Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy: The Idea of Planning in Western Europe, 1914–1940 [1st ed.] 9783030425333, 9783030425340

Citation preview

Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy The Idea of Planning in Western Europe, 1914–1940

Tommaso Milani

Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements Series Editors Stefan Berger Institute for Social Movements Ruhr University Bochum Bochum, Germany Holger Nehring Contemporary European History University of Stirling Stirling, UK

Around the world, social movements have become legitimate, yet contested, actors in local, national and global politics and civil society, yet we still know relatively little about their longer histories and the trajectories of their development. This series seeks to promote innovative historical research on the history of social movements in the modern period since around 1750. We bring together conceptually-informed studies that analyse labour movements, new social movements and other forms of protest from early modernity to the present. We conceive of ‘social movements’ in the broadest possible sense, encompassing social formations that lie between formal organisations and mere protest events. We also offer a home for studies that systematically explore the political, social, economic and cultural conditions in which social movements can emerge. We are especially interested in transnational and global perspectives on the history of social movements, and in studies that engage critically and creatively with political, social and sociological theories in order to make historically grounded arguments about social movements. This new series seeks to offer innovative historical work on social movements, while also helping to historicise the concept of ‘social movement’. It hopes to revitalise the conversation between historians and historical sociologists in analysing what Charles Tilly has called the ‘dynamics of contention’. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14580

Tommaso Milani

Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy The Idea of Planning in Western Europe, 1914–1940

Tommaso Milani Oxford, UK

Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements ISBN 978-3-030-42533-3    ISBN 978-3-030-42534-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Amsab-Institute of Social History, Ghent This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Series Editors’ Preface

Around the world, social movements have become legitimate, yet contested, actors in local, national and global politics and civil society, yet we still know relatively little about their longer histories and the trajectories of their development. Our series reacts to what can be described as a recent boom in the history of social movements. We can observe a development from the crisis of labour history in the 1980s to the boom in research on social movements in the 2000s. The rise of historical interests in the development of civil society and the role of strong civil societies as well as nongovernmental organisations in stabilising democratically constituted polities has strengthened the interest in social movements as a constituent element of civil societies. In different parts of the world, social movements continue to have a strong influence on contemporary politics. In Latin America, trade unions, labour parties and various left-of-centre civil society organisations have succeeded in supporting left-of-centre governments. In Europe, peace movements, ecological movements and alliances intent on campaigning against poverty and racial discrimination and discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation have been able to set important political agendas for decades. In other parts of the world, including Africa, India and South East Asia, social movements have played a significant role in various forms of community building and community politics. The contemporary political relevance of social movements has undoubtedly contributed to a growing historical interest in the topic. Contemporary historians are not only beginning to historicise these relatively recent political developments, they are also trying to relate them v

vi 

SERIES EDITORS’ PREFACE

to a longer history of social movements, including traditional labour organisations, such as working-class parties and trade unions. In the longue durée, we recognise that social movements are by no means a recent phenomenon and are not even an exclusively modern phenomenon, although we realise that the onset of modernity emanating from Europe and North America across the wider world from the eighteenth century onwards marks an important departure point for the development of civil societies and social movements. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the dominance of national history over all other forms of history writing led to a thorough nationalisation of the historical sciences. Hence social movements have been examined traditionally within the framework of the nation state. Only during the last two decades have historians begun to question the validity of such methodological nationalism and to explore the development of social movements in comparative, connective and transnational perspective taking into account processes of transfer, reception and adaptation. Whilst our book series does not preclude work that is still being carried out within national frameworks (for, clearly, there is a place for such studies, given the historical importance of the nation state in history), it hopes to encourage comparative and transnational histories on social movements. At the same time as historians have begun to research the history of those movements, a range of social theorists, from Jürgen Habermas to Pierre Bourdieu and from Slavoj Žižek to Alain Badiou as well as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to Miguel Abensour, to name but a few, have attempted to provide philosophical-cum-theoretical frameworks in which to place and contextualise the development of social movements. History has arguably been the most empirical of all the social and human sciences, but it will be necessary for historians to explore further to what extent these social theories can be helpful in guiding and framing the empirical work of the historian in making sense of the historical development of social movements. Hence the current series is also hoping to make a contribution to the ongoing dialogue between social theory and the history of social movements. This series seeks to promote innovative historical research on the history of social movements in the modern period since around 1750. We bring together conceptually-informed studies that analyse labour movements, new social movements and other forms of protest from early modernity to the present. With this series, we seek to revive, within the context of historiographical developments since the 1970s, a conversation

  SERIES EDITORS’ PREFACE 

vii

between historians on the one hand and sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists on the other. Unlike most of the concepts and theories developed by social scientists, we do not see social movements as directly linked, a priori, to processes of social and cultural change and therefore do not adhere to a view that distinguishes between old (labour) and new (middle-class) social movements. Instead, we want to establish the concept ‘social movement’ as a heuristic device that allows historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to investigate social and political protests in novel settings. Our aim is to historicise notions of social and political activism in order to highlight different notions of political and social protest on both left and right. Hence, we conceive of ‘social movements’ in the broadest possible sense, encompassing social formations that lie between formal organisations and mere protest events. But we also include processes of social and cultural change more generally in our understanding of social movements: this goes back to nineteenth-century understandings of ‘social movement’ as processes of social and cultural change more generally. We also offer a home for studies that systematically explore the political, social, economic and cultural conditions in which social movements can emerge. We are especially interested in transnational and global perspectives on the history of social movements, and in studies that engage critically and creatively with political, social and sociological theories in order to make historically grounded arguments about social movements. In short, this series seeks to offer innovative historical work on social movements, while also helping to historicise the concept of ‘social movement’. It also hopes to revitalise the conversation between historians and historical sociologists in analysing what Charles Tilly has called the ‘dynamics of contention’. Tommaso Milani’s Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy: The Idea of Planning in Western Europe, 1914–1940 concerns the relationship between labour movement activism, ideology and governmental policy in a transnational European context. It provides a fascinating insight into the history of socialism, social thought and economic planning from the First World War to the Second World War. The Belgian De Man (1885–1953) was one of the leading socialist thinkers in interwar Europe before becoming a ‘wartime advisor of the King and proponent of de facto collaboration with the German authorities’ (Martin Conway, The Sorrows of Belgium, 2012, 180). De Man had always been a bit of an intellectual maverick, sharing openly antisemitic ideas in his memoirs and being in close contact with the conservative life reformer and publisher Eugen Diederichs.

viii 

SERIES EDITORS’ PREFACE

This book provides an innovative comparatively-informed history of continuities and changes in socialist and social-democratic thinking and policy-making from the era of the two worlds wars into the Cold War. It makes a novel and highly original contribution to a field that has not received much attention since Gerd-Rainer Horn’s 1996 standard work on European Socialists Respond to Fascism, Zeev Sternhell’s monograph on the intellectual origins of fascism in France as well as Martin Conway’s landmark publications on Belgium during and after the Second World War and on anti-European aspects of Europeanisation. Most current histories of post-1945 European history stress a consensus around a model of planning and welfare state intervention that characterised the reconstruction of Western Europe from the ashes of the Second World War. Tony Judt in particular has emphasised the social democratic nature of that reconstruction, highlighting the ways in which social democrats gradually left ideological debates behind and focused on pragmatic policy making. Milani’s book is an excellent case study that demonstrates why we should not take this interpretation for granted and historicise the ideas on which it was based. Focusing on de Man, but always aware of the French, British and German contexts, Milani brings out the multiple strands of socialism in interwar Europe and situates the development of de Man’s thoughts within these. In particular, he emphasises how the seeming ‘end of ideology’ that the American sociologist Daniel Bell diagnosed in 1960 was a response to ‘the exhaustion of a pre-existing revolutionary paradigm’ within West European social democracy and ‘explains much of its seemingly post-ideological character in the late 1950s’. Milani tells the story of Hendrik de Man’s intellectual biography from 1914 to 1940 as one in which the connections between Marxism and social democracy became undone—and how de Man played a key role in this undoing. Essentially disowning previous generations of theorists, among them his old mentor Karl Kautsky, de Man worked on providing the foundations for social democracy’s ideological renewal, which he saw as the only way to ensure its survival. The context was the crushing of the standard bearer of European social democracy, the German SPD, under National Socialism. With de Man’s move back to Belgium in 1933 following the Reichstag fire, the small country thus became an ideological laboratory for what could be done. Domestically, de Man promised that his party would take over substantial parts of the private sector. The intention was to stimulate demand through this ‘planism’. Internationally, this

  Series Editors’ Preface 

ix

approach to planning received significant attention as it appeared to offer a way to attract the suffering middle classes during the Great Depression. The book outlines the emerging debate between planners and anti-planners, which replaced the old cleavage between radicals and reformers, and how much resistance de Man’s ideas faced. From 1940, within Hitler’s New Order, de Man developed ‘a self-styled authoritarian socialism’. This signalled his final break with the social democratic movement. This book—neither a classic biography nor a standard intellectual history—traces de Man’s ideas as much in more formal academic writings as in his journalistic work. It highlights the interconnections between de Man as an activist-thinker and what political scientists would call a ‘norm entrepreneur’, and the ways in which the reception of his ideas was embedded in a specific political-social context. Fundamentally, this book also provides a significant contribution to the historicising notions of ‘democracy’ in European history. Bochum, Germany Stirling, UK

Stefan Berger Holger Nehring

Acknowledgements

This book could not have been written without the help, encouragement, and criticism of a great many people. The project began as a doctoral dissertation at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), where my supervisors, Professors Heather Jones and N.  Piers Ludlow, offered invaluable guidance and relentless support. I benefited enormously from their expertise, advice, and good humour. Other faculty members of the International History Department—Professor David Stevenson, Professor Sönke Neitzel, Professor Alan Sked, and Dr Antony Best—read various chapters of my thesis and provided excellent feedback. Countless conversations and exchanges within and outside Britain helped give the book its final shape. Alessandra Bitumi, Luc-André Brunet, Professor Patricia Clavin, Ettore Costa, Professor Mario Del Pero, Michele Di Donato, Vesselin Dimitrov, Geneviève Duchenne, Professor Geoff Eley, Steven Forti, Mathieu Fulla, Benjamin Heckscher, Alessandro Iandolo, Anders G. Kjøstvedt, Daniël Knegt, Daniel Laqua, Sara Lorenzini, Dirk Luyten, Michele Mioni, Professor Janet Polasky, Professor David Priestland, Nicolas Roussellier, Alessandro Salvador, Hagen Schulz-­ Forberg, Bruno Settis, Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins, Iain Stewart, Jan Stöckmann, Jan Willem Stutje, and Professor Geert Van Goethem must be credited for their insightful comments and suggestions. Five academics deserve a special mention. Professor Mark F. Gilbert sparked my interest in economic planning long time ago and urged me to keep a strong focus on it ever since. Professor Gerd-Rainer Horn was my advisor at Sciences Po Paris, in 2015–2016 and supported me in many ways, including by tracking down some hard-to-find sources. As examiners of my PhD, xi

xii 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Professors Julian Jackson and Marc Lazar gave input which I did my best to incorporate in the final version of the manuscript. Last but not least, Professor Martin Conway welcomed me as stipendiary lecturer at Balliol College, University of Oxford, in 2018–2019 and allowed me to take advantage of his unparalleled knowledge of Belgian history despite being on leave. My research benefited from generous funding from the LSE and owed much to the assistance from many librarians and archivists across Europe. I am especially grateful to the staff of the Amsab-Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis in Ghent; the Institut Emile Vandervelde, the CegeSoma, and the Algemeen Rijksarchief in Brussels; the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine in Nanterre; and the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis in Amsterdam, not to mention that of the LSE library, one of the best places in the world to dive into the history of the interwar Left. The Vereniging voor de Studie van het werk van Hendrik de Man kindly provided me with its publications as well as with several internal inventories and working documents. Among the many friends and colleagues who made this journey more exciting and less lonely I must cite my LSE fellows—Alex, Alexandre, Artemis, Bastiaan, Cees, Corina, David, Eline, Errikos, Giovanni, Grace, Hamish, Ian, Jonas, Judith, Max, Pete, Taka, and Will; the Balliol history team—Helen, John-Paul, Mark, Martin, Róisín, and Simon; and my close companions at King’s College London, Benedetta and Matia. Back in Italy, Giovanni, Lorenzo, and Luca have been caring as always. Finally, I must thank my parents, who backed me up from afar, and Irene. My gratitude to her cannot be expressed in words, and to her this book is dedicated. Reims, January 2020

Contents

1 Introduction: A Man and a Movement  1 2 Flawed Giant: European Social Democracy Before 1914 17 3 Shockwaves: Hendrik de Man and the Legacy of the Great War 43 4 Turning the Old House Upside Down: Hendrik de Man and Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus 69 5 Breakthrough: Hendrik de Man and the Genesis of the Plan 99 6 Fire and Ashes: The Fight for the Labour Plan in Belgium125 7 Clash of Visions: The Belgian Labour Plan in France153 8 Roads Not Taken: The Belgian Labour Plan in Britain185 9 Delusions of Grandeur: Hendrik de Man in Power213

xiii

xiv 

Contents

10 Conclusion: Hendrik de Man and Post-War Social Democracy243 Bibliography257 Index323

Abbreviations

BBT BES BNB CCEO CGT CS CSC FCC GGD IFSYPO IFTU ILO ILP ISB ISO IWA JGS LP LSI NFRB OREC PCF POB PSB PSdF PSI PSU

Banque Belge du Travail, Belgium Bureau d’Études Sociales, Belgium Banque Nationale de Belgique, Belgium Centre Confédéral d’Éducation Ouvrière, France Confédération Générale du Travail, France Commission Syndicale, Belgium Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens, Belgium Fédération des Cercles Catholiques, Belgium Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands, Germany International Federation of Socialist Young People’s Organizations International Federation of Trade Unions International Labour Organisation Independent Labour Party, United Kingdom International Socialist Bureau Institut Supérieur Ouvrier, France International Workingmen’s Association Jeunes Gardes Socialistes, Belgium Labour Party, United Kingdom Labour and Socialist International New Fabian Research Bureau, United Kingdom Office de Redressement Économique, Belgium Parti Communiste Français, France Parti Ouvrier Belge, Belgium Parti Socialiste Belge, Belgium Parti Socialiste de France, France Partito Socialista Italiano, Italy Partito Socialista Unitario, Italy xv

xvi 

ABBREVIATIONS

SDAP SDAPDÖ SFIO SL SPD SSIP TUC USR VPOD

Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij, The Netherlands Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, Austria Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière, France The Socialist League, United Kingdom Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland, Germany Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, United Kingdom Trade Union Congress, United Kingdom Union Socialiste Républicaine, France Schweizerischer Verband des Personals öffentlicher Dienste, Switzerland

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: A Man and a Movement

“The beautiful years of the Plan”: this is how, in his memoirs, the civil servant, social democratic politician, and President of the European Commission Jacques Delors recalled his time working for the Social Affairs division at France’s Commissariat Général au Plan, between 1962 and 1969.1 Paying a heartfelt tribute to “la planification à la française,” Delors sang the praises of the “uncertainty reducer” by which his country successfully allocated scarce resources without neglecting the “great parameters” such as demography, technological innovation, and the environment.2 Post-war planning, Delors contended, established a “privileged framework for the social dialogue” between various interest groups and relied on the “work of intellectuals” to promote “modernisation,” “growth,” and “more harmonious development.”3 Delors was outspoken in his belief that this method of governance had not outlived its usefulness.4 Yet, when the book came out in 2004, his message did not resonate with progressives. Under Tony Blair, the claim that “the old Left solution of rigid economic planning and state control won’t work” had become the cornerstone of New Labour.5 In the United  Jacques Delors, Mémoires (Paris: Plon, 2004), 48.  Ibid., 71. 3  Ibid., 71–72. 4  Ibid., 72–73. 5  Tony Blair, “Power for a Purpose,” Renewal, 3, no. 4 (1995): 11. 1 2

© The Author(s) 2020 T. Milani, Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0_1

1

2 

T. MILANI

States, Bill Clinton toasted the end of the “era of big government.”6 Gerhard Schroeder in Germany and Lionel Jospin in France also embarked on a market-oriented course: as a distinguished historian of socialism observed in 1999, “all social democratic parties now concede that there are limits to the expansion of public expenditure, and that the era of nationalisation is over. Privatisation has become acceptable, even desirable.”7 It is no accident that, when the increasingly peripheral and enfeebled Commissariat was shut down in 2006, neither side of the aisle in the National Assembly raised objections. Three or four decades earlier, the mood could not have been more different. Between 1945 and the mid-1970s, all major parties in Europe were broadly supportive of the mixed economy, that is, an economic regime in which public authorities exerted decisive influence over the economic system, also by means of controlled enterprises, and maintained high levels of employment through aggregate demand management.8 Coordination within this multi-layered structure was ensured through planning, a concept which—as one critic wrote in 1950—had “seized the imagination” of the Europeans with unprecedented “speed and thoroughness.”9 Widespread acceptance of public regulation permeated politics. Although the term “consensus” might exaggerate the degree of convergence between Left and Right,10 it remains true that, for the first time in history, a range of forces representing almost the entire political spectrum accorded the state a pivotal role in constraining and steering—but not replacing— the market. As a result, the assertion that “the Welfare State, combined with full employment and high earnings, had added to the freedom of the

6  Cited in David Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 210. 7  Donald Sassoon, “Introduction: Convergence, Continuity, and Change on the European Left,” in The New European Left, ed. Gavin Kelly (London: The Fabian Society, 1999), 9. See also Donald Sassoon, “Introduction,” in Looking Left: Socialism after the Cold War, ed. Donald Sassoon (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 1–16. 8  See Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London-New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 66–67. 9  Richard Law, Return from Utopia (London: Faber and Faber, 1950), 68. 10  See, with reference to Britain, Ben Pimlott, “The Myth of Consensus,” in The Making of Britain: Echoes of Greatness, ed. Lesley M. Smith (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 129–141; The Myth of Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945–64, eds. Harriet Jones and Michael D. Kandiah (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996).

1  INTRODUCTION: A MAN AND A MOVEMENT 

3

citizen” was no longer anathema to most conservatives11; the argument that the coexistence of capitalism and democracy was possible, albeit in a “state of antagonistic balance,” rang true to most social democrats.12 The French sociologist Raymond Aron noted in 1966 that “the political systems of the advanced Western nations” had turned into “an acceptable compromise between the characteristic values of the three schools of liberalism, democracy, and socialism,” and because of the “success” of that compromise “ideological conflicts in the West” had petered out.13 The post-war settlement needed moderation, a desire to find common ground, and a high degree of self-discipline by political parties, trade unions, and other social actors to endure. It also required the consolidation of a distinct political culture—that is to say, a set of core values and ideas which bestowed legitimacy on its basic institutions. According to the eminent historian Tony Judt, these were provided by social democracy, namely the Western European centre-left. Social democrats maintained that “genuine improvements in the conditions of all classes could be obtained in incremental and peaceful ways” and therefore rejected “the nineteenth-century paradigm of violent urban upheaval.”14 Likewise, they distanced themselves from the communists as they refused “to commit to the inevitability of capitalism’s imminent demise or to the wisdom of hastening that demise by their own political actions.”15 Their mission was to use “the state to eliminate the social pathologies attendant on capitalist forms of production and the unrestricted workings of a market economy: to build not economic utopias but good societies.”16 Social democrats did not excel in theorising but developed a highly effective brand of politics through which civil, political, and social rights were expanded as never before: the essence of their piecemeal approach lay in “the banality of good.”17 11  One Nation Group, The Responsible Society (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1959), 34. 12  John Strachey, Contemporary Capitalism (London: Gollancz, 1956), 255. 13  Raymond Aron, “Fin des idéologies, renaissance des idées,” in Trois essais sur l’âge industriel (Paris: Plon, 1966), 198–199. 14  Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 363. 15  Ibidem. 16  Ibidem. 17  See Tony Judt and Timothy Snyder, Thinking the Twentieth Century (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012), 331–388.

4 

T. MILANI

Judt was right in stressing social democracy’s landmark but often forgotten contribution to the post-war order. His account, however, has two weaknesses. Firstly, it must be noted that Christian democracy deserves at least as much credit for shoring up stability in Western Europe after 1945.18 Secondly, Judt omitted to say that social democratic wisdom, imbued with common sense and animated by a desire to fix, instead of dismantling, capitalism, was not the expression of a coherent worldview; rather, it was the by-product of a hesitant, excruciating, and sometimes silent emancipation from an overriding, and once dominant, system of thought: Marxism.19 Only by breaking free from the Marxist ideological straightjacket social democracy could pledge unconditional allegiance to the mixed economy. The Godesberg programme approved by German Social Democrats in 1959, which included both the repudiation of the class struggle and a commitment not to seize all the means of productions, was emblematic of a wider Western European trend in this direction.20 The fact that—with the exception of Britain and, to an extent, the Nordic countries—centre-left pragmatism grew out of the exhaustion of a pre-existing revolutionary paradigm is not a minor detail in the tortuous development of social democracy and explains much of its seemingly 18   See Martin Conway, “The Rise and Fall of Western Europe’s Democratic Age, 1945–1973,” Contemporary European History 13, no. 2 (2004), 67–88; Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945 eds. Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser (London-New York: Routledge, 2004). For a recent reassessment of post-war consensus as cemented by social democratic and Christian democratic anti-fascism, see Dan Stone, Goodbye to All That? The Story of Europe since 1945 (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 19  In fact, Judt’s genealogy of social democracy severely downplays its Marxist roots in favour of liberals such as Keynes and Beveridge [see Judt, Thinking, 333–334; Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land (London: Allen Lane, 2010), 41–80]. Judt’s otherwise masterful portrait of Léon Blum equally underrates the strength of Marxism in France. According to Judt, Blum was not “a Marxist thinker” but did “pay frequent lip service to the unimpeachably Marxist character of their theory and practice. […] Marxism was for Blum always an elective affinity not a way of thought” [Tony Judt, The Burden of Responsibility: Blum, Camus, Aron, and the French Twentieth Century (Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 52–53]. Even assuming Judt is right, one is left wondering why a highly influential leader as Blum would have professed faith in an ideology he did not believe in, had it not been for the persistence of Marxism as the dominant political culture within his party. 20  See Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000 (OxfordNew York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 314–320; Jan-Werner Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 125–132.

1  INTRODUCTION: A MAN AND A MOVEMENT 

5

post-ideological character in the late 1950s.21 At least from the 1880s till the outbreak of the Second World War, the lingering problem of how to cope with Marx’s legacy drew conspicuous energies from nearly all believers in socialism, intellectuals, and political leaders alike. For Marxism was not only the ideological cement of the various factions which had founded the Second International: it was also, in its popular, most basic form, a Weltanschauung, and the rock-solid belief of millions of people who had espoused the socialist cause. It would not be an exaggeration to say that other than a theory of society, Marxism was a secular religion, with its rites, its dogmas, and its clergy.22 The crystallisation of Marxism into a stiff set of propositions presented as articles of faith to the masses that occurred largely after Marx’s death is the key reason why its critique became a delicate and potentially dangerous task. Dissent could put what Leszek Kolakowski called “the spiritual certainty” of the labour movement in jeopardy, and erode the trust that workers placed in their representatives, that is, trade unions and parties.23 Intellectuals began fearing that revisions might be carried out in erratic, destructive, or polarising ways, and increasingly perceived themselves as guardians of the orthodoxy. Fulminating against Bolshevism in 1931, the then 77-year old high priest of German Marxism, Karl Kautsky, candidly admitted: “If Lenin is right, then my whole life’s work devoted to the propagation, application, and further development of the ideas of my great masters, Marx and Engels, has been in vain.”24 This was hardly an overstatement: perhaps more than anyone else, Kautsky had contributed to forging the nearly hegemonic Marxist doctrine—the one disseminated by the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)—and set strict 21  Daniel Bell famously wrote about “the exhaustion of Utopia” with regard to post-war American socialism: see Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Political Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Glencoe: Frees Press, 1960), 263–275. 22  Former communist Milorad M. Drachkovitch held that “the energetic force of Marxism” lay in the “alloy of rational, scientific elements and preconceived ideas of religious character” [Milorad M.  Drachkovitch, De Karl Marx à Léon Blum: la crise de la social-démocratie (Geneva: Droz, 1954), 18]. It may be worth stressing that this popular Marxism was based on a highly selective and often distorted reading of Marx’s work, and had been often tailored on the needs of social democratic parties: see Gareth Stedman Jones, Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion (London: Allen Lane, 2016), 1–5, 564–568, 589–595. 23  Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution. Vol. III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 526. 24  Karl Kautsky, “Preface,” in Bolshevism at a Deadlock (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931), 16. This preface is not included in the original German edition.

6 

T. MILANI

l­imits to the degree of ideological nonconformity that social democratic élites would tolerate. Welding Marxism (the ideology) and social democracy (the movement) together was one of his greatest accomplishments. This book deals—if one pursues the analogy with religion further— with an apostasy and a heresy, for which a single individual, Hendrik de Man, must be held responsible. Once steeped in the SPD tradition, de Man left Marxism at the outset of the First World War and, building on that departure, lay down new philosophical and psychological foundations for socialism. In fact, de Man spent much of his life trying to unravel the threads of social democracy and Marxism, hence undoing what the previous generation of theorists, including his former mentor Kautsky, had worked so hard to achieve. Overcoming Marxism, at least in its dogmatic, mechanistic, late nineteenth-century incarnation, became de Man’s most pressing concern throughout the 1920s as he believed that only a profound ideological renewal would ensure the survival of social democracy. Yet, crucially, his challenge was not to remain confined to the realm of ideas: amidst the Great Depression, de Man’s apostasy (his break with Marxism) fed a whole heresy (planism) which he fostered and greatly contributed to spreading. Profiting from his established reputation as an intellectual and his first-hand analysis of recent developments in Germany, de Man moved back to Belgium, his home country, in 1933, where, on behalf of the Parti Ouvrier Belge (POB), he masterminded the campaign for a Labour Plan of his own making aimed at addressing the economic crisis. In taking up the task of revamping a party which had run out of steam, de Man had grand ambitions. Domestically, his pledge to take control over significant parts of the private sector to stimulate demand and curb unemployment energised militants and guaranteed a short-lived yet critical moment of unity within the POB. Internationally, the emphasis he placed on specific sets of nationalisations and other structural reforms broke an impasse for it appeared that, by deploying a realistic but offensive strategy, social democracy could gain traction among the economically deprived middle classes. With the once-venerated SPD in ruins and fascism on the rise, de Man’s project quickly came under the spotlight: between the summer of 1933 and the early months of 1935, the most salient cleavage within Western European social democracy no longer ran between radicals and reformists but between advocates and detractors of Labour Plans, that is to say between planists and anti-planists. However, as the book goes on to show, planism as well as de Man’s leadership did not live up to the expectations raised. The reasons for this

1  INTRODUCTION: A MAN AND A MOVEMENT 

7

failure will be discussed in detail; however, a key factor can be anticipated here, namely the degree of resistance from within Western European social democracy that de Man and his acolytes faced. Much of this opposition stemmed from a genuine fear that de Man had gone too far, and his tendency to get into uncharted waters might eventually play into the hands of anti-socialist forces. The very boldness of planism alienated figures such as Emile Vandervelde, who had initially encouraged de Man, and Léon Blum, who wrestled with several planist factions operating in France. By no means, however, is this explanation exhaustive. As the British reception of the Belgian Labour Plan examined in this book indicates, even a political environment in which the attachment to Marxism did not run deep was not ipso facto favourable to de Man’s ideas: other factors such as specific socio-economic conditions, cultural and linguistic barriers, and different strategic priorities by parties and trade unions could easily hamper the launching of a national Labour Plan. Moreover, de Man’s involvement in Belgian politics forced him to compromise on matters that severely damaged his credibility abroad. From mid-1935 onwards, having agreed to serve in a tripartite government together with Catholics and Liberals, he could no longer cast himself as an outsider, hence undercutting the appeal of planism among those who were looking for a stark alternative to the status quo. The final part of the book covers the still heavily under-researched topic of de Man’s governmental record and estrangement from his party. His endeavours to fulfil the planist promise through coalition politics left him frustrated and embittered, eventually shattering his faith in liberal democracy. Coupled with his neutralism in foreign affairs, de Man’s longing for an authoritarian turn by which he hoped to curb the influence of big business over politics informed his hurried call for cooperation with the Nazi occupying forces soon after Belgium surrendered in June 1940. One of the most fateful consequences of his attempt to carve out a niche for his new, self-styled authoritarian socialism within Hitler’s New Order was de Man’s complete loss of influence over Western European social democracy. From that moment on, the man and the movement went down different paths. The purpose and the limits of this study must be clearly stressed. This is neither an exhaustive biography of de Man nor a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Western European social democracy between the two world wars. It focuses instead on the intersection and subsequent entanglement of de Man’s life and thinking with the trajectory of Western

8 

T. MILANI

European social democracy between, roughly speaking, the July Crisis of 1914 and the Belgian defeat of 1940. In terms of coverage, the implications of this choice are quite far-reaching. To begin with, greater prominence will be given to those writings by de Man which had direct, significant, and documented influence on the politics of other social democratic individuals or groups; hence, for instance, more space will be devoted to his journalistic commentary on the crisis of Weimar or to his editorials for the Belgian party-controlled newspaper Le Peuple than to his ground-breaking academic investigation of “joy in work” as the former were widely circulated among the social democratic rank and file whereas the latter was not. Secondly, little attention will be paid to de Man’s influence outside social democracy, even though a growing body of literature has revealed the existence of a relatively rich and multi-faceted response to his writings well beyond the social democratic milieu.25 Thirdly, in order to evaluate how social democracy reacted to de Man’s ideas and political undertakings, the discussion of several individual receptions of de Man’s writings during the 1920s, when their impact was mainly theoretical, will be complemented with a scrutiny of how social democratic parties in Belgium, France, and Britain engaged with the de Man’s Labour Plan, whose repercussions were eminently political. By doing so, the book will highlight strong links between de Man’s efforts to overcome Marxism, his voluntarism, and his determination to set up a mixed economy during the Great Depression. However, despite aiming to provide a deeper, more nuanced, archival-based understanding of planism as a transnational European phenomenon, this work does not purport to be a conclusive account as more work is required to further trace national, regional, and sub-regional variants of planist ideology and practices, moving beyond the case studies featured here. More generally, this study looks at Western Europe, and might be supplemented by additional research on Central and Eastern Europe, at least with reference to the reception of de Man’s thought. The structure of the book reflects this effort to contextualise de Man’s actions, underlining the manifold ways in which he contributed to reshaping the intellectual and political movement—social democracy—he belonged to. 25  On de Man’s influence on and relationship with European non-conformists and personalists, see, for example, John Hellman, Emmanuel Mounier and the New Catholic Left, 1930–1950 (Toronto-London: University of Toronto Press, 1981), passim.

1  INTRODUCTION: A MAN AND A MOVEMENT 

9

Chapter 2 charts the evolution of Western European social democracy between the 1870s and 1914, highlighting its theoretical foundations and pointing to its key weaknesses. The chapter insists on the unresolved tensions between social democratic theory and practice on the eve of the First World War, such as the survival of a revolutionary mythology, the persistence of anti-statist rhetoric, and a propensity to understand the proletariat as an international unitary actor, in spite of the major cultural, social, and economic transformations that had occurred since the death of Marx. Chapter 3 introduces de Man and accounts for his ideological evolution throughout and immediately after the First World War. This chapter spells out the originality of de Man’s war experience and his peculiar assessment of the consequences of the war, which put him at odds with other left-­ wing figures who chose to fight. Chapter 4 is centred on de Man’s magnum opus first published in 1926, Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus, which laid down a comprehensive critique of Marxism. This chapter shows how that book upset distinguished social democratic leaders such as Emile Vandervelde and Karl Kautsky and yet was highly commended by young intellectuals and activists, based in different Western European countries, who sympathised with de Man’s rather harsh assessment of the realities of social democracy. Chapter 5 investigates the emergence of the idea of the Plan in de Man’s writings and speeches between 1930 and 1934, in reaction to the rise of Hitler and the unfolding of the Great Depression. This chapter shows how de Man successfully merged a variety of elements and themes from disparate sources into an original synthesis aimed at transcending both reformism and revolutionary socialism, hence giving social democracy a more radical yet unitary purpose. Chapter 6 deals with de Man’s drafting of the Belgian Labour Plan and his initiatives aimed at spreading planism, both in Belgium and abroad, between 1933 and mid-1935. This chapter explores the opposition that the campaign for the Belgian Labour Plan faced, both within and outside the Belgian Labour Party (LP), and how these difficulties played into de Man’s decision to drop demands for an integral implementation of his Plan. Chapter 7 analyses the reception of the Belgian Labour Plan in France. This chapter focuses on three competing groups—the neo-socialists, the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) planists, and the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) planists—and how their separate calls for a French Labour Plan failed to win over the leadership of the

10 

T. MILANI

main social democratic party, first and foremost due to Léon Blum’s concern with party unity and resolve to marginalise them. Chapter 8 examines the reception of the Belgian Labour Plan in Britain. This chapter documents how, despite the growth of a British variant of planism and some interest in the Belgian experience, the most influential left-wing pressure group of the time, the Socialist League (SL), chose to champion a more radical platform than de Man’s. Chapter 9 brings de Man to the fore once again and discusses his record as minister and politician between May 1935 and June 1940. The chapter argues that de Man’s disillusionment with the parliamentary system, fuelled by his limited achievements in government, was a major factor in pulling him towards collaboration with the Nazi occupying forces. The conclusion evaluates the long-term impact of de Man’s ideas on post-1945 social democracy, addressing the issue of whether post-war planning somewhat vindicated his original vision. Before moving forward, some terminological clarifications are needed to avoid confusion. In this book, “social democracy” defines the transnational movement composed of parties and trade unions affiliated with the Second International (SI, 1889–1916), the Labour and Socialist International (LSI, 1923–1940), and the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU, 1919–1945) respectively, that is the pre-communist and non-communist wing of the international socialist movement.26 “Social democrat” is used to categorise a member/supporter of social democracy whereas “Social Democrat” applies to a member/supporter of a social democratic party featuring “social democracy” in its name (e.g. the German, the Austrian, or the Dutch one). The word “Left” encompasses social democracy, communism, as well as other minor forces (e.g. anarchists). This choice is neither unproblematic nor uncontroversial. Following some highly regarded scholars, one could use “socialism” to identify the global movement whose origins date back to the first half of the nineteenth century which, following the Bolshevik revolution, split into social democracy and communism.27 Nevertheless, for the purposes  This is because, in the period discussed, the structures of social democratic parties largely overlapped with the labour movement: in some countries, unionised workers automatically became party members. As Adam Przeworski put it, “social democracy has been the prevalent manner of organization of workers under democratic capitalism” [Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1]. 27  See, for example, G.D.H.  Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, 5 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1953–1960); Carl Landauer, European Socialism: A History of Ideas and Movements, 2 vols. (Berkeley-London: University of California Press, 1959). 26

1  INTRODUCTION: A MAN AND A MOVEMENT 

11

of this study, this would complicate things further as “socialism” tended to be used by many thinkers of the interwar years (de Man included) to characterise both an intellectual orientation and a political movement. Moreover, the term “social democracy” is loose enough to lump together more and less ideologically driven actors, including parties and trade unions whose attachment to socialism varied sensibly from country to country. Finally, dating the birth of “social democracy” to 1917 would imply that self-identified “Social Democratic” parties already active in the late nineteenth century could not claim that title, their own names notwithstanding. For all these reasons, the term “socialism” will be deliberately circumscribed to the intellectual/ideological sphere: hence the book will refer to “socialist” ideas but “social democratic” organisations. By the same token, social democracy will be presented as a single force until 1917, when the communists, that is, those who embraced the Soviet model based on the dictatorship of the proletariat, and traditional social democrats, or democratic socialists, that is, those who wanted to build socialism through peaceful, albeit not necessarily reformist, means, parted ways.28 * * * The fundamental assumption on which this book rests is that, between 1914 and 1940, de Man agreed with the essential goals, values, and methods of social democracy, no matter how profound the disagreement between him and other members of the movement on specific issues, and must therefore be regarded as a social democrat.29 This might sound obvious to anyone having first-hand knowledge of de Man’s writings and political record in this period, and indeed the fact that even his social democratic critics, including Kautsky and Vandervelde, never questioned his allegiance to socialism at that time should not pass unnoticed. 28  For a similar classification, see Stefan Berger, “Democracy and Social Democracy,” European History Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2002): 13–37. 29  A practitioner of the socialism of the West, as one of his followers put it, namely a believer in a democratic, pluralistic, and humanitarian form of socialism incompatible with the Bolshevism: see Léo Moulin, Socialism of the West: An Attempt to Lay the Foundations of a New Socialist Humanism (London: Gollancz, 1948), 102. In the same vein, Raymond Aron once depicted de Man as “the only theorist of democratic socialism between the wars” [Raymond Aron, “Post-scriptum to ‘Au delà du marxisme,’” Contrepoint, no. 16 (1975), 166].

12 

T. MILANI

Nevertheless, the claims of the historian Zeev Sternhell, according to whom de Man “had developed a political ideology that that in all respects was already fascist” long before the Second World War and his involvement in collaboration was “merely the outcome of a process that had been in operation for nearly twenty years,” must be briefly discussed for they enjoyed wide circulation and, at least within the Anglophone world, received little criticism.30 To begin with, describing de Man’s collaborationist turn as a straightforward conversion to fascism is utterly simplistic, as scholars of Belgian history have repeatedly observed.31 Sternhell’s attempt to interpret de Man’s trajectory as a one-directional, foreordained march from socialism to fascism is even less convincing and rests upon disputable methodological foundations. As Jacques Julliard pointed out, Sternhell’s approach implies not only the “identity of the individual over time,” as if de Man in 1940 were fundamentally the same person he was in 1920, but also a heavily teleological reading of his life, casting every phase in his career as “a step, an inevitable move” towards the “final alignment with Nazism.”32 Furthermore, only by deliberately overlooking the context within which the ideas of de Man, as well as those of other intellectuals, emerged, Sternhell could fabricate an artificial, and fundamentally a-historical, universe dominated by ideal-types: he therefore turned “fascism” into an all-­ encompassing category embracing very different experiences and patterns of thought.33 But these are neither the only nor perhaps the most serious 30  Zeev Sternhell, Ni droite ni gauche: l’idéologie fasciste en France (Paris: Seuil, 1983): 38. For Sternhell’s interpretation of planism as a fascist, or proto-fascist, ideology, see ibid., 136–159, 206–233. Sternhell equally portrayed de Man as a fascist in Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Asheri, Naissance de l’idéologie fasciste (Paris: Fayard, 1989), esp. 329–333. For an example of how Sternhell’s views were uncritically incorporated into the historiography on fascism, see Richard Griffiths, “Fascism and the Planned Economy: ‘NeoSocialism’ and ‘Planisme’ in France and Belgium in the 1930s,” Science & Society 69, no. 4 (2005): 580–593. 31  As José Gotovitch and Cécile Vanderpelen put it, presenting de Man’s position as “an unconditional endorsement” of Nazi principles is “definitely unfair (sans aucun doute abusif)” [José Gotovitch and Cécile Vanderpelen, “Fascisme, autorité, identité: valeurs des intellectuels francophones et flamands dans la collaboration,” in Les intellectuels et l’Occupation, 1940–1944: Collaborer, partir, résister, eds. Albrecht Betz and Stefan Martens (Paris: Autrement, 2004), 281]. 32  Jacques Julliard, “Sur un fascisme imaginaire: à propos d’un livre de Zeev Sternhell,” Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations 39, no. 4 (1984): 852. 33  See Serge Berstein, “Un bien étrange approche de l’histoire,” and Michel Winock, “Les limites de l’idéalisme historique,” in Fascisme français? La controverse, eds. Serge Berstein

1  INTRODUCTION: A MAN AND A MOVEMENT 

13

weaknesses in Sternhell’s books: his reliance on highly selective quotations from de Man’s writings, up to the point of distorting their original meaning, indeed casts doubts on the accuracy of his findings.34 Sternhell deserves huge credit for having shown how the anti-­ materialistic revision of Marxism fed into discourses rejecting conventional distinctions between Left and Right.35 Nevertheless, the author of this book maintains that tackling de Man’s relationship with social democracy allows for a much deeper and more meaningful appreciation of his real impact for it was on the culture and politics of democratic socialism that de Man left his most enduring mark.36 In fact, de Man’s ups and downs provide unique insights into the tribulations of Western European social democracy during the interwar period, as the latter painfully navigated between tradition and innovation without finding a balance between these conflicting aspirations. * * * Carrying out this project required me to draw on an extensive set of sources, whose main features can only be briefly summarised here. The papers of Hendrik de Man located in Amsterdam, Ghent, and Brussels are essential to grasp de Man’s thinking, life, and personality between 1914 and 1940. Unsurprisingly, these gold mines attracted the attention of several scholars in the past, whose path-breaking research

and Michel Winock (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2014), 17–32 and 33–52 respectively. The book features essays written by twelve historians who take issue with various aspects of Sternhell’s scholarship. 34  For some examples, see Michel Brélaz, Un fascisme imaginaire (Grand-Lancy-Geneva: Éditions des Antipodes, 2000), esp. 51–84. 35  For a sophisticated study of the French case, see Olivier Dard, Le rendez-vous manqué des relèves des années 30 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2002). 36  This is not to deny that de Man was read and sometimes commended by figures from the anti-liberal Right, such as Thierry Maulnier, who felt in tune with some aspects of his thought but objected to others: see, for example, Thierry Maulnier, Mythes socialistes (Paris: Gallimard, 1936), 169–170. Under Vichy, institutions like the Uriage School included some works of de Man in their libraries but it remains unclear whether this was a consequence of de Man’s collaboration or of his pre-war influence. On Uriage, see John Hellman, Knight-Monks of Vichy France: Uriage, 1940–1945 (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), esp. 149–159.

14 

T. MILANI

resulted in no less than five biographies of “the Father of the Plan.”37 I sought to cast new light on the subject by shifting the focus from de Man as an individual to the repercussions of de Man’s thought and actions, relying whenever possible on newly available or underused collections and giving close consideration to the reception of de Man’s ideas in countries and groups which have been hitherto neglected, most notably Britain and the Labour Left. In doing this, I was immensely helped by the opening of the Archief van Belgische Werkliedenpartij, inaccessible until 1990, which greatly enhanced my understanding of the relationship between de Man and the POB. Incidentally, these sources enabled me not to take de Man’s claims from his three memoirs at face value.38 Whilst these books are still indispensable reading, de Man’s statements—especially those about his political experience and clashes with his party—have been carefully vetted as the author was certainly not insensitive to the implications of publishing, and repeatedly editing, his recollections.39 For the same reason, autobiographies of people who knew de Man personally have been used but approached with an equally critical eye.40 Tracing the spread of de Man’s 37  See Peter Dodge, Beyond Marxism: The Works and Faith of Hendrik de Man (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966); Mieke Claeys-Van Haegendoren, Hendrik de Man: een biografie (Antwerp: De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1972); Michel Brélaz, Henri de Man: une autre idée du socialisme (Geneva; Éditions des Antipodes, 1985); Andreas Gatzemann, Hendrik de Man (1885–1953): sein Leben und Werk aus Sicht heutiger Wertediskussionen (Vienna: Novum Pro, 2009); Jan Willem Stutje, Hendrik de Man: Een man met een plan (Kalmthout: Uitgeverij Polis, 2018). 38  See Henri de Man, Après coup: mémoires (Brussels: Éditions de la Toison d’Or, 1941); Henri de Man, Cavalier seul: quarante-cinq années de socialisme européen (Genève: Les Éditions du Cheval Ailé, 1948); Hendrik de Man, Gegen den Strom: Memoiren eines europäischen Sozialisten (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1953). The importance of a careful handling of these sources is stressed by Stutje’s recent biography. 39  Stanley Pearson called these books “exercises in self-justification” [Stanley Pierson, Leaving Marxism: Studies in the Dissolution of an Ideology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 32]. This may be especially true for Après coup, which appeared in 1941 and was heralded by the collaborationist press as “the most virulent condemnation of the ancient regime which led our unlucky country to defeat” [Léon Sabeau, “Confiance en l’idée,” Gazette de Charleroi, September 15, 1941]. Archival evidence corroborates some, but not all, de Man’s remarks in that book. 40  See in particular, in chronological order, Pierre Daye, Trente-deux mois chez les députés (Bruxelles: Voila, 1942); Raymond de Becker, Le livre des vivants et des morts (Brussels: Éditions de la Toison d’Or, 1942); Raoul Van Overstraeten, Albert I-Léopold III, vingt ans de politique militaire belge, 1920–1940 (Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer, 1946); Robert Capelle, Au service du Roi, 2 vols. (Brussels: Dessart, 1949); Léon Degrelle, La cohue de 1940

1  INTRODUCTION: A MAN AND A MOVEMENT 

15

ideas led me to examine hundreds of books and journals related to Western European social democracy that appeared between 1914 and 1945 ca. In addition, the private papers of about thirty Western European intellectuals and politicians, the official accounts of party congresses and party-related organisations, a vast amount of Belgian propaganda, and a selection of Belgian, French, British, Dutch, German, Austrian, and Italian newspapers published between 1910 and 1940 enabled me to better gauge de Man’s public persona. The body of scholarship on which this book rests is too ample and diverse to be properly discussed in this introduction. Nonetheless, three types of secondary sources have been particularly useful to me and must be cited here. Firstly, unpublished dissertations delving into specific aspects of de Man’s thought and career allowed me to get to the grips with issues that are neglected or scantily treated elsewhere.41 Secondly, works addressing planism from a comparative or transnational perspective have been a

(Lausanne: Crausaz, 1950); Henri Carton de Wiart, Souvenirs politiques, 2 vols. (Brussels: La Renaissance du Livre, 1981), Philip Van Isacker, Tussen Staat en Volk: Nagelaten memoires (Antwerp: Sheed en Ward, 1953); Achille Delattre, Souvenirs (Cuesmes: Impricoop, 1957); Raoul Van Overstraeten, Au service de la Belgique. Vol. I: Dans l’étau (Paris: Plon, 1960); Marcel-Henri Jaspar, Souvenirs sans retouche (Paris: Fayard, 1968); Paul-Henri Spaak, Combats inachevés, 2 vols. (Paris: Fayard, 1969); Edgard Delvo, De mens wikt: Terugblik op een wisselvallig leven (Antwerp: De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1978); Isabelle Blume, Entretiens, ed. José Gotovitch (Brussels: Fondation Joseph Jacquemotte, 1976); Robert Poulet, Ce n’est pas une vie (Paris: Denoël, 1976); Edgard Delvo, Democratie in Stormtij: Democratisch socialisme in de crisisjaren dertig (Antwerp: De Nederlandsche Boekehandel, 1983); Jef Rens, Rencontres avec le siècle: une vie au service de la justice sociale (Gembloux: Ducoulot, 1987); Gaston Eyskens, De Memoires (Lannoo: Tielt, 1993); Max-Léo Gérard, Souvenirs pour mes enfants (Brussels: Palais des Académies, 2012). 41  See in particular Monique Biart-Gosset, Le POB et l’adoption du Plan du Travail (décembre 1933): Étude des structures et des mécanismes de décision au sein d’un parti politique (PhD thesis: Université Catholique de Louvain, 1974); Frank Eelens, De Propaganda voor en de Reakties op Het Plan van den Arbeid (dec. 1933-1 mei 1935) (PhD thesis: Rijksuniversiteit Gent, 1976); Johnny Anthoons, Hendrik de Man en zijn opvattingen over de parlementaire democratie (PhD thesis: Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, 1985); Christophe Sente, L’évolution intellectuelle de Henri de Man du début du siècle à la crise des années 20 (Dissertation: Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1988–89); Frederik Verleden, “Een minister in hemdsmouwen”: Hendrik de Man als minister, maart 1935-maart 1938 (PhD thesis: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2002).

16 

T. MILANI

constant source of methodological inspiration.42 Thirdly, the bulletins and the proceedings of the conferences and colloquia held by the Vereniging voor de Studie van het werk van Hendrik de Man provided me with essential guidance and robust foundational knowledge in the early stages of this project.43

42  For a comparative approach, see Mario Telò, Le New Deal européen: la pensée et la politique sociales-démocrates face à la crise des années trente (Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1988); Sheri Berman, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Steven Philip Kramer, “Néo-socialism: the Belgian Case,” Res Publica 18, no. 1 (1976): 59–80; Michel Brélaz, “Henri de Man et le néo-socialisme belge,” Res Publica 18, no. 2 (1976): 251–266. For a transnational approach, see Erik Hansen, “Decade Crisis: Social Democracy and Planisme in Belgium and the Netherlands, 1929–1939,” Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 2 (1981): 293–322; Michel Dreyfus, L’Europe des socialistes (Paris: Complexe, 1991); Dan S.  White, Lost Comrades: Socialists of the Front Generation, 1918–1945 (CambridgeLondon: Harvard University Press, 1992); Gerd-Rainer Horn, European Socialists Respond to Fascism: Ideology, Activism and Contingency in the 1930s (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Gilles Vergnon, Les gauches européennes après la victoire nazie: entre planisme et unité d’action, 1933–1934 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997). 43  The Association issued thirty-eight bulletins and the proceedings of fourteen colloquia between 1973 and 2013. The proceedings of the international conference in Geneva from which the Association originated appeared as VV.AA., “Sur l’œuvre d’Henri de Man: rapports au Colloque International organisé par la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Genève, les 18, 19 et 20 juin 1973, sous la présidence du professeur Ivo Rens,” Revue européenne des sciences sociales: Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto 12, no. 31 (1974); Actes du colloque international sur l’œuvre d’Henri de Man: organisé par la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Genève les 18, 19 et 20 juin 1973, sous la présidence du professeur Ivo Rens, 3 vols. (Geneva: Faculté de droit de l’Université de Genève, 1974). The Association also contributed to a revival of studies on de Man by reissuing his main works in Flemish: see Hendrik Man, Persoon en ideeën, 6 vols. (Antwerp: Standaard, 1974–1976).

CHAPTER 2

Flawed Giant: European Social Democracy Before 1914

In The Economic Consequences of the Peace, John Maynard Keynes famously portrayed the period 1870–1914 as an “economic Eldorado” for Europe, an age of unprecedented food availability, fast capital accumulation, and increasing purchasing power.1 Without denying the “low standard of comfort” experienced by many, Keynes held that most people were, “to all appearances, reasonably contented” with their condition—besides, he argued, “escape was possible for any man of capacity or character at all exceeding the average into the middle and upper classes,” whose “conveniences, comforts, and amenities” were “beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs” of the past.2 For all his criticism of the naïve optimism of Victorian liberals, Keynes too maintained that the Belle Époque had boosted social mobility. In fact, class divisions lay at the heart of European societies for inherited money erected barriers that individual initiative could rarely overcome.3 With hindsight, the Austro-Hungarian-­ born writer Stefan Zweig observed, much more accurately, that the “golden age of security” he believed he had lived in before the First World 1  John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London: Macmillan, 1920), 8. 2  Ibid., 9. 3  See, for example, Hartmut Kaelble, Social Mobility in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Europe and America in Comparative Perspective (Leamington: Berg, 1985), 12–13, 121–126; Andrew Miles, Social Mobility in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth Century England (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).

© The Author(s) 2020 T. Milani, Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0_2

17

18 

T. MILANI

War was but “a dream castle” protected by the privileged status of his parents: “they were wealthy people, who had become rich gradually, even very rich, and that filled the crevices of wall and window in those times.”4 It remains true, however, that the economic landscape of Europe had changed remarkably during the forty-four years pinned down by Keynes. Estimates suggest that per capita growth was higher than in the period 1820–1870 (1.22–0.86), largely due to technological innovation and the industrial take-off in Germany and, to a lesser extent, France. On average, Europe’s GDP grew 2.15% per annum. The development of the steel and chemical industry, the diffusion of electricity, new discoveries in the field of combustion engines, the extension of railways as well as further improvements in communication systems increased output levels and generated better economies of scale.5 The cumulative results of these transformations stood in stark contrast to the “unusually and visibly archaic” earlier phase of industrialism.6 In broad terms, Continental countries—the latecomers—began to catch up with Britain, whose predominance in the financial sector was nonetheless undisputed.7

4  Stefan Zweig, Die Welt von Gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1941), 8, 12. 5  See Albert Carreras and Camilla Josephson, “Aggregate Growth: 1870–1914: Growing at the Production Frontier,” in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe. Vol. II: From 1870 to the Present, eds. Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’ Rourke (CambridgeNew York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 34, 36. On Germany’s and France’s economic performances, see Alan S. Milward and Samuel Berrick Saul, The Development of the Economies of Continental Europe, 1850–1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), 17–70, 71–141; Maurice Lévy-Leboyer and Michel Lescure, “France” and Richard Tilly, “Germany,” in Patterns of European Industrialization: The Nineteenth Century, eds. Richard Sylla and Gianni Toniolo (London-New York: Routledge, 1991), 153–174 and 175–196 respectively. Thoughtful essays on technological progress can be found in Technology in Western Civilization. Vol. I: The Emergence of Modern Industrial Society: Earliest Times to 1900, eds. Melvin Kranzberg and Carroll W. Pursell, Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 563–726. For an excellent overview, see David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 231–358. 6  Eric J.  Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: An Economic History of Britain since 1750 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), 144. 7  See Sidney Pollard, Britain’s Prime and Britain’s Decline: The British Economy, 1870–1914 (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), 260–271; P. L. Cottrell, “Great Britain,” in International Banking, 1870–1914, eds. Rondo Cameron and Valeriı̆ Ivanovich Bovykin (New YorkOxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 25–47.

2  FLAWED GIANT: EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1914 

19

The main consequences of this expansion of production were the increase in the overall population and a further shift towards urbanisation. Between 1870 and 1913, Europe moved from 314 to 471 million inhabitants, close to a third of the world’s population.8 Greater London’s residents jumped from less than 4 million to more than 7 million; Paris’ and Berlin’s rose to over 4 and 3.7 million respectively, a process by which capitals absorbed neighbourhoods and turned into megacities.9 By the same token, the share of workers employed in agriculture declined everywhere, although regional differences persisted. In North-­ Western Europe (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), it dropped from 31.7% to 20.9%; in Southern Europe (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) from 58.6% to 49.3%; in Central and Eastern Europe (Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, Romania, Russia, Serbia, and Switzerland) from 56.6% to 54.9%, with Germany and Switzerland experiencing the greatest reductions.10 In general, productivity was higher in manufacturing than in agriculture; industrialisation, therefore, resulted in an increase of the national income. Uneven growth rates throughout Europe, however, had political repercussions as they swayed the balance of power. The impressive economic performance of the German Reich, which displaced France as the most powerful Continental economy, did much to undermine the stability of the international system.11 Industrialisation had social and psychological implications too. As Eugen Weber wrote, “isolation [of countryside] made for ignorance, indifference, for rumors that spread like wildfire in contrast to the 8  See Carol Leonard and Jonas Ljungberg, “Population and Living Standards, 1870–1914,” in The Cambridge Economic History. Vol. II, 109; Matthew Smith Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe: 1815–1914 (London-New York: Routledge, 2013), 128–132. 9  See Jean-Louis Robert, “Paris, London, Berlin on the Eve of the War,” in Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914–1919, eds. Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert (New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 25–26; Andrew Lees and Lynn Hollen Lees, Cities and the Making of Modern Europe, 1750–1914 (New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 136. 10  Stephen Broadberry, Giovanni Federico and Alexander Klein, “Sectoral developments, 1870–1914,” in The Cambridge Economic History. Vol. II, 61. 11  See Milward and Saul, The Development of the Economies of Continental Europe, 17–21, 515–518; Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914 (LondonAtlantic Heights: The Ashfield Press, 1987), 464–465. For a comparative analysis of the economic strength of the great powers, see William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 180–186.

20 

T. MILANI

stubbornly low assimilation of current events” but “it also made for local solidarity, which was reinforced for mutual aid—a practice that may have arisen out of sheer necessity in the absence of other alternatives but that had generally become ritualized by tradition.”12 The physical concentration of workers in huge, increasingly mechanised factories deprived them of the safety nets entrenched in the rural order and exposed them to new forms of discipline and social control. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sociologists Ferdinand Tönnies, Emile Durkheim, and Georg Simmel all pointed to the different forms of solidarity that existed within agrarian and industrial societies, the latter being much more individualistic and anomic.13 It is no accident that trade unions swelled their ranks in reaction to the disintegration of the cultural environment of the pre-industrial era, becoming not only useful tools to champion workers’ rights, especially in times of plummeting prices, but also self-conscious institutions, based on a common culture, shared values, and specific structures of feeling. Some of the largest organisations—the German Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands (GGD) and the French Confédération Général du Travail (CGT)—were set up between 1890 and 1900, and quickly gathered hundreds of thousands of adherents. In 1913, unionised workers in France were around 1 million, almost 3 million in Germany while Britain, the country with the oldest tradition of working-class organisation, still dominated the rankings with more than 4 million.14 Overall, trade unionism was ideologically heterogeneous and often driven by practical concerns. In most European countries, trade union 12  Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 43–44. 13  See, for example, Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie (Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1922), 3–7; Emile Durkheim, De la division du travail social: étude sur l’organisation des sociétés supérieures (Paris: Alcan, 1893), 142–147, 189–197, 375–385; Georg Simmel, “Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben,” in Die Großstadt. Vorträge und Aufsätze zur Städteausstellung, ed. Theodor Petermann (Dresden: Zahn & Jänsch, 1903), 185–206. 14  See James C.  Docherty and Sjaak van der Velden, Historical Dictionary of Organized Labor (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2012), 336. For an overview, see The Formation of Labour Movements: An International Perspective, 1870–1914, eds. Marcel van der Linden and Jürgen Rojahn (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990). On the “disintegration of the cultural environment,” see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 157; on “structure of feeling,” see Edward Palmer Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Gollancz, 1965), 194.

2  FLAWED GIANT: EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1914 

21

leaders developed a relatively pragmatic attitude towards industrial disputes and restrained the more radical rank and file.15 Nevertheless, workers increasingly embraced a political doctrine that the ruling class, especially after the Paris Commune of 1871, tended to view as subversive: socialism. Not every worker became a convert, of course, and opposition to socialism among industrial workers was not negligible.16 Still, the link between mass industrialisation and the growth of socialism was a strong one. Socialism turned into a mass movement because its advocates identified the working class, broadly defined, as the fundamental agency of political change and got backing from wide segments of it. Although socialist ideas circulated before the second half of the nineteenth century, it was only under the socio-economic conditions of the industrial age that they spread widely enough to become politically influential.17 By 1914, social democratic parties polling between 15% and 35% existed in all Western European countries, with the notable exceptions of Britain and the Netherlands.18 This chapter sets out to investigate the theoretical foundations of Western European social democracy between 1870 and 1914. First, it sketches out its ideology, orthodox Marxism, namely a crude and simplified version of Karl Marx’s thought that emerged in Germany and penetrated most of Western Europe. Second, it discusses three weaknesses of that ideology: its failure to gain a foothold in Britain, where the working 15  Evidence is mixed but insightful remarks about their moderating role can be found in Eric J. Hobsbawm, “The ‘New Unionism’ in Perspective,” in Workers: Worlds of Labor (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 152–175; Frank Broeze, “Militancy and Pragmatism: An International Perspective on Maritime Labour, 1870–1914,” International Review of Social History 36, no. 2 (1991): 165–200. 16  See Luisa Riva Sanseverino, Il movimento sindacale cristiano dal 1850 al 1939 (Rome: Cesare Zuffi Editore, 1950), 15–264; Michael Schneider, Die christlichen Gewerkschaften, 1894–1933 (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1982), 51–362. By 1890, the French Syndicat des Employés du Commerce et de l’Industrie was openly anti-socialist [see T. B. Caldwell, “The Syndicat des Employés du Commerce et de l’Industrie (1887–1919): A Pioneer French Catholic Trade Union of White-Collar Workers,” International Review of Social History 11, no. 2 (1966): 228–266]. 17  For further discussion, see Sassoon, One Hundred Years, 7; Eric J. Hobsbawm, “The Making of the Working Class, 1870–1914,” in Workers: Worlds of Labor, 194–213. The word “socialism” was probably used for the first time in the British journal Co-Operative Magazine in 1827 [see Max Beer, A History of British Socialism. Vol. I (London: G.  Bell & Sons, 1929), 187]. 18  See Sassoon, One Hundred Years, 10. For membership figures, see William Edgar Paterson and Alastair Hugh Thomas, Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 432.

22 

T. MILANI

class was especially numerous; its ambiguity in setting the limits of a fruitful, albeit circumscribed, cooperation with the bourgeoisie; and its difficulty in adjusting to new social and political conditions, with particular reference to the arguments advanced by Eduard Bernstein and Georges Sorel. Third, it highlights three major sources of tensions between social democratic theory and practice: a reiterated commitment to a palingenetic view of the revolution coupled with a gradualist conduct aimed at getting concessions from the ruling class, an anti-statist conception of the political order at odds with policies aimed at strengthening the state, and a tendency to conceive workers as an international unitary actor despite growing difficulties in cooperating internationally and the endurance of nationalism. Finally, it outlines the ultimate paradox of social democratic parties as an organised force by 1914. This paradox can be summarised as follows: the more the social democratic movement grew in strength, the less its ideology could effectively steer its course. From this it does not follow that Marxism had become useless: quite the contrary. As a set of vivid images and inspiring words, it remained a powerful tool to mobilise the militants, and there is no doubt that both the leaders and the rank and file were emotionally attached to it; in that sense, an ideological passion within the Left, to use François Furet’s terminology, existed well before the Bolshevik revolution.19 Yet, by the very nature of orthodox Marxism, social democrats operated under theoretical constraints that made their statements increasingly untenable and their long-term expectations unrealistic. The outbreak of the Great War triggered a crisis in the socialist Weltanschauung whose roots dated back to the previous half-century. It is against this background that Hendrik de Man’s subsequent endeavours to reinvent social democracy must be understood. * * * Despite Karl Marx’s relentless efforts to shape the international labour movement, his views were not immediately and uncritically received by its members. Nor was Marxism initially regarded as a clearly defined, self-­ standing body of ideas. Rather, the concept was polemical: Mikhail Bakunin was perhaps the first to lambast his opponents by calling them “Marxist” during the 1870s, and Marx himself, half-jokingly, rejected the 19  See François Furet, Le passé d’une illusion: essai sur l’idée communiste au XXe siècle (Paris: Robert Laffont/Calmann-Lévy, 1995), 18.

2  FLAWED GIANT: EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1914 

23

label to disown some French followers in 1882.20 The dissemination of Marx’s ideas and their subsequent articulation in a rigid template enormously benefited from Engels’ activism as well as from the parallel rise of German Social Democrats. It is hard to overestimate the “immense and lasting influence” of Engels in constructing Marxism: in 1878 he authored the Anti-Dühring, whose abridged version, published two years later under the title Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft (The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science), quickly became “the most popular introduction to Marxism apart from the Manifesto.”21 It was through the systematisation made by Engels that the ideologues of the SPD, August Bebel and Karl Kautsky, managed to grasp the essence of Marx’s thinking, in which they injected a strong dose of Darwinian positivism.22 In some cases, popularisation came at the expense of quality. In France and Italy, the works of Marx and Engels were less read and known than those, often shallow and poorly written, of Paul Lafargue, Gabriel Deville, or Wilhelm Liebknecht.23 In Central and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, Kautsky’s reputation grew ­enormously, 20  See Georges Haupt, “From Marx to Marxism,” in Aspects of International Socialism, 1871–1914, (Cambridge-Paris: Cambridge University Press and Éditions de la Maison de Sciences de l’Homme, 1986), 1–22; Margaret Manale, “Aux origines du concept de ‘marxisme,’” Economie et société: Cahiers de l’ISMEA S, no. 17 (1974): 1397–1430. 21  Gareth Stedman Jones, “Ritratto di Engels,” in Storia del marxismo. Vol. I: il marxismo ai tempi di Marx, ed. Eric J. Hobsbawm (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1978), 320. See also Franco Andreucci, “La diffusione e la volgarizzazione del marxismo,” in Storia del marxismo. Vol. II: il marxismo nell’età della Seconda Internazionale, ed. Eric J. Hobsbawm (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1979), 3–58, and Engels’ own assessment in Friedrich Engels, “Introduction,” in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892), vii. 22  See Karl Kautsky, Erinnerungen und Erörterungen, ed. Benedikt Kautsky (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1960), 375–386. Some scholars even argued that a “popular substitution of Darwin for Marx” occurred among German workers during the 1880s [Alfred Kelly, Descent of Darwin; The Popularisation of Darwinism in Germany, 1860–1914 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 124]. For a more balanced assessment, see Guenther Roth, The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany: A Study in Working-Class Isolation and National Integration (Totowa: The Bedminster Press, 1963), 159–192 and Stanley Pierson, Marxist Intellectuals and the Working-Class Mentality in Germany, 1887–1912 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 60–69. 23  See Neil McInnes, “Les débuts du marxisme théorique en France et Italie (1880–1897),” Cahiers de l’Institut de science économique appliqué 102, no. 3 (1960): 5–51; Franco Andreucci, “Occasioni e veicoli della circolazione delle idee socialiste,” in Il marxismo collettivo: socialismo, marxismo e circolazione delle idee della Seconda alla Terza Internazionale (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1986), 93–131.

24 

T. MILANI

also thanks to the journal he edited, Die Neue Zeit.24 Whether Marx would have been comfortable with Engels’ and Kautsky’s arrangement of his thought remains an open question.25 For sure, they succeeded where Marx had failed: their brand of Marxism, often referred to as orthodox, became the intellectual bedrock of European social democracy, and through public and private interventions—Engels, for instance, issued detailed guidelines to German, French, Italian, and Austrian parties by mail—they had a direct and immediate impact on how social democratic politics unfolded.26 All in all, orthodox Marxism boiled down to a handful of theoretical propositions, coupled with a few prescriptions. First, a theory of knowledge: men’s consciousness is determined by the mode of production of material life. Second, a theory of historical development: the history of all hitherto existing societies is a history of class struggles; the capitalist society is a transient social order that will be destroyed by its inherent contradictions. Third, a theory of exploitation: under capitalism, wages are lower than they ought to be, for the owners of capital appropriate the surplus value generated by the workers. Fourth, a theory of pauperisation: capitalism tends to increase the misery of the workers. Fifth, a theory of concentration: the means of production fall in the hands of a continuously decreasing number of capitalists, until complete concentration is achieved and expropriation by the working class takes place. Within this framework, the main task for social democrats was to organise the working class in independent political parties, fight for reforms that would make living conditions more bearable, and develop class consciousness in preparation for the inevitable collapse of the capitalist system.27 However well-crafted, effectively propagandised, and generally effective in superseding older strands of socialism—those labelled “utopian” or “bourgeois” by Marx and Engels28—orthodox Marxism faced obstacles 24  See Gerard Haupt, “Model Party: The Role and Influence of German Social Democracy in South-East Europe,” in Aspects of International Socialism, 48–80. 25  For two conflicting views, see Maximilien Rubel, Marx critique du marxisme: essais (Paris: Payot, 1974) and Domenico Settembrini, Socialismo e rivoluzione dopo Marx (Naples: Guida, 1974), 149–154. 26  See Gary P. Steenson, After Marx, Before Lenin: Marxism and Socialist Working-Class Parties in Europe, 1884–1914 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991). 27  I drew these theses from Otto Bauer, “Die Geschichte eines Buches,” Die Neue Zeit 26, no. 1 (1908): 23–33 and, partly, from Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution. Vol. II: The Golden Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 4–6. 28  See David Leopold, “Marx, Engels and Other Socialisms,” in The Cambridge Companion to The Communist Manifesto, eds. Terrell Carver and James Farr (Cambridge: Cambridge

2  FLAWED GIANT: EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1914 

25

that hindered its advancement. To begin with, it was not universally accepted, not even in watered-down form. Most notably, the British working class showed little interest in it as in any other rejectionist ideology questioning the merits of the parliamentary system. Several factors can explain that indifference—from the fragmentation of the patterns of employment to alienation, from the persistence of communitarian loyalties to the attachment to the monarchy—including the lack of a revolutionary intellectual class.29 Virtually all British thinkers, it has been noted, “aimed not at fusing the classes but at reconciling them by rebuilding the human relations which had been destroyed by the growth of industrial, urbanised ways of living,” keeping an ethical, and even Christian, outlook at odds with Marxist materialism.30 Equally important was the emphasis on efficiency that the most authoritative left-wing circle of the 1880s–1890s, the Fabian Society, placed on its variant of socialism. Its most active members, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, were not only committed to gradualism but also steeped in an empiricist culture that soon led them to dismiss Marx’s thought as an obscure and convoluted example of German metaphysics.31 In The Fabian Essays in Socialism, published in 1889, Marx is mentioned only three times, and Engels publicly complained that “the Fabian Church of the Future” was likely to be built on economic foundations that contradicted Marx’s labour theory of value.32 When a Labour Party (LP) finally came to light, it secured an electoral agreement with the Liberals—hence pursuing a strategy that was anathema to most Continental social democrats—and pressured the Asquith government to pass major pieces of social legislation. The accomplishments of the Liberal-Labour alliance between 1906 and 1914 were substantial and possibly

University Press, 2015), 32–49. See also George Lichtheim, The Origins of Socialism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969). 29  For an overview, see Ross McKibbin, “Why Was There No Marxism in Great Britain?,” The English Historical Review 99, no. 391 (1984): 297–331; James D. Young, Socialism and the English Working Class: A History of English Labour, 1883–1939 (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), 19–35. 30  G.D.H.  Cole, A History of Socialist Thought. Vol. III, Part I (London: Macmillan, 1956), 182. 31  See, for example, Sidney Webb, “Rent, Interest & Wages: Being a Criticism of Karl Marx and a Statement of Economic Theory,” manuscript dated 1886, PP/LSE/7/1/4. 32  See Friedrich Engels, “Preface,” in Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. III, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), 100.

26 

T. MILANI

strengthened the pre-existing evolutionary inclinations of British socialism.33 From a Continental perspective, the British case was a powerful reminder that the working class’ ability to organise itself did not necessarily go hand in hand with its willingness to accept revolutionary means of struggle, as Marx himself came to acknowledge.34 Secondly, Marxism did not always set clear boundaries of acceptable political behaviour as the highly contentious issue of ministérialisme demonstrated. In principle, most social democratic leaders favoured some degree of parliamentary cooperation with bourgeois parties to improve the living standards of the workers; on the other hand, they felt that allowing individual party members to serve in bourgeois cabinets was too much to swallow for any movement with serious revolutionary credentials. In 1899, the French Independent Socialist Alexandre Millerand sparked outrage as he broke this convention and entered a Radical-led cabinet. Kautsky officially censored him, although he subtly argued that, under exceptional circumstances, participation might be acceptable as long as ministers were given a specific mandate by their party and promptly resigned in case the government took an anti-labour stance.35 Millerand used his position to achieve considerable reforms, such as the reduction of working hours and the creation of labour councils, but his insubordination made him a political outcast. Quite unfairly, millerandisme became synonymous with opportunism, and some pragmatic reformers, including the former trade unionist and future Prime Minister Aristide Briand, severed their ties with the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), the unitary socialist party founded in 1905, after the Marxist faction headed by Jules Guesde and like-minded anti-participationists gained a position of strength 33  See Duncan Tanner, Political Change and the Labour Party, 1900–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 19–78; Kenneth D. Brown, “The Labour Party and the Unemployment Question, 1906–1910,” The Historical Journal 14, no. 3 (1971): 599–616. On Labour’s confidence in the parliamentary system, see Ralph Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the Politics of Labour (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961), 17–38. 34  In 1872, Marx held that in England, America, and maybe the Netherlands the labour class could conquer “political supremacy” by peaceful means [“Minutes of the Fifth General Congress of the International Workingmen’s Association at the Hague, September 1972,” in The First International: Minutes of the Hague Congress of 1972, with related documents, ed. Hans Gerth (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), 236]. 35  On the “Millerand case,” see Leslie Derfler, Alexandre Millerand: The Socialist Years (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1977) 191–219. Kautsky’s position is effectively summarised in Massimo Salvadori, Karl Kautsky and the Socialist Revolution, 1880–1938 (London: Verso, 1990), 71–73.

2  FLAWED GIANT: EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1914 

27

within it. Even then, ideological tensions lurked beneath the surface as Guesde’s heavily materialistic and rather sectarian brand of socialism remained controversial, but thanks to the energetic campaigns that he and his followers waged throughout the 1890s and 1900s the language of class struggle was absorbed into the French social democratic mainstream and undercut the moderate wing.36 A third, even greater problem for Marxism was its difficulty in adapting to evolving historical circumstances. Kautsky insisted that Marx never aimed to develop an ossified doctrine; in practice, however, the core propositions of orthodox Marxism tended to be taken as dogmas by militants and sympathisers alike, especially the less educated ones.37 Particularly deep-seated was the confidence in the inescapable downfall of capitalism, an argument that lent socialism an aura of inevitability.38 Because of the high level of systematisation provided by Engels, Kautsky, Bebel, and other propagandists, the line between suitable adjustments and unacceptable revisions turned out to be very thin. The debate that took place in 1896–1899 between the most distinguished theoreticians of the SPD, Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein, revealed the limits of public dissent within social democracy. A former editor of the newspaper Der Sozialdemokrat and Engels’ literary executor, Bernstein had an impeccably Marxist pedigree. Furthermore, he was a party loyalist: 36  On Guesdism, see Claude Willard, Le mouvement socialiste en France (1893–1905): les guesdistes (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1965), 595–602; Robert Stuart, Marxism at Work: Ideology, Class and French Socialism during the Third Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 492–502. On Briand’s departure from the SFIO, see Daniel Müller Hofstede, Aristide Briand und der französische Sozialismus: Die Frühzeit des Politikers, 1883–1906 (Münster: Lit, 1996), 221–234. On French reformism, see Emmanuel Jousse, Les hommes révoltés: les origines intellectuelles du réformisme en France (1871–1917) (Paris: Fayard, 2017), 275–307. 37  The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci would later lament that Marxism lost “a huge part of its capacity for cultural expansion among the top layers of intellectuals” while gaining ground “among the popular masses and the lower-rate intellectuals” in the form of an “economic superstition” [Antonio Gramsci, “Quaderno 13 (XXX),” Quaderni del carcere. Vol. III: quaderni 12–29, ed. Valentino Gerratana (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1975), 1595]. 38  For Marxists, “political decision was inserted into a framework of historical change, which did not depend on political decision” [Eric J.  Hobsbawm, “Marx, Engels, and Politics,” How to Change the World: Reflections on Marx and Marxism (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2011), 86]. Sociologist Jules Monnerot once argued that Marxism encapsulated “a doctrine of sociological predestination” [Jules Monnerot, “Est-ce l’avènement du prolétariat?,” De Marx au marxisme, 1848–1948, ed. Robert Aron (Paris: Editions de Flore, 1948), 198].

28 

T. MILANI

an exiled activist during the anti-socialist repression carried out by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, he co-authored with Kautsky the SPD programme of 1891, named after the city of Erfurt, arguably the most succinct and widely circulated Marxist statement in German history.39 At that time, Bernstein still concurred with Engels and Kautsky that a revolutionary transformation of society was unavoidable. However, the realisation that the SPD, whose parliamentary seats increased steadily during the 1890s, might come to dominate the Reichstag gave him second thoughts. By 1896, he had become convinced that time was ripe for a serious theoretical revision of Marxism. To that overriding task he devoted a series of articles he started publishing in Die Neue Zeit, under the heading Probleme des Sozialismus (Problems of Socialism).40 At first, Bernstein criticised the theory of concentration and claimed that, the growth of monopoly notwithstanding, medium and small ownership was likely to survive both in industry and in agriculture. That position did not cause any uproar.41 Much more contentious was the idea, fully expressed in another piece released in January 1898, that socialism could triumph without the “great, all-embracing economic crisis” that social democrats believed would surely break out at some point as the result of “an absolute law of nature.”42 On the contrary, Bernstein suggested that a “piecemeal realisation of socialism” was possible under capitalism through a steady increase in economic regulation, the consolidation of public management, and the democratisation of local government; even more controversially, he added that “any celebratory work worthy of the name of ‘scientific socialism’ would have to examine how far the actual 39  See Vernon L. Lidtke, The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878–1890 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 129–154; Susanne Miller and Heinrich Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy from 1848 to the Present (Leamington: Berg, 1986), 38–40, 240–242. 40  On Bernstein’s trajectory, see Henry Tudor, “Introduction,” in Marxism and Social Democracy: The Revisionist Debate, 1896–1898, eds. Henry Tudor and J.  M. Tudor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 6–11. 41   See, for example, Eduard Bernstein, “Der gegenwärtige Stand der industriellen Entwicklung in Deutschland,” Die Neue Zeit 15, no. 1 (1896): 303–311; Eduard Bernstein, “Die neuere Entwicklung der Agrarverhältnisse in England,” Die Neue Zeit 15 no. 1 (1897): 772–783. 42  Eduard Bernstein, “Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie und die Revolution der Gesellschaft: 2. Die Zusammenbruchstheorie und die Kolonialpolitik,” in Die Neue Zeit 16, no. 1 (1898): 548–557, translated as “The Struggle of Social Democracy and the Social Revolution: 2. The Theory of Collapse and Colonial Policy,” in Marxism and Social Democracy, 160.

2  FLAWED GIANT: EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1914 

29

development of things has departed from the assumptions made in the Manifesto and its associated literature, as well as establish which of its forecasts have been proved correct,” thus implying that the works of Marx contained serious flaws.43 Bernstein maintained that he never intended to ditch Marxism as a whole and considered himself a Marxist for the remainder of his life, yet the doctrinal changes he advocated were profound. Most notably, he was intent upon replacing a crucial pillar of Marx’s system, the dialectic, with an evolutionary philosophy which abolished finalism: this would result in abandoning the prospect of a revolutionary transition to socialism.44 Such an onslaught could not pass under silence. Rosa Luxemburg, Georgi Plekhanov, Jean Jaurès, and Max Adler were among the many who weighed in against Bernstein, whose isolation was striking.45 Providing an extended version of his case, he softened or recanted some of his most provocative views, including one about the irrelevance of final goals for socialism, and looked for supporting evidence from Engels’ writings, a clear sign of yielding to the orthodoxy.46 That was not enough, however, to appease Kautsky, who believed that reformism, as Bernstein’s ideas became known, could succeed only in Britain and was upset by his colleague’s inclination to question Marx’s authority.47 During the Stuttgart conference of October 1898, the SPD delegates enthusiastically received Kautsky’s speech, hence shattering Bernstein’s hopes for a revision of the Erfurt programme. Bernstein’s reputation within the party never fully recovered, although his theses struck a chord with pragmatic party functionaries, members of the cooperative movement, and trade unionists.48  Ibid., 168, 165.  See Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein’s Challenge to Marx (New York: Collier, 1962), 141–165; John Reese, The Algebra of Revolution: The Dialectic and the Classical Marxist Tradition (London: Routledge, 1998), 129–135. 45  See Manfred B.  Steger, The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 151–157. Bernstein found some vocal supporters in Italy, including the former anarchist Francesco Saverio Merlino: see Enzo Santarelli, La revisione del marxismo in Italia: studi di critica storica (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1964), 29–32; Giampietro Berti, Francesco Saverio Merlino: dall’anarchismo socialista al socialismo liberale (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1993), 324–343. 46  See Eduard Bernstein, Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie (Stuttgart: Dietz, 1899), 168–88. 47   See Karl Kautsky, Bernstein und das Sozialdemokratische Programm (Stuttgart: Dietz, 1899). 48  Some scholars argued that, in practice, revisionism had the upper hand before 1914 due to the strength of self-styled reformist factions within the SPD: see, for example, Pierre 43 44

30 

T. MILANI

Bernstein’s debacle did not prevent other social democrats from expressing dissatisfaction with the deterministic trappings of orthodox Marxism. The implications of holding that an economic catastrophe was bound to happen were ambiguous. On the one hand, that position diminished the significance of parliamentary engagements, whose function could only be tactical; on the other hand, it could justify passivism while waiting for the collapse of capitalism. To a certain extent, Kautsky’s attentismus ran the risk of accommodating social democrats to parliamentary rule, a danger that other theorists were bent on avoiding.49 Hostility to fatalism and quietism informed the writings of Georges Sorel, a French engineer-turned-philosopher heavily influenced by the Germanist Charles Andler. An eclectic, lonely, self-proclaimed socialist with no party, Sorel delivered blistering attacks to dialectical materialism, which he regarded as a forgery, the arbitrary connection of “a few sentences” from Marx’s works “commented on as the evangelical texts are by theologians.”50 The author of The Communist Manifesto, Sorel boldly claimed, never formulated any law of historical development, not even the one about the inevitable collapse of capitalism: presumably he “simply wanted to give some practical advice to the revolutionaries, inducing them not to pursue dangerous endeavours and highlighting which conditions might be favourable for undertaking popular action.”51 He lauded Bernstein for having questioned Angel, Eduard Bernstein et l’évolution du socialisme allemande (Paris: Didier, 1961), 362–385. This argument is unconvincing as the Erfurt programme remained in place until 1921, was rewritten at the Görlitz Congress, then largely restored four years later. Only between 1920 and 1925 Bernstein once again played a prominent role in the SPD. 49  See Erich Matthias, “Kautsky und der Kautskyanismus. Die Funktion der Ideologie in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie vor dem ersten Weltkrieg,” Marxismus-Studien. Vol. II (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1957), 151–197; Dieter Groh, Negative Integration und revolutionärer Attentismus: die deutsche Sozialdemokratie am Vorabend des ersten Weltkrieges (Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1973). In 1893 Kautsky famously described the SPD’s relationship with the revolution as follows: “It is not our task to instigate a revolution or to clear the way for it. And since the revolution cannot be arbitrarily brought about by us, we cannot say anything whatever about when, under which conditions, or what forms it will come” [Karl Kautsky, Der Weg zur Macht: Politische Betrachtungen über das Hineinwachsen in die Revolution (Hamburg: Dubber, 1909), 53]. 50  Georges Sorel, “L’avenir socialiste des syndicats,” L’Humanité nouvelle: revue internationale 19, no. 1 (1898): 294. On Andler, see Ernest Tonnelat, Charles Andler: sa vie et son œuvre (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1937), 87–96; Emmanuel Jousse, Réviser le marxisme? D’Edouard Bernstein à Albert Thomas, 1896–1914 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007), 193–215. 51  Georges Sorel, “La necessità e il fatalismo nel marxismo,” La riforma sociale 8, no. 5 (1898): 708–732, reprinted in Giorgio Sorel, Saggi di critica del marxismo, ed. Vittorio Racca (Palermo: Sandron, 1903), 66.

2  FLAWED GIANT: EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1914 

31

the “dogma of social palingenesis,” exposing Kautsky’s alleged hypocrisy, but his instincts were far from reformist.52 According to Sorel, Marxism as a closed, all-encompassing system of thought had been fabricated by German Social Democrats to strengthen their party machine: the revisionist controversy was less about theoretical disagreements than internal factionalism, as the entire SPD was but “a workers’ organisation under the direction of vehement orators,” “an oligarchy of demagogues” manipulating the working class and stifling the trade unions.53 Sorel, who understood socialism not as doctrine but as an act—“the emancipation of the working class that organises itself, educates itself, and creates new institutions”54—developed a radical theory of direct action that he finally set out in Réflexions sur la violence (Reflections on Violence), published in 1908. In order to retrieve Marx’s original spirit and salvage socialism from philistinism and decadence, Sorel contended, a new myth was needed, “a body of images capable of evoking intuitively and as a whole, before any reflective analysis, the mass of sentiments that correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modern society.”55 That myth was the general strike, namely an abrupt insurrection carried out by the proletariat with the purpose of destroying the bourgeois state. Sorel refrained from explaining how the general strike would occur—although he was surely familiar with the activities and propaganda of La Federation des Bourses du Travail headed by the anarchist Fernand Pelloutier, one of his few friends—stressing instead its importance as a mobilising concept: thanks to it, “[s]ocialism remains ever young; attempts made to accomplish social peace seem childish; the desertions of gentrifying comrades, far from discouraging the masses, excite them even more to rebellion; in a word, the line of cleavage is never in danger of disappearing.”56 Because of its spontaneous and unrestrained nature, the general strike would then pave the way for a new society 52   Georges Sorel, “Les polémiques pour l’interprétation du marxisme: Bernstein et Kautsky,” Revue internationale de sociologie, 8 (1900): 276. 53  Georges Sorel, “Les dissensions de la socialdémocratie en Allemagne: A propos des écrits de M. Bernstein,” Revue politique et parlementaire, 25 (1900): 44. 54  Georges Sorel, “La crise du socialisme,” Revue politique et parlementaire, 18 (1898): 612. 55  Georges Sorel, Réflexions sur la violence (Paris: Rivière, 1936), 173. 56  Ibid., 193. On Pelloutier and Sorel, see Jacques Julliard, Fernand Pelloutier et les origines du syndicalisme d’action directe (Paris: Seuil, 1971), 116–168; Kenneth H. Tucker, French Revolutionary Syndicalism and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 131–158.

32 

T. MILANI

imbued with the “ethics of the producers,” a heroic, self-governing breed of workers free at last from any “democratic superstition” fuelled by “financial and political parasites.”57 Sorel’s belligerent rhetoric and apocalyptic vision could hardly appeal the labour movement. Following Pelloutier’s death in 1901, French revolutionary syndicalism lost traction and trade unionism became increasingly moderate. Until 1909, Sorel wished to convert the CGT to his ideas; when he realised that the organisation leaned towards a stable cooperation with the SFIO, he abruptly swung to the opposite extreme and sought common ground with the royalist movement Action Française.58 That choice speaks volumes of Sorel’s distaste for representative democracy and humanitarian values: in his erratic search for “primordial forces to destroy the old order and to create a new,” he would subsequently praise both Lenin and Mussolini and be heralded by Italian fascists as a mentor.59 After the publication of his Reflexions and his flirtation with the monarchists, he was no longer perceived as a respectable socialist intellectual—most of his admirers, such as the publisher Georges Valois, came indeed from the anti-­ parliamentary Right—but his eccentric itinerary proved that dispensing with the discursive framework of orthodox Marxism allowed for mingling Marx’s ideas with those of other thinkers, including critics of rationalism and scientism like Nietzsche and Bergson.60 However divergent in their conclusions, the works of Bernstein and Sorel pointed to the fact that Marxism as developed by Engels and Kautsky was fraying, providing social democracy little guidance for action. Since the 1870s, the gap between what was done and what could be said had

 Sorel, Réflexions sur la violence, 331, 340, 342.  See Frederick F.  Ridley, Revolutionary Syndicalism in France: The Direct Action of Its Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 249–255; Paul Mazgaj, The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 113–127. On the disconnection between revolutionary syndicalism and trade unionism, see Peter N. Stearns, Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor: A Cause without Rebels (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 103–107; Peter Schöttler, “‘La Commune ouvrière en formation’? Georges Sorel et les Bourses du travail,” in Georges Sorel et son temps, eds. Jacques Julliard and Shlomo Sand (Paris: Seuil, 1985), 53–73. 59  Jack J.  Roth, The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 258. On Sorel’s lasting influence, see also Isaiah Berlin, “Georges Sorel,” in Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (London: The Hogarth Press, 1979), 296–332. 60  See Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism. Vol. II, 149–154. 57 58

2  FLAWED GIANT: EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1914 

33

widened so spectacularly as to put ideology under severe strain.61 In retrospect, three major sources of tension caused by that gap can be nailed down. The first lay in reaffirming a commitment to revolution while engaging in a prolonged confrontation with the upper classes to extract concessions and expand the role of workers in public life. Obviously, as orthodox Marxists were at pains to stress, revolutionary ends and reformist means were not mutually incompatible, but in absence of a coherent, well thought-out strategy, short-term gains could easily lead to a dead end. The struggle for universal suffrage is a case in point. Equal political rights ranked among the most urgent demands of social democratic parties, and workers’ mobilisation was unquestionably effective in eliminating some of the existing restrictions: the extension of manhood suffrage in Belgium (1893), Austria-Hungary (1897 and 1907), Norway (1898), Finland (1906), Sweden (1909), and Italy (1912) took place under significant pressure from below.62 However, the increase in the number of voters had mixed consequences for social democratic parties, which made headway everywhere but, also due to the overrepresentation of rural districts, failed to win a majority of seats in any European country. Being too big to ignore representative assemblies but too small to control them, they were now stuck in an uncomfortable position and fraught with tactical d ­ ilemmas. Furthermore, social democrats soon discovered that bourgeois parties could play on deep ethnic and cultural cleavages to remain in power. Leftwing anticlericalism, for instance, led many working-class Catholics to support either a conservative Catholic Party (in Belgium) or moderate 61  Ignaz Auer, a co-founder of the SPD and deputy, famously wrote to his long-time friend Bernstein amid the revisionist controversy: “Do you think it is really possible that a party which has a literature going back fifty years, an organisation going back forty years and a still older tradition, can change its direction like this in the twinkling of an eye? For the most influential members of the party to behave as you demand would simply mean splitting the party and throwing decades of works to the winds. My dear Ede, one doesn’t formally decide to do what you ask, one doesn’t say it, one does it” [Eduard Bernstein, “Ignaz Auer der Führer, Freund und Berater,” Sozialistische Monatshefte 13, no. 5 (1907): 345–346, cited in James Joll, The Second International: 1889–1914 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1968), 93–94]. 62  See Sassoon, One Hundred Years, 20–21. General strikes were particularly important in the Belgian case: see Janet L.  Polasky, “A Revolution for Socialist Reforms: The Belgian General Strike for Universal Suffrage,” Journal of Contemporary History 27, no. 3 (1992): 449–466. For an overview on suffrage discrimination between 1850 and 1913, see Robert J.  Goldstein, Political Repression in 19th Century Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 3–33.

34 

T. MILANI

Liberal candidates who pledged to defend Catholic values (in Italy).63 Even in urban areas, where social democracy was stronger, conservative candidates were now able to exploit racial prejudices, demagoguery, and widespread populist feelings to appeal to previously disenfranchised sections of the population, as mayor Karl Lueger did in building a middleand lower-class power base in Vienna that kept him in power for thirteen years.64 But the implications of penetrating representative institutions ran deeper than that as they brought up questions about the legitimacy of the latter. Were parliaments bound to remain a bourgeois stronghold or could they, in due course, faithfully mirror the balance of power between classes, for example by adopting proportional representation? And, if so, would social democrats still be entitled to dismiss them as undemocratic? In Russia, the concessions made by the Czar in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution, which included the establishment of a multi-party assembly, widened the gulf between those, such as Julius Martov, who wanted to use legal methods, including elections, to further the socialist cause and those, like Vladimir Lenin, who regarded them as a fraud.65 In Germany, under pressure from unionists radicalised by Russian events, Bebel argued that a revolution might be necessary after an electoral victory for defensive purposes, only to protect what had been achieved through the ballot box from the immediate bourgeois reaction.66 Bebel’s was a clever attempt to have it both ways—many social democrats would reiterate his point throughout the 1920s and 1930s67—but his argument could hardly 63  See Carl Strikwerda, A House Divided: Catholics, Socialists, and Flemish Nationalists in Nineteenth-Century Belgium (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 271–282; Gabriele De Rosa, Storia del movimento cattolico in Italia. Vol. I: Dalla Restaurazione all’età giolittiana (Bari: Laterza, 1966), 551–576. 64  See John W. Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848–1897 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 316–410; John W. Boyer, Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in Power, 1897–1918 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 1–110. 65   See Israel Getzler, Martov: A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 113–117; Robert Service, Lenin: A Political Life. Vol. I (London: Macmillan, 1985), 148–151. 66  See Carl E.  Schorske, German Social Democracy, 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1955), 42–45; Ernest Schraepler, August Bebel: Sozialdemokrat im Kaiserreich (Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1966), 70–76. 67  See, for example, the party platform of Austrian social democrats approved in November 1926: Protokoll des sozialdemokratischen Parteitages 1926, abgehalten in Linz vom 30. Oktober bis 3. November 1926 (Vienna: VGA, 1926), 173–177.

2  FLAWED GIANT: EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1914 

35

exhaust the issue, already raised by Bernstein, of whether the step-by-step democratisation of the state was making revolutionary upheavals superfluous.68 The second source of tension within social democracy was the adherence to an anti-statist conception of the future socialist order while backing measures—from old-age pensions to universal access to education, from public housing to unemployment benefits—which would in fact lead to an expansion of the role of the state. Socialist anti-statism predates Marx’s writings and can be traced back to nineteenth-century anarchists. One of them, the French Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, was among the first to explicitly identify socialism properly understood, which he called “mutualism,” with a stateless society: “Whether direct or indirect, simple or compound, the government of the people will always be the deceit (escamotage) of the people.”69 For this reason, he vehemently opposed any form of centralised control over property. When, following the 1848 revolution, Republican Minister Louis Blanc stood for the nationalisation of railways and the creation of state-sponsored social workshops, Proudhon was outraged. To his mind, only the federal union of workers and families, based on the principle of voluntary association and exchange, would safeguard their dignity and independence: “no longer a state servant,” the worker would then turn into “his own master,” acting “on his own initiative and personal responsibility” and finally getting “a fair and rewarding price for his product and services.”70 Without sharing Proudhon’s sympathy for small-property holders and farmers, Marx too viewed the bourgeois state as a stumbling block on the road to the proletariat’s self-government. As he and Engels famously wrote in the Communist Manifesto, “The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie,” to be replaced by “an association 68  For two diametrically opposed cases, see Rosa Luxemburg, Sozialreform oder Revolution? (Leipzig: Verlag der Leipziger Buchdruckerei Aktiengesellschaft, 1908), 38–44; Viscount Philip Snowden, Socialism and Syndicalism (London: Collins’ Clear Type Press, 1913), 130–139. For an excellent overview, see G. D. H. Cole, A History of Socialist Thought. Vol. III, Part II, 941–976. 69  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Idée générale de la révolution au dix-neuvième siècle (Paris: Garnier Frères Libraires, 1851), 140. 70  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, De la capacité politique des classes ouvrières (Paris: Dentu, 1865), 92. On Proudhon’s anti-statism, see Robert Louis Hoffman, Revolutionary Justice: The Social and Political Theory of P.-J. Proudhon (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 168–196; K.  Steven Vincent, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 127–165.

36 

T. MILANI

(Assoziation) in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”71 Truth be told, some passages in Marx’s writings suggest a more positive role for the state, especially in the transition from capitalism to communism.72 Yet Marx’s anti-statism was subsequently underscored, and probably accentuated for practical purposes, by Engels. In the Anti-Dühring, he elucidated the relationship between socialism and the state by envisaging the dissolution of the latter under communism. Historically, Engels explained that the state had been the “official representative of the entire society, the gathering of it together (Zusammenfassung) in a visible body; but it was this only in so far as it was the state of that class which itself represented, in its time, the whole society”; with the ultimate disappearance of classes, “the state makes itself superfluous (überflüssig). As soon as there is no longer a social class to be held in subjugation […] there is nothing more to repress, and a special repressive force, a state, is no longer necessary.”73 He also contended that communism would be essentially post-political: “The government over persons is replaced by the administration of things and the management of the process of production. The state is not ‘abolished’; it withers away (er stirbt ab).”74 It seems plausible that Engels’ rather unsophisticated synthesis stemmed from the necessity of steering a middle course between anarchists like Bakunin, who never stopped claiming that Marx was a “Jacobin” longing for “political dictatorship,” and advocates of state socialism inspired by Ferdinand Lassalle, convinced that only the state could ensure the “training and development of the human race to freedom,” including the working class.75 Eventually, Engels’ position prevailed: in the following decades, anarchists were 71  Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1978), 72, 89. 72  For instance, in the Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels laid out a ten-point programme aimed at making “despotic inroads on the rights of property” such as progressive taxation and centralisation of credit [see Marx and Engels, Manifest, 88]. In general, as David W. Lovell remarked, “Max’s socialism was state-less only in so far as the state was an expression of class society” [David W. Lovell, From Marx to Lenin: An Evaluation of Marx’s Responsibility for Soviet Authoritarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 32]. 73  Friedrich Engels, Herrn Eugen Dühring Umwälzung der Wissenschaft (“Anti-Dühring”) (Stuttgart: Dietz, 1910), 262–263. 74  Ibid., 262. 75  Michael Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy, ed. Marshall S. Shatz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 182; Ferdinand Lassalle, Arbeiterprogramm. Über den Besonderen

2  FLAWED GIANT: EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1914 

37

expelled from nearly all social democratic parties whereas Lassalle’s reputation was overshadowed by that of Marx and Engels, albeit very slowly.76 Yet his anti-statist tenets were restated, rather than revised, by his disciples. In his commentary to the Erfurt programme, released in 1892 and reprinted eight times until 1909 without changes, Kautsky confidently held that, by becoming “the ruling class,” the proletariat will one day turn the state into “a socialist co-operative Commonwealth (Genossenschaft).”77 Even more significantly, the leader of the POB Emile Vandervelde authored a major theoretical work under the title Le Socialisme contre l’État (Socialism Against the State) in 1918. “In the economic as well in the political order, and in general in all the spheres of collective life,” Vandervelde argued, “socialism is not statist, is anti-statist” for, under socialism, “the great cooperative of social work, having achieved its full autonomy, governs itself, without any governmental interference.”78 Even though Vandervelde distinguished between the state as the organ of authority (l’État organe d’autorité) and the state as an organ of management (l’État organe de gestion), with the latter being expected to survive, it is noteworthy that not even the First World War had swept away socialist anti-statism.79 How to combine a libertarian conception of the future political order with a short-term commitment to building a more

Zusammenhang der gegenwärtigen Geschichtsperiode mit der Idee des Arbeiterstandes (Zürich: Meyer & Zeller, 1863), 41. 76  In 1875, Marx wrote the Critique of the Gotha Programme—which remained unpublished until 1891 to avoid internal controversies—to criticise the acceptance of Lassalle’s core ideas by the SPD: see David McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought (London: Macmillan, 1973), 430–438. 77  Karl Kautsky, Das Erfurter Programm in seinem grundsätzlichen Teil erläutert (Stuttgart: Dietz, 1892), 130. 78  Emile Vandervelde, Le socialisme contre l’État (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1918), 169–170. See also Vandervelde’s first sketch of the book: Emile Vandervelde, Le socialisme contre l’État (Ghent: Société Coopérative Volksdrukkerij, 1911). 79  Vandervelde, Le socialisme contre l’État, 75–77. During the revisionist controversy, Bernstein had taken issue with old-fashioned anti-statism, arguing that “however decentralised an administration we envisage, there will always be a large number of tasks which are incompatible with the notion of the autonomous activity of society,” such as the administration of transport or the maintenance of public order [Eduard Bernstein, ‘Die sozialpolitische Bedeutung von Raum und Zahl’, Neue Zeit 15, no. 2 (1897): 100–107 and 138–143, translated as “5. The Social and Political Significance of Space and Number,” in Marxism and Social Democracy, 88]. Yet this point too fell into oblivion following Kautsky’s triumph over him.

