble’s article “Obama, Truman and Hiroshima” came out in The Wall Street Journal, in which he restated the characteristic orthodox view that the dropping of the atomic bombs hastened the end of the war and, therefore, saved numerous lives also on the Japanese side. Moreover, he claimed that there was zero reason to apologize for the atomic bombing, and Obama should ground anything he might say on his visit to Hiroshima in “sound” historical knowledge (Miscamble 2011, 2016). On the other hand, there are also voices of “revisionism” that oppose Truman and Stimson’s explanation. In the 1960s, when the American involvement in the Vietnam War escalated and the morality of American diplomacy was widely questioned, the revisionist view prevailed from the middle of the decade onwards. Gar Alperovitz was one of the representative promoters. According to Alperovitz, neither the use of atomic bombs nor any landing operation was necessary to make the Japanese surrender. Moreover, he claimed that toward the end of the war, this was the dominant opinion within the Truman administration, since Truman and his advisors had intercepted communications to the effect that Japan was negotiating with the Soviet Union to bring an end to the war as soon as possible. They were also well aware that in the negotiations to end the war, the question of whether or not the Emperor would be permitted to retain his throne was the cardinal issue for the Japanese. Therefore, the Truman administration deemed it to be highly possible that the Japanese would capitulate if the administration relaxed the requirement for unconditional surrender and provided assurance about the Emperor. In addition, the Soviet involvement in the war would be a severe blow to Japan and make its capitulation inevitable. Nonetheless, the Truman administration did not make any reference to

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the Emperor’s role in the Potsdam Declaration, nor did it seem to welcome the Soviet Union’s involvement in the war. It seems that the Truman administration merely sought to end the war through the atomic bombings. Through the use of nuclear weapons, the United States could deliver a warning to the Soviet Union that hugely expanded its areas of influence during World War II, and strengthen its diplomacy in constructing the postwar world order (Alperovitz 1965, 1995). Though the contradiction between the orthodox and the revisionist explanations of the atomic bombing is quite obvious, both saw the devastation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki as outcomes of Truman’s decision. The third explanation, namely the compromise explanation, aims exactly at refuting such a viewpoint. According to Barton J. Bernstein, the representative proponent of the third explanation, the use of nuclear weapons against enemy countries did not raise profound moral issues for policymakers in Washington, since it had been the “dominant assumption” since the Roosevelt era. Thus, Truman was merely following this line, although he could have avoided the use of nuclear weapons as U.S. president. He had no incentive to turn over the assumption inherited from his predecessor, since atomic bombing was likely to make landing operations unnecessary and also to be a psychological blow to the Japanese and the Russians. According to Bernstein, intimidating the Soviet Union by atomic bombing was nothing but a “bonus effect” for the Truman administration. Truman would still have decided on atomic bombing even if the Soviet threat had not existed (Bernstein 1975). On this point, Bernstein’s third explanation is close to the orthodox view. On the other hand, Bernstein refuted Truman and Stimson’s estimation of the possible casualties in case landing operations proved unavoidable. In other words, no evidence indicates that they had grasped the number of expected fatalities and wounded between 500,000 and one million during the war. Bernstein’s article in 1986, which, as the following chapter will show, influenced the exhibition plan at the Smithsonian Institution, came to the conclusion that the prevailing estimation in Washington placed casualties between 20,000 and 46,000 (Bernstein 1986). For policymakers in Washington, the lesser estimation already represented a huge number of lives that could be saved by dropping nuclear bombs. However, after the war, when Americans gradually became aware of the disastrous effects of the atomic bombs, U.S. authorities needed an excessive estimation of the number of Japanese victims to exhibit to the public, in order to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons. For Bernstein, the estimation of possible casualties in the range of 500,000 to one million was a fabrication under such circumstances (Bernstein 1986, 1999). Bernstein not only denied Truman and Stimson’s statement over the expected fatalities; he even refuted their justification for using A-bombs. In other words, some alternatives such as promising to retain the Japanese monarchy, awaiting Soviet entry, and even more conventional bombing “very probably could have ended the war before the dreaded invasion and produced the desired surrender before November 1.” In particular, Bernstein asserted that the Nagasaki bombing was “almost certainly unnecessary” (Bernstein 1995: 388, 402).

Atomic bombing in the U.S. and Japan 125 As illustrated earlier, there are three major justifications within American academia for the use of A-bombs. As a matter of fact, the diverse debates seemed to be converging on the compromise explanation. In his overview of the relevant debates published in 1990, the historian J. Samuel Walker noted that the gap between “traditionalist” and “revisionist” interpretations had been almost cleared up (Walker 1990). However, the exhibition of the Smithsonian Institution had rekindled the debate among scholars. Against this background, Walker admitted in a 2005 article that his conclusion of 1990 “failed rather spectacularly to stand the test of time” (Walker 2005). Although it has been more than half-a-century, the dropping of the A-bombs remains a controversial issue. Why can historians never agree on one explanation? The first reason is the lack of historical materials referring to the aim of using nuclear weapons. Expressly, no direct evidence testifies to the true intention of Truman, the man who ordered the dropping of the A-bombs. Historians have had to rely on abundant indirect records to interpret Truman’s intention, which explains the diversity of their interpretations. Second, on the military necessity of using nuclear weapons, historians have to develop their argumentation as “if A-bombs were not put into use.” This necessarily pushes their interpretations into different directions (Nishioka 2013). American scholars’ debates are almost unfailingly referred in high school history textbooks (these textbooks are usually as thick as encyclopedias, and unlike Japanese history textbooks, the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are comprehensively accounted for). Some textbooks depict contemporary minority voices against the use of the atomic bombs. In the past, the orthodox interpretation dominated in America’s textbooks. Nowadays, the situation has changed. Nonetheless, the viewpoints of professional historians and voices against nuclear weapons often appear in column form. The vital part—the main text—still strongly reveals the orthodox viewpoint. It is said that in the process of textbook adoption, citizens widely participate in public hearings and committee meetings organized by the state or school district. Therefore, the contents of textbooks are closely linked to the commonly accepted values and outlooks of the society (Fujita 2012). That the orthodox interpretation prevails in history textbooks probably resulted on the one hand from its dominant role in American academia and, on the other hand, from the strong public support it enjoys. The latter will be thoroughly examined in the next section.

2 Atomic bombing perceived in the American public sphere Through the history textbooks and various kinds of mass media, Truman and Stimson’s explanation was made known to the American public. Therefore, it was not only discussed among scholars, but also widely acknowledged by American citizens. In the United States, almost all kinds of views legitimizing the use of A-bombs are based on Truman and Stimson’s explanation. Against such circumstances, “the first national debate over Hiroshima” (Lifton and Mitchell 1995: 277) had been kindled two decades ago in the United States.

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It was triggered by a proposed exhibition organized for the 50th anniversary of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Smithsonian Institution1 in 1995. It sought to display part of the fuselage of the Enola Gay, the B-29 bomber that dropped the first atomic bomb on Japan. Contrary to the fate of Bockscar, the bomber that dropped the atomic bomb over Nagasaki that is on permanent display at the National Museum of the United States Air Force (Ohio), Enola Gay, despite belonging to the Smithsonian Institution, had never been exhibited before the American public. The Institution now planned to move Enola Gay from its repertory, restore it, and display the bomber in a special exhibition. Moreover, the curators were not satisfied with a mere display of the fuselage. They sought to depict the overall story about the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For all that, the ambitious proposal of the Institution had evoked severe public criticism. If the exhibition was to give an outline of the overall story, it could not avoid shedding light on the disasters that occurred under the mushroom cloud. Actually, the museum’s first script in January 1994, which comprised five sections, had one section that was to exhibit photographs vividly documenting the scenes of the atom-bombed land. Another section introduced various scholars’ viewpoints, as mentioned earlier. Moreover, a section named “Legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki” opined that the atomic bombings of Japan had caused the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and intensified the tension of the Cold War. The 200,000-member Air Force Association (AFA) and the American Legion with its three million members hammered out the proposed exhibition plan. They were convinced that the atomic bombings had forced the Japanese to surrender and, therefore, saved 500,000 to one million American lives that might have been otherwise lost in landing operations. For them, both Bockscar and Enola Gay were symbols of peace and were to be displayed in a solemn atmosphere. Thus, they were principally against the idea of the “Atomic Bombing Exhibition” itself. From such a standpoint, it was inappropriate to introduce the voices of “armchair second-guessers” (Sweeney 1997: 286); to introduce what had really happened under the mushroom cloud was naturally out of the question. In addition, they refused to make any link between the atomic bombings and the emergence of the Cold War. In other words, for members of these two associations, the exhibition plan of the Smithsonian Institution was about to damage the reputation of Enola Gay and to tarnish the glory of the American victory in World War II. Most mass media was on the side of the war veterans. In the summer of 1994, Congressional representatives, concerned by the public discourse over the issue, directed their criticism toward the exhibition. In September, a resolution that characterized the script as “revisionist and offensive to many WWII veterans” and ordered the Smithsonian to make modifications passed unanimously. Under such circumstances, the Smithsonian met with organizations such as the Air Force Association and the American Legion to resolve their differences. The modified script revealed their outlooks, without losing sight of the professional historians’ viewpoints. In January 1995, the museum adopted the suggestion

Atomic bombing in the U.S. and Japan 127 of the historian Bernstein, who was also a member of the advisory board of the exhibition, and revised the number of expected casualties if the landing operations had proven inevitable. Since then, the curators accepted the estimation of one million. After that, they kept the original estimation, but made a remark that the origin of these figures was “uncertain” (Harwit 1996: Chapter 28). Today, Enola Gay is on permanent display in the Air and Space Museum in a suburb of Washington. The introduction is extremely brief. After a general description of the B-29 bomber, the text reads, “On August 6 1945, this Martinbuilt B-29–45-MO dropped the first atomic weapon used in combat on Hiroshima, Japan.” Probably, this is exactly the kind of language the war veterans had hoped for. The American Legion was not against Obama’s Hiroshima visit, although they claimed, publicly and explicitly, to be against any form of apology or revised explanation for the atomic bombings. One would ask, to what extent are standpoints of war veteran groups representative of general public opinion? On August 26, 1945, a public opinion poll on the atomic bombings conducted by Gallup showed that 85% of Americans supported the decision, and 10% were against. After 45 years, in the 1990 Gallup poll, 50% called the bombing a good thing, and 41% a bad thing. In 1991, 1994, 1995, and 2005, the same poll revealed that about 50% of Americans approved of using the bombs, while 35%–45% disapproved. The report of the 2005 poll was titled “Majority Supports Use of Atomic Bomb on Japan in WWII.” It came to the conclusion that around the 60th anniversary of that historic event, “these views are not much different from those measured 10 years ago” (Moore 2005). Regrettably, the Gallup poll has not conducted further investigations after 2005. A Pew Research Center survey in 2015 showed instead that 56% of Americans approved of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, while 34% disapproved. Compared to the poll that came from the Detroit Free Press investigation in 1991, in which 63% supported and 29% opposed the bombings, it indeed revealed a shift in American public opinion on the atomic bombing issue (Strokes 2015). Nonetheless, the difference between the two polls is definitely not crucial. The 1991 result in which over half of Americans approve of the atomic bombings seems to stand. However, less than half of younger interviewees believed that the use of nuclear weapons was justified. In the Pew survey, 47% of 18–29-year-olds agreed. This result has often been used in newspaper reports to indicate Americans’ changing views on the atomic bombing. However, the 1990 Gallup poll has already shown that 38% of 18–29-year-olds approved of the atomic bombings, which is quite a low percentage in the overall study. By comparison, at 47%, the result of the Pew Research Center survey is even higher. At least, views on this issue among young Americans seldom undergo any significant change. Actually, some evidence does reveal that American public opinion on the bombings has undergone a distinct change. According to a CBS News poll conducted immediately after the May 10 announcement of Obama’s visit to Hiroshima was released, 43%, fewer than half of Americans approved of the atomic bombing, while the percentage of those who disapproved rose to 44%. However,

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this change seems to have been quite abrupt and reveals probably nothing but a temporary mood shift. The YouGov survey undertaken at the same time shows a totally different result: 45% thought that the atomic bombing was the right decision, while 25% thought it was wrong. The YouGov survey also shows that fewer than half of Americans approved of the use of nuclear weapons, but the percentage of people disapproving was only half of that of approving. The YouGov survey of the previous year came to a similar result. In his Prague speech of April 2009, Obama proposed that the U.S., “as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon,” had a “moral responsibility” to work toward securing “a world without nuclear weapons.” However, since justifications for the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are firmly rooted in American public opinion, his statement in Prague was not widely shared at home. According to a 2010 CNN poll, 49% of Americans agreed that “a few major countries, including the U.S., should have enough nuclear weapons to prevent an attack from another nation.” In March 2016, when Donald Trump was campaigning for the nomination of the Republican Party, he publicly spoke of the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the “Islamic State.”2 As a number of reports have already pointed out, Obama probably sought to secure his own legacy through his Hiroshima visit. To strengthen U.S. ties with Japan was undoubtedly also part of the consideration. Nonetheless, this historical visit might also have aimed at emphasizing Americans’ “moral responsibilities,” and awakening them from their belief in a justifiable use of nuclear weapons and their dependence on those weapons. On the other hand, Obama was at the same time addressing other countries such as Russia and North Korea. For all that, as the sitting American president preaching for a “world without nuclear weapons” and America’s “moral responsibility,” Obama was primarily addressing American citizens. In today’s world, nuclear proliferation raises the risk of nuclear terrorist attacks. Obama certainly realized that nuclear disarmament was to the geopolitical advantage of the U.S. (the opinions of The Four Wise Men, including Henry Kissinger, laid the ground for the concept of a “world without nuclear weapons”).3 On the other hand, Obama might have sought the recovery of America’s international moral prestige that had been damaged during George W. Bush’s regime, because standing on the moral high ground brings advantage to the U.S. as well. Apart from all that, Obama recognized the need to be very careful in not directly speaking against the orthodox explanation of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Such provocations had already angered the conservative American public and forced the Smithsonian exhibition to be canceled. It is highly possible that similar attempts will bring the idea of a “world without nuclear weapons” to a bitter end or make voters turn to Donald Trump. In addition, if not treated properly, the controversy over the legitimacy of the atomic bombings might evoke volcanic explosions of conservative voices and damage U.S.-Japanese relations. Fortunately, in the case of the Smithsonian exhibition, efforts by both Japanese and U.S. authorities have prevented the internal debates from escalating into a cross-border dispute. However, in Japan, critical voices and protests spread from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi stated, “It was regrettable in terms of the Japanese

Atomic bombing in the U.S. and Japan 129 people’s feelings.” Tensions did indeed arise in U.S.-Japanese relations. Based on these experiences, Obama, who highly values U.S. ties with Japan, would definitely have wanted to avoid a similarly uncomfortable situation. Against this backdrop, Obama’s Hiroshima visit was officially designated as mourning for the innocent people who died in World War II, and he, therefore, avoided any possible misinterpretation of it as an apology. On his 2009 visit to Japan, Obama bent to a nearly 90-degree angle when he greeted the Japanese Emperor. However, in Hiroshima, he did not bow in front of the Cenotaph for the A-bomb victims. Naturally, as the preface of the present article has mentioned, Obama did not make any reference to apology during his Hiroshima visit. It remains unknown how many Americans were emotionally moved by Obama’s Hiroshima visit. However, as far as conservative discourse is concerned, support for the Obama administration did not decline after his Hiroshima visit. In this sense, it is fair to say that Obama had successfully avoided negative reactions by the American public on this issue.

3 Hiroshima perceived in Japan: academic and public views Compared to American academia where three different explanations have their respective influences, Japanese academia is dominated by the revisionist explanation. The first solid study on this topic in postwar Japan was Nishijima Ariatsu’s Why Were the Atomic Bombs Dropped? Writing from the revisionist viewpoint, Nishijima claimed that the U.S. government’s diplomatic-strategic imperative vis-à-vis the Soviet Union had resulted in the dropping of the atomic bombs (Nishijima 1968). Nishijima’s study was characterized by its application of abundant historical documents on the Japanese side and his thorough analysis of the internal situation within the Japanese government, which argues against the necessity of atomic bombings. According to his interpretation, the impact of nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not a huge enough event to bring the pro-war faction to the idea of capitulation, given their insistence from the beginning on fighting until the whole country was devastated. Nevertheless, the entry of the Soviet Union ultimately changed the situation. Greatly shocked by the Soviet involvement, the pro-war faction abandoned the idea of resistance until the end and decided to announce Japan’s surrender while negotiating for better conditions in favor of Japan, because for the pro-war faction, the Soviet Union’s neutrality in the war was the “ultimate precondition” for the “fighting to the end” plan. The Soviet Union’s involvement disrupted this precondition, and thus the pro-war faction had no other choice than to surrender. Based on this viewpoint, Nishijima proclaimed that in terms of forcing Japan to surrender, the atomic bombings had little influences, if any. He even noted that “the people who died in the atomic bombings are absolutely not precious human sacrifices who led to Japan’s capitulation and returned peace to the Japanese people. Their precious lives were actually lost for nothing” (Nishijima 1968). Naturally, some voices refute Nishijima’s interpretation. For instance, according to Asada Sadao’s study, though the Soviet involvement led the strategy of the

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Japanese army to collapse, this was to a great extent predictable for the Japanese side. Therefore, it was the atomic bombings that demoralized the pro-war faction, especially the policymakers of the Army. On the other hand, blaming the atomic bombings could also have saved the Army’s prestige. If it was the atomic bombings that forced the Japanese to surrender, the responsibility for the war lay in the backwardness of Japan’s science, rather than in the Army’s incapacity. Convinced by this explanation, Asada assumed that Japan was unlikely to surrender in August 1945 in the absence of atomic bombings. The possibility of the Japanese surrender by November 1945—the planned timing for the Kyushu landing operation—was 50% or even less. Therefore, the atomic bombings avoided landing operations and “prevented a larger number of lives being lost on both the American and Japanese sides than that in the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (Asada 1997a).4 How are the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki perceived among the Japanese public? The earlier-mentioned polls of the Detroit Free Press (1991) and Pew Research Center (2015) have also been conducted in Japan. In the Detroit Free Press poll, 29% of Japanese respondents approved of the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, while 64% disapproved. The result of the Pew Research Center poll showed 14% approval and 79% disapproval, so the former shows a 15% reduction and the latter a 15% increase. As the previous chapter has indicated, U.S. polls showed a reduction in the rate of approval and an increase in disapproval. However, this change is far smaller than that in Japan. In other words, the gap between American and Japanese views on this issue is becoming more significant rather than diminishing. Why do the majority of Japanese consider the atomic bombings to be unjustifiable? Actually, no investigation has examined this question. If we come back to the two points of contention mentioned in the preface, we could assume that the Japanese might not have believed the American explanation for why atomic bombs were dropped. Moreover, they might have seen other ways to prevent the landing operation plan than dropping atomic bombs. As far as the former interpretation is concerned, Asada had conducted surveys on students of Doshisha University in 1976, 1991, and 1994. According to his survey, not only Japanese scholars but also the Japanese general public believes that the U.S. use of nuclear weapons was aimed at threatening the Soviet Union. As for the latter interpretation, there is seemingly no study that can be referred to. However, since the Japanese do not believe the American explanation that the atomic bombings hastened the end of the war, they doubt their necessity. Naturally, other arguments exist on the Japanese side that disapprove of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For example, not a few Japanese would support the idea that “the use of nuclear weapons is—regardless of circumstance—an inhuman activity of genocide” (Kimura and Kuznick 2010: 17). All in all, Japanese voices against the atomic bombings dominate to such an extent that any argument seeking to justify them is almost taboo. Kyūma Fumio, the defense minister in the first Abe administration, did not seem to have recognized this fact, although he himself comes from Nagasaki. In his speech of June 2007, Kyūma stated that he “considered the atomic bombings to be a crucial

Atomic bombing in the U.S. and Japan 131 step that ended the war, and therefore, inevitable.” This expression evoked harsh criticisms. As a result, Kyūma had to resign as defense minister shortly after this speech. He was also considered to be unwelcome in the Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremony that year. During Obama’s Hiroshima visit, the Japanese authorities did not get an apology from him, nor did the Japanese public expect such from the U.S. president. Even so, in order to make his Hiroshima visit a success, Obama needed to take into consideration not only the internal public discourse in the United States, but also Japanese public opinion that stubbornly resists any attempts to justify the atomic bombings. That explains why Obama took neither an American nor a Japanese standpoint, but a universal one in his speech delivered in Hiroshima. As he stated, there are many sites around the world that chronicle World War II, Yet in the image of a mushroom cloud that rose into these skies, we are most starkly reminded of humanity’s core contradiction. How the very spark that marks us as a species, our thoughts, our imagination, our language, our tool-making, our ability to set ourselves apart from nature and bend it to our own—those very things also give us the capacity for unmatched destruction. By articulating his viewpoint in this fashion, Obama demonstrated the necessity for human beings to get rid of this contradiction and seek to make a “world without nuclear weapons” and called for the necessity of a “moral awakening.” The standpoint of universal humanity is not new for the Hiroshima discourse. As is widely known, on the Cenotaph for A-bomb Victims where Obama laid a floral wreath is engraved the following inscription: “Rest in Peace, for the error shall not be repeated.” According to the explanation of the Hiroshima administration, the subject of the inscription is “the human being.” Long before Obama’s visit, the city of Hiroshima had called for a “world without nuclear weapons” from the standpoint of the entire human being. Concerning his visit to Hiroshima, Obama might have referred to such attempts by the city. As far as Japanese public opinion is concerned, Obama’s Hiroshima visit could be defined as a great success. According to the Nikkei poll, 92% of the Japanese reflected positively on it. That is probably because Obama had showed his empathy with and understanding toward the victims’ suffering, and also because of his attitude of sharing the future with the Japanese according to the motto of “no more Hiroshimas.” In other words, by putting the explanation and evaluation of atomic bombings aside, and focusing on the “empathy of suffering” and the “making of a common future,” Obama’s visit had gained support among Japanese citizens. At least, his visit was fruitful for U.S.-Japan relations.

Conclusion Truman and Stimson’s justification for the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki that focused on the purpose and regarded the outcome as inevitable was widely accepted by postwar Americans. On the other hand, changes in American

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public opinion were also obvious. However, most Americans hitherto accept it. As the orthodox explanation, Truman and Stimson’s statement is also to some extent influential in American academia. In contrast, the revisionist viewpoint that refutes the orthodox explanation dominates in Japanese academia. The Japanese public tends to deny the legitimacy of dropping atomic bombs though it does not usually have clear evidence for its belief. Based on the observation earlier, the present chapter comes to the same conclusion as the studies of the 1990s that Japanese and American perceptions toward the atomic bombings differ. Moreover, the results of the various polls show that after 1990, the discrepancy tends to increase. There are also other issues on which the Japanese and the Americans have different judgments, for instance, the Tokyo Trial (International Military Tribunal for the Far East). In contrast to the American definition of the Tokyo Trial as a “judgment of civilization,” the Japanese tend to see it as a “judgment of the victors.” Nonetheless, despite such discrepancy in their understandings toward a couple of historical issues, Japan and the U.S. have established a solid alliance since 1945. It was on this basis that Obama’s Hiroshima visit could take place. People usually overlook that Japan and the U.S. have achieved a positive bilateral relationship despite their views on historical events. However, precisely when Japan is involved in conflicts with China and Korea due to historical problems, the experience with the U.S. should not be neglected, since this experience hints at how to construct a friendly diplomatic relationship with countries even in the absence of a common historical consciousness.

Notes 1 The Smithsonian Institution was established in 1846 by the U.S. Congress on the basis of British scientist James Smithson’s heritage donations to the United States. Sixty to seventy percent of its budget comes from annual federal appropriations. Its board of regents that governs and administers the organization includes the Chief Justice of the United States and the vice president of the United States. 2 Donald Trump indicated that he approved of Japan and Korea developing nuclear weapons to respond to the threat from China and North Korea. 3 “The Four Wise Men” refers to Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford), George Schultz (Secretary of State under President Ronald Reagan), William Perry (Secretary of Defense under President Bill Clinton), and Sam Nunn (former U.S. Senator). In their contributions to The Wall Street Journal on January 4, 2007, and January 15, 2008, respectively, they claimed the urgency of nuclear arms control and less dependency on nuclear weapons, and called for the ultimate goal of achieving a “world without nuclear weapons.” 4 According to a report by Sankei Shimbun on September 9, 2014, Shōwa Tennō Jitsuroku, released in the same year, revealed that Soviet involvement in the war had given Emperor Hirohito a more significant impact than the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Bibliography Asada, Sadao 麻田貞雄. “Genbaku Tōka no Shōgeki to Kōfuku no Kettei 原爆投下 の衝撃と降伏の決定,” in Hosoya Chihiro 細谷千博, Irie Akira 入江昭 et al. (ed.),

Atomic bombing in the U.S. and Japan 133 Raiheiyō Sensō no Shūketsu: Ajia Taiheiyō no Sengō Keisei 太平洋戦争の終結――ア ジア・太平洋の戦後形成. Kashiwa Shobō 柏書房, 1997a. Asada, Sadao. “The Mushroom Cloud and National Psyches: Japanese and American Perceptions of the Atomic Bomb Decision, 1945–1995,” in Laura Hein and Mark Selden (ed.), Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age. M.E. Sharpe, 1997b. Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. Pluto Press, 1965. Alperovitz, Gar. The Decisions to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an Ameican Myth. A. A. Knopf, 1995. Bernstein, Barton J. “Roosevelt, Truman and the Atomic Bomb, 1941–1945: A Reinterpretation,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 90, no. 1, 1975. Bernstein, Barton J. “A Postwar Myth: 500,000 U.S. Lives Saved,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 42, issue 6, 1986. Bernstein, Barton J. “Kenshō/Genbaku Tōka Kettei made no Sanbyaku Nichi 検証・ 原爆投下決定までの三百日,” Chūō Kōron中央公論, no. 2, 1995. Bernstein, Barton J. “Reconsidering Truman’s Claim of ‘Half a Million American Lives’ Saved by the Atomic Bomb: The Construction and Deconstruction of a Myth,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, 1999. Bruce, Stokes. “70 Years after Hiroshima, Opinions Have Shifted on Use of Atomic Bomb,” Pew Research Center. www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/08/04/70years-after-hiroshima-opinions-have-shifted-on-use-of-atomic-bomb/ (Accessed 29 September 2016). Fujita, Satoshi 藤田怜史. “Amerika Chūtōkyōiku-yō Rekishi Kyōkasho ni okeru Genbaku Tōka Kettei no Kijutsu: 1949–2010 アメリカ中等教育用歴史教科書にお ける原爆投下決定の記述――1949年—2010年,” Meiji Daigaku Jinbunkagaku Kenkyūsho Kiyō 明治大学人文科学研究所紀要, vol. 71, 2012. Harwit, Marin. An Exhibit Denied: Lobbying the History of Enola Gay. Coernicus, 1996. Kimura, Akira 木村朗 and Peter Kuznick. Hiroshima, Nagasaki e no Genbaku Tōka Saikō: Nichibei no Shiten 広島・長崎への原爆投下再考――日米の視点. Hōritsu Bunka-sha 法律文化社, 2010. Lifton, Robert J. and Greg Mitchell. Hiroshima in America: A Half Century of Denial. Avon Books, 1995. Moore, David W. “Majority Supports Use of Atomic Bomb on Japan in WWII,” Gallup. com, August 5, 2005. www.gallup.com/poll/17677/majority-supports-use-atomicbomb-japan-wwii.aspx (Accessed 29 September 2016). Nishioka, Tatsuhiro 西岡達裕. “Genbaku Tōka, Seigi, Tōtoku: Kenkyūshi to Kōsatsu 原爆投下・正義・道徳－研究史と考察,” Kokusaigaku Kenkyū 国際学研究, no. 3, 2013. Nishijima, Ariatsu 西島有厚. Genbaku wa Naze Tōka sareta ka: Nihon Kōfuku o meguru Senryaku to Gaikō 原爆はなぜ投下されたか――日本降伏をめぐる戦略と外交. Aoki Shoten 青木書店, 1968. Sweeney, Charles W. War’s End: An Eyewitness Account of America’s Last Atomic Mission. Avon Books, 1997. Walker, Samuel J. “The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update,” Diplomatic History, vol. 14, no. 1, 1990. Walker, Samuel J. “Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground,” Diplomatic History, vol. 29, no. 2, 2005.

