Hezbollah: From Islamic Resistance to Government [1 ed.] 1440831343, 9781440831348

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HEZBOLLAH

Recent Titles in PSI Guides to Terrorists, Insurgents, and Armed Groups The ETIM: China’s Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat J. Todd Reed and Diana Raschke The Phinehas Priesthood: Violent Vanguard of the Christian Identity Movement Danny W. Davis The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom Vera Eccarius-Kelly The Palestine Liberation Organization: Terrorism and Prospects for Peace in the Holy Land Daniel Baracskay Armed for Life: The Army of God and Anti-Abortion Terror in the United States Jennifer Jefferis The IRA: The Irish Republican Army James Dingley The Khmer Rouge: Ideology, Militarism, and the Revolution That Consumed a Generation Boraden Nhem , The Lord s Resistance Army Lawrence E. Cline , 17N s Philosophy of Terror: An Analysis of the 17 November Revolutionary Organization Ioanna K. Lekea , The Taliban: Afghanistan s Most Lethal Insurgents Mark Silinsky Chechnya’s Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus Elena Pokalova Al Qaeda: The Transformation of Terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa Denise N. Baken and Ioannis Mantzikos

HEZBOLLAH From Islamic Resistance to Government

James Worrall, Simon Mabon, and Gordon Clubb

PSI Guides to Terrorists, Insurgents, and Armed Groups

Copyright © 2016 by James Worrall, Simon Mabon, and Gordon Clubb All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Worrall, James. Hezbollah : from islamic resistance to government / James Worrall, Simon Mabon, and Gordon Clubb. pages cm. — (PSI guides to terrorists, insurgents, and armed groups) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–1–4408–3134–8 (hardcopy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–1–4408–3135–5 (ebook) 1. Hizballah (Lebanon) 2. Lebanon—Politics and government. I. Title. JQ1828.A98W67 2016 324.256920 082—dc23 2015024866 ISBN: 978–1–4408–3134–8 EISBN: 978–1–4408–3135–5 20 19 18 17 16

1 2 3 4 5

This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Praeger An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Acknowledgments Introduction

vii ix

1.

Hezbollah and Terrorism

2.

The Emergence of Hezbollah: The Causes of Terrorism and Political Violence

19

3.

Hezbollah at War

41

4.

Hezbollah as Socio-political Actor

73

5.

Resistance and Coexistence: Exploring Iranian and Syrian Involvement in the Creation of Hezbollah

113

Exploring Hezbollah’s Place in the Post–Arab Spring Middle East

131

6.

1

Conclusion

151

Appendix A: Timeline

153

Appendix B: Individual Member Profiles

157

Notes

163

Further Reading

191

Index

195

Acknowledgments

We would like to offer our appreciation to James Forrest, who gave us the opportunity to come together and work on this project. We would also like to give a special thank-you to Steve Catalano and the Praeger team, who have been encouraging in the process of writing this book. Finally, the team would like to offer its appreciation to Gabriela Waydyk, who assisted with research and data collection.

Introduction

On May 6, 2015, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, made a televised speech on Hezbollah’s own television channel Al-Manar announcing that the movement would be launching a new campaign in the Qalamoun Mountains just inside Syria. In a long discourse on the situation in Syria, and the region more generally, he stated that “Hezbollah will face and defeat terrorists in the Qalamoun barrens.”1 The speech went on to denounce the Saudi-led coalition’s campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen and accused the United States of attempting to arm the different factions in Iraq in order to incapacitate the Iraqi government and army in the face of Daesh, the so-called “Islamic State.” In many ways this speech tells us a great deal about the priorities, paranoia, and power of Hezbollah, literally the Party of God, as well as the continually changing nature of the movement. Now heavily committed to the fight to keep the Asad regime in power in Syria, facing a rising tide of jihadist groups and sentiments in the region, it still needs the crutch of anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism despite the fact that the real threats to the movement now emanate from within the Arab world itself. Hezbollah has experienced a great deal of internal and external change since its foundation in the early 1980s, evolving from a terrorist movement to become part of the government of Lebanon, to operate the most capable militia force in the world, and to form effectively a state within a state inside Lebanon and a force in regional relations, to which the most powerful states have to pay attention. The irony of its leader promising to defeat other Islamist radical militias, calling them terrorists, when Hezbollah itself is on the terrorist blacklist of many states and is considered by many to be more

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than worthy of this epithet despite its move into Lebanese politics and the moderation of their behavior on a number of fronts over the past three decades, is the perfect starting point for this volume. The book aims to be a one-volume introduction to the group, which is both readable and up-to-date while retaining academic rigor in its analysis. Inspired by the latest research in Terrorism Studies and International Relations it places Hezbollah in context, exploring all facets of the group’s identity and behavior. By combining the readability of a narrative approach with the rigor of an academic analysis it offers a detailed but accessible introduction to Hezbollah, exploring all of its activities from resistance to propaganda, organized crime to educational facilities and it does so by combining both thematic and chronological features and offering a theoretically informed and analytically rich examination of Hezbollah’s environment and its own agency. When initially researching Hezbollah one is confronted by a mountain of literature much of which is either highly specialized or very populist. This volume aims to bridge that gap by offering an accessible but academically informed introduction to Hezbollah through an examination of the group’s environment, activities, dilemmas, structures, and influences, showcasing the multifaceted nature of a movement, which is all too often simply dismissed with the terrorist epithet. Even a cursory search for literature on the Party of God reveals a wealth of material; deeper examination and greater familiarity with the broad range of books, journal articles, and media reports on the movement soon reveal the depth and diversity of much of this material. Thus, anyone wishing to add to the pile of publications on Hezbollah needs a good rationale for so doing both in terms of the niche to be filled and with a framework which offers the opportunity for meaningful addition to the debates that rage over the nature and intentions of the Party. Thus it behoves us here to briefly explore some of the existing trends, strengths, and weaknesses of the existing literature in order to demonstrate what this volume adds to the discourse on such a significant and ultimately rather mysterious movement. At the simplest level the literature bifurcates between the academic and the populist, although this should not be used as some kind of crude yardstick of its quality. There are a number of good quality journalistic2 and first-person narrative journeys3 at book length, which can provide some fascinating insights into the group, and are a very good starting point. Needless to say, there are also some overly sensationalist and rather misleading entries in this category as well. Meanwhile, most media reports do not have the space to get beyond basic information and stereotypes, which often makes the limited new information they provide rather de-contextualized and lacking in the kind of detailed and nuanced analysis that is needed to really understand such a complex phenomenon of a multifaceted Islamist group such as Hezbollah.

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Much of the existing academic literature on Hezbollah (on the Shi’a in Lebanon and on Lebanese politics in general) on the other hand tends, naturally enough, to focus on specific facets of the group or particular periods of its history. To give just some flavor, there are for example: volumes examining Hezbollah’s propaganda campaign,4 many volumes dealing specifically with the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war,5 some fascinating work on the role of Shi’a clerical authority in Lebanese politics, 6 a wealth of resources on Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel,7 some interesting recent work engaging in comparisons with Hamas,8 the memoirs of former Hezbollah members9 and even collections of the statements of the group’s secretarygeneral, Hassan Nasrallah. 10 While much of this literature is rich and sophisticated it remains very specific and focused and thus rather too niche for many. An additional problem is that there is currently little literature examining the group and its environment as a whole since about 2009 when so much has happened in the region since that time. The changes wrought to the region and within Lebanese politics have had a major impact upon Hezbollah, and indeed Hezbollah has been a significant actor in many of these processes. This also means that many of the existing, and generally excellent, books attempting to examine Hezbollah in the round in a single volume are rather behind the curve having been written over a decade ago now. 11 Likewise others which take an overly historical approach have squeezed out analysis and the latest ideas from academia in order to try to ensure readability. Those volumes that attempt to take Hezbollah in the round, placing it within its Lebanese, religious and regional milieu12 and employing many of the latest theoretical and analytical devices from academia, have provided excellent insights into the movement and have taken the academic debates forward considerably.13 They are, however, often too off-putting for the lay reader, appearing to be highly technical and/or inaccessible and therefore perhaps risking making the topic seem dull. As the above text indicates, there are multiple ways of examining Hezbollah; many are fruitful and enlightening because they allow for the ambiguities and complexities involved when examining any social phenomenon. Aside from the practicalities of deciding whether to view the group through just one of its facets to gain more depth, through a theoretical analysis or attempting to capture the complexities of its different faces, a further problem emerges with some of the literature in that Hezbollah does tend to inspire either fear and loathing or admiration and sympathy. This can lead to a sometimes highly polemical engagement with the group, either pro or anti, which often leads to more rhetoric than analysis. Viewing Hezbollah purely through the prism of terrorism or as some kind of subsidiary of the Iranian Revolution, which remains in Tehran’s pocket, leads to some of the literature losing all pretence of objectivity. Clearly there are good reasons for people to have such strong viewpoints and this can enrich the

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literature when done well but there is also a gap in the literature for a detailed, up-to-date general overview of the movement, which is not simply a chronology and which uses theoretical insights in a more light-handed way. This book, then, seeks to take a detached and analytical approach which examines all of the facets of the group’s identity, politics, and behavior over the sweep of its existence in order to understand the movement’s evolution, find commonalities and differences in its approaches to challenges and to understand the constraints under which it operates. As such the book fills gaps in the literature by (1) offering an examination of the four key facets of Hezbollah’s identity: religious, resistance, sociopolitical and as allies of Iran but also by placing the group into both its domestic Lebanese milieu and into the wider politics of the region (2) by doing this through the use of ideas taken from the fields of terrorism and International Relations without being led by an explicitly theoretically driven and focused approach (3) by offering a balanced and readable approach to the movement, and (4) by providing this information through a hybrid chronological and thematic framework, to both show the evolution and highlight key themes. Clearly no one book is ever going to be able to fully cover the “Hezbollah Phenomenon,” and there remains much work to do in multiple areas to further develop our understanding of this flexible yet dogmatic movement, which is influenced by and in turn influences so much of Middle East and global politics. Neither is this, or any other book, going to be able to resolve the central debate in the literature on Hezbollah, that of whether or not the movement will ever be able to fully abandon its terrorist roots, its at times extremist thinking, and its coercive tendencies and truly become a peaceful political actor within Lebanon and the wider region. What is clear, however, is that this is a political movement with a tremendous capacity for adaptation, change, and conciliation, which needs to be better understood even if serious questions remain about the extent to which it can move away from its roots. In the light of this discussion then, it is important to highlight here the practical organization of this book and the key themes that run through it. In this sense then, it is natural for us to keep coming back to this seemingly age-old question about the true nature of the movement, terrorists versus freedom fighters, and the extent to which the Party of God has been socialized into the political realities of Lebanon and away from its utopian visions of the perfect Islamic state. These, in essence, are questions of identity and go to the heart of the “Hezbollah Phenomenon.” Thus, in identifying the four key elements of Hezbollah’s identity—resistance, religion, the sociopolitical realties of the Shi’a in Lebanon and the wider region, and finally the ideas, identity and connection with Iran—we have an organizing structure which shapes out thematic chapterization of this book while enabling continuing analysis of the interaction of these identities both within and across the chapters. The second theme that runs through the book is the

Introduction

xiii

idea of the evolution of Hezbollah and its identity in each of these fields; thus the book maps the changes experienced by the Party of God over the course of its existence, examining how this evolution occurred and exploring the constraining and enabling factors which shaped this evolutionary process and mapping the consequences for Hezbollah, for Lebanon, and for the wider region. What follows is a brief chapterization with summaries of the main issues covered by each of the chapters, as can be seen the chapters are largely themed around Hezbollah’s four main elements of identity, and the whole adds up to offer an exploration of the evolution in these areas culminating in a final chapter which examines the challenges and choices facing the Party of God in the light of the Arab Spring, thus bringing us back full circle to Hezbollah’s recently launched campaign in the Qalamoun Mountains of Syria, which has entailed the mass mobilization of thousands of fighters and has already led to the deaths of at least 80 Hezbollah members, all in the name of fighting terrorism.14

CHAPTER 1: HEZBOLLAH AND TERRORISM The first part of Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the topic—as with other books in the PSI series, it maps out key details such as the history of Lebanon in the context of the Middle East, Hezbollah’s leadership and organizational structure, its ideology and Shiite identity, and the tactics it has used over its period of operation. The following chapters go into more depth on each of these facets of Hezbollah. Then, Chapter 1 looks at Hezbollah in the context of terrorism studies in terms of the history of terrorism campaigns and the definition of terrorism. By making reference to the theory of Waves of Terrorism, Chapter 1 makes three points: firstly, that religious terrorism is not exceptional; secondly, that Hezbollah does not neatly fit into broad conceptions of “religious terrorism” and thus requires greater exposition of the nuances of it its identity; and thirdly, that Hezbollah should be viewed as a movement as well as a group, deeply shaped by historical factors and constantly evolving rather than being a static organization. One of the most repeated questions faced in the study of terrorism and terrorist groups is: what is terrorism, and can Hezbollah be considered a terrorist organization? Chapter 1 approaches this question from a broadly critical perspective, separating process of naming an actor “a terrorist” and the academic exercise of identifying tactics that approximate to broad understandings of what terrorism constitutes, which do not fall under other categories of political violence, such as insurgency. By using this approach, the chapter argues that we must recognize the contested and subjective nature of defining terrorism and to analyze the interests, power relations, and battles over legitimacy that underpin the process of naming actors “terrorists.” In this sense, it is

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Introduction

counterproductive to label Hezbollah as a terrorist organization because this underplays how it has evolved since the 1980s to a point where “terrorists” obfuscates its other more dominant functions as a political party, social service provider and a semi-conventional military organization. But by maintaining a separate category for terrorism as a tactic, we can highlight how Hezbollah continues to use tactics of terrorism and what this may say about its broader military strategy. Thus, in addition to providing an anatomy of Hezbollah, Chapter 1 draws out the themes that run throughout this book: how the nuanced identity of Hezbollah has evolved over its life cycle, from the 1980s to the present day.

CHAPTER 2: THE EMERGENCE OF HEZBOLLAH Before focusing on Hezbollah’s activities today, Chapter 2 explores the roots of Hezbollah and how the organization emerged to be the powerful substate actor it grew to be. This chapter firstly discusses a number of theories which have sought to account for the emergence of groups such as Hezbollah, specifically focusing on the contested role of grievances and identity. It argues that the process by which Hezbollah emerged was underpinned by the existence of social networks to mobilize resources, its ability to present itself as a credible organisation and by building on pre-existing narratives and identities that had been formed decades before and had remained latent. When trying to explain what causes militant groups to emerge, there is clearly no single factor at play, and the case of Hezbollah is keeping with this tendency. However the role of grievances as an explanation has been criticized, and while the chapter shows that Hezbollah’s emergence was not solely due to grievances such as poverty, it has shown how these structural factors can set the scope for mobilization. The urbanization, social deprivation, and further grievances among the Shi’a population may not have necessarily caused violence, but they provided space for actors to emerge. The existence of religious networks that became more and more politically minded stretched across the region, thus providing access to resources in Iran, but also the nature of the institutions provided the network with credibility and a means of communication with followers. Of course, the unique environment of Lebanon, with its multiple militant organizations, ensured there was already some mobilization existing but it was the overlap of all these factors that incentivized a purely Shiite organization—Hezbollah—rather than continuing to work with the Palestinian factions or Amal.

CHAPTER 3: HEZBOLLAH AT WAR This chapter tracks the group from its earliest days in resisting the Israeli invasion in 1982 through its terrorist turn both within Lebanon and

Introduction

xv

overseas and into an insurgent movement. It offers a detailed understanding of the interactions between Hezbollah and Israel during the 1990s, assessing the “victory” achieved upon Israel’s withdrawal in 2000 and continuing tensions since the turn of the millennium. The chapter then analyzes the 2006 conflict with Israel after which Hezbollah appeared to be in the ascendancy in the region before examining the quiet phase on the Lebanese-Israeli border that has been in place since the 2006 war. In addition the chapter explores Hezbollah’s assistance to the Palestinians, how its media strategy plays into its military strategy and its seeming return to terrorism in recent years. Thus, by exploring the changing tactics used by Hezbollah and the expansion and increasing sophistication of the group’s military strategies as both the Resistance to Israel but also as a wider actor in the region the chapter takes both a chronological and thematic approach, posing key questions about the group’s capabilities and intentions. In this sense then the chapter focuses upon the modalities of Hezbollah’s core identity as a resistance actor, which forms the driving structure of this chapter and is drawn upon in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER 4: HEZBOLLAH AS SOCIO-POLITICAL ACTOR A key feature of Hezbollah is its role as a welfare provider and how such activities augment its power and challenge the Lebanese state. Chapter 4 begins by exploring the identity and ideology of oppression, linking it to ideas of resistance and the creation of the so-called resistance society. Key to Hezbollah’s creation of this resistance society is both an identity of resistance and the provision of what has come to be an array of social goods and services both to the Shi’a and some other marginalized groups within Lebanon. This chapter therefore provides basic information on the types of welfare support Hezbollah gives, who it gives this support to, where it gains the financial means to maintain this function, and the consequences of such relationships for the behavior of Hezbollah. The provision of goods and services and the representation and defense of Shi’a interests is an important practical and ideological mission for the Party, and are key to the support of its resistance objectives. Hezbollah takes an holistic approach to the needs of its constituency and its desire to create this resistance society; therefore the chapter also explores Hezbollah’s media strategies and its role in both official and unofficial governance and in the creation of the next generation of Hezbollah members and supporters. While its social provision goes back to the roots of the Party’s foundation and thinking, its involvement in Lebanese politics is a more recent innovation with the movement contesting its first Lebanese elections in 1992. What has followed is a shift from defensive and rather passive involvement in politics toward a more proactive and involved participation in both local

xvi

Introduction

and national government. This has been caused by the movement’s need to protect its resistance interests but also by shifts in Lebanese politics and a desire to play a more active role in propagating some of its values. This process has not been easy or straightforward either for Hezbollah or for Lebanon but has led to the Party having seats in cabinet and significant influence over key policy areas and other groups within Lebanese society. The chapter therefore examines Hezbollah’s identity and ideology in more depth, through the provision of welfare to its constituency and tracks the implications—both constraints and opportunities—for the Party as a consequence of its moves into the government of Lebanon.

CHAPTER 5: RESISTANCE AND COEXISTENCE As noted in earlier chapters, resistance is at the heart of Hezbollah’s raison d’être. Given this, Chapter 5 explores the influence of theology and external actors upon Hezbollah’s ideas of resistance, tracking the evolution of these ideas since the creation of the Party of God. While Iran and Syria were fundamental in the establishment of Hezbollah, questions about the influence of Tehran and Damascus upon the Party of God remain. In seeking to unpack the extent of their influence, the chapter traces the nature of the relationship between the regimes in Iran and Syria and the Party of God, with a particular focus upon the provision of ideological and logistical support. In doing this, the chapter begins by considering the impact of Shi’a thought upon Hezbollah, in particular, focusing upon the Karbala Narrative, in which ideas of guilt, martyrdom and resistance play a prominent role. It does this by engaging with the Open Letter and the 2009 manifesto, which help us track the changing role of Shi’a resistance within the group. The chapter then explores the influence of Iran and Syria on training the soldiers of the Party of God, along with the provision of weapons. It finishes by exploring the extent to which Hezbollah can be viewed as a proxy of Iran and/or Syria, achieved by considering the events of 2006 and the war with Israel.

CHAPTER 6: EXPLORING HEZBOLLAH’S PLACE IN THE POST–ARAB SPRING MIDDLE EAST In light of a changing Middle East, Hezbollah faces numerous serious challenges, both domestically and regionally. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, state-society relations began to fragment, creating space for other actors to emerge and for particular identities to become securitized. Some groups, who had previously found space within the regional states’ system, found themselves struggling for survival in a quickly changing region, while others were well positioned to capitalize on the transition. Chapter 6 builds

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upon the final section of Chapter 5 and attempts to locate Hezbollah within the changing Middle East security environment. It explores ideas of resistance within the context of this changing environment, particularly in light of an apparent contradiction within this notion of resistance, ultimately engaging with questions of legitimacy. The chapter begins by considering the Arab Spring and the Lebanese case. It then tracks the evolution of relations within both the Palestinian cause and the so-called Axis of Resistance. The chapter ends by considering how the Party of God has sought to reassert its resistance credentials by positioning itself as against ISIS, framing the fight as one between Muslims and takfiris, with the Party of God fighting on behalf of all Muslims. Finally, the volume concludes with a summary of the main themes running throughout the book.

1 R

Hezbollah and Terrorism

Since its emergence in the 1980s, Hezbollah has gained a fierce reputation in the Middle East and further afield. From its devastating suicide bombing that killed almost 300 U.S. and French personnel, to its claimed successful execution of guerrilla warfare against the occupying Israeli forces, Hezbollah has carved out an image as the “A-Team of terrorists.” Yet to describe Hezbollah simply as a terrorist organization underplays the other major facets of this group. Indeed, it is because Hezbollah occupies such an integral role in the spiritual, social, economic, and political life of Lebanon that it is such a formidable group and has such legitimacy in the region. It is this contested legitimacy, which, whenever talk turns to Hezbollah, leads to the cliché “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom-fighter” being used. This book goes beyond such clichés to examine specifically what makes Hezbollah the organization it is. But before going into depth on the many facets of the Shi’a group, Chapter 1 will provide an overview of the Party of God. And while the first section of Chapter 1 places the group in its historical context to explain how it emerged, the second part of Chapter 1 will put Hezbollah in the international context of terrorism and political violence. Building upon research in terrorism studies, the third section of the chapter will discuss the extent to which Hezbollah are terrorists, engaging in definitional debates to provide more nuance than the clichés provide.

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Hezbollah

HEZBOLLAH: AN OVERVIEW The following section provides an overview of Hezbollah in terms of its roots within the Middle East region and then progresses to provide an anatomy of the organization, looking at its structure, its ideology, the tactics it has used over the years, and the area of its operation. Each of the sections here provides a foundation for following chapters, where the issues are looked at in much more depth.

Lebanon, Map No. 4282, January 2010, United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/ Cartographic/map/profile/lebanon.pdf. Used by permission of the United Nations.

Hezbollah and Terrorism

3

The Middle East, Lebanon, and the Birth of Hezbollah While Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shi’a organization, its extensive links and activities throughout the region make the group a significant player in the Middle East. As of 2015, the Middle East region consists of 18 countries, and has a population of over 370 million people. The term “the Middle East” is not without contention as it is a Eurocentric modern term used by the Allies following World War I. Despite its assumptions of Western domination of the world, the term is now broadly used to describe the Egypt, the Arab Peninsula, the Levant (which includes Lebanon), Iraq, and Iran.1 Described as the cradle of civilization, the Middle East is the birthplace of three major monotheistic faiths: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The centrality of the city of Jerusalem to these faiths would prompt a movement of people from Europe to the West, first with Christians during the Crusades—significantly, settling within modern Lebanon—and second with European Jews moving to Palestine from the late nineteenth century.2 Most of the population in the Middle East are ethnically Arab, with Persians being concentrated in Iran, Kurds based predominantly in Turkey and Iraq, the Jewish population in Israel, and Christians in Lebanon (estimated at 41 percent in 2014), and significant Christian minorities in Palestine and Egypt. The major religion in the Middle East is of course Islam, but this should not be thought of as a uniform religion—although many seek to proclaim it as such. The vast majority of Muslims worldwide are Sunni Muslims, with Shi’a Muslims making up about 10 percent of the overall population. The Open Letter that announced Hezbollah’s program in 1985 explicitly refers to its belief in Shi’a Islam. The Shi’a population are a minority in most Middle Eastern countries; however, they have played a significant political role in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Yemen, and the Alawites (a branch of Shiism) have had significant influence in Syrian politics under the Asads.3 Shiites found refuge in Lebanon in the seventh century; however, facing persecution, they were gradually pushed to the south and east, losing land and authority at the expense of the expanding Christian Maronite, the Druze, and Sunni population.4 One key aspect of Hezbollah’s formation, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, is the social and political marginalization of the Shiite population of Lebanon and how Hezbollah emerged, in effect, to represent this community within the state of Lebanon. While the Middle East’s geographical position between major trade routes has historically brought wealth to the region, and then later resources such as oil, this geographical strategic importance has also brought major international powers into the region—a trend that has continued to the present day. The formation of the Lebanese state can be traced to the aftermath of World War I, which ended in 1918. The aftermath of this war was the supplanting of the old Ottoman Empire with the Middle East being divided and administrated by British and French mandates. In this

4

Hezbollah

new and artificially formed state system, the French became responsible for Lebanon, with which it shared significant cultural ties. The new state of Lebanon consisted of a delicate balance of interests between different ethnic and religious groups, and based on the census of the period, political power was dispensed to the Christian Maronites at the apex, the Sunni population in a secondary role, and the Shi’a population with a minor ceremonial role in the new Lebanese government. However, over the decades this delicate balance was to become disrupted by a number of factors—as will be outlined in-depth in Chapter 2. Some of these factors included the changing demography and the growing social, economic, and political alienation of the enlarged and dispersed Shi’a population. The Israel-Palestine conflict to the south of Lebanon spilled over and with the Palestinian militant group, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), eventually came the Israeli army. The combination of tensions within the Lebanese state led to a brutal civil war between 1975 and 1990, resulting in an estimated 120,000 deaths. In this context a number of militant groups emerged and international forces were drawn into the country. In 1978 and again in 1982–1983, the Israeli army entered Lebanon in order to defeat the PLO and with the goal of assisting the Christian Maronite forces in the civil war. Initially, the Shiite population, frustrated with the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, had welcomed the Israeli army. It was in this environment that Hezbollah—the Party of God—was to emerge (see Chapter 2). As former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak stated: “When we entered Lebanon . . . there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shi’a in the south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah.”5

Leadership and Organizational Structure While Hezbollah’s declared allegiance to the Islamic Republic of Iran has been widely noted, it does have an independent leadership. In the early days of the organization, its leadership mainly consisted of a coalition of Lebanese Shi’a clerics, each with their own influence in Shi’a regions of Lebanon, but from the mid-1980s, it transformed into a more defined organizational structure.6 Hezbollah has a unified leadership that oversees the other aspects of the organization. A seven-member Majlis al Shura— or Consultative Council—is charged with the leadership of the organization.7 Decisions by the council must be reached through consensus and where it is not possible for them to reach a consensus, the Iranian Ayatollah, as spiritual leader, will offer religious and political guidance and directives.8 The council selects the group’s general secretary for a threeyear term. Initially the general secretary was limited to serving two terms but after the assassination of Secretary-General Abbas al Musawi in 1992 the rule was extended to allow general secretaries to serve more than two.9

UNIFIL Deployment, Map No. 4144 Rev. 34, January 2015, United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/ map/dpko/unifil.pdf

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Hezbollah

Hassan Nasrallah succeeded al-Musawi as the secretary-general of Hezbollah, a role that he continues to hold to this day. Born in 1960, the young Nasrallah spent his time reading the Koran and had been deeply influenced by the sermons of Fadlallah—a Shi’a cleric from Iraq who had traveled to preach in Lebanon, who had advocated the creation of a modern Islamic state,10 and who was Hezbollah’s reputed spiritual father.11 The Nasrallah family had escaped before his home town fell to Christian militias during the 1975 civil war and moved to a politically vibrant stronghold called Bazouriyah; it was here he joined Amal, the antecedent group of Hezbollah, which he had helped to set up.12 Upon being elected secretary-general, Nasrallah continued the process of transition from radicalism to pragmatism, making use of his strong rhetorical abilities and exploiting the media to build a strong presence for disseminating the movement’s message.13 The charismatic Nasrallah sits as the figurehead of Hezbollah but the organization is much more diffuse. Currently, five subgroups oversee different aspects of Hezbollah’s activities and report to the Consultative Council: (1) the Political Assembly monitors and manages relations with domestic political actors; (2) the Jihad Assembly (or Special Security Apparatus) manages the resistance activities, including oversight, recruitment, training, equipment, intelligence, and security; (3) the Parliamentary Assembly manages Hezbollah’s parliamentary activities, providing legislative analysis and services for its constituents; (4) the Executive Assembly oversees political party and organizational management, including social, cultural, and educational activities; and (5) the Judicial Assembly provides religious rulings and conflict mediation services for Hezbollah members and communities.14 In Hezbollah’s formative period in the first half of the 1980s, there was no political dimension and the emphasis was certainly more on the revolutionary Jihadi structures and social activities; it was not until the 1990s that the organization emphasized a political route.15 The remit of the Consultative Council has also been expanded over the decades to include an operational committee, a foreign affairs committee, and internal security among others.16 In addition to being a major political and military actor in Lebanon (see Chapter 3), Hezbollah and its antecedent networks provide a substantial array of social and economic services (see Chapter 4). As discussed above, the economic and social circumstances for many of the Shi’a population in Lebanon were dire and were exacerbated by the government’s inability to provide adequate services; this created a vacuum for Hezbollah to fill.17 Through finance from Iran, Hezbollah established a series of religious, charitable, and educational institutions, which spread their influence in society and acted as a means of recruitment and of disseminating its values (see Chapter 5). Azani outlines four dimensions to Hezbollah’s strategy of providing social and economic services. First, it provides financial aid to families in distress, pensions for the families of people who died fighting for Hezbollah, and financial aid to subsidize the costs of

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education, medical treatment, and vocational training. Second, the organization provides medical care through a system that includes two hospitals, seventeen medical centers, and a number of pharmacies and dental clinics. Third, Hezbollah is a substantial educational services provider, with its own curriculum that covers every age group, provides scholarships, and organizes extracurricular youth activities such as the Muslim scout troops. Fourth, the movement has developed its own popular media institutions, such as its television station called al-Manar, which features Islamic programs, current affairs,18 and for example, extensive (glamorized) footage of Hezbollah soldiers fighting the Israeli Defence Force during the 2006 war. As discussed in Chapter 3, the size of Hezbollah’s military capacity is broadly twofold: a specialized core group of fighters numbering 1,000 members, complemented by a reserve force of 6,000 to 10,000 members. In terms of recruitment, full membership is offered to applicants and recruits on the basis of allegiance to Hezbollah’s ideological program, with specialized recruiting bodies existing to attract female members and youth.19 However, the process of recruitment has evolved along with the substantial changes to Hezbollah’s organizational structure. In the early 1980s and motivated to fight the Israeli occupation, personnel was recruited in the Bekaa Valley through family and clan ties, which helped to mobilize hundreds of young volunteers and preserve internal security.20 As Hezbollah’s other services expanded and became more rooted in society, people would join at a young age and they would be motivated to continue membership for much broader reasons than just to oppose Israel. Blanford states how Hezbollah does not generally accept combatants into military traveling until they are 18, but basic military training begins at a much younger age. Furthermore, Hezbollah deploys recruiters to villages to identify prospective members it considers would be suitable in the organization, which can involve observing the prospective member for a year before extending an invitation to participate in a one-year “preparation” period, known as tahdirat.21 Many of these recruits will receive little or no pay for the first two or three years of membership and most will find day jobs to provide an income—it is only later that they receive monthly salaries and support for their family. Hezbollah’s special forces, however, are full-time combatants who train relentlessly.22 With such an extensive and well-organized structure, Hezbollah has been able to wage a highly effective campaign of terrorism and political violence over the decades of its existence, making it a considerable player in the current conflict in Syria (see Chapter 6).

Ideology: Shiism, Islamism, and Wilayat al-Faqih The Open Letter that announced Hezbollah’s program in 1985 explicitly refers to its belief in Shi’a Islam while also stating it is an umma (community) linked to Muslims all over the world. The idea of the umma is a

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common vision for all Islamic movements, and by establishing an Islamic community of believers, it is believed that it will restore Islam.23 Shi’a Islam diverged from other schools of Islam (with Sunni Islam currently being the largest school of thought) over a dispute over who should succeed the Prophet Mohammed after his death in 570 AD. Opposition to Ali’s succession culminated in his assassination, thus prompting Ali’s supporters to split from the rest of the community.24 Shiites refused to accept the legitimacy of the Sunni Caliphate and instead followed the descendants of the Prophet, ending with the Mahdi (who will eventually return to establish a just rule).25 Shiism became the official religion of the Safavid dynasty in the sixteenth century, accounting for the geographical concentration of Shiites in the area that nowadays is Iran and Iraq. The Shi’a population are a minority in most Middle Eastern countries; however, they have played a significant political role in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Yemen, and the Alawites (a branch of Shiism) have had significant influence in Syrian politics under the Asads.26 One of the foundational legacies of Islamism is how it encompasses every aspect of life; thus there is no separation between religion, politics, and society.27 Whereas modern Western organizations tend to be compartmentalized, the totalizing nature of Islam lends itself to the various activities in which Hezbollah is engaged, from the provision of social welfare, charity (Zakat), and religious preaching (Dawa) to politics and resistance. However, Shiism differs insofar as the power of this totalizing system lay with a continuous line of imams who interpret and clarify the various aspects of the Message,28 ending with the Mahdi. Khomeini and Bashar al-Sadr built on Shi’a tradition to develop the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih (the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent), a fundamental element of Hezbollah’s intellectual structure.29 The theory is predicated on the necessity of an Islamic republic (rather than waiting for the Mahdi to return and institute justice) and that such a republic would need to be led by an expert on Islamic jurisprudence (the Wali al-Faqih—the Guardian Jurist). The Jurist inherits the political and religious authority from the Prophet and imams whilst awaiting the return of the Mahdi. Hezbollah views the Jurist, most notably Khomeini, as the divinely ordained ruler of the community of Muslims (the umma); thus, Hezbollah’s “unswerving loyalty to the Jurist is symptomatic of its general pan-Islamic proclivity,” with its “native-land bearing no relation to the scope of his dominion.” The Jurist provides general guidelines for political action and strategic issues, for example the classification of friends and enemies, making peace and declaring war, and the permissibility of suicide attacks. However, “the [Jurist] only initiates directives on matters that concern the entire umma” and Hezbollah retains a large degree of independence.30 Another distinguishing trait of Shi’a identity was the narrative of “the community’s submissiveness, the passive assimilation of the browbeaten and hand-wringing ‘mitwali’ into a hostile Sunni environment.”31 The Islamic revivalism that Khomeini symbolized, however, was part of a wider phenomenon in the Middle East prompted in reaction to modernity

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and Western influence. Western involvement in the region from the mid-nineteenth century onward reconfigured the entire political structure of the region and would set the tone for political mobilization in the Middle East, culminating in the rise of Islamist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Qaeda. Secularization had been seen as a part of entering modernity for Arab leaders, and this prompted a backlash, most significantly in Egypt. Coupled with the failure of alternative ideas such as nationalism and communism, the Islamist ideas that had been primarily cultivated in Egypt began to spread.32 Although these were Sunni Muslim groups, the Islamic revival created an environment in the region where the message and goals of Hezbollah would have sympathy.

Tactics The military wing of Hezbollah came to the fore as part of the National Lebanese Resistance Front in 1983 against the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), which had invaded Lebanon to fight the PLO. While the PLO was defeated with relative ease, Hezbollah’s innovative tactics would take many of the actors in the region by surprise. A series of devastating suicide bombs against the U.S. embassy and UN Multinational Forces caused international forces to withdraw from Lebanon in the mid-1980s. The 1983 suicide bombing on the U.S. army barracks in Beirut killed 299 American and French servicemen, and while the group that launched the attack was called Islamic Jihad, it is associated with Hezbollah who would officially emerge two years later. In addition to the use of large-scale suicide bombings, Hezbollah grew to notoriety home and abroad for its use of kidnappings, as well as hijacking airplanes (a favored tactic of militant groups at the time). Kidnappings, however, were not always perceived as beneficial to the interests of the Shiite community in general and Hezbollah in particular.33 The 1985 hijacking of an American passenger jet by Hezbollah served as a means to enhance its international reputation and to briefly make it an actor in world politics. The hijacked plane, which had been flown to a stronghold in Beirut, was used as a bargaining tool to release Shiite prisoners in Israel.34 Hezbollah also kidnapped over a hundred foreign hostages who were used as leverage to release prisoners, advertise political statements and, in one case, stopping the shipment of arms to Iraq (an enemy of Hezbollah’s patron, Iran). However, in the early 1990s, Hezbollah ceased kidnapping operations and released its Western hostages. The reasons for this shift can be put down to three factors: (1) there had been a change in Iran’s policy, (2) there was increased Syrian pressure to stop the kidnappings, and (3) there was growing opposition among the Shiite community, with Hezbollah’s spiritual leader, Fadlallah, having objected to kidnappings for some time.35 Israel occupied Lebanon from the 1980s to 2000—it still continues to occupy the (disputed) Sheba’a Farms and other Syrian and Palestinian

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territory—and throughout this period, Hezbollah has set itself as an insurgent group seeking to force an Israeli withdrawal through a mix of guerrilla tactics and rocket-fire into Israel, including its population centers. Between 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah’s tactics have included anti-aircraft missiles against Israeli aircrafts, ground operations targeting Israeli soldiers, and capturing Israeli soldiers for negotiations.36 Within Lebanon, during political crises, Hezbollah has also adopted other forms of political action, such as sit-in protests. Today, however, Hezbollah dedicates most of its time to being an active member of the reformed Lebanese government.37

Area of Operation Over its years of activity, Hezbollah has had a significant international reach, with U.S. president Obama in 2010 describing the organization as “the most technically capable terrorist group in the world.” Despite occasional activity abroad, Hezbollah’s main area of operation is the Shiite areas of Lebanon, including parts of southern Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the Bekaa Valley. Its conflict with Israel has also seen it operating around the border regions and it has launched rockets into Israel and its occupied territory, namely the Sheba’a Farms border zone.38 It has had a presence in the Middle East through strong relations, most notably with Iran, which provided the first cohort of fighters to train Hezbollah, and the Syrian government whose support has been crucial for allowing supply lines between Lebanon and Iran. More recently, following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, in mid-2013, Hezbollah pledged its forces to help support the Asad government in Syria, with several thousand Hezbollah fighters participating in the conflict on behalf of their long-term ally.39 The rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in 2014 led to Hezbollah confronting them and their allies, further deepening the Sunni-Shi’a divide to the conflict. Hezbollah has also been active beyond its regional confines. One such speculated attack was conducted against the Israeli embassy in 1992 and another was the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center in Argentina.40 Matthew Levitt argues that, based on his interviews with intelligence services, Hezbollah’s (criminal and money laundering) support infrastructure has a significant global dimension as far afield as Chile and Philippines. It has been claimed that Hezbollah is renowned in South America for pirating multimedia and engaging in mafia-style shakedowns of local Muslim businesses, and Hezbollah has recruited locals in Uganda, Russia, and Southeast Asia in a number of bomb attempts. 41 Since 2012, alleged Hezbollah operatives have been detained in Thailand, Nigeria, and Cyprus, although Hezbollah has disputed these charges.42 Having provided a general anatomy of the organization of Hezbollah and placed it in the context of the Middle East, the chapter will now turn to consider this group in relation to studies on terrorism. The second part of the

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chapter looks at the history of terrorism campaigns through the theory of waves of terrorism advanced by David Rappaport. The aim here is to place Hezbollah in the context of other nonstate actors who have utilized violence, focusing especially on religious movements. This is important for understanding Hezbollah’s multifaceted identity and how the organization has evolved through its life cycle, while also providing some reflections upon terrorism more generally.

A HISTORY OF TERRORISM: THE FOUR WAVES Rappaport identifies four waves of modern terrorism: the Anarchist wave, the Anti-Colonial wave, the New Left wave, and the Religious wave, all of which have ran concurrently with nationalism.43 A wave is a cycle of activity characterized by expansion and contraction phases in a given time, which have an international character with similar activities (and tactics) occurring in several countries. The name of the wave reflects its dominant feature but nationalist organizations were present throughout and they were shaped by the waves in different ways: for example, the Anarchists gave the nationalist groups tactics and training and in the fourth wave nationalism serves or reacts to religious purposes.44 However, contrary to the implicit assumption that nationalist terrorism constantly runs alongside the waves, Rasler and Thompson argue that it experienced a decline alongside the New Left wave in the 1980s.45 These four waves of terrorism have been outlined by Zafra-Davis46 and are summarized below: 1. Anarchist groups in the first wave of terrorism included the Armenian Hunchaks and the Serbian Black Hand. Notable acts of terror by Anarchist groups between 1881 and 1921 included the high-profile assassinations of Russian Czar Alexander in 1881, the French president [Carnot] in 1884, the king [King Umberto I] of Italy in 1900, US President McKinley in 1901, and the 1914 assassination of the Archduke of Austria–Hungary and heir to the throne, partly sparking a World War; the end of the Anarchist Wave came after World War I. 2. The second wave of global terror, the Anti-colonial (or Nationalist) Wave, was sparked by the Versailles Treaty in 1919 at the end of World War I. The Versailles Treaty also provided for the constitution of the League of Nations, which would execute the terms of a series of decolonizations. Essentially, this new wave was a reaction to empires being broken up and territories becoming soon to be independent “mandates”. . . . Wars sprung up during this Anti-colonial Wave, mostly in UK or French territories in the developing world. In the UK case, wars sprung up in the Malay Republic, Ireland, Palestine, and Kenya while France experienced terrorist-driven wars in Algeria and Indochina. The anticolonial movements of the 1920s overlapped with and inspired a number of nationalist organizations that emerged in this period and in the 1960s, such as ETA, the Provisional IRA, and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

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3. The New Left Wave—the third wave—was [partly] spurred by the psychological repercussions of the Vietnam War. The success of the Vietcong against the US military rekindled hopes about the vulnerability of the West . . . Groups sprung up in the developed world and included the West German Red Army Faction (RAF), Italian Red Brigades, American Weather Underground, Japanese Red Army and the French Action Directe. The third wave of terrorism mixed aspects of the first wave’s blending of nationalism and radicalism with the second wave’s emphasis on self-determination. 4. Rapoport’s fourth wave is called the Religious Wave. At the heart of the wave is a radicalized version of Islam with Islamist groups conducting the majority of attacks. This wave was also characterized by the aim of mass casualties. Much of the attention of the Religious Wave has focused on Islam; however, the emphasis should be placed on religious elements in general as terrorism is multiconfessional. Although some may refer to the wave as Jihadi, there are also Christian groups that operate in this wave as well. . . . Another religious-based group, Aum Shinrikyo, which combined Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu elements, launched nerve-gas attacks on the Tokyo subway in 1995, which killed 12 and injured 3,000, causing a mass panic about bioterrorism . . . However, the Religious Wave would be typified by Islamist terrorism, as it was Islamist groups conducting the most internationally high-profile and deadly attacks, later inspiring other religious-based groups.47

The spark that created the Jihadi or Islamist elements of the Religious Wave centered around three events. The events were the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the period of Islamic revivalism following the new Islamic century, and the unsuccessful Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Iranian Revolution showed that religion had more political appeal than the earlier New Left ethos, since the Iranian Marxists only mustered meager support for the Shah, the Western-backed Iranian ruler. As unexpected as the Iranian Revolution was, many Muslims believed that the year marked a new Islamic century due to the disintegration of the secular state. There was hope that a redeemer would come who would usher in the new century. Around this time Sunni terrorism erupted in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The failed Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave more hope to terrorist groups that they had a chance of success against superpowers and what they saw as corrupt Muslim rulers . . . There are two aspects to Islamist groups in the Religious Wave. Some Islamist groups tend to fuse nationalism or state identities, such as Hamas or Hezbollah, with their goals being limited to Islamizing the country they operate within and fighting against the Israeli occupation. A subset of Islamist groups are the Jihadists. Ideologically, the main political aim for most Jihadist terrorist groups is the creation of a single state under Sharia law.48

Having outlined what these waves are generally considered to be, a pertinent question is what the dynamics of waves of terrorism are. Waves are driven by a “common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups’ characteristics and mutual relationships.”49 “[W]aves and organisations have very different life rhythms” and normally “organisations

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disappear before the initial wave associated with them does.” Once “a wave’s energy cannot inspire new organisations, the wave disappears” and critical factors explaining this disappearance are: resistance, political concessions, and changes in the perceptions of generations. But occasionally “an organisation survives its original wave” and “reflects the new wave’s influence—a change that may pose special problems for the group and its constituencies.”50 Perhaps the most significant contribution from this approach is the emphasis on generations. Waves seemingly correspond to the duration of a human life cycle; they tend to last a generation and tend to have less resonance with newer generations. 51 Weinberg and Eubank argue that waves of terrorist violence dissipated after approximately a generation, a period of roughly 20 to 30 years, rather than 30–40 years as Rapoport suggested.52 Conversely, the fact that some groups such as al-Qaeda have passed through several generations53 suggests problems with (1) how we understand a generation and (2) how we link the group, the wave, and generations. One interesting suggestion is that there are ripples within the waves and each of these ripples has different traits in terms of terrorist strategy.54 Thus, while the definition of generations may be arbitrary, there is much to be gained by analyzing how terrorism ends in terms of the differences between generations, and how the generations interact with and perceive each other. However, the waves on terrorism theory has been criticized for being interesting but having little relevance, and the thesis argues that this is because the focus of analysis is a self-defined ideology, rather than an actual movement with connections and linkages.55 These same criticisms can be applied when we consider Hezbollah’s position within these waves of terrorism. Lebanon did not experience an immediate wave of terrorism during the colonial period and the time of the Mandates but nevertheless the grievances and tensions inherent with how the state was formed meant that grievances were latent. Second, the case of Hezbollah demonstrates how it is not necessarily the ideology that drives the “energy” of the wave, but rather it is something that augments a preexistent state of mobilization. The perceived failure of nationalism and of leftist ideology, juxtaposed by the perceived success of Islamism from the late 1970s onward, led to mobilized groups and societies to shift from the former to the latter. Third, while Hezbollah would obviously be classified within the category of religious terrorism, an analysis of this group specifically highlights some of the nuances that the theory of waves of terrorism obfuscates. While the group is part of a religious movement, and more specifically a part of the (re)growth of political Islam, Hezbollah is still a relatively contained organization distinct from other Islamist groups: first its implicit fusion of nationalism and acceptance of the Lebanese state (from the 1990s onward) makes it distinct from groups such as al-Qaeda, and second because its Shi’a identity still demarcates the boundaries of cooperation between other groups within the wave. Although a discussion of

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the waves of terrorism provides a broader context internationally, and its insights on the dynamics and longevity of a group are valuable, the points raised here underpin the claim made in Chapter 2 why Hezbollah should be studied as a social movement. Focusing on Hezbollah as a social movement does not mean that the group is exceptionally different, but it does identify the actual dynamics of interaction, inspiration, and “energy,” which waves of terrorism theory seeks to explain. The chapter now looks at the debate on whether or not Hezbollah should be considered a terrorist group, which leads to discussions on what terrorist and terrorism actually mean. As will be shown, there are problems with labeling someone or a group a “terrorist” as it is a politically loaded term and infers illegitimacy, which is always contested, but this does not mean we should abandon the concept of terrorism entirely.

ARE HEZBOLLAH TERRORISTS? The term “terrorist” has been widely applied to Hezbollah; for example, Richard Armitage described it as the “A-Team of terrorist groups.”56 However, in discussions of what terrorism and what terrorists are, Hezbollah presents an interesting twist to this debate. Not only does it encapsulate the cliché of “one man’s terrorist being another man’s freedom-fighter,” but it also shows the problem with labeling groups “terrorist” when it has undergone such a substantial transformation to the point it, as an organization, mimics many aspects of a state. Therefore, by exploring the question of whether Hezbollah are terrorists, it also shines some light on what “terrorism” and “the terrorist” means. First, there is no one commonly agreed definition of what terrorism is, certainly not one that would be agreed upon on the international stage. In his extensive research on the topic, Schmid highlights 250 different definitions of terrorism. Each of these definitions emphasizes a different aspect of terrorism, listed below: • • • • • •

Its symbolic nature Its indiscriminate nature Its typical focus on civilians and noncombatants Its sometimes provocative and sometimes retributive aims The disruption of public order and security The creation of a climate of fear to influence audiences wider than the direct victims • Its disregard for the rules of war • Its asymmetric character57

While this list does not constitute a definition, it does outline the broad contours of what terrorism is, or at least how people tend to understand it.

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Efforts to have one objective definition of terrorism have been driven in part by academic enquiry but also by international organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. However, these efforts have been limited because, as with many other “-isms,” terrorism is contested58 by different people depending on their context, background, perceptions, and interests. This makes terrorism a subjective term (i.e., shaped by someone’s perspective, which can differ from person to person, or society to society) rather than there being an objective definition like we can find in science. Since terrorism is subjective and has gradually developed to become a pejorative term, the act of labeling someone a terrorist can play a powerful role in de-legitimizing and demonizing the actor. Of course, this depends on the term sticking. Furthermore, since the act of labeling is a way of asserting power and control, actors will seek to shape the definition of terrorism in a way that benefits them (e.g., the U.S. State Department excluding states as actors who can potentially use terrorism). They also may seek to present their own definition of terrorism as if it is objective, fixed, and universal, which has the effect of marginalizing different perspectives.59 Thus, there has been little success at providing an objective definition of terrorism because of its subjective nature and the hidden power relations inherent to labeling someone a terrorist. However, this does not mean that we cannot try to formulate an objective definition or solely focus on how states use the term to marginalize groups. In order to study and analyze terrorism we do need minimum foundations to build from, and this is why it is important to maintain some objective definition. There is an element to truth to the cliché that terrorism “is a bit like pornography, and you will know it when you see it,” and it is precisely for this reason that we can to an extent provide an objective definition of terrorism. 60 Terrorism is defined by Toros and Gunning as: “a violent means aimed at triggering political change by affecting a larger audience than its immediate target, and which is broadly deemed illegitimate.”61 In this definition, both the objective and subjective approaches to defining and studying terrorism are shown as compatible. It highlights that terrorism can be broadly defined as being while accepting that perceived legitimacy is also a defining feature of it. We can also assume that perceived legitimacy will also be on a sliding scale; it will always exist but fluctuate in size, and the more illegitimate the violence is perceived as, the more likely an actor will label it as terrorism. However, the specific definition of terrorism is not necessarily important, as it is the process of defining and labeling, which can enrich the analysis of terrorism, as a tactic and as a discourse. In terms of the objective approach, there is a set of behaviors and acts that, for analytical purposes, can be identified as terrorism, such as the targeting of the “other” to create fear, diffuse a particular message, and mobilize support. While terrorism is just one tactic among a broader spectrum of political violence,62 it does have a unique difference that merits its

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maintenance as a special category of violence. Therefore, the book focuses on political violence but, when relevant, will refer to campaigns of terrorism specifically when salient (e.g., Chapter 3 charts the fluctuations in Hezbollah’s use of terrorism as opportunities for more conventional forms of political violence ebb and flow). The identification of an act of political violence as terrorism is to not make claims on its legitimacy, and even militant groups and states will acknowledge in private they have used terrorism tactics.63 However, there is little benefit in describing these actors as “terrorists” or “state terrorists” because it has more analytical purchase to avoid labeling actors in this way, first because it marginalizes other identities64; second, it more overtly leads to engaging in public discourse of who is legitimate and who is not; and third, there are ethical and practical issues with referring to people as “terrorists” or “ex-terrorists” after conducting interviews with them. The subjective approach to terrorism involves recognizing that, in the public sphere, it is a contested concept and that it is used by actors to delegitimize the claims of others. However, a far more interesting outcome of using a subjective approach is it is possible to identify the different processes of labeling and how, through language, actors attempt to build or deny legitimacy. With this in mind, three questions emerge with relation to Hezbollah: does it engage in terrorism; to what extent is it perceived as a terrorist organization; and what are the political interests in labeling (or not labeling) Hezbollah a terrorist organization? Tactically, Hezbollah has operated on a broad spectrum of political violence. For instance, it gained much credibility within Lebanon for engaging with Israeli forces in guerrilla warfare. It emerged on the international stage through a series of suicide bombings against the U.S. embassy and U.S. marine barracks in Beirut; as a result of these attacks the United States has considered Hezbollah terrorists, and in 1999, the State Department officially designated the whole group (political and military wings) a terrorist organization. The attacks on U.S. facilities were carried out with the intent to create political change by sending a message to the U.S. government, who withdrew after attacks. While the attack on the U.S. barracks broadly targeted combatants, the U.S. government understandably perceived this as an illegitimate attack (it was providing a peacekeeping role, the act was conducted by a nonstate actor, and it was not conducted under conventional rules of war). From the 1980s onward, Hezbollah has drifted away from engaging in hostage-taking toward a greater political dimension and, to an extent, developing a more conventional military posture. However, in 1994 in Argentina, Hezbollah killed 85 people in an attack on a Jewish cultural center, and in 2013 the organization was accused of bombing a tourist bus in Bulgaria, killing five Israelis and one Bulgarian. In the 2006 war with Israel, in addition to guerrilla attacks on Israeli soldiers, its Katyusha rockets were seen to be indiscriminately attacking Israeli population centers to spread fear. While this can be defined as terrorism, it also overlaps with airpower punishment

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strategies, which seek to coerce governments into changing their behavior by pressuring the targeted population (e.g., Hiroshima). Therefore, tactically, Hezbollah engages in a wide range of types of political violence, some of which are similar to acts of terrorism and collateral damage a state might engage in, but when it comes to Israeli citizens and the Jewish population Hezbollah has used terrorism in a much clearer understanding of the term (and thus, more broadly perceived to be illegitimate). This continuation of using terrorism tactics can be seen as a means of signaling resolve against Israel for internal (more radical members) and external (Israel) audiences, especially when this might not be possible through rocket-fire or attacking IDF positions for fear of provoking a damaging response as in 2006. Its willingness to continue using terrorism is not solely attributable to military opportunity and strategic rationale, but can also be linked to how Hezbollah frames Israelis and Jews in its ideology. A key factor in facilitating violence against civilians is through the process of moral disengagement, which Hezbollah’s ideology facilitates through the displacement of responsibility to its victims and by dehumanizing Israelis.65 In terms of perception, Hezbollah is to an extent unique insofar as the state it operates within refuses to call it a terrorist group and considers it an integral part of Lebanon. This reflects the widespread legitimacy the organization holds within the Shi’a population but also the pragmatic approach of co-existence by other sections in society and the political system. External actors have also not been as clear-cut on whether or not they should designate Hezbollah a terrorist organization. Some states have been categorical in labeling Hezbollah a terrorist organization (such as the United States and Israel), but the United States temporarily removed Hezbollah from the State Department’s list following its condemnation of the 9/11 attacks only to be added back. U.S. president Obama has been less inclined to actively describe Hezbollah as a terrorist organization than President Bush did, partly to encourage political engagement but also because of Obama’s policy of engagement with Iran.66 Being designated a terrorist organization obviously has material consequences in terms of limiting financing and mobilization of support, but it can also function as a normative claim to try deny it legitimacy, thus discouraging engagement with the group. For this reason, other states have been more careful to make the distinction between the military wing and political wing. For example, following the attack in Bulgaria and another plot in Cyprus in 2013, the European Union debated whether it should add the group to the list of designated terrorist groups, but it decided to not add the political wing. This decision exemplifies the political nature of defining and labeling terrorism. Internally it sought to manage competing views of its member states, with the Netherlands having banned the organization outright, while the United Kingdom made the distinction between its elements. Another reason was to keep channels of dialogue open and to not discourage the

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nonmilitary aspect of the group. This strategy had been used with the Irish Republican Army and its political wing, Sinn Fein, in order to incentivize them to move away from violence. In the Middle East, where similar groups such as Hamas have broad support, Hezbollah’s standing in the eyes of Middle East states falls along sectarian lines because Hezbollah is seen to challenge regional interests and state legitimacy. To conclude, Hezbollah cannot be simply dismissed as a terrorist organization as this underplays the vast legitimacy it has within the Lebanese political system and the vast diversity of its operations and identity. This does not detract from the fact that Hezbollah has been associated with attacks that have been terroristic or that there are numerous actors who will unequivocally label it a terrorist group. However, the act of labeling, while providing a normative and punitive function, can also be counterproductive in discouraging and ending terrorism, especially when they have significant internal support. For the foreseeable future, Hezbollah will move on and off international lists of terrorist groups for political expediency as long as its military capability is maintained, especially those abroad, which target Israeli and Jewish civilians. It is the continuation of such attacks, which lead Hezbollah, at least in Western and academic discourse, to be placed within a broader canon of movements that have resorted to terrorism.