38 

T. MILANI

extensive state remained an unresolved issue, one which orthodox Marxism wrestled with for a long time without providing any conclusive answer. The third source of tension within social democracy consisted of celebrating working-class internationalism despite the serious difficulties that social democratic parties had in cooperating across national boundaries. The fierce leadership contest between Marx and Bakunin plagued the International Workingmen’s Association (IWA), later known as the First International, and caused its split in 1872.80 The Universal Socialist Congress held in Ghent in 1877 proved that anarchist positions were slumping but anti-socialist laws in Spain, France, Germany, and Switzerland as well as the mushrooming of regional and factional gatherings prevented the reunification of social democratic parties under a single framework for nearly two decades. The new International came to light only in 1889 when social democracy was much more diverse and nationally fragmented than it was in the 1860s.81 The general acceptance of orthodox Marxism, facilitated by the political clout of the SPD vis-à-vis the other funding members, was the only source of internal cohesion.82 Still, its motto “Working Men of all Countries, Unite!” was hardly appropriate for an organisation that featured the nationalisation of the means of production among its core aims and solemnly proclaimed that the permanent relations between social democratic parties could not “violate the autonomy of national groupings, which are the best judges of the tactics to be adopted in their own country.”83 Given these premises, the Second International was bound to remain a consultative forum for highly independent parties: 80  See Paul Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 249–340; Gian Mario Bravo, Marx e la Prima Internazionale (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1979), 52–63. 81  For an overview, see Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Les socialismes français et allemand et le problème de la guerre, 1870–1914 (Geneva: Droz, 1953), 307–312; Leo Valiani, “Dalla I alla II Internazionale,” in Questioni di storia del socialismo (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1958), 168–263. 82  See Anne Kriegel, “Le parti modèle: la social-démocratie allemande et la IIème Internationale,” in Le pain et les roses: jalons pour une histoire des socialismes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 159–173. 83  The resolution cited here, originally passed by a group of French socialists named “les Possibilistes” at their Congress and adopted by the International at its foundation, can be found in Benoît Malon, “Les Congrès socialistes internationaux de Paris en 1889,” La revue socialiste 10, no. 56 (1889): 129–138 and in Les Congrès socialistes internationaux. Ordres du jour et résolutions publié par le Bureau Socialiste International (Ghent: Société coopérative Volksdrukkerij, 1902), 43–44.

2  FLAWED GIANT: EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1914 

39

the permanent Bureau, established in 1900, ensured some institutional continuity and enhanced internal coordination among members but was never bestowed with executive powers.84 The feebleness of the International was further exacerbated by the persistence of nationalism. Neither Marx nor Engels completely overlooked its strength or the necessity to come to terms with it: for instance, the latter claimed in 1893 that “without restoring the autonomy and unity of each European nation, neither the international unity of the proletariat nor the quiet and intelligent cooperation of these nations towards common aims can be achieved.”85 Both men, however, understood nationalism as a transient phenomenon inextricably linked to a particular stage of capitalist development. Social democracy was therefore encouraged to exploit calls for national self-determination under the assumption that the increasing integration between previously separate national markets would result in the demise of nationalism.86 Later on, with characteristic ambivalence, Kautsky admitted that Marx’s views on the matter had been occasionally simplistic or superseded by events.87 But he also contended, in one of his few, scattered contributions on this topic, that economic centralisation would solve the question of nationalities “painlessly,” by blending peoples together in a world polity.88 Some left-wing intellectuals recognised that nationalistic outbursts posed a serious threat to internationalism. As Rosa Luxemburg warned in 1896, the consequences of backing demands for national self-­determination 84  See Julius Braunthal, History of the International, 1864–1914 (London: Nelson, 1966), 243–245. As a consequence, the secretary Camille Huysmans felt he could not intervene as a mediator in the ongoing dispute between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party unless both wings authorised him to arrange a joint meeting: see “Correspondance entre Lénine et Camille Huysmans (1905–1914),” ed. Gerard Haupt, Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 3, no. 4 (1962): 582–665. 85  Friedrich Engels, “Al lettore italiano,” Manifesto del Partito Comunista, ed. Palmiro Togliatti (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1964), 50. 86  See Roman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 169–192; Michal Kasprzak, “To Reject or not to Reject Nationalism: Debating Marx and Engels’ Struggles with Nationalism, 1840–1880s,” Nationalities Papers 40, no. 4 (2012): 585–606. 87  See letter from Kautsky to Adler, 12 November 1896, in Victor Adler, Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky (Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1954), 220–222; Karl Kautsky, “Vorrede des Uebersetzers,” in Karl Marx, Revolution und Kontre-Revolution in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Dietz, 1896), VII–XXX. 88  Karl Kautsky, “Die moderne Nationalität,” Die Neue Zeit 5, no. 10 (1887): 451.

40 

T. MILANI

from Central and Eastern European minorities might be calamitous for the “coherent political struggle of the proletariat in every country” was likely to be overtaken by the “disintegration” of the latter “through a series of fruitless national struggles.”89 Nevertheless, most social democratic parties preferred not to address this topic openly, perhaps comforted by the thought that nationalism was already in decline. Living under an increasingly fractured empire, Austrian social democrats were the most thoroughgoing in investigating the relationship between socialism and national self-determination. Building on the works of his comrade Karl Renner, the young theorist Otto Bauer controversially argued in 1907 that national autonomy was a “necessary demand” for any section of the working class waging the class struggle within a multinational state.90 And yet Bauer confidently concluded, in purely Kautskian fashion, that “the international division of labour necessarily leads to the unification of national communities in a social structure of higher order.”91 Without grasping that quasi-religious faith in the virtues of economic interdependence and in the spontaneous growth of international solidarity among workers, it is impossible to understand why social democrats grossly underestimated the risk of a major war before 1914. Persuaded that nationalism was above all an expression of bourgeois false consciousness and the world was moving towards an ever-closer economic unity, they miscalculated about the possibility that workers might fight against each other. In that spirit, it seemed reasonable to argue, as the French social democratic leader Jean Jaurès did in 1910, that replacing standing armies 89  Rosa Luxemburg, “The Polish Question at the International Congress of London,” in The National Question: Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg, ed. Horace B.  Davis (New York-London: Monthly Press, 1976), 58. On Luxemburg, see also Georges Haupt, “Dynamisme et conservatisme de l’idéologie: Rosa Luxemburg à l’orée de la recherche marxiste dans le domaine national,” in L’Historien et le mouvement social (Paris: Maspero, 1980), 293–341. 90  Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (Vienna: Brand, 1907), 280. See also Rudolf Springer [Karl Renner], Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat (Wien: Franz, 1902). On Austro-Marxism and the national question, see Arduino Agnelli, Questione nazionale e socialismo: contributo allo studio di K.  Renner e O.  Bauer (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1959); Hans Mommsen, Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat. Vol. I: Das Ringen um die supranationale Integration der zisleithanischen Arbeiterbewegung (1867–1907) (Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1963), 314–338. 91  Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage, 452.

2  FLAWED GIANT: EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BEFORE 1914 

41

with popular militias would make conflicts even less likely for offensive war “in the world of democracy and labour is completely outdated, absurd, and criminal.”92 * * * Historian Jacob L. Talmon once compared the trajectory of social democracy from 1848 to the First World War to a process of relaxation: since “messianic expectations” had failed to materialise, local parties “began to feel more like members of a loose international federation than sections of a church militant—the socialist International,” hence starting to fight “the class enemy at home according to the rules of the game.”93 Talmon’s analogy is fitting but does not convey the sense of hope and fulfilment that, ups and downs notwithstanding, social democrats arguably experienced between 1870 and 1914. Industrialisation was breeding a huge working class, on whose numerical expansion the success of social democracy ultimately depended; national economies were more and more woven together; technological progress was boosting productivity; social legislation was at least moderating the effects of capitalist exploitation. In that context, whether through reforms or a sharp revolutionary break, the advent of a classless society seemed only a matter of time. Bearing that complacency in mind, it is easy to realise why most social democrats were inclined to carry on with their activities without scrutinising their movement’s ideology too closely. No matter how roughly, orthodox Marxism seemed capable of squaring the circle between revolution and parliamentarism. In addition, it provided a theoretical framework within which marginal differences in convictions and lines of conduct could be accommodated as well as a set of crystallised symbols and rites “to keep up the ardour of the troops and to transfigure the prosaic nature of everyday political claims.”94 Practical reasons, therefore, worked against 92  Jean Jaurès, L’organisation socialiste de la France: l’armée nouvelle (Paris: Publications Jules Rouff & Cie, 1911), 7. 93  Jacob L. Talmon, The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution: The Origins of Ideological Polarisation in the Twentieth Century (London: Secker & Warburg, 1980), 10. 94  Raymond Aron, Les guerres en chaîne (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), 138. In 1896, Bertrand Russell acutely observed that “Social Democracy is not a mere political party, nor even a mere economic theory; it is a complete self-contained philosophy of the world and of human development; it is, in a word, a religion and an ethic” [Bertrand Russell, German Social Democracy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1896, 1)].

42 

T. MILANI

efforts to forcefully and creatively tackle the weaknesses outlined in this chapter. Only subsequent, traumatic events—the outbreak of the First World War and the Bolshevik revolution—shattered the perception that social democracy would naturally reap the rewards of historical progress, hence forcing a painful reconsideration of the ideological basis upon which social democratic action rested.

CHAPTER 3

Shockwaves: Hendrik de Man and the Legacy of the Great War

Most accounts feature the killing of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, on June 28, 1914, as the assassination which unleashed the chain of events that culminated in the outbreak of the First World War. Yet, in the perception of many European social democrats, another murder came to symbolise the passing of an age, about one month later. In that case, the victim was Jean Jaurès, shot at point-blank range in the back by a nationalist student, Raoul Villain, while sitting at the Café Le Croissant, in Paris, on July 31. Jaurès’ accomplishments went beyond co-founding and leading the SFIO: he was also a great orator, a defender of Alfred Dreyfus, and an outspoken advocate for Franco-German reconciliation after the crushing French defeat of 1871. Revanchisme was alien to him. Spellbound by German culture, he had even devoted his doctoral dissertation, written in Latin, to the study of the early foundations of socialism in the works of Luther, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel.1 His homicide could thus be viewed as an act against some of the core values of the Enlightenment: tolerance, solidarity, cosmopolitanism, and peace. Writing to a friend in 1916, the 1  See Jean Jaurès, De primis socialismi Germanici lineamentis apud Lutherum, Kant, Fichte et Hegel (Toulouse: Chauvin et Fils, 1891). On Jaurès’ life, see Harvey Goldberg, The Life of Jean Jaures (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962). On Jaurès’ philosophical background and understanding of Marxism, see also Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism. Vol. II, 115–140.

© The Author(s) 2020 T. Milani, Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0_3

43

44 

T. MILANI

French historian and philosopher Élie Halévy, who never indulged in apocalyptic rhetoric, held that “the day Jaurès was assassinated and the fire of Europe was sparked, a new era began in the history of the world.”2 Instinctively, many Parisians felt the same way and reacted accordingly, driven by a sense of imminent doom and despair. A large crowd gathered in Montmartre, grieving and shrieking Ils ont tué Jaurès, c’est la guerre. Hundreds of militants, some asking for vengeance but many more dumbstruck, surrounded the headquarters of the newspaper L’Humanité, whose journalists could barely find the strength to speak. In Belleville, police charged and dispersed spontaneous demonstrators while in the Elysée the Ministry of the Interior, Louis Malvy, told the rest of the cabinet that the city was on the brink of revolution. The news of Jaurès’ death rapidly spread across the country. Awakened by the doorbell in the middle of the night, the wife of the socialist parliamentarian Marcel Sembat thought a declaration of war had been issued. Once informed, she burst into tears.3 Around noon the following day, a 28-year old Belgian socialist who had just arrived in the French capital, Hendrik de Man, witnessed not riots, as Malvy had feared, but a full, disciplined mobilisation of troops, very similar to the one he had bumped into at dawn, in his own country. De Man had got up early in the morning, in Brussels, determined to ignore the reservists, go fishing, and enjoy some rest after a few busy days. Yet, as soon as he learned about Jaurès, his priorities shifted dramatically. Once in Paris he felt wrapped in an uncanny, dream-like atmosphere. “The weather was hot and sultry, there was not a breath of air, nature itself seemed to be waiting in suspense. Huge clouds of a lurid sulphurous colour threatened thunder, which never came,” he would later recall. “Men and women walked about almost in silence with the ghostlike detachment of people who have suddenly lost their own volition and henceforth obey the will of a fate which they do not understand, but the hostility of which is brought home to them by everything around them.”4 Much like his French 2  Letter from Halévy to Léon, 24 March 1916, in Elie Halévy, Correspondance et écrits de guerre, 1914–1918, eds. Marie Scot and Vincent Duclert (Paris: Colin, 2014), 139. 3  See Jean Rabaut, Jean Jaurès (Paris: Perrin, 1971), 270; François Fonvieille-Alquier, Ils ont tué Jaurès! (31 juillet 1914) (Paris: Laffont, 1968), 207; Jean-Pierre Rioux, Jean Jaurès (Paris: Perrin, 2005), 11; Marcel Sembat, Les Cahiers Noirs, Journal 1905–1922 (Paris: Viviane Hamy, 2007), 567. 4  Henry de Man, The Remaking of a Mind: A Soldier’s Thoughts on War and Reconstruction (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1919), 23.

3  SHOCKWAVES: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR 

45

comrades, the Belgian now realised how real was the ongoing downhill slide towards war. Unlike most of them, he had experienced first-hand how little social democratic leaders had done to stop it. De Man had just taken part in the extraordinary meeting of the International Socialist Bureau (ISB) held in Brussels, within the offices of the Workers’ Education Committee that he directed, on July 29–30. The “most fateful conference” in the history of the International was attended by many of its prominent members, including Jaurès, Édouard Vaillant, Jules Guesde, Hugo Haase, Karl Kautsky, Victor and Friedrich Adler, Rosa Luxemburg, Angelica Balabanoff, and Pieter Jelles Troelstra.5 Notable absentees were Friedrich Ebert and Vladimir Lenin. Being fluent in four languages, de Man served as interpreter. In this guise, he was present at the debates marking, in his subsequent assessment, the “moral bankruptcy” of the organisation.6 Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia had been delivered six days before and British pressures on the Kaiser to mediate had no effect. Still, the delegates reached Belgium lacking a sense of immediate danger and believing that, at worst, a minor conflict in the Balkans would occur. Jaurès sided with the most confident. According to Charles Rappoport, then representing Argentina, “until the last minute [he] thought reason and common sense would prevail,” largely due to his deep-seated conviction that France and Germany would recoil from the prospect of a massive bloodbath.7 The President of the LSI, Vandervelde, similarly recalled “the steadfastness of his optimism”: at the moment of leaving, Jaurès predicted that, despite “ups and downs,” things would “sort themselves out” and asked Vandervelde to accompany him to an art gallery to see some Flemish paintings.8 Vandervelde himself stunned Paul Hymans, a Belgian liberal he met on July 30, with his relative cheerfulness. Both he and Jaurès believed

5  Braunthal, History of the International: 1864–1914, 351. For a detailed account of the conference, see Georges Haupt, Socialism and the Great War: The Collapse of the Second International (Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1972), 195–215. 6  De Man, The Remaking, 31. 7  Charles Rappoport, Une vie révolutionnaire, 1883–1940: les mémoires de Charles Rappoport, eds. Harvey Goldberg and George Haupt (Paris: Éditions des Sciences de l’Homme, 1991), 295. 8  Emile Vandervelde, Jaurès (Paris: Alcan, 1929), 5–6.

46 

T. MILANI

it was not too late to exert effective pressure on national governments, putting the bit—in the latter’s words—in Attila’s trembling horse’s mouth.9 Jaurès and Vandervelde, though, were in good company: no delegate seems to have been quite prescient of the upcoming catastrophe. On July 29, the German Social Democrat Haase proudly reported that in Berlin, the day before, thousands of workers had demonstrated for peace in twenty-seven different gatherings, proving that the German proletariat was immune to chauvinistic attitudes. He helped Jaurès in drafting a joint resolution and stood close to him during a crowded rally on July 30, after the closing of the official ISB session, to stress the socialists’ determination to stay united.10 The debate often revolved around trivial issues. Plunged into administrative problems, British delegate Dan Irving and Vaillant bickered about the location of the forthcoming Congress whereas Troelstra questioned its extraordinary character. Participants finally agreed to meet up in Paris on August 9 to address the topic “The Proletariat and the War.” However pained and gloomy to the point of annoying Rosa Luxemburg when he portrayed Austrian socialists as powerless in halting the escalation against Serbia, Victor Adler too ruled out the possibility of a general war.11 The passivity that he and the Bohemian Anton Nemec displayed baffled de Man: “Even the most radical elements were struck 9  Emile Vandervelde, “Jaurès au Bureau Socialiste Internationale,” L’Humanité, July 31, 1915; Paul Hymans, Mémoires. Vol. I (Brussels: Institut de Sociologie Solvay, 1958), 81. Jaurès referred to Attila’s trembling horse at the ISB meeting: see Jean Jaurès, “La volonté de paix de la France,” in Œuvres de Jean Jaurès. Vol. IX, ed. Max Bonnafous (Paris: Rieder, 1939), 394. On Jaurès’ peace strategy, see Anne Kriegel, “Jaurès en juillet 1914,” Le pain et les roses, 107–124. 10  These symbolic gestures were not new in the history of the International: in 1904 the delegates Plekhanov and Katayama famously shook their hands in Amsterdam during the Russo-Japanese war [see Bruno Naarden, Socialist Europe and Revolutionary Russia: Perception and Prejudice, 1848–1923, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1992, 152]. On Haase, see Appendix—Official Record of the ISB Session Held at Brussels on 29–30 July 1914 in Haupt, Socialism and the Great War, 252–253; De Man, Après coup, 102–103; Joll, The Second International, 167–168. 11  See Appendix—Official Record of the ISB Session Held at Brussels on 29–30 July 1914 in Haupt, Socialism and the Great War, 252–253, 255, 257, 259–260, 251–252. On Adler’s mood, see Angelica Balabanoff, My Life as a Rebel (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938), 131–132; Julius Braunthal, Victor und Friedrich Adler: Zwei Generationen Arbeiterbewegung (Vienna: Verlag der Weiner Volksbuchhandlung, 1965), 211; on Luxemburg’s reaction, see Antonio Fabra-Ribas, “Jean Jaurès à Bruxelles les 29 et 30 juillet 1914,” La Vie socialiste 9, no. 248 (1931): 11–13. The ISB final resolution and the speeches given by Jaurès and Haase were reproduced in William English Walling, The Socialists and the

3  SHOCKWAVES: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR 

47

with amazement and awe when they saw how the huge cruel machinery of mobilisation began to move.”12 Leaders in Brussels, lulled by official declarations, did not appreciate the gravity of the situation and failed to produce a coordinated strategy when it was needed the most.13 The assassination of Jaurès shattered most of those illusions and increased the urgency of hammering out a common position for French and Germans alike. For that reason, de Man, on the morning of August 1, travelled to Paris along with Camille Huysmans, secretary of the ISB, and Hermann Müller, the SPD politician and future Weimar Chancellor. That afternoon, with the mobilisation for war well under way, the three met a group of French social democrats at the Palais Bourbon and later in the offices of L’Humanité. The mood was grim and tense, epitomised by the “pale face and the tired suffering eyes” of Pierre Renaudel, a long-time associate of Jaurès who had been sitting close to him when Villain opened fire.14 Müller’s main task was to gather information about French attitudes, in view of the SPD meeting scheduled for August 3: he had no mandate, therefore, to speak on behalf of his party. He nevertheless reassured the audience that German Social Democrats were split between a majority willing to vote against war credits and a minority inclined to abstain: casting a vote in favour was not even considered an option. He wished French socialists would take a similar stand and stressed the Kaiser’s desire to avoid war.15 One point he made, though, proved controversial. To a French spokesman arguing that, in case of a deliberate act of aggression, social democrats of victim states would be right in siding with their War: A Documentary Statement of the Position of the Socialists of All Countries (New York: Henry Holt, 1915), 125–128. 12  De Man, The Remaking, 32. 13  As Georges Haupt retrospectively argued, “with the meeting of the ISB, the International had already ceased to exist. […] After that, national sections left without directives, without common and concerted tactics, were to act all alone, in accordance with the wishes and judgements of their leaders” [Georges Haupt, Les congrès manqué: l’Internationale à la veille de la première guerre mondiale (Paris: Maspero, 1965), 115–117]. 14  De Man, The Remaking, 24. See also “L’assassinat,” L’Humanité, August 1, 1914. 15  When, in hindsight, Müller’s good faith was called into question, de Man defended him for “he described the actual situation as it seemed at the moment of his departure from Berlin; he had no inkling of the already ongoing shift in the mood of his party, which took place between July 31 and August 4” [Hendrik de Man, “Pariser Sendung. Die letzte Aktion im August 1914,” Vossische Zeitung, March 22, 1931]. De Man and Müller stayed in touch after the war, and they met at least once to discuss militarism in Germany: see Henri de Man, “New Germany,” Living Age, 4022 (1921): 355–358.

48 

T. MILANI

country, Müller replied that any distinction between aggressor and attacked states was “out of date” for the present dispute originated from “capitalist Imperialism, and the responsibility for it recoils upon the governing classes of all the countries concerned.”16 That answer, couched in stiff Marxist terms, ignited a lively debate. Having no binding force, the meeting ended with a vague pledge to hold further bilateral consultations, after which de Man, Huysmans, and Müller took the last eastbound train, already packed with soldiers. In Brussels, which they reached after a troubled trip, “the last connecting link between the socialists of the two groups of powers” was severed, with Müller heading on to Berlin, where his party was succumbing to the fear of a Russian invasion.17 On August 3, German troops invaded Belgium. The day after, Hugo Haase—the very man who had worked side by side with Jaurès in Brussels— addressed the Reichstag and explained, echoing Müller’s arguments, that imperialist policies were to blame for the crisis but also announced that his party refused to leave “the Fatherland in the lurch in the hour of danger.”18 At the defining moment, the SPD swung in favour of war credits; French socialists did the same. The dispute over self-defence de Man had heard in Paris now affected him personally: were all powers to be regarded as equally responsible for the outbreak of the war? Was German foreign policy driven by overriding structural factors that prevented its government from pursuing a fundamentally different course? Were Belgian socialists morally entitled to resist? All of a sudden, de Man’s commitment to neutrality vanished: There was a decisive impulse at last I felt such an overmastering movement of repulsion against cowardly brutality, of active sympathy with the victim of an unprovoked aggression, of instinctive desire to share the sacrifice of those who willingly gave up everything for honour’s sake, of admiration for the little plucky one against the big brute, that I could not doubt a minute that this call came from what was good and true in me, and had to be obeyed.19  Henri de Man, “Une confirmation,” L’Humanité, March 4, 1915. See also Theodor Wolff, The Eve of 1914 (London: Gollancz, 1935), 502. 17  De Man, The Remaking, 45. 18  Cited in Franz Osterroth and Dieter Schuster, Chronik der deutschen Sozialdemokratie (Hannover: Dietz, 1963), 157. For an account of the SPD’s vote and how it contributed to fuelling the myth of the German people enthusiastically welcoming the war, see Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilisation in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 157–161, 166–169. 19  De Man, The Remaking, 50. An interesting parallel may be drawn between de Man and the later British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, another pacifist who volunteered immedi16

3  SHOCKWAVES: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR 

49

Propelled by such a “resurrection of combative instincts,”20 the selfproclaimed pacifist Hendrik de Man abruptly joined his national army to fight against Germany, to which he owed “the essentials” of his “scientific and socialist culture.”21 The events between July 29, when the ISB met in Brussels, and August 4, which saw the capitulation of German Social Democrats, are key in understanding not only de Man’s reaction to the unfolding of the crisis but also the backdrop against which he analysed the Great War. Regrettably, no diary and only a few letters written by de Man in 1914–1918 are left in the archives and it is therefore impossible to trace the step-by-step evolution of his views. Nevertheless, The Remaking of a Mind: A Soldier’s Thoughts on War and Reconstruction, a book he published in English in 1919, and La leçon de la guerre, the collection of articles released in French in 1920, are a useful proxy and provide a clear picture of the ideological transformation de Man underwent during the conflict. This chapter focuses on that transformation, which amounted to an outright rejection of orthodox Marxism, the strand of thought that had dominated European social democracy until 1914. First, it briefly discusses de Man’s pre-war views and his early involvement in left-wing activism. Second, it evaluates the impact of the war on de Man’s thinking through his twofold experience, as a soldier and as a diplomat. Third, it assesses the originality of de Man’s departure from Marxism as well as the peculiarities of his new outlook: a hybrid variant of democratic socialism built on loathing for communism, faith in the egalitarian potential of capitalism—if wisely managed and properly reformed—and an interest in social psychology which bore little resemblance to early twentieth-century reformism. Although de Man would further sharpen his views and challenge the theoretical foundations of Marxism from a different angle after having returned to Europe from the United States in 1920, the main themes featured in his early post-war writings continued to loom large on his intellectual journey. Because of that, The Remaking of a Mind and La leçon de la guerre can be seen retrospectively as the first ately after the invasion of Belgium [see Nick Thomas-Symonds, Attlee: A Life in Politics (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 21–22]. Unfortunately, there is no account of Attlee’s emotional reaction to the event. 20  De Man, Après coup, 106. 21  Henri de Man, La leçon de la guerre (Brussels: Librairie du Peuple, 1920), 5.

50 

T. MILANI

salvo in de Man’s offensive aimed at reinventing Western European social democracy. * * * Born in Antwerp in 1885, Hendrik de Man grew up in a well-to-do, cosmopolitan family steeped in the values of the austere, industrious Flemish upper class. At the age of sixteen, however, the young Hendrik started displaying a rebellious temper which, coupled with an increasing awareness of the appalling gap between his prosperity and the miserable condition of the Belgian working class, led him to challenge the alleged hypocrisy and aloofness of his peers. He joined the Jeunes Gardes Socialistes (JGS), the socialists’ youth organisation, in 1902, soon becoming an outspoken critic of the Belgian army.22 When, in 1905, he was expelled from a prestigious institute in Ghent for his participation in an anti-czarist rally in the aftermath of the Bloody Sunday massacre, he broke with his parents and moved to Leipzig.23 Germany was well-suited to his militant mindset: the SPD had recently renewed its commitment to Kautsky’s interpretation Marxism against Bernstein’s, and de Man could not agree more. A thoroughgoing supporter of revolutionary socialism, he engaged in several publications and educational activities aimed at moulding class-consciousness, one of the paramount tasks in preparation for the ultimate seizure of power. Theoretically, his views were informed by Kautsky’s historical materialism: in his first important pamphlet, he laid out a comparative analysis of the attitudes displayed by various social democratic parties towards parliamentary rule building on Kautsky’s Die soziale Revolution (The Social Revolution), and indeed acknowledging him as a major source of inspiration.24 Strategically, de Man found himself closer to Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, helping the latter set up the International Federation of Socialist Young People’s Organizations (IFSYPO) in 1907, soon endorsed

22  His first publication, released anonymously, was a rabid attack on conscription: see Catéchisme du soldat belge (Ghent: Imprimerie De Backer, undated [1903 or 1907]). 23  See De Man, Après Coup, 7–60. 24  See Hendrik de Man, Het Tijdvak der Demokratie (Ghent: Germinal, 1907). See also de Man’s retrospective acknowledgement of Kautsky’s influence: Hendrik de Man, “Karl Kautsky,” Vossische Zeitung, October 16, 1929.

3  SHOCKWAVES: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR 

51

and funded by the Socialist International.25 Both Luxemburg and Liebknecht underscored the need for intensifying class struggle instead of cooperating with non-revolutionary forces; de Man’s journalistic writings reiterated that point.26 Nor was his dislike of gradualism tamed by his long stay in England in 1910 as he maintained that universal suffrage under capitalism was deceptive: bourgeois democracy, he believed, was no panacea for workers’ exploitation.27 De Man’s radicalism grew out of frustration with the establishment of the POB, whose willingness to mediate and compromise, he thought, badly served the labour movement.28 His doubts about the POB’s real commitment to revolutionary socialism were well-founded. Under the influence of the syndicalist César de Paepe, the party had originally leaned towards collectivism, a doctrine that prescribed the socialisation of the means of production without resorting to violence.29 Only in 1894, nine years after its foundation, did the POB issue an official declaration of principles, the Charte de Quaregnon, by which it aligned itself to key Marxist ideas, such as the necessity to suppress capitalism to ensure the freedom of the workers and participate in the international struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat. At the same time, the document greatly emphasised the merits of social reform and parliamentary action in achieving those goals.30 Its author, the jurist Emile Vandervelde, was to become not only 25   De Man briefly served as general secretary. See Georges Haupt, La Deuxième Internationale, 1889–1914: étude critique des sources, essai bibliographique (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1964), 348–350; Henri de Man, “Avant-propos,” in Compte rendu de la première conférence internationale de la jeunesse socialiste, tenue à Stuttgart, les 24, 25 et 26 aout 1907 (Ghent: Société coopérative Volksdrukkerij, 1907), 3–7. 26  De Man traced the basic tenets of his position to Kein Kompromiss, kein Wahlbündnis, a pamphlet written by Karl’s father, William Liebknecht, in 1899 [see de Man, Après coup, 59]. 27  “Spurred by my Marxist frenzy, I saw England much in the same way Lenin and Trotsky saw it in the same period, as they indicated the Westminster Parliament by saying with disdain: Over there is the place where ‘they’ assemble” [De Man, Après coup, 91]. See also Hendrik de Man, “Sozialistische Reisebriefe: II,” Leipziger Volkszeitung, February 1, 1910 and February 2, 1910; Hendrik de Man, “Sozialistische Reisebriefe: V,” Leipziger Volkszeitung, August 12, 1910. 28  See Henri de Man, Le mouvement ouvrier en Belgique, manuscript dated December 1909, AHDM/AMSAB/1304. 29  On de Paepe, see Louis Bertrand, César de Paepe: sa vie, son œuvre (Brussels: Librairie de l’Agence Dechenne, 1909). 30  For an extensive commentary, see La Charte de Quaregnon, déclaration de principes du socialisme belge: histoire et développements (Brussels: Éditions de la Fondation Louis de Brouckère, 1980), 67–87.

52 

T. MILANI

the party leader and the most distinguished advocate of Marxism in Belgium but also one of the staunchest supporters of parliamentary rule. His thinking was subsequently celebrated within the POB as an example of “astonishing dynamism,” a “miraculous synthesis […] of all forms of proletarian, political, trade unionist, and cooperative action.”31 In fact, Vandervelde excelled in squaring a genuine admiration for Marx’s conceptual apparatus with the desire to smooth out the process of integration of Belgian social democracy within the country’s legal and political structures after the introduction of universal male suffrage, in 1893. There is no reason to assume that Vandervelde, who had turned down Bernstein’s revisionism, did not truly believe in the inevitable demise of capitalism. However, by setting the event in a remote future as Kautsky did, he encouraged militants to focus on short-term, practical tasks.32 It was also because of the relative suppleness of Vandervelde’s thinking that reformist practices gained wide currency within the POB and debates about the possibility of pursuing an organic alliance with the Liberals, which social democratic parties with deeper Marxist roots had already ruled out in the 1880s and 1890s, dragged on in Belgium until 1914.33 Before the Great War, however, de Man’s criticism was levelled at the symptoms, rather than at the cause, of the POB’s lacklustre political culture. Appointed director of the Centrale d’Éducation Ouvrière (Workers’ Education Committee), an institution aimed at training party members and trade union cadres, in 1910, de Man did not refrain from crossing 31  Arthur Wauters, “La doctrine de Vandervelde,” in VV.AA., Emile Vandervelde: l’homme et son œuvre (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1928), 90–91. This laudatory book, co-authored by eight prominent socialists, is revealing about the status reached by Vandervelde within the POB in the second half of the 1920s. 32  For a succinct restatement of his position, see Emile Vandervelde, “L’évolution révolutionnaire,” Le Peuple, February 13, 1938. 33  As Marcel Liebman argued, “pragmatism” became the hallmark of Belgian socialism, whose main features were “a trade unionism lagging behind politics, and politics being dominated by the material and immediate interests of the cooperative movement” [Marcel Liebman, Les socialistes belges, 1885–1914: la révolte et l’organisation (Brussels: La Revue Nouvelle-Fondation Jacques Jacquemotte-La Vie Ouvrière, 1979), 198]. For a critical analysis of the POB’s integration in the Belgian system, see Claude Renard, La conquête du suffrage universel en Belgique (Brussels: Éditions de la Fondation Joseph Jacquemotte, 1966). According to Janet Polasky, Vandervelde must be credited for developing, together with other social democrats, an original brand of “revolutionary reformism” [Polasky, The Democratic Socialism, 3]. More prosaically, one could argue that Vandervelde adjusted orthodox Marxism to suit the Belgian context without bearing the burden of properly revising it.

3  SHOCKWAVES: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR 

53

swords with moderate elements, often former Liberals of middle-class background who, in his view, “failed to defy the intellectual and moral limitations—such as political careerism—of their class’ mentality,” accusing them of switching parties “the same way a mercenary would change sides.”34 His assaults reached their peak in March 1911 as, in a leaflet published by the Die Neue Zeit, he lambasted the “cooperative cretinism” developed by structures like Vooruit (Forward), the main socialist consumer organisation based in Ghent: by claiming that British-style mutualism was nurturing “the dominant parochialism of the labour movement,” de Man was consciously targeting the “intellectual misery” of his party, stifled by a “practical revisionism […] resting upon the illusions of a decreasing class antagonism and the utopia of a peaceful transition to socialism.”35 By doing so, however, he alienated Vooruit’s powerful President Edward Anseele and forced Vandervelde to publicly brush off the “trivial things” denounced in the piece.36 The bitter dispute between Anseele and de Man ended a year later with a formal censure of the latter’s opinions and an appraisal of the cooperatives’ “admirable work” issued by a panel of distinguished party members.37 Using the most authoritative Marxist journal to criticise the Belgians’ deviance from the orthodoxy was surely a defiant act—but also a misstep for an inexperienced and still relatively unknown party member with no major political accomplishment to claim credit for.38 In retrospect, the controversy about Vooruit is significant for two reasons. First, it revealed de Man’s tendency to overplay his 34  Henri de Man, Le Citoyen Vertongen, manuscript dated December 1911, AHDM/ AMSAB/1316. 35  Henri de Man, “La particularité du mouvement ouvrier en Belgique,” in Henri de Man and Louis de Brouckère, Un épisode de la lutte des tendances socialistes: le mouvement ouvrier en Belgique (Brussels: Éditions de la Fondation Joseph Jacquemotte, 1965), 65, 68, 49, 38, 80. 36   Brief van (E.  Anseele), AHDM/AMSAB/842; Emile Vandervelde, “Die Arbeiterbewegung in Belgien: Erwiderung an de Man und de Brouckère,” Die Neue Zeit 2, no. 28 (1911): 43. 37  Resolutie van Louis Bertrand, Louis De Brouckère en Joseph Wauters betreffende de zaak Anseele-Hendrik de Man, goedgekeurd in de zitting van 28 februari 1912, AHDM/ AMSAB/868. 38  In April 1902, Rosa Luxemburg had vehemently attacked the leadership of the POB on Die Neue Zeit for having allegedly dashed the revolutionary hopes of the workers after an unsuccessful general strike, a charge that Vandervelde dismissed as unfair and insulting. Yet, unlike de Man, Luxemburg was an eminent figure operating outside the POB [Liebman, Les socialistes belges, 1885–1914, 141–144; J. P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg. Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 242–245]. On the strength of the cooperative movement in

54 

T. MILANI

hand in dealing with the POB, which would remain a constant in his career. Second, it showed Vandervelde’s inclination to protect the ideological and institutional heritage of the party, a major cause of friction with de Man in the subsequent decades. It took nothing less than the First World War to shake de Man’s unyielding, quasi-religious devotion to historical materialism. His hostility to any unprincipled pragmatism hidden under a veneer of revolutionary verbalism, however, did not change and would rather be magnified by his war experience. * * * The most enduring consequence of the years 1914–1918 on de Man’s mindset was his break with orthodox Marxism, driven by the determination to critically engage with assumptions and arguments that pre-war social democratic theorists had neither spelled out clearly nor seriously questioned.39 Even though he still praised some aspects of the SPD’s inner organisation during the 1920s,40 de Man’s uncompromising allegiance to the Kautskian brand of socialism died away in the summer of 1914, as the working class’ conduct defied the expectations which orthodox Marxism had previously fuelled. The starting point of The Remaking of a Mind was the acknowledgement that social democracy had tragically misjudged the power of nationalism. Being proudly attached to his Flemish roots, de Man had been grappling with the problem of national identity at least since 1905, getting acquainted with the works of Otto Bauer and the Austro-Marxists during a semester he spent in Vienna.41 An unflinching opponent of militarism,42 Belgium, see Hendrik Defoort, Werklieden bemint uw profijt! De Belgische sociaaldemocratie in Europa (Leuven: Uitgeverij Lannoocampus, 2006), 310–377. 39  See, for example, letter from de Man to de Brouckère, 3 August 1916, AHDM/ AMSAB/89; Henri de Man, “La révision du marxisme,” Le Peuple, May 13,1919, later in de Man, La leçon de la guerre, 10–17. Both sources dwell on issues that were subsequently addressed in Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus, published in 1926. See also de Man, Après coup, 118–119. 40  Especially in the field of workers’ education, where de Man continued to endorse a German-like centralised system: see, for example, Henri de Man, Le mouvement d’éducation ouvrière en Belgique (Brussels: Lucifer, 1922), 3–5, 19; Henri de Man, “La politique de la Centrale d’Education Ouvrière,” Education-Récréation 8, no. 10 (1926): 147–148. 41  See de Man, Après coup, 82–86, 132–133. 42  See, for example, Hendrik de Man, “Die Militarismus in Belgien,” Leipziger Volkszeitung, November 15, 1909.

3  SHOCKWAVES: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR 

55

he painfully recognised, after his momentous decision to enlist, that the lack of international solidarity shown by the proletariat mirrored the inherent limitations of the Second International, which merely linked up “autonomous national organizations for purposes of mutual help and information,” and therefore fell short of breeding a truly transnational sense of belonging.43 Social democracy was, somewhat paradoxically, victim of its own success for the struggle to improve workers’ conditions at national level had led the latter to identify their state as the guarantor of their welfare: “[T]he more national movements thus increased their strength and influence in their own sphere, the less were they prepared to receive directions from abroad.”44 However, this failure went beyond politics and, according to de Man, was due to a reluctance to seize on human psychology. Incidentally, this argument underscored a fundamental disagreement between him and many of the radical comrades he had been close to until 1914. In de Man’s view, well-intentioned Marxists gathering at Zimmerwald, in September 1915, and Kienthal, in April 1916, were right in arguing that the war had been caused by competing imperial interests.45 On the other hand, by calling for a policy of non-collaboration with bourgeois governments, they were equating all the powers involved, blind to the fact that a victory of the Central Powers would have been “incompatible with the progress of any movement which requires political freedom, democracy and peace for its normal development.”46 Even worse, they were unable to explain why the overwhelming majority of workers accepted taking up arms, being neither “traitors” nor “victims of nationalist intoxication” as they erroneously claimed.47 A much more thorough examination of the soldiers’ mentality was necessary in order to account for the limited appeal of pacifism. De Man conceded that coercion and propaganda played a part in the early phases of mobilisation. At best, however, he thought this was a half-­ truth. Building on his first-hand experience, he argued that, after an initial  De Man, The Remaking, 27–28.  Ibid., 29. 45  On these two conferences held in Switzerland, see Olga Hess Gankin and Harold H. Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World War: The Origin of the Third International (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940), 309–478; R.  Craig Nation, War on War: Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left, and the Origins of Communist Internationalism (Durham-London: Duke University Press, 1989), 63–95, 131–168. 46  De Man, The Remaking, 96. 47  Ibid., 76. 43 44

56 

T. MILANI

outburst of enthusiasm, a new feeling emerged among the troops: a “sense of duty,” stirred by “the tremendous elementary power of the desire not to disappoint others who expect something of you. It is this instinct that makes it normal for the least educated of common labourers to do his job well.”48 The enormous grip that this readiness to obey held on thousands of people, fully ignorant of the political implications of the war, came as a shock to de Man, alongside other spontaneous reactions, such as the burgeoning “instinct of solidarity” within the trenches and the less admirable but deeply human “desire to retaliate” against the enemy.49 De Man did not glorify military life. “There are two sorts of trench stories, those that are beautiful and those that are not,” he told an American audience in June 1918. “Beautiful trench stories are not usually true, and the true trench stories are seldom beautiful.”50 To him, war remained nothing but a carnage that spread hatred and acquainted human beings with violence: as he later wrote commemorating his friend Karl Liebknecht, the conflict “had bred more beasts than heroes.”51 Nevertheless, he could not think of a better word than heroism to label the “capacity of the will to subjugate impulses or circumstances adverse to the fulfilment of a duty dictated by conscience” that he had witnessed in most soldiers.52 Under different circumstances, that self-discipline which helped curb the chronic fear of death, he speculated, could be exploited for progressive aims, as de Man held that “the fundamental instincts of our race” could serve “the purposes of our present social ethics to the same extent as […] they were the moral cement of the earlier forms of human society.”53 Those non-materialistic aspects of the human mind, he argued, could no longer be overlooked by any “rationalistic philosophy or Utopian desires” seeking to impose upon the masses “a conception of the brain or an ethical imperative contrary to the native instincts and material interests  Ibid., 161.  Ibid., 164, 166. 50  Hendrik de Man, Talk on War Experiences at Lake Placid Club, manuscript dated 6 June 1918, AHDM/AMSAB/116. 51   Hendrik de Man, “Karl Liebknecht,” Ontwikkeling en Uitspanning 2, no. 16 (1921): 81–82. 52  De Man, The Remaking, 185. 53  Ibid., 193. De Man’s position resembles that of the American progressive and pacifist William James who had called for the establishment of a national service: see William James, The Moral Equivalent of War (New York: New York American Association for International conciliation, 1910). De Man would occasionally cite this essay in the 1940s: see, for example, Henri de Man, Cahiers de ma montagne (Brussels: Éditions de la Toison d’Or, 1944), 195. 48 49

3  SHOCKWAVES: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR 

57

that are the driving power of their common actions.”54 By 1919, de Man was willing to admit that “ideal forces, like the attachment to liberty, the spirit of justice and of chivalry” were powerful drivers of human action, and to criticise “the Marxian philosophy that had thus far confined my outlook too exclusively to the economic aspects of things.”55 Dissatisfaction with Marxism was not limited to the theoretical realm. After three years at the front, during which he became commander of a trench mortar battery receiving an Iron Cross for his bravery,56 in May– June 1917 de Man was sent to Russia on behalf of the Belgian government along with Vandervelde and Louis de Brouckère, at the moment the Entente powers feared the Russian provisional government led by Georgy Lvov might seek a separate peace.57 De Man took the opportunity to extol socialism and patriotism at once. In a speech given before the First Revolutionary Regiment in Petrograd, he introduced himself both as a “soldier of the homeland” and as a “soldier of the revolution,” interested neither in “annexations” nor in “conquests and exactions” but in preventing “a German militaristic hegemony” over Europe and, perhaps, the entire world.58 If pacifists in Germany were justified in their refusal to fight, the circumstances compelled those living in attacked countries to wage “a desperate struggle for that liberty which is necessary to live.”59  De Man, The Remaking, 195.  Ibid., 176. 56  See “Comment Hendrik de Man, un de leaders de la Jeunesse socialiste belge et volontaire belge, gagna la Croix militaire,” typescript dated March 21,1917, AHDM/AMSAB/93; “Een Interview met Rik de Man: Zijne ervaringen op het front en in Rusland,” De Volksgazet, December 4–5, 1918. 57  A copy of the original report is in FRP/AN/313/AP130. The most detailed account of the mission ever published is in Emile Vandervelde, Souvenirs d’un militant socialiste (Paris: Denoël, 1939), 225–259. See also de Man, Après coup, 119–135. De Man contributed to Vandervelde’s book on revolutionary Russia with a chapter on the new Russian army: see Emile Vandervelde, Trois aspects de la révolution russe: 7 mai-25 juin 1917 (Paris-Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1918), 83–161. An interesting comparison may be drawn between Vandervelde’s account and the diary of the SFIO politician Albert Thomas, who recorded a few meetings with Vandervelde during his stay in Russia: see “Journal de Russie d’Albert Thomas: 22 avril-19 juin 1917,” ed. Ioannis Sinanoglou, Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 14, no. 1–2 (1973): 86–204. 58  Henri de Man, Texte du discours prononcé le 12/23 mai 1917 à Petrograd, AHDM/ AMSAB/96. On de Man’s view of Germany as a militaristic country, from whose spirit the SPD was not immune, see de Man, The Remaking, 117–152. 59  Henri de Man, Texte du discours prononcé le 12/23 mai 1917 à Petrograd, AHDM/ AMSAB/96. 54 55

58 

T. MILANI

Belgian and Russian socialists alike shared the same destiny: “As we cannot fight for socialism, we must fight at least for democracy, in order to maintain that minimum of freedom without which socialism will never prosper. That minimum of freedom existed among us, it existed within Western democracy. But it did not exist in Germany.”60 In addition, Russians deserved praise for having toppled the Czarist regime, hence making clear that “only emancipated nations are part of the Entente, struggling against a few, still enslaved peoples.”61 The “moral unity” born out of such an outright rebuttal of autocracy was arguably Russia’s greatest contribution to the war effort, de Man contended.62 In praising Kerensky’s endeavours to reform the ramshackle imperial system de Man was not simply delivering allied propaganda: private correspondence suggests that he truly believed the Socialist Revolutionary Party did the right thing in supporting a wartime coalition government.63 By contrast, his relationship with the Bolsheviks, whom he later described as “men of another mood, if not another stripe,” was strained from the outset.64 The Russian far Left, he complained, was composed of “intellectuals and semi-intellectuals, most of them Jews, Letts, Georgians, and other members of oppressed nationalities, who had been imprisoned or exiled from their native country in their youth.”65 Cut off from the public sphere, with no opportunity to engage in active politics, “they had to confine themselves to theorizing. Their main activity consisted in meeting from night till morning in small groups around a friendly samovar, in smoking an endless number of cigarettes and in vehement discussion of

 Ibidem.  Ibidem. 62  Ibidem. 63  De Man’s contempt for non-interventionists was so strong that in the summer of 1917 he begrudgingly refused to meet Kautsky in Sweden in order not to be associated with the participants to the Stockholm conference [Letter from de Man to Kautsky, 4 July 1917, AHDM/AMSAB/97]. The conference gathered leaders of the Left from countries on both sides during the war to discuss peace terms. On the Stockholm conference, see Hildamarie Meynell, “The Stockholm Conference of 1917,” International Review of Social History 5, no. 1 (1960): 1–25 and 5, no. 2 (1960): 202–225. 64  De Man, Après coup, 123. De Man recalled that he was particularly disturbed by Trotsky, whose Anglophobia had been exacerbated by his imprisonment in Nova Scotia [see de Man, Après coup, 126–129]. In turn, Trotsky would be a harsh critic of de Man in the 1930s [see e.g. Léon Trotski, Leur morale et la nôtre (Paris: Pauvert, 1966), 109–123]. 65  De Man, The Remaking, 241. 60 61

3  SHOCKWAVES: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR 

59

abstract theories.”66 That estrangement made their temper “bitter and intolerant,” a condition Lenin was eager to exploit when he established “despotism from below,” which turned out to be an “unorganised mob-­ rule by disbanded soldiers with their machine-guns.”67 Bolshevism, de Man contended, had little to offer to Western European social democrats: Practically, it was nothing but the response of the hungry war-weary masses to the call for support of the only people who could at least promise them a way out of their misery. Theoretically, it was an attempt to adapt artificially to Russian conditions, aggravated by military and economic disorganization, an abstract doctrine conceived in exile and distilled from social conceptions corresponding to a stage of economic and political development existing abroad but as different from that of Russia as is a hydraulic-press from a sledge hammer in a village smithy.68

Its strategy was equally short-sighted. By killing capitalism in its cradle, Bolsheviks were bound to dash all hopes for a real democratisation of the country: like a “man up a tree,” de Man quipped, they seemed “busily engaged in sawing off the branch” upholding them.69 A second official mission—this time to the United States, between April and November 1918—reinforced de Man’s conviction that a workable, decent socialist system needed solidly liberal and democratic foundations. The trip also marked the beginning of his enduring fascination with America and its culture. At first, his admiration for the United States was instinctive, aroused by the dynamic, creative, pioneering spirit of the New World. “I have clearly seen its shortcomings and, particularly after a couple of months, I have a sharp understanding of what is still missing and raw in a young civilization like this,” de Man confessed to Louis de Brouckère in August 1918, “but its greatness, democratic idealism, spirit of enterprise and bravery are so fascinating that, for my temper and my age, I  Ibid., 242.  Ibid., 242–243. 68  Ibid., 243. 69  Ibid., 245. De Man went on reiterating his anti-Bolshevik allegations in 1920, further sharpened by his acquaintance with Bertrand Russell’s early writings on the Russian revolution: see, for example, “No Bolshevism in Twenty Years: Henri de Man Says State Socialism Dying Out Rapidly,” The Toronto World, March 8, 1920; Henry de Man, “The Menace to Europe’s Urban Civilization,” Queen’s Quarterly 27, no. 2 (1920): 107–117. See also Bertrand Russell, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1920). 66 67

60 

T. MILANI

cannot resist their impact.”70 He found the same passions buoying the US labour movement, fully committed to victory and a just peace, an attitude he linked to the fact that unions were untinged by Marxism.71 Moreover, the streak of individualism still permeating the American mind, especially in the West, went against the overarching trend towards big business and centralisation. De Man was well aware that North American countries were neither on the verge of dismantling the free-market system nor likely to swing to the Left in any foreseeable future.72 However, he wished farmers and industrial workers could come together and, in the long run, form the bedrock of a home-grown social democratic movement.73 The contrast with Bolshevism could hardly be more striking: “In Russia, I have seen socialism without democracy. In America, I have seen democracy without socialism. My conclusion is that, for my part, if I had to choose, I would prefer living in a democracy without socialism than under a socialist regime without democracy.”74 De Man’s belief that the United States was set on a fundamentally progressive course was buttressed by his study of its industrial system: that was the purpose of the trip, and de Man found the subject deeply intriguing. By getting familiar with scientific management as theorised by Frederick W. Taylor and tentatively introduced in some factories from the Atlantic to the Pacific, he realised that the “principles of the good economy […] to achieve the maximum degree of production with the minimum effort and the minimum waste” could have massive implications for social democracy.75 “Until now, Taylorism, as a method of organising manpower, has served capitalist interests only, against those of the mass of producers and  Letter from de Man to de Brouckère, 12 August 1918, AHDM/AMSAB/102.  De Man’s speeches were well received by the press. The New York Times pointed at the differences between him and members of the Socialist Party of America supporting the antiwar St. Louis platform [“Against Socialists Here,” New York Times, September 14, 1918]. The Los Angeles Citizen even portrayed de Man as a titanic figure: when the war broke out “he immediately abandoned his dovelike attitude and sprang into the arena, every inch A MAN” [“Lieutenant Henri du (sic) Man of Belgium Strongly Impresses Unionists of Southern California,” Los Angeles Citizen, July 12, 1918]. 72  See, for example, Henri de Man, “Les élections de novembre,” Le Peuple, September 7, 1920. 73  See H. de Man, “L’alliance des fermiers et des ouvriers,” Le Peuple, May 7, 1920; Henri de Man, “L’handicap Europe-Amérique,” Le Peuple, October 2, 1920. 74  De Man, La Leçon, 25. 75  Conférence donnée par Monsieur de Man, Secrétaire de la centrale d’éducation ouvrière, le 22 Janvier 1919, sur le Taylorisme aux Etats-Unis, AHDM/AMSAB/165. 70 71

3  SHOCKWAVES: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR 

61

of the nation as a whole,” he claimed in the report summarising the findings of his mission, released in 1919.76 However, Europe would only benefit from quickly and fully adopting the American principle: high salaries, low costs of production. That means: an improved mechanical equipment, thanks to the concentration of production, the standardization of products and machinery, production in series, and specialization, so to minimize the intervention and the use of labour; in turn, higher productivity, greater wealth and possibility of reducing almost indefinitely the workday while raising wages.77

It must be stressed that de Man’s endorsement of rationalisation was not unreserved: workers, once involved in a such a uniform and standardised process, could be easily deprived of the pleasure of craftsmanship and degraded to the rank of cogs in a machine out of their control—that was, in his view, the most disturbing aspect of scientific management, and one of the reasons why American workers rightly resisted the application of Taylor’s most reactionary principles.78 Yet, while ensuring better, more agreeable working conditions was certainly a cause worth fighting for, de Man underscored that only ever-­higher outputs would allow living standards to rise steadily and peacefully. In short, he came to view American capitalism as a cooperative and emancipatory enterprise rather than as a zero-sum game based on pure, naked exploitation, which allowed him to discard Marxism even on economic grounds. His penchant for economic social engineering would give a distinctly technocratic flavour to some of his subsequent writings on economics and industrial relations.79  Henri de Man, Au pays du taylorisme (Brussels: Le Peuple, 1919), 15.  Ibid., 98. 78  See ibid., 21–30, 81–89. Throughout the 1920s, de Man was to write extensively about the psychological implications of losing the joy in work. See in particular Hendrik de Man, Der Kampf um die Arbeitsfreude (Jena: Diederichs, 1927), based on fieldwork undertaken in Frankfurt between 1924 and 1926, sections of which appeared also elsewhere: see, for example, Hendrik de Man, “Die Repetitivarbeit als Kulturproblem,” Europäische Revue 3, no. 2 (1927): 88–97. 79  See de Man’s remarks on tentative experiments at introducing industrial democracy mediated by managers, in de Man, Au Pays, 67–79. In 1948 de Man observed that, following his 1918 trip to the United States, he started looking at “the construction of a socialist order as less dependent on the electoral success of parties and more on the development of common welfare (salut commun) across all classes, including those running the economy and the administration” [Henri de Man, Au-delà du nationalisme (Geneva: Les Éditions du Cheval Ailé, 1946), 281]. 76 77

62 

T. MILANI

In the final chapter of his The Remaking of a Mind, de Man ventured to predict that no overthrow of bourgeois institutions would occur in the United States: “I believe that in such an atmosphere socialism can evolve gradually and experimentally from capitalism by the mere play of the tendency to indefinite improvement in efficiency which is inherent to the cooperative system, and by the movement towards more and more political self-determination of the masses, which gives them the power to counteract the detrimental effects of monopolisation.”80 By no means, however, did de Man believe America was unique in that regard: even Europe, despite a very different historical background, could follow suit, provided an ideological reorientation took place. That was the aim of New Socialism, a doctrine he outlined with the purpose of suiting all industrialised nations, in a chapter at first entitled, tellingly enough, “The Remaking of the World.”81 New Socialism, de Man held, differed sharply from Bolshevism, the latter being “destructive of that very freedom” which was the “motive power” of positive change wherever democracy was already in place.82 The “germs” of Russian-style socialism, de Man warned, were becoming “as widespread as those of Spanish influenza,” and proved that social democracy was irremediably split into two opposing factions: on the one side, de Man placed those aiming at “the gradual seizure of political power through propaganda aimed at forming a majority,” retaining “all the correctives to unbound majority-rule implied by the constitutionally safeguarded liberties of opinion, press, speech, and opposition by representative bodies”; on the other, the advocates of “State socialism,” a system which would “entrust a tyrannic and incapable officialdom with a power more absolute than that of any Czar, since it would fetter not only the political, but also the economic” sphere.83 New Socialism would pursue bold economic reforms without suppressing the private sector. While claiming that “private property in land and in the principal means of production and transport” was “no longer justified,” de Man refrained from advocating extensive public ownership: “joint bodies representing both employer and the employed” were “the only means by which satisfactory conditions of labour” could be  De Man, The Remaking, 260.  See the original book manuscript in AHDM/AMSAB/891. 82  De Man, The Remaking, 273. 83  Ibid., 274–276. 80 81

3  SHOCKWAVES: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR 

63

“provisionally secured, and increased productivity attained, without augmenting the individual strain,” thus prompting “collaboration between the management and the managed.”84 Under the new system, the state would act as a regulator as well as a competitor of private enterprise. This mixed regime, categorised as “competitive and experimental socialisation,” would be less a monistic, command-driven structure than a pluralistic framework, putting the “incentive of competition and the constant increase of human productivity, which we owe to capitalism” at the service of “the ideals of freedom, equality of rights and chances, and universal solidarity, which we owe to democracy. Only thus can the reconciliation of the two equally vital, but still antagonistic, principles of individual liberty and social unity be effected.”85 By calling for a “revision” of the doctrine of class struggle, which overlooked the “much larger field […] where the interests of all classes coincide,” de Man came to share some of the fundamental tenets of Fabianism, a strand of thought he had previously scorned.86 * * * What to make of de Man’s elaborations on his war experience? For sure, their impact on the public was modest: we know, for instance, that The Remaking of a Mind failed to reach a large audience.87 Furthermore, not every argument laid down there and in La leçon de la guerre stands out as very deep or particularly original. Presenting the conflict as an all-out struggle between the forces of democracy and German imperialism had become a platitude, especially among English-speaking and  Ibid., 279–281.  Ibid., 281, 283–284. 86  Ibid., 284–285. A contemporary reviewer described the book as the account of “a conversion to what we should call a Liberal creed” [“Some books of the week,” The Spectator, no. 4781 (1920): 216]. In fact, de Man continued to regard himself as a fully fledged social democrat: see, for example, the preparatory materials for his last conference in Seattle: Labor Crisis is near in Belgium, AHDM/AMSAB/159. 87  In the United States the book hit the shelves in a critical moment, around six months before the Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty. In February 1920, the publishing house admitted that, while rating the book “very high” and having “strong hopes for its success,” it had not “struck the popular note,” mostly due to the “strong reaction against books connected with the war” [Letter from Charles Scribner’s Sons to de Man, February 1920, AHDM/IISG/187]. See also letter from Charles Scribner’s Sons to de Man, 2 July 1923, AHDM/AMSAB/893. 84 85

64 

T. MILANI

French-speaking social democrats.88 Nor did de Man avoid the pitfall of painting a too rosy picture of America, portraying it as a force for good.89 In particular, his admiration for Wilson led him to underestimate the mounting tide of conservatism that was soon to sweep American society—as de Man found out at his own expenses in 1920 when, having returned to the United States with the intention of applying for citizenship, he was forbidden to teach and put under police surveillance because of his left-­wing sympathies. Moreover, the Red Scare and the pro-business policies subsequently implemented by the Republicans would terminate or reverse the most ground-breaking experiments in workers’ control that de Man had witnessed and praised during the war.90 Nonetheless, from a wider perspective, de Man’s reflections are highly original, perhaps even unique. Psychologically, the trauma of the First World War stirred up in some veterans the feeling of belonging to a lost generation, crushed by an unparalleled degree of violence, whose faith in progress had been undermined and for whom a return to normality was impossible.91 For de Man quite the opposite is true: the conflict energised him, brought him into two countries he had not previously visited, and got him acquainted with new patterns of thought that prompted a substantial revision of his thinking. Ideologically, trench experiences often paved the way to a brutalised form of politics, underpinned by a bellicose civic religion.92 Once again, de Man moved in another direction: the more 88  See, for example, Arthur Henderson, A World Safe for Democracy (London: The Athenaeum, 1917); Emile Vandervelde, La Belgique envahie et le socialisme international (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1917). 89  De Man’s enthusiasm for the United States outstripped that of many American progressives. As psychologist Joseph Jastrow commented on The Nation, “M. de Man’s idealization of the American mind results from a too complimentary acceptance of profession for reality” [Joseph Jastrow, “Remaking a Mind,” The Nation, 110, no 2857 (1920): 433]. 90  See de Man, Après coup, 160–169. See also letter from the American Federation of Labor to Suzzallo, 19 March 1920, AHDM/AMSAB/156. After losing his job, a frustrated de Man returned to Belgium in late 1920 as director of the Ecole ouvrière supérieure, a newly created institution funded by the POB. 91  See the classic treatment of Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 1–2, 112–121. 92  See George L.  Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 3–11; Furet, Le passé d’une illusion, 34–40. Many scholars have linked the rise of totalitarian movements and regimes to brutalisation during the First World War, including Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14–18: Understanding the Great War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002), 235–237; Robert Gerwarth, “Fighting the Red Beast: Counter-Revolutionary Violence in the Defeated States

3  SHOCKWAVES: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR 

65

he put his own beliefs under examination the more he shrank away from zealotry and extremism. A comparison between his trajectory and that of former pacifists of the far Left such as the Frenchman Gustave Hervé, the Italian Benito Mussolini, the German Karl Liebknecht, and the Belgian Victor Serge is revealing. Like de Man, Hervé had been an unwavering opponent of militarism: he used to sign his editorials as Sans-Patrie and lost his job as a teacher for his convictions. In 1914, he abandoned insurrectionism, took the side of France, and celebrated the proletarian character of its army. He too rejected materialistic and rationalistic philosophies but eventually converted to belligerent and socially conservative nationalism whereas de Man claimed to have fought for progressive principles that were nobler than the defence, or the prestige, of a single country.93 First-­ hand experience of trench warfare ties de Man to Mussolini, who had become a towering figure of Italian revolutionary socialism due to his opposition to the Italo-Ottoman War of 1911. Yet Mussolini’s diaries, written between 1915 and 1917, are imbued with an exaltation of war which is absent from de Man’s wartime writings. Besides, Mussolini ended up theorising trincerocrazia, namely the rule of former war combatants in opposition to parliamentary institutions whilst de Man came to recognise the significance of the latter for the development of a pluralistic socialist society.94 Neither Karl Liebknecht nor Victor Serge abandoned their non-­ interventionist stance during the conflict. However, they became convinced, in 1917, that communism was a cause worth fighting for. Liebknecht, who had co-founded the IFSYPO with de Man, staunchly opposed German’s war effort through his movement Spartakusbund, a position that earned him a heartfelt tribute from his former comrade. In of Central Europe,” in War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War, eds. Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 52–71; Emilio Gentile, “Paramilitary Violence in Italy: The Rationale of Fascism and the Origins of Totalitarianism,” War in Peace, 85–103. 93  Compare de Man’s statement “the only way in which I ever felt any Belgian patriotism in the real sense of the world is by loving Belgium as a microcosm of Europe” to Hervé’s increasingly chauvinistic and authoritarian statements [De Man, The Remaking, 7; Gustave Hervé, La C.G.T. contre la nation (Paris: Éditions de la Victoire, 1920); Gustave Hervé, Lettre aux socialistes (Paris: Éditions de la Victoire, 1920)]. On Hervé, see Gilles Heuré, Gustave Hervé: itinéraire d’un provocateur: de l’antipatriotisme au pétainisme (Paris: Découverte, 1997), 247–286. 94  See Benito Mussolini, “Trincerocrazia,” Il Popolo d’Italia, December 15, 1917; Benito Mussolini, Il mio diario di guerra (Milan: Imperia 1923). On Mussolini, see Pierre Milza, Mussolini (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 163–217.

66 

T. MILANI

1919, following the Soviet example, Liebknecht proclaimed the establishment of a German Free Socialist Republic in Berlin, under which workers’ councils were meant to replace the bourgeois state. The insurrection failed and he was executed by the Freikorps. As for de Man, internationalism remained Liebknecht’s pole star—except that his hero was Lenin, not Wilson.95 Serge shared with de Man an early militancy in the JGS before turning to anarchism and moving to Paris. In 1914 he was in prison due to his connections with the Bonnot gang. Released, expelled from France, and then arrested again for having come back, he was sent to Moscow thanks to a prisoner swap deal in January 1919. There he joined the Communist Party, becoming a close associate of Trotsky. While the First World War pushed de Man to defend his country, an attraction to the Bolsheviks induced Serge to break with it and rediscover his Russian roots in the name of a universalist revolutionary ideology.96 Obviously, all these intellectuals parted ways: Hervé and Mussolini moved to the Right, Liebknecht and Serge to the Left. The important point is that all of them were, to an extent, radicalised and drifted away from liberal democracy; on the contrary, de Man veered towards it. His rupture with Marxism coupled with the appalling contrast between the cruelty of Bolshevism and the vitalism of the United States were key in this atypical development. The Remaking of a Mind and La leçon de la guerre deserve scrutiny also in the context of de Man’s intellectual journey. The most immediate change from his pre-war thinking was, of course, the unreserved acceptance of the most fundamental principle of democratic socialism: the idea that collectivism, if imposed by dictatorial means, would bring about slavery instead of equality. On that point, de Man’s aversion to Bolshevism echoed that of his old mentor, Kautsky.97

95  On Liebknecht, see Heinz Wohlgemuth, Karl Liebknecht: Eine Biographie (Berlin: Dietz, 1975), 366–394. On de Man’s appraisal of Liebknecht’s intellectual integrity and courage in challenging German propaganda, see de Man, The Remaking, 66–67. The stark choice between Wilson and Lenin—epitomising the contrast between the “democracy born out of the French Revolution” and “the primitive, incoherent, and brutal forms of Russian fanaticism”—was suggested by Albert Thomas in a famous editorial [see Albert Thomas, “Démocratie ou bolchevisme,” L’Humanité, November 9, 1918]. 96  See Victor Serge, Mémoires d’un révolutionnaire, 1901–1941 (Paris: Seuil, 1951), 53–79. On Serge, see Susan Weissman, Victor Serge: The Course is Set on Hope (London: Verso, 2001), 11–51. 97  See Karl Kautsky, Die Diktatur des Proletariats (Vienna: Ignaz Brand & Co., 1918).

3  SHOCKWAVES: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR 

67

Still, de Man had no interest in denouncing Leninism for being “in contrast with the essential and immutable principles of Marxist socialism,” as other social democrats did.98 His appetite for American culture led him to envisage a mixed economy that would spring out of a steady increase in productivity: in this he anticipated some trade unionists, such as Hyacinthe Dubreuil, who would extol the virtues of rationalisation in the late 1920s.99 His loss of faith in historical materialism and economic determinism spurred his interest in social psychology, in line with the teachings of Austrian psychotherapist Alfred Adler.100 Altogether, these elements made him a thinker difficult to pigeonhole, a far out figure who was eager to shift towards Fabianism and ethical socialism instead of standing in defence of the doctrinal legacy of the Second International alongside Kautsky, Vandervelde, and Blum.101 The inward-looking character of The Remaking of a Mind and La leçon de la guerre is a source of strength of those books but also their main limitation. Both weave an intriguing narrative of an ideological evolution yet the theoretical justification for it remains flimsy: de Man told the reader how and why he distanced himself from Marxism but did not explain why Marxism was supposedly doomed. Proving that would be his main intellectual concern during the following decade.

98  Léon Blum, Pour la vieille maison: intervention au Congrès de Tours (1920) (Paris: Librairie Populaire, 1934), 10. 99  See Hyacinthe Dubreuil, Standards: le travail américain vu par un ouvrier français (Paris: Grasset, 1929). On the American view of productivity and its spread across Europe after the First World War, see Charles Maier, “Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European Ideologies and the Vision of Industrial Productivity in the 1920s,” Journal of Contemporary History 5, no. 2 (1970): 27–61; Bruno Settis, Fordismi: storia politica della produzione di massa (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2016), 107–204. 100  See, for example, Alfred Adler, “Bolschewismus und Seelenkunde,” Internationale Rundschau 362, no. 4 (1918): 597–600. Whether de Man was already familiar with Adler’s work, which is extensively praised in Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus, is unclear. 101  On the differences between Continental social democracy and Fabianism, see Peter Beilharz, Labour’s Utopias: Bolshevism, Fabianism, Social Democracy (London-New York: Routledge, 1992).

CHAPTER 4

Turning the Old House Upside Down: Hendrik de Man and Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus

Seven years passed before de Man managed to turn the core underlying theme of The Remaking of a Mind—his rejection of Marxism—into a new book, provoking a debate which, for breath and depth, if not for animosity, is comparable to the revisionist controversy of the late 1890s. De Man’s main purpose, however, was less the calling out of the obsolete parts of Marx’s thought and more the renewal of the foundations of Western European social democracy by endowing its intellectuals with a brand new conceptual apparatus. Bernstein wanted Marxism to evolve; de Man strove to transcend it. His intention was to renew socialism in the light of recent developments in social sciences such as the emergence of sociology and, even more importantly, social psychology as new ways of understanding human behaviour and collective action. “Socialism must free itself from Marxism,” he wrote in his memoirs, summarising his state of mind in the mid-1920s. “Not like someone who trashes an enemy whom he had considered a friend for a long time, having suddenly realised he was wrong, but like someone who gets rid of formulas which, once alive and vivifying, have been surpassed by the evolution of facts since long time and have fallen back into the state of harmful prejudices.”1

1  De Man, Après coup, 191. De Man continued to praise Marx’s contribution to the history of socialism, reacting very positively to the publication of the Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte in 1932, in which he found the freshness and vitality that Marxism had lost in

© The Author(s) 2020 T. Milani, Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0_4

69

70 

T. MILANI

This chapter focuses on de Man’s critique of Marxism as expressed in his most relevant theoretical work, Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus. It also discusses how Kautsky and Vandervelde, who intended to preserve Marxism as the ideological cornerstone of Western European social democracy, took issue with it. The dispute between them and de Man, far from being a mere clash of ideas, revealed a generational divide between two leading figures of the Second International, sceptical about the benefits of jettisoning an established, long-revered doctrine, and a breed of activists in their mid-20s to early 30s, based all across Western Europe, persuaded that de Man had simply spotted the obvious, namely the inadequacy of Marxist categories in accounting for the post-1914 realities. By discussing the reception of Zur Pyschologie by three Belgians (Max Buset, Yves Lecoq, and Jef Rens), a Dutchman (Hendrik Brugmans), an Italian (Carlo Rosselli), and a Frenchman (André Philip), this chapter stresses not only the similarity between de Man’s preoccupations and theirs but also, in some cases, the existence of a common background between them and de Man, an element that helped make Zur Psychologie the rallying cry for significant sections of the social democratic youth. Finally, it will briefly evaluate the strength and weaknesses of de Man’s book. * * * The origins of de Man’s decision to return to full-time academic research must be traced to the frustrations of the early post-war period. Contrary to his expectations, the Versailles Treaty contradicted Wilson’s war aims and, to his mind, imposed a Carthaginian peace upon the vanquished.2 Unable to acquire American citizenship, his sympathies went now to the Weimar Republic, “the democratic and unarmed Germany” whose prospects of stability and economic recovery were threatened by the unmitigated hostility of its neighbouring countries.3 Belgium’s alignment with Poincaré’s foreign policy was another source of disappointment. the second half of the nineteenth century [see Hendrik de Man, “Der neu entdeckte Marx,” Der Kampf 25, no. 5–6 (1932): 224–229 and Der Kampf 25, no. 6 (1932): 267–277]. 2  See Un officier socialiste (Hendrik de Man), “La grande désillusion,” Le Peuple, January 26, 1919. 3  Henri de Man, “L’Allemagne nouvelle: l’esprit de mon enquête,” Le Peuple, June 12, 1921. On several occasions de Man publicly urged a revision of the Versailles Treaty, including a substantial reduction in war reparations and the end of the Rhineland occupation [see AHDM/AMSAB/209, AHDM/AMSAB/210].

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

71

When, in January 1923, the Theunis cabinet agreed to occupy the Ruhr, an outraged de Man resigned from the military reserve force, denouncing the “violence” of the government’s conduct, perpetrated through an army which had become “instrumental to a policy which is in flagrant contradiction with the principles I have fought for.”4 The choice of moving back to Germany reflected, therefore, not only a renewed commitment to social theory but also a sense of estrangement from the post-war settlement.5 It was in Darmstadt, where he taught social psychology, that de Man laid the groundwork of his magnum opus published in 1926, Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus.6 This hefty, carefully written book, first published in German, soon revised with minor changes and slightly abridged, then translated into all major European languages,7 covered a wide range of topics, distilling de Man’s efforts to recast socialism as a cultural and ethical phenomenon, rooted in the workers’ search for self-fulfilment in performing their job.8 According to de Man, Marxism—as was the case with other social theories elaborated in the nineteenth century—suffered from “determinism, causal mechanism, historicism, rationalism, and economic hedonism,” having failed to acknowledge that “the realisation of socialism does not depend upon the automatic fulfilment of an economic 4  Letter from de Man to the Ministry of National Defense, 12 January 1923, AHDM/ AMSAB/135. 5  See Henri de Man, “Sabotons la Guerre!,” Education-Récréation 2, no. 25 (1921): 418–419. De Man was also upset by the trade unions’ unwillingness to fully engage in international and transatlantic cooperation: see his remarks about Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of Labour in H. de Man, “A Blow at International Solidarity,” Seattle Union Record, October 6, 1920. 6  A rich but confused collection of notes about his research in Darmstadt, including many reviews of books related to social psychology, is available in AHDM/AMSAB/179–181. 7  Contracts were signed with publishing houses based in the Netherlands (June 1926), Belgium (November 1926), the United Kingdom (February 1927), Czechoslovakia (June 1927), Spain (September–October 1927), Sweden (October 1927), and Italy (November 1928) [see AHDM/AMSAB/905–912]. The first edition published in France, which appeared in 1929, was based on the German second edition, slightly shorter than the original one [see Henri de Man, “Avant-propos de la deuxième édition française,” in Au-delà du marxisme (Paris: Alcan 1929, 5)]. The second edition was also the one translated into Italian by Alessandro Schiavi, upon request by Benedetto Croce, as well as into English by Eden and Cedar Paul. 8  The theme of joy in work lies at the core of the Darmstadt lectures delivered in January– March 1924: see, for example, the undated draft “Arbeitsfreude,” AHDM/AMSAB/259. On this point, see Antoine de Decker, H. de Man: een ethisch ‘socialisme’? (Antwerp: De Sikkel, 1978).

72 

T. MILANI

law” but rather “upon the deliberate activity of the labour movement, upon an activity working in opposition to this alleged economic law, upon activity which aims at maintaining or restoring the workers’ joy in labour.”9 Contending that the “essential driving force of the labour movement” was mainly a “question of dignity” rather than a desire for material gains, de Man argued that working-class solidarity developed out of the “ancestral community instincts which had been modelled into ethical norms by Christianity and by the social experience of past centuries.”10 The socialist creed, therefore, did not stem from class conflict in itself but from an ongoing “moral revolt” (Auflehnung), infused with a specific “sense of justice” (Rechtsempfinden), against the separation of the producer form the whole process of production begotten by capitalism.11 De Man believed that, in many respects, capitalism engendered a “distaste for work” (Arbeitsunlust) for which further increases in prosperity or a less unequal distribution of wealth, however welcome, would be no solution. “Any mere change in property relationship,” he pointed out, would not suffice to make the industrial worker feel “the master of his own work.”12 Social democrats operating under the influence of Marx, de Man wrote, failed to realise that a key source of strength for socialism lay in the instinctive, spontaneous rejection of capitalism on psychological and moral grounds, and that workers who had permanently lost, or never experienced, joy in work could hardly establish or live in a cooperative society. Soviet Russia too, de Man held pointing to the New Economic Policy, ended up resorting to capitalist management techniques as communism had “not succeeded in providing the masses with new working motives in place of the old.”13 On the contrary, socialism would thrive only if “the endeavour to upbuild a better social system becomes in the long run an endeavour to make men better and happier, an attempt to develop the psychological forces which will make such a system possible.”14 In the second and third part of the book, de Man investigated the practical implications of neglecting non-rational factors for social democratic 9  Hendrik de Man, Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus (Jena: Diederichs, 1927), 14, 67. For clarity purposes, quotations are drawn from the English translation: Henry de Man, The Psychology of Socialism (London George Allen & Unwin, 1928), 23, 95. 10  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 39, 91; de Man, The Psychology, 57, 127. 11  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 40–41; de Man, The Psychology, 58–59. 12  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 46; de Man, The Psychology, 65–66. 13  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 49; de Man, The Psychology, 70. 14  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 52; de Man, The Psychology, 75.

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

73

parties across the Western world. The tendency to present socialism as the inevitable outcome of conflicting material forces, he argued, led social democracy to overlook intellectual renovation, turning Marxism into dogma and obliterating the “enduring spiritual creative force” which informed the different strands of socialist thought throughout history.15 In turn, such a stiff adherence to historical materialism estranged the intellectuals—broadly defined as skilled labour, namely those employees whose work is based on knowledge rather than on physical force—as social democrats got used to splitting up that class “into two or three fragments which they assign […] to the capitalist class, to the proletariat, or to the middle class” and treating its members as “camp followers” (Mitläufer) unless “they wholly adopt the mentality of the working masses.”16 The most remarkable consequences of this attitude, however, were party bureaucratisation and a crisis in internationalism, to which de Man devoted some of the most eloquent and penetrating pages of his book. At first the battle for political and social democracy, he noted, was waged by socialists with passionate, quasi-religious intensity: “This struggle for a remote end inspired them with a heroic emotional frame of mind. Their aims were a little vague, perhaps; but they were certainly such as tended to arouse enthusiasm.”17 The successful consolidation of party structures, however, resulted in the dwindling of that crusading spirit: “The leader becomes a professional leader, and his activity takes the form of office work. By slow degrees the motive of the organisation changes. The distant goal of the primary desires is not repudiated” but, in its daily activities, the organisation displays a tendency “towards self-preservation and towards becoming an end in itself.”18 Such a “displacement of motives” (Motivverschiebung) in socialist psychology caused the shift from a revolutionary to a predominantly reformist mindset among leaders and militants alike during the second half of the nineteenth century: social  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 141; de Man, The Psychology, 192.  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 154, 169; de Man, The Psychology, 209, 229. It is worth mentioning that de Man excludes declassed intellectuals from the group: “a socialist society could easily dispense with the ragtag and bobtail of Bohemia (Caféliteraten); but it could not continue to exist without the good will of engineers, men of science, school teachers, able civil servants, and statesmen” [De Man, Zur Psychologie, 168; de Man, The Psychology, 228]. De Man further elaborated on this topic in a conference given in May 1926: Henrik de Man, Die Intellektuellen und der Sozialismus (Jena: Diederichs, 1926). 17  H. de Man, Zur Psychologie, 214; H. de Man, The Psychology, 283. 18  H. de Man, Zur Psychologie, 215; H. de Man, The Psychology, 284. 15 16

74 

T. MILANI

democratic cadres started confusing “the cause of socialism with the cause of the party” as if the two were the same thing.19 To a large extent, trade unionism and the cooperative movement went down the same path. A similar set of unintended consequences, de Man claimed, operated with regard to the prevailing attitudes towards the state. The more the working class gained influence, the more social democracy was incorporated into the existing political system, holding power at local and, from time to time, national levels. As a consequence, the buoyant internationalism of the early days was gradually replaced by an emotional attachment to the institutions already in place, nurturing a widespread social patriotism that social democratic leaders proved unable to rein in. “Since the days of the First International,” de Man argued, “the working-class movement has undergone an increasing national differentiation of mentalities and methods; has displayed a growing tendency on the part of the national organisations towards intellectual autonomy; has manifested a progressive intensification of the motives leading the workers of the respective countries to be integrated as national communities.”20 Defying the expectations of Marx and Engels, social democratic parties had thus become “the true buttress of the State” across Europe.21 De Man was neither upset nor shocked by that ongoing trend as he understood social democracy as “a plurality rather than a unity,” and was keen to hail the national sentiment as “an integral part of the emotional content of the socialism of each country” insofar as it was tempered by a genuine commitment to humanitarianism and world peace.22 On the other hand, both bureaucratisation and the waning of internationalism raised serious doubts about the viability of Marxism as an intellectual framework for the 1920s. “Every organised intellectual movement,” de Man warned, “reaches a stage of development when the power of the organisation becomes the main obstacle to the realisation of the ideal on behalf of which the organisation was founded.”23

 H. de Man, Zur Psychologie, 221, 224; H. de Man, The Psychology, 292, 295.  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 229; de Man, The Psychology, 302. 21  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 235; de Man, The Psychology, 311. 22  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 246; de Man, The Psychology, 325. To him, “every socialist must be eager to overlook nothing which can possibly reinforce internationalism; but for that very reason every socialist must begin by recognising the reality of the conditions and the limitations which derive from the power of national sentiment” [De Man, Zur Psychologie, 357; de Man, The Psychology, 456]. 23  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 224; de Man, The Psychology, 296. 19 20

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

75

At that point, a radical turn both in its internal structures and in its underlying ideology becomes a matter of survival.24 De Man was therefore stressing the need for a new doctrine to “invigorate the pursuit of partial objectives by relating them to some great common end,” both domestically and internationally, and the book did indeed culminate in a call for “a renovation of socialist conviction by means of the moral and religious consciousness.”25 This was a long way from a detailed programme for action yet many passages of Zur Psychologie not only suggest de Man was consistent with the conclusions reached in The Remaking of a Mind but also reveal his growing fondness for British socialism.26 Among the remedies to the bureaucratisation, de Man put strong emphasis on the importance of involving workers in industrial management, as recommended by Guild socialism, “the most modern and the most carefully thought-out form of the socialism of intellectuals.”27 Although it is unclear whether de Man had already met its leading theorist, G.D.H. Cole, there is no doubt that he was well familiar with his work, especially Self-­ Government in Industry (1917) and Guild Socialism Restated (1920).28 24  On important issues, de Man’s analysis of party bureaucratisation echoed Robert Michels’ Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der Modernen Demokratie, first published in 1911. Michels, though, wrote the book after having left the SPD as he had concluded the establishment of a socialist society was impossible due to the oligarchic dynamics inherent to party politics. De Man was much less pessimistic at this stage, and the fact that Zur Psychologie was written from a self-professed socialist made it harder to dismiss its content as reactionary or biased. 25  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 347, 396–397; de Man, The Psychology, 445, 505. 26  This was at least as important as the influence of Jungsozialismus and of the German social democratic Junge Rechte represented by figures such as legal scholars Hermann Heller and Gustav Radbruch, theologian Paul Tillich, and activists Carlo Mierendorff and Gustav Dahrendorf, which is well documented in the literature: see, for example, Franz Walter, Nationale Romantik und revolutionärer Mythos: Politik und Lebensweisen im frühen Weimarer Jungsozialismus (Berlin: Verlag Europäische Perspektiven, 1986), 82–114; Stefan Vogt, Nationaler Sozialismus und Soziale Demokratie. Die sozialdemokratische Junge Rechte 1918–1945 (Bonn: Dietz, 2006), 25–102. 27  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 164; de Man, The Psychology, 222. 28  In an undated note, arguably written in 1919 or 1920, in preparation for a series of lectures on scientific management to be delivered in the United States, de Man explicitly mentioned Cole [see AHDM/AMSAB/158]. For further evidence of Cole’s influence on de Man, see de Man’s contribution to a seminar held in 1921 in Morlanwelz [see Henri de Man, “L’allocution du President de Man: la définition du contrôle ouvrier” and “L’aspect psychologique du contrôle ouvrier,” Compte rendu sténographique de la semaine syndicale tenue à Morlanwelz du 4 au 10 septembre 1921 (Brussels: Lucifer, 1921): 11–17 and 43–60 respectively] and, at a later stage, an essay devoted to industrial democracy [see Henry de Man,

76 

T. MILANI

Equally generous was his assessment of British Labourism, which he regarded as an example of dynamism, flexibility, and ability to withstand dogmatism in comparison with the SPD.  Without denying the often “opportunist” conduct of Labour, de Man cheered its “progressive” outlook: “British socialists, engaged in a daily struggle on behalf of immediate demands, which are, however, justified by ethical motives, can watch the growth of their achievements while animating all their activities with a moral enthusiasm whose inspiration widens as their reformist activities prove increasingly successful.”29 In his view, the “rapid advances of socialism in England” originated from the virtuous interaction between trade unions and “the most advanced members of the intelligentsia,” such as the Fabians.30 Finally, his support of democracy was unwavering. “To the Marxists, the labour movement is nothing more than a simple struggle between the interests of various classes; and they regard political democracy as only a means which will ensure the victory of the working class because the workers outnumbered the non-workers.”31 Social democrats, on the contrary, had to disavow the whole notion of dictatorship of the proletariat and appreciate the value of self-rule: “We must abandon the disastrous belief that there are ‘means’ independent of the ‘end’ […]. We must contrapose to the communist fallacy of a socialism without democracy, the proud conception of a humanitarian ideal which will consciously derive its energies from centuries of equalitarian aspiration.”32 This line of argument allowed de Man to entrench socialism into the core values of Christianity. Both socialism and Christianity, he wrote, stand for the principle that every human being has dignity and deserves respect. For this reason, “Christian sentiment remains one of the most bountiful sources of democratic and socialist convictions.”33 Here, de Man was veering towards Christian socialism, a strand of thought particularly strong both in

“Socialism and Industrial Democracy,” in The Socialism of Our Times: A Symposium, eds. Harry W.  Laidler and Norman Thomas (New York: The Vanguard Press-League for Industrial Democracy, 1929), 362–371]. Few scholars noticed that de Man’s intellectual relationship with Cole predates the 1930s. Among them, see Michael Harrington, Socialism: Past and Future (New York: Anchor, 1989), 96. 29  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 192; de Man, The Psychology, 256. 30  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 155, de Man, The Psychology, 210–211. 31  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 78; de Man, The Psychology, 110. 32  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 79; de Man, The Psychology, 111. 33  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 82; de Man, The Psychology, 116.

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

77

Germany and in Britain, and quite possibly drawing on to the work of the Fabian R.H. Tawney.34 * * * De Man’s endeavours to sever social democracy from Marxism while bestowing dignity on some of the quirks of British socialism, including its anti-materialistic outlook, could hardly have gone unnoticed, within and outside Germany.35 In particular, the book stunned two distinguished figures who had played a major role in de Man’s intellectual and political upbringing: Karl Kautsky and Emile Vandervelde. De Man invited Kautsky not to take criticism personally but both men knew that a book calling the ideology of the SPD into question compelled the party’s former main theorist to hit back, and the following controversy would inevitably unveil some “formal breaks” (formalen Brüchen) in their respective assessments of the past, the present, and the future of social democracy.36 Kautsky, then seriously ill and busy completing Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung, came out against Zur Psychologie in January 1927.37 Predictably, his review turned to be an unreconstructed defence of 34  In Zur Psychologie de Man made a direct reference to Tawney’s The Acquisitive Society (1921) [see de Man, Zur Psychologie, 165; de Man, The Psychology, 223], but he might have been aware of Tawney’s most recent book, in which the British historian argued that “compromise is as impossible between the Church of Christ and the idolatry of wealth, which is the practical religion of capitalist societies, as it was between the Church and the State idolatry of Roman Empire” [Richard H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study (London: John Murray, 1926), 286]. From an overview on British Christian socialism, see Norman Dennis and Albert Henry Halsey, English Ethical Socialism: Thomas Moore to R. H. Tawney (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Mark Bevir, The Making of British Socialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 215–297. 35  Between 1926 and 1928 Zur Psychologie received no less than seventy reviews in all major European languages. 36  Letter from de Man to Kautsky, 3 December 1925, AKK/IISG/DXVI/320. See also the letters from Luise Kautsky to de Man, 12 December 1925 and 17 February 1926, AHDM/IISG/190. 37  In 1927 Kautsky acknowledged that, in some cases, “revisions” of Marxism were “unavoidable” [Karl Kautsky, Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung. Vol. II (Berlin: Dietz, 1927), 630] but he also clarified that his own conception of history, as outlined in the book, was “built on that of Marx and Engels” and thus consistent with historical materialism as a method of inquiry [Karl Kautsky, “Eine Selbstanzeige,” Rote Revue 7, no. 6 (1928): 161]. It is rather evident that de Man’s and Kautsky’s attitudes towards Marxism diverged quite sharply at this stage.

78 

T. MILANI

Marx’s reputation and legacy. Without tackling the main arguments of the book, Kautsky quickly dismissed one of the fundamental premises of de Man’s thinking, that is the possibility of developing a non-materialistic theory of workers’ exploitation, criticised de Man’s lack of engagement with Marx’s economics, then flagged up a number of passages allegedly proving that de Man had misinterpreted Marx’s writings: “Presenting and criticising certain ideas that are impossible to find in Marx and that, at times, Marx himself rejected outright as ‘Marxist’ is a common technique among Marx’s critics. In this case, each Marxist has not only the right but, on occasions, the duty to refute that criticism as false by referring to what Marx actually said.”38 Kautsky was aware that Zur Psychologie was catching the interest of many emerging social democratic intellectuals. Yet the book’s impact left him unimpressed as he suggested that de Man, being a “talented writer,” had simply capitalised on a latent “disposition of spirit” already present in the youth: “war infused the generation grown up under its reign with great revulsion and disdain for systematic hard work” in social theory, and their lack of first-hand knowledge of Marx’s works made them well disposed towards revisionism.39 Most notably, Kautsky refused to concede that Zur Psychologie had made a significant, albeit controversial, contribution to socialist thought. Rather, claiming that Marxists had never neglected the role of intellectuals in society, he attacked de Man’s elitism, contending that his approach would result in “the establishment of the intellectuals as ruling class within the state,” which would oppress the working class rather than freeing it.40 To sum up, Kautsky bemoaned, de Man’s book was based on “empty assertions” and “inaccurate accounts of both the history of our party and our theories.”41 Kautsky’s hatchet job prompted an extensive reply by de Man, who went through a meticulous discussion of specific sections of Das Kapital in order to demonstrate his command of the original text.42 Nevertheless, no common ground could 38  Karl Kautsky, “Les ‘leçons’ de Henri de Man,” La Nouvelle revue socialiste 3, no. 22 (1928): 108–109. The text originally appeared as Karl Kautsky, “De Man als Lehrer. Eine Nachlese,” Die Gesellschaft 4, no. 1 (1927), 62–77. 39  Ibid., 110–111. 40  Karl Kautsky, “Les ‘leçons’ de Henri de Man (fin),” La Nouvelle revue socialiste 3, no. 23 (1928): 213. 41  Ibid., 216. 42  See Hendrik de Man, Antwort an Kautsky (Jena: Diederichs, 1927). This twenty-fourpage pamphlet was originally meant to be an article for Die Gesellschaft. The journal, however, refused to publish it, apparently not to give more visibility to de Man’s book [see

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

79

be found between the 73-year old co-editor of the Erfurt programme and a 42-year former protégé who had flatly rejected most of his mentor’s views.43 Seven years later, in October 1934, the two would cross swords once again after de Man referred to “the degenerate and ossified Marxism of social democracy during the last quarter of the previous century” epitomised by Kautsky and August Bebel, whose conception of the state had “an undeniable lingering odour of barracks.”44 The vitriolic language used by both suggests that no reconciliation had occurred in the meantime, nor had de Man softened his views about the shortcomings of German Social Democracy.45 Vandervelde’s initial attitude was less disparaging but he too wrangled with de Man over Marx’s legacy. In lecture given in Paris in May 1927, Le Patron—as Vandervelde was widely known—called Zur Psychologie “perhaps the most important work on socialism that has been published since the war” and praised de Man’s record as “a propagandist, academic, manual worker, as well as an intellectual, an educational director, and even a war volunteer.”46 Yet, echoing Kautsky’s scathing remarks, he voiced his dissatisfaction with a purely psychological explanation of the social inferiority complex and confessed his “astonishment” at some of de Man’s conclusions: “By departing from historical materialism,” Vandervelde warned, de Man was reverting to “the idealism of Jaurès but, whereas the latter, coming from an opposite pole, never stopped getting closer to Marx, de Man seems to have the preoccupation of moving away from it, and to replace the immanence of a class movement with the transcendence of a group of intellectuals.”47 To his mind, such an “aristocratic conception” was bound to collide with the “profound feeling” of ordinary social Hendrik de Man, “Vorbemerkung,” in Antwort, 1]. See also the letter from de Man to Hilferding, 17 January 1927 and his reply on 29 January 1927, AHDM/IISG/200. 43  De Man published a succinct account of Kautsky’s thought in occasion of the latter’s seventy-fifth birthday. In an otherwise generous assessment, de Man nonetheless stressed that Kautsky’s works ended up reflecting “the stable, comfortable course of social-democratic opportunism (trägen, behaglichen Strom des sozialdemokratischen Opportunismus)” [De Man, “Karl Kautsky.”]. 44  Henri de Man, “Le corporatisme socialiste contre l’étatisme,” Le Peuple, September 19, 1934. 45  See also Karl Kautsky, “Mon étatisme. Une mise au point de Karl Kautsky,” Le Peuple, September 29, 1934. 46  Emile Vandervelde, “Le marxisme a-t-il fait faillite?,” La Nouvelle revue socialiste 2 no. 18 (1927): 514. 47  Ibid., 514–515.

80 

T. MILANI

­ emocrats, who expected to rescue themselves, through their own cond scious actions, not be lifted by a “revolution from without.”48 De Man got back in less than a month, addressing a cohort of students in Brussels. Not only had Vandervelde misquoted him about the role of intellectuals within social democracy, de Man held, but he had also misinterpreted his conception of human agency: “There are no final causes that social science can know, neither ideological nor economic. It is the very principle of causality that I attack. And the method of this attack is psycho-­ analytic: I have tried to show that […] every sociological theory elevates to historical causes the current motives on which it wishes to act.”49 Even if Marxism was helpful in highlighting “le milieu,” for example the material conditions under which social democrats operated, its determinism could not enlighten the appeal of socialism itself.50 To strengthen his case, de Man took his critic as an example: “[I]n order to explain Vandervelde’s convictions, we must acknowledge an ethical purpose, the reaction of the thinking individual against the environment, which means that socialism is not only wanted but wanted as something just; it is necessary to presuppose an absolute scale of ethical values.”51 De Man elaborated on his statements in January 1928, this time stressing the existence of a generational divide. Recalling the times in which he used to criticise Belgian social democracy for not being Marxist enough, de Man noted the irony that Vandervelde was currently busy defending “Marxism against my heresies, whereas fifteen or twenty years ago, he defended his heretical politics against my Marxist orthodoxy.”52 Le Patron, he argued, was driven by a mixture of emotional attachment to the past and strategic calculations in dealing with other social democratic parties. According to de Man, Vandervelde, who “owes the foundations of his socialist thinking to Marx,” naturally resisted the idea of pursuing a new course; moreover, being “first of all the man of the International,” he was hostile to any endeavour that might jeopardise “the traditional cement” uniting Western European social democracy, namely orthodox Marxism.53 48  Ibidem. The second part of the speech was published as Emile Vandervelde, “Le marxisme a-t-il fait faillite? (fin),” La Nouvelle revue socialiste 2, no. 19 (1927), 5–12. The full lecture is in Emile Vandervelde, Études marxistes (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1930), 11–46. The original typescript can be found in AEV/IEV/IIA/50. 49  Henri de Man, La crise du socialisme (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1927), 11. 50  Ibid., 12. 51  Ibid., 14. 52  Henri de Man, Socialisme et marxisme (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1928), 31. 53  Ibid., 33.

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

81

However polite in his wording, de Man came close to levelling a charge of intellectual dishonesty against Vandervelde by suggesting that he refused to “sever the intellectual link which unites his party to the brotherly parties across the Rhine” due to his “temperament” and his “deep love for working class unity.”54 Vandervelde’s comprehensive assessment of Zur Psychologie appeared in March, first in L’Avenir social, the Belgian Labour Party’s official journal, and soon after in Die Gesellschaft—unsurprisingly, considering Vandervelde’s reputation as well as his personal and intellectual affinity with Kautsky.55 Having summarised de Man’s theses, Vandervelde credited him for some insightful observations on certain degenerations of social democracy, including the “excessive bureaucratisation of workers’ organisations.”56 However, he lambasted de Man’s “supersocialism” which, in his view, aimed at empowering intellectuals as a class not only distinct but also superior to the rest of the workers, and slated his “complete bergsonisme,” which he regarded as a drift towards irrationalism and an underestimation of how economic interests inflected human action.57 Furthermore, Vandervelde claimed that, in his zeal against Marx, de Man had created more than one straw man. For instance, a “brutally materialist Marxism, aggressively atheist” as the one depicted by de Man had been articulated only by a tiny number of radicals— including, Vandervelde jibed, the young de Man himself—and never crept into the social democratic mainstream.58 In a rejoinder, de Man insisted that he never intended to suggest intellectuals were naturally entitled to lead the labour movement. Rather, by calling for a “new Fabianism,” he envisaged “a movement of ideas—which at first entails little or no organisation— aimed at preparing individually its adherents to certain socialist tasks which do not fit in the immediate framework of collective class conflicts,” along the lines of the burgeoning cooperation between the Belgian Groupement universitaire d’études socialistes, the British Fabians, and the French CGT  Ibidem.  In 1928, Vandervelde hailed at Kautsky’s Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung as “the culmination of the great effort which the most illustrious of Marx’s disciples, now very old, has never stopped pursuing with an admirable persistence. No one better than him knows the letter and has penetrated the spirit of Marxism” [Emile Vandervelde, La psychologie du socialisme: à propos de trois livres récents: Karl Kautsky-N. Boukharine-Henri de Man (Brussels: Lamertin, 1928), 3]. Vandervelde’s review of Zur Psychologie was published as Emile Vandervelde, “Jenseits des Marxismus,” Die Gesellschaft 5, no. 3 (1928), 222–230. 56  Emile Vandervelde, “Au-delà du marxisme,” L’Avenir social, no. 3 (1928): 134. 57  Ibid., 135, 137. 58  Ibid., 137. The review was reprinted with minor changes in Vandervelde, La Psychologie du socialisme, 21–48, and in Vandervelde, Études marxistes, 87–127. 54 55

82 

T. MILANI

or the Heppenheim colloquium, that de Man was then helping to set up.59 Vandervelde, de Man went on, had misunderstood his analysis of the social inferiority complex. While admitting the existence of exploitation as an objective fact, de Man denied that material exploitation alone was enough to trigger the rise of a countermovement: “[T]he formation of the working class’ socialist mentality is not a direct consequence of its milieu of life but rather the product of a psychic reaction which presupposes a preliminary fixing of the mentality by certain moral beliefs and certain notions of social equality.”60 Hence, without establishing those cultural and ideological preconditions social democracy could hardly succeed, even under favourable economic conditions. De Man cited the United States, where capitalist expansion had not been matched by the rise of an equally powerful working class, as an example of the threats social democracy would face in the future, had it clung to an outmoded, materialistic, and deterministic outlook. The purpose of Zur Psychologie was therefore to underscore the need for a reaction, by lying down the real prerequisites of a successful strategy “through acts of conscious, reasoned and doctrinally motivated will.”61 Despite that falling-out, evidence suggests that, unlike in the case of Kautsky, the relationship between de Man and Vandervelde remained a warm one, leaving room for cooperation between the two in the future.62 * * * Kautsky’s and Vandervelde’s critical and at times embittered comments on de Man’s book confirm that Zur Psychologie was not a pleasant read for social democratic leaders. Brazen reformists who never really stomached orthodox Marxism, such as the director of the International Labour 59  Henri de Man, “Réponse à Emile Vandervelde,” L’Avenir social, no. 5 (1928): 260–261. The Heppenheim three-day conference, held in May–June 1928, gathered young socialists from the German-speaking world and featured de Man as keynote speaker on the topic “The foundations of socialism.” Although the group failed to get traction, largely due to its heterogeneity, the conference is an early example of transnational intellectual cooperation in which de Man engaged before his planist turn. The proceedings were published as Sozialismus aus dem Glauben: Verhandlungen der sozialistischen Tagung in Heppenheim a. B., Pfingstwoche 1928 (Zürich-Leipzig: Rotapfel-Verlag, 1929). 60  De Man, “Réponse à Emile Vandervelde,” L’Avenir social, 264. 61  Ibid., 270. 62  See, for example, the tone of the letter from de Man to Vandervelde, 20 February 1928, AEV/IEV/IV/157.