8

Transnational Asia and its changing dynamics at the turn of the twenty-first century1 LIU Hong

Abstract: East Asia has undergone profound transformations since the beginning of the twenty-first century. The first and foremost is China emerging as the second largest economy in the world; its accelerated pace of economic growth and integration into the global and regional economies have reshaped the Asian political economy. China’s role in global governance has been further strengthened by its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013 (Liu and Lim 2019; Zhao 2019). Second, partly in response to the rise of China, East Asian countries have restructured their domestic economic systems, including the manufacturing, trade, and banking sectors. To some, China’s development model has become gradually more attractive as an alternative to the “Washington Consensus” (a series of neoliberal policies emphasizing fiscal discipline, trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation). Third, East Asian developmental states have faced increasing challenges from domestic interest groups for democratic changes and social movements, thus disabling them from wielding autonomous power in governing the market and economic development trajectories as they did in the 1970s and 1980s (c.f. Suehiro 2008; Yeung 2014; Yeung 2017). Finally, the flows of capital, population, practices, and ideas have become substantially intensified, thanks in no small part to the advancement of transport and technology as well as the escalating pace of globalization and transnational knowledge transfer (Liu and Wang 2018; Ren and Liu 2019). How do we understand these changes and related debates about the dynamics of the East Asian political economy? What are their key characteristics and future prospects? Drawing upon a wide range of data in the English, Chinese, and Indonesian languages, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first section examines the cultural, historical, and institutional foundations in the making of Transnational Asia. The second part calls for bringing network and governance into the center of our analysis. The third section employs empirical examples of changing patterns of interactions between the state and networks in China and Singapore to underscore the growing power of transnational governance.

Introduction: conceptualizing Transnational Asia The remarkable political and economic changes of East Asia over the last decade have taken place against the backdrop of the increased pace of multi-layered

Transnational Asia’s changing dynamics 135 interactions across national boundaries in the region. This has led to the formation of what I call “Transnational Asia.” This concept may be understood from three interlinked angles. In the first place, it is a flexible geographical and cultural space encompassing the regions that are conveniently, but problematically, termed East and Southeast Asia. As has been argued elsewhere (e.g., Liu 2001; Miyoshi and Harootunian 2002; Harootunian 2012), the compartmentalization of Asia into different (artificially divided) sub-regions ignores the long-standing cultural and economic linkages among different socio-cultural and geo-political domains, and we need to look beyond this rigid division in order to comprehend the complex dynamics of modern trajectories in Asia. Second and more important, it is an evolving process and entity through which East/Southeast Asian countries dynamically engage with one another and with the external world, which in turn (re)shapes its own domestic agendas and development strategies. In this process, transnational institutions and flows of ideas (including models of socio-economic growth) play an important part in influencing the paths of development, which led to the making of Asian modernities that are different from Western modernities. Finally, Transnational Asia is an analytical approach concerned with the flows of population, ideas, goods, practices, and capital in the cross-national and trans-regional context. Transnational Asia has its profound historical and cultural foundations, and it has been significantly reinforced by—and helped shape— rapid growth of trade and migration across the national borders over the past two decades. It is through this evolving and multi-layered process of historical and economic interactions that Transnational Asia came to be institutionalized in recent years, impacting upon the region’s political economy as a whole. Extensive intra-regional connections in East Asia through trade, cultural exchanges, remittance, and human migration could be dated back to centuries before the advent of Western colonialism in Southeast Asia and the rise of Japan as a regional power after the mid-eighteenth century (Arrighi et al. 2003; Bosma and Webster 2015; Liu and Benton 2016; Benton and Liu 2018). These connections resumed by the beginning of the twentieth century, when Asia was first created as a regional construct and nationalism emerged in the form of imagined communities, aided by the spread to Asia of “print capitalism.” Asian modernities have been characterized by the tremendous flows of ideas and people in the transnational and intra-regional contexts. By the early twentieth century, Chinese civilization had faced unprecedented challenges resultant from West intrusion and it became a key motive behind the constitutional reforms represented by Kang Youwei and the nationalist movement led by Sun Yat-sen. It was a time of high imperialism in Southeast Asia, too. This shared fear of political annihilation constituted a backdrop against which intellectuals from both areas formulated anti-Western strategies and mutual imaginations. These strategies coalesced into non-state-centered, trans-regional discourses on Asia, “a radically politicized cultural regional concept” (Karl 2002). In the Malay world, many writings by the Chinese (both in Chinese and Malay) were concerned with politics in the cross-regional context, which partly explained why a Chinese woman in exile in the Dutch East Indies was made a principal nationalist propagandist in

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the novels of Pramoedya, one of the greatest intellectuals of twentieth-century Southeast Asia (Liu 2011). The legacies of cross-border historical and intellectual connectivity in East Asia became more pronounced after 1945 when various new countries began their experiments with the nation-building projects amidst the environment of the international Cold War. This can be illuminated through an examination of changing interactions between China and Indonesia which exemplify the characteristics of the new regional formation. China invoked dual images in postcolonial Southeast Asia. During the Sukarno era (1949–1965), many politicians and intellectuals in Indonesia had looked for inspirations from elsewhere, and one of the main sources was, paradoxically, China. Collectively, they created and propagated three master narratives about the new China: as a purposeful and harmonious society; as a successful economy and populist/nationalistic regime supported by the mass; and as the site of a cultural and intellectual renaissance. China’s attraction lay not in its communist ideology, but in the perceived remarkable success it had achieved within a short span of time, which convinced President Sukarno that China’s example could serve as an “Asian formula for Asia’s problems.” The historical legacy of exchanges of ideas/representations during the early twentieth century was constantly and consistently invoked to validate the new search for an adaptation of China’s development model. The systemic incorporation of China’s models of social, political, and cultural developments had significant impact upon the courses of Indonesian history during the closing years of the Sukarno era (Liu 2011). Although Sino-Indonesian synergy was interrupted under the Suharto regime (1967–1998), the warm relationships resurfaced soon after Suharto’s fall. Welcoming the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji in November 2001, the influential daily Kompas (November 7, 2001) put up an editorial entitled “We Can Directly Listen to the Successful Stories of China’s Development,” which hailed China’s progress as “spectacular and fascinating” and declared that “we can now listen to the successful stories concerning China’s development over the last 20 years.” Dahlan Iskan (2008), CEO of the Jawa Pos Group, advocated in his book Pelajaran dari Tiongkok (Lessons from China) that Indonesia should learn from the Chinese model of development. On China’s part, Bandung provides an effective and illustrative metaphor in engaging the Global South. It was by no means a coincidence that Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his “21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative” in October 2013 when visiting Jakarta and delivering a speech to the Indonesian Parliament, with Bandung emerged forcefully in his speech: In 1955, China and Indonesia, together with other Asian and African countries, jointly initiated the Bandung spirit at the Bandung Conference. With the principles of peaceful coexistence and seeking common ground while shelving differences at its core, the Bandung spirit remains an important norm governing state-to-state relations, and has made indelible contribution to the building of new international relations.2

Transnational Asia’s changing dynamics 137 Malaysia’s then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad claimed in October 2010: “The Beijing Consensus shows that having a non-democratic government can also give a good life for the people.” He further suggested that China’s “correct application” of the Beijing Consensus had allowed the nation of 1.3 billion “very poor” people to become “the second-richest country” [sic] in the world.3 Transnational Asia does not just emerge in the realm of the intensive flows of cultures and ideas (Liu and Zhou 2019); more importantly, the turn of the centuries has witnessed the formation of fast-growing economic linkages and population mobility within which China plays a leading role. Rapidly growing intra-Asian trade and economic activities which now account for more than 50% of East Asia’s total trade, a substantial increase from the late 1970s when only 20% of total exports made to each other by the Asian economies (Das 2014). By 2017, China has become ASEAN’s biggest trade partner, and ASEAN China’s third biggest, for eight and six consecutive years respectively. The combined two-way investment had exceeded US$183 billion, with US$108 billion being ASEAN investment in China.4 With the progress of ASEAN+3 financial cooperation, Asian regional liquidity mechanism has proven to be helpful to Indonesia in tackling the 2009 global financial crisis. Developments in regional governance for Asian financial regionalism have received considerable academic attention (e.g., Saputro 2017; Liu and Zhou 2018). The escalating number of Chinese new migrants in the region, the flows of new Chinese migrants into Southeast Asia (four successive waves since the early 1980s), is another indicator of China’s intensive interactions with the region. This is reinforced by such discourses that Singapore as one of the major models of China’s economic reform and opening-up since Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the country in 1978 (Liu and Wang 2018). More significantly, the close relationship between China and ASEAN has been manifested and reinforced at the institutional level (Zhou and Liu 2018). The year 2016 marked the 25th anniversary of ASEAN-China dialog relations, where the “most comprehensive” development of relations between China and ASEAN was celebrated. According to Japan Ministry of Finance data, China overtook the U.S. as its largest export destination in 2009, and remained so until 2012.5 Over the past decade, 60% of the international students in Japan came from China. Japan hosted 94,000 Chinese students in 2015, making up over half of the total number of international students in the country. Cultural linkages and geographical proximity have reinforced the trend of studying in Japan. In 2014, 2.4 million Chinese visited Japan, an 83% increase over the previous year (Clavel 2015). By the end of 2007, the Chinese community, numbering more than 600,000, became the largest foreign community in Japan for the first time, surpassing the number of Koreans (including those from two Koreas). In short, the turn of the twenty-first century has witnessed the formation of a Transnational Asia which draws its historical resources and cultural capital from the long-standing cross-border interactions among countries and peoples in East and Southeast Asia. The intensity of flows of population, capital, goods, and ideas has been significantly reinforced by the institutionalization and multilateral mechanisms.

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China has played an increasingly important role in the new regional formation as an engine of economic growth, source of human mobility, key player of the transnational institutional frameworks (such as ASEAN+1 and China-ASEAN Free Trade Area), and as an alternative form of development. The launch of the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, with $200 billion investment from China, and establishment of the China-led Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) have significantly reinforced the place of China in the making of Transnational Asia (Summers 2016; Zhao 2019). Although the growing centrality of China in the emerging Transnational Asia has met significant (and sometimes organized) resistance (often led by the United States with the overt or tactful support of Japan, with both countries being absent from the AIIB) and territorial disputes between China and some Asian neighboring countries have also undermined the emerging regional order,6 the new transnational formation is both the outcome and dynamics of the new political economy of East Asia at the turn of the twenty-first century, and their complex interplay and implications for the regional transformations deserve close scrutiny (Liu and Lim 2019).

1 Governance and network Transnational flows of capital, ideas, and people have increasingly become the norm in the recent development process of the East Asian region, which in turn calls for new concepts and approaches to decipher the nature and characteristics of this transformation that is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. The following pages examine how network and governance can be deployed as effective analytical tools and as alternatives to the existing dominance of the state-society paradigm. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of state socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as the spread of borderless capitalism, the first decade of the twenty-first century had witnessed a resurgence of societal forces in the making of the international political economy (c.f. Yeung 2017). In the meantime, the statist and institutionalist approaches tend to confine their analyses within the political boundaries of nation-state, giving inadequate attention to complex and intensive transnational flows of capital and people and transnational networks that have increasingly shaped the political trajectories within and without the nation-state, as has been amply demonstrated in the European context (e.g., Newman 2008; Montoya 2008). It is, therefore, necessary to go beyond the conventional state-society paradigms and identify alternative concepts for an understanding of the changing political economy in twenty-first-century East Asia. The concepts and practices of governance and network may serve such a need. While the term “government” in Anglo-American political theory refers to “the formal institutions of the state and their monopoly of legitimate coercive power,” governance refers to “the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred” (Stoker 1998). According to Stoker, the essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of

Transnational Asia’s changing dynamics 139 government: “The governance concept points to the creation of a structure or an order which cannot be externally imposed but is the result of the interaction of a multiplicity of governing and each other influencing actors.” Unlike the conceptualization of the state-society relations, governance can be taken beyond the rigidly defined nation-state boundaries, and global governance has increasingly become a means to mediate the process of political and economic development at the regional and international levels. Another key concept in understanding the new political economy of East Asia is network, which has been significantly shaped by the process and discourses of globalization. While network traditionally serves as an analytical framework in studies on business and society, it has been increasingly employed in the literature dealing with the East Asian political economy as well (e.g., Peng 2002; Nolan et al. 2017). Unlike the state-society relationship which is hierarchically constructed for the accumulations and deployment of political, economic, and symbolic power, (transnational) network is primarily a horizontally constructed structure that cuts through but also intersects with the hierarchical relationship. This essay underscores three different dimensions of network—as a relational entity, an interconnected node, and a collective layer of spatially constructed ties, which represent the diversity of patterns of network’s interactions with the state, society, and market. From the sociological perspective, “a network is composed of a set of relations, or ties, among actors (either individuals or organizations). A tie between actors has both content (the type of relation) and form (the strength of the relation).” One of the two major network approaches views “networks as a kind of organizing logic, a way of governing relations among economic actors” (Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994: 368–377). It has now been generally accepted that social networks are endemic to economic interactions (Fligstein and Dauter 2007). In a more sophisticated manner, Michael Mann (2000: 137) argues that there are five socio-spatial networks of social interaction in the world today: local, national, international, transnational, and global, while others have contended that networks are “a synthesis of hierarchies and markets” (Blatter 2003). David Singh Grewal (2008: 20) defines network more narrowly as “an interconnected group of people linked to one another in a way that makes them capable of beneficial cooperation, which can take various forms, including the exchange of goods and ideas.” He emphasizes the importance of “shared norm or practice that enables network members to gain access to one another, facilitating their cooperation” and the agreed operational standards among network members. Despite the variations in the earlier difference, there is a consensus that network is characterized by connectivity, flexibility, reciprocity, and transnationality, all of which have been central to the new political economy of East Asia. Network can play the roles that neither the state nor society alone can play while effectively link them with the market, which has become an important mechanism connecting different forces within and without national boundaries in Transnational Asia. In short, by going beyond the conventional state-society framework and methodological nationalism, network and governance offer some explanatory power

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that is largely absent in the existing paradigms of the East Asian political economy. They serve as alternative tools to supplement (and sometimes challenge) the conventional wisdoms, thus contributing to a better understanding of a region that is traversing in an uncharted and precarious territory at the time of globalization. They also provide useful tools to comprehend East Asian community building and its challenges, as network and governance can effectively cut through the formal processes of state-state diplomacy and enhance cross-border collaborations.

2 Network and the state in Transnational Asia Having established the utility of network and governance in the context of Transnational Asia, let us now turn to some empirical cases to examine how they have played a part in affecting the East Asian political economy. The examples from China, a global player displaying some characteristics of developmental state, and Singapore, a prototype of the developmental state whose recent development has been increasingly linked with China and Chinese migration, underscore the explanatory power of the analytical tools described in the preceding pages.

2.1 China This section considers the state’s interactions with transnational networks by discussing the changing relations with one specific group that is becoming more influential in urban China—the Transnational Chinese who were born in China, educated abroad, and possess portable skills while exhibiting a high degree of global mobility; the returnees (Haigui) constitute one major component of this group (on Haigui, see Wang et al. 2006; on contemporary Chinese diaspora, see Zhou 2017; Van Dongen and Liu 2017; Ren and Liu 2019). It is estimated that among the 60 million Chinese overseas, about 10 million are the so-called new migrants who left China after reform and opening-up (Wang and Kang 2017). Accompanying the returning trend, new patterns of transnational linkages have surfaced. These transnational networks are manifested not only in the forms of collective economic and social support for China’s globalization, but also in the revival of overseas Chinese nationalism. The Chinese state has played an active part in facilitating and engineering these transnational networking activities (Zweig et al. 2008). The new policies are implemented simultaneously at two fronts: bringing the transnational Chinese back to the fold of the nation-state whilst conveying and projecting the nation-state agendas to the diasporic Chinese communities. While the former is formulated primarily with a view of helping China’s domestic economic development, the latter is carried out in the international sphere and is embedded with political and cultural connotations. The active recruitment efforts initiated by various levels of the Chinese government are also instrumental. One of the state’s major policy initiatives in linking with transnational Chinese networks is the encouragement of “overseas Chinese talents” to serve the country

Transnational Asia’s changing dynamics 141 (weiguo fuwu), which makes the physical and permanent return to China not a prerequisite of patriotism (Liu and Van Dongen 2016). It is in this context that an increasingly large number of Chinese new migrants have returned to China, becoming the so-called Haigui and constituting an important segment of urban elite. There are currently more than 2.6 million Haigui in China, and the year 2016 alone saw the return of 432,500 Chinese students educated overseas (Li et al. 2017). The return trend has been further precipitated by China’s rapid pace of economic growth and the global financial crisis in 2008/2009, which hit the West particularly hard. According to International Financial News, a newspaper run by the People’s Daily, since the 1978 reform and opening up until 2014, 74.48% of the Chinese students studying abroad had chosen to return back to China after graduation, and those who came back after 2007 accounted for more than 80% of the total returnees.7 There has been an accelerating trend of returning to China among highly skilled new migrants. The fact that they feel it is crucial to retain China nationality is a reflection of their increasing pace and intensity of interactions with the homeland, which constitutes a key background for emerging transnationalism. In an attempt to confront the inherent structural tensions between the logics of global mobility and national interests, new migrants/Haigui argued that shared interests and the forging of common cultural/political identities could be served by evoking the restrictive Nationality Law, and their arguments were accepted by some Chinese opinion and policy makers, highlighting the salient convergence of transnational logics and nationalist projects. Equally important, the fact that the state has taken a wide range of measures—except for changing citizenship law—to accommodate the interests of Transnational Chinese in facilitating their global mobility is a powerful indication that transnational elements have gradually found a legitimate role in the policy deliberating process; the relevance of network and governance have been more widely accepted and valued. The Hu Jintao era also witnessed an increased representation of foreign-educated returnees in China’s policy-making process. A total of 82 (or 15%) members among the fifth-generation Chinese leaders have studied abroad, primarily in the U.S. and Europe. Among them, 23 leaders (28%) obtained academic degrees from abroad and 52 (63%) studied or worked abroad for a year or longer, and 7 (9%) participated in months-long programs overseas (Li 2008). A recent study has shown that the returnees tend to be more internationalist in their attitudes toward global affairs and could influence China’s foreign policy, thus constituting a potential constraint to China’s growing nationalist sentiments. It has been reported that the incorporation of foreign-educated Chinese in Beijing’s political and financial policy-making process has Hu Jintao’s backing and that this represents a gradual inroad of non-state factors into the old elite politics (Han and Zweig 2010; McGregor 2009). Since Xi Jinping took over in 2012, there has been a further consolidation of the Chinese diaspora into the overall development strategy of China, as a part of “da qiaowu” (big overseas Chinese work), which was first proposed by Xi himself in the mid-1990s (Liu and Van Dongen 2016). The

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recent structural changes in March 2018 relating to policies toward the Chinese diaspora described in the previous pages are a reflection of such strategic thinking.

2.2 Singapore Singapore’s role in the Asian regional networks was shaped by two major factors: its geographical location at the crossroads of, globally speaking, East and West as well as, in the context of Transnational Asia, East, South, and Southeast Asia. More importantly, the predominant place of entrepôt trade in its economy and the essential role of Chinese business community in this trade. Singapore has been well-placed to be, in the words of Lee Kuan Yew, “the linchpin of Asia” (cited in Liu and Wong 2004: 230). Over the past three decades, transnational networking has remained an important element in the evolution of Chinese society in Singapore, enjoying the state’s strong support. The first World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention was held in Singapore in 1991, partly based upon “the commonality of our Chinese ethnicity,” as the organizing committee chairman put it. In this and subsequent conventions, there have been consistent emphases upon Chinese culture’s contributions to overseas Chinese business success. While transnational network allows the establishment of “a regional wing” in the Singapore state’s attempt to sustain and expand its economic growth, there is a need to nurture and bring in human capital within the country at the time of economic restructuring since the 1980s. And it is in this context that governance, involving the relocation of “authority in multiple directions,” becomes a relevant concept and practice. Singapore’s search for global talents has been fundamentally prompted by the country’s lack of human and natural resources and the necessity of being competitive in the economic arena. Since the 1980s, the small island state has been further hampered by the decreasing fertility rate (a dramatic decline from the historical peak of 5.76 in 1960 to 1.14 in 2018). The 2006 National Rally speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong revealed unmistakably the government’s anxiousness and strategies in seeking global talents. “If we want our economy to grow, if we want to be strong internationally,” said Lee (2006), “then we need a growing population and not just numbers but also talents in every field in Singapore.” He stressed: We must look for all kinds of talent. It’s not just numbers. We’re looking for people with ability, with drive, with initiative and ideas and not just one kind of initiative and ideas, graduates, or professionals or bankers and lawyers, but all kinds. While the agenda to attract foreign talents covers skilled professionals from all over the world, ethnic Chinese have been the key source to tap on, not only because Singapore is a predominately Chinese country, but mainly because Greater China is the largest pool of potential professional migrants who are likely to work in the city-sate. From 1992 onward, the Singapore government started

Transnational Asia’s changing dynamics 143 offering full scholarship to Chinese students to enroll in local junior colleges and universities. One of the main attachments to the offering is that they must work in Singapore for at least six years upon graduation. A survey of 1,195 students coming on this scheme shows 74% have become permanent residents, while some Sino-Singaporean entrepreneurs have played an increasingly significant role in the country’s economic growth and regional business networking (Ren and Liu 2015). The encouragement of foreign talents and (perceived) preferential treatment toward them led to strong and public resentments (against the mainland Chinese migrants in particular) among the locals and became a hotly contested issue in recent elections, which was featured in various media reports, which in turn contributed to discontents about migration policies in Singapore (Liu 2014; Yang 2017). To address this potentially divisive issue, the government appeared to be receptive to influences from multitudes of directions. On the one hand, it reassured its citizens that the locals have been protected by various measures and that it was fundamental for the government to ensure the expansion of the economic pie by selectively importing foreign talents. Over the past few years, various government measures such as differentiating citizens and permanent residents in health and education subsidies have been in place. More importantly, the state has tried to contain the transnational elements of (Chinese) new migrants and make them a part of nation-building projects by attempting to convert their political loyalty to Singapore. While Singapore has raised the thresholds for immigration and citizenship, it has not subscribed to populist policies that have been in place in many industrialized nations. Remarked Lee Hsieng Loong at the 2013 meeting of the Research, Innovation and Enterprise Council, of which he has been the Chairman since its founding in 2006: To make further progress, we will need good people, we will need good research programmes, and then we will be able to get good outcomes. The good people [part] is most critical because first you must have the talent. And to sustain a vibrant research community, it means we have to attract international talent, as well as to nurture local talent. We need to do both. (Lee 2013)

Conclusion The preceding pages have demonstrated both conceptually and empirically the significant role of network and governance in Transnational Asia (and the increasingly vital role of China in this new regional formation) as well as their relevance to the region’s political economy. Three preliminary conclusions may be drawn from our discussions. First, to understand the complexity and multi-dimensionality of social, political, and economic transformations in Transnational Asia, we need to go beyond the conventional state-society dichotomy and bring in new analytical tools. The authority of the vertically constructed state apparatus and its capacities has to be

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placed within the broader orbit of horizontal transnational networks that operate on the intersecting spaces between the public sphere and private arenas. It is in this process that governance emerges as a vital concept and practice. Network and governance, furthermore, are juxtaposed with the changing market mechanisms and regulatory regimes. How these domestic structures respond to, and are being affected by, various transnational forces are a major issue for further empirical and theoretical scrutiny. Second, the state (and its reformulations) remains a crucial player in the evolution of Transnational Asia. The financial crises in both 1997 and 2008/2009 have shown that the state is still indispensable for any meaningful macro-economic policies. This centrality of the state—which could be conceptualized as the networked state—is different from the developmental state of the 1970s/1980s in two important aspects. In the first place, the developmental state’s “marketfriendly strategies” and its interventionalist stance were characterized by the insulation of economic technocrats from political influence, management of policies by efficient and high-quality bureaucracies through public-private consultative bodies that shared information (Suehiro 2008: 28). The networked state, on the other hand, has not only engaged with (global production and ethnic) networks through policy incentives, but also direct involvement in the business enterprises per se. Second, while developmental state functioned within the nation-state borders at a time of nationalism, the networked state has gone transnational as a process of globalization. Finally, we should not conceptualize state-network interactions as a zero-sum game. As the empirical cases on China and Singapore have amply demonstrated, while networks draw upon strengths from the state’s active support in the realization of their own agendas, the states have also benefited significantly from taking a collaborative part in working with transnational networks, which in turn facilitates the emergence of new forms of governance at the corporate, local, regional, and global levels.

Notes 1 Research for this chapter was funded by the Singapore Ministry of Education AcRF Tier 2 Grant (MOE2016-T2–02–87), which is gratefully acknowledged. Some materials and main arguments in this chapter have appeared in East Asian Community Review (vol. 1, no. 1, 2018). The author is solely responsible for the interpretations and any remaining errors. 2 “President Xi gives speech to Indonesia’s parliament,” China Daily, 2 October 2013. 3 “Mahathir Promotes China Model as Alternative to Democracy,” Today, 19 October 2010. 4 Xinhua News Agency, “China, ASEAN see closer economic, trade ties,” http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/10/c_136432613.htm. (last modified 10 July 2017). 5 Ministry of Finance, “Trade Statistics of Japan.” www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/ index_e.htm. (accessed 11 January 2019). 6 The changing international relationship in East Asia, including Sino-American and Sino-Japanese vying for regional leadership on diplomatic and security arrangements, is too complex to discuss here. See for example Shambaugh (2005); Goh (2013).

Transnational Asia’s changing dynamics 145 7 International Financial News, “Liuxue guiguo renshu 2017 nian jiangda 66.6 wan (The number of returning Chinese students educated overseas will reach over 666,000 in 2017),” Xinhua Net. http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/201506/29/c_127961858.htm.

Bibliography Arrighi, Giovanni, Takeshi Hamashita, and Mark Selden, ed. The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspectives. Routledge, 2003. Benton, Gregor and Hong Liu. Dear China: Emigrant Letters and Remittances, 1820–1980. University of California Press, 2018. Blatter, Joachim. “Beyond Hierarchies and Networks: Institutional Logics and Change in Transboundary Spaces,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 503–526, 2003. Bosma, U. and A. Webster, ed. Commodities, Ports and Asian Maritime Trade Since 1750. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Clavel, Teru. “Culture, Cost and Proximity Draw Chinese Students to Japan,” Japan Times, 22 April 2015. Das, Dilip K. “The Role of China in Asia’s Evolution to Global Economic Prominence,” Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 1, pp. 216–229, 2014. Fligstein, Neil and Luke Dauter. “The Sociology of Markets,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 33, pp. 129–156, 2007. Grewal, David Singh. Network Power: The Social Dynamics of Globalization. Yale University Press, 2008. Goh, Evelyn. The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in PostCold War East Asia. Oxford University Press, 2013. Han, Donglin and David Zweig. “Images of the World: Studying Abroad and Chinese Attitudes towards International Affairs,” The China Quarterly, vol. 202, pp. 290–306, 2010. Harootunian, Harry. “‘Memories of Underdevelopment’ after Area Studies,” Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 7–35, 2012. Iskan, Dahlan. Pelajaran dari Tiongkok (Teachings from China). JP Books, 2008. Karl, Rebecca. 2002. Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century. Duke University Press, 2008. Lee, Hsien Loong. “Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s National Day Rally English Speech,” Singapore Government Press Release, National Archives of Singapore, 2006. www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/view-html?filename= 2006082010.htm (Accessed 13 January 2018). Lee, Hsien Loong. PM Lee Hsien Loong, Chairman of Research, Innovation and Enterprise Council (RIEC), speaking at the 7th RIEC press conference, 25 October 2013, 2013. www.nrf.gov.sg/science-people/r-d-talent#sthash.v4u3BfLm. dpuf (Accessed 13 April 2018). Li, Cheng. “China’s Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or Weakness?” Asia Policy, vol. 6, pp. 53–93, 2008. Li, Qing, Xiaoxiao Chen, and Wei Yang. “Sino-Southeast Asian Studies: Toward an Alternative Paradigm,” Asian Studies Review, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 259–283, 2001. Li, Qing, Xiaoxiao Chen, and Wei Yang. China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949– 1965. National University of Singapore Press and Kyoto University Press, 2011. Li, Qing, Xiaoxiao Chen, and Wei Yang. “Beyond Co-ethnicity: The Politics of Differentiating and Integrating New Immigrants in Singapore,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 37, no. 7, pp. 1225–1238, 2014.