CONCLUSION The aim of Chapter 1 was to provide an overview of Hezbollah, which will be developed in depth in the following chapters. In this chapter the question of whether Hezbollah should be considered a terrorist group has been problematized by highlighting the inherent subjectivity surrounding the label “terrorist.” At the heart of this debate is the contestation over legitimacy; internationally, states have been willing to accept that Hezbollah is not a typical terrorist group, and within Lebanon it is broadly seen as a liberation movement and social provider. Thus the term “terrorist” does not do a group as complex as Hezbollah the justice it deserves, although, the fact that the “terrorist” label is contested does not detract from the fact that it has occasionally used tactics that approximate with what most people identify as terrorism. In the context of international terrorism, Hezbollah certainly follows on the trend of Islamist revivalism, but it has much more in common with the anticolonial movements that used terrorism than the Jihadist movements typified by al-Qaeda. And while there is much to be gained from placing Hezbollah in an international context, it is very much a Lebanese, Shi’a movement with relatively independent dynamics. Chapter 2 will analyze Hezbollah as a social movement and explain how the group emerged to make such an impact on Lebanon and the Middle East.

2 R

The Emergence of Hezbollah: The Causes of Terrorism and Political Violence

A cricket ground in Glasgow in 2006 might be the last place one might expect to hear chants praising Hezbollah and its leader Nasrallah; however, the pro-Palestinian protesters were symptomatic of the popular appeal of the Shi’a movement. The small protest against the Israeli cricket team was in response to the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, which had followed violence between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The demonstrators came from various backgrounds but the ease with which they could sympathize with Hezbollah is indicative of the group’s ability to be “another man’s freedom-fighter.” Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel was certainly seen as part of the Palestinian struggle and it struck a chord further than Lebanon: posters of Nasrallah and songs celebrating Hezbollah filled the streets of Ramallah and Nablus in the West Bank, not for Palestinian Fatah-PLO or Hamas. By being seen to advance the Palestinian cause, Hezbollah had managed to gain legitimacy from Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, and secular leftists. This ability to cross apparent divides is, in part, what makes Hezbollah such a powerful organization. But in order for militant groups to be successful, they need to mobilize support from a wide section of society, and the extent to which they can do this is shaped by their foundations and the context they emerge. The purpose of Chapter 2, then, is to explain Hezbollah’s

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broad appeal by analyzing how the group emerged. In doing so, the chapter builds upon debates on the root causes of terrorism and social movements. Many popular assumptions about the factors that cause a militant group and the use of terrorism to emerge include poverty, religion, and a lack of education, or because of a clash between cultures. Krueger and Maleckova find that Hezbollah fighters tend to be less poor than the rest of the Lebanese population and they also tend to be more educated.1 More generally among militants and participants in terrorism, there is competing evidence on whether poverty and educational attainment have any significant role to play in, whether as a reason for individual participation or for the emergence of groups.2 Musgrave highlights how it is a combination of factors, where the structural factors of poverty and weak governance feed into other grievances, consequently fueling terrorism further. As an example, Musgrave identifies “the blockade of the Gaza Strip has caused serious poverty for Palestinians living there and while this is acknowledged as fuelling radicalism, it is also the general political grievance of Israel occupying Palestinian land that also fuels radicalism.”3 Crucially, given that terrorism is a tactic, its use will be partly informed by organizational considerations and strategic considerations of the political opportunity structure; the more pertinent question, therefore, is what causes groups to emerge, which then go on to use terrorism and political violence. Furthermore, the scope of the group’s success in mobilizing large amounts of support is also a key factor here. Given the book’s focus on identity, another more controversial approach that seeks to explain conflict is Huntington’s book Clash of Civilizations. In it, he speculates that conflict will be between cultures, for example, Western culture versus Islamic culture, and that the “fault lines of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”4 While this argument is used to explain the rise of al-Qaeda, it also represents more broadly some problems in cultural explanations for the emergence of terrorism. One major problem with this approach is it essentializes identities that are in fact much more diffuse—in the case of Lebanon we find no uniform Islamic culture nor even a uniform Shiite culture where clan traditions also remain salient. 5 As Mabon argues, people can have multiple identities and their simple existence and interaction with others do not lead to conflict and terrorism,6 but this does not detract from the importance of threats to identities as a causal factor for mobilization. However, the recent social psychological approach of integrative complexity demonstrates how the number of identities can vary in different contexts. Actors with low integrative complexity tend to view their identity in “black and white” terms, with the in-group and outgroup being clearly demarcated in binary fashion. Actors with high integrative complexity can process and synthesize different evaluative points and identities. In their survey of the literature, Liht and Savage state that a drop in integrative complexity levels has been associated with conflict

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intensification and eventual military action, while high levels of integrative complexity are present in actors who are involved in conflict resolution and peace negotiations.7 Therefore the changing complexity of identity can account for the proclivity toward using violence. Crucially, the more interesting process is when a political actor constructs and frames identity in such a way, and through people accepting this viewpoint, facilitating mobilization and shifts toward violence. Linking back to a point made in Chapter 1, we can see this form of identity construction of Israelis and Jews in black-and-white terms as a means of fostering moral disengagement and facilitating/legitimizing the use of violence against them. Even more interesting, the low integrative complexity of Hezbollah’s identity vis-à-vis Israelis does not contradict how Hezbollah also emphasizes value pluralism, and therefore demonstrating high integrative complexity, within Lebanon. Also, identity is not fixed in terms of complexity as Huntington would seemingly suggest, but can vary in contexts. However this does not mean that identity is freely constructed from one person to another. Identity has minimal foundations; for example, the idea of being a Muslim is already established and has relatively fixed norms of behavior. But building on these foundations, identity can be shaped or mobilized for political goals. Identities and culture do not predetermine or cause terrorism and political violence, but they can act to shape attitudes and act as a resource, which people can build upon to use and mobilize for a campaign of terrorism and political violence. More importantly, it is the shape of the identity resource, because of its minimal foundations and pre-existing structure, which also shapes and constrains the behavior of actors, specifically in this case their use of terrorism and political violence. As discussed in Chapter 1, the analysis of groups such as Hezbollah needs to take place within a broader context, but this has to be underpinned by actual relations rather than the broad generalizations offered by the likes of Huntington. Even more accurate theories such as integrative complexity indicate the significance of contextual and relational factors. For example, Hezbollah’s identity might become more dualistic when in conflict with Israel but this does not say much about how others in society agree with this; in other words, how does Hezbollah’s framing of the world reflect and resonate with people. Consequently, the chapter looks at Hezbollah’s formation from a social movement perspective and it uses a combination of theories to explain how the organization emerged in Lebanon. The benefit of this approach highlights the deep historical foundations that, although not causing Hezbollah to emerge, it shapes how it can emerge (i.e., the resources it can mobilize) and the dynamics of the movement thereafter. Therefore, in addition to providing a thorough historical background, the chapter will explain what causes groups that use terrorism and political violence to emerge.

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The chapter first outlines social movement theories of the causes of terrorism and political violence, which are then linked to other notable movements which have also used terrorism. This will provide an analytical framework that will implicitly inform the discussion on Hezbollah. Second, the chapter outlines the emergence of Shiism and developments in Shi’a identity up until the contemporary period. Third, the chapter outlines the impact of Western influence in the Middle East and the institutionalized political and social grievances the Shi’a population in Lebanon experienced. The grievances experienced by the Shi’a, whilst not causing mobilization on their own, are internalized to help form an identity. In order for mobilization to occur, a pre-existent social network was conditioned by this identity and able to utilize it by building a mobilizing narrative and extracting resources. In this sense, the argument presented here differs from resource mobilization approaches because it emphasizes the dual process of conditioning and resource mobilization, which shapes behavior rather than determining it. The extent to which a group can mobilize is also dependent on the degree of social and political space available. Taken together, these factors account for the rise of Shi’a activism and emergence of Hezbollah, its shape, type of behavior, and possible future trajectory. The emergence of Hezbollah as an organization can be located between 1982 and 1985; however, this chapter embeds the group within the broader trend of militancy and Shi’a mobilization that preceded the official launch of one of the most infamous militant groups in recent history.

WHAT ARE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS? Much research focuses on militant groups; however, groups such as Hezbollah, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, and Hamas are typically part of larger social movements. Social movements, defined by Della Porta and Diani, are informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize around conflictual issues, through the frequent use of various forms of protest.8 However, recent studies have moved beyond seeing social movements as only informal networks. Social movements consist of groups and organizations with various levels of formalization, “linked in patterns of interaction which run from the fairly centralised to the totally decentralised, from the cooperative to the explicitly hostile.”9 They can be networks of individuals or networks of organizations, or they can consist of a mix of multiple networks of organizations and of individuals.10 A social movement approach not only helps to put terrorism and political violence in a broader context, but also contextualizes the militant group and how it emerged.11 It is for this reason that Hezbollah is often studied as a social movement. In its early days it was an alliance of clerics and militias and as it evolved it developed substantial links in society through its role as welfare provider. Therefore, discussing the causes of movements is distinct from

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looking at a specific group as the former tends to have a larger support base whilst the support base for the latter tends to be smaller and more selfcontained; in essence, different factors are at play for a group like Hezbollah to emerge than a small group like the Red Army Faction in Germany to emerge, hence the need to use social movement theories. Of course as discussed before, small groups can still be analyzed as part of a social movement—the Red Army Faction is often contextualized within the New Left movement—but these relations tend to be perceived ones rather than physical or material relations as with Hezbollah. There are a wide range of social movement theories that seek to explain how a movement emerges and these will now be outlined. Each of these theories can explain how movements such as Hezbollah emerge and provide a different focus, whether it is on material social grievances, the role of ideology, or the role of organizational processes and networks. Two of the most notable theories are relative deprivation theory and resource mobilization theory; these both seek to explain how movements that use terrorism and political violence emerge.

THEORIES ON HOW MOVEMENTS EMERGE One of the most ubiquitous theories used to explain the cause of oppositional conflict is Ted Gurr’s relative deprivation theory.12 The theory developed in response to the argument that poverty causes terrorism and political violence. However, Richardson points out that many individuals involved in terrorism are in fact rich or at least reasonably well-off. Such individuals as Osama Bin Laden vindicate this point and even groups such as the Red Army Faction were also from middle-class backgrounds. In terms of motivation, many groups tend to focus on identity, ideology, or creating systemic change rather than highlighting poverty as the main grievance.13 Within the 10 poorest countries in the world, although they experience civil war and serious political strife, terrorism has not been a significant security challenge for these countries.14 Thus, there is a growing consensus that absolute poverty is not the primary cause of terrorism, although it may be an enabling factor in causing terrorism15; that is, it can provide opportunities for those already involved in terrorism to recruit new members or expand their influence in society. Yet while absolute poverty might not be a significant cause of terrorism, to what extent does relative poverty—both real and imagined—cause terrorism? It is this question that relative deprivation theory contributes toward answering.

Relative Deprivation Theory Relative deprivation theory can be defined in three steps: (1) there must be a comparison made by an individual or a social group, (2) the individual

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or social group must perceive that he/she or his/her in-group is disadvantaged in relation to another, and (3) the perceived disadvantage must be perceived as unfair.16 Importantly, Gurr argues that “the intensity of relative deprivation varies strongly in terms of the average degree of perceived discrepancy between value expectation and value capabilities.”17 In other words, when expectations are raised but not met, this can create frustration and lead to a backlash. Relative deprivation theory can be expanded to include other types of grievances in addition to economic deprivation. For example, frustration can emerge by being denied inclusion in a political system, a sharp change in the socio-economic conditions, or a lack of jobs (relatives to others) following recent inclusion into education. So greater education and social mobility can raise awareness of deprivation relative to other groups. In other conflicts, the middle-class Catholic population in 1960s Northern Ireland began to become more socially mobile, which brought them to face the perceived social and economic deprivation relative to the Protestant population. This new middle class had recently began to enter higher education and this raised their awareness of the conditions that Catholics lived under and the disadvantages they faced in terms of housing access and employment, to name a few.18 Egyptian Islamists also experienced a similar surge in popular support when Egyptian state policies expanded access to education, thus raising expectations, but the lack of capacity in the economy limited the number of jobs available to them.19 In terms of grievances and relative deprivation, there was significant evidence of its prevalence in the context of Hezbollah. As will be shown below, there is no doubt that the Shiite population experienced social and economic marginalization relative to other groups in Lebanon, and the significant transformations that Lebanon experienced in the decades before Hezbollah led Shiites to perceive relative deprivation. However, for Hafez, the grievances that people hold are not a significant cause of political violence, especially for Muslim social movements; instead, they are only a part of the picture.20 The case of Northern Ireland outlined above also corresponds with this critique. The feelings of relative deprivation led to the Northern Irish civil rights movement and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had been demobilized; it was only after the height of the civil rights movement that the IRA grew and re-engaged in political violence. 21 Thus, Hafez argues that there is no consistent correlation between factors such as poverty, relative deprivation, urbanization or population growth, and Muslim militancy. He disputes the argument that structural transformation causes grievances, which in turn lead people to engage in violence, as if this were the case, the ubiquity of grievances within society would lead to constant rebellion and violence, which clearly it does not.22 This leads Hafez to propose that resource mobilization theory better explains how Hezbollah emerged.

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Resource Mobilization Theory Hafez combines a number of theories to explain how militant groups emerge, which in essence argues that a combination of grievances, mobilization, and repression and the process in which these develop are important in explaining why movements emerge to use political violence. However, he argues that “even if aggrieved groups are able to [mobilise] resources and choose militant strategies to effect change, the nature of their grievances does not determine the purpose,” scope, intensity, and duration of their militancy.23 Therefore while grievances might underpin mobilization, they do not necessarily shape mobilization. But instead, the nature or process of mobilization is important and a move toward militancy is dependent on the relationship between the mobilizing forces and the current political system. The resource mobilization theory “analyses the political environment in which [social movements] operate, the mobilization structures through which [they] acquire and allocate movement resources, and the ideological frames with which [the social movements] justify and motivate collective action.”24 Hafez identifies three resources that would enable groups to effect social and political change: material and organizational resources (dedicated activists, finances, weapons, means of communication), legitimacy and identity resources (sympathizers, shared historic experiences, possession of special knowledge), and institutional resources (access to public office, support from state agencies and elites). In addition, movements can co-opt existing organizations for collective action25; for example, Hezbollah subsumed Islamic Amal and the IRA co-opted a number of civil rights groups. Returning to the example of Northern Ireland, the grievances experienced by Catholics—both real and perceived—led to a number of community and political groups emerging to form a civil rights movement in the hope of addressing them. This civil rights movement emerged because the political system was closed off to them through a majoritarian electoral system and gerrymandering in favor of non-Catholics. The lack of political opportunities incentivized alternative routes of political action, which led to widespread mobilization. In Lebanon, the Shi’a population also experienced a political exclusion and relative deprivation of political access because of the way in which the Lebanese political system was constructed. Thus, as will be shown below, the Shi’a population’s expectation of political representation was frustrated by the old Lebanese political system, which limited the extent they could participate. However, this exclusion manifested in a different way from Northern Ireland; the Lebanese Shiites mobilized through other political movements initially, such as the Palestinian groups. Hafez argues that political exclusion is not enough to cause terrorism and political violence. What he argues is that initial mobilization in response to political exclusion will provide resources for a movement, and

26

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that state repression will then shift a group toward using violence. As seen in Northern Ireland, the passive IRA engaged in the civil rights movement and its move toward political agitation saw young people mobilized on the streets; when the civil rights movement and the Nationalist population faced repression, there were calls for the IRA to engage in armed violence, and it then had extensive resources to put to use. The final piece of Hafez’s theory is the process of framing, whereby after repression a group or network will present the events in a narrative—an ideology—and this will provide the justification for moving toward violence and mobilize resources to that effect. There are three main components in a group’s frame, which it uses to mobilize its target population and generate support: first, frames diagnose a problem; second, they state how such problems are to be solved; and third, they seek to provide motivation by incentivizing action.26 Hafez argues that, in order to justify violence, groups will frame violence in a certain way to encourage moral disengagement against typical normative constraints against using violence (particularly against civilians). These include: (1) an ethical justification for using violence, by portraying violence as a necessary evil to end social injustices or occupation; (2) making an advantageous comparison, by portraying the enemy’s violence as being worse; and (3) displacing responsibility to the victim—Hezbollah justified hostagetaking by accusing its hostages of being “spies” and “agents of imperialism.”27 Thus, by using these narratives, a group can frame violence in a manner that can mobilize people. Despite this last point with regard to Hezbollah, Hafez makes little direct reference to the group and his application of frames focuses on antisystem frames, and this is not entirely relevant to Hezbollah either. And while Hafez’s resource mobilization theory offers a convincing explanation of how terrorism and political violence emerge within a movement, he does not discuss how frames resonate with the population. Thus, the chapter will build on Hafez’s framework and expand it to explain the structural factors that made Hezbollah’s call to arms so successful.

Frame Resonance When a group is seeking to mobilize the population, the frame it is using will need to resonate to some extent, and if it does not, then the group will be weaker and not last as long (although this in the short term might make it more violent, for example, the Red Army Faction). In order for a frame to resonate, there are three interlinked factors focused upon here: credibility, narrative fidelity, and linkages.28

Credibility The frame audience must perceive the frame and the frame advocates as being credible. First, if a group is mobilizing on grievances then these grievances will have to be perceived as existing. Hafez dismisses the role of

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grievances on having an effect on the size and shape of mobilization,29 but frames will be more credible it they reflect the real and perceived grievances. The more real grievances will also sustain more durable mobilization than if they are simply perceived or not physically experienced—for example, upon their release from prison, IRA members could experience the actual changes in society, which then challenge their perceived grievances. The frame advocates also need to be seen as being credible among the audience—imams and religious scholars will be perceived as credible among Islamists; former combatants and former prisoners have been widely utilized in the Northern Irish peace process because they were seen to be credible and authoritative (especially among hardliners).

Narrative Fidelity The chances of a group’s frame resonating with an audience is dependent on the extent it is consistent with the pre-existing narratives, customs, and values of the audience. In this sense, frames are shaped and structured by ideas that already exist; consequently, there are certain limitations on what a movement can be mobilized and its potential size. An identity might be built around a sense of injustice or grievances, which may later be used to mobilize the identity group into action. Therefore framing contemporary grievances in terms of historical ones associated with the identity can not only provide narrative fidelity but also frame credibility. In contrast to Hafez’s critique of grievances, the need to maintain narrative fidelity means that historical grievances within a society can also shape the potential size and dynamics of the movement. Building on identities, a group’s frame can then resonate more successfully.

Networked Linkages The third factor in shaping whether a mobilizing frame will successfully resonate is the existence of linkages between the frame advocates and the frame audience. For many groups that use terrorism, are deemed illegal, or operate under an occupation, their underground and secret nature means it can be difficult to communicate with a potential audience. Whereas now Hezbollah has social services, its own TV station al Manar, institutions, and publicity—which function as a linkage for disseminating its frame—this was only possible because of the networked linkages in the formative period of the group. Linkages have a network function because successful resonance is not only dependent upon being able to communicate with the audience, but also shaped by the quality of those linkages and the implicit power relations within them. If the linkages of a frame are diffused through teacher to student, imam/priest to congregation, father to son, or friend to friend, these relations can amplify the message through personal affinity, normative pressures, and the institutional basis of the linkage might also provide resources, which boost

28

Hezbollah

the authority, esteem, and material incentives of the frame. As will be shown in the chapter, Hezbollah’s means of diffusing its frame held it resonate successfully, and these networks emerged in part because of grievances (hence, once again, shaping the size of Hezbollah). Having outlined the theoretical explanations of how movements that use terrorism and political violence emerge, the chapter will now apply this approach to Hezbollah. The first section outlines Shi’a identity and grievances, which, as has been argued above, are significant for shaping the size and scope of mobilization at the later stage. But looking into the deep roots of Hezbollah, it is possible to show how the factors that helped its frame resonate emerged in the first place, from a narrative of passivity, networks across the region, and the emergence of credible figures in contrast to the discredited traditional elites. Then the chapter will look specifically at how, from these roots, a network emerged, which constructed Hezbollah’s frame and thus successfully mobilized the population.

SHI’A IDENTITY AND GRIEVANCES The existence of a population that identifies itself as a community is a crucial element in mobilization. The distribution of identity groups geographically over a long period of time can set the scene for the scope of future mobilization, particularly in terms of the alliances they form and the forces they oppose. The ability to mobilize an identity group can often be dependent upon following the group’s norms and rules and pursuing its interests. Although norms, rules, and interests can be reframed (as Hezbollah did), the options for reframing are to an extent limited by the foundations of the identity being mobilized. Thus, the chapter first outlines the history of Shiism in terms of geography, regional institutions, narratives, and ideological interpretations. The emergence of politicized forms of Islam was, in part, a reaction to changes in the region that had occurred at the start of the twentieth century. The chapter provides background to the different layers of conflict that existed prior to the rise of Shi’a activism. The combination of regional and internal conflicts created generations that were politically mobilized, thus easing the emergence of new actors; radicalized social networks that were embedded in religious institutions; provided a range of resources to this network that could be tapped into; and conditioned both the social network’s frame and the population’s grievances, thus increasing resonance. The circles of learning in Najaf, Iraq, and later in Qom, Iran, were a hub for Shiite clerics from Iran, Lebanon, and Iraq, thus laying the basis for similar ideological views and a network of kinship. The Shi’a population are a minority in most Middle Eastern countries; however, they have played a significant political role in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Yemen, and the

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Alawites (a branch of Shiism) have had significant influence in Syrian politics under the Asads. Shiites found refuge in Lebanon in the seventh century; however, facing persecution, they were gradually pushed to the south and east, losing land and authority at the expense of the expanding Maronite, Druze, and Sunni population. The vast expanse of the Shiite population in the Middle East would become crucial in contemporary politics. A shared identity throughout a number of states would become a conduit for the diffusion of power and ideas. As well as laying the foundation for potential future alliances, Shiism also provided a framework to cement Hezbollah’s transnational connections and influenced its organizational structure and strategy. One of the foundational legacies of Islamism is how it encompasses every aspect of life; thus there is no separation between religion, politics, and society. Whereas modern Western organizations tend to be compartmentalized, the totalizing nature of Islam lends itself to the various activities Hezbollah is engaged in, from the provision of social welfare and charity (Zakat) and religious preaching (Dawa) to politics and resistance. The blend of Shiism and Wilayat al-Faqih was to prove antagonistic within both the Middle East region and the international system, but it did lay the groundwork for Hezbollah to forge alliances and mobilize its population. The Islamic revivalism that Khomeini symbolized, however, was part of a wider phenomenon prompted in reaction to modernity and Western influence in the Middle East. Western involvement in the region from the mid-nineteenth century onward reconfigured the entire political structure of the region and would set the tone for political mobilization in the Middle East, culminating in the rise of Islamist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Qaeda. Secularization had been seen as a part of entering modernity for Arab leaders and this prompted a backlash, most significantly in Egypt. Coupled with the failure of alternative ideas such as nationalism and communism, the Islamist ideas that had been primarily cultivated in Egypt began to spread. Although these were Sunni Muslim groups, the Islamic revival created an environment in the region where the message and goals of Hezbollah would have sympathy. However, it was the legacy of colonialism that would engulf the region in conflict with a proliferation of militant organizations. Whereas Shiism defined Hezbollah’s geographical layout and its ideology, it was colonialism that would provide the grievances that would give the group justification to mobilize. Western interference and dominion in the Middle East had catastrophic implications for the region. In Egypt, the British encouraged a system of political secularism and intervened militarily to circumscribe its influence, but this only fanned the flames of nationalism and Islamism. From the 1920s to the 1950s, Britain and the United States orchestrated coups in Iran that engendered a culture of suspicion of Western influence within the Persian state.30 The biggest impact the Western powers had, however,

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Hezbollah

was in the heart of the Middle East, located between Egypt and Iran. In 1916, the British and French had promised the Arabs their own state in return for their participation in the war effort against the Ottoman Empire but shortly after they had reneged on it. In place, they divided the Middle East into state boundaries that did not correspond with either a pan-Arab identity or internal identities. State weakness and the power of pan-Arab nationalism would lead to a series of coups in Egypt (1952) and Syria (1949, 1954, 1963, 1966, and 1970) and the prominence of nonstate militant actors throughout the region, first in Jordan and Syria (1950s–1970s) and then in Lebanon (1970s onward). In addition to the aforementioned regional implications of Western influence, a mix of colonialism and local power struggles would account for two zones of conflict at the heart of the region: the Israel-Palestine conflict and the sectarian Lebanese political system. The Israel-Palestine conflict had regional implications because of the spillover effect; for example, 780,000 Palestinians fled to neighboring Arab countries and 200,000 ended up in Lebanon.31 Due to the popular sympathy for the Palestinian issue, the cause of liberating Palestine became a tool for Arab leaders to secure their own legitimacy at home; the outcome was a highly mobilized population and belligerency toward Israel amongst Arab states and their people. The roots of the Israel-Palestine conflict can be traced back to Europe in the nineteenth century. In the face of antiSemitism, the Zionist movement emerged with the aim of establishing a Jewish state. Jewish immigration to Palestine steadily increased, first with the British promise of support for their statehood and second with World War II. With the Zionist movement set on establishing a Jewish state, tensions grew between the Jews and the indigenous Palestinian population, culminating in the 1948 Israeli war of independence/the Palestinian alNakba (catastrophe). The consequence was a large presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, with the latter being the base for the nascent Fatah, the organization that would lead Palestinian resistance and dominate the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO and the Arab world made it their goal to destroy the Israeli state and replace it with a secular state where Palestinian refugees, such as those in Lebanon, could return. The narrative of return amongst the Palestinians would be a factor in their community existing apart from the Lebanese state. When the seeds of the Israel-Palestine conflict were slowly growing in the 1920s, another state just to the north was being built on rocky foundations. Intercommunity strife and Shi’a isolation certainly existed prior to the colonial system. Before the 1920s, Lebanon had been part of the Ottoman Empire and the Sunnis enjoyed special security because they belonged to the official state religion. The Christian population, whilst lower in political status, enjoyed some protection under the “millet” system.32 The Maronites (constituting the majority of the Christians) had ties to France, stemming from extensive French economic and cultural interests

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in the area.33 The Shi’a community, on the other hand, was in a position of impoverishment and political marginalization because the dominant Sunnis despised them for “deviating” from their interpretation of Islam.34 The Shi’a community was disconnected from the political system, poorly educated and characterized by low social mobility.35 Thus, when France took control over the northern part of Ottoman Syria after World War I, the Maronites saw an opportunity to form a state. The Maronite state, however, would need to be big enough to be economically viable but small enough to constitute a Christian majority. The expansion of the boundaries of the Mount Lebanon region (the Maronite stronghold) was expanded to the contemporary Lebanese borders, bringing with it a sizeable Sunni and Shi’a population.36 The 1943 national pact marked the independence of Lebanon and the institutionalization of the sectarian divide. Based on a controversial census, the Maronites were considered the larger group and were accorded the position of presidency and the preeminent powers the role entailed. The Sunnis were granted the premiership whilst the Shi’a community was awarded the speakership of the parliament, a position far weaker than the other two. 37 Furthermore, Shiites were underrepresented in the bureaucracy: only 3.2 percent of the highest posts in the civil service were occupied by the Shiites. 38 This political system required Lebanese to belong to one of the sects, with each sect a formal leadership (although, elites were somewhat detached) and its own institutions and laws and social welfare system.39 Many sects also had external allegiances or relations that, accompanied by the sectarian political system, precluded a Lebanese state acting as a monopolizing force. Thus, the political system limited the political space for communities such as the Shi’a to pursue their own interests whilst also strengthening communal loyalty and identity. Since Lebanese independence, the Shiite population has grown at a quicker rate than other communities, boosting its proportional size to one-third of the population in the 1970s and just under half the population by 2009.40 In addition to political frustration, the Shiites were economically marginalized. The Shiite community was largely poor working class based in the underdeveloped agricultural and industry sectors. Conditions were made worse for the Shiite when the Palestinian refugees who had arrived in 1948 would work for lower wages.41 The Lebanese economy experienced an economic boom from the early days of independence up to the 1970s. However, the benefits mostly accrued to the elites, parts of Beirut, and the Christian-dominated Mount Lebanon and the state provided little help to rural development.42 The combination of rural impoverishment and the boom in Beirut encouraged external and internal migration. Many generations from Shi’a villages left to work abroad, bringing back significant amounts of money and a disdain for the traditional powerful families that had dominated Shi’a society. 43 Tens of thousands left their rural

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communities, settling in the periphery of Beirut, later known as the “belt of misery.” This area would become the “breeding ground” for Shiite militancy in the 1980s.44 The Lebanese government’s modernization process sought to address inequality, partly through increasing education. However, the combination of greater urbanization and education had raised expectations the government could not match. The Shiites could not close the political and economic gaps because they were excluded from the political and economic system in Lebanon.45 The final spark that would prompt Shi’a activism began with the PLO’s arrival in Lebanon. The PLO was an umbrella organization for a wide spectrum of Palestinian militant groups, consisting of the dominant secular Fatah and the collection of small but violent groups funded by Syria. In the 1960s, the PLO had been operating against Israel from Jordan, prompting Israeli incursions into Jordanian territory and undermining the Jordanian state’s authority. Subsequently, a Jordanian crackdown led to the PLO infrastructure and tens of thousands of its forces moving to Lebanon in 1971. The presence of the PLO had the effect of increasing sectarian tensions and redirecting Israeli military interests toward Lebanon. The consequence was a bloody civil war in Lebanon and a series of Israeli incursions and occupation of parts of Lebanon. As well as increasing the grievances felt by the Shi’a generally, it also provided the context for Shi’a mobilization and networking that would be the basis of Hezbollah. The events in the 1970s had a serious impact on the Shi’a community. Initially, the Shiites were sympathetic with the Palestinian cause and many had joined the militant group in light of the financial incentives provided. During the civil war “the Shi’a became the cannon fodder for the Fedayeen” and, as a result, more Shi’a died in the conflict than any other sect.46 However, the growing dominance of the PLO in the south led Shiites to fear they were losing control of their territory and it also posed a challenge to the authority of the Lebanese state system, particularly the dominance of the Maronites.47 Part of this resentment can be explained by the PLO being blamed for daily Israeli incursions that created havoc in the border area.48 Consequently, some Shiites welcomed the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon in 1978 to destroy the PLO. However, the operation was not entirely successful, and the Shi’a population, once again, paid the price. The Shiites received the heaviest casualties and a quarter of a million refugees joined the destitute southern suburbs of Beirut. The Israelis returned in 1982 with far grander plans of reshaping the Lebanese political system; the consequence of this intervention was the death of thousands of civilians, most notably in the Sabra and Chatilla massacre, and the end of the PLO as a respected force in fighting Israel.49 Overall, there were political (and socio-economic) grievances built into the Middle East and Lebanese political systems. The regional system

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consisted of weak states and a range of nonstate militant actors and encouraged belligerency toward Israel (thus affecting Hezbollah’s future options, especially how it interacts internally). The Shiite population had its identity reinforced through the sectarian system but this was not accompanied with a growth in political power. The lack of power would make it difficult for the community to address its grievances and pursue its interests. First, the Shiite population would become more aware of its relative social and economic deprivation in part through urbanization. However, these historical conditions were not enough for mobilization. Although the Shiites had grievances, this had arguably been normalized and the Shi’a culture of passivism provided a narrative of acceptance. Urbanization may have made the community more aware of its political and social deprivation in comparison to others but this fact alone is not enough for militant mobilization. In addition, urbanization broke the identity and alliances/rivalries that had stemmed from the village and clan structure, thus making the form of identity espoused by Hezbollah appealing.50 The emergence of Hezbollah can first be traced back to the social networks that had become politicized in the aforementioned context. Second, a frame was utilized that sought to mobilize the population and secure resources. Third, the successful resonance of this frame, coupled with the social network’s influence, allowed Hezbollah to gain resources that could be used to pursue its goals. Fourth, there were social and political opportunities that increased the utility and likelihood of success of pursuing the course of action it did.

MOBILIZING THE SHI’A: THE GRADUAL BIRTH OF HEZBOLLAH Grievances are not enough to explain militant mobilization; however, they do shape the scope of future mobilization and provide the impetus or demand for social change, unlike what is argued by Hafez.51 A number of factors mediate between historical strains and the rise of a militant group. Mobilization begins with a pre-existent social network that seeks to mobilize a social group to action. In order for them to succeed, the groups need to produce a frame that draws on historical grievances, culture, and ideas and provides a course of action. They then need to provide the infrastructure to recruit and organize volunteers by mobilizing material and organizational resources. Crucially, political opportunity structures will most likely discourage nonviolent means of addressing grievances and there will be a degree of social space that provides the opportunity to mobilize.52 Of course, not all forms of militant mobilization will need to meet these requirements (some forms of violence are less resource-dependent and new technology can provide new forms of social space); however, the social movement framework is broadly applicable to Hezbollah due to its mass appeal strategy.

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Social Networks A pre-existent social network can take many forms: family ties, school ties, sports associations, and political groups. These types of networks often have deeper institutional ties and resources available to them, but of course, this varies. In the case of Hezbollah, antecedent militant groups can also be considered as a part of the pre-existent network. Whereas some militant groups emerge from one or a few forms of social networks that are “apolitical,” Hezbollah was built on a steady progression of Shi’a mobilization over a couple of decades. Broadly speaking, two interrelated structural factors had previously discouraged Shi’a mobilization: the narrative of Shi’a passivism and persecution and the role of the Shi’a political elites in perpetuating the tradition of political apathy. However, the social dislocation that the Shi’a experienced had set the wheel in motion and the traditional political elites began to be discredited and challenged.53 The Shi’a population began to become involved in political organization such as the Communist Party and the Palestinian militants,54 but they were not organized as a Shi’a population per se. The people who would mobilize the population on sectarian lines were part of a “Sheikh network.” This network was influenced by the problems that inspired the Islamist revival regionally. The circles of learning (hawzat) in Iraq and Iran laid the basis for developing similar ideological views and a network of kinship and personal friendship. Many clerics left with a coherent plan for revolutionary change, most notably Ayatollah Khomeini who would lead the founding of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The network formed the basis for future Iranian relations that would be so pivotal for Hezbollah’s emergence in terms of personal relations, a shared ideology, and inspiration.55 The most significant members of the Najaf-Qom network in the Lebanese context are Imam Musa al-Sadr, Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, and Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah,56 each of whom brought with him his circle of followers. 57 The distinct organizations that would be formed by members of this informal network would first mobilize the Shi’a population on sectarian lines and then would be disbanded/merged to make way for Hezbollah. One of the prominent members of the “Sheikh network” was Fadlallah, who would later become the source of inspiration for Hezbollah and the leading Shi’a authority in Lebanon. In 1958, he became involved in the Iraqi-based Dawa Party, which sought to promote Islam with the eventual goal of establishing an Islamic state. In 1966, Fadlallah moved to Lebanon, settling in the poor Shi’a neighborhood of east Beirut. By establishing various social organizations such as the Lebanese Union of Muslim Students, he quickly built a reputation as a charismatic orator and inspired many of Hezbollah’s future leaders, most notably Imad Mughniyah and Hassan Nasrallah. Mughniyah would become one of Hezbollah’s main military

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commander and Nasrallah would become the future leader of Hezbollah. For the former, the presence of Fatah provided him an opportunity to enter militant networks whilst the latter would join the “Sheikh network” in Iraq, after meeting Sayyad Mussawi.58 Arguably, the most influential figure for Shi’a mobilization was Imam alSadr. Originally from Iran, the charismatic Sadr established himself in Tyre and preached to the community about economics and social reform as opposed to his apolitical predecessors. He soon began to attract the Shi’a middle class and helped forge a communal identity, but at the same time, he brought the antipathy of the traditional ruling classes by challenging their dominant position in the Shi’a community.59 The ruling classes had encouraged traditions of submission and inactivity and Sadr sought to reinterpret the tradition of passivity and built up a narrative of Shi’a activism by associating Shiism with activism.60 Sadr raised the awareness of the Shi’a community through the Movement of the Deprived and, more importantly, the militia known as Amal.61 However, Amal was relatively small and broadly subservient to the Palestinian groups; it was the mysterious “disappearance” of Sadr that would have a significant impact on the Shi’a community. Sadr was visiting Libyan leader Colonel Qaddafi in 1978 to mediate between him and Yasser Arafat. However, he did not return from this meeting, with the Libyans claiming he had fled to Italy whilst most others speculating he had been killed or imprisoned by Qaddafi. Despite continuing to hope Sadr is still alive, the downfall of the Qaddafi regime has led former officials in the regime to claim that Sadr was beaten to death after challenging the dictator on theology.62 First, his disappearance brought many in the Shi’a community to compare Sadr to the “hidden Imam” who some Shi’a believe will return and herald the end of the world and their salvation. The elevation of Sadr to such a status had provided an opportunity to mobilize the Shi’a community by appealing to the fundamental roots of Shi’a identity. Second, the absence of Sadr provided a void to be filled and it would not be Sadr’s successor, the secular Nabih Berri.63 The direction Berri took Amal had helped create political space for the radical Islamic cadres that had been steadily growing. However, the mobilizer network realized that Amal was not the best vehicle to pursue their interests; hence they created Islamic Amal, which would serve as the antecedent of Hezbollah. The circles of learning in Iraq/Iran functioned as a space to formulate a nascent ideology of Shi’a Islamism. Deep structures of Shi’a tradition and geographical placement meant such circles of learning acted as a hub, attracting Shi’a clerics from across the region who would make bonds of friendship and potentially be inspired by the radical ideas present. They would then leave the hub to move to a specific locale. The ideas they would take with them would be able to spawn their own networks, partly through the sheer individual power of Sadr and Fadlallah, but also because, to put it simply, the “conditions were ripe.” A conducive opportunity structure can

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provide the mobilizer network the resources, space, and means to tap into or form other social networks to set up a movement. In addition to religious networks, alliances with familial and village networks are particularly salient for Hezbollah. Just as networks can be important for initial formation, they can also be crucial in recruiting members, especially in the early days of an organization. However, Hezbollah was in a unique position due to its ties with Iran (in terms of financial and manpower support) and a greater degree of political space relative to most militant groups. Subsequently, recruitment was more overt and less dependent on social networks and could be institutionalized through the provision of social welfare. As far as pre-existent social networks cause militant groups to emerge, the pre-existence of militant and political activity can provide readymade avenues for these social networks to enable mobilization. Despite the Palestinian presence causing Shi’a grievances, the “Sheikh network” benefited greatly in terms of the resources that groups such as Fatah provided.

Framing Of course, most members of a militant group do not join because of the pay. Instead, they are also inspired by the ideology and goals of the group, especially in the early days of a militant group. A group’s ideology helps generate multifaceted forms of support, whether it is military support from Iran, a conveyor belt of members, or even the attitudinal support of locals that facilitate a group’s operations. In their early days, groups such as Hezbollah seek to create linkages with unmobilized “aggregates of individuals” who have common grievances. They create such linkages by diffusing information through interpersonal and intergroup networks, mass media, the internet, and others.64 Hezbollah’s frame resonates with the grievances experienced by the Shi’a population and the Lebanese community in general that were outlined in the first half of the chapter. Of course, the call for an Islamist state did not resonate as much as Hezbollah’s commitment to ending the Israeli presence or social justice, but the group’s Islamic appeal allowed it to cross the Sunni-Shi’a divide.65 In essence, Hezbollah’s frame built upon different layers of grievances and cultural narratives; the Shi’a population acted as a hub for mobilization but its broader appeal through its Islamic and anti-Israeli element gave it scope to expand its support base. However, a strong frame that resonates with a population is only one more factor that accounts for the rise of Hezbollah. The Lebanese political system is a highly competitive market with a wide range of actors mobilizing on similar frames. Hezbollah’s originality came from its Islamist element (bearing in mind a receptive constituency had been cultivated over the last few decades); therefore, its framing process provided it some political space to mobilize. However, it was its amount of resources

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and innovative tactics that allowed it to compete with other groups on the anti-Israeli front. The 1985 Open Letter functioned as Hezbollah’s frame and it marked the public emergence of the militant organization. In this letter, Hezbollah identifies the Israeli occupation and the sectarian political system as the two main problems facing Lebanon. The solution the frame offered was radical political change: a just society would be achieved in an Islamic Republic that respected the Christian population.66 The Open Letter argues that an Islamic state should not be imposed; however, if people were to choose freely they would choose Islamic governance.67 By framing prognosis in such a manner, Hezbollah provides a rhetorical bridge between the Sunni and Christian population and arguably gives scope for the future democratic strategy that Hezbollah would pursue. The second solution the frame offers is, of course, the end of the Israeli occupation (and indeed, the existence of the Israeli state) through violent means. Opposing Israel in such clear terms (as opposed to rival groups such as Amal) helped Hezbollah embed its frame within regional sentiments held by states and their people and arguably isolated the Maronites whilst providing inroads for Christians and other non-Islamist groups who prioritized resistance to Israel. Although it may seem that Hezbollah’s frame seeks to appeal to a wide audience, its motivational framing has tended to be divided into two: one for its hard-core Shi’a constituency and another for its non-Shi’a audience. It seeks to motivate its Shi’a audience by utilizing Shiite narratives and religious symbols.68

Resource Mobilization and Social Space In order for a social network to translate its frame into mobilization, there needs to be some amount of resources that can allow the group to get off the ground and sustain itself. The ability to avoid destruction by the state or rival groups is partly dependent upon the resources a group has. Typical types of resources include: manpower in terms of number, continued recruitment, and specialization; weapons, equipment, and a source of replenishment; and capital, property, and regular income to secure the first two types of resources and day-to-day expenses such as propaganda. Although Hezbollah’s pre-existent social network would be sufficient to secure such resources, the fact it had the support of Iran (and to a lesser extent, Syria) increased the speed and extent of mobilization immensely. Without Iran’s support, Hezbollah would not have been as successful so quickly. Indeed, some of its antecedent organizations such as the Lebanese Da’wa Party would most likely have become a small secretive cadre rather than an open movement. 69 However, types of support come at a cost. Both material and normative support can come with strings attached or

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the fear of losing support can encourage certain types of behavior (as will be outlined in Chapter 5). Iran’s motivation in supporting Hezbollah was to spread the Islamic revolution and strengthen its strategic capabilities in the region.70 The “Sheikh network” was inspired by the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution and the older generation that preceded the “Sheikh network” that had formulated the concept of Wiliyat al-Faqih. Therefore, the frame Hezbollah adopted was not a cynical sales pitch to Iran; instead, the frame was cultivated by a common social network and it was the personal relationships within this social network that facilitated the strong relationship between Hezbollah and Iran. Of course, if it were not the Islamists who prevailed in the Iranian revolution we would most likely be discussing a completely different social network. Iran sent approximately 500 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (the IRGC) to Lebanon to help Hezbollah establish itself. In addition, the IRGC provided tactical and strategic direction, assisted Hezbollah’s attacks, provided it with intelligence, gave moral and normative legitimacy, and supported the group financially with $100 million a year.71 For example, Iran paid for the monthly salary of each person who joined Hezbollah and provided benefits for him and his family,72 and in such an economically depressed region, financial incentives buttressed ideology and grievance in driving the supply of Hezbollah recruits. The vast majority of this money was used by Hezbollah to fund its social programs,73 which would help the group to tap into local resources and provide it with legitimacy in the face of its competitors. The level of support from Iran would not have been available, however, if Syria did not developed close ties with Iran due to its fear of being isolated in the region after being militarily weakened by Israel. The Syrian-Iranian alliance allowed “a supply line of support to run from Iran through Syria to Hezbollah.”74 Syria had backed Amal in the early 1980s, thus helping facilitate the mobilization of the Shi’a by providing training and equipment for Amal members who would later split away to form Hezbollah (via Islamic Amal). Later, Syria saw Hezbollah as a means to keep its Lebanese allies in line; therefore, the relationship was guided by Realpolitik. 75 Although the relationship with Syria may not have been as close as the alliance with Iran, the alignment of interests with Syria allowed Hezbollah the breathing space to emerge. State support and the availability of resources can be a crucial factor in a group’s emergence; however, the degree of social space available can limit or expand the opportunity for the growth of a militant organization. Arguably, Lebanon could be described as a kind of “failed state” insofar as the Lebanese government did not have a monopoly on the means of violence.76 In cases where states have such a monopoly (through a combination of might, legitimacy, and institutionalization), it is difficult for large groups like Hezbollah to emerge because they face military, policing, and

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intelligence services that limit scope for action, recruiting, and organizing. The Lebanese system, on the one hand, was pluralistic: the presence of many groups ensured there was no monopoly of force and it engendered an environment of internal and external cooperation and balancing rather than simply domination and conflict (though of course Lebanon has its share of conflict). On the other hand, Israel had occupied south Lebanon in the period preceding the arrival of Hezbollah and it had just pushed out one of the main players, the PLO. Occupying forces such as Israel can only control some social space and it therefore opened a gap for Hezbollah to emerge. Israel’s presence also discredited the Lebanese state’s credibility as a security and social welfare provider.77 Former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak stated that “[w]hen we entered Lebanon . . . there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shi’a in the south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah.”78 Of course, this social space was also expanded by the grievances outlined above and the increased demand for an Islamist movement that had been cultivated by the “sheikh network” and the Islamist revivalist wave. However, Hezbollah were certainly not soldiers of fortune and the group’s innovative tactics and devastating military strikes through its formative period was another significant factor in the group’s rise to infamy. As mentioned earlier, Hezbollah’s existence was only solidified as a coherent organization in 1985 but it had existed in various shapes and forms from 1982.79 In 1983, Islamic Jihad utilized one of the first instances of suicide tactics to kill 243 U.S. marines who had been based in Lebanon as part of a multinational force. These types of devastating attacks accompanied skyjackings and kidnappings in this period, and although Hezbollah is selective in which attacks it claims responsibility for, Western intelligence agencies believe that Hezbollah, in some shape or form, was responsible.80 The loose coalition began to adopt insurgency tactics in fighting Israeli forces in the south, taking over a Lebanese army barracks in the process and turning it into its military headquarters.81 Over the years, the movement’s prestige and popularity in Lebanon began to grow, and on February 16, 1985, Sheik Ibrahim al-Amin outlined the Open Letter which signaled the coalescing of the Islamist forces into a coherent movement.82 Announcing the name of the group, the Open Letter ends: “May God’s blessings and peace be upon all of you, Hezbollah.”83

CONCLUSION When trying to explain what causes militant groups to emerge, there is clearly no single factor at play, and the case of Hezbollah is keeping with this tendency. However, the role of grievances as an explanation has been criticized, and while of course the chapter has shown that Hezbollah’s

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emergence was not solely due to grievances such as poverty, it has shown how these structural factors can set the scope for mobilization. The urbanization, social deprivation, and further grievances among the Shi’a population may not have necessarily caused violence, but they provided space for actors to emerge. The existence of religious networks that became more and more politically minded stretched across the region thus providing access to resources in Iran but also the nature of the institutions provided the network with credibility and a means of communication with followers. Of course, the unique environment of Lebanon, with its multiple militant organizations, ensured there was already some mobilization existing but it was the overlap of all these factors that incentivized a purely Shiite organization rather than continuing to work with the Palestinian factions or Amal. In this perfect storm was to emerge one of the most sophisticated militant groups, but as will be shown in later chapters, it was its sheer size and scope that would pull it away from engaging in terrorism and kidnapping toward playing a more active role in Lebanese politics and society.

3 R

Hezbollah at War

This chapter explores Hezbollah’s resistance identity and traces the evolution of the movement in its military sense over the course of its history. It places particular attention on the relationship the Party has with Israel. Since the Jewish State’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 acted as a key catalyst for the formation of the Party of God, the complex conceptualization of this relationship is a vital need for Hezbollah, and studying the interactions of both sides sheds real light on the thinking, ambitions, and limitations of Hezbollah and can be seen as one of the key indicators of the relative “moderation” of Hezbollah that emerges over the years. The chapter begins with a brief conceptualization of the “resistance identity,” which is crucial to the movement’s legitimacy and ability to mobilize its constituency within Lebanon, as well as to appeal to other populations, groups, and states in the wider region. Thus while the chapter focuses on the evolution of Hezbollah’s military activities in both the strategic and tactical senses it also explores its use of propaganda tools in order to both utilize its military activities to generate legitimacy and to maintain an environment of continued threat, from Israel and from Hezbollah toward Israel, which is reinforced by other aspects of its media strategy.

THE IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY OF RESISTANCE In many ways the first decade of the movement’s life from 1982 to 1992 was the most active and violent as it sought to establish itself in the face of threats from all sides in the midst of the ongoing Lebanese Civil War.

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Thus in many ways what would come in later decades would always look more moderate than what was necessary to carve out a position for the new group in the complex power struggles of Lebanon and the wider region. Benedetta Berti highlights the “four simultaneous campaigns” 1 embarked upon by Hezbollah in its first decade of life. The first of these was of course the war with the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in Lebanon; this would later essentially merge with the wider notion of the liberation of Palestine from the Zionists and become the core part of the identity of resistance. The second was to dominate its Shi’a rival Amal both militarily and otherwise, reducing its power to a subordinate position. The third was to challenge the role of the Lebanese government and reduce its ability to counter the group or damage its interests, and finally to expel international forces from Shi’a areas and eventually from Lebanon as a whole. When coupled with extreme anti-Western rhetoric, which at times strongly implied an eventual desire to take on America, we can see that these ambitions were vaunting in their scope and scale and that each required the use of violence in order to increase the group’s power and influence and reduce that of the actors which opposed them. While much has changed in terms of Hezbollah’s focus in the intervening years, as is highlighted in Chapter 4, it would however be a mistake to think that any of these campaigns has comprehensively ended but clearly some have become considerably less important to Hezbollah in a practical sense, even though in a rhetorical sense they may still have some utility at certain moments. Indeed, it is actually easy to rather forget about some of these other campaigns given the centrality of Israel in Hezbollah’s ideology of resistance. The big shift in the military sense, then, has been the switch from the “four campaigns” to the focus on just one. This is, in part, tied to the decision of Hezbollah to become directly involved with Lebanese political processes, which is discussed in the next chapter, but the decision also had the effect of focusing greater attention on the “Israeli threat” and adding to the resistance narrative. As Berti highlights, there is a tendency in the literature when talking about resistance, which “stresses Hezbollah’s reliance on domestic and international terrorism as a defining feature of the group’s strategy and raison d’être,”2 and while Hezbollah has clearly not completely abandoned coercion when it comes to either the Lebanese state or other groups in Lebanon and beyond, there has been a step change in the extent of violence, its severity, and its frequency of use in these contexts. None of this has, however, diminished the ideology of resistance to Israel and its utility to Hezbollah. Israel has always had something akin to a reified status in Hezbollah’s ideology of resistance but as the other “campaigns” fell by the wayside, either after perceived or actual victory or changing circumstances, Israel became ever more important and ever more demonized. Hezbollah actively believes that Israel is evil and represents an existential threat to Islam and to Arab lands, including Lebanon. In this Manichean worldview,

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resistance to Israel (as well as, to a lesser extent, its Western backers) is a sacred duty for every Shi’a.3 In this way, and by promoting this outlook and narrative, with which it has been rather successful, Hezbollah has been able both to protect its ability to wield violence and to have some level of legitimacy for its use of violence. Thus its military prowess, its arsenal of weaponry, and its organizational mindset—its ideology of resistance—are inseparable. Engaging in violent activities therefore not only reinforces its chosen threat narrative, solidifies support, and galvanizes its constituency but also prevents challenges to Hezbollah’s ascendancy from within the Shi’a community and dramatically reduces the chance that any other group from wider Lebanese society will have the will or the means to challenge Hezbollah’s dominant military position in the Lebanese confessional system. The focus on resistance to Israel therefore serves the purpose of reinforcing a core ideology, as well as serving a practical political purpose for Hezbollah of enabling the group to maintain its capacity for violence. Under the Taif Accords, which ended the Lebanese Civil War, “all militias are supposed to have been disbanded within six months of the accords being signed, Hezbollah alone has retained its weapons and organization to this day, despite having signed the agreement. It maintains instead that its armed forces are not a militia but ‘Islamic resistance groups’ committed to ending Israel’s occupation.”4

HEZBOLLAH’S MILITARY STRENGTH Growing rapidly over the first 30 years or so of its existence, Hezbollah came from nowhere to become probably the strongest nonstate military actor in the Middle East adjudged by some to have turned the tide in the Syrian Civil War in President Asad’s favor,5 and to be feared, reviled, and studied extensively, as well as being in a position of possibly even of holding the title of most powerful armed group in the world. Hezbollah’s military strength is clearly a key component of its success thus far and forms an important dimension of one of the main debates in the literature on the group, which can be broadly summarized as those who choose to focus on Hezbollah’s military dimension with its resistance and armed struggle connotations and those who have looked at Hezbollah as a political organization set within a Lebanese milieu, which has necessitated adaptation, conciliation, and compromise. The military side of Hezbollah should not be downplayed; it is a significant , factor in Hezbollah’s raison d être and in a volatile and uncertain region such as the Middle East will continue to be so. This does not however mean that the broad division of the literature between those who primarily focus on the group as a militia or terrorist organization and those who look at it as a political body which is pragmatic and able to compromise does not also

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influence discussion of Hezbollah’s military activities when we focus solely upon these. Indeed, there are plenty of examples of Hezbollah aggression and also of its ability to be socialized into moderating the use of its military capabilities. Awareness of this main division in the existing literature on the group is though essential, partly in assessing the utility and approach of various pieces of literature but mainly so that attempts can be made to see how the two narratives when used together can highlight the times and issues when Hezbollah reacts differently to the expectations of either interpretation. When talking about the coercive abilities of the Party of God we need to be aware of both its capabilities and its intentions, thus while the rest of the chapter focuses on the evolution of Hezbollah’s use of force over the past three decades it is important here to briefly outline the development of its capabilities and to assess the strength of its armed wing at the midpoint of the second decade of the twenty-first century. Beginning as an armed movement in the 1980s in the midst of the Lebanese Civil War meant that the group was initially forced into displaying its fighting prowess with only the basic weapons, which tend to be available to all armed groups in such conflicts, namely small arms mainly consisting of Soviet bloc technologies such as the infamous AK-47 and RPG-7. This meant that without superior firepower, especially when compared to that available to the Israelis or richer sects within Lebanon, Hezbollah was at a real initial disadvantage, thus, in part, necessitating Hezbollah to seek both tactical and strategic advantage not in terms of the numbers and sophistication of its weaponry but in its abilities in terms of discipline, organization, determination, and innovation in tactics. This took time and we should not think that Hezbollah was successful overnight; many of its lessons were learnt the hard way, especially in terms of guerrilla warfare. These facts in large measure explain Hezbollah’s utilization of terrorist tactics and kidnappings, most notoriously of Westerners, during the early years of its existence. One can also say that the tactic of using suicide bombers6 was also important for Hezbollah not only because of its military efficacy but also because it fed into Hezbollah’s “veneration of martyrdom and sacrifice”7 and thus served other goals alongside the strictly military dimension. Indeed, these initial tactics “proved very effective. Neither the United States nor Israel was prepared for Hezbollah’s use of suicide bombings. For example, the U.S. Marine on post at the Beirut barracks [during the infamous 1983 suicide truck bombing, which eventually led to the withdrawal of international peacekeepers from Lebanon] was under orders to keep his weapon unloaded in order to be consistent with the nonaggressive nature of the U.S. mission in Lebanon.”8 Naturally enough, success tends to attract more success and a greater willingness to support a group perceived as being successful and thus supplies of weaponry soon began to flow in greater quantities from those who sought to use the new militia as a tool in their own foreign policy, initially particularly by Syria who, “[u]nable to

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confront Israel militarily, . . . nurtured Hezbollah, which became the most effective military force against Israel in Lebanon.” In this endeavor Syria was soon joined by Iran, with whom it was rapidly developing a strategic alliance,9 “who enlisted the group as its militant Shi’ite and anti-Israeli proxy in the Arab world.”10 By the early 1990s Hezbollah had amassed a significant arsenal of weaponry and had also developed the skills, experience, and organizational structures which made them proficient users of the weaponry they controlled. Throughout the 1990s Hezbollah continued to demonstrate its abilities and its arsenal in confrontations with Israel, and while clearly not able to blunt Israeli military superiority had devised ways of using its weapons asymmetrically to inflict real damage. The next step in the development of the group’s capabilities came with its moves into weapons with greater sophistication and longer range: missiles. Missiles are viewed by many as being game changers in warfare in the Middle East,11 and Hezbollah was quick to realize their potential as tool for taking on Israel and hitting deep into Israeli territory causing civilian casualties. Thus for most of the last 20 years Hezbollah’s acquisition of missile technology with greater and greater reach has consistently been the main focus of concern for Israel. The extent to which Hezbollah came to focus on the expansion of its missile stockpiles is best illustrated through reference not only to the estimates of number of missiles but also to the types in its arsenal, and particularly their ranges and payloads. Estimates of numbers of each type of missile/rocket can be disputed but it is clear that even on conservative estimates the numbers are substantial. Israel’s Home Front Defense Minister Gilad Erdan estimated Hezbollah’s total rocket arsenal at around the 200,000 mark,12 while others including the IDF put the figure around half that.13 Indeed, the variation in guesswork on the extent of Hezbollah’s missile arsenal is striking in that it displays the concern associated with their capabilities (as well of course as the rhetorical effect or paranoia of the person issuing the estimate). The fact that “in September 2008, Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak estimated that they counted 40,000 rockets [and] one year later, President Shimon Peres suggested that the figure was close to 80,000”14 neatly demonstrates that while unknowable, Hezbollah’s missile capabilities are substantial and growing. This is made clearer when examining the jump in the estimated number of missiles between 2005 and 2014. In 2005 Nasrallah himself declared that Hezbollah had over 12,000 rockets,15 while most estimates today show that the number has quadrupled inside a decade. The bulk of Hezbollah’s capability is clearly in the Katyusha class,16 some of which (the 122 mm variant) have a range only of around 20 km/13 miles, although the 220 mm and 333 mm variants have ranges that pose a much greater problem for a small country such as Israel at 40 km/25 miles and 75 km/47 miles, respectively. This was certainly the backbone of

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Hezbollah’s missile assault on Israel in the 2006 war but it seems that even then it had other rockets in its arsenal and that since then its capabilities have significantly expanded. Thus the remainder of Hezbollah’s missile capabilities are thought to be made up of the Fajr 3 (also known as the Grad), the Fajr 5, the Zelzal 2, the M-60017 and the Shahin I and II. These missiles all fall within the short/medium range category and some, such as the Zelzal 2 and M600, have a range in excess of 200 km/125 miles (see Table 3.1, later in this chapter18), although they tend to be unguided and thus something of a blunt instrument, although in the kinds of quantities available, and with payloads ranging from 21 kg on the Katyusha to 600 kg on the Zelzal 2, they could cause significant damage. In addition to these missiles, in November 2014, Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General, Naim Qassem announced that the group now had Iranian medium-range Fateh19 Conqueror missiles,20 which according to an Iranian commander were able to “attack all targets from southern to northern parts of the occupied territories,” as Qassem stated, “with pinpoint accuracy.”21 Hezbollah’s acquisition of these missiles represents a real advance in its capabilities and clearly is a major boost to the group. Thus its missile resources are clearly considerable. In terms of its other capabilities Hezbollah is widely thought to now have substantial strength as its intervention in Syria has shown. Indeed, Lt. General Benny Gantz, the current Chief of the General Staff of the IDF said in summer 2014 that “Hezbollah is now stronger than any Arab army,”22 while on paper this is patently untrue given the sheer size of the Saudi, Egyptian, and Algerian military establishments and given the advanced weaponry available to the Saudis or the UAE armed forces, it goes to show how far Hezbollah has risen and how seriously the Israelis take the threat posed by them. Hezbollah’s armed wing is far from substantial in numbers compared to these armed forces; estimates vary and there is some disputation on the ratio of reserves to full-time soldiers but given that the numbers estimated to have been deployed in the Syrian campaign range from 1,500 to 7,000 and that some estimates of Hezbollah’s total size rise as high as 30,000 it is not insubstantial. In terms of the core of Hezbollah, numbers here have ranged as low as 300–600, although there is a consensus around the 1,000 mark, a number which is considerably reduced from levels estimated to be at 5,000 in the 1980s and is down to the movement’s increased specialization.23 It seems likely that this has most likely increased as a result of the Syrian campaign given the types of numbers often quoted and the estimates of Hezbollah losses.24 What is important to note is that the movement “specializes its forces to a degree unusual in a guerrilla army. In addition to hit-and-run attacks, building improvised explosive devices, and other, more traditional, guerrilla activities, Hizballah trains its forces in artillery, engineering, and communications. As one Israeli officer noted, ‘Hizb’Allah are [sic] a mini-Israeli army. They can do everything as well as

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we can.’ ”25 In addition, the movement has also separated its terrorist abilities from its guerrilla organization, thus enabling greater specialization and greater deniability; it also frequently uses synonyms such as the Islamic Jihad Organisation, which is thought to be the name of Hezbollah’s international terrorist wing, also known as the movement’s External Security Organisation.26 The bulk, in terms of numbers, of the fighting force of the movement comes from its reserves, estimates of which in 2006 put the number at 6,000–10,000 volunteers.27 Given some of the numbers quoted as fighting in Syria this number is also likely to be considerably higher today. Furthermore, it is also important to note that Hezbollah’s military wing is not only augmented by its reserve but also that the movement was also estimated to have at least 5,000 in its internal security branch,28 a number which tellingly perhaps shows that Hezbollah has a desire for internal control that is expressed through a numerically larger internal security branch than the force designed to protect against Israel while operations in Syria are under way. Clearly there is difficulty in getting a clear idea of the numbers involved for obvious practical reasons but things are made even more difficult given the fact that there are other groups who are allied to Hezbollah, or whose members in general confrontations with Israel, such as the 2006 war, will also engage in fighting the Israelis. This problem is memorably invoked by Hala Jaber’s reported description of these loosely associated fighters as being, “like supporters of a football club.”29 What is clear though is that both the core of Hezbollah and its reserves are “well led, and Hizballah fighters [fight] bravely.” As one Israeli soldier acidly commented, “Evidently they had never heard that an Arab soldier is supposed to run away after a short engagement with the Israelis.”30 It is not just the numbers of fighters that matter, however, since there has also been considerable investment into command31 and control systems, bunkers, guerrilla training, and sabotage operations, as well as into the acquisition of both anti-tank weaponry and anti-aircraft weapons.32 This increasingly technology-focused nature, especially when coupled with Hezbollah troops’ experience in fighting Israel and now in Syria, makes them a formidable force. Their ability to deal with Israeli armour including the advanced Merkava 4 tank during the 2006 war through the use of Kornet, RPG-29, 9M133 AT-14, and Metis M anti-tank missiles, their ability to prioritize targets using the most appropriate missile type, and the way in which missile use was combined with IEDs demonstrated that not only did Hezbollah have the technology to take on Israeli armour but that its tactics were suitably advanced as well.33 Thus as the evidence above indicates, Hezbollah has seen a dramatic expansion in its military capabilities. The extent to which Hezbollah has grown in power over the course of the past three decades is perhaps best summed up by the extraordinary claim made by the BBC in 2011 that “Hezbollah has more weapons than many European armies” 34 ; this is

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probably an accurate assessment and explains why the group is taken so seriously and why it is so vehemently opposed to any disarmament process and consistently ignores both the letter and the spirit of the Taif Accords and UNSCRs 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006). Hezbollah knows the value of its arsenal and its ability to use it effectively. This applies in its relationship with Israel as with those who would wish to challenge it within Lebanon. The chapter now proceeds to explore the evolution in the use of Hezbollah’s coercive capabilities, rather than the extent of those capabilities.