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

83

Organisation (ILO) Albert Thomas, were arguably much more positive about it.63 Yet it was among young militants looking for a new course that the book had the strongest appeal. A former teaching assistant of de Man then in his early thirties, Max Buset translated Zur Psychologie into French and got it released by the Belgian left-wing publishing house L’Eglantine in 1927.64 A First World War veteran, Buset was admitted to the Central d’éducation ouvrière established by de Man in 1920, then specialised in economics at the Université Libre de Bruxelles. He deepened his knowledge of British socialism as visiting student to Ruskin College, one of the most distinguished institutions devoted to workers’ education, in 1921, at the very moment Guild socialism was blossoming.65 Considering his experiences, it is hardly surprising that Buset was heavily impressed by Zur Psychologie, arguing that such “a masterful book,” far from epitomising “a simple passing vogue,” was causing “a singularly active ferment” within social democracy and was bound to “leave traces” there.66 Other university students in Brussels had the same feeling. Yves Lecoq, born in 1908, came across the Belgian version of Zur Psychologie and was pleased to find there insights from disciplines, such as pedagogy and psychology, which orthodox Marxists tended to dismiss as irrelevant. De Man’s work, Lecoq later claimed, was “precious” in bolstering “emerging convictions, rather sentimental at first,” but was also an endless source of intellectual and emotional stimulus, whose “breath” repeatedly fed his enthusiasm.67 Having 63  In a letter to Thomas, sent together with a copy of the French translation of Zur Psychologie, de Man introduced the book as “an attempt to lay down certain elements of a doctrine of that realistic and constructive socialism that you embody. And it is, besides that, a testimony of admiration for the admirable and tenacious activity which as director of the International Labour Office, you carry out at service of your faith” [letter from de Man to Thomas, 30 April 1927, FAT/ILO/CAT-7-489]. A few months later, having read the tract La crise du socialisme, Thomas expressed “sympathy” for de Man’s ideas, which he regarded as a “system” incorporating “the most living tendencies of our modern socialism” [Letter from Thomas to de Man, 4 November 1927, FAT/ILO/CAT-7-489]. 64  See letter from Buset to de Man, 10 May 1927, AHDM/IISG/146. 65  G.D.H. Cole is credited as one the most popular lecturers at Ruskin during the 1920s [see Harold Pollins, The History of Ruskin College (Oxford: Ruskin College Library, 1984), 38–39]. On Ruskin, see also the introductory leaflet Ruskin College: What Is and What It Stands For (London: Ruskin College, 1918). 66  Max Buset, “Au delà du marxisme,” L’Avenir social, no. 7 (1927): 198. 67  Yves Lecoq, “Quelques souvenirs sur Henri de Man,” Bulletin de l’association pour l’étude de l’œuvre d’Henri de Man, no. 3 (1975): 6–7.

84 

T. MILANI

met de Man in Frankfurt in December 1930, Lecoq admittedly developed “a kind of fascination with his personality,” not unlike many of his young collaborators, whose “constancy,” “fidelity,” and “devotion” he found remarkable.68 One of them, Jef Rens, had won a one-year fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in 1931 to study in Berlin but soon relocated to Frankfurt in order to attend the classes taught by the author of Zur Psychologie: “This work marked me, like many young people of my generation […]. The book of Henri de Man arrived at the right time to arouse the interest of the socialist youth. Au-delà du marxisme certainly did not satisfy us entirely but we found a language in it that was ours, as well as a lucid analysis of the problems of our time.”69 Rens’ curiosity was piqued also by the eclectic personality of de Man, a widely respected theorist very different from the uninspiring ideologues he had previously heard in Antwerp: “From time to time a leader came to give us a lecture on a so-called doctrinal problem. But these expositions were rather rare and most of the time heavily imbued with a Marxism more or less well understood.”70 In fact, de Man “did not fit the stereotype of the professor,” being athletic and loving open-air life.71 Besides, Rens recalled, he was a talented orator and an acute observer, thanks to his ability to stay focused: “undoubtedly, that force enabled him to consider social phenomena in a more thorough manner than we did, and to grasp certain aspects that we did not see.”72 The two became friends, retaining strong ties across politics and academia which proved mutually beneficial when de Man moved back to Belgium: Rens, then a trade unionist, turned into a key operative during the campaign for the Labour Plan while de Man helped him pursue a doctorate with a dissertation on German National Socialism, based on his fieldwork in Frankfurt.73 Such admiration, though, was not limited to a cohort of young Belgians. Even when reading Zur Psychologie did not lead to an immediate personal acquaintance with the author, the provocative nature of de Man’s thinking struck a chord with highly educated militants based in other countries already baffled by their own experiences in dealing with the working class.  Ibidem.  Rens, Rencontres, 45–46. 70  Ibid., 46. 71  Ibid., 47. 72  Ibid., 50. 73  Ibid., 51–55. On Rens’ background and relationship with de Man, see also “Interview with Jef Rens,” Socialism in Western Europe, 91–130. 68 69

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

85

This was the case of the Dutch Hendrik Burgmans, later on a prominent advocate of European federalism and founder of the College of Europe. As a 26-year-old teacher, Brugmans moved from Amsterdam, where he was born and had got the essentials of his political education, to the small town of Terneuzen, in the Zeelandic Flanders, in 1932, taking up a job at the local high school. There he was surprised to discover that the dockers who formed the backbone of the local branch of the Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij (SDAP) had developed a genuine sense of solidarity towards each other without having read “one line of Marx.”74 Moreover, they seemed uninterested in the grandiose debates social democratic intellectuals regularly sparked. On those grounds, Brugmans concluded that his “Marxist education did not correspond with the proletarian reality.”75 Zur Psychologie left a lasting mark on him, due to de Man’s inductive method, which led him to draw “his conclusions” about the labour movement “from his work as educator,” and to his insistence on “the national question,” as an important component of the workers’ identity which, according to Brugmans, Marxism fell short of explaining.76 De Man, Brugmans thought, was the natural heir of Bernstein, having provided a theoretical rationale for the daily “cultural reformism” he wished to undertake, both as a teacher and as an activist.77 A fervent supporter of the Dutch Labour Plan during the 1930s, Brugmans consistently defended de Man’s reputation as a thinker after the Second World War.78 Evidence of the influence of Zur Psychologie on the Italian anti-fascist Carlo Rosselli and the French economist André Philip, who similarly fell in love with the book despite coming from largely different personal, philosophical, and religious backgrounds, is even more compelling. Born in Rome in 1899 from an upper-class family of Jewish origins, Rosselli was no Marxist in his youth. Still, being steeped in the radical and 74  Hendrik Brugmans, A travers le siècle (Brussels: Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, 1993), 104. 75  Ibidem. 76  Ibid., 105. 77  Ibid., 108. 78  See, for example, Hendrik Brugmans, “Hendrik de Man,” Paraat, January 23, 1948. In this article, Brugmans, a distinguished member of the Resistance, also dismissed charges of collaboration against de Man. De Man read and briefly annotated the article [see AHDM/ AMSAB/593]. In 1952 Brugmans criticised de Man’s political record and attitude after Munich but also stated: “this does not prevent me from esteeming him” [letter from Brugmans to Lecoq, 10 January 1952, AHDM/IISG/570].

86 

T. MILANI

republication tradition of Garibaldi and Mazzini, he was a harsh critic of the monarchy and despised the conservative role played by the Catholic Church within Italian society. Hoping that the First World War would bring national unification to completion, Rosselli supported Italy’s intervention in 1915. Drafted in June 1917, he spent the winter of 1918–1919 as a member of an Alpini division on the north-eastern front, and was finally discharged with the rank of lieutenant in February 1920. Unlike de Man, Rosselli had therefore limited experience of trench life. The conflict, however, crushed his family—his older and beloved brother, Aldo, had volunteered and was killed in action in 1916—and shook the foundations of his patriotism.79 The war, Rosselli argued in 1924 while pondering the reasons why Italian fascism tended to appeal to the youth, had caused a “gigantic upheaval,” for those who had gone through it could hardly harbour illusions about the virtues of violence and, by the same token, had gained a much better grasp of politics: young soldiers who, Rosselli pointed out, “had left with an abstract ideal […] were put in the position of understanding many things that they would have missed, in their class or professional isolation.”80 On the other hand, most fascists, being too young to be drafted and therefore to face the realities of trench life, remained attached to an idealised conception of warfare: to them, “brotherhood, love, internationalism, peace” were meaningless words, “laughable ideals” to be replaced by “violence, strength, might.”81 By the time he was writing, Rosselli had embraced humanitarian socialism, becoming, according to the Italian standards of the age, a reformist, yet one of another stripe from older party leaders such as Filippo Turati, born in 1857, and Claudio Treves, born in 1869. Rosselli thought highly of the British Labour movement and of Guild socialism. Il sindacalismo (Trade Unionism) became the title as well as the topic of his final dissertation in social sciences, submitted in 1921 at the University of Florence. In his thesis, he praised G.D.H. Cole for having succeed in “imposing on the trade union movement, giving a concrete shape to vague, increasingly urgent demands and aspirations of the masses, the two fundamental 79  On Rosselli’s early years, see Nicola Tranfaglia, Carlo Rosselli: dall’interventismo a Giustizia e Libertà (Bari: Laterza, 1968), 11–31; Aldo Garosci, Vita di Carlo Rosselli (Florence: Vallecchi, 1973), 3–22. 80  Carlo Rosselli, “Inchiesta sui giovani (guerra e fascismo),” Libertà 1, no. 10 (1924), reprinted in Salvo Mastellone, Carlo Rosselli e “la rivoluzione liberale del socialismo”: con scritti e documenti inediti (Florence: Olschki, 1999), 153, 153–154. 81  Ibidem.

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

87

motives of struggle: workers’ control and self-government in industry.”82 In 1922 he visited Britain for the first time; he came once again one year later, together with his mentor Gaetano Salvemini, attending the Fabian Summer School, doing some research at the London School of Economics (LSE), developing contacts with the British Trade Union Congress (TUC), and meeting Cole and Tawney.83 Rosselli’s anglophile sentiments—further heightened by a third stay in London in 1924—put him at odds with the establishment of the Partito Socialista Unitario (PSU).84 As he fiercely stated in November 1923, for fifteen years the Italian socialist movement had been “suffering from intellectual paralysis […]. As the body of the party expanded, membership multiplied, the seats in city councils and in Parliament increased, the cultural level and the fervour of intellectual life declined at an impressive pace.”85 Three years before de Man, Rosselli argued that “the most serious mistake” made by reformist leaders during the previous decades was to “elevate the Marxist doctrine to official thought,” a move that inhibited further theoretical developments; “an honest theoretical evaluation” to be conducted on “essentially scientific and realistic grounds,” Rosselli insisted, was badly needed to sort out “what is alive and what is dead in Marxism.”86 In a curious anticipation of the confrontation between Kautsky and de Man, the Marxist philosopher Rodolfo Mondolfo warned that dismissing Marx’s thought would result in depriving the socialist movement of intellectual rigour and of a proper historical consciousness.87 In his rejoinder, Rosselli 82  C. Rosselli, “Il sindacalismo,” unpublished manuscript, AGL/ISRT/3–4/3.1. His main findings appeared in an article wherein Rosselli categorised Cole as “by far the most original” advocate of Guild socialism [C.R. (Carlo Rosselli), “Il movimento operaio,” La Rivoluzione liberale 3, no. 13 (1924): 54]. 83  Letters from Carlo Rosselli to Amelia Rosselli, 28 July 1923, 31 July 1923, 6 August 1923, 14 August 1923, 26 August 1923, 30 August 1923, 2 September 1923, reprinted in I Rosselli. Epistolario familiare di Carlo, Nello, Amelia Rosselli, 1914–1937, ed. Zeffiro Ciuffoletti (Milan: Mondadori, 1997), 158–170. 84  The PSU gathered reformists expelled from the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) in 1922, after its seizure by the maximalist wing. Rosselli eventually joined the PSU in fall 1924, following the assassination of one of its deputies, Giacomo Matteotti. On the PSU, see Gaetano Arfé, Storia del socialismo italiano (Turin: Einaudi, 1965), 338–369; Il socialismo riformista tra Giolitti e il fascismo: Turati, Matteotti, Rosselli, ed. Nicola Colonna (Bari: Palomar, 2005), 51–91. 85  Carlo Rosselli, “La crisi intellettuale del Partito Socialista,” Critica sociale 33, no. 21 (1923): 326. 86  Ibidem. 87  See Rodolfo Mondolfo, “Le attività del bilancio,” Critica sociale 33, no. 21 (1923): 328–330.

88 

T. MILANI

underscored, among other things, a generational gap between his views and those of his critics: “The ‘elderly’ often believe that socialism and socialist culture are to be passed from generation to generation, almost by endosmosis. Not at all: you must be ready to start all over again!”88 Given these premises, it comes as no surprise that Rosselli found in de Man a kindred spirit.89 Arguably, Rosselli’s interest in Zur Psychologie can be traced from late 1927 to early 1928, soon after the French edition became available.90 By then, Rosselli was bearing the consequences of his anti-fascist activism. Having helped to arrange Turati’s escape to France, he was sentenced to ten months of imprisonment on the island of Lipari. There he plunged into study, and evidence suggests that de Man’s book had a huge impact on him. In a set of personal notes written in December 1928, Rosselli expressed unreserved admiration for Zur Psychologie and his author: “Here is a book, indeed here is the book, my book, the book that I had dreamed of writing so many times, so often begun, always abandoned. It is the courageous, honest, fierce confession of a disenchanted Marxist, or rather of a committed and practising socialist who sees the Marxist verb under the light of the facts and of his own experiences.”91 After summarising de Man’s tortuous life, including the “fundamental, revolutionary, shocking” experience as soldier during the First World War, Rosselli carefully scrutinised all the major claims in Zur Psychologie, which he repeatedly endorsed: the blistering attack on the “Vestals of the sacred Marxist heritage,” 88  Carlo Rosselli, “Aggiunte e chiose al bilancio marxista,” Critica sociale 33, no. 23 (1923): 359. For further criticism by Mondolfo, see Rodolfo Mondolfo, “Contributo a un chiarimento di idee,” Critica sociale 34, no. 1 (1924): 14–16. 89  Compare de Man’s views to Rosselli’s in July 1926: “I do not believe in the scientific demonstrations of socialism; I do not believe to possess the absolute truth; I do not intend to yield to the dogma, I do not think I hold the key to the future in my own pocket […]. I am socialist by culture, by reaction, but also—and I say this loudly in order to be heard by some absolute determinists or shrivelled Marxists—by faith and sentiment. I do not think that socialism will occur and that the working class will assert itself in history due to an inevitable evolution of things, apart from human will” [Carlo Rosselli, “Liberalismo socialista,” La Rivoluzione liberale 3. no. 29 (1924): 116]. 90  In October 1928, the dean of Italian anti-fascists Benedetto Croce highly praised the book for its “great efficacy” and “high interest” [Benedetto Croce, “Au delà du marxisme,” La Critica, no. 26 (1928): 460]. It is possible that Croce’s positive remarks influenced Rosselli, considering that La Critica was held in high esteem by anti-fascist elites. In 1929, Rosselli recommended the translation of Zur Psychologie into Italian: see letter from Carlo Rosselli to Amalia Rosselli, 24 February 1929, reprinted in I Rosselli, 447–449. 91  Unpublished notes, ACR/BNC/VIII/1.

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

89

namely the leaders of the Second International; the failure of Marxism in providing “a faith” to be proven in practice; the lack of joy in work as the main source of “discontent of the working class.”92 Particularly relevant to him—and unsurprisingly so, in the light of the Italian situation—was de Man’s energetic defence of democracy, coupled with a neo-Fabian emphasis on intellectuals as pivotal actors within social democracy. Being fully sympathetic with de Man’s attempt to put “social science at the service of will,” Rosselli argued that Zur Psychologie would one day be regarded as a watershed in the history of socialist thought.93 Socialismo liberale, Rosselli’s most ambitious theoretical work, written in 1928–1929 and first published in French in 1930, drew heavily on de Man’s critique of Marxism, “a picture which cannot be more suggestive or more powerful.”94 Although Rosselli’s main concern was to develop an inclusive, progressive ideology appealing to a wide range of anti-fascists, a fundamental affinity between Zur Psychologie and Socialismo liberale could be easily spotted.95 Through Rosselli’s book and the official journal of Giustizia e Libertà, house organ of a clandestine movement that Rosselli had co-founded, some of de Man’s main ideas crept in the Italian anti-fascist milieu.96 Nor would this fascination die out at the end of the decade: Rosselli  Ibidem.  Ibidem. 94  Carlo Rosselli, Socialisme libéral (Paris: Valois, 1930), 108. The fifth chapter of the French edition was entitled “‘Au delà du marxisme,’” a clear tribute to de Man (see ibid., 101–118). Rosselli managed to get Socialismo liberale published once in Paris after having fled from Lipari in July 1929. On his escape, see Francesco Fausto Nitti, Escape: The Personal Narrative of a Political Prisoner Who Was Rescued from Lipari, the Fascist “Devil’s Island” (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1930). 95  A French reviewer already familiar with de Man’s thought even contended that Rosselli’s book offered “nothing new” from a theoretical perspective [G.J. (Gustave Joly), “Carlo Rosselli: Socialisme libéral,” Critique sociale, no. 1 (1931): 18]. 96  See, for example, Magrini [Aldo Garosci], “Il nostro socialismo. II—Giustizia e libertà,” Giustizia e libertà, no. 2 (1934): 1–2. Rosselli’s ideas, however, never became dominant within the anti-fascist camp. An Italian edition of Socialisme libéral appeared in 1945 but had an extremely limited circulation. The original Italian manuscript was released as a monograph only in 1973. Although Rosselli’s reputation dramatically rose after his killing by fascist thugs in 1937, his main book was generally poorly known. Even authors who came to similar conclusions in the late 1930s apparently did it without being familiar with Socialisme libéral: see Aldo Capitini, “Sull’antifascismo dal 1932 al 1943,” Il Ponte no. 6 (1955): 848–854. On the weakness of Italian planism, see Leonardo Rapone, “Il planismo nei dibattiti dell’antifascismo italiano,” in Crisi e piano: le alternative degli anni Trenta, ed. Mario Telò (Bari: De Donato, 1979), 269–288. 92 93

90 

T. MILANI

subsequently corresponded with de Man, developed close relationships with French neo-socialists, and attended the first planist conference at Pontigny in 1934.97 André Philip was presumably more attracted by the ethical and quasi-­ religious conception of socialism laid bare in Zur Psychologie than by any war experience or growing discontent with party politics but, as for Rosselli, an early passion for Britain came also into play. Being born in June 1902, Philip was too young to be drafted during the First World War. Nevertheless, he was deeply affected by the violence brought about by the conflict and grew up determined to reconcile his Protestant faith with the pursuit of social justice. In a letter to a friend written in July 1920, Philip voiced his discomfort with Marx’s materialism: “You call me a Marxist; let’s distinguish, please […]. Except for a few points that I think are inaccurate, I admire Marx as an economist, but I cannot accept his supposedly philosophical ideas on historical materialism […]. Believing that a revolution will be brought about by economic forces and by personal or class interests, that’s stupid. Interest is undoubtedly an excellent instrument of conservation, it is not creative.”98 While studying law in Paris, Philip met Élie Halévy, an eclectic historian who taught a popular course on British socialism and had strong connections with the Fabians.99 Having developed an interest in British trade unionism, Philip spent two summers in England, in 1921 and 1922, making good use of G.D.H. Cole’s personal library in Oxford.100 The published version of his doctoral thesis reveals the extent to which Philip had become intrigued by Guild socialism.101 To him, Cole and his followers were “revolutionaries,” animated by “a profound idealism” and even “a true mysticism” who nonetheless recoiled from dogmatism and the stiffness of systemic thought: “Guild Socialists 97  On the de Man-Rosselli correspondence, which presumably went lost, see letter from de Man to Tasca, 4 November 1933, FAT/FGF/237. 98  Letter from Philip to Laplane, 13 July 1920, cited in Loïc Philip, André Philip (Paris: Beauchesne, 1988), 142–143. 99  On Halévy, see K.  Steven Vincent, “Elie Halévy and French Socialist Liberalism,” History of European Ideas 44, no. 1. (2018): 75–97. 100  Philip expressed gratitude to the Coles in the preface to Guild-socialisme et trade unionisme to whom the book is dedicated [see André Philip, Guild-socialisme et trade unionisme: quelques aspects nouveaux du mouvement ouvrier anglais (Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1923), 8]. 101  Philip would later declare that his doctoral thesis encapsulated the essence of his entire political thought [see Philip’s interview with Francis Jeanson, in Philip, André Philip par luimême, 252].

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

91

have not sought to establish a dogma, to deduce from their principles the consequences of an absolute logical rigor, to constitute, by pure reasoning, an ideal-type of society […]. They wanted first and foremost to educate, fuelling a revolutionary realism among workers that would enable them to solve all the problems of the day, according to the revolution to come.”102 By putting forth a moral, rather than economic, argument against capitalism, they acknowledged the value of craftsmanship: “Their aim […] is to provide the worker with the most complete independence so his work can become a joy for him.”103 Despite not sharing their overoptimistic conception of human nature, Philip praised Guild socialists for their anti-statism and faith in the workers’ capacity of self-government as well as their “endeavour to reconcile” elements from both revolutionary socialism and reformism.104 In the ethics of trade unionism, Philip found an antidote not only to selfishness but also to a wider spectrum of utilitarian and materialistic principles of conduct, the replacement of “selfish individualism” with “a spirit of fraternal help and reciprocal devotion.”105 The contrast between the vitality of trade unionism and the constraints imposed by parliamentary tactics lay at the core of Philip’s second book on Britain, L’Angleterre moderne: le problème social, l’expérience travailliste, published in 1925, which anticipated several aspects of de Man’s critique of social democratic practice. Discussing Ramsay MacDonald’s short-lived minority cabinet, Philip highlighted the paradox of a party which “remained in office only by giving up its programme.”106 In his view, that impasse originated from Labour’s difficulties in coping with the new dynamics sparked by the First World War: on the one hand, a higher degree of government intervention and control over the economy; on the other, higher levels of concentration and collusion in business. According to Philip, MacDonald’s inability to capitalise on the increasingly Left-­ leaning tendencies of trade unions spoke volumes about the need for a fresh, ground-breaking economic programme and, more generally, a clearer set of goals for contemporary social democracy. Warning against the temptation of making “new concessions” to the Liberals in order to return to power, Philip maintained that “left-wing labour” (le travaillisme  Philip, Guild-socialisme, 20–21.  Ibid., 28. 104  Ibid., 395. 105  Ibid., 410. 106  André Philip, L’Angleterre moderne: le problème social, l’expérience travailliste (Paris: Crès, 1925), 241. 102 103

92 

T. MILANI

de gauche) was the only force capable of carrying out a genuine revolution by legal means, that is by establishing workers’ control over industry.107 Another element that Philip and de Man had in common was a direct knowledge of the United States and its industrial system. Thanks to the support of the French economist and technocrat Charles Rist, Philip secured a scholarship from the Rockefeller Foundation and travelled across the North and the West, visiting New York, South Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin. As de Man did during his stay, Philip repeatedly took lowpaid jobs to get acquainted with members of the working class.108 His analysis of scientific management, laid down in Le problème ouvrier aux Etats Unis, released in 1927, is remarkably similar to de Man’s Au Pays du Taylorisme, although Philip’s misgivings about the extension of the American model of industrial relations to Europe reflected the much more conservative atmosphere in which the book was written. “American capitalism holds that an omnipotent employer, by following exclusively his interest (in seeking the optimal exploitation of the worker), can at the same time achieve the happiness of the workers and the social progress,” Philip observed and recognised that “undoubtedly scientific management had accomplished an excellent organisation of the workshops; thanks to it, the United States had reached their extraordinary prosperity.”109 Yet he also pointed out that, under Taylor’s principles, “the worker is absorbed in a mechanical gear which he has to endure without seeking to understand it; this leads to a degradation of the worker’s function within the industrial life of the country, to a diminution of the personality which can become of extreme gravity.”110 American trade unions, therefore, were supposed to fulfil three tasks: “1 Work with the bosses to attain the maximum production; 2 Fight against the bosses to obtain a fair share of the wealth created; 3 Preserve the intellectual and moral autonomy of their members and oppose an original philosophy to the bourgeois conception of the world.”111 In the long run, Philip ventured to predict, American capitalism could override trade unionism due to the poor organisation of the latter, bringing about “the most perfect example of a stabilisation of capitalism through the dictatorship of the employers”;  Ibid., 242.  See letter from Philip to his mother, 13 March 1926, FAP/AN/625/AP/4. 109  André Philip, Le problème ouvrier aux Etats-Unis (Paris: Alcan, 1927), 216. 110  Ibid., 224. 111  Ibid., 226. 107 108

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

93

establish an enduring cooperation with the union by “integrating the labour movement within the capitalist economic system”; or collapse due to an unpredicted crisis caused by external factors.112 It is noteworthy that Philip, no less than de Man, continued to show interest in North America throughout the 1930s, as his unsuccessful attempt to return to the United States as an envoy for the ILO in 1931 and his 1935 detailed discussion of the New Deal indicate.113 Back in France, having been appointed professor of political economy in Lyon, Philip read Zur Psychologie and decided, together with his colleague Bernard Lavergne, to popularise de Man’s ideas in 1928 by publishing a selection of its most significant excerpts.114 By then, Philip had already met de Man and the two were in friendly terms.115 In his introductory essay, Philip claimed that a socialism was going through a “crisis of growth” and only a radical revision of its theoretical foundations would save it from becoming “a doctrine without practice coupled with a practice without doctrine.”116 Changes in the capitalist mode of production, by offering employees the prospects of higher living standards in exchange for more efficiency, posed at least a threefold threat to the working class: corporatism, the increased tendency of skilled labour to take the side of the employers; nationalism, the temptation of raising barriers to protect domestic markets; and conservatism, the danger that increased prosperity would induce workers to abandon the pursuit of higher moral ideals. In 112  Philip, Le problème ouvrier, 558. Philip’s ambivalence towards scientific management can be contrasted with that of other young social democrats more positive about the accomplishments of American capitalism, such as Jules Moch [see Jules Moch, Socialisme et rationalisation (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1927)]. 113  See letter from Thomas to Philip, 25 June 1931, FAP/AN/625/AP/4; André Philip, La crise et l’économie dirigée (Paris: Cluny, 1935), 151–178. 114  As Lavergne noted in his foreword, the book seemed too heavy and dense to be accessible to the general public [see Bernard Lavergne, “Avertissement,” in André Philip, Henri de Man et la crise doctrinale du socialisme (Paris: Gamber, 1928), 15–16]. See also letter from Lavergne to de Man, 28 January 1928, AHDM/IISG/253. De Man himself summarised the main findings of the book for the French public in an article for Monde, whose title drew from Philip’s: see Henri de Man, “La crise doctrinale du socialisme,” Monde 2, no. 76 (1929): 10–11. 115  See the letter from Philip to Gounelle, FEG/BPF/Mss.1670, 35, 10. According to Jacques Poujol, this undated letter, in which Philip mentioned that he hosted de Man in Lyon, was written in early 1928 [Jacques Poujol, “L’entrée en politique du chrétien André Philip,” in VV.AA., André Philip, socialiste, patriote, chrétien (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2005), 38]. 116  Philip, “Socialisme et rationalisation,” in Henri de Man et la crise, 19–20.

94 

T. MILANI

order to meet those challenges, Philip held that socialists, “instead of fighting rationalisation,” had to “direct and control it, making in all concrete cases the necessary distinction between the ‘science of production’ and its use by capitalism.”117 But, even more importantly, they had to debunk the myth of a complete overlap between the socialist idea and the immediate interest of the working class: “the socialist task” was “an endeavour of emancipation” on political and moral grounds, rather than a simple redistribution of resources.118 To Philip, de Man’s approach enabled social democracy to shift “the class struggle from an economic to an ethical plan,” and to foster a “spiritualist realism” (réalisme spiritualiste) through which socialism could recover “its revolutionary strength and old energy”: the “acquisitive motive” would be ultimately replaced with the “absolute moral ideal of Christianity.”119 A few years later, Philip would be at the forefront of the campaign for a French Labour Plan, following the Belgian example. * * * The highly divergent reactions to the publication of Zur Psychologie point to the inevitably divisive character of the arguments set out in the book. Kautsky and, more subtly, Vandervelde threw doubts on de Man’s actual grasp of Marx’s philosophy. However, de Man himself had stated that his target was not so much the author of Das Kapital as the way his thought had been received and absorbed into social democracy, “the elements of Marxist teaching which live on in the labour movement, in the form of emotional valuations, social volitions, methods of action, principles, and programmes. Our concern is, not with the dead Marx, but with living socialism.”120 Nevertheless, Kautsky’s defensive and uncompromising response did not originate from a misunderstanding about de Man’s intentions. Truth be told, as for his condemnation of Bernstein, this scolding reflected his “psychological investment in Marxism” coupled with the steadfast conviction that once deprived of “the theoretical framework which he had laboriously erected,” social democracy would “flounder in 117  Ibid., 41. On this, see also André Philip, “La rationalisation et le problème doctrinal du socialisme,” La Nouvelle revue socialiste 3 no. 24 (1928): 299–310. 118  Philip, “Socialisme et rationalisation,” in Henri de Man et la crise, 45. 119  Ibid., 49, 50, 53. 120  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 5; de Man, The Psychology, 16.

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

95

the morass of petty politics and narrowly focused economic demands”121— an anxiety that his self-exile in Vienna and post-war fall of grace with the SPD probably intensified.122 Still, a major difference emerged between his outlook and de Man’s: while Kautsky believed that social democracy had at times suffered from an insufficient or distorted penetration of Marxism within the labour movement, de Man blamed orthodox Marxism for most of social democracy’s inadequacies.123 On this issue, Vandervelde had no hesitation in siding with Kautsky.124 The proposed therapy could therefore be no more different: less Marxism according to de Man, more and better Marxism according to Kautsky and Vandervelde. On the contrary, those who admired Zur Psychologie were much less concerned with anchoring social democracy to Marx’s authority than with revisiting the foundations of socialism in the light of their own philosophical, moral, and existential questions, and in that respect de Man’s approach truly resonated with them. The decision to cover a great variety of themes in the book allowed de Man to reach out to a wide pool of readers, each of whom found food for thought in it without necessarily coming to exactly the same conclusions. Moreover, it is plausible that the evocative style in which large sections of Zur Psychologie were written as well as some conceptual ambiguities upon which de Man was eager to play helped fire up the imagination of the public.125 However, in hindsight, the impact of

121  Gary P. Steenson, Karl Kautsky, 1854–1938: Marxism in the Classical Years (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978), 120. 122  See David M. Morgan, “The Eclipse of Karl Kautsky, 1914–1924,” in Karl Kautsky and the Social Science of Classical Marxism, ed. John H. Kautsky (Leiden-New York: E.J. Brill, 1989), 57–67. 123  Compare Kautsky’s distinction between “primitive” and “more mature” forms of Marxism [see, e.g., Karl Kautsky, “Marxismus und Philosophie,” Die Gesellschaft, 1 (1924), 313] with de Man’s provocative statement that “all Marxism is to-day ‘vulgar Marxism’” [De Man, Zur Psychologie, 324; The Psychology, 416]. 124  See, for example, Emile Vandervelde, Faut-il-changer notre programme? Avant-projet de révision (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1923), 104–112. 125  See, for example, how he approached the highly controversial issue of the use of revolutionary means: “Do I believe in the revolution? My answer is that the older I grow the more revolutionary do I feel, and the less do I believe in the revolution. I am a revolutionist: this means that the transition from a capitalist system to a socialist system is for me a spiritual motive which can only enter my mind as the conception of an antagonism between two incompatible moral principles. […] I want to work at something far profounder and more essential than would be any revolution in methods of government. What matters beyond everything is the way of living” [De Man, Zur Psychologie, 393; The Remaking, 500].

96 

T. MILANI

the book had probably less to do with these elements than with a couple of big, bold, provocative claims that lay at its core. The first was that the fate of social democracy would not be determined by the numerical expansion of the organised working class but by the strength of socialist impulses and convictions within society at large. In fact, de Man adamantly stated that socialism should not be confused with proletarian class interest and that the material gains of the labour movement might not necessarily result in an advancement of socialist values.126 The second was that intellectuals should take responsibility for cultivating and spreading those values deemed necessary for the moral and social renovation of all classes, without which true socialism would never come to fruition.127 Altogether, these insights informed a spirited exhortation to abandon passivism and acquiescence: If we rely on ‘evolution’, and trust to the future to bring what we desire, we are vanquished by the time at the very start. The future is something which we have to create […]. The best safeguard against a lack of concordance between the distance of the aim and the scope of the action is that we shall adapt the distance of the aim to the scope of the action. By thus reducing the distance between ourselves and our goal, we shall intensify the creative force enabling us to advance towards it. Aims live only in our present actions; their future existence is illusion, whereas their present existence is reality.128

In a nutshell, voluntarism was the single, overarching driving force behind de Man’s book.129 Obviously, Zur Psychologie was not flawless. His critics highlighted de Man’s reluctance to get into the specifics of the economic institutions that would be consistent with his conception of socialism, as observed by thinkers who had also rejected deterministic interpretations of Marx’s 126  See, for example, de Man, Zur Psychologie, 176, 398–399; de Man, The Psychology, 25–28, 125–131, 191–192. 127  See, for example, de Man, Zur Psychologie, 15–18, 90–93, 141; de Man, The Psychology, 234–235, 507–508. 128  De Man, Zur Psychologie, 370; de Man, The Psychology, 473. 129  For further discussion, see Peter Dodge, “Voluntaristic Socialism, an Examination of the Implication of Henri de Man’s Ideology,” International Review of Social History 3, no. 3 (1958): 385–417; Adriaan M.  Van Peski, Hendrik de Man: ein wille zum sozialismus (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1963); Pierrette Rongère, “L’apport de Henri de Man au socialisme contemporain,” in Socialisme et éthique, ed. Roger Reibel and Pierrette Rongère (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1966), 61–119.

4  TURNING THE OLD HOUSE UPSIDE DOWN: HENDRIK DE MAN… 

97

works.130 A second major limitation of the book was the lack of a fully developed pars construens, either in form of a programme for action or through a set of guidelines by which social democracy could be rescued from its crisis. Nonetheless, it seems sensible to suggest—also on the basis of the evidence shown in this chapter—that, ultimately, the significance of Zur Psychologie was no less sociological than theoretical. In the words of Dan S.  White, de Man “broke the ice” by bringing “issues which had been submerged to the surface. His audacity encouraged others who shared his experience and outlook to join in widening the peripheries of the critical space he had opened.”131 Zur Psychologie provided above all a thrilling stimulus—as, looking back, de Man himself realised.132 The fact that a “demanism” in the narrow sense of the word did not emerge at this stage—being, if anything, a vague orientation, a sensibility fuelled by a common frustration with mainstream social democratic politics—did not prevent the book from becoming a reference point for a wide and heterogeneous group of figures in the late 1920s. For all their marginality within social democracy, these dissident voices were in a position to cooperate across borders, have intellectual exchanges, and feed debates that would otherwise have remained clustered within national boundaries. Eventually, when the author of Zur Psychologie returned to public life, his credibility as a leader was strongly enhanced by his pre-existent intellectual reputation. And many of those who bought his argument about the necessity of going beyond Marxism were finally ready, in the turbulent climate of the early 1930s, to actively promote de Man’s new creation—planism.

130  For instance, Gramsci castigated de Man for having produced “a new abstract sociology” [Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere. Vol. III: Quaderni 12–29, ed. Valentino Gerratana (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1975), 857]. 131  White, Lost Comrades, 58. 132  See, for example, de Man, Après coup, 193.

CHAPTER 5

Breakthrough: Hendrik de Man and the Genesis of the Plan

By the late 1920s, Hendrik de Man was known as “the man who killed Karl Marx,” as one of his detractors put it: a highly ambitious, perhaps even presumptuous, social theorist who had stirred up a debate within the German-speaking and the French-speaking world on whether to dispense with Marxism as the conceptual framework underlying social democracy.1 In the early 1930s, however, he seemed increasingly prone to move beyond the realm of ideas and keen to draw a more practical set of policy proposals from his writings. His attitude towards public life was evolving too. According to Rens, de Man informed him in 1932 that, with the upcoming publication of Die Sozialistische Idee marking “the culmination” of his studies, he would soon restart “the practical militant action within the labour movement” seeking to turn his “ideas into reality.”2 In May of that year, de Man told Vandervelde he intended to resume the project of establishing a “laboratory of ideas” devoted to economic planning within

1  Charles Rappoport, “La doctrine et l’histoire: De Man, l’homme qui assassina … Karl Marx,” L’Humanité, February 5, 1928. Rappaport, then a communist, charged de Man of “treason” and claimed his views could be taken seriously only within a party “without doctrine, or programme” [ibidem.]. 2  J. Rens, Rencontres, 48. De Man would later describe Die Sozialistische Idee as “le complément positif d’Au delà du marxisme” [Frédéric Lefèvre, “Une heure avec Henri de Man: le ‘Plan du Travail’ belge,” Les nouvelles littéraires, artistiques et scientifiques 13 no. 656 (1935): 3].

© The Author(s) 2020 T. Milani, Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0_5

99

100 

T. MILANI

the Belgian Labour Party.3 Just a few months later, Vandervelde contributed to awarding de Man a prize for his accomplishments in social science; in turn, de Man proposed to use the money he had received to fund a POB-related research centre.4 In December, during an informal meeting in Brussels, the Bureau d’études sociales (BES) was finally set up, with de Man as director and three towering party members—Vandervelde, Louis de Brouckère, and Arthur Wauters—in the scientific committee. The executive committee was open to delegates from trade unions, cooperatives, and other associations, in addition to POB members.5 In April 1933, de Man finally moved back to Belgium, soon resuming his full-time party membership as well as taking up a teaching position at the University of Brussels.6 Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor and the subsequent suppression of academic freedom seemed to have precipitated de Man’s decision to leave Frankfurt.7 What was less predictable was de Man’s ability to turn into a POB ideologue shortly after his return to his home country: the once-­ estranged, insubordinate radical was to play a pivotal role in the 3  “L’exécution du Plan du Travail: une lettre d’Henri de Man à Emile Vandervelde du 14 mai 1932,” Le Peuple, March 24, 1935. Early talks between the two dated back to November 1931 [see Emile Vandervelde, “Un appel: pour le Plan du Travail,” Le Peuple, January 14, 1934] and de Man prepared a memorandum about the future Bureau in January 1932 [see Hendrik de Man, Mémorandum: Bureau (ou Institut) d’études et de documentation pour l’économie planée’, 12 January 1932, AHDM/IISG/421] but financial constraints and the evolving situation in Germany probably contributed to delaying the project. 4  “Henri de Man reçoit le prix quinquennal des sciences sociales,” Le Peuple, October 29, 1932; “Chez les gens d’esprit,” Le Peuple, October 31, 1932; Official communication from the jury of the Social Science Prize to H. de Man, 2 March 1933, AHDM/AMSAB/929; letter from de Man to Vandervelde, 29 October 1932, AEV/IEV/IV/158. 5  See “A propos du Bureau d’Études sociales et du Bureau d’Action pour le Plan,” Le mouvement syndical belge, no. 12 (1934): 275; “Note sur le Bureau d’Études sociales,” AHDM/AMSAB/343. 6  See de Man, Cavalier seul, 156. In September–October, he started teaching a seminar in social psychology [see de Man’s notes on collective psychology dated 8 September 1933, AHDM/AMSAB/264 and the university circular dated 30 October 1933, AHDM/ AMSAB/265]. Later on, he was asked to reorganise the POB internal structure in view of the forthcoming Congress [see Henri de Man, “Au Bureau du C.G. du P.O.B.,” 8 November 1933, AHDM/IISG/405]. 7  See de Man’s refusal to fill out a questionnaire related to his teaching duties while in Frankfurt [see letter from de Man to the Chancellor of Frankfurt University, 23 May 1933, AHDM/AMSAB/199]. All de Man’s books available in German, apart from Der Kampf um die Arbeitsfreude, were burned by the Nazis in May 1933 [see Imgard Heidler, Der Verleger Eugen Diederichs und seine Welt (1896–1930) (Wiesebaden: Harrassowitz, 1998), 437].

5  BREAKTHROUGH: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE PLAN 

101

renovation of his party’s platform with the blessing of Vandervelde, whom he had once criticised for his unsteady leadership and had clashed with over the enduring relevance of Marxism. How was that possible? Above all, it was the increasingly unstable political environment of the early 1930s, during which the European order began to unravel, that set the stage for the rapprochement between de Man and the POB.8 In that context, de Man had something appealing to offer: an original analysis of the rise of right-wing nationalism based on his experience as a first-hand witness of the demise of the Weimar Republic. That analysis combined elements taken from his critique of orthodox Marxism with fresh insights about the economic crisis and its implications for social democracy. It also contained an embryonic strategy to counter the advance of fascism, an issue that the Nazis’ seizure of power pushed to the forefront debates even in countries with a long-standing commitment to democratic rule, such as France or Belgium.9 Having come up with the intuition to devise a Plan aimed at curbing unemployment, reforming democratic institutions, and making a substantial step forward in overhauling laissez-faire capitalism, de Man returned to politics from a position of strength, no longer as someone on the fringes but as a credible and well-regarded advocate of policies that could address the fears of the party’s mainstream.10 Unlike the next chapter, which will deal with de Man’s endeavours to produce a Plan for Belgium and sell it to public, this chapter traces the emergence of the idea of the Plan in de Man’s writings between 1930 and 1934, and has a less empirical than theoretical focus. First, it investigates de Man’s understanding of the German crisis. Second, it delves into de Man’s use of three key concepts—patriotism, économie dirigée, and corporatism—to sketch out a vision by which social democrats could overcome the impasse they had run into. Finally, it critically evaluates de Man’s analysis and prescriptions.

8  Zara Steiner convincingly described the years between 1929 and 1933 as “the hinge connecting the two decades of the inter-war period, the decade of reconstruction and the decade of disintegration” [Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919–1933 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 635]. 9  For an overview of social democratic and communist reactions to the rise of Hitler, see Horn, European Socialists Respond to Fascism; Vergnon, Les gauches européennes. 10  De Man’s Plan would later be compared to an “emergency rescue” for the POB [ClaeysVan Haegendoren, Van werken krijg je vuile handen: geschiedenis van de Belgische Werkliedenpartij, 1914–1940 (Leuven: Acco, 1989), 101].

102 

T. MILANI

The reader must be aware that de Man’s outlook developed under the pressure of events, and it was not, therefore, free from minor contradictions or changes over time. This lack of systematisation was heightened by the fact that de Man never produced a full monograph on fascism or on the Great Depression—with the partial exception of Die Sozialistische Idee, which nevertheless had higher philosophical ambitions and in which references to contemporary events were confined to the final chapter.11 For this reason, the full picture can be reconstructed only a posteriori, by examining a variety of apparently minor sources, such as speeches, newspaper articles, and other occasional contributions aimed at reaching French-­ speaking, German-speaking, and Dutch-speaking audiences. This does not mean, however, that de Man failed to arrange his ideas in a coherent whole. In many ways, the Belgian Labour Plan, officially launched in December 1933, encapsulated the essence of his conceptual effort. By the same token, studying the emergence of the idea of the Plan sheds light on how theoretical issues and practical concerns were already entangled in de Man’s mind at least three years before his decision to accept a top-level position within the POB. * * * At the moment Hitler was invited to form a government by the President of the Republic Paul von Hindenburg, Germany was in deep turmoil. At the low point of the Depression, in 1932, industrial production had fallen to 61% of its 1929 level and more than 30% of the workforce was unemployed, a far worse situation than the one faced by Britain or France. Due to an interplay of factors, including an ossified banking system, a large pile of foreign debt, a demographically inspired expansion of the labour pool, higher productivity in industry, and a political system that had failed to successfully accommodate different interest groups, mass unemployment spiralled out of control, and resulted in a radicalisation of the electorate between 1930 and 1932, of which the Nazis and the communists were the main beneficiaries.12 11  The book aimed to investigate the development of the socialist idea through history, following the anti-materialistic approach that de Man had outlined in Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus. For a thorough discussion of this book, see Brélaz, Henri de Man, 455–506. 12  See Harold James, The German Slump: Politics and Economics, 1924–1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 6, 419–424; Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 23–30; Dietmar Petzina,

5  BREAKTHROUGH: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE PLAN 

103

In many ways, de Man argued, the combination of forces undermining democracy in Germany was unique. Economically, cooperation between employers and trade unions was hampered by the drastic budget cuts imposed by the Young Plan, which resulted in high inflation and fewer jobs.13 Attempts to restore a balance of payment surplus paved the way to protectionism in agriculture, which benefited big landowners while hurting the rest of the population, and to wage cuts in industry, triggering strikes in response and fuelling widespread unrest.14 Long-term causes, however, were in de Man’s view at least as important. Socially, the top-­ down industrialisation pursued under Bismarck had boosted living standards but, in contrast to what happened elsewhere, including France, a bourgeois class broadly supportive of individual freedom and representative government had not developed.15 The concentration of capital in few hands, under the protection of state bureaucracy, was the hallmark of a system de Man referred to as “authoritarian capitalism,” under which, at least until the First World War, “the relations between directors, foremen, and workers” were the civilian equivalent to those “between officers, sub-­ officers, and soldiers.”16 Even though substantial progress was made after 1918, Germany was affected by wider global trends pushing capitalism towards higher levels of rationalisation and monopoly that ended up crushing small owners to a degree unknown in Britain, France, or “The Extent and Causes of Unemployment in the Weimar Republic,” in Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar Germany, ed. Peter D.  Stachura (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1986), 29–48. As Jürgen W. Falter pointed out, the unemployed were much more likely to vote for the communists than for the Nazis, but a growing perception of job insecurity may very well have led many white-collar workers to support Hitler’s party [see Jürgen W. Falter, “Unemployment and the Radicalisation of the German Electorate, 1928–1933: An Aggregate Data Analysis with Special Emphasis on the Rise of National Socialism,” in Unemployment and the Great Depression, 187–208]. 13  See Henri de Man, “L’assainissement des prix et des salaires en Allemagne,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 5, no. 5 (1930): 160–164. 14  See Henri de Man, “Le protectionnisme agraire et la crise économique en Allemagne,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 7, no. 4 (1932): 97–105; Henri de Man, “La nouvelle politique des salaires en Allemagne,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 7, no. 8 (1932): 265–271. 15  See Henri de Man, “Entre la France et l’Allemagne,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 5, no. 6 (1931): 159–164. 16  Henri de Man, “Le capitalisme autoritaire,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale de Belgique 6, no. 2 (1931): 35.

104 

T. MILANI

America.17 The “new anti-capitalism” embraced by rentiers, pensioners, artisans, and farmers emerged in reaction to the dominance of big business, whose economic status seemed less and less justifiable, and to the international isolation of the country, feeding “a remarkable combination of national and social resentment.”18 National Socialism successfully established itself as the most extreme, “plebeian” variant of right-wing nationalism, spurred by “the impotence of bourgeois pacifism” preached by Walther Rathenau and Gustav Stresemann in their vain attempt to rebuild Germany as a great power within the boundaries of “European solidarity.”19 Some of the features of National Socialism, however, had a more general character and were not limited to the German setting, de Man contended.20 Middle classes leaning towards the Nazis suffered from a sense of economic and psychological dependence upon “anonymous capitalist forces” (anonymen kapitalistischen Macht) that made their existence uncertain and precarious.21 Despite their falling living standards, they strongly resisted the prospect of joining, or making common cause with, the industrial workforce: fascism profited from this instinctive revulsion by allowing a “diversion” (Ablenkung) of socio-economic resentment from economic to non-economic phenomena, channelling people’s anger towards other races or nations.22 The fact that fascism grew out of a “false consciousness,” in Marxian terms, and took advantage from a “lack of intellectual qualities,” de Man insisted, did not make it less dangerous; rather, it increased its appeal among the disenfranchised.23 Modern capitalism had “inhibited” workers’ “collective self-esteem” by exacerbating class divisions; socialism, however, seemed no longer able to provide a strong sense of psychological fulfilment to its supporters, leaving the field open to fascists, who excelled in exploiting “the compensatory effect of

17  See Hendrik de Man, “Die neue Phase des Kapitalismus,” Hamburger Echo, January 20, 1933; Hendrik de Man, “Die Folgen der kapitalistischen Monopolwirtschaft,” Hamburger Echo, January 24, 1933. 18  Henri de Man, Le nouveau nationalisme allemand (Brussels: Imprimerie médicale et scientifique, 1932): 9, 19. The original speech was given in Brussels on November 21, 1931. 19  De Man, Le nouveau nationalisme allemand, 2–3. 20  See Henri de Man, “Les causes universelles du fascisme,” Le Peuple, October 4, 1933. 21  Hendrik de Man, Sozialismus und Nationalfascismus (Potsdam: Protte, 1931), 7. The original speech was given in Berlin on December 12, 1930. 22  Ibid., 16. 23  Ibid., 17, 21.

5  BREAKTHROUGH: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE PLAN 

105

national pride” (die kompensatorische Wirkung des Nationalstolzes).24 Building on his previous critique of Marxism, de Man pointed to the need for a “true radicalisation” (Wahre Radikalisierung) in socialist thought and social democratic action, by which “the reformist function” and the “radical motivation” could be finally reconciled, without stifling the “driving force” (Stoßkraft) towards social justice and greater respect for human dignity which, throughout history, had been the single, most fundamental source of strength of socialism.25 De Man’s insistence on the importance of delivering a radical message stemmed from his bitter disappointment with the decisions taken by the SPD in the final years of the Weimar Republic, when the party lent support to the Brüning cabinet, under the assumption that deflation was a reasonable price to pay to restore political and monetary stability.26 In 1935, de Man would openly decry German social democrats for their “fatalism” in coping with the economic crisis; a refusal to act they justified through a “theory of passivity and forced inactivity” according to which it was in the best interest of the working class to let the economic cycle play out and wait for the subsequent recovery.27 The thrust of his argument, however, was already present in some of the articles he wrote in early 1933, which bore striking resemblance to some charges levelled in the same period by the Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer. Both de Man and Bauer held that an overconfidence in parliamentary action and in discredited economic theories was thwarting social democrats’ attempts to match the 24  Ibid., 23. Interestingly, de Man understood fascism as a process of radicalisation of the middle classes rather than one driven by big business. This is a major difference between his interpretation and the one set out by Marxists such as John Strachey or Leon Trotsky: see John Strachey, The Coming Struggle for Power (London: Gollancz, 1932); Leon Trotsky, The Struggle against Fascism in Germany (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975). 25  De Man, Sozialismus und Nationalfascismus, 47, 49–50. 26  The main architect of this “policy of toleration” was Rudolf Hilferding, a die-hard party loyalist who had previously attacked de Man for his efforts to refute orthodox Marxism and diminish Kautsky’s authority. In 1931, Hilferding even claimed that social democrats who proposed to mitigate the Depression through public works were “not Marxist” [Wladimir S.  Woytinsky, Stormy Passage: A Personal History through Two Russian Revolutions to Democracy and Freedom, 1905–1960 (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1961), 471]. On Hilferding, see William Smaldone, Rudolf Hilferding: The Tragedy of a German Social Democrat (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1988), 120–172; F. Peter Wagner, Rudolf Hilferding: Theory and Politics of Democratic Socialism (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1996), 152–183. 27  Henri de Man, Socialisme et planisme (Brussels: Bureau d’Action pour le Plan, 1935), 8. The original speech was given in Paris on December 10, 1934.

106 

T. MILANI

dynamism of fascist movements.28 Nonetheless, Bauer proposed a united front based on close coordination between the two Internationals whereas de Man, who may have initially contemplated some form of cooperation with the communists, soon began looking for something bolder than aggregating existing anti-fascist parties. To his mind, social democrats had better chances of succeeding by acting on their own and rallying different classes around some grandiose, path-breaking project.29 * * * According to de Man, defeating right-wing nationalism in an age of economic distress required, among other things, turning some notions that fascists were keen to exploit against them. This is different from arguing that de Man was then succumbing to the appeal of fascism or contaminating socialism with fascist tenets.30 Rather, he deliberately attempted to recover concepts that had already been part of the social democratic intellectual arsenal well before fascism seized on them and use them to reinvigorate social democracy. As it will be shown, this rhetorical trick could backfire but was not irrelevant in giving his views a fresh outlook. The first concept was patriotism—although de Man rarely employed the term—namely the idea that social democrats should feel ashamed for being emotionally attached to their own country and that internationalism was not supposed to be in contrast with the recognition of different national identities. The core of this argument could be traced back at least 28  See, for example, Hendrik de Man, “Wende des Sozialismus,” Hamburger Echo, January 17, 1933; Otto Bauer, “Schicksalswende in Deutschland,” Arbeiterville, September 13, 1932, reprinted in Otto Bauer, Werkausgabe. Vol. VI (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1979), 830–837. 29  Bauer’s ideas were at first ridiculed by Soviet communists: see, for example, Dimitrii Zakharovych Manuilsky, Social Democracy: Stepping-Stone to Fascism, or, Otto’s Bauer Latest Discovery (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1934). The original speech was delivered before the executive committee of the Communist Youth International in December 1933. For a systematic exposition of Bauer’s argument, see Otto Bauer, Zwischen zwei Weltkriegen? Die Krise der Weltwirtschaft, der Demokratie und des Sozialismus (Bratislava: Prager, 1936). 30  A synthesis as such was sought by other authors: see, for example, Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Socialisme fasciste (Paris: Gallimard, 1934). Drieu was unquestionably committed to spreading fascism, not to fight it, as his admiration for Mussolini and later on for Hitler demonstrates: see Robert Soucy, Fascist Intellectual: Drieu La Rochelle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 152–174; Pierre Andreu and Frederic Grover, Drieu La Rochelle (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1989), 255–310.

5  BREAKTHROUGH: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE PLAN 

107

to Jean Jaurès.31 Yet, rather ingeniously, de Man now distinguished between two kinds of nationalism: the first based on an “aggressive mindset” (aggressiven Staatsgesinnung) leading to militarism and expansionism, and the second imbued with “love for the Fatherland” (Vaterlandsliebe), a manifestation of “cultural affinity” (kulturellen Verbundenheit) with a people or a language.32 According to him, nationalism and socialism were both legitimate heirs of the industrial revolution, and both stemmed from an understandable desire for collective recognition and self-determination. Furthermore, nationalism could have a libertarian bent, as shown every time minorities rose up to fight against other nations oppressing them, and could therefore be, within certain limits, commendable.33 Socialism, however, was “more total and more radical” for it strove for the freedom of all peoples, and acknowledged that the “states’ lust for power, through armaments, economic protectionism, claims of unfettered sovereignty, and even through the very existence of borders, is the scourge of Europe and the cause of degradation of our present society.”34 One of de Man’s role models was the intellectual-turned-politician Thomas Masaryk, whose defence of Czech identity and willingness to fight for national independence was balanced by an equally firm commitment to social reform,

31  De Man referred to Jaurès’ classic work L’Armée nouvelle, in which internationalism is presented as the natural completion, not the antithesis, of patriotism: see, for example, Henri de Man, Le nationalisme économique (Brussels: Imprimature médicale et scientifique, Brussels, 1934), 21–22. The original speech was given in Brussels on December 15, 1933. On Jaurès’ influence on de Man, see Henri de Man, “De 1910 à 1934,” Le Peuple, January 24, 1934; Henry de Man, “Jean Jaurès, 1859–1914,” in Great Democrats, ed. Alfred Barratt Brown (London: Ivor Nicholson and Johnson, 1934), 369–382. On the reception of Jaurès in Belgium, see Paul Aron, “Jaurès en Belgique,” in Jaurès et les intellectuels, eds. Madeleine Rebérioux and Gilles Candar (Paris: Les Éditions de l’Atelier/Éditions Ouvrières, 1994), 267–278. 32  De Man, Sozialismus und nationalfascismus, 31–32. 33  See Henri de Man, Nationalisme et socialisme (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1932), 7–15. The original speech was given in Ghent and Antwerp in December 1931. It is worth noticing that de Man delivered the speech in Dutch, dwelling upon the situation of the Flanders and lending support to language equality in Belgium [see ibid., 16–32, 71–76]. The first language law in Belgium, introducing regional monolingualism, was passed in June 1932. On the language question in Flanders, see Herman Van Goethem, Belgium and the Monarchy: From National Independence to National Disintegration (Antwerp: University Press Antwerp, 2011), 153–164. 34  De Man, Nationalisme et socialisme, 36, 38.

108 

T. MILANI

humanitarianism, and peace.35 Furthermore, his appreciation of nationalism was balanced by the conviction that, in the long run, only an international federation aimed at ensuring “the autonomy of the peoples” would settle the issue of minorities once and for all, abandoning the principle of absolute sovereignty and establishing an international framework through which disarmament could finally be achieved.36 In envisaging European unity as a long-term solution to international instability, de Man was probably influenced by the Briand Plan, well received by Belgian social democrats and sponsored by other Belgian-led groups, such as the movement Union Jeune Europe, to which de Man was loosely connected.37 The second concept was économie dirigée—an expression we may roughly translate into “planning” or Planwrirtschaft, encapsulating the belief that the economic system could be successfully managed in the interest of the working class as well as of the entire nation.38 De Man realised early on that the economic downturn would exacerbate pre-­ existing tensions within capitalist countries, making the success of 35  Ibid., 48–60. De Man and Masaryk had known each other since the First World War and discussed the problem of German minorities in Czechoslovakia at least once, in the late 1920s [see de Man, Après coup, 130–131]. In 1934 de Man was appointed honorary fellow to the Czech Sociological Society named after Masaryk [see de Man’s diploma as corresponding member, 10 May 1934, AHDM/AMSAB/284]. See also de Man’s letter of condolences for Masaryk’s death [see de Man to the Masaryk Academy, 15 September 1937, ASMAB/286]. 36  De Man, Nationalisme et socialisme, 79. 37  Vandervelde too praised the aims of the Briand Plan: see, for example, Emile Vandervelde, “M. Briand et l’Union fédérale européenne,” La Nouvelle revue socialiste 4, no. 31 (1930): 296–300. Originally established in Switzerland in 1930, Union Jeune Europe gained roughly 5000 members in Belgium, thanks to the efforts of the publisher Edouard Didier. De Man’s involvement in the movement seems to have been rather limited: he published a few articles on the bulletin Jeune Europe—some having already appeared elsewhere—and attended the 1936 summer camp in Zoute. He also joined the organisation’s honorary committee [see the notes by Didier in AHDM/CEGESOMA/AA624/425 and in AHDM/AMSAB/491]. On Jeune Europe, see also Geneviève Duchenne, Esquisses d’une Europe nouvelle: l’européisme dans la Belgique de l’entre-deux-guerres (1919–1939) (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008), 383–529. 38  The expression was already gaining currency within the French-speaking world: see, for example, Bertrand de Jouvenel, L’économie dirigée: le programme de la nouvelle génération (Paris: Valois, 1928); VV.AA. L’économie dirigée (Paris: Alcan, 1934). But the vision of a managed capitalist economy directed towards a greater good than individual profit can also be traced back to Albert Thomas: see Madeleine Rebérioux and Patrick Fridenson, “Albert Thomas, pivot du réformisme français,” Le mouvement social, no. 87 (1974), 85–97; Adeline Blaszkiewicz-Maison, Albert Thomas: le socialisme en guerre, 1914–1918 (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015), 101–116.

5  BREAKTHROUGH: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE PLAN 

109

nationalism only more likely.39 To him, the 1929 crisis seemed structural rather than cyclical, being caused by at least five distinct but interconnected factors: high levels of unemployment due to the ongoing rationalisation—that is, increased efficiency—of industry; a lack of new international markets to export those goods that producers were unable to sell domestically; low levels of productivity in agriculture; the rise of monopolies and trusts, which made prices less flexible and slower to adjust; and the politicisation of foreign trade. The crucial phenomenon underlying all these trends, de Man maintained, was underconsumption: advanced capitalism was marked by a “growing disparity” between supply and demand, due to the latter’s inability to meet the former.40 De Man’s reference to Marx is less surprising than one might think: his methodological objections to historical materialism notwithstanding, de Man had never questioned the soundness of some of Marx’s insights about the long-term unsustainability of capitalism. Moreover, in investigating the Great Depression, de Man— an avid reader lacking a proper training in economics—in all probability built upon the works of professional economists, ranging from heterodox liberals to Marxists.41 Otto Maschl, better known as Lucien Laurat, whom de Man met for the first time in April 1933, ranks high among these influences.42 An Austrian-born economist based in Paris and former card-­ carrying communist, Laurat had a first-hand knowledge of the Soviet New Economic Policy, having lived in Russia between 1923 and 1927. Moreover, despite his steadfast anti-Stalinism, he still considered himself a Marxist and used a Marxist framework of analysis to account for the functioning of the Soviet system.43 In addition to a glowing reputation as 39  See Henri de Man, “Crise économique et critique de l’économie,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 5, no. 10 (1930): 357–362. 40  See Henri de Man, “La crise du capitalisme,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 6, no. 2 (1931): 40. 41  See, for example, John A. Hobson, the British liberal critic of imperialism, whose theory of underconsumption might have inspired de Man. For de Man’s remarks on Hobson’s book Rationalisation and Unemployment: An Economic Dilemma, see Henri de Man, “Le capitalisme libéral,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 6, no. 8 (1931): 265–270. 42  See Lucien Laurat, “Mémoires d’un planiste 1932–1939,” Les études sociales et syndicales, no. 120 (1965): 19–24. See also “Une conférence de Lucien Laurat,” Le Peuple, December 17, 1932. A clipping of that article can be found in AHDM/IISG/341, suggesting that de Man was already familiar with Laurat’s ideas by late 1932. 43  In 1931, Laurat published an extensive analysis of Soviet policy in the mid-1920s as an example of économie dirigée: see Lucien Laurat, L’économie soviétique: sa dynamique, son

110 

T. MILANI

c­ommentator on economic affairs, Laurat had good ties with the POB. Independently from de Man, he had come to the conclusion that Belgian social democrats would benefit from deepening the study of nationalisations and encouraged Jef Rens to set up a research bureau for that purpose.44 His works L’accumulation du capital d’après Rosa Luxembourg (1930), Bilans: cent années d’économie mondiale (1931), and Un système qui sombre (1932) may well have shaped de Man’s understanding of the Great Depression.45 Some even argued, unconvincingly, that Laurat mooted the very idea of a Labour Plan in the first place, in Economie planée contre économie enchainée, which came out in May 1932.46 De Man and Laurat agreed on a crucial point, namely that a generic increase of state intervention and regulation of the economy would not provide a solution to the crisis. For this reason, while playing with the notion of économie dirigée, de Man also expressed misgivings about it. His attitude can be better explained against the backdrop of the 1931 World Social Economic Planning Congress held in Amsterdam, where distinguished experts, businessmen, and academics from all around the globe discussed different schemes aimed at introducing planned production and mécanisme (Paris: Valois, 1931), 119–140. On Lefranc, see also Boris Souvarine, “Un demisiècle d’amitié” and Georges Lefranc, “Lucien Laurat, 1932–1939,” Est & Ouest, no. 515 (1973), 1–4 and 5–7. 44  See letter from Laurat to Rens, 25 March 1933, and letter from Laurat to Rens, 5 April 1933, FLB/IEV/1.320 and 1.321. 45  It is worth stressing that Un système qui sombre first appeared in Belgium, from the publishing house of the POB [see Lucien Laurat, Un système qui sombre (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1932)] and that in the spring of 1933 Jef Rens introduced both de Man and Laurat to his readers as leading theorists in the field of economic planning [see Jef Rens, “Problèmes de socialisation,” Le mouvement syndical belge, no. 4 (1933): 90–93, and Le mouvement syndical belge, no. 5 (1933): 127–131]. Laurat also published a few short tracts on economics for l’Eglantine under the name of A. Minard [see A. Minard (Lucien Laurat), Quelques données du problème européen (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1931); A.  Minard (Lucien Laurat), Le développement du capitalisme et la lutte pour la démocratie (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1933)]. 46  See, for example, Claude Harmel, “Le marxisme de Lucien Laurat,” Est & Ouest, no. 515 (1973): 365–379. It is uncertain whether de Man had read Economie planée. Besides, as discussed later on in this chapter, de Man’s rather subtle distinction between économie dirigée and “Plan” is absent from Laurat’s work, and by April 1933 de Man was already familiar with the WTB Plan: it is therefore difficult to claim that Laurat was the hidden hand behind the Belgian Labour Plan. It remains true that Laurat delved into many of the issues that de Man brought to the foreground in his own Plan, such as the nationalisation of credit: see, for example, Lucien Laurat, Economie planée contre économie enchainée (Paris: Valois, 1932), 105–112.

5  BREAKTHROUGH: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE PLAN 

111

consumption.47 During his 1918 trip to the United States, de Man had already developed mixed feelings towards scientific management: he appreciated the emphasis on efficiency, productivity, and higher wages but despised Taylor’s tendency to treat labour as a mere commodity. Times, however, were changing. A new breed of advocates of planning, such as the managing director of the Taylor Society, Harlow S. Person, and Lewis L. Lorwin, then a fellow of the Brookings Institution, were advocating a much more enlightened vision of planning, called “social,” by which managers would promote the general welfare instead of serving business interests. In the words of Person, “individualistic industry” was no longer able to meet the dynamism of the overall economic system: “we have come to the conclusion that a regulating mechanism must be added to it—social economic planning—and that economic integration represented in social economic planning must precede any effective political cooperation.”48 A progressive undertone was especially evident in Lorwin’s speech, in which he suggested social planning would “provide a basis for cooperative action which would make possible a peaceful exploitation of the world’s resources in the common interests of all groups and nations” as well as “work out a national policy which promised a higher development for all,” bringing people together “on the basis of what is technically and objectively best for the community as a whole.”49 Arguments like these did resonate with de 47  The most significant contribution on the 1931 World Social Economic Planning Congress is Alfredo Salsano, “Gli ingegneri e il socialismo. Taylorismo e planismo di fronte alla grande crisi,” in L’Internazionale operaia e socialista fra le due guerre, ed. Enzo Collotti (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1985), 1181–1216, where de Man’s remarks are also discussed. Important references to the Congress can also be found in Thomas Cayet, “Travailler à la marge: le Bureau International du Travail et l’organisation scientifique du travail (1923–1933),” Le mouvement social, no. 228 (2009): 39–56 and Thomas Cayet, “The ILO and the IMI: A Strategy of Influence on the Edges of the League of Nations, 1925–1934,” in ILO Histories: Essays on the International Labour Organization and Its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century, eds. Jasmien Van Daele, Magaly Rodríguez Garcìa, Geert Van Goethem and Marcel Van der Linden (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), 251–270. 48  Harlow S. Person, “Scientific Management as a Philosophy and Technique of Progressive Industrial Stabilization,” in World Social Economic Planning: The Necessity for Planned Adjustment of Productive Capacity and Standards of Living, ed. Mary L.  Fleddérus (The Hague: International Industrial Relations Institute, 1932), 153. On Person’s new approach, see Harlow S. Person, “The New Challenge to Scientific Management: Can the Principles of Planning and Control Be Applied over a Wider Area than the Individual Enterprise?” Bulletin of the Taylor Society 16, no. 2 (1931): 62–63. 49  Lewis L.  Lorwin, “The Problem of Economic Planning,” in World Social Economic Planning, 262, 265. Lorwin’s paper was praised by Albert Thomas, who also spoke at the

112 

T. MILANI

Man: he too believed that experts were to play a major role in addressing economic imbalances, building an “alliance between labour and science” to redress the imbalances generated by unfettered capitalism.50 Nor did he miss the significance of American intellectuals denouncing laissez-faire: the United States, he held, was undergoing a “truly spiritual revolution,” as the thriving of the technocratic movement demonstrated, showing the extent to which ordinary people could become passionate about social engineering even in countries where capitalism had deep roots.51 However, de Man found the conception of planning espoused by most speakers at the Congress unrealistic. “There is something utopian in all the plans for a managed economy (économie dirigée) discussed in Amsterdam,” he wrote in 1932, for they lacked “the sovereign power that could enforce them upon reluctant powers going in the opposite direction.”52 Although de Man was referring here to a plan for international cooperation, the caveat applied to national plans too. As he pointed out in evaluating the contribution of the Russian delegation to the conference, “in one thing, the managed economy of the Soviets is enormously superior to all the other ‘plans’: it exists and it works.”53 By no means had he become an admirer of the USSR, as shown by further, more critical remarks in the text.54 Nevertheless, unlike many technocrats and liberal reformers, he thought social democrats had to seize the commanding heights of the economy in order to fully exploit the potential of planning, rather than using it to make marginal adjustments to the system already in place. Ultimately, planning could serve too many purposes to be accepted unreservedly. As de Man put it, “Economie dirigée, that sounds very well. The expression suits men’s desire, inseparable from human intelligence, to steer their own fate away from the action of blind, uncontrollable, and conference [see Albert Thomas, “Détermination internationale des normes du travail,” in World Social Economic Planning, 529–541]. Lorwin would later serve as an advisor to the ILO and a consultant to the National Resources Planning Board established by the Roosevelt administration in 1933. On his views on social planning, see also Lewis L. Lorwin, A Time for Planning: A Social-Economic Theory and Program for the Twentieth Century (New YorkLondon: Harper & Brothers, 1945). 50  Henri de Man, Les techniciens et la crise (Brussels: Imprimerie coopérative, n.d.), 30. The original speech was given in Liège on November 10, 1934. 51  Henri de Man, “La technocratie,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 8, no. 4 (1933): 103. 52  Henri de Man, Réflexions sur l’économie dirigée (Brussels: l’Eglantine, 1932), 12. 53  Ibid., 13. 54  See ibid., 15–16.

5  BREAKTHROUGH: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE PLAN 

113

irresponsible forces. But it remains dangerously vague and chaotic unless one says towards what it is directed (dirigée).”55 However essential as a tool, planning alone had no sense of direction. According to de Man, it had to be complemented with two elements: a leader and a Plan. The need for strong leadership informed de Man’s understanding of the New Deal, born out of “the conjunction between a governing will matched with executive power and a public opinion dominated by a general threat.”56 It was Franklin D. Roosevelt, de Man argued, who kicked off the transition of the United States towards state capitalism but the rationale for that transformation had already been laid out by the National Bureau of Economic Research and other advisory boards set up by his predecessor, Herbert Hoover.57 According to de Man, leadership, in order to be effective, had to be transformative. In Massen und Führer, published in 1932, he lamented that social democratic leaders too easily turned themselves into bureaucrats, especially when the masses, as in the case of German militants, were already inclined towards self-discipline and lukewarm about abrupt changes. To these points, already made in Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus, de Man added an embryonic theory of leadership. In a paragraph entitled Die Kommende Aristokratie, he predicted that future leaders would refuse to compromise at any cost and focus on the task of building deep, emotional connections with their followers. “The psychological secret behind the authority of a leader,” he argued “is also the secret of the tamer. That sympathy that makes us penetrate into a foreign soul and gives us the opportunity to exercise dominion over all the living creatures is possible only for who is not afraid and, by bestowing confidence, receives confidence in return.”58 De Man carefully stressed that, by drawing attention to the importance of irrational feelings, he was not lurching towards fascism. His conception of leadership implied mutual trust and reciprocity: leader and masses would strengthen, support, and energise each other, in a circular way, whereas authoritarian leaders believed that “masses must be subjugated to the will of the ruling elites,” a vision at odds with his emancipatory conception of politics.59 Fascists  Ibid., 37.  Henri de Man, “Du plan technique au plan économique,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 8, no. 10 (1933): 473. 57  See Henri de Man, “La volte-face des Etats-Unis,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 8, no. 12 (1933): 523–528. 58  Hendrik de Man, Massen und Führer (Potsdam: Protte, 1932), 45. 59  Ibid., 23. 55 56

114 

T. MILANI

and communists alike saw masses as “an object,” consistently with their loathing for the “democratic freedom of expression.”60 Authoritarian rule erected a barrier between those holding political power and those living under it, hence failing to deliver the promise of socialism: “an ascension, an ennoblement, an improvement, an act of creation, a process of liberation” to be experienced by every single individual.61 The real cornerstone of de Man’s strategy, however, was not the leader but the Plan. The term was, of course, widely employed at the time—the Soviets having issued their first Five-Year Plan in 1928—and de Man is likely to have been inspired by a wide range of sources in choosing it, well beyond the Soviet example.62 Arguably, a particularly important document was the WTB Plan, named after its three proponents: the economists Wladimir Woytinsky, Fritz Tarnow, and Fritz Baade. The WTB Plan, launched in Germany in December 1931, outlined a programme of public works and credit expansion to create one million new jobs, and gained considerable support among trade unionists. As a set of interventionist measures, it sparked a fiery debate: the SPD firmly opposed it, fearing that, if implemented, the Plan would unleash inflation, and the unions begrudgingly discarded it.63 But the WTB Plan, however unsuccessful, was also a beacon of hope: it demonstrated that heterodox ideas, such as Woytinsky’s unabashed defence of an “active economic policy” (aktive Wirtschaftspolitik) to overcome the recession, could get an enthusiastic response from the workers and their representatives, putting the party establishment under heavy pressure.64

 Ibidem.  Ibid., 27. 62  In fact, de Man paid very little attention to Soviet industrialisation in his writings. It is possible that this reflected an enduring hostility to the Soviet model. Still in 1928, de Man described the USSR as a system established through the appeal “to the interests, resentments, and desire for social revenge” which had failed to liberate “constructive forces” by which the “conquest of power” could be defended or morally justified [De Man, Socialisme et marxisme, 19]. 63  On the WTB Plan, see Donna Harsch, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 155–168; Sheri Berman, The Social Democratic Moment, 190–196. 64  See, for example, Wladimir S. Woytinsky, “Wann kommt die aktive Wirtschaftspolitik?” Der Arbeit, no. 8 (1932): 11–31. In 1932 de Man tried to hire Woytinsky as an analyst for the BES [see letter from de Man to De Becker, 12 January 1932, AHDM/IISG/421]; two years later, Woytinsky attended the Pontigny Conference. In his memoirs, he claimed that 60 61

5  BREAKTHROUGH: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE PLAN 

115

In one respect, however, de Man’s notion of “Plan” was deeply original: rather than encompassing a wide-ranging set of measures that could be implemented or not, depending on varying circumstances, with no detailed schedule and no clear priority, the Plan was meant to be binding and immediately applicable: in de Man’s terminology, it was a “Plan for action (Aktionsplan).”65 Conceptually, the Plan would involve the “overcoming” (Aufhebung) of the distinction between the “minimalist practical programme” (praktischen Minimalprogramm) and the “maximalist theoretical programme” (grundsätzlichen Maximalprogramm), hence transcending both the reformist and the revolutionary interpretation of socialism.66 In practice, this was tantamount to saying that planism would seek to bridge the divide between democratic socialism and communism in the name of “constructive socialism” (konstruktiver Sozialismus).67 In ordinary circumstances, de Man explained, social democrats in power used their position to reallocate wealth and improve the material condition of the working class by passing “redistributive reforms” (réformes de répartition); the current crisis, however, was so deep that “structural reforms” (réformes de structure) had to be prioritised, in order to change the underlying capitalist framework under which wealth was created; structural reforms were the only ones that would expand production and consumption.68 The Plan would therefore include measures aimed at nationalising key industries and, even more importantly, the banking sector. Again, de Man was keen to distance himself from those reformists loosely committed to a soft version of économie dirigée: he deemed “chimeric” any effort to manage the whole economy unless credit, energy production, and raw materials were seized immediately and turned into “a the Belgian Labour Plan was “partly copied from the WTB Plan” [Woytinsky, Stormy Passage, 478]. 65  See Hendrik de Man, Wende des Sozialismus (Ende des Reformismus) (Zürich: VPOD, 1934), 22–24. With regard to the Belgian Labour Plan, de Man would speak of “a set of immediate measures for an institutional transformation clearly delimited in advance, but radical within those predetermined limits” [Henri de Man, Le Plan du Travail (Paris-Brussels: Labor, 1934), 15]. 66  Hendrik de Man, Die Sozialistische Idee (Jena: Diederichs, 1933), 327. 67  De Man, Wende des Sozialismus, 3; de Man, Die Sozialistische Idee, 307. 68  As de Man would put it when launching the Belgian Labour Plan, structural reforms under a Plan “aim to introduce a better redistribution also by transforming the regime, and steer it towards a higher national income, that is a production better fulfilling the needs of consumption and developed in parallel to the latter” [De Man, Le Plan du Travail, 6] See also De Man, Socialisme et planisme, 6.

116 

T. MILANI

socialist state’s monopoly.”69 On the other hand, he denied that the Plan would bring about all-out collectivism. Hinting at the bureaucratisation and despotism of the Soviet system, de Man pointed out that “European socialism, in its first phase of the socialising process, must preserve the free competitive sector as much as possible, and even enlarge it.”70 Such a stance would make it easier for social democracy to win support among small businessmen and farmers fearful of expropriation but, de Man insisted, the presence of a dynamic private sector reflected also his “personalist and pluralist view of socialisation,” according to which economic power had to be disperse as much as possible and made accountable, rather than simply be transferred to the state.71 In essence, de Man was calling for the establishment of a mixed economy, based on the coexistence of a public and a private sector: the integral socialisation of the latter would ensue only in the far-off future. The argument resembles the economic case for a New Socialism made in his 1919 book, The Remaking of a Mind.72 At least one big difference, however, must be noted: in 1932–1933, de Man no longer believed—unlike Bernstein, Thomas, Albert, and other reformists—that a smooth and ordered transition from laissez-faire to collectivism, driven by the inherent trend towards an ever more rationalised and increasingly concentrated private sector, was on the cards. On the contrary, a radical break was needed and the Plan would mark that turning point. “From now on, the state must be able to command the banks, instead of being commanded by them. For sure, that implies a transformation of the existing regime as profound as a revolution,” he told a cheering Belgian audience in June 1934. “I do not use that world vulgarly, in the sense of an insurrectional action, but in its true meaning: the overturning of an existent balance of power and the radical transformation of a regime. This is not about triggering riots (créer des désordres); rather, and very simply, it is about ending an existing disorder by establishing a true order (ordre véritable).”73 De Man was adamant in stating that the planist revolution was to be carried out within, not against, the democratic system, accepting majority rule  De Man, Die Sozialistische Idee, 331.  Ibid., 332. 71  Ibid., 333. 72  De Man also resumed the expression “socialisme nouveau” in late 1933: see Henri de Man, “A capitalisme nouveau, socialisme nouveau,” Le Peuple, November 29, 1933; Auguste Dewinne, “Nouveau socialisme,” Le Peuple, December 7, 1933. 73  De Man, Les Techniciens, 27. 69 70

5  BREAKTHROUGH: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE PLAN 

117

and parliamentary constraints, even though the inherent logic of the Plan pointed to the establishment of a strong state and a more powerful executive authority.74 The democratic nature of planism, however, presupposed an unflinching will: by creating a “dynamic unity” between structural reforms and countercyclical measures, planism combined “the objectives of Lenin with those of Roosevelt” and was therefore expected to break with conventional social democratic practices based on negotiations, compromises, and concessions.75 The third concept that de Man used to buttress his proposals was corporatism, that is a way of reorganising the state which was intended to prevent the newly established mixed economy from slipping into statism. It must be stressed that the term was conspicuously absent from de Man’s early writings on the economic crisis and made its appearance only in summer 1934, in a series of articles published by the Belgian POB newspaper Le Peuple. His choice of words was hazardous and driven, one could argue, by contingency. De Man was by then involved in the campaign for the Labour Plan, and by using the term “corporatism” he presumably tried to reach out to Belgian Catholics, who, under the influence of the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, were exploring new ways to reconcile capital and labour.76 Yet de Man must have known that the concept would upset many on the Left, as, unlike the less controversial patriotism or économie dirigée, it brought to mind Italian fascism and its Carta del Lavoro, not to mention Spain’s and Portugal’s authoritarian regimes.77 Further to this, the 74  See ibidem; de Man, Socialisme et planisme, 18, 22–23; Henri de Man, “Les limites de la nationalisation,” Le Peuple, November 15, 1933; de Man, Die Sozialistische Idee, 342–343. 75  De Man, Socialisme et planisme, 22. 76  De Man was outspoken about the necessity of involving the Catholics in the planist campaign [see Conseil General, XXVIIIème Congrès, Bruxelles, 24–25 Décembre 1933 (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1934), 25–26]. 77  A number of socialists contested de Man’s theses. In Belgium, Vandervelde told de Man that “corporatism” was a “dangerous” word [“Séance du Bureau du Conseil Général du 12 juillet 1934,” APWB/AMSAB] after having denounced it as deceptive [see Emile Vandervelde, “L’équivoque corporative: anachronisme et camouflage,” Le Peuple, February 4, 1934]. The journalist and deputy Léon Delsinne strongly objected to de Man on the same newspaper [see, e.g., Léon Delsinne, “Peut-il y avoir un corporatisme socialiste?” Le Peuple, October 5, 1934; Léon Delsinne, “Le corporatisme ne peut plus avoir sens de sens au XXe siècle,” Le Peuple, October 12, 1934; Léon. Delsinne, “Corporatisme ou socialisme?,” Le Peuple, October 26, 1934]. Even committed planists expressed misgivings about conflating socialism with corporatism [see Georges Lefranc, “Le mouvement ouvrier devant le corporatisme,” in VV.AA., Crise et Plan (quinze conférences et études sur le Plan de la CGT) (Paris: Centre Confédéral d’Education Ouvrière, 1935), 88–94; Jef Rens, Fascisme et corporatisme:

118 

T. MILANI

fact that, in 1935, a relatively well-known Italian fascist intellectual, Ugo Spirito, quoted de Man to claim, somewhat arbitrarily, that socialism was bound to dissolve into corporatism proved the point that the concept was slippery at best, and de Man’s filtration with it could do more harm than good to social democracy.78 Truth be told, de Man dismissed fascist corporatism as a false and perverted version of a much nobler set of principles, a “camouflage of the capitalist world’s reaction against democracy.”79 Even more importantly, he referred to Belgian and British authors—de Paepe, Vandervelde, Tawney, and Cole—to underscore that an ancient and venerable strand of socialist thought had favoured the creation of intermediate bodies with the purpose of allowing the self-organisation of the working class well before Mussolini built his own corporate state.80 A mixed economy, de Man contended, would work better if “placed under the sign of the autonomous organisation of professional interests” so to reconcile class and professional solidarity.81 Furthermore, under socialist corporatism, the state would impose a “legal statute” upon certain institutions and enforce “a property regime” upon capital in order to safeguard the public interest but essai documentaire (Verviers: Imprimeur coopérative le Travail, 1937), 99–103; Jef Rens, Corporatisme, non! Organisation des professions, peut-être! (Brussels: Publications de la Centrale d’Éducation Ouvrière, 1937), 99–104]. On the hostility of mainstream socialists to de Man’s corporatist turn, see also Louis Franck, “Ricordi,” in Il corporativismo e l’economia dell’Italia fascista, ed. Nicola Tranfaglia (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1990), 3–30. 78  See Ugo Spirito, Il Piano de Man e l’economia mista (Florence: Sansoni, 1935); Ugo Spirito, “Capitalismo, socialismo, corporativismo,” in VV.AA., Nuove esperienze economiche (Florence: Sansoni, 1935), 219–241. Spirito, a leading theorist of Italian corporatism, worked under the auspices of the Minister of the Culture Giuseppe Bottai. The Scuola superiore di scienze corporative, which Spirito directed, managed to publish a range of articles from international scholars interested in economic planning, including Pirou, Sombart, Lorwin, Cole, and Durbin but, quite interestingly, not de Man. 79  Henri de Man, “Démocratie industrielle ou dictature capitaliste?,” Le Peuple, October 3, 1934. See also Henri de Man, “Le vrai et le faux corporatisme,” Le Peuple, September 26, 1934. 80  See Henri de Man, “Le corporatisme et nous,” Le Peuple, July 25, 1934; Henri de Man, “Le corporatisme socialiste contre l’étatisme,” Le Peuple, September 19, 1934; Henri de Man, “Unité syndicale et différenciation corporative,” Le Peuple, September 5, 1934. In 1933 Vandervelde praised de Man for having warned against the dangers of “a generalised statism, which leaves little room, or no room at all, to the substantial rather than formal freedom of the workers, whether through an industrial or a political democracy” [Emile Vandervelde, L’alternative: capitalisme d’état ou socialisme démocratique (Paris-Brussels: l’Eglantine, 1933), 142]. 81  Henri de Man, “Syndicalisme contre corporatisme?,” Le Peuple, August 22, 1934.

5  BREAKTHROUGH: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE PLAN 

119

the public sector would be jointly managed by technicians and workers’ associations, without suppressing the right to strike as well as the other freedoms enjoyed by trade unions.82 In many ways, de Man was still faithful to the spirit of Guild socialism, which he had praised in Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus, as mentions of Cole and Tawney demonstrate. Some institutions already in place and experiences across Europe might have inspired him too. He greatly admired, for instance, the Reich Economic Council (Reichswirtschaftsrat) of Germany, created in 1920, which was meant to promote cooperation between employers and workers but could also advance labour legislation before Parliament.83 And he was certainly aware of the early reforms undertaken by Swedish social democrats after the 1932 election, inspired by the concept of Folkhemmet (People’s home) as developed by social democratic leaders Ernst Johannes Wigforss and Albin Hansson: both were long-time admirers of Guild socialism and leaned towards left-wing corporatist solutions.84 In other words, by revamping a minority tradition de Man was fending off charges that only authoritarian corporatism made it possible to reconcile the defence of workers’ interests with the establishment of some degree of cooperation between classes.85 82  Henri de Man, “Le corporatisme socialiste contre l’étatisme,” Le Peuple, September 19, 1934. 83  See Henri de Man, “Les institutions paritaires de l’industrie allemande,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale de Belgique 5, no. 7 (1930): 253–258. 84  See Ernst Wigforss, Industrins demokratisering: en överblick av förslagen om arbetarnas deltagande i industrins ledning (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1922); Albin Hansson, Demokrati: tal och uppsatser (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1935). In December 1932 de Man visited Sweden and Denmark [see clippings in AHDM/IISG/178] and in 1933 commented on Swedish monetary policy [see Henri de Man, “L’expérience suédoise,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 8, no. 1 (1933): 1–6]. Swedish social democrats circulated a brief summary of their reforms in August 1933, at the Labour and Socialist International conference held in Paris, which was attended by de Man [see LSIA/IISG/928]. For an overview on Swedish socialism, see Timothy Alan Tilton, The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through the Welfare State to Socialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Mario Telò, Le New Deal européen, 155–168. 85  The existence of a left-wing strand of corporatism, often associated with French trade unionism, was widely acknowledged in the contemporary literature: see, for example, Maurice Bouvier-Ajam, La doctrine corporative (Paris: Sirey, 1937), 81–110; François Perroux, Capitalisme et communauté de travail (Paris: Sirey, 1938), 160–176, 297–309; Gaëtan Pirou, Essais sur le corporatisme: corporatisme et libéralisme, corporatisme et étatisme, corporatisme et syndicalisme (Paris: Sirey, 1938), 13–21. On corporatism and the Belgian milieu, see also Dirk Luyten, Ideologisch debat en politieke strijd over het corporatisme tijdens het interbellum in België (Brussels: Koninkijke Academie, 1996). Insightful remarks on left-

120 

T. MILANI

It remained to be seen at what level the transformation of the economy envisaged by the Plan would be undertaken. On that point, de Man was crystal clear: the Plan would be enforced through the institutional machinery of the nation state. That was less a choice than a necessity, he pointed out, due to the shortcomings of international bodies: the LSI could not even articulate a coherent, comprehensive strategy to resist fascism while the ILO and the League of Nations obviously had no executive power.86 In all likelihood, de Man’s scepticism towards the LSI stemmed from his own personal experience in the summer of 1914. Furthermore, the LSI conference held in Paris in August 1933 left little hope that social democracy could resist going down different national paths, due to the absence of consensus about the causes of fascism and the best way to fight back.87 “Every working class, every people,” de Man wrote in December 1933, “instead of waiting for salvation from an international power which the capitalist world had proved unable to create, must seek their own salvation in the only arena in which they have means to achieve it.”88 A national action, however, was not be confused with a nationalist one. Throughout the 1930s, de Man staunchly opposed protectionism, which he felt was creating “a truly latent state of economic war” in Europe.89 To his mind, economic barriers, quotas, and other measures undercutting international trade were a consequence of, rather than a solution to, the crumbling of wing corporatism can be found in Matteo Pasetti, L’Europa corporativa: una storia transnazionale tra le due guerre mondiali (Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2016), 44–58. 86  See de Man, Die Sozialistische Idee, 335; Henri de Man, “Le plan national d’abord!” Le Peuple, November 22, 1933; de Man, Le Plan du Travail, 12–13. 87  See Après la catastrophe allemande. Résolutions de la conférence de Paris de l’Internationale Ouvrière Socialiste (Zürich: Éditions de l’IOS, 1933). De Man acknowledged the deep divisions that emerged from the conference: see Henri de Man, “Clarification,” Le Peuple, September 24, 1933; Henri de Man, “Avant-propos,” in Pour un plan d’action (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1933), 1. For an overview of the conference, see Gilles Vergnon, “La dernière conférence: la conférence de Paris de l’Internationale Ouvrière et Socialiste (21–25 août 1933),” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 41, no. 3 (1994), 440–470; Leonardo Rapone, La socialdemocrazia europea tra le due guerre: dall’organizzazione della pace alla resistenza al fascismo (Rome: Carocci, 1999), 248–264. 88  De Man, Le nationalisme économique, 20. 89  De Man, Le Plan du Travail, 1; de Man, Le nationalisme économique, 1. See also Henri de Man, “Du protectionnisme à l’autarchie,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 7, no. 12 (1932): 413–419. Tellingly, de Man was invited to give a speech about the Plan at the Institut d’économie européenne, a bulwark of Belgian internationalism [see letter from Van der Ghinst to de Man, 20 November 1933 and the conference’s invitation letter, undated, AHDM/IISG/449].

5  BREAKTHROUGH: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE PLAN 

121

laissez-faire, to which social democratic planning offered the only long-­ term solution as well as the best hope for the establishment of peaceful relations among nations: “[A] national economic plan is the precondition of international conventions. If national economies are not managed through a plan and if private interests, within each country or through the action of international groupings, can do what they want, the chances for economic agreements abroad are minimal.”90 National plans, therefore, could be instrumental to peace as they might be, one day, harmonised into wider international economic plans—in accordance to de Man’s multi-­ faceted internationalism, based on the recognition of different national cultures.91 * * * De Man’s ideas between 1930 and 1934, when compared to those of other authors from the same period, show evident weaknesses as well as surprising strengths. His knowledge of economics may appear to be basic but the same applies to many social democratic writers who had little or no familiarity with non-Marxist political economy at that time.92 Only after 90  Henri de Man, “Libre-échange, autarchie ou économie dirigée,” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 8 no. 8 (1933): 251. See also Henri de Man, “Economie nationale dirigée, OUI! Repli économique national, NON!,” Le Peuple, December 6, 1933; Henri de Man, “Reprise mondiale ou reprises nationales?” Le Peuple, May 30, 1934. 91  De Man’s case is similar to at least one resolution unanimously approved by the LSI in August 1931, during the Vienna Congress, under the heading “The World Economic Crisis and Unemployment”: see Fourth Congress of the Labour and Socialist International: Vienna, 25th July to 1st August 1931—Reports and Proceedings (London: Labour Party Publications Department, 1932), 901–902. In introducing the resolution, the Swiss socialist Robert Grimm stressed the necessity of “transitional reforms which will point the way to the path that leads to the future and that will broaden out into the wide highway to Socialism” [Ibid., 751]. See also the resolution passed by the IFTU—the so-called Amsterdam International— during the international congress held in Brussels in late July–early August 1933 [“Les conclusions des commissions discutées en séance plénière au cours de la dernière journée du Congrès International,” Le Peuple, August 4, 1933; The Activities of the International Federation of Trade Unions, 1933–1935 (London: International Federation of Trade Unions, 1937), 132–135]. The IFTU’s interest in the économie dirigée dated back to the 1920s: see Walter Schevenels, Quarante cinq années: Fédération Syndicale Internationale, 1901–1945 (Brussels: Éditions de l’Institut Emile Vandervelde, 1964), 102–114, 140–148. 92  For an overview of this literature, see, for example, G.D.H.  Cole, What to Read on Economic Problems of To-Day & Tomorrow (Leeds: Leeds Public Libraries, 1932).

122 

T. MILANI

the publication of Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 1936 did the categories of modern macroeconomics begin to permeate left-wing discourses on the economic crisis as the theory of underconsumption, and institutional economics more generally, lost ground.93 De Man’s case for patriotism was elegantly made but added little to his previous works, and his densest speech on the mater had also a relatively narrow focus for it addressed the issue of language equality in Belgium. Calling for a social democratic variant of corporatism was a risky move, which suffered also from bad timing: de Man’s articles were overshadowed by the parallel publication of Mihail Manoilescu’s Le siècle du corporatisme: doctrine du corporatisme intégral et pure, imbued with nationalist and anti-democratic sentiment, and by Louis Rosenstock-­ Franck’s L’économie corporative fasciste en doctrine et en fait, which denounced Mussolini’s system as a propaganda myth. For all their differences, Manoilescu’s and Franck’s books helped turn anti-fascists based in the French-speaking world against corporatism, hence crippling de Man’s efforts to rescue the term from its association with the anti-liberal Right.94 On the other hand, his analysis of the downfall of the Weimar Republic, within the limits of the empirical evidence then available, was remarkably insightful and anticipated many subsequent scholarly findings, especially on the SPD’s missteps in 1930–1932.95 Finally, his view of the Plan was 93  On Keynes’ effort to overcome the limitations of Hobson’s theory of underconsumption, see Robert Skidelsky, “Keynes, Hobson, Marx,” PSL Quarterly Review 66 no. 264 (2013): 7–19. See also Erwin Esser Nemmers, Hobson and Underconsumption (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1956), 26–32. For a more generous assessment of de Man’s economics, see Ludo Cuyvers, “Was Henri de Man an Early Post-Keynesian NeoMarxist?,” Review of Radical Political Economics 47, no. 1 (2015): 90–105. 94  Manoilescu was a Rumanian economist who staunchly defended protectionism and later became a supporter of the fascist movement Iron Guard. Franck was a graduate from the Ecole Polytechnique who wrote his doctoral thesis on corporatism while being in touch with several Italian exiles, including Rosselli, Angelo Tasca, and Gaetano Salvemini [see Mihail Manoilescu, Le siècle du corporatisme: doctrine du corporatisme intégral et pur (Paris: Alcan, 1934); Louis Rosenstock-Franck, L’économie corporative fasciste en doctrine et en fait: ses origines historiques et son évolution (Paris: Gamber, 1934)]. 95  See, for example, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie (Stuttgart-Düsseldorf: Ring-Verlag, 1957), 287–330; Robert A. Gates, “German Socialism and the Crisis of 1929–33,” Central European History 7 no. 4 (1974): 332–359. Similarly, Harold James contended that “the history of the Weimar SPD is, despite the party’s large share of the popular vote, a sad litany of mistakes, lost opportunities, misguided tactics and a confused strategy” [Harold James, “The SPD and the Economic Depression, 1930–1933,” in Bernstein to Brandt: A Short

5  BREAKTHROUGH: HENDRIK DE MAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE PLAN 

123

highly imaginative, largely because of the shrewd intertwining of an economic and a political message. Unlike many other interwar blueprints which aimed to tackle the material consequences of the Depression by technocratic means, de Man’s was based on a more nuanced understanding of the potential of planning as a discourse to energise and mobilise the electorate. While fully acknowledging the paramount role of experts in forging a mixed economy, de Man wished to make the Plan a rallying point for ordinary people, a multi-class political platform which would broaden the appeal of social democratic parties and, ideally, give them a majority to reform their countries peacefully. Having returned to Belgium, de Man did not wait long before putting a similar project to the test.

History of German Social Democracy, ed. Roger Fletcher (London: Edward Arnold, 1987), 143]. This is not to deny that both German Social Democrats and the Brüning cabinet operated under huge fiscal constraints: see, for example, Knut Borchardt, “Constraints and Room for Manoeuvre in the Great Depression of the Early Thirties: Towards a Revision of the Received Historical Picture,” and “Economic Causes of the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” in Perspectives on Modern German Economic History and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 143–160 and 161–183 respectively. De Man was also right in viewing German National Socialism as an essentially middle-class phenomenon: see, for example, Detlev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity (London: Allen Lane, 1991), 156–158; Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic (London-New York: Routledge, 1988), 101–115.

CHAPTER 6

Fire and Ashes: The Fight for the Labour Plan in Belgium

In 1933, de Man plunged into Belgian politics with a twofold purpose. First, he wanted to create the conditions for reversing the deflationary economic policy pursued by the Catholic-Liberal coalition then in power. Second, he was bent on promoting a thorough renewal of the POB, thus preventing the party from suffering the same fate of the SPD.1 De Man viewed these tasks as intimately intertwined. Ousting the Catholic-Liberal bloc, he reasoned, was impossible unless the POB managed to gain support from groups and classes that, in ordinary circumstances, would not make common cause with social democracy. To achieve this, an unprecedented propaganda effort was required.2 At the same time, in order to increase its own appeal, the POB needed to champion a set of realistic but bold and far-reaching reforms aimed at tackling the economic crisis, even at the price of challenging the conventional wisdom of the party, still steeped in orthodox Marxism.3 The linchpin of this strategy was the launching of a Belgian Labour Plan. Because of this endeavour, de Man enjoyed wide international exposure. By 1935, French journalist Bertrand de Jouvenel looked at him as  De Man, Cavalier seul, 159–160.  See, for example, Henri de Man, “Les classes moyennes,” Le Peuple, October 7, 1933. 3  See, for example, Henri de Man, “L’anticapitalisme des classes moyennes,” Le Peuple, October 11, 1933; Henri de Man, “Pour une nouvelle stratégie socialiste,” Le Peuple, October 27, 1933. 1 2

© The Author(s) 2020 T. Milani, Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0_6

125

126 

T. MILANI

the standard bearer of “the planists,” a new breed of intellectuals in politics ranging from New Dealer Rexford G. Tugwell to Guild socialist G.D.H. Cole.4 In October 1936, he introduced de Man to his readers as “the prototype of the ‘leader of the future’” (“chef de l’avenir”), a “kind of social engineer” who was committed to shielding democracy against vested interests and pernicious pressure groups.5 De Jouvenel’s emphatic tone is indicative of de Man’s glittering reputation in some circles at the time, even outside his home country.6 Yet de Man’s rise to prominence within the POB was no fairy tale and should not be told as an unmitigated success story. This chapter sets out to explain how de Man devised a Labour Plan which was embraced by the POB but not put into effect when the latter returned to power, in March 1935. First, the chapter underscores how the Belgian socio-economic and political context allowed de Man to convert the POB, at least temporarily, to his ideas and gain supporters abroad. Second, it investigates how unforeseen difficulties and existing constraints led him to drop the pledge of an integral implementation of his Plan. Finally, it provides an assessment of the campaign for the Belgian Labour Plan. Evidence suggests that many factors beyond personal ambition led de Man to join a cabinet which did not measure up to the standards—most notably, the commitment to enact the whole Plan—that he and his party had previously set. * * * The POB that de Man actively re-joined in 1933 was far from moribund: following the dissolution of the SPD and the repressive laws passed against the Austrian Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SDAPDÖ), it was arguably the second biggest social democratic party in Europe, with 600,000 card-carrying members out of an overall country population of 8 million.7 Yet the party seemed unable to topple the incumbent ­conservative 4  Bertrand de Jouvenel, Un voyageur dans le siècle, 1903–1945, ed. Jeannie Malige (Paris: Laffont, 1979), 198. 5  Bertrand de Jouvenel, “Le pensée et l’action,” Les Nouvelles littéraires, artistiques et scientifiques 16, no. 732 (1936): 1. 6  See also Bertrand de Jouvenel, “Belgique: Patrie du Plan,” La République, September 15, 1934; Bertrand de Jouvenel, “Henri de Man l’homme du Plan,” L’Europe nouvelle, no. 878 (1934): 1216. 7  According to LSI figures released in 1931: see Fourth Congress of the Labour and Socialist International, 380–381; Rudolf Schlesinger, Central European Democracy and Its

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

127

coalition, despite widespread popular discontent.8 Prime Minister Charles de Broqueville refused to abandon the gold standard and repeatedly cut public spending in an effort to balance the budget. In May, the House and the Senate granted the government full powers (pleins pouvoirs) to pass the most severe and unpopular measures of its agenda, including entitlement reform. Meanwhile, the collapse of international trade was having a profound impact on Belgian society: between 1929 and 1932, exports fell by 26%, industrial output declined by nearly one-third, wages were cut, and unemployment soared up to 20%. Spontaneous strikes, often involving clashes with the police, erupted in regions which had been traditional POB strongholds, as documented by the famous documentary Misère au Borinage, filmed in 1933.9 Political stability and democratic rule, the founder of the POB Louis Bertrand warned, could no longer be taken for granted.10 In July, the still embryonic BES directed by de Man was given a boost as the social democratic trade unions Commission Syndicale (CS) gave full backing to its workings: the centre was expanded, put in charge of evaluating pieces of legislation to protect small savers, and finally asked to prepare a broader study of the overall economic situation of the country.11 De Man seized that opportunity to recruit young experts, inviting faculty members and students from Belgian academia to a series of seminars, held at the BES headquarters from September 1933 until March 1934, in which different approaches to solve crisis were debated. Some of the attendees would turn into de Man’s closest aides in the subsequent years: economists Robert J. Lemoine and Albert Halasi, activists Alice Pels and Background: Economic and Political Group Organization (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), 316–317. 8  On the internal paralysis of the POB during the early 1930s, see André Pletinckx, “Le Parti Ouvrier belge dans la première phase de la crise économique, 1930–1933,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Gieschiedenis, no. 3–4 (1976): 273–327 and no. 1–2 (1977): 237–289. 9  See Guy Vanthemsche, De werkloosheid in Belgie: 1929–1940 (Berchem: EPO, 1989), 113–124, 277; Isabelle Cassiers, Croissance, crise et régulation en économie ouverte: la Belgique entre les deux guerres (Brussels: De Boeck, 1989), 155–164; Martine Goossens, “The Belgian Labour Market during the Interwar Period,” in The Economic Development of Belgium since 1870, eds. Herman Van der Wee and Jan Blomme (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 1997), 417–429. On the Borinage, see Jean Puissant, L’évolution du mouvement ouvrier socialiste dans le Borinage (Brussels: Académie Royale du Belgique, 1982). 10  See Louis Bertrand, “Démocratie et régime parlementaire,” Le Peuple, March 20, 1933. 11  See “A propos du Bureau d’Études sociales,” 275.

