Historical Dictionary of Lebanon, Second Edition [2 ed.] 1538120437, 9781538120439

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The historical dictionaries present essential information on a broad range of subjects, including American and world history, art, business, cities, countries, cultures, customs, film, global conflicts, international relations, literature, music, philosophy, religion, sports, and theater. Written by experts, all contain highly informative introductory essays on the topic and detailed chronologies that, in some cases, cover vast historical time periods but still manage to heavily feature more recent events. Brief A–Z entries describe the main people, events, politics, social issues, institutions, and policies that make the topic unique, and entries are cross-referenced for ease of browsing. Extensive bibliographies are divided into several general subject areas, providing excellent access points for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more. Additionally, maps, photographs, and appendixes of supplemental information aid high school and college students doing term papers or introductory research projects. In short, the historical dictionaries are the perfect starting point for anyone looking to research in these fields.

HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES OF ASIA, OCEANIA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST Jon Woronoff, Series Editor Guam and Micronesia, by William Wuerch and Dirk Ballendorf. 1994. Palestine, by Nafez Y. Nazzal and Laila A. Nazzal. 1997. Azerbaijan, by Tadeusz Swietochowski and Brian C. Collins. 1999. Papua New Guinea, Second Edition, by Ann Turner. 2001. Cambodia, by Justin Corfield and Laura Summers. 2003. Kyrgyzstan, by Rafis Abazov. 2004. Republic of Korea, Second Edition, by Andrew C. Nahm and James E. Hoare. 2004. Turkmenistan, by Rafis Abazov. 2005. New Zealand, Second Edition, by Keith Jackson and Alan McRobie. 2005. Vietnam, Third Edition, by Bruce Lockhart and William J. Duiker. 2006. India, Second Edition, by Surjit Mansingh. 2006. Hong Kong SAR and the Macao SAR, by Ming K. Chan and Shiu-hing Lo. 2006. Pakistan, Third Edition, by Shahid Javed Burki. 2006. Iran, Second Edition, by John H. Lorentz. 2007. People’s Republic of China, Second Edition, by Lawrence R. Sullivan. 2007. Australia, Third Edition, by James C. Docherty. 2007. Gulf Arab States, Second Edition, by Malcolm C. Peck. 2008. Laos, Third Edition, by Martin Stuart-Fox. 2008. Israel, Second Edition, by Bernard Reich and David H. Goldberg. 2008. Brunei Darussalam, Second Edition, by Jatswan S. Sidhu. 2010. Yemen, Second Edition, by Robert D. Burrowes. 2010. Bangladesh, Fourth Edition, by Syedur Rahman. 2010. Polynesia, Third Edition, by Robert D. Craig. 2011. Singapore, New Edition, by Justin Corfield. 2011. East Timor, by Geoffrey C. Gunn. 2011. Postwar Japan, by William D. Hoover. 2011. Philippines, Third Edition, by Artemio R. Guillermo. 2012. Kazakhstan, by Didar Kassymova, Zhanat Kundakbayeva, and Ustina Markus. 2012. Thailand, Third Edition, by Gerald W. Fry, Gayla S. Nieminen, and Harold E. Smith. 2013. Science and Technology in Modern China, by Lawrence R. Sullivan and Nancy Y. Liu, 2014. Taiwan (Republic of China), Fourth Edition, by John F. Copper. 2014. Australia, Fourth Edition, by Norman Abjorensen and James C. Docherty. 2015. Indonesia, Third Edition, by Audrey Kahin. 2015. Fiji, by Brij V. Lal. 2016.

People’s Republic of China, Third Edition, by Lawrence R. Sullivan. 2016. Israel, Third Edition, by Bernard Reich and David H. Goldberg. 2016. New Zealand, Third Edition, by Janine Hayward and Richard Shaw. 2016. Brunei Darussalam, Third Edition, by Jatswan S. Sidhu. 2017. Nepal, Second Edition, by Nanda R. Shrestha and Keshav Bhattarai. 2017. Burma (Myanmar), Second Edition, by Donald M. Seekins. 2017. Mongolia, Fourth Edition, by Alan J. K. Sanders. 2017. Yemen, Third Edition, by Charles Schmitz and Robert D. Burrowes. 2017. Chinese Economy, by Lawrence R. Sullivan with Paul Curcio. 2018. Malaysia, Second Edition, by Ooi Keat Gin. 2018. Tajikistan, Third Edition, by Kamoludin Abdullaev. 2018. Postwar Japan, Second Edition, by William D. Hoover. 2019. Iraq, Third Edition, by Beth K. Dougherty. 2019. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Second Edition, by James E. Hoare. 2019. Chinese Environment, by Lawrence R. Sullivan and Nancy Y. Liu, 2019. Saudi Arabia, Third Edition, by J. E. Peterson. 2019. Republic of Korea, Fourth Edition, by James E. Hoare. 2020. Tibet, Second Edition, by John Powers and David Templeman. 2020. Chinese Culture, by Lawrence R. Sullivan, 2020. Syria, Fourth Edition, by Omar Imady, David Commins, and David W. Lesch, 2021. Afghanistan, Fifth Edition, by Thomas H. Johnson and Ludwig W. Adamec. 2021. Lebanon, Second Edition, by Tom Najem and Roy C. Amore, 2021.

Historical Dictionary of Lebanon Second Edition

Tom Najem and Roy C. Amore

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Rowman & Littlefield An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www rowman.com 6 Tinworth Street, London, SE11 5AL, United Kingdom Copyright © 2021 by Tom Najem and Roy C. Amore All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Najem, Tom, author. | Amore, Roy C., 1942- author. | AbuKhalil, Asʻad. Historical dictionary of Lebanon. Title: Historical dictionary of Lebanon / Tom Najem, Roy C. Amore. Other titles: Historical dictionaries of Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East. Description: Second edition. | Lanham, Maryland : Rowman & Littlefield, 2021. | Series: Historical dictionaries of Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East | First edition published as: Historical dictionary of Lebanon / Asʻad AbuKhalil. Lanham, Md. : Scarecrow Press, 1998. | Includes bibliographical references. | Summary: “Historical Dictionary of Lebanon, Second Edition contains a chronology, an introduction, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has more than 800 cross-referenced entries on important personalities as well as aspects of the country’s politics, economy, foreign relations, religion, and culture”— Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2020052088 (print) | LCCN 2020052089 (ebook) | ISBN 9781538120439 (cloth) | ISBN 9781538120446 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Lebanon—History—Dictionaries. Classification: LCC DS80.9 .A28 2021 (print) | LCC DS80.9 (ebook) | DDC 956.92003—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020052088 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020052089

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America.

Contents

Editor’s Foreword

ix

Preface

xi

Reader’s Note about Arabic Transliteration

xiii

Acronyms and Abbreviations

xv

Map

xix

Chronology

xxi

Introduction

1

THE DICTIONARY

15

Appendix A: Presidents, Post-independence

349

Appendix B: Prime Ministers, Post-independence

351

Appendix C: Speakers of Parliament, Post-independence

355

Bibliography

357

About the Authors

397

vii

Editor’s Foreword

May you live in interesting times, as we all know, is not so much a wish of happiness as it is a threat, and that threat has rarely applied more, and more often, to any country other than Lebanon. Alas, it could not help being interesting when one considers the mixture of people living there, Christian and Muslim, and this in different forms, and the Druze, as well as the many different shades of political parties, to say nothing of the fact that in each of these groups some are older and younger, which to some extent means that some are more open to differences and change than others, which is to the good. But this makes for a complicated social, economic, and political life as they try to sort out relations with one another, never quite succeeding for long but nonetheless at least keeping the country together and actually making it one of the more promising places in the Middle East. This also means that it takes a lot of time and space to sort out the differences and explain them cogently to readers. This has been done exceptionally well in this second edition of Historical Dictionary of Lebanon, which we are particularly pleased to be publishing at a time when Lebanon is once again posed on the knife’s edge because its history gives us reason for hope that yet again things will be sorted out and the country will not only muddle through, but also remain one of the most successful states in the Middle East. As usual, this is done through a chronology, a rather extensive one and one that must be consulted now and then to follow the story. Then there is the list of acronyms, of which there are many because so many organizations have been created, and while some have fallen by the wayside, others are of historical interest or are actually shaping the present path. The core dictionary is big, very big, and important for anyone who wants to make sense of Lebanon, with entries on people, places, organizations, and institutions, as well as key aspects of the economy, society, religion, and geography, plus much more. Last but not least is the extensive bibliography, which provides resources for further reading. This book was written by Tom Najem and Roy C. Amore. Both are professors of political science at the University of Windsor in Ontario, Canada. Dr. Najem is a specialist in the field of international relations and comparative politics of the developing world, and served as project manager of the Track Two Jerusalem Old City Initiative from 2005 to 2017. He has published widely on Lebanese politics, Middle East politics, and Track Two and conflict resolution. His latest publications include the following: Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society (2011), Africa’s Most Deadly Conflict: Meix

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EDITOR’S FOREWORD

dia Coverage of the Humanitarian Disaster in the Congo and the United Nation’s Response, 1997–2008 (coauthored, 2012), Track Two Diplomacy and Jerusalem (coedited, 2017), Governance and Security in Jerusalem (coedited, 2017), Contested Sites and Jerusalem (coedited, 2017), and Syria, Press Framing, and the Responsibility to Protect (coauthored, 2017). Roy C. Amore’s teaching and publications focus on the interaction of religion and politics in the Middle East and Asia. His recent books include Religion and Politics in the World’s Hot Spots (2016), World Religions: Eastern Traditions (coedited, 2018), World Religions: Western Traditions (coedited, 2019), A Concise Introduction to World Religions (coedited, 2020), and the forthcoming reference volume Oxford Handbook of Religion and Economic Ethics (coedited). Jon Woronoff Series Editor

Preface

The purpose of this dictionary is to provide readers with a general overview of Lebanon, a small country located in the Eastern Mediterranean, part of a region widely referred to as the Middle East. The dictionary covers a variety of topics, from Lebanon’s ancient history to the contemporary period up to and including the tumultuous year that was 2020. That year, Lebanon’s political and economic systems were struggling in the face of deep systemic problems. The country saw massive civilian protests; COVID-19; and the horrific explosion at the Beirut port that killed hundreds of people, injured thousands, and left thousands more without homes. Furthermore, the external context in which Lebanon operates is intensely divided between hostile political camps, a situation that threatens to spill over into the country. As this book goes to press, the situation in Lebanon remains highly fluid. Lebanon’s politicians will need to show tremendous skill (something previously lacking) to keep the country from destabilizing even further, if not possibly collapsing under the weight of domestic and regional dynamics. The dictionary is intended as an introduction to Lebanon for the nonspecialist. This includes not only students, but also academics who are interested in a reference work that they can return to when questions on Lebanon emerge. In particular, the reader will learn about Lebanon’s storied history, key events, intriguing cities, and the major personalities that have influenced the historic, political, social, and cultural milieu of this fascinating place. In writing this dictionary, we have tried to be as thorough as possible and mindful to offer an inclusive list of personalities, including those traditionally outside the Lebanese power structure; however, we worked with a page limit, which meant decisions needed to be made with respect to which entries to include, as well as the length of each. We hope that we got the balance and mix of entries right. The extensive bibliography at the end of the book was also written with this approach in mind, with apologies in advance for any serious omissions. We gratefully acknowledge the research help we received from several students, too numerous to mention. Michelle Morrison’s (Roy Amore’s wife) help with editing some of the drafts is also much appreciated. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the guidance, and patience, of Jon Woronoff, the series editor, and April Snider, acquisitions editor at Rowman & Littlefield.

xi

Reader’s Note about Arabic Transliteration

VARIANT SPELLINGS Lebanese Arabic names for people, places, and organizations are often spelled quite differently in English transliteration. Sometimes the same person’s name is spelled differently in various sources or even within the same source. Some examples of variations of names found in this volume are as follows: Baalbek, Baalbeck Bekaa, Beqaa Frangieh, Franjieh Geagea, Jaja Jbail, Jubayl Kornet, Qornet Salem, Salim, Salīm

DIACRITIC MARKS Arabic words are transliterated with minimal diacritical marks. This is intended to make them more readable by English readers not familiar with the full set of diacritical marks used by linguistic specialists. Some examples of key Arabic terms with diacritic marks are the following: With Diacritics

Without Diacritics

As’ad

Assad or Asad

Ba’al

Baal

Ba’ath

Baath

Fu’ad

Fuad

Qur’an

Quran

Ra’s

Ras

Sa’id

Said, Sayeed, or Saeed

Shari’a

Sharia or Shariah

Shi’i

Shiite xiii

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READER’S NOTE ABOUT ARABIC TRANSLITERATION

Shi’a

Shia

Ta’if

Taif

Za’im

Zaim

Zu’ama

Zuama

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAB

Abdullah Azzam Brigades

ADF

Arab Deterrent Force

ADL

Armenian Democratic Liberal Party

ADP

Arab Democratic Party

AIW

Arab Institute for Women

ARF

Armenian Revolutionary Federation

ARK

Arab Red Knights

ASU

Arab Socialist Union

AUB

American University of Beirut

CDR

Council for Development and Reconstruction

CENTO

Central Treaty Organization

CSI

Common Space Initiative

EU

European Union

FPM

Free Patriotic Movement

GCLW

General Confederation of Lebanese Workers

GDP

gross domestic product

IDF

Israel Defense Forces

ILMG

Israel–Lebanon Monitoring Group

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IRFID

Institut de Recherche et de Formation en Vue du Developpment

IS

Islamic State

ISF

Internal Security Forces

ISIL

Islamic State in the Levant

IUM

Islamic Unification Movement

LAU

Lebanese American University

LCP

Lebanese Communist Party

LF

Lebanese Forces, Lebanese Front

LNM

Lebanese National Movement xv

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

LNRF

Lebanese National Resistance Front

LP

Lebanese pound

MAN

Movement of Arab Nationalists

MEA

Middle East Airlines

MEI

Middle East Institute

MNF

Multinational Force in Lebanon

NAP

National Action Plan

NBP

National Bloc Party

NCLW

National Commission of Lebanese Women

NGO

nongovernmental organization

NLA

National Liberation Army

NLP

National Liberal Party

NUM

Nasserist Unionists Movement

OETA

Occupied Enemy Territory Administration

PFLP

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PLO

Palestine Liberation Organization

PM

People’s Movement of Lebanon

PNA

Palestinian National Authority

PNO

Popular Nasserist Organization

PSP

Progressive Socialist Party

RMF

René Moawad Foundation

SLA

South Lebanon Army

SSNP

Syrian Social Nationalist Party

STL

Special Tribunal for Lebanon

TLRM

Tanzim: Lebanese Resistance Movement

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UAR

United Arab Republic

UFM

Union for the Mediterranean

UN

United Nations

UNIFIL

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

USD

U.S. dollar

YBP

years before present

•

xvii

Map

Lebanon.

xix

Chronology

BCE ca. 45000 Archaeological evidence suggests human occupation in the Levant by this time, placing the region among the earliest known sites of early modern humans outside Africa. ca. 41000 Archaeological evidence shows human habitation in a rock shelter near modern Beirut. ca. 9000 Baalbek is already a site of human habitation. ca. 7000 Byblos is already a site of human habitation. ca. 2800 The Bronze Age is well underway. Phoenicians settle in the coastal regions of what is now Lebanon and parts of Israel and Syria. ca. 2000 Amorites overrun the Phoenicians along the coast. Byblos is burned but soon reoccupied. ca. 1850 Abraham and the Hebrews immigrate to Canaan from the region now known as Iraq. ca. 1457 Thutmose III and his Egyptian armies overrun Megiddo. The Canaan region becomes part of the expanded Egyptian empire. ca. 1400 Beirut is mentioned in an Egyptian letter. ca. 1400–1100 The Phoenicians evolve the world’s first syllabic alphabet out of earlier cuneiform writing systems. The alphabet uses 22 letters, all of them for consonants. ca. 1200–1000 The oldest extant inscription in the Phoenician alphabet, on the sarcophagus of King Ahiram, dates from this era. The Phoenician alphabet will soon be adapted for use in writing the other languages of the region, including Greek and the Semitic ones. ca. 1100 The Canaan region gains independence from Egypt. ca. 950 Hiram, the king of Tyre, supplies cedar logs and builders for Solomon’s temple in Jerusalem. 875–608 Assyrians invade and control the Phoenicians. The various rebellions of the major cities are suppressed. xxi

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CHRONOLOGY

800s The Phoenicians colonize an area near modern Tunis in North Africa, founding the city of Carthage. 710 Sidon and Tyre revolt against Assyrian domination. 600s Phoenicians found a colony at the port later called Tripoli. 585–538 The Phoenicians are ruled by the Babylonians, who destroy Tyre. 539–533 Tyre and the surrounding Phoenician region are conquered and come under the rule of the Achaemenid Empire of Persia. 334 Alexander the Great conquers Baalbek and renames the city Heliopolis, City of the Sun. 333 Alexander the Great sacks Sidon. 332 Alexander the Great conquers Tyre after a long siege. Carthage becomes more important as a Phoenician colony in North Africa as some survivors flee there. 323 After the death of Alexander the Great, the region now known as Lebanon becomes part of the Seleucid Empire. 149–146 The Third Punic War ends with the total destruction of Carthage by the Romans. 140 The Seleucid ruler’s troops destroy Beirut. 126 Tyre gains independence from the Seleucid Empire. 64 Roman rule of Phoenicia and Syria begins. The Romans conquer Baalbek, or Heliopolis, and make it a strategic location for administering Roman Syria. They later build three temples on and near the site of the older Canaanite temple to Baal. Agrippa captures Beirut.

CE 195 Mount Lebanon becomes part of the Roman Empire. 551 A major earthquake destroys Beirut. 748 A Byzantine army sacks Baalbek. 975 The Byzantines again sack Baalbek. ca. 1020 The Druze immigrate to the Mount Lebanon region. 1109 After a long siege, Tripoli is captured and its library books are burned by crusaders. It becomes a crusader state.

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1124 Tyre is captured by the army of the First Crusade and becomes an important city in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. 1139 Baalbek is hit by the first of three major 12th-century earthquakes. 1174 Saladin’s four-month siege results in the surrender of Baalbek. 1179 Saladin defeats the army of the Kingdom of Jerusalem’s King Baldwin IV in the Battle of Marj Ayyun. 1192 Saladin takes control of the strategic Beaufort Castle, as a key part of his plan to drive the crusaders from the land. 1260 Mongol general Kibuqa captures Baalbek and destroys its fortifications. 1289 The Mamluks take control of Tripoli from the crusaders. 1291 Tyre comes under the rule of the Mamluk Sultanate. 1309 The Mamluks defeat the Druze and Shiite Muslims who had rebelled against Mamluk rule. 1400 The Persian-based ruler Tamerlane, or Timur the Lame, pillages Baalbek. 1516 The Lebanon region becomes part of the Ottoman Empire after the defeat of Mamluk forces during the Battle of Marj Dabak, fought near Aleppo, Syria. 1608 Fakhr ad-Din enters into an alliance with Cosimo II, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, to counter the power of the Ottoman Sultanate. 1613 Fakhr ad-Din begins an exile in Florence, Tuscany, as the guest of his ally, Grand Duke Cosimo II. 1618 Fakhr ad-Din is allowed to return to Lebanon and resume his rule under the authority of the Ottoman Empire. 1622 31 October: The Battle of Anjar, or Majdal Anjar, results in the victory of the forces of Fakhr ad-Din II over an Ottoman army. Ad-Din was then able to set up an Emirate in Ottoman Syria that lasted for more than a decade. 1633 The Ottomans turn against Fakhr ad-Din, imprisoning him in Istanbul. 1635 Fakhr ad-Din and his son are executed by the Ottomans in Istanbul. 1664 An earthquake damages a historic Roman temple and other buildings in Baalbek.

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CHRONOLOGY

1711 The Qaysi faction, including some Druze and Maronite clans, defeat the Yamani faction of Druze clans during the Battle of Ain Dara, a village near Beirut. Following their defeat, many Druze families of the Yamani faction go into exile in Syria. 1750 Baalbek is hit with another damaging earthquake. 1788 Construction begins on the Beiteddine Palace, the new home of Emir Bashir II. 1810 Bashir II helps the Egyptians in their resistance to Wahabi influence. 1811 Druze from Aleppo migrate to the Lebanon area. 1818 Having previously identified, at least secretly, as a Maronite Christian, Emir Bashir sides with Sunni Muslims and orders Shihab clansmen to observe the Ramadan fast. The Beiteddine Palace is completed. 1819 The new governor of Sidon, Abdullah Pasha, demands that Emir Bashir raise a large amount of new taxes from the Mount Lebanon region. Maronite leaders revolt against the new taxes. Bashir voluntarily goes into exile to ease the tensions. 1820 The Ottoman Empire goes to war with Russia, and rebellions start that soon lead to the Greek War of Independence. Fearing that the Christians in Lebanon might side with the Russians or Greeks, the Ottomans demand that Christians disarm. 17 May: With Emir Bashir in exile, the various communities in Mount Lebanon agree to hold a referendum to decide the emirate leadership. The referendum does not take place because Emir Bashir is restored to power. 1821 Mustafa Pasha issues a degree dismissing Emir Bashir from power. 6 August: Emir Bashir goes to Egypt, where he gains influence with Egypt’s governor, who convinces the Ottomans to pardon Bashir. 1824 Tensions between Emir Bashir and Sheikh Bashir lead to hostilities. 1825 Emir Bashir’s forces defeat those of Sheikh Bashir. 11 June: Sheikh Bashir is executed. 1831 War breaks out between Egypt and the Ottomans concerning control of the Syrian regions. Emir Bashir aligns with Egypt and its leader, Muhammad Ali, while Druze factions align with the Ottomans. 1832 Egyptian forces take control of Acre and expect Emir Bashir to help them conquer Syria. 16 June: The combined forces of Emir Bashir and the Egyptians take control of Damascus. Emir Bashir is rewarded when Muhammad Ali gives him control of more territory than Mount Lebanon.

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1840 27 May: A revolt against Emir Bashir and Ibrahim Pasha erupts with the backing of the Ottomans and Great Britain. Bashir’s forces manage to defeat and disarm the rebel factions. August: Even though Great Britain, Russia, and other European powers are backing the Ottomans over Egypt for control of the Lebanon and Syrian region, Emir Bashir refuses to change his alliance from Egypt to the Ottomans. September: The European-backed forces take Beirut, Haifa, and Sidon. 11 October: Egyptian control of Lebanon ends when Emir Bashir surrenders and opts for exile, at first to Malta and then Istanbul. 1841 A multiyear period of sectarian warfare begins between Druze and Maronite factions. 1850 Emir Bashir dies in Istanbul. 1858 A revolt by Maronite peasants leads to the end of the feudal tax system for farmers. 1859 A peasant rebellion is led by Tanyus Shahin, who declares a Republic in the Mount Lebanon region. 1860 Conflict erupts between Druze and Christian populations in Mount Lebanon and Syria, killing thousands. French and other European troops intervene and establish an autonomous political entity in Mount Lebanon dominated by Lebanese Maronite Christians. 1861 The Republic established by Tanyus Shahin comes to an end. The Ottoman Empire begins the Mutasarrifate system, according to which the Ottoman overlords appoint a non-Lebanese Christian to serve as administrator (Mutasarrif) of Lebanon for five-year terms. 1864 Yusuf Karam leads some Maronite residents of Mount Lebanon in a revolt against the tax burden on the farmers of the mountainous region. 1898 Emperor Wilhelm II visits Baalbek and later sends a team of archaeologists to dig up the city’s past. 1908 After the Young Turk Revolt within the Ottoman leadership, movements advocating more autonomy for Arab-speaking regions of the Empire arise. 1915 The Mutasarrifate system ends. Armenian refugees settle in the Bourj Hammoud area of Greater Beirut. 21 August: Cemal Pasha, Ottoman administrator in the Syrian region, orders the execution by hanging in Beirut of 11 men accused of being Arabist separatists.

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1916 May: Jamal Pasha orders the hanging of 21 more men in Beirut and Damascus on a charge of being separatists. 16 May: The secret Sykes–Picot Agreement between Britain and France designates Lebanon and nearby regions as areas of (potential) French control. 1918 11 November: The signing of the armistice marks the official end to World War I. Having been on the losing side, the Ottoman Empire collapses and no longer controls the Lebanon region. 1919 Maronite Christian Patriarch Elias Peter Hoayek heads a Lebanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, successfully requesting a larger territory than just Mount Lebanon. Greater Lebanon, the expanded territory, includes regions with large Muslim and Druze populations. 1920 18 March: King Faisal I declares the start of the Kingdom of Syria as an independent nation that claimed Lebanon as part of his expanded kingdom. 19–26 April: The San Remo Conference meets, leading to the Lebanon regions becoming part of a newly formed State of Greater Lebanon under a French Mandate established by the League of Nations. 10 July: The French arrest seven members of the Lebanese Administrative Council for conspiracy and high treason because they were thought to have been plotting for independence from France. 23 July: French forces win the Battle of Maysalun, putting an end the Franco–Syrian War and the short-lived Kingdom of Syria. 10 August: The Treaty of Sèvres is signed, the first in a series of treaties that divided up the former Ottoman territories and gave France control of Lebanon. 1 September: Grand Liban, or Greater Lebanon, which includes the provinces of Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, South Lebanon, and Bekaa, is established under French control, with Beirut as its capital. 1922 24 July: The League of Nations’ Mandat pour la Syrie et le Liban confirms French control of Syria and Lebanon. 1924 1 December: The former states of Damascus and Aleppo are merged as the Syrian Federation. 1925 A revolt for independence arises in Syria and Lebanon. 1926 23 May: A unified Lebanese Republic is declared, according to the French Mandate, with a new constitution modeled on the French constitution. 1930 May: The Syrian Federation becomes the Syrian Republic, with a constitution, but still under a French Mandate. 1932 A census is taken, shaping the distribution of political power in Lebanon to the present day. No other official census has been taken, signaling the extreme political sensitivities associated with officially reporting demographics. 9 May: The constitution is suspended.

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1940 The Vichy government of France takes control of French-controlled territories in Lebanon. 1941 26 November: Lebanon is declared independent by French general Georges Catroux, but it remains under the authority of the Free French Government. 1943 France agrees to a transfer of power to the Lebanese government. The unwritten National Covenant agreement, or National Pact, lays the groundwork for the confessional system of political power-sharing. 21 September: Bechara El Khoury is elected the first president. 22 November: Accepting the independence of Lebanon, the French release Bechara El Khoury and the other government members they had been holding. This day is now celebrated as Lebanese Independence Day. The Allies keep French troops in control of the region during World War II. 25 September: Riad al-Solh begins a term as prime minister. 1944 1 January: France formally grants independence to Lebanon. 1945 22 March: Lebanon becomes a member of the Arab League. 1946 The last of the French troops depart Lebanon. 14 December: Riad alSolh begins a second term as prime minister. 1947 Bechara El Khoury begins a second term as president. 1949 Lebanon and Israel enter into an armistice agreement. 1950 March: Prime Minister Riad al-Solh survives an assassination attempt thought to have been attempted by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP). 1951 14 February: Riad al-Solh ends his term as prime minister. 17 July: Former prime minister Riad al-Solh is assassinated at an airport in Jordan by three members of the SSNP. 1952 Bechara El Khoury resigns from the office of president. Camille Chamoun begins a term as president. 1956 November: An unofficial Arab summit meets in Beirut. 1957 Lebanon, under President Camille Chamoun, agrees to abide by the spirit of the Eisenhower Doctrine, accepting military and financial aid in exchange for resisting Soviet influence. Many Pan-Arabist Lebanese dislike the arrangement. 1958 The first post-independence civil war begins. At President Chamoun’s request, U.S. troops intervene to establish order. Chamoun resigns as president and is replaced by General Fuad Chehab.

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1961 An attempted coup d’état by members of the SSNP fails. 1964 Having been founded in 1963, the Bank of Lebanon/Banque du Liban begins operation, serving as the central bank. 1967 Lebanon does not participate in the Arab–Israeli War. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is formed and becomes increasingly active in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. 1968 Israel bombs the airport in Beirut in retaliation for a PFLP attack on an Israeli plane in Athens. 1969 The Cairo Agreement, signed by Lebanon’s commander in chief, Emile Al-Bustani, and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat, grants the PLO autonomy over Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in exchange for PLO recognition of the sovereignty of Lebanon. Some Lebanese feel the agreement gives too much authority within Lebanon to the PLO. 1970 Having been evicted from Jordan, the PLO headquarters relocates to Lebanon. 23 September: Suleiman Frangieh begins a term as president. 1970–1975 The PLO and its various factions intensify their attacks on Israel, and Israel extends its military operations against the PLO into Lebanese territory. Many factions within Lebanon become increasingly armed and militant. 1973 17 May: The Melkart Agreement is signed as a follow-up to the Cairo Agreement. 1975 28 February: A gunshot badly wounds parliamentarian Maruf Saad during a protest in Sidon. March: Maruf Saad dies in the hospital. His funeral becomes the occasion for mass pro-PLO demonstrations, setting the stage for the coming civil war. April: Civil war begins in Lebanon after Kataeb fighters ambush a bus in Beirut and Palestinian fighters carry out attacks against Christians. 1975–1976 The first phase of the civil war sees fighting between Christian forces and those of Lebanese leftists and Palestinians. 1976 June: Syrian forces enter Lebanon to restore order, at the request of Lebanese president Suleiman Frangieh. A cease-fire is brokered, with a newly created Syrian Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) charged with enforcing it. Syrian troops remain in Lebanon until 2005. 23 September: Elias Sarkis begins a term as president. 1976–1982 The second phase of the civil war sees the Lebanese government lose control as various sectarian militias and foreign armies take control of their regions of influence.

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1977 16 March: Kamal Jumblatt, Druze leader of the Lebanese National Movement, is assassinated by gunmen who shoot at his car. 1978 The Israeli army invades deep into Lebanon, in retaliation for a Palestinian attack. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) responds by passing Resolution 425, calling on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and for the creation of a peacekeeping force called the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Israel withdraws, leaving control of a strip of the southern Lebanon border under the control of its proxy, the South Lebanon Army. 1979 Various clashes between Chamoun’s militia and Kataeb forces occur. 1980 7 July: Kataeb troops attack the headquarters of the militia known as the Tigers, the military wing of the Chamoun-controlled National Liberal Party, resulting in the defeat and massacre of members of the Tigers militia. 1981 May: American diplomat Philip Habib helps negotiate an agreement to stop the escalation of the fighting between Israel and the PLO. 24 July: With the help of American diplomat Philip Habib, a cease-fire agreement is signed between Israel and the PLO, leading to a brief truce. 1982 3 June: Members of the Abu Nidal faction attempt to assassinate Sholmo Argov, the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom. 6 June: Israel retaliates by launching Operation Peace for Galilee. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reach deep into Lebanon. The subsequent conflict begins the next phase of the war in Lebanon. 23 July: An Israel–Palestinian cease-fire agreement reached. 14 September: President-elect Bashir Gemayel is assassinated along with 26 other members of the Kataeb (Phalanges) movement at the party headquarters. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party is blamed. 15–16 September: Israeli forces occupy West Beirut, and the Kataeb militia takes revenge on the Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. 21 September: Amine Gemayel, Bashir’s brother, is elected president by the National Assembly. Elias Sarkis ends his term as president the following day. 1983 18 April: A bomb explodes at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people. 17 May: Lebanon enters into an agreement with Israel. October: A suicide attack on peacekeeper headquarters kills 241 people. 31 October: The Geneva Reconciliation Meeting begins. 1984 February: U.S. troops withdraw. The Shiite militias control West Beirut. 12 March: The Second Reconciliation Meeting begins in Lausanne. Summer: The inaugural year of the Beiteddine Festival is celebrated.

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1985 Israeli troops withdraw from every area except the security zone on the southern border. 19 May: The War of the Camps begins, with Amal and Palestinian forces fighting in the refugee camps. 28 December: The Tripartite Agreement is signed in Damascus. 1987 President Gemayel’s government abrogates the Cairo Agreement with the PLO and the 17 May 1983 agreement with Israel. 1988 Presidential elections fail. East Beirut is administered by Maronite Michel Aoun, and West Beirut is administered by Muslim prime minister Salim Hoss. 1989 Parliament meets in Taif, Saudi Arabia, endorsing a Charter of National Reconciliation, giving more authority to the cabinet. 1990 October: Syrian forces attack the Presidential Palace. Michel Aoun escapes. The civil war ends. 1991 Militias, except for the Hezbollah one, are abolished by order of the National Assembly. The Lebanese army takes control of Sidon. 1992 Elections are held. 31 October: Rafic Hariri becomes prime minister. 1996 22 January: The Beirut Stock Exchange reopens. April: Israel attacks under its “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” bombing Hezbollah bases in Bekaa Valley, southern Beirut, and the south. The multination Israel–Lebanon Monitoring Group is set up to monitor truce. 1998 Lebanon and Syria reject an Israeli cabinet offer to implement UNSC Resolution 425 in exchange for guaranteeing Israeli security on Israel’s northern border. Emile Lahoud becomes president, and Salim Hoss becomes prime minister. 2000 May: Israel withdraws its troops from southern Lebanon earlier than previously announced. The South Lebanon Army fails to hold the territory. 2002 March: An Arab Summit is held in Lebanon, at which time the Arab peace initiative is introduced. 2004 Syria does not comply with UNSC Resolution 1559, calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. 20 October: Rafic Hariri resigns from his second term as prime minister. 1 October: Marwan Hamadeh, a Member of Parliament, survives an assassination attempt. Some blame Syrian factions. 2005 14 February: Former prime minister Rafic Hariri is assassinated, along with more than 20 others, by a bomb placed in a truck. Syria denies being responsible. Large-scale protests against Syrian influence take place in Beirut. This protest movement comes to be called the Cedar Revolution. 8

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March: Pro-Syrian protestors hold a mass rally at the urging of Hezbollah. The date “March 8” later becomes the namesake of the pro-Syria alliance. 14 March: A large anti-Syria protest is held in Beirut. “March 14” later becomes the namesake of the anti-Syrian faction. 19 April: Prime Minister Omar Karami and his cabinet resign after failing to form a government. Prime Minister Najib Mikati forms a new, pro-Syrian government. 30 April: Syria announces that it has withdrawn the last of its troops from Lebanon, where it had maintained troops since 1976. May: Parliamentary elections are held. Saad Hariri, son of Rafic, leads a successful anti-Syrian campaign in Beirut. June: Anti-Syrian Samir Kassir is killed in Beirut. Saad Hariri’s antiSyrian coalition wins the majority of seats in Parliament. 18 July: Fouad Siniora becomes prime minister, leading an anti-Syrian government. August: Four pro-Syrian security chiefs are arrested at the urging of a United Nations (UN) investigation into the assassination of Rafic Hariri. September: The four pro-Syria generals are formally charged. December: Member of Parliament Gebran Tueni is killed in Beirut, becoming the fourth critic of Syria to die by violence in 2005. His funeral is marked by anti-Syrian protests. 2006 March: Sunni, Shiite, and Christian leaders participate in the “National Dialogue” talks taking place about the fate of the nation. July: War breaks out between Israel and Hezbollah. A Hezbollah cross-border raid kills seven soldiers and captures two Israeli soldiers. Israeli troops move into Lebanon, and Hezbollah fires rockets into Israel. August: UNSC Resolution 1701 calls for an end to the Israeli–Hezbollah war, and hostilities end without a clear victor. September: UN forces are deployed in Lebanon. Israel lifts the blockade of Lebanon. 21 November: Industry minister Pierre Gemayel, son of Amine Gemayel, is killed in Beirut. Anti-Hezbollah and anti-Syrian protests coincide with his funeral. President Emile Lahoud refuses to allow the tribunal investigating those charged with killing Rafic Hariri to do its work. December: A mass rally of Hezbollah supporters protests that the government is unconstitutional. 2007 Hezbollah opposition pressures the government with general strikes. May: The Lebanese Army begins to move into Nahr al-Bared refugee camp to restrict its control by Fatah al-Islam militants. May: The UNSC votes to set up a Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) regarding the assassination of Rafic Hariri. June: Anti-Syrian Member of Parliament Walid Eido is assassinated, along with others, by a car bomb. September: The Lebanese Army ends its seize to take control of Nahr al-Bared refugee camp. Anti-Syrian Member of Parliament Antoine Ghanim and others die from a car bomb. November: President Emile Lahoud’s term ends without a successor, and the cabinet assumes interim executive powers. December: The agreement to

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select Michel Suleiman as the next president is stalled due to lack of agreement about cabinet selections. Another car bomb kills Brigadier General François al-Hajj. 2008 January: Two more car bombs explode, killing nine. 12 February: Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyah dies in a bomb blast in Damascus. Israel is blamed. 13 February: A mass funeral is held for Mughniyah in Beirut. February: Former president Amine Gemayel replaces Karim Paqraduni as president of the Kataeb (Phalanges) Party. February–May: Tensions between the government and the opposition intensify. 21 May: The government and the Hezbollah-led opposition faction come to a compromise arrangement known as the Doha Agreement. 25 May: Michel Suleiman becomes president. June: Heavy sectarian fighting breaks out in Bekaa Valley and Tripoli. July: The unity government, proposed in the Doha Agreement, is formed. September: A reconciliation agreement ends fighting between Alawites and Sunnis in Tripoli. October: Syria and Lebanon begin diplomatic relations. 2009 June: Parliamentary elections result in 71 seats for the pro-Western March 14 Alliance and 57 seats for the Hezbollah-led March 8 Alliance. July: The army reports thwarting an Al-Qaeda–affiliated cell’s plans to kill UN peacekeepers stationed in southern Lebanon. September: The prime minister-designate, Saad Hariri, steps down after his proposed cabinet selections are rejected, only to be reinstated to try again to form a government. November: With his proposed cabinet finally gaining approval, Prime Minister Saad Hariri heads a coalition government. December: Prime Minister Hariri and Syrian president Assad meet in Damascus. 2010 April: Israel accuses Syria of supplying Hezbollah with long-range SCUD missiles. A march of young Lebanese calling for more secularism in Lebanon gives some hope that Lebanon might be able to overcome the sectarian tensions of its past. May: Municipal election results reflect the regional strengths of the March 14 and March 8 factions. July: The Syrian president and the Saudi king visit Beirut. August: Trouble flares between Israeli and Lebanese soldiers along the border, resulting in a few deaths on both sides. September: Tensions flare in a debate about whether the STL should function. October: Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is given a warm welcome in a Hezbollah stronghold in the south. November: The United States pledges $10 million in support for the STL. December: Controversy concerning the STL intensifies. 2011 January: The controversy about the STL leads to the resignation of the Hezbollah faction ministers, causing the collapse of the unity government. June: Najib Mikati is appointed prime minister, leading a Hezbollah-domi-

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nated government, despite protests called “day of rage.” The STL issues arrest warrants for four Hezbollah faction members. Hezbollah refuses to allow their arrest. 2012 Sunnis and Alawites clash, as the conflict in Syria raises tensions in Lebanon. October: Syria is suspected of involvement after a car bomb kills Security Chief Wissam al-Hassan. December: Sectarian fighting breaks out in Tripoli. Many Syrian refugees continue to take shelter in Lebanon, causing overcrowding and social unrest. 2013 Sectarian clashes continue, especially in Tripoli and Sidon. August: Bomb attacks at two mosques in Tripoli result in many deaths. November: A bomb explosion near the Iranian Embassy in southern Beirut kills 22 people. Hezbollah will later say that it suspects Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the bombing. December: After Hezbollah commander Hassan al Laqis is killed, Hezbollah accuses Israel of involvement. A car bomb kills anti-Syrian Sunni leader Mohamad Chatah in Beirut. 2014 Lebanon continues to struggle to accommodate Syrian refugees, now numbered at more than 1 million. 15 February: Tammam Salam, a Sunni Muslim, begins a term as prime minister, leading a power-sharing cabinet. May: The term of President Suleiman ends, with no agreement about his successor. Sectarian clashes in Tripoli reflect influence of the Syrian conflict. August: Pro-Syria rebels attack Arsal, on the border with Syria, and capture several police officers and soldiers. November: Parliament extends its term until 2017, in light of the ongoing conflict. 2015 January: Israel drops munitions on Syria, near the Lebanon border, leading to heightened tensions in the border region. Lebanon takes measures to curb the influx of war refugees from Syria. After the closure of a waste dump site in Naameh, garbage collection stops in the region and leads to the accumulation of large piles of garbage. Demonstrations about the sanitation crisis in the months following escalate into a more general call for better government. 2016 Tensions and some violent conflicts continue between the Lebanese and Syrian refugees. October: After a long vacancy of more than two years, Michel Aoun fills the position of president. November: Saad Hariri begins a term as prime minister and forms a government. 2017 June: Parliament approves a new law governing elections, implementing proportional representation. July: Hezbollah militia help the Syrian Army along the border. November: While staying in Saudi Arabia, Saad Hariri stuns the Lebanese by announcing that he is resigning as prime minister, explaining it only by saying he feared for his life and that governing was made difficult by Hezbollah. Some speculate that the Saudis forced him to

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resign. December: Hariri withdraws his resignation, having gotten agreement that all members of government would avoid becoming involved in conflicts in other Arab states. 2018 Lebanon continues to struggle with the problems arising from accommodating Syrian refugees, now totaling one quarter of its population. Pressure mounts to start sending refugees home to Syria, but strained relations with Syria’s government make such negotiations difficult. 6 May: General elections are held, with the Free Patriotic Movement winning the largest bloc, 29 parliamentary seats. 2019 October: Protests break out in Lebanon and other Arab countries in what comes to be called the New Arab Spring, or Arab Spring 2.0. Having started as a reaction to proposed increases on petrol, internet calls, and other commonly used items, the demonstrators go on to call for the government to do something about the poor economy with its high unemployment, cease sectarian stagnation, and end banking legislation favoring elites. 29 October: Prime Minister Hariri resigns, setting off a political and banking crisis. 2020 21 January: After months of deadlock, Hassan Diab becomes prime minister, with the backing of Hezbollah and a new cabinet. February: Despite the formation of the new government, protests against the government concerning corruption and economic woes continue and escalate. 28 February: Lebanon bans travel by nonresidents in an attempt to combat the spread of the COVID-19 virus. 7 March: Prime Minister Diab announces a default on foreign debt payments and calls for the restructuring of Lebanon’s debt of more than $30 billion due to inability to service near-term obligations. July: Lebanon’s economy woes lead to severe devaluation of the currency, putting the country in a state of hyperinflation. The worsening economic crises becomes a health crisis as hospitals, most of them private, no longer can afford to pay staff or import medicines. France pledges 15 million Euros to help improve Lebanon’s French-language schools. 4 August: A smaller explosion followed by a massive blast devastates the port region of Beirut, killing approximately 200, injuring about 6,000, and leaving thousands of families homeless. 11 August: As protests intensify against the failing economy and the failure of the government to protect the people from the Beirut explosion, the government of Prime Minister Hassan Diab resigns. 31 August: Mustapha Adib is appointed prime minister-designate. 1 September: French president Emmanuel Macron returns to Beirut to negotiate international assistance to Lebanon in return for unprecedented political reforms. 9 September: Adib announces that he has failed to form a government.

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2021 February: Activist Lokman Slim is assassinated. Hezbollah supporters are suspected. 3 March: As the purchasing power of the Lebanese pound lessens greatly and poverty worsens, Parliament approves a World Bank loan, with money to be distributed to the poorer families.

Introduction

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE The modern nation of Lebanon lies on the northwestern portion of the Arabian Plate. Other nations on the same tectonic plate include Saudi Arabia and the states on the Arabian Peninsula. Lebanon occupies a narrow strip of land along the northeastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. It borders Israel to the south and Syria to the east and north. Just as the name Himalaya means “Snow Place,” the name Lebanon, or specifically Mount Lebanon, is thought to derive from an ancient term meaning white, which presumably referred to the snow covering at the higher elevations. There are two large mountain ranges running north–south, parallel to the coast. The Lebanon Mountains range down the central and western regions of Lebanon, coming near to the coast. The other range, the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, known as Lubnan Ash Sharqi in Arabic, lies closer to the Syrian border on the eastern side. The highest of the mountains are snow covered much of the year, and their snow melt provides the water that nourishes the fertile land of the Bekaa Valley between the two ranges and beyond. The flow from the Anti-Lebanon range is one of the main sources for the Jordan River, which flows south to the Dead Sea. The two main rivers of the Bekaa Valley are the Orontes River, which flows north through Syria and Turkey to the Mediterranean, and the Litani, which originates near Baalbek and flows into the Mediterranean Sea near Tyre (Sur). The flow of these two larger rivers and their tributaries is too shallow and steep in most places to allow for navigation by large boats. The geography of Lebanon features many faults, both major and minor, which have made the region prone to many destructive earthquakes for millennia. In tectonic terms, the Arabian Plate is moving northward and colliding with the Eurasian Plate, making for catastrophic geological events along the fault lines. The Yammouneh Fault runs from the southwest to the northeast along the western side of the Bekaa Valley. It is the Lebanese part of the Dead Sea Transform Fault, which has been relatively stable. The Roum Fault, running from Marj Ayyun northwest in the direction of Beirut, has been more active recently. It was involved in the 1956 Chhim earthquake, which did much damage. One major concern is that the Roum Fault may extend northward under or near Beirut’s large population area. The last major

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earthquake to hit Beirut was in 551, and it was combined with a major tsunami. The fear is that the Mount Lebanon Thrust Fold just offshore may be building toward another earthquake/tsunami combination. Even though Lebanon is a small country, the climate varies due to variances between the Mediterranean Sea to the west and the mountains and Bekaa Valley highlands in the center and east. June through September are the hot months, with average high temperatures in Beirut peaking at about 30º C (86º F) in July and August. The months from May through September tend to be dry in Beirut and inland. The rain in Beirut starts to build in October, peaks in January, and falls off by April or early May. The average low in Beirut in January is 11º C (52º F). Inland in the Bekaa Valley the higher altitude means that the temperature ranges are somewhat more extreme. In Baalbek, the average low temperature in January is –1º C (30º F), while the average high temperature in July is 29º C (84º F).

POLITICAL HISTORY Ancient Period The dates of first habitation by early modern humans in the Levant have been getting pushed farther and farther back by recent dating techniques. For example, earlier in the 21st century it was sometimes claimed that early modern humans could be traced back to about 60,000 years before present (YBP). By 2017, the range given had become 90,000 to 120,000 YBP. In 2018, the publication of dates assigned to a jaw and teeth found in an archaeological site in a cave in Israel pushed the evidence of human occupation back to a dating range of 177,000 to 194,000 YBP. This brings archaeological dates more in line with genetic dating suggesting that early modern humans lived in the Levant in about 220,000 YBP. These early dates support the claim that the Levant region is one of the oldest areas of human occupation outside of Africa. In about 3200 BCE (Before the Common Era) a seafaring people formed city states along the coast of present-day Lebanon and farther south along the coast. They were known as Canaanites by the Hebrews who entered the region later. Later they were known as Phoenicians by the Greeks, because the Greeks referred to the coastal region as Phoenicia, meaning the Land of Purple (dye). The people of the coastal region spoke a language classified as a subgroup of Northwest Semitic. The fierce fighting Amorites overran parts of Phoenicia. They destroyed Byblos by fire in approximately 2000 BCE. It was soon rebuilt by the Phoenicians.

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The Phoenicians excelled at sailing and trading. As sailors they have been credited with first learning how to navigate at night by use of the pole star. As traders they shipped their purple dye, cedar timbers, and other products to Israel, Egypt, and throughout the Mediterranean. The region next came under foreign rule when Thutmose III, pharaoh of Egypt in the 1400s BCE, drove out the last of the Hyksos from Egypt and extended Egyptian control to the north. He conquered Megiddo and, in a series of campaigns, brought the region that is now known as Lebanon and Syria under Egyptian control. Later, Egypt’s control of its northern territories was weakened when Egypt itself was invaded. By 1100 BCE, the Canaan region had regained independence. Some time in this era, before 1100 BCE, the Phoenicians made a great contribution to the entire Mediterranean region when they modified the existing way of writing into a set of 22 letters representing consonants. In so doing, the modern alphabet had been invented, and it would later be adapted to write many other languages. Hiram, the king of Tyre, formed a close trading relationship with Solomon, king of the United Kingdom of Israel and Judah. Hiram supplied the huge cedar logs needed for the pillars of Solomon’s temple. He also sent an architect and expert builders to work on the temple. By the 9th century BCE or earlier, the Phoenician trading network had spawned colonies throughout the Mediterranean. The most important of these was Carthage, established as a trading port for North Africa, near modern Tunis. Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian Periods Beginning in the 9th century BCE, the region of the Phoenicians came under a succession of foreign powers from beyond their Eastern borders. The foreign rulers demanded tribute and often destroyed and burned the cities who refused to submit. The Assyrians were the first. Assyrian rule ended when the new regional superpower, the Babylonians, became the overloads in the 6th century BCE. The Babylonian era ended when, beginning in 539 BCE, Tyre and the surrounding regions came under the control of the Persians, the new regional superpower. Greek and Roman Periods Alexander the Great made the conquest of the region a stepping-stone toward his plan to conquer and control the mighty Persian Empire. He took Baalbek in 334 BCE, and renamed it Heliopolis, City of the Sun. During the following two years, he sacked and took control of other Phoenician cities, including Sidon and Tyre. The siege of Tyre was a long and difficult one for

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both sides. Some residents of Tyre fled to Carthage, making it an even more important colony for Phoenician trade, culture, and language. Later, the dialect of the Canaanite language spoken in Carthage would develop on its own path and come to be called Punic. After the death of Alexander in 323 BCE, when various elements of his generals formed separate empires out of his vast conquests, the Canaanite region came under the control of the Seleucid Empire, which ruled from Babylon. After almost three centuries of being ruled by Greek overlords, the region became part of the Roman Empire, started in 64 BCE. Trade with the Roman Empire brought some prosperity to Phoenicia, with the region’s famous purple dye, as well as pottery and glass, as important export products. Some Phoenicians were even granted coveted Roman citizenship. The Romans built impressive temples, as was their practice elsewhere. The ruins of some of their temples remain as tourist attractions today. As elsewhere, the Romans built high-quality roads connecting the cities of the region. The Phoenicians were still under Roman rule when Christianity arose. Christian history recalls that Jesus went to the region of Tyre and Sidon, and the earliest gentile convert was a Phoenician woman, the first of many such converts in the region. Tyre and Sidon became important places in the early spread of Christianity among non-Hebrew populations. St. Peter departed for Rome from a Phoenician port. St. Paul arrived at Tyre by ship and found an established Christian community already in place. After the fall of the western half of the Roman Empire, the region remained under the Byzantine Empire, the eastern part of the old Roman Empire. Islamic and Crusader Periods During the caliphate of Uthman (644–656), the third caliph, Islam became a strong force in Damascus under the governorship of Muawiah, Uthman’s relative. Muawiah sent Muslim troops to the coastal region of Lebanon and brought it under Islamic influence and control. Many coastal people converted to Islam, although those in the more mountainous regions maintained their Christian or other traditions. The schism between Sunni and Shiite Muslims left Lebanon with a divided Muslim population. Further diversity emerged with the later arrival in the 11th century of an offshoot of Shiite Islam who referred to themselves as monotheists but were known to outsiders as Druze. In the 11th century, Christian Crusader armies captured Jerusalem, and by the 12th century much of modern Lebanon’s territory was under the control of one of the several Crusader Kingdoms: the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the far south, the County of Tripoli in the Tripoli region, and the Principality of Antioch to the north.

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Various Shiite Muslim populations immigrated to Lebanon from the 11th through 13th centuries. They were escaping from their former homes in Iraq and Syria, or from farther south on the Arabian Peninsula. The Muslim Mamluks took control of the Lebanon region in the late 13th century. They defeated the Maronite Christian forces in their mountain territories. Beirut became an important center of trade between the Mamluk regions and Europe. Ottoman Period The region came under the control of the Ottoman Turks starting in 1516. The Ottomans ruled indirectly through regional emirs. In the 19th century, wars erupted between Maronites in the north and the Druze in the south. Napoleon sent troops to intervene in 1860. As a result of the destruction of their crops and residences, many Maronites chose to emigrate. French Period World War I brought devastation to Lebanon. The Ottomans sent in an army to take direct control. Supplies were cut off and animals taken, leading to widespread famine. The Ottomans had sided with the Germans and suffered the loss of their empire during the war. France was given a mandate over Lebanon, which came to be known as Grand Liban, by the newly formed League of Nations. The borders of Grand Liban, or “Greater Lebanon,” were defined, becoming the borders of modern Lebanon. A Lebanese constitution was proclaimed in 1926, setting up a Lebanese government, but with final authority still in French hands. Independence and Civil Wars An independent Lebanese government was put in place on November 22, 1943, when France released imprisoned government officials and acknowledged the full independence of Lebanon. The first post-independence war erupted in 1958. The Pan-Arabism movement inspired by Egypt’s Gamal Nasser was supported by many Lebanese Sunni Muslims, while many Lebanese Christians supported President Camille Chamoun’s pro-West stance. Taking advantage of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which promised nations military support in their resistance against Soviet communism, President Chamoun requested and received some military backing from the United States. The crisis ended when Chamoun resigned and was replaced as president by General Fuad Chehab.

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The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians spilled over into Lebanon. Israel bombed the Beirut airport in 1968, destroying several planes, in retaliation for the destruction of an Israeli plane by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which had been operating from Lebanon. In an attempt to deal with the Palestinian resistance operating from refugee camps in Lebanon, army commander in chief Emile Al-Bustani and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasser Arafat signed the Cairo Agreement in 1969. There was resistance to the Cairo Agreement within Lebanon, and the discord intensified after the PLO relocated its headquarters from Jordan to Lebanon. From 1970–1975, the conflict between Israel and the PLO increasingly impacted Lebanon, leading, in early 1975, to a prolonged and devastating civil war. Lebanese president Suleiman Frangieh invited Syrian troops to Lebanon to help restore peace in 1976. A cease-fire was arranged in 1976, to be enforced by a Syrian-led Arab Deterrent Force (ADF). This led to a longlasting Syrian domination of Lebanon. A second phase of the civil war intensified in 1978, after Israel retaliated following a Palestinian attack on its territory by launching a major invasion into Lebanon. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 425, calling for an Israeli withdrawal. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was sent to restore peace and Lebanese authority. Israel withdrew, but for its own security interests Israel turned over control of a zone in southern Lebanon to its proxy, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), although Israeli troops remained in South Lebanon. Israel launched a major invasion of Lebanon in its 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee. President-elect Bashir Gemayel, an ally of Israel, was assassinated. Israel retaliated by occupying West Beirut. Bashir’s brother, Amine Gemayel, became president. An international peacekeeping force came to Beirut. The following year, Israel and Lebanon reached an agreement calling for Israeli troop withdrawal. The international peacekeepers left after many U.S. and French troops, and others, died from bomb explosions. By 1984, the control of various regions of Lebanon was by militias rather than the Lebanese Army. In 1985, Lebanon backed away from the Cairo Agreement with the PLO and the agreement with Israel. By 1988, Lebanon had two de facto governments. West Beirut was controlled by a mainly Muslim regime backed by Syria. East Beirut was controlled by a mainly Christian regime headed by General Michel Aoun. The 1989 Taif Accords strived for a unified government, but it was rejected by Aoun. The civil war ended after Syria attacked the Presidential Palace in 1990, ending the resistance by Aoun’s faction. Syrian influence was dominant over the new Government of National Reconciliation led by Omar Karami. Militias, except that of Hezbollah, were disbanded as of 1991. A Treaty of Brotherhood,

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Cooperation, and Coordination was signed by Lebanon and Syria. It called for a Higher Council cochaired by two presidents and gave legitimacy to Syria’s role in shaping Lebanon’s political and economic policies. Parliamentary elections were held in 1992, with many Christians protesting Syria’s control of the process. Rafic Hariri became prime minister and attempted to rebuild the war-torn Lebanese economy. The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel resulted in Israel’s 1993 Operation Accountability intrusion into Lebanon. Israel’s larger scale 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath ended with an “understanding,” according to the terms of which Hezbollah and Palestinian fighters agreed not to attack Israeli civilians in northern Israel and Israel agreed that Hezbollah had the right to resist Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon in 2000, after controlling the region for 22 years. After the withdrawal, a “Resistance and Liberation Day” was celebrated in Lebanon. The three-year extension given to pro-Syrian president Emile Lahoud’s term in 2004 was resisted by Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who resigned, along with others who opposed Syrian influence. The UNSC called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. Rallies supporting the presence of Syrian forces were held in Beirut. Former prime minister Rafic Hariri and others were killed by a bomb explosion in 2005. Many blamed Syria for the assassination, and Hariri’s funeral in Beirut became the occasion for large protests calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces. These rallies were countered by pro-Syria demonstrations. The demonstrations continued for a month. The date March 8, when a mass pro-Syria rally was held, emerged as the name of the proSyrian, anti-West grouping known as the March 8 Alliance. The other side, the March 14 Alliance, takes its name from a massive anti-Syria demonstration held on 14 March 2005. The ensuing sectarian turmoil and international pressure led to the withdrawal of Syrian forces, ending decades of Syrian presence in Lebanon. After parliamentary elections were held, a government that was not pro-Syria marked a change in the long-term trend in Lebanese politics. The “National Dialogue” talks, involving Sunni, Shiite, and Christian parties, took place in 2006, giving some hope for cooperation in the future. In July of that year, a war started between Israel and Hezbollah, leading to a stalemate and the withdrawal of Israeli forces that had moved into Lebanon. After continuing disputes between the factions, the Doha Agreement, in 2008, realigned the cabinet positions so that the Hezbollah-led opposition gained more political power. A unity government was formed in accordance with the Doha Agreement.

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Lebanon and Syria initiated diplomatic relations in 2008, signaling Syrian recognition of Lebanese sovereignty. In July 2009, the United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) officially began its investigation into the assassination of Rafic Hariri and others. The Hezbollah-led faction would continue to denounce the STL as something intended to accuse it falsely. The March 14 Alliance won the 2009 parliamentary elections but was pressured into forming a coalition with the opposition. The unity government broke down in 2011, and was succeeded by a government led by the Hezbollah faction. Frequent clashes between pro-Syria and anti-Syria factions marred efforts at harmony in 2012. Lebanon took in a high number of refugees from the Syrian war. The stream of refugees continued for years, reaching more than 1 million by 2014, such that the number of Syrian refugees amounted to as much as a quarter of the population of Lebanon. Aside from the influx of refugees, sporadic incidents of armed fighting also spilled over into Lebanon, especially in Tripoli and the border regions. Parliament approved a new electoral law in June 2017. Prime Minister Hariri announced his resignation while in Saudi Arabia in November 2017, but he later changed his mind. In the context of large-scale unemployment, perceived government corruption, and widespread poverty, protests were triggered in October 2019, when the government planned tax increases on petrol, tobacco, and internet charges. With the economy in turmoil and protests in the streets, Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned in October 2019. Mass protests against political corruption and ever-worsening economic conditions continued into 2020. After months of failed attempts at a consensus, Hassan Diab became the new prime minister and formed a government on 22 January 2020, leading to the appointment of a technocratic, as opposed to a sectarian, cabinet. The change in government did not end the demonstrations, as the banking crisis of 2020, the falling value of the Lebanese pound, increasing unemployment, the spread of COVID-19, and the loss of export trade worsened the conditions of most Lebanese. The Beirut Port explosion in 2020 renewed protests against the government, leading to the resignation of Diab, and the overall political system.

POPULATION, CITIES, AND ECONOMY World Bank Data reported that Lebanon’s population was 6.85 million in 2018. Many ethnic, cultural, and religious components make up the modern Lebanese population. The Phoenicians, or Canaanites, who form the oldest identifiable population layer, were themselves likely somewhat diverse. Throughout the centuries ethnic populations migrated into the region from the east, especially from Syria. Other populations arrived from the sea. Many

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came to escape conflicts or persecution. Arab immigrants and influence arrived from farther south on the Arabian Peninsula, especially after the beginning of the Islamic period. The three largest cities of Lebanon are, in descending order of population size, Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon. The only city with more than 1 million people is Beirut, with almost 3 million people. Thus, almost half of Lebanon’s population of approximately 7 million live in the Greater Beirut region. At between 3,000 and 4,000 people per square kilometer, the population density in Beirut is very high compared to most of the world’s cities, and the influx of Syrian refugees has greatly increased that density. The median age is approximately 30 years, and the life expectancy is between 77 and 78 years. Being a heavy net importer, Lebanon always has a large trade deficit. Its main trading partners are China, the European Union, and the United States, as well as regional nations. Most of Lebanon’s exports go to its Arab neighbors. It exports such commodities as gems, precious metals, and mineral oils. It also exports some manufactured goods. Lebanon’s beaches, mountains, ancient ruins, summer festivals, and other attractions make it a magnet for tourists, especially from the Arab world, and among the large Lebanese diaspora. Tourism is an important contributor to the economy but not during times of civil unrest, war, or the virus pandemic. Lebanon’s economy began an impressive climb in 2006; however, it began to decline due to the impact of the influx of refugees from the civil war in Syria, leading to a downturn by 2011. The extremely high government debt load makes infrastructure improvements beyond the government’s ability, leaving inadequate electrical and other services, most noticeably inadequate garbage pickup and disposal. By 2019, the rise of unemployment and the failure of the government to provide basic services led to public demonstrations. The situation became worse as a result of the downturn in economic activity brought about by COVID-19 in 2020. Lebanon’s government announced a default on its international debts and had to ask a reluctant International Monetary Fund for even more loans. The Lebanese pound moved into hyperinflation, causing a sharp rise in the cost of the many imported goods needed for ordinary life in Lebanon. The explosion in the port district in August 2020 further worsened the situation.

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RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES In terms of religious affiliation, Lebanon has a diverse population that plays important roles in its history and politics. Historically, as in the case of many other ancient peoples, the Canaanites worshipped different gods according to their city of residence and local traditions. The modern city name Baalbek is thought to derive from the name of the local god, the Baal (god) of Bekaa. Greek and Roman conquests brought outside religions but without a significant lasting effect on the religious landscape. Ruins of Roman temples remain tourist sites in Baalbek and elsewhere. Christianity, and monotheism, came to the region when some residents adopted Christianity during the 1st century. Jesus himself had gone to Tyre and Sidon according to the Gospel of Mark, and Luke’s gospel reports that Jesus sent disciples to Tyre and Sidon while he was alive. Soon after his death, important leaders like St. Paul and St. Peter founded churches in what is now Lebanon. Christian churches soon became part of the region’s landscape. Eventually, many Christian traditions found adherents in Lebanon either by immigration or conversion. A Christian monk named Maron (or Maroun) moved his monastic community from Syria to the mountains of Lebanon in the 5th century. Many Lebanese adopted this form of Christianity. His followers came to be known as Maronites or Maronite Christians. They follow an ancient liturgical tradition of Eastern Christianity, and their liturgical language has roots in the Aramaic language spoken by Jesus and other Jews in his era. They recognize the pope as their spiritual leader and so are often referred to as Maronite Catholics. Aside from the Maronites, the other Catholic traditions in Lebanon include the Melkite Greek Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic Church. The Orthodox churches in Lebanon include the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Greek Orthodox Church, and the Syrian Orthodox Church. There are also a small number of Lebanese who adhere to the Assyrian Church, which long ago broke away from other Orthodox churches due to a doctrinal dispute. Islam has the most adherents in Lebanon. In the decades following the death of Muhammad in 632, Islam came to the region by both conversion and Arab immigration. Later, various Shiite populations came to Lebanon to escape persecution, adding to the local Shiite Muslim population. The Syrian civil war has greatly increased Lebanon’s Muslim population. The current Muslim population is fairly evenly split between Sunnis and Shiites. There are other traditions in Lebanon that were originally sects of Islam but are now distinct religions even though they are grouped with Muslims by the government according to the terms of the confessional political system of government. The Alawites, or Alawis, migrated to Lebanon from northern

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Syria. They became a distinct religion after separating from Imami Shiite Islam before some migrated to Lebanon. The Druze population dates back to a breakaway sect of Shiite Islam in early 11th-century Egypt. They settled in mountainous regions of Lebanon and nearby countries in the 11th century. They are the dominant population in some regions, for example, the Chouf Mountains. The confessional political system in Lebanon, per the terms of the unwritten National Pact, provides for a government with power-sharing among the many religious-ethnic groups. Under this system, the three main groups are the Maronite Christians, Sunnis, and Shiites.

CURRENT ISSUES AND PROSPECTS As Lebanon approaches its 80th year since gaining independence from France, it finds itself at a precarious crossroads, dealing with a number of pressing political, economic, and security-related issues and challenges. If these are not dealt with adequately, the country will further destabilize politically and economically, and risk becoming a failed state with all that entails. One of Lebanon’s most pressing current issues is coping with the influx of more than 1 million refugees from the civil war in Syria. They have been in Lebanon since the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011, and there is no indication that they will leave the country anytime soon. The sheer logistics involved with housing so many new arrivals are daunting, even with United Nations and other international assistance. The government continues to struggle to provide additional services required by this massive population that effectively lives at the margins of Lebanese society. Many refugees live in camps that are badly equipped in terms of housing, schools, and medical facilities. There are also many who do not live in the camps, but rather are living in impoverished urban areas that were already overcrowded. The presence of the Syrian refugees has raised tensions in Lebanon, especially between sectarian communities that fear the refugees’ impact on the political environment, and by poorer Lebanese, who see them as competitors in the labor market. A second issue currently impacting Lebanon is the conflicting political and social interests of the many sectarian communities. This issue has proved to be the most difficult challenge to governing Lebanon throughout the years, and there is no reason to expect this to change anytime soon. There are not only the conflicting identities of Christians and Muslims, but also several varieties of both Christianity and Islam. In addition to political competition, Lebanon’s religious communities also continue to have very different conceptions of the country’s regional and international orientation. This has

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become particularly problematic in recent years, as some sects have aligned with regional power Iran, while others have aligned with Saudi Arabia, the archrival to Iran. Lebanese sects are also supporting competing groups in the Syrian civil war. Regional conflicts, including the Arab–Israeli one, continue to risk spilling over into Lebanon, as they have in past years. Lebanon’s confessional-based approach to parliamentary democracy is being challenged on several fronts. The challenges have reached unprecedented levels with the ongoing demonstrations that began in 2019 and 2020. One reason is that, although no census has been taken since 1932, the proportional population sizes of various religious groups have changed considerably since the system was instituted. Many Christians have emigrated, especially so during the long civil war period. The influx of the mostly Muslim Syrian refugees (and the Palestinian Muslim refugees, which date back decades) will further challenge the population balance. Sooner or later Lebanese politics will have to take the population shifts into account. Another political challenge arises from the perception that the sectarianbased political system tends to keep too much power in the hands of powerful and self-serving sectarian-based elites, to the detriment of the wider population. Still another related challenge is that patronage may be so entrenched in the traditional political system that the calls for an end to corruption are not possible with the current system. Lebanon’s economic situation is currently its most pressing issue. The large imbalance of trade and other longstanding problems caught up with Lebanon’s economy in 2020, bringing about hyperinflation and a default on international debt. The devastation in the Beirut’s port region caused by the massive explosion in August 2020 left the government at a loss for the resources to rebuild. As a consequence of these many challenges, the legitimacy of Lebanon’s confessional-based political system is perhaps at an all time low. Protests by civil society have raged for years, gaining momentum in 2019 and 2020. Demands of the protestors vary, but many are calling for the current political elite to resign and a new political order take place. The protestors blame wide-scale corruption and incompetence of the elite class of every religious denomination for the economic collapse of the country, where a large portion of the population now lives below the poverty line. The Beirut Port explosion simply summed up the sheer incompetence of the country’s elite. The protestors and civil society, however, have failed to offer an alternative political model that would appeal across Lebanon’s complex sectarian mix, and reform would be notoriously difficult to carry out. It is not entirely clear if there is a unified voice among the opposition as to what kind of political system they would like to see in Lebanon. Lebanon has a complex set of problems, including continuing tensions between sectarian commu-

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nities. If not handled well, it could very well lead the country into another civil war. It is not clear the extent to which an alternative political model with alleviate these tensions. While many of Lebanon’s problems are domestically driven, they are also exacerbated by regional conflicts that have traditionally impacted Lebanon and continue to do so today. Lebanon’s stability, therefore, is predicated to a considerable extent on regional and international dynamics. Lebanon is likely in for some difficult times.

A ABBAS, NAIM (?– ). A Palestinian Sunni Muslim from the Ain al-Helweh refugee camp in southern Lebanon who became active as a jihadi in 1993. Abbas supported Hezbollah in his early jihadi days but later turned to AlQaeda and trained in Iraq. He became critical of Hezbollah and the Iranian influence on Lebanon. He became a commander in the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, which claimed responsibility for the 2013 bombing at the Iranian Embassy in Beirut. Acting as a militant Sunni Muslim, he targeted many of the other factions in Lebanon, including Hezbollah, the Lebanese Army, Shiite Muslims, and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) personnel. Abbas was arrested in 2014, and told his story in a military courtroom. It has been claimed that he confessed to involvement with 19 terrorist attacks from 2013–2014. He has been convicted but not executed because Lebanon ceased executions in 2014. ABBASID CALIPHATE. Descendants of Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib (566–652), an uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, militarily defeated the Umayyad Caliphate of Damascus in 750. The first Abbasid caliph, al-Mansur, founded Baghdad in Iraq. By relocating the caliphate to Baghdad in 652, al-Mansur was better able to integrate the growing number of Persian Muslims into what had been an Arab-dominated regime. This gave much more status to non-Arab Muslims, the Mawali, for example, the Persians. The Abbasids were Sunni Muslims. They had come to power with the help of Shiite Muslims, but their rule was plagued by Shiite uprisings. To keep their vast empire together, the Abbasid Caliphs created an army recruited in large part from Turkish slaves, as well as others drawn from the lower social strata of non-Arab Muslims. Members of the army were known as Mamluks. The original Abbasid Caliphate ended when a Mongol khan overran Baghdad in 1258, and assassinated the last Baghdad Abbasid caliph. Backed by Mamluk military and administrative support, the Abbasid Caliphate later came to rule part of the former empire from Cairo.

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During the period in which Lebanon was ruled by the Abbasid Caliphate, a rebellion of mountain dwellers erupted and then was suppressed in 759. In 960, Prince Allaqa proclaimed independence from Abbasid rule for Tyre and surrounding regions. ABDULLAH AZZAM BRIGADES (AAB). A Sunni-based movement founded in Pakistan in 2009, as an offshoot of the Al-Qaeda network. Its namesake was a Palestinian who was among the first outsiders who volunteered to fight in Afghanistan against the Soviets. He died in that war and is considered a martyr by the movement. AAB has branches that have been active in the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon. The Lebanese branch of AAB is also known as the Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalion, having been named after one of the jihadists who participated in the hijacking and crashing of United Flight 93 in Pennsylvania during the 11 September 2001 destruction of the World Trade Center towers. AAB is considered to represent Al-Qaeda in Lebanon and has called for the release of imprisoned jihadists by the Lebanese government and used missiles to attack Israel and the Western presence in the Middle East. It claimed responsibility for the two bomb explosions in 2013, near the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, as retaliation for Iranian support for Hezbollah. The organization also claimed responsibility for the 2014 bombing at the Iranian Cultural Center in Beirut. The AAB has called for the overthrow of the Saudi kingship. One of AAB’s commanders, Naim Abbas, was captured in 2014, and confessed to involvement in many of AAB’s attacks. The AAB is listed as a terrorist organization by the United Nations and many other nations, including the United States, Canada, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates. ABU ADAL, GEORGE (1920–2001). A businessman and prominent publisher best known for publishing a weekly magazine in French and English, al-Ousbou l-Arabi. His media publications contributed to the Pan-Arabism cause by founding Pan Arab, which gained a readership throughout the Arab-speaking world. ABU MADI, ELIA (1889/1890–1957). A Lebanese-born poet whose many books of poetry remain popular among Arab readers. Abu Madi’s family moved from their home in Lebanon to Egypt in 1911. He soon returned to Lebanon to assist in the opposition to the Ottoman Empire, followed by a move to Cincinnati, Ohio. In 1916, he moved to New York City, where he thrived in an environment of other Arab American poets and writers, including Khalil Gibran.

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Abu Madi’s books of poetry include Tazkar al-Madi, Diwan lliya Abu Madi, Al-Jadawil, Al-Khama’il, and Tibr wa Turab. He founded the Arablanguage periodical al-Samir. His poems, especially “Al-Talasim” (“Riddles”) raise, rather than answer, profound questions about the good and evil tendencies of human nature, the meaning of life, and the existence or fantasy of an afterlife. His many awards include the Lebanese Order of Merit and the Order of the Cedars. ABU SHABAKA, ILYAS (1903–1947). An American-born Lebanese poet who lived as an adult in Lebanon. Abu Shabaka is best known as one of the major writers representing the Romantic School of Arabic poetry. He published several collections of his own poetry and translated classical Frenchlanguage works into Arabic. His several poetry collections, including Ila alAbad and Nida’ al-Qalb, deal with such religious themes as guilt and sin, as well as matters of sensuality and sexuality. ABU SHAHLA, MICHEL (1898–1959). A poet and journalist who cofounded the magazine Al-Na’rad in 1925, and founded the magazine AlJumhur in 1936. ABU SHAQRA, MUHAMMAD (1910–1991). An important Druze religious leader who was closely aligned with the Jumblatt family. ABU SULAYMAN, SHAKIR (1927–?). A Maronite who was active in the Lebanese Front and headed the Maronite League. ADIB, MUSTAPHA (1972– ). Having been born in Tripoli, Adib earned a law degree and a doctorate in political science, with a specialty in strategic studies. He taught at Beirut War College and then universities in France and Lebanese University. Adib’s political career began when he served as chief of staff in the prime minister’s office from 2011–2013. Then he was appointed as Lebanon’s ambassador to Germany beginning in 2013. He was designated as the new prime minister on 31 August 2020. His selection came on the eve of the visit to Beirut by French president Emmanuel Macron. Adib, a Sunni Muslim, as is required for the office of prime minister in Lebanon’s confessional system, was not widely known in Lebanon before becoming prime minister. Nevertheless, he received widespread support. His name had been put forth by four former prime ministers, and his selection was endorsed by Hezbollah, as well as the Future Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement.

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Lebanon’s political leaders had been facing intense pressure to move toward a consensus concerning forming a new government after the Hassan Diab government had been forced to resign in the aftermath of the explosion in Beirut earlier in the month, and especially so because Macron had called for reforms even before his pending visit to Beirut. Macron’s support was thought to be crucial for Lebanon’s request for a large loan from the International Monetary Fund. The widespread support of those protesting in demand of serious political reforms also contributed to the urgency to form a new government. In his acceptance speech, Adib called for real action, as opposed to mere promises, in reforming Lebanese politics and reviving the struggling economy. He also pledged to pick cabinet members with technical expertise to help turn the country around. In September 2020, he announced his inability to form a government. Observers of the Lebanese political scene lay the blame on the Shiite parties, Hezbollah and Amal, which continue to insist on making political appointments to the cabinet, including the crucial finance ministry position. ADONIS (1930– ). The pen name of poet and publisher Ali Ahmad Sa’id, who was born in Syria into a family too poor to afford formal education for him but where poetry was loved and recited by his father. His recitation of a poem for the president led to his admission to a French-language high school and then university in Damascus. While still a teenager, he began writing poems under the name of the Greek god of fertility, Adonis. Following a term in a Syrian prison for his political activism, in 1956 Adonis moved to Beirut, where he earned his PhD. While in Beirut, he continued to write poems. He relocated to Paris in 1980, to avoid the conflict of the civil war in Lebanon. There he taught and began his publishing career by helping found two literary journals: Majallat Shi’r in Paris and Muwaqif in Beirut. Adonis’ poetic style draws on the rich tradition of Arabic poetry but with more modern approaches, for example, the use of free verse and the mixing of styles within a poem. His subject matter, for instance, exile and the profound changes that circumstances force one to make, are also more modern. His essays and poems reflect a strong Pan-Arabism. Several of Adonis’ Arabic poetry collections and essays have been published in French translations. Those translated into English include Adonis: Selected Poems, Sufism and Surrealism, An Introduction to Arab Poetics, and Violence and Islam: Conversations with Houria Abdelouahed. His many awards include the Syria–Lebanon Best Poet Award, as well as awards from Norway, Belgium, and other areas.

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AGRICULTURE, MODERN. Only about 10 percent of modern Lebanon’s gross domestic product (GDP) is derived from some form of agriculture. Traditional agriculture contributes approximately 5 percent of the total GDP, while the growing agri-food sector accounts for another 5 percent. In contrast to most regions of the Middle East, Lebanon receives sufficient annual rainfall to support a wide range of crops. The many rivers of Lebanon help distribute the water from the higher regions down to the fertile valleys. In the Bekaa plain, approximately 40 percent of the land is suitable for cultivation. With its wide array of climate and soil variations, Lebanon produces a wide range of both tropical and other crops, including wheat and barley, tobacco, figs, and grapes, as well as many varieties of fruits and vegetables. Hashish production contributes to the economy of the Bekaa Valley. Cattle, sheep, and goats are the main livestock produced. The Syrian conflict has impacted agriculture in Lebanon in several ways. Having more than 1 million refugees has increased the domestic demand for food by more than 20 percent. Also, many refugees have settled in rural areas, sometimes on land that would not otherwise be cultivated. The closing or uncertainty of trade routes to Syria and Iraq, and throughout the region, has disrupted both the import of agricultural supplies and the market for exports. AIR LIBAN. See MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES (MEA). AKL, SAID (1911–2014). A Maronite Lebanese poet, author, and professor who is known both for this poetry and as a champion of the Lebanese dialect of Arabic. Akl wrote in both standard Arabic and the Lebanese dialect, which he helped to codify and write in Roman alphabetical letters. Politically, he was a committed Lebanese Nationalist. He was one of the founders of the Lebanese Renewal Party in 1972, with its pro-Phoenicianism stance, which sought to distance Lebanon from Pan-Arabism. His Nationalist stance was welcomed by the Guardians of the Cedars movement. See also LITERATURE. AL AMAL. A Lebanese newspaper, with the Arabic name meaning “The Work.” It is the official outlet of the Lebanese Kataeb Party. Political cartoonist Pierre Sadek published in Al Amal during the civil war of 1975–1990. It was formerly published daily but is now a weekly. AL BUSTAN INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL OF MUSIC AND THE PERFORMING ARTS. A festival of music and dance held mainly at the Emile Al-Bustani Auditorium in Beirut each year since 1994. Some performances also take place at the Crystal Garden glass conservatory at Al Bustan

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in Beyt Meri and other venues. It continues for several weeks in February and March. Each year the program is organized around a theme and features renowned performers from Lebanon and worldwide. The festival strives to be innovative. For example, the 2018 program featured break-dancers dancing to music by Bach. ALAMUDDIN, AMAL (1978– ). An internationally famous Lebanese–British human rights lawyer who has represented many high-profile personalities. Alamuddin was born in Beirut into a religiously mixed family. Her father has Druze ancestry, and her mother has a Sunni Muslim background. Her family moved to England to escape the civil war conflict when she was only two years old. She studied law in England and received her law degree from New York University School of Law. She works in the fields of international law, especially human rights law. Her work has involved human rights issues in Kampuchea, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, and many other nations. Among her many high-profile clients have been Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, and Gloria Arroyo, and important cases she has worked on have been, most notably, the attempt to repatriate the Elgin Marbles and the ethnic Rohingya expelled from Myanmar. She has also been a guest lecturer or instructor at several law schools, one example being Columbia University. In 2014, she and actor George Clooney were married in Italy in a highly publicized wedding. They have created the philanthropic Clooney Foundation for Justice. ALAWI, ALAWIS. See ALAWITES. ALAWITES. The Alawites, or Alawis, are members of a religious community now residing in Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and elsewhere through recent immigration. Their home region is the Latakia province of northwestern Syria, where they form a majority. Historically, a significant Alawite population migrated to Lebanon, especially in the northern, Akkar region. The current Alawite population of Lebanon is estimated to be more than 100,000. The name Nusayri(s) was traditionally used for this religious community by outsiders because the community was said to have broken away from Twelver Shiite Islam under the leadership of Muhammad ibn Nusayr. Ibn Nusayr lived in the 9th century in Persia, during the time of the 10th and 11th imams as recognized by Twelver Shiites. He claimed to be the Bab (Gateway, Representative) to those imams, and some think he also claimed to be the Bab of the 12th imam, who disappeared into an occultation—that is, into a hidden state awaiting the time of his return to earth. Ibn Nusayr was eventually excommunicated by the leader of the Twelver Shiite community, and his positions were denounced as extremist. Al-Khasibi assumed leader-

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ship of the community after Nusayr’s death. Sometime after his death in the mid-10th century, al-Khasibi’s grandson, al-Tabarani, was the one responsible for relocating the community. Having been denounced by the mainstream Shiites in Persia, the Alawites relocated to the mountains of the Latakia region of northern Syria under the protection of Byzantine Christians. There are several Alawite beliefs that differ significantly with Twelver Shiite Islam. Their most distinctive viewpoint is that there have been seven emanations of God in various historical periods. Each divine manifestation has three aspects, called, in Arabic, Ma’na (“Meaning”), Ism (“Name”), and Bab (“Gateway” or “Representative”). The era of Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali was the most recent of the seven emanations. The Alawites understand Muhammad as the Name; Imam Ali as the Meaning; and the Bab as Salman al-Farsi, a Persian who was raised as a Zoroastrian and later became a follower of Muhammad. It is said to have been Salman who suggested digging the trench that helped the Medina forces during the Battle of the Trench. Alawites hold a number of beliefs that seem more like Gnostic Christianity than mainstream Islam. One is the idea that souls were originally stars in the heavens and that the goal is to return to that state. Another is that Alawites give an esoteric interpretation of some Quranic passages. On this basis, they do not keep the Ramadan fast nor pray five times a day. The way they keep some Christian holy days may also hint at some Gnostic Christian influence. Although they arose quite independently from the Egyptian origins of the Druze community, they share with the Druze the belief in reincarnation of the soul according to the moral deeds of the person. The Alawites refer to themselves as Alawi(s), meaning followers of Imam Ali, rather than Nusayris. During the French Mandate period, government policy was to refer to them as Alawites. As followers of Ali (Alawi), they can more readily be classified as a sect of Shiite Islam rather than extremists. After gaining a mandate to rule Syria and Lebanon, beginning after World War I, the French gave some regional autonomy to the Alawites in the form of an Alawite State. In 1918, an Alawite leader named Saleh al-Ali started a movement with the goal of forming an Alawite state independent of France. The ensuing conflict between al-Ali and the French forces led to the outbreak of the Syrian Revolt of 1919. The French suppressed the movement, and for much of the period of French rule the Alawites viewed the French as useful for protecting the community against Sunni or other Islamic communities. Most of the Alawite community in Lebanon has supported the Assad government during the Syrian civil war, viewing the Assad regime as a protection against Sunni factions in the region. Several serious incidents have emerged in which Alawite supporters of Assad have clashed with Sunni Arabs in Lebanon. Tripoli has been especially prone to these protests and ensuing violence.

