Historical Essays on the Atlantic Provinces 9780773595156

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HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES EDITED AND WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

G. A. ØWLYK

The Carleton Library No. 35 McClelland and Stewart Limited

Copyright © 1967, McClelland and Stewart Limited

The Canadian Publishers McClelland and Stewart Limited 25 Hollinger Road, Toronto

Printed in Canada by Webcom Limited

THE CARLETON LIBRARY

A series of Canadian reprints and new collections of source material relating to Canada, issued under the editorial supervision of the Institute of Canadian Studies of Carleton University, Ottawa.

GENERAL EDΙTOR

Robert L. McDougall

EDITORIAL BOARD

B. Carman Bickerton (History) Michael S. Whittington (Political Science) Thomas K. Rymes (Economics) Bruce A. McFarlane (Sociology) Gordon C. Merrill (Geography) Derek G. Smith (Anthropology)

THE CONTRIBUTORS

GERALD S. GRAHAM

Rhodes Professor of Imperial History, University of London, London, England. J. BARTLET BREBNER (1895-1957) Formerly Professor of History, Columbia University, New York, U.S.A. M. W. ARMSTRONG

Head, Department of History, Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. MARGARET ELLS

Formerly Research Assistant, Public Archives of Nova Scotia, Halifax, Nova Scotia. W. R. COPP

Formerly on the staff of Bloomfield High School, Halifax, Nova Scotia. D. C. HARVEY (1886-1966) Formerly Provincial Archivist of Nova Scotia, Halifax, Nova Scotia. W. S. MACNUTT

Professor of History and Dean of Arts, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick. J. MURRAY BECK

Professor of Political Science, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia. S. A. SAUNDERS

Special Lecturer, Division of Social Sciences, York University, Toronto, Ontario. J. S. MARTELL (1911-1946) Formerly Assistant Provincial Archivist of Nova Scotia, Halifax, Nova Scotia. ALFRED G. BAILEY

Professor of History and Anthropology and Vice-President, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton. HARVEY MITCHELL

Associate Professor of History, University 0f Calgary, Calgary, Alberta.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION,

1

Fisheries and Sea Power — G. S. Graham, 7 Paul Mascarene of Annapolis Royal — J. B. Brebner, 17 Neutrality and Religion in Revolutionary Nova Scotia— M. W. Armstrong, 33 Loyalist Attitudes — Margaret Ells, 44 Governor Wentworth's Patronage — Margaret Ells, 61 Nova Scotian Trade During the War of 1812—W. R. Copp, 82 The Intellectual Awakening of Nova Scotia — D. C. Harvey, 99 The Politics of the Timber Trade in Colonial New Brunswick, 1825-1840 — W. S. MacNutt, 122 Joseph Howe: Opportunist or Empire-builder? — J. Murray Beck, 141 The Maritime Provinces and the Reciprocity Treaty — S. A. Saunders, 161 Intercolonial Communications, 1840-1867 — J. S. Martell, 179 The Centenary of Edward Whelan — D. C. Harvey, 207 Creative Moments in the Culture of the Maritime Provinces — A. G. Bailey, 229 Canada's Negotiations with Newfoundland, 1887-I895 — Harvey Mitchell, 242 Select Bibliography on the History of the Atlantic Provinces, 260 Note on the Editor, 263 The Contributors, 264

NOTE ON THE EDITOR

George A. Rawlyk has taught at Mount Allison University, New Brunswick, at Dalhousie University, Halifax and at Michigan State University, East Lansing. He is now Professor of History at Queen's University, Kingston. Professor Rawlyk is author of Yankees at Louisbourg (Orono, 1967), and editor of Revolution Rejected (Toronto, 1967) and Joseph Howe: Opportunist? Man of Vision? Frustrated Politician? (Toronto, 1967). He is continuing his research into and writing about the historical development of the Atlantic region of Canada.

2 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

profound impact upon the Atlantic provinces. Until the revolutionary period, the latter area, with the possible exception of Newfoundland, was the northeastern frontier of New England; it was "New England's Outpost." Even after the Revolution had shattered permanently the British American colonial empire, there were still surprisingly strong economic, social, religious and cultural ties between the British Atlantic colonies and New England. These ties help to explain, among other things, the neutrality of the British Atlantic colonies during the War of 1812 and the Annexation Movement in Nova Scotia in the immediate post-Confederation period and again in the 1880's. For a significant number of residents of the Atlantic provinces today, as for their forefathers, what New England has to offer is often regarded as being much more attractive than what is offered by "Upper Canada." The British cοnnectiοn.can be considered the third formative force in the historical development of the Atlantic provinces. Newfoundland has always been the most British colony and province. After the American Revolution, the Loyalist migration, reinforced by economic, strategic and constitutional considerations, drew New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia closer to Great Britain. But Confederation in 1867 and in 1949 introduced a further complicating factor — that of loyalty to the new Canadian nation. These more recent ties with the rest of Canada provide the fourth force in the evolution of the Atlantic region. The interplay of these four major formative forces has to be examined in order to place historical events in the Atlantic provinces in their proper perspective. This interplay also gives a certain unity to the history of the entire region and thus emphasizes the importance of regionalism in the larger Canadian context. The rich and unique historical heritage of the Atlantic provinces has stimulated a long list of historians — good, indifferent, and bad — as well as numerous antiquarians and worse, to undertake research in Maritime history. During most 0f the nineteenth century the "historians" of the region were primarily interested in rather limited provincial studies. In 1829 Thomas Chandler Haliburton published his two-volume An Historical and Statistical Account of Nova Scotia. The volumes were strong on statistics but weak on history, the historical narrative dealing only with the period up to 1763. Even a superficial reading of these volumes will show why Haliburton is remembered by posterity not as a historian but as a humorist. From

INTRODUCTION — 3

1865 to 1867 Bearish Murdoch's three-volume History of Nova Scotia or Acadie was published in Halifax. Murdoch endeavoured "to re-produce the past, as far as possible, in its own forms and colors and Ianguage."2 Consequently, he placed a great deal of stress upon reproducing at great length long excerpts from the original sources; but, unfortunately, there was little analysis or interpretation. Murdoch's study stopped abruptly at 1827. In spite of its many serious limitations, it remains the most valuable book dealing with Nova Scotia published in the nineteenth century. In 1873 Duncan Campbell completed his Nova Scotia in its Historical, Mercantile and Industrial Relations.$ Campbell assiduously followed Murdoch's approach to 1827 and then he floundered almost helplessly as he tried to extend his treatment to 1873. Since 1873 there has been no mature attempt to write a comprehensive history of Nova Scotia. There was nothing concerning the general history of New Brunswick published in the nineteenth century that could be compared with any of the three Nova Scotian studies. However, Duncan Campbell's History of Prince Edward island (1875) reached the relatively low standards set by the same author's Nova Scotia. In addition, Judge D. W. Prowse's History of Newfoundland (1895), although badly organized, contained much relevant information and served as a sound base' from which further Newfoundland research could be carried out. During the first decade of the twentieth century New Brunswick finally caught up with the other provinces. James Hannay's two-volume History of New Brunswick (1909) dealt with the wide sweep of New Brunswick history from the early fifteenth century to 1908. His general survey was probably the best available for any of the Atlantic provinces up to that date. Soon after the general histories of the various provinces were published, the pendulum of historical research began to swing in the direction of far more restricted and specialized topics. Noih Scotia writers led the way followed by a few enterprising New Brunswickers and then quite a distance behind them were two or three stragglers interested in Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland. Most of these researchers had three things in common: they were lawyers or clergymen and not professional historians; they were natives of the Atlantic region and they were 7

B. Murdoch, A History of Nova Scolla or Acidic (Halifax, 1866), II, ív.

1 D. Campbell, Nova Scotia in its H#torical, Mercantile and Induatriat

Relations (Montreal, 1873).

4- HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC

PROVINCES

primarily interested in the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The founding of the Nova Scotia Historical Society in 1878 and the printing of many of the papers presented to the Society — the Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections — marked the beginning of four decades of sometimes penetrating historical writing in the province. Many of the articles published in the Collections during this period can still be read with profit. One cannot sneer at the Reverend George Patterson, "Hin. Samuel Vetch, First English Governor of Nova Scotia," Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections (I884), N, 11-63, or T. B. Akins, "History of Halifax City," ibid. (1895), VIII, 3-272 or the Reverend E. Μ. Saunders, "The Life and Times of the Rev. John Wiswoh, Μ.Α.,"ibid. (1908), Χ111,1-73.Therewere other monographs written about Nova Scotia history printed independently of the Nova Scotia Historical Society. Two of the most noteworthy of these were Sir John G. Bourinot, Historical and Descriptive Account of the island of Cape Breton (Montreal, 1892), and J. S. McLennan, Louisbourg From its Foundation to its Fall, 1713-1758 (London, 1918). Both authors made good use of the printed sources and Senator McLennan utilized in an admirable manner French and British manuscript sources. The New Brunswick Historical Society — which came into being in 1874—failed to bring about a sudden outburst of serious historical writing in the province. Nor did Acadiensis — "Α Quarterly devoted to the Interests of the Maritime Provinces of Canada" — published from 1901 to 1908, succeed in altering drastically the situation. However, Acadiensis did contain a few sound articles by W. Ο. Raymond and by Professor W. F. Ganong. Ganong's work on the historical geography of New Brunswick is still useful and reliable. The First World War brought to a virtual end that period in the historiography of the Atlantic provinces that had been dominated by the clergyman-lawyer historian with deep roots in the area. For two decades after 1925 some of the most able scholars in Canada and the United States concentrated their attention on New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island history. (Newfoundland, however, continued to be largely disregarded.) These men, wbo were university teachers, were fully aware of the inadequacies of the nineteenth-century general histories and realized that the time was propitious to fill the many glaring gaps that existed in the bistoriography of the three Maritime provinces. Furthermore, a great deal of preparatory work had already been done for them by the "amateur histo-

INTRODUCTION - 5

rians." This group of scholars produced numerous articles that were published in learned journals throughout North America and a respectable number of books. Much of what they wrote was excellent and some was brilliant. Almost all of it dealt with the pre-Confederation period. This was the "Golden Age of Maritime Historiography." Some of the most outstanding examples of the "Golden Age" were: Professor John Bartlet Brebner, New England's Outpost (1927), απd The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia (1937); Professor Chester Martin, Empire and Commonwealth (1929) ; Professor D. C. Harvey, The French Regime in Prince Edward Island (1926) and "The Intellectual Awakening of Nova Scotia," Dalhousie Review, XIII (1933), 1-22; Professor W. M. Whitelaw, The Maritimes and Canada Before Confederation (1934); Professor J. A. Roy, Joseph Howe: A Study of Achievement απd Frustration (1935); Professor Alfred G. Bailey, The Conflict of European απd Eastern Algonkian Cultures, 1604-1700 (1937) ; Professor H. A. Innis, The Cod Fisheries (1940) . The Second World War may have spelled the end of the "Golden Age" as for many of the group it marked the conclusion of serious historical writing. Historians continued to fill many smaller gaps, especially in Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick history; the emphasis, however, was still on the pre-Confederation period. During the past few years at least four major studies dealing with the Atlantic provinces have been published — W. S. MacNutt, New Brunswick: A History, 1784-1867 (1963) and the same author's, The Atlantic Provinces, 1712-1857 (1965), Francis W. P. Bolger, Prince Edward Island and Confederation, 18631873 (1964), and P. B. Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-1867 (1962). But there is still no reliable and modern general history of either Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island or Newfoundland. A remarkable number of historical essays have been written about the Atlantic provinces. Some are to be found in widelyread journals while others are buried in periodicals of limited circulation. Much of the detailed and often imaginative work contained in both categories of articles has not reached an extensive audience because of the absence, with the exception of New Brunswick, of modern, authoritative general provincial studies. It therefore seems important that at least some of the more significant and influential articles regarding the Atlantic provinces should be collected and published. Four criteria have been

6 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ΟΝ THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

used in selecting the articles in this volume. First, the essays have been chosen to illuminate significant issues as well as the general contour of the historical development of the Atlantic region from the fifteenth century to the twentieth. Second, the articles selected were judged to have made a positive contribution to historical scholarship. Third, they were considered to be reasonably well-written and organized. Finally, it was decided that at least one article relating to each province would be included. Without question, some of the best essays written about the Atlantic provinces have been concerned with the Confederation period. The recent publication of P. B. Waite, The Life and Times of Con federation, W. S. MacNutt, New Brunswick A History, F. W. P. Bolger, Prince Edward Island and Confederation, Donald Creighton, The Road to Confederation, and W. L. Morton, The Critical Years: The Union of British North America, 1857-1873 makes the inclusion of these articles unnecessary. Any selection of articles can be and will be questioned. It is a frustrating task to choose fourteen from hundreds that are available. Despite the shortcomings of the following selection, it is hoped that the volume will help to throw some light on a few dark (yet significant) corners of the history of the Atlantic provinces. G. A. RAWLYK

Queen's University February, 1967

Fisheries and Sea Power GERALD S. GRAHAM

Within recent months the Royal Navy has occasionally revealed its doings in the headlines of our local press. Spectacular actions at Genoa, Tripoli, and Cape Matapan have lightened for brief moments the darkness which of necessity shrouds British naval strategy. Such episodes are dramatic and sometimes crucial in their importance; but ordinarily they belong among the lesser incidents of war. From the earliest times sea power has been most influential when it has been least conspicuous, and this was especially true during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the days before iron hulls and steam power the merchant tramp, working its triangular route to the West Indies, or the fishing ship anchored off the Banks, not only s~mbοlized but controlled the effectiveness of British sea power. As Admiral Richmond has pointed out, no state can maintain in peace time the naval force needed in a great war; and that nation which wishes to have supremacy at sea must possess a mercantile marine not only to carry on trade, but as a source upon which the navy may draw for personnel.t The carrying trade was, and remains, therefore, a foundation of the navy, because the ability to take punishment depends largely upon the number of seamen and officers available from the merchant service. In the eighteenth century, it was assumed that the admission of foreign vessels to the carrying trade would, by limiting the demand for British shipping, tend to destroy this source. Such an arrangement was, obviously, incompatible with the safety of the Empire in time of war. So far as possible, foreign competition was restricted in order that British overseas trade might be made an exclusive nursery for British seamen. If the principle of monopoly were seriously relaxed, the Vice-President of the Saurcec Report of the Canadian Historical Association, 1941, pp. 24-31. Reprinted by permissiin of the publishers. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, Sea Power in the Modern World (London, 1934), p. 41.

8 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

Board of Trade asked the House of Commons in 1806, "where, in such case, will be found a nursery for raising seamen to man our fleets in future?"2 The English navy, wrote Talleyrand a few years earlier, "is in every respect the offspring of their trade. To rob them of that, is to beat down their last wall and fill up their last moat. To gain it ourselves, is to enable us to take advantage of their deserted and defenceless borders, and to complete the humiliation of our only remaining competitor."3 In the days when a merchant ship could readily be transformed into a warship, the important thing was experience at sea. But there was a constant debate as to which of the trades provided the best training-ground. The West Indies' branch was frequently criticized on account of the tropical fevers which took a heavy toll from ships' companies. Aspersions were cast on the British North American route as providing, apart from the occasional equinoctial gales, too gentle an education. Indeed, there was unanimity on only one point. It was the general opinion — supported by many Board of Admiralty memoranda — that the fisheries, and especially the Newfoundland fisheries, were best adapted to supply "a formidable marine." In 1761, the Board of Trade, in a comparative analysis of the resources of Canada, Louisiana, and Newfoundland, declared that "the Newfoundland Fishery as a means of wealth and power is of more worth than both the aforementioned provinces."4 To many West of England merchants in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Newfoundland fisheries represented a "mine of wealth" and little more. But the West Country merchants ,vere not the government, and, to the best of my knowledge, their special demands rarely influenced the government. Quite apart from economic advantages, the exploitations of the Banks had profound political significance. In the sphere of international diplomacy the cod fishery stood for power. To share the Newfoundland fisheries with France or any other rival, as the government was forced to do in 1783, was more than a matter of sharing the trade; it meant the sacrifice of strategic advantages, and a diminution in the relative strength of Great Britain over her neighbours. It was important, according to an Admiralty memorandum of November, 1787, "to keep the French strictly to the articles respecting the Newfoundland fisheries, and encourage our own to enable us to command the 1 Commons Debate, June 17, 1806 (Hansard, 2nd series, VII, 686). • Quοted, Anon., British Traveller, preface, p. xiv. British Museum, Additional Manuscript, 35913. fol. 73, Report.

FISHERIES AND SEA POWER — 9

fish markets ... their fisheries being chiefly advantageous as raising seamen."5 In other words, the Newfoundland fishery was a significant element in the old European balance of power, as is proved by the great importance attached to fishery clauses in almost every treaty made with France up to 1814. Rivalry with France on the shores of Newfoundland was part and parcel of the rivalry for supremacy at sea; and during the eighteenth century at least, the training of seamen was considered as important as the extension of trade, if not more so. This policy was not original in its emphasis. From the days of Elizabeth, British statesmen saw in the fisheries a national incubator for seamen, "a feeder of the fleet as unrivalled for the excellence of its material as it was inexhaustible in its resources." Lord Cecil, in an effort to counter the ill effects of the Reformation which had led to the abolition of fast-days, pushed through the statute of 1563 whereby the English people were required, under a penalty of £ 3 for each omission, "or else three monethes close Imprisonment without Baffle or Maíneprise," to eat fish, to the total exclusion of meat, on Fridays and Saturdays, and to content themselves with "one dish of flesh to three dishes of fish on Wednesdays."e And to avoid ali risk of misunderstanding, a rider was attached to the effect that all persons teaching, preaching, or proclaiming the eating of fish, as enjoined by the Act, to be "of necessitee for the saving of the soul of man" should be punished as "spreaders of faulse news."7 Three centuries later, this association of fisheries with sea power had not lost meaning. During the negotiations preceding the Treaty of Washington in 1871, Sir John A. Macdonald resisted the surrender of the Nova Scotia fisheries on more than economic grounds. "The value of the catch," he wrote Sir Charles Tupper, "was of less consequence than the means which the exclusive enjoyment of the fisheries gave us of improving our position as a maritime power." If Canada pursued the exclusive system vigorously, he added with rare optimism, she might run a winning race with the United States as a maritime power.8 Sir John Knox Laughton (ed.), Letters and Ρaρers of Charles Middleton, Lord Barha'n (Navy Records Society, London, 1911, vol. 38), II, 280. e Elizabeth, cap. 5; see also, State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, vol. XXVII, nos. 71 and 72. 7 See J. R. Hutchinson, The Press Gang (New York, 1914), p. 95. 'Joseph Pope (ed.), Memoirs of the Honourable Sir John A. Macdonald (Ottawa, 1894), p. 91.

W — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

Until the end of the seventeenth century, the regulation of the Newfoundland fishery had been prescribed by charter from the Crown, and various private individuals had been given rights of trade and settlement. This intermittent system of private charters was abandoned in 1698, when the groundwork was laid for a truly national policy based on statute. The object of the Act — 10 and 11 William III — was, in the words of the preamble, "the raising and maintaining a number of seamen for the speedy manning of our fleets in time of danger." The achievement of this policy depended, first, upon the yearly training of new recruits or greenmen (an arrangement for which the ship-owners were made responsible), and secondly, and most important of a11, upon the prevention of settlement in Newfoundland, which meant the maintenance of English ports as bases for the fisheries, to the exclusion of a resident colonial fishery. The Island of Newfoundland, it was hoped, would become again "a great English ship moored near the Banks" during the fishing season for the convenience of British fishermen. This official opposition to settlement in Newfoundland had no direct relation tο the economics of the industry. The statute of 1698 was based on the thesis that the fishery carried on from Great Britain was the most effective training-school for seamen. Sailors who resided at a distance of three thousand miles, declared George Chalmers, even though subject to impressment, were of no use to Great Britain, because they could not be commanded, when they were wanted most.9 If the fishing industry were to be transferred from Poole and Dartmouth to Bonavista and St. John's, so far as its usefulness to the Royal Navy was concerned it might as well be in Quebec. But in practice, the regulations forbidding settlement in Newfoundland were never observed, and the rule for the compulsory return of labourers at the end of the fishing season was constantly broken. Ships' masters and merchants continued to bring out these so-called "passengers" from England and Ireland, the majority of whom remained on the island. In 1718, the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations reported that "the Navigation of this Kingdom has suffered exceedingly ever since the Trans9

Opinions on Interesting Subjects (London, 1784), p. 92. See also, Extract from a Representation to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations to -His Majesty relating to the Newfoundland Trade and Fishery, dated 29th April, 1765; enclosure, copy of Governor Palliser's Remarks on the Present State and Management of the Newfoundland Fishery, Dec. 18, 1765 (included in Papers Relating ιο Newjoundland in the library of the Public Archives of Canada at Ottawa).

FISHERIES AND SEA POWER — 11

portation of Passengers to Newfoundland has been connived at; and there can be no Doubt that it has been One of the principal Causes of the Want of Seamen for Your Majesty's Service."ιo As the only remedy for the situation, they suggested the removal of the inhabitants to Nova Scotia or some other parts of the British Dοminiοns.ιι It is conceivable that, if the British government had taken a determined stand, even at that late date the progress of settlement might have been checked. With a little pressure, a good many of the inhabitants might have been prevailed upon to settle in Canada or Nova Scotia. But such a scheme would have required transports, land grants, and money fir provisions and implements of agriculture, and the Walpole government was intent upon economy. Moreover, officials, ignorant of the spread of settlement in Newfoundland, were influenced by the illusory assumption that poor soil and a rigorous climate would of themselves discourage settlement, and prevent the island from becoming more than a very thinly populated outpost. Ιn the long run, therefore, Newfoundland, which was intended to be a rendezvous for "fishing ships" from the West Country, grew steadily as a plantation with its own resident fishery. By 1765 the population was in the neighbourhood of twelve thousand; and despite the restrictive regulations of the next few years, this rate of increase was maintained. Families of the third generation were growing up, and natives were already carrying on a large share of the fish trade with southern Europe. By the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars, almost every Act for the protection of the "nursery for seamen" had become a dead letter. Yet the difficulty was this: how to induce a British government to adopt a policy which would take into account the changed situation. It is a curious characteristic of the Briton to go on year after year taking his deepest beliefs for granted, on 10 Copy of a Representation of the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations relating to the Newfoundland Trade and Fishery, dated Dec. 19, 1718, included íq Papers Relating to Newfoundland. See also H. A. Innis, The Cod Fisheries (New Haven and Toronto, 1940), chap. ντ, paaslm. 11 This plan was revived in 1793, when there was talk of sending Newfoundiand settlers to Upper Canada to establish a sturgeon fishery on the Upper Lakes "as well as adding in the present moment [of the American Indian Wan to the internal strength of the Country & the augmentation of the Army." See Charles Stevenson, termer Deputy Quarter-Master of Upper Canada, to Sir John Graves Simeoe, June 18, 1793 (Correspondence of Lieutenant Governor, John Graves Simcoe, Toronto, 1923-31, I, 358); also, Public Archives of Canada, Series Q, vol. 66, 302, Stevenson to Dundas, May 16, 1793.

12 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

the assumption, as Samuel Johnson put it, that what has been longest known has been most considered, and what is most considered is best understood. Back-benchers and Cabinet ministers still talked about the Newfoundland fishery as a "nursery for seamen" although the industry was now almost entirely in the bands of the island inhabitants. As late as 1806, a new governor, Admiral Holloway, was commanded to examine the possibilities of salvaging the ancient system. His instructions reflect the perplexity of British ministers at this time. And whereas it has been thought i/highest importance to the Naval Power of Great Britain that the seamen and other persons employed in the Fisheries carried at Nfid. should return annually at the end of the Fishing Season to some part of our European Dominions for attainment of which object various Laws have been passed and Instructions given, but the same having failed to a great extent in producing the effect proposed, — you are to make the most attentive inquiries, — whether any measures could now be taken for the further encouragement and promoting the Return of every such Seaman and Fisherman to the part of our European Dominions to which he belongs.... And you are also to discourage and as far as you are able, to prevent any of the Said Seamen or Fishermen from deserting to any Foreign Country or from going to reside and establish themselves in the Countries belonging to the United States or even to any of our Colonies in North America.12 British policy was still based on the assumption that the nation possessed a unique strategic advantage in the Newfoundland nursery. In peacetime the fisheries were fostered by every kind of regulation; in wartime they were expected to pay for this treatment in contributions of recruits to the Royal Nary. Yet, even during the eighteenth century, it is difficult to determine in what degree the Newfoundland fisheries fulfilled their intended purpose as a source of man-power. If the West Country merchants are to be believed, the contribution was a heavy one. The Colonial Office correspondence abounds with merchants' complaints about ímpressments, which seem to suggest that the British government was killing the goose that laid the golden eggs. Fishing interests which saw an end to their prosperity if conscription were pushed shouted loudly for protection, and Record Office, Colonial Office, Series 194, νοΙ. 46, Instructions and Questions sent by the Board of Trade to Admiral J. Holloway, copy; returned with answers, Jam. 23, 1807.

11 Public

FISHERIES AND SEA POWER — 13

proclaimed the doom of the ancient "nursery for seamen" unless exemptions were granted to their industry. Here is a typical example — a memorial of the merchants of Dartmouth addressed to the Board of Trade in 1778.13 Following a report on the "alarming and distressed state" of the fishery as a consequence of impressments, the memorandum continues: "We should not trouble yr. Lordships at this critical time when men are wanted to man H.M.'s ships, if the existence of the Trade did not depend upon it, & we flatter ourselves that we shall stand excused by yr. Lordships when it is considered that unless we are permitted to send out our fishermen, we can have no fishery." On the whole, however, the Newfoundland fisheries were rarely granted important exemptions. The cod fishery was regarded as too valuable a source of man-power to be heavily protected. With the exception of skilled harpooners and whalemen, who had special concessions suited to the peculiar conditions of their craft, the men employed in the taking or carrying of fish enjoyed such exemptions as were occasionally extended to the merchant marine in general. At the same time, the summary impressment of fishermen by any captain who wanted to complete his crew in a hurry was never legally permissible. Under Cecil's Act, which established the extra Fish Days, no fisherman "using or haunting the sea" could be picked up without due process of law, and the legal process was normally a complicated one. In the first place, the Admiralty had to send press-warrants to the commanding omcers of the ports. Then, the "Taker," as the press-leader was called, had to submit the warrant to the justices of the pence, who were empowered to select such able men as the warrant required. It is interesting to notice that this custom of civil endorsation, although at first only obligatory in regard to fishermen, was ultimately adopted as a legal preliminary in all impressment on land t4 Obviously, this procedure, if followed conscientiously, took considerable time, and news of the approaching press had a habit of leaking out before the warrants were issued. Hence the sober fisherman had a chance to hide himself as far as possible from his ship. Such a state of affairs was embarrassing to the Admiralty, and from time to time new plans were drawn up r' Public Record Office, C.O. 194, vnl. 19, p. 29, Mach 24, 1778, Hutchinson, Press Gang, 96. No further special provisions for the protection of fishermen seem to have been made until 1719, when an exemption was granted which covered the master, one apprentice, one seaman, and one landsman for each vessel (2 Gei. I1, cap. 15).

14

14 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON ΤΗΣ ATLANTIC PROVINCES

providing for greater secrecy ín order that the authorities might pounce without warning.15 As a matter of fact, legal red tape was always brushed aside in time of emergency. 1n 1799, when there was danger of Spain entering the war, the British government passed a measure which suspended for six months all exemptions from impressment into the Royal Navy, and gave the administration freedom to man the fleet from any classes, including fishermen's apprentices.18 Ten years later, the Admiralty proposed to close down the fisheries for a time, on the grounds that, while they offered "a nursery for seamen superior to anything our rivals can propose," they were a branch of trade that could "without much loss" be suspended, even if such a suspension entailed the maintenance of the fishermen's families.17 This suggestion was never carried out in practice, but the net of conscription was drastically tightened during the Napoleonic Wars. For instance, even persons whose only occupation was picking oysters and mussels from the seashore were declared to be fishermen under the law, and were impressed as "using the sea." There is little doubt, too, that Newfoundland fishermen were forcibly removed from their boats or vessels, regardless of the law, on grounds of urgent necessity. On some occasions, British naval officers stopped vessels entering and leaving Halifax, in order to recruit their ships' full complements, but the resulting public agitation was so great that the governor was compelled to take a hand. In 1806, official orders were issued protecting Nova Scotia fishermen against seizure by impressment.18 Nevertheless, the colonial governor, with the consent of his Executive Council, could issue press-warrants, as was done in England, but apparently this practice was rarely authorized.10 In the opinion of Richard Uniacke, the impressment of colonial fishermen, "far from adding to the Naval strength, diminished Barham Papers, II, 304, Admiralty Memorandum, probably written between August, 1787 and July, 1789; see also Memorandum of Aug. 27, 1788 (rough draft), II, 313. 1' 19 Geo. III, cap. 73; see also, Lord labia, Hi.etory of England, 1713 1783 (3rd ed., revised, 1853), 11, 265. 41 Gen. III, cap. 21 gave protection to the fishermen, but could be suspended in time of emergency. 17 Baring Papers, II, 304, Admiralty Memorandum, op. cit. l' P ublIc Archives of Nova Scotia, vol. 54, p. 78, Wcntworth to Castlereagh, Feb. 3, 1806; see also, W. R. Copp, "Nova Scotia and the War of 1812" (I.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 1935), 79. 10 Public Archives of Nova Scotia, vol. 214, p. 153, Council Minutes, May 18, 1805; see also, Copp. "Nova Scotia and War of 1812," ρ. 78.

FISHERIES AND SEA POWER — 15

it by causing the Fishermen to emigrate."20 "I learn from the best information I can obtain," wrote Admiral Gower to the Board of Trade in 1804, "that ... the annual transport of men from Europe to Newfoundland has furnished such opportunities of getting to the neighbouring Colonies and from thence to the U.S. that 1000's of men have been lost to the country by that means, while the number of seamen going to and fri has been comparatively small."21 Although no official figures are available, it is doubtful whether the Admiralty ever obtained more than about two hundred seamen annually from the Newfoundland and colonial fisheries. In comparison, the home fisheries were more productive. Yet according to Admiralty estimates, the press-gang at its best (which meant during the first years of the war) never furnished more than a total of twenty-two to twenty-three thousand men, a total which would not have manned half the line-ships then fit for service.22 "The impress service is become such a job οf abuse from want of examination," wrote a high official in the Admiralty, "that I have calculated from my own office account an expense of at least £40 per man, notwithstanding very few of the numbers raised are seamen, and one half of those raised are not kept three months in the service. This is a most gross abuse, and requires strict examination."23 The failure of the press-service was chiefly responsible for the adoption of new practices, and towards the end of the eighteenth century the Admiralty began to experiment with bounties. Ship-owners or fishing communities were permitted to purchase immunity. For example, in 1780 the men of Worthing contributed £40 cash to pay the cost of hiring five seamen. Such a bargain covered the fisherman not only in his fishing grounds but while carrying the produce to market. In similar fashion, the Nova Scotia Assembly of 1806 set aside £ 500 for distribution to seamen who signed up voluntarily with the sloop-of-war then in process of building in the dockyard.24 se Public Record Office, London, Minutes of the Board of Trade. Series I, vol. 27, Observations on the Colonial Fisheries, submitted to the Board of Trade. 1 Minutes of the Board of Trade. Series 6, vol. 94, Report of 1804; see also, Colonial 0111cc, Series 194, vol. 39, AdmIral Weldegrave to Chief Justice Coke, Aug. 27, 1797. 22 Barham Papers, II, 313, Memorandum of Aug. 27, 1788 (rough draft). Barham Papers, II, 4. Middleton to Sandwich, 1779. * Public Archives of Nova Scotia, vol. 54. p. 78, Wentworth to Castlereagh, Feb. 3, 1806; see also, Copp, "Nova Scotia and War of 1812," p. 79.

16 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

This small-scale experiment, while not entirely pleasing to the fishing interests,25 slowly but surely pointed the way to new methods of enlistment. In 1810, George Rose, Treasurer of the Navy, introduced a bill to increase the number of seamen by establishing naval seminaries on the coasts, where bays might be trained for four or five years. The recruits were to be taken from among the parish paupers, whom Rose estimated to be in the neighbourhood of ninety thousand. They would not, he assured the government, cost more than £5 each, and would guarantee an accession of seven thousand seamen annually.20 The Rose scheme, which was fundamentally the method used today, namely, a professional training-school for the Royal Navy, was not immediately adopted, but its acceptance in principle as a consequence of Sir James Graham's admiralty reforms in 18304 marked the end of impressment service. After 1815, it was still legal to summon all the seafaring population for the defence of the realm, but such a provision was never enforced during the nineteenth century.27 The decline of the press-service barely preceded the government's final recognition of Newfoundland as a settled colony. In the nineteenth century, policies of plenty were to supersede those of power, and the doctrine of monopoly lost its former appeal. But quite apart from the fact that the new middle class of the Industrial Revolution was beginning to repudiate the old conception of empire, the cod fishery had already surrendered its unique position as a buttress of the Royal Navy. By the end of the War of 1812, Newfoundland had become a colony with its own garrison, courthouse, churches, private property, administrative buildings, and poor-house. Three years later, the island received a full-time governor in place of the transient fishing admiral. In the early dawn of competition and free trade, it was a happy coincidence for Britain that the introduction of steam power, the development of the iron-clad and the establishment of a professional navy should have followed so closely the official death of the Newfoundland "nursery for seamen."

z Minutes of the Board of Trade, Series 1, vol. 8, Merchants interested in the Greenland and Davis &nights fisheries to Lord Hawkesbury, Lloyd's Coffee House, Feb. 12, 1793. Ye Edinburgh Annual Register, I, 160; quoted William Smart, Economic Annals o/ the Nineteenth Century, 1801-1820 (London, 1910), p. 232. 7 Admiral Sir R. H. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher if Kllverstone. Admiral of the Fleet (New York, London, 1929), 1, 273-5.

Paul Mascarene of Annapolis Royal J. BARTLET BREBNER

Paul Mascarene played his role in the eighteenth century on an exceedingly obscure stage in North America, but the drama in which he had a minor part was a world drama. In 1700 Europe and its offshoots overseas were at a turning-point in their development, and nowhere was this more obvious than in the affairs of France and England. In the former the genius for despotism of Louis XIV and his great servants had raised France to continental, indeed world pre-eminence, with powers that could be directed by a single man. Secure at home, feared abroad, still expanding overseas under the impetus given her by the energy of Colbert, and with the splendour and culture of Versailles to command the admiration and emulation of Europe for a century, France — as the mirror of Le Roi Soleil — reflected sparklingly most of the glories of Louis's ideal state. The last pitiful scion of the Spanish Hapsburgs had just passed away and, in his dying, had willed Spain and her great colonial empire to a Bourbon, Philip of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV. It seemed the crowning glory of the duel between France and Spain which had tom Europe for two centuries, and it afforded too tempting a prospect for the Grand Monarch to resist. He kissed his grandson, sent him across the Pyrenees to his new throne, and hastily prepared for military defence of a Bourbon hegemony which he knew the rest of Europe would not passively accept. Yet in spite of the magnitude and polish of Louis's achievement, a keen observer might have seen some serious fissures in its structure, and have reckoned with the fact that a Dutch King of England had been hammering wedges into the cracks. The very presence of William of Orange on the English throne was evidence of the union of protest with which Louis must be prepared to cope. English and Dutch had but recently fought very bitterly for maritime supremacy, and the wittiest and least scrupulous Source: Aaihousie Review, VIΙΙ (January, 1929), 501-516. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. This paper was originally read at the unνeiliog of the portrait of Paul Mascarene by the Historical Association of Annapolis Royal, June 12, 1928.

18 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCΣS

Stuart had accepted a bribe from Louis to leave the Netherlanders to the mercies of invading French armies. When, however, the English people discovered that treachery, and added it to their fear that their Stuart kings planned to imitate the despotism of their French cousins, they proceeded to make England too warm to hold tyrants. The agent whom they retained for the expulsion was the stern Stadholder of Holland, who had proved to be the one man in Europe prepared to resist the northward expansion of France. When "Dutch William" took his place beside James II's daughter, Mary Stuart, on the throne of England, there began a new duel between the French and the English which was to last for a century and a quarter, ending with France in eclipse and Britain the first world power. This struggle speedily involved colonial empires as well as European territory, and from its intricate ramifications there can be selected three elements which help to explain Paul Mascarene's share in it. In the first place, while Louis' greatest statesman, Colbert, had unquestionably done much to extend and to vitalize French colonies in America as elsewhere, the aid he gave them was limited by his narrow mercantilist ideas. He believed that world trade was almost static in quantity. In consequence, he looked for increase in French commerce largely by the diminution of that of Holland and England, and this he pictured at its European rather than its overseas depots. This conception made him the more willing to support the plans of his royal master for direct attack upon those states. Louis did not need much encouragement, but Colbert's approval meant that funds which might have paid for regiments and ships and fortresses to render secure French dominion in America went instead to pay for breastplates for cuirassiers and powder for grenadiers on European battlefields. French Port Royal became British Annapolis Royal because France did not adequately reinforce the gallant spirit of the last defender, de Subercase. In the second place, Louis XIV in his dual role of Grand Monarch and "Most Christian King" decided about 1680 that the only Non-conformists to Roman Catholicism in France, the Huguenots, must either conform, or cease to mar the complete religious uniformity of his domain. When pressure and persecution of a peculiarly odious sort failed to achieve his ends, he revoked, in 1685, the edicts under which France for a century had taught Europe the possibility of religious toleration. That year Paul Mascarene, a year-old baby, was left in Castras with his grandmother while his Huguenot father fled to England. The boy went on to Calvinistic Geneva for his education, to tolerant

PAUL MASCARBNØ OF ANNAPOLIS ROYAL - 19

England for new citizenship in 1706, and to a life-career in the British army after 1708. In the third place, the English had made a bargain with their new king to the effect that he might reign and get as much support out of them for his foreign policy as he could, but that an oligarchy of wealth, drawn partly from the landed interests and partly from the commercial leaders, should rule. With short intermissions it was the Whigs, with their modified mercantilism and their determination to advance the commerce of the new Great Britain, who managed British policy from 1688 to 1770. Marlborough and the Whigs had most to do with preventing the union of France and Spain under one crown, and it was for the American campaign in the War of the Spanish Succession that Paul Mascarene assisted in the siege of Port Royal. Moreover the conclusion of this war, second in a series of four, gave the first indication 0f what the consequences overseas were to be. The Treaty of Utrecht took from France and awarded to Great Britain "the outworks of the Canadian citadel" — Hudson Bay, Newfoundland, and Acadia. Paul Mascarene, then, began his fifty years of life in America when, promoted from his second-lieutenantcy in Lord Moptague's Regiment at Portsmouth to a captaincy in Colonel Walter's Grenadiers, he helped to whip into shape the colonial volunteers for the proposed expedition to Canada. After the siege of Port Royal and the French surrender, made necessary by the overwhelming numerical and material superiority of the British, he "had the honour to take possession of it in mounting the first guard, and was brevetted major by Mr. Nicholson, the commander-in-chief of that expedition."1 The capture of Port Royal was a sort of by-product in an instance of colonial and British aggression where appetite far exceeded capacity. The New York scheme, for which Francis Nicholson and Samuel Vetch had been successful sponsors in England, contemplated nothing less than the conquest of Canada. A late start in 1710 made it impossible to do more than aim the cannon, which was the Canada Expedition, against the sparrow, which was neglected Acadie. The success at Port Royal was almost obliterated by the abysmal failure of the delayed expedition against Canada next year. Tragic ineptitude wrecked the ships of the expedition on the reefs of the St. Lawrence. Yet French Port Royal had been a splendid haven for the privateers which preyed on colonial fisheries and commerce, and it was with a definite sense of relief that the colonists, particularly 1

lava Scilla Stare Popes, Ottawa,

A Seriem, voL 25, p. 73.

20 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

those of New England, contemplated British possession of Acadia as cσn rmed in 1713 by the Treaty of Utrecht. Almost immediately, and greatly to their annoyance, the French revealed their view of the situation by beginning to build the most ambitious fortress in America at Louisbourg, which was designed to serve as a Gibraltar for the St. Lawrence. Even as a fishing station it had such strength as completely overshadowed the sheds and the block house which the British colonists erected at Canso, and its mere existence went far towards nullifying the surrender of Newfoundland and the existence of a British garrison at Placentia. The years 1713-1739 were years of peace for Great Britain, and the tranquillity of the last twenty-five of them — Walpole's Peace — has been credited to the great Whig leader who laid the foundations for British empire in parliamentary sovereignty, vigorous avoidance of war, and shrewd organization of national finance. In Nova Scotia the same years were years of almost complete neglect. The original leaders, Nicholson and Vetch, had hoped for greater things, and they speedily lost what had naturally been a minor interest in their only conquest. Military reorganization to permit the release of the colonials under arms unfortunately coincided with a period of decay and stagnation in the somewhat antiquated British military machine. It took until 1718 to clear up the military confusion in Nova Scotia. The final outcome was that a Welsh colonel, named Richard Phillips, was induced to exchange his command of an old regiment for the office of Governor of Nova Scotia, at £ 1,000 a year, and the colonelcy of a new regiment whose companies were to be stationed at Annapolis and Canso in Nova Scotia, and at St. John's and Placentia in Newfoundland. Colonel Phillips was a man of fifty-nine when he first visited this province in 1720, but he showed a great deal of vigour in his organization of the new civil government and the military establishment. He went home in 1723 in the best manner of contemporary absentee governors, but had to return in 1729 to pull things together again when they had disintegrated under a scandalous parsimony on his part which he blamed on a defaulting regimental agent. Seventy years of age and still niggardly, he went back to Great Britain in 1731, and the neglected province saw him no more, nor heard of him, except when he refused to Paul Mascarene the office of Lieutenant-Governor with its £ 500 per annum. It was under such an administration that Paul Mascarene served his first thirty years in America. Nova Scotia provided a most discouraging prospect. The inhabitants were exclusively

PAIL ΜASCARΕΝ

OF ANNAPOLIS ROYAL — 21

French-speaking or Indians, except for a handful of traders from Boston in the Bay, and transient colonies of fishermen at Canso or other harbours on the Atlantic Coast. The Acadians had been retained in the colony, not really against their will, but probably unaware of a piece of deception on the part of the British, in which the French of Canada and Cape Breton were willing to concur because of their inability to resettle them on French lands and because they hoped some day to regain the province. These quiet farmers never had had much interest in, or use for, government; they were spreading northeast from Annapolis, and already their chief numerical strength was at the head of the Bay. In general they were about to embark on the years which, although they were to provide them with their first tranquil existence, were also to make them the grist between the upper and the nether grindstones of French and British efforts to master the continent. Nova Scotia was the strategic flank in North America, the scene of petty disagreements and Indian raids, in time of peace, but suddenly leaping into importance in time of war, and at such a time open to all its terrors and alarms. Ιt happened that Mascarene served at first under unattractive superiors. Nicholson and Vetch had rendered their service to Nova Scotia in conquering it, and their relations to it thereafter were of doubtful benefit and in any event short-lived. Phillips was far more congenial. Mascarene, who met him in Boston on his way out in 1720, was able to convince him of the ruinous condition of the fort as well as the mutinous spirit of the garrison, and to join with him in measures to repair both. Ιt was Phillips' deputy, Lawrence Armstrong, however, who was the chief cross of Mascarene and the other officers. His was a queer, twisted and thwarted personality, chafing under the anomaly between high office and low prestige, driven to despair and violence by the neglect and selfishness of Phillips, who was illfitted to keep a quarrelsome officers' mess in order (he once broke a full glass wine decanter over a brother officer's head), and who could not even engage his troops in military exercises and thus find work for idle hands, because the military equipment was falling to pieces, and anyhow he dared not trust his soldiers with arms.2 It was an unlovely scene. The Indians were troublesome, the Acadian would not take the oath of allegiance, the French were conspiring to hold their loyalty, the governor was morose, the officers either quarrelling or plotting for leave a See

the many reports in Armstrong's correspondence in N.S., A 16-24, also Nova Scoeie ArchΙνes, 11 (edited Maclechan, Halifax, 1900), pp. 53-54 and passim.