THE ISRAELI INTERVENTION OF 1982 While the role of Israel in sparking the creation of Hezbollah has already been examined in Chapters 1 and 2 it is important here to see in more detail Hezbollah’s military response to the Israelis and particularly its successes and learning processes. Not having the strength to defeat the IDF outright, the obvious strategy was a war of attrition through the use of asymmetric guerrilla and terrorist tactics designed to maximize casualties and undermine Israeli resolve and morale. As Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem explained, this approach when applied to the Israelis had the effect of “confusing the enemy and obliging its command to call for a constant state of alert, eventually leading to the exhaustion and decline in power [as well as] spreading panic among enemy troops, the fear of death persisted after every successful or possible resistance attack. This served to shake enemy morale and subsequently affected troop performance.”35 This might be the Hezbollah take on these early days; the Israelis paint a rather different picture: “In the mid-1980s Hizballah was still a rag-tag military organization. ‘They failed every time,’ says the former intelligence official Barak Ben Zur in describing Hizballah’s significant military operations against IDF posts at that time.”36 It is clear that given its small size and resources during the early phase, Hezbollah’s main goal was to cause maximum casualties whilst minimizing its own losses; it learnt fast and was forced to adapt to survive, a lesson which appears to have been well learnt and which influences the organization to this day.

THE CIVIL WAR Clearly Hezbollah did not arrive at its position as the pre-eminent armed group in Lebanon and the world’s most capable militant grouping without having a ruthless streak, and the attainment of its current strength came about through a mixture of political calculation and willingness to apply physical force to those who stood in the way. While the resistance ideology is clearly crucial for Hezbollah, and the most significant focus of its military activities of the course of its history has been directed against Israel, it is

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also of great importance to examine the movement’s internal Lebanese dimension when it comes to the application of hard power. It is important to acknowledge that Martin Kramer has claimed that the group’s power comes not from its financial or political aspects but from its reliance on sustained violence which is essential for maintaining visibility and strength37; in other words its ability to use physical force as a tool of power necessitates the use of physical force in a self-reinforcing spiral. While it is often stated that part of Hezbollah’s rise to pre-eminence during the Civil War was because it focused on fighting Israel and refused to be drawn into the conflict itself, clearly this was in fact not the case and one of Hezbollah’s earliest goals was to become the dominant, if not indeed the sole, representative of the Lebanese Shiite community. This led to a number of clashes with its Shi’a rival Amal who refused to join with the new Iranian backed movement. As Berti puts it, “the secular Amal and the religious Hezbollah began to clash regularly during the last decade of the civil war as they struggled for control of the Shi’a community.”38 By 1988–1989 the two groups were essentially at war for control of Beirut’s southern suburbs; Hezbollah then exposed its ruthless streak targeting Amal power clusters and checkpoints and assassinating its leaders. This quickly led to defections to Hezbollah and by the beginning of 1989 Amal was forced to sue for peace after having to seek protection from Syrian forces.39

THE TERRORIST PHASE? While much of the focus of this chapter is upon the conflict with Israel, it is important perhaps to make some distinction between the “campaigns” highlighted by Benedetta Berti and to briefly explore how Hezbollah became known worldwide as being a terrorist organization. Given the movement’s initial desire to remove UN peacekeeping troops from Lebanon whom it regarded as invaders and the environment of religious radicalism, and in particular given hostility between Iran and the United States, it is perhaps natural that Hezbollah should have targeted Western targets inside Lebanon. The devastating 1983 suicide bombing of the French and U.S. barracks in Beirut and a series of other attacks on UN forces would eventually drive them out of the country. Perhaps one indication of just how far Hezbollah has changed since the 1980s is its tolerance for the presence of a strongly reinforced UN presence in Lebanon after the 2006 war. Despite this though, Hezbollah participated in a number of high-profile attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets internationally, and especially in the early 1990s, as well as its infamous campaign of kidnappings of Westerners, often charity workers and journalists, with their extended incarceration in Lebanon during the 1980s bringing the movement international notoriety. It is perhaps easy to forget this period in the light of broader changes to

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the movement and its reputation in more recent years.40 While Hezbollah’s role as a terrorist actor is discussed elsewhere in this book, here it is important to be reminded of its initial military goals of removing international forces, attacking the Lebanese state and acting at the behest of the Iranian state in its wider conflict with the West, which led the movement to commit some terrible atrocities and to garner a reputation for its ruthless efficiency in the conduct of these operations.

THE 1990s OFFENSIVE AND THE 2000 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON As the 1990s began, Hezbollah was increasingly in the ascendancy within Lebanon and was able to begin the process of politicization discussed in Chapter 4. With Amal defeated and the Civil War drawing to a close the movement was able to turn its military attention more toward the Israelis who had retreated to their “Security Zone” in the south of Lebanon. The 1990s saw the emergence of an increasingly capable Hezbollah who were able to experiment with new tactics against the IDF and the South Lebanese Army. Yet at the same time the movement’s war with Israel for the liberation of Lebanese territory was hardly prosecuted at full tilt, what emerged on the southern border at times resembled a rather tepid war rather than a full-blooded conflict.41 At times though, the emerging “rules of the game” between both sides broke down and severe escalations occurred with some Hezbollah actions forcing Israeli escalations and in particular the period from 1996 to 2000 was especially violent. There were two major Israeli escalations during the 1990s in response to Hezbollah breaking the perceived “rules.” The first of these major escalations came on July 25, 1993; after a month of Hezbollah shelling of Israeli towns and an intensification of its assaults against the IDF, Israel launched Operation Accountability, a week-long campaign to punish Hezbollah. The outcome of this was a U.S.-mediated agreement in which both sides agreed to refrain from targeting civilians. The second major Israeli escalation occurred in 1996 when on April 11, Israel launched Operation Grapes of Wrath, a 16-day offensive against Hezbollah in response to multiple rocket strikes inside Israel. This was a significant escalation but only impacted Hezbollah’s abilities for a year, “[t]he 12-month period following April 1996 saw a sharp decline in operations, in line with reports at the time of Hezbollah focusing resources on repairing damaged infrastructure.”42 From 1997 though, Hezbollah significantly stepped up its attacks on the South Lebanese Army and IDF in southern Lebanon. Indeed, “[h]aving managed more than 50 attacks in a month on only one occasion in the 12-month period between May 1996 and April 1997, the number of monthly attacks from May 1997 to May 2000 would not once drop below 50.”43 This capability

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demonstrates just how far Hezbollah had come militarily since its early origins during the Civil War; the group’s “development from a radical resistance group known especially for suicide bombings and kidnappings to a highly professional guerrilla force”44 had taken a little over a decade. Perhaps this scale of attacks did have an impact on the domestic pressures within Israel for withdrawal from the “security zone” and in that sense perhaps Hezbollah can claim a degree of victory but it is also important to balance this by remembering that the zone had become an important idea within Israeli security thinking and retreat was hotly contested, as well as the fact that that the domestic pressures agitating for withdrawal came about against a backdrop of the wider peace process and the surprising progress that had been made there, as well as the success of the peace treaty with Jordan. The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon came on May 25, 2000, less than a year after Israel’s new prime minister Ehud Barak had promised that Israel would be unilaterally withdrawing to its northern border by July 2000. During this interim period Hezbollah stepped up its attacks on the “security zone” significantly: “An average of 38.3 attacks in the 12month period from April 1994 to March 1995 had risen to a monthly average of 140.4 attacks between May 1999 and May 2000. In just 25 days of May 2000 Hezbollah launched an overwhelming 323 operations against the IDF and the SLA.”45 This was clearly an attempt to try to portray the Israeli withdrawal as having been forced by the resistance. Indeed the final withdrawal was very much one which was “under fire,” as Suzanne Goldenburg of the Guardian put it “with the fighters of its proxy militia, the South Lebanese Army (SLA) fleeing headlong with their families to crossings all along the border, the scale of the Israeli fiasco was beginning to unfold yesterday.”46 In a famous speech in May 2000, Hezbollah held a rally with Hassan Nasrallah declaring: We meet here to celebrate the victory achieved by martyrdom and blood. When we speak of this victory, the liberation of our land, man’s freedom, the dignity of our homeland, and the self esteem of our nation we are bound to mention all those who have contributed to . . . we should first mention the martyrs, all of them: martyrs of the resistance in Hezbollah, Amal and the Lebanese national forces.

Thus it very much appeared that it had been able to turn “the Israeli withdrawal into a propaganda tool and significantly enhanced its legitimacy within Lebanon because of the perception that its weapons were the tools that forced the Israelis out of Lebanon.”47 The period after Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, however, saw a significant drop-off in Hezbollah attacks on Israel, in what appeared to be a whole new era. This is clearly demonstrated by comparing the number of attacks

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across three periods, from 1992 to 1996 Hezbollah attacked the “security zone” 1,030 times; from 1996 to 2000 the number of attacks quadrupled to 4,060 but between 2000 and 2006 there were only 27 attacks on Israel. It seemed that despite the tensions the situation had been rather transformed.48 Indeed, perhaps as Iver Gabrielstein puts it “Hezbollah’s political aim had now changed from getting the IDF out to preventing the IDF from getting in,”49 but this shift also to some degree changed the very idea of “the resistance” and had the potential to undermine perceptions of the ultimate stated goal of liberating Palestine.

MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIANS One would expect, given that the narrative of resistance has spread over time from being about removing the Israelis from Lebanon to simply removing the Israelis, that Hezbollah’s assistance for the Palestinians would be extensive and unstinting. The picture, however, is considerably more complex than this and can be seen at times as evidence of the movement’s pragmatism. Given that the transformation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), from being the representatives of the unfortunate Palestinian refugees, who had been expelled from their homeland, into a dominant and hated force in Lebanon and a significant catalyst for the descent into the Civil War, it could be difficult at times for Hezbollah to openly side with the Palestinians in Lebanon. This does not mean that Hezbollah has not offered support to Palestinian groups, especially during the Al-Aqsa intifada of 2000–2005, more that the level of cooperation does not come anywhere near the level that the volume and vehemence of the rhetoric might at times suggest. There are a number of reasons for this; many are intensely pragmatic and relate to resources, wider geopolitics, and Hezbollah’s need to focus on Lebanon. In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process of the 1990s posed a real problem for Hezbollah; its pragmatic streak realized that it could not openly undermine the progress that had been made, especially while it maintained widespread support and legitimacy, yet at the same time the danger of a full and comprehensive settlement for the continuation of the established narrative of resistance was very clear. This posed a difficult dilemma for the movement and led them to try to find ways to undermine the peace process clandestinely; they were no doubt glad of the continuing Palestinian opposition to peace with the Israelis in the form of Hamas. This to some extent spurred cooperation between the two movements.50 The relationship that developed with Hamas, which has in turn deteriorated sharply in the face of the increased sectarianism in the region and Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian Civil War, led to a degree of knowledge exchange and training.51

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In addition Hezbollah continues to try to maintain some operations on the West Bank, although this is never easy given the extent of Israeli control there. Indeed, Hezbollah has increasingly tried to operate inside both the occupied territories and Israel proper in its attempts to undermine the peace process; it has not only increased support to Palestinian groups but has also “invested in its own terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank, and went to great lengths to infiltrate operatives into Israel to collect intelligence and execute terror attacks. Hezbollah established a dedicated unit to pursue these goals—Unit 1800.”52 As outlined in Matthew Levitt’s chapter on Unit 1800 it has been responsible for assisting Palestinian groups in planning attacks and with distributing Iranian largesse, has attempted to recruit Israeli Arabs for intelligence and terrorist purposes, as well as planning kidnapping operations. This capability is taken seriously by the Israelis and could be considered to be an element in Hezbollah’s propaganda and deterrent war with Israel but in reality has not really done enough to be considered to be any kind of real military assistance for the Palestinian cause. In sum then, the relationship with the Palestinians, while important, has never reached the levels one might have expected. Hezbollah clearly realizes the limitations here and in the military sphere can only make what amount to relatively symbolic gestures; one of these gestures may even conceivably have been the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in 2006, just weeks after the same feat had been accomplished by Hamas in Gaza.

THE 2006 WAR The 34-day-long war between Hezbollah and Israel that took place over the summer of 2006 is one of the defining events in Hezbollah’s history, the impacts of which were felt around the Middle East and had important long- and short-term impacts upon the movement both militarily and politically within Lebanon and in the wider region. Given the extent of the academic work on the 2006 war it is enough here to highlight some key themes that emerged from this conflict rather than attempting to give a blow-by-blow account of the conflict.53 At this juncture it is important to ask, to what extent did the 2006 war represent a victory for the Party. It certainly looked like one in its aftermath and was claimed as such by Hezbollah, as it probably had to be given the level of destruction and that it was begun by Hezbollah’s rash action on the southern border. The problem for Israel appeared to be its inability to deal with Hezbollah’s rocket attacks, a rather disjointed response, slow and then rapid escalation and unclear measure of what victory would look like. In essence for Hezbollah to be seen to win, it just had to survive; just by holding out for a ceasefire Hezbollah could claim that it had withstood

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the mighty Israeli Army. For Israel not having much to obviously show for 34 days of war and with international opinion turning against it through Hezbollah’s skilful propaganda strategy meant even the Israelis acted like they had lost, commissioning the Winograd Commission of enquiry into performance and decision-making in the 2006 war. This convened in September 2006 and released its report in January 2008. The initial widespread opinion was that at best the war had been a draw and many believed that Israel had effectively been defeated, as the Economist succinctly put it: “Israel’s prime minister set himself an absurd aim—the complete demolition of Hizbullah’s power in Lebanon—and failed to achieve it. The shrewder Mr Nasrallah said victory would consist merely of surviving, and Hizbullah, however battered, did survive. On the last day it was not just standing, it also fired a record 246 rockets into Israel.”54 Whether or not this was a real victory for Hezbollah given the devastation wrought by Israel, which so surprised Hezbollah and the questions asked about Hezbollah’s recklessness in inviting such an assault is a hotly contested debate, as Elli Lieberman puts it: “Hezbollah’s image as the defender of Lebanon was seriously undermined [and] Hezbollah was worried about the general Shi’ia [sic] reaction after years of stability and growth.”55 Yet clearly, militarily at least, Hezbollah performed above expectations and demonstrated its power, resolve, and capabilities. While it could clearly never defeat Israel, its abilities on the battlefields of the 2006 war tell us a great deal about the movement and there are three key things to focus upon here: the rocket and missile threat; infrastructure, ambush, and preparedness; and its ability to appeal to an international audience.56 As we have seen rockets and missiles have become an increasingly important, and potent, part of Hezbollah’s armoury and it was this conflict which really brought home the threat to Israel that these weapons could pose. Human Rights Watch brought together a range of Israeli data on the type of missiles used and the damage caused, as well as condemning Hezbollah for its use of cluster munitions and its deliberate targeting of civilians. Israel estimated that 3,917 Hezbollah rockets landed in Israel; Hezbollah claimed the figure was closer to 8,000.57 In sum the 2006 war caused 43 civilian deaths in Israel and around 1,489 civilian injuries; in addition Israel lost 121 soldiers. Hezbollah casualties are less clear with estimates as high as 700, although Hezbollah only acknowledged 64. Other groups such as Amal and the Lebanese Communist Party lost 17 and 12, respectively, and an estimated 1,080 Lebanese civilians were killed and circa 4,000 wounded.58 By any measure the war was destructive and worse than anything seen in Lebanon since the end of the Civil War in 1990. The impact of this rocket bombardment was significant, although nowhere near as destructive as it might have been. While the rockets perhaps looked like a more impressive capability to the rest of the world than they were, in reality the barrage certainly however brought home to the Israelis the realities of what it might be possible for Hezbollah to achieve.

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Table 3.1

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Hezbollah’s Rocket Arsenal

Type of ordnance and impact

Range and target

• 122 mm 9M22 • 6.33 kg • 75% of rockets landing in Israel

Range: 20 km Targets: • Nahariya • Kiryat Shmona • Ma’a lot-Tarshiha • Safed • Akko • Karmiel

• 122 mm enhanced-range rocket • 6.33 kg

Range: 30 km Targets: • Haifa • Other cities and villages in Galilee region

• 220 mm Raad-2 and Raad-3 • 18 kg • Mainly rocket strikes in Haifa—nearly half of all confirmed strikes

Range: 65–70 km Targets: Haifa

• 240 mm Falaq-1 • 18 kg

Range: 10.5 km Targets: • Kiryat • Shmona • Shtula • Kfar Giladi

• 240 mm Fajr-3 • 45 kg

Range: 43 km Targets: • HaKrayot • Karmiel

302 mm Khyber-1 50 kg

Range: 90 km Targets: • Afula • West Bank • Haifa

Data from “Civilians under Assault: Hezbollah’s Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War,” Human Rights Watch 19, no. 3 (August 2007): 29.

As Ahron Bregman puts it “Israel was caught unprepared and ill-equipped to deal with incoming missiles . . . When the war is over the Israelis will have to check how they were caught unprepared and how they failed to develop a dedicated anti-rocket system on time.”59 It took the Israelis around a third of the war, some 11 days, before a ground invasion of southern Lebanon was initiated thus giving plenty of

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time for Hezbollah to prepare.60 It seemed as if the air campaign that opened the war was about softening up the enemy for the IDF to enter and that this was the major escalation in the war and yet progress was very slow and the IDF were hit heavily during the initial part of the incursion. The reasons for this can in part of course be laid at the door of poor planning by both politicians and the IDF high command, as highlighted in the Winograd Commission report, as well as the IDF’s lack of training for this kind of war whilst dealing with the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Hezbollah’s approach to the conflict however demonstrates just how advanced they had become in this kind of ambush warfare and how well they had studied the enemy and prepared the ground; in other words from a more offensive style in the 1990s they were able to adapt well to a more defensive style in the 2006 war. Perhaps the best example of this is seen in what the Israelis termed “Hezbollah’s Nature Reserves”; these were a system of strongholds in southern Lebanon, often built under the noses of the Israelis and the peacekeeping troops of UN Force in Lebanon. These often complex bunker systems were well hidden and used for the storage of rockets. They were also so well defended that on July 19, in the early days of the ground conflict, when an elite unit of Israeli troops stumbled into the “Nature Reserve” of Maroun al-Ras they simply did not realize what they were dealing with and paid the price; a soldier involved said: “We expected a tent and three Kalashnikovs—that was the intelligence we were given. Instead, we found a hydraulic steel door leading to a well-equipped network of tunnels.”61 They suffered heavy casualties losing eight soldiers; from this point it is reported that the IDF Northern Commander Major General Udi Adam not only “restricted offensive operations into these areas” but as the Winograd Commission commented the “[e]xplicit orders to refrain from firing into areas designated as “nature preserves” constituted a major error at the command level.”62 If Hezbollah’s strength in these areas could so shape Israeli operations, then this demonstrates their battlefield abilities as much as it does Israeli weakness. In addition to this, Hezbollah’s success against Israeli armour proved surprising, hitting at least 46 Israeli tanks, which also prevented the Israelis from operating their usual tactic of manoeuvre warfare.63 Hezbollah then was well prepared appearing “to have divided a three mile-wide strip along the Israeli−Lebanese border into numerous ‘killing boxes.’ Each box was protected in classic guerrilla fashion with boobytraps, land mines, and even CCTV cameras to watch every step of the advancing Israeli army.”64 What proved especially surprising was the strong performance of Hezbollah reserves and the so-called village defence units, as well as Hezbollah’s intelligence systems with good signals intelligence including Hebrew speakers and the ability to tap the phones of Israeli commanders.65 This does not mean that Hezbollah was perfect; they were not able to do anything about Israeli airstrikes and proved surprisingly ineffective against helicopters, bringing down only one in the entire campaign.

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They were also unable to manoeuvre effectively or to counterattack with any real strength and clearly Israeli intelligence also produced some good results with the IDF managing “to locate and destroy almost their entire layout of long-range rockets during the first days of the war.”66 On the propaganda side, discussed in more detail later in this chapter, Hezbollah was able to get journalists to the right places to see what it wanted them to see; it was able to exploit the real-time nature of coverage and the newly powerful regional Arab news media to garner widespread support beyond its normal constituencies and was able to downplay its role while portraying Israeli actions as illegitimate.67 Despite their seeming successes in the 2006 war though, Hezbollah paid a heavy price and has done little to capitalize on its “victory” since then.

ALL QUIET ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT? Since the end of the war of 2006, and despite Hezbollah’s self-declared “victory,” there has been a significant fall in the tensions present on the border between Lebanon and Israel. This is not to say that there is no potential for violence or that violent incidents have not been recorded but that the low-level warfare seen in the 1990s and even in the early 2000s seems to be a thing of the past; instead it appears that a period of cold peace is under way; indeed the current calm is the longest period of stability on Israel’s northern border in 25 years. There are many possible reasons proffered in explanation of this period of calm but since this change predates the advent of the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War, there is little merit in analyzing the conflict in Syria, which has inexorably drawn the Party of God into the quagmire of supporting a key ally. While the strong commitment of the movement to al-Asad’s regime in Syria is explored in more detail in Chapter 6, it is enough here to note that this commitment to Syria is clearly an important factor that explains why Hezbollah has been, and most likely will continue to be, reluctant to provoke the Israelis and appears content with the re-establishment of “rules of the game” on the southern frontier. Clearly Hassan Nasrallah was shocked by the ferocious Israeli response caused by attempted kidnap of IDF soldiers on June 25, 2006; on July 11 he told Lebanon’s New TV Channel: “We did not think, even one percent, that the capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude . . . You ask me, if I had known on July 11 . . . that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not.”68 It is logical therefore to perceive that Hezbollah had simply miscalculated and was in no way expecting the kind of swift escalation which the Israelis embarked upon. Despite the broad peace that emerged after the 2006 war there have still been incidents on the border and it is worth considering the nature of these

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incidents in order to see what they tell us about the ongoing tensions, the development of new tactics, and the continuing importance of Israel in Hezbollah’s calculations about its position, legitimacy, and strength in Lebanon, regardless of the conflict in Syria. Two developments over the course of 2014 provide useful examples of the continuing importance for Hezbollah of demonstrating resolve and in talking up the “Zionist threat.” At the same time, however, they also demonstrate that the deterrent effects of the 2006 war remain keenly felt by the Hezbollah leadership and that Hezbollah remains in something of a dilemma. It cannot be seen to be ignoring Israeli provocations against it, and has an interest in maintaining the perception of a direct threat from Israel but its responses to the threat have to be calculated and be within the “rules” and, above all, should not give the Israelis a pretext for escalation. For much of the post-2006 period Hezbollah appeared to want maximum deniability for any attacks on the border and as such relied upon proxy groups, especially Palestinians to conduct minor, and essentially symbolic, operations against the Israelis. Even then, this was primarily confined to the specific geographic zone of the Har Dov or Sheba’a Farms region, an area of contested sovereignty that abuts the Israeli occupied Golan Heights.69 In many ways this can be seen as a safety valve for the entire border area, a zone of exception to a degree, where Hezbollah can claim legitimacy in its attacks on Israel because of the perception that this is the remaining sliver of Lebanese territory still occupied by Zionists, while Israel in turn can retaliate in a tit-for-tat manner without real fear on either side of there being an escalation. The development of the cold peace along the border does not mean that each side is unwilling to respond to the other but rules of the game between both sides have emerged. Israel still reserves the right to escalate dramatically but the tactics used by both sides are evolving, as they seek to test the limits of these rules, trying to gain an advantage against the other side while trying not to provoke the enemy into disproportionate retaliation. The Israelis calculate in terms of trying to contain Hezbollah and trying wherever to disrupt its capabilities and to gather as much intelligence as possible. For Hezbollah the propaganda utility of successful attacks against the IDF are still useful in reinforcing its legitimacy at home and in reminding the Israelis of its resolve and capabilities. It is noticeable that over the course of 2014, Hezbollah has moved away from some of the proxy attacks by allied groups and has openly claimed responsibility for operations on the border. This is in direct response to perceived Israeli overescalations against the movement and its interests. There have now been at least three Israeli airstrikes inside Syria against convoys that were reportedly shipping weaponry, notably sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles, to Hezbollah inside Lebanon. The first of these, the so-called Rif Dimashq strike, took place on January 30, 2013, against trucks

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that were assembled inside Syria’s main chemical and biological weapons research facility.70 This was followed on July 4, 2013, with further attacks targeting further shipments of missiles, this time surface–surface rockets with the capability of hitting targets deep within Israel.71 These transfers clearly broke Israel’s perceptions of where the rules of the game lay. The Israeli minister of defense, Ehud Barak, speaking in February 2013 stated: “I cannot add anything to what you’ve read in the newspapers about what happened in Syria several days ago, but I keep telling, frankly, that we’ve said—and that’s another proof that when we say something we mean it—we say that we don’t think that it should be allowable to bring advanced weapon systems into Lebanon.”72 On July 5, 2013, there were a series of mysterious explosions inside the Syrian military port at Latakia; this was explained away by Hezbollah’s Al-Manar television as being the result of local clashes and mortar fire, whereas others believe that the transfer of advanced anti-ship missiles from Russia was targeted as a potential transfer to Hezbollah.73 Hezbollah appears to have chosen essentially to ignore these strikes, yet 2014 has seen a rather different approach emerging. On February 24, 2014, an Israeli airstrike targeted another suspected missile shipment coming from Syria; this time the attack took place inside Lebanese territory on one of Hezbollah’s bases near the Syrian border at Janta. The attack led to immediate condemnation and threats from Hezbollah who issued a statement which said: “The attack confirms the nature of the Zionist hostility and requires frank and clear position from all . . . The Resistance will choose the time and place and the proper way to respond to it.” 74 Clearly for Hezbollah the bombing of Lebanese territory, even though the shipment of advanced missiles was obviously Israel’s line in the sand, represented a breach of the rules. This was no mere rhetoric from the movement either, as in mid-March a bomb exploded on the border in the Sheba’a area, targeting an Israeli patrol.75 There were no casualties from the incident and Israel responded by shelling a Hezbollah position. What was interesting about this incident is that Hezbollah not only responded, clearly, because of the fact that the Israeli airstrike took place inside Lebanon but in addition because it chose to publicly declare responsibility for the roadside bomb that targeted IDF troops. In early April 2014 Nasrallah stated: “The Israelis understood the message very well. The story here is not about rules of the game, but rather about deterrence . . . you hit a military target and the resistance responded by hitting a military target.” This is an interesting statement that confirms the nature of the game on the border. Needless to say Nasrallah could not resist some further flourish with the words: “This was not the reply, but this was part of the reply.”76 Despite this though, it is instructive to note that he also felt the need to try to reassure the Lebanese population that his actions in this instance would not provoke the Israelis to escalate thus guaranteeing pain for civilians, noting “that the intention is not to

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spark a violent confrontation, rather to highlight the balance of deterrence.”77 In October 2014 Hezbollah once more publicly claimed responsibility for a similar attack against IDF soldiers on the border, again in the Sheba’a area. While this attack could perhaps be seen as an expression of wider anger with Israeli activities,78 it was probably more retaliation not for an airstrike but for two incidents in September. The first came when a Hezbollah engineer was killed while trying to remove a booby-trapped Israeli listening device from Hezbollah’s communications network; it is telling that Hezbollah announced that the unit responsible for the attack was named the “Ali Hassan Martyr Unit,” after the engineer killed on September 5. There were also reports of a drone strike when another Israeli listening device was found and, also in September, of an Israeli drone malfunctioning and crashing inside Lebanon, thus giving Hezbollah a range of potential justifications for the attack.79 This time the Hezbollah bomb injured the two soldiers who were trying to defuse it, while another IED exploded harmlessly nearby soon after. Israel responded by shelling areas inside Lebanon.80 The incident is interesting, because it was claimed by Hezbollah, with the movement’s deputy leader, Sheikh Naim Qassem, announcing on Lebanese television: “This is a message . . . Even though we are busy in Syria and on the eastern front in Lebanon our eyes remain open and our resistance is ready to confront the Israeli enemy.”81 He went on to say: “The Sheba Farms is an occupied territory and it is our legitimate right to carry out actions to liberate it”82; clearly Hezbollah wanted to gain the benefit from being seen to still be attacking Israel from its own constituencies within Lebanon, while at the same time ensuring that its attack would be seen as being more legitimate by targeting the only part of Lebanon that was perceived to be occupied, and reducing to the minimum the chances of the Israelis being able to disproportionately escalate. The timing of the incident on October 7 is also significant coming as it did on the 14th anniversary of Hezbollah’s successful kidnap of three Israeli soldiers in the same area in 2000.83 Clearly there was a desire to send a message, or what has been termed “a breaking of the silence,”84 for while quiet on the border is good, after eight years there is a danger of it appearing that Hezbollah has been cowed by the Israelis, necessitating a more active policy from the movement. While these recent attacks appear to show Hezbollah moving onto the front foot once more on the border, the best part of a decade now has actually been marked by a high level of acceptance of the rules by both sides. Yet since the rules evolve, there has also been experimentation about the limits of those rules, as well as an acceptance of other aspects. It is clear then that Hezbollah will tolerate Israeli air incursions of Lebanese airspace and even a degree of mock attacks. For Israel air superiority is vital for its security; it seems Hezbollah accepts this because of the low level of rhetoric

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on the issue and because of the absence of attacks/retaliation that correlate with Israeli air incursions. This does not mean to say that Hezbollah do not wish to be able to reply in kind; more that it is not possible for them to do so. This has led to the movement attempting, like the Israelis, to focus on intelligence gathering, the potential for assassination, and testing Israel’s defenses for weaknesses, both away from the border and inside Israel itself. Thus we have seen a number of attempts to recruit Israeli Arabs to collect information for Hezbollah, as well as a series of Israeli arrests of Israeli Arabs who were reportedly either gathering intelligence and passing it on to Hezbollah, smuggling weapons including C4 explosives, or engaged in drug-dealing, which was linked to Hezbollah. 85 These activities not only help to insert a wedge between Israeli Arabs and Jews but also add usefully to revenues, information, and the pressure upon Israeli security services, showing that Hezbollah has not gone away. These kinds of operations change the nature of the game, adding a new playing field without necessarily forcing the other side into escalations. Additionally, Hezbollah has spent time developing drones that can be used to test Israeli defenses. Managing to get well within Israeli airspace probably has relatively few military advantages for Hezbollah but it represents a significant publicity coup when the drones can get through, advertising both Israeli weakness and Hezbollah’s technological prowess. This happened in April 2013 when the IDF said it had shot down a drone near Haifa, although on this occasion Hezbollah publicly denied any involvement. There is evidence that Hezbollah used two armed drones during the 2006 war but these have not been deployed over Israel since, undoubtedly because it could act as a trigger for major escalation. 86 In 2012 a drone, which on this occasion Hezbollah admitted deploying, managed to reach the northern reaches of the Negev desert, perhaps seeking to surveil the Israeli nuclear sites at Dimona, before being shot down.87 Nasrallah boasted: “Possession of such an aerial capacity is a first in the history of any resistance movement in Lebanon and the region . . . It’s not the first time and it will not be the last. We can reach all the zones [of Israel].”88 Clearly, the use of drones is important for the movement, proving that it can compete with Israel in terms of military technology, although it seems likely the drones originate mainly from Iran rather than being the work of Hezbollah technicians. Reports indicate that Hezbollah has at least 200 drones89; indeed the latest development is the news that Hezbollah has successfully carried out airstrikes using drones on the al-Qaeda affiliate group in Syria, Jabat al-Nusra,90 marking not only the first use of these weapons by a nonstate actor but also clearly offering a reason for the Israelis to worry about this threat from Hezbollah and adding to the group’s deterrent capabilities against Israel.

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The fact that Israel’s “Operation Protective Edge” in Gaza over the summer of 2014, launched in response to rocket fire coming from the area, which subsequently exposed of the presence of a plan to use a series of tunnels under the border to attack Israeli targets en masse and potentially kidnap hundreds of Israeli citizens,91 meant that it was not unreasonable to think that Hezbollah may have been planning a similar strategy or perhaps even had plans to co-ordinate with Hamas.92 It is interesting then that we know that Hezbollah has an extensive network of tunnels and underground bunkers in southern Lebanon93 but that IDF searches for potential tunnels crossing the border into Israel94 appear to have turned up nothing so far.95 This seeming absence of tunnels perhaps demonstrates that Hezbollah already knew that some ways of pushing the rules were not worth the risk, a message that the assault against Hamas in 2014 can only have reinforced.96 Despite the fact that, as seen above, there have been more incidents on the border during 2014, whether or not Hezbollah was attempting to communicate to its domestic constituencies that it has not forgotten about Israel, trying to send a message to the Israelis that there is “no more carte blanche for the IDF in Lebanon,”97 or both of these things at the same time. It still appears that even before getting involved in the Syrian imbroglio the movement had rather less appetite after the war of 2006 for taking on the Israelis in anything like open combat. One of the most intriguing aspects of the current quiet along the Lebanese-Israeli border is the failure of Hezbollah to respond to the Israeli assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, who went by the nom de guerre of al-Hajj Radwan in Damascus on February 12, 2008. Immediately after the death of Mughniyeh, Hezbollah sent its own unit of investigators who conducted their own enquiries in parallel to those of the Syrian authorities, initially having suspected the Syrians themselves of the killing.98 It had clearly been a shock that the Israelis99 had managed to pull off such a coup, killing a man whom Hezbollah denied all knowledge of and who had successfully been able to evade capture while traveling all around the Middle East, and was even reported to have undergone plastic surgery to change his appearance.100 Mughniyeh was a target of great importance, a senior Hezbollah member and a trusted coordinator who had most likely been among the Party’s founders in the 1980s, and was strongly believed by Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies to be behind a number of high-profile terrorist attacks on Western targets. He was probably the second most important person inside the Party101 and was posthumously given the title “leader of the two victories” by Nasrallah in recognition of his role in the 2006 war and the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000.102 In the aftermath of the 2006 war, which had so degraded Hezbollah’s capabilities, he had been placed in charge of rebuilding and enhancing the military capabilities of the Party’s military wing so that it could face Israel again in any future conflict.

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This failure to reply to the assassination of Mughniyeh by attacking across the border with Israel has led to speculation that the 2006 war was far more devastating for Hezbollah than many had perceived.103 Since it is clearly impossible for Israel to target every missile and bunker inside Lebanon or to sit back and accept whatever Hezbollah decides to throw at it, the disproportionate response seen in 2006 both degraded Hezbollah’s military capabilities, damaged its political position in Lebanon, and had a seemingly strong psychological effect on the movement. Despite the continuing quiet on the border there is significant evidence that Hezbollah did attempt to exact revenge but rather than seeking to escalate directly against the IDF and use its rocket arsenal to target Israeli civilians, it sought instead to hit Israeli targets elsewhere. Arguably this choice of retaliation strategy can be explained by the continuing deterrent effect of the 2006 war, which has effectively forced Hezbollah back toward terrorism on the regional and global level. If it has no chance of getting revenge without running the risk of inviting massive Israeli escalation which would weaken the movement’s military and political position inside Lebanon, then the only option is to resort to tit-for-tat assassinations of Israeli figures, the targeting of Israeli interests overseas, or the indiscriminate killing of Israeli citizens or Jews in general in order to demonstrate that it has global reach and to act as a deterrent against further Israeli assassinations. Hezbollah sees its failure to retaliate effectively rather differently, although given the level of rhetoric after the assassination and the rapid elevation of Mughniyeh to the front rank of martyrs, it is rather difficult to conceive of the attempted terrorist attacks overseas as being commensurate with the level of rhetorical outpouring. At al-Hajj Radwan’s funeral, attended by the Iranian foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, Hassan Nasrallah’s speech soared as he promised “open war” with Israel. The Israelis appeared to think “his death would lead to the destruction of the resistance . . . but they are wrong, the blood of Imad Mughniyeh will make them [Israel] withdraw from existence.” “Zionists,” he threatened, “if you want this sort of open war, then let the whole world hear, so be it!”104 Israel increased its troops on the border with Lebanon but as we have seen little happened. Given their response to the Israeli assassination of Abbas Mussawi, the movement’s secretary-general in February 1992, which led to both the Buenos Aires and Ankara terrorist attacks, and a period of enhanced activities on Israel’s northern border with the first Katyusha rocket attacks on northern Israel from Lebanon since 1982, which “managed to disrupt life in the north for almost a week,”105 it is odd that the death of the second most important person in Hezbollah failed to elicit a more impressive reaction from the movement, hitting the Israelis in their own homeland. Hezbollah would suggest that this failure to respond to the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh was perhaps the “will of god,” that there was some more grand-scale strategic plot to extract revenge or that part of the

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revenge was to keep the threat of impending attacks hanging over Israel’s head. As Matthew Levitt puts it: “the absence of an attack, then, was not a sign of failure but of a master plan.”106 Yet this failure to respond to the death of Mughniyeh is also mirrored in the group’s weak response to the assassination of Hassan al-Laqqis, reportedly the group’s head of weaponry and procurement. Al-Laqqis was killed on December 3, 2013, shot in the head outside his home in an attack described as “professional.”107 The killing was claimed by a previously unheard of group calling itself the Ahrar al-Sunna Baalbek Brigade, and also later on by the Lebanon-based and al-Qaeda-affiliated Abdullah Azzam Brigades, which Nasrallah later declared he believed was a real group linked to Saudi intelligence.108 Despite this, Hezbollah was quick to blame Israel, although the Israelis denied responsibility for the assassination.109 The death of al-Laqqis raises questions about Hezbollah’s security protocols given the group’s reputation for thoroughness and awareness. Hezbollah was clearly rather complacent given its perceived territorial control over key areas of Lebanon, despite the continuing threat from Israel and from militant Sunni groups. Even if the group that claimed responsibility for the killing is an Israeli fiction, the fact that Nasrallah assigned responsibility to Israel, which Israel denies—a foreign ministry spokesman stating: “Hezbollah has made a fool of itself in the past with these automatic and groundless accusations against Israel . . . If they are looking for explanations as to what is happening to them, they should examine their own actions”110—puts further pressure on Hezbollah to be seen to retaliate against Israel. While the formula of hanging revenge over Israel may seem initially attractive, there is a danger that if you do not follow through on your threats it will reduce your deterrent reputation against Israel and your reputation inside Lebanon. This places Hezbollah in an awkward position; the failure of Hezbollah to respond along the border and the lack of a successful revenge attack being carried out elsewhere in the world could in fact be seen as weakness. Given all of this then, it is reasonable to think that the movement has been effectively deterred by the 2006 war,111 but one must also think of the public pronouncement of the Israeli determination to escalate in order to deter, with what has become known as its “Dahiya Doctrine,”112 as well as the seeming implementation of elements of the doctrine against Hamas in Gaza. Since 2006, there have been five significant Israeli operations in the Strip against Hamas, some more discriminating than others: Operations “Hot Winter” 2008, “Cast Lead” 2009, “Returning Echo” 2012, “Pillar of Defence” 2012, and “Protective Edge” 2014. Some of these have been perceived as being so severe that many have referred to these operations using the epithet, war. Significantly, these have been justified by Israel on the basis of the indiscriminate firing of rockets at Israel, which has become a red line for Tel Aviv and has invited these IDF operations against Hamas, coupled

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with significant levels of pain for Gazan civilians. It is very noticeable that despite Hezbollah’s seeming commitment to the Palestinian cause and its links with Hamas, it has not lifted a finger to assist the Gazans during these repeated Israeli incursions, airstrikes, and in the face of the continuing Israeli blockade of the strip. Indeed, the wider sectarian issues of the Middle East appear to be dividing Hezbollah and Hamas; in late May 2014 it was reported that all Hamas operatives were ordered out of Lebanon, a story denied by Hezbollah but given that the group had already been told to leave Damascus by the alAsad regime, one which had some potential ring of truth.113 On Hezbollah’s self-declared Al Quds (Jerusalem) Day on July 25 in the middle of Israel’s operation in Gaza, Hassan Nasrallah made a speech, as Hezbollah’s resistance identity dictates, denouncing Israel, in which he stated: “We, in Hezbollah, stand beside the Palestinian people and the Palestinian resistance without an exception. We will not spare any means of support that we can and are able to provide. We feel that we are true partners with the Palestinian resistance. . . . Your victory is our own.”114 Despite the rhetoric it is hard to see what support Hezbollah provided to Gaza in the face of the Israeli onslaught; this in turn damages its resistance identity. All of this appears to show that the so-called Dahiya Doctrine, or rather the belief in the existence of this doctrine of disproportionate retaliation,115 named as it is after the southern Beirut suburb and Hezbollah stronghold targeted, causing great destruction, by the Israelis during the 2006 war, has effectively forced the Party of God to rethink its strategy in its war against Israel.

THE RETURN TO TERROR? Recent years have seen a considerable increase in terrorist attacks, both thwarted and successful, which have been attributed to Hezbollah. There had been something of a consensus emerging over the late 1990s and early 2000s that Hezbollah had moved on from its terrorist roots and was abandoning this tactic as its conventional capabilities increased; this was also put down to the Party’s growing stake in politics inside Lebanon. It is of course debatable whether Hezbollah ever abandoned terrorist tactics entirely but there is perhaps some truth in the picture of a rise and then decline in the use of terrorist tactics by the group. Although, at the same time it also makes sense to some extent to differentiate between the terrorism directed against Israel, against internal opponents within Lebanon, and that used against the West, which saw the most significant decline over the 1990s. It can be argued that the decline in Hezbollah’s use of terrorism as a tactic that occurred over the late 1990s and into the first years of the twenty-first century mirrored events and wider changes in the Middle East. Thus we saw more conventional warfare with Israel on the border, the

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Palestinian-Israeli peace process which only fundamentally broke down with the advent of the Al-Aqsa intifada in 2000, the rise of reformists in Iran, the peace dividend from the end of the Lebanese Civil War, Hezbollah’s increased political engagement in Lebanon, and the seeming delegitimation of terrorism, especially in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (combined of course with the fear of the activist U.S. foreign policy which followed) all acting to some degree to reduce the attractions of terrorism as a tool and tactic for the Party of God during these years. Notwithstanding examples of terrorism either attempted, carried out by, or attributed to Hezbollah during this earlier period of relative calm, since the mid-2000s there has been a considerable upsurge in the number of terrorist incidents, both attempted and successful, which have been attributed to Hezbollah and what is most interesting is the global reach of these operations. It is difficult to identify the cause of this upswing in activity, which is clearly the result of a number of factors changing both in the Middle East and within Lebanon during these years: from the Cedar Revolution threatening Hezbollah’s position, to the rise of the Conservatives and President Ahmadinejad in Iran, alongside the global concern over Tehran’s nuclear program which led to a belief that Iran was using its Hezbollah proxy to distract attention and to demonstrate its power. It is however, noticeable that much of the upswing occurred after the 2006 war. Some of the attempted attacks are known to have been planned in retaliation for the killing of Imad Mughniyeh; others have had less clear objectives and have in fact exposed Hezbollah to condemnation. The fact that many of these operations have been thwarted is also of note. Clearly after 9/11 and considerable investment into counter-terrorism globally, as well as with higher public and government awareness, it has become harder to conduct attacks. Failed attacks have also exposed Hezbollah’s networks globally, resulting in damage to its capabilities, and have also harmed the movement’s reputation. Thus a list of some of the most prominent Hezbollah operations of the past decade or so displays a real return to terrorism inside Lebanon and overseas, with the particular trope of targeting Israeli targets overseas. The list below does not itemize actual or perceived support for Palestinian terrorist attacks during the Al-Aqsa intifada, which received strong rhetorical support from Hezbollah.116 • 2005—The assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri (and 21 others) in a car bombing in Beirut117 • 2008—Car bomb on a U.S. embassy vehicle in Beirut • 2008 (February)—Baku, Azerbaijan, plot thwarted, which was targeting the Israeli embassy118 • 2008–09—A plot blamed on Hezbollah in Egypt in which attacks were purportedly planned against Israeli and Egyptian targets in the Sinai Peninsula and possibly Israeli ships transiting the Suez Canal

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• 2009—In Turkey, foiled plot by Turkish security agencies, which was to target U.S. and Israeli interests119 • 2011 (May)—Report of an attack wounding eight civilians in Istanbul was a failed Hezbollah attempt to assassinate the Israeli Consul • 2012 (January)—In Bangkok, Thailand, an attempt was discovered to plant bombs at a spot popular with Israeli tourists • 2012—In Cyprus, attack on Israeli tourists foiled120 • 2012 (January)—Burgas bus bombing that killed six Israeli tourists in Bulgaria • 2012 (January)—Baku, Azerbaijan, another plot targeting the Israeli Embassy is discovered, along with other Jewish targets • 2012 (February)—In New Delhi, India, an Israeli embassy car was blown up near the embassy • 2012 (February)—In Tiblisi, Georgia, a bomb was found in an embassy car • 2012 (February)—In Bangkok, Thailand, plan to target an embassy vehicle thrwarted • 2012 (March)—In Baku, Azerbaijan, plot to target the Israeli and U.S. embassies and Western companies • 2013 (May)—In Nigeria, four suspected Hezbollah militants were arrested and an arms cache discovered with a suspected plot to attack U.S. and Israeli targets121 • 2014 (April)—In Bangkok, Thailand, plot to target Israeli tourists during the Passover celebrations was foiled with the arrest of two suspects122 • 2014 (October)—In Lima, Peru, plot to target Israeli and Jewish interests was foiled by local security agencies123

These give some of the flavor of those attacks thought to be most closely associated with Hezbollah, given that the Party works so closely with Iran it is likely that a number of other planned attacks may have had some level of Hezbollah involvement.124 The return to terrorism is clearly somewhat difficult to disentangle from the Iranian link; this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, but it is also important to retain a Hezbollah perspective on this; clearly at least some of these attempts are aimed at avenging the death of Mughniyeh and at demonstrating to the Israelis that the organization has reach and has not gone away. Yet, given the current situation of effective stalemate and degree of mutual deterrence on the Israeli-Lebanese border, as well as the essential impossibility of Hezbollah actually being able to defeat the IDF, in order to achieve its ultimate objectives Hezbollah effectively has little choice but to conceptualize of the conflict with Israel as being a form of long war125 in which it should preserve its strength, attack wherever possible without inviting unnecessary retaliation and where simply not being defeated is a form of victory in itself. This form of warfare entails numerous problems for the Party within Lebanon and in the conflict with Israel itself. Ironically, it may well be the case that as Hezbollah became better equipped, trained, and organized, on paper it needed terrorist tactics less

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and less. Yet, given the way in which it became a more conventional force while at the same time becoming more embedded in Lebanese politics has actually served to impose new calculations and realities upon the movement. Its rocket arsenal has become so formidable that to use it in anger when (1) it might not easily be replaced and (2) when it would represent such a threat to Israel that it would immediately invite massive retaliation poses a severe dilemma for Hezbollah. The new reality has essentially caught the group in a situation where its very strength in the conventional military sphere may well have led to it being able to effectively deploy that strength (both in terms of rockets and its fighters) without necessarily being severely weakened as a result of a conventional war with Israel but also of inviting massive retaliation and damaging its constituency and legitimacy while still not being able to defeat Israel militarily. The difficulty of taking Israel on along the northern border then effectively forces the Party backward into re-embracing terrorist tactics and practicing warfare by other means, in order to continue to fulfill the requirements of the ideology of resistance.