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ALAWITE STATE. A region of government created during the French Mandate period in Lebanon. The Alawite State included the region along the coast north of Beirut. Its capital was Latakia. To its south was the state called Greater Lebanon, with Beirut at its center. The State of Damascus was to its southeast and the State of Aleppo to its northeast. This arrangement gave some regional autonomy to the region of Lebanon with a majority Alawite population. ALAYLI, ABDULLAH AL- (1914–1996). Born in Beirut to a conservative Shiite Muslim family, Abdullah al-Alayli was a child prodigy who, at age 24, published an important book on the Arabic language that advanced the linguistic description of Arabic root forms. He went on to write many books on Arab nationalism, Muhammad’s wife Khadijah, and the early history of Shiite Islam. He was an important interpreter of Islam who worked to bring harmony between the Sunni and Shiite communities. Al-Alayli was socialist in his politics and helped found the Progressive Socialist Party. His book Ayna Al-Khata (“Where Is the Error?”), arguing for a progressive interpretation of Islam, was so controversial that it was banned in Saudi Arabia and some other countries. Among other ideas, it argued for a secular understanding of marriage, a rejection of the accumulation of large amounts of wealth, and a rejection of the idea that the oil wealth of a nation should accrue to its king. AL-DARAZI (?–1018). Most likely born in a Persian family living in Bukhara, in modern Uzbekistan, in the late 10th century, Muhammad bin Ismail Nashtakin al-Darazi became both a military and religious leader in the era of Egypt-based caliph al-Hakim. His name, Darazi, implies that he came from a family of tailors. Having moved to Cairo in about 1015, Darazi became involved in the religious group that called themselves Muwahhideen, “Monotheists.” Darazi had become an important leader among the Muwahhideen, but his military career was about to radically alter his religious path. Caliph alHakim put Darazi in charge of a large army tasked with putting down the Unity movement in the Syria–Lebanon region. The Unity movement was an attempt to unite Christians, Sunnis, and Shiites under one monotheistic religion as a way to promote harmony in the Syria–Lebanon region. Darazi’s army was defeated by the smaller army of rugged mountain fighters. Having been captured, Darazi became a convert to and leader of the Unity movement, while putting his own spin on it. Under his leadership, his new followers, now called Darazis (Druze) after him, differed in their beliefs from the

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Muwahhideen led by ibn Ahmad in Egypt. Darazi introduced into the faith the idea that Caliph al-Hakim was divine, but that did not win him favor at court. Instead, al-Hakim ordered Darazi to be executed for heresy in 1018. Ironically, the Muwahhideen led by Darazi’s rival, ibn Ahmad, were branded as Dazaris, or Druze, by outsiders. The surviving religious community known as Druze trace themselves back to ibn Ahmad and consider Darazi to be their first and most important heretic. ALEXANDRIA PROTOCOL. An agreement issued on 7 October 1944, among the five Arab states that met in Alexandria, Egypt. The five were Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, then called Transjordan. The Lebanese delegation consisted of Prime Minister Riad al-Solh; the minister of foreign affairs, Salim Taqla Bey; and the chief of the presidential cabinet, Mus Mubarak. The context was that these Arab states shared a dislike for Zionism and its increasing role in Palestine, and they saw a chance for more cooperation among Arab states in a pending postwar setting. The protocol envisioned a league of Arab states, on equal footing, that would, among other things, coordinate foreign-policy matters. The protocol led to the formal formation of the Arab League. See also EGYPT, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. AL-FATAH. See ARAFAT, YASSER (1929–2004). ALLIED ADMINISTRATION. See OCCUPIED ENEMY TERRITORYADMINISTRATION (OETA). AL-MAKASSED FOUNDATION. See MAKASSED FOUNDATION. AL-MURABTUN. See KULAYLAT, IBRAHIM (1934– ). AL-NUSRA FRONT. A Syrian Sunni extremist group with links to AlQaeda, al-Nusra has been actively engaged in the Syrian civil war since 2011. It opposes the regime of Syrian president Assad and managed to control some regions of Syria, including Idlib Province. For political expediency, including attracting aid from Gulf Arab states, al-Nusra eventually severed its affiliation with Al-Qaeda. It has also undergone several name changes, including becoming Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in 2017. The al-Nusra Front expanded into Lebanon as early as 2012, when some of its fighters were involved in sectarian tensions in Tripoli. By 2013, the group pursued a violent campaign in Lebanon against Hezbollah and other Lebanese targets in retaliation for Hezbollah’s robust backing of Assad’s

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regime in the Syrian conflict. In January 2014, the front warned Lebanese Sunni Muslims to avoid going near Hezbollah bases to avoid being caught up in such attacks. Al-Nusra claimed credit for several bombings throughout Lebanon in 2014 and 2015. This included the February 2014 car bombing that killed two soldiers and a civilian, the March suicide car bomb attack in the Bekaa Valley, an October attack that killed 10 Hezbollah fighters, the January 2015 double suicide attack in Tripoli that killed seven people, and further attacks on Hezbollah outposts in June 2015. By late 2015, however, the Lebanese security establishment, in cooperation with Hezbollah, was able to neutralize al-Nusra’s presence in Lebanon, bringing to an end attacks emanating from the group and its like-minded allies. AL-OMARI MOSQUE. A mosque in the old section of Beirut that reflects the periods of the city’s history. A Roman temple on the site gave way to a church during the Byzantine period. With the Arab conquest of Beirut in 635, the structure was transformed into a mosque named after the then-caliph, Omar. That mosque was destroyed in 1115, by Crusaders, who then built a Cathedral dedicated to Saint John the Baptist on the site. Saladin converted it back to a mosque upon taking the city, only to have it restored as a church by later Crusaders. By 1291, the Mamluks had recaptured the city and restored the structure as the al-Omari Mosque. With modern restorations, the mosque now features the older main structure with two minarets and a courtyard. See also MOHAMMAD AL-AMIN MOSQUE. AL-SHAYKH, HANAN (1945– ). A Lebanese-born author who now lives in London. Al-Shaykh’s many publications have received widespread attention in Arabic and English translation. She was raised in a conservative Muslim home in Beirut. Having been educated in a Muslim school for girls and the American College for Girls in Cairo, she began writing as a teenager. Having had an affair with an older author in Cairo, she later married a Christian man, in defiance of the wishes of her strict father. She moved to London in 1975, continuing to publish works in Arabic. Al-Shaykh writes from a Middle Eastern feminist point of view. Her 1980 novel Hikayat Zahrah, translated into English under the title The Story of Zahra: A Novel, reflects elements of her own life, with the struggles of being a female in a male-dominated culture. Her writings defend women’s rights in the Muslim world and challenge traditional conservative views and sexual taboos. Among her other works in English translation are One Thousand and One Nights: A Retelling, Women of Sand and Myrrh, Beirut Blues, Only in

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London, The Locust and the Bird: My Mother’s Story, I Sweep the Sun Off Rooftops, and A Beauty Parlour for Swans: Kensington Gardens (Park Stories). AL-TANZIM. “The Organization,” a Maronite militia that began as a secretive, nationalist movement in 1969. Al-Tanzim was started by military men who broke from Kataeb in protest of the Cairo Agreement. They feared that Palestinians were gaining too much influence in Lebanon. Its emblem featured a map of Lebanon and a cedar tree, symbolizing its nationalistic stance. Al-Tanzim became a small but active force during the civil war of 1975–1990. It fought in alliance with other Maronite factions, including the Kataeb Party, the Guardians of the Cedars, and Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as the Lebanese army. After Syria’s 1976 military intervention into the civil war some pro-Syria members of al-Tanzim broke away to form the Tanzim Party, which was short-lived. Some other Tanzim members founded a related political party called Tanzim: Lebanese Resistance Movement (TLRM) in 1979. Along with other militias, except for that of Hezbollah, it was disbanded according to the terms ending the civil war in 1990. AMAL MOVEMENT. Also referred to as Amal, a Lebanese Shiite-based political party aligned with the March 8 Alliance. The forerunner of the Amal Movement was founded in 1974, by the social activist Shiite cleric Musa al-Sadr, along with concerned others. Al-Sadr had been born in Qom, Iran, into a famous Lebanese family that traces its lineage back to the Prophet Muhammad. Only four years after founding the movement, he disappeared in mysterious circumstances in Libya in 1978. The movement’s goals included the uplifting of the social and political conditions of Lebanon’s numerous poor. The movement’s main work was among the Shiites, but it was a secular movement that worked among and had support from all impoverished Lebanese and several of their leaders. Those goals were reflected in its original Arabic name, with various English translations, for instance, Movement of the Disinherited. With the outbreak of the civil war of 1975–1990, Amal developed a militia called the Lebanese Resistance Units (or Battalions). The militia’s Arabic name led to the acronym AMAL, which is also the Arabic word for hope. The AMAL acronym then became a way to refer to both the military and nonmilitary branches of the movement. Amal aligned closely with Syria, an alliance that continued in the post-Taif political order. Amal leader Hussein el-Husseini tried to keep Amal out of directly fighting in the civil war. He survived an assassination attempt by a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) faction in 1979. Husseini resigned in 1980,

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and was replaced by a more militant leader, Nabih Berri, who made the Amal militia one of the main combatants in the war. Another leadership crisis erupted in 1982, when a deputy leader, Husayn al-Musawi, broke away from the more secular Amal Movement to form the more Islamist Islamic Amal Movement. Musawi’s Islamic Amal Movement aligned more closely with Iran and Iran-backed Hezbollah than did the Amal Movement. As Amal militia’s leader, Berri was one of the signatories in the Syrianbacked Tripartite Agreement of December 1985, which was meant to bring an end to the civil war. The Druze-based Progressive Socialist Party and the Christian-based Lebanese Forces (LF) were the other two parties to that agreement. The Tripartite Agreement failed to end the civil war because it did not have the full support of the Maronite faction, the LF, leading to a coup within their leadership led by Samir Geagea. The Amal militia fought against some Palestinian factions during the War of the Camps, which began in the mid-1980s and continued through the final years of the civil war. It also fought against its main Shiite rival, Hezbollah, for control of parts of Beirut. Amal was one of the factions involved in the 1987 War of the Flag in West Beirut. After fierce fighting between Amal and Hezbollah, Hezbollah emerged as the militia in control of most of West Beirut in 1988, at Amal’s expense. Amal accepted the 1989 Taif Accords agreement, leading to an end to the war. Unlike Hezbollah, the Amal militia was disbanded along with other militias at the end of the civil war, with many Amal fighters integrating into the Lebanese Army. After the war, Amal continued as a successful political party in a close rivalry with Hezbollah for political support among Lebanon’s Shiite community. Amal holds 13 seats in the 2018 Parliament, which is one more than Shiite rival Hezbollah. Amal’s leader, Nabih Berri, has held the all-important office of speaker of the house since 1992, a role reserved for a Shiite according to the terms of the National Pact and Lebanon’s confessional system. AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB). A university founded in 1866, by Christian missionaries who wanted an American-style university. The original name was the Syrian Protestant College, with a charter granted by the state of New York in the United States. Admission was open to people of any religion, as well as those without a religious identity. By 1867, the university had added a medical college, as envisioned from the beginning. The first building on the Ras Beirut campus opened in 1871. A pharmacy school began in 1871, along with a preparatory school, which later became the independent International College. Schools of dentistry, nursing, agriculture (now agriculture and food sciences), architecture, and health sciences

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were opened later. The hospital opened in 1905, and is now known as the American University of Beirut Medical Center, a public hospital that emerged as the center for COVID-19 treatment in 2020. The name was changed to American University of Beirut (AUB) in 1920. The university, along with the French-language Saint Joseph University, has educated Lebanon’s elite for decades. It has also been at the center of political thought and activism within the Arab world, especially during the heyday of Pan-Arabism in the 1950s through the early 1970s. With its main campus in Ras Beirut, AUB now has more than 9,000 students enrolled in seven faculties. AMNESTY LAW (1991). A law passed in August 1991, by the postwar government of Lebanon. It gave amnesty from prosecution to war protagonists for war-related crimes during the civil war of 1975–1990. The Amnesty Law applied to crimes committed before 28 March 1991. It was part of the move to disband the militias, except for the Hezbollah militia, active during the war period. The law was widely criticized by Lebanese and international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International; however, its supporters saw it as a necessary precondition and incentive to get powerful militia leaders and other participants in the war to give up their arms, cooperate, and join the postwar Taif political system. ANGLO–FRENCH DEMARCATION AGREEMENT. A 1923 agreement reached between Britain and France that mapped the border line between British-controlled Palestine and French Mandate Grand Liban. The lines of demarcation drawn in 1923 largely determined the modern border. Interestingly, documents show that those who drew the line of demarcation later realized that they should have included the Sheba Farms, a region in much dispute and currently occupied by Israel, as part of Lebanon rather than Syria. ANJAR. The name Anjar refers both to the small, modern town of Anjar and the formerly important mercantile city of Anjar, which is now an uninhabited archaeological site. The historic city Anjar was built by the Umayyad caliph Malik in the Bekaa Valley at the intersection of two important trade routes. Its name refers to the mountain-fed springs known in Arabic as Ayn al-Jaar, meaning the place where water flows out of the rock. The city was carefully laid out, in the style of Roman rather than Byzantine cities. Major north–south and east–west streets divided the city into four quarters. There were provisions for water and sewage, and Roman-style baths. The most impressive feature was the Great Palace, built as a home for the Umayyad caliphs, surrounded by the Haram and a large courtyard with a triple archway

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entrance. The central city was protected by a wall and four guard towers. Just outside the city was a large caravanserai, where trade caravans were provided shelter and protection at night. AN-NAHAR. A prominent Arabic-language newspaper published in Lebanon. The paper was founded in 1933, by journalist Gebran Tueni, whose son, Ghassan Tueni, replaced him after the father’s untimely death. AnNahar developed from a small, low print-run paper into one of the most-read Arab dailies. Its editorial stance is more aligned with the anti-Syria March 14 Alliance. It is sometimes seen as the main rival to the As-Safir daily, which tended to be aligned with the March 8 Alliance. ANSAR. A Lebanese village that became the location of an Israeli prison camp in 1982. See also ARCHAEOLOGY. ANTELIAS COMMUNE. An 1820 peasant revolt against the tax increases levied by Emir Bashir II. The goal of the Antelias Commune was to establish local community control of the lands traditionally farmed by the peasants. ANTHEM. See NATIONAL ANTHEM. ANTICORRUPTION MOVEMENTS. See ARAB SPRING, IMPACT ON LEBANON; BANKING CRISIS (2020); DIAB, HASSAN (1959– ); HARIRI, SAAD (1970– ); PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT OF LEBANON (PM); PROTEST MOVEMENT OF 2019; WAKIM, NAJAH (1946– ). ANTUN, FARAH (1874–1922). A Lebanese intellectual and publisher who held that modern Arab societies should keep some separation between conservative religion and intellectual inquiry, along the lines of the Enlightenment. He became widely known due to a debate, carried out in publications during a span of several months, between Muhammad Abdul, the mufti of Cairo, and himself. Antun had taken the position that a conservative Islamic culture was not sufficiently supportive of scientific inquiry, which led to the mufti’s rebuttals, claiming that Islam endorsed the idea of using human reason to better understand the workings of God’s universe. Having moved to Egypt, Antun founded an influential periodical named al-Jami‘ah, “The Community,” and he continued to publish a periodical later after moving to the United States. Antun and his sister also published a periodical that was ahead of its time in that it focused on women. He did not

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support Arab nationalism, and his play Sultan Saladin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem portrays the story of how Saladin, an ethnic Kurd, became the hero defending the Arab world against European Crusader aggression. AOUN, GHADAL (?– ). A Lebanese lawyer who serves as public appeal prosecutor in Mount Lebanon. In October 2019, Aoun brought charges of illicit enrichment against former prime minister Najib Mikati, his brother Taha Mikati, his son Taha Mikati, and Bank Audi. The prosecutor’s claim was that the three men received subsidized housing loans. The Mikati men denied the allegations, saying the charges were politically motivated. The Audi Bank also denied any wrongdoing on its part. In May 2020, acting in her role as a judge, Aoun pressed charges against 12 people, including several government officials, and ZR Energy regarding a case of alleged oil fraud. That same month, Judge Aoun ordered the fuel tanker Asopos to be seized by authorities for possible violations of the quality of fuel and testing required by Lebanese laws. AOUN, MICHEL (1935– ). President of Lebanon since 2016, General Michel Aoun is a populist with a loyal following in Lebanon and with the influential Lebanese diaspora. He is also one of the most controversial figures in recent Lebanese history. He headed one of two rival governments in the late 1980s; refused to accept the Taif Accords; and fought Syria and its Lebanese allies until his forces were defeated, finally bringing the Lebanese war to a conclusion. Aoun harbored ambitions to lead Lebanon since the 1980s, but since taking power decades later he has faced calls from many quarters within civil society to resign for his handling of the protest movement of 2019. Aoun was born in the town of Harit Harek, a mixed Christian–Shiite suburb to the south of Beirut. He hails from a modest family, with his father earning a living as a milkman. Aoun attended the military academy in the 1950s and received further training in France and the United States. He steadily rose through the ranks of the military and, in 1984, became commander of the Lebanese Army, a position he held until 1988. He had a solid reputation within the military ranks and was known for promoting coexistence between soldiers of different confessional groups. For example, in 1977 he formed a brigade that included both Christian and Muslim members. That brigade remained intact throughout the war, a feat not easily achieved given how easily the Lebanese military broke down along sectarian lines during the civil war. In 1988, outgoing president Amine Gemayel handed the government over to General Aoun, after the failure to elect a new president. Aoun, a staunch Lebanese nationalist, was determined to reinstate Lebanese government au-

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thority throughout Lebanon. He rightly guessed that the population had grown tired of militia rule and relished a return to state authority. Aoun used his new position as head of a military government to demand that all militias disarm and, significantly, that all foreign forces withdraw from the country. The latter was a direct challenge to Syria’s position in the country. Syria and its Lebanese allies rejected the legitimacy of Aoun’s government, preferring to support the caretaker civilian government of Prime Minister Salim Hoss, which was based in West Beirut. This situation set up a constitutional crisis in Lebanon, where two competing governments claimed legitimacy to rule the country, an unprecedented moment in Lebanese history. Aoun attempted to assert his government’s control through force, using elements of the Lebanese Army, which remained loyal to him. During a twoyear period, he fought the militias and the Syrian military, conflicts that brought much destruction to the country but, ironically, triggered international efforts to successfully bring the Lebanese war to an end. Aoun’s conflict with the Christian militia, the Lebanese Forces (LF), for control of the Christian canton was particularly fratricidal, with many families dividing their loyalties between the two sides. Some analysts argue that the conflict between the two greatly weakened Lebanon’s Christians, a situation that continues to impact the community decades later. Indeed, the animosity between the two sides finds them on opposite sides of the political divide in Lebanon, with one group aligned with the March 14 Alliance and the other with the March 8 Alliance. Aoun’s conflict with Syrian forces and their Muslim militia allies risked trigging a wider regional conflict between Syria and Iraq, given the latter’s backing of Aoun’s forces with fairly sophisticated weapons. That prospect, along with the overall constitutional crisis, motivated the Arab League and Western states to initiate the Taif process. That process led to a series of political reforms contained in the 1989 Taif Accords, which aimed to end the Lebanese civil war. Aoun rejected the Taif Accords because they did not explicitly call for the withdrawal of the Syrian military from the country. His forces continued to fight the Syrians and the newly installed government of President Elias Hrawi until October 1990, when regional dynamics allowed the Syrians to militarily defeat Aoun’s forces. Aoun went into exile in France, where he remained until 2005, when the Cedar Revolution and the Syrian withdrawal led to his return to Lebanon. While in exile, Aoun continued to be politically engaged in Lebanese politics, developing an extensive network of supporters in Lebanon and with the influential Lebanese diaspora. He founded a political party, the Free Patriot-

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ic Movement (FPM), to articulate his policies and organize supporters. In particular, the movement was staunchly anti-Syrian and demanded Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, which was deemed an occupation. Despite exile, Aoun, along with the imprisoned Samir Geagea, remained popular within the Maronite community. His return to Lebanon in 2005, and his participation in the parliamentary elections of that year, confirmed his popularity, as the FPM captured the majority of Maronite seats. Aoun initially supported the anti-Syrian pro-Western March 14 movement and, while not officially part of the group, aligned closely with them. But Aoun broke with the March 14 group shortly thereafter. The break was based on the refusal of other leaders in the movement, particularly Samir Geagea of the LF and the Hariri-dominated Future Movement, to support Aoun’s candidacy for president, despite his party holding the most seats allocated by the confessional system to the Maronite community in Parliament. By 2006, Aoun and the FPM had moved their support to the Hezbollahdominated, pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance, although he did not formally join the group. Although the decision to align with a movement dominated by Hezbollah and Syria seems strange for a leader who opposed both throughout his career, it came down to political opportunism in large part. Aoun clearly understood that the pathway to the presidency required Hezbollah’s support, or at the very least its acquiescence; however, beginning in 2011 a more ideological basis for the alliance also surfaced. The rise of Sunni extremism throughout the region, especially in neighboring Syria, threatened to spill over into Lebanon and necessitated closer cooperation between minority groups like the Shiites and Christians. Aoun’s long-held ambition to become president was finally realized in 2016, when, after a two-year political vacuum during which Lebanon did not have a president, the March 14 and March 8 groupings agreed to Aoun assuming the post. The deal reached allowed the March 14 candidate, Saad Hariri, to become prime minister, while Samir Geagea’s LF would secure important cabinet posts. The latter’s support of Aoun was governed by the Maraab Agreement, which laid out the distribution of political and patronage appointments, ending a 30-year conflict between the two leading Christian parties. Beginning in 2019, the crisis in the economy led to massive protests throughout the country, bringing down Hariri’s government. The protestors, including leading civil society actors and many of the country’s intelligentsia, called on President Aoun to resign, which he flatly rejected. As Aoun enters the final years of his presidency, and likely the end of his political career given his advanced age, his FPM’s hopes have been passed on to the next generation of leaders, including his son-in-law, Gebran Bassil, the former foreign minister.

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AQDYA. See QADA. ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ADP). A political party formed in 1982, under the leadership of Nassib Al-Khatib. The party has an Alawite base and has been pro-Syria. During the civil war, the ADP formed a militia named the Arab Red Knights (ARK). The name is often shortened to just Red Knights. ARK was disbanded after the war, and its leader took up an Alawite seat in Parliament. The resurfacing of violence during the Lebanon conflict of 2008 led to the revival of the Red Knights as a means to defend the Alawites against outside attacks, especially from Sunni extremists. The Lebanese Army later forced the disbanding of the Red Knights. The party participates in the March 8 Alliance, along with their Shiite coreligionists, and remains close to the Alawite leadership in Syria. Under the leadership of the Eid family, it continues to represent the Alawite community in Tripoli. It helps to represent community interests against the larger Sunni community, with which the Alawites have often clashed, including during the long Syrian civil war period. ARAB DETERRENT FORCE (ADF). As envisioned by the 1976 Arab League Summit, Riyadh, and finalized days later at the Arab League Summit, Cairo, an international peacekeeping force was set up to keep the peace in Lebanon, with financing and participation from the Arab League. The ADF was commanded by Syria, and most of the troops were Syrian, with some Palestine Liberation Organization fighters also involved. The presence of this Syrian Army, headquartered in the Bekaa Valley, allowed Syria to exert great influence over Lebanese affairs. Israel strongly objected to the deployment of non-Lebanese Arab troops near its border, so the ADF was not allowed to go south of the Zaharani River. After a plan to withdraw the ADF from the southern Lebanon region in March 1980 led to renewed conflict, the ADF remained on patrol in the south until being disbanded and replaced by the Lebanese Army in 1982. See also EGYPT, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. ARAB KINGDOM OF SYRIA. A short-lived political state formed under the leadership of Faisal ibn Husayn after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1919. The kingdom was centered in Syria but claimed Lebanon as part of its Greater Syria domain. ARAB LEAGUE. An organization dedicated to furthering cooperation among countries where Arabic is the main, or at least an official, language. More formally known as the League of Arab States, Lebanon and five other Arab nations founded it in March 1945, during a Cairo meeting. Aside from

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Lebanon and Egypt, the six founding nations included Iraq, Transjordan (now Jordan), Syria, and Saudi Arabia. It currently has 22 member states spanning North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. The league recognizes Palestine as a state and includes it as one of the league’s members. Each member state has one member on its Council, and thereby each member state has an equal vote. The league meets regularly twice a year, but special meetings may be called if requested by at least two members. The Arab League took an active part in the Lebanese civil war through the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF). The ADF was created in 1976, and consisted of mostly Syrian troops that intervened in the Lebanese civil war under Syrian command. Lebanon hosted an unofficial meeting of the Arab League in 1956, followed by an official one in 2002. ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT, CAIRO (1976). Within days of the Arab League Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, delegates of the Arab League met in Cairo on 25 October 1976. The conference dealt with the plans to deploy Arab peacekeepers in Lebanon in response to Lebanon’s civil war. This led to the formation of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), under Syrian command. Most of the ADF fighters were to come from Syria, but several Arab states agreed to send at least a token number of soldiers to join the ADF. See also EGYPT, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT, RIYADH (1976). The developments of the civil war of 1975–1990 in Lebanon alarmed some of the Arab states so much that a summit conference was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 15 October 1976. Aside from host Saudi Arabia, the only other Arab states in attendance were Syria, Egypt, and Kuwait, along with the Palestine Liberation Organization. The decision of the summit was that plans should be made quickly for the formation of a peacekeeping force drawn from member states of the Arab League and deployed in Lebanon. To finalize these plans, a full summit, which came to be known as the Arab League Summit, Cairo, with full participation of the Arab states, was to be held quickly. ARAB NATIONALISM. See PAN-ARABISM. ARAB NATIONALISTS MOVEMENT. See MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN).

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ARAB PERIOD. Starting in 636, Arab armies entered the Bekaa Valley and took control of that region. By 738, the coastal towns, but not the mountainous regions, were under Arab control. Much of the population under Arab control converted to Islam, while the mountain populations remained largely Christian. The Druze population arrived starting in the 11th century. ARAB RED KNIGHTS. See ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ADP). ARAB SOCIALIST BAATH PARTY. A Syrian-based branch of the Baath Party. The party split from the former Baath Party in 1966. It is sometimes referred to as neo-Baathist because it differed from the former party in that it put more emphasis on socialism rather than Pan-Arabism and was closely aligned with military power. The 1966 Syrian coup d’état, known as the 8th of March Revolution, brought it to power in Syria. The new party devolved into regional parties, often operating alongside the military or by military leaders. The Lebanon Regional Branch is its affiliate in Lebanon. Its militia, the Assad Battalion, was operational during the Lebanese civil war and has sent fighters to Syria in support of the government of Assad. On the political front, the Lebanon Regional Branch has entered into various alliances. It formed part of the Lebanese National Movement and later the Lebanese National Resistance Front and the Unification and Liberation Front. It is affiliated with the March 8 Alliance. Since in 2006, Fayez Shukr has served as leader of the Lebanon Regional Branch. ARAB SOCIALIST UNION (ASU). A political party in Egypt originally founded in 1962, by Gamal Nasser. It advocated socialist policies and the nationalization of many private enterprises, including banks, manufacturing industries, shipping companies, and many other sectors. In the years following Nasser’s death in 1970, the ASU fragmented into left, right, and centrist factions, which, by 1976, had devolved into distinct political parties. A branch of the ASU was formed in Syria and then spread to Lebanon, where it merged into the Arab Socialist Baath Party. ARAB SPRING, IMPACT ON LEBANON. A term used for the protest movement that spread throughout the Middle East beginning in December 2010. It began in Tunisia after a young cart vendor burned himself to death in a suicidal protest after he was severely beaten by police because he did not have the official permit to be a street vendor. In what came to be called the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisians took to the streets to protest the corruption of

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the police and the police-state style government. The protests spread by social media and continued until the resignation of Tunisia’s president 29 days after the event. The nature and goals of the protest varied from country to country. In Lebanon, the more serious protests began in Beirut on 27 February 2011, when a protest against sectarianism and corruption involved protestors marching along the Green Line, the old line of demarcation during the civil war of 1975–1990. By March of that year, protests calling for an end to corruption and the sectarian state were taking place in Sidon, Baalbek, Beirut, and elsewhere. The protests on 17 June in Tripoli led to deaths after armed clashes between supporters and opponents of Syria. A large march calling for an end to Lebanon’s sectarian-based confessional system was held in Beirut on 26 June 2011. In October of that year, the government gave in to demands for higher wages made by the General Labor Confederation and, in so doing, avoided the mass demonstration that had been planned. Unlike the situation in Libya, Yemen, and Egypt, the government of Lebanon survived the challenges of the Arab Spring. See also DAY OF RAGE (2011); MIKATI, NAJIB (1943– ); PROTEST MOVEMENT OF 2019. ARABIC. The main language of Lebanon. The dialect of Arabic spoken in Lebanon is sometimes referred to as Lebanese. The Lebanese dialect of Arabic contains some loanwords from other languages, especially Turkish and Persian. ARAFAT, YASSER (1929–2004). Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from 1969–2003, and the public face of the Palestinian people. Also known as Yasir Arafat, he was born under a different name in Cairo, Egypt, to a Palestinian father and an Egyptian mother. His mother died four years later, after which he lived for four years with her brother’s family in Jerusalem. He identified as Palestinian rather than Egyptian and became involved with smuggling guns for resistance movements in Gaza even as a teenager. Arafat’s exposure to Arab Nationalist positions in school led him to change his name, assuming the name Yasser, or Yasir, from an Arab Nationalist he admired. He undertook training in firearms and demolitions, and later joined the Egyptian army before moving to Kuwait, where he ran an engineering business. He fought on the Arab side in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. Arafat formed an underground resistance movement named Al-Fatah in 1958. He soon left Kuwait to focus his efforts on the Al-Fatah resistance movement. He and his Al-Fatah group became part of the PLO, formed in 1964. Arafat rose to prominence in the PLO during the period of the First

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Intifada beginning in 1967, and by 1969, he had become its highest authority, the chairman. He led the PLO to take a more militant approach toward achieving its goal of liberating Palestine from Israeli control. He directed attacks from PLO bases in Jordan until King Hussein expelled its headquarters in 1971. Arafat then switched the militant operations from Jordan to Lebanon, where the PLO had been active among the many Palestinian refugees there since the 1960s. The PLO was especially strong in southern Lebanon, near the border. The armed presence of the PLO in Lebanon contributed significantly to the collapse of the Lebanese state and the ensuing civil war. Arafat and his forcers were to play a lead role in Lebanon’s civil war. When the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) overran southern Lebanon and West Beirut during the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, he was forced to move the PLO headquarters to Tunisia. He later relocated the headquarters to the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Arafat led the PLO to full membership in the Arab League in 1974, and then became the first nonstate leader to address a United Nations Assembly. It is thought that he began to distance himself from the movement’s most violent organizations, especially Abu Nidal, to gain broader international support. After the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, Arafat shared the award of the Nobel Peace Prize. He also represented the Palestinians at the Camp David Summit of 2000. During his later years, his leadership was challenged by Hamas, a rival Palestinian resistance movement that arose out of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza during the First Intifada beginning in 1987. The conflict between his PLO and Hamas continued after his death. He grew ill in October 2004, and was flown to Paris for medical treatment. The cause of his death in the following month became quite controversial. Some followers believed he had been poisoned, blaming Israel. One medical report suggested he had been poisoned by radioactive polonium, whereas another report held that he died of natural causes. See also PAN-ARABISM. ARCHAEOLOGICAL CRYPT MUSEUM. A small museum located in the area of the underground crypt adjacent to the Saint George Orthodox Cathedral in Beirut. It contains artifacts from the Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine, and later periods, as well as burials and furnishings from earlier churches on the site that were destroyed by earthquakes. ARCHAEOLOGY. The region now known as Lebanon has yielded important archaeological finds going back as far as the era of the Neanderthals and early modern humans. For example, the archaeology of the rock shelter area

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at Ksar Akil, near modern-day Beirut, shows centuries of human occupation dating back as far as 43,000 years before present (YBP). Such early dates are among the oldest known from early modern human sites outside of Africa. This supports but does not conclusively prove the thesis that early modern humans followed a Middle Eastern route as they migrated from Africa and spread out into Western and Central Europe and Asia. The finds at Ksar Akil include a long history of the knapping of flint tools and the making of necklaces by drilling holes in shells and stringing them together as beads, presumably for bodily ornamentation. There is some archaeological evidence, including recent research on ancient DNA, that early modern humans may have lived in the Levant area, including modern Lebanon, long before the Neanderthals came to dominate the area starting approximately 70,000 YBP. There is more extensive evidence of early modern humans dominating the Levant starting in about 47,000 YBP. Although Sidon (Saida) has been an important port city since the landing of the Phoenicians, it had not been extensively excavated before the modern era. Starting in 1914, a French archaeologist, Georges Cotenau, excavated the site of an ancient castle. Starting in 1969, another Frenchman, Maurice Dunand, uncovered the remains of a Roman period bath near the castle site. He also found some ancient artifacts in the area known as the “College site” because there used to be an American school nearby. Beginning in 1998, archaeological work by the British Museum, with the help of the Lebanese British Friends of the National Museum, began on the College site. It has uncovered artifacts representing 5,000 years of occupation, including some walls of a fort and burials from the Crusader era. Given the importance of Lebanon’s ports from ancient through modern times, maritime archaeology has been carried out on both the southern and northern shorelines. The sites of the ancient southern ports have proven more difficult to locate and study. French missionary and archaeologist Father Antoine Poidebard pioneered the use of aviation as a tool for attempting to locate ancient harbors. Working in the 1930s, he located the remains of the Egyptian port at Tyre. In the 1950s and 1960s, Honor Frost did marine archaeology along the coast, including Tyre, Sidon, and Byblos. She followed up on Poidebard’s work but rejected his claim that two offshore moles were man-made structures. By the 2000s, Ibrahim Noureddine and then Michel el-Hélou found many remains suggestive of ancient shipwrecks near the modern harbor at Tyre. There have been several recent developments. A geoarchaeological report issued in 2007, called into question the traditional legend crediting Alexander the Great with building a causeway out to the island to conquer Tyre. The evidence suggests that Alexander’s army merely exploited a natural sand bar. Among the more recent archaeological discoveries, workers in Sidon uncov-

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ered a statue of a Phoenician priest under some pavement in 2014. The object is thought to date from the 6th century BCE. A dig at a 2,000-year-old quarry in Bekaa Valley in 2015, uncovered two significant megaliths that may have been prepared for use elsewhere but never moved from the limestone quarry. One was a 1,000-ton sculpture of a woman, intended to be moved to the Temple of Jupiter. The other was an enormous, 1,600-ton block of stone that had not yet been carved. Another recent development was the return to Lebanon of three pre-Christian statues that had been looted, along with hundreds of other objects, from the temple of Eshmun. Archeologists have also recovered the fragments of several small sculptures of women’s heads, dating from the Persian period, at Jiyeh, near Lebanon’s coast. The speculation is that they depicted goddesses. The ruins of ancient Phoenician, Greek, and Crusader temples, especially the Baalbek temples, attract tourists and heighten interest in Lebanon’s impressive archaeology. The Archaeological Museum on the campus of the American University of Beirut houses many important artifacts of archaeological importance. See also ANJAR; ARCHAEOLOGICAL CRYPT MUSEUM; BAALBEK (also BAALBECK); TRIPOLI. ARMENIAN APOSTOLIC CHURCH. One of the divisions of the Eastern Orthodox Church, this tradition of Christianity is followed by many of Lebanon’s ethnic Armenians. It is also called the Armenian Church or the Armenian Orthodox Church. The term Apostolic refers to the way it traces its origins to the early Christian apostles Bartholomew and Thaddeus. The former Kingdom of Armenia is credited with having been the first country to declare itself a Christian nation, having done so with the conversion of King Tiridates III in 301, more than a decade before Emperor Constantine became a supporter of Christianity in Rome. The Armenian Orthodox Church differs from the Syrian Orthodox Church in its doctrinal view of Christ as having one, divine nature. This contrasts with the two-natures position held by most Christians, as expressed in the creedal formula “fully man and fully God” as adopted by the Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in 451. It also differs in that its liturgy is in the Armenian language. It is sometimes called the Gregorian Church, after its first leader. ARMENIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. Some ethnic Armenians of Lebanon adhere to Roman Catholic Christianity rather than the Armenian Orthodox Church. The leader of the church is the Armenian Catholic Patriarch of

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Cilicia, headquartered at Beirut’s Cathedral of Saint Elias and Saint Gregory the Illuminator. The 2016 visit of Pope Francis to Armenia was especially welcomed by Lebanese Catholics. See also CILICIA MUSEUM. ARMENIAN DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL PARTY-RAMGAVAR (ADL). The most centrist of the three Lebanese parties with Armenian constituents. The ADL associates with the March 14 Alliance. See also ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION (ARF); SOCIAL DEMOCRAT HUNCHAKIAN PARTY. ARMENIAN EVANGELICAL CHURCH. A church that broke away from the Armenian Apostolic Church in Constantinople, now Istanbul, in 1846. The church spread to many other counties, including Lebanon, along with the Armenian diaspora. See also HAIGAZIAN UNIVERSITY. ARMENIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH/ARMENIAN CHURCH. See ARMENIAN APOSTOLIC CHURCH. ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION (ARF). A political party active in Lebanon and many other countries with communities of the Armenian diaspora. It is often referred to as Tashnag, derived from the Armenian term Dashnaktsutyun. Tashnag advocates for Armenian nationalism and the worldwide recognition of the Armenian Genocide. The ARF holds three seats in the 2018 Parliament. It affiliates with the March 8 Alliance. ARMENIANS. The Armenian ethnic population in Lebanon dates from the mass migration out of the territory of the Ottoman Empire as a result of the period of persecution, usually referred to as the Armenian Genocide by those outside of Turkey, starting in 1915. The Armenians who settled in Lebanon in that period mostly did so in Beirut. Many settled in the East Beirut suburb Bourj Hammoud, which remains a center of Armenian crafts and culture. Starting in about 1939, during the French period, more ethnic Armenians came to settle mostly in the Anjar region. The Lebanese Armenians include Armenian Catholic, Armenian Evangelical, and Armenian Orthodox religious communities. The three Armenian-based political parties of Lebanon are the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party.

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ARMISTICE AGREEMENT (1949). To bring a formal end to the 1948 Arab–Israeli War a number of armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab countries involved in the war were signed in early 1949. The Armistice Agreement with Lebanon, signed on 23 March 1949, established the Green Line as a demarcation of the border between the two countries. Israel agreed to withdraw its forces from the Lebanese side of the Green Line. ARMY. See LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. ART. See BASBOUS, JOSEPH (1929–2001); BASBOUS, MICHEL (1921–1981); BEIRUT EXHIBITION CENTER; BEIRUT NATIONAL MUSEUM; BEITEDDINE PALACE; BSOUS SILK MUSEUM; CILICIA MUSEUM; FARRUKH, MUSTAFA (1902–1957); GIBRAN, KHALIL (1883–1931); GIBRAN MUSEUM; RAAD, WALID (1967– ); ROBERT MOUAWAD PRIVATE MUSEUM; SURSOCK MUSEUM. ASSAD, BASHAR AL-. See AL-NUSRA FRONT; ARAB SOCIALIST BAATH PARTY; CIVIL WAR OF 1975–1990; FRANGIEH, SULEIMAN (also spelled FRANJIYEH or FRANJIEH) (1910–1992); SYRIA, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH; SYRIAN CIVIL WAR, IMPACT ON LEBANON. ASSAD, HAFEZ AL-. See CIVIL WAR OF 1975–1990; JUMBLATT, WALID (1949– ); SYRIA, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH; SYRIAN CIVIL WAR, IMPACT ON LEBANON; TREATY OF BROTHERHOOD, COOPERATION, AND COORDINATION (1991). ASSAD, KAMEL AL- (1932–2010). A politician and party leader who was a dominant figure among Shiites, hailing from one of the leading ruling families within the Shiite community. Kamel al-Assad’s father, Ahmed alAssad, had been in Parliament and risen to the position of speaker of Parliament. Kamel al-Assad also entered Parliament and, aside from holding cabinet positions, served several terms as speaker of Parliament: in 1964, again in 1966, and then a longer term from 1970–1984. His last term as speaker was during the disruptive civil war period. It ended after the signing of the May 17 Agreement. Assad founded the Lebanese Social Democratic Party, which is now led by his wife, Lina al-Assad. He took a pro-Syria position and failed to win a seat in the postwar parliamentary elections. The al-Assad family’s political fortunes within the Shiite community have been eclipsed by the Amal Movement and Hezbollah since the mid-1980s.

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AS-SAFIR. Having been founded in 1974, by Talal Salman, As-Safir (“The Ambassador”) was one of Lebanon’s major newspapers until it ceased publication at the end of 2016. It had a strong political focus and styled itself as the “Voice of the Voiceless.” It positioned itself as the news source for Lebanese in the Arab world and Arabs in Lebanon. The editorials tended to reflect a form of Arab nationalism and support for the Palestinians. As-Safir aligned with the March 8 Alliance and tended to be more left-wing than its rival paper, An-Nahar, which aligns with the March 14 Alliance. ASSASSINATION OF RAFIC HARIRI. A few months after leaving his position of prime minister in 2004, Rafic Hariri was assassinated on 14 February 2005, when a powerful bomb in a stolen van exploded as his motorcade passed near Beirut’s historic Saint Georges Hotel along the Corniche. Bassel Fuleihan, a former finance minister and one of Lebanon’s top economists, and more than 20 others were killed and many others injured in the blast, which was so strong that it left a big hole in the road and damaged the hotel. Journalist May Chidiac hosted a TV show discussion about possible Syrian involvement in the assassination, and a subsequent but unsuccessful attempt to assassinate her increased the suspicion that Syria was responsible for Hariri’s assassination. The outrage and protests following the assassination were major factors in the start of the Cedar Revolution, also known as the Independence Intifada because it had the goal of making Lebanon independent of Syrian control. The continuing drive to lessen Syrian influence gave added zeal to the association of anti-Syrian advocates known as the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, and later to the March 14 Alliance. When it became apparent that Hezbollah and pro-Syrian factions might be able to block the attempts to have a Lebanese-based tribunal investigate the assassination of Hariri, the United Nations Security Council became involved, at first by sending an international investigating team and later by setting up the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1757. There was a string of assassinations following Hariri’s. By 2007, six prominent Maronite Christian leaders suspicious of Syrian involvement had been assassinated, often along with their drivers, associates, and bystanders. Then, in 2007, just three days after the creation of the STL, the string of violence continued when a car bomb exploded, killing Sunni politician Walid Eido, along with his son and nine others. Eido had been against Syrian involvement. An eighth assassination, that of Antoine Ghanim, soon followed, as a car bomb killed Ghanim and several others. The dispute concerning whether to allow the STL to continue, along with the long-standing grievance by the Shiite community that it did not have a fair share of the political power, led to the political crisis of 2006–2008,

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which was resolved with the Doha Agreement. That agreement gave Hezbollah and the Shiite-led opposition an effective veto power over the efforts to hold Syria accountable for its suspected involvement. See also KANAAN, GHAZI (1942–2005). ASSIR, SHEIKH AHMAD AL- (1968– ). A Sunni cleric from the Sidon region in southern Lebanon who has come into conflict with both Hezbollah and Christians. Assir is the imam of a Sunni mosque in Sidon. He follows the very conservatist Salafi form of Sunni Islam, and Salafists tend to reject the validity of Shiite Islam. That factor, combined with the way that the Shiitebased Hezbollah militia has controlled southern Lebanon and not disarmed, brought Assir in direct conflict with Hezbollah. The way that he has raised tensions in southern Lebanon and challenged the authority of Hezbollah has been called the Assir Phenomenon. For a month in 2012, Assir’s fighters blocked the main highway between Sidon and Beirut, causing embarrassment for the government and its army, as well as a challenge to Hezbollah dominance of the region. Assir’s supporters have also been in conflict with the Lebanese Army. That tension ran especially high after his supporters attacked an army checkpoint in southern Lebanon on 23 June 2013, resulting in the death of 14 army soldiers. Also, in June 2013, he made a series of demands, with deadlines and threats, calling on the government to attack Shiites in the south. His fighters did kill two army officers and 10 other soldiers as one of his deadlines expired. Assir also called upon Sunnis to desert from the Lebanese Army and denounce his opponents as infidels. He called for his followers to take up arms against Assad’s army in the Syrian civil war. After inspiring his followers to kill army personnel and his calling for army defections, a military court ordered his arrest in 2013. Assir fled, becoming a fugitive, before the army successfully overran his stronghold later in June 2013. He remained in hiding until being apprehended, despite being well disguised, as he attempted to board a plane for Egypt from the Beirut airport in 2015. His trial in a military court led to his being sentenced to death in 2017, and he remains in prison while still being popular among many Sunnis in Sidon. See also SULEIMAN, MICHEL (1948– ). ASSYRIAN CHURCH. Formally named the Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian Church of the East, the name is often shortened to the Assyrian Church or the Assyrian Church of the East. The church separated from the other Eastern Orthodox churches when its adherents chose to follow the teaching, associated with Nestorius, archbishop of Constantinople, that Mary

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should be called Bearer of Christ rather than Bearer of God. Underlying the conflict was the theological problem of how to define the doctrine that Jesus was both human and divine. When the Ecumenical Council of Ephesus ruled against Nestorius in 431, those Eastern Christians who backed his position broke away from the church majority which had condemned their position. Although they thought themselves to be following in a tradition that predated Nestorius, and although the Church of the East eventually distanced itself from some of the teachings of Nestorius, other Christians often refer to members of the Church of the East as Nestorians. The church uses an ancient Syriac dialect in its liturgy. The number of Assyrian Christians in modern Lebanon is quite small; however, the conflicts in Syria and Iraq have forced many Assyrian Church adherents to flee those countries for Lebanon or elsewhere, increasing the church’s numbers in Lebanon. Saint George’s Church in Beirut is an important congregation in helping these new immigrants. AUB. See AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB). AZM, SADIQ JALAL AL- (1934–2016). An academic and controversial intellectual who was born in Syria before coming to study at the American University of Beirut (AUB). Azm then completed his doctorate at Yale University. He returned to teach philosophy at AUB. Azm espoused Marxist–Leninist thought, without formally being a party member. He wrote a controversial book entitled Critique of Religious Thought in the English translation. Some Muslims objected to the book, claiming that it insulted Islam. Before he could be arrested, Azm fled to Syria. He later returned and faced arrest, jail time, and a trial. He was acquitted by the court on the grounds that he had not committed criminal offenses. Having been dismissed from his faculty position at AUB, Azm returned to his Syrian homeland, where he taught philosophy at Damascus University. He also held visiting professor positions at various Western universities. His 1990 book In Defense of Materialism and History espoused his materialist approach to philosophy and historical studies. He was an independent thinker who stood apart from conventional political stances throughout his life.

B BAAL. An ancient Semitic term for lord, owner, or master, it most often was used as a generic term for a god in Canaan. The term was commonly used in reference to a god named Hadad, who was worshipped as the god of storms and rain, as well as the enemy of serpents and the dangerous powers of the sea. In the Hebrew Bible, Baal usually refers to the rival god of the Canaanites, whose priests were bested by the Hebrew prophet Elijah on Mount Carmel according to I Kings 18 of the Bible. There is no extant version of the story from a Canaanite viewpoint. In New Testament times, the name Beelzabul, associated with Satan, may have come from the name Baal. The name Baal survives in the modern-day Lebanese city of Baalbek. That city’s Baalbek temple, dedicated to the Baal of Bekaa, now lies in ruins, but its huge foundation stones were repurposed by Romans when they built a temple to Jupiter. BAALBEK (also BAALBECK). The name of an ancient city inhabited for at least the past 11,000 years at a site in the Bekaa Valley that benefits from good natural water sources, including two rivers and some springs. Its name derives from the Canaanite term for Baal (lord of) Bekaa. The town site was an important one in the Canaanite, Greek, and Roman periods. Alexander the Great conquered Baalbek in 334 BCE and renamed the city Heliopolis, meaning the City of the Sun, perhaps as a reference to the sky god formerly worshipped there. Roman control began after 64 BCE, and Baalbek became an important city of Roman Syria. The Romans built a complex of three temples, including a temple to Jupiter, constructed during a span of decades on the site of the older Baal temple. Beginning with the reign of Constantine in the 4th century, Baalbek and its temples were caught in the struggle between the worship of the old Roman gods and the emerging Christian worship, with Christianity eventually coming to be the norm in the Roman Empire and Baalbek. Arab rule in the region brought Islam in 637. The Arabs referred to the city as al-Qala’a, “the Fortress,” after they fortified part of the former city. The Roman temples that had been turned into churches now were razed, and the Great Mosque was 45

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built. The Mongols sacked the city in 1260, and along with a series of earthquakes, the city’s importance waned in the Ottoman and modern periods. The small, modern city Baalbek benefits economically from being a popular tourist destination; however, the flow of tourism has been severely impacted by Lebanon’s various wars, especially the civil war of 1975–1990, as well as the modern Syrian civil war starting in 2011. Tourists visit the various temple ruins from the Roman period, the Great Mosque from the Umayyad period, and the site of a Roman quarry called Hajar al-Hibla. See also BAALBEK TEMPLES. BAALBEK INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL. A world-famous festival of music and the arts held annually in late summer near the ruins of the Temple of Jupiter from Roman times. The festival features both international and Lebanese performers. Fairuz is among the Lebanese stars who have made many appearances at this venue. See also BAALBEK TEMPLES. BAALBEK TEMPLES. The ruins of several temples dating from the Canaanite, Greek, Roman, and later periods are found in the Baalbek region in the Bekaa Valley. The name Baalbek, or Baalbeck, may derive from the Canaanite term for the temple dedicated to “Baal of Bekaa,” meaning the “lord of Bekaa Valley.” It was constructed with enormous foundation stones estimated to weigh more than 400 tons, with some stones estimated to weigh as much as 1,000 tons. Because it is not easy to understand how 1st millennium BCE residents could move such large stones into position, some people have even speculated that they had help from aliens. More scientific minds assume that, like the large stones of the pyramids and several other ancient Near Eastern cities, the stones were moved by some combination of human labor, ramps, and clever leverage techniques. A goddess was worshipped at Baalbek, as well as Baal, and the city seems to have been famous as a center of prostitution. In the ancient Near East, goddess temples sometimes served as places of prostitution. During the Roman period, beginning in the 1st century BCE, three important temples were built during the span of several centuries. It may be that the choice of the three Roman gods reflects the earlier worship of Baal and the goddess Astarte. The most impressive was the Temple of Jupiter. It was built on the site of the former Baal temple, and it used the huge foundation stones from the earlier temple. The temple to Jupiter was one of the largest in the world. Six of its 54 large columns, standing more than 60 feet high, have survived the city’s many sackings and earthquakes. They stand in a row, held upright by the stones connecting them at the top.

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The Temple of Bacchus was smaller but exceptionally rich in art and architecture. Its most impressive feature was a ceiling of carved stones depicting scenes from Roman mythology, including Mars, Tyche, Vulcan, Diana, and the temple’s namesake, Bacchus, the God of Wine and Pleasure. The third and smallest temple was a circular one dedicated to Venus. Later, in the Christian period, this temple was repurposed as a Christian basilica dedicated to Saint Barbara. BAASSIRI, SAHAR (1986– ). A Lebanese journalist, author, ambassador, and president of a United Nations Forum. She earned an undergraduate degree at the American University of Beirut (AUB) and a graduate degree in journalism at Columbia University in New York City. Baassiri’s journalism career includes positions at the An-Nahar newspaper and as a Beirut correspondent for United Press International. She authored two Arabic-language books in 2009. She was elected president of the International Women’s Forum at the United Nations. Baassiri is Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). BAATH PARTY. See ARAB SOCIALIST BAATH PARTY. BABA GHANOUJ. A popular Lebanese food dish made of grilled eggplant, tahini, olive oil, lemon juice, and garlic. It is used as a dip. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE. BABIKIAN, KHATCHIG (1922–1999). An ethnic Armenian born in Cyprus, Babikian studied in France and Italy, where he was imprisoned in 1940. He later trained as a lawyer at Beirut’s Saint Joseph University. He entered politics and represented the Armenian Orthodox community in the Lebanese Parliament from 1957 until his death in 1999. Babikian headed various governmental ministries starting in 1960. He was known for his command of many languages, his charitable work, and his advocacy for the Armenian community. The Khatchig Babikian Fund, a charity founded as a memorial to him by his family, seeks to aide Armenians, especially those in Lebanon. BAKLAVA. A Lebanese desert made of filo pastry, usually shaped as a triangle, filled with nuts and a sweet syrup or honey. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE. BALADITES. See LEBANESE MARONITE ORDER.

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BANKING CRISIS (2020). The many problems relating to both Lebanon’s commercial banking sector and the national debt, which had been worsening for decades, came to a crisis point in 2020. The national debt stood at an alarmingly high range of more than 150 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The Lebanese pound (LP) was in a free fall on the black market. While the government kept the official exchange rate pegged at less than 1515 LP to one U.S. dollar (USD), the black market rate was more than 2300 LP to USD. The private economy was increasingly operating on the blackmarket rate of exchange. Even the national carrier, Middle East Airlines, began demanding payment in USD for international flights, avoiding using the official exchange rate. The Lebanese Central Bank’s foreign reserves were minimal, so it was not in a position to help the banks meet a widespread demand for bank withdrawals. Banks were not in a position to withstand a run on the bank. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic worsened the ability of the government and Lebanese Central Bank to manage the banking crisis. The banking crisis became official on 28 March 2020, when Prime Minister Hassan Diab announced a default on its Eurobond debt, followed by the application to the International Monetary Fund for a new multibillion-dollar loan package, based on a new five-year plan for reform of the economy. In July 2020, the banking crisis and widespread failure of the economy led Moody’s global rating system to downgrade Lebanon’s rating to a C, the lowest possible rating, in anticipation of widespread defaults on bonds, impacting both international financial institutions and Lebanese individuals holding government bonds. BANKS. See BANKING CRISIS (2020); ECONOMY. BARCELONA PROCESS. See EURO–MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP. BASBOUS, ALFRED (1924–2006). A Lebanese artist whose sculptures have received international acclaim. He received a scholarship to study art in Paris and later joined his older brother, Michel, in Rachana, Lebanon. His first claim to fame came when his work was exhibited at the Rodin Museum in Paris in 1961. He went on to have exhibitions in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, England, and many other places. He received many awards, including the posthumous Medal of the Lebanese Order of Merit in Gold. BASBOUS BROTHERS OUTDOOR GALLERY. An exhibition created by the three brothers Michel, Alfred, and Joseph Basbous whose home was Rachana, a small town north of Byblos, Lebanon. They were internationally

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famous for their sculptures, with their works exhibited in many major galleries worldwide. Throughout the years, they made many large sculptures, which they displayed in the yard outside the family home in Rachana. In 1994, they hosted a sculpture event in which Lebanese and international artists were invited to come to Rachana to create a sculpture to be left there in the outdoor gallery. The artistic event was quite successful and has continued as an annual sculpture festival. BASBOUS, JOSEPH (1929–2001). The youngest of the three Basbous brothers, each of whom became an artist and sculptor of international renown. Joseph did not follow the lead of his eldest brother, Michel, who often sculpted figures, especially female nudes. Rather than human figures, he created abstract shapes in wood and stone. His works were exhibited, often alongside his brothers’ art, in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. He lived at the family home in Rachana. BASBOUS, MICHEL (1921–1981). The eldest of the three Basbous brothers, all of whom were famous sculptors. Michel studied art in Paris and went on to exhibit internationally. The outdoor display of his larger pieces at his Rachana home evolved into the Basbous Brothers Outdoor Gallery. His art was displayed in 2014, at the Beirut Exhibition Center. BASHIR II SHIHABI (1767–1850). A Lebanese prince who ruled Lebanon under the overlordship of the Ottoman Empire and then the Egyptians (1788–1840). He was born into a princely family but raised in poverty because his father died while he was very young. The Shihab family had been Sunni Muslim, but Bashir was raised as a Maronite Christian. His later marriage to a wealthy widow brought him wealth. When the emir abdicated in 1788, Bashir was chosen as the new emir. Aside from ruling over his territory, he had to raise tribute money to send to the Ottoman sultan. He reduced the power of the Druze and thereby gained more regional authority. Bashir II backed the Pasha of Acre in the pasha’s 1821 effort to expand his control of Damascus. When the Ottoman sultan cracked down on the pasha, Bashir II had to flee to Egypt due to fear of the sultan’s wrath. After the pasha was pardoned, Bashir II returned to Lebanon, defeated the Druze faction, and put all of Lebanon under his control. By 1837, he had engaged in war with the Druze, who had resisted conscription, with help of Christian recruits. But by 1840, the Christians and Druze had joined forces against him. The British sided against him too, and he went into exile in Malta. One of Emir Bashir’s lasting contributions was the building of the Beiteddine Palace in the Chouf Mountains north of Beirut. The palace now houses several small museums and hosts the annual Beiteddine Festival.

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BATTLE OF AIN DARA. A war erupted in 1711, between two rival clan groupings in Mount Lebanon. The Qaysi faction, under the leadership of Emir Haydar of the Shihab dynasty, consisted of both Druze and Maronite clans. The Yamani faction consisted of several other Druze clans. The Qaysi faction won decisively, which led to a new political and social order under the authority of the victorious Qaysi families. Many of the Yamani families relocated to Syria. The migration of so many Druze families from Mount Lebanon resulted in the Maronite Christians rather than the Druze having the largest population in the region. BATTLE OF ANJAR. Also known as the Battle of Majdal Anjar, a battle fought in 1622, between the forces of Mustafa Pasha, the muhafiz of Damascus, acting for the Ottoman Empire, and Fakhr ad-Din. Ad-Din had made a military and economic pact with the Medici Grand Duchy of Tuscany in 1608. This had alarmed the Ottomans, who feared the loss of territory within their empire. They had ordered an attack on the prince in 1613. The prince had fled into exile in Tuscany under Medici protection. Meanwhile, his army held off the Ottoman force, and the prince was able to return in 1618 to rule over Lebanon for a few years. By promoting Mustafa Pasha and encouraging him to attack ad-Din, the Ottomans expected to regain control when Pasha’s forces did attack. AdDin’s forces, although outnumbered, managed to defeat the Turks, who subsequently retreated to Egypt. This left the territory of modern-day Lebanon in relative autonomy until 1633 when Ottoman forces arrested Ad-Din and took him to Istanbul and executed him in 1635. BATTLE OF MARJ AYYUN. A turning point in the war between the Muslim Saladin (Salah ad-Din) and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, in which Saladin defeated the young King Baldwin IV at Marj Ayyun in Lebanon in 1179. The Crusader Kingdom’s army triumphed at first, but while they were resting from a day of marching and fighting, Saladin’s forces returned on the attack and won the battle. Baldwin, known as the “Leper King” due to his severe case of leprosy, barely escaped, taking shelter in the Beaufort Castle. BATTLE OF MARJ DABAK. The Ottoman Turks defeated the Mamluk forces during a battle in 1516, fought north of Aleppo near Marj Dabak. The emirs of Lebanon had supported the side of the Ottoman sultan, Salim I, who then agreed to grant the emirs some regional autonomy but with the expectation that they would collect and forward taxes to the sultanate.

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BATTLE OF MAYSALUN. A small force loyal to King Faisal ibn Husayn of the Kingdom of Syria was defeated on 23 July 1920, by a larger French force led by General Mariano Goybet. The French force had advanced from Beirut, with the intent of forcing the resignation of King Faisal and putting an end to Syrian independence. The Arab force had marched from Damascus. The armies met and fought near the Syrian town of Maysalun, near the Lebanese border. The French forces then continued to Damascus, to establish French control of the region and end the Franco–Syrian War. BAYHUM, MUHAMMAD JAMIL (1887–1978). A Sunni Muslim author and politician from a wealthy Beirut family and one of the leading figures favoring Arab unity, Arab pride, and the paramount place of Arabs in Islam. He opposed French rule. He also opposed those Lebanese, mainly Christian, who identified with the ancient Phoenicians. BAYT AD-DIN. See BEITEDDINE PALACE. BEAUFORT CASTLE. Sitting atop a rocky hill overlooking a ravine in southern Lebanon, the site known by its Crusader name, Beaufort Castle, or by the Arabic Qalaat ash-Shaqif, “Castle of the High Rock,” has been fortified perhaps since the Byzantine period. During the subsequent Arab period it was rebuilt as a stronger fortification. Fulk, a Crusader king of Jerusalem, captured it from Druze control in the mid-12th century. The Crusaders enlarged it, making it one of their most impressive castles, along with the Krak des Chevaliers in Syria. Saladin took the strategic fort in 1192, marking a milestone in his war to drive the Crusaders out of the Middle East. By the 17th century, Fakhr ad-Din, a Druze prince, was using the fort in his struggle against the Ottomans. The castle again became pivotal during the late 20th century. By the 1970s, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLO) made use of the fort in its resistance against Israeli occupation in the area. Israel had shelled the fort but was unable to drive the PLO from it, giving the PLO strategic high ground for observing or shelling the regions below. At the outbreak of the 1982 Israel–Lebanon War, the Israel Defense Forces overran a small contingent of PLO fighters and took possession of what was left of the castle in June of that year. Israel controlled the ruined Beaufort Castle until withdrawing in May 2000. Lebanese control of the site resumed from that date. BEGIN, MENACHEM (1913–1992). Prime minister of Israel from 1977–1982, a period of special importance to events in Lebanon. Begin was born into a Jewish family in Poland. The onset of World War II caused his family to flee from Poland. While still a teenager he embraced the Zionist

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cause and joined the Betar Movement, an activist Zionist organization led by Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Betar began in Latvia and then spread to northern Palestine and later Jerusalem’s Old City and nearby Jewish regions. An instructors’ school began in Tel Aviv in 1928. The goal of Betar was to establish a Jewish majority state on both sides of the Jordan River. Begin rose in the ranks of Betar, becoming head of its branch in Czechoslovakia in 1936, and its Poland branch in 1938. In 1940, he was imprisoned in Siberia by Vladimir Lenin’s regime but released after the German invasion of Russia. He joined the Free Polish Army and was sent to Palestine for training. Once in Palestine, Begin became active in the underground movement Irgun Zvai Leumi (also known as Etzel), dedicated to replacing British control with Jewish control. By 1943, Begin was head of Etzel, which undertook extremist-style actions against the British, including breaking into the Acre prison to release Etzel captives and destroying the main British headquarters in Jerusalem. After the state of Israel was proclaimed in 1948, Begin agreed to disband Etzel, and its fighters were integrated into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Beginning in 1948, Begin was a leader of the opposition Herut Party, which became a component of the Likud Party. He served in the Israeli cabinet during the unity government period starting in 1967 until it ended in 1970. With the Likud Party victory in the 1977 elections, Begin took up the office of prime minister. After a 1978 Palestinian resistance cell arrived by boat on the Israeli shore south of Haifa, where they took control of two buses and killed many passengers and some passing motorists, Begin ordered the IDF to invade southern Lebanon under the code name Operation Litani. The goal of the operation was to overrun and destroy various Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) bases in southern Lebanon. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 called for Israel to withdraw, which it did, and created the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to keep the peace. Begin again ordered an invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Known as Operation Peace for Galilee by the Israelis, or The Invasion by the Lebanese or the First Lebanon War by others, it involved units of the IDF moving into Lebanon to engage in fighting with PLO and units of the Syrian Army. The PLO was forced to move its headquarters out of Lebanon, and Israel helped elect a new Lebanese president, Bashir Gemayel, who was assassinated before taking office. Begin headed the Israeli delegation at the secret meetings with Egypt’s Anwar Sadat at Camp David in the United States. He and Sadat agreed to work toward peace between their countries, and both shared the Nobel Peace

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Prize in 1978. His most controversial decision as prime minister was to order the bombing of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility in 1981, with the goal of deterring Iraq’s development of nuclear weapons. BEIRUT. Lebanon’s capital and most populous city, situated near the midpoint of Lebanon’s long Mediterranean coast. It has been a site of human occupation dating back centuries before historical records. Archaeological digs suggest that the historic Beirut cities were much smaller and the areas of occupation varied from era to era but always in the general region of the large promontory that juts into the Mediterranean Sea. The modern city of Beirut embraces a much larger area that includes the various smaller, historic cities. The oldest historical record is an Egyptian text, the Tell Amarna Letters, dating from the 14th century BCE. One of the several explanations for the name Beirut derives it from an ancient term for “wells,” presumably because of the wells tapping the underlying water table. Although other Canaanite cities are mentioned in the Hebrew and Christian Bibles, Beirut is not. It is, however, mentioned in the history of Herod the Great. Lying along two major fault lines, Lebanon is an earthquake-prone region. Beirut was last destroyed by a major earthquake in 551, and it may be under threat of a future major earthquake. Modern Beirut is a city of more than 1 million Lebanese citizens, as well as thousands of Palestinian and Syrian refugees from neighboring conflicts, including the more resent Syrian war. It is the center of the Lebanese economy, international trade, and tourism. It is served by the Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport. The city, before the Lebanese civil war, was often referred to as the Paris of the Middle East for its cosmopolitan feel. During the civil war the city divided into predominantly Christian-controlled East Beirut and Muslim-controlled West Beirut, bringing an end to its oncetolerant reputation. Once the civil war ended, efforts were made, with some success, to recapture some of the city’s past glory. The massive explosion in Beirut’s port region in August 2020 killed more than 130 people, injured thousands, and left an estimated 30,000 homeless. Numerous warehouses and other port facilities were destroyed, severely crippling Lebanon’s capacity to support international trade. See also AL-OMARI MOSQUE; AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB); BEIRUT ARAB UNIVERSITY; BEIRUT EXHIBITION CENTER; BEIRUT NATIONAL MUSEUM; BEITEDDINE PALACE; BOURJ HAMMOUD; CILICIA MUSEUM; CORNICHE; LEBANESE UNIVERSITY; MARTYRS’ SQUARE; MOHAMMAD AL-AMIN MOSQUE; RAS BEIRUT/RA’S BEIRUT; ROBERT MOUAWAD PRI-

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VATE MUSEUM; SAINT GEORGE BAY; SAINT GEORGE ORTHODOX CATHEDRAL; SAINT JOSEPH UNIVERSITY; SURSOCK MUSEUM. BEIRUT ARAB UNIVERSITY. A private institution of higher learning founded in 1960. The spacious main campus is located near Beirut’s south gate. The main language of instruction is English, with some classes held in Arabic or French. There are branch campuses in Debbieh and Tripoli. The university is highly ranked and well regarded. Its alumni include former prime minister Rafic Hariri, as well as important jurists and politicians from other Middle Eastern nations. BEIRUT EXHIBITION CENTER. A building near the waterfront in Beirut that has been refurbished to become a modernistic center for the exhibition of contemporary art. The exterior of the center is covered with anodized mirror aluminum, which makes its sides into a striking work of art reflective of the ever-changing surrounding area. The interior contains a large hall where periodic exhibitions are featured. BEIRUT MEDICAL CENTER. See AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB). BEIRUT NATIONAL MUSEUM. The goal of establishing a national museum began in the 1920s during the French Mandate. Land was purchased on Damascus Road, and by the 1930s the building was completed and the museum opened, but the formal inauguration was delayed until 1942. The museum had to close during the civil war, as Damascus Road became the demarcation between East Beirut and West Beirut. Many precious artifacts were stored in rooms hidden by new walls and thereby survived the war even though the building was occupied by fighting forces. After the war, it took years of restoration before the museum could formally reopen in 1999. The museum has extensive collections ranging over the long history of human habitation in the region. The prehistory collection exhibits stone tools dating back millennia and metal fishhooks dated from 5,000 years before the present. The exhibits from the Bronze Age, beginning in about 3200 BCE, reflect an era of highly developed towns along the coast, as well as inland. The Iron Age collections reflect the influence of the surrounding peoples on the region. The exhibitions continue the chronology through the Hellenistic, Roman, Mamluk, and Arab periods.

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BEIRUT RAFIC HARIRI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. Originally named Beirut International Airport, the facility opened in 1954 in Beirut. It was renamed in honor of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who was assassinated in 2005. It serves as an important hub for both passenger and cargo airplanes. In 1968, the airport came under attack and suffered extensive damage when Israeli airplanes dropped bombs in retaliation for the downing of an El Al flight in Athens, Greece. The runways were damaged, and 14 civilian planes were destroyed. See also ASSASSINATION OF RAFIC HARIRI. BEITEDDINE FESTIVAL. A music and arts festival held annually in July and August, since 1984, in the Beiteddine Palace in Beiteddine, Lebanon. BEITEDDINE PALACE. A grand palace built on a hillside in the Chouf Mountains area south of Beirut by Emir Bashir II, the governor of the region during the Ottoman period. The name Beiteddine, or Bayt ad-Din, is Arabic for “House of Faith.” The palace has survived the various wars in the modern period and is now a popular tourist attraction. It is considered a good example of early 19th-century Lebanese architecture but with some Italian influences. The complex includes an impressive vaulted stables complex, three courtyards, and bathhouses. The central courtyard features a large fountain in front of the main stone building with large arches. Although many of the original art and furnishings have not survived, the building houses several small museums. One museum displays a collection of mosaic artwork from various Lebanese sites. Each summer the palace serves as the venue for art exhibits and musical performances during the Beiteddine Festival. Beiteddine is also the name of the local village, located in the Chouf Mountains about 50 kilometers southeast of Beirut. BEKAA VALLEY. A relatively flat, upper highlands area that has traditionally served as the agricultural zone of Lebanon and even surrounding regions. It runs north–south between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon mountain ranges. It is more than 56 kilometers wide at its widest in the middle of the country and narrows significantly toward the north and especially the south of Lebanon. It is 177 kilometers in length within Lebanon, but on a larger scale it is part of the Great Rift Valley, made up of a combination of valleys and fault lines that extends for thousands of kilometers as far south as Mozambique. The important city Baalbek is situated near the middle of the valley at a site favorable for occupation because it is served by two rivers, as well as freshwater springs. It is famous for the ruins of ancient temples and the Roman-era monolith known as Hajar al-Hibla. During the later period of the

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Umayyad Caliphate Caliph Malik built a new city, Anjar, farther south in the Bekaa Valley, at the intersection of two major trade routes. Some Umayyad ruins are still visible there. The city of Zahlé is the capital of the Beqaa (Bekaa) Governate. It is home to a large Greek Catholic population and known for its Our Lady of Zahle and Bekaa Church. BEQAA VALLEY. See BEKAA VALLEY. BERRI, NABIH (1938– ). A Lebanese lawyer, businessman, politician, party leader, and speaker of the Parliament. Berri was born abroad, in Sierra Leone, into a Lebanese Shiite family. He moved to Lebanon at an early age and earned a law degree at the Lebanese University. He practiced law in the 1970s and then became head of the Amal Movement in 1980, during the civil war era. He came to that role after the resignation of former Amal leader Hussein el-Husseini, who resigned rather than lead the Amal militia into more bloody fighting. Husseini then departed from Amal rather than remain under the leadership of his rival, Berri. Under Berri’s leadership, Amal faced the Israeli Army in resistance against the Israeli Invasion of 1982 into southern Lebanon. He took part in the unity government in 1984. With Syrian backing, Berri got Amal heavily involved in attacking Palestinian refugee camps, in the prolonged War of the Camps. Berri signed the 1985 Tripartite Agreement on behalf of Amal. The other two signatories were Walid Jumblatt for the Progressive Socialist Party and Elie Hobeika for the Lebanese Forces. Berri has had extensive experience in the cabinet under several prime ministers, serving terms as minister of justice, minister of hydraulic and electric resources, minister of housing, and minister of state. After the end of the civil war, Berri transitioned the Amal Movement from a militia into a political party contesting with Hezbollah for the Shiite votes. Berri emerged as the main political figure among the Shiites. He was elected as speaker of Parliament beginning in 1992, and has been reelected to that post by a wide majority ever since. Berri also holds U.S. citizenship and has owned businesses there. BEYDOUN, ABBAS (1945– ). A poet, journalist, and novelist from southern Lebanon. Beydoun’s numerous Arabic poems have received wide acclaim and been translated into several languages. His work as a journalist has been as a cultural editor, most recently at the newspaper As-Safir. His Arablanguage novel Tahil damm has been translated into English under the title Blood Test. It tells the story of a young man who recalls family stories while searching through memorabilia from his late uncle.

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BIQA VALLEY. See BEKAA VALLEY. BKERKE. A site northeast of Beirut, near Jounieh, where a Maronite Christian monastery serves as the see of the Maronite Patriarchs and the spiritual headquarters of the worldwide Maronite Church. BKIRKI. See BKERKE. BLACK SATURDAY. See CIVIL WAR OF 1975–1990. BLACK SEPTEMBER CONFLICT. A regional war between a Jordanian branch of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) Fedayeen and the government of Jordan that flared up in September 1970. The Fedayeen had been launching raids across the Jordanian border into Israeli occupied territory without interference from Jordan. They functioned as a state-within-astate, governing the Palestinian refugees according to regulations of their own making. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan under the leadership of King Hussein had allowed this to continue until some of the more extreme Fedayeen elements began attempts to overthrow the government. Those rebellious actions included hijackings and two attacks on King Hussein’s motorcade, in apparent assassination attempts. These events forced King Hussein to reverse his support of the Fedayeen. He ordered the army to attack the Fedayeen forces in September 1970. During the ensuing conflict the Jordanian army prevailed, and the Fedayeen’s state-within-a-state came to an end. Due to the Palestinian casualties, that month came to be known as Black September by Palestinians. The following year, King Hussein forced the PLO to move its headquarters out of Jordan, and it was relocated in Lebanon. The presence of the PLO in Lebanon helped create conditions that led to the Lebanese civil war, which began in 1975. BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION. In the aftermath of what many Palestinians saw as a ruthless attack on them by the Jordanian army during September 1970, that month came to be known as Black September. In revenge, a radical organization of Al-Fatah fighters formed into an organization, naming itself Black September. One of the group’s goals was to take vengeance on King Hussein for turning on them. It carried out attacks aimed at high-ranking Jordanian officials. It assassinated Prime Minister Wasfi aTel in November 1971, and attempted to assassinate Jordan’s ambassador to Great Britain the following month. Black September carried out many other attacks on pipelines and people, mainly during the course of the next three years. The most extreme was the event at the 1972 Munich Olympics, when a Black September cell attacked

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some members of the Israeli Olympic squad. After killing some on the spot, they took others hostage and negotiated for a plane to take them and their hostages out of Germany to Cairo. The German plan was to kill the hostage takers before they could board the plane and thereby free the hostages. The plan failed when some from the group survived the surprise attack and managed to kill their hostages. Black September had mostly ceased its attacks by August 1973. Yet, it did claim to have been responsible for the 1981 bombing of an Antwerp synagogue and a 1988 bomb attack in Amman, Jordan. BLOC OF INDEPENDENT MARONITE DEPUTIES. A civil war period group of Maronite members of Parliament who wanted to be independent from the Maronite deputies and others who followed the lead of Bashir Gemayel. The bloc was founded in 1979, by Butrus Harb and other independent-minded Maronite politicians. Its political stance was to be more conciliatory toward the other confessional communities than the Gemayel camp. BLUE LINE. A border demarcation established by the United Nations in 2000. It defines the Israeli–Lebanon border. The Blue Line closely follows the line drawn in 1923 to demarcate the border between French-administered Grand Liban and British-administered Palestine. See also GREEN LINE; OPERATION NORTHERN SHIELD; UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2254. BOURJ HAMMOUD. A densely populated town located in the northeastern part of greater Beirut. The town is a commercial center. Bourj Hammoud was founded by Armenians escaping the Armenian Genocide starting in 1915, in the former Ottoman Empire. It then continued to be a place of refuge for Armenians, who still form an ethnic majority in the town. See also ARMENIAN APOSTOLIC CHURCH. BRUSSELS CONFERENCE: SUPPORTING THE FUTURE OF SYRIA AND THE REGION. See SUPPORTING THE FUTURE OF SYRIA AND THE REGION. BSOUS SILK MUSEUM. There was a silk industry in Lebanon from the middle of the 1st millennium until the 1970s. The former silk production operation in Bsous, a town just east of Beirut, has been restored as a silk museum. Its exhibits include the sericulture process of how silkworms are

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cultivated and how silk thread is collected and used to make fine silks. Examples of Lebanese silks are on display year-round, and temporary exhibits of foreign silks also take place. BTIDDIN. See BEITEDDINE PALACE. BUSTANI, BUTRUS AL- (1819–1883). An influential 19th-century Arabic-language author best known for his contribution to the Arabic renaissance. Having been raised as a Maronite Christian, as an adult he took employment as a teacher at a Protestant Christian school. Later he converted from Maronite Catholic to Protestant Christianity. He authored books on Arabic grammar and arithmetic. His most lasting contribution may be his involvement in the translation of the Bible into Arabic, resulting in what came to be known as the Van Dyck Version. In the later years his literary life was consumed with his advocacy of a revival of Arabic-language literature. Politically, he became a Syrian nationalist, advocating for the concept of a Greater Syria. As an educator, he founded a school where students of all ethnic and religious communities were welcome and treated with respect and equality. BUSTANI, EMILE AL- (1907–1963). Having studied at the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in 1937 he founded his own business, the Contracting and Trading Company, based in Beirut. That business became very successful, with contracts for construction in several Middle Eastern countries. He shared his wealth and earned a reputation as a philanthropist. He served in the Lebanese Parliament from 1951 until his tragic death in an airplane crash. His seat in Parliament was then held by his daughter, Myrna Al-Bustani. BUSTANI, FUAD FREM AL- (1906–1995). A Lebanese scholar, poet, author, and university administrator. He was from the prominent Al-Bustani family that included Butrus, Emile, and Myrna Al-Bustani. As a scholar he specialized in Arabic literature. He wrote poetry and scholarly works on Arabic literature, as well as Arabic reference works. As a leading intellectual he served as the first president of Lebanese University from 1951–1970. During the civil war he was a member of the Lebanese Front, an association of influential Maronite Christian leaders.

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BUSTANI, MYRNA AL- (1937– ). A Lebanese businesswoman with the distinction of being the first woman to serve in the Lebanese Parliament when she took the seat of her father, Emile Al-Bustani, after his death in 1963. She is a philanthropist and patron of the arts in Lebanon, and chair of the Al Bustan International Festival of Music and the Performing Arts. BUWAYZ, FARIS (1955– ). A Maronite lawyer, politician, cabinet minister, and member of the National Bloc Party. He served as minister of foreign affairs in the cabinet of President Rafic Hariri. In that capacity Buwayz met with the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Political Department head, Faruz al-Qaddumi, during the May 1991 Arab foreign ministers conference in Cairo. It was the first direct talks held since the era of the Taif Accords. The Cairo meeting was followed by a series of meetings in Beirut and elsewhere. The three main items on the dialogue agenda dealt with the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon, refugee camp security, and the rights of Palestinians in Lebanon. It is thought that this dialogue resulted in a tacit agreement according to which Palestinians would hand over their heavier military equipment and withdraw their military personnel to inside their refugee camps, whereas the government of Lebanon would grant more rights but not citizenship to Palestinians in Lebanon. Buwayz won reelection to the 1992 Parliament, which had been delayed until October in his Kisrawan district due to the boycott by many Christians in protest of the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon. In 1994, as foreign minister, he articulated the government’s desire to see the Palestinian refugees leave Lebanon. In 1996, he spelled out some of the reasons that he and the government opposed permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Those reasons included the lack of suitable space in Lebanon for such settlement and the fact that the sectarian balance in Lebanon would be altered by so many Palestinian refugees, who were predominantly Sunni Muslims, being granted permanent status. That same year, Buwayz spelled out an approach concerning the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The four tracts of that approach included implementing the Palestinians right of return as called for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 194. The second track involved settling the refugees in Lebanon in countries where they had relatives. The third and fourth tracks of his plan, respectively, called for Western and the richer Arab countries to accept more of Lebanon’s Palestinian refugees. BYBLOS. The Greeks referred to the principle ancient Canaanite port city as Byblos, in the land the Greeks called Phoenicia. Locally the city was called Gebal, and the land was Canaan. The modern name for this Lebanese city is Jbail, or Jubayl. In Canaanite religion, the city was said to have been

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founded by El, God, at the beginning of civilization. Archaeological evidence supports the view that humans have lived in the area for at least 10,000 years. Ancient Byblos was a center of shipbuilding and trade. In the ancient period, the main exports were cedar logs and papyrus. Cedar was shipped to Egypt and elsewhere to build temples, palaces, and large boats. Papyrus, made from the inner bark of the papyrus plant, was exported across the Mediterranean as a medium for writing. The Greeks named the papyrus after the city from which it was shipped. The Greek way of pronouncing Gebal led to the term Byblos. The word Bible derives from this Greek way of referring to papyrus, meaning originally a work written on papyrus. Ancient Byblos was also a center of Phoenician culture. Writing was advanced, as evidenced by the Phoenician (Canaanite) alphabet script on the sarcophagus of King Ahirim dating from the 10th century BCE, now on display in the Beirut National Museum. The Phoenician alphabet may have developed from earlier, and it later influenced many other alphabets, including the Greek one. See also PHOENICIANISM. BYBLOS CASTLE. Originating as a stone fort built by Crusaders in the 12th century, the fort was then held briefly by the Muslim leader Saladin before being restored by Crusaders in 1197. It remains in an unrestored state today and serves as a tourist attraction. The area between the castle and the sea is the site of the annual music event known as the Byblos International Festival. BYBLOS INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL. A popular festival of music and art held annually since 2003, in late July, in Jbail, the seaside city known to the Greeks as Byblos. The festival features both Lebanese and famous international musical performers, earning it high praise. The 2019 schedule became quite controversial when conservative religious groups protested the pending appearance of Lebanese indie band Mashrou’ Leila because those religious groups felt the band’s lyrics promoted homosexuality and were offensive to religious sensitives. BYBLOS WAX MUSEUM. A small museum in Jbail displaying wax figures spanning Lebanon’s history from the Phoenicians to the present. BYZANTINE RITE. See GREEK ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY.

C CABINET. Officially known as the Council of Ministers, Lebanon’s parliamentary system includes a cabinet made up of ministers appointed by the president and confirmed by Parliament. The constitution defines the cabinet as the government of Lebanon. The constitution does not specify the confessional representation required for the cabinet, but traditionally it is split between Christians and Muslims, as are the 128 seats in Parliament. The prime minister chairs the meetings of cabinet. The portfolios of each minister may change from time to time. The president may suggest an urgent agenda item and even attend meetings as a nonvoting member. The cabinet is a crucial body in Lebanon’s confessional-based consociational political system. Indeed, a key element of consociational systems is the notion of the grand coalition cabinet. That is, the political leadership of the various confessional or sectarian groups that dominate in Lebanon are to be represented in cabinet. Failure to do so risks the stability of the political system. There are a number of advantages to being in cabinet. Obviously, cabinet is a place where one could articulate and lobby for one’s respective community. Beyond that, being in cabinet gives politicians the all-important access to patronage, which they distribute to supporters in return for continued support. After 2008, the tendency in Lebanon was to have a cabinet of national unity. This would include not only members of the different sectarian communities, but also those that were in opposition, ensuring that no faction is left out of decision-making. This was particularly important in an era where Lebanon was dominated by two factions, March 14 and March 8, and where such factions tended to reflect sectarian divisions. When cabinets are unsuccessful and Lebanon is faced with a political crisis of sorts, the tendency is to create nonpolitical technocratic governments until the political situation is resolved. Indeed, the cabinet appointed in 2020, to deal with a political crisis emanating from Lebanon’s economic collapse, is considered to be a technocratic rather than partisan one, with members nominated by various political parties who are highly qualified for 63

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their portfolios. As examples, the deputy prime minister is Akar Adra, an Orthodox Christian woman who is married to a Sunni Muslim. She and her husband are publishers and researchers, and have founded the Nabu Museum. The justice minister is Mary-Claude Najem, whose qualifications include being a professor of international law with a record of advocating for peaceful solutions to Lebanon’s problems. The public works minister, Michel Ibrahim Najar, has a background in civil engineering. And the finance minister, Ghazi Awzni, is an economist and finance expert. CAIRO AGREEMENT (1969). The secretive Cairo Agreement, signed on 2 November 1969, by Lebanon’s commander in Chief, Emile Al-Bustani, and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat, granted the PLO military and political autonomy over the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in exchange for PLO recognition of the sovereignty of Lebanon. Many Lebanese felt the agreement gave too much authority within Lebanon to the PLO and unnecessarily drew Lebanon into the military conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. In particular, the Cairo Agreement allowed the PLO to carry guns in Lebanon to conduct a military campaign against Israel. In theory, this was to be done in coordination with Lebanese authorities, although in practice, this was largely ignored. Israel responded by attacking Palestinian targets in Lebanon, as well as Lebanese civilian infrastructure. The latter was done to pressure the Lebanese into ending the armed Palestinian presence. The question of Palestinians using Lebanon as a military sanctuary deeply divided Lebanon’s political elite and respective sectarian communities. For the most part, Lebanon’s Christian community wanted the arrangements to end, while Sunni Muslims demanded that Lebanese authorities increase support to the Palestinians. The presence of the PLO contributed to the deteriorating political and security situation in Lebanon in the early 1970s, leading to the outbreak of civil war. The Cairo Agreement was declared null and void by the Lebanese Parliament in May 1987. See also EGYPT, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. CAIRO AGREEMENT (1976). See ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT, CAIRO (1976). CANAANITE. The traditional name for the people, religion, and civilization of the region that now includes southern Lebanon and parts of Israel and the Palestinian Territories. The term Canaan may derive from the purple dye used in the region. Or if one follows the Hebrew tradition, the Land of Canaan refers to the region occupied by the descendants of a man named Canaan, who was Noah’s grandson.

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CANTONS. During the civil war of 1975–1990, the Lebanese state broke down as a central governing authority. The regions of Lebanon controlled by various militias were known as cantons. For example, East Beirut was part of the Christian canton under the control of the Lebanese Forces, a Christian militia. West Beirut was controlled by Muslim militias, and the Chouf Mountains area was controlled by the Druze militia, the People’s Liberation Army. CAPITAL. See BEIRUT. CARACALLA, ABDEL-HALIM (1938– ). A renowned Lebanese dancer originally from Baalbek. After excelling as a pole vaulter, Caracalla turned to dance, with great success. He founded the Caracalla Dance Theatre in 1970. He is known for an innovative style of dance that fuses Western and Middle Eastern classical forms. The Middle Eastern style comes in part from his exposure to the Baalbek International Festival as a youth. Later, he studied Western style under Martha Graham. The Caracalla Dance Theatre troop’s world tours have given Caracalla and his approach to dance a worldwide audience. CARACALLA DANCE THEATRE. See CARACALLA, ABDEL-HALIM (1938– ). CASTLES. Fortified castles were common in medieval Lebanon and throughout the region. Several survive today, although more as ruins than as functioning buildings. The Beaufort Castle in southern Lebanon has played a strategic roll from Crusader to modern times. Byblos Castle changed hands repeatedly during the Crusader period. It now serves as the venue for the Byblos International Festival. Iaal Castle, or Iaal Fortress, the former residence of Ottoman governor Babar, overlooks Tripoli in northern Lebanon. Mseilha, or Mousaylaha, Fort, near Batroun in northern Lebanon, dates from the 17th century. The Sidon Sea Castle is the ruins of a 13th-century Crusader fortress built on an island near the coast in Sidon. Toron Castle in Tibnin, southern Lebanon, is a Crusader castle built by Hugh of Saint Omer in the early 12th century. Sitting strategically on a hill in Tripoli, the Citadel of Raymond de Saint-Gilles, or Tripoli Castle, changed hands between Crusaders and Mamluks in the 13th and 14th centuries. Moussa Castle is a 20thcentury building, complete with clay figures depicting traditional Lebanese lifestyles, skillfully handcrafted by a man named Moussa al-Ma’amari.

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CATHEDRAL OF SAINT ELIAS AND SAINT GREGORY THE ILLUMINATOR. A modern-era cathedral in Beirut’s Debbas Square that serves as the headquarters of the Armenian Catholic Church and its spiritual head, the Armenian Catholic Patriarch of Cilicia. CEDAR REVOLUTION (2005). In the aftermath of the February 2005 assassination of former prime minister Rafic Hariri many Lebanese took to the streets in a widespread, peaceful protest movement. Following a term coined by a U.S. official who named it after the nation’s iconic symbol, in the West it came to be called the Cedar Revolution. In Lebanon and throughout the region, it was called the Independence Intifada, reminiscent of the Palestinian Intifada. The so-called revolution was actually a chain of public protests, mostly but not exclusively in the Beirut area. The participants blamed Syria for the assassination. A diverse population of Lebanese became united around a call for Syria to withdraw from Lebanese affairs, leaving Lebanon to be truly independent. The groups involved included the Citizens for a Free Lebanon, the Center for Democracy in Lebanon, the Democratic Forum, and the Qornet Shehwan Gathering. The main political parties involved included the Future Movement, the National Bloc Party, the Phalanges Party, and the Progressive Socialist Party. In contrast to Lebanon’s tradition of violence, the protests were peaceful ones, following a civil disobedience approach reminiscent of Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King Jr. The protestors called for the withdrawal of Syrian forces and an end to Lebanese governments dominated by Syrian interests. Because they did not trust the pro-Syrian government and security officials, the demonstrators called for an international inquiry into Hariri’s assassination, along with new and free elections to replace the pro-Syrian leaders. The Cedar Revolution met with success. Previously, Syria had thousands of personnel, including troops and intelligence operatives, in Lebanon. Syria acquiesced, after almost three decades of occupation, withdrawing all its troops by the end of April 2005. Lebanon’s pro-Syria government of Omar Karami was disbanded. Concerning the revolution’s demand for justice in the Hariri case, the United Nations (UN) had sent a fact-finding commission to investigate the assassination of Hariri. It had reported that the assassination seemed to be connected to a series of attacks for which Syria was responsible. With the help of the pressure from the Cedar Revolution, the UN created the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in May 2007.

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CEDARS OF LEBANON. The cedar trees of Lebanon were the main source in the ancient Eastern Mediterranean for large logs needed for palaces, temples, and ships. The pharaohs of Egypt sourced them for their ships and large buildings. Ancient temples, including Solomon’s temple and, after its destruction by the Babylonians, the Second Temple in Jerusalem, were built with trees from Lebanon. Throughout its history, its mighty cedars have been a source of Lebanese pride and identity. This is reflected in the prominent position given to the cedar tree on the Lebanese flag. Today only a few groves of cedars remain. The grove known as Arz el-Rab, or “Cedars of the Lord,” on Mount Makmel has modern-day Lebanon’s oldest cedars. It is a protected grove containing recently planted cedars, as well as the old trees. It serves as a tourist attraction and a link to Lebanon’s past. CENSUS (1932). The last time Lebanon conducted an official census of its population was in 1932. The census recorded a population of 785,543, broken down according to religious affiliation, the main form of communal identity and organization in the country. In total, 18 distinct religious sects were recognized. The Christian population accounted for 51.2 percent of the population, while the Muslim population was 48.8 percent. According to the census, the largest community was the Maronite Christians, with 226,378, or 28.8 percent, of the population, followed by the Sunni Muslims, at 22.4 percent, and the Shiite Muslims, at 19.6 percent. More than 70 percent of the population came from these three religious communities. The 1932 census is considered one of the most important documents in Lebanese history, as its findings determined the distribution of political power in postindependence Lebanon. To a considerable extent, it continues to guide the distribution of political power. In Lebanon’s confessional-based political system, largely devised in the National Pact of 1943, political power is distributed to each religious community based on their numerical strength, as determined by the results of the 1932 Census, with the largest communities getting the lion’s share of power. Accordingly, parliamentary seats favored the Christians over the Muslims on a 6–5 ratio, while the Maronite community secured the most important positions of power, including the presidency and the head of the armed forces. The Sunnis came in second in degree of power and the Shiites third. Given the close link between demographics and distribution of political power between competing confessional groups, census-taking in Lebanon is a sensitive political endeavor. Indeed, it is so politically fraught that no formal census has since been taken, and given the possible political implications of any results emanating from doing so, it is unlikely to take place in the near future.

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The makeup of Lebanon’s population has always been a political issue, perhaps more so than in most other countries. Indeed, some critics argue that even the 1932 Census was determined by political considerations where the influential Maronites and their French colonial backers ensured favorable numbers. It is claimed, for example, that some marginalized communities were undercounted or left out of the census altogether, allowing for the results to favor the Christians, and the Maronite community, in particular. Lebanon’s population breakdown was certainly an underlying political issue from independence to the civil war outbreak in 1975. Muslims claimed that the demographic balance had shifted in their favor and that political power needed to be reformed accordingly. Such demands were resisted by the Christian population. To some extent, the 1989 Taif Accords, which helped bring an end to the civil war, dealt with the nexus of demographics and political power. That agreement redistributed political power more evenly between Christians and Muslims, including among the three largest communities. The underlying premise of the agreement is that no matter the population numbers, power must be shared equally between the three communities; therefore, holding a census from the standpoint of the distribution of political power becomes a rather mute point. Demographic concerns also likely played a role in Lebanon’s approach to the large Palestinian refugee population, and the more recent Syrian refugee one. Both communities are largely Sunni Muslims, raising significant concerns within other communal groups, including the Christian and Shiite communities, of the implications of these communities on Lebanon’s delicate demographic and political balance. The refugee populations are, as a consequence, fiercely denied the sort of rights associated with citizenship. Without any government census in the modern era, the sectarian breakdown of the population has been estimated by a range of entities, including civil society actors, using different approaches. One such entity is the Lebanese Information Center. Based on preschool estimates, school registrations, and 2011 voter registrations, it reported the following figures for the general population, excluding immigrants: 34.35 percent Christian and 65.47 percent Muslim. It included the Druze population, estimated at approximately 250,000 in 2009, in the Muslim category. The large immigrant populations holding Lebanese citizenship is majority Christian and, if included, would affect those percentages. In 2016, the Economist newspaper published a report, based on data from the Lebanese Ministry of the Interior, that claimed that Lebanon’s Maronites made up 21 percent of the population, overtaken by the Shiites, at 29 percent, and the Sunnis, at 28 percent. It is unclear if immigrants were included. A private Lebanese entity, Statistics Lebanon, claims to have detailed demographic data on Lebanon, including numbers that reach the smallest of vil-

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lages; however, they do not release such data in its entirety. They claim to respect the concept of demographics and equal power-sharing as laid out in the Taif Accords, which is considered essential for domestic stability. Such a conclusion falls in line with the general understandings of consociational power-sharing political systems found throughout the world, including the essence of the system that exists in Lebanon. CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. The official name for the Lebanese Parliament. Its presiding officer is the speaker of the house. The 128 seats in the Parliament are allocated along confessional lines according to the consociational democracy terms of the Taif Agreement. One half of the seats, 64, are reserved for the Christian grouping, composed of Maronites (34), Eastern Orthodox (14), Melkite Christian (8), Armenian Orthodox (5), Armenian Catholic (1), Protestant (1), and other Christians (1). The remaining 64 seats are allocated as follows: Sunni Muslims (27), Shiite Muslims (27), Alawite (2), and Druze (8). CHAMOUN, CAMILLE (1900–1987). A member of the prominent Maronite Chamoun family who became a lawyer, independence leader, Member of Parliament, and president. Chamoun’s parliamentary career began in 1934, and continued with the winning of subsequent elections. In November 1943, during the last days of the French Mandate period, French officials imprisoned Chamoun and other leaders, including Bechara El Khoury and Riad al-Solh, who were advocating for independence. Their release on 22 November 1943 is celebrated as Independence Day. Chamoun continued to serve in Parliament after independence, combined with an ambassadorship to the United Kingdom and then the United Nations. He took office as president on 23 September 1952, replacing his rival Maronite leader, Bechara El Khoury, who had controversially stayed on past the end of his term. During Chamoun’s presidency, the Pan-Arabism movement, inspired by Egypt’s Gamal Nasser, gained a lot of supporters among the Sunni populations of Lebanon and its neighbors. The Pan-Arabists were pressing for Lebanon to join the newly formed United Arab Republic (UAR). As a Christian and a strong advocate of Lebanese independence, he resisted the idea of joining the UAR. The tensions between the Nasserites and others led to the outbreak of the civil war of 1958, with the Nasserites getting encouragement and perhaps weapons from the UAR and the government getting backing and a contingent of troops from the United States. Chamoun was forced to resign in favor of a more conciliatory president, Fuad Chehab.

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After resigning as president, Chamoun founded the National Liberal Party and held a parliamentary seat for most of the remainder of his life, except for the 1964 Parliament. He remained an active political figure within the Maronite community during the civil war. He died on 7 August 1987. The Camille Chamoun Sports City Stadium in the Bir Hassan region of Beirut is named in his honor. CHAMOUN, DANY (1934–1990). A son of former president Camille Chamoun, he became involved in politics after the outbreak of the civil war of 1975–1990, as commander of the Tigers, the militia of the National Liberal Party (NLP). After the defeat of the Tigers by Phalangist forces in 1980, he went into exile until emerging in 1983, as the NLP leader. He was a vocal critic of Syrian influence on Lebanon, which explains why the proSyrian faction blocked his nomination for president. The responsibility for the assassination of Dany Chamoun and his family in 1990 is controversial because a court trial found Samir Geagea guilty of the act, whereas others felt that the Syrians were behind it. The Dani Chamoun Foundation was set up to honor him and further his causes. CHAMOUN, DORY (1931– ). A son of former president Camille Chamoun and the older brother of politician Dany Chamoun. Except for a brief period of leading the Tigers militia during the civil war of 1975–1990, he avoided politics while pursuing a career in industry until the assassination of Dany Chamoun in 1990. He then took over the leadership of the National Liberal Party (NLP), which had been founded by his father and then led by his brother until the assassination. Dory Chamoun questioned the outcome of the trial that found Samir Geagea guilty of his brother’s assassination, while instead implicating the Syrians. Dory Chamoun has a long history of opposition to the influence of Syria on Lebanese affairs. He was active in the Cedar Revolution in the aftermath of the assassination of Rafic Hariri. He has given speeches in many locations to members of the Lebanese diaspora. He was active in the anti-Syrian Qornet Shehwan Gathering, and he supports the March 14 Alliance. He was first elected to Parliament in 2009. Chamoun still leads the NLP, but neither he nor other NLP members hold seats in the 2018 Parliament. CHAMOUN, TRACY (1960– ). A Lebanese activist, politician, leader of a political party, and ambassador. Born into the political Chamoun family, her grandfather was former president Camille Chamoun. Her father, Dany Chamoun, was leader of the National Liberal Party before his assassination. Her mother, Patti Morgan Chamoun, is an actress and model from Australia. She heads the Dani Chamoun Foundation, named after her late

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father. Chamoun is credited with being the first Lebanese woman to found a political party, the Liberal Democratic Movement. She was appointed as Lebanon’s ambassador to Jordan in 2017, but resigned in August of 2020 in protest of the government’s handling of the Beirut port explosion. CHEDID, ANDRÉE (1920–2011). Of Maronite Lebanese descent on her father’s side, she was born in Cairo, Egypt. She and her husband relocated to Lebanon in the 1940s before moving to Paris for the remainder of her life. Chedid became a successful francophone author, with numerous books of poetry, novels, and short stories. She is especially known for her descriptions of the lives of women, especially Middle Eastern women. Several of her publications have seen English translations, for example, The Sixth Day and Fugitive Suns. An English-language collection of her works, The Prose and Poetry of Andree Chedid: Selected Poems, Short Stories, and Essays, appeared in 1990. CHEHAB, FUAD (1902–1973). Born into a distinguished noble Maronite family, he was a military general in the postindependence era who later became influential in Lebanese politics as well. Having been in the military during the French Mandate period, Chehab became commander in chief of the postindependence Lebanese Army. In that capacity he is credited with rebuilding and modernizing the army along the lines of the French army. As commander in chief in 1952, he refused to order the army’s involvement in the sectarian dispute that had erupted under President Bechara El Khoury, who subsequently had to resign abruptly in September. Chehab then served a short, four-day term as interim president until the election of Camille Chamoun. In 1958, while still commander in chief, General Chehab refused the order of then-president Camille Chamoun to use the army to crack down on Chamoun’s opposition. Chehab was against the more extreme forms of sectarianism and refused to order the Lebanese Army to intervene in an internal, sectarian dispute. Chehab then served as president for six years beginning in September 1958. He did his best to resist pressures from the various sectarian leaders. He tried to build up the power of the state, which came at the expense of the sectarian elites. He promoted moderate policies and steered a middle course regarding the Pan-Arabist movement inspired by Gamal Nasser. Unlike his two presidential predecessors, he then graciously retired from politics rather than attempting to amend the constitution to allow him to serve a second term.