22 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

of absence, the soldiers mutinous or civilian, the officer in charge of ordnance stores a case of dementia praecox, the chaplain defiantly living with another man's wife! From this welter of neglect, incompetence, degradation, and pettiness, Mascarene had stood out from the beginning in 1710 as a gentleman officer who was competent, modest, and tactful. All his superiors trusted him, and gave him the tasks of administration which required industry and judgment. In executing them he proved himself to be a "sound" and dependable subordinate. The lirst statesmanlike and informed comment on the affairs of the province is to be found in his report to Nicholson on the winter of 1710-11 and on the first dealings with the Acadians,3 and in the description of the circumstances of the province, accompanied by shrewd and far-sighted recommendatiοns for defence and settlement, which he sent to Phillips for the use of the Board of Trade in 172Q.4 From year to year in those ignominious early days Major Mascarene was consulted ;on all manner of problems and deputed to carry out all sorts of negotiations. His superiors and his brother officers were glad to place on his capable shoulders the tasks they were either not fitted or not anxious to perform. Interestingly enough, he showed unusual ability and sympathy in direct dealing with the Acadians. He spoke their language, of course, but the bigotry and intolerance towards them which might have been expected from a naturalized Huguenot wearing the red coat were notably lacking. It is readily understandable that such a man as Mascarene, placed by chance circumstance in such an environment, must have been considerably disgusted and disappointed. We know that he seized every legitimate opportunity to serve elsewhere, at Canso or Placentia on garrison duty, or in New England arranging for supplies or making peace with the Indians. One suspects that he, like many an officer since in like circumstances, had the knack of "wangling" some extra leave and of combining pleasure with business. He managed to keep away from the futility of duty at Annapolis a good deal of the time after 1723, and he seems to have had some interest in the precarious Bay trade as conducted by Boston merchants. At any rate he came to regard Boston as his home, and found a wife there in Miss Elizabeth Perry. They founded an American family, and it was to his "fine, brick house" in Boston and his company of friends and relations that he ultimately retired. While Lieutenant'Ν.S. Archives, I (edited AkΙne, Halifax, 1869), pp. 3949. 3

N.S.,

A4, pp. 166 f.

PAUL ΜΑSCARΕΝ

OF ANNAPOLIS ROYAL _ 23

Governor Armstrong lived, Mascarene must be regarded as an officer whose unquestioned abilities tended on the whole to keep him away from his garrison duty. The reward (and it was a meagre one) for this somewhat interrupted career of usefulness came in March, 1740. On the 6th of the preceding December, Armstrong ended his stormy and undignified career by bis own hand. After what the old civilian councillor John Adams described as being "for a long time frequently afflicted with melancholy fitts," he was discovered lying in his quarters pierced by his own sώord. Adams, who had been a member of Phillips' first Council in 1720, and who in Mascarene's absence was undoubtedly the senior councillor, assumed the presidency of the Council and arranged to straighten out Armstrong's affairs, tangled as they were with debts, some of which had been incurred to make up for Phillips' neglect. Mascarene.was in Boston on leave of absence and did not get back to Annapolis until March 20th, only to find that Adams vigorously disputed his right to succeed to presidency of the Council, on the ground that in accordance with the fifth Article of the governor's instructions he had become disqualified by his absence "at Boston, in New England, where his house is, and where his estate is, and where his residence has been the greater part of the time since the Council has been established."5 "Providence had put into my hands a morsel of bread," reported Adams, and "Major Mascarene was come in all haste from Boston to take it from me." The situation had some of the elements of the ridicuklus; but after Mascarene had explained his absences to the Council, the members left Adams in the Council room and took Mascarene to Dr. Sken's quarters where they swore him in as president on March 22nd. A week later Adams wrote to the Duke of Newcastle in plaintive vein, "a poor helpless blind man in the 68th year of his age," appealing for consideration of his services and his poverty, and closing on a fine Old Testament note, — "If you have done well by the house of Jerubbaal, then rejoice ye in Abimelech, and let Abimelech rejoice in you." A glimpse at the dispatches to Annapolis Royal and at the letter-book which contains Mascarene's first official dispatches° reveals at once the temper of the times and the temper of the man chosen by the men on the spot to deal with them. Just before his death Armstrong had been authorized to issue letters of marque and reprisal against the King of Spain, because of the letter's failure to pay the £95,000 agreed upon as the balance 'NS. Α25,

p. 9; Β2, pp. 168-175. • Ν..5.'4. 25, pp. 3 ft, and N.S. Archlvεr Ii, pp. 130 ff.

24 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON ΤΗΣ ATLANTIC PROVINCES

of compensation due for injuries to British subjects. The settlers were to be οn the alert against Spanish attacks, and were to "Annoy the Subjects of Spain in the best Manner they are able." In late August, Armstrong reported to England that he had informed his officers of the situation, and also gave his opinion of the "Dismal! and Melancholy Situation of the Troops at Canso who must certainly fall a Sacrifice (being Without all Manner of Defence)," if they were attacked by the French. The echoes of the plaints of that famous Captain Jenkins, who shattered Walpole's Peace and had an Anglo-Spanish war named after the ear which he declared had been cut off by a Spanish garda costa, had reached Nova Scotia, and in the emergency the officers there did not propose to leave afTairs in the hands of a civilian. Mascarene was their man. Years afterward he was recollecting his experiences in the 'forties, and his picture of Annapolis Royal and Nova Scotia seems worth reproducing verbatim: 1 was then in a Fort capacious enough, but whose works neglected in time of peace were all in ruins, and instead of five hundred men requisite at least to mann it I had butt one hundred, twenty or thirty whereof were utter invalides, often or a dozen of ofcers not above two or three who had ever seen a Bunn fit d in anger and who for the most part were tainted by Republican principles.... He went on to say that in the crucial moments of the siege of Annapolis Royal in 1744, `by confining some of my officers I brought them att least to obey."7 His letter-book, however, shows his immediate appreciation of what must be done at once. He was already personally and, it would seem, understandingly acquainted with those Acadian whose talents distinguished them from the mass and had resulted in their being chosen either as deputies to represent the rest (Mascarene in 1710 had been the first to approve this representative system), or as notarial and executive officers for the administration in the local settlements. His first three letters (written before he reported to England) were to men of this station, and the next three to groups of deputies and to an expelled priest who wanted a passport to Minas. Mascarene knew that war with Spain meant war with France sooner or later; he knew, too, that his garrisons could resist no sustained 7

Brown MS. 19071, f. 61; the Brown MSS. are partially printed, Le Canada Franrais, DocamεπΓS 1pedlls (Quebec, 1888-1890), vo1. i, p. 82 and vol. i•üi passim.

PAUL MASCARENE OF ANNAPOLIS ROYAL — 25

French attack if the habitants were unfriendly and no aid came from Boston. He therefore set out from the beginning of his administration to do three things, in the following order of importance: secure the benevolent neutrality or mild assistance of the Acadians; interest New England in the fate of the province whose safety he knew to be vital to her interest; and shake the administrative Iethargy of the Duke of Newcastle and the Board of Trade. His prescience in 1740 and the vigour and certainty of his actions as soon as he was in office were the foundations of his greatest claim to distinction — the successful defence of the province against the French in 1744 and 1745. His good fortune was that as early as 1741 he found a kindred spirit in William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts; and the two men, haying accurately estimated the situation, took appropriate steps to meet it without depending too greatly on the slowly awakening administration in Britain. If Mascarene's role in Nova Scotian history seems to some distasteful, or his contribution to the later fate of the Acadians a blot upon his scutcheon, it is relatively easy to make up a condemnation of him by a cursory selection from his own letters related to the events of the 'forties and 'fifties. Yet it is grossly unfair to forget that he was (willy-filly) implicated in the operation of farces too great either to be mastered or to be set in motion by a field-officer in a weak colonial garrison. The Acadian problem is a familiar one, and cannot be adequately summarized here.8 Moreover, a careful examination of Mascarene's correspondences reveals a man of lively human sympathies who understood the unlucky plight of the Acadians, was grateful to them for help or neutrality when he was attacked, and was deeply concerned as to how, consistently with his responsibility and duty to his sovereign, he could influence them for their greater safety and protect them from the evil consequences of their misunderstanding of their critical position. It is worth remembering that, Genevan though he was, he could and did enjoy cordial relations with the Roman Catholic priests in the province. Their position was somewhat dubious, but it was Mascarene who evolved a working solution for their relations with the administration when, in 1740, an excommunication Raymond. Nova Scotia under Εng1lsh Rule, Royal Society of Canada, Transactions, 1910; ü, pρ. 55 Υ. Doughty, The Acadian Exiles (Toronto, 1915) ; Brebncr, New England's Outpost (New York, 1927). all treat of It at length. N.S., A 4-40, passim, Arch I, ΙΙ; Le Canada Frantals, op, ctr.; Public Archives of Canada, Report, 1905, Vol. I1; Colonial Opus Sertea 5, vote. 14, 15.

26 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

caused some disturbance.10 The priests were to give formal acknowledgment of British authority by securing the Governor's permission before taking up their duties, and the exercise of a foreign ecclesiastical jurisdiction was forbidden. It is about the last two phases of Masearene's activity in the province that controversy can centre, and the questions to be answered are : (1) Did he in the 'forties simply use the Acadians to save himself and his province? (2) Would it be fair to interpret his policy as one which would appropriately include expulsion of the Acadians if opportunity offered? As was said before, a little discrimination in making extracts from his utterances and relating them to what happened produces a damning case against him. One can even read duplicity into his own remembrance of things past: In these Several Struggles I us'd our french Inhabitants with so much mildness administered Justice so impartially and employ'd all the skill I was master of in managing them to so good purpose that tho' the Enemy brought near two thousand men in Arms in the midst of them and us'd all the means of cajoling & threatning to make them take up arms having brought spare ones to that end they could not prevail above twenty to joyn with them.'L1 There seems to be no reason to believe that Mascarene had not realized from the moment of his arrival in the province that the Acadians represented a problem, and that by 1740 their great increase in numbers and extent of holdings had made them a potential menace if the French could win them to their side in a war. Yet the Acadians did not want to fight for anyone. They wanted to be left alone. In the 'forties it was Mascarene's realization of this, and his grateful resignation to the fact that although they would accept wages to work on his fort, they would retire to their cottages when invaders appeared, which entitle him to be called a statesman. It is quite true that he discussed with Shirley, and the high offïcers who were at the siege of L.ouisbourg in 1745, the desirability of expelling the Acadians; but his counsels were always on the side of moderation. He saw why the others thought as they did; he joined with Shirley in the famous letters which the latter sent to reassure the habitants of considerate treatment from Great Britain; he pretty definitely committed himself and his province to Shirley's direction; yet he resisted infection with the chauvinism which would use victory to expel 82, pp. 176 fr. u Doc. Lied., Ιt, p. 82.

PAUL MASCARENE OF ANNAPOLIS ROYAL - 27

harmless people. As Shirley said, he was "indifferent about pursuing the Advantageous Turn."12 He even fell out with his Council on the subject, and Shirley feared that this might result in "danger of too much tenderness towards 'em [the Acadians] on his part, and perhaps vigour on theirs [the Council's]."13 He was alone in his stand against expulsion in 1745, and used the arguments he knew would have most force — the uncertainty of interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht, the danger of giving the French so many new American subjects, and the cost and difficulty of removing so many people, whose number he seems purposely to have exaggerated. It is best to let him state his own case, and with it to quote his honest admission of the advantages to Britain of his opponents' scheme: I have Iook't upon them the [Acadians] as grafted in the Body of the British Nation, as an unsound limb indeed and therefore to be nurtur'd απd by time and goad care to be brought to answer the purposes expected from them; first to become Subjects and after that good Subjects; which Ι have represented might be effected in some generations by good usage and by removing some impediments, to Witt the influence of the French at' Cape Breton and that of the Missionaries which have been suff er'd to remain amongst this People and which hitherto it has been reckon'd dangerous to attempt to drive away, as ít has been a Question, how farr the Treaty of Utrecht was binding in that case, which certainly cannot be resolved here. If from other Views new measures are to be taken and these inhabitants can be remov'd and good Protestant Subjects transplanted in their room; nothing can be of greater advantage to the Bríttish interest in general απd to that i/ the Northern Colonies in particular απd especially to that of this Province.

He went on to rehearse the objections noted abονe.14 This is the responsible judgment of a good man in his two capacities, first, the optimistic believer in the harmlessness of the habitants and the possibility of time making them citizens, and second, the dutiful soldier and-servant of the crown admitting that the total American situation and the struggle with France might invalidate his own slow solution. While the Acadians were not expelled in the 'forties, it would be too much to credit this solely to Mascarene, for the home government never seriously entertained a proposal for so costly n C' Ιοnjal OfT5ce Series 5, vii. 901, f. 71v

' N.S., A 28, p. 16. I' Ν. S., A 27, ρ. 247.

28 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

and disruptive an act. Yet Mascarene was right, and he had excellent evidence to support his views. When war broke out in 1744, he had already done something to rebuild his fort; and, while Canso fell in sheer surprise and impotence, he hired Annapolis Acadians to fell timber and revet the ramparts of the province's only real fort. That summer he repelled two attacks, neither of which had the artillery with which to make the fort untenable. Even so, they might well have succeeded, for Mascarene had mutiny on his bends in the garrison, as well as the ineptness which long stagnation had produced. He managed to win the devotion of his tottering old common soldiers, reinforced as they were by the timely arrival of over a hundred auxiliaries from Boston, and they held out against the second attack until the French commander, who had tried almost successfully to win over the disaffected officers to an armistice, withdrew before a further reinforcement of fifty fighting Indians. The local Acadians had refused to join the French invaders; and when three French naval vessels sailed into the Basin to shell the fort, there was no land force to co-operate with them and they too left. Ιn 1745 the capture of Louisbourg saved Annapolis from serious attack, but in 1746 the news that France was sending over half her naval strength under the Duc d'Anvílle seriously disturbed New England and Nova Scotia. When storms and disease destroyed that armada, men breathed more easily, and Mascarene sent a detachment up to Minas in order to re-assert government authority there. Here again he had confirmation for his views. When de Ramesay made his amazing and successful attack on Grand Pré in the snowstorms of February, 1747, he tried to get the loεaΙ habitants to assist him. The great majority refused, and maintained their refusal even after the British forces were withdrawn. During the next few years when the Abb€ Le Loutre was trying by every means in his power, even by use of his Indians, to withdraw the Acadians beyond the Misseguash to "French" Acadie, most of them still refused to move and resumed their old casual relations with the Annapolis administration. It was obvious that they were truly Acadians, and meant to stay under the easy yoke of Mascarene's administration. "They acknowledge it is their interest to remain under the British Government," he wrote, and again, "They seem to be sensible of the sweets they enjoy under His Majesty's Government." If they were, and if Nova Scotia rerained a British province, it was because of the humanity, moderation, foresight, and resolute behaviour of their governor. The scene changes, and Mascarene's - role on it, with the

PAUL ΜΑSCARΕΝE OF ANNAPOLIS ROYAL - 29

grievously surprising return of Louisbourg to France in exchange for Madras in 1748, the pleasanter shock of the vigorous founding of Halifax in 1749, and the gradual accentuation of the gnawing problem created by Le Loutre's new Acadie and the Indian attacks on the British settlements. Everyone knew that the issue between France and Great Britain would soon be joined again, and that the flank in Nova Scotia would be the scene of the first conflict. In New England and Nova Scotia the question of the day was "What can be done about the Acadians?" The man who knew was at Annapolis, whither he had returned after a short visit to Halifax, where he and his shabby councillors had stood ill-at-ease on the decks of H.M.S. Beaufort with Cornwallis' brilliant suite before the first Council of an English-speaking Nova Scotia. There was something truly pathetic, but at the same time quite in keeping with Mascarene's sense of service discipline, in the way he, the mainstay of the province in its most troubled times, gave way to the young nobleman who was so soon to be overwhelmed and fatigued with responsibilities and resign. The old commander went back to his post in the gracious valley after having unburdened himself of his archives and his knowledge. Recent arrival of some thousands of settlers, and the novelty of active interest in Nova Scotia on the part of the British administration, had so altered matters that even Mascarene's experience and hard-won knowledge seemed of minor account. The new governor was young, showed a youthful impatience engendered by his great responsibilities, and was fairly contemptuous of all that had been done before he devoted his talents and the British taxpayers' money to making Nova Scotia secure. Ιn JuIy, 1749, he complained to the Duke of Bedford somewhat petulantly because Mascarene had told Shirley of de Ramesay's settlement at St. John River, instead of going across himself and driving him out, and in September he passed on tithe Board of Trade his opinion of the old provincial troops and their command — "the management in that Regiment has been so shameful that 'tis almost incredible — there never was such another in any service; it is my business to make it better and rectify past errors." Halifax and the Misseguash bulked largest in the governor's eyes, and Annapolis and its commander dwindled proportionately in attention and importance. Colonel Paul Mascarene, therefore, faded quietly from the Nova Scotian scene, and his fort once more succumbed to rain and frost and its feeble materials. He had done his best to give CornWállís his ideas on the practicability of exacting an unquali-

30- HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

fled oath of allegiance from the Acadian, and had had to resign himself to seeing the attempt made. He made judicious enquiries among his own flock at Annapolis, and reported that he thought all but a few would refuse, in spite of his warning that British families would take their places. "Several in this River are very wavering butt dare not separate themselves from the herd who in general are influenc'd by the fear of their posterity becoming att last Protestants & the natural inclination they have for the French interest preferable to the English."36 Fortunately for his peace of mind, Comwallís did not attempt to carry through his threat of oath or expulsion, and Mascarene left the province in July, 1751, to go to New England for treaty negotiations with the Indians at St. George. Cornwallis would have gone almost to any ends to detach the Micmacs from the French, and Mascarene was perhaps the agent who induced Jean Baptiste Cope and his tribe of ninety persons on the east coast to come to terms in 1752. In 1753 the Cape Sable group followed suit. But Cornwallis was already gone, and Mascarene does not seem to have returned to the province. While events progressed towards their terrible dénouement of 1755, the old man was passing the turning point of three score years and ten with his family at Boston. It is doubtful whether he would have judged it proper to have raised his voice in defence of the Acadians in 1755. He had always given way when the higher command ordered it; but it is permissible to suggest, on the evidence of his stand in the past, that had he had a voice in Charles Lawrence's Council he might once more have urged moderation in handling the habitants, whom he knew so well. Instead of that, he gracefully grew old in Boston. In 1758 he was made a major-general at the time of the recruiting for the last Canada expedition, but he was too old to go and obliterate his memories of the panic-stricken days on the St. Lawrence in 1711 with the successes which Wolfe won at Louisbourg and Quebec. In 1752 he had sent off his son to make useful friends in London, and in the letters of introduction he gave him we have a very pleasant picture of the old man resting on his laurels in New England. Like many another gentleman in the colonies (George Washington, e.g.) he had his liquid capital in Bank of England stock. Like most officers, he had complaint to make of his financial treatment. Phillips had never allowed him the half salary which Armstrong had enjoyed as Lieutenant-Governor, and he had had to do a good deal of entertaining during the war out of his lieutenant-colonel's pay. He had sold his commission Brown MS. 19071. f. 99.

PAUL MASCARENE ΟK ANNAPOLIS ROYAL - 31

for £2,800, but got nothing for the civil office which he had held from Armstrong's death to Cornwallis' coming. His boy (who had not been allowed to go to England until he had successfully experienced the smallpox!) went with letters to all who might remember his father, and was given detailed instructions on how to proceed in securing compensation for bis father's losses. He must look up his father's Huguenot friends, and if unable in one case to get an introduction "you must take Coach and wait on him (ten a clock or sooner in the morning)." He must not go to law except with "very probable hopes of succeeding." If necessary, he was to make presents to "the Clarks of the State Offices," but it would be wiser to promise them a part of any money recovered. But everything after all depends on God; the boy must simply do his best as his father had done. His Ietter to another Huguenot, Colonel Ladevèze, is a summing-up of his life since leaving England in 1710. Some extracts from it are better than any paraphrase: J am now after these tossing, gott, thanks to Almighty God in my own house amongst my Children and a numerous ο j spring of grand children there by God's grace to pass the remainder of my days in quiett and peace.... Being too old & crazy to act my part as the Settling a New Country requir'd ... 1 am now likely to end my days in this Town where 1 am well respected and from the imployments 1 have had and the Post continued to me by Brevet [Colonel of Foot]. Keep a considerable Rank tho' not able to make any great figure.... You see my hand keeps still studdy, my legs do still their Dice and with the help of spectacles 1 can yet pass whole days in reading. Equally attractive are some rather more domestic glimpses from his other correspondence: Mrs. Mascarene return'd from Cambridge the day 1 expected, Stay'd the time of our washing and went back the 15th to keep thanksgiving... . The family at Cambridge have visited us two or three times within this fortnight when no company & the &dies not abroad 1 read to them Amelia with which they seem very well pleas'd. At another time he entertained the little company in his drawingroom by showing them Some little pieces as old as the time of my courting your mother to Shew them as 1 term'd it how we made live fourry years ago and the way we then had of expressing our sentiments, all this

32 -

HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

not out of Vanity to my Self butt with a'view still farther to cσntribute to your own [his son's] happiness. Yet entertaining seems to have been a burden on his resources, for he explained that he had been cool with "the Cambridge relations" ... "as that family is Iarge, too great an inlett would lave drawn too great a flood." He rode almost daily to display his new saddle and horse furniture "which Fitt my horse very well & are much admir'd." He went to church "att least once every Sunday all this winter." He urged his boy to keep on sending for his garden "the Slipps & roots of flowers you send in Boxes." His great pleasure was to play with his grand-daughter Betsy who "beginns to walk alone." His own diversion was chess. Thanks to these letters18 we have a delightful picture of the retired soldier. He died on January 22, 1760, and thus tranquilly closed a distinguished, if in no sense a spectacular, career. History is full of such instances of sterling service, good judgment, gentlemanliness, and practical ability, which fail to stand out sharply in a crowded canvas of more spectacular exploits. Here was a man who might have been bigoted and harsh, and revenged himself on French peasants for the evils done him by a bigoted French king. Instead of that, he showed a reasonableness quite remarkable under the circumstances of his employment. Repeatedly in his career, which on both civil and military sides was marked by an outstanding grasp of practical essentials, he stood out alone for humane moderation and patience. Even the envy of brother officers at a time of back-biting and tale-telling left him unscathed. His relations with the Acadians were marked by friendliness and patient explanation even when duty compelled him to be firm. These unusual qualities were perhaps the reason why he never secured conspicuous employment, or advancement; but however small and obscure the stage on which he acted, he was an able gentleman who served his adopted country well and died respected and beloved. It may seem a far cry from the splendour of the court of the royal line whose born subject he had been, or from the high politics of the corrupt but inspired parliament which he served, to the pettiness of defending an almost ignored American colony. But if commercial Britain wrested from courtly France the lion's share of Europe's outposts overseas, it was because even in the obscure arenas of the conflict between them she could inspire and retain and weave into a world-wide fabric of brilliant effort such honest and able devotion as that of the exiled Huguenot, Paul Mascarene. ' ,8rowa MS. 19071.

Neutrality and Religion in Revolutionary Nova Scotia MAURICE W. ARMSTRONG

The "Neutral Yankees" of Nova Scotia bave received considerable attention from American historians in recent years.1 Situated in scattered communities in a remote and sea-girt province, the thirteen or fourteen thousand persons of New England origin who had settled the vacant Acadian farmlands after 1759, were poor, discouraged, and unorganized. Even the traditional powers of the Town Meetings had been largely abrogated by an ever vigilant executive government at Halifax.2 "It may, without impropriety, be said," wrote Colonel Robert Morse in 1784, "that in the whole Peninsula there is only one road, that leading from Halifax.. ‚ to Annapolis, a distance of about one hundred and thirty-five miles."2 The remaining settlements were accessible only by boat or by trails blazed through the forests. Had the colonies to the south been able to raise an effective sea force to gain control of the Bay of Fundy coasts they would undoubtedly have found many eager republicans among the Nova Scotian. Without such a force, attempts at invasion, such as that made by Captain Jonathan Eddy at Fort Cumberland in 1776, were bound to be abortive.4 The local inhabitants did not rise, because they were too well aware of their weakness, and of the powerful British ships and guns based Source: The New England Quarterly, IX (March, 1946), 50-62. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. 1 See

J. B. Brebner, New England's Outpost: Acadia Before the Conquest of Canada (New York, 1927); and, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia (New York, 1937); W. B. Kerr, The Maritime Provinces of British North America and the American Revolution (Sackville, New Brunswick, n.d.). 2 D. C. Harvey, 'The Struggle for the New England Form of Township Government in Nova Scotia," Report o/ Canadian Historical Association (Ottawa, 1933), pp. 15-22. Robert Morse, "A General Description of the Province of Nova Scotia, etc., 1783-1784," Canadian Archives Report (Ottawa, 1884), p. Ø. 'See D. C. Harvey, "Machias and the Invasion of Nova Scotia," Report of Canadian Historical Association (Ottawa, 1932), pp. 21 H.

34 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

at Halifax. They were also deeply conscious of the profits to be derived from neutrality. The British troops needed supplies, and although trade with Boston never ceased during the war, Halifax was nearer and prices were good.5 Certainly the Nova Scotians would not consent to take up arms against their kinsmen in New England, but apart from harbouring and assisting escaped prisoners-of-war, supplying American privateers with victuals and information, and vigorously protesting their devotion to the cause of liberty, they did nothing to help the Revolution.6 Was their neutrality therefore, simply a matter of expediency and self-interest, απd were the Nova Scotians, as John Adams said, "a set of fugitives απd vagabonds who are also kept in fear by a fleet and an army?" Such might, indeed, be the conclusion were their political and economic activities the sole criteria of judgment. But there were other forces and influences at work in Revolutionary Nova Scotia. Hitherto, little attention has been paid to the fact that in Nova Scotia the years of the Revolution coincided exactly with a revival of religion which swept through every New England settlement in the province with the most far-reaching and profound social and spiritual results. Such a widespread and vital movement was bound to exert an influence upon Nova Scotians' attitude• towards the Revolution. The extent of that influence and the interaction of neutrality and religion have yet to be estimated, but there can be little doubt that the two were at least mutually dependent, and that the "Great Awakening" in Nova Scotia was an expression of democratic ideals and spiritual independence which shows that these sons of New England were neither so mercenary nor so lethargic as they may at first appear. The state of religion in Nova Scotia before 1776 is poignantly portrayed in a series of memorials and petitions for aid which were sent out by the dissenting churches of the province.T Pastorless, poor, and discouraged they found themselves gradually succumbing to the demoralizing effects of the frontier. They 'Cf.• 6

Brebner, Neutral Yankees, ch. x, "ΡrοSts and Pains of Neutrality." For an interesting collection of letters and petitions concerning Nova Scotian activity in the Revolution see, E. D. Poole, Annals of Yarmouth and Barrington In the Revolutionary War (Vacmoutń, Nova Scotia, 1899). "The Memorial of the Congregational Church in Cornwallis" (November 8, 1769), is printed lis Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, 1888), 2nd Series, IV, 67-69. "A Brief Statement of the Circumstances of the Protestant Dissenters of Nova Scotia," is to be found in the Public Archives of Nova Scotia.

NEUTRALITY AND RELIGION IN NOVA SCOTIA - 35 were torn by internal strife and personal bitterness. The Revolution accelerated this general deterioration, especially among the Congregational churches. In the early years of the conflict several of the Congregational ministers, following the practice so familiar in New England, proceeded to deal with political issues from their pulpits, and stated their republican sympathies in no uncertain terms. Such "rebel clergy" were quickly silenced by the government. The Reverend John Seccomb of Chester, who was known to be "in very necessitous circumstances," was placed under a bond of £ 500 for preaching a sermon "tending to promote Sedition and Rebellion," and for praying for the success of the "Rebels."5 At Argyle, the Reverend John Frost, who was also a Justice of the Peace, tried to prevent a muster of the local militia and "in one of his public discourses expressed his hopes and wishes that the British forces in America might be returned to England confuted and confused."ρ At the same time, however, he prayed for the king — an interesting example of the conflict of ideas, which lay behind Nova Scotian neutrality. Squire Frost was deprived of his public office but suffered no further penalties for his seditious utterances. A third minister, the Reverend Seth Noble of Maugerville (on the St. John River, now in the province of New Brunswick), not only openly espoused "the present struggle for Liberty however God in his Providence may order it," but after the failure of the Eddy expedition against Fort Cumberland, joined the rebels at Machias and was a member of the force which occupied the St. John River Valley in 1777. With the arrival of British naval and military reinforcements in the Bay of Fundy, Parson Noble was compelled to flee the country, leaving his pastiness church at MaugerviIle a prey to wandering Newlights and Baptists.w Cut off from New England, with little chance of refilling their pulpits or recuperating their losses in membership and wealth the outlook of Nova Scotian Congregationalism must have s Minutes of Council, December 23, 1776, and January 6. 1777, in the Public Archives of Nova. Scotia. Mr. Seccomb, formerly of Harvard, Massachusetts, was the author of a rather well-known, humorous poem, "Father Abbey's Will." Cf., J. L. Sibley, Father Abbey': Wil! with Historical amd Biographical Notes (Cambridge, 1854). Mr. Seccomb remained In Nova Scotia until his death in 1792. • Minutes of Council. August 23, 1775. Mr. Frost, the first Protestant minister ordained in Canada, was a native of Kittery, Maine. "Collections of the New Brunswick Historlca! Social)' (St. John, N.B., 1894), I, 74-75; also "Documents of the Maugarvrne Church," ibid., I, 125 ff. Mr. Noble became the first minister of Bangor, Maine, and ís said to bave named that town after his favourite psalm tune.

36 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

seemed particularly dark. The governments, both at London and Halifax were notoriously partial to the Church of England, which was established by law in the province. Chaplaincies and public offices went to the Anglican clergy. They were liberally supported by funds from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts and by government grants.11 Public education, such as it was, was also largely in the hands of the Church. Despite promises of "full liberty of conscience," ofd the guarantees of the rights of Protestant dissenters made to the first settlers from New England,12 the dissenting clergy found them labouring under serious disabilities. At Cumberland, the glebe lands, which had been occupied by the Congregational minister as first minister of the parish, were given to the new Anglican rector.13 While the threat of episcopacy was by no means absent from the struggle in the older colοnies,Y4 because of the relative strength of the free churches, it was never so acute or so real as it was in Nova Scotia. To many of the settlers it must have seemed that they were about to lose not only the political associations of their past, but the faith of their fathers as well. Had not General Massey, the commandant at Halifax, written to Secretary of State Germain, If your Lordship will pardon me forgoing out of my walk... I take upon me to tell your Lordships that until Presbytery is drove out of His Majesty's Dominions, Rebellion will ever continue, nor will that Set ever submit to the Laws of England.15

Such official sentiments gave ample ground for the fear expressed by the Cornwallis Congregationalists, that "We of Consequence in a few Years shall all be Churchmen or Nothing."Σ8 It was to people in this discouraging situation, faced with the loss of their religion in addition to being "divided betwixt natural 11 "Α Brief Statement," indicates that each Church of England clergyman received £70 sterling per annum from the British Government. 3 A Proclamation Given by Governor Charles Lawrence, at Halifax. January 11, 1759 (Boston, 1759). A copy of this "Charter of Nova Scotia" may be seen in The Ju hu Carter Brown Library, Providence, Rhode Nand. W "Sketch of Life and Character of Caleb Gannett, Esq.," Collections of the Massachusetts Historical SocIety, 2nd Series, VIII, 284-85. 14 Cf., A. L, Cross, The Anglican Episcopate aid the Americas Colonies (New York, 1902). Massey to Germain. November 22, 1776, Canadian Archives Report (Ottawa, 1894), p. 355. 1 "The Memorial of the Congregational Church In ClrnwuHis," Proceed ing; of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 2nd Series, 1V, 69.

NEUTRALITY AND RELIGION IN NOVA SCOTIA — 37

Affection to our nearest Relations, and good Faith and Friendship to our King and Country,"17 that the revival of religion offered at once an escape and a vindication. The prophet of the awakening was a young farmer named Henry Alline (1748-1784), who at the age of twelve had moved with his parents from Newport, Rhode Island, to Falmouth, Nova Scotia.18 Deeply religious by nature and with a naturally active and inquiring mind, he had grown uρ without formal education. As the years passed he became subject to mystical experiences such as auditions and photisms which are the marks of inward conflict and a divided personality. His accounts of these experiences and particularly of his final conversion were used by William James as classic examples of the curing of a "sick soul."10 The result so far as Nova Scotia was concerned was that Henry Alline became a flaming evangelist of religious liberty. He preached his first sermon at Falmouth, Nova Scotia, on the eighteenth of April, 1776, a day, which significantly enough, had been set aside in Nova Scotia as a public fast on account of the uncertainties of the times. During the next seven years, like a "Bluenosd" Paul Revere, he rode throughout the province rousing his countrymen, not to any earthly battle, but to spiritual conquest and independence. An old tradition in Nova Scotia pictures him as always riding a good horse, and "with loaded whip" passing at a rapid canter from place to place, "pausing only to proclaim, where opportunity offered, trumpet-toned, the Gospel of the Grace of God."20 Where he could not ride, he sailed, or tramped on snowshoes. Lack of roads did not hinder the spiritual mobilization of Nova Scotia. Beginning in the Minas Basin townships, the revival spread through Annapolis County in 1777, across the Bay of Fundy and uρ the St. John valley in 1779, to Cumberland County, Yarmouth, and Liverpool in 1781, and to Colchester County in 1782. In addition Henry Alline visited Halifax, Pictou, and Prince Edward Island and finally died at the home of Reverend David McClure in North Hampton, New Hampshire, after traversing and preaching to the pioneer settlements along the "Memorial of Yarmouth Township," quoted in Brebner, The Neutre' Yankees, p. 310. For dεtails see The Life end Journal of the Rev. Henry Aline (Boston, 1806). William Jamrs, Ναrieties of Religious Experience (New York, 1916), pp. 159, 217. 0 I. E. Bill, Fifty Years with the Baptist Ministers and Churches of the Maritime Provinces (St. John, New Brunswick, 1880), p. 13.

37

38 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE AΤLAΝΤΙC PROVINCES

coast of Maine.2' Wherever he went the reactions were the same. Some scoffed, some opposed, but greater numbers found a new and absorbing interest. Like a former generation of frontiersmen in Northampton, Massachusetts, "Frolicking ceased and many began to be somewhat thoughtfuL"22 "We had blessed days," wrote AIine from Falmouth in November 1776, "the Lord was reviving his work of grace. Many under a load of sin cried out, what shall we do to be saved? and the saints seemed much revived, came out and witnessed for God. In a short time some more souls were barn to Christ, they came out and declared what God had done for their souls. Ο what a blessed change had taken place in that town."23 Five years later, at Cumberland, meetings continued all night long, with sinners roaring for mercy, praying and praising God with loud voices in the houses and singing spiritual songs as they rode along the roads. It was the same in the other towns. Many were very much awakened: which was such a new thing (neither known nor heard of among them), that many did not know what ailed them ... for there had never been such a talk as a guilty conscience, a burthened mind, a hard heart, or a stubborn will, or about any convictions, or any conversions; nor of the love of God, or declaring what He had done for their sauls.2i In short, religion became the main subject of conversation for many Nova Seotians during the Revolution. In fact, "carnal" things were heartily frowned upon. In the collection of Hymns and Spiritual Songs which Henry Allive composed for the use of his "Christians," a large number concern the dangers of worldliness. Congregations were taught to sing: How vain the wretch that does employ, His mind in quest of carnal joy, And for one hour of carnal mirth Chain down his soul to endless death. and, This tempting world is but a cheat, With poison mix'd in every sweet; His gravestone may be seen in the old cemetery near the Congregational Church in North Hampton, New Hampshire. n Altíne, The Llte and Journal, p. 40. Ct. Jonathan Edwards, Works (New York, 1844), III, 232. The Life and Journal, p. 49. The Lite and Journal, p. 149.

NEUTRALITY AND RELIGION IN NOVA SCOTIA — 39

And all its pleasing themes and love Will but at last α dagger prove.25 Ιn contrast with the rather mundane existence of the ordinary Nova Scotian villager, with its anxious concern and fretful impatience overpolitical and financial events which were beyond his control, the saints could chant, Well, solid minds your earth pursue — And court your empty toys: Ι bid your empty shades adieu, And boast o} solid joys. And when the glorious morn shall rise, Your glory sinks to hell, I'll mount with joy above the skies, And in full glory dwell. 26 Such emphasis on "spiritual" interests and such widespread preoccupation with other worldly affairs was bound to have an influence upon Nova Scotians' attitude towards the Revolution. The colonial question necessarily appeared less important as men's minds placed more and more value upon "heavenly" things. After all, in the light of eternity what comparison was there between the claims of King George and the claims of King Jesus? In 1775 Henry Alline himself refused the offer of a commission in the militia, preferring as he said, "a Commission from Heaven to go forth and enlist my fellow mortals to fight under the banner of King Jesus."27 One searches his Journal in vain for any evidence of interest in political affairs. Even on the two occasions when he was captured by American privateers, his only résponse was to warn "them that wish well to their souls" to "flee from privateers as they would from the jaws of hell, for methinks a privateer may be called a floating belL"28 Similarly, when addressing a company of soldiers at Liverpool in November 1782, he limited himself to warning them against the evils of profanity.2Θ To assume, therefore, that while their brothers in the Thirteen Colonies were, engaged in a life and death struggle for the a Henry Alike, Hymns and Spiritual Songs (Dover, New Hampshire, 1797), Book 1, Hymn 8, sØ i; Book 1, Hymn 11, stanza i. This work, containing four hundred and eighty-eight original hymns by Alllnε passed through four editions, and was popular among the Free Will Baptιsis In New England. $ Hymns and Spiritual Songs, Book V, Hymn 3ω, stanzas I and iv. "Alike, The Life and Jmrnwi, p. 43. "The Life and Journal, pp. 143, 148. "Henry Alike, A Sermon on α Day of Thanksgiving (HalIfax, 1783), p. 34.

40 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES high ideals of "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness," Nova Scotians were unmoved by any higher considerations than safety and profits is unfair. Indeed, the Great Awakening itself may be considered to have been a retreat from the grim realities of the world to the safety and pleasantly exciting warmth of the revival meeting, and to profits and rewards of another character. Although this psychological law of compensation undoubtedly played a part in the eagerness with which Alline's doctrines were accepted by his countrymen, it is net the whole explanation of their conduct. Besides the possibilities for release offered by the revival to emotionally starved and mentally perplexed people, there was also a large element of self-assertion and revolt in the movement. The Reverend Jonathan Scott of Chebogue, the doughty champion of "Old Light" Congregationalism against the inroads of the revivalists, complained bitterly that in his congregation the awakening had meant insubordination to the authority of the church. Members of his parish, "rejected all his Reasonings with Indignation and Contempt." They talked loudly of their "Christian Liberty," and complained bitterly of any "restraining and infringing" upon it." Such "liberty" was the very essence of Henry Alline's preaching; indeed, it gave rise to the accusation of antinomianism which was hurled at him during his lifetime and which continued to be applied to his followers long after his death.θ1 Theologically the movement arose from an attempt to escape from the harsh decrees and arbitrary government of a sovereign God, and in this field Alline's writings are early and unique forerunners of New England liberalism. The very title of one of his works, The Anti-Tradítionfst (Halifax, 1783), is sufficient to mark its author as a rebel. "True redemption," he wrote, is not by divine decree, but by "raising the desires and life of the inner man out of this miserable, sinful and bestial world, and turning it to Christ, from whence it is fallen."32 But Alline's +* "Recorda of Jabogue Church." Manuscript in the Public Archives of Nova Scotia, pp. 134 If. Reverend Jonathan Scott later settled at Poland, Maine. The Reverend James Macgregor the Presbyterian minister of Pictou, Nova Scotia, described Alline's teachings as, "A mixture of Calvinism, Antlnemianism and Enthusiasm." George Patterson, Memoir of Rev. James Macgregor (Philadelphia, 1859), p. 351. See also references to Newhghts in Nathan Bangs. Life of the Rev. Freeborn Gerrettson (New York, 1834), p. 167; W. S. Bartlett, The Funnier Missionary (Boston, 1853), p. 222; and Joshua Marsden, The Narrative of a Mission (Plymouth-Øk, 1216), p. 49. Henry Allíne, Two Mites Cast into the O$ertng of God joy the Benefit of Mankind (lover, New Hampshire, 1204), p. 93.