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Li, Qing, Xiaoxiao Chen, and Wei Yang. “2017 nian zhongguo liuxue huiguo renyuan fazhan qingkuang diaoyan baogao (Report on the Development of Returned Chinese Students Studying Aboard 2017),” in Wang Huiyao and Miao Lyu (ed.), Annual Report on the Development of Chinese Students Studying Abroad 2017 (No. 6), pp. 71–101. Social Science Academic Press, 2017. Liu, Hong. “Sino-Southeast Asian Studies: Towards an Alternative Paradigm,” Asian Studies Review, vol. 25, no. 3, 2001. Liu, Hong. China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1959–1965. Singapore and Kyoto: National University of Singapore Press and Kyoto University Press, 2011. Liu, Hong. “Beyond Co-Ethnicity: The Politics of Differentiating and Integrating New Imagrants in Singapore,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 37, no. 7, 2014. Liu, Hong and Gregor Benton. “The Qiaopi Trade and Its Role in Modern China and the Chinese Diaspora: Toward an Alternative Explanation of ‘Transnational Capitalism’,” Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 575–594, 2016. Liu, Hong and Els Van Dongen. “China’s Diaspora Policies and the Changing Dynamics of Diasporic Chinese Entrepreneurship,” China: An International Journal, vol. 10, no. 3, 2016. Liu, Hong and Guanie Lim. “The Political Economy of a Rising China: Malaysia’s Responses to the Belt and Road Initiative,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 28, no. 116, pp. 216–231, 2019. Liu, Hong and Zhou Taomo. “Bandung Humanism and a New Understanding of the Global South: An Introduction,” Critical Asian Studies, 2019. https://doi.org/1 0.1080/14672715.2018.1564625 Liu, Hong and Tingyan Wang. “China and the Singapore Model: Perspectives from Mid-level Cadres and Implications for Transnational Knowledge Transfer,” China Quarterly, vol. 236, pp. 988–1011, 2018. Liu, Hong and S.K. Wong. Singapore Chinese Society in Transition: Business, Politics and Socio-economic Change, 1945–1965. Peter Lang Publishing, 2004. Liu, Hong and Yishu Zhou. “Chinese Capitalism and ASEAN Economic Community,” in Yos Santasombat (ed.), The Sociology of Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Prospects. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Mann, Michael. “Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?,” in David Held and Anthony McGrew (ed.), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, pp. 136–147. Polity Press, 2000. McGregor, Richard. “‘Sea Turtle’ Plan Tests Beijing’s Old Boy Network,” Financial Times, 12 August 2009. Montoya, Celeste. “The European Union, Capacity Building, and Transnational Networks: Combating Violence against Women through the Daphne Program,” International Organization, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 359–372, 2008. Miyoshi, Masao and Harry D. Harootunian, ed. Learning Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies. Duke University Press, 2002. Newman, Abraham. “Building Transnational Civil Liberties: Transgovernmental Entrepreneurs and the European Data Privacy Directive,” International Organization, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 103–130, 2008. Nolan, Jane, Chris Rowley, and Malcolm Warner. Business Networks in East Asian Capitalisms: Enduring Trends, Emerging Patterns. Chandos Publishing, 2017. Peng, Dajin. “Invisible linkages: A Regional Perspective of East Asian Political Economy,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 423–447, 2002.

Transnational Asia’s changing dynamics 147 Powell, Walter and Laurel Smith-Doerr. “Networks and Economic Life,” in Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg (ed.), The Handbook of Economic Sociology, pp. 368–402. Princeton University Press, 1994. Ren, Na and Hong Liu. “Traversing between Transnationalism and Integration: Dual Embeddedness of New Chinese Immigrant Entrepreneurs in Singapore,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 298–326, 2015. Ren, Na and Hong Liu. “Domesticating ‘Transnational Cultural Capital’: The Chinese State and Diasporic Technopreneur Returnees,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, pp. 1–21, 2019. Saputro, Eko. Indonesia and ASEAN Plus Three Financial Cooperation: Domestic Politics, Power Relations, and Regulatory Regionalism. Palgrave, 2017. Shambaugh, David, ed. Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics. University of California Press, 2005. Summers, Tim. “China’s ‘New Silk Roads’: Sub-national Regions and Networks of Global Political Economy,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 9, pp. 1628–1643, 2016. Stoker, Gerry. “Governance as Theory: Five Propositions,” International Social Sciences Journal, vol. 155, pp. 17–28, 1998. Suehiro, Akira. Catch-Up Industrialization: The Trajectory and Prospects of East Asian Economies. National University of Singapore Press, 2008. Van Dongen, Els and Hong Liu. “Diaspora and Migration: History of the Chinese in Southeast Asia,” in Gracia Liu-Farrer and Brenda Yeoh (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Asian Migration, pp. 33–48. London: Routledge, 2017. Wang, Cangbai, Siu-lun Wong, and Wenbin Sun. “Haigui: A New Area in China’s Policy towards Chinese Diaspora?” Journal of Chinese Overseas, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 294–309, 2006. Wang, Huiyao and Kang Rongping, ed. Report on Development of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs 2017. The Chinese Overseas Publishing House, 2017. Yang, Peidong. “Desiring ‘Foreign Talent’: Lack and Lacan in Anti-immigrant Sentiments in Singapore,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 44, no. 6, pp. 1015–1031, 2017. Yeung, Henry W.C. “Governing the Market in a Globalizing Era: Developmental States, Global Production Networks and Inter-firm Dynamics in East Asia,” Review of International Political Economy, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 70–101, 2014. Yeung, Henry W.C. “State-led Development Reconsidered: The Political Economy of State Transformation in East Asia since the 1990s,” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 83–98, 2017. Zhao, Suisheng (ed.). China’s New Global Strategy: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Volume 1. Routledge, 2019. Zhou, Min, ed. Contemporary Chinese Diasporas. Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Zhou, Taomo and Hong Liu. “Chinese Foreign Policy: Southeast Asia,” in Weiping Wu and Mark Frazier (ed.), The SAGE Handbook of Contemporary China, vol. 1, pp. 610–630. Sage Publications, 2018. Zweig, David, Chung Siu Fung, and Donglin Han. “Redefining the Brain Drain: China’s ‘Diaspora Option’,” Science, Technology, Society, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1–33, 2008.

Part III

Toward a generally accepted historical narrative in East Asia

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Questioning the “empireness” of national history East Asian history narrated in Korea, China, and Japan YU Yongtae

Abstract: As part of our efforts to construct a “generally acceptable historical narrative” in East Asia, this chapter focuses on the most significant obstacle that hinders our project: the “empireness in historical narratives.” The concept of “empireness” is defined as the imagination emerged from the process of an empire’s formation, maintenance, and expansion. Attitudes toward the empireness in the narratives of one’s own country can be roughly divided into two variants: a critical and a boastful attitude. Since a regional history of East Asia requires compatibility with the different national histories of all relevant countries, there is an urgent need to critically reflect on the empireness of our own national histories in order to confront a more general regional history of East Asia. In previous works, I examined how a number of key issues that are taken for granted in national history have been subsequently depicted in regional history. Key examples include the understanding of modern history as based on an attack-defense dichotomy, empires’ ambitions and imperial expansions, and the historical rhetoric of the Hua-Yi distinction. This chapter will analyze recently published works on East Asian history in China, Korea, and Japan. It seeks to re-examine the boastful and self-assertive glorification of expansion-oriented empireness that, from a self-critical perspective, is viewed as harmful to neighboring countries.

Introduction In East Asian countries, the maxims “examine yourself three times a day” and “learn from history” are widely known. They indicate that self-reflection is an extremely challenging task. Therefore, in every country’s perception and interpretation of its own history, there always exists a critical and reflective attitude alongside a boastful one. A boastful historiography constructs its history as a success story from the viewpoint of its own race and discards narratives that do not fit into this picture. Any historiography of this kind could not possibly gain recognition from other countries. For the past 70 years, the question of how to interpret “the periods of colonial rule and invasion” in modern East Asian history has been a common concern in Korea, China, and Japan. As far as the Japanese case is concerned, the achievement of a “postwar historiography” has greatly improved the Japanese’s attitudes toward their own history. However, in recent years, boastful historiographies

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seem to be enjoying a return. This is also reflected in the rise of rightwing voices since the latter half of the 1990s (Jeong 2014: 8, 261–263). Under such circumstances, one Japanese scholar asserted that the “history of modern Japan from our viewpoints” must include the “awareness of the tension relations” with “people who lived under the colonial rule” and take into consideration the standpoint of both the colonizing and the colonized side (Kimishima 2014: 1–2). This chapter has been prepared as part of a lecture series that aims at constructing a generally acceptable historical perception and “historical narrative” of East Asia. It considers empireness to be the most significant obstacle in realizing this project. Therefore, this chapter focuses on how we should deal with the concept of empireness in domestic historical narratives by examining the recently published East Asian history in Korea, China, and Japan. Compared to the criticisms of other countries’ empireness, critical reflection on the empireness of one’s own country is the determining factor in the reconstruction of an East Asian history. The concept of empireness that is applied here refers to the tendency that contributes to an empire’s formation, maintenance, and expansion, as well as the objective circumstances caused by it. Furthermore, the empire referred to here includes both traditional and modern empires. The “East Asian regional history” that this chapter refers to is the published works on the history of East Asia in Korea, China, and Japan after 2000. This includes works written by authors from a single country as well as works jointly written by authors from different countries. In order to examine to what extent the self-centric epistemological system in national history could be relativized, this chapter will focus on the self-perception revealed in domestic nation-state historiography that usually highlights their empireness. In particular, we will examine how East Asian history as narrated by Japanese authors confronts the empireness of Japan. By doing this, this chapter seeks to re-examine the boastful and self-assertive glorification of expansion-oriented empireness that, from a selfcritical perspective, is viewed as harmful to neighboring countries.

1 The tradition and publication of East Asian regional history In recent years, works on East Asia’s regional history have been frequently published in Korea, China, and Japan. For instance, Yang Jun and Zhang Naihe’s History of East Asia: From Pre-Historical Eras to the End of the 20th Century (Changchun Publishing Co., 2006); Hiroshi Mitani, Yusuke Namiya, and Tatsuhiko Namiki’s Modern History for Adults: The Nineteenth Century (The University of Tokyo Press, 2009); and Yu Tai-ya, Park Jin-ryong, and Park Taehong’s Reading Modern East Asian History Together: 1, 2 (Changbi Publishers, 2010–2011). For convenience, they will be referred to in the following sections as the “Changchun version,” the “Todai version,” and the “Changbi version,” respectively. They are all categorized as “single country versions.” The “Changchun version” and the “Changbi version” are the earliest works on East Asian history to be published in China and Korea, respectively. In Japan, there had also been works of this kind before the “Todai version” had been published.

The “empireness” of national history 153 The publication of the aforementioned “single country version” was probably inspired by the joint work of historians from the three countries. It was entitled The History Opening the Future: Modern History of Korea, China and Japan (2005). Unlike the earlier-mentioned “single country version,” this volume was simultaneously published in three languages and received a positive reaction. Based on this experience, the following collaborative project, entitled New East Asian Modern History: I/II (2012), was published in the three countries at the same time. Following this, the East Asian historical narrative has been elaborated on in the tussle between “single nation versions” and joint works. In 2007, “East Asian History” was designated as an elective course in South Korea’s high school education system, followed by the publication of the textbook East Asian History. In Japan, the country that has played the role of forerunner in advocating the necessity of constructing East Asian history, the proposal to insert an “East Asian History” course into the high school curriculum has ultimately failed. Against the background of the collapse of the world order shaped by the Cold War and the trend of democratization, narratives on East Asian history, published in various forms in different countries, started to flourish after 2000. As a result, the task of re-examining de-colonization, long overlooked due to the East vs. West ideological contest, came to the surface and provided a good opportunity for reflection on empireness. However, the rise of East Asia’s regional historical narratives was not just the result of the changing political realities. Efforts made by actors in historical research and history education also played a crucial role. In other words, ordinary accounts of national history and world history are usually constructed from the viewpoint of nation-states. Therefore, they tend to internalize certain historical perceptions that regard the expansion of nation-states, as well as the aggression and suppression caused by it (the empireness), as natural. As a response, East Asia’s regional history functions as a laboratory for critical reflections on such an epistemological system (Baik 2007; Yu 2009: 380–384). In the introductions and postscripts of recently published works on East Asian history, the intention of constructing a regional history is often referred to. For instance, the “Changbi version” re-examined the gap between national history and world history, as well as the self-centrism of the former and the Euro-centrism of the latter. It was initiated in 2004 when the conflicts over historical perceptions between Korea, China, and Japan (e.g., the Fusōsha textbook in Japan and the Northeast Project undertaken by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) had come to the surface after 2000. The “Todai version” emerged against the background of the Chinese and Korean mass protests in 2005 against Japan’s perception of regional history, claiming that “the Japanese people do not reflect on their own ancestors’ crime in the first half of the 20th century.” It claims that Japanese citizens lack knowledge of historical facts in comparison to “citizens in neighboring countries who have systematically learned Japan’s invasion and occupation in school education,” and the Japanese are therefore ignorant of neighboring countries’ histories. The book was thus intended to fill in the blanks of Japanese memory on the “history of East Asia as a whole.” The “Changchun edition” launched in 2004, a time when the “general history of East Asia became indispensable in academic exchange within

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domestic and international circles” and when “debates on East Asia have rapidly increased in the field of politics and economics since 2003.” Compared to the other two versions, the “Changchun version” paid less attention to the necessity of selfreflection, which is also obvious in its concrete depiction. Due to the aforementioned circumstances, narratives on the regional history of East Asia vary greatly. As distinguished from any study conducted from a comparative perspective, the “Todai version” and the “Changchun version” restrict their focus to activities on a national level. These versions structure regional history primarily as a diplomatic history of relevant countries that are merely complemented by respective national histories. In contrast, the “Changbi version” discusses a selective cluster of topics in both national and regional contexts, as well as in the context of civil society. The narrative unfolds from an entangled perspective (regional) and from a comparative perspective (state and civil society). Compared to diplomatic histories and histories of communication, which limit their focus to immediate and short-term relations, “entangled histories” shed light on structural and long-term connections. We need to apply the approach of “entangled histories” to highlight the direct or indirect connections between different actors in history, as well as adopt comparative perspectives in order to underline the subjectivity of these actors (Yu 2010: 30–32). This would deepen our understanding of history. If we examine the outlines of the earlier-mentioned narratives on East Asian history written in different countries, it is obvious that the “Todai version” and the “Changchun version” divide their content into chapters that focus on different nation-states, whereas the “Changbi version” seeks to set a topic and henceforth structures the relating circumstances in various countries from a comparative perspective. In addition, the former versions tend to affirm the East vs. West dichotomy while the latter lays its emphasis on the interconnectedness of the region. The “Todai version” illustrates East Asian history from early modern eras to the outbreak of the first Sino-Japanese War. In the following, we will restrict our subject of comparison to this time period.

2 Two epistemological paradigms: the East vs. West dichotomy and the philosophy of self-defense From an international relations perspective, the “Todai version” and the “Changchun edition” follow a philosophy of self-defense, which is revealed by their chapter arrangements and ideologies that are expoused through their content. They describe modern East Asian history in terms of an “advance” (“Todai version”) or “invasion” (“Changchun version”) of Western powers into the region and the subsequent responses of the respective countries—thereby emphasizing the dichotomy between tributary systems and the modern treaty-based world order and the division between East and West. As a result, the interrelationships between the East Asian countries are largely overlooked. To be sure, the responses of Japan and China have indeed led to the development of modern empires. However, a viewpoint that interprets their own country’s triumphal path to an empire as the necessary outcome of self-defense is one that needs to be reconsidered.

The “empireness” of national history 155 If we take the outline of the “Todai version” as an example, it is obvious that the volume places much value on Japan’s relations with Great Britain, the United States, and Russia, especially on the latter’s threat to Japan. Four chapters out of 27 focus on the earlier-mentioned issues. Recent scholarship that has criticized traditional historiography for overestimating the Western threat seems to be overlooked in this textbook.1 Moreover, the diplomatic entanglements of East Asian countries, as well as their mutual perceptions, are merely outlined without any in-depth analysis. For instance, the French invasions of Indochina and the consequent signing of the Saigon Treaty, which seriously influenced Japan’s policies on China, were not even included—an inexplicable act for a textbook that purportedly zooms into the region’s international relations. Following this manner, the “Todai version” not only sheds light on the activities of powerful nations such as Russia, Great Britain, and the United States but also underlines how “brilliantly” Japan reacted to those external challenges. For instance, the first chapter of what professes itself to be an “East Asian history” (not a Japanese history) is entitled “Japan’s Decision to Open the Country.” Moreover, the authors devoted four chapters to Japan’s justifiable responses, which included the decision of Hotta Masayoshi (堀田), the elder of foreign affairs in Tokugawa shogunate, to open the country from the inside in 1857. It seems that the authors deem Japan’s triumphs in their modernization efforts to be a result of the wisdom of their leaders’ political decisions.2 For this reason, the fact that the tariff was lowered from 20% to 5% in 1864 and that the Emperor succumbed to the demands of the Western powers and signed unequal treaties is not mentioned in this textbook. Chapters 15 to 26 of the “Todai version” focus on the localization of the modern treaty system in Korea, China, and Japan as their respective responses to the expansion of Western powers. It sheds light on the institutional reforms and the making of modern nation-states in East Asia. The outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War has been interpreted as the inevitable consequence of Japan and China’s military expansions, and Japan’s involvement in the war has been regarded as an act of self-defense against the threat from China and Russia. The “Changchun version” follows the development of East Asian countries’ transformations from the tribute system to the modern treaty-based international relations system. Chapters 13 and 14 illustrate European countries’ colonial expansions into Southeast Asia since the sixteenth century, which weakened the existing tribute system and led to its eventual decline due to colonization by Western powers, including Japan. Like the “Todai version,” the “Changchun version” also emphasizes Russia’s repeat invasions into “Chinese territories.” However, the latter recognized 1874 as a major turning point in East Asia’s regional order. It interprets the Treaty of Saigon as “France’s replacement of China as Vietnam’s suzerain.” In addition, Japan is regarded as having “invaded Taiwan” and signing a special agreement with the Beijing government, thereby “annexing China’s vassal state Ryūkyū.” This was, therefore, a landmark event in the collapse of the tributary system which came under internal as well as external attacks (see the Korean translation of the “Changchun version,” pp. 36, 375).

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Corresponding to this event, the argument for self-defense that sought to bail out the declining tribute system also came to the surface. In Chapter 14, the authors apply contemporary maps to clarify the crisis of losing vassal states and territories due to Russian, British, French, and Japanese invasions and outlines China’s responses to the crisis. In other words, Russia’s invasion in Ili and Japan’s attack on Taiwan led to the establishment of direct-controlled provinces in these two-ethnic minorityinhabited regions in 1884 and 1885. It takes the protectorate-like relations between China and Korea during 1884–1894 for granted and interprets China’s participation in the war as self-defense against the threat of Japan’s annexation of Korea. Chapter 15, “Toward a Treaty-based Modern World Order,” is comprised of the following three sections: “China’s National Salvation,” “The Construction of the Japanese Empire,” and “Colonization in Southeast Asia and the Treaty System.” China’s salvation and Japan’s imperial expansion are narrated as confrontations between victims and invaders. The antagonism of East vs. West has been replaced by the dichotomy of China vs. Japan after the First Sino-Japanese War, which was the logical extension of the previous interpretation that saw Korea’s subordination to the Qing Dynasty from 1882 to 1894 as China’s self-defense against Japan. Compared to the earlier two textbooks published in China and Japan, the “Changbi version” stands aloof from the East vs. West dichotomy and the ideology of self-defense. Instead, it focuses on the interconnectedness found within East Asia. Following a general introduction, which demonstrates the actuality and significance of studying East Asia’s regional history, the first chapter concludes with a comprehensive overview of the respective countries’ circumstances and the regional order in the era of the sea ban (seventeenth century to the first half of the nineteenth century). Chapter 2 illustrates the enlargement of the world market and the transformation of regional orders driven by the intervention of Western powers. It seeks to trace the interrelations between East Asian countries’ national crises—brought about by unequal treaties—and the reactions of the states and societies. Chapter 3 sheds light on East Asia’s respective countries’ blueprints and practices toward the making of modern states (namely reforms and revolutions), focusing on the interactions and entanglements revealed in their ideas and practices. Chapter 4, “Imperialist Invasion and Anti-Imperialist Movement,” starts with a section entitled “Power Struggle between Qing, Japan, and Russia,” which signifies that the textbook makes a concerted effort to overcome the East vs. West dichotomy and the ideology of selfdefense. Through its narrative structure, this textbook invites its readers to confront the empireness of their own countries. Moreover, it divides the states and societies of the five countries within East Asia into two categories and analyzes their respective characteristics from a comparative perspective in sections entitled “States of Mandarin and States of Warlords” and “Peasants Society and Social Turmoil.” In summary, the “Todai version” and the “Changchun version” are identical by the fact that they base their argument on the worldview that interprets the modernization of East Asia as a defensive response to the advance and invasion of the West. This is obviously the consequent outcome of evolutional civilization historiography, which viewed East Asia at the time as an arena for the power politics of great empires. All of the East Asian countries, namely China, Japan, Korea,

The “empireness” of national history 157 Ryukyu, and Vietnam, were forced by Western powers’ military invasions and threats to open the country at a time when the state’s sovereignty was severely damaged by unequal treaties signed under the pressure of gunboat diplomacy. Therein lies the origin of the ideology of the “defensive response.” Nonetheless, this logic fails to explain the subsequent unfolding of the SinoJapanese relations and their respective interactions with other neighboring countries. For the neighboring smaller countries, China and Japan’s so-called selfdefense was nothing but “competitive invasion.” For instance, Japan, a country whose sovereignty had already been damaged, became a “semi-power” by infringing on other countries’ sovereignty—including Ryukyu, Korea, and China—since 1874, which marks the starting point of Japan’s rise to becoming an empire. China also sought to cast Korea under its area of influence and protection from 1882 to 1894. The “Todai version” speaks of the Western powers’ advance into East Asia without using the expression “invasion.” (Russia, exceptionally, was characterized as an invader.) Following the same logic, the “expansion of areas under Japanese influence” and “the enlargement of the empire” in East Asia are not interpreted as invasions. By discussing “expansion” and “enlargement,” the textbook indirectly rejects the sovereignty and subjectivity of the areas under control, viewing them as terra nullius.3 Compared to the “Todai version,” the “Changchun version” condemns Western powers’ and Japan’s invasions in East Asia, while refusing to define China’s activities toward neighboring countries as an “invasion.” According to the Japanese government’s official definition in 1982, the expression “invasion” means “to make inroads to another country’s territory and sovereignty with armed force” (Jeong 1998: 207). The United Nations accepted a definition of “invasion” in 1974 that defines the word as “violating another country’s sovereignty, territory, or political independence.” According to these two definitions, the unequal treaties that East Asian countries signed with Western powers can be entirely defined as the consequences of “invasion.” Although Japan also suffered from being forced to sign unequal treaties and subsequently have its sovereignty partly damaged, the “Todai version” makes no reference to the Western powers’ invasion of Japan. This places the “Todai version” apart from the “Changchun version” and the “Changbi version.” What did the authors intend to demonstrate by shedding light on Japan’s national crisis in the dichotomy between East and West? Maybe they uncovered the Western invasion of Japan in order to veil Japan’s violence toward Asian countries, or perhaps they sought to re-emphasize the historiography of “the country of the Gods” that refrains from invasion and being invaded.