128 

T. MILANI

Herman Vos, journalist Georges Truffaut, sociologist Léo Moulin, as well as the usual suspects Buset and Rens.12 It was de Man, however, who made the decisive move towards the launching of a Belgian Plan by addressing the CS Economic Council on October 10, 1933: in his speech he called for “‘a programme for immediate execution’ (un programme d’exécution immédiate)” involving “a detailed and precise plan, and a complete identification between the propaganda platform and the governmental programme.”13 On October 24, the Council approved de Man’s guidelines and set up a commission to develop them in full. Three days later, the POB General Council, after a request for further clarifications, endorsed de Man’s work and appointed new members to the commission: François Van Belle, Désiré Bouchery, Louis de Brouckère, Arthur Jauniaux, Arthur Wauters, Max Buset, and Paul-Henri Spaak. Victor Servy was selected as fifteenth and final member, on behalf of the cooperative movement. Following a series of unrecorded meetings, a first version of the Plan, by then known as Plan du Travail or Plan van de Arbeid, was presented, discussed, and approved by a joint session of the CS National Committee and the POB General Council on November 15, 1933.14 In all likelihood, the contribution of POB politicians to the final draft was very limited: de Man, Buset, and maybe Jauniaux were those who did the hard work.15 The significance of the creation of a joint commission, however, lies in the fact that a number of POB heavyweights agreed to 12  See the minutes of these meetings—fourteen in total—in AHDM/IISG/349A; ABSO/ AMSAB/98. 13  Henri de Man, “Un Plan économique pour la Belgique,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 11 (1933), 297. See also “Des voies nouvelles,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 10 (1933): 261, highlighting the impact of de Man’s speech. On October 17, de Man wrote that his involvement into politics was “absolutely essential” to ensure the effectiveness of the BES [Letter from de Man to Jauniaux, 17 October 1933, AHDM/IISG/585]. 14  See “En avant pour le Plan du Travail,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, 11 (1933): 291; “Note soumise par H. de Man au Bureau du C.G. du P.O.B. en vue de sa séance du 27 octobre 1933,” 23 October 1933, AHDM/IISG/422; “Le Conseil Général du P.O.B. et le Comité National de la Commission Syndicale ont examiné hier, le plan d’action de Henri de Man,” Le Peuple, November 16, 1933. On the origins of the name Plan du Travail, see Jef Rens, “Rectifions!,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, 11 (1936): 228–229. 15  See de Man, Après coup, 207; Henri de Man, “Préface,” in Max Buset, L’action pour le Plan (Brussels: L’Eglantine 1934), 3. De Man set out the essentials of the Plan in his Note of October 27 and Buset carried out most of the research on the banking sector by midNovember [see “Compte-rendu abrégé de la séance du séminaire d’études économiques et financières du 17 Novembre 1933,” AHDM/IISG/349A]. Jauniaux’s contribution is mentioned in Après Coup but remains undocumented.

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

129

step in. The appointment of Spaak, a 35-year-old lawyer and deputy from Brussels, was of the greatest importance. A rising star within Action socialiste, the most radical faction of the party, Spaak had a reputation as a crypto-communist troublemaker due to his disregard for party discipline. Even some members of Action socialiste considered him unreliable because of his extremism and bad temper.16 In many respects, Spaak embodied that left-wing mixture of defiance and discontent which, de Man claimed, only a Plan might channel towards positive goals.17 De Man’s bet paid off. By October 1933 Spaak was yearning for a “realist revolution” to save Belgium from a constitutional crisis comparable to the one that had wrecked the Weimar Republic.18 Having concluded that the country was at the crossroads between fascism and socialism, he finally conceded that the Plan would mark “a sharp break” with reformism and lay ground for a “Labour Front” (Front du Travail) behind which all workers could rally.19 It is unclear whether Spaak’s change of mind was sincere or followed an informal deal with de Man to curb internal dissent.20 Whatever the reasons, the fact that de Man successfully restrained the party’s enfant terrible may have persuaded even those who strongly disliked the Plan, such as de Brouckère, to go along with it. At least, de Man’s scheme would put a halt

 See Rens, Rencontres, 30, 64–65.  As de Man put it, “by treating discussions that highlight the discontent of our troops as a matter of internal discipline, and therefore of individuals, one would put the cart before the horse […]. The true solution lies in steering this ardour in a less sterile and less dangerous direction than the one of romantic insurrectionism and of extremist critique, where it now gloats” [“Note soumise par H. de Man au Bureau du C.G. du P.O.B. en vue de sa séance du 27 octobre 1933,” 23 October 1933, AHDM/IISG/422]. 18  Paul-Henri Spaak, “Que faire? III. Une révolution réaliste,” L’Action socialiste, no. 42 (1933): unpaged. 19  Paul-Henri Spaak, “Le Plan du Travail: II.  Ses mérites,” L’Action socialiste, no. 48 (1933): unpaged; Paul-Henri Spaak, “Le Plan du Travail: III. Ses mérites,” L’Action socialiste, no. 49 (1933): unpaged. 20  When, in February 1934, Action socialiste published an article that enraged Vandervelde and the party leadership, de Man publicly reminded the attendees that “there was, between the two of us, an agreement, a kind of pact […] which Spaak was committed to, ensuring there would be no further conflicts” [“Séance du Bureau du Conseil Général du 27 février 1934 à 2 h,” ABWP/AMSAB]. Several pieces of evidence suggest that, still in September 1934, Spaak had reservations about specific points of the Plan, which he viewed as too moderate, but refrained from going public in order not to damage party unity: see, for example, Angelo Tasca, handwritten notes in “Sur le Plan de Man et sur l’économie dirigée,” 16 September 1934, Notebook 25, FAT/FGF. 16 17

130 

T. MILANI

to potentially disruptive intra-party conflicts, like those who were then ripping the French SFIO apart.21 The feeling that the Plan might engender a greater sense of unity was shared by Vandervelde, who heavily contributed to aligning the POB with de Man’s project. De Man later claimed that soon before the 1933 Christmas Congress Le Patron offered him the vice-presidency as well as the effective direction of the party, while retaining control of the parliamentary group: this is inaccurate.22 Yet it is correct that Vandervelde acquiesced to that solution, originally proposed by de Man.23 Moreover, Vandervelde and de Man coordinated their efforts in preparation for the Christmas Congress, with the elderly leader giving de Man a free hand to devise the Plan.24 One can only speculate whether Vandervelde—then 67-year-old, deaf, and often criticised by younger militants for appearing out of touch—thought about de Man as a serious candidate for

21  See de Man, Après coup, 206, 236. For Spaak’s characterisation as enfant terrible, see Gaston Eyskens, De Memoires (Lannoo: Tielt, 1993), 47. In the summer of 1933, de Brouckère wrote extensively, and with growing anxiety, about the conflict between Léon Blum and the neo-socialists within the SFIO, which resulted in a split in November, less than two weeks before the first draft of the Labour Plan was discussed at the POB Council [see, e.g., Louis de Brouckère, “Scission en France!,” Le Peuple, November 7, 1933]. De Brouckère’s objections to the Plan are hinted at in “Séance du Bureau du 27 Octobre 1933 à 2 h,” ABWP/AMSAB. Within the SFIO, Pierre Renaudel predicted that events in France would have repercussions on the POB [see letter from Renaudel to Bertrand, 11 April 1933, FLB/IEV/I.395]. For other examples of influence, see Jexas (Josef Saxe), “Réflexions sur le Congrès socialiste français: mise au point et examen de conscience,” Le Peuple, July 26, 1933; Louis Piérard, Le socialisme à un tournant (Mons: Librairie Fédérale, 1933); Louis Piérard, “La médiation de l’Internationale,” Le Peuple, October 25, 1933. 22  De Man, Après coup, 229–230. It was de Man in the first place who declared himself available for the position of general secretary upon suggestion by Jauniaux [see letter from de Man to Jauniaux, 17 October 1933, AHDM/IISG/585]. Vandervelde opposed the idea of appointing de Man to an administrative role due to his obligations towards the BES [see “Séance du Bureau du Conseil Général du 3 novembre 1933–2 h,” ABWP/AMSAB]. 23  See Joseph Van Roosbroeck, “Note sur la réorganisation du secrétariat,” s.d., AHDM/ IISG/405. 24  See, for example, Vandervelde’s suggestion to put de Man in charge of developing the Plan [see “Réunion du Bureau du Conseil Général du 19 Octobre 1933,” ABWP/AMSAB]; de Man’s intention of finding an agreement with Vandervelde about the internal reorganisation of the party [see letter from de Man to Vandervelde, 9 November 1933, AHDM/ IISG/620]; Vandervelde’s strong endorsement of the first draft of the Plan on November 15 [see “Séance du Conseil Général et du Comité National de la Commission Syndicale du 15 novembre 1933,” ABWP/AMSAB].

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

131

succession.25 Obviously, the well-known opponent of orthodox Marxism and the white-bearded leader who boasted about belonging to the most staunchly Marxist party of Western Europe were strange bedfellows. But in late 1933 the rise of Hitler, Belgium’s shrinking economy, and the fear that the party base might be tempted by insurrectionism were all good reasons to set differences aside.26 At the 48th POB Congress, held on December 24–25, 1933, de Man and Vandervelde worked in concert. While the former heralded the Plan as “this thing without precedents in the history of our movement,” the latter reassured the old guard that neither the POB’s official programme nor its fundamental principles would be discarded: the Plan was “a fragment of the programme” that the party would enact as soon as it found a majority in Parliament.27 Following a largely formal and self-congratulatory discussion, the Plan was triumphantly approved with 567,451 votes in favour and 8500 abstentions while Vandervelde and de Man were sworn in as president and vice-­ president unanimously.28 Even at a cursory glance, it is clear the Belgian Labour Plan rested upon all the key ideas de Man had expressed between 1930 and 1933: in that sense, that seven-page document was unquestionably his brainchild. The Plan called for “a profound transformation of the country’s economic structure” aimed at the “diminution (résorption) of unemployment” by increasing the purchasing power of the population up to the level of the productive capacity of the economic system.29 The Plan identified “the 25  Writing on generational change within the POB in 1935, Vandervelde wished for a smooth and undramatic transition, animated by a “common concern for welding the pre-war and the post-war generations together in the best way possible” [Emile Vandervelde, “La cure de rajeunissement du socialisme,” La Dépêche de Toulouse, February 17, 1935]. 26  Vandervelde’s comment on the Marxist character of the POB is in Vandervelde, Le cinquantenaire, 109. On his views about the relationship between Marxism and socialism, see also Vandervelde, L’alternative, 15–37. Vandervelde voiced his preoccupations about the situation of Belgium in his speech at the 47° POB Congress, held in May 1933, and these were echoed in the Congress’ final resolutions [see Conseil General, XXVIIème Congrès, Bruxelles. 27–28 mai 1933 (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1933), 27–37, 76–78]. 27  Conseil General, XXVIIIème Congrès, 12, 42. Vandervelde could link the Labour Plan to the 1931 Plan de Salut Public, a package of palliative reforms that the POB deemed urgent for the country. The Plan de Salut Public was far less clear, coherent, and ambitious than the Labour Plan but set a useful precedent. On this first Plan, see Ben-Serge Chlepner, Cent ans d’histoire sociale en Belgique (Brussels: Institut de Sociologie Solvay, 1956), 383. 28  Conseil General, XXVIIIème Congrès, 80, 143. 29  “La Résolution du Congrès de Noel,” in de Man, Le Plan du Travail, 17.

132 

T. MILANI

private monopoly of credit, which subordinates economic activity to the pursuit of individual profit” as the main obstacle to prosperity, and argued for its nationalisation, “in order to give everyone a useful and remunerative job and increase the general welfare.”30 The measures envisaged by the Plan involved the creation of a state-owned “Credit Institute” subjecting banks’ operations, financial institutions already under state control, the National Bank, and insurance companies to the Plan’s directives as well as the establishment of a “Financial Commissariat directly under the legislative authority and responsible for the general direction of credit, the monetary regime, and the current account balance.”31 Legislation would be passed to turn “the main raw materials and motive power monopolies” into public services and run them as consortia placed under a Commissariat, while a similar body would manage public transport.32 Within the private sector, “no change will be made to the property regime”: savings would be protected and free competition promoted; an inheritance tax would prevent “the reconstitution of a hereditary financial oligarchy” while some restrictions would be enforced upon foreign capital, but only to safeguard “national prosperity and the defence of national heritage against any sabotage” from the capitalist class.33 A consultative “Economic Council” would be set up, supervising the operations of the Commissariats of Industry and Transport, and be permitted to submit legislation to Parliament.34 Following these structural reforms, the Plan would introduce a second set of measures in the field of investment, credit, price, labour, monetary, commercial, fiscal, and social policy: prices would be stabilised and speculation discouraged, credit favoured and made more easily accessible, working hours reduced and collective bargaining recognised, foreign trade boosted and protection reduced to a minimum, taxes and levies cut due to the increased revenues generated by the economic recovery, and so on.35 Overall, these measures were expected to improve mass nutrition, social hygiene, housing, infrastructures, education, and, more generally, the quality of leisure. The Plan sketched out the ordering of these steps into a five-year plan (a plan within the Plan, one could say) with the purpose of  Ibidem.  Ibid., 19. 32  Ibidem. 33  Ibid., 20–21. 34  Ibid., 22. 35  Ibid., 22–23. 30 31

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

133

doubling the purchasing power of the internal ­market.36 Last but not least, the Plan outlined a “political reform” to strengthen the democratic character of the Belgian political system: all institutions would gain legitimacy from universal suffrage; constitutional liberties would be fully granted to every citizen; the independence and the authority of the state as well as of the other public institutions would be protected from organised money; the legislative power would be exercised by a single chamber, to be assisted by consultative councils providing technical expertise and by agencies in charge of the implementation of economic policy to ensure rapidity, accountability, and efficiency, “thus avoiding the pitfalls of statism.”37 The Plan therefore had an economic as well as a political dimension, and promised a radical restructuring of the Belgian institutional framework. If the Labour Plan was a faithful expression of de Man’s views, its execution demanded further study at technical level, a task that de Man himself presented as a collective enterprise in which party members equipped with relevant skills could have a say.38 Throughout 1934, under the supervision of the BES, twenty-two commissions featuring almost one-hundred people, one-third of whom from the POB parliamentary group, hammered out proposals of legislation which gave substance to the various heading of the Plan. The proposed bills were approved by a Commission Générale du Plan, appointed by the POB General Council, in January 1935 and published in a 444-page volume shortly after.39 In the meantime, an extraordinary campaign kicked off to circulate the Plan and gather people around it. The propaganda was issued by the Bureau national d’action pour le Plan (BNAP), headed by Buset with the help of a pool of trade unionists who were also close associates of de Man: Arthur Gailly, Paul Finet, and Maurice Naessens. Both the BNAP and its journal, Plan, were funded through a combination of voluntary subscriptions and compulsory contributions from the party, the unions, and the

 Ibid., 23.  Ibid., 24. 38  Conseil General, XXVIIIème Congrès, 12–13. 39  See L’exécution du Plan du Travail par Henri de Man et l’Équipe du Bureau d’Études Sociales (Paris: Alcan, 1935), esp. 5–16, 431–437. See also “Note sur le Bureau d’études sociales,” AHDM/AMSAB/343; “Rapport sur l’exécution du Plan du Travail présenté au Conseil Général du POB par le Bureau d’Études Sociales (novembre 1934),” AHDM/ IISG/428. 36 37

134 

T. MILANI

cooperatives.40 In a handbook for the activists, Buset explained that propaganda for the Labour Plan had to meet four criteria: first, reach out to non-social democratic sections of the electorate, impressing public opinion “by the abundance, the variety, and the novelty of its means of penetration,” including the use of a jargon intelligible to people unfamiliar with socialist ideas; second, “adjust itself” to the “extreme diversity” of professional and social groups targeted; third, appeal less to rationality than “to instincts, sentiments, emotions”; fourth be “infiltrating and obsessive at the same time.”41 To a large extent the campaign met these standards. By March 1934, more than 2 million copies of the Plan had been disseminated.42 In addition to mass demonstrations, rallies, and conferences, new kinds of gatherings were tested, such as bike parades.43 Gender issues were addressed in ad hoc meetings.44 Manifestos targeting constituencies traditionally hostile to the POB were released, including a wide range of booklets courting farmers and Christian workers.45 Comic stripes and cartoons were widely employed to convey simple, direct messages.46 Speeches were delivered 40   See “Séance des Quatre Bureaux du 4 janvier 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB; Emile Vandervelde, “Un appel: Pour le Plan du Travail,” Le Peuple, January 14, 1934; Georges Truffaut, “La propagande pour le plan doit devenir une obsession: toutes les forces vives du Parti doivent dorénavant être au service du Plan, nous dit Arthur Gailly, délégué de la propagande,” Le Peuple, December 25, 1934. 41  Buset, L’action pour le Plan, 68. 42  See “Séance du Bureau du Conseil Général du 16 mars 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB. 43  See, for example, “Pour le Plan du Travail: le rallye cycliste de la Fédération bruxelloise du P.O.B.” Le Peuple, September 10, 1934. 44  See, for example, Claire Rome, “La femme et le Plan du Travail,” Le Peuple, May 9, 1934. Isabelle Blume played a major role in uniting POB women behind the Plan: see Blum, Entretiens, 54–57. 45  See, for example, Maurice Hambursin, “Le P.O.B. lance un appel aux cultivateurs pour qu’ils se rallient au Plan du Travail,” Le Peuple, May 19, 1934; Herman Vos, Le Plan du Travail et l’Encyclique papale Quadragesimo Anno (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1934); Arthur Wauters, Paysan! Réveille-toi (Brussels: Bureau National d’Action pour le Plan du Travail, 1935); Herman Vos, Les démocrates-chrétiens et le Plan du Travail (Brussels: Bureau National d’Action pour le Plan du Travail, n.d.); Oscar de Swaef, Plan van den Arbeid (Brussels: National Actiebureau voor het Plan, n.d.); Frédéric Denis, Travailleur chrétien, tu liras ceci …: tu comprendras … (Brussels: Bureau National d’Action pour le Plan du Travail, n.d.). 46  See, for example, Isi Delvigne, Tuons la crise par le Plan du Travail (Brussels: Éditions de la presse socialiste, 1935). Comic stripes appeared regularly on Plan, which Buset moulded on the French popular magazine Marianne: “12 pages, beaucoup d’images ou photos” [“Séance des secrétaires d’arrondissement wallons du 21 février à 2 1/2  h.,” ABWP/AMSAB].

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

135

through radio broadcast, a March for the Plan was composed, and even a “catéchisme” was distributed.47 The fight for the Labour Plan came to dominate the headlines.48 Domestic events put de Man at the forefront of international left-wing politics: the Christmas Congress gave him the visibility he needed to speak out and be heard while the subsequent mobilisation raised expectations that the Labour Plan would soon enter into force.49 As a consequence, by early 1934 a significant number of social democratic intellectuals had turned their minds to Belgium. Lucien Laurat came out as a vocal supporter of the POB’s new course, and so did an economist close to the CGT, Francis Delaisi.50 A group of young SFIO intellectuals who had established the circle Révolution Constructive in 1932, publishing a book under the same title, finally found a cause worth fighting for: they ardently espoused de Man’s views.51 The reverberations of the Labour Plan were 47  See, for example, radio speeches in AHDM/IISG/365; Chœurs parlés (Brussels: Bureau National d’Action pour le Plan, 1935); Marcel Poot, “Marche du Plan” in AHDM/ AMSAB/336; Georges Bohy-Denis and Hélène Bohy-Denis, Catéchisme du Plan du Travail (La Louvière: Imprimerie Coopérative, s.d). Other musical scores can be found in AHDM/ AMSAB/338, AHDM/AMSAB/339, AHDM/AMSAB/340, AHDM/AMSAB/341. See also the guidelines for the demonstrations of January–February 1935 in AHDM/IISG/432. 48  For instance, the mainstream non-socialist newspaper Le Soir mentioned the Labour Plan, named Plan du Travail or Plan de Man, more than 150 times in 1934. 49  In Belgium, the campaign deliberately put de Man into the spotlight, to increase the impact of his message on ordinary militants [see Delattre, Souvenirs, 135]. 50  See letter from Laurat to de Man, 8 November 1933, ABSO/AMSAB/82; Lucien Laurat, “Réflexions sur un programme: la fin d’une vieille dispute,” La Wallonie, November 21, 1933; Lucien Laurat, L’évolution doctrinale du socialisme (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1934), 31–32. Laurat’s Economie dirigée et socialisation praised the “constructive socialism” animating the Belgian Labour Plan [Lucien Laurat, Economie dirigée et socialisation (Paris-Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1934), 250]. The book was enthusiastically reviewed by Arthur Wauters, the political editor of Le Peuple [see Arthur Wauters, “Economie dirigée et socialisation,” Le Peuple, August 28, 1934] and by the trade unionist press [see “Bibliographie,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 10 (1934): 232]. On Delaisi, see “L’expérience américaine: une conférence de M. Delaisi,” Le Peuple, January 20, 1934. In April 1934, Plan announced that the Delaisi Plan was soon to be released in France. This Plan (not to be confused with the 1931 Delaisi Plan) was moulded on the Belgian Labour Plan but in fact was never published as a separate document and was probably absorbed into the CGT Plan [see Henri Lefort, “Le Plan Delaisi,” Plan 1, no. 6 (1934): 1–2]. 51  See Georges Lefranc, Pierre Boivin and Maurice Deixonne, Révolution constructive (Paris: Valois, 1932); “Préface par le groupe de Révolution Constructive,” in Henri de Man, Le socialisme devant la crise (Asnières: Cahiers de Révolution Constructive, 1935), 1–4. At least two of the founders of Révolution constructive, Lefranc and Claude Levi-Strauss, estab-

136 

T. MILANI

particularly strong in France, as it will be shown in the next chapter, but by no means were limited to it. To cite a few examples, both Austrian journalist Oskar Pollak and the leading journal of German Social Democrats in exile heralded the Labour Plan as a major breakthrough.52 Many Dutch social democrats praised it as a leap forward.53 Swedish philosopher Alf Ahlberg was very positive.54 Italian anti-fascists from Giustizia e Libertà, founded by Rosselli, published and lauded the Plan in their journal.55 Even more importantly, some trade unions and parties decided to emulate it. In June 1934, the Schweizerischer Verband des Personals öffentlicher Dienste (VPOD), led by an admirer of de Man, Hans Oprecht, issued a Swiss Plan which, despite the reservations of other union branches, was incorporated in the programme of the Swiss Socialist Party in January 1935.56 In the Netherlands Meyer Sluyser, editor of the social democratic newspaper Het Volk, began championing a Dutch Labour Plan in January lished contacts with de Man in 1927, after having read Au-delà du marxisme [see letter from Lefranc to de Man, 23 July 1927 and letter from Levi-Strauss to de Man, 17 October 1927, AHDM/IISG/253; Georges Lefranc, “Rétrospectives: à travers un demi-siècle de mouvement ouvrier, 1920–1970. Vol. I: Comment, dans les années 1920, on devient socialiste,” Cahier & Revue de l’Ours, no. 116 (1981): 55]. On Révolution Constructive, see Stéphane Clouet, De la rénovation à l’utopie socialistes: Révolution constructive, un groupe d’intellectuels socialistes des années 1930 (Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1991). 52  See “Ein Plan der Arbeit,” Arbeiter-Zeitung, December 29, 1933; O. P. [Oskar Pollak], “Die Gewinnung der Mittelschichten,” Arbeiter-Zeitung, December 31, 1933; Max Klinger, “Sozialistische Erneuerung: Das Beispiel der Belgischen Arbeiterpartei,” Neuer Vorwärts, no. 30 (1934): 1. 53  See, for example, “De Man oogstte veel succes: Zijn ‘Plan van den Arbeid’ door Congres aanwaard,” Het Volk, December 27, 1933; Meyer Sluyser, “Het Plan van de Arbeid van dr. Hendrik de Man,” Het Volk, December 28, 1933; L.J. Kleijn, “Wat het Belgische vijfjarenplan van prof. Hendrik de Man wil,” Het Volk, January 4, 1934; Johan Wilhelm Albarda, “‘Fiasco’ van Het Plan-De Man,” Het Volk, January 16, 1934. See also various contributions to “Het Plan van de Arbeid: Nieuwe Wegen,” De sociaal-democraat: weekblad van de Sociaal Democratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland, no. 7 (1934). 54   See Alf Ahlberg, “Socialismen På Offensiv. Hendrik de Man Framlågger ett Socialiseringsprogram,” Fackföreningsrörelsen: organ för Landsorganisationen i Sverge, no. 2 (1933): 588–593, 620–626. 55  See L’Osservatore [Giuseppe Favarelli], “‘Il Piano del Lavoro’ del Partito operaio belga,” Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà, no. 10 (1934): 94–103. 56  See Le Plan du Travail pour une économie suisse dirigée (La Chaux-de-Fonds: Imprimerie des coopératives réunies, 1934); Der Plan der Arbeit: Ein Ausweg aus Krise und Not (Zürich: Verlag PDA, 1935). See also the correspondence in ABSO/AMSAB/94. For an overview on Swiss planism, see Michel Brélaz, “Le Plan du Travail suisse,” Bulletin de l’association pour l’étude de l’œuvre d’Henri de Man, no. 12 (1984): 45–66.

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

137

1934 with de Man’s blessing.57 The SDAP would finally release its own Plan van de Arbeid the following year.58 All of a sudden, the Belgian Labour Plan seemed ready to be transplanted into foreign soil. Another indicator of de Man’s surging popularity was the incensed reaction of the communist intelligentsia. In June 1934 Eugen Varga, a key advisor to Stalin and director of the Moscow Institute of World Economy and World Politics, admitted that de Man’s approach had gained momentum.59 He therefore sought to discredit both the Labour Plan and its author. De Man, Varga contended, was a “‘Marxist’ Gandhi,” welcomed “as one of their own” by the German bourgeoisie, palatable to the Nazis, on the payroll of the Belgian National Bank for his contributions to its “aristocratic organ,” the Bulletin.60 Furthermore, his scheme was nothing but a ruse to deceive the working class. Varga emphatically underscored that the Labour Plan would alter neither the basic structures of the capitalist system nor the fundamentally repressive features of the bourgeois state. The means of production would remain in the hands of the capitalist class; property rights would be secured; income inequality would linger on: for all these reasons, placing “the ‘mixed economy’ planned by de Man alongside the economy of the Soviet Union” was, to his mind, “the most brazen fraud imaginable!”61 Varga contended that, if anything, the Labour Plan could clear the way for the enemies of labour by setting up an ever stronger more authoritarian state: the campaign of the POB, he wrote, was “waged in the fascist spirit, and serves the cause of preparing the advent of 57  See Meyer Sluyser, Planmatige socialistische politiek: het Plan van den Arbeid (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1934). See also Hendrik de Man, “Voorrede,” ibid., 2. 58  See Het Plan van de Arbeid. Rapport van de commissie uit N.V.V. en S.D.A.P. (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1935). Evidence of the BES’ influence on the SDAP Plan can be found in ABSO/AMSAB/87. For an overview of Dutch planism, see Gerard M. Nederhorst, “Het Plan van de Arbeid,” Het eerste Jaarboek voor het Democratisch Socialisme, eds, Jan Blank, Martin Ros and Bart Tromp (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1979), 109–135; R. Abma, “The Labour Plan and the Social Democratic Workers’ Party,” The Low Countries History Yearbook, no. 14 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981): 154–181; Freddy Verbruggen, “Terug naar het Plan van den Arbeid” and Hendrik Brugmans, “Le Plan de Man et le Pays Bays,” Bulletin de l’association pour l’étude de l’œuvre d’Henri de Man, no. 12 (1984): 3–29 and 30–36 respectively. 59  “Everything points to the fact that the de Man Plan will very soon be imitated in all the other parties of the Second International” [Eugen Varga, “The De Man Plan is a Fraud on the Workers (Part I),” Communist International 11, no. 12 (1934): 485]. 60  Ibid., 482, 486, 487. 61  Eugen Varga, “The De Man Plan is a Fraud on the Workers (Part II),” Communist International 11, no. 13 (1934): 523.

138 

T. MILANI

fascism to power in Belgium.”62 The assault was so vicious that de Man and his acolytes took it as a sign of Moscow’s mounting anxiety: “[T]he communists, who can no longer claim a role at the upfront of the labour movement, are now the rear-guard, in a position that the movement itself is going to evacuate.”63 The interest raised by the Belgian Labour Plan enabled de Man to develop a transnational network of his own making, by means of which social democrats abroad could deepen their knowledge of his ideas and possibly sharpen them. The first International Plan Conference, funded by the BES and the VPOD, was held on September 14–16, 1934, at the Abbey of Pontigny, where the French philosopher and avid reader of de Man’s works, Paul Desjardins, used to organise ten-day seminars every year—the so-called Décades.64 The conference attracted an impressive cohort of Western European advocates of planning.65 De Man was 62  Ibid., 524. Varga expanded his views in a tract written upon request of the Belgian Communist Party: see Eugen Varga, Le “Plan” (Brussels: C.D.L., 1934). The tract appeared in France as Eugen Varga, Henri de Man et son Plan (Paris: Bureau d’Éditions, 1934). 63  Henri de Man, “Un défenseur communiste du réformisme,” Le Peuple, October 31, 1934. See also Lucien Laurat, “Le Plan du Travail vu de Moscou,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, 10 (1934): 214–219. Laurat’s and de Man’s rejoinders were also circulated as short tracts [Lucien Laurat, Le Plan de Travail vu de Moscou (Brussels: Bureau d’Action pour le Plan, 1935); Henri de Man, Le Plan du Travail et les communistes (Paris-Brussels: Labor, 1935)]. De Man claimed he responded to Varga only because the tract was widely circulated by Belgian communists with the purpose of disorienting younger POB militants [see Henri de Man, “Le Plan et les communistes,” Le Peuple, October 10, 1934]. 64  Desjardins, who had been deeply impressed by Au-delà du marxisme, hosted de Man in 1929 and invited him again in 1932 [see Desjardins’ diary entries quoted in Rolph Nordling and Georges Lefranc, “L’activité sociale de Paul Desjardins,” in Paul Desjardins et les décades de Pontigny: études, témoignages et documents inédits, ed. Anne Heurgon-Desjardins (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1964), 215–222, 301–302, 303–304; letter from Desjardins to de Man, 12 May 1929, AHDM/IISG/279; letter from Philip to de Man, 8 January 1932, AHDM/IISG/338; letter from Desjardins to de Man, 17 April 1932, AHDM/ IISG/338]. Early discussions between Desjardins and de Man about a conference on the Plan dated back to November 1933 [see letter from de Man to Desjardin, 6 December 1933, ABSO/AMSAB/82]. 65  Two further International Plan Conferences were held, the first in Geneva in April 1936 and the second again in Pontigny in October 1937, but de Man did not manage to attend. For further discussion, see Georges Lefranc, “Les conférences internationales des plans et la commission internationale des plans,” Revue éuropeenne des sciences sociales: Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto 12, no. 31 (1974): 189–196; Gerd-Rainer Horn, “From Radical to Realistic: Hendrik de Man and the International Plan Conferences at Pontigny and Geneva, 1934–1937,” Contemporary European History 10, no. 2 (2001): 239–265.

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

139

a­ ccompanied by his inner circle: Vos and Halasi for the BES, Buset as editor of Plan, Rens on behalf of the CS; Isabelle Blume, Gailly, Finet, Léo Collard, Paul Lambert, and Marc Somerhausen as propagandists associated with the BNAP. Jauniaux, Spaak, Truffaut, Isi Delvigne, Edward Anseele Jr, and Maurice de Moor were also part of the Belgian delegation. The French contingent featured trade unionists (René Belin, Robert Bothereau, Robert Lacoste, Achille Dauphin-Meunier), academics (Georges Gurvitch, Edouard Dolléans), and public intellectuals (Bertrand de Jouvenel, Lucien Laurat). The Swiss contingent (Oprecht, Otto Graf, Willy Spühler, Ernst Reinhard) was pivotal in steering the debate; Rosselli, Angelo Tasca, and Woytinsky stood out among the exiles who attended.66 The purpose of the meeting was informative and the tone of discussion rather dry; participants were not supposed to agree upon a common strategy. Most sessions were exercises in brainstorming: in addition to the Belgian Plan, drafts of Dutch, Swiss, Czech, and French Plans were scrutinised; the German Walter Pahl, then based in London, commented on the writings of Stafford Cripps and G.D.H. Cole, which were expected to inform an upcoming English Plan.67 But the highlight of the conference was de Man’s keynote speech, in which, for the first time, he introduced planism as a coherent ideology, based on thirteen points, soon to be known as les thèses de Pontigny. These were general propositions which, while drawing on the Belgian experience, were meant to be applicable to every industrialised country coping with the Depression and the rise of fascism. The first two stated the structural nature of the economic crisis (n. 1) and the exhaustion of reformism (n. 2). The subsequent ones argued for the necessity of abandoning a passive attitude towards the business cycle (n. 3); acting at national level through a reorganisation of the internal market (n. 4); building a majority 66  For the full list of participants, see Konferenz zur Besprechung der Probleme der Panwirtschaft, 14. Bis 16 September 1934: Abbaye de Pontigny (Frankreich) (Zürich: VPOD, 1934), 76–77. Further details on the Belgian delegation can be found in “Séance du Bureau du 4 septembre 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB. 67  See Konferenz zur Besprechung, 10–38. The only French Plan discussed at Pontigny was the CGT Plan. Pahl, who spoke in German and was referred to as “Mr. X” in the Swiss proceedings, informed the audience he had been contacted at the last minute and was not speaking on behalf of Cripps and Cole [see Konferenz zur Besprechung, 29]. Pahl was indicated with his real name on the French record: see “Conférence consultative, à l’abbaye de Pontigny, sur les problèmes relatifs à l’économie planée,” L’Information sociale 17, no. 553 (1934): 15. Originally, de Man had hoped to host G.D.H. Cole, Richard Tawney, or Stafford Cripps [see letter from de Man to Déat, 25 January 1934, ABSO/AMSAB/82].

140 

T. MILANI

around the economic measures that were deemed essential to tackle the crisis (n. 5); establishing a transitional mixed economy by which consumption could grow and meet the productive capacity of the system (n. 6–7); pursuing nationalisations to ensure public management, not necessarily public ownership, of key industries (n. 8); setting up a corporatist framework for the new polity, putting employers and employees on equal footing (n. 9); forming anti-capitalist alliances with the middle classes against monopoly and finance capitalism (n. 10–11); using legal and constitutional means, wherever democracy was in place, to gain political power (n. 12); replacing old programmes with a limited but binding Plan to be immediately enforced by planists once in power (n. 13).68 Less than two months later, in speech at the Sorbonne, de Man added one further thesis to the list: parties which adhered to planism would decline to join or support any coalition government which did not commit itself to a full implementation of the Labour Plan; conversely, they would cooperate with any group or party making that commitment.69 Embracing the motto “Nothing but the Plan, the whole Plan,” de Man was ruling out the possibility of entering in a government whose agenda did not include the Labour Plan.70 These were the basic tenets underpinning a new ideological paradigm which de Man daringly presented as the third phase in the history of social democracy: after insurrectionism and reformism, the age of planism had been ushered in.71 Or so he thought. * * * Overall, the Pontigny conference was the high-water mark of de Man’s career as social democratic ideologue but his effort to pin down planism brought about new challenges and made him more vulnerable. Whereas his international reputation had been boosted by his accomplishments at home—for de Man could claim he was one of the very few intellectuals who managed to climb to the top of a major Western European social democratic party—it soon became clear that his domestic position could be eroded by his entanglements abroad. To begin with, despite holding the vice-presidency of the POB, de Man continued to speak his mind on  Ibid., 4–6. See also “Les thèses de Pontigny,” Plan 1, no. 27 (1934): unpaged.  See de Man, Socialisme et planisme, 13–14. 70  A slightly modified version of the fourteenth thesis, including the motto “Rien que le Plan, tout le Plan” was published in the French edition of Die Sozialistische Ideen: see Henri de Man, L’idée socialiste (Paris: Grasset, 1935), 534. 71  See de Man, Socialisme et planisme, 3–9. 68 69

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

141

national and international affairs, an attitude that annoyed even some of his warmest supporters.72 Secondly, by drawing a straightforward link between the Labour Plan and his wider effort aimed at modernising socialism, he could no longer rely on the benevolence of Vandervelde, whose main concerns were the maintenance of party discipline and the preservation of the POB’s ideological heritage. Divisions within French social democracy, which will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter, heightened tensions between the two. In April 1934, upon request from Le Patron, the POB Council forbade POB militants to publicly meet foreign social democrats whose party was not affiliated to the LSI: this applied to a wide range of French dissidents no longer in the SFIO, and especially to the neo-socialist fringe led by Marcel Déat.73 For a while, de Man kept contacts with them to a minimum and carefully avoided being associated with their activities; however, his newly forged transnational network did not meet such strict requirements.74 On December 12, 1934, Vandervelde ripped into de Man for having allowed a highly heterogeneous group of people, including “individuals who say that old socialism is outmoded, paralysed, and the future belongs to planism,” to attend his talk at the Sorbonne. According to Vandervelde, who had done his best to graft the Belgian Labour Plan onto the Charte de Quaregnon but whose acceptance of it remained within the boundaries set by the “principles of Marxist socialism,” de Man had crossed a line by mingling with figures of dubious reputation.75 As he stated repeatedly, both in private and in public, the Belgian Plan Labour was one thing but planism was another.76

72  In the words of Joseph Van Roosbroeck: “even if he [de Man] signs his articles, public opinion and the rival press cite and interpret these ides as if they were those of our party” [“Séance du Conseil Général du 25 mai 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB]. 73  See “Séance du Bureau du Conseil Général du 16 avril 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB. 74  In early 1934, De Man distanced himself from Déat, who had launched the idea of an international one-week seminar devoted to the Labour Plan, due to his expulsion from the SFIO and support to the Doumergue cabinet. In doing so, de Man openly referred to Vandervelde’s concerns and role within the LSI [see letter from Déat to de Man, 6 January 1934; letter from de Man to Déat, 10 January 1934; letter from de Man to Déat, 17 January 1934; letter from de Man to Desjardins, 27 February 1934, all in ABSO/AMSAB/82]. It is worth stressing that Déat was not invited to the First International Plan Conference. 75  “Séance du Conseil général du 12 décembre 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB.  Beyond Déat, Vandervelde hinted also at militants of right-wing organisations who developed an interest in de Man’s ideas. 76  See letter from Vandervelde to Lefranc, 14 January 1935, in Georges Lefranc, “Les conférences internationales,” 195–196; Emile Vandervelde, “Retour à Marx et analyses marxistes,” Le Peuple, February 17, 1935.

142 

T. MILANI

However important, theoretical frictions were not the only source of animosity between Vandervelde and de Man. In fact, the more the campaign for the Plan proceeded, the more the relationship between its operative branches and the POB party structures became strained. One highly controversial issue was the standing of the BES, de Man’s main fiefdom, vis-à-vis the POB’s parliamentary group, on which Vandervelde held a firm grip. In July, during a session of the POB Council, de Man stated that, in conformity with the catchphrase “Le Plan du Travail au pouvoir,” the parliamentary group would be bound to execute the policy proposals formulated by the twenty-two commissions supervised by the BES. Vandervelde strongly objected to that “schoolteacher’s attitude” and insisted that the parliamentary group would freely discuss the proposals before making a decision, for it was “in the best position to judge what it has to do” whilst the BES was merely “an administrative body.”77 In December, with the work of the twenty-two commissions coming to a close, Vandervelde declared that the POB’s parliamentary group expected to receive the detailed legislation bills well in advance whereas de Man wanted to hand the final drafts to the parliamentarians only at the moment of enacting the Plan, to minimise scrutiny. Their row is indicative of the mutual mistrust between the party and the autonomous bodies gravitating around de Man.78 To be sure, the latter complained about the POB’s ineffectiveness in several occasions: for instance, he found the coverage of the campaign for the Labour Plan provided by the party’s newspapers inadequate and lamented that the crisis of the Banque belge du Travail (BBT) diverted attentions, energy, and resources from the propaganda effort. It was probably around October 1934 that de Man, also because of these difficulties, reached the conclusion that Vandervelde and the rest of the party establishment were paying lip service to the Plan but had no intention of putting it into practice.79  “Séance du Bureau du Conseil Général du 12 juillet 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB.  See “Séance du Conseil général du 12 décembre 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB. 79  See “Séance du Bureau du Conseil général du 16 mars 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB; “Séance du Bureau du Conseil Général du 8 juin 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB; “Séance du C.G. du 8 novembre 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB. De Man criticised an article by Vandervelde in which Le Patron speculated whether the POB might be more lenient towards a future government which, without implementing the Labour Plan, would at least abandon deflationary policies [see Emile Vandervelde, “Prochainement sans doute la crise ministérielle: mais après?,” Le Peuple, October 21, 1934]. The BBT was a Belgian cooperative bank badly hurt by the economic crisis which eventually went bankrupt. The fact that the BBT was involved in short77 78

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

143

De Man’s ascendancy over the POB was further weakened by some setbacks the campaign for the Labour Plan suffered throughout the country. Outside the social democratic milieu, the Labour Plan was met with considerable hostility. De Man’s project inflamed the right-wing press, which viewed it as dogmatic, quixotic, and dangerous: establishing such an extensive and intrusive system of control over the private sector, conservative commentators held, would pave the ground for a future communist dictatorship.80 Others treated the Plan as an ingenious piece of propaganda, not as a feasible set of proposals.81 Even those who took it seriously, such as Catholic right-wing commentator Robert Poulet, ultimately concluded that de Man’s reforms would result into the creation of an “immense bureaucracy of unaccountable controllers.”82 In addition, the strident rhetoric used during the campaign did little to assuage fears that, by championing the creation of a strong state, Belgian social democrats were in fact aiming at curtailing the freedoms of its main political opponents. This anxiety permeated discourses about the Plan within Christian organisations: the Catholic priest and trade union leader Louis Colens denounced it as a smokescreen fabricated by the POB to pursue its term, speculative investments damaged the reputation of the POB as the bank’s president, Edouard Anseele, was also a well-known and powerful party member. For a contemporary account, see “La crise de la Banque Belge du Travail,” Revue d’économie politique 48, no. 4 (1934): 1212–1222. 80  See, for example, “Le Congrès socialiste et l’utopie du plan de Man,” Le Vingtième siècle, December 28, 1933; Tamias [Max-Léo Gérard], “Comment on trompe le peuple,” L’Independence Belge, January 17, 1934; Tamias [Max-Léo Gérard], “Comment le Plan du Travail est incompatible avec les libertés publiques,” L’Independence belge, April 12, 1934; Fernand Deschamps, “Le truc du Plan,” Le Vingtième siècle, January 19, 1934; “Une lettre de M. Henri Lambert sur l’économie libre: il faut découvrir la cause de la monopolisation graduelle ou de son danger,” L’Etoile belge, April 29, 1934; Jules Coelst, “Réformes et plans de façade,” La Libre Belgique, May 10, 1934; Pierre des Sables, “Les dangereuses suggestions du Parti socialiste,” L’Independence Belge, June 9, 1934; Pierre des Sables, “La dictature et les socialistes,” L’Independence Belge, August 6, 1934; Marc Delforge, “La panacée de M. de Man: serait-ce un remède homéopathique?” Vers l’Avenir, December 12, 1934. 81  See, for example, Cyrille Van Overbergh, “Socialisme,” Le Soir, January 12, 1934; Maurice Masoin, “Que vaut le Plan de Man?,” Vers l’Avenir, March 6, 1935. 82  Robert Poulet, “Que penser du ‘Plan de Man’?,” La Nation belge, November 23, 1933. Poulet’s vision of a national and corporatist revolution was outlined in Robert Poulet, La révolution est à droite (Paris: Denoël et Steele, 1934), esp. 186–223. More centrist Catholics were equally unconvinced by de Man’s proposals: see, for example, Fernand Baudhuin, “Le Plan du Travail: comment il apparait à la lecture des textes,” La Libre Belgique, March 17, 1935.

144 

T. MILANI

“anti-social and anti-religious programmes” as early as January 1934; the Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens (CSC), the Fédération des Cercles Catholiques (FCC), and the Ligue Nationale des Travailleurs Chrétiens (LNTC) condemned it on similar grounds a few months later.83 The uncompromising opposition from Christian trade unions came as a serious blow, especially in a vertically divided society as interwar Belgium where the religious cleavage still ran deep.84 The implicit assumption behind the launching of the Labour Plan was indeed that Catholic blue-­ collar workers could be won over and would, within a reasonable amount of time, coalesce around an anti-crisis platform, hence forcing the Catholic Party to either support the Labour Plan for fear of losing votes or face defeat in the subsequent general election. However inconclusive, the evidence available suggests that this did not happen due to a combination of factors: widespread misgivings among Catholics about the real intentions of the POB once in power, a preference for corporatism over state-led planning within the Catholic elite, the backlash against the aggressiveness of the propaganda in favour of the Labour Plan, and the relative success of Catholic counterpropaganda.85 It is true that a minority of Catholic 83  Louis Colens, “Le ‘Plan’ et les démocrates chrétiens: réponse de ceux-ci aux socialistes,” La Libre Belgique, January 4, 1934; “La Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens devant le Plan de Man,” Le Vingtième Siècle, February 11, 1934; “A la fédération des cercles catholiques,” Le Soir, March 12, 1934; “La Ligue des Travailleurs et le Plan socialiste,” La Vie Nouvelle, April 22, 1934. The CSC was especially severe: see C.S.C., “Le Plan de Man,” Le Progrès syndical, no. 30 (1934): 1–2 and C.S.C., “Voulez-vous suicider?,” Le Progrès syndical, no. 42 (1935): 1. For other rejections from prominent Catholics, see Albert Muller, “Le Plan du Travail et la morale catholique,” and Joseph Arendt, “Le valeur économique du Plan de Man,” La Terre Wallonne 15, no. 174 (1934): 313–330 and 331–344 respectively. For the POB’s reaction, see Auguste Dewinne, “Les dirigeants de la démocratie chrétienne ne veulent pas du plan: pourquoi?,” Le Peuple, January 11, 1934; Auguste Dewinne, “Ou est la manouvre?,” Le Peuple, January 18, 1934. The most comprehensive critique of the Labour Plan from a Catholic perspective can be found in a special issue of La Cité Chrétienne, published in February 1935, that featured articles by Jacques Leclercq, Marcel Grégoire, Léon Renard, Joseph Arendt, and others. 84  On the origins of this phenomenon, see Pascal Delwit, La vie politique en Belgique de 1830 à nos jours (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2012), 70–79. 85  Most of these elements were acknowledged by POB activists: see “Les démocrates-chrétiens et le Plan du Travail,” Le Peuple, February 17, 1934; Jef Rens, “Les chrétiens et le Plan,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 3 (1934): 54–58; “Correspondance échangée entre la Commission Syndicale et la Confédération des Syndicats chrétiens,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, 1 (1935): 16–19. Sympathies for corporatism were strong even among young Catholics, a prime target for the campaign for the Labour Plan: see, for example, “Les jeunesses catholiques en marche vers le corporatisme,” La Wallonie, January 29, 1934; “Le

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

145

intellectuals broke ranks but that was a pale shadow of the Labour Front that the POB wished to build up.86 As a consequence, between 1933 and early 1935, the Catholic-Liberal coalition remained steadily in power, even surviving the downfall of the de Broqueville cabinet in November 1934. With a general election in two years, no leverage to compel other parties to approve the Labour Plan, no clear sign of an upcoming economic recovery, and no confidence in his own party machine, there is little wonder that de Man started having second thoughts.87 He gradually realised that, even though a majority for the Plan could not be found in the existing Parliament, there might be one willing to pass at least the most significant and urgent parts of it. A piecemeal, selective implementation of the Labour Plan, which he had initially ruled out, seemed now an appealing option, even if this was tantamount to jettisoning the fourteenth thesis of planism.88 deuxième Congrès de la Centrale Politique de la Jeunesse Catholique,” La Libre Belgique, January 29, 1934. On the backlash, see the letter in which a Catholic trade unionist complained with de Man that the “slogans of infiltration loudly issued by certain socialist cadres aimed at turning the members of catholic trade unionists against their leaders” [Signed letter to de Man, 5 December 1934, IISG/429]. On Catholic counterpropaganda, see Emmanuel Gerard, De Katholieke Partij in crisis: partijpolitiek leven in België (1918–1940) (Leuven: Kritak, 1985), 357–360. 86  The most notable endorsements of the Labour Plan from the Catholic milieu came from Elie Boussart, editor of Terre Wallonie, and Raymond de Becker, who led a faction of dissident young Catholics based at the University of Leuven: see “M. Elie Baussart en faveur de la constitution du Front du Travail,” Le Peuple, February 6, 1934; Auguste Dewinne, “Les catholiques et le Plan,” Le Peuple, December 27, 1934; Jules Parfait, “Les jeunes catholiques belges et le plan de Man,” Esprit, no. 30 (1935): 951–959. De Becker, who had penned one of first detailed commentaries on the Plan for the French journal Esprit in January 1934, had a public exchange of letters with de Man on Le Peuple between December 1934 and January 1935. 87  Already in July 1934, de Man explained that the Labour Plan could not “wait for the next elections of 1936. It is a programme to be enacted in 1934, or not be enacted at all” [Henri de Man, “La résorption du chômage et le Plan du Travail,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 7 (1934): 155]. See also “Séance du Bureau du C.G. du 6 juillet 1934,” ABWP/ AMSAB; Henri de Man, “Le Plan au Pouvoir! L’appel au Parlement avant l’appel aux électeurs,” Le Peuple, July 18, 1934. 88  De Man later claimed he reached that conclusion in autumn 1934 when he became persuaded that not even a stunning electoral victory by the POB would lead to a full implementation of the Labour Plan: “I learned too much about the weaknesses of my own party to fool myself about the role that it could play by governing alone” [De Man, Après coup, 241]. If that were true, it would be hard to explain why de Man articulated his fourteenth thesis in December. Presumably de Man’s change of mind did not occur until January 1935.

146 

T. MILANI

Three further elements must be taken into account to understand de Man’s eventual change of mind. First, by mid-May 1934 he had become convinced that a devaluation of the Belgian Franc could no longer be avoided.89 The POB old guard, being reminiscent of the 1926 devaluation, thought this would go to the detriment of the working class.90 De Man disagreed. Politically, he realised that the Catholic-Liberal majority was internally divided between “deflationist” and “devaluationists” and that the POB could return to power by cutting a deal with the latter.91 Economically, a lower exchange rate was likely to boost exports and stimulate job creation without necessarily causing inflation: by joining a coalition government carrying out an ordered, well thought-out devaluation, the POB would be better positioned to protect the wages and the living standards of the lower classes.92 Second, in the spring of 1934 de Man became personally acquainted with the Vice-Governor of the Belgian National Bank, Paul Van Zeeland.93 Intellectually, the two were a surprisingly good fit. From the outset of the Depression, Van Zeeland had been an outspoken critic of old-fashioned laissez-faire: “à temps nouveaux, remèdes nouveaux,” he wrote in a study of the Soviet Five-Year Plan.94 Like de Man, he was wary of big business meddling with politics and lamented that Continental parliamentary systems severely constrained the executive branch.95 Furthermore, while being close to the Catholic Party, he was increasingly sceptical about the 89  In some notes dated June 13, de Man called it “inévitable à la longue” [AHDM/ IISG/425]. But already in the first half of May he had given a speech and drafted an article in favour of a “limited and controlled” devaluation [Letter from Wauters to the Conseil Général du POB, 12 May 1934, AHDM/IISG/425]. 90  See, for example, “Séance du Conseil Général du 25 mai 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB; “Amendement de Vandervelde à la résolution proposée par H. de Man au Conseil Général du 16 juin 1934,” AHDM/IISG/425. 91  “Séance du Conseil Général du 16 juin 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB. 92  See “Projet de résolution proposée au Conseil Général, le 16 juin 1934, par Henri de Man,” AHDM/IISG/425. 93  See de Man, Après coup, 242. De Man had previously been a contributor to the bulletin of the Belgian National Bank, which Van Zeeland directed: see letter from Van Zeeland to de Man, 30 June 1932, AHDM/IISG/623. 94  Paul Van Zeeland, Réflexions sur le Plan quinquennal (Brussels: Éditions de la Revue Générale, 1931), 100. 95  See Paul Van Zeeland, Regards sur l’Europe: 1932 (Brussels: Office de Publicité, 1933), 172–185. For a full statement of Van Zeeland’s political philosophy, see Paul Van Zeeland, Révision de valeurs: essai de synthèse sur certains problèmes fondamentaux de l’économie contemporaine et leurs réactions politiques (Paris: Albert, 1937), 253–314.

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

147

possibility of defending the gold parity and therefore well disposed towards monetary reform.96 To be sure, Van Zeeland’s instincts were nowise socialist and he certainly preferred “limited and measured” forms of government intervention to an all-encompassing system of economic planning.97 Nevertheless, his reputation as a highly qualified, enlightened technocrat made him the ideal candidate to lead a government supported by the POB as well as by other centre-leaning forces.98 Third, de Man began fearing that a protracted political deadlock would unleash the fury of workers and unemployed alike. A visit to the Borinage, in January 1935, came as a shock to him: the anger of the miners of Quaregnon had become so deep, he felt, that it could soon ignite a rebellion followed by a brutal repression.99 Indeed, in January and February, de Man repeatedly came out against the proclamation of a general strike which would, among things, alienate middle classes.100 His priorities therefore shifted: he saw his duty as “swimming against the current that led workers to revolt” while still operating behind the scenes to “precipitate the events” that would lead to a new parliamentary majority.101 The promise “Nothing but the Plan, the whole Plan” was finally broken in late March 1935. After weeks of financial turmoil, Prime Minister Theunis resigned, Van Zeeland replaced him, and de Man was appointed Minister of Public Works and Employment. Vandervelde, Soudan, 96  Finance Minister Camille Gutt would subsequently claim that Van Zeeland and de Man devised a plan for devaluing the Belgian Franc well before 1935, implying that Van Zeeland had been disloyal to the Theunis government [see Jean F.  Crombois, Camille Gutt and Postwar International Finance (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011, 24–25]. This is probably an exaggeration, although it is true that Van Zeeland and de Man remained in touch: on March 25, 1935, de Man mentioned the fact that he had been talking to Van Zeeland “for a long time” about the regulation of the banking sector [“Séance du 25 mars 1935–après midi,” ABWP/AMSAB]. 97  Van Zeeland, Regards, 166. 98  See de Man, Après coup, 243. 99  See Horn, European Socialists Respond to Fascism, 89–90, citing de Man’s article “Impressions du Bornage: Il est moins cinq,” Le Peuple, January 20, 1935 as well as interviews with Léo Moulin and Jan de Man, one of Hendrik de Man’s sons. See also Delattre, Souvenirs, 135–136. 100  See, for example, Henri de Man, “L’heure du Plan doit venir avant l’heure de la grève générale,” Le Peuple, January 23, 1935; Henri de Man, “Nous avons fait l’économie d’une grève générale. Faites, Messieurs, l’économie d’une dissolution!,” Le Peuple, February 27, 1935. However, de Man’s opposition to a general strike predated his visit to Quaregnon: see “Séance du Bureau du C.G. du 9 janvier 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB. 101  De Man, Cavalier seul, 167.

148 

T. MILANI

Delattre, and Spaak were also sworn in as POB cabinet members.102 The newly formed government of National Renovation fell short of the requirements set at Pontigny: while its programme included devaluation, special powers for one year, conversion of government bonds, public control over credit, reduction of unemployment, public works, and the recognition of the USSR, the much-trumpeted but deeply divisive nationalisation of the banking sector was not contemplated. Also because of this, Van Zeeland could rely on robust tripartite support as most Catholics and Liberals sided with him: 107 deputies voted in favour, 54 against, and 12 abstained.103 Although the decision to engage in national collaboration faced little opposition from the rank and file, the mood within the POB was not triumphant. After all, the party had brokered a backroom deal which few celebrated as a virtuous compromise and many tolerated as the lesser evil.104 Furthermore, whereas some sections of the government’s ­programme bore resemblance to the Labour Plan, the hawkish Finance Minister Max-Léo Gérard was likely to be the one calling the shots on economic policy.105 The implications for the campaign for the Labour Plan 102  See “Le nouveau gouvernement n’est pas aux mains des banquiers,” Le Peuple, March 27, 1935. On intra-party negotiations, see Bregt Henkens, “De vorming van de eerste regering-van Zeeland (maart 1935). Een studie van het proces van kabinetsformatie,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis 26, no. 1–2 (1996), 209–261; Carl-Hendrik Höjer, Le régime parlementaire belge de 1918 à 1940 (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri, 1946), 236–245. 103  Critics of the Labour Plan celebrated its demise: see “Le plan lâché,” La Libre Belgique, March 24, 1935; “Et le Plan … reste en plan,” La Gazette de Charleroi, March 25, 1935. 104  Among the few enthusiasts, see Louis Piérard, La Belgique, terre de compromis: les socialistes belges et le gouvernement Van Zeeland (Brussels: Les Éditions de Belgique, 1935). Another senior POB politician, Jules Destrée, compared Belgium to a burning house and praised the “wisdom” of the POB in accepting governmental responsibility [Jules Destrée, “Quand la maison brûle …,” Le Soir, March 30, 1935]. Vandervelde claimed that the economic crisis forced the POB to act in order to prevent an authoritarian coup d’état and concluded: “We had to do it” [Compte rendu du Congrès extraordinaire du P.O.B. des 30 et 31 mars 1935 (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1935), 42]. Somewhat similarly, de Man contended that an “impasse” had been reached and the reactionaries in parliament could try to make the next round of elections “impossible” [Ibid., 161]. 105  De Man was initially designed Minister of Economic Affairs but opposition from Catholics and Liberals forced Van Zeeland to desist [see “Séance du 25 mars 1935–après midi,” ABWP/AMSAB]. For Gérard’s comprehensive and highly critical assessment of the Labour Plan, see Compte rendus des travaux de la Société d’Economie politique de Belgique, no. 96 (1934): 12–17.

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

149

were momentous: while the POB did not discard the Plan altogether, the huge mobilisation in operation since late 1933 came to an end within a few months.106 Last but not least, de Man’s credibility was damaged. Much to the dismay of his aides, it appeared that he had simply betrayed his principles for a ministerial position. This time, his detractors could easily call him an opportunist.107 * * * In retrospect, it would be easy to conclude that the campaign for the Belgian Labour Plan was riddled with mistakes and contradictions that drastically reduced its chances of success. Its greatest weakness lay in the very limited control de Man had on the POB. For all his prestige and charisma, the Father of the Plan, as he became known at the time, had been co-opted and heavily depended on the political support as well as the economic resources provided by the party establishment. His relationship with Vandervelde proved of critical importance. Le Patron thought that the Labour Plan could kill two birds with one stone as it would revamp the image of the POB while reining in its more radical and insubordinate fringes, especially its youth organisations.108 It was mainly for this reason that he rallied the party around it in late 1933. However, his attachment to Marxism and his protective attitude towards party structures meant that de Man could further his agenda only within narrow limits. De Man was probably right in saying that “in Belgium” one could not “achieve anything outside party frameworks (les cadres du partis).”109 Still, the lumbering presence of those frameworks contrasted with the dynamism that he and his aides tried to inject into the campaign. A second major difficulty stemmed from the practical necessity of assembling a broad coalition within a short period of time. Of course, the 106  It is indicative that the BNAP was shut down in April and converted into a generic Office de Propagande [see Arthur Gailly, “Communiqué du Bureau National d’Action,” Le Peuple, April 13, 1935]. 107  See, for example, Eugen Varga, Le Plan trahi. Réponse à Henri de Man, Ministre de la bourgeoisie belge (Brussels: C.D.L., 1936); Dossier du Plan de Man: trahison et coup de massue, 1934–1935 (N.I.). See also Rens, Rencontres, 53. 108  See, for example, Emile Vandervelde, “Nos J.G.S. et le ‘Plan Révolutionnaire,’” Le Peuple, October 6, 1934; Emile Vandervelde, “‘L’Action Socialiste’ et le réformisme,” Le Peuple, October 7, 1934. 109  “Séance du Bureau du C.G. du 6 juillet 1934,” ABWP/AMSAB.

150 

T. MILANI

pillarised nature of Belgian society posed a formidable obstacle to the idea of gathering the working as well as the middle classes around one single anti-crisis platform: it is no accident that the “resilience of the frontiers which divided Socialists from Catholics” continued to shape Belgian politics even after the Second World War.110 Nevertheless, the same package of reforms could hardly be sold on the same terms to radicalised miners, Catholic farmers, and small shopkeepers alike. De Man realised this was a problem: the BNAP worked hard to tailor its propaganda to the needs of different audiences and, quite ingeniously, delivered it in three waves (vagues), the last of which, starting in January 1935, was intended to make inroads into the petty bourgeoisie.111 In practice, the unbending opposition from Catholic trade unions proved that, despite its novelty, the Labour Plan could not mitigate, let alone dispel, widespread suspicion of Belgian social democracy at large. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the campaign bolstered the POB in various ways, the most important of which was by galvanising hundreds of thousands of militants during a period of severe economic distress.112 If anything, the massive demonstrations orchestrated throughout the country showed the vitality and resilience of the party, which may have deterred internal dissidents from leaving it: by 1935 Spaak, who had once been viewed as a potential defector, had aligned himself to the Labour Plan closely enough to be selected as minister.113 Moreover, the workings of the twenty-two commissions greatly enhanced the quality and sophistication of POB-sponsored legislation. Thanks to the impetus 110  Martin Conway, The Sorrows of Belgium: Liberation and Political Reconstruction, 1944–1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 188. 111  See, for example, Henri de Man, “L’Action pour le Plan: la troisième vague,” Le Peuple, December 26, 1934; de Man, Cavalier seul, 166. 112  As acknowledged even by most critics and/or political opponents of de Man: see, for example, Pierre Daye, La jeunesse et l’avènement de Léopold III (Paris: Grasset, 1934), 113; Delattre, Souvenirs, 136; Camille Gutt, Pourquoi le Franc belge est tombé (Bruxelles: Nouvelle Société d’Editions, 1935), 14–15; Philip Van Isacker, Tussen Staat en Volk: Nagelaten memoires (Antwerp: Sheed & Ward, 1953), 186; Eyskens, De Memoires, 40–41. See also Carl Strikwerda, “The Belgian Working Class and the Crisis of the 1930’s,” in Chance und Illusion: Labor in Retreat, eds. Wolfgang Maderthaner and Helmut Gruber (Vienna-Zürich, Europaverlag, 1988), esp. 286–287. 113  Vandervelde, who had long battled with Action socialiste, insisted on Spaak’s appointment to preserve the “most complete union within the party” [“Séance du Bureau du 25 mars 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB].

6  FIRE AND ASHES: THE FIGHT FOR THE LABOUR PLAN IN BELGIUM 

151

provided by de Man, by early 1935 the POB had “by far the most elaborate of all socialist programs.”114 Finally, the campaign enabled the POB to negotiate the formation of the Van Zeeland cabinet from a position of relative strength. Without the sustained pressure from the grassroots, it is hard to imagine, for instance, that Van Zeeland would have committed himself to a relatively tight regulation of the banking system, considering the misgiving harboured by most Liberals.115 As far as de Man was concerned, the campaign consolidated his position in national politics and gave him much greater leverage to enshrine some of his ideas into the programme of the government of National Renovation. By serving in the latter, he expected to be able to promote short-term measures to curb unemployment and lay the foundations for an organic reform of the financial sector in tandem with Van Zeeland: in de Man’s mind, the Plan was far from dead.116 Furthermore, the fight for the Labour Plan sent shockwaves abroad, where his author’s fame grew quickly and planism seemed to be gaining ground. By transcending Belgian borders, the Labour Plan magnified de Man’s influence on Western European social democracy.

114  So argued a leading expert in the field: Carl Landauer, “Recent Literature on Planning,” Social Research 2, no. 4 (1935): 507. 115  Even Liberals who backed Van Zeeland, such as Paul Hymans, had to be reassured that the programme of National Renovation would stop short of nationalising credit: see Hymans, Mémoires. Vol. II, 736–737. 116  An examination of the discussions within the POB Council in March–April 1935 leaves no doubt that, at the time, de Man pinned high hopes on Van Zeeland and believed at least sections of the Plan would be put into effect, despite the hostility of the other parties. Most notably, on March 25, he went so far to contend that Van Zeeland was willing to do “what the Plan proposes” and set up “an economic commission” which would tackle “the reduction of unemployment and the statutes of banks” [“Séance du Bureau du 25 mars 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB].

CHAPTER 7

Clash of Visions: The Belgian Labour Plan in France

Among the various countries through which the Labour Plan resonated France deserves special consideration. Thanks to the commonality of language and the strong connections between the French and the Belgian labour movement, the document was widely read and painstakingly debated by a wide range of individuals and organisations immediately after its release. Between December 1933 and early February 1934 the Belgian Labour Plan was the single, most controversial topic for the French Left— forcing leaders to declare if they were for or against it, prompting discussions on whether and to what extent it could be applicable within the French context, and inspiring a wave of imitators. As one critic of planism beseeched in the midst of the storm, “Not thirty-six ‘plans,’ just one.”1 Instead of charting all the actors who launched a “Plan” of some sort, this chapter focuses on the three main groups who openly referred to de Man as a source of inspiration and called for a French Labour Plan similar to the one approved by the POB: the neo-socialists, the SFIO planists, and

1  Paul Faure, “Qui n’a pas son plan?,” Le Populaire, January 17, 1934. See also Albert Rivière, “Il pleut des plans,” Le Populaire, May 15, 1934. According to Julian Jackson, 1934 was marked by “planomania” as at least eleven different plans were launched in France alone [Jackson, The Politics of Depression, 150]. For a contemporary overview, see Henri Noyelle, Les Plans de reconstruction économique et sociale à l’étranger et en France (Paris: Sirey, 1935); Charles Pomaret, “Catalogue de Plans,” L’Etat moderne 8, no. 4 (1935): 364–367.

© The Author(s) 2020 T. Milani, Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0_7

153

154 

T. MILANI

the CGT planists.2 Their attitude was often less cooperative than competitive: each group claimed to be the most faithful to de Man’s teachings and questioned the credentials of the others. Yet their history as well as their fate is so closely entangled that it would be impossible to study them separately. For this reason, the structure of the chapter is chronological. The first section explores the historical setting in which the discussions around the Belgian Labour Plan took place and follows the trajectory of the abovementioned groups until early February 1934. The second section deals with their reaction to the events of February 6, when riots in Paris led many social democrats to revise their priorities, and the difficulties that planists met until the formation of the Popular Front. The last section elaborates the main obstacles faced by French planism. * * * The Depression unfolded much more slowly in France than in Belgium but, by mid-1932, it had already caused a moderate growth of unemployment and falling wages and prices, particularly in the agricultural sector.3 Although his last budget included some measures aimed at stimulating the economy, the incumbent Prime Minister André Tardieu had assembled a centre-right coalition which stuck to the principles of fiscal and monetary orthodoxy, namely a balanced budget and the defence of the gold standard. An admirer of the United States, Tardieu ran as a reformer but, all in all, his interventionism bore more resemblance to Hoover’s technocratic conservatism than to the progressive liberalism that Roosevelt subsequently came to embody, and did not go down well with the voters.4 In the 1932 legislative elections, the SFIO gained thirty-two new seats, 2  There will be no discussion, therefore, of the plans set out by figures who made reference to de Man (e.g. the Radical journalist Emile Roche) or opposed the Belgian Labour Plan (e.g. the publisher Georges Valois). 3  See Serge Berstein, La France des années 30 (Paris: Colin, 1988), 25–51. 4  See, for example, André Tardieu, Devant l’obstacle: l’Amérique et nous (Paris: Emile-Paul Frères, 1927); André Tardieu, Paroles réalistes (Paris: Figuière, 1928), “Des rapports de l’invention avec la production, la sécurité et la prospérité nationale,” manuscript dated 5 July 1930, FAT/AN/324AP/50. Like Hoover, Tardieu had been an admirer of scientific management and championed its adoption in France. On Tardieu’s socio-economic vision in the late 1920s–early 1930s, see Monique Clague, “Vision and Myopia in the New Politics of André Tardieu,” French Historical Studies 8, no. 1 (1973): 105–129; François Monnet, Refaire la République: André Tardieu, une dérive réactionnaire (1876–1945) (Paris: Fayard, 1993), 137–174.

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

155

becoming the second largest group in Parliament and having the numbers to form a majority with the centrist Radicals, also due to Tardieu’s losses. Yet this was neither an easy nor an obvious step to take. By all standards, governmental participation had been a thorn in the flesh for French social democracy since the Millerand case.5 The party’s ideology, being an eclectic combination of Jaurèsian idealism, republicanism, and Marxist materialism, did not help solve the issue.6 Back in 1926, the SFIO parliamentary leader, Léon Blum, had outlined the prerequisites for accepting governmental responsibility, hence softening the party’s official stance, inspired to the 1904 resolution adopted by the LSI Amsterdam Congress, which banned all forms of participation. Yet, under present circumstances, Blum saw no point in pushing the SFIO in that direction. His subtle distinction between the seizure of power—that is, a socialist revolution—and the exercise of power—that is, a socialist government under capitalism—could not obscure the fact that the preconditions he laid out for taking office were intentionally harsh, demanding firm control over the cabinet’s agenda even as junior partner.7 It is no exaggeration to say that Blum’s requests were tantamount to killing the prospect of a centre-left government from scratch. Predictably, in May 1932, negotiations with the Radicals collapsed because of the SFIO’s intransigence over the new government’s programme.8 5  For an overview, see Paul Ramadier, Les socialistes et l’exercice du pouvoir (Paris: Laffont, 1961), 21–27; Alain Bergounioux and Gérard Grunberg, Le long remords du pouvoir: le Parti Socialiste français 1905–1992 (Paris: Fayard, 1992), 134–147. 6  See George Lichtheim, Marxism in Modern France (New York-London: Columbia University Press, 1966), 30–33; Tony Judt, La reconstruction du Parti Socialiste, 1921–1926 (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976), 71–97. 7  According to Judt, Blum did not see participation either as “doctrinally repugnant” or “an advantage per se”; however, because of his “belief in the desirable and inevitable collapse of a system founded upon unjust exploitation,” he desired “to avoid contamination by excessive contact with the superstructure of that system” [Tony Judt, “The Socialist Party 1920–1936,” in Marxism and the French Left: Studies in Labour and Politics in France, 1830–1981 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 149]. See Léon Blum, “Le parti socialiste et la participation ministérielle,” in Léon Blum and Paul Faure, Le parti socialiste et la participation ministérielle (Paris: Éditions de la nouvelle revue socialiste, 1926), 3–23. See also “Le Parti Socialiste et la participation ministérielle,” La Bataille socialiste, no. 27 (1929), featuring articles by Faure, Bracke, Zyromski, and other opponents of participation. A copy of this issue can be found in Blum’s papers: see FLB/AN/570AP/7. 8   See Michel Margairaz, L’Etat, les finances et l’économie: histoire d’une conversion, 1932–1952. Vol. I (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique de la France, 1991), 106–107; David Frapet, Le socialisme selon Léon Blum (Nonette: Créer, 2003), 69–70.

156 

T. MILANI

Blum’s conduct irritated some long-time supporters of participation— including Pierre Renaudel, Adéodat Compère-Morel, and Paul Ramadier— and a new breed of parliamentarians increasingly tired of self-inflicted isolation: the mayor of Bordeaux Adrien Marquet, the deputy from Seine Barthélemy Montagnon, and the former secretary of the Chamber’s SFIO group Marcel Déat. Never a deep or profoundly original thinker, Déat was nonetheless a relatively charismatic figure with a penchant for political theorising.9 Close to Albert Thomas,10 in Perspectives socialistes, published in 1930, he urged the SFIO to forge an alliance between anti-capitalist forces with the aim of establishing a managed economy in which the state would steer interclass cooperation by supervising a set of newly formed cartels. Déat occasionally quoted de Man in arguing for the inadequacy of orthodox Marxism.11 His book, though, was less a harbinger of planism than a search for common ground with the Young Turks, a group of Radicals enthralled by the notion of économie dirigée who also stood for a centre-left majority.12 Déat’s ambition and revisionist views, labelled “neo-­ socialist” by one of his detractors, soured his relationship with Blum.13

9  In his memoirs, the French liberal philosopher Raymond Aron admitted that, in his youth, he had been “carried away” by Déat’s eloquence [Raymond Aron, Mémoires: 50 ans de réflexion politique (Paris: Julliard, 1983), 69]. According to Marjolin, Déat was “an excellent orator, endowed with a fertile mind always in motion” and “his personality stood out from mediocrity of most of the socialist leaders. He could be compared with Léon Blum for the quality of the written and spoken word” [Robert Marjolin, Le travail d’une vie: mémoires 1911–1986 (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1986), 65]. 10  In 1931, Déat publicly quoted a letter from Thomas in which the latter stated that Déat’s ideas were to be “at the roots of our modern socialist action” [see XXVIe Congrès national tenu à Tours le 24, 25, 26 et 27 mai 1931—compte rendu sténographique (Paris: Libraire Populaire, 1932), 22]. 11  See Marcel Déat, Perspectives socialistes (Paris: Valois, 1930), 41, 63, 137. 12  See ibid., 117–118, 169–170. The Young Turks included, among others, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Gaston Bergery, Jean Zay, Pierre Cot, Jacques Kayser, and Jean Luchaire. On the prospects of further cooperation between the SFIO and Radicals, see, for example, Bertrand de Jouvenel, “Pour la gauche unitaire. Socialistes et radicaux. Une conversation avec M. Marcel Déat,” La voix, 9 June 1929. 13  See Jules Moch, Rencontres avec … Léon Blum (Paris, Plon 1970), 65–67; Jules Moch, Une si longue vie (Paris: Laffont, 1976), 72–73; Georges Lefranc, “Rétrospectives. Vol. II: militant socialiste et syndicaliste,” Cahiers et Revue de l’Ours, no. 118 (1981): 63–66. Serge Berstein, Blum (Paris: Fayard, 2006), contains insightful remarks on the relationship between Blum and Déat. The term “neosocialism” first appeared in Jean Lebas, Le socialisme, but et moyen: suivi de la réfutation d’un néo-socialisme (Lille: Imprimeur ouvrière, 1931).

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

157

In 1933, the gulf between the socialist parliamentary group, who voted twice in favour of the government’s budget, and the rest of the party widened significantly. At the Paris Congress held in July, Blum, Paul Faure, and other opponents of participation lambasted the neo-socialists for their disregard of party discipline, but Déat and his followers used the podium to question the SFIO’s long-term strategy in the light of Hitler’s seizure of power. “You will block the road to fascism only to the extent that you will get rid of the causes […] that allowed it to grow,” Déat said.14 To do so, he urged the establishment of a strong state to regulate most sectors of the economy, encouraged the party to reach out to middle-class elements hurt by the economic crisis, and proposed a more dynamic parliamentary action. Perhaps echoing de Man, the neo-socialists stressed the necessity of “a programme for immediate action” (une programme d’action immédiate) to mobilise voters but, in practice, struggled to produce an inspiring platform.15 In his replies, Blum took his gloves off. To him, neosocialism was nothing short of a deviation which, in seeking to halt the rise of fascism, might contaminate socialism with authoritarian ideas.16 In presenting Déat as the trailblazer of fascism, Blum was not alone: the term “fascist” was regularly employed by communists and far-Left SFIO members to assail reformists and other non-revolutionary elements, a factor which may have added fuel to the fire between the two sides.17 In 14  “Discours de Marcel Déat, député de Paris,” in Barthélemy Montagnon, Adrien Marquet and Marcel Déat, Néo-socialisme? Ordre, autorité, nation, ed. Max Bonnafous (Paris: Grasset 1933), 83. 15  Ibid., 101. As a former associate of Déat who later remained in the SFIO wrote about the neo-socialist doctrine: “[T]he socialism that has been presented to me has no soul. I cannot feel the thrill of joyful emotion, the warm flame of high experience” [Ludovic-Oscar Frossard, “L’Ancien Testament et le Nouveau,” Marianne 1, no. 46 (1933): 2]. 16  See, for example, Léon Blum, “Parti de classe et non pas parti de déclassés,” Le Populaire, July 19, 1933; Léon Blum, “La leçon de l’histoire,” Le Populaire, July 25, 1933. 17  “It has become common to treat neosocialism as a neo-fascist movement” [Marc Vivier, “Néo-Socialisme (Bernard Grasset Éditeur),” Masses, no. 14 (1934): 7]. This mirrored the theory of social fascism elaborated by Grigory Zinoviev within the Comintern. It is no accident that the main architect of Déat’s expulsion from the SFIO was the pro-communist Marceau Pivert, who went on to break with the Popular Front in 1937 for being too moderate and launched his own Socialist Revolutionary Party one year later [see memorandum GB/3 A6712, FP/AN/F/7/15991/2, “De Versailles à Compiègne … où va la France?,” unpublished manuscript, FAMP/AN/22AS/1]. Nevertheless the neo-socialists won the sympathies of some Italian anti-fascists, including Salvemini and Rosselli [see letter from Salvemini to Rosselli, 5 August 1933, in Fra le righe: carteggio fra Carlo Rosselli e Gaetano Salvemini, ed. Elisa Signori (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2010), 167–168; Carlo Rosselli, “Il neo-

158 

T. MILANI

November 1933, after having been first censored and then expelled from the SFIO, the neo-socialists formed their own party, the Parti Socialiste de France—Union Jean Jaurès (PSdF), but only twenty-eight deputies and seven senators joined the new group.18 The simultaneous release of de Man’s Labour Plan provided Déat, Renaudel, and their associates with a platform they could steal the thunder from. Neo-socialists were less thrilled about the Plan as a set of policy prescriptions than as a symbol.19 First, by comparison, the Belgian Plan allowed them to expose the SFIO’s attentisme and lack of a comprehensive economic programme. Second, neo-socialists realised that, despite being wrapped up in a somewhat unpalatable revolutionary language, the Plan might offer a rationale for governmental participation and therefore create an aura of legitimacy around their new party. Renaudel’s journal La Vie Socialiste proved instrumental to that effort. In November 1933, recent articles published by de Man in Le Peuple were reprinted under the heading Pour un socialisme renouvelé. In introducing them, Robert Bobin protested that those who were making a similar case in France “let themselves to be treated as simple fascists.”20 The practical impossibility of passing measures aimed at seizing all the means of production, Bobin went on, was acknowledged by de Man and, in his view, this vindicated the neo-­ socialists’ prescient insight.21 As soon as the campaign for the Belgian Labour Plan kicked off, even bolder attempts were made to link up the newly formed PSdF to the Belgian experience. “All the principles that have presided over the birth of our movement have been subsequently invoked by Henri de Man,” Déat boasted.22 “We alone in the Socialist Party in France have favourably received the ideas of Henri de Man, which socialismo francese,” La Libertà, 17 August 1933; Carlo Rosselli, “Lo spirito e i fini del neosocialismo francese,” La Libertà, 24 August 1933; “Il neosocialismo francese nel quadro internazionale,” La Libertà, 31 August 1933, all reprinted in Carlo Rosselli, Scritti dall’esilio. Vol. I: Giustizia e Libertà e la concentrazione antifascista (1929–1934) (Turin: Einaudi, 1989), 226–243]. For a critical but not totally negative assessment of neosocialism, see Gaëtan Pirou, Néo-libéralisme, néo-corporatisme, néo-socialisme (Paris: Gallimard, 1939). 18  See “Le Conseil National de scission: Paris, 4 et 5 novembre 1933,” La Vie socialiste 11, no. 349–350 (1933): 4–27. The estimated membership was 20,000. 19  See letter from Déat to de Man, 28 December 1933, ABSO/AMSAB/82. 20  R.B. [Robert Bobin], “Ce que dit Henri de Man: pour un socialisme renouvelé,” La Vie socialiste 11, no. 348 (1933): 6. 21  Robert Bobin, “Une très importante session du Conseil Général du Parti Ouvrier Belge,” La Vie socialiste 11, no. 351 (1933): 10. 22  “Le Plan belge et nous,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 357 (1934): 3.

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

159

corresponded to our own reflections” Renaudel argued, presenting planism as a straightforward result of de Man’s earlier repudiation of Marxism.23 The party’s Executive Bureau passed a resolution praising the “realistic principles for action” (formules d’action réalistes) underpinning the Belgian Labour Plan and wishing that other parties affiliated with the LSI would do the same, so not to “leave to the enemies of the working class the construction of ‘intermediate regimes’.”24 According to neosocialists, planism, with its emphasis on the importance of acting at national level and win over the youth, was the most effective antidote to France slipping into right-wing authoritarian rule.25 Jumping on de Man’s bandwagon was a shrewd gambit but one that could hardly impress those who mistrusted Déat. Addressing the Belgian as well as the French public, Vandervelde pointed out that, while the Belgian Labour Plan bolstered party unity, the neo-socialists exploited de Man’s name to improve the reputation of their breakaway group, hence exacerbating divisions within social democracy.26 It was, however, Léon Blum who reacted most forcefully against what he regarded as an undue 23  Paul Renaudel, “Le ‘renouvellement’ socialiste est une réalité en Suisse comme en Belge,” La Vie socialiste, no. 359 (1934): 12. In 1928, Renaudel had invited de Man to speak in Paris: see Henri de Man, “Socialisme et Marxisme,” La Vie socialiste 6, no. 92 (1928): 8–18. 24  “Chronique du Parti Socialiste de France—Union Jean Jaurès,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 357 (1934): 15. The use of the term réaliste is also noteworthy. Since the late 1920s, it had gained wide currency among the abovementioned Young Turks to qualify their own understanding of economics and society: see, for example, Jean Luchaire, Une génération réaliste (Paris: Valois, 1929). The neo-socialist Montagnon had also made a forceful case for réalisme: see Barthélemy Montagnon, Grandeur et servitude socialistes (Paris: Valois, 1929), 179–180. 25  See, for example, Marcel Déat, “Réflexions sur le fascisme,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 9 (1933): 255–256. In 1934, de Man’s views on foreign policy and national defence were also well received: see Henri de Man, “A propos de la Défense Nationale,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 368 (1934): 4–9 and La Vie socialiste 12, no. 369 (1934): 5–13. The centrality of the nation in the neo-socialist discourse was stressed by Paul Marion, another ideologue of the movement: see Paul Marion, Socialisme et nation (Paris: Imprimerie du Centaure, 1933). 26  Emile Vandervelde, “Henri de Man et Marcel Déat,” Le Peuple, January 7, 1934, reprinted in L’étudiant socialiste 9, no. 5 (1934): 1–2. See also Frédéric Lefèvre, “Une heure avec Emile Vandervelde, écrivain politique,” Les Nouvelles littéraires, artistiques et scientifiques 12, no. 581 (1933): 4, and the neo-socialist reply by J.T., “A propos d’une interview d’Emile Vandervelde,” La Vie socialiste 11, no. 354 (1933): 3. Vandervelde reiterated the point in Emile Vandervelde, “Planisme, néo-socialisme ou néo-réformisme?” Le Peuple, January 6, 1935; Emile Vandervelde, “Le marxisme et le planisme,” Le Peuple, February 3, 1935. Faure too turned de Man’s ideas against the neo-socialists: see, for example, Paul

160 

T. MILANI

appropriation of de Man’s ideas.27 Devoting an unprecedented series of ten editorials to the Belgian Labour Plan in January 1934, he pinpointed the differences between it and the neo-socialist programme. The first, according to Blum, entailed the rejection of ministerial participation within a non-socialist majority,28 the emphasis on class conflict,29 the search for party unity,30 the commitment to the nationalisation of property,31 and, more generally, the creation of a rassemblement aimed at speeding up the transition to socialism. Contrary to the image that Déat and Renaudel were trying to convey, Blum insisted that de Man was no moderate and his name could not be invoked to justify the shameless pursuit of ministerial portfolios.32 Still, Blum was careful to not endorse the Belgian Labour Plan: having set the record straight, he went on to spell out his reservations about it. To begin with, he argued the Plan could generate unintended consequences for, by bringing heavy industries and credit under public control while at the same time expanding domestic consumption, it could eventually delay rather than accelerate the downfall of the capitalist system. Even worse, the “coexistence” between a public and a private sector was likely to trigger a stabilisation in which “the socialised sector, instead of growing little by little until absorbing everything, is circumscribed in advance, isolated.”33 Despite his own misgivings, Blum made also some important concessions. For the first time, he was prone to recognise the usefulness of the Labour Plan “as a plan of combat, as an offensive plan exercising the maximum action on the Belgian working class and the popular masses,” “as an Faure, “Deuxième épître à des sénateurs,” Le Populaire, November 12, 1933; Paul Faure, “Les taches de demain,” La Bataille socialiste 6, no. 73 (1933): 1–2. 27  Evidence suggests that Blum gave the Labour Plan careful consideration. In mid-January, Germaine Fouchère, the secretary of the Chamber’s SFIO group, contacted de Man to organise a public rally entirely devoted to the Belgian Labour Plan “in accordance with the socialist party” [see letter from Fouchère to de Man, 17 January 1934, ABSO/AMSAB/82]. Due to de Man’s commitments in Belgium the event never took place. Blum also attended at least one private meeting with a group of socialist parliamentarians—Vincent Auriol, Jules Moch, Charles Spinasse, Georges Monnet, and Robert Jardillier—to discuss the Plan in detail [see letter from Jardillier to de Man, 3 February 1934, ABSO/AMSAB/82]. 28  Léon Blum, “Au-delà du réformisme,” Le Populaire, January 4, 1934. 29  Léon Blum, “Appel à une bataille de classe,” Le Populaire, January 5, 1934. 30  Léon Blum, “Le Plan du Travail et le Parti Français,” Le Populaire, January 6, 1934. 31  Léon Blum, “Les grands lignes du Plan du Travail,” Le Populaire, January 18, 1934. 32  Léon Blum, “Le sens véritable du Plan du Travail,” Le Populaire, January 21, 1934. 33  Léon Blum, “La socialisation par étapes,” Le Populaire, January 22, 1934.

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

161

i­ nstrument for the seizure of power.”34 Besides, he implicitly admitted that a planist orientation was compatible with genuinely socialist tenets, describing the work of the deputy Vincent Auriol as the closest to de Man’s original approach.35 Blum’s remarks had less a theoretical than a tactical significance. His aversion to planism notwithstanding, the leader was signalling that he would get along with planist fringes as long as they operated within the SFIO rather than outside or against it. Short-term calculations might have played a role in this inclusive attitude. By mid-January, he was certainly aware that the Belgian Labour Plan was gaining admirers well beyond the PSdF and a tiny but vocal group of SFIO planists would make their voices heard during the forthcoming Lille Congress, scheduled for February 10–11. The pivotal figure of this group was Lucien Laurat, who, while being involved in the campaign for the Belgian Labour Plan, was based in Paris and published regularly on the French press. In 1933, Laurat helped launch Le Combat marxiste, a monthly aimed at steering a new course between what he regarded as the three dominant strands of the French Left: “traditional reformism” advocated by the neo-socialists, imbued with nationalism and pre-Marxian utopianism; “the traditional Left” of Blum and Faure, whose “abstract propaganda” had become a “source of inertia”; and the “bolshevism” of French communists.36 For Laurat, only planism could reinvigorate the SFIO. In December, Le Combat marxiste threw its support behind the Belgian Labour Plan, praising both its “political dynamism” and its “economic realism,” and emphasising the similarities between de Man’s and Laurat’s ideas as articulated in two recent pamphlets.37 By then, Laurat’s writings had caught the eye of Jean  Léon Blum, “Plan et Programme,” Le Populaire, January 17, 1934.  Léon Blum, “Appel à une bataille de classe,” Le Populaire, January 5, 1934; L. Blum, “Le Plan du Travail et le Parti Français,” Le Populaire, January 6, 1934. Blum referred to Auriol’s most recent policy proposal: see Jean Brissaud and Vincent Auriol, La nationalisation des assurances (Paris: Librairie Populaire, 1933). Auriol’s full proposals can be found in FVA/AN/552/AP/12. 36  Le Combat Marxiste, “Notre But,” Le Combat marxiste 1, no. 1 (1933): 1. Many prominent planists—including Georges Albertini, René Belin, Pierre Brossolette, Jacques Itard, Jules and François Moch, and André Philip—were subscribers of Le Combat marxiste: see Marcelle Pommera’s notebook in FLL/IHS/4. 37  “Belgique: un plan de socialisation du Parti Ouvrier Belge,” Le Combat marxiste 1, no. 3 (1933): 16–17. See Lucien Laurat, Economie planée contre économie enchaînée (Paris: Librairie Populaire, 1933) and Lucien Laurat, Le socialisme à l’ordre du jour: problèmes et taches du marxisme contemporain (Paris: Librairie Populaire, 1933). 34 35

162 

T. MILANI

Zyromski, the leader of the left-wing faction Bataille Socialiste and Blum’s most powerful opponent within the party.38 “Laurat convincingly demonstrates this: the breadth and depth of the crisis of the capitalist economy is as such that socialist parties can no longer be satisfied, within their propaganda effort, with social policy, narrowly defined,” Zyromski held.39 “The socialist party, the party of the working class, must have a clear conception of its economic policy. That economic policy is the policy of socialisation.”40 The latter meant, in Zyromski’s thoroughly Marxist understanding, the seizure of the economic surplus. By bridging the gap between utopia and reality—moving from “the phase of critical theory to that of constructive practice”—Zyromski presented the Plan as an essentially revolutionary tool which would ensure a relatively smooth transition from capitalism to socialism.41 By winning Zyromski’s approval, Laurat’s planism managed to conquer a well-established faction already active within the SFIO, and a broad coalition for a French Plan began to take shape, with their members being keen to set differences aside. The evolving attitude towards the intellectual circle Révolution Constructive, one of the first to express admiration for de Man, are revealing in this regard. In 1932–1933, the book after which the group was named, authored by the three of the founders—Pierre Boivin, Georges Lefranc, and Maurice Deixonne—had raised eyebrows within the SFIO Left for suggesting that a socialist system might be built without an all-out revolutionary break.42 However, once the neo-socialists had been expelled and de Man himself authorised Révolution Constructive to

38  See letter from Laurat to Zyromski, 12 April 1934, FJZ/CHS/J1-Z-3EA4. On Bataille Socialiste, see Eric Nadaud, “Les socialistes de la S.F.I.O. et l’idée de plan dans les années 1930: le cas de Jean Zyromski et de la tendance ‘Bataille socialiste’,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 43, no. 1 (1996): 5–34. 39  Jean Zyromski, “De la brochure de Laurat au programme d’action,” La Bataille socialiste 6, no. 73 (1933): 2. 40  Ibidem. 41  Ibidem. 42  In late summer 1932, Raymonde Vaysset warned the authors of Révolution Constructive that “a series of partial transformations” of the state “would never be able to achieve the radical transformation which is necessary,” not even under the pressure of the working class [Raymonde Vaysset, “Révolution Constructive,” La Bataille socialiste 5, no. 60 (1932): 11]. Marcelle Pommera was even more trenchant: “This ‘constructive revolution’ does not revolutionise very much and does not construct anything” [Marcelle Pommera, “Revue des Livres,” La Critique sociale, no. 8 (1933): 85].

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

163

publish his preliminary articles about the Labour Plan,43 reservations were dropped and the group started receiving favourable coverage not only from Bataille Socialiste but also from Le Combat Marxiste and L’Étudiant Socialiste, a monthly aimed at socialist students from France, Belgium, and Switzerland.44 Intellectual affinity soon turned into a more tangible convergence. In January 1934, Wolf Epstein and Marcelle Pommera for Combat Marxiste, and Georges Lefranc and Jean Itard for Révolution Constructive joined forces with elements of Bataille Socialiste to present a unitary motion, Pour l’offensive socialiste, before the Seine Congress.45 Under the same title, Itard and Lefranc made their case for a French Plan in Le Populaire, where Zyromski—who co-edited the newspaper—managed to secure them some editorial space.46 Intellectual and political mobilisation often overlapped: André Philip, by then a deputy as well as an ardent planist, contributed to an issue of Esprit, a non-conformist review, which appeared on February 1, largely devoted to the Belgian Labour Plan. SFIO planists were clearly trying to reach out to a more diverse audience, young Catholics included.47 43  See letter from de Man to Lefranc, 10 November 1933, ABSO/AMSAB/82. The correspondence between Lefranc and de Man in fall 1933 is extremely rich. 44  See J.R. [Jules Robert], “Dans le parti: Une déclaration de la ‘Révolution Constructive’,” Le Combat marxiste 1, no. 3 (1933): 8–9; Jef Rens “Le Plan du Travail,” L’étudiant socialiste 9, no. 5 (1934): 3–6; A. Delmarche and G. Hercot, “Adhésion totale au Plan du Travail,” L’étudiant socialiste 9, no. 9–10 (1934): 10–11. De Man’s articles, originally published in Le Peuple, appeared as Henri de Man, Pour un plan d’action (Asnières: Cahiers de Révolution Constructive, 1934), with an introduction signed “Le Groupe de Révolution Constructive,” claiming that “the French socialist thought, so proud of its vitality, seems to have been largely surpassed by our neighbours in the United Kingdom, Poland, and Belgium” [Ibid., 1]. 45  Reproduced in “Une politique nouvelle et réaliste,” Le Combat marxiste 2, no. 5 (1934): 4–6. Laurat too seconded the motion: see “Le Congrès extraordinaire de la fédération socialiste de la Seine s’est tenu hier, salle des Fêtes de la mairie du Pré-Saint Gervais,” Le Populaire, January 29, 1934. On that month, Lefranc wrote an extensive appreciation of the Belgian Labour Plan, calling de Man’s ideas “the indispensable starting point for a new impetus” [Georges Lefranc, “Le plan d’action d’Henri de Man,” L’Homme réel, no. 1 (1934): 20]. 46  See Jean Itard and Georges Lefranc, “Pour l’offensive socialiste,” Le Populaire, January 31, 1934. See also Jean Itard and Georges Lefranc, “Pour un plan de construction socialiste,” Le Populaire, January 17, 1934. In April, Révolution Constructive released a forty-page book, Eléments d’un Plan français, as a contribution for the upcoming SFIO Congress which, Itard predicted, “will mark an important date for French socialism, as the Christmas congress marked one for the Belgian party” [Jean Itard, “Il y a Plan et Plan,” Le Populaire, April 18, 1934]. 47  See André Philip, “Autour du Plan Henri de Man: le socialisme et les classes sociales,” Esprit 2, no. 17 (1934): 788–804. In the same issue, the co-founder of Esprit Jean Lacroix

164 

T. MILANI

SFIO planists secured other substantial victories outside Paris. Jules Moch, then a deputy from the Drôme, hammered out a declaration supporting a French Plan that won the unanimous approval of his federation.48 On February 4, in Aube, the “programme of action” sketched out by Lefranc, Itard, and Laurat received an equally unanimous support while planist resolutions were passed with strong majorities in Hérault and Morbihan.49 Somewhat awkwardly, whilst Déat was exploiting the Labour Plan to substantiate the neo-socialists’ defence of participation, Laurat and Zyromski were using it as a buzzword to galvanise young socialists hungry for bold economic ideas and disgruntled with their party leadership.50 To complicate matters further, a third group of planists came to the fore. On January 14, 1934, the CGT secretary Léon Jouhaux launched an anti-crisis campaign from the Belgian city of Charleroi. The day after he headed a trade union delegation to the French Présidence du Conseil asking for a set of short-term measures, including the forty-hour week, new infrastructures, and the nationalisation of all monopolies, including the credit sector. Some of Jouhaux’s demands were hardly a novelty, having been part of the CGT platform since 1931.51 On that very day, however, his vice-secretary René Belin submitted a draft for a French Plan moulded on the Belgian one to CGT’s federations and department branches, and visited the Maison du Peuple in Brussels. Jouhaux was soon to appoint a brain trust in order to discuss and further expand Belin’s document.52 and André Ulman commented extensively on the Plan. Philip’s article was published in August by L’Eglantine as a pamphlet. 48  “Sur le Plan d’Action du Parti: une seule motion Moch-Cartier,” La volonté socialiste, no. 211 (1934): unpaged. However, Moch’s candid admission that he was unaware of the motion presented before the Seine Congress when drawing up his own is revealing about the lack of coordination among planists: see XXXIème Congrès national tenu à Toulouse les 20, 21, 22 et 23 mai 1934—compte redu sténographique (Paris: Librairie Populaire, 1934), 184. 49  “Les Congrès fédéraux,” Le Populaire, February 7, 1934; “Les Congrès fédéraux,” Le Populaire, February 8, 1934. 50  See Jean Zyromski, “Amical reproche à Vincent Auriol,” Le Populaire, December 27, 1933; Jean Zyromski, “Pour une politique de socialisation,” Le Populaire, January 4, 1934; Jean Zyromski “Crise–Pouvoir–Socialisation,” Le Populaire, February 1, 1934. 51  See “Le Congrès confédéral—Paris, 15 au 18 septembre,” La voix du peuple, no. 133 (1931): 608–611. 52  See René Belin, Du secrétariat de la C.G.T. au Gouvernement de Vichy (Mémoires 1933–1942) (Paris: Albatros. 1978), 46–48. See also “L’action de la C.G.T. pour conjurer la crise économique,” La voix du peuple, no. 160 (1934): 5; “La Confédération Générale du Travail demande l’application de mesures immédiates contre la crise économique,” Le Populaire, 16 January 1934. The January issue of La voix du peuple featured both the Plan du Travail (pp. 10–13) and Belin’s draft (pp. 38–40).