NEUTRALITY AND RELIGION IN NOVA SCOTIA — 41

revolt was not confined to theology; he also attacked the ecclesiastical system of his day, especially the practice of limiting the right to exhort and preach to ordained pastors. Like Gilbert Tenient in 1740, he had the utmost contempt for "unconverted" ministers who set themselves up as guardians of a "pure" ministry. Not only the power of ordination but all church government is a prerogative of the brethren. They are the Body of Christ, and it is through them, and not through a specialized body of ministers that He speaks to the world. But do not understand me that Ι call the voice of every church the voice of Christ: or the majority of votes in every church the voice of Christ.... Whatever is acted and transacted by any body of men with all their paper covenants or strictness of discipline in the externals of religion without that spiritual union, is not done by Christ in the flesh; and therefore can be nothing but Anti-Christ: but wherever or whenever any of the true followers of Christ are gathered together in the fellowship of the Gospel, and are travelling in the unity of the spirit and bonds of peace, there is Christ's visible kingdom . .. , there is all the power that can possibly be on earth in any spiritual a/fair, for there is Christ himself.23 In this statement Allíne proves himself a true son of New England Independency, and the old argument used so frequently against prelate and papist served once more as a defence against encroaching Anglicanism. Spontaneous groups of "Christians," with uneducated farmers as their leaders sprang up throughout the province, and quickly organized themselves into free, selfgoverning churches. Such democratic institutions, and such a widespread and prolonged outburst of religious enthusiasm as the Newlight movement in Nova Scotia can be explained only in terms of the determination of the common man to assert his spiritual independence and to maintain in religion those rights and liberties which, in the circumstances, he was unable to uphold in politics. While the political revolution was occurring in the older colonies, a religious revolution was in progress in Nova Scotia; both revolutions resulted in a growth of democracy and individualism. The Newlight and Baptist churches became the backbone of the Reform Party which later wrestled with the Halifax oligarchy for religious and educational equality and for responsible government. "Their political principles," wrote Bishop Charles Inglis (no unprejudiced commentator, to be 33 Two Mites Cast into the Offering of God for the &ene&it of Mankind, p. 169.

42 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

sure), "are equally dangerous with their religious. It is believed that the conductors of these people are engaged in the general plan of a total revolution in religious and civil government."a 4 The emotional extravagences of the enthusiasts and the lengths to which they carried their peculiar beliefs in "Christian Liberty" were the subject of constant criticism by their opponents, yet even these may be interpreted as the exaggerated assertion of personal independence.85 Such excesses as crawling about like wild beasts, disturbing and disrupting services of worship, and speaking with new tongues, were psychologically primitive traits, but they were also the marks of men and women who refused to conform to contemporary standards and wished to demonstrate their own alliance with a power which was superior to all human conventions. The same individualism which found expressions in other molds in theThirteen Colonies, activated the religious extroverts of the northern outpost. Negatively, an escape from fear and divided loyalties; positively, an assertion of democratic ideals and a determination to maintain them, the Great Awakening in Nova Scotia gave self-respect and satisfaction to people whose economic and political position was both humiliating and distressing. Nowhere does this connection between Nova Scotian' neutrality and the τevival of religion become more apparent than in A Sermon ii Thanksgiving, one of the few of Henry Alline's sermons which have survived. Preached at Liverpool, Nova Scotia, November 21, 1782, before the townsmen and members of the garrison, this sermon stresses the good fortune of Nova Scotians in being spared the horrors of war, and in having instead a revival of religion. How are we screened from the trials of our once happy Nation in the convulsions of the present Day? How have we sat in peace while this inhuman war hoth spread devastation through our Neighboring Towns and Colonies Iike a flood. Not because of the cleanness of our hands or past righteousness.... Yea, and when we have daily expected the impending cloud and to share in the bitter cup, Heaven's indulgent hand has interposed and averted the blow... . 3'

Inglis to S. P. G., 1799. The Bishop also said, ' Shear discipline is democratic. The right of ordination, dismιsεion, etc, lies entirely with the Brethren." Quoted by Hill, in Fi j'j' Years with the ΒαρtisΙ Ministers and Churches of the Maritime Provinces, pp. 189 H. Freeborn Garretison heard a disciple of AWne boast, "Not even adultery, murder, swearing, drunkenness, nor any other sin can break the unίσn between me and Christ" — Bangs, Life of the Rev. FreeØr Garrettscn, p. 165.

NEUTRALITY AND RELIGION IN NOVA SCOTIA — 43

Yea, and more to be admired still, we have not only been excluded from the destructive scene, but while they were involved in the dreadful calamity, we have been blest with that unparalleled blessing, the moving work of the Spirit of God: a work of grace and the advancing of the Redeemer's Kingdom in almost every corner of the Province. Ah! could I but a moment lend you an omniscient eye or discover to your view a map of the disordered world, what peals of death, what marks of misery, and tokens of despair would you behold.... While many an aged Parent is lingering to the grave with grey hairs and sorrow, under the news of that last son slain in such a battle; many an helpless infant is thrown an orphan into the world by the fatal lead destined to the Father's breast: while you, my dear hearers (altho' you have often murmured that you ever came to these inhospitable wilds, and was ready to say with the murmuring Jews, 'Has God brought us here to slay us'), have been hedged about with the kind providence of God, and screened from the impending storm in this peaceable corner i/the earth.... Yea, and above all when they are thus wading through the terrible storm and we have been expecting soon to share the bitter cup, we have been blest with the greatest of all blessings, cultivated with the word and spirit of divine grace, many brought to the Marriage Supper of the Lamb, απd to drink of the wells of Sαlναtiοπ.3° Colonel Simeon Perkins, who had heard this sermon preached, pronounced it "a very good discourse."87 No doubt many others, much less involved than he in privateering and profits from the war, felt even more strongly that this was the Gospel for Nova Scotia. In comparison with the physical and economic factors which held the province within the British Empire, "the Great Reformation under Mr. Henry Allíne," may seem insignificant απd remote, yet psychologically it played a part. Not only Mr. Ailine, but lesser exhorters in every township pointed out the blessings of peace and turned men's minds away from the political issues of the day. In a state of divided loyalties and impotence the Neutral Yankees found an indirect method of asserting their independence. Political neutrality was superseded by religious enthusiasm. ss Anine, A Semma on a Day of Thanksgiving, pp. 22 ff. Permission ιο quote from this rare work was granted by the directors of the Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California. "Simeon Perkins, Diary for Nov. 21, 1782. The manuscript toffy Is In the Public Archives of Nova Scotia.

Loyalist Attitudes MARGARET ELLS

Since the beginning of the American Revolution, the loyalists have been the cause of much heterogeneous writing. They have been set upon pedestals by admirers, and dragged through the mire by opponents. They have been blamed or praised, maligned or extolled, according to the political views of commentators of their own day and this. Of recent years, like so many objects of veneration or vituperation, they have been subjected to the more discerning méthοds of scientific history, with eminently satisfactory results. Conscious of these many and diverse contrIbutions, the reader may well respond to the proposal of a few more words on the same theme with repulsion. Yet if he will stay his hand in the act of turning the page, his forbearance will perhaps be rewarded when he learns the limited scope of the present attempt. Here the loyalists will be discussed only as a factor in the development of a small British province. This study is one of a series prefatory to making an estimate of the strength and direction of loyalist influence in the history of Nova Scotia. The immediate effect of the loyalist migration was to augment the population of Nova Scotia by twenty thousand people. These formed one of the main stocks of population from which the present Nova Scotia has developed. I propose to find out how these loyalists felt towards one another and Nova Scotia, in what spirit they began their life in the provińce, and how they were received by the pre-loyalist inhabitants. To do it most directly, one must go back to the inception of Loyalty-with-acapital-L in the colonies from which Nova Scotia drew its share of refugees, must determine its nature and whether it remained constant, or emerged from war, persecution and exile modified or intensified in the individual. That done, the further question arises, how well or ill the vicissitudes of fortune that attended the profession of loyalty served as a preparation for the hardships of pioneer life. It is quite possible that the answer to these Source: Daihojule Review, XV (October, Σ93$), 320-34. ReprInted by pemissloit of the publishers.

LOYALIST ATTITUDES — 45

questions will not only show the various attitudes of the loyalists at the outset of their life in Nova Scotia, but will provide at least a clue, if not a contribution, to the larger problem of loyalist influence. Before proceeding with the proposed investigations, let me define the term "loyal." I use it, in this regard, as the distinguishing characteristic of those American colonists who gave up their homes and left their native land to remain British. The first considerable body of loyalists came to Nova Scotia from New England, with Howe's fleet in 1776.1 An uncertain number of these remained. Thereafter, the majority of loyalists came from the states south of New England. Although it is difficult to give a final analysis, most of the Nova Scotia loyalists seem to have come from the states of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, a fair number from the Carolinas, fewer from Connecticut and Massachusetts, and a mere sprinkling, except as to negroes, of whom there were two thousand, from the other southern and New England states. It is quite obvious, without detailing a history of loyalism in each of the old thirteen colonies, that the Revolution was acompanied and could be accomplished only by a decrease in the number of supporters of the British government. Since it was the work of a small minority, the vast majority of Americans were, in the beginning, passive loyalists. In the words of Van Tyne: "Loyalty was the normal condition, the state that had existed, and did exist; and it was the Whigs — the Patriots, as they called themselves — who must do the converting.": In the New England colonies, owing tό restrictive measures of the British government in 1774, the "converting" was much more rapid than farther south.' Throughout the war, despite the organized efforts of the patriot party to bring them into line, most of the middle and southern colonies had at least a large minority of royal adherents; Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and North Carolina had as many royal as patriot sympathizers, Georgia and South Carolina more, while New York was overwhelmingly rοyalist.e It is quite clear that at the outset, before any question of independence had been raised, there was no party, except an 'In Stark, J. H. Loyalists at Massachusetts, pp. 133-36, is a list of 900 refugees, the original of which, according to Mr. Allen French, of Concord, Mass., had 200 more names. Van Tyne, Claude, Loyalisu in the American Revolution, p. 2. See O. E. Ellis' article in Winsor's Nasrative and Critical History of America, vol. 7, pp. 187 ff., footnote by editor; also Van Tyne ibid. pp. 93-104, and Flick, A. C.: Loyalism in New York During the American Revolution, p. 181.

46 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

insignificant ultra-Tory group, that supported the British government in the passing of the Townshend Acts. Both Whig and Tory upheld the American against the English interpretation of the colonial constitution, and, until the First Continental Congress met in 1774, differed merely in the means proposed to convince the British government that the American interpretation was the correct one. The acts of that Congress, followed by the Declaration of Independence, brought about a re-shuffling, for many moderate Whigs would not support armed rebellion, and numbers of people who had previously been indifferent declared themselves against the popular party when it proposed to resort to force. From the time they began to enforce the edicts of the First Congress, the patriot party were on the aggressive. Their great minority made their cause desperate; in organization and continuous activity lay their only hope of success. Thus, on one side were the patriots, a compact, organized party, working through the well-known committees of correspondence, with a platform of reform and a slogan of independence. On the other side was the established government in a defensive position. Represented in each province by the officials, the loyalist party stood for preserving the historic rights of Englishmen in America, the ground taken by all Americans prior to the First Continental Congress, and contended that this could be done without revolution. Their objective had been and was self-government of the colonies through their own Iegislatures within the empire. They were a large, diffuse body, "too prone to wait the chastening hand of Great Britain.."* It was this diffusion, this lack of organization, this dependent attitude, which, combined with the natural conservatism of some, and the hatred of civil war of most, and the fact that much ground had been lost because "prior to July Fourth 1776 most of them honestly believed that there was more justice in the American than in the British programme," made possible such large inroads on their numbers as the patriot party continued to make.5 To these factors, and that provided by the failure of the English military commanders to make adequate use of the loyalists, Dr. Flick attributes the slightness of the influence that the loyalists, despite their large numbers, exerted on the course of the Revolution. As the war continued and turned in favour of the revolutionaries) their followers increased at the expense of their opponents. Van Tyne, ibid., p. 81. A. C., Loyalists In New York, p. 220; article in Ø New York State Historical Association Jownal, vol. 6.

I Rick,

LOYALIST ATTITUDES — 47

Lukewarm loyalists and the indifferent, when subjected to persecution and to systematic confiscation of all civil rights by the patriot party, who held control in all the states except New York, followed the line of least resistance and signed the oath of allegiance to the new nation. Thus it has been estimated that in New York the number of those supporting the king fell from 95 to 45 per cent of the population between 1775 and 1782.8 And, after the fighting ended there was a further weeding out, from which emerges the loyalist proper. It was then that those who had acquiesced outwardly with the Revolution but had cherished loyalist sympathies, and those who had not taken up arms against the patriot party, were given the opportunity to decide for or against the empire. They were faced with two rather unpleasant alternatives: they could remain among their political enemies, under laws which penalized them to the point of confiscating their credit, suffrage and property, and hope that the revolutionary government would eventually give them a chance to earn a living, or they could leave their homes and country to join their political friends, the British, and, under government protection and assistance, turn pioneer and hew homes out of the wilderness of one of the remaining British American colonies. It is interesting that in New York 40 per cent of the 90,000 individuals who composed the loyalist party in 1783 carried their doctrine to its logical conclusion and left the state. For those of the party who had been active against the Revolution, there was no such alternative as the foregoing; they could do nothing but leave. For convenience I would divide the loyalists into three general classes. Ιn the first class are those who had made themselves so obnoxious to the opposing party that they had got on the Black List. An analysis of this class shows that they were officials, great landowners and other men of wealth and position, and the remnant that had not migrated to England of the ultra-Tories who had been a party since the early history of the colonies. The members of this class had, generally speaking, refused to sign the Declaration of Independence, and had put their trust in the British government. Their property had been confiscated? and themselves attainted of high treason,e 'Rick, L.oyailsm In New York During the Revolution, p. 160. 7 Flick, Ibid., pp. 216 ff., for list of sales of loyalist property in New York. ° The Black List for Pennsylvania, in volume 75 of the Duane Pamphlets in the Congressional Library, Washington, is typical of the lists of attainted Loyalists.

48 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

their lives being thereby forfeited.° Such treatment was not likely to turn these Ioyalists into patriots; the conclusion of the war found them within the British lines, upholding their cause with increased fervour and bitterness. The second class, consisting of loyalist soldiers, was related to the first both in personnel and in being equally obnoxious to the revolutionaries. The colonies mustered some 50,000 soldiers to assist England in crushing the Revolution.10 Among their number were persons of all ranks, professions and trades who, because they fought against the Revolution, alike incurred the penalty of banishment?' In a third class I would place all the loyalists, exclusive of the two classes already described, who left their respective states. These, although they had suffered intermittent persecution and had been subjected to the usual tests, restrictions and deprivation of rights,12 had not been sufficiently influential or wealthy to have become marked men. This class, larger than either of the others, was composed of merchants, professional men, clerks, farmers, tenants, tradesmen, mechanics and men of all trades. Farmers, tenants of the great Tory landowners, and hangers-on of wealthy business men were numerous. Traditionally conservative, they had clung to their political habits. They liked the idea of a king and parliament, they were used to it, and they had no political feeling except a complete distrust of the rebel party, which was to them a number of cheering, Iaw-breaking, firebrand, political opportunists. Any government proposed to be carried on by these men, who had been making their lives miserable since 1776, had their unqualified disapproval at the outset. The flower of the third class was undoubtedly the professional men, ministers, teachers, lawyers, doctors and educated traders. To them the burden of restrictions placed on loyalists made exile preferable.13 Despite the recommendation of Congress made in fulfilment of the peace treaty, the states refused to legislate for leniency towards loyalists. In nearly all the states they were disfranchised; debts due to them were cancelled; their ο For an analysis of the laws of the different states directed against the loyalists, sec lan Tyne, ibid.. pp. 32741, Appendix C. "Van Tyne, ibid., P. 183. li Regarding their cosmopolitan character, see Coke, D. P., Notes on the Royal Commission on the Losses and Services of the American Loyalists, edited by H. E. Egerton. 1f See Van Tyne, ibid., Appendices A, B, Analysis of test laws and other am y-loyalist laws, pp. 318-41.

1 For example: "when a tax of £150,000 ... was levied in 1785 the Whigs escaped easily;" Fliick, ibid., p. 164.

LOYALIST ATTITUDES — 49

property was confiscated or taxed until they were ruined. In many localities they were tarred and feathered, and driven out with a warning never to return." In anticipation of the time where there would be no British army to stand between them and their persecuting fellow-countrymen, the loyalists towards the close of the war planned an early retreat. From 1776 small detachments of banished loyalists had been making their way to the British provinces. After Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown in 1781, those who had been living within the British lines in New York, or who came in thereafter, made preparations fora great final exodus. The migration of nearly 30,000 to Nova Scotia was accomplished between the last week of April and the twenty-third of November, 1783. The final exodus to Canada, mainly by land, began in the summer and continued much longer. The publication of the list authentic news of the peace treaty was on the twenty-sixth March, 1783.15 Less than a month later, the first fleet of transports left New York for Nova Scotia. Among the more prosperous loyalists, associations had been formed and agents sent to spy out the promised land. A typical society of this kind was that of the Port Roseway Associates. Consisting of about three hundred members, "chiefly of the number of those-who-for their Attachment to Government and after Numberless fatigues in supporting the Royal Cause -. have been obliged to quit all and take refuge within the King's lines," they met first in November of 1782, and, in consequence of the encouragement given by the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor of Nova Scotia, "together with the Proclamations relative to the settlement of that Province," they associated with the purpose of removing to Port Rοseway.15 They sent agents to secure them good land, to ask for special consideration as well as the privileges granted to all loyalists, to find what articles the associates should take with them, and to report generally on the province as a prospective place for settlement." The agents made the requisite enquiries and reported tó the Associates„who sailed in the first fleet to Øe up their lands in Nova Scotia. All loyalists who had lived in the British lines for a full year were to be transported at the 14 Van Tyne, ibkI., p. 295. Van Tyne quotes Rivington's Gazette of this date. u Sec Port Roseway Associates Minute-Book, Ρ. 27, Public Archives of Canada, Phíilípps Manuscript no. 22186. lr See Port Roseway Associates Minute-Book, pp. 35Ø, Letter of Instructiona to their Agents, showing how much they hoped fir from government.

1

50 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

government's expense,λ8 but the more wealthy associations chartered ships of their own.19 By the winter of 1783-4, 20,000 loyalists had arrived in the peninsular of Nova Scotia. The loyalists who settled in Nova Scotia included types of each of the three classes already described. Of the five thousand families who remained in the province, those of the first class were comparatively few. They consisted of men like General John Ruggles, Reverend Charles Iαglis, Major Philip van Cortland, Stephen and James Delancey, Attorney-General Blowers and others, distinguished in themselves or of prominent families, or both. The proportions of the second and third classes, that is of loyalist soldiers and civilians, were 2,000 and 3,000 respectively. Since the number of members in the civilian family averaged between four and five, often being nine or even twelve, while that of the private soldier was between one and two, the actual number of individuals in the civilian families exceeded by 10,000 the soldier families. Exclusive of these, some 2,000 loyal negroes, most of whom had earned their freedom by fighting for the king, settled in Nova Scotia. These numbers include only those loyalists who received and retained grants of land. Between 2,000 and 3,000 came and went away again after a two or three years' attempt to settle. Altogether about 18,400 white and 2,000 coloured loyalists were added to the peninsular population of Nova Scotia by the loyalist migration.20 At the outset of their life in Nova Scotia all grades, ranks and colours of loyalists had a common characteristic, adherence to a political ideal, and had undergone a common experience, persecution. How far these constituted a tie in the face of social differences, it is difficult to ascertain. It is possible that persecution, the privations of the war, and the hardships they experienced before they took up the threads of life in Nova Scotia had a more intense immediate but less permanent effect than the loyalty of which they grew prouder as the years rolled by. The restraint of wartime had been removed, and the immediate prospect of living, not only under the sort of government they trusted, but as the particular objects of that government's concern, was not unpleasing. Despite minor squabbles and one • Van Tyne, ibid., p. 292. 19 Flick, ibid., p. 173. �ιΡ In a previous study 1 compiled a table showing the dispersion of the loyalists in Nova Scotia. See Report for 1934 of the Canadian Hfstorical Association, p. 108. This table places the soldier and civilian, white and negro, grantees and their families in the nine counties into which the province was then divided.

LOYALIST ATTITUDES — Sr

quarrel which led to a split among the loyalists,21 the general attitude was one of helpful camaraderie. Within the ranks of the first and second classes there were strong ties. Those of the first had suffered persecution since the beginning of the Revolution; many of them were related; they had all lost much for their Tory principles, and had a corresponding amount to hope for from government. They had therefore a great deal in common, and tended to stand by one anοther.22 This family feeling was matched, among the soldiers, by a strong esprit de corps, born of the comradeship of the camp and the patriotic nature of their cause. In this case the fellow-feeling of one fighter for another was strengthened by a common dislike for their ally, the English regular soldier. Thus the experiences which the old loyalist and soldier classes had endured intensified their feelings, and in them the attitudes and characteristics that distinguished the loyalists as a whole became marked and sometimes exaggerated to the point of distortion. In this fashion one sees, for example, the general loyalist characteristic of dislike of republicanism hardened, in John Wentworth, into a fear of it which made him continually impute the worst motives to such non-loyalists as Cottnam Tinge, popular orator and Assembly member, who was certainly not guilty of them.23 The attitude most generally exhibited by loyalists was probably that of exclusiveness. They felt, and they had been encouraged to feel, that their profession of loyalty, and their adherence to it throughout the sufferings such a faith entailed, placed them in a class by themselves, above their fellow-men. Just as it had singled them out for persecution while they had been among revolutionists, it should, now that they hlid reached the British fold, entitle them to distinction. In the face of many temptations to go over to the other side, they had kept the faith and done their duty. To quote their own words: "Thus continually called m Between the "55 gentlemen," of the first class of loyalists, and the signets of the counterpetiIion. In the Public Archives of Nova Scotia (hereafter referred to as P.A.N.S.) vol. 369, document 22 is their petition, and the counter-petition of over 600 less influential loyalists is in the Archives in the odgina]. Pamphlets no. 671 and 672 in the Public Archives of Canada indicate the nature and extent ii the controversy that raged over it in both North America and England. E.g., 301m Wentworth, last royal Governor of New Hampshire and Governor of Nova Scotia, 1792-1808, seems to have known all the prominent loyalists, and was continually recommending persons for government appointments on the grounds of their loyalty." $ See Calendar of Papers 1802-1815 in P.A.N.S., many letters from Wentworth to the Secretaries of State between 1802 and 1808, see also Murdoch, History nj.Nova Scotia, vol. 3, pp. 223, 248 IL

52 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

upon by His Majesty, his Commissioners and Generals," the loyalists took a decided part in the cause of their fellow-subjects in Great Britain. in direct consequence of this virtuous and meritorious conduct, their persons have been attainted, their estates confiscated, sold and appropriated to the use of the rebel usurpation, and many of them, possessed of aφiuence and a degree of happiness surpassed by that of no people in any country upon earth, have devoted the whole of their fortunes and their felicity to a religious observance of the conditions and duties of Society, and tο the national safety.24 This feeling that they were a Chosen People did not die with the first generation of loyalists. Ιt came about as Governor Haldimand foretold in 1782: "It may be presumed that the people having suffered so much persecution for their attachment to the Government will transmit the same to their posterity."26 Thus, to be able to attach the initials "U.E." to one's name, signifying descent from one of the original supporters of a united empire, is to this day considered a very real distinction in parts of Canada. It is significant that what has become a matter of sentiment or family pride had originally little of the sentimental element, but much more "cash value." As in the pamphlet quoted above, when loyalism was stressed, the burden of the theme was usually a request for compensation or special consideration of one kind or another. Lest this disposition appear as a selfish desire to recoup their losses at others' expense, it will be well to let the loyalists speak for themselves. The following paraguaph, written when the provisional treaty had just been signed, expresses adequately their notion of their part in the war, and at once explains and justifies their plea for compensation: That the American Loyalists have ever considered the Prosperity and Interest of Great Britain as inseparably connected with their own, and cannot object to any Measures which may procure Benefit to the Mother Country, or avert any Calamity which may threaten Her; but if acknowledgement of American Independence be the necessary price of Peace, and conducive to the Welfare of this Country, it would be a singular hardship indeed that the National Benefit should be purchased at their Expence. ' Pamphlet no. 637, The Case and Claim aί the American Loyalists, p. 15, and no, 695, James Gallowa8'e pamphlet of the same tenor, in Canadian Arthlves. *s P.A.N.S., vol. 367, doc. 25, Haldi and to Townshend, 25 Oci 1782.

LOYALIST ATTITUDES - 53

They could not wish the war prolonged. But since your Petitioners conceive it to be of the Essence of every political Society, that, as each Member is bound to contribute to the Welfare, so He is entitled to the protection of the State; and that mutual Rights and Obligations, and a participation of public Losses and Benefits must infallibly result from the Union — And as the protection of every part of the Empire may, by the Events of War, become impossible, they conceive that the Sacrifice of a particular part, in consequence of the inability of the State to retain it, ought, by the eternal Principles of natural Justice and the fundamental Laws of the British Government, to be borne by the whole Saciety.26 On the assumption that their homes had been the price of peace for the empire, they asked for compensation for their material losses.27 Out of this rational theory grew a tendency to capitalize their loyalty, for which the British government and the exigencies of war were largely responsible. Beginning with the King's Proclamation of 1775, urging his subjects to withstand rebellion, the government had issued continuous propaganda soliciting supporters, encouraging active help from its adherents, and always linking rewards with loyalty.2B When, for example, the English Commissioners came to treat for peace in 1778, they drew an official comparison of the offers made by the king with those by the revolutiońaries, and forbade the loyalists, in the name of loyalism, to accept restitution of property on the terms of reconciliation offered by Congress. Pointing out the improbability of the Revolution being successful, and emphasizing the protection offered by the British, they spurred on the American Tories "to vie with each other in eager and cordial endeavours to secure their own peace and to promote and establish the prosperity of their country" by making more strenuous efforts against the revοlutiοnaries.2θ To a declaration issued in 1780 by the board of directors of loyalists associated "for embodying and employing such of his faithful subjects in North America as may m See Shelburne Manuscńpts in Public Archives of Canada, vol. 67: Petition intended to be presented to Parliament by the late American Governors In Behalf of the American Loyalists 8 Feb. 1783, and articles in the Shelburne Royal American Gazelle, copies of 30 lay and 13 June 1785. In P.A.N.S. *, Sec Pamphlet no. 695 in Public Archives of Canada: Claim of the American Loyalists Reviewed, by Joseph Galloway, 1788, p. 16. 23 There were two proclamations in 1775 and three In 1776 10 this effect. tιΡ See Pamphlets, no. 637, ρ. 15.

54-. HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

be willing to associate under their Direction, for the Purpose of annoying the Sea Coasts of the revolted Provinces and distressing their Trade"80 is attached a list of "Benefits and Rewards" for those who would join. The effect of British propaganda and promises was to foster not only an expectation of compensation but a dependence on the British government for protection, guidance, and even the necessities of life. This dependent attitude of the loyalists recurs constantly in their letters, memorials and pamphlets. Its inevitability is clearly shown by the following excerpt from a statement of the loyalist position: The Distresses of the Loyalists were greatly alleviated and their hopes of Protection continually kept alive by a series of Acts... as well as by the most solemn Assurances of His Majesty's confidential Servants, that they might, in all Events, depend upon His Majesty's support and paternal Regard for their Protection. That these Royal and National assurances were continued down to a very late period, and though they produced still more vigorous proceedings against the Loyalists, stimulated them in their Exertions in support of Government, and confirmed them in their Reliance on the Truth and Justice of the British Ναtiοn.at In the dilemma in which the loyalist found himself, his only hope against being abandoned to "the rage of their Enemies" or to .. . "the calamity of extreme poverty"δ2 lay in the fulfilment by the British government of its promises. The loyalists' tendency to turn to the British government for the solution of all their various problems was not deflected by the political lesson they learned from the Revolution. The experiences they underwent, in the course of persecution and a war conducted against themselves by a republican government, had converted their preconceived dislike of republicanism into a horror of it." As compared with the government of the United States, that of Great Britain was as solid as the rock of Gibraltar; to their revolution-weary sensibilities no qualities in government seemed so attractive as the rock-like ones of stability and m Shelburne Manuscripts, vii. 67, p. 113. Enclosure, 12 Feb. 1783.

Manuscripts, vol. 67, Ρ. 184. Governors' Petition. a Shelburne Manuscripts, vol. 67, Ρ. 156. Anonymous to Shelburne, 11 Dec. 1782. "Ilse Anti-American bias of the loyalist is well known and to be expected. See Colonial Gelee papers in the Public Record 0111cc, London, series 217, val. 60, Parr to Nepean, 5 May 1788, for One example of an excess of antI-American zeal In a loyalist Deldal. a Shelburne

LOYALIST ATTITUDES — 55

security.34 For the moment, at least, their ideal in government was the Elizabethan semper eadem. Hence, one might conjecture in the loyalists a conservative, possibly even a reactionary attitude towards political change. To what degree this disposition was evinced will be the subject of a later study. For the present it must be borne in mind that all these "attitudes" and tendencies varied with the individual and the case in point, and that, as a rule, they emerged most strongly in the ultra-loyalists of the first class, less in the soldiers, and least of all in the common or garden loyalist of the third class. They are not to be construed as inherent qualities of character, but merely as effects of the forces that had played upon the supporters of British government in America since 1774. In view of the similarity of their political professions, and of their common interest in the progress of Nova Scotia, the loyalist and pre-revolutionary inhabitants of the province might well have been expected to regard each other with a friendly eye. When the provincial government in 1774 rejected the invitation of Congress to join the thirteen colonies in revolt, Nova Scotia became an officially "loyal" province. When the legislature petitioned the government for the redress of grievances the next year, it adopted the constitutional means of reform.33 These acts were quite in keeping with the Ioyalist platform to preserve "the historic rights of Englishmen in America," and thus assure "the unity of the empire, security and peaceable progress.SB Both loyalists and old inhabitants were thus, by their own declarations, British constitutionalists. Moreover, they had a common bond in their choice of Nova Scotia as their future home and a common interest in her progress. But the manner of their choosing shows the divergence of the loyalist and pre-loyalist points of view. The old inhabitants were pioneers who had preferred Nova Scotia to New England. They went to Nova Scotia to better themselves. The loyalists would have preferred, had the circumstances been different, to remain in their own homes. Nova Scotia was the less of two evils to them. The old inhabitants came as to a Land of Promise, full of hope and +' The glorious British constitution and the anarchistic state of the American government are 5u frequently mentioned by loyalists that complete references would be impossible, if they were not superfluous. Sentiments like `The Imbecility of the American states forms the only Basis of their Union," and references to "the imperfect, crude, and X11-digested forms of their government" are too many to enumerate. Brebner, J. B., Nova Scotia': Remedy for the American Revu ulm, ed., Canadian Ηi tοrical Review, June 1934, pp. 174 ff. * Flick, Article in the New York State Historical Ass'n Journál, p. 211.

56 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

energy and confidence in themselves and the province: The loyalists came to a land of exile, with superb courage, but casting many a regretful look backward. Besides cherishing a natural desire to return to the homes that were forbidden them, the loyalists had little reason to expect congenial relations with the inhabitants of Nova Scotia. Many had, of course, heard so little about the province and its inhabitants that they had no preconceived notions. But in English official circles the quality of loyalty behind the Nova Scotian official declarations was seriously questioned. For example, Carleton wrote in 1783: "It is certain that ... too many .. . among the old inhabitants are far from being well-affected to the King's Government";37 and again, when the presbytery of Halifax applied to Dr. Witherspoon, a notorious republican, for a religious instructor, he wrote: "After the opinions that have already been entertained of some persons in your province, this conduct makes a very unfavourable impression of their loyalty."38 Carleton was in charge of the embarkation of loyalists in New York, and it would indeed be strange if the impression of Nova Scotians which prevailed among the ofńcials there had not been conveyed to the loyalists, who constantly surrounded them. Even the new settler who had not been subjected to prejudice against the old inhabitants was not likely to find in them an enthusiasm for loyalism like his own. Although many had been threatened and some ruined by American privateers, the old inhabitants had not suffered in the past eight years as the loyalists had. They had not been driven from their homes, tarred and feathered, imprisoned and finally harried out of their land. They had not, generally speaking, fought for their faith. Nor had they been worked up to a fervour of patriotic emotion by war and persecution, as had the loyalists. To the latter, consumed with ardour for their cause, the more casual patriotism of the old settlers seemed like indifference, or worse 99 An early report from the loyalists asserted that men of republican leanings were influential and in many important positions in Nova Scotia, and poińted out the threat that this was to the loyalists who "apprea Colonial Office series 5, 1,01. 111, p. 287, Carleten's letter to North of Oct., 1783 (Public Record Otßce, London). Colonial 015cc series 5, 101. 111, Carleton's letter to Parr, 23 Oct 1783 3$ There are instances of like suspicions among the loyalists themselves. Van Tyne, p. 263, says, "Ilse consistent Loyalists were jealous that 'they, who had borne the burden and heat of the day, should get no better reward than those who came within the British lines to avoid the evils outside.' "

LOYALIST ATTITUDES — 57

hend fresh disturbances may arise therefrom, and that the same persecuting spirit which has driven them into the woods of Nova Scotia will not suffer them to remain even there in peace and tranquίllíty."40 Thus an element of mistrust entered into the attitude of loyalist toward pre-loyalist. That attitude was in general one of superiority, a product of the loyalist exclusiveness already accounted for, tinged with suspicion. The suspicion varied with the individual and interest concerned, from nil to a considerable percentage. Such an attitude was hardly likely to endear the loyalists to the pioneer Nova Scotian. Hitherto the forces which moulded American colonists into loyalists have been considered in their general effect. How they reacted with qualities of individual character is a different matter. That danger' can bring forth courage, sufferings fortitude, and privation cheerful acceptance, no one who has read the annals of the loyalists will deny. They consistently showed these qualities under hardships of every kind. But, once the longcontinued strain was relaxed, reaction was inevitable. From the "settling" period, from 1783 and 1788 in Nova Scotia, many a loyalist idol emerged with feet of clay. When a man like Governor Parr; who had no "partialitys," being as be said, "equally unknown and unconnected upon the whole Continent of America,"41 could refer to the loyalists as a "cursed set of dogs,"42 and frequently voice such sentiments as, "they fret and vex me, I am a fool for my pains, it all proceeds from my anxiety for the welfare of the Province, which they do not care a damn about,"43 it gives one food for thought. Though we grant that pressure of time and events accounts for a certain warmth of expression, the governor's estimate of the loyalists conflicts strangely with the usual picture of them. When one finds his statements amply and independently corroborated, often by the loyalists themselves, the most willing worshipper is forced to dethrone his gods. Considered as heroes, their conduct makes them petty and ridiculbus; looked at from the common level, it shows them merely to have been human. Regarding the 18,000 loyalists as individuals with the usual human tendencies, one should not be surprised that the effect of the vicissitudes they had gone through between 1775 and 1783 was not wholly uplifting. If privation taught them endurance, it Colonial Office series 5, vol. 111, Carleton to Fox, 5 Sept. 1783. u Report of Canadian Αrchlves for 1921, Appendix E, p. 6, Copy of Ρarr's letter to Shelburne, 1 May 1784. 47 Colonial Office series 217, vol. 60, Parr to Nepcan, 13 July 1788. (Public Record 015cc, London.) n Pan to Nepcan, 13 July 1788.

58 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

did not make them less prone to recoup their losses when the opportunity otiered. It is quite clear that as they had thought the world well lost for loyalism, so they had no objection to regaining it by the same means. Parr said, "The Loyalists in general rate their pretensions much above their intrinsic value."** and the demands made by one band of loyalist associates, to cite one of many examples, substantiates his remark. After instructing their agents to obtain promises of extensive land grants on the most privileged terms, of supplies of all kinds and even of workmen to help them with their settling, they required "That assurance be given by Government that their settling at this Place shall no ways injure the claims and demands for former losses and sufferings - or be estimated as a compensation thereof."fδ Some of the most prominent" had as many as four grants of land. They expected to be given jobs, even at the expense of the pre-loyalist office holders, and deluged the governor and the secretaries of state with their applications and demands.47 It would have been impossible, under the circumstances, for anyone to satisfy even the reasonable demands of such a large number of people. When we remember that until the division of the province, which became effective in the autumn of 1784 eighteen months after the first spring fleet arrived, Parr had over 30,000 persons to settle, that the quickest means of communication was by sailing vessel, and that he had been in the province only since October 1782 himself, his task appears gargantuan. One begins to understand how importunate and selfish the loyalists seemed to the harassed man, but one also finds excuse for their importunity. The only means of action for the loyalist who was not receiving his due, and was cut off from the seat of ,government by forest or water, was in persistent application and renewed protest.48The loyalists had been led to expect much from the British government. They conceived themselves to be settling as a privileged people in Nova Scotia, where they would "Parr to Sbelbume, 13 Aug. 1784. (Canadian Archives Report 1921, p. 6). ø Phillipps manuscript, no. 22186, p. 39, Letter of Instruction to Agents. 21 Dec. 1782. b E.g., Isaac Wilkins, the Bartons, the Hílis, see Index of Land Papers, P.A.N.S. 'T Parr wrote to Nepean in 1788 (see Colonial ptfice series 217, vol. 60) : "It is not an easy matter to manage an expecting Loyalist; their present want is every otfice in this government." And the miscellaneous papers in this series for the years 1782-1790 include an enormous number of petitions to the Secretary of State asking for petitions and favours. 18 In the Surveyor-General's letter book, pp. 27, 41 (νο1. 394 In the Public Archives of Nova Scotia) are typical protests and complaints.

LOYALIST ATTITUDES — 59

establish forever the principles for which they had suffered persecution and exile. When they found they could not even obtain the titles to the land on which they were settled, discontent was rife. The current feeling was evinced in many ways; quarrels over proportions of land and provisions, and complaints against Parr and the executive officials were the order of the day. The loyalists on the Saint John River even petitioned to have the continental part of the province separated from the seat of government's After the imperial government had decided to make this change, Pam's burden was lightened. He was thereafter better able to satisfy the demands of the loyalists settled in the peninsula, and the storm subsided. But not before there had been a general stirring up of the province, which had repercussions in the sessions of the legislature which followed the elections of 1785.50 That the discontent was encouraged to exceed its normal proportions by a relatively small number of agitators is clear, and again what one would expect. It is largely to a minority, ambitious for power and place and heedless of the rights of others, that the bad opinion of the loyalists expressed by Parr and others was due. On the whole, as the governor himself said, they were not preeminently bad51 — nor were they pre-eminently good — they were just human. To these attitudes, the response of the people who were already settled in Nova Scotia when the loyalists arrived was varied. At first they were indifferent; the official circle, with the notable exception of the attorney-general,52 friendly and helpful,ó3 But as distinctions and privileges came the way of the newcomers, indifference gave place to uneasiness, which, when it became clear that the loyalists looked on Nova Scotia as their special preserve, turned into alarm. Loyalist exclusiveness evoked pre-loyalist resentment. A paragraph from the letter of an old inhabitant who had suffered in the war is significant: Instead of our being stripped of our Rights to make amends for φΡ

For the connection between the loyalist petitions and government policy in dividing the province, see Miss Gilroy's article The Partition of Nova Scotia in the Canadian Historical Review for December, 1933. w I hope to discuss these In a later paper. Canadian Archives Report for 1921, Appendix E, p. 6, Parr to Shelburne, 1 May 1784, and again p. 8, same to same, 13 Aug. 1784. m Richard Gibbons, who refused to place his fiat on the loyalists' grants for half the usual fee, when he was ordered to do so, and was in 1784 removed to Cape Breton Island as chief justice. ss As shown in the activities of the Surveyor-General, see his letter-book, voL 394, pp. 39, 43, 46, 102 (Public Archives of Nova Scotia).

60 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

losses of the Loyalists who was plundered in New York or elsewhere, we have at least as weighty reasons as they possibly can offer to claim restitution from Gov't for the value of all the property taken from us, our distresses from Imprisonment, etc. They had a numerous British army to protect them, we had to combat the sons of darkness alone; Ιnn a word we had much less than they to hope for by unshaken Ioyalty, and incomparably more to fear.* The loyalists learned that, while it had advantages, being in a favoured class was not unalloyed joy. Thenceforth, whenever loyalist dislike or suspicion showed itself against the old inhabitants, it was heartily reciprocated. Both old and new were ready to find fault with each other. The phase of settling was passing into that of assimilation, and these were the growing pains of the new society.

1 vol. 1 of the New Brunswick Historical Society publications, p. 185, letter from Simonds to Hazen and White, 28 Feb. 1784.

Governor Wentworth's Patronage MARGARET ELLS

Patronage is defined as "the control of appointments to offices, privileges, etc., in the public service." To-day, the use 0f patronage to the party in power in a democracy is too well known to warrant any comment here; in the eighteenth century, patronage was a recognized function of parliamentary government. It was not less recognized, although its practice was different, in governing the colonies. The cabinet ministers íq England were responsible to the Commons, and each dispensed the patronage of the department of which he was the head. Their colonial counterparts, the executive councillors, were theoretically responsible to the crown which appointed them. Actually they were removable by one of the secretaries of state. Patronage in the colonies was therefore divided between this secretary of state and the King's representative, the governor or lieutenant-governor. Being on the spot, the gοvemor had obvious advantages over the British secretary of state for the home department. The purpose of this study is to examine the governorship of John Wentworth, lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia between 1792 and 1808, to find out how he dispensed patronage. In an examination of this kind certain questions naturally spring to the mind: for example, can his use of patronage be shown to have followed any principle? did it form a policy? how far was it dictated by the secretary of state? and did he seek to extend his powers, and if so, to what purpose? In order to answer these and other related questions it will be necessary first to discuss the extent of the powers of patronage of the lieutenantgovernors of Nova Scotia, secondly to analyse Wentworth's appointments, recommendations and awards, to discover principles of policy, and finally to compare his proposals with the home government's disposals, to find out how far and to what purpose he sought to extend his powers of patronage. Source: Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, XXV (1942), 49.73. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. This paper was originally read before the Nova Scotia Historical Society, January 6, 1939.