MEDIA STRATEGY—WAR BY OTHER MEANS This chapter has concentrated extensively on the evolution of Hezbollah’s military capabilities and its activities both against the Israelis and the West, and while the movement’s hard power capabilities remain a significant part of the group’s power and reputation, it is often their ability to leverage these abilities through the judicious application of propaganda and spin that has been an important part of the movement’s power over the years. It is therefore important to think about these capabilities as part, not only of the movement’s power to influence (both inside and outside of Lebanon) but also as an integral part of its war-making capabilities. When it comes to the media Hezbollah has developed an impressive range of capabilities. Most famously of course the movement has its own satellite TV channel Al Manar (the lighthouse/beacon) established in 1989 but it also has a radio station Al Noor (the light) and a network of websites. There are also newspapers favorable to Hezbollah and one controlled directly by them, the weekly newspaper Al Intiqad (Critique), which was established as far back as June 1984, as the more overtly Shi’a and Islamic Al Ahd (the pledge) and a monthly magazine Baqiyatu Allah (what stays with God). This array of media capabilities fitted into the rhetoric of the “four campaigns,” which Hezbollah embarked upon with Al Noor being established in the midst of the “Amal-Hezbollah war when a group of young Hezbollah followers spontaneously began to broadcast news of the conflict.”126 When one examines the organizational structure of the movement it is clear that propaganda and informational activities are accorded great importance. Hezbollah’s executive council controls eight separate units

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(which in fact look rather like ministries in another context); these include: finance, education, health, social affairs, external relations and informational activities.127 The fact that propaganda is embedded within the structure of the organization and is given such importance is testament to the role that media plays in the modern world. Hezbollah recognized this fact early in its existence. Especially from the early 1990s Hezbollah accepted the need to spread its influence in other ways and knowing the power, in particular, of media in enabling it, at the minimum, to cement its position among the Shi’a part of the Lebanese population, it chose to invest heavily in this area. It was obvious that a good media strategy could benefit the Party by strengthening its position in society, justifying its continued maintenance of its militia, while at the same time allowing resistance against Israeli occupation to be pursued by a diversity of means. According to Olfa Lamloum, Hezbollah has: The most organized and wide-ranging media structure of any Islamist grouping, Shiite or Sunni, in the Arab world. Terrestrial and satellite television channels, radio, newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, production companies, internet sites, not to mention theatre companies, musical ensembles and representational iconography: all these are tools deployed in its quest to occupy and control a space of representation and meaning defining what it has dubbed the Society of Resistance.128

One of the innovations brought about by Hezbollah was having camera teams embedded with resistance units making assaults on Israeli and South Lebanese Army positions inside the “security zone” in southern Lebanon. The tapes of these operations were then broadcast on Al Manar, creating a certain glamor, spurring recruitment and acting as evidence of Hezbollah’s claims to be effectively fighting the Israelis. They also no doubt served to reinforce the movement’s coercive capabilities and its will to use them, thereby cementing Hezbollah’s power in the Shi’a community and beyond. Over time Hezbollah’s media capabilities came to be used both to send messages to wider audiences and to attempt to try to remove some of the tarnish that the movement’s reputation had acquired both from some of its actions during the Civil War but also to begin to attempt to dispel the message which was in the heads of the wider world that the movement was about terrorism and fanaticism. By operating in the shadows for so long Hezbollah had allowed this message to gain traction and over time the movement began to feel strongly that its “war against Israel was being falsely portrayed”129; much of the movement’s media strategy during the 1990s was an attempt to reach wider audiences and to convince them of the justness of their cause in removing Israel from Lebanese soil. It is noticeable that the rhetoric about attacking Israel at home or wiping out Israel, which played well at home and in the Arab world, was considerably less visible when reaching out to global audiences.

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Hezbollah’s media strategy is clearly one of propaganda, often of a crude but effective kind, but it has evolved and grown more sophisticated over time not just to target support from the Shi’a of Lebanon but to target “new audiences in and beyond Lebanon.” According to Muhamad Haidar, the head of Al Manar from 1996 to 2000, they aimed to target “five groups: the resistance fighters and their families, the Lebanese community at large . . . the wider Arab world, the Israelis . . . and the International Community.”130 Without doubt they had considerable success with many of these audiences; Hezbollah’s actions emphasized and promoted through its media network have gained it widespread legitimacy in Lebanon even amongst rival sects and have certainly made the world take greater notice of the movement. For the Israelis, Hezbollah’s ability to compete for “audience share” and in the process of contribute to the deligitimization of the Jewish State is increasingly worrying. As is the movement’s ability to use the messages it sends to communicate directly with Israeli citizens and to try to undermine political and military resolve in Israel, which represents a rather different type of threat for the Israeli government. By the 2000s then, Hezbollah’s media strategy was one of growing sophistication with impressive international and regional reach and an audience that was expanding among Sunnis across the Middle East in the wake of the perceived Hezbollah victory in the 2006 war. The media strategy, bolstered by Hezbollah’s performance during the war, meant that “Hezbollah and its General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah grew into folk heroes of the Arab Street . . . [in a] survey conducted in March 2008 . . . in Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates . . . most respondents named Hassan Nasrallah as their most admired leader worldwide.”131 This has undoubtedly changed somewhat as a result of Hezbollah’s entry into the Syrian quagmire and the increased sectarianism in the region. A recent poll taken in three Gulf States (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) not only showed that a majority backed a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine problem, but that only 13 percent of Saudis have an even “fairly positive” view of Hezbollah, although Emiratis at 15 percent and Kuwaitis at 24 percent are somewhat higher.132 This represents a significant decline in the group’s legitimacy across the Sunni Middle East but does not necessarily mean that the value of its propaganda and media strategy has become worthless. Indeed, the media strategy is an integral part of the movement’s overall philosophy and that of how it conducts its military campaigns.

HEZBOLLAH’S PHILOSOPHY OF WAR There are a number of key lessons to be taken from this chapter’s study of Hezbollah’s ideology of resistance, its application of violence through terrorism or more regular ways of fighting. These are perhaps best summed up

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in the movement’s 13 Principles of Warfare, which give us an excellent insight into Hezbollah’s thought processes and wider philosophy, and not just in the military sense. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Avoid the strong, attack the weak—attack and withdraw! Protecting our fighters is more important than causing enemy casualties! Strike only when success is assured! Surprise is essential to success. If you are spotted, you’ve failed! Don’t get into a set-piece battle. Slip away like smoke, before the enemy can drive home his advantage. Attaining the goal demands patience, in order to discover the enemy’s weak points! Keep moving, avoid formation of a front line! Keep the enemy on constant alert, at the front and in the rear! The road to the great victory passes through thousands of small victories! Keep up the morale of the fighters, avoid notions of the enemy’s superiority! The media has innumerable guns, whose hits are like bullets. Use them in the battle! The population is a treasure—nurture it! Hurt the enemy, and then stop before he abandons restraint!133

As can be seen from this list, Hezbollah’s philosophy of warfare is very much like those of other guerrilla movements, incrementalist, playing to their own strengths, engaging on their own terms, and necessitating the support of a population. One must however also bear in mind that the way in which this philosophy is couched also represents a degree of propaganda. Yet there does seem to be a relatively high degree of fidelity between this list and the way in which Hezbollah has operated, particularly from the early 1990s onward. It is though difficult to see that it will always be able to adhere to these principles, especially as it fights in the Syrian Civil War that has become increasingly characterized by frontlines, divided populations, and the abandonment of restraint. Despite this, these 13 Principles do provide a good insight not only into how Hezbollah views its military force and the campaign against Israel but also into how its wider activities, especially in Lebanon, might also be practiced.

CONCLUSION This chapter aimed to highlight the role and evolution of Hezbollah’s military capabilities, emphasizing the importance of the ideology and narrative of resistance for the movement, as well as the ongoing need for it to retain its coercive capabilities more generally. Hezbollah has been both ruthless and pragmatic, has moderated its stances and clung to dogma; the Party eludes simple characterization, yet the resistance identity and Hezbollah’s coercive capacity remains at the heart of the movement’s reputation

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and power. In 1996, appearing on LBC TV, a Christian station, Hassan Nasrallah, reaching out to wider Lebanese society by appearing in a debate with a Christian host to discuss the politics and ideology of Hezbollah, said this: The Resistance is our right as much as it is yours. It is our duty and it is your duty. We are fighting on behalf of a people, a nation and a government. Let us look at our experiences. Between 1982 and 1985, Israel withdrew from a large sector of the land which it occupied. Who do you think forced it to withdraw to its current “security zone”? Gemayel? Negotiations? The Americans? The United Nations Security Council? The Arab League? Only the resistance forced it to withdraw. If [Lebanon] has or wields any power in the peace process, it is solely because of its Resistance. Our conviction is that negotiations do not liberate land and the greatest example of this is what is currently going on between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Where has it got them? We believe and consider the Resistance to be the only way.134

This sums up the centrality of the resistance ideology for Hezbollah and the need for the movement to retain its coercive capabilities. The ongoing debate in the literature between those who view the Party of God through the prism of its ability to compromise and its political, Lebanized and pragmatic elements are correct to highlight these facts, but playing down its roots, its wilder side and the reality of its past (and ongoing) crimes misses something fundamental about the movement’s DNA. Just as those who focus on the terroristic and violent side of Hezbollah miss much of the politics of the movement and its ability to be shaped by its environment as well as to shape it. There can be no denying that Hezbollah is a powerful organization with significant capabilities for violence, yet at the same time it is clear that Hezbollah has learnt to use its military strength in more nuanced ways and to complement it with other strategies. For as it has discovered the power that comes from the barrel of a gun can be very effective indeed, but is no guarantee of long-term success or security. Indeed, the very gun you hold can be deligitimized and may not be sufficient on its own to protect your interests. In order to defend your right to those arms and to secure people’s loyalty to your movement and its goals there is a need to go beyond coercion and engage in persuasion. This can be seen in Hezbollah’s evolving media strategy but has also necessitated the movement’s engagement in politics both in terms of the local delivery of goods and services needed by its constituency and through more formal structures of governance, including competing at the ballot box.

4 R

Hezbollah as Socio-political Actor

This chapter explores Hezbollah’s role in Lebanese politics and society. The first section of the chapter explores the position of the movement in society and the second traces its involvement in politics. Hezbollah as an Islamist social movement is based around its natural constituency among the Shi’a, which necessitates a strong level of social engagement that is designed to benefit and shore up its base, thus enabling its other activities. Its social activities in a wide range of spheres naturally led it over time into a wider political engagement in Lebanon to represent and defend the interests of itself and its constituency. The chapter is therefore drawn back into the debates about what Hezbollah seeks to gain from these activities and whether or not its engagement in these spheres is a positive or negative phenomenon. Clearly this is an extremely complex area and is influenced by Hezbollah’s pragmatic and ideological tendencies, as well as by its wider environment. Thus while tracing Hezbollah’s journey from small-scale welfare provision into what is widely referred to as a “state within a state,”1 to its role in the government of Lebanon, the chapter also seeks to engage in analysis of Hezbollah’s activities in the social and political realms, highlighting what these engagements mean for the Party of God and how they both constrain and enable the Party.

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HEZBOLLAH AS A SOCIAL ACTOR The Ideology and Identity of Oppression As we saw in the previous chapter, Hezbollah’s resistance identity is extremely important; indeed as its 2004 local elections manifesto states, one of their aims is: “consolidating the resistance society (in order to substantiate the already existing ‘resistance identity’).”2 There is therefore a great deal of overlap between this resistance identity and Hezbollah’s social actions in Lebanon in terms of framing and common purpose. Just as resistance is framed against oppression, so the desire for better services, less poverty, better education, and fuller representation is also framed in this wider discourse of struggle. Thus Hezbollah’s provision of elements of these services either directly through its own networks and structures or through the state structures that it controls (many municipalities in Shi’a areas) or over which it has influence, forms a central part of its approach both practical and ideological. A reputation for delivery, accessibility, responsiveness, and incorruptibility is a key element of the movement’s appeal to its base and its strategy to create this “resistance society” or mujtamaa almuqawama. Yet this direct facilitation of social care is not enough on its own; it has to be packaged correctly within a wider narrative. This narrative comes from the movement’s origins both in Shi’a Islam, and in the particularistic “Third Worldist” vision advocated by Ayatollah Khomeini.3 The resistance society therefore cannot be based on good works alone; it also has to be about identity, narrative, and belonging—although social activities can be leveraged to assist in this process. The Party therefore has created a wider narrative of oppression as part of its efforts to create solidarity and common feeling amongst the Shi’a (as well as other particularly left-wing movements who are useful allies). This has been a three-stage process both with the Party and amongst those who are within the Shi’a community more broadly, and on a less important level among wider audiences both within and outside of Lebanon. In Party, solidarity mechanisms such as the “Martyrs Association,” which “offers benefits to the martyrs’ families and those who are taken into custody . . . benefits provided by the Martyrs Association include free food, various living essentials, and a higher status than the average Lebanese (because a family member, or two or even three, were martyrs)” are important symbols of solidarity, as are institutionalized mechanisms of remembrance and respect for these individuals.4 On both a party and wider communal level publicly organized celebration of festivals such as ashura and mantams, or sacred public meetings are crucial: Matams are religious sanctuaries that now serve as political and social gatherings. For Hezbollah, matams function as group communication centers (Pinault, 1992). Matams are essential to share about the jihad and Hezbollah’s

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outlook on the holy war. Islamic observances are organized in matams, and all devout Shi’ites attend these gatherings in which persuasion is exerted continually by Hezbollah leaders.5

These, along with other religious tools, days of remembrance for Jerusalem, denunciation of enemies (the oppressors), group symbolism in terms of portraits and flags, and even a resistance museum6 all help to create a more unified Shi’a community which is shaped by Hezbollah’s discourse and is grateful for the goods and services provided by the Party. With this solid base Hezbollah can then further use its rhetoric to reach out to other audiences. Thus from the outset when it addressed its “Open Letter” to the “Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World,” in which a necessarily simplistic worldview is expressed which categorizes people into oppressors and the oppressed, making a simple binary choice for the listener. In doing so “Hizbullah has triumphantly portrayed itself as a Lebanese nationalist political party working in favour of the ‘wretched of the earth,’ the relatively deprived, irrespective of their communal identity, political affiliation, or sectarian-confessional belonging.”7 It can be said that the interface of rhetoric, group feeling, identity, and reality combine not only to give Hezbollah the opportunity to provide goods and services but also to exploit existing realities in society. There is, for example, evidence that average incomes for Shi’as are below those of other sects and some have argued that populism rather than simply religious feeling is central to Hezbollah’s politics and strategy in the social sphere: “[t]he ‘people’ going against the existing power structure is central to populists. The struggle against a perceived ‘elite’ responsible for political exclusion represents the major outcry of the movement”8 and enables mobilization. Providing social care not only reinforces bonds but further demonstrates that the “other” is not willing or able to do so. The fact that the Shi’a populations of Lebanon are heavily concentrated in the south and in the Bekaa Valley further facilitates this strategy, in both practical and ideological ways. As Daniel Meier shows: “[Hezbollah’s] religious ideology and its political and military resistance work together, succeeding in the building of Shi’i ’asabiyat [solidarity]. This process shows how the borderland area of South Lebanon was a resource for its political identity building thanks to the presence of an ‘enemy entity’ and in the meantime affected the evolution of its identity, its political definition and the scope of its action.”9 Hezbollah have had a number of advantages and have been quick to take advantage of them in order to solidify their support and create an identity based on a mixture of Shi’a Islam, othering, deprivation and a narrative of oppression which facilitates their goals.10 We should also not forget that “[t]he concept of istid`aaf (oppression) unites the ‘social’ with the political and is a concept drawn directly from religious teachings”11; this religious dimension can be overlooked when examining

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this discourse but it pervades the social provision Hezbollah gives in order to keep society on the right track. This overall worldview of oppression has then shaped an identity and ideology of resistance, which in turn shapes (and is shaped by) obligations in the social sphere to find ways of overcoming imbalances and improving the lives of the poor, and especially poor Shi’as. In this sense then we find ourselves with strong resonances of the social movement theories discussed in reference to Hezbollah in Chapter 2. This time though, an examination of what form the need to satisfy a constituency, in order to secure support, by the provision of goods and services takes is the focus. This in turn feeds into a wider project of ideological dissemination and reinforcement, which is crucial to Hezbollah’s religious and resistance goals, as well as satisfying its ideological foundations in the ideal of countering marginalization and oppression.

PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES Like many Islamist movements Hezbollah has long seen providing material assistance to its supporters and natural constituency not only as a religious duty but also as a critical means of spreading the word of god and of building a base from which to operate. Thus, just like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza, and other movements throughout the Muslim world, Hezbollah has been providing goods and services to the population for decades. Hezbollah operates in three broad areas dealing with the provision of goods and services. These are divided into quasi ministries for health, education and social work more broadly, which involves a good deal of public work activities. This is in addition to services directly aimed at fighters and their families including a separate organization catering for the needs of widows.12 In each of these areas there are specialist organizations overseeing individual programs of activities. In the earliest years one of the reasons for providing these services was as Hassan Nasrallah put it: “to keep the people on their land, to prevent emigration from the villages”13 thus to keep their geographic base in the south to better enable the resistance. Since then the provision of social services has spread to other areas and has also been opened up to any Lebanese, whether Shi’a or not, living in those districts. In this way, social provision has always been both goal and identity oriented; it also reflects the reality that “[a]ccording to the United Nations Development Program, 35 percent of Lebanese live below the satisfaction threshold, the majority of which are Shi’a” 14 ; this marginalized and poverty-stricken group naturally responds to those who attempt to alleviate their situation. Hezbollah’s social provision has grown organically in concentric circles from its fighters, to their families, to movement members more widely, to

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its supporters and then to potential supporters, including some Christians, especially in the south of the country. As Anisseh Van Engeland explores, the vacuum left in Shi’a areas by the retreat of the Lebanese state during the Civil War was ripe for Hezbollah to fill and through the creation of networks of supporters and humanitarian concerns the movement sought to fill the gap in provision and in so doing to consolidate a place for itself in society. 15 So extensive is the movement’s welfare provision that “it far exceeds the capacity of the Lebanese state”16 and because of its pervasiveness effectively forces the state and other NGOs and community actors to work with it in the support of some of its objectives. Before exploring the specifics of Hezbollah’s social provision it is important to note that these services are still far from comprehensive and look nothing like those available in Europe or the Gulf States; as Rana Jawad puts it, “social services are provided out of duty to the resistance community and they constitute only the bare minimum, enough for the community not to perish.”17 While the spirit of this is true, Hezbollah clearly aims to go beyond a minimal provision if it can. This is one of the reasons why it works hard to get the state to do more. It should also be noted that some of the organizations providing social good are connected with Iranian organizations and it can be unclear how much control Hezbollah has over them; such is the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran. The level of need in some of Lebanon’s poorest communities in the absence of a state safety net is quite shocking; thus for example, “a 1997 study of one particularly poor area of the [southern Beirut] suburb[s] estimated per capita income to be a mere 14 percent of that of the average Lebanese citizen.”18 Social provision is thus needed in many areas of life.

Education Given the poor state of the nation’s schools, the need to catch the youth early, and Hezbollah’s commitment to enabling people to improve their lives, it is no surprise that educational provision is one of the Party’s most important social provisions. Initially much of this provision was focused on the religious goals of the movement: “a system of religious institutions was the basis for disseminating the Islamic message to all of Shi’ite society, from the youngest children, through pupils at schools and students at Islamic colleges [madrassas] and universities, to adults involved in traditional community frameworks such as mosques and charitable associations.”19 This has since developed into a network of schools that teach both religion and practical subjects; reputedly students reaching universities are extremely well prepared in technical subjects such as maths and the sciences.20 Organizationally, education is organized through Hezbollah’s Educational Unit, which provides free or reduced fee tuition at its schools.21 Naturally enough, schools are seen as of central importance in the creation of the resistance society and educational provision is

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significant, if not exactly on a scale which could truly rival the state or private schools. It is estimated that Hezbollah schools have around 14,000 pupils enrolled.22 There is also a program for the bulk buying of textbooks so that they can be sold on at a discount, as well as a scholarships system which costs around $3.3 million per annum to run.23 The movement has been able to structure a full education system from infancy to the age of 18, devising its own curriculum in the process. It also provides vocational education and some classes and instruction to adults.24 While this system may not be able to reach all those in need, scholarships can bridge some of the gap, and together this educational provision helps to solidify a resistance generation and a ready pool of recruits.

Food This category covers both agriculture and the provision of basic necessities to its communities. On the agriculture front improving farming productivity further encourages people to stay on the land and to make their business more profitable. To this end Hezbollah has developed a network of agricultural hubs which help with the cost of fertilizers and machinery, as well as disseminating advice on yields, storage, and other productivity measures. The movement also provides some veterinary services. More famously the movement runs its own shops selling subsidized basic produce and restaurants giving free meals to the poor, a provision that is further expanded to provide mass feeding at rallies and religious celebrations, especially during Ramadan.25

Healthcare With no social infrastructure in place healthcare is a provision which can have immediate impact and clearly developed out of a need to treat wounded fighters.26 Hezbollah’s healthcare activities, including its four hospitals, are run through the Islamic Health Organisation. Benefiting an estimated 400,000 per annum this is an important social provision for Hezbollah,27 which has become an essential service for many Lebanese. In addition to the hospitals there are also 20 infirmaries, 12 health clinics and 20 dental surgeries, as well as facilities dedicated to its militia. 28 Hezbollah has also proven itself adept in reacting quickly to public health emergencies and is able to outprovide the government and other political parties in this provision, especially by appearing to be neutral in the support it offers. In addition to this the movement has developed ties with pharmacies, offering subsidized drugs, and is able to undercut other healthcare providers in price more generally, while also reserving the right to waive treatment fees.

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Social Services In addition to its provision in these three key areas the Party has been able to establish provision in a range of other spheres which resist easy categorization, all of which though assist the movement in other spheres to some extent. Thus for example the movement has free transport structures in places to connect communities and facilitate access to its services; it provides around 7,500 small discounted loans each year29 through its al-Qard al-Hassan (The Good Loan) organization opened in 1984,30 as well as other general services such as lending libraries and sporting clubs, snow clearance in the Beka’a, and rubbish collection.31 In addition to this the movement also operates the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation, which is essentially the movement’s think tank; it prepares reports of social and cultural issues, organizes conferences, runs a database, and has published more than 300 reports.32

Construction One of the movement’s three key areas of activity is in construction and the provision of what might be termed essential services. Hezbollah’s Jihad al-Binaa organization takes the lead here. Its initial areas of operation were the construction of houses for its members and buildings for its activities, soon widening to include reconstruction of homes destroyed in battles, maintenance of roads, supplying clean water including by truck to remote villages, and developing both water and sewerage systems in southern Beirut.33 Much of this is about keeping the people on their land of course but this scale of heavy engineering of what is, in essence, the movement’s own construction company is particularly impressive and has lasting impact. As explored in the previous chapter, Hezbollah’s instigation of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war proved to be disastrous in terms of the damage caused to Lebanese infrastructure and people’s homes and livelihoods. This essentially forced Hezbollah into promising that it would make things right, thus putting considerable financial pressure on the movement, which had to be assisted by Iran. The movement “promised to pay every family whose home was destroyed US$12,000 as rent for a new house until they were able to normalise their situation again.”34 While reconstruction was by no means funded entirely by Hezbollah, with significant donations from the Gulf and the West funding infrastructure works, this left Hezbollah to focus on housing and short-term relief which was arguably both more their forte but also what they needed to focus on politically. 35 Thus, “Hezbollah’s Reconstruction Campaign and its newly established Wa’ad (Promise) organization rebuilt urban areas and apartments in southern Beirut, reportedly distributing $300 million for immediate aid following the 2006 war, to individuals from the various Lebanese sects.”36

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This offer, and subsequent rapid delivery, of support in rebuilding demonstrated the movement’s abilities in the social sector and was turned into something of a propaganda victory—demonstrating their financial muscle, expressing social commitment across sectarian boundaries, and acting as a show of defiance against the Israelis. Overall then, the movement has clearly been an effective actor in the social field and for this it relies upon its people and their commitment to the cause. In the creation of a “resistance society” the nurturing of its human resources remains key.

YOUTH AND WOMEN’S WINGS Naturally enough, like many other social movements Hezbollah endeavors to build a broad base of support by creating what are in effect social clubs that enable group identity strengthening and also feed into the group’s ability to shape social interaction and shape group identity. If a “resistance society” is to be created then it needs to truly encompass everyone in that society and therefore having youth and women’s wings of the Party creates a more integrated and representative structure which can further shape the society. To this end the Party has created separate structures within the movement for women and the youth. Interestingly the youth wing, the so-called Mahdi Scouts, is both a religious and a practical organization based as the name suggests on the worldwide scouting movement established by Lord Baden Powell; even the uniform bears an uncanny resemblance.37 This movement accepts both boys and girls from the age of six who take part in activities such as Scouts the world over; yet there is a great deal of moral and religious education alongside resistance indoctrination. Thus for example “[a] scouting manual for 12- to 14-year-olds contains chapters titled ‘Know Your Enemy’ and ‘Facts About Jews,’ which describe Jews as cruel, cowardly, corrupt, and deceitful. Books for younger scouts contain puzzles with militant themes, such as a bearded Hezbollah fighter at the start of the maze, with an Israeli bunker at the far end.”38 The Party then encourages a transition into other youth structures more directly within the Party itself and finally into the numerous activities within the Party. Usually though, these youth members fulfill a dual function within the Party, serving when needed in the militia and also fulfilling other more civilianized functions.39 The movement is careful in whom it recruits, seeking out the most pious, and reportedly in recent years has even tried to reach out to other communities in Lebanon to give them the chance to join the movement in the face of the rise of jihadist groups in Syria.40 In this way it seems, along with liaison units in schools, summer camps, and religious retreats,41 Hezbollah can reach the largest number of children, secure a steady supply of recruits, while at the same time being able to choose the

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most suitable and maintain flexibility and a degree of elite status in terms of membership. Levels of association with the Party can be used to encourage group unity among the innermost cadres, while encouraging others to work harder and prove their commitment to the movement before being allowed to join. Even those who do not make it can still retain links to the Party by participating in other levels of activity.42 While women’s roles within Hezbollah are naturally limited and to some degree circumscribed by religion and tradition, at the same time women are crucial for the movement in all kinds of ways and have had an increasing level of influence and visibility in recent years.43 They not only play a key role in the delivery and administration of Hezbollah’s social programs and provision given their increased education levels but have increasingly had more say in the movement as a whole. Indeed, as Lara Deeb shows, Hezbollah is both a modern and a pious organization and uses women to help it project an image of modernity.44 Piety, community work, and support for their menfolk who participate in the resistance are all key roles for women in the eyes of the movement. Indeed, Hassan Nasrallah went as far as to say: “the women is integrated in Hezbollah’s agenda in every matter.”45 While it is of course debatable quite how far this goes, it has been much more the case since 2004 when a decision was taken to include women in political activities, including being candidates in local council elections. The movement now has two women on its governing council, Rima Fahri and Afaf al-Hakim, head of the women’s wing. Clearly we cannot know how much they are able to participate in decision making in the governing council but it is clear that the Hezbollah Women’s Association has a relatively high degree of independence and is not micro-managed by the central organs of the Party.46 As Deeb shows the Women’s Association is in fact a place where the role of women in society is debated, compared with the West, and issues of education, discrimination and domestic violence discussed. With the support of Nasrallah and with Fadlallah’s “progressive perspectives on gender”47 women in the Party have leverage and space to construct a role for themselves, which is clearly different to that of the past. It seems Hezbollah attempts to harness women in complex ways, and likewise it seems that women have used their participation in the movement in order to change how they are perceived and what the boundaries of women’s roles and contributions can be. It would therefore be too simplistic to see the Hezbollah Women’s Association as a symbol either of oppression or of Emancipation. Instead it can be seen as a space of contestation, negotiation, and cooperation, which is logical in both an Islamic and a progressive sense. The complexities of this sphere of traditional attitudes and Quaranic interpretations, alongside women’s participation and the Hezbollah creed of being anti-oppression, has clearly opened up space for women to develop, and in this sense the Party reflects the ambiguities of modern life everywhere when it comes to the blurring of gender roles.

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Like elsewhere though, ideology and reality collide inside the movement, meaning that women’s roles are still rather traditional and subordinated to the needs of the “resistance society.” It is therefore through these roots in society that Hezbollah is able to build the “resistance identity” and the “resistance society” it so desires but like all states it does so through a mixture of methods, both cooperative and coercive.

POPULATION CONTROL AND LEGITIMACY As we have seen above, the mixture of ideology, success, and provision of goods and services has gone a long way to ensuring the success of the Party and the creation of a “resistance identity” among many Lebanese, and especially among the Shi’a. Hezbollah’s legitimacy in its community is considerable yet at the same time the movement has also developed systems of social control and surveillance with which to shape and enforce social norms to some degree and more importantly to know what is going on in the areas under its control. Understanding these structures is extremely difficult but it is clear that given the inevitable scarcity of resources, provision of social services needs to be targeted on both a needs-basis and on a supportbasis. It seems that “Hezbollah’s close ties to the community through its party apparatus allow service providers to have inside knowledge about individual needs” and there are often stories of the Party’s social support networks arriving to assist people the moment they arrive back from hospital or before many family members have realized there is a problem with a relative.48 It seems that “their detailed knowledge of the personal lives of many thousands of people gives them a potential tool for control of the population not just in terms of pure ‘intelligence’ but increasingly it also highlights the importance of the poor ‘maintaining a positive relationship with Hezbollah’s political leaders in the community and staying in their good graces.’ ”49 Perhaps this is to be expected if, as Rana Jawad suggests: “Hizbullah is no different in its social welfare strategies than the other sects in Lebanon. It is the patron–client logic of the political structure in Lebanon that dictates that the ruling faction(s) of the Lebanese sect should offer welfare support to its communities.”50 Clearly there is an element of transactionalism in the Party’s provision of social goods and services, where this shades into social control, surveillance and norm enforcement becomes a more problematic sphere. How far this goes, as is usual with the Party, shifts and changes across time and space. Thus as Daniel Meier notes, “[the] quasi-state capacity enjoyed by Hizbullah in the former occupied zone allowed the movement to define new social rules (e.g. compliance to the party, Islamic morality, refraining from vengeance).”51 On the other hand, attempts to ban the sale of alcohol and the mixing of the sexes in southern

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cities of Sur and Tyre did not go down well with the population and had to be scaled back. While the movement now has an extensive system for the provision of social services, initially this was simply focused on their own fighters but grew naturally from this base. Rather than necessarily following a plan Hezbollah’s provision of services evolved out of a combination of necessity and ideology. As Anne Marie Baylouny states: “[t]he consolidation of territory was an initial necessary but not sufficient step in establishing governance and services . . . As the armed groups became more institutionalized, regulating the fighters became a top priority not only to avoid alienating the population but also to insure hierarchical command”52; thus, structures binding fighters to the Party soon evolved to extend to their families, neighborhoods, and into the wider community beyond that. Hezbollah, alongside its welfare provision, has developed a deep understanding of its communities, which clearly extends to a measure of control of the population. Thus for example, “Hezbollah has a heightened awareness of local priorities because they conduct their own surveys, studies and needs assessments in the areas served by their social services. The Qard al Hassan loan program identifies community priorities through loan applications and regular meetings with regional representatives.”53 This knowledge in turn leads to control, and the movement thus has a range of tools at its disposal to ensure compliance ranging from threats of withdrawal of services and knowledge of individual foibles to policing structures, territorial reminders of dominance, and more subtle means of shaping social order and norms, especially in terms of piety. This latter, as seen above, was especially shaped by the women of the movement. In its policing and judicial activities Hezbollah has worked to try to solve localized sectarian and clan-based disputes through mediation, and where this has failed “solutions would be forcibly imposed on the parties to avoid vendettas escalating into tit-for-tat murders. The organization mediated over 200 such feuds from its establishment in the early to mid-1980s till the early 2000s, enacting reconciliation rituals involving both parties and paying a handsome amount of the compensation itself.”54 All of these activities led to a complex system of legitimacy and control, which, as Cammett suggests, fed into the nexus between political loyalty and access to welfare and has also driven the movement’s need to participate in politics in order to distribute state resources and to cross-subsidize its own welfare activities which are increasingly expensive.55

BUDGETS AND REVENUE Naturally enough, this extensive provision of goods and services does not come cheap, especially when there is also a military wing to service.

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While Hezbollah receives funding from Iran, discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, it also has to raise its own revenues to cover its expenditures and to give itself a degree of operational independence. This has led to a diverse range of revenue-raising activities becoming embedded within the movement’s structures and calculations from soliciting donations from wealthy individuals to business activities and participation in organized crime. The question here is not a simple mechanistic listing of the Party’s revenue-raising activities but is instead an assessment of how these activities shape its social provision and what this may mean for the legitimacy of the movement. This follows in two categories: legal and illegal. In the former category charitable donations and business activities; in the latter, drug and diamond smuggling, pharmaceutical counterfeiting, extortion and illegal taxation, and credit card fraud. Raising funds is a difficult process and is key to the success of the movement; while Iran has given generously, by some reports up to $100 million per annum,56 the movement’s funding needs still go far beyond this perhaps as far as half a billion dollars every year.57 Given the situation in Syria, contributions from Damascus are likely to have dried up and with Iran’s struggling economy and need to support both Baghdad and Damascus, Hezbollah’s need to raise its own revenue is likely to have become even more pressing. The first category, on the surface, is unlikely to provide a problem for the movement in terms of legitimacy but still provides some potential problems. In the first instance reportedly one of the largest revenue sources is charitable donations contributed by the Shi’a diaspora; while some of this is undoubtedly given direct to the movement, there is evidence of the use of charitable front organizations where donations are diverted directly to Hezbollah and thereby not being used for the advertised purposes.58 This has the potential to alienate potential supporters and runs the risk of being an unpredictable revenue stream. Likewise, Hezbollah business organizations will need to be run as such thereby needing profits to be reinvested quite frequently rather than being siphoned off; in addition the movement needs to be careful that these activities do not impinge on the business activities of supporters and sympathizers. It would be easy for Hezbollah to carve out space for its business operations because of its power, thus causing resentment. Likewise it needs to be sure that prices and profits are not too high so as not to appear to be charging constituents to do business with the movement. These facts make it necessary that business activities are not too focused on Lebanon but expand worldwide. The Lebanese diaspora is numerous and widely spread and this in turn facilitates Hezbollah’s involvement in business activities and in organized crime. A great deal of work has been done in recent years to try to trace and understand the extent of the movement’s involvement in criminal activities.59 These activities are potentially extremely lucrative but do little to enhance the reputation of the Party globally or indeed in Lebanon

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especially when compared to the Party’s rhetoric and propaganda. Dealing in counterfeit pharmaceuticals,60 conflict diamonds,61 drugs, and banking fraud62 risk tarnishing the movement as corrupt, un-Islamic, and hypocritical. Yet without them the movement would struggle to maintain its commitments to its constituency and would put at risk its resistance activities. There is also evidence, for example, that Hezbollah has not been able to conquer the traditional Shi’a clan structures of Lebanon quite as thoroughly as might be expected, and that these clans are able to use Hezbollah in order to engage in criminal activities and to enrich themselves; “many of its individual cells now serve primarily their own self-interest instead of their perception of God’s will.”63 This could also further tarnish the movement. Hezbollah’s constant search for money to fund its various expenditures thereby leads to a precarious situation whereby Hezbollah breaks the law and acts immorally on both the domestic and international levels.64 Its power in Lebanon, for example, means that it is able to prevent debt collectors operating in its areas, leading to mass nonpayment of electricity bills and a direct cross-subsidy from the Lebanese state that has to provide additional resources for the state-owned electricity company.65 These activities, both intentional and unintentional, make it appear that the Party’s commitment to abide by Lebanese law is rather hollow and represents a strategic danger to the movement because of the unpredictability of its revenue streams and the hostility criminal activities engender against the movement both nationally and internationally.

PROPAGANDA The way in which Hezbollah is able to integrate its social service provision into its wider discourse is facilitated both by its ideology of oppression and by its strategic propaganda network. This is designed to further consolidate group identity and loyalty, to disseminate its vision, and to advertise the scope and quality of its service provision, while highlighting the weaknesses of the Lebanese state’s provision for its citizens. Its media, especially Al Manar TV and An-Noor Radio, also play a key role “in disseminating propaganda, communicating the fatawa (religious decrees) of the Imams, and raising funds for militant operations.”66 On an internal Lebanese level, as opposed to its external communications and propaganda, the movement goes for a pervasive full spectrum coverage, building from statues, street names, festivals, competitions, and outdoor activities all the way up to television, radio, magazines, newspapers, and websites. The movement even engages with literary forms of communication, especially poetry. Atef Alshaer points out that “[p]oetry has served as an essential communication tool for Hezbollah ever since the movement’s early days” 67 and he traces the continuing relevance of the resistance

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identity through poetry alongside and increasing Lebanonization of the movement’s poetry over time. Such a pervasive media offering, which has expanded and evolved significantly over time, is a key plank in the creation of the “resistance society” and has been remarkably successful for the movement. It helps to demonstrate its modernity, allows it to broadcast a positive image and adds to its strength in other spheres. Thus, for example, al-Manar “lays claim to a wide following among Hezbollah women by offering a range of soap operas selected on moral grounds, a widely popular children’s programme . . . talkshows, game shows and news,” interestingly al-Manar is described as predominant in Lebanon “as a substitution channel, not constantly watched by non-Hezbollah viewers, but frequently consulted for specific programmes, especially the news.”68 Propaganda, reaching a number of different audiences both within Lebanon and beyond, is therefore critical for the Party, adding greatly to its success and becoming a key plank of its wider strategy. This is very much the case when it comes to the promotion of Hezbollah’s ideology of oppression and its provision of social goods and services. In sum then, the movement is able to garner good will and prove its effectiveness by engaging in the provision of goods and services but these activities fit into a wider program of socialization, which is facilitated by these practical initiatives, a well-developed ideological message and a sophisticated media network which communicates effectively with its base, creating if not yet a “resistance society” then at the very least one that has a “resistance orientation.” All of this, naturally enough, provides a readymade political springboard for the movement.

HEZBOLLAH IN POLITICS The Lebanese Political Milieu Before examining Hezbollah’s electoral performance and their goals and behaviors in the political arena it is crucial to understand the Lebanese political environment because this shapes the way in which politics in the country is conducted and constrains Hezbollah’s ability to implement its political agenda. Given that Lebanon is a complex mosaic of religions and ethnicities with complex demographic politics, it is no surprise that the political system in Beirut has been one of compromises, power struggles, and alliances, and that the formal political structures have been set up to offer representation to all groups but not necessarily the same levels of power and influence.69 All of this means that any analysis of Lebanon’s politics, and of Hezbollah’s role in this sphere, has to take into account multiple, sometimes contradictory, elements and range across at least four levels of analysis. The first of these levels takes place within the group itself and often around disagreements over

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strategy and tactics in the political realm. Hezbollah has been so successful because they have managed to maintain a high level of group coherence within the Party and amongst their supporters. This has been achieved through a range of mechanisms to ensure discipline aided greatly by a strong continuity in leadership. This does not mean however that there are not disputes over the direction and pace of travel among the movement but rather that once the time for disagreement is over there is a much stronger tendency for the Party to bury its disagreements and to work for the agreed goal. The second of these levels of analysis takes place outside of the Party itself but within the level of the Shi’a community in Lebanon. Here Hezbollah competes with its Shi’a rival Amal for votes and popularity, as explored above. Hezbollah and Amal have similar roots and approaches, although Amal is more of a secular party but they have frequently been in competition with each other. In addition Hezbollah also faces competition from cross-sectarian groups such as the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party and the Lebanese Communist Party both of which have traditionally attracted strong Shi’a support in the past. Thus by no means does Hezbollah have the political field amongst Shi’as all to itself; indeed there are two additional Shi’a focused parties, the Free Shi’a Movement and the Lebanese Option Party, which both explicitly stand against the dominance of Amal and Hezbollah over Lebanon’s Shi’a community. This competition within the sect between political parties for support and votes therefore means that Hezbollah has to engage in politics at this level to maintain its base.70 This is where its other activities help to reinforce its electoral strength. The third level is the sectarian level, the level of competition and co-operation with other sects and religious groupings.71 Because of the electoral arithmetic there is no way that the Shi’a as a bloc could dominate Lebanon politically without reaching out to other sects and religions. This means that compromises have to be made to attract parties representing other sects. In addition there are also parties in Lebanon, which try to appeal across sectarian boundaries; due to the nature of the system these tend to be quite small but in the context of finely balanced parliaments it can become important to draw these groupings into a coalition. Added spice is given at this level by the fact that the political system that elsewhere divides positions and power on the basis of confessional membership; thus in the classic example the president is always a Maronite Christian, the prime minister always a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament is always a Shi’a; when it comes to parliamentary elections and the division of membership of the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet) representation is not founded on the basis of membership of one of Lebanon’s 18 recognized sects72 but is instead divided on a 50:50 basis between Muslims and Christians. This means that one religion cannot dominate the other and further necessitates cross-sectarian cooperation. Furthermore given the intense mistrust between Sunni and Shi’a in Lebanon and across the wider region,

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there is no Muslim bloc in existence within the Cedar Republic; likewise the Christians are by no means united. While Sunni and Shi’a blocs are surprisingly cohesive, even within individual Christian sects such as the numerous Maronites there are multiple parties with competing visions attracting large proportions of the sect. Thus a situation arises whereby the two main Muslim groups compete for alliances with a range of Christian parties, as well as those representing other minority groups and parties, which are based more around ideas than religious affiliation. The compromises involved here feed into all levels of politics: internal discussions within political parties; competition with rival groups within the same sect who are quick to issue accusations of having sold out the sect in order to form alliance with a party representing a different sect or religion; shifting alliances with other sects whose views and interests have to be considered when allocating positions of power and on issues that have specific relevance for themselves; and finally the way in which regional politics impacts on Lebanese politics. The final level of analysis is the external dimension of Lebanese politics whereby political groupings inside Lebanon seek to develop and leverage relationships with actors from the wider region and beyond, which will improve their access to power at home.73 These relationships naturally come with certain strings attached but are often very important for Lebanese political actors in terms of resources and support at international fora. This chapter places less emphasis on these factors because consideration of Hezbollah’s vital relationships with Syria and Iran forms the focus of the final two chapters of this book. Despite this general caveat it is important to factor in how important regional politics can be in influencing Lebanese politics; while this is not a simple dynamic it clearly has effects which can be more visible at certain times than others. At this juncture it is important to draw these levels of analysis together in order to paint a picture of the way in which Lebanese politics have developed over the past decade or so, a decade in which Hezbollah has become increasingly drawn into the arena of Lebanese political life. Given the tensions present in Lebanon as a consequence of the Civil War and yet with politics tightly controlled as a result of the occupation of the country by Syrian forces, along with wider changes in the region at the beginning of the new millennium the country began the new century with politics polarized between those who supported the continuation of Syrian dominance and those who vehemently opposed it but with perhaps more people moving into the opposition camp over time as the excesses of Syrian control became undeniable. With the assassination of former prime minister (1992–1998 and 2000– 2004) Rafic Hariri on February 14, 2005, in a massive bomb which exploded as his motorcade went by, these tensions were to lead to a change in Lebanese politics. In the demonstrations and international condemnation that followed his death, assassination attempts were made against other leading anti-Syrian figures. The death of Hariri led directly to the successful Cedar Revolution,

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which was a series of mass demonstrations calling for the end of the Syrian occupation, a full investigation into the murder of Hariri, parliamentary elections free from Syrian interference, and a purging of the Lebanese security services to remove pro-Syrian elements. The result was a UN Security Council resolution which established a special court to investigate the murder of Hariri and led to the complete evacuation of Syrian troops from Lebanon by April 26, 2005, thereby bringing about the implementation of a separate resolution that had been passed the previous September. The rival protests, both pro and anti-Syria, which had been called in the aftermath of Hariri’s assassination solidified much of the divisions within the Lebanese political system and have since been the central organizing principle of Lebanese politics. The two camps are named after the dates of their set-piece demonstrations of the Cedar Revolution.74 On March 8, 2005, in response to initial demonstrations condemning Syria, Hezbollah organized a mass pro-Syrian rally in Beirut. This was followed on March 14 by a mass anti-Syrian rally called by the Future Movement, the party of the Hariri family. Those parties that joined with the rallies led primarily by Hezbollah on the one side and the Future Movement on the other either became part of more formal coalitions and alliances within the two movements with the core of the two blocs remaining highly coherent. This being Lebanese politics however means that this clear dividing line was more clear for some parties than others. Thus a brief examination of the composition of the two blocs and the changes over time tells us much about Lebanese politics and the environment in which Hezbollah is operating. The March 8 side exhibited a strong Shi’a bias in its protests which were led by Hezbollah and supported by Amal; they were supported by a series of smaller parties including the Lebanese Democratic Party which is mainly Druze, the Marada party which is mainly Maronite, the Glory Movement which is mainly Sunni, the Armenian Revolutionary Foundation (better known as Tashnag), the Maronite Solidarity Party, the Greek Orthodox Skaff Bloc and the mainly Sunni Popular Nasserist Organisation inevitably along with the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party—Lebanon Region, the mainly Alawite Arab Democratic Party, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Thus a brief analysis of the makeup of the March 8 protest movement shows us that the pro-Syrian camp contains few surprises being mainly Shi’a with strong Arab Nationalist and leftist support. At this stage whilst there was Christian and some Sunni support it was relatively small and came from those who had traditionally had good reason for being in favor of Syria; thus for example the Greek Orthodox have traditionally been strongly Arab Nationalist in orientation and could be expected to support the Arab Nationalist regime in Damascus. On the March 14 side led by the mainly Sunni Future Movement were arraigned the three main Maronite parties of the Free Patriotic Movement75, the Lebanese Forces Party, and the Kataeb Party. They were joined

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by the mainly Druze Progressive Socialist Party76; two Armenian Parties, the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Hunchakian Party; along with groupings as diverse as the Islamic Group, the secular Democratic Left Movement, the mainly Christian National Liberal Party, the Free Shi’a Movement, and a host of other even smaller parties. Over time these two broad groupings solidified into more formal structures; thus on the March 8 side there are two groupings: the formal March 8 Alliance which comprises Hezbollah (whose parliamentary wing is called the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc), Amal, the Syrian Socialist Ba’ath Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. They are joined by the Change and Reform Bloc, which comprises the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Democratic Party, the Marada Movement, Tashnag, and the Solidarity Party. On the March 14 side things are somewhat more straightforward with the formal Future Movement as a political party having alliances with a number of independent MPs bringing them within a wider Future Movement umbrella and joined in the formal March 14 Alliance by the Lebanese Forces Party, Kataeb, the Murr Bloc, Islamic Group, the Social Democratic Hunchakian Party, the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party, the national Liberal Party, and the Democratic Left Movement.77 These two blocs have become the dominant prism through which Lebanese politics tends to be viewed in the wider world but it is also important to bear in mind the constitutional structures of the Lebanese system, which further shape and constrain the way in which politics is conducted. Clearly as a confessional democracy Lebanon’s politics are consistently defined by religious sect but what is often overlooked is the role of key political parties and traditional elites, often working through these parties, as means of maintaining clientelistic ties which has led to a shared desire amongst these parties to maintain the current system at its core while tinkering at the edges for marginal advantages within the wider system. Nowhere is this more clear than when it comes to parliamentary elections. Lebanon’s electoral system is a majoritarian bloc-vote, first past the post system,78 which introduces a great deal of complexity and gives the political parties a great deal of control. Currently under the electoral law agreed for the 2009 elections, constituencies number 26 in total, divided unequally between Lebanon’s 6 governorates and vary widely in size in terms of the number of voters and seats therein. Gerrymandering of the placement of constituency boundaries forms much of the extent of competition between the political parties over changes to electoral law. This is because under the Lebanese system of bloc voting, voters are assigned to their electoral district of origin not residence, strengthening sectarian leaders. No official ballot papers are produced by the government; instead each party produces a list of candidates for each electoral district. Voters can then accept the entire list, choose to endorse the list but remove candidates from it, thereby not endorsing them, or to compile a list of candidates from a range of lists.

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Thus on the ballots, because of the sectarian division of seats in parliament, candidates are only opposed by members of their own sect yet significantly voters can vote for whomever they want. So while the number of seats is protected under a formula laid out under the Taif Accords that ended Lebanon’s Civil War in 1990, given the nature of the first past the post system if there happens to be a majority of one sect in a constituency their votes, as long as the representative chosen is of the right sect, can decide the election of candidates supposedly representing another sect without them necessarily having the backing of a majority of their own sect. This is obviously a problem because it gives the big political parties further control and can mean that those sects which are more widely geographically distributed around the country, especially the Christians, often end up not being represented by the candidates they voted for. It can lead to tactical voting in constituencies where numbers are more evenly distributed with, for example, many Shi’a outside of heartland areas choosing to vote for the Free Patriotic Movement candidates because of their alliance with Hezbollah. The system thereby encourages political parties to have some people on their lists which are from opposing sects. This leads to some parties that supposedly represent one sect having MPs from other, often seemingly opposed sectarian groups. Thus in the current parliament Hezbollah has one Sunni MP, Elwalid Succariyeh, within its own party. Likewise the Future Movement has 8 Christian MPs and 2 Alawite MPs amongst its 26 MPs. It also means that the choices made by the sectarian political parties constrains voter choice. The current system is designed, in theory, to reduce inter-sectarian competition and to maximize co-operation, and to some extent it does this but it comes at the price of having voters from rival sects having the opportunity to choose the representatives of other sects; this along with the lack of proportional representation harms the ability of truly cross-confessional parties from emerging and leaves power in the hands of the main parties. Hezbollah is quite fortunate in this sense because the geographical concentration of its voters in the south, in the Bekaa Valley, and in southern Beirut means that it can dominate these areas politically in elections; thus in the 2009 parliamentary elections a Hezbollah-Amal Alliance won all 23 seats in the Governorate of South Lebanon (even though the 23 seats ended up dividing by sect into 14 Shi’a, 3 Sunni, 2 Maronite, 2 Greek Catholic, 1 Druze, and 1 Greek Orthodox).79 Given the fairly static nature of the system Hezbollah has been remarkably successful in displacing a rival, opening up space to operate politically and finally in gaining the leadership of its sect, but in so doing has become locked into the system and maintains its relationships through similar patronage networks. Hezbollah’s role as the leader of the March 8 Alliance demonstrated its political power and its growing commitment to a role in Lebanese politics, which would eventually lead it to taking posts in cabinet

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and being part of the government of the country, a dramatic turnaround from its earliest years where it evinced little interest of playing a part in the political system.

HEZBOLLAH’S ENTRY INTO POLITICS Hezbollah first formally entered the Lebanese political system in the 1992 parliamentary elections and has since participated in the parliamentary elections of 1996, 2000, 2005, and 2009, as well as the local elections of 1998, 2004 and 2010 but it was by no means pre-ordained that the Party would become part of the electoral politics of Lebanon and seek a place within the country’s institutions.80 Having previously rejected Lebanese institutions and the 1990 Taif Accords which formed the new basis of Lebanese political life, and demanded the formation of an Islamic State, it is a significant U-turn for the movement to then participate in the same political system. Thus to refer back to the levels of analysis outlined above we can see what it took to enable the Party to make this decision and compete in the 1992 Lebanese parliamentary elections, beginning not with the internal Party level but with the sectarian level. Hezbollah had traditionally been opposed to Amal and its involvement in Lebanese politics, as Richard Norton puts it: “The coterie of young clerics who comprised Hezbollah’s cadre resented the non-clerical leadership of Amal, and the movement’s accommodation with clientelism and corruption. Unlike the Amal politicos, who aspired to becoming the new Shi’a bourgeoisie, the cadre of Hezbollah . . . [had been] taught that there could be no accommodation with a corrupt political system.”81 Thus placed between dislike of Amal and them having the Shi’a electoral field to themselves versus dislike of the system itself inevitably ended up playing into the debate within the Party. Likewise the external Iranian sponsor was consulted and involved in discussions surrounding Hezbollah’s dilemma about entry into the Lebanese political system.82 At a Party level a panel of 12 leading members was formed to take the decision; this was clearly designed to contain the debate to some extent and prevent it from taking over the whole movement. Debate in the committee focused on a mixture of questions of Islamic law, wider ideology and practical issues in terms of likely compromises needed and benefits to be gained through participating, in the end the committee decided overwhelmingly by 10–2 to participate in Lebanese elections.83 Clearly having received Iran’s blessing, practical considerations of further eroding its Amal rival’s powerbase, protecting its interests, popular enthusiasm for the Party’s entry into politics, and the chance to access government resources, which could then be distributed, were far too tempting and logical prizes to be spurned in the name of ideological purity. Hezbollah’s

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adaptive nature and ability to foresee where its best interests lie have clearly long been one of their key attributes. In this case their decision to enter Lebanese politics marked a major transformation that appears to have paid off. Having made the decision to participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections Hezbollah had to work out how to leverage its networks to best effect and to develop a political brand with wider appeal. On the former, Hezbollah was able to use its resources to provide transport to the polls for Hezbollah supporters, maximizing its media strategy, canvassing strategy, security provision, and conducting research to assist with policy formulation and the fine-tuning of messages; clearly a great deal of time and effort went into this and once committed the Party united behind delivering electorally.84 On the latter these efforts were combined with political moves to rebrand the movement along resistance lines rather than purely religious and as a national Lebanese movement.85 As Benedetta Berti theorizes, there are always good reasons why armed groups create political parties, and it is clear that being part of the political process changes calculations, preferences, and strategic outlook. She forwards the theory that four key factors interact to enable and push groups like Hezbollah into the political system;, they are: “the group’s degree of institutionalization and its related push to expand, a strain in the availability of mobilization resources, substantial shifts within the political opportunity structure, and a significant internal commitment to reform the organization.” 86 As we can see, Hezbollah’s rapid growth and solid structures enabled it to have a base big enough and disciplined enough to support this move, a need to access state resources, the end of the Civil War and changes in the movement in particular in terms of the new leadership of Hassan Nasrallah all enabled the Party’s move into politics. One should not however suppose that the transition to politics is always smooth or goes in anything like a straight line; as the framework for analysis in the previous section outlined, the internal dynamics of the Party are important in determining how it behaves in politics. In Hezbollah’s case this means differences between the armed and political wings, as well of course as disagreements between individuals and between pragmatist and ideologues. This translates into different strategies and tactics, some rather less political than others. As Berti puts it: The success and influence of Hizballah’s political party are closely related to the development and prosperity of its military apparatus—and when the latter’s core interests are threatened, the logic of political accommodation is temporarily replaced so that the strategic balance between the political and military factions can be restored.87

This of course fits in with other arguments about the hybrid nature of Hezbollah and its ability or constrain whichever way one looks at it to

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choose from a range of tools to secure influence. This strategy of “walking on the edge,” in Eitan Azani’s memorable characterization, between rule-based political activities, high-minded rhetoric and co-operation on the one hand, and controlled and targeted use of violence on the other.88 The decision to participate in the Lebanese political system, initially in a somewhat passive manner, represented a real change that would have a significant impact upon Hezbollah and Lebanon. In the 1992 elections the Party won eight seats of its own with allies directly connected to the Party winning a further four (approaching 10 percent) of parliament; this gave them a significant role and meant that they had overtaken Amal in their first election.89 Interestingly, in subsequent elections Hezbollah has remained at this kind of electoral level and rather than trying to expand its own electoral base has instead developed strong alliances with other parties and it is this rather than pure electoral numbers that has enabled it to play a direct role in the government of Lebanon.

STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE If we examine the performance of Hezbollah in parliamentary elections we see that performance varies slightly but is consistently around the 10 percent in parliament level. Thus in the 1996 elections Hezbollah’s seats slipped slightly to seven with Amal up three to eight; in 2000 Hezbollah and Amal tied on 10 seats each. These numbers hide wider alliances in two ways however. This is because until the new century large numbers of independents won seats and were in turn affiliated to various blocs within parliament; remnants of that situation remain today but are much less pronounced than when in the 1992 elections technically 92 of the 128 MPs were independents. Thus while in 1992 Hezbollah was the largest Party in parliament because of the bloc system whereby parties would be in alliance with independents, the Birri Bloc led by Amal had 17 seats including the 5 of Amal, while Hezbollah’s Bloc had 12 seats with 8 Hezbollah members and 4 independents. In 1996 the Birri Bloc increased its representation to 21 seats with 8 Amal and 13 independents while the Hezbollah Bloc slipped to 9 with 7 Hezbollah and 2 independents. In 2000 the Birri Bloc fell back to 16 albeit with Amal up to 10 seats with 6 independents, meanwhile Hezbollah’s Bloc picked up 3 seats with Hezbollah on 10 and its independents on 2.90 In 2005 Amal and its allies picked up 14 seats with Hezbollah and its bloc picking up the same number.91 In 2009 there was little change with Amal on 13 seats and Hezbollah on 12. It should be noted that over time Hezbollah and Amal developed a modus vivendi, partly brokered and overseen by the Syrians,92 which eventually became in 2005 and 2009 a series of joint Amal-Hezbollah lists in various constituencies, mainly in the Southern Governorate and Bekaa rather than Beirut.93 These electoral alliances with

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Amal and their close cooperation within the March 8 Alliance has undoubtedly strengthened Hezbollah’s power. Electoral arithmetic has also led Hezbollah from the start to realize the necessity of attempting to reach out to other sects within its own districts so as to attract votes, and just as importantly candidates, from other sects willing to stand under the Hezbollah banner since even in areas where the Shi’a dominate there are still Christian, Sunni, and Druze areas that need representation. In addition to these alliances drawing in other sects into Hezbollah’s official political party, the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc gives them a series of formal alliances. Aside from these practicalities of navigating the Lebanese electoral system and ensuring that Hezbollah maximizes its representation in Shi’a-dominated districts, the Party still has to cut deals with other parties which are outside of the immediate confines of its March 8 Alliance, not only into the sympathetic Change and Reform Bloc within the wider March 8 Bloc, while also seeking relationships with other parties that are not necessarily natural allies of the Party of God. Perhaps the most significant of these alliances is with the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel Aoun, which is the main Maronite party. In what is perhaps one of the oddest developments in Lebanese politics in recent times the FPM and Hezbollah entered into not just a transitory alliance of the kind which Lebanese politics sees all too frequently but into a deeper, more formalized arrangement a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed on February 6, 2006, the terms of which were not kept secret but which were openly published and were openly debated as part of the national dialogue meetings within parliament.94 The agreement of the MOU took many months of secret negotiations and came as a complete surprise to seasoned Lebanon observers. The effects of this alliance are discussed in the following section; here the FPM-Hezbollah alliance is discussed in terms of its contents and what it might show us about Hezbollah’s political strategy. The MoU is a surprisingly detailed document which has translated into a surprisingly durable relationship between the FPM and Hezbollah; the text divides into 10 sections and deals with hotly contested issues such as the presence of Palestinians and relations with Syria. This is even more surprising given the FPM’s initial alignment with the March 14 camp and Aoun’s long-standing antipathy towards the Syrian occupation. 95 Under these 10 sections the MoU stresses the importance of dialogue, a national focus, consensus, the reform of electoral law possibly on a proportional representation basis but which also intriguingly allows equal access to media outlets, a strong focus on dealing with corruption and building up the quality of the state, allowing the return of those Lebanese living in Israel who had supported the Israeli occupation by serving in the South Lebanese Army, denouncing political assassinations and calling for the reform of the security services and establishing diplomatic relations with Syria, as well as the

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inevitable focus on protecting Lebanon from Israel.96 Symbolically the MoU was announced in St Michael’s Church on the line that separated Christians and Muslims during the Civil War; the document again reinforces the current Lebanese political structures, accepting the existence of confessionalism and the existing constitution; it also appears to wish to become the basis for a wider political understanding among Lebanese parties. In this sense then while a real step forward, it aims to advance Lebanese politics within these existing structures trying to improve them rather than seeking any form of more radical renewal that would at minimum increase tensions. This formalized assertion of Hezbollah’s commitment to the existing political structures, to a national vision for Lebanon, to dialogue and an anticorruption agenda, all echo much of its wider ideology and the message contained in its manifestos issued for both local and national elections.