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

165

Jouhaux was a lifelong reformist and his sudden conversion to planism may have been skin-deep. On the other hand, some of his collaborators, including Belin and the editor-in-chief of La Tribune des Fonctionnaires Robert Lacoste, were true believers, and their efforts to assimilate de Man’s thinking stemmed from a genuine fascination with the Belgian experience.53 As a result, by late January three competing planist groups existed in France. All of them opposed the deflationary policies of the incumbent government, led by the Radical Camille Chautemps. They all aimed at establishing an économie dirigée to curb unemployment and return to economic growth. They all agreed about the necessity of nationalising monopolies, although the neo-socialists less enthusiastically than the others. Their strategies, however, differed greatly. The neo-socialists envisaged a piecemeal transition towards economic planning working with the Radicals (or at least with their progressive wing). The SFIO planists wished to take control of their party and run on a planist platform without seeking alliances or participating in Radical-led cabinets. The CGT planists hoped to get a Labour Plan approved by mobilising workers and pressuring the government. This prevented the formation of a single planist front but, by the same token, it allowed planism to resonate more widely. Blum’s fear that planism might shake the ideological foundations of the SFIO was not illogical. An unforeseen crisis, however, reshaped the political scene to such an extent that planists’ hopes, and Blum’s apprehensions, were dashed in a few months. * * * On February 6, 1934, several far-Right groups rallied against the new Daladier government for its decision to dismiss the police prefect Jean Chiappe. The Paris demonstrations degenerated into riots that caused at 53  See Robert Lacoste, “A Bruxelles, avec Henri de Man,” La Tribune des fonctionnaires et des rétriates 27, no. 583 (1934): 1, 4. Lacoste developed an early interest in the notion of économie dirigée and was probably the first periodical to introduce the Labour Plan to the French public, even before the final version was released [see “Le Plan Henri de Man pour lutter contre la crise,” La tribune des fonctionnaires et des retraités 26, no. 577 (1933): 3]. In February 1934, Lacoste’s views on the nationalisation of the banking system were cited alongside those of de Man, G.D.H. Cole, and Christian Cornelissen as the French expression of a wider planist orientation [see “Nationalisations des banques et du crédit,” L’Homme réel, no. 2 (1934): 67–77]. In autumn 1934, both Lacoste and Belin attended the Pontigny conference.

166 

T. MILANI

least fifteen casualties. Within the Left, the unrest was seen as a conscious attempt to throw the country into chaos, possibly even the first salvo of an upcoming putsch. As an emotional Blum put it in a dramatic address to the Chamber, “the parties of reaction, defeated two years ago, and those who have sought their revenge alternatively through financial or moral panic, are trying today a coup de force.”54 February 6 had two major consequences. The first was the decision to postpone the SFIO Congress which was to be held less than a week later, freezing the debate at a time when planist ideas were gaining momentum.55 The second was an almost instinctive search for unity among the forces that saw la République under threat, including the Parti Communiste Français (PCF), which had previously ruled out any convergence with the SFIO. On February 12, during a strike called by the CGT, thousands of SFIO and PCF militants marched together under the same banner. The communist newspaper L’Humanité celebrated the “magnificent proletarian response to fascism,” and its editor, Marcel Cachin, caught the new mood by claiming that “the struggle between fascism and the working class and peasantry […] dominates everything!”56 The fact that, the same week, a civil war broke out in Vienna, allowing Chancellor Dollfuss to crush the Austrian social democrats, heightened the feeling that French democracy was in jeopardy.57

54  “La réaction fasciste ne passera pas!,” Le Populaire, February 7, 1934. See also Moch, Rencontres, 91–92. For a chronicle of February 6, see Pierre Pellissier, 6 février: la République en flamme (Paris: Perrin, 2000). 55  The decision was taken on February 7. At the Toulouse Congress, Blum contended that the postponement prevented an even deeper “trouble of ideas” that might have endangered party unity: see “Les évènements du 6 février,” in XXXI Congrès national, 32–33, 350. In March, the SFIO National Council decided to set up a commission to prepare “a plan of propaganda and mass-gathering” as well as “a programme for immediate action by the party in power,” but the task was not accomplished [“Le Congrès national fixé au 20–25 mai se tiendra à Toulouse,” Le Populaire, 12 March 1934]. 56  “Magnifique riposte prolétarienne au fascisme” and “Une grève générale sans précédents,” L’Humanité, February 13, 1934. 57  See, for example, Jean-Baptiste Séverac, “Après la dernière victoire du fascisme,” La Bataille socialiste, no. 76 (1934): 2; Boris Souvarine, “Les journées de février,” La Critique sociale, no. 11 (1934): 201–205. On February 16, a massive rally was organised in solidarity with Austrian workers [see “Paris ouvrière vengera la Commune de Vienne,” Le Populaire, February 17, 1934; “Révolution et contre-révolution en Autriche,” La Vie du Parti, no. 52 (1934)].

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

167

Neither neo-socialists nor SFIO planists were taken aback by the prospect of a right-wing conspiracy. If anything, they agreed that the chronic inability of centre-right cabinets to solve the economic crisis was only making such prospect more likely. “We shall tirelessly repeat that the hour has come for a true revolution, in conformity with our principles as much as to the demands of the historical moment,” Déat wrote.58 His message, however, was not one of uncritical support for the parliamentary system. In his view, being no longer burdened by their association with the SFIO, neo-socialists could now channel “contradictory and tumultuous currents, which have not yet found their direction, to the benefit of the socialist and democratic revolution.”59 Shortly after, this conviction drove him and other neo-socialists to cross paths with fringes which rejected liberal economics and leaned towards a variety of corporatist arrangements. In that spirit, Déat, Louis Vallon, Georges Roditi, and Paul Marion all backed the Plan du 9 Juillet, released in 1934. This Plan aimed to rally young people all across the political spectrum around a set of constitutional reforms to strengthen the executive and introduce economic planning. Signatories included notable intellectuals—de Jouvenel, Jules Romains, and Alfred Fabre-Luce; technocrats—Jacques Branger, Jean Coutrot, and Pierre Laroque; as well as individual members of the Croix du Feu and the Jeunesses Patriotes.60 In January 1935, Montagnon echoed them calling for “a strong state” (un État fort) and “a national mystique” by which the

58  Marcel Déat, “Sanglante confirmation,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 362 (1934): 2. The piece was allegedly written on February 6. 59  Marcel Déat, “Fin des vieux partis,” Notre temps, February 14, 1934. See also “Un manifeste du Parti Socialiste de France,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 363 (1934): 3–4. 60  See VV.AA., Plan du 9 Juillet: Réforme de la France proposée par le groupe du 9 Juillet (Paris: Gallimard, 1934). A young Radical deputy from Eure, Pierre Mendès-France, endorsed the Plan in September [see Louis Vallon, “I. Le Plan du 9 Juillet,” L’Homme nouveau 2, no. 9 (1935): unpaged]. Déat hoped the Plan du 9 Juillet would also win the approval of those “socialists in the SFIO who […] claim at the same time to be faithful to Jaurès and won over by the ‘planism’ of their Belgian comrades” [Marcel Déat, “Tâtonnements,” Paris-Demain 2, no. 57 (1934): 2]. Coutrot, an engineer from the circle X-Crise, was also an admirer of de Man: see letter from Coutrot to unknown member of X-Crise, 25 February 1934, FJC/AN/468/AP/7; copies of internal documents of the BES, FJC/AN/AP468/AP/11; the original manuscript of Coutrot’s book Quoi vivre, in which de Man is cited, FJC/AN/AP468/12.

168 

T. MILANI

neo-socialists could get a foothold among young voters.61 Resentment against the establishment was one feeling that neo-socialists were eager to profit from, even at the price of mingling with the far Right.62 Déat’s far-fetched project of a planist rassemblement, however, collided with the reality of his beleaguered party. On February 9, the neo-socialist Adrien Marquet agreed to serve as Minister of Labour in a cabinet of national unity—in fact, a centre-right one—headed by Gaston Doumergue, alongside unreconstructed conservatives such as Tardieu, Pierre-Étienne Flandin, and Louis Marin. In doing so, Marquet consciously ignored the most recent PSdF resolution, a carefully drafted statement contemplating parliamentary support, not participation, to “a government of public safety and détente.”63 His impulsiveness and opportunism put neo-­ socialists under severe strain for they could neither capitulate nor alienate the powerful Gironde federation, on which Marquet held a firm grip.64 To be sure, his behaviour infuriated Renaudel.65 After three stormy meetings, 61  Barthélemy Montagnon, Essai de synthèse néo-socialiste (Paris: Parti Socialiste de France, 1935), 13–14. Traditionally, the reform of the state had been a favourite theme of the Right, including Tardieu: see André Tardieu, L’heure de la décision (Paris: Flammarion, 1934). For an overview, see Nicolas Roussellier, “La contestation du modèle républicain dans les années 30: la réforme de l’Etat,” in Le modèle républicain, eds. Serge Berstein and Odile Rudelle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992): 319–335. 62  See, for example, Marcel Déat, Jeunesses d’Europe (Paris: SEI, n.d.), 11–14. After having attended a conference on corporatism sponsored by the Italian Ministry of Culture in May 1935, Roditi displayed an increasingly sympathetic attitude towards Italian fascism and, like Déat, sided with Vichy in the 1940s. For an overview on his evolving views, see Georges Roditi, Ecrits d’avant-guerre: ‘L’Homme Nouveau’, ‘Tribune de France’, ‘Idées et Peuples’, 1931–1939 (Clermont-Ferrand: Sorlot, 1941). Evidence suggests that Roditi knew de Man personally: see letter from Roditi to de Man, 10 November 1933, ABSO/AMSAB/82; letter from Roditi to de Man, 3 August 1937, AHDM/IISG/227. 63  “Au groupe néo-socialiste,” Le Temps, February 9, 1934. To make matters worse, in a declaration issued on February 10, Marquet presented his appointment as a bilateral bargain between him and Doumergue [see “Une déclaration de M. Marquet,” Le Temps, February 11, 1934]. For a detailed account, see Ernest Lafont, “Le rapport du groupe parlementaire,” La Vie socialiste, 12, no. 376 (1934): 6–8. 64  Six out of seven SFIO deputies from Gironde joined the PSdF in 1933, half of the militants followed them, and the first local Congress in Bordeaux, in January 1934, hosted 600 delegates and 8000 attendees [see Pierre Brana and Joëlle Dusseau, Adrien Marquet maire de Bordeaux: du socialisme à la collaboration (Anglet: Atlantica, 2001), 123; Pierre Rambaut, “Le Congrès fédéral constitutive de la Fédération de la Gironde du Parti Socialiste de France,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 360 (1934): 13–14]. 65  See “Pierre Renaudel condamne l’Union Nationale et l’entrée de Marquet dans le ministère Doumergue,” Le Populaire, February 11, 1934; Pierre Renaudel, “Pour la République, contre la dictature et le fascisme,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 363 (1934): 1–2.

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

169

facing the danger of losing the party’s only stronghold, the PSdF executive bureau begrudgingly authorised Marquet to serve on a personal basis.66 Two deputies left in protest and neo-socialists were accused by SFIO backbenchers of being in league with the murderers of Jaurès.67 Déat later admitted that he needed “much flexibility, mental agility, and almost the gift of ubiquity” to explain this decision to the public.68 For his part, soon after his appointment Marquet came up with a Plan of public works, approved by the government in March, which at first seemed to vindicate the choice of serving under Doumergue.69 In fact, the Marquet Plan—which aimed at lending social security savings to promote local infrastructure projects—could not match the appeal of the Belgian Labour Plan or other planist schemes due to its narrow objectives and unemotional language. Moreover, as Déat pointed out, it was underfunded due to the deflationary budget crafted by the Ministry of the Economy.70 Instead of ushering in a French New Deal, it replicated the grands travaux that fiscally conservative prime ministers had sponsored in the past. Because of that, the Plan Marquet backfired: Blum dismissed it as a bluff, and even the Radicals took issue with it during their October Congress.71 66  See “Les néo-socialises divisés,” L’homme Libre, February 10, 1934; “Chez les néosocialistes,” Le Temps, February 16, 1934. 67  See “Auguste Reynaud, député du Var, démissionne du parti ‘néo’. La fédération varoise s’était d’ailleurs opposée au maintien de Marquet dans le cabinet Doumergue,” Le Populaire, February 14, 1934; “Maxence Roldes abandonne les ‘néo-socialistes,’” Le Populaire, February 15, 1934; “La présentation du cabinet Doumergue,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 363 (1934): 9–10. 68  Marcel Déat, Mémoires politiques (Paris: Denoël, 1989), 301. Neo-socialist efforts to keep distance from the majority were often convoluted and inconsequential. For instance, in February 1934, the neo-socialist parliamentary group voted in the favour of the Doumergue budget but against the full powers to balance it [see “Vote du budget 1934—La Chambre autorise la procédure des décrets lois,” Le Temps, February 24, 1934]. 69  See, for example, Robert Bonin, “Pour la liquidation du chômage et de la crise économique,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 369 (1934): 1–3. 70  In May 1934, Déat still claimed “an exact parallelism” existed between the neo-socialist analysis and de Man’s as the Marquet Plan had already proved “in contradiction” with the government’s fiscal policy: see Marcel Déat, Problèmes d’hier et de demain (Paris: Parti Socialiste de France, 1934), 15, 26. 71  Léon Blum, “Le Plan démarqué,” Le Populaire, May 17, 1934; Léon Blum, “Naïveté o bluff?,” Le Populaire, May 22, 1934; Marcel Bidoux, “Le Congrès de Nantes a accordé aux ministres radicaux un mandat large,” Le Populaire, October 28, 1934; Marcel Bidoux, “Le Congrès radical a terminé ses travaux hier,” Le Populaire, October 29, 1934.

170 

T. MILANI

Not even a new round of spending cuts persuaded Marquet to step down.72 In June 1934 an increasingly frustrated Déat tried to cause the downfall of Doumergue with the only purpose of kicking Marquet out of office but his machination failed miserably.73 In July, a number of PSdF key figures denounced the party’s association with an unpopular government as a serious liability.74 A resentful Marquet got back by threatening to defect.75 After months of skirmishes and tensions, on November 3, Marquet cut the Gordian knot by resigning from the PSdF. He also set up his own Parti néo-socialiste de France, active only at local level, which allowed him to get re-elected as mayor of Bordeaux in 1935, this time within a centre-right coalition.76 By then, however, the neo-socialists were too discredited and splintered to attract new followers, with Déat wavering between various options: he backed the CGT Plan—to be discussed later in this chapter—but also developed a revised version of it, named Plan Français, through a think tank of his own making, the Comité du Plan, which gained no traction.77 Plagued by financial troubles and a 72  See “La rentrée politique de Renaudel: son discours de la Seine,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 375 (1934): 17; “Le Congrès de la fédération de la région parisienne,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 376 (1934): 11–14, during which Marquet was accused of capitulation; “Le Congrès fédéral du Var,” La vie socialiste 12, no. 376 (1934): 14–15. Publicly, Déat described Marquet’s position as “delicate” and hardly tenable in the long run [Marcel Déat, “Axis de marche,” La Vie socialiste, 12, no. 375 (1934): 3]. See also Marcel Déat, “Rapport moral,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 374 (1934): 1–10. 73  Déat unsuccessfully tried to trigger the resignation of the Minister of Pensions to provoke a government crisis [see Georges Suarez, “Marcel Déat révolutionnaire de juillet ou vers un ministère Paul Boncour,” Le Gringoire 7, no. 291 (1934): 7; Roger Parant, “Grandeur et décadence,” L’Express du Midi, July 11, 1934]. See also Déat, Mémoires, 303–304. 74  Robert Bobin, “Le Conseil central du Parti Socialiste de France—8 Juillet 1934,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 384 (1934): 7–12. 75  See “Le Congrès du Parti Socialiste de France: M. Marquet ne veut pas être un boulet pour le parti. Il le quitterait plutôt,” La Petite Gironde, July 9, 1934. Tellingly, Marquet’s threat was omitted from Bobin’s official account of the meeting. 76  See “Aux urnes pour la démocratie et le travail! Votez pour la liste Adrien Marquet,” Le Cri populaire, April 28, 1935; Jean Cavignac, “Les néo-socialistes dans les élections locales (1934–1939),” in VV.AA., Les néo-socialistes girondins (Bordeaux: Institut aquitaine de sciences sociales, 1988), 191–230. 77  See Marcel Déat, “Notre adhésion au Plan de la C.G.T.,” Paris-Demain 3, no. 81 (1935): 1–2; Marcel Déat, “Préface,” in Comité du Plan, Le Plan français: doctrine et plan d’action (Paris: Fasquelle, 1935), 9–23. The Comité rallied minor left-wing parties, a few independent radicals, and various associations of former combatants: see “Contre la misère, la faillite et le chômage—Comité du Plan,” La Vie socialiste 13, no. 409 (1935): 3–4; “Présentation du Plan,” Le Front: socialiste, républicain, français 1, no. 4 (1935): 4; Marcel

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

171

plummeting membership, the PSdF finally dissolved into the Union Socialiste Républicaine (USR), which assembled minor forces gravitating towards the Radicals.78 Neosocialism ended not with a bang but with a whimper: in the 1936 legislative elections, despite running under the Popular Front banner, Déat was defeated alongside many former PSdF affiliates, and the entire USR won merely twenty-nine seats.79 The gap between rhetoric and reality proved fatal to a small party which attacked the status quo while having one of its leaders in government.80 February 6 was equally fatal to SFIO planists who suffered a crushing setback in Toulouse, where the party gathered in May 1934, at a time anti-­ planists were better positioned to mount a counterattack. Senior figures strongly objected to the drafting of a French Labour Plan, questioning its feasibility and merits. Paul Faure, the general secretary, argued that “before any plan,” the party had to focus on “the seizure of power,” without which planning would be pointless.81 Similarly, Jean-Baptiste Séverac, a highly influential ideologue, warned against any detailed blueprint for action that might stifle the creativity of a future left-wing government: “I believe that the more we leave the terms of the Plan indeterminate, in case the Congress decides to have one, the less likely we are to be deceived.”82 Jean Lebas, the Mayor of Roubaix and leader of the North Federation, challenged the assumption that planism had something original to offer: Déat, “Vers l’expérience française,” Le Front: socialiste, républicain, français 1, no. 8 (1935): 1–2. 78  See “Au Congrès du Parti Socialiste de France,” Le Front: socialiste, républicain, français 1, no. 2 (1935): 1, 4. The main architect of the merger was Joseph Paul-Boncour, a moderate centre-left deputy and former prime minister who was deeply suspicious of the neosocialists’ lurching towards extra-parliamentary forces: see Joseph Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres: souvenirs sur la IIIe République. Vol. II (Paris: Plon, 1945), 322–323. 79  Bertrand de Jouvenel, who campaigned as a neo-socialist, was among those who unsuccessfully ran for Parliament: see Bertrand de Jouvenel, “Pourquoi j’ai été battu,” Vu, special issue (1936): 44–46. 80  The contradiction was evident from the very beginning of the neo-socialist insurgence: see, for example, Aldo Rossi [Angelo Tasca], “La scission socialiste au Congrès du Paris,” Monde: hebdomadaire international 6, no. 268 (1933): 4–5. Anti-parliamentary elements within the PSdF were the most upset by the new alliance: see, for example, Georges Roditi, “Mort ou naissance du néo-socialisme?,” L’Homme nouveau, special issue (1935): unpaged. A similar disappointment subsequently led Marion and de Jouvenel to switch to Jacques Doriot’s Parti Populaire Français. 81  XXXIe Congrès, 22. 82  Ibid., 176. See also Jean-Baptiste Séverac, “A propos de ‘Plans,’” Révolte 4, no. 21 (1934): 5–12.

172 

T. MILANI

“Comrades, what are you proposing to do, in sum? To put it simply: to continue the work of the founders of French socialism.”83 SFIO planists had a hard time in fending off all these attacks, also due to poor coordination. In some cases, they pledged their allegiance to the traditional values of socialism, as Salomon Grumbach did; in others, they proudly postured as non-conformists, like the founder of Révolution Constructive Boivin, who simultaneously condemned the “generalised negativism” of the party and the “damaging mistake” of uncritically supporting the parliamentary system.84 Because of this cacophony of voices, their message came across as muddled. Moreover, planists suffered from Blum’s unparalleled ability to tamp down internal dissent. Unlike a year before, when he had confronted the neo-socialists head-on, Blum chose to play the role of the unifier. He therefore thanked the young generation for having “questioned ideas that we had been taken for granted,” hence rendering “a service” to the whole party: “[I]t is our duty to welcome their criticism, and also to show there is a living link (lien vivant) between the generations.”85 Then he quickly moved on to dismiss the clash between planists and anti-planists as a fight originated by “practical difficulties,” not “theoretical ones.”86 Planists, Blum maintained, had come to acknowledge that a “plan must be amendable and revocable, and it is necessary to lay down its guidelines, not its details.”87 At best, that was an overstatement: only Moch had developed an instrumental conception of the Plan, as a mere device to ensure the consistency of economic policy.88 For his part, Blum praised the Plan as a propaganda tool but, in an effort to identify the “key ideas” behind it, he also resisted the claim that the Plan, and the Plan alone, would lead to victory: “It is not a plan, in my view, that the public needs most. […] What the public wants is the assertion that we will keep our commitments, that there will be no resolution from which we will retreat, no sacrifice on which we will back down, in order to keep the engagement we have taken.”89 In short, Blum ensured that some measures advocated by SFIO  XXXIe Congrès, 226.  Ibid., 161–162, 253–254. The speech was later included in Pierre Boivin, Choix d’écrits (Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1938), 227–234. 85  XXXIe Congrès, 350. 86  Ibid., 351–352. 87  Ibid., 354. 88  See ibid., 177–192. 89  See ibid., 359, 360–361. 83 84

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

173

planists (i.e. extensive public works, nationalisation of credit, insurance companies, and monopolies) were incorporated in the party programme without laying down a proper Labour Plan. As stated in the final resolution, the Congress agreed that “the party, once in power, being dominated by the feeling of its revolutionary mission, could not be chained or limited by any plan or programme” and that “public opinion begins to feel disoriented by the abundance of plans, too often drafted to facilitate vain adhesions, that are followed by no action.”90 The document—prepared by a special commission featuring also Moch, Boivin, Itard, and Philip—won the nearly unanimous support of the delegates, showing that, after February 6, ideological differentiations were outweighed by the quest for party unity.91 Moreover, in May, some of the staunchest opponents of planism were already intrigued by the prospect of a united front with the communists, and even Zyromski felt that working-­ class solidarity trumped any thorough ideological revision.92 In practice, the relatively quiet surrender of the SFIO planists meant that planist ideas would continue to be tolerated within the limits set by the party leaders, Blum and Faure.93  Ibid., 397–398.  Ibid., 366–367, 402. The “great desire for unity of action” was noticed also by foreign observers [see, e.g., “Après le Congrès de Toulouse,” Le Peuple, May 26, 1934]. According to Itard, Révolution Constructive supported the motion “without believing it is perfect, without even finding many virtues in it. The point is we felt a desire for unanimity at that Congress […] so we were afraid, by countering it, to appear to our comrades as agents of a new split” [Jean Itard, “L’unanimité de Toulouse,” Le Populaire, June 27, 1934]. Not all planists were satisfied, as some had warned in advance about the danger of accepting a vague unanimity motion: see, for example, letter from Lefranc to Deixonne, 18 May 1934, FMD/ OURS/1APO5/1; Marcelle. Pommera, “La plus belle motion du monde …,” Le Combat marxiste 2, no. 9 (1934): 15–17. Zyromski gave a more positive assessment of the Congress, although he admitted that “a resistance has been opposed to some of our requests” [Jean Zyromski, “Notre effort au Congrès de Toulouse,” La Bataille socialiste 6, no. 79 (1934): 1–2]. 92  Among the anti-planists, see Jean-Baptiste Séverac, Le Parti Socialiste: ses principes et ses tâches. Lettres à Brigitte (Paris: Éditions de la Bataille Socialiste, 1933), 96–97; Jean-Baptiste Séverac, De l’unité d’action à l’unité organique (Paris: Nouveau Prométhée, 1934). On Zyromski’s attitude, see Georges Lefranc, “La tentative de réunification entre le parti socialiste et le parti communiste de 1935 à 1937,” L’information historique 29, no. 1 (1967): 19–27. 93  Déat sarcastically commented, “The young launched the offensive, not without ardour, not without reputational success, not without jostling a few pots of flowers, not without irreverently pulling some old beards. Obviously, they have been barred and, once again, the ‘elderly’ prevailed. It could not have been otherwise” [Marcel Déat, “La motion de Toulouse,” La vie socialiste 12, no. 378 (1934): 3]. 90 91

174 

T. MILANI

The CGT was the only major organisation in which planism gained full acceptance. If trade unionists converted to planism, it is equally true that neo-socialists and SFIO planists came to appreciate the structural advantages of trade unionism.94 In many respects, the CGT was better positioned than the PSdF and the SFIO to devise a French Labour Plan. To begin with, the very nature of the CGT allowed planists of all stripes and orientations to cooperate, regardless of their age, profession, or party affiliation. The Bureau d’études économiques that the CGT, following the Belgian example, set up in March 1934 was remarkably pluralistic. In addition to the ubiquitous Lefranc and Laurat, the brain trust included, among others, academics in their fifties or sixties who had been close to Albert Thomas (Francis Delaisi, François Simiand, and Paul Mantoux), young trade union cadres (Jean Duret and Achille Dauphin-Meunier), economists (Etienne Antonelli and Robert Marjolin), and engineers from Déat’s inner circle (Vallon and Claude Bonnier).95 Secondly, thanks to its international connections and financial resources, the CGT could facilitate relations with planists abroad. It is noteworthy that, following the events of February 6, the CGT managed to swiftly change the location of a one-­ week conference from Geneva to Brussels in order to have de Man and Buset as speakers.96 Finally, the CGT provided educational structures through which planism could be taught and spread. By mid-1934 until the war, the Institut supérieur ouvrier (ISO) and the Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière (CCEO)—both run by Georges Lefranc with the assistance of a young professor of mechanics, Ludovic Zoretti—became the seedbeds of French planism.97 Amidst a wide range of courses, Lefranc 94  Some of them, like Laurat, were well aware of the role played by the CS in persuading the POB to accept the Labour Plan. In May 1935, writing for the Belgian public, he claimed that the CGT Plan was “inspired to principles that are identical to those of the Labour Plan” [Lucien Laurat, “La situation en France et le Plan de la CGT,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 3 (1935): 54]. 95  See Georges Lefranc, “Le courant planiste dans le mouvement ouvrier français de 1933 à 1936,” Le mouvement social, no. 54 (1966): 80; Georges Bernard, Denise Tintant and Marie-Anne Renauld, Léon Jouhaux dans le mouvement syndical français (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1979), 97–98. 96  See “Une heure avec Henri de Man au Bureau d’Études Sociales (12 juillet 1934),” in VV.AA., Les problèmes d’ensemble du fascisme: Semaine d’études d’Uccle-Bruxelles (10–15 juillet 1934) (Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1939), 22–25. 97  See VV.AA., Les principes et la vie du centre confédéral (Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1935); Emile and Georges Lefranc, La CGT et l’éducation ouvrière en France (Geneva: Bureau International du Travail, 1938). In April 1938, Lefranc invited de

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

175

frequently addressed topics related to planning, such as the Bolshevik revolution or Roosevelt’s New Deal; Laurat taught classes on contemporary social and economic thoughts.98 When the CGT Plan was finally published, in October 1934, the CGT arranged a series of fifteen conferences to advertise it and even launched a monthly, L’Atelier pour le Plan, to emulate Plan, the flagship publication of the Belgian campaign.99 This was well beyond what the SFIO could, or intended to, offer for a propaganda effort. However, the association with the CGT came at a high price, namely the loss of the properly political dimension of the Plan.100 A key promise of the Belgian Labour Plan was indeed that, by winning middle-class support, the Plan would get social democrats a parliamentary majority and pass far-reaching measures, including the nationalisation of credit. As de Man reminded his audience at the Sorbonne in December 1934, “[t]oday it is necessary […] either to give up making the revolution or to gain power first,” meaning that a genuine revolution had to be carried out through the state.101 Yet the CGT was not meant to control political Man to speak at a CGT one-week seminar on workers’ education at Pontigny but de Man’s political commitments prevented him from going [see letter from Lefranc to de Man, 1 April 1938, letter from de Man’s personal secretary to Lefranc, 2 May 1938, AHDM/IISG/227]. De Man kept a copy of the proceedings in his private papers [see AHDM/AMSAB/348]. 98  See Georges Lefranc and Raoul Lenoir, La révolution russe (Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1935); Georges Lefranc, Roosevelt contre la crise (Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1936); Lucien Laurat, La crise mondiale (Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1935); Lucien Laurat, Histoire des doctrines économiques (Paris: Collège du Travail, 1937). In 1936–1937, Laurat taught a module at the ISO on “social and economic aspects of planism”: see the notes in FLL/HIS/1. 99  The CGT plan first appeared on Le Populaire and subsequently circulated as a leaflet: see “La C.G.T. présente un plan de rénovation économique,” Le Populaire, October 29, 1934; Le Plan de Rénovation économique et sociale (Paris: Éditions de la Confédération Générale du Travail, 1935). The conferences were held at the ISO on a weekly basis and later published as VV.AA., Crise et Plan (Quinze conférences et études sur le Plan de la C.G.T.) (Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1935). The first issue of L’Atelier pour le Plan appeared in May 1935. 100  Some SFIO planists realised this very quickly. “The economic plan of the CGT lacks a political plan, the absence of which could be interpreted as the acceptance of the present regime” [Henri and René Modiano, “Le ‘plan de rénovation économique,’” La Bataille socialiste 6, 82 (1934): 4]; “The ‘plan’ can be excellent but it lacks consideration for political and social realities. Who will implement it? Under which conditions? One can go through the texts from the first to the last line, and find no semblance of an answer” [Robert Marjolin, “Pour une conception révolutionnaire du plan,” Révolution constructive 1, no. 4 (1934): 2]. 101  De Man, Le socialisme devant la crise, 15–16.

176 

T. MILANI

power: at best, it could exert some degree of influence over those holding it. For this reason, the CGT Plan looked less a consistent, detailed blueprint for action than a set of distinct and negotiable measures—the creation of an economic council to supersede economic planning, the nationalisation of credit and heavy industries, the launch of public works, the introduction of collective bargaining and reforms in the agricultural sector, and so on—which a centre-left government might or might not implement, at its discretion.102 That was not what Belgian planists were advocating in late 1934. The crucial distinction between “programme” and “plan,” on which de Man insisted, was gone. The combined failure of the neo-socialists as well as of the SFIO planists had thus major consequences for the French Left. While the CGT managed to get its Plan approved first by the National Confederal Committee, in October 1934, then by the unitary Congress held in March 1936, planists had virtually no say in the most fateful decisions taken by the SFIO in the same period: the creation of the Popular Front, followed by the drafting of its programme.103 Blum, never persuaded of the virtues of planism, preferred securing a broad intra-party alliance based on a minimalist agenda, and even more so after March 1935, when de Man’s decision to join the first Van Zeeland government left him puzzled.104 Belgian developments pleased most neo-socialists but disappointed many other

102  See Congrès confédéral de Paris 1935—Compte rendu sténographique de débats (Paris: Éditions de la Confédération Générale du Travail, 1935), 56–73. Speaking before the CGT Congress on September 27, 1935, Jouhaux argued that the CGT Plan consisted of a combination of temporary measures against the crisis and structural reforms, and the two were inextricably linked. However, he also claimed that the origins of the CGT’s policy proposals could be traced back to 1919 for “the ideas contained in the Plan had been issued by the confederal movement long before the Plan was worked out” [ibid., 236]. The CGT Plan was amended after a public meeting with various organisation involved in the creation of the Popular Front: see “Une réunion à la C.G.T.,” Le Populaire, August 6, 1935. 103  According to Harmel, the Popular Front “interrupted, buried, broke or perverted” a number of different initiatives, including the CGT Plan, which would have thoroughly renewed French society [Claude Harmel, “Le Front Populaire contre le planisme,” Les Etudes sociales et syndicales 11, no. 120 (1965): 2]. Harmel’s comment is way too drastic, but there is no doubt that the Popular Front and the launching of a French Labour Plan proved to be mutually exclusive strategies. 104  Blum observed, “It is not the Plan that is in power. It is the Party that has gone into it […]. The experience in which the Belgian Workers’ Party is engaged is therefore much closer to the normal types of ministerial collaboration than to the grandiose operation envisaged by the Christmas Congress” [Léon Blum, “En Belgique,” Le Populaire, March 27, 1935].

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

177

planists, including Zyromski, to whom participation was anathema.105 At that stage, however, ideas had become totally instrumental to the building of a workable alliance: tellingly, a vocal anti-planist like Lebas urged the SFIO to lend support to the CGT Plan only to negotiate with the PCF from a position of strength.106 Congressional pledges were equally ephemeral: a resolution drafted by Auriol, which committed the SFIO to develop its own action programme in accordance with the CGT Plan, remained a dead letter.107 Popular Front politics, it turned out, required flexibility, not doctrinarism. If opposition from within the SFIO seriously damaged the planist cause, communist hostility was the final nail in the coffin for all planists. Echoing Varga’s condemnation of the Belgian Labour Plan, French communists denounced “the disease of the ‘plan’” and the pernicious influence of its advocates: “The objective role of the ‘planners’ (faiseurs du plan), especially the socialist ones, is to divert workers from the only way of acting that corresponds to their interests—a revolutionary struggle for the overthrowing of the capitalist regime.”108 Its General Secretary Maurice Thorez, in December 1934, adamantly declared that the PCF would never join an alliance based on any kind of French Labour Plan: The proposals for nationalisation and socialization of credit are not peculiar to the Socialist Party. They are in the plan of the CGT, as the motion adopted by the Socialist Congress of Toulouse points out. We cannot approve the 105  See Marcel Déat, “De Bruxelles à Paris,” La Vie socialiste 13, no. 409 (1935): 1–3; Louis Vallon, “Le Plan du 9 Juillet et l’expérience belge,” L’Homme nouveau 2, no. 16 (1935): unpaged; Jean Zyromski, “De Belgique … en France,” Le Populaire, April 17, 1935. 106  See Jean Lebas, “Où va le Parti Socialiste?,” Le Populaire, June 24, 1935. Even Blum appeared more pragmatic: see Léon Blum, “Les nationalisations et la crise,” Le Populaire, August 6, 1935. 107  See XXXIIe Congrès national tenu à Mulhouse le 9, 10, 11 et 12 juin 1935—compte rendu sténographique (Paris: Libraire Populaire, 1936), 569–577. 108  Lucien Constant (Georges Kagan), “La Crise du Parti Socialiste—I.  A la veille du Congrès de Toulouse,” Cahiers du bolchévisme 11, no. 10 (1934): 592–593. See also Lucien Constant (Georges Kagan), “Les réformistes et la crise—III.  L’ ‘économie dirigée’ et la C.G.T.” Cahiers du bolchévisme 11, no. 7 (1934): 412–422, for a critique of the early steps towards the CGT Plan. For L’Humanité, both de Man and his French followers could be qualified as social fascists: see, for example, “Le plan social-fasciste d’Henri de Man—Tous d’accord!” L’Humanité, January 8, 1934. Bilan, a review linked to Italian communist exiles published in French, was among the first to denounce the Plan as a crypto-fascist scheme: see “Le Plan de Man,” Bilan, no. 4 (1934): 122–132 and “Le Plan de Man: suite et fine,” Bilan, no. 5 (1934): 166–179.

178 

T. MILANI

CGT Plan, which we claim being in contrast with the interest of the ­workers. We cannot accept the articles of a programme that can be found in the de Man Plan as well as in the programme of the neo-socialists.109

The SFIO’s reservations and the PCF’s opposition, coupled with a climate of opinion dominated by the search for a united front against fascism, resulted in the rejection of planism as a cement for the French Left. Thus, the programme of the Popular Front turned into “a rallying point for different political parties whose intentions were sometimes really antithetical.”110 Planists of different orientations were disappointed with it—no structural reforms, in de Man’s terminology, were outlined in the text111—and when the first Blum government fell, in June 1937, some of these dissident voices bemoaned that only a French Labour Plan would have been able to prevent disagreements and curb tensions on economic policy.112 * * * 109  Maurice Thorez, “L’organisation du front populaire du travail, de la paix et de la liberté,” Cahiers du bolchévisme 12, no. 1 (1935): 28. The speech was given in Paris on December 20, 1934. 110  Jean-François Biard, Le socialisme devant ses choix: la naissance de l’idée de plan (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1985), 265. For a detailed account of the drafting of the programme, see Jackson, The Politics of Depression, 112–133, Julian Jackson, The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy, 1934–38 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 159–167. 111  See “Le programme du Rassemblement populaire,” Le Peuple: Quotidien du syndicalisme, January 12, 1936; “Les revendications du Rassemblement Populaire,” La voix du peuple 18, no. 183 (1936): 5–6; Georges Lefranc, “Le Plan de la C.G.T. et le programme de revendications du Rassemblement Populaire,” L’Atelier pour le Plan 2, no. 9 (1936): 141–144; Gaston Vaillant, “Le programme du Front Populaire et le Plan de la CGT,” Le Front: socialiste, républicain, français 2, no. 11 (1936): 2; Louis Vallon, “Le programme du Front Populaire,” L’Homme nouveau 3, no. 25 (1936): unpaged. See also the unpublished manuscript by René Belin, “L’insuffisance du programme du Front Populaire,” FRB/ IHS/2. In June 1936 Vallon published a book which may be regarded a last-ditch effort to convert the Popular Front to economic planning, if not planism: see Louis Vallon, Socialisme expérimental (Paris: Centre d’Études Polytechniques, 1936). 112  See, for example, Marcel Déat, Le Front Populaire au tournant (Paris: Éditions du Journal “La Concorde,” 1937), 12–16, 36–37, 45–47. Already in March 1936, Lacoste had pointed to “the fragility” of coalition programmes, urging the SFIO to pass the CGT Plan as soon as possible [Congrès confédéral d’unité à Toulouse du 2 au 5 mars 1936—Compte rendu sténographique des débats. Paris: Éditions de la Confédération Générale du Travail 1936, 133]. Later on, Lefranc argued that the Achilles’ heel of the Popular Front was “an excessive confidence in capitalism” [Georges Lefranc, Histoire du Front Populaire (1934–1938) (Paris: Payot, 1965), 427].

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

179

There is no doubt that the reception of the Belgian Labour Plan sparked, between 1933 and 1936, a spirited debate within French social democracy. It is equally clear that the endeavours of neo-socialists, SFIO planists, and CGT planists ended all in failure. To an extent, each group’s project floundered for quite specific reasons. Lack of party discipline, opportunism, and ideological fluctuations crippled the PSdF from the outset. Déat had some intellectual clout and a flair for public speaking but aping de Man did not help him lay out a clear-cut Labour Plan serving French needs. In retrospect, his preference for a centre-left government after the 1932 election does not look unreasonable, although the neo-socialists deluded themselves into thinking that economic planning could be easily sold to moderate Radicals once in power.113 On the other hand, his disastrous handling of Marquet and his clumsy efforts to court the far Right speak volumes about his limitations as a leader. Furthermore, the fact that the PSdF never managed to evolve into a credible, mass-based party suggests that minor, sectarian groupings were a poor vehicle for planism: hence, Déat’s willingness to rip the SFIO apart was ultimately self-defeating. The record of SFIO planists is harder to assess. One of them, Georges Lefranc, went on to become a highly respected historian and claimed that, without the riots of February 6, SFIO planists would have gained the upper hand in the 1934 Lille Congress.114 He also held that, without the vigorous campaign waged by Révolution Constructive, many more militants attracted by planism would have defected to the PSdF.115 Lefranc’s views on the matter must be taken with a pinch of salt. However real and 113  As understood by Gaëtan Pirou, La crise du capitalisme (Paris: Sirey, 1936), 121–124. The Radical leader Édouard Herriot was fiscally conservative and successfully fended off the attacks of the Young Turks: see Serge Berstein, Histoire du Parti Radical. Vol. II (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1982), 122–124, 184–188. On the ideological incongruities of the Radicals, see Jacques Kayser, “Le radicalisme et les radicaux,” in Tendances politiques dans la vie française depuis 1789, ed. Guy Michaud (Paris: Hachette, 1960), 65–88. 114  See Georges Lefranc, “Histoire d’un groupe du Parti Socialiste SFIO: Révolution Constructive (1930–1938),” in Essais sur les problèmes socialistes et syndicaux (Paris: Payot, 1970), 185–186. According to another planist, Georges Soules, the mobilisation of late 1933–early 1934 accounted a real “revolutionary opportunity” comparable to the strikes of May–June 1936 [Raymond Abellio (Georges Soules), Les militants: 1927–1939 (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), 228]. 115  See Georges Lefranc, “Une scission malencontreuse: la scission ‘néo-socialiste’ de 1933,” in Visages du mouvement ouvrier français: jadis, naguère, aujourd’hui (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982), 131.

180 

T. MILANI

mounting, the intellectual ferment of planist circles did not immediately translate into political strength. SFIO planists were, in most cases, intellectuals with little or no experience of intra-party fights, no territorial constituency, and no recognisable spearhead capable of facing down better-known figures as Blum or Faure—and they were indeed well aware of their relative vulnerability.116 Nor is there compelling evidence of the base’s alleged excitement for the neo-socialists before the SFIO planists stepped up.117 Had the planist mobilisation continued to grow steadily, the recalcitrant Blum might have further softened his opposition to planism. But it is quite difficult to imagine that the entire party machine would have eventually yielded to a handful of enthusiasts.118 The third group, the CGT planists, were perhaps the least unsuccessful but only because they were more willing to adapt to changing circumstances. It is true that the CGT Plan, skilfully used as a propaganda tool after June 1936, strengthened the hand of Jouhaux when dealing with the Popular Front in power.119 But some of its measures were used as bargaining chips rather than as precondition for cooperation: many of its boldest prescriptions, such as nationalisations, remained unfulfilled. CGT planists too, in the end, achieved little. French planism, taken as a whole, suffered from additional, more general weaknesses. The first was the divisive role planism came to play in the French domestic political context. In Belgium, de Man’s Labour Plan was viewed by many social democrats as favouring party unity and was therefore welcomed or at least tolerated for that reason. In France, on the other hand, the reception of the Belgian Labour Plan occurred at a time when the split between the neo-socialists and the SFIO was well underway. 116  In January 1934, Lefranc and Itard described Révolution Constructive as a “small group […] that has never wanted to become a wing (une tendance)” [Jean Itard and Georges Lefranc, “Pour un plan de construction socialiste,” Le Populaire, January 17, 1934]. Itard reiterated the claim at the Toulouse Congress [see XXXIème Congrès National, 215]. 117  La Bataille socialiste reported, perhaps disingenuously, that younger militants in Paris were galvanised by the break with the neo-socialists as they viewed the latter as a dead weight [see Emile Farinet, “Dans la Seine, après le départ des néos,” Bataille socialiste 6, no. 73 (1933): 10]. 118  See Horn, European Socialists Respond to Fascism, 87–88. 119  See Léon Jouhaux, “Des réformes de structure sont indispensables: Le Front Populaire doit s’en convaincre,” L’Atelier pour le Plan 3, no. 29–30 (1937): 115–117; Léon Jouhaux, Le Plan de rénovation économique et sociale (Paris: Confédération Générale du Travail, 1937); Actualité du Plan (Paris: Éditions du Centre Confédéral d’Education Ouvrière, 1937); Léon Jouhaux, La C.G.T.: ce qu’elle est, ce qu’elle veut (Paris: Gallimard, 1937), 11–19, 169–187.

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

181

Déat, Renaudel, and others exploited de Man’s ideas to attack their former party; anti-planists in the SFIO responded by seeking to discredit planism as a brand of politics. Because of that, SFIO planists operated in a hostile environment, that hampered the reception of their thought. Secondly, French planism never found its own de Man, namely a clearly identifiable, unifying figure having the final say on theoretical or strategic disputes. Hence, each planist group often claimed to be the only one faithful to the spirit of the original Labour Plan, jockeying for position and igniting unnecessary conflicts between them.120 Thirdly, French planism could not rely on an established pattern of cooperation between the main social democratic party and the trade union movement. Unlike the Belgian CS, which was organically linked to the POB, the CGT had often clashed with the SFIO in the previous decades and jealously defended its independence.121 This is why the acceptance of planism by the former did not result in a more favourable attitude by the latter: the two organisations worked almost in separate spheres. Having taken all this into account, the final, and maybe decisive, factor operating against French planism was the determination of incumbent SFIO leaders, Léon Blum and Paul Faure, to undermine it. Vandervelde too was sceptical and, from late 1934, began to resist de Man’s attempts to steer the POB away from him. Nevertheless, his initial attitude was not confrontational: without Vandervelde’s green light, de Man would have not been appointed vice-president of the party, and the campaign for the Plan would have never been launched. On the other hand, Blum and Faure refused to commit the SFIO to a Labour Plan; when pressed, they made minor and sporadic concessions to the SFIO planists but did not hesitate to scrap them after February 1934, giving priority to the building

120  This applies especially to neo-socialists and SFIO planists as CGT planists tended to be more ecumenical: see, for example, Marcel Déat, “La nouvelle épouvante de Léon Blum,” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 360 (1934): 4–6; Marcel Déat, “Le planisme au Parlement,” Le Petit provençal, January 31, 1935; Pierre Boivin, “Le malaise du Parti Socialiste,” in Choix d’écrits, 221–226; “Préface par le Groupe du Révolution Constructive,” in de Man, Le socialisme devant la crise, 1–4. 121  See, for example, Stéphane Sirot, “SFIO, syndicalisme et luttes ouvrières (1905–1914): des relations problématiques et volontiers distendues,” Cahiers Jaurès 1–2, no. 187–188 (2008): 87–96. Jouhaux was keen to stress the CGT’s refusal to meddle with party politics: see, for example, Léon Jouhaux, Le syndicalisme: ce qu’il est, ce qu’il doit être (Paris: Flammarion, 1937), 33–35.

182 

T. MILANI

of a Popular Front based on a cautious and unimaginative economic programme. Due to the poor state of his private papers and his often contradictory statements, no conclusive answer can be given to the question as to why the intellectually sophisticated, internationally minded, and genuinely progressive Blum remained convinced for so long that establishing a mixed economy in France meant to pave the way for fascism.122 Of course, thinking about the trajectory of several planists who ended up supporting Vichy, it may be tempting to conclude that he was remarkably prescient: French planism had indeed an inherently authoritarian core.123 Yet not even in the case of Déat, who subsequently linked his rejection of the purportedly “sclerotic orthodoxy of old socialism” to the embrace of wartime collaboration, the equation between planism and fascism stands up to close scrutiny or casts much light on his drift.124 To begin with, a substantial cohort of admirers of the Belgian Labour Plan, including some former associates of Déat, joined the Resistance: among these, one should mention at least Philip, Moch, Lacoste, Vallon, Ramaider, Marjolin, Laroque, Pierre Drefyus, Henry Hauck, and Pierre Brossolette. Secondly, it is plausible that other variables, such as an inclination towards neutralism in foreign policy and their further loss of political clout during the second half of the 1930s, were much more important in turning future pétainistes against the institutions of the Third Republic.125 In any case, planism alone 122  Even a sympathetic biographer of Blum acknowledged that his writings on this topic were a “dogmatic schematisation, without connection to reality” [Gilbert Ziebura, Léon Blum et le Parti Socialiste (Paris: Colin, 1967), 358]. According to Biard, Blum made up his mind on the mixed economy after his first governmental experience, in 1937–1938, but even then struggled with the distinction between redistributive and structural reforms: see Biard, Le socialisme devant ses choix, 277–288. 123  Among them, there were neo-socialists (Déat, Marquet, Montagnon, Marion, and Roditi), SFIO planists (Lefranc, Zoretti, Soules, and Albertini), and CGT planists (Belin and Delaisi). 124  Marcel Déat, “Il y a dix ans, Place de la Concorde …,” undated manuscript, FP/ AN/F/7/15945. See also Déat, Mémoires, 542. See also the classic account by Philippe Burrin, La derive fasciste: Doriot, Déat, Bergery, 1933–1945 (Paris: Seuil, 1986). 125  Planists and future collaborators Georges and Emile Lefranc, Albertini, Soules, and Zoretti set up a radically pacifist tendency within the SFIO, Redressement pour la construction du socialisme et de la paix, in late 1938. Occasionally, they exploited their connections with planists, including de Man, to have greater impact on public opinion: see letter from Zoretti to Oprecht, 13 September 1939, FLZ/IHS/2. Outside the SFIO, Déat was one of the staunchest advocates of appeasement. On political marginalisation, see Burrin, La derive fasciste, 275, 447–448; Nimorad Amzalak, Fascists and Honourable Men: Contingency and Choice in French Politics, 1918–1945 (New York-Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 170–177.

7  CLASH OF VISIONS: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN FRANCE 

183

cannot account for left-wing collaboration: the phenomenon requires a multi-faceted, and multi-factorial, explanation.126 Seen in this light, Blum’s unbending opposition to planism appears much less justified and farsighted than arbitrary and preconceived. If anything, it contributed to hindering the development of a richer, more nuanced economic culture within the SFIO, preventing French social democracy from envisaging more ambitious ways of tackling the Depression.127 After all, planning was neither relegated to the dustbin of history nor permanently associated with the dark years 1940–1944: it resurfaced strongly after the Second World War as a crucial component of the French reconstruction and throughout the so-called Trente Glorieuses.128 Maybe Déat was right on one thing: planism, broadly defined, really was “the conception that perfectly suits France.”129

126  See Marc Sadoun, “Les facteurs de la conversion au socialisme collaborateur,” Revue française de science politique 28, no. 3 (1978): 459–487. 127  For a critical assessment of advocates and detractors of planning, see Lichtheim, Marxism in Modern France, 41–43. 128  See Philip Nord, France’s New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era (PrincetonOxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 360–383; Herrick Chapman, France’s Long Reconstruction: In Search of the Modern Republic (Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press, 2018), 299–312. 129  Marcel Déat, “Le planisme et la tradition française,” L’Homme nouveau 2, no. 12 (1935): unpaged.

CHAPTER 8

Roads Not Taken: The Belgian Labour Plan in Britain

The Belgian Labour Plan received much less attention in Britain than in France and its reception so far has not been thoroughly studied. Critics and admirers of British socialism alike seem to agree with the view, expressed by a distinguished Labour politician, that England was “different” and “cut off from Europe,” taking the insularity of its political culture as a given.1 Likewise, scholars who authored extensive works on de Man barely mentioned his impact on British politics, or lack thereof.2 Consequently, Belgian planism and British socialism in the 1930s are often portrayed as separate entities, despite having been animated by similar concerns and having used, to some extent, the same phraseology.3 Truth be told, a few spare references to the Belgian Labour Plan can be found in the literature on the British LP, all pointing to the debt that the 1  Hugh Dalton, Practical Socialism for Britain (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1935), 3. See, for example, Perry Anderson, “Origins of the Present Crisis” and Tom Nairn, “The Nature of the Labour Party,” both in Towards Socialism, eds. Perry Anderson and Robin Blackburn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), 11–52 and 159–217 respectively; Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour People: Leaders and Lieutenants, Hardie to Kinnock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 114–118. 2  For instance, Michel Brélaz maintained that “apart from the Russian Revolution and some other notable events, little was known in England about what was happening within other European socialist parties” [Brélaz, Henri de Man, 668]. 3  See, for example, Adolf Sturmthal, The Tragedy of European Labour, 1918–1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951); Albert S.  Lindemann, A History of European Socialism (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1983).

© The Author(s) 2020 T. Milani, Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0_8

185

186 

T. MILANI

British theorist and Labour activist G.D.H. Cole supposedly owed to de Man. Geoffrey Foote contended that “Cole, more than most British thinkers, was extremely sensitive to developments in foreign socialist thought, and seized on the Plan du Travail […] as a prototype of the Labour Plan” that the LP was supposed to concoct in the near future.4 Similarly, Elizabeth Durbin claimed that Cole “was greatly influenced” by de Man: he translated the Plan drawn up by the latter and managed to get it published “with his introductory explication in 1935.”5 While it holds true that Cole translated the Belgian Labour Plan into English and commented upon it,6 the picture is incomplete. Cole certainly regarded de Man highly and continued to do so even after the Second World War.7 But de Man too was an avid reader of Cole’s writings, which may have resulted in a significant influence by Cole upon him. This chapter will show that de Man was in close touch with Cole as early as July 1933, around six months before the release of the Belgian Labour Plan. However, from this it does not follow that de Man built his Plan around Cole’s ideas, especially considering that Cole’s conception of planning at the time was much more sweeping than his. Arguably, both men inspired each other without reaching full agreement. Secondly, the Labour MP and later Chancellor of the Exchequer Stafford Cripps had also connections with Belgian planists which have been hitherto neglected.8 Thirdly, de Man’s ideas gained some currency in Britain before Cole’s translation of the Labour Plan, presumably from June 1934 onwards. Altogether, these elements suggest that some sections of the Labour Left were more interested in, and entangled with, Continental developments in the 1930s than most historians have realised until now.

4  Geoffrey Foote, The Labour Party’s Political Thought: A History (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 176. 5  Elizabeth Durbin, New Jerusalems: The Labour Party and the Economics of Democratic Socialism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 273. See also Daniel Ritschel, The Politics of Planning: The Debate on Economic Planning in the 1930s (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 282–283, which however conflates planism with Popular Front politics. 6  See G.D.H. Cole, Planned Socialism: The Plan du Travail of the Belgian Labour Party (London: New Fabian Research Bureau, 1935). 7  G.D.H.  Cole, A History of Socialist Thought. Vol. V (London: Macmillan, 1960), 187–191. See also letter from de Jouvenel to de Man, 16 November 1946, in which Cole expressed warm feelings for de Man and his work [FLDM/AMSAB/177]. 8  In fact, no biography of Cripps mentions his interest in, or knowledge of, the Belgian Labour Plan.

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

187

All that said, this chapter does not aim to overstate the influence of the Belgian Labour Plan on British social democracy but rather to explore the reasons why a British Labour Plan never saw the light of day. Hence, the chapter is organised as follows: first, it shows how the traumatic demise of the second Labour Government provided breeding ground for radical ideas in Britain. Second, it highlights Cole’s and Cripps’ relationship with de Man and the transnational connections between Belgian and British planists. Finally, it investigates the key reasons why the Belgian Labour Plan did not gain momentum across the Channel. * * * The summer of 1931 went down as a traumatic period in Labour history. The Labour minority government led by James Ramsay MacDonald was grappling with an unprecedented economic crisis during which Britain’s financial position had been seriously deteriorating. MacDonald, who had promised more wealth redistribution in the 1929 general election campaign, was not blind to the social consequences of deflation: for months he had been resisting calls to slash public spending issued by the Treasury, the press, and the opposition.9 Yet he was also extremely reluctant to challenge the then predominant view that only strict fiscal discipline would restore confidence among investors and consumers. Prudence was perhaps his weak spot. A man in his sixties, MacDonald had spent his entire political career trying to prove that the LP was fit to govern. Due to this quest for legitimacy, he constantly sought to combine a formal commitment to socialism with the deployment of thoughtful tactics aimed at showing Labour’s sense of responsibility and self-restraint, especially with regard to fiscal policy.10 Nor was he encouraged to enter uncharted territory by his 9   See Ross McKibbin, “The Economic Policy of the Second Labour Government, 1929–1931,” Past & Present, no. 68 (1975), esp. 112–114; Ross McKibbin, Parties and People: England 1914–1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 80–81. 10  See David Marquand Ramsay MacDonald (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), 792–794; John Callaghan, “‘Bolshevism Run Mad’: Labour and Socialism,” in Britain’s Second Labour Government, 1929–1931: A Reappraisal, eds. John Shepherd, Jonathan Davis and Chris Wrigley (Manchester-New York: Manchester University Press, 2011), esp. 172–174. For the same reason MacDonald was wary of the wide-ranging plans for public works set out by his minister without portfolio Oswald Mosley: see Robert Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (London: Macmillan, 1975), 179–220; Richard Toye, The Labour Party and the Planned Economy, 1931–1951 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2003), 35–39. Ralph Miliband referred to

188 

T. MILANI

thrifty Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, who had little appetite for higher government borrowing and preferred taxing unearned income to improve the condition of the poor.11 In practice, MacDonald and Snowden positioned themselves to the Right of the Liberals who, spurred by the flamboyant David Lloyd George, had seemingly embraced bold economic interventionism.12 In August, facing the danger of a liquidity crisis and a collapse of the pound, MacDonald capitulated and proposed to cut unemployment benefits. As the cabinet failed to reach an agreement, MacDonald, upon request of King George V, formed a National Government which rallied Conservatives, Liberals, and a fringe of Labour loyalists. Shocked by this volte-face, his party went into opposition and subsequently expelled him. However, in a snap election held in November the LP suffered a historic humiliation, losing about four-fifth of its seats.13 From that moment on, MacDonald occupied an unparalleled position in Labour demonology for his “Great Betrayal.”14 But his conduct cannot be explained in terms of viciousness or ruthless personal ambition only. As Robert Skidelsky convincingly argued, the predicament in which the Second Labour Government found itself “was not just a failure of individuals but the failure of a Party and a doctrine.”15 British social democracy did not manage to “bring together socialism on the one hand with economic and parliamentary democracy on the other”: having no MacDonald’s dismal record in government as “the price of respectability” [Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, 152–192]. 11  See Colin Cross, Philip Snowden (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1966), 82–84; Noel Thompson, Political Economy and the Labour Party: The Economics of Democratic Socialism, 1884–2005 (New York: Routledge, 2006), 69–73. 12  See Peter Sloman, The Liberal Party and the Economy, 1929–1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 51–60; Ritschel, The Politics of Planning, 42–44. 13  For a chronicle, see Reginald G.  Bassett, 1931: Political Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1958). For a detailed account of party manoeuvring, see David J. Wrench, “‘Cashing In’: The Parties and the National Government, August 1931–September 1932,” Journal of British Studies 23, no. 2 (1984): 135–153. 14  See, for example, Lord Morrison of Lambeth, Herbert Morrison: An Autobiography (London: Odhams Press, 1960), 126–132. A classic example of demonisation is Lauchlan MacNeill Weir, The Tragedy of Ramsay MacDonald: A Political Biography (London: Sacker and Warburg, 1938). See also Sidney Webb, What Happened in 1931: A Record (London: The Fabian Society, 1932), and the party’s official view in The Second Labour Government (London: The Labour Party, 1935). 15  Robert Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump: the Labour Government of 1929–1931 (London: Macmillan, 1967), 394.

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

189

­ adequate theory of the transition” towards collectivism, its leaders quickly “ ran out of options, as if there were “nothing to do but govern without conviction a system” they did not believe in “but saw no real prospect of changing.”16 That impotence and lack of imagination upset many Labour intellectuals. Following early talks between Cole, his wife Margaret, and other Labour sympathisers frustrated with MacDonald’s tenure, the New Fabian Research Bureau (NFRB) and the Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda (SSIP) were founded between January and March 1931.17 The first body, which was meant to renew Fabian thinking, had the blessing of the LP: Clement Attlee, then MP from Limehouse, chaired its Executive Committee for two years, until another MP, Christopher Addison, took over. Under the supervision of Cole, who was appointed honorary secretary, the NFRB focused mainly on three areas of research: domestic politics, international affairs, and economics. The economic section, run by two young economists by training, Evan Durbin and Hugh Gaitskell, was perhaps the most successful in producing detailed memoranda on economic planning and socialisation which were well received in academia and thoroughly discussed in conferences and workshops.18 From mid-1933 the LP started relying on the NFRB’s expertise in drafting policy proposals.19 The second body had stronger ties with the trade unions: Ernest Bevin and Arthur Pugh—leaders of the Transport and General Workers Union and the British Iron, Steel, and Kindred Trades Association respectively—ran

 Ibid., 395.  For a detailed account from an insider perspective, see Margaret Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism (London: Heinemann, 1961), 214–242; Margaret Cole, “The Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda,” in Essays in Labour History, 1918–1939, eds. Asa Briggs and John Saville (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 190–203. 18  See Durbin, New Jerusalems, 80, 81, 108–113, 117–120. Gaitskell was familiar with some of the literature that inspired de Man, including the works by Emil Lederer and Eduard Heimann, which he read when attending Ludwig Von Mises’ research seminars in Vienna in July 1933: see scattered notes in HGP/UCL/B5 and HGP/UCL/B6. 19  See Durbin, New Jerusalems, 81; Toye, The Labour Party and the Planned Economy, 41–44. A NFRB professor of statistics, Colin Clark, served also in the LP’s Finance and Trade Policy Committee that was set up in September 1931, becoming the lynchpin between the Bureau and the party. The internal evolution of the NFRB is well documented by the minutes of the Executive Committee available in FSA/NFRB/LSE/7 and FSA/ NFRB/LSE/8. 16 17

190 

T. MILANI

the show as chairman and vice-chairman.20 Unlike the relatively detached and research-oriented NFRB, the SSIP was intended to sketch out shortterm measures enabling the government, and the parliamentary LP in general, to tackle the most urgent issues of the time.21 The tumultuous events of 1931, however, were soon to change the goals, as well as the name, of the SSIP. When the Independent Labour Party (ILP), a minor left-wing political formation which had been affiliated with the LP since 1906, decided to go its own way, a composite but spirited group of members broke with it, predicting, quite rightly, that the ILP would slip into irrelevance. Among them, there were Guild Socialists (William Mellor), former Liberals (Charles Trevelyan), civil servants (Frank Wise), journalists (Henry Noel Brailsford), and barristers (Gilbert Mitchison).22 After prolonged discussions and a split,23 the SSIP dissolved and most of its associates, including Cole, joined forces with former ILP members to set up a new society, the Socialist League (SL), which, within a few months, established itself as the most vociferous pressure group of the Labour Left.24 The SL never gained mass membership and few of its supporters lived outside Greater London.25 However, largely because of the dynamism and eloquence of its spokespersons—first and foremost Stafford Cripps, the former Solicitor General under MacDonald and one of the few Labour MPs to retain his seat after the crushing electoral defeat of 1931—the group scored some major victories: at the 1932 Leicester Party Conference, for instance, it forced the LP National Council to commit itself to nationalise joint stock banks as soon as the party returned to office.26 Furthermore, 20  Cole and Denis N. Pritt also served as vice-chairmen: see “Agenda of the first Annual Meeting held on May 28th, 1932,” FSA/SSIP/J/3/1. 21  See, for example, John Strachey’s and Harold Clay’s memorandum on unemployment commissioned in early 1931: see “Minutes of a Meeting held on February 1st, 1931 at Easton Lodge,” NFSA/SSIP/J/21. 22  See Gidon Cohen, The Failure of a Dream: The Independent Labour Party from Disaffiliation to World War II (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 15–28. 23  Durbin, Gaitskell, and Clark were among those who decided not to join the new organisation while remaining active in the NFRB: see “An Appeal to Members of S.S.I.P.,” NFSA/ SSIP/J/4/1. 24  See Ben Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 41–58; Michael Bor, The Socialist League in the 1930s (London: Athena Press, 2005). 25   See Patrick Seyd, “Factionalism within the Labour Party: The Socialist League 1932–1937,” in Essays in Labour History, esp. 207–210. 26  See Pimlott, Labour and the Left, 49; Bor, The Socialist League, 209–217.

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

191

the SL produced a massive amount of propaganda literature calling for the suppression of capitalism and the introduction of socialist economic planning, under the slogan “A Five-Year Plan.”27 An orientation of thought bearing similarities with planism, therefore, developed in Britain, even though its proponents did not use the term.28 In order to gauge how deep these similarities were, the ideas of the SL’s leading members, Cole and Cripps, must now be examined. * * * Both the NFRB and the SL emerged out of a frustration with mainstream social democracy which closely resembled de Man’s. To Cole’s mind, MacDonald’s failure marked the end of gradualism, namely the illusory belief that “a slow infusion of Socialistic mechanisms and policies into the existing economic order” would ensure “a gradual, unabrupt, painless transition” to socialism.29 Although the introduction of “wedges of Socialism” under capitalism was not necessarily futile, Cole maintained that these infusions had to be carried out in accordance with a broader programme: for this reason, “believers in Socialism” were confronted with the task of preparing “plans for the socialisation of some at least of the vital industries and services of the country.”30 The same convictions were expressed by numerous British left-wing intellectuals in the same period.31 It was the characteristically prolific Cole, 27   See its embryonic programme Forward to Socialism (London: The Socialist League, 1934). 28  They preferred to call themselves “socialist,” implying that most Labour members were not: see, for example, Charles Trevelyan, The Challenge to Capitalism (London: The Socialist League, n.d.), esp. 1–3. See also Telò, Le New Deal européen, 76–84. 29  G.D.H. Cole, Some Essentials of Socialist Propaganda: A Tract for the Times (London: The Fabian Society, 1932), 7. Compare this statement with the much more pragmatic approach to socialisation that Cole had articulated in the late 1920s: see in particular G.D.H.  Cole, The Next Ten Years in British Social and Economic Policy (London: Macmillan, 1929). 30  G.D.H. Cole, “The Essentials of Socialisation,” The Political Quarterly 2, no. 3 (1931): 395, reprinted as G.D.H. Cole, The Essentials of Socialisation (London: New Fabian Research Bureau Tract, 1932). An extended version appeared in G.D.H. Cole, Economic Tracts for the Times (London: Macmillan, 1932), 285–306. 31  See, for example, Richard H. Tawney, The Choice before the Labour Party (London: The Socialist League, n.d.), 3–6; James F. Horrabin, The Class Struggle (London: The Socialist League, n.d.), 6–7; Herbert Morrison, “Reform or Revolution? The Labour Party Must Put Socialism First,” The New Clarion, no. 11 (1932): 241–242, 258; Charles Trevelyan, “The

192 

T. MILANI

however, who made the greatest effort to set out a coherent vision of socialist planning in two series of articles for the weekly The New Clarion, between June 1932 and June 1933. These short essays were subsequently issued as pamphlets32 and can be rightly regarded as the first organic formulation of a British variant of planism.33 Warning against the prospect of exercising power “without a definite plan of action already thought out,” Cole set the priorities of a future Labour Government holding a majority in the House of Commons by laying down “a policy dealing with the essential, immediate steps for the effective establishment of socialist control” in understandable terms for ordinary militants.34 His recommendations differed from the policy of extension of social services that the LP had pursued in the past as he envisaged a much more active role for the state and for the public sector in general.35 By urging the LP to launch a “frontal attack” on capitalism, Cole contended that only by nationalising the Bank of England, the Joint Stock Banks, and all the financial institutions concerned with the supply of capital and credit the party had a chance to succeed: “[T]he socialisation of the productive industries, vitally important as it is, comes after these, because it will be done much more better and more easily if the financial

New Offensive,” The New Clarion, no. 13 (1932): 301–302; Stafford Cripps, “The Future of the Labour Party,” New Statesman & Nation, no. 80 (1932): 255–256; John T. Murphy, Preparing for Power: A Critical Study of the History of the British Working-Class Movement (London: Jonathan Cape, 1934), 262–286. 32  See G.D.H. Cole, A Plan for Britain (London: The Clarion Press, 1932); G.D.H. Cole, What Is This Socialism? Talks to “The Man in the Street” (London: Gollancz-The Clarion Press, 1933). A third pamphlet was issued in the same period: see G.D.H. Cole, Socialist Control of Industry (London: The Socialist League, n.d.). 33  A number of technical memoranda by Cole had been previously issued as SSIP pamphlets: see, for example, G.D.H. Cole, Banks and Credit (London: The Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, n.d.); G.D.H. Cole, The Socialisation of Banking (London: The Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, n.d.). Their wider political implications, however, had not been spelt out. 34  G.D.H. Cole, “What We Mean to Do,” The New Clarion, no. 2 (1932): 33. See also G.D.H. Cole, “What’s Wrong—and Right—with the Labour Party,” The New Clarion, no. 45 (1933): 364; G.D.H. Cole, “What a Socialist Government Must Do,” The New Clarion, no. 46 (1933): 384. 35  See G.D.H. Cole, “The Social Services,” The New Clarion, no. 12 (1932): 281. See also G.D.H. Cole, “The Gospel of Scarcity,” The New Clarion, no. 44 (1933): 344. The orthodox Labour position was outlined in the election manifesto Labour and the Nation (London: The Labour Party, 1928).

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

193

and transporting organisation is already held firmly in Socialist hands.”36 According to Cole, there was no room for compromise between the City, which was struggling to retain its status as a world-leading financial centre and was therefore unwilling to pay for further ameliorative measures, and the overwhelming majority of the British people: socialisation was therefore indispensable. Furthermore, only a “transference at a blow to complete Socialist control” would prevent private banks from undermining the LP in power.37 The government could then manage both the supply of credit and the deposits necessary to fund it, setting out to “raise prices to a level high enough to stimulate employment and reduce the burden of debts to tolerable proportions.”38 In order to ensure an efficient allocation of resources, however, a comprehensive Economic Plan was required. This would entail the creation of new institutions: the machinery of planning, as Cole would call it elsewhere.39 Socialist planning, unlike its capitalist variants, demanded the establishment of “a central authority with power to decide what is to be produced” and “the control of distribution as well as of production.”40 Whilst capitalist planning preached rationalisation in industry in order to maintain some margin of profit, even at the cost of throwing people out of work, socialist planning was based on the principle of full employment: Cole urged the LP to “employ every available worker, either upon capital resources which are already in existence, and capable of producing goods we want, or upon new factories and other instruments of production which we decide to create.”41 Through a National Investing Board, the government would reorganise existing industries, expanding some and scaling down others. Coal, steel, transport, and electricity would be nationalised.42 Further steps towards socialism would be taken by introducing “a really drastic limitation of inheritance” and a system of licences 36  Cole, “What We Mean to Do,” 33. See also G.D.H. Cole, “Take over the Banks—and Ignore the Cranks,” The New Clarion, no. 47 (1933): 408. 37  Cole, “What We Mean to Do,” 33. 38  G.D.H. Cole, “Socialising the Banks,” The New Clarion, no. 3 (1932): 52. On controlling credit and production as the only way to suppress unemployment, see also G.D.H. Cole, “Socialism and Unemployment,” The New Clarion, no. 13 (1932): 305. 39  See, for example, Cole, Socialist Control of Industry, 7–10; G.D.H. Cole, Principles of Economic Planning (London: Macmillan, 1935), 293–324. 40  G.D.H. Cole, “A Socialist Economic Plan,” The New Clarion, no. 4 (1932): 77. 41  Ibidem. 42  See G.D.H.  Cole, “The Restoration of Industry,” The New Clarion, no. 5 (1932): 100, 114.

194 

T. MILANI

aimed at controlling capital still in private hands, in order to use it “for the development of industry in the public interest”: Cole expected these measures to stabilise investment without hurting small savers.43 In agriculture, after having socialised the land, food supply would be increased in order to raise the living standards of the entire population.44 By boosting domestic consumption, however, Britain would not seek economic self-­ sufficiency: Cole praised the international division of Labour and professed himself “utterly against Economic Nationalism and in favour of the fullest development of international trade.”45 Nonetheless, imports and exports would be planned by publicly owned Trade Corporations to satisfy the needs of home production. By socialising foreign trade, the Labour Government would thus be able to “promote increased exchanges of goods between country and country on organised and mutually beneficial lines.”46 Its foreign policy would strive to “break down the absolute barriers between State and State” with the purpose of reorganising the world “as a closely-knit federation of co-operating communities,” forge a close alliance with Soviet Russia, and promote world disarmament by mutual consent.47 Cole was aware that his agenda would be strongly resisted by the other parties as well as by the House of Lords. In fact, he showed no deference to the British parliamentary system, which he deemed “an admirable instrument for the preservation of Capitalism” and “utterly unsuitable” for the purpose of establishing economic planning.48 Because of that, he recommended LP deputies to pass “a drastic measure of emergency powers” as soon as they got into office, creating a legal situation comparable to the one Britain had experienced during the First World War.49 Having speeded up parliamentary procedures, curtailed the powers of the o ­ pposition, and erased “a large part of the useless talk which at present goes upon the floor of the House of Commons,” a left-wing cabinet would then be able to abolish the Upper Chamber for good.50 Cole expected these reforms to be carried out peacefully, provided that the capitalist class did not resort to  G.D.H. Cole, “Socialist Control of Capital,” The New Clarion, no. 6 (1932): 135.  See G.D.H. Cole, “The Land and Agriculture,” The New Clarion, no. 7 (1932): 159. 45  G.D.H. Cole, “Foreign Trade and Protection,” The New Clarion, no. 8 (1932): 182. 46  Ibidem. 47  G.D.H. Cole, “Socialism and Internationalism,” The New Clarion, no. 9 (1932): 196. 48  G.D.H. Cole, “Socialism and Parliament,” The New Clarion, no. 11 (1932): 254. 49  Ibidem. 50  Ibidem. 43 44

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

195

unconstitutional means to stop them: under those circumstances, a “violent revolution” was on the cards.51 Cole’s thoroughgoing planism was fully espoused and further condensed in a plainly written book by Stafford Cripps.52 A distinguished barrister, Cripps expanded on the charges Cole had levelled against Westminster in Can Socialism Come by Constitutional Methods?, a short tract based on a highly controversial speech he gave in January 1933.53 Cripps was not the only social democrat who, in the aftermath of MacDonald’s defection, harboured the suspicion that Britain’s constitutional constraints would make the implementation of a truly left-wing programme impossible.54 But he was the only one envisioning a democratically elected Labour Government deliberately throwing the country into a constitutional crisis to impose large-scale socialisations, extending its life beyond the normal five years period, and even turning itself “temporarily into a dictatorship” to pre-empt a military coup orchestrated by the army.55 Cripps’ conjectures about a potential showdown with the establishment, couched in inflammatory language against the “saboteurs” and the “machinations of the Capitalists,” caused an uproar, were severely condemned by the press, and led the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) to reaffirm its unambiguous commitment to democratic rule.56 Cripps’  G.D.H. Cole, “Peaceably If We May,” The New Clarion, no. 51 (1933): 488.  See Stafford Cripps, Why This Socialism? (London: Gollancz, 1934). Cripps’ case for planning is almost indistinguishable from Cole’s. On party strategy, see also Stafford Cripps, The Ultimate Aims of the Labour Party (London: Labour Party Publications, n.d.). 53  See “A Socialist Programme,” The Spectator, no. 5458 (1933): 138. 54  An authoritative voice as LSE Professor Laski expressed mildly pessimistic views, citing the conservative inclinations of the monarchy: see Harold J.  Laski, The Crisis and the Constitution: 1931 and After (London: Hogarth Press, 1932), 31–36; Harold J. Laski, “The Present Position of Representative Democracy,” The American Political Science Review 26, no. 4 (1932): 629–641; Harold J. Laski, The Labour Party and the Constitution (London: The Socialist League, n.d.), 24–27. The latter tract grew out of Laski’s work for the political section of the NFRB: see the minutes in FSA/NFRB/LSE/J/38. 55  Stafford Cripps, Can Socialism Come by Constitutional Methods? (London: The Socialist League, n.d.), 5. 56  Ibid., 4. Elsewhere, Cripps contended that “‘Socialism without Tears’ is a dream and not a reality […]. Once the party is in power it will have to be ruthless as regards individuals” [Stafford Cripps, “Parliamentary Institutions and the Transition to Socialism,” in VV.AA., Where Stands Socialism To-Day? (London: Rich & Cowan, 1933), 29, 52] and that, despite being hostile to dictatorships in principle, “it may well be that in some countries and under some circumstances a dictatorship of the Proletariat is the sole method of escape from a tyrannous capitalism” [Stafford Cripps, “Democracy and Dictatorship: The Issue for the 51 52

196 

T. MILANI

tirades—including one against the Crown on which he had to backtrack57—enraged several LP moderates.58 Despite, or perhaps because of, his soaring reputation as a firebrand, he replaced Wise as chairman of the SL in May 1933.59 Within a few months, his aggressive style of leadership would alienate Cole, who, fearing that under Cripps the SL and the LP might collide with each other, decided to concentrate his energies on the NFRB.60 These disagreements notwithstanding, Cole and Cripps stood out as the most articulate standard-bearer of British planism—the first being the intellectual leader, the second the political one—and their views can be regarded as representative of a broad spectrum of opinion within British Labour Left of the time.61 Labour Party,” The Political Quarterly 4, no. 4 (1933): 470]. On the TUC’s condemnation, see Walter M.  Citrine, “Labour Policy and Practical Politics,” The New Clarion, no. 55 (1933): 41–42, and “Dictatorships and the Trade Union Movement,” in Report of Proceedings at the 65th Annual Trades Union Congress held at Brighton, September 4th to 8th 1933 (London: Cooperative Printing Society, 1933), 425–435. Laski attempted to mediate between Citrine and Cripps: see Harold J. Laski, “The Labour Party and Democracy,” The New Clarion, no. 54 (1933): 21–22. On their clash, see letter from Citrine to Cripps, 19 February 1935, and letter from Cripps to Citrine, 20 February 1935, both in PSC/WL/32. For a contemporary overview of this debate, see Reginald Bassett, The Essentials of Parliamentary Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1935), 179–232. 57  See “Sir S.  Cripps and the Crown,” The Times, January 8, 1934. Cripps privately acknowledged that he could not envisage “the ultimate Socialist State under a constitutional Monarchy” yet seizing economic power would take priority over the creation of a Republic [Letter from Cripps to Catlin, 26 January 1934, PSC/WL/SC39/2]. 58  In January 1934 a furious Dalton argued that the Tories viewed Cripps as “their greatest electoral asset” because of his “stream of oratorical ineptitudes” [Entry of Friday, 19 January 1934, in The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1918–1940, 1945–1960, ed. B.  Pimlott (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), 181]. 59  See “Report of the National Council for 1933–1934,” in Final Agenda: Socialist League Second Annual Conference, Leeds May 20th and 21st, 1934 (London: The Socialist League, n.d.), 3. 60  See G.D.H.  Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), 284. Cole published one more article in the SL house organ in 1934 [see G.D.H. Cole, “A Socialist Peace Policy,” The Socialist Leaguer, no. 4 (1934): 53–55] and was again in touch with many Leaguers during the Unity Campaign [see the correspondence in PGDHC/NC/D4/11]. His departure was therefore less clear-cut than he subsequently claimed. See also G.D.H.  Cole, “Dedication to Stafford Cripps,” in The People’s Front (London: Gollancz, 1937), 5–8 and the letter from Cole to Cripps, 2 July 1937, PSC/ WL/SC39/2. 61  See Neil Riddell, “‘The Age of Cole’? G.D.H. Cole and the British Labour Movement, 1929–1933,” The Historical Journal 38, no. 4 (1995): 933–957; Pimlott, Labour and the Left, 5–6. Nor were these planists in political wilderness: in January 1934, Attlee offered

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

197

To what extent was de Man aware of these developments? In an article published in late November 1933, he held that the Belgian Labour Plan would “draw the practical conclusion from a doctrinal preparation” whose origins could be traced back to the end of the First World War, and to a revision of the concept of socialisation undertaken, in the previous three or four years, “by our friends Ed. Heimann and Karl Landauer in Germany, Otto Bauer in Austria, Rickard Sandler in Sweden, Cole and Stafford Cripps in England, etc.”62 At a glance, this reference may appear cosmetic, although—as previously noted in this book—de Man had certainly assimilated Cole’s Guild Socialism in the 1920s. But a letter from de Man’s private papers proves that his relationship with Cole was by then tighter and more personal. On August 8, 1933, de Man informed writer Norah James that he had “visited” his “friend G.D.H. Cole last month” and had “discussed” with him “the possibility of an American edition” of Die Sozialistische Idee, whose last chapter encapsulated the essentials of de Man’s planism.63 Furthermore, considering that Cole “declared himself prepared” to give Miss James “additional information” about de Man’s “books in general,” there is room to argue that by July 1933 Cole and de Man not only were on friendly terms but also had good knowledge of each other’s work.64 Cripps’ connections with de Man were probably looser as no evidence of friendship can be found in their papers. Nevertheless, Cripps spoke at Cripps the vice-presidency, and pro tempore presidency, of the parliamentary LP [see letter from Attlee to Cripps, 1 January 1934, PSC/WL/SC39/3]. 62  Henri de Man, “A capitalisme nouveau socialisme nouveau,” Le Peuple, November 29, 1933. Even Vandervelde noted the “extremely numerous similarities between de Man’s and Cole’s ideas” [Emile Vandervelde, “Ce qu’un socialiste anglais pense de l’avenir du socialisme,” La Dépêche de Toulouse, April 22, 1934]. A subsequent direct quote from Cole’s pamphlet The Working-Class Movement and the Transition to Socialism, issued by the SL, suggests that de Man kept reading Cole throughout 1934 [see Hendrik de Man, “Syndikale Eenheid en Beroepsverscheidenheid,” Vooruit, September 5, 1934]. 63  Letter from de Man to James, 8 August 1933, AHDM/IISG/224. De Man visited England in July 1933 and spoke at an Industrial Welfare Society conference: see “Welfare Work in Industry,” Times, July 10, 1933. 64  Letter from de Man to James, 8 August 1933, AHDM/IISG/224. The friendship between de Man and Cole continued even after 1940: the latter agreed to sign a petition aimed at giving the former a second trial after his conviction in absentia: see the text of the petition to the Belgian Senate in AHDM/AMSAB/605; letter by de Man in “Correspondence,” The New Statesman & Nation, no. 996 (1950): 402–403. See also letter from Cole to de Man, 28 December 1945, FLDM/AMSAB/110 and letter from de Man to Cole, 8 April 1946, FLDM/AMSAB/111.

198 

T. MILANI

the Semaine d’Études de Liège held between July 25 and August 2, 1934, on the very day de Man gave a lecture on the Labour Plan.65 Cripps’ speech, devoted to the activities and programme of the SL, was expected to appear in a special issue of L’Etudiant socialiste entitled “Révolution Constructive,” alongside the writings of POB-related planists such as Laurat, Vos, and de Man66; in the end, it was published as a self-standing contribution.67 Considering that the Semaine was organised by POB militants and planism was its topic, Cripps must have become familiar with the Belgian Labour Plan around that time, if not earlier. This applies also to the readers of The Plebs, house organ of the National Council of Labour Colleges, a leading institution in the field of workers’ education. The issue of June 1934 featured excerpts from de Man’s Pour un Plan d’Action under the title “What Must We Do About Fascism?.”68 In a follow-up published in July, the Labour activist Fay Jackson and the German exile Heinz Schlosser discussed the campaign for the Labour Plan in Belgium as well as its echoes abroad, and argued that, without denying the existence of “differences in outlook and circumstances” between Britain and other countries, “Continental attempts” to address issues such as “the winning of the support of the middle classes, the arousing of enthusiasm by a programme for immediate realisation, the working out of our future policy in detail, and the prevention of the stampeding of the electorate by bringing home to it what we really intend to do” deserved greater consideration.69 The Plebs was a well-regarded magazine and

65  See “La semaine d’études des étudiants socialistes,” La Wallonie, July 30, 1934. The week was a gathering point for planists: Jules Moch, André Philip, and Georges Monnet were mentioned as potential French speakers [see Paul Lambert, “Participez à la semaine d’études des étudiants socialistes!” La Wallonie, July 18, 1934]. Originally, Cole was also supposed to attend [see “Fêtes de l’Internationale des Jeunesses socialistes,” La Wallonie, July 11, 1934]. 66  See “Revues et livres,” La Wallonie, October 27, 1934. The French circle Révolution Constructive had already published one tract, edited by Pierre Dreyfus and forwarded by André Philip, about the Socialist League, translating articles mostly by Cole: see Vers un Plan britannique: les études de la Ligue Socialiste (Asnières: Cahier de Révolution Constructive, n.d.). 67  See Sir Stafford Cripps, “Le Plan anglais de construction socialiste,” L’Etudiant socialiste 10, no. 5 (1935): 1–4. 68  See Henri de Man, “What Must We Do about Fascism?,” The Plebs, no. 6 (1934): 124–126. 69  Fay Jackson and Heinz Schlosser, “What Must We Do about Fascism?,” Plebs, no. 7 (1934): 156.

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

199

through that vehicle de Man’s key ideas must have enjoyed some exposure already in June 1934.70 From an institutional viewpoint, the organisers of the campaign for the Belgian Labour Plan were keen to establish formal links with the SL. The POB-related publishing house l’Eglantine released a condensed summary of Cole’s main writings in February 1934, and works by Cole and Cripps were included in a list of recommended readings for planist militants attached to the official handbook of the campaign.71 According to the campaign’s internal records, research assistants at the BES ordered and reviewed a wide array of Cole’s books between 1933 and 1935, including The Intelligent Man’s Guide Through World Chaos, The Intelligent Man’s Review of Europe To-Day, What Everybody Wants to Know about Money, Studies in World Economics, What Marx Really Meant, Some Relations Between Political and Economic Theory, and Studies and Capital in Investment, alongside a few other publications by members of the SL, such as Mitchison’s The First Workers’ Government.72 Following the Pontigny conference, where the activities of the SL were tentatively introduced by the German exile Walter Pahl, Cole was invited to give a talk in Brussels.73 By late 1933, Cole’s works were regularly cited by Herman Vos, one of de Man’s closest allies, and in August 1934 even Vandervelde lauded a collective book produced by the SL.74 70  In 1924, Cole described The Plebs as a “very successful monthly” but its circulation during the 1930s remains unclear [G.D.H. Cole, Organised Labour: an Introduction to Trade Unionism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1924), 114]. Some SSIP and SL publications had already touched upon de Man’s main themes such as the role of technicians under socialism [see, e.g., George W. Thomson, The Technician under Socialism (London: The Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, n.d.); Louis Anderson Fenn, What of the Professional Classes? (London: The Socialist League, n.d.)]. However, considering the lasting legacy of Fabianism, these should not be taken as evidence of de Man’s direct influence. 71  See G.D.H.  Cole, Le socialisme dans le temps présent (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1934); Buset, L’action pour le Plan, 79. Out of the twelve publications recommended, three were Belgian, two were French, and seven were British. 72  See correspondence in ABSO/AMSAB/65. Evidence suggests that Cole was by far the most widely read author within the BES. 73  Cole’s name was featured in a programme of seminars devoted to planism alongside those of Gaston Bergery, Laurat, Rens, Vos, Ansele Jr., and Tasca [see “Sozialistische studiekring,” Vooruit, October 5, 1934]. These events were probably cancelled as no further mention of them can be found in the Belgian press. 74  See Herman Vos, “Het Plan van den Arbeid—Zijn Vertrekpunt,” Vooruit, December 12, 1933; Herman Vos, “Plan-Ekonomie in Scandinavie: Een Noorsch Drie-Jaren Plan,” Vooruit, June 5, 1934; Herman Vos, “Het Socialisme en het Nationale Karakter: De

200 

T. MILANI

The British reciprocated with an increased involvement in the international planist network set up by de Man. In April 1936, a delegation of New Fabians and Leaguers attended the second International Plan Conference held in Geneva.75 The delegation included Cole, John Cripps (Stafford’s son), Mitchison, Gaitskell, Colin Clark, Richard W.B. Clarke, George Wansbrough, and A.P. Leiner.76 Mitchison, Cripps, Wansbrough, and Colin Clark actively participated in discussions about agriculture under planning and the socialisation of the banking sector.77 After that, an intermittent dialogue continued until the outbreak of the Second World War. Most notably, a memorandum on foreign trade and colonies prepared by the NFRB Secretary, Herbert D. Hughes, served as a basis for discussion during the third and final International Plan Conference, in late October 1937.78 Two years later, de Man was invited to London by the NFRB, now amalgamated with the old Fabian Society, to speak on the topic “The Decline of Capitalist Enterprise,” but the event was cancelled due to the crisis provoked by the German invasion of Poland.79 To sum up, on the basis of the limited archival evidence available, it is possible to conclude that Belgian planists developed channels of communication with the SL and the NFRB, and a circulation of ideas between Belgian and British planist took place at least between July 1933, when de Man visited

Engelsche arbeidersbeweging,” Vooruit, September 11, 1934; Emile Vandervelde, “Il y a des gouvernements socialistes en Suède et en Danemark: les choses en vont-elles plus mal?,” Le Peuple, August 5, 1934. Vandervelde referred to a collection of SL tracts, VV.AA., Problems of a Socialist Government (London: Gollancz, 1933). 75  De Man invited Cole, noting that “it was a pity that England was not represented at Pontigny” and stressing that Cole’s participation “would enhance the value of the undertaking” [letter from de Man to Cole, 14 February 1936, PGDHC/NC/C4/1–48]. On this conference and the NFRB’s involvement in it, see the letter from Cole to de Man, 1 March 1936, AHDM/IISG/227. 76  See Conférence Internationale des Plans du Travail, Genève, 17, 18, 19 Avril 1936. Vol I (Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, n.d.), 3–4. 77  See ibid., 24–29, 33–36, 43–45; Conférence Internationale des Plans du Travail, Genève, 17, 18, 19 Avril 1936. Vol II (Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, n.d.), 27, 30–31. 78  See New Fabian Research Bureau, “Le commerce extérieur et le problème colonial,” in IIIe Conférence Internationale des Plan du Travail: Abbaye de Pontigny, 23–24 Octobre 1937 (N.I.: n.d.), 103–110. On this conference, see also Hans Oprecht, “Third International Conference on Planned Economics, on October 23 and 24, 1937, in Pontigny (France),” PGDHC/NC/D1/62/3. 79  See letter from Parker to de Man, 28 June 1939; letter from Parker to de Man, 17 July 1939; letter from Parker to de Man, 20 September 1939, all in AHDM/IISG/389.

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

201

Cole, and October 1937, when the last International Planist Conference was held. It remains to be explained why, therefore, the Labour Left refused to lend support to the Belgian Labour Plan, making it available in English only in late 1935, when the Van Zeeland government had been sworn in. Arguably, the main reason lies in theoretical disagreements. There were obvious similarities between de Man’s idea of a Plan for action as presented in early 1933 and Cole’s “definite programme […] capable of being put forward as the basis of an election appeal and carried through by constitutional means with the aid of a Socialist majority in Parliament,” a programme which would indicate “the steps by which the Labour Government will proceed.”80 Besides, de Man, Cole, and Cripps agreed on seizing control of the financial sector as a priority and rejected economic nationalism as incompatible with democratic socialism.81 Nevertheless, differences between de Man and British planists were more substantial. Above all, de Man was in favour of establishing a mixed economy that would last until the private sector remained competitive and profitable—which suggested the transition to full public ownership would be slow—whilst Cole opposed the creation of any “inherently self-­ contradictory system based on an unworkable compromise.”82 To him, it was “impossible to envisage the economic structure of a socialist society without at the same time envisaging an attempt at the distribution of all the available economic resources, or at least all resources of major economic importance, in accordance with a general economic plan.”83 Under socialism, in Cole’s view, the state would be in charge of producing a

80  G.D.H. Cole and Gilbert R. Mitchison, The Need for a Socialist Programme (London: The Socialist League, n.d.), 6. See also their “S.S.I.P. Memoranda on Socialist Policy,” 10 August 1932, PGDHC/NC/D4/5/4. 81  Cripps’ staunch internationalism informed his main works on foreign affairs: see, for example, Stafford Cripps, Fight Now against War: A Call to Action (London: The Socialist League, n.d.); Stafford Cripps, The Struggle for Peace (London: Gollancz, 1936); Stafford Cripps, Empire (London: The India League, 1938). 82  G.D.H.  Cole, The Intelligent Man’s Guide through World Chaos (London: Gollancz, 1932), 571. Cole here referred to “controlled capitalism based on national planning” but his remarks could be extended to any kind of mixed economy. See also Cole, Principles of Economic Planning, 95–117. 83  G.D.H. Cole, The Machinery of Socialist Planning (London: The Hogarth Press, 1938), 11. The book originated from a memorandum amended during discussions within the NFRB: see the files in FSA/NFRB/LSE/J/25/4.

202 

T. MILANI

detailed inventory of the national resources available and of assessing the actual needs of the population, given that a Socialist Society […] is a Society in which what is to be produced, at what prices the products are to be distributed, what incomes the individual citizens are to have, how much of its income the community is to save and how much to spend on current consumption, are all matters to be collectively determined in accordance with the ends which the collective wisdom of the community sets up as the guiding principles of its economic policy.84

This is why he emphasised the advantages of a relatively swift nationalisation of most industries, not necessarily with compensation, whereas de Man repeatedly pointed out that small business and non-monopolistic enterprises would not be seriously affected by the implementation of the Labour Plan, having their profits stabilised but not suppressed.85 In other words, not unlike Blum in early 1934, Cole remained unconvinced that de Man’s mixed economy would be a sustainable and inherently progressive economic regime. Their antidotes to bureaucratisation also differed. In order to give production a democratic character and prevent extreme centralisation, Cole— reminiscent of his own Guild Socialism—championed the creation of various councils, including local and regional branches, aimed at ensuring workers’ control over the entire process.86 In his view, “a widespread devolution of responsibility and power” was more desirable and, at the end of the day, more effective than “the safeguard of an ultimate political control over the technical autocrats of industry.”87 In a similar fashion, Cripps confidently 84  G.D.H.  Cole, “Towards a New Economic Theory” in Studies in World Economics (London: Macmillan, 1934), 252. The original paper was written in January 1934. See also Cole, Principles of Economic Planning, 162–195; G.D.H.  Cole, Practical Economics, or Studies in Economic Planning (London: Penguin Books, 1937), 7–40. 85  See in particular Henri de Man, “Socialisme petit-bourgeois?,” Le Peuple, November 8, 1933. As de Man put it in his memoirs, “the point is not levelling fortunes by expropriating the rich; the point is preventing banking monopolies, the masters of credit and of basic industries, from undercutting and controlling the whole economy” [De Man, Après coup, 210]. On these differences, see also André Philip, “Préface,” in Vers un Plan britannique, esp. 2–3. 86  See Workers’ Control and Self-Government in Industry, eds. G.D.H. Cole and William Mellor (London: The New Fabian Research Bureau, 1933), esp. 14–17. This memorandum, co-written by nineteen social democrats and trade unionists in June 1933, was an effort to square the circle between the trade unions’ call for workers’ control and the imperatives of large-scale planning. 87  Cole, Principles of Economic Planning, 328, 329.

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

203

held that “technical efficiency” would not suffer from giving directorates “permanent leave of absence” and replacing them with “workers of all grades.”88 By contrast, de Man had come to believe that “the problem of control takes priority over that of ownership,” meaning that the rise of civil servants and managers was making the physical seizure of the means of production by the working class much less decisive as a factor in the realisation of socialism.89 His remedy lay in holding technocrats accountable before democratic bodies, that is the Parliament and the government, and in encouraging them to make common cause with social democracy.90 On that point, de Man’s position was closer to Herbert Morrison’s, who advocated the creation of public corporations and set up the London Passenger Transport Board in 1933, than to the radical, bottom-­up type of industrial democracy envisioned by the Leaguers.91 If anything, his remarks somewhat anticipated Gaitskell’s reflections about various methods of expanding public ownership beyond direct state control in the mid-1950s.92 Incidentally, it must be observed that Cole’s faith in an all-­encompassing model of planning in which the working class supposedly controlled production went hand in hand with his admiration for the Soviet Union. In fact, he had no qualms about stating “Russia’s Cause is Ours.”93 Wedded to a rather fanciful view of Soviet planning, Cole would confidently claim, as late as 1947, that the USSR was “a legitimate form of democracy” under which workers experienced a different, but in some respects higher, degree of freedom than their Western counterparts.94 In contrast, de Man 88  Stafford Cripps, “Introduction,” in Gilbert R. Mitchison, The First Workers’ Government (London: Gollancz, 1934), 9. 89  See Konferenz zur Besprechung der Probleme der Wirschaft, 5. 90  See de Man, Les techniciens et la crise as well as the case against workers’ control made by Buset: see Max Buset, “L’Idée et l’action planistes en Belgique,” in IIIe Conférence Internationale, esp. 42–43. 91  See Herbert Morrison, An Easy Outline of Modern Socialism (London: The Labour Party, 1932); Herbert Morrison, Socialisation and Transport (London: Constable, 1933), esp. 149–176. 92  Hugh Gaitskell, Socialism and Nationalisation (London: Fabian Tract, 1956), 34–36. 93  G.D.H. Cole, “Can Capitalism Recover?” The New Clarion, no. 43 (1933): 324. Cole had no first-hand experience of the Soviet Union. His wife, however, visited the USSR in July–August 1932 and was stunned, alongside other British planists, by the pace of Soviet industrialisation [see undated letters from Margaret to G.D.H.  Cole, July–August 1932, PMC/NC/B1/14/1–9]. See also Clement R. Attlee and G.D.H. Cole, “Introduction,” in Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia, ed. Margaret Cole (London: Gollancz, 1933), 7–11. 94  G.D.H.  Cole, The Intelligent Man’s Guide to the Post-War World (London: Gollancz, 1947), 802. On the pro-Soviet bias of British left-wing intellectuals in the 1930s, see Bill Jones, The Russia Complex: The British Labour Party and the Soviet Union (Manchester:

204 

T. MILANI

repeatedly denounced the “dangerous illusion” of emulating the Soviets and carefully distinguished his brand of planning from communism.95 Overall, it is therefore understandable why, already in February 1934, Cole categorised Belgian planism as “essentially reformist, much more than practically socialist.”96 His foreword to the NFRB edition of the Belgian Labour Plan, issued in December 1935, was indeed largely aimed at showing why “the Belgian Plan du Travail will not, as it stands, meet British needs.”97 His premise was that the LP must not “imitate what the Belgian Socialists have done” but rather “consider how far its underlying notions can be of use […] in working out a policy and a strategy appropriate to British conditions.”98 Most notably, Cole highlighted that the Plan was intended to “strengthen for the time being” the “lesser forms of Capitalism, by extending credit to them more freely and taking measures for general economic recovery which will enlarge the market for their products.”99 This cautious approach, according to him, originated from the social structure of Belgium, “one in which small-scale production and trade occupy a more important place” than in Britain—a remark that de Man considered factually inaccurate.100 Besides commenting on the different socio-economic impact of the economic crisis on Britain vis-­à-­vis other countries, Cole underscored that the LP was not dependent upon “the adhesion” of “middle groups” in order to gain a parliamentary majority: “[I]n Belgium, or in France, the ‘Plan’ may involve government by coalition: in Great Britain there is no reason at all why it should.”101 Yet de Man’s Plan left no doubt about the importance of delivering a clear, consistent, and compelling message: “[T]he British plan of action has been Manchester University Press, 1977), 11–32; Paul Flewers, The New Civilisation? Understanding Stalin’s Soviet Union, 1929–1941 (London: Francis Boutle Publishers, 2008), 71–112. 95  De Man, Die Sozialistische Ideen, 342. 96  G.D.H.  Cole, “L’avenir du socialisme,” L’Esprit international, no. 30 (1934): 192. Cole drew an analogy between de Man and Déat. In 1938, Cole connected the launching of the Belgian Labour Plan to a more widespread recovery of gradualism within European social democracy: see G.D.H.  Cole, Socialism in Evolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1938), 195–196. 97  Cole, “Introduction,” in Planned Socialism, 13. 98  Ibid., 5. 99  Ibid., 8. 100   Ibidem. See also letter from de Man to Cole, 14 February 1936, PGDHC/ NC/C/4/1–74. 101  Ibid., 12.