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At Chehab’s invitation, the French Institut de Recherche et de Formation en Vue du Development submitted a report in 1961, on Lebanon’s economic and social conditions. That report noted the extreme disparities between rich and poor populations in Lebanon, with the warning that a failure to address these disparities could lead to a political crisis. Politicians came to associate Chehab’s name with the stance of being a moderate, progressive leader who opposed sectarianism. That stance came to be called Chehabism, and presidents Charles Helou and Elias Sarkis identified as Chehabists. CHEHABISM. A former Lebanese political movement named after President Fuad Chehab. Chehabists favored moderation between pro-Western and Pan-Arabist positions, as well as the ending of what they saw as excessive sectarianism and the zuama system in Lebanon. Chehabism also favored greater economic and social reform aimed at narrowing the widespread inequality that existed in Lebanon. After President Chehab left office, he was succeeded by Chehabist Charles Helou. A third Chehabist president, Elias Sarkis, was elected in 1976. See also LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. CHIDIAC, MAY (1963– ). A Lebanese TV journalist who served as minister of state for administrative development in 2019 under Prime Minister Saad Hariri. Chidiac was a Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation journalist and TV anchor who was willing to be critical of Syrian influence on Lebanon, especially concerning the continuing presence of Syrian troops on Lebanese soil. She hosted a TV show in 2005, about possible Syrian involvement in the assassination of Rafic Hariri. Thus, it is suspected that Syrian factions were responsible for an assassination attempt on her life in September 2005, when a bomb was placed under the seat of her car. The explosion severely damaged her left arm and leg. Chidiac recovered after a prolonged period of hospitalization in France and again worked as a TV host of a current show. Her career as a journalist has led to numerous awards, including an award from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and a 2006 Courage in Journalism Award by the International Women’s Media Foundation. She founded the May Chidiac Foundation in 2009, a charitable organization dedicated to promoting her values in such arenas as media and education. CHIHA, MICHEL (1891–1954). A businessman, lawyer, publisher, and politician who was one of the main authors of the Lebanese Constitution of 1926. Chiha left Beirut in 1915, to avoid Ottoman rule, and relocated in Egypt as a student of law. Having returned to Beirut, he entered politics in

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1925, and then served on the committee drafting the Constitution of 1926. He became a wealthy businessman and was a strong advocate for the free-enterprise approach. As a politician, he spoke strongly against Zionism, anticipating that a Jewish state would be in competition with Lebanon. He founded the influential French-language newspaper Le Jour in 1934. CHOUF. A district in the south-central part of Lebanon stretching from the Mediterranean coast to the inland mountain range. It was the traditional home region of the Druze, among other confessional communities. CHOUF MOUNTAINS. The mountainous region in Chouf, traditionally the home area of the Druze, but now containing various religious communities, as well as the Druze. Emir Bashir II built his Beiteddine Palace in the Chouf Mountains. It is now the site of the Beiteddine Festival. CHURCH, LEBANESE. See ARMENIAN APOSTOLIC CHURCH; ARMENIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH; ASSYRIAN CHURCH; EASTERN ORTHODOX CHURCH; GREEK ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY; MARONITE CHURCH; PROTESTANT CHRISTIANS; ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANS; SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; UNIATE RITES/UNIATE CHURCHES. CHURCH OF THE EAST. See ASSYRIAN CHURCH. CILICIA MUSEUM. A Beirut museum housing items brought from Turkey by Armenians as they migrated to Beirut to escape persecution. Most items come from the Monastery of Sis in Cilicia, a region in the south of Turkey that was home to Armenians historically. CITADEL OF RAYMOND DE SAINT-GILLES. See CASTLES. CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENT (CSM). A Lebanese movement founded by Gregoire Haddad in 1998. CSM is a secular movement striving for a democracy that begins at the human level and works from there toward an equitable, transparent society. This is meant as a contrast to Lebanon’s traditional sectarian system. One member of the 2018 Parliament, Paula Yacoubian, affiliates with the CSM. CIVIL WAR OF 1860. During the period of the Double Qaimaqamate system set up in 1842, the Mount Lebanon region was divided into a southern district ruled by a Druze deputy governor and a northern region ruled by

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a Maronite deputy governor. Although there were tensions between the two, the system lasted for 18 years. The region was still set up in a feudal style, with landowners demanding rent from peasant farmers. In 1860, the Maronite peasant villagers in one region began to rebel against what they considered to be the oppressive taxation demands made by their Druze landlords. The conflict spread, and the civil war broke out between the Druze and Maronites in May 1860. The following month saw the conflict spread to other Lebanese regions having a population mix of Druze and Maronite. By July, the war had spread to Damascus, where Druze and Muslim gangs attacked Maronites and other Christians. The regional conflict had become the widespread civil war of 1860. The numerous attacks on Christians led France to intervene. Facing pressure from France and other European nations, the Ottomans agreed to a plan that called for military intervention by a combined European force with the mission of restoring peace. France led the force, with troops from several other nations participating. When peace was restored an international commission was formed. Its recommendation was that the Ottomans appoint an administrator to govern the Mount Lebanon area separately from the Ottoman province of Syria. The Ottomans did follow that recommendation, setting up Mount Lebanon as a Mutasarrifate. Each Mutasarrif, the Turkish title for the governing official, was to be a Christian but one who was not from Lebanon. Mount Lebanon was autonomous, and its security was guaranteed by the five European powers. That system of government lasted until the Ottomans lost control of the region during World War I. See also RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE; WAR OF THE MOUNTAIN. CIVIL WAR OF 1958. During the presidency of Camille Chamoun, the Pan-Arabism of Egypt’s Gamal Nasser swept throughout the Arab world. It gained a lot of advocates in Lebanon, especially among Sunni Muslims. When Lebanon’s close neighbor, Syria, joined Nasser’s Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958, the pressure for Lebanon to also join intensified. Chamoun was a veteran of the struggle to gain Lebanon’s independence from rule under the French Mandate, and he held a stance that favored closer ties to the West and was staunchly against Lebanon forfeiting its independence. Deputy Minister Charles Malik made a speaking tour in the United States, during which, through his strong anti-Communist talks, he strengthened the American resolve to support antileftist fervor in Lebanon.

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The various factions in Lebanon became polarized between a Pan-Arab, anti-Western and anti-Israel side, and a pro-Western, anti-leftist side led by Chamoun. The opponents of Chamoun, including many within his own Maronite community, for example, the Maronite Patriarch, feared he would try to extend his term in office, as had his predecessor. Conflict between the Nasserist and independence factions erupted into a brief war after the May 1958 assassination of journalist Nasib al-Matni, who was an outspoken critic of Chamoun. Under the pretense of the Eisenhower Doctrine, U.S. marines landed in Beirut in June to help restore order, but the conflict was resolved by then. A political compromise was reached where Chamoun agreed to step down as president, and the commander of the Lebanese Army, General Fuad Chehab, would become president. Chehab was more conciliatory toward the opposition and their economic and foreign policy demands, including paying lip service to Pan-Arabism. In return, Egypt promised to stop interfering in Lebanese affairs, including supporting the opposition. Syria’s withdrawal from the UAR, and the seemingly regional halt to push for the unification of Arab countries, eased pressure on the Lebanese political system. Under President Chehab, Lebanon entered into a period of political stability, as well as economic and social stability. CIVIL WAR OF 1975–1990. Having long defined Lebanon in the popular imagination, as well as in numerous academic publications, the long-running Lebanese civil war of 1975–1990 brought much destruction to the country’s political, security, and socioeconomic systems. It led to the deaths of perhaps 100,000 to 150,000 people, while displacing hundreds of thousands more. Its effects continue to be felt decades later. The war brought to an abrupt end the post-independence and highly complex governing arrangements among the many sectarian communities that call Lebanon home. Although the Lebanese state, and its institutions, did not collapse fully during these 15 years, it remained a shell of its former self with limited coercive capability. De facto control of Lebanon fell at various times to militias associated with the different sectarian communities and political movements or the armed forces of such external actors as the Palestinians, Syria, Israel, or Western countries. The long duration of the war, or more accurately the many different wars fought during the 15-year period, reflected the complexity of actors and their agendas and capabilities. The Lebanese civil war was an internationalized one. Its trajectory and duration were determined by not only the Lebanese, or even primarily so, as the war carried on, but also powerful regional and international actors, and the political dynamics that shape their respective relationships.

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CAUSES AND ORIGINS OF THE WAR. There is a fairly strong consensus that several factors led to the outbreak of the civil war, all of which contributed to ending the political consensus that governed Lebanon since independence from France during the 1940s. Different schools of thought, however, place more emphasis on one or more of these factors than on the others. Of the two main schools, one underscores economic considerations and the other sectarian ones. The first argues that complex economic dynamics, including the widening gulf between economic classes, and the concentration of economic activity, bringing large segments of Lebanon’s poor to the capital, Beirut, weakened traditional political bonds and provided leftist and radical groups with opportunities to capture additional supporters. These dynamics ultimately led to calls for significant political and economic reforms, and when these failed to materialize, armed conflict between leftists and their well-armed allies and those that supported the status quo ensued. The second school rejects the almost-exclusive emphasis on economic causes, although it does not necessarily preclude economic grievances as contributing factors to political unrest. Rather, it stresses sectarian relations and grievances, and the breakdown of Lebanon’s heavily sectarian political arrangements established by the Constitution of 1926 and the 1943 National Pact. This school’s proponents argue that Lebanon was primarily a sectarian society, along religious lines, with politics and social organization articulated through sectarian channels. With respect to the major challenges facing the country during the early 1970s, society divided largely along sectarian, and not economic, lines. Of these challenges, two had the greatest impact on Lebanon’s carefully crafted yet precarious political consensus. The first challenge related to questions of political reform. Distribution of political power among the country’s sectarian communities was based on their numerical strength, with postindependence political arrangements heavily favoring Lebanon’s Maronite Christian community; however, it had become fairly clear by the early 1970s that the country’s Muslim communities were growing in number and may have eclipsed the Christian population, although the political system was not designed to adjust to this reality. Demands for political reforms grew during this period and ranged from modest changes giving Muslims more power to calls to abolish the sectarian model. The latter, especially championed by the left, was seen by some as a ploy to end Maronite political hegemony and was thus fiercely resisted by the Maronites. The second challenge, intersecting questions of foreign policy, security, and domestic politics, focused on the role and rights of the large Palestinian refugee population and their political/military apparatus based in Lebanon. The issue loomed large and was especially divisive after 1970, when a combination of the terms of the Cairo Agreement and the eviction of Palestinian

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leadership from Jordan relocated the Palestinian movement, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and its various associated groups to Lebanon. The PLO operated autonomously of Lebanese institutions and often with impunity, conducting military campaigns against Israel from Lebanese territory. This drew Lebanon into the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and invited Israeli military reprisals against Palestinian and Lebanese military and economic targets. The conflict damaged Lebanon’s economic and security infrastructure and heightened political tensions between two Lebanese factions: those that have traditionally supported the Palestinians and those that wished to insulate Lebanon from the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Thus, it opened a sensitive division in Lebanese political culture regarding the degree to which the country should be engaged with problematic regional issues. It was, however, the active interference of Palestinian groups in Lebanese domestic politics that appeared to tip the political crisis into outright conflict. The PLO formed a close working alliance with their ideological soulmates, the leftist umbrella organization the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and its charismatic leader, Kamal Jumblatt. The PLO provided its allies with crucial ideological, material, and eventually military support in return for political cover to continue to conduct operations against Israel. The alliance between the two groups alarmed the political establishment as a whole and the Christian community in particular, who believed that without Palestinian support the LNM’s influence in Lebanon would be minimal. As a consequence, Christian parties demanded the government reign in the PLO but ultimately took up arms themselves to defend the political status quo in the event the Lebanese government would not, or could not, adequately address the Palestinian question. As it happened, the Lebanese state was simply too weak to manage the conflicts that took place in Lebanon from 1970–1975. Indeed, the Lebanese state was never particularly strong and relied historically on sectarian elite compromise to govern. Without the agreement of traditional political leaders, who themselves were facing pressure from more extreme voices within their respective communities, the security forces could not act effectively to contain violence emanating throughout the country. The Lebanese security forces, for example, failed to stop the cross-border battles that took place between the PLO and Israel, the political assassinations, and the other acts of violence. They also failed to prevent the wholesale arming of various political movements in the country, surrendering any semblance of state monopoly of coercive power. Indeed, there were intermittent but increasing clashes between heavily armed Palestinian/LNM forces and Christian militias tied to Christian-dominated political parties and movements. By April 1975, those clashes had erupted into full-scale war between them.

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PHASE ONE OF THE CIVIL WAR (1975–1976). The war started following a series of violent exchanges between rival groups, including an attack on an event attended by Kataeb leader Pierre Gemayel. In retaliation, Christian militiamen fired on a bus carrying Palestinians, killing more than two dozen of them. The Lebanese government was unable to prevent what followed— open warfare that also included violent attacks by all sides against civilians. Tens of thousands were killed during this period of the conflict, with civilian populations fleeing en masse to areas controlled by coreligionists, leaving the capital divided between predominately Christian-controlled areas like East Beirut and Muslim-controlled areas like West Beirut. The Christian militias, although outgunned, may have calculated on the support and intervention of the Lebanese Army, although this never materialized as the army fragmented along sectarian lines and, therefore, was ineffective. Soon thereafter the Palestinian/LNM fighters gained the upper hand and rejected attempts to mediate the conflict, including from the Syrians, based on the belief that they were on their way to a military victory and therefore able to dictate favorable terms to ending the conflict. The position taken by the Lebanese left and their Palestinian allies alarmed the Lebanese establishment, as well as regional and international actors— conservative Arab states, Syria, Israel, and the West—all of whom had an interest in the outcome of the conflict. None wished to see a situation arise where the Lebanese government would become dominated by radical parties beholden to the PLO. Such an outcome, it was feared, might give oxygen to the region’s radical forces, triggering an Israeli invasion of Lebanon and pushing the country’s Christian community into an alliance with Israel. Or it might even divide the country permanently along sectarian lines. All were scenarios that Lebanon’s powerful neighbor Syria was especially determined to avoid, given the implications to its own political and strategic milieu. It came as little surprise then, that at the invitation of Lebanese president Frangieh, a close friend of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad, Syrian military forces numbering 30,000 strong entered the country and, after decisive battles with the leftist alliance, forced a cease-fire on the main protagonists, bringing the first phase of the conflict to an end. Syria’s presence in the country was further legitimatized by the Arab League, by its renaming the forces that came to control parts of Lebanon and ostensibly help the government reinstate its control of the country the Arab Deterrent Force. The Syrian military would stay in Lebanon for three decades, becoming a key actor during the entirety of the conflict by supporting various players while opposing others, in line with Syrian national interests. PHASE TWO OF THE CIVIL WAR (1976–1982). The cease-fire imposed on the warring factions did little to resolve the main issues over which the war was fought. Moreover, the country was now physically divided into

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sectarian cantons controlled by one of the militias or the Syrian military with limited government control, a fact that was to remain more or less the case until the end of the war. None of the major players engaged in the opening rounds of battle had achieved their goals; therefore, each used the first few years after the ceasefire to try to consolidate and strengthen its respective position in anticipation of further fighting. The Christian militias were particularly unhappy with the outcome of phase one. They not only failed to defeat the PLO/leftist alliance, which now controlled the Muslim parts of Lebanon, but also had to contend with the powerful Syrian military whose interests conflicted with the Christian establishment. Moreover, the Syrian forces acted as a barrier to Christian ambitions to reestablish the pre-1975 political order. The Christian parties and their militias attempted to strengthen their position by consolidating political and military leadership under newly formed umbrella organizations—the Lebanese Front representing their political wing and the Lebanese Forces the military wing. The ambitious son of Pierre Gemayel, Bashir Gemayel, led the Kataeb military wing and came to dominate the Lebanese Forces. He used heavy-handed tactics to bring other Christian militias under his control, and with the exception of the Frangiehdominated Marada Movement, he was successful. Having more or less united Lebanon’s Christians, the Lebanese Front and the Lebanese Forces proceeded to form a strategic alliance with Israel, greatly strengthening access to weaponry, as well as strategic and diplomatic support, in anticipation of further battles with the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies, as well as Syria. The fate of the Palestinian/LNM alliance in the immediate years after 1976 went in a different direction following the assassination of LNM leader Kamal Jumblatt in the spring of 1977, likely at the hands of Syria. The LNM, which was essentially a loose association of numerous leftists, Pan-Arab and Pan-Syrian groups held together by Jumblatt’s powerful leadership, were no longer effective and at best junior partners to the PLO. This left the Palestinians as the dominate force in control of the Muslim parts of Lebanon, which they continued to use as a base in which to confront Israel. In March 1978, Israel entered the Lebanese civil war determined to neutralize the PLO’s ability to wage conflict. In what Israel called Operation Litani, 25,000 soldiers entered Lebanon and pushed Palestinian fighters and their allies away from the border region. Before withdrawing after facing pressure from the United States, much of the land gained by Israel was turned over to their Lebanese militia clients, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), while the United Nations dispatched a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, a peacekeeping operation to South Lebanon whose forces remain in place as of this writing.

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Fighting between the various groups throughout Lebanon and across the border with Israeli continued and, in fact, intensified in the period leading to the summer of 1982, when a major escalation of the war occurred beginning with Israel’s full-scale military invasion of the country. PHASE THREE (1982–1985). It was during this phase that the conflict in Lebanon fully morphed into a regionalized and internationalized one. The Israeli government, fresh off completing a peace agreement with Egypt, and with a new and sympathetic ally in Washington, D.C., was determined to bring the military component of the Arab–Israeli conflict to an end by defeating PLO forces and evicting them from Lebanon. Israel also hoped to help their Christian allies win the civil war and take control of the government. It was expected that Israel would then be in a position to extract favorable political terms from the Lebanese government, including the normalization of relations. The full-scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon began on 6 June 1982, with Israeli forces reaching the Lebanese capital and bombarding PLO positions (and allies) in West Beirut for weeks before international negotiators secured an agreement for the PLO surrender and relocation to the North African country of Tunisia. In so doing, the Palestinian military and political presence in Lebanon effectively came to an end, leaving the large Palestinian refugee population vulnerable to the whims of their enemies, despite international assurances that they would be safe. With Israel’s military help in defeating the Palestinians and neutralizing Syrian forces, Christian militias were able to gain the upper hand in the conflict. They entered Muslim parts of the country for the first time since the collapse of the Lebanese government in 1975, including West Beirut and the Druze-dominated Chouf Mountains. Significantly, Christian forces also managed to ensure that their man, Bashir Gemayel, was elected president of Lebanon, fulfilling long-held ambitions to take control of the government. The gains made by Lebanese Christian militias and their Israeli allies where short-lived, however, with their policies and maneuvers leaving behind a trail of destruction and lawlessness throughout the country. It began following the assassination of Bashir Gemayel in September 1982, before he was to assume the presidency. That event was met with revenge massacres of Palestinian refugees in the following days, drawing further international attention to the situation in Lebanon. Bashir’s brother, Amine Gemayel, was appointed president in the aftermath. The move received Western support, including the dispatching of the Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF), consisting of U.S., British, French, and Italian troops, to Beirut to assist the government. Furthermore, in May 1983, the Gemayel government signed the Lebanese–Israeli Peace Agreement on terms generous to Israel.

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Despite Western support, Gemayel had little influence with Lebanon’s main actors, including, ironically, his deceased brother’s own Lebanese Forces. The latter’s aggressive policies in the Chouf Mountains and other Muslim parts of the country were met by fierce resistance from sectarianbased militias, greatly undermining the government’s attempts to unify the country. Moreover, although greatly weakened, Syria was determined to derail the Lebanese government and its alliance with the West. Syria offered military and logistical support for groups opposed to the Christian-dominated government, including the Druze and Shiite militias. It was at this point in the conflict that there was a rise of sectarian militias in the Muslim parts of Lebanon, especially among the long-neglected Shiite community. Its militias, Amal and the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, were to take a leading role in challenging the existing order. The more radical movements often allied with Hezbollah, for instance, Islamic Jihad, kidnapped and killed Western civilians in the country, including the president of the American University of Beirut, Malcolm Kerr. They also carried out bombings against soft targets, as well as military opponents. Their attacks included the 1983 bombing of Western military barracks, killing of hundreds of U.S. and European troops of the MNF. These events, combined with the failure of the Western-backed Geneva conference, more formally called the Lebanese National Dialogue Conference, aimed at ending the civil war, saw the new political order in Lebanon quickly spiral out of control. Western troops departed from Lebanon, and the Gemayel government quickly lost what little legitimacy it had. By 1985, Israel had abandoned its grandiose project for Lebanon, withdrawing from most of the country, retreating back to a 10-kilometer zone in southern Lebanon that it controlled with its client militia, the SLA. The power dynamics in the Lebanese conflict once again shifted in favor of Syria but also with the cementing of sectarian militia rule throughout both Christian and Muslim parts of the country. PHASE FOUR (1985–1988). President Gemayel came to recognize the resurgence of Syria as the key power broker in the country even before Israel’s withdrawal, with the Lebanese government having rescinded the May 17 Agreement less than a year after signing it. Indeed, Syria’s presence was strongly felt at the March 1984 Lebanese national dialogue talks, known as the Lausanne Conference, which had a very different feel from the talks that had taken place just a year earlier in Geneva. Syria’s power in Lebanon was also recognized by the major sectarian militias. In Damascus in 1985, the leaders of the Shiite Amal militia, Christian Lebanese Forces, and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party signed on to the Syrian-sponsored Tripartite Agreement, which was aimed at ending the civil war and recognizing Syria’s role as peacekeeper. The agreement, however, failed to hold following an internal political battle within the Leba-

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nese Forces that saw its leader, Elie Hobeika, pushed out by Samir Geagea and allies who vehemently opposed a Syrian-imposed resolution to the conflict. Lebanon remained divided into cantons throughout the remainder of this period, with Lebanese Forces retreating and entrenching their control of the Christian enclave, the Druze militia in their mountain enclave, and the Shiite Amal and Hezbollah militias in much of the Muslim sectors of the country. Indeed, the Shiite militias fought successfully in several battles with resurgent Palestinian forces and their allies for control of the Palestinian refugee camps, in what came to be known as the War of the Camps. The country remained dangerous for Western citizens, as kidnappings by radical groups continued. Lebanon was considered a pariah state by much of the world, as a problem too difficult to resolve; however, by 1988 a new crisis threatened to renew widescale fighting in Lebanon and perhaps even beyond its borders, increasing the urgency for Arab and Western diplomatic efforts to bring the long-standing conflict to a close. PHASE FIVE (1988–1990). The final phase of the conflict began with a crisis concerning presidential succession. President Gemayel’s term had come to an end, but various internal and external power brokers could not agree on a replacement. This created a political vacuum with respect to the office of president, a crisis that even after years of conflict the Lebanese had previously managed to avoid. Ultimately, Gemayel turned over the government to the head of the Lebanese Army, General Michel Aoun, who became prime minister and head of government. Aoun was considered an uncompromising maverick, demanding the disarmament of all militias and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. He was willing to use the legitimacy and force of the Lebanese Army to carry out his orders to unite the country. Indeed, in less than a year, he went after Syrian forces, and both Muslim and Christian militias, the latter in a highly destructive, fratricidal war. To critics, however, Aoun’s move was illegitimate and little more than a power grab. Syria and their Lebanese allies rejected his claim to head the government. They proceeded to establish a rival government in West Beirut headed by Salim Hoss, who had previously served as prime minister. For a year, therefore, Lebanon had two competing governments, one in Muslim West Beirut and the other in Christian East Beirut. In 1989, after a series of military clashes with Syria and her allies, Michel Aoun went on the offensive and declared a War of Liberation against Syrian forces. Heavy fighting occurred between the two sides, with Aoun’s forces receiving heavy weapons from Iraq, Syria’s bitter Arab rival. As a consequence, there were significant concerns in the region that the Syrian and Iraqi proxy war in Lebanon threatened to escalate into a direct conflict between these two large Arab states, further destabilizing the region.

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As a matter of some urgency, Saudi Arabia, backed by the Arab League and Western leaders, led an initiative to end the civil war. Lebanese parliamentarians were invited to the Saudi resort city of Ta’if, where they proceeded to hammer out a settlement, known as the Taif Accords, to end the conflict. The accords called for political reforms equalizing power between Lebanon’s Christian and Muslim communities. Furthermore, it called upon Syria to assist the Lebanese government in reinstating control of the entire country. Lebanese parliamentarians formally adopted the agreement in November 1989, and the major militias, including the Lebanese Forces, accepted it. Moreover, the Lebanese Parliament elected a new president, Rene Mouwad, who was assassinated just 17 days later. Mouwad was then replaced by Elias Hrawi. Aoun rejected the Taif Accords, ostensibly because it did not explicitly call for Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. He continued his War of Liberation against Syrian forces. He also continued to reject the authority of the new president. He proceeded to fight a destructive war with the Lebanese Forces, who he resented for accepting the terms of the agreement. By August 1990, regional dynamics, namely the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, had a significant impact on ending the civil war in Lebanon. In a quid pro quo with the United States, Syria agreed to support U.S. efforts to evict Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait in return for a green light to use fighter jets and other heavy weaponry against Aoun’s forces. His forces were swiftly defeated in October 1990, forcing Aoun into exile in France. With his defeat, the conflict in Lebanon came to an end. See also BLACK SEPTEMBER CONFLICT. CLOONEY, AMAL ALAMUDDIN. See ALAMUDDIN, AMAL (1978– ). COASTAL ROAD INCIDENT. See OPERATION LITANI. COCHRANE, LADY SURSOCK YVONNE (1922–2020). From the aristocratic Cochrane and Sursock (or Sursuq) families, a patron of Lebanese art and architecture, and a strong advocate for appreciating and preserving all aspects of Lebanon’s cultural heritage. Lady Cochrane lamented the tearing down of historic buildings to make way for skyscrapers. She was active in the running of the Nicolas Sursock Museum in Beirut during the 1960s. She also founded and served as president of the Association for the Protection of the Natural Sites and Ancient Buildings. Aside from her many cultural heritage endeavors, she has also played a leadership role in efforts to resettle Lebanese within Lebanon and stem the tide of Lebanese emigration by providing a means of livelihood in rural areas. Lady Cochrane was one of the almost 200 victims of the massive explosion in the port area of Beirut on 4

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August 2020. The Sursock Palace, where she lived, was badly damaged by the explosion, and she died from related injuries sustained by the explosion’s impact in late September. COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY. The Lebanese constitution awards the title of commander in chief of the military to the president, while the top military officer is the commander of military operations. General Fuad Chehab is the commander who stands out in Lebanese history, since he refused to use the army to intervene in internal, sectarian conflicts. He was also elected Lebanon’s president in 1958. Michel Aoun, Michel Suleiman, and Emile Lahoud were postwar military men who became presidents. See LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. COMMITTEE FOR LEBANESE WOMEN’S RIGHTS. See WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND MOVEMENTS. COMMON SPACE INITIATIVE (CSI). A nongovernmental organization created in 2008, after the failure of the government’s National Dialogue Process, to further the process of consensus-building among all Lebanese. Later, the CSI expanded its activities to other nations of the Middle East. CONFESSIONAL SYSTEM. Lebanon has a confessional-based political system, where religion and politics heavily intertwine and form a crucial nexus that impacts the lives of Lebanese citizens in ways that often differ from other political models found in most societies. The all-encompassing Lebanese confessional system permeates the public and the private spheres, and covers almost every aspect of a person’s life, from voting to matters of personal status. Lebanon’s confessional system falls under a unique typology, what political scientist Arend Lijphart referred to in the 1960s as a consociational democracy. He wrote, “Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 [1969]: 216). This type of democratic political system is found in just a few countries worldwide, for example, Belgium, Switzerland, and Lebanon. In these countries, we find populations that are deeply divided along highly politicized communal groups. The divisions tend to fall along racial, ethnic, religious, sectarian, or linguistic lines, and usually predate the creation of the modern nation-state. Yet, despite the seriousness of the divisions, the lack of a unified national identity, or even in many cases the lack of an initial commitment to the nation-state itself, the consociational political arrangements have led to a relatively stable working democracy.

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Consociational systems tend to remain stable and democratic for some time, if two factors are in play. The first is that the system must continue to accommodate the needs of each communal group, especially in the areas of political representation, security, economics, and culture. The tendency of the model is to embed into the political system specific communal rights (as opposed to individual rights), making such arrangements the very bedrock of the system. The second factor is the ability of communal elites to work together, to compromise when required, while at the same time maintaining control and support of their respective communal members. This second point is especially crucial at times when additional loads on the political system increase, risking a possible rupture in the system. In effect, the consociational political system is designed as a compromise of sorts between diverse communal groups to ensure their commitment to the state. The system is designed in such a manner that political power is carefully shared between communal groups, designing a specific set of political arrangements unique to the country at hand. Once the political system is designed, there is a clear understanding among the elite that a failure to maintain the spirit of those arrangements could possibly destabilize the system, ultimately bringing about its collapse. Given the complex and precarious nature of consociational systems, they have historically been seen as temporary models of governance, useful in the short or medium term until a more unified political culture and national identity has a chance to emerge. Once this occurs, it is thought that traditional communal divisions would then dissipate, allowing for more standard and stable democratic models along the lines traditionally associated with Western democracies to take hold. As it turns out, however, while some consociational systems did evolve, for instance, the one found in the Netherlands, it appears that most other models tended to remain indefinitely. This is most certainly the case with respect to Lebanon’s confessional model, where communal identity has remained strong to this day and continues to sit at the very heart of the political system. Consociational arrangements in Lebanon have a long history and mirror the often-complex and fraught relationship between the myriad of religious groups (or sectarian communities) that have called Lebanon home. Indeed, the major division in Lebanese society historically has been confessional, with 18 distinct religious groups and traditions. This includes both Christian and Muslim communities, with the largest of them—Maronite, Sunni, Shiite, Druze, and Greek Orthodox—heavily politicized. It is important to view these religious communities differently from the way one might view religious traditions in contemporary Western societies. Lebanon’s religious communities have historically had very separate identities, with the largest behaving more like distinct ethnic groups, or perhaps even nations. For historical reasons, the religious communities that resided

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within Lebanon’s borders tended to develop separately. They lived in different, largely homogenous parts of the country (with exceptions), held distinct historical narratives, and followed unique cultural practices and norms. This pattern of separateness was reinforced by the fact that the majority of these communities were of minority faiths, fearful of their status and safety with respect to the various empires that came to dominate the area, including the Sunni-dominated Ottoman Empire. Local and international dynamics helped to reinforce the separateness of the communities. For example, the Ottoman Empire had used the Quranic term millet to refer to religious minorities. It introduced the millet system of governing minority communities, which encouraged and supported some autonomy among its religious minorities. For example, the Mutasarrifate system gave a semi-autonomous status to the Maronite community in Mount Lebanon. This approach certainly helped to reinforce trends that were already well in practice and continue to shape Lebanese politics centuries later. The need for Lebanon’s various religious communities to cooperate ebbed and flowed historically, depending on local political circumstances and wider regional and international political dynamics. Throughout history, especially in the 19th century, we see early and more simplistic examples of systems set up where rival confessional groups shared political power according to formulas similar to those described by consociational theory. The key to these early models is that they recognized the primacy of confessional groups within political discourse and the need to share power among them, at least in some manner. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, a modern Lebanese republic was created under a French Mandate. It was the successor to the autonomous Mount Lebanon entity dominated by the Maronite community but also incorporated additional lands from neighboring Syria, adding many more communal groups to the Lebanese mix. These religious communities had little ties to the new state of Lebanon, let alone held any concept of a Lebanese identity. The Constitution of 1926 established the parameters of Lebanon’s political system, opting to adopt consociational arrangements that recognized communal identities in both the public and the private spheres. This policy was seen as especially important given the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Maronites had enjoyed in the former Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate was greatly reduced by the formation of the much larger Lebanon state. A real effort was needed to co-opt the newly incorporated communal groups, who were either hostile toward the Lebanese state or, at the very least, indifferent. Significantly, the constitution recognized the primacy of confessional identity in the distribution of political power. Seats in Lebanon’s Parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, were to be allocated on an equal basis for Chris-

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tians and Muslims, and proportionally to the various confessional communities found within these two faiths. Furthermore, the religious sects were to be fairly represented in the formation of cabinet, while the top civil service jobs were to be allocated on a confessional basis in line with the rules of proportionality. The constitution did not enact a civil code with respect to personal status and family law matters, thereby also recognizing the primacy of confessional identity and prerogatives within the private sphere. This includes rules concerning marriage, divorce, custody of children, and inheritances. For example, a couple from two different religious traditions could not marry (at least not easily) within the country itself if their respective religious traditions did not allow for such relationships. Moreover, some religious traditions allow divorce, while others do not. To support such a system, Lebanon created separate religious courts for 12 different Christian denominations and four Muslim groups, as well as courts for people who follow the Druze and Jewish traditions. The 1943 National Pact, which paved the way for Lebanese independence, altered in important ways the terms of the confessional arrangements originally set in the constitution, further institutionalizing Lebanon’s confessional-based political system. Based on the findings of the 1932 Census, the National Pact distributed political power to each communal group based on their numerical strength, with the largest communities getting the bulk of political power. In general, Christians were allocated more political power than Muslims. Within the Chamber of Deputies, for instance, Christians were awarded six seats for every five Muslim seats. The Maronite community benefited the most from the arrangements. They were guaranteed the most important political positions, including the presidency, and the highest military and bureaucratic posts, including commander of the Lebanese Army and chairman of the Lebanese Central Bank. The Sunni community secured the second most important positions, including the prime ministership, and the Shiite community the third most, including speaker of the Parliament. The allocation of political, military, and bureaucratic appointments was carefully observed to ensure compliance with agreed upon balance between the respective communities. Even though the Maronite community held more power than any of the other sects, the leaders of all the major communities benefited by participating in such a system, especially since it gave them access to patronage. Sectarian leaders would use their government positions and access to government resources to distribute goods and favors, including jobs, to their respective supporters in return for continued political support. The 1989 Taif Accords, which ended the Lebanese civil war, reformed elements of the National Pact and the constitution but did not alter in any fundamental way the confessional-based consociational arrangements. It

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simply tweaked Lebanon’s political arrangements to bring equality between Lebanon’s Christian and Muslim communities. For example, the Chamber of Deputies reverted back to a 50/50 division between the two religious traditions. And although the top positions remained allocated to the communal groups agreed upon by the National Pact, the powers of the positions were adjusted in such a manner as to recognize a degree of equality among the Maronite, Sunni, and Shiite communities. For instance, the powers of the president were greatly reduced in favor of those of the prime minister, and to some extent to those of the speaker of the Parliament. Lebanon’s confessional model has had an uneven record since it was established at the time of the French Mandate. To its supporters, or perhaps at least to those who have pointed out its necessity, the confessional system brought much stability to a small country with an incredibly diverse population of different communal groups that had precious little agreement on what constitutes a Lebanese identity, the place of the country in the world, or even whether Lebanon should exist at all as an independent state. Not only is the confessional system credited with keeping the country together, but also, indeed, Lebanon prospered from the mid-1940s until the 1970s. During that period, Lebanon was considered a liberal country with freedoms not found elsewhere in the Arab world and an economy that afforded many a decent living. The fact that the system collapsed in 1975, it is argued, had more to do with external loads on the system, in particular, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, than necessarily with flaws inherent in the system itself. To critics, however, the confessional system was flawed from the outset and is destined to fail again, as it did in 1975, leading to the long civil war. The model suffered from many shortcomings, and it simply could not account for demographic and social changes affecting society. For example, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was obvious that the Muslim population numerically surpassed the Christian population, but the political system continued to reflect Christian dominance. The lack of genuine reforms was seen as a major cause of the outbreak of the civil war. The reform outlined in the Taif Accords, which corrected some imbalance between Christians and Muslims, is considered flawed, as it supports a system that does not adjust well to changes and biases traditional elites over other political actors. The protest movement beginning in 2019 is clear evidence of this latter point. Furthermore, critics point out that even the framers of the constitution inserted key language in the text asserting that confessional arrangements were temporary, until the country progressed to a level where sectarianism could be abolished and transitioned to a more democratic system based on the equality of all citizens in both the public and private spheres—that is, transitioning toward the more usual one person, one vote majority rules approach. As it stands, the confessional model entrenched divisions in Lebanese society, rather than build on a single secular identity.

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Many current politicians in Lebanon, including those who profit from the system, continue to express a desire to move beyond the confessional model, although such talk may simply reflect platitudes aimed to assuage critics of the system rather than serious conviction or desire to end the system. At least for the foreseeable future, and despite the protests that have shaken the system, it appears that the confessional model will remain in place. Sectarian divisions in Lebanon remain strong and are reinforced by those in the wider region that tend to spill over into Lebanon. To date no viable alternative political model has been effectively articulated to replace what is perhaps a flawed system in need of further reform. CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY. See CONFESSIONAL SYSTEM. CONSTITUTION (1926). After the French were given a mandate over Lebanon following World War I, the French authorized a commission in 1925, to draw up a constitution under French supervision. Men like Michel Chiha, Charles Corm, Petro Trad, and Omar Daouk helped to draft the constitution, and the Representative Council approved the draft constitution in May 1926. It incorporated the principles of freedom, equality, and religious expression, and was inspired in part by the constitution of the French Third Republic, and by the French political system in general; however, unlike what existed in France at the time, the framers of the Lebanese constitution drew on past practices seen on Mount Lebanon. They adopted a unique political formula, a confessional model of governance, to deal with the country’s complex sectarian makeup and historical idiosyncrasies. In particular, the constitution had privileged and then institutionalized the position of religious communities in both the political sphere and also within the private sphere, to the detriment of secular individual rights. Article 24 of the constitution, for example, states that political power is to be distributed according to confessional considerations and specifically stipulates that seats in the legislature are to be divided equally between Christians and Muslims. It further provides that with each of those two religious traditions, and the many sectarian communities found within them, the seats will be allocated on a proportional basis—that is, on the basis of the percentage of the Muslim or Christian population held by each sect within that group. For this context the Druze and Alawite communities are considered to be part of the Muslim group. The Lebanese cabinet was also to include representatives of the major sectarian communities, and allocation would also fall along the lines of proportionality. With respect to the executive branch of government, even

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though the president of the republic would hold significant powers, the position, along with other senior ones were not allocated to any specific community (a process that only started since the National Pact of 1943). The constitution ensured that religious laws held supreme in personal status and family matters. The constitution did not, for example, enact a civil code in these two areas, opting instead to develop a series of religious courts to handle matters that fall under these areas. Interestingly, given the primacy of confessionalism in the political process, the constitution did also express that the system of political allocation by religious identity was a temporary measure, until such time as it is replaced by a nonsectarian system; however, in the more than 100 years since the constitution was written, no alternative system has been adopted or even seriously proposed. Several amendments to the constitution were adopted after independence in 1943. All references to the French Mandate were dropped, and the national flag was modified to specify three horizontal bars, with red bars at the top and bottom, and a white bar with a green cedar in the middle. The most important later changes to the 1926 Constitution arose from the 1943 National Pact and the 1989 Taif Accords. The National Pact specified which communities were to receive the key political positions, and it tended to favor the Maronite community. The Taif Accords went some way in rectifying the imbalance of power created by the National Pact by reverting back to a system of equality between Christians and Muslims in terms of allocation of seats in Parliament and cabinet. CONSTITUTIONAL BLOC. A political party formed in 1934, by Bechara El Khoury. The name refers to one of its goals: restoring the constitution, which had been suspended by the authorities under the French Mandate. The bloc called for full independence for Lebanon. It was mainly a Christian-based party, but it reached out to Muslims by stressing Lebanon’s Arabic heritage. The bloc wanted close cooperation between Lebanon and other Arab states, as well as a role in the Arab League. Camille Chamoun, later to become president, emerged as the other main party official. Chamoun replaced Khoury as leader after Khoury’s resignation. The bloc evolved into a political party, the Constitutional Union Party. CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS (1989). See AOUN, MICHEL (1935– ); GEMAYEL, AMINE (1942– ). CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1990). See TAIF ACCORDS (1989). CONSTITUTIONAL UNION PARTY. See CONSTITUTIONAL BLOC.

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CONSULTATIVE GROUP. See ISRAEL–LEBANON MONITORING GROUP (ILMG). CORM, CHARLES (1894–1963). A Lebanese businessman, author, and philanthropist. While still a teenager, Corm met with Henry Ford and talked him into awarding the franchise for selling Ford automobiles in the Middle East to himself. Corm went on to design the headquarters building in Beirut for his Middle East operations of the Ford Motor Company. It was a very tall building at the time and remains a tourist site and the Corm family home. The Corm home is located near the Green Line and so was occupied during the civil war. Having become very rich as a businessman, at age 40 Corm turned his attention to being a publisher and author. He wrote in French rather than the Arabic that was typical of Lebanese. He was a staunch Lebanese nationalist, and some consider him the father of a school of thought that traced Lebanese heritage to the great Phoenician people who once lived in the region and built many of Lebanon’s most important cities. Corm’s many publications won him numerous Lebanese and international awards, including the 1934 Edgar Allan Poe International Poetry Prize for his work La Montagne Inspirée (“The Sacred Mountain”). He is also respected for his philanthropic work. He helped finance several public buildings in Beirut, including the Beirut National Museum, the National Library, and Parliament. His other many donations included paying for the Lebanese Pavilion at the 1939 World Fair in New York City. See also LITERATURE. CORNICHE. The name referring to a cliffside road or promenade running along a coastline. The Corniche area of greater Beirut is a popular beachside promenade in Ras Beirut. It attracts people from all ages and walks of life, as well as various vendors to cater to their needs. There is also a popular beachside Corniche area in Sidon. CORRUPTION. See ARAB SPRING, IMPACT ON LEBANON; BANKING CRISIS (2020); DIAB, HASSAN (1959– ); HARIRI, SAAD (1970– ); PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT OF LEBANON (PM); PROTEST MOVEMENT OF 2019; WAKIM, NAJAH (1946– ). COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION (CDR). An agency set up in 1977, under the leadership of Lebanon’s newly elected president, Elias Sarkis, and its prime minister, Salim Hoss, to spearhead the rebuilding of the country after initial fighting (1975–1976) in the Lebanese civil war ended. The decision to create the CDR to lead the reconstruc-

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tion effort was done, at least in part, because the Lebanese public sector was deemed too weak and too inefficient to deal with what was expected to be a herculean task of rebuilding the country. That included infrastructure— roads, electricity, public buildings, etc.—as well as the economy. The CDR was to report directly to the Council of Ministers, elevating its status among Lebanese bureaucratic agencies. The CDR spearheaded various projects during the course of the late 1970s and 1980s when the political situation allowed; however, the resumption of the civil war after the initial cease-fire in 1976, and the government’s inability to regain control of most of the country, which had come under the control of sectarian militias or foreign forces, limited to a considerable extent the effectiveness of the organization and Lebanese state institutions overall. The role of the CDR in the rebuilding of Lebanon came in earnest in 1992, when the long-running civil war finally ended and the Lebanese government was able to reassert its authority throughout most of the country. The newly appointed prime minister, Rafic Hariri, made the rebuilding of the Lebanese economy through his Horizon 2000 plan the centerpiece of his government’s mandate and empowered the CDR, as the main institutional organ, to carry out the program. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the CDR managed Lebanon’s postwar economic reconstruction efforts. This included overall program management and coordination, as well as contracting and disbursements associated with individual projects. To critics, however, among other issues, the organization was seen as too powerful, especially in regard to other government ministries. This was a critique dating back to the 1980s and more so now that it was so closely associated with Prime Minister Hariri and his political and economic agendas. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. See CABINET. COUNCIL OF THE SOUTH. See CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. COVID-19. The COVID-19 virus came to Lebanon relatively late. The number of confirmed cases and related deaths was low compared to many countries, in part because testing was available and free. Working in partnership with the World Health Organization, the Rafic Hariri University Hospital in Beirut became the treatment center during the viral outbreak. Patients who presented with COVID-19 symptoms at the various private hospitals, which tend to be better equipped than the government-run hospital, were redirected to the public hospital instead.

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CRUSADER PERIOD. Christian Crusaders occupied Tripoli in 1109, and brought Beirut and Sidon under their control in 1110. They took control of Tyre in 1124. The Crusaders held power in many cities until Saladin defeated them in the late 13th century. CRUSADES, CRUSADERS. The Christian Crusader armies arrived in the Lebanon coastal region in the early 12th century, after capturing Jerusalem. They took control of Tripoli in 1109, and Beirut and Sidon the following year. The Crusaders were not able to conquer Tyre until 1124. They built strong forts to secure their military dominance. The Crusaders remained to rule much of the region for two centuries, until their defeat by Saladin. CUISINE, LEBANESE. The popular foods of Lebanon include such grains as bulgur wheat and rice; beans like fava and lentils; such meats as chicken, lamb, and goat; fish and seafood; fruits; and vegetables. Olive oil is the main oil used. Onions, garlic, lemon, salt, and pepper are common seasonings. Typical dishes include tabouli, kibbi, baba ghanouj, fattoush, halva, falafel, hummus, kafta, marquq, shawarma, shish taouk, and baklava. CURRENCY. See POUND, LEBANESE (LP).

D DABBAS, CHARLES (1895–1935). A lawyer and writer who was the first person to have the title president of Lebanon. Having been born into a Greek Orthodox family in Syria, Dabbas earned a law degree in Paris. As a young man in Lebanon he wrote for a French-language newspaper. His political stance as a Christian was that he wanted Lebanon to be independent from surrounding predominantly Muslim Arab nations. During the French Mandate period, French officials chose him to restructure Lebanon’s judicial system. Then, in May 1926, the French chose him to be president, in accordance with the new Constitution of 1926. Dabbas went on to be elected president in 1929. In 1932, he suspended the constitution and dissolved Parliament, after which he remained president under French appointment. He served as president until he resigned in 1934, after which he remained in government for a few months in the role of deputy and speaker of Parliament. DAHIR, MIKHAIL AL- (1928–?). A Maronite Lebanese lawyer and politician whose home region was the northern Lebanese city of Akkar. After two failed attempts, Dahir was elected to Parliament in 1972. He supported the controversial Tripartite Agreement of 1985. In 1988, he was unsuccessfully nominated for president. As the term of Amine Gemayel was going to end in September 1988, that summer the pro-Syrian faction had put forth the name of Suleiman Frangieh, whose nomination was strongly resisted by the Lebanese Forces (LF), the Maronite militia. Frangieh’s nomination could not be voted on because the LF leader, Samir Geagea, and LF allies boycotted the August 1988 Parliament session, bringing about a lack of a quorum. The pro-Syria faction then put forth Dahir for election. Although he was a Maronite, his election was opposed by the LF faction, in part because he was thought to be too closely associated with Frangieh. Dahir’s nomination was also opposed by Iraq, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Israel, and he was not elected. With no agreement about electing a president, Gemayel made a last-minute appointment of Michel Aoun as leader of a transitional military government. 95

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DAILY STAR. A Beirut-based English-language daily newspaper founded in 1952, by Kamil Muruwwah, a Lebanese journalist and media publisher. The original target readership was Lebanon’s growing expatriate communities wanting to get news about Lebanon and their various homelands. The coverage soon expanded to include news of the Middle East, and a wider readership followed. The Daily Star became the leading English-language paper in the Middle East. After Muruwwah’s assassination in 1966, his wife and sons continued to publish the paper. It went into periods of hiatus during the civil war and subsequent turmoil. It restarted and, for a period, had a distribution partnership with the International Herald Tribune. New owners acquired the Daily Star in 2010, and it was given new life as an important English-language paper with worldwide news coverage with a strong online presence. In February 2020, the Daily Star announced that it was temporarily suspending its print edition, in part because advertising revenues had dropped considerably in the midst of Lebanon’s economic crisis, but that it would continue to offer an online edition. DAKBE. See DANCE. DALLOUL, MOHSEN (1930–?). A Shiite who served as Lebanon’s minister of national defense from 1992–1998, under Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. Dalloul was pro-Syria in his political stance. He later articulated controversial stances in public interviews. In a 2010 ANB TV interview, he argued that Iran should develop nuclear weapons for there to be peace in the region through a balance of terror. DANCE. Dakbe is a form of circle/line dancing. It is a popular dance style in Lebanon, as well as many other Arab countries. Belly dancing is also a popular dance style. DANI CHAMOUN FOUNDATION. A charitable organization named after Dany (also spelled “Dani”) Chamoun, the son of Camille Chamoun and former leader of the National Liberal Party, who was assassinated along with some family members in 1990. The foundation is headed by Dany’s daughter, political leader Tracy Chamoun. It seeks to support work that will honor his legacy. DASHNAK PARTY. See ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION (ARF). DASHNAKTSUTUN. See ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION (ARF).

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DAWUD PASHA (1812–?). An Armenian Catholic who served as the first Mutasarrif (governor) of Mount Lebanon from 1861–1868. DAY OF RAGE (2011). A protest day staged by supporters of ousted Prime Minister Saad Hariri on 25 January 2011. Various protest rallies, ranging from prayer groups blocking traffic to setting tires on fire, were held in the major cities. DAY OF RAGE (2017). Palestinians in Lebanon and elsewhere held a Day of Rage on 7 December 2017, in protest of U.S. president Donald Trump’s decision to relocate the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. DE CAIX DE SAINT-AYMOUR, ROBERT (1869–1960). A French journalist, propagandist, and diplomat who was influential as an advocate of French rule of Syria and Lebanon. He was a staunch colonialist who had argued for French colonial rule of Syria and Lebanon even before World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. As an advisor on Syria to the Quai d’Orsay, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he encouraged France to take control of the Syria and Lebanon regions after the end of the war. His diplomatic roles increased until he became France’s representative to the League of Nations’ Permanent Mandates Commission, which positioned him to advocate for the French Mandate over Grand Liban. DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL PARTY. A small political party founded in 2001, by a group of 50 prominent leaders from both the political and business spheres who favored a progressive, liberal approach in Lebanese politics. Nassib Lahoud, a Maronite parliamentarian and former ambassador to the United States, was the party’s leader until his death in 2012. He was succeeded by Camille Ziade and then Farouk Jabre. The party is often referred to as Tajaddod, the shorter form of its name. Tajaddod elected no members to the 2018 Parliament. DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY. A Lebanese political party whose constituency is mainly drawn from Lebanon’s Shiite Muslims. It was founded by the late Kamel Al-Assad, when he was speaker of the house. The party opposes Hezbollah and the Amal Movement. It holds no seats in the 2018 Parliament. DEUXIEME BUREAU. Dating back to the French Mandate period, this is the short form of the name for Lebanon’s army intelligence unit. It’s prominence in shaping and enforcing government policies has varied in different governments. Deuxieme Bureau came to prominence during the leaderships

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of presidents Fuad Chehab and Charles Helou during the 1960s, when it maintained a tight reign on internal security, including controlling the Palestinian refugee camps, but also kept a check on the powers of traditional zuama. President Suleiman Frangieh, who resented the powers of the Deuxieme Bureau, dismantled the organization in the early 1970s. Some analysts argue that among the consequences of such a shortsighted policy was the uptick of violence in Lebanon shortly thereafter, destabilizing the country and ultimately leading to the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. DIAB, HASSAN (1959– ). Appointed prime minister of Lebanon in January 2020, to head a largely technocratic government in an effort to help end months of unprecedented nationwide protests against government failures to deal with an economic crisis, the likes of which Lebanon had not seen in decades. Diab was born in Beirut to a Sunni Muslim family. He lost his father at the age of 10. He spent his formative education in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at the height of the Lebanese civil war. Diab is a highly regarded Lebanese academic with international standing. He obtained his Ph.D. in computer engineering from the University of Bath, writing a thesis titled “Microprocessor-Based Real-Time Modeling in Relation to the Visual Systems of an Aircraft Flight-Training Simulator.” After completing his Ph.D., he spent his academic career at the American University of Beirut. Diab held a number of academic and administrative positions at the institution, including professor of electrical and computer engineering and vice president of regional external programs. Diab also played various roles in promoting educational reform in Lebanon and the wider Arab world, particularly in the Persian Gulf region. From 2004–2006, he was on secondment to the College of Engineering at Dhofar University, Oman, where he was founding president of the university and acting dean of the College of Engineering. During his career, he published more than 150 publications, including seven books and 50 refereed journal articles, many of the latter in leading international journals. Diab’s political leanings are less well documented, although he was not known to hold official political affiliations or allegiances. Indeed, he is considered a technocrat, a fact that played heavily in his political fortunes in both 2011 and again in 2020, two periods during which Lebanon faced political crises. His entry in Lebanese politics came in 2011, when the government of Saad Hariri resigned, to be replaced by Prime Minister Najib Mikati. Mikati included technocrats in his cabinet, with Diab serving as minister of education and higher education and, for a time, acting minister of social

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affairs. Diab managed the Education Ministry well and held the position until 2014. He introduced long-overdue educational reforms and brought Lebanon positive global attention on educational matters. In 2020, nationwide popular protests concerning the economy and widescale corruption throughout the political elite brought down another Saad Hariri government, plunging Lebanon into its most serious political crisis since 2006. One of the major demands of the protestors was that a technocratic government be formed, to be followed by political reforms and new elections. Following weeks of protests and political maneuvering among the political elite, technocrat Hassan Diab was called on in December 2019, to form a government to bring an end to the protests and move toward dealing with the economic crisis. Critics of his new government, however, noted that Diab was put forth by Hezbollah and their March 8 allies, including the Christian-dominated Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), and, as such, was not free from political influence. Such criticism was given added weight when his government was denied support from the major political leadership within his own Sunni community and their March 14 allies. Indeed, the Parliament’s vote on Diab’s government fell along these partisan lines, with only 69 of 128 voting in favor, denying him a strong mandate to govern. Many within Lebanon’s protest movements were reluctant to support the Diab government, but a combination of protest fatigue and the onset of COVID-19 weakened the movement. Within the first few months of his administration, Diab attempted to deal with the banking crisis of 2020 and announced that for the first time in Lebanon’s history the country would default on its international loan payments. Ultimately, the Diab government was destined to fail. It was never truly a cabinet of technocrats, given the continuing role and influence of Hezbollah and the FPM, for example. Thus, it did not have the support of the protesters, other Lebanese political parties, or the international community. Indeed, with the resignation of the foreign minister just before the explosion in Beirut in August, most pundits were predicting that the government was set to fall. The explosion at the port simply hastened the process, leading to Diab’s resignation on 10 August 2020. DIASPORA, LEBANESE. The number of people of Lebanese origin living abroad is now thought to be far greater than those living in Lebanon. Many of those who left Lebanon from the late 18th century until the civil war did so for economic reasons, especially matters related to trade. The rise of tensions in the Middle East in general in the 20th century led to waves of emigration for reasons related to conflicts with Israel and especially the outbreak of civil war in 1975. As many as 900,000 people migrated from Lebanon to escape conflict. Latin America and the Caribbean have the largest number of the

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Lebanese diaspora. Brazil alone may have as many as 6 million people of Lebanese descent. Europe and North America also have sizable populations of ethnic Lebanese. See also LITERATURE. DIMASHQIYYAH, JULIA TUMAH (1880–1954). A Lebanese woman who founded and wrote for the women’s magazine Jami’at As-Sayyiddat, meaning “Ladies League.” She was a pioneer in women’s issues and concerns. DISPLACED PEOPLE. The various modern wars that have taken place in Lebanon have internally displaced hundreds of thousands of Lebanese from their homes. This includes during the period leading up to the civil war beginning in 1975, which contained intermittent violence, especially in South Lebanon, and during the various stages of the Lebanese civil war itself, which lasted for 15 years. Furthermore, during the postwar period, conflicts that took place in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah throughout the 1990s and in 2006 also displaced populations. The first phase of the Lebanese civil war in 1975 saw the displacement of tens of thousands of people, mostly in the Beirut area, fleeing to parts of the city under the control of militias that shared the same religious background. Lebanese Muslims fled for Muslim-controlled West Beirut, while Christians fled to Christian-controlled East Beirut. This left distinctly sectarian cantons, a feature of the Lebanese landscape that continued until the end of the war and only slowly ended in the years thereafter. Israeli invasions of South Lebanon in 1978, and again in 1982, displaced hundreds of thousands more citizens. Heavy fighting between Christian militias and Druze militias in the Chouf Mountains and other parts of Mount Lebanon in the mid-1980s saw the displacement of more than 350,000 Lebanese, many of them Lebanese Christians fleeing after Druze militias were victorious. By the end of the civil war in 1990, at least a half-million Lebanese were still considered displaced from their traditional home regions. The return of these populations to their homes was a priority but also a politically fraught topic in Lebanon, especially within the Chouf region. In 1993, the Lebanese government established the Ministry of Displaced and a Central Fund for the Displaced. A long and carefully crafted strategy eventually allowed the reparation of many of them. How many internally displaced Lebanese remain is in dispute, however. Numbers range from 70,000 to hundreds of thousands. Since 1948, Lebanon also hosted displaced people from neighboring countries, including hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees, and, more recently, more than 1 million Syrian refugees since the start of the Syrian

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civil war in 2011. Many of the refugees, especially Palestinians, were also internally displaced because of the various conflicts that took place in Lebanon. See also SYRIAN CIVIL WAR, IMPACT ON LEBANON. DIVORCE. See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. DOG RIVER. The English name for a river known as Nahr El Kalb in Arabic and to the Romans as the Lycus (Wolf) River. Its waters arise from a spring near the Jaita Grotto north of Beirut and then flow the short distance to the Mediterranean Sea. It is especially known for its role in history. The Dog River’s banks are unusually steep, making it difficult for past military campaigns to cross northward into Syria. Many famous people have left inscriptions or other artifacts near its mouth. The first such person was Egyptian pharaoh Ramses II, who had three inscriptions carved in stone along the banks near the river’s mouth to commemorate three of his military campaigns to control Syria in the 13th century BC. Most of the surviving 17 commemorative stelae are on the south bank. There are five stelae from trips through the region by Assyrian kings. The Romans carried out road work and built an aqueduct along its banks. Today the site is a tourist destination, both for the beauty of the river itself and the historic commemorative stelae. DOHA AGREEMENT (2008). An agreement signed on 21 May 2008, in Doha, Qatar, by rival Lebanese political factions. The agreement ended the impasse concerning the election of a new president, which had been ongoing since the previous September. According to the agreement a unity government was put in place, such that after the agreement, Parliament was able to elect General Michel Suleiman as president. The agreement was a triumph for the political power of Hezbollah and its opposition allies because, in effect, it gave them veto power in a national unity government. With that power, Hezbollah was in a position to block the ongoing trials on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon concerning the assassination of Rafic Hariri and others. Even more importantly, it could now block any legislation demanding the disarmament of Hezbollah. The Doha meeting was part of the ongoing National Dialogue Process begun by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in 2005, to bring about better working relations among Lebanon’s many sectarian factions. That National Dialogue Process had been interrupted by the Hezbollah–Israel War of 2006 but was continued at Doha. The Doha Agreement did not include a consent by Hezbollah that it would disarm, and sectarian strife soon intensified, effectively making the National Dialogue Process a failure.

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DOUBLE QAIMAQAMATE. After the short rule of Emir Bashir Shihab III ended in 1842, the emirate of Mount Lebanon was divided into two parts known as the Double Qaimaqamate. One part was ruled by the Druze and the other by Christians. Two decades later, the uneasy peace would end with the civil war of 1860. DRUZE. The name Druze refers to an ethnic and religious community now found mainly in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, and as recent immigrants in many other nations. The adherents refer to themselves as Muwahhideen, meaning “Monotheists,” but outsiders call them Druze (or Druse) after one of their early leaders, al-Darazi (or Darazi), who the Muwahhideen later denounced as a false leader. The Druze faith community began in Egypt in 1009, when a charismatic leader named al-Hakim bi-Amrih Allah announced himself to be a divine incarnation, a manifestation of God on earth. His followers broke away from Islam to form a new faith that maintained the oneness of God but that, somewhat like Christianity, believed that God could, and had, become incarnate in a human. Al-Hakim was a caliph in the (Shiite) Islamic Fatima dynasty in Cairo, and he was known for his erratic behavior, which the Druze doctrine interprets in symbolic ways. The Druze beliefs were rejected by mainstream Islam, mainly because the Druze view of al-Hakim bi-Amrih Allah differed so radically from the Muslim doctrine of the Oneness of God and the Muslim strictness about not committing the sin of association—that is, not associating anyone or anything with God. Aside from that crucial theological difference, after the leader’s death his followers had organized and structured the faith in ways that separated it from Muslim authority and practices. This led to persecution of the minority Druze, so they fled Egypt and found a sanctuary in the mountainous regions of what is now southern Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories. The Druze community in Lebanon dates back to the 11th century. The threat of persecution from surrounding Muslim or Christian populations caused the Druze to adopt a practice of secrecy and strict control of knowledge of its doctrines. No outsiders were allowed to marry into or join the community, lest they might reveal the tenants of the faith to others. Within the community, the majority of the Druze, known as the juhhall, or “Unenlightened,” were not instructed in the higher doctrines, nor were they allowed to remain at the service when those matters were discussed among the “Enlightened” or “Noble” members, the uqqal. Many of the uqqal are females. Although the doctrines are secret, Druze are thought to believe in reincarnation, with a karma-like correlation between one’s morality in this life and one’s status in the next. Moreover, it is believed that the days of one’s life are determined by one’s fate. Their social customs and practices

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granted more equality to women than was customary among Muslims in the 11th century. Thursday evenings, rather than the Friday noon of Muslims, became the time for the main gathering of the week. To avoid persecution or suspicion, some Druze have, from time to time, outwardly adopted the practices of the dominant Muslim or Christian majority, while maintaining their Druze faith privately. When Turkish armies became dominant in the 16th century Levant, the Druze fiercely resisted Ottoman rule. Taking advantage of their mountain positions, they maintained some autonomy during the Ottoman period in what is now Lebanon and Syria. The 1925 Druze Revolt against French rule was defeated by the French, who encouraged the Druze to separate themselves from the Arab nationalist movement. The Druze make up an estimated 5 to 6 percent of the Lebanese population. In Lebanon’s confessional political system, the Druze are grouped together with Muslims, along with Sunni, Shiite, Alawite, and Ismaili. The National Pact reserves the position of chief of the general staff for a person from the Druze community. See also PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSP). DRUZE PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY. See PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSP). DUWAYHI, ISTIFAN AL- (1629–1704). A Maronite historian, reformer, and cleric. Duwayhi’s clerical career included studying at Rome’s Maronite College, serving as a priest in Aleppo and Mount Lebanon, serving as a bishop among Maronites in Cyprus, and being elected as the Maronite Patriarch in 1670. Several miracles were attributed to him, and he has been under consideration for sainthood. Duwayhi was widely traveled, and throughout his life he made it his mission to consult or collect documents relating to Maronite history and liturgy. He authored many works in Arabic on almost every aspect of Maronite history and Syriac poetry. Thus, he is considered to be the father of Maronite historical studies. He lived in a time when local rulers were ruthless in taxing the Maronite farmers. Many Maronites were persecuted, and Duwayhi had to relocate to avoid persecution. Despite the bad political environment and the discouraging poverty of this people, he foresaw a way to progress by championing science education, as well as a more Western-style education system among Maronite youth. He founded a Maronite college in Aleppo. He also introduced new ideas and practices into the Maronite Church, especially concerning the baptismal rite.

E EARTHQUAKES. The geography of Lebanon features many faults, both major and minor, which make the region prone to earthquakes. The Yammouneh Fault runs from the southwest to the northeast along the western side of the Bekaa Valley. It is the Lebanese part of the Dead Sea Transform Fault, which has been relatively stable recently. The Roum Fault, running from Marj Ayyun northwest in the direction of Beirut, has been more active recently. It was involved in the 1956 Chhim earthquake, which did much damage. One major concern is that the Roum Fault may extend northward under, or near, Beirut’s large population area. The last major earthquake to hit Beirut was in 551, and it was combined with a major tsunami. The fear is that the Mount Lebanon Thrust Fold just offshore may be building toward another earthquake/tsunami combination. EAST BEIRUT. During the civil war beginning in 1975, Beirut was divided between the East Beirut region, with its mainly Christian population, under the control of Christian militias, including the Kataeb and the Lebanese Forces, as well as later in the conflict army units loyal to Michel Aoun, and the West Beirut region, with its mainly Muslim population and militias. The Green Line demarcated the divisions between the two. The division ended in October 1990, with the end of the civil war. EASTERN ORTHODOX CHURCH. The early Christian churches slowly became divided between those of the western part of the Roman Empire and those of the eastern part. The Western Church recognized the authority of the Patriarch of Rome, the pope, as the ultimate authority, whereas the Eastern Orthodox Christian churches were organized by various regions, each governed by a patriarch. Several of these Orthodox Churches have adherents in Lebanon, including the Greek Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, and the Syrian Orthodox Church.

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ECONOMY. Unlike the economies of most of its Arab neighbors, the Lebanese economy has, since independence, been based on a liberal capitalist model dominated by private-sector interests. Prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, Lebanon was relatively prosperous, driven in part by its position as a regional economic hub. This included banking but also a destination for multinational corporations doing business in the Middle East, a trade transient through its ports, and tourism. The civil war brought much of the Lebanese economy to a halt, ending Beirut’s role as a regional economic hub and causing massive damage to the country’s infrastructure. Lebanon’s post–civil war governments, especially those headed by the former prime minister, Rafic Hariri, spent billions to rebuild infrastructure and support an economy attempting to recapture some of its former glory. The result of these post–civil war efforts to revitalize the economy was mixed. On the one hand, improvements in infrastructure were obvious, although uneven, and there was success in attracting significant investment into certain segments of the economy. On the other hand, only a few industries, for example, banking, construction, and tourism, truly benefited, perhaps by capitalizing on favorable relationships with those in power; however, these sectors were highly vulnerable to the volatile political and security landscape that continued to exist in both Lebanon and the wider region, and subsequently saw wild fluctuations. Finally, the Lebanese government borrowed heavily from international institutions and other donors, a policy that led to severe consequences for the economy throughout the years, culminating in the economic collapse of 2019–2020. In providing an overview of the Lebanese economy, one of the most obvious things that one notices is that Lebanon is, essentially, an importdependent country. It typically has a large annual balance of trade deficits, with the ratio of imports to exports running as high as four to one. In dollar terms, the top imports are fuels, vehicles, pharmaceuticals, precious metals, gems, and machinery. Other major imports include pulp, lead, boats, airplanes, vegetable oils, and electronics. The countries of origin of the imported goods are quite diverse. On a regional basis, by far most of the imports originate in the European Union. On a country by country basis, China is the biggest importer, at about 10 percent of Lebanon’s total imports, followed closely by Greece, Italy, the United States, Germany, and France. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are the leading suppliers from the Middle East. Although relatively minimal to the overall economy, the country’s top exports include gems, precious metals, clocks and watches, mineral oils, medical equipment, plastics, copper, machinery, computers, electronics and

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electrical equipment, cosmetics, and produce. In dollar terms, Lebanon’s exports are mainly to neighboring Middle Eastern countries, including Syria, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Without question, the service sector continues to be the mainstay of the Lebanese economy, with banking, tourism, and construction leading the way. Historically, Lebanon was the banking center of the Middle East. Its bank secrecy laws and generous interest rates attracted oil wealth in the 1960s and 1970s, while expatriates continued to deposit large amounts of money in the banking system during the post–civil war period. Tourism is a major source of revenue for the government and employment but only in times of peace. Tourists consist mostly of the Lebanese diaspora or Gulf Arabs who enjoy Beirut’s cosmopolitan vibe. Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have from time to time punished Lebanon for its perceived pro-Iranian leanings by discouraging their citizens from visiting Lebanon, damaging the tourism industry in the process. Gulf investments in the tourist industry were also discouraged, especially in the period after 2016. Remittances sent from the Lebanese diaspora to family members living in Lebanon also provide a vital income supplement to many households and help offset the trade imbalance. Interestingly, Lebanon’s economy grew reasonably well beginning in 2006, doubling when compared to the ensuing decade at a little less than $50 billion (U.S. dollars [USD]) by 2016, according to World Bank Data. World Bank Data reported Lebanon’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) at a little more than $8,270 USD in 2018. The impact of the civil war in Syria, however, put a damper on the Lebanese economy, leading to several years of GDP growth of less than 2 percent. The economic consequences associated with hosting more than 1 million Syrian refugees outweighed the few economic benefits. Furthermore, since at least 2016, Lebanon has endured economic and political consequences from the Donald Trump administration and Saudi Arabia for aligning too closely with Syria and Iran. For example, the United States and Saudi Arabia have sanctioned Lebanese financial institutions, business interests, and specific individuals for doing business with the Assad regime in Damascus, by far Lebanon’s largest export market. Even without the neighboring conflict in Syria, Lebanon’s economic troubles were brewing and linked to the government’s massive debts. Although a concern since the mid- to late 1990s, Lebanon’s debt-to-GDP growth increased substantially and is among the highest in the world. Servicing the debt has put a significant damper on the Lebanese government’s ability to institute meaningful economic policies. The limitations of Lebanon’s bureaucracy create other hindrances. For example, one limitation the government of Lebanon faces in trying to improve the economy is the drop in its statistical capacity, the ability of a

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country to track and monitor the many sectors of its economy. According to World Bank Data, Lebanon’s statistical capacity, on a scale of 0 to 100, rose rapidly from a very low 42 in 2004, to more than 66 in 2017. That score is in the same range as World Bank Data’s average score for its low- and middleincome grouping. Lebanon then stayed in the 62 to almost 67 range through 2017, before plummeting to 44 by 2019. By way of comparison, Lebanon’s rating of 44 puts it well below World Bank Data’s average of 66 for the United Nations grouping of least developed countries. Lebanon’s score of 44 is well below the average of 57 for the Middle East and North Africa (excluding high income) grouping. In fact, it is among the lowest of all countries. Another significant drawback to the Lebanon economy is the widespread corruption at the political level. Although patronage has long been accepted as part of the Lebanese political system, and a degree of corruption is expected and even built into the system of doing business, the high levels of corruption and misspent resources had allegedly reached unprecedented levels and were considered intolerable. All of these issues contributed to continued economic deterioration by 2019. Then COVID-19 hit Lebanon’s already weak export manufacturing sector and decimated its long-standing economic engine, tourism. Little help was forthcoming from Lebanon’s traditional allies, the Gulf states and the United States, who may have contributed to the situation with policies aimed at punishing Lebanese supportive of the Assad regime in Syria and Iran. The weakening economy and trade deficit led to the loss of the international buying power of the Lebanese Pound (LP). The LP had begun to lose its strength compared to the U.S. dollar (USD). Although the government kept the LP pegged to under 1515 USD, the emerging black market did not. In the 2019–2020 period, the LP lost more than 50 percent of its USD exchange value in the black market, signally a worsening economy and the need for the government to revise its official exchange rate to a more realistic one. Importers began to report that they could not get enough USD from Lebanon’s commercial banks. The weakening of the LP lead to consumer price inflation and rising unemployment. Faced with job loses and rising costs, protests arose in several cities. Protestors called for an end to corruption on the part of government leaders and their patronage networks. Unemployment rose, and the deflation of the LP drove up the cost of fuel to the point that some industries had to either slow down or shut down. The protests ultimately led to the resignation of the Saad Hariri government. Of specific note during the economic troubles was the banking crisis, which began in late 2019. At the local level, there were runs on the banks after a rumor spread warning people about perhaps not being able to withdraw their savings. At the government level, the fear was that Lebanon could

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no longer pay the interest on its massive international debt. This fear of foreign debt default was substantiated when the newly appointed prime minister, Hassan Diab, announced in March 2020, that the country would not be able to pay the interest due on its large holdings of Eurobonds. The government’s only option was to appeal to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for desperately needed new loans. The IMF was reluctant to issue new loans without the government committing to major economic reforms. Those reforms called for, for example, Lebanon to end the flow of patronage monies linked to Lebanon’s traditional sectarian system, a prospect unlikely to occur. After getting cabinet approval, Diab submitted a proposal for a five-year rescue plan to the IMF in May 2020. The plan requested loan commitments of 10 billion USD during the five years. That amount was in addition to 11 billion USD previously approved but not yet drawn down, mostly due to unfulfilled conditions. The submitted plan called for the restructuring of debt, including both loans denominated in LP and foreign currencies. It promised improved efficiencies through fiscal consolidation, especially in the state-run public sectors, for instance, electricity generation and distribution. Regarding the banking sector, the plan anticipated savings by a major restructuring involving forced mergers, better capitalization, and the recovery of monies lost through corruption. The plan further called for meeting the previously unmet conditions set down in previous loan plans for infrastructure. Priority was to go to projects expected to sustain their own debt payments. The IMF had previously suggested that the government revalue the LP’s USD exchange rate to a more realistic amount, in the range of 1750 to 2000 LP to the USD. Even a devaluation to 2000 would still be below the blackmarket rates, which had sometimes spiked to twice that amount in 2020. The community of international donor nations seemed reluctant to fund the loan plan until such time as Lebanon makes major reforms to the inefficiencies, or alleged corruption, inherit in its confessional system. It is also likely that the decision to offer Lebanon an economic lifeline will be politically determined. The United States and their Gulf allies may want Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon to be checked in return for agreeing to financial aid, while other global powers fear that without aid, the Lebanese economy will collapse, precipitating a political collapse and a return to civil conflict. The situation in the summer of 2020 had yet to resolve itself. Although no reasons were cited in his letter of resignation as director-general of the Finance Ministry in late June 2020, Alain Bifani said elsewhere that he could no longer be part of the government’s handling of the economic crisis. Bifani’s resignation also meant that he was resigning his role on the committee negotiating for a crucial bailout loan. He was the second member of that committee to resign.

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In July 2020, Lebanon officially became the first country in history in the Middle East and North Africa region to enter a period of hyperinflation. This raises serious questions regarding the stability of the country’s political and economic systems. The failing economy was dealt yet another devasting blow by the massive explosion in Beirut that occurred on 4 August 2020, in the port region. Aside from the human fatalities, injuries, and homelessness, the long-term effects from the damage caused to the warehouse district will raise the cost of imports while making it more difficult for Lebanese businesses to export their goods. This will make Lebanon’s already excessive balance of trade deficit even worse. The government has pinned its hope for an economic recovery in the long term on the prospect of discovering significant offshore reserves of oil and gas. It has granted exploration rights to a consortium of oil companies, led by Total of France. The consortium began to drill off the coast of southern Lebanon in August 2020, with the hope of discovering a commercially viable region of oil reserves. If significant reserves are discovered, there could be a potential conflict with Israel, which also lays claim to some of the region of exploration. The two countries do not share an agreed upon maritime boundary, although from time to time there have been attempts made at the international level to mediate such a border, which would benefit both countries. By early 2021, the economy was in freefall. It took over 11,000 pounds to buy a US dollar on the black market, leaving many families unable to afford food and other basic necessities. Faced with an ongoing political standoff in which the leaders had not been able to form a government, many desperate Lebanese took to the streets in protest. On 3 March, the parliament approved the terms of a $246 million World Bank loan and a scheme to distribute money to the poorest families on a monthly basis for a year as well as money for school fees. Critics pointed out that the exchange rate to be used in distributing the money was unfavorable and could be seen as a tax on the poorest citizens. A smaller World Bank loan was earmarked to assist smalland medium-sized businesses. EDDÉ, CARLOS (1956– ). The leader, or dean, of the National Bloc Party (NBP) beginning in 2000. He is the grand nephew of former independence advocate and president Emile Eddé, and nephew of the NBP’s former leader, Raymond Eddé. Politically, he is a strong advocate for independence from Syria and the disarmament of Hezbollah. EDDÉ, EMILE (1884–1949). A Maronite lawyer, politician, and president. Having been born in Damascus, he became a prominent lawyer in Lebanon, where he helped found the Lebanese Beirut Bar Association. His political career began with his election to serve as a member of the Lebanese

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delegation at the 1918 Paris Peace Conference. He was a strong advocate for Lebanon’s territory being defined in a way that would counter Zionist claims to portions of southern Lebanon. Eddé served as Lebanon’s president from 20 January 1936–4 April 1941, during the last years of the French Mandate period, when Lebanon was eager to gain independence. After intense negotiations with the French, Eddé signed the Franco–Lebanese Treaty, which called for Lebanon’s independence, but it was never ratified by the French Parliament. EDDÉ, RAYMOND EMILE (1913–2000). A prominent Maronite parliamentarian and cabinet minister who was born and raised in Alexandria, Egypt. He came to Beirut to attend university, earning a law degree from Saint Joseph University. Upon the death of his father, former president Emile Eddé, in 1949, he replaced him as the leader of the National Bloc Party. His parliamentary career began with his election in 1953, followed by successive terms in Parliament. He and his party staunchly opposed exaggerating sectarian discord or dividing Lebanon along sectarian lines, as in Cyprus. Eddé was an unsuccessful candidate for president in 1958. Based on his consistent advocacy for Lebanese independence throughout the periods of French control and his later critiques of Syrian influence and Palestinian intrusion, he came to be called Lebanon’s Conscience. He also opposed the presence of foreign troops in Lebanon, whether Israeli or Syrian. He avoided taking sides in the civil war of 1975–1990. Eddé relocated to France in 1977, to escape the civil war and avoid any repeat of the assassination attempts that had almost killed him more than once. EDUCATION. Since the days of the Ottoman Empire, the education system in Lebanon has been shaped by the policies and realities of each era, as well as Lebanon’s strong sectarianism. During the French Mandate period, the French introduced improvements to the lower education levels, while leaving higher education to Lebanon’s many religious and ethnic populations. After independence, the influx of vast numbers of Palestinian refugees beginning in 1948, strained the public education system. During the civil war of 1975–1990, every level of education was severely disrupted. Then the huge influx of refugees, many of them children, from the Syrian civil war swelled the population of Lebanon by at least one third in a short period of time, leading to major problems in providing education, as well as such basic necessities as food, clothing, shelter, garbage collection, water, and electricity.

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Lebanon’s Ministry of Education and Higher Education oversees every level of education in Lebanon. Lebanon spends less than 3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on public education, well below the 8 percent of GDP spent on average by other nations, according to data collected by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Despite the challenges of wars, sectarianism, and minimal financial support for public education, the literacy rate in Lebanon remains high, at about 99 percent for both girls and boys, according to the World Bank. That is an impressive literacy rate for a country that spends so little and has endured so many problems. The majority of elementary students attend sectarian rather than public schools. The curriculum for all schools, public and private, is set by the Ministry of Education. Lebanon has many higher education institutions, both public and private. The private institutions were typically founded by and intended to serve one of Lebanon’s many religious communities, although they usually now admit students of any background. Lebanese universities have numerous exchange and other agreements with foreign universities. Moreover, many Lebanese choose to attend foreign universities. The historic relationship and ongoing business and cultural relations between Lebanon and France help make France the top destination for undergraduate and postgraduate students learning abroad. Other popular destinations include the Arab-language countries, especially the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Institutions in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada are top choices for higher education in English. See also DIAB, HASSAN (1959– ). EGYPT, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. Since gaining its independence Lebanon has had close relations with Egypt. Egypt hosted the 1944 meeting that brought together five Arab states, one of which was Lebanon, that led to the Alexandria Protocol, in which the five Arab states agreed to work together, especially with the goal of resisting Zionism. The following year, Egypt hosted the meeting in Cairo of six Arab states, one of which was Lebanon, that led to the creation of the Arab League. Egypt had the most influence on Lebanon during the 1950s and 1960s, the period when the Pan-Arabism movement, inspired by Gamal Nasser, was spreading throughout the Arab states and Egyptian power in the Arab world was at its peak. Under Nasser, Egypt interfered in internal Lebanese affairs. That influence became stronger when Egypt and Syria combined to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. During Lebanon’s civil war of 1958, Egypt and allies provided weapons to groups opposed to the Camille Chamoun government, although Egypt denied doing so. When President Fuad Chehab came to power later in 1958, a deal was struck according to which Egypt would not interfere in internal Lebanese affairs as long as Lebanon

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paid lip service to Arab nationalism and Egypt’s leadership role in it. As the major power in the region, Egypt did continue to wield influence, but the breakup of the UAR in 1961 lessened pressure on Lebanon considerably. The secretive 1969 Cairo Agreement, brokered by Egypt, between Lebanon’s Emile Al-Bustani and Yasser Arafat gave the Palestine Liberation Organization authority and some autonomy over the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon, creating a kind of state-within-a-state. Nasser’s Pan-Arab movement gave rise to new political parties in Lebanon. For example, the Popular Nasserist Organization was founded in 1973, by Maruf Saad. It had support mainly among Sunni Muslims in the Sidon region. Saad’s son, Mustafa Saad, commanded its militia, the National Liberation Army, during the civil war. It continues as a part of the March 8 Alliance. In 1976, during the first phase of the civil war, Egypt hosted an Arab League Summit in Cairo. That meeting led to the formation of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), under Syria’s command. The ADF was intended to bring peace to Lebanon, but the result was that Syrian forces remained in Lebanon for decades. Egypt played a minor role in Arab affairs, including in Lebanon, after it signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1979. Egyptian–Lebanese affairs have generally been cordial in recent years. Both countries have an interest in stability in the region and fear the rise of Sunni extremism. One area of continued tensions in the relationship between Lebanon and Egypt is related to the role of Hezbollah in the region, including in Syria and Gaza, which Egypt considers to be problematic. Egypt, along with the Arab League, designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 2017, complicating relations with Lebanon. EHDEN MASSACRE. See FRANGIEH, TONY (1941–1978); MARADA BRIGADE. EIDO, WALID (1942–2007). A prominent Lebanese lawyer and politician. After graduating with a degree in law from Lebanese University, Eido practiced law and later was appointed as a magistrate. He supported a Sunnibased militia during the civil war. He was elected to Parliament in 2000, and again in 2005. He was a vocal critic of Syrian influence on Lebanon. He was a member of the Future Movement and the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance. Eido was assassinated in 2007, when a powerful remote-controlled car bomb exploded as he traveled to the Sporting Club in Beirut, where he often went to play chess. The explosion killed a total of 10 people, including Eido’s son. Before the assassination of Eido, a Sunni, there had been six other prominent anti-Syrian Lebanese, all of them Christians, killed in the two years since the

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2005 assassination of Rafic Hariri. A Syrian connection was suspected because of Eido’s anti-Syrian stance and the fact that the assassination came just three days after the mandate creating the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which Syria opposed, to look into Hariri’s assassination. EISENHOWER DOCTRINE. A plan announced by U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower in January 1957, and adopted by Congress in March of the same year. The Eisenhower Doctrine, born out of the Cold War era, authorized the United States to send troops into foreign countries being threatened by a Communist takeover, if the country so requested. In 1958, Lebanese president Camille Chamoun requested that U.S. troops help put down a rebellion, of which some were alleged to be sympathetic to Communism. Eisenhower did send U.S. troops to Lebanon, but it was not formally declared as an action according to the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine, presumably because Lebanon did not meet the criteria in that it had not been under threat from the Soviet Union or any other Communist state. ELECTORAL LAW (1992). Parliament passed a new electoral law on 16 July 1992. The number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies was increased from 108 to 128. Although the number of seats was increased by 20, the confessional system balance between the Christians and Muslims as set out in the Taif Accords did not change. In the new configuration, the Christian grouping and the Muslim grouping each hold 64 seats. Among the Christian grouping, the Maronite seats increased from 30 to 34, the Eastern Orthodox from 11 to 14, the Melkite Christians from 6 to 8, and the Armenian Orthodox from 4 to 5, while the Armenian Catholic, Protestant, and other Christian minorities remained at one each. Among the Muslim grouping, the Sunni seats increased from 20 to 27, the Shiite from 19 to 27, the Alawite from 0 to 2, and the Druze from 6 to 8. The Maronite Christians have the most of any sect but not as many as the Sunni and Shiite Muslims taken together. The law sets the parliamentary term at four years. With the first postwar elections having been held in 1992, elections were to continue on a four-year cycle. ESHMUN. A Phoenician god of healing, he was worshipped in such ancient Phoenician cities as Tyre and especially Sidon, where he was the tutelary god. His worship also spread to the Phoenician overseas settlements in Sardinia, Cyprus, and Carthage. The Greeks identified him with Asclepius, their god of healing.

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EURO–MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP. Lebanon is a member of this comprehensive trade association, which grew out of what came to be termed the Barcelona Process because its founding meeting and subsequent headquarters was in Barcelona, Spain. The organization’s goals include making improvements in three areas, known as three baskets: economic, political, and cultural. One way to accomplish these goals was by attempting to remove barriers to both trade and investment among the participating nations. Lebanon was one of the original, founding members in attendance at the inaugural 1995 conference in Barcelona and the Barcelona Declaration that grew out of that conference. Lebanon is also a founding member of the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM), which formed out of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership in 2008. EUROPEAN UNION. See SUPPORTING THE FUTURE OF SYRIA AND THE REGION. EXPLOSION IN BEIRUT (2020). A massive explosion devastated the area of Beirut near the port on 4 August 2020. It caused more than 200 deaths and thousands of injuries. Buildings in a vast area were turned into rubble, leading to the loss of both warehouses and their contents in this port so crucial to Lebanon’s economy. The destruction of so many residences within the large zone of destruction left approximately 300,000 people homeless. Even buildings kilometers away had broken windows and other structural damage. Many Beirut residents living far from the port felt the blast so intensely that they suspected it was an earthquake. Early indications were that an accidently started fire had spread to an area where large amounts of fertilizer were stored, setting off an explosion that had the effect of a huge bomb. Outrage concerning the lack of safety regulations in the port region were expressed by many Lebanese citizens, as well as some government officials, leading to further loss of confidence, already at a low level, in the government. The severe setback could hardly have come at a worse time for Lebanon’s already devastated economy, which was under stress by hyperinflation, government default on bonds, rising unemployment, loss of export trade, and lessening of tourism due to the effects of COVID-19. Outrage concerning the explosion led to an intensification of the mass demonstrations calling for a systemic reform of the government, leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his government on 10 August 2020.

F FADLALLAH, GRAND AYATOLLAH SHAYKH MOHAMMAD HUSSEIN (1935–2010). Born into a Lebanese family in Najaf, Iraq, where his father was a spiritual leader among Imami Shiite Muslims, he moved to Beirut in 1966. There he founded a religious school to train young men in Sharia law as taught among Imamis. He was also a social activist, founding a medical clinic and a women’s center. He rose to the rank of Grand Ayatollah in Beirut. He went on to found numerous other schools, orphanages, and Islamic centers. Although he taught that women should be well covered in public, Grand Ayatollah Fadlallah’s teachings were particularly supportive of women’s rights. He held women and men to be equal in spiritual capabilities. He condemned violence against women, as well as so-called honor killings. Although highly respected by most of his fellow Shiite Muslims, his support for suicide bombings in Israel and his alleged ties to Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and members of Hezbollah made him suspect to the West. He survived several assassination attempts, including a deadly 1985 car bomb explosion that killed several others but missed him. FAIRUZ NOUHAD WADI (1935– ). A Lebanese singer whose more than 80 CDs and albums are very popular throughout the Arabic-speaking world. She was born Nouhad Wadi Haddad in a Christian family (Maronite and Syriac Orthodox parents) in Jabal al-Arz, but the family soon moved to Beirut. Her participation in a school choir led to her being selected for other singing groups, including the national radio station choir. Soon she was being featured as a solo artist, and she took the stage name Fairuz. She met the Rahbani brothers, Assi and Mansour, who were music composers and promoters. Working with the Rahbani brothers, she achieved success with new versions of traditional Arabic songs, as well as new songs they wrote. She and Assi Rahbani married in 1954, and she converted to Greek Orthodox Christianity. They have four children.

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Fairuz’s fame grew in part through her participation in the Baalbek International Festival, where she performed annually as one of the featured Lebanese artists. She went on world tours as a singer and was featured in several movies and many musical plays. She has received numerous awards both at home in Lebanon and internationally. She avoided taking sides during the civil war and is considered by all Lebanese to be the country’s most celebrated singer. FAKHR AD-DIN II (or FAKHR AL-DIN) (ca. 1572–1635). A Druze leader who brought Muslims and Maronite Christians under his rule in the Mount Lebanon area. Although the area Fakhr ad-Din (or Fakhreddine) ruled was referred to as the Mountain of the Druzes, he was later credited with being the “Man of Lebanon,” as the first ruler to unite much of what would later become Lebanon. Fakhr ad-Din was born into the politically powerful Maan family. His grandfather had held the title Fakhr ad-Din, and his father was also a political leader of a semiautonomous Druze region that was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire. He came to power as emir in a time with ongoing and long-standing conflict between the Maronites and the Druze. His Qaysis faction emerged as the strongest, and he set out to unite much of modern Lebanon and parts of modern Syria and Palestine under his rule. Fakhr ad-Din’s power and independent-minded nature alarmed the Ottoman overlords. To counter the Ottoman power, he courted both trade and military support from several European powers. Cosimo II, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, proved to be the most supportive, and an alliance with Tuscany was struck in 1608. The Ottomans reacted with military force, and, in 1614, Fakhr ad-Din went into exile, becoming a guest of Medici ruler Cosimo II in Florence, Italy, for two years. He then spent time in Sicily and Napoli. During his years in Italy, he tried unsuccessfully to get the Italians to raise an army to fight for him, and the Italians were unsuccessful in getting him to convert to Roman Catholic Christianity. In 1618, Fakhr ad-Din was able, due to some changes in Ottoman leadership, to return from exile and rule with the permission of the Ottoman overlords. Yet, by 1632, he had sufficiently angered the Ottomans that they ordered an expedition to remove him from power. He was captured in 1633, and imprisoned in Istanbul. Two years later, in 1635, he was sentenced to death, along with his son, for treason. He is revered by some in modern-day Lebanon as the most important early nationalist leader. FALAFEL. A Lebanese food dish consisting of ground chickpeas and spices made into a patty and deep fried. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE.