Message and Manifestos The necessity of both broadening its electoral appeal by downplaying the Islamist rhetoric and devising policies that addressed the concerns of the electorate the realities of politics, coupled with leadership and pragmatism, has led the movement to tailor its message to wider audiences. This is usually demonstrated through comparison between the 1985 Open Letter and the 2009 Manifesto but one can also perhaps more usefully examine the Party’s election manifestos,97 and its MoU with the FPM of 2006 and with the Salafists in 2008. This is because the Open Letter and the 2009 Manifesto tend to be more rhetorical and are much more focused on resistance issues both against Israel and the West in general and thus exhibit considerable continuity. These issues are addressed more in other chapters of this book; here it is more important to examine the issues upon which electoral manifestos concentrate for here we are concerned with domestic Lebanese politics and Hezbollah’s role therein. Thus while the 2009 Manifesto is significant in that it rules out discussion of the movement’s weapons and shows them “increasing [their] political involvement and asserting [their] rights as a major political player. In fact, by insisting that Lebanon—a parliamentary democracy—instead follow a national unity and consensual model, Hizballah highlighted its intention to demand more power in decision making, [sic] to the elected government its determination to be consulted and involved at all levels in the political process,” thereby somewhat negating its anti-confessional stance.98 A noticeable difference between these set-piece documents and its election manifestos is the framing of the rhetoric and the issues on which it chooses to focus; thus while the resistance theme is still present it is less dominant while Islamic themes are clearly downplayed. One other clear theme is the way in which manifestos, particularly for parliamentary elections, have become much more detailed. Thus highlighting some of the core

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themes of the manifesto for the 2009 parliamentary elections, along with key policies, demonstrates this trend. These themes included: political reform, judicial reform, administrative reform, economic and financial reform, the education sector, civil society organizations, energy and resource protection, environmental protection, and the development of social services. Some of the statements are rather vague, such as “youth: provide care for the emerging generations and youth groups . . . protect them from corrupt thoughts,” others are ultra-specific such as section on the Lebanese University, which for example calls for “the revival of the LU Students National Union.”99 The section on the economy calls for the reduction of the public deficit and the subsidization of exports of all kinds although is as slippery as any party on the nature of what this would mean for public spending. In comparison the 2004 municipal election manifesto calls for tree planting, observance of teachers and resistance days, and the establishment of complaints boxes. It is also noticeable that the manifestos for local elections are more Islamic in their orientation while national manifestos are simply more conservative and vague in their outlining of the importance of moral values.100 One of the key changes which has become evident since the movement’s decision to participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections is Hezbollah’s repositioning of itself not simply as the protector of the Shi’a but also as a Lebanese political party that cares for the whole nation; this is not only useful in terms of repackaging its resistance identity to appeal to a wider audience and further legitimating the continuation of its armed wing in defiance of the Taif Accords and various UN Security Council resolutions but also widens its electoral base and makes necessary political alliances with parties such as the FPM much more achievable from a common starting position, which is less openly sectarian. In this sense then the Lebanese political system, coupled with Hezbollah’s flexibility, has changed the nature of the movement. As Hassan Nasrallah put it in the year in 2000: “We don’t possess second citizenship. We were born here, we will die here and we will be buried here. We starve here and satisfy our appetite here, so nobody may outbid us on our patriotism or on [our right] to belong.”101 Thus we can see elements of Hezbollah’s strategy overall; the movement has over time tried to cement its position by becoming less reliant on external sponsors focusing on its Lebanese Nationalism, developing its popularism, while still maintaining an insurance policy with Syria and Iran. To this end participation in local elections and engaging in the day-to-day politics of local government have allowed the Party to demonstrate its ability to deliver and to further strengthen its support.

Municipal Elections Hezbollah has perhaps had more impact in local politics than even at the national level102; its concentrated support enables it to dominate specific

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municipalities, thus, “[a]s a result of local elections, Hezbollah controls about two-thirds of predominantly Shi’a municipalities, including the massive Beirut suburbs of Bourj al-Barajnah and Ghobeirre.”103 This level of control and access to tax revenues enables the Party to deliver for its constituents and demonstrates the degree of support for the Party since arrangements with Amal are not present at this level. Thus in its first local elections in 1998 Hezbollah did very well indeed; as Judith Palmer Harik shows, besides exploiting its record of resistance and its social services network, the Party “relied on democratic precepts to counter challenges from its rivals . . . it adopted strategies and tactics that are traditionally associated with this type of election in Lebanon . . . [and] it used the election machine that had been finely tuned and polished after the preceding parliamentary elections.”104 Thus Hezbollah was able to match Amal’s performance by capitalizing on its strengths and playing by the established rules in its very first local elections.105 In the following local election in 2004 106 Hezbollah’s performance improved further but even in an election which had far less Syrian interference Amal was still able to hold onto significant support, even gaining some seats in municipalities in southern Beirut, yet overall the trend was clearly away from Amal and in the direction of Hezbollah in both the Beqaa Valley and “in the south of the country, [where] Hizballah emerged victorious in over 60 percent of municipalities (compared with 55 percent in 1998), while Amal captured only 30 percent of municipalities (down from 45 percent in 1998).”107 In its manifestos for local government the Party has emphasized its existing prowess in delivery of services and concentrated on practical issues rather than ideology. Thus as Hamzeh lists the following as Hezbollah’s priorities: – Encourage the citizen to play a more active role in the selection process of development projects – Increase the functions and powers of municipalities in the provision of education, health care and socioeconomic affairs – Finance development projects from both municipal revenues and donations – Exercise control over public works and prevent embezzlement – Renovate the physical and administrative structures of municipalities [including computerization]108

We see from this list a mixture of the democratic and pragmatic, with the usual strong focus on corruption and also the implication that “donations” will supplement existing expenditure and a desire to increase the power and remit of the municipalities, which would clearly benefit Hezbollah’s power overall. This despite the fact that municipalities have tax-raising powers of their own, they also have responsibilities in education and transport amongst others; thus local government is a real prize.109

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In the 2010 local elections because of the alliance between Amal and Hezbollah, joint lists were run leading to an extremely strong showing for the two; this was a departure from previous practice and further demonstrated Hezbollah’s pragmatism despite earlier fierce competition at this level.110

REPRESENTATIVES AND PROTECTORS By participating in the political system at the national level the Party acts as the representatives of its direct constituency and has become the voice of the majority of the Shi’a, protecting their interests and demanding a say in the political debate. It should be borne in mind that Hezbollah does not simply equal the Shi’a of Lebanon; there are dissenters and there are people whose support is far from unconditional but given the power of the movement there has been an inevitability to strength translating into support, and given the sectarian nature of the system this has further reinforced the logic for Shi’as of supporting the Hezbollah bloc. Yet at the same time Hezbollah has faced a problem of translating the vision it espouses in its manifestos into positive changes on the ground at national level and has had to engage in the usual political necessities of compromise and back-room deals which has led to accusations of hypocrisy, demonstrating perhaps that its pragmatism is well suited to involvement in political life. Thus far, largely because of a lack of an alternative and because of the movement’s power there has been little reaction to this deal making. While the exact translation of Hezbollah’s vision for Lebanon into reality may be extremely difficult, and some elements simply impossible, for a whole range of structural and practical reasons, since coming into politics Hezbollah has been able to represent the Shi’a in a different manner to their feudal representatives of the past and has forced what many saw as an increasingly compromised Amal to take its responsibilities more seriously. Thus from the traditional image of the Shi’a as the poorest and most marginalized of Lebanon’s sects, they have been transformed into a significant political force whose opinions and needs have to be listened to. This is quite a change and in one sense the deprived that Hezbollah claims to represent have far more of a voice in Lebanon than ever before. This has been achieved despite the fact that the Shi’a remain proportionally underrepresented in the Lebanese political system, notwithstanding the rebalancing at Taif, with the three main sects—Maronites, Sunni, and Shi’a—having 27 seats in parliament each, which is probably no longer representative of the size of the Shi’a population111 with some putting their numbers as high as 45 percent of the population up from just 16 percent at the last census.112 Aside from acting as a strong voice for its constituency, enabling Shi’as better access to resources and opportunities, and perhaps as importantly

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giving the community a sense of pride and empowerment, Hezbollah is clearly in politics because of the opportunities it gives the movement, not least the ability to defend the Party’s interests as distinct from those of its constituency. Clearly the most important interest for the Party is protecting its position in Lebanese society in general and ensuring its ability to act as “the resistance” against Israel by maintaining its armed wing and its overall military effectiveness. In the end, as we have seen, it is the idea of resistance that remains central to the Party’s effectiveness. Having a coercive ability is the ultimate insurance policy, makes Hezbollah relevant to Syria and Iran, adds to the movement’s coherence and discipline, plays a key role in its propaganda and political support, and is the source of much of its power. If, as Benedetta Berti believes, “[t]he political and the military factions have co-existed and mutually reinforced each other for the past decades”113 one of Hezbollah’s key roles in politics is to protect its “resistance activities” and armed wing from being delegitimized and disarmed. This fear can be seen as a core driver of much of the movement’s politics, as is explored in more detail later in this chapter. It is no co-incidence then that Hezbollah’s decision to enter into the government of Lebanon in 2005 came at a time when its possession of a powerful militia was coming under sustained pressure from both within Lebanon and in the wider international sphere. The Cedar Revolution of 2005 and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian forces meant that 2005 was a year of significant change for Hezbollah as it was for the rest of Lebanon. With the end of the Syrian occupation Hezbollah had lost a protective shield and had to rethink its political strategy of simply being in parliament on a somewhat passive level, knowing that the Syrians would gerrymander electoral boundaries to ensure a pro-Syrian majority which would defend Hezbollah’s right to maintain its militia. Overnight the paradigm shifted and a more active role in politics and in the government was required, the alliance with the FPM can be seen to part of this, as can the decision by the Party to participate in the new government. At first this seems odd given the fact that the March 14 Alliance was so successful in the 2005 elections winning 69 seats to the March 8 Bloc’s 57 (in spite of the fact that the Syrian sponsored electoral law designed to prevent anti-Syrian forces progressing was still in force for the election) but the custom in Lebanon is to have representatives from all sects in cabinet and on the Shi’a side that really only means Hezbollah and Amal. Hezbollah had the added incentive of participating in the government because of the strong feeling among the March 14 parties that Hezbollah should be disarmed and as Richard Norton also notes, Walid Jumblatt, leader of the mainly Druze, Progressive Socialist Party, wanted to bring in Hezbollah and Amal to try to prevent any alignment between them and the FPM.114 Under the Taif Accords all militias were to be disarmed and under UN Security Council Resolution 1559 passed on September 2, 2004,

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and recalling a number of earlier resolutions the same thing was demanded. As the price of his participation in the government (along with Amal) Hassan Nasrallah “had pointedly secured (new Prime Minister Fouad) Siniora’s agreement, when it joined the cabinet following the May 2005 elections, that the group was a resistance movement (not a militia),”115 thereby neatly sidestepping the issue, although Hezbollah ministers boycotted cabinet for six weeks until their demand was met.116 This phrasing temporarily reduced the threat to Hezbollah but in the aftermath of the summer 2006 war, which was widely seen as partly Hezbollah’s fault, led to renewed pressure for disbandment of the Party’s military wing. While it is tempting to see Hezbollah’s decision to join the government and to lend its support to the vote of confidence in the new government as rather odd, it is important to remember the febrile atmosphere at the time and Hezbollah’s sudden sense of isolation after the Syrian withdrawal, along with the need to make a clear downpayment on its rhetoric of discourse, national unity and independence. The fact that other benefits were potentially on offer meant that outright resistance in the face of the scale of the March 14 victory would not have been a sensible political move. Aside from its commitment to protect the arms and legitimacy of its military wing, another example of Hezbollah’s reasons for participating in government in order to protect its own interests was its vehement opposition to another of the core demands of the Cedar revolution’s protestors—an international inquiry into the assassination of Rafik Hariri.117 Given that this was very much at the core of the new government’s agenda, again Hezbollah’s taking up of cabinet positions for the first time appears odd but it is clear that finding ways to frustrate this process occupied a good deal of energy. On one level Hezbollah politically had to back some kind of inquiry and by advocating one clearly hoped to be seen as being on the right side of things while having some influence over the process. Towards the end of 2005 the issue of an international tribunal was discussed in cabinet, leading to the government agreeing to request UN help in establishing a Lebanese-International tribunal. This was endorsed as part of the National Dialogue process in early 2006 by Amal and Hezbollah. When more details appeared of what form this would take in November 2006 Hezbollah and Amal resigned from the cabinet. The cabinet simply went ahead and approved the status of the tribunal. Hezbollah was particularly concerned that the tribunal would be used for political purposes against them given its wide remit and were particularly angered by Article 3 of the Attachment to the Agreement. It is important to note that “[t]his article defines responsibility for the crimes in very broad terms, and says that not only are those who committed the crimes responsible, but also any of their accomplices and any of their superiors who had authority over them,”118 thus clearly leaving the way open to potentially bring senior members of Hezbollah to trial in an international court should there be evidence linking them to the assassination.

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The resignation of the Hezbollah Bloc in the cabinet on this issue, coupled with other issues, led to a serious political crisis in Lebanon which is discussed further in the final section of this chapter. Hezbollah’s more base interests and priorities and its attempts to bring down the government by withdrawing and eventually resigning from the cabinet do not look like the behavior of a movement committed to dialogue and led to charges of hypocrisy being levelled against the movement. The FPM-Hezbollah MoU stressed an abhorrence for political assassinations and yet four Hezbollah members have since been indicted by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on charges of having been involved in the assassination of Hariri, leading to furious reactions and a clear desire to protect its own rather than see justice run its course.119 Hezbollah makes much of the themes of justice and fairness, even at times making reference to International Law120 —raising clear question marks about whether the movement’s commitment is to these themes which have become progressively more prominent or to the maintenance of its armed wing and to its resistance identity. These issues are hard to tease out, so entwined in the movement’s DNA are they but they serve to highlight key contradictions at the heart of the movement, which begs the question how far has the movement evolved and to what extent is it committed to social justice and the emancipation of the depressed and downtrodden?

EVOLVED AGENDA—EMANCIPATION? Hezbollah’s political agenda, as we have seen above, while evolving, has also retained many themes and ideas from the past. Clearly inspired by ideals of fairness protection of the poor and infused with the spirit of its own welfare provision the movement has achieved a great deal in improving the lot of the Shi’a of Lebanon, yet at the same time has brought suffering and a degree of oppression. It is still difficult to determine how liberating the movement can be and quite how far away from its Islamist roots it has, and can, move. Two key issues arise here: the movement’s consideration of what its final goal of an Islamic State means and secondly how this meshes with poverty reduction, education, and opportunity not only for its own community but for the whole of Lebanon. Hezbollah’s mission at its foundation was the establishment of an Islamic State in Lebanon and this remains their ultimate objective today. The immediate questions raised here of course are (1) what would such an Islamic State look like? and (2) would this be acceptable to the people of Lebanon? While the former is to a large extent speculation we do of course have a number of significant indicators of what this might mean and how the vision has evolved over time. Clearly though, given the movement’s connections with Iran and the inspiration taken from its revolution and the specific form of governance,

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veleyat-e faqih (government of the jurisconsult) it is likely to be a hybrid of theocratic and democratic government.121 Indeed, Hezbollah’s Open Letter proclaims: We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih [jurist] who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini. . . . We are an umma linked to the Muslims of the whole world by the solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam, whose message God wanted to be fulfilled by the Seal of the Prophets, i.e., Muhammad. Our behavior is dictated to us by legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political conception defined by the leading jurist. . . . As for our culture, it is based on the Holy Koran, the Sunna and the legal rulings of the faqih who is our source of imitation.122

Much of the detail of what their vision of an Islamic State might be cannot accurately be predicted but it is likely that given the influence of the Khomeinist model that it would be undemocratic at its core, as well as being discriminatory because non-Shi’a would be barred from key positions on the theocratic side of the government. If Iran can be seen as a guide, then the picture of what an Islamic State might look like is not an especially attractive one and fares badly when compared to Hezbollah’s rhetoric. Naturally, most Lebanese, including many Shi’a, have no stomach for an Islamic State and Hezbollah appeared to realize quite quickly that playing down this idea was essential to political success. This is because, as Simon Haddad discusses in his 2006 article, “there is a strong relationship between religiosity and support for Hezbollah. Hezbollah supporters appear therefore to be highly religious,”123 this perhaps explains to some extent the continuing resilience of Amal as a secular alternative. It is also clearly the case that the Christians, Druze and Sunnis would fight against any imposition of Hezbollah’s vision. Electorally and politically therefore the idea of an Islamic State is toxic and would make it impossible for Hezbollah to have any real political influence in the system. The realities of Lebanon therefore made it essential not only that Hezbollah play down the religious rhetoric and tailored its message to different groups but also that it had to go further in trying to remove the issue of an Islamic State altogether. It began to do this by further stressing the Islamic precept that “there is no compulsion in religion” and the importance of national dialogue in solving issues. Not one of Hezbollah’s election manifestos mentions the idea of an Islamic State. Yet at the same time it cannot completely abandon this goal, as Joseph Alagha explains: Hizbullah stated in its 2004 “Identity and Goals”—its latest self description that includes aspects of its political ideology and political program—that one of its strategic ideals aims at the establishment of an Islamic Republic

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(jumhuriyya Islamiyya). Hizbullah argued that verily, there is no Islamic movement that does not advocate the establishment of an Islamic state in its own country.124

In 1998 in its “Statement of Purpose” Hezbollah explicitly addressed the issue of the Islamic State clarifying that it would never impose it by force and that it would only happen with the overwhelming support of the population including the Christians and that this would be achieved by dialogue, negotiation, and bargaining in order to convince the population of the merits of Islamic governance.125 Thus it looks like the Party has transformed on one level quite radically from its commitment to the creation of an Islamic State in Lebanon of its early years; the issue has been neatly marginalized since there is no chance of an overwhelming majority of the country embracing the idea and under the current political structure there is no chance of a referendum being held to even ascertain the likely scale of this rejection. These moves away from the vision of an Islamic State do not of course prevent Hezbollah from using religious symbolism to motivate its own constituency, this extends to voting whereby “[i]n each election, the Hezbollah leadership has declared that its members are legally required, as though commanded by Allah (taklif al-shari), to support the party.”126 Likewise, the extent to which their eventual goal may still be an Islamic State is much debated, this despite the seeming strengthening of their commitment to Lebanese politics in their 2009 Manifesto, which marked a real departure from the Open Letter. As Lebanese scholar Amal Saad-Ghorayeb puts it: “the Islamic republic ideal remains the bedrock of Hizbu’llah’s intellectual structure . . . the Israeli occupation may have been its raison d’etre, but its overriding purpose is to serve the ‘Islamic aim.’127 Indeed, as we saw in the first section of this chapter Hezbollah does tend towards the Islamization of the areas that are under its control,128 although there is also clearly an element of self-selection at work here as well. On the other core issue highlighted in terms of emancipation Hezbollah has made considerable strides under the Western vision of emancipation issues such as human rights, women’s rights and access to healthcare and education, as well as a focus on issues of poverty and social justice take the main stage. While it is worth noting that there is some contention in the literature about the role that poverty plays in Hezbollah membership and support, with Judith Palmer Harik suggesting that the bulk of the movement’s support came from the middle classes and not the poor. While much of the literature makes the natural assumption that poverty is a key driver for adherence—the reality is a lot more complicated.129 Despite this debate, rhetoric about poverty, Hezbollah’s social services program and the reality, as Richard Norton notes, that in the southern suburbs of Beirut “per capita income is one fifth to one sixth of the national average”130 mean that poverty can be an issue for

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segments of the entire population and especially for the Shi’a. In trying to raise the issue and address it, Hezbollah appear to be acting in a significantly Emancipatory manner. This is pointed out in much of the literature, as Imad Salamey and Frederic Pearson put it: “[Hezbollah] used these official [public] offices [it holds] as public forums to expose governmental corruption, criticise policies and obstruct strong central authority. Thus, in a bold duality which other parties were ineffective in resisting, the revolutionary character of the party was preserved while government institutions were subjugated to the party’s own ends.”131 Clearly its agenda can be beneficial on two different levels and as we have seen it is this anti-corruption agenda which makes it easier to have relationships with other parties such as the FPM which share these feelings. Hezbollah has also eased access to education and as we have seen in the first part of this chapter has encouraged women’s participation but this may not be the full story; the pragmatic, consensual dialogue loving face and rhetoric of the movement can mask elements and realities that do not always fit with the more public face. This applies for instance to schooling where its network of Mahdi Schools designed to create the so-called society of resistance and to provide cadres ready to serve in the various parts of Hezbollah’s network. As Maha Shuayb puts it “[t]heir mission statement talks about ‘education and indoctrination . . . in Arabic, “indoctrination” is the same word as “to fill up a bottle.” ’ These schools are, notoriously, closed to outsiders and allow no external assessment.”132 Thus while the schools perform well academically, especially in technical subjects, education in this form is as much about control as it is enabling people to improve their life chances. While these negative aspects raise real concerns and may not directly be along the lines envisaged by scholars of Critical Security Studies who focus on their vision of Emancipation on both differing and overlapping issues to those highlighted by Hezbollah,133 both on paper and in its social activities the Party appears to have a commitment to this agenda, which goes beyond the superficial. Given this seeming emancipatory agenda it is worth further examining not just Hezbollah’s involvement in politics to defend their influence and their military wing but also their participation in the government of Lebanon in cabinet, for having secured their political position and overcome their distaste for involvement in the Lebanese political system, only 12 years later the Party would have to decide whether or not to directly participate in the government of Lebanon.

HEZBOLLAH IN GOVERNMENT After the 2005 elections Hezbollah faced another significant choice, this time about taking the next step and going from simply being in parliament to paying a role in government. As we saw above, the step was taken largely

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to protect the movement’s core interests and while the initial experiment in government did not last it is worth exploring the compromises made by Hezbollah, its activities in government and its evolving role in the political process from 2005 to the present. By participating in the government dominated by its March 14 opponents Hezbollah was clearly making a necessary compromise, which was justified by a fatwa and extensive reference to Islamic scholarship by a Lebanese cleric, in order to protect its interests. By endorsing the system through even deeper participation and risking being tarnished among its base by doing so the movement was taking something of a calculated and necessary risk. That Hezbollah would attempt to bring down this government by the resignation of its own and allied ministers in late 2006 and by calling out its supporters in a mass demonstration in December 2006 which explicitly called to bring down the elected government shows its growing power and confidence in the political arena.134 The movement’s desire to bring about what it terms “consensual politics” bringing about an end to sectarianism is in effect veto politics meaning that each group, in concert with its allies, has the power to block any government legislation that it dislikes. This of course effectively neutralizes the ability of the Lebanese government to put the movement’s weapons on the political agenda and firmly secures Hezbollah’s “state within a state” from encroachment by the Lebanese government, and contributes against much of the Party’s rhetoric to the enfeebling of the Lebanese state.135 In the Lebanese system there needs to be a two-thirds majority in cabinet for most business and it needs to maintain the confidence of parliament otherwise it can be reformed. Likewise there is a division at cabinet based on confession and the size of cabinet can vary to accommodate the need for inclusion with both ministers and some ministers of state attending cabinet (the latter usually for their votes). There is also a division between those who hold the so called “sovereign ministries” (defence, foreign affairs, interior and finance) and the so-called service ministries (agriculture, health, education, infrastructure).136 Hezbollah’s withdrawal from cabinet and its policy of mass protests proved ineffective in preventing the Lebanese government from instigating the Hariri tribunal or changing its general direction of policy. Tensions in the country grew leading to armed Sunni–Shi’a clashes in January 2007, which Nasrallah prevented from escalating. Given the lack of progress with Hezbollah’s protest strategy the government became emboldened, dismissing a manager at Beirut airport with strong connections to the movement and attempting to shut down Hezbollah’s private telecommunications networks, which escalated dramatically. Clearly Hezbollah viewed this as a direct assault upon its resistance activities. Trouble-free passage through the airport is essential for its operatives and communications free from eavesdropping are critical for the movement’s political and military effectiveness. Hezbollah had

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long specified that its weapons were there for defensive purposes against the Israelis and would never be used to its advantage within Lebanon, yet for a full five days from the “8 May 2008 Hezbollah did use its weapons to help it to secure its position in Lebanese politics. It seized control of West Beirut and the Sunni and Druze districts in particular, burning newspaper offices, taking a TV station off the air, and surrounding the offices of key government figures.” 137 Clashes erupted around the country between Hezbollah and March 14 political parties and their supporters but it soon became clear that the military balance was very much on Hezbollah’s side. After this show of military strength Hezbollah handed over control to the Lebanese army, the government backed down, and with the taboo now broken, many Lebanese worried what this new turn would mean. This escalation led to diplomatic intervention by external powers who arranged talks in Doha, which led to an agreement that would solve the crisis which had been brewing for some years. Parliament had been unable to agree on a choice for president; thus the agreement in the Doha Accord of May 21, 2008, sought the election of a consensus candidate, the formation of a national unity cabinet in which the March 8 received their coveted veto with one-third plus one posts, agreement on an electoral law for the 2009 elections and the renunciation of all parties of using violence, carrying weapons and inciting sectarian anger completed the key terms of the text.138 It is thus hard from this to see that Hezbollah was in any way punished for having brought its forces onto the streets inciting clashes in which 65 people died.139 It got the veto it so badly wanted, a neutral president was appointed, and while the electoral law was not perfect, it certainly did not unduly disadvantage the movement. Thus Hezbollah retook its seats in cabinet140 and Lebanon returned to a state of uneasy calm. Reassuringly on the May 25 Hassan Nasrallah said: “We don’t want to have control over Lebanon, or to have governance over Lebanon or to impose our ideas over the people of Lebanon, because we believe Lebanon to be a special and diverse country that needs collaboration of everyone.”141 Later that summer Hezbollah appeared to make good on this rhetoric when it signed an understanding with the Salafi Movement in Lebanon. Given the regional dislike of Salafist for Shi’a and the growing sectarian tensions in the region, this again appears to be an extraordinary move by the Party. Lebanon had seen an increase in support for the Salafists among its Sunni population and especially among Palestinians in the refugee camps.142 The summer of 2007 had seen a bloody battle in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr el-Bared near Tripoli between the Lebanese Army and the militant group Fatah al Islam which was aligned with al-Qaeda, as well as a series of bombings in Beirut.143 Hezbollah clearly wanted to find a way of reaching out to Salafists who could have represented a threat. The short memorandum refers to the unity of Muslims, the impermissibility of killing fellow Muslims, the formation of a religious committee to

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discuss differences so as to contain them at this level, an agreement to stand together against both internal and external threats to either movement “so far as resources allow” as well as the inevitable anti U.S. and anti-Zionist rhetoric.144 This was clearly a beneficial move to prevent tensions and promote unity and dialogue. In that sense then it is clearly forward thinking while at the same time reducing a possible threat to Hezbollah by recourse to a bold move. This agreement and the memorandum of understanding with the FPM then are both consummate political documents, which are full of the virtue of dialogue, shared values and the need for unity. Coming in the aftermath of the events of May 2008 this agreement with the Salafists showed a different side to Hezbollah once more. Having used its military power to extend its political power the movement began to focus on the 2009 parliamentary elections to see if it could gain the balance in parliament, thereby taking its vision of “consensus” further still. The 2009 elections though changed little with the results being nearly identical to those of 2005. The new government which came to power under Saad Hariri still contained Hezbollah members under the Doha accord and Hezbollah still maintained the ability to veto policy. With the investigation into the Hariri assassination making progress and looking like it would be pointing the finger directly at Hezbollah and with ambitions for a March 8 led government, in January 2011 Hezbollah and its allies withdrew from cabinet and persuaded the Druze Progressive Socialist Party to switch sides, thus changing the balance of power in parliament. 145 The March 14 movement was simply unwilling to withdraw co-operation from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, indeed there is something rather perverse about Hezbollah asking the son of the murdered Rafik Hariri to try to bring about the end of an investigation and the potential prosecution of his father’s murderers. by June 2011 a new cabinet was in place containing no members of the March 14 Alliance who refused to participate, under the Premiership of Najib Mikati while Hezbollah itself only held two portfolios the government was now run exclusively by the March 8 Bloc with support of the Glory movement to which Mikati belonged and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) of Walid Jumblatt. While Mikati was at pains to paint himself as being the national unity candidate and not beholden to Hezbollah, he was clearly pro-Syrian and more than served Hezbollah’s purposes. It would be too simplistic to see this government as being the creature of Hezbollah beholden as it was to the PSP, Mikati himself and with the FPM being such a significant presence but clearly this went rather a long way from “consensus politics” and took Hezbollah’s involvement to a new level.146 This did not mean that government was easy however, discussions in cabinet remained fraught over issues such as the tribunal and agreement could not be reached. Meanwhile the situation is Syria became ever more felt in Lebanon with a series of kidnappings, skirmishes and terrorist incidents which prompted the March 14 coalition to call for the resignation of

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the government. Surprisingly after several threats to resign, in March 2013 having failed to make progress on procedures for the election amongst other things Mikati formally tendered his resignation to the president who accepted it.147 It seemed in a standoff with Hezbollah over issues such as the election Mikati somewhat unexpectedly called Hezbollah’s bluff. This experiment with government clearly had not entirely gone to plan but again reflects to some extent Hezbollah’s strategy of moderation on most issues but fierce defence of its core interests, in this case especially the Special Tribunal and issues concerning the elections.148 With the next parliamentary elections due to take place in the late spring and early summer of 2013 in the midst of the brutality in Syria, a refugee crisis in Lebanon, tensions in the northern city of Tripoli and increased levels of terrorism within Lebanon, it seemed this could only further exacerbate tensions within the country. Hezbollah, along with many other parties, had put forward their version of a new electoral law for the new election. In this it had a different vision than its ally the FPM who supported the so-called Orthodox Gathering electoral law that would address the problem of relative Christian underrepresentation, or more accurately the problem that Christians could have those who represent them decided without those candidates receiving a majority of Christian votes. Hezbollah on the other hand wanted proportional representation, with Lebanon constituting a single electoral district, naturally enough ensuring that they would receive considerable support. Parliament came close to voting on this law and it seems likely that it could have passed and would have received Hezbollah’s support but Lebanon’s usual alliances fractured the Christian consensus, with the Future Movement standing to lose perhaps half its MPs thus damaging the March 14 Alliance. Given this gridlock and the problems confronting the country a remarkable consensus across the divide emerged (with the exception of the FPM which stood to gain significantly) to postpone the parliamentary elections until November 2014. The situation had not improved by then and parliament voted overwhelmingly to extend its term until 2017. This again demonstrates Hezbollah’s flexibility, clearly the move is rather undemocratic preventing the Lebanese people from voting for a full term. Yet at the same time the movement’s decision to back an electoral law they did not agree with and which strengthened confessionalism and to extend parliament’s term shows a calculated understanding of their own wider interests, an understanding of the need to keep a key ally content and to offer a concession to the Christian community as a whole, while the postponement of the elections recognizes the dangers of polarization given the regional situation. This demonstrates Hezbollah’s frequently contradictory nature and the fact that the movement is now truly immersed as a Lebanese political player. After the collapse of the Mikati government in the spring of 2013 it then took 10 months for a new national unity government to be formed.149

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This came in February 2014 with the appointment of Tammam Salaam as prime minister, a centrist who then went on to appoint a cabinet made up of both March 8 and March 14 Alliances, along with six centrists appointed by the president and Salaam. This new government included three Future Movement members and two Hezbollah members and was divided equally between eight March 8 members, eight March 14 members, and eight centrist members (two of these being from the PSP which is now unaligned between the two blocs).150 This of course means that Hezbollah and its allies have now lost the veto of one-third plus one in the cabinet, although they still have the option of resignation. Yet despite opposition from other parties who demanded a fully neutral cabinet and refused to serve in a cabinet with Hezbollah, the Party still retains its cabinet posts.151 Thus it must be said perhaps that Hezbollah perhaps overplayed its hand in 2011 and in the government of Mikati, yet at the same time it is unlikely that this government, designated as it is a national unity government would wish to pursue issues which may concern Hezbollah. Indeed in the short term stability in Lebanon given the situation in Syria is beneficial to Hezbollah, as is the restoration of a calmer more co-operative image. This short term arrangement, which was designed to last until a president was elected and which would have ended had the postponed elections gone ahead as first planned in November 2014, has proven surprisingly enduring, it seems Hezbollah’s pragmatic streak is to the fore once more and its red lines are more clear than ever.

CONCLUSION—SOCIALIZED OR SOCIALIZING? As we have seen in this chapter, Hezbollah is now a committed social and political actor on the Lebanese scene and has undergone something of a dramatic transformation over the course of its history. The chapter set out to explore the Party’s role in the social and political life of Lebanon, what Hezbollah seeks to gain from its involvement in these spheres and how its participation both constrains and enables the movement. One of the main themes running through the chapter has been the idea of Hezbollah’s commitment to the protection of its resistance capabilities and the promotion of a “resistance society”; in order to do this it has found itself drawn into political life and social provision. A further theme has highlighted what so often pre-occupies the literature on Hezbollah, that is to say the almost unanswerable question about the very basis and nature of the Party, and its public and private faces. Asking how far Hezbollah has moved from its Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist roots, and to what extent it has been socialized into the complex realities of Lebanon’s sectarian society and governing structures is a perennial yet still vital question with partisans on each side of the debate, and a growing body of literature exploring the complex realities of compromise and contestation in the Party’s identity, aims and structures in between the two ends of

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the spectrum of thought. Clearly though, both narratives have some merit. There remain real questions about the strength of the movement’s commitment to upholding promises that it has made. Yet at the same time, the journey the Party has made has been considerable over the past quarter of a century and the movement has clearly dramatically improved the position of both the Shi’a and the poor more generally in Lebanon. Hezbollah has certainly not yet been fully socialized into the Lebanese system and changes from both within and outside Lebanon could have a dramatic effect on this process one way or the other. While this chapter would suggest that the Party has potential to go further in its socialization process, question marks still remain about just how far the process can go before some of the Party’s contradictions come to the surface. Indeed, some have suggested that the Party may be losing some of its legitimacy as a result of the 2006 war, its involvement is Syria and increasing evidence of the Party’s authoritarianism and of corrupt activities, which have tarnished its image and exposed some of the Party’s hypocrisy.152 Even if these realities are overstated, and Hezbollah undoubtedly retains a deep and entrenched position in Lebanon, they serve as useful reminders that Hezbollah’s current strength is not guaranteed to last forever and remains subject to the human frailties of hubris, miscalculation and division. Hezbollah is, therefore, clearly still evolving and undergoing a process of socialization but so too is Lebanon itself. The country has without doubt also been socialized into some of Hezbollah’s ideas and calculations. Resistance is a popular narrative, other sects have made alliances with the movement and more space has been made in the system for the views and needs of the Shi’a communities. Despite inevitable tensions in such a complex society that is so vulnerable to the whims of external powers, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Hezbollah can learn to live comfortably in Lebanon and that the Cedar Republic’s other inhabitants can find a way to live with Hezbollah. That process though remains unpredictable and fraught with dangers.153 Given that the movement’s involvement in politics transcends Lebanon, thereby drawing it inexorably into regional struggles, especially through its relationship with Iran, this external dimension of the Party naturally flows from these discussions.154 The following two chapters therefore explore the movement’s complex relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the changing nature of the Party’s relationships and interactions with the rest of the Middle East in the light of the changes wrought by the upheavals of the Arab Spring.

5 R

Resistance and Coexistence: Exploring Iranian and Syrian Involvement in the Creation of Hezbollah

Hezbollah shares complex and nuanced relationships with other actors in the Middle East, the nature of which has defined the group since its inception. From the formative stages of the group, the Party of God has been inextricably linked to Iran and Syria, reflecting the involvement of these actors in the creation of Hezbollah, while opposed to Israel. At first glance it would appear that the creation of Hezbollah would serve geopolitical agendas of both states, which, in turn, explains the relationship between Tehran, Damascus, and Hezbollah. However, there is far more to understanding the complex relationship between these actors than pure power politics. As such, this chapter considers the impact of external actors on shaping Hezbollah’s transition from Islamic resistance to government. It explores the impact of actors in the formation of the group, before looking at the continuation of ties with external actors. The chapter focuses predominantly upon ties with Iran and Syria and the provision of ideological and logistical support from Tehran and Damascus, before considering how this support feeds into the geopolitical environment of the contemporary Middle East. While many perceive Hezbollah to be a proxy actor receiving instructions from either Tehran or Damascus, this is a gross

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underestimate of the group’s autonomy. Granted, both Iran and Syria played a prominent role in the establishment of Hezbollah, yet the Party of God is far more autonomous, as demonstrated during the lead up to the 2006 war with Israel. When considering the importance of external actors in shaping Hezbollah’s role within Lebanon, there are four main actors to consider. The first is Israel, against whom Hezbollah has defined itself as a resistance organization. The second is Syria, as a consequence of a shared border and shared religious views. The third is Iran, again as a consequence of shared religious views. The fourth is Saudi Arabia, which views Hezbollah as an important geopolitical rival, in part, because of the geopolitical importance of Lebanon, but also because of the increased internationalization of Hezbollah. This chapter engages with all of the aforementioned actors by exploring four areas: first, it considers domestic factors that have left Lebanon open to external interference—the colonial legacy, the presence of Palestinians, and the Israeli invasion in 1982—and the Hariri assassination; second, it looks at the importance of shared religious ties and how Shi’a thought has shaped the group; third, it considers the provision of logistical support; fourth, it considers the geopolitical environment after the 2006 war with Israel. In exploring these four areas the chapter allows for greater understanding of Hezbollah’s relationship with these four actors.

THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT The previous chapters have articulated much of the domestic context necessary to understand the involvement of external actors in the rise of Hezbollah; however, several factors are important to revisit at this point. Understanding the colonial history of Lebanon is important when unpacking some of the facets of Shi’a thought, namely ideas of resistance and the Karbala narrative. In framing the group as being the protectors of the Shi’a of Lebanon, it is important to explore the roots of oppression and the creation of binary identities against this oppressor. A legacy of colonial involvement has impacted on generations of Lebanese psyches, leaving many frustrated at the involvement of external actors, from the French, through the Palestinians and the Syrians. The domestic construction of Lebanon has left the state open to external interference, with actors offering support to the various groups within the state, for numerous reasons. Lebanon possesses a key strategic importance for both Iran and Saudi Arabia, for ideological and geopolitical reasons. For Iran, the existence of clerical ties with Lebanon that pre-date the 1979 revolution means that the relationship with the Shi’a of Lebanon is important. For Saudi Arabia, Lebanon offers an opportunity to counter key regional dynamics, namely the threat of Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s1 and the threat of Iran today.

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Yet Israeli forces were not the only military presence within Lebanon. As previously noted, Syrian forces maintained a presence in Lebanon for 29 years until their withdrawal in 2005. For much of this time, Syria exerted a huge degree of influence over Lebanon; however, with the rising power and popularity of the then three-term prime minister, Rafik Hariri, tensions with Syria began to increase. These tensions culminated in a tempestuous confrontation between Hariri and Bashar Al Asad in the summer of 2004, which led to the resignation of Hariri and, ultimately, his assassination. As Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr note, the assassination of Rafik Hariri changed the direction of Lebanese politics, triggering a revolution and altering the construction of power across the Levant.2 What later became known as the Cedar Revolution was an uprising, the likes of which had not been seen in Lebanon before. The protestors articulated three main demands: the end of Syrian domination of Lebanon, the full withdrawal of Syrian forces, and an international investigation into the assassination of Hariri.3 Many in the international community believe that actors in close proximity to the Asad regime were behind the assassination of Hariri, who himself possessed close ties with Saudi Arabia, highlighting the penetrated nature of Lebanese politics.4Ultimately, Syrian forces withdrew in April 2005. While the role of Syria within Lebanese politics has undeniably been controversial, for Hezbollah, Syria remains a key ally. The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon after a 29-year military presence began to alter power relations between the two, as Damascus became increasingly reliant upon Hezbollah to maintain its influence within Lebanon. Domestically, the Syrian withdrawal prompted Hezbollah to join the Lebanese government in order to protect its own interests. The collapse of the unity government in 2011 once more opened the door to increased Iranian and Syrian influence, further strengthening Hezbollah’s position within Lebanon. In the aftermath of the Hariri assassination, competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia increased, spurred on by the emergence of two key factions: the March 8th Alliance, comprising Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria; and the March 14th Alliance, comprising the pro-Hariri coalition and Saudi Arabia.5 Despite the existence of these factions, in the immediate aftermath of the Hariri assignation, neither alliance favored direct conflict with the other. As a consequence, a cold peace emerged that was ultimately ended by the events of 2006. In the aftermath of the conflict with Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia both sought to aid the postwar reconstruction program. Tehran provided a sum in the region of $120 million,6 whereas Saudi Arabia provided $1.5 billion. This funding demonstrates the opportunity for geopolitical competition within Lebanon, and thus the importance of the state for external actors. This proxy competition is touched on again later in this chapter before being explored in much greater detail in Chapter 6.

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IDEOLOGICAL SUPPORT The emergence of Hezbollah as an organization in 1982, while driven by the domestic political situation, was in no small way facilitated by external actors, who provided ideological and logistical support. The two main actors that aided the birth of the organization were Iran and Syria, each playing an important yet different role. If one considers the very emergence of Hezbollah, the importance of Shi’a thought is paramount, with the group’s emergence following a “time of great foment, enthusiasm, and transition among the Shi’a of Lebanon,”7 which stemmed not only from desires to emulate the Iranian revolution that occurred only three years previously, but also from the continued Israeli presence within southern Lebanon.8 When looking at the development of ties between Iran and Hezbollah, it is important to begin by unpacking several key facets of Shi’a thought, along with the revolution in Iran of 1979. In understanding Shi’a thought, it is far easier to understand the motivation for Iran to support Hezbollah, but also to understand Hezbollah’s actions in Lebanon and regionally. In particular, the Karbala narrative, which occupies such a prominent position within Shi’a thought, plays an essential role in understanding the actions of Iran and Hezbollah.

The Iranian Revolution The events of 1979 in Iran would have a dramatic impact upon the regional dynamics of the Middle East, along with Shi’a communities across the world, particularly in Lebanon. The emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a state that possessed an explicit proselytizing agenda, dramatically altered the status quo of the Middle East and Islamic world. The revolution resulted in the development of an explicitly Islamic foreign policy, which “disrupted the regional order and also ended the slowly emerging alliances of moderate forces in the Middle East.”9 This proselytizing agenda sought to export the ideological beliefs of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, while leaving in its wake, “a trail of devastation in regional relations, littered with spontaneous utterances and unfettered intervention in neighbouring states.”10 Several factors drove the revolution in Iran, including (but not limited to) the corruption of the Shah’s regime, a lack of access to political space, and worsening economic conditions. The year 1978 began with the Shah’s government attempting to discredit Khomeini, who was in exile in Paris. In response, protests began to occur across Iran. The heavy-handed response of the Shah’s military forces resulted in deaths and parallels being drawn with key figures within Shi’a thought, namely Hossein and Ali. Protests escalated, resulting in two atrocities. On September 8, which has become known as Black Friday, a crowd gathered in Jaleh Square, Tehran,

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and after refusing to disperse, was gunned down. Second, at the beginning of Moharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar, tanks drove over protesters in Qazuim, resulting in 135 deaths.11 The spate of protests and ensuing deaths resulted in a crowd of over a million people attending the Ashura celebrations. 12 Shortly after this, reflecting the level of dissatisfaction with his rule amongst the Iranian people, on the 16th of January 1979 the Shah abdicated. The return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Tehran on February 1, 1979, was witnessed by an estimated three million people, from all facets of Iranian society. In the aftermath of the revolution, the system of veleyat-e faqih, or Regency of the Jurist, was implemented by Ruhollah Khomeini. Veleyat-e faqih, a system of rule that derived its laws directly from the Sharia, placed power in the hands of jurisprudents, or those with the correct religious training, given the absence of the twelfth imam.13 The ideas that would constitute veleyat-e faqih were found in Khomeini’s work, the Regency of the Jurist, the main premise of which is that the Shari’a is the word of God. Given this, the Shari’a should regulate human conduct, and, as such, this is the only legitimate form of law. As only mojtaheds (high-ranking clerics) are able to correctly interpret and apply the Shari’a, given the primacy of theological thought, mojtaheds are thus the only individuals who are able to rule, because of their training in Islamic theology and jurisprudence. It is worth noting that veleyat-e faqih went against years of Shi’a political thought, which, previously, had sought to avoid clerical involvement within the political system, as seen by the absence of clerics within the events of 1953. Khomeini’s vision of rule was anti-monarchical, anti-Western, and as a consequence anti-colonial. To this end, veleyat-e faqih offered support to Shi’a groups across the region who sought to challenge these oppressors. This view of foreign policy is enshrined within Article 3.16 of the Iranian Constitution. In it, one can see a “fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the mustad’afin of the world.”14 As such, the revolutionary goals encapsulated within veleyat-e faqih set Iran on a path of hostility with former allies and neighbors. It also had a dramatic impact upon relations between Muslim states. Within five years, Khomeini’s “discourse and emphasis had . . . ‘widened the gap between the predominantly Shi’i population of Iran and Sunni majorities elsewhere . . . and exacerbated sectarian feeling throughout the Muslim world.’ ”15 It did, however, embolden Shi’a groups across the region, in particular the burgeoning Hezbollah. The development of an Iranian Constitution that offered support to a “fraternal commitment to all Muslims and unsparing support to the mustad’afiin of the world”16 facilitated the empowerment of these Shi’a groups. Given this, the importance of Khomeini in the formative years of Hezbollah cannot be understated. This importance can be seen in the development of strong personal links to prominent Lebanese Shi’a clerics, including Musa al-Sadr.

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As previously noted, al-Sadr was a prominent figure within the Shi’a community, but as an Iranian born in Qom had strong ties to Iranian (Shi’a) clerics. One of the last public appearances made by al-Sadr before his disappearance in Libya was to extol the virtues of “Imam Khomeini,” whose behavior demonstrated the “national, cultural, libertarian dimensions” of the revolution of 1979.17 The two had met while in Najaf, after al-Sadr’s niece married Ahmad Khomeini, Ruhollah’s youngest son. 18 Given alSadr’s stature within the Lebanese Shi’a community, his support for Khomeini at this time cannot be understated. However, the importance of the supreme leader is not limited to Khomeini; rather, the influence of Ayatollah Seyid Ali Khamenei is also strongly felt. The importance of the Iranian supreme leader transcends offering religious guidance in matters that cannot be decided by Hezbollah’s governing council. Indeed, the supreme leader is also responsible for the provision of financial support, not necessarily through formal government channels, but from charities and foundations under the direct control of the supreme leader. While not possessing the same level of adulation as Khomeini, Khamenei remains a key figure for Hezbollah. In the aftermath of Khomeini’s death, Iran’s foreign policy underwent a change, with consequences for Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah. Ali Khamenei was a surprising choice to replace Khomeini as supreme leader, lacking the necessary qualifications to make him a marja’ al-taqlid, a high-ranking cleric who was a source of emulation. There were also believed to be 8 grand ayatollahs and 200 ayatollahs who possessed greater Islamic credentials than Khamenei.19 The immediate consequence of this was to allow greater power and autonomy to the office of the president, and in particular to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani took a leading role in the foreign policy of Iran in the aftermath of Khomeini’s death, opposing the intra-Shi’a fighting and advocating a less militant foreign policy.20 Yet as Khamenei consolidated power, a more vocal foreign policy took hold. While the nature of this foreign policy oscillated depending upon the president, verging from the cooperative to the belligerent, this always occurred within the parameters set out within the Iranian Constitution, and continued to spread the goals of veleyat-e faqih.

Shi’a Thought While the previous section has expanded upon contemporary ties between Hezbollah and Iran, to fully understand the nature of ties, one must be familiar with narratives at the heart of Shi’a thought. These narratives can be used to justify the behavior of actors, while also serving as a motivation for additional action. The split between Sunni and Shi’a can be traced back to the rule of the fourth caliph, when a schism emerged over the issue of succession: who was to lead the umma after the prophet’s death.

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For Shi’a Muslims, Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet, was the true successor to Mohammad and, as a consequence, should have been the first imam; however, Ali ruled over the fourth caliphate of Islam, dating 656 to 661. Before Ali became the fourth imam, the Islamic community had accumulated enormous power and wealth, after conquering vast territories. This resulted in certain families possessing inordinate power, including several families who had opposed the prophet in Mecca, prior to him fleeing. In direct contrast to those families, Ali maintained a pious life, of austerity and prayer. “He became a natural focus for dissent, and in turn was resented by those around the caliph: bringing forth the austerity/piety conflict within Islam itself for the first time.”21 This conflict had serious repercussions for Islam, resulting in the murder of Ali and Hossein, and an increase in tensions between Sunni and Shi’a. This history of Shi’ism is important when considering the work of Ruhollah Khomeini, who built on this by drawing distinctions between two facets of society. In his post-1970 writings . . . Khomeini depicted society as sharply divided into two warring classes—tabaqat: the mostazafin—oppressed—against the mostakberin—oppressors; the foqara—poor—against the sarvatmandan— rich; the mellat-e mostazaf—oppressed nation—against the hokumat-e shaytan—Satan’s government . . . In the 1970s, however, he used [the term mostazafin] in almost every single speech and proclamation to depict the angry poor, the “exploited people,” and the “downtrodden masses.” After the revolution, he gradually broadened the term to bring in the propertied middle class, which actively supported the new order.22

This notion of mostazafin would play an integral role within Iranian foreign policy, enshrined in Article 3.16 of the Constitution, particularly with regard to offering support to the Shi’a groups across the world, and Hezbollah in particular.

The Karbala Narrative Aiding the application of such terminology across the Shi’a world were numerous parallels made with historic events within the history of Shi’ism. The most prominent of these was the Karbala paradigm, which involved reference to the Karbala narrative in an effort to facilitate revolution.23 The Karbala narrative details the martyrdom of the third imam, Hossein bin Ali, by the Umayyad army, at Karbala in the year 680. Hossein, one of Ali’s six children, is central to Shi’a thought. Hossein possessed legitimacy from being the grandson of the prophet, but he also gained legitimacy by rebelling against the impropriety, corruption, and oppression of the Yazid court, in an effort to “purify” Islam. The rebellion resulted in the deaths of

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Hossein, his forces, and finally his infant son. Hossein’s death possesses an integral role within Shi’a ritual, as reflected in the festival central to Shi’a beliefs, Ashura, which commemorates his death at Karbala. Some hold that Hossein sought martyrdom at Karbala, suggesting that he believed that the only way he could bring about a return of the original Islamic values that he valued is by sacrificing himself. As Rola El-Husseini accurately notes, the Karbala narrative is found at the heart of Shi’a thought and evokes ideas of “martyrdom, sacrifice, commitment to a cause and passion.”24 Furthermore, the failure of his supporters in Kufa to aid him has added a strong sense of guilt to Shi’a memories of Karbala. Given this, ideas of guilt and martyrdom are inherent within Shi’a thought. The martyrdom of Hossein at Karbala is commemorated during the festival of Ashura, which occurs on the 10th day of Muharram. The importance of Ashura cannot be understated, as it commemorates and celebrates ideas of resistance and martyrdom, which are essential to Shi’a thought and understanding the behavior of Shi’a Muslims. Historically during Ashura, Shi’a Muslims engaged in forms of self-flagellation, namely tatbir, the cutting of the skin on the top of the head with a sword. Historically, Shi’a Muslims would participate in mourning rituals including self-flagellation in order to “gain salvation in the afterlife as well as in this lifetime.”25 However, during the 1990s, this practice was banned by both Hezbollah and Ayatollah Khamenei, who argued that Ashura should be marked by ways that emphasized revolutionary action.26 The move away from acts such as tatbir highlights the change to a more proactive form of resistance, stressing the need to build on lessons from Karbala and to emphasize the importance of resistance. This Karbala narrative is thus extrapolated upon, with parallels drawn between Hossein and his followers and the mostazafin, and the mostakberin and the Umayyads. This was certainly the parallel made in Iran prior to the revolution of 1979, with the use of slogans such as “every day is Ashura and everywhere is Karbala,” which stressed the importance of resistance. Yet, the Karbala paradigm has a much wider application: the narrative of Karbala was used and modified in new forms throughout the 1980s and 1990s, driven by the Islamic Revolution and the rise and success of Hezbollah. While Hezbollah were seen to be supporting the mostazafin, Israel, the United States, and Iraq were seen to be the mostakberin and thus parallels were drawn with the Yazid.27 Given this, for Iran and Hezbollah, the parallels with Hossein ensured that resistance against the oppressors was necessary. The flexibility of application demonstrates how the Karbala narrative can also be used in a different context, namely in an anti-colonial and anti-imperial context. Given this, the narrative can be employed by Shi’a communities across the Middle East. One such individual who made use of the language of the Karbala narrative was Imam Mousa, who became an increasingly important figure in

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Shi’a and Lebanese politics during the course of the 1970s. In 1974 Sadr, frustrated at the apathy and impotence of the Lebanese government to respond to the Shi’a predicament, began to evoke memories of Karbala, advocating a stronger response to the problems facing the Lebanese Shi’a. In a speech in the Bekaa Valley, Sadr suggested that there was “no alternative for us except revolution and weapons,” and only a month later in Baalbek declared that “armaments are the adornment of men.”28During the same speech, Sadr, speaking to a crowd of 75,000 people at the end of the Ashoura festival, drew upon the legacy of Hossein and channeled ideas of resistance: “Starting from today . . . we will no longer complain nor cry. Our name is not Mitwali; our name is ‘men of refusal,’ ‘men of vengeance,’ ‘men who revolt against tyranny’ even though this costs us our blood and our lives.”29 These comments were woven into a narrative of resistance, a narrative that sought to challenge oppression and one that drew parallels with—and stressed the importance of—Shi’a history. While Sadr’s rhetoric resulted in the establishment of Amal, not Hezbollah, it was a necessary precursor to the establishment of the Party of God. Furthermore, given the domestic context that the Shi’a were operating in, often overlooked and marginalized across Lebanon, many were receptive to the charismatic use of the language of resistance. As such, the use of such strong language, evoking the memory of Hossein and stressing the importance of the Karbala narrative, had an undeniably galvanizing impact upon Shi’a communities in Lebanon. Thus, the Karbala narrative is amended slightly for Hezbollah, becoming resistance against an oppressor and an occupier, rather than the more traditional narrative of revolting against a ruler. For Hezbollah, the occupier was Israel, along with its ally the United States. Rola El-Husseini tracks this shift from in the 1985 Open Letter, wherein Hezbollah declared that its intention was to “expel the Americans . . . and their allies definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land.”30 The Open Letter is “strongly imbued with the message of the Iranian revolution,” 31 which stresses the importance of resistance and posits Iran (and thus Hezbollah) in opposition to the West.