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

205

neither so logically and clearly set out as the Belgian, nor supported with so plainly formulated a rationale of action, nor so explicitly directed to securing the support of a majority of the electorate.”102 Cole therefore built on de Man’s work to restate his case for “a series of ordered measures, to be accomplished over a set period of time, and not merely a long list of aspirations, without order or set date for their achievement.”103 Cole’s foreword was written after the formation of the Van Zeeland government, and this might have played a role in his decision to accentuate the allegedly moderate character of the Belgian Labour Plan.104 For sure Cole must have realised that the language of planning could be bent to revive traditional reformism: in February 1936, he informed de Man that, despite “much talk” within the LP, “a reversion to a policy of new-­ Liberalism” was more likely than the development of “a planist sort of Socialism.”105 In all likelihood, Cripps’ and Cole’s misgivings led them to advocate, from mid-1936, the creation of a broad working-class coalition—either a United Front with the communists and the ILP or a People’s Front open to all progressives—against fascism and war, also with the purpose of countering the influence of centrists like Morrison and Hugh Dalton.106 Ultimately, the relentless search for new ways of pulling the party to the Left proved disastrous: when SL members were threatened of expulsion from the LP for having favoured communist infiltration during the pro-communist Unity Campaign launched in January 1937, the organisation disbanded.107 By then, however, the Labour Plan had lost  Ibid. 14.  Ibidem. 104  Cole introduced de Man as “Minister of Public Works in the Belgian Cabinet” [ibid., 6]. In May 1936, Cole would point out that the measures undertaken by Van Zeeland fell “very far short of the programme of ‘structural reformation’ proclaimed in the Plan du Travail” [G.D.H.  Cole, “Planned Socialism,” The New Statesman & Nation, no. 272 (1936): 693]. 105  Letter from Cole to de Man, 22 February 1936, AHDM/IISG/227. Dalton’s big book in favour of planning, Practical Socialism for Britain, first published in March 1935, was indeed set against “our melodramatists of the Socialist League” [Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years, Memoirs 1931–1945 (London: Frederick Muller, 1957), 58]. 106  See, for example, Stafford Cripps, “Weld the Workers Together,” The Socialist, no. 5 (1936): 1; Stafford Cripps, “United Front,” The Labour Monthly, no. 2 (1937): 78–82; G.D.H. Cole, “A British People’s Front: Why, and How?,” The Political Quarterly 7, no. 4 (1936): 490–498; G.D.H. Cole, “The United Front—and the People’s Front,” The Labour Monthly, no. 1 (1937): 14–19. Cole, The People’s Front, 13–34. 107  See Pimlott, Labour and the Left, 98–108; Bor, The Socialist League, 373–388. 102 103

206 

T. MILANI

traction even in Belgium and a planist strategy appeared outmoded. A British Labour Plan akin to the Belgian one was never crafted. * * * All considered, despite some interest in the Belgian campaign for the Labour Plan and in the international planist movement, the SL did not seek to replicate Belgian planism and Cole’s reservations about de Man’s project were arguably key in this. By no means, however, were Cole’s views the only obstacle to a more widespread reception of de Man’s ideas in Britain. At least four other major factors must be cited: the socio-­ economic context of the mid-1930s, limited pre-existing knowledge of de Man as theorist, the lack of a deeply rooted Marxist tradition, and the attitude of trade unionism. Each of them deserves a concise but separate discussion. To begin with, although the Great Slump hit the country severely, the decision to abandon the gold standard in September 1931 and follow, albeit reluctantly, a policy of cheap money enabled the National Government to impose a relatively mild version of austerity, which did not provoke the same social unrest affecting Germany or Belgium. Protective tariffs and social security benefits, however inadequate to meet actual needs, also contributed to softening the social impact of the crisis.108 By and large, the “undramatic” way Britain went through the Depression worked against political radicalisation.109 By the same token, with only marginal segments of the middle class fearing to lose their status and no serious domestic fascist threat within sight, the appeal of planism was not as strong as on the Continent.110 108  As Margaret Cole noted, “after the worst of the depression the economic condition of the working class, taken as a whole, was rising slightly” [Margaret Cole, “The Labour Movement between the Wars,” in Ideology and the Labour Movement: Essays Presented to John Saville, eds. David E. Martin and David Rubinstein (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 223]. For an overview, see Sean Glynn and John Oxborrow, Interwar Britain: A Social and Economic History (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), esp. 133–139, 265–268. On Britain’s peculiar attitude towards the gold standard mentality, see Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin, “The Gold Standard and the Great Depression,” Contemporary European History 9, no. 2 (2000): 183–207. 109  Andrew Thorpe, “Introduction,” in The Failure of Political Extremism in Inter-War Britain, ed. Andrew Thorpe (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1989), 7. 110  As pointed out by Cole: see G.D.H. Cole, “Introduction,” Planned Socialism, 9–11. Cripps thought that the National Government was driving the country into a “Country

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

207

A second element to be taken into account is that de Man’s previous writings were barely known in Britain. This book has shown how de Man’s post-1918 works, and his extensive critique of Marxism in particular, generated a favourable disposition towards planism in young activists like Buset, Brugmans, Philip, and Rosselli. Yet there was no counterpart to them in the United Kingdom: the English translation of Zur Psychologie, issued in 1928, had very little impact.111 The only left-wing intellectual of some reputation to review it was the then 30-year-old Kingsley Martin, who lauded the “common sense and practical knowledge” of the author but did not seem thrilled with it.112 In 1932, both Alfred Zimmern and Godfrey Elton quoted the book, which suggests that it had been read and digested but only among a tiny elite.113 Since Zur Psychologie did not spark any substantial debate within the Labour intelligentsia, the prestige of British planism could not be bolstered by de Man’s climb to power in Belgium. De Man’s lack of name recognition ties in with the third factor, namely the feebleness of Marxism in Britain. In Germany, France, and Belgium, orthodox Marxism had become the ideological cornerstone of social democracy. In Britain, on the other hand, Fabianism had gained the upper hand. As a consequence, Labour leaders of the mid-1920s did not pay tribute to Marx as frequently and unreservedly as Kautsky, Vandervelde, and Blum did: even MacDonald, who was more generous towards the author of Das Kapital than most of his fellow party members, held that “it

Gentleman’s Fascism” whose features, however, differed from the Italian and German variants [Stafford Cripps, National Fascism in Britain (London: The Socialist League, n.d.), 8]. 111  According to George Allen & Unwin, The Psychology of Socialism was a “commercial failure” [letter from George Allen & Unwin to De Man, 29 March 1935, AHDM/ IISG/224]. 112  Kingsley Martin, “Socialism,” The Nation & Athenaeum, no. 14 (1928): 502. A few years earlier, Martin had written a long essay on the war generation imbued with a frustration with established truths and the crumbling social order comparable to de Man’s: see Kingsley Martin, “The War Generation in England,” undated manuscript, KMA/US/ SxMs11/4/4/2/24/1. Yet there is no evidence that Martin developed an enduring interest in de Man’s works. An anonymous reviewer on the New Statesman called de Man’s book “sincere, profound, and challenging, and refreshingly free of cant of malice” [“Socialism under Fire,” The New Statesman, no. 796 (1928): 518]. 113  See Alfred Zimmern, “A National Labour Party?,” The New Statesman & Nation, no. 54 (1932): 291; Godfrey Elton, “The Aristocratic Embrace,” The New Statesman & Nation, no. 64 (1932): 616.

208 

T. MILANI

is not Marxism that survives but Marx,” as an inspirational figure.114 Because of that, orthodox Marxism could not be associated with the status quo, and de Man’s analysis lost much of its allure in the eyes of younger, impatient militants. Somewhat ironically, in their struggle against conventional wisdom, British planists like Cole claimed that British social democracy would actually benefit from taking Marx’s thought more seriously.115 For their part, moderates felt no pressure to cast around for foreign mentors as, at least since the publication of The Means to Prosperity in 1933, they could borrow from the increasingly heterodox works of Keynes in envisioning their variant of managed capitalism.116 The fourth element was the coolness of the trade unions, which controlled much of the LP.117 While the Belgian CS and the French CGT threw their weight behind planism, the British TUC was suspicious of any attempt to radicalise the party platform as its leaders thought the interests of the workers would be better served by cooperating with, instead of challenging, big business.118 From this it does not follow that British trade unions opposed economic planning as a technique, but quite the contrary.119 Nevertheless, their main goal was to gain recognition within, and 114  Ramsay MacDonald, Socialism: Critical and Constructive (London: Cassell and Company, 1921), 56. See also Ramsay MacDonald, Socialism and Society (London: Independent Labour Party, 1905), 92–108. 115  See, for example, G.D.H. Cole, What Marx Really Meant (London: Gollancz, 1934). Nonetheless, like de Man, Cole made a distinction between Marxism as a methodology and Marxism as a crystallised set of beliefs: “An ‘orthodox’ Marxist may be learned in the Marxian scriptures: the one thing he cannot be is a follower of Karl Marx” [G.D.H. Cole, “Marxism and the World Situation of To-Day,” in VV.AA., Marxism (London: Chapman & Hall, 1935), 240]. 116  For an example of Keynes’ influence, see Alfred Leslie Rowse, Mr Keynes and the Labour Movement (London: Macmillan, 1936). 117  As a supporter and later secretary of the SL put it, the LP amounted to “the trade unions participating in politics” [John T. Murphy, New Horizons (London: John Lane The Bodley Head, 1941), 310]. 118  Communists labelled this orientation “Mondism”: see, for example, William Gallacher, Mondism and MacDonaldism (London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1928); Allen Hutt, British Trade Unionism: A Short History (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1962), 119–143. On the moderating influence of British unions in the 1930s, see Ross M. Martin, TUC: The Growth of a Pressure Group, 1868–1976 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 205–243; Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 176–199. 119  In 1931, the TUC welcomed “the present tendency towards a planned and regulated economy in our national life”: see Report of the Proceedings at 63rd Annual Trades Union

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

209

possibly take advantage of, the machinery of planning, not to flesh out a left-wing agenda around it: as the TUC General Secretary Walter Citrine bluntly put it at a SL meeting in 1933, discussing “ultimate Socialist objectives of a theoretical character” was, from the unions’ perspective, a “waste” of time.120 Even figures who on paper might have been more positive about planism, such as Bevin, were not immune from this streak of anti-intellectualism.121 In 1932, Cole invited him to join the SL Executive Council but Bevin, despite his previous association with the SSIP, turned down the offer, on the grounds that he would be “torn” between “loyalties,” and felt that the SL might have “a bias against Trade Unionists.”122 He was also concerned, with some justification, that the SL might turn into “a sort of ladder” for “careerists,” that is members of radical fringes interested in taking over the LP.123 An exchange of letters in December 1935 sheds more light on Bevin’s sentiments. Cole wrote him that Labour intellectuals might “develop an anti-Trade Union complex largely because they feel the Trade Unions have no use for them” and wished that the two Congress held at Bristol, September 7th to 11th 1931, ed. Walter Citrine (London: Co-Operative Printing Society, 1931), 406. 120  Walter Citrine, Men and Work: An Autobiography (London: Hutchinson, 1964), 300 In his diary, Dalton recorded that there was “much suspicion” of the SL “in orthodox circles, at Transport House and on the National Executive, and some opposition within S.S.I.P itself” [Entry of Saturday, 8 October 1932, The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, 169]. In turn, left-wing critics often complained about the Labour movement getting along too well with “intelligent capitalists” who “stand for planning” [Ellen C.  Wilkinson and Edward Conze, Why Fascism? (London: Selwin & Blount, n.d.), 244–245] and warned unions against the “propagation of ‘Roosevelt Recovery Plans’” which might put Britain on slippery slope towards authoritarian corporatism [John T.  Murphy, Fascism! The Socialist Answer (London: The Socialist League, n.d.), 9]. 121  Bevin published a short tract with Cole in 1931, funded The New Clarion, and devised his own plan to tackle unemployment: see Ernest Bevin and G.D.H. Cole, The Crisis: What It is, How It Arose, What to Do (London: New Statesman & Nation, 1931); Ernest Bevin, My Plan for 2,000,000 Workless (London: Clarion Press, 1933). 122  Letter from Bevin to Cole, 24 September 1932, EBP/UW/MSS126-EB-X-12. Bevin was deeply annoyed by how the new LP leader, George Lansbury, at first encouraged the SL: letter from Bevin to Lansbury, 8 March 1933; letter from Lansbury to Bevin, 9 March 1933, GLP/LSE/28. 123  Letter from Bevin to Cole, 24 September 1932, EBP/UW/MSS126-EB-X-12. Bevin turned down a similar offer for the vice-chairmanship of the NFRB: see letter from Bevin to Cole, 29 September 1932, EBP/UW/MSS126-EB-X-12. On Bevin’s early clash with former ILP members, see Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin. Vol. I (London: Heinemann 1960), 515–516; Matthew Worley, Labour inside the Gate: A History of the British Labour Party between the Wars (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 144.

210 

T. MILANI

groups would rather “pull together” and “work out […] a short and simple platform of immediate projects, including both ameliorative and socialistic measures.”124 Despite admitting that the SL had failed to perform that function, he maintained that intellectuals and trade unionists had a common interest in turning the LP “into a really united and well-led party, capable both of getting a majority, and of using it when it has been got,” overcoming the “present senseless, and largely meaningless, division between left and right.”125 But Cole’s plea for reconciliation went unheeded. “The difference between the intellectuals and the Trade Unions is this,” Bevin replied, “You have no responsibility, you can fly off at a tangent as the wind takes you. We, however, must be consistent, and we have a great amount of responsibility. We cannot wake up in the morning and get a brain wave, when father says ‘turn’ and half a million people turn automatically.”126 Besides, he complained that unions had previously given credit to figures as Mosley and Cripps, adding, “I do not believe in the ‘great’ man idea. My experience of life has been that if you can form your judgments as a result of the common contribution arising from the ordinary commonsense of people, you have a better chance of making progress.”127 In turn, Cole sent him a copy of his recent translation of the Belgian Labour Plan as an example of virtuous cooperation between intellectuals and trade unions.128 There is no evidence, though, that Bevin’s views were changed by this or any other reading.129 In retrospect, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Cole’s optimism about the possibility of accomplishing, in Britain, more far-reaching structural reforms than those proposed by de Man was utterly misplaced. With the old guard on the defensive and the parliamentary group decimated between 1931 and 1935, the Labour Left had indeed a golden opportunity to establish the “dominance of socialist discourse” within the LP.130  Letter from Cole to Bevin, 2 December 1935, EBP/UW/MSS126-EB-X-15.  Ibidem. 126  Letter from Bevin to Cole, 31 December 1935, EBP/UW/MSS126-EB-X-12. 127  Ibidem. 128  See letter from Cole to Bevin, 9 January 1936, EBP/UW/MSS126-EB-X-12. 129  In 1944, Cole told his wife that Bevin had “a phobia of intellectuals […]. It is a great pity, but I should call it a case of odium proximi” [“Transcript of a Discussion between G.D.H. Cole and Margaret Cole, 1944,” PGDHC/NC/D1/31/8]. 130  John Callaghan, “British Labour’s turn to socialism in 1931,” Journal of Political Ideologies, 14, no. 2 (2009), 119. 124 125

8  ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE BELGIAN LABOUR PLAN IN BRITAIN 

211

Yet the verbal extremism, staunch collectivism, and final pro-communist drift of the SL eventually backfired, preventing the group from wielding a more enduring and constructive influence.131 In fact, it is plausible that some intellectuals who had grasped the significance of economic planning for the Labour movement declined to use planist jargon not to be confused with Cole and Cripps. The financial journalist Douglas Jay joined the NFRB in 1934 as a fervent admirer of Gaitskell’s theories.132 Nevertheless, in the first edition of The Socialist Case, which came out in 1937, he equated planning with any interference with the price mechanism, prudently claimed that it had to be “intelligent, not comprehensive,” and stated it must not be pursued “at the expense of the freedom of the consuming masses.”133 Durbin went down a similar path. In 1934, he held that planning was to “play a part in the strategy of democratic socialism, or Social Democracy.”134 One year later he clarified, maybe hinting at the SL, that planning did not “imply any dogmatism about the future” and therefore did not involve “the construction of a single plan.”135 Then, in The Politics of Democratic Socialism, published in 1940, he retreated into an anodyne definition of planning as “the substitution of monopoly control for competition in all the markets and industries that it touches,” often against the public interest.136 Caution rather than boldness permeated Labour’s thinking.137

131  Around 1935, Dalton joked that, had he penned a resolution to socialise the Solar System, a Socialist Leaguer would have moved an amendment to add the words “and the Milky Way” [see Dalton, The Fateful Years, 59–60]. Pimlott maintained that “by October 1933 the League had begun to gain a reputation as a disruptive body of middle-class intellectuals grinding a left-wing axe” [Pimlott, Labour and the Left, 49]. 132  See Durbin, New Jerusalems, 83, 112–113. 133  Douglas Jay, The Socialist Case (London: Faber and Faber, 1937), 349, 351. Quotations are drawn from the penultimate chapter, significantly entitled “The limits of planning.” 134  Evan F.M.  Durbin, “Memorandum on the Principles of Socialist Planning,” January 1934, FSA/NFRB/LSE/J/25/3. 135  Evan F.M.  Durbin, “The Importance of Planning,” in New Trends in Socialism, ed. George Catlin (London: Dickson & Thompson, 1935), 149–150. 136  Evan F.M.  Durbin, The Politics of Democratic Socialism: An Essay on Social Policy (London: The Labour Book Service, 1940), 100. 137  Commenting on the 1937 Labour’s Immediate Programme, historian Stephen Brooke held that “if it is true that the party had a clearer view of the horizon it wished to reach, it is also true that this horizon was quickly becoming a frontier beyond which its planners were reluctant to venture” [Stephen Brooke, Labour’s War: The Labour Party during the Second World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992), 31].

212 

T. MILANI

The LP’s political culture would eventually incorporate the notion of planning whilst the strategy of planism lapsed into oblivion. First-hand experience of wartime mobilisation was undoubtedly more influential than interwar discussions in persuading figures as Jay and Durbin of the sustainability, and even the desirability, of the mixed economy, setting the stage for the ground-breaking reforms of the Attlee government.138 By 1945, however, de Man was way too discredited for being a potential source of inspiration for them. In order to understand why, political developments in Belgium between 1936 and 1940 must now be examined.

138  See, for example, Douglas Jay, “Plans and Priorities,” in VV.AA., The Road to Recovery: Fabian Society Lectures given in the autumn of 1947 (London: Allen Wingate, 1948), 9–26; Evan F.M.  Durbin, “The Problems of the Socialised Sector,” in Problems of Economic Planning: Papers on Planning and Economics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), 58–90. See also the draft notes for Economics and Democratic Socialism, which remained unfinished due to Durbin’s death, in EDP/LSE/6/1.

CHAPTER 9

Delusions of Grandeur: Hendrik de Man in Power

The Pontigny Conference of September 1934 marked the peak of Hendrik de Man’s prestige within Western European social democracy. Five years later, despite having managed to seize the presidency of the POB after the passing of Vandervelde, he had become a much more divisive and even shunned figure, somehow discredited by his calls for protracted governmental participation and by his staunch neutralism in foreign affairs. Once a source of hope for radical militants due to his disparagement of piecemeal reformism, he was now identified with the moderate wing of his party, established by his protégé Spaak, which preached socialisme national. For his critics, de Man had turned into the main advocate of a “governmental socialism tolerated by the bourgeoisie.”1 For his admirers, he was still the leader charting “a viable path towards economic revival, social mobility, and the rehabilitation of political democracy” by which the original aims of planism could be fulfilled.2 Yet the longer he remained in politics, especially after March 1938, the less he seemed able to deliver what his supporters expected of him. Being neither a team player nor a consumed tactician, de Man was bound to wrestle with a political system 1  Austria, Le socialisme gouvernemental d’Henri de Man (Brussels: La Nouvelle Eglantine, 1938), 26. 2  Edgard Delvo, Democratie in Stormtij: Democratisch socialisme in de crisisjaren dertig (Antwerp: De Nederlandsche Boekehandel, 1983), 85. For Delvo’s views at the time, see Edgard Delvo, Hedendaagsch humanistisch streven: democratisch socialisme en zijn beteekenis voor de B.W.P. (Antwerp: De Sikkel, 1939), esp. 46–47.

© The Author(s) 2020 T. Milani, Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0_9

213

214 

T. MILANI

which tended to reward more experienced parliamentarians capable of building broad coalitions and willing to choose workable compromises over grand designs. The dominant theme of this chapter is de Man’s mounting frustration with Belgian democracy, arguably the single, most important driver behind his call for collaboration with the Nazis in June 1940.3 Rather than being seduced by the alleged appeal of fascism, de Man then fell into a different temptation: decoupling his socialism from liberal-democratic rule.4 A swift German victory, he thought, would at least free Belgium from its cumbersome, convoluted, and anachronistic institutional framework, which, in his view, had enabled reactionary forces to sabotage his planist reforms. To him, the New Order seemed also poised to eradicate the country’s pre-war establishment, which he contemptuously dismissed as the equivalent of the ancien régime, and possibly precipitate the political and economic unification of Europe.5 It is worth stressing that de Man never presented his wartime conduct as a break with his socialist convictions.6 Yet it remains true that his attitude towards democracy underwent major changes after 1935, and so did his planism, up to the point of cheering the dismantling of the whole system of checks and balances enshrined in the Belgian constitution as soon as the military defeat gave him the opportunity to do so. This chapter accounts for this evolution by zooming in on landmark moments which set de Man on an increasingly illiberal route. First, it shows how his partners in power Paul Van Zeeland, Max-Léo Gérard, and Emile 3  The importance of this element is confirmed by various associates of de Man who either approved or disapproved his choice: see, for example, Edgard Delvo, Sociale collaboratie: pleidooi voor een volksnationale sociale (Antwerp: De Nederlandsche Boekhandel 1975), 133–136; Rens, Rencontres, 63. 4  For a different interpretation, see in particular Dick Pels, “Treason of the Intellectuals: Paul de Man and Hendrik de Man,” Theory, Culture, and Society 8, no. 1 (1991): 21–56; Dick Pels, “The Dark Side of Socialism: Hendrik de Man and the Fascist Temptation,” History of the Human Sciences 6, no. 2 (1993): 75–95. 5  For a detailed discussion of de Man’s attitude in May–June 1940, see Michel Brélaz, Léopold III et Henri de Man (Geneva: Editions des Antipodes, 1988), 19–39; Michel Brélaz, “Henri de Man: le point de non-retour,” in 1940: België, een maatschappij in crisis en oorlog. Acta van het colloquium gehouden te Brussel van 22 tot 26 oktober 1990, eds. Dirk Martin and Alain Colignon (Brussels: NCWO II/CREHSGM, 1993), 347–358. 6  See, for example, de Man, Après coup, 309–310; de Man, Cavalier seul, 267–268, 298. This applies also to his articles and speeches during the occupation: see, for example, Henri de Man, “Premier Mai 1941,” Le Travail, 1 (1941): 1.

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

215

Vandervelde resisted the creation of an embryonic machinery of economic planning in 1935–1936, leaving him embittered. Second, it highlights how de Man became persuaded that the hostility he met as finance minister was caused by the toxic influence of high finance over politics, which only a drastic reform of the state might have curbed. Third, it underscores how de Man’s views on foreign policy led him, around the time of the Munich crisis, to envisage an enduring rapprochement between totalitarian and non-totalitarian countries. Altogether, these developments slowly but surely eroded the foundations of de Man’s commitment to liberal democracy as expressed in his writings since 1919. The consequences of this disenchantment were far-reaching: by urging POB members not to resist the occupation, he placed himself outside the boundaries of Western European social democracy for good. * * * The decision to join the government of National Renovation led by Paul Van Zeeland in March 1935 was neither viewed nor portrayed by de Man and his followers as a shelving of the Labour Plan. Rather, they were at pains to stress that participation would enable them to lay the groundwork for more ambitious reforms, which would culminate into the building of a fully fledged mixed economy in a not-so-distant future.7 Publicly as well as privately, de Man reassured fellow party members that a “prudent and gradual enactment” of the Plan had begun.8 In reality, things were more complicated. Archival evidence suggests that de Man and Van Zeeland did reach a preliminary agreement on a “first project” to set up an Office de Redressement Economique (OREC), already envisaged in the Labour Plan, and equip it with “a degree of executive power on economic affairs” but that proposal was watered down due 7  See, for example, Max Buset, “Notre ligne de conduite,” Plan, no. 15 (1935): unpaged; “Ce que le Gouvernement Van Zeeland a emprunté au Plan du Travail,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 5 (1935): 92–94; Max Buset, “Rapport sur la propagande pour le Plan du Travail,” in Compte-rendu du 52° Congrès—Bruxelles, les 16 et 17 novembre 1935 (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1935): 12–27. 8  “La guérison du malade prouve l’excellence du remède,” draft of a brochure written by de Man for the 1936 election, AHDM/AMSAB/355. Before the POB and the CS Councils, de Man referred to “the beginning of an execution” of the Labour Plan [“Bureaux du Conseil Général et de la Commission Syndicale, 30 octobre 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB]. See also de Man’s speech in Compte-rendu du 52° Congrès, 80–92.

216 

T. MILANI

to “objections which denounced the danger that this might become a ‘hidden economic dictatorship’ within the Government.”9 Opposition certainly came from conservatives in Parliament, who had no confidence in de Man and began targeting OREC as a “waste” of public money ballyhooed by a “phoney propaganda” as soon as it was established, in April 1935.10 However—according to a memorandum written by Lemoine, then de Man’s cabinet chief and arguably his closest collaborator at the time—the antagonism of “Ministers” and of the “Department of Finance,” who feared OREC would encroach upon their prerogatives, proved decisive.11 During the cabinet discussion, Vandervelde too expressed serious reservations, forcing de Man and his main ally in Parliament, Buset, to search for common ground with him.12 In the planist original conception, OREC was meant to be “a kind of economic government emanating from the Parliament and independent from the political government,” by which five commissars, appointed for three years and provided with special powers, would be put in charge of the “execution of the programme of economic recovery adopted by the Chambers.”13 The real OREC bore little resemblance with this scheme as it was firmly placed under the authority of the prime minister and downgraded to the rank of consultative body in charge of the preparation, coordination, and monitoring of the measures taken by the government.14 This solution left de Man and his aides deeply dissatisfied and led them to tirelessly lobby for a reorganisation, which they considered an urgent

 Letter from de Man to Van Zeeland, 6 August 1935, AHDM/IISG/465.  Henri Carton de Wiart, Souvenirs politiques. Vol II (Brussels: La Renaissance du Livre, 1981), 179. 11  Robert J. Lemoine, “Note sur le débute difficiles de l’O.R.E.C., et les dangers qui en résultent pour le gouvernement,” dated 10 May 1935, ARJL/ID2. 12  See letter from de Man to Van Zeeland, 6 August 1935, AHDM/IISG/465. In his memoirs, de Man claimed—somewhat inaccurately—that Vandervelde had issued an “imperious veto” against the strengthening of the executive branch [De Man, Après coup, 252]. However, Vandervelde did voice fears that “the rights of the Parliament and of the Executive” might be “sacrificed to the advantage of a sort of collective economic dictatorship” [Letter from Vandervelde to Buset, 9 November 1935, AHDM/IISG/423]. 13  Marc Somerhausen, “L’Office du redressement économique,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 3 (1935): 50. The extended project authored by one of the twenty-two Plan commissions can be found in L’Exécution du Plan du Travail, 31–38. 14  See “Rapport au Roi. Projet d’arrêté royal délibéré en conseil des ministres créant un Office du Redressement Economique,” ARJL/IEVI.D. 9

10

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

217

matter.15 An increasingly impatient Lemoine indeed complained that Van Zeeland was running the danger of “being accused of having disarmed” de Man in the fight against unemployment.16 These anxieties were well-founded. The fragile legal status of OREC allowed Max-Léo Gérard, the fiscally conservative Minister of Finance, to take advantage of his role to keep the body underfunded, delay its operations, and severely restrain de Man’s wide-ranging programmes of public works.17 Planists were afraid that OREC would turn into “a caricature” of what it was originally intended to be, largely because of the “sabotage” and the “resistance” opposed by Gérard, whose lack of cooperation brought de Man on the brink of resigning from OREC’s vice-presidency in November 1935.18 However, in spite of de Man’s grievances, Van

15  See, for example, Robert J. Lemoine, “Points à discuter relativement à la politique du gouvernement,” memorandum dated 2 July 1935, ARJL/IIA2 and the reorganisation schemes in AHDM/IISG/464, AHDM/IISG/467. In early 1936, some planists outside the government went public about the shortcomings of OREC: see, for example, Jef Rens, “L’Office de Redressement économique: l’idée et sa réalisation,” Plan 3, no. 5 (1936): unpaged; “Au cercle des militants: Marc Somerhausen parle de la réforme de l’Etat,” Journal de Charleroi, February 25, 1936. Sometimes de Man resented this criticism for it appeared to call the existence of OREC into question, and reacted to at least one of those articles with “impetuosity” [see letter from Rens to de Man, 28 February 1936, AHDM/IISG/607]. 16  Robert J. Lemoine, “Note sur le débute difficiles de l’O.R.E.C., et les dangers qui en résultent pour le gouvernement,” memorandum dated 10 May 1935, ARJL/ID2. 17  See, for example, letter from Gérard to de Man, 11 September 1935, letter from Gérard to Van Zeeland, 30 September 1935, both in AHDM/IISG/463. Gérard made no secret of his role in turning down de Man’s requests: see, for example, Max-Léo Gérard, Un ingénieur chez les Ministres (Brussels: Van Buggenhout, 1936), 6–7. Because of this, he was often praised by the Liberal press: see, for example, René Dupriez, “Les finances nationales,” La Gazette de Charleroi, June 23, 1936. For a quick summary of the “arm wrestling match” between Gérard and de Man, see Ginette Kurgan-van Hentenryk, Max-Léo Gérard: un ingénieur dans la cité (1879–1955) (Brussels: Éditons de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2010), 162–169. 18  Robert J.  Lemoine, “Note pour Monsieur le Ministre de Travaux Publics et de la Résorption du Chômage,” memorandum dated 25 September 1935, ARJL/IIA2. Writing to Van Zeeland, de Man denounced “the systematic and persistent sabotage” of the government’s policy by the deflationists within the Department of Finance made possible by Gérard’s attitude [letter from de Man to Van Zeeland, 6 August 1935, AHDM/IISG/465]. For de Man’s threat of resignation, see letter from de Man to Van Zeeland, 17 October 1935, AHDM/IISG/463.

218 

T. MILANI

Zeeland showed no inclination to favour a truly expansionary fiscal policy or question Gérard’s judgement.19 While becoming increasingly open with his own party about the difficulties he faced, there is no evidence that de Man seriously considered leaving, perhaps due to the perceived popularity of Van Zeeland across the country and to the widespread conviction that, by lending support to him, the POB had at least put an end to the most extreme austerity measures imposed by previous governments.20 He decided instead to use his privileged position to argue for a further expansion of the purchasing power of the Belgian population, with the aim of achieving full employment in the medium term.21 At this stage, de Man’s line was fully consistent with his party’s desire to capitalise on the record of the government of National Renovation while at the same time pulling it towards the Left. In theory, the upcoming general election provided a golden opportunity to put 19  See Guy Vanthemsche, “De Mislukking van de vernieuwde economische politiek in België voor de Tweede Wereldoorlog: de OREC (Office de Redressement Economique) van 1935 tot 1938,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 2–3 (1982): esp. 361, 366–367, 386. Writing to Van Zeeland in August 1935, de Man called his policy of economic renovation “fearful and hesitant” in comparison to the “energetic tone” of his “policy of financial restoration” [Letter from de Man to Van Zeeland, 6 August 1935, AHDM/ IISG/465]. For a summary of the planist approach to fiscal policy, see Albert Halasi, “Le programme financier du Gouvernement,” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 5 (1935): 87–90. 20  In early October, he restated that deflationist “saboteurs” were strong within the Treasury and, because of their influence, the government had two economic policies instead of one [“Séance du Conseil Général du 2 Octobre 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB]. Nevertheless, already in August de Man had made clear that, in his view, the POB “could not stay in opposition” and he was planning to serve as Minister of Public Works “for at least five years” [“Réunion du Bureau du Conseil Général et de la Commission Syndicale, 7 Août 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB]. Spaak was among those who argued that the POB had performed “a formidable service” to the working class simply by ousting the deflationists and encouraged his party to “cash in” on this concept [“Séance du Bureau du Conseil General du 18 Octobre 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB]. Arthur Wauters’ report on the political situation at the POB Congress held in November 1935 praised the early achievements of Van Zeeland: see Arthur Wauters, “Rapport sur la situation politique,” in Compte-rendu du 52° Congrès, 3–11. 21  See, for example, Hendrik de Man, “De beslissende strijd voor het Plan van den Arbeid,” Vooruit, April 12, 1936; Hendrik de Man, Ons Plan voor ons Volk. Van het Woord naar de Daad! Wij redden het land uit den afgrond. Morgen brengen wij welvaart (Brussels: Propagandacentrale der BWP, 1936), 11–13. Simultaneously, de Man energetically defended OREC from right-wing detractors: see “Exposé de M. Henri de Man, Ministre des Travaux Publics et de la Résorption du Chômage, sur le budget extraordinaire pour 1936 (Chambres des Représentants, 11–13 février 1936),” in Les travaux publics et la résorption du chômage (Brussels: Ministre des travaux publics et de la résorption du chômage, N.I.), 5–35.

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

219

structural reforms at the top of the agenda, had the POB performed well.22 For this reason, the propaganda for the Labour Plan was retrieved in late October 1935 and the POB electoral platform still featured the Labour Plan prominently.23 As late as March 1936, de Man confidently held that its steadfast loyalty to Van Zeeland was “a huge asset” for the POB and running the campaign as “the party of the Government (parti du Gouvernement)” was in its best interest.24 De Man’s optimism, which few party cadres shared, proved misplaced.25 In May, the POB fared badly at the polls, losing three seats: only the even heavier losses suffered by the Catholic Party allowed the POB to become the biggest party in Parliament. On the Left, the still small Parti Communiste Belge (PCB) made substantial gains in the industrial areas of Wallonia. On the Right, the recently assembled Front Populaire de Rex, led by Catholic traditionalist Léon Degrelle, polled at 11%, revealing the existence of a deep-seated resentment among middle classes towards the financial elite and professional politicians.26 For the POB, this result amounted to a “relative failure.”27 In retrospect, it seems plausible that the party faced some backlash after the vibrant and heavily emotional campaign for the Labour Plan launched 22  In the words of Spaak, only the existent “political configuration” had prevented a “more energetic application” of the “essential ideas of the Plan”: with “an electoral success,” POB ministers would “seize the commanding heights” and purse “a policy more closely inspired to our ideas […] better and quicker.” A much less optimistic Arthur Gailly urged the party to “recreate the virginity of the Plan” to “generate an atmosphere of enthusiasm” and win over working-class militants’ hostile to Van Zeeland [“Séance du Conseil Général et du Comité National de la Commission Syndicale du 6 Novembre 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB]. 23  See Max Buset, La plateforme électorale du P.O.B.: Vade-mecum (Brussels, Éditions du P.O.B. 1936), esp. 1–2, 27–40; “La propagande du Parti,” undated memorandum, AEV/ IEV/III/107; special issue of Plan, no. 18 (1936). 24  “Séance du Bureau du C.G. du 24 mars 1936,” ABWP/AMSAB. 25  In the second half of 1935, some attendees at the POB Council mentioned the gloomy atmosphere within the party and the workers’ lack of enthusiasm for the government of National Renovation [see, e.g., the remarks by Corneel Mertens in “Réunion du Bureau du Conseil Général et de la Commssion Syndicale, 7 Août 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB”]. At the POB Congress of November 1935, various speeches acknowledged some dissatisfaction among the rank and file [see, e.g., the speech by August Balthazar reporting the mood within the Ghent federation in Compte-rendu du 52° Congrès, 93–94]. 26  For a comprehensive discussion of the 1936 elections, see Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, 1936: Leopold III, Degrelle, van Zeeland et les autres … (Brussels: Racine, 2004), 11–33. 27  Emile Vandervelde. “Rapport sur la situation générale,” in Congrès extraordinaire— Rapports, 24–26 Octobre 1936 (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1936), 3.

220 

T. MILANI

two-and-a-half years earlier. The crux of the matter was not whether the government of National Renovation had done enough for the workers or had faithfully complied with its programme but whether the high expectations raised since December 1933 could be met by joining a coalition government uncommitted to the Plan, which inevitably required daily compromises and lengthy negotiations.28 Timing was also problematic: de Man’s ringing rhetoric, celebrating resolute action, stood in stark contrast to the sluggish implementation of the government’s reforms.29 Last but not least, the consequences of Van Zeeland’s landmark decision, the devaluation of the Belgian franc, were mixed for the POB.  Economically, its short-term benefits were tangible: as de Man correctly anticipated, currency depreciation stimulated recovery without unleashing inflation.30 Yet, politically, this widely recognised policy success dramatically reduced the need for further emergency measures and gave Van Zeeland greater leverage to halt de Man’s attempts to widen the scope of state intervention.31 The modest reform of the banking sector passed in July 1935 indicates that, contrary to de Man’s expectations, financial actors were no longer as strained as in March and had therefore regained much of their influence over the policy-making process.32 The conclusion that de Man drew from the electoral setback was that POB had to double down on its efforts to overhaul the political and 28  See Balthazar’s speech in Compte rendu du Congrès extraordinaire du P.O.B. des 30 et 31 mars 1935, esp. 91. 29  Whatever de Man’s intentions, the POB left-winger Ferdinand Brunfaut was probably right in saying that the Father of the Plan had fostered “too many illusions” as he had given the “impression of having a programme” by which unemployment could be reabsorbed “the day after its exposition” [“Séance du Bureau du Conseil Général du 27 Août 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB]. 30  For early favourable accounts, see Fernand Baudhuin, La dévaluation belge: une opération délicate parfaitement réussie (Brussels: L’Édition universelle, 1935); Etienne Poisson, La dévaluation belge, mars 1935 mars 1936 (Paris: Librairie technique et économique, 1937) and the special issue of L’Europe nouvelle, no. 950 (1936). 31  As shrewdly noted by a French liberal economist [see Henri Michel, La dévaluation belge: une opération aussi délicate que décevante (Paris: Imprimerie du Palais, 1936), 161–176]. In a revealing passage of a book he published unanimously, Van Zeeland described monetary reform as the means to “preserve […] what, in the general interest, must be retained from liberalism properly understood” [∗∗∗ (Paul Van Zeeland), La crise de l’étalonor: confrontation de sa forme classique avec les méthodes et les buts de l’économie contemporaine (Paris: Albert, 1935), 141]. 32  See Guy Vanthemsche, “L’élaboration de l’arrêté royal sur le contrôle bancaire (1935),” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 3 (1980), esp. 392–393.

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

221

economic system. As he told his colleagues, “discontent” had been “heightened” by a “much stronger political opposition than most of us had imagined,” which in turn compelled the party and the government to “move faster on the road of structural reforms”: these were going to be “very decisive and very energetic,” in order to “undercut this opposition which is consolidating”—a thinly disguised reference to the meteoric rise of Degrelle.33 By then, de Man must have realised that Vandervelde would counter that strategy: in November 1935, Le Patron had urged the POB not to embrace the cause of constitutional revision, and it is plausible that his firmness contributed to further straining his relationship with de Man.34 In 1941, the latter wrote that Vandervelde was “the man who contributed more than anyone else to the failure of the planist movement.”35 This was an exaggeration, although anecdotal evidence suggests that Le Patron had no qualms about liaising with de Man’s opponents within the Liberal Party to constrain him.36 For sure, the difficulties faced by OREC, the caution of Van Zeeland, and the lukewarm support received from POB members were all sources of frustration for de Man.37 33  “Bureau du Conseil Général du 27 Mai 1936,” ABWP/AMSAB. See also B. D., “Où va la Belgique? M. de Man ne croit pas à l’avenir du rexisme,” La Croix, July 1, 1936. In private, Lemoine explicitly linked the success of Rex to the constraints imposed upon de Man, who was “without the power of attacking [unemployment] through structural reforms and without the power of defending the Plan against the reformists of the parliamentary tradition” [“Note sur le mouvement rexiste et sur l’organisation d’une résistance constructive,” dated 27 March 1936, ARJL/IIA3]. 34  See “Séance du Conseil Général et du Comité National de la Commission Syndicale, du 6 Novembre 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB. The right-wing press reported a growing resentment between the two: see, for example, “M. Vandervelde et M. de Man,” La Libre Belgique, July 11, 1936. According to Rens, Vandervelde retained “a true attachment” to de Man “until the formation of the second Van Zeeland government,” in June 1936 [Rens, Rencontres, 30]. 35  De Man, Après Coup, 222. 36  This was acknowledged by Max-Léo Gérard [Max-Léo Gérard, Souvenirs pour mes enfants (Brussels: Palais des Académies, 2012), 100–101] and Marcel-Henri Jaspar [MarcelHenri Jaspar, Souvenirs sans retouche (Paris: Fayard, 1968), 195–196, 230]. Vandervelde’s misgivings about OREC echoed those of the leading Liberal expert on institutional reform, Herbert Speyer: see Herbert Speyer, Corporatisme ou parlementarisme reformé? (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1935), 30–34. 37  See, for example, the tone of de Man’s letter to Van Zeeland and of his remarks before the POB Council in early August 1935: letter from de Man to Van Zeeland, 6 August 1935, AHDM/IISG/465; “Réunion du Bureau du Conseil Général et de la Commission Syndicale, 7 Août 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB.  See also the retrospective analysis in Henri de Man, “L’action pour le Plan et l’action gouvernementale en Belgique,” speech at the second International Planist Conference, August 1936, AHDM/AMSAB/350.

222 

T. MILANI

* * * With the formation of the second Van Zeeland government, in June 1936, de Man moved from the Ministry of Public Works to that of Finance. During the intra-party negotiations, de Man refused to serve in that position at least once as, at first, he had no intention of taking up a new portfolio.38 Yet he subsequently changed his mind, maybe because he realised that, by giving his consent, he could oust his nemesis Gérard. The latter’s ongoing connections with the financial world and membership in the leading industrialist association of the country provided POB planists with a plausible rationale for demanding his exclusion from the cabinet.39 In his new role, however, de Man could no longer pursue his planist agenda as single-mindedly as he had previously done. In fact, a great deal of his efforts between the summer of 1936 and the winter of 1937–1938 went into establishing himself as a wise, responsible, and even cautious politician when it came to allocating public money. This was probably done out of necessity, considering that his appointment alarmed conservative circles and turned him into the bogeyman of the parliamentary Right, which decried him and Van Zeeland for trying to impose collectivism by stealth.40 De Man’s endeavours to assuage fears and carry favour with centrist public opinion took three forms. First, he repeatedly sung the praises of balanced budgets and fiscal restraint, softening the proto-Keynesian rhetoric he had used in the recent past to champion large-scale public works.41 Second, in order to back his words with actions, he quickly secured a balanced budget for the year 1937, taking advantage of the upward trend in the business cycle and of the meticulous preparatory work  See “Réunion du Conseil General élargi du 13 Juin 1936,” ABWP/AMSAB.  See Buset’s case in “Bureau du Conseil Général du 27 Mai 1936,” ABWP/AMSAB. De Man gathered evidence of these connections around this period: see various notes in AHDM/IISG/485. 40  One of the most vocal opponents of de Man and Van Zeeland was the former Minister of Finance Gustav Sap [see Karel Van Nieuwenhuyse, “Sap versus van Zeeland: politieke titanen kruisen de degens in de jaren ‘30,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 1–2 (2002): 195–251]. On the much-feared glissement au gauche, see, for example, “A l’Association Catholique de Waremme: un discours de M.  D’Aspremont-Linden,” Le Vingtième siècle, July 21, 1937; R. H. (René Hislaire), “Le Congrès de la Fédération des cercles,” L’Independence belge, October 6, 1937. La Libre Belgique, L’Echo de la Bourse and other right-wing outlets prominently featured right-wing accusations on a regular basis. 41  See, for example, “Une déclaration de M. de Man,” Vers l’avenir, June 17, 1936; “Henri de Man entre la Banque et la Bourse,” Le Peuple, September 23, 1936. 38 39

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

223

made by his predecessor.42 Third, he went public about the need for his party to remain in office, even at the price of further compromises, despite the growing pressures from left-wing factions to create a Popular Front moulded on the French model.43 In February 1937, de Man fully embraced the prospect of a prolonged period of collaboration with other forces by aligning himself with the radical-turned-moderate Spaak who, operating in tandem with Catholic journalist Raymond de Becker, had begun pressing the POB to unashamedly espouse a centrist course.44 The expression socialisme national, coined by Spaak to categorise his own ideological orientation, was quite misleading as it inadvertently brought German National Socialism to mind but de Man, while expressing reservations about terminology, found the thrust of Spaak’s arguments convincing. Carrying out planist reforms, he held, required “national solidarity” which the POB could foster only by refusing to go back into opposition and capitulate to “all the extremisms,” namely Rexism and communism, that threatened Belgian democracy: “socialism,” in order to “accomplish, day after day, the common good,” had to be “governmental.”45 This time, de Man and Spaak came under fire for having taken a stand that, in 42  See “Le Ministre des Finances annonce un boni budgétaire de 171 millions,” Le Peuple, October 1, 1936; “Les socialistes au gouvernement ont tenu les engagements qu’ils avaient pris dans l’opposition,” Le Peuple, October 2, 1936. The budget was lauded by the centrist press: see, for example, R.H. (René Hislaire), “La chance de M. H. de Man,” L’Independence belge, November 21, 1936. 43  Strong impetus in that direction came from the POB’s youth organisation, the JGS, who had merged with their communist counterpart in July 1936: see René Delbrouck, L’expérience unitaire des Jeunes Gardes Socialistes (Brussels: Jeunes Gardes Socialistes, 1937). De Man regarded this as the manifestation of an “anti-planist reaction” [“Séance de Bureau de la Commission Syndicale et du Conseil General du 10 septembre 1936,” ABWP/AMSAB]. On the JGS’ background, see Alain Colignon, “Les Jeunes Gardes socialistes, ou la quête du Graal révolutionnaire, 1930–1935,” Cahiers d’Histoire du Temps présent, no. 8 (2001): 181–224. 44  See Raymond de Becker, “M. Spaak définit le socialisme national,” L’Independence belge, February 9, 1937. Before pursuing wartime collaboration, de Becker was an enthusiastic supporter of National Renovation [see Raymond de Becker, Pour une Belgique nouvelle: l’Union Nationale (Brussels: La Centrale d’Edition, 1937)] and would subsequently be editor of the short-lived monthly, and Spaak’s own mouthpiece, Les Cahiers politiques. On his relationship with Spaak, see Michel Dumoulin, “Raymond De Becker et Paul-Henri Spaak,” in Raymond De Becker: Itinéraire et facettes d’un intellectuel réprouvé, eds. Olivier Dard, Étienne Deschamps and Geneviève Duchenne (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2013), 313–344. 45  Raymond de Becker, “M.  Henri de Man nous dit: ‘Je suis d’accord avec Spaak,’” L’Independence belge, February 17, 1937. Both interviews were republished as Paul-Henri Spaak and Henri de Man, Pour un socialisme nouveau (Paris-Brussels: Labor, 1937).

224 

T. MILANI

Vandervelde’s view, was tantamount to recommending “governmental participation anyway.”46 The same caution, however, did not characterise de Man’s attitude towards high finance, against which he was keen to flex his muscles. Sparking some controversy, he introduced a special devaluation tax, targeting the fortunes of those who had speculated against the Belgian Franc during the banking crisis of 1935.47 In the same spirit, he pushed for the appointment of a commission of inquiry, headed by general prosecutor Jean Servais, to ascertain whether any politicians had been unduly favouring financial firms at the outset of the economic crisis. Even though the commission was unable to produce compelling evidence of unlawful behaviour, its findings allowed de Man, the POB, and part of the press to throw discredit at previously well-regarded figures such as Camille Gutt and Charles Fabri for their alleged mishandling of government borrowing and unethical behaviour respectively.48 A parallel judicial investigation, which de Man helped kick off, led to the suspension and subsequent replacement of the director of the Banque Nationale de Belgique (BNB), Louis Franck.49 Finally, de Man accomplished a new, wide-ranging reform of the banking system that increased governmental oversight substantially, also through the appointment of commissars holding veto power within the board of the country’s most powerful credit institute.50 Landing blow

46  Letter from Vandervelde to Spaak, 6 January, 1938, EV/IV/561. Spaak’s and de Man’s views were vehemently contested by other members of the POB Council, including Piérard, Balthazar, and Hubin: see “Réunion du Conseil General du Parti Ouvrier Belge du 22 Février 1937,” ABWP/AMSAB, “Séance du Conseil General du 26 Février 1937,” ABWP/AMSAB. 47  See Arthur Wauters, “Faire payer les spéculateurs,” Le Peuple, October 6, 1936; “Les spéculateurs contre le franc ont trouvé des défenseurs,” Le Peuple, October 10, 1936. 48  See, for example, “La conclusion de l’Emprunt Mendelssohn: les faits que signale la Commission d’enquête sont vraiment graves,” Le Vingtième siècle, December 22, 1936; Arthur Wauters, “Et après?,” Le Peuple, December 26, 1936; Arthur Wauters, “M.  Fabri pharaon de la haute finance,” Le Peuple, December 28, 1936; Charles Janssens, “Les collusions politico-financières,” La Dernière heure, December 30, 1936. 49  See letter from de Man to the Senior Crown Prosecutor, 4 September 1937 and letter from the Senior Crown Prosecutor to Van Zeeland, 20 September 1937, both in AHDM/ IISG/532; letter from de Man to Franck, 23 October 1937, AHDM7IISG/536. 50  See Herman van Der Wee and Karl Tavernier, La Banque Nationale de Belgique et l’histoire monétaire entre les deux guerres mondiales (Brussels: Banque Nationale de Belgique, 1975), 302–307.

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

225

after blow, the minister appeared on the right track to implement some key measures contained in, or inspired by, the Labour Plan.51 De Man’s tenure, however, came to an abrupt end in March 1938. Having briefly returned from a leave period due to food poisoning, he presented to the cabinet a hastily assembled set of new taxes, most of which on high-earners.52 The measures were triggered by a looming economic recession, further heightened by a stock market crisis, whose early signals had nevertheless been visible since the summer of the previous year.53 Prime Minister Paul-Emile Janson, who had replaced Van Zeeland in November 1937, was unimpressed by de Man’s proposals and the other ministers did not come to his rescue. Partly because of poor health and partly because of the lack of support from his colleagues, de Man immediately resigned.54 Another member of the POB, Eugène Soudan, took over and, in a few weeks, devised a package of slightly different tax hikes, many of which were subsequently discarded because of parliamentary opposition. A significant budget deficit developed as a result.55 The most striking feature of this sudden fall from grace was de Man’s own take on what happened once he fully recovered from illness. In a virulent speech given at Charleroi in late May, he claimed to be victim of the “holy war” against progressive taxation waged by “a small minority of 51  See L’œuvre des ministres socialistes de septembre 1936 à octobre 1937 (Brussels: P.O.B., 1937), 10–13. For an account from a planist viewpoint, see Robert J. Lemoine, La réforme du crédit en Belgique (Paris: Finances Publiques, 1937). 52  See the draft of the communication to the Council of Ministers in AHDM/IISG7549. Legislation drafts are in AHDM/IISG/547. De Man too acknowledged the “hurried and improvised character” of his exposition before the interministerial committee [Letter from de Man to Soudan, 27 April 1938, AHDM/IISG/554]. 53  In June 1937, de Man told his colleagues that a “slow decrease” in tax revenues had occurred in May but the cabinet decided not to inform the press [“Procès-verbal du Conseil des Ministres du 23 Juin 1937,” PVCM/AR]. There is no evidence of emergency planning during the subsequent governmental discussions on the budget [see, e.g., “Conseil des Ministres du 20 Aout 1937,” PVCM/AR]. 54  See the account in “Conseil des Ministres du 9 mars 1938,” PVCM/AR, and the critical but not unfair assessment by R.H. (René Hislaire), “Le départ de M. de Man,” L’Independence belge, March 11, 1938. 55  For a comparison between de Man’s and Soudan’s projects, see Albert Halasi’s memorandum in AHDM/IISG/554. On the budget and the 1937–1938 recession, see Fernand Baudhuin, “Les conditions générales de l’évolution des finances publiques durant l’entredeux-guerres,” esp. 67–69 and Maurice Masoin, “Les recettes publiques de 1919 à 1939,” esp. 145–146, in Institut Belge de Finances Publiques, Histoire des finances publiques en Belgique. Vol. II (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1954).

226 

T. MILANI

plutocrats” and other “hidden powers” who were now seeking to slander him and his record.56 De Man implied that Janson as well as his own party had blinked in the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with financial actors and the capitalist class more generally, as the latter refused to carry a heavier tax burden.57 Of course, blaming former colleagues and unnamed financers in order to justify his own failings was an easy way out, and several commentators did accuse de Man of self-serving demagoguery.58 However, his subsequent speeches and writings indicate that, in all likelihood, the idea that the Janson government had capitulated to vested interests seeped into his mind and became ingrained in his thinking.59 The implications of this alleged failure of Belgian liberal-democratic institutions in withstanding the power of organised money were discussed in a series of articles he wrote for the journal Leiding, between January and May 1939. Evoking his own tribulations as minister, de Man argued that, in order for planism to survive, the reform of the state must now be made “a prerequisite” of “decisive importance.”60 Outlining a set of constitutional reforms which would go much further than those included in the Labour Plan, he contended that governments should last as long as the Parliament which elected them, be protected from the constant meddling by parties, and be required to submit four-year budgets.61 He also supported a much tighter regulation of lobbying and, more critically, of the press, which de Man presented as an instrument used by big business to launch “defamatory campaigns” against the enemies of “financial

 Fernand Deny, “M. Henri de Man a parlé lundi soir, à Charleroi,” Le Soir, June 1, 1938.  Compare the speech to the more conciliatory remarks in G.K. (Grégoire Koulischer), “Henri de Man fait justice des attaques de la presse réactionnaire,” Le Peuple, April 30, 1938, issued before most of Soudan’s projects were shelved. 58  See, for example, W.U. (William Ugeux), “Le discours de Charleroi,” Le Vingtième siècle, June 1, 1938. 59  This was especially true after Spaak replaced Janson in May 1938, with Gérard moving back to the Ministry of Finance. De Man viewed this development as a return to the most reactionary form of deflation: see Henri de Man, “La politique intérieure,” Parti Ouvrier Belge: 57e Congés 29-30-31 octobre 1938 (Brussels: Secrétariat du POB, 1938), 3–17. 60  Hendrik de Man, “Is het Planisme dood?,” Leiding: Vlaamsch Socialistisch Maandschrift, no. 1 (1939), 12. 61   See Hendrik de Man, “Hervorming van den Staat vooraf!,” Leiding: Vlaamsch Socialistisch Maandschrift, no. 2 (1939): 68–73; Hendrik de Man, “Regeering en Parlement,” Leiding: Vlaamsch Socialistisch Maandschrift, no. 3 (1939): 147–154. 56 57

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

227

hypercapitalism.”62 Although these measures were meant to reinvigorate the parliamentary system, an illiberal undertone that was absent from the Labour Plan is clearly detectable in these pieces, particularly in the dark portrait of the contemporary “mass-men” hopelessly manipulated by “the anonymous financial empire,” “newspapers,” “radio,” “cinema,” and so on.63 It can therefore be assumed that de Man was not completely disingenuous in expressing the conviction that his efforts to breach the “wall of money” caused his downfall in March 1938. Yet such one-sided interpretation does not stand up to scrutiny. To begin with, de Man bore some responsibility for painting himself into a corner. Fernand Baudhuin, a scholar who produced a highly influential economic history of Belgium, harshly assessed de Man’s tenure as Minister of Finance, criticising the “instability of his character,” the poor relations he had with his own administration, his “nonchalance” in performing his duties, his way-­too-­ frequent holiday trips to Switzerland, and his “regrettable” tendency to mix up official statistics and figures.64 First published in 1944, Baudhuin’s account is punctuated with sarcastic remarks on de Man’s memoirs and must be taken with a pinch of salt, considering Baudhuin’s strong ties with the Catholic Party. Nevertheless, Baudhuin was certainly right in stressing that de Man underestimated the risk of inadvertently running a deficit in 1938 due to falling revenues, neglecting evidence of a forthcoming economic slowdown and postponing key decisions due to the sluggish transition from Van Zeeland to Janson.65 There is indeed no evidence that, politically, de Man prepared the ground for proposing a round of sharp tax hikes. If anything, the overoptimistic declarations he made in late 1937

62  Hendrik de Man, “Oude en nieuwe demokratie,” Leiding: Vlaamsch Socialistisch Maandschrift, no. 5 (1939): 297. 63  Ibid., 295. On this point see also de Man, Après coup, 303–305. For a useful, albeit limited, comparison between the articles in Leiding and the Labour Plan, see Dick Pels, “Hendrik de Man and the Ideology of Planism,” International Review of Social History, 32, no. 3 (1987): 206–229. 64  Fernand Baudhuin, Histoire économique de la Belgique, 1914–1939, Vol. I (Brussels: Bruylant, 1946), 338–339. 65  Ibid., 367–368. The sheer quantity of documents related to the BNB within de Man’s papers suggests that the battle against Franck drained his energies in the second half of 1937. See also how de Man was utterly dismissive of the concerns expressed by other ministers about the state of the economy [see letter from Jaspar to de Man, 8 October, 1937, and letter from de Man to Jaspar, 9 October 1937, both in AHDM/IISG/584].

228 

T. MILANI

provided ammunition to his opponents, which had an easy job in depicting him as an inept and reckless spender.66 The hostility of the financial sector towards de Man must also be set into a wider context. Historically, banks had played a vital role in the development of Belgian heavy industry and, by doing so, had become contiguous with the state. Up to the mid-1920s, bankers were regularly elected in Parliament and parliamentarians were offered seats on the board of joint stock banks. Although the increased reliance on professional management made these connections less visible, Catholic and Liberal deputies remained sensitive to the demands of the banking sector.67 Financial and political actors, such as the farmer agricultural organisation Boerenbond and the Catholic Party, remained close throughout the 1930s, creating scope for collusion and breeding an “unhealthy climate” that demagogues such as Degrelle cunningly exploited.68 The revolving door between finance and politics also meant that little attention was paid to the risk of conflicts of interest.69 In this respect, a famous episode is revealing: amidst the monetary crisis of 1926, the director of the Société Générale Emile Francqui was appointed finance minister. He used his personal connections with British banks to help stabilise the Belgian franc, then resigned 66  See, for example, the speech at a banquet organised by a stockbrokers’ association in December 1937, in which de Man confidently held that the budget was going to be in equilibrium and promised to tender his resignation rather than imposing new taxes [“Manifestation Eugene Resteau,” L’Etoile belge, December 13, 1937]. Similar reassurances were given during the parliamentary debate. De Man’s alleged profligacy was widely used against the POB during the 1939 electoral campaign: see, for example, “Quand les socialistes sont aux finances les millions et les milliard dansent,” Vers l’avenir, March 27, 1939. 67  For an overview, see Ginette Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, “Finance and Financers in Belgium, 1880–1940,” in Finance and Financiers in European History, 1880–1960, ed. Youssef Cassis (Cambridge-Paris: Cambridge University Press-Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1992), 317–335; Ginette Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, “Bankers and Politics in Belgium in the Twentieth Century,” in Business and Politics in Europe, 1900–1970: Essays in Honour of Alice Teichova (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 89–105. 68  Henriette Schoeters, “Les interventions de crise et les collusions politico-financières en Belgique entre 1930 et 1940,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 3–4 (1976): 443. Schoeters pointed out that the POB was not immune from this problem [see ibidem, 433–439]. 69  For instance, Catholics who denounced this phenomenon often linked it to a crisis in morality rather than to the inadequacy of the legislation on the regime of incompatibilities [see Paul Crokaert, “La nouvelle Carthage?,” Le Soir, December 12, 1935] whereas social democrats focused on capital concentration [see Senior, La haute banque en Belgique (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1931): 172–179].

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

229

and immediately joined the regency council of the BNB, which he had recently reorganised by increasing the presence of private banks within its board. Francqui’s conduct did not raise many eyebrows at the time.70 The fact that the Theunis cabinet, in which Francqui served, went down in history as “the government of the bankers” because of the professional background of its key ministers is also indicative of the extent to which, under exceptional circumstances, the business community could be directly involved in running the Belgian state.71 Taking all this into account, it is not implausible that private groups negatively affected by de Man’s reforms deployed a wide array of tactics, not of all them necessarily transparent or legal, to damage him and counter his initiatives.72 Still, this was far from exceptional: virtually in every country increasing state regulation in the 1930s, the business community mobilised pressure groups to resist those changes.73 In addition, if the report of the Commission Servais is to be believed, the actual level of regulatory capture in Belgium was not as significant as de Man contended, and it is therefore hard to believe that a minister might have been stabbed in the back the way de Man thought he had been.74 As it was noted in the aftermath of his Charleroi speech, a strain of paranoia ran through the statements he made about his departure.75 70   See Liane Ranieri, Émile Francqui ou l’intelligence créatrice, 1863–1935 (ParisGembloux: Duculot, 1985), 207–226. 71  See Marie-Rose Thielemans, La grande crise et le gouvernement des banquiers. Essai (Brussels: Institut de Sciences Politiques, 1980). 72  The role played by Belgian financiers in toppling governments they were hostile to is open to dispute but insightful remarks can be found in Guy Vanthemsche, “De val van de regering Poullet-Vandervelde: een ‘samenzwering der bankiers’?,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 1–2 (1978): 165–214. On the hostile attitude of high finance towards the governments of National Renovation, see also Jaspar, Souvenirs, 169–170, and ∗∗∗ [Paul Van Zeeland], Révision de valeurs: essai de synthèse sur certains problèmes fondamentaux de l’économie contemporaine et leurs réactions politiques (Paris: Albert, 1937), 287–288. 73  For a comparison with the United States, where major corporations started lobbying against the New Deal as soon as the latter lurched to the Left, see Robert F.  Burk, The Corporate State and the Broker State: The Du Ponts and American National Politics, 1925–1940 (Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press, 1990), 122–142; Kim PhillipsFein, Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s Crusade Against the New Deal (New York: Norton, 2010), 3–25. 74  For a balanced commentary to the Servais report, see, for example, Alias, “En marge du Rapport Servais: la fin d’un drame,” Le Soir, February 6, 1937. 75  See, for example, “Un discours politique de M. de Man: démagogie et contre-verités,” La Libre Belgique, June 1, 1938. In his memoirs, de Man maintained that the 1938 stock

230 

T. MILANI

In fact, the key sources of de Man’s vulnerability lay elsewhere, most notably in his reluctance to comply with the unwritten laws of party politics. Lacking the power base of a career politician, his chances of success largely depended upon the degree of support he enjoyed from the POB, and even more so from POB ministers, who were in a position to facilitate or hinder his actions as cabinet members. Yet the minutes of the POB Council meetings show that de Man was scarcely interested in investing time and energy to get the party on his side. In the crucial second half of 1935, when Van Zeeland’s economic policy took form, numerous POB figures complained in various occasions about de Man’s regular absences, failure to communicate, and inaccessibility.76 In June 1936, Hubin accused him for displaying “an ill-disguised spirit against Parliament” for not showing up more often during the latter’s sessions.77 At times, his former collaborators were denied an appointment for months.78 Even his resignation, for both its timing and the justification provided, stunned other POB leaders as they had not been alerted in advance about upcoming financial difficulties of that magnitude and were therefore unprepared to take action.79 Nor did de Man enjoy much support from his own POB colleagues, who clearly resented his propensity to go rogue.80 His relationship with the other parties was also fraught with tensions. Already in June 1936, being certainly reminiscent of his clashes with Gérard, de Man stated that he preferred to face “a serious parliamentary market crisis was “organised” with the purpose of overthrowing him [De Man, Après coup, 287]. 76  See, for example, the remarks by Vandervelde and Wauters [“Séance du Bureau du 23 Mai 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB], Van Walleghem and Jaunhiaux [“Bureau du Conseil General du 29 Juillet 1935” ABWP/AMSAB], and even Spaak [“Séance du Bureau du Conseil General—24 Juillet 1935,” ABWP/AMSAB]. De Man’s attendance of Council meetings improved after September. 77  “Séance du Conseil Général du 24 Juin 1936,” ABWP/AMSAB. 78  See letter from Lemoine to de Man, 29 April 1937, AHDM/IISG/483. While no longer his cabinet chief, Lemoine worked for OREC at the time. 79  “Séance du Bureau du 11 mars 1938,” ABWP/AMSAB. See also Emile Vandervelde, Carnets, 1934–1938 (Paris: Editions Internationales, 1966), 84. 80  During the POB Congress of 1938, Joseph-Jean Merlot, who had served with him under Van Zeeland and Janson, made unusually severe comments on his conduct [see “Discours de Joseph Merlot,” Le Peuple, November 8, 1938]. See also the fallout during the following, stormy POB meeting, with de Man stalking out the room after a quarrel about his ministerial record [see “Bureau du Parti. Séance du 14 novembre 1938,” ABWP/AMSAB]. De Man subsequently managed to get a reparatory declaration approved by the POB [see the statement in AHDM/IISG/456].

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

231

opposition” than a covert one “from within” the government, and that, in the future, a “simple majority” could deliver better results than the “very large majority” assembled the year before.81 Over time, this conviction developed into an outright animosity towards internal critics, which he often suspected of being disloyal.82 In October 1937, giving a speech in Antwerp, de Man lashed out at the President of the Liberal Party, Emile Coulonvaux, charging him of having obstructed the action of National Renovation. The country, de Man held, needed a “democratic majority,” not one held back by conservative factions, and urged the Liberals to consider going into opposition.83 It is noteworthy that de Man attacked Coulonvaux at the time Van Zeeland was on the verge of stepping down. If, as some scholars argued, de Man had been making moves for several months with the intention of becoming prime minister,84 then his frontal attack to Coulonvaux was a colossal blunder. In late October, he was indeed charged of forming a new government but the Liberal parliamentary group ended his bid by denying support.85 Perhaps, giving green light to the appointment of the “Father of the Plan” as prime minister would have been too much to swallow for the anti-statist Liberal Party under any circumstances. However, de Man’s recent, untactful speech certainly did not help his cause.86 To sum up, remoteness and poor tactics were the factors that hurt him the most, and the sloppy preparation of the 1938 budget made no exception to this pattern. 81  Roger Croquet, “Une déclaration de M. de Man, Ministre des Travaux Publics,” Le Soir, June 9, 1936. 82  See Delattre, Souvenirs, 172–173. In Delattre’s post-1940 interpretation, this attitude reflected undeclared dictatorial ambitions. 83  “Henri de Man expose à Anvers notre situation politique: il définit la position du P.O.B. attaché à des nouvelles réalités: parti de gouvernement, parti constitutionnel, parti national,” Le Peuple, October 16, 1937. See also Coulonvaux’s self-defence: “Une lettre de M. Coulonvaux, président du parti libéral, sur l’attitude des libéraux,” L’Independence belge, October 17, 1937. 84  See, for example, Vincent Dujardin and Michel Dumoulin, Paul Van Zeeland, 1893–1973 (Brussels: Racine, 1997), 95–103. 85  See “M.  Henri de Man renonce à former le gouvernement,” L’Independence belge, October 31, 1937. 86  See R.H. (René Hislaire), “Comment maintenir l’Union Nationale,” L’Independence belge, October 27, 1937; René Dupriez, “Les conditions libérales a la participation au nouveau gouvernement,” Gazette de Charleroi, October 30, 1937. On the Liberals’ aversion to de Man, see also “La vraie raison de l’exclusive libérale,” Le Peuple, November 1, 1937; X., “Une manœuvre libérale,” Vers l’avenir, November 2, 1937.

232 

T. MILANI

Perhaps the greatest irony of de Man’s traumatic departure from the Ministry of Finance is that the impetus he gave to the governments of National Renovation was almost erased from collective memories, including the one of his own party.87 From his planist—and increasingly disillusioned—perspective, de Man often underlined the limits of that experience, claiming in March 1939 that “whoever […] has done his share of work in the governmental team since 1935, has retained […] the feeling of having had to work with bad tools—no to so bad that the effort was in vain, but bad enough to make a far too high proportion of wasted effort inevitable.”88 However, not everyone saw the glass half-empty and the former prime minister ended up taking most of the credit for the economic accomplishments of the cabinet. An array of commentators soon began heralding Paul Van Zeeland as the embodiment of enlightened centrism and some of them, not least his brother Marcel, forged a political doctrine, named vanzeelandisme, based on his moderate but compassionate social outlook.89 A highly romanticised vision of the years 1935–1937, during which Belgium supposedly had its own New Deal, also gained some currency—yet it was Van Zeeland, not de Man, who was likened to Franklin D. Roosevelt.90 87  Because of wartime events, the party’s official histories written after 1944 significantly downplayed de Man’s role and achievements: see, for example, Marc-Antoine Pierson, Histoire du socialisme en Belgique (Brussels: Institut Emile Vandervelde, 1953), 189–236; Georges Bohy, “La période 1926–1939,” VV.AA., Les fastes du Parti: 1885–1960 (Brussels: Parti Socialiste Belge-Institut Emile Vandervelde, 1960), 117–143; Robert Abs, Histoire du Parti Socialiste Belge (1885–1960): synthèse historique (Brussels: Institut Emile VanderveldeFondation Louis de Brouckère, 1974), 27–29; Robert Abs, Histoire du Parti Socialiste Belge de 1885 à 1978 (Brussels: Fondation Louis de Brouckère, 1979), 50–58. In the POB literature produced before 1940, de Man featured much more prominently: see Emile Vandervelde, with the collaboration of Jef Rens and Jean Delvigne, Le cinquantenaire du P.O.B (1885–1935) (Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1936), 100–111; Marius des Essarts and Sylvain Masy, L’histoire du Parti Ouvrier Belge (Huy: Imprimerie Coopérative, 1937), 211–230. 88   Henri de Man, “Van Zeeland’s Achievements and Failures,” The Highway, 31 (1939): 141. 89  See, for example, Xavier Legrand, Le socialisme belge et les problèmes d’aujourd’hui (Brussels: L’Edition Universelle, 1935), 171–177; Luc Hommel, Paul van Zeeland: Premier ministre de Belgique (Paris: Plon, 1937). On vanzeelandisme (or zeelandisme), see especially Jacques D. Morisseaux, Evolution sociale ou faillite economique? Les conceptions économiques et sociales de Mr Paul Van Zeeland (Brussels: Vansintejan, 1939); ∗∗∗ [Marcel Van Zeeland], L’expérience Van Zeeland en Belgique (Lausanne: Payot, 1940), 283–307. 90  See, for example, Charles Roger, “A ‘New Deal’ for Belgium,” Foreign Affairs 13, no. 4 (1935): 625–637; Louis Franck, Démocraties en crise: Roosevelt, Van Zeeland, Léon Blum (Paris: Rieder, 1937).

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

233

* * * If the practical impossibility of pursuing a more assertive economic policy convinced de Man that parliamentary systems required thoroughgoing reforms, the crisis within the international system also fed into his growing disaffection with democracy. In particular, his unflinching commitment to neutrality brought him closer to the King Leopold III and led him to pin hopes on a lasting international settlement with Nazi Germany. Charting de Man’s evolving views on foreign affairs is not an easy task: between late 1933 and September 1938, when he started laying down the foundations of his “active peace policy” in a speech delivered in Ghent, his remarks on foreign policy were sporadic.91 Some ideas, however, stand out as recurring themes. First, no less than Van Zeeland and Spaak, he was an ardent supporter of the Belgian “policy of independence,” a commitment not to take engagements outside the framework of the League of Nations which intensified in 1936, following Hitler’s occupation of the Rhineland.92 This was in line with de Man’s well-known dissatisfaction with the Versailles Treaty dating back to 1919 and the feeling that, during the 1920s, Belgium had been aligning itself too closely with France.93 Second, he expressed concerns, particularly during the Spanish civil war, that the POB’s enduring allegiance to the LSI might endanger its position as a governmental force.94 In 1937–1938, de Man indeed walked a tightrope between issuing declarations of support to the Republican forces and refusing to be associated with any action that might be regarded as a 91  See “Trente mille travailleurs du textile défilent dans les rues de Gand,” Le Peuple, September 19, 1938. 92  See Paul-Henri Spaak, Pour la Paix (Paris-Brussels: Labor, 1938); Paul Van Zeeland, “Aims of Recent Belgian Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 18, no. 1 (1939): 140–147. See de Man’s comments on a “truly independent” foreign policy, by which “agreements” should not be “limited to the allies of 1914” [“Séance du Bureau du C.G. du 3 Février 1936,” ABWP/AMSAB]. De Man’s hostility to “everything that might resemble, from any distance, a Franco-Belgian alliance” was reported by Vandervelde in his carnets [Vandervelde, Carnets, 26]. 93  De Man openly talked about “leaving a system of alliance, a system of European disequilibrium resting upon the right of the victors” of 1918 [“Réunion du Conseil Général du 25 Mars 1936,” ABWP/AMSAB]. By November 1937, Vandervelde feared that de Man might favour “a rapprochement with fascist powers” [Vandervelde, Carnets, 68]. 94  See de Man’s passing remark about “Platonic internationalism” as a “comfortable terrain” for Belgian social democracy in Paul-Henri Spaak and Henri de Man, Pour un socialisme nouveau, 21.

234 

T. MILANI

breach of Belgian neutrality.95 In foreign policy, he maintained, the national interest mattered more than “sympathies” and “sentiments.”96 The profession of realism staked out by him and Spaak put them in conflict one last time with Vandervelde, who vigorously opposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Francoist faction until his death, in December 1938.97 On the whole, those convictions fell within the Belgian mainstream approach to foreign affairs at that time, both within and outside the POB.98 Three further elements, however, suggest that de Man’s enthusiasm for neutrality outstripped that of the great majority of his fellow party members. To begin with, he levelled charges against those Francophiles who wanted to isolate Germany in the name of anti-fascism and were thus making, in his view, a major European war more likely.99 These attacks would culminate in an article published anonymously on Leiding in October 1939 deploring the supposed “sabotage of neutrality” carried out by the press and part of the political establishment, including segments of the POB.100 Secondly, de Man was loosely involved in an ­informal 95  De Man urged the POB press to present the war “as a struggle for a constitutional and democratic position,” not as a “fight between Berlin and Moscow,” in order not to alienate Belgian public opinion [“Séance de Bureau de la Commission Syndicale et du Conseil General du 10 septembre 1936,” ABWP/AMSAB]. According to him, there was a “great danger” that mounting sympathy for the Spanish Republic might pull the POB towards an alliance with the PCB [“Séance du Bureau de la Commission Syndicale et du Bureau du Parti en date du 9 février 1937,” ABWP/AMSAB]. On the other hand, he claimed that, had he been Spanish, he would have been “one-hundred-per-cent” supportive of its Popular Front, whatever his reservations about Largo Caballero’s pre-war policy [“Réunion du Conseil General du Parti Ouvrier Belge du 22 Février 1937,” ABWP/AMSAB]. On the repercussions on the government, see letter from de Man to de Block, 14 October 1937, AHDM/ AMSAB/384. 96  “Bureau du Parti—Séance du 2 novembre 1938 (avant-midi),” ABWP/AMSAB. 97  See Christian Saelens, “Le P.O.B. et la reconnaissance de Burgos: rupture ou continuité?,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis 1–2 (1987): 291–313. 98  See Fernand Van Langenhove, “Les objectifs de la ‘politique d’indépendance’ de la Belgique,” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire 52, no. 2 (1974): 389–403; Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, Les gâchis des années 30: 1933–1937 (Brussels: Racines, 2007), 508–522. 99  See, for example, his heavy-handed criticism of the Czech journalist Josef Saxe and other anti-fascist exiles [“Bureau du Parti du 21 Janvier 1938,” ABWP/AMSAB] as well as of POB cadres [“Discours d’Henri de Man,” Le Peuple, November 7, 1938]. 100  See ∗∗∗ [Hendrik de Man], “Genoeg sabotage van de onzijdigheid!,” Leiding: Vlaamsch Socialistisch Maandschrift 10 (1939): 605–612. His former ally Buset was among those who reacted more forcefully against de Man’s position [see Max Buset, “Réponse à ‘Leiding,’” La Revue socialiste, no. 10 (1939): 5–17].

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

235

network promoting Franco-German reconciliation that received the blessing of the German embassy in Brussels, through Otto Abetz and Max Liebe. Gatherings at the Salon Didier, which de Man occasionally attended, featured intellectuals who were subsequently involved in collaboration and de Man must have been aware of the pro-German orientation of that circle.101 Thirdly, from the spring of 1938 onwards, de Man developed an unusually close friendship with King Leopold III.102 Both men were concerned about chronic governmental instability and leaned towards a more authoritarian form of democracy in which political parties would be firmly held in check by the head of state.103 Furthermore, they stood for the strictest policy of neutrality.104 Intellectual affinities provided the basis for a political convergence: de Man would later argue that he accepted the appointment as minister without portfolio in late 1939 upon direct request from the King, who wanted him to offset the influence of other Francophile politicians around Prime Minister Hubert Pierlot.105 Between September and November 1938, de Man sketched out his own proposal for a peace initiative by publishing two editorials in Le Peuple.106 Recalling the “lesson of 1914–18” and the “absurd folly” of fighting, he urged his readers to escape the dilemma between peace and 101  See Xavier Dehan, “Jeune Europe, le salon Didier et les Éditions de la Toison d’Or (1933–1945),” Cahiers du Centre des recherches et d’études historiques de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, no. 17 (1995): 203–236; John Hellman, The Communitarian Third Way: Alexandre Marc’s Ordre Nouveau, 1930–2000 (Montreal-London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 140–144, 167–168. De Man’s acquaintance with Abetz dated back to February 1932 [see correspondence in AHDM/IISG/354]. 102  See “Note sur mes rapports avec le Roi Leopold,” memorandum written in December 1948, AHDM/CEGESOMA/AA624/779. 103  See Leopold’s statements in Jacques-Armand Wullus-Rudiger, En marge de la politique belge, 1914–1956 (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1957), 217–221. For a detailed discussion, see Jan Velaers and Herman Van Goethem, Leopold III: De koning, het land, de oorlog (Tielt: Lannoo, 2001), 67–97. 104  See E.J. Nachtergaele, “Les relations Léopold III—Henri de Man (1938–1940),” Res Publica 20, no. 1 (1978): 21–40; Jean Stengers, Léopold III et le gouvernement: les deux politiques belges de 1940 (Brussels: Duculot, 1980), 16–18. 105  See “Note sur mes rapports avec le Roi Leopold,” memorandum written in December 1948, AHDM/CEGESOMA/AA624/779. De Man left the government, without much regret, in January 1940: see his declaration in “M. Pierlot a formé un nouveau gouvernement d’union nationale,” La Cité nouvelle, January 6, 1940. 106  Two very similar pieces, with adjustments for the French public, appeared on the newspaper L’Œuvre in November–December and subsequently as Henri de Man, Une offensive pour la paix (Paris-Brussels: Labor, 1938).

236 

T. MILANI

capitulation by “uprooting the causes of conflicts, the germs of injustices” which the Paris Conference of 1919 had failed to address.107 His argument rested on two assumptions: first, that war could not be considered an instrument “to make freedom triumph” in Europe; second, that a “peace” based on the coexistence of “democratic and totalitarian states” was not a pipe dream.108 In fact, de Man contended that a peace “with all European states,” including Germany and Italy, was the “only means to avoid war.”109 To his mind, this could be achieved through a general peace conference covering all the major unresolved international issues, from disarmament to colonial matters, during which a more acceptable balance between “sated” and “hungry imperialists” could be finally struck.110 There is no reason to believe that de Man’s call for a peaceful settlement, however “utopian”—as Vandervelde called it111—was animated by a crypto-Nazi bias. Nevertheless, two points he made are revealing about his alienation from the values of liberal democracy, barely concealed under a veneer of pacifism. One is the idea that the rapprochement between great powers was to be pursued at an elite level, ideally behind closed doors and without regard for the emotional and volatile public opinion.112 That de Man took secret diplomacy very seriously is demonstrated by the “peace mission” he undertook in the winter of 1938–1939. Acting on behalf of Leopold III, he travelled to Paris, the Hague, Copenhagen, London, Berlin, and Rome with the purpose of testing the waters about a possible follow-up of the Munich conference.113 Characteristically, the POB was kept in the dark about what his vice-president was doing, and not even having finally succeeded Vandervelde stopped de Man from pursuing another secret mission upon demand from Leopold III, in January

107  Henri de Man, “Un dilemme: la Guerre ou l’Abdication? Non, il y a une troisième possibilité,” Le Peuple, September 22, 1938. 108  Henri de Man, “Pour une politique socialiste de paix,” Le Peuple, November 1, 1938. 109  Ibidem. 110  Ibidem. 111  “Bureau du Parti—Séance du 10 octobre 1938,” ABWP/AMSAB. See also “Discours de Max Buset,” Le Peuple, November 7, 1938. 112  See, for example, his remarks on popular reactions to the Czech crisis in de Man, “Un dilemme.” 113  See “Mission de paix hiver 1938–1939,” AHDM/CEGESOMA/AA624/40. A voluminous correspondence about this trip is held at CegeSoma. For an overview, see Brélaz, Léopold III et Henri de Man, 85–95.

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

237

1940.114 There is no evidence that de Man regretted his own secretive behaviour—possibly, an indication of his growing estrangement from the POB and from democratic politics more broadly. The second disturbing thread in de Man’s articles is the use of the catch-all category of “imperialism” to downplay obvious differences between totalitarian and non-totalitarian powers. As some commentators observed, de Man did not present Nazi foreign policy as inherently different from that of Britain or of France, as if they were driven by the same desire for domination and expansion.115 In that respect, de Man overtook orthodox centre-right appeasers, who argued for an accommodation with Hitler without necessarily implying any equivalence between fascist and democratic states.116 In fact, he was only one step away from claiming that the increasingly likely collapse of the international system was making distinctions between the aggressors and the victims of aggression irrelevant. In 1914, de Man had scornfully rejected that argument. But, twenty-five years later, his attachment to liberal democracy had become somewhat tenuous, and his revulsion against war had further increased. His prolonged silences during the drôle de guerre therefore became more and more suspicious. “What happens to de Man?,” his long-time rival Degrelle provocatively asked on May 2, 1940. In an unprecedented move, the leader of Rex acclaimed the president of the POB for his “total disdain” towards the “moribund” Belgian regime and ventured to predict that his self-exclusion from politics set the stage for a greater, perhaps even momentous, role to be played the near future: “He preserves himself, clearly, for ineluctable events.”117 114  Only Spaak was informed as prime minister. On de Man’s appointment as POB President and the resistance he met, see “M. Henri de Man est élu président du P.O.B.,” La Nation belge, May 25, 1939; de Man, Après coup, 297–298. On de Man’s second mission to Rome, see “Verslag, I. 1940,” AHDM/AR/495. On de Man’s “powerless” tenure as POB leader, see Mieke Claeys-Van Haegendoren, 25 jaar Belgisch socialisme: evolutie van de verhouding van de Belgische Werkliedenpartij tot de parlementaire democratie in Belgie van 1914 tot 1940 (Antwerp: Standaard Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij, 1967), 394–402. 115  See Grégoire Koulischer, “Une brochure de Henri de Man: ‘Une offensive pour la paix,’” Journal de Charleroi, January 20, 1939; René Hislaire, “Politique de neutralité, politique de paix,” L’Independence belge, November 24, 1939. Interestingly, de Man’s views won the praise of some right-wing Catholics [see, e.g., letter from d’Aspremont Lynden to de Man, 4 January 1939, AHDM/AR/522]. 116  See, for example, Georges Bonnet, La crise européenne: Mai–Septembre 1938 (Marseille: N. I., 1938); Neville Chamberlain, The Struggle for Peace (London: Hutchinson, 1939). 117  Léon Degrelle, “Que devient M. De Man?” Le Pays réel, May 2, 1940.

238 

T. MILANI

* * * Following the military defeat, de Man authored a manifesto, dated June 28, 1940, urging POB militants to “accept the victory” of the Germans as a fait accompli, take this as “a starting point for new social progress,” and join a soon-to-be-formed “single party” which, “within the framework of a movement of national resurrection,” would establish the “Sovereignty of Labour” under Leopold III.118 De Man’s motivations in drafting and releasing this document had been an endless source of controversy. More benevolent interpretations, such as the one provided by Mieke Claeys-Van Haegendoren, pointed to de Man’s “political isolation,” which caused him to miscalculate about the final outcome of the war and the margin of manoeuvre left to the King in Nazi-occupied Belgium.119 Others, like the one more recently set out by Jan Willem Stutje, stressed de Man’s “aristocratic ambition” as a driving force behind his conduct.120 Ultimately, no conclusive explanation can be given for the limited evidence available and different understandings of de Man’s personality may well lead to diverging assessments of his actions. For sure, as Herman Balthazar maintained, “the tendency […] to separate the theoretician from the politician” is “deplorable” as this approach tends to eclipse the “ideological aspect” of de Man’s call for collaboration.121 While his intentions will remain a matter of dispute, his choice of words sheds much light on his outlook in the aftermath of the Belgian capitulation. Interestingly, his manifesto was less a celebration of the Third Reich than a rabid denunciation of the deficiencies of pre-war liberal democracies. True, de Man paid tribute to a system which, “despite everything in it that is alien to our mindset,” had “lessened differences of class” and to “the superior morale of the German army” which he claimed was “due, to a large extent, to the greater social unity of the nation and to the resulting prestige of its authorities.”122 Nevertheless, greater emphasis is placed 118  Hendrik de Man, “Manifest van 28 Juni 1940: Aan de Leden van de Belgische WerkliedenPartij,” AHDM/AMSAB/494. The document was released in French five days later [see Henri de Man, “Un manifeste du P.O.B.,” Gazette de Charleroi, July 3, 1940]. 119  Van Haegendoren, Hendrik de Man, 293. 120  Stutje, Hendrik de Man, 438. 121  Herman Balthazar, “Henri de Man dans la ‘révolution avortée,’” Revue européenne des sciences sociales: Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto 12, no. 31 (1974): 198. 122  Hendrik de Man, “Manifest van 28 Juni 1940: Aan de Leden van de Belgische WerkliedenPartij,” AHDM/AMSAB/494.

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

239

upon the negative contribution of Nazi Germany in ushering in a new era, by bringing about “the debacle of the parliamentary regime and of the capitalist plutocracy in the so-called democracies.”123 Towards the latter, de Man was merciless: Social justice could not emerge out of a regime which pretended to be democratic but under which, in fact, the power of money and professional politicians dominated, one more and more incapable of any bold initiative, of any serious reform. […] The pluto-­democracies offer us the spectacle of authorities deserting their positions and of the rich crossing borders by car, without worrying about what happens to the masses.124

In his view, war had already “condemned regimes wherein speeches are a substitute for actions, responsibilities are dissipated in the small talk of the assemblies, and the slogan of individual freedom serves as a cushion for conservative egoism.”125 The time was ripe for the building of “a new world” by an “elite” who preferred “a dangerous and hasty life to a torpid and easy one” and who sought “responsibility instead of shying away from it.”126 De Man’s alienation from liberal democracy is key in explaining his immediate—and, ultimately, self-delusional—understanding of the defeat as a fatal but much-needed moment of reckoning for his country.127 This is confirmed by another source, namely the editorials he published on Le Travail in September–October 1941. By then, any hopes of quickly establishing a Vichy-style type of government for Belgium had vanished. De Man’s remarks, therefore, can hardly be taken as an attempt to win the sympathies of the Germans or to pander to a popular opinion longing for

 Ibidem.  Ibidem. 125  Ibidem. 126  Ibidem. 127  In a text based on the notes he took during eighteen-day war against Germany, de Man wrote that, on May 20, 1940, Queen Elizabeth of Belgium called Hitler “a kind of elementary or demonic force performing a destructive role that has probably become necessary” and speculated that “a more socialist order” was likely to emerge because of him [“Les dixhuit jours,” AHDM/CEGESOMA/AA624/118]. De Man reported an excerpt of this conversation in his memoirs, without citing the source, and commented that “one could doubt” about Hitler’s “constructive capacity, but his work of destruction, clearing, and removing obstacles seemed well achieved” in the summer of 1940 [De Man, Cavalier seul, 258–259]. 123 124

240 

T. MILANI

a smooth accommodation with the victors.128 In his articles he predicted a forthcoming reconciliation between “the socialist order” and the “authoritarian state,”129 in the name of a purportedly upcoming “authoritarian democracy” replacing “bourgeois democracy.”130 The latter, de Man explained, would be supplanted by a new system finally “free from the flaws of plutocratic regimes.”131 Rather than identifying democracy with “one or another of the stages” of mankind’s “movement” towards greater freedom,132 true believers in socialism were invited to welcome any “new incarnation” of “democratic will” enabling workers to march towards “more well-being, security, and consideration—in a word, greater human dignity.”133 Even though de Man did not go so far as to portray the Third Reich as the harbinger of a future socialist state, he nonetheless maintained that “despite the occupation, one must act for the improvement of workers’ conditions and the ideological preparation of a unified and socialist Europe,” exploiting the “minimum” of freedom tolerated “in times of war.”134 To his mind, that attitude was still preferable to the defence of “parliamentary democracy,” which had turned into “an obstacle to be overcome” rather than a set of institutions worth being protected.135 Whatever one could read between the lines of these rather schematic and convoluted pieces, it is plain that, having eventually disavowed the historical legacy of political liberalism—including constitutional government, pluralism, and individual rights—de Man had ceased to be a social democrat. The man who, two years earlier, still retained hopes that, despite the “real depth” of its “crisis,” parliamentary democracy had “serious chances of surviving in Belgium,” had crossed a threshold, choosing demolition over reform.136 Indeed, his wartime writings retained a 128   For an overview, see Paul Struye and Guillaume Jacquemyns, La Belgique sous l’occupation allemande (1940–1944) ed. José Gotovitch (Brussels: Complexe, 2002), esp. 63–70. On de Man’s collaboration in 1940–1941, see Jean Gérard-Libois and José Gotovitch, L’An 40: La Belgique occupée (Brussels: CRISP, 1971), 216–232; Etienne Verhoeyen, La Belgique occupée: de l’an 40 à la libération (Brussels: de Boeck-Wesmael, 1994), 171–202. 129  Henri de Man, “La liberté ou les libertés,” Le Travail, no. 1 (1941): 1. 130  Henri de Man, “Vers la démocratie autoritaire,” Le Travail, no. 2 (1941): 1. 131  Henri de Man, “Illusions et réalités de la démocratie,” Le Travail, no. 3 (1941): 2. 132  Henri de Man, “Les mobiles de la démocratie,” Le Travail, no. 4 (1941): 1. 133  Henri de Man, “Le contenu social de la démocratie,” Le Travail, no. 5 (1941): 1. 134  Henri de Man, “Libertés concrètes,” Le Travail, no. 7 (1941): 2. 135  Henri de Man, “La liberté change de camp,” Le Travail, no. 8 (1941): 2. 136  “Réflexions sur la monarchie constitutionnelle,” memorandum dated 23 May 1938, AHDM/AR/377.

9  DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR: HENDRIK DE MAN IN POWER 

241

distinctly illiberal flavour even after late 1941, when the hardened stance of German occupying authorities led him to flee from Belgium.137 That de Man stubbornly refused to be pigeonholed among fascists was of secondary importance: in the light of his early wartime conduct and unremitting condemnation of interwar Belgian politics, it is no wonder that most social democrats, and especially fellow POB members who pledged their allegiance to the Pierlot government in exile, disparaged him as a renegade.138 What remains to be seen is whether, after 1945, some of de Man’s earlier ideas—those untinged by his subsequent authoritarian drift—came to fruition and the extent to which social democracy managed to come to terms with them.

137  From his Swiss self-imposed exile, de Man continued to reiterate the distinction between “authoritarian socialists,” who “really wanted a socialist order,” and “those who cling to the methods of the past,” being “content with playing a small role within the existing regime” [De Man, Cahiers de Ma Montagne, 154]. 138  See, for example, “Réponse au manifeste De Man, du 28 juin 40, par Monsieur Camille Huysmans” dated 28 September 1940, PPHS/EUI/PHS-49; “Allocution radiophonique de Jef Rens: Henri de Man, doublement traître,” June 22, 1942, AJR/CEGESOMA/ AA830/273. Only a few isolated voices—mostly former followers and friends of him— sought to rescue his name between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s: see, for example, Georges Lefranc, Histoire des doctrines sociales dans l’Europe contemporaine (Paris: Aubier, 1960), 258–266; André Philip, Les socialistes (Paris: Seuil, 1967), 68–77. As late as 1973, the official POB historian Robert Abs observed that the “passions” raised by the “case de Man” had not yet been “extinguished” [Robert Abs, Emile Vandervelde (Brussels: Labor, 1973), 241].

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion: Hendrik de Man and Post-War Social Democracy

This book has investigated the relationship between Hendrik de Man and Western European social democracy as it developed between 1914 and 1940. Throughout these years, de Man’s influence over the movement peaked twice: intellectually, with the publication of Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus, in 1926; politically, with the launching of and the subsequent campaign for the Belgian Labour Plan, in late 1933 to mid-1935. In sharp contrast, the period following the 1936 election was one of swift decline in both realms, culminating into de Man’s call for collaboration with Nazi Germany, which made him an outcast from the post-war Left. Despite de Man’s professed faith in the socialist idea, his ascendancy on social democracy did not outlive the invasion of Belgium. The evidence presented in this study suggests that de Man’s considerable interwar prestige did not result from the value of his intellectual contributions alone: the theoretical and practical difficulties faced by social democracy provided him with windows of opportunity to emerge and establish himself as a leader. In a nutshell, the growing gulf between orthodox Marxism and the socio-political realities of Western Europe is the backdrop against which de Man’s trajectory must be discussed. Because of his life experiences as well as his inner knowledge of socialist thought, de Man was exceptionally suited to chart a course of action for social democracy outside the boundaries of Marxism. His voluntarism, so clearly articulated in his writings of the 1920s, predisposed him to search for proactive, imaginative solutions to the economic crisis of the 1930s. Given © The Author(s) 2020 T. Milani, Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0_10

243

244 

T. MILANI

his peculiar background, de Man had no qualms in advocating an extensive use of state power to revive the economy while shifting at the same time the internal balance of the capitalist system in favour of the working class: the Belgian Labour Plan, with its underlying call for the creation of a mixed economy, grew out of this insight. However, as this book demonstrated, de Man’s vision was not universally shared or welcomed by his fellow social democrats. For all its appeal as a buzzword, “planning” was a highly problematic notion from a traditional Marxist standpoint as it promised to transform capitalism from within instead of overthrowing or superseding it from without. Equally contentious was the idea of integrating middle classes into the electoral base of social democracy, hence calling the latter’s self-identification with the industrial working class into question. Furthermore, a comparative and transnational analysis of the reception of de Man’s Labour Plan reveals that different national contexts mattered in determining how de Man’s proposal was read and understood. In countries in which the Marxist tradition was more resilient, such as Belgium and France, the most innovative aspects of de Man’s planism were resisted by incumbent leaders who regarded them as adventurist; where the Marxist tradition was less dominant or barely present, such as in Britain, de Man’s ideas failed to strike a chord for their seemingly lack of originality or came across as more moderate than they actually were. Partly because of its inherent ambiguities and partly because of the chaotic political conjuncture in which it emerged, de Man’s planism sparked heated discussions but never took root as firmly as his creator hoped. De Man’s growing involvement in Belgian governmental politics after 1935 constrained his ability to elucidate and further sharpen the planist vision he had set forth. Lastly, his wartime collaboration cast a long shadow on his previous ventures, leading some scholars— most notably Sternhell—to contend that planism contained the seeds of fascism from the outset. Altogether, there is little doubt that de Man’s political career began to fall apart at least some years before the summer of 1940. But what about his wider, highly ambitious attempt to reshape Western European social democracy as a post-Marxist project? Might it be possible that de Man’s ideas “bore fruit after the war” as the Labour Plan became “in many ways the model for state planning in much of Western Europe after 1945”?1 1  Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: Penguin, 1998), 138. See also Erik Hansen, “Hendrik de Man and the Theoretical Foundations of Economic

10  CONCLUSION: HENDRIK DE MAN AND POST-WAR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 

245

To answer this question, several elements must be taken into account. On the surface, post-war social democrats did not want to be saddled with de Man’s tarnished reputation, and this was nowhere more true than in Belgium, where former POB members conveniently claimed de Man had “tried to contaminate the Labour Party” with Nazi ideas, as if naïve but well-intentioned cadres had been tricked into bowing to “an anti-­ democratic and anti-parliamentary movement” from 1933 onwards.2 Furthermore, vivid memories of de Man’s manifesto held revisionism back. When the Parti Socialiste Belge (PSB) was founded in 1945 on the ashes of the POB, the delegates pledged allegiance to the original Charte de Quaregnon without amending it because, as de Brouckère warned, “innocent novelties […] may lead to fascism.”3 The backlash against planism was not limited to de Man’s home country. Pietro Nenni, an anti-­ fascist exile and leader of the clandestine Italian Socialist Party, following a close reading of Après Coup, wrote in February 1942 that de Man’s “neoreformism” remained “a serious danger for the labour movement,” and had to be intellectually denounced.4 For their part, communists turned de Man’s life into a cautionary tale, “a story” that militants who “have been offered, are offered or will be offered new, non-Marxist formulas” had to “reflect on.”5 Disowning de Man, however, did not prevent social democrats from being haunted by some of the weaknesses he had spotted since the 1920s, Planning: The Belgian Experience, 1933–40,” European History Quarterly, 8, no. 2 (1978): 235–257. A similar point was tentatively made by Tinbergen, who served as first director of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau from 1945 to 1955: see Jan Tinbergen, “Hendrik de Man: Oorspronkelijk Denker,” Bulletin de l’association pour l’étude de l’œuvre d’Henri de Man, no. 13 (1985): 145. 2  Camille Huysmans, About Belgium (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1944), 39. One Catholic intellectual similarly argued that de Man had re-joined the POB upon return from Germany “in much the same manner as a pirate boards a ship” [Johannes Albertus Goris (Marnix Gijsen), Belgium in Bondage (New York: L.B. Fischer, 1943), 45]. 3  Cited in Steven P.  Kramer, “Belgian Socialism at the Liberation, 1944–1950,” Res Publica 20, no. 1, (1978): 117. As Martin Conway put it, the PSB was at first characterised by “a pervasive and essentially insurmountable immobility” [Martin Conway, The Sorrows of Belgium, 187]. 4  Pietro Nenni, Vent’anni di fascismo, ed. Gioietta Dallò (Milan: Edizioni Avanti!, 1964), 327. Nenni restated his faith in Marxism and went on to support an alliance with the Communist Party in the 1948 Italian election. On Nenni’s outlook, see Alexander de Grand, “‘To Learn Nothing and to Forget Nothing’: Italian Socialism and the Experience of Exile Politics, 1935–1945,” Contemporary European History 14, no. 4 (2005): 539–558. 5  Victor Leduc, Le marxisme, est-il dépassé? (Paris: Raison d’être, 1946), 54.

246 

T. MILANI

and the remedies they found after 1945 seemed curiously reminiscent of de Man’s prescriptions. Tellingly, the first manifesto issued by the PSB conceded that the party needed “intellectuals”: doctors, nurses, teachers, professors, chemists, architects, and other professionals were warmly invited to join.6 Reaching out to non-manual workers lay at the core of the electoral strategy more consistently pursued in the following decade, when the PSB dropped its hackneyed Marxist jargon to woo the classes moyennes, and finally managed to expand its base well beyond working-class voters.7 Similarly, the party’s economic agenda, built upon the notion of économie dirigée, focused on the need to spread private property instead of suppressing it, established the “outline of an economic programme” under which the “private enterprise and individual efforts” could “develop with the highest degree of freedom” without damaging the “general interests,” and envisaged a tighter regulation of credit to “prevent the formation of a financial oligarchy choking industries and small businesses.”8 One could perhaps argue that, albeit stripped of the flamboyant anti-capitalist rhetoric of the 1930s, the language of planism still reverberated through the PSB. An even stronger presence could be detected within Belgian trade unions, where a former follower of de Man and leader of the metallurgy union, André Renard, remained an outspoken advocate of far-reaching structural reforms.9 These analogies were less accidental than one might think, especially when considering the “resilient planning euphoria” in the wake of the Second World War, from which neither the Right nor the Left were immune.10 Belgian social democrats as well as their counterparts in the rest of Western Europe came to terms with the once despised mixed economy, accepting the latter as entirely compatible with their long-term goals, and 6  P.S.B., La ligne politique du Parti précédé de la déclaration des principes: textes adoptés par le Congrès de la Victoire des 9, 10 et 11 juin 1945 (Brussels: SOC, 1945), 47. 7  See Sarah Timperman, “1945–1954: Le PSB s’ouvre aux classes moyennes,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 3–4 (1998): 445–498. 8  Exécutif du P.S.B., Qu’entend-on par économie dirigée? (Brussels: PSB, 1949), 4, 8. 9  On Renard and renardisme, see Pierre Tilly, André Renard (Brussels-Liège: Le Cri, Fondation Renard, 2005), 2005. 10  David C. Engerman, “The Rise and Fall of Central Planning,” in The Cambridge History of the Second World War. Vol. III, ed. Michael Geyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 598. Judt called planning the “political religion of Western Europe,” on which “all were agreed—resisters and politicians alike” [Judt, Postwar, 67]. For a recent comparative analysis, see Isser Woloch, The Postwar Moment: Progressive Forces in Britain, France and the United States after World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019).