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FAMINE, GREAT. A period of mass starvation in Lebanon from 1915–1918. Estimates of the number of people who starved to death in the territory of modern Lebanon range from 200,000 to 250,000, which means that approximately 50 percent of the population died during the Great Famine. Both natural causes and wartime conditions contributed to the disaster. The natural causes were a change in the climate cycle, a period of prolonged draught, and widespread crop damage due to swarms of locusts. One of the wartime conditions was the disruption of trade with Europe, which meant that the normal market for Lebanese exports, primarily silk, was cut off. This deprived many households of the cash income earned by women spinning and weaving silk. Another wartime factor was that the heavy conscription into the Ottoman army left too few farm laborers, while blockades in the port regions by the Allied forces cut off imports. With too little food in the markets, prices soared beyond the means of most families, whose incomes continued to fall during a time of severely rising food costs. Most people could not afford to buy food even though some provisions were available in the markets. Various attempts by the Ottoman government to alleviate the situation did not help. As malnourishment increased, so did the spread of serious diseases. During this crisis, Jamal Pasha ordered the execution of 21 people in Beirut and Damascus in 1916, on charges of being “antiTurkish,” leading to the remembrance of Martyrs’ Day and the name of Beirut’s Martyrs’ Square. FARRUKH, MUSTAFA (1902–1957). A Lebanese artist who studied art in Italy and traveled to the major art collections of Europe before returning to Lebanon. He is noted especially for his paintings of Lebanese village life. FARRUKH, UMAR (1906–1987). An educator and author who opposed Western and Christian influence on Lebanese and Arabic culture. His Arabic-language textbooks on philosophy, literature, and other subjects played an important role in furthering Arabic-language education. FATAH AL-ISLAM. An organization that began in 2006, among Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon. Its leaders broke away from the Syrian-backed Fatah al-Intifada group when that group betrayed some of its members to Lebanese officials. Led by Al Abssi, the breakaway Fatah alIslam group recruited members from among the refugees, and Al Abssi made his base of operations in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli. Michel Suleiman, who would soon thereafter be president, led a Lebanese Army force against the Fatah al-Islam presence in the Nahr al-

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Bared Camp in 2007. After four months of fighting and many deaths on both sides, Fatah al-Islam’s control of the camp ended. The organization scattered and continued to play some role as part of the Al-Qaeda network. FATTOUSH. A popular Lebanese salad dish made with pieces of roasted pita bread, tomatoes, cucumbers, mint, parsley, romaine lettuce, spring onion, and radishes. The dressing includes olive oil, lemon juice, sumac, and cucumbers. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE. FAYADIYYA INCIDENT (1978). A February 1978 conflict between the Maronite militias of the Lebanese Front and Syrian forces, in the first phase of the civil war of 1975–1990. FEMINISM. See LITERATURE; WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND MOVEMENTS. FESTIVALS. See AL BUSTAN INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL OF MUSIC AND THE PERFORMING ARTS; BAALBEK INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL; BEITEDDINE FESTIVAL; BYBLOS INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL. FLAG. The Constitution of 1926 adopted a flag and defined it as having the colors blue, white, and red, with a cedar tree in the white portion. After gaining independence in 1943, amendments were made to the constitution calling for a change in Lebanon’s national pendant. The new flag is made with three horizontal bars and a cedar tree. The top and bottom bars are red, and each takes up one-fourth of the flag’s height. The center bar is white and covers the middle half of the flag. A green cedar tree is located in the white bar, with its base touching the bottom red bar and its top touching the top red bar. The cedar tree has been associated with Lebanon since the days of ancient Egypt and the Bible. The color red is said to symbolize the blood shed by Lebanese as they struggled for independence, and the white symbolizes such virtues as purity and peace, as well as the snow on the nation’s higher mountains. FOOD, LEBANESE. See CUISINE, LEBANESE. FORCES OF MARADA. See MARADA BRIGADE.

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FRANCO–LEBANESE TREATY. An agreement concerning independence and friendship that was signed in 1936, but never ratified by the French government. France, having been given a mandate to govern Lebanon after World War I led to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, was under pressure from Lebanese proponents of independence. The French government had authorized the high commissioner to Lebanon to enter into negotiations for Lebanon’s independence, with the goal of maintaining a close relationship for trade and cultural exchange. The Lebanese delegation was led by President Emile Eddé, along with the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, Khalid Shihab, and Secretary of State Ayyub Tabet, as well as seven delegates chosen by Parliament. The French delegation was led by Pierre Laffond as high commissioner to the Lebanese government. The treaty called for full independence for Lebanon within three years, and France was to recommend an independent Lebanon for membership in the League of Nations. France was to help restructure the Lebanese Army. Other provisions dealt with such practical matters as currencies; diplomatic exchanges; protection of foreigners; and many of the other provisions of a modern, independent state. In an annex section, the treaty also called for fair representation for Lebanon’s many ethno-religious populations. The terms of the treaty were opposed by some Lebanese Muslims who preferred a PanArab state or a union with Syria. The French were also negotiating a similar Franco–Syrian Treaty calling for Syrian independence. The Lebanese Parliament approved the treaty, but the French Parliament did not. When France fell to the Germans in 1940, any prospect for France ratifying the treaty faded under the Vichy government. FRANCO PASHA (1814–1873). A Greek Catholic from Istanbul who served as Mutasarrif, the title of a person appointed as governor of Mount Lebanon within the Ottoman Empire, from 1868 until his death in 1873. FRANGIEH, HAMID (1907–1981). A parliamentarian, minister, and diplomat from the politically active Frangieh family of northern Lebanon. Frangieh served terms in Parliament beginning in the 1930s. He was a strong advocate for independence during the French Mandate period. He served in cabinet as minister of foreign affairs, and his most important role was to be Lebanon’s representative in the formation of the Arab League. He was unsuccessful in his 1952 bid for the presidency. FRANGIEH, SULEIMAN (also spelled FRANJIYEH or FRANJIEH) (1910–1992). A Maronite politician and scion of the powerful Frangieh family from the northern Lebanese city of Zgharta who served as president from 1970–1976. His presidential victory in 1970, by a single parliamentary

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vote over the Chehabist candidate, Elias Sarkis, marked a victory of the traditional zuama over Chehabism. President Frangieh undid many Chehabist policies, including dismantling the powerful Deuxieme Bureau (Lebanon’s military intelligence service), which some argue contributed to destabilizing the security environment in the years leading up to the civil war. Some Lebanese held him partly to blame for the civil war. He received media attention in the United States and Lebanon when in 1974, he became so insulted after a customs dog sniffed his luggage upon landing in the United States that he made it into a diplomatic incident by claiming that the lack of respect shown to him at the airport showed that the United States was trying to undermine the independence of Lebanon. It came to be known as the Sniffing Dog Incident. Frangieh was a close ally of President Assad of Syria, and their families go back decades. As president of Lebanon, Frangieh invited Syrian troops into Lebanon in 1976. Following the murder of his son, Tony Frangieh, in 1978, at the hands of Kataeb militiamen, Suleiman broke from the Christian camp and firmly allied with Syria for the remainder of the war. During the political impasse surrounding the need to choose a president in 1988, the pro-Syria faction, with influence from Syria’s President Assad, put forth his name in nomination for a new term as president. His nomination was strongly resisted by the Lebanese Forces, the Maronite militia led by Samir Geagea, and their allies. Parliament failed to have a quorum when it met in August 1988, mainly due to Geagea’s influencing several members to not attend. After failing to get Frangieh elected, the pro-Syria faction put forth Mikhail al-Dahir for election in a failed second attempt to place a proSyria person in the presidency. Frangieh’s grandson, Suleiman Frangieh Jr., became a leader of the Marada Movement. His great-grandson, Tony Frangieh, is a Member of Parliament from the Marada Movement. See also SOLH, RACHID AL- (1926–2014). FRANGIEH, SULEIMAN, JR. (1964– ). Leader of the Marada Movement political party and a former Member of Parliament from Zgharta in northern Lebanon. He is named after his grandfather, former president Suleiman Frangieh. During the early years of the civil war of 1975–1990, his father, Marada Brigade commander Tony Frangieh, along with his mother and sister, were murdered during an attack on their home in 1978. Frangieh Jr. avoided being killed because he was away at school. For his safety, he was taken to Damascus by his grandfather. There he came under the influence of the Assad family. He returned to Lebanon as a young adult and took up the leadership of the Marada Brigade in 1982.

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Frangieh Jr. was elected to Parliament, despite his young age, in 1991, and continued in that role through the 2000–2004 term. He lost in the next election cycle but returned to Parliament in 2009. He stepped aside in the 2018 elections, allowing his son, Tony Frangieh Jr., to win the seat and represent the Marada Movement. He and his party remain in the pro-Syria March 8 Alliance, and Frangieh Jr. is a perennial candidate for the presidency. FRANGIEH, TONY (1941–1978). Born into the Frangieh family of business and political figures from northern Lebanon, Antoine “Tony” Frangieh was the son of President Suleiman Frangieh. He was first elected to Parliament in 1970, replacing his father. During his father’s era as president, Tony held a ministerial position in the cabinet. He was a commander of the Marada Brigade, a Maronite militia, during the early years of the civil war of 1975–1990. The Frangieh family was pro-Syria, in contrast to the anti-Syria stance of the Kataeb militia associated with the rival Maronite family led by Bashir Gemayel. The rivalry led to an attack on the Frangieh home, resulting in the death of Tony, his wife, and their daughter. The son, Suleiman Frangieh Jr., was spared because he was not at home. His grandson, also named Tony Frangieh, is a member representing the Marada Movement in the 2018–2022 parliament. FREE LEBANON. See HADDAD, SAAD (1937–1984); SOUTH LEBANON ARMY (SLA). FREE PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT (FPM). A Lebanese political party founded in 2005, by Michel Aoun, after his return from exile in Paris. The FPM’s platform called for reforms in both the economic and political spheres. The party went on to win 21 seats in the 2006 parliamentary elections. It reached an agreement with the Hezbollah faction that called for Hezbollah to disarm if certain conditions could be met, but the agreement did not accomplish the goal of disarmament. In late 2006, it was one of the parties demanding, and then getting, the resignation of the Fouad Siniora government. The FPM went on to win 19 seats in the 2009 election. The FPM is currently led by Gebran Bassil, the son-in-law of Michel Aoun. It is associated with the March 8 Alliance. It is the largest of the sectarian Christian parties, holding 20 of the 64 seats allotted to Christians in the 2018–2004 Parliament in the confessional system. It is part of the Strong Lebanon bloc.

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FREM, FADI (1953– ). A Lebanese engineer who fought against the Palestine Liberation Organization forces in Lebanon. He later served as lead intelligence officer and then chief-of-staff of the Lebanese Forces (LF). President-elect Bashir Gemayel appointed him commander of the LF in 1982. He held that position until 1984, after which time he returned to private life as a businessman. FRENCH MANDATE. The term for the period of control by France of Lebanon that began with the 1920 Sam Remo Conference and was made more official by the League of Nations on 1 September 1920. The French Mandate ended with Lebanon’s independence in 1943. Lebanon and Syria had long been ruled as part of the Ottoman Empire. Since 1851, the Mount Lebanon region had been governed as a Mutasarrifate, an administrative region governed separately from the rest of the Ottoman’s Syria Province. France was the main country involved in getting the Ottoman sultan to agree to this change. The administrator, or Mutasarrif, was to be a non-Lebanese Christian. This arrangement gave France a special role in Mount Lebanon’s affairs. French diplomat Robert de Caix de Saint-Aymour had argued for French control of Lebanon and Syria even before the onset of World War I. At the commencement of World War I in 1914, the Ottomans had made the decision, which was quite controversial within the regime, to ally with the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy (until 1915) rather than the Triple Entente of France, Russia, and Great Britain. That fateful decision put them on the losing side of the war, and they lost control of the regions that were to become Syria and Lebanon. When the Ottomans lost control of the region in 1916, British representative Sir Mark Sykes and French representative François Georges-Picot negotiated the Sykes–Picot agreement, which was not made public at the time. It laid the groundwork for British control of the Mesopotamia area and French control of the region that was to become Syria and Lebanon. After the war ended, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres gave recognition to the French control of Lebanon and Syria. With the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the question arose about whether the separate region formerly known as Mount Lebanon should remain as a small, predominantly Christian country or be part of a larger country. The Maronites were led by Patriarch Elias Peter Hoayek, who had been a conduit of support funding from France to Christians. Approximately half the population of Mount Lebanon had starved to death during the famine caused by the war. Hoayek advocated for the territory of Mount Lebanon to be expanded to include a “greater Lebanon.” Doing so would give the new country access to the major ports and the rich agricultural lands in the Bekaa Valley. This idea was accepted at the Paris Peace Conference, leading to the creation of a Greater Lebanon, or Le Grand Liban in French. Greater

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Lebanon now included the former districts of Tripoli, Sidon, and the Bekaa Valley. Beirut¸ which was not part of the former Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate, was chosen as the new capital. Beginning in September 1918, the region came under control of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA), with French, British, and Arab officials involved. The OETA governance ended in May 1920, at the San Remo Conference, which gave a mandate to France to govern the region of the northern parts of the former Ottoman province of Syria. The newly created League of Nations made the French Mandate official on 24 July 1922. The provisions of the French Mandate over both Lebanon and Syria included the goal of preparing the countries for independence as soon as possible. In actuality, independence would not happen for more than two decades. There were rebellions in both Syria and Lebanon against French rule. The Druze revolted against their treatment by the mandate between 1925–1927. Several significant events occurred in 1926. The name was changed to Lebanon Republic, the constitution was adopted on 23 May, and an official flag was introduced in that constitution. The constitution created a government with a president, prime minister, cabinet, and Parliament with a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The flag was based on the French tricolor flag with the addition of a cedar tree. Charles Dabbas was chosen by the French to be president. Dabbas, who had previously been given the task of restructuring the judicial system by the French, was a Greek Orthodox Christian who leaned more toward France and the West than to the Arab world. Elections were held in 1929, the result being that Dabbas began serving as Lebanon’s elected, rather than appointed, president. Three years later, in 1932, things took a dramatic turn when Dabbas suspended the constitution and dissolved Parliament. He continued to govern as president, reverting to the status of appointed president under the authority of the French Mandate. Dabbas resigned as president in 1934, but he remained active in government for a short while. In 1934, Bechara El Khoury founded a new political party named the Constitutional Bloc, which was dedicated to gaining independence and restoring the constitution. Emile Eddé served as president from 1936–1941, during the last years of the French Mandate. He was a strong advocate for independence. After a long period of negotiations with the French, both parties signed the Franco–Lebanese Treaty on 13 November 1936. That treaty called for independence, but the French Parliament refused to ratify the agreement, so independence was delayed. The Lebanese demands for independence had become so strong by 1943, that the French had imprisoned all government leaders, including the president, prime minister, and cabinet. Their release from prison on 22 November 1943, signaled the end of the French Mandate and the beginning of indepen-

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dence. That day is celebrated as Independence Day. The constitution was amended to eliminate all references to the French Mandate, make Arabic the official language, and adopt a new flag. The new flag has three horizontal bars: red ones at the top and bottom, and a white middle bar with a cedar tree. The French did institute needed changes in Lebanon during the Mandate. Aside from introducing the French language and culture, there were improvements in infrastructure, in the legal system, governmental structures, and education. Planning for the Beirut National Museum commenced, but the project was not carried out until later. See also LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY (LCP); SAINT GEORGES HOTEL; SOLH, RIAD AL- (1894–1951); THABIT, AYYUB (1884–1951); USAYRAN, ADIL (1905–1998). FRENCH PERIOD. See FRENCH MANDATE. FULEIHAN, BASSEL. See ASSASSINATION OF RAFIC HARIRI. FUTURE MOVEMENT. A political party founded in August 2007, by Saad Hariri, and largely designed to support the political fortunes of the Hariri family. It held its first convention in Beirut in April 2009. It is a secular party drawing support mainly from Sunni Muslims. The party is the dominant force in the March 14 Alliance and tends to be critical of any attempts by Hezbollah to dominate the state. The party’s media outlets include Future Television and Future Radio, and the newspaper Al-Mustaqbal. The party held 26 seats in Parliament after the 2009 elections, making it the largest party. The Future Youth is the party’s youth division. FUTURE YOUTH. The youth division of the Future Movement political party.

G GEAGEA, SAMIR (also spelled JAJA) (1952– ). Leader of the Christianbased Lebanese Forces (LF) political party. Samir Geagea’s father was in the military, but young Samir chose to become a medical student at the American University of Beirut until the outbreak of the civil war in 1975 led him to drop out of medical school and become a fighter in the Kataeb militia. Geagea became caught up in the 1985 dispute within the LF leadership. His rival, Elie Hobeika, was pro-Syria and signed the Tripartite Agreement on behalf of the LF. Geagea split with Hobeika and led an attack on him and his headquarters. Hobeika fled and eventually moved to a Syriancontrolled location. Geagea eventually triumphed in this internal dispute within the LF militia. As the civil war continued, Geagea’s LF reluctantly cooperated with the Lebanese Army, under the command of General Michel Aoun. Both leaders were committed to the goal of driving out the Syrian Army despite their differences, but with the signing of the Taif Accords, Geagea was willing to accept those accords but not Aoun, who still wanted Syrians out of Lebanon. The two factions fought a fratricidal war for control of the Christian canton, including East Beirut. In 1994, Geagea was found guilty of ordering the assassination or attempted assassination of four of his former rivals, one of whom was Rashid Karami. He served 11 years in solitary confinement before being pardoned and released in 2005, by the post–Cedar Revolution government. After his release, he resumed his role as leader of the LF. By 2016, Geagea came to an understanding with his longtime Maronite rival, Aoun. Known as the Maraab Agreement because it was reached at Geagea’s Maraab home, the understanding ended a political leadership crisis. The terms of the understanding were that Geagea would support Aoun as president and that, in turn, Geagea’s LF party would get key cabinet positions. See also CHAMOUN, DORY (1931– ); GEAGEA, SETHRIDA TAWK (also spelled TAOUK) (1967– ).

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GEAGEA, SETHRIDA TAWK (also spelled TAOUK) (1967– ). A prominent activist and politician. She was born in the Maronite Lebanese business Tawk family while living in Ghana, where her father owned a business. She became an activist while earning a degree in political science at Lebanese American University. There she met Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces (LF). They were married in 1991. Geagea became active in politics as a way of resisting the Syrian influence on Lebanon, which had led to the banning of the LF and her husband being imprisoned. She worked with others to end the era of pro-Syrian governments. She joined like-minded leaders in the Qornet Shehwan Gathering and undertook other actions to continue the political aspirations of the LF. Her activism included working with union movements, student groups, and other organizations toiling against the Syrian-influenced agenda of the government. Geagea was active in the Cedar Revolution of 2005, and the subsequent March 14 Alliance. After the Cedar Revolution led to the downfall of the pro-Syrian government, she was elected to Parliament in 2005, as a representative of Bsharri and a LF leader. She helped the new government pass the Amnesty Law in July 2005, which resulted in the release of her husband from prison. GEMAYEL, AMINE (1942– ). President of Lebanon from 1982–1988. He led the country in the midst of a bitter civil war that took on a particularly harsh sectarian nature during this period, while regional powers Israel and Syria occupied much of the country. Although a moderate by nature and generally well regarded, Gemayel had limited influence on the country, with real power being placed in the hands of sectarian militias and foreign forces. Gemayel’s term ended with no successor, leading to a constitutional crisis where two competing governments, one based in East Beirut and the other in West Beirut, emerged. Amine Gemayel was born in Bikfayya in 1942, into the prominent Gemayel family, which has been politically engaged for generations, including participating in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. His father, Pierre Gemayel, founded the Kataeb Party in 1936, and was a prominent figure among Christian groups in the early 1970s that attempted to preserve the status quo in Lebanon in the face of demands for change. Amine was educated at Saint Joseph University in Beirut. He completed a law degree in 1965, and began practicing shortly thereafter. He was actively involved in Kataeb Party politics and, in 1970, won a by-election for a parliamentary seat held by his uncle, who died while in office. Amine was reelected to Parliament in 1972.

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He had a good working relationship with political representatives of other sectarian communities, especially those that favored either the status quo or moderate progressive change. Staking out the political middle was to serve him well. Amine, a largely discreet politician with little independent power base of his own, was thrust into the limelight following the assassination of his more partisan and hardline brother, president-elect Bashir Gemayel, in September 1982. A few days later, Amine was chosen by a large majority in Parliament to serve as Lebanon’s next president. Initially, there were promises of international support, particularly by the United States and other Western powers, who sent troops to Lebanon to help the government restore order, extend its control of Lebanese territory, and, by extension, bring an end to the civil war. Gemayel formally requested the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country, including the Syrians, who had initially entered at the invitation of the Lebanese government, denying Syrian forces the cover of legitimacy. With U.S. mediation, he also signed a peace agreement with Israel, detailing the terms of that country’s withdraw from Lebanon. The situation in Lebanon, however, abruptly changed, extinguishing hope that the conflict would soon come to an end. A series of events, many of them linked, would greatly weaken the Gemayel presidency. Significantly, Western forces had left Lebanon by March 2004, following suicide bomb attacks against their troops; the Lebanese prime minister and his government resigned; the reconstituted Lebanese Army split once again along sectarian lines; and the sectarian militias, including the Lebanese Forces, refused to cede territory or cooperate with the government. Furthermore, the one-sided agreement with Israel on terms highly favorable to Israel raised the ire of Syria and their Lebanese allies, effectively guaranteeing fierce resistance to the new order that was trying to take hold in Lebanon. By 1985, Gemayel had all but conceded the failure to reestablish control of the country and proceeded to acquiesce to the realities on the ground. Specifically, that included accepting the reemergence of Syria as the dominant external actor. In 1985, the Gemayel government rescinded the agreement with Israel and worked with Syria (Gemayel traveled to Damascus numerous times to meet the Syrian president) and their allies to try to find a resolution to the war. After several attempts, including some that held out some promise, a resolution to the conflict in Lebanon remained out of reach. The country fell into entrenched zones of influence with the Christian militias zealously guarding their canton and often being at great odds with President Gemayel, while the Muslim militias and their Syrian patron controlled their respective areas.

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The various power brokers in Lebanon failed to find a replacement for President Gemayel as his term ended. Gemayel then proceeded to turn over the government to the commander of the Lebanese Army, General Michel Aoun, who became the interim head of government. That situation was rejected by Syria and their Muslim allies who supported a rival government led by Salim Hoss, setting off a dangerous escalation of the conflict in Lebanon and ultimately contributing to international efforts to resolve the conflict. Gemayel left Lebanon after his term ended, going into self-imposed exile in France, where he stayed for approximately a dozen years. He remained engaged in Lebanese politics, however, and continued to lobby the international community to pressure Syria to withdrawal from the country. He also continued to write and lecture about international affairs, including at various prestigious universities in the United States. Gemayel returned to Lebanon in 2000, and immediately inserted himself back into politics. He helped found the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, a group of independent politicians, most of them Christian, demanding the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and the full reinstatement of Lebanese sovereignty. He also reengaged in Kataeb Party politics, holding the presidency of the party from 2008–2015. Gemayel’s sons, Pierre Amine and Samy, followed their father into politics. Pierre Amine was elected to Parliament in 2000, and served as minister of industry in the Fouad Siniora government, but he was assassinated in 2006. Samy has been a Member of Parliament since 2009, and assumed the presidency of the Kataeb Party in 2015. Amine Gemayel remains an elder statesmen of Lebanese politics. GEMAYEL, BASHIR (1947–1982). Charismatic leader of the Christian wartime militia, the Lebanese Forces. Bashir Gemayel was elected president of Lebanon in August 1982, during the height of Israel’s invasion and occupation of the country at the start of the Israel–Lebanon War; however, he was assassinated just days before taking office, leading to a series of revenge killings by his militia of many people, including Palestinian and Lebanese civilians living in refugee camps. His brother, Amine Gemayel, was elected president shortly after Bashir’s death and served until 1988. Bashir was born in Beirut in 1947, into the politically prominent Gemayel family. His father, Pierre, founded the right-wing Christian-dominated political party Kataeb in 1936; served as a minister in several governments; and was a major figure in the Christian right; opposing both the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and the growing influence of Lebanon’s left. Bashir would follow his father into party politics and came close to implementing the party’s vision of Lebanon.

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Gemayel was educated at St. Joseph University in Beirut, receiving degrees in political science and law. He also studied in the United States and worked for a brief time at a law firm in Washington, D.C., in the early 1970s. It is believed that his relationship with the CIA, evident in the late 1970s and the period leading up to his successful presidential bid, began during his initial stint in Washington. Gemayel quickly rose through the ranks of the Kataeb Party, coming to head its military wing. He played a leading role in military battles during the first phase of the civil war in 1975–1976, including the well-documented seizure of the Palestinian refugee camp Tel al-Zaatar. Following the first phase of the fighting, the Christian militias and their political leaders established the Lebanese Front (the political wing) and the Lebanese Forces (the military wing) to better coordinate their efforts. Bashir headed the Lebanese Forces. Shortly thereafter, he set about to unify the various Christian militias under his command and proceeded to do so through both political and military means. With respect to the latter, in 1978 his forces attacked the Marada Brigade militia under the control of the Frangieh family and killed its leader, Tony Frangieh (former president Suleiman Frangieh’s son and heir apparent). In 1980, Gemayel’s forces attacked and all but wiped out the Tiger militia, controlled by the Chamoun family, bringing most of the Christian military forces (save Marada) under his command and, at the age of 32, becoming the largely unchallenged leader of the Maronite community. Indeed, he controlled the largest private army in Lebanon, estimated to be about 20,000–25,000 men. Gemayel also worked closely with Israel, which provided his forces with important military equipment and strategic depth, as they found common cause in seeing the removal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syria from Lebanon. He also worked closely with Washington, particularly with the security services, who saw him as a useful ally in the region. The alliance between Gemayel’s forces and Israel aligned in 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, dealing a military blow to the PLO, which agreed to leave Lebanon, and Syria, which was on the defensive and pushed back to the Bekaa Valley. At the same time, the Lebanese Forces under Gemayel were successful at pushing into territory previously held by their opponents. As the term of President Elias Sarkis was about to end, Gemayel positioned himself to capture the presidency. Unopposed within his own Maronite community, and with the strong backing of his military units and the Israeli forces, Gemayel was able to secure the presidency with enough votes in Parliament, despite attempts by his opponents to boycott the election process and deny him the required quorum.

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Although many, especially among Muslim parliamentarians, may have been coerced into ultimately supporting his bid (indeed, the election actually took place not in Parliament, but in a military barracks controlled by the Israeli forces), an argument can be made that those who voted in his favor hoped that he had influence in Israel (especially with Prime Minister Menachem Begin) and, perhaps even more importantly, Washington, to secure an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. There is at least some evidence that as the date of his presidency neared, he attempted to broaden his appeal beyond his base by distancing himself, at least at the rhetorical level, from Israel by calling on all foreign forces to leave Lebanon and reaching out to Arab leaders. On 14 September 1982, while attending a meeting at Kataeb Party offices in East Beirut, a massive bomb detonated, bringing the building down and killing Gemayel and several others. A member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), Habib Shartouni, was accused and later convicted of planting the bomb. It was never fully determined which, if any, military or intelligence agency assisted in the logistics of the exercise, although many fingers pointed to Syrian intelligence. Although Amine Gemayel was to assume the presidency a few days later, his political program was much more moderate and less ambitious, bringing to an end the political program and objectives set out by Bashir and his supporters. Bashir Gemayel’s son, Nadim, represents the next generation of the Gemayel political dynasty and, as of 2020, sits as a member of the Lebanese Parliament. GEMAYEL, MAURICE (1907–1970). A member of the prominent Gemayel family of Maronites. He held various ministries and was one of the main figures in the Kataeb Party. See also GEMAYEL, AMINE (1942– ); GEMAYEL, BASHIR (1947–1982); GEMAYEL, PIERRE (1905–1984); GEMAYEL, PIERRE AMINE (1972–2006). GEMAYEL, PIERRE (1905–1984). A Maronite Lebanese political leader who was the principal founder of the Kataeb Party. Pierre Gemayel was born in Egypt but moved to Lebanon as a pharmacy student and remained there. As an avid athlete, he attended the 1936 Olympic Games, where, some say, he admired the nationalistic spirit in Germany and was inspired to start a nationalist movement after returning to Lebanon. His new Kataeb, or Lebanese Phalanges, organization did incorporate military terms, as the Arabic term Kateab refers to military battalions and the English term Phalange(s) derives from the plural form of the Greek term phalanx, a battalion of fighters in close formation.

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Gemayel emerged as the leader of the forces that opposed those who favored the Pan-Arabism of Gamal Nasser during the civil war of 1958. He became a cabinet member and an important leader of the Maronite politicians. He joined with other Christian leaders in the Tripartite Alliance. During the civil war of 1975–1990, Gemayel was one of the leaders of the Lebanese Front, while leaving his younger son, Bashir Gemayel, to command the military wing, the Lebanese Forces. He lived to see the controversial but charismatic Bashir elected as president but also the tragic assassination of Bashir before he could be sworn into the office. His older son, Amine Gemayel, was then elected as president. GEMAYEL, PIERRE AMINE (1972–2006). A Maronite lawyer and politician, he was a member of the Gemayel family prominent in Lebanese politics. His grandfather was Kataeb Party founder Pierre Gemayel, and he was the son of former president Amine Gemayel. He began serving in Parliament in 2000, taking a strong position against Syrian influence. He was assassinated while riding in a car in November 2006, becoming the sixth prominent anti-Syrian Lebanese to be killed since the assassination of Rafic Hariri. GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LEBANESE WORKERS (GCLW). A liberal trade union begun in 1958. Antoine Bechara served a long term as its president, until 1991. In 2019, the head of the GCLW, Bechara Asmar, warned the government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri that failure to deal with the economic crisis would lead to mass protests in the streets. Then, in July 2020, he lamented the loss of jobs due to the crisis in Lebanon’s economy and regretted that the labor movement was powerless to counter the effects of the crisis on workers. GENERAL UNION OF LABOR. An organization formed in 1970, as the umbrella movement for nine trade unions. Its size and reach throughout Lebanon and many ethno-religious populations made it an important political factor. The union led a general strike in 1992, bringing about the demise the government of Prime Minister Omar Karami. GENEVA CONFERENCE (1983). A meeting held in Geneva, Switzerland, from 31 October to 4 November 1983, during the third phase of the civil war of 1975–1990. The leaders of the main factions in Lebanon were in attendance. Little real progress was made toward the goal of achieving a national reconciliation, at least not enough success to bring an end to the civil war. The following year, the parties met again at the Lausanne Conference, which also did not bring about the end of the war.

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GEORGES-PICOT, FRANCOIS. See SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT. GHANDOUR FACTORY STRIKE. A prolonged strike starting in 1973, and continuing into 1974, at the Ghandour Food Factory in Beirut. The Communist Action Organization in Lebanon helped organize and support the strike. GHANIM, ANTOINE (1943–2007). A Lebanese lawyer, professor, and Member of Parliament. Having been born in Beirut and earning a law degree, Ghanim practiced law and became a professor of law at Lebanese University. He was elected to Parliament in 2000, and again in 2005. He was a member of and a leader in the Lebanese Phalanges Party. Politically, he was vocal in his stance against Syrian influence in Lebanese affairs and actively involved during the Cedar Revolution’s nonviolent protests following the assassination of Rafic Hariri. At age 64, having just returned from a summer stay in Abu Dhabi, Ghanim became the eighth prominent, anti-Syrian figure of influence to be assassinated in the years after the assassination of Rafic Hariri. The assassination, carried out on 19 September 2007, in the Beirut suburb of Sin el-Fil by a car bomb, killed seven people. Syrian agents were suspected to be responsible for the attack. GHANIM, ISKANDAR (1911–2005). A long-serving Lebanese military officer. Ghanim’s training began in the Military Academy of Homs. He rose through the ranks in the Lebanese Armed Forces and was promoted to general in 1971. In 1966 and 1967, he served as defense attaché at the Lebanese Embassy in Washington, D.C. He was appointed chief of the Military Court in 1967, and then served as commander of the Beirut region beginning in 1967. By 1968, he had been promoted to be commander of North Lebanon, before his first retirement in 1969. President Suleiman Frangieh called him out of retirement to be appointed commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces in 1971. He served in the governmental positions of minister of national defense and minister of water and electric power resources beginning in 1975. He resigned from the military in 1976, and retired for the second time, passing away in 2005. GHULAT. An Arabic term meaning “extremist,” used in a pejorative sense by Shiite Muslims in regard to religious communities that have gone to extremes from a mainstream Shiite viewpoint. The extreme position is often the view that Ali is divine, or nearly so. See also ALAWITES.

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GIBRAN, KHALIL (1883–1931). Born into a poor Maronite family in Bsharri, North Lebanon, during the period of Ottoman rule, this Lebanese American became one of the world’s best-known poets among both Arabic and English readers. In 1895, after his father was imprisoned on an embezzlement charge and then released into poverty, his mother, young Khalil, and some siblings moved to Boston, United States, where her brother had already relocated. Khalil was, for the first time, enrolled in formal education, and he quickly learned English. He also attended an arts institute and showed great promise as an artist. As a teenager, he was sent back to Lebanon to attend school in Beirut, where he was greatly influenced by the work of Syrian writer Francis Marrash. After several years in Beirut, he returned to Boston. Although best known for his poetry, Gibran was also an accomplished artist. He was trained in Paris and socialized with the Parisian intellectual and artistic elite at the time, notably August Rodin. Gibran painted or drew more than 700 works. His drawings and paintings have been used on book covers and as book illustrations, and many can now be viewed in various collections. The largest collection of his art in the West is the one donated by his lifelong friend and supporter, Mary Haskell Minas, to the Telfair Museum of Art in Georgia. The Gibran Museum in Bsharri, Lebanon, also has an extensive collection of his artwork. Some have argued that his work has not received proper attention because of its inaccessibility to Westerner art critics. Gibran’s writings exude a mystical spirituality that transcends any one religious tradition. He draws on his Christian background, as well as Sufi Islam. He was especially impressed by the spirituality of the Baha’ullah, founder of the Baha’i faith. His writings have received widespread appeal throughout the world. Within the Arab world, Gibran’s writings had a significant impact on Arabic literature. Indeed, they helped to spawn a new Romantic movement in Arabic literature of poetic prose. His works were also controversial, particularly with the religious establishment. The Prophet, a collection of 26 essays published in 1923, became Gibran’s best-known and most loved English-language work. The Prophet has been translated into numerous languages and was said to be the Bible of counterculture in the 1960s. It has influenced scores of famous figures, including such music legends as Elvis Presley, Johnny Cash, and John Lennon. GIBRAN MUSEUM. A museum in a former monastery in Bsharri, Lebanon, that exhibits numerous paintings, drawings, and displays about the life and works of the great Lebanese American author and artist Khalil Gibran. The museum also displays furnishings from Gibran’s New York studio and other memorabilia. The museum is housed in a historic 7th-century monastery dedicated to Saint Serge (Mar Sarkis). The stone monastery, located on a

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scenic hillside, was repurposed in the early 1930s and opened as a museum in 1935. Later expansions to the structure provided space for additional exhibits. GOVERNORATE. Lebanon is administered under a system of eight districts known as governorates. The governorates, with their capitals, are as follows: Akkar (Halba), Baalbek-Hermel (Baalbek), Beirut (Beirut), Bekaa (Zahleh), Mount Lebanon (Baabda), Nabatieh (Nabatieh), North (Tripoli), and South (Sidon). GRAND LIBAN. The territory of modern Lebanon and Syria fell under the sphere of influence of France according to the terms of the then-secretive Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916. With the signing of the armistice on 11 November 1918, control of the region passed from the Ottoman Empire to France. According to the negotiations at the 1920 San Remo Conference and subsequent terms of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, the region became a French Mandate known as L’État du Grand Liban in French, or the State of Greater Lebanon in English. The French Mandate was confirmed by the League of Nations on 24 July 1922, and officially declared on 1 September 1920, as the French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon. The new state was called Greater Lebanon because it encompassed not only the territory of Ottoman Empire’s Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate, but also the areas ruled by the Ottomans as Tripoli, Sidon, and Bekaa Valley, and Beirut as the capital. The decision to create a greater Lebanon was controversial, as many of the people who lived in the annexed areas did not want to belong to the new state and certainly had little attachment to the concept of a distinct Lebanese identity. Grand Liban was renamed the Lebanon Republic in 1926. Under the Constitution of 1926, it adopted a flag featuring the iconic cedar tree. It gained its formal independence from France in 1943. GREATER LEBANON. See FRENCH MANDATE; GRAND LIBAN. GREATER SYRIA. The concept that Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria form a natural geographic unity and should be united under one government. The intellectual Antoun Saadeh and his Syrian Social Nationalist Party were the most zealous advocates of the Greater Syria goal. GREEK CATHOLIC CHRISTIANS. See MELKITE CHRISTIANS.

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GREEK ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY. The Greek Orthodox Church is one of the several traditions within Orthodox Christianity, dating back to the early apostles who introduced Christianity to Antioch and nearby regions. Estimates of the Greek Orthodox population of Lebanon range from 5 to 8 percent. GREEK PERIOD. Alexander the Great conquered Tyre and the surrounding region in 332 BCE, ending the Persian Period and starting Greek rule. After Alexander’s death and the division of his empire among four of his generals, the Lebanon region came under the rule of the Seleucids until the Roman period. GREEN LINE. The line of demarcation between Muslim-controlled West Beirut and Christian-controlled East Beirut during the civil war of 1975–1990. The Green Line roughly followed along Beirut’s historic center, which was badly destroyed during the civil war. A major rehabilitation of the area took place during the 1990s under the auspices of the controversial private-sector development company Solidere. GREEN LINE, 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. See ARMISTICE AGREEMENT (1949). GUARDIANS OF THE CEDARS. A Lebanese nationalist party and militia founded in 1972, by Etienne Saqr and others. With its base among Maronite Christians, it opposed Pan-Arabism, Syrian influence, and Palestinian influence in Lebanon’s affairs. During the civil war, the Guardians of the Cedars militia fought against armed Palestinians in a long siege of the Tel alZaatar refugee camp in 1976. They were also part of the fighting in the northern region and around Tripoli. The Guardians fought in southern Lebanon as well. Politically, the party espouses a version of Phoenicianism, with its view that the Lebanese are a unique population dating back to Phoenician days, and as such are quite distinct from other Arab nations. The Guardians of the Cedars won no seats in the 2018 parliamentary elections.

H HADDAD, JOUMANA (1970– ). An author, feminist, activist, political candidate, and TV host from Beirut. Haddad was a candidate for Parliament during the 2018 elections. She hosts the TV show Al Hurra. Her writings include essays and collections of poetry. Her novel The Seamstress’s Daughter relates the stories of women who endured the hardships of four of the wars that have marred the Middle East during the past century. She founded the Arab-language magazine Jasad in 2008. Jasad later became the subject of a 2013 film titled Jasad and the Queen of Contradictions. Haddad’s political stance strongly favors a move toward a more secular government and society in Lebanon, including the legalization of secular, civil marriages. She opposes discrimination in Lebanon based on racism and confessionalism. She contested the 2018 parliamentary elections, along with other progressive authors and activists, under the banner “We Are All Patriots” (“Kulna Watani”). Her narrow defeat was contested by the Watani party. Haddad’s many honors include being listed as one of the top 100 Arab women by Arabian Business Magazine. HADDAD, SAAD (1937–1984). A Lebanese Christian who led a renegade army in southern Lebanon. Haddad had been a member of the Lebanese Army and risen to the rank of major, in command of a detachment in the south of Lebanon. On his own initiative he formed an alliance with Israel as a way to advance the goal he shared with Israel, fighting the forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the region. Although the alliance with Israel was not sanctioned by government policy, Haddad received weapons and funding from Israel to carry on the fight against the PLO. During the Israeli invasion of 1978 into southern Lebanon, Haddad’s forces assisted the Israeli forces. When his forces then clashed with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, he was dismissed from the Lebanese Army. Haddad then declared the region Free Lebanon.

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HAGE, RAWI (1964– ). A journalist and novelist who was born in Beirut, immigrated to Canada in 1992, and now lives in Montreal. Hage’s novel De Niro’s Game was highly acclaimed, including being shortlisted for prestigious Canadian awards and winning the International Dublin Literary Award in 2008. His second novel, Cockroach, was also widely acclaimed and won the 2008 Hugh MacLennan Prize for Fiction. Carnival, a third novel, also won the 2012 Hugh MacLennan Prize for Fiction. His 2018 novel Beirut Hellfire Society is set in bloody 1970s civil war period Beirut. HAIGAZIAN UNIVERSITY. To serve the Armenian diaspora in Lebanon, the Armenian Evangelical Church helped to found Haigazian College in 1955. Its campus was located in the Kantari District of Beirut. It became an institution of higher learning in 1966. Due to the civil war, it moved its campus to the Ashrafieh District in 1987. The name was changed to Haigazian University College in 1992, to reflect its degree-granting status, and by 1996, it had shortened the name to Haigazian University and began offering master’s degrees. In 1997, it moved back to the Kantari District, where it continues to expand its enrollment and campus facilities. Haigazian University Press began publishing in 2011. The university opened the Haigazian University Armenian Diaspora Research Center in 2012. It offers programs in arts, humanities, social sciences, business, and natural sciences. See also ARMENIANS. HAJJ, FRANÇOIS AL- (1953–2007). A major general in the Lebanese Armed Forces who was involved in the War of Liberation and the period of the Israeli occupation in South Lebanon. Hajj was assassinated on 12 December 2007, at the age of 54, by a car bomb explosion. It was not clear who was to blame for the assassination, and it had not been common for assassins to target military officers. HAJJ, UNSI AL- (1937–2014). A Lebanese poet, cultural critic, and editor. As a poet, Hajj was considered a modernist. He worked for the daily newspaper An-Nahar and, later in his career, associated with the pro-Hezbollah al-Akhbar newspaper. Among his many influential Arabic-language poems are his early collection Lan (“Will Not”), Haqlon min Ubbad al-Shams (“A Field of Sunflowers”), his later essay collection Kalimat, Kalimat, Kalimat (“Words, Words, Words”), and his later book Khawatem (“Epilogues”). HALL OF FAME MUSEUM. A display of historical figures representing famous people from all of Lebanon’s sectarian groups. Located in Zouq Mosbeh, in the hills of Mount Lebanon north of Beirut, it claims to be the

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world’s first animated silicon museum. The figures are done in the style of a wax museum, but they are made of silicon, which allows parts of them to animate as their recorded words are played. HALVA/HALAWA. A Lebanese food made of sweet sesame paste with added fruits and nuts. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE. HARB, BUTRUS (1944– ). A Maronite lawyer, politician, and minister. Harb earned a law degree at Saint Joseph University and began his long law career. He won a seat in Parliament for the first time in 1972. As a politician he proved to be independent-minded and an innovator in forming political alliances. He helped organize the Bloc of Independent Maronite Deputies in 1979. Harb was also one of the founding members of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering in 2001, with its stance against Syrian influence on Lebanon. He also helped form the National Face for Reform in 2004. He took part in the Cedar Revolution, with its anti-Syrian stance, following the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005. Harb held cabinet positions as transport minister and minister of education. He is credited with making significant reforms to the educational system. He also played a role in negotiating the Taif Accords. He made an effort to get Hezbollah to disarm its militia in 2007. His failed proposal called for the integration of Hezbollah forces into the regular Lebanese Army. Harb withdrew as a 2008 candidate for president in favor of Michel Suleiman. He survived an assassination plot in 2012. He supports the March 14 Alliance. HARIRI, RAFIC (1942–2005). Sometimes referred to as “Mr. Lebanon” for his outsized wealth and political influence, Rafic Hariri was the most dominant prime minister in Lebanese history, a position he held from 1992–1998, and again from 2000–2004. He was the architect of Lebanon’s multibillion-dollar post–civil war economic program and among the most influential political actors in the first decade and a half of the Taif political order until his assassination on 14 February 2005, an event that led to significant changes to the country’s security and political dynamics. This included the withdrawal from Lebanon of the once-dominate Syrian military and security forces, and the realignment of Lebanese politics along two intensely rival axes—the March 8 Alliance and the March 14 Alliance, the latter most closely associated with Hariri’s political heirs. Rafic Hariri was born into a modest Sunni family from the southern Lebanese city of Sidon. At the age of 22, he, like so many throughout the Arab world, moved to Saudi Arabia for employment opportunities. He started in

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education and moved on to accountancy in the construction industry before operating his own construction firm. His firm was highly regarded, and Hariri would ultimately gain the confidence of Saudi Arabia’s ruler, King Fahd. The relationship between the two benefited Hariri, granting him the rare privilege of Saudi citizenship, and greatly expanding his economic fortunes. By the late 1970s, Hariri’s firm had morphed into the highly influential Saudi Oger, but he also held a significant stake in Oger International, the multibillion-dollar international conglomerate focused on construction, real estate, and banking. His entry into Lebanese political and economic circles began in earnest during the latter half of the civil war through both his philanthropy and Saudi contacts. His Hariri Foundation helped provide scholarships for thousands of Lebanese students, and his financial aid helped cities hit hard by conflict. And being Saudi Arabia’s main political emissary in Lebanon gave him access and helped build relationships with key Lebanese, regional, and international actors. Indeed, Hariri financed the Taif conference, which ultimately led to the Taif Accords and the end of the civil war. Hariri’s political rise followed the fallout from the highly controversial 1992 parliamentary elections (the first held in Lebanon since 1972), which took place despite significant Lebanese opposition and regional and global concerns. Syrian intentions were to legitimize their dominance over Lebanon with a pliant pro-Syrian political establishment. Syria’s plan for a pliant Lebanon did not work out as expected, as massive protests and general strikes followed the election and brought Lebanon’s economy to the brink of collapse. This forced the resignation of a newly appointed pro-Syrian prime minister, Rachid al-Solh, after only a short period and ultimately threatened to unravel Syria’s hard-fought position in the country. As a consequence, a grand bargain of sorts was struck between Syria and its Lebanese allies, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, France, the United States, and their Lebanese allies, on the other. The bargain saw a loosening of Syrian dominance of Lebanon by allowing the pro-Saudi, pro-Western Hariri to become prime minister and head a government whose major priority was to focus on Lebanon’s economy and reconstruction after decades of war. Syria and its allies retained a dominant say in the country’s security matters and related foreign policy issues. The political bargain came to define Lebanese politics for more than a decade and aligned with Hariri’s time in office. Although political tensions remained, and stalemate and brinkmanship tended to define Lebanese politics during this era, Hariri remained the driving force in Lebanon’s post–civil war economy and reconstruction, and the public face of the country. More-

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over, he was one of the few Lebanese politicians in office at the time who was sufficiently independent (although not exclusively so) of Syrian power to act as a check on that power. Hariri’s power and influence were based on two major factors: his personal wealth and his strong ties to influential global leaders. His financial means aided in his development of an unrivalled political base, especially within his Sunni community. He came to represent Sunnis at the national level through organization and the distribution of patronage, the latter a key element of Lebanese political success, and through his backing by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, the United States, and France. As a close friend of French president Jacques Chirac, France gave him important political cover and leverage in his dealings with political rivalries in Lebanon, most importantly with Syria. Indeed, Lebanon’s postwar reconstruction hinged heavily on the country’s ability to unlock billions of dollars of aid from international donors—the same donor countries that backed Hariri. As such, he was deemed by many both inside Lebanon and externally to be essential to Lebanon’s economic future, a fact perhaps grudgingly accepted at the time by his political rivals. The formation of Hariri’s first government came in the fall of 1992. It was referred to as the “government of economic salvation,” which reflected the new Lebanese political arrangements. Hariri’s allies dominated the economic portfolios and related bureaucratic positions, and Syrian allies dominated the foreign policy and security portfolios, giving Hariri a mandate to carry out the sort of policies necessary for reconstruction and economic development. Hariri’s economic program, dubbed Horizon 2000, was formally unveiled in March 1993. The 10-year economic plan (1993–2002) set public investment goals in every economic sector and at the time was supposed to cost approximately $12 billion. It was heavily focused on rebuilding Lebanon’s devastated physical infrastructure and creating an economic environment that gave the private sector the confidence to invest and prosper. Ultimately, the goal was to move Lebanon back among the world’s middle-income countries. The Hariri government also pushed through the creation of large privatesector real estate companies to develop large tracts of urban land. Among other things, this raised questions about a possible conflict of interest between the public and private actors. Several of these companies were created during the 1990s. The most ambitious and controversial, Solidere, was established to redevelop the Beirut Central District, by far the most valuable real estate in Lebanon. Solidere was especially controversial because of the heavy-handed way many property owners in the area were treated and because well-placed politicians, especially Hariri himself, were said to have gained financially from the project.

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By 1998, Hariri’s popularity had waned to the extent that it emboldened his political opponents and made governing difficult. While he was credited with stabilizing the economy in the early years of his mandate and improving infrastructure to some extent, progress was uneven. His government borrowed heavily and put the country into significant financial debt, ultimately negatively impacting the economy and halting the reconstruction process. Hariri also faced increased criticism concerning possible conflicts of interest between public affairs and his private financial interests. By 1998, with the election of President Emile Lahoud, whom Hariri was said to have opposed, he had resigned as prime minister and was replaced by Salim Hoss. By the summer of 2000, Hariri’s political stock had risen once again. His political movement swept the 2000 parliamentary elections, giving Hariri a strong mandate to head another Lebanese government, which he did until 2004. Political tensions were especially high in Lebanon during this period, caused, in part, by global and regional circumstances emanating from the events of 11 September 2001. Hariri and his allies were accused by their rivals, in particular, Hezbollah and Syria, of working with the United States, France, and others to undermine them. Indeed, Syria was facing significant international pressure to withdraw from Lebanon. In late 2003, the George W. Bush administration signed into law the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, which called on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon or face sanctions. And, in 2004, the United States and France co-sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which included the following demands: that Syria leave Lebanon; that all militias, including Hezbollah, disarm and disband; and that free and fair presidential elections be held. The last demand was a direct reference made concerning Syrian attempts to get the Lebanese constitution amended to allow the pro-Syria politician, and major rival to Hariri, President Lahoud, to stand for a second term. Hariri, ultimately, was unable to govern and resigned his position in October 2004. Four months later, he was assassinated as his motorcade proceeded along Beirut’s Corniche. A powerful bomb had been placed in a van near the Saint Georges Hotel. Its explosion killed Hariri and many others. Scores of people were injured, and the historic hotel suffered damage as well. Hariri’s assassination sparked massive changes to the Lebanese political environment. In 2007, the Lebanese government and the United Nations set up the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to determine who was behind the assassination. In his honor, Beirut International Airport was renamed Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport. He is also honored by the name of Rafik Hariri University Hospital in Beirut, a public hospital that became the center for treatment of COVID-19 patients in 2020.

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HARIRI, SAAD (1970– ). Heir to the Hariri family’s political fortunes following the 2005 assassination of Rafic Hariri, his father and the former prime minister and business tycoon, Saad Hariri served as prime minister of Lebanon from 2009–2011, and again from 2016–2019. Both governments he headed ended in resignations, the first due to conflict with the Hezbollah-led opposition and the second the result of massive public protests due to an economic crisis and allegations of widespread political corruption across the spectrum. The protests against the political establishment continued in the months following his resignation and were ongoing during the COVID-19 pandemic. Saad Hariri was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to Rafic Hariri and his first wife, Nida Bustani. His early education took place near the city of Sidon, where the Hariri family originates. He then pursued further and higher education in France and the United States, completing a business degree at Georgetown University. Following his education, Hariri joined his father’s business empire, working at Saudi Oger and later playing a role in securing Saudi Oger’s acquisition of the influential Turkish company Turk Telekom. Although relatively young and politically inexperienced, he became head of his father’s political party or bloc, the Future Movement. He led it to electoral success during the 2005 parliamentary elections, which were held in the months following the assassination and without the heavy-handed presence of the Syrian security forces. Given his inexperience, Hariri opted to nominate his father’s trusted aide, Fouad Siniora, to represent the party as prime minister and head the next government, which lasted through to the 2009 parliamentary elections. Hariri played an important role during the hostilities of 2006–2008, which almost brought the country to a civil war, helping to negotiate a unity government and thus positioning himself to eventually take the reigns of power. The opportunity to govern followed the 2009 parliamentary elections, which again gave the Future Movement and their allies the mandate to govern. Hariri became the prime minister, heading a government of national unity that included the opposition headed by Hezbollah. His government was short-lived, however, as the deeply divisive issue of government support for the international tribunal investigating the assassination of Rafic Hariri led to the resignation of Hezbollah cabinet ministers and their allies. Hariri had little choice but to resign. Hariri’s relations with Hezbollah and their Syrian ally continued to deteriorate in the months following the resignation. Indeed, the Syrian government issued an arrest warrant for Hariri, accusing him of aiding rebels in the Syrian conflict. By that stage, however, Hariri had gone into self-imposed exile in Paris, fearing for his personal security in Lebanon.

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Hariri returned to Lebanon during the summer of 2014. He negotiated a deal with his political opponents that brought an end to a two-year stalemate that included the bitter standoff between political factions concerning the election of Lebanon’s next president. The deal saw Hariri return as prime minister in 2016, for a second time, to head a national unity government in return for clearing the way for the March 8–backed candidate, Michel Aoun, to become Lebanon’s president. Hariri’s second term in office was tumultuous, even beyond what had become the standard conflict with the opposition. In 2017, on a trip to Saudi Arabia, where he is a duo national and has substantial financial interests, he announced that he was resigning the prime ministership, blaming the policies of Hezbollah and their patron Iran for making it impossible to govern. The resignation was rejected by President Aoun, who asked that he return to Lebanon. The resignation was seen as suspicious by the Lebanese public, including his supporters, all of whom demanded that he return home. The episode became an international incident, with speculation that he was under duress to resign by the Saudi leadership, which was unhappy with their client’s ability to deal effectively with Saudi Arabia’s regional archrivals, Hezbollah and Iran. Following French intervention, Hariri returned to Lebanon weeks later, ultimately suspending his resignation. Hariri continued to lead the Lebanese government, but a poor showing in the 2018 parliamentary elections forced him to cede even more cabinet power to the opposition. By the fall of 2019, a severe economic crisis was unfolding, centered on the country’s troubled finances and its banking sector, forcing the government to take serious austerity measures. These measures, including the government decision to tax the popular WhatsApp application, triggered spontaneous and wide-scale protests that brought the country to a halt. Protestors demanded the government’s resignation in favor of an interim technocratic government and the holding of new elections and new leaders. The protestors also demanded that the political and economic elite be held accountable for alleged corruption, which had all but bankrupted the country. Hariri resigned in the fall of 2019, and attempted to get ahead of the crisis by supporting the protestors’ demands for a truly technocratic government, a policy that the March 8 Alliance, led by Hezbollah and its allies, the Aoundominated Free Patriotic Movement, were unwilling to support. In this context, Hariri and his political movement refused to cooperate with the March 8–backed government of Hassan Diab, which he said was not a purely technocratic government and, therefore, did not meet the demands of the protestors. As of April 2021, Saad Hariri, as the prime minister designate, has not been able to secure the cabinet positions needed to form a new government.

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HASSAN, RAYA HAFFAR AL- (1967– ). A Sunni Muslim politician who has been called the “First Woman of Lebanese Politics.” After earning a degree in business administration from American University of Beirut (AUB) and an MBA in finance from George Washington University, Hassan worked in both the private and public sectors before entering politics. She also has worked in the area of international development as a program specialist for the United Nations Development Programme. She chaired the committee that oversaw the major development projects, both public and private, in Tripoli. In 2009, Hassan became the first woman to serve as minister of finance, and she went on to become Lebanon’s first female minister of the interior and municipalities in January 2019. That is an important post because its minister controls Lebanon’s security agencies. Upon taking up that post, she announced an ambitious agenda that included improving Lebanon’s roads, lessening the traffic jams caused by unnecessary security checks, improving prison conditions, and working for women’s rights and equality. Hassan is a member of the Future Movement party led by Saad Hariri and supports the March 14 Alliance. HELOU, CHARLES (also spelled HILU) (1913–2001). A Maronite Lebanese lawyer, politician, and president. After earning a law degree at Saint Joseph University, Helou worked as a journalist for French-language media, including Le Jour. He turned from journalism to politics and was elected to Parliament. He went on to serve in various cabinet posts and was elected president in 1964, succeeding Fuad Chehab. Politically, Helou, along with the later Elias Sarkis, was one of the two presidents who identified as Chehabists—that is, they followed the lead of former president Fuad Chehab by taking a stance of moderation and antisectarianism. This approach led Helou to steer a middle path between his own pro-French, pro-Catholic, and pro-West stance, on the one hand, and the Pan-Arabism sweeping the Arab world, on the other. Like Chehab, he wanted Lebanon to modernize politically, leaving behind its past sectarianism and dominance by the zuama. Helou tried to avoid getting Lebanon involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict, arguing that Lebanon’s strength lies in its weakness. In 1969, a political crisis erupted concerning the treatment of Palestinian refugees, with Sunni prime minister Rashid Karami holding out for better treatment of Palestinians. This crisis led to the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which gave the Palestinians some political and military rights in Lebanon, as demanded by Karami. After retiring as president, Helou went on to publish books and serve as head of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie.

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HEZBOLLAH/HIZBOLLAH. A political and militant organization founded by Abbas al-Musawi and other pro-Iran Shiite leaders in 1982, with the assistance of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. It is named after a Quranic term meaning “Party of God.” Musawi was a Shiite cleric from the Bekaa Valley region who had completed his clerical education in Iraq, where he became a strong advocate for the theocratic positions of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini. Musawi and his family were later killed in a 1992 attack on his motorcade by fire from Israeli helicopters. One major stimulus for the formation of Hezbollah was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which disproportionately affected the Shiite community. The initial Israeli attacks ended after a couple of weeks, with the help of an agreement brokered by the United States, but Israel’s continued heavy-handed occupation of much of Lebanon helped to foster militancy among some Shiites. The new, Shiite-based movement received aid in the form of money and weapons predominantly from Iran through the backing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Iran hoped to spread the Iranian Revolution to sympathetic Shiite populations throughout the Middle East, and Hezbollah was one channel in which to do so. Hezbollah carried out bombing attacks, often on Israeli-linked targets, as well as Western forces, determined to drive both out of Lebanon. Furthermore, it hoped to establish a Shiite-dominated religious state in Lebanon along the lines of the Iranian revolution. Hezbollah gained international attention when it took credit for the 1984 attack on U.S. marines at their barracks in Beirut. Hezbollah, or at least groups closely linked to it, also engaged in hostagetaking, particularly of Western civilians based in Lebanon, as a way to further their geopolitical bargaining power. During the war, one of Hezbollah’s most militant allied groups, the Islamic Jihad, claimed responsibility for kidnapping and killing several civilians, including the president of American University of Beirut, Malcolm Kerr. During the civil war, Hezbollah and Amal were the two main militias among Shiite Muslims and, combined, came to dominate Muslim-controlled parts of Lebanon during the 1980s, displacing the Palestine Liberation Organization and their leftist allies. Both were backed by Syria and Iran. After the civil war ended, Hezbollah was the only militia allowed to keep its weapons, to the opposition of Christians and Sunnis, despite the Taif Accords calling on all militias to disarm. The ostensible reason was that it was needed to liberate southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation. Hezbollah, however, fit neatly into Syrian (who controlled Lebanon) and Iranian strategic depth in their conflict with Israel, and this likely drove the policy to retain Hezbollah’s military capacity.

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Musawi, along with family members, was killed on 16 February 1992, by an Israeli attack on his motorcade. He was replaced as secretary-general, the top leader, by Hezbollah regional commander Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah, who had returned from seminary training in Qom only three years previously, would go on to be the face of Hezbollah for years to come. Hezbollah continued to control several camps and surrounding villages in southern Lebanon in the 1990s, and effectively was an autonomous nonstate actor with more fire power than the Lebanese military. From those positions the militia was able to fire missiles into northern Israel without interference from the government or the Lebanese Army. In response to those Hezbollah rocket attacks, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in its Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996. After diplomatic intervention by the United States and France, an informal agreement was reached that called for Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and Hezbollah to cease firing rockets into Israel. The Israel–Lebanon Monitoring Group was set up to oversee the informal agreement. Hezbollah partially complied with the agreement by lessening the number of rocket attacks. The conflict escalated in 1997, with renewed fighting between Hezbollah and its two main adversaries in southern Lebanon, the Israel Defense Forces and the South Lebanon Army. Although United Nations Security Council Resolution 426 and the Taif Accords called for the disarming of all militias, Hezbollah has refused to do so, even though the official reason for retaining its arms, Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, was no longer relevant once Israel withdrew in 2000. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 of 2004 called for the withdrawal of Syrian troops and the disarming of Hezbollah, but again, Hezbollah refused. Beginning in July 2005, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora launched a National Dialogue Process intended to gain more sectarian cooperation, bring about political reform, and get Hezbollah to disarm. The dialogue process was suspended with the outbreak of the Hezbollah–Israel War in 2006, and Hezbollah did not disarm. Then, in 2007, Butrus Harb led an attempt to get Hezbollah to disarm by offering its fighters the opportunity to integrate into the Lebanese Army, but Hezbollah again rejected the proposal. The 2008 Doha Agreement did not call for Hezbollah disarmament, marking Hezbollah’s political victory over its rivals in Lebanon and cementing its role as the dominant political force in the country with an effective veto over government policy. Conflicts between his government and Hezbollah concerning investigations into the assassination of Rafic Hariri led Rafic’s son, Saad Hariri, to resign as prime minister in 2011. Hezbollah then backed the appointment of Najib Mikati as prime minister starting in 2011, but forced him to resign in 2014, when he failed to hold Hezbollah’s support.

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When Saad Hariri returned from exile in Paris to serve for a second term as prime minister of a unity government in 2016, he again met resistance from Hezbollah, so much so that when he made the surprise announcement of his resignation while on a trip to Saudi Arabia in 2017, he blamed Hezbollah and their supporting state, Iran, for the resignation. President Michel Aoun rejected the resignation, and Hariri returned to serve in the office but with continuing conflict with Hezbollah. Hezbollah is, perhaps, the most important component of the March 8 Alliance, with its pro-Iranian, pro-Syrian stance. Pressure from Hezbollah, combined with the failing economy and the banking crisis of 2019, led to the resignation of Saad Hariri in 2019. The new prime minister, Hassan Diab, and his government had the backing of Hezbollah and its close allied party, the Amal Movement. Beyond its unprecedented role in Lebanon, Hezbollah is a regional force, working closely with, or for, Iran in wider regional rivalries between Shiite and Sunni states or between Iran and Israel. Hezbollah intervened in the Syrian civil war and likely saved the Assad regime, and its fighters are involved in many regional conflicts from Yemen to Iraq. This has led to conflict with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. Hezbollah became a target of criticism and protest demonstrations after the port district explosion in Beirut in 2020 left numerous Lebanese dead, injured, or homeless. Nasrallah had to publicly deny that Hezbollah had maintained any supplies or operations in the port region, but not all Lebanese were convinced by the denial. See also FUTURE MOVEMENT; HAJJ, UNSI AL- (1937–2014); MUGHNIYAH, IMAD FAYEZ (1962–2008). HEZBOLLAH–ISRAEL WAR (2006). In response to Hezbollah attacks on Israel Defense Forces (IDF), including a daring cross-border raid and the capture of some Israeli soldiers, IDF launched a war on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon on 12 July 2006. The actions of the IDF became controversial because they included attacks on civilian installations, including the bombing of Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport. Israel also set up a blockade to stop ships coming into Lebanon in an effort to cut supplies from Iran. Israel carried out airstrikes but also an invasion of troops into southern Lebanon. Hezbollah fired Iranian-supplied weapons into norther Israel. After 34 days of fighting and the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, the conflict came to an end without a clear victory for either side. Given the relatively greater Israeli military might, Hezbollah could celebrate the kind of triumph that comes from a stalemate in an asymmetrical war, despite the wide-scale destruction in Lebanon and the number of deaths in the Shiite community. It used its “victory” to gain further con-

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cessions from the Lebanese government, incorporated in the 2008 Doha Agreement, which included giving Hezbollah and its allies a third of the cabinet seats in a national unity government and an effective veto over government policy. HILU, CHARLES. See HELOU, CHARLES (also spelled HILU) (1913–2001). HOAYEK, ELIAS PETER (1843–1931). Having been born in Helta, Lebanon, among a Maronite Christian community, Hoayek trained as a priest at the Seminary College of St. John Maroun and went on to serve as the Patriarch of Antioch for the Maronite Church from 1898 until his passing. As a church leader, he is credited with, among many other achievements, establishing institutional structures for members of the Maronite Christian diaspora, including Egypt, Cyprus, Argentina, and the United States. Hoayek was a strong advocate for a state of Lebanon and is credited with being one of the founding figures of the modern state. During World War I, when the Ottomans sided with Germany and put a blockade on the coast of Lebanon, the Ottoman government suspected Hoayek of being pro-France, in part because Hoayek was channeling funds from France and the Lebanese diaspora to aid the starving Lebanese population. When the Ottoman forces had to withdraw from Lebanon, it was Hoayek who headed the Lebanese delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference at Versailles. He presented the concept of an independent Greater Lebanon, which would include more territory than had been part of the former Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate administrative region. Hoayek’s proposals were accepted, leading to the creation of French Mandate’s government of the Greater Lebanon he wanted. Bishop Hoayek was both a leader of his own Christian church and an advocate for a peaceful coexistence of all Lebanese, whatever their religious or cultural background. See also MARON, SAINT (also spelled MARUN or MAROUN) (?–410). HOBEIKA, ELIE (1956–2002). Commander of the mainly Maronite militia known as the Lebanese Forces (LF) during the civil war of 1975–1990. Hobeika was blamed for the 1977 massacre of Palestinians in Yarin, in southern Lebanon. He had received military training in Israel. He rose in the ranks of the Christian militias that came together to form the LF in 1980. During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, his close ties to Israel led Israel to put the LF in charge of moving into the Palestinian refugee camps. Hobeika was implicated in the massacre of many civilians in the Shatila refugee camp.

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Hobeika was a signatory of the December 1985 Tripartite Agreement, but many Maronites opposed the agreement because they feared it gave too much power to Syria. One member of the LF, Samir Geagea, so strongly objected to Hobeika’s support of the Tripartite Agreement that he led a successful coup against Hobeika’s leadership. Hobeika then set up headquarters in Damascus, where he continued to lead a small faction of his former forces in a pro-Syrian stance. Later, upon returning to Lebanon in 1990, he was active in the Promise Party, which won two seats in the 1992 Parliament. He was assassinated in 2002. HOLY SPIRIT UNIVERSITY OF KASLIK. A private Catholic university founded by Maronite Christians and located in Kaslik, in the Mount Lebanon region. It uses English and French as languages of instruction and enrolls more than 8,000 students. HORIZON 2000. See HARIRI, RAFIC (1942–2005). HOSPITAL. See AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB); COVID-19; HARIRI, RAFIC (1942–2005); MAKASSED FOUNDATION; SAINT JOSEPH UNIVERSITY. HOSS, SALIM (1929– ). A veteran of the Lebanese political scene who served in Parliament and was appointed prime minister on a number of occasions during a three-decade-long period beginning in the mid-1970s. Hoss, who is ideologically close to Pan-Arabism, greatly admired the leadership of Gamal Nasser and supported many of the pan-Arabism tenets, including the plight of Palestinians. He is also considered by many to be an uncompromising but moderate technocrat, and thus a safe pair of hands when political circumstances dictated the need for such a person. The fact that he did not belong to any of the major political blocs and was incorruptible only added to his credibility. Hoss was born in Beirut to a relatively modest family. His father died when Hoss was still an infant, and he was raised by his mother. He attended American University of Beirut (AUB) on scholarship and majored in business and economics at the undergraduate and master’s levels. He then went on to the United States, where he secured a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to complete a Ph.D. in economics and business from Indiana University. Upon his return to Lebanon, Hoss taught for almost a decade and a half at AUB. In addition, he worked in various capacities for a number of government and nongovernmental organizations dealing with banking, development, and other financial areas. These organizations included the Kuwaiti

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Fund for Arab Economic Development; the Arab Monetary Fund; the Arab and International Investment Bank; and Lebanon’s Banking Control Commission, the latter of which he chaired. Hoss’s entry into politics was, in large part, tied to his relationship with Elias Sarkis, Lebanon’s president from 1976–1982. They met while Hoss worked at the Lebanese Central Bank, became friends, and spoke regularly about politics and economics. When Sarkis assumed the presidency in 1976, he called on Hoss to join his cabinet, with Hoss eventually becoming prime minister and leading a largely technocratic government, a position he held until 1980. During his first term as prime minister, Hoss’s major contribution was the creation of a bureaucratic unit, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). The CDR was designed to be free from the shackles of bureaucratic and political interference, and able to attract Lebanon’s most capable people to lead the reconstruction efforts following the initial phases of the war. Unfortunately, the war never ceased during this initial period, limiting government efforts to regain control of the country and institute reconstruction efforts to any significant degree. Indeed, efforts could not fully commence until 1992, when the CDR’s role in Lebanon’s economy became especially prominent, and then only under the leadership of Rafic Hariri. Hoss continued to serve in cabinet during the mid-1980s, and held different portfolios; however, he served as prime minister again in 1987, following the assassination of the sitting prime minister at the time, Rashid Karami. Hoss served from 1987–1990, a period of especially complex political dynamics when two rival governments claimed to represent Lebanon once Parliament could not agree on who was to succeed President Amine Gemayel once his term ended in the fall of 1988. Hoss led a civilian government based in West Beirut and supported by Syria, while the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Michel Aoun, led a military government based in East Beirut and backed by Iraq. Once Aoun was defeated and the civil war came to an end via the Taif process, the Hoss government ended. Hoss served as prime minister for a third time from 1998–2000, following the resignation of the influential Rafic Hariri, who had previously headed the government for six years but reached an impasse with Syria and its Lebanese allies. Hoss was considered a compromise candidate, leading a technocratic government until the 2000 parliamentary elections. Hoss’s political career came to an abrupt end during those parliamentary elections, where he lost his seat in Parliament, an unprecedented outcome for a sitting prime minister, attributed to the successful campaign against him by Hariri’s powerful political machine. Following the end of his political career in 2000, Hoss continued to speak out on political and humanitarian issues. In the period following the assassination of Rafic Hariri, he helped create the

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National Unity Forum, which was envisioned as a third way to navigate the polarizing politics that had emerged in Lebanon. With respect to humanitarian issues, for example, in May 2017, at 88 years of age, he announced that he would go on a one-day hunger strike in solidarity with Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails who were in the midst of a hunger strike for improved conditions. Hoss is a widely published author, with several books to his name. His works reflect his academic expertise and political interests but also include political memoirs. HOTEL-DIEU DI FRANCE. See SAINT JOSEPH UNIVERSITY. HRAWI, ELIAS (1925–2006). Elias Hrawi was Lebanon’s first president during the post–civil war period, replacing René Moawad, who served for only 17 days before being assassinated. Hrawi, who served from 1989–2008, owed his position to Syria, which controlled Lebanon, and he was largely overshadowed by the more powerful Lebanese prime minister, Rafic Hariri, the dominant Lebanese political actor of the 1990s. Hrawi was born in a village near the town of Zahle, in the Bekaa Valley, to a family of landowners. He studied at Saint Joseph University, completing a degree in commerce before returning to run the family agricultural business. His business interests expanded into oil importation during the 1970s and 1980s. The Hrawi family members were influential politicians in their region of Lebanon, with his brothers holding parliamentary seats since Lebanese independence. In 1972, Elias Hrawi formally entered the national political arena by being elected to parliament. During the war years, he briefly served in cabinet as public works minister. Although a relatively unknown politician with limited appeal, he was adept at adjusting to the military and political dynamics on the ground, fostering a close working relationship with Syria. That connection served him well in the post–civil war period. On November 24, 1989, only two days following the assassination of Moawad, Syria swiftly ensured that its ally Hrawi was appointed president, assisting him in imposing the Taif process, reinstating Lebanese state control throughout the country, and establishing the parameters of Lebanese–Syrian relations. Hrawi’s immediate challenge upon taking office was dealing with populist army general Michel Aoun, who headed a rival government that refused to accept the terms of the Taif Accords and the legitimacy of Hrawi’s presiden-

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cy. With the strong assistance of the Syrian military, and nearly a year later, Aoun’s forces were defeated, ending the last corner of resistance to the Taif Accords. Hrawi was credited with rebuilding the Lebanese Army and establishing the process that disarmed militias, extending state control to most parts of Lebanon. The disarming of the militias, however, had its critics, particularly in the Christian and Sunni communities, which were unhappy that the Shiite militia Hezbollah was allowed to maintain its arms. Indeed, the question of Hezbollah’s military force would remain a bitterly contested political issue decades following the end of the civil war. Hrawi was also criticized for signing the 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, which legalized Syria’s role in Lebanon and defined the overall relationship between the two countries. To the most ardent critics, the treaty amounted to legalizing Syrian domination of Lebanon, effectively turning the country into a Syrian satrapy. In many ways, by the fall of 1992, Hrawi was overshadowed in terms of power and influence by the country’s new prime minister, Rafic Hariri. This was in part because of the sheer power and influence Hariri brought to the position and the support he had in his Sunni community. Hrawi, on the other hand, had limited support in his Maronite community and was dependent on Syria for his political survival. It also reflected structural and political changes introduced by the Taif Accords, which effectively stripped the president of many of his powers, shifting them to the prime minister and cabinet, and, to a lesser extent, the parliamentary speaker guaranteed to the Shiites. The exact distribution of power between the positions, however, was left somewhat vague, allowing room for negotiations and compromise between the representatives of the three largest communities. Hrawi found himself competing with the prime minister and the speaker of the Parliament for influence in Lebanon. Collectively, the three were referred to as the troika, or the three “presidents,” reflecting the relatively equal powers the three shared as the representatives of their respective communities. Furthermore, Hrawi and Speaker Nabih Berri were close to Syria and used this to counterbalance Hariri, often leading to intense standoffs among the three of them and requiring the mediation of Syria to resolve. In 1995, Hrawi secured an amendment to the constitution extending his term by three additional years. The move was as unpopular as it was unprecedented, marking the first time since independence that a president served beyond the nonrenewable six-year term and making Hrawi the longest-serving president in Lebanese modern history.

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Hrawi might be best remembered for his failed policy in 1998, meant to get civil marriage legalized in Lebanon, challenging long-held control of the institution of marriage by the various religious traditions. His thinking was that throughout time mixed marriages would lead to the weakening of sectarianism. HUMMUS. A popular Lebanese food dish made from ground chickpeas, tahini, lemon juice, and garlic. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE. HUNCHAK PARTY. See SOCIAL DEMOCRAT HUNCHAKIAN PARTY. HUSSEINI, HUSSEIN EL- (1937– ). A Shiite Muslim politician and cofounder of the Amal Movement political party. He comes from a prominent Shiite family from Bekaa. He entered local politics while still a teenager and won a parliamentary seat in 1972. He served as secretary-general of the Amal party from 1978 until he resigned in 1980, because he did not want to embroil the party in the raging civil war. He became speaker of the Chamber of Deputies in 1982, with Syrian backing, and continued serving as speaker during and after the civil war. It was in that capacity that he made his greatest contribution, as he represented Parliament and the Shiites in the negotiations leading to the Taif Accords. Some credit him with being the father of that important agreement. His stance against Rafic Hariri’s plan to appropriate land in Beirut for what became the Solidere development led him to lose his office as speaker in 1992. He remained in Parliament until resigning in protest in 2008. See also BERRI, NABIH (1938– ).

I IAAL FORTRESS. See CASTLES. IBRAHIM, EMILY FARIS (1914–?). An American-born woman who moved to Lebanon as a child. Ibrahim was educated in Beirut and became an important advocate for feminism and especially the rights of Lebanese women. She pioneered the right of women to play a role in politics when she became the first woman to run for election to Parliament. IMAM. An Arabic term meaning “leader.” It is used by Sunni Muslims as the title of the person who leads prayers at a mosque. Shiite Muslims use the term to refer to the line of leaders starting with Ali and then his sons, and continuing through a lineage that varies among the various branches of Shiite Islam. IMAMI MUSLIMS. See TWELVER MUSLIMS. INDEPENDENCE. When the League of Nations created the French Mandate system to govern newly created Greater Lebanon, one of the goals included was that France would facilitate the movement of the new country toward independence. No timeline was put on the process leading to an independent, democratic nation. There were several obstacles. One was that the new territory of Greater Lebanon had not been a nation before, and the concept of a Lebanese identity was precarious at best across the sectarian communities. The former Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate included only about half of the new Greater Lebanon, and none of the included areas of the former Syrian Province had experience with Western-style democracy. Moreover, there were many well-entrenched sectarian communities, each with its own religious, as well as economic structures of a feudal nature.

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A big step toward independence had been taken by 1926, with the introduction of a democratic constitution modeled on the French political system. Negotiations for independence followed at a slow pace, leading to the signing of the 1936 Franco–Lebanese Treaty; however, the French Parliament never ratified that treaty, and World War II further complicated the process. Lebanese leaders and political parties pressed for independence. France refused and responded by arresting the president, prime minister, and cabinet members. With Lebanon becoming more difficult to govern and facing pressure from Britain and the United States, France finally released the government leaders from jail on 22 November 1943, effectively ceding independence. Lebanon celebrates that date as its Independence Day. France formally declared independence for Lebanon on New Year’s Day 1944, with the last of its troops departing in 1946. INDEPENDENCE DAY. Celebrated on 22 November, the date in 1943, when France released the Lebanese president, the prime minister, and cabinet members from prison, ending French claims on sovereignty of Lebanon according to the French Mandate. Independence Day is celebrated with parades, patriotic speeches, displays of flags, and other festivities. INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT. A small political party founded by Michel Moawad in 2006. The party once had three members in Parliament, but Moawad is the only party member to hold a seat in the 2018 Parliament. The Independence Movement is an advocate of strong Lebanese independence and participates in the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance. INDEPENDENT FREE LEBANON. See HADDAD, SAAD (1937–1984); SOUTH LEBANON ARMY (SLA). INDEPENDENT NASSERITE MOVEMENT. See MOVEMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT NASSERISTS-AL-MURABITUN. INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE ET DE FORMATION EN VUE DU DEVELOPPMENT (IRFID). See CHEHAB, FUAD (1902–1973). INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE. An international high school with its main campus located in Ras Beirut, near the American University of Beirut. It offers instruction in Arabic, French, and English. Most of its students speak all three languages. Students may qualify for the international, French, or Lebanese baccalaureates. Many of its graduates each year are admitted to top universities in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Europe, as well as Lebanon.

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INTRA BANK CRASH. The 1966 failure of an international banking enterprise based in Beirut. The founder and principal officer of Intra Bank was Yousef Beidas. Before moving to Beirut, Beidas was a Palestinian Christian who managed the Barclays Bank branch in Jerusalem. With the rise of Zionism, he moved from his home in Nazareth to Beirut, where he set up a money exchange service called Intra Bank. Beidas grew Intra Bank from a modest money exchange company into a sizeable international bank with significant real estate holdings in prime locations in major cities, including properties on New York City’s Fifth Avenue and the Champs-Élysées in Paris, as well as major holdings in Geneva and London. Along with the success and international operations of Intra Bank came various businesses owned by the bank or ethnic Lebanese with ties to the bank. These enterprises included Lebanon’s national carrier, Middle East Airlines; the Casino du Liban; and a recording and movie studio named Studio Baalbeck. Beidas and his bank promoted Lebanon as an emerging center for the financial, film, and tourist industries. While Beidas was out of the country in 1966, someone circulated printed warnings that the bank was on the verge of a collapse. This caused a run on the bank. It had insufficient reserves to accommodate the many people who demanded to withdraw their deposits, and the Lebanese Central Bank refused to come to the bank’s aid. This led to the failure of Intra Bank in October 1966. Beidas moved to Switzerland, where he passed away a few years later. INVESTCOM. See MIKATI, NAJIB (1943– ). IRAN, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. During the first four decades of the history of independent Lebanon, its international relations mainly involved its Arab neighbors, Israel, France, and the United States. Iran, not being an Arab state and not being part of the Pan-Arab movement, was not a major factor for Lebanon’s foreign relations. On the nongovernmental level, however, there were close ties between the Shiite clerics of Iran and Lebanon, as well as close family connections. These ties would eventually develop into more significant military and political links between Iran and Lebanon’s Shiite community beginning in the second phase of the civil war. Developments in Lebanon in the early 1980s aligned with Iran’s recent Islamic revolution and its policy to spread the revolution throughout the region. Lebanon’s Shiites, one of the country’s poorest and most marginalized communities formed the Amal and Hezbollah militias to exercise influence in the Lebanese civil war. Hezbollah was, in fact, created by the Iranian

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Revolutionary Guards. This brought Iran into indirect conflict with the government of Lebanon at the time, as well as being a major participant in the Lebanese civil war. Iran’s initial policy was to assist Shiite groups in fighting the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and push Western forces, and influence, out of Lebanon. Some of Hezbollah’s more militant affiliates conducted attacks against military and civilian targets, including the many kidnappings and killings carried out by the Islamic Jihad. One high-profile incident involved the gunning down of the American Malcolm Kerr on the American University of Beirut campus, where he had recently arrived as its new president. The attack on Americans intensified with the 1983 bombing of the Beirut military barracks housing the Multinational Force in Lebanon, made up of the Western troops stationed there to keep the peace. Many U.S. and European soldiers were killed in the attack. Islamic Jihad was one of the Iranian-backed groups that took part in the Western Hostage Crisis that was ongoing from 1982–1992. As the success of Hezbollah as a fighting unit grew, the militia began to figure more prominently into Iranian regional security considerations. In short, Iran invested heavily in Hezbollah to aid Iranian regional and global ambitions. The importance Iran placed on Hezbollah was apparent once the Lebanese civil war ended, when Iranian pressure via Syria allowed the militia to retain its arms, despite opposition from other Lebanese communities and Western and Arab governments. In many ways, Hezbollah figured into Iranian regional policy and influence in the region. Iran provided the militia with relatively sophisticated weapons and financial aid to continue its military conflict with Israel. Hezbollah, in fact, acted as an arm of Iranian foreign policy and a sort of deterrence force for Iran in its long-standing conflict with Israel. It gave Iran greater military capability along Israel’s border, which could be used should Israel try to strike Iran militarily. Hezbollah’s performance in conflicts with Israel in 1993 and 1996, as well as Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, showed the militia’s potential value to Iran. The 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, which was effectively fought to a draw, demonstrated Israeli military vulnerabilities and massively increased Hezbollah’s military value to Iran. Iran has armed Hezbollah with tens of thousands of even more sophisticated rockets, and Hezbollah now figures into any Iranian regional military planning. Hezbollah’s grip on Lebanese politics, especially during the period of the neighboring Syrian civil war, has—at least indirectly—meant that Iran’s influence in Lebanon has increased exponentially. Indeed, some observers, perhaps with a degree of hyperbole, considered Lebanon to be an

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Iranian satrapy. Iran’s influence in Lebanon has complicated Lebanese domestic politics even further, while putting Lebanon in the crosshairs of regional and global rivalries. Iran has been criticized in Lebanon by political opponents of Hezbollah, especially in the Christian and Sunni Muslim communities, and also by militant Sunni groups who have carried out attacks against Iranian targets in Lebanon, including the Iranian Embassy. When Prime Minister Saad Hariri made his surprise announcement of his resignation during a 2017 trip to Saudi Arabia, he blamed Hezbollah and its Iranian backers for making it almost impossible to govern Lebanon. He later took back the resignation after President Michel Aoun refused to accept it, but he did not change his mind about Iranian interference in Lebanon’s affairs. The cementing of Shiite political power in Lebanon, through Hezbollah and the March 8 Alliance, has meant that Iran has become a major player in Lebanon’s international relations. This has put Lebanon on a collision course with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf Arab states, which have demanded the curtailment of Iranian influence in the country. To some extent, the economic crisis of 2019–2020 was caused by sanctions imposed by the United States and their Arab allies against Lebanon and its institutions for links to Iran and Syria. International financial aid for Lebanon has become politicized and possibly delayed as a strategy to punish Lebanon for its links to Iran. ISLAMIC AMAL MOVEMENT. A Lebanese party formed when Husayn al-Musawi broke away from the Amal Movement to form a separate party that was more exclusively Islamic and less secular. The party was closely aligned with Iran and Hezbollah. ISLAMIC JIHAD. A small Shiite organization based in the Baalbek region and consisting mainly of small cells that operated in Lebanon during the civil war of 1975–1990. Islamic Jihad had links with Fatah al-Islam and is thought to have received financing from Iran. Beginning in about 1985, it gained notoriety when it claimed responsibility for several of the incidents involving the capture, and usually the killing, of foreign nationals. It was one of several Islamic groups involved in what came to be known as the Western Hostage Crisis, or Lebanon Hostage Crisis. It was closely related to Hezbollah. ISLAMIC UNIFICATION MOVEMENT (IUM). A Sunni Muslim–based political party in Lebanon. The Arabic name is sometimes put into English as the Islamic Unity Movement. The IUM is also referred to simply as Tawhid, a shortened form of its Arabic name, Harakat al-Tawhid

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al-Islam. The party began in 1982, when Said Shaaban broke away from the Lebanese Islamic Group to take a more radical stance against the 1982 Israeli occupation. ISMAILI MUSLIMS. The branch of Shiite Islam named after Imam Ismail, the seventh imam according to their tradition. In contrast to the Twelvers, the Imami branch of Shiite Islam, they are sometimes referred to as Seveners, after the seventh imam. Ismailis are less numerous than Imami Muslims in Lebanon and worldwide. ISRAEL–LEBANON MONITORING GROUP (ILMG). Following the intrusion of Israeli troops into Lebanon territory in Israel’s Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher and French foreign minister H. de Charette began a period of intense shuttle diplomacy with Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. After many trips during a span of two weeks, the diplomatic efforts resulted in the April 1996 Understanding. The Understanding fell short of being an agreement and was unsigned by the parties. It was an operational agreement about the rules of conduct. Its provisions called for Hezbollah and its allies to cease attacks on northern Israel. For their part, the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and Israel were to avoid attacking civilians in Lebanon and launching attacks from civilian population areas. The Understanding was not a real cease-fire, and it allowed for both sides to defend themselves. To oversee the cooperation of the parties, the April 1996 Understanding called for the creation of an ILMG. Its membership included the United States and France, the two outside countries involved in brokering the Understanding, as well as Lebanon, Israel, and Syria, the nations directly involved. The ILMG was set up to hear claims of violations of the Understanding, with the provision that such claims had to be submitted within 48 hours of the incident. The Understanding and the existence of the ILMG did seem to make a difference at first. In the early months of 1996, before their existence, Hezbollah had launched more than 20 rockets into northern Israel, but after the formation of the ILMG the frequency of the missile attacks lessened. In anticipation of the return to a time of peace, a Consultative Group was also set up to oversee and facilitate the reconstruction projects in Lebanon. It had members from the United States, the European Union, and Russia. Despite the Understanding and the work of the ILMG, the conflict did escalate in 1997, with continuing fighting between the Israel Defense Forces and the SLA against Hezbollah. The renewed fighting called the effectiveness of the ILMG into question; however, the ILMG had no punitive powers, and so its ability to bring about a cease-fire was restricted.

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ISRAEL–LEBANON WAR (1982–1985). Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin ordered an Israeli invasion of Lebanon, code-named Operation Peace for Galilee, in 1982. In a three-pronged attack, Israel sent as many as 70,000 fighters into Lebanon. Known in Lebanon as the Invasion, this Israeli action began a three-year war between Israel and Lebanon. Israel’s immediate goal was to overrun Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters who had been firing rockets into northern Israel, but the invasion also led to conflicts between Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) (who were allied with conservative Christian militias) and the PLO, the Syrian military, and their Lebanese allies. Israel’s larger goals were to destroy the PLO’s military capabilities and weaken Syrian control of the region. Toward the beginning of the action, Israel took control of the ruins of the Beaufort Castle, a castle built by the Crusaders on a high rock. The Israelis had previously tried to take control of the strategically placed castle from the PLO, without success, but they did gain control of the castle early in the war and managed to hold on to it long after the end of the war. By August 1982, the large Israeli contingent was having initial success. The PLO Headquarters, having relocated to Lebanon after being forced out of Jordan, was now forced to leave Lebanon. It was in the process of moving to Tunisia, far away from Palestine. Israel had also managed to drive Syrian troops out of Beirut, forcing them to withdraw to the Bekaa Valley region. With the PLO on its way out and the Syrian troops out of Beirut, Christian politicians were planning to set up a new government with Bashir Gemayel, leader of the LF, as president. But the assassination of Gemayel in September 1982 led to a breakdown in the unity among Christian factions that had existed previously under Gemayel’s strong leadership. Bashir’s brother, Amine Gemayel, became president, but he was not able to effectively control the various Christian militias or drive out the Israelis. Israel decided to have its allies, the LF, be the fighters to actually enter the Palestinian refugee camps. When numerous innocent Shiite and Palestinian civilians were killed in September 1982, during the Sabra and Shatila Massacres, by LF units, but with Israeli oversight, international pressure began to mount on Israel to withdraw. Israel did withdraw from Beirut and the Shouf Mountains region, but that left the Druze vulnerable to being overrun by Christian militias. By 1983, the Israelis had entered into a withdrawal agreement with President Gemayel, but many Lebanese leaders rejected it because it gave too much control of southern Lebanon to Israel. By 1984, it was clear that the agreement would not be passed in the Lebanese Parliament. ISRAEL–LEBANON WAR (2006). See HEZBOLLAH–ISRAEL WAR (2006).

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ISRAEL, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. Since the founding of the modern state of Israel in 1948, formal relations between Lebanon and Israel have been adversarial at best or in an active state of war during the worst periods. During the Arab–Israeli War of 1948, Lebanon was one of the participants on the Arab side. Lebanon signed an Armistice Agreement with Israel, ending its engagement in the war, on 23 March 1949. That agreement called for Israel to withdraw its troops to beyond a line of demarcation known as the Green Line. The two sides have remained in a technical state of war since 1948. As a consequence of that first war, more than 150,000 Palestinian refugees fled to Lebanon, growing in number throughout the years and living in a series of camps dotted throughout the country. Their presence, along with those of the various Palestinian organizations, would play a significant role in the trajectory of Lebanese–Israeli relations in the years to come. By the late 1960s, Palestinian guerrilla groups were using Lebanon as one of their main staging grounds in their military conflict with Israel, for which Lebanon would pay a price. In retaliation for the downing of an El Al airplane by Palestinian militants in 1968, Israel bombed the airport in Beirut, damaging the runway and several civilian airplanes. By the early 1970s, Lebanon had effectively become the last sanctuary for Palestinian groups fighting a guerrilla war against Israel. In 1971, King Hussein forced the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to move its headquarters out of Jordan. It complied by relocating to Lebanon, which created the conditions for increased tension between Israel and Lebanon in the following years. Palestinian fighters increased their strikes on Israel, with Israel retaliating with great ferocity against both Palestinian groups and Lebanese targets. The latter was aimed at punishing Lebanon for hosting the Palestinians and as a tactic to pressure Lebanese authorities to expel Palestinian fighters from Lebanon, as Jordan had done in previous years. The conflict between Israel and the PLO, often fought on Lebanese soil, played a significant role in the collapse of the Lebanese political order and the start of the civil war. Israel proceeded to play a major role in the civil war of 1975–1990. The PLO continued to conduct military operations against Israel, bringing Lebanon further into the crosshairs of the Israeli military. During phase one of the conflict, when the Arab League legitimized the predominantly Syrian Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) in Lebanon in 1976, Israel strongly objected to the presence of foreign (non-Lebanese) troops being deployed near the border. The compromise was that ADF troops were kept north of the Zaharani River and thus away from the border.