62 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON ΤΗΣ ATLANTIC PROVINCES

The patronage of the lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia lay in his powers to appoint to certain offices, tó recommend who should be appointed tο other offices, and to award or influence the awarding of contracts in the public service. Appointments filled directly by the governor included such salaried positions as revenue collectors and seizing officers, sheriffs, port wardens, keepers of lighthouses and certain commissioners and clerks, of which there were a good many. A larger class of officials, who were paid on presenting their accounts of services performed, consisted of road commissioners, health οtńcers, coroners, justices of Inferior, Dyer and terminer, and nisi prfus courts, and special commissioners of various kinds. Still larger was the body of unpaid omcials whom the lieutenant-governor appointed. Justices of the peace, and militia officers for every district, town and village, trustees of schools, commissioners of intestate estates, and such township officers as commissioners of dykes or sewers whom the grand juries occasionally neglected or declined to appoint, came into this category. The foregoing omcials were appointed by the lieutenantgovernor, usually with the advice of his council, but without reference to the British government. The more lucrative and influential of provincial offices were within the gift of the home government, and to these the governor could recommend knowing that his nominations would at least be considered. To make sure of the executive and legislative council's being filled, the governor was expected to submit nominations to the imperial authorities whenever a vacancy occurred. On one occasion, when seven out of the twelve seats were vacated by absence or death, Wentworth appointed three councillors from among those whom he had recommended, and the appointments were sustained by the home government.1 His power of appointing to office was obviously a matter of concern to any governor who took his job seriously, for upon it might depend the whole success of his administration. His connections with the home government and in the province made it possible for the governor to dispense patronage of a less obvious kind, in influencing the awarding of contracts, such as those for supplying the admiralty with masts and the army and navy with food and stores. If he were unscrupulous, he might use this connection to further his own ends; or, if he were easy-going, the C.D. 217/75, p. 33, Wentworth to Portland, 20 June I801, following recommendation of 25 Dec. 1800 (C.O. 217/37, to King) on the death of Bulkelev and again on 30 May, 1801 (C.D. 217/75, p. 25 tο Portland).

1 P.R.D.,

GOVERNOR WENTWORTH'S PATRONAGE — 63

interests of his friends. Between 1792 and 1795 Wentworth waxed very enthusiastic about the new flour mill which he had encouraged Hartshorne and Tremaine to buíld,z and suggested that the army contract for flour be placed with them. This was done in 1798, but the contract was not renewed, and one is left to speculate whether the governor's devotion to the interests of government or of his friends Hartshome and Tremaine was uppermost when he urged the advantages of giving them the contract. The extent to which Wentworth used this sort of influence in the many petty contracts and jobs which came to his notice cannot be ascertained; it may be estimated from his general policy. Besides the types 0f patronage already discussed, the governor had the issuing of certain warrants, licences and orders, which, though largely matters of routine, might become a means of exerting influence. In these were included warrants erecting special courts, writs for electing members to the House, and licences for teaching school, solemnizing marriages, and occupying land. Letters of induction for establishing rectors in their benefices, leaves of absence, passports, Mediterranean passes were issued by the governor; in time of war they were augmented by letters of marque and reprisal, orders of pardon and execution, and orders for impressing seamen. Before analysing Governor Wentworth's appointments, it is important to notice that, when he took office in Nova Scotia in 1792 at the age of fifty-five, he was ignorant neither of the pitfalls of colonial government nor of conditions and problems in the province. The home government, in appointing Wentworth to succeed Parr, selected a man very specially prepared for the job of governor of Nova Scotia. Eight years of dimcult administration as the last royal governor of New Hampshire, preceded by two years as agent for the province in London, had given him experience in the technique of governance and familiarity in imperial government circles. Eight active years in Nova Scotia as surveyor-general of the king's woods gave him opportunities to discover the conditions peculiar to the province, as to personalities and influences as well as generally, and to decide who should be his friends and the friends of government. In view of this background, Wentworth's use of patronage is more than usually significant. It should not only throw light on Wentworth's character, and on the undercurrents of his administration, but should contribute to several larger questions as to the political !P.A.N.S., vol. 50, Wciitworth to Dundas, 25 Oct. 1792 and P.A.C. 1894 Report, pp. 481, 497, 498, 501.

64 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

and social effects, on governor and governed, of revolution and the practice of loyalism. One of Wentworth's Iessons emerges very clearly from his correspondence: even a superficial scanning of his letters to the. home government reveals that the governor had a strong sense of the value of patronage and a proportionately keen desire to use all the powers he could claim. Two of Wentworth's earliest letters to the home department were concerned with the filling of offices which were not yet vacant: one was a nomination to replace the barrack-master whose death seemed imminent,3 the other to replace the Naval Officer, who was twenty-eight years old "on his demise or other avoidance."4 A year before Henry Newton's death Wentworth was ready to fill his not yet vacant chairs of collector of customs for Halifax and receiver of dues for Greenwich Hospital with his friend George Thesiger;s in 1801 he heard rumours of a change in the vice-admiralty court and lost no time in suggesting that his son, whom he had previously nominated to assist Thesiger at the Customs, be made regístrar;e when he recommended that Pictou be made a port of entry in 1802, he was ready with a nominee for customs collector.7 Weutworth's willingness to make nominations to offices, vacant or otherwise, was matched by his desire to be consulted whenever changes were imminent. On the death of Chief Justice Smith of Quebec in 1793, it was rumoured that T. A. Strange, head of the Nova Scotia bench, might succeed him, but nothing came of it. Early in 1795 reports that there might be a new chief justice in Nova Scotia reached Wentworth's ears. On the first occasion the governor deprecated the rumour, but recommended that, if it should be true, Attorney-General Blowers be appointed in Strange's place.$ When the rumour revived, so did the governor's interest. He wrote:9 Ι named a person to you some time since, but Ι would wish if his friends should apply, that it should be understood that Ι have a good opinion of him, but that some reference to me on the s C.O. 217/63, p. 300, to King, undated but previous to 27 June 1792. 4 'bid., p. 299, to same, undated but previous to 27 June, 1792. (See P.A.C. Report, 1894, p. 477, Wentworth to King, 27 June 1792 referring to p. 299.) 'CI. 217/37, Wentworth to King, 25 Dec. 1800. When Newton died in Jan., 1802, the home govt. ignored Wentworth's nominations. ' CI. 217/37, to King, 8 July 1801. *C.O. 217/76, p. 473, to Hobart, 10 Sept. 1802. ° C.O. 217/36, to King, 25 Jan. 1794. oIbid., 23 Jan. 1795.

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subject, is thought advisable, whoever may succeed. By this means Ι shall be supported in the business of Government and best carry their views into effect. Later in the same despatch Wentworth stated that it would be "expedient ... to refer. . . for information" to him, on "interest" being made for the promotion of R. J. Uniacke, another of the law officers. Following the above confidential comments, the governor made specific recommendations in favour of Sterns against Uniacke to the under-secretary, when the chief justice resigned in 1797. These were communicated to the secretary of state, who replied directly to the governor; he approved of appointing Blowers, but for several reasons rejected Wentworth's strong recommendation to promote Sterns to the attorneygeneralship at the expense of Uniacke. Wentworth could only accept the reversal and write the secretary of state "recommending" formally that Blowers, Uniacke and Sterns be appointed to the offices respectively of chief justice, attorney-general and solicitor-general, as determined by that secretary. The latter then officially announced the king's approval of the "Governor's" appointments. By these devious ways the home government at once carried out its own views and contrived that Wentworth should appear to "be supported in the business of govt." The eagerness of Wentworth to use to the full his powers of patronage can be proved as many times as need be by reference to his correspondence, which is full of instances like the above; they throw light only on how the governor dispensed or wished to dispense the most important and lucrative provincial offices. To discover his general policy as regards patronage one must use sources outside his letters and methods different to those hitherto applied: the sources are those which record the actual issuing of the instruments of patronage, chiefly commissions, orders, and warrants, but also mandates, licences, and letters of execution for various purposes: the method is by analysis. To analyse anything, one must have a standard, a rule; given a rule of distinction between the elements which compose an appointment, one can determine the factors which operated to effect it. One must ask: what possible distinctions between Nova Scotians might be made by a man like Wentworth? Apart from usual supporters, such as relatives and friends, Wentworth had a common bond with half the population of Nova Scotia. He was a loyalist; so were they. Like his countrymen, the governor had eschewed revolution; like them, he had suffered indignities to his

Ø — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

person, cοnfiscatίοn of property, and finally exile. If they had cause to hate the revolution and distrust the rebels, how much more had the last royal governor of New Hampshire. It would be strange if the political bond of seventeen years of loyalism should prove not to have affected his patronage. With regard to the number of loyalist appointees, the evidence appears to establish Wentworth's impartiality. During his governorship, many more appointments were made to pre-loyalists than to loyalists.10 Out of 1336 appointees, 816 were preloyalists, while 520 were loyalists. Allowing for the fact that many minor offices in the revenue department, the courts of common pleas, and within township government had long been held by pre-loyalists, the disproportion of 61 to 39 per cent is perhaps not surprising. But further analyses show that it was often to unpaid jobs that these pre-loyalists were appointed. Sixty per cent of the commissioners of intestate estates, whose remuneration was negligible and influence nil, were pre-loyalists; seventy-two per cent of road commissioners, where the compensation and influence were slight, were placed in the same class. Revenue collectors, on the other hand, who had regular means of compensation in fees, were more than half loyalists. Out of 302 other jobs, including coroners, notaries, school trustees, registers and commissioners of various kinds, 141 were paid, of which sixty-three per cent went to loyalists, while pre-loyalists got sixty per cent of the 111 which were unpaid. From these figures it appears that Wentworth had the interests of his fellowloyalists very much at heart. A further analysis of appointments reveals that loyalism, while undoubtedly a factor influencing the governor, was occasionally rivalled by claims of friendship and relationship. Wentworth's twelve nominees to the six best jobs, that is, offices combining the best remuneration and most prestige, within his gift,11 were all loyalists but three, Monk, Morris, and Beckwith; Monk was a relative, Morris' appointment was in the regular ΙΟ

Wentworth's appointees were classified as loyalists or pre-loyalists, by using the list of grantees of land during the period of loyalist settlement, county histories, genealogies, biographies, works on the loyalists, memoirs, monographs. Appointees whose origins remained doubtful after these sources bad been consulted were cut out of the lists. n These were 4 provincial treasurers, 2 puísne justices, 2 solicitors-general, a provincial secretary, a surveyor-general of lands, and 2 naval offIcers, to whom he nominated respectively by Francis Green, George Thesiger, Bearing Wentworth, and Michael Wallace, G. H. Monk and Brenton Halliburton, Jonathan Sterns and James Stewart, Bening Wentworth, Charles Morris, Jas. Putnam and Jolm Beckwith.

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line of promotion, and Beckwith was, so far as can be determined, an Englishman very friendly to Wentworth; BeØíng Wentworth, who held two of the offices and several less important ones, was the governor's brother-in-law. These appointees were all friends of the governor. Seven of them12 Wentworth nominated to offices other than these under consideration. The governor's eleven council appointments show the same trend: seven of them were loyalists,13 two of them being his brother-inlaw and his son, one was a Scottish merchant of prοminence,14 and the other three were pre-loyalist merchants of Halifax.15 It has been shown that Wentworth was not without friends and supporters in non-loyalist circles. He considered Freke Bulkeley, son of Richard who had been provincial secretary since 1751, as a dear friend. Early in his administration, he looked with favour upon another influential pre-loyalist, John Butler Butler, and recommended him for a seat in council. Butter received his mandamus, but removed out of the province before he had been sworn into the council. He returned two years later with the appointment of deputy commissary-general to the troops, but when he applied for his seat, Wentworth told him it was occupied and refused to recommend him for another mandamus. Butler applied for one himself, and when the home government asked Wentworth whether a new one was necessary, the governor evaded the question but protested against Butler's application on the grounds that his position gave the commanding officer of the troops the control of Butler's being present in the council. This argument, which applied equally to Alexander Brymer, who attended council very regularly in spite of being deputy paymaster-general and therefore subject to the commanding officer's control," the Home government disregarded, and in 1801 issued the mandamus. Butler did not present it for two years; when he did, the governor played for time by raising a technicality as to its wording, and went on protesting against ' Thesiger, Monk, Wentworth, Stems, Wallace, Stewart, and Beckwith. Τhey were; Denning Wentworth, Chas. Mary WenIworth, Stephen Delancey, James Brenton (technically not a loyalist, since be came to N.S. before 1776, but one of a famous Rhode island loyalist family who lost everything In the Revolution, and therefore counted as a loyalist), t.awrence Hartshorne, Michael Wallace, and E. B. Brenton. " William Forsyth. m John Butler, Andrew Belcher and Chas. Hill. 1 J'.A.N.S., vol. 50, 22 Aug. 1793, Wentworth to Brymer, addressing him as paymaster-general. See legislative Council Journals 1792-1800, for his attendance in Council.

1

68 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

the appointment, until the home government peremptorily ordered him to swear Butler into the council.17 Factors other than the commanding officer's control of the attendance of a councillor appear to have affected the change in the governor's attitude towards Butler. In the first place, Butler's policy in contracting for flour shattered Wentworth's plans for filling those contracts at Hartshorne and Tremaine's mill in Dartmouth. The governor's seven-year campaign in favour of the local mill, came to naught when Butler "artfully deceived" the commanding officer, the Duke of Kent, "into other measures."18 Wentworth's disappointment and annoyance with Butler over the flour contract might have subsided before 1803, had another consideration not emerged. Being dated 1801, Butler's new mandamus would give him precedence over four councillors whom Wentworth had appointed in 1801 and 1802;19 one of the four was the governor's son and another was his friend Hartshorne. When Butler was finally admitted in 1804, young Wentworth and Hartshorne resigned, rather than yield precedence to him. The governor's trial of strength against Butler reveals an extraordinary tenacity, and a disregard of the home government's intentions, in trying to gain his point, which, while typical of his methods, were but the palest reflection of what the governor could do, when roused. Although he upset some plans of Wentworth and his friends, Butler never attained the status of an enemy,20 for the stigma of disloyalty was never attached to him, as it invariably was to those whom Wentworth considered his enemies and/or the "enemies of govt." — synonymous terms to the governor. When he attempted to override R. J. Uniacke's claims of promotion to the attorney-generalship, Wentworth did not hesitate to impugn Uniacke's loyalty. The governor did not suggest preferring the loyalist Sterns to Uniacke until he had thoroughly prepared the ground by confidential cautions as to Uniacke's rectitude. "I fear our Solicitor-Genii is not perfectly right" ... if I find him, him, certainly, unworthy, he must be superseded,"21 he wrote in 1793. Two years later his suspicions v p,A.N.S., νο1. 60, doc. 43, 7 April 1804, secretary of state wrote Wentworth pointing out that the expression "sovereign council,' though incorrect should not have prevented his being admitted. 1 P.R.O., C.Ο. 217/31, wentwonh to King, 6 Aug. 1800. "Wentworth pointed this out to Hobart, sec'y of state, 10 Oct. 1803, C.O. 217/78, p. 177. f4 He was considered a friend of Wentworth's by under-sec's King, see C.O. 217/70, p. 220, Feb. 1799, King's memorandum re the Maroon. a~ C.O. 217/36 to under-see'y King, 7 Dec. 1793.

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had expanded into vague charges of sedition: "Ι is conduct is dark and insidious, secretly connected with seditious purposes and giving advice against the service ..."22 When Wentworth wished to displace Butler and Uniacke he proceeded like the termite, which bores from within: maintaining an appearance of friendliness with the two men, the governor undermined their positions in his confidential correspondence. Wentworth had many successes in his recommendations to government and, despite his failure in the two instances just cited, he in no way relinquished his faith in the termite method of attack. It was a method peculiarly adapted to the ways of eighteenth century patronage and to the tradition of royal governorship into which Wentworth fitted. His unfortunate experiences after 1774 taught him to look for disloyalty in the most unlikely places, and to seek to uproot it; thus he was prone to suspect all who deviated, or appeared likely to deviate, from the path of conduct which his own logalism dictated. Suspecting, both his reason and inclination prompted him to convey his fears to his superiors, which he did in the way best calculated to warn them and protect himself if his fears should prove groundless. It is probable that Uniacke's activity as a "Cumberland rebel" in the Eddy rising of 1776,29 his record as a leader of reform in the sixth assembly,' and his reputation for liberalism25 then and in the 'nineties smacked of disloyalty to Wentworth's sensitive ear. When this conviction coincided with his desire to advance his friend Sterns, of whose sound political views there could be no doubt, the combination was irresistible: the governor became the termite. The ethical propriety of undermining public officers through the confidential channels which the governorship offered seems never to have become an issue with Wentworth. The dangers of disloyalty were so real to him that he continued to suspect everyone until his political views were proven. From this reasoning, I believe, sprang the policy which a study of his appointments and nominations shows, of surrounding himself with friends, and filling the more important offices in the province with loyalists wherever he had no friends. Nowadays patronage and politics are so closely associated as to be almost inseparable. This condition obviously could not Ibid., 23 Jan. 1795. *s Brebner, The Neutral Yankees af Nova Scotia, p. 283.

"Ella, Loyalist Sparks of Liberty, Dal. Review, Jan. 1937. ø Chief Justice Strange was against promoting Uniacke, preferring a loyalist.

70 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

obtain under the eighteenth century form of non-party cοΙοnίal government. Yet certain political ends could then be served by patronage. Sir Alexander Croke, the Nova Scotia administrator in 1809, declared that "the Government of the Province has always a considerable power over them (the members) from its means of bestowing little favours and advantages upon the members and theix friends,"26 and later he stated that commissioners and others employed in building roads were always selected from among the members and their friends 2T Although there is no means of ascertaining who the members' friends were, the records show that Croke was wrong at least with regard to road commissioners: in the nine years which followed the first urge grant for roads in 1799, four hundred and twentytwo commissions were issued, of which only thirty-one went to members of the House.28 Four of the eleven health officers of 1799 were appointed from the membership of the House, but otherwise Wentworth's appointments do not bear out Croke's statements. They show that the governor did not use patronage directly to gain supporters in the House. He had supporters there: Thomas Barclay, elected Speaker in 1793, was a close friend; two other intimates Michael Wallace and Lawrence Hartshorne, were in the House until, shortly after the turn of the century, Wentworth followed up previous favours by seating them in council. In 1802, when rumour whispered that he might be removed from the governorship, Wentworth had enough friends in the House to carry an address to the king asking that he be retaíned.29 Whether the governor refrained intentionally from using patronage as a political tool in the House is not indicated by his correspondence or appointments. While Barclay was Speaker, Wentworth was sure of a sympathetic House, and after 1798 he may have depended upon a few members to gain that end. As time went by Wentworth's dependence was placed more and more on the council, rather than the House. This confidence in his council grew in proportion as the governor's own appointees took the places of the older members. The result of Wentworth's policy of appointing friends to the highest offices was that by 1803 he had a council of supporters. A number of resignations and deaths in 1801 and 1802 cleared the way for the fulfilment • Ρ.AN S., νοΙ. 58, doc. 60, to sec'y of state, 23 Dec. 1808 (copy). "Ibid., doc. 66, to same, 11 Feb. 1809. s Council Mlnmles, vo1. 214 and Commission Books, vol. 171, 172. ▪ Αssembly Journal, 1802, Ρ. 39, address proposed by Minis; Ρ. 42 text.

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of Wentworth's recommendations.$° Two of the ten councillors who composed that board in 1803 had been appointed before Wentworth's regime, and one was the judge of the vice-admiralty court, Croke; the other seven, including Wentworth's brotherin-law and his son, were the governor's appointees, and had received other favours from him than their appointments to council. Croke was by nature reactionary, and mowers and Halliburton, the two who preceded Wentworth at the board, were closely associated with the governor. There was not one of the ten who would be likely to disagree with Wentworth on any important matter.si The governor supported and was supported by his council. When he took a strong stand against the Assembly in 1802, the council said "aye;" when he went further in 1804, and still further in 1806, they upheld him. They thus became a potent political factor. Since they likely influenced the governor quite as much as he used them, it is more accurate to say that governor and council formed a party of reaction than that either used the other as a political tool. Between 1800 and 1808, they became increasingly aggressive ín asserting the prerogative rights of the governor against practices and claims of the House. A constitutional struggle typical of colonial legislatures ensued, which culminated in an attack on the right of the House to determine contested elections. When the English crown lawyers gave their unqualified opinion in favour of the House,82 the viçtory of the "democratic" elements in the legislature was as complete as the humiliation of the governor and council. It has been shown that the unity of the council was the effect of the governor's character as an ultra-loyalist rather than his prowess as a politician. Wentworth had not used patronage directly, that is, to gain a political party in the House, but through patronage he reshaped the council which, as soon as it took and maintained a constitutional position against the House, became a homogeneous political body. Thus the impact of Wentworth's patronage on politics, though real, was indirect. Wentworth's political stand against the House after 1800 is the more surprising in view of his early lack of constitutional conscience.' In the 'nineties when the House, haying established its exclusive right to initiate and amend money bills, was gloryDsymcr went to England to live, Duncan and Delancey resigned in 1801; Morris, Newton, Cochran and Deschamps died in 1802. a Τbe ten were Chief Justice Blowers, Judge Croke, Dr. Haliiburton, Judge Brenton, Prov. Sec'y Wentworth, Tress. Wallace, Chas. Mary Wentworth, Andrew Belcher. Wm. Forsylh, and Lawrence Hartshorne. *ΙΙ Ρ.R.Ο., C.O. 217/81, p. 671, Crown lawyers to Castlereagh, 7 July 1807.

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ling in its success, the governor expressed neither alarm nor disapproval. With carefree abandon he encouraged the forming of a revenue bill which was quite at variance with the royal instructuns.53 The explanation of the emergence of a keen constitutional sense in Wentworth lies in the fact that the struggle between the governor (backed by the council) and the House was part of another contest, more important to Wentworth, with Cottnam Tinge. The Wentworth-Tinge feud had its official beginnings in Wentworth's attempt to prevent Tinge from succeeding to the Naval Office, and went on for fifteen years. That it took a constitirtional turn was due, I believe, partly to the growing unity of Wentworth's and the council's interests, and partly to the influence of one of the councillors, Sir Alexander Croke. Croke came to the province from England as judge of the vice-admiralty Court, and was sworn in as senior member of council in 1802. Previous to arriving in the province Croke tried to secure precedence over all but the governor at the council board.94 When he and the chief justice and the bishop drew up statutes of regulation for King's College, he swept aside the more liberal but far from radical ideas of the other two members and secured the board of governors' consent to rules so restrictive that the bishop and home government rejected them.85 Croke was nit only an arch-conservative, but so great was his keenness on constitutional questions, that when he was administering the government of Nova Scotia in 1808-9, he actually vetoed an appropriation bill, and thereby exerted a prerogative unpractised in British constitutional history.98 Croke quarrelled with everyone, but he held an influential position and his judgement was respected. His influence on the rest of the council and on Wentworth must inevitably have been on the side of the prerogative as against the "popular" branch of the Assembly. Although Croke's constitutional niceties may sometimes have been lost on the governor, it behooved him to listen to anyone so zealous for the prerogative as Croke. Through his own zeal to add to the powers of the governorship, Wentworth had recently sa Ρ.A.N.S., MS. Acts 1792, e. 13, of which the deputy provincial secretary later said "I am at a Ioss to know how the then Lieutenant-governor conceived himself justified in giving his assent to the Act notwilhstanding the inhibition contained in the Royal Instructions." Sec Kils, R study of early provincial taxation, P.A.N.S. Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 2, ρ_ 4, 5. w Ρ R.Ο., G.O. 217/37, Croke to King, 18 July 1801. ' Ηishορ Inglis' Letters. Transcripts in Ρ.A.NS., vol. 4, p. 111. as See Adams Archibald's comments in his study of Croke,1.S.HS., VoL II, p. 121.

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been inveigled into a clash with the church. A dispute arose over the issuing of marriage licences which brought out clearly both the governor's disposition to extend his powers of patronage and his susceptibility to the influence of his associates. In 1800 Wentworth took advantage of a quarrel between the rector and another clergyman in St. Paul's parish, to claim a power, hitherto exercised by the rector, of addressing •marriage licences to ministers other than the rector, vicar or curate. He went further and proposed to issue licences to ministers of all denominations. The home government promptly denied Wentworth's claims and ordered him to return to the former procedure.87 It is clear from the bishop's correspondence that, although it related specifically to conditions in only one parish, the secretary of state's order was intended to apply generally and to correct the governor's attempt to depart from precedent.38 The governor's action in issuing licences sprang from an abuse, that of the rector's assigning licences to clergymen outside the church; but the home government considered Wentworth's cure worse than the disease. When he addressed a licence to Mr. Wright, minister of the German church in St. Paul's parish, the governor invaded the rector's monopoly of receiving licences (and distributing them) in his own parish. The implication, that the governor could issue marriage licences indiscriminately, menaced the exclusive privilege of the church to marry by licence instead of banns. Bishop Inglis protested against "the innovation" by letter,38 and in person through several interviews, out of which emerges the train of events which led to Wentworth's radical stand. The bishop reported to the Archbishop of Canterbury: It has been suggested to the Governor "that he as supreme ordinary had a right to give out marriage licences in any manner he chose." When this was mentioned to me, I very bluntly replied that it was supreme nonsense to talk so; that the English law, Ecclesiastical or civil knew nothing of a supreme ordinary.... I beg leave to observe that I had a delicate part to act to support the right of our clergy on the one hand, and yet avoid a rupture with Sir John on the other, which last would be very unpleasant and of bad consequence. I was fortunate enough to succeed ... After much conversation on the subject, when the Chief Justice and Secretary were present, Sir John P ASS., vol. 60, doe. 4, Portland to WenØOrth, 23 May 1800. Inglis' Letters, vol. 4, p. 53, to Archbishop of Canterbury, 25 July 1800. s inglt.? Letters, vol. 4, to Wentworth, 14 App. 1800.

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Wentworth said "that the marriage licences for the present should continue as formerly, and be exclusively directed to Clergymen of the Church of England; that he was doubtful whether he had a right to alter the form of them, and he would write to the King's Minister on the subject and follow his directiσn" 140 Although the governor agreed to discontinue exercising his newly assumed "right" until he had confirmation from England, his conduct does not make him appear the devout churchman. Yet Wentworth had shown real devotion to the church during his administration in New Hampshire,41 and his correspondence in Nova Scotia impels the conclusion that he was sincerely and actively anxious to further church interests. When the suggestion was made that he as "supreme ordinary" could alter the issuing of licences, it seems probable that the effect of the innovation on the church was not made clear, for Inglis reported that, when he "repeatedly asked what benefit or good purpose could be expected or obtained by a measure confessedly new, and attended with certain bad consequences ... no satisfactory answer was given, and it was only alleged that Dr. Breynton and Mr. Stanser had frequently assigned over to Dissenting Ministers ... and it would be hard to preclude the Governor from a liberty assured by the Clergy; if they had a right to do so, he must have an equal right."42 This interpretation of the matter, as an Opportunity to sustain a privilege of the governorship, was not without motive, as the bishop shows: . . it is but justice to say," he wrote, "that Sir John is a worthy good tempered man. The misfortune is that he has not firmness to resist improper applications, and the Secretary of the Province who is his kinsman, thinking that more would be made by the Licence in the new mode, and to whom the perquisite belongs was the mover and promoter of the innovation. "43 The governor's part in the marriage licence affair was, by the bishop's evidence, that of a tool in the hands of his brother-inlaw. For his own mercenary purposes, Benning Wentworth was able to induce the governor to forget, or to see in a different light, his duty to the church whose authority he had always been eager to establish and extend. This was by appealing to Went" Ingtts' Letters, vol. 4, p. 53, 2.5 July 1800. a Mayo, L. S., John Wentworth, chap.II, The Church and College. ' Inee Letters, vol. 4, pp. 53, 54. " Ibid., p. 53.

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worth's pride in the governorship. I submit that it was the governor's susceptibilities in this respect that led him into the orbit of Croke's highly reactionary influence, and thence into the constitutional battle of the last six years of his administration. The true nature of Wentworth's final attempt to extend his patronage was disguised by the complications that attended and the implications that followed it. 1n the years between 1802 and 1807 the struggle, which involved home government, council, House and even certain county officials, assumed many aspects to many people, but to Wentworth it was simplicity itself. By his own confession, all considerations, constitutional, social, economic, and personal, were subordinate to one, and all objectives were united in one: the removal from public office in the province 0f William Cottnam Tinge. Wentworth's relations with Tinge previous to 1792 are not clear, but their official connections had a bad beginning. Following expressions of discontent in the province, the House of Assembly in 1790 conducted an investigation of the function and personnel of the Naval Office. The governor took steps to remedy the local causes for discontent by requiring the naval officer to stop taking fees from coasting vessels and to withdraw his deputies from all ports except Shelburne, where a naval officer was made necessary by there being a customs establishment, and promised to represent the Assembly's views to the home government. When the naval officer died early in 1792, Wentworth, who was then in London and about to receive his commission as governor, proposed, as reported by Lawrence, a special agent of the House, "to settle the disputes of the Naval Office to the satisfaction of the Province."** Wentworth's remedy was to appoint James Putnam, a loyalist friend, to the office. Meanwhile the administrator of Nova Scotia had appointed Cοttnam Tinge, who had long been his father's deputy, and, although he refused to swear him into office until Tinge presented his mandamus from the king 46 Wentworth was unable to obtain 'the naval officer's dismissal. In 1792 Tinge was elected to the Assembly, in whose business he immediately took a very active part. For nearly six years there is no official indication of any quarrel between the governor and the naval officer; then, on the heels of veiled charges of "an insidious attempt to create a disaffection among the people P.A.N.S., vol. 302, doc. 46, Lawrence to Speaker of N.S. House, 4 May 1792. N.S_Η.S., vol. 20, Archibald's Memoir of Wentworth, p. 73, says Wentworth received a peremptory order from the Brit. Govt. to swear him in.

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... by an officer of Government handsomely provided for,"" Wentworth in 1798 represented Tinge as making "revοlutiοnα ry schemes by endeavours to introduce bad ideas into the militia" and of being "always ... improperly engaged," causing "delays and hesitations" in the Assembly.47 These accusations were made, in true Wentworthian style, in confidential letters to the under-secretary of the home department. They were shortly followed by others of the same tenor and increasing virulence. According to the governor, Tinge "schemed" to make money out of the Maroons'$ provoked the House and council to dissension on points of privilege, tried to embarrass the public business, thereby earning the name of "United Nova Scotian" at a time when United Irishmen were disturbing the British government,'" and "agitated" elections "with improper zeal and animosity."δ0 "This man," wrote Wentworth, "has some specious talents, vain — ambitious to lead a party, pursuing turbulence, and subversive of whatever is in use, in private or in public life, -- he is exactly the miniature of the Abbe Sioyes in France — does not deserve the goad will of the King's Government nor to be rewarded with a comfortable office."61 The feud with Tonge became an obsession with Wentworth. In ten years he wrote no less than nineteen letters to the home department alone in which he denounced Tinge or his "party." To justify or disprove every one of the various violent charges which Wentworth made against Tinge would be impossible: one cannot judge a case without hearing both sides, and the direct evidence here is all from the governor. Even if it were not impossible, it would be foolish, for, whatever form they took, they were essentially all the same — attacks on Tinge's loyalty. Their very violence which increased to an incredible degree before the denοuément in 1807 weakened Wentworth's case; no such monster of iniquity as he depicted could have carried on his "machinations" in the Assembly, the Naval Office, and the province at large, undenounced except by the governor. Wentworth was continually contradicting himself, and making prophecies of Tinge's downfall which never came true. The facts revealed by the journals of the House are the antithesis of 217/37, to UnderØ'y King, 19 Nov. 1797. p. 32, to King, 10 March 1798. ' The Maroons were sent to N.S. from Jamaíεa and were under Wentworth'g care, see C.Ο. 217η0, ρ. 60. Went. to King. ω C.O. 217/70. p. Υ42, to King, 18 Aug. 1799. αο C.O. 217/73, p. 4, 27 10ν, 1799. σι C.O. 217/70, p. 142, to Kfn6. 18 Aug. 1799. µ C.O.

' Τ C.Ο. 217/69,

GOVERNOR WENTWORTH'S PATRONAGE -- 77

Wentworth's. From the time Tinge took his seat in 1792 until he resigned it in 1808, his record gives no hint of disloyalty. He was most active in a House which was more than one-third loyalist, led by a loyalist speaker;52 he was elected Speaker of two succeeding Houses; he headed the Halifax county poll over all candidates, loyalist and non-loyalist, in the 1799 elections; four years later, when Wentworth was inveighing against Tinge's "virulence against the business of government" as being "equally notorious and reprehensible," Tinge moved for a loyal address to the king.55 The available evidence outside of Wentworth's correspondence corroborates that of the journals. A year after he was forced out of the Naval OfFice, Tinge was returned to government service by being made deputy commissary of the troops to accompany Sir George Prevost to the West Indies. Local sentiment in his favour was evinced at the time by the calling of public meetings in Hants and Annapolis counties to protest against his dismissal,54 and since by tradition, which ascribes to Tinge the part of Nova Scotia's first tribune of the ρeορle.55 To the British government Tinge was a satisfactory public servant, to the people of Nova Scotia he was a patriot, to Wentworth he was a dangerous schemer against government. The fact is that Tinge was a progressive and successful attacker of the local government. His popularity made him a menace to the executive. Tinge did not at all fit in with Wentworth's conception of a loyal public servant. The governor would have considered his conduct as a member of the House, where he raised such questions as secret rather than open voting for committee membersδ6 απd more equal representation of the cοuntry,δ' radical in a private citizen; but "that a man benefited by Government by an office to himself, commissions to his brother and uncle and a pension to his grandmother, should be the prime mover" (in instituting correspondence societies απd committees 5 the 7th Assembly. See my analysis of activity of members, P .A .1 .S. " Assembly Journal, 1803, p. 30, text of address, p. 34. u Vol. 225, doc. 3. letter ceiling meeting in Windsor, sheriff's notice & vn1. 139, p. 32, Prov. Sec'y to Hants sheriff, ordering him not to allow meeting. Vol, 225, doe, 4, Public notice for meeting in Annapolis, vol, 54, pp. 162 ff., Wentworth to Míllidge and Ruggles. 1 May 1807. "Murdoch, vol. III, pp. 259, 260. Also many other references. Since he knew people who remembered Tinge, Murdoch's opinion is valuable. Archibald, op. cot. and 3. G. Marshall, Brief History of N.S., pp. 13, 14, conilams Murdich. Q, 1793 Journal, p. 4. e7 Agitated in 1799, Murdoch, III, Ρ. 182 for comment.

78 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCΣS

before the 1799 elections) Wentworth felt could "hardly be credited."56 He could not understand Tinge and he feared any radicalism; his fear grew as Tinge extended his influence. Ιn 1799 he hinted that Tinge night be removed from the Naval Ofmce.65 Tinge did not achieve the distirlction of being Wentworth's arch-enemy without treading on other toes than the governor's. In the summer of 1797, when the Jamaica legislature was demandmg economy in the management of the five hundred Maroons they had sent to Nova Scotia, Tinge embarrassed the governor by offering to take three hundred of them off his hands at £ 10 a head. The proposition exactly fitted the terms specified by Jamaica; Wentworth must either accept it and abandon the whole establishment he had set up for taking care of the Maroons, or justify the maintenance of this expensive establishment in the face of Tongé's οffer.85 The friends whom Wentworth had appointed to take care of the Maroons were implicated: the predicament of the governor was that of the governor's clique. The friends of Wentworth were further humiliated when three of them were defeated at the hands of Tinge and two of his "country" members in the 1799 elections.01 At that time Tinge's faculty of pouncing on the element in a situation most likely to irritate his opponents and to expose them to ridicule, came into play. Before the election, the members who represented the town and county in the previous House published a joint card, offering their services to the electorate. These were Wallace, Hartshorne, Morris, and Stewart for the county, and Pyke and Cochran for the town, most if not all of whom were known to be friendly with the governor. Tinge promptly published the following: TO THE FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF HALIFAX

Gentlemen. Without family connections, particular interests, or any influence but that arising from public opinion, but encouraged by the request of many respectable members of your body,1 beg leave, with great deference singly to offer myself as candidate to represent you in General Assembly. On your opinion of my political conduct, which has passed within your immediate observation, 1 rest my hopes of success. Should this C.O. 217/73, p. 4, to lung, 27 Nov. 1799. CI. 217/70, p. 142. ^o Many entries In the Wentworth letter books, vols. 52, 53, re Maroons. @ The Halifax County poll stood: Tinge 1257, Mortimer 1077, Fulton 1001, Morris 1000, Wallace 888, Stewart 627, Hartshorne 605, the last 4 being Wentworth's friends.

GOVERNOR WENTWORTH'S PATRONAGE - 79

have acquired your approbation, and should 1 be honored with your confidence on this occasion, 1 have to assure you that 1 will never swerve from those principles which have invariably directed me. 1 remain, gentlemen, with sentiments of respect, your most obedient servant, W. COTTNAM TONGE.a 2

As Tinge's influence increased, he became anathema to the executive. Following assertions by the House in 1799 and 1800 of its powers of appropriating monies, relations between House and council grew steadily worse. Between 1802 and 1804 there developed in the House a party for constitutional reform, and in the council a determination to take the Assembly's challenge and fight for control of expenditure. It was not until 1797 that there was any surplus in the provincial treasury and therefore any cause for dispute over the appropriating of supplies. Tinge's policy was often against the interests of the governor's clique, which increasingly dominated the council. The only councillors who attended regularly were residents of Halifax, most of whom were as closely associated with mercantile interests as they were with the provincial administration. Tinge identified himself with the country and raised the ire of Halifax by proposing taxation of absentee landlords, and anti-smuggling laws, and advocating high taxes, an extended programme of road-building, and other expenditures which the Haligonians considered opposed to their interests. The reform party was led by Tinge; in 1803 Wentworth described it as "endeavouring to create dissensions with a view to obtain an elective Legislative Council."89 It has been shown that the council then consisted of Wentworth's friends and the ultra-conservative Croke, a combination as antipathetic to Tinge and his radical party as darkness to light. A clash was inevitable. The governor launched the attack by asserting a right to control completely all appropriations for repairing roads and bridges. Whereas road votes had originated in the House and reached the governor through council, they were now to originate in the governor's schedule of appropriations. The executive could thus curtail the House's road-building programme. The governor won his point in the session of 1805-6, when the House appropriated £2,000 without deviating from his estimate, but only at the cost of embarrassing the administration by losing the 1804 appropriation bill. Whatever satisfaction Wentworth and his henchmen derived from this Pyrrhic victory was wiped out n Weekly ChroMde, 23 Oct. 1799, Ø Murdoch, III, p. 182. C.O. 217/78, p. 139, to Hobart, 6 Aug. 1803.

80 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

when the House ignored two-thirds of his estimate in 1806-7.84 The following year the governor did not even present an estimate for expenditures for roads and bridges. The battle of the roads and bridges was fought on constitutional grounds. While he was engaged in the later stages of it, the governor became involved in two other major constitutional issues, where he was on much less certain footing. At the opening of the session in 1806 he refused to receive Tinge as Speaker of the House, and later refused to issue a writ for a new election."5 In the first instance he exercised a branch of the royal prerogative unknown in Nova Scotia and unused in England since James Ii's time; in the second case he claimed a right to determine contested elections which, if allowed, would have destroyed the character of the House as a representative institution. Beyond deliberating for two days and "lamenting" the governor's action, the Assembly did not protest the first claim, but elected a new Speaker. It did attack the governor's pretensions to determine the membership of the House. It applied again for a writ, addressed the governor, and when he declared their claim to be "subversive of the powers vested in the Governor by His Majesty's Royal Commission and Instructions," asked for proof in the documents, which the governor refused. Having previously secured copies of such of the Instructions as related to the legislature,"" the House knew that they contained nothing to substantiate the governor's statement. They therefore gave Wentworth the lie in an address in which they asked the support of the governor-general"T against the claims of the lieutenant-governor and council and forbore to comment on "The impolicy of the advice which has induced the Governor to agitate a question of privilege in times like the present." During the conflict Wentworth's relations with Tinge had gone from bad to worse. In 1803 he recommended again that Tinge be dismissed from the Naval Office, and suggested a successor."" Everything that went wrong thereafter was placed at Tinge's door. He became Speaker in 1805; the session, which 6, Journal of Αssεmbly for 1806, p. 32, compare estimate with Appropriation Act for 1806-7, showing that House voted £3015/6/8 not recommended by the Governor, besides altering 15 out of 46 of his recommendations. 0 1806-7, Journal, p. 34, writ called for filling seat of Thos. Walker, declared vacant by House, 1807-8 Journal, p. 31, writ again called for. • 1807-8 Journal, p. 22, Governor transmits parts of Instructions. α161d., pp. 105, 6, text of address to Gov..Gen'l. • C.O. 217/78, p. 127, to Hobart, 24 July 1803. John Beckwith, an Englishman connected with the Haliburton and Brenton families, nominated.