3 Empire, the dream of becoming an empire, and the making of empires In the previous section, I claimed that modern Japan’s path toward becoming an empire started in 1874. Different to my periodization, the majority of general histories on Japan—as well as the “Todai version” of East Asian history—dates the beginning of Japan’s rise to an empire to its occupation of Taiwan. Is this

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periodization justified? How would the “Changchun version” depict the Qing Dynasty’s imperial policies that sought to respond to Japan’s rise to power? The two Chinese characters of “Teikoku” (or Diguo 帝国) can be traced back to the translation of the Dutch word “keizerrijk” and the English word “empire” in the Bakumatsu period. In the history of both Europe and Asia, empires have existed in various forms. In pre-modern eras, an empire meant an absolute ruler’s control over a vast territory. After constitutional systems came into being in modern times, regardless of whether an absolute ruler existed, “empire” meant the hierarchical ruling system of modern states over a vast territory including itself and remote areas inhabited by other races. As Eric Hobsbawm has made clear, emperors and empires have existed for a long time, but imperialism is a newly emerged phenomenon. It is new in questing for an empire with modern state as the ruling subject.4 Therefore, the concept of “empireness” is not restricted to modern empires. It applies to any form of empire as far as an empire exists. It is universally known that the Chinese dynasties can be defined as pre-modern empires since the time of the Qin and Han Dynasties, regardless of whether they understood themselves as such. Taking the imperial system of the Tang Dynasty as an ideal model, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam more or less shared the same “dream of becoming an empire.” As the three versions of East Asian history have commonly remarked, when the Manchus—hitherto viewed as barbarians—succeeded in establishing the Qing Dynasty and expanding their rule over China, the respective East Asian countries took it upon themselves to play the role of “Zhonghua” (Middle Kingdom) and reconstruct a Sino-centric world order on a smaller scale. However, due to the different subjective desires and objective conditions, their achievements in re-establishing the Sino-centric world order also differed greatly. If we admit that the traditional “dream of becoming an empire” has its origin in China, its modern version comes from Japan. When the East Asian countries were still sharing the traditional “dream of becoming an empire” derived from the Chinese model, Japan was the first country that reacted to the threat of European modernity and sought to transform itself to a modern empire. It was in the Treaty of Kanagawa of 1854 that Japan designated itself as “Empire” for the first time. In the Treaty, the country was named in English as the “Empire of Japan” and in Japanese as “Teikoku Nippon” (帝国日本). On the other hand, the phrase “Nippon Teikoku” (日本帝国), invented by the Edo Bakufu, was usually used in the context of Japan’s confrontation with Western countries. It embodies demonstrations of independence and national dignity and therefore internalizes their aim to “enrich the country, strengthen the armed forces” that supports this claim. In 1856, Tokugawa Nariaki (徳川斉昭) claimed that despite the small scale of our “country of the Gods,” foreigners admire and fear us as an empire. This is a result of the vigorous and powerful military actions carried out abroad, including Empress Jingū’s three expeditions to the Korean peninsula, the medieval defense against the Mongolian, and Hideyoshi’s crusade to Korea in early modern times. (Park 2004: 109)

The “empireness” of national history 159 After the Meiji restoration, this logic was still common. After Japan’s first military operation abroad, namely its invasion of Taiwan in 1874, this logic had been gradually established. For instance, in February 1874, Ōkubo Toshimichi and Ōguma Shigenobu, associate counselors of the imperial court, claimed that “to take vengeance on those who murdered the civilians in our vassal Ryūkyū is the responsibility of the Japanese Empire’s government. The punitive expedition is therefore legitimized” (Lee 2014: 217). In December 1875, immediately after the Ganghwa Island Incident, a certain civil petition calling for military operations against Korea stated that “Korea has been a minor country in the Northeast. Despite its position as our empire’s vassal, it has refused to pay tribute since the Middle Ages. How can we tolerant such a crime?” (Park 2004: 113). It is noteworthy that phrases typical of the Sino-Barbarian worldview such as “punitive expedition” (討蕃) and paying tribute (朝貢) were still used. Japan was also addressed as an “empire.” It turns out that modern Japan’s “dream of becoming an empire” was based on the world order of pre-modern East Asia and took shape with the reception of the modern world order. Immediately after having attacked Ganghwa Island, Japan began to name itself “Dai Nippon teikoku” (大日本帝国, Empire of Great Japan) in its confrontation with Korea. It reveals Japan’s ambition for having set its first step toward constructing an empire. Taking the attack of Taiwan as its opportunity, Japan had now taken control of the domestic politics and diplomacy of the Ryukyu Kingdom. The Ganghwa Island Incident was only the necessary consequent next step. From 1874 to 1875, the Japanese had developed a hierarchical system that defined Japan as a “free and independent country,” China as an “independent country restricted by treaties,” and Korea as an “independent country that pays tribute,” positioning Japan as a first-class country in East Asia. This transformation reflected the contemporary strong wish of the Japanese to play the role of Great Britain in the East (Kim 2011: 210–211; Park 1984: 100–101). In fact, thanks to the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876, Japan forced Korea to open the country and thus guaranteed its status in international society. By doing so, Japan not only rose to a semi-power in the world system but also succeeded in accumulating capital by forcibly taking over rice and gold in Korea (Baik 2009: 23). The “Todai version” recognizes Japan’s extension of administration in Hokkaidō and Ryukyu as “the process of colonization” (see p. 192). This reference is a noteworthy remark based on a self-reflective re-consideration of history. These two events are the first cases in the process of Japan’s rise to becoming a modern empire wherein Japan “annexed” outside countries or regions inhabited by other races. In the first volume of Koza Higashi Kingendai-shi (講座東アジ ア近現代史, Lectures on Modern East Asian History) edited by Wada Haruki (和 田春樹) et. al., Inoue Katsuo (井上勝生) defines Japan’s expansion in Hokkaido and its occupation of Korea as “two annexations.” Following Inoue’s argument, we could certainly add the merger of Ryukyu’s to the Japanese Empire and name the three events as “three annexations.” The first two, namely the annexation of Hokkaidō and Ryukyu, occurred before the first Sino-Japanese War and belong to the series of Japan’s imperialistic policies that ultimately led to the war. The

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“Todai version” is in the position to confront the reality of “colonization” in Hokkaido and Ryukyu Kingdom. Regrettably, however, it fails to recognize the two events as the starting point of Japan’s rise to becoming an empire. Therefore, positing the first Sino-Japanese War as this starting point is necessarily based on a Euro-centric worldview. This assertion is supported by the following two arguments. First, the “Todai version” restricts the definition of “imperialistic expansion” to an expansion of monopoly capitalism that typically characterizes reality in Europe. It thus fails to grasp the peculiarities of Japan’s imperialism that was to be understood as both a protective defense against Western powers and as a preemptive attack on East Asian neighboring countries. Second, the “Todai version” does not recognize Japan as an empire until it succeeded in removing the unequal treaties and was viewed by Western powers as an equal partner. This reveals that the textbook merely focuses on Japan’s relationship with the West while largely overlooking its relations with East Asian neighboring countries. As mentioned earlier, Meiji Japan’s rise to becoming an empire and Russia’s occupation in Ili had stimulated the Qing Dynasty to transform itself from a traditional empire to a modern one. Between 1884 and 1885, the Qing established a provincial administration in Xinjiang. Moreover, it affected its diplomacy with Korea as well as its domestic politics, which sought to put Korea under its protection from 1882 to 1894. During this time period, the Qing had lost almost all of its tribute states. Its desire to display itself as a modern empire became stronger in its confrontations with Korea, its last tribute state. This desire was concretized as the policy of a protectorate province. Supported by military powers, Yuan Shi-kai was appointed as Imperial Resident in Korea, taking control over Korea’s fiscal and diplomatic issues through his agencies. This was the Qing’s attempt to make Korea its protectorate province, which had not been fulfilled due to the Qing’s defeat in its war with Japan. In the process of the Qing’s struggle to transform itself into a modern empire, Chinese civilian intellectuals were supportive and proposed a plan of “national imperialism.” For instance, Liang Qichao wrote in 1902 that mainstream world politics was a competition of empires. In accordance, he posited that China should unify various races inhabiting its territory and “construct one powerful nation.” On this basis, China should hence “develop a nation-state” and learn from the nations of the Latin and Teutonic races to occupy more colonies (Yu 2008: 35–36). The domestic policies of China’s modern empire led to the construction of a powerful nation—the Chinese nation. Its foreign policy was in the pursuit of occupying more colonies. Compared to circumstances in Japan, the empireness of modern China has been only realized in domestic policies. At exactly the same time, Korea had been driven into a deep crisis as the victim of invasions from three countries, namely China, Japan, and Russia. As one of Korea’s strategies for self-preservation, it announced in 1897 the founding of the Great Korean Empire. However, this strategy comprised little more than a name change and was far removed from an essential move toward empire-making. Still, it revealed the conflictual historical reality when each country was struggling for its own “dream of becoming an empire.” The sovereignty of “the Great Korean Empire” had been gradually weakened in the power struggles between it and China, Japan, and Russia. The forcible annexation of Japan brought its final

The “empireness” of national history 161 destruction. The Nguyễn Dynasty, which named itself the “Empire of Ðại Nam,” fell into France’s control even before that. Taken together, the four East Asian countries share similar historical experiences in transforming their traditional “dream of becoming an empire”—based on the Sino-centric world order—to the modern “dream of becoming an empire,” which aims at enriching the country and strengthening its military forces. However, to which extent these “dreams” were turned into reality differs from country to country. Thus, when discussing contemporary historical perceptions, the concept of empireness as an inhibiting factor in a self-reflective historiography necessarily varies. Compared to Korea, Japan and China have a more convincing historical argument for their empireness. If the reflection and reconsideration of one’s own country’s empireness is the precondition for writing an “East Asian history,” we urgently wish that China and Japan could honestly confront their own empireness. This is also the basic condition by which to understand the epistemological framework in narrating East Asian history in the “Todai version” and the “Changchun version.”

4 The possibilities and limitations of a self-reflective historiography As mentioned earlier, the epistemological frameworks of the “Todai version” and the “Changchun version” of East Asian history are under the obvious influence of a boastful historiography perspective, which supports the ideology of empireness. Such an ideology is also reflected in the details of concrete historical events in their respective narratives. However, we also notice that these two narratives are not absolutely without self-reflective factors. It is especially noteworthy that the “Todai version” provides a critical re-examination of Japan’s empireness, while the “Changchun version” does not. First of all, the “Todai version” illustrates Japanese-Korean relations before the opening of the country from an objective standpoint. It claims that each country “considered itself to be on a higher stage in the hierarchy than the other” and “forged a contesting (as equal opponents) relation with Tsushima—an island that played the role as a balancing point due to its dual” (see p. 12). This interpretation critically reflects on the fact that Japan had viewed Korea as its tribute state at the dawn of the Meiji restoration. Moreover, the Ganghwa Island Incident in 1875 was a result of Japan’s provocation, which aimed at triggering a military conflict. It later turned out that the Japanese authorities had fabricated the report, accusing the Korean side of having fired first with intent. This fabricated information was widely circulated in various Japanese newspapers and strongly evoked hatred toward Korea among Japanese folk and stimulated propaganda that called for the authorities to “punish” Korea. Second, the “Todai version” illustrates the “early modern” history of the Ryukyu Kingdom in a separate chapter, treating it on an equal level as Korea, China, and Japan. In addition, it defines the Meiji government’s “Ryukyu disposition” in 1879 as the “Ryukyu Annexation,” a term used to describe Japan’s taking over of Ryukyu. It also applies the same logic to Meiji Japan’s expansion in Hokkaido. As far as the negotiations between Japan and China on the massacre of

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Ryukyu residents is concerned, the textbook points out that the Qing had never committed to Japan’s claim for Ryukyu’s position as its vassal state. Nonetheless, the Meiji government arbitrarily interpreted the Qing’s statement in order to legitimize its attack in Ryukyu (see p. 169). Third, the “Todai version” relativized the mainstream narrative that Japan had launched an imperialistic expansion after the first Sino-Japanese War and provided the possibilities for reinterpretation. According to conventional interpretation, Japan established its rule in Taiwan after the first Sino-Japanese War and became a colonial power like the Western countries, which affirmed Japan’s success in civilizing itself and hugely stimulated national pride. The “Todai version” provided alternative interpretations of the same historical event. For instance, it introduces Natsume Sōseki’s diary, which spoke of “Japan’s success as an overexertion that leads to nonsense,” and Sōseki’s remark that “rather than attribute mercifulness to the Japanese, we should recognize that the Chinese are more descent folk” (p. 260f). Moreover, it showcases the violence of Japanese troops against Chinese civilians during the war. Fourth, the “Todai version” seeks to confront the reality that all of the East Asian countries have internalized the self-centrism ideology of “leaving Asia” during the process of nation-state formation. In Chapter 27, “The Making of International Public Goods,” it claims that “when China and Japan sought to adapt to Western modernity, they also adopted the orientalism and viewed their neighboring countries as the opposite side of modernity” (p. 277). It also asserts that “in the process of nation-state formation, to legitimize itself by refuting neighboring countries is a widely seen phenomena” (p. 271). The earlier-mentioned four points are reflective elements in the “Todai version.” In the “Changchun version,” no such self-criticism can be observed. Some exceptional examples that reveal modern Korea’s empireness can easily be related to the U.S.’s empireness in the Vietnam War. Volume II of the “Changbi version,” for example, discusses the nature of South Korea’s involvement in the war and the problem of violence toward civilians. From a self-critical aspect, it re-examines a series of events, namely the “tracing the historical reality” movement from the latter half of the 1990s that gave voice to local inhabitants who had spoken out. It caused a split in historical perceptions and ultimately led to the Korean president’s official apology to Vietnam. These events are narrated from self-critical perspectives (Yu 2010: 113–146). It is noteworthy that in the “Todai version” there are also narratives supportive of modern Japan’s empireness that seek to whitewash its history. This is even more dangerous than a narrative that blatantly follows the line of a boastful historiography and is obviously under its influence. First, the nature of the unequal treaties has not been clarified. According to the “Todai version,” the formal equality of the two parties that signed the treaty is emphasized. The loss of juridical sovereignty and independent regulation of tariffs is not articulated. In addition, it includes a column asking “are the treaties unequal?”, actively arguing that the individual agreements in the treaties signed with Western powers, especially with Great Britain, contain “aspects that do not preset the colonial powers’ privilege” (p. 124f). Concerning the conventional tariffs, it states that “even when the export tariff was kept on a low level, it harms

The “empireness” of national history 163 the government that depends on customs revenue, but benefits those enterprises that shoulder the nation’s exportation” (p. 125). If this statement were true, why would Korea, Japan, and the Qing Dynasty trouble themselves to abolish these treaties? Paradoxically, the “Todai version” represents Japan’s effort in removing the unequal treaties as a success story and emphasizes the contributions of the wisdom of the country’s leading politicians. In contrast, the “Changbi version” compares two historical facts. The first is that because the treaty system originated from Great Britain’s importation of opium (a narcotic drug banned in Great Britain), opium became the most frequently imported product of Great Britain to China at the beginning of the 1890s. The second fact is that the European and American countries placed a 30%–40% tariff on all imported products. Second, by deliberately misinterpreting the dichotomy between the treatybased system and the tribute system, the “Todai version” attempts to whitewash Japan’s empireness. For instance, it claims that “having adopted the diplomacy based on international law, Japan demanded its neighboring countries to follow the same rules of the game” (p. 143). In fact, due to this new set of game rules, Vietnam, Korea, and Myanmar had lost their sovereignty. The Ryukyu Kingdom declined any treaty and therefore became, together with Korea, territories of Japan. The textbook neglects the earlier-mentioned historical facts and deliberately places emphasis on the nature of the treaty system as a symbol of modernity and common goods.5 The “Changbi version” reminds people to confront the fact that “the tribute system recognizes the autonomy of tribute states that accept the system, while in the modern treaty system, countries that accepted treaties were either annexed or made colonies” (p. 142). The “Changchun version” asserts that “the so-called treaty system that was brought by Western powers to East Asia was nothing but enforcement of the colonial system” (p. 376). The depiction of Japanese intellectuals’ and politicians’ perceptions toward public law in the “Todai version” does not align with reality. In fact, they did not perceive international law as positive law, but rather in terms of an ideal in natural law. In other words, they did not believe in the equality of every nationstate in front of international law. For politicians such as Kido Takayoshi and Ōkubo Toshimichi, the so-called public law was the legal tool of Western powers to “plunder weak countries.” Small countries, therefore, had no opportunity to make use of it (Shibahara 1988: 466–470). Third, the “Todai version” not only actively defended the propaganda that called for the punishing of Korea and covered up Japan’s empireness, but it also refuted Japan’s invasion of Korea during the First Sino-Japanese War. Concerning what caused the outbreak of the war, it states that “voices for the expedition to Korea do exist. However, the government’s decision to engage in military action was another thing” (p. 232). If we admit that public discussions and public discourses are the pillars of modern Japanese politics (p. 111), we will realize that Japan’s policy toward Korea was unfolded and exercised on this basis. In the “Todai version,” Japan’s “expedition” and “expansion of influence” in the Ryukyu Kingdom and Korea are ever defined as an invasion. This self-centered historiography that ignores Korea’s standpoint is also revealed in its depiction of Japan’s policy towards Korea after the First Sino-Japanese War.

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According to the interpretation in the “Todai version,” Japan’s intervention in Korea’s domestic policy had resulted in the exclusion of the Qing and Russia and its “domination” in Korea. In other words, Japan had “taken over” Korea’s diplomatic affairs in 1905. This interpretation follows the same logic in the narrative of Japan’s “reclaimation” of the Ryukyu Kingdom’s diplomacy in 1875. To put it another way, instead of speaking of “invasion, aggression, and plunder,” the textbook defines the historical reality as “interference, intervention, and take over.” This perception is obvious not far away from the ideological propaganda that calls for the punishment of Korea, wherein “Korea has been Japan’s vassal state down through the ages and has to subordinate itself to the Japanese Emperor.” In addition, it even adds the comment, claiming, “as the theoretical basis for Meiji restoration, it is difficult to argue against the ideology of ‘punishing Korea’” (p. 183). The expression “punitive expedition” in the Seikanron (征韓論) indicates that the Celestial Empire’s legitimate responsibility to punish its vassal states’ immorality is by no means an invasion. Together with “tohan” (討蕃), “seikan” (征韓) belongs to the rhetoric of the Sino-centered worldview as well. It bears the supportive theoretical indication of empireness and is considered to be inappropriate as a term in today’s historical narrative. A Modern History of East Asia (1994), edited by Uehara Kazuyoshi (上原一慶) et. al., published before the “Todai version,” reveals a more reflective attitude toward Meiji Japan’s aggression. In this volume, the authors speak of the “invasion in Taiwan” instead of a “Taiwan expedition” and the descriptive words as follows: “Triggered by the Imo Incident, the Japanese government launched is military expansion to prepare for its invasion in Korea and its war against the Qing dynasty. This marks the beginning of Japan’s essential first step toward militarism.” Compared to this volume, we could make the conclusion that the “Todai version” falls behind historical perceptions as dated as this publication is, which was published 15 years ago. Finally, it is noteworthy that the “Todai version” does not make a single reference to the Yasukuni Shrine. From the Meiji Restoration until the end of World War II, many people who died in service of Japan’s civil war as well as in its military campaigns abroad on behalf of the Emperor were commemorated here. The first example of Japan’s military operations abroad was its attack on Taiwan, which marks the starting point of the Japanese Empire’s expansion plans. According to the charter of the Yasukuni Shrine, its functions include irei (慰霊 commemoration) and kenshō (顕彰 honoring). Therefore, the Yasukuni Shrine functions not only as a facility for commemoration but also as an institution that actively honors Japan’s incursions into foreign countries.

Conclusion Because China and Japan have deeper-rooted experiences as empires in both pre-modern and modern times than Korea, the request for them to confront their own empireness is thus more urgent. Compared to the “Changchun version,” the “Todai version” reveals a more critical attitude toward the empireness of Japan. Nevertheless, its self-reflection is restricted to merely a depiction of a

The “empireness” of national history 165 number of concrete historical events while its perceptual framework of modern history is still under the influence of a boastful historiography. There are two essential weaknesses in the epistemological framework that prevents the “Todai version” from achieving this critical sense of self-reflection. First, it relies on two presumptions, namely, the East vs. West dichotomy and the ideology of self-defense. Both are derived from a perspective that focuses merely on the relations between great imperialist powers. Second, the presumption is that Japanese political leaders had actively made the determination to open the country, yet that their decision to invade other countries was necessary selfdefense and therefore a passive reaction to the changing circumstances. As long as this perceptual framework exists, Japan’s aggression in East Asia will never be defined as such. Accordingly, on this basis, a generally accepted East Asian history as proposed will never come into being. However, I predict the to-be-published volume on the twentieth century of the “Todai version” will not refute the Tokyo Trial historiography, which defines Japan’s expansion from 1931 as an invasion. To define Japan’s expansion before 1931 as a process of civilization and after 1931 as aggression is a widely circulated periodization. Yoshida Yutaka (吉田裕) has criticized this double standard in Japan’s historical perception, claiming that it “accepts the judgment of the Tokyo Trial and admits Japan’s war responsibility to the minimal extent,” and “virtually refutes Japan’s war responsibility or just ignores it” (Yoshida 2004: 91). Since the 1990s, some of Japan’s prime ministers have declared apologetic statements. On the other hand, some cabinet ministers and prime ministers either repeatedly refute the statements or make reversions. This is the result of the earlier-mentioned double standard in Japan’s historical perception. In August 2015, the statement by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo on the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, which attracted great attention, revealed the same logic. On December 28, Japan’s Abe cabinet and the Park Geun-hye government of Korea settled the dispute over the “wartime comfort women” issue and reached a “final, irreversible” agreement. It shows that the political leadership of the two countries had begun to stand aloof from their boastful historiography tendencies. Therefore, a “generally accepted historical narrative of East Asia” can only be achieved when political leadership and academic historical research/history education are moving toward the same direction. Besides, that is why historical research and history education must play an essential role in the progress toward democracy. Huang Yeonsan (黄鉉産), Korea’s well-known literary critic, has described modern Japan’s colonial rule as follows: Confronting the past, this Japan that we see today is the subject facing the Japan of the past. It is the “other” that emerged from its past and has overcome it. (. . .) If we objectively view our past as an “other,” many problems are solved by themselves. (. . .) It is crucial to overcoming the national and ethnical standpoint, objectively confronting the crimes from the standpoint purely of a human being. The act of justifying war crimes has a greater impact on fortune/infortune of Japan’s future, rather than on Korea’s future. (Huang 2015: 102)

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Contemporary Japan is both the “other” and the subject of the Japan of the past. This viewpoint also applies to Korea, China, and Vietnam. Citizens of every country are both assaulters and victims of all historical events that have occurred in all time periods. Therefore, to which extent people can critically reflect on their own country’s violence also relates to their country’s fortune and misfortune in the future. Moreover, if the fortune and misfortune of a country is related to its reflection on the historical events, it will inevitably affect other countries. This concern should be the starting point in the creation of a regional history. In order to minimize the misfortune that could be brought about in the future, we need to begin “acknowledging the historical facts” of invasion and criminal acts, and teach our students—with great courage—to confront them. That is what we call “learning from history.” Therefore, the boastful historiography tendency in Japan’s education of modern history concerns me much more than merely refuting the opinions of Japanese prime ministers’ apologetic statements.

Notes 1 The Meiji government has exaggerated the threat that Western powers posed for colonies as well as Russia’s attempt to move southwards. Such propaganda, used to highlight the necessity of Japan’s independence, is obviously an exaggerated rhetoric. In fact, the Meiji government’s attempts to enlarge its territories to Ryukyu and Korea ultimately led to its military confrontation with the Qing Dynasty (Banno 1977: 10–11; Shibahara 1988: 479–480; Takahashi 1996: 523–524). 2 It also reveals the tendency to reevaluate Bakufu’s diplomacy and reverse the negative assessment of previous scholarship (Iwanami Shinsho Henshūbu 2013: 27). 3 According to Tokutomi Sōho, for contemporary Japanese, “the expansion did not equal to invasion to other countries. It solely meant the Japanese nation’s rise to a world power with its moral nobility.” Japan’s expansion was “protection for the nation’s security” (Jang 2010: 308–309). 4 For the definition of “empire,” see Lee (2014: vol. I and vol. III); Yamamoto (2004: 3–30). 5 Different from the “Todai version,” the “Handai version” of world history defines the free trade system based on unequal treaties that Japan and China were forced to sign under Western imperialists’ gunboat diplomacy as “free trade imperialism.” It points out that Japan, on the one hand, strove to abandon the unequal treaties imposed on it by Western powers, but on the other hand, Japan “followed the same way to open its neighboring Korea and impose unequal treaties on it. And this strategy, had largely shaped Japan’s later policies toward Asia” (Osaka University History Education Project 2014: 187–189).

Bibliography Baik, Yeongseo 白永瑞. “Jikokushi to Chiikishi no Sotsū: Higashi Ajia-jin no Rekishi Jujutsu ni tsuite no Seisatsu 自国史と地域史の疎通：東アジア人の歷史敍述につ いての省察,” Gendai Shisō 現代思想, no. October-35, 2007. Baik, Yeongseo 白永瑞 et al. Dongasia Yeosa Ihaengui Segallae 동아시아 近代移行의 세 갈래. Changbi 創批, 2009. Banno, Junji 坂野潤治. Meiji Shisō no Jitsuzō 明治思想の実像. Sōgensha 創元社, 1977. Huang, Yeonsan 黄鉉産. “Dareuge Saneunbeopeul Baewoya Handa 다르게 사는 법 을 배워야 한다,” Jugan Gyunghyan 週刊京郷, no. 1128, 2015.

The “empireness” of national history 167 Iwanami, Shinsho Henshūbu 岩波新書編集部. Nihon Kingendaishi wo dono yōni Miru no ka 日本近現代史をどのようにみるのか. Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 2013. Jang, Inseong 張寅成. “Geundae Dongasia Gukjesahoieseoui ’Jilseo’wa ‘Jeongui’: Gundae Ilbon Jisikinui Dongasia Gukjesahoiguan 근대 동아시아 국제사회에서 의‘秩序’와‘正義’：근대 일본 지식인의 동아시아 국제사회관,” Dongbuka Yeoksanonchong 東北アジア歴史論叢, no. 28, 2010. Jeong, Jaejeong 鄭在貞. Ilbonui Nolli: Jeonhwangiui Yeoksagyoyukgwa Hanguk Insik 日本의 論理: 轉換期의 歷史敎育과 韓國認識. Hyuneumsa 玄音社, 1998. Jeong, Jaejeong 鄭在貞. Hanilui Yeoksagaldeunggwa Yeoksadaehwa 韓日의 歷史葛 藤과 歷史對話. Hyuneumsa 玄音社, 2014. Kim, Yongdeok 金容徳, ed. Ilbonsaui Byunhyukgirul Bonda: Sahoiinsikgwa Sasang 日 本史의 變革期를 본다: 社會認識과 思想. Jisiksaneupsa 知識産業社, 2011. Kimishima, Kazuhiko 君島和彦, ed. Kindai no Nihon to Chōsen: “Sareta” Gawa kara no Shiza 近代の日本と朝鮮：「された」側からの視座. Tōkyōdō Shuppan 東京 堂出版, 2014. Lee, Smseong 李三星. Jeguk 帝国 (Hanguk Gaenyumsa Chongseo 韓国概念史叢書, vol. 8). Sohwa 小花, 2014. Osaka University History Education Project 大阪大学歴史教育研究会, ed. Shimin no tame no Sekaishi 市民のための世界史. Osaka University Press, 2014. Park, Jinwoo 朴晋雨. Geundaei Ilbon Hyungseonggiui Gukgawa Minjung 近代 日本 形成期의 國家와 民衆. J&C, 2004. Park, Yeongjae 朴英宰. “Geundae Ilbonui Hanguk Insik 近代日本의 韓國認識,” in Yeoksahakhoi (ed.), Ilbonui Chimlyak Jeongchaeksa 日本の侵略政策史硏究. Iljogak 一潮閣, 1984. Sakamoto, Kazuya 坂元一哉. “Shushō no Yasukuni Sanpai to Nicchū Kankei: Nani ga Giron o Konran saseru no ka 首相の靖國参拝と日中関係――何が議論を混乱さ せるのか,” Osaka University Law Review, no. 64, 2014. Shibahara, Takuji 芝原拓自. “Taigaikan to Nashonarizumu 対外観とナショナリズ ム,” in Shibahara Takuji et al. (ed.), Taigaikan 對外觀. (Nihon Kindai Shisō Taikei 日本近代思想大系, vol. 12). Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, 1988. Takahashi, Hidenao 高橋秀直. Nisshin Sensō e no Michi 日清戦争への道. Sōgensha 創元社, 1996. Yamamoto, Yūzō 山本有造. “‘Teikoku’ to wa Nani ka 「帝国」とはなにか,” in Yūzō Yamamoto (ed.), Teikoku no Kenkyū 帝国の研究. Nagoya University Press, 2004. Yoshida, Yutaka 吉田裕, translated by Ha Jong-mun et al. Ilbonin ui Jeonjaenggwan 日本人의 戰爭觀. Yeoksabipyeongsa 歷史批評社, 2004. Yu, Yongtae 柳鏞泰. “Minzu dayitong lun he neizaihua le de diguoxing zai jindai zhongguo 民族大一統論和內在化了的帝国性在近代中國,” Xuehai 学海, no. 5, 2008. Yu, Yongtae 柳鏞泰. “Kankoku no Betonamu Sensō Ninshiki to Rekishi Wakai e no Nichi 韓国のベトナム戦争認識と歷史和解への道,” in Tōhoku Ajia to Tōnan Ajia no Rekishi Wakai 東北アジアと東南アジアの歴史和解. Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 2010. Yu, Yongtae 柳鏞泰 and Iwakata Hisahiko 岩方久彦 trans. Kansei no Naka no Keishō: Higashi Ajia Rekishi Ninshiki to Rekishi Kyōiku no Seisatsu 歓声のなかの警鐘：東 アジア歴史認識と歴史教育の省察. Akashi shoten 明石書店, 2009. Yu, Yongtae 柳鏞泰 et al. Hamgge Ingneun Dongasia Geunhyundaesa 함께 읽는 동아 시아 근현대사, vol. I. Changbi 創批, 2010.

10 Historical perception in Taiwan and collaborative studies on East Asian history HSU Yu-Ming

Abstract: Historical perception is generally defined from two perspectives. In a broad sense, it refers to the process through which nation-states identify themselves by interpreting events that occurred in the past; on this basis, they search for key concepts that help them realize their situation. In a narrow sense, this refers only to historical narratives. Regarding the editing of history textbooks, especially in the pedagogic field, the selection and presentation of historical events usually prompts the emergence of controversial issues. Certainly, problems related to historical perception exist in Taiwan. When Taiwan’s party politics unfolded against the background of Taiwanization, debates concerning the history of education were kindled, which have led to a complete revision of textbooks in society and history. In addition, owing to the trend of de-Sinicization in Taiwan’s history education, the contesting historical perceptions have escalated into tensions or even conflicts between Taiwan and Mainland China. In the context of East Asia’s political situation, Taiwan has been a close ally of Japan. However, as a result of the process through which the history textbook for the three countries is jointly edited, Taiwan has often been ignored in discussions on East Asian problems. This chapter first provides a brief introduction to previous scholarship undertaken in Taiwan on Japan’s history textbook problem. Meanwhile, it also sheds light on Taiwan’s debates related to historical perception. By doing so, this chapter seeks to reconsider Taiwan’s role in its dialog with neighboring countries in the context of East Asia’s problem related to historical perception.