10  CONCLUSION: HENDRIK DE MAN AND POST-WAR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 

247

in that respect one of de Man’s key insights was vindicated. A strong impetus came from the British LP who, having achieved a resounding victory in the 1945 general election, nationalised the Bank of England, civil aviation, coal, communications, transport, electricity, gas, iron, and steel; built a universal health care system; established a national insurance; and reformed housing and education.11 In France, nationalisations were carried out without much opposition by a series of provisional tripartite governments between 1944 and 1946, with the SFIO as partner. A Commissariat Général au Plan was set up under the direction of Jean Monnet and given the task of rebuilding the national economy. Social security was also expanded in 1946–1947.12 Yet neither in these countries nor in Belgium— where nationalisations were far more limited—social democrats couched these measures in socialist, let alone Marxist, terms.13 To a degree, this was due to the polarising effect of the early Cold War, as they felt obliged to part company with the communists, rhetorically no less than strategically.14 But, above all, this low-key approach reflected a growing awareness that, as long as sustained economic recovery was accomplished, unfettered competition could be restricted, full employment was not out of reach, and striking a sustainable balance between the public and the private sector would bolster stability, economic progress, and peace, even though all this stopped short of creating a fully socialist society. Since the downfall of capitalism, not so unthinkable in the 1930s, had not materialised, the prospect of turning the state into an engine of growth and redistribution became much more appealing. As Kingsley Martin observed in 1951, if 11  For an overview, see Kenneth O.  Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945–1951 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), esp. 94–187; Peter Hennessy, Never Again: Britain, 1945–51 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), esp. 119–215. 12  For an overview, see Claude Gruson, Origine et espoirs de la planification française (Paris: Dunod, 1968), 38–47; Margairaz, L’Etat, les finances et l’économie. Volume II, 807–859. 13  See, for example, Serge Berstein, “La SFIO,” in Les nationalisations de la Libération: de l’utopie au compromise, eds. Claire Andrieu, Lucette Le Van and Antoine Prost (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1987), 168–184; Catherine Ellis, “Letting it Slip: The Labour Party and the ‘Mystical Halo’ of Nationalization, 1951–1964,” Contemporary British History 26, no. 1 (2012): 47–71; Conway, The Sorrows of Belgium, 181–182. 14  See how the SFIO secretary Guy Mollet embraced the alliance with the French Christian Democrats in 1947 despite having been elected on an impeccably orthodox Marxist platform the year before: Bruce Desmond Graham, The French Socialists and Tripartisme, 1944–1947 (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1965), 197–219, 252–265; Roger Quilliot, La S.F.I.O. et l’exercice du pouvoir, 1944–1958 (Paris: Fayard, 1972), 170–184, 228–234.

248 

T. MILANI

“a minimum standard of life” could be guaranteed together with traditional liberal freedoms and “rights of social security, adequate leisure, and adequate employment […] would it not be idiotic to denounce such as system as Keynesian, reformist, Kautskyist, or any other phrase from the vocabulary of Marxist controversy, and to demand, in order to produce something called Socialism, that we should fight class war to the bitter end with all that implies?”15 According to Martin and other Labour left-­ wingers, attaining that level of social justice remained unfinished business.16 Yet even those who lamented the shortcomings of the post-war welfare state rarely belittled its progressive character. By the same token, the tangible achievements of the mixed economy did much to curb any remaining revolutionary fervour within the social democratic camp. Books like Anthony Crosland’s The Future of Socialism, which emphasised the “diminishing area of controversy” among parties on economic issues, or André Philip’s Pour un socialisme humaniste, in which socialism was loosely defined as the “technique of realisation of democratic values,” set the tone for the new pragmatic era.17 But how consistent were these developments with de Man’s views and teachings? Being a persistent critic of the USSR since 1917, de Man never pinned high hopes on the possibility of an enduring cooperation with Western European communists, thus encouraging social democracy to pursue a firmly independent course of action. Yet it would be misleading to conclude that post-1945 Western European social democrats, despite operating in a context which often precluded any engagement with communist forces, turned into latter-day enforcers of 1930s planism. After all, countless groups called for “planning” throughout the Great Depression and de Man’s followers could not retrospectively claim the monopoly over the term—even though there is room to argue that de Man “acted as a catalyst” of all those tendencies.18 Besides, recent scholarship has highlighted that the 1940s were perhaps of greater significance in  Kingsley Martin, Socialism and the Welfare State (London: Fabian Tract, 1951), 10.  See ibidem, 10–14; Ian Mikardo, The Second Five Years: A Labour Programme for 1950 (London: Fabian Society, 1948); G.D.H. Cole, Is this Socialism? (London: New Statesman & Nation, 1954). 17  Anthony Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), 498; André Philip, Pour un socialisme humaniste (Paris: Plon, 1960), 195. 18  M.L. Smith, “Ideas for a New Order in France, Britain and the Low Countries in the 1930s,” in European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period, ed. Peter M. Stirk (LondonNew York: Pinter, 1989), 157. 15 16

10  CONCLUSION: HENDRIK DE MAN AND POST-WAR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 

249

the consolidation of a new interventionist culture, due to the intensification of transnational intellectual exchanges among exiles and the crossfertilisation between discourses on globalism, modernisation, development, and planning.19 The scope and comprehensiveness of planning after 1945 also matters when it comes to evaluating whether the Belgian Labour Plan was its harbinger. Robert Marjolin—who pursued a highly successful career as civil servant after his early involvement in French left-wing politics during the 1930s—contended in his memoirs that post-­war planning ought not to be confused with pre-war planism: after 1945, “the issue was to allocate scarce resources—labour, raw materials, foreign exchange, equipment—for the uses that appeared the most important. To do that, it was necessary to draw up a set of priorities. And one could do so without being dirigiste, interventionist on principle, and a fortiori socialist” whereas original planism “was an ideological construct. It aimed to replace the market forces at a time when these could still operate and would have yielded the results sought (economic expansion, reduction of employment) if only the necessary conditions were met.”20 Marjolin’s claim that pre-war planism intended to fully replace the market is inaccurate, at least with reference to the variant championed by de Man. Nevertheless, his words point to a crucial difference: pre-war planning, and planism more generally, envisioned a high level of micro-management of the economy by the state, often empowering the working class, whereas post-war planning leaned towards macro-management, the limitation of direct interference and extensive technocratic governance.21 Moreover, the postwar Keynesian synthesis rested upon a strong degree of international cooperation and a sound coordination between fiscal and monetary policy: markets were embedded not only nationally but also i­nternationally, 19  See, for example, Or Rosenboim, The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), esp. 130–167; Michele Alacevich, “Planning Peace: The European Roots of the Post-War Global Development Challenge,” Past & Present 239, no. 1 (2018): 219–264; Sara Lorenzini, Global Development: A Cold War History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 9–21. 20  Marjolin, Le travail, 67. For Marjolin, these “necessary conditions” amounted to deficit spending. 21  To quote David Marquand, “the Keynesian system was quintessentially a system of indirect rule. The Keynesian managers did not have to dirty their hands in the grubby world where factories are managed, products manufactured and markets captured; they did not even have to deal face to face with those who did. They had only to pull the levers of demand from an aloof sanctum in Treasury Chambers” [David Marquand, The Progressive Dilemma: From Lloyd George to Kinnock (London: Heinemann, 1990), 64].

250 

T. MILANI

through the Bretton Woods system.22 De Man was not totally neglectful of those dimensions. For instance, he occasionally extolled the benefits of an economically integrated Europe.23 Similarly, his support for devaluation in 1934 indicates that his understanding of monetary issues was subtler and less dogmatic than most social democrats’ of the time.24 However, it holds true that de Man tended to exaggerate the ability of individual nation states to spend their way out of major recessions, underestimating how badly capital mobility might have hurt small open economies.25 More generally, the economics of planism was rudimentary, almost homespun if compared to the macroeconomic models that gained ground during and after the Second World War.26 To sum up, post-war planning turned out to be less invasive, less politicised, less ideologically charged but also intellectually more sophisticated than the one de Man had stood for. Another major difference between de Man’s ideas and post-war social democracy lies in their respective attitudes towards parliamentary rule. By and large, social democrats did not see the point of combining support for planning with a commitment to thoroughgoing institutional reform. After 1945, as Donald Sassoon pointed out, “the Left participated in institutional changes and constitution-making only in countries where it was necessary to do so” but, in general, showed no inclination to undercut the authority of parliaments: “[I]t was as if, throughout Western Europe, the 22  See John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organisation 36, no. 2 (1982): 379–415; Donald Markwell, John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 210–267. 23  See, for example, Henri de Man, Réflexions sur la Paix (Brussels: Éditions de la Toison d’Or, 1942), in which de Man sketched out a post-war European Union based on pooled sovereignty, supranational control of armaments, the abolition of internal tariffs, a common external commercial policy, and close economic cooperation [ibidem, esp. 73–76]. 24  For a comparison with the French, see Kenneth Mouré, “‘Une Eventualité Absolument Exclue’: French Reluctance to Devalue, 1933–1936,” French Historical Studies 15, no. 3 (1988): 479–506. 25  The risk of capital outflows during the implementation of the Plan was barely alluded to in de Man’s writings, although a literature already existed on the topic. For a contemporary overview, see Gaëtan Pirou, La monnaie française depuis la guerre, 1914–36: inflation, stabilisation, dévaluation (Paris: Sirey, 1936). 26  Even if it seems plausible that an early interest in planism paved the ground for a wider reception of Keynes’ work, especially in France: see Pierre Rosanvallon, “The Development of Keynesianism in France,” in The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations, ed. Peter A. Hall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 171–193.

10  CONCLUSION: HENDRIK DE MAN AND POST-WAR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 

251

socialist and social-democratic Left had accepted the Leninist view of politics with a special twist: the bourgeois state could not be reformed, it could only be smashed; as the socialists did not wish to smash it, they accepted it in its entirety.”27 This streak of conservatism caught the eye of de Man. In one of his very rare post-war contributions on the future of socialism,28 a private letter written in January 1949 and published after his death, he contended that “the greatest fault of this last generation of socialists has been to mistake democracy for the parliamentary regime,” the latter being “in total decline since the end of the era of bourgeois revolutions.”29 The parliamentary system, de Man continued, was only “a recent and transient variant” of democracy which worked “well, more or less, only in Britain and Scandinavia” but elsewhere had proved itself unable to “transform the social order by structural reforms,” paving the ground for “coalition governments” dominated by “the power of money.”30 In retrospect, de Man’s historical assessment appears too harsh, and it would be easy to note that dismissing parliamentary rule as a fraud is only a step away from endorsing the suppression of representative institutions, a blunder de Man had already made in 1940. On the other hand, de Man was quite right in arguing that, also due to proportional representation and the moderating influence of upper Chambers, parliamentary systems encouraged short-termism, forcing social democratic parties to lurch from compromise to compromise, from deal to deal, up to the point of losing their appetite for radical change. Rather than taking it as an instrument to advance a socialist agenda, post-war social democrats “insisted political democracy was an end in itself.”31 By doing so, one major political goal of planism remained unfulfilled, namely rekindling confidence in democracy by making binding commitments to detailed sets of measures, thereby eschewing much of the horse-trading that  Sassoon, One Hundred Years, 128, 129.  After 1945, de Man’s writings focused on the development of nuclear weapons, the Cold War, and the challenge of mechanisation and technological development. His last published work was devoted to the rise and fall of civilisations: see Hendrik de Man, Vermassung und Kulturverfall: eine Diagnose unserer Zeit (Munich: Leo Lehnen, 1951). 29  Letter dated January 26, 1949, in “Henri de Man,” Écrits de Paris: revue des questions actuelles, no. 117 (1954): 94–95. 30  Ibidem, 95. 31  Dietrich Orlow, Common Destiny: A Comparative History of the Dutch, French and German Social Democratic Parties, 1945–1969 (Oxford-New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 45. 27 28

252 

T. MILANI

consociational politics entails.32 Having accepted the logic of a system based on “a culture of power-sharing,”33 social democracy became more and more entangled with the structures underpinning post-war corporatism: consequently, by the end of the 1970s, its representatives looked more like guardians of the status quo than agents of reform.34 In that respect, it is noteworthy that at least one distinguished disciple of de Man, Louis Vallon, was drawn into the orbit of Gaullism by the General’s pro-­ planning economic outlook coupled with a penchant for a strong executive authority, capable of curtailing the power of the legislative branch.35 De Gaulle’s record after 1958 does suggest that the alliance between a popular president and an elite of reform-minded haute fonctionnaires could produce a coherent, and largely successful, policy of modernisation from above; whether that policy had anything to do with democratic socialism is, of course, more debatable.36 The continuities between de Man’s vision and post-war social democracy should therefore not be overstated. It would be equally misleading, however, to discard planism as an interwar oddity with negligible impact on subsequent historical developments. A more nuanced approach would lead to see planism as a formative experience which enabled a new generation of social democrats to challenge the foundations of their parties’ ideology and programmes without being forced to break with social democracy as a whole. With the benefit of hindsight, planism was less successful in building consensus around the importance of filling the vacuum created by the crisis of Marxism than in carving out a niche for dissidents whose acquaintance with de Man predisposed them to accept the 32  For an overview, see Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies, ed. Kenneth McRae (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974). 33  Martin Conway, “Democracy in Postwar Western Europe: The Triumph of a Political Model,” European History Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2002): 60. 34  See the penetrating portrait of right-wing social democrats in Ralf Dahrendorf, “The End of Social-Democratic Consensus?: The Legitimacy of Political Power in Contemporary Societies,” in Life Chances: Approaches to Social and Political Theory (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 106–121. 35  See Julian Jackson, A Certain Idea of France: The Life of Charles de Gaulle (London: Penguin, 2018), 368–373, 399–400. Vallon did not hesitate to draw links between de Man’s thinking, pre-war planism, and the post-war planned economy: see Louis Vallon ou la politique en liberté: de Jaurès à de Gaulle, ed. Gérard Brun (Paris: Economica, 1986), esp. 186–218. 36  See Jackson, A Certain Idea, 637–641. It was another follower of de Man, André Philip, who denounced this model as “authoritarian technocratic socialism”: see ibid., 640.

10  CONCLUSION: HENDRIK DE MAN AND POST-WAR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 

253

mixed economy ten or fifteen years later. Because of that, planism ought to be viewed not as a forebear but as a laboratory and a training ground. It is thus significant that some former planists were keen to acknowledge the lasting mark de Man had left on their political education. Most notably, Paul-Henri Spaak’s memoirs contain a heartfelt, almost emphatic, tribute to de Man in which the author claimed the Father of the Plan had “largely contributed” to his abandonment of “romantic and unrealistic” positions, admitted he had been “seduced, perhaps even a bit subdued” by his personality, and wished that, despite his “severe blunders” during the war, de Man could eventually be remembered as “the most authentic socialist thinker of the twentieth century” as well as “one of the greatest socialists of our time.”37 Others, more prosaically, did not hesitate to draw heavily from the planist literature—including the CGT Plan of 1934–1935—when imagining the forthcoming reorganisation of the national economy on behalf of the Resistance: this was the case of André Philip and Jules Moch.38 Finally, the fact that many figures associated with or interested in de Man’s thought held key cabinet positions in the early post-war period should not pass unnoticed: in France, Paul Ramadier and Robert Lacoste, respectively as Prime Minister and Minister of Labour, were involved in the reconstruction during the crucial years 1947–195039; in Britain, Stafford Cripps, Hugh Dalton, and Hugh Gaitskell carried great weight under Attlee40; in Belgium, the PSB’s machine soon came under the grip of Buset41; and so on. Lumping them together as members of a “de Man generation” would be far-fetched but it remains true that all of them cut their teeth reflecting on and debating economic planning 37  Spaak, Combats inachevés. Vol. I, 25–26. On Spaak’s relationship with de Man, see Jacques Willequet, Paul-Henri Spaak: un homme, des combats (Brussels: La Renaissance du Livre, 1975), 38–42, 71–98, and Michel Dumoulin, Spaak (Brussels: Racines, 1999), esp. 50–61, 91–98. 38  For further discussion, see Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 173–179; Margairaz, L’Etat, les finances et l’économie. Vol. II, 739–742. 39  See Jean-Jacques Becker, “Paul Ramadier et l’année 1947,” in Paul Ramadier, la République et le socialisme, ed. Serge Bernstein (Brussels: Complexe, 1990), 221–237; Pierre Brana and Joëlle Dusseau, Robert Lacoste (1898–1989): de la Dordogne à l’Algérie, un socialiste devant l’histoire (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010), 129–175. 40  For an overview, see Jim Tomlinson, Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy: The Attlee Years, 1945–1951 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 41  Robert Falony, Le Parti Socialiste: un demi-siècle de bouleversements, de Max Buset à Elio Di Rupo (Brussels: Pire, 2006), esp. 15–20.

254 

T. MILANI

between the two world wars, and grappling with de Man’s works was part of their intellectual apprenticeship. The fact that their pro-planning outlook was by then seen as a fully legitimate, even indispensable, component of a sound left-of-centre approach to economics meant that the language of planning had percolated through the social democratic discourse, an outcome which owed something to de Man’s intellectual and political engagements. The last and perhaps more controversial issue to be addressed is whether de Man’s relationship with Western European social democracy could have been more constructive and fruitful, especially considering how rapidly and smoothly social democracy accommodated itself to the mixed economy after 1945. This does not imply that planism had all the answers: rather, as this book has shown, its inherent contradictions and opacity contributed to its early success but also to its quick demise, and the effects of properly implemented planist measures remain open to speculation as these were never consistently tried out.42 Nevertheless, if one resists a teleological reading of de Man’s individual trajectory, much of the suspicion, criticism, and outright hostility that his ideas generated at the moment they were publicly expressed seems unfair or at least out of proportion. Once set into their original context, without projecting the events of 1940 onto them, de Man’s views hardly resemble a destructive force, tainting a respectable movement with crypto-fascist beliefs: rather, they appear a flawed yet bold endeavour to step up to the intellectual and political challenges of the time. Very little of this pioneering spirit can be found in the record of Kautsky, Vandervelde, or Blum, whose emotional as well as theoretical attachment to Marxism did not facilitate a prompt response to unforeseen events, whether those were the collapse of the Second International, wartime mobilisation, the emergence of American capitalism, party bureaucratisation, the rise of fascism, or the persistence of mass unemployment. Too busy preserving the analytical framework they had inherited from previous generations, overwhelmingly concerned with the maintenance of strict ideological conformity, they constantly ran the risk of overlooking or misinterpreting forces that operated outside their mental maps. Although a detailed examination of the consequences of these conservative instincts goes well beyond the scope of this conclusion, it seems plausible that social democracy might have gained in dynamism, 42  In the words of Jackson, because planism “failed politically one is not able to judge it economically” [Jackson, The Politics of Depression, 166].

10  CONCLUSION: HENDRIK DE MAN AND POST-WAR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 

255

flexibility, and—maybe—popular appeal if it had engaged with de Man’s intuitions more closely at an earlier stage. A minor episode is revealing in this regard. On May 30, 1947, Léon Blum gave a speech at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. By then, the 75-year-­ old former prime minister no longer had misgivings about the compatibility of state planning and socialism. “The modern state” Blum told the audience “is detaching itself progressively from capitalism and this is why it is possible for socialist parties to handle it without serving it and, all the more so without serving capitalism. As these parties take power, they gain an instrument for struggling against capitalism, that is by using the authority of the state to set conditions favourable for the attainment of socialism.”43 This statement encapsulates the very essence of de Man’s planism: Blum, who took several unorthodox stances on doctrinal matters in 1946–1947, was now encouraging a form of revisionism not so different from the one he had once opposed.44 Yet timing in politics is almost everything. One can only wonder whether a less hidebound attitude towards Marxism in the 1920s and 1930s by its orthodox wing would have enhanced social democracy’s ability to respond to fascism, tackle the economic crisis, or further expand socially as well as electorally after the Second World War. For sure, incumbent leaders handled planism as a threat instead of an opportunity, as if the very identity and raison d’être of socialism were at stake. The subsequent history of social democracy was also shaped by their inclination to choose the known over the unknown.

43  Léon Blum, “Exercice et conquête du pouvoir,” In L’Œuvre de Léon Blum. Vol. VI (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1958), 436. 44  Serge Berstein situated Blum’s main work of this period, A l’échelle humaine, “beyond Marxism,” drawing parallels between him and de Man [Berstein, Léon Blum, 670].

Bibliography

Archives ABSO/AMSAB Archief van BWP-Bureau voor Sociaal Onderzoek, AMSAB-Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Ghent.

ABWP/AMSAB Archief van Belgische Geschiedenis, Ghent.

Werkliedenpartij,

AMSAB-Instituut

voor

Sociale

ACR/BNC Archivio Carlo Rosselli, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Florence.

AEV/IEV Archives d’Emile Vandervelde, Institut Emile Vandervelde, Brussels.

AGL/ISRT Archivi di Giustizia e Libertà, Istituto Storico della Resistenza in Toscana, Florence.

© The Author(s) 2020 T. Milani, Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0

257

258 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AHDM/AMSAB Archief Hendrik de Man, AMSAB-Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Ghent.

AHDM/AR Archief Hendrik de Man, Algemeen Rijksarchief, Brussels.

AHDM/CEGESOMA Archief Hendrik de Man, CegeSoma, Brussels.

AHDM/IISG

Archief van Hendrik de Man, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam.

AJR/CEGESOMA Archief Jef Rens, CegeSoma, Brussels.

AKK/IISG Archief van Karl Kautsky, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam.

ARJL/IEV Archives de Robert J. Lemoine, Institut Emile Vandervelde, Brussels.

PVCM/AR Procès-verbaux du Conseil des Ministres, Algemeen Rijksarchief, Brussels.

EDP/LSE Evan Durbin Papers, London School of Economics and Political Science, London.

FAMP/AN Fonds des Amis de Marceau Pivert, Archives Nationales, Paris.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

FAP/AN Fonds André Philip, Archives Nationales, Paris.

FAT/AN Fonds André Tardieu, Archives Nationales, Paris.

FAT/FGF Fondo Angelo Tasca, Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, Milan.

FAT/ILO

Fonds Albert Thomas, International Labour Office, Geneva.

FEG/BPF Fonds Elie Gounelle, Bibliothèque du protestantisme français, Paris.

FJC/AN Fonds Jean Coutrot, Archives Nationales, Paris.

FJZ/CHS Fonds Jean Zyromski, Centre d’Histoire Sociale du XXème Siècle, Paris.

FLB/AN Fonds Léon Blum, Archives Nationales, Paris.

FLB/IEV Fonds Louis Bertrand, Institut Emile Vandervelde, Brussels.

FLDM/AMSAB Fonds Lecocq-De Man, AMSAB-Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Ghent.

259

260 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

FLL/IHS

Fonds Lucien Laurat, Institut d’Histoire Sociale, Nanterre.

FLZ/IHS Fonds Ludovic Zoretti, Institut d’Histoire Sociale, Nanterre.

FMD/OURS Fonds Maurice Deixonne, Office Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste, Paris.

FP/AN Fonds Panthéon, Archives Nationales, Paris.

FRB/IHS Fonds René Belin, Institut d’Histoire Sociale, Nanterre.

FRP/AN Fonds René Pleven, Archives Nationales, Paris.

FSA/NFRB/LSE Fabian Society Archives, New Fabian Research Bureau, London School of Economics and Political Science, London.

FSA/SSIP/LSE Fabian Society Archives, Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, London School of Economics and Political Science, London.

FVA/AN Fonds Vincent Auriol, Archives Nationales, Paris.

GLP/LSE George Lansbury Papers, London School of Economics and Political Science, London.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

261

HGP/UCL Hugh Gaitskell Papers, University College London, London.

KMA/US Kingsley Martin Archive, University of Sussex, Brighton.

LSIA/IISG Labour and Socialist International Archives, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam.

PEB/UW Papers of Ernest Bevin, University of Warwick.

PGDHC/NC Papers of G.D.H. Cole, Nuffield College, Oxford.

PMC/NC Papers of Margaret Cole, Nuffield College, Oxford.

PP/LSE Passfield Papers, London School of Economics and Political Science.

PSC/WL Papers of Stafford Cripps, Weston Library, Oxford.

Published Primary Sources Books Abellio, Raymond [Georges Soules]. Les militants: 1927–1939. Paris: Gallimard, 1975. Adler, Victor. Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky. Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1954.

262 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anderson Fenn, Louis. What of the Professional Classes? London: The Socialist League, n.d. Aron, Raymond, Mémoires: 50 ans de réflexion politique. Paris: Julliard, 1983. Auriol, Vincent. La nationalisation des assurances. Paris: Librairie Populaire, 1933. Austria, Le socialisme gouvernemental d’Henri de Man. Brussels: La Nouvelle Eglantine, 1938. Bakunin, Michael, Statism and Anarchy, edited by Marshall S. Shatz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Balabanoff, Angelica. My Life as a Rebel. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938. Bassett, Reginald. The Essentials of Parliamentary Democracy. London: Macmillan, 1935. Baudhuin, Fernand. La dévaluation belge: une opération délicate parfaitement réussie. Brussels: L’Édition universelle, 1935. Bauer, Otto. Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie. Vienna: Brand, 1907. Bauer, Otto. Werkausgabe, 9 vols. Vienna: Europaverlag, 1975–1980. Bauer, Otto. Zwischen zwei Weltkriegen? Die Krise der Weltwirtschaft, der Demokratie und des Sozialismus. Bratislava: Prager, 1936. Belin, René. Du secrétariat de la C.G.T. au Gouvernement de Vichy (Mémoires 1933–1942). Paris: Albatros, 1978. Bernstein, Eduard. Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie. Stuttgart: Dietz, 1899. Bertrand, Louis. César de Paepe: sa vie, son œuvre. Brussels: Librairie de l’Agence Dechenne, 1909. Bevin, Ernest. My Plan for 2,000,000 Workless. London: Clarion Press, 1933. Bevin, Ernest and G.D.H. Cole. The Crisis: What It Is, How It Arose, What to Do. London: New Statesman & Nation, 1931. Blum, Léon. Pour la vieille maison: intervention au Congrès de Tours (1920). Paris: Librairie Populaire, 1934. Blume, Isabelle. Entretiens, edited by José Gotovitch. Brussels: Fondation Joseph Jacquemotte, 1976. Bohy-Denis, Georges and Hélène Bohy-Denis. Catéchisme du Plan du Travail. La Louvière: Imprimerie Coopérative, s.d. Boivin, Pierre. Choix d’écrits. Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1938 Bonnet, Georges. La crise européenne: Mai - Septembre 1938. Marseille: N. I., 1938. Bouvier-Ajam, Maurice. La doctrine corporative. Paris: Sirey, 1937. Brugmans, Henri. A travers le siècle. Brussels: Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, 1993. Brun, Gérard ed. Louis Vallon ou la politique en liberté: de Jaurès à de Gaulle. Paris: Economica, 1986. Buset, Max. L’action pour le Plan. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1934.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

263

Buset, Max. La plateforme électorale du P.O.B.: Vade-mecum. Brussels, Éditions du P.O.B. 1936. Capelle, Robert. Au service du Roi, 2 vols. Brussels: Dessart, 1949. Carton de Wiart, Henri. Souvenirs politiques, 2 vols. Brussels: La Renaissance du Livre, 1981. Chamberlain, Neville. The Struggle for Peace. London: Hutchinson, 1939. Citrine, Walter. Men and Work: An Autobiography. London: Hutchinson, 1964. Cole, G.D.H. A Plan for Britain. London: The Clarion Press, 1932. Cole, G.D.H. Banks and Credit. London: The Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, n.d. Cole, G.D.H. Is this Socialism? London: New Statesman & Nation, 1954. Cole, G.D.H. Le socialisme dans le temps présent. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1934. Cole, G.D.H. Organised Labour: An Introduction to Trade Unionism. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1924. Cole, G.D.H., Planned Socialism: The Plan du Travail of the Belgian Labour Party. London: New Fabian Research Bureau, 1935. Cole, G.D.H. Practical Economics, or Studies in Economic Planning. London: Penguin Books, 1937. Cole, G.D.H. Principles of Economic Planning. London: Macmillan, 1935. Cole, G.D.H. Socialism in Evolution. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1938. Cole, G.D.H. Socialist Control of Industry. London: The Socialist League, n.d. Cole, G.D.H. Some Essentials of Socialist Propaganda: A Tract for the Times. London: The Fabian Society, 1932. Cole, G.D.H. The Essentials of Socialisation. London: New Fabian Research Bureau Tract, 1932. Cole, G.D.H. The Intelligent Man’s Guide through World Chaos. London: Gollancz, 1932. Cole, G.D.H. The Intelligent Man’s Guide to the Post-War World. London: Gollancz, 1947. Cole, G.D.H. The Machinery of Socialist Planning. London: The Hogarth Press, 1938. Cole, G.D.H. The Next Ten Years in British Social and Economic Policy. London: Macmillan, 1929. Cole, G.D.H. The People’s Front. London: Gollancz, 1937. Cole, G.D.H. The Socialisation of Banking. London: The Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, n.d. Cole, G.D.H. Studies in World Economics. London: Macmillan, 1934. Cole, G.D.H. What Is This Socialism? Talks to “The Man in the Street.” London: Gollancz-The Clarion Press, 1933. Cole, G.D.H. What Marx Really Meant. London: Gollancz, 1934. Cole, G.D.H. What to Read on Economic Problems of To-Day & Tomorrow. Leeds: Leeds Public Libraries, 1932.

264 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cole, G.D.H. and Gilbert Richard Mitchison. The Need for a Socialist Programme. London: The Socialist League, n.d. Cole, G.D.H. and William Mellor eds., Workers’ Control and Self-Government in Industry. London: The New Fabian Research Bureau, 1933. Comité du Plan. Le Plan français: doctrine et plan d’action. Paris: Fasquelle, 1935. Cripps, Stafford. Can Socialism Come by Constitutional Methods? London: The Socialist League, n.d. Cripps, Stafford. Empire. London: The India League, 1938. Cripps, Stafford. Fight Now against War: A Call to Action. London: The Socialist League, n.d. Cripps, Stafford. National Fascism in Britain. London: The Socialist League, n.d. Cripps, Stafford. The Struggle for Peace. London: Gollancz, 1936. Cripps, Stafford. The Ultimate Aims of the Labour Party. London: Labour Party Publications, n.d. Cripps, Stafford. Why This Socialism? London: Gollancz, 1934. Crosland, Anthony. The Future of Socialism. London: Jonathan Cape, 1956. Dalton, Hugh. Practical Socialism for Britain. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1935. Dalton, Hugh. The Fateful Years, Memoirs 1931–1945. London: Frederick Muller, 1957. Davis, Horace B. ed. The National Question – Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg. New York-London: Monthly Press, 1976. Daye, Pierre. La jeunesse et l’avènement de Léopold III. Paris: Grasset, 1934. Daye, Pierre. Trente-deux mois chez les députés. Bruxelles: Voila, 1942. Déat, Marcel. Jeunesses d’Europe. Paris: SEI, n.d. Déat, Marcel. Le Front Populaire au tournant. Paris: Éditions du Journal “La Concorde”, 1937. Déat, Marcel. Mémoires politiques. Paris: Denoël, 1989. Déat, Marcel. Perspectives socialistes. Paris: Valois, 1930. Déat, Marcel. Problèmes d’hier et de demain. Paris: Parti Socialiste de France, 1934. De Becker, Raymond. Le livre des vivants et des morts. Brussels: Éditions de la Toison d’Or, 1942. De Becker, Raymond. Pour une Belgique nouvelle: l’Union Nationale. Brussels: La Centrale d’édition, 1937. Degrelle, Léon. La cohue de 1940. Lausanne: Crausaz, 1950. De Jouvenel, Bernard. L’économie dirigée: le programme de la nouvelle génération. Paris: Valois, 1928. De Jouvenel, Bertrand. Un voyageur dans le siècle, 1903–1945, edited by Jeannie Malige. Paris: Laffont, 1979. Delattre, Achille. Souvenirs. Cuesmes: Impricoop, 1957. Delbrouck, René. L’expérience unitaire des Jeunes Gardes Socialistes. Brussels: Jeunes Gardes Socialistes, 1937.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

265

Delors, Jacques. Mémoires. Paris: Plon, 2004. Delvigne, Isidore. Tuons la crise par le Plan du Travail. Brussels: Éditions de la presse socialiste, 1935. Delvo, Edgard. De mens wikt: Terugblik op een wisselvallig leven. Antwerp: De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1978. Delvo, Edgard. Democratie in Stormtij: Democratisch socialisme in de crisisjaren dertig. Antwerp: De Nederlandsche Boekehandel, 1983. Delvo, Edgard. Hedendaagsch humanistisch streven: democratisch socialisme en zijn beteekenis voor de B.W.P. Antwerp: De Sikkel, 1939. Delvo, Edgard. Sociale collaboratie: pleidooi voor een volksnationale sociale. Antwerp: De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1975. De Man, Hendrik. Antwort an Kautsky. Jena: Diederichs, 1927. De Man, Hendrik. Der Kampf um die Arbeitsfreude. Jena: Diederichs, 1927. De Man, Hendrik. Die Intellektuellen und der Sozialismus. Jena: Diedrichs, 1926. De Man, Hendrik. Die Sozialistische Idee. Jena: Diederichs, 1933. De Man, Hendrik. Gegen den Strom: Memoiren eines europäischen Sozialisten. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1953. De Man, Hendrik. Het Tijdvak der Demokratie. Ghent: Germinal, 1907. De Man, Hendrik. Massen und Führer. Potsdam: Protte, 1932. De Man, Hendrik. Ons Plan voor ons Volk. Van het Woord naar de Daad! Wij redden het land uit den afgrond. Morgen brengen wij welvaart. Brussels: Propagandacentrale der BWP, 1936. De Man, Hendrik. Persoon en ideeën. 6 vols. Antwerp: Standaard, 1974–1976. De Man, Hendrik. Sozialismus und Nationalfascismus. Potsdam: Protte, 1931. De Man, Hendrik. Vermassung und Kulturverfall: eine Diagnose unserer Zeit. Munich: Leo Lehnen, 1951. De Man, Hendrik. Wende des Sozialismus (Ende des Reformismus). Zürich: VPOD, 1934. De Man, Hendrik. Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus. Diederichs: Jena, 1927. De Man, Henri. Après coup: mémoires. Brussels: Éditions de la Toison d’Or, 1941. De Man, Henri. Au-delà du marxisme. Paris: Alcan, 1929. De Man, Henri. Au-delà du nationalisme. Geneva: Les Éditions du Cheval Ailé, 1946. De Man, Henri. Au pays du taylorisme. Brussels: Le Peuple, 1919. De Man, Henri. Cahiers de ma montagne. Brussels: Éditions de la Toison d’Or, 1944. De Man, Henri. Cavalier seul: quarante-cinq années de socialisme européen. Genève: Les Éditions du Cheval Ailé, 1948. De Man, Henri. La crise du socialisme. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1927. De Man, Henri. La leçon de la guerre. Brussels: Librairie du Peuple, 1920. De Man, Henri. Le mouvement d’éducation ouvrière en Belgique, Brussels, Lucifer, 1922.

266 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

De Man, Henri. Le nationalisme économique. Brussels: Imprimature médicale et scientifique, Brussels, 1934. De Man, Henri. Le nouveau nationalisme allemand. Brussels: Imprimerie médicale et scientifique, 1932. De Man, Henri. Le Plan du Travail. Paris-Brussels: Labor, 1934. De Man, Henri. Le Plan du Travail et les communistes. Paris-Brussels: Labor, 1935. De Man, Henri, Le socialisme devant la crise. Asnières: Cahiers de Révolution Constructive, 1935. De Man, Henri. Les techniciens et la crise. Brussels: Imprimerie coopérative, n.d. De Man, Henri. L’idée socialiste. Paris: Grasset, 1935. De Man, Henri. Nationalisme et socialisme. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1932. De Man, Henri. Pour un plan d’action. Asnières: Cahiers de Révolution Constructive, 1934. De Man, Henri. Pour un plan d’action. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1933. De Man, Henri. Réflexions sur la paix. Brussels: Éditions de la Toison d’Or, 1942. De Man, Henri. Réflexions sur l’économie dirigée. Brussels: L’Eglantine 1932. De Man, Henri. Socialisme et marxisme. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1928. De Man, Henri. Socialisme et planisme. Brussels: Bureau d’Action pour le Plan, 1935. De Man, Henri. Une offensive pour la paix. Paris-Brussels: Labor, 1938. De Man, Henri and Louis de Brouckère. Un épisode de la lutte des tendances socialistes: le mouvement ouvrier en Belgique. Brussels: Éditions de la Fondation Joseph Jacquemotte, 1965. De Man, Henry. The Psychology of Socialism. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928. De Man, Henry. The Remaking of a Mind: A Soldier’s Thoughts on War and Reconstruction. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1919. Denis, Frédéric. Travailleur chrétien, tu liras ceci…: tu comprendras…. Brussels: Bureau National d’Action pour le Plan du Travail, n.d. Des Essarts, Marius and Sylvain Masy. L’histoire du Parti Ouvrier Belge. Huy: Imprimerie Coopérative 1937. De Swaef, Oscar. Plan van den Arbeid. Brussels: Actiebureau voor het Plan, n.d. Drieu La Rochelle, Pierre. Socialisme fasciste. Paris: Gallimard, 1934. Dubreuil, Hyacinthe. Standards: le travail américain vu par un ouvrier français. Paris: Grasset, 1929. Durbin, Evan F.  M. Problems of Economic Planning: Papers on Planning and Economics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949. Durbin, Evan F. M. The Politics of Democratic Socialism: An Essay on Social Policy. London: The Labour Book Service, 1940. Durkheim, Emile. De la division du travail social: étude sur l’organisation des sociétés supérieures. Paris: Alcan, 1893. Engels, Friedrich. Herrn Eugen Dühring Umwälzung der Wissenschaft („AntiDühring“). Stuttgart: Dietz, 1910.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

267

Engels, Friedrich. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1892. Exécutif du P.S.B. Qu’entend-on par économie dirigée? Brussels: PSB, 1949. Eyskens, Gastons. De Memoires. Lannoo: Tielt, 1993. Franck, Louis R. Démocraties en crise: Roosevelt, Van Zeeland, Léon Blum. Paris: Rieder, 1937. Gaitskell, Hugh. Socialism and Nationalisation. London: Fabian Tract, 1956. Gallacher, William. Mondism and MacDonaldism. London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1928. Gérard, Max-Léo. Souvenirs pour mes enfants. Brussels: Palais des Académies, 2012. Gérard, Max-Léo. Un ingénieur chez les Ministres. Brussels: Van Buggenhout, 1936. Goris, Jan-Albert [Marnix Gijsen]. Belgium in Bondage. New York: L.B. Fischer, 1943. Gramsci, Antonio. Quaderni del carcere, edited by Valentino Gerratana, 4 vols. Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1975. Gutt, Camille. Pourquoi le Franc belge est tombé. Bruxelles: Nouvelle Société d’Editions, 1935. Halévy, Elie. Correspondance et écrits de guerre, 1914–1918, edited by Marie Scot and Vincent Duclert. Paris: Colin, 2014. Hansson, Albin. Demokrati: tal och uppsatser. Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1935. Henderson, Arthur. A World Safe for Democracy. London: The Athenaeum, 1917. Hervé, Gustave. La C.G.T. contre la nation. Paris: Éditions de la Victoire, 1920. Hervé, Gustave. Lettre aux socialistes. Paris: Éditions de la Victoire, 1920. Horrabin, John. The Class Struggle. London: The Socialist League, n.d. Huysmans, Camille. About Belgium. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1944. Hymans, Paul. Mémoires, 2 vols. Brussels: Institut de Sociologie Solvay 1958. James, William. The Moral Equivalent of War. New York: New York American Association for International Conciliation, 1910. Jaspar, Marcel-Henri. Souvenirs sans retouche. Paris: Fayard, 1968. Jaurès, Jean. De primis socialismi Germanici lineamentis apud Lutherum, Kant, Fichte et Hegel. Toulouse: Chauvin et Fils, 1891. Jaurès, Jean. L’organisation socialiste de la France: l’armée nouvelle. Paris: Publications Jules Rouff & Cie., 1911. Jay, Douglas. The Socialist Case. London: Faber and Faber, 1937. Jouhaux, Léon. La C.G.T.: ce qu’elle est, ce qu’elle veut. Paris: Gallimard 1937. Jouhaux, Léon. Le Plan de rénovation économique et sociale. Paris: Confédération Générale du Travail, 1937. Jouhaux, Léon. Le syndicalisme: ce qu’il est, ce qu’il doit être. Paris: Flammarion, 1937. Kautsky, Karl. Bernstein und das Sozialdemokratische Programm. Stuttgart: Dietz, 1899. Kautsky, Karl. Bolshevism at a Deadlock. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931. Kautsky, Karl. Das Erfurter Programm in seinem grundsätzlichen Teil erläutert. Stuttgart: Dietz, 1892.

268 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kautsky, Karl. Der Weg zur Macht: Politische Betrachtungen über das Hineinwachsen in die Revolution. Hamburg: Dubber, 1909. Kautsky, Karl. Die Diktatur des Proletariats. Vienna: Ignaz Brand & Co., 1918. Kautsky, Karl. Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung, 2 vols. Berlin: Dietz, 1927. Kautsky, Karl. Erinnerungen und Erörterungen, edited bt Benedikt Kautsky. The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1960. Keynes, John Maynard. The Economic Consequences of the Peace. London: Macmillan, 1920. Laski, Harold J. The Crisis and the Constitution: 1931 and After. London: Hogarth Press, 1932. Laski, Harold J. The Labour Party and the Constitution. London: The Socialist League, n.d. Lassalle, Ferdinand. Arbeiterprogramm. Über den Besonderen Zusammenhang der gegenwärtigen Geschichtsperiode mit der Idee des Arbeiterstandes. Zürich: Meyer & Zeller, 1863. Laurat, Lucien. Economie dirigée et socialisation. Paris-Brussels: L’Eglantine 1934. Laurat, Lucien. Economie planée contre économie enchaînée. Paris: Valois, 1932. Laurat, Lucien. Histoire des doctrines économiques. Paris: Collège du Travail, 1937. Laurat, Lucien. La crise mondiale. Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1935. Laurat, Lucien. L’économie soviétique: sa dynamique, son mécanisme. Paris: Valois 1931. Laurat, Lucien. Le Plan de Travail vu de Moscou. Brussels: Bureau d’Action pour le Plan 1935. Laurat, Lucien. Le socialisme à l’ordre du jour: problèmes et taches du marxisme contemporain. Paris: Librairie Populaire, 1933. Laurat, Lucien. L’évolution doctrinale du socialisme. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1934. Laurat, Lucien. Un système qui sombre. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1932. Law, Richard. Return from Utopia. London: Faber and Faber, 1950. Lebas, Jean. Le socialisme, but et moyen: suivi de la réfutation d’un néo-socialisme. Lille: Imprimeur ouvrière, 1931. Leduc, Victor. Le marxisme, est-il dépassé? Paris: Raison d’être, 1946. Lefranc, Emile and Georges Lefranc. La CGT et l’éducation ouvrière en France. Geneva: Bureau International du Travail, 1938. Lefranc, Georges, Roosevelt contre la crise. Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1936. Lefranc, Georges, Pierre Boivin and Maurice Deixonne. Révolution constructive. Paris: Valois, 1932. Lefranc, Georges and Raoul Lenoir. La révolution russe. Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1935. Legrand, Xavier. Le socialisme belge et les problèmes d’aujourd’hui. Brussels: L’Édition Universelle 1935.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

269

Lemoine, Robert J. La réforme du credit en Belgique. Paris: Finances Publiques, 1937. Lorwin, Lewis L. A Time for Planning: A Social-Economic Theory and Program for the Twentieth Century. New York-London: Harper & Brothers, 1945. Luchaire, Jean. Une génération réaliste. Paris: Valois, 1929. Luxemburg, Rosa. Sozialreform oder Revolution? Leipzig: Verlag der Leipziger Buchdruckerei Aktiengesellschaft, 1908. MacDonald, Ramsay. Socialism and Society. London: Independent Labour Party, 1905. MacDonald, Ramsay. Socialism: Critical and Constructive. London: Cassell and Company, 1921. MacNeill Weir, Lauchlan, The Tragedy of Ramsay MacDonald: A Political Biography. London: Sacker and Warburg, 1938. Manoilescu, Mihail. Le siècle du corporatisme: doctrine du corporatisme intégral et pur. Paris: Alcan, 1934. Manuilsky, Dmitrii Zakharovych. Social Democracy: Stepping-Stone to Fascism, or, Otto’s Bauer Latest Discovery. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1934. Marion, Paul. Socialisme et nation. Paris: Imprimerie du Centaure, 1933. Marjolin, Robert. Le travail d’une vie: mémoires 1911–1986. Paris: Laffont, 1986. Martin, Kingsley. Socialism and the Welfare State. London: Fabian Tract, 1951. Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1978. Mastellone, Salvo. Carlo Rosselli e “la rivoluzione liberale del socialismo”: con scritti e documenti inediti. Florence: Olschki, 1999. Michel, Henri. La dévaluation belge: une opération aussi délicate que décevante. Paris: Imprimerie du Palais, 1936. Mikardo, Ian. The Second Five Years: A Labour Programme for 1950. London: Fabian Society, 1948. Minard, A. [Lucien Laurat]. Le développement du capitalisme et la lutte pour la démocratie. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1933. Minard, A. [Lucien Laurat]. Quelques données du problème européen. Brussels: L’Eglantine 1931. Moch, Jules. Rencontres avec…Léon Blum. Paris: Plon, 1970. Moch, Jules. Socialisme et rationalisation. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1927. Moch, Jules. Une si longue vie. Paris: Laffont, 1976. Montagnon, Barthélemy. Essai de synthèse néo-socialiste. Paris: Parti Socialiste de France, 1935. Montagnon, Barthélemy. Grandeur et servitude socialistes. Paris: Valois, 1929. Montagnon, Barthélemy, Adrien Marquet and Marcel Déat. Ordre, autorité, nation, edited by Max Bonnafous. Paris: Grasset, 1933. Morisseaux, Jacques D. Evolution sociale ou faillite economique? Les conceptions économiques et sociales de Mr Paul Van Zeeland. Brussels: Vansintejan, 1939.

270 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Morrison, Herbert. An Easy Outline of Modern Socialism. London: The Labour Party, 1932. Morrison, Herbert. Socialisation and Transport. London: Constable 1933. Morrison of Lambeth, Lord. Herbert Morrison: An Autobiography. London: Odhams Press, 1960. Moulin, Léo. Socialism of the West: An Attempt to Lay the Foundations of a New Socialist Humanism. London: Gollancz, 1948. Murphy, John T, Fascism! The Socialist Answer. London: The Socialist League, n.d. Murphy, John T. New Horizons. London: John Lane The Bodley Head, 1941. Murphy, John T. Preparing for Power: A Critical Study of the History of the British Working-Class Movement. London: Jonathan Cape, 1934. Mussolini, Benito. Il mio diario di guerra. Milan: Imperia, 1923. Nenni, Pietro. Vent’anni di fascismo, edited by Gioietta Dallò. Milan: Edizioni Avanti!, 1964. Nitti, Francesco Fausto. Escape: The Personal Narrative of a Political Prisoner Who Was Rescued from Lipari, the Fascist “Devil’s Island.” New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1930. Noyelle, Henri. Les Plans de reconstruction économique et sociale à l’étranger et en France. Paris: Sirey, 1935. One Nation Group. The Responsible Society. London: Conservative Political Centre, 1959. Paul-Boncour, Joseph. Entre deux guerres: souvenirs sur la IIIe République, 3 vols. Paris: Plon, 1945. Perroux, François. Capitalisme et communauté de travail. Paris: Sirey, 1938. Philip, André. André Philip par lui-même ou les voies de la liberté. Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1971. Philip, André. Guild-socialisme et trade unionisme: quelques aspects nouveaux du mouvement ouvrier anglais. Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1923. Philip, André. La crise et l’économie dirigée. Paris: Cluny, 1935. Philip, André. L’Angleterre moderne: le problème social, l’expérience travailliste. Paris: Crès, 1925. Philip, André. Le problème ouvrier aux Etats-Unis. Paris: Alcan, 1927. Philip, André. Pour un socialisme humaniste. Paris: Plon, 1960. Piérard, Louis. La Belgique, terre de compromis: les socialistes belges et le gouvernement Van Zeeland. Brussels: Les Éditions de Belgique, 1935. Piérard, Louis. Le socialisme à un tournant. Mons: Librairie Fédérale, 1933. Pirou, Gaëtan. Essais sur le corporatisme: corporatisme et libéralisme, corporatisme et étatisme, corporatisme et syndicalisme. Paris: Sirey, 1938. Pirou, Gaëtan. La crise du capitalisme. Paris: Sirey, 1936. Pirou, Gaëtan. La monnaie française depuis la guerre, 1914–36: inflation, stabilisation, dévaluation. Paris: Sirey, 1936.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

271

Pirou, Gaëtan, Néo-libéralisme, néo-corporatisme, néo-socialisme. Paris: Gallimard, 1939. Poisson, Étienne. La dévaluation belge, mars 1935 mars 1936. Paris: Librairie technique et économique, 1937. Poulet, Robert. Ce n’est pas une vie. Paris: Denoël, 1976. Poulet, Robert. La révolution est à droite. Paris: Denoël et Steele, 1934. Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. De la capacité politique des classes ouvrières. Paris: Dentu, 1865. Rappoport, Charles. Une vie révolutionnaire, 1883–1940: les mémoires de Charles Rappoport, edited by Harvey Goldberg and Georges Haupt. Paris: Éditions des Sciences de l’Homme, 1991. Rens, Jef. Fascisme et corporatisme: essai documentaire. Verviers: Imprimeur coopérative le Travail 1937. Rens, Jef. Rencontres avec le siècle: une vie au service de la justice sociale. Gembloux: Ducoulot, 1987. Roditi, Georges. Ecrits d’avant-guerre: ‘L’Homme Nouveau’, ‘Tribune de France’, ‘Idées et Peuples’, 1931–1939. Clermont-Ferrand: Sorlot, 1941. Rosenstock-Franck, Louis. L’économie corporative fasciste en doctrine et en fait: ses origines historiques et son évolution. Paris: Gamber, 1934. Rosselli, Carlo. Scritti dall’esilio. Vol. I: Giustizia e Libertà e la concentrazione antifascista (1929–1934). Turin: Einaudi, 1989. Rosselli, Carlo. Socialisme libéral. Paris: Valois, 1930. Rowse, Alfred Leslie. Mr Keynes and the Labour Movement. London: Macmillan, 1936. Russell, Bertrand. German Social Democracy. London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1896. Russell, Bertrand. The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1920. Sembat, Marcel. Les Cahiers Noirs: Journal 1905–1922. Paris: Viviane Hamy, 2007. Senior, La haute banque en Belgique. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1931. Serge, Victor. Mémoires d’un révolutionnaire, 1901–1941. Paris: Seuil, 1951. Séverac, Jean-Baptiste. De l’unité d’action à l’unité organique. Paris: Nouveau Prométhée, 1934. Séverac, Jean-Baptiste. Le Parti Socialiste: ses principes et ses tâches. Lettres à Brigitte. Paris: Éditions de la Bataille Socialiste, 1933. Sluyser, Meyer. Planmatige socialistische politiek: het Plan van den Arbeid. Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1934. Snowden, Viscount Philip. Socialism and Syndicalism. London: Collins’ Clear Type Press, 1913. Sorel, Georges. Réflexions sur la violence. Paris: Rivière, 1936. Sorel, Georges. Saggi di critica del marxismo, edited by Vittorio Racca. Palermo: Sandron, 1903.

272 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Spaak, Paul-Henri. Combats inachevés, 2 vols. Paris: Fayard, 1969. Spaak, Paul-Henri. Pour la Paix. Paris-Brussels: Labor, 1938. Spaak, Paul-Henri and Henri de Man. Pour un socialisme nouveau. Paris-Brussels: Labor, 1937. Speyer, Herbert. Corporatisme ou parlementarisme reformé? Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1935. Spirito, Ugo. Il Piano de Man e l’economia mista. Florence: Sansoni, 1935. Springer, Rudolf [Karl Renner]. Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat. Wien: Franz, 1902. Strachey, John. Contemporary Capitalism. London: Gollancz, 1956. Strachey, John. The Coming Struggle for Power. London: Gollancz, 1932. Tardieu, André. Devant l’obstacle: l’Amérique et nous. Paris: Emile-Paul Frères, 1927. Tardieu, André. L’heure de la décision. Paris: Flammarion, 1934. Tardieu, André. Paroles réalistes. Paris: Figuière, 1928. Tawney, Richard. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study. London: John Murray, 1926. Tawney, Richard. The Choice before the Labour Party. London: The Socialist League, n.d. Thomson, George W. The Technician under Socialism. London: The Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, n.d. Tonnelat, Ernest. Charles Andler: sa vie et son œuvre. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1937. Tönnies, Ferdinand. Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie. Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1922. Trevelyan, Charles. The Challenge to Capitalism. London: The Socialist League, n.d. Trotski, Léon. Leur morale et la notre. Paris: Pauvert, 1966. Trotsky, Leon. The Struggle against Fascism in Germany. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975. Vallon, Louis. Socialisme expérimental. Paris: Centre d’Études Polytechniques, 1936. Vandervelde, Emile. Carnets, 1934–38. Paris: Editions Internationales, 1966. Vandervelde, Emile. Études marxistes. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1930. Vandervelde, Emile. Faut-il-changer notre programme? Avant-projet de révision. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1923. Vandervelde, Emile. Jaurès. Paris: Alcan, 1929. Vandervelde, Emile. La Belgique envahie et le socialisme international. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1917. Vandervelde, Emile. L’alternative: capitalisme d’état ou socialisme démocratique. Paris-Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1933. Vandervelde, Emile. La psychologie du socialisme: à propos de trois livres récents: Karl Kautsky-N. Boukharine-Henri de Man. Brussels: Lamertin, 1928. Vandervelde, Emile. Le socialisme contre l’État. Ghent: Société Coopérative Volksdrukkerij, 1911.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

273

Vandervelde, Emile. Le socialisme contre l’État. Paris: Librairie Berger-­ Levrault, 1918. Vandervelde, Emile. Souvenirs d’un militant socialiste. Paris: Denoël, 1939. Vandervelde, Emile. Trois aspects de la révolution russe: 7 mai-25 juin 1917. ParisNancy: Berger-Levrault, 1918. Vandervelde, Emile with the collaboration of Jef Rens and Jean Delvigne. Le cinquantenaire du P.O.B (1885–1935). Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1936. Van Isacker, Philip. Tussen Staat en Volk: Nagelaten memoires. Antwerp: Sheed en Ward, 1953. Van Overstraeten, Raoul. Albert I-Léopold III: vingt ans de politique militaire belge, 1920–1940. Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer, 1946. Van Overstraeten, Raoul. Au service de la Belgique. Vol. I: Dans l’étau. Paris, Plon 1960. Van Zeeland, Paul. Réflexions sur le Plan quinquennal. Brussels: Éditions de la Revue Générale, 1931. Van Zeeland, Paul. Regards sur l’Europe: 1932. Brussels: Office de Publicité, 1933. Van Zeeland, Paul. Révision de valeurs: essai de synthèse sur certains problèmes fondamentaux de l’économie contemporaine et leurs réactions politiques. Paris: Albert, 1937. Varga, Eugen. Henri de Man et son Plan. Paris: Bureau d’Éditions 1934. Varga, Eugen, Le ‘Plan.’ Brussels: C.D.L., 1934. Varga, Eugen. Le Plan trahi. Réponse à Henri de Man, Ministre de la bourgeoisie belge. Brussels: C.D.L., 1936. Vos, Herman. Le Plan du Travail et l’Encyclique papale Quadragesimo Anno. Brussels: L’Eglantine 1934. Vos, Herman. Les démocrates-chrétiens et le Plan du Travail. Brussels: Bureau National d’Action pour le Plan du Travail, n.d. VV. AA. Crise et Plan (Quinze conférences et études sur le Plan de la C.G.T). Paris: Centre Confédéral d’Education Ouvrière, 1935. VV. AA. L’économie dirigée. Paris: Alcan, 1934. VV.  AA. Les principes et la vie du centre confédéral. Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1935. VV. AA. Plan du 9 Juillet: Réforme de la France proposée par le groupe du 9 Juillet. Paris: Gallimard, 1934. VV. AA. Problems of a Socialist Government. London: Gollancz, 1933. Walling, William English. The Socialists and the War: A Documentary Statement of the Position of the Socialists of All Countries. New York: Henry Holt, 1915. Wauters, Arthur. Paysan! Réveille-toi. Brussels: Bureau National d’Action pour le Plan du Travail, 1935. Webb, Sidney. What Happened in 1931: A Record. London: The Fabian Society, 1932.

274 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Wigforss, Ernst. Industrins demokratisering: en överblick av förslagen om arbetarnas deltagande i industrins ledning. Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1922. Wilkinson Ellen C. and Edward Conze, Why Fascism? London: Selwin & Blount, n.d. Wolff, Theodor. The Eve of 1914. London: Gollancz, 1935. Woytinsky, Wladimir S., Stormy Passage: A Personal History Through Two Russian Revolutions to Democracy and Freedom: 1905–1960. New York: The Vanguard Press, 1961. Zweig, Stefan, Die Welt von Gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1941. ∗∗∗ [Marcel Van Zeeland], L’expérience Van Zeeland en Belgique. Lausanne: Payot, 1940. ∗∗∗ [Paul Van Zeeland], La crise de l’étalon-or: confrontation de sa forme classique avec les méthodes et les buts de l’économie contemporaine. Paris: Albert, 1935. ∗∗∗ [Paul Van Zeeland], Révision de valeurs: essai de synthèse sur certains problèmes fondamentaux de l’économie contemporaine et leurs réactions politiques. Paris: Albert, 1937. Actualité du Plan. Paris: Éditions du Centre Confédéral d’Education Ouvrière, 1937. Catéchisme du soldat belge. Ghent: Imprimerie De Backer, undated [1903 or 1907]. Chœurs parlés. Brussels: Bureau National d’Action pour le Plan 1935. Conférence Internationale des Plans du Travail, Genève, 17, 18, 19 Avril 1936, 2 vols. Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, n.d. Der Plan der Arbeit: Ein Ausweg aus Krise und Not. Zürich: Verlag PDA, 1935. Dossier du Plan de Man: trahison et coup de massue, 1934–1935. N.I. Eléments d’un Plan français. Asnières: Cahiers de Révolution Constructive, 1935. Forward to Socialism. London: The Socialist League, 1934. I Rosselli. Epistolario familiare di Carlo, Nello, Amelia Rosselli, 1914–1937, edited by Zeffiro Ciuffoletti. Milan: Mondadori, 1997. Konferenz zur Besprechung der Probleme der Panwirtschaft, 14. Bis 16 September 1934: Abbaye de Pontigny (Frankreich). Zürich: VPOD, 1934. Labour and the Nation. London: The Labour Party, 1928. La Charte de Quaregnon, déclaration de principes du socialisme belge: histoire et développements. Brussels: Éditions de la Fondation Louis de Brouckère, 1980. Le Plan de Rénovation économique et sociale. Paris: Éditions de la Confédération Générale du Travail, 1935. Le Plan du Travail pour une économie suisse dirigée. La Chaux-de-Fonds: Imprimerie des coopératives réunies, 1934. L’exécution du Plan du Travail par Henri de Man et l’Equipe du Bureau d’Études Sociales. Paris: Alcan, 1935. L’Œuvre de Léon Blum, 7 vols. Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1954–72.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

275

L’œuvre des ministres socialistes de septembre 1936 à octobre 1937. Brussels: P.O.B., 1937. Œuvres de Jean Jaurès, edited by Max Bonnafous, 9 vols. Paris: Rieder, 1931–1939. Ruskin College: What Is and What It Stands For. London: Ruskin College, 1918. Sozialismus aus dem Glauben: Verhandlungen der sozialistischen Tagung in Heppenheim a. B., Pfingstwoche 1928. Zürich-Leipzig: Rotapfel-Verlag, 1929. The Activities of the International Federation of Trade Unions, 1933–1935. London: International Federation of Trade Unions, 1937. The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1918–1940, 1945–1960, edited by Ben Pimlott. London: Jonathan Cape, 1986. The Second Labour Government. London: The Labour Party, 1935. Vers un Plan britannique: les études de la Ligue Socialiste. Asnières: Cahier de Révolution Constructive, n.d.

Reports P.S.B, La ligne politique du Parti précédé de la déclaration des principes: textes adoptés par le Congrès de la Victoire des 9, 10 et 11 juin 1945. Brussels: SOC, 1945. Après la catastrophe allemande. Résolutions de la conférence de Paris de l’Internationale Ouvrière Socialiste. Zürich: Éditions de l’IOS, 1933. Compte rendu du Congrès extraordinaire du P.O.B. des 30 et 31 mars 1935. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1935. Compte-rendu du 52° Congrès  – Bruxelles, les 16 et 17 novembre 1935. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1935. Compte rendus des travaux de la Société d’Economie politique de Belgique, no. 96 (1934). Congrès confédéral de Paris 1935 – Compte rendu sténographique de débats. Paris: Éditions de la Confédération Générale du Travail, 1935. Congrès confédéral d’unité à Toulouse du 2 au 5 mars 1936  – Compte rendu sténographique des débats. Paris: Éditions de la Confédération Générale du Travail, 1936. Les Congrès socialistes internationaux. Ordres du jour et résolutions publié par le Bureau Socialiste International. Ghent: Société coopérative Volksdrukkerij, 1902. Conseil General, XXVIIème Congrès, Bruxelles. 27–28 mai 1933. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1933. Conseil General, XXVIIIème Congrès, Bruxelles, 24–25 décembre 1933. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1934. Final Agenda: Socialist League Second Annual Conference, Leeds May 20th and 21st, 1934. London: The Socialist League, n.d. Fourth Congress of the Labour and Socialist International: Vienna, 25th July to 1st August 1931  – Reports and Proceedings. London: Labour Party Publications Department, 1932.

276 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Congrès extraordinaire – Rapports, 24–26 Octobre 1936. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1936. Het Plan van de Arbeid. Rapport van de commissie uit N.V.V. en S.D.A.P. Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1935. XXVIe Congrès national tenu à Tours le 24, 25, 26 et 27 mai 1931 – compte rendu sténographique. Paris: Libraire Populaire, 1932. XXXIème Congrès national tenu à Toulouse les 20, 21, 22 et 23 mai 1934 – compte redu sténographique. Paris: Librairie Populaire, 1934. XXXIIe Congrès national tenu à Mulhouse le 9, 10, 11 et 12 juin 1935 – compte rendu sténographique. Paris: Libraire Populaire, 1936. Protokoll des sozialdemokratischen Parteitages 1926, abgehalten in Linz vom 30. Oktober bis 3. November 1926. Vienna: VGA, 1926. Report of the Proceedings at 63rd Annual Trades Union Congress held at Bristol, September 7th to 11th 1931, edited by Walter Citrine. London: Co-Operative Printing Society, 1931. Report of Proceedings at the 65th Annual Trades Union Congress held at Brighton, September 4th to 8th 1933. London: Cooperative Printing Society, 1933. The First International: Minutes of the Hague Congress of 1972, edited by Hans Gerth. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958.

Book and Report Chapters Attlee, Clement R. and G.D.H. Cole. “Introduction.” In Twelve Studies in Soviet Russia, edited by Margaret Cole, 7–11. London: Gollancz, 1933. Blum, Léon. “Le parti socialiste et la participation ministérielle.” In Léon Blum and Paul Faure, Le parti socialiste et la participation ministérielle, 3–23. Paris: Éditions de la nouvelle revue socialiste, 1926. Buset, Max. “L’Idée et l’Action planistes en Belgique.” In IIIe Conférence Internationale des Plan du Travail: Abbaye de Pontigny, 23–24 Octobre 1937, 37–53. N.I.: n.d. Buset, Max. “Rapport sur la propagande pour le Plan du Travail.” In Compte-­ rendu du 52° Congrès – Bruxelles, les 16 et 17 novembre 1935, 12–27. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1935. Cole, G.D.H. “Marxism and the World Situation of To-Day.” In VV.AA. Marxism, 208–240. London: Chapman & Hall, 1935. Cole, G.D.H. “The Essentials of Socialisation.” In Economic Tracts for the Times, 285–306. London: Macmillan, 1932. Cripps, Stafford. “Introduction.” In Gilbert R.  Mitchison, The First Workers’ Government, 5–13. London: Gollancz, 1934. Cripps, Stafford. “Parliamentary Institutions and the Transition to Socialism.” In VV.AA. Where Stands Socialism To-Day?, 27–56. London: Rich & Cowan, 1933. Déat, Marcel. “Préface.” In Comité du Plan. Le Plan français: doctrine et plan d’action, 9–23. Paris: Fasquelle, 1935.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

277

De Man, Hendrik. “Voorrede.” In Meyer Sluyser, Planmatige socialistische politiek: het Plan van den Arbeid, 2. Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1934. De Man, Henri. “Avant-propos.” In Compte rendu de la première conférence internationale de la jeunesse socialiste, tenue à Stuttgart, les 24, 25 et 26 aout 1907, 3–7. Ghent: Société coopérative Volksdrukkerij 1907. De Man, Henri. “Avant-propos de la deuxième édition française.” In Henri de Man, Au-delà du marxisme. Paris: Alcan, 1929. De Man, Henri. “Jean Jaurès, 1859–1914.” In Great Democrats, edited by Alfred Barratt Brown, 369–382. London: Ivor Nicholson and Johnson, 1934. De Man, Henri. “L’allocution du President de Man: la définition du contrôle ouvrier.” In Compte rendu sténographique de la semaine syndicale tenue à Morlanwelz du 4 au 10 septembre 1921, 11–17. Brussels: Lucifer, 1921. De Man, Henri. “L’aspect psychologique du contrôle ouvrier.” In Compte rendu sténographique de la semaine syndicale tenue à Morlanwelz du 4 au 10 septembre 1921, 43–60. Brussels: Lucifer, 1921. De Man, Henri. “Préface.” In Max Buset, L’action pour le Plan, 3–4. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1934. De Man, Henri. “La politique intérieure.” In Parti Ouvrier Belge: 57e Congés 29-30-31 octobre 1938, 3–17. Brussels: Secrétariat du POB, 1938. De Man, Henry. “Socialism and Industrial Democracy.” In The Socialism of Our Times: A Symposium, edited by Harry W.  Laidler and Norman Thomas, 362–371. New  York: The Vanguard Press-League for Industrial Democracy, 1929. Durbin, Evan F. M. “The Importance of Planning.” In New Trends in Socialism, edited by George Catlin, 145–166. London: Dickson & Thompson, 1935. Engels, Friedrich. “Al lettore italiano.” In Manifesto del Partito Comunista, edited by Palmiro Togliatti. Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1964. Engels, Friedrich. “Preface.” In Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. III, 91–111. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991. Franck, Louis. “Ricordi.” In Il corporativismo e l’economia dell’Italia fascista, edited by Nicola Tranfaglia, 3–30. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1990. Jay, Douglas. “Plans and Priorities.” In VV.AA. The Road to Recovery: Fabian Society Lectures given in the autumn of 1947, 9–26. London: Allen Wingate, 1948. Kautsky, Karl. “Vorrede des Uebersetzers.” In Karl Marx, Revolution und KontreRevolution in Deutschland, VII-XXX. Stuttgart: Dietz, 1896. Kramer, Steven Philip. “Interview with Jef Rens.” In Socialism in Western Europe: The Experience of a Generation, 91–130. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984. Lavergne, Bernard. “Avertissement.” In André Philip, Henri de Man et la crise doctrinale du socialisme. Paris: Gamber, 1928. Lefranc, Georges. “Le mouvement ouvrier devant le corporatisme.” In VV. AA. Crise et Plan (Quinze conférences et études sur le Plan de la CGT), 88–94. Paris: Centre Confédéral d’Education Ouvrière, 1935.

278 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Le Groupe de Révolution Constructive. “Introduction.” In Henri de Man, Pour un plan d’action, 1–3. Asnières: Cahiers de Révolution Constructive, 1934. Lorwin, Lewis, L. “The Problem of Economic Planning.” In World Social Economic Planning: The Necessity for Planned Adjustment of Productive Capacity and Standards of Living, edited by Mary L.  Fleddérus, 773–798. The Hague: International Industrial Relations Institute, 1932. New Fabian Research Bureau. “Le commerce extérieur et le problème colonial.” In IIIe Conférence Internationale des Plan du Travail: Abbaye de Pontigny, 23–24 Octobre 1937, 103–110. N.I., n.d. Person, Harlow S. “Scientific management as a philosophy and technique of progressive industrial stabilization.” In World Social Economic Planning: The Necessity for Planned Adjustment of Productive Capacity and Standards of Living, edited by Mary L.  Fleddérus, 153–203. The Hague, International Industrial Relations Institute, 1932. Philip, André. “Socialisme et rationalisation,” in Henri de Man et la crise doctrinale du socialisme, 19–54. Paris: Gamber, 1928. Philip, André. “Préface.” In Vers un Plan britannique: les études de la Ligue Socialiste, 1–3. Asnières: Cahier de Révolution Constructive, n.d. Simmel, Georg. “Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben.” In Die Großstadt. Vorträge und Aufsätze zur Städteausstellung, edited by Teodor Petermann, 185–206. Dresden: Zahn & Jänsch, 1903. Spirito, Ugo. “Capitalismo, socialismo, corporativismo.” In VV.AA., Nuove esperienze economiche, 219–241. Florence: Sansoni, 1935. Thomas, Albert. “Détermination internationale des normes du travail.” In World Social Economic Planning: The Necessity for Planned Adjustment of Productive Capacity and Standards of Living, edited by Mary L. Fleddérus, 529–541. The Hague: International Industrial Relations Institute, 1932. Wauters, Arthur. “La doctrine de Vandervelde.” In VV.AA. Emile Vandervelde: l’homme et son œuvre, 87–110. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1928. Wauters, Arthur. “Rapport sur la situation politique.” In Compte-rendu du 52° Congrès – Bruxelles, les 16 et 17 novembre 1935, 3–11. Brussels: L’Eglantine, 1935. “Discours de Marcel Déat, député de Paris.” In Barthélémy Montagnon, Adrien Marquet and Marcel Déat. Néo-socialisme? Ordre, autorité, nation, edited by Max Bonnafous, 69–103. Paris: Grasset 1933. “Exposé de M. Henri de Man, Ministre des Travaux Publics et de la Résorption du Chômage, sur le budget extraordinaire pour 1936 (Chambres des Représentants, 11–13 février 1936).” In Les travaux publics et la résorption du chômage, 5–35. Brussels: Ministre des travaux publics et de la résorption du chômage, N.I. “Préface par le groupe de Révolution Constructive.” In Henri de Man, Le socialisme devant la crise, 1–4. Asnières: Cahier de Révolution Constructive, 1935. “Une heure avec Henri de Man au Bureau d’Études Sociales (12 juillet 1934).” In VV.AA. Les problèmes d’ensemble du fascisme: Semaine d’études d’Uccle-Bruxelles (10–15 juillet 1934), 22–25. Paris: Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière, 1939.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

279

Journal Articles Adler, Alfred. “Bolschewismus und Seelenkunde.” Internationale Rundschau 362, no. 4 (1918): 597–600. Ahlberg, Alf. “Socialismen På Offensiv. Hendrik de Man Framlågger ett Socialiseringsprogram.” Fackföreningsrörelsen: organ för Landsorganisationen i Sverge, no. 2 (1933): 588–593, 620–626. Arendt, Joseph. “Le valeur économique du Plan de Man.” La Terre Wallonne 15, no. 174 (1934): 331–344. Bauer, Otto. “Die Geschichte eines Buches.” Die Neue Zeit 26, no. 1 (1908): 23–33. Bernstein, Eduard. “Der gegenwärtige Stand der industriellen Entwicklung in Deutschland.” Die Neue Zeit 15, no. 1 (1896): 303–311. Bernstein, Eduard. “Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie und die Revolution der Gesellschaft: 2. Die Zusammenbruchstheorie und die Kolonialpolitik.” Die Neue Zeit 16, no. 1 (1898): 548–557. Bernstein, Eduard. “Die neuere Entwicklung der Agrarverhältnisse in England.” Die Neue Zeit 15, no. 1 (1897): 772–783. Bernstein, Eduard. “Die sozialpolitische Bedeutung von Raum und Zahl.” Neue Zeit 15, no. 2 (1897): 100–107, 138–143. Bernstein, Eduard. “Ignaz Auer der Führer, Freund und Berater.” Sozialistische Monatshefte 13, no. 1 (1907): 339–348. Bobin, Robert. “Le Conseil central du Parti Socialiste de France – 8 juillet 1934.” La vie socialiste 12, no. 384 (1934): 7–12. Bonin, Robert. “Pour la liquidation du chômage et de la crise économique.” La vie socialiste 12, no. 369 (1934): 3. Bobin, Robert. “Une très importante session du Conseil Général du Parti Ouvrier Belge.” La vie socialiste 11, no. 351 (1933): 10. B., R. [Robert Bobin]. “Ce que dit Henri de Man: pour un socialisme renouvelé.” La vie socialiste 11, no. 348 (1933): 6. Buset, Max. “Au delà du marxisme.” L’avenir social, no. 7 (1927): 194–200. Buset, Max. “Réponse à “Leiding”,” La Revue socialiste, no. 10 (1939): 5–17. Buset, Max. “Notre ligne de conduite.” Plan, no. 15 (1935): unpaged. Citrine, Walter, “Labour Policy and Practical Politics,” The New Clarion, no. 55 (1933): 41–42. Cole, G.D.H. “A British People’s Front: Why, and How?” The Political Quarterly 7, no. 4 (1936): 490–498. Cole, G.D.H. “A Socialist Economic Plan.” The New Clarion, no. 4 (1932): 77. Cole, G.D.H. “A Socialist Peace Policy.” The Socialist Leaguer, no. 4 (1934): 53–55. Cole, G.D.H., “Can Capitalism Recover?” The New Clarion, no. 43 (1933): 324. Cole, G.D.H. “Foreign Trade and Protection.” The New Clarion, no. 8 (1932): 182.

280 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cole, G.D.H. “L’avenir du socialisme.” L’Esprit international, no. 30 (1934): 183–201. Cole, G.D.H. “Peaceably If We May.” The New Clarion, no. 51 (1933): 488. Cole, G.D.H. “Planned Socialism.” The New Statesman & Nation, no. 272 (1936): 693–694. Cole, G.D.H. “Socialising the Banks.” The New Clarion, no. 3 (1932): 52. Cole, G.D.H. “Socialism and Internationalism.” The New Clarion, no. 9 (1932): 196. Cole, G.D.H. “Socialism and Parliament,” The New Clarion, no. 11 (1932): 254. Cole, G.D.H. “Socialism and Unemployment.” The New Clarion, no. 13 (1932): 305. Cole, G.D.H. “Socialist Control of Capital.” The New Clarion, no. 6 (1932): 135. Cole, G.D.H. “Take over the Banks – and Ignore the Cranks.” The New Clarion, no. 47 (1933): 408. Cole, G.D.H. “The Essentials of Socialisation,” The Political Quarterly 2, no. 3 (1931): 394–410. Cole, G.D.H., “The Gospel of Scarcity.” The New Clarion, no. 44 (1933): 344. Cole, G.D.H. “The Land and Agriculture.” The New Clarion, no. 7 (1932): 159. Cole, G.D.H., “The Restoration of Industry,” The New Clarion, no. 5 (1932): 100, 114. Cole, G.D.H. “The Social Services,” The New Clarion, no. 12 (1932): 281. Cole, G.D.H. “The United Front – and the People’s Front.” The Labour Monthly, no. 1 (1937): 14–19. Cole, G.D.H. “What a Socialist Government Must Do.” The New Clarion, no. 46 (1933): 384. Cole, G.D.H., “What’s Wrong – and Right – with the Labour Party.” The New Clarion, no. 45 (1933): 364. Cole, G.D.H. “What We Mean to Do.” The New Clarion, no. 2 (1932): 33. Constant, Lucien [Georges Kagan]. “La Crise du Parti Socialiste – I. A la veille du Congrès de Toulouse.” Cahiers du bolchévisme 11, no. 10 (1934): 592–593. Constant, Lucien [Georges Kagan]. “Les réformistes et la crise – III. L’“économie dirigée” et la C.G.T.” Cahiers du bolchévisme 11, no. 7 (1934): 412–422. Cripps, Stafford. “Democracy and Dictatorship: The Issue for the Labour Party.” The Political Quarterly 4, no. 4 (1933): 467–481. Cripps, Stafford. “Le Plan anglais de construction socialiste.” L’Etudiant socialiste 10, no. 5 (1935): 1–4. Cripps, Stafford. “The People’s Front.” The Labour Monthly, no. 2 (1937): 78–82. Cripps, Stafford. “The Future of the Labour Party.” New Statesman & Nation, no. 80 (1932): 255–256. Cripps, Stafford. “Weld the Workers Together.” The Socialist, no. 5 (1936): 1. Croce, Benedetto. “Au delà du marxisme.” La Critica, no. 26 (1928): 459–460.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

281

C.S.C. [Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens]. “Le Plan de Man.” Le progrès syndical, no. 30 (1934): 1–2. C.S.C. [Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens]. “Voulez-vous suicider?” Le progrès syndical, no. 42 (1935): 1. Déat, Marcel. “Axis de marche.” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 375 (1934): 1–4. Déat, Marcel. “De Bruxelles à Paris.” La Vie socialiste 13, no. 409 (1935): 1–3. Déat, Marcel. “La motion de Toulouse.” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 378 (1934): 3–5. Déat, Marcel. “La nouvelle épouvante de Léon Blum.” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 360 (1934): 4–6. Déat, Marcel. “Le planisme et la tradition française.” L’Homme nouveau 2, no. 12 (1935): unpaged. Déat, Marcel. “Notre adhésion au Plan de la C.G.T.” Paris-Demain 3, no. 81 (1935): 1–2. Déat, Marcel. “Rapport moral.” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 374 (1934): 1–10. Déat, Marcel. “Réflexions sur le fascisme.” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 9 (1933): 255–256. Déat, Marcel. “Sanglante confirmation.” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 362 (1934): 1–2. Déat, Marcel. “Tâtonnements.” Paris-Demain 2, no. 57 (1934): 1–2. Déat, Marcel. “Vers l’expérience française.” Le Front: socialiste, républicain, français 1, no. 8 (1935): 1–2. De Jouvenel, Bertrand. “Henri de Man l’homme du Plan.” L’Europe nouvelle, no. 878 (1934): 1216. De Jouvenel, Bertrand. “Le pensée et l’action.” Les Nouvelles littéraires, artistiques et scientifiques 16, no. 732 (1936): 1, 8. De Jouvenel, Bertrand. “Pourquoi j’ai été battu.” Vu, special issue (1936): 44–46. Delmarche, A. and G. Hercot. “Adhésion totale au Plan du Travail.” L’Etudiant socialiste 9, no. 9–10 (1934): 10–11. De Man, Hendrik. “Der neu entdeckte Marx.” Der Kampf 25, no. 5–6 (1932): 224–229. De Man, Hendrik. “Der neu entdeckte Marx.” Der Kampf 25, no. 6 (1932): 267–277. De Man, Hendrik. “Die Repetitivarbeit als Kulturproblem.” Europäische Revue 3, no. 2 (1927): 88–97. De Man, Hendrik. “Hervorming van den Staat vooraf!,” Leiding: Vlaamsch Socialistisch Maandschrift, no. 2 (1939): 68–73. De Man, Hendrik. “Is het Planisme dood?” Leiding: Vlaamsch Socialistisch Maandschrift, no. 1 (1939): 3–13. De Man, Hendrik. “Karl Liebknecht.” Ontwikkeling en Uitspanning 2, no. 16 (1921): 81–82. De Man, Hendrik. “Oude en Nieuwe Demokratie,” Leiding: Vlaamsch Socialistisch Maandschrift, no. 5 (1939): 290–301.

282 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

De Man, Hendrik. “Regeering en Parlement,” Leiding: Vlaamsch Socialistisch Maandschrift, no. 3 (1939): 147–154. De Man, Henri. “A propos de la Défense Nationale.” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 368 (1934): 4–9. De Man, Henri. “A propos de la Défense Nationale.” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 369 (1934): 5–13. De Man, Henri. “Crise économique et critique de l’économie.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 5, no. 10 (1930): 357–362. De Man, Henri. “Du plan technique au plan économique.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 8, no. 10 (1933): 471–473. De Man, Henri. “Du protectionnisme à l’autarchie.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 7, no. 12 (1932): 413–419. De Man, Henri. “Le contenu social de la démocratie.” Le Travail, no. 5 (1941): 1. De Man, Henri. “Entre la France et l’Allemagne.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 5, no. 6 (1931): 159–164. De Man, Henri. “Illusions et réalités de la démocratie.” Le Travail, no. 3 (1941): 1–2. De Man, Henri. “La crise doctrinale du socialisme.” Monde, 2, no. 76 (1929): 10–11. De Man, Henri. “La crise du capitalisme.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 6, no. 2 (1931): 38–43. De Man, Henri. “La liberté change de camp.” Le Travail, no. 8 (1941): 1–2. De Man, Henri. “La liberté ou les libertés.” Le Travail, no. 1 (1941): 1. De Man, Henri. “La nouvelle politique des salaires en Allemagne.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 7, no. 8 (1932): 265–271. De Man, Henri, “La politique de la Centrale d’Education Ouvrière,” EducationRécreation 8 no. 10 (1926): 147–148. De Man, Henri. “La résorption du chômage et le Plan du Travail.” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 7 (1934): 152–158. De Man, Henri. “L’assainissement des prix et des salaires en Allemagne.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 5, no. 5 (1930): 160–164. De Man, Henri. “La technocratie.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 8, no. 4 (1933): 101–106. De Man, Henri. “La volte-face des Etats-Unis.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 8, no. 12 (1933): 523–528. De Man, Henri. “Le capitalisme autoritaire.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale de Belgique 6, no. 2 (1931): 33–38. De Man, Henri. “Le capitalisme libéral.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 6, no. 8 (1931): 265–270

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

283

De Man, Henri. “Le protectionnisme agraire et la crise économique en Allemagne.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 7, no. 4 (1932): 97–105. De Man, Henri. “Les institutions paritaires de l’industrie allemande.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale de Belgique 5, no. 7 (1930): 253–258. De Man, Henri. “L’expérience suédoise.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique 8, no. 1 (1933): 1–6. De Man, Henri. “Les mobiles de la démocratie.” Le Travail, no. 4 (1941): 1. De Man, Henri. “Libre-échange, autarchie ou économie dirigée.” Bulletin d’information et de documentation de la Banque Nationale du Belgique, 8, no. 8 (1933): 245–251. De Man, Henri. “Libertés concrètes.” Le Travail, no. 7 (1941): 1–2. De Man, Henri. “Premier Mai 1941.” Le Travail, no. 1 (1941): 1. De Man, Henri. “Réponse à Emile Vandervelde.” L’Avenir social, no. 5 (1928): 259–268. De Man, Henri, “Sabotons la Guerre!” Education-Récréation 2, no. 25 (1921): 418–419. De Man, Henri. “Socialisme et marxisme.” La Vie socialiste 6, no. 92 (1928): 8–18. De Man, Henri. “Un Plan économique pour la Belgique.” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 11 (1933): 292–298. De Man, Henri. “Van Zeeland’s Achievements and Failures,” The Highway, no. 31 (1939): 141. De Man, Henri. “Vers la démocratie autoritaire.” Le Travail, no. 2 (1941): 1. De Man, Henri. “What Must We Do about Fascism?” The Plebs, no. 6 (1934): 124–126. De Man, Henry. “New Germany.” Living Age, 4022 (1921): 355–358. De Man, Henry. “The Menace to Europe’s Urban Civilization.” Queen’s Quarterly 27, no. 2 (1920): 107–117. Elton, Godfrey. “The Aristocratic Embrace.” The New Statesman & Nation, no. 64 (1932): 616. Fabra-Ribas, Antonio. “Jean Jaurès à Bruxelles les 29 et 30 juillet 1914.” La Vie socialiste 9, no. 219 (1931): 11–13. Farinet, Emile. “Dans la Seine, après le départ des néos.” Bataille socialiste 6, no. 73 (1933): 10. Faure, Paul. “Les taches de demain.” La Bataille socialiste 6, no. 73 (1933): 1–2. Frossard, Ludovic-Oscar. “L’Ancien Testament et le Nouveau.” Marianne 1, no. 46 (1933): 2. Halasi, Albert. “Le programme financier du Gouvernement.” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 5 (1935): 87–90. Jackson, Fay and Heinz Schlosser. “What Must We Do about Fascism?” Plebs, no. 7 (1934): 153–156.

284 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jastrow, Joseph. “Remaking a Mind.” The Nation, 110, no. 2857 (1920): 432–433. J. G. [Gustave Joly], “Carlo Rosselli: Socialisme libéral.” Critique sociale, no. 1 (1931): 18. Jouhaux, Léon. “Des réformes de structure sont indispensables: Le Front Populaire doit s’en convaincre.” L’Atelier pour le Plan 3, no. 29–30 (1937): 115–117. Kautsky, Karl. “De Man als Lehrer. Eine Nachlese.” Die Gesellschaft 4, no. 1 (1927): 62–77. Kautsky, Karl. “Die moderne Nationalität.” Die Neue Zeit 5, no. 10 (1887): 392–405, 442–451. Kautsky, Karl. “Eine Selbstanzeige.” Rote Revue 7, no. 6 (1928): 161–167. Kautsky, Karl. “Les “leçons” de Henri de Man.” La Nouvelle revue socialiste 3, no. 22 (1928): 96–111. Kautsky, Karl. “Les “leçons” de Henri de Man (fin).” La Nouvelle revue socialiste 3, no. 23 (1928): 209–216. Kautsky, Karl. “Marxismus und Philosophie.” Die Gesellschaft, 1 (1924): 306–314. Klinger, Max. “Sozialistische Erneuerung: Das Beispiel der Belgischen Arbeiterpartei.” Neuer Vorwärts, no. 30 (1934): 1. Lacoste, Robert. “A Bruxelles, avec Henri de Man.” La Tribune des fonctionnaires et des retraités 26, no. 583 (1934): 1, 4. Landauer, Carl. “Recent Literature on Planning.” Social Research 2, no. 4 (1935): 504–511. Laski, Harold J. “The Labour Party and Democracy.” The New Clarion, no. 54 (1933): 21–22. Laski, Harold J. “The Present Position of Representative Democracy,” The American Political Science Review 26, no. 4 (1932): 629–641. Laurat, Lucien. “La situation en France et le Plan de la CGT.” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 3 (1935): 52–55. Laurat, Lucien. “Le Plan du Travail vu de Moscou.” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 10 (1934): 214–219. Laurat, Lucien. “Mémoires d’un planiste 1932–1939.” Les Etudes sociales et syndicales, no. 120 (1965): 19–24. Lecocq, Yves. “Quelques souvenirs sur Henri de Man.” Bulletin de l’association pour l’étude de l’œuvre d’Henri de Man, no. 3 (1975): 6–11. Le Combat Marxiste. “Notre But.” Le Combat marxiste 1, no. 1 (1933): 1. Lefèvre, Frédéric. “Une heure avec Henri de Man: le “Plan du Travail” belge.” Les Nouvelles littéraires, artistiques, et scientifiques 13, no. 656 (1935): 3 Lefèvre, Frédéric. “Une heure avec Emile Vandervelde, écrivain politique.” Les Nouvelles littéraires, artistiques et scientifiques 12, no. 581 (1933): 4. Lefort, Henri. “Le Plan Delaisi.” Plan 1, no. 6 (1934): 1–2. Lefranc, Georges. “Le plan d’action d’Henri de Man.” L’Homme réel, no. 1 (1934): 20–23.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

285

Lefranc, Georges. “Le Plan de la C.G.T. et le programme de revendications du Rassemblement Populaire.” L’Atelier pour le Plan 2, no. 9 (1936): 141–144. Lefranc, Georges. “Lucien Laurat, 1932–1939.” Est & Ouest, no. 515 (1973): 5–7. Lefranc, Georges. “Rétrospectives: à travers un demi-siècle de mouvement ouvrier, 1920–1970. Vol. I: Comment, dans les années 1920, on devient socialiste.” Cahier & Revue de l’Ours, no. 116 (1981): 1–59. Lefranc, Georges. “Rétrospectives. Vol. II: militant socialiste et syndicaliste.” Cahiers et Revue de l’Ours no. 118 (1981): 1–70. L’Osservatore [Giuseppe Favarelli]. “‘Il Piano del Lavoro’ del Partito operaio belga.” Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà, no. 10 (1934): 94–103. Magrini [Aldo Garosci], “Il nostro socialismo. II – Giustizia e libertà.” Giustizia e libertà, no. 2 (1934): 1–2. Malon, Benoît. “Les Congrès socialistes internationaux de Paris en 1889.” La Revue socialiste 10, no. 56 (1889): 129–138. Marjolin, Robert. “Pour une conception révolutionnaire du plan.” Révolution constructive 1, no. 4 (1934): 2. Martin, Kingsley. “Socialism.” The Nation & Athenaeum, no. 14 (1928): 502. Modiano, Hélène and René Modiano. “Le “plan de rénovation économique”.” La Bataille socialiste 6, no. 82 (1934): 2–4. Mondolfo, Rodolfo. “Contributo a un chiarimento di idee.” Critica sociale 34, no. 1 (1924): 14–16. Mondolfo, Rodolfo. “Le attività del bilancio.” Critica sociale 33, no. 21 (1923): 328–330. Morrison, Herbert. “Reform or Revolution? The Labour Party Must Put Socialism First.” The New Clarion, no. 11 (1932): 241–242, 258. Muller, Albert. “Le Plan du Travail et la morale catholique.” La Terre Wallonne 15, no. 174 (1934): 313–330. Parfait, Jules. “Les jeunes catholiques belges et le plan de Man.” Esprit, no. 30 (1935): 951–959. Person, Harlow S. “The New Challenge to Scientific Management: Can the Principles of Planning and Control Be Applied Over a Wider Area than the Individual Enterprise?” Bulletin of the Taylor Society 16, no. 2 (1931): 62–63. Philip, André. “Autour du Plan Henri de Man: le socialisme et les classes sociales.” Esprit 2, no. 17 (1934): 788–804. Philip, André. “La rationalisation et le problème doctrinal du socialisme.” La Nouvelle revue socialiste 3, no. 24 (1928): 299–310. Pomaret, Charles. “Catalogue de Plans.” L’Etat moderne 8, no. 4 (1935): 364–367. Pommera, Marcelle. “La plus belle motion du monde…” Le Combat marxiste 2, no. 9 (1934): 15–17. Pommera, Marcelle. “Revue des Livres.” La Critique sociale, no. 8 (1933): 85.

286 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Rambault, Pierre. “Le Congrès fédéral constitutive de la Fédération de la Gironde du Parti Socialiste de France.” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 360 (1934): 13–14. Renaudel, Pierre. “Le “renouvellement socialiste” est une réalité en Suisse comme en Belge.” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 359 (1934): 12–13. Renaudel, Pierre. “Pour la République, contre la dictature et le fascisme.” La Vie socialiste 12, no. 363 (1934): 1–2. Rens, Jef. “Le Plan du Travail.” L’Etudiant socialiste 9, no. 5 (1934): 3–6. Rens, Jef. “Les chrétiens et le Plan.” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 3 (1934): 54–58. Rens, Jef. “Problèmes de socialisation.” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 4 (1933): 90–93. Rens, Jef, “Problèmes de socialisation.” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 5 (1933): 127–131. Rens, Jef. “Rectifions!” Le Mouvement syndical belge, no. 11 (1936): 228–229. R., J. [Jules Robert]. “Dans le parti: Une déclaration de la “Révolution Constructive”.” Le Combat marxiste 1, no. 3 (1933): 8–9. Roditi, Georges. “Mort ou naissance du néo-socialisme?” L’Homme nouveau, special issue (1935): unpaged. Roger, Charles. “A ‘New Deal’ for Belgium.” Foreign Affairs 13, no. 4 (1935): 625–637. Rosselli, Carlo. “Aggiunte e chiose al bilancio marxista.” Critica sociale 33, no. 23 (1923): 359–362. Rosselli, Carlo. “Il movimento operaio.” La Rivoluzione liberale 3, no. 13 (1924): 53–54. Rosselli, Carlo. “La crisi intellettuale del Partito Socialista.” Critica sociale 33, no. 21 (1923): 325–328. Rosselli, Carlo. “Liberalismo socialista.” La Rivoluzione liberale 3, no. 29 (1924): 114–116. Rossi, Aldo [Angelo Tasca]. “La scission socialiste au Congrès du Paris,” Monde: hebdomadaire international 6, no. 268 (1933): 4–5. Séverac, Jean-Baptiste. “Après la dernière victoire du fascisme.” La Bataille socialiste, no. 76 (1934): 2. Séverac, Jean-Baptiste. “A propos de “Plans”.” Révolte 4, no. 21 (1934): 5–12. Somerhausen, Marc. “L’Office du redressement économique,” Le mouvement syndical belge no. 3 (1935): 50–51. Sorel, Georges. “La crise du socialisme.” Revue politique et parlementaire, no. 18 (1898): 597–612. Sorel, Georges. “La necessità e il fatalismo nel marxismo.” La riforma sociale 8, no. 5 (1898): 708–732. Sorel, Georges. “L’avenir socialiste des syndicats.” L’Humanité nouvelle: revue internationale 19, no. 1 (1898): 294–307.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

287

Sorel, Georges. “Les dissensions de la socialdémocratie en Allemagne: A propos des écrits de M. Bernstein.” Revue politique et parlementaire, 25 (1900): 33–66. Sorel, Georges. “Les polémiques pour l’interprétation du marxisme: Bernstein et Kautsky.” Revue internationale de sociologie, 8 (1900): 262–284. Souvarine, Boris. “Les journées de février.” La Critique sociale, no. 11 (1934): 201–205. Souvarine, Boris. “Un demi-siècle d’amitié.” Est & Ouest, no. 515 (1973): 1–4. Spaak, Paul-Henri. “Le Plan du Travail: II. Ses mérites.” L’Action socialiste, no. 48 (1933): unpaged. Spaak, Paul-Henri. “Le Plan du Travail: III. Ses mérites.” L’Action socialiste, no. 49 (1933): unpaged. Spaak, Paul-Henri. “Que faire? III. Une révolution réaliste.” L’Action socialiste, no. 42, (1933): unpaged. Suarez, Georges. “Marcel Déat révolutionnaire de juillet ou vers un ministère Paul Boncour.” Le Gringoire 7, no. 291 (1934): 7. Thorez, Maurice. “L’organisation du front populaire du travail, de la paix et de la liberté.” Cahiers du bolchévisme 12, no. 1 (1935): 26–36. T. J., “A propos d’une interview d’Emile Vandervelde.” La vie socialiste 11, no. 354 (1933): 3. Trevelyan, Charles. “The New Offensive,” The New Clarion, no. 13 (1932): 301–302. Vaillant, Gaston. “Le programme du Front Populaire et le Plan de la CGT.” Le Front: socialiste, républicain, français 2, no. 11 (1936): 2. Vallon, Louis. “Le Plan du 9 Juillet et l’expérience belge.” L’Homme nouveau 2, no. 16 (1935): unpaged. Vallon, Louis. “Le programme du Front Populaire.” L’Homme nouveau 3, no. 25 (1936): unpaged. Vallon, Louis. “I.  Le Plan du 9 Juillet.” L’Homme nouveau 2, no. 9 (1935): unpaged. Vandervelde, Emile. “Au-delà du marxisme.” L’Avenir social, no. 3 (1928): 134–142. Vandervelde, Emile. “Die Arbeiterbewegung in Belgien: Erwiderung an de Man und de Brouckère.” Die Neue Zeit 2, no. 28, 42–47. Vandervelde, Emile. “Jenseits des Marxismus.” Die Gesellschaft 5, no. 3 (1928): 222–230. Vandervelde, Emile. “Le marxisme a-t-il fait faillite?” La Nouvelle revue socialiste 2, no. 18 (1927): 513–521. Vandervelde, Emile, “Le marxisme a-t-il fait faillite? (fin)” La Nouvelle revue socialiste 2, no. 19 (1927): 5–12. Vandervelde, Emile. “Henri de Man et Marcel Déat.” L’Etudiant socialiste 9, no. 5 (1934): 1–2.

288 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vandervelde, Emile. “M.  Briand et l’Union fédérale européenne.” La nouvelle revue socialiste 4, no. 31 (1930): 296–300. Van Zeeland, Paul. “Aims of Recent Belgian Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs 18, no. 1 (1939): 140–147. Varga, Eugen. “The De Man Plan is a Fraud on the Workers (Part I).” Communist International 11, no. 12 (1934): 482–491. Varga, Eugen. “The De Man Plan is a Fraud on the Workers (Part II).” Communist International 11, no. 13 (1934): 514–524. Vaysset, Raymonde. “Révolution Constructive.” La Bataille socialiste 5, no. 60 (1932): 11. Vivier, Marc. “Néo-Socialisme (Bernard Grasset Éditeur).” Masses, no. 14 (1934): 7. Woytinsky, Wladimir S. “Wann kommt die aktive Wirtschaftspolitik?” Der Arbeit, no. 8 (1932): 11–31. Zimmern, Alfred. “A National Labour Party?” The New Statesman & Nation, no. 54 (1932): 291. Zyromski, Jean. “De la brochure de Laurat au programme d’action.” La Bataille socialiste 6, no. 73 (1933): 2–3. Zyromski, Jean. “Notre effort au Congrès de Toulouse.” La Bataille socialiste 6, no. 79 (1934): 1–2. ∗∗∗ [Hendrik de Man], “Genoeg sabotage van de onzijdigheid!” Leiding: Vlaamsch Socialistisch Maandschrift no. 10 (1939): 605–612. “A propos du Bureau d’Études sociales et du Bureau d’Action pour le Plan.” Le mouvement syndical belge, no. 12 (1934): 275–277. “A Socialist Programme.” The Spectator, no. 5458 (1933): 2. “Au Congrès du Parti Socialiste de France.” Le Front: socialiste, républicain, français 1, no. 2 (1935): 1, 4. “Belgique: un plan de socialisation du Parti Ouvrier Belge.” Le Combat marxiste 1, no. 3 (1933): 16–17. “Bibliographie.” Le mouvement syndical belge, no. 10 (1934): 232. “Bilan de l’expérience économique et monétaire belge.” L’Europe nouvelle no. 950 (1936). “Ce que le Gouvernement Van Zeeland a emprunté au Plan du Travail.” Le mouvement syndical belge, no. 5 (1935): 92–94. “Chronique du Parti Socialiste de France – Union Jean Jaurès.” La vie socialiste 12, no. 357 (1934): 15–16. “Conférence consultative, à l’abbaye de Pontigny, sur les problèmes relatifs à l’économie planée.” L’Information sociale 17, no. 553 (1934): 3–15. “Contre la misère, la faillite et le chômage – Comité du Plan.” La vie socialiste 13, no. 409 (1935): 3–4. “Correspondance échangée entre la Commission Syndicale et la Confédération des Syndicats chrétiens.” Le mouvement syndical belge, 1 (1935): 16–19.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

289

“Correspondance entre Lénine et Camille Huysmans (1905–1914).” Edited by Georges Haupt, Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 3, no. 4 (1962): 582–665. “Correspondence.” The New Statesman & Nation, no. 996 (1950): 402–403. “Des voies nouvelles.” Le mouvement syndical belge, no. 10 (1933): 261. “En avant pour le Plan du Travail.” Le mouvement syndical belge, no. 11 (1933): 291. “Henri de Man.” Écrits de Paris: revue des questions actuelles, no. 117 (1954): 91–96. “Het Plan van de Arbeid: Nieuwe Wegen.” De sociaal-democraat: weekblad van de Sociaal Democratische Arbeiderspartij in Nederland no. 7 (1934). “Journal de Russie d’Albert Thomas: 22 avril-19 juin 1917.” Edited by Ioannis Sinanoglou. Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 14, no. 1–2 (1973): 86–204. “La crise de la Banque Belge du Travail.” Revue d’économie politique 48, no. 4 (1934): 1212–1222. “L’action de la C.G.T. pour conjurer la crise économique.” La voix du peuple, no. 160 (1934): 10. “La présentation du cabinet Doumergue.” La vie socialiste 12, no. 363 (1934): 9–10. “La rentrée politique de Renaudel: son discours de la Seine.” La vie socialiste 12, no. 375 (1934): 17. “Le Congrès confédéral – Paris, 15 au 18 septembre.” La voix du peuple, no. 133 (1931): 585–621. “Le Congrès de la fédération de la région parisienne.” La vie socialiste 12, no. 376 (1934): 11–14. “Le Congrès fédéral du Var.” La vie socialiste 12, no. 376 (1934): 14–15. “Le Conseil National de scission: Paris, 4 et 5 novembre 1933.” La vie socialiste 11, no. 349–350 (1933): 4–27. “Le Parti Socialiste et la participation ministérielle.” La Bataille socialiste, no. 27 (1929). “Le Plan belge et nous.” La vie socialiste 12, no. 357 (1934): 3–4. “Le Plan de Man.” Bilan, no. 4 (1934): 122–132. “Le Plan de Man: suite et fine.” Bilan, no. 5 (1934): 166–179. “Le Plan Henri de Man pour lutter contre la crise.” La tribune des fonctionnaires et des retraités 26, no. 577 (1933): 3. “Le rapport du groupe parlementaire.” La vie socialiste 12, no. 376 (1934): 6–8. “Les revendications du Rassemblement Populaire.” La voix du peuple 18, no. 183 (1936): 5–6. “Les thèses de Pontigny.” Plan, 1 no. 27 (1934): unpaged. “Nationalisations des banques et du crédit.” L’homme réel, no. 2 (1934): 67–77. “Présentation du Plan.” Le Front: socialiste, républicain, français 1, no. 4 (1935): 4. “Révolution et contre-révolution en Autriche.” La Vie du Parti, no. 52 (1934). “Socialism under Fire.” The New Statesman, no. 796 (1928): 518. “Some books of the week.” The Spectator, no. 4781 (1920): 215–217.