GOVERNOR WENTWORTH'S PATRONAGE — 81

followed that when the appropriation bill had not passed, was a difficult one. According to Wentworth, the business was "protracted ... by the Speaker, who through the whole session presented the uncommon case of opposition to the King's interests, from the Chair, where his incompetency to the decorum and duties of the situation became manifest. . . "09 When, despite his "incompetency," Tinge was elected Speaker by the new House, Wentworth refused to receive him. Within a month after the House rose, the governor suspended him from the Naval Οmce.70 Reporting his action, Wentworth stated that he considered the dismissal of Tinge ... "more essentially ... a measure absolutely necessary to the honour and well being of His Majesty's Government in these Colonies than any" that had occurred to his "observation in forty years of faithful experience in His Majesty's service." Those forty years began before the Stamp Act was repealed. A man who considered the dismissal of a £ 100-a-year official in the small province of Nova Scotia more essential than any measure during the American Revolution and the years of change that preceded and followed it, would be capable of almost any act to secure that dismissal, for he had clearly lost all sense of proportion. Previous to 1 804 Wentworth's usual methods had failed to displace Tinge. Meanwhile Tinge and his party became more and more influential in the House, and at the same time more antagonistic to the council. Their disgrace would be Tinge's disgrace and the council's victory, and a council victory, if fought on the constitutional issues sponsored by Croke, would be a triumph for the prerogative. Thus spurred on by his hatred for Tinge and his and the council's interests in ruining him, the governor became a crusader for the prerogative. The sequel may be told in few words. The home government allowed Tinge to be dismissed. But it dealt the governor and council a crushing blow by supporting the constitutional claims of Tinge's party in the House. The pretensions of the governor, the decisions of the chief justice and the opinions of the council were swept aside when the home government declared unequivocally that the House had full power to determine contested elections.71 It is perhaps significant, ton, that within six weeks of his receiving this decision, Wentworth was superseded in the governorship. ο C.O. 217/80, p. 137, to Castlereagh, 3 Feb. 1806. 713 Ρ.Α.Ν.5., νο1. 139, p. 29, Prov. Sec'y to Tinge, 21 Feb. 1807. '1 C.O. 217/81, p. 671, Crown Lawyers to Castlereagh, 7 July 1807.

Nova Scotian Trade During the War of 1812 WALTER RONALD COPP

In 1816 an anonymous writer, "A British Traveller," made the following statement in the course of his argument that the British West Indies should be required to obtain their timber and provisions from Nova Scotia and the other North American provinces rather than from the United States: During the late war, Halifax in Nova Scotia, the least eligible i/the four provinces, in an agricultural point of view (except in peculiar districts), was the principσΙ station of a large naval and military force, which visited it without any previous arrangements 'o increase the victualling means of the province. The town was also swelled by a prodigious concourse of strangers; and seven or eight hundred negroes, lured by the prospect of gain, landed by the fleets from the Delaware and Chesapeake, who proved to be a useless body of eaters, whose labours could not, for a considerable period, contribute to augurent the stack of provisions. Yet, notwithstanding these extreme demands ... there was a profusion of all the necessaries of life. Now, if an infant settlement, thinly peopled, and but partially cleared, could, when unprepared, issue such immense supplies, — what could it not do in ordinary times, if better cultivated and peopled? .. 1 Source: Canadian Historical Review, XVIII (June, 1937), 141-55. Reprinted by permission of the author and the University of Toronto Press. This article is a revision of an original essay which received one-half of the William Inglis Morse history prize from Dalhousie University in the spring of 1936. The revision is not extensive: some phrasings were changed and the section on the prices of general commodities during the war was rewritten. I should like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor D. C. Harvey of the Public Archives of Nova Scotia for constructive criticism of the revised article. All references unless otherwise stated are from the official correspondence and legislative papers in the Public Archives of Nova Scotia. tau.] ■The Colonial Policy of Great Britain, considered with relation to her North American provinces and West India possessions, by a British Traveller (London, 1816), ρ. 107.

NOVA SCOTIAN TRADE DURING THE WAR OF 1812 — 83

One contemporary reader at least did not accept this statement, for the following marginal comment, written probably by Bearish Murdoch,2 the historian of Nova Scotia, appears in one copy of the British Traveller's volume: "There was no scarcity we obtained all our flour & many other articles from the U. States and the fleet on the American coast did the same." How much nearer to the truth was the marginal comment than the printed statement will appear from the following examination of the trade of Nova Scotia during the War of 1812. Throughout the war the naval and military contractors at Halifax purchased large quantities of goods from Americans who, in return, bought British manufactures imported by Halifax merchants. The United States supplied the British fleet which blockaded its coasts and reduced its capital to ashes. For almost three years Nova Scotia was an entrepôt for North American commerce, since a large part of the foreign trade of the United States passed through her ports. She re-exported American food to both Europe and Canada, so that it is possible that troops serving under generals as far apart as the Duke of Wellington and Sir George Prevost consumed supplies from this source. Established trade routes were modified during the war, in that goods which formerly had been carried directly from Great Britain and the West Indies to the United States were sent to Nova Scotia and forwarded from there. American products no longer were shipped directly to Newfoundland, Spain, and Portugal, but to Nova Scotia whence they resumed, in British ships, their interrupted voyage. New commercial enterprises were begun as a result of wartime demands. These were the importation from the United States of supplies for the use of his majesty's forces in Nova Scotia and Canada, and the exportation to the United States of prize goods condemned in the viceadmiralty court at Halifax. Nova Scotia, though not suffering from scarcity, had no great surplus of provisions at the outbreak of war. The province had not, since the expulsion of the Acadian, produced food sufficient for its inhabitants, so that without supplies from the United States there was danger of a food shortage.a In July, 1812, a survey of conditions was made: questions as to supplies were sent to the commanding othcers of militia in the various counties. Such answers as have been preserved show that beef, wood, ° The name of Bearish Murdoch, with the date 1824, appears on the fly leaf of the copy referred to. ° Vol. 59, doc. 73: Sir John C. Sherbrooke, Iíeuteziant-governor of Nova Scotia, to Earl Bathurst, the colonial secretary, Oct. 7, 1812.

ä4 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

and candles could be procured throughout the province, but that in some districts flour, rice, and peas could not be purchased.* The situation might have become serious had not Sir John Sherbrooke, the lieutenant-governor of the province, reciprocated the friendly gesture of the people of Maine who were unsympathetic to the war and had decided "not to molest their Neighbours the Inhabitants of New Brunswick."a Acting on the advice of the council he issued this proclamation: Whereas every species of predatory Warfare carried on against defenceless Inhabitants living on the shores of the United States contiguous to this province and New Brunswick can answer no good purpose and will greatly distress individuals. I have therefore thought it proper by and with the advice of His Majesty's Council to order and direct all His Majesty's Subjects under my government to abstain from molesting the Inhabitants living on the shores of the United States contiguous to this province and to New Brunswick and on no account to distress or molest the goods or unarmed coasting vessels belonging to the defenceless inhabitants on the frontiers so long as they shall abstain on their parts from any Acts of hostility or molestation towards the Inhabitants of this province and New Brunswick who are in a similar situation. It is therefore my wish and desire that the subjects of the United States living on the frontiers may pursue in peace their usual and accustomed trade and occupations without molestation so long as they shall act in a similar way towards the frontier inhabitants of this province and New Brunswick. I do therefore order and command all His Majesty's subjects within my jurisdiction to govern themselves accordingly until further order.e Sherbrooke reported to England that he considered it was in the best interests of the province to adopt a conciliatory policy towards the people of Maine, since they might supply provisions, which, he feared, would be wanted later.? Sherbrooke, as governor, had power in times of emergency to suspend certain of the laws of trade. He made use of it at an early date: on July 22, 1812, a licence was issued to Edward Perkins to import from any port of the United States, in any ship or vessel, a cargo of flour, meal, corn, or provisions of any kind, • Shelburne Regiment, Records 1795-1830: Answers to questions, Aug. 24, 1812. L Vol. 214, pp. 211, 242, 243: Minutes of council, July 3, 1812. Ibid. Vοl. 59, doc 49: Sherbrooke to Lard Liverpool, the colonial secretary, July 4, 1812,

NOVA SCOTIAN TRADE DURING THE WAR OF 1812 — 85

also pitch,.tar, or turpentine.8 Such licences at the conclusion of the voyage were deposited with the customs, which examined the cargoes to ensure that no unauthorized goods were imported. On this licence is written, possibly by a customs officer, a certificate that the brig Francisco shipped at Boston, on August 21, 1812, 700 barrels of flour, 200 barrels of bread, 100 barrels of pork, and 130 barrels of beef. These items provide a suggestion as to the needs of the province. Whether or not the governor should allow a large licensed trade was a point to be decided. The council advised him to permit during the emergency the entry of salted provisions from the United States and to direct the collector of customs to admit licensed vessels until further orders.9 This emergency continued until the British government, by an order-in-council of October 13, 1812, authorized a limited trade with the United States. Only once did the governor on his own authority allow re-exportation to the United States, and this was a special case, for the British merchandise in question had been warehoused in Halifax since 1811 and was owned by Americans 10 The council, though it did approve of this specific export licence, advised against a general granting of such lícences.11 American vessels could not obtain clearance papers to sail to a British port, and if they sailed without them they would encounter difficulties with the American authorities upon their return. Licences to call at Halifax were useless unless this difficulty were overcome. Vessels circumvented the restrictions by loading with provisions in an American port and taking out clearance papers for Si Bartholomew, a Swedish island in the West lndies,12 whither, after discharging cargo at Halifax, they sailed in ballast in order to obtain the papers necessary for return to the United States. The long trip, without cargo, considerably decreased profits and not more than half a dozen vessels went through this complicated process. Governor Sherbrooke desired to entourage the importation of food supplies, because, as he told the colonial secretary, provisions were scarce and expensive.13 The American shippers must have charged high prices since parts of their voyages were unprofitable. The governor • Vol. 226, doc. 13: Permit from Sherbrooke to Edward Perkins, July 22, 1812. • Vol. 214, pp. 263, 264, 265: Minutes of council, Sept. 7, 1812. ]bid., pp. 268, 269, 270: Petition of Messrs. Grassie & Co. in minutes of councIl, Oct. 8, 1812. 11 Ibid., pp. 268, 269, 270: Minutes of council, Oct. 8, 1812. 12 It is 190 miles east of Porto Rico and is eight square miles in area. u Vol. 59, doc. 79: Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Nov. 6, 1812.

86 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

suggested that prices might be reduced by allowing the importing vessels to carry lumber to the West Indies;14 and later, without authority from England, he issued licences permitting this practice.1° Vice-Admiral Warren realized that the importation of provisions was desirable and co-operated with Sherbrooke by countersigning the licences; this ensured that the vessels would not be liable to capture by British cruisers or pńvateers.10 After the arrival in December of the order-in-council of October 13, 1812, there was no doubt as to Sherbrooke's power to issue export licences.17 Soon after the commencement of hostilities Governor Sherbrooke informed the home government that there was a dearth of provisions in his province and that the United States was the only source of supply.18 A month later he wrote that the United States wanted British goods and that some Americans were trying to secure them from Nova Scotia. Here was an excellent opportunity to obtain specie and provisions, the demand for both of which was likely to increase in the province as time went on; trade with the United States could be encouraged by directing war cruisers not to molest licensed American vessels and by ordering the customs to admit such vessels to entry. In conclusion, he solicited the views of the British government.19 Whether or not the government was influenced by the letter has not been brought to light, but it did issue an order-in-council, dated October 13,1812,30 by which the ports of Halifax in Nova Scotia and of Saint John and St. Andrew's in New Brunswick were 14 Ibid.

15 Vol. 59, doc. 85: Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Nov. 18, 1812. 1 Vol. 226, doc. 39, Shcrbrσoke to Vice-Admiral Warren, Nov. 21, 1812; Ibid., doc. 38, Warren tο Sherbτooke, Nov. 21, 1812. 17 Vol. 214, pp. 293, 294: Minutes of council, Dcc. 31, 1812. The lords of the committee of the council for trade and plantations were requested by the colonial secretary to give an opinion on the power of LieutenantGovernor Sherbrooke to issue such licences as were granted before the arrival of the order-in-council of October 13. Earl Bathurst forwarded their findings to Nova Scotia. They were of the opinion that the lieutenant-governor did not have the power to grant licences to neutral vessels to carry British goods from Nova Scotia to the United States and lumber from Nova Scotia to the British West Indies. Having thus curtailed the governor's power, they concluded by expressing the hope that the order-in-council of October 13, 1812, would relieve the difficullies in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. See vol. 62, dec. 66, Bathurst to Sherbrooke, Jan. 31, 1813; Ibid., de. 67, James Buller to Henry Gouiburn, Jan. 9, 1813. µΡ Vol. 59, doc. 49: Sherbrooke to Liverpool, July 4, 1812. µΡ Ibtd., doc. 61: Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Aug. 7, 1812. m Vol. 355, no. 54: Copy of order-ín-council, Oct. 13, 1812.

NOVA SCOTIAN TRADE DURING THE WAR OF 1812 — 87

opened to a licensed trade with those ports in the United States from which British ships were excluded. Any ship or vessel, unless it belonged to a subject of France or one of her allies, could trade in certain enumerated articles. Wheat, grain of any kind, bread, biscuit, flour, pitch, tar, and turpentine produced in the United States might be imported. Articles produced in the United Kingdom and Ireland or in the British West Indies which had been imported into the province in British ships might be exported, provided that the customs at the ports from which they were shipped could certify that the law was fulfilled as regards their origin and importation. A licence was not issued for each voyage but was in effect for a specified period, the licensee being allowed to use it for any number of vessels. As soon as the order of October 13 became known to Nova Scotian and New England merchants, a large licensed trade sprang up. Provisions received in Halifax from the United States were shipped to Spain and Portugal,21 to Canada to supplement the food supplies of Prevost's army,22 to Newfoundland to feed the people and to supply the naval vessels stationed there,23 and were used to victual the North Atlantic squadron24 and to make up the deficiencies in Nova Scotia's own food supply. Naval stores, mainly pitch, tar, and turpentine, were imported from the United States for the use of men-of-war, privateers, merchantmen, and fishing vessels. It may seem strange that American food was sent to Canada by way of Nova Scotia, but this was due to the state of communications. In winter, when snow covered the ground, food could be carried in sleighs directly from New York state and Vermont to Canada, but in summer it was impossible to transport provisions by wagons, for the districts along the border were unsettled and generally either wooded or swampy. Consequently food had to be taken by British ships from Nova Scotia up the St. Lawrence River to Canada. Trade from Nova Scotia to the United States was extremely active. For so small a province an enormous volume of British merchandise and West Indian produce25 was imported by local merchants and for• Vol. 59, doc. 73, Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Oct. 7, 1812; vol. 111, no. 2, p. 36, Sherbrooke to Wilson Croker, Aug. 15, 1813. *' Vol. 11I, p. 13 (Inland letter): Sherbrooke to Admiral Keats, Newfoundland, July 26, 1813. a Ibid. • Vol. 248, doc. 76: Memorial of Peter McNab praying for licence to import certain goods for the use of 111Q. Ships, March 2, 1813. as Ibid., doc. 79, Richard Tremaín & Co., merchants, to Sherbrooke, Oct. 28, 1813; vol. 226, dec. 117, Richard Tremain to Sherbrooke, Nov. 23, 1813.

88 - H IS T O R I C A L E S S A Y S O N T H E A T L A N T IC P R O V IN C E S

w arded to the U nited States. Sherbrooke in January, 1815, expressed h is belief that British goods to the value o f a m illion pounds sterling had pased through N o v a Scotia,26 but this figure needs substantiation to be accepted. A joint com m ittee o f the assem bly and council, in February, 1815, estim ated that the drawbacks to be allow ed on good s re-exported in the year 1814 w ould total approxim ately £ 5 4 , 0 0 0 . 27 T h e increase in revenue receipts o f the port o f H alifax during the w ar period indicates the great expansion in trade.28 P O R T O F H A LIFA X

Y ea r 181 2 181 3 181 4 181 5

R even u e R eceip ts £ 3 1 ,0 4 1 £ 7 0 ,3 3 8 £ 9 3 ,7 5 9 £ 6 0 ,7 5 8

It w as contrary to the law o f the U n ited States for an A m eri­ can vessel to carry goods to a British port. A m erican shipm asters had two m ethods to circum vent the law: they m ight slip stealthily ou t o f port and sail w ith ou t clearance papers, or th ey might d eceive the custom s officers as to their real destination and obtain clearance papers for som e port, trade with w hich w as not interdicted by the A m erican governm ent. It is possible that a third m ethod w as used, nam ely corruption o f the custom s offi­ cials. T his w ould not m eet w ith public disapproval in N ew England w here the w ar w as unpopular. Sailing w ithout clearance w as undesirable since this put the vessel’s ow ners and the ship­ pers in danger o f prosecution by the U nited States governm ent. In a letter to Earl Bathurst the governor outlined an incident w h ich revealed one m ethod by w h ich the deception o f the A m erican custom s w as accom plished: T w o A m erican s, o f th e nam es o f P lasket, a n d C larke, w ho h a d o b ta in ed a licence to im p o rt P ro visio n s a n d N a v a l Stores in to this P rovin ce, arrived here on the 3 1 st. ulto. w ith a cargo in th e brig D esp a tch a n d h ave rep resen ted to m e, th at a t the tim e they cleared the vessels o u t o f the U n ited S tates th ey w ere un der th e necessity o f takin g o n b o a rd a fe w casks o f C yder, “ V ol. I l l , no. 33, p. 129: S herbrooke to B athurst, Jan . 6, 1815. 37 V ol. 226, no. 109: R ep o rt o f jo in t com m ittee to exam ine the public accounts, F eb . 20, 1815. 38 F . G . B utler, “C om m ercial relations o f N o v a Scotia w ith the U nited States, 1783-1830” (unpublished M .A . T hesis, P .A .N .S .), p. 24.

NOVA SCOTIAN TRADE DURING THE WAR OF 1812 - 89

and one hundred boxes of Spermaceti candles, which was done by them solely with a view of concealing from the Custom House 0/Jicers in Massachusets [sic] the real place of the brig's destination that on the arrival of the vessel in this Port, they voluntarily declared to the Officer of the customs who first boarded her, that these articles were on board informing him of the purpose for which they had been shipped, and intimating to him their intention, of taking them away again when the Brig returned.28 Notwithstanding this explanation, the local customs seized the cider and candles, articles not enumerated in the order-in-council of October 13. The intervention of the governor was necessary in order to have them restored to their owners. To prevent such inconvenient zeal on the part of the customs officials, the governor asked the colonial secretary to send "special instructions to the Collectors, for their guidance" in regard to the licensed trade, as a too strict interpretation of the revenue laws would deprive the province of flour and other necessaries of life,90 a request to which Bathurst agreed.S1 The re-export of British merchandise to the United States presented another problem, because British vessels could not enter American ports and American vessels could do so safely only with proper clearance papers, which could not be obtained from a British port. A merchant outlined to Sherbrooke a method which had been devised to overcome the difficulty: A vessel sails from Halifax Loaded with dry Goods — she is met in the Sound by another with a Clerance from Newport or New London to New York, or Brunswick, with the same description of Goods inserted in her clearance altho' she sails in Ballast — The Goods are transferred from one vessel to the other in the Out ports in the Sound — The Goods are carried to New York, or Brunswick from whence they are sent to Philadelphia & Southern States. Thus are the Manufactures of Great Britain spread over the Continent of America free of duty — which is not only an injury as it a ffects the Revenue of that Country but will operate against the views of that Government in her wishes to establish her own Manufactories to the Injury of Great Britain — The people of New Haven have engaged largely in this Trade, connected with houses in New York — whether it proS,Vol. 59, b IbId.

doc. 91: Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Jan. 28, 1813.

a VoL 111, no. 5, p. 48: Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Aug. I7, 1813.

Ø — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

ceeds from interested motives, or to Oppose the Measures of their Government is a matter of indifference — the effect is the some — and our only Crime of selling them Goods, for FIour which we want —a2 This letter mentions some of the benefits accruing to Great Britain from the licensed trade, Sherbrooke estimated these benefits even more highly than did the merchant: The trade with the United States is carried on at present to a great extent and with much advantage to this Province. The people of the Eastern States engage in it more generally and with more eagerness than formerly. The trade by License holds aut to them a prospect of advantages which has Ι beliei'e had a great effect in drawing o$ their attention from War. lithe whole hostile energies of the Eastern States had been engaged against the British North American Colonies as would most probably have been the case if all avenues of Trade had been cleared against them, Ι conceive that the result would have been very different from what we find it at the present day. Ιn this way 1 think the license trade has operated more to our Security than an additional force of Several thousand Men.aa Salt beef and salt pork had not been included in the order-incouncil of October 13, 1812. Sherbrooke believed that they had been omitted purposely lest their importation "interfere too much with the Fresh Trade in these articles."3{ They were to be had cheaply and in immense quantities in the eastern states and when a shortage developed,83 the governor received numerous requests for licences permitting their importation. Sherbrooke suggested to the colonial secretary that it would be wise to allow this trade,36 but the lords of trade gave an adverse opinion on VoΙ. 226, doc. 117: Tremaín to Sherbrooke, lov. 23, 1813. It would seem that the collusion of the customs officials in certain New England parts was necessary to carry on this illegal trade. Those at the port of New Haven appear to have been particularly susceptible to the appeals of the merchants for, when the New 17ngland coast was blockaded late in 1813, the Halifax merchants inquired whether or nit the port of New Raven also was blockaded. The provincial secretary forwarded to one of the merchants the reply of Admiral Warren "who was pleased to say that the established Blockade including the port of New Haven ... was a measure ..." etc. (Italics not in the original) (v01. 140, p. 531, Cogswell, provincial secretary, to Trcmain, Nov. 5, 1813; see vol. 141, p. 22, Cogswell to Messrs. Hartshorne, Biggs & Co., merchants at Halifax, June 11, 1814). Vol. 111, no. 5, p.48: Sherbrooke to Batliursi, Aug. 17, 1813. 1" Vol. 111, p. 13 (inland letter) : Sherbrooke to Keats, July 26, 1813. Ibid. κΡ Vol. 111, no. 14, p. 62; Sheτbτοοke tο Bathurst, Sept. 23, 1813.

NOVA SCOTIAN TRADE DURING THE WAR OF 1812 — 91

the ground "that it would be inexpedient to authorize the importation of Salted Beef & Pork from the United States.. . as these Articles can be procured in any quantities from His Majesty's Dominions in Europe."37 This they qualified Iter by saying that there might be importation of these articles for the use of the garrison and navy.38 The imperial government expanded the export trade to the United States by issuing an order-in-council, dated July 15,1813, allowing the export of gypsum by licence, and another on November 2, 1813, extending the privilege to prize goods condemned in a British vice-admiralty court. In September of that year certain Halifax merchants had petitioned the governor to allow the export of prize goods to the United States, informing him that they had purchased large quantities with the expectation of exporting them but "that a vessel had lately been seized on account of having such articles on board although she was partly loaded with British Merchandise and was for such merchandise furnished with an express Licence from His Excellency and Clearance from the Custom house."99 The council considered the petition and was of the opinion that, since a duty had been paid on the prize goods, they had become British and accordingly came under the order of October 13, 1812. Sherbrooke, however, believing that he did not have the power to license this exportation, forwarded the petition with an extract from the council's minutes to England for advice.*0 The lords of trade upheld his interpretation that the order of October 13 did not include prize goods but, since the export of these undoubtedly would increase their value and so encourage naval captures, they said they would arrange that an order-ín-council be passed to allow this trade by licence and directed Sherbrooke to continue to issue licences until such time as the other reached him 41 *f Vol.

62, doc. 89: Thomas Lack to Henry G°uIburn, Oct. 20, 1813.

3, Ibid., doc. 95: Bathurst to Sherbrooke, Jan. 15, 1814. Forty-one barrels of beef and pork had been imported into Nova Scotia during the year 1813 to eupply the imperial forces (see ibid., doe. 96: Lack tu Gou1bum, Dec. 29, 1813). There is evidence that there was further importation of these articles in 1814 (see vol. 214, pp. 379, 380: Petition of John Moody in minutes of council, Feb. 5, 1814). Ιο Vol. 214, pp. 355, 356, 357: Minutes of council, Sept. 7, 1813. Vol. 111, no. 8, p. 54: Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Sept. 8, 1813. ο Vol. 62, doc. 86: Bathurst to Sherbrooke, Oct 29, 1813. Later Bathurst warned Sherbrooke that military and naval stores could not be exported even though they might bave been captured and condemned In a viceadmiralty court (ibid., dec. 92: Bathurst to Sherbrooke, Jan. 1, 1814).

92 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

It is an interesting digression to note how American shippers made use of British licences for their own ends. An American vessel, the OEconomy, was boarded by the famous Nova Scotian privateer Liverpool Packet and, being without a licence, was taken as a prize. When the case was heard in the vice-admiralty court at Halifax, the master of the vessel, who in the meantime had visited Boston, produced a licence. The claim was advanced before the court that the vessel had been destined to Boston and not to Halifax and therefore was lawful prize. The Acadian Recorder which reported the case in full made this comment: It is well known that the Northern States of America are. supplied with the articles which compose this [the OEconomy's] cargo from the Southern ports. Licences for importing them into Halifax, would a,Jord a complete protection to this coasting trade, from British cruisers, because the voyages in both cases, are always in a Northern direction, which might suit either destination. That they are employed to cover the coasting trade of the U. States, or for other fraudulent purposes, is evident, because of above one hundred licences which have been granted within the last eight months, not more than twenty have found their way, with cargoes of corn and provisions into the port of Halifax.42 The prices of general commodities rose noticeably but not phenomenally during the war. Since December, 1807, the prices of American goods had been high in Nova Scotia due to the commercial warfare between the United States and Great Britain between 1807 and 1812. When war broke out, the demand increased and prices rose still further. Flour, which was selling at forty shillings a barrel in 1803 and which rose to seventy-five shillings during the first year of the embargo, sold as high as one hundred shillings and never lower than eighty-five shillings during the war. By the summer of 1816, when the post-war decline had stopped, flour could be purchased in Halifax for forty-five shillings a barrel. The peak of prices of American commodities was reached during 1814 when the supply was diminished by the blockade of the American coast and the demand was increased by the enlargement of the British military and naval establishments in Nova Scotia. Wartime demand also brought about an increase in the prices of local and West Indian goods, but as there was no special problem regarding the supply of these the increase was not large. The rise in prices is demonstrated by the following incident. 'Accdíαn Recorder, March 27, 1813.

NOVA SCOTIAN TRADE DURING THE WAR OF 1812 — 93

The imperial parliament, in 1812, had voted £3,000 for the erection at Halifax of a residence for the naval commander-inchief of the North Atlantic station, but by 1814, due to the high prices of local goods, the sum was insumcient for the purpose. At the suggestion of Admiral Griffith, Sherbrooke asked the Assembly of Nova Scotia to supplement the grant to bring the building fund to the necessary total. He explained "that the great rise in prices of all building materials has rendered it [the £ 3,000] so inadequate that the Rear Admiral assures me neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Commissioner would feel authorized to commence the work."49 The Assembly voted £ 1,500.44 In 1813 the British navy began to tighten its blockade of the United States and by the autumn of that year the coast from Maine to Florida was sealed to shipping. This had immediate repercussions in Nova Scotia. Merchants who had imported large quantities of British goods for export to the United States petitioned Sherbrooke complaining that Admiral Cochrane refused to allow licensed vessels to approach the American coast and urging that this interference with the licensed trade would infect a serious injury on the province.45 The governor took up the cause and forwarded to England the merchant's petitions, but the imperial government would do nothing. It regretted that Nova Scotia suffered, but Cochrane was in command and it would not interfere with his orders. The decision was defended justly enough on grounds of international propriety, it being pointed out that the authorizing of a licensed trade to British subjects while the coast was blockaded would "have the effect of debarring Neutral Nations from a Trade which was at the same time carried on by one of the Belligerents. "46 The finding of a new trade route between Nova Scotia and the United States was necessary and, in this, Bluenose and Yankee ingenuity was exhibited. The British had occupied a part of Maine and by proclamation had opened to trade the port of 4* Vol. 288, no. 96: Address of líeutenaπ t-governor to assembly, Feb. 28,

1814.

' Βeaπιιah

Murdoch, History of Nova-Sco:Ie or Acadie (Halifax, 1867), 111, 363. 4 Vol. 248, doc. 79, Richard Tremain & Co., to Sherbrooke, Oct. 28, 1813; v01. 226, doc. 117, Tremain to Sherbrooke, Nov. 23, 1813; vii. 214, pp. 379, 388, Minutes of council, Feb. 5, 1814; νο1. 311, no. 25, p. 89, Sherbrooke ti Bathurst, June 1, 1814; vol. 141, p. 22, Cogswell to Messrs. Hartshorns, Biggs & Co., June 11, 1814. ø Νο!. 62, doe. 121: Bathurst to Sherbrooke, July 15, 1814.

94 - H IS T O R I C A L E S S A Y S O N T H E A T L A N T IC P R O V IN C E S

Castine in the conquered territory.47 A dvantage w as taken o f this. British m erchandise, im ported to H alifax apparently by British m erchants but w h ose real ow ners, the governor had reason to believe, were A m ericans, w as taken by various routes into the occupied section o f M aine from w h ich it w as introduced into the U nited States. Som e w as carried by w agons from H alifax to W indsor and then by boat to N ew Brunsw ick or C astine, w hile other m erchandise w as shipped directly from H alifax. T o obtain licen ces to transfer goods from N e w Brunsw ick to the occupied territory w as a sim ple m atter. T he governor com m ented: “I m ust in justice to the persons concerned in their speculations observe that as far as I have been able to learn these im portations have not been accom panied w ith any Circum stances o f fraud or concealm ent calculated to injure H is M ajesty’s R even u e.”48 The stringent blockade during 1814 diverted trade through N ew Brunswick as this table sh ow s.49 V ESSEL S E N T E R IN G H A LIFA X F R O M N E W B R U N SW IC K

Y ea r 1 8 1 1 ...................................... 181 2 181 3 181 4

N um ber o f vessels 80 98 35 89

A table o f the num bers o f A m erican vessels entering and leavin g the port o f H alifax reveals the effects both o f the issuing o f licen ces and o f the blockade.50 P O R T O F HALIFA X

Y ea r 1 8 1 1 ....................................... 181 2 181 3 181 4 181 5

A m erica n vessels E n terin g L eavin g 0 0 42 35 107 93 28 34 0 0

n V ol. I l l , no. 29, p. 105, S herbrooke to B athurst, Sept. 23, 1814; vol. 385, n o. 10, O riginal proclam ation signed by S herbrooke and R ear A dm iral Griffith, Sept. 21, 1814. 48 Vol. I l l , n o . 33, p . 129: S herbrooke to B ath u rst, Jan . 6, 1815. “ B utler, “ C om m ercial relations o f N o v a Scotia,” p. 21. ® A ppendix o f Proceedings o f the G eneral A ssem b ly upon the convention, concluded betw een his m ajesty and th e U nited S tates o f A m erica (H alifax , 1819). Q uoted in B utler, “ C om m ercial relations o f N ova S co tia," p. 22.

NOVA SCOTIAN TRADE DURING THE WAR OF 1812 — 95

Early in 1814 Sherbrooke reported to England that many applications had been made to him for licences to import specie from the United States: As the commercial intercourse under licences between this Province and the United States is almost entirely discontinued, I think the importation of Specie would be attended with advantage. The discount upon Bills would become less & Government would probably be supplied with such sums as the public service might require upon much better terms than could be obtained since the commencement of Hostilities.'" A reply was received from Bathurst in April informing Sherbrooke that he was "at liberty to issue Licences for the importation of specie into the port of Halifax from the territories of the United States."52 This letter Sherbrooke forwarded to RearAdmiral Griffith with the request that he would give such orders as might facilitate the impοrtatiοn.ó9 An explanation for this trade may be that, while British manufactures were entering the United States in spite of the blockade, the exportation of flour, provisions, and naval stores from that country practically had ceased; American merchants being thus unable to settle their debts in kind were now forced to pay in coin, and Nova Scotian shippers were anxious that they should be permitted to pay. Though there was an enormous trade through Nova Scotia during the war, it must not be thought that the navigation iáws were disregarded. With the exception of the trade expressly allowed by order-in-council, they were enforced as rigidly as ever. Bathurst cautioned Sherbrooke: "Nothing short of an urgent necessity, in which the safety of the Colony may be implicated, and so immediate as not to allow a reference home, will justify him [the governor] in the violation of the law."5* Before the governor would issue a licence to import onions from the United States, he had to be assured by the naval officer commanding that such importation was for the good of his majesty's service." Yet the navy was not always favoured thus, for, when permission to import tobacco was sought with the plea that the British tars had need of it, the governor, acting on the advice of the council, refused to grant a licence on the ground Vοl. 111, no. 22, p. 80: Sherbruοke to Bathurst, Feb. 11, 1814. Voί. 62, doc. 114: Bathurst to Sherbrooke, API-i1 12, 1814. b3 Val. 111, p. 86 (inland letter): Sherbrooke to Griffith, May 25, 1814. 54 lol. 62, doe. 94: Circular letter, Bathurst to Sherbrooke, Jan. 14, 1814. '' Vii. 248, doc. 76: Memorial Peter 'dNab to Sherbrooke, March 2, 1813; ννl. 111, no. 17, p. 65, Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Oct 18, I813.

96 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

that tobacco could be imported legally from the United States into Bermuda and that the naval purveyor could obtain his supplies thence." The rigidity of the laws of trade is emphasized further by the following incident resulting from the blockade of the American coast. A number of neutral vessels which had sailed fir the United States from Europe, on being informed that American ports were closed, proceeded to Halifax to wait until the owners could be informed of their plight. Wishing to return home, the captains solicited the permission of the governor to sell parts of their cargoes to enable them to make needed repairs and to buy provisions. The articles to be sold were lemons and salt; the former, being ripe, would spoil before the vessels could reach Europe, and the latter was much needed in the province for the use of fisheries. The governor feeling, however, that he had no power to make a decision, referred the case to the council. A committee of three was appointed to report on the quantities of provisions on board each vessel, the quantities needed to return home, the amount of repairs necessary, the probable value of the materials needed for these, and lastly what part of the cargoes could be sold with the least prejudice to British commerce and to the best interests of the foreign owners. Meanwhile, the council directed that the vessels were to be anchored in an unfrequented part of the harbour under the custody of the customs, and a wharf was to be appointed for their use in case any should require to dock.δ7 Thirty-four Halifax merchants aided the neutral captains by addressing a petition to the governor, praying him to allow the sale of the salt on the foreign vessels, since British salt was not to be had in any quantity and the amount on these vessels would be insufficient to injure the regular importers of salt and in addition would benefit the fisheries.δ8 After all this procedure, the council advised the governor to allow the sale of the lemons and saltαΡe During the war the merchants of Halifax, acting through the local committee of trade, were energetic in promoting their common interests. The committee during the first year kept two objects in view: the protection of the coasts and the securing of convοys.80 Later its interests turned to the peace treaty which 6° Val. 111, p. 82 (inland letter): Sherbrucke to Griffith, May 5, 1814. "Vol. 214, pp. 429, 430: Minutes of council, July 9, 1814; tbld., pp. 433, 434, July 14, 1814. ® Vol. 226, doc. 135: Copy of petition (undated). se Vii. 214, pp. 433, 434: Minutes of council, July 14, 1814. Vol. 304, no. 61: Sabatier to Wilkins, Peb. 22, 1813.

NOVA SCOTIAN TRADE DURING THE WAR OF 1812 — 97

would close the war. A petition was sent to the colonial secretary asking that the treaty should prohibit American trade with the British West Indies, should forbid French and American fishermen to pursue their calling along the shores of Nova Scotia, and should settle the disputed international boundary line in Passamaquoddy bay in favour of Great Britain.61 The council and Assembly adopted a joint address to the prince regent of much the same purport as the petition of the cοmmittee.θ2 The prmvtnce's agent in London, S. B. Morland, brought the joint address to the attention of the British ministry, and the foreign office replied vaguely that the interests of Nova Scotia would "not be overlooked."63 Morland believed that the wishes of the province in regard to the fisheries and the boundary question would be granted, but he was doubtful about the West Indian trade since conflicting interests might operate against Nova Scotia's desires.84 The peace of Ghent did not settle these questions. It was the task of future treaties and conventions to arrange such details. The knowledge that the president of the United States had approved the treaty of Ghent reached Nova Scotia through an unofficial source early in March, 1815.85 Immediately the principal merchants of Halifax petitioned Lieutenant-Governor Sherbrooke for permission to export to the United States certain products of the British North American colonies and British manufactured goods, prize goods, and produce of the British West Indies legally imported into the province.ó8 Sherbrooke asked the advice of the council which, being certain of the establishment of peace though the official communication from the British government had not arrived,87 advised the issuing of a proclamation allowing the export of such goods, the property of British subjects, in British ships owned and operated according m ibid., no. 66: Copy of peütion, Oct. 8, 1813; vii. 226, doc. 82: Sabatier to Sherbrooke, Nov. 8, 1813; νοl. 111, no. 21, p. 72: Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Nov. 9, 1813. 62 Vol. 304, no. 60: Petition of assembly to prince regent, Feb. 24, 1814; ibid., no. 81, Report of committee of house on joint action with council, March 5, 1814; vol. 305, no. 12, S. B. Moeland, province's agent In London, to Chief Justice Blowers, president of the council, and L. M. Wilkins, speaker of the assembly, April 7, 1814. Vol. 305, no. 13: Morland to Blowers and Wilkins, July 8, 1814. u ibid. The treaty was signed at Ghent on December 24, 1814. °° Vol. 214, pp. 464, 465, 466: Minutes of council, March 4, 1815. On March 15, 1815, the governor received official notification of the conclusion of the treaty (vol. 288, no. 107, Message of Sherbrooke to council, March 15, 1815; vol. 305, no. 28, Message of Sherbrooke to assembly, March 15, 1815).

98 _ HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

to Ιaw.88 This proclamation, dated March 4, 1815, later received the approval of the committee of the privy council for trade.89 Thus the commerce of Nova Scotia resumed its pre-war course while negotiations proceeded between Great Britain and the United States regarding a more permanent arrangement.

• Vol. 214, pp. 464,465,466: Minutes of council, March 4, 1815; νο1. 111, no. 34, p. 134: Sherbrooke to Bathurst, March 7, 1815. • Vol. 63, doc. 5: Bathurst to Sherbrooke, May 10, 1815.

The Intellectual Awakening of Nova Scotia D. C. HARVEY

My subject to-night is a rather ambitious one, but it has been chosen deliberately; not only in response to President Stanley's request for an appropriate opening lecture in his projected series, but also in an endeavour to satisfy my own curiosity. For many years 1 have been interested in the controversy that has raged between the "great man" and the "spirit of the age" theories of history; between those who have argued that progress is due to kings and heroes, and those who have found in progress itself a dynamic force. For many years, also, I have been interested in Joseph Howe, whom most Nova Scotian regard as a great man that Carlyle would have called King Howe; and I have frequently asked myself, as well as the printed page, how far he may be regarded as having sprung Minerva-like from the rocks of the North-West Arm, or how far he was the embodiment of the spirit of his age in Nova Scotia. For the purposes of this study, I shall regard that period of our history, from 1835 to 1848, as a period when Nova Scotians were thoroughly awake; and I shall attempt to rediscover the various forces and agencies that had been at work in our previous history, that had converged, co-operated and united to produce this intellectual awakening, with its culminating achievement in responsible government, so well known to us all in Nova Scotia, and to a lesser degree throughout the English-speaking world. In making this study,1 must cover considerable ground in a very sketchy manner; and I must allude to many things merely to note their significance. But Ι should like to emphasize the importance of the period between the War of 1812 and the trial of Howe for criminal libel in 1835, though I cannot dwell very long upon it; for it is in this period that I find the awakening of Source: Dalhousie Review, XIΙΙ (April, 1933), 1-22. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. This paper was originally given as the opening lecture of the Dalhousie series of public lectures, delivered January 13, 1933.