Introduction: the problem with textbooks in the context of the debate over “historical perception” The problem of “historical perception” is one significant factor affecting international relations within East Asia. It initfially emerged from an issue related to Japan’s domestic politics and gradually escalated into a diplomatic concern. Though conflicting historical perceptions are found in every East Asian country, including Taiwan, they are not referenced by the term “historical perception.” The problem of “historical perception,” at least in Taiwan, is the proper noun, as it references only the debates in Japan. Therefore, the discussions on historical perceptions in East Asia are usually Japan-centric, and the depiction of the debate’s development is deeply rooted in Japan’s domestic and foreign policies.

Historical perception in Taiwan 169 However, the problems of “historical perception” can be defined in both broad and narrow senses. In a broad sense, historical perception can be described as the process whereby nation-states identify themselves by interpreting events that occurred in the past; on this basis, they search for leading principles for their ideal situation. In a narrow sense, the term refers only to historical narratives. Especially in the pedagogic field, regarding the editing of history textbooks, the selection and presentation of historical events usually prompts controversial issues. Certainly, problems related to historical perception exist in Taiwan and have increasingly intensified due to debates in recent years. Although Taiwan’s experiences differ from those of Japan, the experiences of the two countries are definitely related if observed from the East Asian perspective. To promote the cooperation of East Asian countries, deepening the mutual understanding of Taiwan and Japan is necessary. Meanwhile, searching for common features and intensifying the basis for cooperation between East Asian countries is extremely substantive. It is commonly believed that controversies related to historical perception in Japan can be traced to the beginning of the 1990s, the point at which the issue related to comfort women became publicly known. Voices petitioning the Japanese government for apologies and compensation continue to be raised. In domestic discourses, critics of the “Tokyo Trial view of history” and “masochistic view of history” emerged, which frequently resulted in a clash of conflicting opinions. For instance, when the Ministry of Education approved the New History Textbook published by Fusōsha in 2001, critical voices exploded from both inside and outside of the country. However, if we carefully observe the international context and the unfolding of Japan’s textbook problem, which recurred three times, we can easily conclude that textbook revision and related juridical acts had already taken place in the 1950s. In 1982, the textbook controversy developed from a domestic issue related to diplomatic conflict. That year, China and Korea protested against the Japanese Ministry of Education’s involvement in the textbook approval process; in other words, they resisted the Ministry’s demand to delete narratives related to the comfort women and to define the Japanese army’s activity in China as an “advance” (進出) instead of an “invasion” (侵略). Therefore, the domestic controversy escalated into a serious diplomatic issue. In the end, the Japanese government sought to resolve the problem by adopting the so-called Neighboring Country Clause when examining textbooks. According to the Clause, the narratives in textbooks should not only correspond to Japan’s domestic debates over historical perception. They should also demonstrate understanding and seek international harmony in their treatment of modern and contemporary historical events involving neighboring Asian countries. Thereafter, the problem related to historical perception in East Asia has primarily related to the circumstances of Japan itself, albeit still being characterized by both domestic and international aspects. The discourses in Japan were introduced to Taiwan through mass media, which had strong influences. On the one hand, the impression that Japan is reluctant to confront its responsibility during the war and critically reflect on it has gradually

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been established in Taiwan. On the other hand, as a region that is undergoing democratization, Taiwan has begun to realize the power of textbooks. Movements that aim to liberate the interpretations of historical events from the state’s monopoly have emerged. The revision of the history guideline is the most representative example of the state’s interference in the writing of history. The guideline revised by the state comprises the leading principles with which private publishing houses align when composing textbooks. Taiwan’s problem of historical perception is grounded by the issues that have been regularly evoked through the history guideline revision. Therefore, it shares many features with the textbook controversy in Japan. History textbooks not only play a significant role in a given society; they are also indicators of that society. From the standpoint of historical science, history itself represents the one and only objective process, and historical perception is a human construction. Since the history of every nation is constructed, memorized, and handed down to a younger generation through history education, history textbooks are the most substantial intermediaries for passing on historical memories. In addition, as history textbooks represent the official interpretation of the public authorities, the historical memories of a nation condensed in history textbooks can easily impress and impact their readership. Conversely, the systemized memories of a nation are highly dependent on the concept of “Erinnerungsort” (place of remembrance). Hence, history textbooks largely define the legitimate historical truth in a society. For that reason, in the process of Taiwan’s democratization, the local factions have deemed the historical perception constructed under KMT’s longstanding authoritarian rule highly biased and asserted that the right to interpret history must be delegated elsewhere. In the late 1990s, fierce debates were kindled in Japan concerning the history textbook issue and the so-called new liberal view of history. Meanwhile, a transformation in Taiwan’s paradigm related to the interpretation of history was taking place. The subjectivity of Taiwan became a focus, and voices demanding a homogenous Taiwan identity were raised. Against this background, “native historiography” is gradually replacing the dominant Sino-centric historiography and has officially become the mainstream narrative. A landmark event related to this transformation was the publication of the government-edited junior high school history textbook Renshi Taiwan (認識台湾, Understanding Taiwan) in 1997. With the release of this volume, sharp conflicts among different views of history in Taiwanese society rose to the surface. Advocates against the perspective supported by native historiography, which was represented in Understanding Taiwan, criticized the textbook for whitewashing Japan’s colonial rule in Taiwan. They offered a critique stating that this act was no different from Japanese rightists’ glorification of the country’s prewar and wartime aggression. Thereafter, controversies related to the revision of the textbook outline have arisen repeatedly. The issue of word selection has attracted the attention of all social classes. For instance, debates over the terms “rishi” 日治 (Japanese rule) and “riju” 日 拠 (Japanese occupation), as well as over “zhongzhan” 終戦 (the end of war) and “guangfu” 光復 (Taiwan’s recovery), are well known. The fact that Taiwan’s

Historical perception in Taiwan 171 historical perception is commonly entangled with Japan’s rightwing discourses situate Taiwan in an unfavorable and ambiguous position in the context of East Asia’s problem concerning historical perception (Wang 2014: 72–94).

1 Research undertaken in Taiwan on Japan’s controversy over history textbooks Before focusing on the topic of East Asia’s joint research, I would like to briefly introduce the circumstances of academic researches undertaken in Taiwan related to Japan’s history textbooks. Again, it must be emphasized that this is an issue that transcends borders, as it is discussed in three different places: Japan’s local discourse, the international arena, and Taiwan’s domestic public sphere. In terms of controversies over its own history textbooks, Taiwan’s discourses are certainly influenced by the problems related to history textbooks in Japan. However, researches on the Japanese history textbook problem are scarce. Scholars instead focus on Taiwan’s own textbooks and the region’s history education. The discussions in researches related to textbooks focus on education and curriculum. The 2010 published study of Lan Shun-Te (藍順徳), Jiaokeshu yishi xingtai (教科書 意識形態, The Ideology of Textbooks), is a representative example. Following his review of previous scholarship on textbooks, Lan sought to analyze the textbooks from the viewpoint of ideology, drawing on perspectives related to aspects such as politics, gender, ethnicity, religion, class, and region. Materials included in the study comprised dissertations, journal articles, and reports published by the National Science Council on the topic of textbook ideology that were published from 1979 to 2008. Lan concluded that researches on textbooks (primarily textbooks in the course “Society”) undertaken before 2000 tended to be critical towards political ideology. However, after 2000, especially after the publication of the textbook Understanding Taiwan and the rise of the debate over “Sinicization” and “Taiwanization,” researchers tended to focus on drawing comparisons between textbooks used in Taiwan and China, as well as textbooks before and after the end of Martial Law. Researches in this field began to shift their focus to the development of Taiwanization (黄貞瑜 2013: 5). Wang Fu-chang’s 2001 study, “National Imagination, Ethnic Consciousness, and History: Analysis of the Context and Content of Understanding Taiwan,”1 is an illuminating example (Wang 2001: 145–208). By examining reports from newspapers and mass media, Wang successfully illustrated the ways in which the thinly veiled national imagination was exposed by the controversy over the textbook Understanding Taiwan as well as how the ethnic identity is entangled with historical memories. In Taiwan, analyses of textbooks and historical perceptions are customarily published in periodical journals on history education. Periodical publications typically act not only as arenas in which advocates advance their argumentations; they also provide an ideological front. For instance, the journal Haixia pinglun (海峡評論, The Strait Review), which propagates the standpoint of Sinicization, aims to enhance the national culture and carry forward the Chinese tradition. Other periodicals, such as Lishi jiaoyu (歴史教育, History Education), Tsing-hua

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lishi jiaoxue (清華歴史教学, Tsing-hua History Education), and Lishi yuekan (歴史 月刊, Historical Monthly), which emphasize school education, are now calling for a reform in history education. They comprise the chief arena in which Taiwan’s current situation, policies related to history education, and opinions on “Sinicization” and “Taiwanization,” appear most frequently. Conversely, the Taiwan History Association, an organization which calls for “Taiwanization,” composed an edited volume entitled Lishi yishi yu lishi jiaokeshu lunwenji (歴史意識与歴史教 科書論文集, History Consciousness and History Textbooks) in 2003, which focuses on the issues of history education and national identity. Plainly speaking, most studies related to Taiwan’s textbooks reference the Japanese case as a comparable example. Studies that specifically focus on Japan’s textbook problem are also not unusual. However, there are still few articles of this kind, and they usually focus only on the pedagogic field. However, a few illuminating analyses have been undertaken from the perspective of historiography. Ho I-lin’s (何義麟) article “Riben lishi jiaokeshu zhi yanbian: baidang zai ‘guoji kaoliang’ yu ‘benguo zhongxin’ zhijian” (日本歴史教科書問題之演変――擺蕩在“国際 考量”与“本国中心”之間, “The Transformation of Japan’s History Textbooks: Between ‘Consideration of International Community’ and ‘National Centrism’”), published in the edited volume, is a representative example (Ho 2002: 69–78). For most of Taiwan’s scholars, examining Japan’s problem of historical perception has positively contributed to the development of Taiwan’s historical perception. For instance, in the 2005 article “The Phantom of the War: The Second Sino-Japanese War in Japan’s History Textbooks” (Hsu 2005: 84–115), I primarily shed light on the problem related to historical perception and the controversies over history textbooks in Japan. Meanwhile, I compared history textbooks used in both Japan and Taiwan and sought to unveil the transformation of Taiwan’s textbooks in light of the local political contests. In the 2006 article “The Historian in Trail: A Survey on Ienaga Saburō and the Japanese Textbooks Lawsuits” (站列法庭的歴史学：家永三郎与日本教科書審定訴訟之 研究; Hsu 2006: 251–282), I examined Ienaga Saburō’s lawsuits from both legal and historical viewpoints. This article first discussed the question of whether Japan’s system of textbook approval contradicts the academic freedom guaranteed by the constitution. To critically reflect on Taiwan’s current circumstance in the field of history education, which places importance on history education while overlooking the quality of the textbook itself, I sought to demonstrate that university professors should actively participate in writing textbooks and the historian circle should acknowledge such works as academic contributions. In his article “Historical Revisionism and New Nationalism: The Political Impact of Japan’s Debate over History Textbooks” (歴史修正主義与新民族 主義――日本修改教科書争議的政治効応; Lo 2006: 81–106), Lo Chih-Ping argued that Japan’s hidden desire to revise its history textbooks points to the creation of a new nationalism. He differentiated Japan’s national identity in the prewar and postwar eras and concluded the following: The revisionists in Japan aimed to awaken the prewar kōkoku shikan (皇国史観, the view of history which

Historical perception in Taiwan 173 establishes Japan as an imperial nation) that required loyalty and unconditional sacrifice for the Emperor. Therefore, they protested the view of the war that characterized postwar Japan, labeling it as a “masochistic view of history” and sought to replace such a narrative through historical revisionism. In terms of the depth psychology that facilitated Japan’s revision of history textbooks, Wang HorngLuen’s article “From On War to The New History Textbook: Ressentiment and its Institutional Constitutions in Contemporary Japanese Nationalism” (従《戦争 論》到《新歴史教科書》――試論日本当代民族主義的怨恨心態及其制度成 因; Wang 2010: 147–202) examined the depth psychology of Japan’s rightists from both sociological and psychological perspectives. Wang applied Max Scheler’s concept of Ressentiment to understand how Japan’s modern nationalism was constructed. According to Wang’s analysis, in discussions on this issue, people should first consider the significant gap in Japan’s self-perception in the prewar and postwar eras. In other words, the greatness of the Japanese people in the brilliant Emperor Jinmu’s Reich, which was the general conception in prewar Japan, was converted to a status whereby the Japanese were deemed criminals against humanity, for which Japan has had to continuously apologize following the war. As the Allies (primarily the U.S. Army) occupied Japan, a democratic state was established in a rude and forcible manner. However, Japan’s Emperor system and the widespread historiography grounded by the concept of the imperial nation was not completely eliminated. Wang maintained that the heated debate itself has confirmed the existence of deeply rooted resentment. The article first places importance on the social background of the emergence of new history textbooks supported by new nationalists. It then seeks to examine the ways in which the mental structure of these nationalists developed by applying social theories (Huang 2013: 7). As far as studies on New History Textbook are concerned, Huang Tzu-Chin’s article “Japan’s History Textbook Problem: A Case Study of ‘The New History Textbook Commission’” (日本歴史教科書問題―『新歴史教科書編纂会』的個 案探討; Huang 2004: 1–77) is a representative example.2 According to Huang, as the problem of history textbook is interrelated with the reconstruction of Japan’s value system as well as its diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries, it serves as the perfect indicator of the direction of Japanese society. In addition, as this problem is also closely related to the country’s political and economic issues, as long as Japan’s domestic conflicts persist, the history textbook problem will remain. In his article “A Comparative Study on Taiwan and Japan’s History Textbooks for Secondary Schools” (台湾与日本的中学歴史教科書之比較; Kan 2009: 151–170), Kan Huai-Chen (甘懐真) compared the guidelines of Taiwan’s and Japan’s history textbooks and concluded that the conflicts between Japan’s leftwing historians and the conservative Japanese authority constitute the historical background against which the Japanese guideline for textbooks was formed. On this basis, Kan re-examined Taiwan’s textbook system, advancing suggestions and reflections for Taiwan’s textbook system. Comparative perspectives provided by these examples are the first step toward an East Asian joint research endeavor focused on the question of historical

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perception. In her article “A Comparative Study on the Junior High School History Education in China and Japan: A Conflict Between Nationalism and Globalism” (中日初中歴史教育的比較――民族主義与世界主義的糾葛; Huang 1994), Huang Hsui-Yuan analyzed the goal of history education revealed in the textbooks used by Taiwan, Japan, and Mainland China, shedding light on the interrelation between nationalism and globalism. Huang argued that against the background of the Japanese government’s emphasis on education reform and in accordance with the concept of international peace, even though reflection on the bygone war seems to be fading in history textbooks, it is still clearly articulated therein. This reveals the differences of opinion between Japan’s government, professional historians, and editors of textbooks. Certainly, such divergence in opinions hampers the Japanese government’s efforts to achieve a unified national identity, but it does not guarantee that Japan will not repeat the tragedy of ultra-nationalism. Huang pointed out that Chinese history education was undoubtedly determined by the will of the government. In China, history education is a part of its political and ideological education, as well as education about the country’s general situation. Therefore, a number of the country’s significant policies are taught through history education. In terms of topics related to international peace, the textbooks preach international friendship and cooperation, praising the co-prosperity of all nations. Regarding domestic democracy and human rights, some narratives contradict the government’s policies. In Taiwan, history textbooks used hitherto have been drafted in accordance with the concept of Sinicization and based on the motto of protecting the hometown and the motherland. For a domestic audience, these textbooks seek to lay the ground for national unification by familiarizing the students with the Chinese tradition and strengthening their sense of belonging to China. For an external audience, they highlight international cooperation to emphasize Taiwan’s international status. Narratives of this kind perfectly reveal the internal and external circumstances in which Taiwan has been placed in the first half of the 1990s (Huang 2013: 8).

2 Taiwan’s concern on the cooperative compilation of East Asian history textbooks Historically, the National Institute for Compilation and Translation (国立編訳館) has been the representative institution supervising Taiwan’s public history textbooks. It was established in 1932 as a national institution for book compilation and was part of the Ministry for Education. Its chief duty was to translate and edit academic publications, textbooks, and dictionaries as well as encyclopedias. Following the institute’s relocation with the GMD government in Taiwan, its contributions have served different purposes over time. Until 1997, as Taiwan’s Ministry for Education permitted the non-official compilation and publication of textbooks, the National Institute for Compilation and Translation monopolized the editing of all textbooks used in primary and secondary schools in the Republic of China. However, in 2011, the institute was consolidated with the National Academy for Educational Research. The latter was hitherto responsible

Historical perception in Taiwan 175 for presenting an analysis of the educational system and education policies, installing databases for education policies and opinion polls, and providing necessary information as well as consultation when education policies needed modification. Following its consolidation with the National Institute for Compilation and Translation, it held the additional responsibility of surveying and inspecting textbooks. As an authority on the examination of primary and secondary school textbooks, it has also frequently organized trainings for schoolteachers. In June 2012, the “Workshop for Joint Construction of East Asian History Textbook,” organized by the National Academy for Educational Research and National Taiwan Normal University, took place. It is noteworthy that this workshop was the first opportunity for attendees to thoroughly and rationally discuss questions related to managing the cooperation of scholars from various countries and accomplishing the co-authorship of history textbooks, as well as handling controversial topics. Despite Taiwan’s close ties to Mainland China, Japan, and Korea, the authority has never clearly stated Taiwan’s stance regarding transnational joint history textbooks and joint research projects on history perception. The joint authorship of history textbooks by authors from different countries enables dialog between various countries/nations by offering a historical narrative that overcomes the self-perception of any one nation-state. It also provides the basis for mutual understanding that is inevitable in international cooperation. In the West, a considerable number of jointly written history textbooks have been made available to the public. In recent years, East Asia’s major countries are actively quickening their pace to catch up. Projects related to the joint authorship of history textbooks have been carried out in China, Japan, and Korea. Following the 2005 attempt, Dongya sanguo de jinxiandai shi (東亜三国的近現代 史; Mirai wo Hiraku Rekishi: Higashi Ajia Sankoku no Kingendai-shi 未来を ひらく歴史――東アジア三国の近現代史, Modern History of East Asia’s Three Countries), Chaoyue guojing de dongya jindaishi (超越国境的東亜近代史; Atarashii Higashi Ajia no Kingendai-shi 新しい東アジアの近現代史, A BorderTranscending Modern History of East Asia, 2013), was published. However, Taiwan did not react to the trend of international cooperation. Especially when confronted by the prospect of cooperation with China, Japan, and Korea, Taiwan becomes silent due to diplomatic concerns and other internal and external factors. Meanwhile, in Taiwan, debates over the history textbook guideline and historical perception, which are closely linked to the construction of the national identity, have mushroomed between parties holding opposing viewpoints, especially regarding the historical evaluation of Japan’s occupation in Taiwan. Stated differently, due to the current political and geopolitical situation, Taiwan’s problem of historical perception tends to be articulated through internal rather than external discourses. The aforementioned workshop in 2012, as it was supported by a public institution, might be the first step towards Taiwan’s participation in transnational joint history textbook projects. The scholars who participated in writing the East Asian history textbook have been invited to present keynote speeches. Scholars invited

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from outside of Taiwan include Professor Bu Ping (步平) from the Institute of Modern History (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and Professor Emeritus Kasahara Tokushi (笠原十九司) from Tsuru University. In addition, Professor Chou Wan-Yao from the Department of History of National Taiwan University and Professor Wang Horng-Luen from the Institute of Sociology (Academia Sinica) have delivered keynote speeches from Taiwan’s standpoint and that of historical sociology, respectively. Professor Bu Ping and Professor Emeritus Kasahara, who once participated in the joint authorship of the East Asian history textbook, are representative scholars in this field in China and Japan. They provided the most recent information to the workshop participants. In addition, the two local scholars presented attitudes from Taiwan’s academic community regarding the joint history textbook written by Chinese, Japanese, and Korean scholars. In her article “A Survey on the Possibility and Limitation of Joint History Textbook of East Asia,” Professor Chou Wan-Yao brought to light many vital issues, including the hidden subjectivity of nation-states and the complexity of historical memories and international politics. First, the narrative in the textbook A Border-Transcending Modern History of East Asia is centered on the Japanese Empire. Therefore, it significantly lacks narratives on “peripheral regions” such as Taiwan and Ryukyu, as well as their respective views. Consequently, when confronting the question on how East Asian history is narrated, the viewpoints of people living in the peripheral regions are obviously not represented. In addition, the question of whether “peripheral regions” in the Japanese Empire, such as Taiwan, Ryukyu, and Korea, share common experiences remains unanswered. According to Chou, the earlier-mentioned problems must be properly handled through the joint authorship of history textbooks on East Asia. Conversely, Professor Chou has posed a number of difficulties that may be encountered in the joint authorship of history textbooks by individuals from various countries as follows: Theoretically, border-transcending narratives that overcome the historiography of nation state should be highly recommended. However, in reality, for historiographies created in respective countries usually have difference contexts, they easily come into conflict with each other, and offer contradictory interpretations of the same historical event due to their different standpoints. Moreover, when each country seeks to solve their own critical history problem, they need to confront their respective tradition of state will and national spirit. (Chan and Chen 2012: 171) These opinions and viewpoints essentially reveal Taiwan’s anxiety. In joint researches on East Asia, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean scholars did not intentionally exclude Taiwan. Yet, in the discussions of these countries on historical perception in East Asia, Taiwan has been marginalized or even overlooked. In addition, the special affinity between the Taiwan-centric historiography and Japan’s rightwing discourses put Taiwan in a difficult situation. Consequently, at present, Taiwan urgently needs to consider questions such as how to participate

Historical perception in Taiwan 177 in the discussion on East Asia’s historical perception while maintaining an amicable team, or how to concretize the standpoint from which the Taiwanese may observe and narrate East Asian history. We could refer to the common views generated from the workshop as a first step toward cooperative research on historical perception with other East Asian countries. A summary of the key points from the workshop follows: 1

2 3

4

5

All workshop participants agreed on the significance and great value of jointly authoring a history textbook on East Asia. Stated differently, this endeavor is an attempt to overcome our own perspectives and represents a brave challenge to the framework of the nation state. The process of undertaking the challenge is the focus rather than its outcome. The preconditions include freedom of expression and open conversation. Meanwhile, arguments based on chauvinistic emotion are unwelcome. Questions pertaining to topics, such as democratization in prewar and postwar Taiwan and how to understand the concept of “justice” in the transition period after Taiwan’s democratization, must be embedded into the project. The first unavoidable difficulty is that pertaining to Cross-Strait relations. Certainly, the “way to mutual understanding” is overwhelmingly important; however, in this process, Taiwan’s autonomy must be the precondition for further discussions. The second dilemma is the dichotomy comprising offenders and victims. Finally, reversing the influences of nationalism is another crucial task. We must be skeptical of nationalism’s negative influences. Meanwhile, we must also determine who would benefit the most from our ability to overcome nationalism. As the pre-stage of Taiwan’s participation in the joint research, Taiwanese scholars might take part in the transnational network of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean scholars. By incorporating enlightening case studies and the common views generated therein into the textbooks, Taiwan’s scholars could teach students thought processes oriented toward peace, and transform the current “lack of understanding” to “conversation and mutual understanding” in a harmonious manner. (Chan and Chen 2012: 172–173)

Conclusion Scholars who hold the Taiwan-centric view of history faithfully believe that reforms in history education will accelerate Taiwan’s process of democratization. Though the issue of history education has not been treated as part of the problem related to historical perception, the two issues represent two sides of the same coin. This was proven by the Sunflower Student Movement in March 2014. The students involved were born after the “Order of Martial Law” was lifted and were raised in the era of liberation and democratization. Most were educated by the curriculum comprising history courses revised in 2006. This outline was

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made public with the title “Tentative Outline for Curriculums in General High Schools” in 2004 when Tu Cheng-Sheng oversaw the Ministry of Education under the Democratic Progressive Party. As it became effective as of 2006, it is typically referenced as the “Tentative Outline of 95th Year of the Republic.” Following this outline, the history of Taiwan was taught for the first time in a separate textbook, as an independent subject of study, rather than as one part of Chinese history (Wang 2011). The understanding of national identity, democracy, and human rights of participants in the Sunflower Student Movement was presumably shaped by this outline. As far as the historical perception and history education are concerned, Taiwan has the opportunity to align itself with the global standard and seek to cooperate with East Asian countries. For all countries, history textbooks provide a connection between the past and the present in the form of history. Therefore, they serve the following two purposes: first, they hand down the officially recognized historical narrative; second, they reframe the past according to the present society’s needs. By articulating the abolishment of prejudices, discrimination, and stereotypes in history textbooks, people can learn to overcome their own historical burdens. Jointly authored history textbooks written by multi-national groups and joint research on East Asia’s historical perception is a force driving a separation from negative historical heritage and the establishment of concrete practices supporting education focused on peace.

Notes 1 “Min zu xiang xiang, zu qun yi shi yu li shi: ‘Ren shi Taiwan’ jiao ke shu Zheng yi fengbo de nei rong yu mai luo fen xi 民族想像，族群意識与歴史―《認識台湾》 教科書争議風波的内容与脈絡分析.” 2 Recent book reviews published by Huang also provide valuable insights on this issue (see Huang 2014: 105–113).