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During phase two of the war, Israel entered into a more open strategic alliance with Christian militias, which it had previously backed clandestinely. The alliance was aimed at defeating the PLO and their Lebanese leftist allies, as well as Syria, and reestablishing a Christian-dominated government. Israel’s first major military foray into Lebanon’s civil war was in 1978, when Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin ordered Operation Litani. This operation involved an Israeli invasion of approximately 15,000 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fighters into southern Lebanon in retaliation for the death and destruction that had recently resulted from a PLO cell’s attack on two buses in northern Israel. The aim of the invasion was to destroy the PLO bases in southern Lebanon. The United Nations Security Council then adopted United Nations Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426, calling for the withdrawal of IDF troops and the creation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to keep the peace. In its 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, the IDF began a major invasion into Lebanon, starting the Israel–Lebanon War of 1982–1985. The aim was to evict the PLO and Syria from Lebanon and establish a pro-Israeli Christian-dominated government in Beirut. One outcome of that 1982 war was that the PLO was militarily defeated and had to move its headquarters from Lebanon to Tunisia. This effectively ended the Palestinian–Israeli military conflict along the southern Lebanese/northern Israeli border. Another outcome, however, was that the Hezbollah militia was formed, with backing from Iran, to resist Israel and ultimately continue a long-standing military conflict with the Jewish state, which remains to this day. Lebanon’s president, Amine Gemayel, signed the Lebanese–Israeli Peace Agreement in May 1983, but it was widely criticized in Lebanon for favoring Israel and ultimately retracted. Syria regained its influence, and by 1985, Israel had withdrawn its forces back almost to the border, while relying on its Lebanese ally, the South Lebanon Army, to control guerrilla activities in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel. During the post–civil war period, Israeli–Lebanese relations were dominated by the continuing conflict between Israeli forces, still located in a small sliver of land along the border, and Hezbollah, a nonstate actor who was determined to evict Israel from Lebanon. The two fought several conflicts and exchanged gunfire on numerous occasions. In 1992, an Israeli helicopter attack killed Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi and his family, and in 1993, a brief conflict between the two ensued. By 1996, Israel had again invaded Lebanon in what it termed Operation Grapes of Wrath. When Israel informally agreed to withdraw and Hezbollah informally agreed to stop firing rockets into northern Israel, the Israel–Lebanon Monitoring Group was set up to oversee the uneasy peace, which had broken down by 1997.

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In 2000, the United Nations defined the Israel–Lebanon border with a demarcation known as the Blue Line. Israel also unilaterally withdrew its army from its so-called security zone in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah, however, refused to disarm and continued to conduct a military conflict with Israel. The Hezbollah–Israel War erupted in July 2006, after a cross-border raid by Hezbollah fighters led to the death of some IDF soldiers and the capture of others. In an effort to cut off Iranian supplies to Hezbollah, Israel set up a naval blockade and bombed Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport. Israel withdrew after 34 days of fighting, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. Israeli–Hezbollah relations are determined, in large part, by the wider regional power dynamics between Israel and Iran, with Hezbollah acting as a surrogate for Iran. Tensions between Israel and Hezbollah will remain, with the risk of war always a possibility, as long as Israel and Iran continue their regional conflict. ISRAELI INVASION OF 1978. After 1977, when Menachem Begin came to power, Israel became more aggressive in its efforts to stop Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) rockets from being fired into northern Israel from PLO-controlled regions of southern Lebanon. Then, in March 1978, a cell of PLO fighters captured two buses in northern Israel, taking the passengers hostage and executing those who did not manage to escape. Israel responded with a military action beginning on 11 March 1978, code-named Operation Litani. Israel sent approximately 25,000 troops into southern Lebanon, advancing as far north as the Litani River. Facing diplomatic pressure from Egypt and the United States, Israel soon agreed to withdraw its troops almost to its own border, while leaving Israel Defense Forces troops along a strip of land on the Lebanon side of the border. To maintain control of the larger southern region, Israel supported its ally, the South Lebanon Army (SLA) under the command of Saad Haddad. The SLA had assisted Israel’s invasion because Haddad had the goal of setting up, with Israeli support, a Christian-controlled region in South Lebanon that he called Free Lebanon. ISRAELI INVASION OF 1982. See ISRAEL–LEBANON WAR (1982–1985).

J JACOBITE CHRISTIANS. See SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH. JAITA GROTTO. A complex of caverns carved by water flow throughout the centuries. It is considered one of the most scenic sites in the Middle East. Visitors take a boat ride through the lower grotto and explore the much larger upper grotto on foot. Visitors can also enjoy a garden, a train ride, and a cable car ride to view the scenic vistas from the surrounding hills. The Dog River flows from a nearby spring to the sea. JAJA, SAMIR. See GEAGEA, SAMIR (also spelled JAJA) (1952– ). JAMMOUL. See LEBANESE NATIONAL RESISTANCE FRONT (LNRF). JASAD. An Arab-language quarterly magazine published in Beirut. It was founded in 2008, by Joumana Haddad. The mission of Jasad (“Body”) is to publish a variety of cultural items dealing with matters relating to the human body, including scientific, journalistic, and social scientific items. Its essays on sexual topics have been controversial among more conservative Arab readers. JBAIL/JUBAYL. A port city located north of Beirut on the Mediterranean Sea, the area has been a site of human habitation since at least 7000 BCE. Known as Gebal to the Canaanites and Byblos to the Greeks, the city was famous in the ancient world as the main trading port of Canaan. Tourists come to the city in late July to view the art and hear the musical performances during the Byblos International Festival. JEWS. Jews have lived in the territory of Lebanon since the days of ancient Israel, the Jewish Northern Kingdom. The tribes of Naphtali and Asher were the most northern of the 12 tribes, and their territory reached as far north as Mount Hermon in modern Lebanon. Parts of modern-day Lebanon were 167

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included in the United Kingdom ruled over by David and his son Solomon during the height of Jewish political power three millennia ago. Hiram, king of Tyre, supplied Solomon with cedar trees for his temple in Jerusalem, and when some Jews returned from the Babylonia exile, they built the second temple using Lebanese cedars as well. In more modern times, most of Lebanon’s Jews lived in Beirut or Sidon. The 1932 Census recorded approximately 3,500 Jews in Lebanon, but Jewish emigration from Syria is thought to have increased that number to more than 10,000 in the decades leading up the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. Lebanon’s Jews were active in the banking and business sectors of the economy. Along with other Lebanese, many Jews fled the country during the civil war. The Jewish section of Beirut was devastated during the civil war due to its location between two areas of control. Continuing tensions between Lebanon and Israel in the modern period have led to the immigration of almost all of the remaining Lebanese Jews to Israel, the United States, and elsewhere. Throughout the war periods, the constitution afforded protection to Jews, as one of the recognized religious sects. Most synagogues have been destroyed by war. The large Magen Abraham synagogue in Beirut suffered severe war damage but was restored with monies donated by both Jews and non-Jews. It reopened in 2014, to serve the Jewish population of Lebanon, now estimated to range from 100 to 200 people. The former synagogue in the old region of Sidon remains intact but is now a private residence of a non-Jewish family. JORDAN, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. Lebanon’s relations with Jordan have traditionally reflected their geographic proximity, shared common language and culture, and political orientation. Both are also small countries with limited resources, vulnerable to the same regional complexities and challenges. Lebanon and Jordan, then called Transjordan, were among the five Arab states that signed the Alexandria Protocol in 1944. The protocol led to the 1945 formation of the Arab League, formally known as the League of Arab States. Lebanon and Transjordan were founding members, along with Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Both countries were committed to the Arab state system, although Transjordan still may have harbored territorial ambitions beyond its existing border. Lebanon and Jordan have traditionally had good relations, sharing common interests and ideological orientation. Both were pro-Western and shared deep suspicions about Pan-Arabism, especially the kind articulated by Egypt’s Gamal Nasser or leftist Arab parties. They were also part of the alliance of conservative Arab states led by Saudi Arabia during the Arab Cold War, which took place from the 1950s until about the mid-1970s. Within the context of the Arab Cold War, both Lebanon and Jordan were allies, working closely to eliminate the regional threat of Pan-Arabism.

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The two countries also shared concerns about Zionist ambitions in Palestine. The conflict in Palestine, and then between Israelis and Palestinians, would consume and impact both countries, perhaps more than any others in the Arab world. They share a contigiuous border with Israel, both experienced a large influx of Palestinian refugees starting in 1948, and both struggled to deal with Palestinian fighters who used their respective territories as sanctuary in conducting military battles with Israel. By 1970, King Hussein had used his military forces, in what became known as Black September, to rout Palestinian fighters based in Jordan, eventually forcing them and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to leave Jordan. The Palestinians, with help from the wider Arab world, ultimately reestablished themselves in Lebanon, using the country to continue their military conflict with Israel. In the early 1970s, Jordan, through the use of various methods, supported Lebanese authorities and like-minded Lebanese groups who hoped to limit the presence of armed Palestinian fighters in Lebanon. During the Lebanese civil war, Jordan backed moderate Muslim forces and Christian groups opposed to the Palestinian-dominated leftist movement, and Syria. Jordan has supported the various post–civil war Lebanese governments. Both countries have an interest in limiting the rise of Sunni Islamic, as well as Shiite, extremism in the region, and seeing an end to the Syrian war, which has left Jordan and Lebanon caring for hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees. JOUNIEH. A seaside town north of Beirut with a predominantly Maronite population. It served as the headquarters for the Maronite militias during the civil war of 1975–1990. Bherke, the headquarters of the Maronite Church, is nearby JOUR, LE. A publication of the Constitutional Bloc from 1934 until it merged with L’Orient to form L’Orient-Le Jour in 1972. JUMBLATT FAMILY. A Druze family whose members have a long history of prominence in Lebanese economic, social, and political life. The Jumblatts can be traced back to an ethnic Kurdish family who migrated from Syria in approximately 1600. They settled in the Chouf Mountains region north of Beirut, where they came into contact with and converted to the Druze religion. The family became large landholders in the prevailing feudal system, enabling them to become the dominant political force among the Druze.

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In the modern period, the head of the family was always a powerful zaim. Fouad Jumblatt, head of the family in the 1920s, was assassinated. His wife, Nadhirah, then took over the leadership role. Their son, Kamal Jumblatt, went on to found the Progressive Socialist Party, before also being assassinated. Kamal’s son, Walid Jumblatt, continues the family’s political role. Nora Jumblatt, Walid’s wife, is president of the Beiteddine Festival and a leading patron of the arts in Lebanon. Their son, Taymour Walid Jumblatt, holds the family’s traditional seat in Parliament. See also MUKHTARAH, AL-. JUMBLATT, KAMAL (1917–1977). A zaim-style leader from the prominent Jumblatt family of Druze landowners, intellectuals, and politicians. His father, Fouad Jumblatt, was a prominent figure before his assassination in the 1920s. After that assassination, his mother, Nadhirah, quite ably assumed the family leadership role. Jumblatt studied at Saint Joseph University and then in Paris, before his studies there were interrupted by World War II. He then earned a law degree from Saint Joseph University. He amassed an impressive record as a poet and intellectual interested in both philosophical and scientific matters. During his six decades, Kamal authored numerous books covering such diverse topics as medicine, religion, and economics. He was also a published poet. Although he was the leader of the Druze sectarian group, he often participated in Roman Catholic masses during his lifetime. Kamal’s years in Paris left him with good relations with the French. At first, he was not a critic of the French Mandate. Later, as the French kept delaying in granting independence as called for by the League of Nations Mandate, he became an advocate for independence and a supporter of independence leader Bechara El Khoury. He won a parliamentary seat in the first election after the 1943 independence and would continue as a parliamentarian. Six years after independence, Jumblatt got active in politics and founded the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) in 1949. It would be a secularist, nonconfession, and nonsectarian party. He wanted the party to have an appeal that would attract leftist supporters from outside the Druze community, but that did not happen to any major extent. Thanks to the great deference shown to him among the Druze, the PSP did succeed among them, so much so that the party was sometimes referred to as the Druze Progressive Socialist Party. Jumblatt was among those whose opposition and charges of corruption led to the resignation of President Bechara El Khoury in 1952. He then backed the new president, Camille Chamoun. Having not been reelected for the first time in 1957, Jumblatt became a staunch opponent of the Chamoun-led government. His opposition, along with others who opposed Maronite control of the government, led to the

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brief civil war of 1958. Back in politics, he served as a cabinet minister during the 1960s. As minister of the interior in 1970, he was responsible for lifting the ban on the Lebanese Communist Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Although the Jumblatt family’s ancestral roots were Kurdish, Kamal was a strong supporter of Pan-Arabism in general and, more specifically, Gamal Nasser’s goals of fostering more unity among the Arab nations. His leftist leanings, despite being from a landowning family, led to his being awarded the International Lenin Peace Prize in 1972. Jumblatt was the principal organizer of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). The LNM grew out of the former Front of National and Progressive Parties and Forces in the early 1970s, in the period leading up to the outbreak of the civil war. The LNM was a leftist umbrella grouping that included Jumblatt’s own PSP, along with several leftist, Arabist, and proSyria organizations. He wanted an end to the confessional system enshrined in the Taif Accords, which made him unpopular with the entrenched leaders of the confessional system. During the early days of the civil war, the LNM was one of the main entities in opposition to the government. Jumblatt’s strong support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led to its support of him during the outbreak of the civil war of 1975–1990. Jumblatt’s PSP party formed the People’s Liberation Army, a militia that controlled areas of the Chouf Mountain and Mount Lebanon regions during the civil war, when the central government gave way to a system of cantons. Jumblatt’s forces were in control of much of Lebanon’s territory before the intervention of Syria in the civil war. Jumblatt was openly critical of the Syrian intervention, which he rightly feared would deprive his forces of an early victory in the civil war. Then, on 16 March 1977, while riding in a car in his Chouf Mountain home area, Jumblatt was shot to death by an assassin, along with his driver and a bodyguard. Syria was suspected of being behind the killing and later implicated. The LNM largely folded following Jumblatt’s death, and the Lebanese left would lose its place in the conflict in favor of more sectarian militias. Leadership of the Druze community was assumed by Kamel’s son, Walid Jumblatt. JUMBLATT, NORA (?– ). A leader of the efforts to settle Syrian refugees into stable economic and social settings, and a prominent figure in the Jumblatt family. She is a patron of the arts and the long-serving president of the Beiteddine Festival. She is married to political leader Walid Jumblatt.

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JUMBLATT, WALID (1949– ). The scion of the powerful Jumblatt family of Lebanon’s Druze community. Walid Jumblatt is a prominent politician whose name has been synonymous with Lebanese politics for more than 40 years. He assumed the leadership of his community and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) after the 1977 assassination of his father, Kamal Jumblatt. Walid is one the great survivors, both literally and figuratively, of Lebanese politics, adjusting his relationships with national, regional, and international actors as political dynamics in Lebanon dictate. It is no surprise, therefore, to find that during his 40-year career, he has at times worked closely with Syria and yet at other times been a bitter and openly critical opponent of Damascus. He has supported the pro-Western March 14 Alliance and been a close ally of the Hariri family. Yet he has shifted and supported the March 8 Alliance and Hezbollah. What accounts for this apparent contradictory behavior is generally straightforward. It reflects the deeply entrenched need to politically survive and, furthermore, politically maneuver his small and vulnerable Druze community against deeply fraught political and security dynamics. By many accounts, he has managed to do so relatively well. Although it was clear that Syria had ordered the murder of his father following the first phase of the Lebanese civil war, Jumblatt understood that he had to reconcile with Damascus and come to accept the dominate role of Syria in Lebanon, something his father had refused to do. The risks to Walid’s own life, and that of the position of the Druze community, were too great otherwise. In this context, he visited Hafez al-Assad numerous times during the war years, acquiescing to Syrian control of Lebanon. In return, Jumblatt was able to get Syrian military support in his conflict with rival Christian militias and their external allies in 1982. Jumblatt helped form the National Salvation Front militia, which was later renamed the Lebanese National Resistance Front. The militia, backed by Syria, played a role in fighting both Christian militias and their Israeli allies during Israel’s invasion and occupation of the country from 1982–1985. Jumblatt was to enter government in 1984, when President Amine Gemayel formed a unity government. He served in cabinet for the remainder of the war years, securing a number of ministerial positions. He also solidified his role as the leading political representative of the Druze community. Jumblatt was careful to balance political relations in a post–civil war political system under Syrian dominance. While he personally opposed Syria’s military presence in Lebanon and its overall control of the political system, he continued to participate in it nonetheless. To not do so may have jeopardized his leadership of the Druze community, as Syria would have certainly undermined his power, replacing him with more malleable alternatives. Jumblatt’s approach contrasts with many Christian leaders who chose to boycott the political process while Syria continued to occupy Lebanon.

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Jumblatt also continued to have cordial relations with Lebanese politicians opposed to Syria, or at least independent of Syria. His relationship with former prime minister Rafic Hariri is a prime example of this. Jumblatt’s political strategy largely seemed to work during the 1990s, as he served in cabinet throughout the period. He also was able to secure influence on the complex question of repatriating internally displaced Lebanese, many of whom were from areas under his political influence. By 2000, Jumblatt was increasingly and openly critical of Syria’s role in Lebanon, as well as the continuing military role of Hezbollah. This put him in the crosshairs of both. His relationship with Syria’s new leader, Bashar alAssad, for example, was uncertain. Indeed, Jumblatt was emerging with a group of Lebanese politicians demanding greater independence for Lebanon, increasing tensions with Syria and their Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. The assassination of Jumblatt’s ally, Rafic Hariri, touched off the Cedar Revolution, which demanded Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. Among politicians, Jumblatt helped to lead opposition demands for Syria to quit Lebanon, and he became one of the leaders of the pro-Western March 14 Alliance, an alliance that came to dominate Lebanese politics for a few years after Syria’s 2005 withdrawal. By as early as 2009, Jumblatt was beginning to distance himself from the movement, in large part recognizing the dominant power of the Hezbollah-led March 8 Alliance. In the process, he continued to maintain an influential role in Lebanese politics. Although by 2020, Jumblatt remained the dominate politician from the Druze community, he officially retired from Parliament before the 2018 elections, with his son, Taymour Walid Jumblatt, standing for and winning a seat. Walid has, throughout his career, been perceptive of political winds and adopted his positions accordingly. He called for political change, for a new generation of political leaders to emerge, following the 2019–2020 protests. And in the days following the August 2020 explosion in Beirut, he demanded that the government resign and for there to be an international investigation. He rejected the idea that the Lebanese authorities were capable of credibly carrying out such an investigation.

K KAABOUR, AHMAD (1955– ). A Lebanese singer, actor, songwriter, and composer. Kaabour’s song “Ounadikom” earned him recognition from an early age. He is known for works that engage the social conditions of the Palestinians and Lebanese. As an actor, Kaabour’s roles have included, most notably, playing Waddie Hadda in Carlos. See also MUSIC, LEBANESE. KAFTA. A Lebanese food dish made of minced meat and spices, and then either grilled or baked. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE. KANAAN, GHAZI (1942–2005). A Syrian official who headed up Syrian intelligence operations in Lebanon from 1982–2002. During that long period, Kanaan exerted great control over Lebanese politics and policies on behalf of the interests of the Syrian government. By using his influence to get Lebanese parties to run pro-Syrian candidates, effectively vetoing anti-Syrian candidates, and using intimidation tactics and other means he made sure that Lebanon followed Syria’s will. Kanaan returned to Syria in 2002, to serve in various capacities there. He became Syria’s minister of interior in 2004. After the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005, Kanaan was questioned but not charged. He died in October of that same year from a gunshot wound to his head. Not everyone accepted the Syrian officials’ report that it was a suicide. KARAM, MELHEM (1932–2010). A Lebanese media publisher and journalist who headed the Lebanese Journalists Union for 50 years. Karam was considered to be a pillar of Lebanese journalism and a constant champion of press freedom. He also served the Arab Journalist Federation and the International League of Journalists. Moreover, Karam was a prolific novelist, known as the “Prince of the Arab Novel.” His most notable works included The Storm, A Thousand and One Nights, and The Secrets. Upon announcement of his death in 2010, praise for his contributions to Lebanese journal175

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ism, public debate, and culture came from several corners, including all of the major politicians and the president, vice president, and speaker of the Parliament. KARAM, YUSUF BAYK (1823–1889). A regional political leader-turnedrebel-and-nationalist. Karam holds mythical status in Lebanese historical annals, especially in the Maronite community, for his military feats and efforts to check Ottoman power in Lebanon. He was born to a noble family in the Maronite community in the northern Lebanese city of Ehden and received an education fitting of his family’s standing. His father was leader of the region, and upon his passing in 1857, Yusuf became leader of Ehden and the surrounding area. He was popular, had political reach far beyond his area of Mount Lebanon, and was deeply devoted to the Maronite faith and traditions. The Mount Lebanon region was unstable at the time of Karam’s rule, with tensions between economic classes and especially sectarian communities. In 1860, Mount Lebanon imploded into a full-fledged war between Maronite Christians and Druze that spilled over into neighboring regions, including major cities. The Ottomans ruled the area, but European powers were arming the various sides. In 1860, Karam was appointed the acting Christian governor of Mount Lebanon, but he ran afoul of Ottoman authorities for his opposition to their political plans for the country and was exiled in 1862. In 1864, he returned to Lebanon and led a rebellion that was, in part, a protest of the tax burden on residents in the mountainous region. He led a series of military battles against Ottoman authorities and, although greatly outnumbered, was victorious in some of these battles. His hope was to expel Ottoman forces from Lebanon and establish, with European backing, a more independent Lebanon. In 1867, Karam surrendered to Ottoman forces and agreed to leave Lebanon for exile in Italy for a second time. He continued to champion Lebanese independence to European leaders during his years in exile. In 1889, he passed away while in Italy. His body was returned to be buried in a cathedral in his hometown of Ehden. The site is a destination for pilgrims and visitors. KARAMI, FAISAL (1971– ). A Sunni Muslim politician and former cabinet minister. Karami was born into the important Karami family from the Tripoli region, with its long history of political leadership in Lebanon. He is the grandson of former prime minister Abdul Hami Karami, the son of former prime minister Omar Karami, and the nephew of former prime minister Rashid Karami. Faisal is head of the Arab Liberation Party, which is part of the National Coalition bloc. He holds a seat in the 2018–2022 Parliament.

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KARAMI, OMAR (1934–2015). Hailing from the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli, Karami led two post–civil war governments as prime minister. The first began right after the end of the civil war in 1990 but only lasted until early 1992, in the face of nationwide protests concerning a severe economic crisis. The second began in 2004, but was brought down less than a year later by Cedar Revolution protests resulting from the assassination of his predecessor, Rafic Hariri. Omar Karami was born into the most influential Sunni Muslim family in northern Lebanon, one that has played a leading role in politics, religion, and philanthropy, and produced several national political figures throughout the country’s history. His father, Abdul Hamid Karami, was prime minister in 1945, and a champion of Lebanese independence, and his brother, Rashid Karami, held the premiership on numerous occasions and was a sitting prime minister when assassinated in 1987. Omar, educated at Cairo University and American University of Beirut, trained as a lawyer and carried on the family’s political traditions. He was the education minister in the Salim Hoss–led government in 1989, and a year later, prime minister. His government was the first post–civil war government and faced the monumental task of rebuilding a country that remained deeply fractured, with heavily armed militias, an Israeli occupied zone in southern Lebanon, and a shattered economy, all the while under the tutelage of the Syrian security forces, the ultimate arbitrator of Lebanese political and security considerations. His relatively short-lived government counted some major achievements, including, for example, dissolving the wartime militias (save Hezbollah and the South Lebanon Army), rebuilding and extending Lebanese Army control of much of the country, and helping to negotiate the end of the Western Hostage Crisis ordeal. Karami, however, was seen by his critics as being too close to Syria, a sentiment only magnified by his signing of the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination (1991), which many felt institutionalized Syrian dominance over Lebanese affairs. His insisting on holding the 1992 parliamentary elections against the wishes of many Lebanese groups, and in the midst of a severe economic crisis, led to further deterioration of confidence in his government. Protests were held throughout the country and were widespread. They came to be known in some circles as the “revolution of the poor.” Karami’s position was untenable, and he resigned in May 1992. He was replaced by Rachid al-Solh, another pro-Syrian prime minister, who singularly focused on seeing through the elections in late summer of 1992, but protests shortly thereafter brought his government down in favor of Rafic Hariri.

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Karami’s second chance at governing occurred in 2004, when, with some degree of irony, he replaced the outgoing prime minister, Hariri, who had resigned due to increasing tensions with Syria and its Lebanese allies. Karami’s second term in office was also short-lived. Within Lebanon and externally, Karami and his cabinet were considered pro-Syrian and pliant to Syrian interests. Karami faced criticism for opposing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which called on Hezbollah to disarm and Syria to leave Lebanon. It was, however, the fallout from the assassination of Hariri in February 2005, with hundreds of thousands of people marching in the streets in the Cedar Revolution, that brought down the Karami government. The revolution also led to the withdrawal of Syrian security forces from Lebanon and the ushering in of a new political era. Karami left politics shortly after his resignation. His son, Faisal Karami, became the political face of the Karami family and served in subsequent Lebanese cabinets. KARAMI, RASHID (1921–1987). A Sunni lawyer and politician from Tripoli who served as prime minister numerous times. His father, Abdul Hamid Karami, was a Sunni Muslim grand mufti who played a role in Lebanon’s independence. Rashid Karami went to Cairo as a student of law, which may have played a role in his later pro-Arab stance in Lebanese politics. Karami was first elected to Parliament, receiving a cabinet post in 1951, to fill the seat of his late father. Four years later, he began his first term as prime minister. He would go on to win subsequent elections as a representative of Tripoli and serve terms as prime minister many additional times. His political stance was pro-Arab, and he favored the Arabist side during the civil war of 1958. Karami favored support for the Palestinians in Lebanon. He boycotted the government of President Charles Helou concerning the rights of those Palestinians, leading to the secret Cairo Agreement of 1969, which gave social and military rights to the Palestinians, as Karami favored. During the Amine Gemayel presidency, Karami protested by withdrawing to his home base, Tripoli. As Lebanon’s Muslim population grew faster than the Christian population, Karami was a strong advocate for increasing the percentage of parliamentary seats in favor of Muslims. Since no new official figures had been taken since the Census of 1932, his views did not lead to any significant changes. Karami cooperated with the Syrians, who asked him to head the national unity government brokered by Syria in 1984. He was assassinated in 1987, while the civil war was still ongoing.

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KASSAR, ADNAN (1930– ). A prominent lawyer, businessman, and former minister of economy and trade. Kassar was born in Beirut and earned a law degree from Saint Joseph University. He practiced law and became a successful businessman. He took on a leadership role in the business community in 1972, by chairing Beirut’s Chamber of Commerce. During the civil war, he worked to keep the business operations of Lebanon as normal as possible. He worked for a united effort among all of Lebanon’s chambers of commerce and served as their leader. Kassar’s work in bringing about cooperation among various business communities in Lebanon led to his selection to serve as chair of the General Union of Arab Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture. His efforts played a role in the establishment of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area. He served a two-year term at the International Chamber of Commerce beginning in 1999. Adnan and his brother Adel, as business partners, bought Fransabank in 1980, and went on to develop the Fransabank Group, which became a major bank in Lebanon, as well as having a presence in several other nations. Adnan was appointed minister of commerce and trade in 2004, holding the position until the resignation of the government in 2005. He returned to the unity government cabinet in 2009, serving as minister of state until the resignation of the government in 2011. Aside from his legal, business, and political work, Kassar has a long history of supporting arts and culture. His achievements have led to numerous Lebanese and international honors, including awards from China, Russia, Sudan, Brazil, and other nations, recognizing him as an important friend to their nations. KATAEB PARTY. Known in English as the Lebanese Phalange or Phalanges party, it is most often referred to by the Arabic equivalent term, Kataeb. The term phalange is the plural form of the Greek word phalanx, referring to a closely positioned group of fighters. The party was founded in 1936, by Christian leaders, one of whom was Pierre Gemayel, with the goal of fighting to achieve Lebanon’s independence as a separate nation rather than as part of a union with Syria or some other Arab nation. The faction of the party that favored full independence from France won out, and Kataeb, or Phalanges, became one of the several parties competing for votes among the Christians in independent Lebanon. It won its first parliamentary seats in 1958. That same year, it created a militia to fight in the civil war of 1958. Kataeb leaders opposed the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which allowed Palestinian fighters to operate in Lebanon. The leaders demanded that the government disarm the Palestinians. Government inability to do so led to the heavy arming of the Kataeb Party, resulting in inevitable clashes between them and Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies.

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Indeed, the Lebanese civil war of 1975–1990 started in April, following clashes between the Kataeb and Palestinians. Following the first phase of the war, Lebanese Christians reorganized their political and militia power. The Kataeb became the dominant group in the political Lebanese Front, while its militia was incorporated into the Lebanese Forces, which then became the main Christian militia for the remainder of the war. The height of political power for the party came in 1982, when Bashir Gemayel was elected president. When Bashir was assassinated before taking office, his brother, also a Kataeb Party leader, took office as president, the first ever from that party. Although nowhere near as influential as it once was, the party does continue to have support among Lebanon’s Maronite Christian community. The party holds three seats in the 2018 Parliament and is part of the March 14 Alliance. KERR, MALCOLM. An American scholar of the Middle East who was a former professor at, and then briefly president of, American University of Beirut (AUB). Kerr was born and raised in Beirut as the son of parents who taught at AUB. After earning his doctoral degree, he taught at AUB before moving to teach in the United States, where he went on to publish extensively about the Middle East and the Arab world. This includes his best-known work, The Arab Cold War, in which he analyzed the conflict between progressive and conservative Arab states during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1984, Kerr accepted an appointment as president of AUB. It was during the phase of the civil war of 1975–1990 when Shiite militia were becoming quite militant. Shortly after taking up residence, Kerr was shot by two gunmen as he left a building on campus. The killers were never caught or identified, but Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for his assassination. Steve Kerr, one of his sons, later became famous as a player for the Chicago Bulls of the National Basketball Association (NBA) when they won multiple NBA championships, as well as coach of the Golden State Warriors. KHADDAM, ABDUL-HALIM (1932–2020). A Syrian politician and leader in the Arab Socialist Baath Party. Khaddam directed Syria’s foreign affairs after Assad came to power in 1970, making him very influential in shaping Syria’s interests in Lebanon. In 1984, he became one of Syria’s three vice presidents, with control of foreign affairs. In that capacity he continued to exert Syria’s influence on Lebanon through Syrian policy and personal relations with Lebanese business and political leaders, including Rafic Hariri.

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KHALID, MUFTI HASAN (1921–1989). A Lebanese Sunni Muslim from Beirut who trained in Islamic jurisprudence in Beirut and Cairo. Khalid’s career led him to be appointed mufti in 1967. He was killed when a car bomb exploded in Beirut in 1989. KHAYYAT BOOKSHOP. Located near American University of Beirut, the Khayyat Bookshop has long been important as a source of academic and political books, as well as a meeting place. In addition to stocking books in Arabic and other languages, the bookshop publishes academic works in French and English. KHOURY, BECHARA EL (1890–1964). A lawyer, judge, and minister who holds the distinction of being the first president of independent Lebanon. Khoury was a strong advocate for independence during the later part of the period of the French Mandate. When France resisted, and with one of his goals being to restore the constitution, he formed a new political party known as the Constitutional Bloc. The Constitutional Bloc had a Christian base, but Khoury worked with the Muslim faction and stressed the nation’s Arabic heritage, and entered into discussions with Sunni Muslim leader Riad al-Solh. Both leaders were arrested by the French, who did not yet support independence, during a period sometimes known as the War of Independence. Khoury’s short first term as president was from 21 September to 11 November 1943. After a brief hiatus, he served a long second term beginning on 22 November 1943. He oversaw a period of economic growth and modernization. Being on the losing side of the Arab–Israeli War in 1948 was a setback for Lebanon. Facing accusations by Kamal Jumblatt and other leaders of corruption and related protests, he was forced to resign in some disgrace on 18 September 1952. In addition to being known as Lebanon’s first president, Khoury was also famous for establishing (with Riad al-Solh) the political arrangements for governing postindependence Lebanon and what became known as the unwritten National Pact. KHOURY, ELIAS (1948– ). A Lebanese novelist, critic, and playwright. Khoury was born in Beirut and then moved to Jordan in 1967. He was so moved by the suffering of those in a Palestinian refugee camp that he joined Fatah. He left after the Palestinian deaths during the Black September Conflict between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which began in 1970. Khoury went on to study in France, earning his doctorate at the University of Paris. He edited journals and had begun publishing novels by 1975. His novel The Little Mountain is told against the backdrop of the

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Lebanese civil war of 1975–1990. His novel Gate of the Sun, depicting the plight of Palestinian refugees, was made into a film. Aside from his prolific writing career, Khoury has taught at several U.S. and European universities. See also LITERATURE. KHURI (or KHOURY), BISHARAH ABDULLAH AL. See KHOURY, BECHARA EL (1890–1964). KHURI (or KHOURY), RA’IF (1913–1967). An author, teacher, and journalist born in Nabay, Lebanon, near Beirut. Aside from journal articles, Khuri published poems, plays, essays, and numerous books. One of his books is available in English translation as Modern Arab Thought: Channels of the French Revolution to the Arab East. KIBBI. A popular food dish in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region made from ground lamb and bulgur, a form of dried, cracked wheat. Kibbi may be cooked or served raw. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE. KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM, LATIN. A kingdom established by Christian Crusaders. At its zenith in the mid-12th century, it included much of modern-day Israel, Palestine, and southern Lebanon. After Saladin captured Jerusalem in 1187, the kingdom’s territory consisted of smaller and smaller holdings along the coast until it lost control of Acre in 1291. KINGDOM OF SYRIA. See ARAB KINGDOM OF SYRIA. KORNET CHEHWAN GATHERING. See QORNET SHEHWAN GATHERING. KULAYLAT, IBRAHIM (1934– ). Head of the Independent Nasserite Movement, founded in 1958. Kulaylat also organized the Nasserite Sunni militia Al-Murabtun, which was very active during the Lebanese civil war. His militia drew on Sunni, Shi’i, and some Christian factions. Kulaylat went into exile in France in 1985. KULNA WATANI. A political movement, translated as “We Are All Patriots,” led by progressive Lebanese intellectuals. Often shortened to just Watani, the party won one seat in the 2018 parliamentary elections. See also HADDAD, JOUMANA (1970– ).

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KURDS. An ethnic population whose traditional homeland is the mountainous regions now forming parts of Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran. Some Kurds migrated to Lebanon as early as the 12th-century period of rule of Lebanon by the Ayyubids, a Kurdish dynasty. Other Kurds came as administrators of Lebanon during the period of Ottoman control. In the modern period beginning in the 1920s, civil strife and poverty in traditional Kurdish areas led to waves of Kurdish immigration to Lebanon, especially Beirut. Many of the Kurdish immigrants have never been granted Lebanese citizenship and form an impoverished underclass. Lebanese Kurds are Sunni Muslims. Many speak Kurmanji, a northern dialect of the Kurdish language of the IndoEuropean family of languages.

L LABAKI, NADINE (1974– ). A Lebanese actress who has gone on to become an internationally known director and activist. Having been born in Beirut and studied media arts at Saint Joseph University, Labaki became a successful actor. Her international reputation is mainly based on her movies. She has cowritten and directed three films that achieved international recognition. The 2018 film Capernaum, both written and directed by her, deals with the issue of neglected children through the story of a 12-year-old boy who, while serving a prison term, sues his parents for neglect. It received numerous international film awards. The film’s nomination for an Oscar for Best Foreign Language Film was a first for a female Arab director. She is active in the Beirut Madinati political party, which contested the 2016 Beirut elections on a nonsectarian platform calling for better government services, along with social-economic reforms. LAHOUD, EMILE (1936– ). President of Lebanon from 1998–2007, a distinction he shares with his predecessor, Elias Hrawi, of being Lebanon’s longest-serving president, thanks to a highly controversial constitutional amendment allowing for an extension of his term. Lahoud was born in the town of Baadat, in the Metn region, to the influential Lahoud family, which has produced numerous politicians and military men of distinction. His father served in the military and was politically active in the independence movement. His mother was of Armenian descent, with family roots in Syria and Turkey. Lahoud undertook his education at military academies in Lebanon, the United Kingdom, and the United States, including at the U.S. Naval War College. He then embarked on a career in the Lebanese military, with a specialty as a naval officer, rising steadily through the ranks. In 1989, in the midst of a constitutional crisis of competing governments in West Beirut and East Beirut, he was asked by President Hrawi to become the new commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, a position he accepted. The decision put him into a direct clash with Michel Aoun, former head of the army and his former boss, who headed the rival government. 185

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General Lahoud headed the Lebanese Armed Forces between 1989–2007, and was credited with rebuilding the force into a national institution with support across the sectarian divide. He was also given credit for the role he played in the disarming of wartime militias. He was politically astute, especially in his dealings with Syria and Hezbollah. Critics, however, accused him of acquiescing to Syrian and Hezbollah demands, weakening Lebanese security concerns in the process. In 1998, the Lebanese Parliament amended the constitution, allowing for a sitting commander of the Lebanese Army to run for president. The controversial amendment, pushed by Syria and its Lebanese allies, cleared the way for General Lahoud to be elected president. Initially, at least, his election was fairly well received, especially within the Maronite Christian community. After almost a decade of marginalization, the Maronites hoped that his appointment would lead to a stronger presidency, and thus a return to Maronite political relevance. It was also felt that as a champion of Lebanese institutions, he would create a strong state that would extend its authority throughout the country. Within his first two years, Lahoud certainly attempted to reassert the position of the presidency, especially vis-à-vis the prime minister and cabinet. His success in doing so was likely owing to that fact that Prime Minister Salim Hoss did not carry the same sort of political and economic weight that his predecessor, Rafic Hariri, held. Indeed, Rafic Hariri’s return to the prime ministership from 2000–2004 led to a period of intense competition between the two men, with very public standoffs. Much of this was related to questions of power and patronage distribution within the political system. There were also disagreements about Hariri’s neoliberal economic policies and debt-driven development; however, the rift between the two men was driven by two incredibly volatile issues that deeply divided the Lebanese. One involved Syria’s role in Lebanon, and the other concerned the disarmament of Hezbollah, both of which came to the forefront of Lebanese politics following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000. Facing increased political and popular pressure from some corners in Lebanon, and such external powers as the United States, France, and the Gulf Arab states, Lahoud supported Hezbollah’s right to maintain its arms and continue to conduct the conflict with Israel. He also supported Syria’s continued role in Lebanon, including maintaining the presence of thousands of Syrian troops in the country. Lahoud was increasingly criticized for his strong pro-Syrian, pro-Hezbollah stand, including by his own Maronite community, which had become disillusioned with his leadership on these two important issues. Some observers, however, have interpreted his approach to his long-standing pragmatic nature, wherein he likely calculated that demanding Syrian withdrawal and

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Hezbollah disarmament would divide Lebanese popular opinion along sectarian lines, leading to an inevitable clash with Hezbollah and a possible return to civil war. Nonetheless, by 2004, the situation had come to a head and ultimately impacted forthcoming Lebanese presidential elections. The international community, likely with encouragement from its allies in Lebanon, pressured Syria on Lebanon. Significantly, this included United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which called on all foreign forces to leave Lebanon, and for all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias to disarm. It also demanded that Lebanese presidential elections be held free of foreign interference. The Syrians and Hezbollah were furious about Resolution 1559, blaming their Lebanese opponents for lobbying for it. The Syrians doubled down on their determination to ensure that an ally occupy the presidency, complicating the implementation of Resolution 1559. In a highly unpopular move, Syria’s Lebanese allies in Parliament approved an amendment to the constitution for an extension of President Lahoud’s term, to the chagrin of many Lebanese politicians, including Hariri and Walid Jumblatt, both of whom lobbied the Syrian president heavily against extending Lahoud’s term. It also included Lahoud’s own cousin, politician Nassib Lahoud, and Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Sfeir, the latter being the leading political voice in his community. The decision also bitterly divided Lebanese public opinion and greatly weakened Lahoud’s legitimacy. Lahoud’s extended three-year term (2005–2007) faced severe turbulence, handicapping his ability to pursue a political agenda. The 14 February 2005 assassination of Rafic Hariri led to the Cedar Revolution, during which hundreds of thousands of civilian protestors, backed by politicians and the international community, forced the Syrian military to quit Lebanon after 30 years. This led to parliamentary elections won by forces opposed to Syria and unsympathetic to the president. Hezbollah’s power play against its political opponents in Lebanon, following its conflict with Israel, turned into a two-year stalemate paralyzing government and effectively ended any immediate prospect of disarming Hezbollah. The 2008 Doha Agreement eventually brought the impasse to an end, including allowing for a new Lebanese president to be elected, some six months after Lahoud’s term ended. LAHOUD, NASSIB (1944–2012). A Maronite engineer, real estate magnate, art collector, politician, minister, and ambassador. After earning an engineering degree in England, Nassib Lahoud returned to Lebanon and founded his own firm. His Lahoud Engineering Company specialized in large-scale projects. Lahoud’s diplomatic skills played a role in the conference that led to the Taif Accords and the end of the civil war in 1990. He

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was rewarded with an appointment by President Elias Hrawi to serve as Lebanon’s ambassador to the United States. He returned to Lebanon as an appointee to the postwar parliament. He was then elected to Parliament in 1992, serving three terms. Lahoud’s political agenda was to limit or even end Syrian control of Lebanese politics. That stance led him to oppose pro-Syria legislation and join with the like-minded, mostly Christian Qornet Shehwan Gathering. He also was one of 50 prominent figures who started the Democratic Renewal Party in 2001. The party favored a more progressive and less sectarian political system in Lebanon. It is part of the March 14 Alliance. It has elected only a few members to Parliament. Lahoud died in Beirut on 1 February 2012. LAUSANNE CONFERENCE (1984). During the third phase of the civil war of 1975–1990, the central government, under Amine Gemayel, had been weakening as the war continued. To further move toward a government of reconciliation in Lebanon, which had begun during the 1983 Geneva Conference, delegates of the major factions in that war met in Lausanne, Switzerland, in March 1984. Having recently forced the Western, mostly American forces to retreat from Beirut, and having stationed approximately 40,000 troops in Lebanon, Syria was in control of the conference. The goal of Syria was to get the factions to agree on a reconciliation government, with Syria wielding the main influence. The effort failed. The conference ended after nine days, with only a weak “cease-fire and security” plan agreed on. The civil war would continue until 1990, when the Taif Accords made a government of reconciliation possible. LE GRAND LIBAN. See GRAND LIBAN. LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES. See ARAB LEAGUE. LEAGUE OF NATIONS. See DE CAIX DE SAINT-AYMOUR, ROBERT (1869–1960); FRENCH MANDATE; GRAND LIBAN. LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (LAU). A private, secular university with a main campus in Beirut and a second campus in Jbail. It is chartered through the University of the State of New York. It offers a comprehensive choice of degree programs and enrolls more than 8,000 students. LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. After independence in 1943, the Lebanese Army was formed from Lebanese soldiers and officers who had fought under French command during the French Mandate. One of those officers,

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General Fuad Chehab, was made commander of the new Lebanese Army. He set out to shape that army along the lines of the French Army. He was a Maronite Christian, and during the early days the army was predominantly Maronite in terms of both officers and others, although this would change in later years. Chehab was against using the army to intervene in sectarian political disputes, and so he refused to carry out the wishes of President Bechara El Khoury in 1952, leading to Khoury’s resignation. Chehab then served briefly as an interim president until the election of Camille Chamoun. In 1958, he again refused a command, this time from Chamoun, to have the army intervene in an internal, sectarian dispute. Chehab’s moderate, nonsectarian approach came to be termed Chehabism and led to him assuming the presidency as the compromise candidate between different political camps after Chamoun’s resignation. Historically, the Lebanese Army was not a strong one. It avoided any direct confrontations during the 1948 Arab–Israel War by withdrawing from southern Lebanon, allowing Israeli troops to occupy the region. The various sectarian leaders, the zuama, historically maintained enforcement within their domains. Some scholars argue that the army was purposely kept weak, so as to not undermine the political power of the zuama, if not take over the machinery of governance through a coup d’éat, as has happened throughout much of the Arab world. The threat of increasing power and military might among the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1960s and later encouraged the government to strengthen the army and increase its budget; however, the army’s ability to deal effectively with Palestinian fighters was greatly limited by political obstacles and divisions. During the civil war of 1975–1990, the Lebanese Army split along sectarian lines and lost control of most regions of the nation, as those regions came under the control of sectarian militias or foreign military forces. Even the capital was split between an East Beirut and a West Beirut, and controlled by militias. When President Amine Gemayel’s term came to an end with no agreement on a successor, the army commander, Michel Aoun, became prime minister. In that capacity, he set about to use the army—at least the part that stayed loyal to him—to defeat and disarm the militias and attempted to drive out the Syrian Army. With the end of that war, the Taif Accords called for the disbanding of all militias, and all of them except for the Hezbollah militias did disarm and disband, with some of their soldiers integrating into the central army. Prime Minister Omar Karami made an effort to rebuild the army and its control of all of Lebanon, with considerable success, but he had to resign in 1992, before making the goal a reality.

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Ultimately, Lebanese authorities were successful in rebuilding the Lebanese Army. Indeed, the army was increasingly seen as a symbol of national unity and garnered respect from the sectarian communities. In 2007, Michel Suleiman led an army attack against Fatah al-Islam forces in the Nahr alBared refugee camp. After four months of fighting and the deaths of many on both sides of the conflict, the army was triumphant. The move against Islamic militants, in this case and in others, was popular with the Lebanese public and raised even further the profile of the army in the popular consciousness. The Lebanese Army also increasingly replaced nonstate actor Hezbollah in controlling key border posts in Lebanon, as Hezbollah’s forces were stretched to the limit fighting in the Syrian conflict and found it convenient to cooperate with the military, a practice that occurred often. Despite the crisis in Lebanon in 2019–2020, and with Lebanese authorities losing legitimacy among widespread segments of the population, the Lebanese Army remains the one major organ of the state with its reputation intact, a unifier among Lebanon’s diverse population. See also ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ADP); FRANCO–LEBANESE TREATY; GHANIM, ISKANDAR (1911–2005); HADDAD, SAAD (1937–1984); HAJJ, FRANÇOIS AL- (1953–2007); SOUTH LEBANON ARMY (SLA). LEBANESE ARMY. See LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. LEBANESE CATHOLICS. See MARONITE CHRISTIANS; ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANS. LEBANESE CENTRAL BANK. The Banque du Liban is the central bank of Lebanon. Its functions include the concession to issue the Lebanese pound and hold gold and Lebanese reserve currencies, which are mostly in U.S. dollars. See also BANKING CRISIS (2020); ECONOMY. LEBANESE CHRISTIANS. See ARMENIAN APOSTOLIC CHURCH; ARMENIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH; ASSYRIAN CHURCH; EASTERN ORTHODOX CHURCH; GREEK ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY; MARONITE CHURCH; PROTESTANT CHRISTIANS; ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANS; SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; UNIATE RITES/UNIATE CHURCHES. LEBANESE CIVIL WAR. See CIVIL WAR OF 1860; CIVIL WAR OF 1958; CIVIL WAR OF 1975–1990.

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LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY (LCP). Formed in 1924, under the guidance of Russia, the party was the advocate for Communism in both Lebanon and Syria. The Communist Party in Syria became a separate entity in 1944. During the French Mandate, it was outlawed from 1939–1943. After regaining party status, the LCP contested elections but failed to win any seats before it was again outlawed in 1948. It survived as a small, underground movement until 1965, when it became part of the Front for Progressive Parties and National Forces, the forerunner to the Lebanese National Movement. The LCP became a legal party again in 1970, and it was one of several parties to maintain an active militia. Party members came under attack by militant Sunni groups in the 1980s, and its leaders, in particular, were subject to assassinations. It fought against Amal in 1987. George Hawi, the party’s former leader, was assassinated by a car bomb in 2005, shortly after he had taken a position critical of Syrian control of Lebanon. The LCP continues to be active through a network of leftist organizations under the LCP umbrella. LEBANESE CUISINE. See CUISINE, LEBANESE. LEBANESE, DIASPORA. See DIASPORA, LEBANESE. LEBANESE DRUZE. See DRUZE. LEBANESE FOOD. See CUISINE, LEBANESE. LEBANESE FORCES (LF). A Maronite-dominated political party that was formerly a Maronite-based militia that fought in the civil war of 1975–1990. During the war, it was designed as an umbrella organization that encompassed and eventually supplanted the militias of the major Christian political parties, for instance, the Kataeb Party, and allied with other Christian groups. LF was initially led by Christian strongman Bashir Gemayel, who ruthlessly united Christian militias under his command. By 1982, the LF, backed by Israel, had made great strides in the conflict and set about to take control of the Lebanese government. Following the assassination of Gemayel, Elie Hobeika was in command of an LF detachment that was blamed for the killing of many civilians during the Sabra and Shatila Massacres. The LF were active during the War of the Mountain, which began in the Chouf Mountains in September 1983. With the backing for the Lebanese Armed forces, the LF, under the leadership of Samir Geagea, engaged in fighting against the Druze-based Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), led by Walid Jumblatt. The PSP was

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backed by the Palestinians and, most significantly, Syria. That war spread to other regions in Lebanon but came to an end in the spring of 1984, after only a few months. A major rift in the leadership of the LF occurred in 1985, when Christian forces were on the defensive, having lost their attempt to take control of Lebanon. Hobeika had been a signatory to the Tripartite Agreement, which was bitterly opposed by Geagea and many other Maronites on the grounds that the agreement legitimized and gave even more control to the Syrians. Geagea led a successful coup against Hobeika and took over the leadership of the LF. Hobeika then relocated to Damascus with some of his LF supporters. Following their military defeats, the LF remained in control of the Christian cantons of Lebanon and ran it as a state-within-a-state. Their canton remained the only major part of Lebanon independent of Syrian control, except for a small sliver of land along the Israeli border. The LF leadership strongly opposed the nomination of pro-Syrian presidential candidate Suleiman Frangieh in 1988. They effectively kept the nomination from going forward when Geagea and his allies boycotted the 1988 parliamentary session, causing a potential failure of quorum. When the pro-Syria side next proposed the name Mikhail al-Dahir, another Maronite sympathetic to Syria, as the presidential candidate, Geagea and his allies opposed his nomination as well. The crisis caused by this impasse led to the appointment of a transitional military government led by General Michel Aoun. The LF militia fought a terrible fratricidal war with Aoun and his forces for control of the Christian canton in 1989–1990. That conflict greatly weakened Lebanon’s Christian community. The LF military disbanded at the end of the war, as did the other militias, except the Hezbollah one. LF evolved into a political party, currently lead by Samir Geagea. In 1994, Geagea’s refusal to cooperate with Syrian forces led to his arrest for and conviction of the murders of rival politicians, and he was sent to prison, the only major militia leader to have such a fortune. In the eyes of his supporters, the verdict was politically motivated. Geagea was released from prison 11 years later, in 2005, and continued to lead the LF, which won 14 seats in the 2018 parliamentary elections, second in Christian seats only to Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement. LEBANESE FRONT (LF). An officially secular political movement supported mainly by Maronite Christians. The name Lebanese Front dates to 1977, but it was formed in 1976, during the first phase of the civil war of 1975–1990. It was a political umbrella organization representing most of the Maronite Christian parties. The LF was formed as a rival to the Lebanese

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National Movement, led by Kamal Jumblatt. Its leaders included former president Camille Chamoun, Pierre Gemayel, former president Suleiman Frangieh, Charles Malik, and Fuad Frem al-Bustani. The military wing of the movement was the Lebanese Forces. During the civil war, the Lebanese Front, along with its Lebanese Forces militia, had a strategic alliance with Israel because they shared the goal of limiting the power of both the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syria. It reached the zenith of its power in the summer of 1982, when it put forth Bashir Gemayel’s name for president. Following Bashir’s assassination, the LF supported his brother, Amine Gemayel; however, with the death of most its aging leadership during the 1980s, the LF ceased to exist as a major entity, although its militia, the Lebanese Forces, transformed as a political party and continues to be active today. See also ABU SULAYMAN, SHAKIR (1927–?); FAYADIYYA INCIDENT (1978); MARADA BRIGADE. LEBANESE–ISRAELI CONFLICT. See ISRAEL–LEBANON WAR (1982–1985). LEBANESE–ISRAELI PEACE AGREEMENT RAEL–LEBANON WAR (1982–1985).

(1983).

See

IS-

LEBANESE JEWS. See JEWS. LEBANESE MARONITE ORDER. Also called the Lebanese Monastic Order, an institution formed in 1694, by Maronite monks. It represents Maronite monastics from Lebanon and the wider region. Members of the order are also known as Baladites, from an Arabic term referring to country monks, meaning monks in rural areas. LEBANESE MONASTIC ORDER. See LEBANESE MARONITE ORDER. LEBANESE MUSLIMS. There are three Muslim traditions with adherents in Lebanon, as well as two other religious communities that are put in the Muslim grouping when it comes to allocating seats in the Lebanese Parliament. The Sunnis are one of the three Muslim traditions. The other two are the Imami (Twelver) and the Ismaili Shiites. The Druze and the Alawites are the two other religious communities that the government groups with Muslims in the confessional system of political leadership.

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LEBANESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT (LNM). In 1969, during the period before the civil war, Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt and his Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) encouraged other leftist, Pan-Arabist, and pro-Syrian groups to form an umbrella organization known as the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). The LNM was supportive of Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Politically and in accordance with Jumblatt’s approach, it wanted to see an end to the confessional system. That stance threatened the entrenched politics of control by sectarian-based elites. The LNM’s member organizations resisted the government’s efforts to control the movement of the PLO fighters into and within Lebanon. LNM forged alliances with PLO factions at a time when the government was ordering the army to control PLO activities. With the outbreak of civil war in 1975, the LNM evolved into a militia with an estimated 2,000 fighters. It was allied with the various factions of the PLO. It fought against the Israel Defense Forces and the Christian-based militias. LNM leader Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated in March 1977, greatly weakening the cohesion among the LNM’s contingents. With Lebanese Muslims turning more to the PLO rather than the LNM for support, the weakened LNM disbanded in 1982. It was replaced by the Lebanese National Resistance Front, commonly referred to as Jammoul. By 1983, Shiite militias, along with Syria, had assumed control of much of Muslim Lebanon. See also ARAB SOCIALIST BAATH PARTY. LEBANESE NATIONAL RESISTANCE FRONT (LNRF). A small militia formed by a coalition of leftist forces that came together to resist the Israel invasion of Beirut during the Israel–Lebanon War of 1982. It began under the name Lebanese National Salvation Front. The LNRF is commonly referred to by its Arabic acronym, Jammoul. It gained support from some Palestine Liberation Organization fighters, as well as some pro-Syria groups. It was most active in the 1982–1985 period of the civil war, when it claimed responsibility for many attacks on positions of the Israel Defense Forces. See also JUMBLATT, WALID (1949– ). LEBANESE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT. See LEBANESE NATIONAL RESISTANCE FRONT (LNRF). LEBANESE NATIONALISM. The social or political stance that strongly associates with and promotes Lebanon and the Lebanese. It distinguishes itself from Arab nationalism or Pan-Arabism, as well as movements based on religious or ethnic identities.

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LEBANESE PHALANGES PARTY. See KATAEB PARTY. LEBANESE PROTESTANTS. See PROTESTANT CHRISTIANS. LEBANESE UNIFICATION MOVEMENT. A predominantly Druzebased party affiliated with the March 8 Alliance. The party was founded by Member of Parliament Weaam Wahhab in 2006. LEBANESE UNIVERSITY. Established in 1951, as a public university, it offers higher education for all of Lebanon’s diverse population. It is Lebanon’s only public university. Instruction is in Arabic, and tuition is affordable for most families. The main campus for Lebanese University was in Beirut, but during the civil war, when travel to Beirut was problematic, branch campuses were opened. At its founding, it had only two faculties, one for training teachers and the other at the Institute of Statistics. Today the university enrolls thousands of students in its 16 faculties, with a large range of degree programs ranging from undergraduate to doctoral levels. LEBANON, GEOGRAPHY. See EARTHQUAKES LEBANON, GREATER. See FRENCH MANDATE; MARONITE CHRISTIANS; MOUNT LEBANON. LEBANON HOSTAGE CRISIS. See WESTERN HOSTAGE CRISIS. LEBANON INTIFADA. See CEDAR REVOLUTION (2005). LEBANON–ISRAELI WAR, 1982–1985. See ISRAEL–LEBANON WAR (1982–1985). LEBANON, THE NAME. Historically, attested from biblical times, the name Lebanon referred to the mountainous region now known as Mount Lebanon. The word Lebanon is thought to derive from a root referring to whiteness, most likely a reference to the snow on the mountains. It is the short-form name of the Republic of Lebanon. See also GRAND LIBAN; LUBNAN. LEBANON REPUBLIC. See GRAND LIBAN. LEBANON, SMALLER. See FRENCH MANDATE; MARONITE CHRISTIANS; MOUNT LEBANON.

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LEVANT, THE. A term used historically as a rather vague term for the lands in the eastern region of the Mediterranean. The term is derived from an Italian term referring to “the rising” of the sun. The extent of the Levant has, at its broadest usage, covered the entire Eastern side of the Mediterranean from Egypt to Syria. In its more common usage in the modern era, its coverage includes the area from Israel to Syria. No matter how it is defined, the region of Lebanon is always considered part of the Levant. LIRA. See POUND, LEBANESE (LP). LITANI OPERATION. See OPERATION LITANI. LITERATURE. Drawing upon its long and rich history; diversity of ethnic and religious groups; and French, English, and Arabic linguistic streams the literature of Lebanon is one of the country’s strengths. The Lebanese literary tradition has benefited from the fact that many of its authors have spent time abroad, whether as students or exiles from the civil strife at home. For example, time spent in France enriched the work of such Lebanese writers as Georges Schehadé, Andrée Chedid, Abbas Beydoun, and Amin Maalouf. The time spent among the Druze by Christian writer Maroun Abboud produced works that revealed to the world the nature of everyday life among the Druze in the Lebanese mountains. The tumultuous political history of modern Lebanon, ranging from the Ottoman, French Mandate, and independence periods, has also played an important role in shaping both Lebanese writers and their subject matter. The civil war shaped the literature of its era and also drove many authors into exile, where they gained a wider readership. Lebanese literature also includes the works of the many authors living in the Lebanese diaspora, for example, Elia Abu Madi, Mikhail Naimy, Rawi Hage, Elias Khoury, and the renowned Khalil Gibran. Feminist writers, writing from Lebanon and the diaspora, for instance, Hanan al-Shaykh, Ghada al-Samman, May Ziade, Joumana Haddad, and many others have opened up the world of women in Arab society. See also CORM, CHARLES (1894–1963); NASRALLAH, EMILY (1931–2018); TUENI, NADIA HAMADEH (1935– ). L’ORIENT. See L’ORIENT-LE JOUR. L’ORIENT-LE JOUR. Born from a 1970s merger of L’Orient and Le Jour newspapers, it remains an important French-language newspaper published in Lebanon.

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LUBNAN. The Arabic spelling of Lebanon. The Arabic spelling for the formal name, Republic of Lebanon, is al-Jumhuriyah al-Lubnaniya.

M M1 GROUP. See MIKATI, NAJIB (1943– ). MAALOUF, AMIN (1949– ). Born in Beirut into a family of Christians with a mixed ethnic background. Maalouf worked as a journalist in Beirut until he moved to Paris in 1976, during the civil war period. He is fluent in Arabic, but as a Paris resident he writes in French. His many French-language fiction works and some nonfiction publications made him famous and well respected in French circles. Translations of his works expanded his readership throughout the world. He also has written musical compositions. Maalouf’s writings reflect a passion for peace and understanding among ethnic and religious peoples. He is especially concerned with helping the West understand the Middle East and Africa. His writings speak out against political corruption, ethnic discrimination, and the imbalance of wealth. Among his English translation titles are In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong, The Crusades through Arab Eyes¸ Disordered World: Setting a New Course for the Twenty-First Century Ports of Call, and On Identity. Among his many awards, Maalouf’s election to the prestigious Academie Francaise in 2011 marked a first for a person born in Lebanon. MADRID PEACE CONFERENCE (1991). A meeting held in Madrid, Spain, from 30 October to 4 November 1991, with the goal of achieving a lasting peace between Israel and its neighbors. The First Intifada had erupted in December 1987, and was still ongoing in March 1991, when U.S. president George H. W. Bush announced to Congress his plan to help negotiate peace in the Middle East. After months of diplomatic trips by James Baker, Bush’s secretary of state, delegations from Middle Eastern countries gathered in Madrid that October. The conference was cochaired by Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Delegates from Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel were in attendance, along with a Jordanian–Palestinian group. Israel had made it a precondition that representatives

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of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and East Jerusalem would not be in attendance. It was the first time delegates from all affected nations sat together to negotiate peace in the Middle East. The Madrid Conference did give the various delegations a chance to state their positions and demands, but it was not successful in formulating an agreement for peace in the region. It was followed by a several bilateral and multilateral conference with the goal of continuing the discussion. By 1992, the negotiations were failing, and some of the parties began to move away from the Madrid arrangement. Israel changed course and began talks with the PLO, and Jordan and Israel began bilateral talks. MAHMASANI, SUBHI (also spelled SOBHI) (1911–1986). A Lebanese jurist from a Sunni Muslim community. Subhi became known for his efforts to harmonize the Western and Islamic legal systems. He published works on the legal systems in several Arabic countries. As a legal scholar, Subhi advised the government of Lebanon, and he then served as minister of the economy beginning in 1966. MAJLIS AL-JUNUB. See CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES MAKASSED FOUNDATION. Formally, Al-Makassed Philantropic Islamic Association of Beirut. The Makassed Foundation is a nongovernmental organization based in Beirut. It has especially served the Sunni community of Lebanon for years. The foundation focuses on education, with special attention to fostering strong social values. It encourages a strong role of women in society. Healthcare and social services are also part of its mission. As part of its healthcare mission, the foundation runs the Al-Makassed Hospital (MGH) in Beirut, which dates back to 1930. In 1997, MGH opened a Hematology, Oncology, and Bone Marrow Transplant Center. It also oversees medical training in association with universities. The Makassed Foundation was long administered by members of the Salem family of Sunni Muslims. The Makassed Foundation of America raises money in support of advancing education, empowering women, and providing healthcare in Lebanon. See also SALAM, SAEB (1905–2000). MAKDISI, SAMIR (1932– ). Lebanese economics educator. After earning a doctoral degree in economics at Columbia University in New York, Makdisi had a distinguished teaching career at American University of Beirut (AUB). He was founding director of the Institute of Financial Economics at AUB. Among his many publications is the book The Lessons of Lebanon: The Economics of War and Development, in which he described Lebanon’s

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economic development, its struggle during the various phases of the civil war, its struggles with sectarianism, and the conditions required for future development. Makdisi has served in many administrative capacities, notably as a member on the board of directors of the Euro-Mediterranean Economic Research Institute. He also served a term in cabinet as minister of economy and trade in 1992. MALIK, CHARLES HABIB (1906–1987). A Lebanese Greek Orthodox Christian academic, politician, and diplomat. In his early career, he taught philosophy at the American University of Beirut. Later, he served terms as Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Nations, the United States and elsewhere. Malik was president of the United Nations General Assembly in 1958–1959. He denounced communism during a speaking tour in the United States in 1958. As Lebanon’s foreign minister in 1958, he played a role in getting the U.S. to send marines to help restore peace in Lebanon. He affiliated with the Lebanese Front political party. See CIVIL WAR OF 1958; UNITED STATES, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. MALUF, NASRI (also spelled MALOUF) (1911–2005). A Melkite Greek Catholic who was active in Lebanese politics and advocated for a moderate approach with harmony among the ethnic groups. Maluf served in various cabinet positions and played a role in helping end the civil war. MAMLUK. The Mamluks were originally members of an army formed by Abbasid Caliph al-Mamun in the mid-9th century. They were recruited largely from the lower class non-Arab Muslims, especially slaves in Turkey. The Mamluks came to have such political power within the Abbasid Caliphate that their leaders were able to hold high administrative positions. Mamluk leader Muhammad ibn Raiq forced Caliph al-Radi to hand over effective power to the Mamluks in the mid-10th century. Following the fall of Baghdad to Mongol forces in 1258, the Mamluks shifted their power base to Egypt, where they set up the Mamluk Caliphate in Cairo in 1261. The Mamluk Caliphate ruled over Lebanon during parts of that period. The Mamluks took control of Tripoli from the Crusaders in 1289. Two years later, Tyre came under their rule. They had extended their control into the Mount Lebanon region by 1309. Mamluk rule in the Lebanon region lasted until the Mamluks were defeated by Ottoman forces during the Battle of Marj Dabak in the Aleppo, Syria, region in 1516. The Mamluk Caliphate in Cairo lasted from 1261 until the Ottomans took control of Egypt in 1517.

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MARAAB AGREEMENT. See AOUN, MICHEL (1935– ); GEAGEA, SAMIR (also spelled JAJA) (1952– ). MARADA, AL-. See MARADA MOVEMENT. MARADA BRIGADE. A militia active before and during the civil war of 1975–1990. It was a Maronite militia based in the Zgharta region of northern Lebanon. The brigade originally had been formed under the name Zgharta Liberation Army by Tony Frangieh, who commanded it until his death in 1978. It played a controversial role in getting Tony’s father, Sulieman Frangieh, elected president in 1970. At first the brigade was a very small force and not well equipped. The militia became active in the civil war when it came to the defense of Christians in Tripoli who were being harassed by Sunni Muslims. It allied for a while with the Lebanese Front, along with other Christian groups, but broke away because Frangieh’s pro-Assad stance differed radically from the position of the rival Kataeb militia, led by Bashir Gemayel, which was antiSyria and sympathetic toward Israel. The rivalry between the Kataeb and Marada militias led to the murder of Tony Frangieh and his family in 1978. The event came to be known as the Ehden Massacre. The Marada Brigade transitioned into the Marada Movement political party. MARADA MOVEMENT. A Lebanese political party that has its roots in the Marada Brigade active during the civil war period in northern Lebanon. It is a social conservative party, with voter support mainly from Maronite Christians from the north, predominately around the town of Zgharta. It won three seats in the 2018 parliamentary elections and is part of the March 8 Alliance. Long dominated by the Frangieh family, Suleiman Frangieh Jr. is the leader of the party. MARCH 8 ALLIANCE. In the context of the Cedar Revolution, which was a protest against Syrian involvement in Lebanon’s affairs and especially the assassination of Rafic Hariri, a large public demonstration was held in Beirut’s downtown area on 8 March 2005. The rally was organized and attended by Lebanese who took the position that Syria was a good friend and supporter of Lebanon. The organizers, mostly Shiite Muslims, as well as some other pro-Syrians, credited Syria with helping to end the civil war of 1975–1990 and expressed appreciation for Syria’s help in resisting Israeli invasions. These parties benefited, in various ways, from Syria’s long presence in Lebanon.

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Later, a grouping of their political opponents was formed, calling itself the March 14 Alliance, named after the date of a large anti-Syrian demonstration held in downtown Beirut in 2005. In opposition to the anti-Syria March 14 Alliance, an alliance of pro-Syrian political factions was formed taking the March 8 date of that mass demonstration as its namesake. Since 2005, Lebanon has been dominated by these two competing political blocs, with political power alternating between them in the years following. At times, there were also (tenuous) unity governments, where the cabinet included members from both movements. March 8 was dominated by Lebanon’s Shiite community and strongly pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian, and it supported the continuing presence of Hezbollah’s military wing. The position of March 8 should be contrasted with that of March 14, which was dominated by Lebanon’s Sunni community and tended to be pro-Saudi and pro-Western. It called for Hezbollah to give up its armed presence in Lebanon. Lebanon’s once-powerful Christian community divided its allegiances, effectively becoming junior partners in both movements. Hezbollah is by far the dominant party in the March 8 Alliance, even though the other Shiite party, Amal, has considerably more parliamentary seats. This apparent oddity is the result of nonofficial political dynamics related to Hezbollah’s coercive capabilities independent of the Lebanese state. Other political parties of the Alliance include leftist pro-Syrian or PanArab movements, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and the small Frangieh-dominated Marada Movement. Two additional political groupings later joined March 8, broadening the appeal of the movement beyond the Shiite community and shifting the balance of power toward March 8. The Maronite Christian–dominated Free Patriotic Movement, although originally working with March 14, distanced itself from the former and moved into a close alignment with March 8. The reason for the move was largely pragmatic, as its leader, Michel Aoun, felt his political ambitions could be better realized in an alliance with March 8 and Hezbollah. By 2011, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt had changed the alliance of his Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) from the March 14 Alliance to the March 8 Alliance. The move was also seen as pragmatic, given the growing ability of Hezbollah to dictate events on the ground in Lebanon. March 8 adherents made up a slight majority of the 128 members of the 2018 Parliament; however, the explosion in Beirut of August 2020, and public anger at Lebanon’s elite, including President Aoun and Hezbollah, will test the political appeal of March 8 in the next parliamentary election. MARCH 8 MOVEMENT. See MARCH 8 ALLIANCE.

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MARCH 14 ALLIANCE. Following the assassination of Rafic Hariri, several protests against Syrian involvement sprang up, as the beginning of what came to be called the Cedar Revolution or Lebanon Intifada. The largest of these, with an estimated 1 million participants, was held on 14 March 2005. A grouping of political parties was then formed, naming itself after that March 14 mass demonstration, under the leadership of such leading Sunni politicians as Saad Hariri and the leaders of various Christian parties. The March 14 Alliance consists of political parties that historically tended to be critical of Syria’s involvement in Lebanon. The alliance is against Syrian and Iranian influence, and looks to Saudi Arabia for support, whereas its main political rival, the March 8 Alliance, is pro-Syria and pro-Iran. March 14 has also pushed for Hezbollah to end its role as a militia and disarm, something the other parties previously active in the civil war did when the conflict ended, in line with the requirements of the Taif Accords. March 14 sees Hezbollah’s arms as a political and security threat to Lebanon, pointing to, for example, the destruction of Lebanon that Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel has wrought throughout the years. March 14 is supported by most Sunni Muslims and some Christian parties. It actually once included all Christian parties and organizations critical of Syrian dominance of Lebanon, including the Kataeb, the Lebanese Forces, the Aounist Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), the Qornet Shewan and others. It also included the dominant Sunni party, the Hariri family controlled Future Movement. The Druze party, Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), was also a member. Although it dominated the political arena in the aftermath of the assassination, by 2009, it had lost ground to March 8. A number of reasons account for this, the most significant, however, is the political and personal rivalries and divisions among the parties and their leaders that originally supported the anti-Syrian uprisings. The main Maronite dominated party, the FPM, broke from March 14 fairly early on. The main reason is related to the fact that the alliance would not offer its support to the political ambitions of the FPM leader Michel Aoun, who having returned from exile in 2005, wanted to become Lebanon’s president. Important groups in the alliance, like the Lebanese Forces and the Future Movement, were not prepared to back him for the post. The FPM then switched alliances, working with March 8, greatly strengthening the latter group. Indeed, March 8 succeeded in securing Aoun’s presidential ambitions in 2016. The other key partner that left March 14 for March 8 was Walid Jumblatt’s PSP. The move was pragmatic and reflected the growing power of Hezbollah, and the need for the smaller and more vulnerable Druze community to align with powerful elements in the Lebanese political arena.

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Although the March 14 movement headed government from 2005–2009, and again during two subsequent periods, its power was heavily checked by March 8, even in times of governing. March 14 lost ground to March 8 during the 2018 parliamentary elections. It is unclear how March 14 will fare in future elections, especially in light of the August 2020 Beirut explosion that has led to widescale criticism of the governing elite, even though some March 14 parties are trying to align themselves with civil society protestors. MARCH 14 MOVEMENT. See MARCH 14 ALLIANCE. MARON, SAINT (also spelled MARUN or MAROUN) (?–410). A Syriac Christian hermit monk. Having studied for the priesthood in Antioch, Maron chose to live the rest of his life in a monastic setting on a Syrian mountain in the late 4th and early 5th centuries. He became greatly respected as a highly spiritual ascetic monk in contact with God through his natural surroundings. Miracles were attributed to him, and his reputation spread among Christians. After his death, his followers came to be known as Maronites. Aside from his ascetic spirituality, Maron also promoted Christian missions in the region. One of his leading disciples, Abraham of Cyrrhus, became a missionary and spread the Maronite style of Christianity to Lebanon, where it took root and remains. Maronite Christians celebrate 9 February as his Feast Day. The Maronite Church is a distinct order within the Roman Catholic Church. MARONITE CHRISTIANS. Estimated to range from 20 to 30 percent of the population of Lebanon, the adherents to the Maronite Church form an important ethno-religious community in Lebanon. According to the terms of the confessional system, the position of president is reserved for a Maronite Christian, as are a number of key political, security, and bureaucratic positions. Within Lebanon their main population centers are concentrated in the East Beirut and Mount Lebanon areas, although Maronites continue to live throughout the country. The Maronite community has a long and storied history in present-day Lebanon. Maronites historically lived primarily in secluded mountain villages, where they continued to fiercely protect their religious and community traditions against encroachment from more orthodox empires and regional forces. The community was controlled by powerful noble families, a practice that still has traces today, and the Maronite Church. The Maronites have historically been linked with developing and championing the concepts of Lebanese identity and Lebanese nationalism as something distinct from other regional identities, especially Arab and Muslim. They looked to a rising Europe as inspiration and protection, and as

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Maronite numbers continued to grow in the Mount Lebanon region, they clashed on numerous occasions with other established communities, especially the Druze. Conflict between the two communities led to the Maronite/Druze civil war of 1860, and the establishment of an autonomous entity known as Mount Lebanon, which was dominated by the Maronite community, and guaranteed protection by European powers. Under the influence of Europe, especially France, Lebanese identity under Maronite tutelage continued to develop. By the end of World War I, the Maronites had lobbied for and secured the establishment of a Greater Lebanon, carved out from the former Mount Lebanon and parts of historic Syria. Per the French Mandate, which lasted until roughly the end of World War II, the Maronites came to hold significant influence in the new country. The Maronites continued to dominate in post-independence Lebanon, securing through constitutional and verbal agreements key government and security positions. The civil war of 1975–1990, partly fought over political reforms aimed at giving Muslims more political power, ended Maronite dominance of Lebanon. The post–civil war system, based on the Taif Accords, greatly weakened but did not eliminate the Maronite community’s influence in Lebanon. They remain, alongside the Sunni and Shiite communities, the most politically influential in this small but highly sectarian country. See also MUTASARRIF/MUTASARRIFATE; WAR OF THE MOUNTAIN. MARONITE CHURCH. Formally known as the Syriac Maronite Church of Antioch, the Maronite Church is a self-governing church in communication with the papacy. Maronite tradition maintains that the Church in Antioch was founded by Saint Peter, and it continues its ties to the Church of Saint Peter, the Roman Catholic Church. It is the largest of the Uniate Churches, those in Union with the Vatican but allowed to practice their own rites and traditions, as well as appoint their own leaders. The namesake of the Maronite Church is Saint Maron, a 4th- and 5thcentury priest who lived a monastic life and sent a missionary to Lebanon. Historically, adherents of the Church lived in Syria, Turkey, and Palestine, as well as Lebanon. Today the Church is also found in those countries that have received Maronite Christian immigrants in sufficient numbers to establish a worshipping community. The traditional language of the Church was Aramaic, a Semitic family language widely spoken in the ancient Middle East. Aramaic was the language most likely spoken by Jesus and other Jews of his day, and there are a few Aramaic terms to be found in the Greek New Testament. Today some Aramaic is still used in the Maronite liturgy.

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The Maronite Church maintains the Maronite College in Rome to provide theological training for its priests. Lebanese Americans have established the Most Holy Trinity Monastery in Massachusetts, where monks follow the traditional monastic lifestyle of prayer, solitude, and work. The Maronite Church has been active in Lebanese politics throughout the country’s history and played an important role in the community’s links with the Western world. Various church leaders throughout history were famous writers and historians of Lebanon. Church leaders, especially the Patriarch, continue to be politically and socially influential. The Church is a major landowner in Lebanon. MARONITE COLLEGE IN ROME. Established in 1864, under Pope Gregory XIII, the Maronite College in Rome serves as the theological seminary for training priests in the Maronite Church. Many of its graduates then serve Maronite Churches in Lebanon and abroad among the Lebanese diaspora. MARONITE LEAGUE. An organization founded in 1952, whose members are prominent Maronite Christians of Lebanon. It maintained a small militia during the civil war days. The Maronite League advocates for a strong, independent Lebanon with cooperation among all the Christian communities. The league works closely with Maronite religious leaders. It also promotes the interests of Maronite communities among the Lebanese diaspora. As many as 60 new members are invited to join annually. See also ABU SULAYMAN, SHAKIR (1927–?). MARONITE SECT. See MARONITE CHRISTIANS; MARONITE CHURCH. MAROUN, ABBOUD (1886–1962). A writer whose poetry and prose focused on simple village life among the Druze of Mount Lebanon. Maroun was a Christian whose career as a teacher led him to live and work among the Druze in Aley. His writings provided outsiders with invaluable descriptions of the Druze way of life otherwise unavailable to Arabic readers at the time. For example, one of his most famous poems, entitled “Banu Ma’ruf” (“Sons of Mercy”), describes the secretive Druze beliefs and practices in some detail. MARQUQ/MARKOOK. A flat bread, traditionally cooked in a domed oven, commonly eaten in Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE.

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MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. According to Lebanese law, only the recognized clerics or officials of religious organizations may perform legal marriages. Each such religious organization is entitled to define its own rules concerning who may or may not marry. The legal age for marriage varies among the religious traditions, as well as by gender. The normal age of capacity in Lebanon is 18 for males and 17 for females, but marriages for girls as young as nine are possible with special permission in some religious traditions. The rules for religiously mixed marriages vary among the religious traditions, and the rules of males and females may vary as well. Most of the religious traditions insist that the bride and groom must be adherents of the religion performing the ceremony. This creates a problem for religiously mixed couples. Muslim males, whether Sunni or Shiite, may marry a Christian or Jewish woman even though she does not convert, as long as it is agreed that the children will be raised as Muslim. A Muslim female is not permitted to marry outside Islam, if the man does not convert and the marriage is to be performed by a Muslim authority. The same rules apply to Catholics. Druze and Jewish weddings do not allow a religiously mixed couple to marry. Orthodox Christians may marry an outsider only if that person converts. Although there have been repeated attempts to introduce legislation enabling civil marriages, the state does not recognize civil marriages performed in Lebanon. This means that couples with mixed religious identities, or no religious affiliation, must go abroad to have a civil marriage. They may then register the marriage at the Lebanese Consulate or Lebanese Embassy in the country where they were married, or register it upon returning to Lebanon. The state does then recognize their marriage. The traditional practice of arranged marriages is common in Lebanon, but nonarranged marriages are common as well. For Muslims, polygamy is permitted but now seldomly practiced, according to the restrictions required under Islamic law. Although Lebanon no longer defines homosexuality as a disease, same-sex marriage is not permitted among any of the religious traditions. The Penal Code outlaws sexual acts that contravene the laws of nature, which has traditionally been understood to make homosexual acts illegal, but this interpretation has recently been challenged in court, with some success. Religious institutions also control whether a divorce may be granted, as well as the terms of financial settlement if a divorce is granted. Divorce is not allowed among Maronite Christian couples. Since inheritance laws vary among the religions, the financial terms of the settlement vary as well.

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MARTYRS’ DAY. A Lebanese public holiday held on 6 May each year in commemoration of the Lebanese nationalists who were executed on that day in 1916, in Martyrs’ Square in downtown Beirut. That square was renamed Martyrs’ Square in their honor in 1931. MARTYRS’ SQUARE. A large square in the center of Beirut. It was originally named Tower Square, and then it was known as the Place of Canons because it was the home of Russian canons. It was renamed in 1931, in honor of the Lebanese nationalists executed there in 1916, after being charged with “anti-Turkish” activities by Jamal Pasha. This event is commemorated each year on Martyrs’ Day. The square was destroyed during the Lebanese civil war, when it became a demarcation line between Christian-controlled East Beirut and Muslim-controlled West Beirut, but it has since been restored. See also GREEN LINE. MARUN/MAROUN. See MARON, SAINT (also spelled MARUN or MAROUN) (?–410). MASAD, BULUS (1806–1890). A Maronite Patriarch who published works on Christian theology in the mid-19th century. MASHROU’ LEILA. A Lebanese indie band whose lyrics have proven to be controversial among the political establishment and religious conservatives. The band originated among university students in 2008. The name translates into English as “Overnight Project” and is said to refer to the way its members, as students at American University of Beirut, originally met at night to play music as a project intended to relieve both the personal stress students felt and the stress of the problematic social and political structure in Lebanon. They quickly became a popular band and went on to headline some of Lebanon’s music festivals. The band’s satirical lyrics became quite controversial on several topics, but the most controversial ones involved politics and homosexuality. The lyrics sometimes expressed criticism of Lebanon’s political leaders. Other lyrics spoke out against homophobia. These controversies led to the cancellation of a scheduled appearance in Amman, Jordan. The controversy came to a head during the buildup to the band’s scheduled appearance at the 2019 Byblos International Festival. Several conservative Christian groups voiced offense at what they considered to be the band’s advocacy of homosexuality and other things offensive to religious sensitivities. Some religious organizations threatened to sue the band for its offensive lyrics, while, on the other hand, a lawsuit was filed against those who had issued threats to the group. After unsuccessful efforts to resolve the matter, organizers of the

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Byblos International Festival cancelled the concert. Other musicians and human rights advocates came to the support of the band and the principle of artistic freedom. MATAR, LINDA (?– ). A long-standing activist for women’s rights in Lebanon. To help support her family, Matar began working in a factory at age 12. She joined the League of Lebanese Women’s Rights in 1953, the year women’s suffrage began in Lebanon. Beginning in 1978, she served as the league’s president. Her influence extends well beyond Lebanon through her participation in numerous international conferences and events. Matar has been the recipient of many awards in recognition of her tireless efforts on behalf of the women of Lebanon and beyond, including a special tribute to honor her life’s work held by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). MAWAQIF. Meaning “Positions,” Mawaqif is a monthly periodical founded in Beirut by author Adonis in 1968. With its editorial position calling for progressive reform in Arab countries, it attracted other progressive Arab writers as contributors and continued to publish until 1994. MAY 17 AGREEMENT. Following the Israeli invasion of 1982, which resulted in the Israel–Lebanon War, President Amine Gemayel bowed to pressure by U.S. president Ronald Reagan to enter into direct negotiations with Israel. These negotiations led to an agreement with Israel signed on 17 May 1983. The controversial agreement called for the end of Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon in exchange for Lebanon’s recognition of Israel and an end to the Palestinian attacks launched from Lebanon. Syria objected to the agreement, and so did many Lebanese. The agreement, among many other things, granted all kinds of security prerogatives to Israel over large swathes of Lebanon. The controversy ultimately forced the government to abrogate the May 17 Agreement the following year, especially when it became clear that Syria was regaining its influence in Lebanon. See also CIVIL WAR OF 1975–1990. MEDIA AND PUBLISHING. As the first Arabic-speaking country in the Middle East to allow privately owned radio and television stations, Lebanon developed as a leader in media and publishing within its region. It was also an early adopter of the internet, giving its newspapers and Arabic-language publishers an advantage in the internet era. There are some limitations to competition in as much as the number of media outlets is limited and the large companies that control those outlets are often tied to political movements or powerful families. Censorship is minimal and mainly limited to

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disallowing matters critical of government officials or that might lead to sectarian strife. The two main government-related television networks are the National News Agency (NNA) and the Central News Agency (CNA). The larger private television networks include Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI), Future TV, al-Manar, and al-Jadeed. The 1962 Publications Law restricts the number of newspapers to 53. The most important ones are the Daily Star (English), L’Orient-Le-Jour (French), An-Nahar (Arabic), al-Mustaqbal (Arabic), al-Akhbar (Arabic), and As-Safir (Arabic). The main state-owned radio station is Radio Liban. Commercial stations include Voice of Lebanon, Radio One, and Sawt alGhad. Lebanon’s relatively small book publishing sector depends largely on sales to Arabic readers in other countries. The annual Beirut Book Fair and the Beirut Francophone Book Fair help in the effort to market local publications. The main controversy regarding media has been occasional charges of pictures being staged or altered to reflect a bias in the associated story. A freelance photographer lost his work with Reuters after being accused of altering his photos to make a 2006 attack by the Israel Defense Forces look worse than it may have been. See also CHIDIAC, MAY (1963– ); LITERATURE. MELKART AGREEMENT. As a follow-up to the Cairo Agreement of 1969, representatives of the Lebanese government and the Palestine Liberation Organization reaffirmed their commitment to the terms of the Cairo Agreement and imposed restrictions on Palestinian militarism on Lebanon territory. The terms of the agreement did not hold for long, as violent confrontations soon erupted in Lebanon. MELKITE CHRISTIANS. An estimated 5 percent of Lebanese adhere to the Melkite Greek Catholic Church in Lebanon. The tradition can be traced back to the early Christians of Antioch and, more broadly, Byzantine Christianity and the use of the Greek language and its reliance on the Greek (as opposed to Latin) Fathers, which explains the use of the term Greek in its name. The term Melkite, meaning “imperial,” refers to the way the Church adhered to the majority position after the Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in 451—that is, they went along with the imperial-backed position as opposed to those Eastern Christians, for example, the Armenian Apostolic Church, who opposed the Chalcedon creed affirmed by the two natures (divine and human) of Christ. After the Arabic culture became dominant in Syria and Lebanon, the Melkite Christians adopted the Arab language. The Church formally affiliated with the Holy See in Rome in 1729, which brought it into the worldwide

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Roman Catholic fold. Like other Orthodox churches, it maintains the style of worship and many of the traditions of its Byzantine origins. Unlike most Orthodox churches, however, it is part of the worldwide Roman Catholic Church. MEOUCHI, BOULUS (1894–1975). A Maronite Patriarch, the 74th, from 1955–1975. During the period of the civil war of 1958, Meouchi took an Arab Nationalist stance that led him not to support the positions advocated by then-president Camille Chamoun. Meouchi’s role was key in helping to resolve the crisis, leading to Chamoun being replaced by General Fuad Chehab. MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES (MEA). A Lebanese airline that dates back to 1945. In its early days, MEA serviced only destinations in the Middle East region. After its merger with Air Liban, it became a worldwide airline. During the civil war of 1975–1990, the Beirut airport was often out of service. MEA survived by leasing its airplanes to other airlines. It resumed operations in 1990, but operated at a sizable annual loss until extensive cost reductions and restructuring made MEA profitable in the early 2000s. Then, in 2006, the Israel–Lebanon war again disrupted service, with service only to Jordan and Syria. Full service resumed shortly after the end of that war, and new aircraft were purchased. MEA began a new era in 2010, when it promoted its first-ever female pilot, Rola Hoteit, to the role of captain. The airline is now part of the SkyTeam Alliance. See also BEIRUT RAFIC HARIRI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT; INTRA BANK CRASH. MIKATI, NAJIB (1943– ). A political novice who made a significant fortune in global business to become one of Lebanon’s richest men. Mikati twice served as prime minister—briefly in 2005, when his main role was to shepherd the summer’s parliamentary elections, and from 2011–2014, when he resigned after failing to maintain the support of Hezbollah, a key backer of his government. Mikati was born to a Sunni Muslim family in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli. He attended American University of Beirut (AUB) and completed further studies in France and at Harvard University in the United States. With his brother Taha, he formed the M1 Group, which initially focused on construction and eventually morphed into an international conglomerate with interests in a range of industries, from real estate and retail, on the one hand, to banking, oil, and gas, on the other.

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It was, however, in telecommunications where Mikati and his brother made their mark. Through their company, Investcom, they came to control a vast network of telecommunication companies in the Middle East, West Africa, and elsewhere. In Lebanon, they owned Cellis, which was one of two major cell phone operators in the country for some time and was often at the center of political discussions and debate. In 2006, when Investcom became a publicly traded company, it was bought for $5.5 billion by MTN, Africa’s largest mobile phone company. The Mikati family, however, maintained a stake in the company. Mikati’s political career began in earnest in 1998, when he served in Salem Hoss’s cabinet as minister of public works and transportation. He subsequently was elected to Parliament during the 2000 elections, securing a seat in his hometown. Within the context of the time, Mikati was considered relatively neutral but with a good working relationship with Syria. Given the latter, he was seen by Syria and some of their Lebanese allies as a potential rival and alternative to Rafic Hariri, and the Hariri family. Mikati’s first opportunity to govern, although briefly, came in April 2005, and followed the assassination of Rafic Hariri and the resignation of Prime Minister Omar Karami. Mikati was the consensus candidate, with a mandate to prepare the country for the crucial 2005 parliamentary elections. He received the backing from the main political camps, in large part because he made it clear that once the elections were completed, he would step down, a promise he kept. Mikati returned to the political spotlight in 2011, following the collapse of Saad Hariri’s national unity government. Although considered politically nonaligned, Mikati became prime minister with the support of Hezbollah and the March 8 Alliance. The March 14 Alliance did not participate in his government, denying him the legitimacy associated with a national unity government. Mikati’s premiership was dominated by his government’s attempts to shield Lebanon from the consequences of the neighboring civil war in Syria, with limited success. By 2014, he had clashed with Hezbollah, in particular, concerning an election law for forthcoming parliamentary elections and appointments of senior security personnel. Hezbollah withdrew its ministers from his cabinet, causing his government to collapse. In 2019, in the midst of wide-scale popular protests about the economy and elite corruption, Mikati was charged by a state prosecutor for alleged corruption. He was accused of benefiting financially from a governmentsubsidized housing loans program. Mikati strongly denied the charges, arguing that it was politically motivated for his past opposition to the election of sitting President Michel Aoun and demanding that the government resign in the face of the mass protests.