100 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

Nova Scotians most pronounced, and it is precisely this period that has been neglected most by the historians of Nova Scotia. Further, it was in this period that the descendants of pre-loyalists, loyalists and Scots were enabled to enjoy educational facilities in their own province, were encouraged to know and to love their own country, and actually began tο think as Nova Scotians. In a word, then, I have set out to discover not only the intellectual awakening of Nova Scotia, in its narrower sense, but the emergence of the characteristic Nova Scotian, when he was thoroughly aroused to the strength and weakness of his birthright, and eager to overhaul the entire ship of state, from the keel of commerce to the captain on the bridge. This is too large an order to be filled in one short essay; but, if I can collect a few samples, perhaps someone may be moved to pursue the subject further, and to enlighten his fellow-countrymen as to the great days and the complex forces that went to the making of a Nova Scotian. Ιn attempting to explain this intellectual awakening of Nova Scotia, a mere chronological list of economic necessities leading. to inventions, of such institutions as the Church, the newspaper and magazine, the school and library, the art gallery and museum, the laboratory and archives, of public assembly and social contacts, is not enough, though the diffusion of ideas and the hardening of custom by these means constitute the story of the ordinary homogeneous community. The interplay of these economic factors and social institutions produces a certain type whose social heritage may be characterized as French, British, American or what not. But special factors have contributed to the making of what Dr. MacMechan has called, "the Novascotianess of Nova Scotia," and have made it an amalgam of British and American ideals, or, if the French be not forgotten, a mechanical mixture of all three types. These special factors may be indicated as: the original design to make Nova Scotia an imperial understudy tο Great Britain and a barrier of New England against the French; the overwhelming influence of New England in the early history of the province; the arrival of the Hector in Pictou Harbour — harbinger of Scottish immigration; the coming of the loyalists, with a tragic halo on their brow; the continued presence of the representatives of the British army and navy in Halifax; the social standards and canons of taste in Iiterature and art that centred in Halifax, partly as models for all Nova Scotians and partly as progressive irritants and, above all, the fact that those who go down to the sea in ships must eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

THE INTELLECTUAL AWAKENING OF NOVA SCOTIA - 101

To begin, then, at the beginning; Halifax was founded as a conscious imperial effort of the British government, though the project had been urged and inspired by the aggressive New England puritans, who, at that time, had no thought that Nova Scotia would ultimately supplant Massachusetts itself as the chief imperial understudy on this side of the Atlantic. But the fact is important, for one of the most marked characteristics of Nova Scotian thinking was its vein of imperialism. Now the essence of imperialism, at its worst, is self-regarding domination, and, at its best, paternal guidance. There cannot be an imperial power unless there is also a dependent community; and, if one dependent community is admitted to partnership, other dependent communities have to be found, or the empire, as such, must cease to exist. In this instance, the dependent community was to be the Acadian population of Nova Scotia; and, in taking effective possession of the territory, Governor Cornwallis and his council regarded themselves as a branch of the imperial executive established at Halifax for the avowed purpose of planting British communities at half a dozen strategic points, in order to subject the Acadians thoroughly to British rule and to convert the colony into a barrier of British New England against French New France. Later, the anglicized colony as a whole would be controlled by the imperial executive branch at Halifax. But, if it accorded with the old colonial system for the executive at Halifax, which was partly British and partly American, to regard itself as a partner in an imperial project, it came as a surprise to Cornwallis, Lawrence, and their successors that the rank and file of the New EπgIanders, who flocked to Nova Scotia both after the founding of Halifax and after the expulsion of the Acadians, should insist on being regarded in the same light. They had made terms, and demanded all the. rights of British subjects before they came; and, when the impending American Revolution had forced them to think imperially, they, ignoring the Halifax executive, through their representatives in the assembly, expressed to the king and both houses of parliament their concern for the future of the empire; and they suggested certain modifications of policy that would recognize the common interests of dependent and imperial communities. While emphasizing their duty to and affection for their sovereign, their attachment to the mother country of which many were natives, their zeal "to support her power and consequence over all the British dominions" and their dread of the dissolution of the empire, they insist that their concern also "for the pńn-

102 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

ciples of humanity and for the just rights of mankind in civil society" made them "tremble at the gloomy prospect" before them and suggest more enlightened policies for dispelling that gloom. They concluded their address with a discriminating benediction; "May the spirit of concord, justice, and public virtue direct the councils of the British senate; and may the Father of Mercies preserve constitutional freedom to the British race in every part of the globe." Though the individuals who drafted this address and the group that they reρτesented became temporarily submerged, as a result of the American Revolution, this sense of partnership in imperial concerns persisted in Nova Scotia throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and the War of 1812. Perhaps it was most marked after the American loyalists came to the province to help in building up a new empire with the fragments that had been salvaged from the old, notwithstanding the reactionary tendencies of the period to strengthen the executive and restrict the activities of the assembly to purely subordinate matters. At any rate, there were not a few in Halifax who kept abreast of imperial problems, and had definite convictions about imperial policy. Richard John Uniacke, for example, when on a visit to England in 1806, considered it his duty to call upon the Secretary of State for the Colonies and give him the benefit of his observations, not only upon purely Nova Scotian affairs, but also upon the British North American colonies in general, the conditions in the United States of America, and the best means of making the colonies the successful commercial rivals of the United States. He also offered advice as to the sort of treaty that should be concluded between the British Empire and Napoleon in order to secure the future peace and prosperity of the world. His observations extend to some 8,000 words and reveal considerable insight; but what here interests me most is his calm assumption of imperial partnership: "It would be unpardonable," he wrote to Mr. Windham, "in those who have leisure to attend to subjects of public interest, to withhold from His Majesty's confidential servants any information they may possess having a tendency to promote the public good." Though Uniacke's representations in London no doubt had the support of the executive in Halifax, they perhaps must be regarded as an indication of imperial thinking on the part of a small group only; but, in 1819, an incident happened that recalled the great days of 1775, and led to a concerted effort of both the council and the assembly to influence, if not direct,

THE I ΝTELLECTUÁL AWAKENING OF NOVA SCOTIA - 103

imperial policy. When the text of the Convention of 1818 between Great Britain and the United States reached Nova Scotia, it called forth all the best Iocal talent. A report of a joint committee of the council and the assembly was prepared, printed, and sent to all the other British North American colonies. with an invitation to join them in petitioning the Prince Regent against the Convention. This report reviewed imperial policy from 1763 to 1818, and outlined opinions and policies in no uncertain terms. It is signed by descendants of pre-loyalists, loyalists and Scots. It therefore represents Nova Scotian opinion. The accompanying address to the Prince Regent says that the Convention "allowed the people of that country to participate in the most valuable appendages of the British sovereignty in America," and in a self-conscious strain it continues: As the senior British Government in the North American Colonies, we feel it our duty on this most important occasion to call the attention of all the inhabitants of British America to our present situation; and to invite them to unite with us — not in factious or seditious murmurings, but in a respectful, dutiful and becoming deportment, such as to entitle us to the confidence απd assistance of the mother country. These three instances must suffice, though many more could be adduced, to illustrate the continuity and range of imperial thought in Nova Scotia before the days of Howe. Though they do not indicate the sources of Howe's conception of an executive composed of representative Nova Scotians, constituted on the British model, they do reveal a community conscious of the problems of empire, eager to be a normal school for the sister colonies, and morally bound to give the mother country the benefit of its views on imperial policy. The second important fact to notice was the predominance of the American element in our population prior to 1800. Though some 5,000 British and foreign Protestants had been thrown into Nova Scotia between 1749 and 1753, they were not of the type that could possess the land, or give character and leadership to a pioneer community. In fact, they were a plantation rather than a colony; and, as it transpired, the New Englanders, who came in their wake, transmuted a military stronghold into a civil government. Some 8,000 of these New England puritans or Americanized Britons came to Nova Scotia, between 1749 απd 1767, to trade, to fish, to farm, and to demand all the rights of British subjects. It was these pre-loyalist Americans who took

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effective possession of Nova Scotia, who established the townships from Liverpool to Yarmouth, from Annapolis Royal to Cobequid and from Cobequid to Chignecto. It was they who demanded and obtained the first representative assembly in what is now British North America; who published the first newspaper, and who thus provided for future Nova Scotians the two chief vehicles of self-expression, the forum of the House of Assembly and the pages of the public press. They even tried to transplant the New England town meeting, and for some time they carried on a struggle with the executive at Halifax in the interests of local autonomy. Though isolated by the nature of the country, hampered by the limited means of communication, and handicapped by poverty, they contrived to lay the foundations of prosperous communities in the entire western half of the province, and to initiate its chief industries, including shipbuilding. It is true that the newspaper seldom penetrated into these rural communities, and that frequently their representatives in the assembly resided at Halifax. Schools were rare, and formal education almost unknown; but they were men of the Book. In their churches and societies they congregated, old and young alike. There they debated long on baptism and the sacraments, free-will and predestination. In watching over themselves and their neighbours they found both excitement and relaxation. In studying the Bible for rules of conduct or grounds of controversy, they assimilated its language and were saved from intellectual stagnation. One of these controversies produced several books and pamphlets which were published in Halifax, as early examples of native literature. Though none of these books may be classified as either "literature of knowledge" or "literature of power," they are among the historical muniments that, on the advice of Howe, have been gathered up by Aldus and placed in our archives, as source materials for the future intellectual historian of Nova Scotia. During and after the American Revolution, the population of Nova Scotia was more than doubled by the arrival of 20,000 refugees, loyalists and disbanded troops, who were settled in both the eastern and western parts of the province as well as in the towns and townships already established. Most of these refugees and loyalists, and some of the disbanded troops, were also Americans; thinking, talking and acting like Americans; but they were distinguished from the pre-loyalists by the fact that, having been harshly treated or driven from their homes, they left the land of their birth or adoption both in sorrow and in anger. They were also distinguished by the fact that among them there

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was a larger percentage of educated men or of office-holders, who because of their talents and experience might be expected to give leadership in such pioneer communities as they founded or entered. But it is alleged that, coming as they did to a fully organized government, with its important positions already filled, they sought to create vacancies by exploiting their own loyalty to the disadvantage of existing oflice-holders, and thus, in a measure, continued the war in Nova Scotia, visiting the sins of the American Whigs upon their cousins, who had established British power in this province before the Revolution. Though at first they were prominent in the assembly, did something to improve parliamentary practice, and were forward in attack upon the council till they practically controlled it, they soon surrendered to the contemporary fear of democracy; and therefore they cannot be credited with having contributed in their generation to the movement for constitutional reform. Under the loyalist Governor Wentworth, who was given to nepotism, they were now ready to strengthen the executive against the assembly by every possible sanction, political, social and religious. But if they failed in this respect, they made definite contributions to the cultural improvement and intellectual awakening of Nova Scotia, through founding a bishopric, a college and a magazine. The erection of a bishopric in Nova Scotia Was due to the initiative of loyalist clergymen who met in New Υοrjt before the exodus of 1783. It was accomplished in 1787, and it meant that henceforth the Church of England could cultivate this field with confidence and energy. From the beginning of the British occupation, the Church of England had been assumed to be the established church of the colony. III 1758 it had been recognized as such by a local Act; and though, as it afterwards transpired, the local legislature had not power to make such an establishment, it enjoyed a de facto if not a de Pure supremacy until the eve of Confederation. The coming of the loyalists, then, with many clergymen and a prospective bishop, meant that henceforth the province was to be organized progressively and aggressively into parishes; and that a clergyman was to be placed in every strategic locality, to hold aloft the torch of civilization, to become a little centre of culture, and a recruiting agency for schools. In a positive sense, therefore, the erection of a bishopric was a factor in the intellectual and cultural development of Nova Scotia. But in another sense, however unintentional, it became a progressive force. Keeping up with the Joneses is not a new trait

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of human nature, nor is resentment of monopoly and privilege; and, because the Church of England comprised a decreasing proportion of the population, as immigration increased, its special privileges became an object of discontent and attack, spurring the more numerous but less favoured religious bodies to demand similar treatment or, as this was impossible, to break its monopoly and deprive it of its privileges and endowments. Tο these less favoured denominations the road of progress was an uphill struggle to secure equal rights in property, education, marriage laws, and official preferment. What has been said as to the twofold contribution of the episcopate towards progress is equally true of the loyalist college. As early as 1764 a Church of England seminary of learning had been projected by the congregation of St. Paul's; and by 1769, in collaboration with the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, Windsor had been selected as the most suitable site. But the religious and literary institution, which became King's College, originated in the minds of the same New York loyalist clergymen who had conceived the idea of an episcopate. Ιt took form in I787, when the correspondence committee at Halifax petitioned the local government to save the youth of Nova Scotia from the seminaries of the United States, which would undermine their loyalty. As Horton Academy, it was formally opened in November, 1788, a year before the Halifax Academy actually commenced its career. By 1789, King's College was incοrροrated; and, with both imperial and local support, it served the province well, producing a number of distinguished clergymen and public servants, until 1802, when by royal charter, but much to the disgust of some of its most enlightened members, it became an exclusive institution. Henceforth, until 1832 at least, its usefulness was more apparent as a progressive irritant than as a positive force. In that year, after Pictou Academy had been successfully launched in opposition, and Dalhousie University was on the stocks, it altered its regulations so as to permit other than orthodox Anglican students to enjoy its educational facilities. As the oldest British university in the Dominion of Canada, it has had a proud record. Through its library, which incidentally was founded on the gift of a Boston merchant, and through its faculty and students it has contributed much to the intellectual awakening and diffusion of culture throughout the province. Though Professor William Cochran launched the Nova Scotia Magazine in 1789, he was at that time principal of Halifax Academy and King's, therefore, cannot claim credit for this magazine. But in the pe?iod subsequent to 1826 its special lit-

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erary flavour became most marked, and its students contributed to both the Acadian and the Halifax Monthly. In the same period its distinguished graduate, Judge Haliburton, produced his historical and satirical works. The organization of society everywhere in the eighteenth century was aristocratic and conservative, and both education and religion were regarded as the cement of society. In Nova Scotia the loyalists saw no reason to depart from the prevailing modes. By their educational system they hoped to educate the children of Nova Scotia in the principles of the British Constitution. By an established church they hoped to inculcate loyalty to the king of England as well as to the King of Kings. They sought stability, not progress. Believing, as the Duke of Wellington later did, that the British establishment both lay and ecclesiastical was the perfection of human wisdom, they thought of all change in this respect with displeasure. Hence the dictum, "Fear God, Honour the King, and Meddle not with those who are given to change," which recurs so frequently in the sayings of Haliburton's Old Minister. In this system there was no room for Condorcet's idea of progress. Nor could this system, which in itself was the true mould, find any place for the new democratic idea that a people evolves its own ideals and refashions its government in response to its needs. But though these loyalists were children of an undemocratic age, they set in motion forces that they could not control, and, as I have already said, they made a twofold contribution to progress, which was seen td advantage in the second generation. Next in importance to the establishment of an episcopate and a college was the publication of a magazine, which may be regarded as an experiment in adult education. This was the Nova Scotia Magazine and Comprehensive Review of Literature, Politics and News. It appeared in July, 1789, and ran for three years. It consisted largely of selections from British magazines, accounts of British and foreign politics, and lists of new books, together with a minimum of local news. It was printed by John Howe, and edited during the first year by Rev. William Cochran. When the latter resigned in July, 1790, the former carried on alone, as both editor and publisher, and made some changes in both size and price, but little in policy, except that he included a larger number of selections from American magazines. In the beginning, the editor was confident that his magazine would stand comparison with any of its contemporaries in either America or Great Britain; and he was very hopeful that it would diffuse a taste for British literature, would encourage young

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writers to try their strength, and above all that it would encourage gentlemen to offer their speculations on natural history, topography and agricultural technique. At the end of a year he felt that he was leaving the magazine as an established fact, and he noted with pleasure that one society for the promotion of agriculture had been formed in the capital, with the prospect of others to follow in the country. As to the influence of this magazine on the intellectual awakening of Nova Scotia, it is difficult to speak with confidence. Perhaps something may be guessed from the number and standing of its subscribers, and from the proportion of original to selected material in its table of contents. Its subscribers comprised the lieutenant-governor and his council, the admiral, the general and their officers, the bishop and his clergy, the chief justice and members of the bar, members of the assembly, justices of the peace, a number of merchants, but very few plain, blunt, men. On the other hand these subscribers, though largely confined to one class of the population, because of their official duties, were widely distributed throughout the province. In a list of 267 subscribers, Halifax takes the lead with 172; but there are 13 in Prince Edward Island, 7 in New Brunswick, and 4 in Cape Breton. The other 71 are distributed throughout Nova Scotia proper, as follows: Shelburne 21, Cornwallis 12, Windsor 10, Annapolis 5, Parrsborough, Wilmot and Dígby, 4 each; Horton, Lunenburg and Amherst, 2 each; Sackville, Newport, Liverpool, Truro and Pictou, one each. In other words, the magazine penetrated to practically every township; and, beyond a doubt, it brought to its subscribers and to the various communities represented a wider range of articles than they could otherwise have seen, at a time when public libraries were unknown and private libraries were extremely restricted and rare. To a limited extent and for a limited time, therefore, the Nova Scotia Magazine preserved and diffused a taste for British literature. Of original contributions in prose or verse, few were offered and some that were offered could not be accepted, because they were defective either in temper or in craftsmanship. In prose the articles were of a very practical nature, and advocated improvements in educational or agricultural technique. In poetry, there was more competition. One Minimus specialized in the translation of classical odes, and one Pollio aspired to original composition. Pollio seems to have been popular with both the editor and his readers. Though the editor had to caution him against making brow rhyme with snow and health with death, he did so in a kindly manner, assuring him that he would not have gone to so

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much trouble with an inferior writer; and, when another contributor attempted to satirise his work, he refused to publish the satire, recommending Pollio's compositions as subjects for imitation rather than burlesque. The reading public also wanted Pollin to continue, and, in an interval when his muse was sulking, one Α.Z. contributed a poem, "To Polio," in which he implored him on behalf of a large circle of readers not to cease his "musical lays." Pollio was a Haligonian and apparently a mature writer; but from Shelburne the editor received an early response from a girl of nine who attempted an ode to spring. The editor replied gallantly but firmly as follows: "The verses on spring, by our fair correspondent at Shelburne, are by no means contemptible, especially when considered as coming from a girl of nine. But if the young lady will cultivate poetry in preference to her sampler, we advise her to let her infant muse get more strength before she puts her upon the world." Though space forbids, one more sample must be given before we leave this interesting experiment. It will be remembered that there were twelve subscribers to the magazine resident in Cornwallis. From Cornwallis a farmer wrote the following poetical letter to the editor, on October 22, 1789: Dear Mr. Editor, when tir'd with labour, 1 went just to rest me, and chat with a neighbour, He was reading a book, with a blue paper cover, Which difer'd from others, being printed all over. 1 thought at first sight, 'twos a Methodist sermon, The country of late being full of such vermin: This thing, says my neighbour, you never have seen, Tho' it looks like a book'tis the new magazine; There's nothing in nature but what it contains, Peruse, 'twill amuse you, and puzzle your brains. It exceedingly pleased me, and made me enquire How I could obtain it. Why, answered the squire, You may have twelve a year, for the trifling expense Of four crowns, two shillings, and one single sixpence. I went home and have been three days contriving Which way I could pay, for I've thoughts of subscribing: As cosh in the country is quite out of use, The only way left is to pay in produce. indeed my friend Jacob tells me, he supposes, An honest Hibernian will deal in bluenoses.

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If this pay will answer, tο be sure sir I shall Become a subscriber, and pay every fall. If I were writing a Ph.D. thesis on this poem, I should feel it necessary to point out the many hints it contains as to the sόcial and economic conditions of the time: the division of the rural population into squires and farmers, the recent advent of Methodism into an Anglο-Puritan community, the scarcity of money which was forcing a reversion to barter, the early use of the word bluenoses, and frank recognition of the eighteenthcentury Irishman as an expert judge of potatoes; but as I am for the moment interested only in the intellectual awakening of Nova Scotia, I shall emphasize the fact that the magazine, with its blue paper cover, seems to have made quite a stir in Cornwallis, since it inspired a simple farmer to express himself in verses, that it cost 22/6, that its selections were regarded as all inclusive, ignoring nothing in nature, and that the humour of the farmer was tinged with bitterness, a typical loyalist mood. The editor, who was a genuine Irish-American, says in a footnote to the poem that, while he has already accepted the principle of payment in kind, he insists that the bluenoses shall be much superior to the poetry. No doubt both his Irish wit and his American experience taught him that it would be a shrewd and inexpensive method of advertising to publish the poem, despite its defective rhymes and unpoetical imagery, for it does reveal something both of the interest that had been created by his venture and of the quality of local talent that could be exploited. After Cochran departed for Windsor, John Howe carried on for almost two years. He looked forward to the time when the magazine would become "enriched with the exertions of native genius"; and he preached the gospel of peace "as ever favorable to the arts." He felicitated the province on the spread of educational establishments; and he assured his readers "that the temporary jealousies which have heretofore subsisted between old and new settlers are entirely done away, and a spirit of harmony and good humour universally prevails." Though this was a pious wish rather than a fact, it is only such casual utterances, all too infrequent, that make us realize that the magazine was published in Halifax, rather than in London, Edinburgh or Boston. In other words, it was the product of two men who had come to the province with their character and tastes already formed; and, though utilitarian in aim, it failed to touch the people who needed it most, or to evoke local talent to any marked degree.

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Thus it passed into history as another munirent of that loyalist effort which could find fulfilment only in the second generation. Ιn passing, it is interesting to note that three attempts were made to write a history of Nova Scotia between 1773 and 1801. In 1773, a Mr. Legge gave notice of his intention to write "a natural and political history of this province upon a plan entirely new and original" He expected to get his information by the questionnaire method, but does not seem to have succeeded. In 1789, the editor of the Nova Scotia Magazine referred to a history that was in preparation by a hand that was "amply capable of such an undertaking." But it too failed to appear. Again, in 1801, a prospectus was issued by Wm. Sabatier for a complete history of Nova Scotia, that would retrieve its reputation outside the province. Information for this also was tο be gathered partly by questions and partly by special tours of inspection. Advantage was to be taken of the arrival in Halifax of an English gentleman — evidently G. J. Parkyn — who was not only a draughtsman but possessed in a considerable degree "the art of engraving in aquatints," to secure his services as an illustrator. Ιn all, forty engravings were tο be made, including,general and county maps; and the whole was to be completed on an unprecedented scale. Though nothing came of this effort, it probably inspired the work of Titus Smith, who explored the whole province in 1801-2 on behalf of the government, and left his journal, in manuscript, for the use of later historians. As with the literary dreams of this generation, their historical ambitions were to be deferred until the population had increased and a broader economic foundation had been laid for the intellectual superstructure. This increase of population was destined to come mainly from North Britain, and not till the second decade of the nineteenth century, although it had been foreshadowed by the arrival of the Hector in 1773, three years before the American Declaration of Independence. Apart from individual arrivals, the disbanded troops of 1783, and the two ship-loads of 1791, there had been no Scottish immigration to Nova Scotia, after the Hector, until the lull in the Napoleonic Wars, during the Peace of Ar iens. During the years 1801 to 1805 there was a considerable influx; but, when the wars broke out again, the Scots were employed at home, until 1815, when they were washed upon the shores of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton in mounting waves. As a result of this immigration and the natural increase of the previous settlers, the population of Nova Scotia increased from less

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than 40,000 in 1784, to 80,000 in 1817, 120,000 in 1827 and 200,000 in 1837. Numerically, at least, there can be no doubt as to the importance of this Scottish immigration to Nova Scotia. But an examination of the passenger Iists does not explain the influence that these people have had upon our economic and intellectual life. Practically all of them left their motherland because they could not obtain adequate subsistence there, and a large number of them could not even sign their names. A clue to this influence must, therefore, be sought elsewhere: in the arrival of men like Edward Mortimer the self-made merchant, or John. Dawson who was an educated man of business, or Rev. James McGregor a pioneer missionary; but above all in the accidental sojourn of Rev. Thomas McCulloch, who had been designated as a missionary to his Scottish fellow-countrymen in Prince Edward Island. He it was who stirred his illiterate countrymen into action, provided the means of training against tremendous odds, produced a highly stimulating group of distinguished scholars, and left to Pictou county and the Nova Scotian Scots that intellectual tradition of which they are so justly proud. Here again Carlyle would have found a hero and named him King McCulloch. McCulloch arrived in 1803. He immediately identified himself with the problems of his adopted country, joined in the discussion of public questions, engaged in religious controversy, and established his reputation as a sound and fearless scholar, an energetic preacher, and a natural-born reformer. But his heart was in education. Through his advocacy, a society was formed as early as 1805 to collect funds for a college, and he himself opened a school to prepare pupils for the day of its establishment. When a grammar school was opened in Pictou under the Act of 1811, he became its principal, and was thus kept in training for the higher post. During all these years he kept the idea before his people, and, finally, in 1816, an act of incorporation for Pictou Academy was obtained. Classes were opened in 1817, and in 1818 they were transferred to their own building, the late Old Pictou Academy, when Dr. McCulloch gave an address on "The Nature and Uses of a Liberal Education." From this address much may be gathered as to the secret of McCulloch's power as well as to the nature of his problem. He had not only to finance and equip a college, but also to build anew a respect for education; and, like the early Church, he had to stoop to conquer: that is, he had to adulterate the pure ideal of education as an end in itself with the barbarian elements of

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education as a means to social and material advancement. It was the only way, and it succeeded. Hence the tradition of rising from the ranks by education, the indifference to flowers of scholarship, the tendency to concentrate upon the acquisition and diffusion of existing knowledge. Anyone who has read Mephibosheth Stepsure will not doubt that McCulloch's own scholarship would have mellowed like old port, had his powers unfolded in a more genial atmosphere; but, compelled as he was to teach Greek, Hebrew, Logic, Moral and Natural Philosophy and Theology, to preach every Sunday, to collect money for his college and specimens for his museums, to defend his institution against both external and internal foes, he paid the penalty of an overworked pioneer; and, while striving to raise his pupils to the standard of Glasgow University, he had to become something of a "crammer," unable to encourage that intellectual play without which education cannot be complete. But, despite these almost insuperable obstacles, he established a Iibrary, a museum and philosophical apparatus in Pictou; before the Mechanics' Institute, was founded in Halifax to the same end, he initiated a series of intellectual movements that have not yet spent themselves; and he moulded a generation of fellow Scots who as journalists, teachers, lawyers, scientists and clergymen made no small contribution to the intellectual awakening of Nova Scotia. With this brief allusion to Scottish immigration we must be content, for now we have discussed all the elements of our population that were active in the period under review. Ιn that period the national strains that formulated policy and dominated action were British and American. But, composed of these two peoples, there were two classes, at first in opposition but later in accord, that gave tone to society απd a stimulus to intellectual activity: the officials in Halifax, απd the merchants of the capital and the provincial towns. From the first the official class was in a favoured position. As men of breeding, educated in metropolitan centres, with a good income paid from the imperial treasury and supplemented by local fees, they were able to support their pretensions and indulge their tastes. However unpopular they became at times, they stood throughout the period as social models for envy or emulation; and they could always be relied upon to patronize intellectual activity in the capital at least, απd provided it did not show too independent a spirit. Above these officials and stimulating them were the more transient lieutenant-governors, military and naval officers and distinguished visitors, some of whom

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were men of scholarly attainments, all of whom were gentlemen.

It was largely to these transients that puritan Nova Scotia owed her early theatrical attainments, her market for books, pictures and expensive furniture, and her reputation for sophisticated entertainment. But it was the merchant classes who, in association with these transient and permanenrt officials, bridged the social gulf between them and the people, broadened the basis of culture, and informed the legislative action of the province. Like the higher officials, the merchants were at first transients and recognized neither racial nor religious lines. They traded where money was to be made, regardless of friend or foe, peace or war. But as time passed, a group of these settled and coalesced in Halifax, and began to interest themselves actively in the needs of their adapted country as well as in their own special problems. Like the American and British immigrants, of whom they were a part, they reared families that thought of Nova Scotia as home; and, as they were forced by the nature of their vocations to examine provincial and international conditions, they were the first to break through traditional modes of thought, to arrive at intelligent conclusions as to general policy, and to bring pressure upon local or imperial omcials to remodel economic or political systems. Though the transient character of the Nova Scotia merchants was most apparent prior to the American Revolution, they were prominent in the movement to secure a representative assembly in 1758, as well as in drafting the famous address to the British government in 1775. Between 1783 and 1804, they were gradually deciding for permanent residence, and they tended to associate more frequently in memorials or petitions to the local government on matters of commercial policy, particularly as to trade with the United States. During the Napoleonic wars and the War of 1812, their wealth and the speculative spirit Were increased by privateering, and they manifested something of the character of Englishmen in "the spacious days of Great Elizabeth." In this period there was a boom in shipbuilding, not only in Halifax but in every town that was conscious of its favourable situation. Ιn this period, too, the Mediterranean passes that were first asked for in 1766 were in frequent demand; and Nova Scotians in their own ships began to sail and to trade beyond Cape Finisterre, and to bring home both material and intellectual proofs of their ventures into the wide world of men and things. In these merchants formed an organization in Halifax

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and constituted an executive committee, the Committee of Trade, to watch over their interests and to correspond with the imperial government about commercial policy. They were at this time particularly concerned about the practical monopoly of the West Indian market that had been obtained by the American merchants under Jay's Treaty; and they were very anxious to point out that Nova Scotia was a place of importance worthy of the attention of the mother country. They said that since the American Revolution the influx 0f inhabitants "has promoted industry and domestic comfort, and a race of people born on the soil are becoming attached to it." Referring to the report of Titus Smith in 1802, they said `By a late survey of the interior of this province it is discovered that the lands are not only better than had been imagined, but superior to the greater pan of the rest of North America." After this expression of local patriotism, their memorial went on to ask for the exclusion of the United States from the West Indian market, in order to keep the Nova Scotian fishermen at home and to enable them to make a livelihood there. Two years later, these merchants took the lead in organizing the other British North American traders, and the British merchants interested in North American trade, to unite with them and thus to bring collective pressure upon the British government. It is impossible here to follow their activities further than is necessary to suggest their leadership and influence. By 1813 they were writing direct to Lord Bathurst, urging that, in the future treaty of peace with the Americans, the fisheries and the West Indian trade be not surrendered as they had been in Jay's Treaty. In 1814 they induced the local assembly to make similar petition. In 1817 they made another elaborate memorial to the local government for transmission to headquarters, in which they reviewed the history of the fisheries from 1749 to date, described the American competition and technique, and asked for encouragement by bounties, on the ground that they were no insignificant people. "There are," they said, "now people of extensive capital in the province who were bom in it and are consequently attached to the soil and not like those poor emigrants, who were many of them originally overpersuaded to come to a new country, then left it on the occurrence of the first obstacles with which disease or war afflicted them." By 1819 these merchants had succeeded in stirring both council and assembly into action on the Convention of 1818 with the United States; and, on that occasion, the local govern-

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ment tried to unite the governments of all the other colonies in a joint effort to influence both the imperial and the foreign policy of the mother country. Three years later, in 1822, the Halifax Chamber of Commerce took the place of the Halifax Committee of Trade, and during the next ten years they were extremely active in both political and economic matters. At the same time, while accumulating wealth and influence, they built new homes, imitated the official classes in acquiring country residences, and commenced their career as patrons of literature and the arts. Having noticed the varied and active elements of our population, and projected their characteristic tendencies into the period of intellectual activity between 1812 and 1835, when the nativeborn Nova Scotian, English, American and Scottish began to emerge ín the full flush of self-conscious manhood, let us review the spirit of the age, the activities that were in progress, and the ideas that were in the air, when Howe stepped forward to personify this spirit, to co-ordinate these activities, to vitalize these ideas, and to become the characteristic Nova Scotian. The rapidly increasing population had forced enquiry as to the quantity of vacant land that was available for immigrants, and also as to the use that was being made of the land previously granted to individuals or groups. Much of this preempted land had already been escheated for the loyalists; but, at this time, the old Philadelphia grant and the Douglas grant were revested in the crown, and new settlements were made there as well as in other parts of the province. Similar curiosity was roused as to the natural resources of the province as a whole. Agriculture, fishing, Iumbering and shipbuilding forged ahead; and the minds of the young Nova Scotian were quickened both by economic rivalry and by the literature of knowledge that was written about their province and its industries. The unsettling and hazardous nature of the lumbering industry, as contrasted with farming, brought from the pen of McCulloch Μephibοsheth Siepsure, in which, by a series of humorous letters, he tried to teach the settlers in Pictou the principles of perseverance and thrift. Defective knowledge of comparative agriculture and the defective technique of Nova Scotian farmers inspired John Young, like IcCulloch an educated Scottish immigrant, to write his Letters of Agricola; and they in turn led to the formation of a central agricultural society with numerous local branches, to foster knowledge and improve technique. Both MephibDsheth 5w psure and the Letters of Agricola appeared in the Αcadian Recorder, which at that time was a par-

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venu paper, having been founded in 1813, just in time to take part in the intellectual awakening. When the Acadian Recorder first appeared, there were already three newspapers of the old style printed in Nova Scotia — the Gazette, the Journal and the Weekly Chronicle. They led a placid existence, and lived in almost perfect harmony with one another and with the administration of their day. But, with the advent of the Recorder in 1813, and the Free Press in 1816, something of the modern unrest was projected into our life. Letters, discussions, controversies began to quicken the interest of the reading public and to increase the demand for reading matter. In less than twenty years, the number of newspapers in Nova Scotia had increased to nine: six in Halifax, two in Pictou, and one in Yarmouth. The geographic distribution of these papers is significant. Yarmouth, representing the American end of the province, had become a great shipbuilding centre, and responsive to changes in public opinion. There, an unsuccessful attempt had been made to establish a paper in 1827; in 1831 the Yarmouth Telegraph had embarked on a brief career; but in July, 1833, the Yarmouth Herald appeared, and it has continued to this day. In Pictou, which was predominantly Scottish, the Colonial Patriot was successfully launched, on December 7, 1827. It gave voice to the Scottish radicalism of the province, and played no small part in the initiation of reform. Did not the great Howe himself say: "The Pictou scribblers have converted me from the error of my ways"? The more conservative Scots found satisfaction in the Pictou Observer, which was founded in 1831. In Halifax, the Weekly Chronicle had beenre-issued as the Acadian in 1827; and, in 1828, the Novascotian or Colonial Herald, which had been founded in 1824 by G. R. Young, son of Agricola, was purchased by Joseph Howe, who made of it the leading newspaper in British North America. In the period under review here, the Novascotian was just beginning to overshadow all its contemporaries, both rural and urban; but, with the favourable result of the libel action in 1835, when it succeeded in establishing the freedom of the press, it was ready to spur the legislature on to that constitutional freedom with which the name of Howe is inseparably connected. In fact, the Novascotian was so comprehensive in its contents, so ably edited, so well written, and so widely circulated, that it pushed off the market the two ambitious magazines that struggled for place and fame between 1826 and 1833 — the Acadian and the Halifax Monthly.

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These two magazines were symptomatic of the intellectual awakening of the age, both in their aspirations and in their temper. Between 1811 and 1826, three educational acts had been passed to establish a grammar school in every county and a common school in every community. Though the aim of these acts had not been attained, considerable progress had been made; and, at the top of the educational pyramid, King's College and Pictou Academy were training students, who were eager to test their powers in the school of life. In 1822 public subscription libraries had been opened in Yarmouth and Pictou, preceding by only twelve years those literary and scientific societies which were established in both places in 1834. In 1824, the Halifax Public Library appeared; and in 1831 the Mechanics' Library and Institute. The first lecture in the Institute was given in January, 1832; and, during the next quarter of a century, every phase of literature and science was discussed in this institute, which might well have been called the University of Halifax. From the parent organization branches spread to Dartmouth, Upper Stewiacke and Truro. In 1832 a petition was presented to the legislature by Doctors Carritt, Gregor, James, Bishop and Stirling for aid in establishing a medical school in Halifax; and in 1834 the Halifax Athenaeum was founded. It was while these activities were in progress, meeting to some extent the demands for adult education, that the new magazines made their appearance. The Acadian Magazine or Literary Mirror began in July, 1826, and ran almost two years. Its aim was to advance the literary standing of Nova Scotia, and to efface the impression that "we were comparatively ignorant and barbarous." The editor was hopeful that the growth of schools, colleges, and libraries would kindle the literary ambitions of youth, and that the magazine would provide an outlet for talent. While admitting that a young country had little to offer to the antiquarian, he saw in Nova Scotia a great future, fit subject to call forth "the ardor of the patriot and the exertion of the philosopher." The earlier numbers of this magazine contained many selected articles; but in January, 1827, the editor rejoiced that he was able to issue a complete number of original articles, despite the prophecies of his critics that be would have to rely upon "casual foreign supplies for men of talent and genius." Though this proved a unique instance, the Acadian was more nearly a native product than the earlier Nova Scotia Magazine had been. The editor sought local descriptions and embellishments; and

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contributions came to him from all over the province, in both prose and verse, narrative, descriptive and controversial. An article on the characteristics of Nova Scotia by Peter and Paul deserves much more notice than Ι can afford to give it. It pulsates with local patriotism. The writer boasts of the number and quality of the local periodicals, of the many signs of literary talent, the poetry already produced, the history that was about to be written (no doubt that of Haliburton), the libraries that had been established "to light the path of scientific research," and of the political results that were already apparent from this "universal endeavour to arouse the human mind." "At our elections," he writes, "it is a transporting sight to the pure and incorruptible patriot to behold the unsubdued spirit of independence struggling with the cold and almost irresistible piercing elements of poverty; for neither the appalling apprehensions of a bailiff, nor the peculiarly terrific horrors of a dungeon, can overcome the inflexible firmness of a Nova Scotian's political spirit." The Acadian Magazine ceased to be a literary mirror in 1828, but was succeeded by The Halifax Monthly in 1830. The latter followed much the same policy as its predecessor, and strove to evoke local talent. It is remarkable as a reflexion of the contemporary local interest in natural history and the natural resources of the province. It printed in full many of the literary and scientific lectures that were given in the Mechanics' Institute; and it published critical accounts of the various educational systems of the day: the Madras and Lancaster systems, and Jacotot's system of universal instruction. It was alert to progress in the world of commerce and indusry, and it paid considerable attention to the legislative activity of the local assembly. It deplored the friction that existed between town and country, and championed the cause of the capital with considerable spirit. On the whole, it was an interesting, gossipy, and representative magazine, which did credit to its day and generation, and reflected adequately the intellectual state of Nova Scotia one hundred years ago — when poets, essayists, journalists and historians, artists, educators, controversialists and politicians strove with or against one another to lift Nova Scotians to the level of their fellow countrymen overseas. Ιn a critical review of an exhibit of pictures in Dalhousie College in 1831, the writer finds the exhibit so creditable to the province that he is willing to compare the artistic productions of the 13,000 Haligonians with those of any other cross-section of the British Empire that has a like number of inhabitants. With this proof of the intellectual awakening of Nova Scotia before the Age of Howe, I must rest my case.

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Between 1812 and 1835 then, it is clear that Nova Scotian as such were emerging, rubbing the sleep out of their eyes and facing their own problems, in various ways, but with disdernment and energy. They were conscious that they were Nova Scotians; but they would have found it as difficult to conventionalize a type as we to-day find it difficult to define a Canadian. In this respect they and we are not unique. "Show me a typical Englishman," said an American tourist to the late Master of Balliol, as he pointed to a group of students who were filing out of a lecture-room in Oxford. "They are all typical Englishmen," replied Mr. Smith. So it was with the Nova Scotian. If one had pointed to an Acadian from Clare, would not he have said, "I am the true Nova Scotian by right of birth"? If one had pointed to a foreign Protestant from Lunenburg, would he not have said, "I am the Nova Scotian par excellence, because its history and geography have transformed me from a landlubber into a first-class fisherman"? But it is not of these that Peter and Paul think, when they are writing on the characteristics of Nova Scotia, for the Acadian Magazine. Nor is it of them that Howe thinks, when he says: "You who owe your origin to other lands cannot resist the conviction that, as you loved them, so will your children love this: and though the second place in their hearts may be filled by merry England, romantic Scotland or the verdant fields of Erin, the first and highest will be occupied by the little province where they drew their earliest breath, and which claims from them filial reverence and care." Nor was it of these that Haliburton thought, when he made Sam Slick the hero of his Nova Scotian satires as unconsciously as Milton made Satan the hero of Paradise Lost. Rather, it seems to have been inevitable that the Nova Scotian character should have been moulded by American and British experiences, and that the social heritage of the Nova Scotian should have been a far from uniform blend of American and British characteristics. It was inevitable, too, that the process of blending, the clash of two civilizations in a new environment, should produce a new and distinctive personality. The two great interpreters of their generation, Haliburton and Howe, both realized this; and each in his characteristic way expressed it. Haliburton, when his American mood of boasting was uppermost, spoke of the Nova Scotian as half Yankee, half English, the best product of his race. Howe, speaking in a diplomatic strain of the three great branches of the British race, the people of Great Britain, of the United States and of British North

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America, pleaded for unity of ideals coupled with diversity of character, in these words: "The clover lifts its trefoil leaves to the evening dew; yet they draw their nourishment from a single stem. Thus distinct and yet united, let us live and flourish." Both these great Nova Scotians spoke before we had become Canadians, but their words still have meaning, and today we should not forget that one hundred years ago Nova Scotians had already prepared themselves by intense economic and intellectual activity for the greatest achievement of their history, when with Howe as primus inter pares they formulated the principles by which part of the British Empire has since been transmuted into the British Commonwealth. Ιn fact, they left little for this generation of Nova Scotians to do, except, perhaps, to find that four-leaf clover, which will include the rest of humanity along with the three great branches of the British race.

The Politics of the Timber Trade in Colonial New Brunswick, 1825-40 W. S. MAC NUTT

The politics of colonial New Brunswick have defied the attempts of historians to generalize. Professor Lower has referred to their occult and questionable character. They are distinguished by an absence of that doctrinal abstraction which makes the Canadian and Nova Scotian stories relatively easy to follow. There were no seers and prophets like Baldwin and Howe to simplify the issues. It is the purpose of this article to show that the lack of cohesion in New Brunswick politics, the shifting cleavage of opinion, were owing to the nature of the New Brunswick economy — that it was the politics of the timber trade which determined the course of events during the period under review. The thesis might be stated in a more general way to the effect that the struggle for the control of crown lands, upon which the timber trade was dependent, forced all other issues far into the background. While in 1837 Canadian Reformers were concerned with the application of a new principle of government, the merchant democrats of New Brunswick were achieving a victory in the economic field which made remaining discontents seem abstract and impractical. It has been said that during the Napoleonic Wars seventeentwentieths of the New Brunswick population were dependent upon the timber trade for their maintenance. For the twenty-five years following the Treaty of Vienna, while the population was more than doubling, there is no reason for greatly reducing this estimate. The specific factors responsible for the growth of the trade were the preference for colonial timber which amounted to 45s. per load of 50 cubic feet and the high tariff charge upon foreign timber admitted to the United Kingdom. This tax had been imposed during the war for revenue purposes and was maintained virtually unaltered for twenty years after the peace. Source: Canadian Hístaricai Review, XXX (March, 1949), 47-65. Reprinted by permission of the author and the University of Toronto Press.

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It completely eliminated Baltic timber from the expanding markets of industrial Britain which became the purlieu of exporters from British North America. Though the colonial product could not equal the quality of Baltic timber for frame building, it was considered superb for interior fitting and wainscoting.) Nova Scotia and Canada shared in this development but not to the very great degree to which all New Brunswick, with the exception of the southeast corner adjacent to Nova Scotia, participated. The statistics show that the West Indies market offered temporary distractions only, that the fisheńes, providing seasonal employment to coastal dwellers, were of secondary importance, that agriculture almost perished. It was the timber trade which paid for the great importations of food and hardware necessary to an expanding society on wilderness soil. It was the products of timber, the ships, which, by sale in the harbours of the United Kingdom and by the charges earned in the carriage of freight, invisibly redeemed the heavy balance of trade against the colony. The all-consequence of the timber trade is well revealed by the province-wide celebrations which occurred in 1831 when the British government was defeated in the House of Commons on a proposal to increase the duty on colonial timber. While effigies of noble lords prominent in promoting the measure were blazing above them, citizens of Fredericton roasted and ate oxen in the streets. At St. Andrew's the exuberant populace, amid toasts to the Glorious Forty-Six majority of members against the measure, towed a Baltic-built ship into the estuary of the St. Croix and there blew her up with gunpowder, "with very pretty effect."2 With the close of the Napoleonic Wars, the trade had begun to spread to every part of the province. The lower St: John Valley, owing to the very selective requirements of the timbermen, was even at this early stage regarded as a worked-out area.a Interest quickly developed in the almost unexplored north where plundering parties of Americans had long been operating without permanent settlement. It was Allan Gilmour, a merchant of Glasgow, who, deprived of his sources of supply in Poland and Finland by the operation of the continental blockade and later εΡ A good summary of the history of the timber duties and a review of their effects is to be found in the evidence of J. D. Hume and others, given before the Select Committee for Taking Duties on Timber. See Brlilsh Parliamentary Papers, 1835. ' Si. John Courier, Apr, 30, 1831. a For the manner in which New Brunswick was supplanted by Lower Canada as a source of masts for the Royal Navy, see R. G. Albion, Forests and Sea-Ροωσr (Cambridge, 1926).