Bibliography Chan, Mei-Yua and Chen Pei-Xuan. “2012 dongya lishi jiaokeshu gonggou gongzuofang 2012 東亜歴史教科書共構工作坊,” Jiaokeshu yanjiu 教科書研究, vol. 5, no. 2, 2012. Ho, I-lin’s 何義麟. “Riben lishi jiaokeshu zhi yanbian: baidang zai ‘guoji kaoliang’ yu ‘benguo zhongxin’ zhijian 日本歴史教科書問題之演変――擺蕩在“国際考 量”与“本国中心”之間,” Taiwan lishi xuehui huixun 台灣歴史学会会訊, no. 13–14, 2002. Hsu, Yu-Ming 許育銘. “Zhanzheng meiying: riben lishi jiaokeshu zhong de zhongri zhanzheng 戦争魅影――日本歴史教科書中的中日戦争,” Jindai zhongguo 近代中国, no. 163, 2005. Hsu, Yu-Ming 許育銘. “Zhanlie fating de lishixuejia: jiayong sanlang yu riben jiaokeshu shending susong zhi yanjiu 站列法庭的歴史学：家永三郎与日本教科書審定 訴訟之研究,” Donghua renwen xuebao 東華人文学報, no. 9, 2006. Huang, Hsiu-Yuan 黄綉媛. “Zhongri chuzhong lishi jiaoyu de bijiao: minzu zhuyi yu shijie zhuyi de jiuge中日初中歴史教育的比較――民族主義与世界主義的糾葛,”

Historical perception in Taiwan 179 Ph.D. Thesis submitted to National Taiwan Normal University, Institute for History, 1994. Huang, Tzu-Chin 黄自進. “Riben lishi jiaokeshu wenti: ‘xin lishi jiaokeshu bianzuanhui’ de gean tantao日本歴史教科書問題――‘新歴史教科書編纂会’的箇案探 討,” Zhongyanyuan yatai quyu yanjiu zhuanti zhongxin 中研院亜太区域研究専題 中心, 2004. Huang, Tzu-Chin 黄自進. “Dongya lishi jiaokeshu wenti de zucheng: ping juchi longyi zhu ‘Higashi ajia rekishi kyōkasho no kōzu: nihon, chūgoku, taiwan, kankoku, oyobi zainichi chōsenjin gakkō’ (Hōritsu Bunka-sha, 2013) 東亜歴史教科書問題 的組成―評菊池一隆着『東アジア歴史教科書問題の構図――日本・中国・台 湾・韓国, および在日朝鮮人学校,” Jiaokeshu yanjiu 教科書研究, vol. 7, no. 1, 2014. Huang, Zhen-Yu 黄貞瑜. “Lishi renshi yu shuxie: Tai, ri, zhong gaozhong lishi jiaokeshu bijiao yanjiu 歴史認識与書写―台，日，中高中歴史教科書比較研究,” Master Thesis submitted to National Dong Hwa University, History Department, 2013. Kan, Huai-Chen 甘懐真. “Taiwan yu riben de zhongxue lishi jiaokeshu zhi bijiao 台 灣与日本的中学歴史教科書之比較,” Lishi jiaoyu 歴史教育, no. 14, 2009. Lan, Shun-Te 藍順徳. Jiaokeshu yishixingtai: lishi huigu yu shizheng fenxi 教科書意識 形態―歴史回顧与実徴分析. Dingwen shuju 頂文書局, 2010. Lo, Chih-Ping 羅志平. “Lishi xiuzhengzhuyi yu xin minzu zhuyi: riben xiugai jiaokeshu zhengyi de zhengzhi xiaoying 歴史修正主義与新民族主義：日本修改教科書 争議的政治効応,” Wenti yu yanjiu 問題与研究, no. 45, 2006. Wang, Chong-Fu 王仲孚. “Lun Gaozhong lishi xin kegang de genben wenti 論《高 中歴史新課綱》的根本問題,” Haixia pinglun 海峽評論 (online version), no. 247, 2011. www.haixiainfo.com.tw/247-8199.html (Accessed September 2018). Wang, Fu-chang 王甫昌. “Minzu xiangxiang, zuqun yishi yu lishi: Renshi taiwan jiaokeshu zhengyi fengbo de neirong yu mailuoxing fenxi 民族想像，族群意識与 歴史――認識台灣教科書争議風波的内容与脈絡性分析,” Taiwanshi yanjiu 台灣 史研究, vol. 8, no. 2, 2001. Wang, Horng-Luen 汪宏倫. “Cong ‘zhanzhenglun’ dao ‘xin lishi jiaokeshu’: shilun riben dangdai minzuzhuyi de yuanhen xintai jiqi zhidu chengyin 従《戦争論》 到《新歴史教科書》――試論日本当代民族主義的怨恨心態及其制度成因,” Taiwan shehuixue 台灣社会学, no. 19, 2010. Wang, Horng-Luen 汪宏倫. “Taiwan de ‘lishi renshi wenti’ chutan: shiguan, zhanzheng, kuangjia 台灣的‘歴史認識問題’初探：史観，戦争，框架,” 21 Seiki Higashi Ajia Shakaigaku 21 世紀東アジア社会学, no. 6, 2014.

11 Historical perception in China and collaborative studies on East Asian history JIANG Pei

Abstract: Today, our world is witnessing the acceleration of globalization. However, amid this process, East Asia faces a particular problem: the contradicting interpretations of World War II in this region’s various countries. Such cognitive contradictions are seemingly the result of conflicting historical views. But in fact, they represent a general situation of political rivalry and economic conflicts in the region. The Chinese people traditionally tend to judge historical events from a moral standpoint. More specifically, the Chinese consider the West to be invaders and conspirators. At the same time, however, they have to concede the role of the West as the enlighteners and advocates for modern civilization. The contradictions in the Chinese worldview are obvious. Deeply influenced by the pre-modern tributary system, the Chinese are used to understanding the current conflicts in East Asia from the worldview of tianxia, which privileges the unified central authority and therefore tends to be self-centered. In addition, since revolutionary historiography is still the prevailing interpretation of modern Chinese history, the history of East Asia is customarily described as Asia’s resistance against the West and a revolution against local tradition. Moreover, given China’s success in economic construction over the past 40 years, nationalism has gradually and unwittingly given rise to an overwhelming national pride and national arrogance. We urgently need to reflect on the influences of these factors in shaping Chinese historical perceptions. When discussing collaborative studies of historical perception in East Asia, we need to take into consideration a broad range of issues, including the mode of thinking, pragmatic interests, and so on. In my view, the current cooperation of East Asian historians is an unofficial attempt to form a community that starts from a common ground of historical consciousness and seeks to achieve agreement and smooth the tensions and conflicts that have resulted from real politics. It is an attempt by intellectual groups to overcome the political reality.

Introduction: the problems addressed in this chapter Regardless of their virtues or drawbacks, approaches such as “transnational history,” conceived by Professor Akira Irie, and “global history” (also known as “new world history”), introduced by William McNeill in 1963, gained significant influence within the guild of historians. Usually understood as the reaction of

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history as a discipline to the current trend of economic and cultural globalization, such approaches challenge the framework of nation-states and shed light on historical phenomena that transcend national, regional, ethnic, and cultural boundaries. In East Asia, by contrast, historians now are, surprisingly, still posing questions such as “how to construct a generally acceptable historical perception through joint studies.” This should lead us to more thoroughly consider East Asia’s public discourses in general. Even in Taiwan and Japan, where everyone is supposed to enjoy freedom of speech, the particular East Asian political culture, including strong national identity and pressure from the public sphere, has ensured that scholars do not challenge the existing historical narratives in their respective societies. East Asia’s past and present are the result of multilateral relations entangled in the respective countries’ conflicts of interest. What makes the current situation in East Asia so peculiar is that all the countries in this region are latecomers in the path to modernization. Even Japan, the country that embraced the Meiji Restoration and proclaimed a program of “Datsu-A” (leaving Asia and entering Europe), is still significantly influenced by Confucianism. Amid an unending series of radical changes, such as Japan’s contest with the United States for hegemony in Asia and the resulting Pacific War, the Cold War, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and newly emerged conflicts with rising China, Japan was not given sufficient time to let the modern mindset replace its traditional culture. In Taiwan, on the other hand, local culture has artificially been made different from that of Mainland China due to the two sides’ political separation after 1949. Recent trends of democratization and the increasingly controversial ethnic issues are responsible for Taiwan’s “demonization” of Mainland China. A similar political division exists between North and South Korea as well. Moreover, the two Koreas have a victim mentality towards both Japan and China. The Chinese, who called their country the “Celestial Empire” for centuries, became obsessed with nationalism during the long series of invasions by Western powers and Japan since 1840. In 2010, as China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy, more than a few Chinese believed, wrongly, that China was reviving as a world power. Online nationalism and chauvinism is therefore widespread. Against the background of East Asian countries’ cultural divergence and conflicts of interest resulting chiefly from political division, I would first like to show my sincere respect to the editor of this volume for providing us intellectuals the opportunity to discuss the possibility of “Joint Research and East Asia’s Historical Perception.” Meanwhile, I am assailed by doubts as to whether our limited effort will bear fruit in the foreseeable future. According to opinion polls carried out jointly by non-governmental organizations in Japan and China from 2005 to 2014, although down from 2013’s 77.55%, 64.8% of Chinese deem the territorial disputes the most significant factor damaging Sino-Japanese bilateral relations. “Japan’s historical perception and history education” is also considered one of the important factors affecting the two countries’ diplomatic relation. Japanese, on the other hand, do not see the territorial disputes as the most serious obstacle to improving the two countries’

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relations.1 I have not yet surveyed similar opinion polls undertaken to investigate cross-strait relations. In my view, the most contentious issue in that case would no longer be the two states’ dispute over which is the legitimate China, but rather, the self-determination of Taiwan. Thus the Taiwanese authorities even sought to categorize Chinese history as “world history,” shedding light on Taiwan’s history as the successor of Republican China. In the fierce and sometimes emotional battle between the Guomindang and the Democratic Progressive Party, historical interpretations have strayed from the rational and the objective. In North and South Korea, two countries suffering from the same political division, interpretations of the nation’s past, especially of the Korean War, which caused the division, are even more conflicting. Simply put, a generally acceptable historical perception based on joint studies is only possible when East Asian countries succeed in resolving political friction and territorial disputes and learn to manage the conflicts resulting from their respective interests. But are joint studies and mutual understanding concerning East Asia’s past absolutely impossible, if rivalry among the states is still the status quo? Or, to put it differently, are our joint studies to construct a shared historical perception in East Asia pointless for improving mutual understanding among East Asian nations? The answer is, undoubtedly, no. China, Korea, and Japan are all engaged in territorial disputes with each other. With special political or diplomatic intentions, disputes of this kind are usually dramatized by the mass media, eliciting widespread hostility that sometimes leads to radical opinions and acts, or even extreme chauvinism. Politicians and interest groups are likely to rock the boat and enlarge the national defense budget, raising trade protectionism, which, in turn, intensifies the xenophobia of the masses. Hostility, stereotypes, and discrimination combine under such circumstances, often leading not merely to criticism of the rival’s political system and military power but also to reciprocal attacks on each other’s cultural traditions and “misinterpretations” of history. Therefore, efforts made by joint studies to enable East Asian people to understand each other’s past are critical in order to lay the groundwork for harmonious unofficial cultural contacts, ease political tensions, and compensate for the hostility that has resulted from diplomatic confrontations. We also need to open our own mind to diverse mindsets, world outlooks, and interests. Open-mindedness is one of the preconditions for discussing joint studies of East Asia’s historical perceptions. In my view, our current project—a wise and far-sighted endeavor of intellectuals of several different nations confronted with East Asia’s conflictual reality—can be understood as an effort by intellectuals to break through the political reality and ease political conflicts by unofficial means. Though there is unlikely to be a Copernican revolution in this regard in the foreseeable future, all decent intellectuals should take part in this attempt. Our effort will probably serve as a step on East Asia’s path towards a peaceful and stable community. Due to limitations in research materials and scope, this chapter focuses on the Chinese perception of Sino-Japanese relations against the background of increasingly aggravating bilateral relations between China and Japan since the turn of

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the century. By analyzing materials such as Li Shi, the two-volume Chinese history textbook for senior high school approved by the Primary and Secondary School Textbooks Authorization Committee in 2004, representative surveys on Japanese history carried out by Chinese scholars, and recent Chinese scholarship on the Second Sino-Japanese War, this chapter seeks to objectively and rationally analyze recent Chinese intellectuals’ views on joint studies on East Asia’s historical perception.

1 The characteristics and crisis of the Chinese historical perception In China after 1949, interpreting modern Chinese history and Sino-Japanese relations is invariably entangled with ideological construction, chauvinistic propaganda, and hatred of the Japanese, elicited by the experience of violence in the era of Japanese invasion and occupation. This trend, to be sure, is also a result of the Chinese mode of thinking—their cultural tradition and world outlook. Chinese tend to evaluate historical events according to ethical standards. Moral evaluation is one of the typical characteristics of traditional Chinese historical insight. This mindset—different from that merged in rule by law and rational administration—is rooted in the patriarchal clan societies’ rule by interpersonal relations, ethics, and emotion. Therefore, it definitely does not fit in the modern value system. However, even today, almost all history textbooks used in high schools and universities unfailingly identify modern Chinese history, which starts with the British invasion of China in 1840, as a period of national humiliation. This time period witnesses “too many tears and too much blood in its history,” in the words of the heroic hymn by which Chinese soldiers and civilians launched their fight against foreign aggressors.2 Citing the invasions, occupations, and economic loss, several textbooks define Russia and Japan as the two countries that invaded China most frequently and did the nation the greatest harm. From the standpoint of the nation-state, it goes without saying that the Chinese are absolutely justified in claiming the right to self-determination and protecting the nation’s right to life. However, a historical interpretation solely focused on a victim mentality usually fails to reconsider the main causes of the delays in China’s modernity. Confronted by the “epoch-making transformation since three thousand years” as formulated by Li Hongzhang (李鸿章), people have not learned any lessons from history if the masses are still mobilized to enmity by such sentimental propaganda rather than guided to enlightenment. The second major characteristic of Chinese historical perception is inconsistency. On the one hand, Chinese consider Western countries, including Japan, to be reactionary powers that are responsible for China’s miserable semi-feudal and semi-colonial situation and deprived the country’s independence. On the other hand, Chinese also believe that the importation of modern Western civilization is crucial for China’s transformation from a feudal society. They were eager to learn from Western countries and sought to revitalize the country by promoting the capitalist system. As China and Western countries cooperated, Western

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civilization—in terms of material life and institutions—rapidly spread in China. Meanwhile, the Chinese claim that imperialists prevented China from developing capitalism.3 Chinese regard Western countries as invaders who used their military power to force the country to open. At the same time, they also played the role of planters of modern technology, economic systems, and civilization. History education in China is usually passive and ambivalent in evaluating foreign influences. For instance, in the narrative on the historical development of China’s modernity, the first volume of the textbook Li Shi sharply criticizes and condemns Western countries and Japan. Yet the second volume of Li Shi blames the encounter with the West for the dissolution of China’s natural economy. This, in turn, gave rise to the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1895), brought a thorough structural transformation to the Chinese society, and ultimately made the development of national capitalism the zeitgeist of the era. The Outline of Chinese Contemporary History, one of the textbooks for the unified university education of political theory, reveals similar ambivalence in assessing China’s relation to the West. These two seemingly complementary arguments represent the inconsistency of the Chinese worldview. The third characteristic of Chinese historical perception is the cultural concept of tianxia (“all under heaven”) that presumes a unified and centralized nation. In Chinese history, feudal states existed independently until a loosely organized centralized empire came into being in the West Zhou Dynasty. Until the Spring and Autumn/Warring States periods, the state again split until a unified country under a central authority was established. Since then, influenced by the ideology of a unified empire, the Chinese deemed national unification under a centralized government the ideal form of polity and condemned any form of national division. At the very beginning, unification or separation is defined in terms of territorial extension. In modern times, the standard is redefined in terms of a unified central authority. Not only did the Chinese apply such criteria to the Republican system in the emerging phase of the Republic of China, but they also deem it the ultimate goal even when calling for democracy and liberty. This preoccupation has led to a great deal of misinterpretation and misjudgment. When it comes to perceptions of East Asia as a region, scholars usually characterize the region as a Confucian cultural sphere, overemphasizing the impact of Chinese civilization while overlooking the distinctiveness of various East Asian countries over the course of history. The fourth characteristic of the Chinese historical perception is the influence of the historiography of the Chinese Revolution. After 1949, the master narrative of modern Chinese history and the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) stresses the legitimacy of the Chinese proletarian revolution and claims the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule over the country. Revolution was thus made the ultimate standard by which to evaluate every historical event. In this context, modern Chinese history is described as a revolutionary history of the Chinese nation’s fight against foreign invasion and feudalism. Beginning with Lin Zexu, “the first person to open his eyes and see the world,” advocators calling for importing Western economic and institutional systems such as Wei Yuan

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(魏源), Xue Fucheng (薛福成), Zheng Guanying (郑观应), Wang Tao (王韬), Kang Youwei (康有为), and Liang Qichao (梁启超) are usually characterized as progressive forces against feudalism. Nonetheless, they are not unconditionally qualified as revolutionaries. Other social movements such as the Taiping Rebellion, the Boxer Rebellion, and the resistance movement of Tongmenghui led by Sun Yat-sen are defined as revolutionary movements against foreign invasion. They are also not unconditionally qualified as revolutionaries. According to the revolution’s historiography, the West conceals its sinister intentions; Japan is a deceitful nation; Russia represents barbarism; and whoever ruled in China was representative of feudalism and counterrevolutionary elements that needed to be deposed through revolution. These arguments imply that democratic republicanism will never put China on a progressive path, and the Chinese economy cannot flourish under Western oppression. Only after the revolution brought about national independence was Chinese society able to make progress toward political liberty. The Chinese Communist Party is the legitimate representative and the only leader of the progressive zeitgeist.4 Through this ongoing ideological fabrication, the aforementioned revolutionary historiography has cast a long shadow over the circle of academic historians in China. On this basis, its influence predominates in spheres such as art, cinema, and theater and is even widespread among intellectuals and educators. As a result, the young generation in China, which does not have the opportunity to relearn history after secondary school, generally shares this vague and superficial perception of history. The fourth characteristic of Chinese historical perception is an increasing trend towards nationalism, stimulated or revived by China’s economic miracle. For a thousand years, Chinese culture, based on agricultural civilization, gained overwhelming supremacy in East Asia. The cultural concept of tianxia and the tribunal system defined Chinese culture’s relationship with its neighboring civilizations. The belief that “people who act according to moral imperatives are legitimate rulers of tianxia,” together with the worldview toward the dynasty to “pay tax on rice to whoever won tianxia,” has determined the Chinese view on the right kind of polity. Because Chinese civilization could be sustained even in the event of foreign invasion by assimilating neighboring nations, the Chinese are convinced of their own culture’s superiority. Repeated aggression by foreign countries and the loss of their sense of superiority since modern times have smashed the old Chinese self-image and resulted in a mixture of an inferiority complex and the admiration of foreign countries. However, about 30 years after China reopened its doors in the 1980s, the country became the world’s second-biggest economy. The Chinese feeling of superiority and nationalism that was suppressed during the past century began to revive. The desire to revive the lost glory of the empire, the insistence on taking back the lost territories and national assets that Western powers extracted from China, and the demand to solve China’s conflicts with its neighboring countries through military confrontation in order to compensate for the trauma that history has inflicted on the Chinese—all these are spreading in anonymous internet discussions and have become widely shared views among young people without adequate education in

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history. National pride has arisen and combined with narrow-minded xenophobia to create a mentality that is worrisome. These characteristics of Chinese historical perception are the result of several factors, including the traditional Chinese mindset, the ideological fabrication in today’s China, and changing international relations. Much of the Chinese historical perception is problematic, for the subjects of historical cognition lack an understanding of the driving forces of history and a neutral and critical attitude when evaluating historical events. In addition, due to their ignorance of neighboring countries and regions and the national characteristics of people residing nearby, their historical conception is easily shaped by ideology and changes in international relations. To sum up, in terms of value judgment, the Chinese need to critically reconsider their historical thinking.

2 Perceptions of Sino-Japanese relations and regional relations in East Asia Due to space limitations, this section solely discusses the perception of modern Sino-Japanese relations and regional relations in East Asia by Chinese academic historians, the Chinese media, and ordinary people in China. What is East Asia? This concept of a regional community has been constructed as an equivalent to “Europe” or “the West,” a counterpart to the industrialized mode of production that represents backward agricultural civilization. In this sense, the concept of “Greater East Asia” that Japan propagated during the war was not merely an ideological trick to legitimize its ambition to expel Western colonizers from East Asia and ensure its own hegemony there. It was also a claim to the interests and rights of the region where Japan is located, regardless of the wishes of other East Asian countries. More than a century ago, Fukuzawa Yukichi (福沢諭吉) interpreted the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) as “a battle between Enlightenment and conservatism,” “a war between civilization and barbarism.” Fukuzawa asserted that in the eyes of Japanese, the current conflict targets neither China nor the Chinese. It aims at advancing the world civilization by wiping out all kinds of barriers. Therefore, it is not a battle between people and countries, but a contest for the right belief.5 For China, East Asia is the closest region and the one with which it is geopolitically most entangled. Many of the country’s alliances, competitors, and rivals coexist with it in East Asia. But the Chinese historical perception is that little attention has been paid to China. During the century since China started down the path of modernity, and especially in the last three decades, the leading countries in Europe and North America have ever-increasing influence on Chinese lifestyles based on their technology and economic systems. When it comes to knowledge of foreign countries, the Chinese tend to focus on European and American countries while overlooking their Asian neighbors. Many young

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Chinese are thoroughly conversant with the cities, lifestyles, and cultural characteristics of Europe and North America but are ignorant about neighboring countries like Japan and Korea. Even about Taiwan, all they know are the sightseeing spots such as Alishan, the Sun Moon Lake, the National Palace Museum in Taipei, and the Taipei World Financial Center. In the textbooks used in high schools and universities in China, incredibly, the concept of East Asia as a vital region for China is seldom articulated or analyzed. However, historical narratives relating to countries in this region or China’s relation are not entirely absent. For instance, the textbooks introduce the China-centered tribunal system in ancient East Asia with obvious national pride. The narrative of modern history usually devotes considerable space to discussing the two invaders, Russia and Japan, while neglecting the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. Chinese awareness of the concept of East Asia is virtually nonexistent. Sometimes this concept is used as a synonym for Japan. For instance, China’s territorial disputes with India have never been mentioned in high school textbooks or curricula for politics in universities. Even the Korean War does not appear in high school textbooks and is only briefly mentioned in university textbooks. In the Chinese public sphere, as well as in the eyes of ordinary Chinese, East Asia seems to consist of China, Japan, and the two Koreas. Taiwan is a part of Southeast Asia. East Asia seems to be full of divisions: Sino-Japanese relations have turned from friendship to rivalry; Japan and South Korea’s seeming amity papers over not a few conflicts; the two Koreas are openly hostile to each other; and China and North Korea, formerly “fraternal comrades,” have now entered a diplomatic ice age. As a result, talking about a shared consciousness in East Asia can seem like an empty dream. Concerning Sino-Japanese relations in the modern age, both the media and ordinary people in China are obsessed with the stories of Japanese missions to Tang China. Filled with indignation, they accuse Japan, China’s former student, of badly and ungratefully treating its mentor. When it comes to Japan’s Asia-Pacific War and the barbaric crimes of the Japanese army, propaganda narratives are usually adjusted according to diplomatic circumstances. In recent years, Japanese politicians’ repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, as well as their occasional antiChina statements, have constantly pushed the war narratives in Chinese media to new extremes. For that reason, the Chinese generally have the impression that the Japanese government is reluctant to depict the war from a neutral perspective and to face its war responsibility. Amid Chinese people’s general lack of critical reflection on the war, Chinese mass media’s habitual anti-Japanese propensity and market forces have resulted in a flurry of TV programs on war-related topics. Some are in bad taste or even absurd, depicting contemporary protagonists’ time travels back to the war years. Though the plots may vary, TV programs of this kind uniformly depict the Japanese Army and the puppet troops as brutes or monsters. In addition, as the Chinese economy continues to grow and the country moves rapidly towards industrialization, the economic gap between China and Japan is rapidly shrinking, and China is developing into a larger economy than Japan. As a consequence, the China/barbarism dichotomy ensconced in the

188

Jiang Pei

mindset of the Chinese has re-emerged. Chinese base their national pride on their population and land area and frivolously deem themselves a great nation, while addressing their neighbor with phrases like “little Japan.” However, interestingly, Chinese consumers’ positive impressions of Japan’s manufacturing industry since the 1980s have survived. Captivated by materialism, they did not bring their antipathy toward Japan into the realm of daily life. Electrical appliances and other household goods made in Japan are symbols of reliable quality. Chinese youth and the middle class frequently visit Japanese-run shops and department stores such as Uniqlo, Muji, and Isetan. Japanese restaurants and izakaya (Japanese pubs) are gaining unprecedented popularity in China. When it comes to a desire for more advanced civilization and better-made products, Chinese are seldom political. From the eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, Japan was directly or indirectly engaged in a number of military conflicts on Chinese territory, including the First Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Russo-Japanese War, the First and Second Shandong Expeditions, and ultimately, Japan’s full-scale invasion of China in 1937. China was unable to stop Japan from expanding its area of influence in the country. The conflict between China and Japan was a conflict between modern civilization and the traditional. Hence the defeat of China was inevitable. In China’s path towards modernity, Japan has long played the role of a transmitter in China’s adoption of Western science and technology. We need to ask whether Japan was also—as Marx once described Britain’s role in Asia in the Opium Wars—an “unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.” Grand narratives are created to define the entirety of modern Sino-Japanese relations. Though Chinese academic historians and historians in international relations have provided interpretations from various aspects—such as geopolitics, the topology of modern economic development, and intellectual history (focusing on Fukuzawa Yukichi’s statements on China)—there is one cardinal principle in all such analysis: It holds that Japan’s aggression toward China always followed the “continental policy” based on a secret conspiracy. This explanation usually, intentionally or unintentionally, paints the Japanese government and military in one color, overlooking the inner contradictions of Japan’s various interest groups, factors determined by international relations, and the complexity of Sino-Japanese relations as a whole. For a long time, imperial-power-dominated Chinese politics has been characterized by its lack of clarity or accountability. Most Chinese believed that political activities were necessarily the result of conspiracy. Zhuge Liang of the Three Kingdoms period represents the ideal politician by virtue of his outstanding intelligence and his ability to use the soft to overcome the hard. For Chinese, the concept of politicians implies a group of wise men, and politics is a contest of wisdom. Violence is most terrifying and is the worst option of all. In China’s confrontation with modern Japan, Japan’s superior position brought China endless humiliation. Therefore, when depicting Japanese politicians and military men related to Sino-Japanese relations or Japan’s war in Asia, Chinese tend to illustrate them as deceitful and ignorant of justice, or as morally corrupt people who ignore human rights and behave barbarically.

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In Chinese high school history textbooks, narratives on the Anti-Japanese War took up no more than five pages. Aside from the necessary introduction of the outbreak and the end of the war, the narrative focuses on the Japanese army’s brutality and the CCP’s resistance movement. How the National Army led by Chiang Kai-shek fought the Japanese was entirely overlooked, not to mention the suffering of ordinary people in Guomindang- and CCP-dominated areas, as well as in Japanese-occupied zones.6 The historical knowledge and historical perception provided by such narratives are insufficient and one-sided. Recently, noteworthy changes have taken place in the curriculum of the “Outline of Chinese Contemporary History,” an obligatory course for standardized university education in political theory. In the sixth chapter of its textbook, one section is devoted to “The Guomindang’s Anti-Japanese War Combat Operations.” Though the content covers no more than three pages, this change indicates a revolutionary progress in China’s perception of the Anti-Japanese War. The previous two sections of the same chapter focused primarily on the CCP’s small-scale anti-Japanese actions after the Mukden Incident. Under the title “The Chinese Communist Party Raises the Flag of Anti-Japan Military Resistance,” the author intentionally highlights the CCP’s action even during the Second United Front of the two Chinese parties and gives the impression that the Nationalists were forced by the Communists to fight Japan. In addition, the fourth section of the same chapter, entitled “The Chinese Communist Party Became the Central Pillar of China’s Anti-Japan Resistance,” occupies more than 12 pages. It discusses CCP’s military actions and its war mobilization and organizational construction.7 Analyzing the impact of the CCP’s guerilla warfare, the author claimed that the CCP organized 125,000 military operations, killing 17.14 million Japanese army soldiers and puppet troops (including 527,000 Japanese soldiers). The author further concluded that during the course of China’s Anti-Japanese War, 1.5 million Japanese were killed by Chinese troops.8 In other words, Japan lost one million soldiers from the Mukden Incident (1931) until the outbreak of full-scale war in 1937. How is this possible? How should we interpret the full-scale Chinese resistance against Japan? The characteristics of Chinese historical perception become obvious in Chinese depictions of the Second Sino-Japanese War. As if afraid of being personally insulted, the Chinese are reluctant to reflect on questions such as why China turned out to be a weak and backward country in the global process of modernization. Chinese seldom seek to understand Japan’s continental policy in the context of its attempt to construct a Japan-centered new regional order in East Asia. Nor do they focus on Japan’s misreading of China, which caused Japan to adopt the wrong strategy toward China.9 Most narratives tend to morally judge Japan’s invasion of China. Instead of empirically analyzing the economic and social history in the occupied zones during the eight years, such narratives shed special light on phenomena such as opium-smoking, prostitution, forced labor, “comfort women,” and so on, seeking to paint the whole era black. Some depictions even exaggerate the facts or distort the truth. For instance, the Japanese concession in Tianjin drained water for self-preservation during the 1939 floods.