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MILITIAS. Historically, the Lebanese state had been kept weak due to the devolution of authority and armed forces along sectarian and regional lines. That weakness led to the collapse of the Lebanese Army during the early phase of the civil war of 1975–1990. This meant that regional militias, usually sectarian in nature, were tolerated at the expense of there being a strong national army. This state of affairs contributed to the division of the country and Beirut itself into regions of control by various militias during the civil war of 1975–1990. Subsequent efforts to reconstitute the central army during lulls in the war did not prove to be effective. According to the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 426 and the Taif Accords, all militias were to be disbanded, and they all were except for the Hezbollah one. See also AL-TANZIM; AMAL MOVEMENT; AMNESTY LAW (1991); ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ADP); ARAB SOCIALIST BAATH PARTY; CANTONS; FAYADIYYA INCIDENT (1978); GUARDIANS OF THE CEDARS; KULAYLAT, IBRAHIM (1934– ); LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY (LCP); LEBANESE FORCES (LF); MARONITE LEAGUE; NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY (NLP); PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSP); SAAD, MARUF (1910–1975); SA’IQA, AS; SOUTH LEBANON ARMY (SLA); UNION OF WORKING PEOPLE’S FORCES. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND HIGHER EDUCATION (MEHE). See EDUCATION. MOAWAD, MICHEL (1972– ). Politician and political party leader. Moawad was born into a prominent Maronite political family. His father was former president René Moawad and his mother former parliamentarian and former cabinet minister Nayla Moawad. Michel founded the Independence Movement political party in 2006, and he continues as party president. He also was one of the founding members of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, an association of mostly Christian leaders who favor a strong, independent Lebanon. MOAWAD, NAYLA (1940– ). Journalist, politician, minister, and philanthropist, and the wife of former president René Moawad. Nayla was born into the prominent El-Khouri Maronite family in Beirut. She received higher education at Saint Joseph University and Cambridge University in England. She worked as a journalist for L’Orient newspaper before marrying René Moawad in 1965. Two years after his assassination in 1989, she helped found the René Moawad Foundation in his honor. She was elected to parliament in 1991. As a politician, Moawad spoke out against Syrian influence in Lebanon’s affairs. She also worked for children’s and women’s

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rights. She served a term in cabinet, as minister for social affairs. Moawad stepped aside from running for Parliament in 2009, and her son, Michel Moawad, was elected to her seat. MOAWAD, RENÉ (1925–1989). Having earned a law degree at Saint Joseph University, René Moawad went on to head a law firm in Tripoli. His first successful candidacy for a parliamentary seat came in 1957. He held his seat in subsequent elections until the outbreak of the civil war of 1975–1990. As the prolonged civil war was coming to an end, parliament convened on 5 November 1989. It ratified the Taif Accords and chose René Moawad as the new president, over the objections of General Michel Aoun. Moawad held the office of president for only 17 days. He was assassinated 22 November. His assassins are unknown. His seat in parliament was filled by his wife, Nayla Moawad, and then by his son Michel Moawad. MOHAMMAD AL-AMIN MOSQUE. A modern mosque in Independence Square in downtown Beirut built under the leadership of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and completed in 2008, after his death. Inspired by Istanbul’s Sultan Ahmed Mosque, it is built of yellow ochre stone, with four minarets and blue domes. MONASTERY OF QOZHAYA. A large and important Maronite monastery located in the Qadisha Valley area of Lebanon. Monks have resided at the site since the 13th century, and at one point it served as the see (headquarters) of the Maronite Patriarch. In the 16th century, it had the first printing press in the Middle East, which can still be viewed by visitors today. The monastery is dedicated to 4th-century Egyptian St. Anthony the Great, as reflected in its formal name, the Monastery of Saint Anthony of Qozhaya. It now is under the institution known as the Lebanese Maronite Order. The monastery profits from its ownership of land in and around the Qadisha Valley. Aside from monastic residences for nuns and monks, the monastery has an impressive church and a large cave, the Grotto of Saint Anthony, nearby. The grotto has the reputation of being a site where miracles occur. The monastery also has a guest house for welcoming visitors. MONOPHYSITE CHRISTIANS. See SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH. MOSAIC TILES. The use of mosaic tiles for floor or other artistic expressions was common in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East. The Beiteddine Palace in Beirut hosts a fine collection of Lebanese mosaics from various locations.

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MOUKHEIBERR, ALBERT (1912–2002). Lebanese politician elected to Parliament to represent the Greek Orthodox community. Politically, Moukheiberr advocated for a strong, independent Lebanon. He was educated as a physician in Switzerland, before returning to Lebanon. He entered politics in 1952, winning a seat in Parliament in the Metn district of Lebanon. He served in Parliament from 1952–1968, and again from 1972–1992 and 2000–2002, when he passed away. Moukheiberr served in several cabinets during his career, including deputy prime minister, minister of health, minister of education, minister of housing, and as acting minister in a number of high-profile posts. As a strong antiSyrian, he accused Syria of controlling Lebanon’s political system and demanded that Syria withdraw its troops from Lebanon. He was also a critic of Hezbollah, calling on the Lebanese Army to take control of areas where the Hezbollah militia had control, thereby exercising state sovereignty over all of Lebanon’s borders. MOUNT HERMON. A cluster of three high peaks in Lebanon near the Syrian border. As the highest elevation in the region, Mount Hermon has always been important as a source of water. Some of its many names refer to it as a snow region. Its elevation also makes it as a strategic place to view the surrounding regions. Like other high mountains in antiquity, Mount Hermon was anciently viewed as the home of divine entities. The ruins of several altars have been found partway up the mountain, in keeping with the ancient Near Eastern practice of worshipping the god(s) of the sky at “High Places”—that is, at altars built on mountains or high hills. It is likely that Baal was worshipped in connection with Mount Hermon, as mentioned in the Hebrew Bible’s Book of Kings. The Sheba Farms Dispute, which flared up in 2000, involved whether the small farm region on the northwestern slopes of Mount Hermon should be considered part of Lebanon or part of Syria. It became important in the context of determining if Israel had fully withdrawn from Lebanon, in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 425. MOUNT LEBANON. The region of Lebanon that lies to the north of Beirut. The area is known for its snow-capped mountains, some small surviving cedar forests, and the flora and fauna found at higher altitudes. The nation owes its name, Lebanon, to the white, snow-covered mountains of the region. See also LEBANON, THE NAME; MUTASARRIF/MUTASARRIFATE. MOUNT LEBANON MUTASARRIFATE. See MUTASARRIF/MUTASARRIFATE.

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MOUSAYLAHA FORT. See CASTLES. MOUSSA CASTLE. See CASTLES. MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN). A Pan-Arabist organization founded in 1952, by George Habash, a Palestinian Christian, while a student at American University of Beirut. MAN favored socialism and rejected Western influence. It also opposed Israel’s presence and expansionist tendencies. The movement took root in several Arab nations, which gave rise to parties and organizations, especially Marxist ones, separate from the original MAN structure. By the late 1960s, the organization ceased to be a force in Middle Eastern politics. Many members of the MAN branch in Lebanon broke away to form the Organization of Lebanese Socialists in 1968, which later merged into a new group, the Communist Action Organization in Lebanon, which gained attention during the Ghandour Factory Strike. Other Lebanese MAN members founded the Arab Socialist Action Party, Lebanon. See also POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP). MOVEMENT OF CHANGE. Also known as the Taghyir Movement, a political party founded in 1991, in support of the political stance of Michel Aoun. The party has consistently taken a stance against Syrian influence in Lebanon. It won no seats in the 2018 parliamentary elections. MOVEMENT OF THE DISINHERITED. See AMAL MOVEMENT. MOVEMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT NASSERISTS-AL-MURABITUN. Political party in Lebanon, abbreviated MIN and sometimes translated as the Independent Nasserite Movement (INM). The party sees itself as inspired by the values of Egypt’s Gamal Nasser, which leads it to espouse PanArabism, socialism, and secularism. MOVEMENT OF THE PIONEERS OF REFORM. A Sunni Muslim organization founded by Tammam Salam in 1973, and intended to counter more leftist Muslim activism. Salam dissolved the party with the outbreak of the civil war of 1975–1990. MOVEMENT OF UNIONIST NASSERISTS. See NASSERIST UNIONISTS MOVEMENT (NUM). MSEILHA FORT. See CASTLES.

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MUAWIYA (c. 600–680). Former governor of Syria who became the founder of the Umayyad Dynasty, which ruled over the vast territories of the Umayyad Caliphate, including the territory now known as Lebanon. MUDALLALI, AMAL (?– ). Reporter, political researcher, and ambassador. After earning degrees from American University of Beirut and the University of Maryland, Mudallali worked as a foreign correspondent for An-Nahar newspaper. She served as foreign media advisor to Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. As a prolific senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center from 2012–2016, Mudallali authored several research reports on Lebanon and the wider regions of the Middle East and North Africa. Those research reports include “Lebanon’s Existential Threats” (2013), “Hizbullah’s Roll of the Dice in South Lebanon” (2013), “American Policy in Lebanon: Stability Through Dissociation” (2013), and “The Syrian Refugee Crisis Is Pushing Lebanon to the Brink” (2013). Since 2018, she has served as Lebanon’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations. MUDHAFFAR PAHSA (1837–1907). A Roman Catholic military officer who rose to a high position with the Ottomans before being appointed as a Mutasarrif in 1902. MUFTI. An Arabic title given to a high-ranking Islamic scholar qualified to give legal opinions with regard to the application of Sharia. A mufti is entitled to issue a fatwa, a legal opinion on an issue. MUGHNIYAH, IMAD FAYEZ (1962–2008). A senior Hezbollah leader, known by his nom de guerre as al-Hajj Radwan. Mughniyah grew up in a Shiite family near Tyre. As a young adult, he became active in al-Fatah. He helped found Fatah’s Student Brigade, which played an important role under Yasser Arafat’s leadership. Mughniyah spent time in Iran and was on good terms with the leaders of the Iranian Revolution, including Ayatollah Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards. He became an activist with Hezbollah and took a leadership role in organizing resistance attacks, bombings, and kidnappings in support of Hezbollah goals and against Israel. U.S. security officials thought Mughniyah was implicated in numerous bombings and other terrorist activities, but they were unable to detain him. He was assassinated by a car bomb in 2008, after attending a commemoration of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Many theories about who was responsible for the assassination soon emerged, including Israel, Syria, the United States, or rival Hezbollah groups. MUHAFADHAH. See GOVERNORATE.

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MUHAFIDH. The title for the governor of a governorate, any one of Lebanon’s eight administrative districts. MUHARRIR, AL-. A newspaper that published from 1963 until it was forcibly closed by pro-Syrian troops in 1976, due to its criticisms of Syrian policies. MUJADDARAH. A dish made with lentils, rice, and onions that is popular in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE. MUKHTAR. The title of the village headman, or Selected One. MUKHTARAH, AL-. The home of the Jumblatt family, with a grand palace and notable art collection. MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF). After Israel’s Operation Peace for Galilee invasion of Lebanon in 1982 touched off the Lebanon–Israeli War, a peacekeeping force was sent to Lebanon. Led by the United States, the MNF also had troop participation from France, Italy, and Great Britain. The MNF arrived in Beirut in late August. It’s first task was to supervise the peaceful withdrawal of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters from Lebanon, according to an agreement that had been successfully negotiated with PLO leader Yasser Arafat. Another MNF goal was to help in the restoration of power to the Lebanese government. The work of the MNF went smoothly at first, but tensions culminated with the bombing of the MNF barracks in October 1983, killing 58 French and 241 U.S. personnel. The MNF withdrew in 1984, failing to achieve its objectives. MUNICIPALITY. The many municipalities of Lebanon are organized into federations of municipalities according to a system of eight governorates. Municipalities fall under the authority of the government’s ministry of interior and municipalities. MURABITUN, AL. See MOVEMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT NASSERISTS-AL-MURABITUN. MURR, ELIAS. See MURR, MICHEL (1932– ). MURR, GABRIEL. See MURR, MICHEL (1932– ).

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MURR, MICHEL (1932– ). A long-serving minister of the interior who played a much larger role in shaping Lebanese government policies than most cabinet ministers. Murr was born into a Greek Orthodox family and went on to be educated as an engineer. In his early adult years, he lived in West Africa, where he ran a profitable construction company. Having moved back to Lebanon, he successfully contested for a seat in the 1968 Parliament, with the backing of Maronite leader Pierre Gemayel. He then lost his parliamentary seat in the 1972 elections. When the dispute about Syrian influence on Lebanese affairs arose after the signing of the Tripartite Agreement, Murr sided with the pro-Syrian faction led by Elie Hobeika. When the Lebanese Forces, under the leadership of Samir Geagea, ousted the pro-Syria faction, Murr moved to the Zahle region, which was under Syrian control. When the civil war ended and Syrian influence was dominant in Lebanese politics, Murr became minister of defense in 1990. Beginning in 1994, he was made minister of the interior, a powerful position that oversaw domestic intelligence and security. The interior ministry also had to approve major government projects, putting Murr into a position to control lucrative contracts. As the overseer of elections, the interior ministry, under his control, was suspected of manipulating some local elections. He was also accused of using his power to grant or withhold citizenship to Syrian migrants as a way to manipulate elections. Murr fell out of favor after the 2000 elections. He was replaced as interior minister by his son, Elias Murr. Michel Murr’s brother Gabriel owns Murr Television (MTV). The two brothers, Michel and Gabriel, have been in a political and business dispute for years, after Michel’s daughter Myrna ran against Gabriel in a by-election for the parliamentary seat traditionally held by a Greek Orthodox person. Gabriel won the election, but the rival Murr family subsequently harassed MTV. MURUWWAH, KAMIL (also spelled MROWA) (1915–1966). A Lebanese journalist who founded the Arabic-language newspaper Al-Hayat in 1946. That paper’s editorial stance was against the influence of Egypt’s Gamal Nasser. Muruwwah later founded an English-language newspaper, the Daily Star. Its original purpose was to provide English-language news to Lebanon’s expatriate communities, but it soon expanded its coverage to the wider Arab world. In 2010, new owners acquired the Daily Star and have modernized it, developed an online presence, and expanded its worldwide coverage. Muruwwah’s strong stance against Nasser motivated a pro-Nasser extremist to assassinate him in 1966. See also PAN-ARABISM.

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MUSAWI, ABBAS AL- (also spelled MOUSSAWI) (1952–1992). A Shiite Muslim cleric from the Bekaa Valley in southern Lebanon who studied at Al-Najaf in Iraq. He was strongly influenced by the thoughts of Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Upon returning to Lebanon, he helped found Hezbollah in 1982. As one of Hezbollah’s main leaders, he was blamed by some outsiders for playing a role in planning several Hezbollah bombing attacks. He served in the office of secretary-general of Hezbollah from 1991 until his death the following year. He died, along with his wife, son, and some others, on 16 February 1992, when Israeli helicopters attacked his motorcade traveling along a road in southern Lebanon. The Israeli assassination attack was understood to be in retaliation for his alleged earlier role in ordering the kidnapping and killing of Israeli soldiers. MUSEUM OF LEBANESE PREHISTORY. The artifacts of this collection originally were part of the research collections of Saint Joseph University in Beirut. Those collections evolved into the current Museum of Lebanese Prehistory in 2000. The displays are arranged as a voyage through time, especially featuring the development and function of tools in use by humans from the ancient human occupation of Lebanon through the beginning of the historical periods. One unusual feature is the juxtaposition of ancient and modern human tools serving similar functions. Aside from maintaining displays open to the public, the museum’s staff is active in new archaeological research into Lebanon’s prehistory. MUSEUMS. See ARCHAEOLOGICAL CRYPT MUSEUM; BASBOUS BROTHERS OUTDOOR GALLERY; BEIRUT EXHIBITION CENTER; BEIRUT NATIONAL MUSEUM; BEITEDDINE PALACE; BSOUS SILK MUSEUM; BYBLOS WAX MUSEUM; CILICIA MUSEUM; GIBRAN MUSEUM; HALL OF FAME MUSEUM; MUSEUM OF LEBANESE PREHISTORY; ROBERT MOUAWAD PRIVATE MUSEUM; SURSOCK MUSEUM. MUSIC, LEBANESE. Traditionally, music in Lebanon was closely related to that of other Arab cultures in the region. The highly poetic lyrics often spoke of love or nationalism. Modern Lebanese music has been influenced by urban Arab music in an Egyptian style, as well as elements of Western music in all its varieties. Traditional musical instruments include a large lute, a two-cane flute known as mijwiz, a reed flute called a nay, a Turkish/Greek lute called a buzuq, a kind of zither called a Qanun, and the tabla and daf percussion instruments.

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Lebanese and international music is featured each summer in the many popular international festivals that attract large international crowds. La Fête de la Musique, a day of celebration of music concerts and other events, is held annually in Beirut. The Baalbek International Festival is held each summer in the setting of the ruins around the Temple of Jupiter in Baalbek. The Al Bustan International Festival of Music and the Performing Arts, held in Beirut each year, strives for innovation. The Beiteddine Festival of music and arts is held annually in July and August in the Beiteddine Palace in Beiteddine. The Byblos International Festival, featuring music and art, is held in July in Byblos. Many of Lebanon’s most famous singers, for example, Fairuz, became more widely known through such festivals. See also ZAJAL, LEBANESE. MUTASARRIF/MUTASARRIFATE. After bloody fighting between the Druze and Maronite populations of the Mount Lebanon region during the civil war of 1860, an international commission was appointed to make recommendations about the conflict. Its recommendations included the idea that the Ottoman administration of the area be reconfigured so as to create a new Ottoman official to govern the Mount Lebanon region separately from Syria. It was accepted by the Ottoman sultan that the official position would be called by the Turkish term Mutasarrif, and the region itself would be called a Mutasarrifate. The Mutasarrif was to be a non-Lebanese Christian. Eight different men held the office of Mutasarrif from its inception in 1861 until 1915. They all adhered to some form of Catholic Christianity, including Armenian, Greek, and Roman. See also NAUM PASHA (1846–1911); OHANNIS PASHA (1852–?). MUTRAN, KHALIL (1872–1949). Poet, author, translator, and journalist who was born in Baalbek, Lebanon, and later worked in Egypt. For that reason, Khalil Mutran earned the name “Poet of Two Countries,” although he later considered himself a poet for all Arab countries. MUWAHHIDEEN. See DRUZE.

N NABATIEH. A town that functions as a regional center in the Nabatieh governorate, in southern Lebanon. The local population is predominantly Shiite Muslim, with a minority of Greek Catholics. Nearby Beaufort Castle, also known as Castle of the High Rock, has an extensive military history ranging from Byzantine times to the Israel–Lebanon War of 1982. Now in ruins, it is again controlled by Lebanon and serves as a tourist attraction. NAHR AL-BARED. Located north of Tripoli, one of the largest of the 12 Palestinian refugee camps. Nahr al-Bared is situated near the Mediterranean along the road to Syria. It came into the international spotlight during the 2007 Siege of Nahr al-Bared, as government forces met heavy resistance as they sought to regain control of the camp from the Fatah al-Islam faction. The modern camp consists of the small area of the original, densely populated camp, as well as the larger new areas that surround the old camp on three sides. NAIMY, MIKHAIL (1889–1988). Lebanese poet, novelist, and philosopher, famous for his spiritual writings. Born and raised in a Christian family in Baskinta, Lebanon, Naimy went on to study in Nazareth, Ukraine, and the United States. In the 1920s and early 1930s, he lived in New York City, where he became a close associate of other Lebanese and Arab-language authors, most notably Khalil Gibran. Together they provided leadership to the “New York Pen League,” with the goal of reviving Arabic literature by moving beyond the tendency to imitate classical Arabic form and subject. As one of the broad groupings of Arab-language emigrant poets known as Mahjar (“Place of Emigration”), Naimy’s work is considered to be an outstanding example of Arab Romanticism, a style of poetry that, in contrast to classical Arabic poetry, focused more on the expressing in simple language the poet’s intense feelings about nature, the body/soul complex, and the personal life of being a poet who feels oneself to be an outsider. Naimy articulated his vision for a new style of Arabic poetry in his 1923 book of criticism titled al-Ghirbal (“The Sieve”), in which he called upon Arab poets 223

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to move beyond imitating the past. He put this into practice in his own poetry by avoiding the use of lofty terms that are no longer common, allowing himself to vary the verse, and writing in a softer tone. Naimy is known among English readers for his work The Book of Mirdad: The Strange Story of a Monastery Which Was Once Called the Ark. The work was written in English and translated into Arabic, and still enjoys a wide readership. It addresses philosophical topics through religious narratives put in the form of teachings by a person named Mirdad, who speaks from a point of view of a mystic seeking to guide followers toward a deeper understanding of God within human nature. Naimy moved back to Baskinta in 1932, and resided in Lebanon until his death. NAKHLA, RASHID (1873–1939). A Lebanese journalist, newspaper editor, media publisher, and poet. Nakhla’s poetry is understood to be in the Neoclassical style. His poem “We Are the Homeland” (“Kullana Lil Watan”) was selected as the lyrics for the national anthem of Lebanon. NAQQASH, MARUN AL- (1817–1855). An actor and playwright who, having been born in Sidon to a family that soon relocated to Beirut, was later exposed to Western-style theater while living in Italy. Upon returning to Beirut, Naqqash started a theater company that produced Western dramas that he had translated into Arabic. He wrote original plays in Arabic, which gives support to those who credit him with being the founder of modern Arabic theater. His plays deviated from classical styles in that they were staged with musical elements and made use of Western technics and styles, as well as more traditional ones. His first original play, al-Bakhil, reflects the influence of French playwright Moulière. His second play, about a man who became caliph for a day, was performed for the Ottoman sultan. His third play was set in Beirut and performed at his own private theater. Naqqash died quite young, before he had a chance to further refine his style, blending European and Arabic traditions. His brother, Niqula, and nephew, Salim, continued to develop the style and stage original plays. Salim is credited with being the first to use female actors on the Arabic stage. NASRALLAH, EMILY (1931–2018). A Lebanese writer and activist for women’s rights. After graduating from American University of Beirut in 1958, Nasrallah worked as a writer for a magazine and went on to publish her first novel, later translated from Arabic as Birds of September, just four years later. That novel won several prizes and launched her long career as a prolific journalist and novelist. She used her literary fame in support of her lifetime advocacy for women’s rights. Nasrallah was inducted into the National Order of the Cedar by then-president Michel Aoun for her literary

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achievements. Her other honors include being one of three recipients of the prestigious Goethe Medals for her contributions to international cultural exchange. NASRALLAH, HASSAN (1960– ). Considered the most powerful political figure in post–civil war Lebanon, despite never holding political office. Nasrallah is leader of the powerful Shiite militia Hezbollah and holds ultimate veto power in Lebanon’s government. He is also a powerful regional actor. Nasrallah is a Shiite cleric who was born in East Beirut. His family moved to southern Lebanon to avoid the dangers associated with the outbreak of the civil war of 1975–1990. He then joined Amal. Having been deeply interested in Islam from an early age, Nasrallah left Lebanon to begin his clerical studies in Najaf, Iraq. When Lebanese students were expelled from Iraq in 1978, he returned to southern Lebanon and started fighting in the Amal militia, rising to the position of regional commander. Along with some other former Amal supporters, Nasrallah left Amal to support and fight with the Hezbollah movement formed by Abbas al-Musawi, with Iranian support, after the Israeli invasion of 1982. He then fought with Hezbollah as it clashed with Amal for supremacy among the Shiites of southern Lebanon. His seminary training had been interrupted when he was forced to leave Iraq in 1978, but with his new association with Iranian-backed Hezbollah, he was able to continue his seminary training in Qom, Iran, an important center for Shiite education and the base of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini. He finished seminary training and returned to fight in the Hezbollah militia in 1989. With the end of the civil war in 1990, Nasrallah continued in Hezbollah leadership roles. He rose quickly through the ranks, and after Hezbollah founder alMusawi died as a result of an Israeli missile attack in 1992, Nasrallah replaced him as secretary-general, the top position in Hezbollah. Nasrallah had been influenced by the activist school of Imami Shiism. In contrast to the quietist school, which focuses on spirituality, activist clerics sometimes try to uplift their community from poverty and influence political matters. Hezbollah had been formed with the goal of social and economic improvement for its Shiite supporters, and Nasrallah furthered that goal by embracing a number of social welfare endeavors, putting in place an extensive patron–client relationship similar to that of Lebanon’s traditional zuama. Hezbollah influence in Lebanon is directly related to its military capacity. Unlike other sectarian-based civil war–era militias, Hezbollah was able to maintain its vast arms on the ostensible grounds that they were used to liberate Lebanon from Israeli control; however, even after Israel withdrew

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from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah refused to give up its arms, increasing tensions with Lebanon’s others sectarian communities, especially the Sunni and Christian communities. Hezbollah’s coercive capabilities, which are reportedly greater than that of the Lebanese Army, have given the group tremendous advantage in Lebanese politics. They have even succeeded in getting the Lebanese government to officially adopt Hezbollah’s narrative that the militia is the “resistance” (to Israel), legitimizing their nonstate military structure. During his period of leadership, Nasrallah has managed to greatly increase the role of Shiites in Lebanon’s sectarian politics. With the signing of the Doha Agreement in 2008, Hezbollah was, by means of the increased powers afforded to the speaker of Parliament and the securing of a veto guaranteeing a third of cabinet seats, able to block the efforts of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon from furthering its efforts to arrest and put to trial Hezbollah members accused of involvement in the assassination of Rafic Hariri and others. Moreover, the increased power of the speaker and the cabinet seats meant that Parliament would not be able to force Hezbollah to disband its militia. Nasrallah also cemented Hezbollah’s role as a regional power, in close alliance with its patron, Iran. Hezbollah fighters have effectively helped win the Syrian civil war for Syrian president Assad and been active in other regional wars on behalf of the Iranian-led Shiite bloc of powers. Almost immediately after the 2020 explosion in Beirut, which devastated the port area and led to many deaths and injuries, as well as homelessness, some Lebanese did not believe the official explanation that the ammonium nitrate had been ignited accidentally. Rather, they believed that it may have been set alight by Israel as a setback to Hezbollah activities in the port region. Nasrallah responded with strong denial, saying that Hezbollah had no operations or supplies of any kind in the port district. The government promised a full investigation but was reluctant to allow international assistance in that process. Public demonstrations intensified, leading to the resignation of the government of Hassan Diab and increased pressure on Nasrallah to avoid provoking Israel. Hezbollah is facing tremendous pressure to relinquish its stranglehold on Lebanese politics, which has put Lebanon at odds with regional power Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other powers. Support from these countries will be essential if Lebanon is to manage the tremendous economic and political crises it faces in the coming years. How much power Hezbollah is willing to cede is unclear. Nasrallah has, however, made it clear that Hezbollah’s military presence in Lebanon is not up for negotiation and that the militia should not be pushed into a corner where it may have to resort to force to protect its interests.

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NASSER, GAMAL ABDUL. See PAN-ARABISM. NASSERISM. See PAN-ARABISM NASSERIST UNIONISTS MOVEMENT (NUM). Also translated as the Nasserite Unification Movement, a Lebanese political party founded in 1982, under the name Movement of Unionist Nasserites, with the goal of bringing together all political parties who looked to Egypt’s Gamal Nasser as a champion of progressive political policies. It participates in the March 8 Alliance but won no seats in the 2018 general elections. NASSERITE UNIFICATION MOVEMENT. See NASSERIST UNIONISTS MOVEMENT (NUM). NATIONAL ACTION PLAN (NAP). A comprehensive plan to enhance the role of women in Lebanon. It was adopted by the Lebanese government in 2019, and is scheduled for implementation between 2019–2022. The initial drive for NAP came from the National Commission of Lebanese Women, made up of several government ministries, as well as three civil society organizations. Following the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, to increase of role of women in various leadership roles in government ministries and economic life, several United Nations agencies advised the work of the undertaking. See also WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND MOVEMENTS. NATIONAL ANTHEM. Lebanon’s national anthem was chosen from among other submissions during a competition held in 1927. Wadih Sabra is credited as the composer, and Rashid as the lyricist. The opening line translates as, “All for our country, for the glory, for the flag.” NATIONAL BLOC PARTY (NBP). Founded as a political association in 1936, the NBP became an official political party in 1943. The founding leader, former president Emile Eddé, was replaced by his son, Raymond Eddé. The party participated in the Helf Alliance coalition beginning in 1968, but it left that coalition the following year in disagreement concerning the Cairo Agreement (1969). The NBP participates in the March 14 Alliance and is currently led by Carlos Eddé. The constituency of the party is mainly Maronite Christian. It won no seats in the 2018 parliamentary elections. NATIONAL COMMISSION OF LEBANESE WOMEN (NCLW). See NATIONAL ACTION PLAN (NAP).

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NATIONAL COVENANT. See NATIONAL PACT (1943). NATIONAL DIALOGUE PROCESS. After Fouad Siniora became prime minister in July 2005, the government leaders launched an era of discussion intended to reach an accord among Lebanon’s many sectarian factions. It involved a series of talks among the sectarian communities about how Lebanon could progress toward a political reform in ways benefiting every group. Aside from better cooperation among sectarian interests, it was thought desirable to lessen Syrian influence and normalize relations with Syria. Another goal was to get Hezbollah to disarm, as called for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 of 2004, as well as the Taif Accords of 1989. The National Dialogue’s goals ran up against Hezbollah’s firm resolve not to disarm and Syria’s unwillingness to lessen its influence in Lebanese affairs. The National Dialogue had to be suspended with the outbreak of the Hezbollah–Israel War in 2006. There was another setback when Shiite ministers, three from Hezbollah and two from Amal, resigned in November 2006, throwing the government into a crisis. The Doha Agreement, signed in 2008, failed to call for the disarmament of Hezbollah, and sectarian strife intensified, meaning that the National Dialogue Process failed to achieve its goals. Beginning in 2008, the Berghof Foundation, as one of its projects to promote peace in the Middle East, began funding a project called National Dialogue(s) in Lebanon. It helped establish the Common Space Initiative to support and complement an ongoing national dialogue in Lebanon. The Common Space Initiative seeks to build a consensus among Lebanese on such key national concerns as safety and values. NATIONAL GROUPING. A political association formed in 1996, with the intent of bringing about better cooperation among Maronites who objected to the role that Syria played in Lebanon. NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY (NLP). A Lebanese political party with support mainly from Maronite Christians and long associated with the Chamoun family. The NLP is led by Dory Chamoun and won no seats in the 2018 general elections. During the early years of the civil war of 1975–1990, the NLP had its own militia, known as the Tigers. The militia was ultimately, and forcibly, integrated into the Lebanese Forces militia. NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (NLA). See POPULAR NASSERIST ORGANIZATION (PNO).

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NATIONAL MUSEUM OF BEIRUT. See BEIRUT NATIONAL MUSEUM. NATIONAL PACT (1943). Also referred to as the National Covenant, an unwritten agreement from 1943, that laid out the post-independence governance arrangements for Lebanon, including its foreign policy orientation. It was negotiated by the political leaders, President Bechara el Khoury of the Maronite community and Prime Minister Riad al-Solh of the Sunni Muslim community, and subsequently approved by the National Assembly. The main tenets of the agreement remain today, while others were amended through the Taif Accords. The National Pact was negotiated within the context of two important global developments that greatly influenced the situation in Lebanon and the thinking going into the negotiations, including the impending end of the colonial period and the consolidation of the Arab state system. By 1943, it had become clear to the Maronite community that the French colonial presence in Lebanon, which greatly aided the community’s political and economic position, and protected their overall interests vis-à-vis other communities and regional actors, was no longer tenable. As a consequence, it was seen as important to reach out to other Lebanese sectarian communities to plan for governing the country in the postcolonial era. This reality necessitated the need to reach some kind of compromise about power-sharing arrangements, as well as the country’s relationship with both the Arab world and the West. While the Sunni community was traditionally least receptive to the notion of an independent Lebanese state, they came to the realization that their preference for Lebanon to join a larger Pan-Arab or at least Pan-Syrian superstate was unrealistic given the consolidation of the independent Arab state system by the 1940s. As a consequence, the Sunni leadership was open to negotiating with the Maronites about the terms of an independent Lebanese state, in return for a share of political power and a foreign policy that took their concerns into consideration. The political terms of the agreement reflect, to a considerable extent, traditional practices in which political power in Lebanon is often shared and distributed among different sectarian communities; however, the National Pact took this practice a step further in the degree of specificity, clearly spelling out the allocation of political positions for each of the major sectarian communities. The National Pact called for the distribution of political power on the basis of the numerical strength of each of the 17 recognized communities, with the largest receiving the lion’s share of power. The population numbers were based on the results of the Census of 1932, the only official census taken in modern-day Lebanon to date. The Census held that, overall, the Christian

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population was slightly larger than the Muslim population. As a consequence, the Christian communities were to be awarded more seats in the 99member National Assembly, on a ratio of six seats for every five Muslim seats allocated. With respect to individual communities, the Census determined that the Maronites were the largest single sect, followed by the Sunni and Shiite communities, respectively. As a consequence, the Maronites were awarded more seats in the National Assembly than any other community, with the Sunnis holding the second most seats, the Shiites the third, the Greek Orthodox fourth, and so on. The National Pact’s distribution of power to each of the communities was particularly stark with respect to individual positions. The Maronites were guaranteed the presidency, by far the single most powerful position in the country. As such, Maronite political hegemony was thought to be preserved. The Maronites were also guaranteed the positions of commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces and head of the Lebanese Central Bank. The Sunni community received the second most prominent positions in government and the bureaucracy, including the prime ministership, while the Shiites were given the third most important positions, including the speaker of the National Assembly. Overall, the distribution of positions according to the size of the sectarian community was widespread and carefully adhered to within the government body, including the senior echelons of the bureaucracy. With respect to Lebanon’s orientation and foreign policy, a compromise of sorts was reached between pro-Western and pro-Arab voices. Lebanon was referred to as a country with an Arab face and was to enjoy good relations with both the Arab and Western civilizations. Indeed, the architects of the National Pact saw Lebanon as a sort of bridge between both, benefiting through trade, diplomacy, and culture. The tenets of the National Pact held until 1975. Some scholars argue that it worked generally well and gave Lebanon stability and prosperity throughout the 1950s and 1960s, a situation that was in short supply throughout the Arab world during this period. Furthermore, they argue that Lebanon’s problems leading to the civil war of 1975–1990 were more a matter of externally driven demands on the system and less so with the internal political arrangements. However, critics of the National Pact point to its significant flaws, contributing to the weakening of the political system’s legitimacy as the years progressed and its ultimate collapse in 1975. For starters, critics note the rigidness of the agreement in times of demographic and social change, making it prone to becoming dated.

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The changing demographic reality, where Muslims were thought to have long eclipsed Christians in numerical strength, was the main challenge to the basic tenets of the National Pact. This reality, critics argue, led to demands among Muslim leaders for adjustments to give their communities more power. The reluctance of the Christian elite to accommodate the request led to weakening support for the National Pact and contributed greatly to the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. Several attempts to reform the National Pact took place during the 1970s and 1980s. After many failed attempts, the Taif Accords of 1989 was successful. It was adopted by the National Assembly and accepted by the main protagonists in the civil war, even if reluctantly so. Although the principals of the National Pact were largely kept in place, political power was distributed more evenly among the three largest communities: Maronite, Sunni, and Shiite. Furthermore, Lebanon’s identity was clearly defined as Arab, and it was seen as part of the Arab world. NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT. See UNITY GOVERNMENT. NATIONALISM. See LEBANESE NATIONALISM; PAN-ARABISM. NATIONAL RESISTANCE. See LEBANESE NATIONAL RESISTANCE FRONT (LNRF). NAUM PASHA (1846–1911). A prominent Catholic from a family based in Aleppo. Born into a Roman Catholic family in Istanbul, he rose in the ranks of Ottoman civil servants to serve 10 years, beginning in 1892, as Mutasarrif (governor) of the Mount Lebanon region under Ottoman rule. Later he became the Ottoman ambassador to France. NEO-PATRIMONIAL. See CONFESSIONAL SYSTEM. NESTORIAN CHURCH. See ASSYRIAN CHURCH. NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION (NGO). See ALAMUDDIN, AMAL (1978– ); CHIDIAC, MAY (1963– ); HARIRI, RAFIC (1942–2005); MAKASSED FOUNDATION; NATIONAL DIALOGUE PROCESS; RENÉ MOAWAD FOUNDATION (RMF); SADEK, PIERRE (1921–2013); SOLH, LEILA AL (1946– ); SOLH, MOUNIRA AL(1911–2010); SOLH, RIAD AL- (1894–1951); TUENI, GEBRAN (1957–2005); WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND MOVEMENTS. NUAYMAH, MIKHAIL. See NAIMY, MIKHAIL (1889–1988).

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NUSAYRIS. See ALAWITES. NUSRA FRONT. See AL-NUSRA FRONT.

O OCCUPIED ENEMY TERRITORYADMINISTRATION (OETA). The name for the government during a period of rule of the region of modern Lebanon between the end of Ottoman control and the beginning of the French Mandate. During a brief period, beginning on 30 September 1918, control was in the hands of World War I allies under the title the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA). French, British, and Arab officials participated in the OETA. The region of modern Lebanon corresponded to what was at first referred to as OETA North, but the name was soon changed to OETA West. The Palestine region was OETA South, and the Iraq region was OETA East. These regions were administered as captured territory under military jurisdiction and law. The OETA administrators were responsible for all aspects of governing, including the provision of food and other necessities. OETA control of the region of modern Lebanon came to an end when it was agreed at the April 1920 San Remo Conference that the French would have a mandate to rule Lebanon and the British would have the mandate over Palestine. OHANNIS PASHA (1852–?). An Armenian Catholic from Istanbul who served as Mutasarrif (governor) of Mount Lebanon from 1912–1915. OPERATION ACCOUNTABILITY. The name Israel used for its air attack on Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon that began on 25 July 1993. Operation Accountability was carried out in response to Hezbollah rocket attacks that resulted in several deaths among Israeli forces. The Israeli attack lasted seven days, until a cease-fire agreement brokered by the United States ended the conflict on 31 July. OPERATION GRAPES OF WRATH (1996). Military operation carried out in southern Lebanon and Beirut by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Israel’s stated goal was to pressure the government of Lebanon to be more effective in ending Hezbollah missiles being fired into northern Israel. It 233

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began on 11 April 1996, with Israeli missiles and artillery fire targeting Hezbollah positions and Lebanese infrastructure. A blockade of major Lebanese ports by Israeli warships began two days later. Hezbollah responded with more rockets fired into northern Israel. During the following days, more than 800 civilians, including many children, took refuge in the United Nations (UN) compound at Qana in southern Lebanon. More than 100 of them were killed and many others maimed when Israeli missiles hit the UN compound on 18 April. The media called this the Qana Massacre. There was controversy concerning whether Israel deliberately targeted the compound or rather hit it by accident while firing at nearby Hezbollah rocket launch sites. Facing pressure from the UN, the parties reached the April 1996 Agreement, also known as the Grapes of Wrath Accord, effective 27 April. The unsigned agreement called for Hezbollah and its allies to cease firing missiles into Israel and for Israel and its South Lebanon Army ally to desist from endangering Lebanese civilians. The agreement also called for the creation of the Israel–Lebanon Monitoring Group to oversee the region. Moreover, a Consultative Group was set up to facilitate reconstruction in Lebanon. OPERATION LITANI. An Israeli military action in Lebanon undertaken in retaliation for the 11 March 1978 attack in Israel by a cell of 11 Palestinian fighters. The attackers came by boat and took control of a bus traveling between Haifa and Tel Aviv. The passengers on that bus and a second seized bus were held hostage and many eventually killed, along with some passing motorists. The incident came to be known as the Coastal Road Massacre. Four days later, Prime Minister Menachem Begin ordered the beginning of Operation Litani as a reprisal attack intended to strike several Palestinian strongholds in Lebanon. The operation involved both missile bombardments and ground troops crossing the border into Lebanon and advancing toward the Litani River, south of Tyre. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) managed to overrun the Palestinian strongholds, while killing approximately 300 Palestinians. Many Palestinian fighters had managed to flee and were able to fight back by shelling Israel. The United Nations reacted by passing United Nations Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426, condemning the civilian casualties and calling for the withdrawal of IDF fighters. As the IDF left, the Christian forces under the command of Saad Haddad took control of the regions of southern Lebanon formerly held by Palestinian groups. By 23 March, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon had arrived to enforce the truce. Subsequently, the South Lebanon Army took charge of controlling the region within several kilometers of the border, lessening the threat to Israel from missile launches near the border and continuing to give Israel a foothold in Lebanon.

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OPERATION NORTHERN SHIELD. The code name that Israel gave for a small-scale military operation conducted along the Blue Line to locate tunnels that could be used by Hezbollah to cross into Israel. Israel had long been aware of at least one of the tunnels, and during the operation the existence of five or more tunnels was confirmed. Before beginning the operation, using its diplomatic channels, Israel had pressured some other nations, notably Russia, to encourage the Lebanese government to take action on the issue of the tunnels, but Lebanon had not done so. From 4 December 2018 to 13 January 2019, Israel Defense Forces personnel worked to locate and destroy the tunnels. The existence of several of the tunnels was confirmed by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, which found that at least two of the tunnels crossed under the Blue Line. OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE. See ISRAEL–LEBANON WAR (1982–1985). ORIENT. See L’ORIENT-LE JOUR. ORTHODOX CHURCH. See EASTERN ORTHODOX CHURCH. OTTOMAN EMPIRE. From the early 16th century to 1918, the Lebanon region was part of the vast Ottoman Empire centered in Istanbul. The Ottomans ruled the Lebanon region indirectly, through locally based authorities. The degree of regional autonomy varied greatly during this era of Ottoman rule. For example, one local ruler, powerful Druze leader Fakhr ad-Din, conspired with the Grand Duke of Tuscany and other European leaders attempting to gain his support for more independence. These attempts eventually failed, and Fakhr ad-Din was captured and later executed in Constantinople. In the 1860s, the Ottomans attempted to control the region better by dividing it into several administrative districts, but their power was waning in the face of European penetration into regions of the Ottoman Empire, including Lebanon, as well as local desires for independence. Ottoman rule came to an end when the Ottomans entered World War I on the German side, and after the war the Ottoman-controlled regions in the Levant were divided up at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. See also MUTASARRIF/MUTASARRIFATE.

P PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). Founded in 1964, during an Arab League Summit in Cairo, Egypt, the official goal of the new organization was to liberate Palestine from Zionist control by bringing the various Palestinian groups already in existence under one movement. After the founding of the modern state of Israel in 1948, the war that would soon follow, and the ongoing reprisal operations, more than 700,000 Palestinians had become refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and surrounding regions, while those in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip found themselves to be without political power. There had previously been no umbrella organization to bring the various Palestinian groups and refugee populations together as a unified movement. A Palestine National Council was created, consisting of representative civilians, to set the goals of the PLO. Those goals called for the end of Israeli rule over the former Palestine and the return of Palestinians to their traditional home areas. The PLO pursued guerrilla war against Israel, using neighboring countries as a base, to achieve their goals. Three years after its formation, the decisive Israeli victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 weakened the cause of the Palestinians and made their goals seem less achievable. A military leader, Yasser Arafat, came to play a more important leadership role, and, by 1969, he had become the long-serving chairman of the PLO’s Executive Committee. He understood that the Palestinians could not rely on Arab countries to liberate Palestine, a task that had to be undertaken by the PLO itself. According to his more militant approach, various groups within the PLO increased their attacks on Israel, primarily from Jordan and Lebanon initially (Egypt and Syria were severely limited after 1967). The attacks from its Jordan bases continued until even more militant PLO factions started to interfere in Jordanian politics, attacking Jordanian government targets and purportedly attempting to assassinate King Hussein. In September 1970, King Hussein ordered the army to attack the PLO militants in his kingdom, in an action that came to be known as Black September. The following year, King Hussein expelled the organization. 237

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The expulsion from Jordan left Lebanon as the last remaining sanctuary in which the Palestinians could carry out military action against Israel. The PLO shifted its headquarters and center of resistance to Lebanon, where thousands of Palestinian refugees lived. The Cairo Agreement of 1969 gave the PLO autonomy over the refugee camps in Lebanon and the right to use Lebanese territory to conduct military operations against Israel. The PLO’s main aim in Lebanon was to ensure a political climate favorable to allowing it to conduct military operations against Israel. This was especially critical, as the PLO’s armed presence in Lebanon bitterly divided Lebanese political leaders and the wider public, threatening to disrupt PLO operations. The PLO sided with Lebanon’s leftist components and moderate politicians sympathetic to the Palestinian position. Some of the more radical groups within the PLO, however, openly and aggressively aided Lebanese leftist groups that wanted to overthrow the Lebanese establishment and set up a leftist radical Lebanon. Lebanon’s Christian right was particularly concerned about the impact the PLO–Israeli conflict was having on Lebanon, as well as the blatant interference of various Palestinian groups in Lebanese politics. Unlike Jordan, the Lebanese government was too weak and divided to constrain PLO activity in Lebanon. This failure led to the arming of Lebanon’s Christian right parties, which took it upon themselves to challenge the PLO and their Lebanese allies, ultimately leading to the Lebanese civil war, which pitted the two camps against one another. Lebanon’s rightist forces and their allies were unable to defeat the PLO, and until 1982, the latter was able to maintain control of large swaths of southern Lebanon, operating as a state-within-a-state. During those years, the PLO continued its operations against Israel. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon ended the dominant presence of the PLO in Lebanon and, effectively, its theater of military operations against Israel. The PLO was forced to relocate its headquarters to Tunisia, and the focus of the Palestinian struggle shifted to the Occupied Territories. Later attempts to reestablish a foothold in Lebanon largely failed. PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL. See ARAFAT, YASSER (1929–2004); PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, a self-governing body called the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) came into existence in 1994. It had jurisdiction of the Gaza Strip

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and some parts of the West Bank, and limited control of other regions of the West Bank. The PNA later changed its name to the State of Palestine, which received the status of observer state by the United Nations in 2012. See also ARAFAT, YASSER (1929–2004); PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP); REFUGEES, PALESTINIAN. PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON. See PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); REFUGEES, PALESTINIAN. PAN-ARABISM. A movement supported by people who want strong ties among all the predominantly Arab nations or one large state covering the Arab-speaking world. Pan-Arabism seeks to embrace all Arab-speaking regions of North Africa and the Middle East. Its origins date back to the writings of Lebanese intellectual Jurji Zaydan, who advocated for Arab unity from his Cairo home. Pan-Arabism is closely related to Arab nationalism. It tended to be socialist and anti-Western. Egypt’s Gamal Nasser was a strong advocate of Pan-Arabism, and his influence spread to Lebanon and throughout the Arab world. In the 1950s through the 1970s, there were Pan-Arabist proponents in Lebanon, mostly from among the Sunni Muslim population, who favored a weakened state and closer Arabist ties. The National Pact had helped create an independent Lebanon, but the influx of Palestinians and the Pan-Arabism movement were challenges to Lebanon’s stability and independence. Several Nasserist political parties were founded in Lebanon, but Pan-Arabism and related Arab nationalist proponents were not confined just to those parties. The conflict between Lebanese nationalists and the Pan-Arabists was a major issue over which the civil war of 1958 was fought. See also EGYPT, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH; KULAYLAT, IBRAHIM (1934– ); MOVEMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT NASSERISTSAL-MURABITUN; NASSERIST UNIONISTS MOVEMENT (NUM). PAQRADUNI, KARIM (1944– ). A Lebanese politician who was raised in Beirut in a mixed family of Armenian Orthodox and Maronite Catholic. Paqraduni became active in Christian politics early on in his career, serving in the Kataeb Party as a leader of its youth division, and then went on to hold various high-level positions in the party at various times throughout his career. He also rose to positions of influence in the Lebanese Forces during the civil war. Paqraduni had strong links throughout the Arab world and felt that the fate of Lebanon’s Christians was best served by working in the Arab world rather than against it. He held a pro-Syrian position at various times during his

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career, especially when it was politically advantageous to do so, and supported his fellow party members who shared that stance. He served as president of the Kataeb Party beginning in 2001, and stepped down from a leadership role in 2008. Paqraduni was one of the great survivors of Lebanese politics. Although never a senior politician or a leader with a following, he was more of a pragmatic and useful politician who throughout his career demonstrated the ability to reach out to opponents and read the proverbial political tea leaves, adjusting his political stances accordingly. PARLIAMENT OF LEBANON. See CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. PARTY OF GOD. See HEZBOLLAH/HIZBOLLAH. PASHA, JAMAL. See FAMINE, GREAT; MARTYRS’ SQUARE. PATRONAGE. See CONFESSIONAL SYSTEM; LAHOUD, EMILE (1936– ). PATRON–CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS. See CONFESSIONAL SYSTEM. PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY. See CIVIL WAR OF 1975–1990; PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSP). PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT OF LEBANON (PM). A Lebanese leftist political party founded in 2000, by Najah Wakim. The PM holds no seats in the 2018 Parliament. It is a member of the March 8 Alliance. The party is known for its anti-American and anti-Israel stance. It has a Pan-Arabist stance and seeks stronger ties with other Arab nations and less influence from the United States. The party also is a critic of corruption among politicians. PERSIAN RULE. Cyrus the Great of Persia conquered the Lebanese region known as Phoenicia in 539 BCE and made it a satrapy within his vast empire. It remained so until Alexander the Great’s war with the Persian Empire led him to capture Tyre and the Lebanon coastal region in 332 BCE. PHALANGES PARTY. See KATAEB PARTY.

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PHARAOUN, HENRI (1901–1993). Lebanese art collector, sportsman, politician, and businessman. Having been born into a Melkite Christian family in Egypt that relocated to Beirut when he was quite young, Pharaoun earned a law degree in France before returning to Lebanon. He earned fame as an outstanding tennis player. He was elected to Parliament in 1943, and began a term as minister of foreign affairs in 1945. He went on to play a crucial role in shaping Lebanon during the independence era. Pharaoun is credited with helping to found independent Lebanon and designing the flag. He again served as minister of foreign affairs and in other cabinet positions after independence. Pharaoun was known for resisting the Pan-Arabist movement and calling for national union and cooperation among Lebanon’s various sectarian factions. He went on to become a wealthy businessman. Pharaoun used some of his wealth to develop an extensive art collection. That collection is now on display in his former residence, in the Robert Mouawad Private Museum. PHOENICIA, PHOENICIANS. The Greeks referred to the coastal area of modern Lebanon and farther south as Phoenicia, which they valued as a source of purple dye. In ancient times, the region was governed as a cluster of city-states, for example, Tyre, Byblos, and Sidon, along the coast rather than as a larger state. The Phoenicians were skilled at sailing the Mediterranean Sea and may have been the first to navigate at night by Polaris, the pole star. Being traders and seafarers, the Phoenicians founded other prosperous cities like Carthage and Utica along the coast of North Africa. Some modern Lebanese nationalists, especially Christians, look to the ancient Phoenicians rather than the Arabs as their ancestral heritage. This point of view is sometimes referred to as Phoenicianism. See also CANAANITE. PHOENICIAN ALPHABET. See BYBLOS. PHOENICIANISM. A point of view held among some Lebanese, especially Maronite Christians, that looks back to the Phoenicians, rather than to later Arab immigrations, as the ethnic and cultural base of the Lebanese population. This view leads to opposition of Pan-Arabism and Syrian influences in Lebanon’s politics and culture. See also AKL, SAID (1911–2014); GUARDIANS OF THE CEDARS. PIERRE SADEK FOUNDATION. See SADEK, PIERRE (1921–2013).

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POLITICAL CRISIS (2006–2008). At least three related factors led to a political crisis that paralyzed Lebanon from the summer of 2006 until the spring of 2008, almost tipping the country back into a sectarian civil war. The first factor was the devastating Hezbollah–Israel War of the summer of 2006. Although Hezbollah arguably fought the powerful Israeli military to a standstill, with international mediation bringing the conflict to an end, the war cost more than 1,000 Lebanese lives and millions in economic destruction. Hezbollah faced criticism from its opponents, and significantly from within its own community for contributing to the outbreak of the conflict. Hezbollah’s leadership was on the defensive and needed a political victory following the conflict, in part to quell criticism of it. A second factor was the political pressure Hezbollah was facing following the assassination of Rafic Hariri and the deaths of several others. Hezbollah, in particular, was openly against the international investigation and potential trial for the 2005 assassination, fearing it would be implicated in some manner. The third factor was related to political power in Lebanon and the fact that the Sunni-dominated March 14 Alliance controlled the government following the 2005 parliamentary elections, leaving the Hezbollah and the Shiitedominated March 8 Alliance in opposition. Historically, the Shiite population had been overshadowed politically, and now the Shiite-led opposition had been pressuring for more effective representation in government. The crisis actually began in November 2006, with the resignation of five Shiite cabinet members, three from Hezbollah and two from the Amal Movement. The aim was to deny the government legitimacy and force its resignation. In December 2006, Hezbollah organized a mass rally in Beirut against what it called the unconstitutional government, based on the absence of Shiite representation in cabinet. By January 2007, the pressure on the government was such that it was forced to resign. Hezbollah’s supporters occupied Beirut’s center, demanding a new unity government be formed where the opposition factions (i.e., Hezbollah and their allies in March 8) are given a veto wielding one-third of the cabinet seats. In November of that year, the term of President Émile Lahoud expired, and he left office. With the government in disarray, it was not possible to choose a successor, so Prime Minister Fouad Siniora assumed the role of acting president. The effort to gain approval for General Michel Suleiman to be the new president was derailed due to disputes about proportioning cabinet positions. To make matters worse, several politically based assassinations took place, in addition to the killing of a sitting cabinet minister, the Lebanese Christian politician from the March 14 movement, Pierre Gemayel. By May 2008, several serious conflicts had occurred between Hezbollah and the acting government of Fouad Siniora. Hezbollah stated that it felt it was in a state of war with the government, as the latter attempted to remove

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Hezbollah’s independent telecommunications network, as well as personnel sympathetic to it at the airport. Hezbollah forces reacted to government provocations by militarily taking control of West Beirut, turning its guns, which are purportedly to defend against Israel, toward its Lebanese opponents. Conflicts between Hezbollah and opposition fighters took place, raising the stakes that civil war could return to the country. The crisis was ultimately defused by regional actors when the leaders of the Lebanese factions met in Doha, Qatar, in May 2008, and reached a compromise solution known as the Doha Agreement. That agreement gave the opposition more positions in cabinet, the requested one-third, in fact, resulting in the power to veto proposed legislation. With the new agreement in place, Michel Suleiman was elected as the new president, and the crisis of 2006–2008 came to an end. Political tensions between March 14 and March 8 continued, however, leading to political stalemate and political instability in the following years. POLITICAL PARTIES. A casual observer of Lebanese politics will note the massive number of political parties that officially exist in the country. While theoretically this is true, it is important to understand that historically many Lebanese political parties have not played the same role as political parties in Western political systems or, indeed, even in the socialist political systems that dominated Eastern Europe and elsewhere for much of the second half of the 20th century. Political parties in Lebanon can be categorized in several different ways. First, there are those political parties that are simply extensions of the rule of traditional families. They are used by these families to mobilize their supporters, rather than necessarily to attract new ones. They tend to be devoid of ideological positions, although sometimes they do have general positions, and reflect the traditional patron–client exchanges. The traditional ruling families from the major sects tend to have a political party of this type. Dominant leaders and their families that have emerged in the post–civil war period, for instance, the Hariri family and their Future Movement, are also an example. Second, there are political parties that have ideological programs but tend to be dominated by or at least associated with a single family. The Kataeb Party and its links to the Gemayel family, and the Progressive Socialist Party and its links to the Jumblatt family are two examples of this. It is also likely that the Free Patriotic Movement and its links to Michel Aoun and his family fit this model. These types of parties may continue to exist without their founder or founding family, but they also may not.

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A third type of political party emerged from the civil war. This type tended to start out as a sectarian militia, but once the war ended, they transitioned into a sectarian-based political party. These include the Maronite Lebanese Forces and the Shiite parties, Amal and Hezbollah. A fourth type of political party more closely resembles, in terms of organization and ideological program, those that we traditionally associate with parties elsewhere. These include numerous leftist and Arabist parties but also the Pan-Syrian Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP). Some of these parties have transnational linkages. Although they were active on the leftist side during the earlier phases of the civil war, they are minor players in Lebanese politics. Finally, in Lebanon there are organizations and movements that are not political parties, but alliances of different parties, groups, and politically influential individuals who work together to further a political agenda. These include, for example, the Qornat Shehwan Gathering and, critically in the post-2005 political era, the March 8 Alliance and March 14 Alliance. See also ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION (ARF); ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ADP); ARAB SOCIALIST UNION (ASU); CONFESSIONAL SYSTEM; CONSTITUTIONAL BLOC; DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY; INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT; LEBANESE FRONT (LF); MARADA MOVEMENT; NASSERIST UNIONISTS MOVEMENT (NUM); NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY (NLP); POPULAR NASSERIST ORGANIZATION (PNO); PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSP); PROMISE PARTY; UNION OF WORKING PEOPLE’S FORCES; ZAIM. POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP). A movement dedicated to the resistance of Israel’s occupation of Palestine. The PFLP was founded by George Habash after Israel’s occupation of the West Bank after the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. Habash and other members embraced both Pan-Arabism and anti-Western socialism. The PFLP gained notoriety when it turned to a new tactic, the hijacking of passenger planes, beginning with the hijacking of an Air France airplane in 1976. After the airplane was flown to Entebbe, Uganda, the incident ended when Israeli commandos overran the hijackers and rescued the passengers. The PFLP was the largest faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, after al-Fatah, during the 1970s. For support it turned to China and especially the Soviet Union, whose later weakening and eventual collapse by 1991 weakened PFLP’s financial support. The PFLP rejected the terms of the 1993 Oslo Accords but did support the formation of the Palestinian National Authority. Abu Ali Mustafa took over the leadership it 2000, but he was killed the following year when the PFLP headquarters in Ramallah was attacked by Israeli forces using helicop-

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ters. Ahmed Saadat then took over the leadership, and later Israel blamed him for killing the Israeli tourism minister. Three PFLP members, including Saadat, were elected to the Palestinian Parliament in 2006, but soon thereafter Saadat was arrested and sentenced to a long prison term by the Israelis. Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, the military wing of PFLP, was especially active in suicide bombings during the Second Intifada. See also MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN). POPULAR NASSERIST ORGANIZATION (PNO). A Lebanese political party founded in 1973, by parliamentarian Maarouf Saad and other Sunni Muslims. Its base was from among the Sunni population, especially those in the Sidon area. The organization advocated a Pan-Arab position and other policies inspired by Egypt’s Gamal Nasser. Saad was killed in 1975, during an operation of the Lebanese Army concerning a dock strike in Sidon. During the beginning of the civil war of 1975–1990, the militant wing of the party, the National Liberation Army (NLA), was created and led by Maarouf’s son, Mustafa Saad. The NLA received support and funding from Yasser Arafat and Libya. It later participated in the coalition that fought against the Israel-backed South Lebanon Army. The party is currently led by Osama Saad and is part of the March 8 Alliance. POPULATION. There are estimated to be almost 7 million people living in Lebanon. This figure includes the sizable Palestinian and the more than 1 million Syrian refugees who reside in Lebanon but do not hold citizenship there. More than half the population is Muslim, with Sunni Muslims and Shiite Muslims estimated to each form about 27 percent of the total. Among the Christian populations, the Maronites form the largest of the Christian groups, at about 21 percent, followed by Greek Orthodox at 8 percent, Melkites at 5 percent, and several smaller Christian groups totaling 1 to 2 percent. The Druze population is about 5 percent, and Alawites number approximately 100,000. If we count both more recent emigrants and the descendants of past emigrants, the Lebanese diaspora is thought to number more than Lebanon’s current population. The largest diaspora communities are in Latin America and the Caribbean, with Brazil having as many as 6 million residents with Lebanese ancestry. POUND, LEBANESE (LP). The currency of Lebanon is known as the pound in English, the lira in Arabic, and the livre in French. The Lebanese pound (LP) is currently pegged to the U.S. dollar (USD). The history of currency in Lebanon reflects the nation’s history of control by outsiders. During Ottoman rule, the currency was the Ottoman lira, which was replaced in 1918, by the Egyptian pound. During the period of French control,

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the Syrian pound was the currency in both Syria and Lebanon, with the Syrian pound pegged to the French franc at 20 to 1. By 1939, the Lebanese pound had become distinct from the Syrian pound but was still pegged to the French franc. Then, in 1941, it was temporarily pegged to the British pound during World War II. It was definitively pegged to the British pound in 1949, and then the USD in the post–civil war period. During the civil war beginning in 1975, the Lebanese pound inflated badly, to the point where 2500 LP were exchangeable for only one USD. After the war ended in 1990, the value of the LP has appreciated somewhat, until the severe downturn of the economy, which came to a head beginning in 2019, when the LP’s value on the black market plunged severely. The banking crisis of 2020 forced the government to request help from the International Monetary Fund. With the LP in freefall on the black market, some help came in the form of two World Bank loans in March 2021. PRESIDENT, ACTING. According to the terms of the constitution, the prime minister serves as acting president until such time as a new president is appointed. Since independence the following prime ministers have served as acting president: Ayoub Tabet, Petro Trad, Salim Hoss, Fouad Siniora, and Michel Aoun. PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF. According to the constitution of Lebanon, a president is the head of state. Candidates for the office must be Lebanese citizens and at least 25 years of age. A person is elected to the office of president by a vote of Parliament and serves a six-year term. A president cannot then stand for reelection as president but may stand for a subsequent election. In Lebanon’s confessional system according to the National Pact, the office of president is reserved for Maronite Christians. An exception is made in the case of an acting president, since the prime minister, who comes from the Sunni Muslim community per the National Pact, serves as acting president until such time as Parliament elects a president. According to the terms of the National Pact, the office of president was the most powerful governmental position, but per the post–civil war Taif Accords, the powers of the presidency have been significantly reduced to the extent that the office of prime minister commands as much, if not more, importance. The complexity of the constitutional language, unwritten understandings, and the person holding the office of president, per Taif, determines to some extent the degree of power he or she will have compared to the prime minister.

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The post–civil war presidents have been Elias Hrawi (1989–1998), Emile Lahoud (1998–2007), Michel Suleiman (2008–2014), and Michel Aoun (2016–2022). Also, Fouad Siniora and Tammam Salam served as acting president. PRIME MINISTER, OFFICE OF. According to the terms of the 1943 National Pact and Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing arrangements, the prime minister must always come from the Sunni Muslim community. The position was, prior to the 1989 Taif Accords, considered to be the second most important political position after the presidency, a post reserved for a Maronite Christian; however, the position of prime minister was far weaker than that of the presidency and, in fact, was largely subordinate to the president. For example, the prime minister of Lebanon was appointed by the president and may be removed from office by the president. The prime minister also serves as acting president when the office of president is otherwise vacant. The Taif Accords, however, reformed the political system in such a way that greatly strengthened the position of prime minister, while simultaneously weakening the presidency. The prime minister is the head of government and president of the council of ministers, the formal name for the cabinet. Significantly, the prime minister is appointed by Parliament, which is in line with other parliamentary democracies, rather than the president. Indeed, in post–civil war Lebanon, the prime ministers have tended to wield as much power as the president and, in some cases, like during the era of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, even more power. The complexity of the constitutional language, unwritten understandings, and the person holding the office of prime minister according to Taif determines to some extent the degree of power he or she will have compared to the president. Post–civil war prime ministers have been Omar Karami (1990–1992; 2004–2005), Rachid al-Solh (1992), Rafic Hariri (1992–1998; 2004–2005), Najib Mikati (2005–2005; 2011–2014), Fouad Siniora (2005–2009), Tammam Salam (2014–2016), Saad Hariri (2016–2020), and Hassan Diab (2020– ). PRISONS. The Lebanese prison system has more than 20 prison facilities. The facility at Roumieh was built as a prison, and the others are converted military barracks. The overcrowded conditions and bad treatment of prisoners, especially at Roumieh, have received critical attention from Lebanese media and the international community. A plan facilitated by the United Nations to improve prison facilities and the treatment of prisoners was adopted by the government in 2015, but its implementation has been delayed due to the influx of migrants from the Syrian conflict and economic condi-

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tions. Critics of the system claim that the lack of a sufficient number of prison guards and lack of proper training have fostered an informal system in which so-called senior prisoners (shawish) are able to both control and exploit the majority of prisoners. Critics also claim that torture is used to extract confessions. See also ANSAR. PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSP). A Lebanese political party that advocates for a secular and nonsectarian position regarding public policies. Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt founded the PSP in 1949, as an attempt to overcome Lebanon’s sectarian, confessional system. During the civil war of 1975–1990, the People’s Liberation Army served as its militia, which controlled regions of Mount Lebanon and the Chouf Mountains. After the 1977 assassination of Jumblatt, the leadership of the party passed to his son, Walid Jumblatt. The party was originally pro-Syria, but it has vacillated throughout the years depending on political circumstances. It supported the March 14 Alliance beginning in 2005, but switched to the March 8 Alliance beginning in 2009. It continues to shift between the two movements, a dynamic reflected by the needs of the small and vulnerable Druze community to ally with the dominate force in Lebanese politics. PROMISE PARTY. A small political party whose constituents were mainly Maronite Christians who were pro-Syria. It was formerly known as the National Secular Democratic Party. The Promise won two seats in the 1992 elections under the leadership of former Lebanese Forces commander Elie Hobeika. It then won a few seats in later elections and had members who served in the cabinet. The party holds no seats in the 2018 Parliament. PROTEST MOVEMENT OF 2019. Public protests and mass demonstrations erupted in Lebanon in 2019, after the government proposed some new taxes. The economy had deteriorated rapidly. The value of the Lebanese pound had dropped on the black-market exchange rate many Lebanese businesses and families were forced to use. Unemployment and poverty had increased markedly, and electricity blackouts had become common. Women and even young girls played an important role on the front lines of the protest moment. Taking advantage of the expectation that male police officers would be less likely to strike them, females often risked their own lives when they put themselves in between the police and other demonstrators. When one woman kicked a security guard who seemed ready to shoot protestors, it was caught on camera, and the video of the scene went viral in Lebanon. In that and other ways, the protesters’ messages were shared on social media, fueling the movement.

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The protests contributed to the decision to resign made by Prime Minister Saad Hariri on 29 October 2019; however, the new government of Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his technocratic cabinet did not reverse the downturn in the economy or end the protests. The impact of the COVID-19 virus in early 2020, caused a temporary reprieve of the public protests, but they resumed in June 2020, and accelerated significantly following the explosion in Beirut in the port area in August of that year. See also BANKING CRISIS (2020); WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND MOVEMENTS. PROTESTANT CHRISTIANS. An estimated 40,000 of Lebanon’s estimated more than 1.6 million Christians are affiliated with Protestant Christian denominations. The major Protestant denominations represented are Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists. Most Lebanese Protestant families can be traced back to American and British missionary activities of the previous two centuries. The majority of the Protestant Christians live in the Beirut area. The National Pact system allots one parliamentary seat to Protestant Christians. PURPLE DYE. Ancient Phoenicia was famous for the manufacture and export of a richly colored purple dye made by extracting a purple part of a species of mollusck native to that region of the Mediterranean coast. The name Canaan may derive from one name for this dye. The dye was quite expensive, and in some regions around the Mediterranean its use may have been reserved for royalty, making purple a color symbolizing kingship.

Q QABADAYY. A term of Turkish origin used in Lebanon to refer to a thug or strongman who might be hired by a rich or influential person to intimidate or harm a rival. Qabadayys have been employed during political elections. QABBANI, MUHAMMAD RASHID (1942– ). Former Grand Mufti of Lebanon and the most prominent Sunni Muslim cleric in the country. Born in Beirut, Qabbani completed higher study of Sunni Islamic Fikh (Jurisprudence) in Cairo before returning to Lebanon. He rose to the position of Grand Mufti of Lebanon. He survived an assassination attempt in 2009, with the help of Lebanese security forces. Qabbani has taken a strong stance against the proposal to institute civil marriage in Lebanon, even issuing a fatwa requiring all Sunnis to oppose it. He strongly condemns the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands and has strongly denounced ISIS-supported terrorism against Christians living in the Middle East. QADA. Any of the 26 administrative districts of Lebanon. They form parts of the system of eight governorates. The plural form is aqdya. QANA MASSACRE. During the 16 days of Israel’s Operation Grapes of Wrath military operation in Lebanon in April 1996, more than 800 civilians sought shelter in a United Nations (UN) compound in the southern Lebanon town of Qana. On 18 April, the UN compound was hit by as many as 13 Israeli missiles, killing more than 100 civilian adults and children. Because so many civilians were killed, the media referred to the incident as the Qana Massacre. Hezbollah fighters had been firing rockets from nearby, with the possibility of the Hezbollah fighters taking shelter in the compound, so it remains controversial as to whether the compound was deliberately targeted or came under fire intended for rocket-launch positions. QASSAR, ADNAN (1930– ). See KASSAR, ADNAN (1930– ).

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QAWARMA. A traditional Lebanese dish made with chopped lamb or mutton preserved in salt and animal fat, for example, the fat from the tail of the awassi sheep, and stored in jars. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE. QAWUQJI, FAWZI AL- (1890–1977). Leading Arab nationalist military figure in the interwar period. Born during the Ottoman period into a Turkish family in Tripoli, al-Qawuqji became a military officer who served in several theaters. During World War I, he fought for the Ottomans, who sided with Germany. He was decorated for his battle prowess by both his Ottoman rulers and the Germans. After the fall of the Ottomans as a result of being on the losing side of the war, he fought for an independent Arab Kingdom of Syria, and then for a while fought with the French after they put down that independence movement; however, al-Qawuqji abandoned fighting on behalf of the French Mandate and joined the rebel cause during the rebellion (1925–1927). He fought for the Palestinian cause when the modern state of Israel was at war with the Arab and Palestinian resistance. In 1972, alQawugji published his memoirs, in two parts, in the Journal of Palestine Studies. QORNET SHEHWAN GATHERING. An organization of mostly prominent Christian leaders drawn from the business, intellectual, and political spheres. It takes its name from the town of its headquarters, Qornet Shehwan, in the Mount Lebanon governorate. Although not a political party, it advocates for an agenda that reaches into the arena of Lebanese political debate. Several of its members won parliamentary seats in the 2000 elections, but many then failed in their reelection bids in 2005, when the Free Patriotic Movement won many of the Mount Lebanon region seats. The Qornet Shehwan Gathering advocated for seven principles that espouse the goals of a strong and united Lebanon independent of Syria and encroachments from Israel, the implementation of the Taif Accords and the constitution, and cooperation with the Arab world. Since the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005, Qornet Shehwan has taken an even stronger stand against Syrian influence in Lebanon. The 2018 Parliament includes at least five members who are affiliated with the Qornet Shehwan Gathering. See also HARB, BUTRUS (1944– ). QULAYLAT, IBRAHIM. See KULAYLAT, IBRAHIM (1934– ). QURM, CHARLES. See CORM, CHARLES (1894–1963).

R RAAD, WALID (1967– ). A conceptual artist who was born in Chbanieh, Lebanon, and, in 1983, immigrated to the United States. After coming to the United States as an accomplished photo artist, Raad undertook graduate studies in the history of Lebanon and the wider Middle East, leading to a body of work that includes documentation of the horrors of the Lebanese civil war. He founded a project called the Atlas Group, which fictionally documented civil war events in Lebanon. His mixed-media exhibit The Atlas Group (1984–2004) included selections from those documents. A catalog, titled Walid Raad, of his comprehensive 2015 exhibit at New York’s Museum of Modern Art was published that same year. He is now professor in the School of Art at the Cooper Union in New York City. RAFI’I, ABDUL-MAJID AR- (1928–?). A physician and parliamentarian from Tripoli who was active in the pro-Iraq Arab Socialist Baath Party and an opponent of Syrian influence in Lebanon. RAHBANI BROTHERS. Assi (or Assy) Rahbani (1923–1986) and Mansour Rahbani (1925–2009) were heavily involved in every aspect of the Lebanese Arabic-language musical scene. They composed, produced, and/or directed songs, musical plays, films, and concerts in Lebanon and for world tours. They came to fame in part through their work for the Baalbek International Festival. Aside from their own musical talents, they were also known through their close association with Fairuz, the Lebanese Arabiclanguage singer who was Assi’s wife. Assi and Fairuz’s son, Ziad Rahbani, continues to work in the music industry. See also RAHBANI, ELIAS (or ILYAS) (1938– ). RAHBANI, ELIAS (or ILYAS) (1938– ). One of the famous musical family known as the Rahbani Brothers. Along with his two older brothers, Assi and Mansour, Elias has also composed for his famous sister-in-law, singer Fairuz. He was born in Antelias, Lebanon. He studied music at the Lebanese Academy, the National Conservatory, and privately in France. He worked as 253

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a music adviser and producer for Radio Lebanon. Rahbani’s work includes lyrics, compositions, and productions. His credits include composing hundreds of songs, in both Middle Eastern and Western styles, working on the music for 25 films and composing ballet music, music contributions to television shows, and numerous records and CDs. RAHI, BECHAR BOUTROS AL- (1940– ). A Maronite priest who was elected as the Maronite Church’s Patriarch of Antioch after the resignation of Patriarch Nasrallah Butrus Sufayr in 2011. As with previous individuals elected to the office of Patriarch of Antioch, he added the Boutros (or Butrus) to his name because Saint Peter (Boutros) is claimed to have been the leader of the church in Antioch, before relocating to Rome. He was elevated to the role of cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church in 2013. Patriarch al-Rahi has taken positions on several political issues, for example, the arming of Hezbollah, that have brought both praise and criticism from various sides of the political spectrum. RAMGAVAR. See ARMENIAN DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL PARTYRAMGAVAR (ADL). RAS BEIRUT/RA’S BEIRUT. Meaning “tip of Beirut,” Ras Beirut is a region of northwest Beirut that juts out toward the Mediterranean Sea. It is an affluent area with a mixed religious and ethnic population. Several major educational institutions, including American University of Beirut and the International College, are located here. Its seaside beaches and Corniche promenade attract large crowds on summer weekends. REFUGEE CAMPS. See BUWAYZ, FARIS (1955– ); CAIRO AGREEMENT (1969); DEUXIEME BUREAU; FATAH AL-ISLAM; GUARDIANS OF THE CEDARS; KHOURY, ELIAS (1948– ); NAHR ALBARED; REFUGEES, PALESTINIAN; SIEGE OF NAHR AL-BARED; TEL AL-ZAATAR; UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA); WAR OF THE CAMPS. REFUGEES, PALESTINIAN. The founding of the modern state of Israel and the subsequent wars between Israel and its neighbors have led many Palestinians to become refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. There are several categories of Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon. The refugees, mostly from northern Israel, of the 1948 Arab–Israeli conflict and their descendants are officially registered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Other

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Palestinians came as refugees from the 1970–1971 Black September Conflict in Jordan. More than 400,000 Palestinian refugees have been registered into the 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The largest one is the Ain al-Hilweh camp, established in 1948, south of Sidon. The Burj el-Shemali camp was established in 1955, just east of Tyre, and the Rashidieh camp was established in 1963, south of Tyre. The Nahr al-Bared camp was the site of a 2007 military siege, resulting in many deaths. The government reported that as of December 2017, there were 175,000 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon, with about 45 percent of those living in the 12 official camps and the rest living among the general population. The government does not recognize the Palestinian refugees as citizens; therefore, they have restrictions on their right to work and are not eligible for government services and to own property. The quality of life in the camps is poor. Some Palestinians have left Lebanon either permanently or temporarily to escape conflicts or in search of better economic conditions. See also BERRI, NABIH (1938– ); BUSTANI, MYRNA AL- (1937– ); CAIRO AGREEMENT (1969); CIVIL WAR OF 1975–1990; DEUXIEME BUREAU; EDUCATION; GEMAYEL, BASHIR (1947–1982); HOBEIKA, ELIE (1956–2002); KHOURY, ELIAS (1948– ); STATE-WITHIN-ASTATE; SYRIAN CIVIL WAR, IMPACT ON LEBANON; WAR OF THE CAMPS. RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE. A series of agreements and conventions promulgated between 1860–1864, between the Ottoman Empire and various European states. Some Islamic forces had been killing Christians in the Ottoman-controlled Mount Lebanon area and elsewhere in the Ottoman province of Syria during the civil war of 1860. According to the terms of an August 1860 agreement, a French-led force of troops from France, Russia, Prussia, Great Britain, and Austria intervened in Mount Lebanon and the region to stop the killing of Christians by Druze and Muslims. This series of agreements led to the formation of the Mutasarrifate as the system of governance in the region. RELIGIONS. Lebanon has an unusually large number of sizable religious identities, and they have played a large role in its history, culture, and politics. The governmental structure assigns seats in Parliament according to two broad religious groupings: Christians and Muslims. Each of these groupings includes diverse divisions who may see others within their grouping as false religions. No Census has been taken since 1932, which shows the sensitivity of this issue. Under its confessional system, Parliament allots seats based on religious identity.

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In 2011, the Beirut-based research firm Statistics Lebanon estimated Lebanon’s demographics as Shiite 27 percent, Sunni 27 percent, Maronite 21 percent, Greek Orthodox/Catholic 12 percent, Druze and Alawites 5 percent, and Armenian Catholic/Orthodox/other Catholics/other/agnostic/atheist 7 percent. The Christian grouping includes Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant traditions. The Catholic tradition in Lebanon includes the Armenian Catholics, Melkite Greek Catholics, Roman Catholics, and Maronites. The Orthodox tradition in Lebanon includes Armenian Orthodox Christians, and Syrian Orthodox Christians. There are also a small number of members of the Assyrian Church, which long ago broke away from the Orthodox tradition. The Protestant churches in Lebanon include the Anglican Church, Presbyterian Church, Congregational Church, and Armenian Evangelical Church. The Muslim grouping includes Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, Alawites and Druze. The Shiite Muslims includes the Imamis, also known as Twelver Muslims, as well as the Ismaili Muslims, who are also known as Seveners. The grouping also includes two traditions, the Druze and Alawites, which long ago broke away from the other Shiite traditions. There was a small number of Jews living in Lebanon in the past, but now there are very few. RENÉ MOAWAD FOUNDATION (RMF). Two years after the assassination of President René Moawad on 22 November 1989, his wife, politician Nayla Moawad, and other supporters started a foundation in his namesake. The mission of the RMF is to promote social and economic development in Lebanon and throughout the region. It supports a wide range of development projects in education, health, and income enhancement. The René Moawad Foundation, USA, raises funds in support of the Lebanon-based RMF. RIDA, MUHAMMAD RASHID (1865–1935). Early Islamic reformer. Having been born near Tripoli in Ottoman Syria, and later relocating to Egypt, Rida was a leading scholar of Islamic law during the late Ottoman and early modern periods. He was a strong advocate for the position that the Arab world needed to modernize to compete with the West and also return to the principles of the Salafi, the first three generations of early Islam—that is, he sought a blending of modernity and a conservative form of Islam. Rida was a disciple of and strong advocate for the Islamic reform positions of Jamal alDin al-Afghani (or al-Afghan), a Persian Muslim who had attempted to influence a number of rulers in both Muslim and Western nations. He was also influenced by another follower of al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, an Egyp-

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tian mufti who was successful in instituting some reforms in Egypt. Rida wrote a biography about Muhammad Abduh, and they were both advocates of Islamic reform. Rida’s concern with the backwardness of Islamic countries led him to call for Islam to embrace Western science and technology. He wrote about the proper way to conduct a modern state. His position was that the ruler should consult with the religious scholars on matters of law and policy. His position stopped short of the veto powers given the clerics later in Iran after the 1979 revolution. He took as a model the more consultative approach of European parliamentary systems. Such a system in an Islamic nation would mean that the views of the clerics would be taken seriously but not as mandates. Soon after his arrival in Cairo, Rida founded the periodical al-Manar, which published articles on interpreting the Qur’an, written from a Salafi viewpoint. Although his theological principles were meant to be derived from the Salafi period, his drive to modernize Islamic society led him to take daring and controversial positions. He accepted Darwinism, which meant that, to be consistent, he had to interpret the Qur’anic passages about Adam allegorically. This deviated significantly from the more strictly literalist approach to scripture among other Muslims. Rida also saw the need to soften the Islamic prohibition against lending money for interest, feeling that to progress, the Islamic societies needed to adopt some of the capitalist banking practices of the West. His position anticipates the more recent move toward Islamic banking, which finds ways to advance loan money without violating the prohibition against usury. Rida’s most far-reaching proposal perhaps was for the establishment of an Islamic caliph who would give spiritual guidance to all Muslim nations. This concept influenced the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928. Rida is now credited with being an important influence on the modern concept of an Islamic state. RIFAI, NURIEDDINE (?–1979). A leader of Lebanon’s internal security forces who came out of retirement to serve as prime minister for a brief period in 1975, heading up a largely military government. RIYADH AGREEMENT (1976). See ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT, RIYADH (1976). RIYADH CONFERENCE (1976). See ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT, RIYADH (1976).

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ROBERT MOUAWAD PRIVATE MUSEUM. A museum of art and other fine objects located in a privately owned mansion on Army Road in Beirut. It is open to the public, with an admission charge. The building was built in the early 1900s as the residence of Henri Pharaoun. He was a Lebanese politician, jeweler, and world traveler who amassed an extensive collection of fine art objects (pottery, carpets, vases, paintings, furnishings, weapons, jewels, and many art objects) sourced from cultures ranging from the Far East to Europe, including many Middle Eastern pieces. The display items date from the classical (Greek, Roman, and Byzantine) through the modern periods. The name of the museum reflects the current owner, Robert Mouawad, who opened the mansion and the Pharaoun art pieces for public viewing starting in 2006. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY. See ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANS. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANS. There are many Christian churches in Lebanon that recognize the pope of Rome as their spiritual leader and are considered to be Rites of the worldwide Catholic Church. They are sometimes referred to as Uniate Churches, meaning that they are in union with the Roman Catholic Church. The Uniate Rite with the largest percentage of the Lebanese population is the Maronite Church, which is said to have been founded in Syria by the apostle St. Peter. Its namesake is a later Syrian saint named Maron. Some estimates are that Maronites constitute around 21 percent of the Lebanese population. There are several other Catholic Rites followed in Lebanon. Melkite Greek Catholics in Lebanon adhere to a Rite originating in Antioch, Syria, that spread through the Byzantine Empire. Some estimates hold that Greek Catholics constitute about 5 percent of the population. Some of the Armenians who have migrated to Lebanon adhere to the Armenian Catholic Church rather than the Armenian Orthodox Church. There is also a small percentage of the population that is Roman Catholic—that is, they adhere to the Roman Rite rather than one of the Uniate Rites. See also HOLY SPIRIT UNIVERSITY OF KASLIK. ROMAN PERIOD. Starting in 64 BCE, the Romans extended their rule to the Lebanon region and granted citizenship to the people in urban centers. The Lebanon region became part of the Byzantine Empire after the fall of Roman power in the West. This lasted until the 7th century brought the beginning of the Arab Period.

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RONALD REAGAN’S 1982 PEACE INITIATIVE. A proposal for a peaceful agreement between Israel and the Palestinians proposed by U.S. president Ronald Reagan in September 1982. The 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt had not been accepted by most factions of the Arab world, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syria. Three years later, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin had ordered an invasion of Lebanon, code-named Operation Peace for Galilee, to eliminate the PLO bases in southern Lebanon as a threat to Israel. That Israeli action touched off the Lebanon–Israel War (1982–1985). The United States had sent in a marine division to supervise the withdrawal of PLO fighters from Beirut. On 1 September 1982, President Reagan announced the successful completion of the operation and the withdrawal of the marines. Reagan noted that the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut called attention to the homelessness plight of so many Palestinians. Reagan explained that U.S. diplomacy had, up to that point, taken a more neutral stance appropriate for a mediator, a role it had played at Camp David in 1980, but that it was now time to articulate the principles that the United States felt should be adopted. He then went on to propose what he called a fresh start, a plan for achieving lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, building on the foundation laid down by the Camp David Summit. The Reagan initiative called for Palestinians to accept the State of Israel and recognize that their own aspirations could only move forward on that basis. It also called on Israel to recognize that Israel’s security depended on peace with the Palestinians. Reagan envisioned that Israel would give up territory in the West Bank, under a framework of control by Jordan, in exchange for a lasting peace. The plan also called for a transition period during which Palestinians could develop a system of self-government. The Reagan initiative was not adopted, but the initiative anticipated the later Oslo Accords, except for the important difference to be played by Jordan. ROUMI, MAJIDA EL (1956– ). Lebanese soprano and activist. Her outstanding musical talent was recognized at an early age. As a young adult, her career as a singer with a beautiful soprano voice led to numerous successful recordings and concert performances. Her dedication to needy social issues led to her 2001 appointment as an ambassador to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Her other social action activities include work with the Save the Children Fund’s activities in Jordan. RUSSIA, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. Russia, even in the days of the Soviet Union, never had particularly close relations with Lebanon, nor did it have overt strategic interests in the country. Lebanon was more closely aligned with the West, France, and the United States, in particular. What

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interests Russia had with Lebanon were largely tied to wider regional dynamics, including the Arab–Israeli conflict, and more specifically Syrian–Israeli relations. In more recent years, Russia’s interest in Lebanon has stemmed from the neighboring conflict in Syria (where Russia has significant interests), concerns about the rise of Sunni fundamentalism, and a desire to broaden its relationships and influence in the Arab world, for both strategic and commercial value, which it has done with some degree of success. Russia and Lebanon have cordial, although not extensive, relations. Historically, Russia, as an imperial power in competition with the Ottoman Empire and other European powers, long had an interest in the geographically close Middle East. In addition to strategic and commercial considerations, Russia also played the role as a protector of the region’s Christian Orthodox communities, in which it had influence. For example, with respect to Lebanon, Russia was one of the countries that contributed troops to the French-led force that intervened in 1860, to stop the killing of Christians in the Mount Lebanon region, according to the terms of the Règlement Organique agreements. It also was one of the five European powers that ensured the security of the autonomous Mount Lebanon, the forerunner to the modern-day Lebanon. With the communist revolution in Russia and the rise of the Soviet Union, a desire to spread Communism in the Middle East was a major goal. In 1924, the Soviet Union helped guide the formation of the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), which later became separate from its Syrian counterpart. The LCP was outlawed from 1939–1943, and again in 1948, which put a strain on Soviet relations with Lebanon. During the Cold War period, Soviet relations with the Lebanese state were minimal, given the latter’s alliance with the West. The Soviet Union, did, however, play a more active role in the Lebanese civil war through its relationship with its main Middle East client state, Syria. Indeed, especially after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the brief introduction of Western forces to Beirut, the Soviet Union heavily rearmed Syrian forces in the country with sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles. The rearming of Syria played a role in that country’s ability to stave off Israeli/Western attempts to push it out of Lebanon and reassert its dominance over Lebanon, which remained until 2005. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s meant that Russia focused its energies on its own internal and regional matters, withdrawing considerable resources from the Middle East. It continued to play a minor role through international organizations. For example, Russia was one of the members of the Consultative Group, created by the United Nations to facilitate the reconstruction of Lebanon following the destruction caused by Israel’s Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996.

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By the second decade of the 21st century, Russia had started to reassert its global influence, with particular emphasis on and success in the Middle East. Indeed, arguably, Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war saved the Assad regime and tied it closely to Moscow. The intervention kept Assad in power and has led to Russia negotiating long-term leases allowing it to build or expand several military installations on Syrian soil. Since the intervention in Syria, Russia has expanded its military and diplomatic footprint throughout the Middle East, and it is again a major player in the region. With respect to Lebanon, Russia has played an intermediary role between Hezbollah and Israel when tensions between the two have increased, and Russia has attempted, although with limited success so far due to Western pressure, to sell weapons to the Lebanese military. Lebanon has become a target of Russian interests, given the country’s close proximity to Syria. Russian companies are working to develop Lebanon’s offshore gas and oil reserves. Russia wants to sign long-term agreements for cooperation in many areas. Within the Lebanese government, the strong Hezbollah faction favors a closer relationship with Russia. Whether or not Russian–Lebanese ties get closer depends on how the United States and other Western countries decide to relate to a Hezbollah-dominated Lebanon. Washington’s sanctions policy during the Trump administration, designed to weaken Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran’s influence in Lebanon, may inadvertently move Lebanon into closer cooperation with Russia. RUSTUM PASHA (1810–1885). One of the men appointed in the office of Mutasarrif of Mount Lebanon by the Ottoman regime. He served two five-year terms, from 1873–1883.