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by the competition of Baltic shippers, first established permanent, large-scale operations on the Miramichi. Between 1823 and 1831 his series of reconnaissances, "to visit the navigable rivers, tο see where the forests were," resulted in the founding of the firms of Gilmour, Rankine and Company of Miramichi and Bathurst, Robert Rankine and Company, Sant John, and Arthur Ritchie and Company, Restigouche. With additional satellites at Quebec and Montreal, he handled in his best days three hundred cargoes of timber annυaIΙ}~, some on his own account and others on contract, which were dispersed tο every port of the United Kingdom.' About the same time, Joseph Cunard established himself as emperor of the right bank of the Miramichi which, as early as 1825, could claim pride of place over the St. John Valley both for the quantity and the quality of its timber. The great fire of that year forced the tímber.frontier northward and Bathurst became a port of consequence. In the early eighteen-thirties, the operators were moving up the Restigouche in search of the ever-scarcer pine groves. By 1840 it was said that the only good timber left in New Brunswick was to be found in the disputed territory, an economic factor which has not received its due account. For in New Brunswick, the issue in contention with the United States was seen as the trade of Fredericton versus that of Bangor. Had it not been for the trade in spruce deals which -attained sudden prominence in 1833 and which led to the erection οf hundreds of sawmills, timber might have ceased to be a factor of major importance. Control of the trade inevitably fell into the hands of those few individuals who could guarantee delivery of large quantities trimmed to the specifications of the importers in the United Kingdom. Thus the bulk οf the trade of the Miramichi, Nepisiguit, and Restigouche gravitated towards either one of the arch-rivals, Alexander Rankine, Gilmour's deputy, or Joseph Cunard. The numerous middlemen who did business with the timber-gangs were in the camp of one party or the other. Newcastle and Chatham became the capitals of contending factions whose rivalry originated in trade but extended into politics and religion. Their "collisions" in the woods form a large part of the legend of the Miramichi. The trade of the St. John Valley was more widely dispersed, but ultimate control lay with the merchants of Saint John, a city which attained dizzy heights of optimism with the expansion of timber but which recoiled into For Gilmour's own account of his work see British Ρarltαmertary Papers, 1635, MinuteS of Evidence, Select Committee for Taking Duties on Timber.

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equally abysmal depths of disaster when the trade encountered adversity. Concentration upon timber was so general that agriculture, despite ofńcial concern, barely survived. The populous localities such as Saint John and the Miramichi towns imported virtually all food-products necessary to their sustenance chiefly from the United States, to which the specie of the province was invariably drawn. Time and time again the statisticians emphasize this vital point. It was soberly estimated that the imperial duties on wheat, flour, and salted products, which had been removed from the Canadas, were alone responsible for enabling agriculture to yield its wretchedly poor volume of products, most of which were marketed in the areas in which they were produced .5 The merchant community of Saint John, which was anxious to import everything the province consumed, as well as to export everything it produced, opposed these duties consistently.& Similarly the lumbering interests opposed the bounties which the provincial legislature paid on fish and farm-products. Through their hands passed a ceaseless turn-over of goods, going both ways, from which they could extract a two-way profit. This was the condition which they had established for themselves απd which they hoped to extend. Such a condition made the calling of "store-keeper" a highly lucrative one; απd the men who came to the fore in New Brunswick during this period, if they were not of the legal profession, were of this calling. "The merchants and shippers derive profits from the very causes which suppress agriculture in New Brunswick."7 Of the effects of the timber trade upon the generality of the inhabitants, it is possible to write with confidence. It was the rare farmer indeed who devoted himself to agricultural pursuits for twelve months of the year. The seductions of the woods were not confined to immediate cash returns. There was the lure of an adventurous life and good companionship opposed to the solitary and patient toil of the farm. Moralists of the period point to the general intemperance of the lumbermen and their idle frittering away of profits. For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that the system of "open accounts" maintained with the merchants, by which parties were outfitted and provisioned in the autumn on credit with interest of 35 οr 40 per cent, rendered 5 P.A.C., C.D. 188, Harvey to Glenelg, May 18, 1838. • P.A.C., C.O. 61, Petition of St. John Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 6, 1837. + P.A.C., C.O. 189, The memorial of Marcus Gunn, Aug. 14, 1835. Dispatches received (enclosure).

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very familiar the spectacle of the lumberman returning to his farm in early summer, wearing brightly checkered store clothes but without cash. On the pinching effect upon his farming operations, it is not necessary to dwell. Farmers make good lumbermen but lumbermen do not make good farmers.e Men of capital who attempted large-scale farming inevitably found themselves defeated by the higher wages paid to immigrants in the timber-trade or in the shipyards of Saint John. As only one-fifth of the total acreage of the province was held as private property, it was the ungranted domain of the crown which offered the greatest incentive to timber-hunters; and it was, the management of this domain which occasioned nine-tenths of the political grievances in New Brunswick during the period. After 1815 the imperial government took no direct interest in the forests and the first imposition of authority came in 1819 when the executive council of New Brunswick placed a duty of ls. per ton on timber cut on crown lands. Timbercruisers, who up to this time had freely roamed through the woods taking what they pleased, were compelled to come to Fredericton, state in advance how much timber they proposed to cut and in what locality, and stake bonds for the payment of the duty in the following spring. The legislature condemned the duty as the ruination of the trade. To the mercantile element it came as an immediate reduction of profit. But in spite of opposition and inefficiency in the manner in which the tonnage money was collected, the duty constituted the means by which a considerable fund was created. When Sir Howard Douglas arrived in the province in 1824 as lieutenant-governor, he found to his delight that upwards of £20,000 had accumulated in what was known as the casual and territorial revenue of the crown. It was free from interference by the legislature and gave to the government an increased degree of independence. For the othcial junta at Fredericton, the importance of the casual revenue vastly increased in 1830 when the imperial authorities placed upon it the charge of maintaining the civil list of government. How important it became as a factor in the politics of New Brunswick can best be appreciated by comparison with the yields from the crown lands of Nova Scotia and the Canadas. In 1824 also there appeared the man who for the next fifteen years was to be the central figure of New Brunswick politics. The letters of Thomas Saillie tell us that he was in the army • For an interesting presentation of the option which faced the New Brunswick farmer, see Mrs. F. Beaven, Life in the Beckwoods of New Brunswick (London. 1846).

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during the Napoleonic Wars, and that at the peace he entered the Colonial Office where he had a brother, George Baillie, one of the financial agents for the colonies. He ingratiated himself with Lord Bathurst who in this year offered him a consulship at Tunis. But he was persuaded to relinquish this post in favour of another nominee and by way of compensation was offered that of commissioner of crown lands and surveyor-general in New Brunswick. This transaction by which Baillie, in his own mind at any rate, established a claim of "vested right" in office, partly explains the strong hand he was able to play both at the Colonial Office and in the politics of the province in the years which lay ahead.° One of the last generation of colonial administrators appointed from the mother country, Baillie received an unfriendly reception upon his arrival in the province. The terms of his commission authorized him to exact fees which, if collected, would have reached monstrous proportions. But Douglas, exercising a politic discretion amid the bitter undercurrents of criticism and invective, effected a reorganization of offices one of the effects of which was the reduction to reasonable limits of Baillie's combined fees and salary as commissioner of crown lands only. In this transaction Baillie perhaps played up his role as One of magnanimous surrender, and thus further increased his claim upon the authorities at home. The reorganization, which also took away from the receiver-general the custody of the tonnage money and drastically reduced the importance of the office, antagonized Baillie with the influential Bliss connection of whom Judge John Murray Bliss was the leading protagonist and whose son, George Pigeon Bliss, occupied the οffice.l" Of Baíllie's character the principle qualities stated in his favour are those of frankness and liberality. Certainly he was a man of imagination who could speak of himself as "an estatekeeper of sixteen million acres." The unabashed accusation of dishonesty which Hannay, the historian of New Brunswick, makes against him cannot be borne by the judgment of his contemporay officials or the documentary evidence we possess Y Baillle's memorials are numerous and arc to be found throughout the whole of the official correspondence of New Brunswick during his years in office. C.O. 193/3 is a volume of his private papers. 10 Judge Bliss, during the brief period in which he administered the province in 1824, appointed his son to the office under terms of a very generous commission. Of the connexion, Lemuel Allan Wilmot, Charles Simonds, and Hugh Johnston were later to lead the legislative attack against Baillie.

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today.Σ1 His arbitrariness was based upon a conviction of the power of the prerogative and upon a determination to carry out the letter of his instructions. But there was a carelessness of administrative detail, particularly in financial matters, and too great a confidence in his subordinates which later exposed him to the merciless attacks of his enemies. He was probably garrulous, boastful, and vain. The anecdote related by Hannay, that he attempted to dress the personnel of his office in uniforms with brass buttons, is as good an indication as any of the hauteur which he introduced to the rugged Fredericton scene of 1824. His enemies could say that he enjoyed a princely salary; but his friends could reply that he spent it in a princely way. After the death of his first wife, Baillie in 1833 married the daughter of William F. Odell, the provincial secretary, and further cemented an affinity with this powerful official which had been steadily developing for years. During the lieutenantgovernorship of Sir Archibald Campbell (1831-7), a hero of the Burmese War and a man of stern tory conviction but retired habits, the province was governed by what might be called the Odell-Baillie clique. The salaries of the secretary and the commissioner far exceeded those of other officials, even that of the chief justice. This faet, extremely evident on the social front at Fredericton, steadily alienated from the compact the loyalist families on whom it might naturally lean for support. Of all the group of officials about the governor, Baillie was not the most judicious, but he was the most aggressive; and he had the power to influence the material fortunes of the entire province. Upon taking office, Baillie found the affairs af his department in chaotic condition. His insane predecessor, Lockwood, had been placing public money in his own pocket and spending it on a lavish scale. It seems clear that, during the interregnum prior to the arrival of Douglas, the administration had been the prey of local cabals."' There was no true record of what was crown land and what was private property. The calculations af the It J. Hannay, The History of New Brunswick (2 vols., Saint John, 1909), 11, 34.

n "Ι found the Crown Revenue in a very confused and extraordinary

predicament and have had a great deal of trouble and difficulty in clearing it from the complicarüns resulting from the fund having been first in the hands of a lunatic, then in those of a Receiver-General who was himself the Auditor-General and then in tite hand of Mr. Bliss, the late President's son, who refused to render any account lo the AuditorGeneral grid who had in his hands when 1 called him 10 account no less than nine thousand pounds of the public money." P.Á.C., C.Ο. 189, Dispatches Received, I840, Sir Howard Douglas to G. Baillie, Enclosure to G. /Wilee to Russell, May 19, 1840.

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unprofessional early surveyors were incomplete and inaccurate. The practice had been general of marking οff the fronts of land-grants from the rivers and streams along which they lay, a quick and easy method of measuring. But the side and rear lines were not marked off at all, a condition which explains the very large amount of litigation in colonial New Brunswick. Baillie's objective was the creation of an enlarged land office establishment which could rectify the errors and omissions of forty years and extend his authority to every corner of the province. During twelve years of office in which his power was steadily on the increase, it is fair to say that he largely succeeded. As the timber-trade recovered from the setback of 1826, his deputies pursued the operators to the furthest reaches of the four great rivers which drain northern New Brunswick. They enforced the edicts of the commissioner, exacted fees for making surveys, seized timber when it was illegally cut. Baillie himself was the supreme power. He made the legislation governing the timber-trade, he enforced his own legislation, he adjudicated upon disputes among the operators. Most important of all his offices was the receptacle for the tonnage money for which he was accountable to nobody but the lieutenant-governor. His functions were legislative, executive, judicial, financial, making him what his detractors called "a fourth branch of government." He could boast of having prosecuted many of the wealthy timbermen who sat in the legislature. Most significant of these prosecutions was that of Charles Simonds for trespass in Saint John in 1827, an action which commenced a vindictive personal enmity which finally was to be one of the major factors in destroying the ascendancy of Baillie and his associates. But the commissioner made himself a marked man for still another reason, one which antagonized not only the timber trade but those remnants of the colonial aristocracy who surrounded him in Fredericton. This was the enthusiastic support which he gave to the new policy of sale of crown land inaugurated by the Colonial Office in 1827 but not finally put into effect until 1831. The Downing Street officials, on the basis of floods of statistics of trade from Van Diemen's Land to Lake Huron, had reached a specific conclusion. Two conditions of life in the colonies had struck them as significant. These were the high wages of labour and the cheapness of land. The surplus and unwanted labourers of industrial Britain could, therefore, after a short period of apprenticeship in the colonies, buy from the crown the lands on which they should finally settle. Furthermore, if large expanses of crown lands should be sold, there would be created a fund

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which, safely invested in British government securities, could pay for the entire expenses of civil government. Criticism of the appropriations made for the support of the colonial government and church had been frequent and sharp in the House of Commons. The scrapping of the old system of free grants of land came as a rude shock to the loyalist families whose honourable traditions did not compensate for their disappointed expectations. For now they were confronted with the unfamiliar elements of capital, of which they had none, and speculation in land, which could change the entire social structure of the province. Sir Howard Douglas, whose name still bears a liberal reputation in New Brunswick but whose dispatches reflect the attitudes of the colonial aristocracy, bitterly opposed the new policy. For two years the law ofńcers of the crown, C. J. Peters and G. F. Street, forced a delay on the plea that what had been given under the -Sign Manual in 1784 could not be reversed by the mere instruction of a secretary of state in 1827. The entire bench of judges concurred in this opinion. The old system, though it failed for forty years to advance the settlement of the province, had been highly favoured. The timber-trade could exploit the ungranted forests; and officers of government could occasionally obtain free grants of land to hold until the great day should come when property values in New Brunswick should rise.la Baillie, and this is perhaps a testimonial to his courage, was the only man who said that the new policy would work. In the furore which broke out as the sale of crown Iands was finally ordered by the Colonial Office in 1831 and enforced by Baillie, the imposition of quitrents on granted lands was a matter of quite secondary importance. The failure of the policy of sale of crown lands was general throughout British North America. But in New Brunswick, Baillie produced for six years ample evidence of what appeared to be complete success.14 Revenue from sales steadily increased until, in the first six months of 1835, the casual revenue amounted to the unprecedented sum of £ 153,739.The explanation lies in the great prosperity of the timber-trade during the u In

1827, immediately before the sales policy was put into effect, Douglas bad procured grants of 2,000 acres for each member 01 the Council. 78 From 1831 to 1837 acreages sold in the various provmccs were as follows: New Brunswick, 694,180, Lower Canada, 371,015, Upper Canada, 95,775, Nova Scotia, 116,824. The New Brunswick total is excΙusiνε of the 500,000 acres sold to the Land Company. See P.A.C., C.O. 189, Dispatches Received, 1840, Return to an Address of the House of Commons, March 31, 1840,

POLITICS OF THE TIMBER TRÁbE IN

NEW

BRUNSWICK - 131

early and middle thirties. The demands of the British market could not be filled; and competition for valuable timber-bearing areas increased proportionately. These years of New Brunswick history reflect a frontier optimism. Information concerning the location of mill-sites or of pine groves was at a premium. Employees of the crown land office embarked on enterprises of their own. The story was current that a clerk in 166 ie's οffiεe made £ I,000 in a single day by the purchase and resale of a single small tract of land. One of the most contentious cases to come before the council concerned the ownership of a few rocks at a narrow point on the Big Nipisiguit above Bathurst where a dam could be built under favourable cίrcumstaπces.Yδ The crest of the wave was probably reached early in 1836 when, after the failure of the cotton crop in the United States, British ships with empty holds called at Saint John for timber. The merchants of Saint John on this occasion, despite the agreement with the United States to the contrary, petitioned for the right to export timber which had been cut on the disputed territory.lø So long as these conditions prevailed, BailIie could steadily increase the upset pace asked at auction for tracts of crown land; he could select sites for mills, dams, and booms and value them at what seemed exorbitant prices. In the exercise of his functions as supreme arbiter there is evidence that he showed favouritism to privileged individuals.l? The infiltration of the province by American timber interests in these years was an important contributory factor to the temporary success of the land sales policy. In 1835 the land market in Maine was in an extremely buoyant state; and much of the enthusiasm and easy money came to New Brunswick. Maine timbermen, with allegedly unlimited sums of capital, appeared on the scene to take part in the onslaught on the forests. The position was at first complicated because the law did not permit aliens to hold lands in the province. Their naturalization could be achieved only by conformity to the Church of England. The first sales made to them were through British subjects as interCouncil Minutes, July 23, 1839.

Ibtd.. May 3, 1836. 1, A remarkable example of the questionable practices which prevailed at the Crown Lands Once was one investigated efter the arrival of Sir John Harvey, that of the sale of I,500 acres of land to Captain Eccles. It was divided into thirteen tracts in different parts of the province, "consisting of narrow strips with extensive fronts on the rivers, often embracing both sides of the stream, containing three islands and several mil privileges and other desirable sites." A part of the grant was resold to Beckwith, chief clerk in nettlé s office. PA.C., C.O. 188, Harvey to Gleneig with enclosure, Aug. 18, 1837.

332 — IΗΙSTOR;CA.λ.. ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

mediaries; and Campbell, getting wind of them, promptly cancelled them.i8 But two years later they were accepted with equanimity. There became general a feeling that American capital was necessary for the development of the country. Peters, the attorney-general, gave an opinion that only by the incorporation of Americans with British subjects in limited companies could their participation be made legal.12 By 1836 the organization of such limited corporations amounted to a mania. The names of lawyers and merchants who made up the legislature are to be found on the lists of shareholders. The most important of these promoters was Ernest H. Lombard, a professed American who had been driven from lumbering operations on the Aroostook, but one who said that British institutions were best. His formation of the Red Rapids Company which operated on the Tobique involved the purchase of 100,000 acres.29 In the southern part of the province, the leading spirit in the introduction of American capital was Moses H. Perley, a Saint John barrister of talent and energy, whose largest single enterprise was the Lancaster Milling Corporation at Musquash on the Fundy coast.2 Ι So quick was the swing of opinion in favour of American participation that Sir John Harvey, the lieutenant-governor, was willing, in the negotiations concerning the disputed territory, to concede to the United States the right of driving timber down the St. John.22 The timber interests could visualize an increase in the value of property along the banks of the river. Fredericton would become an entreρόt fir the Maine hinterland and Saint John the port of export. But these sanguine hopes were dashed by the general failure of American banks in 1837, the drying up of all credit, both real and fictitious, and the failure of many of the companies to complete their instalment payments on the purchase of land. Saillie himself could claim credit for the largest purchase of all. In 1831 he went to England in affliction for the loss of his first wife. But he spent a great deal of time at the Colonial Office; and he also had time to interest a number of London merchants, headed by John Labouchere, the brother of the undersecretary for the colonies, in the possibilities of speculation in colonial lands. The result was the formation of the New Brunswick and Nova Scotian Land Company which purchased in 1834 500,000 acres of land in York County along the northern boundary of P.A.C., C.O. 188, Campbell to Stanley, Jan. 7, 1834.

• Ibíd., Harvey ta Cleneig, June 29, 1837. P.A.C., Council Enclosures, 1834-6, Memorial of Lombard. *r P.A.C., Council Minutes, Feb. 13, 1836, with memorial of Perley. o P.A.C., C.O. 188, Harvey to Gleneig, Sept. 11, 1838.

POLITICS OF THE TIMBER TRADE IN NEW BRUNSWICK — 133

the parish of Queensbury. Mr. Secretary Stanley, in return for his beneficent services, was honoured by the selection of his name for the first settlement which resulted. Fishermen from Skye, who were failures, and English and Scotch borderers who were successful, constituted the new settlement. Kendall, the agent of the Company, became a source of additional strength to Saillie. The Royal Road to Stanley was built by the government and ultimately pushed through to Grand Falls, producing an increased value for the Company's holdings. The petition of the legislature in 1832, offering a fixed civil list in exchange for the surrender of the casual and territorial revenue, came at a time when the Colonial Office was negotiating with the newly-formed Land Company and when the activity of other speculators was beginning to jeopardize the position of those engaged in the timber trade. The 1833 brief which Charles Simonds and E. B. Chandler took to England, serves as an excellent catalogue of the grievances of the mercantile interests in New Brunswick at this period. Stanley reduced it to eight essential points. Of these, seven are concerned with crown lands and timber and best illustrate the nature of Baillie's administration. The most specific of the complaints was directed against the timber monopolies of Joseph Cunard who in 1830 had been granted reserved rights to all the timber above the falls of the northwest Miramichi. In the following two years these rights had been extended to the Nipisiguit for a period of ten years' duration?$ The effect was to drive the independent operators into the more inaccessible regions of the north or to draw them into the coils of Cunard's commercial empire. The brawling timbermen of Bathurst and the Miramichi indulged in a series of disorderly meetings; and petitions were presented to both the provincial and imperial authorities.24 Alexander Rankine, who had at first joined in the policy of monopoly and had received favours from Saillie but later abandoned them because of public clamour, The documents relative to Cunard's monopolies are to be found in the Minutes of the Executive Council, 1833. One of the most downright of the many violent memorials against Baillie was thαt of Hugh Munro, dated from Bathurst, Dec. 17, 1832: "If we can turn our eyes 4o the more than Siberian tyranny by which this land has been polluted these twelve years past, and hear the screaming yells of tribes of oppressed lumbermen to attest the fact from every quarter thαt a pine tree was manufactured in the Province, the poor emigrant and resident bartering for a location and the widow and orphan bringing up the rear, supplicating this demagogue, all this is no credit to our boasted freedom and from its character must be a stranger to our constitutIOn."

134— HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

appeared as the champion of the independent men and accompanied the delegation to London, threatening to withdraw his firm and its large investments of capital from the province. Baillie's plea in defence was that it best suited the interests of the crown to deal with larger operators who possessed capital, that capital was necessary to construct sluices around the falls of rivers and for the removal of obstacles in their beds, and that he could not with confidence deal with the smaller operator. But since Cunard himself had not carried out two of the conditions of the monopoly — the sluicing of the Miramichi falls and the removal of rocks from the bed of the Nipisiguit — there came from Stanley a gentle instruction to the effect that Mr. Cunard must yield his reserves.25 Highly characteristic of problems of the timber trade was that of water-lots or of what Baillie preferred to call wharf-lots. In 1802 the pre-loyalist firm of Simonds, White, and Hazen had obtained property rights over their extensive waterfront in Saint John harbour to low watermark and had established a precedent which other merchants might seek to emulate. They were able to interfere with the seagoing activities of other firms, to stop the casual activities of fishermen, and to halt the driving of timber and the erection of booms in front of their highly advantageous location. The case had been a source of ceaseless irritation to the Common Council of Saint Jοhn.2t But it was a very notable exception to the usual terms of land-grants which were limited at high watermark, Baillie seized this excellent opportunity of adding to the casual revenue. Merchants whose lands were bounded by seas and rivers, he said, certainly could make use of the water in front of their properties. But they had no right to erect wharves, dams, and booms on those same waters. Thereupon, he proceeded to sell at auction the "wharf-lots" in front of the properties of merchants of the timber communities on the Miramichi and the Restigouche and at Bathurst. He sold what had been known as the public Ianding at St. Stephen. Men who had long been established in such locations were compelled to pay high prices for the privilege of preventing others from blocking their access to the vital sea or river-front. Charles Simonds, a scion of the firm so closely involved in the controversy, placed the matter so forcefully before Stanley during the London interviews that he yielded completely on the point. It would be best, he instructed Campbell, to quiet the P.A.C., C.O. 189, Stanley to Campbell, Aug. 17, 1833. m. See Baillie, Observutfons on the Evidence Brought before the Committee on Grievances (Fredericton, 1833).

POLITΣCS OF THE TIMBER TRADE íN NEW BRUNSWICK - I35

apprehensions of owners of land by making low watermark the boundary of all existing grants. The law officers of the crown would draft a bill and send it to New Brunswick. Later he was compelled to retract. The law officers could not contrive to draft a bill which would both protect the water-rίgbts of propertyholders and at the same time guarantee the uninterrupted navigation of rivers. The remaining complaints, all pointing to the desirability of surrendering the crown lands to the charge of the legislature, may be summarized in the allegation that Baillie had "more power than a British subject should possess:" His deputysurveyors, whom he now called rangers but whom the Courier designated "harpies," had the trade under rigid control. Ιn order to pay for the increased establishment he had created, he imposed in 1831, contrary to the cautions of Campbell and the Colonial Office, an extra stumpage duty of 3d. on the ton, making the total ls. 3d. This extra charge, categorically described in the Courier as the Secret Service Fund, in addition to increasing overhead costs in the trade, enabled Baillie still further to enlarge his administrative machinery, the weight of which told more and more heavily. Cases of imposition of double duty for unlicensed cutting became more frequent. There were multiplying cases of unfair charges, of carelessness in laying out the timber berths, of malpractice in the land office at Fredericton. Baillie defended himself by drawing comparisons with charges upon the timbermen of Maine where both the price of land and tonnage duty were three to four times higher than in New Brunswick. Why could not the lumbermen of New Brunswick, with the advantage of magnificent rivers as conveyors of their products, pay prices equal to those of Maine? Α perhaps more pointed retort was that a single tree, 24 inches in diameter, would pay for the acre of land on which it stood. The 1833 brief resulted in the breaking of Cunard's monopoly and other secondary gains for the legislature. But on the essential issue, the surrender of the crown lands, the principle of which the Colonial Office had long been willing to accept, nothing was accomplished. The negotiations bad broken down on the question of whether or not the payments of the Land Company should be included in the surrender. Simonds and Chandler were informed that the complaints against Baillie were really directed against the policies he had been instructed to enforce. But the issue was firmly drawn. For the next four years, two political parties of fixed conviction contended in New Brunswick. Ιn power there were Odell and Baillie, with the close

136 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

support of Peters and Street, and with a following who benefited by their patronage. About Fredericton and throughout York County they were firmly entrenched. On the Miramichi they could count on the serried mass of Cunard's dependents. They were called the "official" party but the word Tory appears to have been used only rarely. The family relationship between Odell and Baillie was the only justification for the use of the term "Family Compact" which, with much greater accuracy, could have been applied to the leaders of the Opposition. The drawingrooms of Government House were available for their councilsof-war; and the dispatches of Campbell, ringing with contempt for the merchant-democrats of the legislature, reveal how completely he was subject to their influence. Of the Opposition, the merchants of Saint John constituted the backbone. As older men were removed by death, Charles Simonds, the leader of the mercantile community in the seaport city and the speaker of the legislature, grew in stature as leader of the popular front. His support throughout the province was general. Of democratic sentiment but of dictatorial methods, attempting to preserve the monopoly of the Bank of New Brunswick at Saint John while breaking Baillie's monopoly at Fredericton, a member of the Church of England who could with propriety preside over Wesleyan meetings, Simonds was an outstanding representative of a familiar type, a politicallyminded merchant who could iήentify public good with private gain. He marshalled the majority of the legislature with firmness; and recalcitrant members were frequently threatened with expulsion. As the struggle came to a close, he secured the moral backing of the younger Ward Chipman, the chief justice, who as an elder statesman exerted great influence from the presidency of the legislative council. Jn the legislature there was a familiar cry, that no official should receive a salary greater than that of the chief justice. Simonds profited enormously by two omissions of the ` οfficia1" pal-ty. They failed to contest seats in the legislature; and they failed to establish a press which could influence public opinion until it was too late.27 The Courier, in violent weekly articles, was concentrating attention upon the exclusive, arbitrary, and irresponsible proceedings of the Government. As rival to the literary achievements of Howe in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick can offer only the weekly wit of John Gape, who poked fun at the mistakes, delays, and incapacities of Baillie and *7 The St. John Weekly Chronicle, published by Lewis W. Durant, was

not established until 1836.

POLITICS OF THE TIMBER TRADE IN NEW BRUNSWICK — 137

his minions of the land οffice.28 It was the literature of revolt couched in the plain politics of the woods. The mounting barrage of invective, directed against Baillie and managed by Simonds from his position as generalissimo of the legislature, required outside assistance before the final victory could be won. It was events in Upper Canada which supplied the leverage. The 1835 instructions to Sir Francis Head, published in the Toronto press and eagerly scanned in New Brunswick, together with what seemed the clear determination of Glenelg to pacify the North American colonies, inspired the legislative delegation of 1836. William Crane, a wealthy merchant of Westmoreland County, and Lemuel Allan Wilmot, that prodigious young man of thirty whose five-hour declamations could thrill and enchain the legislature, were sent to London. The events from midyear, 1836 to July, 1837, are too crowded and detailed to record here. Campbell received instructions to yield on the demand of the legislature. "Considerations applying not only to New Brunswick but also to the other British North American Provinces also require that no time be lost in giving general publicity to the proposals which you are authorized to make. It is my wish that no needless reserve be practiced on this occasion."29 Drafts of three bills to transfer the crown lands to legislative control, in return for a permanent civil list of £ 14,500, were sent from England. The legislature assembled on December 20, 1836. But Campbell, obstinate and frigid though the tide was running so strongly against him, refused assent to the enacted bills. His principal excuse was that no suspensory clause, reserving the acts for the royal pleasure, had been added. There were other reasons which seem trivial in view of the great issues involved, but which were important in protecting the interests of office-holders. Amid a blaze of vituperation from both sides, the legislature was prorogued on March 5, 1837. New petitions were drafted, one asking for Campbell's recall. Crane and Wilmot re-embarked for England. In the days of the government's defeat and discomfort, its strong man was George Frederick Street, the solicitor-general, who pursued the delegation to Whitehall to tell Campbell's side of the story. He did not hesitate to challenge the right of the crown to alienate its The writer of the John Gape articles was Robert Gowen, a Scot who came to Fredericton in 1820 as a drummer-boy in the 74th Regiment. At the time the articles were written he was an accountant in the Central Bank at Fredericton. P.A.C., C.O. 189, Glenelg to Campbell, Sept. 10, 1836.

138 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

domain 8Ó a cause which the exponents of the prerogative had twenty years before abandoned in Britain. But the charge of the Opposition, that Campbell was playing for time in hopes that the Melbourne government wουld fall, seems a reasonable one. In that difficult year of 1837, Glenelg was determined that there should be one contented province in British North America. Upon their aria! at London, Crane and Wilmot had no necessity for protest. The "misunderstandings" and "painful position" of Sir Archibald Campbell, whose resignation was received as they reached London, were righted by the appointment of Sir John Harvey who was yearning for a wider field of endeavour on Prince Edward Island. His instructions rendered certain the triumph of the legislature. No lieutenant-governor ever came to a province more certain of his line of duty than Sir John Harvey when he came to New Brunswick. As Sir Colin Campbell wrote from Halifax, it was all "cut and ready" for him'1 Wilmot was on his way back from London, bearing the palm of final victory for the legislature and with the promise of a commission as king's counsel for himself. Crane, certain of the quick passing of the contentious bills, had lingered behind to contemplate the wonders of railways and steam navigation. When he was tossed from the top of an overturned coach to suffer brain concussion and a broken arm the compassion of Glenelg, who seems to have genuinely admired these representatives of New Brunswick democracy, arranged fir him superior accommodation in a London nursing home. Harvey was a sanguine individual, ever prepared "intelligently to anticipate his instructions." He was a Whig appointee, and he identified the aspirations of the colonial reformers with those of the Whigs in Britain. His very brief residence on Prince Edward Island had persuaded him of the justice of escheat of the lands of non-resident proprietors. On his journey to Fredericton, instead of taking the Miramichi route as first intended, he came by Shediac—Saint John. Two days at Saint John commenced an affinity with Simonds which strengthened throughout his administration. Upon arrival at Fredericton, he did not hesitate to call the legislature for July 6, earlier than his instructions perLater in the summer Street was accused of being the author of a mischievous article in the Chronicle which asserted that the surrender of the Crown Lands had become invalid owing to the death of William IV. P.A.C., Letter-book of Sir John Harvey, Campbell to Harvey. May 17, 1837.

POLITICS OF THE TIMBER TRADE IN NEW BRUNSWICK — 139

mitred, overcoming the "constitutional" scruples of Odell and Baillie, "owing to the state of public excitement."82 This summer of 1837, ominous for the future of British North America, transformed New Brunswick from one of the most diflicult provinces to that of the most contented. The Civil List Bill became law and the crown lands subject to legislative control. Without waiting for the Royal Mandamus, Harvey called to the executive council Simonds, Hugh Johnston, and George Shore from the "popular party." Baillie was systematically degraded. A committee of the reformed council administered the crown lands and to this committee he became a simple instrument, losing his post as commissioner, his seat on the council, and suffering a one-third reduction in salary. For the next five years he was the victim of an inquisition, the details of which are not relevant here. Later in the year Odell offered his resignation from the executive council but it was finally rejected. The provincial secretary was regarded as too valuable a depository of local knowledge. George Frederick Street, taking a lawyer's objection to Harvey's summary methods of liberalizing the council, resigned his seat.83 The victory of 1837 made remaining discontents seem of trifling importance. For it inaugurated the rule of victorious timber-barons who held the seats of an all-powerful legislature. When Harvey transmitted the Blue Book early in 1838 he could honestly declare that it would be vain to search for grievances in New Brunswick. During the excitement of the winter, as the queen's troops had moved up the St. John Valley to Canada, the legislature had voted a grant to enable him to raise 1,200 volunteers for service in any part of America; and festivities had rung with toasts to the gallant militia of Upper Canada. Signal proofs of loyalty had not been wanting. Men who had gained so complete a victory, who had at their disposal a new source of vast revenue, were not disposed to accept with equanimity the advent of new constitutions. When Harvey came to New Brunswick in 1837, the surplus of the casual revenue was £ 153,700. When he left in 1841 it was gone and the province was quickly slipping into debt. Under these lush conditions Simonds and his fellow delegates went to Quebec in 1838 and assured Durham that all cause of friction between crown and people had been removed. Durham was so enthused that he could write that "the constitutional practice had been, in fact, fully carried into effect in this province; the Government *s Ρ.Α.C., C.I. 188, harvey to Glenclg, June I, 1837. $ P.A.C., Council Minutes, Aug. 19, 1837.

140 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

had been taken out of the hands of those who could not attain the assent of a majority in the Assembly, and placed in the hands of those who possessed its confidence."84 The constitutional principle may have been put into effect. New Brunswick unquestionably gained a long start over the other provinces in the movement towards responsible government. But responsible government had not come. For the plain men of the New Brunswick legislature, who had won out in the battle of the timber-trade, perceived one thing as they contemplated complete conformity with the British practice of government. Further progress towards responsible government, whatever it meant, included surrender of the initiative of money grants into the hands of a departmental executive. It meant partial surrender of control over the 14 million acres which they had so recently acquired for themselves. Here we have the explanation of the incoherent reception to the resolutions of Lemuel Allan Wilmot in 1840. That chapter in New Brunswick history, therefore, which might have corresponded with the story of Baldwin and Lafontaine in Canada, must be called the struggle for the initiative. The party which won the smashing triumph for reform in 1837 in large part became the reactionary party; and the final goal of responsible government was obscured for nearly twenty years amid the rivalries of parochial politics. The merchant politicians who held seats in an all-powerful legislature were not disposed to surrender direct control of the rich prize which they had won to the executive, whether the executive possessed their confidence or not.

g' Lord

Durham, Report on the AQuirs of British North America don, 1839), p. 69; reprinted in the Carleton Library, pp. 106-7.

(Lon-

Joseph Howe: Opportunist or Empire-builder? J. MURRAY BECK

The biographer faces a difficult task when he seeks to disentangle a politician's motives from his professed principles. In few, if any, cases can he use the methods of the psychoanalyst to assist him. Yet he ought not to dismiss summarily his subject's political ideals, simply because they might be predicated upon a desire for personal gain or advancement. It is this writer's opinion that Professor James A. Roy makes such an error in his volume entitled Joseph Howe: A Study in Achievement and Frustration,1 especially when he deals with Howe's quest for imperial office after 1855. Undoubtedly Professor Roy has grounds for becoming annoyed with Howe. In reciting his own accomplishments Howe was, on occasion, anything but modest; in the earlier stages of the quest the tone of his letters was, at times, irritatingly ingratiating; over an extended period he kept urging his clams with unashamed persistence upon any British minister who would listen. But although some of this may leave a bad taste, it is at least comprehensible, and perhaps even forgivable, when not divorced from the context in which it occurred. To present the complete picture, we must fit Howe's claims into a consistent concept of empire, which Professor Roy glosses over and minimizes. The result is that Professor Donald Creighton, perhaps following Roy, is led to the altogether one-sided conclusion that "poverty drove [Howe] into an unseemly hunt for jobs."2 Howe's claims for recognition were, to say the least, compelling. That he had passed his "whole life ... in the study of Colonial questions — in close observation of the working of Source: Canadian Historical Review, XLΙ (September, 1960), 185-202. Reprinted by permission of the author and the University of Toronto Press. t James A. Roy, Joseph Howe: A Study in Achievement and Frusiratlon (Toronto, 1935). 'D. G. Creighton, Dominion of the North, New edition. (Toronto, 1957), p. 250.

142 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

British American, and Colonial Institutions"3 in hardly a perversion of the truth. That he should stress his services as "the exponent and advocate of the new system of Administration that pervades British America, and which we call Responsible Government"" was entirely logical. Perhaps it was somewhat ungracious of him to assert that "mainly by my exertions, the Constitution of my Native Province was remodelled and established upon sound principles."5 Surely he was only a member of the team of Huntington, Uniacke, Doyle, and associates who worked towards that end. Yet in this team Howe was at least inter stellas lung minores rather than primus infer pares. For it was he who presented the practical case for responsible government to the authorities in London as no other Nova Scotian could have done it; it was he who by his extended tours to every hamlet throughout the province familiarized his fellow Nova •Scotians with the principles which the team was espousing; and it was certainly he who swung the balance in the closely contested, crucial election of 1847 and thereby made the inauguration of responsible government possible. Howe's assertion that he had "conducted the successful administrations of Sir John Harvey and Sir Gaspard Le Marchant"5 between 1848 and 1854 may also come as a surprise. For throughout this period the recognized leader of the government -- the title of premier bad not yet come into use — was ]awes B. Uniacke. But Uniacke's position carried with it little more prestige than that of any other executive councillor, and meant simply that he was the formal medium of communication between the executive council and the lieutenant-governor. Furthermore, the chief business of the provincial government was conducted in the omce of the provincial secretary headed by Howe, and in the eyes of Nova Scotian generally it was his administration, not that of the colourless Uniacke. Even in his relations with governors Harvey and Le Marchant, Howe was far closer to them than any other executive councillor, Uniacke included. Howe's reference to "a system of Public Works, devised by me, and now rapidly advancing"7 is likewise not exaggerated. For it was he who almost single-handedly persuaded the provincial legislature to initiate the building of railways as public * Public Archives of Canada, Howe Papers, VII, Howe to Russell (con. adantisi), Mach 15, 1855. Ibid., Howe to Moleaworth, Sept. 10, 1855. 'Ibid., Howe to Blackwood, Nov. 15, 1856. ' Ibid., Howe to Russell, Aug. 10, 1859. T Ibid., Howe to Blackwood, Nov. 15, 1856.

JOSEPH HOWE: OPPORTUNIST OR EMPIRE-BUILDER — 143

enterprises; it was he who after many setbacks arranged with British capitalists and the British government for the financing of the first Nova Scotian railways; and it was he who as first chairman of the Railway Board superintended both the planning of these works and their detailed execution. Under these circumstances Howe could legitimately tell the colonial secretary that at fifty years of age he had "exhausted the range of ambition" within Nova Scotia. To the ordinary run of man this would not have been serious; to the restless, inquiring spirit that was Howe it was something akin to catastrophe. For what appears to be a major deficiency in every biography of Howe to date is the failure to appreciate how much he was actuated by an irresistible drive to see, to know, and to participate. Wherever he went he took with him an almost insatiable curiosity to observe every form of human endeavour at first hand. Once having seen and learned, he was eager to offer his views to the responsible officials, even though the matter was no concern of his. Not until a serious breakdown took its toll of his magnificent physique in 1869 did he curtail his extensive peregrinations, and, Professor Roy notwithstanding, his intellectual curiosity remained undiminished to the end of his days. Α second characteristic of Howe which is insufficiently stressed was his almost reverential attitude towards British institutions and the British heritage. Hoore's loyalty for his native province may have approached fanaticism, but it in no wise exceeded his loyalty for the mother country. Howe, the son of a loyalist, was himself the loyalist par excellence. Going to England was, in his eyes, going home. Α Nova Scitian should look, not westward to the backwoods of Cιnada, but eastward to the heart of the Empire. In 1866 he wrote: "I am a dear lover of old England and to save her would blow Nova Scotia into the air or scuttle her like an old ship."8 But, as Dr. D. C. Harvey has pointed out, Howe had no difficulty in reconciling his local and imperial patriotisms. Ιn his mind any lack of harmony between Britain and her Empire could be overcome simply "by removing all survivals of the old Colonial system, not as a step towards separation from the British stream of thought and tradition, but rather that [colonials might feel themselves] in the midst of that stream, bearing [their] tributary contribution to the heart of the empire with gratitude and self-respect."9 ' 'bid., IX, Howe to Sir John C. D. Hay (private), Nov. 12, 1866. D. C. Harvey, Joseph Howe and Local Patriotism. An inaugural lecture published in pamphlet form (University of Manitoba, 1921), pp. 13-14.

144 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES It is this concept which governed Howe when he repliedle to the proposals of J. W. Johnston for the union of the British North American colonies in the Nova Scotian House of Assembly in February, 1854. In place of union, Howe called for the solution of pressing problems within the Empire. In particular, he pleaded with British statesmen to combine the intellectual resources of the colonies with those of the mother country for the government and preservation of the Empire. To promote this end he suggested, first, the representation of colonials in the British House of Commons. Put one or two Nova Scotian in the Commons, he said, and one British company would not continue to monopolize all the mines and minerals of the province as it had for thirty years; no minister would dare to bring down a reciprocity treaty which bartered away the fisheries of Nova Scotia without its being consulted; no ministry would think of withdrawing its guarantees to Nova Scotia for railway construction, thereby sullying the national faith. Secondly, Howe requested that energetic spirits in the colonies be permitted to participate in the government of the Empire. In only One respect did he envy the Americans — the boundless field of emulation and rivalry in which the poorest man in the poorest state might win the highest national honours.