Shi’a Thought and Hezbollah Manifestos The importance of Shi’a religious values, of Khomeini and indeed of Iran, can be seen within Hezbollah’s manifestos. Two documents are worth referring to here, namely the Open Letter of 1985 and the 2009 manifesto. The language of these documents is rich and evocative, seeking to foster a spirit of resistance and unity. It is clear that while explicitly a Shi’a organization, Hezbollah is also attempting to appeal to the wider umma: “We declare openly and loudly that we are an umma which fears God only and is by no means ready to tolerate injustice, aggression and humiliation.”32 Joseph

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Alagha takes this argument one stage further, to suggest that Hezbollah’s friends are “the oppressed of the entire world, irrespective of their color, race, or religion.”33 In seeking to protect the umma, the Open Letter seeks to confront “basic enemies: the US, France and Israel . . . is against Westoxification,” although it is important to note that this Westoxification is driven by a “hatred of the US administration, not the US people.”34 The notion of the mostazafin can also clearly be seen in the formative stages of the group, notably in the 1985 manifesto, articulated in “An Open Letter: The Hezbollah Programme.”35 Under the banner of “Our Identity,” the document states: We are often asked: Who are we, the Hizballah, and what is our identity? We are the sons of the umma (Muslim community)—the party of God (Hizb Allah) the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran. There the vanguard succeeded to lay down the bases of a Muslim state which plays a central role in the world. We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini. God save him!

This document continues: We are an umma linked to the Muslims of the whole world by the solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam, whose message God wanted to be fulfilled by the Seal of the Prophets . . . Our behavior is dictated to us by legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political conception defined by the leading jurist (wilayat al-faqih).

The two passages quoted above stress the admiration in which Khomeini was held, but also stresses the importance of veleyat-e faqih. While the letter does not stipulate the usage of a particular political system, Di Peri suggests that Khomeini’s system of veleyat-e faqih would be the “most plausible model.”36 The 2009 manifesto was written in response to the changing position that Hezbollah found itself in, having transitioned from resistance to a prominent political actor in Lebanon. The 2009 manifesto is less of an ideologically driven vision statement, as the Open Letter can be read as, which reflects this changing position within Lebanon and across both the Middle East and Islamic world. While it did not dramatically shift Hezbollah’s view of the world, it altered some of the language used to refer to the United States and Israel, dropping references to “Great Satan” and “Small Satan.”37 The importance of the Karbala narrative is immediately evident in the 2009 manifesto, which outlines how the document is “a result of the priority of deeds and responsibility of sacrifice that we have experienced.”38 This refers again to the history of Shi’ism, but also evokes memories of the

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struggle experienced by the Shi’a of Lebanon. As such, the continued support for the oppressed is a key theme.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT Training the Party of God While Shi’a thought plays an integral role within the formation of Hezbollah, the importance of external actors can also be seen in the provision of logistical support for the Party of God. In the formative stage of the group, both Iran and Syria provided funds, arms, and training. Indeed, during the formative years of Hezbollah, Iran provided 1,500 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to train Hezbollah fighters in the Bekaa Valley.39 The presence of members of the IRGC in Lebanon was brought about by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Israeli forces entered southern Lebanon in an attempt to prevent the continued Palestinian attacks on Israel and Israeli officials. The catalyst for the invasion was the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to the United States by the Abu Nidal Organisation.40 The presence of members of the IRGC was facilitated by a military agreement between Syria and Iran over the nature of the response, with the conclusion reached that IRGC forces would not engage directly with Israeli forces as this would be logistically and practically unwise.41 In light of the IDF’s (Israel Defence Forces) technological advancements, the small number of IRGC would stand little chance of affecting the course of the war. Instead, the IRGC sought to unify the newly created Party of God, drawing together the disparate mix of individuals that comprised Hezbollah. In these early days, the IRGC helped with recruitment and logistical training. Additional incentives were on offer, with monthly salaries offered to those who joined the new group. Other welfare incentives were offered, notably access to free education and medical assistance. Iranian and Syrian patronage at this time was clear. Iran was providing large financial assistance to Hezbollah, aiding the recruitment drive, solidification, and training process. The success of this strategy can be seen in the creation of training camps across the Bekaa Valley. Over time, the popularity of Hezbollah spread across the Shi’a-controlled areas of Lebanon, thanks, in no small part, to the provision of services brought about by Iranian and Syrian money. Stemming from the nature of these ties, Hezbollah have been referred to as a “tool of Iran,”42 developing the idea that the Party of God is a proxy actor, doing Tehran’s bidding. As Gary Sick notes: Numerous assassinations of enemies abroad in the late 1980s and 1990s were widely and persuasively attributed to Iranian official sponsorship, and Iran

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was accused of sponsoring operations by other militant organisations, such as the Argentinean bombings of 1992 and 1994 and the 1996 bombing, attributed to Hizballah organisations in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.43

However, both sought to retain a sense of plausible deniability on their clandestine operations overseas.44 Take, for instance, the 1992 attack on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, where 29 civilians were killed, or the 1994 car-bomb attack in Buenos Aires on the Jewish Community Centre.45 These attacks were facilitated by networks associated with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). This association has provided Hezbollah with a global reach, through which it has now created a network that has led some to suggest that it is far more capable and organized than al-Qaeda.46 This global network of criminal enterprise is also facilitated by expatriate followers,47 along with support from the IRGC Quds force.48 Iranian involvement in creating the Special Security Apparatus (SSA), a clandestine, elite unit within Hezbollah, was an attempt not only to secure the leadership of the Party but also to ensure that Iranian interests were protected. In addition, the creation of the SSA solidified the relationship between Tehran and the Party of God. Links were established between the SSA and MOIS, wherein the SSA was given a degree of autonomy, but would consult with the MOIS leadership in Tehran and Iranian intelligence figures in Damascus and Beirut.49 While ties between the two remain strong, as Hezbollah gained strength and confidence, the notion that Hezbollah was solely doing Iran’s bidding began to be eroded. As Magnus Ranstorp notes, the Iran–Hezbollah relationship challenged the conventional notion of state-sponsored terrorism and of a linear channel of sponsor–proxy. 50 As Hezbollah’s power increased, the linear nature of this sponsor–proxy relationship evolved, to the extent that in 2006, some suggest that Hezbollah launched operations against Israel without Tehran’s approval. This challenges the notion that Hezbollah is purely Iran’s proxy.51 Despite this, Matthew Levitt suggested that, in 2005, the extent to which Iran sponsored Hezbollah was in the region of $100 million per year, while at the same time, some Western diplomats put this figure at closer to $200 million.52

THE PROVISION OF WEAPONS Aside from providing ideological guidance, finance, and training, Tehran and Damascus have also proved integral in providing weapons to the group, with weapons transferred to Hezbollah, from Iran, via Syria. The source of these weapons is not in doubt, with Nasrallah in 2007 stating that Iran was providing financial support, along with weapons. Weapon shipments from Iran are typically sent via Damascus.

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During the years before the second Lebanon war the Iranians transferred weapons to Hezbollah in an almost unbroken stream by taking advantage of various opportune situations. For example, at least nine times the Quds Force used Iranian and Syrian cargo planes flying humanitarian aid in to the earthquake victims at Bam (in southeastern Iran) to take large quantities of weapons for Hezbollah on their return flights (December 2003–January 2004).53

A source close to the IRGC leadership, speaking to Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, provided a detailed account of the organization’s role in training and arming Hezbollah: Firstly, in 1985, the Revolutionary Guards established the Hizbullah missile unit which was trained in Lebanon, at the Sheikh “Ubeidallah Military Base in the Beqa.” About 2000 men from the Revolutionary Guards were in this base, which served as their headquarters. [In 1989,] when the Lebanese civil war ended, and the Taif Agreement was signed and most of the Revolutionary Guards left Lebanon, between 150 and 250 Hizbullah [fighters] were trained by the best Revolutionary Guards trainers, who stayed in Lebanon . . . Secondly, special training courses [for Hizbullah fighters] were organized in Iran, and so far, over 3,000 Hizbullah [fighters] have taken them. The [courses] included training in guerilla warfare, missile aiming and launching, [use of] artillery, handling of unmanned aircraft, use of “kites” [i.e. hang gliders], naval warfare techniques, handling of speedboats and conventional warfare. Thirdly, in the last three years, 50 pilots have been trained. Fourthly, The Revolutionary Guards established 20 permanent missile bases within the strip [running along] the Israeli border. They also equipped Hizbullah with mobile bases, [i.e.] medium-sized trucks that can carry and launch missiles. Between 1992 and 2005, Hizbullah received approximately 11,500 missiles and rockets, 400 short- and medium-range pieces of artillery, [and] Aresh, Nuri and Hadid rockets. Last year, Hizbullah first received a shipment of large “Uqab missiles with 333-millimeter warheads, and an enormous supply of SAM7 shoulder-[fired] anti-aircraft missiles as well as C802 missiles, copied from Chinese missiles, two of which were used in the attack on the Israeli ship the day before yesterday.”54

Furthermore, the source detailed the extent of IRGC involvement in Lebanon in 2006: there are 70 trainers, experts and technicians, as well as 60 Faylaq Quds intelligence agents, who assist the Hizbullah missile unit and its local leadership. In addition, there is a secret Revolutionary Guards unit, consisting of 20 officers, who use advanced means to track the movement of the Israeli forces in the field, and select targets in Israel for the operation commanders.55

Tehran also sought creative ways to resupply Hezbollah, one of which was through the use of Red Crescent ambulances.56 During the 2006 war,

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U.S. diplomatic cables documented the use of Iranian Red Crescent ambulances to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah, where “shipments of medical supplies served also to facilitate weapons shipments.”57 An unnamed source “had seen missiles in the planes destined for Lebanon when delivering medical supplies to the plane,”58 which was allegedly half full, before medical supplies had been loaded. Syria is also responsible for supplying weapons to Hezbollah, despite the denials of President Bashar al Asad. In a U.S. diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks, Syria was accused of supplying SCUD missiles to Hezbollah. These concerns were put to Asad, “who bluntly stated that he knew of no new weapons systems going to Hezbollah.”59 In a memo from then U.S. secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, to the embassy in Damascus, Clinton detailed how the United States had learnt about Syrian intentions to supply Hezbollah with SCUD missiles. The memo read: “I must stress that this activity is of deep concern to my government, and we strongly caution you (Syria) against such a serious escalation . . . Your interest in avoiding war should require you to exert maximum restraint, including restraining Hezbollah and preventing the group’s acquisition of such lethal, long-range weapons.”60 The desire to supply Hezbollah with weapons and money demonstrates the importance of the group for Tehran and Damascus, even risking the wrath of the United States to do so.

GEOPOLITICS IN ACTION While the provision of support to Hezbollah reflects the Islamic Republic’s desire to support the downtrodden of the Muslim world, especially Shi’a groups, the establishment of Hezbollah also served the geopolitical agendas of Tehran and Damascus. Indeed, the creation of the Party of God helped Iran spread the message of the Islamic Revolution far beyond its shores and would serve to protect the Asad regime in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. It is important to acknowledge, however, that relations between Iran and Syria have not always remained cordial. Despite often operating closely in an effort to secure Hezbollah, relations between Tehran and Damascus are not always cordial. Indeed, there are suggestions that Tehran has attempted to bypass Damascus and to ensure that there is a direct line between Hezbollah and Tehran, facilitated through the establishment of a network of fiber-optic cables.61 However, an in-depth discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this project. The growth of Hezbollah as a dominant actor in the contemporary Middle East has amplified the growing schism within the Muslim world. In 2006, King Abdullah II of Jordan referred to the emergence of a “Shi’a Crescent” across the Middle East. In making this comment, Abdullah was highlighting a growing concern across many states of the rising power of

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Iran, and how a burgeoning Iranian power may impact upon the stability of the region. Indeed, the sectarian schism across the Middle East has resulted in an increase in proxy competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, along with the emergence of violent groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. These geopolitical issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

THE 2006 WAR AND EMERGING TENSIONS The year 2006 witnessed the violent manifestation of tensions between Hezbollah and Israel, in a war that lasted 34 days, ending in a “Divine Victory.”62 This conflict, while beneficial to Hezbollah, increasing the group’s legitimacy across the Arab and Muslim world, was also of great benefit to Iran. As outlined in a 2009 Rand report, Hezbollah “effectively bested the vaunted Israeli Defence Force,”63 which served to further Iran’s “Arab Street” policy, albeit by proxy. However, the final outcome of the conflict is far more nuanced than this position suggests. Indeed, many charged Hezbollah with bringing wanton destruction to Lebanon in light of the IDF’s destruction of Southern Beirut, while Hezbollah argued that other groups in Lebanon conspired with Israel against the Party of God. Moreover, as Knudsen and Kerr suggest, Hezbollah “won because it did not lose, whereas Israel lost because it did not win,”64 reflecting power disparities between the two. While some hold that Hezbollah’s action to capture Israeli soldiers was launched with Tehran’s permission,65 it is uncertain as to whether the operation was launched at Iran’s bequest.66 In accordance with agreements between Hezbollah and Iran, Tehran was informed of what was to come on July 12, 2006, the day war broke out.67 Despite this, there is a belief that for Iran the war between Israel and Hezbollah could have been premature: It exposed the extent of Hezbollah’s Iran-assisted military deployment in Lebanon, which Tehran would have preferred to have used against Israel only at such as time as it (Tehran) gave the order: in the event of an American or Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear installations.68

The extent and nature of operational ties between Iran and Hezbollah are thus trickier to clearly identify.69 While some, such as former Hezbollah secretary-general Subh al-Tufeili, have accused Hezbollah of becoming a “tool of Iran, and even its security service,”70 as Magnus Ranstorp notes, the nature of the relationship between the two is far more complex than typical client–proxy relationships. What is clear is that the 2006 war demonstrated the success of the Iranian “Arab Street” strategy, as Hezbollah’s success as a resistance

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organization created a huge level of symbolic capital across the Arab world, from which Iran also gained.71 This success has also allowed Iran to challenge Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy at a domestic and regional level.72 Indeed, with the Saudi criticism of Hezbollah’s actions, some viewed this as Riyadh’s acceptance of a U.S.-Israeli strategy of eliminating pro-Iranian groups across the region,73 yet this would be contradicted by strong public opinion in support of Hezbollah within the kingdom.74 This interpretation of events has further been supported by reaction to the U.S.-Iranian nuclear discussions in both Saudi Arabia and Israel. The 2006 war strengthened Hezbollah’s position both within Lebanon and across the wider Middle East. The political capital gained from the perception of victory against Israel increased its domestic power, with Foad Siniora, prime minister following the assassination of Hariri, referring to the victims of the conflict as martyrs.75 Regionally, Hezbollah’s popularity grew, with Nasrallah joining the ranks of Asad and Ahmadinejad as the region’s more popular leaders. This burgeoning popularity, driven by a combination of opposition to Israel and a narrative of resistance, would provide Syria with the opportunity to regain influence within Lebanon; however, the Party of God’s response to the Arab Spring would erode much of this legitimacy and popularity.

CONCLUSION This chapter has demonstrated the importance of external actors in facilitating the emergence of Hezbollah as a dominant player within the Levant and across the Middle East more broadly. It explored the importance of Iran and Syria in establishing and supporting Hezbollah, through the provision of ideological and logistical support. It has also unpacked the framing of Israel as the oppressor within the parameters of the Karbala narrative. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 served as a source of inspiration for Shi’a Muslims worldwide, and in the following years, Iran’s influence upon Hezbollah was clear. The importance of personal links between Lebanese Shi’a clerics and Iran is clear and the training that many clerics received in Qom aids the application of the Karbala narrative to the Lebanese context. Ideas of resistance map closely onto the political situation in Lebanon, and thus Hezbollah can draw upon the Karbala narrative to engender legitimacy both domestically and internationally. By positioning itself as the protector of the Shi’a of Lebanon, along with as a resistance organization against Israel, Hezbollah is able to gain support from the Shi’a of Lebanon, the Shi’a community broadly, and also from the Muslim world. This quest for legitimacy is explored in greater detail in the next chapter. Yet despite the importance of Iran, the chapter stressed how tensions have begun to emerge between the group and Tehran, with Hezbollah

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acting as a more autonomous actor than many would initially expect. While tensions with Syria were apparent at the establishment of Hezbollah, the regime of Bashar Al Asad has proved invaluable in facilitating the transfer of weapons from Tehran. The importance of Syria to Hezbollah can be seen in the group’s involvement in the conflict in Syria post Arab Spring. The following chapter considers the impact of the Arab Spring upon the group, exploring how Hezbollah agents have been responsible for engaging in anti-regime action across the region, and how this appears incongruent with their continued support for the Asad regime in Syria. This seemingly leaves the Party of God in a precarious position.

6 R

Exploring Hezbollah’s Place in the Post–Arab Spring Middle East

While the previous chapter articulated the importance of Iran and Syria in the creation of Hezbollah, relations with Tehran and Damascus have evolved over the Party of God’s existence. Although both Iran and Syria proved influential in facilitating the emergence of the group, over the course of the 30 years of its lifespan, Hezbollah has become an increasingly influential and autonomous actor within the Middle East. This increasing influence has altered power relations and, consequently, the nature of relations with its allies, while also affecting the nature of resistance that it is able to offer against Israel and other actors perceived to be oppressors. The growing strength and autonomy of Hezbollah are highlighted by the 2006 war with Israel, a conflict that was seemingly launched without an explicit green light from Tehran, which would have been unforeseeable a decade previously. However, the position of Hezbollah within the post–Arab Spring Middle East remains uncertain. Events post December 2010 have changed the regional order, seemingly realigning the region into three blocs: the resistance bloc, the status quo bloc, and the radical Islamist bloc.1 This realignment has posed challenges for Hezbollah, along with many other Middle Eastern regimes, laying bare a clear dilemma between ideological and geopolitical calculations. The changing regional order has resulted in regional powers also facing a dilemma as to whether geopolitical concerns outweigh ideological imperatives.

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Whilst Hezbollah possesses a strong emancipatory element in its domestic policy, as discussed at length in earlier chapters, this does not always correlate into its relations with actors across the region. Although Hezbollah seeks to challenge the status quo and behavior of numerous states across the region, this is not a universal, coherent foreign policy strategy, as can be seen when considering how Hezbollah has responded to crises in Palestine and Syria. Thus, in understanding Hezbollah’s role within the contemporary Middle East, it is necessary to look at relations with other states within the region, questioning how these relations have evolved, particularly in light of the Arab Spring. Operating within a changing regional and international environment, while also responding to threats, highlights the difficulty of transitioning from a resistance organization to an organization with increased political responsibilities. These responsibilities often highlight tensions between ideological positions and the harsh reality of real politik. In unpacking this tension, it is possible to better understand Hezbollah’s location within the post–Arab Spring Middle East and to track its evolution from Islamic resistance to government. However, we can also see the existence of continuities within Hezbollah’s actions and that while operating with an explicitly Shi’a agenda, there is a consistent narrative of transcending sectarian divisions across the history of the Party of God. The first instance of this can be found within the Open Letter and this narrative of unity within the Muslim world continues to play a prominent role within the speeches of Nasrallah. In undertaking this analysis, the chapter explores how narratives inherent within the Party of God have been challenged by regional events. To achieve this, the chapter begins by providing a brief overview of the Arab Spring and the impact upon Lebanon. It then explores relations with Israel and the Palestinian issue in the aftermath of 2011. Building upon this, the argument turns to exploring relations with other members of the “Axis of Resistance,” in particular Iran and Syria, before exploring the relationship with the Gulf States. The chapter then considers the impact of the rise of the Islamic State upon the Party of God along with how Hezbollah has responded to the dramatic change in the regional order. Underpinning the chapter is the question about the nature of Hezbollah as a resistance actor. The chapter highlights an apparent contradiction within Hezbollah’s resistance ideology, using the Karbala narrative as discussed in Chapter 5 as a tool to articulate this incongruence. It does this by undertaking an analysis of speeches by Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah from 2013 to 2014. In undertaking such a task, it is important to consider to whom Nasrallah is speaking. While his speeches have a domestic audience, comprised predominantly of the Shi’a of Lebanon, there are other audiences to whom Nasrallah is speaking. It is important to consider the wider population of Lebanon, notably the Sunni and Christian populations, along with the wider regional and international audiences. As such, one can see the need for

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Nasrallah to appeal to broader audiences and, given the movement’s position of power within the Lebanese government, to act in accordance with these responsibilities.

THE ARAB SPRING The emergence and spread of popular protest movements across the Middle East and North Africa in December 2010 dramatically altered the political landscape of the region. Social, political, and economic conditions had become sterile, and as Fouad Ajami notes, the glue holding ruler and ruled together was “suspicion and fear.”2 The political climate across the region at the time is described accurately thus: The Arab world had grown morose and menacing. Its populations loathed their rulers and those leaders’ foreign patrons. Bands of jihadists, forged in the cruel prisons of dreadful regimes, were scattered about everywhere looking to kill and be killed. Mohamed Bouazizi summoned his fellows to a new history, and across the region millions have heeded his call.3

Hope had been extinguished, yet all it took was the frustration of one individual to reach breaking point and to self-immolate. Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old street vendor from Tunisia, frustrated at the lack of economic opportunities in Tunisia and coupled with continued harassment by government officials, took his own life. This provoked a series of protests across Tunisia, culminating in the removal of President Ben Ali in January 2011. Across the region, variations on a theme of “the people want to overthrow the regime” became commonplace. The consequences of Bouazizi’s action were felt across the Middle East and North Africa, with previously disenfranchized, depoliticized individuals becoming empowered, calling for change and challenging the legitimacy of ruling elites. The movements were initially driven by frustration at economic conditions, where socio-economic parallels could be drawn across the region; however, the protests soon possessed more of a pro-democracy feel. These movements have been referred to as many things, known as the Arab Spring, Arab Awakenings, or Arab Uprisings and while many similarities can be drawn across the events of 2010 and 2011, it is important not to homogenize the protest movements. Indeed, there are numerous differences between these events, in terms of the factors that led to the emergence of protest movements to their outcomes. Previously embedded autocratic regimes were deposed in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya; in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Syria, rulers were able to survive the challenge posed by protestors, while other states were able to prevent the emergence of popular protest movements entirely. While protests in Lebanon were limited, in neighboring Syria, the rule of Bashar Al Asad was seriously challenged by the emergence of protest

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groups across the state. Few suspected that the regime of Bashar Al Asad, the young, anti-Western modernizer, would be seriously challenged by the events of the Arab Spring. Asad had managed to cultivate an image that was grounded in populism and resistance to the West, but one that also sought to modernize. Given this, it came as a surprise to many that his regime was seriously challenged. Protests hit Syria in March of 2011, with people in Daraa taking to the streets in protest at the torture of students who had sprayed a wall with anti-government graffiti.4 In addition to the dissatisfaction at the treatment of the students, protesters asked for reform of the Asad regime, but not for the resignation of Asad.5 At this point, it appeared that Asad would take heed of the protesters’ demands and reform his regime. Instead, Asad’s forces responded with force, firing on the protesters.6 This set in motion a strategy of brutal repression of the protesters across Syria that has defined the state’s response to opposition groups. Asad’s forces used military force to suppress opposition groups and restricted access to water and electricity as a form of collective punishment.7 The protests quickly descended into civil war with groups coalescing along religious lines, with Asad, Alawites, and other pro-regime groups being opposed by Sunnis who became increasingly repressed by the regime. The Syrian conflict is of great strategic importance for many in the Middle East, with the conflict being seen as the latest manifestation of a long-standing proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.8 The two have been embroiled in an ideological and geopolitical conflict since the 1979 revolution in Iran, with both states seeking to claim legitimacy over the Islamic world and leadership over the Middle East.9 With the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the competition between the two states increased, manifesting itself in several areas of proxy competition, notably in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Syria. While the nature of the proxy competition varies, from financial support to political groups in Lebanon, to proxy conflict in Syria, the importance of these areas of competition can be seen in zero-sum terms. As such, Saudi Arabia viewed the events as an opportunity to “win Syria back to the Arab fold,”10 and to separate Syria from Iran and Hezbollah, thus reducing the power of both. Regional concern about the continuation of regime repression of protest groups transcends the Saudi–Iranian competition, culminating in a suspension from the Arab League in November 2012. In a statement on the decision, Qatari prime minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr Al Thani, stated that “Syria is a dear country for all of us and it pains us to make this decision . . . We hope there will be a brave move from Syria to stop the violence and begin a real dialogue toward real reform.”11 However, it is important to note the geopolitical significance of this move, as an attempt to isolate Syria from Iran, as well as for humanitarian reasons.

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As a consequence of the Saudi–Iranian proxy competition and the continued repression of the Syrian population, Gulf States began to offer financial support to opposition groups. Initially falling under the banner of the Free Syrian Army, groups quickly began to splinter off. Opposition movements within Syria coalesced on religious grounds, leading to the emergence of several fundamentalist Sunni groups, namely the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), whose prominence in Syria and Iraq grew quickly in 2014. As the Asad regime’s control over peripheral areas in Syria weakened, ISIS was able to gain control of much of the north-eastern part of Syria and from there to move into northwestern Iraq. Much support for opposition groups has emerged from the Gulf States, with Saudi Arabia and Qatar providing financial support and weapons.12 This support resulted in competition between the two over who should take the lead on the provision of support, and indeed, the question of which groups should receive support,13 which was ultimately won by Saudi Arabia. There have also been calls within the United States and the United Kingdom to support opposition groups, but only those who are deemed to be moderate.14 These tensions demonstrate the complexity of the situation and tensions within opposition groups, which is in direct contrast to the pro-Asad alliance. As previously noted, Hezbollah has historically been heavily reliant upon the rule of Bashar Al Asad, and as a consequence, challenges to Asad’s rule in Syria would have ramifications not only for the Party of God, but also regionally. The fragmentation of the Syrian state and the proliferation of opposition groups have facilitated the rise of the Islamic State, which has dramatically altered regional security calculations. Given the importance of protecting Shi’a Muslims for Hezbollah, it is therefore imperative to explore the impact of regional dynamics upon Hezbollah and how the group has responded to these challenges. Before undertaking this task, the chapter will discuss the impact of the Arab Spring upon Hezbollah’s location within Lebanon. Given that the Arab Spring was driven by desires to challenge and overthrow autocratic regimes across the region, it appears that this motivation coalesces well with the aims of Hezbollah. Indeed, ideas of resistance and emancipation appear to complement each other well, meaning that Hezbollah should have been one of the actors to emerge in a positive light from the emergence of protests. Furthermore, the popular protests that challenged the rule of leaders with close ties to the United States and Israel, such as Hosni Mubarak, were celebrated by Hezbollah.15 In the years leading up to the uprisings, the most popular leaders in the Middle East were Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Bashar al Asad, and Hassan Nasrallah. All three were vocal in their opposition to Israel and the West and their positions of resistance proved

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popular across the region. However, with the crushing of the Green Movement in Iran16 and events in Syria, including the involvement of Hezbollah, all three lost credibility. While Ahmadinejad has seemingly retired from public life in Tehran and Asad has eroded any credibility that he possessed by the brutal repression of the Syrian population, Nasrallah is attempting to regain credibility and legitimacy by challenging ISIS in Syria and Iraq. This strategy will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter; however, it is important to consider the domestic impact of ISIS—and the Arab Spring generally— upon the socio-politico-economic conditions in Lebanon.

THE DOMESTIC FACTOR While the Arab Uprisings failed to ignite the sectarian tinderbox in Lebanon, there has been an evident blowback from events in Syria into Lebanon. The decision to send Hezbollah forces to support the regime of Bashar al Asad proved unpopular to many, in part because of casualties, but also because of the increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict. Yet, as a spokesperson for the Party of God articulated, there was a clear need for Hezbollah to engage in conflict in Syria, as many of “the challenges and dangers [that Lebanon] is facing are connected to the threats posed by these terrorist groups,”17 referring to opposition groups. The conflict in Syria has undeniably had a serious impact upon the domestic situation in Lebanon. Sectarian divisions have been fuelled by conflict across the border, manifesting in violence across Beirut. Indeed, certain suburbs of Beirut became the epicenter of a sectarian conflict that was in danger of engulfing the Islamic world.18 In response to Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict, Jabat al-Nusra, one Syrian opposition group, took responsibility for a car bombing in Beirut. The attack was carried out in response to “the massacres of the party of Iran [Hezbollah] against the children of Syria.”19 The impact upon domestic constituents is combined with a fear at the spillover of conflict from Syria. Rising violence across Beirut has exacerbated this fear, as has the threat of ISIS and other radical groups crossing the border into Lebanon. Yet, as previously noted, Hezbollah has sought to position itself as a protector of the oppressed broadly, rather than just of Shi’a minorities. Given this, the group has attempted to stress this. When speaking to the Christian aspects of the Lebanese population, Nasrallah refers to “defending the Islamic and Christian sanctities in al-Quds, guarding its people against expulsion and displacement, and confronting Judaizing al-Quds.”20 This message seeks to foster unity amongst the disparate facets of Lebanese society, whilst also speaking to the wider umma. Yet it remains essential to maintain support from the Shi’a constituency and as such, Nasrallah continues to stress the importance of Shi’a credentials and

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values: “As Shiites of Ali bin Abi Talib, we will never abandon Palestine, its people or its holy places.”21 The flow of refugees attempting to escape the fighting has also put a huge strain on the Lebanese state. The number of refugees from the Syrian conflict is estimated to be in the region of 9 million,22 with approximately 2.5 million in neighboring countries. 23 Lebanon is experiencing huge domestic problems as a direct consequence of the influx of refugees,24 with some suggesting that by the end of 2014 the number of Syrians in Lebanon will be over a third of the Lebanese population, a number around 1.5 million.25 This has a huge impact upon the Lebanese economy, costing in the region of $100 million per month to provide free electricity and water to refugee camps and pushing 170,000 Lebanese into poverty.26 While Hezbollah argues the need to continue supporting the rule of Bashar al Asad, the domestic impact of the Syrian conflict is undeniable.

ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE As this book has noted throughout, narratives of resistance have been a key part of Hezbollah’s strategy, achieved by positioning the Party of God as a resistance organization against Israel and the United States. A key component of this opposition to Israel has been support for the Palestinian quest for statehood. Much of Nasrallah’s rhetoric in Quds Day speeches27 stresses the importance of the Palestinian cause as a key component of resistance. In making reference to Palestine, the Party of God is attempting to build upon the Karbala narrative, protecting the oppressed, thus seeking legitimacy from across the umma, rather than solely acting for Shi’a audiences. As such, when articulating Hezbollah’s successes in resistance, Nasrallah explicitly refers to engagement with Israel, against whom the Party of God can claim several victories. For Nasrallah, “the path of the resistance is the path to dignity, honor, liberation and victory. We are no more astray. The very first signs of that were the liberation of the South in 2000 and the liberation of Gaza Strip afterwards. The signs were more confirmed when the resistance gained victory in July War in Lebanon and in Gaza War in Palestine.”28 It is clear that resistance plays an integral role within the ideology of Hezbollah, with the Palestinian cause—and opposition to Israel—at the heart of the narrative of resistance. The Palestinian cause has historically been a source of legitimacy for actors in the Middle East, as one can see when considering the use of the Palestinian cause by various actors across the region. If one considers the language used by Ayatollah Khamenei, making reference to Palestine as a “limb of our body,” one can see the symbolic importance that the Palestinian cause possesses.29 This language seeks to bring the Palestinian cause into Iranian notions of resistance, and while the relationship between the

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Shi’a of Lebanon and Palestinians has historically been complex, the same language is also used by Nasrallah. In the Qods Day speech of July 25, 2014, resistance was mentioned 67 times, highlighting the prominence of ideas of resistance within Hezbollah’s contemporary actions. Within these 67 mentions of resistance, the Palestinian cause featured prominently, with Palestine mentioned 31 times and Gaza mentioned a further 78 times. Moreover, given that resistance requires an oppressor, Israel was mentioned 108 times.30 Thus, the binary identity of oppressor and oppressed is continued. It is clear then that the Palestinian cause is a key component of Hezbollah’s strategy of resistance, although it is pertinent to note that the speech took place during the 2014 Israeli incursion into Gaza. This explicit support for the Palestinian cause against Israel demonstrates Nasrallah’s desire to posit Hezbollah as an organization that offers protection to all Muslims, rather than just to the Shi’a cause. Ideas of resistance for the Party of God transcend sectarian schisms and can be applied to the umma as a whole. This desire to transcend sectarian divisions is extrapolated upon in Naim Qassem’s writings on Hezbollah, where he articulates an aspiration “to be in a position to unify Islam’s various schools of thought . . . [and] unison at the various cultural, political, holy struggle or other levels.”31 The uprisings across the Arab world galvanized the Party of God’s belief in the power of resistance. Nasrallah appeared convinced that “the major changes in the region which the resistance movements have the lion’s share in making along with the major changes currently underway in the world on more than one level make us feel that we are closer to achieving the goal of liberating al-Quds more than any time in the past.”32 Indeed, when one considers the initial success of resistance organizations and protest groups across the region, the galvanizing impact upon Hezbollah and Nasrallah is understandable. However, the Israeli military incursion into Gaza in the summer of 2014 challenged this trajectory of resistance, with Hezbollah seeking to position itself at the vanguard of the Palestinian cause. Conversations between Nasrallah and the leader of Hamas, Khaled Meshaal, are often reported in Lebanese papers. On July 21, 2014, one Lebanese newspaper, The Daily Star, documented a telephone conversation between Nasrallah and Meshaal, in which Nasrallah stated that “Hezbollah and the Lebanese resistance will stand by the Palestinian people’s uprising and resistance in our heart, willpower, hope and destiny.”33 The text of this conversation was released by a Hezbollah spokesperson in an effort to demonstrate the extent of Hezbollah’s involvement in Palestinian resistance. This was followed by comments such as “we stand by the intifada and the resistance of the Palestinian people and we share the same will, hopes and fate,”34 which highlights Hezbollah’s attempts to position itself both as protectors of the umma and as the key resistance organization to Israel.

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THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE: RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND SYRIA Relations between Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria, while occasionally fractious, have seemingly become stronger in the aftermath of Arab Uprisings. The severity of the threat to the Asad regime in Syria has resulted in an increased Hezbollah and Iranian presence in Syria in an effort to aid forces loyal to Bashar al Asad. As such, support for Asad’s regime has been vocal. During the course of Nasrallah’s speech at a forum discussing the importance of Jerusalem, he referred to the “steadfastness of the resistance axis that comprises Iran, Syria and the resistance movements in confronting all the challenges.”35 In understanding the Party of God’s position with regard to Iran and Syria, it is important to unpack Hezbollah’s actions in the aftermath of the emergence of protest movements across the region. Despite the Arab Uprisings appearing to share many of the same values as held by Hezbollah, Nasrallah was cautious about the protest movements. Perhaps many succeed in demolition but do not succeed in building. This is the true challenge . . . This trial is now faced by several Arab peoples who had moved with their revolutions to the final stages or to a high percentage or to a moderate percentage apart from the difference in evaluation and milieus. This is the true trial now. You may topple a regime but the true trial is that you be able to build a state. This status quo is now experienced by more than one country and more than one people.36

Creating the mechanisms necessary to ensure that security and civil peace are preserved thus appears to be imperative, as for Nasrallah, the first priority must be to preserve stability: This is the responsibility of the state. We want security, internal peace, civil peace and we want the people to stay living with each other. We want a true, strong, just, active state. The assumption of parties—even if they are just, strong and professional—for self-security responsibilities in any region would achieve goals different from the target. Instead of leading to security, it would lead to civil war and war among clans, families and the various components of the civil community. The state is the side able to assume this responsibility without taking its people and community to civil war.37

If the protest movements are unable to ensure this, then perhaps this understanding of Hezbollah’s priorities can explain the group’s attitudes toward events in Syria. While they appear incongruent with narratives of resistance, for Nasrallah, certain terms are important. References to stability, security, truth, and justice are regular features of attempts by Hezbollah to justify their continued support for Asad. While the subjectivity of these terms is apparent, the group perceives that the regime of Bashar al Asad

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can ensure that these priorities are met, while also protecting the Alawi minority in Syria. [W]e have a certain vision towards what is taking place in Syria. We have a stance. We call for calmness, dialogue, peace, reform, transcendence of wounds, preserving Syria’s unity and the unity of its people and preserving the blood of its army and people. As is the case with every Syrian, our heart is aching for Syria, its dignity, position, strength, welfare, security and stability. We may differ with others in Lebanon or abroad in approaching, understanding, and reading what is taking place, the backgrounds, targets, and interactions. This is our right which we practice daily.38

While acknowledging the plight of the people of Syria, the support for Asad in his response to the events has been steadfast. Hezbollah’s position on events in Syria springs “from firm convictions, a strategic vision, an evaluation to the situation in the region, and a precise, calm, and rational approach to the threats and events and projects.”39 One can then see the importance of the state for Nasrallah, highlighting the transition to government. Supporting this position, Nasrallah has praised Asad for his handling of the Lebanese hostage crisis, which began with the capture of a Lebanese citizen, Hassan al-Meqdad, in Damascus. The situation escalated with the capture of 20 prisoners, including Syrian, Turkish, and Saudi citizens by the prominent Shi’a clan the Meqdad.40 The spate of kidnappings reflects tensions emanating from events across Syria. With reference to the kidnapping of Lebanese citizens, Nasrallah stated the following: “I start here with thanking the Syrian authority and President Bashar Asad for his special care. From the very first movements, the state and its presidents and officials assumed their responsibilities.”41 This has been coupled with criticism of opposition groups and condemnation of those supporting Syrian opposition groups, discussed in the next section. That’s not to mention what is worse—meaning the attacks on cars and public and private properties. What is that good for? Indeed and according to all norms this is forbidden. On the religious level, this is forbidden and on the moral level as well as according to all human, legal norms this is disgraceful.42

But with the spillover of violence from Syria into Lebanon, furthered by the number of Syrian missiles hitting Lebanese territory,43 the argument that Asad cannot provide security, let alone civil peace, is questioned, which may change Hezbollah’s strategy toward events in Syria. However, the rise of ISIS has offered a counterargument to this position, reaffirming the need to strengthen Asad in the fight against ISIS and violent opposition groups. Continued support for Asad, despite the ferocity of violence, has, unsurprisingly, led to erosion of Hezbollah’s legitimacy in several arenas. While it

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could be argued that supporting Asad is necessary in order to protect Syria’s minority Alawite community, when considering other audiences, namely the wider umma and the international community, the Party of God’s legitimacy has diminished. As a consequence, despite the continued rhetoric of providing support to the oppressed across the Muslim world, tacitly supporting Asad’s brutal repression of opposition groups seemingly leaves Hezbollah on the side of the oppressor rather than the oppressed. Criticism of Hezbollah’s continued action in Syria has also emerged from Hamas, who condemned the Party of God’s involvement in supporting Asad: “What happened in Syria and the engagement of Hezbollah in the crisis is indeed a weighty loss for the party and its reputation in the region as a movement of resistance.”44 Bassem Naim, an adviser to the leadership in Gaza, argued that Hezbollah’s involvement in the conflict created the sectarian dimension: It [Hezbollah] was dear to the hearts of the Arabs, despite its Shiism. Yet, the fact that Hezbollah put its [Shiite] doctrine above politics gave its intervention in Syria a sectarian dimension. Consultative meetings took place within the framework of exchanging advice, yet the meetings stopped because the parties involved became stiff, and it is hard to hold discussions now.45

There are, however, clear reasons as to why Hezbollah continued to support the regime of Bashar al Asad. As noted previously, Hezbollah perceive that the Asad regime provides the best chance of a stable, secure Syria and, by extension, Lebanon. However, the more pressing reason for continuing to support Asad stems from the importance of Syria as an arms supply bridge from Iran. While Lebanese seaports and Beirut airport provide alternative routes for arms shipments, these are easily subject to blockade. Weapons’ routes via Syria provide Hezbollah with the easy means to resupplying, rearming, and ensuring that it retains the propensity for engaging in a protracted conflict. Continued support for Asad is also presented as an attempt to secure the Lebanese state against the threat from radical Sunni groups such as ISIS and Jabat al-Nusra. However, by continuing to support Asad, a clear contradiction emerges within ideas of resistance and the Karbala narrative.

HEZBOLLAH AND THE GULF STATES The involvement of Gulf States in Lebanese politics has been documented earlier in this book, however, relations between the Gulf States and Hezbollah have become increasingly complicated in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, reflecting a change in the geopolitical calculations of many within the region. At the heart of these calculations are questions about Iran’s intentions, with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain

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concerned at the burgeoning influence of Tehran across the region. These tensions between Gulf States are manifesting in an increase in sectarian tensions across the region, but also have involved Hezbollah, given its ties to Iran and involvement in Syria. As noted previously, the ethno-religious constitution of Lebanon leaves the state open to interference from external actors. While the previous chapter highlighted the prominent role played by Iran and Syria in the establishment of Hezbollah, other actors have become increasingly involved in Lebanese politics. Saudi Arabia continues to play an increasingly prominent role in Lebanon, supporting the March 14th coalition. In addition to their political involvement, Saudi Arabia has also helped with the postwar reconstruction of Beirut after the 2006 war.46 Lebanon has thus proved to be an arena of proxy competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran.47 With the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in 2003, and thus the end of a tri-polar Gulf region, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been engaged in a proxy conflict over the hegemony in the Middle East and across the Muslim world. This has resulted in the emergence of several sites of proxy conflict across the Middle East, namely Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Several of these sites have witnessed the outbreak of violence, driven by this competition, notably in Iraq and Syria. Hezbollah has been drawn into the conflict in Syria, siding with Asad and Iran and thus positioning itself against the rebel groups sponsored by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Yet the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran can also be seen in Lebanon, over the role of Hezbollah and ideas of resistance within the Middle East. Hezbollah has encapsulated much of the resistance ideology that Iran articulated in the immediate aftermath of the revolution of 1979, gaining a great deal of support from numerous sources across the region. The Al Saud recognized the growing popularity of the Party of God across the Middle East, particularly in the aftermath of the 2006 war with Israel and was increasingly worried by the results. In this, the war demonstrated the success of the Iranian strategy, whereby the actions of Hezbollah, coupled with the perceived nature of the client–proxy relationship, allowed Tehran to challenge the Al Saud’s legitimacy across the Muslim world. Stemming from this, the Al Saud faced a dilemma: to not respond and to risk looking weak while Tehran’s strength grew, or to support the Party of God. In an effort to reclaim some of the power that Tehran had gained from Hezbollah’s successes, the Al Saud discussed providing support for the group, yet this was met with fierce criticism within the kingdom. Debates over the provision of support for Hezbollah exposed the tension between aspirations to leadership over the Arab world and the Wahhabi clerical aversion to Shi’ism.48 Following this, Riyadh was vocal in its criticism of Hezbollah’s actions, yet this was contradicted by strong public opinion within the kingdom, which supported Hezbollah’s actions. 49 The severity of the Al Saud’s

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concerns about the rising power of Hezbollah is documented in a Wikileaks cable in which they call for the creation of an Arab-led military force to destroy Hezbollah.50 The emergence of a proxy conflict within the Syrian conflict has further complicated Hezbollah’s relations with the Gulf States. Despite the complexity of the Saudi-Qatari relationship, both states have supplied opposition groups in Syria with weapons and funding, thus supporting those groups fighting against Hezbollah. In addition, the rising violence in Beirut was followed by allegations of Saudi Arabian complicity in attacks on Hezbollah, with Hezbollah suggesting that Bandar Bin Sultan, the Saudi foreign minister, is behind the attacks as punishment for continued support for Asad in Syria.51 The potential ramifications of an escalation in violence between Saudi-sponsored proxy groups and Hezbollah have potentially severe consequences for the stability of Lebanon along with the continuation of the conflict in Syria.

THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE The emergence of ISIS in the summer of 2014 dramatically altered the political landscape of the region. While operating predominantly in Syria and Iraq, ISIS has created fear that can be found regionally and internationally. Rising out of the ashes of Al Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS gained prominence globally through using extreme violence as a tactic to induce fear locally and globally. The image portrayed is one of strength, which is shaped by its social media strategy.52 In doing this, ISIS sought to portray an image of being the protector of Islam. Yet their aspirations also possess a territorial aspect, demonstrated in a YouTube video53 filmed at the border between Syria and Iraq. In the video, a spokesperson for ISIS spoke of the desire to reject the boundaries imposed on the region by the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916.54 The group declared the establishment of a caliphate as a dream that lives in the depths of every Muslim believer . . . It is a hope that flutters in the heart of every mujahid, muwahhid . . . It is the caliphate. It is the caliphate . . . the abandoned obligation of the era . . . We clarify to the Muslims that with this declaration of the caliphate, it is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the caliph [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi].55

The group have since gained control of areas of Iraq, including territory where oil reserves are located, leaving them with control over an estimated 60 percent of Syria’s oil fields56 and several of the smaller Iraqi oil fields. Building upon this momentum, ISIS declared the establishment of the Islamic State, a caliphate under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi that spanned north-eastern Syria and northern parts of Iraq.

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Members of the Islamic State are renowned for their brutal treatment and killing of Shi’a Muslims, who are perceived as heretics, along with other religious groups including Christians and Yezidis. The group’s reputation has forced many to flee from areas controlled by ISIS out of fear of what may happen if they remain. In addition to killing those opposing them, or holding opposing views, ISIS is also responsible for the destruction of Shi’a shrines in Syria and Iraq, to international condemnation. The nature of ISIS has created a climate of fear across the region. As Nasrallah articulates: This monster called ISIS does not differentiate between friend and foe or ally and enemy and it has no restrictions. Fighting these people is not a question of weapons and confrontation on the ground. The playing field should be established on thought, beliefs, culture, emotions, and feelings. It is not easy to reach the level of hatred, rancour, and emotional preparedness to spill the amount of blood they have.57

The fear of the rise of ISIS has spread across the Middle East from Israel to Iran and all those in-between. Given its shared border with Syria, concern about the spread of ISIS across the region is felt in Lebanon, where Nasrallah has been vocal of the importance of Hezbollah’s actions in preventing the spread of the group into Lebanon. In a speech to the Mahdi Scouts, Nasrallah stated that “If we [Hezbollah] hadn’t intervened in Syria the right way and at the right time, ISIS would be in Beirut now,”58 reflecting the fear of the growing power of the group. This belief was stressed in an interview with Al Akbar, where Nasrallah argued that “going to fight in Syria was, in the first place, to defend Lebanon.”59 In the same interview, Nasrallah outlined the presence of Syrian groups into Lebanese territory prior to Hezbollah’s actions in Syria: They do not know, for example, that Ersal’s mountainside, extending for tens of kilometers, and several other mountainous areas in Bekaa have been occupied by armed Syrian groups since the beginning of the events. They established training camps, operations rooms, field hospitals, barracks, and meeting points inside Lebanese territory. That was before the first Hezbollah fighter went to Syria.60

Fears about ISIS and other jihadi groups engaging in violent acts across Lebanon are furthered by conflict in Arsal, a town on the Syrian border. Arsal was the scene of intense fighting over the summer of 2014 between jihadist groups from Syria and the Lebanese army. While the Lebanese army won the initial battle, the continued ISIS presence in the area suggests that the army may have lost the war. Hezbollah have been reluctant to become involved in Arsal, given the fears that this would fuel the ISIS narrative of a growing sectarianism within Lebanon.61

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The importance of Lebanese security has undeniably been a key motivating factor in the Party of God’s actions in Syria; however, the geopolitical and regional consequences of the growth of ISIS cannot be ignored. There is a major threat, that conquers and moves forward, committing horrendous massacres, without any controls or limits in the intellectual, moral, religious, or humanitarian sense. There is a beast on the loose in the region. Should we thank or condemn those who fight this beast, to stop it from devouring the people of the region, its states, and entities?62

Yet Nasrallah’s concern about ISIS goes far beyond fears about the group’s intention over migrating to Lebanon. The location of sites of religious significance for Shi’a Muslims in Iraq provoked Nasrallah to state the following: “We are ready to sacrifice martyrs in Iraq five times more than what we sacrificed in Syria, in order to protect shrines, because they are much more important than [Syria’s holy sites].” 63 This reflects the responsibility Hezbollah feels to protect Shi’a Muslims and, indeed, sites of religious significance for Shi’a Muslims. Yet given the use of the Karbala narrative and ensuing responsibilities to protect Shi’a Muslims, the umma, and other oppressed individuals, Hezbollah is also seeking to challenge ISIS over their treatment of other groups across Syria and Iraq: “Everyone knows that Hezbollah is against ISIS and takfiri groups and is fighting them and making sacrifices. The groups that kill and slaughter pose a threat to all the peoples of this region.”64 This has resulted in allegations that, in the summer of 2014, dozens of Hezbollah fighters were present in Iraq, alongside members of the IRGC, reflecting broader sectarian concerns.65 It is alleged that ISIS has received support from various Gulf States, leading to Nasrallah’s articulation that “the magic will turn against the magician . . . Gone are the days that allowed the demolition of religious sanctities.”66 This suggestion highlights the burgeoning divisions across the Middle East, in part driven by the increase in tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran.67 In an October meeting with the Supreme National Security Council, Nasrallah stated that “Hezbollah’s priority in its confrontation against the threats of Takfiri terrorism is preventing the spread of crisis and insecurity to the Lebanese community and maintenance and strengthening of stability and national unity of the country.” 68 This statement demonstrates the extent of concern at the possible consequences of ISIS’s growth. References to takfiri terrorism are part of an attempt to construct a narrative that separates ISIS from Islam and from the Muslim community. This narrative is emerging from numerous Hezbollah sources. “And that’s being done through some groups within our Muslim society. These groups are damaging the reputation of Islam, its image and prestige, . . . the region is paying the price of foreign intervention, invasion and war [which] created

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these takfiri groups among us.”69 Those framed as being takfiri are thus also constructed as the “enemies of Islam,” who are responsible for the rising insecurity in the Middle East and international arena.70 Supplementing this counter-ISIS strategy are efforts to stress unity across the Muslim world. The threat from ISIS transcends Shi’a Muslims and Muslims broadly and, as a consequence, is framed as an existential threat to the people of the Middle East: “We have to believe that there is a real existential danger threatening us all and it is not a joke . . . This danger does not recognise Shi’as, Sunnis, Muslims, Christians, Druze, Yazidis, Arabs or Kurds. This monster is growing and getting bigger.”71 The incidents that have taken place across the Levant have demonstrated the need for unity, and while many of the calls for unity have stressed unity in the umma, there have also been calls for unity across Lebanon.72 Building upon this, Nasrallah has been keen to stress that ISIS has committed atrocities against all Muslim communities, with Sunni Muslims being those experiencing the greatest suffering. This sentiment was echoed across a six-hour interview conducted with Al Akhbar. In it, Nasrallah stated that the ISIS does not know Shi’a or Sunnis, Muslims or Christians, Druzes or Yazidis, Arabs or Kurds. This beast is growing and expanding. . . . This is a cause of concern to everyone and everyone should be worried. Inside the Islamic circle, all the confessional minorities are under threat; all the Ashaari Sunnis—who make up the majority of the sect—are in real danger. The threat is to their lives, money, honor, children, women, and everything they hold as sacred.73

This clearly articulates the threat that ISIS poses to the umma as a whole. As a consequence, in respond to ISIS, Nasrallah called upon the people of the Middle East to unite: Lebanese and all people of the region must put all differences aside. I call on every Lebanese, Palestinian, Iraqi, Syrian and any Gulf national to leave sectarian intolerance behind and think that this phenomenon is not a threat against Shi’as only. No one should regard this battle as a sectarian one, it is a takfiri war against anyone who opposed it.74

The continued references to takfiri are thus an attempt not only to show unity across the Muslim world, but also to position ISIS outside of the umma. This attempt to demonstrate unity echoes much of the sentiment from the New Hezbollah Manifesto, which stresses the need to move beyond sectarian divisions. In a section worth quoting in full: The Islamic world gains strength with his allies and the cooperation of his countries. We assure the importance of benefiting from the elements of the

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political, humanitarian, and economic power available in each and every country of the Islamic world, on the basis of integration and non-subjection to the invaders. We remind of the importance of unity among Muslims, as Allah the Almighty said in his holy book: “And hold fast, all together, by the rope which God (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves.” (Sourat Al Imran, verse 103) We also remind of the importance of cautiousness from sectarian sensitivities—especially between Sunnis and Shiites, as we wager on the conscience of the Muslims in facing the conspiracies and schemes on this level.75

This section of the New Hezbollah Manifesto makes explicit a section of the Open Letter that discusses how Hezbollah is an umma linked to the Muslims of the whole world by the solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam, whose message God wanted to be fulfilled by the Seal of the Prophets, i.e., Muhammad. This is why whatever touches or strikes the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and elsewhere reverberates throughout the whole Muslim umma of which we are an integral part.76

Given how unity within the Muslim world is stressed in both documents, it is clear to see that a strategy of transcending sectarian divisions is integral to the Party of God’s actions. As such, there immediately are parallels between the language of the New Hezbollah Manifesto and Nasrallah’s rhetoric toward ISIS. This then perhaps tells us a great deal about the rationale for supporting Asad in Syria, that it is not for solely ideological reasons; rather, it is out of necessity to safeguard the Muslim world. A problem arises however, when one considers the necessity of engaging with and responding to different audiences, and the different problems that these audiences have to engage with. The fears of audiences internal and external to Lebanon are dramatically different and require different forms of engagement from Hezbollah. Nasrallah is required to respond with force to ISIS and to ensure the security of the Asad regime in Syria while simultaneously ensuring the stability of Lebanon and preventing the emergence of sectarian schisms across the state. As the Lebanese civil war remains in recent memory, there is little desire for a return to arms across Lebanon; however, given the increasingly sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict and also the delicate sectarian balance in Lebanon, the nature of the Party of God’s response must operate on two levels. This balancing act is one that the Party of God has long been engaged in, as referenced in a Wikileaks cable. In a series of public addresses over the last week, Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah has raised the rhetoric of a possible war with Israel while simultaneously offering conciliatory words to PM-designate Saad Hariri as he attempts to form

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a government. March 14 figures welcome Nasrallah’s internal posture while worrying about his external rhetoric.77

The conflation of internal and external actions can pose serious problems for the security and stability of Lebanon. An addition problem arises when considering how actors should respond to the threat posed by ISIS and other jihadist groups across Syria and Iraq. This is furthered when considering that many of those standing in opposition to ISIS have historically been opposed to each other, particularly Hezbollah and the United States, and Iran and the United States. While Saudi Arabia and Qatar are also concerned at the rise of ISIS, Riyadh has sought to strengthen the Lebanese army rather than to establish Sunni militias or to support Hezbollah.78 This reflects an awareness of the lack of appetite across Lebanon for a return to sectarian violence despite the number of recent sectarian acts of violence across Beirut. In light of the creation of an international coalition to defeat ISIS, Nasrallah was vociferously critical: “We are principally against any international coalition in Syria, whether it targets the Syria regime, ISIS, or any other group,” noting that “Hezbollah is against Lebanon’s participation in this alliance.”79 Despite the increasing threat from ISIS and other radical jihadi groups in Syria, the legacy of suspicion directed at the United States and Israel remains.