S SAAD, HABIB BASHA AS- (1886–1966). A Maronite politician who served in many capacities, notably prime minister and later president in 1934. SAAD, MARUF (1910–1975). Born in either 1910 or 1914, an activist and politician from Sidon. As a young man, Saad helped organize the Palestinian Arab revolt in 1936, against British rule in Palestine. After returning to Lebanon, he was jailed for a while by the French for resistance to their rule. Saad was first elected to Parliament in 1957. He looked upon Egypt’s Gamal Nasser as a great Pan-Arab leader and, in 1973, founded of the Popular Nasserist Organization. When tensions mounted leading up to the outbreak of civil war of 1975–1990, Saad led a militia that effectively controlled the Sidon area, in defiance of the national government. Although he had long been a supporter of the cause of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), he fell out of favor with the PLO when he resisted its increasing influence on Sidon. Saad helped organize a protest in favor of local fishermen in February 1975. During the protest, he was shot, allegedly by a government sniper, and died from his wounds a month later. His death became one of the main catalysts that sparked the civil war that began later that year. SAAD, MUSTAFA (1950–2002). The son of Maruf Saad who took over the leadership of the Popular Nasserist Organization (PNO) after his father’s death. During the civil war, he led the PNO’s military wing, the National Liberation Army. He served in Parliament as a PNO representative. After his death in 2002, his brother, Ousama Saad, replaced him in the parliamentary seat. SAADEH, ANTOUN (1904–1949). A Lebanese intellectual who staunchly resisted the divisions imposed by the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Saadeh founded the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) in 1932, a secular party with the radical goal of uniting Greater Syria under one government 263

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and thereby overcoming the fragmentation of the borders imposed by the Sykes–Picot Agreement. His book The Rise of Nations (“Nushu Al Ummam”) laid out his vision for one state uniting all of Greater Syria, with Damascus as its capital. He refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Lebanese government. During World War II, Saadeh lived in Berlin and sided with the Axis countries because he blamed Great Britain and France for the Sykes–Picot divisions. He returned to Lebanon in 1947, denouncing the power-sharing confessional system and calling for the uniting of Lebanon and Syria. Resistance against Saadeh’s movement by Lebanese nationalists led to attacks on the SSNP printing press and the killing of some of his supporters. Saadeh fled to Syria, where he gained support from Al-Zaim, the new president of Syria. Saadeh’s troops invaded Lebanon in 1949, but they were badly defeated. According to the terms of a secret deal between Syria and Lebanon, Saadeh was handed over to Lebanese officials and executed as a traitor on 8 July 1949. He is still admired by some as a thinker and committed leader. Saadeh’s SSNP went underground after his execution and the arrest of several party leaders. It resurfaced in the late 1950s, as one of the parties resisting the Pan-Arabism movement. During the civil war, the SSNP turned to some terrorist-style actions. After the war, it took its place among Lebanon’s numerous political parties. It continues to contest parliamentary elections and holds three seats in the 2018 Parliament. See also SOLH, RIAD AL- (1894–1951). SABA, AS’AD (1913–1971). One of the great masters of the written form of the Lebanese zajal style of poetry. SABAH, JEANNETTE (1927–2014). A Lebanese singer and movie star, her full name was Jeanette Gergis al-Feghali, but she was known by the stage name Sabah. She was popularly referred to as Sharourah al-Wadi, a phrase that refers to a beautiful singing bird. During her career, she was in more than 80 movies and 25 plays, and sang more than 3,000 songs. Her career stretched from 1940 until well into the 21st century. Aside from her long musical and performance career, she was famous for having been married 10 times. Her last marriage, at age 85, made her the world’s oldest bride that year. SABBAH, HASSAN KAMEL AL- (also spelled CAMIL A. SABBAH) (1894–1935). A Lebanese researcher and inventor in electronics. Al-Sabbah held teaching appointments in Damascus and Beirut, and then studied briefly at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before earning a master’s degree in engineering sciences from the University of Illinois. In 1923, al-

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Sabbah started working in the engineering laboratory at the General Electric Company (GE) in New York state. While working for GE, his pioneering research in electronics engineering led to more than 70 patents and numerous innovative applications, the profits from which went to GE. Al-Sabbah worked on circuits for rectifiers, converters, and solar cells. He foresaw that solar energy could transform the economy of the Middle Eastern region. He is sometimes credited with being the father of the solar cell, and his work greatly contributed to the space industry’s use of solar cells. He died tragically in a car accident in New Jersey. SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRES. After the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) withdrew its fighters from the various Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, leaving the Palestinian civilians behind. An agreement was reached with Western leaders guaranteeing the safety of the refugee population; however, after the assassination of president-elect Bashir Gemayel, Christian militiamen entered the Palestinian refugee camp and neighborhoods of Sabra and Shatila on 16 September 1982, with Israeli acquiescence and initiated a two-day massacre of Palestinian civilians and Shiite Muslims. Estimates of the dead vary greatly from hundreds to possibly a few thousand. The Israeli forces, under Ariel Sharon’s command, were blamed for encouraging and, at minimum, not stopping the slaughter, given their control of access and entry to the area. The lingering Palestinian hatred of Sharon would later play a role in the start of the Second Intifada in 2000, after Sharon visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. SADEK, PIERRE (1921–2013). A political cartoonist whose work was regularly featured in the satirical magazine Ad-Dabbur and then later in the daily An-Nahar. His internationally famous cartoon depicted the sphinx crying upon the death of Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser. During the civil war of 1975–1990, his cartoons were published in Al Amal. The Pierre Sadek Foundation in Beirut is dedicated to collecting and preserving his work. It stages exhibits of his work and educates young artists in the art of caricature. SADR, IMAM MUSA AL- (1928–1978). A Shiite Muslim cleric from Iran who relocated in 1960, to Lebanon, the homeland of his father. From his home base in Tyre, al-Sadr published the periodical Maktabi Islam. Like the al-Sadrs in Iran, Musa became a political and social activist cleric rather than confining himself to traditional religious roles—that is, he was of the Activist rather than the Quietist school of Shiite clerics. He helped found schools and neighborhood improvement movements. He also began to play an increasing role as a leader in advocating for the rights of the Shiites of Lebanon to be

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better represented in Parliament and better armed against Israel. Two of his lasting contributions were helping to found the Movement of the Disinherited, to advocate for the poor of South Lebanon, and later the related Amal Movement, which took a more militant approach. He took a pro-Syria stance during the civil war. Al-Sadr worked to overcome the sectarian divisions among the Lebanese population. He advocated for the political rights of the Alawites and worked with Lebanon’s Sunni Muslims and Christians. Imam Musa al-Sadr mysteriously disappeared, and presumably died, while visiting Libya in 1978. SAFI, WADI AL- (1921–2013). Famous singer, songwriter, and musician born into a Maronite family named Francis in Niha, Lebanon. Later he adopted the stage name Wadi (or Wadih) al-Safi. His career was launched by winning a singing contest on the radio. He became one of Lebanon’s bestloved musical stars, and his fans dubbed him the “Voice of Lebanon.” He developed a singing style that built on regional, as well as urban, Lebanese musical traditions. He was skilled at singing in several languages, which added to his appeal during international tours and regional festivals. In addition to singing thousands of songs during his career, he also composed songs and played instruments. He performed together with other famous singers, for instance, Fairuz. SAFIR, AS-. See AS-SAFIR. SAID, ALI AHMAD. See ADONIS (1930– ). SAIDA. See SIDON. SAINT GEORGE BAY. An important bay on the Mediterranean shore of Beirut. The bay takes its name from the local version of the legend of Saint George and the Dragon, which holds that the mythic battle was fought in this bay. It is the site of the historic Saint Georges Hotel, as well as the controversial development scheme of the Solidere corporation. SAINT GEORGE MARONITE CATHEDRAL. Located in downtown Beirut in an area of old churches and the modern Mohammad al-Amin Mosque, this church serves as the headquarters of the Maronite Church in Beirut. The current cathedral was built in the late 19th century and modeled after the large Basilica di Santa Maria Maggiore (“Major Basilica of Saint Mary”) in Rome. A smaller mid-18th century church also dedicated to Saint

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George had been on the site previously. As with many buildings in Beirut, the cathedral was heavily damaged during the Lebanese civil war and was not restored and rededicated until 2000. SAINT GEORGE ORTHODOX CATHEDRAL. There has been an Orthodox cathedral on site of the current Saint George Orthodox Cathedral since the 5th century, when the status of the local leader was elevated from bishop to metropolitan (bishop). Earthquakes destroyed the previous cathedrals. The present one dates from the 18th century, with extensive additions and alterations after its initial construction. It was damaged during the civil war but has been restored and is a popular tourist destination. It also serves as the seat of the metropolitan bishop of the Archdiocese of Beirut for Greek Orthodox Christians. Adjacent to the church is an entrance to the Archaeological Crypt Museum, located below ground level. The small museum has displays of artifacts dating back to the Hellenistic Period, as well as the remains of altars and other furnishings from older churches on the site. SAINT GEORGES HOTEL. A grand old hotel dating from the 1920s, during the period of the French Mandate, and named after Beirut’s Saint George Bay. Principal architect Auguste Perret combined the latest in Parisian styles with regional features. When it opened, with four floors and 70 guest rooms, it was the largest hotel in the region. In its prime, it was a meeting place for Beirut’s international business, governmental, and social elite. The hotel has undergone several setbacks in recent decades. It was badly damaged by artillery and fire during the Lebanese civil war. After the war, restoration plans were delayed. Then the 2005 explosion that killed Prime Minister Rafic Hariri did further damage. The building remains unrestored because it is caught up in a struggle with Solidere, the massive downtown renovation project that is partly private and partly public. It has held out, as a private entity, resisting Solidere’s controversial plans to demolish the building and further develop the bay region. SAINT JOSEPH UNIVERSITY. An important center of higher learning founded by French Jesuit priests in the late 19th century. French remains the main language of instruction at Saint Joseph University, but it promotes French, Arabic, and English trilingualism. It is often referred to by the initials USJ, from the French Université Saint-Joseph. USJ is a private Catholic institution with enrollment open to everyone. It is especially known for its research and training in various medical fields, as well as for its hospital, the Hotel-Dieu de France. It also enjoys a good reputation in many other areas, including engineering, law, economics, and social sciences, and has

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educated many of the country’s elite. Its Catholic heritage is reflected in its work in theology, as well as its serving as the host institution for a center for the study of Arabic Christianity known as CEDRAC. The various faculties are spread across five campuses in Beirut, and USJ also has several regional campuses. See also MUSEUM OF LEBANESE PREHISTORY. SAINT MARON. See MARON, SAINT (also spelled MARUN or MAROUN) (?–410). SA’IQA, AS. With its name translated as “The Storm,” a Syria-based military faction backed by the Syrian regime. As Sa’iqa was formed in 1966, to promote Syrian influence among Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organization. It played an active role as a militia during Lebanon’s civil war but is no longer active in Lebanon. SALADIN/SALAH AD-DIN (1137–1193). Muslim leader who united Muslims and successfully fought the Christian Crusaders. Having been put in charge of Islamic troops in Syria in 1169, by the Fatimid caliph in Egypt, Saladin expanded his domain of control and built his army to the point where he attacked the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1177. The king of Jerusalem, Baldwin IV, and his forces defeated the attackers. Just two years later, Saladin returned with a better-prepared force and defeated Baldwin IV at the Battle of Marj Ayyun. SALAH AD-DIN. See SALADIN/SALAH AD-DIN (1137–1193). SALAM, NAWAF (1953– ). Lebanese judge, jurist, academic, and diplomat. Salam is currently serving a term as a judge on the International Court of Justice. Prior to that he served a 10-year term as Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Nations, during which time his roles included the prestigious positions of vice president of the General Assembly and president of the Security Council. Salam’s publications, including his 2004 edited book Options for Lebanon, on legal reform and ways to overcome sectarianism, helped make him a favorite for prime minister among many of the 2020 protestors who were calling for deep reforms that would overcome rule by Lebanon’s entrenched elite sectarians.

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SALAM, SAEB (1905–2000). A Sunni Muslim businessman, landowner, philanthropist, and politician from Beirut. Salam was born into a prominent Beirut family. His father, Salim Ali Salam, had been a businessman and member of the Ottoman Parliament. One of Saeb’s major accomplishments as a businessman was as founder of Middle East Airlines in 1945. As a politician, he was first elected in 1943. He went on to serve in various cabinet positions, first as minister of the interior and later as minister of oil. He had close ties to Saudi Arabia, which helped him negotiate deals with Aramco. Salam opposed the invasion of Egypt during the Suez Crisis of 1956. He joined other Muslims in opposition to Lebanon’s proposed joining of what came to be known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Salam served several terms of various lengths as prime minister. He first served two short periods as prime minister, from 14–18 September 1952, and then 1 May to 16 August 1953. He served longer terms as prime minister from 2 August 1960 to 31 October 1961, and 13 October 1970 to 25 April 1973. After surviving two assassination attempts, owing to his resistance to Syrian influence in Lebanon, Salam lived in Switzerland from 1985–1994. He headed the charitable Makassed Foundation. His eldest son, Tamman Salam, later took over the leadership of Makassed and served a term as prime minister, and also was acting president. SALAM, TAMMAM SAEB (1945– ). Sunni Muslim businessman and politician. Having been born into an influential Sunni Muslim family in Beirut as a son of former prime minister Saeb Salam, and having earned a degree from Haigazian University, Tammam Salam entered the business world before going on to serve in several political capacities. His first foray into the political arena came in 1973, when he founded the Movement of the Pioneers of Reform as a moderate Sunni organization meant to counter leftist activism among some Muslims. He dissolved the Pioneers of Reform two years later with the outbreak of the civil war of 1975–1990. Salam was elected to the 1996 Parliament as an independent candidate from Beirut. After losing as a candidate for the 2000 Parliament, he was out of national politics until his election to Parliament in 2005, again as an independent. Later he was appointed minister of culture in the cabinet of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. With the backing of the March 14 Alliance, Salam became the consensus prime minister designate after the resignation of Najib Mikati in March 2013. After 10 months of political deadlock, he successfully formed a government and began serving as the 34th prime minister of Lebanon in 15 February 2014, an office he held until 18 December 2016.

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It was a turbulent era due to the Syrian civil war’s impact on Lebanon. In a speech to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2014, Prime Minister Salam warned that Lebanon was facing a terrorist onslaught from obscurantist and criminal groups. He denounced violent attacks by radicals in Syria, especially the attacks on Yazidis and Christians, while pointing out that thousands of Muslims had also been killed by extremists. He called attention to the strain on Lebanon’s social, humanitarian, educational, health, and security systems caused by the influx of more than 1.5 million refugees from the Syrian war. He called attention to the fact that the number of Syrian war refugees was equal to one-third of Lebanon’s total population. Salam called upon the international community to compel Israel to fulfill the stipulations of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701—specifically, to stop violating Lebanese sovereignty by land and sea. Israel, he insisted, should withdraw from Lebanese territories in cooperation with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Salam was a featured speaker in February 2016, at the “Supporting Syria and the Region” conference cohosted in London, England, by the United Kingdom, Germany, Kuwait, and the UN. He again called attention to Lebanon’s Syrian refugee problems and called upon the international community for support in helping Lebanon cope with issues arising from the influx of refugees. Salam also took office as Lebanon’s acting president on 25 May 2014, serving in that capacity until 31 October of the following year. SALAMEH, RIAD (1950– ). A long-serving governor of the Lebanese Central Bank (Banque du Liban) and key architect of Lebanon’s post–civil war financial and economic system. Salameh was long seen as the irreplaceable steward of Lebanon’s financial system, with a great deal of support from the international financial and donor communities, including the United States; however, Lebanon’s financial and economic meltdown of 2019/2020 and related banking crisis led to calls by critics for his resignation. Salameh was born in the town of Antelias, just north of Beirut in the Metn district. He and his siblings were raised by their grandparents and extended family, while his parents, prosperous business owners, split their time between Lebanon and the West African country of Liberia, where they held substantial interests. Salameh attended America University of Beirut, studying economics. He worked at Merrill Lynch, the wealth management and financial services multinational, where he ultimately rose to the senior position of vice president, dividing his time between Beirut and Paris. His success at the firm drew the attention of Lebanese businessman-turned-politician Rafic Hariri, who entrusted Salameh with some of his significant financial interests.

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When Hariri became prime minister in late 2002, he brought several people from his business empire into his administration. Within this context, Salameh became the governor of the Lebanese Central Bank in 2003. Salameh was initially credited with stabilizing Lebanon’s financial sector, and establishing and driving the framework in which government and banking structures operated in the post–civil war period. He was seen as a steady hand, a fact that became especially apparent during periods of domestic, regional, and international unrest and uncertainty. This included, for example, the many Hezbollah–Israel wars, the turbulent period following the assassination of Rafic Hariri, and the global financial meltdown of 2007–2008. Salameh was seen as so instrumental to Lebanon’s financial health that his initial six-year period as governor of the Lebanese Central Bank was renewed four consecutive times, with the latest appointment scheduled to end in 2023. Although critics of Salameh’s role in managing the economy certainly existed from the outset of his tenure in the early 1990s, it was really only during the financial crisis of 2019–2020, with Lebanon’s currency in a free fall, that criticism of him became far more public and widespread. He was criticized, for example, for Lebanon’s very large and some say unmanageable external debt, and for establishing highly favorable terms for Lebanese banks, enriching them while risking the overall financial stability of the country. The vulnerability of Lebanon’s banking structure, which he had helped create, was laid bare in 2016, when hard currency from remittances and Persian Gulf sources dried up, fueling the banking crisis of 2019–2020 and jeopardizing the life savings of ordinary Lebanese, plunging many into poverty. The massive protests that took place during the period saw demands for his resignation. Long-time political opponents, including Hezbollah and those linked to President Michel Aoun, viewed his demise as a way to meet some of the demands of protestors while getting rid of a long-standing ally of rival political camps. Criticism of Salameh also served as a useful scapegoat in lieu of real changes to the Lebanese political and economic order. Even the largely technocratic government of Prime Minister Hassan Diab, which has clashed with Salameh concerning the decision to default on foreign loans, has focused its criticism of his leadership and held him accountable. Salameh defended the Lebanese Central Bank, and his policies in particular, and laid responsibility for the difficulties Lebanon was facing squarely on politicians and said the political will needed to make fundamental changes required the stabilization of Lebanon’s economy. While historians will make the ultimate call on Salameh’s legacy, it may be fair to say that his record will be mixed.

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SALEM, ELIE (1930– ). An author and professor of political science at American University of Beirut who went on to serve as foreign minister and deputy prime minister beginning in 1982. Upon leaving politics, Salim founded of the Lebanese Institute for Policy Studies. He then became president of the University of Balamand. His son, Paul Salem, is president of the Washington-based Middle East Center, a think tank. SALEM, PAUL. The son of former Lebanese politician Elie Salim, who serves as president of the Middle East Institute (MEI) in Washington, D.C. MEI is a think tank that, through publications, conferences, and other means, promotes information about and good relations with Lebanon and other Middle Eastern nations. SALIBI, KAMAL SULEIMAN (1929–2011). Lebanese historian who taught at American University of Beirut. Salibi was founder and director of the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies in Amman, Jordan. He is considered a prominent historian of Lebanese history, and his books on modern Lebanese political history include The Modern History of Lebanon, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered, and Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958–1976. SALMAN, TALAL. See AS-SAFIR. SAMMAN, GHADA AL- (1942– ). Journalist, novelist, and publisher. Samman was born and raised in Damascus, Syria. She moved to Beirut for graduate studies and remained there until the civil war period, when she relocated to Paris. Samman has written and published numerous novels and collections of poetry. She is considered to be an important advocate of women’s rights and a feminist perspective. One of her novels, published shortly before the civil war, predicted the outbreak of bloodshed, and a subsequent work detailed the suffering during that war. Her works in English translation include Beirut Nightmares, The Night of the First Billion (as coauthor), and Arab Women in Love and War: Fleeting Eternities. SAN REMO CONFERENCE. An international meeting that took place from 19 April to 26 April 1920, in the town of San Remo on the Italian Riviera. The purpose of the conference was to decide the future of the territories formerly held by the Ottoman Empire, which had suffered defeat and disintegration by being on the losing side of World War I. In addition to host Italy, there were also official delegations from Great Britain and France. Representatives from Japan, Greece, and Belgium were also in attendance.

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Aside from recommendations concerning other territories formerly controlled by the Ottomans, two mandates were created to govern the regions of the former Syria Province of the Ottoman Empire. France was mandated to rule the northern region of the former Syria Province, comprised of Syria and Lebanon, while Great Britain was mandated to govern Palestine. These arrangements were later formalized in the Treaty of Sèvres. The French Mandate came to be known as L’État du Grand Liban, and then, in 1926, the Lebanon Republic. SARKIS, ELIAS (1924–1985). President of Lebanon from 1976–1982. Sarkis oversaw a country in the midst of civil war, with militias and foreign military forces occupying much of the land. In such conditions, the effectiveness of his administration was limited. Sarkis was born in the small mixed religious village of Shbaniyeh just outside of Beirut. He hailed from a modest family of shopkeepers. Sarkis attended Saint Joseph University, where he attained a law degree, followed by a short stint of practicing law. He then proceeded to join the public service, where he held a number of posts, notably magistrate of the Court of Accounts. From 1968 until his own presidency, he held the powerful position as governor of the Lebanese Central Bank. His first major task in that position was to deal with reforming the Lebanese banking structure following the spectacular collapse of Lebanon’s largest bank, Intra Bank, and the almost complete loss of confidence in the overall banking system. Sarkis’s entry into politics was very much linked to his relationship to former presidents Fuad Chehab and Charles Helou, whose collective leadership of 12 years is referred to in Lebanese history as the Chehabist period, dominated by a strong security state with reformist tendencies. Sarkis started out as a legal advisor to President Chehab before assuming the position of chief of staff, a post he also held with President Helou before moving on at the recommendation of the president to head the Lebanese Central Bank. Sarkis was known as an efficient administrator. During his time as chief of staff to President Chehab, he played an essential role in organizing the Deuxieme Bureau, the much-feared military intelligence agency whose main role was to keep a tight grip on the country’s security, which often entailed infringing on the freedoms of Lebanese and others in the country, including major political figures. In 1970, Sarkis ran for president as the Chehabist candidate. He lost the election to Suleiman Frangieh by a single vote, bringing an end to the Chehabist reformist era. In 1976, however, Sarkis ran for president again, and in this case his bid for the presidency was successful. He defeated respected politician Raymond Edde, the candidate of many on the left. It was thought that Sarkis’s election was helped by Syrian support.

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President Sarkis was a moderate leader who believed in reform allowing for greater equality between Christians and Muslims, good relations with the Arab world and the West, and, above all, a strong security state. With respect to the latter, Sarkis had hoped that Syrian forces could help to fill that role in the short term, allowing the Lebanese state to rebuild after the first phase of fighting ended in 1976. Although Sarkis was considered neutral in the civil war, and was on speaking terms with most of the main protagonists, he was unable to unite the country and bring the conflict to an end. Although he tried to rebuild the state and, along with his prime minister, Salim Hoss, introduced bureaucratic initiatives designed to tackle the reconstruction of the country, the country’s fate was determined by others, including the militias and regional actors. In reality, he spent most of his presidency as a bystander to many of the conflicts taking place throughout the country. This included two invasions by Israel, Syrian battles with various militias and regional forces, and inter- and intra-militia conflicts. On occasion, he was able to use his office to help mediate cease-fires but was often overlooked by the more powerful regional actors. By 1982, in the last months of his presidency, an Israeli invasion had created several dynamics that continued to sideline the Lebanese government, although President Sarkis, who was suffering from cancer at the time, did help to arrange the arrival of multinational forces to Lebanon to assist in stabilizing the country. When his term ended, Sarkis left Lebanon and settled in Paris, where he passed away just three years later, at the age of 60. SAUDI ARABIA, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. Lebanon has historically enjoyed friendly relations with its Arab neighbor, Saudi Arabia. The two were among the original six nations who founded the League of Arab States, or Arab League, in 1945, which has grown to include 22 member states; however, tensions have emerged in recent years because of Saudi anger due to the dominant role that Hezbollah and their Iranian patrons play in Lebanese politics. Lebanese–Saudi relations were strong and generally friendly during the post-independence period leading up to the civil war, which began in 1975. Both countries were pro-American and part of an unofficial alliance of conservative Arab states during the Arab Cold War period. Saudi Arabia supported traditional elements within the Lebanese polity, fearing the rise of leftist and radical groups, and their possible impact throughout the region. The countries also shared important economic relations, with Beirut providing an important banking conduit for Saudi oil, while tens of thousands of Lebanese workers, skilled and unskilled, worked in Saudi Arabia and con-

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tributed significantly to that economy. Indeed, several Lebanese made substantial fortunes in Saudi Arabia and returned to Lebanon, where they became successful politicians. Rafic Hariri is the best-known example. During the civil war of 1975–1990, Saudi Arabia attempted on several occasions to mediate the conflict and offer other forms of diplomacy. During the early phase of the war, Saudi Arabia hosted the Arab League Summit, Riyadh, 1976, in an effort to end that war. This summit was quickly followed by the Arab League Summit, Cairo, 1976, which formed the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), with the goal of bringing an end to that war. Syria was the leader of the ADF, but Saudi troops participated, although they were withdrawn a few years later, hoping to put an official Arab League stamp on the original Syrian intervention. After a series of military clashes occurred in Lebanon between Syrian troops and their opponents in 1989, Michel Aoun declared a War of Liberation, with the goal of driving Syrian troops out of Lebanon. Saudi Arabia was alarmed because a proxy war was developing in which two Arab states, Iraq and Syria, were backing the two sides in the war in Lebanon. The result was the Saudi-hosted conference in Taif, Saudi Arabia, which led to the Taif Accords. In effect, Saudi involvement led to the conditions that had the potential to end the 15-year civil war. Saudi Arabia competed with Syria, and later Iran, for influence in Lebanon’s post-Taif political system. Between 1992–2004, an uneasy understanding was reached where all three countries retained influence in Lebanon, mostly through their Lebanese political proxies. In general, Saudi Arabia provided support for Lebanon’s Sunni community, through the Hariri family, and Syria and Iran the Shiite community through Amal and Hezbollah. Syria, the dominate force in Lebanon, controlled security issues among other areas but acquiesced to Saudi Arabia’s allies controlling the economy and reconstruction of the country. Although tensions existed throughout the period, the agreed upon modus operandi generally functioned. Saudi Arabia, other Gulf States, and their Western allies offered Lebanon support at international institutions, particularly with respect to securing financial assistance. Syria’s abrupt withdrawal from Lebanon in the aftermath of the pro-Western Cedar Revolution shook the political arrangements that had existed for 15 years and opened up the possibility of Lebanon fully extricating itself from the Syrian/Iranian axis and realigning fully with the West and conservative Arab states; however, developments did not unfold in this manner. Lebanon divided into two hostile political movements, with strong sectarian overtones. Each of the movements was supported by an external patron. The Sunni-dominated March 14 Alliance supports a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia and the West, while, in contrast, the Shiite/Hezbollah-dominated March 8 Alliance supports a close relationship with Iran and Syria.

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Although the Saudi-backed March 14 Alliance had the upper hand in the initial years, the Iranian-backed March 8 did so after 2009. To many observers, Saudi Arabia and Iran were competing for influence in Lebanon as part of a regional proxy competition for regional dominance between the two bitter rivals, which Saudi Arabia was losing. By 2017, Saudi Arabia had grown increasingly frustrated by their Lebanese clients’ inability to contain the growing power of Iran in Lebanon, with Lebanon increasingly falling into the Iranian regional order. Under the aggressive crown prince Mohamed Bin Salman, the Saudis took the extraordinary step of effectively arresting the Lebanese prime minister, Saad Hariri, while on a trip to Riyadh (he holds Saudi citizenship and has substantial business interests in the kingdom), and forcing him to resign his position. Although the stunt backfired, the Saudis have continued to punish Lebanon for its pro-Iranian tendencies, withdrawing economic activity, forcing its citizens to abandon Lebanon, and refusing to assist Lebanon at the diplomatic level. The rationale behind these steps was to force the Lebanese government to limit Iranian influence in the country. Some observers argue that Saudi policy in Lebanon (perhaps in conjugation with the Trump administration) contributed to damaging the Lebanese economy and helping to precipitate the economic crisis that led to riots in 2019 and 2020. SAYEGH, SALMA AL- (1889–1953). A Lebanese Arab-language author, philanthropist, and teacher. She helped advance the role of women in Lebanon through the foundation of different women’s organizations, as well as her work in education. Beirut’s Salma al-Sayegh School is named in her honor. SCHEHADÉ, GEORGES (1905–1989). Lebanese playwright and poet. Having been born in Egypt into an ethnic Lebanese family, Schehadé later moved to Beirut and then Paris when the Lebanese civil war started. Writing in French, he published numerous works in various genres, including fiction, poetry, and theater. His international fame came primarily from the plays he wrote. His most successful work was the play titled Histoire de Vasco (1957), which was eventually staged in many languages. An opera, The Story of Vasco, was later based on that play. Schehadé’s many awards include the Prix de la Francophonie in 1986. SECTARIAN PARITY. See CONFESSIONAL SYSTEM; NATIONAL PACT (1943); SECTARIANISM; TAIF ACCORDS (1989).

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SECTARIANISM. Lebanon uses a political and legal system based on 18 officially recognized sectarian communities. Politically, Lebanon employs a consociational-style confessional system that allocates seats in Parliament and higher-level government and military positions according to sectarian identity based on religious affiliation. The 128 seats in Parliament, officially termed the Chamber of Deputies, are divided equally between a grouping of 12 Christian sectarian communities and a grouping classified as Muslim. The 12 sects in the Christian grouping are Maronite, Chaldeans, Melkites, Syrian Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, Jacobite, Nestorian Assyrians, Protestants, Copts, and others. The Muslim grouping includes Sunni, Imami (Twelver) Shiite, and Ismaili Shiite Muslims, as well as Alawites and Druze. The small number of Jews remaining in Lebanon constitute the smallest of the 18 sects. Within each of the Christian and Muslim groupings, seats are further suballocated according to an arrangement that roughly reflects the relative sizes of their populations. The Lebanese legal system devolves the power to legislate and enforce matters of family law, for example, marriage and divorce regulations, to the various sectarian systems. Many critics of the Lebanese political system argue that sectarianism must be abolished, as it contributes to divisions with Lebanon, encourages corruption, and threatens the country’s overall stability. See also NATIONAL PACT (1943); TAIF ACCORDS (1989). SERVICE TAXI. A type of shared-ride taxi, traveling on the major roads of Beirut, as well as other cities, providing lower fares than regular taxis. SEVENERS. See ISMAILI MUSLIMS. SFEIR, NASRALLAH BOUTROS. See SUFAYR, NASRALLAH BUTRUS (1920–2019). SHAHIN, TANYUS (1815–1895). A Maronite Christian who was born as a peasant in the village of Rayfoun, in the Keserwan district of Mount Lebanon. Shahin emerged as a hero to local Christian peasants in 1859, when he led a rebellion against the Maronite feudal landowning families. His peasant rebellion succeeded in expelling the Khazins, an extended family of feudal landowners. Shahin then expanded his rebellion to defend poor Christians elsewhere in Mount Lebanon, declaring a republic. As his movement spread, tensions arose between Christian peasants and Druze overlords in several regions of Mount Lebanon. It became the regional civil war of 1860. The Druze forces prevailed, and the Christian rebellion came to an end. Shahin could not afford to pay his fighters, and the authorities, including the Maronite clergy, were critical of him. By 1861, he had

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agreed to cease his rebellion and end his republic. He retired from military life and took a position in local government in his home village until his death. SHAMUN, KAMIL (1900–1987).

(1900–1987).

See

CHAMOUN,

CAMILLE

SHARTUNI, HABIB (1958– ). The assassin who planted the bomb that exploded at the headquarters of the Kataeb Party in 1982, killing presidentelect Bashir Gemayel. Shartuni was a Maronite from the village of Chartoun in Mount Lebanon. He had become a radical member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Shartuni planted explosives on the second floor of a building where Gemayel was to give a speech. He was arrested after the explosion and served time in prison until being freed by Syrian forces during their offensive in Lebanon in October 1990. He is assumed to have then fled to safety in Syria. SHAWARMA. A popular Lebanese dish made of ground meat, for example, lamb or chicken, and spices. The meat is formed around a rod and then cooked on a rotisserie. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE. SHAYKH. A term of respect, similar to the English term elder, used by Sunnis for a wise cleric and used by some Lebanese families as an honorific for the family leader. SHAYKH SHABAB. A term used in the 19th century in Lebanon to refer to the local leader among the peasants who rebelled against the oppressions of the feudal system. SHEBA FARMS DISPUTE. The name Sheba (or Shiba) Farms refers to a small region of about 25 square kilometers and containing 14 farms. The region is on the northwestern slopes of Mount Hermon. The dispute concerns the question of whether the region is part of Lebanon or Syria. The question of the historic ownership of the Sheba Farms area is complex and indecisive. The 1923 Anglo–French Demarcation Agreement set the boundaries between French Mandate Syria and British Mandate Lebanon. In that agreement, Sheba Farms falls on the Syrian side of the demarcation line; however, the farms themselves were owned by Lebanese, and taxes were paid to Lebanon, not Syria. It was subsequently discovered that those who drew the line of demarcation later became aware that they had made a mis-

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take and that the Sheba Farms region should have been on the Lebanon side of the line. The mistake was never corrected, and neither country did much to lay claim to the region. During the Arab–Israeli War of 1967, Israel took control of the Sheba Farms region, along with the other territories it occupied. United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 called for the withdrawal of Israel from occupied Lebanon. When Israel withdrew from Lebanon, it did not withdraw from Sheba Farms. In 2000, Israel claimed that it had fully complied with Resolution 425, with the understanding that Sheba Farms was not part of Lebanon. Syria complained that Israel should withdraw because Sheba Farms was part of Lebanon. Hezbollah has used the Sheba Farms occupation as a rationale to maintain their armed presence in Lebanon, arguing that Israel has not withdrawn from Lebanese territory. One important reason that Israel continues to hold the Sheba Farms region is that controlling the water springs running down from Mount Hermon is an important addition to Israel’s scarce water resources. Both Syria and Lebanon claim that Sheba Farms is part of Lebanon, whereas Israel and the United Nations consider it part of Syria. SHIA. See SHIA ALI; SHIITE MUSLIMS. SHIA ALI. Shiite Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad designated Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, as his successor in the leadership of the Islamic community. When, after the death of Muhammad, his senior companions selected Abu Bakr as the first caliph, or “successor,” the Party of Ali (Shia Ali) objected and remained convinced that the true leader was Ali. Shiite Muslims use the term imam (leader) rather than caliph (successor) for the line of leaders after Muhammad. See also ISMAILI MUSLIMS; TWELVER MUSLIMS. SHIDYAQ, AHMAD FARIS ASH- (1804–1887). An author, publisher, and Arabic linguist who was born into a Maronite family in Ashqut, Lebanon. Shidyaq relocated to Cairo in 1825, where he wrote in Arabic for a periodical. In 1925, his brother, Asaad ash-Shidyaq, converted to Protestantism, which, he believed, led to Asaad’s imprisonment and death by torture at the instigation of Maronite clergy. In 1934, he took up a position in publishing for a Protestant missionary institution in Malta, leading to his conversion to Protestantism. Shidyaq then journeyed to Europe and published books on Europe, the Arabic language, and other topics, as well as

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poems. While staying in Tunisia, Shidyaq converted to Islam and adopted the Arabic name Ahmad. He spent his last years as a resident of Turkey, where he continued to write on a wide variety of topics. SHIDYAQ, ASAAD ASH- (1798–1829). Scholar, writer, and journalist. Born into a Lebanese Maronite Christian family, Shidyaq was a scholar in Arabic and became employed as a translator by Protestant Christian missionaries. He converted to Protestant Christianity in 1825, which led to his family reporting that fact to the Maronite priestly authorities. He was imprisoned in 1825, and died from torture and the bad prison conditions four years later. This tragic death turned his more famous younger brother, Faris ashShidyaq, so against the Maronite clerics that he later converted to Protestantism as well. SHIHAB, FUAD (1902–1973). See CHEHAB, FUAD (1902–1973). SHIHABISM. See CHEHAB, FUAD (1902–1973). SHIITE MUSLIMS. An estimated 27 percent of Lebanese are Shiite Muslims. They are followers of the Party of Ali (or Shia Ali), which looks upon Imam Ali and a subsequent line of imams as the true leaders of Islam after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. In Lebanon the Imamis, Ismailis, and Alawites are classified as Shiite Muslims. See also DRUZE; SUNNI MUSLIMS. SHTURA AGREEMENT (1977). Named after the town in which it was signed on 25 July 1977, during the early phase of the civil war of 1975–1990, the agreement intended to apply the terms of the Cairo Agreement of the Arab League Summit, Cairo, 1976. That Cairo Agreement created the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), which was controlled by Syria and consisted mostly of Syrian troops. The Shtura Agreement called for the ADF to surround the Palestinian refugee camps and oversee the disarming of the Palestine Liberation Organization fighters. The agreement was never implemented, however. SHUHRUR AL-WADI (1894–1937). The pen name of Asad al-Khuri Fghali, one of the masters of Lebanese zajal-style poetry. The Arabic book Diwan Shahrur al-Wadi, published in 2000, contains a collection of his poems. SIDON. An important port city in southern Lebanon since ancient times, it is also known as Saida or Sayda. Located on the Mediterranean coast between Tyre to its south and Beirut to its north, modern Sidon is Lebanon’s third

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most populated area. Archaeological artifacts, mainly worked flints, found near the coast indicate human habitation in the Sidon area by the early 4th millennium BCE. The city is often mentioned in the Hebrew Bible. According to the Hebrew view of early history, the city was named after the man Sidon, who was the son of Canaan and grandson of Noah. The Bible is critical of Jezebel, a princess of Sidon who was wedded to Israeli king Ahab to seal relations between the two regimes. Sidon, along with Byblos, was a main trading port of ancient Phoenicia. The city is situated on a promontory and partially sheltered from storms by an island. During Phoenician times, Sidon took advantage of its sheltered port location to develop a flourishing sea trade. Sidon’s main export was the purple dye made from a certain mollusck, which became the signature color of royalty. Sidon has been conquered and destroyed several times. The Philistines destroyed the city in about 1200 BCE, and the Assyrians did as well in the 7th century BCE. It fell to the Persian Empire in the 6th century BCE, and the Persians then made it the capital of the region, including the territory of modern Syria and Lebanon. In addition to its trade in purple dye, Sidon was also famous for its glass making, shipbuilding, and skill at sailing. Alexander the Great conquered Sidon without resistance in 333 BCE, leading to a Hellenistic period. Then came the period of Roman rule, to be followed by Byzantine rule. The Arab conquest of Sidon in 667 brought Islam, Arabic culture, and Saida as the Arabic name of the city. In the 12th century, control of Sidon passed back and forth between Christian Crusaders and Muslim forces, until Mamluk forces took lasting control for Islam in 1291. The city prospered as a trading port during the Ottoman period, which ended with the fall of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. In the modern period, Sidon came under attack by several factions during the civil war, resulting in extensive damage to the city and surrounding agricultural land. The Hariri Foundation has been heavily involved in the restoration of Sidon, the home city of former prime minister Rafic Hariri. Modern Sidon’s population is predominately Sunni Muslim, but there are regions with sizable Shiite, Greek Orthodox, and Maronite populations, as well as small minorities of the other Lebanese ethnic and religious groups. The main sights of special interest in modern Sidon include the Khan elFranj (“Inn of Foreigners”), a 17th-century caravanserai; Sidon Sea Castle; the Castle of St. Louis; the ruins of a Phoenician temple; the souk in the Old City area; the seaside promenade called the Corniche; and the impressive new Bahaa el-Dine Mosque. SIDON SEA CASTLE. See CASTLES.

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SIEGE OF NAHR AL-BARED. A 2007 military action by Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces (ISF) against the Fatah al-Islam faction in the Palestinian refugee camp north of Tripoli known as Nahr al-Bared. The conflict began on 19 May 2007, when ISF personnel attempted to arrest certain Fatah al-Islam members in a house in Tripoli, on suspicion of taking part in a bank robbery. The Fatah al-Islam faction retaliated by attacking an army checkpoint at the Nahr al-Bared camp, killing several sleeping soldiers. The army retaliated by shelling the camp, and a prolonged conflict ensured between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Army. The camp’s more than 30,000 Palestinian refugees had to scatter to the Beddawi camp or elsewhere to avoid the fighting. Government forces prevailed in the end, with fighting ending on 2 September 2007. SILK CRISIS. An economic crisis in Lebanon in the 1890s, caused by the radical disruption of Lebanon’s sericulture and silk-weaving industries when cheaper and better silk goods began entering the Middle Eastern and European markets from China. See also FAMINE, GREAT. SINIORA, FOUAD (1943– ). Long known as the “right-hand man” of powerful Lebanese businessman and politician Rafic Hariri, Siniora served as prime minister of Lebanon from 2005–2009. The period saw significant political upheaval—the withdrawal of Syrian forces, the Hezbollah–Israel War, political assassinations, and a violent upturn in the March 14 and March 8 rivalry—all of which limited to a considerable extent the effectiveness of Siniora to governing. Siniora was born into a Sunni Muslim family in the southern Lebanese city of Sidon. He attended American University of Beirut (AUB), where he obtained a MBA. Early in his career he worked for the Lebanese Central Bank. He also lectured at AUB. Siniora’s economic and political fortunes were heavily linked to his relationship with Hariri. Siniora worked in various capacities for Hariri’s business empire, eventually coming to head Hariri’s financial interests, which included a stint as chairman of the Hariri-owned Banque Mediterranee. Siniora served in all of Hariri’s cabinets during the 1990s and from 2000–2004. He held the position of minister of state and eventually the all-important minister of finance position. Siniora played an outsized role in Hariri’s cabinets, with many observers commenting on his enormous influence in the direction of the post–civil war economy. He, for example, introduced to Lebanon the value-added tax, as well as policies that exponentially increased the country’s debt.

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Siniora became the front man for the Hariri family’s political interests following the assassination of Rafic Hariri in February 2005. He headed their political party, the Future Movement. That party was victorious in the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2005, giving him the mandate to serve as prime minister, a position he held until 2009. Initially, his government included a few members of the opposition—a customary and essential practice in Lebanese politics—including representatives from Hezbollah and their allies. The relationship with the opposition soured after little more than a year, however, leading to the resignation of opposition cabinet ministers and a political crisis that paralyzed the Siniora government and brought Lebanon to the brink of another civil war. The catalyst for the crisis was the decision by the government in the fall of 2006, to support international efforts to establish an international Special Tribunal for Lebanon to try suspects in the assassination of Hariri. Given the likelihood that Hezbollah’s Syrian ally (or perhaps Hezbollah itself) would be implicated in the crime, Hezbollah members resigned from cabinet so as to deny the tribunal legitimacy. The essence of the political crisis, however, centered on wider opposition demands for far greater representation in government—a demand for a third of the cabinet seats—granting them an effective veto of all government decisions, including support for the tribunal. Hezbollah’s leadership called for its supporters to practice civil disobedience and mass protests to bring down the government until a government of national unity that met its demands was formed. The crisis escalated for the next year and half through a series of events, punctuated by mass protests and demonstrations leading to civilian deaths, as well as the assassination of progovernment politicians, including a sitting cabinet minister. The crisis climaxed in the spring of 2007, when, in response to government attempts to limit Hezbollah’s private telecommunications network, as well as its intelligence network at the airport, Hezbollah fighters took over several areas of Beirut, clashing with pro-regime fighters and threatening a return to civil war. Dozens of people were killed. The intervention of the international community and the mediation efforts of Qatar led to the Doha Agreement, an understanding that gave the opposition their desired veto power. This paved the way for a government of national unity under Siniora and unlocked the related deadlock for a parliamentary vote for a new president. Siniora remained prime minister until 2009, when he stepped aside in favor of Saad Hariri, heir to the Hariri political dynasty. Siniora remained politically influential and a close ally of Saad Hariri, leading the Future Movement’s bloc in the Lebanese Parliament until he decided to retire from politics in 2018.

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The widescale popular protest against economic conditions and alleged elite corruption that swept Lebanon in 2019 and 2020 brought down the Saad Hariri government and targeted former politicians. The latter included Siniora, who faced questions by state prosecutors concerning the allocation of billions of dollars in state funds while he was in power. This was the first time a former prime minister had been summoned in this manner. He also was the target of popular protests. Siniora strongly denied the accusations and noted that they were politically motivated. SKAFF, ELIE (also spelled ELIAS) (1948–2015). A prominent landowner and politician from Zahlé, Lebanon. Having been raised in Zahlé as the son of politician and cabinet minister Joseph Skaff, Elie Skaff studied and lived in New Zealand before returning to Lebanon. He was first elected to Parliament in 1992, as a candidate on the Popular Bloc list. He was reelected repeatedly until 2009. During that time, he served in multiple different cabinet positions, including industry and agriculture. SLIM, LOKMAN (1962–2021). A prominent Shiite film director, publisher, journalist, activist, and influential critic of Hezbollah and Lebanon’s Confessional System. After retuning to Beirut from doctoral studies at the Sorbonne in 1988, Slim became a journalist who went on to develop an international reputation. He founded his own publishing house, Dar al Jadeed, in 1990, and oversaw the publication of works in Arabic dealing with controversial topics. Along with his wife, Monika Borgmann, Slim co-directed the films Massaker (2005) and Tadmor (2016), both of which won awards. Massaker, meaning massacre in English, is a documentary featuring interviews with anonymous people involved in the killings during the 1982 incidents at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Tadmor documents the torture and atrocities experienced by Lebanese prisoners in a prison camp in Palmyra, Syria. In addition to being a journalist, director, and publisher, Slim also was an incubator of nonprofit institutions promoting activist causes. Growing out of his longstanding interest in documenting the atrocities of the civil war, he was one of the founders of the Umam Documentation and Research organization, which serves as an archive for historical research documents about the war and as a venue for cultural activities. He also started the Hayya Bina project, which has goals including improvement of the environment and getting citizen involvement in moving Lebanon away from its old political system based in religious communities. Slim was assassinated in early February 2021. He was found in his car, having been shot in the head a few days prior. It was assumed that Hezbollah supporters, who had previously threatened him, may have been responsible.

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SNIFFING DOG INCIDENT. In 1974, Lebanon’s president, Suleiman Frangieh, found having his luggage sniffed by a customs dog after his plane landed in New York City to be insulting and humiliating. It escalated into a diplomatic incident when he took it as a sign that the United States was determined to undermine the independence of Lebanon. SOCIAL DEMOCRAT HUNCHAKIAN PARTY. A center-left party, one of three Lebanese parties with Armenian Lebanese constituencies. It’s history dates to 1887, and the call for Armenian independence from the Ottoman Empire. It associates with the March 14 Alliance. It won no seats in the 2018 parliamentary elections. See also ARMENIAN DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL PARTY-RAMGAVAR (ADL); ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION (ARF). SOLH, LEILA AL (1946– ). Born into the prominent al-Solh family, Leila al-Solh, along with Wafaa Hamze, had the rare historical distinction of being one of Lebanon’s few female cabinet members in 2004. She served as minister of industry. Al-Solh is vice president of the Alwaleed bin Talal Humanitarian Foundation, a Lebanese philanthropic body that is now part of Alwaleed Philanthropies. She is widely regarded as one of the most powerful women in the Middle East. SOLH, MOUNIRA AL- (1911–2010). An activist who is recognized as a pioneer for women’s rights and the rights of disabled people in Lebanon. She was born into the politically prominent Solh family and later married her relative, Wahid al-Solh, who was assassinated during the civil war of 1958. Her role as an activist ranged from the movement for independence to advocacy for the rights of women and the disabled. Politically, she was active in the demonstrations calling for an end to the French Mandate and full independence for Lebanon. Then, in 1960, she was the first woman in Lebanon to stand for parliamentary election. Her advocacy for women’s rights led to a leadership role in both the Lebanese and the International Council of Women organizations. She had founded the Al Amal Institute for the Disabled in 1959, and her continuing advocacy for the rights of disabled people led to her involvement in local and international conferences and organizations. SOLH, RACHID AL- (1926–2014). A Sunni Muslim lawyer, judge, and politician. Al-Solh was born in Beirut into the prominent Solh family. After graduating from Saint Joseph University, he became a lawyer and went on to a career as a judge. His political career began with his being elected to Parliament in 1964, and again in 1972 and 1992. He served two terms as

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prime minister. The first term began with his appointment by President Suleiman Frangieh on 31 October 1974, and ended with his resignation on 15 May 1975, during of the outbreak of civil war. The second, short term came much later, when President Elias Hrawi appointed him to the office of prime minister in the turbulent period after the end of the civil war. Al-Solh served from 13 May to 31 October 1992. He left politics four years later, in 1996. SOLH, RIAD AL- (1894–1951). A lawyer and politician who had the distinction of being the first prime minister of independent Lebanon. Al-Solh was born into a prominent Sunni Muslim family in Sidon. His father, Reda al-Solh, was an official during the Ottoman era. Al-Solh was an opponent of the terms of the 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement, preferring to have the Arab regions of the former Ottoman Empire be one state. He also feared, correctly, that the Balfour Declaration would lead to Zionist expansion in Palestine. Al-Solh’s political career began with his election to head the new government in Saida after the fall of the Ottomans. His nationalism and calls for Lebanon’s independence led to his being put in jail several times during the period of the French Mandate. As a strong advocate for independence, he became one of Lebanon’s most important leaders at the time of independence. As a staunch nationalist, Al-Solh realized that for Lebanon to become a strong state, the confessional communities would need to work together. As the first prime minister, serving his first term from 25 September 1943 to 10 January 1945, he sought to build a consensus among Lebanon’s religious groups. He negotiated the terms of the National Pact and played a strong role in implementing them. He served a second term as prime minister from 14 December 1946 to 14 February 1951. Both terms were under the presidency of Bechara El Khoury. During al-Solh’s time in office, the controversial arrest, followed by a speedy trial in a military court and a hurried execution, of Antoun Saadeh caused great resentment among Saadeh’s Syrian Social Nationalist Party members. That resentment led to a failed assassination attempt on his life in 1950, and, then in 1951, his assassination during a trip to Amman, Jordan. The Riad al-Solh Square in Beirut is named in his honor. A statue of him stands in that square. Moreover, his familial legacy thrives thanks to the prominence of his daughters. They include Leila al-Solh, who made Lebanese history when she and Wafaa Hamze held cabinet positions in 2004. Today, Leila al-Solh is vice president of the Lebanese Alwaleed bin Talal Humanitarian Foundation, a philanthropic body. She is widely regarded as one of the most powerful women in the Middle East.

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SOLH, SAMI AL- (1887–1968). Sunni Muslim lawyer and politician. AlSolh was born in Palestine and later lived in Istanbul. In addition to his family language, Arabic, he was tutored in French, Greek, and Turkish. After completing a law degree at the University of Paris, he moved to Beirut and practiced law. His strong Arab nationalist stances got him into trouble with Ottoman authorities, and he was exiled to Istanbul. Returning to Beirut, he served as a judge during the French Mandate period. He went on to serve five short terms as prime minister: 26 July 1942 to 22 March 1943, 23 August 1945 to 22 May 1946, 11 February 1952 to 9 September 1952, 16 September 1954 to 19 September 1955, and 18 November 1956 to 20 September 1958. Al-Solh’s concern for Lebanon’s disadvantaged citizens earned him the nickname “Father of the Poor.” He was also honored by having the Boulevard Sami El Solh in Beirut named after him. SOLH, TAKIEDDIN AL- (1909–1988). Sunni Muslim journalist, teacher, and politician. Al-Solh was born in Beirut and educated at American University of Beirut. He worked as a journalist and literature teacher. He was elected president of the Press Syndicate. Al-Solh’s political career began as a diplomat. He was elected to Parliament in 1947, and again in 1964. He served as a cabinet minister before serving two short terms as prime minister from 21 June 1973 to 31 October 1974, and 20 July 1980 to 25 July 1980. SOLIDERE. A public-private corporation with a massive development scheme intended to revitalize the downtown core of Beirut, known as the Beiruty Central District, including the Saint George Bay area. The project was heavily backed by Rafic Hariri and other business partners. The appropriation of land for the massive project was quite controversial. Critics like Hussein el-Husseini, then speaker of Parliament, felt that the owners of the land to be appropriated were not being offered fair compensation. Those owners were to receive shares in the development company, but critics held that the valuation of the shares was far less than the actual value of their land. Criticism of the project also came from civil-society actors, particularly those interested in preserving the historic fabric of Beirut. They accused the project of removing too many historic buildings because it was more profitable to replace them with dense, modern high-rises. Critics also raised questions about conflict of interest to political leaders, especially Rafic Hariri, who stood to financially benefit from the project, and questions about the blurring of lines between public and private interests. The Beirut Central District was badly damaged by the explosion in Beirut in August 2020.

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SOUK. The Arabic term for a market. A souk usually has many small stalls, sometimes covered, where individual merchants sell foods and spices, dry goods, jewelry, clothing, and everything else. There is a usually a souk in the older section of Lebanese cities. SOUTH LEBANON ARMY (SLA). A renegade militia that played a role in southern Lebanon since the outbreak of the civil war, though it formally adopted the South Lebanon Army name in May 1980. Saad Haddad, a Lebanese Christian and major in the Lebanese Army, previously had been commanding a force in the far south of Lebanon. During the Israeli invasion of 1978, Haddad had cooperated with the Israelis in their shared goal of the elimination of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces and control from the region. Haddad’s troops received training and funding from Israel, ultimately becoming a client militia. Haddad took the radical step of declaring the region he controlled as Independent Free Lebanon on 18 April 1979. The government saw this as a traitorous threat to its authority and immediately reacted by dismissing him from the Lebanese Army. Some of his soldiers remained loyal to the Lebanese Army. Others, mostly Christians, remained under his command, with the new name South Lebanon Army. This began a period in which the SLA functioned as Israel’s military presence in the region. The SLA required all males in the area it controlled to serve for one year in the army, beginning at age 18. It governed the region and ran a radio station called Voice of Hope, which had funding from foreign Christians and broadcast mainly Christian programming. The Israeli invasion of 1982 again brought Israeli troops into the region. The SLA worked closely with the Israeli forces, who left the civilian functions of governing the region in SLA hands. In 1984, General Haddad passed away and was replaced by General Antoine Lahad, another renegade former member of the Lebanese Army. Lahad headed the SLA until it collapsed in 2000. After Ehud Barak and his Labor Party won the 1999 Israeli elections, Barak made good on his campaign promise to withdraw Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. Beginning in May 2000, the Israelis began to quickly withdraw, while civilians rushed into their former villages and Hezbollah and other fighters quickly moved into their former strongholds. The SLA could no longer control the region. As many as 3,000 SLA fighters were arrested. Most were given only light sentences. A few leaders were given death sentences that were later reduced to long prison terms. Many of the SLA fighters and their families crossed the border into Israel, including Lahoud, where they either settled or migrated to other countries.

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SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, OFFICE OF. The officer who presides over the Lebanese Parliament’s Chamber of Deputies. According to the terms of the Lebanon’s confessional system of government, the speaker of the house is always chosen from among Shiite Muslims. The speaker has a four-year term of office that is renewable, according to the agreement arising from the Taif Accords. The speaker of the house is considered to be the third most important position in government, forming one part of the Troika System. Nabih Berri has held the post for most of the two decades following the end of the Lebanese civil war. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON (STL). A United Nations (UN) Security Council international trial of the individuals accused of the assassination of Rafic Hariri and 21 other people who died from a bomb attack on 14 February 2005. The secretary-general of the UN had sent a fact-finding mission to look into the Hariri assassination soon after the event took place. That mission recommended that an international investigation be conducted, and in accordance with the recommendation, a United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission was created. That commission later reported that it had reason to believe that a network of people had been responsible for previous terrorist attacks in Lebanon, as well as the Hariri incident. Some individuals had been implicated during the investigations into the explosion, and four Syrian army officers were detained, without a trial, by Lebanese officials. Due to a state of political impasse in Lebanon, where March 14 supported the trial and March 8 opposed it, it was not possible to proceed with the trial in Lebanon. The Security Council had adopted Resolution 1164 in 2006, calling for a consultation between the UN and the government of Lebanon concerning the proposal to try the Hariri assassination case in an international court. The March 14–backed prime minister agreed to the arrangements for the trial, but the March 8–backed speaker refused to convene Parliament to approve the proposed international trial. To resolve the impasse and move forward with the trial, the STL was established on 30 May 2007, by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1757. The Security Council took the unusual, and therefore controversial, step of opening an international trial into the internal affair of a member state. The government of Lebanon was invited to agree to the conditions of the trial within 10 days, which it did. The trial was to be an international one, but Lebanese laws were to be followed. The tribunal’s mandate gave it jurisdiction over events and attacks from 1 October 2004 to 12 December 2005, if they were connected to the assassination in terms of victims, patterns, purpose, or perpetrators. The mandate also allowed for the accused to be tried in absentia.

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The main venue of the STL is in the region of The Hague, in the Netherlands. A Beirut Outreach and Legacy office was also opened in connection to the trial. The STL began on 1 March 2009. It was set up with four phases: pretrial, trial, sentencing, and appeals. During the pretrial phase, it was determined that the trial’s jurisdiction included certain previous terrorist attacks considered to be connected to the attack on Hariri. The pretrail Judge indicted and ordered the arrest of four people in June 2011. The indicted individuals were Salim al-Ayyash, Hassan Oneissi, Assad Sabra, and Mustafa Badreddine, all Hezbollah members. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah refused to allow them to be arrested. He also denounced the STL as illegitimate. The accused four men went into hiding, and the trial began in absentia. The STL was originally given a three-year mandate, but that has been extended as required for completion. In August 2020, shortly after the explosion in Beirut, the STL released its findings. It convicted one of the four men, Salim al-Ayyash, for his role in the bombing. Furthermore, the STL found that there was a political motive for both Syria and Hezbollah to carry out the attack; however, no organization, including Hezbollah, or the Syrian government or intelligence were conclusively found to have played a role in the death of Hariri and the 21 others. Although the verdict is unlikely to have satisfied those looking for justice for Hariri’s murder, it likely helped prevent even more strain on the Lebanese political system and conflict between various sides, a fact likely understood by Saad Hariri given his reaction to the decision. See also EIDO, WALID (1942–2007); GEMAYEL, PIERRE (1905–1984). STATE-WITHIN-A-STATE. A term referring to an organization or movement that controls a significant region within a larger, formally recognized state. The role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Jordan before being expelled and later in Lebanon before being expelled are examples. See also BLACK SEPTEMBER CONFLICT. SUFAYR, NASRALLAH BUTRUS (1920–2019). Patriarch of Antioch and the East of the Maronite Church from 1986 until his resignation in 2011, when he received the status of Patriarch Emeritus. He was appointed a cardinal in the Roman Catholic Church in 1994. He is credited with leading the effort to reform the Maronite liturgy. He had taken a stance on the social and political issues arising in Lebanon. SULEIMAN, MICHEL (1948– ). President of Lebanon from 2008–2014. General Michel Suleiman was the compromise candidate among rival political groups, ending a six-month political crisis during which the country was

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without a president. Suleiman was also the second consecutive commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces to move from the military to the presidency (and the third in Lebanon’s modern history), signifying, to a large degree, the neutral role that the army has taken in a deeply fractured polity and the general respect afforded to the institution as a national unifying force. Ironically, Suleiman’s term ended without a successor, leaving the country once again without a president, this time for an unprecedented two-year period. Suleiman was born in the town of Amchit, in the Jbail district of Lebanon, some 40 kilometers north of Beirut, to a father who was an officer in the internal security services. Suleiman completed a degree in political and administrative sciences at the national Lebanese University before attending military school and embarking on a career in the military. He also received additional military education at institutions in Europe and the United States. In 1998, he became commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, replacing Emile Lahoud, who assumed the presidency. During his time as head of the armed forces, Suleiman was credited with dealing with a number of complex situations, demonstrating leadership skills with exceptional political nuance. For example, during the 2005 Cedar Revolution, where massive protests demanded the end of the Syrian-dominated order, he refused to use the army to crack down on protestors. Moreover, in 2007, the army succeeded in removing the heavily armed Islamic extremist group Fatah al-Islam from the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp, uniting Lebanese public opinion on the issue and further raising the profile of the Lebanese Army as a well-functioning organization of the state. A third example stemmed from his success in deploying military units in areas controlled by Hezbollah, as well as southern Lebanon, in conjunction with United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. From 2006–2008, Lebanon experienced a severe political crisis between the March 14 and March 8 movements, paralyzing the country’s political institutions and preventing the election of a new president. The 2008 Doha Agreement brought the crisis to an end and allowed for Suleiman to emerge as the compromise candidate, an independent political actor with no affiliation to either group and with widespread popularity among the Lebanese populace. Moreover, the major regional and international players with an interest in Lebanon were comfortable with him, signifying the possibilities of a degree of calm returning to the country. Despite a promising start to his presidency, including the formation of a national unity government that included members of March 14 and March 8, and the promise to hold national dialogue meetings where the various sides could air their grievances as they worked toward reconciliation, the situation soon deteriorated along familiar trajectories. The situation was greatly exacerbated in 2011, by the civil war in neighboring Syria, which once again threatened to bring Lebanon’s political order to the brink of collapse.

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The Lebanese government’s official policy toward that war was to remain neutral, the so-called politics of dissociation; however, the reality was that the various Lebanese sides, including those actually participating in government, were actively engaged in the Syrian war, thereby ignoring official policy. Sunni groups were providing resources and manpower to Syrian opposition bent on overthrowing the Syrian regime, while Hezbollah sent thousands of troops into Syria to support the regime. The conflict spilled over into Lebanon, in terms of both violence and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees, adding yet another complex layer to Lebanon’s already overburdened and fragile system. Furthermore, Islamist groups with strong links to Syria used Lebanon as a theater of operation during this period, helping to destabilize the security of the country. In one such case in 2012, in the city of Sidon, Salafist preacher Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir and his supporters took over the city center of Sidon, setting up a military-style compound there. They made it clear that they would take down their compound only if Hezbollah disarmed. President Suleiman was credited with bringing a diplomatic solution to the conflict in this case, ending the protests in return for raising the question of Hezbollah’s arms at the next National Dialogue meeting. However, continued tensions between Assir and his followers, on one side, and Hezbollah and its followers, on the other, led to fighting in the Sidon region in the summer of 2013. The conflict escalated to one between Assir’s followers and the Lebanese Army, leading to dozens of deaths and hundreds of wounded on both sides, before the Lebanese Army put down the revolt. The military courts sought the death penalty for Assir for the deaths of Lebanese soldiers, and he was eventually captured and tried in the years after Suleiman was no longer in office. As his term was coming to an end, President Suleiman was increasingly critical of Hezbollah, particularly concerning its intervention in the Syrian war, and the consequences of doing so to Lebanon’s security and political milieu. The political situation remained as polarized as it was from 2006–2008, leading to a stalemate in the election of a new president. The post remained unfilled for two years, until an agreement was struck to appoint Hezbollah’s ally, Michel Aoun, to the presidency in return for Saad Hariri heading the government as prime minister. Michel Suleiman left office with a mixed record, signifying to many that the power of the presidency, greatly reduced by the Taif Accords, to effect real change in a country as bitterly divided as Lebanon with powerful nonstate actors was questionable. His reputation as an honest politician with Lebanon’s best interest at heart, however, remained largely intact. See also SYRIAN CIVIL WAR, IMPACT ON LEBANON.

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SULH, ALYA RIAD AL-. See SOLH, RIAD AL- (1894–1951). SUNNA. See SUNNAH. SUNNAH. An Arabic term for the oral traditions about the teachings, decisions (approvals or disapprovals), and other sayings deriving from the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. For Sunni Muslims, the Sunnah is the next most authoritative source, after the Quran, for guidance in living one’s life. Sunni Muslims derive their name from their adherence to the Sunnah. SUNNI MUSLIMS. The majority of the world’s Muslims adhere to the Qur’an and the oral sources derived from early Islam known as the Sunnah. An estimated 27 percent of Lebanon’s Muslims are Sunnis, and another 27 percent are classified in one of the divisions of Shiite Islam. The Sunni predominately live in Lebanon’s major coastal cities, with strongholds in Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon. The Lebanese Sunni community has traditionally held strong Pan-Arabist sympathies and historically been opposed to the creation of an independent Lebanon, preferring to be part of a larger Arab or Pan-Syrian political entity containing a large Sunni majority. Global politics and regional realities during the 1940s dictated otherwise, ensuring that the Sunni elite struck a political compromise with the influential Maronite community known as the National Pact, establishing the basis of an independent Lebanon and ensuring the Sunnis a prominent political role in Lebanon second only to the Maronites. Traditional notable families (Solh, Salam, and Karami, for example) have long dominated the political, religious, social, and cultural institutions of the community through an effective and reinforcing network on patronage, manipulation of ideology (e.g., Arab nationalism), and the use of coercion. The latter was especially useful in times of elections. Although this system of leadership in the community continues to dominate today, these families have been, for the most part, eclipsed by other much wealthier Sunni families (Hariri and Mikati, for example) who made billions in the Arab Gulf world and elsewhere before entering into Lebanese politics after the civil war. During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, leftist and Pan-Arabist political movements challenged traditional rule through appealing to widespread discontent concerning the legitimacy of a Christian-dominated political order, especially at a time of rising Pan-Arabist regional currents (including support for Palestinians and alignment with Arab nationalism), and economic discontent. Indeed, the demands of Lebanon’s Sunni masses and the inability of the traditional leaders to co-opt them effectively significantly contributed to Lebanon’s civil war.

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The Sunni community’s role as the dominant Muslim community declined during the 1980s, at the peak of the civil war, giving way to Lebanon’s traditionally neglected Shiite community and their powerful militias, Amal and Hezbollah. Sunni political fortunes were revived to a considerable degree through the combination of the political reforms of the Taif Accords and the conclusion of the civil war, as well as the rise of a new injection of Sunni leadership epitomized by the late Rafic Hariri; however, the Shiite community and its powerful militia, Hezbollah, backed by Iran, is currently recognized as the predominant political power in a deeply sectarian political system. The significant tensions between Lebanon’s Sunni and Shiite communities, which have long replaced Christian–Muslim tensions, reflect a wider regional competition between these two leading sects of Islam played out in the wars in neighboring Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere. The failure of the Sunni leadership to challenge Shiite supremacy has given rise to Sunni Islamist extremist movements aimed at militarily challenging Shiite power. While these movements, which are particularly prominent in Sunni cities like Tripoli and Sidon, have failed to gain political traction, they share a degree of popularity on the street and have destabilized the security situation, threatening to engulf Lebanon’s two largest Muslim communities in a wider conflict. SUPPORTING THE FUTURE OF SYRIA AND THE REGION. A series of conferences sponsored by the European Union (EU) and some of its member states. The first two conferences were held in April 2017 and 2018, in Brussels, Belgium. The third conference was held in Brussels on 12–13 March 2019, and the fourth conference on 29–30 June 2020. The goals of the conferences are to bring about peace in the Middle East through promoting dialogue and supporting progress in meeting the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254. The conferences have called upon countries to pledge donations to support the refugees of the Syrian civil war. These pledges have totaled billions of dollars, with two-thirds of that amount coming from the EU and its member states. SUR. See TYRE. SURSOCK, LADY YVONNE COCHRANE. See COCHRANE, LADY SURSOCK YVONNE (1922–2020). SURSOCK MUSEUM. Formally named the Nicolas Ibrahim Sursock Museum, a fine arts museum housed in the large villa built in 1912, by the wealthy Sursock (or Sursuq) family. The villa was bequeathed to the city of Beirut upon Nicolas Sursock’s death. The villa reflects Lebanese and Vene-

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tian architectural styles. An expansion, completed in 2015, under the adjoining garden greatly increased the space for exhibits. The museum’s permanent collection includes paintings, sculptures, and other types of art from Lebanon, the Middle East, and as far away as Japan. See also COCHRANE, LADY SURSOCK YVONNE (1922–2020). SYKES, SIR MARK. See SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT. SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT. A secret accord reached between Great Britain and France on 19 May 1916. Britain was represented by Sir Mark Sykes and France by François Georges-Picot. The agreement helped to define the boundaries of the nations to be carved out of the former Arab territories ruled by the Ottoman Empire, which had been on the losing side of World War I. Britain and France determined which of the new regions would be under British or French control. The region of modern Lebanon fell under French control and became known as Grand Liban. Arab nationalists saw the agreement as a betrayal by the British, who only a year earlier had promised the Arabs independence if they revolted against the Ottomans. The borders of Sykes–Picot formed, mostly, the boundaries of the modern Middle East state system. SYRIA. See ARAB DETERRENT FORCE (ADF); SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT; SYRIA, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH; SYRIAN CIVIL WAR, IMPACT ON LEBANON; SYRIAN–ISRAELI GOLAN HEIGHTS CONFLICT; SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH. SYRIA, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. For centuries Lebanon has been closely associated with Syria geographically, politically, and in terms of shared sectarian populations. Geographically, except for the sea to the west and a small southern border with Israel, Lebanon is surrounded by Syria, both to the north and its longer eastern border, making it one of only 27 countries with just two adjoining nations. The border between Lebanon and Syria mostly follows the lines drawn on a map according to the terms of the Anglo–French Demarcation Agreement of 1923. Ethnically, the long, shared border, or in some periods the absence of a border, led to shared populations. Migrations of Druze, Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, Maronites, Kurds, Alawites, and other ethnic and sectarian groups flowed into both the Lebanese and Syrian regions to either escape wars or find a place to settle. Many sectarian communities had cross-border social ties with their counterparts in the other country.

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Politically, Syria and Lebanon often have been under the same rule. Both were ruled from the early 16th century as the province of Syria of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans ruled indirectly, through appointed officials. Fierce fighting erupted between the Druze and Maronite populations in the Mount Lebanon region in 1860. France and other Western nations then pressured the Ottomans to set up a semiautonomous region known as a Mutasarrifate. To rule the Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate, the Ottomans appointed a chief administrator with the title Mutasarrif, who had to be a Christian but not from Lebanon. The rest of the territory of modern Lebanon remained more administratively connected to Syria. The Ottomans lost control of the entire region in 1916, during World War I. The secretive Sykes–Picot Agreement gave France control of the region of modern Syria and Lebanon, while the British got control of Palestine. By 1918, the region, then occupied by troops of the Allies, formally had been put under a military-style governance known as the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. Per the terms of the 1920 San Remo Conference and the subsequent Treaty of Sèvres, France was officially recognized as having a mandate to control both Lebanon and Syria. The newly formed League of Nations made these mandates official in July 1922. According to the provisions of those mandates, France was expected to facilitate a transition to independence and democracy for each nation. Maronite Patriarch Elias Hoayek had lobbied for the concept of a Greater Lebanon, as opposed to the former, much smaller Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate. The Maronites got their wish, and the boundaries of Greater Lebanon closely align with those of modern Lebanon. Many of the communities that lived in the annexed lands opposed the move, preferring to stay part of a larger Syria. The Druze population in both Lebanon and Syria revolted, beginning in 1925, against their treatment per the French Mandate. The French stalled on granting independence to both countries until local demands, combined with France’s involvement in World War II, led to their independence in the mid1940s. Both Syria and Lebanon, along with Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq, took part in the 1944 Alexandria Protocol, which sought to restrict the growing role of Zionism in Palestine. The following year, both nations were among the founders of the Arab League. Throughout the modern period, Syria, being much larger, has attempted to control Lebanese affairs or even annex Lebanon based on the concept of a Greater Syria. For example, the short-lived Arab Kingdom of Syria formed after the fall of the Ottomans claimed Lebanon as part of its Greater Syria kingdom. Furthermore, Syria only established an embassy in Beirut in

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recent years, giving credence to those who argue that Damascus harbored irredentist claims on Lebanon. Within Lebanon, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party was active, and its main aim was to unite the two as one country. The Pan-Arabist movement, sparked by the thought of Egyptian president Gamal Nasser, led to Syria joining with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. Many among Lebanon’s Sunni population and others pressed hard for Lebanon to follow Syria’s lead and join the UAR. The civil war of 1958 erupted in Lebanon between Lebanese nationalists and Pan-Arabists, and was at least, in part, as a consequence of the UAR. The Lebanese civil war of 1975–1990 greatly concerned the regime in Damascus, as it feared the impact of the war on Syrian regional security with possibilities of the conflict spilling over into Syria. As a consequence, Damascus was determined to play a role in the outcome of the conflict. Soon after the civil war of 1975–1990 began, Syrian president Hafez al-Assad feared that the weakening military strength of the Christian forces might encourage Israel to intervene in Lebanon to protect the Maronites, threatening Syria’s security. This led to Syria successfully pressuring Lebanon’s president, Suleiman Frangieh, a longtime family friend of the Syrian president, to agree to a package of political reforms and invite the Syrian military into the country to separate the sides and help the government establish peace. By inviting Syrian troops into Lebanon, the Lebanese government inadvertently opened Lebanon to the Syrian dominance that would last until 2005. The Arab League legitimized the Syrian military presence by naming it the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), with a mandate to help bring the war to an end and assist the Lebanese government in reestablishing control. The ADF was under Syrian command and consisted mainly of Syrian troops, with a lesser number from some other Arab League member states. By this process, Lebanon was opened to a Syrian dominance that would last until 2005. As the civil war continued, however, sectarian parties and their militias were sharply divided between those who welcomed the strong Syrian presence in Lebanon and those who stanchly opposed Syrian influence on, and especially Syrian troops in, Lebanon. As the central Lebanese state gave way to a number of cantons controlled by sectarian militias, those militias were sharply divided between those that looked to Syria for arms and financial support, and those that fought against Syrian troops in Lebanon. At times during the war, Syrian troops occupied much of Lebanon. Even the capital became divided between an anti-Syrian East Beirut and a pro-Syrian West Beirut. Syria was suspected of playing a role in the 1977 assassination of Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt. In 1982, after seven years of civil war, and with the presence of Israeli and Western troops, President Amine Gemayel formally requested that Syria withdraw it troops from Lebanon. Since Syria had originally sent troops at

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the request of the Lebanese government, the request to withdraw had the effect of turning Syria from helpful neighbor to occupying nation. Gemayel’s position in Lebanon soon weakened, however, and Syrian troops remained. Ghazi Kanaan, a Syrian official who headed Syria’s much-feared intelligence agency in Lebanon, then began a period lasting from 1982–2002, during which he had the equivalent of a veto power of political appointments and policies, both commercial and political, in Lebanon. The May 17 Agreement reached under President Gemayel in 1983, called for Israel to withdraw its troops from southern Lebanon in exchange for diplomatic recognition, but the agreement had to be abrogated after strong objections from Syria and some Lebanese. Syria brokered the 1985 Tripartite Agreement signed by leaders of Lebanon’s three main Christian, Druze, and Muslim militias. The agreement was meant to end the civil war, but the cooperative arrangement failed when Samir Geagea and other Maronites strongly objected to the amount of influence on Lebanese affairs the agreement gave to Syria. In effect, it seemed to put Syria and its military in a legal position to dominate Lebanese politics. Geagea led a successful coup against the Lebanese Forces (LF) commander, Elie Hobeika, who then took refuge in Syria. Having taken control of the LF militia, Geagea then teamed up with the other main Maronite militia, the Lebanese Army, led by Michel Aoun. When Amine Gemayel, the outgoing president, handed over the government to General Michel Aoun in 1988, after there was no agreement about who should be the new president, Aoun began a policy of forcing all militias to disband and all foreign troops to withdraw. This was a direct threat to Syria, which then backed the rival government of Prime Minister Salim Hoss. Having two rival governments, with President Aoun’s government centered in East Beirut and Prime Minister Hoss’s set up in West Beirut, set off a constitutional crisis. During the next two years, Aoun, with backing and supplies from Iraq, tried to drive the Syrian troops out of Lebanon, with some success, in what he named a War of Liberation. Aoun went into exile in France but started a political movement focused on getting Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. The Taif Accords of 1989 led to the end of the civil war but allowed for the continuation of Syrian dominance of Lebanese affairs, as well as Syrian troops remaining on Lebanese soil. The Maronite faction led by Aoun still insisted that Syrian troops must leave, while the Geagea faction, for the sake of ending the prolonged civil war, reluctantly accepted the continuation of the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon. With the installation of the new government under President Elias Hrawi, Syria and its allies were able to put an end to Aoun’s military resistance.

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The Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, signed in 1991, between Syria and Lebanon, under Hrawi, gave Syria control of many aspects of political policies in Lebanon. The rise to power of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri the following year, however, allowed Lebanon to somewhat balance the strongest forms of Syrian influence, especially in the economic sphere. A series of treaties beginning in 1994, increased Syrian influence on Lebanon in many arenas. These treaties included a Cultural Agreement, an Orontes River Agreement, a Labor Agreement, and a Tourism Agreement. Critics of these agreements held that Lebanon was being reduced to the role of an unofficial colony of Syria. The Sheba Farms Dispute, which flared up in 2000, centered on the question of whether the small region of farms in the Mount Hermon area was officially part of Syria or Lebanon. This controversy was not originally one between Lebanon and Syria, but instead arose in the context of whether Israel had completely withdrawn from Lebanon, as required by a United Nations Security Council Resolution, since the Sheba Farms region was still occupied by Israel. Several influential political and social leaders, most of them Maronites, who were critical of Syrian dominance in Lebanon met periodically, beginning in 2001, to discuss peaceful ways to lessen Syrian influence. They called themselves the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, named after their meeting location in the Mount Lebanon governorate. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, adopted in 2004, called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, including Syrian troops, from Lebanon. Both Syria and their Hezbollah allies denounced the resolution. Syria did not withdraw. After the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005, large public demonstrations were held in Beirut and elsewhere to protest the widespread Syrian influence on Lebanon, as well as its suspected role the assassination. These demonstrations came to be known as the Cedar Revolution, or the Lebanon Intifada. The anti-Syrian grouping known as the March 14 Alliance took its name from the massive protest that took place in downtown Beirut on 14 March 2005. As many as a million Lebanese showed up to rally against Syrian influence and the assassination. The factions in Lebanese politics who favored a strong role for Syria then countered the March 14 Alliance by forming the pro-Syria March 8 Alliance, named after a pro-Syria rally held in Beirut on 8 March 2005. Syrian security and intelligence agencies departed Lebanon by the end of April 2005. A series of assassinations, mostly of Maronites opposed to Syrian influence, followed the assassination of Hariri. Syria’s supporter, Hezbollah, refused to let investigations of these assassinations proceed in Lebanese courts,

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using the new powers Hezbollah now had according to the Doha Agreement of 2008. The United Nations (UN) stepped in by setting up the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, led to social, political, and economic problems for Lebanon. By September 2014, the prime minister had been invited to speak in front of the UN General Assembly. Aside from calling for Israel to withdraw, Prime Minister Tammam Salam warned about the onslaught of terrorism in Lebanon as a result of the sectarian conflict that was spilling over from Syria’s civil war. He called attention to the fact that the 1.5 million refugees from the Syrian conflict accounted for almost one-third of Lebanon’s population, putting a strain on Lebanon’s governmental services, especially its medical and educational ones. Two years later, he gave an update on the worsening situation in a speech to the Supporting Syria and the Region conference held in London. Lebanon’s biggest challenge has been accommodating the vast number of Syrian refugees. Some have settled with relatives or friends, where their presence puts great strains on the host communities, which often were economically deprived even before the refugee influx. Others are settled in the several, poorly equipped refugee camps. Another problem relates to security along the borders, because some factions fighting the Assad government have sought safety in Lebanon, while entering Syrian on military raids. In addition to the economic fallout from the influx of refugees, the economic stresses on Lebanon as a result of the Syrian conflict also include disruption of supply lines for both import and export trade. Smuggling has also been a problem. The ongoing Syrian civil war has also exacerbated tensions between Lebanon’s Shiite community, which largely supported Syria’s government, and Lebanon’s Sunni community, which has mostly opposed the Assad governments for Syria’s history of influence in Lebanon and especially Assad’s continuing support for Hezbollah. See also AGRICULTURE, MODERN; GEAGEA, SETHRIDA TAWK (also spelled TAOUK) (1967– ). SYRIAN ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY RESTORATION ACT (1993). See HARIRI, RAFIC (1942–2005). SYRIAN ARAB DETERRENT FORCE. See ARAB DETERRENT FORCE (ADF). SYRIAN CIVIL WAR, IMPACT ON LEBANON. The Syrian civil war began in the midst of the Arab Spring in 2011, initially as an uprising against the leadership of President Bashar al-Assad, but quickly morphed

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into a complex sectarian conflict and, ultimately, an internationalized civil war. The conflict, ongoing as of this writing, impacted Lebanon perhaps more than Syria’s other neighbors. The reasons for this are relatively straightforward. The two countries share a similar history; a porous border; and deep familial, sectarian, and elite linkages. Indeed, the two countries’ political, security, and economic fortunes are intimately intertwined due in part to the consequences of Syria’s almost 30-year occupation (1976–2005) of its much smaller neighbor. The Lebanese population and its political elite were not only divided in their sympathies and allegiances, but also actively engaged in the conflict. Not surprisingly, the divisions were based on sectarian identities, with Lebanon’s Sunni community opposed to the Alawite-dominated Assad regime and the Shiite community strongly supportive. Lebanon’s Sunni community was often at odds with the Syrian government concerning its long occupation of Lebanon and apparent bolstering of Lebanon’s Shiite community and its leadership at Sunni expense. Moreover, many in the community blamed President Assad for the 2005 murder of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri, the Sunni community’s preeminent leader at the time. The possibility of seeing President Assad and his minority-dominated regime overthrown and replaced by a Sunni-dominated government in Damascus was appealing to the Sunnis. Perhaps most significantly, it would have meant a possible shift in the balance of power in Lebanon away from the Shiite community and in favor of the Sunni community. Conversely, Lebanon’s Shiite community and its main leadership were alarmed by developments in Syria and the prospects that their close ally and coreligionists in Damascus were in danger of being overthrown. To the Lebanese Shiite leadership, and Hezbollah in particular, such a development would prove to be an existential threat. Hezbollah was in a tight strategic relationship with the Assad regime and, together with Iran, formed an important axis against Israel and other rivals in the region, for instance, Saudi Arabia. Without the support of the Assad regime, Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon, and its strategic and deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis Israel, would almost certainly be weakened. Lebanon’s Christian and other sectarian communities fell somewhere between these two positions, and their sympathies shifted as developments in Syria evolved. For example, although initially unsympathetic to the Assad regime, the prospect of radical Islamic movements taking the reins of power led to fear among Christians. The Lebanese government’s ability to shield Lebanon from the effects of the Syrian war was limited, and beholden to the cooperation and acquiescence of the leadership of the various sectarian communities, those same communities that have supported opposing sides in the Syrian conflict. The

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Lebanese confessional system is, after all, a carefully balanced system of political power sharing intended to accommodate the myriad of sectarian communities that make up the Lebanese population. The three largest sectarian communities—Sunni, Shiite, and Maronite—had an effective veto of government decision-making. As a consequence, two things were needed for government to function. One, the elites of the three leading sectarian communities had to work effectively together, while at the same time maintaining the loyalty of their followers. And two, demands and pressures on the system had to be relatively low. None of these conditions existed in Lebanon at the time of the outbreak of the Syrian war, and this was to have an impact on the government’s ability to react to destabilizing factors emanating from the conflict. Indeed, the Lebanese political system was deadlocked, divided between two hostile political camps—the Sunni-dominated March 14 Alliance and the Shiite-dominated March 8 Alliance. The Maronite political leadership was divided more or less evenly between the camps, relegating the community to junior partner in both. The two political camps had profound ideological and strategic differences, especially related to Lebanon’s regional orientation: March 14 identified strongly with the Saudi/Sunni bloc and March 8 the Iranian/Syrian Shiite bloc. The Syrian civil war raised tensions between the two major political camps and their respective sectarian communities, and made it difficult for the Lebanese government to manage the numerous challenges—security, refugee, economic—Lebanon faced as a consequence of the Syrian conflict. THE SECURITY CHALLENGE. With varying degrees of involvement, the different Lebanese sectarian communities have participated in the Syrian conflict in support of their allies and coreligionists, whether oppositional or government forces. By doing so, they have drawn Lebanon into the Syrian conflict and created a host of security challenges for the Lebanese, destabilizing the country. Several Lebanese political leaders and movements at various times called for President Assad to step down. They provided material and logistical support for the Syrian opposition, both secular and religious, and several Lebanese joined the fighting in Syria. Lebanon offered a transient point for fighters and became a key conduit for oppositional arms and other supplies. This was not lost on the Assad regime and its Lebanese allies, which raised tensions even further in Lebanon and invited reprisals against the Lebanese in terms of cross-border attacks, bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings. It was, however, the robust intervention of thousands of experienced Hezbollah fighters on the side of the Assad regime and against the Syrian opposition that demonstrated the degree of involvement of the Lebanese in the Syrian war. Indeed, Hezbollah played a significant role in bolstering the

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Assad government, perhaps even saving it, along with Russia’s help, from the military defeat that many pundits thought was inevitable prior to Hezbollah’s intervention. While Hezbollah was active throughout Syria, it was particularly present in the areas bordering Lebanon (in the town of al-Qusayr, for example), key entry points for oppositional fighters to and from Lebanon. In May 2013, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, publicly announced that Hezbollah was officially committed to the fight against the Syrian rebellion. Intervening in the Syrian conflict invited reprisals from Syrian opposition forces, both secular and religious. In the spring of 2013, for example, one of the main Sunni Islamic groups fighting in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, threatened to attack Beirut if Lebanese president Michel Suleiman did not put an end to Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict. The same sort of threats to retaliate against Hezbollah, and by extension Lebanon, also came from the Free Syrian Army. It is within this context that one could understand a security breakdown in parts of Lebanon, especially in 2012 and 2013, when car bombs in Hezbollah strongholds killed numerous Shiite civilians. The bombings were designed to inflame sectarian tensions between Shiites and Sunnis, and draw the organization into conflict with rival Lebanese groups. The most significant sectarian conflicts that took place in Lebanon were in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli, where Sunni and Alawite communities fought significant battles resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people. The conflict drew in the Lebanese Armed Forces, which also suffered casualties. Battles in the southern city of Sidon and towns in the Bekaa Valley were also related to the Syrian conflict. This sketch of security challenges the Lebanese state has faced, including conflict on the borders, bombings in cities, armed clashes between groups, assassinations of prominent figures, and kidnappings, is connected to the situation in Syria. It also reflects internal political and security dynamics, including a general breakdown of state security. THE REFUGEE CHALLENGE. The Syrian war has created more than 4 million refugees. Approximately 1.2 million Syrian refugees live in Lebanon, a country of only 4 million people. To put this ratio into some stark perspective, this would be the equivalent of the United States hosting some 80 million refugees. The Lebanese state, and Lebanese society, is severely strained in dealing with a refugee population of this magnitude. The refugee situation has destabilized the security, economic, social, and political fabric of society. There are obvious security challenges that come with the refugee population. For example, with respect to the continuing war in Syria, fighters and other armed men have used Lebanon as a base to carry out activities in Syria. This has been met with Syrian military strikes across the border, further

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dragging Lebanon into the war and destabilizing Lebanese communities, particularly those along the border regions. A second example is that Islamic extremists have been actively recruiting among the refugees, who have in turn become politically active in Lebanon. A third example is the increased involvement in such illicit criminal activities as smuggling. Refugee smuggling has brought them into clashes with Lebanese groups that have traditionally participated in these activities. These dynamics have driven the rash of kidnappings in the Bekaa Valley during various periods of the war. Another major concern is the increased tension between Syrian refugees and their Lebanese host communities, where the majority of the refugees live. Host communities, which tend to be poor, feel increasingly marginalized. They blame refugees for stealing jobs from them, pushing down wages, and distorting the local economy by causing prices to rise. There is also growing resentment of the assistance refugees receive from the international community, while the conditions of poorer Lebanese are thought to be ignored. In cases where the refugees are Sunni and the host or nearby communities are Shiite, additional sets of tensions emerge. Finally, the sustainability of the refugee situation on a long-term basis is an issue of great concern for the Lebanese. Lebanon, for social, political, and economic reasons, is simply unable to absorb the large refugee population. The presence of the Syrian refugee population has increased sectarian tensions in Lebanon. More than three quarters of the refugees are Sunni, raising concerns in other communities, especially within the Shiite and Christian sects, that the refugees could possibly and dramatically alter the sectarian make up of Lebanon, especially if they remain in the country for any extended period of time. Should this indeed be the case, this has the potential of upsetting the carefully balanced sectarian composition of the country, where political power, as previously noted, is allocated to the various sects based on numerical strength. THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGES. The Syrian conflict has created a host of economic problems for Lebanon, a country already dealing with long-term structural challenges in this regard. These include high government debt and massive unemployment, the latter prominently visible in peripheral regions of the country. The drivers of the Lebanese economy—tourism, real estate, and banking—are particularly dependent on stability and consequently have been hard hit as tensions increase and security, especially personal security, worsens. To cite one of many possible examples, in 2012, the Gulf Cooperation Council ordered its citizens, a staple of Lebanese tourism, not to travel to Lebanon. This caused an estimated loss of $7 billion.

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Lebanese exports, especially agricultural goods, have been impacted by the conflict in Syria. This is because Syria is a traditional market for such goods and a transient point for goods moving to the Gulf or Turkey. The hard-hit Lebanese city of Tripoli, long dependent on such trade, is a case in point. The influx of Syrians into Lebanon has altered the labor market, exacerbating the unemployment situation for the Lebanese and deepening the economic precariousness of Lebanon’s large underclass. Indeed, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), approximately 1.5 million Lebanese, out of a population of 4 million, live in poverty and are considered at risk. These socioeconomic conditions are major drivers of instability in Lebanon, affecting its most vulnerable citizens. They raise tensions even further between Lebanon’s working class and Syrians (who are even more vulnerable), putting increasing pressure on the political class to address the situation. These conditions act as a magnet for militant Islamic organizations, which use financial incentives to recruit young men. While the Lebanese economy has been able to profit from other aspects of the Syrian conflict—wealthy Syrians relocating to Beirut, an influx of development aid from the international community, and informal economic activities tied to meeting the needs of Syria’s wartime economy—they are not enough to offset the negative impacts. Moreover, the more clandestine economic activities, for instance, smuggling, have increased the level of violence among criminal gangs competing for control of the illicit trade. This is particularly evident in the border towns in the Bekaa Valley, contributing to a deteriorating security situation there. LEBANESE GOVERNMENT RESPONSES. Although much of the literature was deeply pessimistic about Lebanon’s ability to handle the crises brought about by the Syrian conflict, Lebanon’s ruling elite and Lebanese institutions have surprisingly shown a great deal of resilience, especially in addressing some of the security challenges. This is driven in part by the fact that, despite contributing much to Lebanon’s problems, the political elite, including March 8 and March 14, and key members of the international community, do not want Lebanon to collapse, a position reinforced by the rise of Islamic extremist groups throughout the region. The official Lebanese government policy regarding the Syrian war differed significantly from that of other countries in the region. While Turkey and the Arab world weighed in on the conflict in Syria, the Lebanese government pursued a policy of dissociation—that is, Lebanon would not take sides in the conflict or participate in international statements or policies on Syria. The government, for example, disassociated itself from United Nations (UN) Security Council statements condemning violence in Syria, as well as

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the Arab League’s decision to suspend Syria in late 2011. An articulation of the dissociation policy was made by Prime Minister Najib Mikati in January 2012, and again at the UN in September of that year. Although the policy has been widely criticized for being ineffective, it may have been the only realistic option open to the government. It was also very pragmatic. It allowed the Lebanese government and its institutions to function as best they could in difficult circumstances and continue to work with the two main political blocs and their respective constituencies, each of which was supporting opposing sides in the Syrian war. With respect to the security situation, the Lebanese government has had some success in tackling the issue. With the support of the international community and cooperation and/or acquiescence of the major political blocs, including Hezbollah, Lebanese security institutions have worked to secure areas that have experienced violence. These include Beirut, the border regions, Tripoli, and elsewhere. Foreign aid allowed for the procurement of weapons and supplies from Europe (especially France) and the United States. Furthermore, various European countries, notably the United Kingdom, provided training and other expertise, including assisting with improving border security. The Lebanese government has also worked toward lowering tensions in areas particularly hard hit by sectarian clashes, especially in the divided city of Tripoli, the epicenter of conflict between Alawites and Sunnis in Lebanon. Lebanese security forces have had success in stabilizing various regions and securing borders, and their capacity for doing so is becoming stronger. Indeed, the Lebanese Armed Forces are highly popular with the Lebanese public, including the sectarian communities, which bodes well for building Lebanese state capacity. The Lebanese government’s position on refugees was more limited, at least initially. Given Lebanon’s long and unhappy history with Palestinian refugees, the Lebanese government was rather reluctant to recognize the Syrian refugee population, preferring to call them displaced. The government has also attempted to limit the number of Syrians entering Lebanon by imposing a host of restrictions, which was seen as a popular step by many elements of the Lebanese public. Assistance for the Syrian refugees fell to the UN and its agencies, especially the UNHCR, through the financial support of the international community, especially the European Union, the United States, and the Gulf Arab countries. In some ways, the initial refusal to recognize the refugee crisis was to Lebanon’s detriment, meaning potentially fewer resources were coming into the country to deal with the situation than otherwise would have been the case. This realization partly explains the government’s decision to work with the UN in developing the “Lebanon Crisis Development Plan (2015–2016),”

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which gives the Lebanese government the lead in dealing with the refugee situation. The plan, which was launched in December 2014, and is part of the UN’s Regional Refugee Resilience Plan (3RP), uses the Lebanese system to channel international financing to the Syrian refugees (referred to as de facto refugees), as well as the poorest Lebanese. The plan is supposed to address a host of socioeconomic issues and conflict mitigation strategies. Moreover, it is to integrate humanitarian and stabilization strategies, and has the potential to address some of the most pressing destabilizing elements facing Lebanon; however, the effectiveness of the plan will depend on the ability of the international community to provide funds and, critically, the capacity of Lebanese institutions working with UN agencies to deliver. Lebanon’s stability continues to hinge, in part, on the dynamics of the conflict playing out in Syria (though the 2019–2020 economic crisis largely of Lebanon's own doing has taken shaken its political stability even more so than the Syrian war). As of this writing, Lebanon’s political elite will, at best, muddle through, prioritizing some security matters while putting off action on other significant political issues because of a lack of consensus. In the meantime, and with some degree of irony, memories of Lebanon’s own long and devastating civil war are quite possibly the main factor contributing to Lebanon’s relative stability in the face of the Syrian war. SYRIAN–ISRAELI GOLAN HEIGHTS CONFLICT. Lebanon has been drawn into the longstanding conflict between Syria and Israel concerning control of the Israeli-occupied portion of the Golan Heights. The Golan Heights region, formerly part of the Ottoman Empire’s province of Syria, had been defined as part of Syria under the French Mandate period of control of Syria. It remained part of Syria after independence. Then, during the June 1967 war, Israel overran approximately two-thirds of the Golan Heights and has continued to rule the region as occupied territory ever since. During the October 1973 war, Syrian troops first took control of much of Syria’s lost territory on the Golan Heights but lost it again during the Israeli counteroffensive. The subsequent cease-fire agreement in 1974 left Israel in control of the region. Lebanon was drawn into this Syrian–Israeli conflict concerning the Golan Heights in the 1980s and 1990s. Because Syria did not want to risk another war with Israel over its lost territory and because Israel had, in effect, annexed the region, Syria used Israel’s desire to put an end to Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel launched from southern Lebanon as a bargaining chip. During that period, Syria had hoped that by controlling Lebanese politics and having a large number of Syrian troops in Lebanon, it could negotiate a deal in which Syria would end Hezbollah attacks from southern Lebanon in exchange for Israel withdrawing from the occupied Golan Heights. Syria’s efforts failed.