The sons of the rebels are men full grown; the sons of the loyalists are not.... What national distinction ever lights upon British America? Has she ever supplied a governor to the Queen's widely extended dominions, a secretary, or an undersecretary of state? [lave we ever had a man to represent us in either House of Parliament or in any imperial department? How long is this state of pupilage to last? Not long. If British statesmen do not take this matter in hand, we soon shall. 1 yield to no man in respect for the flag of my fathers, but 1 will live under no flag, with a brand of inferiority to the other British races stamped upon my brοwt 1 Look at the organization of the Colonial Office! It governed forty colonies and had not a single colonial in it. The colonial secretary and the under-secretaries, despite their high attainments, had no personal knowledge of colonial public or social life, nor hold upon the affections of the people. Look at the governors! Their selection was confined to the circle of two small Ιο See Howes speech on "The Organization of the Empire" in .1. A.

Chisholm, The Speeches and Letters of Joseph Howe (Halifax, 1909), II, 261-95. ΙΙ Ibid., pp. 290-91.

JOSEPH HOWE: OPPORTUNIST OR EMPIRE-BUILDER — 145

islands, to old officers and broken-down members of Parliament, in every way inferior to leading spirits in the colonies. Talk of a union of the provinces! "What we require is union with the empire; an investiture with the rights and dignity of British citizenship ... how powerful this empire might be made; hοω prosperous in peace, hοω invincible in war, if the statesmen of England would set about its organization and draw to a common centre the high intellect which it contains."12 Just over a year later (March, 1855), while Howe was in the United States recruiting Americans for the British forces in the Crimea, word came that Lord John Russell had succeeded to the Colonial Office and that the under-secretaryships had not yet been filled. Howe immediately requested one of the appointments as evidence of "the announcement of a new policy by which the highest Civil employments of the Crown were to be thrown open to the Queen's Colonial subjects."19 Thus began, says Professor Roy, "one of the most humiliating and selfabasing dunníngs of Downing Street on record."14 At best this judgment seems somewhat harsh. Fifteen letters to the English officialdom over a six-year period hardly constitute a highly concentrated campaign of self-aggrandizement. Assembled and read together, they might tend to create the impression described by Professor Roy; scattered among hundreds of Ietters they reveal Howe the suppliant in a somewhat different light. Certainly the quest for imperial office was anything but uppermost in his mind, since he was constantly addressing himself to a host of other problems with all his accustomed vigour. Later students have magnified the intensity of the quest out of all proportion. The simple truth is that long experience had convinced Howe that the Colonial Office moved only under persistent urging; moreover, it required special efforts to keep one's claims under active consideration when three ministries and six colonial secretaries held office over a five-year period. Undoubtedly Howe made his request with all the less diffidence because Lord John Russell was colonial secretary. To him Howe had addressed letters on public questions as early as 1839 and their relations had long been characterized by the utmost frankness. On this occasion Russell could do little to assist him; he informed Howe that the vacancy at the Colonial Ofńce had been filled, that he agreed on the advantage of "holding out to men of capacity & character [in the colonies] the promise of an 12

Ibid., pp. 292, 295.

12

Howe Papers, 1/11, Howe to Russell, March 15, 1855. Roy, Howe, p. 200.

14

146 -- HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

honourable ambition in the Imperial service,"16 and that he hoped he might be of service to Howe in the future. Three months later Howe renewed his request in London itself, while he negotiated a loan for the Nova Scotian railways. Prior to a personal interview with Russell, he forwarded his speech on "The Organization of the Empire," which had recently been published in pamphlet form. In the accompanying letter he stated: "A Colonial Governorship, if there was a vacancy, I would not refuse."18 But clearly his heart was set on a position at the centre of the Empire and preferably in Russell's own office. He hoped eventually to win his way into Parliament and distinguish himself by the intelligent dispatch of the business entrusted to his care. Getting into Parliament first and aspiring to office afterwards, he admitted, was the ordinary rule, but perhaps it might be "waived in favour of a person who had held all the principal offices in his Province and served the Queen in other capacities." "To win a position here, in the heart of my fatherland," continued Howe, "is my highest ambition." Here is the key to an understanding of his quest for office. Legitimate ambition, not poverty, was the driving force behind it. As chairman of the Railway Board, Howe received excellent remuneration and, as he himself realized, would never be much better off so long as his assistance to the unfortunate always exceeded his means. Accordingly he saw in imperial office not the hope of financial rewards, but the high mission of improving the government of the Empire. His contacts with British statesmen had led him to conclude that he was in no way their intellectual inferior. His long experience, be felt, could be put to use in devising colonial constitutions and in generally improving colonial organization. His talents as a public writer might be "turned to account in the controversies which perpetually arise" in government.17 As usual, the reply was gracious; his claims would definitely be considered whenever a suitable vacancy occurred.18 Actually he was fortunate to get a reply at all; certainly he could not have chosen a worse time to press his claims on Russell. Earlier in the year, at a conference in Vienna, Lord John had accepted a compromise for solving the problems of the Middle East and the Black Sea. Later, just as Howe was seeking office, Russell had condemned the same compromise in the strongest of terms. 6

Ηοωε Papers, ΙΙ, Russell to Ηοωε, April 10,

'Ibid., VII, Howe to Russell, July 3, 1855.

11 lb1d.

Ι855.

τø Ησωe Papers, ΙΙ, Arthυr Russell to Ηοωε, July 10, 1855.

JOSEPH HOWE: OPPORTUNIST OR EMPIRE-BUILDER — 147

Immediately a storm of indignation broke over his head which can "only be explained by the neurotic emotions of a great war and by the terror Iest the costly sacrifices of the struggle should issue in a dishonourable peace"1° Annoyed that Lord John had lacked a vigorous defendant in Parliament and in the press and grateful for his assurances with respect to employment, Howe dashed off a fair statement of Russell's case, hoping that the article might do some good if published in a paper which the government contrQ1led.20 The colonial secretary expressed his gratitude, but doubted "whether the noise of the present clamour [would] allow the voice of justice to be heard."21 On the day he wrote this letter he resigned; he remained out of office for almost four years. Nο worse blow could have befallen Howe's aspirations for office; the British statesman most cognizant of his services and ability had been removed from the political scene. About this time Howe's pamphlet on "The Organization of the Empire" drew a reply from the Canadian Francis Hincks, who chanced to be overseas on business.E2 1n a nutshell, Hincks asserted that the existing colonial system was "all that can be reasonably desired" and that "the grievances stated by Mr. Howe have no existence." As for colonial representation in the Commons, it was utterly impractical. If the colonies desired to participate in the government of the Empire, they would have to share in the burden of defence and Hincks doubted their willingness to do so. As to the limitations upon ambition in the colonies, Hincks felt that "the British provinces ... present[ed] as fair a field for an ambitious man as they could do under any other circumstances." Ιt was true that, if the provinces became states of the American Union, their public men might compete for a few higher prizes, but "all the local prizes would be deteriorated in value, and the probability of attaining any of the others would be small." Even in the existing circumstances, the still higher prizes of England were not beyond the reach of colonials. There was "nothing to prevent Mr. Howe himself from transferring his talents to the English arena, should he be of opinion that Nova Scotia afford[ed] too limited a field for their display." Several times previously Hincks and Howe had disagreed on public policy. A particularly stormy controversy had developed u)

G. P. Gooch, ed., The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1840-78 (London, 1925), II, 187. *}Howe Papers, VII, Howe to Russell (confidenlíai), July 11, 1855. *Έ Ibid., 11, Russell to Howe, July 13, 1855. Francis Hizieks, Reminiscences if His Public Life (Montreal, 1884), pp. 228-50.

148 —

HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

between the two over an alleged breach of faith by Hincks in the intercolonial railway question. Howe could never get it out of his head that, after joining in negotiations with Maritime leaders for such a railway, Hincks had sacrificed the interests of the Maritimes by abandoning the project in favour of one put forward by his capitalist friends associated with the Grand Trunk. The Grand Trunk scheme later brought about the downfall of Hincks's ministry; after he and some of his colleagues were accused of using the promotion for their personal gain, the so-called Colbert of Canada was forced to resign in September, 1854. Hoore's pamphlet on the organization of the Empire with its reference to a vast scheme of jobbery and corruption in Canada by which the vital interests of British America had been overthrown, had apparently stung Hincks to the quick. Yet it is strange that in making a personal defence he, a former radical, supported the colonial status quo in every particular. As Howe reminded him in his reply (August, 1855) : "You used to have a keen eye for a grievance, but I fear prosperity has clouded your vision. You used to strain at a gnat, and now you can scarcely see a camel." Howe doubted if Hincks's arguments on distinctions were worthy of serious note unless he could show (which he failed to do) that a colonist's career did not practically stop when he became a provincial minister. I contend that it does; that, having reached that point, he is hedged in by barriers which he cannot overleap; that, thenceforward, he must "fling away ambition"; that he has got into a cul-de-sac; that he finds John Bull, looking very like a beadle, guarding the rich scenery beyond and saying to him, as he marks the expression of his long eye, "No thoroughfare here."2' On the broader question of imperial-colonial relations, Howe denied that the colonies were unwilling to share the cost of defending the Empire. If colonial minds were permitted to assist in adjusting the relations of the colonies with Britain and foreign countries, and if "a fair distribution of the honours and distinctions of the empire made it a point of honour and of duty," almost all the provinces would send a regiment to assist the mother country against her enemies. With this assistance British statesmen would be able to feel independent of treacherous allies and the British people more certain of the safegy of their soil, their institutions, and their high civilization. To realize this great conception there is nothing wanting but For the complete reply, see Chisholm; Speeches, 11, 311-27.

JOSEPH HOWE: OPPORTUNIST OR EMPIRE-BUILDER — 149

to draw into the Councils of this Empire the ripened intellects and noble spirits that lead this population. Talk not to me of di, lculties. All government is compromise, and half the diplomacy wasted on "the four points" [at Vienna] would soon adjust details. The Hincks-Howe debate had an interesting sequel. After allowing Russell's successor, Sir William Molesworth, some time to settle down, Howe resumed his quest for office on September 4.24 By this time he had come to perceive that the possibilities of appointment to the Colonial Oflice were limited and the barriers in the way formidable. Α governorship, he hinted, would be about as acceptable as an under-secretaryship. Three days later Molesworth informed him that he had just had "the satisfaction of establishing a precedent for seeking occupants for Imperial posts among distinguished men of the colonies."26 The Queen had approved his nomination of Francis Hincks as Governor in Chief of Barbadoes and the Windward Islands. He hoped to meet Howe's wishes as well if an opportunity arose, but he saw no immediate prospect of a suitable vacancy, either at home or abroad. All unknown to Howe, Molesworth had first broached the matter to Hincks on August 17,28 and the latter had declined a position with the Grand Trunk to accept the governorship. The London Times hailed the appointment as "the inauguration of a totally different system of policy from that which has been hitherto pursued with regard to our colonies."27 The Montreal Pilot called it "the most practical comment which can possibly be offered upon the solemn and sorrowful complaints of Mr. Howe, anent the neglect with which Colonists are treated by the Imperial Government.... Perhaps his turn may not be far distant."28 As for Howe, the injustice and irony of it all could not have escaped him. When the principle which he had laboured to establish was at last accepted, it was for the benefit of a politician who was under a cloud for allegedly using his public position to further his private interests;20 he himself, despite his not inferior abilities and irreproachable public conduct, remained unrecognized. Nevertheless, he expressed satisfaction to Molesworth for • Howe Papers, VIΙ, Howe to Molesworth, Sept. 4, 1855. Ibid., II, Molesworth to Howe, Sept. 7, 1855. >~ Rlncks' Reminiscences, p. 363. 1+ !bid., p.364. • Ibid., p. 366-67. s See R. S. Longley, Sir Francis Hincks (Toronto, 1943), pp. 234-41_

150 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

his early recognition of the new principle, even in the case of a man with whom he had often differed. If Hincks's selection were followed up by that of other colonials as suitable vacancies occurred, a new spirit would be infused into the colonies. If it were not, it could be regarded only as an indication of the strength of the English combinations which Hincks served and which others of independent opinions declined to cοnciliate.80 Shortly afterwards Howe departed for Nova Scotia. Professor Roy's picture is that of a man "sorely troubled in spirit" and oppressed by a "sickening sense of failure."81 Since the relevant documents di not support these statements, one can only conclude that Roy is indulging in a type of imaginative licence which is expected of the creator of fiction, but not of the serious biographer. Disappointed Howe may have been, but no one had a more amazing faculty than he for dismissing the unpleasantness of the past and for turning hopefully to the future. Furthermore, his official mission had been concluded satisfactorily, and for his success he was shortly to receive special recognition from the Nova Scotia legislature. Perhaps no opinion other than the foregoing could be expected from a biographer who had decided that after 1855 Howe's career was an unrelieved record of disappointment and failure, and who arranged all the pieces to create that effect. A year later (October, 1856) Howe resumed his quest for office. This time he asked an old acquaintance at the Colonial Office, Arthur Blackwood, to submit his claims to Henry Labouchere, Molesworth's successor as colonial secretary.82 Once more came the assurance that his request was being recorded, and a reminder that there were many claimants on the patronage of the crοwn.33 In his letter of thankss* Howe again stated that, because of the insuperable obstacles in the way of an undersecretaryship, he would be content with a governorship, but for the first time he also expressed his determination not to serve further under a lieutenant-governor. "I have earned and held all the offices sometimes with no slight exercise of patience. If Ι cannot rise I will not descend, but, resuming my own profession and retaining an independent seat in the Legislature, will be content with the influence Ι can command and the ranks which British America, fairly estimating my services, may accord." m Howe az

Papers, VII, Howe to Molesworth, Sept. 10, 1855.

Roy, Howe, p. 202.

*= Molesworth had died in October, 1855. *= Howe Papers, II, Βiαckwοad to Howe. Oct. 22, 1856. Ibtd., VII, Howe to Blackwood, Nov. 15, 1856.

JOSEPH HOWE: OPPORTUNIST OR EMPIRE-BUILDER — 151

Useless words! Howe was drawn to political life no less than iron filings to a magnet. For a political animal such as he, resolutions like the foregoing were therefore quite meaningless. If promotion to a more extended sphere were denied, Howe would still be at the very centre of Nova Scotian politics. So ended part one of the quest. For the next twenty months, eventful ones for Howe, imperial office was largely forgotten. During that time came his break with the Irish Catholics and eventually with the entire Catholic body of Nova Scotia. This led, in turn, to the defeat of the Liberal government in March, 1857, and the resignation of Howe from the Railway Board. It led also to his campaign to unite the Protestants in opposition to the Conservatives and their Catholic allies at the next election. But by mid-1858 the picture had altered and Howe was restless. His duties as an assemblyman were over for the year; the Catholic question had largely subsided and required none of his energies; an election and an opportunity to defeat the Johnston administration were still a year away. In these circumstances part two of the quest for office had its beginning. This time the avenues of approach were somewhat uninviting. To Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton, the colonial secretary under Lord Derby, Howe was a complete stranger. Accordingly the best course seemed to be the bold one — an approach to the man at the top. Perhaps Derby might recall his interviews with Howe during the railway negotiations of 1851 and 1852. After the usual lengthy recital of his claims, Howe concentrated upon the governorship of British Oregon, his own name for the future colony of British Cοlumbia.85 If he were only given the opportunity, its resources would permit him to lay the foundations of a "Noble Colony." Many British Subjects that now go from Home or from the Northern Provinces would follow me there. It would not be difficult to attract a great many within the United States territory to reside again under the old flag. Chinese would come in ... and make useful settlers.... There is no reason why the spare labour of the world should drift into the United States, if it can be attracted to British possessions, and England should have within her own territory in Oregon a commercial emporium, from which lines of steam communication might soon radiate, and through which she might hereafter exercise a powerful influence in all that part i/the world. Howe to Derby. June 16, 1858. The colony of British Columbia was created and its government provided for by a British statute of August, 1858. Ibíd.,

1:2 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES Howe had indeed caught a vision; he was prepared, moreover, to set about making it a reality at a moment's notice. But to all this enthusiasm not a word of reply came from the British prime minister. The period from June to November Howe spent in the United States. Again his restless and inquiring mind drove him to "a careful examination of the condition of [the country], social, political, and industrial, frbm Maine to Texas."38 By late November he had completed the primary object of his visit — the publication of his speeches and public letters. Between November 27 and 29 he forwarded the two large volumes to all who might assist him in securing imperial office. But this time the tone of the accompanying letters was different.S7 There was a note of irritation that he had been kept waiting so long for what he should have been granted as a right. Now, for the first time, it might be fairly alleged that financial need was a contributing factor in his drive for office; Howe was without steady employment and he had used up his resources in publishing his papers. With some bitterness he complained to William Bridges of the Metro General Life Assurance about the promotion of "all sorts of simples and blockheads"3θ over his head. In the letters to Derby, Bulwer-Lytton, and the permanent under-secretary, Herman Merivale, the language was not quite so outspoken, but its purport was the same. Let them imagine his feelings "when men of no Colonial experience, who have done no service to British America, who have no knowledge of it, who have never written a line, made a speech or struck a blow for its improvement and who are intellectually to say the least of it not [his] superiors, are sent to rule our Provinces, whose resources, mental and industrial, [he has] illustrated and developed by the labours of half a life."39 In this series of letters Howe was undoubtedly guilty of one indiscretion when he asked Russell to plead his case with a ministry to which Lord John was politically opposed. Russell went out of his way, none the less, to inform Howe that his two volumes were "mark'd with the talent & patriotism which disIbid., Rowe to Sir Gaspard Le Marchant, Nov. 29, 1858. L. Grant takes the view that from the start Howe declined to "abase himself before the well-meaning mediocrities like Labouchere or Newcastle. He could not do it. In none of his letters do we find the real tine of the office-seeker." The Tribune o) Nora Scotia (Toronto, 1920), p. 128. Howe Papers, Ill, Howe to Bridges, Nov. 29, 1858. Ibid., Howe to Merivale, Nov. 29, 1858. See also Howe to Derby, Nov. 29, 1858 and Howe to Bulwer-Lytton, Nov. 27, 1858.

S+ W.

JOSEPH HOWE: OPPORTUNIST OR EMPIRE-BUILDER — 153

tinguish you."40 Naturally he said also that he could not possibly interfere in the patronage of the Derby ministry. But to label this, "an unmistakeable srlub,"41 as Professor Roy does, is incomprehensible. Roy seems to delight in singling out instances of alleged snubs and cold formality. Possibly the Colonial Office may have decided to do nothing for Howe, but its replies were always courteous and generally friendly. Knowing Howe as they did, its officials would not act otherwise for fear of certain castigation at his hands. Derby's reply, which Professor Roy describes as throwing out "a meagre crumb of comfort,"42 was regarded by Howe as "a very handsome letter." Ιn it the prime minister expressed his appreciation of Howe's services in colonial government for the preceding twenty years, and the belief that neither the Colonial Οffice nor Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton would underrate those services..43 In reply, Howe assured Derby that Bulwer-Lytton had manifested no desire to do him injustice; as a matter of fact, his claims had only recently been brought to the colonial secretary's notice. Consequently he was still hoping for the governorship of British Oregon.4 ' But he was not building up false hopes, for about the same time he wrote t0 Sir Denis Le Marchant: "I suppose they will do something with me or for me, but shall not break my heart, if they do not."46 As it turned out, his letters to Derby and Le Marchant crossed another in the mails in which the colonial secretary expressed his regret that, because of the limited number of offices at his disposal, there appeared Iittle probability that Howe's wishes could be met in the immediate future.40 That concluded Howe's correspondence with the Derby administration. In June of 1859 Palmerston was back in office with Lord John Russell as his foreign secretary. Meanwhile Howe had been busy electioneering in Nova Scotia, and largely through his efforts the Liberals appeared to have wοn.47 But in accordance with the conventions of that day the Johnston administration could not be displaced until the legislature met 40 Ibid., II, Russell to Howe, Jan. 8, 1859. 41 Roy, Howe, p. 213. 42 ibid. 42 Howe Pcρers, Η, Derby tu Howe (private), Jan. 17, 1859. " ibid., 111, Howe to Derby, March 8, 1859. ibid., Howe to Sir Denis Le Marchant, March 10, 1859. Sir Denis was the brother of Governor Le Marchant. 4. ibid., II, Carnarvon (for Bulwer-Lytton) to Howe, Feb. 15, 1859, '1 111h was the "disputed" election of 1859, in which a number of Liberal members were alleged to be disqualified because of olńce-holding.

154 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

early in 1860. So Howe was again at loose ends and looking towards London. In August he approached Russell with a new claim and a new request.48 During the Crimean War, he pointed out, he had raised troops for Britain in the United States at infinite peril to himself; afterwards, for two years in "speeches, pamphlets, and newspaper articles, widely circulated on both sides of the Atlantic." An indirect result was the loss of his own office at a cost to himself of £2,000 to date. The Derby ministry could not have been expected to recognize this claim, since it had opposed the policy on which it was based. But with Palmerston and Russell the situation was different, for it was their policy which Howe had been carrying out in the United States. The new request was for employment with the Foreign Oflíce. Howe confessed that he had begun to despair of working for the Colonial Office, first, because he did not know its new head, the Duke of Newcastle, and secondly, because he had "spoken too plainly. . . to be much of a favourite there." He admitted that he was not as welΙ fitted for Russell's department, but he at least knew the United States better than and the South American states as well as "many of those to whom the .interests of the Empire are often entrusted in these countries." This letter raises the question of whether the cards had been stacked against Howe from the beginning in his quest for office: According to Professor Roy, "the tragedy was that Howe was unable to realize that the reasons for his failure lay in himself."*θ He argues that for twenty years Howe, a mere colonial, had presumed to lecture and advise Her Majesty's ministers; that he had almost invariably been proven right; and that he 'as never forgiven for the brilliance of his talents. Another of Howe's biographers, W. L. Grant, had expressed the belief earlier that "the Colonial Office had no fancy for a turbulent, great-hearted, idealistic Howe, with views on Imperial consolidation, who avowedly wanted office as a means of influencing the British public and if possible of entrance into the Imperial parliament."50 But this is certainly not the whole story. The British climate was uncongenial• to Howe for other reasons. This was the day of the "Little Englanders" in which the Empire was generally held in low esteem. It was also the day in which political instability was the normal condition, and ministry succeeded ministry at short intervals. Was it not to be expected under these cireur48 Papers, VII, Howe to Russell; Aug. 10, 1859. a0 Roy, Howe, p. 199. w Grant, Tríbυπe, p. 129.

JOSEPH HOWE: OPPORTUNIST OR ΕΜΡIΚΕ-ΒU ΙLDΕR — 155

stances that the limited patronage of the crown would be used entirely to serve domestic ends, both political and personal? Russell referred Howe's letter to Newcastle, who expressed a desire to employ him, but doubted if an opportunity would soon arise, since "a very large number of unemployed colonial Governors [were] eagerly applying for any [vacancy] that chance [might] bring."61 The reply outraged Howe, who proceeded to examine, "with reference to much higher interests than [his] own," the principles which ought to govern patronage like colonial governorships.52 The men currently being sent out as governors, he pointed out, were much like those who had Iost the American colonies, because of their inability to comprehend and deal with the intellectual and material developments going on around them; on the other hand, the men now passed over in the colonies were Iike those who drove the governors out, made a nation, and became governors and generals, ambassadors and presidents, thus "exchanging the obscurity of Colonial life for the front ranks in history." Even the most loyal colonist would be less than human if he did not ultimately resent the promotion over his head of persons not to be compared to him in experience, ability, or administrative talent. "If the Colonial Empire is to be maintained," he concluded, "it must be organized and its energies called forth and directed by men of a different stamp from many of those who did not seem to know how to make a Colony anything but a source of weakness and expense." Shortly afterwards (February, 1860) Howe became provincial secretary in the Young administration, and six months later Ieader of the government of Nova Scotia for the first time. When the Duke of Newcastle visited Halifax in company with the Prince of Wales in midsummer, 1860, Howe did not intrude a personal matter, but later addressed the colonial secretary in Canada, again expressing a desire to "reproduce Nova Scotia. .. in some region [particularly Oregon] where the vital energy which free Institutions bring with them is most required."59 A year later he repeated the request, this time for Newfoundland, "where some tact and common sense appear to be much wanted," or British Columbia, where he thought he might do the most gοod.54 Thus, whether in office or out of it, impoverished Howe Papers, 11, Newcastle to Russell, Aug. 26, 1859. 5a Ibid., as Ibid.,

VΣΙ, Howe to Newcastle, Dec. 15, 1859. Howe to Newcastle, Aug. 15, 1860. Ibid., VIII, Howe to Newcastle, July 10, 1861. W. L. Grant calls it "a sad spectacle, that of the great man knocking at preferment's door, and knocking in vain." Tribune, 128. But, unlike Roy, he does not separate Howe's οffice-seekΙng from his concept of empire.

156 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

or comparatively well off, Howe steadily pursued the quest for office. Finally, in December, 1862, after further appeals to Russell and Newcastle, Howe was rewarded with a fishery commissionership under the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. While the duties of the office were somewhat slight, it did provide the rather handsome remuneration of £750 per annum, and ample time for travelling about and delving into all sorts of problems, an opportunity which Howe used to the full over the next three years. At the outset Howe considered the position to be merely the first step towards higher imperial office. But that was not to be. In the spring of 1866, with the Reciprocity Treaty about to be terminated, it was once more necessary for him to give thought to the future. A handsome offer to edit the New York Albion elated him no end. To Mrs. Howe he wrote: . we can live here [i.e., in New York] in our usual quiet way and put by $1,000 to pay our debts every year, leaving our assets in Nova Scotia undiminished. For this new and unexpected mercy Ι fervently thank God. It makes me feel more independent of all chances and casualties than t have done for many a day.55 Yet it would mean the abandonment of his hopes for higher office and of the promotion of his concept of empire. Consequently he directed a request to the colonial secretary for the continuation of his commissionership with new terms of reference. But in the end, without taking up the editorship or waiting for a final reply from England, he assumed the financially unremunerative task of saving his countrymen from a federation to which they had not given their assent. The irony of it all is that when he finally received a governorship — that of his native province — it came, not from the British government which he had long dunned, but from the Dominion whose creation he had strongly opposed. Professor Roy considers that this relative lack of success in office-seeking constitutes an important part of Howe — a study in frustration. But he misses the one thing which might.have caused Howe to feel frustrated during the sixties and seventies (although it did not) — his failure to win acceptance for the concept of empire which he had enunciated during the fifties. For the importance which he attached to this concept continued ®

Public Archives of Nova Scotia, a volume of Howe letters collected by J. A. Cbisholm, Howe tο Mrs. Howe, Jan. 15, 1866, pp. 186-87.

JOSEPH HOWE: OPPORTUNIST OR EMPIRE-BUILDER — 157

to be reflected in his later letters and speeches. He was particularly critical of "the Manchester school of politicians" and their intimations that they would not be unhappy if the colonies chose to become independent. He also trained his sights on those who belaboured the colonies for not contributing more materially to Weir own defence. The tone of criticism in the House of Lords after the Parliament of Canada rejected the Militia Bill of 1862 especially irritated him. It was madness, he told Newcastle, to wound the susceptibilities of a loyal people by silly speeches and to set them thinking of separation, "if we are driven to shape our future without any regard to England's honour and interest (which appears to be the advice given by some of these wiseacres) we can make a nation sooner than they think."δe On this occasion he asked that he be sent to the various provinces to settle by negotiation, rather than by irritating speeches "flung to and fri across the sea," the whole question of provincial participation in defence, both in peace and war. Later, in a speech at Niagara," he expressed the same sentiments publicly. Separation, he kept reminding the public men of Britain, would be a sadder blow for England than for the colonies, because it would leave her without a harbour, a spar, or a ton of coal on the continent of America. Ιn December of 1862 be reρlied58 to the proposition of C. B. Adderley that, just as the thirteen original colonies had done, the five existing North American colonies should provide fοτ their own defence. "A thorough scheme of organization," he contended, would be "more acceptable to proud and unrepresented communities than repeated requests fοτ uncovenanted assistance.... Does it never occur to you that you ought to elevate us to the full dignity of citizenship, before you call upon us to assume all its burthens? That before you ask us to share with you ail the perils and cost of empire, you should share with us its honours and distinctiοns?"59 When, at Russell's request, Howe produced another paper on "The Organization of the Empire"00 in October, 1866, he called it the "result of ten years of reflection on the grandest subject to which an Englishman can turn his thoughts.Θ1 I am satisfied," " uwe Aspers, VIII, Howe to Newcastle, April 17, 1862. '7 Chisholm, Speeches, II, 372-83.

"Howe tο Adderlet', Dcc. 24, 1862. Quoted In Roy, Howe, p. 242. "Chisholm, Speeches, II, 388. ' Ibld., pp. 492-506. m Howe Papers, IX. Howe to Stanley, Nov. 14, 1866,

158 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

he continued, "that we ought all to think in that direction and go for 'The Empire, one and indivisible' rather than for any scheme of dismemberment." The scheme of dismemberment to which Howe alluded was the proposed federation of British America. It is not too much to say that Howe opposed Confederation because he felt it to be incompatible with his concept of empire. The diverse and unconnected colonies, be contended, were not yet prepared for union; federation would not put them in a better position to defend themselves; the method of effecting it would lead in Nova Scotia to the all-pervading sentiment of loyalty being replaced by a mood of sullen indifference and the growth of annexationist sympathies. "We go in for the Empire one and indivisible but when the old ship is broken up we are not such fools as to trust our lives in a crazy craft in which we are certain tο be drowned."ea From this time on his disillusionment with British politicians developed apace. The indifference with which the British Parliament treated the Act of Confederation he considered to be an utter disgrace. "I believed ... that the House of Lords would do justice though the heavens should fall; that a man with a manly, honest face could go to the bar of the House of Commons and obtain fair play ... but if you ask me if 1 feel that confidence now, 1 am sorry to say that I do not."θ8 Yet nothing could lead him to express disloyal sentiments. Undoubtedly be weakened his bargaining power in the movement for repeal by telling his opponents privately beforehand that, no matter what the outcome, he would pursue a thoroughly constitutional course. No one has yet assessed his considerable services in preventing the extremists from getting out of hand once the issue was decided. But after that there appears tο have been an almost complete break in the correspondence which he had been carrying on with English statesmen for thirty years or more. And around him he thought he saw growing evidence of the dismemberment of the Empire. One sign was the substantial withdrawal of British troops from Canada. But the crowning blow was the sacrificing of Canadian interests by the Washington Treaty of 1871. Howe told the governor-general that the conduct of the British commissioners was hasty, selfish, unfair, almost fold., Ηowe

to Hay, Nov. 12, 1866. He called it idiotic to "embark in this crazy Confederacy with a mongrel crew half French and half English and certain to be sent to the bottom at the first broadside." m Quoted from a speech given in Temperance Hall, Halifax, on Jan. 13, 1868. Chisholm, Speeches, 11, 529.

JOSEPH HOWE: OPPORTUNIST OR EMPIRE-BUILDER — 159

ρusi(lanimοus.θ4 To Sir John Rose he wrote: `Bit by bit England gives North America away, and the feeling is becoming widespread here that the sooner we join that Branch of the English family that is not afraid of the other the better for us aΙΙ."θ6 At length (February 27, 1872) Howe ventured to express his opinions publicly in a speech at Ottawa.06 The dismemberment of the Empire, he pointed out, had been openly forecast in leading British newspapers. While neither crown, parliament, nor people had deliberately accepted this policy, the tendency of English thought and legislation seemed to indicate that the drift was under way, Because of the recent sacrifice of Canadian interests, he concluded, the time was rapidly approaching when Canadians and Englishmen must have "a clear and distinct understanding as to the hopes and obligations of the future." For this indiscretion Howe was suitably reprimanded in cabinet. Yet his remarks cannot be dismissed as the prattling of an ailing and weary old man. In them is reflected the natural disappointment of one whose high concept of empire is being spurned, but also the confidence that British America, if forced to fend for itself, can make its own way. Howe paid the penalty of the solitary individual who urges ideas upon people not yet ready to receive them. The first great step forward in the government of the colonies had been the concession of responsible government in 1848. After that the "Little Englanders" were quite satisfied for the colonies to go their own way, expecting only that Britain would be credited with leading them on to full independence. While the government was content to retain the colonies provided they contributed to their own defence, it evinced no interest whatever in theoretical speculation regarding the future of the Empire. It was not until the mid-eighties that the idea of a centralized empire received substantial support in the movement for imperial federation, and it was not until the first decade of the twentieth century that it became clear that the final form of the Empire was to be the decentralization of the modern Commonwealth. But for Howe, however impracticable his ideas may have been, the issue was clear in the fifties and sixties. Criticize him, if you will, for magnifying the difficulties of uniting the British North American colonies. Criticize him, too, for an exaggerated w Howe Papers, IX, Howe to the Governor General (private). Aug. 22, 1871. es Ibid.. XXXIX, Rowe to Rose, June 26, 1871. Chisholm, Speeches, II, 631-41.

130 - HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES pro-British sentimentalism. But do not attribute his office-seeking primarily to selfish ambition or the hope of financial rewards. To him responsible government had conferred upon colonials only the partial rights of British citizens. As a natural extension, the Empire ought to be organized without delay to confer these rights in all their fullness. To serve this Empire was the noblest mission that be could conceive, preferably at its centre in London, but, alternatively, even in so remote and primitive a region as British Oregon.

The Maritime Provinces and the Reciprocity Treaty S. Α. SAULADERS

The traditional belief has been that the Maritime provinces benefited greatly from free access to the American market under the terms of the Reciprocity Treaty. So far, this belief has never been carefully examined, and it is the aim of this brief summary of much factual material to make a beginning at the elucidation of some obscurities in a problem which has long awaited investigation. The conclusions reached are, that while trade in general held up well, and exports to the United States increased considerably, the importance of the American market was most obvious during the latter years of the Civil War; that much of the increase not attributable to the Civil War is accounted for by a transfer of figures; and that for the major industries the overwhelming advantages which the American market afforded were not so apparent until some years later. The question arises why the idea persists that a fatal blow was dealt the Maritime provinces by the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty, and that their losses are greater than those of any of the other North American colonies. The answer, in very general terms, can be given briefly, and is, that a concomitance of circumstances favourable to the Maritime provinces synchronized with the period of the Reciprocity Treaty, and that shortly afterwards the tide of events began to flow in the opposite direction. The abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty, and the advent of Confederation, were the two political events which roughly marked the turning point, and responsibility was popularly placed on one, or the other, or both. It will be impossible to discuss here the part that Confederation may have played in accelerating the decline in the relative prosperity of the Lower provinces, either by raising costs of production or in hampering the renewal of a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States; but other factors, more important than the Reciprocity Treaty in contributing to the Sauree; Dalhousie lievlew. XIV (October, 1934), 355-371. Reprinted by permissώοn of the publishers.

162 — HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

prosperity of this period, were those external forces which greatly stimulated the shipbuilding industry and the carrying trade; railway construction in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; and last, but not least, the American Civil War. By the turn of the half century, the British North American colonies were well on their way to attaining their majority. Responsible government for Nova Scotia and Canada was conceded in 1848, and granted in due course to the other provinces. The Enabling Actif 18461 made complete fiscal freedom inevitable in the course of a few years, and, in 1849, the sweeping away of the Navigation Acts exposed the colonies to the competition of all the world in the carrying trade. The favoured position which formerly had been theirs in the British West Indies no linger existed, and colonial preference in the markets of Great Britain was rapidly disappearing, to vanish entirely in 1860. The Maritime provinces weathered these changes without approaching too near to the disaster which was repeatedly predicted. By 1850, the population stood at about half a million. The rapidly expanding market for fish and lumber had made it possible to establish both industries on a sound foundation; and the increasing commerce of the world, demanding more and more shipping capacity, had led to the growth of the shipbuilding industry on a large scale. The General Mining Association had made extensive investments in the coalfields of Nova Scotia, and definite progress had been achieved under the able management of Richard Brown, until, in 1853, mineral products, almost exclusively coal and gypsum, constituted about one-tenth of Nova Scotia's total exports. Si far, the advent 0f the steamship had not affected the supremacy of the sailing vessel in the trade in bulky cargoes and to distant markets. Little more than the first sod had been turned in railway construction in British North America, and even in the United States there were only 9,021 miles in operation in 1850. Although these two important innovations of the nineteenth century, the steamship and the locomotive, had had little effect upon the economic structure of the Lower provinces; nevertheless, the trend of population westward beyond the Alleghaníes, and along the margin of the Great Lakes, was beginning to make itself felt through increased production in foodstuffs, which was virtually putting a stop to grain raising in the Maritime provinces. 19-10 Victoria, Cap. 94, Aug. 28, 1846: "An Act to enable the Legislatures of certain British Possessions to reduce or repeal certain duties of Customs."

MARITIME PROVINCES AND RECIPROCITY TREATY - 163

Tu the fishing industry, Nova Scotia was pre-eminent, with considerably over a third of her recorded exports made uρ of fish and fish products; Prince Edward Island came next with about one-tenth; and New Brunswick made a very poor showing with about one-twentieth. In agriculture and foodstuffs, Prince Edward Island held first place, as they constituted from two-thirds to three-quarters of her entire export trade; New Brunswick can be ignored; while in Nova Scotia they accounted for from onesixth to one-fifth. Much of this group was made uρ of re-exports of commodities which were not produced either within the province itself or within the Maritime provinces; and, except in Prince Edward Island, the imports vastly exceeded the exports. In the products of the forest, New Brunswick had no rival. From two-thirds to four-fifths of her entire export trade belonged to this category, and if the statistics pertained to domestic producion alone, the proportion would be much higher. 1n Prince Edward Island the proportion was less than one-fifth, and on the decline; whereas in Nova Scotia the industry appears to have been fairly steady, the proportion holding around one-sixth. For Nova Scotia, the mining industry has been already mentioned, and it may be neglected far New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. By 1850, the United States had become a powerful and numerous nation, with a population of over twenty-three million, and a merchant marine second only to that of Great Britain. Whitney's cotton gin, and the many inventions which led to the mechanization of the textile industry in England, made possible a rapid extension of the area under cotton culture in the southern states. Following the War of 1812-14, the slight and sporadic movement of population across the Alleghenies developed into a general migration to the valleys of the Ohio and Upper Mississippi. On the northeastern seaboard, the manufacturing industries got a start during the Napoleonic Wars, and, while there was a setback at the close of hostilities, made rapid progress under the fostering care of the protective system established in 1816. This gave rise to a three or four cornered trade 0f manufactured goods from the northeastern states to the northern territory between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi River; foodstuffs and supplies from this territory to the cotton producing areas in the South; raw cotton to England and thé New England states; and manufactured goods from the industrialized section of Great Britain to the New England and east central states. This, very briefly, and very roughly, is the course of the trade which formed the basis of the industrialized area on the northeastern seaboard

164 - H IS T O R I C A L E S S A Y S O N T H E A T L A N T IC P R O V IN C E S

o f the U nited States, especially N e w England. It w as primarily the dem and o f the hom e m arket w hich w as responsible fo r these m anufactories: nevertheless, som e o f the products soon began to be m arketed beyond the national boundaries, and it is the export figures w hich m ost conveniently illustrate w hat was taking place. Exports o f dom estic m anufactures, o f an average o f $ 4 ,6 8 9 -7 8 7 - for the decade 1821-1830, had increased to an average o f $ 1 0 ,5 1 6 ,2 1 5 - fo r the ten years 18 4 1 -1 8 5 0 . The grow th o f the cotton industry is best know n by the decline in re-exports o f foreign m anufactures, and an increase in exports o f dom estic products. R e-exports o f foreign cotton m anufactures fell from an average o f $ 2 ,0 6 1 ,1 6 1 - fo r the decade 1821-1830, to $ 6 3 5 ,5 4 6 - for 1841-1850; and, at the sam e tim e, A m erican m anufactures o f cotton rose from an average o f $ 1 ,1 7 7 ,0 8 2 for the years 1826-183 0 , to $ 3 ,9 5 5 ,7 3 4 - for the years 18411850.2 It w ill be no surprise, therefore, to learn that trade betw een the M aritim e provinces and the adjacent territory to the south greatly increased, and the trend can be accurately discerned from the follow in g table.3 M a ritim e P rovin ces - P ercen tage o f T o ta l Im p o rts a n d E xports fro m a n d to th e U n ited S ta tes Y ea r 1831 1841 1851

N o v a S cotia Im p o rts E xports % % 20.4 9.1 24.9 12.0 2 5 .2 20.8

N e w B ru n sw ick Im p o rts E x p o rts % % 12.8 4.2 19.0 3.2 33.7 10.8

P. E. Island Im p o rts E xports % % 1.3 .3 .8 1.5 12.9 30.5

In what follow s, an attempt will be m ade to set forth the major developm ents under the R eciprocity T reaty,4 to ascertain the benefits derived by the M aritim e provinces, and to estim ate what they lost through its abrogation by the U nited States in 2 R ep o rt o f Israel D . A n d re w s on the Trade a n d C om m erce o f the British N o rth A m erican C olonies. Sen. Ex. D ocum ent No. 112, 32nd C ongress, 1st Session. W ashington, 1853. Pp. 843, 845. 3 T h e P rin ce E dw ard Islan d percentages, and those o f N ova Scotia for th e y ear 1831, apply to the to ta l foreign trad e. T his leads to no serious erro r, since the foreign tra d e o f Prince E d w ard Islan d was largely confined to the U nited States, which also holds true fo r N ova Scotia as late as 1831. * F o r the story o f the negotiations which led to the R eciprocity T reaty, see the excellent w ork o f D r. C harles C. Tansill, T h e Canadian R eci­ procity Treaty o f 1854. Jo h n s H opkins U niversity Studies in H istorical and Political Science, Series X L , N o . 2, 1922.

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