HEZBOLLAH AND RESISTANCE As argued throughout this book, at the heart of Hezbollah’s ideology is the idea of resistance, which can be tracked from its roots as an Islamic resistance organization through to its position within the Lebanese government. Driven by the Shi’a idea of the Karbala narrative and desires to challenge the oppressor, we can view Hezbollah’s actions through this lens. The empowerment of peoples in the aftermath of the Arab Spring seemingly is congruent with these ideas of resistance. Domestically, this is clear, although the organization is negotiating the difficult terrain of maintaining its resistance ideology while holding a substantive position within Lebanese politics and engaging with the challenges that emerge while governing. Externally, one can see clear ideas of resistance when exploring relations with Israel and Hezbollah’s response to the Palestinian question, although the Syrian conflict has highlighted an area of contradiction. The narrative of resistance contains a consistent thread of Hezbollah challenging the perceived oppressor and offering support to the oppressed. This highlights the efforts of Nasrallah to make Hezbollah a resistance organization for all Muslims, rather than just for the Shi’a. While supporting Shi’a Muslims is imperative, as seen in the group’s support for the Shi’a

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of Syria and Iraq, the larger constituency of the global umma holds much more appeal for Nasrallah. This protection of the umma also features as part of a double legitimizing strategy, wherein Hezbollah sought to appeal to domestic and external audiences to increase its legitimacy. Domestically, in an impressive propaganda campaign, Hezbollah promoted itself as the “defender of Lebanese integrity,”80 fusing Lebanese, Arab, and Islamic elements. Externally, Hezbollah sought to fortify a pan-Arab Islamic transnational identity, utilizing the Karbala narrative of resistance against an oppressor. Supporting this first strand of the strategy is an effort to conflate Lebanese resistance with Palestinian resistance, as seen in Nasrallah’s speeches. Tensions emerge, however, when considering intra-Islamic violence. The rise of the vehemently anti-Shi’a Islamic State in Syria and Iraq highlights the need to protect Shi’a Muslims across the region, which fits neatly into the idea of resistance. However, events in Syria, post–Arab Spring, have seemingly challenged Hezbollah’s legitimacy across the region. Hezbollah has maintained its alliance with Bashar Al Asad, despite the continued use of violence against Syrians. This seemingly challenges legitimate references to the Karbala narrative, in maintaining support for the oppressor rather than the oppressed. What is clear from this is that geopolitics and real politik possess a key importance when understanding Hezbollah’s actions across the region. It is clear then that Syria possesses a key geopolitical importance for Hezbollah, and for Saudi Arabia and Iran, which can explain their behavior in the conflict. However, given the statements about Islamic unity and the importance of resistance for the Party of God, Hezbollah’s actions in Syria undermine legitimacy both regionally and internationally. As such, this support for Asad, coupled with vociferous opposition to Israel and support for the Palestinian cause, highlights a clear incongruence in Hezbollah’s ideological frame, which has begun to erode their legitimacy in the region.

Conclusion

The book has aimed to be a one-volume introduction to the Hezbollah that is both readable and contemporary, while retaining academic rigor in its analysis. Inspired by the latest research in Terrorism Studies and International Relations, to facilitate a greater awareness of the Party of God, it places Hezbollah in both Lebanese and Middle Eastern contexts, exploring all facets of the group’s identity and behavior. By combining the readability of a narrative approach with the rigor of an academic analysis, it has offered a detailed yet accessible introduction to Hezbollah, exploring all of their activities from resistance to propaganda, organized crime to educational facilities by combining both thematic and chronological features and offering a theoretically informed and analytically rich examination of Hezbollah’s environment and its own agency. Throughout this book, the two themes of identity and evolution have underpinned the analysis and discussion of Hezbollah, from its emergence in the 1980s up to its participation in the Syrian civil war today. Given the series of which this book is a part of looks at “terrorist groups,” it seemed natural for us to come back to this seemingly age-old question about terrorists versus freedom fighters as one part of its identity. The book took an implicit critical realist perspective to engaging in this debate by separating the label of “terrorist” from the broadly observable tactic of “terrorism.” This was done because trying to place Hezbollah in the “terrorist” box obfuscates the other facets of its identity, which are more significant and more interesting. And while not perfect, it also helps move the discussion a little closer to objectivity by not engaging in, or making claims to, legitimacy, but to still help analyze the process of contestation between Hezbollah and its environment. Its use of tactics of terrorism—which is

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one of the less intense forms of activity it engages in—has tended to ebb and flow, depending on its relative strength and opportunities vis-à-vis its rivals. Identity also informs how Hezbollah has utilized terrorism, whereby its embracing of a plurality of identities in the Lebanese context weakens the incentive for using terrorism, while its continued framing of Israelis in blackand-white terms facilitates the moral disengagement to legitimize attacks on Israeli civilians. Adding to this complexity of identity is how Hezbollah’s internal credibility and legitimacy in terms of its other identities—as a political party, a social service provider, and religious authority—are built upon its identity as a resistance force against Israel. This point relates more broadly to Hezbollah’s resistance identity, which has been discussed extensively in the book. In light of recent events, in which Hezbollah has maintained support for the Asad regime in Syria despite atrocities carried out against the Syrian population, much of this resistance identity was eroded. Hezbollah certainly emerged onto the Lebanese political scene as a radical, revolutionary group, operating within the context of an Israeli occupation. It was profoundly Shiite in its outlook and its perspective on what should become of the Lebanese state was quite clear in its hopes of replicating the revolutionary republic that had been founded in Iran only three years earlier. Its radicalism was punctuated by its bombing of the U.S. embassy, hijackings, and hostage-taking in the 1980s, but the next decade saw a significant evolution in Hezbollah’s orientation, reflecting its environment and limitations. By making the transition into politics, it made its claim to be a party of Lebanon as well as a Party of God, even if it would be the only group to hold on to its military capacity ostensibly to continue the resistance against Israel. While it has tactically used violence to its benefit, albeit with some miscalculations such as in its 2006 war with Israel, the changing environment in the Middle East highlights clearly the tensions in Hezbollah’s identity. Its long-term, close alliance with Bashar al Asad in Syria has drawn the movement into conflict with predominantly Sunni forces, specifically the radical, anti-Shiite Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. As concluded in the previous chapter, this support for Asad, coupled with vociferous opposition to Israel and support for the Palestinian cause, highlights a clear incongruence in Hezbollah’s ideological frame, which has begun to erode their legitimacy in the region. The conflict in Syria and its outcome mark a significant point in the continued evolution of Hezbollah and raises questions about its future trajectories, both in Lebanon and across the region. Its involvement in what superficially appears as a growing Sunni–Shi’a divide, despite attempts to transcend it in the fight against ISIS, might suggest a return closer to its older identity but this underplays Hezbollah’s adaptability and its roots within Lebanon. Ultimately then, the Party of God faces a delicate balancing act to ensure its legitimacy and survival, both as a domestic actor in Lebanon and as an influential actor across the Middle East.

Appendix A R

Timeline

1920

The League of Nations grants the mandate for Lebanon to France.

1926

Lebanon is declared a republic under the French mandate.

1934

The country’s first and only census is conducted.

1941–1946

Lebanon declares independence and gradually the French withdraw. A confessional system is formed in the 1943 National Pact, distributing power on the basis of the 1934 census (predominantly to the Christian Maronite population).

1948

The first Arab-Israeli war. Israel declares independence, and Palestinian refugees enter southern Lebanon.

1958

A civil war erupts, leading the Maronite president to request U.S. troops to defuse tensions.

1960

Imam al-Sadr arrives in Lebanon.

1967–1969

The Six-Day War with Israel and Arab neighbors begins, leading to a resounding defeat for the Arab states and growing independence of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO is given autonomy in Palestinian refugee camps and uses Lebanon as a base to attack Israel, and fighting between Lebanese and Palestinian forces begins.

1971

After Black September in Jordan, Fatah and the core PLO contingent relocate to Lebanon.

1975

The Lebanese 1975–1990 civil war begins after a spate of attacks between Maronites and Palestinians. Imam al-Sadr forms the Shiite militant group, Amal.

1976

Syrian forces move in with a Arab League mandate as a peacekeeping force.

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1978

Palestinian militants kill 69 Israelis in a number of attacks within Israel. The Israel Defence Force invades and occupies southern Lebanon to attack PLO bases, withdrawing later after a UN resolution calls for a withdrawal and creates the UNIFIL peacekeeping, which is charged with ensuring its implementation.

1978

Imam al-Sadr “dissappears” after a visit to Libya.

1979

The Iranian revolution leads to the establishment of the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran, under Ayatollah Khomeini.

1982

Israel invades Lebanon with the purpose of removing the PLO, placing Beirut under siege for 70 days and culminating in PLO fighters withdrawing from Lebanon. In the aftermath of the Israeli occupation, Hezbollah begins to take form as an organization. Eight hundred U.S. Marines arrive as part of a peacekeeping force.

1983

A suicide bomber kills 63 people in an attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut, with senior figures in Hezbollah being blamed. In two similar attacks later that year, the U.S. Army barracks in Beirut is hit, killing 241 Marines and sailors, and an attack on French military facilities kills 58.

1985

Hezbollah’s Open Letter outlines its program.

1985–1988

Militants, including Hezbollah, engage in kidnapping Westerners and hijacking airlines.

1989–1990

The Lebanese parliament agree on a power-sharing agreement, the Taif Accords, which brings the civil war and Maronite dominance to an end. Part of the agreement calls for the disarmament of the militias, but Hezbollah refuses.

1992

Hezbollah agrees to participate in the Lebanese elections. A Jewish community center in Argentina is bombed, killing 85. Hezbollah’s military wing is blamed for the attack.

1993–2000

Israel bombards south Lebanon following a series of attacks by Hezbollah. Such skirmishes continue throughout the decade.

1994

The Oslo Peace Accords between the PLO and Israel are announced.

2000

Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, announces that Israel will withdraw from south Lebanon. Syria begins to deploy troops back into Lebanon.

2001–2005

Syria dismantles bases and begins withdrawing some forces from Lebanon. The Second Intifada erupts in Israel-Palestine, marking the decline of the peace process and the rise of Hamas. Skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israel continue.

2005

Former prime minister Rafik Hariri is assassinated, resulting in a backlash against Syria, which is blamed for the attack and which then makes a final withdrawal from Lebanon. A member of Hezbollah is included in the cabinet of the new government for the first time.

2006

Following fighting between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah captures two IDF soldiers in a cross-border raid. Israel escalates a large-scale

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attack across Lebanon, with Hezbollah firing rockets toward Israeli population centers. The conflict ends with an Israeli withdrawal and Hezbollah declaring victory, while much of Lebanon’s infrastructure is destroyed. 2007–2008

Lebanese forces fight in a number of incidents with Islamist groups. Negotiations including Hezbollah and other Lebanese parties continue on breaking the political deadlock, culminating in a national unity government despite Hezbollah continuing to hold on to its weapons. Imad Mughniyeh is killed in a car bombing.

2009

Hezbollah announces that Nasrallah is elected to continue as the group’s leader; meanwhile the group continues to negotiate with other parties on involvement in government.

2010

Grand Ayatollah Fadlallah, Hezbollah’s spiritual leader, dies.

2011

Hezbollah briefly withdraws from the cabinet following tensions over the investigation into the killing of Rafik Hariri, with a UN tribunal identifying Hezbollah members as suspects.

2011–2012

The Syrian Civil War erupts, leading to cross-border clashes and sectarian fighting, with Hezbollah being actively involved in fighting in Syria.

2013

The European Union places the military wing of Hezbollah on the terrorism blacklist following the attack in Bulgaria in 2012.

2013–

The conflict continues in both Lebanon and Syria, with Israel also attacking Hezbollah positions. The Lebanese government receives military aid from the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia.

Appendix B R

Individual Member Profiles

SAYED HASSAN NASRALLAH Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, born on the August 31, 1960, in east Beirut, is the third secretary-general of Hezbollah. At the age of 15, Nasrallah joined the Lebanese political and paramilitary movement Amal. He studied at the Shi’a seminary in the Beqaa Valley town of Baalbek. From there he traveled to Najaf, Iraq, for Quranic studies at a seminary. He returned to Lebanon in 1978 when the Ba’ath government expelled Shi’a clerics and students who were deemed “radical.” He then studied and taught at Amal leader Abbas al-Musawi’s school, later becoming Amal’s political delegate in Beqaa.

Political Significance Nasrallah joined Hezbollah following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. He took over the movement’s leadership after the Israeli assassination of al-Musawi in 1992. Under his leadership, Hezbollah became stronger militarily and thus more capable of resisting and attacking Israel. Nasrallah remains an advocate of the “continued resistance” against Israeli occupation of Lebanon as well as the strong opponent of the state of Israel. Nasrallah became widely popular within Lebanon and the Islamic world for ending the Israeli occupation of the south of Lebanon, which contributed to bolstering Hezbollah’s political standing within Lebanon. He is also credited for playing a major role in a complex prisoner exchange deal between Israel and Hezbollah in 2004.

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Nasrallah faced criticism from pro-Western Arab regimes, including Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, for the 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. He also came under severe criticism from some within Lebanon. The leader of the Druze community and the Progressive Socialist Party of the Republic of Lebanon, Walid Jumblatt, expressed his dissatisfaction with Nasrallah’s actions in the 2006 conflict with Israel. This criticism was issued in the face of the large-scale damage inflicted on many parts of Beirut as a result of Israeli bombardments. After the war, Hezbollah distributed massive amounts of U.S. dollar notes that came to Beirut from Iran via Syria to citizens affected by the conflict. Under Nasrallah’s leadership, Hezbollah supported the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt, but not in Syria. In terms of the war in Syria, Nasrallah remains committed to Hezbollah’s fighting in Syria against the takfiri militants, comparing it to the struggle against the Israeli enemy and arguing that fighting in Syria would have spread to Lebanon had the takfiris risen to power in Syria. He maintains that Israel and the United States have infiltrated takfiri groups and are using them for their own purposes. Despite being aware and permissive of the ongoing fighting between Lebanese Shiites and Lebanese Sunnis in Syria, he is against such fighting taking place in Lebanon. Nasrallah is a strong supporter of Palestinian resistance. He is in favor of Palestinian resistance rather than negotiations. He also expressed his approval of suicide bombings in Israel; however, in his conviction, it is the Palestinians’ responsibility to claim its land. Nevertheless, Hezbollah training of Palestinian militants in Lebanon has been reported for over a decade as well as admitted by Nasrallah in a 1997 interview. In 2008, he appealed to Egyptians to challenge their government’s proWestern policy of isolating Hamas through closing the Rafah border and not providing relief for the Palestinians. More recently, Nasrallah has offered to aid any Palestinian group that attacks Israel from the Golan Heights. Nasrallah’s stance on the last U.S.-led war in Iraq was similar. He called on Iraqis, as well as Arabs and Muslims in general, to resist the U.S. “occupation” of Iraq. In September 2014, Nasrallah condemned the war on ISIL militants waged by the U.S.-led coalition. However, he offered to send fighters to Iraq to fight the jihadists, justifying his commitment by the need to protect Iraqi holy sites.

Connections to Other Figures Nasrallah is a strong ally of the Syrian president Bashar al Asad. In June 2014 he praised Asad’s victory in presidential elections and called upon the Syrian opposition to acknowledge defeat. He also called upon

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regional countries to cease their support for Syrian rebels groups. He is an advocate of a political solution to the Syrian conflict, which should be based on negotiations with Asad. Nasrallah argues that his support for Asad is rooted in Asad’s support for resistance in Lebanon in the past. Nasrallah possesses close connections to the Iranian leadership, resulting in Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issuing a fatwa extending Nasrallah’s term as secretary-general for life. In 2000, Iranian president Khatami and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei assured Nasrallah of Iran’s continued ideological and material support for Hezbollah. This help extends to economic support provided through public service institutions and charities. Some sources also indicate Iran’s military support for Hezbollah, including regular weapons shipments. Ties also exist between Hezbollah and Iran’s Qods Force, the elite wing of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. At the time of the 2003 Iraq war, Qods Brigades provided encouragement and resources to Hezbollah units operating in Iraq. Hezbollah has also cultivated global support networks under Nasrallah’s leadership. Action against those networks has been taken by law enforcement officials in countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Azerbaijan, Belgium, and Colombia.

SHEIKH NAIM QASSEM Sheikh Naim Qassem (born 1953) is a Shi’a Lebanese cleric and politician, and since 1992 has been Hezbollah’s deputy secretary-general. He was born in the Basta district of Beirut, a predominantly Sunni neighborhood and joined the Amal movement in 1975. He became an active member of Hezbollah in 1989. Qassem is described as a “Hezbollah intellectual,” who is the author of numerous book and articles on the group.

Political Significance Qassem is an eager proponent of Shi’a resistance groups inside as well as outside of Lebanon. Before the 2003 war on Iraq, he encouraged Shi’a opposition in Iraq to not be fearful or weakened by the U.S. plans to attack the region. He has also committed Hezbollah to the Palestinian liberation. Qassem’s approach to Hezbollah is resistance-oriented. He strongly believes in the unity of military and political purposes in Hezbollah’s activities without distinguishing between the group’s military and political wings and recognizes resistance as the main priority of the organization. Supporting this, Qassem disclosed rejecting the offer of billions of dollars in return for disarming and discontinuing resistance. His political approach is aimed at countering the “Israeli threat” as well as opposed to the American interference in Lebanon. During opposition

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rallies in Beirut in 2006, he is said to have led the crowd in chants of “death to America and Israel.” Qassem is also vocal about domestic matters, declaring his support for universal social and health insurance along with fighting corruption.

HAJJ HUSSEIN KHALIL Hajj Hussein Khalil is a political advisor to Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah. Khalil is a prominent member of Hezbollah and has been named by some investigators as a potential suspect in the case of the assassination of Lebanese Internal Security Forces captain Wissam Eid. Khalil is said to have first established Hezbollah’s security apparatus in Bekka in 1982, where he was coordinating operations with Amal. In light of Iranian organized security arrangements, Khalil was appointed by Nasrallah as one of the confidants to represent him at Poliburto, Consultative Council, and the Executive Committee meetings. Subsequently, Khalil became responsible for explaining Hezbollah’s political position and activities to the various local political forces and maintaining Hezbollah’s contacts with Syria. He was also part of the delegation of 50 Lebanese leaders who visited Damascus in 2013 to hold talks with Syrian president Bashar al Asad. Khalil maintains that armed resistance is the most viable way of liberating Arabs’ occupied land. He believes in the need to further develop what he refers to as a “revolutionary mentality” in the Arab world. Khalil is supportive of rocket attacks against Israel by Palestinians. He condemned a Human Rights Watch report concerning the indiscriminate nature of such attacks in 2006 war as “political debauchery,” arguing that Palestinians are the victims in that conflict. Like other Hezbollah officials, Khalil has officially acknowledged Hezbollah’s support for the Palestinian resistance but has been unwilling to disclose what kind of support Hezbollah has engaged in, instead referring to shared experiences of resistance with Palestinians.

RUHOLLAH MOSTAFAVI MOOSAVI KHOMEINI Ruhollah Mostafavi Moosavi Khomeini was born on September 22, 1902, in Khomeyn, Iran, and died on June 3, 1989, in Teheran, Iran. He was the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a position of the highest ranking political and religious authority following the successful overthrow of the Shah of Iran during the Iranian Revolution in 1979. He was also a scholar and teacher and author of numerous writings on Islamic philosophy, law, and ethics.

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Khomeini lived in exile from November 1963 until his return to Iran in 1979 after being forced to flee for his strong political engagement in the opposition to Mohammad Reza Shah’s reforms. He was first sent to Turkey and then to Iraq where he resided in the Shi’i holy city of Najaf. While there, he carried on his political activity directed against the Shah, recording his speeches on cassettes and pamphlets, which continued to be sent to Iran and motivate anti-regime demonstrations. At the request of the Shah, the Iraqi government expelled him from the country upon which Khomeini decided to move to Paris, where he stayed before returning to Iran in 1979. He continued to give speeches against the Shah, who finally abdicated on January 16, 1979. Two weeks later, Khomeini returned to Iran where he was welcomed by millions of people. Subsequently, the Islamic Republic of Iran was founded with a new Islamic constitution. During the early years of the Islamic Republic, relations with Israel broke down and the regime adapted a pro-Palestinian approach. Khomeini was of opinion that Israel should be denied legitimacy and be defeated by Islam. Khomeini was also incredibly supportive of the creation of Hezbollah. He was a vocal opponent of the U.S. government, calling it the “Great Satan,” as well as an opponent of the USSR, believed by him to be the “Lesser Satan.” Khomeini was distinguished for his popularity, charisma, and theological qualifications. He is known for introducing the theory of veleyat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), which is based on the idea of granting theocratic political authority to a supreme leader. Under his rule, Shari’a law was introduced. However, by implementing the doctrine of the veleyat-e faqih, Khomeini instituted a system of rules in which Shari’a law can be overruled by a ruling Ayatollah which effectively rendered Shari’a law subordinate to the will of a ruling Ayatollah and no longer the foundation of legislation. Thus, some suggest that veleyat-e faqih prioritizes the interests of the regime over Shari’a law. Before the revolution, Khomeini was supported by many secular intellectuals and activists; however, he lost their support after coming to power due to a move away from democracy, freedom of speech, and the will of the people.

MOHAMMED YASSER ABDEL RAHMAN ABDEL RAOUF ARAFAT AL-QUDWA Mohammed Yasser Abdel Rahman Abdel Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa was a Palestinian leader, popularly known as Yasser Arafat. He was born on August 24, 1929, in Cairo, Egypt, and died on November 11, 2004, in Paris, France. He was chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), president of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), and leader of the Fatah political party and former paramilitary group, which he founded in 1959.

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Arafat created Fatah, which in Arabic means “victory” or “conquest,” declaring that “Violence is the only solution” and that the liberation of Palestine could be achieved only “through the barrel of a gun.” Arafat spent most of his life fighting for Palestinian self-determination; however, in later life he engaged in peace negotiations with the Israeli government. This reduced his legitimacy and fuelled allegations of corruption and submission by his political rivals. As such, his stance on Israel modified over the years. In 1988 he accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242, which recognized Israel’s right to exist, and repudiated all forms of terrorism. Consequently, in 1994 he received the Nobel Peace Prize for the negotiations in Oslo. In 1977, Arafat aligned the PLO with LNM (Lebanese National Movement), led by Kamal Jumblatt. Arafat established the base for Fatah’s future financial support by enlisting contributions from the many wealthy Palestinians working in Lebanon and the Gulf States, as well as in Libya and Syria. Before the First Intifada, Arafat created and controlled a “parallel power structure,” consisting of official Palestinian authority institutions and of various unofficial Palestinian groups such as Hamas, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Tanzim. Suicide bombings were common during his leadership and although he used to condemn such attacks verbally, he rarely pursued the perpetrators. During the First Intifada, Libya, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia provided Arafat with financial assistance, allowing him to restructure the PLO. He supported Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which caused many Arab states to cease funding the PLO and to provide financial support to the PLO’s rivals, namely Hamas and other Islamist groups. Arafat rejected the far-reaching peace proposal laid out for Palestinians by Clinton at Camp David summit in 2000, without ever presenting a counterproposal. Arafat rejected Clinton’s plan, which would have given the Palestinian Authority 97 percent of the West Bank, all of Gaza and half of Jerusalem. In the aftermath of the Second Intifada he became a pariah to Israel and the United States, regularly encouraging Palestinians to become martyrs in the struggle to win Jerusalem.

Notes

INTRODUCTION 1. “Nasrallah: ‘Hezbollah Will Face & Defeat Terrorists in Qalamoun Barrens,’ ” Al Masdar News, May 6, 2015, http://www.almasdarnews.com/article/nasrallah -hezbollah-will-face-defeat-terrorists-in-qalamoun-barrens/. 2. Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel (London: Random House, 2011); Thanassis Cambanis, A Privilege to Die: Inside Hezbollah’s Legions and Their Endless War against Israel (New York: Free Press, 2011). 3. Neil MacFarquhar, The Media Relations Department of Hezbollah Wishes You a Happy Birthday (New York: Public Affairs, 2010). 4. Zahera Harb, Channels of Resistance in Lebanon: Liberation Propaganda, Hezbollah and the Media (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 5. Gilbert Achcar, The 33-Day War: Israel’s War on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Its Aftermath (London: Saqi, 2007); Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon: The Second War in Lebanon (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008). 6. Rodger Shanahan, The Shi’a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 7. Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani, eds., Israel and Hezbollah: An Interstate and Asymmetric War in Perspective (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 8. Stephen C. Pelletiere, Hamas and Hezbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2004); Henrik Meyer and Michael Th. Greven, Hamas und Hezbollah: Eine Analyse ihres Politischen Denkens (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2009); Joshua Gleis and Benedetta Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012). 9. Naim Qassem, Hezbollah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2005). 10. Nicholas Roe, ed., Voice of Hezbollah (London: Verso, 2007).

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11. Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics series) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Ahmad N. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004); Hala Jaber, Hezbollah (SAGE Key Concepts series) (London: Sage, 1997). 12. For a wider viewpoint, see Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006). 13. Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program (Amsterdam: AUP, 2006); Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah’s Identity Construction (Amsterdam: AUP, 2011); Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011); Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion (London: Pluto, 2002); Max Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi`ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 14. Nour Samaha, “Why Qalamoun Matters for Hezbollah,” Al Jazeera, May 11, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/150511085809867.html.

CHAPTER 1 1. Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East (London: Penguin Group, 1991). 2. Ibid. 3. Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 4. Ahmad N. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004); Latif Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 5. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History. 6. Magnus Ranstorp, “Hizbollah’s Command Leadership: Its Structure, DecisionMaking and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institution,” Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 3 (1994). 7. Casey Addis and Christopher Blanchard, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011). 8. Ranstorp, “Hizbollah’s Command Leadership.” 9. Addis and Blanchard, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress. 10. Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel (New York: Random House, 2011). 11. Eitan Azani, “The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36, no. 11 (2013). 12. Blanford, Warriors of God. 13. Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 14. Addis and Blanchard, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress. 15. Azani, “The Hybrid Terrorist Organization.” 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Addis and Blanchard, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress. 20. Nicholas Blanford, “Joining Hezbollah,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CAIROREVIEW/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=92. 21. Ibid.

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22. Ibid. 23. Azani, “The Hybrid Terrorist Organization.” 24. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007). 25. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah. 26. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History. 27. Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2007). 28. Ibid., 112. 29. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah (London: Pluto Press, 2002). 30. Ibid., 6; Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, 119. 31. Blanford, “Joining Hezbollah,” 11–12 32. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. 33. Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Krista Wiegand, “Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 8 (2009). 37. Ibid. 38. “Hezbollah,” Council for Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/ hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013). 42. “Hezbollah.” 43. David Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004). 44. Ibid. 45. Karen Rasler and William Thompson, “Looking for Waves of Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 1 (2009). 46. Pola Zafra-Davis, “A History of Terrorism: Ideology, Tactics and Organization,” in Terrorism and Political Violence, ed. Caroline Kennedy, Gordon Clubb, and Simon Mabon (London: Sage, 2015). 47. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism.” 48. Nina Musgrave, “The ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism,” in Terrorism and Political Violence, ed. Caroline Kennedy, Gordon Clubb, and Simon Mabon (London: Sage, 2015). 49. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 47. 50. Ibid., 48. 51. Ibid. 52. Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank, “An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?,” Studies of Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 7 (2010). 53. Audrey Kurth Cronin, Ending Terrorism: Lessons for Defeating Al-Qaeda (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). 54. Mark Sageman, “Ripples in the Waves: Fantasies and Fashions,” in Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy: The Four Waves Theory and Political Violence, ed. J. Rosenfeld (Oxon: Routledge, 2011). 55. Darcy Noricks, “The Root Causes of Terrorism,” in Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together, ed. Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin (New York: National Defense Research Institute for the Office of the Secretary for Defense, 2009).

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56. Quoted in Rola El Husseini, “Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria,” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 5 (2010). 57. Alex P. Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (Oxon: Routledge, 2011). 58. Ibid. 59. See Richard Jackson, “Knowledge, Power and Politics in the Study of Political Terrorism,” in Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning (Oxon: Routledge, 2009); Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning, eds., Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009); Harmonie Toros and Jeroen Gunning, “Exploring a Critical Theory Approach to Terrorism Studies,” in Critical Terrorism Studies, ed. Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning (New York: Routledge, 2009). 60. Colin Wight, “Theorising Terrorism: The State, Structure and History,” International Relations 23, no. 1 (2009). 61. Toros and Gunning, “Exploring a Critical Theory Approach to Terrorism Studies.” 62. Michael J. Boyle, “Progress and Pitfalls in the Study of Political Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 2 (2012). 63. M. L. R. Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement (London: Routledge, 1995). 64. Toros and Gunning, “Exploring a Critical Theory Approach to Terrorism Studies.” 65. Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Jacob Hoigilt, “Islamism, Pluralism and the Palestine Question: The Case of Hizbullah,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 2 (2007). 66. Hussain Sirriyeh, “The US, Hezbollah and the Idea of Sub-State Terrorism,” Israel Affairs 18, no. 4 (2012).

CHAPTER 2 1. Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (2003). 2. Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat (London: John Murray Publishers, 2006). 3. Nina Musgrave, “The ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism,” in Terrorism and Political Violence, ed. Caroline Kennedy, Gordon Clubb, and Simon Mabon (London: Sage, 2015), 155. 4. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civlizations: And the Remaking of World Order (London: The Free Press, 2002), 1. 5. Ahmad N. Hamzeh, “Clan Conflicts, Hezbollah and the Lebanese State,” Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 19, no. 4 (1994): 433–445. 6. Simon Mabon, “Introduction,” in Terrorism and Political Violence, ed. Caroline Kennedy, Gordon Clubb, and Simon Mabon (London: Sage, 2015). 7. Jose Liht and Sara Savage, “Identifying Young Muslims Susceptible to Violent Radicalisation: Psychological Theory and Recommendations,” in Suicide Bombers: The Psychological, Religious and Other Imperatives, vol. 41, ed. Mary Sharpe (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), 5–25.

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8. Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1999). 9. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, eds., Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 7–12. 10. Ibid. 11. Jeroen Gunning, “Social Movement Theory and the Study of Terrorism,” in Critical Terrorism Studies, ed. Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning (London: Routledge, 2009). 12. Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971). 13. Richardson, What Terrorists Want. 14. James Piazza, “Does Poverty Serve as a Root Cause of Terrorism?,” in Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, ed. Stuart Gottlieb (London: CQ Press, 2010). 15. Karin Von Hippel, “The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths,” Political Quarterly 73, no. 1 (2002). 16. Heather Smith et al., “Relative Deprivation: A Theoretical and Meta-Analytic Review,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 16, no. 3 (December 22, 2011). 17. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 60. 18. Heather Smith et al., “Relative Deprivation: A Theoretical and Meta-Analytic Review,” in Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA, ed. Richard English (London: Macmillan, 2003). 19. Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 20. Ibid. 21. M. L. R. Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement (London: Routledge, 1995). 22. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel; Gunning, “Social Movement Theory and the Study of Terrorism”; Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). 23. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, 17–18. 24. Ibid., 19. 25. Colin Beck, “The Contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism,” Sociology Compass 2, no. 5 (2008); Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 26. Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Hizballah as a Social Movement Organization: A Framing Approach,” Mediterranean Politics 14, no. 3 (2009). 27. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel; Martin Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizballah,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 28. Robert Benford and David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26, no. 1 (2000). 29. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel. 30. Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013). 31. Latif Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 32. Ibid. 33. Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society (London: Routledge, 1996).

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34. Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 35. Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward. 36. Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society. 37. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History. 38. Ahmad N. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004). 39. Nubar Hovsepian, “State-Society Relations and the Reproduction of the Lebanese Confessional System,” in The War on Lebanon: A Reader, ed. Nubar Hovsepian (Moreton-in-Marsh: Arris Books, 2007), 35. 40. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah; Pew, Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2009). 41. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History. 42. Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel (New York: Random House, 2011). 43. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History. 44. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah. 45. Ibid., 14. 46. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 17. 47. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah. 48. Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward, 61. 49. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah. 50. Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizballah.” 51. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel. 52. Ibid.; Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. 53. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah. 54. Marius Deeb, “Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology, Social Basis, and Links with Iran and Syria,” Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2 (1988). 55. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah. 56. Ibid. 57. Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizballah.” 58. Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel. 59. Ibid., 16. 60. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah. 61. Hussain Sirriyeh, “The Emergence of Hizbollah and the Beginnings of Resistance, 1982–85,” in Israel and Hizbollah: An Asymmetric Conflict in Historical and Comparative Perspective, ed. Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani (Oxon: Routledge, 2010). 62. Sami Moubayed, “The Missing—or Recovered—Imam,” Asia Times, 2011; Robert Worth, “The Surreal Ruins of Qaddafi’s Never-Never Land,” New York Times, September 21, 2011. 63. Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel. 64. David Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological Review 54, no. 4 (1986): 469. 65. Karagiannis, “Hizballah as a Social Movement Organization.” 66. Ibid. 67. Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2011). 68. Karagiannis, “Hizballah as a Social Movement Organization.”

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69. Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 97. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. 72. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007). 73. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah. 74. Ibid., 26. 75. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History. 76. Farid el Khazen, “Patterns of State Failure: The Case of Lebanon,” in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, ed. Tore Bjorgo (Oxon: Routledge, 2005). 77. Sirriyeh, “The Emergence of Hizbollah and the Beginnings of Resistance, 1982–85.” 78. Newsweek, July 18, 2006, quoted by Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History. 79. Ibid. 80. Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizballah”; Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. 81. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah. 82. Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel. 83. Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto.

CHAPTER 3 1. Benedetta Berti, Armed Political Organisations: From Conflict to Integration (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 34. 2. Ibid., 35. 3. Ibid., 43. 4. James Worrall, “Reading Booth in Beirut: Is Hezbollah an Emancipatory Actor?,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36, no. 3 (2013): 242. 5. See, for example, Liz Sly, “Asad Forces Gaining Ground in Syria,” Washington Post, May 11, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/Asad-forces-gaining -ground-in-syria/2013/05/11/79147c34-b99c-11e2-b568-6917f6ac6d9d_story.html; Yaron Friedman, “Syria’s Rebels Are Pitting Israel against Hezbollah, and Winning,” Ynet News, March 21, 2014, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4501517,00.html; Pomegranate, “Lebanon’s Border with Syria: Taking Charge,” Economist, June 15, 2014, http:// www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/06/lebanon-s-border-syria. 6. For more on Hezbollah’s initial embrace of suicide bombing (although its use of the tactic now appears to be somewhat defunct), see: Daniel Helmer, “Hezbollah’s Employment of Suicide Bombing during the 1980s: The Theological, Political, and Operational Development of a New Tactic,” Military Review 86, no. 4 (2006): 71–82. 7. Nathan Brown, “U.S. Counterterrorism Policy and Hezbollah’s Resiliency,” GSSR 1, no. 3 (2013), http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2013/12/10/u-s-counter terrorism-policy-and-hezbollahs-resiliency/. 8. Ibid. 9. For more on this relationship, see: Jubin Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Abbas William Samii, “A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-Iran -Syria Relationship,” Middle East Journal 62, no. 1 (2008): 32–53.

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10. Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “The Hezbollah Problem,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, no. 17 (2010). 11. See, for example, the works of Ahron Bregman, an expert on missile technology and the Middle East. 12. “Minister: Hezbollah Has over 200,000 Rockets,” Times of Israel, October 8, 2013, http://www.timesofisrael.com/minister-hezbollah-has-over-200000-rockets/#!. 13. “7 Years Later, Hezbollah Has Developed Capabilities to Strike Anywhere in Israel,” IDF Blog, July 11, 2013, http://www.idfblog.com/hezbollah/2013/07/11/7-years -later-hezbollah-has-developed-capabilities-to-strike-anywhere-in-israel/. 14. Jean-Loup Samaan, “The Dahya Concept and Israeli Military Posture vis-à-vis Hezbollah since 2006,” Comparative Strategy 32, no. 2 (2013): 151. 15. Patrick Devenny, “Hezbollah’s Strategic Threat to Israel,” Middle East Quarterly 13, no. 1 (2006). 16. For more on the Katyusha class, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/russia/katyusha.htm, and as it relates specifically to Israel, http://www.iris.org.il/ katyusha.htm. 17. Hizballah Rockets, Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/para/hizballah-rockets.htm. 18. Taken from “Hezbollah’s Rocket Force,” BBC News, July 18, 2006, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5187974.stm. 19. More detailed information on this class of missiles is available at http:// missilethreat.com/missiles/fateh-a-110/. 20. “Hezbollah: Our New Iranian Missiles Are a Deterrent against Israel,” Haaretz, November 23, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.628065#!. 21. “New Iranian-Supplied Missiles Can Hit Israel with Pinpoint Accuracy: Hezbollah,” The Daily Star, November 23, 2014, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/ Lebanon-News/2014/Nov-23/278605-iran-equipped-hezbollah-with-advanced-missiles -report.ashx#sthash.OHlaTOF6.dpuf. 22. Nicholas Blandford, “Israel: Hezbollah Is Now Stronger Than Any Arab Army,” Christian Science Monitor, June 9, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle -East/2014/0609/Israel-Hezbollah-is-now-stronger-than-any-Arab-army. 23. Quoted in Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 225. 24. See, for example, Marisa Sullivan, “Hezbollah in Syria,” Middle East Institute Security Report, no. 19, Institute for the Study of War (April 2014), http://www .understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Hezbollah_Sullivan_FINAL.pdf. See also: Tony Badran, “Hezbollah and the Army of 12,000,” NOW, April 7, 2013, https://now .mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/hezbollah-and-the-army-of-12000. 25. Daniel Byman, “The Lebanese Hizballah and Israeli Counterterrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 12 (2011): 930–931. 26. See Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (London: Hurst, 2012), 2; “Islamic Jihad Organization (Lebanon)/Islamic Jihad (IJO),” TRAC: Terrorist Research and Analysis Consortium, http://www.tracking terrorism.org/group/islamic-jihad-organization-lebanon-islamic-jihad-ijo. 27. Prashant Rao, “Analysis: Hezbollah: A force to Be Reckoned With,” Agence France Presse, July 18, 2006. 28. Magnus Ranstorp, “The Hizballah Training Camps of Lebanon,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 251.

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29. Byman, A High Price, 225. 30. Byman, “The Lebanese Hizballah and Israeli Counterterrorism,” 929. 31. Hala Jaber, for instance, talks about how the improvements in Hezbollah’s performance in the early 1990s were in part down to “a change in the structure of command”; Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (London: Fourth Estate, 1997), 38. 32. “Hezbollah Reportedly Acquires SA-18 SAMs,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 5, no. 4 (2003), http://web.archive.org/web/20090110201645/http://www.meib.org/ articles/0304_l2.htm. 33. David Eshel, “Hezbollah Anti-Amour: Tactics and Weapons,” Defense Update, 2007, http://defense-update.com/analysis/lebanon_war_4.htm. 34. Owen Bennett-Jones, “Hezbollah: Terrorist Organisation or Liberation Movement?,” BBC News, October 11, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15173180. 35. Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2005), 71. 36. Byman, “The Lebanese Hizballah and Israeli Counterterrorism,” 930. 37. Martin Kramer, “Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 47, no. 8 (1994): 20–43. 38. Berti, Armed Political Organisations, 34. 39. Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). 40. This should perhaps be slightly tempered by the 2002 testimony of CIA Director George Tenet: “Although Hezbollah has not killed Americans recently, it does target them.” Mathew Levitt, “Untangling the Terror Web: The Need for a Strategic Understanding of the Crossover between International Terrorist Groups to Successfully Prosecute the War on Terror,” http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/306.pdf. 41. Clive Jones, “Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and the War in South Lebanon 1985–97,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 8, no. 3 (1997): 82–108. 42. Iver Gabrielsen, “The Evolution of Hezbollah’s Strategy and Military Performance, 1982–2006,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25, no. 2 (2014): 262. 43. Ibid. 44. Augustus Richard Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30, no. 1 (2000): 22. 45. Gabrielsen, “The Evolution of Hezbollah’s Strategy and Military Performance,” 257–262. 46. Suzanne Goldenburg, “Chaos and Humiliation as Israel Pulls out of Lebanon,” Guardian, May 24, 2000, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/may/24/ israelandthepalestinians.lebanon. 47. James Worrall, “Reading Booth in Beirut: Is Hezbollah an Emancipatory Actor?,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36, no. 3 (2013): 242. 48. Eyal Zisser, “Hezbollah: The Battle over Lebanon,” Military & Strategic Affairs 1, no. 2 (2009), cited in Elli Lieberman, Reconceptualising Deterrence: Nudging towards Rationality in Middle Eastern Rivalries (London: Routledge, 2013), 205. 49. Gabrielsen, “The Evolution of Hezbollah’s Strategy and Military Performance,” 263. 50. Rola El Husseini, “Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria,” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 5 (2010): 803–815. 51. For more on interesting comparison of Hamas and Hezbollah, see: Joshua Gleis and Benedetta Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012). 52. Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God, 208.

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53. For accounts of the 2006 war, see, inter alia: Gilbert Achcar, The 33-Day War: Israel’s War on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Its Aftermath (London: Saqi, 2007); Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009); Ahron Bregman, Israel’s Wars: A History since 1947 (London: Routledge, 2009). 54. “Nasrallah Wins the War,” Economist, August 19, 2006, http://www.economist .com/node/7796790. 55. Lieberman, Reconceptualising Deterrence, 195. 56. The last of these is discussed in the section on Media Strategy as a weapon later in this chapter. 57. “Civilians under Assault: Hezbollah’s Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War,” Human Rights Watch 19, no. 3 (August 2007), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/ iopt0807/iopt0807web.pdf. 58. Figures quoted here are mainly rough estimates put together from a range of sources including official Israeli statistics, the UN and various media reports from Reuters, the BBC, Washington Post, the Daily Telegraph, and the International Herald Tribune. 59. Paul Marks, “Missile Defence Unready for Middle East Crisis,” New Scientist, July 19, 2006. 60. For an interesting critique of Israeli actions, see: Uri Bar-Joseph, “The Hubris of Initial Victory: The IDF and the Second Lebanon War,” in Israel and Hezbollah: An Asymmetric Conflict in Comparative Perspective, ed. Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani (London: Routledge, 2010), 147–162. 61. Uzi Mahnaimi, “Humbling of the Supertroops Shatters Israeli Army Morale,” Sunday Times, August 27, 2006, http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world _news/article166140.ece. 62. Shahar Illan, “Barak: Onus for Conduct of War Lies with Government,” Haaretz, December 31, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/news/barak-onus-for-conduct-of-war-lies -with-government-1.236280#!. 63. For more on the ground war, see: Matt Matthews, “We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War,” The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26 (2008), 43–60. 64. Mahnaimi, “Humbling of the Supertroops Shatters Israeli Army Morale.” 65. Gabrielsen, “The Evolution of Hezbollah’s Strategy and Military Performance,” 272–274. 66. Ibid., 274. 67. For a fascinating examination of the changing nature of media and Hezbollah’s use of it during the 2006 war, see: Marvin Kalb and Carol Saivetz, “The IsraeliHezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict,” Brookings, 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2007/2/17islamic%20world/2007 islamforum_israel%20hezb%20war.pdf. 68. Rory McCarthy, “Hizbullah Leader: We Regret the Two Kidnappings That Led to War with Israel,” Guardian, August 28, 2006, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/ aug/28/syria.israel. 69. For more on the Sheba’a dispute, see: Krista Eileen Wiegand, Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy & Settlement (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 143–179. 70. Dominic Evans, “Israel Hits Syria Arms Convoy to Lebanon: Sources,” Reuters, January 30, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/30/us-syria-israel-attack -idUSBRE90T0K120130130.

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71. “IAF Strike in Syria Targeted Arms from Iran,” Jerusalem Post, July 5, 2013, http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Report-IAF-strike-in-Syria-targeted-arms-comingfrom-Iran-312036. 72. “Israeli Defense Minister Suggests Role in Syria Airstrike,” CNN, February 4, 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/02/03/world/meast/israel-syria-strike. 73. “Israel Targeted Russian-Made Missiles in Syria, US Officials Say,” Guardian, July 14, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/14/israel-accused-russian -missiles-syria. 74. “Hezbollah Vows to Respond to ‘Israeli air strike,’ ” BBC News, February 26, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26352905. 75. “IDF Shells Hezbollah Position after Border Blast,” Arutz Sheva, March 14, 2014, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/178510. 76. “Nasrallah Declares ‘We Bombed Israel in Revenge,’ ” Arutz Sheva, April 7, 2014, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/179345#!. 77. Jack Khoury, “Nasrallah: Hezbollah behind March Bombing of Israeli Patrol,” Haaretz, April 7, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.584238#!. 78. Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah’s Message for Israel,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 2327, October 21, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ policy-analysis/view/hezbollahs-message-for-israel. 79. Gili Cohen et al., “Hezbollah Claims Responsibility for Blasts, after Two Israeli Soldiers Wounded,” Haartez, October 7, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/ diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.619714#!. 80. “Israel Fires into Lebanon after Shebaa Border Bomb,” Deutsche Welle, October 7, 2014, http://www.dw.de/israel-fires-into-lebanon-after-shebaa-border-bomb/a-17980690. 81. “Hezbollah Says Border Attack Was Message to Israel,” Reuters, October 7, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/08/us-israel-lebanon-hezbollah-idUSKCN0HX 13420141008. 82. “Hezbollah Bomb Attacks Escalate Tensions in North,” Israel Hayom, October 8, 2014, http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=20629. 83. Levitt, “Hezbollah’s Message for Israel.” 84. Yossi Melman, “Hezbollah Sends Message to Israel: No More Carte Blanche for the IDF in Lebanon,” Jerusalem Post, October 8, 2014, http://www.jpost.com/ Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Hezbollah-sends-message-to-Israel-No-more-carte-blanche-for -the-IDF-in-Lebanon-378399. 85. Levitt, “Hezbollah’s Message for Israel.” 86. Israel Kershner, “Israel Shoots Down Drone Possibly Sent by Hezbollah,” New York Times, April 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/world/middleeast/ israel-downs-drone-possibly-sent-by-hezbollah.html?_r=0. 87. “Hezbollah Admits Launching Drone over Israel,” BBC News, October 11, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19914441. 88. Ibid. 89. Roi Kais, “Hezbollah Has Fleet of 200 Iranian-Made UAVs,” Ynet News, November 25, 2013, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4457653,00.html. 90. Peter Bergen and Emily Schneider, “Hezbollah Armed Drone? Militants’ New Weapon,” CNN, September 22, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/22/opinion/ bergen-schneider-armed-drone-hezbollah/. 91. Harriet Sherwood, “Inside the Tunnels Hamas Built: Israel’s Struggle against New Tactic in Gaza War,” Observer, August 2, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/aug/02/tunnels-hamas-israel-struggle-gaza-war.

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92. Meir Orbach et al., “Israel Fears Gaza Tunnels ‘Child’s Game’ Compared to Hezbollah’s,” Al Monitor, August 4, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/business/2014/ 08/israel-tunnels-hamas-hezbollah-digging-technology.html##ixzz3H53nxUWR. 93. Nicholas Blanford, “Has Hezbollah Built Tunnels under the Border with Israel?,” Daily Star, September 15, 2014, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/ 2014/Sep-15/270682-has-hezbollah-built-tunnels-under-the-border-with-israel.ashx#ix zz3H5tt3Tsp. 94. “Report: IDF Quietly Investigating Hezbollah Terror Tunnels,” Arutz Sheva, September 3, 2014, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/184726#!. 95. “Northern Israeli Residents Hire Private Contractor to Dig Up Feared Hezbollah Attack Tunnels,” Algemeiner, September 30, 2014, http://www.algemeiner.com/ 2014/09/30/northern-israeli-residents-hire-private-contractor-to-dig-up-feared-hezbollah -attack-tunnels-video/. 96. Although this did not stop the Al-Manar Web site from reporting with barely disguised glee on the panic over potential tunnels in Israel and the fact that Israeli searches “left no result.” “Israel Deeply Concerned about Hezbollah Cross-Border Tunnels,” Al Manar, August 7, 2014, http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/adetails.php? fromval=2&cid=71&frid=31&seccatid=71&eid=164525. 97. Melman, “Hezbollah Sends Message to Israel.” 98. “Exclusive: The Final Hours of Imad Mughniyeh,” Al Akbar English, February 19, 2013, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/15019. 99. It eventually transpired that it was the CIA that had carried out the assassination: Adam Goldman and Ellen Nakashima, “CIA and Mossad Killed Senior Hezbollah Figure in Car Bombing,” Washington Post, January 30, 2015, https://www.washing tonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-and-mossad-killed-senior-hezbollah-figure -in-car-bombing/2015/01/30/ebb88682-968a-11e4-8005-1924ede3e54a_story.html. 100. Ian Black, “Car Bomb Ends Life of Hizbullah Chief Wanted for String of Kidnappings and Mass Murders,” Guardian, February 14, 2008, http://www.theguardian .com/world/2008/feb/14/israelandthepalestinians.lebanon. , 101. Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon s Party of God, 30. 102. Ibid., 3. 103. Lieberman, Reconceptualising Deterrence, 207. 104. “Hezbollah Chief Threatens Israel,” BBC News, February 14, 2008, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7245042.stm. 105. Israel Shahak, “The Musawi Assassination: A Foretelling of Israel’s New Policies in Lebanon,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, June 1992, http://www.wrmea .org/1992-june/from-the-hebrew-press-the-musawi-assassination-a-foretelling-of -israel-s-new-policies-in-lebanon.html. 106. Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 4. 107. “Israel Denies Claims of ‘Professional’ Murder of Hezbollah Commander Hassan Al-Laqqis outside His Beirut Home,” Independent, December 4, 2013, http://www .independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-denies-claims-of-professional -murder-of-hezbollah-commander-hassan-allaqqis-outside-his-beirut-home-8982298.html#. 108. Ibid. 109. “Nasrallah: Israel Will Be ‘Punished’ for Al-Laqqis’ Death,” Ynet News, December 20, 2013, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4467779,00.html. 110. Laila Bassam and Dominic Evans, “Hezbollah Says Commander Killed in Beirut, Blames Israel,” Reuters, December 4, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/04/ us-lebanon-hezbollah-killing-idUSBRE9B306S20131204.

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111. For a fascinating exploration of deterrence theories applied to Hezbollah, see: Lieberman, Reconceptualising Deterrence, 172–210. 112. It is important to note here that the “Dahya Doctrine” does not actually exist. “There has been neither an official Israeli document formulating a Dahya strategy nor a government policy explicitly endorsing [the IDF northern commander Gen.] Eisenkot’s statement [which led to the widespread belief in the existence of this doctrine]”; instead, Dahiya can be concluded to be a concept or a debate, and although it is “not officially endorsed by the Israeli Defense Forces, it is a key reflection of the state of the Israeli military debate vis-à-vis Hezbollah since the 2006 war.” See Samaan, “The Dahya Concept and Israeli Military Posture,” 146–147. 113. Ariel Ben Solomon, “Report: Hezbollah Orders Hamas out of Lebanon,” Jerusalem Post, May 30, 2014, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Report-Hezbollah-orders -Hamas-out-of-Lebanon-314850. 114. “Nasrallah Promises ‘All Means of Support’ for Gaza ‘Resistance,’ ” Al Monitor, July 26, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/nasrallah-hamas -hezbollah-gaza-aleppo.html##ixzz3HBZpYqhs. 115. “Israel Warns Hizbullah War Would Invite Destruction,” Ynet News, October 3, 2008, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3604893,00.html. 116. For more on this aspect, see: Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, Chapter 8, 208–245. 117. The list below is partly based upon a cross-referenced version of “Timeline of Terror: A Concise History of Hezbollah Atrocities,” The Henry Jackson Society, 2012, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Timeline-ofTerror_Membership-version_low-res.pdf. 118. Sebastian Rotella, “Azerbaijan Seen as New Front in Mideast Conflict,” LA Times, May 30, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/30/world/fg-shadow30. 119. Avi Issacharoff, “Turkish Forces Foil Hezbollah Attack on Israeli Target,” Haaretz, December 9, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/turkish-forces-foil -hezbollah-attack-on-israeli-target-1.2529#!. 120. Nicholas Kulish, “Hezbollah Courier Found Guilty in Plot to Attack Israeli Tourists in Cyprus,” New York Times, March 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/ world/middleeast/hezbollah-courier-guilty-of-role-in-cyprus-terror-plot.html?_r=0. 121. Camillus Eboh, “Lebanese Hezbollah Suspects to Sue Nigerian Government,” Reuters, June 13, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/13/us-nigeria -hezbollah-idUSBRE95C13820130613. 122. Ari Yashar, “Thailand: Terror Suspects Admit Plans to Attack Israelis,” Arutz Sheva, April 18, 2014, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/179715. 123. Ari Yashar, “Peru Foils Hezbollah Terror Attack on Israelis,” Arutz Sheva, October 30, 2014, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/186835#!. 124. For more discussion of this, see: Matthew Levitt, “Tehran’s Unlikely Assassins,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 20, 2012, http://www.washington institute.org/policy-analysis/view/tehrans-unlikely-assassins. 125. The term long war is often used as a pseudonym for the War on Terror; it is used here both to echo the difficult nature of defeating Islamist terrorism and to emphasize the fact that since Hezbollah cannot defeat Israel its strategy must, by necessity, be a long-term one—some might even say ultra long term. For more discussion about the term long war, see: Christopher Pernin et al., Unfolding the Future of the Long War: Motivations, Prospects, and Implications for the U.S. Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), Chapter 2.

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126. Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, 42. 127. Ahmad N. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004). 128. Olfa Lamloum, “Hezbollah’s Media: Political History in outline,” Global Media and Communication 5 (2009): 353–354. 129. Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, 43. 130. Zahera Harb, Channels of Resistance in Lebanon: Liberation Propaganda, Hezbollah and the Media (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 178. 131. Tobias Schwerna, Lebanon: A Model of Consociational Conflict (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2010), 101. 132. David Pollock, “New Poll Shows Majority of Saudis, Kuwaitis, Emiratis Reject ISIS, Back Two-State Solution with Israel,” Washington Institute, Policy Watch 2329, October 23, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/new-poll -shows-majority-of-saudis-kuwaitis-emiratis-reject-isis-back-two-st. 133. Ehud Ya’ari, “Hizballah: 13 Principles of Warfare” The Jerusalem Report, March 21, 1996, quoted in Daniel Isaac Helmer, Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Lebanese Incursion Between 1982–2000 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 53–54. 134. Quoted in Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, 45–46.

CHAPTER 4 1. See, for example, Hussain Abdul Hussain, “Hezbollah: A State within a State,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 8, 68–81, http://www.hudson.org/content/research attachments/attachment/1316/current_trends_volume_8.pdf. 2. Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 85. 3. Nikki R. Keddie, “Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective,” in The Modern Middle East: A Reader, ed. Albert Hourani, Philip Shukry Khoury, and Mary Christina Wilson (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 617. See also: Patrick Clawson and Michael Rubin, Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), 88–90. 4. Taylor Armstrong and Jonathan Matusitz, “Hezbollah as a Group Phenomenon: Differential Association Theory,” Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 23, no. 4 (2013): 479. 5. Ibid., 480. 6. Michael J. Totten, “Hezbollah’s Disneyland,” World Affairs Journal Dispatches, June 24, 2013, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/hezbollahs -disneyland. 7. Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 218. 8. Imad Salamey and Gary Copeland, “How Exceptional Are Islamists? Comparing Support for Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 13, no. 2 (2011): 170, 174. 9. Daniel Meier, “(B)ordering South of Lebanon: Hizbullah’s Identity Building Strategy,” Journal of Borderlands Studies (2015), 9, Early View: DOI: 10.1080/08865 655.2015.1012735. 10. Steven Childs, “From Identity to Militancy: The Shi’a of Hezbollah,” Comparative Strategy 30, no. 4 (2011): 363–372.