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Syria still wants the return of its occupied territory, while Israel has entrenched itself in the occupied Golan Heights by building settlements and passing laws that govern the region as if it were part of Israel. The Donald Trump administration recognized Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights, while the rest of the international community has not. See also SYRIA, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. SYRIAN–LEBANESE LABOR ACCORD (1994). See SYRIA, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH. The Syrian Orthodox Church, or Syriac Orthodox Church, is estimated to have only a few thousand adherents in Lebanon. Most members emigrated from Syria, starting from the World War I period and continuing thereafter. Its leader is the Patriarch of Antioch, now headquartered in Damascus. Its theology stresses the oneness of Christ’s human and divine nature. SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY (SSNP). A political party founded by five people on the American University of Beirut campus in 1932, under the leadership of Antoun Saadeh. The SSNP was opposed to what it saw as the arbitrary boundaries created by the Sykes–Picot Agreement. It wished to unite the territory of the Fertile Crescent, embracing Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, as one Greater Syria state. The SSNP established itself in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. It was opposed by both Lebanese nationalists and Arab nationalists. In 1949, SSNP fighters unsuccessfully invaded Lebanon from Syria, and Lebanon blamed Saadeh for ordering the invasion. In a secret deal between the two regimes, Syria handed over Saadeh to Lebanon, which led to the execution of Saadeh and the arrest of the party officials. After that, the SSNP was dormant in Lebanon until resurfacing during the time of President Camille Chamoun. The SSNP was against the Pan-Arabism movement, instead favoring the concept of a Greater Syria. Chamoun’s pro-Western and nationalist stance therefore found some common ground with the SSNP in that they both opposed Pan-Arabism. When General Fuad Chehab became president, he strengthened the state security apparatus in his efforts to weaken and control the power of Lebanon’s traditional sectarian elites. The resentment against the heightened intelligence among the military is often given as the motivation for a failed coup attempt by army officers with SSNP allegiance in 1961. During the civil war of 1975–1990, some SSNP members aligned with the militias opposing the Christian militias. The SSNP strongly opposed Israel and struck Israeli fighters and pro-Israeli factions when opportunity to do so

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presented itself. SSNP member Habib Shartouni was tried and convicted for planting the bomb in the attack that killed president-elect Bashir Gemayel and others on 14 September 1982. After the return to normal elections following the civil war, the SSNP contested in parliamentary elections. At its best, in 1992, it won six seats. It holds three seats in the 2018 Parliament.

T TABOULI. A salad commonly eaten in Lebanon made of chopped parsley, tomatoes, onions, mint, and bulgur wheat. See also CUISINE, LEBANESE. TAIF ACCORDS (1989). Also referred to as the Taif Accord or Taif Agreement, it was negotiated by Lebanese parliamentarians in 1989, in the city of Taif, or Ta’if, Saudi Arabia. The Taif Accords introduced key political reforms designed to bring an end to Lebanon’s long-running civil war. It was eventually adopted by Lebanon’s Parliament later that year, and by October 1990, the civil war had ended. The accords built on the Constitution of 1926 and the 1943 National Pact, and became the basis for post–civil war governing. It faced opposition from a number of corners, including civil-society actors who led protests in 2019–2020, demanding an end to the Taif political system, to be replaced by a secular-based democratic order. The Taif Accords agreement did not fundamentally alter the confessionalbased Lebanese political system. It simply reformed it by giving Lebanese Muslims more political power. At the heart of the reforms is the understanding that no matter the balance of the sectarian population of the country, Christians and Muslims are to share political power equally, at every level of government and throughout the upper echelons of the bureaucracy. In particular, the largest three sectarian communities, Maronite, Sunni, and Shiite, are effectively considered politically equal. Furthermore, although not explicitly stated, the practice, especially since 2008, is that the dominant leadership of each of these three communities were to be included in a coalition government, with each holding what amounts to a veto of decision-making. The Taif Accords introduced a number of specific changes to the political order. Examples of some of the major changes follow. Seats in the Lebanese Parliament, or the Chamber of Deputies, were at first increased to 108. There previously had been 99 seats proportioned on the basis of 6:5 in favor of the Christians. Now according to the Taif Agreement, the 108 seats were to be equally distributed between Christians and Muslims, with 54 each. In 1992, the seats were increased by 20, to 128, still evenly divided between the 311

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Christian and Muslim groupings. Of the 64 Christian seats, the Maronite community held 34, Greek Orthodox 14, Melkites (Greek Catholics) 8, Armenian Orthodox 5, Armenian Catholics 1, Protestants 1, and other Christian minorities 1. Of the 64 Muslim seats, the Sunni community held 27, the Shiite 27, the Druze 8, and the Alawite 2. By equalizing the number of seats in Parliament between Christians and Muslims, the Taif Accords simply reverted back to the pre-1943 National Pact era and the model introduced by the Constitution of 1926. The Taif Accords maintained the sectarian allocation traditionally reserved for the top three executive positions and those of the senior bureaucracy. The office of the presidency remains the prerogative of the Maronite community, while the Sunni community maintains the prime ministership and the Shiite community the speaker of the house; however, the Taif Accords altered the powers of each of these offices in a way that weakened the once all-powerful presidency in favor of the other two, especially the prime minister, who came to head a cabinet with increased powers. Moreover, the Taif Agreement was less clear about the divisions of power between these three executive positions, and the presidency and the prime ministership. This may have been intentional, as a way to diffuse power between officeholders and possibly force compromise and agreement. The changes at the executive level were designed to equalize, to a great extent, the powers of the Maronite, Sunni, and Shiite communities. Indeed, for much of the post–civil war period, Lebanese political observers spoke of the competition between those holding the three executive positions as the Troika system, or the three presidents, reflecting the relative weight of the three positions in Lebanese politics. The Taif Accords also addressed the important question of Lebanon’s foreign relations, historically a highly divisive issue. Taif clearly aligned Lebanon with the Arab world, removing the more nuanced language on foreign alliances agreed to in the National Pact and put into practice for much of the post-independence period. Taif also called on all foreign forces to leave the country, save Syria. Indeed, far from calling on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, the accord designated to Syria and its robust security forces already stationed in Lebanon a major role in assisting the Lebanese government in reestablishing control of the country. In reference to Syria’s forces, Taif simply stated that Syrian forces were to withdraw to the Bekaa Valley after two years, something that was not carried out and had little enforcement mechanism at any rate.

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The entire Taif process, and the agreement that emerged, was a clear concession to Syria’s dominant role in Lebanon and its political and security interests in the country. Whether the framers of the agreement understood the degree to which Syria would use Taif to assume massive political and security control of Lebanon is unclear, however. Whatever the case may be, the Taif Accords legitimized the Syrian security presence in Lebanon. It also gave the Assad regime in Damascus the cover it needed to shape Lebanese politics, including security and foreign policy, along pro-Syrian lines for years, from the implementation of Taif in 1990 until its security forces were ultimately forced out of Lebanon in 2005 by the Cedar Revolution. It should be pointed out that support for Taif was not unanimous when it was first introduced, and opposition persisted throughout the post–civil war political era. Opposition was strong from within the Christian community, especially those supporters aligned with Michel Aoun and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. Opposition was less centered on the political changes, which were seen as inevitable, than on the role assigned to Syrian forces in Lebanon. These opponents demanded that Syrian forces withdraw from the country and continued to oppose the Syrian-dominated Taif political system both within Lebanon and from outside the country during much of the 1990s and early 2000s. Opposition from Lebanon’s Sunni community also existed, particularly as tensions between its leadership and Syrian officials increased, culminating with the assassination of Rafic Hariri, the Sunni leader, in February 2005. Opponents of the Taif Accords also came from within civil society, which grew in strength in the years after Taif was implemented. The opposition became especially strong during the protest movement of 2019–2020. Civilsociety actors demanded a complete overhaul of the political system in Lebanon, which, they argued, benefited a corrupt ruling class and divided the masses by playing up sectarian divisions. Civil-society opponents of Taif demanded the ending of the confessional political order and replacing it with a secular political system along the lines of those found in most Western democracies. As of this writing, such demands have not been successfully articulated outside of the protests, and the Taif order remains in place; however, Taif, just like the Constitution of 1926, did explicitly state that the abolishing of political sectarianism was a desired goal, once conditions would allow for such a step to take place. TAIF AGREEMENT. See TAIF ACCORDS (1989). TAJADDOD. See DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL PARTY.

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TALEB, NASSIM NICHOLAS (1960– ). A professor, stock trader, and widely read author who has become a world-renowned intellectual. Taleb was born in Amioun, Lebanon, into a Greek Orthodox Lebanese family with a history of service in Lebanese politics dating all the way back to 1866. His grandfather and great-grandfather had each served as deputy prime minister. As an educator, Taleb has held prestigious university positions. He was Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at New York University and then Dean’s Professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. As a stock trader, he specialized in risk theory. Events that take a market by surprise are called black swans, and he was able to trade successfully by anticipating such events. Taleb is best known for his reflections on the role that uncertainty plays in almost every arena. His five-book series Incerto takes its name from the Latin word for uncertainty. The Black Swan, the second book in his Incerto series, has the subtitle The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Another book in the series, Antifragile, with the subtitle Things That Gain from Disorder, continues the reflections on uncertainty with comments about how to benefit from improbable events. Taleb’s book Skin in the Game has the subtitle Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life. He is credited with being one of the few thinkers who anticipated the 2008 financial crisis in the United States. TANZIM. See AL-TANZIM. TANZIM: LEBANESE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (TLRM). See ALTANZIM. TANZIM PARTY. See AL-TANZIM. TAQIYYAH. A Muslim term for concealing the truth. In the Lebanese context, it refers to the practice, in the past, among some Druze and Shiite Muslims, of concealing their sectarian identity to avoid persecution. TAQLA, PHILIP (1915–2006). A Lebanese politician and diplomat who is best remembered for his service in the 1960s and early 1970s as foreign minister, governor of the Lebanese Central Bank, and Lebanon’s representative to the United Nations. TARABULSI, MUHAMMAD KHAYR (1952–2002). Lebanese weightlifter who competed successfully in the major international weightlifting events from 1968–1982, including the 1968, 1972, and 1980 Olympics and

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World Championships, and the 1978 and 1982 Asian Games. In 1972, Tarabulsi finished second in the middleweight division at the World Championships and won the silver medal in the same division at the Olympics. TASHNAG PARTY. See ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION (ARF). TEL AL-ZAATAR. A Palestinian refugee camp in northeastern Beirut. It was fortified and housed approximately 20,000 refugees before the civil war of 1975–1990 spread to the region in January 1976. Following a series of massacres against civilians by opposing sides of the conflict, a combined force of Christian militias, including the Kataeb Regulatory Forces, the Guardians of the Cedars, the Tigers militia, and other groups, undertook a siege of the camp. The siege continued for more than three months before the camp was overrun. The conflict at Tel al-Zaatar is considered one of the most notorious of the many massacres against civilians during the civil war, and it triggered further revenge killings of civilians, notably in the town of Damour. THABIT, AYYUB (1884–1951). A Lebanese Christian who served in Parliament beginning in 1922, and was appointed president by the French in 1943, shortly before the end of the French Mandate era. TIGERS. See NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY (NLP). TORON CASTLE. See CASTLES. TOURISM. See ECONOMY. TOWER OF CLAUDIUS. A large stone structure constructed in 43 CE on the western side of Mount Lebanon. It is now called the Tower of Claudius because an inscription dedicates it to Roman emperor Claudius. A second local inscription credits a local god referred to as Beelgalasos with paying for the temple. A smaller structure located nearby, farther down the hill, may be the ruins of that god’s temple. The tower now lies in ruins, with the walls of the lower floor still standing. TRAD, PETRO (1886–1947). A Lebanese Christian who was an activist, lawyer, and politician. Born in Beirut and educated in Paris, Trad returned to practice law in Beirut. His participation in a 1913 Christian-led political movement calling on France to offer protection for Lebanon and Syria led to his being sentenced to death by the ruling Ottomans. Some of the others

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were killed, but he escaped. Trad’s success as a lawyer led to him being elected to Parliament beginning in 1922, and subsequently thereafter. In 1934, he began two terms as speaker of the house. He became president in 1943, serving from 22 July to 21 September 1943. TREATY OF BROTHERHOOD, COOPERATION, AND COORDINATION (1991). Known informally as the Friendship Treaty, a treaty between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic negotiated following the end of the civil war of 1975–1990. It was signed on 22 May 1991, by Lebanese president Elias Hrawi and Syrian president Hafez al-Assad. The treaty had six articles. Article 1 pledged cooperation and coordination in many fields, including political, economic, security, cultural, and scientific. Article 2 called for that cooperation to extend to joint projects and coordinated development plans. In Article 3, each country promised not to harbor any entity or base that might be a threat to the security of the other country. The crucial Article 4 called for the withdrawal, after certain conditions were met, of Syrian forces into the Bekaa Valley and such other regions as a joint commission might agree upon. Article 5 committed both states to the principles of the Arab League and the United Nations, and to coordinating their positions on those bodies. Article 6 called for the creation of an entity called the Supreme Council with the power to carry out the terms of the treaty. Membership on the Supreme Council consisted of the president, prime minister, deputy prime minister, and speaker of the house from each country. Various committees of the Supreme Council were to deal with follow-up and coordination, foreign affairs, economic and social affairs, defense, and security. And there was to be a General Secretariat established. Critics of the treaty, both within Lebanon and beyond, held that it provided a way for Syria to exercise near-total control of Lebanon’s policy decisions, institutionalizing the pax-Syriana that already existed in Lebanon. The Cedar Revolution of 2005 effectively forced Syrian troops out of Lebanon and minimized but did not completely eliminate Syrian influence in the country. Furthermore, the treaty, although not carrying the same weight as it did during Syria’s occupation of Lebanon, was not formally revoked. TREATY OF SÈVRES. See GRAND LIBAN. TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT. An agreement by the three main Lebanese factions signed on 28 December 1985, in an effort to end the civil war. The agreement was brokered by Syria. It was signed in Damascus and had the effect of recognizing the ever-increasing Syrian role in Lebanon. It also called for reforming Lebanon’s political system to give Muslims more political power. The three signatories were the Shiite Amal militia, signed by its

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leader, Nabih Berri; the Druze Progressive Socialist Party, signed by Walid Jumblatt; and the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), signed by Elie Hobeika. The agreement was quite controversial among Maronite leaders, many of whom saw it as giving Syria too much influence. The agreement boosted Syria’s role in Lebanon but did not end the civil war, in part because Samir Geagea rebelled against it, and having taken over the leadership of the LF, he withdrew the Christian support from the treaty. TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE. See GEMAYEL, PIERRE (1905–1984). TRIPOLI. Located at the confluence of the Abu Ali River and the Mediterranean coast, Tripoli is the second-largest city in Lebanon and the most important city in the north. Among its half-million or more residents, not counting Syrian refugees, most are ethnic Arabs and adherents to Sunni Islam. The two largest minorities are the Alawites and the Christians. The Christian population has many ethnic and denominational subdivisions. It includes Greek Orthodox, both Maronite and Greek Catholics, and Armenians. The Armenian Christians include Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant Evangelicals. Tripoli has been inhabited since at least the 2nd millennium BCE and served as an important center of occupation since at least the biblical period when Canaanites and Phoenicians were prominent. Throughout the centuries it has come under the influence of the great powers of the surrounding region, including Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Umayyads, Abbasids, Christian Crusaders, Mamluk Muslims, Ottomans, and French. Local names reflect its multiethnic past. The name Tripoli, meaning “Three Cities,” derives from the Greek period, whereas Arabic terms are used for the city’s two main sections: The area along the river is known as al-Madina, “The City,” and the area along the sea is called al-Mina, “The Port.” During the Crusader period (spanning the 12th and 13th centuries), Tripoli was a regional capital in the Crusader State of the Levant. Among the major areas of historic and archaeological interest from the Crusader period is the large Crusader fort known as the Citadel of Raymond de Saint-Gilles, built on a hill between the water and the old city. The Knights Hospitaller were headquartered in the Krak Des Chevaliers castle. The castle was later used by the Mamluks and then the Ottomans. After two centuries of Crusader rule, the Muslim Mamluks of Egypt ruled the region. The Mamluks had destroyed much of the Crusader city near the port, and they rebuilt their city more inland, most likely for defensive reasons. There are also several remains of various buildings of the Mamluk period. For example, remnants of the Grand Mansouri Mosque, which was

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repurposed by the Mamluks from the Crusader Saint Mary’s Church, remain today. Other Mamluk remnants surviving in the old city include those of baths, narrow streets, and souks. Tripoli and surrounding towns preserve several traditional arts and crafts, including woodworking, pottery, and metal working. The city’s restored waterfront and beach resorts are also attractive to tourists. Tripoli is, however, one of the more unstable cities in Lebanon, prone to sectarian conflicts among the various communities that make up its population, especially the Sunni and Alawite communities. The civil war in Syria has spilled over into Tripoli, with the local Alawites supporting the Assad regime and the Lebanese Sunnis the opposition. Violent clashes between the two have occurred numerous times. Tripoli is also one of Lebanon’s poorest cities, with a significant gap between the wealthy and poor. Unemployment in the city is especially high. Islamist and other radical groups have established themselves in the city, especially in some of the poorer neighborhoods. TRIPOLI CASTLE. See CASTLES. TROIKA SYSTEM. An informal name ascribed to the post–civil war Taif political order. In particular, it refers to the relatively equal powers between the offices of the president, the prime minister, and the speaker of Parliament, which are often together referred to as the Troika, or the three presidents. The three positions are allocated to the three largest sectarian communities in Lebanon—the Maronite, Sunni, and Shiite—which have relatively equal political power in the Lebanese system. See also NATIONAL PACT (1943). TUENI, GEBRAN (1957–2005). As the son of journalist and politician Ghassan Tueni, and poet and writer Nadia Hamadeh Tueni, and the grandson of Gebran Tueni Sr., Gebran was born into a famous family. Even in the early days of his short lifespan he achieved fame as a journalist who took a strong stance against foreign occupation of Lebanon, whether by Palestinians, Israelis, or Syrians. He was a leader in the March 14 demonstration during the Cedar Revolution, taking an oath that is still recalled by many Lebanese. Tueni’s strong advocacy for Lebanese nationalist goals and independence from Syrian domination led to his assassination in 2005, by a car bomb explosion in Mkalles, a town in the Mount Lebanon governorate. His legacy endures. The Gebran Tueni Foundation strives to continue advocating for his goals, and the Gebran Tueni Award is bestowed on Middle Eastern journalists whose work exhibits his courage, leadership, and other values.

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TUENI, GEBRAN, SR. (?–1948). Lebanese journalist who founded the popular newspaper An-Nahar. Tueni was an important contributor to the Arab Renaissance movement. His controversial positions caused him to live in exile in Paris, before returning to found his newspaper in 1933. Under his editorship, An-Nahar grew from its humble beginnings to become a leading daily. TUENI, GHASSAN (1926–2012). A Lebanese of the Greek Orthodox sectarian community who excelled in many arenas, including as publisher, journalist, and politician. At the age of 22, after the death of his father Gebran Tueni, Ghassan took over his father’s work as publisher of the newspaper An-Nahar, traditionally the most influential daily in the country. TUENI, NADIA HAMADEH (1935– ). Lebanese writer whose many books of poetry made a great contribution to Lebanese francophone literature. She is the wife of the late Ghassan Tueni and the mother of activist Gebran Tueni, who was assassinated in 2005. TWELVER MUSLIMS. A name often used for the Imami(s), the most numerous of the Shiite Muslim traditions in Lebanon and worldwide. The name derives from their belief that the line of imams ended when the twelfth imam, Muhammad al-Muntazar, while still a young boy in Persia in about 874, disappeared. He is considered to be in a hidden state known as occultation in English. See also SHIA ALI. TYRE. City located on a peninsula jutting into the Mediterranean Sea in southern Lebanon that has been occupied by humans for thousands of years. Known to the Hebrews as Zor and to the Romans as Tyrus, it is now called Sur, or Sour. The history of human habitation at Tyre stretches back to the early millennia of early modern human migration out of Africa and into the Tyre region as early as 43,000 years before present or even earlier. The region would have been an ideal spot to survive on a diet of both sea and land foods. Tyre’s rich history reveals it to have been a thriving trading port during the time of the Egyptian pharaohs, who imported cedars for their ships and large buildings from Lebanon through the port at Tyre. Aside from having the best trees for use as ship masts and temple pillars, the ancient Phoenicians of Tyre supplied a unique purple dye to the Egyptians and other affluent customers throughout the Mediterranean. That purple dye was made from a mollusk native to the area.

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During the era of Hebrew kings David and Solomon, close trade relations existed between the Hebrew kingdom and that of the Phoenicians. Hiram (Ahiram), king of Tyre, supplied cedar logs, as well as builders skilled in constructing tall buildings, for David’s palace and Solomon’s temple in Jerusalem. The cooperative arrangement between the two kingdoms was sealed, in the ancient manner, by the marriage of a Phoenician princess to King Solomon. In exchange for the timber and craftsmen from Phoenicia, the Hebrew kings sent grain and olive oil to Phoenicia. In addition to expanding their trade with the Hebrews during the 10th century BCE, the Phoenicians also expanded their trade links throughout the Mediterranean and started trade colonies as far away as Spain. The importance of Tyre as a trade center attracted the attention of Persia, the rising superpower of the 6th century BCE, motivating Cyrus of Persia to conquer Tyre and the Phoenician kingdom in 539 BCE. Two centuries later, Alexander the Great’s plan to conquer Persia led him to take control of Tyre in 332 BCE, thus beginning the Greek period. The rise of Christianity during the 1st century brought St. Paul and other early Christian leaders to Tyre to found new churches. With the rise of Islam in the 7th century, Islamic control of the region began. The region was declared independent under Prince Allaqa in 950. The Crusaders took control of Tyre in 1124, and held the city until Saladin restored Islamic control. The region then became part of the Ottoman Empire. Archaeological work at Tyre beginning in the 1950s has located the port area from the Phoenician era, but most of the ruins from that early period are now under water. There are visible remains from the Greek period, however. Sections of the Greek hippodrome remain, recalling the Greek love of chariot racing. There are also some archaeological remains from later periods. Tourists can now visit the ruins of a Roman cemetery, bathhouse, and water system. The main sights of modern Tyre (Sur) include a double-domed Shiite mosque; the Christian quarter, including the residence of the Maronite bishop; and an extensive souk. See also SIDON.

U UMAYYAD CALIPHATE. The third caliph, Uthman, was from the powerful Umayyad clan, many of whose members had opposed Muhammad in the early years. During Uthman’s brief rule, he appointed Umayyad clan relatives as governors in key regions of the expanding Islamic state, including Damascus and Cairo. After the death of the fourth caliph, Ali, the ensuing Islamic civil war led to the political dominance of the supporters of the Umayyads, the Sunni faction, over the supporters of the Party of Ali, the Shiite faction. Then, Muawiya, the Umayyad governor of Damascus, became the new caliph, with the backing of the Sunnis. Damascus, Syria, became the new capital of the caliphate. The Umayyad Caliphate ruled a vast territory that included modern Lebanon, as well as North Africa, Spain, and most of the Middle East all the way to the Indian subcontinent. During the Umayyad period, the Lebanese coastal town of Tripoli became prominent as an access point for Umayyad trade and military excursions on the Mediterranean. UNIATE RITES/UNIATE CHURCHES. A term for Eastern Churches that are in Union with the Roman Catholic Church. Uniate Churches are selfgoverning in the sense that Rome allows them to follow their own rite (rituals and regulations), make their own appointments, and set their own governance, but always with the understanding that they recognize the Holy See of Rome as the supreme authority. For that reason, they are sometimes referred to as the Eastern Rite Churches. One of the key differences from the Roman Rite is that some of the Uniate Rites traditionally allow priests to marry if they so chose. See also ARMENIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH; MARONITE CHURCH; MELKITE CHRISTIANS; ROMAN CATHOLIC CHRISTIANS. UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN (UFM). The UFM was founded in Barcelona, Spain, in November 2008, with Lebanon as one of the original 27 members. It grew out of the Barcelona Process, which led to the formation

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of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership, which is primarily a trade organization and includes Lebanon among its members. The membership largely overlaps the membership of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership. The UFM has expanded to include 43 members. Membership includes all European Union states, as well as most of the states bordering on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. The exceptions are Libya, which has only observer status, and Syria, which has been expelled. The goals of the UFM include the promotion of stability and interstate decision-making among members. The UFM also has the goal of promoting sustainable development in the region, including wise ecology of the Mediterranean Sea and its tributary rivers. This concern for both the sea and rivers is referred to as blue ecology. Progress on agreements on blue ecology, specifically water strategy, and some other topics has been delayed because Lebanon and Palestine, as well as Syria before its suspension, insisted on language referring to Israeli occupied territories that Israel refused to accept. UNION OF ISLAMIC ULAMA. An Iran-backed organization formed in West Beirut in 1982, with the goal of uniting Lebanese Sunni and Shiite Muslims against the occupation by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). UNION OF WORKING PEOPLE’S FORCES. Political party founded by Kamal Chatila and Najah Wakim in 1965. It represented the conservative faction in the Nasserist movement. Its small militia, the Victory Divisions, fought in the Beirut area during the civil war of 1975–1990. It supported Arab nationalism and the Syrian intervention in Lebanon. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. See EGYPT, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH; SYRIA, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. UNITED NATIONS (UN). Lebanon was one of the 51 founding members of the UN in 1945. Lebanon remains an active member and was a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council in 1953–1954, and again in 2010–2011. The civil war of 1975–1990, the number of Hezbollah–Israeli clashes, the Syrian civil war, and the presence of foreign armies on Lebanese soil have led to several resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was created in 1978, by United Nations Security Council Resolution 426, to oversee the withdrawal of Israel troops occupying Lebanon. In 2004, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 called for the withdrawal of foreign troops, both Syrian and Israeli, from Lebanese territory. United Nations Security Coun-

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cil Resolution 1701, adopted in 2006, called for an end to hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign forces from southern Lebanon. The 2006 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 included a call for the Syrian refugees in Lebanon to be resettled in Syria. UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL). A peacekeeping force created by United Nations Security Council Resolution 426. UNIFIL was needed after the Israeli military invaded southern Lebanon in 1978, in retaliation for a Palestinian attack on two buses and their passengers in northern Israel. The goals of UNIFIL included overseeing the Israeli withdrawal, securing the peace, and aiding the government of Lebanon in restoring control of its southern region south of the Litani River. UNIFIL also oversaw the provision of humanitarian aid. The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mandate for Lebanon led to later resolutions and is renewed annually. The force consists of approximately 10,000 personnel at a cost of $500 million. Resolution 1701, following the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, greatly expanded the mandate and resources of UNIFIL with respect to monitoring developments in southern Lebanon and assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces in establishing control of the border region. The aim was to prevent a repeat of the conditions that led to the 2006 war. UNIFIL did not, however, have Chapter VII enforcement capability, something the United States was pushing for in the negotiations leading to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. The success of UNIFIL is considered by observers to be mixed. Although all sides of the conflict are unhappy with the performance of UNIFIL, to date no one has called for its mission to end, as it performs a useful role in separating the combatants and monitoring violations. Furthermore, all sides fear a security vacuum in the south from any possibly UNIFIL withdrawal, which may escalate the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. The August 2020 renewal discussion at the UN did raise demands by the United States for UNIFIL to be more effective in dealing with Hezbollah. See also BEGIN, MENACHEM (1913–1992); MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF); SALAM, TAMMAM SAEB (1945– ). UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA). A United Nations program originally established in 1949, specifically to aid the almost 750,000 Palestinians who had become refugees in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab–Israel conflict. The need for relief has only grown due to population increases and the lack of permanent solutions to the problems faced by the refugees. By 2020, the UNRWA had more than 30,000 personnel working with Palestinian refugees, at the time numbering more than 4 million, in five

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regions: Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. Concerning its areas of operation, the four officially stated goals are as follows: knowledge and skills, long and healthy lives, decent standards of living, and human rights. To accomplish these goals, the agency provides food, shelter, medical aid, education, and work opportunities. Its related operations include social services and improvements to the infrastructure of the refugee camps. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 425 AND 426. Resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council on 19 March 1978, in response to Israeli forces invading southern Lebanon. Resolution 425 called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces. Resolution 426 called for the establishment of a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to stabilize the region. The chain of events had started on 11 March, with the Coastal Road Massacre, or Coastal Road Incident, during which a Palestinian cell undertook an attack on two buses along the coastal road between Haifa and Tel Aviv. During that incident, both buses and their passengers were taken hostage, and many Israelis were killed. In retaliation, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fighters invaded Lebanon on 15 March, under the code name Operation Litani, with both aerial assaults and ground troops attacking suspected Palestinian strongholds in southern Lebanon. The IDF responded by withdrawing its forces in accord with Resolution 425. According to the terms of Resolution 426, UNIFIL forces arrived and peace was restored in southern Lebanon. See also SOUTH LEBANON ARMY (SLA). UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 426. See UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 425 AND 426. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1559. United Nations Security Council resolution passed on 2 September 2004, having been sponsored by France, as the former holder of a mandate to govern Lebanon, and the United States. It called for comprehensive developments regarding Lebanon. All foreign troops were to be withdrawn from Lebanon, which applied to both Syria and Israel. Syria was no longer to intervene in Lebanese political affairs. All militias were to be disbanded, and free and fair elections were to be held. Syria did not withdraw its troops until pressured to do so by the Cedar Revolution the following year, in 2005, and Hezbollah did not disband its militia.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1701. United Nations Security Council resolution passed on 11 August 2006, calling for comprehensive actions intended to restore full control of Lebanon to its government and put an end to the Hezbollah–Israel War (2006). It called for all hostilities to cease, the withdrawal of all but government forces in southern Lebanon, respect for the Blue Line, the implementation of the provisions of the Taif Accords, and the release of captured Israeli soldiers. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1757. Resolution adopted by the United Nations (UN) Security Council on 30 May 2007, mandating the creation of an international Special Tribunal for Lebanon for the purpose of holding a trial of the suspects accused of the assassination of Rafic Hariri, former Lebanese prime minister, along with 21 other people who were killed in the bombing, which took place on 14 February 2005. It was unusual for the Security Council to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state, but the political impasse among Lebanese parliamentarians at the time led to the approval of the resolution by a cabinet vote of 10 in favor, none opposed, and five abstentions. The resolution called for input on the trial’s proceedings by the government of Lebanon. The subsequent written agreement between the UN and the government of Lebanon became an annex to Resolution 1757. The trial called for by the resolution began on 1 March 2009. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2254. United Nations Security Council resolution adopted on 18 December 2015, reaffirming the calls for a peaceful political settlement in Syria and, among other things, calling for the resettlement of the Syrian refugees from other countries, for example, Lebanon. UNITED STATES, LEBANON’S RELATIONS WITH. As the most significant global power since at least the end of World War II, it should come as little surprise that the United States plays an outsized role in the politics of Lebanon. The United States has intervened politically, diplomatically, economically, and militarily in the affairs of Lebanon throughout the years, in the pre–civil war era, during the civil war, and in the post–civil war period. Its influence continues to be felt in Lebanon today. American interest in the area of modern Lebanon dates back to the 19th century, when Christian missionaries from the United States were present. A group of them founded the Syrian Protestant College in 1866, to introduce American-style education. The college evolved into American University of Beirut, which has been the educator of so many of Lebanon’s leading figures

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in every walk of life. Tens of thousands of Lebanese also immigrated to the United States dating to this period, increasing the links between the two countries. The United States and Lebanon had strong relations during the pre–civil war era, from 1943–1975. Generally, the various Lebanese governments have been pro-American at the regional and global levels, and have aligned with like-minded pro-American Arab governments, especially the Arabian Gulf states and Jordan. Lebanon faced its first real political crisis in 1958, briefly leading to a civil war. During the period leading up to and including the civil war of 1958, most political groups in Lebanon were aligned with either the Pan-Arabism of Gamal Nasser or those who wanted an independent, more pro-Western Lebanon. During his speaking tour of the United States, Deputy Minister Charles Malik had called attention to the leftist leanings of the Pan-Arabist opposition. The United Arab Republic backed the Pan-Arabists, while the United States sent money and troops to aid the government of President Camille Chamoun. Chamoun then was forced to resign and was replaced by General Fuad Chehab. The United States sent troops to Lebanon in 1958, with the goal of supporting the government of President Camille Chamoun, who had requested the troop support to help suppress his rivals. This was the Cold War period, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower was motivated by the fear that Chamoun’s rivals were leftists who might be drawn into the communist sphere of influence. Moreover, the United States feared the momentum of Pan-Arabism and sought to prevent its spread to Lebanon. Sending the troops was not formally declared according to the Eisenhower Doctrine, but it was in the spirit of that policy. The normally friendly diplomatic relations between the United States and Lebanon had a short-lived setback in 1974, when President Suleiman Frangieh became enraged and offended during an airport security check involving a dog after his flight arrived in the United States. Frangieh proclaimed that this Sniffing Dog Incident showed that the United States had no respect for Lebanon’s independence. The United States was actively engaged in various ways in the Lebanese civil war of 1975–1990. It supported at various times Lebanon’s traditional leadership against the more radical leftist opposition and their Palestinian allies. As a global power, the United States played a key role in mediating regional conflicts fought on Lebanese territory during this period, including the 1978 and 1982 Israeli invasions of the country, and the withdrawal of Palestine Liberation Organization forces from Lebanon. However, it is important to stress that U.S. power in Lebanon during the civil war years was actually quite limited and, in many ways, reactive to developments on the ground. Despite sending troops to Lebanon from

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1982–1984, as part of the Multi-National Forces, the United States failed in its support of a pro-Western government and ended up withdrawing from the country, ceding Lebanon to Syrian and Iranian influence. Indeed, Lebanon, from 1984–1990, became extremely dangerous to Western civilians, as several were taken hostage and killed. Unable to resolve the conflict, the United States isolated Lebanon and treated the country as a pariah. By 1989–1990, the United States had encouraged the Saudi-backed Taif process, which ultimately brought an end to the civil war. The United States entered into a quid pro quo with Syria, the dominant actor in Lebanon. In exchange for Syrian support for the U.S. goal of reversing Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi control of Kuwait, the United States agreed to allow Syria to use fighter planes and large weapons to defeat Michel Aoun’s Christian forces in Lebanon, and bring the military conflict to an end. The United States then acquiesced to Syrian dominance of the postwar political system in Lebanon in return for stability. American president George H. W. Bush’s effort to bring peace to the Middle East led to the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991. Lebanon was a delegate at that conference, along with delegates from other Middle Eastern nations. The conference opened an era of diplomatic dialogue but did not lead to any lasting peace agreements. From 1990–2000, the United States and Syria had influence in Lebanon and competed but still operated according to an agreed upon modus operandi, despite diametrically opposed agendas. After Israel’s 1996 invasion of Lebanon, the United States helped broker an end to the conflict. The Israel–Lebanon Monitoring Group was set up by the United States and other nations in an attempt to enforce the agreement. Furthermore, the United States was among the donor nations that supported the government of Rafic Hariri during its vitally needed economic reconstruction of the country. Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, however, U.S. policy in the Middle East took a highly aggressive manner against perceived rivals. This included Iraq, Iran, and, significantly in this case, Syria. The United States was pressuring the Syrians to withdraw from Lebanon and for Hezbollah to disarm. In 2003, U.S. Congress passed the Syrian Accountability Act, sanctioning the country unless it withdrew from Lebanon. The United States also cosponsored the 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and the disbanding of all militias, the latter clearing directed at Hezbollah. Since Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, a consequence of the 2005 Cedar Revolution and international pressure, the United States (and Saudi Arabia) have competed with Iran for influence, with each side supporting their respective Lebanese clients. By 2009, Iran’s allies in Lebanon, in particular, Hezbollah, were politically ascendant and held an effective veto of Lebanese government policy. As a result, U.S.–Lebanese relations have been complex

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since then. The United States continues to support pro-Western elements in the Lebanese political system, as well as such institutions as the Lebanese Army and security forces, as a way to try to limit Hezbollah’s influence. The Donald Trump administration took a harder line on Lebanon than the Barack Obama administration, and demanded that Hezbollah’s role in the Lebanese government be reduced. It applied various sanctions against Lebanon and Lebanese institutions that deal with Hezbollah, including banks. Some commentators argue that Lebanese economic woes are, at least in part, a reflection of U.S. and Saudi economic pressure. The Trump administration made further financial aid to Lebanon’s failing economy conditional upon reforms to the Lebanese political process, which would lessen the power of Hezbollah and, by extension, Iranian influence. Support from the United States, given its predominant influence in global financial institutions, is paramount for Lebanon to get needed aid. UNITY GOVERNMENT. According to the terms of the confessional system set up by the National Pact, Lebanon’s religious communities are guaranteed seats in the country’s Parliament, and the major sects are to be represented in cabinet. The latter must include the dominant leadership within the three largest sects, the Shiite Muslims, Sunni Muslims and Maronite Christians. In the contemporary period, in addition to these provisions, the post-Taif political system, especially after 2008, stressed the necessity of unity governments between those parties that have a majority in Parliament and those that are in opposition, as it would better represent the sectarian mix of the countries. So, in a unity government, political archrivals like the Future Movement and Hezbollah would both be represented in cabinet. Furthermore, the opposition would be represented in a meaningful way, with a veto guaranteed to one-third of cabinet posts. Unfortunately, these unity governments, which perhaps more accurately reflect the wishes of the Lebanese population, are unwieldly and rarely work effectively, leading to their early demise. UNIVERSITḖ SAINT JOSEPH (USJ). See SAINT JOSEPH UNIVERSITY. UNIVERSITIES. See AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT (AUB); BEIRUT ARAB UNIVERSITY; HAIGAZIAN UNIVERSITY; HOLY SPIRIT UNIVERSITY OF KASLIK; LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (LAU); LEBANESE UNIVERSITY; SAINT JOSEPH UNIVERSITY; UNIVERSITY OF AL-MANAR; UNIVERSITY OF BALAMAND.

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UNIVERSITY OF AL-MANAR. The al-Manar Society, with the backing of former prime minister Rashid Karami, realized its goal of establishing a university serving Tripoli and North Lebanon. That goal was realized beginning in 2003. It is commonly known as MUT, short for al-Manar University of Tripoli. It now offers several undergraduate degrees across seven faculties, as well as a master’s degree in business administration. UNIVERSITY OF BALAMAND. Private university operated since 1988, by the Greek Orthodox Church. It is located on Balamand Hill near the Greek Orthodox Monastery, south of Tripoli. In addition to its original campus on Balamand Hill, it also now has branch campuses in Beirut. Instruction is mostly in English. See also SALEM, ELIE (1930– ). USAYRAN, ADIL (1905–1998). A Shiite Muslim who served many years in Parliament and various ministries. Usayran was against the French Mandate and was arrested by the French in 1943, for his pro-independence stance. He easily won election to Parliament in 1943, and went on to serve as speaker of Parliament in the 1950s. USAYRAN, LAYLA (1934–2007). Novelist who was among the most important of the female novelists writing in the Arabic language. Usayran was born in Sidon into a Lebanese family, and she later attended American University of Beirut. Publishing mostly in the 1960s, she was a strong advocate for Palestinian rights and Pan-Arabism. Her role as a leader among Arab women writers is documented in the book Arab Women Writers by Zeidan. Her autobiography is entitled Shara’it mulawwana min hayati (“Colored Ribbons from My Life”). In 1996, Usayran was awarded the National Cedar Medal.

V VAN DYCK, CORNELIUS (1818–1896). American doctor who moved to Beirut, mastered the Arabic language, and became an Orientalist and professor at American University of Beirut. Van Dyck authored school textbooks in Arabic and translated the Bible into Arabic. VOICE OF LEBANON. Arabic-language radio station started as the first independent news source in Lebanon in the first year of the civil war of 1975–1990. The station was backed by the Kataeb Party and provided an alternative news source during the civil war years. The Voice of Lebanon ignored the 1994 government attempt to ban news from independent stations, and it continues as an Arabic-language music and news station.

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W WAKIM, NAJAH (1946– ). Lebanese lawyer, politician, author, and activist. Wakim is known for being a left-leaning secular Arabist and an independent thinker. He and Kamal Chatila founded the Union of Working People’s Forces, a moderate Nasserist group, in 1965. Wakim’s political career began when he won a Greek Orthodox seat in the 1972 parliamentary elections. His victory was by a wide margin, but he was not supported by some Greek Orthodox among the electorate. He received death threats and experienced failed assassination attempts during the civil war period. Wakim’s stance has been anti-Israel, leading him to criticize the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982, and the presidential candidacy of Bashir Gemayel, who had Israeli backing. His opposition to Lebanon’s sectarianism led him to oppose the Taif Accords and lament the strong role sectarian leaders have in Lebanese politics. The People’s Movement of Lebanon, which he founded in 2000, stands for improved relations with other Arab countries, less corruption, and less influence within Lebanon by sectarian groups. Wakim lost his seat in Parliament in the 2005 elections, and the People’s Movement won no seats in the 2018 Parliament. WAR OF LIBERATION. In 1989, following a series of clashes between Syrian troops and their Lebanese opponents, Michel Aoun declared a War of Liberation, with the goal of driving out Syrian troops. Iraq, Syria’s regional rival, was supporting the Aoun side with heavy weaponry, resulting in heavy fighting, not seen in years. It alarmed international and regional actors, one of whom was Saudi Arabia, which feared that the situation was becoming a proxy war between Iraq and Syria, threatening to spill over into neighboring countries and endangering the stability of the entire region. Saudi Arabia then called for a meeting in Taif (Ta’if), Saudi Arabia, leading to the Taif Accords and the end of the civil war. Aoun’s forces, who opposed Taif, were militarily defeated in October 1990, by Syria, which had the green light to do so by the United States and its regional allies. See also HAJJ, FRANÇOIS AL- (1953–2007).

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WAR OF THE CAMPS. Term referring to that part of the Lebanese civil war involving armed conflicts among Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Lebanese factions for control of the various Palestinian refugee camps. From 1985–1988, armed conflicts took place among factions waging war against Israel and Lebanese forces trying to maintain control of Lebanese territory and lessen the motivation for the Israel Defense Forces to occupy the region. The Shiite militias, especially Amal, were victorious in the conflicts and came to control the camps and Muslim parts of Lebanon. By doing so, they prevented the return of the PLO as an influential player in Lebanon. WAR OF THE FLAG. One of several smaller wars that were incidents within the prolonged civil war of 1975–1990. It was touched off in 1987, when the Lebanese flag at a TV station was temporarily replaced by a sectarian flag. The war involved fighting in West Beirut between the Shiite Amal Movement and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party and its militia, the People’s Liberation Army. The Amal Movement’s militia gained the upper hand in the fighting. WAR OF THE MOUNTAIN. A multiple-party conflict that took place from September 1983 through the spring of 1984. The name reflects the fact that the fighting mainly took place in the mountainous Chouf District, which stretches southeast of Beirut along the coastline and inland into mountainous terrain. Having invaded Lebanon in 1982, Israel’s sudden withdrawal in late August 1983, left the Chouf District in a situation where several factions were vying for control. The long-standing tensions between the Maronites and the Druze dating back to their conflict during the civil war of 1860 helped stoke the flames of war. On one side of the conflict was the Lebanese Forces (LF), a militia with mainly Maronite Christian support. It was backed by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The other side was led by the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) fighters, who were backed by Syria. After the LF, led by Samir Geagea, and with help from the Lebanese Armed Forces, tried to take control of the Chouf region, with its predominantly Druze population, the PSP, under the leadership of Walid Jumblatt, put up heavy resistance, gaining the backing of several Muslim factions. The PSP mounted an effective offensive in September. With the Druze-led coalition on the offensive and Lebanese Armed Forces reinforcements unable to arrive in time, PSP regained control in the Druze area. The Lebanese Air Force began flying sorties over Druze positions. Armed with Syrian-made antiaircraft artillery, the Druze successfully resisted the air assaults.

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With the town of Souk el Gharb under threat of being brought under PSP control, the United States agreed to intervene on the government side in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. It fired artillery at PSP positions from a naval destroyer off the coast. Before coming to an end later that summer, the conflict had spread from the Chouf Mountains into three other districts, Aley, Baabda, and West Beirut. WASA PASHA (1824–1892). Also known as Pashko Vasa, he served as Mutasarrif, governor of Mount Lebanon under the Ottomans, from 1882 until his death. WATANI. See HADDAD, JOUMANA (1970– ); KULNA WATANI. WAZZAN, SHAFIK AL- (1925–1999). Sunni who served as prime minister of Lebanon from 1980–1984, during the civil war period. During Wazzan’s term as prime minister, in June 1982, Israel mounted a large-scale invasion of Lebanon. Wazzan is credited with negotiating for the withdrawal of Palestinian fighters from Beirut. The deal negotiated by the government of President Amine Gemayel and Prime Minister Wazzan with Israel, which called for a withdrawal of Israeli forces from most of Lebanon, was not implemented because its terms proved to be too unpopular with most Lebanese and Syria and her allies. WEST BEIRUT. During the civil war beginning in 1975, Beirut was divided between the West Beirut region, with its mainly Muslim population and militias, and East Beirut, with its mainly Christian population under the control of Christian militias. The Green Line demarcated the division between the two. The city was reunited in October 1990, with the end of the civil war. WESTERN HOSTAGE CRISIS. A multiyear period, from 1984–1992, during which time several Western individuals were taken hostage by Hezbollah and allies in Lebanon. The first such hostage was William Buckley, a political officer who had been working in the Beirut office of the State Department of the United States. He was taken hostage on 16 March 1984, by the Islamic Jihad, which claimed he was a CIA spy and killed him. Peter Kilburn, who worked as a librarian at American University of Beirut, was the next one taken, in December 1984. Two years later, Kilburn, along with two British hostages, were also killed, allegedly in retaliation for air strikes in Libya by the U.S. Air Force.

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Hezbollah became involved in hostage taking again in 1985, when it took American journalist Terry Anderson hostage. Anderson was held for six years before being released. Many other Westerners from several nations, including the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and Italy, were also taken hostage in 1985. Several were killed. The abductions, often followed by killings, continued from 1986–1988. These included the 1988 abduction of Terry Waite, who had come from England to negotiate a release of the captives but was himself held captive. Most of the captives were accused of spying by their captors. William Higgins, a U.S. marine, was among the captives. When the report came that Higgins had been hanged, President George H. W. Bush called for an end to hostage taking in the Middle East by all parties, including Israel. The hostage crisis began to phase out by 1990, when the Lebanese civil war concluded, and came to an end by 1992. It did not end in a formal way, with a negotiated agreement or prisoner exchange. Such negotiations would have been difficult because, on the one hand, many Islamic factions took part, and on the other hand, foreign nationals from 20 or more countries were involved. The hostage crisis created a major scandal during the second Ronald Reagan administration in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affair. A covert operation took place where the Americans ensured weapons would go to Iran for Iranian help in getting hostages released. Part of the funds from the arms sales to Iran were then funneled illegally to Contra rebels in Nicaragua. WOMEN. Traditionally, Lebanese women have fulfilled the roles assigned to them in the patriarchal system found in the Middle East and most of the rest of the world. Those roles center on the home and include the many domestic chores, child-rearing, and care for elders. The social roles expected of women have varied, however, among Lebanon’s many ethnic and sectarian communities. Although Lebanon could still be seen as a patriarchal society, more Lebanese women work outside the home, and there have been more opportunities in public and leadership roles for women than in most Arabic countries. Several Lebanese women, including those in the Lebanese diaspora, have achieved international success. Among the female writers and journalists are Hanan al-Shaykh, Ghada al-Samman, May Ziade, May Chidiac, Paula Yacoubian, Nayla Moawad, and Joumana Haddad. Internationally noted females in the entertainment field include Nouhad Wadi Fairuz, Majida el Roumi, singer/actor Jeannette Sabah, and singer/actor Nadine Labaki. Many women in all social roles and sectarian communities have striven to enhance women’s rights and movements in Lebanon, with hard-fought success at achieving the right to vote, fully achieved in 1957, and more

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limited but improving successes in other arenas. The leadership role of Lebanese women, for example, activist Linda Matar, reaches beyond Lebanon. One ongoing concern is that Lebanon’s legal system leaves family law in the hands of its 15 recognized sectarian communities, which means that the regulations on marriage and divorce vary greatly, even within one village or city. Several religious organizations have strict rules governing religiously mixed marriages. In the modern era, this has meant that many couples with mixed backgrounds, rather than one of them agreeing to a religious conversion, go to Cyprus or elsewhere abroad to get married and then have their marriage registered after returning to Lebanon. So far, the call for a governmentally recognized civil marriage has met with strong resistance from religious leaders and has not been instituted. Another long-standing but unresolved concern is that according to Lebanese law, women, unlike men, cannot pass along citizenship to their children if their spouse is not Lebanese. With the large number of Palestinian and Syrian refugee families now living in Lebanon but without holding Lebanese citizenship, this will be an increasing concern as Lebanese women marry men who do not hold Lebanese citizenship. It also means that women among the Lebanese diaspora cannot, unlike men, register their children for Lebanese citizenship if they marry a non-Lebanse citizen. One goal has been to increase the percentage of women in the civil service and elected positions. In 2019, the government adopted a National Action Plan that set goals for increasing the leadership role for women across all governmental ministries, as well as in the economic sphere. The plan called for implementation during a three-year period (2019–2022). It was spearheaded by the National Commission of Lebanese Women, a multiministry task force with advice from United Nations agencies. The parliamentary cabinet of former prime minister Hassan Diab, which served briefly from January to August 2020, was considered to be a technocratic rather than a sectarian one and had an all-time high of six women members. Some of those women were among those who resigned in sympathy with the public demonstrations even before Diab himself resigned. See also HASSAN, RAYA HAFFAR AL- (1967– ); LITERATURE; PROTEST MOVEMENT OF 2019; SAYEGH, SALMA AL- (1889–1953). WOMEN’S POLITICAL RIGHTS AGREEMENT. See WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND MOVEMENTS. WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND MOVEMENTS. During the French period of Grand Liban, only males could vote. Although the Constitution of 1926 recognized the rights of all citizens, women were not allowed to vote until a

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protest movement gained universal suffrage in 1952, according to the terms of the Women’s Political Rights Agreement. For the next five years, until 1957, women who could not document that they had at least a basic education were excluded from voting. One of the challenges of the women’s movement in Lebanon is that there are so many ethnic and religious traditions, most of them male-dominated and patriarchal. The government officially recognizes 18 religious sects and 15 different legal status codes. Women’s organizations are often based in just one of the 18 religious sects. This created a need for one or more women’s organizations that could promote cooperation and a common cause in the women’s movement. To meet this need, the Lebanese Women Council was formed by a merger in 1952, of the Lebanese Women’s Associations University and the Lebanese Women’s Solidarity. It is a broad-based, umbrella nongovernmental organization (NGO) that has more than 150 affiliated women’s and mixed associations. It operates in both Arabic and English. Several women’s organizations and NGO’s have worked to get more women elected to Parliament but with only limited success. Only six of the 128 members elected to Parliament in 2018 were women. There had been 86 female candidates in that election. Only the Hezbollah party did not have at least one female candidate. A few women have been ministers in the cabinet. The Arab Institute for Women (AIW), formerly known as the Institute for Women’s Studies in the Arab World, is a NGO that publishes research on Arab women and maintains several social action programs. The advocacy programs include such areas as civil and human rights, legal affairs, genderbased violence, women’s political participation, development, and peace. The AIW biannual journal, Al-Raida, publishes research and advocacy articles on gender-related topics. The AIW is part of the American University of Beirut, which offers academic programs in gender studies. Fe-Male is a Beirut-based organization that proudly calls itself feminist, despite the stigma the term often carries in Lebanon, where many associate feminism with an extreme anti-male or anti-family stance. Fe-Male’s goals include challenging the objectification of women in ads and media, fighting violent extremism, and developing the capacities of women of all ages to become more secure. The activities of the Lebanese Democratic Women’s Gathering strive for gender equality in Lebanon through such means as calling for compliance to relevant international agreements, advocating for human rights and gender equality, and ending violence against women. The Committee of Employee Women Union is a NGO operating in the northern cities of Tripoli and Akkar. Its goals for helping women include combating discrimination, encouraging vocational training, participating in the political process, obtaining better health care for children and expectant mothers, and changing the laws that discriminate against women for inherit-

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ed citizenship. Gender discrimination in the transfer of citizenship is one concern of women’s rights advocates. According to Lebanese law, the children of Lebanese males, but not females, living abroad are entitled to Lebanese citizenship. Lebanese women’s organizations have also been advocating for changes in laws about rape. One goal is to modernize the current Penal Code 522, which gives no penalty for rape if the male subsequently marries the woman. Lebanese female writers, including those in the diaspora, have played an important role in advancing the women’s movement in Lebanon. Hanan alShaykh’s 1980 novel The Story of Zahrah deals with the struggle of being a female in a male-dominated Arab world. Joumana Haddad is a prominent feminist author, TV personality, and candidate for the 2018 parliamentary elections. Ghada al-Samman has written several novels from her feminist perspective. See also HASSAN, RAYA HAFFAR AL- (1967– ); LITERATURE; MATAR, LINDA (?– ); MOAWAD, NAYLA (1940– ); PROTEST MOVEMENT OF 2019; SAYEGH, SALMA AL- (1889–1953); YACOUBIAN, PAULA (1976– ). WORSHIPPERS OF THE COMPASSIONATE. See YAKAN, FATHI (1933–2009).

Y YACOUBIAN, PAULA (1976– ). Lebanese journalist, manager, TV host, politician, environmental and women’s activist, and advisor to the World Bank Group. Paulette (Paula) Yacoubian was born into the Lebanese Armenian Yaghobian family in Beirut. She started as a TV journalist at an early age and soon became a successful news reporter. Meanwhile, she earned a degree from Lebanese University. She went on to fame as the host of her own news show on Future TV. Yacoubian’s career as a TV personality led to her working for several networks. One involved working in the United States for a time. She has also been manager of a station. Yacoubian’s most important political reporting may have been her live interview of Saad Hariri from Saudi Arabia during the time between his resignation as prime minister and his later withdrawal of that resignation. During that interview, Hariri announced that he did plan on returning to Lebanon. As a TV journalist and news reporter, Yacoubian came to be known for her advocacy for several spheres of concern. She is passionate about environmental issues and an advocate for women’s rights and equality. Given her Armenian heritage on her father’s side, and herself being the daughter of a survivor of that genocide, she has also called attention to the need for more awareness about the Armenian genocide and hosted a TV feature on the topic. She is CEO of Media Communications, a company that serves the needs of media organizations. Yacoubian stepped away from her journalist career to run, successfully, for a seat in the 2018 Parliament. She ran in the Beirut 1 district as an independent and affiliates with the bloc known as the Civil Society Movement. She is a critic of Lebanon’s entrenched sectarian system and the political leaders that it continues to elect along religious lines. She uses the slogan Bekite, translated as “Enough is enough.” Yacoubian even goes so far as to refer to the current political establishment as thieves and mafia. In sharp contrast to the traditional system where most members of Parliament receive votes from only their own sect, she is proud to say that her electoral support was broadly based: 48 percent Muslim and 52 percent Christian. 341

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As an important activist for women’s rights in the Arab world, Yacoubian serves as an advisor on the World Bank Group’s External Advisory Panel for Diversity and Inclusion. She wants a movement for radical change in Lebanon. This included an end to sectarian-based corruption; improvement on environmental issues, particularly the garbage problem; and the development of political parties with multi-sectarian support. Yacoubian resigned from Parliament following the explosion in Beirut in August 2020. She, along with a number of other Members of Parliament who also resigned, hoped the move would force new elections, a major demand of civil-society protestors. YAFI, ABDALLAH EL- (1901–1986). Sunni Muslim lawyer, politician, and former multi-term prime minister. Having had the distinction of being the first Arab to earn a doctorate in law from the University of Paris, Yafi returned to Beirut as a lawyer before being first elected to Parliament in 1932. His doctoral thesis had been on women in the Arab world, and he promoted the right of women to be employed outside the home. The first of his many terms as prime minister began on 24 October 1938, and ended on 21 September 1939. Yafi held subsequent terms during the 1950s and 1960s. He turned down the offer to be prime minister in 1974, during a period of enormous political and security challenges that ultimately led to the collapse of the state and the beginnings of the civil war. YAKAN, FATHI (1933–2009). An Islamic cleric who once headed the Islamic Action Front (Lebanon). His writings and actions were an inspiration to later Islamic leaders. Together with his wife, he helped found Jinan University (Lebanon), a private institution with campuses in Sidon and Tripoli. YAZIJI, IBRAHIM AL- (1847–1906). Lebanese newspaper editor whose legacy lies more in his role as Bible translator than as an editor. As a Greek Catholic fluent in both Greek and Arabic, Yaziji was asked by Jesuit missionaries to translate the Bible into Arabic. Cornelius Van Dyck had previously published an Arabic translation for Protestant use. Yaziji devised a way to simplify the writing of Arabic characters. YAZIJI, NASIF AL- (1800–1871). Lebanese Christian poet, translator, and intellectual who mastered the style of classical Arabic poetry and played a vital role in revitalizing Arabic literary traditions. Yaziji is the father of female poet Wardah al-Yaziji.

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YAZIJI, WARDA AL- (1838–1924). Lebanese Christian who is credited with pioneering poetry as a profession among Lebanese women. She was the daughter of Nasif al-Yaziji, who also was an accomplished author. The 1867 collection of her Arabic poetry is entitled Hadiqat al-Ward, meaning “The Rose Garden.” YUSUF PASHA (1856–?). One of the Mutasarrifs, governors of Mount Lebanon. His five-year term began in 1907.

Z ZAHLÉ/ZAHLAH. An important city in Lebanon’s Bekaa region. Modern Zahlé was founded in the 18th century by Christians and remains a predominantly Greek Catholic city. It is located roughly halfway between Beirut and Damascus, and is easily accessible by both rail and road. As a result, it has historically benefited from its strategic location as a center of trade. Known as the “Bride of the Bekaa” for its beauty and sense of place, it is a major tourist destination, attracting visitors to its historic buildings, for example, Our Lady of Zahlé and Bekaa Church, and the surrounding countryside, which is known for its wine production. ZAIM. Term meaning “leader” used to refer to the political leaders that play a large role in Lebanon’s client–patron–based confessionalism system. The zuama, the plural of zaim, are typically the male heads of the noble or traditional wealthy and influential families. Each of the sectarian communities has one or more zaim, and many compete for influence within their respective communities. Because the zuama were family-based, the leader role was passed down from father to one or more chosen sons, or typically to other males in the immediate family. In the days of the feudal past, a few powerful families were the landowners of large estates worked by peasants indebted to the landowner for patronage and protection. Kamal Asad was an example of a landowner zaim among the Shiites. In urban areas, especially Sunni ones, the zuama used the patron–client relationship, sectarian or ideological appeal, and strong-arm tactics to wield power. Riad al-Solh and Rashid Karami were examples. Another type depended more on populist appeals, as well as offering protection. Examples include the Christian zuama like Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel. This patronage system evolved into the Lebanese political system. Several zuama led political parties. Examples include the Jumblatts as zaim leaders of the Progressive Socialist Party and the Gemayels as zaim leaders of the Kataeb Party. In the modern system, the zaim, or his child, is often voted

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into Parliament to hold the seat traditionally held by the family. The Jumblatt family is one example. The seat of Kamal Jumblatt passed on to his son, Walid Jumblatt, and then to his grandson, Taymour Walid Jumblatt. ZAJAL, LEBANESE. Meaning “sing out loud,” zajal is a form of poetry common in Lebanon. Zajal poetry is in the vernacular dialect rather than classical Arabic. Poets may recite zajal poetry before local audiences, but zajal poets often perform in pairs, dueling poetically on topics in front of audiences. Traditionally, on special occasions when two poets are about to duel, the elder one raises a tambourine as a signal to begin. The audience divides itself into supporters of each of the dueling poets. The first poet then sets a topic for debate, a riddle to be solved, or some other point to get things started. The other poet then is expected to compose and recite/sing a poetic response, and so the back and forth begins. Prizes may be awarded to the best of the dueling poets, as chosen by a judge. Sometimes a troupe of poets and supporting chorus will tour together. There also may be more than one poet on each side of the duel. There is another approach to the duel in which the two sides are not debating a topic, but rather showing off their poetic skills according to whatever challenge they may have been given. The Lebanese zajal poetry tradition is ever evolving. The style rewards creativity and entertainment rather than memorization or classical approaches. ZAYDAN, JURJI (1861–1914). Lebanese novelist, journalist, editor, and teacher. Born in Beirut into a poor Greek Orthodox family that ran a small restaurant, Zaydan received little formal education and began working in the family restaurant when he was about 11 years old. He was admitted to the Syrian Protestant College, but his studies were interrupted by the firing of a popular professor who favored the new theory of evolution proposed by Charles Darwin. Darwin’s theory of evolution was being denounced by many Christians as contrary to the Bible, and the controversy spilled over into Lebanon. Zaydan supported the student movement to reinstate the instructor. When the crisis closed the school (for a year), he moved to Cairo in 1882, where he lived for the rest of his life. In Cairo, Zaydan became a journalist, publisher, and prolific author. He founded the periodical al-Hilal and wrote 22 historical novels. The five titles translated into English are The Conquest of Andalusia, The Battle of Poitiers or Charles Martel and ‘Abdal-Rahman, The Caliph’s Sister: Harun al-Rashid and the Fall of the Persians, The Caliph’s Heirs: Brothers at War: The Fall of Baghdad, and Saladin and the Assassins. Zaydan is recognized as an important figure in the formation of the Pan-Arabist movement, which became an important political force in the era of Egypt’s Gamal Nasser.

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ZIADE, MAY (1886–1941). Important female author who wrote for newspapers and periodicals, as well as wrote poems and books. Ziade wrote in English, French, and especially Arabic, and is considered to be one of the most important of the 20th-century Arab-language feminist writers. ZUAMA. The Arabic plural form of zaim, it refers to the system of hereditary leaders of powerful Lebanese families.

Appendix A Presidents, Post-independence

Name

Dates in Office

Bechara El Khoury

1943–1952

Camille Chamoun

1952–1958

Fuad Chehab

1958–1964

Charles Helou

1964–1970

Suleiman Frangieh

1970–1976

Elias Sarkis

1976–1982

Amine Gemayel

1982–1987

Rene Mouawad

1989–1989

Elias Hrawi

1989–1998

Emile Lahoud

1998–2007

Michel Suleiman

2008–2013

Michel Aoun

2016–

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Appendix B Prime Ministers, Post-independence

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PRIME MINISTERS, POST-INDEPENDENCE

Name

Dates in Office

Riad al-Solh

1943–1945

Abdul Hamid Karami

1945

Sami al-Solh

1945–1946

Saadi Munla

1946

Riad al-Solh

1946–1951

Hussein Oweini

1951

Abdallah el-Yafi

1951–1952

Sami al-Solh

1952

Nazem Akkari

1952

Saeb Salam

1952–1952

Abdallah Yafi

1952

Khaled Chehab

1952–1953

Saeb Salam

1953

Abdallah Yafi

1953–1954

Sami al-Solh

1954–1955

Rashid Karami

1955–1956

Abdallah Yafi

1956

Sami al-Solh

1956–1958

Khalil Hibri

1958

Rashid Karami

1958–1960

Ahmad Daouk

1960

Saeb Salam

1960–1961

Rashid Karami

1961–1964

Hussein Oweini

1964–1965

Rashid Karami

1965–1966

Abdallah Yafi

1966

Rashid Karami

1966–1968

Abdallah Yafi

1968–1969

Rashid Karami

1969–1970

Saeb Salam

1970–1973

APPENDIX B

Name

Dates in Office

Amin Hafez

1973

Takieddin al-Solh

1973–1974

Rachid al-Solh

1974–1975

Nureddine Rifai

1975

Rashid Karami

1975–1976

Salim Hoss

1976–1980

Takieddin al-Solh

1980

Shafik al-Wazzan

1980–1984

Rashid Karami

1984–1987

Salim Hoss

1987–1990

Michel Aoun

1988–1990

Salim Hoss

1990

Omar Karami

1990–1992

Rachid al-Solh

1992

Rafic Hariri

1992–1998

Salim Hoss

1998–2000

Rafic Hariri

2000–2004

Omar Karami

2004–2005

Najib Mikati

2005

Fouad Siniora

2005–2009

Saad Hariri

2009–2011

Najib Mikati

2011–2014

Tammam Salam

2014–2016

Saad Hariri

2016–2020

Hassan Diab

2020

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Appendix C Speakers of Parliament, Post-independence

Name

Dates in Office

Sabri Hamade

1943–1946

Habib Abou Chahla

1946–1947

Sabri Hamade

1947–1951

Ahmed Assad

1951–1953

Adel Osseiran

1953–1959

Sabri Hamade

1959–1964

Kamel Asaad

1964

Sabri Hamade

1964–1968

Kamel Asaad

1968

Sabri Hamade

1968–1970

Kamel Asaad

1970–1984

Hussein el-Husseini

1984–1992

Nabih Berri

1992

355

Bibliography

CONTENTS I. Introduction A. Survey of the Literature B. Research Collections II. General and Reference A. Chronologies and Travel Guides B. News Media III. History A. General B. Ancient to Ottoman C. Ottoman Period to French Mandate D. French Mandate Period E. Independence and Civil War Periods IV. Politics, International Relations, and General V. Religions, Minorities, and Refugees VI. Special Topics A. Banking and Economy B. Cuisine, Culture, and Social Life C. Diaspora D. Film and Theater E. Literature F. Women, Family, Marriage, and Divorce

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I. INTRODUCTION A. Survey of the Literature There are extensive resources in every area of interest for the study of Lebanon available in Arabic, French, and English. This literature review deals with the academic works written in the English language. For news media resources, there are major Lebanese newspapers publishing in English, French, and Arabic. The Daily Star publishes in English and L’Orient-Le-Jour in French, and in Arabic there are several, including alNahar, al-Akhbar, as-Safir, and al-Mustaqbal. Their websites and archival 357

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materials usually have translations in two or all three of those languages. Unfortunately, the economic difficulties Lebanon has faced throughout the years have challenged the economic viability of some of these papers, whose futures are very much in doubt. Indeed, as-Safir stopped printing in 2016, and as of this writing it remains unclear as to whether hopes of reviving it will eventually pan out. A number of books have been written on the general history of Lebanon. These include two early works by the Lebanese American scholar who taught at Princeton University, Philip Hitti, who, in 1957, published Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present, and almost a decade later, A Short History of Lebanon. Lebanese historian, Kamal Salibi published his account of Lebanese history in 1976, and then followed it up in 1988, with the timely and excellent A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered. A number of other books on general Lebanese history are worth considering, including William Harris’s Lebanon: A History, 600–2011, Fawwaz Traboulsi’s A History of Modern Lebanon, and Meir Zamir’s The Formation of Modern Lebanon, to name a few. Samir Kassir’s Beirut offers a history of the Lebanese capital and, by far, Lebanon’s most important city. And finally, to properly contextualize Lebanese history within the wider region, Albert Hourani’s modern classic A History of the Arab Peoples is essential reading. There are a number of academic studies that focus on various periods in Lebanon’s long history. These include its ancient pre-Ottoman period; the 600-year-long Ottoman period; and the long French Mandate period, spanning two decades. For the pre-Ottoman period, there have been a good number of publications found in the English language on the Phoenician, Roman, Crusader, and Islamic periods, with additional studies focusing on such city-states as ancient Byblos and Tyre. Readers may be particularly interested in Hanan Charaf’s fascinating collection of edited papers for the Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies, published in 2016. Titles in the special edition include: “Syriac and Kurshina Inscriptions on Wall Paintings in Qadisha Valley, Lebanon,” “The Maritime Approaches of Ancient Byblos (Lebanon),” “The Qadisha Valley, Lebanon,” and “The Castle of Smar Jbeil: A Frankish Feudal Stronghold in Lebanon.” Joseph Doumet’s Tyre: A Study on the Ancient Purple introduces readers to this most important of colors to the Lebanese economy throughout the many centuries through the purple dye industry. Further works on ancient economic practices include I. M. Diakonoff’s “The Naval Power and Trade of Tyre” and “Medieval Glassmaking at Tyre, Lebanon” by Fred Aldsworth and colleagues.

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There is a rich volume of works on Lebanese history through the Ottoman period, especially in its later years, including The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920 by Engin Akarli, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East by David Fromkin, and The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East by Michael Provence. Lebanese American scholar Leila Fawaz has produced two important works on the period, Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut and An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860. A cluster of very good studies have, for example, come from a group of Middle Eastern historians working at various Canadian universities. These include Stefan Winter’s The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788, James Reilly’s Ottoman Cities of Lebanon: Historical Legacy and Identity in the Modern Middle East, and Jens Hanssen’s Fin De Siecle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital. Ussama Makdisi’s The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon introduces the reader to the complexity of sectarianism during this era, an issue that has greatly impacted Lebanese history to the present day. Books on the French Mandate period include S. H. Longrigg’s Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate and the more recent Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate: Cultural Imperialism and the Workings of the Empire by Idir Ouahes. For this period, see also Meir Zamir’s Lebanon’s Quest: The Road to Statehood, 1926–1939 and Max Weiss’s excellent and more narrowly focused In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi`ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon. A number of good studies were conducted on the period of independence from 1943 to 1975, followed by the far more voluminous works on the 1975–1990 Lebanese civil war. With respect to the period of independence prior to the civil war, Michael Hudson’s authoritative The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon, first published in 1968 (with later editions), is the classic study on the Lebanese political system. Leonard Binder’s edited volume Politics in Lebanon, which was published about the same period, includes a number of excellent studies on the political system and, despite its age, is very much worth reading 50 years later. For a detailed understanding of the relationship between leadership and the masses, one could refer to Michael Johnson’s Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State, 1840–1985. Much of the literature published about this period views it through the lens of understanding why the political system collapsed in 1975 and civil war ensued. Books of this genre include Farid el-Khazen’s The Breakdown of the

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State in Lebanon, 1967–1976; Walid Khalidi’s Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East; and Kamal Salibi’s Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1958–1976. Both journalistic and academic accounts of the Lebanese civil war, its various phases, and its multitude of actors have been published throughout the years. A number of foreign correspondents who covered the war period have written book-length accounts of the war worth reading, notably Robert Fisk’s Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon. Academic accounts include Elizabeth Picard’s Lebanon: A Shattered Country; Itamar Rabinovich’s The War for Lebanon, 1970–1983; and Theodor Hanf’s Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation. Augustus Richard Norton provides detailed accounts on the rise of two crucial parties that came to dominate the Shiite community since the civil war in Amal and the Shi`i Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon and Hezbollah: A Short History. Finally, a number of works have appeared in the years following the conflict that deal with the question of Lebanese memory of the civil war period, with one notable example being Craig Larkin’s Memory and Conflict in Lebanon: Remembering and Forgetting the Past. The Lebanese civil war ended in 1990, some 30 years before this book went to press. A wealth of books and academic articles have been published covering political and social dynamics in Lebanon during this three-decade period. With respect to books covering the Lebanese political system, one could consider a number of them. These include the following: Andrew Arsan’s Lebanon: A Country in Fragments, Tom Najem’s Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society, Reinoud Leenders’s Spoils of Truce: Corruption and State-Building in Postwar Lebanon, Rola El-Husseini’s Lebanon Pax Syriana: Elite Politics in Postwar Lebanon, and Mark Farha’s Lebanon: The Rise and Fall of a Secular State under Siege. Studies on various aspects of Lebanese politics give readers a more indepth understanding of key issues facing present-day Lebanon. Consider the following, for example. On sectarianism, see Melani Cammett’s Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon and Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon by Bassel Salloukh and colleagues. On political economy, see Hannes Baumann’s Citizen Hariri: Lebanon’s NeoLiberal Reconstruction. On Hezbollah, see Joseph Alagha’s The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. And on security, see Nicholas Blanford’s Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East, as well as Oren Barak’s “Ambiguity and Conflict in Israeli–Lebanese Relations.”

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A few studies have also been completed by social scientists working from different disciplines on the question of memory, war, and identity. Among them are Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif and Paul Tabar’s “National versus Communal Memory in Lebanon,” Sune Haugbolle’s War and Memory in Lebanon, and Sami Hermez’s War Is Coming. Recent books on religions and minorities in Lebanon include Lebanon’s Sunni Islamists: A Growing Force by Omayma Abdel-Latif, Leisurely Islam: Negotiating Geography and Morality in Shi`ite South Beirut by Lara Deeb and Mona Harb, Shi`ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities by Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, The Christians of Lebanon: Political Rights in Islamist Law by David D. Grafton, The Druze Community and the Lebanese State: Between Confrontation and Reconciliation by Yusri Hazran, Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism by Robert B. Rabil, and The Shi`i of Lebanon: Clans, Parties, and Clerics by Rodger Shanahan. A number of solid publications have appeared in recent years on the oftencomplex relationship between the Lebanese and the million-plus Syrian refugees who call Lebanon home. See, for example, Anne Marie Baylouny’s When Blame Backfires: Syrian Refugees and Citizen Grievances in Jordan and Lebanon, “The Economics of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Neighboring Countries: The Case of Lebanon” by David Anda and colleagues, T. Fakhoury’s “Governance Strategies and Refugee Response: Lebanon in the Face of Syrian Displacement,” and Hybrid Political Order and the Politics of Uncertainty: Refugee Governance in Lebanon by Nora Stel. While the Syrian refugee population has lived in Lebanon since the conflict in Syria began in 2011, the Palestinian refugees have been in Lebanon since the 1948 Arab–Israeli war. Many of the studies on Lebanon, especially those dealing with the Lebanese civil war, address the Palestinian population and its political and security organs, as they impacted Lebanese politics and the trajectory of the civil war greatly. Post–civil war studies on the Palestinian refugee population are also numerous and include, for example, Samer Abboud’s “The Seige of Nahr Al-Bared and the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon,” Simon Haddad’s “The Determinants of Lebanese Attitudes toward Palestinian Resettlement: An Analysis of Survey Data,” and Laleh Khalili’s “A Landscape of Uncertainly: Palestinians in Lebanon.” Recent sources on banking and economy include Banking on the State: The Financial Foundations of Lebanon by Hicham Safieddine, “Feudalism in the Age of Neoliberalism: A Century of Urban and Rural Co-dependency in Lebanon” by A. Z. Simitian, and “The Lebanese Economic Project: Lessons from the Past and Challenges for the Future” by Mazen Soueid. The titles in the section on cuisine, culture, and social life are quite diverse and include a good number of sources on sexuality. With respect to the latter, see, for example, Sabiha Allouche’s “Queering Heterosexual (Intersectarian)

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Love in Lebanon,” “Suicide Risk Factors among Trans Feminine Individuals in Lebanon” by Rachel Kaplan and colleagues, and Queer Beirut by Sofian Merabet. Recent sources on the large Lebanese diaspora include The Lebanese Diaspora: The Arab Immigrant Experience in Montreal, New York, and Paris by Dalia Abdelhady, “Strong in Their Weakness or Weak in Their Strength? The Case of Lebanese Diaspora Engagement with Lebanon” by Jennifer Skulte-Ouaiss and Paul Tabar, and Andrew Arsan’s Interlopers of Empire: The Lebanese Diaspora in Colonial French West Africa. The many sources on Lebanon’s film and theater scene include Historical Dictionary of Middle Eastern Cinema by Terri Ginsberg and Chris Lippard, Lebanese Cinema: Imagining the Civil War and Beyond by Lina Khatib, and Theater in Lebanon by Tarek Salloukh. Sources about Lebanon’s rich literary output include The Literature of the Lebanese Diaspora: Representations of Place and Transnational Identity by Jumana Bayeh, Beirut Hellfire Society: A Novel and other works by Rawi Hage, The Lebanese Post–Civil War Novel: Memory, Trauma, and Capital by Felix Lang, Mikhail Naimy’s work Kahlil Gibran: A Biography, Stories My Father Told Me: Memories of a Childhood in Syria and Lebanon by Elie Zughaib and Helen Zughaib, and many more. The sources in the section on women, family, marriage, and divorce cover diverse topics and include, most notably, Lina Khatib’s “Gender, Citizenship, and Political Agency in Lebanon,” Arab Family Studies by Suad Joseph, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi`i Lebanon by Lara Deeb, “Leaving a Violent Domestic Relationship: Experiences of Women in Lebanon” by Jamilé Khoury and Samantha Wehbi, “Empowering Women or Dislodging Sectarianism? Civil Marriage in Lebanon” by Sherifa Zuhur, and many other good journal articles. There are also works on women in the section on literature and film and the section on theater. B. Research Collections The best comprehensive collections of library research materials in English, French, and Arabic are to be found among Lebanon’s many universities, especially the American University of Beirut, Saint Joseph’s University, Lebanese American University, and Lebanese University. The Beirut Arab University has Arabic resources. The Haigazian College has research resources in Armenian and a research collection dealing with the Armenian diaspora. The Holy Spirit University of Kaslik has research materials relevant to the Maronite Christians. The University of Balamand, located at a monastery south of Tripoli, is a good source for research on the Greek Orthodox tradition.

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The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, located in Beirut, publishes research papers written from a nonpartisan perspective on public policies relevant to Lebanon. Museums in Lebanon with archaeological and related research materials include the following: the Archaeological Crypt Museum, located at the Saint George Orthodox Cathedral in Beirut, with a small collection dating back to the Hellenistic period; the Archaeological Museum, located at the American University of Beirut; the Beirut National Museum; the Beiteddine Palace, located in the Chouf Mountains region south of Beirut; the Gibran Museum in Bsharri; the Museum of Lebanese Prehistory, located in Beirut; the Hall of Fame Museum, located north of Beirut; and the Robert Mouawad Private Museum, located in the private mansion on Army Road in Beirut. In addition to the art collections included in those museums, there are also several collections of art at other locations: The Sursock Museum in Beirut has collections of art from Lebanon and abroad, the Beirut Exhibition Center has an art exhibit, and the Basbous Brothers Outdoor Gallery features a collection of sculptures. Aside from the research collections in Lebanon, there are extensive holdings abroad. The Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris and, in England, Oxford University, Cambridge University, and the University of London, have collections dating back decades. Most major research universities in North America have materials as well. The Library of Congress has extensive holders, of course.

II. GENERAL AND REFERENCE A. Chronologies and Travel Guides “Chronology.” Middle East Journal 74, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 95–133. Doyle, Paul. Lebanon. Chesham, UK: Brandt Travel Guide, 2017. New edition, 2021. Haag, Michael. Syria and Lebanon, 2nd ed. N.p.: Cadogan Guides, 2000. “Lebanon Profile: Timeline.” BBC News, 25 April 2018, http://www.bbc. com/news/world-middle-east–14649284 (accessed 27 July 2020). B. News Media Al-Akhbar [The News]. http://al-akhbar.com/ (accessed 15 August 2020). An-Nahar [The Morning]. English online edition, https://www.annahar.com/ english/home (accessed 15 August 2020).

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Daily Star Newspaper. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ (accessed 15 August 2020). Economist. https://www.economist.com/ (accessed 15 August 2020). L’Orient Le Jour [The Orient, the Day]. http://www.lorientlejour.com/ (accessed 27 July 2020). Naharnet. http://www.naharnet.com/ (accessed 15 September 2020).

III. HISTORY A. General Cobban, Helena. The Making of Modern Lebanon. London: Hutchinson, 1985. Firro, Kais M. “Lebanese Nationalism versus Arabism: From Bulus Nujaym to Michel Chiha.” Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 5 (2004): 1–27. DOI: 10.1080/0026320042000265657. Harris, William. Lebanon: A History, 600–2011. Studies in Middle Eastern History. London: Oxford University Press, 2014. ———. The Levant: A Fractured Mosaic. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2005. ———. The New Face of Lebanon: History’s Revenge. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2006. Hitti, Philip. Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present. London: Macmillan, 1957. ———. A Short History of Lebanon. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965. Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. Kassir, Samir. Beirut. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010. Kaufman, Asher. “Phoenicianism: The Formation of an Identity in Lebanon in 1920.” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no.1 (2001): 173–94. ———. “‘Tell Us Our History’: Charles Corm, Mount Lebanon, and Lebanese Nationalism.” Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 3 (2004): 1–28. DOI: 10.1080/002632004000213438. Salibi, Kamal. A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. ———. The Modern History of Lebanon. London: Praeger, 1976. Traboulsi, Fawwaz. A History of Modern Lebanon. London: Pluto, 2012. Zamir, Meir. The Formation of Modern Lebanon. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.

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B. Ancient to Ottoman Abousamra, Gaby. “Syriac and Kurshina Inscriptions on Wall Paintings in Qadisha Valley, Lebanon.” Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies 4, no. 2–3 (2016): 148–93. DOI: 10.5325/jeasmedarcherstu.4.2–3.0148. Aldsworth, Fred, George Haggarty, Sarah Jennings, and David Whitehouse. “Medieval Glassmaking at Tyre, Lebanon.” Journal of Glass Studies 44 (2002): 49–66. Allouche-Francis, Martina, and Nicolas Grimal. “The Maritime Approaches of Ancient Byblos (Lebanon).” Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies 4, no. 2–3 (2016): 242–77. DOI: 10.5325.heasnedarecgersty.4.2–3,0242. Archaeology and History in Lebanon. London: Lebanese British Friends of the National Museum, 2000. Aubet, María Eugenia. “The Phoenician Cemetery of Tyre.” Near Eastern Archaeology 73, no. 2–3 (2010): 144–55. DOI: 10.1086/NEA25754043. Chaaya, Anis. “The Castle of Smar Jbeil: A Frankish Feudal Stronghold in Lebanon.” Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies 4, no. 2–3 (2016): 209–41. DOI: 10.5325/jeasmedarcherstu.4.2–3.0209. ———. “The Qadisha Valley, Lebanon.” Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies 4, no. 2–3 (2016): 121–47. DOI: 10.5325/jeasmedarcherstu.4.2–3.0121. Charaf, Hanan. “From the Guest Editor.” Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies 4, no. 2–3 (2016): III–VI. Cranmer, Kerry W. Tyre: The Invincible. Tulsa: Word and Spirit Publishing, 2012. Diakonoff, I. M. “The Naval Power and Trade of Tyre.” Israel Exploration Journal 42, no. 3–4 (1992): 168–93. DOI: 10.4324/9780429026881–10. Doumet, Joseph. Tyre: A Study on the Ancient Purple. Beirut: AHL Books, 1981. Doumet-Serhal, Claude. Stones and Creed: 100 Artifacts from Lebanon’s Antiquity. Beirut: AHL Books, 1999. ———. The Klat Collection: Near Eastern Terracotta Models and Figurines. Beirut: AHL Books, 2009. ———. Sidon: 15 Years of Excavations. Beirut: AHL Books, 2013. Doumet-Serhal, Claude, and Camille Asmar. Tout Savoir Byblos: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know. Beirut: AHL Books, 2015. Doumet-Serhal, Claude, Anne Rabate, and Andrea Resek, eds. Networking Patterns of the Bronze and Iron Age Levant: The Lebanon and Its Mediterranean Connections. Beirut: AHL Books, 2008.

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El-Loz, Kamid. 4,000 Years and More of Rural and Urban Life in the Lebanese Beqa’a Plain. Beirut: AHL Books, n.d. Garrard, Andrew, and Corine Yazbeck. “The Revival of Prehistoric Field Research in Lebanon: The Qadisha Valley Prehistory Project.” Near Eastern Archaeology 68, no. 4 (2005): 193–94. Goitein, S. D. “Tyre-Tripoli-’Arqa: Geniza Documents from the Beginning of the Crusader Period.” Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series 66, no. 2 (1975): 69–88. DOI: 10.2307/1453907. Hajj, May. “Wall Paintings in the Qadisha Valley, Lebanon: Various Styles and Dates.” Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies 4, no. 2–3 (2016): 94–208. DOI: 10.5325/jeasmedarcherstu.4.2–3.0194. Jong, Lidewiijde De. “Performing Death in Tyre: The Life and Afterlife of a Roman Cemetery in the Province of Syria.” American Journal of Archaeology 114, no. 4 (2010): 597–630. DOI: 10.3764/aja.114.4.597. Lawler, Andrew. “Rebuilding Beirut.” Archaeology 64, no. 4 (2011): 24–29. Marriner, Nick, Christophe Morhange, and Samuel Meulé. “Holocene Morphogenesis of Alexander the Great’s Isthmus at Tyre in Lebanon.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104, no. 22 (2007): 218–23. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0611325104. Massih, Jeanine Abdul. “The Archaeological Heritage of Lebanon.” Near Eastern Archaeology 73, no. 2–3 (2010): 68–72. DOI: 10.2307/25754037. Museum of Lebanese Prehistory, Saint Joseph University–Beirut, http:// www.usj.edu.lb/mpl/ (accessed 27 July 2020). Salloum, Laure. “Deir el-Ahmar: A Northern Settlement in Northern Bekaa Valley (Lebanon).” Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies 4, no. 2–3 (2016): 278–98. DOI: 10.5325/jeasmedarcherstu.4.2–3.0278. Stieglitz, Robert R. “The Geopolitics of the Phoenician Littoral in the Early Iron Age.” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research 279 (1990): 9–12. C. Ottoman Period to French Mandate Abou-Hodeib, Toufoul. “Taste and Class in Late Ottoman Beirut.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 3 (August 2011): 475–92. DOI: 10.1017/S0020743811000626. Akarli, Engin. The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Farah, Caesar E. The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830–1861. London: I. B. Tauris, 2000.

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Fawaz, Leila. Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983. ———. An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860. London: I. B. Tauris, 1995. Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. Austin, TX: Holt Paperbacks, 1989. Reprint 2001. Gelvin, James L. Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of the Empire. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Hakim, Carol. The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea, 1840–1920. Berkley: University of California Press, 2013. Harik, Iliya F. Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711–1845. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968. Hill, P. “How Global Was the Age of Revolutions? The Case of Mount Lebanon, 1821.” Journal of Global History 1–20 (2017). DOI: 10.1017/ S17400228200000145. Hanssen, Jens. Fin De Siecle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Makdisi, Ussama. “After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform, and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 4 (2002): 601–17, DOI: 10.1017/S0020743802004014. ———. The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. DOI: 10.1017/S0020743802004014. Provence, Michael. The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Reilly, James A. “Ottoman Beirut: Crisis, History, and Sectarian Memory.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 31, no. 1 (2011): 164–71, DOI:10.1215/1089201X2010064. ———. Ottoman Cities of Lebanon: Historical Legacy and Identity in the Modern Middle East. London: I. B. Tauris, 2016. DOI:10.1215/ 1089201X–2010–064. ———. “Ottoman Saida and the Problems of a Lebanese National Narrative.” In Religion, Ethnicity, and Contested Nationhood in the Former Ottoman Space, ed. John Nielsen, 173–86. Leiden: Brill, 2012. ———. “Past and Present in Local Histories of the Ottoman Period from Syria and Lebanon.” Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 1 (January 1999): 45–65. DOI: 10.1080/00263209908701255. ———. Town and Steppe in Ottoman Syria: Hostility, Exploration, and Cooperation in the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Der Islam 92, no. 1 (2015): 148–60.

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Tanielian, Melanie Schulze. “Feeding the City: The Beirut Municipality and the Politics of Food during World War I.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 46, no. 4 (November 2014): 737–58. DOI: 10.1017/ S00020743814001044. Winter, Stefan. The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1788. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012. D. French Mandate Period Firro, Kasis M. Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State under the Mandate. London: I. B. Tauris, 2003. Gaunson, A. B. The Anglo–French Clash in Lebanon and Syria, 1940–45. London: Macmillan, 1987. Kaufman, Asher. “Phoenicianism: The Formation of an Identity in Lebanon in 1920.” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 1 (January 2001): 173–94. DOI: 10.1080/714004369. ———. “‘Too Much French, but a Swell Exhibit’: Representing Lebanon at the New York World’s Fair, 1939–1940.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 1 (2008): 59–77. DOI: 10.1080/13530190801890253. Longrigg, S. H. Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1958. Ouahes, Idir. Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate: Cultural Imperialism and the Workings of the Empire. London: I. B. Tauris, 2018. Thomas, Martin. “Divisive Decolonization: The Anglo–French Withdrawal from Syria and Lebanon, 1944–46.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 28, no. 3 (September 2000): 71–93. DOI: 10.1080/ 0308653000. Weiss, Max. In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi`ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. ———. “Practicing Sectarianism in Mandate Lebanon: Shi`i Cemeteries, Religious Patrimony, and the Everyday Politics of Difference.” Journal of Social History 43, no. 3 (2010): 707–33. DOI: 10.530008583099. Zamir, Meir. Lebanon’s Quest: The Road to Statehood, 1926–1939. London: I. B. Tauris, 2000. E. Independence and Civil War Periods Abukhalil, As’ad. “Syria and the Shi’ites: Al-Asad’s Policy in Lebanon.” Third World Quarterly 12, no. 2 (April 1990): 1–20. Alin, Erika G. The United States and 1958 Lebanon Crisis: American Intervention in the Middle East. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994.

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V. RELIGIONS, MINORITIES, AND REFUGEES Abboud, Samer. “The Seige of Nahr al-Bared and the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon.” Arab Studies Quarterly 31, no. 1–2 (2009): 31–48. Abdel-Latif, Omayma. Lebanon’s Sunni Islamists: A Growing Force. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008. Abukhalil, As’ad. “Syria and the Shi`ites: Al-Asad’s Policy in Lebanon.” Third World Quarterly 12, no. 2 (April 1990): 1–20. Amore, Roy C. Religion and Politics in the World’s Hot Spots. Cornwall-onHudson, NY: Sloan, 2016. Anda, David, Mohamed Al Marouani, Charbel Nahas, and Björn Nilsson. “The Economics of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Neighboring Countries: The Case of Lebanon.” Economics of Transition and Institutional Change 28, no. 1 (2020): 89–109. DOI: 10.1177/0738894220906370. Azar, Fabiola, and Etienne Mullet. “Muslims and Christians in Lebanon: Common Views on Political Issues.” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 6 (2002): 735–46. DOI: 10.1177/0022343302039006005. Baylouny, Anne Marie. When Blame Backfires: Syrian Refugees and Citizen Grievances in Jordan and Lebanon. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020. Betts, Robert Brenton. The Druze. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988.

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About the Authors

Tom Najem is professor of political science at the University of Windsor in Ontario, Canada, where he served as department head from 2002 to 2012, and project manager of the Track Two Jerusalem Old City Initiative from 2005 to 2017. He is a specialist in the field of international relations and comparative politics of the developing world. Najem has published widely on Lebanese politics, Middle East politics, and Track Two and conflict resolution. His latest publications include the following: Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society (2011), Africa’s Most Deadly Conflict: Media Coverage of the Humanitarian Disaster in the Congo and the United Nation’s Response, 1997–2008 (coauthored, 2012), Track Two Diplomacy and Jerusalem (coedited, 2017), Governance and Security in Jerusalem (coedited, 2017), Contested Sites and Jerusalem (coedited, 2017), and Syria, Press Framing, and the Responsibility to Protect (coauthored, 2017). Roy C. Amore is professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Windsor in Ontario, Canada. His teaching and publications focus on the interaction of religion and politics in the Middle East and Asia. His recent books include Religion and Politics in the World’s Hot Spots (2016), World Religions: Eastern Traditions (coedited, 5th edition, 2019), World Religions: Western Traditions (coedited, 5th edition, 2019), and A Concise Introduction to World Religions (coedited, 4th edition, 2020). He is also coeditor of the forthcoming reference volume Oxford Handbook of Religion and Economic Ethics.

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