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This action was interpreted as a Japanese attempt to inundate the Jidong guerrillas (even though the Jidong guerrillas were based in mountain areas in North Tianjin). Some studies do not examine the reliability of historical documents. In one case, referring to the massive flood of 1942 at Baiyangdian Lake, the author maintained that the Japanese army had intentionally broken the dike in more than 100 locations, flooding 40 villages in Heibei province (which is impossible given the amount of water in the lake). Local narratives also tend to exaggerate the Japanese army’s violence, attributing deaths of all kinds to the Japanese army. (For instance, some researchers maintain that more than 35 million Chinese were killed or injured between 1937 and 1945, including 10 million prisoners and forced laborers.10) In the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese and the Japanese government were able to maintain friendly bilateral relations thanks to their mutual economic needs. The guilty feeling generally shared among the Japanese for the country’s wartime crimes, and the Chinese desire for Japan’s modern technology and products, temporarily papered over the history problems. After the year 2000, and especially in the last decade, both diplomatic relations and the mutual perceptions among the people in both countries are entering an ice age, for almost all factors that help compensate the two sides’ negative image of the other are disappearing. (Due to China’s rapid emergence as an economic giant, Japanese feelings of guilt over the war have significantly declined, and the Chinese are no longer unconditional admirers of Japanese technology.) For more than a century, the Japanese have been used to holding a leading role in Asia and around the world. The Chinese, on the other hand, have been eager to resume their traditional hegemony in East Asia. In this context, the fact that China’s GDP overtook Japan’s in 2010 has a historical and symbolic significance. In 2013, the “Annual Report 2014: Competitiveness of Asian Economies,” made public at the Boao Forum for Asia, maintained that among Asia’s 37 countries and regions, Japan’s economic competitiveness was ranked 23rd. After several decades of rapid economic growth, the current economic depression frustrates the Japanese and casts a shadow over the public mood. As a result, public discourse is gradually becoming more conservative, and voices calling for charismatic political leaders are rising. By contrast, the Chinese now firmly and proudly believe that their country is reviving as a great power. Consequently, the interaction between the national psychologies of the Chinese and Japanese is undergoing an intricate change. The image of a developed Japan and a developing China, of a strong Japan and a weak China, is being replaced as relations between the two countries become more equal. Among some poorly educated and conservative Chinese, the Sino-centric worldview that depicts China as a Celestial Empire is reviving. Disagreements, hostilities, and the mutual disdain that now characterize the reciprocal perceptions of the Chinese and the Japanese have rendered the historical issue problematic, which did not seem to be the case in the past. Motivated by the general mood of the masses, Japanese politicians make official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine to demonstrate their hardline stance toward China. In response, the Chinese authorities have started to hold annual

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remembrance ceremonies for victims of the Nanjing Massacre. The voices of the masses have been escalated to national policy, and the latter, in turn, emotionally charges the masses and damages the reciprocal images of the people in both countries.

Conclusion After having reviewed Chinese perceptions toward East Asia and toward SinoJapanese relations in the recent past as well as those today, we feel that objectively rewriting a fact-based history of East Asia and filling the gap of diverse countries’ perception toward East Asia is a crucial task that would help curb chauvinistic tendencies and improve regional relations. On September 9, 2014, the China Daily (China) and the think tank Genron NPO (Japan) published the findings of the 10th Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey (Japanese respondents N = 1,000; Chinese respondents N = 1,564). Ninety-three percent of Japanese have an “unfavorable” impression of China (as compared to 91.1% in 2003), which reaches its peak in 2005. Conversely, 86.8% of Chinese have an “unfavorable” impression of Japan, as compared to 92.8% in the last survey (Figure 11.1).11 The aforementioned findings of this opinion survey reveal that in the last ten years, especially after 2010, the “unfavorable” impression of Chinese and Japanese toward each other is increasing. This tendency impedes our joint studies of East Asia and perceptions of history in China and Japan. For when both sides are not openly engaged in confrontation, distorting historical facts to demonize each other turns to be a key means for them to express their anger and hostility. In an age of accelerating globalization, the fact that the world’s material civilization first emerged in the Western industrial systems and spread around the globe makes the Western value system indispensable in the political realm. Due to its communist ideology and its political interests, China claims that it refuses to commit to Western values. But on the other side, concepts such as liberty, democracy, equality, justice, and the rule of law have been integrated into the “core socialist values” announced recently. In Japan and Taiwan, the aforementioned values and national rights have also been articulated. Such principles seem to be shared among East Asian countries. However, when it comes to national interests, the situation is different. In China, anyone showing understanding toward Japan and Taiwan’s standpoint would be denounced as a hanjian (national traitor); in Taiwan, such a person would also be labeled a traitor; and in Japan, he or she would be put under considerable pressure. Simply put, whether joint studies on East Asia can be undertaken at the academic level does not depend on academia itself or on historians’ circles. Self-centered, nation-state-based standpoints that affect every country and every nation are the central issue preventing East Asia from creating generally acceptable core values and a shared perception of history. In this sense, questions for historians today, such as how to think critically and how to provide the public and the

60%

49.4

50%

46.1

40%

37.4 32.5

30%

20% 12.8

11.2 10%

6.6 2.0 2.0

0%

0.1 highly favorable

favorable

ordinary citizens

unfavorable

highly unfavorable

refuse to answer

Intellectuals and university students

(a) General impression of Chinese toward Japan

60% ordinary citizens 47.0 47.9

50%

Intellectuals and university students

40% 29.2

30% 20%

16.4

16.0 15.8

13.9

10% 4.7

6.0 2.4

0.8

0% highly important

important

no opinion

not important

not important at all

no answer

(b) Chinese public opinion in 2014 on the need to improve Sino-Japanese relations Figure 11.1 Results of Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey 2014

100%

80% 70%

75.6% 63.9%

78.3% 73.2%

66.3%

56.9%

60%

65.9%

86.8%

64.5%

55.9% 36.5%

40%

20%

90.1%

79.3%

72.0%

65.2%

50%

30%

93.0%

92.8%

90%

37.9% 15.1%

10%

33.1%

36.4%

27.3% 26.6% 24.1%

24.4%

14.5%

40.6% 32.6%

38.3% 28.6% 27.3% 20.8%

31.8%

15.6% 9.6%

11.3%

5.2%

6.8%

2013

2014

11.8%

0% 2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Impression of Japanese toward China: positive/relatively positive

Impression of Japanese toward China: negative/relatively negative

Impression of Chinese toward Japan: positive/relatively positive

Impression of Chinese toward Japan: negative/relatively negative

(c) Mutual perceptions of Chinese and Japanese in the past ten years 100% 90% 80% 73.1%

70%

60.2%

60% 50%

49.8%

46.6% 51.7%

40.9%

40% 30%

42.7%

36.8% 32.3% 17.1%

18.2% 14.2%

15.2% 7.6%

0% 2005

45.3% 37.3%

20.1%

10%

44.7%

41.4%

26.9%

20%

40.6%

2006

2007

15.5%

24.0% 23.6%

31.1% 13.0%

11.4%

2.7%

2008

22.2%

20.3%

5.1%

2009

2010

2011

15.1%

18.8%

17.7% 13.1%

10.7% 4.6%

28.3%

8.0%

2012

2013

2014

Opinions from the Japanese side: positive/relatively positive development Opinions from the Chinese side: positive/relatively positive development Opinions from the Japanese side: negative/relatively negative development Opinions from the Chinese side: negative/relatively negative development

(d) Public opinion in China and Japan over the last ten years on the future development of Sino-Japanese relations Figure 11.1 (Continued)

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Jiang Pei

100% 86.6%

90% 80%

90.1%

92.5% 83.1%

76.5%

70%

72.6% 71.2%

60%

73.8% 80.3%

82.1%

81.5%

80.3% 74.1%

77.6%

78.4%

70.6%

72.3% 67.2%

65.0%

50% 40% 30%

24.0% 14.8%

20% 8.1%

10.3%

10% 0%

3.2% 4.2%

2005

4.2%

2006

18.7%

15.8%

4.2%

2007

5.1% 3.5%

2.3%

2008

2.9%

2009

4.3%

3.3%

5.9% 7.5%

0.5%

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Opinions from the Japanese side: significant/relatively significant

Opinions from the Japanese side: insignificant/relatively insignificant

Opinions from the Chinese side: significant/relatively significant

Opinions from the Chinese side: insignificant/relatively insignificant

(e) Public opinion in recent years on the significance of Sino-Japanese relations Figure 11.1 (Continued)

mass media with global and international perspectives to reinterpret East Asia’s regional relations and to reconsider the history of the region, are not solely methodological issues but also practical issues that affect the stability and the shared prosperity of the region. For each country in East Asia, accurate information is a precondition for historical perception and therefore must be guaranteed, regardless of whether it might damage the political interests or harm the national pride of certain countries. Instead of following the crowd or producing narrow-minded arguments, intellectuals today must play a guiding role. As Figure 11.1a–e reveals, Chinese intellectuals place more value on Sino-Japanese relations than ordinary Chinese do. If even the intellectuals—the elites of our age—are reluctant to search for the historical truth, common ground for historical perception will never emerge. Furthermore, through factors such as the multiple perspectives of historical perception and the diverse interpretation of historical events, as well as of the causal relations between these events, and the richness of the available documents, the process of “constructing historical facts” has two aspects: examining the historical facts and creating myths. In May 1923, the Chinese historian Gu Jiegang contributed an article to Dushu Zazhi (读书杂志), a monthly founded by Hu Shih. Gu discovered the phenomena of the “multi-layered construction of Chinese ancient history.” What Gu meant by this concept was not only the discovery of new historical materials but also crucial issues such as changes in epistemological

Historical perception in China

195

subjects, the shifting methodology of obtaining historical knowledge, and the creation of historical consciousness. Nowadays, political propaganda is continuously being generated in every East Asian country. In such a context, ordinary people are discouraged from thinking critically and are gradually brainwashed. Third, despite all the obstacles, we believe that historical narratives that hew to the factual historical record do exist. We believe that broadening the scale and opening the mind would help people overcome their own narrow interests and think objectively. We should feel confident in reaching historical truths. Numerous sets of evidence will lead people to morally just positions and critical reflection.

Notes 1 http://world.chinadaily.com.cn/2014zrlt/2014-09/09/content_18580477. htm 2 Curriculum and Teaching Materials Research Institute and Center for Developing History Curriculum, People’s Education Press (ed.). Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun shiyan jiaokeshu lishi (1) 普通高中课程标准实验教科书 历史 (1). People’s Education Press, 2004, p. 26. 3 Curriculum and Teaching Materials Research Institute and Center for Developing History Curriculum, People’s Education Press (ed.). Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun shiyan jiaokeshu lishi (1) 普通高中课程标准实验教科书 历史 (1). People’s Education Press, 2004, p. 33. 4 Editorial Board of Essentials of Modern and Contemporary History of China. Essentials of Modern and Contemporary History of China (revised in 2013). Higher Education Press, August 2013 (5th ed.), pp. 71f. 5 Fukuzawa Yukichi. “Nisshin Sensō wa Bunya no Sensō Nari 日清の戰爭は文野の 戰爭なり,” (29 July 1895), cited in Fukuzawa Yūkichi Zenshū, vol. 14, Iwanami Shoten, 1961, p. 492. 6 Curriculum and Teaching Materials Research Institute and Center for Developing History Curriculum, People’s Education Press (eds.). Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun shiyan jiaokeshu lishi (1) 普通高中课程标准实验教科书 历史 (1). People’s Education Press, 2004, pp. 35–39. 7 Editorial Board of Essentials of Modern and Contemporary History of China. Essentials of Modern and Contemporary History of China (revised in 2013). Higher Education Press, August 2013 (5th ed.), pp. 142–151. 8 Editorial Board of Essentials of Modern and Contemporary History of China. Essentials of Modern and Contemporary History of China (revised in 2013). Higher Education Press, August 2013 (5th ed.), pp. 154, 165. 9 Song Zhiyong 宋志勇 and Tian Qingli 田庆立. Riben jinxiandai duihua guanxishi 日本近现代对华关系史 (Japan’s Relation to China in Modern Times). Shijie Zhishi Press, 2010, pp. 2f. 10 He Tianyi 何天义 (ed.). Rijun qinhua zhanfuying zonglun 日军侵华战俘营总 论 (General Introduction of Japanese Army’s Concentration Camps in China). Social Science Academic Press, 2013, p. 15. 11 http://world.chinadaily.com.cn/2014zrlt/2014-09/09/content_18580477. htm

Afterword TANAKA Hitoshi

This volume is the result of a grant from the One Asia Foundation and an open course held in 2015 at Osaka University’s School of Law titled “‘Historical Narrative’ in the Twenty-First Century World: Toward Building a Cooperative Community in Asia.” The instructors at this open course were handpicked by the editor of this volume and organized into three research teams. The first group consisted of researchers who were involved with historical documents and were part of the Documentation Center for China Studies (2012–2017) that was organized through cooperative universities and other research facilities. In this group, cooperative research was conducted on various topics in twentieth-century Chinese politics via workshops and seminars. The second group consisted primarily of teaching staff and graduate students from the Graduate School of Law and Politics at Osaka University who participated in the Osaka University Political History Workshop organized by the editor of this volume. The third group consisted of members from the history departments of China’s Nankai University and Taiwan’s National Dong Hwa University who participated in the 2007 international seminar titled “Present-Day China and East Asia’s New Environment.” The interdisciplinary area studies and history research brought forth a fruitful dialog between the universities; this was to help facilitate interactive research in East Asia. This was an invaluable opportunity for researchers from areas such as modern Chinese political history and political science as well as historians from China, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, etc. with various backgrounds. They held discussions among themselves and with students on whether a “historical narrative” is possible in the present day, which resulted in some intense debates. In closing, I would like to thank the One Asian Foundation for providing us with this valuable opportunity. I would further like to express my gratitude to the staff of the Osaka University Graduate School of Law and Politics, and Tanabiki Junko of Horitsu Bunka-sha, for providing us with an exceptional environment in which we were able to publish this volume.

China

Major events

1859 1860 Convention of Peking 1861 Government body in charge of foreign policy in Imperial China established 1862 1863 1864 Hui (Muslim) Minorities War; Yakubu Beg Administration

1856 The Second Opium War 1857 1858 Treaty of Tianjin; Treaty of Aigun

1855

1850 1851 Taiping Rebellion 1852 1853 1854

Year

Timeline

Treaty of Tianjin; Anpin Harbor and the Port of Tamsui opened

Taiwan

Perry Expedition Japan-U.S. Treaty of Peace and Amity; Anglo-Japanese Friendship Treaty Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia

Japan

Korea

(Continued)

First International

Treaty of Saigon

Crimean War

World

China

Major events

1877 1878

1876 Chefoo Convention

1875

Shen Baozhen (沈葆禎) inaugurated as coastal defense

Takebashi Incident; Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office established

Imperial Japanese Naval Academy established

Japanese invasion of Taiwan Treaty of Saint Petersburg

1873

1874

Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty

Meiji Restoration

Imperial Grant for Treaty of Amity and Commerce between U.S. and the Empire of Japan

Japan

Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy founded Conscription Ordinance

Mudan Incident; Taiwan Incident

Taiwan

1872 Qing government’s Students’ Overseas Policy (U.S.)

1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 Russia occupied the Ili Territory

1866

1865

Year

(Continued)

Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity

Ganghwa Island Incident

Establishment of the Min Clan Government

General Sherman Incident; French Campaign Against Korea

Korea

Congress of Berlin

Second Treaty of Saigon UK government bought a share of the Suez Canal Company

Unification of Germany; Paris Commune

International Telegraph Union

World

1891 1892 1893

1890 Treaty of Sikkim・Tibet

1886 1887 Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Peking 1888 The Beiyang Fleet organized 1889 Guangxu Emperor ruled government directly

1885 The Treaty of Tianjin (Qing Dynasty-Japan); the Treaty of Tianjin (Qing Dynasty-France)

1883 1884 Sino-French War; XinJiang Province established

1880 Li Hongzhang established a Navy 1881 Treaty of Saint Petersburg 1882

1879

Taiwan Post started

Qing Dynasty designated Taiwan Province

Modern postal services began; Gapsin Coup Geomun Island Incident; Telecom opened (Seoul-Inchon)

Chichibu Incident (a large-scale peasant revolt) Inauguration of Cabinet Government; ITO Hirobumi appointed as first prime minister

Promulgation of the Injunction against grain Constitution of the export in Hamgyong Empire of Japan Province Promulgation of Imperial Rescript of Education

Imo Incident; the Amity and Trade Treaties concluded with the U.S., England, Germany, etc.

Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors

Tokyo Shokon Sha renamed Yasukuni Jinja; the Ryukyu Kingdom was abolished and the Ryukyu Domain established

(Continued)

Second International

Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, and Italy)

1903 The Chinese Eastern Railway opened to traffic

1902

1900 Boxer Fighters (Yihetuan) advance to Beijing and Tianjin; the Eight-Nation Alliance occupied Beijing; Russia occupied the NorthEastern Region 1901 The New Policies; the Boxer Protocol

1899 The Boxer Rebellion

1898 The Hundred Days’ Reform

The Provisional Organization to Investigate the Customs in Taiwan established; Taiwan Shrine established

Establishment of the Bank of Taiwan Taipei Natural Foot Society began anti-foot-binding movement

The Three-steps Security Control enforced The Hoko System adopted

Anglo-Japanese Alliance

Troops sent to China for the Boxer Rebellion; the Military Ministers to be ActiveDuty Officers Law established

Supreme Military Council established

The Triple Intervention (Russia, Germany, France）

Government-General of Taiwan began military administration Law 63 enacted

Japan

1895 The Treaty of Shimonoseki; cession of Formosa to Japan 1896 Sino-Russian Secret Treaty 1897

Taiwan Declaration of war on Qing Dynasty

China

Major events

1894 The First Sino-Japanese War

Year

(Continued)

Peasant uprising in the Southern Region Anti-Japanese dispute by port workers in Mokpo

Peasant uprising in Jeju Island

Hwalbindang began activity

The Great Korean Empire proclaimed Public debate held by the Independence Association

Donghak Peasant Revolution; Tte Gabo Reform Eulmi Incident; use of the Solar Calendar

Korea

Trans-Siberian Railway opened to traffic

The Open-Door Policy declared in the U.S.

World

1910

1908 The Principles of the Constitution (Qinding Xianfa Dagang); the Xuantong Emperor (Puyi) ascended the throne 1909

1907 Enforced System of Province in Northeast China

1905 Anti-U.S. boycott; the T’ung-meng Hui (Chinese United League) founded; Chinese Imperial Examinations abolished 1906 Imperial Edict for Preparation of Constitutionalism

1904 The Treaty of Lhasa

Japanese annexation of Korea

Japan suppressed the Southern Region of Korea

(Continued)

The U.K.’s Dominion; Union of South Africa created

Governor-General Office established; anti-Japanese loyal soldiers rose in revolt The Anglo-Russian The National Debt Convention signed Repayment Movement; sent a Special Envoy to the Hague; Emperor Gojong of Korea abdicated; troops dismissed Oriental Development Revolution of Young Company established Turks Party

Imperial Edict for the establishment of South Manchuria Railway Co., Ltd. Japan-Korea Treaty of 1907; Russo-Japanese Agreement; Prince Yoshihito visited Korea

Entente Cordiale signed

Taft-Katsura Agreement (U.S.-Japan); Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty

The Japan-Korea Treaty; construction of the Gyeongbu Line started

Surrender of Lüshun; Treaty of Portsmouth

Russo-Japanese War

Assassination of Hirobumi Ito by Korean independence activist and Nationalist An Jung-geun The Governor exercised Japanese annexation of “The Battle of Takoham” Korea; the Imperial Veteran Association established

“San-Yi Law” (Thirty-First Law, 1904) came into effect; the Beipu Incident

Government-General of Formosa promulgated regulation acts for land cultivator’s rights

China

Major events

1915 Acceptance of the TwentyOne Demands; Yuan Shikai declared Imperial ruler 1916 Yuan Shika died; Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China restored; Parliament convened 1917 The Manchu Restoration; war declared against Germany; establishment of Republic of China Military Government

1911 Promulgation of the Railway Nationalization Decree; the Wuchang Uprising; Outer Mongolia’s Declaration of Independence 1912 Provisional Government of the Republic of China established; fall of the Qing Dynasty 1913 The Second Revolution; Sino-Russian Agreement 1914 The Diet was dissolved; the Chinese Revolutionary Party formed

Year

(Continued)

Nishihara Loans started

The Truku (Taroko) War; establishment of the Taiwan Assimilation; joined World War I The Tapani Incident Sent the Twenty-One Demands Hasegawa Yoshimichi served as the Japanese Governor-General of Korea

Taishō political crisis

Luo Fu-Xing Incident

[Russia] October Revolution

［Russia］Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism

Treaty of London

World War I

The Second Balkan War

Start of the Land Research The First Balkan War; Project the Third Japan-Russian Secret Treaty

Emperor Meiji died

World

Qian Bridges Po Lin Event

Korea Promulgation of the Land Acquisition Decree

Japan

The Alishan Forest Railway opened; cutting of the pigtail while wearing Han clothing

Taiwan

Petition Movement for the establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament began The Third Law in effect; a desegregated school system for Taiwanese and Japanese began

1924 The 1st National Congress of Violation of the Public Order and Police Law Kuomintang; Incident the Second War of Feng-zhi; Feng-Russia Agreement

Prince Hirohito visited Europe

The New People Society formed

1920 The Zhili-Anhui War; membership in the League of Nations; Movement for the System of Local Administration; Ministry System started 1921 Abrogation of Japan-China Military Agreement; Chinese Communist Party formed 1922 Hong Kong Seafarers Strike; the First War; Zhili Clique vs. Fengtian Clique; Chen Jiongming’s Rebellion 1923 2.7 Incident; Lüshun Dalian Recovery Campaign The Great Kanto Earthquake; the Kantō Massacre: massacre of Koreans; the Toranomon Incident The Second ProConstitution Movement

The Washington Naval Treaty signed; demise of AngloJapanese Alliance

The Nikolayevsk Incident

The Educational Ordinance of Taiwan promulgated; the Headquarters Ordinance of Taiwan Army promulgated

1919 The May Fourth Movement; the Karakhan Manifesto; the Nationalist Party of China established

Declaration for the Siberian Intervention; the Rice Riots Membership in the League of Nations and ILO

Movement for Abolishing Law 63

1918 Agreement of Japan-China military

The Washington Naval Conference

League of Nations formed

Comintern organized; Treaty of Versailles

The Fourteen Points; Germany surrendered

(Continued)

［Italy］Victory of Fascist Party

Korean Workers’ Mutual The Nine-Power Aid Society; Treaty; May Day Memorial Soviet Union formed Lecture by the Workers’ Party of Korea Amtaedo Peasant Republic of Turkey Movement formed

Yi Donghwi and Kim Li organized the Korean Social Party The March 1st Movement; the Korean Provisional Government established; Makoto Saito chosen as Governor-General The Battle of Fengwudong/ Qingshanli; The Chosun Ilbo and The Dong-A Ilbo published

China

Major events

1931 The Liutiaohu Incident; the Chinese-Soviet Republic established

1925 Sun Yat-sen died; the May Thirtieth Movement; the National Government of the Republic of China established in Guangzhou 1926 The March 18th Massacre; Zhongshan Incident; Northern Expedition started 1927 The April 12 Incident; the Wuhan Nationalist Government disintegrated; the Nanchang Uprising 1928 Second Phase of the Northern Expedition; Zhang Zuolin Explosion Death Incident; the Northern Expedition military entered Beijing; Chinese reunification 1929 Conference for the Table of Organization and Equipment; Chinese Eastern Railway Incident 1930 The Central Plains War; the First Extermination Campaign

Year

(Continued)

The Locarno Treaties

The Fifth Comintern Congress; Kellogg-Briand Pact

The Great Depression

London Naval Treaty

Spanish Republic Revolution; the Lytton Commission formed by the League of Nations

The Communist Party of Korea founded

Gensan General Strike; the Gwangju Student Independence Movement Gum Laborers’ General Strike in Pyongyang Singanhoe (新幹會) Dissolution Decision; Ugaki Issei appointed as governor

The Public Security Preservation Laws enacted; Soviet-Japanese Basic Convention Emperor Taisho died; Hirohito ascended the throne The Shandong Expedition; the Eastern Conference The March 15 Incident

4.16 Incident

Return to the Gold Standard System The Mukden Incident; Jĭnzhōu bombed; finance management by Takahashi Korekiyo started

The Public Security Preservation Laws enacted; Erlin Sugarcane Farmers Incident The Hua-Tung Line opened; the Peasant Union formed The Taiwanese People’s Party founded

Formosan League for Workers established

Eizo Ishizuka appointed as the 13th GovernorGeneral of Taiwan

The Taiwanese Federation for Local Autonomy was formed; the Musha Incident

The June 10th Movement; [England］The New the Manse Policy of China Demonstrations announced The Singanhoe (New Trunk Association) founded

World

Korea

Japan

Taiwan

Denunciation of the Treaty of Washington

Emperor-as-Organ-ofthe State Theory; Declaration of Clear Evidence of the National Polity; Aizawa Incident February 26th Incident; Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany

The Shinchiku-Taichū Earthquake; Taiwan Exposition of 40th Anniversary in the Japanese Ruling Period

Taiwan Takushoku Co. Ltd. established

“The National Mobilization The Battle of Shanghai; Movement” headquarters Nanjing invaded established by GovernorGeneral of Taiwan

1934 The New Life Movement advocated; the Long March

1935 The Zunyi Conference; August 1 Declaration; the Chinese Currency Reform; the December 9th Movement

1936 National Salvation League formed; the Suiyuan Campaign; Sian Incident

1937 The Marco Polo Bridge Incident; the Second United Front; the Nanjing Massacre

1933 The Battle of Rehe; the abandonment of the Old Ryo and Yuan replacement; the Tanggu Truce; the Fujian Incident

The League of Blood Incident; 5.15 Incident; the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol signed Withdraw from the League of Nations; Amendments of the Press Law, Newspaper Law; Rice Control Act

1932 Shanghai Incident; Manchukuo proclaimed; Sino-Soviet restoration of diplomatic relations

[U.S.] Silver Purchasing Act; [Russia] became Member State of the League of Nations Seventh World Congress of the Comintern; [Italy] Second ItaloAbyssinian War

[Germany] The Hitler Cabinet formed; [U.S.] the New Deal enacted

Declaration to the Anti-War Congress, Amsterdam

(Continued)

Koreans in Manchuria The Spanish Civil War established the “Sokoku Kofukukai”; the Nisshōki (Sun-Mark Flag) eradicated Anti-Japanese commando [U.S.] The Quarantine attacked Hamgyŏngnamdo Speech; and Pochonbo Brussels Conference

The Sakuradamon Incident (Patriotic Deed of Lee Bong-chang); bomb set off in Shanghai by Yun Bong-gil The Rural Promotion Movement started; Anti-Japanese guerrilla corps attacked Kankyōhoku Prefecture, Kyongwon County police stations Order of Labor Cropland

China

Major events

Public Service Association of Imperial Subject (Komin Hōkōkai) established

1941 The New Fourth Army Incident (the South Anhui Incident); tax levied on rice crops transferred to Central Tianfu; the China Democratic Political League formed

Forced name change from Korean to Japanese; Korean Liberation Army established

Germany invaded the Soviet Union; Atlantic Charter; the Pacific War

[Germany] Occupation of Paris; alliance of Japan, Germany, and Italy

German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact; [Germany] invaded Poland

The Battles of Khalkhyn Gol; Proclamation of National Requisition Ordinance; Hiranuma Cabinet resignation Outline of the Basic National Policy established; Southward Advancement policy; advancement into northern region of French Indochina; Imperial Rule Assistance Association formed; Festival of the 2600th Anniversary held The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact; Tojo Cabinet formed; the Malayan Campaign; attack on Pearl Harbor

Proclamation of the Great Three Policies; Japanization, industrialization, and the base for southward advancement

The Doorways Regulation revised (surnamechanging for Taiwanese was permitted)

[Germany] The Anschluss of Austria; the Munich Agreement

Konoe’s Statement; Proclamation of National Mobilization Law

World

National Mobilization Law; the Temple Reorganization Movement

Korea

Japan

Taiwan

1940 Mao Zedong’s the New Democracy; the Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China established; the Hundred Regiments Offensive

1938 The Outline of Resistance for National Foundation; National Political Assembly; Battles of Wuhan and Guangzhou 1939 The National Spiritual Mobilization Principles; Measures of Limiting Activities in Opposing Party

Year

(Continued)

End of Japanese occupation

The Committee of Handling Japanese Assets established; Taiwan National Languages Committee established

1946 Political Consultation Conference of Republican China; the Chinese Civil War; the National Assembly

Women’s Volunteer Corps regulations; requisition enforced by the National General Mobilization Act; the Committee for Preparation of Korean Independence formed (Lyuh Woon-hyung） “8.15” National Liberation Atomic bombings Day of Korea; of Hiroshima and Preparatory Committee Nagasaki; for National the Imperial Rescript on Construction Started; the Termination of the Greater East Asia War [U.S.-Russia] enforcement of military administration The First U.S.-Soviet Joint The International Commission held Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trial) convened; new constitution for postwar Japan enacted Operation Number One; air strike on October 10 in Okinawa; Battle of Leyte Gulf

The system of conscription

North China Korean Independence League formed; Korean Language Society Incident; the Military Service Law Proclamation of Conscription

The Student Mobilization Order; the Greater East Asia Conference

The first bombing of Tokyo; Battle of Midway

Six-year compulsory education system introduced; Taiwan Voluntary Navy System implemented

1945 The Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China; Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; the Double Tenth Agreement

1943 Abrogation of the Unequal Treaty between China and the U.S. and China and the U.K.; Chiang Kai-shek’s China’s Destiny published 1944 The China Democratic League formed; Joseph Warren Stilwell recalled

Taiwan Voluntary Army 1942 The Yan’an Rectification soldiers join the military Movement; the pact of Lend-Lease policy between China and the U.S.