290 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Sur le Plan d’Action du Parti: une seule motion Moch-Cartier.” La volonté socialiste, no. 211 (1934): unpaged. “Une politique nouvelle et réaliste.” Le Combat marxiste 2, no. 5 (1934): 4–6. “Un manifeste du Parti Socialiste de France.” La vie socialiste 12, no. 363 (1934): 3–4.

Newspaper Articles Albarda, Johan Wilhelm. “‘Fiasco’ van Het Plan-De Man.” Het Volk, January 16, 1934. Alias, “En marge du Rapport Servais: la fin d’un drame.” Le Soir, February 6, 1937. Baudhuin, Fernand. “Le Plan du Travail: comment il apparait à la lecture des textes.” La Libre Belgique, March 17, 1935. B.  D., “Où va la Belgique? M. de Man ne croit pas à l’avenir du rexisme.” La Croix, July 1, 1936. Bertrand, Louis. “Démocratie et régime parlementaire.” Le Peuple, March 20, 1933. Bidoux, Marcel. “Le Congrès de Nantes a accordé aux ministres radicaux un mandat large.” Le Populaire, October 28, 1934. Bidoux, Marcel. “Le Congrès radical a terminé ses travaux hier.” Le Populaire, October 29, 1934. Blum, Léon. “Appel à une bataille de classe.” Le Populaire, January 5, 1934. Blum, Léon. “Au-delà du réformisme.” Le Populaire, January 4, 1934. Blum, Léon. “En Belgique.” Le Populaire, March 27, 1935. Blum, Léon. “La leçon de l’histoire.” Le Populaire, July 25, 1933. Blum, Léon. “La socialisation par étapes.” Le Populaire, January 22, 1934. Blum, Léon. “Le Plan démarqué.” Le Populaire, May 17, 1934. Blum, Léon. “Le Plan du Travail et le Parti Français.” Le Populaire, January 6, 1934. Blum, Léon. “Le sens véritable du Plan du Travail.” Le Populaire, January 21, 1934. Blum, Léon. “Les grands lignes du Plan du Travail.” Le Populaire, January 18, 1934. Blum, Léon. “Les nationalisations et la crise.” Le Populaire, August 6, 1934. Blum, Léon. “Naïveté o bluff?” Le Populaire, May 22, 1934. Blum, Léon. “Parti de classe et non pas parti de déclassés.” Le Populaire, July 19, 1933. Blum, Léon. “Plan et Programme.” Le Populaire, January 17, 1934. Brugmans, Hendrik. “Hendrik de Man.” Paraat, January 23, 1948. Coelst, Jules. “Réformes et plans de façade.” La Libre Belgique, May 10, 1934.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

291

Colens, Louis. “Le “Plan” et les démocrates chrétiens: réponse de ceux-ci aux socialistes.” La Libre Belgique, January 4, 1934. Crokaert, Paul. “La nouvelle Carthage?” Le Soir, December 12, 1935. Croquet, Roger. “Une déclaration de M. de Man, Ministre des Travaux Publics.” Le Soir, June 9, 1936. Déat, Marcel. “Fin des vieux partis.” Notre temps, February 14, 1934. Déat, Marcel. “Le planisme au Parlement.” Le Petit provençal, January 31, 1935. De Becker, Raymond. “M. Henri de Man nous dit: “Je suis d’accord avec Spaak. ”” L’Independence belge, February 17, 1937. De Becker, Raymond. “M. Spaak définit le socialisme national,” L’Independence belge, February 9, 1937. De Brouckère, Louis. “Scission en France!” Le Peuple, November 7, 1933. Degrelle, Léon. “Que devient M. De Man?” Le Pays réel, May 2, 1940. De Jouvenel, Bertrand. “Belgique: Patrie du Plan.” La République, September 15, 1934. De Jouvenel, Bertrand. “Pour la gauche unitaire. Socialistes et radicaux. Une conversation avec M. Marcel Déat.” La Voix, June 9, 1929. Delforge, Marc. “La panacée de M. de Man: serait-ce un remède homéopathique?” Vers l’avenir, December 12, 1934. Delsinne, Léon. “Corporatisme ou socialisme?” Le Peuple, October 26, 1934. Delsinne, Léon. “Le corporatisme ne peut plus avoir sens de sens au XXe siècle.” Le Peuple, October 12, 1934. Delsinne, Léon. “Peut-il y avoir un corporatisme socialiste?” Le Peuple, October 5, 1934. De Man, Hendrik. “De beslissende strijd voor het Plan van den Arbeid.” Vooruit, April 12, 1936. De Man, Hendrik. “Die Folgen der kapitalistischen Monopolwirtschaft.” Hamburger Echo, January 24, 1933. De Man, Hendrik. “Die Militarismus in Belgien.” Leipziger Volkszeitung, November 15, 1909. De Man, Hendrik. “Die neue Phase des Kapitalismus.” Hamburger Echo, January 20, 1933. De Man, Hendrik. “Karl Kautsky.” Vossische Zeitung, October 16, 1929. De Man, Hendrik “Pariser Sendung. Die letzte Aktion im August 1914.” Vossische Zeitung, March 22, 1931. De Man, Hendrik, “Sozialistische Reisebriefe: II.” Leipziger Volkszeitung, February 1, 1910. De Man, Hendrik, “Sozialistische Reisebriefe: II.” Leipziger Volkszeitung, February 2, 1910. De Man, Hendrik. “Sozialistische Reisebriefe: V.” Leipziger Volkszeitung, August 12, 1910.

292 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

De Man, Hendrik. “Syndikale Eenheid en Beroepsverscheidenheid.” Vooruit, September 5, 1934. De Man, Hendrik. “Wende des Sozialismus.” Hamburger Echo, January 17, 1933. De Man, Henri. “A capitalisme nouveau, socialisme nouveau.” Le Peuple, November 29, 1933. De Man, Henri. “Clarification.” Le Peuple, September 24, 1933. De Man, Henri. “De 1910 à 1934.” Le Peuple, January 24, 1934. De Man, Henri. “Démocratie industrielle ou dictature capitaliste?” Le Peuple, October 3, 1934. De Man, Henri. “Economie nationale dirigée, OUI! Repli économique national, NON!” Le Peuple, December 6, 1933. De Man, Henri. “Impressions du Bornage: Il est moins cinq.” Le Peuple, January 20, 1935. De Man, Henri. “L’Action pour le Plan: la troisième vague.” Le Peuple, December 26, 1934. De Man, Henri. “L’Allemagne nouvelle: l’esprit de mon enquête.” Le Peuple, June 12, 1921. De Man, Henri. “L’alliance des fermiers et des ouvriers.” Le Peuple, May 7, 1920. De Man, Henri. “L’anticapitalisme des classes moyennes.” Le Peuple, October 11, 1933. De Man, Henri. “La révision du marxisme.” Le Peuple, May 13,1919. De Man, Henri. “Le corporatisme et nous.” Le Peuple, July 25, 1934. De Man, Henri. “Le corporatisme socialiste contre l’étatisme.” Le Peuple, September 19, 1934. De Man, Henri. “Le Plan au Pouvoir! L’appel au Parlement avant l’appel aux électeurs.” Le Peuple, July 18, 1934. De Man, Henri. “Le Plan et les communistes.” Le Peuple, October 10, 1934. De Man, Henri. “Le plan national d’abord!” Le Peuple, November 22, 1933. De Man, Henri. “Les causes universelles du fascisme.” Le Peuple, October 4, 1933. De Man, Henri. “Les classes moyennes.” Le Peuple, October 7, 1933. De Man, Henri. “Les élections de novembre.” Le Peuple, September 7, 1920. De Man, Henri. “Le vrai et le faux corporatisme.” Le Peuple, September 26, 1934. De Man, Henri. “L’handicap Europe-Amérique.” Le Peuple, October 2, 1920. De Man, Henri. “L’heure du Plan doit venir avant l’heure de la grève générale.” Le Peuple, January 23, 1935. De Man, Henri. “Un manifeste du P.O.B.” Gazette de Charleroi, July 3, 1940. De Man, Henri. “Nous avons fait l’économie d’une grève générale. Faites, Messieurs, l’économie d’une dissolution!” Le Peuple, February 27, 1935. De Man, Henri. “Pour une nouvelle stratégie socialiste.” Le Peuple, October 27, 1933. De Man, Henri. “Pour une politique socialiste de paix.” Le Peuple, November 1, 1938.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

293

De Man, Henri. “Reprise mondiale ou reprises nationales?” Le Peuple, May 30, 1934. De Man, Henri. “Socialisme petit-bourgeois?” Le Peuple, November 8, 1933. De Man, Henri. “Syndicalisme contre corporatisme?” Le Peuple, August 22, 1934. De Man, Henri. “Un défenseur communiste du réformisme.” Le Peuple, October 31, 1934. De Man, Henri. “Un dilemme: la Guerre ou l’Abdication? Non, il y a une troisième possibilité.” Le Peuple, September 22, 1938. De Man, Henri. “Une confirmation.” L’Humanité, March 4,1915. De Man, Henri. “Unité syndicale et différenciation corporative.” Le Peuple, September 5, 1934. De Man, Henry. “A Blow to International Solidarity.” Seattle Union Record, October 6, 1920. Deny, Fernand. “M. Henri de Man a parlé lundi soir, à Charleroi.” Le Soir, June 1, 1938. Deschamps, Fernand. “Le truc du Plan.” Le Vingtième siècle, January 19, 1934. Des Sables, Pierre. “La dictature et les socialistes.” L’Independence belge, August 6, 1934. Des Sables, Pierre. “Les dangereuses suggestions du Parti socialiste.” L’Independence belge, June 9, 1934. Destrée, Jules. “Quand la maison brûle...” Le Soir, March 30, 1935. Dewinne, Auguste. “Les catholiques et le Plan.” Le Peuple, December 27, 1934. Dewinne, Auguste. “Les dirigeants de la démocratie chrétienne ne veulent pas du plan: pourquoi?” Le Peuple, January 11, 1934. Dewinne, Auguste. “Nouveau socialisme.” Le Peuple, December 7, 1933. Dewinne, Auguste. “Ou est la manouvre?” Le Peuple, January 18, 1934. Dupriez, René. “Les conditions libérales a la participation au nouveau gouvernement.” Gazette de Charleroi, October 30, 1937. Dupriez, René. “Les finances nationales.” La Gazette de Charleroi, June 23, 1936. Faure, Paul. “Deuxième épître à des sénateurs.” Le Populaire, November 12, 1933. Faure, Paul. “Qui n’a pas son plan?” Le Populaire, January 17, 1934. Gailly, Arthur. “Communiqué du Bureau National d’Action.” Le Peuple, April 13, 1935. Hambursin, Maurice. “Le P.O.B. lance un appel aux cultivateurs pour qu’ils se rallient au Plan du Travail.” Le Peuple, May 19, 1934. Hislaire, René. “Politique de neutralité, politique de paix.” L’Independence belge, November 24, 1939. H. R. [René Hislaire]. “Comment maintenir l’Union Nationale.” L’Independence belge, October 27, 1937. H.  R. [René Hislaire]. “La chance de M.  H. de Man.” L’Independence belge, November 21, 1936.

294 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

H. R. [René Hislaire]. “Le Congrès de la Fédération des cercles.” L’Independence belge, October 6, 1937. H. R. [René Hislaire]. “Le départ de M. de Man.” L’Independence belge, March 11, 1938. Itard, Jean. “Il y a Plan et Plan.” Le Populaire, April 18, 1934. Itard, Jean. “L’unanimité de Toulouse.” Le Populaire, June 27, 1934. Itard, Jean and Georges Lefranc. “Pour l’offensive socialiste.” Le Populaire, January 31, 1934. Itard, Jean and Georges Lefranc. “Pour un plan de construction socialiste.” Le Populaire, January 17, 1934. Janssens, Charles. “Les collusions politico-financières,” La Dernière heure, December 30, 1936. Jexas [Josef Saxe]. “Réflexions sur le Congrès socialiste français: mise au point et examen de conscience.” Le Peuple, July 26, 1933. Kautsky, Karl. “Mon étatisme. Une mise au point de Karl Kautsky.” Le Peuple, September 29, 1934. K., G. [Grégoire Koulischer]. “Henri de Man fait justice des attaques de la presse réactionnaire.” Le Peuple, April 30, 1938. Kleijn, L.J., “Wat het Belgische vijfjarenplan van prof. Hendrik de Man wil.” Het Volk, January 4, 1934. Koulischer, Grégoire. “Une brochure de Henri de Man: “Une offensive pour la paix”.” Journal de Charleroi, January 20, 1939. Lambert, Paul. “Participez à la semaine d’études des étudiants socialistes!” La Wallonie, July 18, 1934. Laurat, Lucien. “Réflexions sur un programme: la fin d’une vieille dispute.” La Wallonie, November 21, 1933. Lebas, Jean. “Où va le Parti Socialiste?” Le Populaire, June 24, 1935. Masoin, Maurice. “Que vaut le Plan de Man?” Vers l’avenir, March 6, 1935. Mussolini, Benito. “Trincerocrazia.” Il Popolo d’Italia, December 15, 1917. Officier socialiste, un [Hendrik de Man]. “La grande désillusion.” Le Peuple, January 26, 1919. Parant, Roger. “Grandeur et décadence.” L’Express du Midi, July 11, 1934. P., O. [Oskar Pollak]. “Die Gewinnung der Mittelschichten.” Arbeiter-Zeitung, December 31, 1933. Piérard, Louis. “La médiation de l’Internationale.” Le Peuple, October 25, 1933. Poulet, Robert. “Que penser du “Plan de Man”?” La Nation belge, November 23, 1933. Rappoport, Charles. “La doctrine et l’histoire: De Man, l’homme qui assassina… Karl Marx.” L’Humanité, February 5, 1928. Rens, Jef. “L’Office de Redressement économique: l’idée et sa réalisation,” Plan 3, no. 5 (1936): unpaged. Rivière, Albert. “Il pleut des plans.” Le Populaire, May 15, 1934.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

295

Rome, Claire. “La femme et le Plan du Travail.” Le Peuple, May 9, 1934. Sabeau, Léon. “Confiance en l’idée.” Gazette de Charleroi, September 15, 1941. Sluyser, Meyer. “Het Plan van de Arbeid van dr. Hendrik de Man.” Het Volk, December 28, 1933. Tamias [Max-Léo Gérard]. “Comment le Plan du Travail est incompatible avec les libertés publiques.” L’Independence belge, April 12, 1934. Tamias [Max-Léo Gérard]. “Comment on trompe le peuple.” L’Independence belge, January 17, 1934. Thomas, Albert. “Démocratie ou bolchevisme.” L’Humanité, November 9, 1918. Truffaut, Georges. “ La propagande pour le plan doit devenir une obsession: toutes les forces vives du Parti doivent dorénavant être au service du Plan, nous dit Arthur Gailly, délégué de la propagande.” Le Peuple, December 25, 1934. U., W. (William Ugeux), “Le discours de Charleroi.” Le Vingtième siècle, June 1, 1938. Vandervelde, Emile. “Ce qu’un socialiste anglais pense de l’avenir du socialisme.” La Dépêche de Toulouse, April 22, 1934. Vandervelde, Emile. “Henri de Man et Marcel Déat.” Le Peuple, January 7, 1934. Vandervelde, Emile. “Il y a des gouvernements socialistes en Suède et en Danemark: les choses en vont-elles plus mal?” Le Peuple, August 5, 1934. Vandervelde, Emile. “Jaurès au Bureau Socialiste Internationale.” L’Humanité, July 31, 1915. Vandervelde, Emile. ““L’Action Socialiste” et le réformisme.” Le Peuple, October 7, 1934. Vandervelde, Emile. “La cure de rajeunissement du socialisme.” La Dépêche de Toulouse, February 17, 1935. Vandervelde, Emile. “Le marxisme et le planisme.” Le Peuple, February 3, 1935. Vandervelde, Emile. “L’équivoque corporative: anachronisme et camouflage.” Le Peuple, February 4, 1934. Vandervelde, Emile. “L’évolution révolutionnaire.” Le Peuple, February 13, 1938. Vandervelde, Emile. “Nos J.G.S. et le “Plan Révolutionnaire”.” Le Peuple, October 6, 1934. Vandervelde, Emile. “Planisme, néo-socialisme ou néo-réformisme?” Le Peuple, January 6, 1935. Vandervelde, Emile. “Prochainement sans doute la crise ministérielle: mais après?” Le Peuple, October 21, 1934. Vandervelde, Emile. “Retour à Marx et analyses marxistes.” Le Peuple, February 17, 1935. Vandervelde, Emile. “Un appel: pour le Plan du Travail.” Le Peuple, January 14, 1934. Van Overbergh, Cyrille. “Socialisme.” Le Soir, January 12, 1934. Vos, Herman. “Het Plan van den Arbeid – Zijn Vertrekpunt.” Vooruit, December 12, 1933.

296 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vos, Herman. “Het Socialisme en het Nationale Karakter: De Engelsche arbeidersbeweging.” Vooruit, September 11, 1934. Vos, Herman. “Plan-Ekonomie in Scandinavie: Een Noorsch Drie-Jaren Plan.” Vooruit, June 5, 1934. Wauters, Arthur. “Economie dirigée et socialisation.” Le Peuple, August 28, 1934. Wauters, Arthur. “Et après?” Le Peuple, December 26, 1936. Wauters, Arthur. “Faire payer les spéculateurs.” Le Peuple, October 6, 1936. Wauters, Arthur. “M.  Fabri pharaon de la haute finance.” Le Peuple, December 28, 1936. X., “Un manœuvre libérale.” Vers l’avenir, November 2, 1937. Zyromski, Jean. “Amical reproche à Vincent Auriol.” Le Populaire, December 27, 1933. Zyromski, Jean. “Crise–Pouvoir–Socialisation.” Le Populaire, February 1, 1934. Zyromski, Jean. “De Belgique… en France.” Le Populaire, April 17, 1935. Zyromski, Jean. “Pour une politique de socialisation.” Le Populaire, January 4, 1934. “Against Socialists Here.” New York Times, September 14, 1918. “A la fédération des cercles catholiques.” Le Soir, March 12, 1934. “A l’Association Catholique de Waremme: un discours de M.  D’Aspremont-­ Linden.” Le Vingtième siècle, July 21, 1937. “Après le Congrès de Toulouse.” Le Peuple, May 26, 1934. “Au cercle des militants: Marc Somerhausen parle de la réforme de l’Etat.” Journal de Charleroi, February 25, 1936. “Au groupe néo-socialiste.” Le Temps, February 9, 1934. “Auguste Reynaud, député du Var, démissionne du parti “néo”. La fédération varoise s’était d’ailleurs opposée au maintien de Marquet dans le cabinet Doumergue.” Le Populaire, February 14, 1934. “Aux urnes pour la démocratie et le travail! Votez pour la liste Adrien Marquet.” Le Cri populaire, April 28, 1935. “Chez les gens d’esprit.” Le Peuple, October 31, 1932. “Chez les néo-socialistes.” Le Temps, February 16, 1934. “De Man oogstte veel succes: Zijn ‘Plan van den Arbeid’ door Congres aanwaard.” Het Volk, December 27, 1933. “Discours de Joseph Merlot,” Le Peuple, November 8, 1938. “Discours de Max Buset,” Le Peuple, November 7, 1938. “Discours d’Henri de Man,” Le Peuple, November 7, 1938. “Een interview met Rik de Man: Zijne Ervaringen op het front en in Rusland.” De Volksgazet, December 4–5, 1918. “Ein Plan der Arbeit.” Arbeiter-Zeitung, December 29, 1933. “Et le Plan… reste en plan.” La Gazette de Charleroi, March 25, 1935. “Fêtes de l’Internationale des jeunesses socialistes.” La Wallonie, July 11, 1934.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

297

“Henri de Man expose à Anvers notre situation politique: Il définit la position du P.O.B. attaché à de nouvelles réalités: parti de gouvernement, parti constitutionnel, parti national.” Le Peuple, October 16, 1937. “Henri de Man entre la Banque et la Bourse.” Le Peuple, September 23, 1936. “Henri de Man reçoit le prix quinquennal des sciences sociales.” Le Peuple, October 29, 1932. “La conclusion de l’Emprunt Mendelssohn: les faits que signale la Commission d’enquête sont vraiment graves.” Le Vingtième siècle, December 22, 1936. “La C.G.T. présente un plan de rénovation économique.” Le Populaire, October 29, 1934. “La Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens devant le Plan de Man.” Le Vingtième siècle, February 11, 1934. “La Confédération Générale du Travail demande l’application de mesures immédiates contre la crise économique.” Le Populaire, January 16, 1934. “La Ligue des Travailleurs et le Plan socialiste.” La Vie Nouvelle, April 22, 1934. “La réaction fasciste ne passera pas!” Le Populaire, February 7, 1934. “La semaine d’études des étudiants socialistes.” La Wallonie, July 30, 1934. “L’assassinat.” L’Humanité, August 1, 1914. “La vraie raison de l’exclusive libérale.” Le Peuple, November 1, 1937. “Le Congrès du Parti Socialiste de France: M. Marquet ne veut pas être un boulet pour le parti. Il le quitterait plutôt.” La Petite Gironde, July 9, 1934. “Le Congrès extraordinaire de la fédération socialiste de la Seine s’est tenu hier, salle des Fêtes de la mairie du Pré-Saint Gervais.” Le Populaire, January 29, 1934. “Le Congrès national fixé au 20–25 Mai se tiendra à Toulouse.” Le Populaire, March 12, 1934. “Le Congrès socialiste et l’utopie du plan de Man.” Le Vingtième siècle, December 28, 1933. “Le Conseil Général du P.O.B. et le Comité National de la Commission Syndicale ont examiné hier, le plan d’action de Henri de Man.” Le Peuple, November 16, 1933. “Le deuxième Congrès de la Centrale Politique de la Jeunesse Catholique.” La Libre Belgique, January 29, 1934. “Le nouveau gouvernement n’est pas aux mains des banquiers.” Le Peuple, March 27, 1935. “Le plan lâché.” La Libre Belgique, March 24, 1935. “Le plan social-fasciste d’Henri de Man – Tous d’accord!” L’Humanité, January 8, 1934. “Le programme du Rassemblement populaire.” Le Peuple: Quotidien du syndicalisme, January 12, 1936. “Les conclusions des commissions discutées en séance plénière au cours de la dernière journée du Congrès International.” Le Peuple, August 4, 1933.

298 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Les Congrès fédéraux.” Le Populaire, February 7, 1934. “Les Congrès fédéraux.” Le Populaire, February 8, 1934. “Les démocrates-chrétiens et le Plan du Travail.” Le Peuple, February 17, 1934. “Les jeunesses catholiques en marche vers le corporatisme.” La Wallonie, January 29, 1934. “Le Ministre des Finances annonce un boni budgétaire de 171 millions.” Le Peuple, October 1, 1936. “Les néo-socialises divisés.” L’Homme libre, February 10, 1934. “Les socialistes au gouvernement ont tenu les engagements qu’ils avaient pris dans l’opposition.” Le Peuple, October 2, 1936. “Les spéculateurs contre le franc ont trouvé des défenseurs.” Le Peuple, October 10, 1936. “L’exécution du Plan du Travail: une lettre d’Henri de Man à Emile Vandervelde du 14 mai 1932.” Le Peuple, March 24, 1935. “L’expérience américaine: une conférence de M.  Delaisi.” Le Peuple, January 20, 1934. “Lieutenant Henri du Man of Belgium Strongly Impresses Unionists of Southern California.” Los Angeles Citizen, July 12, 1918. “Magnifique riposte prolétarienne au fascisme.” L’Humanité, February 13, 1934. “Manifestation Eugene Resteau.” L’Etoile belge, December 13, 1937. “Maxence Roldes abandonne les “néo-socialistes”.” Le Populaire, February 15, 1934. “M.  Elie Baussart en faveur de la constitution du Front du Travail.” Le Peuple, February 6, 1934. “M. Henri de Man est élu président du P.O.B.”, La Nation belge, May 25, 1939. “M.  Henri de Man renonce à former le gouvernement.” L’Independence belge, October 31, 1937. “M. Pierlot a formé un nouveau gouvernement d’union nationale.” La Cité nouvelle, January 6, 1940. “M. Vandervelde et M. de Man.” La Libre Belgique, July 11, 1936. “No Bolshevism in Twenty Years: Henri de Man Says State Socialism Dying Out Rapidly.” The Toronto World, March 8, 1920. “Paris ouvrière vengera la Commune de Vienne.” Le Populaire, February 17, 1934. “Pierre Renaudel condamne l’Union Nationale et l’entrée de Marquet dans le ministère Doumergue.” Le Populaire, February 11, 1934. “Pour le Plan du Travail: le rallye cycliste de la Fédération bruxelloise du P.O.B.” Le Peuple, September 10, 1934. “Quand les socialistes sont aux finances les millions et les milliard dansent.” Vers l’avenir, March 27, 1939. “Revues et livres.” La Wallonie, October 27, 1934. “Sir S. Cripps and the Crown.” The Times, January 8, 1934. “Sozialistische studiekring.” Vooruit, October 5, 1934.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

299

“Trente mille travailleurs du textile défilent dans les rues de Gand.” Le Peuple, September 19, 1938. “Un discours politique de M. de Man: démagogie et contre-verités.” La Libre Belgique, June 1, 1938. “Une conférence de Lucien Laurat.” Le Peuple, December 17, 1932. “Une déclaration de M. de Man.” Vers l’avenir, June 17, 1936. “Une déclaration de M. Marquet.” Le Temps, February 11, 1934. “Une grève générale sans précédents.” L’Humanité, February 13, 1934. “Une lettre de M. Henri Lambert sur l’économie libre: il faut découvrir la cause de la monopolisation graduelle ou de son danger.” L’Etoile belge, April 29, 1934. “Une lettre de M.  Coulonvaux, président du parti libéral, sur l’attitude des libéraux.” L’Independence belge, October 17, 1937. “Une réunion à la C.G.T.” Le Populaire, August 6, 1935. “Vote du budget 1934 – La Chambre autorise la procédure des décrets lois.” Le Temps, February 24, 1934. “Welfare Work in Industry.” Times, July 10, 1933.

Published Secondary Sources Books Abs, Robert. Emile Vandervelde, Brussels, Labor, 1973. Abs, Robert. Histoire du Parti Socialiste Belge de 1885 à 1978. Brussels: Fondation Louis de Brouckère, 1979. Abs, Robert. Histoire du Parti Socialiste Belge (1885–1960): synthèse historique. Brussels: Institut Emile Vandervelde-Fondation Louis de Brouckère, 1974. Agnelli, Arduino. Questione nazionale e socialismo: contributo allo studio di K. Renner e O. Bauer. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1959. Amzalak, Nimrod. Fascists and Honourable Men: Contingency and Choice in French Politics, 1918–1945. New York-Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Anderson, Matthew Smith. The Ascendancy of Europe: 1815–1914. London-New York: Routledge, 2013. Andreu, Pierre and Frédéric Grover. Drieu La Rochelle. Paris: La Table Ronde, 1989. Angel, Pierre. Eduard Bernstein et l’évolution du socialisme allemand. Paris: Didier, 1961. Arfé, Gaetano. Storia del socialismo italiano. Turin: Einaudi, 1965. Aron, Raymond. Les guerres en chaîne. Paris: Gallimard, 1951. Audoin-Rouzeau, Stephane and Annette Becker. 14–18: Understanding the Great War. New York: Hill and Wang, 2002. Bassett, Reginald G. 1931: Political Crisis. London: Macmillan, 1958.

300 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baudhuin, Fernand. Histoire économique de la Belgique, 1914–1939. Brussels: Bruylant, 1946. Beer, Max. History of British Socialism, 2 vols. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1929. Beilharz, Peter. Labour’s Utopias: Bolshevism, Fabianism, Social Democracy. London-New York: Routledge, 1992. Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology: On the Political Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. Glencoe: Free Press, 1960. Bergounioux, Alain and Gérard Grunberg. Le long remords du pouvoir: le Parti Socialiste français 1905–1992. Paris: Fayard, 1992. Berman, Sheri. The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Berman, Sheri. The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1998. Bernard, Georges, Denise Tintant and Marie-Anne Ridauld. Léon Jouhaux dans le mouvement syndical français. Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1979. Berstein, Serge. Histoire du Parti Radical, 2 vols. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1982. Berstein, Serge. La France des années 30. Paris: Colin, 1988. Berstein, Serge. Léon Blum. Paris: Fayard, 2006. Berti, Giampietro. Francesco Saverio Merlino: dall’anarchismo socialista al socialismo liberale. Milan: Franco Angeli, 1993. Bevir, Mark. The Making of British Socialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. Biard, Jean-François. Le socialisme devant ses choix: la naissance de l’idée de plan. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1985. Blaszkiewicz-Maison, Adeline. Albert Thomas: le socialisme en guerre, 1914–1918. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015. Bor, Michael. The Socialist League in the 1930s. London: Athena Press, 2005. Borchardt, Knut. Perspectives on Modern German Economic History and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Boyer, John W. Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in Power, 1897–1918. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Boyer, John W. Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848–1897. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. Bracher, Karl Dietrich. Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie. Stuttgart-Düsseldorf: RingVerlag, 1957. Brana, Pierre and Joëlle Dusseau. Adrien Marquet maire de Bordeaux: du socialisme à la collaboration. Anglet: Atlantica, 2001. Brana, Pierre and Joëlle Dusseau. Robert Lacoste (1898–1989): de la Dordogne à l’Algérie, un socialiste devant l’histoire. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

301

Braunthal, Julius. History of the International, 1864–1914. London: Nelson, 1966. Braunthal, Julius. Victor und Friedrich Adler: Zwei Generationen Arbeiterbewegung. Vienna: Verlag der Weiner Volksbuchhandlung, 1965. Bravo, Gian Mario. Marx e la Prima Internazionale. Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1979. Brélaz, Michel. Henri de Man: une autre idée du socialisme. Geneva: Éditions des Antipodes, 1985. Brélaz, Michel. Léopold III et Henri de Man. Geneva: Éditions des Antipodes, 1988. Brélaz, Michel. Un fascisme imaginaire. Grand-Lancy-Geneva: Éditions des Antipodes, 2000. Brooke, Stephen. Labour’s War: The Labour Party during the Second World War. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992. Bullock, Alan. The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin. 3 vols. London: Heinemann, 1960–1983. Burk, Robert F. The Corporate State and the Broker State: The Du Ponts and American National Politics, 1925–1940. Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press, 1990. Burrin, Philippe. La dérive fasciste: Doriot, Déat, Bergery, 1933–1945. Paris: Seuil 1986. Cassiers, Isabelle. Croissance, crise et régulation en économie ouverte: la Belgique entre les deux guerres. Brussels: De Boeck, 1989. Chapman, Herrick. France’s Long Reconstruction: In Search of the Modern Republic. Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press, 2018. Chlepner, Ben-Serge. Cent ans d’histoire sociale en Belgique. Brussels: Institut de Sociologie Solvay, 1956. Claeys-Van Haegendoren, Mieke. Hendrik de Man: een biografie. Antwerp: De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1972. Claeys-Van Haegendoren, Mieke. Van werken krijg je vuile handen: geschiedenis van de Belgische Werkliedenpartij, 1914–1940, Leuven, Acco 1989. Claeys-Van Haegendoren, Mieke. 25 jaar Belgisch socialisme: evolutie van de verhouding van de Belgische Werkliedenpartij tot de parlementaire democratie in Belgie van 1914 tot 1940, Antwerp, Standaard Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij 1967. Clouet, Stéphane. De la rénovation à l’utopie socialiste: Révolution constructive, un groupe d’intellectuels socialistes des années 1930. Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1991. Cohen, Gidon. The Failure of a Dream: The Independent Labour Party from Disaffiliation to World War II. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007. Cole, G.D.H., A History of Socialist Thought, 5 vols. London: Macmillan, 1953–1960. Cole, G.D.H. A History of the Labour Party from 1914. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948. Cole, Margaret. The Story of Fabian Socialism. London: Heinemann, 1961.

302 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Colonna, Nicola ed. Il socialismo riformista tra Giolitti e il fascismo: Turati, Matteotti, Rosselli. Bari: Palomar, 2005. Conway, Martin. The Sorrows of Belgium: Liberation and Political Reconstruction, 1944–1947. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Crombois, Jean F. Camille Gutt and Postwar International Finance. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011. Cross, Colin. Philip Snowden. London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1966. Dahrendorf, Ralf. Life Chances: Approaches to Social and Political Theory. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979. Dard, Olivier. Le rendez-vous manqué des relèves des années 30. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2002. De Decker, Antoine. H. de Man: een ethisch ‘socialisme’? Antwerp: De Sikkel, 1978. Delwit, Pascal. La vie politique en Belgique de 1830 à nos jours. Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2012. Dennis, Norman and Albert Henry Halsey. English Ethical Socialism: Thomas Moore to R. H. Tawney. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. Derfler, Leslie. Alexandre Millerand: The Socialist Years. The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1977. De Rosa, Gabriele. Storia del movimento cattolico in Italia. Vol. I: Dalla Restaurazione all’età giolittiana. Bari: Laterza, 1966. Docherty James C. and Sjaak van der Velden. Historical Dictionary of Organized Labor. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2012. Dodge, Peter. Beyond Marxism: The Works and Faith of Hendrik de Man. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Drachkovitch, Milorad M. De Karl Marx à Léon Blum: la crise de la social-­ démocratie. Geneva: Droz, 1954. Drachkovitch, Milorad M. Le socialismes français et allemand et le problème de la guerre, 1870–1914. Geneva: Droz, 1953. Dreyfus, Michel. L’Europe des socialistes. Paris: Complexe, 1991. Duchenne, Geneviève. Esquisses d’une Europe nouvelle: l’européisme dans la Belgique de l’entre-deux-guerres (1919–1939). Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008. Dujardin, Vincent and Michel Dumoulin. Paul Van Zeeland, 1893–1973. Brussels: Racines, 1997. Dumoulin, Michel. Spaak. Brussels: Racines, 1999. Durbin, Elizabeth. New Jerusalems: The Labour Party and the Economics of Democratic Socialism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985. Eley, Geoff. Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Falony, Robert. Le Parti Socialiste: un demi-siècle de bouleversements, de Max Buset à Elio Di Rupo. Brussels: Pire, 2006. Farber, David. The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

303

Flewers, Paul. The New Civilisation? Understanding Stalin’s Soviet Union, 1929–1941. London: Francis Boutle Publishers, 2008. Fonvieille-Alquier, François. Ils ont tué Jaurès! (31 juillet 1914). Paris: Laffont, 1968. Foote, Geoffrey. The Labour Party’s Political Thought: A History. London: Croom Helm, 1985. Frapet, David. Le socialisme selon Léon Blum. Nonette: Créer, 2003. Furet, François. Le passé d’une illusion: essai sur l’idée communiste au XXe siècle. Paris: Robert Laffont/Calmann-Lévy, 1995. Garosci, Aldo. Vita di Carlo Rosselli. Florence: Vallecchi, 1973. Gatzemann, Andreas. Hendrik de Man (1885–1953): sein Leben und Werk aus Sicht heutiger Wertediskussionen. Vienna: Novum Pro, 2009. Gay, Peter. The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein’s Challenge to Marx. New York: Collier, 1962. Gehler, Michael and Wolfram Kaiser eds., Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945. London-New York: Routledge, 2004. Gerard, Emmanuel. De Katholieke Partij in crisis: partijpolitiek leven in België (1918–1940). Leuven: Kritak, 1985. Gérard-Libois, Jules and José Gotovitch. L’an 40: la Belgique occupée. Brussels: CRISP, 1971. Getzler, Israel. Martov: A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. Glynn, Sean and John Oxborrow. Interwar Britain: A Social and Economic History. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976. Goldberg, Harvey. The Life of Jean Jaures. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962. Goldstein, Robert Justin. Political Repression in 19th Century Europe. London: Croom Helm, 1983. Graham, Bruce Desmond. The French Socialists and Tripartisme, 1944–1947. London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1965. Groh, Dieter. Negative Integration und revolutionärer Attentismus: die deutsche Sozialdemokratie am Vorabend des ersten Weltkrieges. Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1973. Gruson, Claude. Origine et espoirs de la planification française. Paris: Dunod, 1968. Harrington, Michael. Socialism: Past and Future. New York: Anchor, 1989. Harsch, Donna. German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. Haupt, Georges. La Deuxième Internationale, 1889–1914: étudie critique des sources, essai bibliographique. Paris: Mouton & Co., 1964. Haupt, Georges. Aspects of International Socialism, 1871–1914. Cambridge-Paris: Cambridge University Press and Éditions de la Maison de Sciences de l’Homme, 1986. Haupt, Georges. L’historien et le mouvement social. Paris: Maspero, 1980.

304 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Haupt, Georges. Les congrès manqué: l’Internationale à la veille de la première guerre mondiale. Paris: Maspero, 1965. Haupt, Georges. Socialism and the Great War: The Collapse of the Second International. Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1972. Heidler, Irmgard. Der Verleger Eugen Diederichs und seine Welt (1896–1930). Wiesebaden: Harrassowitz, 1998. Hellman, John. Emmanuel Mounier and the New Catholic Left, 1930–1950. Toronto-London: University of Toronto Press, 1981. Hellman, John. Knight-Monks of Vichy France: Uriage, 1940–1945. Montreal-­ Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993. Hellman, John. The Communitarian Third Way: Alexandre Marc’s Ordre Nouveau, 1930–2000. Montreal-London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002. Hennessy, Peter. Never Again: Britain, 1945–51. London: Jonathan Cape, 1992. Hess Gankin, Olga and Henry Harold Fisher. The Bolsheviks and the World War: The Origin of the Third International. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940. Heuré, Gilles. Gustave Hervé: itinéraire d’un provocateur: de l’antipatriotisme au pétainisme. Paris: Découverte, 1997. Hobsbawm, Eric J. Industry and Empire: An Economic History of Britain since 1750. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968. Hobsbawm, Eric J. How to Change the World: Reflections on Marx and Marxism. New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2011. Hobsbawm, Eric J. Workers: World of Labor. New York: Pantheon, 1984. Hoffman, Robert Louis. Revolutionary Justice: The Social and Political Theory of P.-J. Proudhon. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1972. Höjer, Carl-Hendrik. Le régime parlementaire belge de 1918 à 1940. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri, 1946. Horn, Gerd-Rainer. European Socialists Respond to Fascism: Ideology, Activism and Contingency in the 1930s. New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Hutt, Allen. British Trade Unionism: A Short History. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1962. Jackson, Julian. A Certain Idea of France: The Life of Charles de Gaulle. London: Penguin, 2018. Jackson, Julian. The Politics of Depression in France, 1932–1936. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Jackson, Julian. The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy, 1934–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. James, Harold. The German Slump: Politics and Economics, 1924–1936. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Joll, James. The Second International: 1889–1914. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1968. Jones, Bill. The Russia Complex: The British Labour Party and the Soviet Union. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

305

Jones, Harriet and Michael Kandiah. The Myth of Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945–64. Basingstoke, Macmillan 1996. Jousse, Emmanuel. Les hommes révoltés: les origines intellectuelles du réformisme en France (1871–1917). Paris: Fayard, 2017. Jousse, Emmanuel. Réviser le marxisme? D’Edouard Bernstein à Albert Thomas, 1896–1914. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007. Judt, Tony. Ill Fares the Land. London: Allen Lane, 2010. Judt, Tony. La reconstruction du Parti Socialiste, 1921–1926. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976. Judt, Tony. Marxism and the French Left: Studies in Labour and Politics in France, 1830–1981. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986. Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. New  York: The Penguin Press, 2005. Judt, Tony. The Burden of Responsibility: Blum, Camus, Aron, and the French Twentieth Century. Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998. Judt, Tony. Thinking the Twentieth Century. New York: The Penguin Press, 2012. Julliard, Jacques. Fernand Pelloutier et les origines du syndicalisme d’action directe. Paris: Seuil, 1971. Kaelble, Hartmut. Social Mobility in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Europe and America in Comparative Perspective. Leamington: Berg, 1985. Kelly, Alfred. The Popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 1860–1914. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981. Kennedy, Paul. The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914. London-­ Atlantic Heights: The Ashfield Press, 1987. Kolakowski, Leszek. Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution, 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Kolb, Eberhard. The Weimar Republic, London-New York: Routledge, 1988. Kranzberg, Melvin and Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., Technology in Western Civilization. Vol. I: The Emergence of Modern Industrial Society: Earliest Times to 1900. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Kriegel, Annie. Le pain et les roses: jalons pour une histoire des socialismes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968. Kuisel, Richard F. Capitalism and the State in Modern France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Kurgan-van Hentenryk, Ginette. Max-Léo Gérard: un ingénieur dans la cité (1879–1955). Brussels: Éditons de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2010. Landauer, Carl. European Socialism: A History of Ideas and Movements. 2 vols. Berkeley-London: University of California Press, 1959. Landes, David. The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

306 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lees, Andrew and Lynn Hollen Lees. Cities and the Making of Modern Europe, 1750–1914. New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Lefranc, Georges. Essais sur les problèmes socialistes et syndicaux. Paris: Payot, 1970. Lefranc, Georges. Histoire des doctrines sociales dans l’Europe contemporaine. Paris: Aubier, 1960. Lefranc, Georges. Histoire du Front Populaire (1934–1938). Paris: Payot, 1965. Lefranc, Georges. Visages du mouvement ouvrier français: jadis, naguère, aujourd’hui. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982. Lichtheim, George. Marxism in Modern France. New  York-London: Columbia University Press, 1966. Lichtheim, George. The Origins of Socialism. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969. Lidtke, Vernon L. The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878–1890. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Liebman, Marcel. Les socialistes belges, 1885–1914: la révolte et l’organisation. Brussels: La Revue Nouvelle-Fondation Jacques Jacquemotte-La Vie Ouvrière, 1979. Lindemann, Albert S., A History of European Socialism. New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1983. Lorenzini, Sara. Global Development: A Cold War History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. Lovell, David W., From Marx to Lenin: An Evaluation of Marx’s Responsibility for Soviet Authoritarianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Luyten, Dirk. Ideologisch debat en politieke strijd over het corporatisme tijdens het interbellum in België. Brussels, Koninkijke Academie, 1996. Margairaz, Michel. L’Etat, les finances et l’économie: histoire d’une conversion, 1932–1952, 2 vols. Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique de la France, 1991. Markwell, Donald. John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Marquand, David, Ramsay MacDonald. London: Jonathan Cape, 1977. Marquand, David. The Progressive Dilemma: From Lloyd George to Blair. London: Heinemann, 1990. Martin, Ross M. TUC: The Growth of a Pressure Group, 1868–1976. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Mazgaj, Paul. The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979. Mazower, Mark. Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. London: Penguin, 1998. McKibbin, Ross. Parties and People: England 1914–1951. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. McLellan, David. Karl Marx, His Life and Thought. London: Macmillan, 1973. McRae, Kenneth ed. Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

307

Miles, Andrew. Social Mobility in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. Miliband, Ralph. Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the Politics of Labour. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961. Miller, Susanne, and Heinrich Potthoff. A History of German Social Democracy from 1848 to the Present. Leamington: Berg, 1986. Milward, Alan, and Samuel Berrick Saul. The Development of the Economies of Continental Europe, 1850–1914. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977. Milza, Pierre. Mussolini. Paris: Fayard, 1999. Mommsen, Hans. Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat. Vol. I: Das Ringen um die supranationale Integration der zisleithanischen Arbeiterbewegung (1867–1907). Vienna: Europa-­ Verlag, 1963. Monnet, François. Refaire la République: André Tardieu, une dérive réactionnaire (1876–1945). Paris: Fayard, 1993. Morgan, Kenneth O., Labour in Power, 1945–1951. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Morgan, Kenneth O. Labour People: Leaders and Lieutenants, Hardie to Kinnock. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. Mosse, George L. Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars. New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. Müller, Jan-Werner. Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011. Müller Hofstede, Daniel. Aristide Briand und der französische Sozialismus: Die Frühzeit des Politikers, 1883–1906. Münster: Lit, 1996. Mulligan, William. The Origins of the First World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Naarden, Bruno. Socialist Europe and Revolutionary Russia: Perception and Prejudice, 1848–1923. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Nation, R.  Craig. War on War: Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left, and the Origins of Communist Internationalism. Durham-London: Duke University Press, 1989. Nemmers, Erwin Esser. Hobson and Underconsumption. Amsterdam: North-­ Holland Publishing Company, 1956. Nettl, John Peter, Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Nord, Philip. France’s New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era. Princeton-­ Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010. Orlow, Dietrich. Common Destiny: A Comparative History of the Dutch, French and German Social Democratic Parties, 1945–1969. Oxford-New York: Berghahn Books, 2002. Osterroth, Franz and Dieter Schuster. Chronik der deutschen Sozialdemokratie. Hannover: Dietz, 1963.

308 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Pasetti, Mattia. L’Europa corporativa: una storia transnazionale tra le due guerre mondiali. Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2016. Paterson, William Edgar, and Alastair Hugh Thomas. Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe. London: Croom Helm, 1977. Pelling, Henry. A History of British Trade Unionism. London: Penguin Books, 1992. Pellissier, Pierre. 6 février: la République en flamme. Paris: Perrin 2000. Peukert, Detlev J.K. The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity. London: Allen Lane, 1991. Philip, André. Les socialistes. Paris: Seuil, 1967. Philip, Loïc. André Philip. Paris: Beauchesne 1988. Phillips-Fein, Kim. Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s Crusade Against the New Deal. New York: Norton, 2010. Pierson, Marc-Antoine. Histoire du socialisme en Belgique. Brussels: Institut Emile Vandervelde, 1953. Pierson, Stanley. Leaving Marxism: Studies in the Dissolution of an Ideology. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. Pierson, Stanley. Marxist Intellectuals and the Working-Class Mentality in Germany, 1887–1912. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. Pimlott, Ben. Labour and the Left in the 1930s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. Polasky, Janet. The Democratic Socialism of Emile Vandervelde: Between Reform and Revolution. Oxford, Berg 1995. Pollard, Sidney. Britain’s Prime and Britain’s Decline: The British Economy, 1870–1914. London: Edward Arnold, 1989. Pollins, Harold. The History of Ruskin College. Oxford: Ruskin College Library, 1984. Przeworski, Adam. Capitalism and Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Puissant, Jean. L’évolution du mouvement ouvrier socialiste dans le Borinage. Brussels: Académie Royale du Belgique, 1982. Quilliot, Roger. La S.F.I.O. et l’exercice du pouvoir, 1944–1958. Paris: Fayard, 1972. Rabaut, Jean. Jean Jaurès. Paris: Perrin, 1971. Ramadier, Paul. Les socialistes et l’exercice du pouvoir. Paris: Laffont, 1961. Rapone, Leonardo. La socialdemocrazia europea tra le due guerre: dall’organizzazione della pace alla resistenza al fascismo. Rome: Carocci, 1999. Reese, John. The Algebra of Revolution: The Dialectic and the Classical Marxist Tradition. London: Routledge, 1998. Renard, Claude. La conquête du suffrage universel en Belgique. Brussels: Éditions de la Fondation Joseph Jacquemotte, 1966.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

309

Ridley, Frederick F. Revolutionary Syndicalism in France: The Direct Action of Its Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Rioux, Jean-Pierre. Jean Jaurès. Paris: Perrin, 2005. Ritschel, Daniel. The Politics of Planning: The Debate on Economic Planning in the 1930s. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Riva Sanseverino, Luisa. Il movimento sindacale cristiano dal 1850 al 1939. Rome: Cesare Zuffi Editore, 1950. Rosenboim, Or. The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. Roth, Guenter. The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany: A Study in Working-­ Class Isolation and National Integration. Totowa: The Bedminster Press, 1963. Roth, Jack Joseph. The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Rubel, Maximilien. Marx critique du marxisme: essais. Paris: Payot, 1974. Salvadori, Massimo L. Karl Kautsky and the Socialist Revolution, 1880–1938. London: Verso, 1990. Santarelli, Enzo. La revisione del marxismo in Italia: studi di critica storica. Milan: Feltrinelli, 1964. Sassoon, Donald. One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century. London: I.B. Tauris, 1996. Schevenels, Walter. Quarante cinq années: Fédération Syndicale Internationale, 1901–1945. Brussels: Éditions de l’Institut Emile Vandervelde, 1964. Schlesinger, Rudolf. Central European Democracy and Its Background: Economic and Political Group Organization. London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1953. Schneider, Michael. Die christlichen Gewerkschaften, 1894–1933. Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1982. Schorske, Carl E. German Social Democracy, 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1955. Schraepler, Ernst. August Bebel: Sozialdemokrat im Kaiserreich. Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1966. Service, Robert. Lenin: A Political Life, 3 vols. London: Macmillan 1985. Settembrini, Domenico. Socialismo e rivoluzione dopo Marx. Naples: Guida, 1974. Settis, Bruno. Fordismi: storia politica della produzione di massa. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2016. Shonfield, Andrew. Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power. London-New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Signori, Elisa ed. Fra le righe: carteggio fra Carlo Rosselli e Gaetano Salvemini. Milan: Franco Angeli, 2010. Skidelsky, Robert. Oswald Mosley. London: Macmillan, 1975. Skidelsky, Robert. Politicians and the Slump: the Labour Government of 1929–1931. London: Macmillan, 1967.

310 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sloman, Peter. The Liberal Party and the Economy, 1929–1964. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Smaldone, William. Rudolf Hilferding: The Tragedy of a German Social Democrat. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1988. Soucy, Robert. Fascist Intellectual: Drieu La Rochelle. Berkeley: University of California, Press 1979. Stearns, Peter N. Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor: A Cause without Rebels. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971. Stedman Jones, Gareth. Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion. London: Allen Lane, 2016. Steenson, Gary P. After Marx, Before Lenin: Marxism and Socialist Working-Class Parties in Europe. 1884–1914. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. Steenson, Gary P. Karl Kautsky, 1854–1938: Marxism in the Classical Years. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978. Steger, Manfred B. The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Steiner, Zara. The Lights that Failed: European International History. 1919–1933. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Stengers, Jean. Léopold III et le gouvernement: les deux politiques belges de 1940. Brussels: Duculot 1980. Sternhell, Zeev. Ni droite ni gauche: l’idéologie fasciste en France. Paris: Seuil 1983. Sternhell, Zeev, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Asheri. Naissance de l’idéologie fasciste. Paris: Fayard, 1989. Stone, Dan. Goodbye to All That? The Story of Europe Since 1945. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Strikwerda, Carl. A House Divided: Catholics, Socialists, and Flemish Nationalists in Nineteenth-Century Belgium. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. Struye, Paul and Guillaume Jacquemyns. La Belgique sous l’occupation allemande (1940–1944), ed. José Gotovitch. Brussels: Complexe, 2002. Stuart, Robert. Marxism at Work: Ideology, Class and French Socialism during the Third Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Sturmthal, Adolf. The Tragedy of European Labour, 1918–1939. New  York: Columbia University Press, 1951. Stutje, Jan Willem. Hendrik de Man: Een man met een plan. Kalmthout: Uitgeverij Polis 2018. Szporluk, Roman. Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Talmon, Jacob Leib. The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution: The Origins of Ideological Polarisation in the Twentieth Century. London: Secker & Warburg, 1980. Tanner, Duncan. Political Change and the Labour Party, 1900–1918. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

311

Telò, Mario. Le New Deal européen: la pensée et la politique sociales-démocrates face à la crise des années trente. Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1988. Thielemans, Marie-Rose. La grande crise et le gouvernement des banquiers. Essai. Brussels: Institut de Sciences Politiques, 1980. Thomas, Paul. Karl Marx and the Anarchists. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. Thomas-Symonds, Nick. Attlee: A Life in Politics. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010. Thompson, Edward P., The Making of the English Working Class. London: Gollancz, 1965. Thompson, Noel. Political Economy and the Labour Party: The Economics of Democratic Socialism, 1884–2005. New York: Routledge, 2006. Tilly, Pierre. André Renard. Brussels-Liège: Le Cri, Fondation Renard, 2005. Tilton, Timothy Alan, The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through the Welfare State to Socialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. Tomlinson, Jim. Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy: The Attlee Years, 1945–1951. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy. London: Allen Lane, 2006. Toye, Richard. The Labour Party and the Planned Economy, 1931–1951. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2003. Tranfaglia, Nicola. Carlo Rosselli: dall’interventismo a Giustizia e Libertà. Bari: Laterza, 1968. Tucker, Kenneth H. French Revolutionary Syndicalism and the Public Sphere. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Tudor, Henry and J. M. Tudor. Marxism and Social Democracy: The Revisionist Debate, 1896–1898. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Valiani, Leo. Questioni di storia del socialismo. Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1958. Van der Linden, Marcel and Jürgen Rojahn eds. The Formation of Labour Movements: An International Perspective, 1870–1914, 2 vols. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990. Van Der Wee, Herman and Karl Tavernier. La Banque Nationale de Belgique et l’histoire monétaire entre les deux guerres mondiales. Brussels: Banque Nationale de Belgique, 1975. Van Goethem, Herman. Belgium and the Monarchy: From National Independence to National Disintegration. Antwerp: University Press Antwerp, 2011. Van Peski, Adriaan M. Hendrik de Man: ein wille zum sozialismus. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1963. Vanthemsche, Guy. De werkloosheid in Belgie: 1929-1940. Berchem: EPO, 1989. Vanwelkenhuyzen, Jan. Les gâchis des années 30: 1933–1937. Brussels: Racine, 2007. Vanwelkenhuyzen, Jan. 1936: Léopold, Degrelle, Van Zeeland et les autres… Brussels: Racines, 2004. Velaers, Jan and Herman Van Goethem. Leopold III: De koning, het land, de oorlog. Tielt: Lannoo, 2001.

312 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vergnon, Gilles. Les gauches européennes après la victoire nazie: entre planisme et unité d’action, 1933–1934. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997. Verhey, Jeffrey. The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilisation in Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Verhoeyen, Etienne. La Belgique occupée: de l’an 40 à la libération. Brussels: De Boeck-Wesmael, 1994. Vincent, K.  Steven, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism. New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Vogt, Stefan. Nationaler Sozialismus und Soziale Demokratie. Die sozialdemokratische Junge Rechte 1918–1945. Bonn: Dietz, 2006. Wagner, F. Peter. Rudolf Hilferding: Theory and Politics of Democratic Socialism. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1996. Walter, Franz. Nationale Romantik und revolutionärer Mythos: Politik und Lebensweisen im frühen Weimarer Jungsozialismus. Berlin, Verlag Europäische Perspektiven, 1986. Weber, Eugen. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976. Weissman, Susan. Victor Serge: The Course is Set on Hope. London: Verso, 2001. White, Dan S. Lost Comrades: Socialists of the Front Generation, 1918–1945. Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press, 1992. Willard, Claude. Le mouvement socialiste en France (1893–1905): les guesdistes. Paris: Editions sociales, 1965. Willequet, Jacques, Paul-Henri Spaak: un homme, des combats, Brussels, La Renaissance du Livre 1975. Wohl, Robert. The Generation of 1914. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979. Wohlgemuth, Heinz. Karl Liebknecht: Eine Biographie. Berlin. Dietz, 1975. Woloch, Isser. The Postwar Moment: Progressive Forces in Britain, France and the United States after World War II. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019. Worley, Matthew. Labour inside the Gate: A History of the British Labour Party Between the Wars. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. Wullus-Rudiger, Jacques-Armand. En marge de la politique belge, 1914–1956. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1957. Young, James D., Socialism and the English Working Class: A History of English Labour, 1883–1939. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989. Ziebura, Gilbert. Léon Blum et le Parti Socialiste. Paris, Colin 1967. Actes du colloque international sur l’œuvre d’Henri de Man: organisé par la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Genève les 18, 19 et 20 juin 1973, sous la présidence du professeur Ivo Rens, 3 vols. Geneva: Faculté de droit de l’Université de Genève 1974.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

313

Book Chapters Abma, R. “The Labour Plan and the Social Democratic Workers’ Party.” In The Low Countries History Yearbook, no. 14, 154–181. Den Haag: Martinus Nijoff, 1981. Anderson, Perry. “Origins of the Present Crisis.” In Towards Socialism, edited by Perry Anderson and Robin Blackburn, 11–52. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965. Andreucci, Franco. “La diffusione e la volgarizzazione del marxismo.” In Storia del marxismo. Vol. II: il marxismo nell’età della Seconda Internazionale, edited by Eric J. Hobsbawm, 5–58. Turin, Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1979. Andreucci, Franco. “Occasioni e veicoli della circolazione delle idee socialiste.” In Il marxismo collettivo: socialismo, marxismo e circolazione delle idee della Seconda alla Terza Internazionale, 93–131. Milan: Franco Angeli, 1986. Aron, Paul. “Jaurès en Belgique.” In Jaurès et les intellectuels, edited by Madeleine Rebérioux and Gilles Candar, 267–278. Paris, Les Éditions de l’Atelier/ Éditions Ouvrières, 1994. Aron, Raymond. “Fin des idéologies, renaissance des idées.” In Trois essais sur l’âge industriel, 123–239. Paris: Plon, 1966. Baudhuin, Fernand. “Les conditions générales de l’évolution des finances publiques durant l’entre-deux-guerres.” In Institut Belge de Finances Publiques, Histoire des finances publiques en Belgique. Vol. II, 35–75. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1954. Becker, Jean-Jacques. “Paul Ramadier et l’année 1947.” In Paul Ramadier, la République et le socialisme, edited by Serge Bernstein, 221–237. Brussels: Complexe, 1990. Berlin, Isaiah. “Georges Sorel.” In Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, edited by Henry Hardy, 296–332. London: The Hogarth Press, 1979. Berstein, Serge. “La SFIO.” In Les nationalisations de la Libération: de l’utopie au compromise, edited by Claire Andrieu, Lucette Le Van and Antoine Prost, 168–194. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1987. Berstein, Serge. “Un bien étrange approche de l’histoire.” In Fascisme français? La controverse, edited by Serge Berstein and Michel Winock, 17–32. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2014. Bohy, Georges. “La période 1926–1939.” In VV.AA., Les fastes du Parti: 1885–1960, 117–143. Brussels: Parti Socialiste Belge-Institut Emile Vandervelde, 1960. Brélaz, Michel. “Henri de Man: le point de non-retour.” In 1940: België, een maatschappij in crisis en oorlog. Acta van het colloquium gehouden te Brussel van 22 tot 26 oktober 1990, edited by Dirk Martin and Alain Colignon, 347–358. Brussels: NCWO II/CREHSGM, 1993.

314 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Broadberry, Stephan, Giovanni Federico and Alexander Klein. “Sectoral developments, 1870–1914.” In The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe. Vol. II: From 1870 to the Present, eds. Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, 59–83. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press 2010. Callaghan, John. “‘Bolshevism Run Mad’: Labour and Socialism.’” In Britain’s Second Labour Government, 1929–1931: A Reappraisal, edited by John Shepherd, Jonathan Davis and Chris Wrigley, 170–184. Manchester-New York: Manchester University Press, 2011. Carreras, Albert, and Camilla Josephson. “Aggregate Growth: 1870–1914: Growing at the Production Frontier.” In The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe. Vol. II: From 1870 to the Present, edited by Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, 30–58. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Cavignac, Jean. “Les néo-socialistes dans les élections locales (1934–1939).” In VV.AA. Les néo-socialistes girondins, 191–230. Bordeaux: Institut aquitaine de sciences sociales, 1988. Cayet, Thomas. “The ILO and the IMI: A Strategy of Influence on the Edges of the League of Nations, 1925–1934.” In ILO Histories: Essays on the International Labour Organization and Its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century, edited by Jasmien Van Daele, Magaly Rodríguez Garcìa, Geert Van Goethem and Marcel Van der Linden, 251–270. Bern: Peter Lang, 2010. Cohen, Gidon. The Failure of a Dream: the Independent Labour Party from Disaffiliation to World War II. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007. Cole, Margaret. “The Labour Movement between the Wars.” In Ideology and the Labour Movement: Essays Presented to John Saville, edited by David E. Martin and David Rubinstein, 191–225. London: Croom Helm, 1979. Cole, Margaret. “The Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda.” In Essays in Labour History, 1918–1939, edited by Asa Briggs and John Saville, 190–203. London: Croom Helm, 1977. Cottrell, Philip L. “Great Britain.” In International Banking, 1870–1914, edited by Rondo Cameron and Valerii Ivanovich Bovykin, 25–47. New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Dumoulin, Michel. “Raymond De Becker et Paul-Henri Spaak.” In Raymond De Becker: itinéraire et facettes d’un intellectuel réprouvé. Edited by Olivier Dard, Étienne Deschamps and Geneviève Duchenne, 313–344. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2013. Engerman, David C. “The Rise and Fall of Central Planning.” In The Cambridge History of the Second World War. Volume III: Total War: Economy, Society and Culture, edited by Michael Geyer, 575–598. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Falter, Jürgen W. “Unemployment and the Radicalisation of the German Electorate, 1928–1933: An Aggregate Data Analysis with Special Emphasis on

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

315

the Rise of National Socialism.” In Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar Germany, edited by Peter D.  Stachura, 187–208. Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1986. Gentile, Emilio. “Paramilitary Violence in Italy: The Rationale of Fascism and the Origins of Totalitarianism,” 85–103. In War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War, edited by Robert Gerwarth and John Horne. New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Gerwarth, Robert. “Fighting the Red Beast: Counter-Revolutionary Violence in the Defeated States of Central Europe,” 52–71. In War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War, edited by Robert Gerwarth and John Horne. New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Goossens, Martine. “The Belgian Labour Market during the Interwar Period,” 417–429. In The Economic Development of Belgium since 1870, edited by Herman Van der Wee and Janne Blomme. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997. Gotovitch, José and Cécile Vanderpelen. “Fascisme, autorité, identité: valeurs des intellectuels francophones et flamands dans la collaboration,” 278–295. In Les intellectuels et l’Occupation, 1940–1944: Collaborer, partir, résister, edited by Albrecht Betz and Stefan Martens. Paris: Autrement, 2004. James, Harold. “The SPD and the Economic Depression, 1930–1933.” In Bernstein to Brandt: A Short History of German Social Democracy, edited by Roger Fletcher, 143–155. London: Edward Arnold, 1987. Julliard, Jacques. “Sur un fascisme imaginaire: à propos d’un livre de Zeev Sternhell.” Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations 39, no. 4 (1984): 849–861. Kayser, Jacques. “Le radicalisme et les radicaux.” In Tendances politiques dans la vie française depuis 1789, edited by Guy Michaud, 65–88. Paris: Hachette, 1960. Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, Ginette. “Bankers and Politics in Belgium in the Twentieth Century.” In Business and Politics in Europe, 1900–1970: Essays in Honour of Alice Teichova, 89–105. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003. Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, Ginette. “Finance and Financers in Belgium, 1880–1940,” 317–335. In Finance and Financiers in European History, 1880–1960, edited by Youssef Cassis. Cambridge-Paris: Cambridge University Press-Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme 1992. Leonard, Carol, and Jonas Ljungberg. “Population and Living Standards, 1870–1914.” In The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe. Vol. II: From 1870 to the Present, edited by Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, 108–130. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Leopold, David. “Marx, Engels and Other Socialisms.” In The Cambridge Companion to The Communist Manifesto, edited by Terrell Carver and James Farr, 32–49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Lévy-Leboyer, Maurice, and Michel Lescure. “France.” In Patterns of European Industrialisation: The Nineteenth Century, edited by Richard Eugene Sylla and Gianni Toniolo, 153–174. London-New York: Routledge 1991.

316 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Masoin, Maurice. “Les recettes publiques de 1919 à 1939.” In Institut Belge de Finances Publiques, Histoire des finances publiques en Belgique. Vol. II, 115–177. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1954. Matthias, Erich. “Kautsky und der Kautskyanismus. Die Funktion der Ideologie in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie vor dem ersten Weltkrieg.” In Marxismus Studien. Vol. II, 151–197. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1957. Monnerot, Jules. “Est-ce l’avènement du prolétariat?” In De Marx au marxisme, 1848–1948, edited by Robert Aron, 165–201. Paris: Flore, 1948. Nairn, Tom. “The Nature of the Labour Party.” In Towards Socialism, edited by Perry Anderson and Robin Blackburn, 159–217. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965. Nederhorst, Gerard M. “Het Plan van de Arbeid.” In Het eerste Jaarboek voor het Democratisch Socialisme, edited by Jan Blank, Martin Ros and Bart Tromp, 109–135. Amsterdam, Arbeiderspers 1979. Nordling, Rolph and Georges Lefranc. “L’activité sociale de Paul Desjardins.” In Paul Desjardins et les décades de Pontigny: études, témoignages et documents inédits, edited by Anne Heurgon-Desjardins, 215–222. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1964. Petzina, Dietmar. “The Extent and Causes of Unemployment in the Weimar Republic.” In Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar Germany, edited by Peter D. Stachura, 29–48. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1986. Pimlott, Ben. “The Myth of Consensus.” In The Making of Britain: Echoes of Greatness, edited by Lesley M. Smith, 129–141. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988. Poujol, Jacques. “L’entrée en politique du chrétien André Philip.” In VV. AA. André Philip, socialiste, patriote, chrétien. Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France 2005, 35–50. Rapone, Leonardo. “Il planismo nei dibattiti dell’antifascismo italiano.” In Crisi e piano: le alternative degli anni Trenta, edited by Mario Telò, 269–288. Bari: De Donato, 1979. Robert, Jean-Louis. “Paris, London, Berlin on the Eve of the War.” In Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914–1919, edited by Jay M. Winter and Jean-Louis Robert, 25–53. New  York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Rongère, Pierrette. “L’apport de Henri de Man au socialisme contemporain.” Socialisme et éthique, edited by Roger Reibel and Pierrette Rongère, 61–119. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1966. Rosanvallon, Pierre. “The Development of Keynesianism in France.” In The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations, edited by Peter A. Hall, 171–193. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Roussellier, Nicolas. “La contestation du modèle républicain dans les années 30: la réforme de l’Etat.” In Le modèle républicain, edited by Serge Berstein and Odille Rudelle, 319–335. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

317

Salsano, Alfredo. “Gli ingegneri e il socialismo. Taylorismo e planismo di fronte alla grande crisi.” In L’Internazionale operaia e socialista fra le due guerre, edited by Enzo Collotti, 1181–1216. Milan: Feltrinelli, 1985. Sassoon, Donald. “Introduction: Convergence, Continuity, and Change on the European Left.” In The New European Left, edited by Gavin Kelly, 7–19. London: The Fabian Society, 1999. Sassoon, Donald. “Introduction.” In Looking Left: Socialism after the Cold War, edited by Donald Sassoon, 1–16. London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997. Schöttler, Peter. ““La Commune ouvrière en formation ”? Georges Sorel et les Bourses du Travail.” In Georges Sorel et son temps, edited by Jacques Julliard and Shlomo Sand, 53–73. Paris: Seuil, 1985. Seyd, Patrick. “Factionalism within the Labour Party: The Socialist League 1932–1937.” In Essays in Labour History, 1918–1939, edited by Asa Briggs and John Saville, 204–231. London: Croom Helm, 1977. Stedman-Jones, Gareth. “Ritratto di Engels.” In Storia del marxismo. Vol. I: il marxismo ai tempi di Marx, edited by Eric J.  Hobsbawm, 315–354. Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1978. Strikwerda, Carl. “The Belgian Working Class and the Crisis of the 1930’s.” In Chance und Illusion: Labor in Retreat, edited by Wolfgang Maderthaner and Helmut Gruber, 279–304. Vienna-Zürich: Europaverlag 1988. Thorpe, Andrew. “Introduction.” In The Failure of Political Extremism in Inter-­ War Britain, edited by Andrew Thorpe, 1–10. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1989. Tilly, Richard. “Germany.” In Patterns of European Industrialisation: The Nineteenth Century, edited by Richard Eugene Sylla and Gianni Toniolo, 175–196. London-New York: Routledge, 1991. Winock, Michel. “Les limites de l’idéalisme historique.” In Fascisme français? La controverse, edited by Serge Berstein and Michel Winock, 33–51. Paris: CNRS Éditions 2014.

Journal Articles Alacevich, Michele. “Planning Peace: The European Roots of the Post-War Global Development Challenge,” Past & Present 239, no. 1 (2018): 219–264. Aron, Raymond. “Post-scriptum to “Au delà du marxisme”.” Contrepoint, no. 16 (1975): 161–169. Balthazar, Herman. “Henri de Man dans la “révolution avortée”.” In Revue européenne des sciences sociales: Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto 12, no. 31 (1974): 197–215. Berger, Stefan. “Democracy and Social Democracy.” European History Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2002): 13–37 Blair, Tony. “Power for a Purpose.” Renewal, 3, no. 4 (1995): 11–16.

318 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brélaz, Michel. “Henri de Man et le néo-socialisme belge.” Res Publica 18, no. 2 (1978): 251–266. Brélaz, Michel. “Le Plan du Travail suisse.” Bulletin de l’association pour l’étude de l’œuvre d’Henri de Man, no. 12 (1984): 45–66. Broeze, Frank. “Militancy and Pragmatism: An International Perspective on Maritime Labour, 1870–1914.” International Review of Social History 36, no. 2, (1991): 165–200. Brown, Kenneth D. “The Labour Party and the Unemployment Question, 1906–1910.” The Historical Journal 14, no. 3 (1971): 599–616. Brugmans, Hendrik. “Le Plan de Man et le Pays Bays.” Bulletin de l’association pour l’étude de l’œuvre d’Henri de Man, no. 12 (1984): 30–36. Caldwell, T.  B. “The Syndicat des Employés du Commerce et de l’Industrie (1887– 1919): A Pioneer French Catholic Trade Union of White-Collar Workers.” International Review of Social History 11, no. 2 (1966): 228–266. Callaghan, John. “British Labour’s turn to socialism in 1931”. Journal of Political Ideologies, 14, no. 2 (2009): 115–132. Capitini, Aldo. “Sull’antifascismo dal 1932 al 1943.” Il Ponte, no. 6 (1955): 848–854. Cayet, Thomas. “Travailler à la marge: le Bureau International du Travail et l’organisation scientifique du travail (1923–1933).” Le mouvement social, no. 228 (2009): 39–56. Claque, Monique. “Vision and Myopia in the New Politics of André Tardieu.” French Historical Studies 8, no. 1 (1973): 105–129. Colignon, Alain. “Les Jeunes Gardes Socialistes, ou la quête du Graal révolutionnaire, 1930–1935.” Cahiers d’histoire du temps présent, no. 8 (2001): 181–224. Conway, Martin. “Democracy in Postwar Western Europe: The Triumph of a Political Model.” European History Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2002): 59–84. Conway, Martin. “The Rise and Fall of Western Europe’s Democratic Age, 1945–1973.” Contemporary European History 13, no. 2 (2004): 67–88. Cuyvers, Ludo. “Was Henri de Man an Early Post-Keynesian Neo-Marxist?” Review of Radical Political Economics 47, no. 1 (2015): 90–105. De Grand, Alexandre, “‘To Learn Nothing and To Forget Nothing’: Italian Socialism and the Experience of Exile Politics, 1935–1945.” Contemporary European History 14, no. 4 (2005): 539–558. Dehan, Xavier. “Jeune Europe, le salon Didier et les Éditions de la Toison d’Or (1933–1945).” Cahiers du Centre des Recherches et d’études historiques de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, no. 17 (1995): 203–236. Dodge, Peter. “Voluntaristic Socialism, an Examination of the Implication of Henri de Man’s Ideology.” International Review of Social History 3, no. 3 (1958): 385–417. Eichengreen, Barry and Peter Temin. “The Gold Standard and the Great Depression.” Contemporary European History 9, no. 2 (2000): 183–207.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

319

Ellis, Catherine. “Letting it Slip: The Labour Party and the ‘Mystical Halo’ of Nationalization, 1951–1964.” Contemporary British History 26, no. 1 (2012): 47–71. Gates, Robert A., “German Socialism and the Crisis of 1929–1933.” Central European History 7, no. 4. (1974): 332–359. Griffiths, Richard. “Fascism and the Planned Economy: ‘Neo-Socialism’ and ‘Planisme’ in France and Belgium in the 1930s.” Science & Society 69, no. 4 (2005): 580–593. Hansen, Erik. “Decade Crisis: Social Democracy and Planisme in Belgium and the Netherlands, 1929–1939.” Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 2 (1981): 293–322. Hansen, Erik. “Hendrik de Man and the Theoretical Foundations of Economic Planning: The Belgian Experience, 1933–40.” European History Quarterly 8, no. 2 (1978): 235–257. Harmel, Claude. “Le Front Populaire contre le planisme.” Les études sociales et syndicales 11, no. 120 (1965): 2–18. Harmel, Claude. “Le marxisme de Lucien Laurat.” Est & Ouest, no. 515 (1973): 365–379. Henkens, Bregt. “De vorming van de eerste regering-van Zeeland (maart 1935). Een studie van het proces van kabinetsformatie.” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 1–2 (1996): 209–261. Horn, Gerd-Rainer. “From Radical to Realistic: Hendrik de Man and the International Plan Conferences at Pontigny and Geneva, 1934–1937.” Contemporary European History 10, no. 2 (2001): 239–265. Kasprzak, Michal. “To Reject or not to Reject Nationalism: Debating Marx and Engels’ Struggles with Nationalism, 1840–1880s.” Nationalities Papers 40, no. 4 (2012): 585–606. Kramer, Steven P. “Belgian Socialism at the Liberation, 1944–1950.” Res Publica 20, no. 1 (1978): 115–139. Kramer, Steven Philip. “Néo-socialism: the Belgian Case.” Res Publica 18, no. 1 (1976): 59–80. Lefranc, Georges. “La tentative de réunification entre le parti socialiste et le parti communiste de 1935 à 1937.” L’information historique 29, no. 1 (1967): 19–27. Lefranc, Georges. “Le courant planiste dans le mouvement ouvrier français de 1933 à 1936.” Le mouvement social, no. 54 (1966): 69–89. Lefranc, Georges. “Les conférences internationales des plans et la commission internationale des plans.” Revue européenne des sciences sociales: Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto 12, no. 31 (1974): 189–196. Maier, Charles. “Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European Ideologies and the Vision of Industrial Productivity in the 1920s.” Journal of Contemporary History 5, no. 2 (1970): 27–61.

320 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manale, Margaret. “Aux origines du concept de “marxisme”.” Economie et société: Cahiers de l’ISMEA S, no. 17 (1974): 1397–1430. McInnes, Neil. “Les débuts du marxisme théorique en France et Italie (1880–1897).” Cahiers de l’Institut de science économique appliquée 102, no. 3 (1960): 5–51. McKibbin, Ross. “The Economic Policy of the Second Labour Government, 1929–1931.” Past & Present, no. 68 (1975): 95–123. McKibbin, Ross. “Why Was There No Marxism in Great Britain?” The English Historical Review 99, no. 391 (1984): 297–331. Meynell, Hildamarie. “The Stockholm Conference of 1917.” International Review of Social History 5, no. 1 (1960): 1–25. Meynell, Hildamarie. “The Stockholm Conference of 1917.” International Review of Social History 5, no. 2 (1960): 202–225. Mouré, Kenneth. “‘Une Eventualité Absolument Exclue’: French Reluctance to Devalue, 1933–1936.” French Historical Studies 15, no. 3 (1988): 479–506. Nachtergaele, Eric-John. “Les relations Léopold III – Henri de Man (1938–1940).” Res Publica 20, 1 (1978): 21–40. Nadaud, Éric. “Les socialistes de la S.F.I.O. et l’idée de plan dans les années 1930: le cas de Jean Zyromski et de la tendance ‘Bataille socialiste’.” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 43, no. 1 (1996): 5–34. Pels, Dick. “Hendrik de Man and the Ideology of Planism,” International Review of Social History 32, no. 3 (1987): 206–229. Pels, Dick. “The Dark Side of Socialism: Hendrik de Man and the Fascist Temptation.” History of the Human Sciences 6, no. 2 (1993): 75–95. Pels, Dick. “Treason of the Intellectuals: Paul de Man and Hendrik de Man.” Theory, Culture, and Society 8, no. 21 (1991): 21–56. Pletinckx, André. “Le Parti Ouvrier belge dans la première phase de la crise économique, 1930–1933.” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 3–4 (1976): 273–327. Pletinckx, André. “Le Parti Ouvrier belge dans la première phase de la crise économique, 1930–1933.” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 1–2 (1977): 237–289. Polasky, Janet. “A Revolution for Socialist Reforms: The Belgian General Strike for Universal Suffrage.” Journal of Contemporary History 27, no. 3 (1992): 449–466. Rebérioux, Madeleine and Patrick Fridenson. “Albert Thomas, pivot du réformisme français.” Le mouvement social, no. 87 (1974): 85–97. Ridell, Neil, “‘The Age of Cole’? G.D.H. Cole and the British Labour Movement, 1929–1933.” The Historical Journal 38, no. 4 (1995): 933–957. Ruggie, John Gerard. “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” International Organisation 36, no. 2 (1982): 379–415.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

321

Sadoun, Marc. “Les facteurs de la conversion au socialisme collaborateur.” Revue française de science politique 28, no. 3 (1978): 459–487. Schoeters, Henriette. “Les interventions de crise et les collusions politico-­ financières en Belgique entre 1930 et 1940,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 3–4 (1976): 426–443. Sirot, Stéphane. “SFIO, syndicalisme et luttes ouvrières (1905–1914): des relations problématiques et volontiers distendues.” Cahiers Jaurès 1–2, no. 187–188 (2008): 87–96. Skidelsky, Robert. “Keynes, Hobson, Marx.” PSL Quarterly Review 66, no. 264 (2013): 7–19. Smith, M.L. “Ideas for a New Order in France, Britain and the Low Countries in the 1930s.” In European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period, edited by Peter M. Stirk, 149–169. London-New York: Pinter, 1989. Timperman, Sarah. “1945–1954: Le PSB s’ouvre aux classes moyennes.” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 3–4 (1998): 445–498. Tinbergen, Jan. “Hendrik de Man: Oorspronkelijk Denker.” Bulletin de l’association pour l’étude de l’œuvre d’Henri de Man, no. 13 (1985): 145–146. Van Langenhove, Fernand. “Les objectifs de la “politique d’indépendance” de la Belgique.” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire 52, no. 2 (1974): 389–403. Vanthemsche, Guy. “De Mislukking van de vernieuwde economische politiek in België voor de Tweede Wereldoorlog: de OREC (Office de Rédressement Economique) van 1935 tot 1938.” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 2–3 (1982): 339–389. Vanthemsche, Guy. “De val van de regering Poullet-Vandervelde: een ‘samenzwering der bankiers’?” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 1–2 (1978): 165–214. Vanthemsche, Guy. “L’élaboration de l’arrêté royal sur le contrôle bancaire (1935).” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, no. 3 (1980): 389–437. Verbruggen, Freddy. “Terug naar het Plan van den Arbeid.” Bulletin de l’association pour l’étude de l’œuvre d’Henri de Man, no. 12 (1984): 3–29. Vergnon, Gilles. “La dernière conférence: la conférence de Paris de l’Internationale Ouvrière et Socialiste (21–25 août 1933).” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 41, no. 3 (1994): 440–470. Vincent, K.  Steven. “Elie Halévy and French Socialist Liberalism.” History of European Ideas 44, no. 1. (2018): 75–97. VV.AA. “Sur l’œuvre d’Henri de Man: rapports au Colloque International organisé par la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Genève, les 18, 19 et 20 juin 1973, sous la présidence du professeur Ivo Rens,” Revue européenne des sciences sociales: Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto 12, no. 31 (1974). Wrench, David J., “‘Cashing In’: The Parties and the National Government, August 1931–September 1932.” Journal of British Studies 23, no. 2 (1984): 135–153.

322 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished Secondary Sources Dissertations Anthoons, Johnny. Hendrik de Man en zijn opvattingen over de parlementaire democratie. Phd thesis: Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, 1985. Biart-Gosset, Monique. Le POB et l’adoption du Plan du Travail (décembre 1933): Étude des structures et des mécanismes de décision au sein d’un parti politique. PhD thesis: Université Catholique de Louvain, 1974. Eelens, Frank. De Propaganda voor en de Reakties op Het Plan van den Arbeid (dec. 1933-1 mei 1935). PhD thesis: Rijksuniversiteit Gent, 1976. Sente, Christophe. L’évolution intellectuelle de Henri de Man du début du siècle à la crise des années 20. Dissertation: Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1988–89.

Index1

A Abetz, Otto, 235 Addison, Christopher, 189 Adler, Alfred, 67, 67n100 Adler, Max, 29 Adler, Victor, 46 Ahlberg, Alf, 136 Anseele, Edward, 53, 143n79 Anseele Jr., Edward, 139, 199n73 Antonelli, Etienne, 174 Aron, Raymond, 3, 11n29, 156n9 Asquith, Herbert Henry, 25 Attlee, Clement, 48n19, 189, 196n61, 212, 253 Auer, Ignaz, 33n61 Auriol, Vincent, 160n27, 161, 161n35, 177 B Baade, Fritz, 114 Bakunin, Mikhail, 22, 36, 38

Balabanoff, Angelica, 45 Baudhuin, Fernand, 227 Bauer, Otto, 40, 54, 105, 106, 106n29, 197 Bebel, August, 23, 27, 34, 79 Belin, René, 139, 161n36, 164, 164n52, 165, 182n123 Bergery, Gaston, 156n12, 199n73 Bernstein, Eduard, 22, 27–30, 29n45, 30n48, 32, 33n61, 35, 37n79, 50, 52, 69, 85, 94, 116 Bertrand, Louis, 127 Bevin, Ernest, 189, 209, 209n121, 209n122, 209n123, 210, 210n129 Bismarck, Otto Von, 28, 103 Blair, Tony, 1 Blanc, Louis, 35

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 T. Milani, Hendrik de Man and Social Democracy, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42534-0

323

324 

INDEX

Blum, Léon, 4n19, 7, 10, 67, 130n21, 155–157, 155n7, 156n9, 159–162, 160n27, 161n35, 165, 166, 166n55, 169, 172, 173, 176, 176n104, 177n106, 178, 180–183, 182n122, 202, 207, 254, 255, 255n44 Blume, Isabelle, 134n44, 139 Bobin, Robert, 158, 170n75 Boivin, Pierre, 162, 172, 173 Bonnier, Claude, 174 Bothereau, Robert, 139 Bottai, Giuseppe, 118n78 Bouchery, Désiré, 128 Bracke (Alexandre Marie Desrousseaux), 155n7 Brailsford, Henry Noel, 190 Branger, Jacques, 167 Briand, Aristide, 26, 27n36 Brossolette, Pierre, 161n36, 182 Brugmans, Hendrik, 70, 85, 85n78, 207 Brüning, Heinrich, 105, 123n95 Buset, Max, 70, 83, 128, 128n15, 133, 134, 139, 174, 207, 216, 234n100, 253 C Cachin, Marcel, 166 Chautemps, Camille, 165 Chiappe, Jean, 165 Citrine, Walter, 209 Clark, Colin, 189n19, 190n23, 200 Clarke, Richard W. B., 200 Clinton, William Jefferson, 2 Cole, G.D.H., 75, 75n28, 83n65, 86, 87, 87n82, 90, 118, 118n78, 119, 126, 139, 139n67, 165n53, 186, 186n7, 187, 189–197, 191n29, 192n33, 195n52, 196n60, 197n62, 197n64,

198n66, 199–206, 199n70, 199n72, 199n73, 200n75, 201n82, 203n93, 204n96, 205n104, 208–211, 208n115, 209n121, 209n123, 210n129 Cole, Margaret, 206n108 Colens, Louis, 143 Collard, Leo, 139 Compère-Morel, Adéodat, 156 Cot, Pierre, 156n12 Coulonvaux, Emile, 231 Coutrot, Jean, 167, 167n60 Cripps, John, 200, 201, 201n81, 205 Cripps, Stafford, 139, 139n67, 181n81, 186, 187, 190, 191, 195–199, 195n52, 195n56, 196n57, 196n58, 206n110, 210, 211, 253 Croce, Benedetto, 71n7, 88n90 Crosland, Anthony, 248 D Dahrendorf, Gustav, 75n26 Dahrendorf, Ralf, 252n34 Dalton, Hugh, 196n58, 205, 205n105, 209n120, 211n131, 253 Darwin, Charle, 23 Dauphin-Meunier, Achille, 139, 174 De Broqueville, Charles, 127, 145 De Brouckère, Louis, 57, 100, 128, 129, 130n21, 245 De Gaulle, Charles, 252 De Jouvenel, Bertrand, 125, 126, 139, 156n12, 167, 171n79, 171n80 De Moor, Maurice, 139 De Paepe, César, 51, 118 Déat, Marcel, 141, 141n74, 156–160, 156n9, 156n10, 156n13, 157n15, 157n17, 164, 167, 167n60, 168n62, 169–171,

 INDEX 

169n70, 170n72, 170n73, 173n93, 179, 181–183, 182n123, 182n125, 204n96 Degrelle, Léon, 219, 221, 228, 237 Deixonne, Maurice, 162 Delaisi, Francis, 135, 135n50, 174, 182n123 Delattre, Achille, 148, 231n82 Delors, Jacques, 1 Delsinne, Léon, 117n77 Delvigne, Isi, 139 Delvigne, Jean, 232n87 Desjardins, Paul, 138, 138n64 Deville, Gabriel, 23 Dolléans, Edouard, 139 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 166 Doumergue, Gaston, 141n74, 168–170, 168n63, 169n68 Dreyfus, Alfred, 43 Dreyfus, Pierre, 182, 198n66 Drieu La Rochelle, Pierre, 106n30 Dubreuil, Hyacinthe, 67 Durbin, Evan, 118n78, 189, 190n23, 211, 212, 212n138 Duret, Jean, 174 Durkheim, Emile, 20 E Ebert, Friedrich, 45 Elton, Godfrey, 207 Engels, Friedrich, 5, 23–25, 23n21, 27–29, 32, 35–37, 36n72, 39, 74 Epstein, Wolf, 163 F Fabre-Luce, Alfred, 167 Fabri, Charles, 224 Faure, Paul, 155n7, 157, 159n26, 161, 171, 173, 180, 181 Finet, Paul, 133, 139

325

Flandin, Pierre-Étienne, 168 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 43 Franck, Louis, 224, 227n65 Francqui, Emile, 228, 229 Franz Ferdinand, 43 Furet, François, 22 G Gailly, Arthur, 133, 139, 219n22 Gaitskell, Hugh, 189, 189n18, 190n23, 200, 203, 211, 253 George V, 188 Gérard, Max-Léo, 148, 148n105, 214, 217, 217n17, 221n36, 226n59 Gompers, Samuel, 71n5 Graf, Otto, 139 Gramsci, Antonio, 27n37, 97n130 Grimm, Robert, 121n91 Grumbach, Salomon, 172 Guesde, Jules, 26, 27, 45 Gurvitch, Georges, 139 Gutt, Camille, 147n96, 224 H Haase, Hugo, 45, 46, 48 Halasi, Albert, 127, 139 Halévy, Elie, 44, 90 Hansson, Albin, 119 Hauck, Henry, 182 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 43 Heimann, Eduard, 189n18, 197 Heller, Hermann, 75n26 Herriot, Edouard, 179n113 Hervé, Gustave, 65, 65n93, 66 Hilferding, Rudolf, 105n26 Hindenburg, Paul Von, 102 Hitler, Adolf, 7, 9, 100, 102, 131, 157, 233, 237, 239n127 Hobson, John A., 109n41 Hoover, Herbert, 113, 154, 154n4

326 

INDEX

Hubin, Georges, 224n46, 230 Hughes, Herbert D., 200 Huysmans, Camille, 39n84, 47, 48, 245n2 Hymans, Paul, 45, 151n115 I Irving, Dan, 46 Itard, Jean, 161n36, 163, 163n46, 164, 173, 173n91, 180n116 J Jackson, Fay, 198 James, Norah, 197, 197n64 Janson, Paul-Emile, 225–227, 226n59, 230n80 Jardillier, Robert, 160n27 Jaspar, Marcel-Henri, 221n36 Jauniaux, Arthur, 128, 130n22, 139 Jaurès, Jean, 29, 40, 43–48, 43n1, 46n9, 79, 107, 107n31, 167n60, 169 Jay, Douglas, 211, 212 Jexas (Josef Saxe), 130n21 Jospin, Lionel, 2 Jouhaux, Léon, 164, 165, 176n102, 180, 181n121 K Kant, Immanuel, 43 Kautsky, Karl, 5, 6, 9, 11, 23, 24, 26–32, 30n49, 37, 37n79, 39, 45, 50, 52, 58n63, 66, 67, 70, 77–79, 77n37, 79n43, 81, 81n55, 82, 87, 94, 95, 95n123, 105n26, 207, 254 Kayser, Jacques, 156n12 Kerensky, Alexander, 58

Keynes, John Maynard, 4n19, 17, 18, 122, 122n93, 208, 208n116 L Lacoste, Robert, 139, 165, 165n53, 178n112, 182, 253 Lafargue, Paul, 23 Lambert, Paul, 139 Landauer, Carl, 10n27, 151n114 Laroque, Pierre, 167, 182 Laski, Harold J., 195n54, 196n56 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 36, 37, 37n76 Laurat, Lucien, 109, 109n42, 109n43, 110, 110n45, 110n46, 135, 138n63, 139, 161, 162, 163n45, 164, 174, 174n94, 175, 175n98, 198, 199n73 Lavergne, Bernard, 93, 93n114 Lebas, Jean, 171, 177 Lecoq, Yves, 70, 83, 84 Lederer, Emil, 189n18 Lefranc, Georges, 135n51, 162–164, 163n43, 163n45, 174, 174–175n97, 178n112, 179, 180n116, 182n125 Leiner, A. P., 200 Lemoine, Robert J., 216, 217, 221n33, 230n78 Lenin, Vladimir, 5, 32, 34, 45, 51n27, 59, 66, 66n95, 117 Leopold III, 233, 235, 236, 238 Liebe, Max, 235 Liebknecht, Karl, 50, 51, 56, 65, 66 Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 23 Liebknecht, William, 51n26 Lloyd George, David, 188 Lorwin, Lewis L., 111, 111n49, 118n78 Luchaire, Jean, 156n12 Lueger, Karl, 34 Luther, Martin, 43

 INDEX 

Luxemburg, Rosa, 29, 39, 45, 46, 50, 51, 53n38 Lvov, Georgy, 57 M MacDonald, James Ramsay, 91, 187–191, 187n10, 195, 207 Malvy, Louis, 44 Manoilescu, Mihail, 122, 122n94 Mantoux, Paul, 174 Marin, Louis, 168 Marion, Paul, 159n25, 167, 171n80, 182n123 Marjolin, Robert, 156n9, 174, 182, 249, 249n20 Marquet, Adrien, 156, 168–170, 168n63, 169n70, 170n72, 170n75, 179, 182n123 Martin , Kingsley, 207, 207n112, 247, 248 Marx, Karl, 5, 9, 22–27, 23n22, 26n34, 29, 35–39, 36n72, 37n76, 72, 74, 77n37, 78–81, 85, 90, 94, 96, 99, 109, 207, 208 Masaryk, Thomfvas, 107, 108n35 Mellor, William, 190 Mendès-France, Pierre, 167n60 Merlot, Joseph-Jean, 230n80 Michels, Robert, 75n24 Mierendorff, Carlo, 75n26 Millerand, Alexandre, 26, 155 Mitchison, Gilbert R., 190, 199, 200 Moch, Jules, 160n27, 161n36, 164, 164n48, 172, 173, 182, 198n65, 253 Mondolfo, Rodolfo, 87, 88n88 Monnet, Georges, 160n27, 198n65 Monnet, Jean, 247 Montagnon, Barthélemy, 156, 159n24, 167, 182n123 Morrison, Herbert, 203, 205

327

Mosley, Oswald, 210 Moulin, Léo, 128 Müller, Hermann, 47, 47n15, 48 Mussolini, Benito, 32, 65, 66, 118, 122 N Naessens, Maurice, 133 Nemec, Anton, 46 Nenni, Pietro, 245, 245n4 O Oprecht, Hans, 136, 139 P Pahl, Walter, 139, 139n67, 199 Paul-Boncour, Joseph, 171n78 Pelloutier, Fernand, 31, 32 Pels, Alice, 127 Person, Harold S., 111 Philip, André, 70, 85, 90–94, 90n100, 90n101, 93n112, 93n114, 93n115, 161n36, 163, 173, 182, 188, 198n65, 198n66, 207, 248, 253 Pirou, Gaëtan, 118n78 Pivert, Maceau, 157n17 Plekhanov, Georgi, 29, 46n10 Pollak, Oskar, 136 Pommera, Marcelle, 162n42, 163 Poulet, Robert, 143, 143n82 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 35 Pugh, Arthur, 189 R Radbruch, Gustav, 75n26 Ramadier, Paul, 156, 253 Rappoport, Charles, 45

328 

INDEX

Reinhard, Ernst, 139 Renard, André, 246 Renaudel, Pierre, 47, 130n21, 156, 158–160, 159n23, 168 Renner, Karl, 40 Rens, Jef, 70, 84, 84n73, 99, 110, 110n45, 128, 139, 199n73, 221n34 Rist, Charles, 92 Roche, Emile, 154n2 Roditi, Georges, 167, 168n62, 182n123 Romains, Jules, 167 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 113, 117, 154, 175, 232 Rosenstock-Franck, Louis, 122 Rosselli, Carlo, 70, 85–90, 87n82, 87n84, 88n89, 88n90, 89n94–96, 90n97, 122n94, 136, 139, 157n17, 207 Russell, Bertrand, 41n94, 59n69 S Salvemini, Gaetano, 87, 122n94, 157n17 Sandler, Rickard, 197 Schiavi, Alessandro, 71n7 Schlosser, Heinz, 198 Schroeder, Gerhard, 2 Sembat, Marcel, 44 Serge, Victor, 65, 66 Servais, Jean, 224, 229, 229n74 Servy, Victor, 128 Séverac, Jeanà-Baptiste, 171 Simiand, François, 174 Simmel, Georg, 20 Sluyser, Meyer, 136 Snowden, Philip, 188 Sombart, Werner, 118n78 Somerhausen, Marc, 139 Sorel, Georges, 22, 30–32 Soudan, Eugène, 147, 225, 225n55

Spaak, Paul-Henri, 128, 129, 129n20, 130n21, 139, 148, 150, 150n113, 213, 218n20, 219n22, 223, 223n44, 223n45, 224n46, 226n59, 233, 234, 237n114, 253 Spinasse, Charles, 160n27 Spirito, Ugo, 118, 118n78 Spühler, Willy, 139 Sternhell, Zeev, 12, 12n30, 13, 13n33, 244 T Tardieu, André, 154, 154n4, 155, 168, 168n61 Tarnow, Fritz, 114 Tasca, Angelo, 122n94, 139, 199n73 Tawney, Richard Henry, 139n67, 77, 77n34, 87, 118, 119 Taylor, Frederich W., 60, 61, 92, 111 Theunis, Georges, 71, 147, 147n96, 229 Thomas, Albert, 57n57, 66n95, 83, 83n63, 111n49, 156, 156n10, 174 Thorez, Maurice, 177 Tillich, Paul, 75n26 Tönnies, Ferdinand, 20 Trevelyan, Charles, 190 Treves, Claudio, 86 Troelstra, Pieter Jelles, 45, 46 Trotsky, Leon, 51n27, 58n64, 66, 105n24 Truffaut, Georges, 128, 139 Tugwell, Rexford, 126 Turati, Filippo, 86, 88 V Vaillant, Édouard, 45, 46 Vallon, Louis, 167, 174, 178n111, 182, 252, 252n35 Valois, George, 32, 154n2

 INDEX 

Van Belle, François, 128 Van Zeeland, Marcel, 146n93, 232n89 Van Zeeland, Paul, 146–148, 147n96, 148n105, 151, 151n115, 151n116, 176, 201, 205, 205n104, 214, 215, 217–222, 217n18, 218n19, 219n22, 220n31, 221n37, 222n40, 225, 227, 230–233, 230n80 Vandervelde, Emile, 7, 9, 11, 37, 45, 46, 51–54, 52n31, 52n33, 53n38, 57, 57n57, 67, 70, 77, 79–82, 81n55, 94, 95, 99–101, 108n37, 117n77, 118, 118n80, 129n20, 130, 130n22, 130n24, 131, 131n25, 131n26, 131n27, 141, 141n74, 141n75, 142, 142n79, 147, 148n104, 149, 150n113, 159, 181, 197n62, 199, 207, 213, 214, 216, 216n12, 221, 221n34, 221n36, 224, 224n46, 233n92, 234, 236, 254 Varga, Eugen, 137, 138n62, 138n63, 177

Villain, Raoul, 43, 47 Vos, Herman, 128, 139, 198, 199, 199n73 W Wansbrough, George, 200 Wauters, Arthur, 100, 128, 135n50, 218n20 Webb, Beatrice, 25 Wigforss, Ernst, 119 Wilson, Woodrow, 64, 66, 66n95, 70 Wise, Frank, 190, 196 Woytinsky, Wladimir S., 114, 115n64, 139 Z Zay, Jean, 156n12 Zimmern, Alfred, 207 Zoretti, Ludovic, 174 Zweig, Stefan, 17 Zyromski, Jean, 155n7, 161–164, 173, 173n92, 177

329