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11. Rana Jawad, Religion and Social Welfare in the Middle East: A Lebanese Perspective (Bristol: Policy Press, 2009), 199. 12. Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, ‘Terrorism’ and the Politics of Perception,” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2005): 187. 13. Eitan Azani, “Hezbollah’s Strategy of ‘Walking on the Edge’: Between Political Game and Political Violence,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35, no. 11 (2012): 745. 14. Childs, “From Identity to Militancy,” 369. 15. Anisseh Van Engeland, “Hezbollah: From a Terrorist Group to a Political Party— Social Work as a Key to Politics,” in From Terrorism to Politics, ed. Anisseh Van Engeland and Rachael Rudolph (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 38. 16. Shawn Flanigan and Mounah Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad: Nonprofits as Resistance Organization,” Middle East Policy XVI, no. 2 (2011): 123. 17. Jawad, Religion and Social Welfare in the Middle East, 131. 18. Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” 127. 19. Eitan Azani, “The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36, no. 11 (2013): 903. 20. Thanassis Cambanis, “Hezbollah Mahdi Schools Mix Maths with Doctrine,” Financial Times, October 20, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e0be1122-2695-11e39dc0-00144feab7de.html#axzz3YiykpKsc. 21. Azani, “The Hybrid Terrorist Organization,” 905. 22. Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” 126. 23. Anne Marie Baylouny, “Born Violent: Armed Political Parties and Non-State Governance in Lebanon’s Civil War,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25, no. 2 (2014): 340. 24. James Love, “Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power,” Joint Special Operations University Report 10-5, June 2010, 25, http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20 Publications/JSOU10-5loveHezbollah_final.pdf. 25. Baylouny, “Born Violent,” 340. 26. Azani, “The Hybrid Terrorist Organization,” 905. 27. Baylouny, “Born Violent,” 340. 28. Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” 122–137. 29. Baylouny, “Born Violent,” 340. 30. Harb and Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy,” 187. 31. Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” 122–137. 32. Harb and Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy,” 188. 33. Van Engeland, “Hezbollah: From a Terrorist Group to a Political Party,” 38. 34. Jawad, Religion and Social Welfare in the Middle East, 71. 35. Mona Harb, “Faith Based Organisations as Effective Development Partners? Hezbollah and Post War Reconstruction in Lebanon,” in Development, Civil Society and Faith Based Organisations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, ed. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 214–239. 36. Baylouny, “Born Violent,” 340. 37. The official Al Mahdi Scouts Web site is available at: http://www.almah discouts.net/. 38. “Hezbollah: The Middle East’s Wild Card,” The Week, July 13, 2013, http:// theweek.com/articles/462252/hezbollah-middle-easts-wild-card. 39. “Hezbollah’s Youth,” Al Sharq-Al Awsat, July 21, 2007, http://www.aawsat.net /2007/07/article55262035/hezbollahs-youth. 40. “Hezbollah Recruiting Non-Shiites for ISIS Fight: Report,” Daily Star, November 12, 2014, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Nov-12/277324 -hezbollah-recruiting-bekaa-youth-against-isis-report.ashx#sthash.C3J7Ty2i.dpuf.

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41. Robert Worth, “Hezbollah Seeks to Marshal the Piety of the Young,” New York Times, November 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/world/middleeast/21 lebanon.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 42. For an example of how effective this strategy can be, with even nonparty members expressing absolute loyalty, see: Thanassis Cambanis, A Privilege to Die: Inside Hezbollah’s Legions and Their Endless War against Israel (New York: Free Press, 2010), 72. 43. See, for example, the 2001 film The Women of Hezbollah by Maher Abi-Samra, http://icarusfilms.com/new2001/hez.html. 44. Lara Deeb, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi’i Lebanon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 45. Roi Kais, “An Inside Look at the Women of Hezbollah,” Ynet News, July 26, 2013, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4410031,00.html. 46. Victoria Firmo-Fontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television: A Case Study of AlManar TV and the Hezbollah Women’s Association,” in Women and Media in the Middle East: Power through Self-Expression, ed. Naomi Sakr (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 175. 47. Deeb, An Enchanted Modern, 216. 48. Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” 123. 49. James Worrall, “Reading Booth in Beirut: Is Hezbollah an Emancipatory Actor?,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36, no. 3 (2013): 245. 50. Jawad, Religion and Social Welfare in the Middle East, 24. 51. Meier, “(B)ordering South of Lebanon,” 8. 52. Baylouny, “Born Violent,” 336. 53. Shaheen Sajan, “The Duality of Hezbollah: The Crossroads of Armed Struggle and Local Community Development,” MA Dissertation, Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, November 2009, 74, http://mobile.library2.smu.ca/bitstream/handle/ 01/21920/sajan_shaheen_masters_2009.PDF?sequence=2&isAllowed=y. 54. Baylouny, “Born Violent,” 338. 55. Melani Cammett, Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2014), chapters 5 and 6. 56. Cited in Christopher Harmon, Terrorism Today (London: Routledge, 2008), 87. 57. Martin Rudner, “Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money -Laundering,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 8 (2010): 702. 58. Ibid., 703–704. 59. See in particular: Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (London: Hurst, 2013). 60. Ariel Ben Solomon and Benjamin Weinthal, “Hezbollah Maintains Complex Network of Front Companies Trading in Counterfeit Medicine,” Jerusalem Post, August 1, 2013, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hezbollah-maintains-complex -network-of-front-companies-trading-in-counterfeit-medicine-321717. 61. Carl Wege, “Hezbollah in Africa,” Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 3 (2012). 62. Rudner, “Hizbullah Terrorism Finance,” 705–707. 63. Ayla Hammond Schbley, “Torn between God, Family, and Money: The Changing Profile of Lebanon’s Religious Terrorists,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23, no. 3 (2000): 190. 64. See also: Chris Dishman, “The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005): 237–252; Peter Lowe, “Counterfeiting: Links to Organised Crime and Terrorist Funding,” Journal of Financial Crime 13, no. 2 (2006): 255–257; Louise Shelley and Sharon Melzer, “The Nexus of Organized

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Crime and Terrorism: Two Case Studies in Cigarette Smuggling,” International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 32, no. 1 (2008): 43–63. 65. Rudner, “Hizbullah Terrorism Finance,” 705. 66. Childs, “From Identity to Militancy,” 369. 67. Atef Alshaer, “The Poetry of Hezbollah,” in The Hizbullah Phenomenon: Politics and Communication, ed. Lina Khatib, Dina Matar, and Atef Alshaer (London: Hurst, 2014), 119. 68. Firmo-Fontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television,” 178. 69. Joseph G. Jabbra and Nancy W. Jabbra, “Consociational Democracy in Lebanon: A Flawed System of Governance,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 17, no. 2 (2001): 71–89. 70. Ahmad Hamzeh, “Clientelism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends,” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 3 (2001): 167–178. 71. Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969). 72. Those sects are: Alawite, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Assyrian Church of the East, Chaldean Catholic, Coptic, Druze, Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Isma’ili, Jewish, Latin Catholic, Maronite, Protestant, Sunni, Shi’a, Syriac Catholic, and Syriac Orthodox. 73. Marie-Joëlle Zahar, “Power Sharing in Lebanon: Foreign Protectors, Domestic Peace and Democratic Failure,” in Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, ed. Philip G. Roeder and Donald S. Rothchild (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 219–240. 74. Karim Knio, “Is Political Stability Sustainable in Post-‘Cedar Revolution’ Lebanon?,” Mediterranean Politics 13, no. 3 (2008): 445–451. 75. It should be borne in mind that the Free Patriotic Movement later moved into the March 8 camp and now comprises the backbone of that grouping having 19 MPs to Hezbollah’s 12. 76. The Progressive Socialist Party also later left the March 14 Alliance initially lending its support to the March 8 Alliance before becoming nonaligned. 77. Karim Knio, “Lebanon: Cedar Revolution or Neo-Sectarian Partition?,” Mediterranean Politics 10, no. 2 (2005): 225–231. 78. Imad Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon (London: Routledge, 2014), 111. 79. See the Web site of the Lebanese Electoral Commission, http://www.elections .gov.lb/Parliamentary/Elections-Results/2009-Real-time-Results/The-2009-MPs.aspx. 80. Joseph Alagha divides Hezbollah’s history into three phases: the Saliency of Hizbullah’s Religious Ideology (1978–1985), the Prominence of Hizbullah’s Political Ideology (1985–1990), and Primacy to Political Programme (1991–), thus encapsulating Hezbollah’s journey from religious awakening to demands for an Islamic State in Lebanon to participation in Lebanese confessional politics. Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology. 81. Augustus R. Norton, “The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics,” The International Spectator 42, no. 4 (2007): 480. 82. See: Ahmad N. Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation,” Third World Quarterly 14, no. 2 (1993): 321–337. 83. Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2005), 187–200. 84. Carl Wege argues that the decision to move into politics in the early 1990s led to “the splitting of the party into an emasculated Hezbollah and a marginalized Islamic Resistance . . . the splitting of Hezbollah into an opposition movement within a Lebanese

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political system functioning under Syrian tutelage and a military Islamic Resistance movement have undermined the basic concepts on which Hezbollah was founded. The ‘open letter’ delivered by Hezbollah in 1985 foresaw the everexpanding fury of an Islamic revolution. That revolution has now been forestalled”; Carl Anthony Wege, “Hezbollah Organization,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 17, no. 2 (1994): 151–164. Others such as Benedetta Berti see this not as a betrayal of the organization’s root but as a natural and pragmatic evolution: Benedetta Berti, Armed Political Organisations: From Conflict to Integration (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). 85. Berti, Armed Political Organisations, 55–56. 86. Benedetta Berti “Armed Groups as Political Parties and Their Role in Electoral Politics: The Case of Hizballah,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 12 (2011): 957. 87. Ibid., 958. 88. Azani, “Hezbollah’s Strategy of ‘Walking on the Edge,’ ” 741–759. 89. Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai, Political Islam in the Age of Democratization (New York: Palgrave, 2013), 156. 90. Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz, and Christof Hartmann, eds., Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook: Volume I (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 189–190. 91. Simon Haddad, “The Lebanese Parliamentary Elections of 2005,” The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 30, no. 3 (2005): 305–331. 92. Clearly the Syrians wanted to ensure some balance and a range of allies. See: Norton, “The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics,” 481–482. 93. Cammett, Compassionate Communalism, 82. 94. Bouchra Bouyoub, “The Free Patriotic Movement and Hizbullah Political Entente: A Paradigm Shift in Lebanese Identity and State Formation?,” in State Formation and Identity in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Kenneth Christie and Mohammad Massad (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 174. 95. Cammett, Compassionate Communalism, 81–83. 96. The full text of the memorandum is available at: http://www.voltairenet.org/ article163916.html. 97. A crucial reference point here is Joseph Alagha’s work to bring together translated versions of all of these manifestos, which also offers a useful brief introductory commentary. The book also offers perhaps the definitive chronology of events available: Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents. 98. Berti, “Armed Groups as Political Parties and Their Role in Electoral Politics,” 956. 99. Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 94–95. 100. For a good example of this, see the section on civil society organizations in the 2009 parliamentary manifesto. 101. Augustus R. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 158. 102. Ahmad N. Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Islamists and Local Politics: A New Reality,” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 739–759. 103. Norton, “The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics,” 481. 104. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 96. 105. For a detailed analysis of this performance, see: Carole Dagher, “Lebanon Holds First Municipal Elections in 35 Years,” Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, July/August 1998, 55–56, http://www.wrmea.org/1998-july-august/lebanon-holds-first -municipal-elections-in-35-years.html.

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106. For a comparison of the results, see: Ahmad N. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 133. 107. Roger Shanahan, “Hizballah Rising: The Political Battle for the Loyalty of the Shi’a of Lebanon,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 9, no. 1 (March 2005): 2. 108. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 123–124. 109. Omri Nir, Nabih Berri and Lebanese Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2011), 134. In addition, Hezbollah’s local government activities have won a prize: “The UN Best Practices Award Given to the Ghobeyri Municipality;” Harb and Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy,” 188. 110. International Foundation for Electoral Systems, “Lebanon’s Local Elections 2010,” IFES Briefing Paper, May 21, 2010, http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2010/2010_Lebanon_Local_Elections_Third_Round.pdf. It should also be borne in mind that the main contests are always in the bigger municipalities as there are a large number of very small local government areas; the elections in these districts are often desultory with around 20 percent of municipalities in 2010 being sewn up by local notables coordinating lists. 111. Demographics in Lebanon are extremely problematic and politically sensitive, but it is clear that Muslims have had a higher birthrate than Christians and that Christians have experienced more emigration from a numerically superior population at the last census in 1932. This emigration brings further issues as many still hold Lebanese or dual nationality and thus can vote in Lebanese elections. 112. Shanahan, “Hizballah Rising,” 6. 113. Berti, “Armed Groups as Political Parties and Their Role in Electoral Politics,” 958. 114. Norton, “The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics,” 482–483. 115. Ibid., 483. 116. Bokhari and Senzai, Political Islam in the Age of Democratization, 158. 117. It should be remembered that the tribunal was not simply about the Hariri assassination but was also designed to examine a range of other recent political assassinations in Lebanon. 118. Paul Salem, “The After-Effects of the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War,” Contemporary Arab Affairs 1, no. 1 (2008): 16–17. 119. See: Nada Bakri, “Indictment in Hariri Assassination Is Published,” New York Times, August 17, 2011; Martin Chulov, “Hariri Indictment Claims Assassins Given Away by Their Phones,” Guardian, August 17, 2011; “STL Indicts Fifth Hezbollah Member in Hariri Case,” Daily Star (Lebanon), October 10; Azani, “Hezbollah’s Strategy of ‘Walking on the Edge,’ ” 742, 752–753. 120. On the issue of the influence of International Law on Hezbollah, see: Filippo Dionigi, Hezbollah, Islamist Politics, and International Society (London: Palgrave, 2014); especially chapters 8, 9, and 10. 121. This is discussed at length in Chapter 5. See also: Mats Warn, “A Lebanese Vanguard for the Islamic Revolution: Hezbollah’s Combined Strategy of Accommodation and Resistance,” Stockholm Studies in Politics, no. 149 (2012), http://www.diva -portal.org/smash/get/diva2:567751/FULLTEXT02.pdf], 80–83. 122. “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program,” http://www.cfr.org/terrorist -organizations-and-networks/open-letter-hizballah-program/p30967. 123. Simon Haddad, “The Origins of Popular Support for Lebanon’s Hezbollah,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 1 (2006): 31. 124. Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, 156.

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125. For more discussion of this, see: Worrall, “Reading Booth in Beirut,” 244. 126. Norton, “The Role of Hezbollah in Lebanese Domestic Politics,” 481. 127. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah Politics & Religion (London: Pluto, 2002), 34–35. 128. Ali Mamouri, “Southern Suburbs Stand Apart in Beirut,” Al Monitor, December 27, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/beirut-southernsurburbs-residents-syria.html#. 129. Judith Palmer Harik, “Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon’s Hezbollah,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996): 41–67. 130. Cited in Ken Silverstein, “Augustus Norton on Hezbollah’s Social Services,” Harper’s, March 14, 2007, http://harpers.org/archive/2007/03/sb-augustus-no -1173896326. 131. Imad Salamey and Frederic Pearson, “Hezbollah: A Proletarian Party with an Islamic Manifesto—A Sociopolitical Analysis of Islamist Populism in Lebanon and the Middle East,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 18, no. 3 (2007): 426. 132. Cited in: Cambanis, “Hezbollah Mahdi Schools Mix Maths with Doctrine.” 133. For a full discussion on Security Studies notions of Emancipation and how this applies to Hezbollah, see: Worrall, “Reading Booth in Beirut,” 235–254. 134. Krista E. Wiegand, “Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 8 (2009): 676–677. 135. Boaz Atzili, “State Weakness and ‘Vacuum of Power’ in Lebanon,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 8 (2010): 757–782. 136. Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, 147–148. 137. Worrall, “Reading Booth in Beirut,” 243. 138. For the text of the agreement, see: Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 110–112. 139. Wiegand, “Reformation of a Terrorist Group,” 677. 140. Hezbollah held the following portfolios in government: 2005, Muhammad Fneish—Minister of Energy and Water, Trad Hamadeh—Minister of Labour (Independent), but Hezbollah endorsed Fawzi Salloukh as Minister of Foreign Affairs; this was a compromise after Hezbollah members had been blocked from the role; he held the position until 2009. The 2008 cabinet contained just one Hezbollah minister, Muhammad Fneish —Minister of Labour; 2009, Muhammad Fneish—State Minister for Administrative Development, and Hussein Hajj Hassan—Minister of Agriculture; 2011, Ibid.; 2013, Muhammad Fneish—Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, and Hussein Hajj Hassan—Minister of Industry. 141. Cited in: Wiegand, “Reformation of a Terrorist Group,” 678. 142. For a more detailed discussion on Salafism in Lebanon, see: Hilal Khashan, “Lebanon’s Islamist Stronghold,” Middle East Quarterly 18, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 85–90. 143. Simon Haddad, “Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon: Anatomy of a Terrorist Organization,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 6 (2009): 548–569. 144. Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 112. 145. “Lebanese Government Collapses,” Al Jazeera, January 13, 2011, http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/2011112151356430829.html. 146. For more on this period and the external contest of the Arab Spring, see: Joseph Alagha, “Hezbollah and the Arab Spring,” Contemporary Review of the Middle East 1, no. 2 (2014): 189–206. 147. Scarlett Haddad, “Mikati’s Resignation Shakes Up Lebanese Politics,” Al Monitor, April 2, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/mikati -resignation-lebanon-blessing.html#.

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148. Lina Khatib, “Hizbullah’s Political Strategy,” Survival 53, no. 2 (2011): 61–76. 149. “Lebanon Forms New Government after Months of Political Deadlock,” Guardian, February 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/15/lebanon-forms -new-government-salam. 150. “Members of Lebanon’s New Government,” Daily Star, February 14, 2014, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Feb-15/247481-members-of -lebanons-new-government.ashx. 151. Ben Knight, “Hezbollah Leaves Lebanon in Political Limbo,” Deutsche Welle, March 5, 2014, http://www.dw.de/hezbollah-leaves-lebanon-in-political-limbo/ a-17472044. 152. Eric Lob, “Is Hezbollah Confronting a Crisis of Popular Legitimacy?,” Middle East Brief, no. 78, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, March 2014, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB78.pdf. 153. Azani, “Hezbollah’s Strategy of ‘Walking on the Edge,’ ” 741–759. 154. See, for example, Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), chapters 7 and 8.

CHAPTER 5 1. Frederick Wehrey, Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza Nader, Jeremy J. Ghez, Lydia Hansell, and Robert A. Guffey, Saudi-Iranian Relations since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 78. 2. Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr, Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution (London: Hurst, 2012), 4. 3. Ibid. 4. International Crisis Group, Lebanon’s Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri’s Future Current, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North% 20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Lebanon/96%20Lebanons%20Politics%20-%20The %20Sunni%20Community%20and%20Hariris%20Future%20Current.pdf. Hariri was assassinated on February 14, 2005, with “converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act.” United Nations, Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595 (2005), http://www.un.org/News/dh/docs/mehlisreport/,53. 5. Wehrey et al., Saudi-Iranian Relations, 79. 6. Ibid., 81–82. 7. Augustus R. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 29. 8. Ibid., 33. 9. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “The Foreign Policy of Iran,” in The Middle East in the International System, ed. Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2002), 284. 10. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order (London: OUP for IISS, 1996), 9. 11. Michael Axworthy, Iran, Empire of the Mind: A History from Zoroaster to the Present Day (London: Penguin, 2008), 261–263. 12. Day of mourning for the martyrdom of Hosein. The parallels between Hosein and the protesters are important to note here.

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13. Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981), 61. 14. Wehrey et al., Saudi-Iranian Relations, 79. 15. Fred Halliday, “Iranian Foreign Policy since 1979: Internationalism and Nationalism in the Islamic Revolution,” in Shi’ism and Social Protest, ed. Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press 1986), 106–107. 16. Iranian Constitution, Article 3.16, www.alaviandassociates.com/documents/ constitution.pdf, accessed September 24, 2010. 17. Con Coughlin, Khomeini’s Ghost (London: Macmillan, 2009), 135; citing Le Monde, August 23, 1978. 18. Ibid., 135. 19. Masoud Kazemzadeh, “Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran,” Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 2 (2008): 192. 20. Rola Di Peri, “Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective: The Case of Hizbullah,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 15, no. 4 (2014): 10. 21. Axworthy, Iran, Empire of the Mind, 126. 22. Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism, Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 26–27. 23. Rola El-Husseini, “Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria,” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 5 (2010): 805. 24. Ibid., 805. 25. Edith Szanto, “Beyond the Karbala Paradigm: Rethinking Revolution and Redemption in Twelver Shi’a Mourning Rituals,” Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies 6, no. 1 (2013): 78. 26. Ibid. 27. Kamran Scot Aghaie, The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi’i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran (Seattle: Washington University Press, 2004), 132. 28. Nicolas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel (New York: Random House, 2011), 21. 29. Ibid., 6. 30. El-Husseini, “Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal,” 805. 31. Di Peri, “Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective,” 7. 32. An Open Letter: The Hizballah Programme, http://www.cfr.org/terrorist -organizations-and-networks/open-letter-hizballah-program/p30967. 33. Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2011), 16. 34. Ibid., 20. 35. An Open Letter. 36. Di Peri, “Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective,” 8. 37. Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents, 30. 38. The New Hezbollah Manifesto (2009), http://www.lebanonrenaissance.org/assets/ Uploads/15-The-New-Hezbollah-Manifesto-Nov09.pdf. 39. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 40. 40. Many dispute this as legitimate grounds for invasion, given the severity of tensions between Nidal and Arafat’s PLO. 41. Magnus Ranstorp, “The Hizballah Training Camps of Lebanon,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, vol. 2, ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 248.

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42. Al-Siyassa, December 14, 2006; Magnus Norell, A Victory for Islamism: The Second Lebanon War and Its Repercussions (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2009), 12. 43. Gary Sick, “Iran: Confronting Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (2003): 84. 44. Ranstorp, “The Hizballah Training Camps of Lebanon,” 244. 45. Ibid., 246. 46. Hezbollah: Financing Terror through Criminal Enterprise, Testimony of Dr. Matthew Levitt, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental affairs, U.S. Senate, May 25, 2005. 47. Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (London: Hurst, 2013), 357. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid., 253. 50. Ibid. 51. Abbas William Samii, “A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizballah-Iran-Syria Relationship,” Middle East Journal 62, no. 1 (2008): 32–53. 52. Hezbollah: Financing Terror through Criminal Enterprise. 53. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Centre, Using the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards as the Main Tool to Export the Revolution beyond the Borders of Iran, http://www.terrorism -info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_07_067_2.pdf. 54. The Middle East Media Research Institute, Iran and the Recent Escalation on Israel’s Borders (4): Reaction in Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, http://www.memri.org/ report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1745.htm. 55. Ibid. 56. Bassem Mroue, Wikileaks US Cables: Iran Armed Hezbollah through Ambulances, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/29/wikileaks-us-cables-iran-_n_789056.html. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Tim Lister, “Wikileaks: Syria Accused of Supplying SCUD Missiles to Hezbollah,” CNN, December 7, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/12/ 06/us.wikileaks.syria/. 60. Ibid. 61. Barak Ravid, “Wikileaks Cable Exposes Iran Hand in Hezbollah Communication Network,” Ha’aretz, December 6, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy -defense/wikileaks-cable-exposes-iran-hand-in-hezbollah-communication-network-1 .329169. 62. Knudsen and Kerr, Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution, 8. 63. Wehrey et al., Saudi-Iranian Relations, 24. 64. Knudsen and Kerr, Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution, 9. 65. See Norell, A Victory for Islamism, 5; Wehrey et al., Saudi-Iranian Relations, 25. 66. See: Ambassador Henry Crumpton, cited by Caroline Drees, “Syria, Iran Lack Full Hizbullah Control: US Official,” Reuters, July 25, 2006, in Samii, “A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands,” 50. 67. Norell, A Victory for Islamism, 11–12. 68. Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 257. 69. El-Husseini, “Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal,” 8–9. 70. Al-Siyassa, December 12, 2006; in Norell, A Victory for Islamism, 12. 71. El-Husseini, “Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal,” 8–9.

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72. Paul Aarts and Joris van Duijne, “Saudi Arabia and Iran: Less Antagonism, More Pragmatism,” in Viewpoints Special Edition, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1979–2009: Evolution of a Pivotal State, Middle East Institute, 70. 73. Baghat Korany and Moataz A. Fattah, “Irreconcilable Role-Partners? Saudi Foreign Policy between the Ulama and the U.S.,” in The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization, ed. Baghat Korany and Ali E Hillal Dessouki (Cairo: Cairo Press, 2009), 374. 74. Aarts and van Duijne, “Saudi Arabia and Iran,” 70. 75. Knudsen and Kerr, Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution, 28.

CHAPTER 6 1. While not coherent, independent entities, power groups can be seen thus: Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas; Saudi Arabia and the GCC states, Egypt, Israel, Turkey; ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other radical Islamist organizations. It is the interaction between these blocs that will provoke conflict in the coming years. It is also worth noting that there is a degree of overlap between the blocs, the Wahhabist ideology, prevalent within Saudi Arabia, playing a key role within the ideology of groups such as ISIS. 2. Fouad Ajami, The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously, Foreign Affairs, 2012, 57. 3. Ibid., 65. 4. Cornell University Library, Arab Spring: A Research & Study Guide—Syria, http:// guides.library.cornell.edu/c.php?g=31688&p=200753. 5. LSE IDEAS Reports, Syria’s Bloody Arab Spring, http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/ publications/reports/pdf/sr011/final_lse_ideas__syriasbloodyarabspring_phillips.pdf. 6. Cornell University Library, Arab Spring. 7. Ibid. 8. Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013). 9. Ibid. 10. Madawi Al-Rasheed, “The Saudi Response to the ‘Arab spring’: Containment and Co-option,” Open Democracy, January 10, 2012, https://www.opendemocracy .net/5050/madawi-al-rasheed/saudi-response-to-%E2%80%98arab-spring%E2%80%99 -containment-and-co-option. 11. David Batty and Jack Shenker, “Syria Suspended from Arab League,” Guardian, November 12, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/12/syria-suspended -arab-league. 12. Some estimates suggest that Qatar has spent in the region of $3 billion supporting opposition groups. See: Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding Smith, “Qatar Bankrolls Syrian Revolt with Cash and Arms,” Financial Times, May 16, 2013, http://www.ft.com/ cms/s/0/86e3f28e-be3a-11e2-bb35-00144feab7de.html#axzz3G1PasLiO; David E. Sanger, “Rebel Arms Flow Is Said to Benefit Jihadists in Syria,” New York Times, October 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadists-receiving-most -arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 13. Sigurd Neubauer, Qatar’s Changing Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/ 04/08/qatar-s-changing-foreign-policy/h7gf. 14. See: Patricia Zengerle and Richard Cowan, “U.S. House Votes to Arm Syrian Rebels, but Questions Remain,” Reuters, September 17, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/

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article/2014/09/17/us-iraq-crisis-congress-idUSKBN0HC28120140917. However, it is important to note the problem of defining and identifying “moderate” rebel groups. 15. CNN Wire Staff, “Mubarak Resignation Prompts Celebrations, Some Silence,” CNN, February 12, 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/11/ egypt.foreign.reaction/. 16. The Green Movement was an opposition movement in Iran that engaged in political activity in 2009. It challenged the results of the election that gave Ahmadinejad his second term as president. The movement was crushed by the state and the election results stood. Some give credit to the Green Movement for inspiring the Arab Springs. The protests resulted in a number of deaths and the arrest of a number that the Guardian posits as 500. See Robert Tait and Julian Borger, “Iran Elections: Mass Arrests and Campus Raids as Regime Hits Back,” Guardian, June 17, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2009/jun/17/iran-election-protests-arrests1. See: Charles Kurzman, “The Arab Spring: Ideals of the Iranian Green Movement, Methods of the Iranian Revolution,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 44 (2012): 162–165. 17. “Hezbollah Official Stresses Need for Shiite-Sunni Unity,” The Daily Star, September 30, 2014, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Sep-30/ 272444-hezbollah-official-stresses-need-for-shiite-sunni-unity.ashx?utm_source=Magnet &utm_medium=Recommended%20Articles%20widget&utm_campaign=Magnet%20tools #ixzz3FStzY1Hw. 18. David Kenner, “How One Beirut Street Found Itself on the Front Lines of a Regional War,” Foreign Policy, October 21, 2014, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/ 2014/01/21/how_one_beirut_street_found_itself_on_the_front_lines_of_a_regional_war. 19. Ibid. 20. Hassan Nasrallah, “Declaration of al-Quds as the Capital of Palestine, the Arabs and Muslims,” http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/speech-of-hezbollah -secretary-general.html. 21. “Nasrallah Slams Fears of ‘Shiite Expansion,’ ” The Daily Star, http://www .dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Aug-03/226140-nasrallah-slams-fears-of -shiite-expansion.ashx#ixzz38qqvq7Do. 22. “Syrian Refugees: A Snapshot of the Crisis—in the Middle East and Europe,” http://syrianrefugees.eu/. 23. Ibid. 24. UNHCR, “2014 UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Lebanon,” http://www .unhcr.org/pages/49e486676.html 25. MEE and agencies, “Syria Refugees Soon a Third of Lebanon Population: UN,” Middle East Eye, July 4, 2014, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-refugees-soon -third-lebanon-population-un-1494368866. 26. Ibid. 27. Quds Day is an international event taking place on the last Friday of Ramadan to express solidarity with the people of Palestine. It was established in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution. 28. Nasrallah, “Declaration of al-Quds as the Capital of Palestine.” 29. Shaul Shai, The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Books, 2005), 149. 30. Hassan Nasrallah, “Al-Quds Day Speech,” July 25, 2014, http://vineyardsaker .blogspot.com.br/2014/07/speech-of-hezbullah-secretary-general.html. 31. Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2005). 32. Nasrallah, “Declaration of al-Quds as the Capital of Palestine.”

188

Notes

33. “Nasrallah Vows Hezbollah Will Stand by Resistance in Gaza,” The Daily Star, July 21, 2014, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Jul-21/264570 -nasrallah-vows-hezbollah-will-stand-by-resistance-in-gaza.ashx#ixzz38qqInVWi. 34. Naharnet Newsdesk, “Nasrallah Contacts Meshaal: The Resistance Stands by Palestinians,” July 21, 2014, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/139780. 35. Nasrallah, “Declaration of al-Quds as the Capital of Palestine.” 36. Hassan Nasrallah, “Ceremony Marking the Anniversary of the Death of Imam Khomeini,” June 1, 2012, http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/speech -delivered-by-hezbollah-secretary.html. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Hassan Nasrallah, “Resistance and Liberation Day,” May 25, 2012, http:// vineyardsaker.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/speech-of-hezbollah-secretary-general_30.html. 40. Reuters, “Lebanon-Syria Hostage Crisis Sparks Fears of Sectarian Violence,” August 15, 2012, http://www.france24.com/en/20120815-lebanon-syria-hostage-crisis -sparks-fears-sectarian-violence-hezbollah-shiite. 41. Hassan Nasrallah, “Resistance and Liberation Day.” 42. Ibid. 43. Charles Levinson, “Syrian Jets Fire into Lebanese Territory,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044381680 4578001800053081808.html. 44. Asmaa Al Ghoul, “Hamas-Hezbollah Ties Deteriorate over Syria,” Al-Monitor, June 5, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/hamas-hezbollah -syria-iran.html# . 45. Ibid. 46. Frederick Wehrey, Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza Nader, Jeremy J. Ghez, Lydia Hansell, and Robert A. Guffey, Saudi-Iranian Relations since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 79. 47. Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran. 48. Wehrey et al., Saudi-Iranian Relations, 24. 49. Paul Aarts and Joris van Duijne, “Saudi Arabia and Iran: Less Antagonism, More Pragmatism,” in Viewpoints Special Edition, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1979–2009: Evolution of a Pivotal State, Middle East Institute, 70. 50. “Wikileaks: Saudis Urge Force to Destroy Hezbollah,” BBC News, December 8, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11945514. 51. Nasser Chararah, “Is Saudi Arabia Targeting Hezbollah?” Al-Monitor, July 24, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/hezbollah-saudi-conflict -repercussion-abroad.html#. 52. Christoph Reuter, Raniah Salloum, and Samiha Shafy, “Digital Johad: Inside Islami State’s Savvy PR War,” Spiegel Online, October 8, 2014, http://www .spiegel.de/international/world/the-professional-pr-strategies-of-isis-in-syria-and-iraq-a -995611.html. 53. “ISIS—The End of Sykes-Picot,” June 29, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=YyM0_sv5h88. 54. For a greater discussion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, see: James Barr, A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle That Shaped the Middle East (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011).

Notes

189

55. A. Y. Zelin, ISIS Is Dead, Long Live the Islamic State, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/isis-is-dead -long-live-the-islamic-state. 56. Keith Johnson, “The Islamic State Is the Newest Petrostate,” Foreign Policy, July 28, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/28/baghdadis_hillbillies _isis_iraq_syria_oil_terrorism_islamic_state. 57. Al Akhbar, “Hezbollah Leader Warns ISIS Is a Growing Threat to the Region, Must Be Defeated,” August 15, 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/hezbollah -leader-warns-isis-growing-threat-region-must-be-defeated. 58. “Nasrallah: ISIS in Beirut If Not for Hezbollah,” Daily Star, June 17, 2014, http:// www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jun-17/260442-nasrallah-isis-in -beirut-if-not-for-hezbollah.ashx#ixzz398aGJ6nz. 59. Al Akhbar, “Hezbollah Leader Warns.” 60. Ibid. 61. Lina Khatib, “The Political and Security Fallout of the Battle in Arsal,” http:// carnegie-mec.org/2014/08/16/political-and-security-fallout-of-battle-in-arsal. 62. Al Akhbar, “Hezbollah Leader Warns.” 63. “Wall Street Journal: Hezbollah’s Nasrallah Pledges Troops to Support Iraqi Regime, as Soldiers Fortify Beirut against ISIS,” Algemeiner, June 18, 2014, http:// www.algemeiner.com/2014/06/18/hezbollahs-nasrallah-pledges-troops-to-support-iraqi -regime-but-sources-say-unlikely-as-soldiers-fortifying-beirut-against-isis/. 64. “Nasrallah: We Reject the Washington-Led International Alliance against ISIS,” Middle East Monitor, September 24, 2014, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/ middle-east/14345-nasrallah-we-reject-the-washington-led-international-alliance -against-isis. 65. Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Insight—Iran’s Elite Guards Fighting in Iraq to Push Back Islamic State,” Reuters, August 3, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/03/ uk-iraq-security-iran-insight-idUKKBN0G30GG20140803. 66. “Nasrallah: ISIS in Beirut If Not for Hezbollah.” 67. Although it is worth stressing that the Gulf States are equally concerned by the rise of ISIS. 68. “Nasrallah: Fighting Threats of Takfiri Terrorism Hezbollah’s Priority,” Shiitenews.com, October 1, 2014, http://www.shiitenews.org/index.php/lebanon/11875 -nasrallah-fighting-threats-of-takfiri-terrorism-hezbollah-s-priority. 69. “Hezbollah Official Stresses Need for Shiite-Sunni Unity.” 70. Ibid. 71. “Nasrallah: ISIS Is a ‘Real Existential Danger’ to the Whole Region,” Al Akhbar, August 15, 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/nasrallah-isis-real-existential -danger-whole-region?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign =Feed%3A+AlAkhbarEnglish+%28Al+Akhbar+English%29. 72. “Hezbollah Official Stresses Need for Shiite-Sunni Unity.” 73. “Nasrallah: ISIS Is a ‘Real Existential Danger.’ ” 74. Ibid. 75. Section 6 Islam and Resistance, The New Hezbollah Manifesto (November 2009), http://www.lebanonrenaissance.org/assets/Uploads/15-The-New-Hezbollah-Manifesto -Nov09.pdf. 76. “The Open Letter,” http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/ open-letter-hizballah-program/p30967.

190

Notes

77. “Lebanon: Hizballah on the Defense While Striving for National Unity,” June 21, 2009, https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=09BEIRUT822&q=hezbollah 78. Abdulrahman al-Rashed, “Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, ISIS and Hezbollah,” Al Arabiya, August 7, 2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/08/ 07/Lebanon-Saudi-Arabia-ISIS-and-Hezbollah.html. 79. “Nasrallah: We Reject the Washington-Led International Alliance against ISIS.” 80. Rola Di Peri, “Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective: The Case of Hizbullah,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 15, no. 4 (2014): 14.

Further Reading

Abul-Husn, Latif. The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. Alagha, Joseph. Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto. Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2011. Alagha, Joseph. Hizbullah’s Identity Construction. Amsterdam: AUP, 2011. Alagha, Joseph. The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program. Amsterdam: AUP, 2006. Azani, Eitan. Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011. Azani, Eitan. “The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36, no. 11 (2013): 899–916. Blanford, Nicholas. Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel. New York: Random House, 2011. Deeb, Marius. “Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology, Social Basis, and Links with Iran and Syria.” Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2 (1988): 683–98. Di Peri, Rosita. “Islamist Actors from an Anti-system Perspective: The Case of Hizbullah.” Politics, Religion & Ideology 15, no. 4 (2014). El Husseini, Rola. “Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria.” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 5 (2010): 803–15. el Khazen, Farid. “Patterns of State Failure: The Case of Lebanon.” In Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjorgo. Oxon: Routledge, 2005. Hafez, Mohammed. Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. “Clan Conflicts, Hezbollah and the Lebanese State.” Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 19, no. 4 (1994): 433–45. Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hizbullah. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004.

192

Further Reading

Harik, Judith Palmer. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007. Hoigilt, Jacob. “Islamism, Pluralism and the Palestine Question: The Case of Hizbullah.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 2 (2007): 123–36. Hovsepian, Nubar. “State-Society Relations and the Reproduction of the Lebanese Confessional System.” In The War on Lebanon: A Reader, edited by Nubar Hovsepian. Moreton-in-Marsh: Arris Books, 2007. Jaber, Hala. Hezbollah (SAGE Key Concepts series). London: Sage, 1997. Jones, Clive and Sergio Catignani, eds. Israel and Hizbollah: An Interstate and Asymmetric War in Perspective. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. Karagiannis, Emmanuel. “Hizballah as a Social Movement Organization: A Framing Approach.” Mediterranean Politics 14, no. 3 (2009): 365–83. Knudsen, Are, and Michael Kerr. Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution. London: Hurst, 2012. Kramer, Martin. “Hezbollah: The Calculus of Jihad.” In Fundamentalisms and the State Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance, edited by M. Marty and R. S. Appleby, 539–56. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. Kramer, Martin. “The Moral Logic of Hizballah.” In Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, edited by Walter Reich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Levitt, Matthew. Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2013. Mansfield, Peter. A History of the Middle East. London: Penguin Group, 1991. Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. Palmer Harik, Judith. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. London: IB Tauris, 2004. Qassem, Naim. Hizbullah: The Story from Within. London: Saqi, 2007. Ranstorp, Magnus. “Hezbollah’s Command Leadership: Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions.” Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 303–39. Ranstorp, Magnus. “The Hizballah Training Camps of Lebanon,” In The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, vol. 2, edited by James Forest. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006. Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. Hizbu’llah. London: Pluto Press, 2002. Samii, Abbas William. “A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the HizballahIran-Syria Relationship.” Middle East Journal 62, no. 1 (2008). Shai, Shaul. The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Books, 2005. Shanahan, Rodger. The Shi’a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011. Sirriyeh, Hussain. “The Emergence of Hizbollah and the Beginnings of Resistance, 1982–85.” In Israel and Hizbollah: An Asymmetric Conflict in Historical and Comparative Perspective, edited by Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani. Oxon: Routledge, 2010. Sirriyeh, Hussain. “The US, Hezbollah and the Idea of Sub-State Terrorism.” Israel Affairs 18, no. 4 (2012): 652–62. Szanto, Edith. “Beyond the Karbala Paradigm: Rethinking Revolution and Redemption in Twelver Shi’a Mourning Rituals.” Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies 6, no. 1 (2013).

Further Reading

193

Wiegand, Krista. “Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 8 (2009): 669–80. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, ed. Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

Index

Abdullah Azzam Brigades, 64 Abu Nidal Organisation, 123 Adam, Udi, 56 Agricultural hubs, 78 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 135–36 Ahrar al-Sunna Baalbek Brigade, 64 AK-47, 44 Alagha, Joseph, 103 Al Ahd, 68 Al-Amin, Sheik Ibrahim, 39 Al-Aqsa Intifada, 52, 56, 66 Al-Asad, Bashar, 65, 115 Alawite Arab Democratic Party, 89 Alexander, Czar, 11 Al-Hajj Radwan’s funeral, 63 Al-Hakim, Afaf, 81 Ali Hassan Martyr Unit, 60 Al Intiqad (newspaper), 68 Al-Laqqis, Hassan, 64 Al Manar TV, 7, 27, 59, 68, 70, 85, 86 Al-Meqdad, Hassan, 140 Al-Musawi, Abbas, 4–5, 34 Al-Qaeda, 9, 13, 18, 20, 29, 61 Al-Qard al-Hassan (The Good Loan), 79 Al Quds (Jerusalem) Day, 65 Al-Sadr, Musa, Imam, 34, 35, 117–18 Al Saud, 142 Alshaer, Atef, 85 Al-Tufeili, Subh, 127

Amal, 6, 35, 38, 42, 49, 54, 90 Amal-Hezbollah war, 68 American Weather Underground, 12 Anarchist groups, 11 An-Noor Radio, 68, 85 Anti-aircraft missiles, 58 Anti-colonial movements, 11 Anti-Syrian rally, 89 Anti-Western modernizer, 134 Aoun, Michel, 95 Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, 89 Arab Spring, 57, 133–36 Arafat, Yasser, 35, 161–62 Armenian Democratic Liberal Party, 90 Armenian Hunchaks, 11 Armenian Revolutionary Foundation, 89 Armitage, Richard, 14 Asads, 8 Ashoura festival, 121 Ashura, 74 A-Team of terrorist groups, 1, 14 Aum Shinrikyo, 12 Azani, Eitan, 6, 94 Baqiyatu Allah (magazine), 68 Barak, Ehud, 4, 45, 59 Bashar al-Sadr, 8 Baylouny, Anne Marie, 83 Bazouriyah, 6

196

Index

Beirut, 31–32 Bekaa Valley, 7, 75, 91, 123 “Belt of misery,” 32 Berti, Benedetta, 42, 49, 93, 100 Bin Ali, Hossein, 119–20 Bioterrorism, 12 Birri Bloc, 94 Black Friday, 116 Bombing: Jewish community center in Argentina, 10; tourist bus, Bulgaria, 16. See also Suicide bombing Bouazizi, Mohamed, 133 Bourj al-Barajnah, 98 Bregman, Ahron, 55 Budgets and revenue, 83–85 Bulgaria, 16, 17 Cedar Republic, 88 Cedar Revolution of 2005, 66, 89, 100, 115 Christianity, 3 Christian Maronite forces, 4 Civilians, 63, 152 Civil rights movement, 25, 26 Civil War, Lebanese state, 4, 32, 43, 48–49, 51, 66, 91 Clash of Civilizations (Book), 20 Colonel Qaddafi, 35 Colonial legacy, 114 Conditioning, 22 Consensual politics, 106 Construction, 79–80 Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation, 79 Consultative Council, 4, 6, 160 Counter-terrorism, 66 Cyprus, 17 Dahiya Doctrine, 64, 65 Damascus, 84, 113, 115, 124, 126 Dawa Party, 34 Deeb, Lara, 81 Democratic Left Movement, 90 Denunciation of enemies, 75 Doha, 107 Drones, 61 Drug-dealing, 61 Druze Progressive Socialist Party, 90, 100, 108

Education, 24, 77–78 Educational services provider, 6–7 Egyptian Islamists, 24 Emancipation, 102–5 Enemy entity, 75 Engeland, Anisseh Van, 77 Executive Assembly, 6 External Security Organisation, 47 Fadlallah, Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn, 34 Fadlallah, sermons of, 5, 9 Fahri, Rima, 81 Fajr 3, 46 Fatawa (religious decrees), 85 Fedayeen, 32 Financial aid to families in distress, 6 Food, 78 Frame resonance, 26; credibility, 26–27; narrative fidelity, 27; networked linkages, 27–28 Framing, 36–37; components, 26 Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), 95 French Action Directe, 12 Gabrielstein, Iver, 52 Gaza Strip, blockade, 20 Geopolitical agendas, 113, 126–27 Ghobeirre, 98 Golan Heights, 58 Goods and services, 76–77; construction, 79–80; education, 77–78; food, 78; healthcare, 78; social services, 79 Government, Hezbollah in, 105–10 Grad, 46 Guardian Jurist, 7, 8, 29 Guerrilla warfare, 1, 16, 44 Gulf states, 141–43 Gurr, Ted, 23, 24 Haddad, Simon, 103 Hafez, Mohammed, 24, 25, 26–27 Hamas (Gaza), 9, 19, 29, 52, 53, 62, 64–65, 76, 141 Har Dov, 58 Harik, Judith Palmer, 98, 104 Hariri, Rafic: assassination, 88–89, 101, 114–15; three-term prime minister, 115 Healthcare, 78

Index Hezbollah: area of operation, 10–11; formative period, 6, 27, 39; in government, 105–10; identity, 21; ideology, 7–9; Iran support, 37–38; as Islamist social movement, 73; leadership and organizational structure, 4–7; message and manifestos, 96–97, 121–23; military strength, 43–48; municipal elections, 97–99; philosophy of war, 70–71; post–Arab Spring Middle East, 134–49; priorities, 98; relations with Iran and Syria, 139–41; role within Lebanon, 114; as social actor, 74–76; strategy and performance, 94–96; tactics, 9–10; and terrorism, 3–4, 14–18; vision for Lebanon, 99; Women’s Association, 81 Hezbollah-Amal Alliance, 91 Hezbollah’s bluff, 109 Hezbollah’s Nature Reserves, 56 High-ranking clerics, 117 Hijacking airplanes, 9 Humanitarian, 77 Hussein, Saddam, 142 Identity construction, 21 Imam Khomeini, 118 Imams, 8; and religious scholars, 27 Integrative complexity, 20–21 Intercommunity strife, 30 Internationalization of Hezbollah, 114 International terrorist wing, 47 Iran-assisted military deployment, 127 Iranian Ayatollah, 4 Iranian (Shi’a) clerics, 118 Iranian Revolution, 12, 116–18 Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), 38, 123 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 18, 22, 24 ISIS. See Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) Islam, 3; politicized forms of, 28 Islamic Group, 90 Islamic Health Organisation, 78 Islamic Jihad Organisation, 9, 47 Islamic resistance groups, 43 Islamic revivalism, 8, 12, 29 Islamic Revolution, 38, 120, 126

197

Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), 5, 135, 136; rise of, 10, 143–48 Islamist: revivalism, 18; terrorism, 12 Israel and Hezbollah, 127–28 Israel Defence Forces (IDF), 9, 42, 123 Israeli air incursions, 60–61 Israeli armour, 47, 56 Israeli embassy, attack on, 10 Israeli escalations, 50 Israeli interventions (1982), 48 Israeli-Palestinian peace process, 52, 66 Israeli threat, 42, 159–60 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, 50–52 , Israel s occupation of Lebanon, 9–10 Israel-Palestine conflict, 4, 30 Istid`aaf (oppression), 75 Italian Red Brigades, 12 Jabat al-Nusra, 61, 135–36 Japanese Red Army, 12 Jawad, Rana, 77, 82 Jerusalem, 3 Jewish community center in Argentina, bombing on, 10 Jewish cultural center, Argentina, 16 Jewish immigration to Palestine, 30 Jihad al-Binaa, 79 Jihad Assembly, 6 Jihadi, 12 Jordan, 32 Judaism, 3 Judicial Assembly, 6 Jumblatt, Walid, 100, 108, 158 Jumhuriyya Islamiyya, 104 Karbala Paradigm, 119–21 Kramer, Martin, 49 Kataeb Party, 89, 90 Katyusha rockets, 16; attacks, 63 Khomeini, Ahmad, 118 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 4, 8, 29, 34, 74, 116 Khomeini, Ruhollah Musawi, 103, 119, 122 Khomeinist model, 103 Kidnappings, 9 Koran, 5, 103 Laden, Osama Bin, 23 Lamloum, Olfa, 69 Lebanese Communist Party, 54, 87

198

Index

Lebanese Democratic Party, 89, 90 Lebanese Forces Party, 89–90 Lebanese-International tribunal, 101 Lebanon, 3–4; Civil War, 4, 32, 43, 48–49, 50, 66, 91; confessional system, 43; domestic construction, 114; electoral system, 90, 95; hostage crisis, 140; political milieu, 86–92; political processes, 42; political system, 25, 31, 32, 36, 89; psyches, 114; Shiite community, 49 Levitt, Matthew, 10, 53, 64 Liberal Party, 90 Madrassas (Islamic colleges), 77 Mafia-style shakedowns, 10 Mahdi, 8 Mahdi Scouts, 80 Majlis al Shura, 4 Majoritarian electoral system, 25 Manifestos, 96–97 Mantams, 74–75 Marada Movement, 90 Marada party, 89 Marginalization, 3, 24, 31, 76 Marja’ al-taqlid, 118 Maronites, 30, 31 Maronite Solidarity Party, 89 Martyrs Association, 74 Marxists, 12 Matams, 74–75 Media strategy, 68–70 Medical care, 6 Meier, Daniel, 75, 82 Meshaal, Khaled, 138 Middle East, 3–4; Western influence, 22 Mikati government, 109 Militant mobilization, 33; grievances, 33 Militant Sunni groups, 64 Military: activities, 41; capacity, 7; prowess, 43; wing, 9, 17 Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), 124 Missiles, 45 Mitwali, 8 Mobilization, 21, 22, 25–26 Moderation, 41 Modus vivendi, 94 Moharram, 117

MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security), 124 Mojtaheds, 117 Moral disengagement, 17, 21, 152 Mostakberin, 120 Mostazafin, 120, 122 Mount Lebanon, 31 Mughniyah, Imad, 34–35, 62, 63 Mujtamaa al-muqawama, 74 Murr Bloc, 90 Musgrave, Nina, 20 Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), 9, 29, 76 Muslim militancy, 24 Mussawi, Abbas, 63 Mussawi, Sayyad, 35 Mustad’afiin, 117 Nahr el-Bared, 107 Naim, Bassem, 141 Najaf-Qom network, 34 Nasrallah, Sayyid Hassan, 5–6, 34, 51, 59, 70, 76, 101, 132 Nationalist terrorism, 11 National Lebanese Resistance Front, 9 “Nature Reserve” of Maroun al-Ras, 56 Netherlands, 17 New Left Wave, 12 9/11 attacks, 17, 66 Northern Ireland, 24, 25–26 Northern Irish peace process, 27 Obama, Barack, 10, 17 Operation Accountability, 50 Operation Grapes of Wrath, Israel, 50 Operation Protective Edge, 62 Ordnance and impact, 55 Orthodox Gathering electoral law, 109 Ottoman Empire, 3, 30 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 4, 9, 30, 32, 52 Palestinian al-Nakba, 30 Palestinian Fatah-PLO, 19 Palestinian-Israeli peace process, 52, 66 Palestinian refugees, 30, 52 Palestinians, military support, 52–53 Pan-Arab Islamic transnational identity, 149 Pan-Arab nationalism, 30 Parliamentary Assembly, 6

Index Party of God. See Hezbollah Pearson, Frederic, 105 PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), 4, 9, 30, 32, 52 Political assassinations, 95, 102 Political Assembly, 6 Political violence, 16, 17, 21, 22. See also Terrorism Population control and legitimacy, 82–83 Poverty, 23 Powell, Baden, Lord, 80 Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), 108 Pro-Hariri coalition, 115 Propaganda, 85–86 Pro-Palestinian protesters, 19 Proxy attacks, 58 Qaddafi, Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar, 35 Qard al Hassan loan program, 83 Qassem, Sheikh Naim, 46, 48, 60, 159 Qazuim, 117 Quds Force, 124, 125 Rafsanjani, Akbar Hashemi, 118 Rag-tag military organization, 48 Raising funds, 84, 85 Rappaport waves of terrorism, 11–12 Recruitment, Bekaa Valley, 7 Red Army Faction (RAF), West German, 12, 23 Red Crescent ambulances, 125 Regency of the Jurist, 117 Relative deprivation theory: defined, 23–24 Religious radicalism, 49 Religious wave, 12 Representatives and protectors, 99–102 Resistance identity, 41, 74, 82, 148–49; ideology, 41–43 Resistance orientation, 86 Resistance society, 74, 80, 82, 86, 110 Resource mobilization, 22; and social space, 37–39; theory, 25–26 Revenue-raising activities, 84 Rif Dimashq strike, 58 Riyadh, 128, 142, 148 Rocket arsenal, 68 RPG-7, 44

199

Sacred public meetings, 74–75 Sadr, 35 Safavid dynasty, 8 Salaam, Tammam (prime minister), 110 Salamey, Imad, 105 Saudi Arabia, 115 Saudi-Qatari relationship, 143 Sectarian Lebanese political system, 30 Secularization, 9, 29 Security Zone, Israel, 50, 51 Self-defined ideology, 13 Self-determination, 12 Serbian Black Hand, 11 Sermons of Fadlallah, 5 Service ministries, 106 Sheba’a Farms border zone, 10 Sheba’a Farms region, 58, 60 Sheikh network, 34–35, 36, 38, 39 Shi’a Muslims, 3, 4; and Hezbollah, 29; history of, 28; identity and grievances, 28–33; mobilization, 33; Syrian politics, 29. See also Sunni Muslims Shi’a thought, 118–19, 121–23 Shiism, 8, 22, 29 Sinn Fein, 18 Smuggling weapons, 61 Social actions in Lebanon, 74 Social and economic services, 6–7 Social and political change, 25 Social Democratic Hunchakian Party, 90 Socialization process, 111 Social movements: defined, 22–23; emergence of, 23 Social network, 22, 34–36 Social services, 79 Solidarity Party, 89, 90 South Africa, 10 South Lebanese Army (SLA), 51 Sovereign ministries, 106 Soviet bloc technologies, 44 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 12 Special Security Apparatus (SSA), 124 State terrorists, 16 “State within a state,” 74, 106 St Michael’s Church, 96 Succariyeh, Elwalid, 91 Suicide bombers, 44 Suicide bombing, 1; UN Multinational Forces, 9; U.S. army barracks, 9, 16; U.S. embassy, 9, 16

200

Index

Sunni Muslims, 3, 4, 29, 31, 70, 87, 89; Caliphate, 8. See also Shi’a Muslims Sunni-Shi’a divide, 10, 36 Sunni terrorism: eruption, 12 Surface–surface rockets, 59 Syria, 30; SCUD missiles to Hezbollah, 126; weapon supplies, 126 Syrian Civil War, 10, 43, 52, 57, 71 Syrian conflict, 134 Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, 87, 89, 90 Tahdirat, 7 Taif Accords, 43, 48, 91, 92, 97, 100 Taklif al-shari, 104 Tashnag, 89, 90 Tatbir, 120 Tehran, 113, 115, 124, 125, 126, 127, 142 Tel Aviv, 64 Terrorism: defined, 14, 15, 16; history, 11–14; political violence as, 16; poverty and, 23; waves of, 11–14 Terrorist phase, 49–50 Terrorists, 14–18 Tit-for-tat murders, 83

Transactionalism, 82 2006 War (Hezbollah and Israel), 53–57 Umma, 7, 8, 118, 121, 122 United Kingdom, 17 Urbanization, 33 Veleyat-e faqih, 103, 117, 118, 122, 161 Versailles Treaty (1919), 11 Vietnam War, 12 Village defence units, 56 Violence against civilians, 17 Violent confrontation, 60 Weapon shipments, 124–25 Weapons, provisions, 124–26 Wilayat al-Faqih, 7, 8, 29 Women’s role, 81 Youth and women’s wings, 80–82 Zafra-Davis, Pola, 11 Zionists, 42, 63; movement, 30; threat, 58 Zur, Barak Ben, 48

About the Authors

JAMES WORRALL, Ph.D., is a lecturer in International Relations and Middle East Studies in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds. He specializes in Levantine and Gulf Politics, Counterinsurgency, and the role of international organizations in the Middle East and beyond. His published works include Statebuilding and Counterinsurgency in Oman: Political, Military and Diplomatic Relations at the End of Empire and International Institutions of the Middle East: The GCC, Arab League, and Arab Maghreb Union. He holds a doctorate in International Relations from the University of Leeds. SIMON MABON, Ph.D., is a lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics, Philosophy, and Religion at the University of Lancaster; Director of the Richardson Institute; and a research associate at the Foreign Policy Centre in London. He works on the nexus of sovereignty, religion, and political violence. His published works include Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East and Terrorism and Political Violence. He holds a doctorate in international relations from the University of Leeds. GORDON CLUBB, Ph.D., is a lecturer in International Security at the University of Leeds. He specializes in disengagement from violence, preventing terrorism, and conflict transformation. His published works include an edited volume on Terrorism and Political Violence and an upcoming monograph on the Deradicalising Terrorism Movements: Irish Republicanism and the Decline of Armed Struggle.