(Continued)

United Nations established; Fulton Speech (the Iron Curtain Speech)

Yalta Conference; [Germany] surrender; Potsdam Declaration

Invasion of Normandy

The Communist International (Comintern) dissolved; the Cairo Declaration

The Declaration of the Allies

China

Major events

Taiwan

Martial Law declared; the White Terror

1950 The Sino-Soviet Treaty of [U.S.] Taiwan Strait Friendship, Alliance and “neutralized” Mutual Assistance; Agrarian Reform Law of the People’s Republic of China; the (Chinese) People’s Volunteer Army marched to North Korea

1949 The New Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference; establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC); Mao Zedong visits Moscow

The February 28 Incident 1947 Declaration of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army; the 1947 General Rules of Land Law; cnactment of the Constitution of the Republic of China United States Aid 1948 The National Assembly; Management Committee Provisional People’s established Congress of Huabei; the Liaoshen Campaign/ Huaihai Campaign

Year

(Continued)

Public Offices Election Act; establishment of the National Police Reserve; Association of Keeping the Peace organized

World

The Korean War

COMECON organized; NATO organized; [U.S.] U.S. relations with China with Special reference to the period; division of West and East Germany

The Israeli Declaration of Independence; The Berlin Blockade

Lyuh Woon-hyung The Marshall Plan assassinated; announced; United Nations formation of Temporary Commission independent India on Korea established and Pakistan

Korea

The Communist-aligned Teigin Incident; Democratic People’s Ashida Hitoshi Cabinet; Republic of Korea and the Education Ordinance; the Western-aligned the Imperial Rescript to Republic of Korea Soldiers and Sailors established; Lost Effect; the Special Committee of the Tokyo Trial Punishing Collaborations Judgment for Japanese Imperialism established The Diet Fraction The Dodge Line; Incident; Manifestation of the Law of Land Reform; Economic Stability Kim Gu Murdered Policy

February 1st General Strike cancelled by Douglas MacArthur

Japan

Became the 69th member of the United Nations; the Tanzan Ishibashi Cabinet; Burma Memorial Association; Sunagawa Incident

1956 Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Major Relationships”; the Hundred Flowers Campaign; the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China

1955 Mao Zedong, “About the Issues of Agricultural Cooperative”

Japan Liberal Party established; conference Between Ikeda Hayato and Walter Spencer Robertson The Ministry of the Interior The Japan Democratic decided on the Nine Party founded Natives’ Names; the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty The Sun Li-jen Incident Unification of the Social Democratic Party of Japan; Liberal Democratic Party of Japan founded

Land-to-the-Tiller Program

U.S. Special Unit organized The Treaty of San Francisco; the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan The Sino-Japanese Peace The Fourth Yoshida Treaty Cabinet

1953 Mao Zedong “The General Line in the Transition Stage”; the Sino-Soviet Economic and Technological Assistance Agreement 1954 The First National People’s Congress (Proclamation of the Constitution)

1952 The Land Reform ended

1951 The Expedition to Lhasa

The Round Off Constitutional Amendment

The Extraction Constitutional Amendment passed The Korean Armistice Agreement; the First Currency Reform implemented

(Continued)

The Bandung Conference; the Warsaw Pact; the World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs [Russia] “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences”; the Hungarian Uprising

SEATO established

Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin died

[Britain] Closed the Suez Canal

The Treaty of San Francisco

China

Major events

1961 Adjustment policy; Wu Han, “Hai Rui Dismissed from Office”

1960 [USSR] The withdrawal of the specialists in China; Third Class Ownership System of People’s Commune

1958 The General Line for the Socialist Construction; the People’s Communese formed; the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis 1959 Protests and uprisings in Tibet; the Lushan Conference; the Sino-Indian Border Collision

1957 The Anti-Rightist Campaign; Mao Zedong, “The East Wind Prevails Over the West Wind”

Year

(Continued)

Japan

Commission on the Constitution established; the Non-permanent Member (UN Security Council) Taiwan Garrison Command Conference between established; John Foster Dulles and the Second Taiwan Strait Fujiyama Aiichiro; Crisis Nagasaki Incident regarding the Chinese National Flag China Development Trust The National Conference Association established; for Preventing the the 8.7 Floods Revision of the U.S.Japan Security Treaty; the Japan—Vietnam Agreement Concerning Compensation Treaty of Mutual Temporary provisions Cooperation and effective uring the period Security between the of national mobilization United States and for suppression of the Japan; Communist Rebellion (amendment); Lei Chen’s Ikeda Cabinet; establishment of arrest; Democratic Socialist land consolidation Party Japan-Korea talks

Taiwan

May 16 Coup

March 1960 South Korean presidential election; April Revolution; establishment of Second Republic of Korea

The Progressive Party Incident

Korea

Foundation of OECD

The Cuban Revolution; the U.S.-Russia Summit Meeting

Iraqi Republican Revolution

EEC started; [Russia] Launched Sputnik 1

World

1968 Establishment of Revolutionary Committees; Denunciation Meetings against Liu Shaoqi

1965 Lin Biao, “Long Live the Victory of the People’s War!”; Yao Wenyuan’s articles in Wenhui Bao 1966 “May 16 Notification”; “Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution” 1967 Shanghai People’s Commune; Wuhan Incident

Compulsory education (9 years)

100th Anniversary Memorial Ceremony for the Meiji Restoration

Establishment of National Foundation Day The Textbook Trial of Ienaga Saburō

Setting of Export Processing Zone

Establishment of National Security Bureau

Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and the Republic of Korea

Satō Cabinet; Games of the XVIII Olympiad

LT Agreement

[U.S.] Completion of U.S.’s economic aid

1962 Mao Zedong, “Continuous Revolution”; Sino-Indian border conflict Anti-Japan Movement 1963 “Follow the Examples of Comrade Lei Feng” campaign; Rural Socialist Education Movement; Sino-Soviet Public Controversy Completion of Shihmen 1964 Mao Zedong’s Inland Dam Construction Plan; 1st nuclear weapons test

Blue House Raid; National Chart of Education

South Korea-U.S. Status Administrative Agreement

6.3 Incident; sent troops to Vietnam

Third Republic of Korea

Kim Jong-pil/Ōhira Masayoshi talks

(Continued)

Establishment of the European Communities (EC); establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) [U.S.] End of Operation Rolling Thunder; Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia

[France] Withdrawal from NATO

[U.S.] Gulf of Tonkin Incident; [USSR] Khrushchev’s downfall [U.S.] Operation Rolling Thunder; 30 September Movement

[U.S.] Intervention in Vietnam War; Cuban Missile Crisis Establishment of Organization of African Unity; [U.S.] Assassination of John F. Kennedy

China

Major events

1976 Zhou Enlai’s death; April 5 Tian’amen Incident; Mao Zedong’s death; Gang of Four’s arrest

1973 Deng Xiaoping’s re-emergence; 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (rising of Gang of Four) 1974 Criticize Lin (Biao), Criticize Confucius Campaign; Deng Xiaoping’s speech “Three Worlds Theory”; Li Yizhe poster 1975 1975 Constitutions

1971 Lin Biao Incident; restoration of the lawful rights of the PRC in the United Nations 1972 Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China; Tanaka’s 1972 visit to China

1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict; 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China; Liu’s death in prison 1970 First space satellite (Dongfanghong I); denunciation against Chen Boda

Year

(Continued)

“Democratic National Salvation Declaration”

Tanaka’s visit to ASEAN

Lockheed bribery scandals

Presidential emergency measures

Kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung

“Ten Major Construction Projects”

Chiang Kai-shek’s death; President Yen Chia-kan Port of Taichung’s opening

July 4th North-South Korea Joint Statement; October Restoration; establishment of Fourth Republic of Korea Park Chung-hee’s June 23rd Declaration (Peaceful Reunification Diplomacy)

Okinawa Restoration; normalization of JapanChina diplomatic relations

Abrogation of ROC-Japan diplomatic relationship

End of Vietnam War; 1st G6 summit Reunification of North and South Vietnam

Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam; oil crisis

[U.S.] Watergate Scandal

Start of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; [U.S.] Cambodian campaign [U.S.] “Dollar Shock” (“Nixon Shock”)

Jeon Tae-il’s self-immolation

7th presidential election; Gwangju Public Corp. Condominium

[U.S.] First moon landing by Apollo 11

6th Constitutional Amendment

Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué

World

Korea

Japan

“Baodiao Movement”; withdrawal from the United Nations

Taiwan

Abrogation of ROC-U.S. diplomatic relationship; Kaohsiung Incident

1981 Trial of Lin Biao and Gang of Four; “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” 1982 1982 Constitutions; 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China; Liu’s death in prison

Era Name Act; starting ODA to China

President Chiang Chingkuo; opening of all lines of National Freeway 1

1978 1978 Constitutions; controversy between Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping; 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 1979 Normalization of China-U.S. diplomatic relations; Wei Jingsheng’s arrest; Democracy Wall’s closure 1980 Rehabilitation of Comrade Liu Shaoqi; setting Special Economic Zone (Shenzhen, etc.) First Visit to Japan of Japanese orphans in China

Nakasone’s visit to Republic of Korea; Japanese history textbook controversies

Kuomintang’s “Unification of China by Three Principles of the People”

Three-Noes Policy by Chiang Ching-kuo

North-link Line’s opening; Hsinchu Science Park’s initiation

Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China

Zhongli Incident

1977 Deng Xiaoping’s revival; 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China

Busan American Cultural Service Building arson

Establishment of 5th Republic of Korea; President Chun Doohwan visits U.S.

Bu-Ma democratic protests; assassination of Park Chung-hee Gwangju Uprising

Students Demonstration for Requirement of the Restoration’s Abolishing and Democratization

(Continued)

[USSR] Tashkent Suggestion; Falklands War

Establishment of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel; Iran-Iraq War [U.S.] President Ronald Reagan; assassination of Anwar Sadat

Iranian Revolution; [U.K.] Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

Vietnam-Chinese’s mass return to China

Cambodian-Vietnamese War

China

Major events

Taiwan

1987 Hu Yaobang’s resignation; 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China 1988

Repeal of martial law; lifting of embargo on Mainland travel for meeting relatives Lifting ban on newspaper publications; Chiang Ching-kuo’s death; President Lee Teng-hui

1983 Resolution of Assembly by CCP Chiang Nan Incident 1984 Reforming state-owned enterprise; Deng Xiaoping’s “One Country, Two Systems”; Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong 1985 Dismantling of People’s Commune; establishment of Township-government 1986 Compulsory Education Act; “Anti-DuPont” demonstration; Student Movement in Hefei; foundation of Democratic A Theory of Socialist Spiritual Civilization Progressive Party

Year

(Continued)

Takeshita’s visit to China; Yen Loan

Takeshita Cabinet

Nakasone’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine

President Chun Doohwan visits Japan

Japan

World

Plaza Accord

Edsa Revolution; [USSR] Chernobyl disaster; [USSR] Vladivostok Suggestion [USSR] Perestroika; ASEAN summit (Manila Declaration) [USSR] Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; End of Iran-Iraq War

1985 South Korean legislative election New Democratic Party’s Declaration of Constitutional Reform Movement; May 3rd Incheon Incident Presidential election (Roh Tae-woo’s victory) Establishment of 6th Republic of Korea; 1988 South Korean legislative election; August 7th Declaration; Seoul Olympics

Korean Air Lines Flight 007; Lech Wałęsa wins Nobel Peace Prize Rangoon bombing Association of Indira Intensification of student Gandhi demonstration

Korea

Kim Hak-sun’s lawsuit against Japanese government

Act on cooperation for United Nations peacekeeping operations; Emperor Akihito’s visit to China

End of “Temporary Provisions Against the Communist Rebellion”; abolishment of “Million Years Diet”

1991 Patriotic Education Campaign

1992 Consensus 1992 Deng Xiaoping’s South China Tour; normalization of China-South Korea diplomatic relations; 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (“Socialist Market Economy”) 1993 Border agreement between 1st Wang-Koo talks (Wang China and Vietnam Daohan: Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, Koo Chen-fu: Straits Exchange Foundation) Fall of 1955 System; Kono Statement

Emperor Hirohito’s death

1989 Hu Yaobang’s death; 1989 Tian’amen Square protest; Jiang Zemin (General Secretary of the CCP); 14th Dalai Lama’s reception of Nobel Peace Prize 1990 Acceptation of Developing Pudong; Hong Kong Basic Law (Draft) Invasion of Kuwait; German reunification

Establishment of Democratic Liberal Party; Inter-Korean high-level talks [Korea and USSR] Toplevel talks; [North and South Korea] Affiliation in UN; Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 1992 South Korean legislative election; 1992 South Korean presidential election (President Kim Young-sam)

(Continued)

Real Name Policy Maastricht Treaty (Finance); (effective); [North Korea] Declaration 1st APEC Summit Talks of secession from NPT

Dissolution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; establishment of Memory of the World (MoW)

Abolishment of Apartheid; dissolution of the Soviet Union

Fall of Berlin Wall; Malta Summit

“Korea National Community Reunification Plan”

China

Major events

Memorialization of the February 28 Incident (President Lee Tenghui’s official apology); Lee Teng-hui’s “Six-Point Reply”; Lee Teng-hui’s visit to U.S. 1996 Taiwan presidential election (President Lee Teng-hui)

Abolishment of “Three Principles of the People” as a university entrance exam subject

Taiwan

Using “Understanding 1997 Deng Xiaoping’s death; Taiwan” in junior high handover of Hong Kong; school textbooks 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Deng Xiaoping Theory) 1998 Zhu Rongji (Premier of the People’s Republic of China); Organic Law of Village Committees; Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development

1996 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis; Jiang Zemin’s visit to Korea

1994 Abolishment of Bank of China Foreign Exchange Certificate; beginning of construction of Three Gorges Dam 1995 1995 Hong Kong legislative election; China-U.S. Summit; Jiang Zemin’s “Eight-point Proposal”

Year

(Continued)

1st ASEM Summit; Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Treaty of Amsterdam (signed); Asian Financial Crisis

[U.S.] “Three No’s” Principles on Taiwan (Clinton)

Accession to OECD

President Kim Dae-jung

Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, Alliance for the 21st Century The 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation; founding of Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform

World

Establishment of WTO

[North Korea] Kim Il-sung’s death

Korea

Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake; Murayama Statement

Japan

2004 Suggestion of the “Socialist Harmonious Society” Theory

2001 Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization; Beijing’s winning of 2008 Olympics bid; accession to WTO 2002 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Hu Jintao: General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP); SARS incident; South-North water transfer project 2003 Premier Wen Jiabao; Sun Zhigang incident; Shenzhou 5

1999 Handover of Macau; bombing of the People’s Republic of China Embassy in Belgrade Incident 2000 China western eevelopment; “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue”

Koizumi’s visit to North Korea

Accession to WTO; Chen Shui-bian’s “One Country on Each Side”

Taiwan passport (“TAIWAN” printed below the national emblem); Name Change Campaign (Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign) Chen Shui-bian’s re-election

Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine; Japanese history textbook controversies

[PRC] Zhu Rongji’s visit to Japan

Chen Shui-bian’s “Four Noes and One Without”

Allowing “Mini Three Links”; Democratic Progressive Party’s rising

Act on National Flag and Anthem

Local Government Act; Lee Teng-hui’s “Two-State Theory”; 1999 Jiji Earthquake

Special Law on the Inspection of Collaborations for the Japanese Imperialism

[North Korea] Six-party Talks begin

June 15th North-South Joint Declaration; Starting Gyeongui Line’s Reconnecting

(Continued)

Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea Enlargement of the European Union (25 Member States); ASEAN+3 Summit

2002 FIFA World Cup; East Timor independence

[U.S.] September 11 attacks; [U.S. and U.K.] War in Afghanistan

Introduction of Euro as an accounting currency; establishment of ASEAN-10

China

Major events

2007 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China; Property Law 2008 Tibetan unrest; Joint Statement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests”; 2008 Sichuan earthquake; Beijing Olympic Games; Charter 08 2009 July Ürümqi Riots

2006 Abolition of Agricultural Tax; opening of Qinghai-Tibet Railway

2005 Anti-secession Law; Anti-Japanese demonstrations; suggestion of the “Three Rural Issues”

Year

(Continued)

[U.S.] President Barack Obama

The Democratic Party of Japan’s Government

Starting negotiation of “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”

Enlargement of the European Union (27 Member States)

[North Korea] North Korean missile test

Kyoto Protocol’s effectuation; Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN+3 Summit

World

[U.S.] Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers; G20’s emergency meeting

Starting “East Asian History” as a high school elective subject

Korea

China-Japan poisoned dumplings incident

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visits to Japan

Japan

President Ma Ying-jeou; Hu Jintao’s “Six-Points” Proposition to Taiwan

Lien Chan’s (Chairman of the Kuomintang) visit to China; National Assembly’s Constitutional Amendments into Effect Starting of direct flights between China and Taiwan; calling for Chen Shui-bian’s dismissal; Temporary Compulsory Education No. 95 Normal State Resolution

Taiwan

2012 Bo Xilai Incident; anti-Japanese demonstration against nationalization of Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands; 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Xi Jinping: General Secretary of the CCP) 2013 Particulate matter (PM 2.5) issues; establishment of Air Defense Identification Zone in East China Sea 2014 Setting of “Victory of War of Resistance Against Japan and Nanjing Condolence” Day; Japan-China Summit Meeting

2010 Expo 2010 Shanghai; 2010 Senkaku (Diaoyu Islands) boat collision incident; Liu Xiaobo’s reception of Nobel Peace Prize; becoming No. 2 economy in GDP 2011 Wenzhou train collision

Sunflower Student Movement

Sub-replacement fertility; mutual opening of tourism office in Taipei and Beijing

2011 Great Eastern Japan/Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami Abe Cabinet begins

President Park Geun-hye

Starting movement of setting “Comfort Women” statue

(Continued)

[Russian Federation] Annexation of Crimea

2017 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China

President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima

President Tsai Ing-wen

Japan

2016 Establishment of AIIB

Taiwan Abe Statement; TPP Agreement

China

Major events

2015 Abolition of One-child Policy; Xi-Ma Meeting; deciding of RMB’s joining the SDR

Year

(Continued)

“Comfort Women” statue (Busan)

[South Korea and Japan] Announcement by foreign ministers of Japan and the Republic of Korea at the Joint Press Occasion

Korea

PCA’s tribunal about South China Sea [U.S.] President Donald Trump

ASEAN Economic Community

World

Index

95 guidelines 8 1955 System 11 Abe Shinzo 7, 121, 136, 165; Abe Statement 12–13 Anti-Rightist campaign 40 Arrow War (Second Opium War) 25 ASEAN 18, 100, 130; ASEAN+1 138; ASEAN+3 137 Asian financial crisis 88 Asianism 87 Asian Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) 3 authoritarian 113, 170 Bandung 10 Principles/10 Principles for Peace 80 Bandung Conference/Asian African Conference 70, 88 Ban Ki-moon 12 big government 45 Boao Forum for Asia 190 bourgeois 28, 57 Boxer Rebellion 25, 185 Bush, George W. 128 capitalism 30, 62, 72, 160, 184 Chen Shui-bian 8 Chiang Ching-kuo 8 Chiang Kai-shek 12, 25, 56, 189 China Democratic League 40 Chinese civilization 53, 135, 184 Chinese Civil War 25, 81 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 24, 45, 52, 71, 184 Chinese historical perception 183 Chinese-ize 55 Chinese Nationalist Party 24, 38

Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War 12 class struggles 27 Cold War 70, 87, 126, 136, 153, 181 comfort women (statues) controversy/ issue 4, 165, 189 Cominform 53 Comintern 53 committed to the Soviet 71 Common Programme 53 constitutionalism 39 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 53 Constitution of the Republic of China 56 consultative council 57 Datsu-A-Ron (Leaving Asia, Entering Europe) 92, 181 democracy 25, 38, 52, 109, 178 democratic centralism 47 democratic party 59 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 8, 178 democratic revolution era (former/ new) 27 democratization 3, 38, 153, 181 Deng Xiaoping 7 de-Sinicization 18, 168 developmental regime(s) 3 Dewey, John 40 Ding Wenjiang 42 Double Tenth Agreement 56 dropping (of) nuclear bombs 123 East Asian community 88, 140, 180 empireness 151

222

Index

ethnic identity 171 Euro-centrism 90, 153 Fairbank, John K. 52 February 26 Incident 95 First World War (World War I) 104 Fukuzawa Yukichi 94, 186 Ganghwa Island Incident 159 general line for the transitional period 65 Genyōsha 92 global history 180 globalization 139, 181 Gotō Shinpei 109 Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere 92 Greater East Asia War (Pacific War) 90, 187 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 31 Gu Jiegang 194 hanjian 191 Hayek, Friedrich 47 historical awareness 33, 53 historical continuity 34 historical narrative(s) 6, 23, 52, 70, 151 historical revisionism 14, 172 history education 6, 153, 168, 181 Hundred Day’s Reform 28 Hungary Incident 70 Hu Qiaomu 52 Hu Shih 40 identity 90, 170, 181 ideology 53, 91, 100, 156, 171 Ienaga Saburō 172 independence 54, 88, 157 international relations theory 99 Ishibashi Tanzan 91 Japanese occupied zones 10, 157, 183 Japan’s annexation of Korea 93, 156 Japan’s democracy and parliamentary system 49 Kang Youwei 135, 185 keep a low profile and bide your time (tao guang yang hui) 3, 78 Khrushchev, Nikita 74 Kim Hak-sun 10 Kissinger, Henry 128 Kita Ikki 95 Kokuryūkai (black dragon society) 93

Konoe Fumimaro 96 Kono Statement 4 Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military 5 Korean War 73 Kōtoku Shūsui 96 Laski, Harold 40 lawful legitimacy 56 Lee Teng-hui 8 legitimacy 2, 46, 52, 122, 184 Lenin, Vladimir 72 Liang Qichao 160, 185 liberalism 33, 40, 78 Li Hongzhang 183 Lin Zexu 184 Liu Shaoqi 58 localization 8, 155 Luo Longji 40, 48 Malenkov, Georgy 73 Manchuria/Manchurian Nation 104, 118 Manchuria(n) Incident 12, 27, 104 Manshū Railway Company 108 Mao Zedong 24, 39, 54, 71 Mao Zedong Ideology 54 Marco Polo Bridge Incident 12 Marx-Leninism 53 May Fourth Movement 25, 40 Ma Ying-jeou 8 May Thirtieth Movement 25 Memory of the World Program 5 Mikoyan, Anastas 60 Miyazaki Tōten 91 Molotov, Vyacheslav 74 Murayama Statement 4 Murayama Tomiichi 11, 128 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the U.S. and the Republic of China (Taiwan) 77 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 89 National Day of Remembrance for the Nanjing Massacre 5 national humiliation 8, 183 nationalism 87, 113, 140, 172, 185 nationalistic voice(s) 14 national traitor 191 National Unified Front 55 Natsume Sōseki 162 Nehru, Jawaharlal 78 Neighboring Country Clause 4, 169

Index new liberal view of history 170 New Policies 33 NGO (non-governmental organization) 100 Northeast Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 10, 153 Obama, Barack 13, 121 Okakura Tenshin 91 Ōkawa Shūmei 91 one party dictatorship 41 Opium Wars 25, 188 Ozaki Hotsumi 91 pan-Asianism 88 Park Geun-hye 12, 165 patriotic education 7 patriotism 7 Peaceful Coexistence 70 People’s Democratic Autocracy 63, 71 People’s Political Consultative Conference (the People’s PCC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 52 perception from the expansion of nation-states 153 planned economy 44 Poland Incident 80 policy aimed toward the Soviet Union 59 postwar regime 11 Potsdam Declaration 124 proletariat 28, 60, 78 Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy 13 Putin, Vladimir 12 recommended representatives 58 reform and openness policy 31 Republic historiography 31 revolutionary historiography 180 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 48 Russian Revolution 28 Russo-Japanese War 93, 104, 188 Ryukyu Disposition 161 Saigō Takamori 96 Saving the Nation Association (Jiuguohui) 40 Seikanron 164 self-centric national history 152 self-reflective historiography 161 Self-Strengthening Movement 25, 184 semi-colonial/semi-feudal society 29, 183 Shandong Expeditions 188

223

shut-down 73 Sino-Barbarian dichotomy 99 Sino-centric 158, 170 Sino-French War 25 Sino-Japanese War 25, 42, 93, 104, 154, 183 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance 73 Smithsonian atomic bomb controversy 122 SNS (social networks) 7, 139 socialism 44, 54, 74 Society for History Textbook Reform 4 Song Jiaoren 95 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 77 Stalin criticism 80 Stalin, Joseph 54, 72 Stimson, Henry L. 123 Suharto 136 Sukarno 136 Sunflower Student Movement 177 Sun Yat-sen 25, 95, 135, 185 Taiping Rebellion 33, 185 Taiwan’s historical perception 172 Taiwan Strait Crisis 77 territorial disputes 138, 181 textbook problems 168 third world 70 Tian’anmen Square Protest 4, 31 Tito, Josip 53 Tokyo Trial 132, 165 total war 38, 74 Transnational Asia 134 Treaty of Kanagawa 158 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan 73 Treaty of San Francisco 73 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea 10 tribute system 81, 155 Truman, Harry 123 Trump, Donald 128 Tsai Ing-wen 8 Twenty-One Demands 99 Uchimura Kanzō 97 Understanding Taiwan 8, 170 UNESCO 5 universal human rights 100 U Nu 78

224

Index

Vietnam War 123, 162 Wang Zaoshi 40 war responsibility 11, 87, 187 Washington System 117 Weimar Constitution 40 World Anti-Fascist War 12 World Cultural Heritage 5 world without nuclear weapons 122

Xi Jinping 12, 136 Xinhai Revolution 25, 95 Xinyue 40 Yasukuni Shrine 4, 164, 187 Yoshino Sakuzō 91 Yuan Shi-kai 160 Zhang Xueliang 113 Zhou Enlai 72